[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 9, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-119
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
international--relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-354 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member
Joan I. O'Donnell, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
WITNESSES
Page
The Honorable James Pardew, Principal Deputy Special Advisor to
the President and Secretary of State for Dayton and Kosovo
Implementation, U.S. Department of State....................... 8
The Honorable Larry C. Napper, Coordinator for Eastern European
Assistance (SEED), U.S. Department of State.................... 10
Dr. Daniel S. Hamilton, Special Coordinator for Implementation of
the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 13
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman a Representative in Congress
from New York and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations...................................................... 36
The Honorable George P. Radanovich, a Representative in Congress
from California................................................ 38
The Honorable Larry C. Napper.................................... 40
The Honorable James Pardew....................................... 56
Dr. Daniel S. Hamilton........................................... 70
Additional material submitted for the record:
Questions submitted for response by the Administration, submitted
by Chairman Gilman............................................. 84
U.S. ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in
room 2200, Rayburn House Office Guilding, Hon. Benjamin A.
Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will come to order.
It is apparent that the region of Southeast Europe, the
Balkans region, is not only demanding an increasing amount of
attention from policy makers in our government, it is now
making a claim on an ever-greater share of our budget
resources.
In the next few days we'll be introducing legislation which
I hope will help us all to get a handle on just how much of our
budget resources will, in fact, be claimed by programs intended
to help the countries of that region over the next few years.
Let me point out that during the last decade the United
States provided roughly $7 billion in foreign aid and debt
forgiveness to the 15 states that now constitute all of Eastern
Europe, plus billions of dollars more in funds for peace
keeping and military costs in the Balkans region.
Last year we led our NATO allies in a 3-month military
operation against Serbia that cost billions more to our defense
budget.
Today we find that our foreign aid budget for just the
eight states of Southeastern Europe has ballooned up to well
over $1 billion in the last fiscal year.
The President has now submitted a supplemental
appropriations request asking for more foreign aid that would
raise our foreign assistance to the Balkans once again to well
over $1 billion.
We are informed that the President is now also asking for
roughly $2 billion more for our defense budget for the cost of
our military deployments in the Balkans.
Finally, the President last year committed our Nation to
participate in the multilateral assistance program for the
Balkans, the total cost of which no one seems willing or able
to tell the Congress.
All of this comes at a time when the President is asking
for large aid increases to fight the flow of illicit drugs in
our hemisphere, to support the peace process in the Middle
East, to fight the proliferation of technology related to
weapons of mass destruction, and to support reforms and protect
nuclear materials in nuclear-armed Russia.
Last August our Committee on International Relations held a
hearing on our growing American engagement in the Balkans. Many
of our Committee Members took the opportunity raised by that
hearing to send up some cautionary flags regarding the amount
of our taxpayers' money that would be made available for the
rapidly growing expenses in the Balkans.
As we all know, the European Union has stated that it will
take the lead in carrying the burden in the Balkans. That is,
in fact, what many Members here in Congress would agree should
happen.
The legislation that I and other Members of the Committee
intend to introduce next week would place a flexible cap on
what our Nation should contribute over the next 5 years to the
multilateral aid program for the Balkans. It is important for
our Nation to set its priorities.
We can continue under such a cap to provide generous aid to
the region. We can, indeed, be very helpful to the Balkan
countries through our continued aid. Our very considerable
military costs, which are not covered by the cap in this
legislation, will also likely continue for some time in the
Balkan region.
We must recognize, however, that the prosperous states of
the European Union have taken on the task of leading the
multilateral aid effort in Southeast Europe and should fulfill
it.
Setting clear policy on the extent of the role our Nation
will play with regard to foreign aid for the Balkans region
should help us achieve that outcome.
Before I recognize our Ranking Member for his opening
remarks, let me say that I believe our hearing today is timely.
The daily news reports the continuing ethnic strife that
afflicts the Balkans. We now have two U.S. military deployments
in that region in support of peace--deployments with no clear
end in sight.
Our Reserve and Guard units are being called up for
unprecedented, lengthy tours of duty in the Balkans that are
having an impact on the morale and lives of our military
personnel.
In short, our bills are growing and will continue to grow.
Our hearing this morning is intended to help us understand how
much those bills might finally total.
I'd now like to recognize our Ranking Member, Mr.
Gejdenson, for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Gilman appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It does seem a
shame that history will be deprived of our collective wisdom
opening this hearing, but I am ready to go ahead anyway.
Chairman Gilman. We'll submit our opening statements for
the record, without objection.
Mr. Gejdenson. Let me just say that I think all of us share
the responsibility to make sure that when the taxpayers' money
is used, that it is used effectively and that America, while it
takes up its share of responsibility as the leading democracy
in the world, that we make sure that our European allies and
other countries, the developed countries, take on a fair
responsibility.
I think it is important to note that when we take a look at
American security, we spend about a third of a trillion dollars
on defense. That is an important part of our security without
any question, coming from the arsenal of democracy. Our state's
very focused on that part.
We spend about 7 percent of what we spend in the defense
budget in the account that deals with the State Department and
foreign diplomacy. It is often hard in the short-term to look
at the savings and the costs involved in these areas.
I frankly think if there's a place in this budget that the
American taxpayers get a great return--not that we do not make
mistakes, not that we cannot be more efficient--it is in our
foreign diplomatic effort.
We spent over half a century in Germany, we spent over half
a century in Korea with hardware, with personnel, with
tremendous expense to make sure Americans' interests were
defended, that peace in the world was defended. I think we have
to recognize, as we sharpen our pencils and make sure the
Administration is getting the best return for the taxpayers,
that what we do in the Baltics and elsewhere in Europe is of
immense importance to American security. Whether those East
Bloc countries succeed as Poland and Lithuania, and the Baltic
states are succeeding, or whether they become as Belarus is
today, another Stalinist state, is of incredible importance to
the United States.
We have made most of Eastern Europe our allies and friends.
I think we have a great opportunity to expand that and even
build a long-term, solid relationship with Russia.
So I think these are important hearings and we ought to
make sure that we recognize that this is all part of America's
economic and military security.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Is there any other Member seeking recognition?
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman, I will not take
much time.
This is a region of the world which in many ways is the
most complex. The failure over the years of our policy makers
to grasp the complexity of Central and Eastern Europe has been
an extremely costly enterprise.
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, some of us publicly
called on the Administration of President Bush to issue an
ultimatum to Milosevic indicating that violence, military
action, will not be tolerated. Just as we succeeded for two
generations from keeping the mighty Soviet Union from taking
military action any place in Europe, tiny Yugoslavia would have
heeded such an injunction.
The President, Secretary of State Baker, then Secretary of
State Eagleberger, opposed these suggestions. The result has
been close to 260,000 innocent people dead, and hatreds which
are referred to as historic becoming very current.
It is one thing to be upset about the battle of Kosovo in
1389. It is another thing to be upset about your wife or
daughter being raped or your son being killed 3 weeks ago.
So we need to move into these areas in a preventive
fashion, and that the Bush Administration failed to do in 1991.
Had there been a clear message to Milosevic, none of these
issues would be before us now. Not the billions and billions of
dollars in cost, and not the quarter million people who are
dead. Not the collateral damage of shipping on the Danube
coming to a halt, basically impacting on the economy of Romania
and Hungary in a very negative way, and none of the upsurge of
anti-American sentiment in Russia because of our Kosovo
activity.
When the history books will be written about the last
decade of the 20th Century, the failure to act intelligently
and preventively in this region will go down as one of the
colossal failures of American foreign policy.
Let me just mention in contrast that the initiative taken
by my good friend and colleague Congressman Bereuter and myself
in recommending that a small American military contingent be
placed in Macedonia played an indispensable role in preventing
the bloodshed from moving over into that small republic.
So I look forward to the testimony of our friends and
guests, but I do so with regret. All of this could have been
avoided had the Bush Administration, at the peak of its
popularity following the victorious conclusion of the Persian
Gulf encounter, moved resolutely in Yugoslavia. That failure is
the failure we are dealing with today--the billions we have put
into this effort, the vast numbers of people who have been
innocently killed, the destruction of a fabric of a functioning
society.
I've been going to Kosovo and the region for years on an
annual basis. All of this comes from the notion which is still
so prevalent in this body that somehow we can look away from a
problem and it will solve itself--whether the problem is
Colombia today, Kosovo yesterday, East Timor the other day. We
need to take preventive action, we need to anticipate events,
and we must rise above what are cheap, short-term political
considerations of not wanting to get into this conflict.
Secretary of State Jim Baker said, ``We have no dog in that
fight,'' Yugoslavia. We had plenty of dogs in that fight, and
Jim Baker made one of the most horrendously irresponsible
statements when he said that.
We have learned in the following 9 years how many dogs we
had in that fight. It is an appalling phenomenon to have a
Secretary of State display this degree of a lack of
sophistication in dealing with an impending crisis which could
have been easily prevented.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Lantos. I will be happy to yield.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. I thank my colleague for yielding or being
recognized on my own time here. I was not going to speak, but
first of all, I appreciate the comments of my colleague from
California with respect to what we encouraged the
Administration to do in Macedonia, and we are, in my judgment
so to speak, not out of the woods there yet. We need to focus
in our bill upcoming on Macedonia as well as Albania.
The gentleman points very much to the Bush Administration,
and frankly, I do not disagree with him in most respects.
It does seem to me that we, the North Atlantic Alliance,
were not ready for the end of the Cold War. Our institutions
were not ready to cope with what happened in Yugoslavia.
As a Member then of the House Intelligence Committee, I was
impressed with the quality of the intelligence and the
predictions that we had available to us. We saw the scenario
unfold, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the violence that
followed, exactly as predicted. Policy makers in the Bush
Administration, and then in the Clinton Administration, were
unwilling to act on that intelligence.
