[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 75 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]
105th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. RES. 75
To advise and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, subject to certain conditions.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
April 17, 1997
Mr. Helms submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations
April 23, 1997
Committee discharged pursuant to the order of April 17, 1997
April 24, 1997
Considered, amended, and agreed to
_______________________________________________________________________
EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION
To advise and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, subject to certain conditions.
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (as defined in section 3 of this resolution),
subject to the conditions in section 2.
SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.
The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention is subject to the following conditions, which shall
be binding upon the President:
(1) Effect of article xxii.--Upon the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify
to the Congress that the United States has informed all other
States Parties to the Convention that the Senate reserves the
right, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, to
give its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention
subject to reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the
Convention.
(2) Financial contributions.--Notwithstanding any provision
of the Convention, no funds may be drawn from the Treasury of
the United States for any payment or assistance (including the
transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16 of Article IV,
paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII,
paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision
of the Convention, without statutory authorization and
appropriation.
(3) Establishment of an internal oversight office.--
(A) Certification.--Not later than 240 days after
the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to the
Congress that the current internal audit office of the
Preparatory Commission has been expanded into an
independent internal oversight office whose functions
will be transferred to the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons upon the establishment
of the Organization. The independent internal oversight
office shall be obligated to protect confidential
information pursuant to the obligations of the
Confidentiality Annex. The independent internal
oversight office shall--
(i) make investigations and reports
relating to all programs of the Organization;
(ii) undertake both management and
financial audits, including--
(I) an annual assessment verifying
that classified and confidential
information is stored and handled
securely pursuant to the general
obligations set forth in Article VIII
and in accordance with all provisions
of the Annex on the Protection of
Confidential Information; and
(II) an annual assessment of
laboratories established pursuant to
paragraph 55 of Part II of the
Verification Annex to ensure that the
Director General of the Technical
Secretariat is carrying out his
functions pursuant to paragraph 56 of
Part II of the Verification Annex;
(iii) undertake performance evaluations
annually to ensure the Organization has
complied to the extent practicable with the
recommendations of the independent internal
oversight office;
(iv) have access to all records relating to
the programs and operations of the
Organization;
(v) have direct and prompt access to any
official of the Organization; and
(vi) be required to protect the identity
of, and prevent reprisals against, all
complainants.
(B) Compliance with recommendations.--The
Organization shall ensure, to the extent practicable,
compliance with recommendations of the independent
internal oversight office, and shall ensure that annual
and other relevant reports by the independent internal
oversight office are made available to all member
states pursuant to the requirements established in the
Confidentiality Annex.
(C) Withholding a portion of contributions.--Until
a certification is made under subparagraph (A), 50
percent of the amount of United States contributions to
the regular budget of the Organization assessed
pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall be
withheld from disbursement, in addition to any other
amounts required to be withheld from disbursement by
any other provision of law.
(D) Assessment of first year contributions.--
Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for
the first year of the Organization's operation, ending
on April 29, 1998, the United States shall make its
full contribution to the regular budget of the
Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of
Article VIII.
(E) Definition.--For purposes of this paragraph,
the term ``internal oversight office'' means an
independent office (or other independent entity)
established by the Organization to conduct and
supervise objective audits, inspections, and
investigations relating to the programs and operations
of the Organization.
(4) Cost sharing arrangements.--
(A) Annual reports.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification, and annually
thereafter, the President shall submit a report to
Congress identifying all cost-sharing arrangements with
the Organization.
(B) Cost-sharing arrangement required.--The United
States shall not undertake any new research or
development expenditures for the primary purpose of
refining or improving the Organization's regime for
verification of compliance under the Convention,
including the training of inspectors and the provision
of detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling
and analysis techniques, or share the articles, items,
or services resulting from any research and development
undertaken previously, without first having concluded
and submitted to the Congress a cost-sharing
arrangement with the Organization.
(C) Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may be
construed as limiting or constricting in any way the
ability of the United States to pursue unilaterally any
project undertaken solely to increase the capability of
the United States means for monitoring compliance with
the Convention.
(5) Intelligence sharing and safeguards.--
(A) Provision of intelligence information to the
organization.--
(i) In general.--No United States
intelligence information may be provided to the
Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any official or
employee thereof, unless the President
certifies to the appropriate committees of
Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence, in consultation with the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, has established and implemented
procedures, and has worked with the
Organization or such other organization, as the
case may be, to ensure implementation of
procedures, for protecting from unauthorized
disclosure United States intelligence sources
and methods connected to such information.
