[House Report 105-828]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Union Calendar No. 470
105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - House Report 105-828
INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE
HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED
MATTERS
----------
FIFTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
together with
MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS
October 30, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Union Calendar No. 470
105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - House Report 105-828
INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE
HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED
MATTERS
__________
FIFTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
together with
MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS
October 30, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE
HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED
MATTERS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GARY A. CONDIT, California
STEPHEN HORN, California CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana DC
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
Carolina JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JIM TURNER, Texas
PETE SESSIONS, Texas THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas ------
BOB BARR, Georgia BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
DAN MILLER, Florida (Independent)
RON LEWIS, Kentucky
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Lisa Smith Arafune, Deputy Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and
Regulatory Affairs
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana, Chairman
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio GARY A. CONDIT, California
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia ------ ------
PETE SESSIONS, Texas
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Mildred J. Webber, Staff Director
J. Keith Ausbrook, Chief Counsel
Jay Apperson, Special Counsel
Chip Griffin, Professional Staff Member
R. Andrew Wilder, Clerk
Kristin L. Amerling, Minority Counsel
Elizabeth Mundinger, Minority Counsel
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, October 30, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the
committee's fifth report to the 105th Congress. The committee's
report is based on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory
Affairs.
Dan Burton,
Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. Summary and Overview.............................................1
II. Perjury and Obstruction..........................................6
III. Unlawful Distribution of White House Data and Conversion of White
House Resources for Political Purposes..........................14
IV. The President and First Lady Knew of the Conversion of Government
Resources to Benefit the DNC and the Campaign...................49
V. Conclusions.....................................................57
VI. Rules Requirements..............................................57
Endnotes......................................................... 59
Index of supporting documents.................................... 74
VIEWS
Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon.
Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns,
Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, Hon. Gary A. Condit, Hon. Bernard
Sanders, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton,
Hon. Chaka Fattah, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J.
Kucinich, Hon. Rod R. Blagojevich, Hon. Danny K. Davis, Hon.
Thomas H. Allen, and Hon. Harold E. Ford, Jr................... 556
Supplemental views of Hon. David M. McIntosh..................... 664
Union Calendar No. 470
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 105-828
_______________________________________________________________________
INVESTIGATION OF THE CONVERSION OF THE $1.7 MILLION CENTRALIZED WHITE
HOUSE COMPUTER SYSTEM, KNOWN AS THE WHITE HOUSE DATABASE, AND RELATED
MATTERS
_______
October 30, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Burton of Indiana, from the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, submitted the following
FIFTH R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS
On October 9, 1998, the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled,
``Investigation of the Conversion of the $1.7 Million
Centralized White House Computer System, Known as the White
House Database, and Related Matters.'' The chairman was
directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.
I. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW
The story of the White House Database is one about a White
House that disregarded the difference between the official
business of the U.S. Government and the political business of
reelecting the President. Because the line between official
business and campaigning was obliterated, this President and
his White House subordinates proceeded to spend at least $1.7
million of government funds on a complex, centralized computer
system known as the White House Database or ``WhoDB.'' It was
used not just for official purposes; senior White House staff
planned and, in fact, used it to advance the campaign
fundraising objectives of the Democratic National Committee
[DNC]. This conversion of government property to the use of the
DNC constitutes a theft of government property under 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 641.
Similarly, White House staff, at the President's direction,
used other White House resources to translate their new
expertise in database development, acquired at government
expense, to plan the development and use of databases for the
DNC and other political committees in violation of the Hatch
Act, 5 U.S.C Sec. 7324, which restricts government employee use
of government property for political activities. This, too,
represents a theft of government property.
The conversion of the White House Database and other
government resources to benefit the DNC and the President's
campaign in this way was an integral part of the conversion of
the Nation's White House into the political fundraising tool of
the President and the DNC. With respect to the Database alone,
the conversion of that resource was simply a continuation of
the obliteration of any distinction between the official
functions of the White House and the campaign to reelect the
President.
Prior to the deployment of the White House Database, lists
generated by White House computers for invitations or
attendance at social events, meetings, and other White House
functions were routinely provided to the DNC and the Clinton/
Gore '96 campaign. These lists included, for example, the 1993
and 1994 Holiday Card lists, among others, that were assembled
through White House computers, merged with DNC lists and
campaign lists, and then left in the possession of the DNC and
the Clinton/Gore campaign for their use. The names and
addresses of the people to whom the President and First Lady
send holiday cards are a very valuable asset to those entities.
They are also the property of the U.S. Government.
The President's involvement in the plan to convert
government property to the DNC and the ultimate accomplishment
of that plan (represented by the transfer of these lists and
data to the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign) motivated the
White House to mount an extraordinary effort to delay and
impede the investigation. Incriminating documents were withheld
until after the 1996 election--in one case, for more than a
year. The White House refused to respond for months to repeated
requests for documents and information. Most significantly,
when called before the committee to explain the withholding of
documents, Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills chose
to give demonstrably false testimony. This matter has been
referred to the Department of Justice for investigation of
possible perjury and obstruction of the investigation.
Finally, there is evidence that the President and First
Lady were responsible for the development of the Database and
were informed of the theft of this and other government
property for political purposes. The unlawful conversion of
government property to the use of the DNC or a political
campaign represents not only the crime of theft of government
property. It also represents an abuse of power by the
President, who used his high office and the Nation's White
House to achieve his and his political party's fundraising
objectives. The committee issues this report to expose the
evidence of the President's possible involvement in the theft
of government property and his abuse of power.
A. Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills Lied to the Committee
and Obstructed the Investigation by Withholding Documents
The committee found substantial evidence that Deputy White
House Counsel Cheryl Mills perjured herself in testimony before
the committee about her decision, made in concert with White
House Counsel Jack Quinn, to withhold important documents
responsive to the committee's requests. The withheld documents
included: (1) the handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, an
assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine
Bowles,1 expressing the President's desire to
integrate the White House Database with the DNC database; and
(2) a June 28, 1994 memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold
Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady,2 showing
that the First Lady was informed of Marsha Scott's interest in
using the Database for political purposes and employing White
House staff to create political databases. To these proposals,
the First Lady later wrote to Harold Ickes, ``This sounds
promising. Please advise.'' 3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes at end of report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While these documents were discovered at the White House in
September 1996, they were both withheld until well after the
1996 election. Marsha Scott's memorandum was produced to the
committee in February 1997, after it was found by other members
of the Counsel's Office in an independent search. Bailey's
notes were not produced until October 1997, when they were
discovered by other members of the Counsel's Office who were
reviewing, apparently for the first time, files created by
Cheryl Mills to contain withheld documents.
Ms. Mills testified that she and Mr. Quinn had determined
that the documents were not responsive, and that the Database
referenced in one of them was not the White House Database, but
was another database on which the author of the document,
Marsha Scott, was working at the time. Subsequent deposition
testimony establishes that there was no other database to which
the document could have referred. Accordingly, not only is Ms.
Mills's statement that she thought at the time that it was
another database not credible, but so is her claim that she and
Mr. Quinn determined that the documents were not responsive.
The committee believes that Ms. Mills, in fact, determined
that the documents were responsive, would expose unlawful
activity, and would be politically damaging, if released
shortly before the 1996 election. The withholding of these
documents illegally obstructed the committee's investigation,
delayed the discovery of important relevant evidence, and
raised further questions about the truthfulness of the White
House's representations to the committee throughout the
investigation.
B. White House Personnel Took Government Data and Transferred it to the
Democratic National Committee to Assist in Campaign Fundraising
The committee uncovered substantial evidence of plans to
transfer, and the actual transfer of, official government data
from the White House Database and other sources to entities
outside of the Federal Government for use in campaign
fundraising. Additionally, White House personnel converted
official resources, such as White House computers,
photocopiers, stationery, office equipment, and possibly even
the time of career staff for activities expressly related to
the President's reelection campaign. The knowing transfer of
government data for an unofficial use and the use of government
resources for campaign purposes constitute the theft of
government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
The documents withheld by Cheryl Mills make clear that (1)
the President himself wanted to integrate the Database with the
DNC database and (2) the First Lady was interested in using the
design of the Database and White House personnel for the
development of political databases outside of the White House.
Many documents also suggest that Senior White House officials,
such as then-Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes and Deputy
Counsel to the President Bruce Lindsey, were frequently
informed of plans for the political use of the Database and
plans to manage outside data using White House resources.
Testimony from numerous White House and DNC witnesses
establishes that DNC fundraising staff, in concert with Social
Office and Office of Political Affairs staff, mined the White
House Database for valuable information to enable the DNC to
accomplish its fundraising goals.
Other data was also transferred to the Clinton/Gore
campaign or the DNC. The committee has obtained evidence that
the 1993 White House Holiday Card list was transmitted to and
retained by the Clinton/Gore campaign and is still in their
possession. The 1994 White House Holiday Card list was
transmitted to the DNC and remains in its possession. Also, the
committee obtained documents that show that the President
routinely transferred names and addresses obtained through the
official White House mail to his campaign database.
1. Data from the White House Database and other Government Databases
The committee has obtained substantial credible evidence
that data from the White House Database was systematically made
available to the DNC to assist in its fundraising efforts.
Documentary evidence and sworn testimony establish that members
of the DNC Finance Department contacted the White House on a
routine basis to ask for information on who had attended
previous White House social events. This information was then
used by the DNC Finance staff to determine who would be
recommended to the White House by the DNC Finance staff for
invitations to future White House events.
DNC Finance staff testified to this process in depositions,
as did White House Political Affairs staff. In addition, White
House Social Office staff testified to giving out such
information from the Database to White House Political Affairs
staff who then passed it on to DNC fundraisers. One document
produced by the White House states that the DNC obtained direct
access to Social Office Information by sending a staff person
to the White House Social Office to research event attendance.
The committee obtained evidence that the distribution of
this data to the DNC was authorized by Erskine Bowles (at that
time, Deputy Chief of Staff) in a meeting in March 1995 with
Truman Arnold (at that time, DNC Finance Chairman) and Ann
Stock, the White House Social Secretary. Truman Arnold
testified that he met with Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock to seek
better access to Social Office information. Erskine Bowles and
Ann Stock testified that they had no recollection of that
meeting. Erskine Bowles was unable to produce a calendar from
that time to verify whether such a meeting took place.
The committee finds this to be part of a recurring pattern
in which witnesses who had regular contact with the President
develop faulty memories about key meetings and events that
implicate the President and White House staff in wrongdoing.
Nevertheless, these same witnesses can remember in striking
detail those events that exculpate the President and his staff.
The committee also discovered, in the possession of the
DNC, lists generated by the White House Database and other
White House data systems, including (1) a list of Asian Pacific
Americans prepared by the White House Office of Public Liaison,
(2) the White House calligrapher's list prepared by the Social
Office for the President's ``Yale Dinner'' and White House
holiday parties, and (3) lists prepared by the Social Office of
those invited to the White House Arts and Humanities Dinner in
October 1995. While the White House permitted the DNC to have
some of these lists without redacting personal information,
such as home addresses, the committee was denied this
information in the copy of the Database produced to the
committee on the ground that it was too personal.
2. 1993 and 1994 White House Holiday Card Lists
Although the 1993 and 1994 White House Holiday Card lists
were prepared in a government database that predated the White
House Database, they constitute government property of
substantial value. The transfer of data through the 1993 and
1994 Holiday Card project came to light as the committee
investigated the data used to populate the White House
Database, which included the 1994 Holiday Card list. The
knowing delivery of these lists to others outside of the
government would also constitute the theft of government
property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
The committee's evidence shows that the 1994 list was
deliberately transmitted to the DNC and not returned,
notwithstanding a February 1997 letter to the committee from
White House Counsel Charles Ruff stating that the list was
inadvertently sent to the DNC and returned immediately upon the
White House's discovery that it was in the possession of the
DNC. Documents and deposition testimony show that White House
staff was fully aware that the DNC had the list in November
1994 and that there was no documentation that the White House
had imposed any restrictions on its use. Moreover, while the
DNC returned one copy to the White House, it retained a copy
for itself.
The transmission of the 1994 Holiday Card list from the
White House to the DNC did not differ significantly from the
handling of the 1993 Holiday Card list. The 1993 Holiday Card
list was delivered to W.P. Malone, Inc. (Malone), a contractor
to the Clinton/Gore campaign in Arkadelphia, AR, which
maintained the campaign supporter lists in a database known as
PeopleBase. The 1993 list from the White House was combined
with the holiday card lists from the campaign and the DNC into
one computer at Malone. This list was retained in that computer
in Arkadelphia until the computer was shipped to the Clinton/
Gore campaign offices in Washington, DC, in 1995, where it
still resides.
C. The President and First Lady Directed the Development of the White
House Database and Were Informed of and Involved in Plans for the Use
of Government Resources to Advance the President's Re-election Campaign
As Marsha Scott, the architect of the White House Database
and of at least one plan for integrating the White House with
the campaign by converting the Database to campaign uses, noted
regarding that plan: ``This is the President's idea and it's a
good one.'' 4 Numerous documents make clear that the
President and First Lady directed the development of the White
House Database and were aware of and kept informed of its
potential uses. The First Lady actually received a
demonstration of the Database. The President approved a job
description for Marsha Scott that specifically referenced her
access to the Database. Also, contrary to the written opinion
of the White House Counsel's Office, the President routinely
continued to build PeopleBase with the names and addresses of
individuals who communicated with him through the official
White House mail. The pattern of evidence obtained by the
committee implicates the President and the First Lady in the
possible theft of government property.
D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions
Senior officials in the White House sought to obstruct the
committee's investigation of the systematic transfer of data
from the White House to campaign entities and the President's
and First Lady's knowledge and involvement in the conversion of
the White House Database and other official resources to the
use of the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign. This obstruction
culminated in the perjury of Cheryl Mills, Deputy Counsel to
the President. Despite the efforts of White House officials to
obstruct the investigation, the committee found substantial
evidence that White House officials, including possibly the
President and the First Lady, knowingly and willfully planned
to convert, and did in fact convert, valuable government
property, including data from the White House Database, to the
DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign in violation of 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 641. Such conduct by the President represents not only a
theft of government property; it represents an abuse of power
by the President.
II. PERJURY AND OBSTRUCTION
On June 27, 1996, pursuant to the direction of the Chairman
of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee,
Representative William J. Clinger, Representative David M.
McIntosh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Economic
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, first wrote
to then-Chief of Staff to the President Leon Panetta requesting
information on the White House Database, known inside the White
House as ``WhoDB.'' 5 Since the committee's very
first efforts to discover the facts about the Database,
including its planned and actual use, and its costs, the
committee encountered unprecedented efforts by the White House
to withhold documents and information and to mislead the
committee with materially false statements as to its use.
Through its investigation, the committee has uncovered
substantial disturbing evidence of repeated false or misleading
statements emanating from the highest levels of the White
House, including the White House Counsel's Office and the
Office of the Press Secretary, concerning how the Database was
planned and used. The investigation has uncovered evidence
which reveals that persons in the White House Counsel's Office,
which was charged with responding to the committee's inquiry,
were themselves central figures in the scheme to put the
Database to prohibited uses. Those same persons, with ample
motivation to protect at least themselves, actively sought to
provide misleading explanations and conceal and alter
documents.
These actions severely hampered the committee in the
exercise of its proper oversight role and needlessly prolonged
the investigation at taxpayer expense. More importantly,
despite the best efforts to find the facts and to present them
to the American people, the committee may never know many of
the facts which would be revealed by the production of
contemporaneous documents which the committee has specifically
sought, but which the White House reports ``cannot be found.''
In addition, responsive documents that (1) the White House did
locate and (2) are evidence of the President's and First Lady's
involvement in plans to convert the Database and other White
House resources to campaign uses were deliberately withheld
from the committee just before the 1996 election and not
produced until February 1997 in one instance, and for more than
a year in another case.
To consider adequately the White House's efforts to
obstruct the committee's investigation, it is important to
recognize the fundamental legal principle applicable to data in
the White House Database and other government data
repositories. That principle is that once data is entered into
an official government, taxpayer-funded database, distribution
to any outside entity, including partisan political entities,
is prohibited. As Cheryl Mills, then-Associate Counsel to the
President, wrote with respect to this issue on January 17, 1994
in an internal White House memorandum:
Once White House employees integrate information
provided by any source into the database system, it
becomes government property in the form that it is
stored in the database system. Therefore, data from the
database system may be provided to a source outside the
federal government only for authorized purposes. 5 CFR
Sec. 2635.704. Authorized purposes are those specified
by law or regulation or those purposes for which
Government property is made available to the public.
Id.6
David Watkins, Assistant to the President for Administration,
expressed the same view of the government's ownership of the
data in the White House Database.
[T]he White House Database will be government
property and cannot be given to or used by a campaign
entity (unless made public and thus available to any
campaign entity).7
During the course of the committee's investigation, White
House officials, and in particular the White House Counsel's
Office, repeatedly misled the committee as to whether anyone in
the White House planned to transfer, or in fact transferred,
data from the White House Database. Very early in the
investigation, on June 28, 1996, Jack Quinn, then Counsel to
the President, told the committee:
The database is for White House use only; we prohibit
distribution to outside entities or political
organizations--including the Democratic National
Committee or the Clinton-Gore '96
Committee.8
Despite such steadfast denials by the White House, the
investigation has revealed the systematic distribution of data
from the White House Database and other official sources to the
DNC, including the ongoing distribution of such data to the DNC
Finance Department which the DNC Finance Director stated in his
deposition ``should properly be called the fundraising
division.'' 9 In addition, there is substantial
evidence that contrary to specific written advice from the
White House Counsel's Office, other official resources, such as
computer time, stationery, photocopying equipment, and other
office equipment and supplies, were converted to help manage
the DNC's and the Clinton/Gore campaign's data.
A. Members of the White House Counsel's Office and Possibly Others
Obstructed the Committee's Investigation to Prevent Disclosure of the
Theft of Government Property and the Possible Involvement of the
President and First Lady
The principle that the distribution of government data to
campaign entities is prohibited provides ample motive for the
White House to obstruct the committee's investigation. In one
specific instance, that obstruction, followed by material false
statements by Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills
during an open hearing before the committee, was especially
significant because it marked the most obvious effort to
conceal the clearest evidence that the President and the First
Lady were involved in the distribution of such data and
conversions of other government resources to serve the
interests of political campaign entities.
The committee believes that there is substantial evidence
that in September 1996 then-Associate (now-Deputy) Counsel to
the President Cheryl Mills, with the knowledge and concurrence
of then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn, knowingly and wilfully
obstructed the investigative authority of this committee by
withholding documents that were plainly responsive to the
committee requests for documents and information. Moreover,
when this obstruction was brought to light in a hearing before
the committee, Ms. Mills lied under oath about the documents
and the circumstances surrounding their nonproduction.
Ms. Mills's actions, withholding responsive documents from
the committee, delayed the committee for more than a year from
obtaining important evidence that the President wanted to
``integrate'' the White House Database with the DNC database
and delayed until after the 1996 election the disclosure of the
use of White House personnel and office equipment to assist the
DNC in its efforts to develop a new database. Consequently, not
only did the American public not have relevant information
regarding the conversion of official resources prior to the
1996 election, the committee's ongoing investigation was
impeded by the delay in producing those important documents.
Moreover, the failure to produce these documents when they
were discovered in September 1996 had the effect of delaying
the committee's investigation long enough to allow memories of
relevant witnesses to fade for more than a year until they
could plausibly testify that they could no longer remember the
meetings or conversations reflected in the documents. The
committee believes that Ms. Mills was fully aware of these
potential effects and deliberately engaged in the withholding
of documents for that purpose. In the second term, she was
promoted from Associate Counsel to the President to Deputy
Counsel to the President.
On October 28, 1997, White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff
produced to the committee a document containing the handwritten
notes of Brian Bailey, an assistant to then-Deputy Chief of
Staff Erskine Bowles, that read:
HAROLD [ICKES] AND DEBORAH DELEE WANT TO MAKE SURE
WHODB IS INTEGRATED W/DNC DATABASE--SO WE CAN SHARE--
EVIDENTLY, POTUS WANTS THIS TO[O]! (MAKES SENSE)
10
A letter from Mr. Ruff and a production log accompanied the
document and other documents produced to the committee that
day.11 The letter was intended to apprise the
committee of ``some new information and to correct certain
statements regarding two earlier aspects of [the White House]
document production.'' 12
Mr. Ruff's letter and the production log raised as many
questions as it purported to answer. With respect to the
handwritten notes, Mr. Ruff explained that these notes, along
with other documents, had been found in September 1996, more
than a year earlier, and set aside in folders.13 Mr.
Ruff's letter also sought to obscure whether the previously
withheld notes were responsive to the committee's request,
saying: ``Although certain of these documents [including the
notes] are arguably not responsive, we are erring on the side
of production.'' 14
While Mr. Ruff's explanation for the nonproduction of the
notes sought to avoid the admission that they were responsive
and had been withheld, he was unable to make such a claim with
respect to a June 28, 1994 memorandum 15 from White
House Office of Political Affairs staff member Marsha Scott to
Harold Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady that was also
found in September 1996. That document included evidence
suggesting that the White House Database would be useful for
the campaign and urging that Marsha Scott and her database
development team of government employees be allowed to continue
to work with the DNC and others to develop databases outside of
the White House.
This document had already been produced in February 1997 by
Mr. Ruff, who at that time apparently was unaware that Ms.
Mills had discovered the document in September 1996 and
withheld it as nonresponsive. When Mr. Ruff produced it, he
included it in a production of documents that he represented in
his February 27, 1997 transmittal letter as ``responsive''
16 to the committee's request and also admitted in
open hearings before the committee that he had determined that
it was responsive.17
The complete sequence of events relating to Ms. Mills's
withholding of the document and her testimony before the
committee is as follows:
August 2, 1996
The Majority Members of the Subcommittee on National
Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs
write to President Clinton requesting, among other things,
``All communications related to the WhoDB'' which ``includes
all documents and materials that memorialize conversations,
meetings, or other communication.'' 18
September 18, 1996
Deputy Counsel to the President Cheryl Mills discovers (1)
handwritten notes reflecting the President's desire to
integrate the White House Database with the DNC database
19 and (2) a June 28, 1994 memorandum 20
from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey (with a
copy to the First Lady) regarding the White House Database and
the development of the DNC and other databases outside of the
White House using government resources.
September 19-24, 1996
Despite Cheryl Mills's discovery, the thousands of pages of
documents produced by Ms. Mills and White House Counsel Jack
Quinn during this time do not include either document.
February 26, 1997
Apparently unaware that Cheryl Mills had previously
discovered the June 28, 1994 memorandum, White House Counsel
Chuck Ruff produces it to the committee and another copy of it
that includes the First Lady's note to Harold Ickes that ``This
sounds promising.'' 21
March 6, 1997
Mr. Ruff inaccurately represents that the memorandum was
discovered ``over the last few months as part of the ongoing
review of files . . . .'' 22
October 28, 1997
White House Counsel Charles Ruff produces a copy of the
handwritten notes, and discloses that the notes and the
memorandum had been discovered in September 1996.23
November 6-7, 1997
Cheryl Mills testifies under oath that:
(1) she determined that notes reflecting the
President's interest in integrating the White House
Database with the DNC database ``were not responsive to
the seven enumerated items'' requested by the
committee; 24
(2) ``the particular [database referenced in the
second paragraph of the June 28, 1994 memorandum], at
the time [she] had knowledge of, was not related to the
WhoDB;'' 25
(3) her ``impression at the time'' of production of a
January 17, 1994 memorandum 26 was that the
database in that memorandum was not the White House
Database; 27 and
(4) ``[u]ltimately, they ended up using WhoDB, which
is not modeled on PeopleBase.'' 28
Each and every one of these statements is a material false
statement, and the evidence obtained by the committee shows
that Ms. Mills knew they were false at the time that she made
them.
B. The Evidence Before the Committee Establishes That The Testimony of
Cheryl Mills Before the Committee Was False and That She Knew it Was
False
The evidence obtained by the committee contradicts Ms.
Mills's testimony in every respect. The sworn deposition
testimony of five other witnesses makes clear that at the time
the documents were withheld, Ms. Mills could not have believed
that they were not responsive, deliberately withheld them, and
lied to the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
about withholding them.
1. Ms. Mills's Testimony regarding the Notes Was Demonstrably False
Not only are the notes on their face responsive to the
committee's request. But the author of the notes, Brian Bailey
(an assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles),
testified that the notes did indeed memorialize a
``communication,'' 29 which falls clearly within the
scope of the committee's August 2, 1996 request.
2. Ms. Mills's Testimony Regarding the June 28, 1994 Memorandum Was
Demonstrably False
Like the notes, the memorandum on its face was responsive
to the committee's request. The second paragraph states:
``Currently in the White House we are preparing, as you know,
to implement a new database system starting August 1.'' There
is no other database system to which that sentence and the
ensuing paragraph could have referred. Not only is that true
from the face of the document, but that fact was confirmed by
the testimony of four other witnesses whose testimony is
consistent with the testimony of each other and who had no
reason to lie.
Moreover, when that document was discovered by White House
Counsel Charles Ruff, independent of Ms. Mills's discovery, he
immediately produced it as a document responsive to the
committee's request. He did not, at the time of production,
qualify its responsiveness in any way. Mr. Ruff also expressly
testified that the memorandum was responsive to the committee's
request.30
a. Marsha Scott's testimony contradicts Cheryl Mills's
testimony
Marsha Scott, who developed the White House Database,
contradicted Ms. Mills's testimony, stating under oath that the
database referenced in the June 1994 memorandum was indeed the
White House Database and that the description, including that
the WhoDB was modeled after PeopleBase, accurately described
the White House Database.31
The White House has been mysteriously unable to produce the
January 11, 1994 memorandum from Marsha Scott or the January
13, 1994 memorandum from Erich Vaden, one of Marsha Scott's
principal assistants on the White House Database project,
requesting the advice provided in Ms. Mills's January 17, 1994
memorandum. Having those documents would assist in determining
whether the January 17, 1994 memorandum was intended to be
responsive to a request for advice regarding the White House
Database or some other database as Cheryl Mills claimed.
Notwithstanding these missing documents, counsel for Marsha
Scott insisted in Ms. Scott's deposition that a December 16,
1993 memorandum to Cheryl Mills with the subject heading of
``White House Database'' 32 ``track[ed]'' the advice
in Cheryl Mills's January 17, 1994 memorandum.33 Ms.
Scott also confirmed in her testimony that Ms. Mills's
memorandum addressed some of the same issues raised in her
December 16, 1993 memorandum seeking advice on the White House
Database,34 which contradicts Ms. Mills's claims
that her January 17, 1994 memorandum referenced some other
database.
b. Erich Vaden's testimony contradicted Cheryl Mills's
testimony
Erich Vaden, Marsha Scott's principal assistant who was
largely responsible for the technical development of the
Database and who became the Database Administrator,
contradicted Ms. Mills when he testified that:
(1) the database referred to in the second paragraph
of the June 28, 1994 memorandum could be no database
other than the White House Database; 35
(2) nothing in that paragraph suggested to him that
the referenced database was not the White House
Database; 36
(3) Marsha Scott was not involved in the development
of databases in the White House other than the White
House Database at that time; 37 and
(4) he had specifically and expressly discussed with
Cheryl Mills in January 1994 that the database
referenced in her January 17, 1994 memorandum was the
White House Database, not some other Correspondence
Department database, which she acknowledged at that
time.38
c. Laura Tayman's testimony contradicts Cheryl Mills's
testimony
Laura Tayman, who also worked with Marsha Scott and Erich
Vaden on the development of the White House Database,
contradicted Ms. Mills's testimony when she confirmed that:
(1) there were no other databases in the White House
to which the June 1994 memorandum could be referring;
39
(2) the database referenced in the January 17, 1994
memorandum was, and could only have been, the White
House Database; 40 and
(3) the White House Database was designed to include
features from PeopleBase.41
d. Miscellaneous other testimony regarding the use of
PeopleBase as a model for the White House Database
contradicts Cheryl Mills's testimony
That the White House Database was, in fact, modeled after
PeopleBase (contrary to Ms. Mills's testimony) is also
confirmed by the testimony of Erich Vaden 42 and
Mark Bartholomew, a career White House technical staff member
who worked on the White House Database project.43
C. Cheryl Mills Could Not Have Believed That Her Testimony Was Truthful
The testimony of these five witnesses contradicts Cheryl
Mills's testimony and establishes that she did not believe, and
indeed could not have believed, that her statements before the
committee were true, namely that (1) the handwritten notes were
not responsive to the committee's request; (2) the database
referenced in the second paragraph of the June 28, 1994
memorandum was not the White House Database; and (3) the
database in the January 17, 1994 memorandum was not the White
House Database.
D. Ms. Mills's False Testimony Before the Committee is Evidence That
She and Possibly White House Counsel Jack Quinn and Others Obstructed
the Committee's Investigation by Withholding Documents Responsive to
the Committee's Inquiry
Ms. Mills's false testimony to Congress is also evidence of
unlawful obstruction of the committee's investigation. The
evidence contradicting Ms. Mills shows that instead of
determining that the withheld documents were not responsive,
she determined that the documents were responsive.
Consequently, she, White House Counsel Jack Quinn, and
possibly others deliberately determined without legitimate
justification to withhold documents that were the subject of
the committee's request. Mr. Ruff's October 28, 1997 letter
admits that the documents had been found in September
1996.44 Ms. Mills admitted that she and White House
Counsel Jack Quinn reviewed the handwritten notes in September
1996.45 She also admitted that she placed both the
handwritten notes and the June 28, 1994 memorandum in separate
folders in the Counsel's Office in September 1996.46
Finally, Ms. Mills testified that she and Mr. Quinn made
the decision jointly to withhold the documents as
nonresponsive.47 The withholding of these documents
without justification did, in fact, impede the committee's
investigation and constitutes unlawful obstruction under 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1505.
E. Ms. Mills Prevented the American People From Learning Just Before
the 1996 Presidential Election That the President of the United States
and the First Lady Were Involved in the Theft of Government Data and
Other Government Resources to Benefit Their Political Campaigns
The act of withholding the documents themselves and then
lying to cover up the obstruction is significant evidence of
Ms. Mills's consciousness that the contents of the documents
reflected involvement of the President and the First Lady in
various efforts to convert government property for unauthorized
purposes. Significantly, the documents were withheld only 6
weeks before the 1996 Presidential election. There can be no
doubt that Ms. Mills knew that the release of the withheld
documents would have been, at the very least, politically
damaging if the documents had been released shortly before the
1996 Presidential election. Indeed, the documents attracted
substantial media attention when they were released in
1997.48
Since the production of the documents, the committee has
also obtained other corroborating evidence of the theft of
government property, i.e., that data was transferred to the DNC
and that other White House resources were converted. However,
Ms. Mills's failure to produce the documents at the time when
they were discovered was detrimental to the committee's
investigation and delayed the discovery of both the documents
withheld and other important evidence.
The committee considers giving false testimony before it to
be a very serious matter that may subject a witness to serious
penalties for perjury, making false statements in a
congressional investigation, and obstruction under the criminal
code of the United States. Consequently, the committee
acknowledges that Chairman McIntosh has already referred
evidence obtained relating to this matter to the Justice
Department for further investigation and appropriate
prosecution.
III. UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE HOUSE DATA AND CONVERSION OF WHITE
HOUSE RESOURCES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES
The documents ultimately produced by the White House and
the testimony of numerous witnesses reveals that the theft of
data from the White House Database for political purposes was
an integral part of an illegal scheme to convert government
data and other resources that was planned and executed to aid
the DNC fundraising effort and the Clinton/Gore campaign. On
May 22, 1997, Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, told
the committee that ``there is no evidence . . . that WhoDB was
planned to be used for political purposes . . . .''
49 Notwithstanding this denial, the handwritten
notes of Brian Bailey that were withheld by Cheryl Mills and
produced 5 months after Mr. Ruff's letter reflect that the
President of the United States wanted to integrate the White
House Database and the DNC database to share data in violation
of 18 U.S.C Sec. 641.
In addition to the Federal criminal code's prohibition
against converting government property, the White House also
had a clear policy that government resources could not be used
for political purposes, even if White House staff could engage
in political activity under the Hatch Act. Cheryl Mills had
prepared, with former White House Counsels Bernard Nussbaum,
Lloyd Cutler, and Abner Mikva, memoranda to White House staff,
essentially advising that they could engage in political
activity provided they did not use White House resources to
support it.50 Mills testified before the committee
when asked why, as reflected in the June 28, 1994 memorandum,
government employees were working on the DNC's database:
As you are probably aware, White House officials and
others are allowed to engage in political activity and
they are allowed to use their time in that way when
they volunteer to provide political activity, so to the
extent that Ms. Scott wanted to provide or make herself
available to engage in those activities, provided she
did not use Government resources, that would be
consistent with the Hatch Act.51
Congressman Shadegg further inquired regarding the use of
government resources:
Government resources seems to be a good question.
