[Senate Hearing 105-183]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-183
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 8, 9, 15 AND 17, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Tuesday, April 8, 1997
a.m. session
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald, former Secretary of Defense............... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Schlesinger, Hon. James R., former Secretary of Defense.......... 5
Letter Submitted by Hon. Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary
of Defense................................................. 5
Weinberger, Hon. Caspar, former Secretary of Defense............. 9
P.M. SESSION
Albright, Hon. Madeleine Korbel, Secretary of State.............. 61
Prepared statement........................................... 64
Wednesday, April 9, 1997
Feith, Douglas J., Feith and Zell, P.C., former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy.................... 107
Prepared statement........................................... 110
Ikle, Dr. Fred C., former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency......................................................... 105
Kirkpatrick, Dr. Jeane J., former U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 91
Prepared statement........................................... 96
Perle, Richard N., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.................................. 99
Rowny, Lieutenant General Edward L., U.S. Army (retired),
International Negotiation Consultant........................... 131
Prepared statement........................................... 133
Scowcroft, General Brent, President, Forum for International
Policy, and former National Security Policy Advisor............ 134
Zumwalt, Admiral E.R., Jr., United States Navy (retired), Member,
President's Foreign Intelligence Avisory Board................. 124
Tuesday, April 15, 1997
Bailey, Hon. Kathleen C., Senior Fellow, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory............................................ 182
Prepared statement........................................... 185
Letter Submitted by Paul L. Eisman, Senior Vice President for
Refining, Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation............ 182
Letter Submitted by Robert W. Roten, President and CEO of
Sterling Chemicals......................................... 183
Forbes, Malcolm S., Jr., President and CEO, Forbes, Inc., New
York, New York................................................. 153
Prepared statement........................................... 157
Johnson, Ralph V., Vice President, Environmental Affairs, Dixie
Chemical Company, Inc., Houston, Texas......................... 180
Kearns, Kevin L., President, United States Business and
Industrial Council............................................. 174
Prepared statement........................................... 176
Merrifield, Hon. Bruce, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce... 187
Reinsch, Hon. William A., Under Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration................................................. 189
Prepared statement........................................... 192
Spears, Wayne, Owner and CEO, Spears Manufacturing, Inc., Sylmar,
California..................................................... 178
Prepared statement........................................... 179
Webber, Frederick, President, Chemical Manufacturers Association,
Washington, D.C................................................ 194
Prepared statement........................................... 197
Thursday, April 17, 1997
Goss, Hon. Porter J., U.S. Representative in Congress From
Florida........................................................ 219
Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., former Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency............................................. 236
Odom, General William, U.S. Army (retired), former Director,
National Security Agency....................................... 227
O'Malley, Edward J., former Assistant Director
(Counterintelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation......... 231
Appendix
Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention.................... 261
The Case Against The Chemical Weapons Convention ``Truth or
Consequences'' [Prepared by The Center for Security Policy].... 276
Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Others at the White House,
April 4, 1997.................................................. 321
False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention
[Prepared by Empower America].................................. 326
Letters and Other Material Submitted in Support of Ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
American Ex-Prisoners of War................................. 329
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.......................... 329
Reserve Officers Association of the United States............ 329
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A............................. 330
Prepared Statement of Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense
Analyses................................................... 331
Letters Submitted in Opposition to Ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention:
Sterling Chemicals........................................... 335
Small Business Survival Committee............................ 335
Statement by Ronald F. Lehman Before the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, June 9, 1994.............................. 337
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
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TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--A.M. SESSION
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Thomas,
Ashcroft, Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Robb,
Feingold, Feinstein, and Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
I believe it is customary to wait until there is at least
one Senator from each party present.
I would inquire of the minority counsel.
Can you give us some advice as to whether Senator Biden
would wish us to proceed?
I might explain to our distinguished guests this morning--
and, as a matter of fact, everybody here is a distinguished
guest as far as I am concerned--as I just said, it is a
tradition, in this committee, at least, to have at least one
Senator from each party present before the proceeding begins.
Senator Biden is on a train coming in from Delaware, and I
am seeking information as to whether it would be his wish that
we proceed without him until he gets here.
I am told that it is satisfactory with Senator Biden that
we do proceed.
As is obvious, this morning's hearing is the first of the
Foreign Relations Committee's final round of testimony on the
Chemical Weapons Convention, or that's right.
I think it is fair to say that history is being made here
this morning and I believe today is the first time that three
distinguished, former U.S. Secretaries of Defense have ever
appeared together before a Senate committee to oppose
ratification of an arms control treaty. And if ever a treaty
deserved such highly respected opposition, it is the dangerous
and defective so-called Chemical Weapons Convention.
This morning's witnesses include Hon. James Schlesinger,
Secretary of Defense for President Nixon, Hon. Donald Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense for President Ford, and Hon. Caspar
Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan.
Further, we will have testimony today in the form of a
letter from Hon. Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the
Bush administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precluded him
from being here in person today. But he has asked Secretary
Schlesinger to read into the record Secretary Cheney's strong
opposition to Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will
consist of testimony by and from Defense Secretaries of every
Republican administration since Richard Nixon, testimony that
will counsel the Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously
defective treaty.
These distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More
than 50--more than 50--generals, admirals, and senior officials
from previous administrations have joined them in opposing the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and if that does not send a clear
signal on just how dangerous this treaty really is, I cannot
imagine what would.
So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your
being here today to testify. I regret that we cannot offer you
the pomp and circumstance of the Rose Garden ceremony last
week, but our invitation to be there got lost in the mail
somehow.
Your testimony here today will convey to the American
people highly respected assessments of this dangerous treaty.
Now our precise purpose today is to examine the national
security implications of the CWC which is important because the
105th Congress has 15 new Senators, including three new and
able members of this committee who have never heard testimony
on this treaty.
The case against the treaty can be summarized quite simply,
I think. It is not global, it is not verifiable, it is not
constitutional, and it will not work. Otherwise, it is a fair
treaty.
The Chemical Weapons Convention will do absolutely nothing
to protect the American people from the dangers of chemical
weapons. What it will do is increase rogue regimes' access to
dangerous chemical agents and technology while imposing new
regulations on American businesses, exposing them to increased
danger of industrial espionage and trampling their
constitutional rights. Outside of the Beltway, where people do
not worship at the altar of arms control, that is what we call
``A bum deal.''
We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from the
proponents of the treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from
the face of the earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No
supporter of this treaty can tell us with a straight face how
this treaty will actually accomplish that goal.
The best argument they have mustered to date is yes, it is
defective, they say, but it is better than nothing.
But, in fact, this treaty is worse than nothing for, on top
of the problems with the CWC's verifiability and
constitutionality, this treaty gives the American people a
false sense of security that something is being done to reduce
the dangers of chemical weaponry when, in fact, nothing--
nothing--is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the
American people at greater risk.
More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical
weaponry have not ratified the CWC, and more than one-third of
them have not even signed it. This includes almost all of the
terrorist regimes whose possession of chemical weapons does
threaten the United States, countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq,
and North Korea. Not one of them--not one of them--is a
signatory to this treaty and none of them will be affected by
it.
Worse still, this treaty will increase access to dangerous
chemical agents and technology to rogue states who do sign the
treaty. Iran, for example, is one of the few nations on this
earth ever to use chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory of
the CWC.
I am going to stop with the rest of my prepared statement
today so that we can get to our witnesses, which is what you
are here for.
But I want to say, once more, that I ask the American
people not to take my word for anything that I am saying. I ask
the American people to consider the judgments of these
distinguished former Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC.
I am looking forward to hearing from them about the
treaty's scope, verifiability, about its Articles X and XI, and
the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the overall
potential impact of this treaty on America's national security.
That said, we turn to the witnesses.
Secretary Schlesinger, we call on you first.
[The prepared statement of The Chairman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Helms
This morning's hearing is the first of the Foreign Relations
Committee's final round of testimony on the Chemical Weapons
Convention. I think it is fair to say that history is being made this
morning. I believe today is the first time that three distinguished
former United States Secretaries of Defense have ever appeared together
before a Senate committee to oppose ratification of an arms control
treaty. And if ever a treaty deserved such highly respected opposition,
it is the dangerous and defective Chemical Weapons Convention.
This morning's witnesses include the Honorable James Schlesinger,
Secretary of Defense for President Nixon; the Honorable Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense for President Ford; and the Honorable
Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan.
Further, we will have testimony today, in the form of a letter from
the Honorable Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the Bush
Administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precludes him from being
here in person today, but he has asked Secretary Schlesinger to read
into the record Secretary Cheney's strong opposition to Senate
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will consist
of testimony by and from defense secretaries of every Republican
administration since Richard Nixon--testimony that will counsel the
Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously defective treaty. These
distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More than 50 generals,
admirals, and senior officials from previous Administrations have
joined them in opposing the Chemical Weapons Convention. If that
doesn't send a clear signal of just how dangerous this treaty really
is, I can't imagine what would.
So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your being here
today to testify. I regret we cannot offer you the pomp and
circumstance of a Rose Garden ceremony, but your testimony here today
will convey to the American people highly respected assessments of this
dangerous treaty.
Our precise purpose today is to examine the national security
implications of the CWC. This is important because the 105th Congress
has 15 new Senators, including three new and able members of this
committee, who have never heard testimony on the treaty.
The case against this treaty can be summarized quite simply: It is
not global, it is not verifiable, it is not constitutional, and it will
not work.
The Chemical Weapons Convention will do nothing to protect the
American people from the dangers of chemical weapons. What it will in
fact do is increase rogue regimes' access to dangerous chemical agents
and technology, while imposing new regulations on American businesses,
exposing them to increased danger of industrial espionage, and
trampling their Constitutional rights. Outside the beltway, where
people don't worship at the altar of arms control, that's what we call
a bum deal.
We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from proponents of
this treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from the face of the
earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No supporter of this treaty
can tell us, with a straight face, how this treaty will actually
accomplish that goal.
The best argument they have mustered to date is: Yes, it is
defective, but it is better than nothing.
But in fact, this treaty is much worse than nothing. For, on top of
the problems with the CWC's verifiability and constitutionality, this
treaty gives the American people a false sense of security that
something is being done to reduce the dangers of chemical weapons, when
in fact nothing is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the
American people at greater risk.
More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical weapons
have not ratified the CWC, and more than one third of them have not
even signed it. That includes almost all of the terrorist regimes whose
possession of chemical weapons does threaten the United States--
countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea. Not one of them is
a signatory to this treaty. And none of them will be affected by it.
Worse still, this treaty would increase access to dangerous
chemical agents and technology by rogue states who do sign it. Iran,
for example, is one of the few nations on the earth ever to use
chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory to the CWC.
Why, you may ask, why does Iran support the treaty? Because by
joining the CWC, Iran can demand access to chemical technology of any
other signatory nation--including the United States, if the U.S. Senate
were to make the mistake of ratifying it. In other words, Iran will be
entitled to chemical defensive gear and dangerous dual-use chemicals
and technologies that will help them modernize their chemical weapons
program.
Giving U.S. assent to legalizing such transfers of chemical agents
and technology to such rogue nations is pure folly, and will make the
problem of chemical weapons more difficult to constrain, not less.
For example, if the U.S. were to protest a planned sale of a
chemical manufacturing facility by Russia to Iran, under the CWC Russia
could argue that not only are they permitted to sell such dangerous
chemical technology to Teheran, but they are obliged to do so--by a
treaty the U.S. agreed to. Because Iran's terrorist leaders have
promised to get rid of their chemical weapons.
Is it possible for the United States to verify whether Iran will be
complying with its treaty obligations? Of course not. Even the
administration admits that this chemical weapons treaty is
unverifiable.
President Clinton's own Director of Central Intelligence, James
Woolsey, declared in testimony before this committee on June 23, 1994,
that, and I quote, ``the chemical weapons problem is so difficult from
an intelligence perspective, that I cannot state that we have high
confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a
small scale.
So in other words, under this treaty, the American people will have
to take the Ayatollahs' word for it.
And what about Russia--the country possessing the largest and most
sophisticated chemical weapons arsenal in the world? Russia has made
perfectly clear it has no intention of eliminating its chemical weapons
stockpile. In fact, Russia is already violating its bilateral agreement
with the U.S. to get rid of these terrible weapons; It has consistently
refused to come clean about the true size of its chemical weapons
stockpile; and Russia continues to work on a new generation of nerve
agents, disguised as everyday commercial or agricultural chemicals,
specifically designed to circumvent this chemical weapons treaty that
the Clinton Administration is pulling out all the stops to force the
Senate to ratify.
All this, sad to say, is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of
what's wrong with this treaty. There is a whole array of other problems
which I hope we can discuss today. But I think it borders on fraudulent
to mislead the American people, as so many other treaty proponents
have, into to believing that their lives will somehow be made safer if
this treaty is ratified--and that their safety is being put at risk if
the Senate refuses to be stampeded by Rose Garden ceremonies and high-
pressure tactics.
But I ask the American people not to take my word for it. I ask all
Americans to consider the judgments of these distinguished former
Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC. I am looking forward to
hearing from them about the treaty's scope, verifiability, its Articles
X and XI, and the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the
overall potential impact of this treaty on America's national security.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At the outset, I will allow Secretary Cheney to join us
vicariously. He has sent a letter, as you indicated, and I
shall read it into the record.
This letter is dated April 7, from Dallas, Texas.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your letter inviting me to join
several other former Secretaries of Defense in testifying in early
April when the Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings on the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Regrettably, other commitments will
preclude me from participation. I hope that this correspondence will be
sufficient to convey my views on this convention.
During the years I served as Secretary of Defense, I was deeply
concerned about the inherent unverifiability, lack of global coverage,
and unenforceability of a convention that sought to ban production and
stockpiling of chemical weapons. My misgivings on these scores have
only intensified during the 4 years since I left the Pentagon.
The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply too
ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily concealed, and
the international community's record of responding effectively to
violations of arms control treaties too unsatisfactory to permit
confidence that such a regime would actually reduce the chemical
threat.
Indeed, some aspects of the present convention--notably its
obligation to share with potential adversaries, like Iran, chemical
manufacturing technology that can be used for military purposes and
chemical defensive equipment--threaten to make this accord worse than
having no treaty at all. In my judgment, the treaty's Articles X and XI
amount to a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation of
chemical warfare capabilities around the globe.
Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical Weapons
Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to the
United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely
to cheat on the CWC even if they do participate.
In effect, the Senate is being asked to ratify the CWC even though
it is likely to be ineffective, unverifiable, and unenforceable. Having
ratified the convention, we will then be told we have ``dealt with the
problem of chemical weapons'' when, in fact, we have not. But
ratification of the CWC will lead to a sense of complacency, totally
unjustified given the flaws in the convention.
I would urge the Senate to reject the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Sincerely,
Dick Cheney.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
thank the committee for its invitation to testify today on the
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I must at the
outset underscore my belief that the proper criterion for
judging the convention is whether or not it is in the interest
of the United States and whether or not it will serve the long-
run purposes of the American people. It should not be approved
simply for reasons of diplomatic momentum or a gesture toward
multilateralism, but as a treaty with which this Nation must
live.
Mr. Chairman, I start with the interesting and somewhat
checkered history of efforts at the control of chemical
weapons. The introduction of poison gas in World War I and then
its widespread use in the later stages of that war led to a
horrified reaction. That reaction, plus the unease concerning
its subsequent use by colonial powers, led to the Geneva
Convention in 1925, which forbids the use of poison gas by all
signatories.
In the period prior to World War II, the European powers
carefully prepared for the possible use of poison gas. In the
actual circumstances of the war, however, the German decision
to refrain from using poison gas came not for humanitarian
reasons, not for reasons of the treaty, which German diplomats
might well have described as ``a scrap of paper,'' but out of
concern for the threat of devastating retaliation by the
Western allies.
Iraq has been and is a signatory to the Geneva Convention.
In the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's, Iraq used poison gas as a
way of stemming the ``human wave'' attacks of the Iranians.
What was our reaction and the reaction of other Western powers
at that time? In brief, it was to avert our gaze.
Later, as the war died down, Saddam Hussein used gas
against Iraq's Kurds. This time, however, the response was
slightly more vigorous. An international gathering took place
in Paris in January 1989. Not only did the international
community fail to denounce Iraq, most participants were
reluctant even to name Iraq for using gas. Our own reaction,
was to say the least, somewhat muted. After all, Iraq provided
protection in the Gulf against the Ayatollah's Iran. For what
were regarded as sound geopolitical reasons, we failed to take
action to sustain the existing prohibition on the use of poison
gas by a signatory--despite Iraq's blatant violation of the
Geneva Convention. This manifest failure of the existing arms
control regime did stimulate renewed efforts on the Chemical
Weapons Convention that lies before you. Aha! Perhaps if we
were unwilling to enforce the existing ban on the use of poison
gas, we might be more willing to take strong actions against
its manufacture.
Would we actually do more in enforcement when the evidence
is far more ambiguous and the menace more distant? The use of
poison gas is readily detectable; manufacture is not. Tapes and
photographs were widely available of Kurdish women clutching
their children to their breasts in the vain attempt to protect
them against the gas. And yet we did nothing--for then it was
not regarded as in our interest to intervene.
By contrast, in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein did not use
poison gas against our troops. In the famous letter from
President Bush to Saddam Hussein in early 1991 in which we
demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, we reminded Saddam that
the United States had nuclear weapons. As Secretary Baker has
said, we also, ``made it very clear that if Iraq used weapons
of mass destruction, chemical weapons against U.S. forces, that
the American people would demand vengeance and that we had the
means to achieve it.''
What are the lessons learned from these episodes? Treaties
alone will do little. To prevent the use or the manufacture of
chemical weapons requires a structure for deterrence backed by
real capabilities. Above all, enforcement will depend upon the
will to take action which, if history is any guide, will in
turn depend upon a careful geopolitical assessment.
Mr. Chairman, let me turn from history to specific problems
in this convention. In this brief statement, I can only deal
with five problem areas. Nonetheless, I would hope that the
members of this committee and your colleagues in the Senate
receive clear reassurance in these areas before you approve the
convention.
First is non-lethal chemicals. Non-lethal chemicals are
necessary for crowd control, for peacekeeping, for rescuing
downed pilots and the like. In the negotiations on the
convention, we were pressed to ban non-lethal chemicals along
with lethal chemicals. President Bush, under pressure from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated prior American policy and
indicated that use of riot control agents would not be banned.
The Clinton administration has been far more ambiguous on this
subject, retreating from President Bush's stated exclusion.
Sometime it has suggested that such agents could be used in
peacetime but not in wartime. That raises the question of
defining when the Nation is at war. Was the Vietnam War a war?
Just 2 days ago, the New York Times stated that the
administration ``has also refused to interpret the treaty in a
way that would allow the use of tear gas for crowd control,
mainly because the Pentagon has said it has no need to ever use
non-lethal gases.''
If the latter is true, it represents a remarkable
transformation of Pentagon attitudes, and I recommend that you
check this out. The first part of the quotation reflects the
continuing ambivalence of the administration on the question of
non-lethal chemicals. I trust that the Senate will seek
clarification of the administration's position and indeed
insist that the use of tear gas will not be banned either in
peace or war. Otherwise, we may wind up placing ourselves in
the position of the Chinese Government in dealing with the
Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. The failure to use tear gas
meant that that government only had recourse to the massive use
of firepower to disperse the crowd.
Second is sharing CW technology. Article X of the treaty
requires that signatories have a right to acquire CW defensive
technologies from other signatories. This may mean that the
United States is obliged to share such technologies with Iran,
Cuba, and other such nations that may sign the convention.
Almost certainly that interpretation will be argued by lawyers
in the government. But, even if the Senate were able to prevent
such obligatory transfers, it is plain that Article X
legitimizes such transfers by other industrial nations which
will argue they are obliged to do so by the treaty.
Clearly, that undercuts any sanctions directed against
rogue nations that happen to sign the convention. And, in any
event, there are still other states that do not agree with our
judgments in these matters and will acquire such chemical
warfare defensive technologies and will share such technologies
with rogue nations whether signatories or not.
Third is the defense against chemical weapons. Continued
and vigorous efforts to develop chemical weapons defenses are
required. In the years ahead, various groups, inclined to
fanaticism, are likely to use chemical weapons as instruments
of sabotage or terrorism. Aum Shin Rikyo, the Japanese
religious cult, is but a prototype of these other terrorist
groups. To deal with such prospective attacks, it is essential
to have continuing efforts on defensive measures to protect our
civilian population as well as our forces.
In this connection, two points must be made. First, the
illusion that this convention will provide protection against
chemical weapons will tempt us to lower our guard and to reduce
our efforts on defensive CW measures. Such temptations should
be formally rejected through safeguards. Second, the sharing of
technologies required by Article X will provide other nations
with the information that will help to neutralize our chemical
weapons defenses and, thus, expose us to greater risk.
Fourth is industrial espionage. The convention permits or
encourages challenge inspections against any facility deemed
capable of producing chemical weapons--indeed against any
facility. This exposes American companies to a degree to
industrial espionage never before encountered in this country.
This implies the possibility of the capture of proprietary
information or national security information from American
corporations by present or by prospective commercial rivals. To
preclude such intrusive inspections requires the vote of three-
quarters of the Executive Council of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Such super majority votes are
unlikely to be forthcoming and will grow less so over time.
The committee may wish to inquire how FBI counter
intelligence feels about these arrangements.
Mr. Chairman, I trust that the committee will delve deeply
into this issue because scuttlebutt has it that the White House
has indicated to senior FBI officials that they are to say
nothing against this treaty. Consequently, you may wish to
examine not only present but former counter intelligence
officers.
The Chairman. We will. Thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. This convention is sometimes compared to
the arrangements under the Atoms for Peace Agreement. But it
should be noted that few of the several mechanisms that provide
protection in the nuclear area exist under this convention.
Five is how do we respond to violations. Is the convention
something more than a feel good treaty? Is it more meaningful
than the more explicit and more relevant ban on use in the
Geneva Convention? If so, what is its operational significance?
Last April, Secretary Perry, reiterating some of the warnings
of President Bush and Secretary Baker to Saddam Hussein stated,
``Anyone who considers using a weapon of mass destruction
against the United States or its allies must first consider the
consequences. We would not specify in advance what our response
would be, but it would be both overwhelming and devastating.''
Administration officials have more recently reiterated that
threat. Does this convention oblige us to take actions beyond
attacks on ourselves or on our allies? Are we prepared to take
action if Iran attacks Tajikistan or even uses gas against its
own minorities? If Syria, or Saudi Arabia, or Israel, or South
Africa manufactures gas, what are we prepared to do? What
actions would we take if we discover that Russia, or Ukraine,
or China is engaged clandestinely--or openly--in the
manufacture of gas?
As the leading world power and as the initial sponsor of
this convention, the United States bears a particular
responsibility for those signatories who have foregone the
right of direct retaliation and who lack the American capacity
for a response, both ``overwhelming and devastating.'' The role
of the United States visibly transcends that of the
Netherlands, or of Sweden, or of other nations that are
prepared to sign the convention. I trust, therefore, that this
committee will press for clear answers regarding how we might
feel obliged to respond in different hypothetical
circumstances.
Mr. Chairman, as this committee proceeds with its
deliberations, I trust that it will carefully examine some of
the exaggerated or false claims that have been made on behalf
of the convention. This treaty will not serve to banish the
threat of chemical weapons. It will not aid in the fight
against terrorism. Only effective police work will accomplish
that.
As the Japanese cult, Aum Shin Rikyo, has demonstrated, a
significant volume of lethal nerve gas can be produced in a
facility as small as 8 feet by 15 feet. Increasingly, are we
aware how vulnerable this Nation may be to terrorist attacks,
and this treaty will do little to limit such vulnerability. Nor
will this treaty ``provide our children broad protection
against the threat of chemical attacks.'' Such statements
merely disguise and, thereby, increase our vulnerability to
terrorist attacks. To the extent that others learn from
international sharing of information on CW defenses, our
vulnerability is enhanced rather than diminished.
Finally, this treaty in no way helps ``shield our soldiers
from one of battlefield's deadliest killers.'' As indicated
earlier, only the threat of effective retaliation provides such
protection. That we would respond in the event of an attack on
our troops has great credibility and, thus, serves as an
effective deterrent. The Chemical Weapons Convention adds no
more to this protection of our troops than did the Geneva
Convention.
Mr. Chairman, some treaty proponents, while conceding the
lack of verifiability, the lack of broad enforceability, and
the other inherent weaknesses of the convention, suggest that
it should be ratified because whatever its weaknesses, it
serves to establish ``international norms.'' If Senators are
moved by that last ditch defense of the convention, they should
vote for ratification. I urge, however, that Senators bear in
mind that most nations do not care a figure for ``international
norms,'' and we already have the Geneva Convention as a norm,
regularly violated. And they remain relatively free to violate
this norm with relative impunity since the treaty is difficult
to verify and more difficult to enforce.
Proponents have simply ignored the evidence of the past
failure to control chemical weapons and have proceeded blithely
with a renewed effort at control which disregards the ambiguity
and the ineffectiveness of the control mechanism. In the rather
forlorn hope to preclude the employment of chemical weapons,
they have produced an agreement with an illusory goal and a
rather gargantuan and worrisome enforcement mechanism. The
manifold weaknesses of the proposed convention deserve careful
attention from every member of the Senate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased later to
respond to any questions the committee may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Weinberger.
STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman and Senators, it is always an
honor to appear before a committee of the U.S. Senate and I am
deeply appreciative of that this morning.
I think that both your Chairman's statement and Secretary
Schlesinger's very impressive statement also, both together,
set out the basic reasons why I think all of us on this
Secretary of Defense panel feel so strongly that this treaty
should not be ratified.
I would like to make a couple of points at the beginning
because it is the common practice now for opponents of anything
that is desired by the White House to be painted in as
unenviable a position as possible. I would like to make it
clear that everybody I know detests chemical weapons,
particularly soldiers.
I have some small personal experiences I might share with
you. They stem mainly from the fact of my extreme age. The fact
is that, during World War II, I had been assigned to the
Australian Anti-Gas School. The Australians used very spartan
methods and very rigorous methods of instructing, and they
instructed by showing us the actual effects on our own persons
of mustard gas, a blister agent. They gave us all kinds of
information with respect to the required defense and defensive
equipment.
I was then later appointed one of the gas defense officers
to the 41st Infantry Division, conducted a lot of training with
the soldiers in the gas protective equipment which, as anybody
who served in the armed forces knows, is extremely difficult to
operate in, and this leads, without any question whatever, to
this detestation of these weapons.
So people who oppose this treaty are not people who favor
poison gas. I think it is important to make that rather obvious
point at the beginning because we have heard so much about the
motives of opponents of this treaty. My motive is the security
of the United States, with which I had the honor to be
associated for 7 years as Secretary, and which I think, as a
country, should be maintained, even in the face of very strong
support of a treaty which purports to outlaw and ban the
production of these terrible weapons.
Everybody likes the aims of the treaty. Everybody will
admit, I think, that it is a well intentioned treaty. Everybody
that I know including many of the proponents, admit that it is
a very badly flawed treaty, and it is with those flaws that I
am concerned today.
Primarily the flaws, as Secretary Schlesinger just
mentioned, are that it cannot be verified and it cannot be
enforced. The enforcement mechanism involves going to the
United Nations Security Council, of which Russia and China are
members. It does not require a very big stretch of the
imagination to indicate that they would probably veto any kind
of enforcement action proposed against them.
So you would have not only the lack of verifiability, you
would have, very much like with the Geneva Convention, a very
nice statement of the proper intentions of humankind which
simply cannot be enforced and which basically, sadly,
accomplish nothing.
Now there has been a great deal of discussion also about
the enforcement mechanisms, the international inspectors and
what they can do and their powers. This is not just academic
discussion, Mr. Chairman. These inspectors, under this treaty,
under Articles X and XI, would have powers that basically
American enforcement agents do not. Even the IRS and even the
Department of Justice cannot wander around the country without
search warrants and demand to see anything they want to see in
thousands of factories. There are varying estimates of the
number of factories and commercial plants involved, but they
are all in the thousands. I won't attempt to say which one is
right or wrong, but they are in the thousands. The treaty gives
the right to these inspectors to see what they want to do, to
make analyses and tests, and the other articles of the
convention require that we share any late technologies we might
develop--and we should be working on them; I hope we are; we
always used to--defensive technologies to improve the masks,
the protective equipment, and all of the other things.
As we make some progress in this field, that would have to
be shared and, therefore, would be, consequently, far less
valuable, to put it mildly, in the event that any of our troops
should be attacked with a gas attack.
These inspections are a two-way street in some ways. We
have the right of inspection under what I consider to be the
worst appeasement agreement we have signed and that has been
presented since Munich, and that is the North Korean Agreement
under which we promised to give them two very large nuclear
reactors which can produce plutonium--although it is always
said not to worry, they can't. But, of course, they can. And we
are permitted also to have all kinds of inspection under that
appeasement agreement.
We have not been granted this to the extent that we need
it. What we are allowed is to go where North Korea wants us to
go. It's exactly as with the agreement with Iraq that ended
that war. We are permitted to go where the Iraqis let us go and
after long delays in which they are given the opportunity to
remove any incriminating kinds of evidence.
That is one way that these inspections can work, and those
would be probably the ways that countries like Iran, that have
signed the agreement, would interpret it.
But the permitted inspections and the way we would do it,
because we carry out our word as a country and we do allow
these things once we sign an agreement, would be as intrusive
as anything previously imagined and far more intrusive than our
own officials are allowed under our own laws to investigate
violations of American law.
Jim Schlesinger has covered very adequately and thoroughly
the industrial espionage problems that are involved in this and
in the sharing of these not only offensive, but defensive
technologies that we may be working on. And it is important
that we work on these defensive technologies because, even if
all the countries sign this agreement, the possibilities that
it would be treated as Geneva is always treated are always
there. Indeed, we know that Iraq is stockpiling this VX nerve
agent, which is a rather nasty piece of equipment, and Russia
has been developing the nerve agent A-223, which is purported
to be something like 7 times as fatal as the VX nerve agent.
These are things that are going on now, after these treaties
have been signed and while the whole discussion is there.
The idea that these countries would give up these newly
developed agents on which they spent a great deal of money,
some of it, in Russia's case, our money that we sent over for
economic development, does not seem to me to be very credible.
The requirement that we share all of these technologies
also would remove any kind of deterrent capability that we
might have if we carry out the treaty in full. And one of the
deterrent capabilities is retaliation.
We have had many indications not only in World War II but
in the Gulf and elsewhere, that the fact that we were spared a
chemical attack there simply stems from the ability that we
would have to retaliate. If we give up that retaliatory
capability, along with all but four or five nations, the four
or five nations would still not be nearly as worried about
launching an attack as they were in the case of the Gulf War.
We already know that there is at least a possibility. We
don't know it and I would not claim it as a fact, but there is
at least a possibility that Iraq's storage of these chemical
weapons is resulting in disease and illness to American forces
now. People talk about who is to blame and all of that. The
only important issue, I think, there is that we should
remember, and I hope we always will, that we have an absolute
obligation to take care of these people who did fall ill from
whatever cause in that war for the rest of their lives and take
care of their families. I hope we are prepared to honor that.
All of these are things that have happened with nations
that have either signed or refused to sign the treaty. Iran is
one that has signed. Iran, therefore, would be able to see and
inspect any one of several thousand companies. They would have
to share their technologies and we, as a country, would have to
share our technologies with Iran.
Strong supporters of the treaty, including General
Schwarzkopf, when reminded of the fact, when asked if that is
what he really wanted, said of course not. He said the worst
thing in the world would be to share any knowledge with a
country like Iran in this field.
So there has been, I think, a lack of understanding, and I
congratulate the committee on holding these hearings, because I
hope that we can get a full understanding of how a well
intentioned treaty, the goals of which everybody of course
supports, cannot possibly reach those goals if we are going to
have the kind of provisions that remain in this treaty.
We also have a situation in which we are repeatedly told
that the April 29 deadline must be met, otherwise we will have
no influence in administering the treaty. Mr. Chairman, we are
going to bear 25 percent of the cost of this treaty, and I
suspect any 25 percent owner, so to speak, to use corporate
terms, is going to have a little influence in it. I think that
it is absurd to say that we must rush to judgment simply
because April 29 is the deadline.
There was plenty of opportunity last fall when the treaty
was before the Senate, and was withdrawn by the administration,
to have the kind of discussion that we are now having and that
we should have. If it takes a little past April 29, and if by
any chance we are able, through reservations or other changes,
to make any of these things to which we object so strongly
slightly more acceptable, that would certainly be worth a few
days or a few months delay.
The costs involved, of course, are not just the 25 percent
of the costs of administering the treaty and of all of the
inspections that we would find so intrusive and so violative of
what we believe to be our constitutional rules against
unreasonable search and seizure, seizing property without due
process, and all the rest. We could add the $70 million that we
have already given Russia under the so-called ``Bilateral
Destruction Act'' to start destroying their weapons. And they
have announced publicly and in writing--I guess it has been
released; it's been printed all over the country--that they
will no longer be bound by it, that it no longer serves their
best interests and, therefore, they are not paying any more
attention to it.
They are a signatory of this Chemical Weapons Convention
and they have been held up as a country that is essential to
get into the international order and is willing to destroy
these weapons. But certainly the record thus far is slightly
less than modest.
I think it is important that we emphasize again, as I did
at the beginning, that our opposition to these kinds of weapons
is well known. We were instrumental in getting the Geneva
Agreement approved many, many years ago. We have signed the
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, which had a great deal of hope
behind it, and practically no realization. And now Russia has
walked away from it.
We have showed that we would, of course, not only if we
sign this convention comply with it, but that we would be a
leader in financing it. All of that I think is an ample
demonstration to the world, if any is needed, that we don't
like these weapons. But we don't have to sign a flawed and an
ineffective, unenforceable, unverifiable convention to prove
that; and I don't think that we should worry so much about
being tarred as being pro chemical weapons that we would
disregard completely the flaws in this treaty and ratify it
anyway just to make a statement.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much having had the
opportunity to express these views before you and your
committee, and as Secretary Schlesinger has said, I will be
glad to try to answer questions at an appropriate time.
The Chairman. We thank you, sir. Secretary Rumsfeld.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to express concerns
about this convention. Rather than read my entire statement, I
would like to touch on some of the more important points, and I
ask that my entire statement be included in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Certainly, one of the most serious problems
facing our country and our friends and allies around the world
is, indeed, the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention before the Senate
would appear to fit in that category. But in my view, it has
serious flaws.
I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this
and, indeed, that a number of our friends and associates that
we have worked with on these problems over the years find
themselves on opposing sides.
As a former Member, I also recall the difficulty of finding
oneself in the position of opposing a position that is strongly
supported by a President. It is not an attractive position to
be in or a pleasant one. My inclination was always to try to
support the President on these matters.
Certainly in this case, being positioned as appearing to
favor chemical weapons, is also not an appealing position.
So let me be very clear: Were there pending before this
committee a convention that was verifiable and global and that
would accomplish the elimination of chemical weapons in the
hands of nations most likely to use them, I would be appearing
before the committee as a supporter.
Unfortunately, I do not believe that it meets those tests.
First, I don't believe that this is verifiable, nor have I
met a single, knowledgeable person who believes that it is
verifiable. It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in
some countries, but it is debatable whether the treaty would
reduce chemical arsenals in any of the nations potentially
hostile to the United States. Countries identified by the
United States as possessing chemical weapons that have not
signed the CWC, let alone ratified it, include Libya, Syria,
Iraq, and North Korea. Certainly these countries are among the
most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens, our
soldiers, and our allies.
In addition, there are countries that might sign the
convention which would not be reliable with respect to
compliance. Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not
a trivial problem, it seems to me.
For example, even if Iran does ratify the agreement, we
really cannot rely on them to comply with its terms. Also, it
is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its
obligations under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, as
Secretary Weinberger pointed out. Also, Washington newspapers
and Jane's have recently reported that the Russians have
developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner that
would make discovery next to impossible in that they are
apparently comprised of common commercial chemicals. This
raises the question as to the likelihood of their complying
with the convention.
As a Wall Street Journal article recently put it, under the
Chemical Weapons Convention, members to the convention could
look for chemical weapons in New Zealand or the Netherlands but
not in North Korea, Libya, or Iraq, which are countries that
could be chemical warfare threats.
Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the
convention would result in real arms control accomplishments,
nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the
world to have standards and values, as Secretary Schlesinger
mentioned. This is the ``speed limit'' argument.
My friend, Dr. Kenneth Adelman, a former Director of ACDA,
recently argued, supporting the agreement, that standards and
values violated are better than no standards and values at all.
I personally think that is probably the most persuasive
case that can be made for the convention. However, I do not
believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the scales.
While standards and norms are important, there is a real
risk that in ratifying the convention and in setting forth high
standards, the U.S. would be misinforming the world by
misleading people into believing that we had, in fact, done
something with respect to the international controls over the
use of chemical weapons, despite the certainty, in my mind, at
least, that this convention cannot provide that assurance.
Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only
potential benefits of the convention, such as standards and
norms, but also its burdens and costs.
It seems to me clear that any advantages of setting forth
such standards by ratifying the convention are more than offset
by the disadvantages.
I note that there would be considerable cost to the
taxpayers in that the convention provides for the use of a
U.N.-style funding formula, which calls for the United States
to pay some 25 percent of the total. In addition, there would
be costs to private industry, which I do not believe can be
properly quantified at present in that it is not possible yet
to know how the mechanisms to police this convention would
actually work. This is to say nothing of the cost to companies
of trying to protect proprietary information from compromise.
These costs would amount, in a real sense, to unfunded
mandates on American enterprise.
These were among the concerns that were expressed by a
number of government, civilian, and military officials in a
letter sent to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott late last
year, which I signed, and I ask that a copy of that letter and
the signatories be placed in the record at this point.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
September 9, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, United States Senate,
Washington, DC 20510.
Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to
take final action on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on or before
September 14th. This Treaty has been presented as a global, effective
and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As individuals with
considerable experience in national security matters, we would all
support such a ban. We have, however, concluded that the present
convention is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among
others.
The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for example,
Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed to join the treaty
regime. Russia is among those who have signed the Convention, but is
unlikely to ratify--especially without a commitment of billions in U.S.
aid to pay for the destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then,
given our experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its
repeated refusal to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement
on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be expected.
The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control
possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal weapons
purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two chemical agents that
were employed with deadly effect in World War I--phosgene and hydrogen
cyanide. The reason speaks volumes about this treaty's impractical
nature: they are too widely used for commercial purposes to be banned.
The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence community has
repeatedly acknowledged in congressional testimony. Authoritarian
regimes can be confident that their violations will be undetectable.
Now, some argue that the treaty's intrusive inspections regime will
help us know more than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however,
is whether any additional information thus gleaned will translate into
convincing evidence of cheating and result in the collective imposition
of sanctions or other enforcement measures. In practice, this test is
unlikely to be satisfied since governments tend to took the other way
at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will create a
massive new, U.N.-style international inspection bureaucracy (which
will help the total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as
much as $200 million per year). It will jeopardize U.S. citizens'
constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. government to permit
searches without either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a
costly and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000
companies across the country may be subjected to new reporting
requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs of between thousands
to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year to comply. Most of these
American companies have no idea that they will be affected. And perhaps
worst of all, the CWC will undermine the standard of verifiability that
has been a key national security principle for the United States.
Under these circumstances, the national security benefits of the
Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its considerable
costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject ratification of
the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global, effective and
verifiable.
Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical
Weapons Convention
As of September 9, 1996; 11:30 a.m.
Former Cabinet Members:
Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense
William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the President
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State (signed on September
10)
John S. Herrington, former Secretary of Energy (signed on September 9)
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General
Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense (signed on September 10)
Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense
Additional Signatories (retired military):
General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding General,
Training and Doctrine Command
Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Aviation
General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Commandant of
U.S. Marine Corps (signed on September 9)
Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director
for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (signed on September 9)
Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic
Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Naval
Nuclear Propulsion
General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force
Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation
General John. L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force
General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Commander,
Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems Command
Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander 3rd
Fleet (signed on September 10)
Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Additional Signatories (non-military):
Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
Affairs (signed on September 9)
Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space Council
Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters
Angelo Codevilla, former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute (signed on
September 10)
Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization
J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Midge Decter, former President, Committee for the Free World
Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of Intelligence Programs,
National Security Council
Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory Council
Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Services
David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President
E.C. Grayson, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Stefan Halper, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (signed on
September 10)
Thomas N. Harvey, former National Space Council Staff Officer (signed
on September 9)
Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic Trade Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense
Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Army
Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science
and Technology
Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National Security
Council
Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the President
John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy
John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, National Security
Council
Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy,
Department of Commerce
Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer
James C. McCrery, former senior member of the Intelligence Community
and Arms Control Negotiator (Standing Consultative Committee)
J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy (signed on
September 10)
Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert specializing in
Iraqi affairs
Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine
Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Economist, National Security
Council
Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and former Director of the Policy Planing
Staff, Department of State
Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
for Arms Control
Carl M. Smith, former Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee
Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security Council
Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of Science and
Technology
William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and Defense Policy
Coordinator to the President
Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator
Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for Technology
Policy, Department of Commerce
Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica
Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Mr. Rumsfeld. Over the coming days, the members of the
committee and the Senate will be faced with two important
questions relating to the convention. First is, can the Senate
responsibly oppose the President on this important foreign
policy issue? Second is, what will happen if the Senate does
reject the treaty and the United States seemingly stands
essentially alone in the world, ex-
cept for the rogue states with whom we would be associated as
non-signatories?