These procedures shall include the requirement
of--
(I) the offer and provision, if
accepted, of advice and assistance to
the Organization or the affiliated
organization in establishing and
maintaining the necessary measures to
ensure that inspectors and other staff
members of the Technical Secretariat
meet the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity,
pursuant to paragraph 1(b) of the
Confidentiality Annex, and in
establishing and maintaining a
stringent regime governing the handling
of confidential information by the
Technical Secretariat, pursuant to
paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality
Annex;
(II) a determination that any
unauthorized disclosure of United
States intelligence information to be
provided to the Organization or any
organization affiliated with the
Organization, or any official or
employee thereof, would result in no
more than minimal damage to United
States national security, in light of
the risks of the unauthorized
disclosure of such information;
(III) sanitization of intelligence
information that is to be provided to
the Organization or the affiliated
organization to remove all information
that could betray intelligence sources
and methods; and
(IV) interagency United States
intelligence community approval for any
release of intelligence information to
the Organization or the affiliated
organization, no matter how thoroughly
it has been sanitized.
(ii) Waiver authority.--
(I) In general.--The Director of
Central Intelligence may waive the
application of clause (i) if the
Director of Central Intelligence
certifies in writing to the appropriate
committees of Congress that providing
such information to the Organization or
an organization affiliated with the
Organization, or to any official or
employee thereof, is in the vital
national security interests of the
United States and that all possible
measures to protect such information
have been taken, except that such
waiver must be made for each instance
such information is provided, or for
each such document provided. In the
event that multiple waivers are issued
within a single week, a single
certification to the appropriate
committees of Congress may be
submitted, specifying each waiver
issued during that week.
(II) Delegation of duties.--The
Director of Central Intelligence may
not delegate any duty of the Director
under this paragraph.
(B) Periodic and special reports.--
(i) In general.--The President shall report
periodically, but not less frequently than
semiannually, to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives on the types and volume of
intelligence information provided to the
Organization or affiliated organizations and
the purposes for which it was provided during
the period covered by the report.
(ii) Exemption.--For purposes of this
subparagraph, intelligence information provided
to the Organization or affiliated organizations
does not cover information that is provided
only to, and only for the use of, appropriately
cleared United States Government personnel
serving with the Organization or an affiliated
organization.
(C) Special reports.--
(i) Report on procedures.--Accompanying the
certification provided pursuant to subparagraph
(A)(i), the President shall provide a detailed
report to the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives identifying the procedures
established for protecting intelligence sources
and methods when intelligence information is
provided pursuant to this section.
(ii) Reports on unauthorized disclosures.--
The President shall submit a report to the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives
within 15 days after it has become known to the
United States Government regarding any
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
provided by the United States to the
Organization.
(D) Delegation of duties.--The President may not
delegate or assign the duties of the President under
this section.
(E) Relationship to existing law.--Nothing in this
paragraph may be construed to--
(i) impair or otherwise affect the
authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence to protect intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure
pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5));
or
(ii) supersede or otherwise affect the
provisions of title V of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
(F) Definitions.--In this section:
(i) Appropriate committees of congress.--
The term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Committee on International
Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(ii) Organization.--The term
``Organization'' means the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established
under the Convention and includes any organ of
that Organization and any board or working
group, such as the Scientific Advisory Board,
that may be established by it, and any official
or employee thereof.
(iii) Organization affiliated with the
organization.--The terms ``organization
affiliated with the Organization'' and
``affiliated organizations'' include the
Provisional Technical Secretariat under the
Convention and any laboratory certified by the
Director-General of the Technical Secretariat
as designated to perform analytical or other
functions, and any official or employee
thereof.
(6) Amendments to the convention.--
(A) Voting representation of the united states.--A
United States representative will be present at all
Amendment Conferences and will cast a vote, either
affirmative or negative, on all proposed amendments
made at such conferences.
(B) Submission of amendments as treaties.--The
President shall submit to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification under Article II, Section 2,
Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States any
amendment to the Convention adopted by an Amendment
Conference.
(7) Continuing vitality of the australia group and national
export controls.--
(A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that the
collapse of the informal forum of states known as the
``Australia Group,'' either through changes in
membership or lack of compliance with common export
controls, or the substantial weakening of common
Australia Group export controls and non-proliferation
measures in force on the date of United States
ratification of the Convention, would constitute a
fundamental change in circumstances affecting the
object and purpose of the Convention.
(B) Certification requirement.--Prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to Congress
that--
(i) nothing in the Convention obligates the
United States to accept any modification,
change in scope, or weakening of its national
export controls;
(ii) the United States understands that the
maintenance of national restrictions on trade
in chemicals and chemical production technology
is fully compatible with the provisions of the
Convention, including Article XI(2), and solely
within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United
States;
(iii) the Convention preserves the right of
State Parties, unilaterally or collectively, to
maintain or impose export controls on chemicals
and related chemical production technology for
foreign policy or national security reasons,
notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
(iv) each Australia Group member, at the
highest diplomatic levels, has officially
communicated to the United States Government
its understanding and agreement that export
control and nonproliferation measures which the
Australia Group has undertaken are fully
compatible with the provisions of the
Convention, including Article XI(2), and its
commitment to maintain in the future such
export controls and nonproliferation measures
against non-Australia Group members.