This is on stationery which says the White House,
Washington. I presume that would be a Government
resource, wouldn't it? 52
Ms. Mills responded to that question by admitting twice that
the stationery was, in fact, a government
resource.53
For a similar use of government resources, including
merely government photocopying paper, the Clinton
administration prosecuted Peter Collins for the theft of
government property. United States v. Peter Collins, 56 F.3d
1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In that case, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the conviction of Mr.
Collins for using office supplies, including paper for making
photocopies, to support the U.S. Amateur Ballroom Dancing
Association. Id. at 1421. The court also expressly acknowledged
that the theft of computer time and storage could also
constitute the theft of government property under 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 641. Id. at 1420. The court also noted that intangible
property, including the mere content of a writing, is a thing
of value that can be converted to an unofficial use in
violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. Id. (citing United States v.
Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871
(1979)).
The committee found evidence, beyond the withholding of
incriminating documents, of both the systematic transfer of
data from the White House Database and other data systems to
political entities and the systematic use of other government
resources to advise and assist those entities in the
development and management of their data systems. These
conversions of government property, according to the Deputy
Counsel to the President and the rationale of United States v.
Collins, are inconsistent with the Hatch Act and constitute the
theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
A. Marsha Scott Developed a Plan for the President To Use the White
House Database for Partisan Political Purposes
The committee has unearthed abundant evidence that the
planned uses for the WhoDB included partisan political ones for
the 1996 reelection effort. Multiple documents expressly
identify using the WhoDB as critical to election year efforts
to energize the President's friends and supporters. The
withheld June 28, 1994 memorandum includes a timeframe for
development and deployment that is directed at the 1996
campaign. The memorandum states:
By the first of the year [1995] we should have any
flaws identified and corrected and the majority of the
White House using the system. We will then have a year
[until 1996] to fully train and familiarize our folks
to its many possibilities and uses.
Although the timeframes in the memorandum plainly are aimed at
making certain that the White House Database was fully
operational by 1996, Marsha Scott denied that the dates had
anything to do with the campaign.\54\
A draft of another memorandum written by Marsha Scott for
White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty reveals a plan to:
``reach[] out to [the President's] friends and supporters . .
.; identify and contact the key early supporters in all fifty
states . . .; put in WhoDB the names and relevant information
about those early supporters . . .; [and] add to this base
group by early 1995, those folks we will be working with in
1996.'' \55\
The draft further outlines the plan to use the White House
Database to ``recreate the Primary campaign structure . . .;
establish a database to hold and work these names. (WhoDB will
be fully functional by January [1995]) . . .; recreate the
General campaign structure using the same method we employed
for recreating the Primary . . . [,] add[ing] the DNC and
campaign records . . .; identify by early 1995, key financial
and political folks in each state who can work with us'' with
the expectation that ``[t]hrough consistent dialogue and
follow-up, leaders will emerge'' to allow ``[c]o-ordinat[ion]
with DNC and DLC about what they are doing for these folks.''
\56\ With respect to this plan, Scott states directly, ``This
is the President's idea and it's a good one.'' \57\
The final memorandum prepared and actually sent to Deputy
Chiefs of Staff Erskine Bowles and Harold Ickes 58
tracks the draft in key, although not all, respects. In
producing this final memorandum, the White House first produced
it without the most damaging information. The concealed text
included all references to using the data, and people
identified in the database, for the 1996 reelection campaign,
as well as the fact that the planned use was personally
approved by--indeed originated with--the President.\59\
Although the draft memorandum itself, not just the final
version that was withheld, was responsive to the committee's
original August 2, 1996 request, it was not produced until May
13, 1997. When Marsha Scott was questioned about the contents
of this memorandum, she acknowledged that this plan involved
using the White House Database to identify leaders for the 1996
campaign.\60\
B. The White House Social and Political Affairs Offices Shared Data
From the White House Database With DNC Fundraisers
The transfer of data from the White House Database was a
significant tool in the conversion of White House resources to
the use of the DNC to exchange White House invitations and
other perks for campaign contributions. Individuals in the
White House Social Office and Political Affairs Office were the
points of contact through which White House data was converted
to the use of DNC fundraisers.
The transfer of data was so significant that first, Jack
Quinn denied that such transfers happened. Then, confronted
with newspaper reports that such transfers did occur, the White
House Press Office staff acknowledged the reports, while at the
same time the Counsel's Office staff and the Press Secretary
himself were secretly helping to draft a misleading press
release for DNC Finance Chairman Truman Arnold. When new White
House Counsel Chuck Ruff was confronted with the press reports
and the Press Office statements, he sought to qualify and
minimize the use of the data, claiming that it happened only
occasionally. However, the committee uncovered that DNC Finance
Chairman Truman Arnold and Erskine Bowles agreed to a plan to
allow DNC fundraisers to obtain regular access to data from the
White House Database to select donors for attendance at White
House events.
The committee uncovered a scheme to use data from the White
House Database to enhance DNC fundraising efforts. This scheme
involved the White House staff using the White House Database
to identify for the DNC individuals who had attended White
House social events. The DNC would then use that information to
determine whom to recommend for invitations to upcoming White
House social events. In this way the DNC ensured that it was
able to reward its donors appropriately with White House
invitations.
1. the white house counsel and the white house press office concealed
the regular and continuous transfer of data from the white house
database to the DNC
The White House Counsel consistently denied or sought to
minimize the transfer of any data stored in White House
databases to the DNC or other partisan political entities,
including specific denials of dissemination of data from White
House computers in the specific context of generating
invitations to White House events. In a June 28, 1996 letter to
the committee, White House Counsel Jack Quinn stated:
The database maintained by the White House is a list
of names, addresses and other pertinent information for
generating invitations to White House events. . . . The
database is for WhiteHouse use only; we prohibit
distribution to outside entities or political organizations--including
the Democratic National Committee or the Clinton-Gore '96
Committee.61
This denial was untrue. On January 30, 1997, the Los
Angeles Times reported that White House staff frequently
retrieved data on large contributors and turned it over to the
DNC to help raise money for the President's reelection. The
L.A. Times story by investigative reporter Glenn F. Bunting,
reported that former DNC National Finance Chairman, Truman
Arnold told him that:
[the DNC finance] staff routinely used WhoDB to identify likely
candidates for increased donations. . . . [T]he staff found out
how many White House invitations certain donors were receiving,
so they could arrange more events for prospective contributors.
. . . I started checking back with the White House just as a
routine matter. . . . It didn't seem very privileged to me. It
was open to a lot of people.
* * * * * * *
[P]eople familiar with the system said that during the last
two years DNC workers routinely used the database as a fund-
raising tool to recruit prospective donors and to solicit large
contributions.
* * * * * * *
Arnold said he focused on reconnecting the party with
contributors who had given in 1992 but who had ``fallen from
the fold.'' To do this, Arnold said, party staff members tapped
the White House computer base, usually calling for the
information. . . . ``It was most helpful to us because we were
looking to the disaffected,'' Arnold said. ``The database
helped us to see who had been invited to what.'' 62
That day's White House Press Briefing was largely dominated
by questions stemming from the story. With no mention of the
White House Counsel's prior denial that any such data had been
disseminated to the DNC, the White House Deputy Press Secretary
Barry Toiv after talking with the White House Counsel,
responded repeatedly that giving such White House data to the
DNC was appropriate:
If the DNC, in the context of putting together a list
of people that they might want to ask to be invited to
an event here, asked the question, was this particular
person invited to previous events, or did this person
previously attend events at the White House, it would
be entirely appropriate for the Social Office to answer
that question. . . . If they didn't know [the answer],
the place where that information was kept was in the
database.63
This statement is wholly inconsistent with Mr. Quinn's
assertion 6 months earlier that the White House prohibits the
distribution of such data to the DNC. The White House now
admitted that what was prohibited 64 was, in fact,
``entirely appropriate.'' In addition, the White House had
refused to provide this very information to the committee for
over 3 months. On October 3, 1996 the committee had
specifically asked the White House to acknowledge whether ``the
White House ever provided any data from the WhoDB to an outside
organization or individual.'' 65
The committee requested an answer by October 9, 1996. The
White House failed to answer by that date, was asked again to
respond by October 29, 1996,66 again failed to
answer, was again asked to respond by November 18,
1996,67 again failed to answer, was again asked to
do so by January 14, 1997,68 and again did not
respond.69 Indeed, the answer to this question was
never provided during the tenure of Jack Quinn as Counsel to
the President.
Even after Mr. Ruff's arrival as Counsel to the President,
and after the press briefing admission of the data transfer to
the DNC, the White House still failed to answer the committee's
questions with respect to that very matter. The committee once
again, requested answers to these questions by February 26,
1997.70 The White House once more failed to answer
and was asked again to do so by February 28, 1997.71
Not until February 28, 1997, almost 5 months after first being
asked, well after the 1996 Presidential election, and well
after the previously denied facts had been exposed by the LA
Times, did the White House finally admit to the committee that
data from the White House Database had been funneled to the
DNC.72
In addition to the White House Counsel repeatedly refusing
to answer the committee's questions, the President's Press
Secretary Mike McCurry also concealed his own role in the story
at a White House press briefing. Although Mr. McCurry had
assisted Mr. Arnold in drafting a statement regarding the use
of the Database, he turned the briefing over to his assistant
Barry Toiv. When Toiv was asked if anyone in the White House
had spoken with Truman Arnold, he responded, ``I don't know.''
73 Mike McCurry, although still present, said
nothing. Four questions later, when reporters pressed the
issue, asking ``[D]on't you think you might want to ask
[Arnold] about that? [] Given all the reports you all haven't
talked to [Arnold] yet[,]'' McCurry interjected to tell Toiv
``Barry, the Counsel's Office has. . . .'' 74 To
this, Toiv admitted, ``That's true. The Counsel's Office has
contacted him. . . .'' 75
At no time did McCurry reveal the fact that he had talked
to Arnold the previous night. The committee had asked who in
the White House had contacted Arnold.76 In response,
theWhite House revealed that McCurry had indeed talked to
Arnold about these matters on the evening of January 29, 1997:
Later that evening [January 29, 1997], Mr. McCurry
returned Mr. Arnold's call. * * * Mr. Arnold said that
he trusted Mr. McCurry's opinion and wanted some
guidance as to how to respond to a number of press
inquiries related to the WhoDB * * *.77
Not only was McCurry silent about his own conversation with
Arnold on the night before the briefing, neither he nor Toiv
revealed the White House Counsel's role in conveying a
misleading denial for the DNC to issue. On the very day of the
press briefing, [January 30, 1997] Sally Paxton, Associate
Counsel to the President, after Arnold read her a prepared
written statement denying aspects of data transfer matters
attributed to him by the L.A. Times, secretly received and
thereafter transmitted to the DNC, Arnold's written
denial.78
The following day Arnold was ``unavailable'' and instead
issued a statement under his name claiming he had never heard
of WhoDB.79 Presumably, this was the statement which
had previously been read to Paxton, received at the White
House, and faxed to the DNC. Of course, the committee's
investigation has established that many aspects of the data
transfer described by Truman Arnold to the L.A. Times were, in
fact, true.
2. Sworn Testimony Indicates That The DNC Obtained Data Exactly as
Arnold Had Revealed to the L.A. Times
The committee's investigation confirmed that Mr. Arnold had
set up a scheme with Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock in March 1995
to allow DNC fundraisers to contact the White House Social
Office to obtain the valuable information contained in the
White House Database regarding who had attended events at the
White House. Prior to this confirmation by the committee's
investigation, the White House sought to downplay the extent
and frequency of the data flow to the DNC. In his February 28,
1997 letter to the committee, Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the
President, stated that
the DNC occasionally called the White House to inquire
whether specific individuals had been to prior events,
such as state dinners. [White House] [s]taff sometimes
would consult WhoDB to answer a specific
question.80
This attempt to minimize the conduct was contrary to what
Truman Arnold had revealed to the L.A. Times. Arnold is
reported to have admitted: ``I started checking back with the
White House just as a routine matter.'' 81 The L.A.
Times also reported:
people familiar with the system said that during the
last two years DNC workers routinely used the database
as a fund-raising tool to recruit prospective donors
and to solicit large contributions.82
More importantly, as set forth infra, the evidence
uncovered by the committee's investigation, including the sworn
testimony of numerous witnesses, both at the White House and
the DNC, revealed that such conduct was not at all occasional,
but was a significant, regular, and ongoing practice which
allowed the DNC access to the prohibited White House data. This
evidence included Truman Arnold's testimony in a committee
deposition in which he stood by his publicly reported statement
that the DNC ``started checking back with the White House just
as a routine matter.'' 83
Indeed from documents and testimony obtained as part of the
investigation, both from the White House and the DNC, as well
as the testimony of participants in the data flow scheme both
at the White House and the DNC, a clear picture emerges of the
regular and ongoing practice of supplying the DNC with
government-owned proprietary data. Further, the investigation
reveals that this data was indeed used in a sophisticated
scheme to directly further the fundraising goals of the DNC.
3. Obtaining the data on social event attendance was directly tied to
fundraising efforts
Obtaining invitations to White House events and other perks
was part of a direct coordinated scheme between the White House
and the DNC to convert the White House into nothing more than a
fundraising machine. As recently as May 25, 1998, the
Washington Post starkly revealed not only the tremendous value
of White House event attendance, but the very effective use of
such attendance in assuring a huge flow of money to the
DNC.84
Bernard Schwartz, described as ``the party's largest single
individual donor,'' 85 was reported to have been
``twice invited to stay in the Lincoln Bedroom but couldn't
make it. He attended state dinners for the Emperor of Japan and
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and was toasted at a White
House dinner two years ago on his 70th Birthday.''
86 Schwartz was quoted as saying, ``It's awesome to
go to the White House, an extraordinary privilege.''
87 Indeed, the article quotes a former DNC official:
``He was really sort of your perfect donor--just wanted to
attend events and never asked for anything.'' 88
a. The DNC planned to use White House event invitations as
a fundraising tool
Documents found within the White House show that the DNC in
concert with the White House staff used access to events as a
tool to achieve fundraising goals. A May 5, 1994 DNC memorandum
written by DNC staffer Martha Phipps sets forth the plan to use
event invitations to meet DNC fundraising goals. The memorandum
identifies as essential to reaching a goal of $40 million
offering invitations to specific events, including ``[s]ix
seats at all White House Private dinners * * * [s]ix to eight
spots at all White House events * * * White House residence
visits and overnight stays * * * [t]wo places per week at the
Presidential CEO lunches * * * [and] [t]en places per month at
White House film showings.'' 89
This memorandum was discovered in the Office of the White
House Chief of Staff (Leon Panetta at the time the memorandum
was written) in a file marked ``Democratic National Committee,
FINANCE SUPPORTERS, Revised 5/4/94.'' 90 Also
contained in the file was another page which appears to be from
a larger document. In addition to its location in a DNC file,
the content of this page, and its wording, gives every
appearance that it was written by someone at the DNC. It
significantly states:
The White House Social Office has been relatively
inaccessible to the DNC. * * * We are on the same team and
would like to share information in a legal and ethical manner.
If we can break down the territorial nature of the Social
office, we will accomplish a great deal more for the President
and the party.
problems
Events
At this time we do not have access to calendars or advance
notice of events and dates. We frequently face the embarrassing
situation of being notified of upcoming events by the
contributors. Additionally, we can match the most appropriate
people and events, given some advance notice.
Follow Up
The DNC is not aware of who has been taken care of to date.
Only recently have we been allowed to send a staffer to the
Social office to look up Trustee involvement for the past year.
Having this information in a timely fashion is important to our
fundraising efforts.
Cooperation
The nature of fundraising is very last minute. Contributors
often come in at the last minute for a specific event. * * * We
need flexibility to make changes where appropriate.
Fundraising Interference
DNC solicitation is subverted due to major donors being
invited to high level White House events regardless of the date
or amount of contribution. This is a disincentive especially
for the Trustee level contributor.
Understanding the contributor
The Trustee consist [sic] of many of the nation's
wealthiest and most influencial profiles. Some White House
staffers fully understand the profiles of these contributors.
We avoid events with huge crowds that may make the donors feel
unimportant.91
Yet another page contained in the file contains handwritten
notes reflecting that 30 percent of the DNC Managing Trustees
(DNC Trustees raised or donated $100,000 or more to the DNC)
92 had not been to the White House. The notes
further reflect the need for a ``list of who has been [to the
White House].'' 93
These documents found inside the White House parallel other
documents discovered inside the DNC complaining of the
inability to gain access to internal White House information.
These documents include internal DNC memorandum prepared by DNC
Fundraising staff. This fact cannot be over-emphasized. DNC
Finance Director Richard Sullivan testified in depositions both
before the Senate and House that the Finance Division at the
DNC ought to have been named ``the fundraising division.''
94 Sullivan described his duties:
The finance director reported to the Finance
Chairman. Essentially, the finance director had the
day-to-day interaction with the fundraising staff, and
worked with the fund-raising chairman in working
towards the goals of how much money was to be raised
and in what way.95
Significantly, Sullivan testified that he had no other
duties at the DNC other than fundraising.96 In 1995
one of Sullivan's top fundraising assistants, Ari Swiller,
served as Director of ``major supporter fund-raising,'' whose
duties including ``work[ing] in raising money from our top tier
of donors.'' 97 Indeed, Swiller headed the DNC
Trustee program which Swiller described as ``a group of major
donors and contributors to the Democratic Party as well as
major fundraisers.'' 98 He described duties in
heading the program as ``speaking with donors, following up
with them, working on events and soliciting contributions from
new donors.'' 99
b. The plan involved the transfer of prior attendance
information by the White House Social Office to the
DNC
The committee found evidence that the White House staff and
the DNC planned to facilitate DNC fundraising by providing the
proprietary prior event attendance information to DNC
fundraisers. While witnesses sought to assert that providing
this information was part of an ``official'' invitation
process, much of it was, in fact, nothing more than a scheme to
allow DNC fundraisers to have better information on the
susceptibility of prospective donors to solicitations. By
obtaining information from White House computers on previous
event attendance, DNC fundraisers could decide who had already
been rewarded, who needed to be rewarded, and who needed to be
inspired through a White House invitation to raise and give
money to the DNC.
It is clear that within the White House the guest lists
detailing who has been invited, who has accepted, and who has
attended White House social events is jealously guarded. This
information was maintained in the White House Database with
respect to events such as official State dinners with foreign
Heads of State, State arrival ceremonies for visiting Heads of
State, receptions, and other official events. It is equally
clear from the evidence that the DNC wanted this information,
and complained when they could not get it.
In March 1995, the DNC fundraising staff's complaints about
access to the White House Social Office reached the new DNC
Finance Chairman Truman Arnold in a memorandum from Richard
Sullivan.100 The memorandum included complaints that
mid-level White House staff compiled the event invitation lists
and recommended who should be included in White House
functions--``When we follow up, our requests are often second
guessed, questioned and scrutinized by this tier of staff.''
101 It descibed the ``need to sell and represent our
donors as supporters that represent more than contributions,''
102 and proposed, under the heading
``COORDINATION,'' that ``[e]ach agency and WH department should
have a list of supporters and a staff person identified and
devoted to handle matters related to reaching out to our
donors.'' 103
Significantly, the memorandum recommends:
[W]e might be able to work out a situation with the Social
Office for us to get a copy of invited guests after WH affairs
have occurred.
* * * * * * *
If there's a problem sending it to [DNC] finance then
perhaps it could be sent to the Chairman's office and then
routed to finance.104
Ari Swiller, DNC Deputy Finance Director under Richard
Sullivan, testified that many of the ideas in the memorandum
represented the perception of those persons, including himself,
in the DNC finance division.105 Swiller testified
that he formed his perception based upon his own experience of
having made calls to the White House Social Secretary's Office
and having his ``requests for information about upcoming events
[]not responded to, because persons in the White House [he]
dealt with felt that there shouldn't be preferential treatment
given to the finance division.'' 106
Swiller testified that there was a time when the DNC could
not get information from the White House staff reflecting who
had been invited to or attended White House
events,107 and that both he and others in the DNC
Finance Division desired to obtain White House Social Secretary
lists of persons who had attended events at the White
House.108 Indeed, this information was extremely
valuable to the DNC Finance Division because whether or not a
person had attended a prior event at the White House was a
factor used by the DNC fundraising division in determining who
it would recommend for invitations to upcoming
events.109
DNC Finance Chairman 110 Truman Arnold, was very
candid in his deposition with respect to how prior attendance
information was used as part of the DNC fundraising effort.
Arnold testified that the reason the DNC obtained the prior
attendance information was:
Because in trying to reactivate the people who had
stopped contributing . . . 111
There were people in Washington, inside Washington
who know how to work the system to get to a lot of
events that don't ever give a dime, or work, . . .
112
So it was our way of bringing equity to the system .
. . to make sure that the DNC was not being abused, and
that the President wouldn't be abused.113
Arnold admitted that the system of making sure people got
invited to the White House was designed to ``energize'' them to
raise and give money.114 He went on to compare the
DNC fundraising operation in this regard to people who attend
church being expected to tithe:
. . . [I]f you attend church, you are supposed to be
a tither. So if I can hopefully give a little
explanation, short philosophical approach to what I was
doing that may clarify some other questions, I am not a
hard s[ell]. I have been in sales all of my life, but
my whole philosophy is to include and to involve people
in the process, and if they like it and embrace it,
they will do their part without being asked. And if
they don't like it they won't.
Whether it be charity drives that I have had for my
hospitals, for my church, for civic endeavors in the
community, mine is one of doing my part, stepping up,
including and involving and engaging. They become
energized, take part, take a role, and the balance
follows. This was my approach to this. This is what I
was attempting to do.115
Indeed, Ari Swiller, also admitted that there were
discussions with respect to people being invited over and over
again to the White House even though they had not contributed
recently.116
Truman Arnold admitted that the White House attendance
information was used in the preparation of DNC lists:
[W]e had the list--how many times they had attended White
House social events.
* * * * * * *
[T]he list would have already been prioritized, and there
were references who they were and the nature of their business
and how they had come to be contributors.117
Another internal DNC memorandum to DNC Deputy Finance
Director David Mercer, revealed that ``The only way [the DNC]
can get the things we need to have done is through the [White
House Chief of Staff's] office. This person is critical to our
abilities.118 Indeed, it was the Chief of Staff's
Office 119 to whom the DNC Finance Chairman, Truman
Arnold, turned to break the logjam and permit the information
flow. As set out below, Arnold went to the White House to
obtain an agreement that the White House would provide the DNC
with the information it sought.120
In March 1995, shortly after taking over the helm as DNC
Finance Chairman, and after the fundraising staff voiced to him
their complaints about the inability to get proprietary White
House attendance data,121 Arnold went to the White
House and met with Erskine Bowles, Deputy Chief of Staff, and
Ann Stock, White House Social Secretary. Although Arnold
testified that the data flow arrangement had been in place
before he arrived at the DNC,122 he explained that
the meeting was arranged ``because there was a lot of confusion
on how the system worked and what the responsibility was. I
wanted to find the responsibility of the DNC and how it
interfaced with the White House Social Office.'' 123
It was at this meeting that Arnold learned of the Social
Office event data which the White House would make available to
the DNC:
So I met with [Ann Stock] and * * * Erskine Bowles
and we had a discussion about the protocol and how the
system worked. And as a result of that, I knew that
they had an internal record of everyone and the number
that had attended a social event, and what that event
was, and how many times they had attended as part of
the Social Office.
So, from that, the understanding that I had with the
Social Office is that we would check [for prior
attendance].124
While Mr. Arnold's testimony was refreshingly candid with
respect to most matters, one troubling aspect of his testimony
on this crucial meeting was Arnold's seeming attempt to suggest
that the DNC was permitted to obtain proprietary White House
data in an effort to ``screen'' inappropriate persons from
attending events.125 The record as a whole, however,
makes clear that obtaining event attendance information had
nothing to do with screening for inappropriate persons, as
Arnold himself made clear. Arnold elsewhere repeatedly
testified that non-familiar DNC names were already screened by
the DNC before the DNC called the White House for attendance
data. He said:
[W]hen we had our list screened, our nominees
screened, we would call over to rate them and
prioritize them to see what the record was, because we
knew how many that the DNC had invited them to, but
they could have come from a lot of different directions
to other events.126
The only thing we called for was to see the number of
times that this list, that we had already screened, the
number of times that they had attended functions
because we did not have that information. * * * the
only thing we used it for was to prioritize the
attendees.127
[I told the fundraising staff] [t]hat we had the
responsibility to screen. In our recommendations, we
would assume major responsibility for screening of IDs
to the White House, and the procedure we would use is
to do the best we could with the tools we had to work
with and then we would call the White House to see,
after we screened them, how many times they had
attended, as part of prioritizing. * * * 128
As with his fleeting and seemingly half-hearted suggestion
concerning a ``non-fundraising'' screening function, Arnold
also sought to defend the appropriateness of receiving the
information by suggesting that:
I never discussed financial terms in any form or
fashion with the Social Office. They never knew in the
list how much had been contributed, why they were being
submitted, what kind of workers they were. There was a
Chinese wall between the Social Office and the
Financial Office.129
While it may very well be true that the DNC Finance
Division did not discuss contributions with the Social Office,
that is beside the point. There was no need to discuss
contributions with the Social Office because the DNC Finance
Division already had the financial and contributor information
about every donor and potential donor. What they lacked was the
proprietary White House data about past event attendance.
Far from keeping that valuable data from the DNC--the White
House agreed to provide it, and indeed thereafter did so on a
regular and ongoing basis. It cannot be overstated that the
White House agreed to provide the information that Arnold
sought directly to the DNC Finance Division, the very entity
which was charged with raising money.
Neither Erskine Bowles nor Ann Stock recall the meeting at
all. Stock testified that she had no recollection of a meeting
with Arnold and Erskine Bowles. She recalled a meeting in her
office in the White House with Arnold and his wife, where they
discussed the logistics of the Arnolds' move to Washington, DC,
but has no recollection of any discussions with Truman Arnold
concerning the DNC and White House event
attendance.130 Significantly, Stock testified--
directly contrary to Truman Arnold with respect to White House
authorization for DNC staff to call and obtain information from
the White House databases. Stock pointedly stated that Arnold
``may have had the desire [to obtain such information] but he
didn't have the ability to do that.'' 131
Similarly, Erskine Bowles testified that he had no
recollection of any such meeting. He testified that he did not
remember a meeting with Arnold and Stock at any time, and
recalled no meeting with Arnold in March 1995.132
Prior to his deposition, committee staff had specifically
requested Mr. Bowles to bring his calendar for 1995 for use
during the questioning. Bowles neither brought his calendar,
nor reviewed it. He testified ``I don't know where it is.''
133 Bowles did recall meeting with Arnold at some
time during Bowles's tenure as Deputy Chief of Staff and
recalled Arnold complaining about problems of getting people
invited to White House events.134 Bowles testified
that he was unaware of any White House event attendance data
which was ever provided to Arnold.135
It is difficult to reconcile the testimony of Truman Arnold
and the testimony of Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock without
concluding that the meeting to discuss the arrangement took
place. Arnold has a clear memory of it; the others do not.
Moreover, it is during this period that Brian Bailey worked
for Erskine Bowles and created the handwritten notes reflecting
that the President agreed that the WhoDB and the DNC database
should be integrated.136 These notes are evidence
that the President signed off on a plan to give DNC Finance
Chairman Truman Arnold the very data that he sought in his
meeting with Erskine Bowles and Ann Stock.
The inescapable conclusion is that Truman Arnold and
Erskine Bowles agreed that the DNC would receive the
proprietary White House information to--in Truman Arnold's
words--``reactivate the people who had stopped contributing''
137 and with the ``hope'' that they would be
``energized'' to raise money.138 The best evidence
that individuals at the highest levels in the White House
agreed to provide the data is the fact that the data was
thereafter regularly provided.
c. Richard Sullivan, Ari Swiller, and others obtained data
from the White House Social Office and the Office
of Political Affairs
Apparently in response to DNC complaints about not knowing
about White House events for which they might submit names for
invitations, at least while Erskine Bowles served as Deputy
Chief of Staff, a group operated within the White House which
held regular weekly ``list creation meetings.'' This group
permitted the notification of upcoming official White House
events to coordinate component entities to be able to submit
names for invitations.139 Remarkably, the DNC as
well as the the Clinton-Gore reelection campaign, and the
Democratic Leadership Council [DLC] were regular participants.
The DNC representative to the group, Brooke Stroud, admitted
that the DNC was ``just like any other department within the
White House.'' 140
Following the weekly list creation meetings at the White
House, DNC personnnel armed with the knowledge of upcoming
events, informed the respective DNC offices of those events and
invited all offices to submit names to the DNC ``Office of
Constituent Services.'' According to testimony received by the
committee it was this entity, the Office of Constituent
Services, within the DNC which was the official entity to
collect DNC names, prioritize them, and send them to the White
House as part of the invitation process.141 The
number of events for which DNC submitted names was
approximately 20 a month.142
This system itself provided a mechanism which allowed for a
significant flow of proprietary White House information to the
DNC (and presumably to the DLC and to the Clinton-Gore
reelection campaign). This data included otherwise jealously
guarded (even within the White House) information revealing
which individuals had been selected for invitations to upcoming
official White House events,143 and who had been
invited to past events.144 The information
concerning who had been invited to upcoming White House events
was widely sought by persons both within and outside of the
White House. However, this information was kept highly
confidential by the Social Office. As Ann Stock, the White
House Social Secretary testified:
[Persons in the White House] could possibly call and
ask [who had been invited to an upcoming event from
their recommended list] but that wasn't really a
regular occurrence, because we had a policy of not
releasing lists, because we wanted invitations to come
from President and Mrs. Clinton, not from people who
had suggested names. So we had a policy of not
releasing the lists [either inside or outside of the
White House].145
We chose not to submit [the invitation] list and
circulate it through the White House so that the
President and First Lady would have the opportunity to
invite people . . . rather than somebody decide that
they wanted to call up and say, I put you on the list.
That is why it was kept very
confidential.146
We usually didn't give them the information, which
was a source of contention, because we maintained [the
invitee list] until the people came to the White House,
the list was under the purview of President and Mrs.
Clinton, how and why they had been invited, and we
didn't circulate the list.147
The value of this information was expressed most pointedly by
Stock when she testified:
People want to claim credit for getting someone
invited to the White House. That is why we did not
circulate those lists. . . . 148
People like to have the information.149
Beyond the list creation meetings, specific staff members
of the DNC called specific individuals in the Social Office and
Office of Political Affairs to obtain lists and information
about prior attendance at White House events. Richard Sullivan,
the DNC Finance Director himself testified that he obtained
lists of attendance at White House CEO lunches and the White
House Economic Conference and that he used those lists to raise
money.150 Karen Hancox, the Deputy Director of the
Office of Political Affairs testified that Sullivan called her
and asked for information about prior event attendance, that
she called the Social Office staff for such information, which
was given to her, and that she, in turn, gave it to
Sullivan.151
Ari Swiller, the Director of the DNC's major donor program,
similarly testified that he and two other DNC staff members
called for such information from the staff in the Social
Office.152 He also testified that it was his
impression that Donald Dunn in the White House Office of
Political Affairs was looking up data on a computer when he
provided such data toSwiller.153 Donald Dunn, whom
DNC Director of Constituent Services Brooke Stroud called ``Information
Central,'' 154 confirmed that Swiller contacted him and that
he used the White House Database to provide him with
data.155 Swiller also testified that he received lists from
the White House when he had inquired about prior
attendance.156
Consistent with Arnold's and Bowles's plan, it plainly
became a routine matter for DNC staff to contact the White
House staff to obtain this information. Moreover, the
President's objective of integrating the White House Database
was effectively achieved. DNC fundraisers had obtained access
to the crucial and valuable data in the White House Database.
d. The White House Database was used to supply data to the
DNC for planning DNC events at the White House
After Arnold exposed the practice of the White House
providing the DNC with proprietary White House information in
connection with official White House events, the White House
Press Office sought to transform what Jack Quinn had said was
prohibited 157 into something fully appropriate,
claiming that the DNC by obtaining proprietary information was
somehow performing an offical governmental
function.158 During the January 30, 1997 press
briefing Deputy White House Press Secretary Barry Toiv also
suggested that the data flow to the DNC was limited only to
``official'' White House functions:
The only contact that we're aware of that the DNC would
have had would have been when the Social Office was putting
together lists of people to invite to official events here . .
. .
* * * * * * *
[T]hose [DNC events at the White House such as coffees] are
not the events I'm talking about.
* * * * * * *
It would not have been appropriate to use the database to
determine who ought to come to a DNC event. And--well, that's
the answer.159
Although Toiv was correct that it would not be appropriate
to use the White House Database ``to determine who ought to
come to a DNC event,'' he failed to answer the question of
whether the Database had, in fact, been used to determine who
ought to come to a DNC event. The committee's investigation
revealed that the DNC did obtain data from the Database in the
planning of DNC events at the White House.