Let me address those questions in order.
First is the issue of not supporting the President. As I
indicated, my inclination has always been to try to do that.
However, we know the Constitution did not grant sole authority
to the President of the United States in the area of foreign
policy. Indeed, it does not provide for a simple majority to
ratify a treaty but, rather, for a two-thirds vote, so that it
would have to be almost beyond doubt that a given treaty is in
our national security interest. So it is certainly within the
right of the Senate to disagree.
Also, not surprisingly, there have been a number of
treaties, conventions, and agreements where the Senate has
disagreed over our history.
The second question, as to what might happen if the U.S.
stands alone, is an important one and one that I suspect will
be a principal focus of the debate over the coming days.
One result of the Senate not ratifying the treaty will be,
admittedly, expressions of concern by some of our friends and
allies around the world that have. But I suspect there will be
no smiles from the rogue states. And the world will be spared
the deception which would follow ratification, because the
world will not be led to have erroneously believed that the
threat of chemical weapons has been effectively dealt with. I
submit that we will be spared the complacency that Secretary
Schlesinger mentioned, which I think would follow ratification.
Further, small and medium sized companies will be spared
the costs and the risks to their proprietary information which
would result from U.S. participation. You know, big companies
seem to get along just fine with big government. They get along
with American government, they get along with foreign
government, they get along with international organizations.
They have the staying power, they have the resources to wait
things out. They have the ability, with all their Washington
representatives, to deal effectively with bureaucracies.
Indeed, that talent and skill, that capability on the part
of big companies actually serves as sort of a barrier to entry
to small and medium sized companies that lack that capability.
So I do not suggest for a minute that the large American
companies are not going to be able to cope with these
regulations. They are. They will do it a whale of a lot better
than small and medium sized companies.
But if you look at that opening round with the Department
of Commerce's regulations and requirements, and having been a
regulator in the Federal government at one point in my life, I
know that if you start with this, you end up with this
(indicating). It does not take long.
That problem of regulation on small and medium sized
companies literally sucks the energy out of those companies.
They are not capable of waiting and finding out the answers to
all those things. They are trying to make money. That is the
area of our society where the energy, the vitality, and the
creativity is. They are the ones who are creating jobs in our
country--not the large companies, which have been downsizing
for the most part.
So the fact that a number of large companies are not
concerned about this does not surprise me the all, I must say.
What would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well,
we did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had
very different views as to what the appropriate relationship
between the American people and their government ought to be
than other countries did.
Would we be abdicating leadership on this issue of chemical
weapons and the threat by not ratifying, as some have argued? I
say no. I think not.
I say this because the threat of chemical weapons will
remain despite the fact that this agreement gets ratified by a
number of nations. And the world will--must--look to the United
States for leadership in dealing with that threat. Because of
our capacity, our resources, our knowledge, our credibility, we
will retain a significant leadership role.
So, despite the argument, the power of the argument, that
the U.S. would be standing alone, I think the truth is that we
have done it before and it has worked out rather well. Not
every country has the ability to stand alone, but the U.S. is
not just any country.
With our resources, our weight, our capabilities, we can
not only afford to provide leadership, but we have a special
obligation to provide that kind of leadership and not just go
along with the current diplomatic momentum.
Because we are the United States, we have a singular
responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such as
this and then to set about the task of fashioning a better
solution.
Other countries look to us for that kind of behavior.
I hope the Senate will decide to take its time and work to
achieve the changes necessary to improve this in material ways.
The proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to the reduce
the chemical and biological weapons threat is a practical place
to start.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you and your committee for your
efforts to give such careful consideration to the matter and I
appreciate the opportunity of participating.
Thank you very much.
Prepared Statement of Donald Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning.
Let me say at the outset that I am not an expert on chemicals, nor
am I a lawyer. I have been in and around the subject of Arms Control
since my service in the Congress in the 1960s, as U.S. Ambassador to
NATO during the early 1970s when we were working on MBFR and SALT, as
well as my service in the Pentagon. So, I am here today not as an
expert on chemicals or international law, but rather as one with a long
interest in U.S. national security.
One of the most serious problems facing the United States, our
friends and allies, and indeed the world is proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Surely among the most important treaties of the
decades since World War II are those which effectively enhance U.S.
national security by addressing this problem. The Chemical Weapons
Convention now before the Senate would appear to fit in that category,
but, in my view, it does not.
I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this issue.
Indeed, a number of the people many of us have worked with on these
subjects over the years and respect, find themselves on opposing sides.
Furthermore, as a former Member of the Congress, I well understand
the difficulty in finding oneself in the position of opposing a treaty
that the President of the United States strongly supports and that has
such broad appeal. Being posi-
tioned both as opposing our President and as favoring poison gas, which
seems to be what happens to those who oppose this convention, is not an
attractive position.
Let me be clear. Were there pending before the Senate a convention
that was verifiable and global and which would accomplish the
elimination of chemical weapons in the hands of the nations most likely
to use them, I would be appearing before this committee as a supporter,
asserting that ratification would be in our national interest.
Unfortunately, I do not believe this convention meets these tests.
Interestingly, the preamble of the convention states in the first
paragraph: ``The states parties to this convention * * *. Determined to
act with a view to achieving effective progress toward general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of
mass destruction * * * .''
That is a goal that can only be described as monumentally
ambitious. More to the point, it is not clear to me that that is today
the agreed policy of the U.S. government or even that it is realistic.
The history of mankind suggests that the achievement of ``complete
disarmament'' is not a likely prospect, and the idea of ``strict and
effective international controls'' to assure compliance with ``complete
disarmament'' is, to put it mildly, a stretch.
I do not believe that this convention is verifiable. Nor have I met
or heard a single knowledgeable person who believes it is verifiable.
The U.S. intelligence community has acknowledged in congressional
testimony that we cannot have high confidence that violation of the CWC
will be detected.
It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in some countries. It
is debatable, however, whether this treaty would reduce the chemical
arsenals of any of the nations potentially hostile to the United
States. Countries identified by the United States as possessing
chemical weapons, that have not signed the CWC let alone ratified it,
include Libya, Syria, Iraq and North Korea. Certainly, these countries
are among the most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens,
our soldiers and our allies.
In addition there are countries that might well sign the
convention, but which would not be reliable with respect to compliance.
Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not a trivial problem.
For example, even if Iran does ratify can we really rely on them to
comply? Also, it is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its
obligations under the 1990 U.S.-Russian bilateral destruction
agreement. The Washington Times and Jane's have reported that the
Russians have developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner
which would make discovery next to impossible, in that they are
comprised of common commercial chemicals. This raises the question as
to the likelihood of their complying with this convention.
It appears that this convention is proceeding in a way that it
could conceivably disarm democratic, friendly, non aggressive nations,
that either do not have chemical weapons, or if they have them would be
most unlikely to use them against us, while it will not effectively
apply to totalitarian, enemy and aggressive nations that would be most
likely to use them against the U.S. and its allies. As a recent Wall
Street Journal article put it, under the Chemical Weapons Convention,
members to the convention could look for chemical weapons in New
Zealand or the Netherlands, but not in North Korea, Libya or Iraq--
countries which could be chemical warfare threats.
Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the
convention would result in real arms control accomplishments,
nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the world to
have standards and values. Dr. Kenneth Adelman, former director of
ACDA, recently argued in supporting the agreement that ``standards and
values violated are better than no standards or values at all.'' That
is the most persuasive argument for the convention I have heard.
However, I do not believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the
scales.
While standards are important, there is the real risk that in
ratifying the convention and setting forth high standards, the U.S.
would be misinforming the world by misleading people into believing
that there were reasonable international controls over the use of
chemical weapons, despite the certainty that this convention cannot
provide that assurance. The use of various gases during World War I led
to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which banned first use of chemical
weapons in war. Despite that high standard, that ban has not been
observed, witness Iraq's use of such chemicals.
Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only any
potential benefits of the convention, but also its burdens and costs.
It seems clear that any advantages of setting forth laudable standards
and values by ratifying the convention are more than offset by the
disadvantages.
I note that there would be considerable cost to U.S. taxpayers in
that the CWC provides for use of a U.N.-style funding formula, which as
I recall bills the U.S. to pay some 25 percent of all costs.
Personally, I think that percentage is too high and I cannot see why we
would wish to extend it to still more international organizations.
In addition, there would be costs to private industry, which I do
not believe can be quantified at present, in that it is not possible to
know yet how the mechanisms to police the convention would work. And
this is to say nothing of the costs to companies of trying to protect
proprietary information from compromise.
These were among the concerns expressed by a number of former U.S.
government civilian and military officials in a letter sent to Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott late last year, which I signed. (I have
attached a copy of the letter to my remarks, and ask that it be made a
part of the record at this point.)
[The letter referred to by Mr. Rumsfeld appears on page 15.]
Other concerns expressed in the letter included: The risk that the
convention would lead to the creation of a new U.N.-style international
inspection bureaucracy at great cost to the American taxpayers; that
the CWC could undermine the standard of verifiability that had been a
key national security principle for the U.S.; and that the convention
could prevent the use of non-lethal riot control agents, to the
disadvantage of U.S. forces.
Over the coming days members of the committee and the Senate will
be faced with two important questions.
First, can the Senate responsibly oppose the President on this
important foreign policy issue; and second, what will happen if the
Senate does reject the treaty, and the U.S. seemingly stands
essentially alone and apart in the world.
Let me address those questions in order.
First, is the issue of not supporting our President on a key
foreign policy matter. As one, with a background in the executive
branch, I begin with a strong preference to support the President on
such matters. Indeed, I felt that pull even as a Member of Congress
with Presidents of the other party. And I so voted. So that is my
inclination.
However, we know the Constitution did not grant the President sole
responsibility in foreign affairs. Indeed, it provides not for a simple
majority vote for the Senate to ratify a treaty, but a two-thirds vote,
so that it would have to be beyond doubt that a given treaty is in the
U.S. national security interest. So, it is not only well within the
right of the Senate to disagree with a treaty as its best judgment may
dictate, but it is its constitutional obligation. In exercising that
responsibility, there have been a number of treaties, conventions, and
international agreements that have not been approved by the U.S. Senate
over our history, and in each case the sun came up the next day and the
world did not end.
The second question as to what might happen if the U.S. stands
apart on this issue, is also an important one, and one which I suspect
will be a principle focus of the debate over the coming days. One
result of the Senate not ratifying this treaty will be expressions of
concern by some of our friends, but there will likely be no smiles from
the rogue states.
Next, the world will be spared the deception which would follow
ratification, because the world will not be led to believe erroneously
that the threat of chemical weapons had been effectively dealt with,
and the complacency which would follow.
Further, small and medium sized U.S. companies will be spared the
costs and the risks to their proprietary information which would result
from U.S. participation. Big companies seem to get along well with big
governments, foreign governments, and international organizations. They
have the resources, the time, and the Washington representatives to
work skillfully with governments. These capabilities of larger
companies serve as an advantage over smaller companies, which lack the
staying power and resources to cope with national and international
regulations, inspections and the like.
Next, U.S. taxpayers will be spared the cost of the convention.
That is not a reason to reject it alone, but it is a fact. The U.S.
would be spared the time and effort of implementing, complying with,
and trying to enforce an agreement which in any event doesn't cover the
nations most likely to use chemical weapons.
So what would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well, we
did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had very different
views as to the appropriate relationship between the people and their
government.
Also, President Ronald Reagan did it with the Law of the Sea
Treaty, notwithstanding the fact that most every nation in the world
had signed that agreement. He did so because he found objectionable
certain provisions relating to the seabed mining provisions. He refused
to sign that treaty and asked me to serve as his Special Envoy to alert
key countries of the dangers of going forward with that portion of the
treaty.
Would the U.S. be abdicating its leadership on this issue by not
ratifying the convention, as some have argued? The answer is no. I say
that because the problem of chemical weapons will remain despite this
agreement, and the world will look to the U.S. for leadership in
dealing with that serious threat.
So despite the power of the argument that the U.S. would be
standing alone, the truth is, we have done it before and it has worked
out rather well. Not every country has the ability to stand alone. But
the U.S. is not just any country. With our resources, our weight, our
capabilities and our credibility the United States not only can afford
to provide leadership, but it has a special obligation and ability to
not just go along with what seems popular at the moment, but to stand
up for what is right. Because we are the United States we have a
singular responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such
as this, and then set about the task of fashioning a better solution.
I hope that the Senate will decide to take its time and work to
achieve the changes necessary to improve it in material ways. The
proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to reduce the chemical
and biological weapons threat is a practical place to start.
Mr. Chairman I commend you and your committee for your efforts to
give the most careful consideration to this matter. I appreciate this
opportunity to express my views and my concerns about the convention.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank all three of you.
Senator Biden was necessarily detained because of the train
this morning, and we were authorized to begin without him. So
he missed his opportunity, as the ranking member, to make a
statement.
I would just say for perhaps his guidance that I took 14
minutes and he might want to consider that same neighborhood.
Senator Biden. I will try to do less than that, Mr.
Chairman. I thank the committee for its indulgence and I would
like the record to show that, although I am late, it will not
add to the total time. Had I been here, I would have used the
time. And the only manifest failure this morning that I have
observed, to use Secretary Schlesinger's words, is the train
schedule. That has been my most manifest failure this morning.
I may reveal others as I speak, though.
Mr. Chairman, I think this is a defining moment, not only
for the United States but, quite frankly, for this committee
and in your significant effort to reestablish this committee
and its credibility and standing within the Congress. I think
our failure to act on this treaty would be a reflection on us,
as well as an extremely negative reflection on the United
States' role internationally.
Twelve years ago, the United States made a firm commitment
to destroy 30,000 tons of poison gas that we had stockpiled. We
had made that decision because these weapons no longer had any
military value, according to our leaders.
President Reagan also initiated an international effort
aimed at forcing others to do what we already decided to do
unilaterally. Through two Republican administrations, efforts
to negotiate a chemical weapons treaty made slow, but steady,
progress, and I would go back to that in a minute, but that was
all part of that process.
The effort gained new urgency after the Gulf War brought
home the threat of poison and chemical weapons over 4 years
ago. To set the record straight on that, as my friends I am
sure know, in terms of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf
War, Secretary Weinberger alluded to the exposure of American
troops to poison gas. That was part of an Iraqi stockpile we
destroyed after the Gulf War. I am certain he realizes that
there was nothing illegal under any law about stockpiling or
producing chemical weapons.
The Geneva Convention applies only to the use of poison gas
in international conflict.
The CWC, on the other hand, bans production and stockpiling
of poison gas and would give significant justification in the
eyes of the international community had we again discovered
another nation was making or storing these weapons or had we
used whatever force we chose to use against them.
Second, with regard to the issue of the Gulf War, prior to
the Gulf War, an example of Saddam Hussein using poison gas
against the Kurds, which was alluded to here, is another reason
why the CWC is needed, in my view. There is nothing illegal
under the Geneva Convention about the use of poison gas in
internal conflicts.
The proscription applies only to international armed
conflict, as I am sure the Secretary knows. So they didn't even
violate the Geneva Convention. It is also true the
international community failed to act.
But you did not fail to act, Mr. Chairman. You led the
effort here in the U.S. Senate with Senator Pell and we
received a unanimous vote for a sanctions bill on September
1988 soon after this came to light.
Unfortunately, the bill died at the end of the Congress, in
large measure because of the opposition of the Reagan
administration. Indeed, the Reagan State Department, then
deluded into believing the United States could cooperate with
Saddam Hussein, denounced the Senate bill that you pushed and
you got through as premature.
So I say that neither this Senator nor would others stand
idly by if violations of the Geneva Convention were discovered.
But I'm sure the Secretary knew that there was no violation of
the Geneva Convention and the point he made was still a very
valid one. That is, we did not act.
We led the world to the altar, you might say, of attempting
to deal with chemical weapons, and I am confident that we will
not abandon 160 other nations, for, if we did, it seems to me
we would send a signal of retreat, forfeit our leadership, and
cripple our ability to forge coalitions against the gravest
threats we face as a Nation, as Secretary Rumsfeld referred to.
This is the proliferation of weapons, all weapons, of mass
destruction. We have not even talked about biological weapons
yet.
I know that the witnesses this morning do not share my view
that this treaty is in our vital national interest. And I know
that and we have heard arguments that the treaty is flawed
because several rogue states have not signed.
We also heard that verification will be difficult and that
the CWC will harm U.S. industry and that it will supposedly
force us to transfer sophisticated chemical equipment and
defenses to dangerous regimes.
And, finally, maybe the most strenuous argument we have
heard today is that we are going to be lulled into a false
sense of security, that we are going to drop our guard.
I hope to demonstrate through these hearings today,
tomorrow, and the next day that those criticisms are incorrect
and the problems they site will only get worse--get worse--
without CWC.
From the military perspective, I believe this convention is
clearly in our interest. I know that the witnesses do not agree
with me. However, two other former Secretaries of Defense and
the present Secretary of Defense, not represented here today,
do agree with me. Harold Brown, William Perry, and Secretary of
Defense Cohen all believe it is in our interest.
There is a draft statement from Brown and Perry. It says,
``As former Secretaries of Defense, we would like to join
former military leaders, including past Chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Powell, Vessey, Jones, Crowe, and former Chiefs
of Staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps plus
combat veterans like Norman Schwarzkopf in offering our strong
support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Treaty.''
I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of their
statement be placed in the record in the interest of time, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Draft Statement of Harold Brown and William Perry
As former Secretaries of Defense, we would like to join former
military leaders including past chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Generals Colin Powell, John Vessey, David Jones, and Admiral William
Crowe, and former chiefs of staff from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps, plus other combat veterans like General Norman
Schwarzkopf, in offering our strong support for the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
We firmly believe that U.S. ratification of the CWC will contribute
significantly to the security interests of the United States and the
safety of our armed forces. In conjunction with the Department of
Defense's other efforts against chemical weapons proliferation, a
robust chemical protection program and maintenance of a range of non-
chemical response capabilities, the CWC will serve the best interests
of the United States and the world community. In light of the decision
under President Reagan to get rid of the vast majority of U.S. chemical
weapons stockpiles, it is in our interests to require other nations to
do the same. The access provided for by the treaty will enhance our
ability to monitor world-wide CW activities.
We believe the CWC, which was negotiated under Presidents Reagan
and Bush and completed by President Bush, to be a carefully considered
treaty that serves our national interests well. Failure to ratify the
CWC would send a clear signal of U.S. retreat from international
leadership to both our friends and to our potential adversaries and
would damage our ability to inhibit the proliferation of chemical
weapons.
Senator Biden. As the authors of this statement note, every
single Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since President
Carter's administration has endorsed ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Last Friday, 17 distinguished
retired military officers sent a letter to the President in
which they endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The collection of signatures on this letter is
quite impressive. If my colleagues will indulge me, let me just
read a few: General Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, Admiral
Stanley Arthur, General Michael Duggan, General Charles Horner,
General David Jones, General Wesley McDonald, General Meryl
McPeak, General Carl Mundy, Admiral William Owens, General
Gordon Sullivan, Vice Admiral Richard Truly, Admiral Stansfield
Turner, General John Vessey, General Fred Warner, Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt.
In this letter they wrote--and I will just read the first
paragraph--the following. They say, ``As former members of the
United States Armed Forces, we would like to express our strong
support for Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. This landmark treaty serves the national security
interests of the United States.''
I will not read the rest of the letter, but I ask unanimous
consent that it be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
April 3, 1997.
The Honorable William J. Clinton,
The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500.
Dear Mr. President: As former members of the United States Armed
Forces, we write to express our strong support for Senate ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This landmark treaty serves
the national security interests of the United States.
Each of us can point to decades of military experience in command
positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to prepare for the
wartime use of chemical weapons and for defenses against them. We all
recognize the limited military utility of these weapons, and supported
President Bush's decision to renounce the use of an offensive chemical
weapons capability and to unilaterally destroy U.S. stockpiles. The CWC
simply mandates that other countries follow our lead. This is the
primary contribution of the CWC: to destroy militarily-significant
stockpiles of chemical weapons around the globe.
We recognize that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical agents, presents a major national security threat to
the U.S. The CWC cannot eliminate this threat, as terrorists and rogue
states may still be able to evade the treaty's strict controls.
However, the treaty does destroy existing stockpiles and improves our
abilities to gather intelligence on emerging threats. These new
intelligence tools deserve the Senate's support.
On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security against
chemical weapons. We must continue to support robust defense
capabilities, and remain willing to respond--through the CWC or by
unilateral action--to violators of the convention. Our focus is not on
the treaty's limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC
destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it significantly
improves our intelligence capabilities; and it creates new
international sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of
the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC.
Officers who signed the April 3, 1997 letter to the President
Admiral Stanley Arthur, USN (Ret.), former Vice Chief of Naval
Operations
General Michael Dugan, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Chief of Staff
General Charles Homer, USAF (Ret.), former CINC, U.S. Space Command
General David Jones, USAF (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Admiral Wesley McDonald, USN (Ret.), former CINC, Atlantic Command
General Merrill McPeak, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Chief of Staff
General Carl Mundy, USMC (Ret.), former Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
Admiral William Owens, USN (Ret.), former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff
General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
General Robert RisCassi, USA (Ret.), former CINC, U.S. Forces Korea
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret.), former CINC, Central Command
General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret.), former Army Chief of Staff
Admiral Richard Truly, USN (Ret.), former Director, NASA
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.), former Director of Central
Intelligence
General John Vessey, USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Frederick Woemer, USA (Ret.), former CINC, Southern Command
Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations
Senator Biden. Now several of these signatories to the
letter I have just read were present at a White House event
early on Friday in which dozens of distinguished Americans from
many walks of life joined together to call for early
ratification of the treaty.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that the text of the
remarks made at this event be included in the record as well,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The information referred to appears in the Appendix.]
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, the convention has won the
endorsement of several highly respected veterans organizations
as well. These include the Reserve Officers Association, the
Vietnam Veterans Association, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., the American Ex-Prisoners of
War, and I would ask unanimous consent that the statements by
these organizations also be placed in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to appears in the Appendix.]
Senator Biden. These individuals and organizations, none of
whom can be characterized as soft headed or soft hearted,
recognize the benefits of the convention for our front line
soldiers, who increasingly face the risk of less discriminating
and more treacherous weapons like poison gas. We should do the
same.
I would like to point out that I do not for a moment, nor
do I know anybody else who does, question the patriotism, the
integrity, or the distaste for poison gas or chemical weapons
that is shared by our three most distinguished witnesses today.
Anyone who would make such a statement is a damn fool.
But the truth of the matter is we just have, as I say, a
healthy disagreement among respected women and men about the
value of this treaty for the United States. I think the value
for those in favor far outweigh those opposed, but not in terms
of their intellectual capability but in terms of their number.
The argument that the treaty will be ineffective because
several rogue states have not signed is, I find, equally
perplexing. Today there is absolutely nothing illegal about the
chemical weapons programs in these rogue states, and that will
change once the CWC comes into force. At least it will be
illegal. It will make such programs illegal. It will also
provide us with a valuable tool--the moral suasion of the
entire international community--to isolate and target those
states who violate the norm which my friend, the former
Secretary and head of more than one agency, believes--his view
is that norms don't matter in international relations. I would
like to have a talk with him, if we have more time, about the
notion of norms and why I think they do matter.
But at any rate, if you disagree and norms don't matter,
then it doesn't matter. But most Americans and most people do
agree that norms do matter. They do have some impact. They may
not solve it all, but they have an impact.
As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who will testify
this afternoon has noted, to say that we should not try to make
chemical weapons illegal because there will be cheaters is like
saying we should not have laws because we know people are going
to break them.
Norms are created so that we have standards for civilized
conduct by which to judge others. Without them, we leave the
rogue countries to behave as free actors.
Indeed, by joining the convention, we place the full weight
of the world community to take whatever actions are necessary
to respond and to prevent them. I acknowledge that we will
ultimately take only that action which we view to be in our
national interest. We will ultimately take only that action we
view to be in our national interest.
When my friends were former Secretaries of Defense, they
did not recommend actions taken when we knew countries were
acting in ways that were beyond our interests without
considering the global interest and the interest of the United
States relative to other considerations.
So I acknowledge that ultimately we will take action or not
take action based on whether it is in our interest.
Equally importantly, we will place our military might
behind the world's threat to act against violators.
The argument that U.S. industry will suffer under the
supposedly onerous burdens of the treaty is particularly
intriguing to me. You see, I come from Delaware. If there is
any state in the Union that has a greater interest in the
chemical industry, I know of none. And I can assure you
gentlemen, big or small--and they are both big and small--if
they had a problem, I guarantee you I would hear about it. I
promise you that I would after 24 years.
You were a former member, Secretary Rumsfeld. Do you doubt
that the industry would let me know? Do you doubt for one
moment?
I can tell you that not only do they support it--and, by
the way, this impacts on half of Delaware's industrial output,
these chemicals. It is one-half. Not only does industry support
it, they strongly support it.
And in terms of those small outfits, Secretary Rumsfeld may
not be aware of this, but Dan Danner of the National Federation
of Independent Businesses said the CWC will have no impact on
their members. They are neutral on the treaty.
Maybe he was unaware of that, but that is their position.
What I have heard from the chemical industry is if you
don't ratify this convention, the chemical industry, which is
the country's largest exporter, stands to lose hundreds of
millions of dollars in export earnings; because it would be
subject to trade sanctions that the United States wrote into
the treaty to target rogue states. We wrote it in.
Now this will be the irony of all ironies. My State will
get a kick in the teeth on something we wrote into a treaty,
because we do not ratify the treaty. And Germany has already
announced that, come April 29, sanctions are going to apply.
In fact, we have heard that all non-members will be subject
to those German sanctions.
By the way, one of our largest competitors is Germany, as
you might guess. So there is a little interest there.
The argument that the convention is unverifiable is a
classic case of making the perfect the enemy of the good. No
arms control treaty is perfectly verifiable, and the CWC is no
exception to the rule. While there are risks that a State party
will hide some covert chemical weapons stockpiles or illegally
produce chemical weapons, it will be much more difficult to
engage in large scale violations that would pose the greatest
danger to U.S. military forces.
As one of our witnesses this afternoon, a former colleague
of yours, Ambassador Kirkpatrick points out--though she did not
mean to point it out this way--she said you know, don't worry
about verification. We are going to have to do this
verification anyway, even if there is no treaty. That is the
point. That is the point. We have to do it anyway. And we can
do it less well--less well--without the treaty than with the
treaty.
George Tenet, the Acting Director of CIA, said, ``In the
absence of tools that the convention gives us, it will be much
harder for us to apprise you, apprise the military and
policymakers of where we think we are in the world regarding
these developments.'' The intelligence community sees benefits
in us ratifying CWC.
In addition, there may well be occasions in which on-site
inspection will provide evidence of treaty violations. In other
words, while we will not catch every violator, we will catch
some, and that does act as a deterrent. And without CWC, we
won't catch anybody.
The allegation that the treaty would lead to the end of
export controls on dangerous chemicals is based on a poor
reading of the treaty, with all due respect.
Article XI of the convention supports the chemical, trade,
and technology exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under the
convention.'' It also requires that trade restrictions not be
``incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this
convention.''
The CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement
of the Australia Group controls which member states use to keep
chemical and biological materials out of the hands of rogue
states. The executive branch has said this time and again and
so have our Australia Group allies.
In fact, as we speak, our allies are in the process of
repeating these assurances through diplomatic contacts. It is
the decline and failure of U.S. leadership that would pose the
gravest threat to the Australia Group, and failure to ratify
the CWC would be seen by friend and foe alike as a retreat from
that world leadership.
Under that circumstance, State and chemical industries
might indeed conclude that we should go back to helping the
Iraqis and Libyans of the world to build their suspect chemical
facilities. If one were to extrapolate the argument treaty
opponents make, one would have to conclude that no matter what
we do, the Australia Group is a dead letter because on April
29, those Australia Group countries that have joined the
convention will be required to begin trading freely in
dangerous chemicals, according to the argument made by the
opponents. Obviously, this is as preposterous as it sounds. But
it is a logical outgrowth of the allegation made by opponents.
Finally, I would look forward to engaging the witnesses on
their claim that the convention will lull us into a false sense
of security. The Pentagon made it clear on numerous occasions
that it will maintain a robust chemical capability supported by
robust intelligence collection. The commitment to protecting
our forces has the full support of the President and the
Congress. In addition, I have agreed with Senator Helms,
assuming this treaty comes up, to a legally binding condition
of the treaty that requires the Secretary of Defense to insure
that the U.S. forces are capable of carrying out our military
missions regardless of any foreign threats or use of chemical
weapons. Besides, our experience in other arms control
agreements shows there is little chance of our becoming
complacent about a chemical weapons threat if the CWC is
ratified.
I just would cite the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
not much more in the interest of time.
Article X does not require the CWC defense assistance
beyond antidotes and medical treatments. Does that really harm
U.S. security? Isn't it a fair trade for getting those
countries to forego chemical weapons? If other countries want
to provide additional CWC defenses, as the Secretary indicates,
how would the U.S. failure to ratify stop that in any way? You
made your own argument. You said these guys are going to go out
and do this anyway.
Well, that's true. If they're going to do it, they're going
to do it whether we are a signatory or not. Being a signatory
in no way enhances that prospect. Industrial espionage is
another question that I will not get into in the interest of
time. But I notice that the chemical industry is not making
that case, Secretary Rumsfeld, and we will have safeguards
requiring the Secretary of Defense to maintain U.S. military
capabilities to operate in chemical environments.
The riot control agents is another subject that I would
like to speak to, which I think we have taken care of.
I thank the Chairman for allowing me to make my statement
late, and I thank you gentlemen for listening. But then, what
else could you do?
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Biden
Mr. Chairman, this is a defining moment in our foreign relations.
In my view, the credibility and continued leadership of the United
States on arms control and proliferation matters hangs in the balance.
Twelve years ago the United States made a firm commitment to destroy
the thirty thousand tons of poison gas that we had stockpiled. We made
that decision because these weapons no longer had any military value.
We also initiated a global effort aimed at forcing others to do
what we had already decided to do unilaterally. Through two Republican
administrations, efforts to negotiate the Chemical Weapons Treaty made
slow but steady progress. The effort gained new urgency after the Gulf
War again awakened us to the threat posed by chemical weapons. Over
four years ago, Secretary of State Eagelburger signed the Chemical
Weapons Treaty on behalf of the Bush Administration.
Having led the world to the altar, I am confident that we will not
abandon 160 other nations. For if we did, we would send a signal of
retreat, forfeit our leadership, and cripple our ability to forge
coalitions against the gravest threat we face as a nation--the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
I know that the witnesses today do not share my view that this
treaty is in our vital national interest. I know that we will hear
arguments that the treaty is flawed because several rogue states have
not signed. We will hear that verification will be difficult, that the
CWC will harm U.S. industry, that it will supposedly force us to
transfer sophisticated chemical equipment and defenses to dangerous
regimes. Finally, perhaps their most strenuous argument will be that
this treaty will lull us into a false sense of security and cause us to
drop our guard.
I hope to demonstrate today that these claims are incorrect and
that the problems they cite will only get worse without the CWC. From
the military perspective, I believe that this convention is clearly in
our interest. I know that the witnesses may not agree with me in this
regard. However, two other former Secretaries of Defense not
represented here today do agree with me. These are Harold Brown,
Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, and William Perry,
Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton term.
I ask unanimous consent that their statement be included in the
record. As they note in their statement, every single Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of staff since President Carter's Administration has
endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Last friday, 17 distinguished retired military officers sent a
letter to the President in which they endorsed ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. The collection of signatures on this
letter is quite impressive. I would ask unanimous consent to place the
text of this letter as well as an opinion piece by Secretary of Defense
William Cohen in the record.
Several of these signatories were present at a White House event on
Friday in which dozens of distinguished Americans from many walks of
life and both sides of the political fence joined together to call for
early ratification of this treaty. I would ask unanimous consent that
the text of the remarks made at this event be included in the record.
The Convention has won the endorsement of several highly-respected
veterans and military organizations as well. This list includes the
Reserve Officers Association, the Vietnam Veterans Association, the
Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., and
The American Ex-prisoners of War. I would ask unanimous consent that
statements by these organizations be placed in the record.
These individuals and organizations--none of whom can be
characterized as soft-headed or soft-hearted--recognize the benefits of
this Convention for our front-line soldiers, who increasingly face the
risk of less discriminating and more treacherous weapons like poison
gas. We should do the same.
Mr. Chairman, the argument that the treaty will be ineffective
because several rogue states have not signed is equally perplexing to
me. Today, there is absolutely nothing illegal under international or
domestic law about the chemical weapons programs in these rogue states.
That will change once the CWC enters into force. It will make such
programs illegal. It will also provide us with a valuable tool--the
weight of the entire international community to isolate and target
those states that violate the norm set by this treaty.
As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who will testify this
afternoon, has noted--to say that we shouldn't try to make chemical
weapons illegal because there will be cheaters, is like saying that we
shouldn't have laws because people will break them. International norms
of behavior are created so that we have standards of civilized conduct
by which to judge others. Without them, we leave the rogue countries to
behave as free actors.
Indeed, by joining the convention, we place the full weight of the
world community to take whatever action is necessary to respond to, or
prevent an adversary from using chemical weapons. Equally important, we
will place our military might behind the world's threat to act against
violators.
The argument that U.S. industry will suffer under the supposedly
onerous burdens of the treaty is particularly interesting for me to
hear. You see, coming from Delaware I know a thing or two about the
chemical industry--which is the industry that will be most impacted by
this treaty. The chemical industry accounts for over one-half of
Delaware's industrial output. If the chemical industry had a problem
with this treaty, I assure you that I would have been among the first
to hear about it. Instead, what I have heard is that the chemical
industry played a key role in negotiating the convention and is among
its strongest supporters.
What I have heard is that if we don't ratify this convention, the
chemical industry, which is this country's largest exporter, stands to
lose hundreds of millions of dollars in export earnings because it
would be subject to trade sanctions that the United States wrote into
the treaty to target rogue states. In fact, we have now heard that
Germany has announced that it will impose trade restrictions on non-
members come April 29.
The argument that the convention is unverifiable is a classic case
of making the perfect the enemy of the good. No arms control treaty is
perfectly verifiable. The CWC is no exception to that rule. While there
are risks that a state party will hide some covert chemical weapons
stocks or illegally produce chemical weapons, it will be much more
difficult to engage in large-scale violations that would pose the
greatest danger to U.S. military forces. This is because of the CWC's
extensive on-site inspection regime.
George Tenet, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence,
testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that: ``In the
absence of the tools that the Convention gives to us, it will be much
harder for us to apprise you, apprise the military and policymakers of
where we think we are in the world with regards to these
developments.''
The intelligence community wants us to ratify CWC because it will
give them additional tools to detect chemical weapon programs in other
countries. And that is something we're going to have to do anyway. In
addition, there may well be some occasions in which on-site inspection
will produce evidence of treaty violations. In other words, while we
may not catch every violator, we may well catch some--and that will
lead to deterrence.
And without the CWC, we won't catch anybody--because there will be
no bar on countries producing and stockpiling those weapons. The
allegation that the treaty would lead to the end of export controls on
dangerous chemicals is based on a poor reading of the treaty text.
Article Eleven of the Convention supports chemical trade and technology
exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also
requires that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this convention.''
But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of
the Australia group controls, which member states use to keep chemical
and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The
executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our
Australia group allies.
In fact, as we speak, our allies are in the process of repeating
those assurances through diplomatic contacts. It is the decline and
failure of U.S. leadership that would pose the gravest threat to the
Australia group. And failure to ratify the CWC would be seen by friend
and foe alike as a U.S. retreat from world leadership in an area that
is critical to global security. Under that circumstance, states with
chemical industries might indeed conclude that they should go back to
helping the Iraqs and Libyas Of the world to build suspect chemical
facilities.
If one were to extrapolate the arguments of treaty opponents, one
would have to conclude that no matter what we do, the Australia group
is a dead letter. Because on April 29 those Australia group countries
that have joined the Convention will be required to begin trading
freely in dangerous chemicals according to the argument made by
opponents. Obviously, this argument is as preposterous as it sounds,
but it is the logical outgrowth of the allegation made by the
opponents.
Finally, I look forward to engaging our witnesses on their claim
that this Convention will lull us into a false sense of security. The
Pentagon has made it clear on numerous occasions that it will maintain
a robust chemical defense capability supported by robust intelligence
collection. The commitment to protecting our forces has the full
support of the President and the Congress and I believe strongly that
no future Administration or Congress will abandon our solemn
responsibility to our troops in this regard.
In addition, I have agreed with Senator Helms to add a legally
binding condition to the treaty that requires the Secretary of Defense
to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out military
missions regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical weapons.
Besides, our experience with other arms control agreements shows that
there is little chance of our becoming complacent about the chemical
weapon threat if the CWC is ratified.
For example, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was signed
twenty-five years ago, yet we are continually vigilant on the threat of
nuclear proliferation. As for defenses against poison gas--troop
protection and decontamination training is a function of congressional
funding. That equipment and that training will not go away unless
Congress lets it go away. I certainly won't allow it, and I don't think
my colleagues on the other committees of jurisdiction or on side of
this issue will either.
I am concerned that the opponents solution to the perceived problem
of being lulled to sleep is to allow the threat of chemical weapons to
grow even worse. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to a frank and open
exchange with our witnesses. I hope that the hearing today moves us one
step closer to action on this critical treaty before the impending
deadline.
Thank you.
The Chairman. You didn't take but 18.5 minutes.
Senator Biden. Well, then I will forego my questions, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Oh, no, no. You are always very impressive, I
will say, one way or another.
The Chairman. Since we are playing a name game, Trent Lott
got a letter the other day, signed by a few military people,
such as Dick Cheney, Bill Clark, Alexander Haig, John S.
Herrington, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Edwin Meese, Donald Rumsfeld,
Caspar Weinberger, General Voss, Vice Admiral William Houser,
General Kelley of the Marine Corps, General Thomas Kelly of the
Army, Admiral Wesley McDonald--is that enough?
Senator Biden. That's pretty good, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. OK. We have about 75 other signatories.
Without objection, we will put that in the record.
[The letter referred to by Chairman Helms appears on page
15.]
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, this is not fair to do, but
two of the guys you named changed their mind and signed a
letter on April 3 saying that they are for the treaty.
Oh, they changed their mind after they signed that.
Oh, gosh, all right.
There are a lot of guys changing their minds around here
these days. Maybe we can change your mind, too.
The Chairman. That will be the day.
You won't change my mind about this statement made
repeatedly about the Reagan Administration, which is not for
this treaty. Think about Weinberger, Kirkpatrick, Bill Clark,
Ed Meese, Richard Perle, Dick Adams, and on down the list. In
fact, I know of no one on the Reagan team, as it is known, who
is in favor of it. Sadly, nobody can ask the President himself,
President Reagan, how he feels about it.
I understand that several Senators are going to return so
that they can have their time. We have agreed that 5 minutes
for the first round may be the course of wisdom.
Secretary Rumsfeld, you served for many years as Chairman
and CEO of G.D. Searle and Company, which is, I believe, a
large, multilateral pharmaceutical business. You have had quite
a bit of experience and expertise in dealing with government
regulations, to which you referred.
In your expert opinion, why would the Chemical
Manufacturers Association be so aggressive in supporting the
treaty when I have this many letters (indicating) from chemical
companies saying it is a bad treaty and please do not approve
it?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I cannot climb into the minds of the
executives of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Senator,
but certainly an industry like that has, as Senator Biden has
indicated, an opportunity to increase the number of chemicals
they can export if this treaty is passed. At the present time,
a number of chemicals are not permitted for export, which would
be made permissible for export by this convention.
So it is in their interest to have it passed in that
regard.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Second, I am not an expert on the
association, but certainly they represent the big companies.
They don't represent the medium sized and small companies.
Senator Biden has said he does not doubt that he would be
hearing from small companies if there were a problem. I suspect
if this passes he will hear from them. I don't believe that the
thousands, whatever the number is, of companies across this
country know about this treaty in any detail, believe that the
treaty would apply to them, understand that they could be
subjected to inspections, appreciate the unfunded mandates that
would be imposed on them in the event this treaty were to be
ratified.
I might just point out that the Aerospace Industries
Association has stated its strong concern about the treaty, and
I hope that since they have said that they have not changed
their mind.
But you never know.
But they have said it would unnecessarily jeopardize our
Nation's ability to protect its national security information
and proprietary technological data.
I was told yesterday by an individual who is knowledgeable
that the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, for example, personnel
from there were involved in one of the mock inspections
conducted by the U.S. government. They evaluated the inspection
results and some weeks later, from outside the facility, using
modern technology, were capable of coming away with classified
information and proprietary information from the inspection.
