[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
Tuesday, June 8, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-85
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-467 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Deborah Bodlander, Senior Professional Staff Member
Marilyn C. Owen, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
Page
The Honorable Martin S. Indyk, Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State...................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations...................................................... 00
The Honorable Martin S. Indyk.................................... 00
Additional material:
Correspondence dated February 4, 1999 to The Honorable Martin
Indyk from Representatives Benjamin A. Gilman and Matt Salmon
of the International Relations Committee submitted by Chairman
Benjamin Gilman................................................ 00
Response dated June 3, 1999 to the letter dated February 4, 1999
by The Honorable Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, submitted by
Chairman Benjamin Gilman....................................... 00
Questions for the Record, submitted to Ambassador Indyk by
Chairman Benjamin Gilman....................................... 00
Response by Ambassador Indyk to Questions for the Record,
submitted by Chairman Benjamin Gilman.......................... 00
Questions for the Record, submitted to Ambassador Indyk by Matt
Salmon, a Representative in Congress from Arizona.............. 00
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
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Tuesday, June 8, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. In
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A.
Gilman (chairman of the Committee) Presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will come to order. This
morning the Committee on International Relations is conducting
a hearing on developments in the Middle East. As usual, we are
pleased to have Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
Martin Indyk join us on this very important topic.
In the past few months, there have been a number of changes
in the region which affect U.S. policy in a variety of regional
matters. The Committee is, therefore, interested in the
Administration's views regarding these changes, particularly as
they affect U.S. policy regarding the Middle East peace
process, Iran and Iraq.
Back in October, Martin Indyk was sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs by the Department of State.
In that capacity, Ambassador Indyk assists the Secretary of
State in providing overall direction and coordination of our
policy in the Middle East and in north Africa, and from April
1995 to October 1997, Dr. Indyk served as U.S. Ambassador to
Israel, and during that period he helped to strengthen U.S.-
Israeli relations, reinforcing the U.S. commitment to advance
the peace process and substantially increase the level of
mutually beneficial trade and involvement.
Prior to his assignment to Israel, Dr. Indyk served as
special assistant to the President and senior director for Near
East and south Asian affairs at the National Security Council.
While at the NSC he served as principal adviser to the
President and National Security Adviser on Arab-Israeli issues,
Iraq, Iran, and South Asia, was a senior member of Secretary
Christopher's Middle East peace team, and served as a White
House representative in the U.S.-Israel Science and Technology
Commission. We welcome Dr. Indyk this morning.
With the election of Ehud Barak as Israel's Prime Minister-
elect, many expect Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to resume
fairly quickly. Barak still has to put together a coalition
government, but he has given indication that he will come to
the United States at an early date. We therefore hope that
Secretary Indyk will apprise us of the latest developments in
that area.
Iran's actions on a variety of issues continue to be of
grave concern to many of us. Also alarming was the recent
disclosure that Iranian authorities arrested 13 Jews on charges
of spying for Israel and the United States. The suspects were
accused of spying for the ``Zionist regime'' and ``world
arrogance'', references to Israel and the United States,
respectively. We are very disturbed about that development and
want to know what steps our Nation is taking in this matter and
how it may affect our policy considerations regarding Iran.
Clearly, the regime is not rehabilitating its image, if that
has been its intent.
Iran's neighbor, Iraq, wants to raise its oil input. As
such, it recently ordered government engineers to start
developing a giant oil field in the south to add 80,000 barrels
to daily production. We would welcome the Department's comments
about this new circumstance and how that impacts sanctions
against Iraq in the oil-for-food program.
We also want to discuss in greater detail the
Administration's plan to assist the Iraqi opposition, since we
met just a few days ago with leaders of the executive
presidency of the Iraqi National Congress.
Elsewhere in the region Egypt's Parliament overwhelmingly
nominated President Hosni Mubarak for a fourth 6-year term, and
President Mubarak signed into law new restrictions on Egyptian
human rights groups. Regrettably, the law allows the government
to disband the boards of directors of private groups, nullify
their decisions and object to funding resources. It will also
set prison terms at 1 or 2 years for violations.
While the State Department has said this new law takes
Egypt in the wrong direction, we are anxious to learn about
efforts to moderate this restrictive law as well as the
Department's assessment regarding the progress of democratic
governance and the human rights of the Coptic Christian
minority.
Assistant Secretary Indyk, we have a lot to cover this
morning. You may read your statement or summarize it as you
please. It will be made a part of the record of the hearing. We
would welcome in the future if you could make your statement
available to us at an earlier date. The Committee plans to send
you additional questions to be answered for the record in the
event that we don't cover everything today.
Chairman Gilman. Assistant Secretary Indyk, please proceed.
Mr. Indyk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Bear with me. I now recognize the Ranking
Minority Member Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. I am also here to hear Mr. Indyk, I will be
very brief. It must be frustrating for him to be in the
backwater area of the State Department. It seems to me not much
is happening in your region lately.
I would be curious, as you go through this, to receive an
assessment of what the situation is in a couple of places. One
in Jezzin, if I am pronouncing that correctly. Who is now in
control there? Is it the Lebanese Government, or is it the
Hezbollah? Have you met with Bashar, the son of President Asad,
and what is your sense of his gaining the ability to take over
for his father?
Obviously, as Chairman Gilman pointed out, the situation of
the 13 Jewish people who have been arrested for spying, is
something that is very troubling. Whether it is playing to
internal domestic politics between the so-called moderates and
hard-liners in Iran. In Iraq, I guess the question is the role
of Ahmed Chelabi and whether or not his organization can
actually coalesce the various factions, and is this more than a
debating society? Are these people really pulling together,
trying to come up with an organization that is capable of
replacing Saddam Hussein?
I expect that you will give us plenty of information on the
new Israeli Government and how you see the peace process moving
forward once the new governments is in place.
It is a pleasure to have you here and have you in your
post, giving us great confidence that the Administration has
picked an excellent individual for one of the real hot spots.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I found your opening
remarks exceptionally positive and accurate, and I want to
identify myself with your comments.
I merely want to add, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that several
of us in recent times have made overtures to the Government of
Iran. In my own case, Secretary-General Kofi Annan of the
United Nations conveyed my desire to visit Iran. I think it is
important to keep on the record our interest in opening a
dialogue with the Government of Iran, but this arrest of a
number of members of the Jewish community in Iran is certainly
not conducive to Iran changing its image in the West. Phony
charges against innocent civilians is not a good way for the
Iranian Government to attempt to reintegrate itself into the
civilized world community, and I am very anxious to hear
Secretary Indyk's comments on your observations.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Indyk.
STATEMENT OF MARTIN S. INDYK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR
EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Indyk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Congressmen Gejdenson and Lantos. I am grateful for the
opportunity to appear before you again to talk about U.S.
policy toward the Middle East. It has been a long time, Mr.
Chairman, and therefore, I have prepared a long statement,
which is the reason why you didn't get it earlier. I would like
to submit it for the record and just provide a few highlights.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
Mr. Indyk. I invite you to interrupt me if I'm going on too
long as I just try to summarize this long policy statement.
Mr. Chairman, in the Middle East, as in the rest of the
world, we stand on the threshold of a new millennium, but this
region finds itself caught between its turbulent and conflict-
ridden past and a future of greater peace, stability,
prosperity and popular participation. It is not yet clear which
direction the Middle East will take because the indicators are
mixed.
On the one hand, we have seen difficulties in the Arab-
Israeli peace process over the past 2\1/2\ years which have
dramatically slowed the momentum toward positive change in the
region. Last month, however, the Israeli people, as you have
noted, voted for change, and Prime Minister-elect Ehud Barak
now has a strong mandate to continue the search for a
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. If Israel's negotiating
partners are ready to respond, we believe it will be possible
to resume negotiations on all tracks and move toward the
comprehensive peace that would usher in a new era of
coexistence and regional cooperation.
Saddam Hussein's defiance of the U.N. Security Council
threatens to destabilize the Gulf while exacting a heavy price
from the Iraqi people, but Saddam has emerged from the Desert
Fox campaign weakened and isolated and much less capable of
creating trouble for his neighbors for the time being.
