[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES: WHAT ARE THEY?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
May 12, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-75
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-962CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member
Marilyn C. Owen, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
WITNESSES
Page
The Honorable Stephen R. Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large and
Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New
Independent States............................................. 8
The Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Lt. General, USAF (Retired),
President, The Scowcroft Group, Inc.; President, The Forum for
International Policy; Former Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs...................................... 34
Dr. Michael A. McFaul, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
Stanford University............................................ 37
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations...................................................... 54
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from New Jersey................................................ 58
Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich.......................... 59
Dr. Michael McFaul............................................... 64
Additional material submitted for the record:
Response to Question submitted to Ambassador-at-Large Stephen
Sestanovich by Representative Eni F.H. Faleomavaega............ 78
Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Ambassador-at-
Large Sestanovich by Chairman Benjamin Gilman.................. 80
Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Ambassador-at-
Large Sestanovich by Representative Dan Burton................. 99
RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES: WHAT ARE THEY?
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Wednesday, May 12, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The meeting will come to order.
Before we begin our business, we are saddened this morning
about the loss yesterday of our friend Admiral James ``Bud''
Nance, Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, with whom we had a great deal to do as we worked
with that Committee.
Admiral Nance had a distinguished record of service in the
Navy and in the White House. He made a special mark, however,
in his years of service as a dollar-a-year adviser to Chairman
Helms. His lifelong ties to the chairman, coupled with his
intimate knowledge and appreciation of the workings of the
national security apparatus in the executive branch, made him
all the more valuable to the entire legislative branch's
efforts to make a positive contribution to the development of
our Nation's foreign policy.
Our Capitol Hill family will miss him greatly, and our
prayers are with his wife, Mary Lyda, and his family this
morning.
We also want to offer our condolences to Bob King, a
longtime staffer on this Committee, on the loss of his father.
So please join us in a brief moment of silence in memory of
Bud Nance and in condolences to Bob King.
[Moment of silence.]
Chairman Gilman. Before we begin our hearing this morning,
I note President Yeltsin's dismissal of Prime Minister Primakov
and his government last night, further evidence of how volatile
developments in Russia can be and in our own relations with
Russia.
In the 106th Congress, the International Relations
Committee will attempt to conduct a complete review of our
relations with Russia, the impact of Russian foreign policy on
United States interests around the world and the success or
failure of our programs for democratic and economic reform in
Russia.
The Committee began that process back in March with a
hearing on Russian proliferation of technology related to
weapons of mass destruction. Today we will be seeking to
analyze Russian foreign policy and its objectives and, in so
doing, seek to better understand whether Russian foreign policy
is supportive or obstructive of our own policy. While some of
us today may see Russia as helpful to us in the diplomacy
seeking an end to the conflict in Serbia, many of us are not
certain that we fully understand Russia's long-term objectives
in the region of the Balkans or in other regions stretching
across Europe, the Middle East and Eurasia.
It is obvious, however, that all is not well in the U.S./
Russian relationship or in our own American foreign policy
toward Russia.
Let me cite some recent news analysis of U.S. policy toward
Russia. From the New Republic of March 22nd, an article by
Jacob Heilbrunn says, ``However laudable the intentions, the
result of Clinton's policies have been disastrous.''
From the National Journal of April 17th, an extensive
article by Paul Starobin, entitled ``Moscow Mirage'', states,
``The Clinton Administration sees what it wants to see in
Russia rather than what is really there.''
From the National Review of October 12th, an op-ed piece by
Dimitri Simes claims, and I quote, ``The Administration has
hopelessly botched its Russian policy.''
I have voiced some strong concerns throughout the past
year, both publicly and in correspondence with our President,
over what we have seen as a highly negative Russian foreign
policy. The President and his Administration have followed a
policy toward Russia that has provided billions of dollars in
assistance to its government directly through international
financial institutions like the IMF, through favorable debt
reschedulings, through Russian contracts with the Space
Station, and through the grant of a quota to Russia for
launches of American-made satellites.
The Administration's policy has also included working with
Russia to denuclearize Ukraine and the other Soviet successor
states that border on Russia that inherited nuclear weapons.
That policy has also agreed to demands by Russia for revisions
in arms agreements and for a growing role for Russia in the
NATO alliance.
In 1995 and 1996, our Nation did little, if anything, when
the Russian Government killed thousands of innocent civilians
in the course of a brutal and unsuccessful military operation
against separatists in the Russian region of Chechnya,
violating its commitments as a member of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe. The United States also
offered incentives to Russia to halt its sale of nuclear
reactors to Iran.
But what do we today see Russia doing as a result of this
favorable American approach to its problems and demands? First,
Russian proliferation of technology for weapons of mass
destruction to Iran and allegations that Russia has violated
U.N. sanctions on Iraq by providing arms and military equipment
to Saddam Hussein's regime;
Second, new Russian arm sales to Syria, a state sponsor of
terrorism;
Third, Russian sales of advanced weapons and military
technology to Communist China, fueling a growing military
threat to Taiwan and, potentially, to our American Seventh
Fleet that is now deployed in support of democratic governments
on the Pacific Rim;
Fourth, Russian entreaties to China and to India to join it
in a strategic triangle of some sort with the apparent goal of
undermining American leadership in unspecified ways; and,
Fifth, Russia's insistence that it be allowed to maintain its
military bases in Independent States like Ukraine and Georgia,
forcing such states to agree to treaties legalizing those bases
by simply refusing to withdraw Russian troops.
Then there is Russian manipulation of ethnic conflicts and
energy pipelines in the region of the former Soviet Union in
order to try to maintain Russian dominance over the states of
that region and to make certain future West European dependency
on Russian-controlled energy supplies.
Tomorrow morning our Committee will be holding a hearing on
diplomatic initiatives for Kosovo. We, in our Nation, should be
certain we understand what Russia is seeking by its involvement
in the diplomatic solution to the Serbian conflict and by its
possible participation in an international force for the Kosovo
region.
We also should not ignore the long-standing allegations of
corruption at high levels in the Russian Government or the
complaints among Russian democratic activists that that
corruption, the murder of Russian journalists and of the
prominent Russian democrat Galina Starovoitova, the secret
trials of environmental activists, and support of vestiges of
the Communist regime, are actually symptoms of a real lack of
democracy within Russia.
How can we truly assess Russia's future role and influence
in Serbia if we fail to consider what influence its potentially
growing presence there might have on the efforts to help
democratize Serbia someday? In fact, we should ask whether
Russian diplomacy won't simply result in a strengthening of
Slobodan Milosevic as a ruler of Serbia.
This morning we have a small, but quite qualified list of
witnesses. First, we will be hearing from the Honorable Steve
Sestanovich, our U.S. Ambassador at Large for the New
Independent States of the former Soviet Union.
We welcome you back, Mr. Ambassador.
Our second witness really needs no introduction, and we are
very pleased that he has been able to be with us today, the
Honorable Brent Scowcroft, former adviser to President Bush for
National Security Affairs and retired Lieutenant General of the
U.S. Air Force. We welcome you, General Scowcroft.
Finally, Mr. Michael McFaul, Senior Associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. We welcome Mr.
McFaul.
At this time I would like to recognize the Ranking Minority
Member, Mr. Gejdenson, for any opening remarks he might like to
offer. Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Listening to your
remarks, I am not sure whether we've gone back to the old Cold
War, or it is the new political war over foreign policy here in
Washington. I frankly felt 6 months ago when I heard the
Republicans were going to make foreign policy the campaign
issue for this year, I thought that the press had gotten its
message wrong. But clearly, by your opening remarks, by the
kind of blunders we have seen on the House floor on the
situation in Kosovo, with the Speaker slinking in at the end
and voting for the policy and the whip on the floor breaking
arms to defeat the resolution, it is clear it is going to be
very difficult to have a logical and thoughtful dialogue about
our foreign policy.
It seems to me that Russia is a big problem, and it is also
a tremendous opportunity. Sometimes, when I hear these
statements, I get a sense there is a longing for the old Soviet
Union so that it was nice and simple, we could just confront
them and hope to defeat them someday. We have defeated them.
They are in chaos, and we have to help find a way out of that
chaos, and we are not going to do it just with polemics, trying
to create blame for a situation that is inherently unstable.
It is a government that has never been a democracy. It is
not a country that had democratic institutions and then lost
them for a period of time. There were never serious democratic
institutions in the Soviet Union. There were none in Russia,
and today it is in the infancy of developing a democracy.
I come to the floor and I see amendments to cut Nunn-Lugar
funds that helped do away with Russian weaponry. We need to
find a way to engage the Russians not simply as the old Cold
War enemy; we have to find a way to work with them, to deal
with their economic and political crisis.
I think there is no question that we are trying to create
in some quarters in this Congress the kind of isolation of
Russia that was created after World War I. I don't think that
is a good move. If we want to just create a new military
adversary, then let's isolate the Russians, let's try to
increase their own paranoia, and we will be back where we
started, having missed a great opportunity to reduce the danger
in the world.
Are there lots of dangers in Russia? You can be sure of
that. When you look at people who operate nuclear power plants,
who can't pay their employees for 5 or 6 months at a time,
forget about the fissionable material; the scientists
themselves will leave in order to feed their families.
We have to come up with a dynamic policy in dealing with
Russia that encourages their good behavior where they make
profits on legitimate activities like satellite launches, and
discourages the proliferation of technology and personnel who
have the knowledge of creating more proliferation.
We have to work with them to try to build both an economic
system that we once fought, going from communism to capitalism,
but we also have to support the development of a political
system.
It doesn't take a political scientist to see what chaos
they are in today. We have to think what consequences our
actions will bring about in Russia, how do we help them get
control of dangerous technologies, get an economy where they
can afford to keep their scientists instead of having
scientists work for renegade nations around the world; and I
think we would do a better job of that if we held hearings that
were based on really achieving a policy and had fewer attacks
on the President.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Leach.
Mr. Leach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hadn't intended to
make an opening comment, but I think several observations are
in order after the last statement.
One of the great ironies and observations of congressional
politics is that the minority side is criticizing a Speaker who
supported their President and their position, and that strikes
me as awkward.
Second at issue, because the word ``Cold War'' has been
raised, is the policies that are in place having nothing to do
with who is making the policies, having nothing to do with how
one side or the other perceives those policies. But we are in
the process at this very moment of looking at a situation in
Kosovo where we may well be a thwarted United States of
America, and conceivably stalemated in such a way that we will
have raised the enmity of many around the world in the
developing world, but most poignantly, in Russia and in China.
We are in the process of looking at a ``hot war'' that we are
not doing as well in as anyone in America would like and
precipitating two new ``Cold Wars.''
That has nothing to do with any of the issues that this
Congress is talking about in how we approach Russia or China,
but simply to do with the ramifications of the hot war in
Kosovo; and we, as a Congress, have to be very cognizant of
that, and the Administration has to be cognizant of it. In
fact, it could be that the two new Cold Wars that are being
precipitated in potential may be more significant than the hot
war itself in Kosovo; and these are the ramifications of the
well-intended but perhaps counterproductive policy for which
there is no aspect of partisan observations, simply an
observation of what are the facts in the field.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. I didn't intend to say anything, but since the
discussion has been opened up, I will make a couple of
observations, Mr. Chairman.
At no time would we need bipartisan foreign policy more
than we do now, and I am one of those who profoundly regrets
that bipartisanship seems to be a rare exception these days and
strident voices of partisanship are heard in the land.
I agree with my good friend from Iowa that our relations
with Russia and our relations with China are certainly far more
important than our relations with Yugoslavia, and I also think
it is important to look beyond the daily irrational actions of
Mr. Yeltsin and to ask what happened to U.S./Russian relations
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Some of us visited the Soviet Union for many years, and
then Russia, and after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there
was an enormous amount of goodwill toward the United States. We
had a leadership delegation that visited Russia just a week or
two after the first summit between Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin
in the spring of 1993, and the reception on the Russian side
could not have been more enthusiastic, cordial and hopeful,
maybe overly hopeful.
The following year we had another leadership delegation to
Moscow. The reception was somewhat less ebullient. The third
year it was not ebullient at all, and the reason, of course, is
clear.
We had two examples before us in this century on how to
deal with defeated powers. After the First World War, we acted
in a narrow, myopic, non generous fashion, and we reaped Hitler
in the Second World War.
After the Second World War, with the Marshall Plan, we
acted in a singularly generous, farsighted, intelligent
fashion, and we reaped two generations of peace.
When the Third World war ended which, of course, was the
end of the Cold War with the defeat of the Soviet Union and the
triumph of the democracies, we had these two examples, and we
did not choose the intelligent second example.
The Russians had tremendous expectations of cooperation and
assistance and help and participation. Yeltsin and his foreign
minister were so pro-American that it was almost embarrassing
to see them publicly express their love affair with us, but
with the exception of Nunn-Lugar funds, there is very little we
did.
Now, I understand corruption in Russia probably as well as
anybody here, and I am not suggesting we should have pumped
money into Russia, but we should have provided project aid. We
should have provided specific assistance to groups. The much
maligned George Soros recommended that $4 a month would have
provided adequate retirement for Russian seniors, which would
have been a pittance. He proposed that in a Wall Street Journal
article that I still have in my office, one of the most
intelligent suggestions of the post-Soviet era never acted
upon.
I think it is not surprising that a country which was one
of the two superpowers, which was looked up to from the
Olympics to military might across the globe, feels unbelievably
frustrated, and given the very second-quality, second-rate
leadership, stumbles from crisis to crisis.
The China case, Mr. Chairman, is a bit different because I
think in a sense what is happening is China is very salutary
for those in this country--I don't include myself--who have
been very naive about China. China is showing its true colors
as a Communist dictatorship.
The Chinese leadership knows every bit as well as every
Member of this Committee that the bombing of the embassy was by
mistake, that the President and the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense and everybody else apologized. We stand
ready to make financial restitution to the families of the
victims, and we stand ready to bear the cost of rebuilding the
embassy once the time comes.
But what the Chinese Communist leadership has done was to
revert back to the most sickening characteristics of a
Communist police state, lying through its teeth to its people
and whipping up anti-Western sentiment. This is not a new
phenomenon in China. It goes back to the Boxer Rebellion and
way beyond, but I think it is important for us to sort of get
our bearings straight and not engage in internecine warfare
here, but to take a prospective look at our relations with both
China and Russia and try to make the most of the singularly
unstable and somewhat chaotic relationship and to awaken from
our dream of viewing China as a great democratically moving
ally; it is anything but that.
China has shown its true colors in the last few days, and
that lesson had to be learned by some of our policy makers,
both in and out of government.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my
full statement be made a part of the record----
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. Just make a couple of points.
We know that Sergei Stepashin has now been elevated to the
post of prime minister, and I think it bears remembering that
he is one of the chief architects of the Chechen War, which I
and many others roundly criticized, and unfortunately, there
were some within the State Department, and even our Vice
President, who compared it to the civil war in this country,
which I think was a very, very farfetched and misguided
perspective to obtain.