(C) Annual certification.--
(i) Effectiveness of australia group.--The
President shall certify to Congress on an
annual basis that--
(I) Australia Group members
continue to maintain an equally
effective or more comprehensive control
over the export of toxic chemicals and
their precursors, dual-use processing
equipment, human, animal and plant
pathogens and toxins with potential
biological weapons application, and
dual-use biological equipment, as that
afforded by the Australia Group as of
the date of ratification of the
Convention by the United States; and
(II) the Australia Group remains a
viable mechanism for limiting the
spread of chemical and biological
weapons-related materials and
technology, and that the effectiveness
of the Australia Group has not been
undermined by changes in membership,
lack of compliance with common export
controls and nonproliferation measures,
or the weakening of common controls and
nonproliferation measures, in force as
of the date of ratification of the
Convention by the United States.
(ii) Consultation with senate required.--In
the event that the President is, at any time,
unable to make the certifications described in
clause (i), the President shall consult with
the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
resolution of support for continued adherence
to the Convention, notwithstanding the
fundamental change in circumstance.
(D) Periodic consultation with congressional
committees.--The President shall consult periodically,
but not less frequently than twice a year, with the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives, on Australia Group export control and
nonproliferation measures. If any Australia Group
member adopts a position at variance with the
certifications and understandings provided under
subparagraph (B), or should seek to gain Australia
Group acquiescence or approval for an interpretation
that various provisions of the Convention require it to
remove chemical-weapons related export controls against
any State Party to the Convention, the President shall
block any effort by that Australia Group member to
secure Australia Group approval of such a position or
interpretation.
(E) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
(i) Australia group.--The term ``Australia
Group'' means the informal forum of states,
chaired by Australia, whose goal is to
discourage and impede chemical and biological
weapons proliferation by harmonizing national
export controls chemical weapons precursor
chemicals, biological weapons pathogens, and
dual-use production equipment, and through
other measures.
(ii) Highest diplomatic levels.--The term
``highest diplomatic levels'' means at the
levels of senior officials with the power to
authoritatively represent their governments,
and does not include diplomatic representatives
of those governments to the United States.
(8) Negative security assurances.--
(A) Reevaluation.--In forswearing under the
Convention the possession of a chemical weapons
retaliatory capability, the Senate understands that
deterrence of attack by chemical weapons requires a
reevaluation of the negative security assurances
extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
(B) Classified report.--Accordingly, 180 days after
the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall submit to the
Congress a classified report setting forth the findings
of a detailed review of United States policy on
negative security assurances, including a determination
of the appropriate responses to the use of chemical or
biological weapons against the Armed Forces of the
United States, United States citizens and allies, and
third parties.
(9) Protection of advanced biotechnology.--Prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, and on
January 1 of every year thereafter, the President shall certify
to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives that the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and
pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being
significantly harmed by the limitations of the Convention on
access to, and production of, those chemicals and toxins listed
in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.
(10) Monitoring and verification of compliance.--
(A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that--
(i) the Convention is in the interests of
the United States only if all State Parties are
in strict compliance with the terms of the
Convention as submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, such
compliance being measured by performance and
not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to
comply; and
(ii) the Senate expects all State Parties
to be in strict compliance with their
obligations under the terms of the Convention,
as submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification;
(B) Briefings on compliance.--Given its concern
about the intelligence community's low level of
confidence in its ability to monitor compliance with
the Convention, the Senate expects the executive branch
of the Government to offer regular briefings, not less
than four times a year, to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives
on compliance issues related to the Convention. Such
briefings shall include a description of all United
States efforts in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic
channels and forums to resolve compliance issues and
shall include a complete description of--
(i) any compliance issues the United States
plans to raise at meetings of the Organization,
in advance of such meetings;
(ii) any compliance issues raised at
meetings of the Organization, within 30 days of
such meeting;
(iii) any determination by the President
that a State Party is in noncompliance with or
is otherwise acting in a manner inconsistent
with the object or purpose of the Convention,
within 30 days of such a determination.
(C) Annual reports on compliance.--The President
shall submit on January 1 of each year to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives
a full and complete classified and unclassified report
setting forth--
(i) a certification of those countries
included in the Intelligence Community's
Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by the
Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control
Staff and the National Intelligence Council (or
any successor document setting forth
intelligence priorities in the field of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction)
that are determined to be in compliance with
the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
(ii) for those countries not certified
pursuant to clause (i), an identification and
assessment of all compliance issues arising
with regard to the adherence of the country to
its obligations under the Convention;
(iii) the steps the United States has
taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction
with another State Party--
(I) to initiate challenge
inspections of the noncompliant party
with the objective of demonstrating to
the international community the act of
noncompliance;
(II) to call attention publicly to
the activity in question; and
(III) to seek on an urgent basis a
meeting at the highest diplomatic level
with the noncompliant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant
party into compliance;
(iv) a determination of the military
significance and broader security risks arising
from any compliance issue identified pursuant
to clause (ii); and
(v) a detailed assessment of the responses
of the noncompliant party in question to action
undertaken by the United States described in
clause (iii).