Richard Sullivan testified that the DNC finance staff
``probably'' contacted the White House and obtained prior event
attendance information with respect to putting together
invitees to DNC sponsored dinners, lunches, and receptions held
both at the White House and outside the White
House.160 Similarly, Truman Arnold testified that
his DNC staff did indeed obtain for use by DNC fundraisers
prior White House attendance in preparing lists for DNC
events.161 Ari Swiller, who was very active in
seeking and obtaining White House information, made no
distinction between official events and DNC sponsored events at
the White House.162 Swiller testified:
Often we would submit a list of names to be included
at an event at the White House, and when we did that,
we wanted to see if people we were submitting had been
invited to previous events and attended or regretted,
or been invited at all.163
He added that this happened without distinction between
official or DNC events.164
Furthermore, it is clear that with respect to DNC events at
the White House the DNC got more information from White House
databases in the form of actual lists and printouts both for
upcoming events at the White House and for previous events at
the White House. In addition, the committee has exposed the
establishment of an entire infrastructure, including government
manpower, computer time and resources, fax transmissions, and
telephone reports paid for by government funds, which were
converted to the DNC fundraising efforts.
e. The White House infrastructure was dedicated to helping
the DNC raise money through White House invitations
The resources dedicated to these events represent the
conversion of the taxpayer-funded White House infrastructure to
help the DNC raise money. That infrastructure included the
preparation and mailing of invitations to DNC
events.165 White House computer systems, including
the White House Database, were utilized for inputting the DNC
names into a list for each DNC event at the White
House.166 Once the list was inputted, it was then
printed from the White House Database (and, previously, its
predecessor system) and sent to the White House Calligrapher's
Office where the written invitations were prepared for mailing
from the White House.167
Thereafter, the White House Social Office received
responses from those invited, and tracked whether they accepted
or declined the invitation. White House personnel received the
responses of those accepting or regretting and entered that
respones and for those accepting, their date of birth and
Social Security number into the White House
Database,168 or its DOS predecessor database
system.169
All of this information, including the updated accept/
regret responses was able to be printed out in hard copy
updates from both the White House Database and its DOS
predecessor system.170 When the White House Database
was installed, it permitted White House staff to view an entire
list on the computer screen without the need to print out a
report.171
After handling invitations at government
expense,172 the White House faxed to the DNC updated
guest status lists from government computer systems for
upcoming DNC events at the White House. These lists provided
up-to-date information from the White House computer systems
reflecting who had been invited, and who had accepted, who had
declined an invitation.173
Both prior to and after the installation of the White House
Database, these White House-generated and updated lists were
regularly sent by persons in the White House to the DNC to
facilitate event attendance.174 While the DNC
actually solicited the contributions, the White House
infrastructure handled all of the arrangements for the events
to which the contributions were attributed.
Having the lists prepared by White House staff on White
House computers permitted the DNC to ``work the phones,''
targeting calls to those who had not responded to the White
House to check on their intentions.175 Remarkably,
this appeared to be the exception. The usual practice was for
government employees to make these calls in follow-up to
invitations.176 The use of the White House staff to
generate attendance cloaked the DNC's involvement, concealing
the role that contribtions played in obtaining the invitations.
This process effectively integrated the White House
infrastructure with the DNC staff for the purpose of raising
money through White House invitations.
4. the transfer of data from the white house database as part of a
scheme to convert the white house infrastructure to the benefit of the
dnc may constitute the theft of government property
18 U.S.C. Sec. 641 provides:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly
converts to his use or the use of another, or without
authority, sells, conveys, or disposes of any record,
voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States
or of any department or agency thereof, or any property
made or being made under contract for the United States
or any department or agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with
intent to convert it to his own use or gain, knowing it
to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined, or
converted--
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than ten years or both; but if the value of such
property does not exceed the sum of $10,000, he shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1
year, or both.
The evidence obtained by the committee shows that
individuals in the White House may have violated this section
of the Federal criminal code by converting to the use of the
DNC a thing of value, namely data from the White House
Database. The information was plainly a thing of value in the
scheme to use White House invitations to reward and energize
donors.
There can be no suggestion that they did not transfer this
data knowingly and without authority. White House Counsel Jack
Quinn plainly recognized that such transfers were prohibited,
and memoranda from the Counsel's Office to all White House
staff advised that the use of White House property was not
permitted under the provisions of the Hatch Act that otherwise
permit political activity by White House staff.
Erskine Bowles and Truman Arnold knowingly and willfully
planned the transfer of data to support the conversion of the
White House infrastructure to an effective fundraising machine.
The DNC fundraisers knowingly and willfully carried out that
scheme to obtain the data and to convert the White House
infrastructure to the use of the DNC for fundraising. And White
House staff knowingly and willfully cooperated in that scheme
by giving out the data and by allowing the White House to
become a fundraising tool of the DNC.
Obtaining the data itself was a critical element in
advancing the scheme to use the White House for fundraising to
meet DNC fundraising objectives. Without the information from
the White House Database, the DNC would have wasted precious
fundraising resources--White House invitations--on at least
those who had already been rewarded for their generosity.
Obtaining the data allowed the DNC to integrate their
fundraising with the White House Social Office.
C. White House Staff Transferred Other Data to the DNC and the Clinton/
Gore Campaign Before the White House Database Was Operational
The sharing of White House data did not begin with the
White House Database. Prior to the development of the Database,
White House staff apparently distributed White House lists to
the DNC. The committee found numerous White House lists in the
hands of the DNC and the campaign that pre-dated the White
House Database.
These lists included calligraphers' lists with hundreds of
names and addresses from White House holiday receptions in 1994
and the President's Yale Dinner in December of the same year,
which were produced to the commiteee by the DNC.177
The Yale Dinner list, although available to DNC fundraisers,
was withheld from the committee by the White
House.178 They also included the 1993 and 1994
Holiday Card lists that were transferred to the campaign and
theDNC, respectively.179 The list of those invited
to attend the White House Economic Conference in 1994 was also produced
by the DNC.180 A White House Office of Public Liaison list
of Asian Pacific American leaders was given, according to the White
House Counsel, possibly to John Huang while he was employed by the
DNC.181 The transfer of the lists, which are things of
value, and the knowing conversion of them to the use of the DNC is a
theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, which punishes
the knowing conversion of government property.
Finally, although Cheryl Mills had prepared a memorandum
specifically advising that names and addresses from the
official mails could not be sent to the DNC (in the context of
the 1993 Holiday Card project), the President routinely
directed that names and addresses from official correspondence
that had not been entered in the WhoDB be included in
PeopleBase. This, too, could constitute theft of government
property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. It is hardly surprising that
with this history of sharing data that the White House
Database, when it became operational, was used as a vehicle to
transfer similar valuable data to outside entities.
1. White House Staff Knew that the 1994 Holiday Card List was
Transferred to the DNC
The committee discovered that the Holiday Card project, at
least in 1994, served as a vehicle to funnel massive amounts of
proprietary government data, at least 76,000 names and
addresses,182 from White House computers (prior to
the creation of the White House Database) to the DNC. The
Holiday Card projects undertaken during previous
administrations are appropriate and legal joint undertakings by
the White House, the national political party of the President,
and his campaign entity, if any.
While the national party traditionally pays for the
production and mailing of the White House holiday cards,
government data is prohibited from being provided to the
national party by the White House. In order to ensure that the
law is not violated, the White House, the political party, and
the campaign often transmit their respective lists to a third-
party professional outside vendor to merge the lists and mail
the cards.183 The purpose of this process is to
ensure that the political party does not receive the White
House list, which is government property.
Despite these legal restrictions, the committee dislodged
evidence that persons within the Clinton White House sought to
use the Holiday Card project to unlawfully transmit government
data to the DNC. Contemporaneous notes made by Erich Vaden
reveal that Marsha Scott suggested that the Holiday Card
project could be used as a vehicle to transmit the data to the
DNC.184 These notes suggest a criminal conspiracy to
circumvent the prohibition on transferring data to the DNC.
According to Vaden's testimony, in response to Scott's
suggestion that the White House names might be sent to DNC,
Vaden felt it necessary to contact Cheryl Mills in the White
House Counsel's Office to learn whether this was unlawful.
``Marsha was saying, `Hey, well, we are sending this to the
public.' It is public knowledge. You know, we are not hiding
who we send the Christmas card to. De facto, people find out.
So it is then public? Is that a public record then?''
185 Vaden testified that: ``to the extent possible
that we could, we were looking for vehicles, you know, as ways
to share that information with people.'' 186
This statement is not the only instance of the expressed
desire to accomplish what the law prohibited. In her reply to a
June 17, 1994 memorandum from Brooke Stroud [DNC] to Tara Burns
(White House), Burns suggested that the DNC bring over their
list to the White House ``for a cross check''--``since we
legally can't give it to you, I think it'd be helpful if you
all could come over some time.'' 187
Despite knowing the prohibition on transferring White House
data to the DNC, and even suggesting during her deposition that
she thought it was illegal,188 Brooke Stroud, Deputy
Director of Membership Services at the DNC, who was in charge
of the 1994 Holiday Card project for the DNC, oversaw the
delivery of the merged list (including the White House lists)
to the DNC in November 1994 from the Saturn Corp., a third-
party contractor used for the production of the
list.189 There, it was entered into the DNC
computer.190 Further, a hard copy printout was made
which reached 5 feet in height,191 which has not
been located.192 This is troubling indeed, for as
Richard Sullivan testified with respect to other White House
lists:
We assembled tens of lists to work off of, and I
don't rule out that those lists may have been
assimilated into this assimilation of tens of hundreds
of lists that were floating around in the fund-raising
division. * * * [I]t * * * would have accumulated with
other lists that I had and others. * * * Generally when
we were working on our big Washington galas, we would
try to put together thousands of names for prospect
mailings or for prospect list callings. So that we
would ask everyone to produce whatever list they had. *
* * 193
The knowing transmission of this list to the DNC is a
violation of White House policy and a violation of 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 641, which prohibits the theft of government property. The
mere possession of the list by the DNC is evidence of a theft
of the property. But in addition to the possession of the list,
there is other evidence that White House and DNC staff knew
that they had no authority to transfer or receive and retain
the list. Nevertheless, the list was transferred to the DNC not
just once, but multiple times and retained in several forms.
The multiple transfers are part of a pattern of evidence that
White House staff provided and the DNC staff retained valuable
government property. It is clear that these lists should not
have been been sent to the DNC even once, much less the many
times they were sent.
The list was transferred to DNC computers multiple times.
The data in the merged file from which duplicates were removed
(called ``deduping'') at the DNC over the 1994 Veterans Day
weekend itself remained as uploaded data in a file in the DNC
computer. There were in factnumerous other tapes and computer
files containing this government data which were impermissibly
transferred to the DNC.
a. At the direction of the DNC, Saturn delivered a sample
printout of the merged tape to the DNC
After the DNC and White House lists had been combined or
merged by the Saturn Corp., the DNC instructed Saturn to
produce and deliver to the DNC for review a ``sampling'' of the
lists (including the White House data).194 Stroud
has no recollection as to what happened to the ``sample'' list
which included White House data.195
b. At the direction of the DNC and with the knowledge and
cooperation of White House staff, Saturn delivered
the merged computer file tape to the DNC
Prior to the Veterans Day weekend in 1994 Brooke Stroud
(with the full knowledge of White House personnel) directed
Saturn to deliver the merged Holiday Card list including the
White House data to the DNC headquarters. There, Stroud had
arranged for the data to be entered into the DNC computer and
to be further de-duped by White House volunteers under the
direction of a government employee, Sharon Lewis. Saturn made
deliveries of the merged data to the DNC in multiple
installments on November 8, 9, and 11, 1994.196 The
component parts making up the merged list were entered into the
DNC computer where it was worked on and further de-
duped.197 As Brooke Stroud testified:
A. All the lists, PeopleBase, White House, DNC, all the
lists were sent to a merge/purge house who did the de-duping.
They did not--they didn't do a great job. So we brought the
list in.
* * * * * * *
Q. All right. That list came back to the DNC?
A. Right.198
DNC personnel and White House volunteers worked on the data
in the DNC computer at least during the Veterans Day weekend
and thereafter. The two computer personnel at DNC testified
that they had no recollection of these events involving
volunteers or weekend work. Though, clearly someone beyond the
technical level of Stroud would have been needed to enter the
data and set up the terminal access for a dozen persons. Bryan
Daines, the Director of Information services at the DNC,
testified that only two DNC employees were technically capable
of uploading data into the DNC system from a magnetic tape--he
and Al Hurst, a DNC computer programmer.199 However,
neither Daines 200 nor Hurst 201 had any
recollection of performing such a task.
It is likely they would have remembered this incident,
given the unusual circumstances of the situation including the
use of White House volunteers on a weekend.202 This
suggests that someone other than these two entered the data
into the DNC computer. The committee has been unable to
discover in what file name or other identifying information it
was entered, what, if any access limitations were built in, and
who thereafter had access to the information thus entered is
unknown to the committee.
The committee requested all sign-in/sign-out logs and
records for the time period covering the Veterans Day weekend
which would reveal the names of those persons present in the
DNC. The DNC did not produce those records, and refused to
state what records they had produced and why they were
produced. Finally, testimony revealed that these records had
been destroyed.203
On or about November 30, 1994, the DNC produced tapes from
the DNC computer containing the de-duped, or cleaned-up,
information. However, at least one set of tapes containing the
merged data was returned to Saturn Corp. to be placed in postal
presort format and then transferred to the laser house (``The
Last Word'') for final mailing.204 The information
transferred to the tape, of course also, as far as is known
remained in the file within the DNC computer. No evidence
exists that the data was deleted from the computer system after
the tapes were made to be returned to Saturn.
c. A so-called problem tape was delivered to the DNC and
retained
The committee's investigation revealed that the prohibited
data went to the DNC and into its computer system, yet again,
this time, under the guise of a problem tape. After receiving
the DNC de-duped tapes back from the DNC on or about November
30, 1994, Saturn placed the data in a postal presort format. On
or about December 2, 1994 Saturn delivered the data to the
laser house for addressing and mailing.205
However, the Last Word discovered what was perceived to be
a problem with the tape provided by Saturn. The Last Word
returned tapes to Saturn Corp. which Saturn received on
December 14, 1994.206 Two days later, on Friday,
December 16, 1994, Saturn representatives arrived at DNC with
the problem tape. Two letters from Saturn, one dated December
20, 1994 to Brooke Stroud,207 and one dated December
22, 1994 to Eric Sildon,208 confirm the meeting of
Saturn personnel at the DNC on that date concerning the problem
tape.
With respect to these events, Al Hurst, the computer
programmer at the DNC, recalled that his only contact with
Saturn personnel occurred at the time of the ``the problem
tape.'' 209 He testified that when Saturn brought
the ``problem tape'' to the DNC, ``we uploaded it to a secure
place on the AS400 [the DNC computer database system].''
210 Beyond his recollection that he once viewed the
problem tape on the computer screen with Brooke
Stroud,211 Hurst has norecollection as to what
happened to the tape itself, which Saturn brought to the DNC on
December 16, 1994 and which Hurst uploaded into the
computer.212
With respect to the data from the tape which had been
uploaded into the DNC computer system, the record establishes
that it remained in the computer for an extended period of
time. At some time after 1994, at Brooke Stroud's request,
Hurst made yet another tape containing this data.213
He gave the tape to Brooke Stroud, but has no idea what she did
with that copy.214 In addition to this copy of the
data on yet another tape, the data also remained in the DNC
computer system thereafter.215
In fact, this data remained in the specified file in the
DNC computer system for a total of over a year, until in
approximately January 1996, Hurst testified he deleted the file
from the DNC system.216 However, before deleting the
data, Hurst made yet another tape which contained the
data.217 This copy was placed on a tape rack in the
unsecured DNC computer room.218
Hurst's testimony regarding the deletion of the data from
the DNC computer system is unusual. Hurst is a computer
programmer. He described his duties as being ``to keep the
computer running, to train people how to use the computer, and
to make enhancements and changes to the programs that are on
the computer.'' 219
Yet Hurst, seemingly out of the blue and of his own
volition, made the independent judgment to delete the file from
the system--a file which contained data that he produced in the
form of a tape for Brooke Stroud. Hurst testified that he did
not ask anyone else whether the file should be
deleted.220 He stated that he made the determination
because ``it was taking up a lot of space on the system.''
221 Despite specific recollections of having deleted
this particular file, the name he gave to the file, and when he
deleted it, Hurst was unable to recall the volume of the data
in this file.222
In addition, despite his earlier testimony that the other
criteria he used in determining whether to delete a file was
how often it was used, he admitted that he consulted no one
about this file's use.223 and that he did not check
the computer program data which would have revealed its
``use.'' 224 He could not explain why he did not
check that information before deleting the file.225
Nor could Hurst provide any explanation as to why he copied the
data onto a copy tape prior to deleting the file in January
1996.226
In sum, this data (from the supposed ``problem tape'') was
purposefully and deliberately entered into the DNC computer
system where it remained for at least a year. Further, numerous
copy tapes were produced from downloading that data, some of
which, at least, remained unsecured in the possession of the
DNC for years. At least one such copy remains in the possession
of the the DNC at this very moment. And the original Saturn
tape from which the data was originally uploaded remains
unaccounted for, last seen at the DNC when uploaded.
d. After the mailing, the final merged tape was returned to
the DNC, not the White House
Following the lasering and the mailing of the 1994 holiday
cards, the final tape containing White House data was returned
not to the White House, but to the DNC. Al Hurst understood it
had come from Saturn in as much as it had a Saturn label on the
tape.227 However he received it and placed it on the
tape rack in the unsecured computer room at the
DNC.228 Hurst did not recall uploading this tape
into the computer, or whether anyone else may have in March
1997. This tape was subsequently retrieved by Hurst in March
1997 from the tape rack for a copy to be made at DNC counsel's
request.229
2. The White House Counsel Sought to Evade the Committee's Questions
about the 1994 Holiday Card Tape because the Staff Knew that the Tape
Had Been Transmitted to the DNC Illegally
The White House has sought to conceal many of these facts
and to mislead investigators concerning the unlawful access.
These efforts to mislead are evidenced by the convoluted
language in the attachment to White House Counsel Charles F.C.
Ruff's letter of February 28, 1997.
One of the most glaring examples is the White House's
assertion that it had only ``recently become aware'' of the DNC
receipt of the White House list.230 In fact, Maggie
Williams, Chief of Staff to the First Lady, Alice Pushkar,
Director of the Office of the First Lady's Correspondence, Jim
Dorskind, Director of White House Correspondence, Sharon Lewis,
who directed the White House volunteers, and perhaps Cheryl
Mills, then-Associate Counsel to the President, were all fully
aware in November 1994 that the White House data was unlawfully
transferred to the DNC.
The White House certainly knew as early as August 1995 that
the final list was unlawfully at the DNC. Alice Pushkar
testified that she knew it by that date, and prior to that had
always ``assumed'' that the DNC and not the White House had
received the final list after the 1994 mailing.231
However, in August 1995, Pushkar told Cheryl Mills, Deputy
Counsel to the President, in a written memorandum that the DNC
had the tape.232 Indeed, Mills responded that the
DNC could not legally have the list.233
While Erich Vaden testified that to his knowledge the
Holiday Card list was not shared with the DNC,234
the evidence clearly reveals that, at least in 1994, it was.
More importantly, the elaborate efforts taken by the White
House to conceal the facts and to misrepresent the
circumstances of the delivery of the data has not only
obstructed the committee's investigation, but suggests a
consciousness of criminal guilt surrounding the delivery.
At least by October 1996, the committee's investigation had
identified the possible improper use of official data under the
guise of the traditional joint White House/DNC Holiday Card
projects. On October 3, 1996, the committee requested answers
to specific questions surrounding the Holiday Card projects.
While many of the questions focused on the 1995 and 1996
Holiday Card projects, the final question asked the White House
to ``identify any and all outside contractors who assist or
have assisted in the preparation and/or mailing of the White
House holiday cards.'' 235 The committee requested
answers by October 9, 1996. The White House failed to answer by
that date and was asked again to respond by October 29,
1996.236 White House Counsel Jack Quinn again failed
to answer and was asked to respond by November 18,
1996.237 He again failed to answer, was again asked
to do so, this time by January 14, 1997,238 and
again, he did not respond.239 Indeed, answers to
these questions concerning the Holiday Card project were never
provided during the tenure of Jack Quinn as White House
Counsel, despite representations that such answers would be
forthcoming.
After Mr. Ruff's arrival, the White House had still failed
to answer the holiday card questions. The committee, once
again, requested answers to these questions by February 26,
1997.240 The White House once more failed to answer,
was asked again to do so by February 28, 1997.241
Not until February 28, 1997, almost 5 months after first being
asked, and well after the 1996 Presidential election, did the
White House Counsel's Office respond--only then revealing for
the first time the illegal transfer of massive amounts of data
from the White House to the DNC in the guise of the 1994
Holiday Card project.
At a White House press briefing on January 30, 1997, White
House spokesman Barry Toiv stated categorically that at no time
did the DNC ever get to see any list from White House computers
for the Holiday Card project. He further emphasized that ``the
entire [merged list] was then brought back [to the White
House],'' that only the printer would see the whole list, and
that ``The DNC would not see the White House list.''
242
In a February 28, 1997 letter, the White House Counsel
told the committee that in 1994 the arrangements for the
preparation and mailing of holiday cards was ``similar'' to
that in 1995 and 1996. The White House suggested that in 1994
(as in 1995 and 1996):
The White House, [and] the DNC [] independently
submitted their respective lists directly to an outside
vendor. The vendor then compiled the lists into a
single list, attempted to eliminate duplicates and
mailed the same White House card to everyone on the
list.243
Mr. Ruff's letter further stated that ``there was a clear
understanding that, after the various lists had been merged and
the duplicates eliminated, the final list was to be returned to
the White House only.'' 244 In fact, this was simply
not true. The White House was unable to produce any documentary
evidence reflecting that the vendor understood that it was to
return the deduped lists only to the White House. Indeed, no
documents produced by Saturn included anyinstruction that the
final list was to be returned only to the White House. The person in
charge of the project at the White House similarly testified that she
could not recall any discussions about the requirement of either the
original White House tape or the merged tape being returned to the
White House,245 and that with respect to the final merged
tape, she ``assumed it would go back to [the DNC].'' 246
The evidence uncovered by the committee revealed Saturn was
instructed to send the merged lists not to the White House but
to the DNC. Prior to the final mailing, the merged lists were
delivered to the DNC where the list was entered into the DNC AS
400 computer system.247
The White House Counsel's Office further characterized the
delivery of the merged tape to the DNC as a ``mistake'' and a
``mix-up.'' 248 In fact it was not a mistake or a
mix-up at all, but was intentionally sent to the DNC to be
entered into its computer and cleaned up or ``deduped'' by
White House volunteers directed by White House employees. Not
only had Saturn Corp. done exactly what the DNC asked it to
do--deliver the merged tape to the DNC--it did so with the full
knowlege of White House officials in charge of the 1994 Holiday
Card project. In memoranda dated November 9, 1994
249 and again on November 15, 1994,250
Brooke Stroud at the DNC, informed Maggie Williams and Alice
Pushkar at the White House that White House lists were at the
DNC for ``manual de-duplication,'' having been delivered from
Saturn to the DNC.
Further, White House employee Sharon Lewis was fully aware
that White House lists had been entered into the DNC computer,
because she coordinated White House volunteers to dedupe the
merged lists at the DNC headquarters on the Veterans Day
weekend in 1994.251 Jim Dorskind, Assistant to the
President and Director of White House Correspondence, was also
fully and specifically aware of the fact and directed Lewis to
direct White House volunteers to the DNC for the
project.252
In addition, it is quite possible that Cheryl Mills had
specific knowlege of the unlawful transfer of data to the DNC.
Brooke Stroud testified that ``Cheryl Mills might have [had
knowledge of the project and the use of White House volunteers
to dedupe the list at DNC], but I don't remember.''
253 Stroud stated, that while she had no distinct
memory of Mills having such knowlege, Mills ``was on the
telephone for most of our meetings, or most of the holiday card
group meetings.'' 254
Additional evidence, suggesting that other White House
staff, including Mills, had actual knowledge of the prohibited
transfer of data at the time of the transfer, is Mills's later
attempts at damage control in her 1995 memoranda. For example,
in her memorandum to Alice Pushkar of August 14, 1995, Mills
retreated from her earlier categorical response to Alice
Pushkar that the DNC ``shouldn't have [the] tape''
255 to her more expedient advice that
``[n]evertheless, the DNC is, as you know, prohibited from
using the official Holiday Card list for any purposes other
than the Holiday Card project.'' 256
Pushkar testified that she had no idea what Mills meant by
``use restrictions'' and that she (Pushkar) wasn't concerned
about use restrictions at the DNC.257 Mills's
memorandum further suggests that not only was the DNC
prohibited from using the list for any purpose other than the
Holiday Card project, but also that such ``use restrictions''
had been imposed on the DNC by the White House.258
Mills's memorandum clearly states that prior to 1995 the White
House had ``entered into use agreements to protect the use of
the White House list against any other use than the holiday
[card] project.'' 259
The committee sought from the White House copies of all
such ``use agreements,'' both by letter request,260
and later subpoena.261 Such agreements between the
White House and the DNC would, of course, clearly establish
that the White House staff knew very well that the DNC had
obtained the prohibited data. Despite the compelled production
of these critical documents, the White House has never produced
these records, claiming that they are missing. On November 19,
1997, the White House Counsel's Office responded to the
committee that:
We have been unable to locate any use agreements for
any years between any holiday card vendors or the DNC
and the White House. * * * 262
The White House Counsel's staff provided no further
explanation concerning these suddenly missing documents,
casually suggesting that ``should we subsequently locate
responsive material, it will be provided promptly.''
263 Thereafter, at the committee's request a
subpoena was issued compelling production of this material.
Further, in an attempt to discover why the White House was
``unable to locate'' these records, the subpoena compelled all
records reflecting efforts made by the White House Counsel's
Office to locate them.264 No documents have been
produced in response to this subpoena.
It is reasonable to conclude in light of this record that
the list was delivered to the DNC without any use restrictions.
Mills's memo suggests that she believed either that the DNC had
the list or that it was better to lie about the existence of
such use restrictions than to admit that the DNC had the list
without them.
There is ample reason to prepare a memorandum after the
fact, saying that use restrictions were imposed when they were
not. Preparation of such a memorandum would conceal the fact
that the lists were delivered to the DNC without restrictions.
The memorandum would lead the reader to believe that even if
the DNC had the tape, it could not and would not use it for
fundraising purposes. The inability of the White House to
produce any agreements or any evidence of agreements, other
than Mills's self-serving memorandum, leads the committee to
conclude that White House staff knowingly allowed the list to
be delivered to the DNC without restriction in violation of
law, and in direct contradiction to the White House's later
statements to the committee that the lists were sent to the DNC
inadvertently.
3. The Clinton/Gore Campaign Impermissibly Received the 1993 Holiday
Card List.
The committee has exposed the fact that White House staff
not only impermissibly transferred the 1994 White House Holiday
Card list to the DNC, but also that the White House portion of
the 1993 Holiday Card list was transferred into the Clinton/
Gore computer system. The documentary evidence discloses that
the Clinton/Gore campaign acquired between 33,000
265 to 43,000 266 names and addresses
from the White House, which were entered and still reside in a
Clinton/Gore campaign computer.
In 1993, the entity selected to merge the Holiday Card list
was W.P. Malone, Inc. (Malone), an Arkadelphia, AR firm which
was also the entity which had maintained the Clinton PeopleBase
campaign database.267 Documents obtained by the
committee reveal that the White House list went to Malone on or
about November 8, 1993.268
As a result of interviews with Malone employees conducted
by committee staff in Arkadelphia on April 29, 1998, a Malone
staff member supplied a sworn affidavit to the committee that
(1) the White House portion of the 1993 Holiday Card list was
received in disk or tape form and was merged with both DNC and
PeopleBase lists to create a master database for the card
mailing; (2) this separate database was entered into the
Clinton/Gore ICL DRS 6000 computer which was later moved to the
offices of the Clinton/Gore '96 campaign in 1995; and (3) he
has no recollection that he was asked to return these disks to
the White House, or to return the master merged lists
containing the White House submissions to the White
House.269
This retention of the final merged list by Malone was no
mistake or inadvertent oversight. Indeed, the retention by
Malone of the merged list, including the White House data, was
fully known by persons in the White House, including Marsha
Scott and Dan Burkhardt. In January 1994, for example,
Burkhardt had asked Malone--not for the return of the final
master list--but for a copy of it for White House clean
up.270
Not only was the original list retained by the Clinton/Gore
campaign following the 1993 Holiday Card mailing, but also,
corrections to the list made by White House employees on White
House stationery and at government expense were transmitted to
the Clinton campaign to be used to clean up the campaign
database.271 The best evidence suggests that the
number of returned envelopes totaled approximately
8,000.272 The White House sent the directive to
Malone, with instructions to use the information gleaned from
the mailing to clean up the database, with specific instruction
to drop listings from the database where the envelopes
reflected insufficient addresses, and where new address
information had been provided, the new listings ``can be
updated on the database.'' 273
That the 1993 information was intentionally used to clean
the campaign database was known at the highest levels of the
Clinton-Gore campaign and the White House. Documents attached
to a March 9, 1998 memorandum from Lyn Utrecht, counsel to the
Clinton/Gore campaign, to Bruce Lindsey and recovered from
White House files, make clear that the 1993 White House Holiday
Card mailing was used to correct addresses in the campaign
database.274
There were, in fact, elaborate efforts made in 1993 to get
the 1993 White House holiday card data not only to the Clinton-
Gore campaign, but to the DNC. There is evidence that plans
were underway to send White House lists directly to the DNC.
The data sought to be transfered under the guise of holiday
card lists had been compiled by White House employees based
upon official lists including ``correspondence, event
attendance lists, outreach lists and other sources. * * *''
275 The DNC transfer plan was apparently set forth
in a September 15, 1993 memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Maggie
Williams, entitled ``Holiday Greeting Cards.'' 276
Yet this crucial document is inexplicably missing. The White
House Counsel informed the committee that it has ``not
located'' a copy of this document.277
Thereafter, persons in the White House sought to implement
complex schemes to transfer both campaign lists and White House
lists to the DNC. Evidence suggests that the first scheme was
designed to funnel campaign lists (presumably from PeopleBase)
through the White House and then to the DNC. This scheme would
have hidden evidence of a direct transfer of campaign data to
the DNC. While providing such lists may be legal under certain
circumstances, providing them also triggers reporting
requirements as well as in-kind contribution limits which could
have been avoided by sending the data through the White House.
Whatever the reason, it appears that Cheryl Mills took the
position that such a transfer scheme was ``impermissible.''
278 The White House has been unable to ``locate[] a
written memorialization of the `explanation of the
impermissibility of a list from campaign to [White House] to
DNC[,]' '' 279 which presumably would elucidate both
the details of the scheme and the reasons for opposing it.
Another effort was made to use an outside entity to funnel
the data to the DNC. It is not clear whether these efforts were
designed to funnel the campaign data to the DNC, similar to the
first scheme, or to funnel the White House data to the DNC, or
both. In an October 20, 1998 e-mail message from Matthew Moore
to Cheryl Mills, Moore informed Mills that:
Dan Burkhardt, in light of your explanation of the
impermissibility of a list from campaign to WH to DNC,
inquired as to the permissibility of sending our
created list to a third party, having the campaign and/
or transition send similar lists to the same third
party (for elimination of duplicates on the list and
creation of a master list), who would then send the
resultant list to the DNC.
Again: Campaign/Transition to Joakum Doe to DNC
parallel to: WH to Joakum Doe to DNC. With all
resulting list being sent to the DNC.
Please advise.280
The committee's efforts to fully understand the specific
details of this proposal has also been prevented by missing
records. In response to the committee's request for the
memorialization of Daniel Burkhardt's inquiry as to the
permissibility of sending a list to the DNC through third
parties,281 the White House Counsel's Office
responded that it has ``not located [such] a written
memorialization.'' 282 In response to the
committee's request for Mills's response to the e-mail
proposal,283 the White House Counsel stated, ``[w]e
have not located a memorialization of a response to the October
20, 1993 e-mail from Matthew Moore to Cheryl Mills.''
284
However, by October 28, 1993, Cheryl Mills had provided a
remarkable attempt at ``legal cover'' in the form of a
memorandum, allowing the transfer of White House data to any
outside entity, including the DNC. Despite clear pronouncement
elsewhere that once data is entered into databases in the White
House, it cannot thereafter be transfered to outside sources,
here, Mills states:
Because the White House did not use mailing lists
created from the official government mail from members
of the public who wrote to the President (or the First
Lady or any other White House entity), but rather
created a list of supporters of the Administration
based upon personal knowledge of staff members, this
list properly can be provided to a non-federal entity,
including the DNC or a non-governmental
individual.285
This analysis of what data may be used for the holiday card
lists sent to the DNC makes no sense. It is simply not credible
that a list of approximately 43,000 names, with their
accompanying addresses was ``created * * * based on personal
knowlege of staff members.'' Indeed, the names are gathered by
White House personnel in performance of their official duties
at the White House, and included: 2,500 names of military
personnel including ``all military assigned to the White
House;'' 286 the internal White House and taxpayer-
funded Presidential contact [PCON] database list;
287 lists of invitees to the White House, the
diplomatic corps, and the Secret Service.288 It also
included State Department lists which were provided by ``a
career person who has background or who has received lists in
the past.'' 289 Further, Mills herself describes the
source of this White House data in the very same memo--not as
coming from the memories of individuals--but from White House
staff who ``reviewed their correspondence, event attendance
lists, outreach lists and other sources * * *.'' 290
In addition, only as recently as August 11, 1993, Cheryl
Mills had concluded that the very same White House Holiday Card
list ``was created from the official mail of the President. . .