As a matter of fact, at that time--and this isn't a
partisan dig, and I think you know the earlier comments, not by
my friend from California, but by my friend from Connecticut, I
think it is very unfortunate to take the chairman's opening
comments, which I think were very well thought out, and to
reduce heartfelt and profound disagreements about our Kosovo
policy and policies vis-a-vis Russia, and to reduce them to
petty partisanship, I think does a disservice to honest
disagreements.
I think we need to engage in those disagreements where they
manifest themselves, in an unfettered way, knowing that where
possible--and I underscore ``where possible''--there ought to
be a bipartisanship in our foreign policy. But to do so
artificially, I think sets itself up to a policy that is not
sustainable.
I think with our Kosovo policy there are very real problems
with that policy. I find it absolutely staggering and
disconcerting that there was no plan, and apparently there is
no plan now for the 820- to 850,000 internally displaced
Kosovar-Albanians who languish and potentially are dying, but
certainly are at grave risk inside of Kosovo. I know because I
have asked from the top, Wesley Clark on down, what was the
plan. If we initiate bombing, where was the fire wall to
protect the Kosovar-Albanians, and there was no plan, and there
is no plan today.
The thought was that Slobodan Milosevic would blink early
on. The idea was to bomb for 2 days, then pause and find a
peace. Regrettably, the dictatorship has shown some resiliency
and has not blinked.
I think it is wrong and misguided to criticize the Chairman
and to reduce his comments to petty partisanship, because it is
not. There are real differences.
There are also, as Mr. Leach pointed out, some very
profound implications, however unwitting, that could manifest
themselves in the PRC, as well as in Russia. We are now, and we
have had hearings on the Helsinki Commission just recently. We
are driving a whole generation of people who haven't made up
their mind yet about NATO in the West into the hands of the
ultranationalists, and that is very, very grave. I think we
need to consider the implications as we go into the year 2000.
Mr. Leach. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Smith. I would be happy to yield to my friend.
Mr. Leach. I apologize for taking the Chair's time, but
just one observation: There are times that bipartisanship
should imply a greater amount of unity. There are also times
when the greatest reflection in world affairs of a Congress and
an American people working together is to show differences of
judgment. When all of this is over in Kosovo, I think it is
going to be extraordinarily healthy that the world is going to
see a Congress with a panoply of judgment.
Mr. Gejdenson. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Leach. It is the gentleman's time.
Mr. Gejdenson. I agree that there are lots of people on
your side and on my side who have different views.
I think some of what is happening, though, particularly
with the majority whip, Mr. DeLay, is not about a reflection--
--
Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, could I have my time----
Chairman Gilman. Gentlemen----
Mr. Smith. The point--and I don't know what the exact word
was, something about the Speaker and that he was slinking in
and voting yes. The distinguished Speaker is a totally
honorable man. I know that I was never contacted and told, you
must vote this way or that; it was a vote of conscience.
Mr. Campbell, while I disagreed with his approach, I
respected him enormously that he felt that the War Powers Act
was triggered by this and there ought to be an up-or-down vote
on this very important engagement. As we are seeing now, it is
enlarging even at a time when the Russians are indicating
Chernomyrdin and others are trying to perhaps put something
together; and perhaps our Ambassador can shed some light on
that.
We are enhancing the bombing, and maybe that is part of the
strategy, I don't know, but I assume goodwill until shown
otherwise, and I assume it of all parties.
Chairman Gilman. I am going to suggest that since our time
is limited today and we have a number of good witnesses waiting
to be heard, we will move on with our testimony.
Ambassador-at-Large Sestanovich, Special Adviser to the
Secretary of State for the New Independent States, assumed his
position in September 1997 and is responsible to coordinate
United States relations with Russia and the other states of the
former Soviet Union. Ambassador Sestanovich has served most
recently as Vice President for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Previously, he
was a Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies.
Before that, he served with our National Security Council
and with the State Department.
Ambassador Sestanovich is an old Hill hand, having worked
for Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan some years back. We welcome
Ambassador Sestanovich.
You may put your full statement in the record and
abbreviate your remarks, whichever you deem appropriate. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE STEPHEN SESTANOVICH, SPECIAL
ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE NEW INDEPENDENT
STATES
Ambassador Sestanovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
actually like to begin by saying that for Administration
witnesses nothing is more illuminating and helpful than to open
a hearing of this kind with the back-and-forth that I have just
been privileged to hear. The only thing I could think of that
would be better would be if I had the opportunity to ask you
questions for the remainder of the hour, and perhaps as a
procedural innovation we might think of that next time.
Mr. Chairman, I have a fuller statement which I would ask
to have put into the record.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection, the full statement will
be made part of the record.
Ambassador Sestanovich. I appreciate this opportunity to
discuss Russian foreign policy and Russian-American relations.
Even before the Kosovo conflict revealed deep disagreement
between Russia and the United States on this defining
international problem, Members of this Committee had raised
questions, the kind that you have raised today and others,
about the premises of our approach toward Russia. You have
asked where Russian foreign policy, for that matter Russia
itself, is headed.
Today's headlines about President Yeltsin's dismissal of
Prime Minister Primakov give rise to further questions, and I
am ready to say a few words about this situation later if you
wish.
All these are large and urgent issues on which we need a
frank and open dialogue between the Administration and the
Congress. Our success will depend on the degree to which we can
develop a common perspective, understanding, and strategy; and
I hope we can contribute to that end today.
Mr. Chairman, our dialogue should start with a recognition
of how thoroughly our relations with Russia have been
transformed in the 1990's, as some of you have noted. The first
post-Cold War decade, which is now almost behind us, has been
marked by a pattern of cooperation between Russia and the
United States that was unimaginable before the collapse of
Soviet communism. I don't need to recite the diplomatic
landmarks of this period, but they were all attended by the
closest possible communications and coordination between Moscow
and Washington.
As important as they were, however, the achievements of the
1990's did not obscure the fact that there are many in Russia
who reject partnership with the West. They have rarely been so
vocal as during the current Kosovo conflict. Some of these
critics seem motivated by frustration at Russia's weakness.
Others display outright hostility toward the United States and
democratic capitalism. Still other opponents of cooperation
with the United States seem guided by narrow economic or
bureaucratic interests, and other opposition politicians find
foreign policy issues a useful, rhetorical club with which to
beat the government.
I might note that as Russia heads toward parliamentary
elections this fall and Presidential elections in 2000, we
should expect to hear more of this kind of rhetoric.
This mix of motives and perspectives, as well as the weak
lines of institutional authority and control, can make it
difficult to say what Russian foreign policy really is. Is it
the offensive press spokesman of the defense ministry who
compares NATO to Nazis, or is it the prudent decision to keep
the number of Russian warships off the coast of Yugoslavia to a
minimum?
At a time like this, we have to keep our eye on
fundamentals, on the core interests and practical results that
we want to advance in our dealings with Russia.
Last fall in Chicago, Secretary Albright stated, ``Our most
important priority in dealing with Russia is to protect the
safety of the American people.'' In this spirit, and
recognizing how many aspects of our relations I am leaving
aside, whether it is economic issues or support for independent
media, I propose today to touch on four security challenges we
face and give you a brief assessment of the progress we are
making in addressing them with Russia.
Let me start with nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War
made possible Russian-American agreement on deeper cuts in
strategic nuclear arsenals than ever before, and both
governments are committed to negotiating further cuts.
Unfortunately, the START II treaty has become a political
football in the Russian parliament. Despite the lack of
progress toward ratification of the treaty, however, we are
active on a number of fronts to bring our arsenals into line
with post-Cold War realities. We have had expert consultations
on the shape of a possible START III agreement, which could
bring forces down by as much as 80 percent from Cold War highs.
Russian and U.S. officials have also met to implement the
agreement reached last year by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
on sharing early warning data on missile launches. We have
begun a serious dialogue on the arms control implications of
President Clinton's directive to explore limited national
missile defense.
Mr. Chairman, three-quarters of our assistance dollars to
Russia go to reduce the danger that nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction will fall into the wrong hands. The
expanded threat reduction initiative, if approved by this
Congress, will further strengthen our ability to block
proliferation threats emanating from Russia and other countries
of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. I strongly urge you to support
this program and to fully fund the Administration's $1.03
billion assistance request for Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
Mr. Chairman, Russian-American cooperation on proliferation
problems also has a strong basis in common interest; and let me
say a word about that, because we have taken some important
steps forward recently.
Our Special Ambassador, Bob Gallucci, and the Russian Space
Agency head, Yuri Koptev, have developed a work plan to address
some of our most pressing concerns about missile proliferation.
We have concluded a similar plan to enhance export controls on
nuclear technologies. American and Russian experts met last
month to begin implementation of these plans, and we will
continue to make this issue a high priority until we solve it.
Third, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the question of
Russian-American cooperation on the Kosovo problem. Until the
opening of NATO's air campaign, our approaches to this matter
had been broadly similar, including joint support of Resolution
1199 in the U.N. security council last fall. The Russian
leaders had also made clear that they would not support the use
of force by NATO, and when our military action began in March,
it produced an outburst of Russian anger and hyperbole at all
levels and across the political spectrum.
Since this initial rhetorical spasm, however, the Russian
Government has adopted a posture different from Communist and
nationalist spokesmen in two important ways. First, the
government has expressed its determination to stay out of the
conflict, providing neither military equipment nor military
intelligence. We have no information contradicting these
statements.
Second, the Russian Government has sought to identify
principles that could be the basis for a political settlement
of the conflict. In Oslo last month, Secretary Albright and
Foreign Minister Ivanov reached an agreement on all but one of
these principles. Last week in Bonn the G-8 foreign ministers
took another step forward and agreed on a full set of
principles, including deployment of a strong and effective
international security presence.
Today, a United States team led by Deputy Secretary Strobe
Talbott is in Moscow for further consultations with Foreign
Minister Ivanov and Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin,
who serves as President Yeltsin's special representative. We
welcome Russia's movement toward joining the growing
international consensus on this conflict, just as we welcome
the prospect of Russian participation in a peace keeping
force--and, I might say, participation by other countries as
well.
Mr. Chairman, our interest in working with Russia to
resolve the Kosovo crisis is but one example of an ambitious
effort to deal cooperatively with problems of European
security.
Consider the breakthrough agreement reached at the end of
March on adaptation of the CFE treaty. This hard-won result was
possible because the 30 nations around the negotiating table
focused on what they could gain by agreeing rather than on the
myriad obstacles in their way. The new agreement now provides
an impetus for Russia to withdraw its troops and munitions from
Moldova and to begin drawing down its forces in Georgia. If
Russia will take steps to fulfill commitments it has made, the
United States and others stand ready to help it deal with some
of the practical problems that are involved.
Russian-American cooperation extends to other areas, Mr.
Chairman; to Nagorno-Karabakh where our diplomats work
together; to Bosnia where our troops serve side by side.
If we are honest, we have to admit that the Kosovo crisis
has put new strains on Russian-American cooperation. Russia's
cooperation with NATO seems likely to be on hold for the
duration of the crisis, but the framework for this cooperation,
the NATO-Russia Founding Act, remains intact. So do the
interests, Russian and American, that led to its creation in
the first place. On this basis of common interest, we should
expect both sides to be making active use of this framework
once the Kosovo crisis is behind us.
Mr. Chairman, I am sometimes asked by Russian journalists
whether the U.S. Government is bothered by the apparent rise of
anti-Americanism in Russia. My answer of course is yes; if it
took hold, anti-Americanism would limit the ability of the
Russian Government to pursue our common interests. But let me
give you the second half of my answer as well.
To my mind, anti-Americanism in Russia is less about us and
more about them. It is a tool for attacking Western-style
institutions and, above all, attacking democracy itself. Looked
at from this angle, the problem actually seems a little less
hopeless, for everything that we know about Russian public
opinion suggests that support for democracy remains strong in
that country. As long as it does, support for cooperation with
the West, for integration rather than isolation, is likely to
remain strong as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions
and those of your colleagues.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sestanovich appears
in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Ambassador, what are Russia's foreign policy objectives
in the Balkans?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Their objectives, if we look at
what they say, are to end this conflict. They say that it has
to be ended on a basis that protects the territorial integrity
of Yugoslavia, and with that we can agree.
They say that they aim at a set of other objectives, like
the return of refugees, the end of ethnic cleansing, and with
those we can agree.
We can't agree on principles that will make it, or on goals
that would make it, impossible for the allies of NATO or for
other countries to actually deal effectively with the real
problems that face the Balkans.
If Russian objectives are to solve this problem in Kosovo
and instability in the Balkans more generally in a way that is
simply aimed at hampering American policy, then we won't be
able to cooperate; but if it rests on the kinds of principles
that their political leaders have said are the ones that they
are pursuing, then we have a basis to cooperate.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, with all that we have been
doing to try to help Russia directly and through multilateral
means and all that we have done to integrate Russia into
international organizations, why do we see so much anti-
Americanism among the population in Russia?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Mr. Chairman, you raise a
complicated question, and I hope that you will put that same
question to Professor McFaul later because he is an especially
careful student of it. But let me say that there are both signs
of anti-Americanism in Russia that grow out of disagreement
over, in the immediate case, the conflict in Kosovo, and that
grow out of ideological motives.
There is still a large body of support for the Communist
Party in Russia, and it is nothing if not anti-American. At the
same time, it is important to see the sources of interest and
affinity in Russian public opinion toward the West.
There was a poll that came out yesterday, Mr. Chairman,
that revealed that 60-plus percent of the Russian population
favors closer relations with the West and the United States.
One can find many different trends here. I think we have to
take this problem as we face it day by day.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, will the Administration
stand fast in refusing to increase Russia's quota for launches
of American-built satellites until the proliferation by Russia
of technology related to weapons of mass destruction to Iran
has ended?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated in my
statement, our concern about the flow of missile technology and
nuclear technology from Russia to Iran is as great as yours,
and there is no problem we have been working on more actively
over the past couple of years than this one.
We have recently developed a work plan with the Russian
authorities to try to increase control over this flow of
technology. If we are able to succeed at that, it would create
a basis for taking another look at the launch quotas that you
described. If we can't succeed at it, it will be very hard to
do that.
Chairman Gilman. One last question, Mr. Ambassador.
Russia is in default on its Soviet-era debt, its Treasury
debt, its Finance Ministry bonds, and I believe on its
Eurobonds as well. It is also close to, if not in, default to
the IMF. In fact, any new IMF loans will simply go to pay
Russia's old IMF debts.
In private business that is called check-kiting. Why should
we be supporting any further IMF loans without any new and real
economic reforms in Russia and, particularly, given Russia's
fairly negative foreign policy?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Mr. Chairman, we should support
further IMF loans to Russia only if Russia is able to do what
you describe, and that is, put together an economic reform
program that creates confidence in the fund that it will be
able to use the money well and repay it. That is why this has
been a protracted negotiation between the Fund over the past
several months, between the Fund and Russia to work through the
very strict conditionality that the Fund has imposed.
I might note that the agreement that the Fund signed with
the Russian Government, reached with the Russian Government
last month, provides for the disbursement of funds only if the
Russian Government is able to take a number of prior actions,
some of which involve new legislation to accomplish exactly
what you described, that is, more effective economic reform.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you.
Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say that I agree there will be tremendous pressure
from Capitol Hill not to increase the Soviet launches of
American satellites. Even though I think we will damage the
United States more in that process than we will the Russians.
The less legitimate business we do with Russia in the kind of
economic crisis that exists, aren't you just then increasing
the pressure on them to proliferate? So if they can't do
launching, what can they do--because that is where we are going
to punish them.
We are going to punish them in places where they are doing
legitimate business. I would say the Administration needs to
stand up to Congress and go after those sectors where they are
involved in illegal activities, trying to pressure Russia on
those.
The problem in Russia is, we all love democracy, but
democracy and economic collapse don't usually go together, and
I think what you are seeing there, the pressures on the system,
are the failure of their new freedom and economic system to
improve the life of the average Russian. Then the politics play
out, the nostalgia for the old Soviet Union where at least it
was stable and at least there were no bread lines.
So I would like you to know--if you do what you say you are
going to have to do, aren't you really encouraging the Russians
to sell more weapons, to do more proliferation?
Second, I would like to understand the assessments I have
heard on the news, that the feeling is that Yeltsin sacked his
prime minister in order to shore up his own position in the
upcoming impeachment situation. I would like you to help us
understand why it strengthens Yeltsin to sack his prime
minister.
And last, I would like to know, on Russia-Belarus unity, is
this just rhetoric to keep everybody in each country feeling
that they are still part of something bigger, or is there
potential that there would be a joining of Belarus and Russia?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Congressman, I hope it won't
surprise you to hear that I, from time to time, argue in the
discussions that we have at the State Department that we need
to stand up to Congress. So I fully endorse your recommendation
there.
Chairman Gilman. You will have to explain what that means,
Mr. Sestanovich.
Ambassador Sestanovich. I completely agree with you that
part of promoting an economic reform and recovery in Russia on
a sound basis that strengthens democracy involves promoting
legitimate business. I completely agree with you there.
Here is where we have a difficulty. It is hard for us to
say simply, there is one sector that we say is clean and
legitimate, while there is a dirty sector that goes on
unregulated and uncontrolled by the government.
Our approach has been, while encouraging what contacts we
can have with the defense industry in Russia, in promoting
responsible business practice by them, to urge the Russian
Government to get control of the dirty sector, and we need
leverage to do that. The space launch quota is one element of
that leverage, but it is in the Russian Government's interest
in many other ways to get control of that dirty sector.
Mr. Gejdenson. Let me interrupt for one second. The problem
with that theory is the Russian Government can't collect taxes.
It can't control these technologies because there is no system
of government there, and maybe there is not the will either.
But let me tell you, I would think they would have the will
to collect the taxes so they could pay their pensioners, so
they could do the things they need to. They can't do it. It
seems to me it is a wonderful theory, but it seems to me also
that there is more involved.
I hope you can answer the last two, also.
Ambassador Sestanovich. The Russian democratic experiment
is never going to succeed if one succumbs to that fatalism. We
have to work with them in order to be able to accomplish some
of these basic functions of government and of responsible
international citizenship. I mean, governments have got to be
able to control that kind of flow of technology or else they
will not survive.
Russian tax collection, by the way, is up.
We have got to do more, though, than just rely on the
commercial incentives that are available to us, even though
they are very important. That is what I mentioned, the expanded
threat reduction initiative that we have presented to the
Congress. That will help us to prevent the proliferation of
Russian expertise by employing 8,000 to 10,000 more Russian
scientists. I hope we will have your support on that.
Mr. Gejdenson. Belarus?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Quickly on Belarus, Russians
themselves will differ on whether there is just talk or
anything happening there. It is a relationship about which both
sides have very many reservations, but we watch it closely.
Particularly, we watch it as a possible conduit for the flow of
technology that we have been talking about just now.
As to President Yeltsin's change of prime ministers, he
has--as you know--an impeachment vote scheduled this week in
the Duma. He is putting another item on the table for them to
address, which is confirmation of the prime minister, and that
will force the Duma to consider which one it is going to go
ahead with.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Leach.
Mr. Leach. I certainly would like to probe further this
personal position of yours that you are an advocate of standing
up to Congress and the Administration. Let me tell you, as
someone who once worked at the Department of State, I am a very
strong advocate of the Department of State, but I am not an
advocate of the foreign policy that is being precipitated at
this time by this Department of State. It is very serious, and
I would like to read back a sentence of yours, or two
sentences.
You state, ``To my mind anti-Americanism in Russia is less
about us and more about them. It is a tool for attacking
Western-style institutions and above all democracy itself.'' I
will tell you if that is what you are saying in the Department
of State, you are misreading Russia profoundly as the
Ambassador in charge of relations with Russia.
What is happening in Russia today is a profound reflection
of Russian history and Russian attitudes toward religion.
Everybody knows that they have a circumstance of identifying
with the Serbs because of the Orthodox church. In addition, in
1941, every Russian believes, the Serbs held up the German
army, Operation Barbarossa, and by that 2-week holdup, German
tanks froze outside of Moscow 3 days before Christmas, and that
saved Moscow and possibly Leningrad. That is the principal
reason the Russians totally identify with Serbia.
It isn't escapism, that they are being antidemocratic. They
are profoundly opposed to the foreign policy of the United
States of America.
Now, there is a rationalization for that foreign policy,
and there are also reasons not to support that foreign policy,
but this type of escapist rhetoric of judgment precipitated by
the Department of State and the Congress does not represent the
highest traditions of the U.S. Department of State.
Because at the background of this were certain negotiations
at Ramboulliet led by the United States Department of State in
which an agreement was reached, but also in which threats were
precipitated. The Department of State led the movement of
suggesting if Milosevic didn't agree, we would bomb.
Milosevic didn't agree. To defend the credibility of the
United States, we then bombed.
I consider that to be an exact reversal of historic 20th
century American diplomacy first articulated by Teddy
Roosevelt, which was to speak softly but carry a big stick.
This Department of State took the reverse position. It spoke
sharply and then had to rely upon a stick that is now perhaps
becoming one of the greatest counterproductive policy mistakes
of this century.
I want to ask you, do you believe our diplomacy has served
us well? Do you believe that this is just a passing fad that is
being used as escapism in Russia? Or do you think there is the
potential here for a huge, marked difference in relationships
between the United States and Russia based upon the policy that
this Department of State has led?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Congressman, I hope you didn't
misunderstand what I meant by that remark about what is
involved in the growth of anti-Americanism in Russia. I didn't
mean to trivialize it at all or to suggest that it is escapist.
To the contrary, I think it is, in fact, a broader
phenomenon and a deeper one perhaps even than the emotions that
you suggest in tracing a sense of Russian loyalty to Serbia--to
Yugoslavia for standing up to the German invasion in 1941. That
is, there is a deep identity crisis that is being resolved in
post-Soviet Russia. It involves questions like, shall we be
democratic or not, are we part of the West or not; and those
are questions with which Russians are wrestling, have been
wrestling before this crisis and will continue to wrestle with
after this crisis.
I said, though, that it seems to me there is some reason
for confidence in the result because if the issue is ultimately
the one that I described, that is, this kind of identity
crisis, what one sees is rather strong support for a democratic
orientation. That gives us, I think, some reason to think that
beyond this particular crisis there will be grounds for common
interests between us and Russia.
I did not in any sense mean to trivialize it, and perhaps
this is just a misunderstanding of the words.
I think there is, of course, a potential for the kind of
change that you describe, that is, a breach between Russia and
America, depending on the kind of answers that are given to the
questions I mention--to these questions I have characterized as
an identity crisis. Because there is that potential is why we
are working on a cooperative relationship with Russia, why we
have pursued the integration of Russia into international
institutions and have spoken of democratic Russia as entitled
to a large and honorable place in those institutions.
I don't have anything to apologize for in pursuing and
advocating those policies, but I think they have to be based on
a realistic assessment on what is happening in Russia.
Mr. Leach. I appreciate that. My time has expired. All I
can say is that you have begged the question. The issue is the
ramifications of Kosovo policy on all of this and the public
opinion polling, of which you have chosen one part to note, is
very interesting because it has shown a remarkable turnaround
in Russia altitudes toward the United States over a two-month
period of time, a turnaround of stunning significance that will
have enormously damaging implications for U.S.-Russian
relations and, much more importantly, on the future of Russia
itself.
It appears that this Department of State did not weigh that
perhaps as much as it might have as it precipitated certain
policies that appear to be producing very fair results today.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Can I add one comment on that, Mr.
Chairman, if I might?
Of course we took those ramifications into account. Our
premise in our relations with Russia is, first, that we have
common interests and we should pursue the kind of integration
that I have described;
Second, that where we have disagreements, we can't paper
them over just because we are afraid the Russians will take it
badly. To the contrary, we have to face up to those
disagreements and pursue policies that are in our interests.
On that basis, we can have a productive relationship with
Russia.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Leach.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As we look at Russia today, what we see, it seems to me,
Mr. Ambassador, is an economic basket case and a nuclear
superpower with a deeply wounded national psyche, and that is a
rather dangerous and volatile combination.
Now, in planning policy for the post-Yeltsin era, it seems
to me we need to be conscious of the enormous positive
developments that have unfolded in Russia in the last decade.
They have a free press. They travel freely. They have access to
Western media. Practically all of the Russian leadership has
recognized the enormous importance of economic cooperation with
the West. Even General Lebed is making statements which
indicate that he is beginning to understand that Russian
economic development is inextricably intertwined with
cooperation in the West. There is a multiplicity of political
forces at play ranging from the most irresponsible of the
unreformed Communists, Zhirinovsky, to truly Western-oriented
bona fide democrats, with a small ``D.''
If you agree with this small framework, I would be grateful
if you would share with us--and I know this has to be very
preliminary--your appraisal of the change in prime minister
ship that occurred today, the likely role former Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin will continue to play with respect to the Kosovo
crisis. Since Secretary Talbott is in Moscow as we speak, and
you certainly are in close touch with him, what is Strobe
Talbott's message to Yeltsin and the Russian leadership at this
critical juncture?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Congressman, let me start with the
last one. The message at this critical juncture is we have an
opportunity, if Russia will seize it with us, to forge an
international consensus about how to deal with the Kosovo
conflict. We have a strong foundation for that consensus
created by the agreement of the G-8 foreign ministers last
week. That was an agreement on words, and now we have to see
whether we actually can extend that to an agreement on action.
Strobe Talbott's team in Moscow is looking, in following up
on these meetings during former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's
visit to Washington for the G-8 foreign ministers' meeting, at
whether we can go one level of detail deeper in understanding
whether we really do have or can forge a common approach.
We have no reason to think that Mr. Chernomyrdin's role
will change. He's been appointed by the President as a special
representative on this issue. He's not part of the government
apparatus in which Members submitted their resignations today
and all of whom are on an acting basis from this day forward.
He's President Yeltsin's representative. Deputy Secretary
Talbott met with him today and will meet with him probably
again tomorrow. We have no reason to think he will not be one
of the sources of--one of the channels of--communication on
this issue.
Of the significance of the change of prime minister ship,
it is rather hard to tell at this stage. We know Mr. Stepashin.
We don't know whether he will have a mandate to pursue
different policies from Mr. Chernomyrdin. We can look at
President Yeltsin's statement in which he expressed a
commitment to accelerate economic reform. He expresses his
dissatisfaction with the pace at which that had been pursued
recently. In addition to expressing some thanks to Prime
Minister Primakov and appreciation for the role he has played
in stabilizing the situation in Russia, he did express
dissatisfaction on this front. We may see some signs that Mr.
Stepashin, if he is confirmed by the Duma, will have a mandate
to work actively in that area, and certainly it is very
necessary.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I, too, believe like Mr. Leach--your
statement about anti-Americanism in Russia is less about us and
more about them. It is a tool for attacking Western-style
institutions and, above all, democracy. Looked at from this
angle, the problem is actually a little less hopeless. But from
my mind, I think it is a little more hopeless. I say that
because whether or not we are liked, liking someone and liking
a country collectively may be good on the short term.
Popularity should be fifth on the listing of priorities. I am
concerned there are very few benign dictatorships out there
that, if they move increasingly toward fascism or
ultranationalism or back to communism, which the Duma certainly
has indicated they are capable of doing, at home that means
more human rights abuses in the future and more aggressive
foreign policy. So that makes me more pessimistic, not less.
Again, whether or not they like us or not is less important to
me than anything else, especially those other points.
I do have a few questions. Sergei Stepashin, as I pointed
out earlier, one of the main architects of the Chechnyan war
obviously now has been raised to Prime Minister, as we have all
noted. What impact, in your view, will that have realistically
on Russian policy? It may have been a move obviously to divert
attention or perhaps bring down the Duma if they fail in
confirming him after three attempts, but what move will that
have vis-a-vis Kosovo?
Second, in China, Russian Representative Victor
Chernomyrdin has said there needs to be an unconditional halt
to NATO bombing before anything relative to peace moves
forward. What is the Administration's response to that? Has
Ambassador Collins sought to address the domestic audience in
Russia on Russian television or in any other way, or try to
give the NATO/U.S. side of things there? If you could, respond
briefly to that.
Finally, in terms of the resolution Mr. Gejdenson offered
on the floor several days ago, was that something that emanated
from the White House or the State Department? To my mind, it
was an after-the-fact confirmation or negation of the policy.
Whose idea was it?It seems to me it was a very high-risk
strategy. Frankly, Ithink ambiguity would have been the more
preferable course to take because many of us had profound
misgivings about this policy. But we were hoping it would end
tomorrow, and in no way, shape or form did any of us want to
convey to Milosevic or any of his cronies that the House was so
divided. Yet this high-risk strategy was pursued. Where did
that come from?
Mr. Gejdenson. Would the gentlemen yield? I am sure the
Ambassador doesn't know, and I can tell that you I do know. It
came from language the Senate had passed by, I think, 57 votes
a short time earlier. Frankly, we didn't believe that it would
become a big political battle with the Whip's actions on the
floor.
Mr. Smith. Again, I have heard that stated a few times
about the Whip, the Whip and the slinking in of the
distinguished Speaker of the House. Again, you belittle our
profound misgivings. I am one of those who follows this and has
followed it ever since the beginning of the war in Slovenia
when Croatia was under attack. I remember reporting to Brent
Scowcroft and speaking to him and the NSC people about my visit
to Vukovar and Osjek when they were under siege. So I have a
long-standing concern about this. To belittle that is--somehow
the Whip is saying, this was the political vote; it was not. It
was a profound disagreement with the Administration and how
they were pursuing their policy.
Again, I think you do us a great disservice when you keep
saying that. I hope you would rethink your strategy, because
this is not a political issue. This is an issue of profound
differences, and the outcome--as we are seeing, the
miscalculations that have been made are leading to a disastrous
outcome. You keep bringing this up. My question really wasn't
about the language, it was about the strategy.
Whose idea was it to go forward with this, Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Congressman, I can't add anything
to what Mr. Gejdenson said, but I can answer the other
questions that you have put.