(D) Countries previously included in compliance
reports.--For any country that was previously included
in a report submitted under subparagraph (C), but which
subsequently is not included in the Intelligence
Community's Monitoring Strategy (or successor
document), such country shall continue to be included
in the report submitted under subparagraph (C) unless
the country has been certified under subparagraph
(C)(i) for each of the previous two years.
(E) Form of certifications.--For those countries
that have been publicly and officially identified by a
representative of the intelligence community as
possessing or seeking to develop chemical weapons, the
certification described in subparagraph (C)(i) shall be
in unclassified form.
(F) Annual reports on intelligence.--On January 1,
1998, and annually thereafter, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall submit to the Committees on Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committees on
International Relations, National Security, and
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives a full and complete classified and
unclassified report regarding--
(i) the status of chemical weapons
development, production, stockpiling, and use,
within the meanings of those terms under the
Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
(ii) any information made available to the
United States Government concerning the
development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling, retention, use, or direct or
indirect transfer of novel agents, including
any unitary or binary chemical weapon comprised
of chemical components not identified on the
schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a
country-by-country basis;
(iii) the extent of trade in chemicals
potentially relevant to chemical weapons
programs, including all Australia Group
chemicals and chemicals identified on the
schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a
country-by-country basis;
(iv) the monitoring responsibilities,
practices, and strategies of the intelligence
community (as defined in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947) and a
determination of the level of confidence of the
intelligence community with respect to each
specific monitoring task undertaken, including
an assessment by the intelligence community of
the national aggregate data provided by State
Parties to the Organization, on a country-by-
country basis;
(v) an identification of how United States
national intelligence means, including national
technical means and human intelligence, are
being marshaled together with the Convention's
verification provisions to monitor compliance
with the Convention; and
(vi) the identification of chemical weapons
development, production, stockpiling, or use,
within the meanings of those terms under the
Convention, by subnational groups, including
terrorist and paramilitary organizations.
(G) Reports on resources for monitoring.--Each
report required under subparagraph (F) shall include a
full and complete classified annex submitted solely to
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and
to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives regarding--
(i) a detailed and specific identification
of all United States resources devoted to
monitoring the Convention, including
information on all expenditures associated with
the monitoring of the Convention; and
(ii) an identification of the priorities of
the executive branch of Government for the
development of new resources relating to
detection and monitoring capabilities with
respect to chemical and biological weapons,
including a description of the steps being
taken and resources being devoted to
strengthening United States monitoring
capabilities.
(11) Enhancements to robust chemical and biological
defenses.--
(A) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the
Senate that--
(i) chemical and biological threats to
deployed United States Armed Forces will
continue to grow in regions of concern around
the world, and pose serious threats to United
States power projection and forward deployment
strategies;
(ii) chemical weapons or biological weapons
use is a potential element of future conflicts
in regions of concern;
(iii) it is essential for the United States
and key regional allies to preserve and further
develop robust chemical and biological
defenses;
(iv) the United States Armed Forces are
inadequately equipped, organized, trained and
exercised for chemical and biological defense
against current and expected threats, and that
too much reliance is placed on non-active duty
forces, which receive less training and less
modern equipment, for critical chemical and
biological defense capabilities;
(v) the lack of readiness stems from a de-
emphasis of chemical and biological defenses
within the executive branch of Government and
the United States Armed Forces;
(vi) the armed forces of key regional
allies and likely coalition partners, as well
as civilians necessary to support United States
military operations, are inadequately prepared
and equipped to carry out essential missions in
chemically and biologically contaminated
environments;
(vii) congressional direction contained in
the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104-201)
should lead to enhanced domestic preparedness
to protect against chemical and biological
weapons threats; and
(viii) the United States Armed Forces
should place increased emphasis on potential
threats to forces deployed abroad and, in
particular, make countering chemical and
biological weapons use an organizing principle
for United States defense strategy and
development of force structure, doctrine,
planning, training, and exercising policies of
the United States Armed Forces.
(B) Actions to strengthen defense capabilities.--
The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions
necessary to ensure that the United States Armed Forces
are capable of carrying out required military missions
in United States regional contingency plans, despite
the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons. In
particular, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that
the United States Armed Forces are effectively
equipped, organized, trained, and exercised (including
at the large unit and theater level) to conduct
operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment that are critical to the success of the
United States military plans in regional conflicts,
including--
(i) deployment, logistics, and
reinforcement operations at key ports and
airfields;
(ii) sustained combat aircraft sortie
generation at critical regional airbases; and
(iii) ground force maneuvers of large units
and divisions.
(C) Discussions with regional allies and likely
coalition partners.--
(i) In general.--The Secretaries of Defense
and State shall, as a priority matter, initiate
discussions with key regional allies and likely
regional coalition partners, including those
countries where the United States currently
deploys forces, where United States forces
would likely operate during regional conflicts,
or which would provide civilians necessary to
support United States military operations, to
determine what steps are necessary to ensure
that allied and coalition forces and other
critical civilians are adequately equipped and
prepared to operate in chemically and
biologically contaminated environments.