President Khatami's election in Iran in the recent local
elections there has made it clear that a significant majority
of the Iranian people support political liberalization, respect
for the rule of law and a constructive role for Iran in
regional and international affairs. This evolution still faces
a strong, sometimes violent, opposition from some quarters
inside Iran, and Iran's determined development of ballistic
missiles to enable delivery of its weapons of mass destruction
over long distances has the potential to trigger a new and
dangerous arms race across the region.
Extremism is now on the defensive in Algeria and Egypt
after years of bloody confrontation, and across the Arab world
the gradual struggle for political liberalization and economic
reform is taking place. Finally, King Hussein's untimely death
has underscored the fact that a process of succession is under
way across the region after decades of unchanging rule in most
Arab countries.
Because the Middle East is a region of vital interest to
the United States, we are committed to helping it achieve a
better future in the 21st century than that which it has
experienced in the last half of the 20th century, when the
Middle East was often regarded as a synonym for trouble and
hopelessness. Above all, we have an intense interest in
preventing it from backsliding into another era of extremism
and conflict marked by a new arms race in ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction.
How can we widen the circle of peace while countering those
who would oppose the promotion of a more normal existence for
all the people of this region? The answer in our minds is
clear. We must broaden the scope and depth of our relationship
with those states that share our commitment to a more peaceful
and prosperous region, work with them to achieve our common
vision, and at the same time we must enforce our ability to
contain and overcome those states or forces that threaten our
interests.
On the Middle East peace process, Mr. Chairman, it is
difficult for me to say much at this juncture because, of
course, we are waiting for Prime Minister-elect Barak to form
his government. The President and Secretary of State are
committed to advancing the peace process on all tracks. We
would like to see both Israel and the Palestinian Authority
fulfill their obligations under the Oslo accords by
implementing the Wye Agreement. We would like to see the
resumption of final status negotiations on the Palestinian
track with the objective of bringing them to a conclusion
within a year, and we would also like to see a resumption of
the long-stalled Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the peace
process negotiations, as well as the multilaterals and a
reinvigoration of the normalization process.
I would like to stress two points because I know that they
have become of some concern to many Members of this Committee.
First of all, throughout the peace process, we have been guided
by the belief that agreements can only be reached through
direct negotiations. The only bases for negotiating a peace
agreement between Israelis and Palestinians are the terms of
reference defined in Madrid and the principles agreed to in the
Oslo accords. These include U.N. Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338. They do not and never have included U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 181.
Second, our experience has taught us the importance of the
parties creating the proper environment for progress in the
negotiations and for dealing with differences through those
negotiations. That is one major reason why the Administration
is working hard to see that the proposed July 15th meeting of
the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention
does not take place. We have voiced our opposition to such a
meeting in the strongest terms and continue to do so. We have
made clear that we would not attend a meeting if it takes
place, and we have encouraged all others to do likewise. This
meeting, Mr. Chairman, will not contribute to the peace
process.
Let me just focus the rest of my remarks on Iraq and Iran
issues which you have all raised. Eight years after the Gulf
War and Saddam's persistent defiance of the international
community, we are under no illusions that Iraq, under Saddam
Hussein, will comply with UNSC resolutions on disarmament,
human rights, accounting for the Kuwaiti POW's and the return
of stolen property.
In view of this reality, our policy now rests on three
pillars. First, as long as he is around, we will contain Saddam
Hussein in order to reduce the threat he poses both to Iraq's
neighbors and to the Iraqi people. Second, we will seek to
alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people of Saddam's
refusal to comply with the UNSC resolutions; and finally, we
will work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as
Iraq's neighbors, to change the regime in Iraq and help a new
government, representative of the needs and aspirations of the
Iraqi people, rejoin the community of nations.
Our containment with regime-change policy is designed to
protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an
aggressive and hostile regime. We maintain a robust force in
the region, which we have made clear we are prepared to use
should Saddam cross our well-established red lines. Those red
lines include: Should Saddam try to rebuild his weapons of mass
destruction should he threaten his neighbors should he
challenge--continue to challenge allied aircraft within the no-
fly zones or should he move against the people living in the
Kurdish-controlled areas of northern Iraq.
Let me be particularly clear on this point. The United
States is concerned for the protection of all Iraqis against
the repression of the Baghdad regime. Hence, we believe that
the world community should tolerate no backsliding from
Baghdad's obligations under all of the U.N. Security Council
resolutions intended to protect the people of Iraq and its
neighbors from the depredations of Saddam Hussein. In
particular, Mr. Chairman, the U.N. Security Council Resolution
688 twice cited the consequences of Baghdad's repression of the
Iraqi civilian population as a threat to international peace
and security. It, therefore, demanded that Baghdad immediately
end this repression. Baghdad is in flagrant violation of this
U.N. Security Council resolution, as it is of so many others.
Although our containment policy has been effective in
preventing Saddam from threatening the region, it, of course,
has its costs. As we have seen repeatedly since 1991, even a
contained Iraq under its current leadership retains an ability
to threaten both the stability of the region and the welfare of
the Iraqi people. Both are paying too high a price for Saddam's
continued rule. In our judgment, both the region and the people
of Iraq deserve better. It is past time for Saddam to go.
For these reasons, President Clinton announced in November
of last year that the United States would work with the Iraqi
people toward a government in Iraq which is prepared to live in
peace with its neighbors and respect the rights of its people.
We are fully committed to supporting the Iraqi people in
bringing this about. In pursuit of this objective, the United
States will adhere to two important principles. First, we will
uphold the territorial integrity of Iraq; and second, we will
not seek to impose from the outside a particular government or
leaders on the people of Iraq. That is up to the Iraqi people
themselves, but we do support a change of government that will
be responsive to the aspirations of the Iraqi people, one that
takes meaningful steps toward a democratic future for the
country and can represent fairly the concerns of all of Iraq's
communities.
If it is to be successful, change must come from within,
from the Iraqis themselves. In particular, the security forces
and the people must stand on the same side against Saddam. The
support of Iraqi exiles, including the politically active
opposition, along with neighboring states, however, is
indispensable. The captive Iraqis need a voice.
Free Iraqis--those in exile and those who live in relative
freedom in northern Iraq--bear a special responsibility to
develop a coherent vision for a brighter future for this
country. They must take the lead in developing and promoting an
alternative vision based on the restoration of civil society,
the rebuilding of Iraq's economy and the promotion of a new
role for Iraq as a force for peace and reconciliation in the
region. They can also play an effective role in delegitimizing
Saddam, in helping to build the case for his prosecution as a
war criminal and in getting the truth into and out of Iraq.
Congress has provided the Administration with a number of
important tools to support Iraqis who are working toward a
better future for Iraq. These include earmarks of $8 million in
existing economic support funds. We are using these funds to
strengthen opposition political unity, to support Iraqi war
crimes initiatives, to support humanitarian programs and the
development of civil society and for activities inside Iraq. We
also have established and recently stepped up broadcasting
hours for Radio Free Iraq, which operates independently and
broadcasts daily in Arabic uncensored news and information to
the people of Iraq.
We have named a Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq,
Frank Ricciardone, who is managing our overall effort. He has
already had considerable success in helping disparate
opposition groups work together and elect a new interim
leadership that right now is preparing the way for an Iraqi
opposition conference that will have as broad participation as
possible.
Finally, there is the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides
discretionary authority to the President to direct up to $97
million in Defense Department draw down and training for
designated Iraqi opposition groups. We have now begun the
process of drawing down this account for the provision of
nonlethal supplies to the Iraqi opposition. Many have called
upon the President to use this authority to arm the Iraqi
opposition and support military action against Saddam Hussein.
We believe such action is premature. There are a host of
issues that must be resolved before such equipment and training
could be provided with confidence that it would advance our
objectives of promoting a change of regime and not just lead to
more Iraqis being killed unnecessarily. One requirement is a
credible, broad-based Iraqi political umbrella movement based
on consensus that can authoritatively articulate a future
vision for those Iraqis who now lack a voice in their own fate.
Hence, the first kind of support which we will provide to the
Iraqi opposition under the draw down will be to meet their most
urgent requirements, equipment for the infrastructure vital to
the effectiveness of an international political advocacy
movement, broadcasting equipment and training in civil affairs.
Further kinds of material assistance to the Iraqi opposition
can be provided when the conditions are created to enable them
to be best absorbed and exploited.
We will need the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors if we are
to provide effective support to the internal Iraqi opposition.