.'' 291 Indeed, Mills had been specifically told on
August 6, 1993 that the White House Holiday Card list ``will
come from databases within the White House.'' 292
Yet, less than 3 months later, she authored a memorandum
purporting to reach the exact opposite conclusion and
concocting an argument to allow the flow of prohibited data to
the DNC, and key documents which would reveal the circumstances
of this remarkable turnaround are inexplicably missing.
The committee uncovered that the White House staff, under
the guidance of Cheryl Mills, assembled the 1993 Holiday Card
list and forwarded it to the operator of PeopleBase, the
Clinton/Gore campaign database operator, where it was merged
with the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign lists, cleaned up
based on the returns after the mailing, and has been retained
in the Clinton/Gore computer to this day.
Indeed, the Clinton/Gore campaign is well aware that it has
this list and has yet to notify the committee of its return to
the rightful owner, which is the White House, or its
destruction. As recently as August 21, 1998, Carl Mecum
analyzed the file, presumably under the direction and with the
permission of the Clinton/Gore campaign, to prepare the
affidavit for the record of this investigation. Despite this
notice of its possession of the lists, as far as the committee
knows, no steps have been taken to return the government's
property.
While the original transfer may constitute a theft of
government property, the retention of the list knowing it to be
stolen also constitutes theft under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. The
Clinton/Gore campaign, because of the committee's
investigation, is on notice that the data belongs to the
government. Accordingly, the continued retention of the list
constitutes a theft independent of the original theft.
4. The Names and Addresses from the Official Mail Sent to the President
were Transferred to PeopleBase
While Cheryl Mills's October 28, 1993 memorandum could not
have been clearer--that data from the official mail could not
be transmitted to the DNC--the names and addresses of people
who contacted the President through the official mails or
through the White House switchboard were routinely referred for
entry into PeopleBase. Such transfers of official government
data to the President's campaign database could constitute the
theft of government property under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
According to an October 17, 1994 memorandum prepared by
White House staff, ``Quite frequently, the President will ask
that certain names and addresses be added to the `supporter
file'. * * * Attached is a list of supporter file information.
Please make sure all this information is added to the Data Base
System. Also, can you send this information to Arkansas or do
you need me to? '' 293
While the nature and extent of this practice was not fully
explored, the committee obtained several specific examples of
lists that were forwarded to PeopleBase from the White House,
including a January 1996 White House phone log with notations
in the margin in unidentified handwriting ``PB'' and
``WhoDB'',294 and a July 1993 list of addresses with
a cover note to Monica Breadlove who operated PeopleBase, to
add the names and addresses on the list to
PeopleBase.295 It is not clear whether the President
asked for these lists to be forwarded to PeopleBase or what the
criteria for directing these particular addresses to PeopleBase
was. If the the names and addresses were, indeed, from the
official mails or derived from other official sources, the
transfer of the data to PeopleBase could be considered a theft.
D. Marsha Scott Converted Other Government Resources To Benefit the
Democratic National Committee and the Campaign
The committee has uncovered information that government
personnel and resources were converted to directly benefit
outside political campaigns. Marsha Scott, in memorandum after
memorandum, appeared to be advising and/or managing the
campaign database and/or DNC databases, as well as other DNC
operations. The knowing use of government computers, paper, and
other office supplies and resources for the benefit of the DNC
or the Clinton/Gore campaign constitutes the theft of
government property. See United States v. Peter Collins, 56
F.3d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Even if Ms. Scott was permitted to engage in political
activity on her own time, it is clear that she knowingly and
wilfully used her White House computer and other office
equipment and supplies to translate her new-found expertise in
database development and data management to the benefit of the
DNC or the President's campaign. This activity is contrary to
Cheryl Mills's advice and testimony discussed earlier in this
report that White House staff are prohibited from using White
House resources to engage in political activity.296
Marsha Scott's June 28, 1994 memorandum makes clear that
she was seeking to do just that. As Mr. Shadegg and Ms. Mills
agreed at the committee hearing on November 7, 1997, Ms. Scott
used government resources to prepare her memorandum to Harold
Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady regarding her
involvement in developing the DNC and other outside databases.
That in itself is a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
Both White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff and Ms. Scott in
her deposition acknowledged that the memorandum dealt with
working on outside databases.297 Indeed, in Mr.
Ruff's case, his insistence that these were outside databases
was intended to clarify that the memorandum was not discussing
the use of the White House Database to populate other outside
databases. Thus, to defend Ms. Scott from a charge that she was
using the White House Database improperly, Mr. Ruff was willing
to admit, as was she, that she was using other government
resources to make plans for the DNC and other political
databases, a violation as well.
Indeed elsewhere, in Marsha Scott's June 28, 1994
memorandum to Harold Ickes, Bruce Lindsey and the First Lady,
Marsha Scott reported having used government resources and
personnel to work with the DNC on the development of their
database. She also sought Ickes's, Lindsey's, and Mrs.
Clinton's intervention to direct the DNC to allow her team of
government personnel to work with the DNC on its database to
ensure compatibility with future political databases outside of
the White House.
My team and I are also engaged in conversations with the
DNC about the new system they are proposing. We have asked that
their system be modeled after whatever system we decide to use
outside the White House. I need you to make very clear to them
that their system must be technologically compatible, if not
the same, as whatever system we decide to use for political
purposes later on. These discussions are currently in progress
and a clear direction from you to the DNC will eliminate much
unnecessary wrangling.
* * * * * * *
* * * [L]et my team work with the DNC to help them design a
system that will meet our needs and technical specifications.
We can show them what to do and then clone another system for
our specific uses later on. Any information stored in
PeopleBase could then be dumped into the new system and made
available * * * for political purposes.
* * * * * * *
* * * I am proceeding as if this is the plan.298
The ``team'' to which Scott referred was composed of White
House personnel, including career personnel who thought they
were performing only official government services with respect
to all aspects of their database work with Marsha
Scott.299
Indeed, career employees were sent to the DNC by White
House officials. One career employee testified that ``[I]t just
didn't look right for us to go to the DNC. We were Federal
employees * * * [M]y entire team was questioning us going to
the DNC when we went, yes * * *,'' until his career supervisors
put a stop to any further visits.300 He further
testified that ``[W]hen we visited the DNC there was some
discussion about being able to swap systems and information and
things like that; but that was brought to a
halt''.301
Other career employees testified that members of the WhoDB
team had been sent to the DNC for yet another meeting. While at
the DNC, the team was contacted by beeper, and ordered back to
the White House.302 A career employee who was sent
and then ordered back explained ``The sense was that it wasn't
appropriate for Federal employees to have direct contact with
DNC''.303
The White House Counsel's Office would later make
extraordinary and elaborate attempts to cloak the diversion of
official personnel and resources to political activity as being
permitted by the Hatch Act. There is no doubt, but that certain
White House officials may, in appropriate circumstances, engage
in partisan political activities on their own time. However,
while individuals are free to voluntarily engage in certain
partisan political activities, the law does not sanction White
House employers directing individuals to perform political work
without their knowledge or consent. That is a diversion of
official government resources, which is unlawful.
In addition, the committee uncovered the fact that much of
the work on database development, which the White House later
sought to characterize as work on campaign databases, had
involved government resources, including White House
stationery, fax machines, et cetera, for which, as far as we
have been able to determine, there has been no reimbursement
from any campaign or party entity. The record is unmistakable
that in the Clinton White House, the lines between official and
partisan political acts were so blurred as to be non-existent.
This led White House staff to involve themselves in political
activity using government resources in violation of 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 641.
Beyond that, the efforts to label certain database work as
campaign-related, was an after-the-fact attempt to justify the
nonproduction of records related to the official White House
Database. Those records make clear that persons at the highest
levels of the White House, including the First Lady, knew of
the use of official government resources for partisan campaign
activities 304 in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
The crucial June 28, 1994 memorandum from Marsha Scott to
Harold Ickes, Bruce Lindsey, and the First Lady, was itself
written on official White House stationery and prepared on
government-owned word processor equipment and systems. It
conveyed and update not only on the White House Database
project, but a report of the White House Database team, (whom
Scott referred to as ``my staff'') and its trip to Arkadelphia
to review the PeopleBase system. The memorandum further
provides an update on the implementation of the White House
Database,
By the first of the year [1995] we should have any
flaws identified and corrected and the majority of the
White House using the new system. We will then have a
year [until 1996] to fully train and familiarize our
folks to its many possibilities and uses.\305\
After reviewing this memorandum, the First Lady responded:
``This sounds promising. Please advise. HRC''--and directed the
memo, along with the notation to Harold Ickes.\306\ This is
indeed a remarkable memorandum. It reveals that persons at the
highest levels of the WhiteHouse, including the First Lady,
knew of, and approved the planned use of the White House Database for
partisan political purposes, or the use of government personnel and
resources to work on outside partisan political databases. Either
scenario is simply unlawful, and represents a planned theft of
government property for partisan political activities.
Further, the committee's investigation uncovered the
significance of Marsha Scott's proposal to use government
personnel to set up an outside database for future political
purposes into which ``any information stored with PeopleBase
could then be dumped.'' The evidence obtained by the committee
shows that by June 28, 1994 the ``information stored with
PeopleBase'' included over 40,000 names and accompanying data
from White House computers.307 The committee found
that the unlawfully transfered data ended up in the Clinton-
Gore `96 campaign computer.308
The many other memoranda written by Ms. Scott to her
superiors regarding her political activity equally reflect a
diversion of government resources to the benefit of the DNC and
the campaign. In addition to her June 28, 1994 memorandum, Ms.
Scott wrote to Harold Ickes regarding ``DATABASE OUTSIDE WHITE
HOUSE.'' 309 On January 26, 1994, she had written a
``CONFIDENTIAL'' memorandum to Hillary Rodham Clinton and Bruce
Lindsey outlining plans to use White House resources and
personnel to clean up and correct campaign lists for future
campaign use:
Status of Outside Databases
* * * * * * *
Another way we can insure accuracy, is by providing
corrections to any data sent to us. As long as we are not
giving ``updated or supplemental information about data the
entity may have initially provided'', we can correct ``where
the action is de minimis.'' (See Cheryl's [Mills] memo attached
for a full explanation.) I will work with Cheryl on a case by
case basis and am anxious to discuss this with you
further.310
As with other documents, the White House Counsel sought to
conceal this very information from the committee by altering
documents to delete the information reflecting work on outside
political databases.311 Another draft of notes or an
agenda for a meeting with the First Lady and Deputy Chiefs of
Staff Phil Lader and Harold Ickes references ``Systems outside
White House,'' ``Database for campaign use,'' and ``resources
available to fund outside databases.312
It is apparent that these kinds of notes and memos finally
were enough for Harold Ickes. In a note dated December 5, 1994,
he was reminded of a scheduled meeting with Marsha Scott in
which he was ``supposed to be getting her clear on what she
will be doing and what she will not be doing.'' 313
The note further exposes exasperation with Marsha Scott's
communications: ``As you know, until you have this
conversation, you will continue to get memos from her and
copies of memos she is sending around to different people * *
*.'' 314
Ultimately, in May 1996, the President approved a new job
description for Marsha Scott, prepared mostly by Deputy Chiefs
of Staff Evelyn Lieberman and Harold Ickes, expressly
authorizing Marsha Scott to involve the President's supporters
in fundraising from her government position and purporting to
limit her access to the White House Database to uses that were
``only in connection with her official duties.'' 315
However, those official duties, according to the same memo,
included fundraising. The use of the Database for fundraising
constitutes theft of the data for the DNC's use.
In his deposition, Harold Ickes described Marsha Scott's
views of her responsibilities as ``expansive.'' 316
When asked whether he ever expressed concern to Marsha Scott
about this view of her responsibilities, he said, ``No. Well,
the answer is, I didn't worry about it, because I knew that
this was--if it were going to go anywhere, it would have to
come back up through me, and I had no problem with her writing
memos about it.'' 317 Ickes also testified that he
did not concern himself with Marsha Scott's June 28, 1994
memorandum regarding plans to develop a new DNC database
because ``I don't think [the DNC] had the money at that time to
even think about a new computer system. They were lucky to turn
on the electricity of the one they had.'' 318 He
further added: ``I knew what the financial situation of the DNC
was. They had a database that had been there for years. They
hardly had the money to turn on the damn database, much less
establish a new one, so this sort of stuff didn't worry me.''
319
This testimony demonstrates that Harold Ickes knew that
Marsha Scott was using an ``overexpansive'' view of her
responsibilities to work on the development of DNC databases at
a time when the DNC had no money to do it itself. Without DNC
financial capability, it was even more important that White
House staff, such as Marsha Scott, conduct as much development
and planning activity as possible from a position where the DNC
would not have to pay her. Ickes knowingly continued to allow
the diversion of government resources to the DNC at a time when
he also knew that the DNC itself lacked resources. Thus, at the
taxpayers expense, Marsha Scott was allowed to plan databases
for the DNC.
IV. THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY KNEW OF THE CONVERSION OF GOVERNMENT
RESOURCES TO BENEFIT THE DNC AND THE CAMPAIGN
``The President and the First Lady want this done.
Translating this into action on the part of others is
the rub.'' 320
This statement, included in a memorandum from Marsha Scott
to the First Lady and Bruce Lindsey, describes the essence of
the President's and First Lady's involvement in the White House
Database project. This and other documents and testimony
showing that thePresident and the First Lady were informed of
the use of official resources for unofficial political purposes suggest
that the President and the First Lady were aware of the conversion of
government resources to support the DNC and the campaign. See Section
III.A and III.D (regarding Scott's conversion of government resources
for political purposes).
The committee believes that the President's involvement in
the conversion of the White House into a fundraising tool
represents an abuse of power. The President is entrusted with
the conservation of the White House as a national landmark. The
scheme to transfer data from the White House Database and other
data sources supported the overall objective of systematically
using White House invitations to accomplish political
fundraising goals. The committee has issued this report to
expose the evidence of this abuse of power.
The documents plainly show that the President and the First
Lady jointly directed the use of official resources to create
the Database, with Marsha Scott in charge. Even after the
initiation of the project, the President and First Lady
remained deeply involved in the ongoing development and use of
the Database. In this regard, the First Lady's actions with
respect to the Database and the conversion of other official
resources should be viewed as the President's.
The evidence suggests that the President and the First Lady
were involved in the enhancement of the DNC fundraising
operation through the use of White House staff and resources,
including the White House Database. See Section III.B
(regarding the conversion of data from the White House Database
to the use of DNC fundraisers). While having an official
purpose, the White House Database was susceptible to being used
for both official and unofficial purposes. The President and
the First Lady capitalized on the Database's susceptibility to
misuse for political purposes. The White House Database
included financial information, 321 which allowed
internal decisions on invitations to White House events to be
determined by the degree of financial support given by
potential invitees. The President's and First Lady's
involvement in the details of the Database suggest that they
knew what a powerful tool the Database would be not only for
internal data management, but also for working with the DNC and
the campaign to upgrade their data and data management systems.
The DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign also benefitted from
the President's and First Lady's knowledge and approval of the
use of official resources, in addition to the Database, for
unofficial purposes. The connection between the conversion of
the White House Database and the conversion of other resources
is reflected in the memoranda that address the internal data
needs of the White House while at the same time seeking to
address the database needs of the DNC and the campaign. Indeed,
those sections of documents that addressed the issues of
management of the DNC were originally withheld from the
committee to conceal the relationship between the White House
Database and the other efforts to use official resources for
political purposes.
A. Evidence Relating to the President's and First Lady's Knowledge of,
Approval of, and Involvement in the Conversion of Resources, Including
the White House Database, to the DNC and the Campaign
Several documents produced to the committee reflect the
President's and First Lady's knowledge, approval, and
involvement in the conversion of government resources,
including the White House Database, to the DNC and the
campaign.
1. The President Wanted to ``Integrate'' the White House Database with
the DNC Database: Handwritten Notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to
Deputy Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles 322
The handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to then-
Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles, express most clearly the
President's involvement in efforts to convert the White House
Database to the use of the DNC. These notes, written in late
1994 or 1995,323 expressly say that the President
wants to ``integrate'' the White House Database with the DNC
database to ``share'' data.324 Associate Counsel
Cheryl Mills had opined that once data is entered in an
official government database, sharing it with anyone for
political purposes violates the law.325 The
President's interest in sharing data with the DNC suggests that
the President was willing to convert the White House Database
to the use of the DNC in violation of clear White House legal
advice and in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, which prohibits
the theft of government property.
The withholding of this document by Cheryl Mills herself
further corroborates that the President was interested in
illegally integrating the Database. As discussed in Section II,
there would be no reason to withhold this document, which was
obviously responsive to the committee's request, unless it
implicated the President in wrongdoing.
2. Conversion of White House Resources ``Sounds Promising'' to The
First Lady: June 28, 1994 Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes
and Bruce Lindsey, with a copy to the First Lady 326
In her June 28, 1994 memorandum, Marsha Scott communicated
to the First Lady her interest in and efforts to develop
databases for the DNC or ``other entities we choose to work
with for political purposes later on.'' 327 The
First Lady responded to this memo with a handwritten comment at
the top of the page: ``This sounds promising. Please advise.''
328 This memorandum shows that the First Lady was
informed of this conversion of government staff and other
resources for political purposes and even found it a
``promising'' project.
As with the Bailey handwritten notes, the deliberate
withholding of a version of this document (which is in itself a
criminal violation) corroborates its incriminating content.
This evidence is particularly strong corroboration because the
document was withheld, again by Cheryl Mills, who had provided
advice through three separate memos to White House staff that
such work using government resources was prohibited by law.
Cheryl Mills knew that this memorandum implicated the First
Lady in Marsha Scott's conversion of government property and
withheld it for that reason. See Section II.E.
3. The President Recreates the Campaign: Draft Memorandum to Chief of
Staff on Early Supporters 329
``This is the President's idea and it's a good one,''
announces a memorandum, which was originally produced to the
committee in draft and was written by Marsha Scott for White
House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty.330 This draft
memo reveals a plan to: ``reach[] out to [the President's]
friends and supporters * * *; identify and contact the key
early supporters in all fifty states * * *; put in WhoDB the
names and relevant information about those early supporters * *
*; [and] add to this base group by early 1995, those folks we
will be working with in 1996.'' 331
The draft further outlines the plan to use the White House
Database to ``recreate the Primary campaign structure * * *;
establish a database to hold and work these names. (WhoDB will
be fully functional by January [1995] * * *; recreate the
General campaign structure using the same method we employed
for recreating the Primary * * *[,] add[ing] the DNC and
campaign records * * *; identify by early 1995, key financial
and political folks in each state who can work with us'' with
the expectation that ``[t]hrough consistent dialogue and
follow-up, leaders will emerge'' to allow ``[c]o-ordinat[ion]
with DNC and DLC about what they are doing for these folks.''
332
4. The President Approved the White House Database: ``WhoDB
Requirements Report'' 333
The WhoDB Requirements Report expressly set forth the early
history of the project. It stated: ``The President and First
Lady have requested from Marsha Scott that a resource database
containing relevant information about all White House events
and contacts be designed and implemented.'' 334 That
document further stated that the objectives of the Database
would be to ``[p]rovide the President and the First Lady with a
database that tracks all contacts with individuals and
organizations that are important to the Presidency.''
335
The knowledge and involvement of the President and the
First Lady in directing the creation of the White House
Database suggests that they had a particular interest in the
Database project, such as the possible political uses of
databases, with which they were familiar from their use of the
campaign database, PeopleBase. Moreover, the potential for
conversion of the White House Database to political purposes
was enhanced by choosing Marsha Scott, a long-time friend of
the President who was involved in other schemes to convert
government resources for unofficial political purposes. This
document is also consistent with numerous other memoranda that
invoke the President's and First Lady's names for the Database
project.336
5. WhoDB Was Intended to Support the Fundraising Objectives of the
President and the First Lady: October 25, 1994 Draft Memorandum to
Erskine Bowles from Paul Antony and Brian Bailey 337
The draft October 25, 1994 memorandum from Paul Antony and
Brian Bailey to Erskine Bowles, ``Update on White House
Database Project,'' confirms that the President and the First
Lady thought that the Database would be a useful tool to track
events and contributions. The memo expressly states under the
heading ``WILL IT MEET THE NEEDS OF POTUS AND THE FIRST LADY?''
that those needs include ``keep[ing] accurate records of
individuals' dealings with the White House (invitations,
contributions, meetings) * * *'' 338 The answer was
``YES?'' 339
Clearly, this memo indicates that the President wanted the
Database to be able to correlate contributions, invitations to,
and attendance at events and so-called ``meetings.'' This
document reflects the contemporaneous communication to Brian
Bailey (an assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine
Bowles) by Marsha Scott, regarding what needs the First Lady
expressed regarding the Database--that is, to track
``invitations, contributions, and meetings.'' 340 At
the time Brian Bailey wrote this memorandum, he had been in the
White House only a few weeks 341 and had no reason
not to write down what he was told about needs for the
Database. Although he testified that he consulted with Cheryl
Mills frequently, he could not remember whether he had spoken
with her prior to the drafting of this
memorandum.342
The final database that was created, in fact, met, the
President's and the First Lady's needs. It included
designations of contributors, such as DNC Trustee or DNC
Managing Trustee,343 which correspond to specific
dollar contributions. Not only were the designations within the
Database useful for the President and First Lady to identify
donors for invitations, the committee now knows that DNC
fundraisers matched up their contributor information with WhoDB
attendance information (see Section III.B) to appropriately
reward donors. The combined efforts of the DNC and the White
House most effectively and efficiently ensured the maximization
of fundraising by matching DNC data on donors and White House
data on attendance. This document indicates that these
functions were designed to meet a ``need'' of the President to
have such information.
6. The First Lady Received a Demonstration of the Database and Asked
for a Specific List to be Included: March 2, 1995 Memorandum from Erich
Vaden to Marsha Scott 344
On March 2, 1995, Erich Vaden wrote a memorandum to Marsha
Scott that reflected that he had given the First Lady a
demonstration of the Database. From that demonstration, the
First Lady asked that a specific list, the ``Miles Rubin Rapid
Response List,'' be included in the Database.345
This memorandum shows the substantial involvement of the First
Lady in the details of this Database in that (1) she wanted a
demonstration and (2) she wanted a particular list added to the
Database.
Moreover, at the same time as she was asking for data to be
put into the Database, others were devising a plan to send data
to the DNC from the Database. Just a few weeks later, Truman
Arnold and Erskine Bowles met to devise the plan for the White
House to share data with the DNC (see III.B.2). This plan set
forth an illegal scheme to convert official resources (the
Database and White House personnel) to implement fundraising
based on meetings and contact with the President through such
activities as coffees, overnights in the Lincoln Bedroom, and
invitations to White House events.
7. The President Regularly Views Data and Places ``High Priority'' on
Data Clean-up: March 28, 1995 Memorandum [for multiple distribution]
from Erskine Bowles, ``Clean-up and Coding of Database Records''
346
Indeed, 4 days after the meeting between Erskine Bowles and
Truman Arnold, Erskine Bowles wrote a memorandum to various
White House staff asking them to verify the data in the
Database.347 The memorandum stated that the new
Database would ``speed up the list creation process by giving
us the ability to identify and target individuals.''
348 It further represented that ``The President and
First Lady will view this information on a regular basis.''
349 In addition, the memorandum stated: ``This
clean-up project is one of the highest priorities for the
President and your office should treat it as such.''
350
The new Database would in fact speed up the list creation
process because it would allow the DNC to identify more readily
those donors who were due for invitations to the White House.
Because of the commitment to supply data to the DNC, it was
important to clean up the data. It is logical to conclude that
the President placed a high priority on the data because of the
enhanced role of White House invitations in the DNC fundraising
plan.
Identifying the appropriate people in the Database for
White House invitations took on new importance at this time. In
March of 1995, the President was attempting to raise millions
of dollars from Democrat party supporters to counter the
Republican electoral gains the previous November. In January,
he had personally authorized the use of overnight stays to
raise money, asking for ``names at 100,000 or more, 50,000 or
more'' and noting in his own handwriting that he was ``ready to
start the overnights right away.'' 351 Logically, a
President so personally involved in fundraising (and using
White House invitations to do it) needed access to the right
kind of data to make his efforts successful.
8. The President Signs Off on Official Fundraising Job: The May 1996
Marsha Scott Job Description 352
In May 1996, the President approved a job description for
Marsha Scott. That description included: ``insur[ing] that the
President's supporters were involved in fundraising activities
to the extent possible'' and ``attend[ing] political
fundraising coffee/events, and certain other events * * *''
353 The description also stated that Scott will
``have appropriate access to the White House database [sic] but
only in connection with her official duties.'' 354
According to the documents produced regarding this description,
the President asked to ``discuss once more'' the description
with Harold Ickes 355 and approved it only after the
discussion (``okay, per our discussion'').356
It is not clear what official function is fulfilled by
Marsha Scott's efforts to involve supporters in fundraising and
attending fundraisers. However, the committee regards the
disclaimer of use of the White House Database ``only in
connection with her official duties'' to be nothing but boiler
plate language with little or no meaning in this context. Here,
the President approved a job description that included as an
``official duty'' the involvement of others in fundraisers. By
including that definition within the definition of official
responsibilities, the President essentially gave a license to
use the White House Database for Marsha Scott's work involving
fundraisers.
9. The First Lady was Aware of Marsha Scott's Transfer of White House
Data from the White House Database to the Campaign, the Conversion of
Government Resources for the DNC, and The Political Nature of the
Database: January 26, 1994 Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary
Rodham Clinton and Bruce Lindsey 357
On January 26, 1994, Marsha Scott prepared a memorandum
detailing proposals to help clean up data in the campaign
database and at the DNC. Marsha Scott informed the First Lady
that she was working to clean up the campaign data from the
campaign database by ``providing corrections to any data sent
to us.'' 358 Not only was Marsha Scott's use of
government resources to work on the outside resources a
conversion of government property; making corrections to the
data of others using White House data was also a conversion.
a. Transfer of data through providing corrections to the
Campaign
In this memorandum, Marsha Scott communicates to the First
Lady about her efforts to convert government data to the
campaign. The memorandum states that the White House staff can
ensure the accuracy of data ``by providing corrections to any
data sent to us.'' 359 In her deposition, she
insisted that this was permissible regardless of the quantity
of data.360 But the corrections to PeopleBase
enhanced the value of the list that was ultimately delivered to
the 1996 Clinton/Gore campaign.361
The view that address corrections were of ``de minimis''
value is preposterous. The entire value of a list of names and
addresses is derived from its accuracy. To correct a list of
thousands of names, even if each correction is minor, adds
significant value to that list. If that correction is taken
from a White House data source, it is a theft of government
property. Yet, this memorandum expressly explains to the First
Lady how government property can be stolen.
b. Conversion of government resources for the DNC and the
Clinton/Gore campaign
This memorandum to the First Lady is one of several
memoranda to the First Lady and others prepared by Marsha Scott
reflecting her involvement in the conversion of government
resources to benefit the DNC and the campaign.362
These memos reflect her systematic use of her time and other
government resources to improve the data at the DNC and the
campaign. In her deposition, Scott admitted that, like the June
28, 1994 memorandum, this memorandum was written on a White
House computer and on White House stationery.363 As
discussed in section III.D, this use of government resources to
benefit the DNC and the Clinton campaign represents a theft of
government property, even if White House staff are permitted to
use their time to engage in political activity at the White
House. There is no evidence that the First Lady, Harold Ickes
(who was the recipient of most of these memos), or anyone else
did anything to stop it.
Further evidence of the incriminating nature of the
portions of this document dealing with the outside databases
includes the fact that White House Counsel Jack Quinn, with the
involvement of Cheryl Mills, originally produced this
memorandum without any of the information regarding outside
databases.364 The committee views this as an attempt
to conceal incriminating information from the committee. Cheryl
Mills, who had prepared three memoranda on the scope of
permissible political activity, withheld those portions of the
documents because she knew that the information withheld would
expose that the First Lady had been informed of Marsha Scott's
impermissible political activities.
c. The Database as a political project
Marsha Scott communicated in this memorandum to the First
Lady her view that the White House Database was a political
project. She identified a career employee on her team as a
``closet Democrat,'' explained that his work on the Database
was kept secret, and complained about the other career staff's
lack of loyalty to the President.365 She wrote that
she found ``an inherent conflict in having our entire
information management system developed and supervised by
people who do not know and may not support the President.''
366 She later sent a memorandum to Deputy Chief of
Staff Phil Lader complaining about the allegiance of the career
technical staff.367 All of these steps suggest that
the Database was more than just a White House management tool--
it required political loyalty and secrecy.
B. The Contemporaneous Documentary Evidence Is Credible
The contemporaneous documentary evidence, suggesting that
the President and the First Lady knew of, approved of, and
continued to be involved in the conversion of White House
resources to the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign, is very
credible. These documents represent the best evidence of the
real thoughts and actions of individuals at the time, and they
are supported by credible testimony.
In one case, although Marsha Scott testified that she has
``no memory of a conversation with the President'' regarding
the Database other than a passing remark that she made to him
that she was ``'working on something to get a social system
up,'' 368 nevertheless, admitting that she had read
the WhoDB Requirements Report,369 she did not change
its text about the President and First Lady's involvement. This
suggests that, at the time, she viewed it as accurate.
In addition, there is no reason to discount invocations of
the President's name in these documents. Marsha Scott, who had
known the President for many years and appears to have frequent
access to the President, made these invocations. Further, she
made them to persons at the highest levels of the White House--
persons who would have reason to know if the invocations were
not accurate, including White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty
and Deputy Counsel to the President Bruce Lindsey.
Moreover, one making false invocations is not likely to do
so to the very person whose name one is invoking. However, that
is exactly what Marsha Scott did. In her January 26, 1994
memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Bruce Lindsey, Scott states ``The President and the First Lady
want this done. Translating this into action on the part of
others is the rub.'' 370
Finally, Jerry Carlsen, a career employee of the Office of
Administration, and Manager of the Systems Integration and
Development Branch of the Office of Information Systems and
Technology who was asked to lead the White House Database
development team, testified that Marsha Scott told him that the
Database was a top priority for the President.371 He
further testified that he had never heard the President's
authority invoked with respect to another project at the White
House.372
The President and the First Lady clearly involved
themselves more deeply in projects like the White House data
management systems than other Presidents and First Ladies. Of
course, they recognized that the Database had a value greater
than just running an efficient White House, such as the value
of using the Database for other unofficial political purposes.
The clear involvement in the development of the Database, the
President's desire to integrate the White House Database with
the DNC database, and the circumstances surrounding the
distribution of data from the Database (see Section III.B) are
compelling evidence that the President and First Lady planned
and carried out those plans to develop a database that could
be, and was, used for unofficial political purposes.
The President's encouragement of sharing official
resources, such as the White House Database, to benefit the
DNC, seconded by his agent, the First Lady, in her support for
the development of outside databases referenced in the June 28,
1994 memo, plainly represents the dedication of White House
resources to unofficial political activity. There is simply no
evidence that the President or the First Lady, having been
informed of these activities using White House property, ever
did anything to stop them.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The committee has obtained evidence that (1) Deputy Counsel
to the President Cheryl Mills perjured herself and obstructed
the investigation to prevent Congress and the American public
from finding out that the President and the First Lady were
involved in the unlawful conversion of government property; (2)
the President and the First Lady were involved in the unlawful
conversion of government property to the use of the DNC and the
Clinton/Gore campaign; and (3) numerous other individuals,
including Truman Arnold, Erskine Bowles, and Marsha Scott were
also involved in the unlawful conversion of government property
to the use of the DNC and the campaign through the diversion of
data and resources.
VI. RULES REQUIREMENTS
A. Committee Action and Vote
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2) (A) and (B) of House Rule XI, a
majority of the Committee having been present, the report was
approved by a vote of 7 ayes to 3 nays.
B. Statement of Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of House Rule XI and clause
2(b)(1) of House Rule X, the findings and recommendations of
the committee are contained in the foregoing sections of this
report.
C. Statement on New Budget Authority and Related Items
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House Rule XI and Section
308(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the
committee finds that no new budget authority, new spending
authority, new credit authority, or an increase or decrease in
revenues or tax expenditures result from approval of this
report.
D. Statement of CBO Cost Estimate and Comparison
Pursuant to House Rule XI(2)(l)(3)(C) and Section 403(a) of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee finds that
a statement of Congressional Budget Office cost estimate is not
required as this report is not of a public character.
E. Statement of Constitutional Authority
Pursuant to House Rule XI(2)(l)(4), the committee finds
that a statement of constitutional authority to approve the
report is not required as this report is not of a public
character.