(ii) Reporting requirement.--Not later than
one year after deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the Secretaries of
Defense and State shall submit a report to the
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed
Services of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives on the result of
these discussions, plans for future
discussions, measures agreed to improve the
preparedness of foreign forces and civilians,
and proposals for increased military
assistance, including through the Foreign
Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing
under the Arms Export Control Act and the
International Military Education and Training
programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961.
(D) United states army chemical school.--The
Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary
to ensure that the United States Army Chemical School
remains under the oversight of a general officer of the
United States Army.
(E) Sense of the senate.--Given its concerns about
the present state of chemical and biological defense
readiness and training, it is the sense of the Senate
that--
(i) in the transfer, consolidation, and
reorganization of the United States Army
Chemical School, the Army should not disrupt or
diminish the training and readiness of the
United States Armed Forces to fight in a
chemical-biological warfare environment;
(ii) the Army should continue to operate
the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort
McClellan until such time as the replacement
training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is
functional.
(F) Annual reports on chemical and biological
weapons defense activities.--On January 1, 1998, and
annually thereafter, the President shall submit a
report to the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committees on International Relations, National
Security, and Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives on previous, current, and planned
chemical and biological weapons defense activities. The
report shall contain for the previous fiscal year and
for the next three fiscal years--
(i) proposed solutions to each of the
deficiencies in chemical and biological warfare
defenses identified in the March 1996 report of
the General Accounting Office entitled
``Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis
Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing
Problems'', and steps being taken pursuant to
subparagraph (B) to ensure that the United
States Armed Forces are capable of conducting
required military operations to ensure the
success of United States regional contingency
plans despite the threat or use of chemical or
biological weapons;
(ii) identification of the priorities of
the executive branch of Government in the
development of both active and passive chemical
and biological defenses;
(iii) a detailed summary of all budget
activities associated with the research,
development, testing, and evaluation of
chemical and biological defense programs;
(iv) a detailed summary of expenditures on
research, development, testing, and evaluation,
and procurement of chemical and biological
defenses by fiscal years defense programs,
department, and agency;
(v) a detailed assessment of current and
projected vaccine production capabilities and
vaccine stocks, including progress in
researching and developing a multivalent
vaccine;
(vi) a detailed assessment of procedures
and capabilities necessary to protect and
decontaminate infrastructure to reinforce
United States power-projection forces,
including progress in developing a nonaqueous
chemical decontamination capability;
(vii) a description of progress made in
procuring light-weight personal protective gear
and steps being taken to ensure that programmed
procurement quantities are sufficient to
replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and
chemical protective overgarments to maintain
required wartime inventory levels;
(viii) a description of progress made in
developing long-range standoff detection and
identification capabilities and other
battlefield surveillance capabilities for
biological and chemical weapons, including
progress on developing a multi-chemical agent
detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and
unmanned ground sensors;
(ix) a description of progress made in
developing and deploying layered theater
missile defenses for deployed United States
Armed Forces which will provide greater
geographic coverage against current and
expected ballistic missile threats and will
assist in mitigating chemical and biological
contamination through higher altitude
intercepts and boost-phase intercepts;
(x) an assessment of--
(I) the training and readiness of
the United States Armed Forces to
operate in a chemically or biologically
contaminated environment; and
(II) actions taken to sustain
training and readiness, including
training and readiness carried out at
national combat training centers;
(xi) a description of progress made in
incorporating chemical and biological
considerations into service and joint exercises
as well as simulations, models, and war games,
and the conclusions drawn from these efforts
about the United States capability to carry out
required missions, including missions with
coalition partners, in military contingencies;
(xii) a description of progress made in
developing and implementing service and joint
doctrine for combat and non-combat operations
involving adversaries armed with chemical or
biological weapons, including efforts to update
the range of service and joint doctrine to
better address the wide range of military
activities, including deployment,
reinforcement, and logistics operations in
support of combat operations, and for the
conduct of such operations in concert with
coalition forces; and
(xiii) a description of progress made in
resolving issues relating to the protection of
United States population centers from chemical
and biological attack, including plans for
inoculation of populations, consequence
management, and a description of progress made
in developing and deploying effective cruise
missile defenses and a national ballistic
missile defense.
(12) Primacy of the united states constitution.--Nothing in
the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other
action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution of
the United States, as interpreted by the United States.
(13) Noncompliance.--
(A) In general.--If the President determines that
persuasive information exists that a State Party to the
Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons production
or production mobilization capability, is developing
new chemical agents, or is in violation of the
Convention in any other manner so as to threaten the
national security interests of the United States, then
the President shall--
(i) consult with the Senate, and promptly
submit to it, a report detailing the effect of
such actions;
(ii) seek on an urgent basis a challenge
inspection of the facilities of the relevant
party in accordance with the provisions of the
Convention with the objective of demonstrating
to the international community the act of
noncompliance;
(iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent
basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level
with the relevant party with the objective of
bringing the noncompliant party into
compliance;
(iv) implement prohibitions and sanctions
against the relevant party as required by law;
(v) if noncompliance has been determined,
seek on an urgent basis within the Security
Council of the United Nations a multilateral
imposition of sanctions against the
noncompliant party for the purposes of bringing
the noncompliant party into compliance; and
(vi) in the event that the noncompliance
continues for a period of longer than one year
after the date of the determination made
pursuant to subparagraph (A), promptly consult
with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
resolution of support for continued adherence
to the Convention, notwithstanding the changed
circumstances affecting the object and purpose
of the Convention.