Although these neighbors all share Iraqi people's longing for a
change of regime in Baghdad, views about how we can help Iraqi
people reach this goal differ. We must take those views into
account and gain their cooperation in promoting the recovery of
Iraq as a good neighbor and contributor to regional stability.
As for Iran, Secretary Albright a year ago laid out our
approach to Iran in her Asia Society speech. The main point she
made was that we are prepared to develop with the Islamic
Republic, when it is ready, a road map in which both sides
would take parallel, reciprocal steps leading to a more normal
relationship. Unfortunately, the Iranian Government has made
clear that at this stage it is not ready to engage, insisting
instead that the U.S. first take a number of unilateral steps.
Given Iran's reluctance to begin a bilateral dialogue, we
have pursued other avenues that can serve to broaden our
engagement with Iran. We have worked constructively with Iran
in multilateral settings on issues of common concern, such as
countering the spread of narcotics and the situation in
Afghanistan. We have also noted with interest Iran's improving
relations with the Arab world, particularly on the other side
of the Persian Gulf. We welcome such a relaxation of tensions,
but at the same time we remain in close consultation with our
Arab friends in the region who share our cautious approach
based on testing Iran's willingness to abandon destabilizing
policies, and in this regard we remain concerned at Iran's
threatening approach to the islands dispute with the United
Arab Emirates.
We have also supported greater contact between our two
peoples. We believe that such exchanges can increase mutual
understanding and respect and help overcome decades of
mistrust.
Within the context of a broad review of general U.S.
sanctions policy, President Clinton recently announced his
decision to exempt commercial sales of food, medicines and
medical equipment from future and current sanctions regimes
where we have the authority to do so. This decision will enable
the sale of certain items to Iran. It does not, however,
conflict with our policy of applying economic pressure to the
Iranian Government. Any benefit derived will accrue to the
Iranian people and, of course, to American farmers and
manufacturers. It is important to remember that U.S. sanctions
policy seeks to influence the behavior of regimes, not to deny
their people basic humanitarian necessities.
Apart from that recent adjustment, our sanctions policy
will remain in force vis-a-vis Iran. The reasons behind this
policy of applying economic pressure remain the same today as
they did when that policy was first invoked. U.S. sanctions are
a response to Iranian Government practices that violate
international norms and threaten our interests and those of our
allies. In this regard we will continue to oppose bilateral
debt rescheduling, Paris Club debt treatment for Iran and the
extension of favorable credit terms by Iran's principal foreign
creditors. We will also continue to oppose loans to Iran by
international financial institutions.
Unfortunately, some Iranian government practices that we
seek to have changed have continued, although not to the same
degree in all areas under the present government of President
Khatami. Iran, as you are aware, remains on the State
Department's list of state supporters of terrorism, and despite
Iranian public statements condemning certain terrorist acts or
expressing sympathy for Kenyan and Tanzanian victims of the
August, 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam, Iranian support for terrorism remains in place.
President Khatami himself has publicly denounced terrorism
and condemned the killing of innocents, including Israelis. The
Iranian Government has also stated that Iran would accept a
peace acceptable to the Palestinians. We assume that these
statements are sincerely made, and it is therefore also
reasonable for us to expect that the actions and policies of
the Islamic Republic should reflect that. Unfortunately, so far
this is not been the case. Iran was harshly critical of the Wye
Agreement and its Hezbollah proxy in Lebanon threatened
Arafat's life, and President Khatami himself met with leaders
of the Palestinian rejectionist groups when he visited Syria
last month and apparently promised them more support.
We remain concerned at Iran's continued drive to develop
weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles
necessary to deliver them. In this regard, we are particularly
concerned about Iran's nuclear drive. Last summer Iran also
tested a ballistic missile, the Shehab III, capable of
delivering warheads 800 miles, and is reported to be close to
producing a missile with an even greater range. These
developments pose significant potential threats to U.S. forces,
as well as to our friends in the region.
We have to act quickly, Mr. Chairman, to forestall what is
shaping up to be an imminent arms race in ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction, and we need to do this by
working with Israel, with our Arab allies and with Turkey to
help boost their abilities to deal with these emerging threats.
These responses include strengthening active and passive
defenses, enhancing deterrents, slowing down proliferation
through relevant multilateral arms control regimes and other
means, and encouraging moderation in the policies pursued by
those regimes that are trying to acquire these systems.
Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles together with its other ongoing policies of
concern are the reason that we oppose investment in Iran's
petroleum sector. We oppose Iran's participation in the
development and transport of Caspian resources, and we oppose
multilateral lending to----
Chairman Gilman. Secretary, if I might interrupt, we will
continue with the hearing right through the roll call for those
of you who may want to go over and vote and come right back.
Please continue.
Mr. Indyk. Thank you. I will be wrapping up right now, Mr.
Chairman.
We oppose Iran's full integration in international economic
fora.
We look forward to a time when greater economic interaction
with Iran will be possible, but this depends on the Iranian
Government's willingness to address practices that, in our
view, continue to disqualify Iran from enjoying the full
economic and commercial advantages that come with responsible
membership in the international community.
Finally, we continue to observe with great interest
internal developments in Iran. As we have often said, we fully
respect Iran's sovereignty and the right of the Iranian people
to choose their system of government. That said, we will not
shy away from expressing our support for values that we believe
to be universal. In this regard, both the Presidential election
in 1997 and the recent municipal elections were remarkable for
their openness and the level of participation of the Iranian
people. Statements by President Khatami in support of human
rights and the rule of law deserve acknowledgment and support.
At the same time we are concerned at the gap that often
remains between words and deeds. For example, we find it hard
to reconcile President Khatami's words with the announcement
yesterday that 13 members of the Jewish communities of Shiraz
and Isfahan, including rabbis, would be charged with espionage.
These arrests, Mr. Chairman, send a very disturbing signal. We
call on the Government of Iran to ensure that no harm comes to
these individuals and to release them immediately.
Mr. Chairman, in the Middle East our vital interests remain
engaged. We face both long-standing challenges and new
opportunities to promote peace, prosperity and stability in
this troubled region. We look forward to continuing our work
with you and the Members of this Committee as we seek to
advance our interests in this troubling region, as we seek to
bring it a future of greater peace, prosperity and stability.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Secretary Indyk, for your
concise and overall review.
Chairman Gilman. Secretary Indyk, Public Law 104-45 of 1995
mandated that our U.S. Embassy in Israel should be removed from
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Can you tell us what is the status of
that move as far as the State Department is concerned?
Mr. Indyk. Yes, Mr. Chairman. As you know, when that Act
became law, President Clinton made it clear that, consistent
with his long-standing policy, he would not do anything to
undermine the peace process. That law provided that if the
embassy was not moved by May 31st of this year, 50 percent of
the funds in our security and maintenance account for foreign
buildings would be deducted from that account. We are about to
reach the point where we will be unable to use 50 percent of
those funds; that is, we have already used up 50 percent of
those funds. Therefore, while he has not made a final decision
in this regard, the President will in all likelihood use his
waiver of authority given to him under the Act so as to prevent
those funds from being rendered unavailable.
We have over the last month or so engaged in consultations
with interested Members of Congress on this subject. We have
sought to be constructive, and still wish to be constructive,
in trying to find a resolution of this issue, but we also have
to fulfill--the President has to fulfill his responsibilities
both to the peace process and to the protection of our
embassies and personnel abroad, and it is for that reason that
he is now considering using his waiver authority under the Act.
This is, as you are aware, Mr. Chairman, a very sensitive
time in the peace process. We are waiting for the Government of
Israel to be formed, a new government to be formed. That
government, we expect, given the statements made by Prime
Minister-elect Barak, will want to resume final status
negotiations on the Palestinian track as well as negotiations
on other tracks of the peace process, and in that context we
feel very strongly that we should not take actions now that
would preempt those negotiations or undermine them.
As you are aware, Jerusalem is an issue that will be
discussed in these negotiations, and we think it is incumbent
upon us, given our special role, that we promote this process,
that we not take actions now that would disrupt those
negotiations, both because of the concern that we have about
the need to have funds to ensure that our embassies and people
abroad are protected and because of our concern to not preempt
or prejudge final status negotiations that are about to get
underway. The President is now weighing the use of his waiver
authority under the Act.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Secretary, the President from time-to-
time keeps using the waiver authority with regard to this
issue, and we think it is long overdue that we get under way
with the plans. This is the only capital in the entire world
where our embassy is not situated in that capital, and if you
are talking about a limitation of funds, this Committee has
already authorized additional funds for embassy security in the
amount of hundreds of millions of dollars. I see the President
has also just in the last day or two recommended additional
funds. So, if it is a funding issue, there shouldn't be a
problem. If it is a political issue, that political issue
remains continually there, and I would think it is long overdue
that we resolve this issue.