I do think we needed to have something like we now have--a
Combined Joint Task Force--so that coalitions of the willing
could have taken on that problem at its earliest stage in
Yugoslavia. We did not have that instrument, and Europeans
certainly did not have any stomach for involvement.
In fact, although well-intentioned, the German recognition
of Solvenia's independence really precipitated the problem that
we saw very shortly in Eastern Croatia between Serbs and
Croatians. The Serbs were concerned about the protection of the
Serbian ethnics living in that part of Croatia. That, I think,
was the time when we should have used force and could have used
it effectively.
But we didn't. There's a lesson I think we also need to
learn out of that, my colleagues. As difficult as it is for
Americans to accept this fact, sometimes there are things that
are more important than self-determination. The continued
solidarity of the Yugoslavian state was more important than the
understandable desire of Slovenians to have independence
because ultimately, it precipitated in a matter of days a
Croatian demand for a declaration of independence. Then we were
off to the violent races.
That's a lesson we need to learn, and it applies in places
in Africa as well. Sometimes there are things that are more
important than self-determination.
I thank my colleagues for listening, and now I'd like to
see if we have something to hear from our witnesses. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.
Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. I will be very brief.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me just say it is no secret where I was in terms
of how I viewed the military bombing of Kosovo. However, I do
understand that it is our responsibility that when the United
States takes military action we must assume a responsibility to
help rebuild. That's the price that we must pay.
My concern is at whose expense and in what region of the
world. We've got critical needs and issues in Africa, Latin
American, and the Caribbean, so I am very anxious to hear from
our witnesses to see how this is going to evolve.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Ms. Lee.
If there are no other Members seeking recognition I am
going to recess our hearing until the vote is over. Hopefully
our reporter will get the equipment moving by the time we
return.
The Committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rohrabacher [presiding]. This hearing is called to
order. I will be temporarily in the Chair until Mr. Gilman or
Mr. Bereuter returns.
Mr. Radanovich has a short opening statement.
Mr. Radanovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing today.
As we are looking at exit strategies for the U.S. forces in
the Balkans, let me make this one point. Democratization of
Southeast Europe is one of the most important interests, and
maybe even more so for our allies in the European Union and
NATO.
Every year U.S. taxpayers see their hard-earned dollars
going toward ensuring peace in this region. Without
democratization and economic prosperity there, our soldiers
will remain perhaps for many years.
By supporting Croatia's membership in NATO's Partnership
for Peace program, and its accession into the World Trade
Organization, we will not only be making a sound investment in
the future stability of Southeast Europe, but we will also be
sending a clear message to other countries in the region of the
benefits that come from choosing a democratic path.
Toward that end, I recently introduced H. Con. Res. 251, a
resolution that both congratulates Croatia on its democratic
elections and calls for U.S. support and facilitation of
Croatia's goals for membership in the Partnership for Peace and
the WTO.
Croatia was so clearly a loyal and valuable ally to the
United States during the Kosovo crisis, and I believe it
deserves commendation for its stand with the United States and
NATO during Operation Allied Force and SFOR.
Croatia also needs direct investments, and I am thrilled
about the opening of OPIC's office in Zagreb last week. I am
sure this will prove to be beneficial to both sides. It will
promote U.S. exports and encourage small business to flourish
in Croatia, which will also help reduce unemployment in Croatia
considerably.
This year's U.S. assistance for Croatia is also critical
for refugee return, and we must make sure that this assistance
includes all ethnic groups.
Clearly, if economic prosperity is enhanced and returning
refugees see the opportunity to work, they will return more
quickly and in greater numbers.
Recently, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright commented
on Croatia in an interview to Radio Free Europe. She said the
recent democratic changes in Croatia are strong and exciting.
She also said that the additional assistance has been
announced, and that the U.S. is going to look directly at other
ways to help Croatia.
I would like to ask just a couple of questions, and to get
the answers in writing would be just fine--that is, if this
distinguished panel could comment on what the Administration
meant when it said that we are looking at other ways to help
Croatia.
I would like to hear in more precise terms what U.S.
assistance will consist of. Would you estimate that this is the
right moment to reward Croatia's contribution to the success of
the U.S.-NATO Operation Allied Force and SFOR? What might be
the timeframe for that? Again, answers in writing would be just
terrific. I'd appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gejdenson. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Radanovich. Yes.
Mr. Gejdenson. I'd just be curious to hear from our
panelists if they can calculate what would happen to that
assistance if, say, a cap was placed at 15 percent on aid to
the region, and what that would do to programs like the one in
Croatia?
Thank you.
Chairman Gilman [presiding]. If we could hold that until we
get to our questions.
Thank you, Mr. Radanovich.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will make this very quick, and thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me echo the praise of Mr. Radanovich about Croatia. It
is something we should not overlook. Croatia had a democratic
election during this turmoil, and not only did it have a
democratic election, but the opposition party won and power has
been transferred. This is a tremendous success for the cause of
democracy and something that we should not forget.
Furthermore, Croatia during the time period--this time
period when there was this conflict and tensions were high and
people were polarized--permitted some of their soldiers who had
committed war crimes during the conflict to go and stand trial
and to face justice, and several were convicted. That should
not be looked at as a negative thing about Croatia, it should
be a positive thing.
The fact is that the war criminals are still in power in
Serbia. The Croatians had a free and democratic election and
sent their people that they thought might have committed crimes
to face justice.
So I would put my name on Mr. Radanovich's bill, first of
all as a cosponsor.
But with that said, let me note that it took a long time
for the United States of America to decide who were the bad
guys down there--a long time.
Furthermore, I will just end it with this and say I do not
think the United States has to pick up the lion's share of the
cost for these type of operations, either ongoing or in the
future. I want to know about why we are having to shoulder the
military cost, and how much that was; and I want to know how
much after the military action it is costing us now.
We were told we were going to get out of the Balkans for
just a couple of billion dollars and within a year or two. It
has been many years now and it has cost us many billions of
dollars. It is not realistic to think the United States and the
people of the United States can continue carrying that load
after the Cold War is over.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Now that the malfunctioning stenographic equipment has been
repaired, I am going to ask the stenographer to make certain
that the opening statements are fully recorded.
We'll now turn to our witnesses for their testimony.
Ambassador Larry Napper now serves as Coordinator of
Assistance to Eastern Europe after a long career with our State
Department.
After serving with the U.S. Army, Ambassador Napper joined
the Foreign Service and rose to a number of important positions
with our diplomatic corps, including key positions at our
Embassy in Moscow, Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy in
Romania, Director of the Department's Office of Soviet Union
Affairs, and Ambassador to Latvia.
Ambassador Napper has also served as a Congressional Fellow
with our former colleague Congressman Lee Hamilton in 1983 and
1984.
It is good having you back before the Committee once again,
Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador James Pardew was appointed to his current
position last year after having been appointed to the rank of
Ambassador in 1997. Ambassador Pardew has a long record of
service with our military from which he has a number of
decorations.
Among other positions, Ambassador Pardew served with the
staff of the Joint Chiefs and the Army General Staff and
completed a number of foreign tours of service.
Ambassador Pardew served as a representative of the
Secretary of Defense at the 1995 negotiations on the Dayton
Accords for Bosnia. Then he served as Director of the military
``Train and Equip'' program in Bosnia from 1996 to 1999.
Dr. Daniel Hamilton is our country's Special Coordinator
for the President's Southeast Europe Initiative and
Implementation of the ``Stability Pact'' multilateral aid
program for Southeastern Europe. Having served as Deputy
Director of the Aspin Institute in Berlin from 1982 to 1990,
and then as Senior Associate for European-American Relations at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from 1990 to
1994, Dr. Hamilton took up new responsibilities for the State
Department's policy planning staff as an advisor to our U.S.
Ambassador to Germany and as an Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs starting in 1994.
He now continues to serve as Associate Director of the
Policy Planning Staff while fulfilling his responsibilities
with regard to Southeast Europe.
Gentlemen, we welcome you and we appreciate your taking the
time from your busy schedules to appear before the Committee
today. You may summarize your written statements which, without
objection, will be included in the record. Please proceed in
whichever order you desire.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES W. PARDEW, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DAYTON AND KOSOVO IMPLEMENTATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Pardew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very
pleased today to testify on the U.S. assistance programs for
Southeastern Europe. I do have a longer statement which I will
submit for the record.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection, it will be made part of
the record.
Ambassador Pardew. I will briefly summarize our overall
policy as a framework for U.S. assistance programs, the goal of
our programs, our successes and challenges that we face as we
go forward. Ambassador Napper will speak on the specific
aspects of our assistance programs, including the supplemental.
Dr. Hamilton will address the Stability Pact for Southeastern
Europe.
Our assistance programs in the Balkans are directly linked
to our fundamental interests there. As I've testified before
this Committee before, that fundamental interest is regional
stability.
Military forces are not the solution to long-term stability
in the region. They are certainly not the most cost-effective
way of providing long-term stability.
Rather, stability requires robust political and economic
programs backed by sufficient resources to make the difference.
In pursuit of our interests we've made considerable
investments in civilian programs in the Balkans in the past few
years. These investments have produced important returns which
support our overall goals.
In Croatia we share your enthusiasm and excitement about
recent events. Recent elections promise dramatic transition to
democratic governance, market reforms, and full partnership
with European and international institutions.
It is now possible to quickly open doors that were closed
for so long for Croatia. PFP membership, membership in the
international organizations, and greater financial assistance
are open based on performance and support to the Dayton peace
process.
Since 1995, 600,000 refugees have returned to their homes
in Bosnia, and last year 800,000 refugees returned in Kosovo.
Humanitarian aid helped get them through the winter.
We have caused reductions in many military forces in the
area, transformed the Kosovo Liberation Army, held elections in
Bosnia, and plan to hold elections in Kosovo this Fall.
Throughout the region, along with our allies, we sponsored
democratic processes and institutions, economic reforms, policy
and judicial reforms, anti-crime programs, and independent
media development.