So I don't think that it would be wise for us to
underestimate the risk that would exist to classified
information, to a company's proprietary information.
There is a third problem. Most of us in business are
engaged with joint ventures and partnerships with companies
across the globe. We share proprietary information in the same
facility. Were these inspections imposed, it is entirely
possible that not only your own proprietary information could
be compromised but also the proprietary information of joint
venture partners to whom you have promised not to permit their
proprietary information to be shared.
Even cereal companies close their doors and do not allow
people to walk through the plant. Why? They don't have
classified information. What they have is process information,
and the idea of photography or samples leaving their factory
would unquestionably concern them deeply.
The Chairman. I thank you. My time is up.
Without objection, I am going to ask that the letters from
industry in opposition to treaty ratification be made a part of
this record.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
The Chairman. I don't have but 30 seconds left, so I will
turn to the distinguished Senator from Delaware.
I was just handed an interesting little comment that I will
say to all of you. One of the letters that I have is from the
company which makes the ink for the dollar bill. They are
frightened that foreign inspections under the CWC would give
counterfeiters some advantage.
Mr. Rumsfeld. They are probably incorporated in Delaware.
Senator Biden. I hope so. That accounts for the other 50
percent of our business.
Actually, that's not true. Chickens are bigger.
Dr. Schlesinger. They are incorporated in Virginia and the
letter was sent to Charles Robb.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Gentlemen, obviously because of the time I am not going to
be able to ask you all that I want to, though I am sure my
colleagues will do a better job at it than I would.
Let me ask you about a few things you have mentioned here
and about conditions that have been tentatively agreed to,
conditions added to the treaty that have been tentatively
agreed to by Senator Helms and me--speaking only for me and not
for any other member of the Democratic Caucus or the Republican
Caucus. One of the criticisms was that this is unenforceable,
this treaty. And one of the conditions we have tentatively
agreed on is that the President would be required to consult
with the Senate if the treaty is being violated. The President
would be required to report to us on what was being done by way
of inspections, diplomacy, and sanctions to respond to the
violation. And if the violations were to persist for one year,
the President would have to come back to the Senate and ask the
Senate to decide if we should continue to adhere to the treaty
or not. He would have an affirmative obligation.
My question is, does this condition in any way, do you view
it as positive, not whether it cures the problems of the
treaty, but do you consider it a positive condition?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think it is a positive condition.
Mr. Weinberger. I would suggest, however, that we might
want to look very carefully at the content of the report that
the President makes to the Senate and see if it, in fact, is as
accurate as it should be.
Senator Biden. I think that is a valid concern and a valid
point raised. There is another condition that we have
tentatively agreed on.
In response to a piece, an op-ed piece done by you
distinguished gentlemen, you said, on March 5, that if the
United States is not a CWC member State, the danger is lessened
that American intelligence about ongoing chemical weapons
operations will be ``dumbed down'' or otherwise compromised.
In order to address that concern, Senator Helms and I have
agreed to a condition requiring periodic reports and prompt
notice to the Congress about chemical weapons programs around
the world and the status of CWC compliance.
The executive branch would also be required to offer
briefings on these issues. This condition would give Congress
an active role in advising the President in regard to insuring
compliance. The information would be before the Congress and it
would be incumbent upon us to review it and define, if we
disagreed, when violations were taking place.
My question is does this in any way go toward alleviating
the concern about dumbing down?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, it helps in some ways and it adds to
the problem in others.
As you know, there is a proclivity of the executive branch,
when it wants to avoid action, to ignore or to dumb down
violations by others. There is a long history of this. I need
not repeat it.
Senator Biden. I'm aware of that.
Dr. Schlesinger. You referred to the Iraq case yourself.
Senator Biden. Now the other question that several of you
have indicated in written material in the past was without a
commitment of billions of U.S. aid to pay for destruction of
Russia's vast arsenal, they will not comply with this treaty.
Senator Helms and I have agreed to a condition to a
resolution of ratification in an attempt to address this issue.
Our condition states: The United States will not accept any
Russian effort to condition its ratification upon the U.S.
providing guarantees to pay for implementation.
Let me ask you this. Does this in any way help in that
problem, although I find it kind of strange? It's like the
argument about why the Nunn-Lugar legislation was a bad idea--
this is not an argu-
ment on your part, but some here have argued that it was a bad
idea because we were paying money to the Russians to destroy
nuclear weapons.
I always found that an interesting argument, and I don't
know why it would be such a bad idea to help destroy their
chemical weapons, either. At any rate, we have a condition that
says that that can be no condition of ratification.
Is that a useful or a destructive addition to this treaty?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that is useful, Senator. It does,
however, underscore a fundamental problem that we have in that
the bilateral destruction agreement was the foundation for the
Chemical Weapons Convention and that Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin has now said that agreement has outlived its
usefulness. That is worrisome.
Senator Biden. As you will recall--and this will obviously
be my last comment--as you will recall, the reason for that
treaty was to prompt this treaty. You will remember that.
Second, we did not ratify the treaty nor did they ratify the
treaty.
Anyway, thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Before I recognize Senator Lugar, let me say
that the distinguished ranking member, Joe Biden, and I have
spent several hours together trying to work on details, and we
have agreed on about 21 relatively minor defects in the treaty.
There are 5 or 6 major things yet to be considered, and the
administration up till now--not Joe Biden, but the
administration--is stonewalling considering even those defects.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join you and members of the committee in
welcoming witnesses this morning who are good public servants
and personal friends of many of us on this committee. I have
listened to their testimony and I have studied the op-ed which
they wrote for the Washington Post last month. I believe their
contribution was well written, but, at least for me, it was
unpersuasive.
Critics of the convention often speak as if the concerns
they are expressing are being heard almost for the first time
and that members of the committee have now taken these issues
into account in developing the resolution of ratification.
The critics may not be familiar with the resolution of
ratification that we passed out of this committee by a vote of
13 to 5 last year or the ongoing negotiations on the
ratification issue this year which the Chairman just cited.
The resolution is precisely the vehicle through which these
matters of interpretation are taken up and conditions added to
conform to U.S. domestic law. Instead of working these complex
interpretation issues, many critics are repeating many of the
same arguments that we have dealt with.
I would say, for example, that we are treated to the so-
called complacency argument; that is, United States
ratification of the CWC will lull the country into a false
sense of security and a tendency to neglect its defenses. But
this is surely a matter of political will here at home. It has
nothing to do with the treaty. There is nothing inevitable
about arms control agreements contributing to lessening a
perceived need and, therefore, support for defense against such
threats.
But there is something wrong with the notion that by
allowing our potential adversaries to have a chemical weapon
situation without norms and international law, that we are sure
to be reminded to defend ourselves against them. Rather than
whining about complacency, Congress ought to do its job:
Authorize and appropriate the funds necessary to provide for a
robust chemical defense capability.
In addition, Congress has every ability to add or to shift
funds to ensure that CWC monitoring remains a priority.
Second, we are treated again to the so-called poisons for
peace argument; namely, the CWC will obligate member states to
facilitate transfers of CWC specific technology, equipment and
material to member states of the convention. Further, they
charge the treaty commits new member states not to observe any
agreements that would obstruct these transfers.
That is the Iranian interpretation of Article XI. The
United States and others rejected that argument and maintain
that interpretation of Article XI did not require them to do
so, that mechanisms such as the Australian Group are legitimate
under the CWC, and the work of the Australian Group will
continue.
The resolution of ratification clarifies the American
interpretation. The U.S. preserves the right to maintain or
impose export controls for foreign policy or national security
reasons. But nothing in the convention obligates the United
States to accept any weakening of existing national export
controls and that the export control and nonproliferation
measures the Australian Group has undertaken are fully
consistent with all requirements of the CWC.
If, as critics state, the CWC would likely leave the United
States more and not less vulnerable to chemical attack, then
the blame again resides with political leaders in the United
States, not with the convention. The treaty in no way
constrains our ability as a nation to provide for a robust
defense against chemical weapons or to impose and maintain
export controls.
Third, we are told that if the U.S. is a CWC participant,
American intelligence is in danger of being dumbed down or
compromised. Again, any dumbing down of intelligence has
nothing to do with the convention. It has to do, once again,
with political will.
We quite predictably get, then, a charge on the
Constitution made by critics that U.S. participation could
leave U.S. citizens and companies vulnerable to burdens
associated with reporting and inspection arrangements and to
jeopardizing confidential business information.
The critics pose as protectors of American industry, but
industry has spoken for itself. U.S. industry would not support
the CWC if it posed significant risks to confidential business
information. Specifically, the chemical industry has worked
intensively to ensure that protections against the loss of
confidential information are incorporated in the CWC and the
administration-proposed implementing legislation.
By the same token, allegations that this will require
violation of the Constitution are wrong. The proposed
implementing legislation provides for search warrants if
routine or challenge inspections are to be carried out without
consent. The CWC also allows the U.S. to take into account
constitutional obligations regarding searches and seizures,
proprietary rights, and providing access through challenge
inspections.
Finally, there is the argument that we be in no hurry to
adhere to the convention and if and when we decide to join
other signatories will have no choice but to adjust.
Nevertheless, if we are not a party when it enters into force,
we will have no role in the governing body and that is
important.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I noted
when I walked in here the presence of the distinguished
Admiral, who has rejoined us here.
It is a pleasure to see you again, Admiral. We are glad to
have you back with us.
Today I thank all three of you for being here as witnesses.
All three of you had distinguished careers, and it is a
pleasure to see you back before the committee.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding these hearings. I
respect immensely the concerns that you have raised. You have
done so in an appropriate fashion over the last number of
months, and we are going to have a chance, as it appears now,
in the next few days to actually express our will in the Senate
on this, which I think is appropriate and proper given the
April 29 deadline.
I commend you and Senator Biden for the tremendous effort
you have both put in, along with your staffs, to try to resolve
some of the outstanding differences. Senator Lugar as well
deserves a great deal of credit, having a long-standing
commitment to this issue.
So I commend all of you for your work.
I noted, Mr. Chairman, that you said the Reagan
administration team was sort of opposed to this. The name game
is dangerous, but the last time I looked, General Vessey, Jim
Baker, Ken Adelman, Colin Powell, General Rowny, Paul Nitze and
the Vice President were part of the Reagan team and they
support the Chemical Weapons Convention.
But there is a danger in going back and forth. I think the
question has to be raised of what is in the interest of our
country here, whether or not this is going to serve our
interests in the 21st century.
I am struck by a couple of observations. One is that we saw
in the 1970's--in fact, Secretary Schlesinger I think was very
much involved in this--the Biological Weapons Convention or
treaty which President Nixon sent up to us here, which was
strongly supported, as I recall, by both parties, both sides of
the aisle. It has some 157 signatories, I think. One hundred
forty countries ratified it. There is no verification, to the
best of my knowledge, in that particular convention, yet it has
worked pretty well.
It has short comings, obviously. There is not universal
adherence to it, but it has worked fairly well.
I raise that because this treaty obviously does have
verification included in it. One would argue that it actually
does a much better job.
I am also struck by the fact that in 1985, President Reagan
signed into law a bill that would eliminate by the year 2004
the entire existing stockpile of chemical weapons. So we made a
decision about a decade ago. One could argue, I suppose, the
merits of it, but we made that decision; and we have been about
the business not of upgrading or modernizing any of our
chemical weapons but to unilaterally--to unilaterally--
eliminate our own stockpiles in chemical weapons.
I know of nothing that has been said here, nor has anyone
advocated, at least in the last few years that I have been
here, that we ought to modernize our stockpiles in chemical
weapons. No one has made that suggestion that I know of or
offered legislation in that regard.
So it seems as a country, in a bipartisan way, going back
almost 25 years, more than 25 years, that we have taken a
leadership position, both internationally and unilaterally, on
the issue of chemical weapons; because we realize the dangers
involved and associated with these weapons of mass destruction.
The issue now comes down to whether or not this Nation,
having authored, championed, and led this effort, whether or
not we are going to be able to sit on the Executive Council
which will set the rules of the road.
We are acting in some way as if, if we don't ratify this,
it does not happen. It does happen. If we don't ratify this, it
does happen.
The issue now becomes whether or not we are going to ratify
in such a way that the interests of our country and the
interests which we champion, that is, the abolition of chemical
weapons and weapons of mass destruction, that we are going to
be allowed to sit at the very table to decide the rules of the
road to determine whether or not that is going to work, having
unilaterally decided that we will take ourselves out of this
game by the year 2004.
I just wonder, briefly, if our three witnesses here might,
in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention of the
1970's, the general success of that, the decision in 1985 by
the Reagan administration and Secretary Weinberger to
unilaterally get out of this business by the year 2004--that
was a Reagan administration decision--why it is not in the best
interest of our country to move forward on this convention in
light of the decisions we have already made.
The Chairman. We will let you answer that on the next
round.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to listen and learn
this morning. Mr. Chairman, as you suggested, there are 15 new
United States Senators. There are 3 new United States Senators
on this panel.
This is one United States Senator who needs to know more
about what we are doing here, and I very much appreciate you
and Senator Biden opening the process and giving us a chance to
learn and listen.
Just as in life where actions have consequences, treaties
have consequences. We live with those consequences.
I, as a supporter of a ballistic missile defense system, am
somewhat struck that we are still captive to the 1972 ABM
Treaty in the argument of some why we cannot go forward and
construct a ballistic missile defense system.
We are not here to talk about the ABM Treaty, but I am here
to learn a little bit more about what this chemical treaty is
about. Understanding, as the distinguished panel has brought
out in rather poignant terms this morning in the questioning
and the comments by my distinguished colleagues have added to
this enlightenment, first, civilized conduct is not predicated
on treaties and is not governed by treaties. Civilized conduct
is not anchored by treaties or some esoteric academic kind of
parchment.
Civilized conduct is anchored by civilized people. One of
the concerns I have with this treaty as it is written, not
unlike what I have heard this morning--and I must say also what
Secretary Weinberger has said, I do not know of anyone who is
for chemical weapons or the use of them--and as someone who has
understood a little bit about combat, as others on this
committee know and some of the direct personal experiences
articulated by our panel this morning show they understand a
little bit about this business, is this; and I guess my
question comes down to this: Should we have a chemical weapons
treaty and if we should, what form should it take? I would be
very interested in our three distinguished panelists, Mr.
Chairman, answering that question. If not this treaty, should
we have one? Whatever that answer is leads us obviously to the
next question, which is what form, if you agree we should have
a treaty, what form should that treaty take.
Secretary Weinberger?
Mr. Weinberger. I think we have to bear in mind the point
that you made at the beginning, that you don't solve the
problems of ethics or of use of these weapons by any attempt to
impose civilized standards on uncivilized government. I don't
think for a moment, in connection with the statements Senator
Biden and Senator Dodd made, that it would make the slightest
difference to Saddam Hussein whether it was legal or illegal
for him to use poison gas. He did violate that treaty, the
original agreement in Geneva, when he attacked the Kurds. I
think any time it suits his interest, he would do so.
Indeed, the old Soviet definition of truth is whatever
serves the country. So you have to have in mind that kind of
attitude.
Against that background, there is no impropriety in setting
standards. I think that you can make it clear that the use of
poison gas is outlawed by public opinion around the world. You
can get statements to that effect. But when you add to that the
enormously intrusive processes which require us to share with
some extremely potentially hostile countries defensive
mechanisms that we may be, and I hope are, working on to
improve our capability of defending against this type of
warfare, then I think you are neglecting the best interests of
the United States. That is one of the reasons why I think this
treaty, this convention, should not be ratified.
There are all kinds of ways of making international
statements. But when you bind yourselves to the situation of
preventing the country from having the kind of defensive
capability it needs in a world like this, then I think you are
not serving the best interests of the United States. That is
one of the reasons I think this treaty goes far beyond
attempting to set just international standards and speed
limits, and all those other comforting terms, because at the
same time it requires us to take actions that would weaken us
very severely and, I think, increase the chances of chemical
warfare being used by rogue nations who would be told very
publicly that other nations had no retaliatory capability.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Just very briefly, I won't take much time. I
see you are on the yellow already.
First, obviously a great deal of the problem is with
Articles X and XI.
Second, the Executive Council is a problem. It is unlike
the United Nations, where the United States at least has a
veto. Here, in this instance, as I recall, Asia has 9 members,
Africa has 9 or 10, Latin America has 7, Eastern Europe has 5,
Western Europe has 10, and ``other'' is thrown in with Western
Europe. We don't even have a guaranteed seat.
So it would be a very different kind of mechanism, even
different than the International Atomic Energy mechanism, as
Secretary Schlesinger mentioned.
So I think those two things stand out by way of problems.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kerry.
Dr. Schlesinger. Might I add just a little bit on that
point, the last point that Mr. Rumsfeld mentioned?
The fact is that, under the IAEA, the United States
provides scrutiny of the budget in a way that this budget will
not be scrutinized through the internal politics of the IAEA.
Second, the Western nations have a blocking vote in the Board
of Governors of the IAEA. It requires a two-thirds vote of the
IAEA. To prevent intrusions in the United States requires a
three-quarters adverse vote. And as Mr. Rumsfeld has just
indicated, under the circumstances, the United States is not
guaranteed a seat. It is described as ``other.''
That is, I think, a clarification of the remarks by Senator
Dodd with regard to our participation in the Executive Council.
That may be a transitory device. It may be a permanent device.
But there is no indication of it.
Finally, there is a facilities agreement under the IAEA so
that there is no hunting license to go around in the 10,000
facilities in the United States that are subject to the
requirements of this agreement.
The Chairman. Now Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have a number of questions, and I am sure I will not be
able to get at them in the short time available. But let me
begin, if I can.
Gentlemen, I assume you don't believe that chemical weapons
manufacturing or chemical weapons threats can be adequately
monitored by U.S. technical means alone.
Do you agree with that?
Mr. Weinberger. That's correct. I agree with that. It
cannot be.
Senator Kerry. So you need some kind of protocol, some kind
of mechanism for the process of adequately providing our
intelligence community with a capacity to advise our leaders
adequately.
Mr. Weinberger. Senator, I see what you are getting at. But
the fact of the matter is that the treaty that we are
considering here does not have any kind of guarantees or any
kind of verifiability that countries that say they are going to
do one thing are going to do it.
Just because it has a very intrusive mechanism which allows
them to go all into these 10,000 or more companies in the
United States or similar numbers in other countries of the
world does not mean that there is any guarantee that any of the
countries that are signatory to it are in effect going to be
doing what they say they are going to be doing.
Senator Kerry. By that same logic, there is no absolute
guarantee for any treaties that we have signed. Isn't that
accurate?
Mr. Weinberger. That's one of the reasons I was always
worried about relying exclusively on an arms control regime, as
opposed to a military capability regime along with arms control
for insuring our own security.
Senator Kerry. If you follow that logic----
Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, could I say something
without taking away from the Senator's time?
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Can he do it without taking
away from my time?
The Chairman. Oh, certainly.
Senator Kerry. That is a privilege. Thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. Senator, let me try and raise the
fundamental question here, which is the loss of sources and
methods.
When David Kaye was in charge of the inspection in Iraq, he
discovered to his chagrin that the Iraqis had been able to hide
from Western intelligence their activities. Why--because the
Iraqis themselves had been trained by the IAEA in the
techniques used by Western, specifically American,
intelligence.
He had a conversation with an Iraqi official who simply
stated we have gotten all of this information.
Now the Executive Council of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is engaged in training people
from all nations at this juncture.
What we are doing in the intelligence area is probably
suffering a net loss. As the Senator indicates, we will have
greater access and, therefore, we will have increased
intelligence of one type. But our techniques for intrusion, our
techniques for interpretation will be compromised.
This is clearly the case in North Korea, in which the North
Koreans have wisely discovered through our revelations that the
IAEA's demand to see their waste dumps will compromise
information on their production of plutonium.
So the Senator's question is quite right with regard to
improved intelligence, but it is offset by the compromise of
sources and methods.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond, I
understand your argument, but I think the logic is lost here
for a number of reasons.
First of all, Iraq is not a party. So nothing will change
with respect to Iraq. In fact, none of the rogue states about
which we have the greatest fears are parties. Therefore,
nothing with respect to our intelligence gathering or state of
anxiety should change with respect to those states.
On the other hand, because you have a regimen with respect
to everybody else who is trafficking in or legitimately trading
in the precursor chemicals, we will have a much greater
ability, in fact, according to our own intelligence personnel,
to determine the ability of those rogue states to, in fact, get
a hold of those chemicals, or the ability to manufacture on
their own.
What do you say to that? It is interesting that Jim Woolsey
said this will give the country an additional tool in the box.
Our current CIA Acting Director, George Tenet, says it will.
John Deutch said it will. The entire U.S. command structure,
almost the entire U.S. command structure for the Persian Gulf,
who faced the threat of chemical weapons, say that this will
strengthen our hand.
It is hard for me to understand why you find their
perception of this as an increased tool and as an important
protection wanting.
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that is easily answered, Senator,
and if I may respectfully suggest, you are on the wrong wicket
in this regard.
For a decade DCI's have come to this Senate, to the House,
and stated that this treaty is unverifiable. Jim Woolsey came
up and said this treaty is unverifiable. John Deutch, who has
been cited by the administration as saying that it is
verifiable has stated, ``I've never said it's verifiable. It's
clearly unverifiable.'' And in the article with General
Scowcroft, he indicated it was unverifiable.
The nonsignatories, such as Syria and Libya, are likely to
get a little assistance from signatories like Iran and Cuba.
That will not be difficult to establish.
Senator Kerry. Can I just interrupt you there on the point
of verifiability?
Dr. Schlesinger. Sure.
Senator Kerry. First of all, no treaty is purely
verifiable. No treaty.
Second, none of them said that this treaty is not
verifiable to some degree. They all said this is verifiable to
a certain degree. We all understand that.
The question before us is are we better off without any
protocol which controls precursor chemicals, are we better off
being totally outside of the regime that will be set up by the
control as of the 29th of this month, and are we better off
without all nations, Russia included, coming in to an agreement
as to how we will try to track this. Are you better off in
terms of verifiability?
Are you better off in terms of verifiability without this?
That is my question.
Dr. Schlesinger. We have to look at the----
Senator Kerry. No. Please answer my question.
Are we better off without verifiability?
The Chairman. Just a minute. The Chair is----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. I'd just like to get my
question answered, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, you can do it with a little more
discretion than that.
Now you are talking with a former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. He should know what he is talking about.
He deserves better than to be----
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I'm not trying to do anything
except----
The Chairman [continuing]. Please, please.
Dr. Schlesinger. Now you can answer the question, sir.
Dr. Schlesinger. There will be gains in verifiability and
losses in verifiability. The fact that our techniques will be
undermined probably will exceed the gains in verifiability.
Moreover, we are dealing not only with the verification of
chemical weapons, we are dealing with the possible industrial
espionage in the United States. And that industrial espionage
is going to be a godsend--I repeat, a godsend--to foreign
intelligence agencies and to the corporations which will feed
on those foreign intelligence agencies.
A recent book, ``War by Other Means,'' talks about economic
espionage in the United States and how vulnerable we are to
economic espionage. That must be included in the total
assessment with regard to the performance of the intelligence
community.
Mr. Chairman, may I say that I worry deeply about the
statement that was earlier made by Senator Biden that the
intelligence community wants us to ratify the treaty. I heard
that statement--and excuse me, Senator Kerry for drifting off
your question--I heard that statement, and I am deeply
concerned that the intelligence community should not be wanting
a decision on any policy matter. The intelligence community is
there to provide information, not to provide judgments on
policy issues.
I hope that that statement did not reflect either the
DCI's, the Acting DCI's views or the views of the intelligence
community.
Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might answer
another of Senator Kerry's questions which is do you think we
are better off by not signing this protocol. My answer is
unequivocally yes, we are better off by not signing it because
this particular protocol not only has all of the faults that we
pointed out and is not verifiable, but it does require us, and
we would carry out our obligations, I am confident, because we
always have, it requires us to share both defensive and
offensive technological developments that we should be working
on to protect our troops.
That I think is a very deep flaw. The Senator, I am sure
inadvertently, omitted from the list of rogue nations that have
not joined the fact that Iran has joined and Iraq has not.
So you would be giving an enormous intelligence advantage
and an enormous disclosure advantage to a country like Iran.
When General Schwarzkopf was asked why he supported the treaty
and if he understood that by supporting the treaty he was
supporting the sharing of this kind of technical development
with Iran, he said of course not. He was horrified.
I think that is a fair description of what he felt when
this was brought home to him.
The Chairman. Senator Grams.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
welcome our distinguished panel, and I appreciate your time
here this morning.
Some of these you might have already answered. I came in
late, so I apologize. But I would just like to go over some of
the basics on this.
One basic argument, a major argument, that has been made by
the supporters of the CWC is that, although it may be far from
perfect, that it is better to have some treaty in force rather
than none at all; in other words, sign on to be part of this
board or Executive Council to enact what may be a troubled
treaty.
How would you respond to that assertion, that it is better
to be a part of this treaty than none at all.
Mr. Rumsfeld, may we start with you?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I think that when one weighs the advantages
and disadvantages, it is clear to me, at least, that the
defects vastly outweigh the advantages of establishing a
standard or a norm in this instance.
Further, I think it is perfectly possible to achieve the
advantages that would accrue from this agreement without having
to be burdened with the disadvantages.
Senator Grams. How would you do that, Mr. Rumsfeld?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, one way, as I mentioned, is the
question of Articles X and XI, which I think should not be in
there. The way they are written they represent very serious
problems. The second way I mentioned was the mechanism of
enforcement. The so-called Executive Council I think is flawed
and would offer the United States nowhere near the ability to
affect decisions that we have in the United Nations or that we
have in the IAEA.
Senator Grams. Mr. Weinberger?
Mr. Weinberger. Well, I think the argument that something
is better than nothing depends upon something not being worse
than what you have.
We don't need to sign this treaty to assert our goodwill or
to assert the fact that we are against chemical weapons. I said
at the beginning that I have the greatest detestation for these
weapons, and I am sure every soldier does. Anyone who took part
in any kind of service understands what they mean and what they
do.
But we don't have to sign a flawed treaty to demonstrate to
the world our rejection of these kinds of weapons. We have many
times taken actions that indicate that we are opposed to them.
So I would certainly agree completely with Don Rumsfeld
that you do have great disadvantages and those disadvantages
outweigh any possible good that can come from a generalized
statement that we, too, dislike these weapons and we, too, are
willing to have them abolished.
Senator Grams. Mr. Schlesinger?
Dr. Schlesinger. We have a treaty, we have an agreement, we
have a convention, the Geneva Convention, which is already in
force. So it is not a question that something is better than
nothing because we already have something. That something
prohibits the use of chemical weapons. It is easier to detect
the use of chemical weapons than it will ever be to detect the
manufacture of chemical weapons. Consequently, we are far
better off not watering down the Geneva Convention in the way
that this treaty threatens to.
I note that in Article VII or, thereabouts, it says that no
way does this current agreement weaken the requirements of the
Geneva Convention. We should take a firm stand on the use of
weapons, and we need to have the capacity to enforce it.
If we look at what will happen after the signing of this
agreement, if, for example, China signs--and I have been
described as a friend of China. I don't see any reason for us
to drift into confrontation with China. But I want to say that
anybody who believes that the Chinese will give up their
chemical weapons capability or that they will give up the
capacity to manufacture must be suffering from hallucinations.
If we are prepared to do anything about it, that would
require a greater rigor in dealing with Chinese departures from
agreed on arms control measures than we have exhibited to this
point.
Mr. Rumsfeld. May I add one comment or thought that comes
to mind?
Senator Grams. Sure.
Mr. Rumsfeld. In view of both what you and Senator Kerry
have asked and discussed, the implication that nothing will
change with respect to Iraq goes back to my point on Articles X
and XI. I think it will change, even with respect to Iraq, in
this sense. Country's that don't sign will be there, and with
the dramatically increased flow of information which Articles X
and XI require, and transfer of technology, and availability of
information, it will get around. There is no question but that
the information, particularly with respect to the defensive
side, will be available. It will get out into the marketplace.
You cannot keep it in. If that many countries have access
to it, it will not be secret from the rogue nations.
Senator Grams. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first take this opportunity to thank you and the
ranking member, Senator Biden, for the leadership and the
dedication you have demonstrated on this issue before us this
morning. I also want to recognize the efforts of the White
House Working Group and the Lott Task Force to clarify this
issue. I know that these negotiations are taking a great deal
of time and involve a tremendous amount of technical detail.
I want to note that this committee, too, has spent a lot of
time on this treaty. In the 104th Congress, the distinguished
Chair held three extensive hearings. I was pleased to be able
to participate in those hearings, which have given the members
of this committee an opportunity to closely examine a number of
issues pertaining to this treaty and the consequences of its
ratification or of the failure to ratify it.
We asked some tough and probing questions and I think
received thoughtful responses from the administration and
private witnesses who have come before us.
Despite all of this hard, hard work, we find ourselves at
the 11th hour without Senate debate on this treaty. Even though
the United States had the key leadership role throughout
negotiations over this treaty, and even though 70 countries
have already ratified it, this institution has not yet had a
chance to actually consider the ratification of CWC.
I just would like to reiterate, in the couple of minutes I
have, what has already been said here this morning. Time is of
the essence for the full Senate to have this debate. We are all
well aware of the looming deadline of April 29, exactly 3 weeks
from today. That is the deadline by which the United States
must deposit its instrument of ratification of this treaty so
that we may be a full participant in the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW, the governing body
that will have the responsibility for deciding the terms for
the implementation of CWC.
In my view, the United States participation in the OPCW is
fundamental to ensuring that American companies and American
citizens are treated fairly under the inspection provisions of
this treaty. It is precisely because some observers think that
these provisions are faulty that Senate consideration is
essential. Senators should have the opportunity to debate these
concerns, and the American people certainly deserve a chance to
hear them.
As elected representatives with the constitutional
responsibility to provide advice and consent to treaties signed
by the President, I think we are obligated to give full
consideration to the CWC. With the April 29 deadline looming
ahead of us, I think we owe it to the people who elected us to
fulfill that duty to do it in a timely fashion and to do it
responsibly.
This treaty was signed by President Bush in January 1993
and was submitted to the Senate by President Clinton in
November of that year. Almost 3\1/2\ years later, the Senate is
now faced with a 3-week deadline. The Chemical Weapons
Convention is the culmination of a decades-long effort to bring
these weapons under international control and work toward their
eventual elimination.
While I think we would all concede and have said that the
CWC remains imperfect, I still believe it is the best avenue
available for beginning down the road to that eventual
elimination.
So, Mr. Chairman, I again commend the tremendous interest
you have taken in this issue, but I hope we can vote on the
treaty soon.
Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of questions for the
panel.
First, in your March 5 Washington Post op-ed, the three
distinguished members of this panel indicated that if the
United States decides to become a party at a later date to this
convention, perhaps after improvements are made to enhance the
treaty's effectiveness, it is hard to believe that its
preferences regarding implementation arrangements would not be
given considerable weight.
I guess I would like to know what improvements you would
make. If it is in the interest of the United States to make
these improvements, how would you propose that the United
States accomplish this if we are not a member of the OPCW?
Mr. Weinberger. Well, I don't think that the possibility of
our being disregarded exists, Senator. I think if we are
expected to pay 25 percent of the costs of this treaty, which
are very considerable, we are certainly going to be listened
to.
As far as changes are concerned, I tried to indicate this
morning, in a too lengthy statement, perhaps, all of the things
that I think are wrong with it. Certainly Articles X and XI
would have to be changed in a major way so that we do not
preclude ourselves from having the capability of defending
against rogue states who either signed or didn't sign this
convention.
What we have done in those articles, in my opinion, gives
them all of the opportunity to either weaken or basically
eliminate any kind of improvements we would make in the
protective clothing, the masks, the defensive capabilities
against these terrible weapons. It does not prevent rogue
states from using them, or from stockpiling them, or from
manufacturing them.
Senator Feingold. If I may follow up just for a second on
that, in effect, then, you are saying that our financial
leverage would be sufficient to allow us to change it?
Mr. Weinberger. Oh, I would be extremely disappointed if it
isn't, Senator. Yes. We have quite a lot of opportunity to
observe that in a number of other organizations, and if we are
expected to put up 25 percent--and I would suspect that within
a couple of years it would be 35 percent--of the cost of this
treaty, we would certainly, I would hope anybody who was
President at that time or Secretary of State at that time would
make it quite clear that we require for our contribution a very
genuine decisionmaking role.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and for holding
the hearing. I am delighted to be here with these three
gentlemen who I view as some of the key implementers of our
strategy to win the cold war. You gentlemen were allegation
three there and were a key part of that, to which our country
and my children have an enduring debt to you for doing that.
I thank you for it, for all you have done.
I have a couple of questions. I am new to this committee
and new to the Senate. So this is among the first hearings I
have had on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Secretary Weinberger, Russia, of course, has not signed on
to the treaty and yet is the world's largest chemical weapons
possessor. Do you think we at a minimum should require that
they sign on before we would consider signing on to this
treaty?
Mr. Weinberger. Senator, my understanding is that they have
agreed, or ``signed on,'' so to speak, but they have not
ratified it yet. Their record is extremely poor in this
because, as you said, they have a very large stockpile of these
weapons and they have already stepped out of--which is the kind
and polite way to phrase it--the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement, which was widely heralded as one of the great
saviors of mankind when it was originally submitted. They have
simply said it has outlived its usefulness.
So that is a very unfortunate record to have before the
world.
They are widely reported to have said that they would only
sign on if we agreed to pay the full costs of their destruction
of their weapons. This is a large sum; and if it ever should
happen, I would very much hope that we would have some ability
to monitor and follow any money we gave them. We have already
given them some sort of token or opening demonstration of our
goodwill, and we don't know what that was used for. And we
don't know what a lot of the economic aid is used for.
So all of these are things that I think would certainly
have to be at least far better understood than they are now. It
would not bother me at all if Russia were required to have some
kind of guarantee that they would take care of destruction of
their own weapons and that we should not make our commitment to
any kind of agreement to pay for that.
Senator Brownback. Now as we have both noted, they have not
ratified. Should we require their ratification before we would
ratify?
Mr. Weinberger. Well, it would certainly be a more
comfortable feeling, but it certainly would not remove, in my
mind, the objections to the faults and the flaws within the
treaty itself.
Senator Brownback. So, even really if they do ratify, you
would still have the same sort of reservations you do now?
Mr. Weinberger. As it stands now, yes, sir, I would.
Senator Brownback. And that would depend upon further
negotiations with the Russians and their destruction of the
chemical weapons they have?
Mr. Weinberger. I would just like to find out what the
problem is with the Bilateral Destruction Agreement they
signed. Why has it served its purpose? Why is it no longer
useful for them to adhere to it?
Senator Brownback. Secretary Rumsfeld, you had noted that
the United States has the ability as a nation to stand alone,
to pull something to be a much better document, a much better
treaty, than what it is in your testimony. If we did stand out
on this and we said we're not going to sign the CWC; because it
is such a flawed agreement, how would we be able to, how do you
think it would evolve that we would pull that on toward a
better agreement? How would you see that evolving into the
future to where it would be something that you would like to
support?
As all of you noted, and as all of us have noted, none of
us wants chemical weapons in this world. We are all opposed to
those. How would you see that evolve to where we could get a
better agreement?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do think that the United States is among
the very few countries in this world that do have the ability
to not be subject to the kind of diplomatic momentum and to
decide what they believe is right and then set about trying to
fashion an arrangement whereby what's right can be achieved. If
we can't, who in the world can do that?
So the idea that we are going to lose our leadership I
think is just not true.
The way to approach it, it seems to me, would be to start
with what is important and what is realistic. As these
gentlemen and I have tried to do today, we have pointed out the
things that are the problems. What one would do would be to try
to avoid those.
I must add a comment, however, about the Russians. The fact
that recently there is information available suggesting that
they have, using everyday commercial chemicals, developed the
ability to develop chemical weapons suggests that they or
anyone else would be able to shift facilities from making
chemical weapons to making commercial chemicals in a very short
period of time.
We were talking about no treaty is verifiable. It is a lot
easier to verify intercontinental ballistic missiles than it is
chemicals, commercial chemicals, that can also be used for
chemical weapons and things that can be made in very small
spaces.
So I think even though we have an enormously intrusive
regime for policing it, as intrusive as it is, it would not be
able to do the job.
So I think that we have the cart before the horse in this
process, and I would like to see us go back and do it right.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, you might want to put in the
record the Reuters report on what the Russians are doing. It is
interesting that the new development avoids any of the
precursors that are listed under the existing treaty. So if one
uses different precursor chemicals, one can avoid the
restrictions of the treaty.
The Chairman. Let's go to one more round. I don't want to
keep you here all day, but this is a fascinating discussion.
Let me reiterate at mid point that I certainly do appreciate
your coming here today and cooperating with us.
We will make this a 3-minute-per-Senator round.
You said something early in your testimony, Mr. Secretary,
about people being instructed not to say anything unfavorable
about this treaty. Well, we have had the same thing in our
committee among the staff, and I had one report saying that the
FBI had specifically been instructed to say nothing unfavorable
about this treaty.
Now you have been Director of the CIA and I need your help.
Whom would you recommend, past or present, that we subpoena to
testify under oath regarding the CWC and the White House
directions that we have had reported to us?
Dr. Schlesinger. I will suggest a list to the staff,
Senator.
The Chairman. Pardon?
Dr. Schlesinger. I will suggest a list to the staff----
The Chairman. Very well.
Dr. Schlesinger [continuing]. A list of suitable
witnesses--whether or not the subject of subpoena is a decision
for the committee and not by me.
The Chairman. That will be fine, and I thank you.
Now I think it has not been mentioned, except indirectly,
about Jim Woolsey's testimony in June 1994, in which he said
the chemical weapons problem ``is so difficult from an
intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have a
high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance,
especially on a small scale.''
Now, Secretary Rumsfeld, I have a letter from the Aerospace
Industry Association stating strong concern that the CWC will,
and I quote the letter, ``unnecessarily jeopardize our Nation's
ability to protect its national security information and
proprietary technological data.''
Now this was fascinating to me because back in early
January, I think it was, the B-2 was taken to North Carolina,
to Seymore Johnson Air Force Base, and thousands of people came
to see it. Everybody was proud of it and marveled at the
enormity of it, and so forth.
But then it occurred to me that chemicals are used in the
manufacture of the B-2.
Now let me ask you to step back and very quickly say what
kinds of risks to our companies are posed by letting foreign
inspectors poke around, interview employees, take photographs,
and take samples for analysis overseas.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, Mr. Chairman, I must say that I cannot
answer it authoritatively, and I am struck by the dramatically
different views on this particular issue by proponents and
opponents.
My personal view is anything I have read or seen in this
document and these materials I cannot see how we could avoid
allowing classified information to be made available to
inspection teams.
I have heard statements by Members of the Senate of:
``Don't worry about that, that's not a problem.'' But I have
not seen anything in the agreements that suggest to me that
it's not a problem, because modern technology enables people to
do an enormous amount of analysis some distance in time and
space from where the materials were located and still come away
with information that is exceedingly important, classified, and
proprietary.
I don't know how it would be avoided.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Biden.
Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, on that particular point,
the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons will
use as its principal tool the GC/MS, to wit, the gas
chromatograph mass spectrometer. That is the tool that was used
by the Livermore Laboratory to procure from outside the gates
classified information at a missile facility, and that will be
the tool of choice.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Joe.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I apologize for having left for a few moments. I
had to go to another meeting briefly.
I understand this issue of defensive technologies made
available to rogue states, states that are parties to the
convention. I assume we are primarily talking about Iran. We
could be talking about China, we could be talking about, in
some people's minds, Russia.
But paragraph 1 of Article X lists ``medical antidotes and
treatments'' as a permissible form of defensive assistance.
Now, again, as Secretary Rumsfeld just pointed out, it is
amazing how an authoritative and informed people end up on both
sides of the issue on the same point. So let me ask you this.
Where do any of you find the requirement that a State
Party, that is, a signatory to this convention, a ratifier, is
required to provide anything more than that--medical antidotes
and treatments?
Mr. Weinberger. Do you want to look at the third paragraph,
Senator, of Article X? Each State Party undertakes to
facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, scientific
and technological information concerning means of protection
against chemical weapons.
Senator Biden. Has the right.
Mr. Weinberger. Yes, the right.
Senator Biden. So you believe that paragraph says that we
are required to give them, any State, any technology that we
have available?
Mr. Weinberger. Senator, as was said in another connection,
English is my mother tongue, and I can't read it any other way.
Senator Biden. Now on Article XI, the chemical trade that
the CWC would encourage is only that ``for purposes not
prohibited under the convention.'' And the only prohibited
trade restrictions are those ``incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this convention.''
Now we don't say we have to undo our trade restrictions and
neither do the other Australia Group members. So why do we
accept Iran's interpretation of this article over that of our
allies and the U.S.?
Mr. Weinberger. Precisely because it is so fuzzy that you
have all kinds of interpretations, and you will have a big set
of arguments as to who is doing what. And any interpretation
that we may claim can be denied very easily by all other
countries that don't happen to agree with us or don't want to
agree with us.