The Congress has indicated its desire, its intent to do
this time and time again, and I think it is long overdue now
that we resolve the Jerusalem embassy issue. I would urge you
and the Department to take another hard look at all of this.
Mr. Secretary, Palestinian officials have made increasing
reference to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947,
which called for the creation of two small states for Jews and
Palestinians out of the former Palestine Mandate. Under 181,
Israel would have far less territory than before 1967. What is
the relevance of 181, and why are the Palestinians now
referring to it? How does the State Department view these
statements?
The current Middle East peace process has been based on
U.N. Security Resolutions 242 of 1967, which created a so-
called land-for-peace formula, and I would welcome your
comments.
Mr. Indyk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could just make a
comment on your statement about Jerusalem. We have not used the
waiver authority before this. If the President decides to do
it, this would be the first time.
In terms of the issue of funding, we are grateful for your
authorization of those funds. You are correct in saying the
President has asked for additional funds. The problem is that
the way the law is written in this regard, the account that
holds those funds is affected by whether the embassy is moved
or not; and 50 percent of the funds in that account, according
to the law, will not be available if the embassy is not moved
by May 31st.
May 31st has passed. Now we are at the point where 50
percent of the funds are being obligated, and we will need
access to the other 50 percent. If we don't have access to that
other 50 percent, contracts will have to be canceled, and work
will have to be suspended. That is the problem we face at the
moment, and that is one of the reasons why the President is
considering using his waiver authority.
As far as Resolution 181 is concerned, let me repeat again
in the clearest possible terms what I said in my opening
statement, that we do not regard 181 as relevant at all to the
negotiations, period. You also asked why are the Palestinians
referring to Resolution 181. As I understand it, from
statements that they have made, their reference to 181 appears
to be their desire to invoke that General Assembly resolution
as the basis for claiming an independent Palestinian state. You
may recall that Resolution 181 back in, I think, 1947 provided
for the creation of two states in Palestine, a Jewish state and
an Arab state, and that is why they are invoking this decades-
old resolution to claim legitimacy for their claim to an
independent state. As far as we are concerned, only Security
Council Resolution 242 and 338 are the resolutions relevant to
the negotiations on the Palestinian track.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Secretary, we will briefly recess. Mr.
Leach is on his way back to conduct the hearing, and we will
continue as soon as he returns. It will take a few minutes. I
am going to the floor to cast my vote.
Mr. Indyk. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Leach. [Presiding.]
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, we are delighted to see you and thank you
for a very comprehensive statement. Let me begin with an issue
that you haven't mentioned, although I take it is on the minds
of most of us. With the apparent victory of NATO in Kosovo, I
anticipate there will be major lessons learned by all of the
players in the Middle East as to the willingness and the
ability of the United States to use military power as necessary
to achieve our objectives.
I vividly recall the lunch we had with the new King of
Jordan a couple of weeks ago where, in response to several
questions, he made the very obvious point that the outcome of
the engagement in the former Yugoslavia will have an enormously
significant bearing on the attitude of players in the Middle
East. I certainly fully agree with that conclusion, as I
suspect most of my colleagues do.
My first question is--and I have two or three others--my
first question is, would you give us your reaction as to what
conclusions the various players will draw from this truly major
and, once the dust settles I think we can say, historic move by
NATO, because clearly the lesson of Kosovo, or one of the many
lessons of Kosovo, is that human rights trump national
sovereignty. Some may not like it, some clearly do not like it,
but those are the facts. Milosevic is not allowed to kill,
rape, and plunder people who are technically his subjects,
irrespective of their ethnic origin.
The second question I have relates to Japan, which is, in
this context, within your purview. I have been very disturbed,
as I think many of my colleagues have, that the Japanese
Government displays an incredible degree of reluctance in debt
forgiveness as it comes to the poorest nations on the face of
this planet. Every indication is that all of these debt
forgiveness conferences dealing with truly destitute societies
are running into a very rigid and unbending Japanese attitude
because they simply are unprepared to forgive debts that these
totally money less, resource less societies have accumulated
over the years.
During his visit here the King of Jordan raised the
Japanese issue with several of us, and I certainly am extremely
supportive of Jordan's request for debt relief as it comes to
Japan. I am wondering if you would be prepared to comment on
that issue.
The final question I have, if I still may abuse the time at
my disposal which is no longer there, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Leach. You have some leniency.
Mr. Lantos. What in your view is the rationale for the
Government of Iran to make common cause with the rejectionists
of the Palestinian groups at a time when hopefully we will be
moving toward implementation of the peace process and the
building of a stable and peaceful and prosperous Middle East?
Why is this retrograde policy continuing?
Mr. Indyk. Thank you very much, Congressman Lantos. First
of all, in terms of the Kosovo example, I think it is a very
good question, and because there is no doubt----
Mr. Lantos. Do I get an A?
Mr. Indyk. If I were grading, definitely.
There is no doubt that leaders around the world, but
especially in the Middle East, were watching closely and
continue to do so to see how this would play itself out. I
think in particular the fact that NATO, with the United States
in the lead, intervened on behalf of the Albanian-Kosovars, who
are Muslims, was something that resonated very clearly in the
Muslim world, but particularly in the Arab world. I think it
did a lot to put paid to the argument about double standards
that somehow the West and the United States always practice
against the Arabs or against the Muslims, and here was a very
clear case in which that wrongful claim was put to rest.
Second, I think the fact that we were able to demonstrate
united resolve amongst the NATO allies sent a very important
signal about our commitment to stability in Europe and to our
commitment to human rights, and those commitments will resonate
in the Middle East, as well, where they are very important.
Third, the effectiveness of air power. At the beginning of
the Kosovo conflict, you will recall that people drew the
contrast between the terrain and difficulties of operating in
Serbia with air power versus the open terrain of Iraq. I think
that NATO has demonstrated very clearly the effectiveness of
air power in Kosovo in terms of achieving our objectives. I
think that this can be multiplied by a factor of at least
three, if not more, in terms of the effectiveness of air power
should we need to use it if Saddam Hussein crosses our red
lines in Iraq. I think I made clear earlier what our red lines
are in that regard. So I think it sends a very important signal
as we continue to confront Saddam Hussein that we have the
capability and the resolve to achieve our objectives in Iraq.
Finally, I think that it serves to reinforce a message that
we have been projecting to the Middle East for some time, which
is that leaders in the region have a choice. They can get on
the side of positive, constructive change, sign on to the rules
of the international community, give up sponsorship of
terrorism, give up flaunting of Security Council resolutions,
support peacemaking in the region and thereby secure the needs
of their people and the interests of their country. I think it
is no coincidence that you see Libya, after 10 long years, now
giving up the terrorist suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing for
trial. Obviously we have to see them fulfill the rest of the
Security Council resolutions requirements. They have made some
commitments to do so. We need to test that.
We need Syria keen to reengage in the peace process with
Israel, and we see the beginnings of change in Iran as
represented by President Khatami, who, of course, himself is
the product of a very real desire for change on the part of the
Iranian people. It is no coincidence that he talks the talk of
human rights and the rule of law and respect for the
individual, but it is obviously a work in progress in terms of
the fulfillment of those lofty ideals.
I think that overall the impact of the victory in Kosovo is
a positive one in terms of the signal that it sends to the
Middle East, and that brings me--I will jump to the third
question, come back to Japan--to the question of why would Iran
support Palestinian rejectionists, and it is for me an
unfathomable issue. I don't understand why, when the President
Khatami says that they will support what the Palestinians
support, that Iran should have come out against the Wye
Agreement and should be supporting the Palestinian
rejectionists who represent nobody on the Palestinian side.
They are yesterday's men who speak only the language of
violence and terrorism and rejection. Why President Khatami
would want to associate himself with these people is, I have to
say, beyond me, and therefore I am at a loss to explain why.