We also are using assistance to bolster the democratically-
elected government in Montenegro against pressures from
Belgrade.
In Serbia we are tightening financial sanctions and
expanding the visa list, and supporting Serb opposition in an
effort to change the regime in Belgrade.
The job of stabilizing the region is not complete, however.
We continue to face challenges every day. Hard-line
nationalists in Bosnia remain in positions of influence. Kosovo
remains an unstable and dangerous place. Milocevic continues to
cause difficulties in Montenegro, Kosovo, and Bosnia. The
transition to democratic and economic reform is simply not
complete.
I must highlight, in summary, the problem of crime and
corruption as destructive forces which cross-cut the region and
threaten the development of democratic institutions and reform.
We have both bilateral and regional initiatives to tackle this
serious problem.
In Fiscal Year 2000, our bilateral SEED assistance to
Southeast Europe is $516 million to fund political, economic,
police and judicial reform, and humanitarian aid--the keys to
long-term stability.
Additionally, the Administration has requested supplemental
funding for Southeast Europe for this year. This funding is
critical if we are to move our objectives forward in the region
and provide adequate and secure facilities for our diplomats
who work in difficult and often extremely dangerous conditions.
We are clear and consistent with our European allies that
Europe must pay the lion's share of the financial burden in the
region, and they have acknowledged this responsibility. In
fact, the Europeans have pledged $731 million for Kosovo this
year, which amounts to 60 percent of the pledges for Fiscal
Year 2000.
The U.S. share of this spending amounts to 13.9 percent.
On police, European and Canadian commitments account for 40
percent of the personnel. The U.S. pledge accounts for a little
over 12 percent.
We clearly understand the message from Congress on burden
sharing and we will continue to work with you in that regard.
Mr. Chairman, we certainly wish to work with the Congress
on burden sharing further, and we look forward to receiving
your bill and reviewing it carefully.
The issue of flexibility which you mentioned is extremely
important. We believe that restrictive caps which limit our
flexibility are not a good idea.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to Ambassador Napper who
will speak to you on the details of the supplemental.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pardew appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Ambassador Pardew.
Ambassador Napper.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LARRY C. NAPPER, COORDINATOR FOR
EASTERN EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE (SEED), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Napper. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do
appreciate the opportunity to speak with you and the Committee
again on the state of the SEED Program in Central and Eastern
Europe.
Building upon the success of that program over the past
decade, the President has proposed $610 million in SEED funding
for Fiscal Year 2001. This request focuses on Southeast Europe,
a region which, as Ambassador Pardew has suggested, remains a
region in transition where U.S. vital interests are at stake.
In addition, the President has submitted a supplemental
request for Fiscal Year 2000 funding in Southeast Europe. Given
the urgency of this request, we do ask that Members of Congress
support the rapid approval of this vitally needed additional
funding.
The supplemental requests $624 million in non defense funds
for the following purposes: $194.5 million in SEED funding for
Croatia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia democratization; $22
million in USAID operating expenses; $31 million in foreign
military financing to help PFP countries implement reforms to
facilitate their cooperation with NATO; $2.875 million in
international military education and training; $239 million for
the construction of secure diplomatic facilities in Tirane,
Sarajevo, and Pristina; $24 million in diplomatic and consular
presence funding for the State Department's on-the-ground
presence in the region; $107 million in contributions to
international peace keeping activities to cover our assessed
costs in Kosovo and also in East Timor; $3.622 million in
education and cultural exchanges.
Mr. Chairman, the President's supplemental request contains
$92.8 million in SEED funds for Kosovo. If approved by
Congress, this would bring the total SEED appropriation for
Kosovo to $242.8 million in 2000.
In addition to this vital SEED funding, we urge Congress to
fully fund the President's request for $107 million to cover
our assessed contribution for U.N. peace keeping costs.
The recent events in Mitrovica underscore that both the
SEED and peace keeping funds are essential to support UNMIK's
efforts to establish public order, assure protection of human
rights, and begin the process of economic recovery.
UNMIK's success in these areas is vital to ensure that U.S.
forces can accomplish their mission in safety and security.
U.S. commitments in Kosovo represent our fair share of a
broader effort in which our European partners play the leading
role.
European countries and the European Commission pledged more
than 70 percent of the contributions to the Kosovo budget
already pledged, and have disbursed more than 70 percent of the
voluntary contributions received by UNMIK.
In the broader perspective, our European partners pledged
61 percent of the total amounts pledged up to now for Kosovo
reconstruction in Fiscal Year 2000, and other non-U.S. donors
pledged another 25 percent of that total.
As Ambassador Pardew has suggested, our own percentages
with regard to the Kosovo budgets--13.4 percent for police,
12.1, and the overall for Kosovo reconstruction and recovery
13.9 percent, so that's a very good burden sharing story.
I want to support the remarks by Mr. Radanovich and Mr.
Rohrabacher concerning Croatia. The President's request
contains $35.7 million in supplemental SEED funding for
Croatia, and if approved, this would bring the total funding
for that country to $50.8 million in Fiscal Year 2000.
The recent Croatian elections and the subsequent formation
of a new government led by the opposition are the most hopeful
developments in the Balkans since Dayton.
The initial actions of the new government give us
confidence that the change in Zagreb is real and profoundly
hopeful.
We have a historic opportunity here. With our support
Croatia can go from a problem to a partner in the pursuit of a
broad regional peace.
Mr. Chairman, the President's request also contains $34
million in supplemental funding for Montenegro. It is
imperative that our assistance in Fiscal Year 2000 keep pace
with Montenegro's needs as its democratically-elected
government struggles to cope with unrelenting psychological and
economic pressure from Belgrade.
With the support of the Congress, the President's
supplemental request for Montenegro would allow us to meet both
urgent requirements for budget support and essential longer-
term developmental needs.
If Congress approves the President's supplemental request,
total SEED funding available for Montenegro in Fiscal Year 2000
would be $58 million.
The United States must also continue and broaden its
support for the opposition to Milosevic within Serbia. American
support encourages the Serbian opposition to come together
around common goals of promoting democracy, building a market
economy, and establishing the rule of law.
We have allocated $25 million in SEED funds to support this
process in Fiscal Year 2000. The President's supplemental
budget request of $15 million would enable us to provide robust
democratization assistance to Serbia's democratic opposition,
and to help that opposition begin to prepare for a Serbia after
Milosevic is gone.
The current crack down on the Serbian opposition
underscores the fact that those who have the courage to stand
up to Milosevic expect and deserve our support.
Finally, the President's supplemental request contains $17
million in supplemental SEED funding for regional programs in
Southeast Europe. These funds are needed to support small and
medium enterprise, and to increase the effectiveness of our
existing efforts to fight organized crime in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Albania, as Ambassador Pardew has suggested.
If approved, the supplemental request would bring total
SEED funding for regional programs in Southeast Europe to
$106.87 million.
Mr. Chairman, I recently returned from a trip to Southeast
Europe, including visits to Kosovo, Croatia and Macedonia.
I had the opportunity to see firsthand how our Embassies
and USAID missions are using SEED funds to accomplish vital
U.S. foreign policy objectives. Our people in the region often
work in difficult and dangerous conditions. We owe them the
support that would be provided by full funding of the
President's request for State and USAID operating expenses, and
the construction of secure diplomatic facilities in Pristina,
Tirane, and Sarajevo.
President Clinton's supplemental request for 2000 and
budget request for 2001 are essential to implement peace and
overcome the terrible legacy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and
elsewhere in this troubled region.
This funding would enable us and our partners to build a
brighter future and to serve U.S. interests by taking full
advantage of hopeful new developments, such as the new
government in Croatia and the emergence of the Stability Pact.
That is why we would welcome early Congressional enactment of
the President's proposal for supplemental SEED funding for
2000, as well as the Administration's 2001 budget request.
Mr. Chairman, I do have a longer statement and I would
appreciate it being introduced in the record. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Napper appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Without objection, the full statement will
be included in the record.
Thank you, Ambassador Napper.
Now we'll turn to Dr. Daniel Hamilton, with regard to the
implementation of the Stability Pact.
Dr. Hamilton.
STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL S. HAMILTON, SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTHEAST EUROPE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee for the opportunity to testify on our efforts to
stabilize Southeastern Europe.
I want to complement the presentations made by Ambassadors
Pardew and Napper by focusing on our cooperation with our
European partners through a Stability Pact for Southeastern
Europe, which we believe is an important vehicle to bring
lasting peace and prosperity to the region.
I also have a longer statement which I'd like to submit for
the record, and I will simply summarize it here.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
Dr. Hamilton. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, over the past decade there has been a
bipartisan effort on the part of the United States to create
what President Bush called a ``Europe whole and free,'' and
President Clinton has called a ``peaceful, undivided,
democratic Europe.'' That Europe is truly within our grasp, but
it is not there yet because we still need to stabilize
Southeastern Europe.
This Europe is within our grasp, however, because 50 years
ago we recognized that the strategic challenge facing the
United States in Europe was to defend Europe itself and
transform Western Europe. Countries that we had talked to
having ancient animosities at that time, and that had dragged
the United States into successive wars.
Because of our success there, after the Cold War we were
able again, in a bipartisan manner, to turn to stabilize
Central and Eastern Europe. Through our efforts, through NATO
enlargement, through the EU's own efforts, and through such
efforts as the U.S.-Baltic Charter, that part of Europe is also
on track and is stable.
We would argue that our core strategic challenge again
today is to stabilize Southeastern Europe, to do in many ways
what we had done previously. Due to our earlier success, we
have strong and prosperous partners to help us do the job. Our
European allies, particularly the European Union should take on
the lion's share of this effort. They have agreed with that.
The President and Secretary Albright have insisted upon it. We
believe that will, in fact, be the case, and that the Stability
Pact for Southeastern Europe can be a vehicle to advance that
bargain.