Ambassador Collins has, in fact, been on TV talking about
this issue and has been interviewed in the newspapers. It is a
high priority of ours to make sure that our views are
understood by the Russian people.
I have seen the statement that Mr. Chernomyrdin made in
China, or after his visit to China, proposing that the bombing
has to end first before other issues are addressed. From our
point of view, that is not a realistic way of solving this
problem.
Mr. Smith. I know I am over my time, but the original
bombing strategy called for two days and a pause. I mean, we
had an opportunity during Easter celebration--you had the Pope,
eight cardinals, a cross-section of religious leaders saying,
here is a pause opportunity to try to make peace work. Isn't
this an opportunity right now?
Ambassador Sestanovich. I think the Yugoslav Government
understands very well how to seize that opportunity.
Mr. Smith. But he doesn't care--the degrading even of his
military. As long as his life and his power stay intact, the
concern is that he will allow others to do the dying. The
Kosovar Albanians, 850,000 strong, inside of Kosovo at grave
risk, they are my highest concern, and we are not reaching
them.
Ambassador Sestanovich. I am getting beyond my portfolio
here, Congressman.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me
to say one word about the other question that the Congressman
raised, which was the significance of the change of the prime
minister ship for the Kosovo policy. Our assumption is that
President Yeltsin sets Russia's direction on this issue.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thought this was a hearing on Russian foreign policy, not
on American policy toward Kosovo. I truly don't totally
understand the point of my friend from Iowa. I understand why
he thinks a policy that seems to have exacerbated that which it
was designed to contain doesn't make a lot of sense. I don't
understand the Ambassador's comments that he was not talking
about Russian reactions to American policy in Kosovo, he was
talking about a much broader question of anti-Americanism in
Russia.
I guess I want to throw out a different theory that really
isn't about hostility for Western--it is not really--the anti-
Americanism isn't necessarily an attack on democracy. It is a
feeling probably as much from what precipitated it--a
cumulation of lots of things, but as much precipitated by what
happened in August with, sort of the bottom falling out, as it
is by the Kosovo episode. It is the sum total of a belief that
we tried it their way, and look what we got. As a witness later
today says, we are the size of Denmark economically. Add to
that NATO expansion and just a whole accumulation of things,
plus politics.
There is an election coming up, which is, by the way,
something to say, in Russia. There is an election coming up
both for the Duma and for the President, and some anti-American
rhetoric now is probably good politics in the context of that
election. I think you can probably be a democrat, small ``D,''
and articulate sort of an anti-American position, and there is
nothing much we will be able to do about this for the next year
or so other than pursue sensible policies. We are still going
to get that reaction because domestic politics in Russia
requires it, and we shouldn't drive ourselves nuts, because
there is not too much we can do about it.
Ambassador Sestanovich. I think the kind of feelings of
marginalization and helplessness that you described maybe are
an important part of what we are seeing now. You are certainly
right that ``small-D'' democrats in Russia can express anti-
American anger. I would add they do it with considerable
unease, because I think they sense what it is really about--
that it is about the sort of broad political choices, the sort
of ultimate political choices about the kind of country they
are going to have and not just about policy issues.
You mentioned this ``we tried it their way'' sense of
frustration created by last August's crash.
Mr. Berman. Or created by the reforms of 1993 or
everything.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Sure. What is interesting is right
after August there was a lot of that talk; ``We tried it their
way, now we will try it our way.'' You hear that much less now
because there is a kind of realism about what the real
possibilities are in the modern world.
People in Russia across the political spectrum who look
hard at what the real options are for Russia don't kid
themselves about a third way. There is much less of such talk
now than in the early fall, and I think that is a very positive
development.
Mr. Berman. One last point, much narrower. Mr. Gejdenson,
the gentlemen from Connecticut, raised the issue on the space
launches, and I just want to praise your answer. It is crazy
not to allow space launches by an entity that is not
proliferating, that is employing a lot of people, that is doing
something that is helpful to us and helpful to American
economic interests and Russian interests? In the course of
doing that, the idea of leveraging realistic things, not
change--not total tax collections, but some of the things you
mentioned, are they putting monitors in some of these
questionable plants? Are they actually going to pass the export
control regime they have now talked about for a year and 3
months? Those specific kind of things--as part of reaching
this--the Russians have a million people, as I understand it,
that are employed in this program. There is some leverage
there.
I hope at the end of the day we get to the point where they
are doing some of the things we would like them to do on
proliferation and we are lifting the cap, because that seems to
me like the best possible outcome.
Ambassador Sestanovich. I can't improve on what you said.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, I am going to use my time to try to convey a
message and ask you maybe to convey it back to the Secretary
and to the President. Normally I would use my time to ask you
questions, but this is a very critical and unusual
circumstance.
Let me begin with a moment of background, because you don't
know me well. I happen to support the President in a large
number of his foreign policy objectives and domestic
objectives. For example, on foreign policy, I think he is
absolutely right on family planning. I think he is right to
reverse the Mexico City policy. I think he was courageous to
reach out to China. I think he was especially courageous to go
to Gaza and to stand up for some rights of people who don't
have that many people standing up for their rights.
So I don't speak from the point of view of somebody who is
a committed critic of the President, nor am I known as the most
partisan member of my party. I don't think anybody in this body
would say that. So my advice comes from a heart very worried by
what I perceive to be the Administration's choice--and here I
am afraid you said it, although I think you said it
humorously--to stand up to Congress, rather than to recognize a
coequal branch. Since that is an issue of the most tremendous
importance regarding Kosovo, I am going to take my time to
speak to it.
When the Speaker of the House failed to quash me, when the
Speaker of House failed to use his power to prevent a vote, he
was criticized by people in the Administration, and it was said
to be a sign of weakness. We heard some of that criticism today
that the Speaker was supposed to stand up to the far right and
prevent this vote from happening.
I am not far right. I am probably the most moderate
Republican in the Congress. Certainly I am in California. What
the Speaker did was to give us the right to vote, and that is
not a sign of weakness. It was a respect for the constitutional
process. His reluctance to impose his own will on the
membership was, I think, a sign of tremendous respect.
For example, in the Persian Gulf War it was similar. The
Speaker at that time, an honorable man, was Speaker Foley, and
the Minority Leader Bob Michel, when I served before, they did
not try to impose their will. They said, this is war and peace,
and in war and peace we are not going to try to establish a
party line and make you walk it.
As to pressure, there was pressure, Ambassador. There was
pressure. Talk to Dennis Kucinich about pressure on the
Democratic side. ``I know you might disagree with this war, but
for heaven's sake stick with the President on this one.'' That
was an argument that was heard on the floor of the House, and
truly it should have been left to the individuals.
The reason why the vote failed on an evenly divided vote,
213 to 213, was because the President didn't try. I think that
members of his party tried, and I know for a fact that
colleagues on this Committee tried to convince their
colleagues. But starting from an attitude that we really only
need to tell Congress what we are going to do, as opposed to we
need to get the approval of Congress as a partner, flawed the
outcome. It wasn't the President's proposal--I could have
answered Chris Smith's question--because the President said he
didn't need congressional support--because the Secretary of
State said she didn't need to come to Congress. When I asked
the Secretary of State in open hearing whether there were
hostilities in Kosovo, she refused to answer my question.
Now, there are hostilities. I know the legal consequences
of admitting that. But what she should have said is, ``Yes, and
we disagree with the War Powers Act for the following
reasons.'' But to say to a Congressman sitting on this
Committee, ``I will not answer your question as to whether
there are hostilities in Kosovo,'' is to denigrate the coequal
branch of which I am certainly the most humble and least
important Member, but, nevertheless, I am a Member.
I think that the President hurt his case measurably by
sending this letter to the House floor during the middle of the
debate, a letter that was misconstrued by people of good will
that the President was promising he would indeed get a vote
from Congress before introducing ground troops. I don't
criticize my friends for misconstruing it because I think it
was intended to be misunderstood.
But what it says when you parse it is, and I quote the
President, ``I would ask for,'' (not I would obtain)
``congressional support,'' (not congressional approval or vote)
``before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a
nonpermissive environment.'' That doesn't mean before
introducing U.S. ground troops. That means if you bomb
Yugoslavia enough, what had been a nonpermissive hostile
environment might become a quasi permissive environment.
This reliance upon torturing words was so disappointing
when what our people wanted and the Congress wanted was clear
talk, straight talk. Here it is. We are at war. Here is my case
for being at war. Support me.
If the President had tried, he would have convinced at
least one more Member, and he would have then had the approval
for the bombing. It is a direct consequence of his not trying,
in my judgment, that he suffered that blow to what he was
attempting. Our country did not suffer because our
constitutional processes worked.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Let me
say----
Ambassador Sestanovich. Might I just have one word here?
Chairman Gilman. If you wait just a moment. Let me say to
our Committee we will continue right through the voting. I have
asked one of our Members to go over and come back, and we will
continue with the testimony right through the voting period.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, I am sorry, did you want
to respond?
Ambassador Sestanovich. I wanted to say to Congressman
Campbell that he has given me the idea to say I need to clarify
what I meant by ``stand up to the Congress,'' which is I think
something that you would agree with, which is when we have a
disagreement, argue it out, say what we think. I will certainly
convey, probably without the full eloquence that you gave to
it, your message to Secretary Albright.
Mr. Campbell. Thanks very much.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome Ambassador Sestanovich to our hearing
this morning. In the real spirit of bipartisanship, I wanted to
make a statement earlier that I do associate myself with the
comments made earlier by the gentleman from California, Mr.
Lantos.
As you know, Ambassador, we had such a tremendous high when
the Berlin wall came down, and there was tremendous expectation
on the part of the world to think that now Russia is going to
be part of us, living as a free people without communistic
practices. All this has happened now after the many years that
we have tried.
I wanted to ask you, do you perceive a danger or, at least
in the Administration, a real danger of the failure on the part
of the Western industrialized nations to provide substantive
economic assistance to a former nuclear power as is the Soviet
Union? There seems to be a little repetition of what happened.
With the failure of the Allies in World War I, we ended up
really, really having the more serious situation of having to
deal with a Nazi Germany.
Do you see any real sense of nationalism happening in
Russia that will end up producing another Stalin? I sense that
we have failed on the part of the economic industrialized
nations in providing the proper economic assistance to Russia.
You had mentioned earlier that 75 percent of our own economic
assistance goes to the nuclear issues and not economic
assistance. Can you correct me on that?
Ambassador Sestanovich. No, that is what 75 percent of our
bilateral assistance to Russia is, in the area of threat
reduction, and I think it is a very good investment. However,
you should be aware that there are many other forms of
assistance that the Russian Government receives from other
countries and other institutions. From international
institutions, the Russian Government has received credits on a
very large scale. The IMF's program in Russia is now the
largest single program that it has--its indebtedness or the
credits that it has extended to Russia. The World Bank has
large programs; the EBRD also. Many countries have extended
Eximbank credits, trade credits.
Mr. Faleomavaega. What is the total? What is the bottom-
line dollar value?
Ambassador Sestanovich. I will get some better numbers than
I can give you off the top of my head.
[Ambrassador Sestanovich's response to this Question
appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Faleomavaega. Billions? Hundreds of millions?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Tens of billions, surely.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And they are still asking for more.
Ambassador Sestanovich. It is a long process, and their
economic situation is very difficult. It is very difficult
above all because--not because the level of assistance has been
inadequate, but because Russian----
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am sorry, Mr. Ambassador, but I would
like to yield to my friend from Massachusetts for a question.
Mr. Delahunt. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I think the point that my friend is making--and maybe I am
wrong--but, in the aftermath of World War II, this Nation, I
think, did something that was extraordinary, clearly it was
unpopular at the time, and that was the Marshall Plan. I think
what he is suggesting is that this didn't occur with the demise
of the Soviet Union and the aftermath of the Cold War, and
possibly we missed an opportunity.
I agree with Mr. Berman and Mr. Gejdenson, it just makes no
sense to punish the Soviet Union and punish ourselves and drive
them further into the area of proliferation.
I just have one quick question relating to Kosovo. Several
statements have been made that it was--and I just wrote this
down--the original strategy was two days and a bombing pause. I
never heard that, Ambassador. I never heard that from the
Administration. I haven't heard it anywhere. Another claim that
was made was that Milosevic would blink. I never heard anyone
from the Administration suggest that. Can you tell me, is--am I
accurate in saying that was never a pronouncement of the
Administration in terms of the crisis that we are currently
experiencing?
Ambassador Sestanovich. I am with you, Congressman. The 2
days and a pause is a formula that is unknown to me. I hope
that it is not established as retrospective in rewriting the
history of this.
Mr. Delahunt. I am really concerned that we are going to
create facts, as we often do here, by simply repeating them
often enough. I have never heard the Administration stake out
that position. If there is evidence of that, I would like
somebody to come forward and provide that documentation.
I have to leave now because I am in the midst of being on
the floor.
Chairman Gilman. We will have to recess the hearing until
Mr. Ballenger returns, when will he be taking over the chair.
The Committee stands in recess just for a few minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Ballenger. [Presiding.] I am filling in until our
leader gets back--Congressman Cass Ballenger. I am sorry I
missed substantially what you said here, and then I was just
about listening to Tom Campbell's description of his status as
far as politics is concerned, and they asked me to go vote real
quick and come back so we can keep this thing going.
But I would like to ask you what has occurred in the paper
this morning, and I think this question leads to it. During his
1992 visit to China, President Yeltsin stated that Russia
should sell China its most sophisticated weapons and so forth.
Since then Russia has sold China advanced fighter aircraft,
quiet-running diesel subs, guided missile, destroyers armed
with advanced Sunburn anti-ship missiles and so forth. In fact,
China now accounts for about 30 to 40 percent of all Russia's
arms exports. One U.S. periodical described this as China's
buying binge in Moscow and called it a message to the U.S. 7th
Fleet. Isn't Russia helping China to challenge us as far as
force projection in the Pacific Rim in the future is concerned?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Congressman Ballenger, you are
right that China has become a big customer for Russian arms
exports. You are also right that we need to look carefully when
arms transfers of this kind have the potential to affect
regional balances of power and create dangerous capabilities
that threaten our servicemen who are stationed abroad. That is
certainly the way in which we look at this problem.
I might say to you that it is our judgment that Russian
transfers have not, in fact, significantly altered Chinese
capabilities vis-a-vis our own in this region, but it is an
important issue to watch closely because one could imagine
transfers that would have that effect. For that reason, this is
an issue that we discussed with the Russians; and were we to
see the kind of trends that would have that threatening
potential, it would be a problem for us.
Mr. Ballenger. A couple more on that line. Is the United
States concerned over Russia's assistance to India in extending
the range of its missiles and over the new Russian sales of
cruise missiles to India? Did I state that properly? Is the
United States concerned about Russia's assistance to India to
extend the range of its missiles?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Let me say that we are concerned
about transfers, military transfers particularly, of
sophisticated equipment and capabilities from any direction to
India because our effort has been to--in the wake of India and
Pakistan's nuclear tests--to show that there is an
international consensus against the appearance of new nuclear
powers. I am not familiar with the particular case that you are
referring to, Congressman.