You have, what you have set up here is an oral battleground
for varying interpretations. It will allow enemies of the
United States or potential enemies to make claims that, when we
are in the position of denying them, will set us up as being
violators of this treaty.
Senator Biden. If I can, I would conclude by saying would a
condition that would be binding, that a legal declaration we'd
make to not provide rogue states with advanced chemical
defenses--assurances--would that meet any of your concerns?
Mr. Weinberger. Well, I would certainly like to see it
written down, Senator. Yes.
Senator Biden. OK, thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, the provisional body, the
provisional body states that we are obligated to provide these
defensive technologies.
There was an argument in a recent National Public Radio
broadcast between the general counsel of ACDA and the head of
the provisional body, Mr. Kenyan, a Brit. He stated and rebuked
the proposition that the United States might be able to avoid
providing this kind of technology, that it was required
underneath the CWC.
So I think that you have a clear legitimization. Even if
we, for one reason or another, withhold such information, our
industrial partners will proceed to provide this because of the
legitimization provided by this agreement.
As Senator Biden observed earlier, norms are important, and
if you provide a norm which allows the Germans or others to
provide information to Iran, they will accept that norm.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Weinberger, you obviously were the Secretary of
Defense during most of the Reagan administration. For the
record, and for this Senator, much has been made of the fact
that the CWC was initiated during the Reagan administration.
Could you provide, at least me, somewhat of an analysis as
to how it was initiated, why it was initiated, and today why
most of the Reagan administration officials during that time
are now opposed to it?
Mr. Weinberger. Well, I cannot speak for anyone else,
Senator, and I don't know what the historic origins of it were
all the way back. But I think that everybody was appalled by
the use by Iraq of poison gas against the Kurds, and there was
an attempt to get some kind of international order to try to
prevent that sort of thing.
President Reagan is a very compassionate and humane man and
obviously shared with the world the distaste and the
detestation of these kinds of weapons.
I would hesitate very much to say that he had an
opportunity to see all of the provisions that emerged from the
very lengthy negotiation. He certainly did not have that
opportunity. He certainly did not know that four of the
principal rogue nations of the world would stay outside the
treaty and, therefore, not be banned from doing anything at all
and that we would be put in the position of weakening any kind
of retaliatory capability we might have.
Those are conditions that changed since the initial
praiseworthy, humanitarian effort to try to do something about
the elimination of these weapons.
As Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, we did that after
World War I, the Geneva Conference. We did it later on, after
President Reagan left office, with the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement, which simply does not work out.
There are all kinds of reasons why humane and compassionate
people--and I like occasionally to classify myself in that same
category--dislike these weapons and would like to do something
about it.
But the fact of the matter is that what we have done here
is not only ineffective, but it is dangerous for the security
of our troops, in my opinion.
Dr. Schlesinger. I have two quick points, Senator.
When George Shultz announced the quest for a chemical
weapons agreement, he said that it would be a verifiable
chemical weapons treaty. This is not verifiable.
Second, the Reagan administration to the very end believed
that the United States should retain a 500 aging ton level of
binary chemical weapons and should not surrender that minimum
capability until such time as other countries came into
conformity. I think that the argument that this all originated
with Ronald Reagan is not an accurate argument.
George Bush was for this treaty, but Ronald Reagan would
not be if he were able to comment on it.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, the first question I want to put to you is that
the United States is now embarked on a path of unilaterally
destroying our stockpile of chemical weapons. Do you think we
should carry through on that?
Mr. Weinberger. To the extent that Secretary Schlesinger
indicated, with the reservation that was made during the Reagan
administration that we should have a minimal deterrent
capability and that other nations should know that we do have
that, particu-
larly rogue nations that are likely to or have indeed used
chemical weapons.
Senator Sarbanes. So you would keep some chemical weapons?
Mr. Weinberger. I think you have to, Senator. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes. And that's your position, I take it,
Secretary Schlesinger?
Dr. Schlesinger. No, sir. The existing stockpile is
obsolete, and it is more dangerous.
Mr. Weinberger. Excuse me. It's the binaries we're talking
about now.
Dr. Schlesinger. It's obsolete and dangerous, and I think
we must get rid of it one way or another.
Mr. Weinberger. The unitary weapons are indeed being
replaced. It is the binary weapons that we were talking about
under the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. But everyone said
that we had to keep some kind of minimal retaliatory capability
of the binary weapons.
Senator Sarbanes. What is your position, Secretary
Rumsfeld?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I think that we need some to develop the
defensive capabilities that are necessary, so that we know what
we are doing.
Senator Sarbanes. So you would all keep some chemical
weapons.
Now the next question I have is what is your position on
whether the Senate should have an opportunity to vote on this
treaty. I know how you would encourage members to vote as I
understand your testimony. But what is your position on whether
the Senate ought to be able to take this treaty up and consider
it and vote on it.
Dr. Schlesinger. The Senate should vote.
Mr. Weinberger. Yes, certainly. I thought that's what this
process was, that this was the beginning of the process that
leads to a Senate vote.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, it doesn't always lead to a Senate
vote. No. The question I am putting to you is whether you think
there should be a Senate vote.
Mr. Weinberger. I have no problem with that at all.
Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Rumsfeld?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no problem with it.
Senator Sarbanes. Now the other question I want to ask you
is this. You have each raised a number of problems or concerns
that you have with the treaty. I want to narrow it down and
isolate it out.
If the rogue nations do not sign the treaty, is that in and
of itself, in your view, sufficient grounds not to approve the
treaty?
Mr. Weinberger. Speaking for myself, Senator, it would seem
to me that if you have a ban on the nations that are basically
in some form of general agreement with us with respect to
democratic values and all the rest of it, and that they carry
that out, and that the nations that do not, including
specifically the rogue nations outside this treaty at the
moment, you would be offering them an invitation to launch a
chemical attack. This is because we would have, by a standard
that we follow, we would carry out our agree-
ment and we would denude ourselves of any capability of
retaliating and that is one of the best ways of deterring.
It is unfortunate that in this kind of world that has to be
the case, but it is.
Even the nations, some of the nations that are within the
treaty, like Iran, you find that----
Senator Sarbanes. I just want to try to focus this for the
moment.
Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. Yes, I understand what you are
saying, Senator, but I would like to complete the answer. The
answer basically is that the answer of rogue nations from those
who sign would be a source of considerable concern.
It is not the only source of concern because many nations
which sign----
Senator Sarbanes. I understand that.
Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. Would not be able, would not
keep their word, and we could not verify whether they are doing
it or not.
Senator Sarbanes. Is the absence of the rogue nations in
your view of sufficient concern that you would be against the
treaty?
Mr. Weinberger. It is one of the reasons that leads me to
oppose it, but there are many others.
Senator Sarbanes. If the others were not present, would
that in and of itself be enough that you would oppose it?
Mr. Weinberger. If the others were what?
Senator Sarbanes. If the other reasons that you have for
opposing it were not present, were taken care of, would the
absence of the rogue nations be enough for you to oppose it?
Mr. Weinberger. Well, as you put the question, if all of
the things I object to are not in the treaty, then almost by
definition I wouldn't oppose it.
Senator Sarbanes. No, no--the rogue nations are not in the
treaty in the question I'm asking. That's all I'm--I'm just
trying to determine how critical a factor that is in your
thinking.
Mr. Weinberger. Let me say that my opposition is based on a
large number of reasons and one of them is the absence of the
rogue nations from any provisions with respect to compliance.
Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Schlesinger?
Dr. Schlesinger. No, the absence of the rogue nations in
and of itself would not lead me to oppose the treaty. I would
regret that absence. But the other problems are much more
serious in my view.
Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Rumsfeld?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree with Secretary Schlesinger.
The Chairman. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
just a quick, brief question.
As you know, riot control agents, such as tear gas, have
also been used by the U.S. military during search and rescue
missions for downed pilots or to handle situations where
noncombatants are mixed in with the combatants. My
understanding is that the Clinton administration's current
interpretation of the CWC is that it would ban such uses of
riot control agents by the U.S. military.
Mr. Weinberger, when the Reagan administration was
negotiating the CWC, was it ever your understanding that the
U.S. would have agreed to such a ban or that it was a desired
result of this treaty at all?
Mr. Weinberger. No. Those were always to be excluded
because of their obvious importance and their obvious
necessity. We understand that the commitment was made that they
would be excluded from the treaty but that the Clinton
administration changed its mind in its commitment and now says
that they would be banned.
There is now some very technical discussion of whether they
would be banned in wartime or not; that it might be all right
to use them in peacetime crowds, but not in wartime. I would
like to use them to protect our soldiers in wartime or in
peacetime.
Senator Grams. Now if this is not a lethal chemical, does
this give you any concern about the broad scope of agents that
could be covered under this treaty, which would open the door
for more inspections?
Mr. Schlesinger?
Dr. Schlesinger. I'm not sure I understood the question,
sir.
Senator Grams. I mean, if this is a nonlethal chemical and
this is included, is there a concern that it would be so broad
that all chemicals or any definition of a chemical could be
part of the reasons for inspections or to come into plants in
the U.S.?
Mr. Rumsfeld. The very reason for an investigation suggests
that there is a question. So ``investigation'' can run to
organizations that don't have anything to do with lethal or
nonlethal chemical weapons--because someone has to look. If
there is an allegation, a charge, a question, they can go in
and investigate. That is where you end up with the numbers of
companies running into the thousands.
Senator Grams. Mr. Schlesinger, this is the economic
warfare that you had talked about earlier, possibly?
Dr. Schlesinger. I'd like to clarify one thing.
President Ford issued an Executive order which has existed
and prescribed U.S. policy on riot control issues for the last
20 years. That has been somewhat obscured now by pressures from
our allies and equivocation within the administration.
On the question that you put, indeed, inevitably questions
will be raised about any chemicals under those circumstances.
Senator Grams. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could just say with respect to my last round of
questioning, I want to make it very clear, and I think
Secretary Schlesinger knows this, that he is a friend and a man
for whom I have enormous respect. I would in no way try to do
anything except work this light here, which is our perpetual
enemy. We try to get answers rapidly and, unfortunately,
sometimes we get witnesses here who are so good at answering
only one question.
Dr. Schlesinger. I fully understood, Senator, and I tried
to protect your time. I was not successful.
Senator Kerry. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
If I could just ask you, Secretary Weinberger, I was really
struck by your statement about deterrence. Is it your position
that you can only deter chemical weapons use with chemical
weapons?
Mr. Weinberger. No. I thought I was quite clear, Senator,
that it is one of the ways of trying to do it. Arms control is
another way, and there are probably many more. But it is
essential, I think, that a country that has already used poison
gas against some of its own people, as just occurred, it is
only prudent I think for that country to know that if they
launch a chemical attack on some other nation or the United
States that they would be met with a comparable, not a
proportionate, response in the terms of one of our departments,
but a massive response and that they should know that. That is
one of the means of deterring, though it is not the only means.
Senator Kerry. Wouldn't you say that the Bush
administration was, in fact, quite effective at making it clear
to Iraq that the nuclear use was, in fact, available and, to
the best of our knowledge, there is, as of now, no indication
that that was not successful?
Mr. Weinberger. Yes. That is my exact point, that we were
able to do that. If we denuded ourselves of any capability of
making that kind of response, I have no doubt that----
Senator Kerry. But nobody here is talking about that. All
we are talking about is continuing to pursue what a number of
administrations have pursued, which is reducing our own
manufacturing participation in chemical weapons.
Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. That's fine. But I don't think
at the same time we ought to take away our capabilities of
developing new, improved, and better defensive technologies and
equipment.
Senator Kerry. Defensive, I agree. And the treaty agrees.
Mr. Weinberger. No, the treaty doesn't.
Senator Kerry. Well, the treaty says very clearly that we
are allowed to defend.
Mr. Weinberger. That's right, and we have to disclose them
completely to any other signatory, and that disclosure in
itself weakens them if it does not destroy their effectiveness.
Senator Kerry. Well, in point of fact Article I, which you
have not referred to, addresses the questions of whether or not
you have to, under any circumstances, assist, encourage, or
induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity that is
prohibited by this treaty.
Now all we are talking about under this treaty is chemical
weapons. So, therefore, Article I, in fact, most people--see,
there is that infernal bell, or light. It is hard to have a
dialog here.
Most people have argued it supersedes any other clause in
here, because the basic intent of this treaty is to preclude
the manufacture by anybody of chemical weapons in a way that
could be used against another nation.
Mr. Weinberger. That is the intent. There are nations
outside it who may be manufacturing them, who may be
stockpiling, and, in fact, are stockpiling them as we know now.
What I am troubled by is the fact that if we develop a so-
called fool proof mask and protective clothing that still
enables you to take the actions that soldiers have to take in
defending themselves and their country, you are going to have
to share that. By sharing it, you eliminate its effectiveness.
There is a little process called reverse engineering whereby
all of the processes which you have to produce that have to be
given to other members, other signatories, and those signatory
members, as Secretary Rumsfeld suggested, that kind of
information, distributed on that kind of scale, one way or
another is bound to get into the hands of potential enemies.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, this is a very, very
important point. In effect, what you are saying is that if you
were to share it, you would have rendered even more ineffective
the capacity to use chemical weapons, which is, in effect, the
very purpose of this treaty.
Mr. Weinberger. Well, that is not the way I would phrase
it. No.
Senator Kerry. Let me just finish my thought.
Mr. Weinberger. We are talking about defensive equipment
now.
Senator Kerry. I understand. But if you can defend against
something, it has no offensive capacity. If it has no offensive
capacity, you have taken away its military value. That is
precisely the purpose of this treaty.
Mr. Weinberger. You are talking about absolutes, Senator,
absolute capabilities and all the rest. But what I am talking
about are improvements in an already imperfect defensive
capability that we have now.
Senator Kerry. But if I were a military leader----
Mr. Weinberger. Sharing those improvements makes them
relatively--at least we could phrase it this way if you would
like--makes them relatively less effective than if we didn't
share them.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. I agree. But if I were a
military leader, knowing that we had shared our ability to be
able to have a foolproof mask, I am not going to use the
chemical weapon. And if you don't use the chemical weapon
because you know it is foolproof, you have done exactly what
you have tried to do with this treaty, which is eliminate the
potential for chemical weapons to be used.
Mr. Weinberger. I'm sorry, but I don't follow you. I have
great respect for you, but I don't follow that.
Senator Kerry. Well, I don't think it is that hard to
follow.
Mr. Rumsfeld. May I respond?
Senator Kerry. I think----
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary Rumsfeld.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I just think that the way you have cast it is
not correct. First, there is the threat of the use of chemical
weapons, which is a terror weapon. It affects people, behavior,
and soldiers. Second is the reality that for every offense
there is a defense and for every defense there is going to be
an offense. There is always going to be an evolution in
technology. So the idea of perfection does not exist in this
business.
But let's say that you had reasonably good defensive
capability. Assume that on the part of the other side. You
cannot function for long in a chemical environment. You could
not function with that kind of equipment. The advantage clearly
is in the hands of the aggressor.
So I think you are on a track that, to me, does not make
sense. In my view, sharing technology about how to defend
against these weapons is not anything other than
disadvantageous for the defender and advantageous for the
aggressor.
The Chairman. That is the last word.
We have been here for 2 hours and 47 minutes. I have been
on this committee for quite a while--otherwise I would not be
sitting in this chair, and I do not recall a more significant
hearing with more facts and figures being given than you
gentlemen have provided.
I want you to know, speaking for myself and I think for all
of the Senators on this committee, I am enormously grateful for
your having made the sacrifice to even be here, particularly
Secretary Rumsfeld. You came quite a distance.
But I do thank you on behalf of the Senate and the
committee.
As we close, let me point out once more, in case somebody
has forgotten it, that last year this treaty was reported by
this committee and scheduled for debate in the Senate. And it
was not dropped by my request. It was dropped by the request of
the administration, which did some head counting and realized
they did not have the votes.
Now I presume in saying that you think the Senate ought to
vote on this treaty that you mean after the committee has
performed under the rules and reported it to the Senate with a
majority vote. Is that what you mean?
Mr. Weinberger. Of course. Yes.
Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, it is.
Mr. Weinberger. As I said, Senator, I thought this was part
of the process for the Senate.
Mr. Rumsfeld. It's for this committee to decide that.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, if we were ready last year,
why aren't we ready this year? Nothing has changed in the
treaty.
The Chairman. Well, I don't know about that. I thought you
and I made some changes in it.
Senator Biden. Oh, we know we did. But the point is we were
ready before.
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, there are two branches of
government, Senator, at least.
Senator Kerry. But only one does treaties.
The Chairman. I'm at a disadvantage with hearing aids, so I
had better get out of this one.
There being no further business to come before the
committee, we stand in recess.
Thank you again, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the committee recessed, to
reconvene at 3:30 p.m. the same day]
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--P.M. SESSION
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Coverdell, Hagel, Smith,
Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Robb, Feinstein, and
Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Madam Secretary, I was delighted late yesterday to learn
that you wanted to appear before this committee today to give
the benefit of the administration's perspective on the treaty
again. I think it is clearly a matter of public record that the
entire Helms family admires you. I think they are going to
score some points by having you up here this afternoon.
Now, if Senator Biden will agree, this is the first time
you have appeared as Secretary of State formally.
Secretary Albright. That is true.
The Chairman. And this being such an important issue, I
know that the Senators will have questions either in writing or
in person that they want to ask directly of you. I know,
knowing you, that you will respond to these written questions,
realizing the Senators have commitments to other places.
I and the other members of the committee will forego our
statements, unless Senator Biden wishes to make one.
Senator Biden. I will be happy to place mine in the record,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Biden
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank Secretary Albright
this afternoon for appearing on such very short notice and making time
in her busy schedule to be with us this afternoon because she
recognizes the central importance of this issue for our national
security.
I appreciate the opportunity to take a few minutes again to address
perhaps the most important issue to come before the 105th Congress to
date: The Chemical Weapons Convention.
This afternoon we will hear more testimony about this treaty and
what it does and does not do, but the core issue is very simple: This
treaty outlaws poison gas weapons.
The Chemical Weapons Convention would make it illegal under
international and domestic laws for a country to use, develop, produce,
transfer or stockpile chemical weapons.
The Chemical Weapons Convention represents a significant step
forward in our efforts to contend with the greatest immediate threat to
our national security: The proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
The CWC will help protect our citizens from the use of poison gas
weapons by terrorist groups. It will benefit our military by requiring
other nations to follow our lead and destroy their chemical weapons. It
will improve the ability of our intelligence agencies to monitor
chemical weapons threats to our armed forces and our Nation.
The convention has the strong support of the American chemical
industry, which was centrally involved in the negotiation of the CWC.
It also takes into account all of the protections afforded Americans
under our Constitution.
The CWC will make pariahs out of states that refuse to abide by its
provisions. Through the sanctions required by the convention, it will
make it more difficult for those pariah states to obtain the precursor
chemicals they need to manufacture poison gas. It will create
international pressure on these states to sign and ratify the CWC and
to abide by its provisions.
The CWC will create a standard for good international citizens to
meet. It will brand as outlaws those countries that choose to remain
outside this regime.
The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will mark a
major milestone in our efforts to enlist greater international support
for the important american objective of containing and penalizing rogue
states that seek to acquire or transfer weapons of mass destruction.
we need to disregard arguments that are superfluous to the core
reality of what this convention will accomplish: It outlaws poison gas,
period. The United States is already committed to destroying its
chemical weapon arsenal. By ratifying the CWC, we can hold other
countries to the same standard we have set for ourselves.
In this morning's testimony, we heard three very distinguished
former Secretaries of Defense tesify on this treaty.
Among the claims they made about the CWC are that it would force us
to share our most advanced defensive technology with all states,
including countries of concern, that have ratified this agreement.
Another assertion they made is that it requires us to abandon all
controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology through
mechanisms like the australia group.
In reviewing the treaty, we find both claims are false.
With regard to sharing defensive technology, paragraph seven of
article ten states that: ``Each state party undertakes to provide
assistance through the organization and to this end to elect to take
one or more of the following measures.'' Let me emphasize: ``Elect to
take one or more.''
Among the options, the option I expect the United States would
choose, is that we could: ``Declare, not later than 180 days after this
convention enters into force for [us], the kind of assistance we might
provide in response to an appeal by the organization.''
That's right: We would declare what we might provide.
The Chairman and I are very close to agreement on a condition that
would require the executive branch not to provide any assistance to a
rogue state beyond medical antidotes and treatment. And that would be
fully in keeping with article ten of the CWC.
As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our current
mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive technology, the
CWC explicitly allows us to keep these protections in place.
Article eleven supports chemical trade and technology exchange
``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also requires
that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations
undertaken under this convention.''
But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of
the Australia Group controls, which member states use to keep chemical
and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The
executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our
Australia Group allies.
I am convinced that the CWC does not require us to share our most
advanced defensive technology or to abandon existing controls on
chemical weapons. I will be interested to hear how the officials in the
administration today view these provisions.
I understand that Secretary Albright must leave after her statement
today, and I welcome the opportunity to hear her testimony and the
statements and responses of all of our witnesses here today.
The Chairman. And we will print any statement that you wish
to make for the record, and that will give you an opportunity
to summarize if you wish. In other words, you are a free agent
and you are welcome. Madam Secretary, the stage is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE KORBEL ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
delighted to see you here, as I enjoyed our trip to North
Carolina.
The Chairman. We enjoyed it.
Secretary Albright. I had a good time.
Senator Biden and Senator Brownback, I am very glad that
you were able to make time for me to testify on such short
notice. I am also delighted to note the return of Admiral
Nance, who just walked through the door. I wish him continued
recovery, and I say that sincerely on behalf of the entire
Department and not simply those whose names are scheduled to
come up before you for confirmation.
Mr. Chairman, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is
one of the President's top foreign policy priorities and, this
afternoon, I would like to explain why. I begin with the
imperative of American leadership. The United States is the
only nation with the power and respect to forge a strong global
consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
In recent years, we have used our influence wisely to gain
the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakstan. We have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear
program. We have maintained sanctions against Iraq. We have
joined with others in controlling the transfer of dangerous
conventional arms. In these and other efforts, we have counted
on the support and counsel of this committee and your Senate
colleagues.
American leadership on arms control is not something we do
as a favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for
Americans and to protect our allies and friends. We have now
another opportunity to exercise leadership for those ends and,
once again, we look to this committee for help.
The CWC will enter into force on April 29th. For reasons I
will discuss, we believe it is essential to ratify the
agreement before then, so that America will be an original
party. Chemical weapons are inhumane. They kill horribly,
massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable than
the wind.
We decided years ago to renounce the use of these weapons
and to begin destroying our own chemical weapons stockpiles.
Thus, the CWC will not deprive us of any military option we
would ever use against others, but it would help ensure that
others never use chemical weapons against us.
In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in
mind that today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are
legal. The gas Saddam Hussein used a decade ago to massacre
Kurdish villagers was legally produced. In most countries,
terrorists can buy chemical agents, such as sarin gas, legally.
Countries such as Iran and Libya can buildup their stockpiles
of chemical weapons legally.
If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons,
we must begin by making not only their use, but also their
development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal.
This is fun-
damental. Making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the
CWC.
The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation
to build or possess a chemical weapon and gives us strong and
effective tools for enforcing that standard. This will not
eliminate all danger, but it will make chemical weapons harder
for terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build, or conceal.
Under the treaty, parties must give up the chemical weapons
they have and refrain from developing or acquiring them in the
future. To enforce these requirements, a comprehensive
inspection regime will be in place. The treaty will give us the
tools we need to learn more about chemical weapons programs. It
will also enable us to act on the information we obtain.
In the future, countries known to possess chemical weapons
and who have joined the CWC will be forced to choose between
compliance and sanctions. Countries outside the CWC will be
subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to
possess chemical weapons.
These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They
will make it more costly for any nation to have chemical
weapons and more difficult for rogue states or terrorists to
acquire materials needed to produce them.
Over time, I believe that if the United States joins the
CWC, most other countries will, too.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the problem
states will never accept a prohibition on chemical weapons if
America stays out, keeps them company, and gives them cover. We
will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support
strong action against violators if we ourselves have refused to
join the treaty being violated.
The core question here is, who do we want to set the
standards? Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed, because we
cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by the
outlaw states. To me, that is like saying that because some
people smuggle drugs, we should enact no law against drug
smuggling. When it comes to the protection of Americans, the
lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who abide
by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by
which all should be judged.
Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of
April, we would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive
Council for at least 1 year, thereby losing the right to help
draft the rules by which the Convention will be enforced; we
would lose the right to help administer and conduct
inspections; and because of the trade restrictions imposed on
nonmember states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that
they would risk serious economic loss.
Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan
goal. The convention itself is the product of years of effort
by leaders from both parties. The treaty has strong backing
from our defense and military leaders.
I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this
morning from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not
favor approval of this convention. Their arguments deserve
consideration. I would point out, however, that other former
Secretaries of Defense from both parties support the treaty,
and that every former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, going back
to the Carter administration, has endorsed it.
Just this past week, we received a letter signed by 17
former four-star generals and admirals, including three of the
former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and five former service
chiefs.
Let me quote from that letter:
Each of us can point to decades of military experience in
command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to
prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for defense
against them.
The quote continues:
Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but instead on
its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles that could
threaten our troops; it significantly improves our intelligence
capabilities; and it creates new international sanctions to
punish those states who remain outside the treaty. For these
reasons, we strongly support the CWC.
I also note, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
that your witnesses this morning have not had the benefit of
the dialog we have been conducting with Senators, including
yourself, the Ranking Member and other members of this
committee. We have attempted, in the course of this dialog, to
address the major issues treaty opponents have raised.
For example, some believe the CWC will require its members
to exchange manufacturing technology that could then be used to
make chemical agents. In fact, the CWC prohibits members from
providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical
weapons proliferation.
There are those who suggest that if we were to ratify the
CWC, America would then become complacent about the threat that
chemical weapons pose. This, too, is false, and this body can
help ensure that it remains false.
The President has requested an increase of almost $225
million over 6 years in our already robust program to equip and
train our troops against chemical and biological attack.
Some have expressed the view that the inspection
requirements of the CWC could raise constitutional problems
here in the United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly
that inspections will be conducted according to each nation's
constitutional process.
Another fear is that the CWC could become a regulatory
nightmare for small business. But after reviewing the facts,
the National Federation of Independent Business concluded that
its members ``will not be affected'' by the treaty.
Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really
need not act before April 29th. But, as I have said, there are
real costs attached to any such delay. The treaty has already
been before the Senate for more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500
pages of testimony and reports have been provided and hundreds
of questions have been answered. The Senate is always the
arbiter of its own pace; but from where I sit, a decision prior
to April 29 would be very welcome and, Mr. Chairman, I believe
very much in the best interest of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a
future of greater security and safety for us and for all who
share our commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that
future is through the maintenance of American readiness and the
expansion of the rule of law. We are the center around which
international consensus forms. We are the builder of
coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader in
separating acceptable international behavior from that which
cannot be tolerated.
This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden
by some, but I think, to most of our citizens, it is a source
of great pride. It is also a source of continuing strength, for
our influence is essential to protect our interests, which are
global and increasing. If we turn our backs on the CWC after so
much effort by leaders from both parties, we will scar America
with a grievous and self-inflicted wound. We will shed the
cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for others to
pick it up.
But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James
Baker and Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as
Generals Powell, Mundy and Schwarzkopf, and thoughtful public
officials such as former Senators Nunn, Boren and Kassebaum-
Baker, we will reinforce America's role in the world.
By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a
new and effective legal regime. We will be in a position to
challenge those who refuse to give up those poisonous weapons.
We will provide an added measure of security for the men and
women of our armed forces. We will protect American industry
and American jobs. We will make our citizens safer than they
would be in a world where chemical arms remain legal.
This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own.
It reflects existing American practices and advances enduring
American interests. It is right and smart for America. It
deserves the Senate's support and it deserves that support now.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Madeleine K. Albright
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you this afternoon. As evidenced by the
bipartisan show of support at the White House last week, timely
approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is one of the
President's top foreign policy priorities.
This afternoon, with the help of my colleagues, I would like to
explain why.
I begin with the imperative of American leadership. The United
States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to
forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. In recent years, we have used our position wisely to gain
the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. We
have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear program. We have
maintained sanctions against Iraq. And we have joined forces with more
than two dozen other major countries in controlling the transfer of
dangerous conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and
technologies.
In these and other efforts, we have counted on the strong support
and wise counsel of this committee and your Senate colleagues. Your
consent to ratification of the START II Treaty made possible the
agreement in Helsinki to seek further significant reductions in cold
war nuclear arsenals. And the Nunn-Lugar program set the standard for
forward-looking bipartisan action to promote nuclear security.
American leadership on arms control is not something we do as a
favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for Americans and
to protect our allies and friends. We have now another opportunity to
exercise leadership for those ends. And once again, we look to this
committee for help.
The CWC will enter into force on April 29. Our goal is to ratify
the agreement before then so that America will be an original party. By
so doing, as the President said last Friday, we ``can help to shield
our soldiers from one of the battlefield's deadliest killers * * * and
we can bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism, and
proliferation around the world.'' Chemical weapons are inhumane. They
kill horribly, massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable
than the wind. That is why the United States decided--under a law
signed by President Reagan in 1985--to destroy the vast majority of our
chemical weapons stockpiles by the year 2004. Thus, the CWC will not
deprive us of any military option we would ever use against others; but
it would help ensure that others never use chemical weapons against us.
In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in mind that
today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are legal. The gas Saddam
Hussein used to massacre Kurdish villagers in 1988 was produced
legally. In most countries, terrorists can produce or procure chemical
agents, such as sarin gas, legally. Regimes such as Iran and Libya can
buildup their stockpiles of chemical weapons legally.
If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons, we must
begin by making not only their use, but also their development,
production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal. This is fundamental.
This is especially important now when America's comparative military
might is so great that an attack by unconventional means may hold for
some potential adversaries their only perceived hope of success. And
making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the CWC.
The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation to build
or possess a chemical weapon, and gives us strong and effective tools
for enforcing that standard. This is not a magic wand. It will not
eliminate all danger. It will not allow us to relax or cease to ensure
the full preparedness of our armed forces against the threat of
chemical weapons. What it will do is make chemical weapons harder for
terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build or conceal.
Under the treaty, parties will be required to give up the chemical
weapons they have, and to refrain from developing, producing or
acquiring such weapons in the future. To enforce these requirements,
the most comprehensive and intense inspection regime ever negotiated
will be put in place. Parties will also be obliged to enact and enforce
laws to punish violators within their jurisdictions.
Of course, no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, but this treaty
provides us valuable tools for monitoring chemical weapons
proliferation worldwide--a task we will have to do with or without the
CWC.
CWC inspections and monitoring will help us learn more about
chemical weapons programs. It will also enable us to act on the
information we obtain. In the future, countries known to possess
chemical weapons, and who have joined the CWC, will be forced to choose
between compliance and sanctions. And countries outside the CWC will be
subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to possess
chemical arms.
These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They will make
it more costly for any nation to have chemical weapons, and more
difficult for rogue states or terrorists to acquire materials needed to
produce them.
Over time, I believe that--if the United States joins the CWC--most
other countries will, too. Consider that there are now 185 members of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and only five outside. Most
nations play by the rules and want the respect and benefits the world
bestows upon those who do.
But the problem states will never accept a prohibition on chemical
weapons if America stays out, keeps them company and gives them cover.
We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support strong
action against violators if we ourselves have refused to join the
treaty being violated.
The core question here is who do we want to set the standards?
Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed because we cannot assume early
ratification and full compliance by the outlaw states. To me, that is
like saying that because some people smuggle drugs, we should enact no
law against drug smuggling. When it comes to the protection of
Americans, the lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who
abide by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by
which all should be judged.
Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April:
We would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive Council
for at least 1 year, thereby costing us the chance to help
draft the rules by which the convention will be enforced;
We would not be able to participate in the critical first
sessions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, which monitors compliance;
We would lose the right to help administer and conduct
inspections; and
Because of the trade restrictions imposed on nonmember
states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that they
would risk serious economic loss.
According to a letter signed by the CEOs of more than fifty
chemical manufacturing companies, the American chemical industry's
``status as the world's preferred supplier * * * may be jeopardized if
* * * the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC.''
According to those executives ``we stand to lose hundreds of
millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of
good-paying American jobs.''
Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan goal. The
convention itself is the product of years of effort by leaders from
both parties.
And the treaty has strong backing from our defense and military
leaders.
I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this morning
from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not favor approval of
this convention. There is no question their arguments are sincerely
held, and deserve consideration. I would point out, however, that other
former Secretaries of Defense from both parties are on record in
support of the treaty, and that every former chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, going back to the Carter Administration, has endorsed
it.
Just this past week, we received a letter of support signed by 17
former four star generals and admirals, including three of the former
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and five former service chiefs.
In their words:
Each of us can point to decades of military experience in
command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to
prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for
defenses against them. Our focus is not on the treaty's
limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC
destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it
significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and it
creates new international sanctions to punish those states who
remain outside of the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly
support the CWC.
I also note, Mr. Chairman, that the former officials who testified
before the committee this morning have not had the benefit of the
intensive dialog we have been conducting with Members of the Senate
leadership, including yourself, the ranking Member, and other key
members of this committee. We have attempted, in the course of this
dialog, to address the major issues the opponents of the treaty have
raised, and to provide appropriate assurances in binding conditions to
accompany the resolution of ratification.
For example, critics have asserted that the CWC obliges member
states to exchange manufacturing technology that can be used to make
chemical agents. This is untrue. The CWC prohibits members from
providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical weapons
proliferation.
Nothing in the CWC requires any weakening of our export controls.
Further, the United States will continue to work through the Australia
Group to maintain and make more effective internationally agreed
controls on chemical and biological weapons technology. And, as I have
said, the CWC establishes tough restrictions on the transfer of
precursor chemicals and other materials that might help a nation or
terrorist group to acquire chemical weapons.
Opponents also suggest that if we ratify the CWC, we will become
complacent about the threat that chemical weapons pose. This, too, is
false--and this body can help ensure it remains false. The President
has requested an increase of almost $225 million over 5 years in our
already robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical
and biological attack. We are also proceeding with theater missile
defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat.
Some critics of the treaty have expressed the fear that its
inspection requirements could raise constitutional problems here in the
United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly that inspections
will be conducted according to each nation's constitutional processes.
Another issue that arose early in the debate was that the CWC could
become a regulatory nightmare for small businesses here in the United
States. But after reviewing the facts, the National Federation of
Independent Business concluded that its members ``will not be
affected'' by the treaty.
Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really need not
act before April 29. But as I have said, there are real costs attached
to any such delay. The treaty has already been before the Senate for
more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500 pages of testimony and reports
have been provided, and hundreds of questions have been answered. The
Senate is always the arbiter of its own pace. But from where I sit, a
decision prior to April 29 would be very much in the best interests of
the United States.
Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a future of
greater security and safety for us and for those who share our
commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that future is through
the maintenance of American readiness and the expansion of the rule of
law. We are the center around which international consensus forms. We
are the builder of coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader
in separating acceptable international behavior from that which cannot
be tolerated.
This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden by some,
but I think to most of our citizens, it is a source of great pride. It
is also a source of continuing strength, for our influence is essential
to protect our interests, which are global and increasing. If we turn
our backs on the CWC, after so much effort by leaders from both
parties, we will scar America with a grievous and self inflicted wound.
We will shed the cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for
others to pick up.
But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James Baker and
Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as Generals Powell,
Mundy, and Schwartzkopf, and thoughtful public officials such as former
Senators Nunn, Boren, and Kassebaum-Baker, we will reinforce America's
role in the world.
By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a new and
effective legal regime. We will be in a position to challenge those who
refuse to give up these poisonous weapons. We will provide an added
measure of security for the men and women of our armed forces. We will
protect American industry and American jobs. And we will make our
citizens safer than they would be in a world where chemical arms remain
legal.
This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own. It
reflects existing American practices and advances enduring American
interests. It is right and smart for America. It deserves the Senate's
timely support.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Let us see, we have nine, and you need to leave here by
about 4:15 or 4:20?
Secretary Albright. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. I think we will have to confine ourselves to
about 3 minutes per Senator.
Let me just say to you, as your well-advertised friend,
that during the 103d Congress, both the Congress and the
administration were controlled by the political party to which
you belong and to which I once belonged. The CWC was submitted
in November 1993 and it lay absolutely fallow for the entire
remainder of the 103d Congress, with no action even hinted by
the Senate.
During the 104th Congress, with the Senate controlled by
Republicans, we passed the treaty from this committee and were
prepared to vote for it--or vote on it--on September 14, 1996.
But, what do you know? On the very day that the vote was
scheduled, the administration panicked and asked the Senate not
to vote on the treaty. Now I read in the press that members of
the administration are either openly stating or insinuating
that some of us are to be blamed for blocking passage of the
treaty.
Now, that kind of thing will not do. I have said
repeatedly, and I will say it to you again--and as we discussed
when you were good enough to go to North Carolina--if some in
the administration will stop stonewalling and let us look at
some of the important changes that I think need to be made in
this treaty, I think you might be surprised at the outcome. But
as long as the administration stonewalls, I can stonewall, too.
I am going to reserve the balance of my time. I think I
have about a minute and a half remaining.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I will adopt your practice and
yield to my colleague from California, since I get to speak to
the Secretary all the time on this issue.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Good afternoon, Madam Secretary. I very much appreciated
your comments.
Let me ask you a question that is somewhat speculative, but
I hope you will answer it. I have been really very puzzled. I
have read all of the analyses, all of the discussions that I
could find between our Ranking Member and our Chairman over why
this situation seems to have become so polarized. It is hard
for me to understand it. I see the argument made on
verification. It seems to me, though, that we are a step ahead
whenever we make illegal the manufacture of some of these
gasses.
I think the important points you made in your speech were
that the Iraqi gasses were legally made, and the degree to
which nations will conform to an international concordat which
simply states these are illegal and that the verification is
based on the constitutional methodology of each country, that
still we accomplish something. Have you been able to pinpoint
more definitively any of the rationale for the opposition to
this?
Secretary Albright. Senator Feinstein, you ask, I think, a
very important question. Because from the perspective of those
of us who believe that this Chemical Weapons Convention is a
tool for those countries, especially the United States, that
have already given up the use of chemical weapons, to get
insight and control over what is going on in other countries in
chemical weapons programs, it seems mighty strange that we
would want to deprive ourselves of what is clearly a very good
method for checking up on what others are doing.
I must say that as I have read testimony by the others or,
frankly, have listened to my friend, the Chairman, who I think
is a true patriotic American, there is something that makes one
wonder what is the problem with this. I think that the issue
comes down to the fact that we would all very much like to have
perfect arms control treaties. That is, those that are
completely and totally verifiable, that limit everybody else
and leave us some options. This is not possible.
This treaty does have certain issues raised about
verification. But our estimation is that the treaty can verify
and does verify problems where there can be a massive problem
or a large military problem for the United States. Therefore,
we can go through other parts, but I think that the reason that
good Americans are concerned about this is that they want
perfection, and what we have is a treaty that is excellent and
very good and a useful tool for the United States.
I would, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, like to enter
into the record two letters that I have for you--one from the
Secretary of Defense and one from the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs--that really, I believe, address in a very cogent and
coherent way some of the questions that have been raised. If I
might just take one more minute and deal with the verification
issue--and this is in Secretary Cohen's letter. He says:
Critics have argued that the CWC's verification regime is
not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the
CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our
ability to monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation,
which we must do with or without the CWC. As you know, the
military use of any weapon typically requires significant
testing, equipping, and training of forces. These activities
would be more difficult to hide in the face of the CWC's
comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based
data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection
rights. Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this
regime should enable us to more readily detect significant
violations before they become a real problem for U.S. national
security.
So the point is the same--that it is impossible to have
perfection. But with this convention, it is a huge step forward
for America.
[The material referred to by Secretary Albright follows:]
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC 20501.
The Honorable Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for the opportunity to provide the views of the
Department of Defense on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). I
sincerely regret that my duties as Secretary of Defense have taken me
out of the country and thereby, have precluded me from testifying
before your Committee on this most important national security treaty.
As you very well know, as we approach the next millennium, we face
the prospect of regional aggressors and others seeking to use chemical
weapons to achieve what they cannot achieve through conventional
military means. Dealing with this threat requires a coherent, multi-
faceted national response involving: active and passive defenses
against chemical weapons; strong unilateral and multilateral export
controls to limit the spread of chemical weapons technology; improved
intelligence collection and threat analysis; well-coordinated civil
defense capabilities and an international standard barring the
production and possession of chemical weapons. The CWC is a necessary
component of this response. It strengthens our hand in achieving
effective limits on the spread of technology that could be used against
us, supports our intelligence and civil defense efforts, and holds
others to the standard that Presidents Reagan and Bush and previous
Congresses set for the United States.