The Stability Pact boil-down is really a bargain between
integration and reform.
We and our European allies and other institutions--
international institutions, international financial
institutions--agree to stabilize, transform, and work on a
long-term plan to integrate the countries of this region into
the European and trans-Atlantic mainstream.
The countries of the region, in turn, have agreed to work
individually and together more than before to create the
conditions by which that can be possible--in economic terms,
through economic reforms; in security terms, through security
cooperation; and by promotion and consolidation of democracy
and human rights throughout the region.
We have been working since the Sarajevo Summit, which
launched this pact last summer, to work ahead on specific
elements of the bargain. As I said, there are three baskets, if
you will--security, economics, and democracy/human rights. We
have some early signs of success in that area.
Just briefly, on the economic area. The international
financial institutions--the World Bank, the European Bank for
Reconstruction Development, the European Investment Bank--have
all now devised regional strategies for Southeastern Europe
which they had not before.
They all support the goals of the Stability Pact, and each
of them are committing or are looking at commitments on their
part for further financing for projects throughout this region.
All the countries of the region through the Stability Pact
have agreed on what we call an investment compact. That is, to
commit to country-specific action plans--we have an action plan
before that--on what they will do to create a climate conducive
to private investment.
In the end, it is private sector, private investment, not
assistance that will transform this region. What we are doing
through the Stability Pact is creating the conditions conducive
to private enterprise, not just foreign investment, but
domestic investment as well, and each of the countries in the
region have agreed now through this plan and through a
mechanism that we have to work on concrete action steps to
create that kind of environment.
We have also created a business advisory council for the
region which consists of U.S., West European and companies from
the region itself, that will work directly with each country in
the region on private sector advice and what needs to be done
to transform, again, their investment climates.
In the security area, the main issue that is focused on
this region has been corruption. As Ambassador Pardew said, we
have been very focused on this issue, and that U.S.
initiative--all the countries of the region through the
Stability Pact have agreed to what we call an Anti-Corruption
Initiative. It is not just a piece of paper. It outlines
commitments of these countries and has an Action Plan to be
implemented country-by-country on what these countries will do
to fight corruption. It is tied to specific steps, and we have
an implementation mechanism, again, country-by-country to work
on that as well.
The countries of the region have also signed a Memorandum
of Understanding that has created a regional Customs Directors
Association which will facilitate a World Bank loan that's been
prepared by the Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative to
upgrade border crossings and revamp the Customs services of the
entire region, which I am sure many of the Committee Members
know has been an issue in terms of corruption and other
elements. We are trying to marry the anti-corruption elements
with reform of Customs facilities throughout the region.
The countries of the region, through the Stability Pact,
have all agreed on efforts to control, seize, and destroy small
arms and light weapons throughout the region. They have agreed
to work on aligning their arms export policies with major
European and international standards, and to devise a common
end-user certificate through the region so that such exports
can be tracked.
They have all signed on to a declaration confirming their
commitments to implement conventions against weapons of mass
destruction and have all agreed--including I note, the Bosnian
Serbs--have all agreed and called on the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to accede to the chemical weapons convention.
In the area of democracy and human rights, the country's
experts from around the region have agreed to examine their
history. We think an important development that they have said
together, they will stand together and use historians and their
education ministries to review textbooks with a view to
eliminating bias and prejudice, to have an ongoing series of
efforts to review history throughout the region.
We think it is an important development, and we would like
to continue to support it.
We are working through the Stability Pact on the promotion
of free and independent media through the region as well.
Hungary has taken an important initiative called the
``Szeged Process,'' which is to link efforts to support the
Serb opposition by working with Serb opposition mayors in
various countries in Serbia. It has been a helpful initiative
that we support.
As I mentioned, the President and the Secretary fully
expect, and our European colleagues have agreed, that Europe
must take on the lion's share of this effort.
The European Union in December took some important steps in
that regard by announcing that they would begin, and they have
since begun, accession negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria,
in addition to Hungary and Slovenia, which were already on
track. They have agreed that Turkey is a candidate for European
Union membership. They have taken the further steps that are
needed to implement their financial commitments.
President Prodi of the European Commission has announced
that the European Commission would devote $11.5 billion euros
to this region over the next budget cycle of 7 years. We think
that's an important pledge. You can believe we are working on
holding our colleagues to that.
If you step back just briefly and look at other things that
have been achieved, and why the Stability Pact--what's the
value added of this effort? Let me give you just two examples.
Bulgaria and Romania had disagreed for 10 years over a
bridge over the Danube, which created a 500-kilometer detour
for road traffic. They could not agree on the location or the
financing.
Through the Stability Pact, they have now agreed on both
with no U.S. financial commitments involved. These are totally
European commitments. We believe it is a significant
development. It helps not only close that 500-kilometer gap,
but starts to link these countries again with the European
mainstream.
Commission Member Chris Patten recently announced, and we
have, I think, an announcement today as well, a resolution of
the congestion at the Blace border crossing between Macedonia
and Kosovo. Again, through the auspice of the Stability Pact,
we have devised a way to relieve that congestion and get a
regional cooperation mechanism in place in that area.
The last one I would just mention is that NATO and the
World Bank in a unique partnership, have agreed on
demobilization and training of retired military officers
throughout the region. If you will ask officials from those two
institutions, they never would have come together in this kind
of partnership if it hadn't been through the good auspices of
the Stability Pact.
Our goal now is to take these pledges and these early signs
of success and turn them into on-the-ground realities to make a
difference in people's lives so that they see that this is not
just an abstract international gathering, but something that
makes a difference.
We try to aim to advance both parts of our bargain--reforms
by the countries and commitments by the international
community--at a regional conference scheduled to be held at the
end of this month on the region as a whole. We do believe that
the international financial institutions and the European Union
will pledge significant figures toward what they call a quick-
start package of regional infrastructure projects and projects
in the areas of democracy and human rights.
They are matching the funding to the projects that have
been proposed through the region now, so the exact figures
simply are not there, but they should be available very soon. I
believe we will certainly be in touch with the Congress as we
know that, and certainly, Ambassador Napper and I would like to
continue to be in touch with the Committee staff about the
details of that as it evolves.
The Stability Pact is really an effort in crisis prevention
as was mentioned by a number of Members earlier. Crisis
prevention is cost prevention. With the Stability Pact we can
transform what has been a primary area of instability
throughout this region into a stable and prosperous part of the
mainstream of Europe and the trans-Atlantic community.
We are not naive enough to believe this will happen easily
or quickly, but we do believe it is a core strategic challenge
that we must engage in because we have looked, and as I said,
we have learned history's lesson. American failure to invest in
defending American vital interests in Europe has always meant
we have paid a higher price later. That was the lessons of the
last century in Europe, and is one we are trying to avoid and
learn from today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamilton appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Dr. Hamilton.
We'll now proceed with a few questions.
Gentleman, in a recent meeting with our Committee staff on
the issue of aid for Southeast Europe, a State Department
representative stated that the President would not provide any
statement of intentions as to how much our Nation would pledge
or commit to aid in the region over the next 5 or 6 years. Of
course after the Dayton Accords and the NATO deployment in
Bosnia, the President clearly stated that what the U.S. wanted
to pledge and commit as part of a multilateral aid package for
that country over a 4-year period.
As representatives for the President's implementation of
the multilateral aid package for the Southeast Europe region,
an aid package to which the President committed our Nation at
the Sarajevo summit last July, can you please tell us why the
Congress will not be provided with an outline of just how much
the Executive Branch wants to pledge and commit to any
multilateral aid package for the Balkans so that the Congress
may assess the future pattern of the appropriations challenges
in our overall foreign aid program?
Any of our panelists? Ambassador Napper.
Ambassador Napper. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question
and I appreciate it. It is a good one. Obviously the Congress
would like to know something of the Administration's
intentions, and I hope we've laid those out to the degree we
can today.
If you look at the 3-year pattern of the last fiscal year,
this fiscal year, and the President's budget request for 2001,
I think it does give you a sense of where we are headed.
We went from a level of $430 million, for instance, in the
SEED program in Fiscal Year 1999 to a budget this year of $533
million. If we did get the supplemental which the President has
requested, the level after that supplemental, if we got it
fully, would be $727.5 million. For 2001 we've requested $610
million.
So as you can see here, we are not talking about a
progression of at least the SEED assistance. I think the SEED
Program is something of an accurate barometer for the entire
effort in Southeast Europe. We are not talking about a program
here which is on an ascending scale off the charts. We are
talking about relatively moderate increases which have been
necessary because of the events that have transpired on the
ground in order to respond, and where possible to anticipate
these developments in a very turbulent region.
Precisely because it is a turbulent region and very
difficult to read, it is very difficult to project out beyond
that 3-year cycle of funding and to begin to talk about exactly
where the program will be. To begin to give you figures for
2002, 2003, or 2004 simply seems to us not to be the most
responsible behavior for the Administration at this juncture.
I guess that would be my response, Mr. Chairman. We tried
to give the lay of the land as we see it to your staff and to
the Committee, and I think that would have to be my response at
this juncture.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Ambassador Napper.
Any other panelists care to comment on that issue?
Ambassador Pardew.
Ambassador Pardew. Mr. Chairman, I would only like to add
that it has been extremely difficult for us to project the
direction that this would go in the out years, but to the
degree that we've had success, we've also been very careful to
reduce our commitments.
For example, we started in Bosnia with 60,000 NATO and
allied troops. I forget the original number of U.S. troops, but
it was about 20,000. That number has declined to where we'll
have about a total of 20,000 international troops in Bosnia
this year. The U.S. commitment will be less than 5,000.
Our SEED and other spending has been on the decline as well
as we have achieved some success in implementing the Dayton
Agreement. But it is very difficult, we could not see Kosovo
coming, so in some cases it is just impossible to project
future requirements.