(B) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be
construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority
of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
(C) Presidential determinations.--If the President
determines that an action otherwise required under
subparagraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to
protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure, the President shall report
that determination, together with a detailed written
explanation of the basis for that determination, to the
chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence not later than 15 days after making such
determination.
(14) Financing russian implementation.--The United States
understands that, in order to be assured of the Russian
commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles,
Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the
implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement
and the Convention. The United States shall not accept any
effort by Russia to make deposit of Russia's instrument of
ratification of the Convention contingent upon the United
States providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation
of commitments by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction
Agreement or the Convention.
(15) Assistance under article x.--
(A) In general.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Congress that the United States shall
not provide assistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article
X.
(B) Countries ineligible for certain assistance
under the foreign assistance act.--Prior to the deposit
of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall certify to the Congress that for any
State Party the government of which is not eligible for
assistance under chapter 2 of part II (relating to
military assistance) or chapter 4 of part II (relating
to economic support assistance) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961--
(i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of
Article X will be provided to the State Party;
and
(ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of
Article X other than medical antidotes and
treatment will be provided to the State Party.
(16) Protection of confidential information.--
(A) Unauthorized disclosure of united states
business information.--Whenever the President
determines that persuasive information is available
indicating that--
(i) an officer or employee of the
Organization has willfully published, divulged,
disclosed, or made known in any manner or to
any extent not authorized by the Convention any
United States confidential business information
coming to him in the course of his employment
or official duties or by reason of any
examination or investigation of any return,
report, or record made to or filed with the
Organization, or any officer or employee
thereof, and
(ii) such practice or disclosure has
resulted in financial losses or damages to a
United States person,
the President shall, within 30 days after the receipt
of such information by the executive branch of
Government, notify the Congress in writing of such
determination.
(B) Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction.--
(i) Certification.--Not later than 270 days
after notification of Congress under
subparagraph (A), the President shall certify
to Congress that the immunity from jurisdiction
of such foreign person has been waived by the
Director-General of the Technical Secretariat.
(ii) Withholding of portion of
contributions.--If the President is unable to
make the certification described under clause
(i), then 50 percent of the amount of each
annual United States contribution to the
regular budget of the Organization that is
assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article
VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in
addition to any other amounts required to be
withheld from disbursement by any other
provision of law, until--
(I) the President makes such
certification, or
(II) the President certifies to
Congress that the situation has been
resolved in a manner satisfactory to
the United States person who has
suffered the damages due to the
disclosure of United States
confidential business information.
(C) Breaches of confidentiality.--
(i) Certification.--In the case of any
breach of confidentiality involving both a
State Party and the Organization, including any
officer or employee thereof, the President
shall, within 270 days after providing written
notification to Congress pursuant to
subparagraph (A), certify to Congress that the
Commission described under paragraph 23 of the
Confidentiality Annex has been established to
consider the breach.
(ii) Withholding of portion of
contributions.--If the President is unable to
make the certification described under clause
(i), then 50 percent of the amount of each
annual United States contribution to the
regular budget of the Organization that is
assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article
VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in
addition to any other amounts required to be
withheld from disbursement by any other
provision of law, until--
(I) the President makes such
certification, or
(II) the President certifies to
Congress that the situation has been
resolved in a manner satisfactory to
the United States person who has
suffered the damages due to the
disclosure of United States
confidential business information.
(D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
(i) United states confidential business
information.--The term ``United States
confidential business information'' means any
trade secrets or commercial or financial
information that is privileged and
confidential, as described in section 552(b)(4)
of title 5, United States Code, and that is
obtained--
(I) from a United States person;
and
(II) through the United States
National Authority or the conduct of an
inspection on United States territory
under the Convention.
(ii) United states person.--The term
``United States person'' means any natural
person or any corporation, partnership, or
other juridical entity organized under the laws
of the United States.
(iii) United states.--The term ``United
States'' means the several States, the District
of Columbia, and the commonwealths,
territories, and possessions of the United
States.
(17) Constitutional prerogatives.--
(A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following
findings:
(i) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
United States Constitution states that the
President ``shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur''.
(ii) At the turn of the century, Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge took the position that the
giving of advice and consent to the
ratification of treaties constitutes a stage in
negotiation on the treaties and that Senate
amendments or reservations to a treaty are
propositions ``offered at a later stage of the
negotiation by the other part of the American
treaty making power in the only manner in which
they could then be offered''.