F. Changes in Existing Law
Pursuant to House Rule XIII(3), the committee finds that a
statement of changes in existing law is not necessary, as the
report does not alter existing law.
G. Statement of Committee Cost Estimate
Pursuant to House Rule XIII(7)(a), the committee finds that
a statement of committee cost estimate is not necessary as the
report is not of a public character.
H. Statement of Federal Mandates
Pursuant to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and Section
423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee
finds that a statement of Federal mandates is not necessary as
this report is not of a public character.
ENDNOTES
1. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief of
Staff Erskine Bowles, undated, White House document production Bates
Stamp No. M 033298. (Hereinafter, document numbers preceded by ``M'' or
``EOP'' indicate White House documents.)
2. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
Database,'' June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
3. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
Database,'' June 28, 1994, (copy inscribed with handwritten notes of
the First Lady) M 32438-32439.
4. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, undated
(computer archive date February 11, 1995), M 33054-33057; Memorandum
from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, M
32457-32461 (unredacted copy).
5. The scope of the committee's investigation is set forth in the
July 17, 1997 referral from the chairman of the House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, which provides in pertinent part:
[T]he content of the WhoDB and any other database and
comparable information repository; its purposes and uses, both
planned and implemented; the planning, creation, design,
implementation, management of the same; the sources of
information that were used, planned or contemplated to be used
to populate the same; the use and dissemination of any
information at any time contained in any such repository to any
person or entity; the use of government time and resources in
any of these matters; the knowledge, direction, encouragement,
assistance or acquiescence of any person with respect to any of
these matters; and any matter that might reasonably lead to the
production of relevant evidence concerning these matters.
In addition, the Subcommittee should investigate any attempt,
plan, scheme, or other action which would impede or prevent a
thorough investigation of these matters, including, but not
limited to, nonresponsive or misleading answers, evasive acts,
attempts at delay, or unsupported claims of privilege.
Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, to David M. McIntosh, chairman, Subcommittee on National
Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, July 17,
1997, (Hereinafter, letters to or from the subcommittee chairman shall
be designated as letters to or from ``Chairman McIntosh.'')
6. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, Jan. 17, 1994, M
24918-24920 (citing 5 CFR Sec. 2635.704) (emphasis added). 5 CFR
Sec. 2635.704 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Standard. An employee has a duty to protect and conserve
Government property and shall not use such property, or allow
its use, for other than authorized purposes.
(b) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) Government property includes any form of real or
personal property in which the Government has an
ownership . . . or other property interest as well as
any right or other intangible interest that is
purchased with Government funds, including the services
of contractor personnel. The term includes . . .
automated data processing capabilities . . . [and]
Government records.
(2) Authorized purposes are those purposes for which
Government property is made available to members of the
public or those purposes authorized in accordance with
law or regulation.
See also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever embezzles, steal, purloins, or knowingly converts to
his use or the use of another, or without authority . . .
conveys or disposes of any record, . . . or thing of value of
the United States or of any department or agency thereof . . .;
or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent
to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been
embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted--
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both. . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
7. David Watkins, ``Briefing Paper on Databases--Eyes Only,'' Jan.
31, 1994, M 32467-32472.
8. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
McIntosh, June 28, 1996 (emphasis added).
9. Committee deposition of Richard Sullivan, Oct. 22, 1997, p. 17.
10. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, undated, M 033298 (all
capitals in original).
11. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
16. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 27, 1997.
17. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 240 (1997) (testimony of Charles F.C. Ruff,
Counsel to the President).
18. Letter from the majority members of the Subcommittee on
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs to
President William J. Clinton, Aug. 2, 1996.
19. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, undated, M 033298.
20. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
21. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32438-32439 (copy
inscribed with handwritten notes of the First Lady).
22. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Mar. 6, 1997.
23. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
24. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 115 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy
Counsel to the President).
25. Id. p. 241.
26. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President, Jan. 17,
1994, M 24918-24920.
27. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 241 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy
Counsel to the President).
28. Id.
29. Committee deposition of Brian Bailey, Feb. 6, 1998, p. 135.
30. White House Compliance with Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 240 (1997) (testimony of Charles F.C. Ruff,
Counsel to the President).
31. Committee deposition of Marsha Scott, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 90-91.
32. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Cheryl [Mills], Dec. 16, 1993,
M 25101.
33. Committee deposition of Marsha Scott, Feb. 18, 1998, p. 84.
34. Id. p. 89.
35. Committee deposition of Erich Vaden, Jan. 25, 1998, p. 258.
36. Id.
37. Id. p. 260.
38. Id. pp. 25-27, 34, 81, 98-99.
39. Committee deposition of Laura Tayman, Mar. 20, 1998, p. 136.
40. Id. pp. 122-124.
41. Id. pp. 50-51.
42. Vaden deposition, pp. 144-145.
43. Committee deposition of Mark Bartholomew, Aug. 15, 1997, p. 73.
44. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
45. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
Cong., 1st sess., pp. 114-115 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy
Counsel to the President).
46. Id. p. 133.
47. Id. pp. 248, 265.
48. See, e.g., Guy Gugliotta, ``Lawmaker Suggests Obstruction in
Late Delivery of Memo on White House Database,'' the Washington Post,
Friday, Oct. 31, 1997, p. A8; Jeanne Cummings, ``White House Retained
Memo on Database,'' the Wall Street Journal, Friday, Nov. 7, 1997, p.
A4; Larry Margasak, ``Committee Chairman Warns White House Lawyers on
Delays,'' Associated Press, Nov. 6, 1997; John Solomon, ``Withheld
Documents Say President Wanted Database to Share With DNC,'' Associated
Press, Oct. 30, 1997.
49. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, May 22, 1997.
50. Memorandum from Bernard W. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President,
and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to White House
Staff, July 12, 1993, M 033320-033330; Memorandum from Lloyd Cutler,
Special Counsel to the President, and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel
to the President, to Executive Office of the President Staff, Apr. 6,
1994, M 033331-033342; Memorandum from Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the
President, and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to
Executive Office of the President Staff, Oct. 12, 1994, M 033343-
033355.
51. White House Compliance With Committee Subpoenas: Hearings
Before the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 241 (1997) (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy
Counsel to the President) (emphasis added).
52. Id. (statement of Representative Shadegg).
53. Id. (testimony of Cheryl Mills, Deputy Counsel to the
President).
54. Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 93-94.
55. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, undated
(computer archive date Feb. 11, 1995), M 33054-33057 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold
Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, M 32457-32461 (unredacted copy).
59. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold
Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, M 25673-25677 (redacted copy).
60. Scott deposition, Feb. 18, 1998, pp. 144-146.
61. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
McIntosh, June 28, 1996 (emphasis added).
62. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los
Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1.
63. White House Press Briefing by Mike McCurry and Barry Toiv, Jan.
30, 1997 (12:45 p.m. EST), transcript, p. 9 (emphasis added)
(hereinafter ``White House Press Briefing'').
64. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
McIntosh, June 28, 1996 (``The database is for White House use only; we
prohibit distribution to outside entities or political organizations--
including the Democratic National Committee.'') (emphasis added).
65. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Oct. 3, 1996, response to question 1(I) (emphasis in
original).
66. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Oct. 28, 1996.
67. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Nov. 13, 1996.
68. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Jan. 10, 199[7].
69. On Jan. 17, 1997, Quinn wrote to the Committee that, with
respect to the Oct. 3, 1996 questions, ``That response is almost
complete and I expect it will be finished at the end of next week.''
Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman McIntosh,
Jan. 17, 1997.
70. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Feb. 21, 1997.
71. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Feb. 27, 1997.
72. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, response to question 1, Feb. 28, 1997.
73. White House Press Briefing, transcript p. 8.
74. Id. pp. 8-9.
75. Id. p. 9.
76. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Jan. 31, 1997.
77. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
McIntosh, Feb. 3, 1997.
78. Id.
79. ``DNC Statement on the White House Database,'' Jan. 30, 1997, M
037428.
80. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 1 (emphasis
added).
81. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los
Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1 (emphasis added).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Committee deposition of Truman Arnold, July 18, 1997, p. 124.
84. ``Big Donor Calls Favorable Treatment a Coincidence,'' the
Washington Post, Monday, May 25, 1998, p. A1.
85. According to the Washington Post, Schwartz contributed $25,000
in the 1991-92 election cycle; $112,000 in 1993-94; $602,000 in 1995-
96; and $421,000 in 1997-98. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Memorandum from Martha Phipps to Ann Cahill, ``White House
Activities,'' May 5, 1994, EOP 036287. A previous draft of this
memorandum which appears to have been prepared for Martha Phipps
(inside the DNC) appears to have been faxed to the White House from the
office of the Chairman of the DNC on Apr. 28, 1994. See draft
memorandum to Martha Phipps, Apr. 28, 1994, EOP 036294. This earlier
draft encompassed only items 1 through 10 of the later memo. It
included, however, the following notation: ``NOTE: Any money above and
beyond the $40 million goal would require two additional Presidential
events outside of Washington, DC'' Id.
90. Notes, undated, EOP 036283-036286. See also White House
Production Log, ``Documents produced to the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight on June 6, 1997, EOP 32986-36699, Office of the
Chief of Staff,'' June 6, 1997.
91. Notes, updated, EOP 036286 (emphasis added).
92. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los
Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1.
93. Handwritten notes, undated, EOP 036285.
94. Sullivan deposition, Oct. 22, 1997, p. 17.
95. Id. p. 19 (emphasis added).
96. Id. p. 17.
97. Id. p. 20.
98. Committee deposition of Jacob Aryeh (``Ari'') Swiller, Jan. 6,
1998, p. 16.
99. Id. p. 17 (emphasis added).
100. Memorandum from David Mercer, Fran Wakem, Ari Swiller,
Jennifer Scully, and Peter O'Keefe to [Truman] Arnold and Richard
Sullivan, ``Proposed Communications & Marketing Ideas: INTERNAL MEMO--
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION,'' Mar. 14, 1995, DNC 3236734-3236737, at DNC
3236734.
101. Id. DNC 3236735.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Swiller deposition, p. 69.
106. Swiller deposition, p. 70
107. Id. p. 92.
108. Id. pp. 79-80.
109. Id. p. 54 (stating that whether or not someone had been to an
event at the White House was ``a factor'' in DNC finance prioritization
of names to recommend for invitations); pp. 57-58 (stating that
information he received from the White House about prior event
attendance and prior invitations to attend events was a factor that
would be considered in the prioritization of recommendations for
invitations to future White House events).
110. Arnold had been personally asked to become DNC finance
chairman by President Clinton after declining the position when asked
by DNC Chairman Don Fowler. Arnold deposition, pp. 63-64. The
President's charge to Arnold was ``to raise the money and to make sure
it was spent frugally.'' Id. p. 64.
111. Id. p. 122.
112. Id. p. 116.
113. Id. p. 116.
114. Id. pp. 123-124.
115. Id. p. 124. See also id., p. 77 (``[P]eople . . . contribute
if they were included and made aware of the need.'').
116. Swiller deposition, p. 95.
117. Arnold deposition, pp. 117-118.
118. Memorandum to David Mercer, ``Finance Needs,'' Mar. 13, 1994,
DNC 3236707. This memorandum also states that ``[m]ajor contributors or
raisers should have the opportunity to dine in the White House Mess. We
have not been able to get this done with any consistency, and I do not
understand why?'' Id. The memorandum also outlines the importance of
movies, the White House Tennis Court, and theater tickets. Id.
119. The very office in which DNC documents reflecting the DNC
fundraising staff's desire for the information and their complaints
about getting it. See Production Log, June 6, 1997, EOP 036286.
120. Arnold deposition, pp. 126, 141, 142.
121. White House Automated Verification Entry System [WAVES]
records reflect Arnold's entry for a meeting with Ann Stock on Mar. 24,
1995. See WAVES records, Mar. 24, 1995, EOP 040404. This was 10 days
after the Finance Staff memo was prepared which outlined complaints and
sought DNC-White House coordination for servicing DNC donors.
Memorandum, Mar. 14, 1995, DNC 3236734-3236737. Ari Swiller testified
that the topics in the memorandum had been discussed at a fundraising
staff meeting around Mar. 14, 1995, and that both Richard Sullivan and
Truman Arnold appeared to be receptive to the ideas expressed at the
meeting. See Swiller deposition, pp. 63-64 (``[P]art of this discussion
. . . is [that] there was a concern that on certain occasions we were
unable to get information about who attended or was invited to White
House events.''); p. 66 (``[The discussion would] probably [have]
be[en] about the same time period.''); p. 84 (stating that Mr. Sullivan
and Mr. Arnold were receptive to the concerns).
122. Arnold deposition, p. 121 (``[I]t was a procedure in place. It
seemed to work well . . .''); p. 126 (stating that procedure was in
place before Arnold arrived).
123. Arnold deposition, p. 126. Despite the transcript reference on
this page (p. 126) to his having met with Marsha Scott, the record
makes clear that his meeting was only with Bowles and Stock (not Marsha
Scott). See id. pp. 133, 137, 141, 142, 144, 108 (``[I] never met with
[Marsha Scott] on official business at the White House.'').
124. Arnold deposition, p. 126 (emphasis added).
125. See id., pp. 126-127:
[Bowles and Stock] were concerned about someone inappropriate
having access to the White House. So I assumed responsibility
for doing the very best that we could with information that was
available to bring equity to the system so it wouldn't be
overrun with people who knew how to work the system; they would
be legitimate people of good reputation. So we shored up our
responsibilities. Not only were we raising money, we were
making sure that appropriate people were being invited and
included.
Id.
126. Arnold deposition, p. 115 (emphasis added).
127. Id. pp. 133-134 (emphasis added).
128. Id. p. 143 (emphasis added).
129. Id. 122. See also id., p. 137. At the meeting with Bowles and
Stock, neither told Arnold that there was any information which the
White House could not provide to the DNC. Id. However, Arnold did
testify that ``[t]he ground rules were discussed that there would be no
financial information across those lines. The White House didn't want
to know it, was not allowed to know it. Whether it was legal or policy,
I'm not sure.'' id.
130. Committee deposition of Judith Ann Stock, Feb. 20, 1998, pp.
126-128.
131. Id. pp. 127-128.
132. Committee deposition of Erskine Bowles, May 5, 1998, pp. 53-
54.
133. Id. p. 58.
134. Id. p. 54.
135. Id. pp. 55-56.
136. Bailey deposition, p. 13 (``[F]rom September 1994 until
November 1995, I am not sure of the exact day, I worked at the White
House Chief of Staff's Office.'').
137. Arnold deposition, pp. 122-124.
138. Id. p. 123-124.
139. Stock deposition, pp. 33-34.
140. Committee deposition of Brooke Stroud, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 47.
141. Id. pp. 52-55.
142. Id. p. 93.
143. Id. p. 70. When DNC offices wanted to know who had ``made the
cut'' or been included on the invitation list to an upcoming event,
Stroud called and obtained that information from Kim Widdess. Id.
Stroud thereafter passed on the information to the DNC requestor. Id.
See also Id. p. 71 (``[I]f they were really on the ball, they were
able to fax over a list that said who was included. But that was
rare.''); p. 77 (``Sometimes I never--never heard back at all.
Sometimes somebody would want to know just about one person to make
sure the one person off the list had been selected. And sometimes an
actual list would be sent over that said who had been invited.'').
144. Id. p. 78 (``[I]nconsistently, again, a list may or may not be
sent over [from the White House to the DNC] afterward . . . But it was
very rare.''). Such lists were sent to Brooke Stroud and were
apparently also sent to DNC Finance Director Richard Sullivan. Id. p.
79. Sullivan nevertheless obtained additional such White House lists,
for Stroud saw them in Sullivan's office. Id. Stroud could not recall
how many such lists she received; she testified that she filed them in
her office. Id. p. 80. When the questioning turned to the location of
her files, Stroud then said, ``I might have thrown them away, I might
have kept them. I don't really know.'' Id. p. 81.
145. Stock deposition, p. 56. She noted that the only instances in
which White House lists were released were for State Dinners, but only
for publication in the Washington Post after the dinner took place. Id.
pp. 56-67.
146. Id. p. 58 (emphasis added). Stock gave every indication that
providing the information to anyone was done only with the approval of
the President or First Lady based upon a demonstrated need by a senior
White House official of the highest level: ``It went to President and
Mrs. Clinton, and on occasion if the Chief of Staff asked to see
something right before the event occurred, like an hour or two before
it occurred, but we did not circulate lists through the White House . .
.'' Id.
147. Id. p. 59 (emphasis added).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id. p. 60.
150. Committee deposition of Richard Sullivan, Mar. 5, 1998, pp.
40-41, 81-86.
151. Committee deposition of Karen Hancox, Dec. 18, 1997, pp. 55-
56.
152. Swiller deposition, pp. 57, 60.
153. Id. pp. 99, 104.
154. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 41.
155. Committee deposition of Donald Dunn, Jan. 27, 1998, pp. 78-80.
156. Swiller deposition p. 20.
157. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
McIntosh, June 28, 1996.
158. White House Press Briefing, transcript pp. 6-7.
159. White House Press Briefing, transcript pp. 6, 9.
160. Sullivan deposition, Oct. 22, 1997, p. 92. Sullivan, the DNC
Finance Director, testified that he did not believe this happened with
respect to any of the DNC ``coffees,'' but that:
I don't rule out the fact that in putting together the list
of recommended invitations for the dinners or receptions or
lunches that were held at the White House or DNC-sponsored,
that, again Ari [Swiller] might not have made an inquiry to the
Social Secretary's office. I don't remember specific instances,
but I can't tell you definitely, no, because that could have
happened.
Id. p. 93. Sullivan also stated: ``I don't rule out that he may have
made a call or two or three as they related to the lunches or
receptions or dinners.'' Id. p. 95. Furthermore: ``I have a very, very
vague recollection that [Ari Swiller] may have made a call in reference
to an individual as we put together the list for a [DNC-sponsored]
dinner or a lunch.'' Id. p. 96.
161. Arnold deposition, pp. 120-121. Arnold testified as follows:
Q. Did you use that same process with those kinds of events?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you use them for--let me make sure I understand. You
used them for all the DNC events that you were involved in?
A. Right.
Mr. Ballen. Did he use what?
Mr. Ausbrook. That process of vetting the list and screening
them with the White House.
The Witness. The number of times in attendance previous. The
Social Office would tell us how many times they had been there.
The staff did those. It was a procedure in place. It seemed to
work well, because during this period of time there were no
improprieties of anyone having attended or any problem being
made, to my knowledge.
Id.
162. Swiller deposition, p. 21 (``I don't recall ever drawing a
distinction [between official White House events as opposed to DNC-
sponsored events at the White House].''). See also Id. p. 23 (``Again,
you're drawing a distinction I was not familiar with when I was at the
DNC, of what was a DNC-sponsored and what was official. . . . I didn't
know of such a distinction at the time. When it would come to
submitting names, I would review a list . . . [o]r I would submit a
short list of names [which went to the White House].''); p. 24 (no
distinction in his mind between official White House events and DNC-
sponsored events).
163. Id. p. 20 (emphasis added).
164. Id. p. 36. Swiller participated in sending DNC names for both
official events and DNC-sponsored events at the White House. See Id.
pp. 21, 37.
165. Stock deposition, pp. 30-33. White House staff usually
prepared and mailed written invitations for DNC-sponsored events taking
place at the White House. Id. In the case of ``last minute''
invitations, White House personnel spent time telephoning from the DNC
list to extend invitations. Id.
166. Id. p. 28 (``[W]e would put [the list] into the White House
Database to create a calligrapher's list so that invitations could be
addressed. Those invitations were sent out.''). Stock testified that
the process was the same for both political events, including DNC-
sponsored events, and official events. Id. p. 31. See also Committee
deposition of Kimberly Widdess, Feb. 24, 1998, p. 28 (``The [White
House] database is used when we have a list of people that we are going
to invite. We enter their names and addresses into the database and
then it--that information is then printed out on a list that the
calligraphers write the invitations off of. . . .''; p. 29 (``Most
often, the invitations are sent--we have hard copy invitations and an
actual card that is sent out to people.'').
167. Stock deposition, p. 28 (``[W]e would put [the list] into the
White House Database to create a calligrapher's list so that
invitations could be addressed. Those invitations were sent out.'').
Stock testified that the process was the same for both political
events, including DNC-sponsored events and for official events. Id. p.
31. See also Widdess deposition, p. 28 (``The [White House] database is
used when we have a list of people that we are going to invite. We
enter their names and addresses into the database and then it--that
information is then printed out on a list that the calligraphers write
the invitations off of. . . .''). p. 29 (``Most often, the invitations
are sent--we have hard copy invitations and an actual card that is sent
out to people.'').
168. Widdess deposition, p. 28 (``[T]hen responses come to the
office [of the Social Secretary], people responding to the event. That
information is entered into the computer with their dates of birth and
Social Security number.'').
169. Id. pp. 29-30 (stating that, prior to installation of White
House Database, a DOS-based computer system performed a similar
function).
170. Stock deposition, p. 87 (``WhoDB and the previous [White House
computer system in the Social Office] generated exactly the same
reports.''). See also Facsimile from Judy Spangler, White House Office
of the Social Secretary, to Jennifer Scully, DNC, Apr. 15, 1994, DNC
3058341-3058351 (print-out from White House Database reflecting status
of persons invited to an upcoming Apr. 19, 1994 DNC Trustee Reception
at the White House, as of Apr. 15, 1994 at 1 p.m).
171. See Widdess deposition, pp. 30-31:
You can see the entire guest list on the screen so you don't
have to waste paper printing names out. It gives you
information as to--immediately gives you information as to how
many responses you have, how many responses you are waiting on.
It is a much better system for us to use in the office for
executing events. . . . The only way the old system you could
see the guest list is if you printed it out. . . . The WhoDB
lets you see the entire guest list and who their guest is and
if they have accepted, responded, regretted or whatever. The
other system you could only see one record.
Id. (emphasis added).
172. Swiller deposition, p. 36. Swiller participated in sending DNC
names for both official events (p. 37) and DNC sponsored events at the
White House (p. 21). Id. pp. 21, 37.
173. Facsimile from Judy Spangler, Office of the Social Secretary,
Executive Office of the President, to Jennifer Scully, DNC, Apr. 15,
1994, DNC 3058341-3058351 (11-page White House computer report dated
Apr. 15, 1994 reflecting the names of invitees and their acceptance-
regret-no response status as of 1 p.m. on that date for an upcoming DNC
Trustee Reception to take place at the White House).
174. See id. Ari Swiller, of the DNC Finance Division, testified
that he saw such White House-generated lists which had been faxed to
the DNC ``every couple of months'' during the time period 1993 through
1997, and that he had personally received such faxed lists from persons
in the White House Social Office, namely Judy Spangler, Tracy LeBreque
and perhaps Kim Widdess. Swiller deposition, pp. 18-19. See also id. at
pp. 29-30 (received lists both before and after events).
175. Swiller deposition, pp. 31-32 (stating that DNC personnel,
after identifying persons who had not responded, telephoned such
persons to remind them of the invitation and to inquire whether they
wished to attend). Swiller personally made ``dozens'' of such calls
connected with at least two events. Id.
176. See Widdess deposition, p. 115 (stating that White House
employees ``frequently'' contacted the DNC to obtain telephone numbers
of non-responding persons so that White House employees could make
follow-up telephone calls to such persons); Stock deposition, p. 87
(``You have a slight problem with this list. It is Apr. 15th, and the
event is Apr. 19th, and no one has responded, which is why they are
sending the list to find out if anybody has phone numbers to figure out
how to call people and see if they either--my guess is this was not an
invitation that went out on an invitation list, and it was a phone
list, and they have bad phone numbers, and it was 108 on the 15th, and
it is 3\1/2\ days later. Basically you are looking at a completely
unresponsive list.'').
177. Memorandum from Minyon Moore to Chair [Deborah] DeLee, Bobby
Watson, Laura Hartigan, Jill Alper, and Vida Benavides, ``Upcoming
Holiday Events at the White House,'' Dec. 9, 1994, DNC 0908516-0908663.
178. Letter from Lanny Breuer, Special Counsel to the President, to
Mildred Webber, Staff Director, Subcommittee on National Economic
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, June 2, 1997.
179. See letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President,
to Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997; Affidavit of Carl Mecum, Sept. 4,
1998.
180. ``Economic Conference List--Southern Region, Invitation List
of Panelists and Observers as of 3/21/95,'' Mar. 21, 1995, DNC 3236693-
3236694, 3236696-3236699, 3236712.
181. White House Office of Public Liaison, ``APA Opinion Leaders,''
DNC 0626453-0626472; letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the
President, to Chairman McIntosh, June 6, 1997.
182. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie
Williams, and Jim Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-1019685.
183. See Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995
Holiday Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24915-24917.
184. Handwritten notes of Erich Vaden, undated, M 20536 (``MS . . .
--Christmas List as vehicle to get out? . . . --Meeting w/Cheryl.'').
185. Vaden deposition, p. 183. Apparently, Scott also advanced the
argument that the White House could provide the DNC the final list
because they were paying for the mailing. Id. (referencing de minimis
language in Cheryl Mills's Memorandum, cited supra n.6 (M 24918-
24920)).
186. Vaden deposition, p. 183.
187. Handwritten reply inscribed on copy of Memorandum from Brooke
Stroud to Tara Burns, ``X-mas List,'' June 17, 1994, DNC 1019608.
Marsha Scott also suggested that the DNC could come to the White House
and review lists. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles,
``Meetings To Be Held While I Am Gone,'' Oct. 28, 1994, M 33082-33083.
188. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 133.
189. Id., pp. 142-143.
190. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 36-37. See also Id. p.
106 (``White House lists were uploaded into the DNC system. . . .'');
Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar and Maggie Williams,
Nov. 9, 1994, DNC 1020078; Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice
Pushkar, Maggie Williams, and Jim Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-
1019685. The only two persons at DNC capable of entering the tape into
the AS 400 were Al Hurst and Bryan Daines. Neither has a recollection
of having done so. See Committee deposition of Al Hurst, Mar. 13, 1998,
p. 40; Committee deposition of Bryan Daines, Apr. 6, 1998, p. 29.
191. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, p. 169; Stroud deposition,
Nov. 18, 1997, p. 30.
192. Despite Brooke Stroud's recollection that she believed that
she had boxed the printout at the DNC to send to Archives and despite
the specific request for its production, the DNC has not produced it.
Also unaccounted for is a ``Sampling'' or partial printout of the
merged lists from Saturn which was delivered to Stroud at the DNC.
Stroud testified that she did not recall what had happened to the
sample printout. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 10-12, 28-29.
193. Sullivan deposition, Mar. 5, 1998, pp. 44-46.
194. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 10-11.
195. Id. pp. 28-29.
196. Saturn documents 0000607, 0000005, 0000006; Stroud deposition,
Nov. 18, 1997, p. 100. See also Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice
Pushkar and Maggie Williams, Nov. 9, 1994, DNC 1020078 (``White House
lists are contained on multiple discs . . . . Saturn delivered that
list to the DNC today, we will begin manual de-duping immediately. . .
. Saturn will deliver [disks 6 & 7] on Friday [Nov. 11, 1994].'');
Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie Williams and
James Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-1019685 (``Disks Six and
Seven have been uploaded. We will complete clean-up no later than
Friday. . . .'').
197. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 36.
198. Stroud deposition, Nov. 4, 1997, pp. 164-67.
199. Daines deposition, p. 29 (``Just Al [Hurst] and myself [were
the persons at the DNC in 1994 who had the expertise and the know-how
to upload data from a magnetic tape into the DNC computer so that the
data could be worked on.]'').
200. See Daines deposition, p. 24 (no recollection of volunteers
working on 1994 Holiday Card list on any weekend in 1994); p. 37 (no
recollection of volunteers being asked to modify data in a database at
DNC); p. 40 (no recollection of data being received in Nov. 1994 from
an outside entity to which Brooke Stroud was granted access); p. 40 (no
recollection of having met Sharon Lewis); p. 44 (even after being shown
documents reflecting disk deliveries from Saturn, no recollection of
DNC receiving such disks).
201. Hurst deposition, p. 41 (``No, I don't recall any contact with
Brooke Stroud over Veterans Day weekend.''); id. (``I worked at the DNC
on Saturdays and Sundays, but it is not my practice to.''); id. (``No,
I don't recall working on Veterans Day Weekend of 1994.''). Hurst had
no recollection of any of events concerning the delivery of tapes over
the Veterans Day weekend or the use of White House volunteers in that
effort. Id. p. 100 (``I never received any disks.'').
202. Hurst deposition, p. 41 (``I worked at the DNC on Saturdays
and Sundays, but it is not my practice to.''). Daines deposition, p. 24
(``No, I very rarely was there weekends.'').
203. Committee deposition of Joseph Birkenstock, June 2, 1998, p.
114.
204. See Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie
Williams and James Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684-1019685
(``[T]he de-duped list will be returned to Saturn Corporation to be
placed in a postal-presorted order . . . . [T]he laser house . . . will
begin [lasering, stuffing and stamping] . . . as soon as they receive
the tape from Saturn . . . .'' ); letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric
Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn documents 0000604-0000607) (``The output
tapes from the DNC were sent back to Saturn in the Saturn format for
presort processing . . . . Tapes [were] received back from the DNC [on
November 30, 1994] . . . .'' ).
205. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn
documents 0000604-0000607 (``4. The presort processing was accomplished
by Saturn and a tape was sent to The Last Word for imaging on the
envelopes; . . . [Attachment:] Tapes shipped to the Last Word . . . 12/
02/94.'').
206. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn
documents 0000604-0000605 (``Saturn received the 3 pre-sorted files
back from The Last Word on Wednesday, December 14.'').
207. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Brooke Stroud, Dec. 20, 1994,
Saturn document 0000633 (discussing the ``problem'' with the tape,
``based on our meeting at the DNC on Friday December 16, 1994.'').
208. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994, Saturn
Document 0000604-0000607 (``On Friday [December 16] after your call, we
identified the problem in talking with Al [presumably Al Hurst] at your
offices and came over to review the problem.'').
209. Hurst deposition, p. 28 (``[The only contact with Saturn was]
when it was discovered there was a problem with the tape.''); p. 30
(``[T]hey brought a tape back to us prior to the mailing of the
Christmas cards when there was a problem.''); pp. 37-38 (``It is my
recollection that Brooke Stroud called me upstairs and she was up there
talking to the people from Saturn.'').
210. Id. p. 30 (``[T]hey brought a tape back to us prior to the
mailing of the Christmas cards when there was a problem.''); p. 32
(``Q. The tape that came back from Saturn that was associated with the
problem, what, if anything, was done with that tape at the DNC when you
all received it back? A. I uploaded it to a secure place on the AS400 .
. . . We uploaded it to a library on the AS400 that only a programmer
would have the capacity to look at.'').
211. Id. pp. 37-38 (``The only thing we did with it was to view it
on the screen to see which records had problems with them . . . [The
viewing was done by] myself and Brooke Stroud . . . [but no one else]
that I remember.'').
212. Id. p. 35.
213. Id. pp. 52-53 (``[S]he wanted a tape made of the problem
data.'').
214. Id. p. 54 (``I have no idea what she did with the tape.'');
id. (``I don't recall ever seeing that tape-ever again.'').
215. Hurst deposition, p. 53.
216. Id. p. 45.
217. Id. p. 79.
218. Id. p. 82 (``I deleted the file on the system. The data was
now on the tape.''); id. (``I put it on the tape rack . . . in the
computer room of the DNC. . [and] labeled [the tape] S-A-T-M-S-T.'').
Hurst testified that while he believes the tape remained on the tape
rack until approximately March 1997, he acknowledged that ``[a]nyone
who came into the computer room could have pulled it off the rack,''
and that, other than on weekends, the room generally was not locked.
Id. pp. 83-84.
219. Id. p. 16.
220. Id. p. 46 (``I don't recall asking anyone.'').
221. Hurst deposition, p. 45.
222. Id. p. 62 (``No, I don't recall [the volume of information
that was in the file].''). See also Id. p. 85 (``I don't remember what
the size of the file was and the number of records.''). Hurst's failure
to recollect is particularly odd in light of his specific recollections
of seemingly unimportant details, as well as the fact that the volume
of the data--``taking up too much space''--was the very reason he
articulated for deciding to delete the file in the first place.
Further, he testified that there were but two criteria which he
employed in deciding to delete files, one of which was the ``size'' or
volume of the file. Id. p. 45. The volume of the file was an important
factor, not only with respect to the deletions in Jan. 1996, but also
with respect to copying the data onto a tape. As Hurst testified, the
time it took to make tape copies of the data depended upon the volume
of data: ``A larger tape would take longer to upload than a smaller
tape would, because of the number of fields in the file and the total
number of records in the file.'' Id. pp. 74-75. Hurst, in fact, dealt
with this tape at least five times: first, when he uploaded it into the
DNC computer; second, when he made a copy tape for Brooke Stroud;
third, when he decided to delete the data (using his volume criterion);
fourth, when he made another copy tape prior to deleting the file; and
fifth, in March 1997, when he was given the tape by DNC counsel to copy
yet again.