Mr. Ballenger. The sale of cruise missiles to India.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Let me see if I could leave it this
way, Congressman. I would be glad to arrange a classified
briefing for you on this subject. My understanding about the
most recent Russian transactions with the Indians in this case
is that they involved training and maintenance. Let me look
into it further, and if you would be interested in a classified
briefing, we could certainly set that up.
Mr. Ballenger. In the New York Times, April 27th, 1998,
Russia----
Ambassador Sestanovich. Often classified material.
Mr. Ballenger. Classified as far as the New York Times is
concerned. It said, ``Russia helping India to extend range of
its missiles.'' Obviously sometimes the New York Times gets
ahead of the rest of us around here. I just was curious.
Ambassador Sestanovich. They are ahead of me on this point,
Congressman, but I would be glad to look into this for you.
We have seen the press reports concerning the transfer of
rocket stages from Russia to India. The transfer of these
rocket stages was permitted by the agreement the United States
negotiated with Russia in July 1993 to resolve a 2-year dispute
over Russian plans to assist India in the indigenous production
of cryogenic rockets. The results of those negotiations were
briefed to Congress and widely reported in the press at the
time.
Pursuant to the July 1993 agreement, which was implemented
beginning in September 1994, Russia agreed to limit the
cryogenic engine contract to the transfer of seven complete
rocket-stages to India.
We have no information to indicate the Russia has not been
abiding by its agreement. Were we to obtain information to the
contrary, we would make our concerns known to senior levels of
the Russian government, and would Urge the GOR to bring its
missile exports in line with its bilateral and multilateral
missile nonproliferation commitments.
Mr. Ballenger. Let me just ask a basic, then. Russia's
ability to produce cruise missiles of some capabilities, is
that fairly common knowledge or not?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Sure. I mean, this is the old joke
the Soviet Union didn't have a military industrial complex; it
was a military industrial complex, and with capabilities across
the spectrum.
Mr. Ballenger. I am just referring to the paper stories
about India--I mean, China and Russia getting together to veto
whatever is going to go on in Kosovo and telling us to get out
immediately. How seriously do you take that, that basic threat
or effort on their part?
Ambassador Sestanovich. There is no doubt if there were to
be a U.N. Security Council resolution on Kosovo, it would have
to be accepted by the permanent Member because they all have
vetos.
Mr. Ballenger. Right.
Ambassador Sestanovich. When you find Russian and Chinese
spokesmen stating positions that are at odds with how we see
the situation and the path toward a solution, it obviously
reduces the likelihood that we are going to have consensus, a
workable consensus, in the Security Council.
As I mentioned earlier, Congressman, perhaps it was when
you were out of the room, from our point of view, what Mr.
Chernomyrdin said after his conversations with the Chinese was
unrealistic as a way of dealing with this problem. Proposing a
bombing halt before the crucial issues are resolved is simply
not the path that NATO has proposed or that will actually
address this problem.
Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Faleomavaega, you yielded a minute.
Would you like the rest of your time?
Mr. Faleomavaega. I would like to restore my time if there
is any way to.
Mr. Ballenger. Sure, be happy to.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, Mr. Ambassador, I think the Chairman alluded to
earlier about--as you had indicated--the Security Council. I
think my question is relevant because Russia is a member of the
Security Council. Will that be OK? I am just curious. As you
know, the members of the nuclear club have the absolute veto
for the Security Council wherever or whenever there are crises,
especially military involvements, and all of these are taken
into consideration. I have always been given the impression
that if there was a crisis--not just the Kosovo crisis, let's
just look at Yugoslavia as a whole with Slovenia and Croatia
and Bosnia came into the picture--I have always been under the
impression that the Security Council would be the base
organization to which nations like ours and the 19 member
nations of NATO would appeal in the United Nations to resolve
this conflict. It is a military conflict. We've got a problem
with Milosevic obviously, but then also you have to separate
the good people of Serbia or those of Serbian ancestry.
Sometimes we have a difficult time, having forgotten a little
bit about the history, why there's such a close affinity
between Russia and Serbia. That has been alluded to earlier, in
World War II they were both fighting a common enemy, and that
was Nazi Germany. I think I also understand the fact that
Serbia would never want any German to come to their turf, if
you will.
One of the successes as to why Tito was able to control
Yugoslavia was because he was not only part Serbian, but I
think he was also part Croatian. But because of that and the
strong arm of Tito, even the mighty Soviet Union couldn't come
in and take over Yugoslavia like they did Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.
My point here, Ambassador, is why wasn't the Security
Council the controlling organization of this whole crisis in
Yugoslavia? Why NATO? My understanding is that NATO is supposed
to be a defense security organization. Here is the point I am
making: Ethnic cleansing, my gosh, there is ethnic cleansing
all over the world. I can tell you about the 100,000
Melanesians or West Papua New Guineans against which the
Indonesian Government has been conducting military atrocities,
murders, killings, rapes, and all of this--it is found in West
Papua New Guinea.
My point is, does this mean that we are looking into ethnic
cleansing, perhaps having security organizations in Asia, a
NATO in Asia, a NATO in Africa, in the same way that we have a
NATO that is supposed to defend countries in Europe? Because
this is what we are leading into. I just am curious, did the
Administration consult closely with President Yeltsin of Russia
when the Yugoslavian crisis came to the front? Not just Kosovo,
but the time that Slovenia and Croatia and Bosnia came into the
picture.
Here is the concern that I raise, Mr. Ambassador. When the
North Korean crisis became nuclear, we never bothered
consulting with the South Korean leaders, and they were a
little miffed about that. In the situation with China; we went
to China; Japan also felt a little miffed about consulting with
them and expressed their concerns. So now the situation is in
Yugoslavia. I was just curious, Mr. Ambassador, had there been
close consultations by the Administration with President
Yeltsin way before the Kosovo thing ever came into being?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Absolutely, Congressman. Before the
sort of deepening of the Kosovo conflict and crisis, last
winter and spring, we consulted closely with the Russians and
worked together with them to devise a settlement to the war in
Bosnia. As I mentioned earlier, our forces served side by side
in Bosnia in SFOR now, and have for, I believe, 3 or 4 years.
The consultations between Russian and American foreign
ministries have been close. Our diplomats have participated in
the contact group which has dealt with the Kosovo issue.
President Yeltsin and President Clinton have spoken several
times since the air campaign began and many times before that
on this issue and have corresponded on the same subject
frequently.
We were cosponsors of the U.N. Security Council resolution
last fall. Our diplomats were together at the Rambouillet
negotiations. President Yeltsin, President Clinton issued a
statement on Kosovo at their summit in September in Moscow. So
there has been no difficulty in understanding each side.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Did President Yeltsin agree to the
provisions of the Rambouillet proposal to President Milosevic?
As I understand, some of those provisions were very harsh.
Ambassador Sestanovich. We did not have full agreement with
the Russians at Rambouillet.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I will try
the next round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Cooksey.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome to the Committee. I'll try not to
beat up on people from the State Department, and I will not
raise the ``K'' word in our discussions today. I believe in the
basic goodness of people and the Russian people, but Russia has
changed. The former Soviet Republic no longer exists because of
a flaw in economic policy and political policy. But whatever
the reasons, it is important, I feel very strong, that we
should have good relations with Russia, and I think we could do
it on a people-to-people basis.
I happen to believe that the leaders of too many
governments, the Russian Government, our government probably
and some other governments, have a lot of flawed leaders, and
our systems don't always put the best and the brightest there.
But in this era in which television is the medium, the person
who gets there is the person who stands up on top of a tank and
gives a speech, even though he has, maybe, a brain that is
pickled by whatever. Or someone becomes a leader because he
gives one speech and makes one statement in the province--and I
will not use the ``K'' word--and he becomes the leader of
Yugoslavia. That even happens today and probably in this
country.
But still, accepting those premises, my question is who
dictates Russian foreign policy toward the United States? Who
dictates Russian foreign policy toward China? Who dictates
Western foreign policy toward Western Europe? And who dictates
Russian foreign policy toward the former Soviet Republics?
Now, and as an adjunct to that, I would like to know who
dictates U.S. foreign policy toward Russia? How do you arrive
at your foreign policy conclusions? Now, that is the first
question.
Second question, there was a book that was published this
year called ``The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage, Espionage in
the United States during the Stalin Period,'' and it was based
on, as I am sure the period that an American writer or Russian
writer had access to the KGB files in 1992. These files
indicated that Alger Hiss was guilty, the Rosenbergs were
guilty, a member of the State Department or more than one were
spying for the Soviet Union, and even a Member of Congress from
New York State was spying for the Soviet Union.
My question is, what is the State Department doing to make
sure that you don't have someone that is spying for Russia
today? The reason I ask that question is, do people in the
Russian Government, whoever these people are that are dictating
Russian foreign policy, do they know what our foreign policy is
before Members of Congress? Do they know it because of their
espionage, or do they know it because they are in this hearing
room? I don't think this is the best place to learn what our
foreign policy is going to be, but I am sure there are people
here.
One of my great games that I play in this room is that I
try to pick out who from the country being discussed is here
representing that country. I already picked out about three
people here that I assume are working for the Russian
Government. But I won't put them on the spot.
But, anyway, if you could answer those questions, I would
appreciate it, and hopefully that will----
Mr. Sestanovich. I hope there are some Russian diplomats
here and others as well. I would hate to think that they have
something better to do than to listen to our discussions. But I
can assure you that the State Department spends a lot of effort
at internal security measures to make sure that the people who
work for us are security-conscious, could carefully control the
information that is available to us that involves national
security interests, and that only the people who should have
access to that information do, and that only the people who
should be working at the State Department do. But if you are
interested in a fuller discussion of that question, I can
arrange for it.
The other question you asked is who dictates Russian
foreign policy, and then you added as an aside, who dictates
our policy. I think probably the word that would make it hard
to answer that is ``dictates,'' because I think both processes
are much more diffuse and pluralist than the word ``dictate''
would allow.
The letter of the Russian Constitution gives the President
the authority over foreign policy, but he has a lot of people
who work for him. He has a foreign ministry, a defense
ministry, an intelligence apparatus, a security council, a
personal staff, and all of those institutions, and people have
an influence. In addition, there is a Parliament that has its
prerogatives, not so different from those in other countries,
involving budgetary oversight.
Mr. Cooksey. Is their level of sophistication greater than
this country or less or----
Mr. Sestanovich. Their congressional staffs are not as big.
I let you draw your own conclusions from that.
On the question of where our policy toward Russia,
countries of the former Soviet Union and other countries comes
from, it comes from a rather broad and open process of the same
sort, which is ultimately, under the President of the United
States.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Steve.
First, about some of the points that Tom Campbell made
earlier, and some of the things that we have been having to
endure from the media as of late, and just to reaffirm, those
of us who are elected by our constituents believe that our
Constitution requires that the Congress play a significant role
in determining foreign policy, especially the involving of the
United States of America in a war. Clearly the founders of our
Republic wanted the Congress to be involved in that and did not
see that the President of the United States as an individual
had the powers of a king in engaging the new country or the
United States of America in a war.
We had gotten through that, and we spent hundreds of years
under the rule of a king, and that is not what we have now.
During the Cold War we permitted certain leeway and certain
centralization of power to happen in the United States of
America, and the Cold War is over. I think this is the process,
what we see now, and some of the friction going on is a process
in the shaking out and the redistribution of that power again
after the Cold War.
Now, on to some specifics, and I am sorry I was not here
earlier. I am the Chairman of the Space and Aeronautics
Committee, and I had an important hearing about the
implications of Y2K on our space program and whether or not
there will be some major problems. But as the Chairman of that
Subcommittee, I have been deeply involved with the effort to
cooperate with our former enemies in Russia who are now our
potential friends in the space effort.
Let me ask you this: I was not here to hear you say this,
but is it my understanding that you suggested that Russia is
not involved in proliferating weapons, missiles and other
technology?
Mr. Sestanovich. I don't think I could have said anything
of the sort, Congressman. What I said is that the flow of
missile technology from Russia to other countries and
particularly to Iran is one of our greatest concerns, and
something we have spent an immense amount of time and effort
trying to get the Russian Government to address and control.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Fine. Because I heard another Member make
a suggestion that you had indicated that.
Mr. Sestanovich. Please give me his name, and I will try to
straighten him out.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now as to this situation in the Balkans,
from what I understand, Curt Weldon, when he went there with
the delegation of the Members of Congress to negotiate with the
members of the Duma, reached a compromise solution with the
members of the Duma and were about to underscore the importance
of that kind of cooperation when they were informed that they
should not go to Serbia and to Belgrade because Jesse Jackson's
mission had been a failure and that the prisoners were not
going to be released, and thus they were encouraged by the
Administration to abort that part of their plan which was to go
forward together, members of the Duma and Congress, to
Belgrade, receive the prisoners, and announce to the world that
there is an option that we have reached some sort of a
potential breakthrough for a peace proposal.
Why did the Administration suggest to Congressman Weldon
that the prisoners were not going to be released and try to
discourage him from going to Belgrade?
Mr. Sestanovich. I spoke to Congressman Weldon a couple of
times about this question, and I am a little surprised by your
recollection of it, and I will tell you why. We had a
discussion, he and I, when he was in Vienna in the middle of
his discussions with the Duma-Congress group that was there,
the kind of contact that, by the way, we think is very
positive.
Congressman Weldon said to me that he had been given some
vague statements from someone representing himself as an
emissary of President Milosevic indicating that it might be
possible to release prisoners if they visited. But he said he
had no intention of going unless there was a public statement
that there would, in fact, be a release of these prisoners so
that he wasn't subject to the kind of bait and switch tactics
that we have seen used by President Milosevic sometime in the
past. I thought that seemed like a very good approach.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So your answer is that the Administration
did not discourage Mr. Weldon.
Mr. Sestanovich. I thought we left it when we talked was
that his approach of insisting on a public statement that would
get him--would put President Milosevic on the record about an
intention to release prisoners seemed like a good protection
for him. But if your question is broader than this as to
whether it seemed like a good idea to get involved in
negotiations with President Milosevic, that did not seem
advisable. But on the question of prisoners, Congressman Weldon
seemed rather aware of the risks involved in going without firm
assurances.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I understand from Mr. Weldon that they had
agreed after negotiations with the Duma that Russians could
agree, and the Serbians who were present said that this would
probably be acceptable and were on the telephone in
communications with Mr. Milosevic, that instead of having NATO
peace keepers as we were demanding, they would accept non-NATO
peace keepers, the United Nations peace keepers, and they would
be armed, and there would be autonomy for Kosovo. Just from a
distance, it appears that the Administration is moving toward
that position at this moment.
Is this correct? I mean, are we moving toward the point
where we could now accept,--instead of the NATO peace keepers,
U.N. peace keepers as Mr. Weldon negotiated in Vienna?
Mr. Sestanovich. Our view and that of the NATO Alliance has
been that the only kind of peace keeping force that will solve
the problem of creating enough confidence for refugees to
return is one that has NATO at its core, and that is an
unchanged position.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, we have been watching television in the
last couple of days, and we have seen Mr. Chernomyrdin--I never
can pronounce those Russian names.