I think that the Iranians continue to view Israel in very
negative terms. I think that that is very unfortunate, because
as long as they continue to do so, it is a major obstacle to
their playing a constructive role in the region and to their
having a constructive relationship with the United States.
As far as Japanese debt forgiveness, we have urged the
Japanese Government to forgive Jordan's debt. President Clinton
raised this with Prime Minister Hashimoto when he was here. We
have engaged with them repeatedly over a long period of time to
try to get them to do this. They face some difficulties with
the issue of debt forgiveness having to do with their internal
arrangements and what they would have to do to forgive the
debt; and they are also concerned that if they go ahead with
debt forgiveness under their law, they would not be able to
provide any more credit to Jordan. But the Jordanians are
making clear that they would rather have the debt forgiveness
than the future credit, and so we will continue to press this
as we will press our other G-7 partners, particularly the
French, Germans, and the British, who also hold Jordanian debt.
We would like to see them all support debt forgiveness. We,
of course, forgave Jordan's debt some years ago, some $700
million worth of Jordanian debt, and we think they should
follow suit. Why? Because with the untimely passing of King
Hussein and the ascension to the throne of King Abdullah,
Jordan, which is in a pivotal position in the region in
geostrategic terms and in terms of the peace process and in
terms of stability, faces a very real problem in terms of
growing its economy. King Abdullah, as you heard, made a very
strong commitment to doing his part in terms of economic
reform, deregulation, privatization, all the things that Jordan
needs to do to create the opportunity to grow the economy and
to attract foreign investment. We have been supporting his
efforts to open the markets in the region to Jordanian
products, which is an essential element of this, but the third
element is debt forgiveness and debt relief so that the
government doesn't have this huge burden of debt repayments at
a time when it is trying to grow the economy.
We think it is in our vital interest to see this occur, and
we strongly support it.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. [Presiding.] Thank you.
Mr. Salmon.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you very much, Ambassador Indyk. It is
good to see you again. As you know, 13 American citizens have
been killed by Palestinian terrorists in Israel since the
signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993. Over 20 suspects
in the attacks currently reside in territory controlled by the
Palestinian Authority, and several of these suspects are
walking about freely. Some have reportedly been given positions
in the Palestinian police forces. The United States has the
right and the responsibility under U.S. law to prosecute the
terrorist killers of Americans.
I do commend the Administration for sending investigative
teams on numerous occasions to Israel to investigate these
attacks, and I also want to acknowledge the Administration's
efforts to verify the incarceration of terrorists who have
murdered Americans in PA prisons. According to a June 3rd
letter from the State Department, your agency says, in an
effort to confirm that the suspects remain in custody, U.S.
officials have conducted a series of visits to PA prisons, and
I thank you for that. In the past several months our officials
have made six visits to PA prisons to confirm the incarceration
of Palestinians suspected of involvement in killing Americans.
When I visited Israel last year and met with several
Palestinian officials, including Chairman Yasser Arafat, to
express the congressional commitment that the killers of
Americans be brought to justice, there was a willingness on
their side to have the U.S. officials monitor the incarceration
status of the killers of Americans. I do appreciate the
Administration for taking the Palestinian Authority up on their
offer.
I still believe, however, that the effort to bring to
justice the Palestinian terrorists who have murdered Americans
has been incomplete, as I think you would agree. For example,
no rewards have yet been offered by the U.S. Government for
information leading to the capture of Palestinian killers of
these 13 Americans, even though multimillion-dollar rewards
have been offered in other cases of Americans killed by
terrorists abroad; and despite reams of evidence implicating
certain individuals in the murders of Americans, including in
one case, an outright confession, no indictments have been
secured by American authorities, and I have three questions
based on this issue.
I am interested in why no reward has been offered leading
to the capture of Palestinian fugitives implicated in the
attacks of Americans; that is first.
Second, Israel recently requested the extradition of one of
the alleged terrorist murderers of American citizens, Mohamed
Deif. The PA basically acknowledged knowing Deif's whereabouts,
but has indicated for political reasons that they will not
arrest Deif. Has the Administration ever criticized the
Palestinian Authority for harboring this alleged killer of
Americans?
Finally, what penalty has the PA suffered due to their lack
of complete cooperation in the investigation of the terrorists
in their territory who have murdered American citizens? I have
an additional two questions that I would like to submit for the
record.
Thank you.
Mr. Indyk. Thank you, Mr. Salmon. First of all, on the
issue of rewards, this is something that I have taken up
personally to see whether we can post rewards for the
Palestinian fugitives, those who are not in custody, who are
charged with killing Americans. There is some sensitivity
involved in this. We are trying to work this issue--I would
prefer it if you would indulge me that I brief you privately on
that matter, but it is an issue we are pursuing.
On the question of indictments, of course that is an issue
for the Department of Justice, and they are continuing to
pursue this issue, but they do not have the basis for indicting
these people as yet, and I would urge you to get the answer
from them. But we are working with them to pursue that issue,
and Mr. Mark Richards will be joining us on another trip to
Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the near future as we
pursue these issues.
As far as Mr. Deif is concerned, he is, as you are probably
aware, one of the masterminds of the Hamas bombing campaigns.
He has been a fugitive for some years now. We believe he is in
Palestinian Authority-controlled territories. We have pressed
at the highest levels, by which I mean President Clinton
himself, the Palestinian Authority, to find Deif and to arrest
him and prosecute him, and this has been a constant effort on
our part.
We have seen a responsiveness on the part of the
Palestinian Authority and a serious effort, particularly
recently, to try to find him, without success. We have indeed
criticized the Palestinian Authority in the past for its
failure to apprehend Deif, and this will continue to be one of
our highest priorities in our engagement with the Palestinian
Authority on these kinds of security issues. I would say that
we have seen a marked improvement in the performance of the
Palestinian Security Authority when it comes to preventing
terrorism, and they are working closely with Israeli security
services to achieve that objective. This remains an outstanding
issue, and we will not be satisfied until Deif is in custody.
We will continue to pursue that.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
I am going to ask that the Department of State letter of
June 3rd, 1999, with regard to this issue be made part of the
record.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, let me direct my questions to Iran and its
nuclear capabilities. In December of this last year, Jamie
Rubin said the following about the U.S. position on Bushehr's
Nuclear Power Plant. He said, ``We are convinced that Iran is
using the Bushehr reactor project as a cover for acquiring
sensitive Russian technology''. Then in your own statement on
page 5 you talk about the Administration's policies as pursuing
multilateral efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring and
developing weapons of mass destruction; and on page 12 you
specifically talk about, again, the concern of Iran's ability
to develop weapons of mass destruction and its clandestine
efforts to procure nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
You go on to say, in this regard, that we are particularly
concerned about Iran's nuclear drive.
With all of those statements and many others that the
Administration has made, can you tell me then how is it that
the State Department has requested an increase for voluntary
contributions above and beyond those which we use to
participate in the international Atomic Energy Agency? Which
voluntary contributions have fueled the development of the
Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran? I raised this question, I
believe, with you the last time you were here. I have raised it
at other times as well.
I have since learned that the IAEA has initiated a new
program in Iran to help the Iranians in the area of uranium
exploration. The IAEA in the past years has had a similar
exploration program in North Korea, which we objected to, and
following our objections, the program was ended.
So my question, Mr. Secretary, is do we continue to support
the IAEA's voluntary contributions to building what, in fact,
they themselves describe--and I am going to read from their
project description, which says, ``the technical support of the
national authorities,'' referring to Iran, ``in the proper
discharge of its function for the safe implementation of the
Bushehr nuclear power plant will be critical, critical, for the
design and construction of the plant''.
We continue to have Administration witnesses who tell us we
never want to see this plant built, and yet we continue to fuel
it. Can you explain to me how that policy is consistent?
Mr. Indyk. Not easily. I think that the way to reconcile
these, in terms of understanding what is going on here, is to
understand that we do have an interest in seeing the IAEA
extend its safeguards in Iran, and the IAEA is at the moment in
the process of seeking Iran's acceptance of enhanced safeguards
that would have--or would give--the international community
and, therefore, the United States a better ability to get a
handle on Iran's nuclear activities, and that is in our
interests.
The IAEA is not an agency of the U.S. Government. We don't
control it, and they are going about this process according to
their own judgment about how to secure this, and their view is
that under the nonproliferation treaty, signatory states are
entitled to technical cooperation, and that is why they have
engaged in these projects that you are talking about. It is
under that rubric of technical cooperation.