223. Hurst deposition, p. 46.
224. Id. p. 68 (``No, I don't recall looking--I don't recall
checking that criteria.'').
225. Id. p. 68 (``No, I don't know why I didn't check that
criteria.'').
226. Id. p. 80 (``I don't remember why I made the copy [in January
1996]. I don't remember what drove me to make the copy of that
tape.''). See also Id. p. 81 (``I made the copy of the tape, and, I
don't remember why I made a copy, but after I made the copy I deleted
[the file] off the system.'').
227. Id. p. 117; see id. at 114 (``I recall another tape came from
Saturn after all the Christmas cards were mailed.'') (emphasis added).
228. Id. pp. 34-35 (``I put it on the tape rack . . . in the
computer room at the DNC. . . . Q. What were you [just] talking about
that you had put on the tape rack? A. The tape that we received from
Saturn after the Christmas cards were mailed.'') (emphasis added);
229. Hurst deposition, p. 62-63, 114
230. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 1.
231. Committee deposition of Alice Pushkar, Jan. 13, 1998, pp. 49,
163.
232. Memorandum from Alice J. Pushkar to Cheryl Mills, Aug. 3,
1995, M 033308-033309 (``The DNC has a tape of the entire 1994 holiday
card list.'').
233. Mills immediately told Pushkar verbally that the DNC should
not have the tape. That specific response was recorded by Pushkar in
her contemporaneous handwritten notes of that conversation which she
entered on her copy of her memorandum to Mills. Handwritten notes of
Alice Pushkar, undated, M 33308 (``Shouldn't have tape''). Pushkar
testified that after receiving the memorandum, ``[Cheryl Mills]
immediately called me back and said, you know, the list should have
been returned to the White House.'' Pushkar deposition, p. 95. See also
id. pp. 113-114 (``I just recall her saying . . . they shouldn't have
the tape . . ..''); p. 114 (Mills understood Pushkar was going to try
to get the tape back).
234. Vaden deposition, pp. 225-226.
235. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Oct. 3, 1996.
236. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Oct. 28, 1996.
237. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Nov. 13, 1996.
238. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Jan. 10, 199[7].
239. On Jan. 17, 1997, Quinn wrote to the Committee that, with
respect to the Oct. 3, 1996 questions, ``That response is almost
complete and I expect it will be finished at the end of next week.''
Letter to Chairman McIntosh from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President,
Jan. 17, 1997.
240. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Feb. 21, 1997.
241. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Feb. 27, 1997.
242. White House Press Briefing, transcript p. 13.
243. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 1.
244. Id.
245. Pushkar deposition, pp. 47-48.
246. Id. pp. 48, 163-164.
247. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 36.
248. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, July 15, 1997.
249. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Director of
the Office of the First Lady's Correspondence, and Maggie Williams,
Chief of Staff to the First Lady, Nov. 9, 1994, DNC 1020078.
250. Memorandum from Brook Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie
Williams, and James Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1994, DNC 1019684.
251. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, pp. 6-7, 34-37.
252. Id. pp. 15-23. See also Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice
Pushkar, Maggie Williams and Jim Dorskind, Nov. 15, 1997, DNC 1019684.
253. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 49.
254. Id. p. 50.
255. Handwritten notations of Alice Pushkar, undated, M 033308-
033309 (reflecting Mills's responses to Aug. 3, 1995 memorandum from
Alice Pushkar to Cheryl Mills). See also Pushkar deposition, pp. 113-
116 (stating that Cheryl Mills informed her that ``[the DNC] shouldn't
have the tape.'').
256. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday
Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24815-24817 at M 24916 (emphasis
added).
257. Pushkar deposition, pp. 139-140. Similarly Brook Stroud could
not recall giving computer personnel at the DNC any instructions with
respect to limitations on access, use or copying of the White Hose
data. Stroud deposition, Nov. 18, 1997, p. 87.
258. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday
Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24915-24917 at M 24917 (``Despite the
use restrictions we impose on the DNC, for appearance [sic] purposes,
the vendor should provide either of those two lists [White House
portion and final merged lists] only to the White House.''). It is not
at all clear whether she was suggesting that the ``use restrictions''
were only for appearances, or whether having the tapes returned to the
White House was only for appearances.
259. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday
Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995, M 24915-24917 at M 24915.
260. By a letter of Oct. 9, 1997, the committee requested the
following:
Any and all contracts, and, or, ``use agreements,'' in
whatever form, drafted, negotiated or entered into between the
White House or Executive Office of the President and any
vendor, the Democratic National Committee, the Clinton-Gore
Campaign, the Clinton-Gore reelect committee, or other entities
with respect to the planning, implementation or production of
the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 `'Holiday Card Project.'' Such
contracts, or ``use agreements'' are reference in Cheryl Mill's
[sic] August 14, 1995 memorandum (M 24915--M 24917). Documents
provided pursuant to this request should include, but not be
limited to, those referred to in that memorandum. Those
referred to in that memorandum should be identified as such in
your response.
Letter from Chairman McIntosk to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the
President, Oct. 9, 1997.
261. By Subpoena, the following records were compelled to be
produced:
Any and all contracts, and, or, ``use agreements,'' in
whatever form, drafted, negotiated or entered into between the
White House or Executive Office of the President and any
vendor, the Democratic National Committee, the Clinton-Gore
Campaign, the Clinton-Gore reelect committee, or other entities
with respect to the planning, implementation or production of
the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 ``Holiday Card Project.''
Subpoena of Charles F.C. Ruff, Dec. 16, 1997 (originally returnable
Jan. 15, 1998), item 2(b). See also id. item 2(c).
262. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Nov. 19, 1997, response to question 2.
263. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Nov. 19, 1997, response to question 2.
264. Subpoena of Charles F.C. Ruff, Dec. 16, 1997 (originally
returnable Jan. 15, 1998), item 2(b). See also id., item 2(c).
265. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday
Card Numbers,'' Nov. 10, 1993, M 034954 (``White House[:] . . . 33,000
. . . '').
266. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to
Mack McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993, M 034960-044962 and M
04961-034962 (``White House List[:) . . . 43,000'').
267. The Clinton-Gore campaign committee is the owner of
PeopleBase. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim
Dorskind, ``Holiday Card Problem Areas and Considerations,'' Aug. 29,
1993, M 034907-034909 at M 034908.
268. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Maggie Williams, ``Holiday
Cards,'' Nov. 9, 1993, M 034950 (``The internal White House holiday
card list went to Little rock last night. Malone, Inc. will work with
it and other lists in maintains to come up with the agreed upon
database of 250,000 names.'').
269. Affidavit of Carl Mecum, Apr. 29, 1998, para.para. 5, 7, 16.
270. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday
Card Wrap-Up,'' Jan. 13, 1994, M 034980-034982 at M 034981 (`'I already
have requested a copy of the master list from Malone so that we can
review and eliminate duplicates. That list should arrive by week's
end.'').
271. Letter from Daniel W. Burkhardt, Special Assistant and Counsel
to the Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, to Monica
Breedlove, W.T. [sic] Malone, Inc., Mar. 2, 1994, M 034984 (directing
that the information be used to correct the campaign database).
Burkhardt this action despite his won documented knowledge that such
action was unlawful. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhandt to Marsha Scott,
``Holiday Card lists,'' Dec. 7, 1993, M 034965 (``[I]t has always been
my understanding from White House counsel that the White House could
not provide the resources to modify or correct lists coming from Malone
or the DNC . . .'').
272. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, `'Holiday
Card Wrap-Up,'' Jan. 13, 1994, M 034980-M 034982 at M 034980 (``[A]s of
[January 13, 1994] we have received only 8,000 returns.'').
273. Letter from Daniel W. Burkhardt, Special Assistant and Counsel
to the Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, to Monica
Breedlove, W.P. Malone, Inc., Mar. 2, 1994, M 034984.
274. Memorandum from Lyn Utrecht, ``Database at W.P. Malone,'' Mar.
9, 1995 Attachment 2, `'Database Status Report (Summary),'' M 036558-
036560 and M 036560 (``Address corrections entered as received to
include 1993 Christmas card mailings and DNC summer, 1994 mailing'').
the more detailed memorandum discussing this fact was withheld from the
committee by the White House. In a letter to the committee of Mar. 13,
1998, the White House stated that the memo was withheld because it was
``subject to attorney-client privilege held by Clinton-Gore, and ha[s]
not been produced.'' Letter from Lanny Breuer, Special Counsel to the
President, to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the
committee, Mar. 13, 1998.
275. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, via Matt Moore, to David
Watkins, Oct. 28, 1993, M 034826-034827 at M 034826.
276. Id. (``Initially, this [White House] list was going to be
provided to the Democratic National Committee [DNC].'').
277. See letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff,
Counsel to the President Mar. 2, 1998, p. 1, item 2 (seeking production
of this memorandum); letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to
the President, to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the
committee, Mar. 13, 1998, response to item 2 (``[W]e have not located a
copy of this document.'').
278. E-mail Memorandum from Matthew L. Moore to Cherly Mills,
``Christmas Card Lists,'' Oct. 20, 1993, M 034831.
279. See letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff,
Counsel to the President, Mar. 2, 1998, p. 1, item 2 (seeking
production of this memorandum); letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special
Counsel to the President, to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels
to the committee, Mar. 13, 1998, response to item 2 (`'We have not
located a copy of this document.'').
280. E-mail Memorandum from Matthew L. Moore to Cheryl Mills,
``Christmas Card Lists,'' Oct. 20, 1993, M 034831 (emphasis added).
281. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Mar. 2, 1998, pp. 1-2, item 5.
282. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President,
to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the committee, Mar. 13,
1998, response to item 5.
283. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Mar. 2, 1998, p. 2, item 6.
284. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President,
to Keith Ausbrook and Jay Apperson, counsels to the committee, Mar. 13,
1998, response to item 6.
285. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills via Matt Moore, to David Watkins
(cc: Dan Burkhardt), Oct. 28, 1998, M 034826-M 034827 at M 034826
(emphasis added).
286. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim
Dorskind, ``Holiday Card Lists,'' Aug. 29, 1993, M 034894-034898, at
034896.
287. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt via Marsha Scott to Mack
McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993, M 034960-034962 at M 034961.
288. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott to Mack
McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993, M 034960-034962 at M 034961-
034962.
289. See Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim
Dorskind, ``Holiday card Lists,'' Aug. 29, 1993, M 034894-034898 at M
034897.
290. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, via Matt Moore, to David
Watkins, ``Holiday Greeting Cards II,'' Oct. 18, 1993, M 034826-034827
at M 034826
291. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Dan Burkhardt, ``Holiday
Greeting Card Project,'' Aug. 11, 1993, M 034899 (emphasis added).
292. Memorandum from Daniel W. Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to
Cheryl Mills, ``Democratic National Committee participation in Holiday
Card Project,'' Aug. 6, 1993, M 034893.
293. Memorandum from Helen Dickety to Kelly Crawford, Oct. 17,
1994, M 034692.
294. White House telephone call log, ``PHONE CALLS CONCERNING POTUS
AND THE ADMINISTRATION, LOG START DATE 1/8/96, LOG END DATE 1/26/96,''
M 034780.
295. Cover note and list from Kelly Crawford to Monica Breadlove,
July 27, 1993, M 036286-036301.
296. See supra notes 50-51 (regarding Nussbaum, Cutler, and Mikva
memoranda).
297. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, May 22, 1997; Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1998, pp.
94-102.
298. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes,
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
Database,'' Jan. 28, 1994, M 32433-32434 (emphasis added).
299. Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1988, p. 83 (``Q. And who on your
team was discussing this with the DNC? A. . . . It was Erich Vaden, it
was myself, and it was Mark Bartholomew.''); Vaden deposition, pp. 256-
257 (``I considered [all work related to WhoDB] to be official duties .
. .'').
300. Committee deposition of Jerry R. Carlson, Aug. 28, 1997, pp.
60-62.
301. Id. pp. 68-69.
302. Committee deposition of Mark Barthotholomew, Sept. 16, 1997,
pp. 40-43; Committee deposition of Karl H. Heissner, Sept. 9, 1997, pp.
59-62.
303. Heissner deposition, Sept. 9, 1997, p. 61.
304. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, and
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
Database,'' June 28, 1994, M 32438-32439 (``My team and I are also
engaged in conversations with the DNC about their new system they are
proposing. We have asked that their system be modeled after whatever
system we decide to use outside the White House. I need you to make
very clear to them that their system must be technologically
compatible, if not the same, as whatever system we decide to use for
political purposes later on. These discussions are currently in
progress. . . . [L]et my team work with the DNC to help them design a
system that will meet our needs and technical specifications. We can
show them what to do and then close another system for our specific
uses later on.'').
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See Affidavit of Carl Mecum.
308. Id. para. 7.
309. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Database
Outside WH,'' May 31, 1994, M 036280.
310. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-
32466 at M 32463 (emphasis added).
311. See Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 25634-
25637 at M 25634.
312. Meeting agenda, Feb. 2, 1994, M 33044.
313. Unidentified note, Dec. 6, 1994, M 33181.
314. Id.
315. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Leon Panetta and Evelyn
Lieberman, May 17, 1996, M 33215-33219 at M33217 (reflecting approval
of new job description fro Marsha Scott).
316. Committee deposition of Harold Ickes, Mar. 12, 1998, pp. 50,
122.
317. Id. p. 123.
318. Id. p. 51.
319. Id. p. 57.
320. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to the First Lady and Bruce
Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-32466.
321. Letter from White House counsel Charles F.C. Ruff to Chairman
McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 2.
322. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief
of Staff Erskine Bowles, undated, M 033298.
323. Bailey deposition, p. 13 (testifying that he was employed in
the White House Chief of Staff's Office from Sept. 1994 to Nov. 1995).
324. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief
of Staff Erskine Bowles, undated, M 033298.
325. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President, Jan. 17,
1994, M 24918-24920.
326. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New
Database,'' June 28, 1994, M 32433-32434.
327. Id. at M 32434.
328. Confidential Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and
Bruce Lindsey (cc: the First Lady), June 28, 1994, M 32438-32439, at
32439 (copy inscribed with handwritten notes of the First Lady).
329. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Chief of Staff [Mack
McLarty], undated (computer archive date Feb. 11, 1995), M 33054-33057
at M 33057.
330. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, undated
(computer archive date Feb. 11, 1995), M 33054-33057.
331. Id. (emphasis added).
332. Id. (emphasis added).
333. ``WhoDB Requirements Report,'' undated.
334. Id. p. 3.
335. Id.
336. ``Centralized White House Database Security Brief,'' Jan. 12,
1993, M 2778-2780. See also, Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack
McLarty (cc: Bruce Lindsey), ``Master Database'', Dec. 7, 1993, M 25921
(``Both the President and the First Lady have asked that I make this my
top priority.''); Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Cheryl Mills ``White
House Database,'' Dec. 16, 1993, M 25101 (``I am working on a project
that is of high priority to the President and the First Lady'');
Memorandum from Marsha Scott to James L. McDonald, Jr. ``Continuing
efforts for the First Lady,'' Feb. 4, 1994, M 25334 (``These projects
are very important to the President and the First Lady and should be a
priority for us all.''); Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader,
Mack McLarty, and Harold Ickes ``Follow-up to [Hillary Rodham Clinton]
Meeting,'' Mar. 7, 1994, M 32447 (``. . . Hillary's desire to have me
proceed unimpeded with the Database Project. . . .''); Internal White
House E-mail message from Jerry Carlson to Patsy Thomasson, undated,
``Update on 11-14-9[4] Meeting Regarding Project,'' M 26251-26252
(``Erskine [Bowles] . . . asked that the report and output formats be
reviewed in detail to insure the President gets what he is expecting.
Erskine . . . will then take this to the President for input.'');
``Project Outline and Discussion, Updated 3-5-96,'' M 23168-23169 at M
23169 (``. . . Marsha Scott is expecting to deliver reports on a weekly
basis to the President and First Lady starting in March.'').
337. Draft Memorandum from Paul Antony and Brian Bailey to Erskine
Bowles, ``Update on White House Database Project,'' Oct. 25, 1994,
M21402-21404.
338. Id. M 21402 (all capitals in original).
339. Id. (underline and capitals in original).
340. Id.
341. Bailey deposition, p. 13 (testifying that he was employed in
the White House Chief of Staff's Office from Sept. 1994 to Nov. 1995).
342. Id. pp. 27-28.
343. Letter from White House counsel Charles F.C. Ruff to Chairman
McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997, response to question 2.
344. Memorandum from Erich Vaden to Marsha Scott, ``Number of
Items,'' Mar. 2, 1995, M 25639.
345. Id.
346. Memorandum [for Multiple distribution] from Erskine Bowles,
``Clean-up and Coding of database Records,'' Mar. 28, 1995, M 32493.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Janice Enright, ``Terry
McAuliffe's Requests to POTUS,'' Jan. 6, 1995, EOP 35937; Handwritten
notes, undated, CGRO 1570 (reflecting President's communication cited
within the memorandum).
352. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Leon Panetta and Evelyn
Lieberman, ``Marsha Scott, VIP Operation at the Democratic National
Committee,'' May 17, 1996, M 33215-33219.
353. Id. M 33217.
354. Id.
355. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha
Scott,'' May 14, 1996, M 33227.
356. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha
Scott,'' May 14, 1996, M 33220.
357. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-
32466.
358. Id. M 32463.
359. Id.
360. Scott deposition, Feb. 18, 1998, p. 69.
361. Affidavit of Carl Mecum, para. 10.
362. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Database
Outside White House,'' May 31, 1994, M036280; Notes of meeting with
HRC, Lader, Ickes, ``Database Update,'' Feb. 2, 1994, M 033044;
Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Outside Data,'' Nov.
21, 1994, M 33050-33052; and Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold
Ickes, ``DNC Offices and Surrogate Speakers,'' Aug. 19, 1994, M 33283-
33285.
363. Scott deposition, Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 71-72.
364. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 25634-
25637.
365. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Bruce Lindsey. ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 25634-
25637.
366. Id. M 32465.
367. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, ``Meeting Follow-
up,'' Mar. 4, 1994, M 27470-27475.
368. Scott deposition, Apr. 28, 1998, p. 14 (emphasis added).
369. Id. p. 101.
370. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994, M 32463-
32466.
371. Carlson deposition, p. 22.
372. Id. p. 23.
index of supporting documents
1. Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey, Assistant to Deputy Chief of
Staff Erskine Bowles, undated (M 033298).
2. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey
(cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New Database,''
June 28, 1994 (M 32433-32434).
3. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey
(cc: the First Lady), ``Recommendation for Design of New Database,''
June 28, 1994 (copy with handwritten notes of First Lady, undated) (M
32438-32439).
4. Letter from Chairman Dan Burton to Subcommittee Chairman David
M. McIntosh, July 17, 1997.
5. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Marsha Scott, Jan. 17, 1994 (M
24918-24920).
6. David Watkins, ``Briefing Paper on Databases--Eyes Only,'' Jan.
31, 1994 (M 32467-32472).
7. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
McIntosh, June 28, 1996.
8. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Oct. 28, 1997.
9. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Feb. 27, 1997.
10. Letter from the majority members of the Subcommittee on
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs to
President William J. Clinton, Aug. 2, 1996.
11. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Mar. 6, 1997.
12. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Cheryl Mills, Dec. 16, 1993 (M
25101).
13. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, May 22, 1997.
14. ``Withheld documents say President wanted database to share
with DNC,'' Associated Press, Oct. 30, 1997.
15. ``Lawmaker Suggests Obstruction in Late Delivery of Memo on
White House Database,'' the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1997, p. A8.
16. ``White House Retained Memo on Database,'' Wall Street Journal,
Nov. 7, 1997.
17. ``Committee chairman warns White House lawyers on delays,''
Associated Press, Nov. 6, 1997.
18. Memorandum from Bernard W. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President,
and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to White House
Staff, July 12, 1993 (M 033320-033330).
19. Memorandum from Lloyd Cutler, Special Counsel to the President,
and Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to White House
Staff, Apr. 6, 1994 (M 033331-033342).
20. Memorandum from Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, and
Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, to Executive Office
of the President Staff, Oct. 12, 1994 (M 033343-033355).
21. Draft memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, Feb. 11,
1995 (M 33054-33057).
22. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold
Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, (unredacted copy) (M 32457-32461).
23. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles and Harold
Ickes, Nov. 1, 1994, (redacted copy) (M 25673-25677).
24. ``Fund-Raisers' Use of White House Database Reported,'' Los
Angeles Times, Thursday, Jan. 30, 1997, p. A1.
25. White House Press Briefing by Mike McCurry and Barry Toiv, Jan.
30, 1997 (12:45 p.m. EST), transcript, pp. 1, 6-21.
26. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Oct. 3, 1996.
27. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Oct. 28, 1996.
28. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Nov. 13, 1996.
29. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Jan. 10, 199[7].
30. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
McIntosh, Jan. 17, 1997.
31. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Feb. 21, 1997.
32. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Jack Quinn, Counsel to the
President, Jan. 31, 1997.
33. Letter from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to Chairman
McIntosh, Feb. 3, 1997.
34. ``DNC Statement on the White House Database,'' Jan. 30, 1997 (M
037428).
35. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Feb. 28, 1997.
36. ``Big Donor Calls Favorable Treatment a Coincidence,'' the
Washington Post, Monday, May 25, 1998, p. A1.
37. Memorandum from Martha Phipps to Ann Cahill, ``White House
Activities,'' May 5, 1994 (EOP 036287).
38. Draft memorandum to Martha Phipps, Apr. 28, 1994 (EOP 036294).
39. Notes, undated (EOP 036283-036286).
40. Memorandum from David Mercer, Fran Wakem, Ari Swiller, Jennifer
Scully, and Peter O'Keefe to [Truman] Arnold and Richard Sullivan,
``Proposed Communications & Marketing Ideas: INTERNAL MEMO--NOT FOR
DISTRIBUTION,'' Mar. 14, 1995 (DNC 3236734-3236737).
41. Memorandum to David Mercer, ``Finance Needs,'' Mar. 13, 1994
(DNC 3236707).
42. White House Automated Verification Entry System [WAVES]
records, Mar. 24, 1995 (EOP 040404).
43. Facsimile from Judy Spangler, White House Office of the Social
Secretary, to Jennifer Scully, DNC, Apr. 15, 1994 (print-out from White
House computers reflecting status of persons invited to an upcoming
Apr. 19, 1994 DNC Trustee Reception at the White House) (DNC 3058341-
3058351).
44. Memorandum from Minyon Moore to Chair [Deborah] DeLee, Bobby
Watson, Laura Hartigan, Jill Alper, and Vida Benavides, ``Upcoming
Holiday Events at the White House,'' Dec. 9, 1994 (DNC 0908516-
0908663).
45. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President,
to Mildred Webber, staff director, Subcommittee on National Economic
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, June 2, 1997.
46. Affidavit of Carl Mecum, Sept. 4, 1998.
47. ``Economic Conference List--Southern Region, Invitation List of
Panelists and Observers as of 3/21/95,'' Mar. 21, 1995 (DNC 3236693-
3236694, 3236696-3236699, 3236712).
48. White House Office of Public Liaison, ``APA Opinion Leaders''
(DNC 0626453-0626472).
49. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, June 6, 1997.
50. Handwritten notes of Erich Vaden, undated (M 20536).
51. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Tara Burns, ``X-mas List,''
June 17, [1994] (DNC 1019608).
52. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Erskine Bowles, ``Meetings To
Be Held While I Am Gone,'' Oct. 28, 1994 (M 33082-33083).
53. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar and Maggie
Williams, ``Holiday Card,'' Nov. 9, 1994 (DNC 1020078).
54. Memorandum from Brooke Stroud to Alice Pushkar, Maggie
Williams, and Jim Dorskind, ``Holiday Card: an update,'' Nov. 15, 1994
(DNC 1019684-1019685).
55. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Eric Sildon, Dec. 22, 1994 (Saturn
Documents 0000604-0000607).
56. Letter from Saturn Corp. to Brooke Stroud, Dec. 20, 1994
(Saturn Document 0000633-0000634).
57. Memorandum from Alice Pushkar to Cheryl Mills, ``Holiday Card
Project,'' Aug. 3, 1995 (M 033308-033309).
58. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, July 15, 1997.
59. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Alice Pushkar, ``1995 Holiday
Card Project,'' Aug. 14, 1995 (M 24915-24917).
60. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Oct. 9, 1997.
61. Subpoena of Charles F.C. Ruff, Dec. 16, 1997.
62. Letter from Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, to
Chairman McIntosh, Nov. 19, 1997.
63. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday Card
Numbers,'' Nov. 10, 1993 (M 034954).
64. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to Mack
McLarty, ``Holiday Cards,'' Dec. 2, 1993 (M 034960-034962).
65. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim Dorskind,
``Holiday Card Problem Areas and Considerations,'' Aug. 29, 1993 (M
034907-034909).
66. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Maggie Williams, ``Holiday
Cards,'' Nov. 9, 1993 (M 034950).
67. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday Card
Wrap-Up,'' Jan. 13, 1994 (M 034980-034982).
68. Letter from Daniel W. Burkhardt, Special Assistant and Counsel
to the Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages, to Monica
Breedlove, W.P. Malone, Inc., Mar. 2, 1994 (M 034984).
69. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott, ``Holiday Card
Lists,'' Dec. 7, 1993 (M 034965).
70. Memorandum from Lyn Utrecht to Bruce Lindsey, ``Database at
W.P. Malone,'' Mar. 9, 1995 (M 036558-036560).
71. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, via Matt Moore, to David Watkins,
Oct. 28, 1993 (M 034826-034827).
72. Letter from Chairman McIntosh to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to
the President, Mar. 2, 1998.
73. Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Special Counsel to the President,
to Keith Ausbrook, senior counsel, and Jay Apperson, special counsel,
Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and
Regulatory Affairs, Mar. 13, 1998.
74. E-mail Memorandum from Matthew L. Moore to Cheryl Mills,
``Christmas Card Lists,'' Oct. 20, 1993 (M 034831).
75. Memorandum from Dan Burkhardt to Marsha Scott and Jim Dorskind,
``Holiday Card Lists,'' Aug. 29, 1993 (M 034894-034898).
76. Memorandum from Cheryl Mills to Dan Burkhardt, ``Holiday
Greeting Card Project,'' Aug. 11, 1993 (M 034899).
77. Memorandum from Daniel W. Burkhardt, through Marsha Scott, to
Cheryl Mills, ``Democratic National Committee participation in Holiday
Card Project,'' Aug. 6, 1993 (M 034893).
78. Memorandum from Kelly Crawford to Helen Dickey, Oct. 17, 1994
(M 034692).
79. White House telephone call log, ``PHONE CALLS CONCERNING POTUS
AND THE ADMINISTRATION, LOG START DATE 1/8/96, LOG END DATE 1/26/96,''
(M 034780).
80. Cover note and list from Kelly Crawford to Monica Breedlove,
July 27, 1993 (M 03286-03301).
81. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Database
Outside WH,'' May 31, 1994 (M 036280).
82. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994 (M 32463-
32466).
83. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Bruce Lindsey, ``Internal Database Update,'' Jan. 26, 1994 (M 25634-
25637).
84. Meeting agenda, Feb. 2, 1994 (M 33044).
85. Unidentified note, Dec. 5, 1994 (M 33181).
86. Memorandum from Harold Ickes to Leon Panetta and Evelyn
Lieberman, ``Marsha Scott, VIP Operation at the Democratic National
Committee,'' May 17, 1996 (M 33215-33219).
87. ``Centralized White House Resource Database Security Brief,''
Jan. 2, 1993 (M 2778-2782).
88. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Mack McLarty, ``Master
Database,'' Dec. 7, 1993 (M 25921).
89. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to James L. McDonald, Jr.,
``Continuing Efforts for the First Lady,'' Feb. 4, 1994 (M 25334).
90. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, Mack McLarty, and
Harold Ickes, ``Follow-up to [Hillary Rodham Clinton] Meeting,'' Mar.
7, 1994 (M 32447).
91. Internal White House E-mail message from Jerry Carlsen to Patsy
Thomasson, ``Update on 11-14-9[4] Meeting Regarding Project,'' undated
(M 26251-26252).
92. ``Project Outline and Discussion, Updated 3-5-96'' (M 23168-
23169).
93. Draft Memorandum from Paul Antony and Brian Bailey to Erskine
Bowles, ``Update on White House Database Project,'' Oct. 25, 1994 (M
21402-21404).
94. Memorandum from Erich Vaden to Marsha Scott, ``Number of
Items,'' Mar. 2, 1995 (M 25639).
95. Memorandum [for Multiple Distribution] from Erskine Bowles,
``Clean-up and Coding of Database Records,'' Mar. 28, 1995 (M 32493).
96. Memorandum from Janice Enright to Harold Ickes, ``Terry
McAuliffe's requests to POTUS,'' Jan. 6, 1995 (EOP 035937).
97. Handwritten notes, undated (CGRO-1570).
98. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha
Scott,'' May 14, 1996 (M 33227).
99. Memorandum for the President from Harold Ickes, ``Marsha
Scott,'' May 14, 1996 (M 33220).
100. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``Outside
Data,'' Nov. 21, 1994 (M 33050-33052).
101. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes, ``DNC Offices
and Surrogate Speakers,'' Aug. 19, 1994 (M 33283-33285).
102. Memorandum from Marsha Scott to Phil Lader, ``Meeting Follow-
up,'' Mar. 4, 1994 (M 27470-27475).
[The supporting documents referred to follow:]
MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. TOM LANTOS, HON. ROBERT E.
WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. PAUL E.
KANJORSKI, HON. GARY A. CONDIT, HON. BERNARD SANDERS, HON. CAROLYN B.
MALONEY, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, HON. ELIJAH E.
CUMMINGS, HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH, HON. ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, HON. DANNY
K. DAVIS, HON. THOMAS H. ALLEN, AND HON. HAROLD E. FORD, JR.
CONTENTS
I. Executive Summary
II. Findings
A. The Development of WhoDB
B. Event Planning
1. Official Events
2. Events Sponsored by Outside Entities
C. The Holiday Card Project
D. The Involvement of the President and First Lady
III.Response to Majority Allegations
A. The Alleged ``Theft'' of the Holiday Card List
B. The Alleged ``Theft'' Concerning Event Attendance Information
C. The Alleged ``Conversion'' of Government Personnel and Resources
D. The Allegation of a White House ``Infrastructure'' to Support
DNC
E. The Allegations Regarding the President and First Lady
F. The Allegations Regarding Cheryl Mills
1. The Majority's ``Evidence'' of Perjury and Obstruction
a. Scott Memo
b. Bailey Notes
2. The Majority's Allegations Regarding Motive
IV. The Costs of the WhoDB Investigation
V. Conclusion
Appendix I
I. Executive Summary
The majority report accuses the President, the First Lady,
senior White House staff, and Democratic National Committee
[DNC] employees of theft of government property. These
conclusions are extraordinary. Simply put, the record does not
support an allegation of theft. It is not theft to remove
duplicate addresses from the President's holiday card list so
that recipients do not receive duplicate cards. It is not theft
to answer an inquiry as to whether an individual has attended
an event at the White House. Yet, at bottom, this is the type
of evidence the majority cites as support for its conclusions.
There has not been any prosecution for ``theft of
government property'' that even remotely resembles the conduct
examined here--nor will there ever be. Violation of the
``theft'' statute occurs where an individual ``embezzles,
steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use
of another, or without authority sells, conveys or disposes of
any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United
States.'' As the Supreme Court has ruled, to be guilty of this
crime a person must have a ``criminal intent to steal.''
No one ``stole'' the President's holiday card list. In both
the Republican and Democratic administrations, the President's
holiday cards are paid for by the President's political party,
so as to avoid any appearance that taxpayer money is being used
to pay for greetings to political supporters. In the case of
the 1994 list, a conscientious DNC employee, Brooke Stroud,
learned that the contractor that had been hired by the DNC to
remove duplicate addresses from the President's holiday card
list did not properly ``de-dupe'' the list. She therefore
worked over a weekend with her parents and several volunteers
to properly remove duplicate addresses from the list. This is
not embezzling, stealing, or purloining the holiday card list.
Ms. Stroud obtained the holiday card list for the purpose of
insuring that the President did not send two cards to the same
address--not for the purpose of stealing the list.
Similarly, there was no theft of the 1993 holiday card
list. Apparently, the contractor charged with ``de-duping'' the
1993 holiday card list failed to remove the list from its
computer. The computer was later moved--for unrelated reasons--
to the 1996 Clinton/Gore campaign. There is no evidence that
this list was used for campaign purposes. In fact, the Clinton-
Gore campaign never even accessed this list. Not only was there
no intent to steal, but it appears that the Clinton-Gore
campaign was not even aware that it possessed the list.
The majority's assertion that it is theft to disclose
attendance at White House events has even less of a foundation.
When the White House Social Office was planning official events
like a state dinner, the office had the responsibility of
submitting a proposed guest list to the President and the First
Lady. In order to assemble an appropriate list, the Social
Office asked various parties, including the DNC, for
suggestions. This was exactly the same practice followed in
prior administrations.