Mr. Sestanovich. Chernomyrdin.
Mr. Burton. Yes. Come back from China and say that they and
the Chinese are of one mind that the United States and the NATO
allies should stop the bombing and pull out of Kosovo. Now,
with the upheaval that is taking place with Mr. Yeltsin firing
Mr. Primakov and other members of the Cabinet, one wonders, if
there might be a destabling influence in Russia that could lead
to open hostilities. In other words, the Russians have been
long-time allies of the Serbs. They told us and the Chinese
have said you need to stop bombing and get out of there. They
put a Russian trawler out there in the sea for intelligence
purposes, we understand. Now you have this upheaval there in
the hierarchy in Russia. I just would like to have your opinion
as to whether or not you think this could lead to some direct
or more involvement by Russia and possibly China in the Kosovo
issue if we don't adhere to their wishes.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Congressman, President Yeltsin has
made some very strong statements about the importance of
staying out of this conflict. He has said that there is--and he
has given directives to make sure that there is no risk of
that--that there is no provision of military equipment to
Yugoslavia which would violate a U.N. embargo, that there is
not a provision of military intelligence to the Yugoslavs.
We don't have any indication that anything is happening
other than what President Yeltsin has said on that, and we
certainly would not want the kind of hostilities that you
describe to take place. So we are mindful of that. They are
very mindful of it.
Mr. Burton. I understand and I know that Yeltsin is
concerned about it, but they are trying to impeach him right
now. He has just fired his foreign minister and other members
of the cabinet. You have got some real hard liners in the Duma
over there, and some of those hard liners, or many of those
hard liners, are former Communist Party members who are----
Ambassador Sestanovich. Current Communist Party?
members.
Mr. Burton. Current Communist Party members, who are very
supportive of Milosevic, and they don't want us in there; and I
just wondered if we had any intelligence information or
information through the State Department that would lead one to
believe that we might have a problem with Russia and maybe even
China, if something isn't done to bring about a halt to the
problem in Kosovo.
Ambassador Sestanovich. I can't speak about China. I can
tell you that the activities of the Russian Government indicate
that they are following the concert directives that President
Yeltsin has spoken of publicly.
Mr. Burton. So your position is that Yeltsin's----
Ambassador Sestanovich. As to the members of the Duma, they
are not in a position to make decisions of that kind.
Mr. Burton. Unless they impeach him.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Even then.
Mr. Burton. Now, let us talk about one other subject,
quickly before my time runs out. Have you or other top
officials of this Administration ever been presented with
credible reports or evidence that top Russian officials have
personally engaged in activities that would be considered
corrupt by our standards? I didn't know that was a funny
question, but that is OK.
Ambassador Sestanovich. I think it is fair to say that the
ethics laws and regulations that govern the activities of
Russian political figures and the general practices are a
little looser than they are here.
Mr. Burton. I have been told that there was a report that
State Department had seen or had been involved in that showed
that there was corruption by top officials in the Russian
Government, and it was not made available or public.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank
the gentleman. We thank the Ambassador for being patient in
extending his time for us throughout the vote period. We now
proceed to the next witness.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sestanovich appears
in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Our next witness is General Scowcroft.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Yes, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Could I just convey a question to the
Ambassador before he leaves. I really would appreciate it.
Chairman Gilman. All right. We are running late. If you
would, go ahead.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Ambassador, I understand there's a
Russian company who is in concert with a New York firm that
wants to set up a multi billion dollar nuclear storage facility
somewhere in the South Pacific.
Can you check that out for me, Mr. Ambassador, if this is
true? I want to know the name of the Russian company and also
want to find out if this is in accordance with our stated
public policies about Russian companies that go out setting up
nuclear storage facilities.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, if you would submit that
to the Committee we will make it part of the record. Thank you
very much.
We now proceed to our second panel, General Scowcroft and
Dr. McFaul. Lieutenant General Scowcroft is President of the
Scowcroft Group, an international investment advisory firm, and
President of the Forum for International Policy, a nonpartisan,
nonprofit organization providing independent analysis on major
foreign policy issues.
General Scowcroft has served as National Security Adviser
to Presidents Ford and Bush, as a Military Assistant to
President Nixon and as Deputy National Security Adviser to
Presidents Nixon and Ford. General Scowcroft has held a broad
range of positions during his military career and has
subsequently chaired and served on a number of important policy
advisory councils.
We also have with him on this panel Dr. Michael McFaul. Dr.
McFaul is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. He is an Assistant Professor of Political
Science at Stanford University and a research fellow at the
Hoover Institute.
We welcome our witnesses. We regret it has taken this long
to get to your testimony. We thank you for your patience.
Chairman Gilman. General Scowcroft, you may proceed. You
may put your full statement in the record and summarize it with
a statement, if you prefer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRENT SCOWCROFT, LT. GENERAL, USAF (RETIRED),
PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP, INC., PRESIDENT, THE FORUM FOR
INTERNATIONAL POLICY, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
General Scowcroft. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is
a great privilege to be here before the Committee on such a
complicated and important subject. I do not have a written
statement, but I do have a few preliminary remarks I would like
to make.
Without going into the historic roots of Russian foreign
policy, let me make just a few introductory remarks about some
of the forces I think are motivating Russian foreign policy
today.
I think there are two principal aspects to Russian foreign
policy, motivating them. Both of them are resulting from the
conditions in which Russia finds itself today. A deplorable
economic state and deteriorating scientific and defense
establishment industry is one. The disappearance of the Soviet
Union is another, and finally, deep humiliation about their
fall from great power status to a middling political power with
an economy about the size of the State of Illinois.
The first state, their deplorable economic state affecting
their military and their defense industries, leads to arms
sales, technology sales, scientific missions and so on that are
certainly affecting us in a number of parts of the world.
My sense is that the primary motivation is economic rather
than political but, in some cases, I don't think you can rule
out a political motive. They are desperate to keep their arms
industries going. They are desperate to keep their scientists
employed, and in addition to that, the control of the state
over all of its entities is fairly loose.
The second part, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, has
not fully been accepted by a number of quarters inside Russia,
and there is a sense that somehow the former parts of the
Soviet Union eventually will in some way rejoin or something
and that the vast raw materials, for example, down in the
Caucasus and in central Asia really, by right, belong to
Russia. I think that, in part, motivates some very troublesome
aspects of Russian policy in, for example, Georgia, in
Azerbaijan, and elsewhere in central Asia.
In addition to that is a third, the sense of humiliation of
Russians, of a proud country reduced from its Cold War status
to its present condition. I think that sense of humiliation is
leading them to lash out in many directions, is in itself
beginning to breed an anti-Western sense of nationalism, and I
will mention that a little later.
In the early post-Cold War years, I think the United States
in its policy was very cognizant of this sense of humiliation.
We really reached out to try to avoid saying that the Soviets
lost the Cold War, reached out to make them feel a member of
the Western community.
That even went to the extent in 1993 of looking the other
way when a disagreement between Yeltsin and the parliament led
to a shelling of the parliament building when they refused to
be dismissed. In 1994, in the tragedy in Chechnya, the
Administration said, initially, that it is an internal matter--
quite different from what we have said subsequently about
Kosovo, for example.
We really reached out to try to embrace the Russians, but I
think gradually we have changed. We have not changed our
policy. What we have changed is the execution of the policy.
Gradually, we have turned to a policy either of neglect of
Russia or hectoring them on issues that are of importance to
the United States. I think it is further humiliating them and
is a primary cause now of the growth of anti-Western and anti-
U.S. nationalism in Russia.
I think this change, again in execution, not in policy,
really began with NATO expansion. NATO is, for the Russians,
the living symbol of their defeat and fall from power. Now, do
the Russians go to bed every night worrying about NATO, wake up
every morning cursing NATO? No, of course not, but NATO is
still a four letter word for the Russians and will always
remain one.
With respect to NATO expansion, all of the prospective new
members of NATO, with the exception of Slovenia, are former
members of the Warsaw Pact or of the Soviet Union itself. I
think the Russians could be excused if they think that all this
is happening to them because they are weak and we are taking
advantage of that weakness, thus, again, reminding them how
they have changed and deepening their humiliation.
I think almost everything that has happened in the last
years, whether it is this, whether it is the ABM treaty, or
proliferation, has furthered this attitude. To me, the climax
of this trend took place in January this year when the
Secretary of State went to Moscow to meet with Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin.
She said she had a five point agenda: First, the Russian
budget is unrealistic; second, the CFE proposals, that is,
conventional force changes, in Europe are unacceptable; third,
we deeply resent the anti-Semitic character of recent Russian
remarks. Fourth, the transfer of missile and nuclear technology
to Iran is unacceptable, and if it continues, we will cutoff
quotas for Russian rocket launches. This seems to me
counterproductive and, again, could be interpreted by Russians
as an economic competition seeking to shut down their rocket
industry in favor of ours. Last, we have a problem with the ABM
treaty because of rogue nations with missiles, and we would
like to negotiate revisions. If we can't do that, we may have
to denounce it.
The only thing the Russians have left of great power status
is their nuclear weapons; and the abrogation of the ABM treaty
could jeopardize their ability, especially in their weakened
state, to maintain a robust deterrence.
When Ms. Albright was asked the question, well, given this
list, the agenda you have, is it time to return to a policy of
containment of Russia? She said, don't be ridiculous, our
policy is engagement. I think this is illustrates the problem
we face. We are doing things unconsciously to the Russians that
are driving them into hypernationalism.
It is not our intent, but we need to look at our policies
to see if there are not ways we can engage the Russians, on
nonproliferation, for example.
We just beat up on them in Iran. Have we asked them to help
us with North Korea, with Libya, with all of the others
``rogue'' states? No. Take the ABM treaty. Ronald Reagan said
when we develop SDI that we will give it to the Soviet Union.
Why not go to them and say, look, we both face this threat. Why
not cooperate in dealing with it?
I don't think the Russians are in a position to do anything
about any of these things, they are so weak. It is the attitude
and the perception of us taking advantage of them in that
condition which troubles me.
The final chapter in this saga was the initiation of a
bombing campaign in Kosovo when Primakov was literally in the
air flying to Washington, the ultimate humiliation. Either he
came to Washington as if nothing had happened or had to turn
around and go home. While I agree with Congressman Leach's
comments about Russia and Serbia, I think a lot of their
motivation right now is not a Serbian-Russian love affair so
much as it is the Russians want to be a participant. They want
to be included. They don't want to be ignored except when we
beat up on them.
Ironically, we are now turning to them, imploring them to
bail NATO out of a failed or a faltering military policy. This
is an enormous temptation for the Russians, both to deal NATO a
blow and to appear now as a key peace maker, the person or the
country that will solve the problems we face in Kosovo.
So I think, basically, while the Russians are doing a
number of things that we don't like and we certainly ought to
call them to account for it, we are in danger of promoting, by
our actions, not by our policy, a virulent anti-West, anti-U.S.
nationalism which we will come to regret in coming years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, General Scowcroft.
Chairman Gilman. Dr. McFaul.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL A. MCFAUL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Mr. McFaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a longer
statement which I would like to submit to the record and just
summarize here.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection the full statement will
be made part of the record. You may go ahead with your summary.
Mr. McFaul. Thank you. It is both a pleasure and honor to
be here. In answering your question on what are Russian policy
foreign objectives, my answer is it depends on who you ask in
Russia.
In making our assessments of Russia's behavior in the
world, I think it is absolutely critical that we realize that
Russia today is not a totalitarian state dominated by the
central community of the Communist Party, the Soviet Union.
That state disappeared in 1991.
Rather, Russia is a democratizing state, a weakly
institutionalized democracy with a lot of deficiencies, but a
democratizing statement nonetheless. Consequently, Russia's
foreign policy is a product of domestic politics, competitive
domestic politics in Russia today.
That system is highly unstable and highly erratic with poor
institutions, unlike our own; but the policies that we see
throughout the world are a product of domestic politics in
Russia. It is not too much unlike the debate I heard here
earlier this morning between you. I heard lots of different
foreign policies. Had a Russian walked in and asked different
ones of you, he might have had five or six different ideas
about what American foreign policy is today. I think we need to
remind ourselves that it is precisely the situation you have in
Russia today.
Now, there are a few things that most Russians agree upon.
First, they all recognize that resolving Russia's economic
decline and internal weakness is a precondition for
establishing Russia as a great international power again today.
You cannot be an international actor if your economy is the
size of Illinois, no offense to Illinois; nor can you be a
serious international player if you can't control your own
borders. Everybody recognizes that.
Second, all Russian actors agree that Russia must pursue
economic, political, and military integration within the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia, quite frankly,
wants to continue to have a sphere of influence in the
Commonwealth of Independent States. There is little
disagreement in Russia today about that.
Third, most leaders, not all, but most leaders in Russia
believe that Russia's nuclear arsenal is the one power
attribute that still accords Russia special status in the
international system, just as General Scowcroft said. As a
consequence they do not want to lose that. That is where it
ends, though. That is where the consensus ends.
After that, on virtually every other major foreign policy
issue, I think there is major disagreement in Russia; and to
understand what the policy is, one needs to understand who is
up and who is down in terms of Russian domestic politics.
Let me spell out for you four different camps in Russia
which I think the ebb and flow of them are important to
understanding the conduct of Russian foreign policy.
First, there are what I call the pro-Western idealists.
These are individuals and parties who have a normative
commitment to integrating Russia into the Western community of
democratic states. They believe that Russia is best served by
becoming an integral member of the West.
This group includes the liberal reformers that dominated
the government in the earlier part of this decade, personified
first and foremost by former Foreign Minister Kozyrev. They
dominated in 1992 and 1993. Their power has waned ever since;
and today they are marginal actors in the definition of Russian
foreign policy, but they are still players nonetheless.
The second group is what I call the pro-Western
pragmatists. This group also believes that Russian interests
are best served by Russian integration with the West, but they
believe this for material, economic reasons, not for normative
reasons. They are not what I would call democrats with a small
``D'' necessarily. Rather, they are economic actors that see a
win-win situation in terms of Russia integrating into the West.
This includes companies like Gazprom, the largest gas
company in the world, oil companies, mineral exporters, high-
tech enterprises and large financial organizations. There are
also a few important Governors that I would put in this camp,
as well as a whole host of Russian nongovernmental
organizations, church groups, trade unions, student
associations, and women organizations that also believe that it
is in Russia's interest to integrate into the West.
Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is the leading
political figure in Russia that I would identify with this
camp; and also, by the way, I would say that the majority of
Russian citizens also were in this camp, although that has
changed in the last month. From 1993 until August 1998 this
group dominated the definition of Russian foreign policy and,
depending on the issue, they still play a very important role
in the conduct of Russian foreign affairs abroad.
Third group I would label--and this might sound a bit like
an oxymoron, but as the anti-Western pragmatist. Like the
second group, this group believes that influence in foreign
policy debates and the definition of foreign policy should be
driven first and foremost by Russian interests and not norms,
morals, or revolutionary missions.