(iii) The executive branch of Government
has begun a practice of negotiating and
submitting to the Senate treaties which include
provisions that have the purported effect of--
(I) inhibiting the Senate from
attaching reservations that the Senate
considers necessary in the national
interest; or
(II) preventing the Senate from
exercising its constitutional duty to
give its advice and consent to treaty
commitments before ratification of the
treaties.
(iv) During the 85th Congress, and again
during the 102d Congress, the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate made its
position on this issue clear when stating that
``the President's agreement to such a
prohibition cannot constrain the Senate's
constitutional right and obligation to give its
advice and consent to a treaty subject to any
reservation it might determine is required by
the national interest''.
(B) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the
Senate that--
(i) the advice and consent given by the
Senate in the past to ratification of treaties
containing provisions which prohibit amendments
or reservations should not be construed as a
precedent for such provisions in future
treaties;
(ii) United States negotiators to a treaty
should not agree to any provision that has the
effect of inhibiting the Senate from attaching
reservations or offering amendments to the
treaty; and
(iii) the Senate should not consent in the
future to any article or other provision of any
treaty that would prohibit the Senate from
giving its advice and consent to ratification
of the treaty subject to amendment or
reservation.
(18) Laboratory sample analysis.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification, the President
shall certify to the Senate that no sample collected in the
United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred
for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the
United States.
(19) Effect on terrorism.--The Senate finds that--
(A) without regard to whether the Convention enters
into force, terrorists will likely view chemical
weapons as a means to gain greater publicity and
instill widespread fear; and
(B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum
Shinrikyo would not have been prevented by the
Convention.
(20) Constitutional separation of powers.--
(A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following
findings:
(i) Article VIII(8) of the Convention
allows a State Party to vote in the
Organization if the State Party is in arrears
in the payment of financial contributions and
the Organization is satisfied that such
nonpayment is due to conditions beyond the
control of the State Party.
(ii) Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution vests in Congress the
exclusive authority to ``pay the Debts'' of the
United States.
(iii) Financial contributions to the
Organization may be appropriated only by
Congress.
(B) Sense of senate.--It is therefore the sense of
the Senate that--
(i) such contributions thus should be
considered, for purposes of Article VIII(8) of
the Convention, beyond the control of the
executive branch of the United States
Government; and
(ii) the United States vote in the
Organization should not be denied in the event
that Congress does not appropriate the full
amount of funds assessed for the United States
financial contribution to the Organization.
(21) On-site inspection agency.--It is the sense of the
Senate that the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department of
Defense should have the authority to provide assistance in
advance of any inspection to any facility in the United States
that is subject to a routine inspection under the Convention,
or to any facility in the United States that is the object of a
challenge inspection conducted pursuant to Article IX, if the
consent of the owner or operator of the facility has first been
obtained.
(22) Limitation on the scale of assessment.--
(A) Limitation on annual assessment.--
Notwithstanding any provision of the Convention, and
subject to the requirements of subparagraphs (B), (C),
and (D), the United States shall pay as a total annual
assessment of the costs of the Organization pursuant to
paragraph 7 of Article VIII not more than $25,000,000.
(B) Recalculation of limitation.--On January 1,
2000, and at each 3-year interval thereafter, the
amount specified in subparagraph (A) is to be
recalculated by the Administrator of General Services,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, to reflect
changes in the consumer price index for the immediately
preceding 3-year period.
(C) Additional contributions requiring
congressional approval.--
(i) Authority.--Notwithstanding
subparagraph (A), the President may furnish
additional contributions which would otherwise
be prohibited under subparagraph (A) if--
(I) the President determines and
certifies in writing to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate that the failure to provide such
contributions would result in the
inability of the Organization to
conduct challenge inspections pursuant
to Article IX or would otherwise
jeopardize the national security
interests of the United States; and
(II) Congress enacts a joint
resolution approving the certification
of the President.
(ii) Statement of reasons.--The President
shall transmit with such certification a
detailed statement setting forth the specific
reasons therefor and the specific uses to which
the additional contributions provided to the
Organization would be applied.
(D) Additional contributions for verification.--
Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), for a period of not
more than ten years, the President may furnish
additional contributions to the Organization for the
purposes of meeting the costs of verification under
Articles IV and V.
(23) Additions to the annex on chemicals.--
(A) Presidential notification.--Not later than 10
days after the Director-General of the Technical
Secretariat communicates information to all States
Parties pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) of a proposal for
the addition of a chemical or biological substance to a
schedule of the Annex on Chemicals, the President shall
notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
of the proposed addition.
(B) Presidential report.--Not later than 60 days
after the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat
communicates information of such a proposal pursuant to
Article XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a
positive recommendation by the Executive Council
pursuant to Article XV(5)(c), whichever is sooner, the
President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate a report, in classified and
unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the
proposed addition to a schedule of the Annex on
Chemicals. Such report shall include--
(i) an assessment of the likely impact on
United States industry of the proposed addition
of the chemical or biological substance to a
schedule of the Annex on Chemicals;
(ii) a description of the likely costs and
benefits, if any, to United States national
security of the proposed addition of such
chemical or biological substance to a schedule
of the Annex on Chemicals; and
(iii) a detailed assessment of the effect
of the proposed addition on United States
obligations under the Verification Annex.