To avoid recommending individuals to the White House who
had recently been to theWhite House, the DNC, on occasion,
asked the White House Social Office whether certain individuals had
attended an event at the White House recently. When White House
employees answered these legitimate inquiries, they were not stealing
government property. They were simply helping to insure that the
President and the First Lady were presented with a better guest list.
A legitimate question is whether anyone improperly used
government resources for political purposes. On this issue,
however, the relevant witnesses testified that they had no
reason to believe that the holiday card list or the attendance
information--or any other information derived from the White
House database--was ever used for campaign or political
fundraising purposes. The Committee fully investigated every
minuscule transfer of information from the White House to the
DNC and did not establish that any of the information was used
improperly.
It is tempting not to dignify the majority report's
accusations regarding the President and First Lady with a
response. Since the charge has been made, however, it is
necessary to correct the record. The majority report's attempt
to implicate the President and First Lady in the theft
``scheme'' is not, in any way, substantiated by the evidence.
First, it is impossible to implicate the First Family in a
crime that has not been committed. Further, the record
indicates that the President and First Lady were only
peripherally involved with the database. The staff involved in
the database project could recall only a handful of
conversations with the President and First Lady about the
database--and those discussions were general in nature and
raise no concerns.
The majority also unfairly claims that Cheryl Mills, Deputy
White House Counsel, has committed perjury and obstruction
because Ms. Mills and other White House counsel disagreed with
Rep. McIntosh's conclusion about whether two documents were
responsive to his document request. It is not a crime to reach
a different conclusion than Rep. McIntosh.
Two years ago, Rep. McIntosh falsely accused SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt of flying first-class at taxpayer expense,
leading a Wall Street Journal columnist to observe:
Rep. David M. McIntosh has been chasing SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt Jr. all over Planet Washington. He does
so in pursuit of a ``scandal'' that, when we press our
x-ray spectrometer up against it, seems to consist of
the substance of interstellar space, which is to say,
nothing.
Mr. Levitt is accused of flying first class and
staying in nice hotels, and digging into his own pocket
to pay for it.
It takes a special kind of ingenuity to find
something to get outraged about here.\1\
\1\ Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Business World: Fly First Class (With
the Other Criminals), Wall Street Journal (July 15, 1997) (attached as
exhibit 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It also takes ``special ingenuity'' to discern a theft of
government property in this case. It may be frustrating to
spend over two years investigating an esoteric issue like the
White House database and find nothing. However, this does not
justify smearing the reputations of numerous public servants
and others without factual or legal support, nor does it
justify making ludicrous charges about the President and the
First Lady.
II. Findings
The White House Database (``WhoDB'') is a computerized
Rolodex used to track contacts of citizens with the White House
and to create a holiday card list. Well over two years ago,
Rep. McIntosh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National
Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs
began a sprawling investigation into the development and use of
the WhoDB.\2\ The Subcommittee, in conjunction with the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, has deposed 34
witnesses exclusively on WhoDB issues,\3\ and obtained over
43,000 pages of documents. It spent a great deal of taxpayer
money on this investigation. Yet neither the Subcommittee nor
the Committee held a public hearing on merits of the
investigation in the entire 105th Congress. What the evidence
gathered by the Committee shows is summarized below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Letter from Subcommittee Chairman David M. McIntosh to Leon
Panetta (June 27, 1996).
\3\ The deposition of one additional witness focused on both WhoDB
and other campaign finance related matters. See Deposition of Truman
Arnold, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (July 18,
1997). All depositions referenced in this report, unless otherwise
noted, were conducted by this Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. The Development of WhoDB
The Clinton administration inherited a number of different
computer systems that various offices within the White House
had used to track contacts. The Clinton administration planned
to update the computer systems by creating one White House
database that a number of the offices could access for the most
up-to-date contact information on individuals such as addresses
and phone numbers.4 The idea for such a system
apparently was not unique to the Clinton administration. A
database contract proposed late in the Bush administration
similarly described a system that would maintain a ``list of
names and addresses of individuals identified as important to
the President.'' 5
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Deposition of Laura Tayman, 29 (Mar. 20, 1998); Deposition of
Marsha Scott, 26-27, 58-59 (Feb. 18, 1998); Deposition of Erich Vaden,
15-16 (Jan. 25, 1998); Deposition of Mark Bartholomew, 36-37 (Aug. 15,
1997).
\5\ See The Propriety of the Taxpayer-funded White House Database,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural
Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight, 53 (Sept. 10, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The new database eventually became what is known as the
White House database or the ``WhoDB.'' According to a survey by
the Government Accounting Office, the White House estimated
that the WhoDB contains approximately 200,000 names of
individuals, as well as information such as the individuals'
addresses, organizational affiliations, and relationships with
the First Family.6 The White House estimates that
the total cost of development, operations, and maintenance of
the database from FY 1994 through August 1998 is
$785,467.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Id. at 97.
\7\ This estimate was provided by the Office of White House Counsel
in September 1998. The majority does not explain anywhere in its report
how it reached the conclusion that the WhoDB cost $1.7 million, and no
witnesses deposed by the Committee confirmed that that number was
accurate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although early plans anticipated that WhoDB would be used
by many offices within the White House, the two main users were
the Social Office, which used it to create guest lists for
events held at the White House, and the Correspondence Office,
which used it to create a list of names and addresses of
individuals who would receive holiday cards from the President.
After conducting a lengthy investigation into the
development and use of the WhoDB, the Subcommittee has learned
that those involved in developing the WhoDB regularly consulted
White House counsel on database issues, including the limits on
the receipt and use of information contained in the
WhoDB.8 For example, Brian Bailey, who was an
assistant to then-Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles,
testified as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See, e.g., Deposition of Erskine Bowles, 30, 107-08 (May 5,
1998); Deposition of Laura Tayman, 79-80 (Mar. 20, 1998); Deposition of
Marsha Scott, 90-91 (Feb. 18, 1998); Deposition of Erich Vaden, 101-04
(Jan. 25, 1998); Deposition of Brian Bailey, 27-28 (Feb. 6, 1998).
Erskine, from day one, was insistent that . . . this
is a short-term assignment and it just didn't make any
sense to even think about doing anything illegal,
immoral, or unethical. He used those three words all
the time. And he said, if there is anything that you
have one ounce of question about or even a shade of
gray in, go talk to the White House Counsel, and if
White House Counsel says no, then the answer is
no.9
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Deposition of Brian Bailey, 27 (Feb. 6, 1998).
The advice from White House counsel to those who worked on
the WhoDB distinguished between the transfer of data from
outside sources into a White House database and the transfer of
data from a White House database to outside sources. The
counsel's office advised that the White House can receive data
for a White House database from any source, including ``private
entities or individuals, non-profit organizations, political
organizations, and other sources.'' 10 For example,
if the Clinton-Gore campaign had a computerized Rolodex of
contacts who were important to the President, it would not be
illegal to import this data into the WhoDB, just as it would
not be illegal for a new government employee to bring the
employee's personal Rolodex with him or her into government
service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages (Jan. 17, 1994),
White House Bates No. M24918-20. All documents produced by the White
House for the WhoDB investigation are designated with the letter ``M.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House counsel took a dimmer view of transferring
data from a White House database to outside sources. The
counsel advised ``data from the database system may be provided
to a source outside the federal government only for authorized
purposes.'' 11 All of the relevant witnesses
testified that there was no transfer of data from the WhoDB to
databases outside the White House.12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the
President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Correspondence and Presidential Messages (Jan. 17, 1994),
M24918-20.
\12\ E.g., Deposition of Erich Vaden, 296 (Jan. 25, 1998);
Deposition of Marsha Scott, 133 (Feb. 18, 1998); Deposition of Mark
Bartholomew, 88-89 (Aug. 15, 1997); Deposition of Al Hurst, 112 (Mar.
13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, according to testimony, the WhoDB system had a
warning banner stating that data was for official use, and
users had to acknowledge this before logging on.13
Not only were employees made aware of the legal limits on the
WhoDB, witness after witness testified that they had no reason
to believe that the legal advice from White House counsel was
ever disregarded.14
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Deposition of Erich Vaden, 115-16 (Jan. 25, 1998).
\14\ See, e.g., Deposition of Erskine Bowles, 107-08 (May 5, 1998);
Deposition of Laura Tayman, 142 (Mar. 20, 1998); Deposition of Harold
Ickes, 132-33 (Mar. 12, 1998); Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 162
(Feb. 20, 1998); Deposition of Marsha Scott, 134 (Feb. 19, 1998);
Deposition of Donald Dunn, 151 (Jan. 27, 1998); Deposition of Erich
Vaden, 296 (Jan. 25, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Event Planning
The Social Office uses the WhoDB when planning official
White House events and unofficial events held on the White
House grounds. The Clinton administration's Social Office has
helped plan thousands of events to which hundreds of thousands
of guests were invited to the White House.15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 54-57 (Feb. 20, 1998)
(testifying that the Social Office held about 2,000 events in 4 years,
entertaining about half a million people in 4\1/2\ years).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Official events
According to deposition witnesses, official events include
events such as state dinners, arrival ceremonies, and bill
signings. Following the practices of previous administrations,
for these events, the Social Office collects a list of
recommended invitees from other offices within the White House
and from relevant outside entities such as congressional
offices, the DNC, and interested parties.\16\ These lists are
compiled into one list which is reviewed by the President, the
First Lady, or the White House Counsel's Office.\17\ The guest
list is then input onto the WhoDB.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 32-37 (Feb. 20 , 1998)
(``again, what we're going on is a precedent of me sitting down with
previous social secretaries and asking them how they did that and how
they went about building lists'').
\17\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 68, 76 (Feb. 20, 1998).
\18\ Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 26-28 (Feb. 24, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The WhoDB list is apparently used to create a
calligrapher's list of names and addresses for producing
written invitations; a Presidential identifier list which lists
the names and affiliations of the guests for the President; a
security list which lists names, social security numbers, and
birthdates which is sent to the WAVES computerized security
system; a gate list used for check-in on the date of the event
which contains the list of guests approved by security; and a
final attendee list which the gate sends to the Usher's Office
after the event.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 90-95 (Feb. 20, 1998);
Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 129 (Feb. 24, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the testimony of relevant White House and DNC
staff, the White House did not want the same people to be
invited repeatedly to official White House events.\20\
Therefore, before the DNC recommended potential invitees, DNC
staff would sometimes call the White House and ask whether a
particular individual had been to a past White House event.\21\
These calls generally involved a request about the attendance
of one or two individuals.\22\ The White House sometimes did
not respond to these requests and sometimes did--at times
consulting WhoDB.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 98 (Feb. 20, 1998) (``Of
course. We don't want duplicate invitations''); Deposition of Donald
Dunn, 152 (Jan. 27, 1998); Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 59 (Oct. 22,
1997); Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 182-83 (Jan. 6, 1998);
Deposition of Karen Hancox, 60 (Dec. 18, 1997) (stating that the
``genesis'' of such calls was that the White House Social Secretary was
concerned that DNC staff was submitting names of people who had been
invited a lot to the White House).
\21\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 33 (Oct. 22, 1997); Deposition
of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 105-06 (Jan. 6, 1998).
\22\ E.g., Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 105-06 (Jan. 6,
1998); Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 72-73 (Oct. 22, 1997).
\23\ E.g., Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 70, 80-81, 86 (Jan.
6, 1998) (testifying that ``often'' DNC requests to the White House for
information about upcoming events ``were not responded to,'' and that
DNC requests to the White House for event attendance lists were
``often'' denied); Letter from Charles Ruff, Counsel to the President,
to Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh (Feb. 28, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a general rule, after guest recommendations were
submitted to the Social Office by outside entities, the Social
Office did not inform them whether their suggested invitees had
been invited. However, on a few occasions, this information was
verbally provided--sometimes to the DNC.\24\ In addition, for
about a month (five to six events), the Social Office provided
written lists of invitees to the offices and outside entities
that had made recommendations.\25\ However, this process was
dropped as too cumbersome.\26\ The Social Secretary assumed the
entity wanted this information in order to set up appointments
while the invitee was in town.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 54-64, 97-99, (Feb. 20, 1998)
(``we didn't have time, energy, or the inclination to give that
information . . . That is not the business I was in . . . I did not
provide the information . . . The rule was not of not giving out the
list . . . I don't know if [Social Office Staff] ever provided it'');
Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 76-77 (Feb. 24, 1998) (noting that the
Social Office received requests from entities such as the Ford Theater
and the Kennedy Center for information about who had accepted or
regretted invitations, and that the Social Office treated such requests
``the same way we treated the [DNC] requests''); Deposition of Jacob
Aryeh Swiller, 70 (Jan. 6, 1998); Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 86-88
(Oct. 22, 1997) (Mr. Sullivan remembers other DNC employees making this
type of call on 4-6 occasions); Deposition of Donald Dunn, 107-109
(Jan. 27, 1998) (Mr. Dunn testified that on some occasions he provided
information to the DNC regarding the status of persons invited to an
upcoming event. He did not specify whether this information concerned
official or unofficial White House events).
\25\ According to testimony, such lists were created and printed
off of a Wordperfect system--not off of WhoDB. Deposition of Kim
Widdess, 27-28, 108 (Feb. 24, 1998).
\26\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 54-64 and 143 (Feb. 20, 1998);
Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 87 (Nov. 4, 1997) (noting that she saw
such lists ``once in a blue moon . . . rarely'').
\27\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 57-62 (Feb. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Events sponsored by outside entities
As with prior administrations, outside entities sponsored
events at the White House, meaning that these entities
reimbursed costs of events held on White House grounds. In the
Clinton administration, entities sponsoring such events have
included the Kennedy Center, the Ford's Theater, and the
International Olympics Committee, among others. The DNC has
also sponsored events at the White House.28
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Treasury,
Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1998, Part 3, 113-142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the Reagan and Bush administrations, political
entities also held events at the White House.29
Former Clinton administration Social Secretary Judith Ann Stock
testified that ``[i]t's the same as if there were a Republican
President, the RNC also would pay for an event that might be
sponsored in the White House with the Eagles. That's what we
based our judgment on. And that was something that was well
defined and well understood . . . by previous administrations
as well as this administration.'' 30
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ For example, Republican donor program events at the White
House during the Bush administration include: Oct. 17, 1991, Team 100
dinner hosted by President Bush; Feb. 20, 1992, National Republican
Senatorial Committee Trust reception, hosted by President Bush; Mar. 9,
1992, National Republican Senatorial Committee [NRSC] and National
Republican Congressional Committee [NRCC] fundraising planning event in
which President Bush met with members of the NRSC and NRCC to discuss
the President's Dinner, a joint fundraising event; Apr. 8, 1992, Eagles
reception hosted by President and Mrs. Bush; Apr. 9, 1992, Eagles
reception hosted by President and Mrs. Bush; May 14, 1992, NRCC
President's Forum and House Council briefing and reception involving
meeting with President Bush; Jan. 6, 1993, Presidential Trust and
Eagles reception hosted by President and Mrs. Bush; Jan. 7, 1993,
Presidential Trust and Eagles reception hosted by President and Mrs.
Bush; Jan. 12, 1993, Team 100 dinner hosted by President Bush.
Republican donor program events at the White House during the Reagan
administration include: July 9, 1981, two Eagles receptions hosted by
President Reagan; Sept. 22, 1981, Eagles reception hosted by President
Reagan; Apr. 16, 1982, Eagles reception hosted by President Reagan;
June 21, 1982, Senatorial Trust reception hosted by President Reagan;
Sept. 13, 1983, Eagles reception hosted by President Reagan; Nov. 22,
1983, Senatorial Trust reception hosted by President Reagan; May 10,
1984, reception for the President's Dinner Committee hosted by
President Reagan; August 29, 1984, reception for GOP Re-elect Committee
hosted by President Reagan; Apr. 2, 1985, Presidential Trust reception
hosted by President Reagan; Apr. 22, 1985, reception for the Republican
Congressional Leadership Council; Sept. 12, 1985, Eagles reception;
Dec. 9, 1986, Eagles meeting attended by President Reagan; Dec. 16,
1986, reception for House-Senate dinner fundraisers hosted by President
Reagan; Apr. 29, 1987, President's Dinner reception hosted by President
Reagan; May 28, 1987, meeting hosted by President Reagan with GOPAC, a
political action committee founded by Congressman Newt Gingrich; Sept.
15, 1987, NRCC meeting with President Reagan; Sept. 30, 1987, Eagles
meeting with President Reagan; Apr. 14, 1988, President's dinner state
chairmen meeting with President Reagan; May 11, 1988, President's
dinner donors meeting with President Reagan; June 30, 1988, Republican
Congressional Leadership Council reception hosted by President Reagan;
July 26, 1988, NRSC meeting with President Reagan; July 29, 1988
Presidential Trust meeting with President Reagan. See Minority Report,
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Investigation of Illegal or
Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,
S. Rept. No. 167, 105th Cong., 2d sess., v. 5., pp. 8053-55, appendix
to Chapter 28 (Mar. 10, 1998) (hereafter ``Senate Minority Report'').
\30\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 21 (Feb. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As in prior administrations, invitation lists for White
House events sponsored by outside entities generally were kept
in White House databases, and the invitations were sent from
the White House. 31 The guest lists were vetted with
the counsel's office to ensure the potential invitees were
``appropriate to be admitted to the White House.''
32 The lists were then put into a database--like the
WhoDB--to create a list for the calligraphers' office, which
sent out the invitations. The Office of the Social Secretary
would receive invitation responses and ask for the social
security numbers and birthdates of guests. According to the
Social Secretary, that system had been ``in place since they've
been using the Secret Service to admit people through the White
House.'' 33 Thus, as in previous administrations,
the Clinton administration used White House resources and staff
to input information from outside organizations like the DNC
into White House databases and to process RSVPs and guest
admission for events sponsored by outside entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 27-29 (Feb. 20, 1998).
\32\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 27 (Feb. 20, 1998).
\33\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 28 (Feb. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House Social Secretary testified that the Chief
Usher of the White House was responsible for reimbursement for
the time and resources of the persons involved in the
invitation process. She stated that the Chief Usher's system
regarding what was reimbursed was ``again based on what the
Bushes had used.'' 34
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 29 (Feb. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The record indicates that, on a few occasions, the Clinton
White House provided status reports to the sponsoring entity
regarding who had RSVPed.35 The White House Social
Secretary suggested that the purpose of providing such
information was to help the sponsor determine whether it needed
to follow-up on inviting people to the event.36
Because guests generally RSVP directly to the White House, the
entity would have no other way of obtaining up-to-date RSVP
information. The White House provided such information to
sponsoring entities such as the Library of Congress, the DNC,
and others.37 The record also indicates that the DNC
received from the White House a few attendance lists regarding
past DNC-sponsored events at the White House.38 Mr.
Swiller of the DNC testified that ``sporadically, every couple
of months'' the DNC would receive such lists.39
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ E.g., Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 87 (Feb. 20, 1998).
\36\ Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 87 (Feb. 20, 1998).
\37\ See Deposition of Kimberly Widdess, 76-77 (Feb. 24, 1998);
Deposition of Judith Ann Stock, 30-31 (Feb. 20, 1998).
\38\ E.g., List for ``Reception (DNC Trustees),'' with cover fax
sheet dated Apr. 4, 1994, DNC B No. 3058341.
\39\ Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 18-20 (Jan. 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. The Holiday Card Project
Since 1995, the WhoDB was also used to create a list of
names and addresses for individuals designated to receive a
holiday card from the President. The Clinton administration
followed the holiday card procedure established by previous
administrations.40 A number of entities--including
the White House, the DNC, the campaign, and others connected
with the President--created lists of card recipients. The DNC
paid outside contractors to merge the lists and to produce and
mail the cards.41 As was the practice in prior
administrations, the President's political party (in this case,
the DNC) paid for the costs of producing and mailing the cards
to avoid any appearance that federal funds were being used to
send greetings to the President's supporters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Deposition of Alice Pushkar, 158 (Jan. 13, 1998).
\41\ Deposition of Alice Pushkar, 158 (Jan. 13, 1998); Deposition
of Jodie Torkelson, 99 (Sept. 9, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The record indicates that the holiday card lists that were
on the WhoDB were not provided by the White House to any
outside entity other than the contractors who were hired to
merge and purge the lists and print the cards. No relevant
witnesses had reason to believe the lists were used for
campaign fundraising or any inappropriate
purposes.42
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 90-92 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition
of Alice Pushkar, 157 (Jan. 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, in 1994, before the WhoDB was used for the holiday
card project, the contractor charged with merging the various
lists provided a copy of a holiday card list to the DNC. The
White House informed the Subcommittee of this fact even though
the Subcommittee had not requested this pre-WhoDB
information.43 Although relevant witnesses were
questioned for numerous hours on the 1994 holiday card project,
the record does not indicate that the 1994 holiday card list
was used for any purpose other than the holiday card
project.44
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Letter from the Executive Office of the President to
Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh (Feb. 28, 1997).
\44\ See, e.g. Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 92 (Nov. 18, 1997);
Deposition of Al Hurst, 110-11 (Mar. 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Apparently, the DNC and White House employees responsible
for the 1994 holiday card project were not satisfied with the
work done by the contractor who merged the lists. Therefore,
the DNC employee charged with the project, Brooke Stroud, along
with her parents, spent a holiday weekend at the DNC with
volunteers (apparently women who had volunteered to help with
the holiday card project in previous administrations) removing
duplicate names and addresses from a holiday card
list.45
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 164-175 (Nov. 4, 1997). It also
should be noted that the list that was de-duped at the DNC may not have
included information that came from the White House. Although Brooke
Stroud believed it did include White House information, documents
relating to the de-duplicating project show that it may have been
limited to a ``merge and purge'' of information provided by the DNC and
the PeopleBase. Ms. Stroud explained, ``The way I remember it is
different than the way it is being described here (in the documents),
but that doesn't mean that my memory is the one to go with.''
Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 97, 103 (Nov. 18, 1997). Furthermore,
James Dorskind, a White House employee who worked on the 1994 holiday
card, testified that he believed that de-duplication did not include
White House information. Deposition of James Dorskind, 90-91 (Oct. 3,
1997) (``there were volunteers who assisted in 1994 in de-duping the
PeopleBase list, as I recall it, or the DNC, whatever it was that was
going in for the purpose of the holiday card project'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During this process, only two DNC employees had access to
this list, Ms. Stroud and computer specialist Al Hurst. Both
testified that they had no reason to believe the information
was used for campaign fundraising or any campaign
purpose.46 They only used the information for the
holiday card project.47
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 92 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition of
Al Hurst, 110-11 (Mar. 13, 1998).
\47\ Deposition of Al Hurst, 111-12 (Mar. 13, 1998); Deposition of
Brooke Stroud, 91-94 (Nov. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It also appears that the contractor responsible for ``de-
duping'' the 1993 holiday card list failed to remove the list
from its computer when the project was completed. The list
ended up in the hands of the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign by
accident when the contractor moved its computer to the Clinton-
Gore campaign in October 1995 so the campaign could access a
different database on that computer (PeopleBase). Again there
is no evidence that the list was used for campaign fundraising
or any unofficial purpose.48 To the contrary, the
date-tag on the computerized file containing the holiday card
list indicates that the file was not accessed after the
computer was moved to the campaign.49 Apparently,
the campaign was not even aware of the existence of this file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Affidavit of Carl Mecum (Sept. 4, 1998).
\49\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. The Involvement of the President and First Lady
The Committee thoroughly investigated the extent to which
both the President and First Lady were involved in the WhoDB
project. The record indicates that the President and First Lady
were interested in and aware of the database, but had little
involvement in its development or use. Several individuals who
have regular contact with the President and First Lady
testified about this matter.
Marsha Scott, then Director of Correspondence at the White
House, who led the WhoDB project, testified that she felt
confident that ``at some point I probably said [to the
President], `I am working on something to get a social system
up.' '' She had no memory, however, of specific discussions
with the President about the database. She further testified
that she did not believe that she ever made a progress report
to him on the project.50
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 14-25 (Apr. 28, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Erskine Bowles, then-Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President, testified that he spoke with the President about the
database ``maybe twice.'' 51 Harold Ickes, also
then-Deputy Chief of Staff to the President, testified that he
believes he had ``one or two conversations'' with the President
about the database, but that ``it was not something that he was
particularly focused on.'' Mr. Ickes noted that the President's
concern was that ``people be remembered.'' 52
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Deposition of Erskine Bowles, 18 (May 5, 1998).
\52\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, 22-28 (Mar. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the record indicates that the President was
not involved in discussions with White House staff regarding
outside databases. Ms. Scott testified that she does not
believe she ever spoke with the President about outside
databases.53 Mr. Ickes testified that he did not
ever have an understanding that the President wanted the White
House and DNC databases integrated or compatible.54
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 22 (Apr. 28, 1998).
\54\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, 63-64 (Mar. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence indicates that the First Lady wanted a database of
White House contacts, but that her involvement with the details
of the WhoDB project was peripheral. Ms. Scott testified that
she only recalled one conversation with the First
Lady.55 This discussion occurred early on in the
development of the WhoDB. She discussed that conversation as
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 17 (Apr. 28, 1998).
What I remember of my discussions with her was that
she hoped I would make this a high priority and she
wanted this to get done. I mean, we were in a
technological wasteland in the White House and it was
very, very time consuming for all of us, and
particularly for the offices that she controlled, which
was the Social Office, to get their work done. And she
wanted, before we got into another round of big
functions and holiday lists, she very strongly and I
would even say even desperately wanted us to have
something set up so it would be a lot easier on all the
staffs as we got into this.56
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 116 (Feb. 18, 1998).
Mr. Ickes testified that he did not recall any
conversations with the First Lady about the WhoDB.57
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, 26-29 (Mar. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Response to Majority Allegations
The majority report makes six major allegations regarding
the WhoDB investigation: (1) the holiday card list was stolen,
(2) event attendance information was stolen, (3) government
resources and personnel were stolen, (4) an infrastructure at
the White House was dedicated to supporting the Democratic
National Committee, (5) the President and the First Lady were
involved in the unlawful conversion of government property to
the use of the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign, and (6) White
House counsel, Cheryl Mills, committed perjury and obstructed
the investigation. These allegations, however, are not
substantiated by the Committee record. To the contrary, the
majority's allegations conflict with the overwhelming weight of
the testimony and evidence gathered by the Committee.
Regrettably, despite the extensive resources devoted to
investigating the WhoDB and the serious nature of the charges
being made by the majority, the majority did not schedule a
single day of hearings on the merits of the WhoDB investigation
in the 105th Congress.58 As Rep. Waxman stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ In the 104th Congress, there was one hearing on the WhoDB. The
Propriety of the Taxpayer-funded White House Database, Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and
Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
(Sept. 10, 1996). In the 105th Congress, the Committee addressed
questions relating to document production, including the production of
WhoDB material in a hearing, but never held a hearing on the merits of
the investigation. White House Compliance with Committee Subpoenas,
Hearing Before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Nov. 6
and 7, 1997).
Mr. McIntosh didn't hold a single hearing on this
investigation in the last two years, despite the fact
that he summoned 34 witnesses to depositions and
demanded 43,000 documents. . . . [T]hat means the
entire investigation has been conducted in secret. The
media and the public have had no opportunity to observe
Representative McIntosh's methods or evaluate the
credibility of his suspicions. In short, the public has
had no chance to see if the investigation of the
alleged Christmas card list caper was legitimate
oversight or political witch hunt, or just
foolishness.59
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Business Meeting on Committee Report, Report on Investigation
of the White House Database, and Release of Documents, House Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight (Oct. 9, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. The Alleged ``Theft'' of the Holiday Card List
The majority report claims that ``[t]he knowing delivery of
[the] holiday card lists to others outside of the government .
. . constitute[s] the theft of government property under 18
U.S.C. Sec. 641.'' 60 The record simply does not
support this accusation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Majority report, Investigation of the Conversion of the 1.7
Million Centralized White House Computer System, Known as the White
House Database, and Related Matters, House Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight (Oct. 9, 1998) (hereafter, the ``Majority
Report'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The theft statute provides:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly
converts to his use or the use of another, or without
authority sells, conveys, or disposes of any record,
voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States
or any department or agency thereof; or whoever
receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to
convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been
embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted--shall be
fined . . . or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.61
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ 18 U.S.C. 641.
The majority claims that ``[t]he mere possession of the
list by the DNC is evidence of a theft of the property,'' but
this is not true. As the Supreme Court has held in Morissette
v. United States,62 an individual does not commit
theft under this statute unless there is ``criminal intent to
steal or knowingly convert, that is, wrongfully to deprive
another of possession of property.'' 63
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
\63\ 342 U.S. 246, 276.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This crucial element of intent does not exist in the case
of the alleged theft of the 1994 holiday card list. Ms. Stroud,
the DNC employee who obtained the list, did not obtain the list
from the contractor with an intent to deprive the White House
of property that belongs to the White House. Instead, she
obtained the list for an entirely legitimate reason: to remove
duplicate addresses. This is not a crime. In fact, it is
commendable.64
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ The majority report mentions other versions of the 1994 list
that may have been sent to the DNC. Deposition testimony indicates that
these versions, as well, stayed in the possession of two employees--
Brooke Stroud and a computer operator--until they were provided to DNC
counsel in response to requests made pursuant to this investigation.
Further, these lists were protected from disclosure to other employees
and were only used for the purpose of sending out the holiday cards.
Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 173-74 (Nov. 4, 1997); Deposition of
Brooke Stroud, 32-33, 45-46, 92-95 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition of Al
Hurst, 30-54, 66-91, 110-11 (Mar. 13, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same fundamental flaw--lack of criminal intent--
invalidates the majority's assertion that a theft of property
occurred in connection with the 1993 holiday card list. This
holiday card list ended up at the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign by
accident. It is not theft to unknowingly accept a used computer
that happens to have White House data stored in its hard drive.
In addition, the record indicates that neither of the
holiday card lists were used for any purpose other than sending
out holiday cards.65 In fact, the 1996 Clinton-Gore
campaign apparently did not even know that it had received the
1993 holiday card list and never accessed the list. Thus, there
is no support for another element of the ``theft'' statute--
conversion of the property for his use or the use of another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Deposition of Brooke Stroud, 92 (Nov. 18, 1997); Deposition of
Al Hurst, 110-111 (Mar. 13, 1998); Affidavit of Carl Mecum (Sept. 4,
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. the alleged ``theft'' concerning event attendance information
The majority report also alleges that the White House and
DNC committed ``theft'' by executing a ``scheme'' involving the
use of WhoDB to help the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign.
According to the majority, this plan purportedly was approved
at a March 1995 meeting between then-DNC finance chair Truman
Arnold, then-White House Social Secretary Ann Stock, and then-
Deputy Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles. The majority claims that
``theft'' occurred because the White House responded to DNC
inquiries about whether individuals had attended past White
House events, and the DNC used that information in fundraising
efforts.
These allegations are not substantiated by the evidence.
The evidence shows that the White House employees who provided
event attendance information to the DNC did not commit a
``theft'' of government property. To the contrary, they had a
legitimate reason for responding to the DNC requests. The White
House did not want to invite the same people repeatedly to
White House events. Providing information on recent event
attendance to entities like the DNC that were asked to submit
recommendations for potential guests helped the White House
build betterguest lists. The DNC, too, sought information for
legitimate purposes: making sure they provided appropriate guest
suggestions for White House events. Nothing in these actions reflects
any sort of intent to wrongfully deprive the government of property.
Further, it is difficult to see how the mundane information
involving White House event attendance can even be ``stolen.''
Everyone who attends an event at the White House has this
information, as they obviously can see who is there. In
addition, the White House regularly publishes who attends state
dinners in the newspaper.
Other evidence also fundamentally contradicts the
majority's claims. Relevant DNC witnesses testified that they
did not use event attendance information from the White House
for fundraising purposes. Richard Sullivan, former finance
director of the DNC, testified as follows:
Q: Now, to your knowledge, was anyone who had been
invited or who had attended official events--that's
still what we are talking about here--thereafter
contacted by anyone at the DNC to make a contribution
and reminded of their having been invited or attended
an event?
A: Not to my knowledge.
Q: You never contacted anybody who had been invited
or attended an event, asked for a contribution and
reminded them of their having been invited or having
attended?
A: No.
Q: Okay. . . . Did anyone at DNC ever contact a
potential contributor and ask for a contribution and
remind that contributor that a member of their family
or a business associate had attended or been invited to
such an event, to a White House event, to your
knowledge?
A: No, not to my knowledge.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 89-90 (Oct. 22, 1997). Later
in his testimony, Mr. Sullivan testified that he had made a few fund-
raising calls using names he saw on a list of attendees at a 1993-1994
White House CEO luncheon. The list Mr. Sullivan used, however, was
created before the WhoDB was operational. Moreover, the record before
the Committee does not establish that the list even came from the White
House. Deposition of Richard Sullivan, 21, 40-49 (Mar. 5, 1998).