However, this group does not believe that integration in
the West is a win-win situation for Russia. Rather, they look
to the world to be a zero-sum game competition between Russia
and the West; and so if America is up, that means Russia is
going down.
They look at the world as a unipolar world today, dominated
by the United States; and they want to do everything they can
to destroy American hegemony and create what they term a
multipolar world.
However, this group are pragmatists. They are well aware of
Russia's weakness, and so they realize in the short term they
need Western engagement but not necessarily to integrate with
the West, but actually to compete with the West.
In this group I would say that Prime Minister--or I should
say former Prime Minister Primakov, is the leading proponent of
this view. Many nationalist groups I would put in this group as
well, directors of military enterprises, some, but not all,
within the ministry of defense, and the Russian intelligence
community. From August 1998 until today, literally this
morning, this group dominated the definition of Russian foreign
policy.
Then my fourth group, finally, are what I call the anti-
Western ideologies. These folks are passionately anti-Western.
They are motivated by norms, ideological beliefs, sometimes
ethnic, civilizational kinds of things; and they promote a kind
of foreign policy that is actually not in Russia's national
interest, at least from my point of view.
This includes Mr. Zhirinovsky, the head of the Liberal
Democratic Party. It includes many, many members of the Russian
Communist Party today and even more radical groups on both the
left and the right.
This group gets a lot of attention in the West for the
things they say about foreign policy, but I think it is
important to realize that they have never been in control of
foreign policy in Russia and are unlikely to be in control of
Russian foreign policy in the near future.
Let me turn briefly to Kosovo to illustrate how these
different groups have competed for influence and how it
influences the conduct of Russian foreign policy.
The initial reaction to Kosovo was dominated by the anti-
Western ideologies. If you looked and you saw the camera shots
outside of the American embassy, it was Zhirinovsky out there.
It was the Communists out there, throwing beer cans and talking
about Western imperialism. They were in charge; and it seemed
for a time, by the way, that they would push Russian policy in
directions that I think would not have served Russia's national
interest.
However, the second phase of the Russian policy was not
dominated by them. Russia did not go to war to help their
Serbian brothers, i.e., norms, ethnic ties, rather than
interests. Rather, Mr. Primakov realized that that was not in
Russia's interests, and the second phase of Kosovo--Russian
policy toward Kosovo was dominated by the anti-Western
pragmatists.
They understood that Russia was too weak to do anything in
this; and yet, they were motivated first and foremost to try to
weaken the NATO alliance, to try to split the NATO alliance,
and try to make this a losing proposition for the United States
and, consequently, a winning proposition for Russia.
That group lost control of the policy. When Mr. Yeltsin
appointed former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the pro-Western
pragmatists took over the definition of Russian foreign policy;
and after Primakov's dismissal this morning--by the way, I
would add they are now firmly in the driver's seat until at
least the next go-around in terms of the definition of Russia's
policy toward Kosovo.
They believe that this is a win-win situation. They welcome
the chance to be on the international stage, and they want to
cooperate in a way with the NATO alliance to find a win-win
situation in Kosovo.
Think about that. In the period of 4 weeks, Russian foreign
policy had three different policies on Kosovo. If I had more
time, I could walk you through a whole range of different
foreign policy issues where you would see the exact same
fluctuations and tendencies.
There is important lessons here, and I will be brief about
what this means for U.S.-Russia relations. First, it means that
we cannot assume some static foreign policy coming out of
Russia. On the contrary, it is a very volatile situation
domestically, and that means that Russian foreign policy is
also going to be very volatile.
Now, in the short run I think that is negative and very
bad. Who do you talk to? Who are your partners over there? It
is difficult to know. In the long run, I think that keeps the
door open that I would call the pro-Western pragmatists and
even the pro-Western idealists might win out in Russia.
Today they're down and out. Today they don't dominate on
most issues, but it is simply too early to say this game is
over. This game is not over. I am a big fan of the NBA,
watching a lot of NBA games. You turn it on in the second
quarter and your team is down 20 points, you are a really
foolish person to think that that is going to be the end of the
game.
Right now, I think we are in the second quarter of our
relationship. It is a long ways until we know the outcome of
Russia's domestic politics; and we have to keep in mind,
therefore, that positive outcomes down the road may be
possible.
Finally, let me leave you with one last fact. The very fact
that Russian groups are arguing and competing for interest
about foreign policy, to me, is also a positive sign. This is a
great, vast improvement over when we just read central
Committee directives about what the Soviet Communist Party
believed Soviet national interest in the world were.
The vigor of their debate and the range of opinions in
Russia are almost as heated and vigorous as the ones you hear
in your own building, and I think that is a positive sign for
Russian democracy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McFaul appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Dr. McFaul.
General Scowcroft, at the height of the Cold War our Nation
found a way to balance Russian and Chinese antagonism to the
benefit of our Nation in the so-called ``Strategic Triangle.''
How can we best manage a situation in which Russia and China
appear to work together to undermine America's ability to
project power and influence in key regions, regions such as the
Persian Gulf and the straits off of Taiwan?
General Scowcroft. Mr. Chairman, I think that we need to
keep in mind the benefits of the kind of policy we had in the
Cold War. A rule of thumb for me would be to have better
relations with both the Russians and the Chinese than they can
ever have with each other. They may be tactical allies now, and
I believe the Russians are doing things against their
fundamental interests--selling weapons and technology to the
Chinese.
I doubt the possibilities of a thorough strategic alliance
between the two. There are too many enmities, but they are two
big players in the world. They are two of our primary concerns
in this new millennium, and we need to get it straight with
both of them and act with respect to both of them from cold,
calculated policy, not emotion.
Chairman Gilman. I thank you for that response. General,
some historians see Russian foreign policy historically rooted
in a desire to make certain that the Russian state doesn't
disintegrate and, therefore, inevitably resulting in policies
that are meant to insure the existence of a ``great, united
Russia'' and to make certain that regions bordering Russia,
such as the Baltics and Ukraine, do not truly break away from
Russian control. U.S. policy would prefer that Russia respect
the territorial integrity of its newly independent neighbors,
however.
Do you believe that Russian foreign policy toward its
neighbors today is radically different from its previous
incarnations under the czars and the Communists and will
refrain once and for all from seeking to reinstate control over
countries such as Ukraine?
General Scowcroft. I think the jury is still out. The
Russians are searching for their soul in many respects. I think
the historic arguments between the Slavophiles and the
Westernizers in Russia is, in a way, still going on in
modernized form. Who are they, the Russians are asking
themselves, who are they, what are their fundamental interests,
and so on.
Historically, Russia has been invaded over and over and
over, and their fundamental security policy has been to build
padding around the Russian heartland to give defensive space,
and it has served them well.
One of the whole problems of Eastern Europe and what we do
about Eastern Europe goes back to that. For the West, it has
been a buffer against the infection of communist Russia. For
the Russians it has been a bulwark that invaders would have to
penetrate.
I think we ought to do two things: First of all, shore up,
to the extent we can, the independence and the ability to
survive of the former members of the Soviet Union, encourage
them to have viable political systems and economic systems and
let the Russians know that we consider them permanently
independent. But, do it in such a way as not to drive Russia
into a belief that we are trying to take advantage of their
period of weakness to build a system around them by which we
can throttle them or keep them under control.
Chairman Gilman. That is trying to balance a pretty fine
line.
General Scowcroft. It is a fine line. I don't think it is
past our ability to do. If we don't do it we are going to fall
off one way or another, and I think we will live to regret it.
Chairman Gilman. Dr. McFaul, at our hearing back in July on
U.S.-Russia relations prior to the August economic collapse in
Russia, most of our witnesses felt that further IMF loans to
Russia would only buy a little time before the next economic
crisis in Russia. In fact, the IMF loan last year subsequently
bought only a month's respite before the August collapse.
What, in your opinion, would be the rationale for providing
a further IMF loan to Russia, and what new Russian economic
reforms can you point to that would make Russia eligible for
any new IMF funding?
Mr. McFaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should say that I am
not an advocate of further IMF funding. I do not see a record
of achievement under the Primakov Government in terms of
economic reform. They have not done elementary things, and so I
do not think it is--you shouldn't reward inactivity.
Having said that, the one rationale I could see for
providing those funds is simply to avoid making the situation
worse, but what IMF is talking about is simply take one check
from one bank account and putting it in the other. They are not
actually talking about transferring new money, and that would
help Russia avoid further disaster.
Having said that, I think there is a real mystery going on
in the Russian economy and, that is, our dire predictions from
July of last year and after the financial crisis simply have
not come true. If you look at the statistics just released last
week, inflation is only 3 percent in April.
They are collecting more taxes last month than they did
throughout the whole previous year. We do not have a good
understanding of what is going on there. I suspect it is the
state sort of buying time. I don't suspect it is fundamental
economic reform, but I should note that we are pretty confused
in terms of what is going on in the economy.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Dr. McFaul.
Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say that I
do think that, General Scowcroft and Dr. McFaul, you are both
correct. I mean, the most astounding I think I have learned in
sitting on this Committee for 18 years is how much is just
personal.
If the President doesn't visit the country enough, if the
Secretary of State doesn't go there, if the Vice-president
hasn't been there, they become obstreperous; and sometimes when
you see areas of the world where we get a little trouble, you
find that they at one point thought they were the center of
activity; and now they think they are on the back road where
nobody stops.
Whether they do it consciously or subconsciously, they
always get our attention. I think we do need to pay a lot more
positive attention to Russia and not just in these situations
of crisis.
I agree in essence with both of you on the satellite
launches. But I guess my question would be, if you agree with
my position, that it is a bad place to put pressure, how do I
convince Mr. Berman that there are good places to create
pressure so that we have them clean up their act on
proliferation without damaging their economy by limiting
satellite launches. Frankly, I was one that would like to see
an increase in Russian launches and a decrease in Chinese
launches to make up for that shortfall we will face.
On arms proliferation, the United States sells about half
the arms worldwide. It is a little hard for us to stand up and
kind of vent our moral outrage at Soviet arms sales to keep
their defense industries alive while we participate in a
similar practice with other countries.
We think they are better countries, but the economic
dynamic is similar in that it helps bring down the cost of this
equipment when our own military buys it.
We have bipartisan problems in the Congress of the kind of
insensitivity you mentioned. We recently had a gratuitous vote,
in my opinion, that simply stated we will deploy an ABM, an
anti-missile system; and, one, we are not ready to do that.
Two, it was aimed at the North Koreans, who may have a
missile that can reach us; but as you have said, simply ignored
what is the largest number of missiles that could be aimed at
the United States. How do we move forward there? I would like
to hear more about that.
Third, one of our colleagues, Mr. Rohrabacher, continues to
suggest that we simply pull out of NATO, that this Cold War is
over and that we no longer need NATO or participate in NATO. So
I would appreciate answers for those.
General Scowcroft. Mr. Gejdenson, that is quite a list, but
let me say something quickly on each one.
On the launch quota as leverage, it just seems to me that
it is counterproductive leverage. What we are saying is we are
going to punish your good, honest firms who are doing things
right in order to get at the ones who aren't.
It seems to me that instead of doing that, we ought to say
we will increase the quotas for these firms to show that we are
cognizant of the good and the bad actors.
Now, what we can substitute for it, I don't know. I have
looked around. It is not easy, but I don't think you can defend
the policy we have on the basis that we have to do something.
Mr. Gejdenson. So you would be a very important voice on
that issue in the coming months as Congress presses for the
opposite, to shut off the launches, and I hope you speak out
loudly.
General Scowcroft. I will be happy to because we have
forgotten U.S. interests here. We need places to launch our
satellites. We do not have the capability here, and we are
going to fall way behind unless we can solve this problem
somehow.
On the ABM treaty, it is a very complicated problem. I
really do think we ought to try to enlist the Russians
cooperatively. I think Michael makes a very good point, they
are pretty hopeless now. They probably can't do anything even
if they tried, but the psychological impact of our making the
effort would be good.
We also need to think, in the whole missile business, about
the Chinese and their attitude toward missile defenses and so
on. There is no point in doing something which will create the
problems we are trying to avoid.
On arms sales, I don't disagree with you, but I think we
are thoughtful about our arms sales. It doesn't always work
out, but the Russians are really not being thoughtful. They
will sell to anybody who has the money to pay for it, and
unfortunately, that is mostly the rogue states.
NATO, I think, is still of critical importance to the
United States; and it is less what NATO does than the fact of
NATO. It represents American participation in the security of
Europe; and if we have learned anything in this century, it is
that that is critical. We cannot have a decent relationship,
security relationship with Europe unless we have that kind of
umbrella of NATO.
Mr. McFaul. Very briefly to go through your list.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Yes, Dr. McFaul.
Mr. McFaul. Two seconds. On satellite launchers, of course
we should not punish Khrunichev and Lockheed, by the way, in
this. It simply makes no sense. They are definitely part of
what I call this pro-Western pragmatists. I actually worked at
that company in the early 1990's, and there is no doubt in my
mind that they see cooperation with the West as in their
interest and in our interest.
On the ABM treaty, this is to me is a clear example of
where emotion is trumping interests in Russia, and that to me
says we have an opportunity to work with them, and I think
there is lots of opportunities there. The ministry of defense
officials are not as militantly anti-ABM and anti-ballistic
missile defense as some of the politicians in the Duma.
Finally, on NATO, I would just agree with General Scowcroft
and let us keep the door open all the way to Russia.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Cooksey.
Mr. Cooksey. Dr. McFaul, could I get you to clarify one of
your points. Was your second category pro-Western pragmatists
or protagonists?
Mr. McFaul. Pragmatists, excuse me.
Mr. Cooksey. Do you think I would be correct in my
assumption, feeling, that the leadership of Belarussia would
fit into your fourth category of anti-Western ideologies?
Mr. McFaul. Yes, that would be correct.
Mr. Cooksey. My question about the view is, what is the
likelihood of Russia forming a union with Belarussia as part of
a greater Russia, and if so, how would that impact their
foreign policy for the future?
Mr. McFaul. If you look at the evolution of that policy,
what was very clear from, say, 1996 to 1998 is that the
pragmatist were blocking it, right. There was a lot of rhetoric
about yeah, yeah, yeah, we all need to get together, but in
fact, if you looked at the policy, it was Russia blocking it
because it wasn't in their economic interest.
When Mr. Primakov took over, he pushed more for that
because it was seen as some kind of balancing against the
United States which to me also seems absurd, but that is the
way they framed it.
There is a lot of hesitation right now. There is a big
debate going on. I suspect that as we get into the Russian
electoral cycle, nobody is going to want to say I am against
this unification; and so you are going to see a lot of rhetoric
about, yes, of course, I am for it. However, I wouldn't expect
it to happen anytime soon. I suspect after the election you
might see the pragmatists reassert themselves on that policy.
General Scowcroft. I wouldn't disagree with that. I think
the real danger here is, aside from these four groups, that
there will arise because of a heightened spirit of nationalism,
resentment at the West and so on, a leader who promises order,
who promises he is going to lead Russia back to a time of
greatness; and it is in circumstances like that that they may
reach out to Belarussia.