Chairman Gilman. What's the number of our troops now,
Ambassador Pardew?
Ambassador Pardew. The total number of NATO and allied
troops will be around 20,000 this Spring.
Chairman Gilman. How about U.S. involvement?
Ambassador Pardew. The U.S. percentage of that is 4,600.
Our total percentage of SFOR is 23 percent.
Chairman Gilman. Are we proposing to reduce our troops----
Ambassador Pardew. We have reduced them down to those
numbers, and we'll reassess from that level, Mr. Chairman, as
to whether or not there should be further reductions.
Chairman Gilman. When will that reassessment take place?
Ambassador Pardew. There is to be a review in NATO probably
in the Fall.
Chairman Gilman. So until then we'll stay at the 4,600
level?
Ambassador Pardew. That's the plan. Yes, sir.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you.
The already-enacted Fiscal Year 2000 Foreign Operations Act
requires the Secretary of State to certify that our Nation has
pledged no more than 15 percent of the total resources pledged
by all donors of assistance to the Kosovo region. The Secretary
has, in fact, already provided such a certification to
Congress.
Why would a certification that our Nation has pledged no
more than 15 percent of all resources pledged by all donors for
the entire region of Southeast Europe prove a problem for our
Secretary, or would it not be a problem for her ability to
provide such a certification for the region?
Ambassador Napper. Mr. Chairman, you're exactly correct
that the Secretary did certify that, but let me explain the
provision and the context.
The provision in the appropriations bill applied to one
donor's conference for Kosovo which took place in November of
last year. The provision was that the Administration could not
expend funds for Kosovo until the Secretary of State had
certified that our contribution at that donor's conference was
no more than 15 percent, and we did so. That was an event in
time which took place once and could be therefore relatively
easily certified.
The problem with a cap of this kind that would extend into
the future is precisely the uncertainty of the world, and
especially that part of the world where you have a constant
train of unpredictable, unforeseen events. I would personally
be very concerned as the responsible official for at least the
SEED part of the account that we would not be able to respond
to new challenges such as Kosovo or new opportunities such as
Croatia.
A couple of the Members have expressed how important it is
to move quickly on Croatia and we agree 100 percent. If we'd
been limited by a cap on what we could have put into Croatia
immediately, we would not have been able to take care of that
opportunity. So that would be my response, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you Ambassador Napper.
We appear to be suffering from some further technical
problems in that our timing system is not working. I've asked
our staff to keep track of the time and I will advise Members
when their time has expired.
The last question. The European Union has announced that it
is going to provide about $12 billion in direct assistance over
a 6-year period to the countries of Southeast Europe, which may
not be that much of an increase in aid to the region by the EU.
Does that $12 billion figure include expected aid donations by
the EU member states? If not, how much do you expect might be
provided by those individual states over a 5 or 6-year period
to aid the countries of Southeast Europe, and what other
amounts of aid to the region other than that from EU or U.S. do
you expect might become available to that region, such as aid
from Japan or the World Bank?
Dr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, the pledge to which you
referred is the pledge by President Prodi of the European
Commission's next budget cycle to the region, so it is limited
to the finances by the Commission itself.
We fully expect that EU member states will add
significantly to that figure. They go through their respective
budget cycles. Most of them do not do multiyear budgeting, so
it is hard to do the same projection for each EU member state
as the Commission has done through its cycle.
We do, however, know for instance that the German
government, and this has been a public statement, has said that
they intend to invest 1.2 billion marks for the region in
support of the Stability Pact over the next 4 years. This would
translate into $300 million marks a year over this period.
The Dutch government has made similar statements. I
hesitate to go into the specifics because they have to go
through their own parliamentary processes as well.
What we are trying to do is ascertain the exact levels in
advance of this regional conference, so that at the regional
conference we fully expect EU member states and the Commission
to be able to say what they will pledge over what period of
time.
The regional conference is intended for donors to pledge
over an envelope of 2 years, and we do anticipate that our EU
colleagues, as well as countries such as Japan, and countries
such as Switzerland and Norway who are all members of the
Stability Pact would also make those pledges known at that
time.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Dr. Hamilton.
Let me remind our Members that, at the end of our hearing
today, we will have a markup on two items. We hope that our
Members will remain after our hearing, so that we can have a
quick markup on two very important measures, one concerning
Austria and the other one concerning Mozambique. So please bear
with us and stand by.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
For the sake of moving the process, I will not ask any
questions. I'd like to make just a very brief statement because
my position was clear from my opening remarks.
We are paying for past mistakes, and as is always the case
when we fail to deal with an issue at a point when it is in its
embryonic stage, we then pay for it heavily in blood and in
treasure later on. That's what we are dealing with.
I think this is a well crafted, serious, responsible
proposal and I am in full support of it. I want to commend our
witnesses and I want to commend the Administration.
I do want to just make a very brief observation concerning
your questions on draw downs of American troops. I think there
is a real danger that we fall into the trap of considering draw
downs as ipso facto positive. There comes a point where draw
downs add to the danger that our troops face. I think it is
very important to recognize that in dangerous situations, and
certainly the Balkans qualifies, there is a great case to be
made for overwhelming force being on the ground----
Chairman Gilman. Make a comment on procedure.
We'll continue with our hearing. Mr. Bereuter is going down
to vote at this time and will come back. We will continue our
hearing without any break.
I am sorry for the interruption, Mr. Lantos.
Chairman Gilman. The vote on the Floor relates to the
Hansen Amendment to the airport bill.
Mr. Lantos. Right.
I think there is a very strong case to be made for having
overwhelming force on the ground to deter the kind of violence
which we have seen lately from both the Serbian and the
Albanian side. I think this ritualistic incantation that draw
downs are good contains very serious seeds of danger.
We have had plenty of examples since the end of World War
II where adequate U.S. presence, military presence on the
ground--both in Europe during the Cold War, in South Korea,
continuing as of today--have been successful in deterring
violence and military activities. The Balkans are no different.
I am no more inclined to support a U.S. force of 3,000 than
I am a U.S. force of 4,600 or 5,900. These have to be military
judgments made by competent military commanders on the spot.
I believe strongly in the responsibility of Europeans to
carry the bulk of the load, and our role at this stage should
be a minor participant role. However, I do not think it is in
our national interest to press for further reductions
irrespective of the military judgments involved.
General Clark is a uniquely qualified American military
commander to make the judgment on the level of our
participation, and I think it behooves Congress to support a
proven and successful military leader following the conclusion
of an incredibly successful military operation without a single
American battle casualty, and recognize that some of these
troops may be there for a long, long time to come. That is
clearly preferable to a reemergence of hostilities in the
Balkans, which is obviously the alternative we face.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I agree with Mr. Lantos in terms of making
sure that we have adequate forces. We do not want Americans to
die because we are being penny wise and pound foolish, but I
also agree, Mr. Lantos, that the Europeans certainly need to
carry the bulk of this weight.
As of this time, over the last 6 years, how much money have
we spent, and how much have our European allies spent? We are
talking about military and all other spending.
Ambassador Napper. On the developmental assistance side,
Mr. Rohrabacher, the figures would be for the Europeans
approximately $10 billion in developmental assistance over the
period 1991 to 1999, and for the United States in a comparable
period something on the order of $2.1 billion.
Now, on the military side, I am not sure we have the
comparable figures.
Ambassador Pardew. I have some figures here, Mr.
Rohrabacher which I will give to you, but I'd also like to take
this for the record because I think it is an important
question. Let me give you the information I have.
The total figure for military and nonmilitary expenditures
for Kosovo in Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000 is $6.3 billion.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Excuse me. Could you repeat that again,
please?
Ambassador Pardew. The total figure for military and
nonmilitary expenditures in Kosovo in Fiscal Years 1999 and
2000 is approximately $6.3 billion. Of that amount,
approximately $1.2 billion comes from the Department of State
accounts. This sum includes a supplemental appropriation.
That's what I have on Kosovo.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I have a figure in front of me that says
the U.S. has expended about $12.95 billion--so $13 billion on
peace keeping and military operations in former Yugoslavia
since 1991. Is that an incorrect figure?
Ambassador Pardew. I cannot say if it is correct or
incorrect, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. OK.
Our European allies have spent $10 billion in assistance to
that area. Is that right? Is that what you testified?
Ambassador Napper. That would be our estimate on the
developmental assistance side. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It seems to me that we are spending more
than 50 percent, frankly, of what's going on down there. My
guesstimate, from what you've said and what I am reading here,
I think we are spending 50 percent. I think we are carrying the
load at 50 percent. My guess is on the military side we are
carrying. During the actual fighting that took place, we
carried maybe much more than that.
Ambassador Pardew. Let me give you a couple more numbers. I
want to give you a Bosnia number. I think you said Bosnia too,
right?
Mr. Rohrabacher. OK.
Ambassador Pardew. Let me just make a general comment and
then we will, I think, get some numbers for the record.
We are talking here largely about civil implementation
programs, and we are working very hard to stay within the
guidance that the Congress has sent to us.
I cannot speak to military spending. However, to me,
military spending is based on what it takes to prevail. If our
military commanders believe that the forces are required--be
they American or European or whatever--we need to prevail
there.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That makes sense if you were doing it on
your own, what you just said makes all the sense in the world
if you're doing it on your own. If you're not doing it on your
own, then it could mean that we are being treated as a bunch of
suckers by Europeans who are letting us fly all the missions,
take all the risks, and then, of course, give us no gratitude
in the end.
I sat next to some Europeans here for a NATO meeting just a
moment ago, and they were trying to tell me how the United
States was actually at fault for World War II because we had
gone in and helped in World War I, which prevented a compromise
from happening, and of course because they didn't have a
compromise from World War I, that led to World War II. That
gave them a good reason not to be grateful for all the hundreds
of thousands of Americans that gave their lives over there to
save their hide. The Europeans are not going to be grateful to
us.