(C) Presidential consultation.--The President
shall, after the submission of the notification
required under subparagraph (A) and prior to any action
on the proposal by the Executive Council under Article
XV(5)(c), consult promptly with the Senate as to
whether the United States should object to the proposed
addition of a chemical or biological substance pursuant
to Article XV(5)(c).
(24) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the
applicability to all treaties of the Constitutionally based
principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition (1)
of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF
Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF
Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range
Missiles, together with the related memorandum of understanding
and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
(25) Further arms reductions obligations.--The Senate
declares its intention to consider for approval international
agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or
limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a
militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power
as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution.
(26) Riot control agents.--
(A) Permitted uses.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification, the President
shall certify to Congress that the United States is not
restricted by the Convention in its use of riot control
agents, including the use against combatants who are
parties to a conflict, in any of the following cases:
(i) United states not a party.--The conduct
of peacetime military operations within an area
of ongoing armed conflict when the United
States is not a party to the conflict (such as
recent use of the United States Armed Forces in
Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda).
(ii) Consensual peacekeeping.--Consensual
peacekeeping operations when the use of force
is authorized by the receiving state, including
operations pursuant to Chapter VI of the United
Nations Charter.
(iii) Chapter vii peacekeeping.--
Peacekeeping operations when force is
authorized by the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
(B) Implementation.--The President shall take no
measure, and prescribe no rule or regulation, which
would alter or eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April
8, 1975.
(C) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``riot
control agent'' has the meaning given the term in
Article II(7) of the Convention.
(27) Chemical weapons destruction.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention,
the President shall certify to the Congress that all of the
following conditions are satisfied:
(A) Exploration of alternative
technologies.--The President has agreed to
explore alternative technologies for the
destruction of the United States stockpile of
chemical weapons in order to ensure that the
United States has the safest, most effective
and environmentally sound plans and programs
for meeting its obligations under the
Convention for the destruction of chemical
weapons.
(B) Convention extends destruction
deadline.--The requirement in section 1412 of
Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for
completion of the destruction of the United
States stockpile of chemical weapons by
December 31, 2004, will be superseded upon the
date the Convention enters into force with
respect to the United States by the deadline
required by the Convention of April 29, 2007.
(C) Authority to employ a different
destruction technology.--The requirement in
Article III(1)(a)(v) of the Convention for a
declaration by each State Party not later than
30 days after the date the Convention enters
into force with respect to that Party on
general plans of the State Party for
destruction of its chemical weapons does not
preclude in any way the United States from
deciding in the future to employ a technology
for the destruction of chemical weapons
different than that declared under that
Article.
(D) Procedures for extension of deadline.--The
President will consult with Congress on whether to
submit a request to the Executive Council of the
Organization for an extension of the deadline for the
destruction of chemical weapons under the Convention,
as provided under part IV(A) of the Annex on
Implementation and Verification to the Convention, if,
as a result of the program of alternative technologies
for the destruction of chemical munitions carried out
under section 8065 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in Public Law
104-208), the President determines that alternatives to
the incineration of chemical weapons are available that
are safer and more environmentally sound but whose use
would preclude the United States from meeting the
deadlines of the Convention.
(28) Constitutional protection against unreasonable search
and seizure.--
(A) In general.--In order to protect United States
citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures,
prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to Congress
that--
(i) for any challenge inspection conducted
on the territory of the United States pursuant
to Article IX, where consent has been withheld,
the United States National Authority will first
obtain a criminal search warrant based upon
probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and describing with particularity
the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized; and
(ii) for any routine inspection of a
declared facility under the Convention that is
conducted on the territory of the United
States, where consent has been withheld, the
United States National Authority first will
obtain an administrative search warrant from a
United States magistrate judge.
(B) Definition.--For purposes of this resolution,
the term ``National Authority'' means the agency or
office of the United States Government designated by
the United States pursuant to Article VII(4) of the
Convention.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this resolution:
(1) Chemical weapons convention or convention.--The terms
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the
Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Opened for Signature and Signed by the United
States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following
protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents
being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or the ``Convention''
(contained in Treaty Document 103-21):
(A) The Annex on Chemicals.
(B) The Annex on Implementation and Verification.
(C) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential
Information.
(D) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory
Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons.
(E) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory
Commission.
(2) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
established under the Convention.
(3) State party.--The term ``State Party'' means any nation
that is a party to the Convention.
(4) United states instrument of ratification.--The term
``United States instrument of ratification'' means the
instrument of ratification of the United States of the
Convention.
<all>
105th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. RES. 75
_______________________________________________________________________
EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION
To advise and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, subject to certain conditions.
_______________________________________________________________________
April 24, 1997
Considered, amended, and agreed to