As I have stated before, the United States does not need chemical
weapons to protect our security interests. Our robust military response
capabilities and increasingly robust defensive capabilities provide an
effective deterrent and allow us to inflict an effective, devastating
and overwhelming response should we be attacked. We have a strong
national security interest in seeing other nations eliminate their
chemical weapons stockpiles and capabilities, since that elimination
will reduce the risk that our troops will face chemical weapons on the
battlefield.
Critics of the CWC have made several assertions regarding the
implications of the CWC for our national security that I urge you to
reject.
Chemical Defense: Critics suggest that if the United States
ratifies the CWC, it will reduce our support for defensive measures.
Nothing could be further from the truth. DOD not only maintains a
robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical and
biological attack, but I have asked Congress to increase our budget for
chemical and biological defenses by almost $225 million over the next
six years. Moreover, I place a high priority on our theater missile
defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat
U.S. Response Capability: Critics charge that the CWC, by
constraining riot control agents, will reduce our options for
responding to an attack against our troops, including our ability to
rescue downed pilots. In fact, the Chemical Weapons Convention does not
limit our options in the situations in which our troops are most likely
to be engaged and pilots might be downed: peacetime military operations
within an area of ongoing armed conflict in which the U.S. is not a
party to the conflict (such as Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda); consensual
peacetime operations when the receiving state has authorized the use of
force (including UN Chapter VI operations); and peacekeeping operations
under the Chapter VII authority of the UN Security Council.
In all such cases, the CWC's restrictions on the use of RCAs
against combatants apply only when U.S. forces are engaged in a use of
force of a scope, duration and intensity which would trigger the laws
of war. These are situations in which other options normally would be
used and for which I am accelerating the development and fielding of
non-chemical, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with the CWC.
The CWC also does not limit our options in normal peacekeeping
operations and other likely scenarios, such as law enforcement
operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations,
counterterrorist and hostage rescue operations and noncombatant rescue
operations outside of internal or international armed conflict.
Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Some have argued that by ratifying
the CWC, we would be contributing to chemical weapons proliferation.
This is because they believe that the CWC would require us to provide
to other member states our most advanced defensive equipment and
manufacturing technologies, which some of these states would then use
to build up clandestinely their chemical weapons capabilities. In fact.
nothing in the CWC requires that we share our advanced chemical weapons
defensive capabilities or chemical manufacturing technologies. Indeed,
quite the opposite is true. The CWC prohibits any member from providing
any assistance to anyone if that member believes that doing so would
contribute to chemical weapons proliferation. Further, it establishes
strict trade restrictions on precursor chemicals and requires that
member states ensure that their internal regulations, which would
include export controls, also are consistent with the object and
purpose of the CWC. We will continue to work in the Australia Group to
maintain effective internationally-agreed controls on chemical weapons-
usable elements and technology.
Rogue States: While some critics argue that it is meaningless since
only law-abiding nations will respect it, the reality is that the CWC
will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few notorious rogue
states and impose trade restrictions that will curb their ability to
obtain the materials to make chemical agents. This is clearly better
than the status quo.
Verification: Critics have argued that the CWC's verification
regime is not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the
CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our ability to
monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation--which we must do with
or without the CWC. As you know, the military use of any weapon
typically requires significant testing, equipping and training of
forces. These activities would be more difficult to hide in the face of
the CWC's comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based
data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection rights.
Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this regime should
enable us to more readily detect significant violations before they
become a real problem for U.S. national security.
U.S. Industry: Some critics have claimed that the CWC will impose
costly burdens on U.S. industry that could potentially erode our
technological edge and, by eroding our edge, affect our national
security. The reality is that the American chemical companies most
affected by the CWC view its requirements as reasonable and manageable.
Small chemical businesses who were initially troubled by critics'
claims now also agree that abiding by the CWC will be manageable. The
reality also is that, if the United States fails to ratify the CWC, it
will be U.S. industry that is penalized with trade restrictions that
industry estimates could cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
Mr. Chairman, in the 1980s, I led the Congressional fight to build
binary chemical weapons to deter Soviet chemical use in Europe. With
the end of the Cold War, the world has changed. Regional aggressors can
be deterred by our vow to respond with overwhelming and devastating
force to a chemical attack. Our military commanders agree that
threatening a chemical weapons response is not necessary and they
support the CWC.
The safety of our troops and the security of our nation will be
strengthened by the CWC. But, the clock is ticking. So that we can reap
the full security benefits of the CWC, it is imperative that the
Congress act on this national security treaty before the treaty goes
into force on April 29. If we ratify in time, the U.S. will have a seat
at the table during the first critical days of implementation of the
CWC and be assured that American citizens will be able to ensure the
fullest and most rigorous compliance with this treaty. I urge your
Committee to report the Chemical Weapons Convention out favorably to
the Senate and the Senate to act now to ratify the Convention before it
enters into force on April 29.
Sincerely,
William S. Cohen
cc:
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Ranking Member
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC 20510-3301,
8 April 1997.
The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301
Dear Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for the opportunity to provide you, and through you to
the United States Senate, my military appraisal of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Let me state that the accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention
by as many nations as possible is in the best interest of the Armed
Forces of the United States. The combination of the nonproliferation
and disarmament aspects of the Convention greatly reduces the
likelihood that US Forces may encounter chemical weapons in a regional
conflict. The protection of the young men and women in our forces,
should they have to go in harm's way in the future, is strengthened not
diminished, by the CWC.
The United States has unilaterally commenced the destruction of its
chemical weapons stockpile--under the CWC, all other chemical weapons
capable State Parties incur this same obligation. While no verification
regime is perfect, the Convention's regime allows for intrusive
inspections while protecting national security concerns. The CWC
enjoins the world community to forego these heinous weapons, implements
a regime of enforcement, and impairs the ability of those outside the
Convention to obtain the materials to make chemical agents.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders are
steadfast in support for a strong chemical defense posture. We will
maintain a robust chemical defensive capability supported by aggressive
intelligence collection efforts, but will not rely solely an these
measures. As Secretary Perry testified in March 1996, if any country
was foolish enough to use chemical against the United States, the
response will be overwhelming and devastating. We do not need chemical
weapons to provide an effective deterrent or to deliver an effective
response.
It is important to emphasize that the CWC permits the use of riot
control agents under most scenarios that the United States will likely
face during future operations. If US Forces are deployed during
peacetime to intercede in an internal or international armed conflict,
such as under a UN mandate, the CWC will not affect our use of RCAs
unless US or UN Forces become engaged in a use of force of a scope,
duration, and intensity that would trigger the laws of war with respect
to these forces. Until that time, the United States is not restricted
by the CWC in its RCA use options, including against combatants who are
parties to the conflict.
If we are a party to an international armed conflict, the CWC
prohibits the use of RCAs only in specific situations where combatants
are present. In these particular situations, options other than RCA
exist. As one example, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with
the CWC could be employed. The CWC permits RCA use in riot control
situations under direct and distinct US military control, such as
controlling rioting prisoners of war, and in rear echelon areas outside
the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civilian
disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations. The ability
of our forces to defend themselves will not be reduced by the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Nothing will override our commanders' inherent
authority and obligation to use all legal means available and to take
all appropriate action, including the use of lethal force, in self
defense of their units and personnel.
In my military judgment, we are better served as an original member
of the Convention. I strongly support this Convention and respectfully
request the Senate's advice and consent.
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Copy to:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Member
The Honorable Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
The Honorable Carl Levin,
Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Madam Secretary, two of the strong points of
the convention are that our own intelligence will be enhanced--
namely, we know a lot about chemical weapons, or believe we do
now; but, given the network of inspections and a network of
finding out about the shipment of chemicals and their
precursors, we will have a better lead as to who is active and
where the materials are going.
The question that arises, and I suppose arose this morning,
is: Is there value to us in terms of having international law
behind us; that is, a norm in which clearly the production of
chemical weapons is illegal in the world? I just ask you from
your standpoint of your previous work in the United Nations,
dealing with other nations. If the charge is made that we might
let our guard down, would not be active, is it not your
experience that in fact, if we have international law going for
us, plus an international set of inspections and intelligence
collection, we are more likely not only to act, but to act
effectively, and maybe even, in some cases, unilaterally?
Specifically, if Libya had a situation that we felt was
undesirable, we could now, I presume, send aircraft there and
demolish the facilities before they knew what we were doing?
Are we more likely, however, as a Nation, to do that if we have
international law going for us, plus the intelligence apparatus
of all other nations going for us likewise?
Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, I believe that we gain
greatly by having, first of all, the added intelligence
capability that comes from having an international regime and,
second, the force of being part of an international regime.
Though it is not exactly the same situation, I would say that
we have multiplied our own effectiveness through something like
the IAEA--the way to inspect and have safeguards on nuclear
weapons, by having a regime that puts the force of the entire
international community behind an inspection or behind a
determination to take action and provide international
sanctions.
So this is a force multiplier for us, the country that no
longer plans to use chemical weapons ourselves and knows that
others still have them.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, it seems to me--and I will
not take the time, in part, because I do not have the time--
that everything that the critics say is wrong with this treaty
is worse without the treaty, beginning with verification and I
think, literally, every major criticism.
Let me ask you a question. This is a strange-sounding
question, I guess. But let us assume we either bring this
treaty up--hopefully, we will have an opportunity to do that by
April 29th and vote on it--we bring it up and it is defeated or
we do not bring it up. What do you say? I mean what happens?
Describe to us what happens when you attend the next meeting of
your counterparts, where the Secretaries of State, your
counterparts in France and Germany and Great Britain, et
cetera--I mean our allies, our friends, the Australia Group--
not all of whom are European, obviously--what happens at that
meeting?
I am not being facetious when I ask the question; I am
being serious.
Secretary Albright. I would hope very much that I would
never have to be in that position; because I truly do think
that it would be not just a major embarrassment for the leading
country in the world to be in a position of having decided not
to become a part of what is now a hugely ratified convention,
but I think it would also hurt us, Senator, in other ways.
Because we see ourselves as the leaders of creating
international norms and regimes.
I think I have said to some of you that I believe that
there are four groups of countries in the world, and the
largest one are those countries of which we are the leader,
that are basically those countries that abide by international
norms, that provide--because they establish a better way of
life for our citizens--rules of the road. It would lessen our
credibility not only in this obviously important regime but
across the board if we decide, for some reason, not to become a
part of what is clearly a step forward in limiting weapons of
mass destruction.
I think it would hurt our credibility across the board, and
not just on this issue, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
The Chairman. Senator Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. Madam Secretary, I know that there have
been extensive discussions about conditions between the
administration, the Chairman, and others. Could you
characterize your assessment of the progress, your general
feeling at this hour, as we are embedded in the debate? Is
there an optimism on your part with regard to this process?
Have we gone as far as we can and we are down to our
differences? Do you characterize it as still being a viable
process that might move to an agreement?
Secretary Albright. Senator Coverdell, first of all, I
think that there has been a great deal of goodwill as the
process has gone forward and through a variety of meetings.
There has been, I think, considerable movement on dealing with
a variety of questions that obviously are legitimate, given our
process of government and the importance of having you all, as
the representatives of the people, understand more about how
this treaty is being carried out.
I do think that I am optimistic, because that is my nature.
I do think that while there are still a number of points on
which we disagree, that we are moving forward in a good way.
What I do think is absolutely important is for the time to come
for the Senate to vote. There have been, as I have stated--13
hearings that have been held before this one was, 1,500 pages
of testimony, lots of back-and-forth, in terms of trying to
exchange information. I think that if we cannot agree on some
of the differences within informal groupings, that there must
be some way that we can vote--you all can vote--on the
differences that still exist.
I cannot stress enough the importance of having the vote
before the time expires to be an original party. I think we are
definitely cutting off our nose to spite our face if we do not
ratify before that deadline. Our request to all of you is to
vote.
Senator Coverdell. If I have just a second, just as a
matter for clarification and not necessarily related to the
overall aspect of our position in the world, but has Israel
signed this treaty, do you know?
Secretary Albright. Israel has signed, but not ratified.
Senator Coverdell. But not ratified?
Secretary Albright. Right.
The Chairman. The Senator from Minnesota.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you.
I guess, in the limited amount of time that we have, almost
more than asking the question, I just would like to amplify or
build on a point you made about the importance of our hoping to
have an agreement and moving this forward and having a vote. I
am on the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and General Schwarzkopf,
when he testified before our committee dealing with the illness
of the Gulf veterans, was really poignant in also expressing
his support for this agreement. Just to quote from not just
General Schwarzkopf, but any number of other military leaders:
``On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security
against chemical weapons.'' I think that was your point. You
did not come here to argue it is perfect. We must continue to
support robust defense capabilities and remain willing to
respond through the CWC or by unilateral action to violators of
the convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations
but, instead, on its many strengths. The CWC destroys
stockpiles that could threaten our troops, it significantly
improves our intelligence capabilities, and it creates new
international sanctions to punish those states who remain
outside the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the
CWC.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will be able to have an
agreement and bring this to the floor. I do believe we owe it
to people in the country to have an up or down vote, and I hope
it will be a favorable vote.
Secretary Albright. I must say that I was very impressed
with the testimony that General Schwarzkopf gave earlier, in
which he basically said that, by our not ratifying, we put
ourself on the side of Iraq and Libya and on a different side
from our allies.
I think, when Senator Biden said, how would I feel in
meetings, I would find it mighty strange to be on the same side
of the table as Iraq and Libya.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Madam Secretary, always nice to see you.
Secretary Albright. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Since I last saw you, I know you have become
much more enlightened in many areas. You have played baseball.
You have gone to North Carolina.
Secretary Albright. That is true.
Senator Hagel. I know we can expect even greater things
from you now.
Senator Hagel. Madam Secretary, picking up on the Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Syria issues, those are the real threats.
Those countries are the real threats. I do not believe the
threats of chemical warfare to our troops or civilized nations'
troops are within the signatory countries of the CWC. So my
question is: How do we get to the real threat, those countries
that we fear most, who we either suspect or know now possess
chemical weapons and are not afraid to use them?
Secretary Albright. Senator, I think that it is exactly
because of our concern over the rogue states that we have to
try to use the tools that the international regime puts before
us. I think that what happens here is, first of all, that it
becomes even more clear that the rogue states are isolated
politically and that they are subject to trade sanctions that
put pressure on their economies and limit their ability to
obtain the ingredients for chemical weapons.
If, for instance, there is also a concern, I think, by some
that they will sign in a cynical way, well, if they sign up and
then try to cheat, the rogue states will be subject to the
CWC's unprecedented verification measures, and they will
probably get caught. When they are caught, they will be subject
to international pressure and other CWC sanctions. I think that
by not putting ourselves in a position of being one of the
original ratifiers of CWC, we weaken the convention itself, and
then weaken our own ability and deprive ourselves of this force
multiplier to try to get at the rogue states.
This is the single best tool we have to try to get a handle
on the Iraqs and Libyas, because this will provide an eye into
their system.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for coming. There is an old
saying in politics that to get a vote, you have got to ask for
a vote. I appreciate your being here, because no one from the
administration has ever asked for my vote on this. I have had
many people from the other side asking me for my vote on this.
Senator Biden. Ask him, will you, now, quick. Ask him.
Secretary Albright. Give me a minute. I was going to do it
with drama.
Senator Smith. And all I have heard is from the other side.
So my question, which has already been asked somewhat before,
is: Is this the best we can do? And Senator Helms' comments
earlier, which were that there are three points he wants to
work out. Is it too late to work anything else out in this
treaty?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, let me say
officially, openly, publicly, I am asking you for your vote.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Secretary Albright. And let me also say that there are some
areas, I think, that the Chairman has concern about that I
think we can still work on. I think there are some where we may
not be able to work something out. You all will have to vote on
that.
Senator Smith. And would that be done in the OPCW
decisionmaking process, which means the April 29 deadline and
U.S. participation in the process are important? Is that where
we address questions like nonlethal chemicals that our police
may need for riot control and things of that nature?
Secretary Albright. Well, let us talk specifically about
the riot control issue. I think that difference, if I may be so
bold, is based on a misunderstanding about what the treaty
provides in terms of riot control. If I might just take a
minute while asking you for your vote to explain fully what
happens to the riot control agents.
The CWC does not limit our ability to use RCA's, riot
control agents, in the situations in which U.S. troops are most
likely to be involved. I think there is a concern that we are
robbing ourselves of a tool. What I am going to tell you is how
we are not doing that.
The CWC does not limit our options in such likely scenarios
as law enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief
operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue operations,
and noncombatant rescue operations outside of armed conflict.
The CWC also does not limit RCA use under normal peacekeeping
operations. That includes peacetime operations within an area
of ongoing conflict, to which the U.S. is not a party, such as
Somalia, Bosnia or Rwanda, or in consensual peacetime
operations, when the receiving State has authorized the use of
force--that is including Chapter 6 operations under the U.N.
peacekeeping operations under Chapter 7.
So the CWC restrictions on riot control agents apply only
when combatants are present and U.S. forces are engaged in the
use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity that would
trigger the laws of war.
Now, the reason I read this to you in such detail is that I
think this is an example of where we may have a
misunderstanding of fact and as one of the areas where there
are still discussions, which we believe could be dealt with. In
the letter that I introduced into the record, written by
General Shalikashvili, I think more of this is addressed.
So I am hoping, in the intervening days we have here, that
we can address in a factual way some of the problems that still
exist.
Senator Smith. Thank you. I hope that we can do that. My
time is up. We are discharging our constitutional
responsibility to vote on this treaty. One of my concerns you
answered earlier in your testimony, which was that we are not
in fact voting for something that is unconstitutional or
violates the constitutional rights of Americans.
Finally, I hope at some point here you can address an
implication that Secretary Schlesinger made that some in the
FBI are being muzzled right now, not to speak unfavorably about
this treaty. I wonder, at some point, if you could comment on
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, a pleasure to see you.
Just to kind of clarify the last question that Senator
Smith asked, dealing with riot control chemicals. On February
2nd, an article in a column by John Deutch, who served as
Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of
Defense for President Clinton, wrote the following. He said:
We should reject interpretations of the CWC that prohibit
the use of tear gas or other nonlethal chemicals so that we do
not put ourselves in the bizarre position of having no choice
but to rely on guns and bullets when we face situations like
driving off noncombatants who might be threatening a downed
pilot.
Now, do you agree with that statement? And do you believe
that is what the CWC is stating clearly?
Secretary Albright. I think that the CWC does not prohibit
it. As I said, the restrictions apply only when combatants are
present and U.S. forces are engaged in the use of force of the
scope, duration and intensity that would trigger the laws of
war. I think we would have to see what the situation is. But,
basically, it is possible for us to use various new kinds of
chemical agents in order to rescue hostages and to deal with
isolated issues. We always have a third choice in a war, which
is to use nonlethal weapons. We are not left only with the
possibility of using chemical weapons or riot control agents.
Senator Grams. So, generally then, you would agree with the
statement that Mr. Deutch made?
Secretary Albright. Well, I would have to see it within its
overall context, but I generally agree with the statements that
he made.
Senator Grams. And just one other quick question dealing
with Russia. The recent record on arms control agreements has
been less than impressive for Russia. It has not implemented
the Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical weapons which
it signed with the United States several years ago. There have
been reports that Russia has developed a chemical weapons
program specifically designed to evade the CWC.
In addition, Russia has not even ratified the START II
Treaty on nuclear weapons, which I and many other Senators
strongly support. So does the administration believe that
Russia should agree to fully implement the Bilateral
Destruction Agreement before the U.S. would join the CWC?
Secretary Albright. Senator, let me just take a little
minute here to explain something. We just finished our meetings
in Helsinki with the Russians. We went there with the idea of
issuing a number of joint communiques. One which had not been
part of our original intention, because we were dealing with
Russia--NATO and with START and other issues--but the Russians
came to us and we then issued a joint U.S.-Russian statement on
chemical weapons. It was basically done because of President
Yeltsin's and Foreign Minister Primakov's interest in making
clear that they wanted to go forward in order to expedite
ratification.
So the second paragraph says: The Presidents reaffirm their
intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification
in each of the two countries.
President Clinton expressed his determination that the U.S.
be a party. Then President Yeltsin noted that the convention
had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation
for prompt ratification--I am not reading it all. The
Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in
the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries
to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential
and to gain experience with procedures and measures for
verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, et
cetera.
So I would say that there is a major push on behalf of
President Yeltsin, who is going to use this document to make
sure that they go forward with ratification of the CWC also.
Senator Grams. How much cost will there be to the U.S. For
the Russian program to destroy its chemical weapons?
Secretary Albright. I will have to get that for you for the
record.
[The information referred to was unavailable at the time of
printing.]
Senator Grams. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think I first ought to give you the opportunity--because
the question was simply left hanging out there by one of my
colleagues--that people within the administration were being
muzzled with respect to commenting on this treaty. I think the
specific reference was to the FBI. Could you address that?
Secretary Albright. Senator, I am completely unaware that
something like that would be taking place. I have heard nothing
like that. I have no reason to believe that that is true--
absolutely none.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, the Joint Chiefs are in favor
of this treaty, are they not?
Secretary Albright. They are, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. And I think they have been very clear in
indicating, not just the chairman, but all the other members of
the Joint Chiefs, as well, is that correct?
Secretary Albright. That is correct. Then, earlier, there
was a letter submitted, or a statement, by 17 other former
generals and former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and other
generals very much in favor of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Senator Sarbanes. I do not quite understand--and I
addressed some questions this morning directed toward it--this
notion that unless the rogue states sign up, the rest of the
world should not approve and ratify this treaty and the United
States ought not to be part of it. Do you understand that
argument?
Secretary Albright. I do not, sir, because my own feeling
is that it is as if we had been provided with a brand-new
mechanism for looking inside potential violator societies to
find out what they are doing. We are eschewing that tool mainly
because the rogues, or those who are not part of the system, do
not want to sign it.
As I said in my statement, it is like saying that you are
not going to have laws against drug smuggling just because all
the drug smugglers have not signed up to it. What you do is you
try to develop the best possible regime, and not allow the
lowest common denominator to determine what the will of the
international community and the majority of nation-states would
like to have happen.
Senator Sarbanes. Would not the convention in fact make it
possible to put into place a more rigorous regime against the
rogue states than is possible under the current situation?
Secretary Albright. Absolutely. What it does is provide a
system for intrusive inspections into their societies, and then
a system for also having more stringent sanctions against them,
with the force of having international law and the
international community behind them. So, by deciding not to
take action until they do, I think we are cutting off our nose
to spite our face.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, we are within 2 or 3 minutes
of fulfilling what I hope was a commitment. Before you leave,
let me suggest that you mention to the administration that it
would clear up the whole thing if a statement were issued in
the name of the President or the administration, saying that
nobody in the FBI nor anybody else employed by the Federal
Government must not speak disapprovingly of the treaty. Now,
that will clear it up.
Now, there is one other thing. The Chemical Manufacturers'
Association was claiming that $600 million in sales would be
lost if this treaty is not ratified. We discussed that when you
were here. They have since cut that number down by more than
half, and even their new figures are highly suspect. It was
said here this morning that the Chemical Manufacturers'
Association does not represent the small manufacturers--only a
few big ones.
During your confirmation hearing, you may recall that I
asked that you supply the committee with a detailed list of
chemicals that would be affected if the United States were not
to ratify the CWC. You told me then, in good faith I am sure,
that such a list would be forthcoming. It has not come. I
certainly understand why. Would you tell your people to get
that list to us?
Secretary Albright. Yes, absolutely.
The Chairman. I know you have another meeting. I thank you
for coming to see us. Do you have further comments to make? I
see notes being passed around. I figured there is one more
thing they want you to say.
Secretary Albright. Yes. Apparently the list has been sent
to you this morning in response to that question.
The Chairman. This morning. Very well.
Secretary Albright. So the check is in the mail.
The Chairman. If there be no further business to come
before the committee----
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any further
business for the Secretary. I want to just publicly thank you.
I was a bit of a pain in the neck in attempting to see you and
ask you to accommodate.
I guess I was a pain in the neck to Secretary Albright, as
well, to come up here this afternoon. I thought it was
important.
With regard to tomorrow's hearing, Mr. Chairman. I realize
that the committee has a rule that I am just learning. Back in
the good old days, when my team was in charge and I was
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, we used to have a one-to-
one rule. That is, the minority and majority could have the
same number of witnesses. I have learned subsequently that is
not the rule here.
The Chairman. It never has been.
Senator Biden. I understand that. But yesterday we were
going to have--I wanted to have Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch had to go out of town. I said to my staff--there was
a bit of a misunderstanding--that Scowcroft could come
tomorrow, along with General Rowny and Admiral Zumwalt. I am
now told by my staff that they may not be able to appear
tomorrow because of a rule.
I would like you to consider accommodating a rookie ranking
minority member here and allow them, since I have asked them to
change their schedules, so that I do not find myself--this is
probably the only thing I have ever agreed with General Rowny
on and Admiral Zumwalt.
And I do not want to completely ruin my credibility with
them. So I would like to publicly ask you to consider allowing
an exception to the rule. I will give up two future draft
choices at a later date if you would consider allowing me to
have them tomorrow, notwithstanding the committee tradition of
a 2- or 3-to-1 majority. So I am going to publicly ask you if
you would consider that. I am not asking for an answer now. If
the answer is no, do not give it to me now.
If it is yes, I would take it now.
The Chairman. Well, as Mr. English back in my home town of
Monroe used to say, I will study about it.
Senator Biden. All right. Good.
The Chairman. There being no further business to come
before the committee, we stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the committee adjourned to
reconvene at 2:11 p.m., April 9, 1997.]
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Frist, Biden, Kerry,
Robb, Feinstein, and Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
We have been delaying a little bit, because one of the four
witnesses on the first panel has just arrived. We are delighted
to see you.
Well, I say to my distinguished colleagues, Mr. Robb and
Mr. Biden, that today marks the third in this particular round
of hearings on the Chemical Weapons Convention. This morning's
first panel of witnesses will include the Hon. Jeane
Kirkpatrick, known to all of us, former Ambassador to the
United Nations; the Hon. Richard Perle, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense; the Hon. Fred Ikle, former Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Doug Feith, former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Former goes before each
one of those titles.
There will be a second panel of witnesses in support of the
Convention.
We appreciate your appearing here this afternoon as the
committee undertakes further consideration of the CWC. All four
of you are distinguished leaders, whose impressive expertise
makes your insight crucial to the Senate's consideration of
this matter, which involves, as we all know, the future
security of the United States. The Senate will benefit greatly
from your assessment and guidance regarding the wisdom of
ratifying the treaty in its present form--and I would
underscore those words.
Now, I will say we have had many, many compliments by
telephone, fax and otherwise regarding the testimony of three
former Secretaries of Defense who were here in person, and one
of whom read a letter of opposition to the treaty written by
the previous Secretary of Defense. We look forward to your
testimony. You are joined in your opposition by a fourth
Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, and more than 50
generals, admirals and top officials from previous
administrations.
I think this ought to be sort of a wake-up call to the
administration, because the American people, despite efforts to
the contrary by some in the news media, the American people are
increasingly aware of the defects in this treaty. Now, I am not
going to proceed further with my statement, in the interest of
hearing our witnesses, but I will defer to the distinguished
Ranking Member.
If Senator Robb has any comments, since I did not know you
were here yesterday, we would be glad to hear from you as well.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me
begin by publicly thanking you for allowing the second panel.
We have a number--seven very distinguished Americans here. I
think they probably find--they are probably in the position,
not for the first time, but not as frequently as we are, of
finding themselves on opposite sides of things they are usually
in total agreement with their friends on and vice-versa. I mean
we are accustomed to that. That is part of our stock in trade.
I appreciate you allowing former National Security Advisor
Brent Scowcroft--a former general, as well--General Rowny, and
Admiral Zumwalt to be here. I realize the rule is basically 3-
to-1, but you were kind enough to us yesterday to allow that. I
appreciate it.
I want to take just a few minutes to address a few concerns
that we raised in yesterday's hearing and that have gone
unanswered. The reason I bother to do it I am not sure, because
so much has been going on in terms of the non-public side of
this process and in terms of negotiations; I am not suggesting
that any of the things we have tentatively agreed on among
ourselves on this side of the bench and with the administration
and Senator Lott and others, that they will satisfy any of the
witnesses, but there is no reason they would know they existed.
I will just take just a few minutes--probably about 9 I hope.
My impression is that one of the reasons you suggested that
we have an additional set of hearings was that we have a number
of new Members--a very bright, informed group of people, who
have taken their jobs on this committee very seriously--and
that they did not have an opportunity to participate in
previous hearings. My impression is that these new Members
truly want to learn about the treaty and base their decision on
the facts. I hope that these hearings are giving them an
opportunity to be acquainted with them.
This afternoon, we are going to hear testimony about the
treaty and what it does and does not do. But I used to practice
law with a fellow who was one of the best trial lawyers in the
State of Delaware, a guy named Sid Bialek. He always used to
say when he would teach young lawyers like me how to address a
jury, he would say, when you start off with a jury, tell them:
Now, jury, keep your eye on the ball. This is not about whether
or not my client is a nice guy. It is whether he killed Cock
Robin. Keep your eye on the ball.
Well, I think one of the things we have to keep our eye on,
I say to my colleagues--obviously, not to the witnesses--is
that this is a treaty that outlaws poison gas. It outlaws
chemical weapons. At least that is its intent. I guess that is
the essence of the debate here--whether or not it adequately
does that.
Entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will
mark a major milestone in our effort to enlist greater
international support for an important American objective of
containing and penalizing rogue states that seek to acquire or
transfer weapons of mass destruction. I want to make it clear,
based on yesterday's panel, the first one--and it was a
distinguished panel--several said, including one former
Secretary of Defense, that they were accused of being for
chemical weapons and for the use of these.
I just want you to know, I know no one who supports the
treaty in the Senate who suggests anyone who opposes the treaty
is someone who is for the active use of chemical weapons. So I
want to make that clear at the outset. I never heard anybody
say that, and I am sure the former Secretary would not have
said it unless someone had mentioned it to him. But no one on
this committee that I am aware of who is for the treaty thinks
that.
Among the claims, though, that were made yesterday about
the CWC is that it would force us to share our most advanced
defensive technology with all states, including countries of
concern that have ratified the agreement. Iran comes to mind
immediately.
Another assertion is that it requires us to abandon all
controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology
through mechanisms like the Australia Group. As I reviewed the
treaty, I became a little concerned about this initially. With
regard to sharing the defensive technologies, some general
provisions appeared to back up their claim. But, on close
inspection, I believe it reveals that the critics are wrong.
First, the provisions in Article X, Paragraph 3, are
deliberately vague. The obligation on a party is to facilitate
the fullest possible exchange of equipment and information.
When read in light of the overriding imperative of Article I,
to not assist any party from engaging in activities prohibited
by CWC, it seems clear to me and the lawyers that I have
consulted that we will not be obliged to provide assistance to
rogue states under this provision.
Now, just to make sure that I was reading this correctly, I
asked for some clarification. I spoke to somebody who obviously
would want to clarify it the way I read it, so take it for what
it is worth. But the National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger,
today sent me a letter. In that letter, he states that any
exchange of equipment and technology under Paragraph 3 of
Article X, ``is limited to that which we determine would be
appropriate and permitted under the convention.'' In addition,
Paragraph 7 of Article X requires no assistance, ``other than
medical supplies, if we so choose''--if we so choose.
I ask that this letter from Mr. Berger be inserted in the
record, Mr. Chairman, so that my colleagues can at least
understand the position that I hold and that I believe that
pertains.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
[The information referred to follows:]
The White House,
Washington, DC, April 9, 1997.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510.
Dear Senator Biden. In recent days, concerns have been raised about
the impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the ability of rogue
states to acquire advanced U.S. Chemical defense or chemical
manufacturing technology. I would like to take this opportunity to set
the record straight on these matters.
Specifically, concern has been expressed about Paragraph 3 of
Article X of the CWC, which states that ``Each Party undertakes to
facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and
technological information concerning means of protection against chemi-
cal weapons.'' The inclusion of the words ``facilitate'' and
``possible'' underscores that no specific exchange is required and that
any exchange which does occur is limited to that which we determine
would be appropriate and permitted under the Convention. Moreover,
nothing in Paragraph 7 of Article X, which concerns possible responses
to requests for assistance, requires us to provide anything other than
medical supplies, if we so choose.
Concern has also been expressed about whether Article XI of the
CWC, which relates to cooperation in the field of chemical activities
for purposes not prohibited under the treaty, might force our chemical
industry to share dual-use technologies and manufacturing secrets with
other nations. Let me assure you that Article XI does not require
private businesses to release such proprietary or otherwise
confidential business information, nor does it require the U.S.
Government to force private businesses to undertake such activities.
Let me further assure you that the export controls that we and other
Australia Group members have undertaken, as well as our own national
export controls, are fully consistent with the CWC and serve to further
its implementation.
I hope this information facilitates Senate consideration of the
CWC. I look forward to continuing to work with you and other CWC
supporters to ensure a successful vote on this vital treaty in the days
ahead.
Sincerely,
Samuel R. Berger,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Senator Biden. At this point, Mr. Chairman, you and I have
come close to agreement on a condition that would require the
executive branch to ensure that countries of concern receive no
assistance from us beyond medical antidotes and treatment, and
that we would be fully informed and it would be fully in
keeping with Article X of the CWC.
As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our
current mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive
technology, the CWC explicitly allows us to keep these
protections in place. Article 7 supports chemical trade and
technology exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under this
convention.'' It also requires that trade restrictions not be,
quote, incompatible with the obligations undertaken in this
convention.
But the CWC is completely consistent with the continued
enforcement of the Australia Group controls, which member
states use to keep chemical and biological weapons materiel out
of the hands of rogue states. The executive branch has said
this time and again, and so have our friends and allies in the
Australia Group. That helps explain why 26 of the 29 members of
the Australia Group have ratified this treaty--everyone except
Iceland, Luxembourg and the United States.
Last October, at the most recent meeting of the Australia
Group, the 29 countries reaffirmed their intention to maintain
common export controls, while joining the treaty convention. In
a statement issued at the meeting, the Australia Group said,
``the maintenance of effective export controls remain an
essential, practical means of fulfilling obligations under the
CWC.''
I would also ask unanimous consent that that statement be
inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Australian Embassy, Paris,
October 17, 1996.
Australia Group Meeting
Australia Group participants held informal consultations in Paris
between Oct. 14-17, to discuss the continuing problem of chemical and
biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. Participants at these talks
were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United
States, with the Republic of Korea taking part for the first time.
Participants maintain a strong belief that full adherence to the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the best way to eliminate these types
of particularly inhumane weapons from the world's arsenals. In this
context the maintenance of effective export controls will remain an
essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC and
the BTWC.
All participants at the meeting welcomed the expected entry into
force of the CWC, noting that this long-awaited step will be an
important, historic moment in international efforts to prohibit
chemical weapons. Participants agreed to issue a separate statement on
this matter, which is attached.
Participants also welcomed the progress of efforts to strengthen
the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the Ad Hoc Group of BTWC
States Parties in Geneva. All Australia Group participating countries
are also States Parties to this treaty, and strongly support efforts to
develop internationally agreed procedures for strengthening
international confidence in the treaty regime by verifying compliance
with BTWC obligations.
Experts from participating countries discussed national export
licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent assistance to the
production of CBW. They confirmed that participants administered export
controls in a streamlined and effective manner which allows trade and
the exchange of technology for peaceful purposes to flourish. They
agreed to continue working to focus these national measures efficiently
and solely on preventing any contribution to chemical and biological
weapons programs. Participants noted that the value of these measures
in inhibiting CBW proliferation benefited not only the countries
participating in the Australia Group, but the whole international
community.
Participants also agreed to continue a wide range of contacts,
including a further program of briefings for countries not
participating in the Paris consultations to further awareness and
understanding of national policies in this area. Participants endorsed
in this context the importance of regional seminars as valuable means
of widening contacts with other countries on these issues. In
particular, Romania's plans to host a seminar on CBW export controls
for Central and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth of
Independent States in Bucharest on Oct. 21-22 and Japan's plans to host
a fourth Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo in early 1997 were
warmly welcomed by participants. Argentina will also host a regional
seminar on non-proliferation matters, in Buenos Aires, in the first
week of December 1996. France will organize a seminar for French-
speaking countries on the implementation of the CWC. This will take
place shortly before entry into force of the Convention.
The meeting also discussed relevant aspects of terrorist interest
in CBW and agreed that this serious issue requires continuing
attention.
Participants agreed to hold further consultations in October 1997.
__________
Australia Group Countries Welcome Prospective Entry Into Force of the
Chemical Weapons Convention
The countries participating in the Australia Group warmly welcomed
the expected entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
during a meeting of the Group in Paris in October 1996. They noted,
that the long awaited commencement of the CWC regime, including the
establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, will be an historic watershed in global efforts to abolish
chemical weapons for all time. They also noted that all states adhering
to the CWC are obliged to ensure their national activities support the
goal of a world free of chemical weapons.
All of the participating countries reiterated their previous
statements underlining their intention to be among the original States
Parties to the CWC. They noted that 24 of the 30 countries
participating in the Australia Group have already ratified the
Convention. Representatives also recalled their previous expressions of
support for the CWC, and reaffirmed these commitments. They restated
their view that the effective operation and implementation of the CWC
offers the best means available to the international community to rid
the world of these weapons for all time. They called on all signatories
to ratify the CWC as soon as possible, and on the small number of
countries which have not signed the treaty to join the regime and
thereby contribute to international efforts to ban these weapons.
Representatives at the Australia Group meeting recalled that all of
the participating countries are taking steps at the national level to
ensure that relevant national regulations promote the object and
purpose of the CWC and are fully consistent with the Convention's
provisions when the CWC enters into force for each of these countries.
They noted that the practical experience each country had obtained in
operating export licensing systems intended to prevent assistance to
chemical weapons programs have been especially valuable in each
country's preparations for implementation of key obligations under the
CWC. They noted in this context, that these national systems are aimed
solely at avoiding assistance for activities which are prohibited under
the Convention, while ensuring they do not restrict or impede trade and
other exchanges facilitated by the CWC.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced the CWC does
not require us to share our most advanced defense technology or
to abandon existing controls on chemical weapons. Just to make
certain of that, I asked Sandy Berger to address this point. I
will, in the interest of time, since I asked you to add
additional witnesses, ask that the remainder of my statement be
placed in the record and conclude by saying this treaty enters
in force on April 29th, and time is running short. Mr.
Chairman, I hope that we, when we conclude these hearings--as
long as I do not prolong them--that at some point we might be
able to reach an agreement on how to proceed on the floor. But
that is for another time, another moment.
I thank the witnesses and I thank the chair.
[The prepared statement and the information referred to by
Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Biden
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to take a few minutes this
morning to address a few concerns that were raised in yesterday's
hearing and may have gone unanswered.
When you called these hearings, you said that it was important that
the new members of the committee have an opportunity to learn more
about it. And I am pleased to see that our new colleagues have taken
your recommendation to heart.
My impression is that they truly want to learn about this treaty
and base their decision on the facts--and maybe the request by the
Secretary of State won't hurt, either.
This afternoon we will hear more testimony about this treaty and
what it does and does not do, but the core issue is very simple: this
treaty outlaws poison gas weapons.
The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will mark a
major milestone in our efforts to enlist greater international support
for the important American objective of containing and penalizing rogue
states that seek to acquire or transfer weapons of mass destruction.
Yesterday, we heard three very distinguished former Secretaries of
Defense testify on this treaty.
Among the claims they made about the CWC are that it would force us
to share our most advanced defensive technology with all states,
including countries of concern, that have ratified this agreement.
Another assertion they made is that it requires us to abandon all
controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology through
mechanisms like the Australia Group.
As I reviewed the treaty, I became a little concerned about this.
With regard to sharing defensive technology, some general provisions
appeared to back up their claim.
But close inspection reveals that the critics are wrong.
First, the provisions of Article Ten, Paragraph Three are
deliberately vague: the obligation on a party is to ``facilitate'' the
``fullest possible exchange'' of equipment and information.
When read in light of the overriding imperative in Article One to
not assist any party from engaging in activities prohibited by the CWC,
it is clear that we will not be obligated to provide assistance to
rogue states under this provision.
Now just to make sure that I was reading this correctly, I asked
the White House to clarify this point for me. Sandy Berger, the
President's National Security Adviser, today sent me a letter that
confirms this interpretation.
In Mr. Berger's letter, he states that any exchange of equipment
and technology under Paragraph Three of Article Ten ``is limited to
that which we determine would be appropriate and permitted under the
convention.'' In addition, Paragraph Seven of Article Ten requires no
assistance ``other than medical supplies, if we so choose.''
I ask that this letter from Mr. Berger be inserted into the record,
so that my colleagues can reassure themselves that this treaty does not
oblige us to share advanced chemical defense technology with rogue
states.
On this point, the Chairman and I are very close to agreement on a
condition that would require the executive branch to ensure that
countries of concern receive no assistance from us beyond medical
antidotes and treatment. And that would be fully in keeping with
Article Ten of the CWC.
As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our current
mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive technology, the
CWC explicitly allows us to keep these protections in place.
Article Eleven supports chemical trade and technology exchange
``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also requires
that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations
undertaken under this convention.''