We have to do what's right, and we have to figure out what
our role is in the post-Cold War world. It is not to bear the
burden for people who are richer than us and have the
capabilities of keeping peace in their backyard. We'll see. The
Balkans is the first major operation after the close of the
Cold War, and we'll see when all the accounting is done whether
the American people feel that that's the appropriate role and
the appropriate level of investment for the United States of
America.
I've got some questions on that obviously myself, but that
does not reflect on you guys. You're trying to do your job in
the executive branch with the President. Over here in the
Congress, we are trying to make the right decision.
Ambassador Pardew. My only point was that we cannot speak
for military spending. You make some excellent points here.
I would just say that within the civil side of this we are
making every effort to ensure that we pay our fair share, but
nothing more than that.
Ambassador Napper. If I could just make one further
comment----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Could you hold on, I am worried I am going
to miss this vote.
Chairman Gilman. We have about 4 minutes remaining on the
vote.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I've got to run, I am sorry.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will stand in recess. Mr.
Bereuter is on his way back and will reconvene our hearing as
soon as he returns.
Mr. Bereuter [presiding]. Ambassador Napper, I understand
you wanted to respond further to a point that was made or an
issue that was raised just before the temporary recess?
Ambassador Napper. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter, I appreciate
that opportunity.
Mr. Rohrabacher did refer to some figures, but I thought it
might be useful just to review a couple of figures that we put
on the table earlier and reflect the Administration's
commitment to burden sharing and our success in achieving
burden sharing, particularly in Kosovo at this juncture.
What I would call the key benchmark, the yardsticks at this
point, are the contributions to the Kosovo consolidated budget,
which is the budget that runs the territory, contributions to
police deployments, and overall contributions to recovery and
reconstruction in Kosovo. On each of those we have an excellent
burden sharing story to tell.
With regard to the Kosovo budget, we have contributed
approximately 13.4 percent of the total contributions made for
1999 and 2000. Of the number of police now deployed in the
territory, a critical factor for maintenance of stability and
the creation of order there, we are at about 12.1 percent of
total police deployed.
Mr. Bereuter. Which country is that?
Ambassador Napper. The United States.
Mr. Bereuter. In Bosnia or----
Ambassador Napper. Kosovo.
If we look at costs overall for reconstruction, economic
revitalization, our percent is at 13.9 percent. Those are the
best calculations we have right now. We've worked very hard on
these numbers, and we feel that they are accurate.
With regard to Bosnia, over time, over the 4 or 5-year
period of the economic reconstruction and revitalization effort
in Bosnia, our percentage has been pretty consistently at 18
percent of the total international community effort there.
So I do think we have good burden sharing. We work very
hard at it, we take it seriously. It is a matter of discussion
at the highest levels whenever Europeans and Americans meet on
the Balkans.
Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you.
I'd like to proceed with some comments and questions. I
thank you gentlemen for your testimony and for what you're
doing to oversee our resources and to bring coordination to the
area.
I do have to tell you that I am very unsatisfied with
what's happening in Kosovo and Bosnia, and ask for redoubled
efforts in certain areas.
One thing that is notable in your presentations is there is
no focus on Macedonia. Macedonia has borne a higher cost for
what has happened in the region, particularly in Kosovo, than
any other country. You should address that issue, and Congress
should be responsive to those concerns. They have a government
headed by a prime minister who is a small ``d'' democrat,
elected in 1998. They deserve our assistance and we are not
giving it to them in any substantial way.
Dr. Hamilton, I noticed your comments about that border
crossing. I have seen it from the air. I understand we have, or
will have, examples of road rage there with people waiting in
line for up to 2 days. Undoubtedly, there are examples of
corruption there as well. We have to solve that problem.
I'd like to know who is blocking the progress on East/West
rail service from Albania to Macedonia to Bulgaria. I'd like to
know why that's not moving through the international financial
institutions.
I notice that the SACEUR Wesley Clark has called for more
troops in Kosovo. I understand why he's made that call but it
is the wrong call. It is international police that are not
there, so military personnel are doing things that should be
handled by the international police force.
Having been in Kosovo 2 weeks ago, I am distressed to see
the slaughter of Serbs by the Albanian Kosovars in those
communities, despite the fact we are trying to give them 24-
hour-a-day protection. Across the border in Presevo you have
ethnic cleansing by the Serbs of those Albanian ethnic
communities.
I noticed the tanks of the 1st Infantry Division deploying
on high ground overlooking that border, and I hope they'll be
given the order to fire if necessary to stop inappropriate
conduct on the Serbian side of the border.
I am concerned that the Europeans and other countries
committed to providing civilian resources in Bosnia and in
Kosovo are failing to deliver those resources, especially, of
course, police.
I notice the calls for additional funds for peace keeping
in the Balkans and in East Timor. I hope you are living with
what you should understand by now is a limitation, and that we
are providing no more than 25 percent of peace keeping forces'
cost to the United Nations. We are not providing 31.7 percent.
Previous democratically-controlled and Republican-controlled
Congresses have said we are providing no more than 25 percent.
That's part of the reason we had the dispute regarding the size
of our arrearages to the U.N.
I know Ambassador Holbrooke is committed to trying to get
those changes, but I am hoping that these figures are not
intentionally or inadvertently taking us over the 25 percent
level. If necessary, I will add an amendment to legislation to
ensure that no more than 25 percent is provided.
I intend to vote against the supplemental. If I vote
against it, not that I am so powerful, you're not going to get
it passed because a lot of people of the same view are not
going to vote for that supplemental.
We need to re-orient; we need to get a lot tougher on
corruption. Somehow you've got to get a tough on corruption in
Bosnia.
We are getting no direct foreign investment there. I've
never thought the Dayton plan was implementable, but it
certainly is not implementable as long as we have this level of
corruption from all parties in Bosnia.
So unless you can provide us some assurance that you are
going to provide some assistance, or be willing to take
Congressional initiatives on Macedonia, and that we are going
to get international police comprised of people from the
European Union countries and other European nations, we are not
going to pay more than 25 percent. I do not know why we should
support the supplemental.
Other than that, I am happy with things.
Ambassador Pardew. Mr. Bereuter, you covered a lot of
territory there. I cannot write fast enough to get all your
points down.
Let me just hit some high points if I could.
First, on Macedonia, we agree that progress has been
significant there. I will let my colleagues speak to what is in
the works for them.
On the Blace border crossing point, we hope that
construction can begin on off site facilities which will allow
these trucks to pool before they travel to the site and we can
clear that up.
Mr. Bereuter. Do you think you can move them across the
border more quickly?
Ambassador Pardew. Yes. Part of this is processing. There
needs to be an offset place where they can go and be processed
and then they can move through the border crossing site.
There's just a limited road space to Blace, and to widen the
roads and so forth is a huge investment, so we are trying to do
it other ways.
Mr. Bereuter. You know this is a major lifeline to the rest
of the world. This is the Thesaloniki port connection.
Ambassador Pardew. Yes, sir. Unfortunately the lifeline
also goes through Serbia. One of the real problems here is the
main four-lane highway through that region goes not through
Kosovo, but actually through Serbia. We cannot use that route,
of course. It is the lifeline to Kosovo.
Now, there are two things to help the transportation
system. Blace is one initiative we are working on, and we
expect construction to start right away to fix it. The railroad
connection there also has to be improved. The Germans have
provided additional locomotives, and we are doing some things
there to help as well.
Mr. Bereuter. What about the East/West corridor?
Ambassador Pardew. I cannot answer that. I wrote that down.
Maybe Larry can speak to that.
Ambassador Napper. Mr. Bereuter, we agree with you entirely
about the importance of Macedonia. For that reason, in the
Fiscal Year 2000 assistance budget, we are doubling the base
assistance program for Macedonia.
We began in Fiscal Year 1999 with a base assistance program
there of $16 million. We are increasing that to $30 million in
Fiscal Year 2000. So it is roughly doubling it. We intend to
try to maintain that level provided for Macedonia because we do
believe it is important and a vital country for the stability
of the region.
We want to support the multiethnic government that's been
formed there. I was just in Macedonia, had good talks with the
government about how we would use this assistance. I think we
are trying to move vigorously to support them.
Mr. Bereuter. I was there about 12 days ago with 12 Members
of Congress. I do not know if that was before or after your
visit.
Ambassador Napper. It was just about the same time, as a
matter of fact, because you had just been in there, I think,
the day before.
Mr. Bereuter. I noticed the French would not let us keep
our airplane on the apron while we were there for 1 day, but
that's a side issue with the French. We had to fly it all the
way back to Italy, and then it came back to pick us up 6 hours
later.
Ambassador Napper. With regard to the East/West transport
corridor which you mentioned, under our South Balkan
Development Initiative, the United States has provided $30
million over the last 4 years for the development of that East/
West corridor that links Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria. We
have been providing considerable assistance there.
What we want to do now is to move that assistance into a
multilateral framework under the Stability Pact. Dr. Hamilton
can address that in a moment.
Mr. Bereuter. Ambassador Napper, I thought there was a
request pending before the World Bank, and it's been blocked in
the World Bank. It seems to me the World Bank has a role in
this and this would be a multilateralization of that
assistance.
Ambassador Napper. That's exactly what we are trying to do.
We are trying to take a bilateral program, which we have been
funding for the past 4 years, in advance of the international
community, rally support for Macedonia and the other two
countries, and trying to put it in and develop greater
international assistance for it. I agree with that, and that's
the clear direction that we are headed.
Mr. Bereuter. International police?
Ambassador Napper. On international police, yes. We agree
with you that international police are, in fact, in many ways
the key to the problem of maintaining public order. Here the
story frankly is not--I agree with you, it is not as good as we
would have perhaps hoped by this juncture.
The total number of the police authorized for the Kosovo
mission at this point is 4,718.
Mr. Bereuter. The original request was 6,000 and cut back
to that, I believe.