We have made our views clear to the IAEA. We have objected
to the project, and we have done so at senior levels of the
IAEA. The agency has nonetheless decided to proceed with that
project.
Mr. Menendez. Mr. Secretary, my concern is very simply that
while the IAEA is a great agency and we all support it, we all
support, to the extent that any country is going to promote a
nuclear program, for it to be under the safeguards established
under the international norms of the IAEA. We in the past
raised in North Korea questions very strenuously about uranium
exploration. We already know that the Iranians have uranium
conversion technology. Now we are going to help them seek
uranium, we are going to help them with their technical
cooperation, and we may not control the IAEA, but we are its
major, major contributor of voluntary funds. I cannot believe
that we cannot achieve in the Iran case what we achieved in the
North Korea case and, at least, not give them the uranium
exploration capability that will ultimately make the reactor a
reality.
I do hope the Administration will vociferously take a
position in this regard. Otherwise it is a hollow policy as far
as I am concerned.
Mr. Leach. [Presiding.] Thank you. I would just like to
raise several quick issues. One, you referenced in Jordan the
desire to get Japanese debt forgiveness. On the table in the
international community at this time is a broader debt
forgiveness involving 45 of the poorer countries in the world.
The Administration has theoretically been somewhat supportive,
but has not been definitively so, and I understand the subject
is going to be raised at the next G-7.
I would just like to emphasize, because it touches
potentially either directly in your jurisdiction in one or two
countries or neighboring jurisdiction, there is a lot of
support in Congress for this initiative, and I hope that you
are not too dainty in your attitudes. As you are advocating
debt forgiveness for Japan, this is an exceptional time for the
poorest of the poor to be very forthcoming. I hope that message
is loud and clear to the Department of State, which has not
been quite as active as it should be on this subject. There
will be legislation that will be under consideration by perhaps
this summer in that regard.
Second, I would like to raise the issue of culture and
food. With regard to Iran, you have properly referenced that we
do have some more forthright cultural exchanges. Everybody in
life has certain interests, and you reference some orchestras
and music and academic exchanges, but the greatest aesthetic
art in the history of mankind is the sport of wrestling, and I
hope the Department of State continues to bear that in mind,
particularly with Iran. Wrestling is more important to Iran by
maybe a thousandfold factor than ping-pong was to China. I hope
as these wrestling exchanges come into being, the Department of
State will be forthright, and I bring to you an Iowa
perspective on this subject as well as a very personal one.
With regard to food in Iran, I happen to believe, as many
do, that in terms of people-to-people relations, food and
medicine are fundamentally people to people as contrasted with
geostrategic and other dimensions, at least absent actual war.
It is, of course, appropriate to open up in food and medicines
with Iran, but it may not be a significant step unless there
are government loan guarantees on the food side. So my question
to you is, is the Administration considering loan guarantees on
food exports to Iran?
Mr. Indyk. First of all, on the issue of debt forgiveness,
this is not my area of responsibility, but I will certainly
take back your views and make sure that they are registered
forcefully with my colleagues. Jordan actually is not part of
that group of the poorest nations, but for the other reasons
that I have outlined to Congressman Lantos, we feel that it
should enjoy the benefits of that debt forgiveness.
We agree with you completely and welcome your comments
about wrestling, and we have sought to facilitate an exchange
of wrestlers in various competitions, and that clearly
resonated very strongly with the Iranian people. The
unfortunate thing is that we can do these kinds of things, and
we will continue to do them--and people-to-people exchanges are
important, and the Iranians proposed enhancing that, and we
have taken them up on that--but it hasn't, unfortunately, so
far, perhaps it is too soon, had the kind of snowballing effect
in terms of their willingness to engage with the United States
in discussion of the issues of concern to us and the issues of
concern to them.
We made it clear that we are ready to discuss both, but
that we need to have that discussion. I think the President has
been very clear in his interests in finding a way to engage
with Iran, but we have also been very clear that there are
these issues that need to be addressed, and that we are
prepared to do so. There are things that concern them as well
as the things that concern us.
I hope that wrestling will have the desired impact, and
that sooner rather than later we will have the chance to
wrestle with them over the negotiating table.
As far as loan guarantees, I have to answer that question
in the negative. As part of this decision, we do not intend to
provide loan guarantees for the purchase of food or medicines.
The Iranian Government has the ability to pay for the needs of
its people. If it doesn't, we think it should spend less on
armaments, and particularly weapons of mass destruction, and
more on the needs of its people. I don't think that the need is
really there in this case, but even if it was, I don't believe
that we would be involved in that kind of business. As I make
clear in my opening remarks, we are opposed to international
financial lending or extension of credits to Iran as long as it
goes around doing things which threaten our interests and the
interests of the international community.
Mr. Leach. Fair enough. I just want to conclude by
emphasizing I think everybody in this Congress would rather
have exchanges with Iran based on muscle and not missile power.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. I would like to focus on your testimony on
Iran, and I missed part of it. I take it is the
Administration's belief that Iran continues to supply financial
and other forms of assistance to organizations that we view as
terrorist organizations. Does that assistance continue at this
time?
Mr. Indyk. Yes, it does, in particular to Hezbollah.
Mr. Berman. What about Hamas?
Mr. Indyk. To Hamas it is more in terms of training and
political connections, as far as we are aware. The Hamas
doesn't have financial problems that they need to depend on
Iran for financial assistance. They have their own network that
we have been trying to shut down, a global network for raising
funds. The Iranians also provide financial support to the
Palestine Islamic Jihad, which is a straight terrorist
organization based in Damascus. So it is basically Hezbollah,
Hamas and PIJ that we are concerned about.
Mr. Berman. There is a view that has been stated a lot that
basically President Khatami doesn't really have control of
foreign and security policies. Is that the Administration's
view, that others in Iran are in control on those issues; and
that notwithstanding his perception as a moderate, it has very
little impact on Iranian foreign policy?
Mr. Indyk. I think he does control Iranian foreign policy,
if I can draw a distinction between that and national security
policy. He doesn't control, as far as we can tell, the national
security institutions, whether it is the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards and their terrorist arm, the Al Guds force, or whether
it is the Ministry of Intelligence, although he does have some
influence there ,but he doesn't appear to control it.
As far as how to characterize what is going on there, I
think we in the West, in the United States, have tended to view
this as a struggle between the forces of enlightenment and the
forces of reaction, with Khatami representing the good guys,
with Supreme Leader Khomeini representing the bad guys, and
with former President Rafsanjani somewhere in the middle. I am
not sure that this captures the complexity of the power
struggle that is going on. There is certainly a dimension of
that where the conservatives, and the conservative clergy in
particular, are concerned about the way in which the people
want greater freedom, freedom of expression, greater respect
for the rule of law, greater individual freedoms. Khatami, the
President, very much represents that point of view, but when it
comes to national security policy, it seems that there is a
kind of collective decisionmaking that goes on, and he operates
within the context of this collective decisionmaking. I think
we have seen considerable change in some areas.
If you look at the rapprochement within the Gulf in
particular, with the Gulf Arabs, you see that they have
attenuated some of their objectionable policies when it came to
subversion and promotion of terrorism against these countries.
They have, for all intents and purposes, stopped that, which
suggests that there is some kind of collective decision in that
regard.
I think we have to view it in both respects. What they have
been able to do in the Gulf is entirely reasonable to expect
them to be able to do when it comes to other forms of
terrorism, particularly terrorism against the United States. We
continue to be concerned about surveillance activities and
preparations in that regard and when it comes to terrorism
against the peace process. We are hopeful that they will come
to understand that the very principle that they have applied in
the case of reconciliation and rapprochement with the Gulf
Arabs applies in these other cases as well, and that they will
stop pursuing terrorism completely.
Mr. Berman. So it is now fair to conclude that,
notwithstanding some internal liberalization, what I take to be
a relatively open election recently and some changes in Iranian
attitudes toward its neighbors in the Gulf, that on the basic
points of continuing to develop a nuclear weapons capability, a
long-range missile capability, and continuing support for at
least certain terrorist organizations designed to try and
destroy the Middle East peace process and perhaps some U.S.
targets as well, those problems that caused our dual
containment policy to develop are ongoing. Is that a fair----
Mr. Indyk. That is correct. With reference to dual
containment, there is a long section that I didn't refer to in
my opening statement about this. Dual containment is a policy
that has developed over the past 6 years in two directions. In
the case of Iraq, we are containing until overthrow. In the
case of Iran, we are containing until engagement. So we are, in
a sense, ready to go two different ways when it comes to Iraq
and Iran, or we are already embarked on different routes.