Ari Swiller, former head of the DNC trustee program,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provided similar testimony:
Q: Do you have any reason to believe anyone at the
DNC used this information that you received relating to
attendance to White House events to determine whether
or not to solicit a contribution from the invitee? For
instance, would you solicit contributions from
confirmed invitees and attendees and hold off
soliciting from recommended invitees who had not been
accepted by the White House?
A: No.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 183 (Jan. 6, 1998). Mr.
Swiller also testified that he had no reason to believe that WhoDB was
used for political fundraising or campaign purposes. Id. at 182. See
also Deposition of Brook Stroud, 90-91 (Nov. 18, 1998) (testifying that
she did not use final attendance lists regarding White House events to
determine whether or not the DNC should solicit a contribution from
anyone on such lists, and that she never used these lists for campaign
fundraising purposes).
This testimony is inconsistent with the majority's claim
that information was ``converted'' for the benefit of the DNC.
Further, DNC staff requests to the White House were often
ignored, and DNC staff testified that the DNC was not able to
obtain information from the White House more readily following
Mr. Arnold's March 1995 visit at the White House.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Deposition of Jacob Aryeh Swiller, 70, 80-81, 86-87 (Jan. 6,
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. The Alleged ``Conversion'' of Government Personnel and Resources
The majority also alleges that the White House violated the
``theft'' statute by converting ``government personnel and
resources'' to directly benefit outside political
campaigns.\69\ The main basis for the majority's assertion is a
June 28, 1994, memo by Marsha Scott, who was leading the
development of WhoDB at the time the memo was written.\70\ The
majority's claim, however, ignores relevant testimony by the
author of the document and others that directly contradicts the
majority's conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Majority Report.
\70\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd
to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The June 28, 1994, memo by Ms. Scott discusses four
different databases, including the White House
database.71 In the memo, Ms. Scott states that her
``team'' and she are ``engaged in conversations with the DNC
about the new systems they are proposing,'' and suggests, ``let
my team work with the DNC to help them design a system that
will meet our needs and technical specifications.''
72 Ms. Scott in her deposition testimony explained
that she and the WhoDB team were working with the DNC to ensure
that the WhoDB would be able to receive information from the
DNC.73
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 89-101 (Feb. 19, 1998).
\72\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd
to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
\73\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 94-95 (Feb. 19, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the White House Counsel's Office had
advised,74 these efforts were not illegal. Like many
individuals in many other types of jobs, the President is
entitled to build a Rolodex of individuals who he knows and
with whom he is interested in maintaining contact. The DNC
database had extensive information about individuals who the
President knew. It was therefore a logical source of data for
populating the electronic White House Rolodex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ See, e.g., Memorandum from Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to
the President, to Marsha Scott, Deputy Assistant to the President (Jan.
17, 1994), M24918-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with Ms. Scott's testimony, individuals who
worked with her on WhoDB testified that they recalled talking
with the DNC to discuss making sure the White House could
receive data from the DNC.75 Nowhere in the
voluminous deposition record is there evidence that any
individuals on the WhoDB team--or any White House employee--
did, in fact, work on developing outside databases. In fact,
when Ms. Scott's former assistant, Erich Vaden, was asked
whether anyone worked with the DNC to design a system, he
testified, ``I know she [Ms. Scott] would have liked that, but
it never happened.'' 76
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Deposition of Mark Bartholomew, 50-51 (Aug. 15, 1997), 47-48
(Sept. 16, 1997); Deposition of Erich Vaden, 166-67 (Jan. 25, 1998).
\76\ Deposition of Erich Vaden, 263 (Jan. 25, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The only use of government resources for unofficial
purposes that this investigation demonstrated regarding the
June 28, 1994, memo was that the memo itself arguably should
not have been printed on government paper because, in addition
to discussing WhoDB, it also discussed outside political
databases. Under the Hatch Act, it is not illegal for certain
employees of the Executive Office of the President to engage in
political activity, but the costs associated with that activity
cannot be paid by the government.77 Thus, it is
arguable that a memo discussing outside political databases
should not be written on official stationary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ 5 U.S.C. 7234(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The majority asserts that the use of government paper for
the memo is ``similar'' to the conduct prosecuted in United
States v. Collins.78 The conduct in Collins,
however, involved a government employee with an apparent
partiality to ballroom dancing who made approximately 76,500
copies of ballroom dancing newsletters and calendars on a
government copier, on government paper, for his personal
use.79 It is irresponsible--and just plain silly--to
compare that conduct to using two sheets of government paper
for a memo discussing ideas on both government and
nongovernment databases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ 53 F.3d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Majority Report.
\79\ Collins, 53 United States F.3d at 1418.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. the allegation of a white house ``infrastructure'' to support dnc
The majority report asserts that the investigation
``exposed'' a White House ``infrastructure'' that processed
invitations for DNC events at the White House.80 The
majority fails to mention that the White House Social Office
has processed invitations the same way for all outside entities
holding an event at the White House, including the Kennedy
Center and the Library of Congress. The majority also fails to
mention that the system followed in the Clinton White House was
based on the precedent set by past Republican
administrations.81 The exclusion of this relevant
evidence underscores that this investigation appears to be
designed to generate allegations about the Clinton
Administration, rather than seriously examine the way White
House resources are used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Majority Report.
\81\ See discussion above in Part II.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. the allegations regarding the president and first lady
The majority claims that the President and the First Lady
were ``involved in the unlawful conversion of government
property to the use of the DNC and the Clinton/Gore campaign.''
82 The record, however, does not even remotely
support the majority's claim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ Majority Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, as discussed above, the conduct at issue in the
WhoDB investigation did not violate the ``theft'' statute. It
is impossible to implicate the President and First Lady when a
crime did not occur.
Second, as discussed above, the deposition testimony from
the relevant witnesses indicates that the President and First
Lady were interested in and aware of the database, but were not
involved with the details of its planning and use.
The majority cites nine documents to argue that the
President and First Lady conspired to steal government
property. In this discussion, however, the majority
mischaracterizes most of the documents, fails to include any of
the substantial exculpatory evidence that the Committee
uncovered when questioning witnesses about these very
documents, and makes enormous leaps of logic. Despite the
majority's elaborate efforts to demonstrate a link between a
scheme toillegally use the WhoDB and the First Family, the
record simply does not support the majority's allegations.
The following are a few examples of how the majority
ignores exculpatory evidence, mischaracterizes documents, and
makes arguments that strain credulity in order to tie the First
Family to an alleged ``scheme'':
Brian Bailey Notes.\83\ As its strongest
evidence, the majority cites to the handwritten notes
of Brian Bailey, former aide to Mr. Bowles, which state
that ``Harold [Ickes] and Deborah DeLee want to make
sure WhoDB is integrated w/DNC database--so we can
share--evidently, POTUS [the President] wants this
to.'' Although the majority asserts that these notes
indicate that the President wanted to transfer data
from the WhoDB to the DNC, these notes do not support
the majority's assertion. On their face, the notes do
not make clear whether the reference to ``sharing''
information concerned White House receipt of
information from the DNC (which is appropriate) or DNC
receipt of White House database information (which
might not be appropriate). Moreover, the testimony of
all the relevant witnesses conflicts with the
majority's assertion. These witnesses uniformly
testified that they had a clear understanding that it
was inappropriate for the White House to share data
from its databases, and had no reason to believe that
the White House ever transferred information from WhoDB
to an outside database.\84\ In fact, none of the 35
witnesses that testified in the WhoDB investigation
said that they believed that WhoDB was inappropriately
linked with a DNC or other outside database, or that
the President wanted improper linkage to occur.\85\ Mr.
Bailey, the author of the notes, himself testified that
he had no personal knowledge of what the President
wanted with respect to the database, and that the notes
likely were based on information he heard in passing
and quickly wrote down to himself.\86\ He also
testified that he likely spoke with White House counsel
on this matter and had no reason to believe anyone at
the White House ignored legal advice relating to the
database.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey (undated), M033298.
\84\ E.g., Deposition of Brian Bailey, 39, 129-32 (Feb. 6, 1998).
\85\ See, e.g., Deposition of Harold Ickes, 61-63, 130-31 (Mar. 12,
1998); Deposition of Brian Bailey, 129-132 (Feb. 6, 1998).
\86\ Deposition of Brian Bailey, 129-30 (Feb. 6, 1998).
\87\ Deposition of Brian Bailey, 36-37, 129-32 (Feb. 6, 1998).
June 28, 1994, Marsha Scott Memo.\88\ The
majority claims that this memo from Marsha Scott to
Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey and ``cc'd'' to the
First Lady ``shows that the First Lady was informed of
the conversion of government staff and other
resources,'' because Ms. Scott describes her interest
in ensuring that the WhoDB is compatible with the DNC
database. As discussed above in Part III. C, however,
the record does not establish that this memorandum is
evidence of an illegal conversion of government
resources. In fact, the only wrongdoing that was
potentially established was that this two-page
memorandum was printed on government stationary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd
to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M032438.
WhoDB Requirements Report.\89\ In one of its
more bizarre leaps of logic, the majority report points
to the language in a WhoDB requirements report that
states that the President and First Lady requested that
a database ``containing relevant information about all
White House events and contacts be designed and
implemented.'' \90\ Based on that language, the
majority concludes that the document suggests that the
President and First Lady ``had a particular interest in
the Database project, such as the possible political
uses of databases.'' \91\ There is simply no foundation
for this inference, however, since the WhoDB
requirements report never mentions any political uses
of databases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ WhoDB Requirements Report, undated, produced by the White
House with no bates stamp No.
\90\ WhoDB Requirements Report, undated.
\91\ Majority Report (emphasis added).
The only evidence in the Committee record of direct
involvement by the President in building any database concerns
his occasional practice of passing along names and addresses of
individuals to be incorporated into the PeopleBase database.
The PeopleBase is the database developed by Malone, Inc., for
President Clinton in the early 1980's which was used by
President Clinton while he was Governor of Arkansas.\92\
President Clinton owns the data within the PeopleBase.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Deposition of William Percy Malone, 14 (Oct. 1, 1997).
\93\ Deposition of William Percy Malone, 55 (Oct. 1, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The majority report states in its opening pages that the
President's conduct was illegal because ``the President
routinely continued to build PeopleBase with the names and
addresses of individuals who communicated with him through the
official White House mail.'' 94 There are two
fundamental problems with this assertion, however. First, the
record does not establish that the President forwarded
information from official White House mail to PeopleBase. In
fact, the majority report simply ignores the testimony of the
Committee witness who actually was responsible for forwarding
names and addresses from the President to PeopleBase, and who
was the only Committee witness with personal knowledge of the
practice. This individual, former White House aide Laura
Tayman, testified that she forwarded ``business cards and torn-
off sheets of paper with [the President's] actual writing. It
was not any electronic information.'' She noted that she was
generally asked to do this after the President had been
traveling. Most importantly, Ms. Tayman stated flatly that she
``never'' forwarded names from correspondence.95
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Majority Report (emphasis added).
\95\ Deposition of Laura Tayman, 108-10 (Mar. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, even if the President had forwarded to PeopleBase
the names of certain individuals who had corresponded with him,
it is not at all clear that this would be illegal. If the
practice of occasionally transferring such information were
prohibited, then no elected public officials would be able to
put names and addresses of individuals they meet on the job
into their personal Rolodexes.
F. The Allegations Regarding Cheryl Mills
Finally, the majority makes unsubstantiated accusations
that smear the reputation of White House Deputy Counsel to the
President, Cheryl Mills. On September 17, 1998, Rep. McIntosh
requested that the Department of Justice investigate Ms. Mills
for perjury and obstruction of justice because Rep. McIntosh
disagreed with the White House's determination that two
documents were not responsive to a request made pursuant to the
WhoDB investigation. He also discussed his charges publicly,
resulting in a Washington Post article containing his
allegation that there was ```very strong evidence' that Ms.
Mills lied to Congress.'' 96 The majority has now
reiterated these claims in the majority report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ Database Criminal Probe Sought, Washington Post (Sept. 9,
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The majority claims that Ms. Mills committed obstruction of
justice and gave false testimony regarding the production of
two documents: (1) the June 28, 1994, memo by Marsha
Scott,97 and (2) the notes of White House aide Brian
Bailey.98 The White House did not produce these
documents in its initial September 1996 response to Mr.
McIntosh's August 2, 1996, request. Upon further review of the
documents, however, the White House, on its own initiative,
produced them to Rep. McIntosh.99
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\97\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey, cc'd
to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
\98\ Handwritten notes of Brian Bailey (undated), M033298.
\99\ The White House produced the Scott memo on Feb. 26, 1997, and
the Bailey notes on Oct. 28, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The majority believes that the two documents at issue are
responsive to the August 2, 1996 request and that the White
House erred in failing to produce the documents in the initial
September 1996 production. The majority reaches this conclusion
after having had the benefit of the testimony of numerous
witnesses on these documents, including the authors of the
documents, which the White House did not have. The majority,
however, is not justified in asserting that this difference in
judgment--and Ms. Mills's subsequent testimony describing what
happened--involved obstruction and lying.
1. The majority's ``evidence'' of perjury and obstruction
a. Scott memo
The majority claims that Ms. Mills made three false
statements in her testimony regarding production of the Scott
memo. The majority further alleges that these statements are
evidence that Ms. Mills, and possibly other White House
counsel, committed obstruction by ``withholding'' the Scott
memo ``without justification.'' The record does not support the
majority's claims.
The Scott memo describes a number of different databases
and does not explicitly mention WhoDB. The disputed paragraph
of the memo states that ``Currently in the White House we are
preparing, as you know, to implement a new database system
starting August 1. While that system is modeled after the
Peoplebase software, it has major differences.'' 100
After the document was produced, the Committee learned from its
author that the disputed paragraph refers to WhoDB. Ms. Mills,
who consulted with her supervisor, the counsel to the
President, on the production of documents that included the
Scott memo, apparently had a different impression when she
reviewed the document in September 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Memo from Marsha Scott to Harold Ickes and Bruce Lindsey,
cc'd to the First Lady (June 28, 1994), M32438.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The majority claims that Ms. Mills testified falsely by
stating that, when she reviewed the Scott memo in September
1996, she believed that the database referenced in the disputed
paragraph was not WhoDB. The main basis for the majority's
conclusion appears to be testimony of other witnesses regarding
what they thought the memo meant. The judgments of others,
however, cannot be imputed to Ms. Mills, and such evidence
therefore does not support any charge that Ms. Mills was lying
instead of having a different impression of the memo.
Further, the majority omits testimony received by the
Committee that shows that the disputed paragraph was ambiguous
and subject to different interpretations. As noted above, the
memo does not expressly refer to ``WhoDB.'' Moreover, it is a
confusing document that discusses four different databases.
Even Marsha Scott, the author of the memo, testified that the
memo lacks clarity:
This is a very poorly written memo, and I am very
embarrassed by it. It is one of several that I have
encountered 5 years later that embarrassed me greatly.
This is one that will go down in my own personal
history as being one of the worst that I have ever
written . . . So I can see why it is very confusing to
you. And on this particular memo, I actually don't mind
the questions because I think it is really poorly
written.101
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 99 (Feb. 19, 1998).
When specifically asked about the database referenced in the
paragraph at issue, Ms. Scott also testified that her reference
to a database was to her concept of WhoDB at the time of the
memo, but that it ``didn't happen.'' 102
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 91 (Feb. 19, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of these ambiguities, the record does not support
the majority's effort to criminalize Ms. Mills's impression of
and testimony about this document.
The majority also claims that Ms. Mills testified falsely
during questioning about the Scott memo when she stated her
view that the WhoDB is not modeled on a computer system known
as ``PeopleBase.'' To support this claim, the majority cites to
witnesses who do not in fact contradict Ms. Mills. One of these
witnesses is former White House aide Erich Vaden.
Unfortunately, in his September 17 letter to Attorney General
Reno regarding his allegations about Ms. Mills, Mr. McIntosh
selectively edited the testimony of Mr. Vaden to exclude
statements by Mr. Vaden that support Ms. Mills's testimony.
Mr. McIntosh attached to his letter only the following
Vaden testimony discussing PeopleBase: ``[W]hat we wanted to
use was sort of a list of its functionalities, the kind of data
it stored, how it presented the data. You know, just as, I
guess, an inspiration, so to speak, of similar type systems.''
Mr. McIntosh omitted what Mr. Vaden said immediately before the
quoted passage. When the quoted passage is put in context, Mr.
Vaden's testimony actually indicates that PeopleBase was not
the model for WhoDB. Following is the entire relevant portion,
with the portion Mr. McIntosh did not include in italics:
Q. So were you in some way trying to use the design
of PeopleBase to help you design WhoDB?
A. We didn't want to adopt the design of the system.
It is an old system. It's character-based, as opposed
to a GUI-based system, a graphical user interface. So
we never went down with the intention of adopting it or
adopting anything similar to it. But what we wanted to
use was sort of a list of its functionalities, the kind
of data it stored, how it presented the data. You know,
just as, I guess, an inspiration, so to speak, of
similar type systems.103
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Deposition of Erich Vaden, 143-44 (Jan. 25, 1998).
Rep. Waxman informed the majority of the selective editing
over a week before the majority issued its report on the WhoDB
investigation.104 Nevertheless, the majority report
still claims that Mr. Vaden's testimony ``confirms'' that WhoDB
was modeled after PeopleBase, and fails to point out Mr.
Vaden's statement that ``We didn't want to adopt the design of
the system. It is an old system.'' The majority's conduct in
discussing Mr. Vaden's testimony on PeopleBase--both in Mr.
McIntosh's September 17 letter and in the majority report--
provides an illustration of the majority's unfair approach to
presenting evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ See Letter From Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Attorney General
Janet Reno (Sept. 28, 1998) (cc'd to all members of the Committee)
(exhibit 2 to these views).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The testimony of Mr. Bartholomew, another witness cited by
the majority regarding the PeopleBase issue, also does not
support the majority's claims. The Committee did not ask Mr.
Bartholomew whether WhoDB was modeled after PeopleBase, nor did
he testify one way or the other about this issue. The testimony
cited by the majority simply states that PeopleBase was one of
several systems identified to ``take under consideration'' in
designing the new database.105 Therefore, Mr.
Bartholomew's testimony, including the part cited by the
majority, is irrelevant to this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Deposition of Mark Bartholomew, 73 (Aug. 15, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the majority omits the testimony of other
witnesses that supports Ms. Mills's understanding that WhoDB
was not modeled after PeopleBase. One witness, Jerry Carlsen,
was manager of systems integration and development at the White
House and tasked to lead the development of WhoDB. He testified
that he neither met with PeopleBase staff nor heard any
discussions about PeopleBase beyond the fact that it was
``somewhat highly inaccurate . . . and that it wasn't
necessarily real user friendly.'' 106
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ Deposition of Jerry R. Carlsen, 65-66 (Aug. 28, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third statement of Ms. Mills that the majority claims
was ``false'' concerned her remarks about one of her own memos,
a January 17, 1994, memo entitled ``Correspondence Department
Database Project.'' Ms. Mills was questioned on this document
during her testimony on the Scott memo. She testified that her
``impression'' when she wrote the ``Correspondence Department
Database Project'' memo was that it did not concern
WhoDB.107 She also stated that there were many
different databases at the White House.108 The
majority claims that Ms. Mills's testimony regarding her
impression of her memo constitutes perjury. This allegation,
again, is based on impressions of other witnesses as to whether
the memo related to WhoDB, and the majority's discussion of the
allegation omits testimony that supports Ms. Mills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Hearings Before the House
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, White House Compliance
with Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 105-61, 241 (Nov. 6
and 7, 1997). Relevant excerpts of Ms. Mills's testimony are attached
as exhibit 3.
\108\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``Correspondence Department Database Project'' memo
does not expressly reference WhoDB. Further, Ms. Scott
testified that, at the time the memo was created, there were
two other ongoing Correspondence Department database
projects.109 These facts, in addition to Ms. Mills's
own testimony about her own impressions of her own document,
underscore the unfairness of the majority's claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ Deposition of Marsha Scott, 90 (Feb. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Bailey notes
The majority also claims that Ms. Mills committed
obstruction by failing to produce the Bailey notes in September
1996 and lied by testifying that she determined the Bailey
notes were ``not responsive to the seven enumerated items''
requested by the Subcommittee. Similar to their arguments on
the Scott memo, the justification the majority provides for
these serious charges is that Ms. Mills ``could not have
believed'' that the Bailey notes were not responsive because
the document is in fact responsive.
In her testimony, Ms. Mills stated that she ``can't go back
and recreate . . . at this time what information I had that led
us to conclude that this material was not responsive to any of
the seven enumerated items [in Mr. McIntosh's August 2, 1996
request].'' 110 She discussed the process she went
through, which she said involved reviewing the notes with then-
White House Counsel Jack Quinn.111 She further
elaborated that she ``think[s]'' that they assumed that Mr.
Bailey's own notes were not responsive to Mr. McIntosh's
request for ``communications.'' 112
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Hearings Before the House
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, White House Compliance
with Committee Subpoenas, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 105-61, 115 (Nov. 6
and 7, 1997).
\111\ Id.
\112\ Id. at 263.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House may well have erred by not producing the
Bailey notes. However, the Committee record, which includes a
deposition of Mr. Quinn, does not support the majority's
serious allegations that Ms. Mills ``deliberately withheld'' a
document she believed to be responsive, or purposely misled the
Committee in her testimony. This conclusion is reinforced by
the fact that the Bailey notes were part of a large group of
documents that were reviewed for responsiveness by White House
counsel in a short period of time.113 It would not
be surprising if honest mistakes were made under such time
pressure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ Id. at 114. Ms. Mills's testimony to the Committee indicates
that the White House Counsel's Office produced to the Subcommittee over
27,000 pages of documents for the WhoDB investigation within a short
time after the Counsel's Office received the documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of these facts, it simply is not responsible to
conclude that Ms. Mills committed obstruction and lied.
2. The majority's allegations regarding motive
The majority alleges that Ms. Mills had a motive to
obstruct the Committee's investigation and commit perjury
because the documents at issue reflect involvement by the
President and First Lady in ``conversion'' of government
property and would have been ``politically damaging'' to
release before the November 1996 election. This is a bootstrap
argument. As discussed above, the Committee record does not
establish that there was ``conversion'' of government property.
In fact, despite the extraordinary investment of resources in
the WhoDB investigation, the majority failed to uncover any
serious wrongdoing. The majority's suggestion that the White
House had a motive to withhold documents is in direct conflict
with the fact that there was simply no wrongdoing to cover up.
Further, not one of the 35 witnesses that the Committee
deposed on WhoDB issues questioned Ms. Mills's honesty or
integrity. Ms. Mills also showed these documents to the White
House counsel, her supervisor, who agreed with her analysis and
interpretation.114
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Hearings on White House Compliance
with Committee Subpoenas, House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, 115, 248-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in more detail in Rep. Waxman's September 28,
1998, letter to Attorney General Janet Reno,115
these and other facts demonstrate that the majority's
assertions about Ms. Mills are based on selective testimony of
other individuals about their impressions of the documents at
issue, as well as speculation about Ms. Mills's motives. It is
wrong to base such serious allegations on such insubstantial
and incomplete evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ Letter from Mr. Waxman to Attorney General Janet Reno (Sept.
28, 1998). This letter describes how Mr. McIntosh's allegations of
perjury and obstruction are unsubstantiated and do not warrant further
review. The letter also addresses numerous other unfounded statements
made by the majority regarding Ms. Mills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of the majority's allegations relating to Ms. Mills
essentially boil down to a disagreement between the majority
and the White House about the relevance of two documents.
Disputes between lawyers over the relevance of documents are
commonplace and legitimate. What is extraordinary is the
majority's attempt to elevate this run-of-the-mill document
dispute into a federal criminal case. Not only do the
majority's accusations lack foundation in fact, but they also
set a dangerous precedent: that to disagree with Mr. McIntosh
on the relevance of documents is to risk being publicly smeared
and called a criminal.
IV. The Costs of the WhoDB Investigation
Although this investigation of the esoteric subject of a
computerized Rolodex did not reveal any serious wrongdoing, it
did eat up a great deal of resources and taxpayer funds. The
WhoDB investigation began over 27 months ago, on June 27,
1996.116 The Subcommittee spent so much time and
energy on this investigation that it did not hold hearings on
any topic between June 16, 1997 and March 5, 1998. During those
nine months, Subcommittee resources were devoted almost
exclusively to the investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ Letter from Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh to Leon Panetta
(June 27, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Subcommittee requested information from 14 different
entities who produced over 43,000 pages of documents. Over 16
subpoenas were sent and 250 letters written on the subject. In
addition, the Committee deposed 35 witnesses for a total of
more than 135 hours of questioning on the WhoDB. In fact, about
20 percent of all of the depositions taken by this Committee in
the $7.4 million campaign finance investigation were limited to
WhoDB issues. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact
cost of the WhoDB investigation, it would appear to dwarf the
cost of developing and using the WhoDB, which the White House
estimates to be less than $800,000.117
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ In Sept. 1998, the Office of White House Counsel estimated
that the cost of the development and operation of the WhoDB was about
$785,467.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee's first three depositions in the WhoDB
investigation illustrate the significant costs that the
Committee frequently imposed on witnesses for no tangible
benefit. These depositions concerned document production by
PRC, a White House computer contractor that provided systems
support to the WhoDB. When PRC received a request for
documents, it informed the Subcommittee that its contract with
the White House required that it obtain White House
authorization before providing White House information to the
Subcommittee.118 PRC requested and received the
necessary authorization,119 and provided the
documents to the Subcommittee within three weeks of receiving
the request for documents.120 Nothing in the record
regarding this timely response suggests that the White House
obstructed the investigation. Nevertheless, the Committee
conducted three depositions to try to determine if the few days
it took the White House to authorize PRC to respond was a
deliberate attempt to frustrate the Committee's investigation.
According to one of the witnesses, PRC, Inc., spent more
responding to document requests and attending depositions
related to the WhoDB investigation than it did fulfilling the
terms of its White House contract.121
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ Deposition of Donald Upson, 66 (Aug. 7, 1997).
\119\ Letter from the Executive Office of the President to PRC,
Inc. (Aug. 15, 1996) and Deposition of Donald Upson, 66 (Aug. 7, 1997).
\120\ Letter request from Subcommittee Chairman McIntosh to PRC,
Inc. (July 30, 1996); Letter from PRC, Inc. to Subcommittee Chairman
McIntosh (Aug. 19, 1996).
\121\ Deposition of Donald Upson, 61 (Aug. 7, 1997). Mr. Upson
testified that the document request and related depositions cost PRC
more than it spent on ``porting the WhoDB,'' which he estimated to cost
$40,000-$50,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another witness who was unnecessarily burdened and harassed
during the course of the investigation was Marsha Scott, the
White House official who supervised the development of the
WhoDB. Her unfortunate experiences, which included providing
eight days of testimony for nearly 40 hours to congressional
investigators, are described in detail in the minority views
accompanying the Committee's report on the campaign finance
investigation.
There are numerous other examples of unnecessary burdens
imposed by the Committee during the WhoDB investigation. For
example:
One witness, Charles Benjamin, former
associate director in the White House Office of
Administration, estimated that he spent about 1,500
hours--the equivalent of over 37 work weeks--between
June 1996 and September 1997 responding to requests for
information relating to WhoDB. He said that such
responses consumed about one-half to three-quarters of
his time, and that ``quite frequently'' he had to work
after hours to respond to these requests.122
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Deposition of Charles Benjamin, 130-31 (Sept. 5, 1997).
The White House estimated that the computer
division of the Office of Administration, which is
charged with running the database, devoted over 5,500
hours to answering questions. That's the equivalent of
one full-time employee devoting two and a half years to
nothing but responding to Committee questions. During
just one three-month period in which the White House
tracked the cost of responding to this investigation
and the related GAO audit, it estimated that the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
response cost the taxpayers $155,000.
The Committee required Bryan Daines, a former
computer operator at the DNC, to fly to Washington, DC
from Bend, Oregon for 1\1/2\ hours of questioning in a
deposition on issues about which the witness had little
substantive knowledge. Prior to the deposition, the
witness's attorney informed the Committee that Mr.
Daines had little relevant knowledge and offered to
make him available for a phone interview. The Committee
refused this sensible alternative, forcing the witness
to spend between two and three days preparing for and
traveling to this deposition.123
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ Deposition of Bryan Daines, 85-86 (Apr. 6, 1998).
Even Jacqueline Bellanti, an unpaid volunteer
at the White House who is accused of no wrongdoing, was
forced to hire a lawyer to represent her at a
deposition.124
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Deposition of Jacqueline Bellanti, 66 (Oct. 7, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Conclusion
Rep. McIntosh's investigation of the WhoDB is reminiscent
of his investigation of the travel practices of SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt. A Wall Street Journal opinion piece by Holman
Jenkins summarized the Levitt investigation as follows:
Rep. David M. McIntosh has been chasing SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt Jr. all over Planet Washington. He does
so in pursuit of a ``scandal'' that, when we press our
x-ray spectrometer up against it, seems to consist of
the substance of interstellar space, which is to say,
nothing.
Mr. Levitt is accused of flying first class and
staying in nice hotels, and digging into his own pocket
to pay for it.
It takes a special kind of ingenuity to find
something to get outraged about here, but Mr. Levitt
did use legitimate government-paid upgrades to defray
the cost of upgrading even further. If you stand back
and twist your head at a funny angle, you can pretend
this means taxpayers ``paid'' for Mr. Levitt to fly
first class. . . .
Perhaps there is a secret McIntosh method here--a
plan to disable the Clinton administration by hassling
one of its few grown-ups. But Republicans should
remember that someday, perhaps within the lifetimes of
our grandchildren, they could conceivably end up the
party of government again. Then they might want to coax
some grown-ups into service too. The precedent here is
not an inviting one. . . .
Life being short, Mr. Levitt entered into a plea
bargain with Mr. McIntosh's subcommittee and has agreed
to suffer in business class at taxpayer expense rather
than loll in first class at his own. We are honestly at
a loss to understand what principle of good government
is served by this outcome, but that's par for the
course. It would be interesting, though, to get a full
accounting of how much of the taxpayer's money Rep.
McIntosh spent to bring this heroic denouement. The SEC
calculates it alone has spent $187,000 responding to
Mr. McIntosh's request for documents and accounting of
Mr. Levitt's every limo ride.125
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Business World: Fly First Class (With
the Other Criminals), Wall Street Journal (July 15, 1997).
Regrettably, much of what Mr. Jenkins said about the Levitt
investigation seems to apply with equal force to the WhoDB
investigation. Once again, the Committee has been in pursuit of
the ``scandal'' that ``seems to consist of the substance of
interstellar space, which is to say, nothing.''
Henry A. Waxman.
Tom Lantos.
Robert E. Wise, Jr.
Major R. Owens.
Edolphus Towns.
Paul E. Kanjorski.
Gary A. Condit.
Bernard Sanders.
Carolyn B. Maloney.
Eleanor Holmes Norton.
Chaka Fattah.
Elijah E. Cummings.
Dennis J. Kucinich.
Rod R. Blagojevich.
Danny K. Davis.
Thomas H. Allen.
Harold E. Ford, Jr.
[Supporting documentation follows:]
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF DAVID M. McINTOSH
During consideration of the Committee's Report, Mr. Waxman
referred to a previous investigation, conducted by the
Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources,
and Regulatory Affairs of the travel practices of senior agency
officials. Unable to address the evidence in the Report, Mr.
Waxman instead attempted to smear the Subcommittee and its
staff for their work on that investigation and the evidence
discovered about the failure of Securities and Exchange
Commission [SEC] Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. to conform his
travel practices to the travel policies of his own agency.
The single most important point that the Minority ignores
is that the SEC travel policy prohibited flying first class
even when paid for with personal funds. Chairman Levitt
violated this policy and used taxpayer funds to help defray the
cost of upgrading from coach to first class. In contrast to the
biased and polemical Wall Street Journal article referenced by
Mr. Waxman, the Washington Post reported that SEC documents and
other records show that Mr. Levitt ``often flies first class
and stays at luxury hotels, partly at government expense, and
sometimes attaches personal travel to official trips . . .\1\
According to the Post, ``The documents show that Mr. Levitt
uses government-paid upgrades and reimbursements to help reduce
his own costs when he chooses more expensive accommodations
than government rules allow.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Brett D. Fromson, Levitt's Travel Practices Scrutinized, the
Washington Post, (July 3, 1997) (emphasis supplied).
\2\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Waxman's attacks on that investigation are entirely
unwarranted. He failed to recognize that the Subcommittee's
investigation of Mr. Levitt brought Mr. Levitt's travel
practices into conformity with the SEC's policy. As a result of
the Subcommittee's investigation, Mr. Levitt stopped flying
first class, at least for a while, until the SEC changed its
travel policy to allow first class travel paid for with
personal funds. The Subcommittee will continue to investigate
ways to save taxpayer funds through ensuring that agency travel
practices are in conformity with agency policy.
Mr. Levitt's willingness to change his practices and then
change the SEC policy is ample evidence that his practices were
not in conformity with SEC policy. Apparently, it is not Mr.
Waxman's view that regulators should abide by their own
regulations.
Hon. David M. McIntosh.
[Supporting documentation follows:]