But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of
the Australia Group controls, which member states use to keep chemical
and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The
executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our friends
and allies in the Australia Group.
That helps explain why twenty-six of the twenty-nine members of the
Australia Group have ratified this treaty--everyone except Iceland,
Luxembourg and the United States.
Last October, at the most recent meeting of the Australia Group,
the twenty-nine countries reaffirmed their intention to maintain common
export controls while joining the Chemical Weapons Convention.
In a statement issued at that meeting, the Australia Group said,
and I quote: ``the maintenance of effective export controls will remain
an essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC.''
I ask consent that this statement be inserted into the record.
I am convinced that the CWC does not require us to share our most
advanced defensive technology or to abandon existing controls on
chemical weapons. And just to make certain of that, I asked Sandy
Berger to address this point in the letter I referred to.
So I ask my colleagues to review this section of the treaty and to
examine Mr. Berger's letter and the Australia Group's statement to
reassure themselves that the CWC does not obligate us to share advanced
defensive technology or chemicals or chemical technologies with
countries like China, Cuba or Iran.
Turning to another issue, my colleague, Senator Smith, expressed an
interest yesterday in the constitutional issues that many critics of
the convention have raised. I want to take this opportunity to set the
record straight.
The convention is constitutional. There is nothing in the
convention that requires searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
takings of property without just compensation, or compelled self-
incriminatory testimony
Just this morning we received a letter from twenty-two law
professors and distinguished attorneys expressing their view that the
convention is constitutional, including former Attorney General Elliot
Richardson, former State Department legal adviser and Harvard law
professor Abram Chayes, Columbia University professor Louis Henkin, and
Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe. I ask that this letter be placed
into the record.
Those who claim that the CWC would permit international inspectors
to engage in warrantless searches in any business or private home are
dead wrong and are spreading falsehoods.
There will be no warrantless searches under the CWC, period. Here
are the facts:
There are two types of inspections--routine inspections and
challenge inspections.
Routine inspections apply only to declared facilities--that is,
facilities that produce or use scheduled chemicals. In the unlikely
event that a declared facility does not consent to be searched, an
administrative warrant will be sought from a federal judge or
magistrate judge.
This is the same procedure that would be used for inspections
conducted under Federal health, safety, and environmental laws.
Challenge inspections are conducted at the request of another
government based on evidence of possible non-compliance. These
inspections can take place anywhere in the United States.
The administration has agreed that, absent consent, the U.S.
Government will have to obtain a criminal search warrant, based on
probable cause of criminal wrongdoing, to conduct a challenge
inspection everywhere but declared facilities.
If a search warrant cannot be obtained for either type of search,
the inspection will not take place.
And, since the convention allows the United States Government to
``take into account any constitutional obligations it may have with
regard to searches and seizures'' when granting access to U.S.
facilities, we will not be in breach of our treaty obligations if a
challenge inspection is denied due to Fourth Amendment considerations.
I ask consent that a letter from the Attorney General to Senator
Lott addressing these very issues be made a part of the record.
I hope that the Attorney General's assurances, along with the
statements of other administration officials, have eased the concerns
of those who, like me, strongly believe in the importance of the Fourth
Amendment.
Again, I would like to thank my colleagues and our witnesses for
their time and attention this morning. I hope that these hearings will
help to clear up the misconceptions about the Chemical Weapons
Convention so that we can move expeditiously to bring this treaty
before the full Senate for a vote on ratification.
This treaty enters into force on April 29, and time is running
short.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______
Letter From Attorney General Janet Reno
to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott
Office of the Attorney General,
Washington DC, March 3, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Mr. Leader: As the public debate over ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) grows in intensity, various concerns
regarding the constitutionality of the CWC have come to my attention.
Some have suggested that enforcement of the CWC, in order to be
effective, will necessarily impinge on Fourth Amendment rights.
Specifically, concerns have been raised that the Convention will
authorize warrantless, non-consensual searches or that searches will be
conducted pursuant to warrants that lack probable cause. The CWC and
the draft implementing legislation contemplate no such circumstances.
All inspections will be conducted consistent with the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment.
Let there be no doubt, the Department of Justice stands fully
behind both the goals and the specific terms of the CWC. The
Convention, along with the proposed legislation, strikes the proper
balance between effective efforts to eliminate the scourge of chemical
weapons and to preserve our constitutional rights. Over the course of
the past four years, the Justice Department has closely scrutinized CWC
and has assisted in the drafting of its implementing legislation. Our
focus has been consistently on the necessity of adherence to
constitutional requirements. In testimony given on September 9, 1996,
before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Richard Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, explained how inspections would be conducted
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We expect the vast majority of
routine inspections will be conducted with consent. On the few
occasions where consent has been withheld, administrative search
warrants will be sought for routine inspections. In the case of
challenge inspections, again, we expect consent to be the rule.
Declared facilities selected for a challenge inspection would be
subject to inspections in the same manner as provided under the CWC and
implementing legislation for routine inspections. However, a criminal
search warrant will be applied for in every case where consent is
denied to a challenge inspection of undeclared facilities.
The convention, in Annex 2, pt. X, para. 41, specifically allows
the U.S. Government, in granting access to facilities identified for
challenge inspections, to ``take into account any constitutional
obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches
and seizures.'' Hence, in the rare event that the Fourth Amendment
would pose a bar to a search of premises identified for a challenge
inspection, the United States would remain in full compliance with its
obligations under the CWC.
I realize that many of the detractors of the Convention are
principled in their opposition. Their constitutional concerns are,
however, unfounded. The dictates of the Fourth Amendment have been
scrupulously honored in the drafting and will be rigidly followed in
the implementation. Finally, no legitimate Fifth Amendment issues are
raised with respect to the record keeping or disclosure requirements.
The provisions of the Convention and the draft implementing legislation
neither require nor contemplate compelling anyone to incriminate
himself. And, both the CWC and draft legislation in no way authorize
the taking of private property without compensation.
It is my hope that the Senate will consider the Convention in an
expeditious manner and will consent to its ratification.
Sincerely,
Janet Reno.
__________
April 9, 1997.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr,
Minority Leader, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Biden: The undersigned lawyers, former government
officials, and professors of constitutional and international law write
to urge the Senate to give its prompt advice and consent to the
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Senate's
decision will have profound ramifications for United States leadership
in controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the
Convention will enter into force on April 29 whether or not the United
States ratifies, but if it does so without U.S. ratification, American
participation in the staffing of the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and in the inspector corps will be severely
reduced. Therefore, prompt action is essential.
The CWC is a global commitment to eliminate an entire category of
weapons of mass destruction and to verify their continued absence. The
treaty's backbone is the most thoroughgoing international law
enforcement system yet devised, providing for verification of the
destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and for monitoring of
chemical plants to prevent future proliferation. The verification
system includes declaration of precursor chemicals that could be made
into chemical weapons, routine inspections at facilities that are
declared to possess such precursors, and ``challenge'' inspections to
confirm compliance at any facility or location. President George Bush,
under whose administration the treaty was completed and signed,
characterized the Convention as ``an entirely new concept for
overcoming the great obstacle that has impeded progress in the past
toward a full chemical weapons ban.''
We would have thought that U.S. ratification of this Convention was
a foregone conclusion. Unfortunately, at the last minute, objections
have been raised concerning the constitutionality of the Convention's
elaborate verification system under the Fourth Amendment. Treaty
opponents have circulated the claim that, under the CWC, foreign
inspectors would be empowered to intrude into the privacy of American
citizens and businesses in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
Much of this commentary based on a letter from Judge Robert Bork to
Senator Orrin Hatch stating that ``there are grounds to be concerned''
about the compatibility of some of the provisions of the Convention
with the Constitution. Judge Bork's letter concedes that he is ``not
intimately familiar with the provisions of the Convention,'' an
acknowledgment that is borne out by the inaccuracy of his description
of the Convention in the body of his letter.
The short answer to these contentions is that the Convention itself
provides that each State Party shall implement its provisions ``in
accordance with its constitutional processes,'' (Art. VII, par. 1), and
the challenge inspection provisions further require that inspections
must be consistent with ``any constitutional obligations * * * with
regard to * * * searches and seizures.'' (Verification Annex, pt. X,
par. 41). Thus, Congress, which must pass domestic legislation to
implement the inspection provisions of the Convention, can do so in a
manner that fully protects the rights of American citizens under the
Fourth Amendment without in any way violating the international
obligations the United States will undertake under the treaty. A vast
quantity of scholarly and governmental discussion on the subject has
affirmed virtually unanimously that the CWC fully respects U.S.
constitutional protections of privacy. Indeed, every scholar willing to
put his or her opinions on the CWC to the test of detailed public
review agrees that the treaty manifests extraordinary care in balancing
the demands of privacy against the requirements for effective
verification of the Convention.
If the Senate fails to give its advice and consent to the CWC, an
extraordinary achievement of over fifteen years of bipartisan effort
will be frustrated; and a major opportunity to prevent the
proliferation of chemical weapons will have been lost. If the Senate
wishes to reject the treaty, that is of course its prerogative. But it
should not do so on the spurious ground that it conflicts with the
Constitution.
Sincerely,
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, DePaul University College of Law
Professor Richard B. Bilder, Burrus-Bascom Professor, University of
Wisconsin Law School
Professor Thomas Buergenthal, Lobingier Professor of Comparative Law &
Jurisprudence, the George Washington University Law School
Professor George Bunn, Dean Emeritus, Professor Emeritus, University
of Wisconsin Law School
Professor David D. Caron, University of California at Berkeley School
of Law
Abram Chayes, Professor of Law, Emeritus Felix Frankfurter Harvard Law
School
Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch, Columbia University School of Law
Professor John Hart Ely, Richard A. Hausler Professor University of
Miami School of Law
Phil Fleming, Crowell & Moring
Professor Thomas M. Franck, Murray and Ida Becker Professor, Director,
Center for International Studies, New York University School of
Law
Professor Michael J. Glennon, University of California at Davis School
of Law
Professor Barry Kellman, DePaul University College of Law
Professor John F. Murphy, Villanova University School of Law
John B. Rhinelander, Shaw, Pittman
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of
International, Comparative and Foreign Law, Harvard Law School
Professor Laurence H. Tribe, Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of
Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School
Professor Louis Henkin, University Professor Emeritus, Special Service
Professor, Columbia University School of Law
Professor David A. Koplow, Director, Center for Applied Legal Studies,
Georgetown University Law Center
Professor Peter Raven-Hansen, Associate Dean, Academic Affairs, Glen
Earl Weston Research Professor, George Washington University
Law School
Elliot L. Richardson, Esq., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Professor Edwin (Rip) Smith, Leon Benwell Professor of Law and
International Relations, University of Southern California Law
School
Professor Burns H. Weston, Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished
Professor, Associate Dean, International and Comparative Legal
Studies, University of Iowa College of Law
The Chairman. Let us have brief statements by our other
Senators here, if you wish. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You were kind enough
to make reference to the fact that I came in just at the
conclusion of yesterday afternoon's hearing, and you had not
recognized me as you were banging the gavel. I thank you for
that acknowledgement.
I had raced up from an armed services hearing, trying to
sort out the dangers posed by Russian submarines and other
submarines, in order to get here. I want to assure you,
however, that both the portions of yesterday's meeting, in the
morning that I had to leave and the portion that I missed
yesterday afternoon, were replayed on C-SPAN, beginning about
midnight and ending about 2:45 a.m.
And, Mr. Chairman, to demonstrate my commitment to the
cause, I want you to know that I stayed up and watched all of
the hearing that I missed. Regrettably, I am going to have to
go to an intelligence hearing today, so I will miss more. But I
am sure that it will be rebroadcast.
On a more serious vein, I did attend all of the hearings
last year. I thought they were some of the best and most
informative. There have been excellent witnesses on both sides
of the question. I committed myself to the affirmative side. I
thought that was the more persuasive argument last year. I have
not changed my position. But I think that the distinguished
witnesses that we have had for these hearings have done more to
give the American people, and certainly the members who are
going to vote on these issues, a better understanding of what
the treaty does and does not do. For that, I commend you, and I
thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Frist.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
congratulate you for bringing forth such outstanding witnesses
in this series of hearings. I want to thank each of you for
being with us today.
I continue to struggle with the issues that we are talking
about--the verification, the extent of coverage, global
coverage, enforceability. Part of it is based on my experience
of being in chemistry labs myself, whether it is organic
chemistry or inorganic chemistry, which I had to do to become a
physician, and remembering very vividly people saying, ``right
in this room, in this little laboratory, we could do such
destruction if we wanted to.'' Then I come back today, in terms
of that verification and enforceability, and I look forward to
hearing from each of our witnesses as we systematically
continue our addressing these very important issues.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Briefly, please, ma'am, and sir. After you two, if any
other Senators come in, I am going to not notice their arrival
either. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Just very quickly, Mr. Chairman, if I
might, and to our distinguished witnesses.
I think the thing that would be most helpful to me, and
perhaps you can cover this in your testimony, would be if you
could substantiate your comments on your belief of non-
verification, why you believe it is better to stay out of this
kind of a treaty and why you think that, with our staying out
of it, we would have a better opportunity (a) to make a moral
commitment and (b) a real commitment and (c) how verification
would be improved if we are not in the treaty.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I am sure they will answer that in due time.
Briefly, please.
Senator Wellstone. Mr. Chairman, I feel like I am under
pressure to be brief.
The Chairman. You are.
Senator Wellstone. So I will be brief. I know we have got a
long hearing today, and I am only going to be able to stay for
the first part. I apologize to the others. So I thank the Chair
for the hearing and I thank each of you for being here.
The Chairman. Do you have anything to say, Chuck?
Senator Hagel. No. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, you will be the lead-
off, please.
STATEMENT OF DR. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you for coming.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for inviting me to testify before this distinguished committee
on this important subject. It is an important subject, and the
Senate's decision will be more important even.
I have followed this and some comparable issues with great
interest since I served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations under Ronald Reagan. At that time, there were
several such covenants that either had been passed or were
being considered. It was then that I became aware of some of
the facts which have ever since caused me to have a lot of
questions and doubts about such covenants.
It was then that I first became aware of the fact that the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was being used to achieve very
different purposes than those for which it was undoubtedly
intended. It was then I became aware of the fact that it was
being used to acquire and spread the technology and products
needed to produce nuclear weapons rather than to prevent their
spread.
It was even then understood among the informed public in
the United Nations context that a country such as Iraq, by
signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT, acquired
a right to share technology which could then be used to produce
nuclear products. Now, it is generally understood by such
countries that the shortest route to a nuclear capacity is
through the NPT, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Iran is traveling that road today. We and other signatories
are helping to finance their development of a nuclear capacity,
and we know it.
Secretary of State Christopher made an interesting comment
on this subject 2 years ago, when he said, in terms of its,
``organization, programs, procurement and covered activities,
Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons, which
has been followed by almost all states that have recently
sought a nuclear capability.''
Now, more recently, there have been several public reports
of U.S. Government efforts to persuade Russia not to assist
Iran in the development of a nuclear capacity and of
operational reactors. There have been reminders from Russia
that Iran is a signatory of the NPT and, as such, has a right
to assistance in developing a nuclear capacity for peaceful
use. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that there has been far too
little attention given to this problem, the principal source of
nuclear proliferation.
It was also in my U.N. years that I first became really
sensitive to the issue of the composition of the governing
board of the IAEA. Senator Biden may think I am not keeping my
eye on the ball. But I assure you, Senator Biden, I am.
As for the composition of the governing board of the IAEA,
Iraq, as I am sure many of you know, sat on the governing board
of the IAEA through just exactly that period that it was
violating its own promises not to undertake development of
nuclear weapons.
It also was violating, at that very moment, already
existing promises not to use poison gases in war. Iran and Iraq
are two of the countries in the world that have already
violated the Geneva Protocol against using poison gases. As we
all understand, I think, there is already an operative treaty
which forbids the use in war of, ``asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases,'' which is the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
Now, Mr. Chairman, many people speak of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and its verification regime as if it
had prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If that
were the case, Mr. Chairman, Iraq, North Korea, India, and
Pakistan, among others, would not today have either advanced
programs for producing nuclear weapons or the weapons
themselves. But, of course, they do.
There is a kind of strange silence which shrouds the facts
of nuclear proliferation. Even the U.S. Government has been
strangely reluctant to face facts about the failure of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to prevent proliferation. But
if our government and our allies had faced facts about the
nuclear proliferation facilitated by the NPT, they would
presumably not have reproduced Article XI and other key
loopholes in the Convention on Chemical Weapons which have
permitted and facilitated proliferation.
But, of course, in the Convention on Chemical Weapons, they
have paragraphs which call for sharing technology among the
signatories and forbid efforts to restrict or impede trade in
development and promotion of scientific and technological
knowledge in the field of chemistry--for peaceful purposes, to
be sure. I think the spirit of the CWC is, ``share now'' the
treaty counsels, ``verify purposes and intentions later.''
Mr. Chairman, my years at the United Nations sensitized me
to the composition of governing boards of the United Nations.
All too often, the composition of those governing boards simply
reflect the bloc system and its operation in the U.N.; it
dominates many processes of the U.N. The bloc system is purely
geographical and political in character, and takes little or no
account of technical competence or democratic representation--
or of who pays the bills, I might add.
I believe that the Senate should take specific note of the
composition of all the international boards entrusted to
enforce international covenants, boards which make important
decisions affecting our country. The CWC governing board will
be chosen on a basis that gives little weight to competence,
because the IAEA's governing board is used as a model. The
IAEA's verification regime has not been able either to verify
or to enforce the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
As we can learn hard lessons about failures of the IAEA
regime to adequately verify violations of the NPT, so, Mr.
Chairman, can we learn some hard lessons from the IAEA
experience, about the non-enforceability of just such treaties.
What happens when violations of the Nonproliferation Treaty
are discovered? This is a very important question. There are
the questions of verifiability and enforceability. What happens
when a nation which has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty is discovered to be in violation?
The answer is: Not much.
Iraq has suffered some penalties because of its violations
of the NPT. But it has suffered, because it invaded a
neighbor--namely, Kuwait--not because it cynically violated the
NPT norms.
I believe that the composition of the governing board of
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW, guarantees that
countries with the greatest technical knowledge will be in a
permanent minority in that decisionmaking group. The important
decisions will be made by the OPCW; but the United States and
Western Europe, the most highly industrialized and technically
sophisticated countries, will be in a permanent minority in
that group.
The United States has no guaranteed seat in that governing
body. Neither the amount of our financial contribution nor our
technical competence guarantees us a seat. We will compete for
a seat with the other most highly industrial countries for 10
of 41 seats. Asia will have nine. There will be one rotating
seat. Latin America and the Caribbean will have seven. Africa
will have nine. Eastern Europe will have five. What we in the
U.N. call WEOG, Western Europe and others group--and we fall in
that group--will have 10.
I am not certain, Mr. Chairman, where Russia falls in these
groups today. Probably in Eastern Europe, but maybe not. There
would have to be some special provision made. That is
important, since, if indeed Russia ratifies the treaty, it is
eligible to sit on the OPCW. It may not. It has signed but not
yet ratified, of course.
But the composition of the OPCW explains why its decisions
are not likely to take account of the best technical
information available. Not only that, the method of composition
of that group explains why most efforts by U.N. bodies to
develop operational groups fail. Because the members of the
group are chosen on the basis of criteria which are irrelevant
to their ability to perform, with technical competence, the
task of the group.
From experience with the NPT and the IAEA, I believe we
have had a great deal of opportunity to learn about the
problems of verification and enforceability. The IAEA's
verification procedures, of course, require prior notification
and consent of the party to be inspected including the parties
inspected, the right to approve or veto the composition of the
teams of inspectors.
Now, we all know that Iraq's nuclear projects and its
progress were discovered only as a consequence of their defeat
in the Gulf War. Iraq's violations of NPT have been discovered
again and again, as we keep finding things we did not know and
new information about aspects of their program that we were
unaware of by virtue of our access through the armistice and
their defeat in the Kuwaiti War. It was not the result of IAEA
inspections. Routine procedures for verification did not reveal
Iraq's large nuclear project.
Now, as everyone knows, it is much simpler to develop
chemical weapons than nuclear weapons. It is much easier to
procure and hide the components. As everyone knows, the
technology required in developing nuclear weapons is much more
complex and esoteric than chemical weapons. Everyone knows that
chemical weapons rely largely on dual-use substances that are
common in everyday life. Chemical weapons can be manufactured
with uncomplicated technology.
That is, I think, why, in the 1980's, when I was at the
United Nations, it was commonplace to hear Third World
spokesmen refer to chemical weapons as the Third World's
nuclear bombs. Even very technologically underdeveloped
countries could produce them. It was suggested often that it
was not quite cricket for the devel-
oped countries to try to deprive the least developed countries
of the Third World weapons of mass destruction.
I do not think any of us need weapons of mass destruction,
quite frankly, to prove that we can survive in the contemporary
world.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Senate should face the
fact that ratifying this treaty will not prevent the
manufacture or use of chemical weapons. That is precisely the
point. The Chemical Weapons Convention is neither verifiable
nor enforceable.
Proponents sometimes say, so it is not perfect. Is not
something that is not perfect better than nothing at all?
I do not think that is necessarily so, particularly since
the countries that have signed and ratified the Convention are
countries about which we would never worry about using chemical
weapons. The countries that have neither signed nor ratified
are countries that we are most likely to worry about--the so-
called rogue states or outlaw nations--Syria, Iraq, North
Korea, Libya. Those are the countries we worry about.
We do not worry about Britain, France, the WEOG, and the
Australia Group. I do not worry a bit about the Australia
Group. Those are our best friends. They do not need to worry
about us either, I might say.
The treaty's advocates simply ignore the fact that the
treaty cannot help us monitor the production of these weapons
by states most likely to use chemical weapons. Why, then, have
so many countries signed on to a treaty that can offer so
little protection?
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is simply wishful
thinking, frankly. I believe it is hoping and pretending that
something that you want to be verifiable, enforceable, and
universal may actually turn out to be that, in spite of the
fact that, from experience, we know it is not and will not.
We should also face the fact that signing the treaty will
not prevent signatories of bad will from breaking their
promises not to produce noxious gases. We know that Russia has
in fact already, in its continuing production of noxious gases,
broken two sets of promises--not the promises of the treaty,
but bilateral promises to the United States involving the
production of nerve gases and the failure to destroy gases
which they had agreed to destroy. Countries do not necessarily
keep their promises.
Advocates of the treaty argue it would surely do some good
and, at the very least, would do no harm.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Chemical Weapons
Convention will actually make the world more dangerous. That is
why I came today. I believe the treaty will hasten the spread
of advanced chemical weapons, as I believe a comparable treaty
has hastened the spread of the technology for nuclear weapon
construction--and that is not all.
Mr. Chairman, I recently asked a French friend, who happens
to be visiting just now, did the Maginot Line do France any
harm in World War II?
Well, I think most French think so. It gave them the
impression that they had dealt with a dangerous threat--an
invasion from the east, across their borders--when in fact they
were in as much danger as before. The Maginot Line created a
comforting illusion which lulled France into a false sense of
security.
I believe the world is probably less dangerous today, Mr.
Chairman, than at any time in my life--or certainly than in
most of my life. I cherish this sense of lessened threat. I
love it. But I believe we are not so safe that we can afford to
create a false sense of security by pretending that we have
eliminated chemical weapons.
President Clinton said in one statement that I read: ``We
will have banished poison gas from the Earth.'' Well, that is
poetic license or a politician's license or perhaps a
President's license, but it surely is not an accurate statement
about what will be the case. The countries most likely to
produce and use poison gas are unaffected by this treaty.
I think the Senate, personally, should reaffirm the U.S.
sense of responsibility and our commitment to that
responsibility toward preserving a peaceful world and decline
to ratify this treaty unless or until progress is made toward
making it more verifiable, enforceable, and universal. There is
still a long way to go.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before this
distinguished committee today.
The subject of today's hearing is important. The Senate's decision
will be more important. I have followed this issue with interest since
my tenure as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations under
Ronald Reagan brought several such proposed covenants to the forefront
of my attention.
It was then that I first became aware of the fact that the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was being used to achieve very different
purposes than those for which it was intended--that it was being used
to acquire and spread the technology and products needed to produce
nuclear weapons rather than to prevent their spread.
It was even then understood among the informed public that by
signing the treaty a country--such as Iraq--acquired a ``right'' to
share technology needed to produce nuclear products.
By now, it is generally understood that the shortest route to a
nuclear capacity is through the NPT. Iran is traveling that road today.
We and other signatories are helping finance their development of a
nuclear capacity. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said on this
subject, ``Based upon a wide variety of data, we know that since the
mid-1980's, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring
and developing nuclear weapons.'' He added that in terms of its
``organization, programs, procurement, and covert activities, Iran is
pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons which has been followed
by almost all states that have recently sought a nuclear capability.''
[F.N. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 7/95. Vol. 51, Issue 4, page 23.]
More recently there have been several public reports of U.S.
Government efforts that persuade Russia not to assist Iran in the
development of its nuclear capacity and reminders that Iran--a
signatory of the NPT--had the right to assistance in developing a
nuclear capacity for peaceful use. There has been far too little public
attention to this--the principal source of nuclear proliferation.
It was also in my U.N. years that I first noticed the composition
of the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). Iraq sat on the governing board of the IAEA and were at that
very time violating promises not to undertake the development of
nuclear weapons--promises not to use poison gases in war. [Iraq did
both.] Several of the same countries have already violated commitments
not to use poison gas in war, for, as we all understand, there is
already an operative treaty which forbids the use in war of
``Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases.'' It is the Geneva Protocol
of 1925.
Mr. Chairman, many people speak as if the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and verification regime had prevented proliferation of nuclear
weapons. If that were the case Iraq, North Korea, India, Pakistan would
not have either bombs today nor advanced programs for producing them.
But they do.
A strange silence shrouds the facts of nuclear proliferation. Even
the U.S. Government has been strangely reluctant to face the facts
about the failure of the NPT to prevent proliferation. But it is an
open secret that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a source
of proliferation of nuclear technology. It is also perfectly clear that
the CWC will facilitate the spread of chemical weapons through
provisions in Chapter Eleven of the treaty that call on countries with
a developed chemical industry to share their advanced technology with
less developed countries.
If our government and our allies had faced facts about the nuclear
proliferation facilitated by the NPT they would presumably not have
reproduced in Article XI the loopholes that have been permitted and
facilitated it. But they have in the paragraphs which call for sharing
technology among the signatories and forbid efforts to ``restrict or
impede trade and development and promotion of scientific and
technological knowledge in the field of chemistry * * * '' for peaceful
purposes to be sure.
Share now, the treaty counsels, verify purposes and intentions
later.
My years at the United Nations also sensitized me to the
composition of the governing boards of U.N. bodies. All too often the
composition of governing boards simply reflects the bloc system which
dominates many processes in the United Nations. The bloc system is
purely political/geographical in character. It takes little or no
account of technical competence and standards, of democratic
representation, or of who pays the bills.
The Senate should take careful note of the IAEA governing board.
Iraq served on the governing board of the IAEA the entire time that
it was working to develop nuclear weapons in violation of its pledge.
It is not the only known violator to be selected for that board. The
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) governing board will be chosen on a
basis that gives still less weight to competence.
The IAEA's verification regime often regarded as a model has not
been able either to verify or to enforce the NPT.
As we can learn hard lessons about failures of the IAEA regime to
adequately verify violations of the NPT, so we can learn about the non-
enforceability of such Treaties. What happens when violations are
discovered? Not much. Iraq has suffered because it invaded a neighbor,
not because it cynically violated NPT norms.
The composition of the governing body of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) guarantees that countries with
the greatest technical knowledge will be in a permanent minority. There
are no permanent members on the OPCW and no vetoes.
The composition of the Executive Council of the OPCW explains why
the U.N. bodies fail at operational efforts, through their validity as
representational bodies.
From experience with the NPT and the IAEA we have had the
opportunity to learn a good deal about the problems of verification and
the weaknesses of the verification regime that was developed to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the inadequacy of the IAEA's
verification procedures that require prior notification of the party to
be inspected, consent of the inspected party, and a right to approve or
veto the composition of the team of inspectors.
Iraq's large, advanced nuclear development project was discovered
only as a consequence of their defeat in the Gulf War NOT as a result
of IAEA inspections. Likewise, North Korea's large nuclear development.
And as everyone knows, it is much simpler to develop chemical than
nuclear weapons, much easier to procure and to hide the components.
Nuclear weapons require weapons grade plutonium. The technology
required in developing nuclear weapons is more complex and esoteric.
But chemical weapons rely largely on dual use substances common in
everyday life, small space, and uncomplicated technology. That is why
in the 80s chemical weapons were sometimes called the ``Third World's
nuclear bombs.'' Even very technologically underdeveloped countries
could produce them.
The Senate should face the fact that ratifying the treaty will not
prevent the manufacture or use of chemical weapons. The Chemical
Weapons Convention is neither verifiable nor enforceable. Proponents
attempt to dismiss the many loopholes in the treaty with the assertion
that nothing is perfect. But perfection is not the question.
Proponents seek to minimize the fact that the countries with the
most highly developed programs either have signed but not ratified the
treaty--Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, Vietnam--or have not signed at all--
Syria, Iraq, North Korea, Libya--but signing does not solve the
problem. Signing will not prevent signatories from breaking their
promises not to produce noxious gases as Russia has recently broken a
promise to the United States.
And the treaty's advocates simply ignore the fact the treaty cannot
help us monitor the production of the states most likely to use
chemical warfare.
Why then have so many countries signed on to a treaty that can
offer so little protection?
Only wishful thinking encourages it. It is as if pretending that
the treaty were verifiable, enforceable, and universal would make it
so. But it doesn't. It also will not prevent signatories from breaking
their promises not to produce noxious gases as Russia has recently
done.
But surely it would do some good, treaty advocates argue. At the
very least we can say it would do no harm.
Mr. Chairman, it is because I believe the CWC would actually make
the world more dangerous that I am here. I believe the treaty will
hasten the spread of advanced chemical weapons as it has nuclear
technology.
Americans working for ratification of the CWC should take a hard
look at what happened in the United Nations Human Rights Commission
meeting in Geneva this week. The United States could not even get a
discussion of China's human rights violations put on the agenda.
For the seventh straight year China was able to prevent
discussion--much less censure--of its deeply shocking treatment of
Tibet and all manner of dissidents and to do so by a comfortable 27 to
17 margin (with nine abstentions). China won the vote with strong Third
World support, including some close U.S. associates such as Egypt,
India and Indonesia.
China's chief delegate, Wu Jianmen, explained later the vote showed
that the Third World ``identified'' with China. He also emphasized the
failure of some close U.S. allies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Japan, Greece, Italy, Canada and Australia) to co-sponsor the
``Western'' resolution this year, because, he said, they ``want dialog
and cooperation and not confrontation.'' In truth China won the vote
because there is weak support for democracy beyond North America,
Europe, and a few Asian and South American states, and also because
China mounted a tough worldwide campaign--that included arm-twisting
and threat of economic consequences. A belated U.S. effort to rally
support--including personal intervention by Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright--did not help much.
This shameful outcome was not a defeat for the United States or the
countries sponsoring the resolution. It was a defeat for humane values
and rational discussion of deeply serious moral and political issues.
It was a defeat for victims of repression and for the very purposes for
which the United Nations was founded. This outcome in the Human Rights
Commission is a harsh reminder that the United States often cannot win
votes for its basic values and interests in U.N. arenas--even when the
issue is purely symbolic and the U.S., itself, and most of our
principal allies are present.
The balance of power would be much less favorable to the United
States in the governing body that will implement the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
In pressing the Senate to ratify the CWC quickly, before the treaty
enters into effect on April 29, the Clinton administration has argued
that by getting in on the ground floor the United States will be
assured of having an important voice in shaping the structure and
function of the organization. But that is not so. The composition and
structure of the governing body of the CWC are prescribed in the
treaty. The treaty, itself, hands us a stacked deck with which to play
for influence.
The United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China (that
is, the permanent members of the Security Council) are all guaranteed
seats on the Human Rights Commission but not on the Executive Council
that will administer the CWC. The 41 members of that Executive Council
will be designated from the U.N.'s standard geographical groupings and
elected by all the signatories of the CWC for 2 year terms. There will
be no permanent members and no vetoes.
The United States is a member of the WEOG (Western European and
Other Group) which is allotted 10 seats on the 41 member Executive
Council that also provides nine seats for Asia, seven for Latin America
and the Caribbean, nine for Africa, five for Eastern Europe plus one
rotating seat. To win one of the 10 WEOG seats for a 2-year term, the
United States will need to compete with the other Western industrial
democratic nations who altogether will have only 10 of 41 seats (or 15
of 41 seats if we count Eastern Europe; or 16 of 41 with all of Europe
plus Japan).
In this competition our friends in the European Union will have 15
votes to our one vote. Therefore, the United States would frequently
fail to gain a voice in the decisions of the Executive Council. Neither
the amount of our financial contribution nor our technical competence
would guarantee us a seat.
The draft of the CWC supported by the Reagan administration guarded
against this possibility. It provided that permanent members of the
Security Council would be members of the Executive Council that
implements the treaty. This would have guaranteed representation of the
most powerful nations and those with the most highly developed chemical
industries. The CWC which is now before the Senate operates on the
basis of one country, one vote.
The fact that the United States might have no voice in setting
policy for implementing the CWC but would surely be bound by its
decisions is one important reason that the U.S. Senate should not
ratify this treaty.
There are others.
Most of the countries in the Human Rights Commission have ratified
the Declaration on Universal Human Rights.
Will the United States ratifying the CWC make the world safer?
Mr. Chairman, did the Maginot Line do any harm to France in World
War II? Most French think so. It gave them the impression that they had
taken care of a dangerous threat: an invasion from the East; when in
fact, they were in as much danger as ever. The Maginot Line created a
comforting illusion which lulled France into a false sense of security
and facilitated Hitler's conquest.
The world is less dangerous today than during most of my lifetime.
I cherish this sense of lessened threat. But we are not so safe we can
afford to create a false sense of security by pretending that we have
eliminated the threat of chemical weapons. President Bill Clinton said,
``We will have banished poison gas from the Earth.'' It will not be so.
We had better do some hard thinking about how to defend ourselves and
the world against the poison gases that have been and will be produced
whether or not we ratify.
I think the Senate should reaffirm the U.S. sense of responsibility
and commitment to a peaceful world and decline to ratify this treaty
unless or until it becomes verifiable, enforceable, and universal.
There is a long way to go.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Let me say to the visitors here today and those who are
watching on television that I have been to several functions
that shared the podium with the distinguished Jeane
Kirkpatrick, who, by the way, is a Senior Fellow of the
American Enterprise Institute and, as almost everybody knows,
she is a former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. But
everywhere I go or have gone, where she has appeared likewise,
I have sensed that she is one of the most respected women in
America. We are honored to have you with us today.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Now, we move to Mr. Richard N. Perle, who is
one of the best informed individuals I know. He is formerly
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy. I do not know how many times I have called on Richard
for information and guidance on various issues. We are
certainly glad to have you here, and you may proceed, sir.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, you do not have any idea how
many times we have regretted that you called on him, because he
is so persuasive. I hope you are not so good today, Richard.
The Chairman. Just watch him.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. PERLE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Mr. Perle. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting
me.
Senator Biden, I can assure you I would not have come today
if I did not think there was a very strong case to be made. I
will try to take seriously your injunction to keep my eye on
the ball.
In fact, I think my colleague and friend Jeane Kirkpatrick
clearly identified the ball when she described the way in which
the Nonproliferation Treaty, without anyone ever having
intended that it should work this way, had the effect of making
technology for the production of nuclear material far more
readily available than it might have been otherwise--a defect
that unhappily is reproduced like a computer virus in the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
Before I get into the key point I want to make today, let
me say that I have chosen to focus on one issue--one rather
narrow issue. I think that is in fact the ball that Senator
Biden has in mind. My colleague Doug Feith, from whom you will
hear shortly, has prepared a more comprehensive statement that
deals with other aspects of the treaty in a thoroughly
convincing and understandable way. I agree entirely with the
points that Doug will soon be making.
But I want to restrict myself to one key point. That is, as
it happens, the point that Sandy Berger was concerned to deal
with in the letter with which he provided you. I take that
letter as confirmation of the fact that the National Security
Adviser, like others, have begun, under the exigency of
imminent action on this treaty, to understand that there are
problems in the treaty that need to be addressed. I wish they
had been addressed at an earlier stage in the proceedings. That
is to say, while the treaty was under negotiation. Because had
the ball that Sandy Berger has now found been seen earlier, we
would have a treaty without Article X in it, and probably
without Article XI in it.
Had we been more attentive, had we learned the lesson of
the Nonproliferation Treaty, had we thought through the means
by which countries may in future acquire a meaningful military
chemical weapons capability, I am quite convinced that we would
not have allowed Article X to become a part of this treaty.
What Jeane had to say about the Nonproliferation Treaty
applies to this Convention in spades. The reason why I say in
spades, Mr. Chairman, is that the production of nuclear
material clandestinely from facilities that are intended for
peaceful purposes and that are monitored by the IAEA--not
perfectly, but monitored--is a very difficult thing to
accomplish. Building nuclear power plants is not easy.
Operating them is not easy. Handling nuclear material is not
easy.
Chemical weapons, on the other hand, pose an entirely
different set of issues. The production of lethal chemicals
which can be used for military purposes is not difficult. Any
facility capable of producing insecticides, any facility
capable of producing fertilizer can, with relatively minor
modifications--well within the capacity of any country that has
an insecticide or a fertilizer plant--be converted to the
production of chemicals. Indeed, some of the chemicals of
concern are not even barred under this treaty, because they are
already so widely spread around the world.
So the acquisition of lethal chemicals for military
purposes is easy. But the possession of lethal chemicals is
not, by itself, sufficient to constitute a military capability.
Because in order to use chemical weapons for military purposes,
you have to be able to protect your own troops. The soldiers
that go into the field, the pilots that drop canisters, the
artillerymen that launch chemical shells all need to be
protected themselves. Otherwise, their missions become
suicidal. They are difficult enough even if they are protected
themselves.
So what is difficult about acquiring a chemical weapons
capability, a military capability, is not the offense; it is
the defense. The offense is easy. The defense is very hard.
Article X of this treaty says that the parties to the
treaty, the signatories, will be entitled to receive help in
the development of the hard thing--the defensive capabilities.
In fact, it requires participants who enter into this in good
faith to assist them.
I want to read the exact words of Article X, because I have
a feeling that, by the time the Senate votes, everyone will
have understood that this is the ball that we have to keep
clearly in focus. Paragraph 3 of Article X reads as follows:
Each state party undertakes--undertakes--to facilitate and
shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, material and scientific and
technological information concerning means of protection
against chemical weapons. The parties undertake.
Paragraph 6 of Article X reads:
Nothing in this convention--nothing in this convention [if
we had drafted this up here, it would say notwithstanding any
other provision of law] nothing in this convention shall be
interpreted--shall be interpreted--as impeding the right of
states parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally
and to conclude individual agreements with other states parties
concerning the emergency procurement of assistance.
So Article X not only pledges the parties, they undertake
to share everything that is hard to achieve in a chemical
weapons capability--the defensive side--but, in fact,
anticipating the possibility that someone might say, well, we
interpret this differently, words have specifically been
included that say nothing in this convention shall be
interpreted as impeding.
Now, what are we talking about when we talk about the
assistance, the fullest possible exchange, and so forth? That
is defined in Article X. It refers inter alia to detection
equipment and alarm systems, protective equipment,
decontamination equipment and decontaminants, medical antidotes
and treatments, and advice on any of these protective measures.
In short, everything you need, combined with the offensive
chemicals themselves, to constitute a militarily effective
chemical weapons capability.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I am sure Mr. Perle would not
mind my asking. Can I ask a clarification question?
Mr. Perle. Sure.
Senator Biden. What does Paragraph 7 mean?
Mr. Perle. The paragraph I read to you, nothing in this
convention shall be----
Senator Biden. No. Each party undertakes to provide
assistance through the organization and, to this end, to
elect--to elect to take one or more of the following measures.
Does that modify it? That is all I am trying to bring up.
Mr. Perle [continuing]. No. I do not believe it does.
It sets up a mechanism, which actually makes matters a
little bit worse. Because the Secretariat will become a
repository--not the only repository, because this envisions
bilateral cooperation, as, for example, between China and Iran
or China and Pakistan. But the Secretariat will now become a
repository of information about defensive technology.
So the span of control of the United States will be
diluted, to the extent to which the United States does not
constitute the Secretariat all by itself, which of course it
will not.
Senator Biden. I thank you. I have a different view, but I
will wait until my time for questions.
Mr. Perle. So I think it is reasonable to speculate that if
we go ahead and approve this convention as it is now written,
we will look back 1 day--5 years from now, 7, 10 years from
now, maybe sooner--and we will unhappily identify states who
got their chemical weapons capability through the sharing that
is going to take place pursuant to Article X.