Ambassador Napper. Actually----
Ambassador Pardew. The new requirement now is about 4,800.
Ambassador Napper. Right.
Mr. Bereuter. The original request, a suggestion from the
international people, was 6,000 and we are at, about 2,000?
Ambassador Napper. The Security Council of the United
Nations is the body that makes the decision as to how many
police are authorized for the mission. They started out with an
authorization of just over 3,000 police. That authorization was
then increased at the suggestion of the people on the ground to
this 4,718 figure.
Mr. Bereuter. Is it true that we actually have a reduction
in people there now? Are forces leaving and not being replaced?
Ambassador Napper. No, I think the reverse is true. There
is an increase in the number of police deployed. There are
2,375 police deployed, that's the figures we have today, which
leaves you with 52.3 percent of those authorized deployed.
Now that is not adequate, and we are trying to get that
figure up. That's one of the things we have in the request for
the supplemental, which I hope you will reconsider your views
of that and help us.
Mr. Bereuter. It depends on how good you can make the
Southeast Balkan ones, because my problem is throwing the money
away in Colombia.
Ambassador Napper. I would not be able to address that, Mr.
Bereuter.
But I do hope that at least the Southeast Europe part of it
could earn your support. Part of that is to provide some
additional U.S. police, and we are pressing very hard with our
European allies to get their police number up.
It has improved somewhat. They're now at 64 percent of
their pledges for police and moving up in the right direction.
So the police situation is not adequate there, we agree with
that, but we are increasing our own commitments and we are
urging others and having some success in getting them to
increase.
Ambassador Pardew. Let me just add a point, please. There
are really three elements on police. First there's the
international police, and those numbers are not adequate--2,300
of 3,700 required.
Then there's the Multinational Support Unit (MSU). These
are units in Kosovo for riot control and so forth. We have
three units that have volunteered so far, three countries that
have volunteered. They have not yet arrived. It is an issue of
facilities, but we are hopeful that facilities will be
available, soon.
The third element is the local police. We had to start from
scratch creating local Kosovo police, creating from scratch a
police training academy, recruiting people, and so forth.
Mr. Bereuter. It is very difficult, I know.
Ambassador Pardew. We've had two classes graduate. We are
trying to increase the output to 500 every 8 weeks, and to find
an additional facility outside of Kosovo, in Europe, where we
could double the number of local police this coming year.
Mr. Bereuter. Can they be trained in Budapest at the center
there?
Ambassador Pardew. The Hungarians have made an offer. The
Swiss have made an offer, and other countries are looking at
possibilities of using their facilities for off site training.
Mr. Bereuter. I was told there are 173 graduates out there
today, 8 of whom are Serbs.
Ambassador Pardew. There are two classes of about 175 each.
One just graduated before you got your number. A very, very
small number of Serbs participate in this program and there are
many reasons for that. The Serbs in the north are simply not
promoting participation. Second, some Serbs are fearful of
working with the Kosovars. We are encouraging Serbs to
participate----
Mr. Bereuter. We are trying to employ them at Bondsteel. A
very small number said they are willing, as Kosovar Serbs, to
be employed, but that Kosovar Serbs have been killed in a
couple of instances or intimidated in others so they do not
show up anymore.
Ambassador Pardew. Intimidation is a major problem
throughout Kosovo. That's true. We are doing everything we can
to prevent that, and to work with the moderates, but the
influence of extremists is still significant and it is a
problem.
Ambassador Napper. Just one other question that you had,
Mr. Bereuter, was about the assessed U.N. peace keeping costs.
I wanted to assure you that the level of peace keeping funding
that we've requested in the President's supplemental would not
exceed 25 percent of the U.N. assessment, so if we got
supplemental, we would not exceed 25 percent.
Mr. Bereuter. I am glad to hear it.
Ambassador Napper. A couple of points briefly on the
question of the Europeans.
As I said, every time Americans and Europeans meet to
discuss this issue--the Secretary will do so again tomorrow
when she meets Patten and others in Brussels--we've had
discussions continually on the question of European commitments
and fulfilling those. We've seen some success on this.
The budget cycles are different. They only begin their
budget cycle at the beginning of January, and so disbursements
come later than ours because we have a budget cycle that begins
a bit earlier. But we have, for instance, seen considerable
European commitments fulfilled on the Kosovo consolidated
budget. They've just deposited $10 million in that and another
$20 million is due at the middle of March. So these commitments
are beginning to be fulfilled.
Mr. Bereuter. What do you feel about their response to the
need to keep their commitments on police?
Ambassador Napper. I think they----
Mr. Bereuter. I know the Danes are, but who else is?
Ambassador Napper. I think there are a number of European
governments that have begun to increase their commitments on
police. For instance, the Austrians have deployed 49 out of 50
of the ones that they had promised. Denmark is 26 out of 26.
Finland is 20 out of 20. France is current with their
deployment. Others are lagging. In fact, there are other--
because this is a worldwide police effort, there are other
countries that are not European countries that, in fact, are
the ones that are, if you will, lagging a bit behind.
Mr. Bereuter. The Europeans provide about 40 percent? Is
that correct--only 40 percent of the total police force?
Ambassador Napper. They have provided----
Mr. Bereuter. Pledged, I mean.
Ambassador Napper. They have provided 64 percent of their
total pledge.
Mr. Bereuter. Overall, of the total police force, their
commitment is only about 40 percent? Is that roughly correct?
Ambassador Napper. If you take the European Union countries
and the other OSCE countries, it is about 40.8 percent, yes.
Mr. Bereuter. The OSCE countries enlarge dramatically
beyond the EU countries.
Ambassador Napper. Yes.
Mr. Bereuter. It seems to me that the Europeans are playing
a pretty small role if their overall commitment, even though
they haven't met it, is only 40 percent.
Ambassador Napper. They could be doing more, we are urging
that they do so, and it is improving. The numbers are improving
on the European commitment.
Mr. Bereuter. The problem with having peace keeping forces
from the rest of the world, in many cases, is that outside
people are not culturally attuned at all to that environment.
It is bad enough for a European or an American to go into that
area, but forces from Southeast Asia or from Africa have
problems from the beginning. They, in fact, create problems at
times, unfortunately.
If the Europeans cannot pick up a much larger role of the
international police keeping force, I do not think you're ever
going to get an effective police force there that meets the
4,000-plus requirement.
Ambassador Napper. We are certainly trying to. The police
effort there certainly involves an effort to keep a certain
standard, to have a certain standard in terms of the
capabilities of the individual policeman to do his job. That
applies across the board.
It is not an ideal situation. We are relying on a
multilateral force to be organized, and in part, as we do want
to keep our commitment to a relatively small part, we have to
encourage others to deploy. It is not to our satisfaction at
this juncture, but there has been improvement.
Mr. Bereuter. I will just look for what you can do through
the Administration to increase the European commitment. You're
stuck with me because I have no colleagues here, so you're
suffering through my questions, but I haven't heard yet anyone
address, and maybe I haven't given you a chance, the problems
of corruption, particularly in Bosnia.
Ambassador Pardew. Let me address what we are doing to
solve the international police problem.
The President is personally involved in this, making phone
calls, discussing the issue with his counterparts. He's
directly engaged and encouraging our European colleagues to
contribute more police.
Secretary Albright is meeting tonight with her colleague.
This will be a major topic of discussion in that meeting.
We are working this at every level because we recognize
this is a critical issue holding us back.
Mr. Bereuter. I would like to strengthen your hand, so I
hope you will recognize that when you see my handiwork.
Ambassador Pardew. On the issue of corruption in Bosnia, we
are working this at two levels. First, there's the criminal
element of this. In that regard we are improving the quality of
our assistance there by providing FBI and other expertise. We
are working, again, with our European allies, to create an
armed international police element to participate in the
investigative process of corruption at a high level.
The second element of the anti-corruption program is
economic reform. We have to break the link of the nationalist
parties controlling economic enterprises. We are working with
the World Bank, the IMF, and others to take a tough position on
conditionality to force privatization and reform. We are not
happy with the level of privatization in Bosnia at this point
to get these companies out of the hands of these parties and--
--
Mr. Bereuter. I think you understand the problem, and I
just think you're going to have to do something really dramatic
to break through here. Otherwise we are just not going to get
direct foreign investment in there. You're not going to see a
willingness for countries to put resources into Bosnia.
Ambassador Pardew. We have passed that message to the
leadership there as late as yesterday when Secretary Albright
met with the presidents. We have told them there's no
international commercial bank in Bosnia. We are hopeful that
one will be there in the next couple of months.
Our Ambassador to Bosnia, Tom Miller, has withdrawn
assistance on privatization, specifically to make the point. I
have worked through Treasury with the IMF and the World Bank to
toughen the conditionality to force the issue on privatization.
Congressman, this is one we are taking extremely seriously,
and we are building in some very tough conditions to make it
happen.
We want the payment bureau taken down and we've got a
schedule to do so. The payments bureau is a holdover from the
old communist system, the system they used to move money
through a government. We plan to have it dismantled by the end
of the year, and we are going to take a very hard line with it.
Mr. Bereuter. It may be helpful to you to provide some
detail on that before we go to debate on these issues, and I'd
be interested in seeing it.
Ambassador Pardew. I'd be happy to.
Mr. Bereuter. I need to go vote but I want to give Dr.
Hamilton a chance.
Dr. Hamilton. Just briefly, on Macedonia in particular. On
Blace, part of the arrangement, the deal that's coming
together, is a one-stop process, so that instead of stopping
along the border they just go right through it one time.
The construction would facilitate the off-road, and then
when they're ready to go they'd just go across. As Ambassador
Pardew said, the construction of that should start right away.
On your issue on the rail, the Committee has made clear our
effort here is to leverage European and IFI funding. Through
the Stability Pact, what we have done is provide a package on
energy, on transportation, and on environment and water. At
this regional conference we expect that the Europeans and the
international financial institutions will approve a solid
package for Macedonia in these three areas which connects the
Macedonians to their neighbors in energy, transportation and
water, and that these projects would be able to start.