Mr. Berman. I understand, and if we were to start
negotiating or discussing our differences with Iran, U.S.
policy would not keep us from doing that as I understand it?
Mr. Indyk. That is right. We have made it clear that we
would engage with them.
Can I draw a distinction? I am not so sure how useful it
is, but I think it is important that in the case of Iran's
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, that is something on
which we don't see any differences between Khatami and
Khomeini, or, for that matter, between this present government
and the previous government of the Shah of Iran. The
explanation for that, I think, is that Iran lives in a
strategic neighborhood where other neighbors have these
weapons. Iran has strategic ambitions to be dominant in its
region, and those are powerful motivators that will affect the
whole question of whether they continue to pursue these
weapons.
Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, would you just indulge me one
reaction to that comment?
Chairman Gilman. [Presiding.] Without objection.
Mr. Berman. I have thought for a long time that it is a
mistake to hinge our policy toward Iran on whether Iran is
continuing to pursue its weapons program. It is going to do
that as long as it sees that that is in its interest, it seems
to me--as opposed to, say, its continued support for terrorism
and its implacable opposition to the Middle East peace process.
On the issue of its weapons program, the focus should be on
those countries that are contributing to Iran getting that
program, not on Iran's policy. We should be looking at the
proliferators in our continued and ongoing attempts to impede
and slow down their ability to get those weapons.
Mr. Indyk. I agree with you, with one caveat, and that is
that we do concentrate on the proliferators. As you know, we
have had some success when it comes to North Korea and China.
We have had less success when it comes to Russia. We are
continuing to focus on that and hope that the kinds of action
plans that have now been agreed on will be implemented, the
kinds of law that have been passed there will also be
implemented, and that this will have the effect of controlling
the flow of technical assistance to Iran for its weapons
programs. But it still remains important to address the issue
of how to deal with the implications of Iran's acquisition of
these weapon of mass destruction. That is an issue we are
increasingly concerned about because of the way in which it can
generate an arms race in the region, where countries who feel
threatened by this development feel it necessary to develop
their own weapons of mass destruction and missiles and so on.
That is why we have developed this comprehensive approach that,
on the one hand, tries to help our allies in the region--
Israel, the Arab countries, Turkey--help them to defend against
these threats, help them to deter such threats, help to slow
them down, as you already suggested, and also tries to find a
way to establish a regional security system in which these
weapons do not represent destabilizing elements. That requires
a moderation of the regimes that have these policies as well.
So, as part of a comprehensive approach, moderating the
regime in Iran is an important element.
Mr. Berman. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
Dr. Cooksey.
Dr. Cooksey. It is good to have you here today. The
Clinton-Carville team was actually involved in the race in
Israel recently, and I was over there earlier when the campaign
was going on. My question is, first, what are the
Administration's plans in terms of what is going to go on with
Israel and its surrounding neighbors, and are we going to
impose the Administration's plans for the settlement of the
Golan Heights issue and some of the other issues there?
Second, if we are imposing our political values and
political campaigns on the Middle East countries, are we going
to continue to impose Americanism on these other civilizations
that have different cultural values; or are we going to allow
them to keep the good things about their culture and their
civilizations as they move into a world in the next century in
which people's values, lives and freedoms are respected?
Mr. Indyk. We have long believed that peace in the Middle
East cannot be imposed on the parties, on any party; that the
only way to achieve a lasting peace is through a direct
negotiation between the parties in which they reach agreement
amongst themselves. We can facilitate that. We can, where it
makes sense, propose ideas or bridging proposals; but we cannot
and will not impose our own view of a settlement on the parties
because that is just a recipe for an unstable arrangement that
won't last, and we are not interested in that.
As far as imposing our culture, you raise an interesting
point about which I think there is a great deal of concern,
particularly in the Arab world, where it has been present for
not just for decades, but for centuries. This is the historical
tension between the West's culture of modernization and Islam's
values, and it has in many ways been a creative tension. Islam
has made a tremendous contribution, as you are probably aware,
to Western civilization, but at times it can be quite
threatening to them.
But my first point is that this is not a new phenomenon. It
doesn't come with the Internet and globalization. It has been
there for many centuries, in fact, since Napoleon invaded
Egypt. In the current environment, what we see in the region is
an effort to come to terms with this, to try to reconcile the
tension between Islam and the West; and what we do see is
traditional Islamic conservative societies beginning to change,
to modernize. The modernization is inevitable as a result of
globalization, but as the new generation comes forward, we
see--and that is what we are witnessing now--a generational
change in the Middle East. We see a greater openness and
receptivity to the process of modernization, and this is
occurring at both the levels of the people and the leaders. An
important phenomenon to note is the way in which the succession
process is now taking place to the next generation.
It happened in Israel's democratic process with the
election of Netanyahu, and Barak is of that generation. It has
happened in Jordan with the passing of the throne to the next
generation, King Abdullah rather than the previous crown
prince, King Hassan, the king's brother. We have seen it happen
in Bahrain as well with the new emir, the son of the old emir.
We see an ophthalmologist in Damascus being groomed by his
father to take over there.
Dr. Cooksey. Better than a lawyer.
Mr. Indyk. But it is not just there. King Hassan in Morocco
is grooming his son to take over. Throughout the Gulf you have
a new generation being prepared to assume power, and those
people, coming from a younger generation, most of them having
been educated in the West, do bring to government a modern
outlook and an ability to reconcile this tension in a way in
which the older generation had much more difficulty.
Dr. Cooksey. Good; that is my concern. I have met people on
both sides of the issue in the Middle East on the Israeli side
and on the Arab side, and there are some wonderful traditions
in all the cultures. I just hate to see us go in and impose our
political system. There are some bad things about our political
system, too, sometimes; and I also hate to see us put a
McDonald's on every corner, because they have some wonderful
food without McDonald's--in fact I seldom go to McDonald's
here. I would hope that the good things about their culture,
their religion, their traditions are left alone. Maybe some of
the areas that cause some problems and are not ideal in a
democratic society will improve with time.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I will defer to
my colleague, who I think was here before me.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I want to invite the doctor to my district where the
number of Middle Eastern restaurants nearly reaches the number
of McDonald's.
Dr. Cooksey. Great.
Mr. Sherman. I want to commend the Ambassador for his
response on the question of loans to rogue states. I know it is
particularly appealing to think that we are providing food, but
really, we are just providing money. Even something as
seemingly innocent as a loan guarantee to Iran to buy food is
as good as a loan, because if you can borrow money with the
full faith and credit of the United States, you can get money
anywhere and at low rates. Money is fungible, and the money
that Iran doesn't need to spend from its own budget to buy food
can be used to buy weapons of mass destruction or to fund
terrorism. I would add for the record, and I don't have the
citation, that a study of Iraq during the 1980's indicates that
the money it was able to avoid spending to buy food went
directly into its weapons acquisition and development programs.
I particularly want to commend the Ambassador for his
statements about the 13 Jewish religious leaders from the
Iranian city of Shiraz. I believe this is the first public U.S.
Government comment; and that makes sense because, although
these religious leaders were seized during Passover, over 60
days ago, many of us have worked behind the scenes. But you
can't work behind the scenes anymore now that the Iranian
Government has charged these individuals, rabbis, with spying,
a capital offense in Iran. Mr. Ambassador, what effort is the
State Department undertaking or planning to undertake in order
to secure their release or at least assure their safety?
Mr. Indyk. Thank you, Congressman Sherman. I know that you
have been particularly concerned about this and involved in
trying to resolve the situation. It is, I am sure you will
agree, a very unfortunate development that the Government of
Iran has announced that these 13 Iranian Jews from Shiraz and
Isfahan, some of them teachers, some of them rabbis, have been
charged with espionage. As you know, we have been actively
following this since it occurred, seeking to support efforts by
others to find a solution to the problem, and we will continue
to do so.