Short of that, I don't think it will happen, and I don't
see that on the horizon; but if you look at the crop of
Presidential candidates for the year 2000, it doesn't inspire
confidence.
Mr. Cooksey. General Scowcroft, I was in the Air Force this
time 30 years ago, so I am impressed with your affiliation with
the Air Force; but you were part of an Administration or two
Administrations that I feel had sophisticated foreign policy
and carried it out very effectively and accomplished their
goals and had some overall strategic foreign policy.
I think that probably one of the problems that the
Administration had was that they did not put as much emphasis
on domestic foreign policy, and probably that contributed to
losing the election or either didn't put emphasis on it or did
not laud your successes.
I feel like currently we have an Administration that has
put a lot of emphasis on domestic foreign policy and has a very
unsophisticated foreign policy. I am from Louisiana and, a lot
of people from Arkansas think that dealing with Louisiana is
foreign policy, but that is neither here nor there.
My question is, how does this play out in Russia? I think
most of the nations in this day and time that have any
semblance of democracy, elect leaders or choose leaders based
on domestic policy and these leaders often are very
unsophisticated on foreign policy, and that becomes a secondary
goal or objective, and it creates a lot of problems between
nations.
What are the chances of getting a group of leaders in
Russia that will have this increased sophistication on foreign
policy, or do they have it now?
General Scowcroft. I think we are going to have to be
patient about the Russian political system. They don't know
where they are. They don't know what they want. All these
groups are contending back and forth.
There are also the sophisticated urban areas of Moscow, St.
Petersburg, then the rest of the country, which increasingly
looks on Moscow as a hostile state.
All these things may take decades to work themselves out;
and what we need to do is be patient, be firm, patient but
helpful where we can. Economically I agree we can't help at all
right now, but we ought not to do things that gratuitously give
rise to a kind of a hostile sentiment in the Russians and lead
the Russians to say we don't belong to the West, we can't get
into NATO, we can't get into the EU, the West doesn't consider
us as Western; therefore, we had better not be, we had better
do something else. That is the danger.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Cooksey. One quick question. I have a daughter who went
to Russia some years ago in this people-to-people program. How
effective do you think these programs are in developing a
better relationship with these?
Is there any way that we can get more people-to-people
relationship, because I don't have a lot of confidence in the
politicians in either country.
General Scowcroft. We ought to push them wherever we can.
Are they going to make a big difference in the short run?
Absolutely not. But I think they certainly do no harm, and they
advance our understanding of them and their's of us.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I personally
want to welcome General Scowcroft and Dr. McFaul for our
Committee hearing this afternoon.
General Scowcroft, I have always been an admirer of your
perception and especially of the expertise, tremendous
expertise, that you have in having to serve previous
presidents, especially in the area of security.
You had indicated earlier that NATO, as a security,
regional organization, was a must in order to provide stability
in Europe, much to the chagrin, as you well know, of the
Russians, because we know that the original purpose of NATO
really was for defense purposes.
At that time, at the height of the Cold War, we were
fighting the former Soviet Union, Socialist Republics. Now
there is no more Soviet Union, and you are advocating that we
should still have NATO for the sake of stability in Europe.
I would like your opinion as to where the Security Council
of the United Nations comes into play? If we are going to have
a regional security organization like NATO-Europe, why wouldn't
we have one in Asia? Why shouldn't we have one in Africa?
When you are talking about basic foreign policies involving
ethnic cleansing, we have them in Africa, we have serious
problems in the Asia Pacific region--and for the very
fundamental humanitarian reasons, I fully support the
President's position on why we had to go to Kosovo because, for
anything else, you remember it's the same reason why President
Bush went to Somalia.
I want your opinion on this. If you think that NATO's is
that important for Europe, shouldn't we also have regional
security organizations in Asia and other regions of the world?
General Scowcroft. No, I don't think so. I think in this
sense Europe is unique. It has been the cockpit of wars for 100
years. We have now, I hope, overcome that. If we ever have a
really huge crisis again, a world crisis, the people who are
going to stand by us in dealing with it are going to be the
Europeans. It is not going to be India, it is not going to be
China, it is not going to be Japan and so on, wonderful
countries though they are.
The core of the kinds of things that we believe in and the
core of the kind of world that we are promoting reside in the
Atlantic community; and we need that kind of solidity.
I am much less concerned about NATO as an instrument to do
anything, as I am about continuing to develop the sense between
Europe and the United States that we are one, that we work
together, that we think because that is what is going to make a
better world for all of us.
Mr. Faleomavaega. General Scowcroft, I beg to differ with
you on this issue. When NATO was founded, de Gaulle pulled out.
For some 40 years we single-handedly had to defend these
European nations. Where was France?
Now, all of a sudden President Chirac is shining out like a
good example of being one of the brothers of this compact that
they were never a part of, and constantly, France is always on
our heels, always disagreeing on policies that we have had even
in this current Administration.
My question, too, where were our European allies when we
were fighting in Vietnam? The South Koreans are the only ones
that I saw when I was there. Are you also suggesting that the
Japanese are not democratic enough to support these same
fundamental principals that we are talking about?
General Scowcroft. No, I think you missed my point. My
point is not that we agree on everything with the Europeans. My
point is that we come from the same root principles; and
therefore, we are natural allies. We differ on a number of
things. The French never left the NATO alliance. They left the
Integrated Command System. When the chips are down, the French
are there. Anytime there is a little wiggle room, they will
wiggle away.
What I am really saying is that we should not let this
group that did so wonderfully in World War II and in the Cold
War dissipate and have the United States go back to
isolationism and Europe go its own way.
I am not sure European integration is at the point where it
will make it without the kind of stability that the Atlantic
alliance gives it.
Mr. Faleomavaega. My time is up. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Two questions, one
to General Scowcroft. Is SDI in our interest? Do you support
SDI; and if so, how do you do it, given ABM? How do you bring
it to fruition given the ABM treaty?
The question to Dr. McFaul, this is the big one, give us
your answer on Kosovo.
General Scowcroft. Yes, I think SDI is in our long-term
interests, but I underscore long term. I think we ought to
proceed with a vigorous ``R'' and ``D'' program. I don't think
we have the answer to a system that is deployable at anything
like the cost and effectiveness that we really ought to have,
but I think we ought to work on it, and I see no reason we
shouldn't go to the Russians and say we would like their
cooperation. We would develop a system cooperatively and then
would provide it to any country that is worried about a missile
attack on its territory. I would transform the program from a
unilateral, in-your-face one, which we have now, to something
which can be a defensive weapon for everybody.
Mr. Campbell. To follow a moment, the ABM treaty, if it is
interpreted to ban a deployed space-based missile system--I
understand that the legal adviser to the State Department in
the Reagan Administration argued that it did not prohibit it--
but if you take the view that it did--do you take the view that
it does--and if so, then we would, I take it, have to amend ABM
or go to the Russians and denounce ABM, a technical term of
denounce--I don't mean criticize it, just say 6 months' notice
we are out of it. Is that correct?
General Scowcroft. Yes, that is correct, we could. You see,
I think the Russians would be amenable to modifications,
assuming they are part of it--but weapons in space are
something else. They won't agree to anything where they can't
keep up and which we could use to deny them a deterrent
capability.
Mr. Campbell. Understood. Thanks.
Dr. McFaul, what is the right answer in Kosovo? What should
we do? I know a million experts who told us what we have done
wrong. I have tried to avoid saying that because I never
claimed to have any far-sightedness. The procedures, that is my
field, right, at least I think it is--constitutional, what
should have been done constitutionally; but I don't know the
right answer.
There are terrible human rights abuses. I don't want to
make Russia our enemy for the rest of my lifetime. What is your
answer right from this point? Not what should have been.
Mr. McFaul. Not what should have been done.
Mr. Campbell. Take us from where we are today and move me
forward.
Mr. McFaul. I want to make one comment as a social
scientist, and then I will give you my views, which is that if
you think about what I said about Russian foreign policy, I
think there is a lot very similar about American foreign
policy.
What is wrong about what is going on today is that we do
not have a shared definition of objectives in foreign policy.
Think about 10 years ago--you could say our strategy was
containment of Communism, and there might be some people who
would disagree; but most people, both in the Congress and the
executive branch, would agree with that.
Today, we don't have that shared strategy; and, therefore,
we tiptoe into things. People don't agree on the objectives;
and, therefore, they disagree vehemently about the means.
My own view is that it was right to do something about it,
that we had to do something. You cannot--both for, I think,
moralistic reasons you cannot just sit by and watch genocide in
Europe if you are serious about being a power in Europe--and I
think we should be--but that we have to have the means lined up
with the ends. That is where I think our mistake has been.
Today, of course, because there is not consensus about
plying what I think are the right means to solve this, then I
think we have to go for resolution. We have to do it with the
Russians on board, and I do not see having the Russians being
on board so far. I see it as a win for American foreign policy,
not as some slippage so far, but we cannot allow--we have to
now stay to the same objectives that we started from the get-
go.
This is not about a marriage contract or some sort--
negotiation is even the wrong word. There is nothing to
negotiate about. In my opinion, there is nothing to negotiate.
We have our terms, and until those terms are met we have to----
Mr. Campbell. Pardon me, international security presence is
what the Ambassador representing the State Department spoke of
earlier, involving Russians and peace keeping. That is part of
the answer. You see it, too, I take it?
Mr. McFaul. Yes.
Mr. Campbell. So I am going to say something, and then you
tell me whether it is right or wrong because I was really
asking for you to give a definitive answer which would then be
universally accepted by all.
Russian troops along with some NATO presence, maybe not
United States and the UK because of the objection of Milosevic,
a mixed group goes into occupied Kosovo. It is a horribly
bombed country; huge amount of money needed then to rebuild
Kosovo. The bridges that we bombed Monday--will be rebuilt on
Monday by you and me, tax payers. A number of years this force
resides there to keep the Serbians from coming back. Is that
the answer that you see as appropriate?
Mr. McFaul. Unfortunately, I do and with one amendment--
that I absolutely believe it has to be that American forces
have to be part of that component; if you don't do that, then
you don't achieve your primary objective, which is to get the
Kosovars back, and that is the important words to remember.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Leach.
Mr. Leach. General Scowcroft, earlier today I made an
observation, may or may not be valid, but it struck me that
from a diplomatic perspective this Administration had breached
a century-long tradition of Teddy Roosevelt about speaking
softly but carrying a big stick. In doing that, they have also
breached a shorter-term policy of General Scowcroft's, and let
me explain it.
It strikes me that under the Bush Administration, if there
is anything that was a doctrine--and this is a doctrine that to
a degree stems from the President and from his National
Security Adviser, yourself, which is very Chicago school, using
your terms of art, very cold and calculating--it was the Powell
Doctrine, which was to carefully describe objectives and then
to apply overwhelming force if it need be to carry them out.
It strikes me in Kosovo, which has enormous ramifications
both for Russian policy as well as for NATO, we have struck a
rather deep nail into the Powell Doctrine.
Objectives seem to be a bit fuzzy, but more importantly, we
have decided to not prevail; and instead, we have a doctrine of
what appears to me to be punishment, that is, that the policy
in place is very punishing to the Serbs, but may well be a
policy not designed to prevail, which is an extraordinary
circumstance in geostrategic terms, partly because this is a
civil war, partly because whether or not it is a civil war, it
is a war, and NATO has now been identified with this new
policy.
One aspect of NATO relates to whether anyone will want to
join if this is the kind of policy that NATO comes to
symbolize.
I would like to ask you, as a Chicago school theorist, as
well as a former National Security Adviser, how you assess this
policy. Do you think it is realistic?
General Scowcroft. I think NATO is very much at stake in
Kosovo, depending on how it comes out. NATO will not
disintegrate regardless of what happens, but it could erode and
cease to be a cohesive force.
However we got to Rambouillet, we did it with the
accompaniment of a lot of threats to Milosevic, threats by the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, SACEUR and so on.
When a great power threatens, it has to be prepared to carry
out that threat. We have not always done that in the past, but
that is a cardinal rule, because if you don't carry it out,
then people cease paying attention to your threats and then you
do have to use force.
We operated from that point on with fairly fuzzy
objectives. The Rambouillet objectives were different from
those cited as the objectives of the bombing. They were not the
same kinds of objectives, although they should have been
identical, and our strategy was based on hope, rather than
cold, calculating analysis. Once you say you are going to use
force, you need to have it sufficient to achieve your
objective.
I don't think the bombing is punishment. I think it is
hope--hope that we won't have to get troops on the ground and
we don't have to get into a dirty ground war, that somehow this
immaculate coercion will change Milosevic's mind.
I don't think there ever has been a case--I can't think of
a case where a bombing campaign by itself has changed a foreign
leader's mind. The Serbs, if they stand for anything, it is
their pride and their ability to take pain and show how tough
they are.
So it seems to me that the part of the Powell Doctrine--and
I don't like that term. I think it is a misnomer--which is
essential is the need to achieve your objectives. You can try
it with bombing, but if bombing doesn't work in the first 3
days, don't keep it up for 6 more months hoping it will.
You have to have something else in your kit bag to say,
yes, we are going to achieve that objective. If this doesn't do
it, then we will do something, and that is what I think was not
done.
Mr. Leach. I appreciate that, and I would only conclude by
saying I have never known a policy that can be, in my judgment,
legitimately criticized from two perspectives.
Either we should not have made the threats and not gotten
involved; or if we did pursue it, we should have pursued it in
a forthcoming way.
General Scowcroft. I think it is exactly right.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Leach.
Mr. Faleomavaega, just has one brief question, and then we
will wind up our hearing.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Gentlemen, we have learned a lot of lessons from Vietnam,
and coming down to the question of using military force in our
dealings with the Russian Government, as my friend from Iowa
alluded earlier, it has become known as the Powell Doctrine. If
you will, General Scowcroft, carry a big stick and if you are
going to use military force, use it all the way. But it seems
that our policy now is that we have gotten rid of the basic
Powell Doctrine, if you will, in the Gulf War, but now we are
using limited use of force and you are suggesting it is OK to
use limited use of force.
We learned our lessons from Vietnam. We bombed the heck out
of those people. In fact, it energized the Vietnamese, whether
they were Communists, pro-democratic or patriots, it energized
those people to the point they became nationalists, and I
believe that we are doing the same thing to the Serbian people.
Forget Milosevic. We are doing the same thing to the Serbian
people.
I would like to ask the gentlemen, where are we going with
this continued bombing? Do you think we should resort to a more
forceful use of force of arms?
General Scowcroft. Just very briefly, I am pessimistic
about the ability of negotiations to achieve our objectives--
maybe to give us a fig leaf but not to achieve our objectives.
I think the only way we can achieve our objectives is to
prepare for and, if necessary, use ground forces.
Mr. McFaul. I would like to concur with that. I think that
is right. What troubles me is because of the way of our own
domestic politics in this country that we do not have the
support either for the objectives or for the means of achieving
those objectives.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you. I want to thank our panelists,
and thank our Members. The Committee will submit questions in
writing to the State Department for expeditious response by the
official witness at today's hearing. This hearing stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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