The project you mentioned has been part of the vetting
process by the international financial institutions so that
they would hopefully be able to fund that. That is what is
underway.
The other part we have made clear to our European
counterparts is the need for the European Union to open its
market further to access for not only Macedonia, but the other
countries in the region. As Secretary Albright made that point
as recently as yesterday, she will be seeing President Prodi
tomorrow and making the same point.
We are working very carefully with the Macedonians right
now because they are the Co-chair of the economic table for the
Stability Pact. The international community met in Skopje about
a month ago, and the government pledged good things in that
area. But they have signed this investment compact which
pledges them to work on specific reforms in the economic area.
We have created a country team mechanism by which the donor
community works with key decisionmakers in each country
government, including Macedonia. The team just met on Tuesday
with the senior levels of the Macedonian government on their
next steps on economic reform. It is a supportive group. It
includes all the donors, and it is proceeding.
So there are a number of things that are focused on
Macedonia. We hope to have more.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. I have an educational initiative
that I will offer. I hope you will look kindly on if you can.
Does the gentleman from California have questions?
Otherwise I am going to dismiss the witnesses.
Mr. Sherman. Yes, I do.
Mr. Bereuter. Just let me say a couple of things here
first.
The Committee will submit questions for answers in writing
to our witnesses, and I want to say before I leave that I
appreciate your testimony and your responses.
I am going to turn the chair over to Mr. Lantos and hope
for the best here. The other gentleman from California, Mr.
Sherman, can ask his questions after which time, if Chairman
Gilman is not back, Mr. Lantos is free to dismiss the
witnesses. Then we'll have a short break, pending Mr. Gilman's
return, at which time the Committee will markup the two bills.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Japan is physically closer to Bosnia and
Kosovo than my district in California. How much money, how many
troops, how many lives have been put on the line by the
Japanese to defend peace and security in Southeast Europe?
Ambassador Pardew. First of all, as you know, Congressman,
Japan, I think, has some restrictions on that. Their military--
--
Mr. Sherman. So they benefit economically by having
restrictions--Is there any restriction in the Japanese
constitution that would prevent them from sending money to pay
for the American troops?
Ambassador Pardew. The Japanese are contributors to the
Kosovo----
Mr. Sherman. How much money have they sent?
Dr. Hamilton. Japanese contributions and disbursements to
UNMIK, the total pledged is $7.3 million, which is 4.1 percent
of the total pledged.
Mr. Sherman. That's of that particular agency. But when you
look at the cost of establishing peace, first in Bosnia then in
Kosovo, when you look at putting American lives on the line,
you would not say that the Japanese effort is 4 percent of the
American effort in terms of the total cost, including the cost
of maintaining military presence there.
I realize that's comparing apples and oranges. I am just
bringing this question up to illustrate the fact that other
rich countries are shirking their responsibilities. It is
absolutely absurd that we still have peace keeping troops doing
the job that Europeans should be doing, and that we are still
incurring a cost to do that. I think historians are going to
have to compare this to our reaction in southern Sudan where
neither Europe nor the United States is doing anything. A
Europe that cannot keep peace in Europe obviously makes it more
difficult for us to do anything in southern Sudan.
Ambassador, I can see that you wish to respond.
Ambassador Napper. I just wanted to add one other fact for
the record, Mr. Sherman. For our calculations with regard to
the overall burden sharing effort in Kosovo, Dr. Hamilton has
mentioned the contributions to the consolidated Kosovo budget,
but taken as a whole, the Japanese contribution thus far is
$88.7 million out of a total of $1,210,000,000. So it is a
little over 7 percent.
Mr. Sherman. It is tough enough that the foreign services
of Europe and Japan do everything possible to overstate their
effort and to understate ours. My fear is that our own foreign
policy establishment does likewise. If anyone thinks that the
total effort in Kosovo was a $1.5 billion effort, that the
total effort in Kosovo of all countries was less than it costs
to build a freeway interchange, then they must have been
sleeping through the entire war.
I do not know what figure you used, but to look at what was
the primary focus of American military power for many months
and to attribute less than one-half of 1 percent of our
military budget during the period of hostilities toward what
was the focus of our entire military establishment illustrates
the fact that our own foreign policy establishment is working
hard to explain, to understate the fact that American
taxpayers, American men and women in the military are bearing a
very disproportionate share of the load. Even today, George
Bush, Governor of Texas, is able to say quite poignantly that
even if we are forced by circumstances to be the peacemakers,
why are we stuck being the peace keepers?
What especially concerns me is we were told to get involved
in Kosovo because Europe was so much more important to us than
Africa, because Europe was so economically powerful and
significant, yet this powerful European continent cannot patrol
a tiny area, an area where less than two million people live.
It strikes me as odd that we are told that Europe is so
important that we must go and defend them, that they are so
powerful that they deserve our help, and yet so powerless that
they need it. It is disappointing, to say the least, that we
are still carrying European responsibilities at the cost of the
American taxpayer. To try to claim that Japan is doing 5 or 10
percent of the load-carrying in Kosovo and Bosnia, I think
strains all of our understanding of the situation.
I will yield back the balance of my time.
Ambassador Pardew. I just wanted to say, Congressman, that
of course our engagement in this region--as I said in my
opening statement--is based on our interests there. We do think
the European interest is greater than ours. It is their
continent. But we are a partner with Europe. We are partner in
NATO. This is a NATO-led operation, and we should participate
in that partnership.
Mr. Sherman. We have deliberately structured this
situation. We could have formed a new organization, including
Japan, and invited Japan to contribute more money. We could
have invited the European exclusive organizations to
participate. We are a partner of every nation in the world,
virtually. We've even told we have a strategic partnership with
China. Certainly we are members of the United Nations. So
simply by picking which organization will intervene here or
there, we can declare that any corner of the world is a place
where America must bear a disproportionate share of the burden.
The fact remains that 5 and 10 years from now the Japanese
will be selling more manufactured product in Kosovo than we
are. That 10 and 20 years from now Europe will continue to
engage in trade practices that show that they are indeed
powerful diplomatically when they want to be--powerful in
fighting for their own economic interests and powerful in
twisting American policy to meet their economic objectives.
You have a variety of different hats and flags that can be
flown over different trouble spots, and we've chosen the words
NATO to try to imply that the people of Los Angeles have a
greater responsibility for assuring peace in Pristina than the
people of Tokyo. That's a conclusion that we reached only
because we wanted to. Geographically, that is not the way God
designed the planet.
Ambassador Pardew. I would only like to assure you that the
foreign policy establishment is making every effort to ensure
that others pay their share. As Ambassador Napper and others
have mentioned this morning----
Mr. Sherman. I believe I still have time, and I will say
that every effort possible means every effort that doesn't
unduly trouble, inconvenience or anger those who are foisting
their responsibilities on us. Every effort possible would be
announcing that it is up to Europe to carry this and that we
are leaving except for perhaps some technical assistance that
they're unable to do.
We were told during the war that we had to do all the
bombing because their planes didn't work. Of course they were
unwilling to buy any of ours before then or in the future. Now
we are told we have to patrol because every effort possible
means everything that doesn't make them too angry.
I believe my time is expired.
Mr. Rohrabacher. As much as the Chairman appreciates the
comments of my friend, we have to move on.
Does any other Member have----
Ms. Lee. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I will be very quick.
As to what our policy is now this year with regard to the
reconstruction efforts, the infrastructure-building--I know
last year the President made statements that we were reluctant
to do that because of the fact that Milosevic was still there.
But given that the bombing, of course the bridge and all of the
other buildings that were damaged, what are we doing, if
anything? Does any of this money go toward that? Or do we still
have a kind of hands-off approach on actual reconstruction
efforts?
Dr. Hamilton. Do you mean for Serbia particularly or for
the region?
Ms. Lee. In Kosovo specifically.
Ambassador Napper. With regard to Kosovo, the
appropriations bill that was passed last fall precludes an
American involvement in large-scale physical reconstruction in
Kosovo. That was a prescription in the law, so we are not doing
that. We are undertaking a number of programs to promote the
economic revitalization of Kosovo, and this goes across a whole
gamut of activities, from encouraging the growth of small and
medium enterprises, to a revival of agriculture in Kosovo, to
providing assistance to the authorities there and those
authorities that will be elected later in the year, local
municipal governments, in structuring their finances and taxes,
technical assistance in that regard. So across a whole gamut of
activities we are trying to promote the economic revitalization
of Kosovo, but we are precluded by law from engaging in large-
scale reconstruction of, for instance, rebuilding power plants
or the airport or roads or things of that nature.
With regard to Serbia, fundamentally the guidelines are
still as we discussed them with you the last time we were here.
That is, as long as Milosevic is in power, we will not be doing
any reconstruction assistance in Serbia.
Ms. Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Any other Member have questions?
Seeing none, the Chair will indulge in one question.
I understand there are reports that the communist Chinese
government has invested big sums of money in Serbia. Do you
have any indication of that?
Ambassador Pardew. There were reports some months ago that
there was some investment, some financial dealings between the
Chinese and Milosevic. We have discussed this with the Chinese
and have been assured that it had stopped, but let me get you
an answer for the record on that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. As far as all the witnesses, do you know
of any communist Chinese investment in Serbia?
Ambassador Napper. I know of nothing more than what
Ambassador Pardew has just stated, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. That would be a matter of
concern, obviously.
I would ask any Members of the Committee who would like to
ask further questions to submit them in writing for our
witnesses. We do appreciate our witnesses and thank you very
much for spending this time. We've had to run in and out here.
We will now excuse you, and the Committee stands adjourned
pending the Chairman's return.
Without objection, written questions for witnesses will be
submitted within 1 week.
[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m. the Committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 9, 2000
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