The administration argues that, well, we are not going to
do that. Of course, we are not going to give our defensive
technology to rogue states. You would have to be out of your
mind to do that. We have no intention of doing that. It is
certainly the right of the administration to enter into an
undertaking without any intention of carrying it out, because
it runs counter to one's common sense. Some people would call
that bad faith. I think it would be justified bad faith if we
were unhappily unable to avoid the undertaking in the first
place, which we are still in a position to avoid.
But there are a great many other countries that also
possess defensive capabilities and defensive technology. They
may not be so willing to act in bad faith. Indeed, they may be
actually rather eager to find a basis for sharing the kinds of
defensive technologies, equipment, know-how, and so forth that
we are talking about here.
So if, for example, the challenge were to discourage the
Chinese from assisting the Pakistanis, would not the Chinese
invoke Article X of the treaty and say, we understand your
feelings about this, Mr. President, but we undertook to share
this technology. You are not asking us to violate a solemn
undertaking, are you?
I think our capacity to persuade others will be
significantly diminished by virtue of the undertakings in
Article X, which we may enter into in bad faith, but others
will not.
Let me give you a proliferation scenario just for
illustrative purposes. Let us take Iran as the example. Iran
has already signed, and I assume it will ratify the convention.
I think there is evidence that Iran presently has a chemical
weapons capability. But let us say that the Iranians, upon
entering the Chemical Weapons Convention, decide to abandon
that offensive capability. It is a matter of converting some
plants that are now producing chemicals to the production of
insecticide or fertilizer. What can you do from left to right,
you can do from right to left.
So Iran now ceases to have an offensive chemical weapons
production capability. It is, therefore, in strict compliance
with the terms of this convention. That is what I would do if I
were Mr. Rafsanjani and wanted a chemical weapons capability.
Because I do not today have the defensive side of the equation.
So I would eliminate any violation by ceasing illegal
activity. Now I would invoke Article X, and I would go to other
countries and say, ``We have no offensive capability. We are in
full compliance. You are obliged--you have undertaken to share
with us the defenses.'' I promise you there will be countries
that will accommodate them--for a price--maybe even without
insisting on much of a price. Who could argue against it, since
they will be, at that point, in full compliance?
So a period of time elapses, during which the Iranians, who
were clever, acquire all the defensive technology they need.
They acquire, in the words of the treaty, detection equipment
and alarm systems, protective equipment, decontamination
equipment and decontaminants, medical antidotes and treatments,
and advice on all of the above.
Once they have that firmly in hand, once they have the
difficult part of acquiring a chemical weapons capability, now
they restart the production of offensive chemicals. But it is
too late. We will have supplied them the thing that they cannot
now easily achieve. They will put part A and part B together,
and they will have a chemical weapons military capability. The
instrument by which they will have achieved this is the
convention that we are now talking about ratifying.
Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying two other things.
One about how we could get into this situation. How could we be
at this stage of the proceedings, with so many countries having
signed this agreement, with the Senate about to take it up,
having overlooked--because that is the only fair way to
describe it--the portentous implications of Article X?
There is another article, Article XI, which tends very much
in the same direction, and I think it will have a similar
result.
I had occasion to discuss this treaty recently with a
senior official of this government, a cabinet level official. I
asked this person about Article X. This person did not know
about Article X. Now, Article X has become better known in the
last 72 hours. But a couple of weeks ago, there were an awful
lot of very senior officials of this government who did not
know about Article X and did not know about the problem.
You wonder how this could happen. Well, it happens in the
following way. The United States makes a decision to propose a
treaty on chemical weapons and a draft is put together. The
draft did not have Article X in it. We sent a team of people to
Geneva, and they come back 10 years later, basically. For 10
years, they are working away on this convention.
The people who are receiving their cables in Washington are
very often people who were in Geneva, because there is a kind
of rotation. This is how it works in the real world. So you get
an intellectually incestuous relationship among the Geneva
people and the Washington people, with almost no adult
supervision. The individuals involved in this invest a great
deal of their time, years of their lives, in attempting to
bring about a treaty.
Somebody insists on an Article X, or maybe a group of
countries insist on an Article X. It is 10 years after we got
started on this, and we want to bring this treaty home. It is
the experts who are making the decision. No President reads the
treaty. No Secretary of State reads the treaty. No Under
Secretary. No Assistant Secretary. I promise you, Mr. Chairman,
this treaty, 160 pages long, has not been read by anyone who
was not paid full-time to work on it.
So terrible mistakes can be made--mistakes in which
somebody loses sight of the ball along the way. That is what
comes to the Senate for ratification.
One last point. Senator Feinstein asked about verification.
How would verification be improved if the United States
remained outside the treaty? It is a fair question. The answer
is counterintuitive. So let me take a quick shot at it.
I think it would be improved in two ways. First of all, I
think we would do a better job of keeping to ourselves the
means by which we detect violations. Jeane Kirkpatrick made
reference to the fact that Iraq had served on the governing
board of the IAEA. They were there for a good reason.
The Iraqi Government did not contribute the full-time
talent of one of its senior officials for the benefit of the
IAEA; I promise you that. He was there to learn as much as he
could learn about how the IAEA went about detecting illegal
activity. He was an intelligence officer. I promise you that
the organization responsible for implementing this agreement
will be full of intelligence officers, including intelligence
officers from countries who are eager to discover how they
might be caught if they had a clandestine program.
So we will end up educating the very people whose programs
we are trying to stop in how to avoid getting detected in the
first place. So that is one way in which we will be worse off.
We do not have to educate them now, but we will then.
Second, and this is a more subtle point, once activity
becomes illegal, the way in which information about it is
collected and analyzed and reported acquires an entirely
different meaning than when it is simply intelligence about the
activities of others.
When we are interested in the capabilities of a Russian
missile, we employ technicians who look at the test data that
they are able to acquire, who look at photography, who look at
all sources of intelligence; and they make a judgment about the
capability of that missile; and they say how far they think it
can go; and they say what size warhead they think it can carry.
They say everything to the best of their ability about that
missile; and they do not think about the implications of their
answer, because their job is to unearth the truth about that
missile.
But now, suppose there is an arms control regime in which
that missile, if its range is over 600 kilometers, is a
violation of a treaty; but if it is only 595 kilometers it is
not a violation of a treaty, and you are now responsible for
deciding whether to send to the President a report that says,
we believe the range of this missile to be 650 kilometers,
which has very important political implications. At that point,
an element of political judgment enters into the assessment of
intelligence.
I saw this day in and day out as we grappled with the
question of how to interpret what we were seeing in the old
Soviet Union in the cold war days, so I believe that the
objectivity with which we view the evidence becomes inevitably
colored by political considerations when the issue is not, what
do we know, but is what we know going to touch off a crisis
because we have now caught someone violating the treaty; and
that requires some response on our part.
So I do not accept the now hourly-passed-off view that we
are going to do more with this treaty than without it, which is
the conventional wisdom; but I think it overlooks these two
very important points.
I am sorry for going on too long, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much.
The Chairman. You have not at all, and I thank you very
much.
Now we have another long-time friend of all of us, Dr. Fred
Ikle, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. We appreciate you coming, sir. We will be glad to hear
from you now.
STATEMENT OF DR. FRED C. IKLE, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Dr. Ikle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to be
invited here.
The previous witnesses, Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Richard
Perle, made so many of the important points of what effectively
is a sad story that I can be quite brief. It is a sad story;
because as witnesses yesterday mentioned, there were good
intentions behind this treaty, and we all are--the witnesses
yesterday and today--are horrified by the potential of chemical
weapons and would like to see them banished from the face of
the Earth.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick very tellingly brought back the
nonproliferation treaty, which of course was preceded by the
Atoms for Peace program. President Eisenhower with that program
also had very good intentions. In fact, he got enormous kudos
in the press when he presented that program. It was one of his
greatest public affairs successes, and--as it turns out now
from hindsight--one of the main contributors to nuclear
proliferation.
I can add to the telling points Richard Perle made about
Article X and the related culprit, Article XI about the
assistance in chemical manufacturing technology. Here, there is
something a bit startling in the discussion we had. By and
large the discussion in Congress and in the media has been very
thoughtful on both sides, serious arguments, honestly felt.
It is all the more regrettable here that on the question
relating to Article XI it looks like some misinformation has
deliberately been infiltrated into our discussion, and that is
the allegation which a number of people here picked up
innocently, the allegation that the United States would lose
seriously in chemical manufacturing exports if we did not
ratify the treaty.
For a while, the administration spokespersons mentioned a
number like $600 million lost per year in U.S. exports,
legitimate chemical manufacturing exports. When pressed on
where that number came from, the administration said: ``talk to
the Chemical Manufacturing Association.'' When the people there
were asked, they really were unable to give an explanation.
So we did some further digging into this question; and it
turns out the only exports that the U.S. could no longer make,
if it did not become a party to the treaty, to other treaty
members like Germany, Japan, and the U.K., would be the poison
gas itself, which of course we do not want to be exporting, and
the most dangerous ingredients to be used in gas warfare.
Schedule I type chemicals is poison gas itself. There are
no exports, obviously, from the United States of any
importance. Schedule II, that may have some role in pesticides,
but exports are much more limited than the $600 million figure
suggested.
So why has this export damage been so vigorously mentioned,
particularly by the Chemical Manufacturing Association
representatives that are urging the Senate to ratify this
treaty? I think the answer, I believe, is that some people
there relish the prospect that the Chemical Weapons Convention
would undo the restrictions of the Australia Group, precisely
the thing Senator Biden expressed serious concern about, and
rightly so.
Now, this is a serious charge to make, and maybe I had
better have a couple of exhibits for my case. One, I was not
able to fully nail down. Maybe you could have this done, Mr.
Chairman. Last fall, in the House of Representatives, a step
was taken--exactly where it came from I do not know, it would
seem to have the support of the Chemical Manufacturing
Association--to lift the licensing requirements for chemical
weapons exports to the member states of the convention before
even the United States had ratified the treaty.
Then, Members--colleagues of yours--I think yourself, Mr.
Chairman, Senator Pell, Senator Glenn, Senator Kyl in a
bipartisan effort stopped that premature dismantling of our
licensing requirements.
The more definitive exhibit goes further back. In testimony
before this committee on June 9, 1994, a spokesman conveying
the support of the Chemical Manufacturing Association said, and
I quote, ``There are several significant reasons why the
chemical industry supports the CWC. Those chemical
manufacturers do not make chemical weapons. Our industry does
produce commercial chemicals which can be illegally converted
into weapons. An effective CWC could have the positive effect
of liberalizing--liberalizing the existing system for export
controls applicable to our industry's products, technologies,
and processes.''
So I think there is at least a partial explanation for the
enthusiasm of the CMA for this treaty. Now, that is perhaps in
some ways a serious charge. I think it is.
Let me add one more point there. To the extent I have been
able to find out, and I know some other people have confirmed
this, this is not a charge against the most senior officials of
the industry who are members of the association. I have talked
to CEO's of large chemical companies, including in Delaware,
who have never heard of the treaty while it was in process and
while the representatives here in town of the CMA have been
working together with this club in Geneva that Richard Perle
described, and nourished the support for this treaty.
So I think we have to first of all get rid of the idea that
not ratifying the treaty would damage the exports of the United
States chemical industry, the legitimate, important exports;
and second I think we have to put a question mark behind the
support alleged by the CMA of the responsible senior officials
in the chemical industry.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank you, Dr. Ikle. I think the
legislation you were talking about was H.R. 364, and that would
have just devastated the U.S. export controls.
Now we come to Doug Feith, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy, and by George, I
am anxiously awaiting hearing from you. Thank you for coming
in.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS J. FEITH, FEITH AND ZELL, P.C., FORMER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATION POLICY
Mr. Feith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to appear before this committee again on this
important question. I agree with Dr. Ikle that the debate on
the Chemical Weapons Convention has been of remarkably high
quality for a matter so complex. I have a statement that I
would appreciate the committee admitting for the record, and
what I would like to do now is just touch on some of the points
in my written statement, if that is acceptable.
The Chairman. Very well. Without objection it will be so
ordered.
Mr. Feith. Thank you.
Both sides in this debate have established substantial
common ground. Both sides agree that the treaty is not
verifiable, if by verifiable we mean confidence in detection by
U.S. intelligence of illegal clandestine stockpiling or
production of chemical weapons. No one in the intelligence
community has ever said the treaty is verifiable by that
standard.
It is worthwhile to stress that the verification problem
here is not the lack of perfection. The problem is not that we
would detect cheating only 90 percent or 50 percent of the
time. The problem is that chemical weapons production is so
easy to do and to conceal that it is inherently impossible to
achieve any degree of confidence, let alone high confidence,
that we could detect it even regarding militarily significant
quantities of chemical weapons.
Someone once drove this point home by saying that the
Chemical Weapons Convention is like an effort to ban
Hollandaise sauce without banning eggs and butter. Treaty
critics believe that it would not serve the anti-chemical-
weapons cause for us to join a ban that we know will be
ineffective, impossible to monitor properly, and impossible to
enforce.
I speak as a lawyer devoted to the principle of law. The
world would surely be a better place if law in fact played a
greater role in securing international peace and civilized
behavior, but we do not move toward this goal by promulgating a
patently ineffective treaty. A chemical weapons ban that states
know they can sign cynically and violate without punishment
will not shore up the international norm against such weapons.
Creating bad law is not the way to build respect for law. The
CWC will cheapen the currency of international law.
The wiser approach, in my opinion, to chemical weapons arms
control is embodied in the bill S. 495, authored by Senator Kyl
and cosponsored by Senators Lott, Helms, and others. The United
States should work to obtain international agreement on
mechanisms for enforcing the existing treaty that bans
initiation of chemical warfare. We should put teeth in the 1925
Geneva Protocol.
If that treaty were properly enforced, there clearly would
not be any need for the CWC; and if the Geneva Protocol
continues to be violated with impunity, then there is no hope
that the CWC will be respected, for violations of the CWC are
far less discoverable and provable and far less likely to
horrify worldwide opinion than violations of the non-use ban.
What of the point that we might as well ratify the CWC as
we are destroying the U.S. chemical arsenal anyway? It is
better, in our view, to destroy our arsenal unilaterally than
to enter into a treaty that we know will not accomplish its
purpose. By acting unilaterally, we produce some of the key
benefits hoped for from the CWC without taking on the treaty's
undesirable baggage. Our action makes a strong moral statement
against chemical weapons, but it does not lend our name to the
dishonest proposition that Iran, China, or others have actually
abolished their chemical weapons arsenals.
Which brings us back to the question highlighted by Senator
Feinstein: Whether we are better off with the inspection and
information rights that the CWC will provide, or without. On
balance, we are better off without.
The CWC's verification regime stands on two legs. The first
is voluntary disclosure. Most of the regime is based on what
the parties voluntarily declare about their own holdings of
chemical weapons, manufacturing facilities and the like.
Virtually all the CWC's inspections will be at so-called
declared facilities, that is, locations that each party will
itself declare to be subject to inspection.
Nearly all the large budget of the new CWC organization
based in The Hague will be allocated to inspecting declared
facilities and processing the parties' voluntary declarations.
Does anyone expect a country like Iran or China or Russia to
declare a facility in which it is planning to produce or store
illegal chemical weapons? The declarations and the inspections
of declared facilities will yield our government little, if
anything, of value to augment what we already know from our own
national intelligence means.
Looking for chemical weapons at declared facilities brings
to mind the joke about the drunk who looks for his keys under
the street lamp rather than some ways off where he dropped
them, because there is more light under the lamp.
The verification regime's second leg is challenge
inspection. That is, inspection of a facility that was not
declared. This is often talked of as if it were a tool for
adding to our knowledge, or for finding violations. It is not.
One cannot spot check a country the size of Iran, much less
China, by means of challenge inspections.
The purpose of challenge inspections is to try to embarrass
a state that one has by other intelligence means caught in a
violation. So it is incorrect to think that we will learn much
of substantive value through challenge inspections.
Moreover, the CWC's challenge inspection provisions were
watered down in the negotiations to the point where they are
not even a useful tool for embarrassing cheaters. Parties will
easily be able, within the treaty's terms, to delay and
otherwise defeat the purposes of the challenge inspection
provisions.
The issue of whether the CWC will produce a net gain for
our intelligence capabilities must also be considered in light
of the harm that will result from participation in the
international inspection program by unreliable states, as
Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Mr. Perle highlighted, and as
Secretary Schlesinger highlighted yesterday.
I would simply emphasize that when rogue states learn how
to inspect, they learn how to conceal, and in this regard I
think it should disturb the Senate that the administration has
taken steps to begin training foreign CWC inspectors even
before the Senate has acted on this treaty. I understand that
some government agencies are resisting this effort, and I urge
this committee to inquire into this.
Now, Articles X and XI of the CWC have received a great
deal of attention lately, and these provisions are a major part
of the reason that the CWC will do more harm than good, as has
been explained very well.
I do want to reemphasize in response to the textual
analysis that Senator Biden mentioned that the argument that
Article X, paragraph 3, the most troubling provision, is
overridden by Article I, is, I believe, flatly contradicted by
what paragraph 6 says, that nothing in this convention shall be
interpreted as impeding the right of States' Parties to provide
assistance.
The people who drafted this provision anticipated precisely
the argument that Article I might override Article X, paragraph
3, and they took care of it by nailing it in paragraph 6. This
is a serious problem.
As for Article XI, it prohibits, or at least expresses
disapproval of export restrictions in the chemical field among
treaty parties.
Unlike the language of Article X, that of Article XI is not
completely unqualified, so the administration has been able to
offer an interpretation that renders this provision
meaningless, a legal nullity.
But whether or not the administration's interpretation is
valid, I would argue that it is beside the point--the real
issue is not--and I want to emphasize this point. The real
issue is not what the United States itself will export, but
what third countries will want to sell to the Irans of this
world.
For export controls to be effective they must have
multilateral support, which is hard to organize. If a German or
Chinese company arranges to sell an advanced chemical plant to
Iran, and the U.S. Government protests that this would enhance
Iran's chemical weapons program, we can expect the German or
Chinese Government to cite Article XI for the proposition that
the sale is not only permitted but required by the CWC; for
Iran will be a party in good standing, or in any event a party
against whom no violation can be proved.
Whatever one thinks of the CWC overall, no one can deny
that it would be a better or less bad treaty if the so-called,
``poisons for peace'' provisions were fixed.
Though I think the Senate should reject the CWC outright,
some treaty critics would be willing to withdraw their
opposition if only the Senate would ensure that Articles X and
XI are properly amended before U.S. ratification. Such critics
argue that to be minimally acceptable the CWC should at least
not undermine the very interests--stemming chemical weapons
proliferation--that it aims to promote.
Administration officials counter with the argument that it
would be embarrassing for the United States at this late stage
to insist that the treaty be amended. They say this would
destroy our diplomatic credibility.
While it would to some extent be embarrassing, it is also
embarrassing to ratify a treaty with provisions as perverse as
Articles X and XI. As for our diplomats' credibility, the
effect of forcing amendments of Article X and XI could be
powerfully positive.
If the administration's interpretations of those provisions
are widely held, then the amendment should not be unduly
difficult to arrange. If they are so difficult, this would
confirm that the provisions are a problem, and the United
States should not ratify until the problem is resolved.
If the administration, as is likely, then succeeds in
getting the needed amendments, the influence of our diplomats
would be enhanced. The next time a multilateral forum proposes
a treaty with a bizarre provision adverse to our interests, our
negotiators would be able to declare credibly that that
provision will preclude Senate approval of the treaty. This
will strengthen our hand.
A final point regarding deadlines. Many states of concern
to us--Syria, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea--have not signed the
CWC. Although some such states, specifically Russia, China,
Iran, and Cuba, have signed; none of these latter four has yet
ratified. The administration insists that it is crucial that
the United States ratify the CWC before April 29, but if we do
we will be the only state party that actually has a significant
chemical weapons capability.
April 29 is an artificial deadline. Any time the United
States might decide to become a party, it will, because of its
military and financial status, be afforded an appropriate
position of influence in the treaty organization if we assert
ourselves properly.
This is true because we are to pay 25 percent of the total
budget of the new organization. It is true also because the
other major states in this field are waiting for the United
States before they decide whether to ratify. If the Senate is
ready to act before April 29, then well and good, but the
Senate should not, in my opinion, hasten its deliberations
simply to make a meaningless deadline.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas J. Feith
Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you again
on this important question. It was in March 1996 that I last had the
honor to address this committee on why I think the Senate should not
consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
During the Reagan Administration, I served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy and my responsibilities
included the chemical weapons treaty negotiations.
The debate on the CWC has been of remarkably high quality for a
matter so complex. The sides have engaged each other intelligently and
generally respectfully and have established substantial common ground.
They agree that chemical weapons are evil. Specifically, all four of us
on this panel--Fred Ikle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle and myself--
agree with the treaty's proponents that it would be desirable to
eliminate these weapons from the world entirely and that the United
States should continue to destroy its own chemical weapons, as we are
already doing, whether or not the United States joins the CWC. We all
favor the CWC's goal. We all agree that the chemical weapons threat in
the world is a problem the gravity of which the world should never
underestimate. In fact, a key reason for opposing the CWC is that it
will falsely advertise that the chemical weapons threat has been
mitigated when it has not.
The debate has also made clear that both CWC proponents and critics
acknowledge that the treaty has flaws. Both sides agree that the treaty
will not be global and will not cover a number of the states of
greatest concern to us.
Both sides also agree that the treaty is not verifiable, if by
``verifiable'' we mean confidence in detection by U.S. Intelligence of
illegal, clandestine stockpiling or pro-
duction of chemical weapons. No one in the intelligence community has
ever said the treaty is verifiable by that standard. It is worthwhile
to stress that the verification problem here is not the lack of
perfection. The problem is not that we would detect cheating only 90
percent or even only 50 percent of the time. The problem is that
chemical weapons production is so easy to do and to conceal that it is
inherently impossible to achieve any degree of confidence--let alone
``high confidence''--that we could detect it, even regarding militarily
significant quantities. Someone once drove this point home by saying
that the CWC is like an effort to ban hollandaise sauce without banning
eggs and butter.
In her testimony before this Committee yesterday, Secretary of
State Albright argued for the CWC by asserting that rogue states would
be subject to unprecedented verification measures and ``will probably
be caught'' if they violate the treaty. The Secretary of State was
incorrect in this assertion and there is no intelligence authority in
the government that would confirm her claim.
Both sides in the CWC debate agree that the treaty will not
actually eliminate chemical weapons from the world. And both sides
agree that the CWC is in essence a moral statement against chemical
weapons, a declaration that the civilized nations abhor these weapons
and think that no one should possess them.
The debate now has a rather precise focus: Given the importance of
the chemical weapons problem and given that the CWC has its flaws, is
the United States better served by ratifying the treaty or not. Treaty
proponents say that the United States is better off if the world enacts
this new international law against possession of chemical weapons, even
if we know that key countries will violate it. They also say that we
are better off with the inspection and information rights that the CWC
will provide than without. Treaty critics contend that the treaty will
not accomplish its purpose and will actually exacerbate the chemical
weapons problem in the world.
Treaty critics believe that it would not serve the anti-chemical-
weapons cause for us to join a ban that we know will be ineffective,
impossible to monitor properly and impossible to enforce. I speak as a
lawyer devoted to the principle of law. The world would surely be a
better place if law in fact played a greater role in securing
international peace and civilized behavior. But we do not move toward
this goal by promulgating a patently ineffective new treaty. A chemical
weapons ban that states know they can sign cynically and violate
without punishment will not shore up the international norm against
such weapons. On the contrary, it will damage that norm even more
severely than it was harmed by the world's failure to uphold the 1925
Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons when Iraq violated that venerable
treaty in the late 1980's.
Creating bad law is not the way to build respect for law. The ill-
conceived CWC will cheapen the currency of international law. The wiser
approach to chemical weapons arms control is embodied in the bill, S.
495, authored by Senator Kyl and cosponsored by Senators Lott, Nickles,
Mack, Coverdell, Helms, Shelby and Hutchison: The United States should
work to obtain international agreement on mechanisms for enforcing the
existing treaty that bans initiation of chemical warfare. In other
words, we should put teeth in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. If that treaty
were properly enforced, there would clearly be no need for the CWC. And
if the Geneva Protocol continues to be violated with impunity, then
there is no hope that the CWC will be respected, for violations of the
CWC are far less discoverable and provable and far less likely to
horrify world opinion than violations of the non-use ban. If one cannot
get the world excited about disfigured corpses produced by violations
of the Geneva Protocol, it is unrealistic to expect tough enforcement
action when U.S. officials allege clandestine storage somewhere of some
chemical bulk agent.
What of the point that we might as well ratify the CWC as we are
destroying the U.S. chemical arsenal anyway? It is better, in my view,
to destroy our arsenal unilaterally than to enter into a treaty that we
know will not accomplish its purpose. By acting unilaterally, we
produce some of the key benefits hoped for from the CWC without taking
on the treaty's undesirable baggage. Our action makes a strong moral
statement against chemical weapons. But it does not lend our name to
the dishonest proposition that Iran, China or others have actually
abolished their chemical weapons arsenals. The world can verify our
compliance with our self-imposed ban by reading the Congressional
Record. We then do not have to participate in a costly, wasteful,
intrusive but ineffective verification regime that is more likely to
spread militarily relevant chemical weapons technology than contain it.
Any other chemical weapons state that wants to follow our lead can
do so, also unilaterally. Each will have the opportunity to persuade
the world as best it can that it is doing what it has promised. This
way, states will not obtain a clean bill of health simply by signing a
treaty and subjecting themselves to an inspection regime that they know
is easy to defeat.
Which brings us back to the question of whether we are better off
with the inspection and information rights that the CWC will provide or
without. On balance, we are better off without. Treaty proponents
stress that the CWC's verification provisions are unprecedented in
their elaborateness and intrusiveness, which is true. But they will
contribute little of any importance to what we need to know about the
chemical weapons threat in the world.
The CWC's verification regime stands on two legs. The first is
voluntary disclosure. Most of the regime is based on what the parties
voluntarily declare about their own holdings of chemical weapons,
manufacturing facilities, chemical stocks and the like. Virtually all
the inspections to be conducted under the CWC will be of so-called
``declared facilities''--that is, locations that each party will itself
declare to be subject to inspection. Routine inspections will focus
exclusively on ``declared facilities.'' Nearly all the large budget of
the new CWC organization based in the Hague will be allocated to
inspecting ``declared facilities'' and processing the parties'
voluntary declarations. Does anyone expect a country like Iran or China
or Russia to declare a facility at which it is planning to produce or
store illegal chemical weapons? The declarations and the inspections of
``declared facilities'' will yield our government little if anything of
value to augment what we already know from our own national means of
intelligence. Looking for chemical weapons at ``declared facilities''
brings to mind the joke about the drunk who looks for his keys under
the street lamp rather than some ways off, where he dropped them,
because there is more light under the lamp.
The CWC verification regime's second leg is challenge inspection--
that is, inspection of a facility that was not ``declared.'' This is
often talked of as if it were a tool for adding to our knowledge or for
finding violations. It is not. One cannot spot check a country the size
of Iran, much less China, by means of challenge inspections. The
purpose of challenge inspections is to try to embarrass a state that
one has, by other intelligence means, caught in a violation. So it is
incorrect to think that we will learn much of substantive value through
challenge inspections. Moreover, the CWC's challenge inspection
provisions were watered down in the negotiations to the point where
they are not even a useful tool for embarrassing cheaters. Parties will
easily be able, within the treaty's terms, to delay and otherwise
defeat the purposes of the challenge inspection provisions.
The issue of whether the CWC will produce a net gain for our
intelligence capabilities must be considered also in light of the harm
that will result from participation in the international inspection
program by unreliable states. As Secretary Schlesinger noted before
this committee yesterday, Iraq in the 1970's and 1980's learned a great
deal about how to conceal its nuclear weapons program through
participating in the inspection regime of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. When rogue states learn how to inspect, they learn how to
conceal. In this regard, I think it should disturb the Senate that the
Administration has taken steps to begin training CWC inspectors even
before the Senate has acted on the treaty. I understand that some
government agencies are resisting this effort. I urge this committee to
inquire into this.
Articles X and XI of the CWC have received a great deal of
attention, including at this committee's hearing yesterday with the
three former Secretaries of Defense--Rumsfeld, Schlesinger and
Weinberger--who opposed ratification. These provisions are a major part
of the reason that the CWC will do more harm than good. These
provisions will promote the spread of chemical defense and other
technology that will make it easier for states to develop a chemical
war fighting capability than if the CWC did not exist.
Article X obliges the parties to facilitate the exchange with the
other parties of chemical weapons defense material and technology. To
have an effective chemical war fighting capability, one must have
defense material and technology to protect one's own forces. Article X
will establish the right of Iran, for example, to obtain such items
from Germany, France, China or some other state. And it will establish
the right of the would-be sellers to provide such items to Iran. The
language of Article X is straightforward. Paragraph 3 says:
Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the
right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, material and scientific and technological
information concerning means of protection against chemical
weapons.
And Paragraph 6 says:
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the
right of States Parties to * * * provide assistance * * *
[where ``assistance'' is defined as ``delivery * * * of
protection against chemical weapons, including * * * detection
equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment * * *;
decontamination equipment * * *; medical antidotes * * *; and
advice on any of these protective measures].
As Richard Perle has pointed out, the CWC prohibits that part of a
chemical weapons capability that is easy for states to make for
themselves: the weapons themselves. The other part of that capability--
defense material and technology, which is relatively ``high tech'' and
difficult to acquire--is precisely what the treaty affirmatively
requires the parties to proliferate.
Similarly, Article XI prohibits--or at least expresses disapproval
of--export restrictions in the chemical field among treaty parties.
Unlike the language of Article X, that of Article XI is not completely
unqualified, so the Administration has been able to offer an
``interpretation'' that renders this provision meaningless, a legal
nullity. This allows Administration officials to assert that the United
States will maintain export controls on Iran and others notwithstanding
Article XI. Whether or not the Administration's interpretation is
valid, it is beside the point.
The real issue is not what the United States itself will export,
but what third countries will want to sell to the Irans of this world.
For export controls to be effective, they must have multilateral
support which is hard to organize. To return to the example above: If a
German or Chinese company will arrange to sell an advanced chemical
plant to Iran and the U.S. government protests that this would enhance
Iran's chemical weapons program, we can expect the German or Chinese
government to cite Article XI for the proposition that the sale is not
only permitted but required by the CWC, for Iran will be a treaty party
in good standing (or, in any event, a party against whom no violation
can be proved). There is precedent for such a colloquy. The Clinton
Administration protested against a Russian sale of a nuclear reactor to
Iran. The Russians replied by citing the provisions in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty--the ``atoms for peace'' section--on which CWC
Articles X and XI are modeled. This is why Fred Ikle has referred to
Articles X and XI as ``poisons for peace.''
Whatever one thinks of the CWC overall, no one can deny that it
would be a better (or less bad) treaty if the ``poisons for peace''
provisions were fixed. Though I think the Senate should reject the CWC
outright, some treaty critics would be willing to withdraw their
opposition if only the Senate would ensure that Articles X and XI are
properly amended before U.S. ratification. Such critics argue that, to
be minimally acceptable, the CWC should at least not undermine the very
interest--stemming chemical weapons proliferation--it aims to promote.
Administration officials counter with the argument that it would be
embarrassing for the United States, at this late stage, to insist that
the treaty be amended. They say this would destroy our diplomatic
credibility. While it would, to some extent, be embarrassing, it is
also embarrassing to ratify a treaty with provisions as perverse as
Articles X and XI. Also, the Clinton Administration could take comfort
from the fact that the error of agreeing to those provisions was
committed not by itself but by the Bush Administration.
As for our diplomats' credibility, the effect of forcing amendments
of Articles X and XI could be powerfully positive. If the
Administration's interpretations of those provisions are widely held,
then the amendments should not be unduly difficult to arrange. If they
are so difficult, this would confirm that the provisions are a problem
and the United States should not ratify until the problem is resolved.
If the Administration, as is likely, then succeeds in getting the
needed amendments, the influence of our diplomats would be enhanced.
The next time a multilateral forum proposes a treaty with a bizarre
provision adverse to our interests, our negotiators would be able to
declare credibly that that provision will preclude Senate approval of
the treaty. This will strengthen our hand.
A final point regarding deadlines. Many states of concern to us--
Syria, Libya, Iraq and North Korea--have not signed the CWC. Although
some such states--specifically Russia, China, Iran and Cuba--have
signed, none of these latter four has yet ratified. The Administration
insists that it is crucial that the United States ratify the CWC before
April 29, but if we do, we shall be the only state party that actually
has a significant chemical weapons capability.
April 29 is an artificial deadline. Any time the United States
might decide to become a party, it will, because of its military and
financial status, be afforded an appropriate position of influence in
the treaty organization. This is true because we are to pay 25 percent
of the total budget of this new organization. It is true also because
the other major states in this field are waiting for the United States
before they decide whether to ratify. If the Senate is ready to act
before April 29, then well and good. But the Senate should not, in my
opinion, hasten its deliberations simply to make a meaningless
deadline.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. That concludes the testimony.
Now, we have two or three Senators on this side coming
back. I think we had better limit ourselves in the first round
to 5 minutes, if that is satisfactory.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, is it possible to get a little
more? Five minutes is really very difficult to develop any
line.
The Chairman. Well, it will eat into the time of the
proponents of the treaty.
Senator Kerry. We have got all day.
Senator Biden. Admiral Zumwalt has to leave here at 4:30, I
am told. Maybe----
Senator Kerry. Well, I will go along with it, then.
The Chairman. All right. Let us try 5 minutes.
Dr. Ikle, I have a letter dated March 13 from the Aerospace
Industries Association. It states that a strong concern that
the CWC will, and I quote from the letter, ``unnecessarily
jeopardize our Nation's ability to protect its national
security information and proprietary technological data.''
Now, this treaty, as we know, will permit foreign
inspectors into thousands of U.S. businesses to poke around,
interview employees, take photographs, and take samples home
for analysis there. Now, given your assessment of the foreign
policy benefits of this treaty, if any, do you think it makes
sense to subject U.S. companies, private companies, to this
danger of the theft of millions of dollars in trade secrets?
Dr. Ikle. I like the way, Mr. Chairman, you put the
question--``given the benefits of the treaty.''
If the treaty was of major benefit, clearly verifiable in
other aspects and it enhanced arms control objectives, maybe
that was a risk we would want to take, that on occasion some
very clever disguised intelligence person, disguised as an
objective inspector, could pick up some valid information.
But that is not the case. The benefits of the treaty, even
as seen by the supporters, are not that strong, and from what
we have heard today, they are a negative. From what we have
heard so far among the witnesses today, what you can obtain by
samples that can be analyzed in a national laboratory back home
by instruments which can be carried with you, brought into the
places where chemicals are prepared for our sensitive weapons
systems, could be very, very significant.
I remember from my days in the Pentagon the briefings that
I received of analyses that our intelligence organization had
made in other places, and how much we learned from just
somebody walking through with the right little instrument in
his pocket. So that is very serious.
Incidentally, if I may insert here a further thought, as if
all of this was not bad enough, some supporters who want to
hasten the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
argue that it should be followed up then by a verification
scheme for biological weapons.
As Arms Control Director, I took the biological weapons
treaty before this committee. Senator Fulbright was sitting in
the chair at the time, and I explained right away that it was
not verifiable but it was a useful thing to have as a statement
of our opposition to biological weapons, and I do not regret
that. I think it is useful even now in Iraq, because it caught
Iraq violating the agreement that they had signed.
But if you want to follow that up with an inspection team
on biological weapons--many people in the bureaucracy are now
working on that, in this process that Richard Perle described
to Geneva and back here without ``adult supervision''--it is
ten times as dangerous, the things you can then steal from
these so-called onsite inspections to get really way ahead in
biological weapons. So it is dangerous here, and if you cannot
stop the follow on it will be really catastrophic.
The Chairman. I thank you, sir.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, you hear a lot of arguments that
nonratification of the CWC will mark the forfeiture of U.S.
leadership in the fight to eliminate chemical weapons from the
face of the Earth. That is almost a quote-unquote from voice
after voice after voice orchestrated by the White House. Do you
agree, or do you believe that the rest of the world will
continue to look to the United States with or without this
treaty?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, actually I think that
to the extent that the rest of the world looks to us for
leadership, and I think we sometimes exaggerate that leadership
in our own minds, I do not think it will be affected much by
what we do on this treaty; and I will tell you why.
The reason is that our reputation for leadership in the
military, scientific, and technological domain rests not only
on our clear undoubted excellence and long lead on other
nations, but also in our willingness to assume responsibility
for responding to dangerous challenges.
We have done this again and again, and I think we will
continue to offer that kind of leadership. Sometimes that
requires standing alone, or standing nearly alone and saying,
should we not consider what the implications of this are for
the spread of chemical weapons in the Middle East, North
Africa, and Europe?
I think that those nations that have a high regard for us
might even have a higher regard for us.
The Chairman. I think so, too. Senator Biden. My time is
up.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. In the interests of
time I am going to focus on only one issue, and I think we all
acknowledge that sometimes the more persuasive we make one of
our arguments against the treaty, the more irrelevant another
argument becomes.
For example, it is kind of interesting that I think
Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Mr. Perle have made very strong
arguments against universality of the treaty, because if they
are correct then the last person you want in this, Mr.
Chairman, is Korea and the other rogue nations, Iraq and Libya;
so I think it is a very compelling argument against
universality.
Mr. Feith makes a very compelling argument that one of the
reasons why verification does not work is because the Bush
administration responded to what Ronald Reagan wanted done, and
that was he wanted intrusive investigations that were
inspections that maybe would violate our Fourth Amendment, and
so we fixed the Fourth Amendment. There is no Fourth Amendment
problem here, notwithstanding what people assert, and I think
you would acknowledge that. You may not want to, but as a good
lawyer I believe you would have to. I know you looked at it.
So the administration fixed one piece and made the
inspections, the relevance of inspections that were challenge
inspections less relevant.
But let me focus on this notion that paragraph or Article X
is so bad. Let me tell you folks how I read it, and Mr. Perle,
I would like to direct this to you, but I will not limit it to
you, although I would like to get in one other question before
the light goes out.
As I read it, and I might point out, Mr. Feith, paragraph 6
is not affected--does not in any way limit paragraph 1.
Paragraph 6 refers to bilateral, not international regimes but
bilateral, and so the issue here is whether or not we are going
to contribute to, in effect, this fund. We are going to put in
this information that can be disbursed by this international
organization.
All paragraph 6 is about is saying that if we want to keep
our deal going with NATO, if we want to keep our deal going
with our allies, we can do that.
But as I see this, multilateral is the only way to limit
these chemical weapons, yet paragraph 6 on Article X refers to
bilateral. Paragraph 1, which defines assistance, I believe
trumps paragraph 3, but ultimately paragraph 1's definition
lies in paragraph 7. It defines what international assistance
is. That is where it is defined.
Within that, it says that international assistance is the
following, that you can provide assistance, and to this end
elect--elect one or more of the following so there is no
requirement, as I read Article X, and as constitutional
scholars I have spoken to--and this is not a constitutional
issue, but legal scholars I have spoken to, there is no
requirement of the United States to throw anything into the pot
but what it decides it wishes to throw in, and to that end,
Senator Helms and I have been negotiating conditions, which
leads to my question.
A condition that says--let me get it here--that requires
the United States--requires the United States not to contribute
to the voluntary fund for chemical defense assistance anything
other than certain medical antidotes and treatment, which is
what is listed in paragraph 1, so if we are not in the treaty,
the point you made still pertains. If England or if France or
if anyone else is going to transfer this technology to Iran,
they are going to do it whether we are in it or not.
If we are in the treaty, we are not obliged to do that, and
to clarify that--at least I am, and I assume the Chairman still
is--willing to attach a condition to the treaty defining our
interpretation of Article X and limiting what can or cannot be
transferred to what is mentioned, medical antidotes and
treatments.
I am not asking you to accept it. I would just like your
view, Mr. Perle, whether that would--assume the worst from your
perspective, that the treaty passes. Is it better to have that,
and if it is, how much better is it?
Mr. Perle. I do think, Senator, that paragraph 3, which
describes the undertaking, is not qualified by the elaboration
of the various means in paragraph 7. I do not think that was
ever the intention.
It will, I am sure, not surprise you to know that in the
course of negotiation at one time paragraph 3 read, ``each
State Party guarantees to facilitate.''
The United States thought that was too much, and maybe
others did as well, so we ended up compromising on
``undertakes,'' as though--the point, in objecting to
``guarantee,'' the American representative made it very clear
that he did not think he could fall back on the interpretation
you have just offered of paragraph 7 to limit the extent of the
undertaking.
Senator Biden. My time is up. I would disagree with that. I
would argue statutory interpretation, the specific controls the
general. The specifics in paragraph 7, the legal judgments I
have gotten comport with this.
Mr. Perle. Senator, if I could just answer the question
with a kind of question, if we could fix this treaty, I mean, I
am sure that you would agree that the cleanest solution would
be to eliminate the whole of Article X. Why not do that?
Senator Biden. I think the cleanest solution would be to
limit our participation in the treaty to define this the way in
which we intended, or at least we intended here; because I
think to go back and renegotiate an entire treaty, we are
another 10 years down the road, but we can fix it by doing this
in my view.