As you know, we do not have a direct dialogue or ability to
engage the Iranian Government directly in this regard. We will
certainly be active in ensuring that those who do have the
ability to engage with the Iranian Government make this an
issue. I would repeat again what I said in my opening remarks,
when I don't think you were here, that we call on the
Government of Iran to ensure their safety and to release them
immediately.
Mr. Sherman. I was here in spirit. I heard you.
We have recently undertaken an extraordinary effort for the
benefit of peace and security in Europe. We have reacted to
human rights abuses and stability threats in Europe with
greater force than similar threats and similar abuses on other
continents. With that in mind, have we called upon Europe to
pressure or even perhaps reduce its economic involvement with
Iran? I make reference especially to the investment of the
Total French Oil Company in Iranian oil fields. Is that
something we are either doing or anticipate doing?
Mr. Indyk. We have worked closely with our European allies,
particularly when it comes to counter proliferation, to prevent
Iran from acquiring the technology capabilities that would
enable them to advance their WMD Programs. Its the same when it
comes to terrorism--making sure that this is an issue on their
agenda when they engage with the Iranians.
When it comes to economic pressure on Iran, we have been
less successful. We have tried hard over the years to persuade
our allies not to engage in normal commerce with Iran. We
succeeded in some cases in preventing international financial
institutions from lending to Iran. We have succeeded in holding
up any kind of foreign assistance to Iran, but when it comes to
commercial dealings, including foreign credits by these
countries, we have had less success.
When it comes to investment in the Iranian oil industry, we
have taken a very strong position against that, as has the
Congress. We have opposed that very forcefully. The Congress
has enacted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which provides for
sanctions in the case of foreign investment in the Iranian oil
industry.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Ambassador, if I could cut you short
because I just want to get in one question to which you may
want to respond in writing later. I do hope in light of Kosovo
that the European public is urged to make some sacrifices in
this direction.
I just want to shift and put in the record a question. We
have not moved our embassy to Jerusalem or taken other steps
because we do not want to deal with issues involving final
status, yet at the same time the President has written a letter
stating that the Palestinian people should be able to determine
their own future on their own land, which many have been
interpreted as leaning in the direction of statehood or at
least dealing with the issue of final status. In light of the
Administration already commenting upon final status with regard
to self-determination, how could it be harmful for the U.S.
Ambassador to officially maintain a working office in Jerusalem
or to allow Americans born in Jerusalem to have their parents
listed on their passport, place of birth, Jerusalem, Israel?
Mr. Indyk. Do I have a chance to answer that?
Chairman Gilman. Please, yes, but time is short, so we will
have to conclude right after Mr. Delahunt. Go ahead.
Mr. Indyk. In terms of the statement the President made,
this is not a new statement. This is a repetition of statements
he has made in the past. He is very careful to avoid endorsing
Palestinian right to self-determination. I think you, yourself,
said some may have interpreted it that way, but that is not the
position we have taken. We continue to argue very forcefully
and effectively to the Palestinians that the only way in which
they can pursue their aspirations effectively is through
negotiations, and that is the exact context in which those
words you read were made in the President's letter to Chairman
Arafat. That is the position that we took and succeeded in
getting him to avoid making a unilateral declaration of
independence.
We are entirely consistent in saying that whether these
issues are Jerusalem or the status of the Palestinian and Judea
issues, that the parties agreed they would deal within the
final status negotiations, and that is where they should be
addressed. We will not seek to preempt the outcome of those
negotiations, whether they have to do with Palestinian rights
or Israelis.
When it comes to the--you mentioned passports, and what was
the other issue? Can you help me?
Mr. Sherman. One issue was officially maintaining a working
office.
Mr. Indyk. Yes. I just wanted to make clear that we had a
suite of rooms in a hotel when I was Ambassador that we
maintained, the Alon Hotel. Now the Ambassador has an apartment
there for the sake of convenience and security and for
conducting business in Jerusalem. We use those rooms for that
purpose, and that has been a long-standing practice. I think it
started under Ambassador Sam Lewis, so we don't avoid doing
business in Jerusalem in that way.
As far as the passport is concerned, it is a very difficult
issue which I personally feel quite uncomfortable about. But
again, consistent with our policy of not wanting to do anything
that would infer that we take a position on this issue, we have
avoided resolving that.
I hope, Mr. Sherman, that we will be able to get the final
status negotiations resumed in short order, and that we will be
able to resolve these issues in those negotiations. Our
objective is to try to do that on an accelerated basis, and
that hopefully a year from now we won't have to have these
kinds of discussions.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I don't know if I have any time, Mr.
Chairman, but let me just pose three questions, and if there is
insufficient time, maybe you can communicate in writing. You
expressed concern about Iran's position vis-a-vis the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. Could you describe the level of
activity that you discern in terms of impeding that process?
Second, on page 12 of your testimony, you refer to concern
about the arms race and ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. Then you go forward to talk about strengthening
active and passive defenses and enhancing deterrents. I am just
somewhat concerned that we may be encouraging or inciting or
aiding and abetting that arms race. Could you just clarify
that?
Again, I refer to page 10 of your testimony which discusses
how we have worked constructively with Iran in multilateral
settings on issues of common concern, such as countering the
spread of narcotics. I applaud that. I would like to hear you
amplify on that. Who is winning those wrestling matches, by the
way?
Mr. Indyk. We are.
Mr. Delahunt. We are. That is good to hear.
Mr. Indyk. In terms of Iranian opposition to the peace
process, I think the best example of the problem here was after
the Wye Agreement was signed by Chairman Arafat. The Iranians
came out and attacked him and the Palestinian Authority in a
very critical way, and I think within about a week of the
signing of that agreement, a bomb went off in Jerusalem.
Thankfully, it went off prematurely and only wounded a few
people, but the Palestine Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility
for that bomb, and that bomb was aimed at the heart of the
peace process.
Mr. Delahunt. You have concluded that was not simply
because of the link between Iran and the Jihad, but that this
specific act was supported by Iran?
Mr. Indyk. Let me be a little careful here.
Mr. Delahunt. Right.
Mr. Indyk. What is clear is that Iran is supporting the
Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad is not
like Hamas. It doesn't have a kind of political movement behind
it. It is a straight terrorist organization, and it is financed
by Iran, and that is the problem. If that bomb had succeeded in
going off when it was supposed to in the middle of a market in
Jerusalem, it would have had a devastating effect.
So we have to ask ourselves, what are the Iranians up to?
What are they trying to achieve here? It seems from their
rhetoric as well as their actions that they want to impede the
peace process. They want to succeed. I believe that, however,
past terrorist bombings that were backed by Iran did have an
effect in seriously slowing down the process. It is because of
these specific issues that we continue to be concerned about
it. You have a situation where President Khatami, who has
condemned terrorism, goes to Damascus and meets with these
groups, and we have to ask ourselves why, is that necessary?
When it comes to what we are doing on the WMD front, I
think I understand your point, but what we are trying to do
here is help countries that are threatened by these weapons,
and deal with it through defense or enhancing their deterrent
capability with our own deterrent capabilities. These are
difficult, complex questions. We are not there yet. We are not
ready to brief you on exactly what it is we have in mind when
it comes to deterrents, but the whole purpose is to avoid that
arms race rather than to fuel it.
When it comes to counter narcotics, the Iranians have been
very aggressive in their efforts to stamp out narcotics
production in Iran and transiting of narcotics through Iran.
Mr. Delahunt. Have we worked with them in a multilateral--
--
Mr. Indyk. Through the UNDP, we have. We have supported
that. We have recognized their efforts in that regard by taking
them----
Mr. Delahunt. If I may, Ambassador, have our drug
enforcement officials, our law enforcement officials had direct
contact with their counterparts?
Mr. Indyk. I don't believe so, although I am not exactly
sure, but that hasn't happened in international fora. I believe
that there may be some opportunities in the near future.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Secretary, one last question. Is the Administration
considering ways to extend the life of existing economic aid
programs for Yemen which are currently operating on residual
funds in a pipeline, and what is the status of Yemen's request
that the Peace Corps return to Yemen?
Mr. Indyk. The answer is we would very much like to. I
think, Mr. Chairman, how seriously stressed the foreign aid
funds are, and any help that you can provide us in that regard
in terms of the moneys available would be much appreciated
because we do think Yemen deserves support and that the aid
program should be extended.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you very much for your time and
patience, Mr. Secretary. The meeting stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the Committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 8, 1999
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