Mr. Perle. But if it means what you say it means, and other
parties to the treaty understand that, then it seems to me it
would be a breeze to change it.
The Chairman. Because of this point, I am going to allow
you about 45 seconds, which I will take off my time.
Mr. Feith. I appreciate that, Senator. I would just say,
Senator Biden, if everybody in the Senate devoted the kind of
meticulous attention to the words that you have done, I am
confident that there would be a much greater understanding and
much less support for the treaty.
I do compliment you on paying close attention. This treaty
looks worse when you look at it closely, so I very much applaud
your careful attention.
Senator Biden. Now, that is a nice smart-ass comment.
Mr. Feith. When you said that if we are out of the
agreement we will not be bound, and the Germans or the British
will be participating under the terms of this article, that is
true.
If, on the other hand, the United States made clear that
the condition for our coming into the treaty is fixing this
provision, without which, I think we can all agree the treaty
would be better off--the fact that you have to do so elaborate
an interpretation makes it clear that we will have difficulties
when we go to other countries. Even if we could persuade
ourselves of your interpretation, on which reasonable people
can differ, when we go to persuade other countries, that is the
nub of the issue: going to Germany or China or whoever and
trying to get their cooperation on export controls----
Senator Biden. No, that is not is how it is happening here.
Mr. Feith [continuing]. We are going to have great
difficulty. The treaty would be better off without this
provision complicating things.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I wish to thank
the panelists. You have provided an awful lot of very
significant insight, and I, as well as all of my colleagues, am
grateful, and thank you.
I am going to help my friend Senator Biden here, because I
am going to follow along that path that he has taken. Is this,
in your opinion--and I would like to hear from each of you--a
treaty, a convention that is one that you can rehabilitate? Is
it one that you think we can still work on and, if it is, what
do we do? Do we eliminate X and XI, amend it? If we were able
to amend X and XI, would that satisfy the four of you?
Each of you, I would like to have each of you, if you
would, respond. Ambassador.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think it would be very
significantly improved. I believe that the composition of the
governing board requires attention as well.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Perle. Senator, I could support this treaty without any
great expectations of its efficacy if we corrected the problem
in Article X and Article XI, and I think that can be done. It
took 10 years to produce this treaty with this serious flaw in
it. I think it would take a great deal less time to eliminate
the flaw. Nothing else would have to be renegotiated, only this
one provision.
Senator Hagel. In your opinion. Thank you. Sir.
Dr. Ikle. I would agree that it would eliminate the damage
to the down side. It would not make it into a great
accomplishment, and it would still have some flaws on the
intelligence collection; but it would be much less damaging, so
that on balance maybe it could be passed, if it is really
amended, Article X.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Feith. In my view, the treaty is a net loss from the
national security point of view, in any event. I believe that
the country would be better off if the Senate rejected the
treaty and sent everybody back to the drawing board and did
something constructive in this field.
But one of the key questions is: How much of a net loss? I
agree with all of my colleagues that the treaty would be far
less bad if Articles X and XI were duly amended.
Senator Hagel. So there we are, Mr. Chairman. We figured it
out, and I will yield my time back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Very good. He is a breath of fresh air in the
Senate, I will tell you that.
I am going to suggest that the Senator have 8 minutes to
sort of compensate for whatever has run over with time.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. With my
voice, I may need it.
Welcome back to the panel. Let me, if I can, follow up on
the question from Senator Hagel. Mr. Perle, I understand, then,
from your answer to Senator Hagel that your chief, your
principal objection to it resides in the transfer of
technological scientific information, Article X, section 3, and
then in Article XI, the entire question of technical
information with respect to chemical, general chemical
development, is that correct?
Mr. Perle. Yes, although it is not just section 3 of
Article X. It is really the whole of Article X.
Senator Kerry. Well, let me ask you why--and I am having
difficulty with this, but I am trying to keep open-minded about
it. Reading Article I, which as you, I am sure, will agree, is
the heart of this treaty and the overpowering article, it says
that each party to the convention undertakes never under any
circumstances--and I presume you will agree that any
circumstances mean, under any circumstances, so that when you
go to Article XI, or X, you are clearly defining within the
context of Article I under any circumstance no party can ever
transfer directly or indirectly chemical weapons to anyone.
Therefore, all of Article XI with respect to development of
any kind of chemical is clearly interpreted by the directly or
indirectly clause of I.
Second, it says that you can never undertake under any
circumstances to develop or produce or otherwise acquire,
stockpile, retain, to assist, encourage or induce anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited under this convention.
Now, I do not think any lawyer sitting here has any problem
with that language, do we? Is there any confusion as to what is
prohibited here?
Mr. Perle. Senator, the problem is that until a State Party
to the convention is found to have violated the convention by
engaging in the production of chemical weapons----
Senator Kerry. Precisely.
Mr. Perle [continuing]. There is no basis upon which you
could presume that Article I would permit you to avoid the
undertaking of Article X or the promise of Article XI.
Senator Kerry. Now, let us get to that. Now we are sort of
going down the road.
So therefore, under any circumstances, the only way we will
ever be able to do anything about Article I or any of the
others is to know what is going on.
Mr. Perle. No, not to know what is going on. There is a
very big difference between knowing what is going on and
proving through the mechanisms of the institution that a
violation has taken place.
Senator Kerry. Right, but that is ultimately how you know.
You prove it. You prove it through the challenge process,
through the inspection process.
Mr. Perle. No, I do not think you will ever prove anything
through the inspection process.
Senator Kerry. So no verification process----
Mr. Perle. Could I just say one thing?
Senator Kerry. Let me just ask you, are you saying that no
verification process whatsoever would therefore be sufficient?
Mr. Perle. I am saying you cannot verify the production of
chemical weapons, because any plant that can be used for the
production of permitted chemicals can also be used for the
production of chemical weapons. There is a problem here.
Senator Kerry. I understand that, and that can happen
today, without the treaty.
Mr. Perle. In 1997 a country that is not violating the
agreement, and which is therefore entitled to all the benefits
of Article X and XI, may exploit those benefits, invite
international companies in to buildup their chemical industry
as perfectly proper and perfectly legal, invite, solicit,
receive cooperation in the development of the full range of
defensive measures, and then, having accomplished all of that,
violate Article I and some other point.
Senator Kerry. But isn't the problem, can't they do that
now anyway?
Mr. Perle. Can they induce others to?
Senator Kerry. They could invite anybody or induce anybody
or pay anybody to do whatever they want today.
Mr. Perle. The difference is the following. Let us take
China and Pakistan as an example. The Germans complain that
they are too frequently identified in this regard. The German
industry is very aggressive in this regard, but set that aside,
and take China and Pakistan.
If China today engages in the sharing of chemical defensive
technology with Pakistan, you can be sure that an American
administration that is doing its job is going to be in Beijing
remonstrating with the Chinese and saying, we think this is a
very dangerous thing to do.
Senator Kerry. But let me stop you there if I can for a
minute.
Mr. Perle. But suppose there was a treaty that says they
must do it?
Senator Kerry. I understand. Well, no. What it says is,
they shall have the right to participate in the fullest
possible exchange.
Mr. Perle. Right.
Senator Kerry. Now, possible is what is right and
appropriate under Article I, which means----
Mr. Perle. No, no. No, no. But there will have been no
finding in the case of Pakistan, Senator. Pakistan is a
legitimate recipient of assistance until Pakistan is found to
have violated the agreement.
Senator Kerry. Correct, but it is only as to defense,
number 1, that they have a right to request anything.
Mr. Perle. Well, both with respect to defensive, and with
respect to commerce and chemicals.
Senator Kerry. Defensive with respect to chemical weapons,
and generically with respect to the development of a chemical.
Mr. Perle. But the defense is the tough part. That is what
is hard to do.
Senator Kerry. But let me ask you, you were in the
administration that offered to give the Russians Star Wars once
we developed it. I mean, you were going to turn over the entire
defense to them once we put it together. That was your plan.
Mr. Perle. There is an important difference here.
Senator Kerry. Which is?
Mr. Perle. Which is that the defense in this case, the
ability to operate in the presence of chemical weapons, is what
makes the offensive capability possible.
Senator Kerry. But that is exactly the same thing.
Mr. Perle. No, it is not. The sharing of defenses in the
earlier context was intended to permit both sides to eliminate
the offensive capability.
Senator Kerry. Correct.
Mr. Perle. Not to make it feasible. It is exactly the
opposite.
Senator Kerry. I would disagree. If you are sharing a
defensive capacity--I mean, Caspar Weinberger yesterday used a
good example. If you have developed a foolproof gas mask, and
you transfer the foolproof gas mask to another country, the
likelihood, if you both have a foolproof gas mask, of either of
you successfully using chemical weapons against each other is
zero if it is foolproof, so the likelihood--I mean, you are not
going to factor it into your military strategy. That was the
same strategy in Star Wars.
Mr. Perle. Well, we do not have chemical weapons, Senator,
and we will not, so a foolproof gas mask--let me just put it
this way. I would not worry if we had a foolproof gas mask, but
I would certainly worry if Iran or Iraq or Libya had a
foolproof gas mask, even if we also had one.
Senator Kerry. But you see, you have already suggested that
we are better off getting rid of our chemical weapons
altogether, without any inspection regimen. Now, that is very
hard for me to follow.
Mr. Perle. Because I do not think they are militarily
useful.
Senator Kerry. Well, if they are not militarily useful,
then you do not worry about what they have in terms of
defensive capacity. You are going to deter it with nuclear
weapons. We did not have any problem deterring Iraq, did we,
during that war. It seems to me that there is a cold war
philosophy going on here that you have got to have a
technological edge, and you have to keep having the edge rather
than struggling to go into a state of neutrality.
Mr. Perle. I take very seriously what Jeane said, that
chemical weapons are regarded in much of the Third World as the
poor man's equivalent of nuclear weapons, and there is a lot of
pressure to acquire these chemicals.
We want to discourage that, and we want to discourage it in
every possible way, and one way to discourage it is to make
sure that the thing that is most difficult for a country
desiring chemical weapons to accomplish, which is the
acquisition of a defense, is made more difficult and not less
difficult, and any treaty that promises to share that
technology is just headed in the wrong direction. Why don't we
fix it?
The Chairman. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
want to thank the witnesses, because I think their testimony
has really been very thought-provoking. I have been a proponent
of the treaty, and I must say you have encouraged me to look at
it in a very different way.
I have read and reread Article X now about eight different
times.
But Mr. Perle, you make an interesting theorem, and that is
that the effectiveness of any policy here is the defense, and
if you can defend against it you create a spiral. I mean, you
succeed.
Do you have any information that the administration might
have agreed to this section on a case-by-case basis?
Mr. Perle. I am not sure I understand what you mean.
Senator Feinstein. In other words, that this section would
only be carried out provided they, the United States, had the
right to reject a request.
Mr. Perle. No, I have no information to that effect. I
think it is our intention not to honor the undertaking. I mean,
I would prefer that when we undertake to treaties----
Senator Feinstein. You mean, to guarantee to undertake and
then not honor--in other words, not carry out that section?
Mr. Perle. I think we intend not to carry out what is a
clear obligation.
Senator Feinstein. That is No. 3.
Mr. Perle. If we are burdened with this treaty then I, too,
would be in favor of not honoring that commitment, because it
would be a foolish thing to do.
Senator Feinstein. Because I think you made a good
argument. Why is Article X in there? Obviously, if somebody has
an offensive use of a chemical weapon against them, I think the
legitimate nations of this world are going to respond and try
to be helpful as much as possible. I wonder why it is necessary
to have this in it at all, in terms of the integrity of the
treaty.
Mr. Perle. I believe it is not, and more to the point, if
you will allow me to say this, I think that if you came to the
conclusion that it should not be there, and two or three of
your colleagues joined you, we can get it out of there.
Senator Feinstein. May I then go on, and thank you very
much, to what Ambassador Kirkpatrick mentioned on the
composition of the governing bodies. You mentioned that. That
was the other concern that you had. What changes do you think
are merited in the composition?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Feinstein, what concerns me
with this governing body and comparable ones is the
preponderance on the governing body of countries lacking in the
technological sophistication and technological experience to
make really well-informed judgments about handling these
materials. That is what concerns me.
I just do not think that the quality of the decisions will
be nearly as reliable as they could be. They are dangerous in
any case. We all agree that this is a dangerous subject, and
any decisions dealing with it are going to be imperfect and
leave some danger. But the more the board that makes the
decisions knows, the more experience they have, the more
detailed technological sophistication they have, the better
their decisions will be. That is what concerns me about it.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether this is possible or
not, but I would very much like to have an administration
response to the arguments made on Article X. I think the points
made here are very good points. I wonder why Article X is
really necessary.
Senator Biden. I would be happy to give them to you. They
have responded officially and on the record. I would be happy
to make sure you get them.
Senator Feinstein. All right. That is a major concern to
me. I just make that point.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank you, Senator Feinstein.
Lady and gentlemen, thank you so much for coming.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you dismiss this panel,
could I have 30 seconds to try to clarify one point, if I may?
The Chairman. Thirty seconds.
Senator Biden. First of all, I think Article X--I disagree
with the reading, but even if your reading is correct, I think
it can be cleared up by a condition.
But, Mr. Perle, you talked about the real world. The real
world is Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi, or any of the rogue states.
They are not going to worry about protecting their troops
before they use chemical weapons. Nothing in their modus
operandi would suggest that would even be a consideration for
whether or not they would use chemical weapons, if they were
going to use it, I would respectfully suggest.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, could I have 20 seconds? I
just want to clarify one point with Mr. Perle.
The Chairman. It is your time, 20 seconds. Go.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, sir.
I just wanted to clarify with Secretary Perle that it is my
understanding that nothing in the convention requires the
finding of a treaty violation before Article I applies to that
particular country. I think, in your answer to me, you were
suggesting you had to first find the violation. I do not
believe you do.
Mr. Perle. In the illustration that I offered before, where
the Chinese might be building a facility for Pakistan, I do not
mean--I just chose Pakistan at random.
Senator Kerry. I am not even picking those countries. I
just mean generically.
Mr. Perle. But any country pair. I do not see on what
basis, Senator, we could prevail over the words and the
obligations and the undertakings of the treaty itself if there
had been no finding of a violation. Otherwise, you are saying,
anybody can do whatever anybody wishes.
Senator Kerry. Well, in effect----
The Chairman. No, wait a minute, 20 seconds.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I think this is important to
note.
The Chairman. All of them are important, including the next
panel.
Senator Kerry. In effect, in this treaty, you can.
The Chairman. Come on, Senator, I gave you more time than
anybody else had.
Senator Kerry. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. But I am
not trying to abuse it. I just think the record is important
here.
Mr. Perle. I will be glad to call you after the hearing.
Senator Kerry. There is a withdrawal capacity for national
interest here. Any time we see the national interest, you have
got 90 days to get out of this.
Mr. Perle. Oh, yes, we can always get out of this treaty.
But that is not going to solve any of the problems we are
concerned about.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen and lady. We appreciate
your coming so much.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The next panel consists of three friends of
all of us. They have been around this place for a while.
As I was saying, this panel not only consists of Americans
who are well known, but they are friends of every one of us on
the committee. General Scowcroft, I have known him ever since I
came to this city, and that was a while ago. He is now
President of the Forum for International Policy. He is former
National Security Policy Advisor. Admiral Zumwalt is a member
of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and he
is former Chief of Naval Operations. Ed Rowny. He is the very
Hon. Ed Rowny, my neighbor, former Ambassador, and Lieutenant
General, U.S. Army, retired, International Negotiation
Consultant, former Chief Negotiator for START I, and Special
Arms Control Advisor, Washington, D.C.
Now, I am going to have to depart for another meeting I
cannot get out of, and Senator Hagel said that he would take
the gavel for me. I have one question, if I may, out of order.
That would be for Admiral Zumwalt.
Sir, Article X has been criticized, because it promotes the
spread of CW defense technology. Article XI has been
criticized, because it tends to undermine multilateral export
controls among treaty parties in the chemical field. Even
regarding untrustworthy states like Iran, are the concerns
about Article X and XI sensible? In other words, is it
sensible, sir, to concern ourselves with whether Iran might
more easily get CW defense or other technology as a result of
these Articles? Would the United States of America be better
off if Articles X and XI are fixed before the CWC is ratified?
Three questions.
Admiral Zumwalt. It is a fair question to raise in
connection with Articles X and XI, in my judgment. The answer,
in my judgment, is that non-ratification to seek a modification
at this time would, in essence, delay the participation of the
United States, in the mechanism that is being set up for a very
large number of years, and that the organization created by
those that have ratified it in sufficient numbers would operate
with all of the advantages and disadvantages the critics on
either side are citing.
I believe that we would be better off to ratify the treaty
and to work from within the system, with the considerable
powers we bring, both financial and political, to make any
modifications over time than we would to let this new treaty
regime operate without the insider influence of the U.S.
Government.
The Chairman. Very well.
Now Senator Hagel is going to take the chair and the gavel.
Why do not you, since you are under time constraints, go with
your statement first, sir, followed by Ed Rowny and Mr.
Scowcroft.
Senator Biden. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
accommodating this panel. I appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF E.R. ZUMWALT, JR., ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES NAVY
(RETIRED), MEMBER, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
BOARD
Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since I was notified, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, just yesterday of the requirement to be here, I
would submit for the record an article I have written and a
letter which I co-authored, which state the positions I have
taken on this treaty. I, of course, recommend that it be
ratified.
I found myself disappointed to have to be at crosshairs
with the distinguished panel that just preceded he me, because
they are all good friends of mine; but I take issue with a
number of things that were said.
First, with regard to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, I
was a part of the group that analyzed the capabilities of the
nations of the world to acquire nuclear weapons before the
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty was considered. We estimated that
there were somewhere between 20 and 30 nations, within a period
of 10 years, that would have the nuclear capability. In my
judgment, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty has, without a
question of a doubt, slowed down the rate of acquisition of
nuclear weapons.
It was not a perfect treaty. It could have been made more
perfect if it could have been negotiated, but it was not
negotiable in any other form. It has accomplished its mission
far better than no regime would have permitted it be
accomplished. I think the same thing can be said with regard to
this Chemical Weapons Convention.
We hear that it is a disadvantage that we will not get the
rogue nations in. The rogue nations will not come in whether or
not the United States ratifies it. It will make no difference
whatsoever with regard to the situation in the world whether or
not we ratify insofar as the rogue nations are concerned. It
has been said that because they would not come in, the treaty
is therefore useless.
In my judgment, the international regime that the treaty
gives us--the ability to sanction the rogue nations that do not
come in--is not there without U.S. membership and thus
effective U.S. influence as it is for those like Iran who do
come in. But the conventional sanctions that we are capable of
bringing about in other ways are still there for us to operate.
In other words, insofar as those who do not come in are
concerned, I think this treaty, ratification or not, is
irrelevant.
With regard to the Article X issue, I think it has been
quite clear, both based on what lawyers have told us and what
Mr. Berger for the administration has told us, that the
undertaking to facilitate does not obligate the United States
to do more than has been discussed here; namely, to provide, if
it chooses to do so, the kind of help that would not in any way
harm us.
The ability for us to get more access is an important thing
to me as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. I have just finished service on a subcommittee
of that group, which has examined our ability to gain the
appropriate intelligence in the BW field and the CW field and
in the nuclear field. I can tell you that we need to improve it
and that, however less than perfect it might be, the
opportunity to inspect is going to give us additional
information which can be cross-compared with what we get
through other sources in the intelligence community. It will,
without a doubt, enhance our ability to know more about what is
going on.
That, coupled with the fact that we have an international
regime, if we ratify the treaty, to work within, the fact that
the treaty will cause, at the very least, the disposition of
masses of volumes of poisonous substances-- after all the
nations who are ratifying it will be obligated to eliminate
their volume--make it less available for the terrorists groups
and for the rogue nations to get, in one way or another.
I worry about a decision to reject. I worry about a
decision to qualify in a way that does not provide formal
ratification. I think that the logical course for the United
States, now that we have reached this point, with a treaty that
is going to come into effect whether or not we ratify it, is
that we are better off to work within the system, use our
financial powers and our political powers to seek the
modifications that are necessary and to pick up the advantages
that are there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to by Admiral Zumwalt follows:]
Washington Post,
January 6, 1997.
A Needless Risk for U.S. Troops
[by E. R. Zumwalt Jr.]
It has been more than 80 years since poison gas was first used in
modern warfare--in April 1915 during the first year of World War I. It
is long past time to do something about such weapons.
I am not a dove. As a young naval officer in 1945, I supported the
use of nuclear weapons against Japan. As chief of naval operations two
decades ago, I pressed for substantially higher military spending than
the nation's political leadership was willing to grant. After retiring
from the Navy, I helped lead the opposition to the SALT II treaty
because I was convinced it would give the Soviet Union a strategic
advantage.
Now the Senate is considering whether to approve the Chemical
Weapons Convention. This is a worldwide treaty, negotiated by the
Reagan administration and signed by the Bush administration. It bans
the development, production, possession, transfer and use of chemical
weapons. Senate opposition to ratification is led by some with whom I
often agree. But in this case, I believe they do a grave disservice to
America's men and women in uniform.
To a Third World leader indifferent to the health of his own troops
and seeking to cause large-scale pain and death for its own sake,
chemical weapons have a certain attraction. They don't require the
advanced technology needed to build nuclear weapons. Nor do they
require the educated populace needed to create a modern conventional
military. But they cannot give an inferior force a war-winning
capability. In the Persian Gulf war, the threat of our uncompromising
retaliation with conventional weapons deterred Saddam Hussein from
using his chemical arsenal against us.
Next time, our adversary may be more berserk than Saddam; and
deterrence may fail. If that happens, our retaliation will be decisive,
devastating--and no help to the young American men and women coming
home dead or bearing grievous chemical injuries. What will help is a
treaty removing huge quantities of chemical weapons that could
otherwise be used against us.
Militarily, this treaty will make us stronger. During the Bush
administration, our nation's military and political leadership decided
to retire our chemical weapons. This wise move was not made because of
treaties. Rather, it was based on the fact that chemical weapons are
not useful for us.
Politically and diplomatically, the barriers against their use by a
First World country are massive. Militarily they are risky and
unpredictable to use, difficult and dangerous to store. They serve no
purpose that can't be met by our overwhelming conventional forces.
So the United States has no deployed chemical weapons today and
will have none in the future. But the same is not true of our potential
adversaries. More than a score of nations now seek or possess chemical
weapons. Some are rogue states with which we may someday clash.
This treaty is entirely about eliminating other people's weapons--
weapons that may someday be used against Americans. For the American
military, U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is high
gain and low or no pain. In that light, I find it astonishing that any
American opposes ratification.
Opponents argue that the treaty isn't perfect: Verification isn't
absolute, forms must be filled out, not every nation will join at first
and so forth. This is unpersuasive. Nothing in the real world is
perfect. If the U.S. Navy had refused to buy any weapon unless it
worked perfectly every time, we would have bought nothing and now would
be disarmed. The question is not how a treaty compares with perfection.
The question is how U.S. ratification compares with its absence.
If we refuse to ratify, some governments will use our refusal as an
excuse to keep their chemical weapons. Worldwide availability of
chemical weapons will be higher, and we will know less about other
countries' chemical activities. The diplomatic credibility of our
threat of retaliation against anyone who uses chemical weapons on our
troops will be undermined by our lack of ``clean hands.'' At the bottom
line, our failure to ratify will substantially increase the risk of a
chemical attack against American service personnel.
If such an attack occurs, the news reports of its victims in our
military hospitals will of course produce rapid ratification of the
treaty and rapid replacement of Senators who enabled the horror by
opposing ratification. But for the victims it will be too late.
Every man and woman who puts on a U.S. military uniform faces
possible injury or death in the national interest. They don't complain;
risk is part of their job description. But it is part of the job
description of every U.S. Senator to see that this risk not be
increased.
[See page 25 for the letter to which Admiral Zumwalt
referred.]
Senator Hagel [presiding]: Admiral Zumwalt, thank you very
much.
In the interest of time, what Senator Biden and I have
agreed to do, if it is OK with your fellow panelists, is get
the last 15 minutes we have with you, Admiral, with questions.
So, with that, the Chairman had a question and I would turn to
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I understand the Admiral has a 4:30 plane,
if you guys do not mind. I will be very brief.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, did not the Nonproliferation Treaty regime help us
mobilize the world reaction to North Korea's violations?
Admiral Zumwalt. In my judgment, it did; yes, sir.
Senator Biden. And would we have been able to make a
credible threat of international sanctions had there been no
such treaty?
Admiral Zumwalt. Clearly the regime, the NPT, made that
more feasible and more effective.
Senator Biden. And did not that point you are making about
the CWC, that, at least at a minimum, it establishes a norm
against which, when violations are clear, we can mobilize world
opinion and justify actions we would likely take that we might
not be able to justify in world opinion?
Admiral Zumwalt. Absolutely. It is a less than perfect
step, but far better than the present system.
Senator Biden. In the interest of time, obviously, this is
going to be somewhat more of a statement than a question. I
think you have made five very valid points. That is, as I
translate them, everything the critics say is wrong with this
treaty would be worse if you did not have the treaty.
Everything that is wrong with the treaty would be worse if you
did not have the treaty.
The last point that you made, which you referenced, is
political power. As it relates to Article X and Article XI,
even if my interpretation is wrong, which I believe it is not--
and most legal scholars do not believe it is either--but even
if it is wrong, the place in which we are going to be able to
impact on whether or not another nation transfers technology, a
defensive technology, to a rogue state will not be through a
treaty provision, it will be through our economic power. We
just flat say to Germany and Britain and France and the rest--
we will either say it or we will not--we will either say, if
you do, you have got a problem, and here is the problem, let me
define it for you.
I know that Brent Scowcroft met with his counterparts in
Germany, France, England, and Italy, and every other country in
the world, when they were engaged in things that we might have
had questions about. So the point you make, I think, should not
be missed. Our significant political, military, and economic
power with nations that have the capability of transferring
technology is what is going to determine whether they transfer
technology.
The last point I would make is, the Australia Group, I
think they all--and there are 26 of them who have ratified--
they all believe that Article XI in no way, in no way, impedes
the organizational structure of the Australia Group and the
commitment they have made to one another.
Anyway, there is more to say, but I thank you for being
here, and especially for the notice. I jerked you all around,
because we were unable to get a commitment as to when. I
apologize. But I thank you for being here.
Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you.
If it is appropriate and OK, what I would like to do, we
have got 10 minutes left, maybe we could break it down into 3-
minute pieces. That way we give our three colleagues an
opportunity to each ask a question.
Senator Frist.
Senator Frist. Admiral, thank you for being here today. In
the interest of time I have just one question regarding the
countries who have not signed on, the so-called rogue nations,
whether it be Syria or Iraq or North Korea or Libya. If we did
not sign on or if we do sign on, either way, how do you see
this treaty really impacting those particular nations?
Admiral Zumwalt. I think, with or without the treaty, we
can continue to impose sanctions on those rogue nations who
have not come in. With the treaty, we can clearly impose
sanctions on them if they do not respond to our right to
inspect. So it seems to me that we lose nothing and gain
something by the ratification. The fact that that regime exists
as of April 29th, whether or not we are in it, means that we
are foregoing a great opportunity to shape for the better a
regime that does exist. We cannot stop that existence.
Senator Frist. And by our not participating but still
having the regime there, say once again how our presence is
going to affect those nations.
Admiral Zumwalt. Well, the Chairman of this committee, in
my judgment, has done a good job of shaping up the United
Nations by withholding funds. The same thing can be done, or
the other means of asserting political power can be used,
working within the organization, while having the influence of
being a member.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
Admiral, welcome. What do you think would be the impact
with respect to Russia and their potential participation if we
do not ratify?
Admiral Zumwalt. I believe that Russia is likelier to come
in if we ratify than if we do not--far likelier. I believe that
we can continue to use all the same kind of methods that we
have used to shape up, if I may use that expression, the
Russians to date, by helping and withholding.
Senator Kerry. Do you, in reading either Article XI or
Article X, do you perceive any overt or discernible conflict or
do you have to search for the conflict that has been described
with respect to Article X and the rights and fundamental
obligations of this treaty?
Admiral Zumwalt. If I understand the points they have made,
I do not--I think there is a consensus on both sides that we do
not find ourselves forced, if we ratify, to do anything that is
harmful to us. The issue is then, what about the other members
of the regime? I repeat again, they are in that regime whether
or not we ratify. So that their conduct is something that we
will have more opportunity to influence from within than from
without.
Senator Kerry. Now, Admiral, you were Chief of Naval
Operations and have had a remarkable career, in charge of our
young people in harm's way. I think that you--and General
Scowcroft likewise, and I will come to him later with this
question--but based on your military career and the
responsibilities that you have had to exercise, in your
judgment, are our military forces and our young people in
uniform better off with this treaty or without?
Admiral Zumwalt. In my judgment, as I say in the documents
that I will submit for the record, they are better off with us
within the treaty than they are without. I believe that it
would be a disservice to our men and women in uniform if we
stay outside this regime, which in any event is going to come
into existence on April 29.
Senator Kerry. And the principal reason in shorthand for
that is?
Admiral Zumwalt. That we have the ability better to
influence from within than from without. Pluses and minuses
notwithstanding, the regime exists as of April 29th.
I might also add, Senator, that you used to take orders a
lot better than you do now.
Senator Kerry. Well, I was elected not to take orders.
Thank you. I share with my colleagues that the Admiral was
my commanding officer when I was in Vietnam; yes, he was. I had
the privilege of having him pin my Silver Star on my chest at a
beach in Vietnam. So it is nice to have him here.
Admiral Zumwalt. For a very well deserved act of courage.
Senator Hagel. Senator, for that, you get an extra couple
of minutes.
Senator Kerry. For that, I have learned not to take them.
Senator Hagel. I was going to say, your life is a lot
easier right now, Senator. Seriously, if you would have any
questions, we have a little extra time.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, welcome.
Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. I wanted to go back again to I think the
central point that Mr. Perle made, which was developing a
defense against chemical weapons is perhaps the greatest
incentive to the development of chemical weapons, in the sense
that if you can defend against them adequately, it creates
perhaps an incentive to be able to use them--and particularly,
I guess, with the mentality that might use these horrible
things. Do you agree with that theory?
Admiral Zumwalt. The regime makes it possible for defenses
to be improved. That is unassailable. One has to make a
judgment about the tradeoff between what that accomplishes for
the good of the majority of the nations involved, versus what
opportunities it gives the bad guys to take advantage of it.
The fact that we have created an international regime that
gives us at least some opportunity to provide sanctions, some
opportunity to provide a regime of international law, makes me
feel that, on balance, we are better off to go ahead and take
the----
Senator Feinstein. If you would permit me, the good guys
really do not need this. Because the good guys are not going to
use the chemical weapons. The good guys are going to respond to
a neighbor in need like that and help. It is really the bad
guys that you have got to deal with. My experience is, with the
bad guys, they are going to use this kind of thing for every
conceivable edge they can get. Therefore, why help them?
Admiral Zumwalt. Well, Senator, let us take Iran as an
example. I think we both agree that they are a bad guy. Iran is
going to be within the regime. Based on my experience on the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, I would rather
get the advantage of being able to demand the inspections that
we get from this regime than I would to worry about the rather
exotic strategy that my brilliant friend Richard Perle
suggested they would follow. I think that the fact that we
would have the pressure of public opinion, the opportunity to
use political power, and so forth, would more restrain Iran
that otherwise would be the case.
Senator Feinstein. All right. Then take that example. Iran
has an illegal insecticide plant or any kind of a manufacturing
plant. Somewhere within this plant there is some capacity to
make or combine or to produce a chemical weapon in some way.
That is not necessarily going to be found on an inspection. It
probably will not be.
Admiral Zumwalt. There is some probability that it will not
be found. There is some probability that it will be. Coupled
with other intelligence capabilities, which are constantly
improving, I think we can increase that probability over time.
Therefore, I would rather be within the regime than without. I
think we gain more than we lose. I do not trust Iran at all,
but I think that there will be more restraint on them if we are
within the regime and operating it in a vigorous way.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
Admiral Zumwalt, thank you very, very much for taking the
time.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Admiral. I appreciate
it.
Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you, sir. Thank you for
accommodating my schedule.
Senator Hagel. I hope you are on your way to somewhere
exotic.
Admiral Zumwalt. I made a promise to a granddaughter.
Senator Hagel. Oh, wonderful. General Rowny, welcome.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD L. ROWNY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. ARMY
(RETIRED), INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION CONSULTANT
Ambassador Rowny. Thank you, sir.
Before I start, I would like thank the Chairman, Senator
Helms, who is my neighbor and good friend, who stood by me when
I resigned from SALT II in protest over that flawed treaty. I
think we got a good subsequent treaty as a result of turning
down SALT II. I have him to thank for that.
I also have tremendous respect for the minority leader
here, Senator Biden, who attended to our negotiations in
Geneva. While we did not always agree, he was always thoughtful
and fair and never ad hominem. We had a great deal of respect
for him.
Senator Biden. Thank you, General.
Ambassador Rowny. Rather than read my prepared statement,
which I would like to put into the record, perhaps I could save
some time by just hitting some of the high points.
I will ad lib however. I would like to have my written
statement put into the record.
Senator Hagel. It will be, without objection.
Ambassador Rowny. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, initially I was opposed to this treaty. I was
opposed to it, because I didn't think it was verifiable. I
didn't like the provisions about the inability to use tear gas
in combat. I didn't like Article X and particularly paragraph 3
of Article X. Most importantly, I felt that this treaty might
lull us into a false sense of security and fail to provide
protection for our troops.
But after listening to various debates and following the
fascinating evolvement of the 30 conditions, 22 of which have
been agreed upon, I have changed my mind. Now I feel that on
balance the U.S. Senate should ratify this treaty.
Let me give you my reasons.
First, as to verifiability, this treaty is not effectively
verifiable. I think that is clear, and I think we should not
kid ourselves that might be.
Second, as to tear gas, I would hope that one of the
conditions that is placed on the treaty allows the use of tear
gas in combat.
Senator Biden. I think we can do that.
Ambassador Rowny. I understand that the treaty allows us to
use tear gas in domestic situations. But, for example, if in
time of war it is necessary to go after a downed pilot, we
should be able to use tear gas to do so.
As for paragraph three of Article X, I think if we could
interpret this in the U.S. way and not the Iranian way, this
would be very helpful.
I want to dwell on this idea of the ability to protect
against chemical weapons. I was appalled when I spoke to
several of my friends who were in the Gulf War that we had to
go to Germany to get protective vehicles, that we had to go to
Great Britain to get our sniffing devices, and that we had to
go to the Czech Republic to get contamination equipment. This
is no way for a great power to operate, to have to rely on its
allies for essential defensive equipment and detection devices.
Also, I think that there are more aspects to defense. We
should help to defend against terrorists in this country, and I
think the moneys and efforts should be put to that end.
Furthermore, I believe that ballistic missile defenses should
be deployed, because I feel that there are several rogue states
which now have ballistic missiles capable of reaching our
troops in time of combat with nuclear, biological, and chemical
warheads. In a few years they will be able to reach the United
States.
I think that we should be able to defend not only our
troops in combat but the United States against an accidental
launch or limited attack. I am not talking about full scale
attacks by China or a resurgent Russia but only about limited
attacks.
I am encouraged that the administration has now recognized
our lack of defenses and has said that $225 million will be
allocated to protect our troops.
I hope that the Congress will fully support this $225
million to provide the defenses against chemical attack.
As for Russia, I have been working for 4 years since I left
the government to try to get the Russians to ratify START II,
and I have been finding this increasingly difficult. I think it
is important, but in connection I think it is also important
that we get Russia to join the states which would ratify the
CWC.
President Yeltsin has already signed the CWC, but the Duma
is opposing ratification. I think if the U.S. fails to ratify
the CWC, it will give the Russians an excuse for not ratifying
it.
The United States has been in the vanguard, asking
countries to join this convention. For us to renege and not
ratify the CWC will tarnish our international prestige.
A great deal of the world looks up to us as leaders and for
setting norms and standards. I think, as a minimum, this treaty
would set norms and standards. I am in favor of that.
Mr. Chairman, I was in the arms control business for over 2
decades. I think that there are four criteria for any good
treaty.
First is verification. Second is that the treaty should not
be flawed. Third is that it be enforceable, and fourth is that
it be in the security interests of the United States.
I have already said that this treaty is not effectively
verifiable. On the other hand, if we were to enter into the
treaty before the 29th of April, we would get a seat within the
process and we would be able to help get violators exposed. I
think on balance we gain more from being on the inside than we
do by being on the outside, especially since this treaty is
going to come into effect in any case.
The second criterion is that a treaty not be fatally
flawed. While the CWC is a flawed treaty, I don't think any of
the flaws are fatal. The flaws that are there I think are
fixable. I think the tear gas flaw is fixable. I think that
paragraph 3 of Article X is fixable. Therefore, I do not think
that the fatally flawed argument can apply against this treaty.
As for the third criterion, enforceability, no arms control
agreement can stand on its own. Even the START I and START II
treaties, with which I was proud to be associated, can not
stand on their own. To make a treaty effective you need a good
defense posture. You have to have a credible way of enforcing
it. If you don't have that, an arms control treaty is not worth
the paper it is written on.
I would hope, again as a matter of emphasis, that we give
whatever moneys are necessary to defend ourselves against an
attack in the field, terrorist attacks at home, and ballistic
missile attacks.
Finally, the vital fourth criterion of any treaty is that
it be in the interest of the United States. On weighing the
pros and cons I have concluded after a lot of thoughtful
consideration, that the U.S. Senate should ratify this treaty.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Rowny follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Edward L. Rowny
Mr. Chairman: It is a privilege for me to testify once again before
the Foreign Relations Committee.
Until recently, I was opposed to the ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) by the U. S. Senate. My initial reading of the
CWC led me to believe that it was unverifiable, that it would prevent
the U.S. from using tear gas in combat, and that it would obligate us
to provide sensitive chemical technology to signatory rogue states.
However, my major concern was that the United States might be lulled
into a false sense of security and fail to provide adequate defenses
for our men and women in uniform and citizens at home.
I have now studied the treaty more carefully and have also followed
the negotiations of the 30 conditions opponents want to attach to the
convention. I have been impressed with the Administration's willingness
to negotiate a number of these conditions. Accordingly, I have changed
my mind, and I now feel that ratification of the CWC would be in the
best interests of the United States.
The treaty is clearly not verifiable. However, I believe that we
can gain from being a member of the inspection framework. it is
important that the U.S. Senate ratify the CWC before 29 April, 1997 so
that we may be a party to the verification process and that American
inspectors, who are among the best trained and experienced in the
world, can become members of the international inspectorate. It is true
that there are certain disadvantages to being a party to the inspection
process. However, I am convinced that we have more to gain by being on
the inside than on the outside looking in.
I still have misgivings about the prohibition against the use of
tear gas during time of war. While I understand that it is not
prohibited for use in domestic situations, I can visualize many cases
where non-lethal agents would be beneficial in combat.
As for the obligation to share defensive technology in all cases, I
do not subscribe to the Iranian interpretation of Article X. Rather, I
am convinced that the treaty can be interpreted in a way that protects
our interests without violating the terms of the CWC.
When it comes to my major concern, I was appalled to learn from
several officers that during the Gulf War they had to borrow detection
equipment from Great Britain, protected vehicles from Germany, and
decontamination equipment from the Czech Republic. I am encouraged by
the Administration's recent request for funds which would eliminate or
mitigate the dangers to our soldiers in combat and our civilian
populace. This demonstrates an awareness of our inadequate defensive
posture and progress to correct it. However, it is important that the
$225 million in requested expenditures be approved by the Congress.
I believe that it is also important that the Administration pursue
a vigorous program to provide ballistic missile defenses for our forces
overseas and for our people at home against accidental launches and
limited attacks by rogue states. Several of these states now possess
ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear, biological and chemical
warheads capable of striking our U.S. troops deployed overseas and will
soon be capable of striking the United States. Protecting our soldiers
in combat and our civilians from terrorist activities, accidental
launches, and rogue state attacks requires not only the request for
funds by the administration, but the provision of such funds by the
Congress.
The CWC will come into effect on 29 April, 1997 whether the U.S.
Senate ratifies it or not. A failure to ratify the treaty would place
us outside the world's civilized nations and associate us with the
pariahs. Additionally, failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the CWC
would give the Russian Duma an excuse to discard the treaty. It is
important that Russia become a party to the treaty so that we can
inspect their facilities which are reportedly developing new chemical
agents.
I am also concerned that our enviable position as leaders of the
free world would suffer if we fail to ratify a treaty we have convinced
scores of other nations to join. We are highly respected and admired
abroad largely because of our leadership in establishing high standards
and norms of international conduct. At the very least, the CWC will
establish such norms and standards for others to follow.
For more than two decades as an arms controller, I have maintained
that arms control agreements must meet four criteria. First, they must
be effectively verifiable; second, they must not contain fatal flaws;
third, they must be enforceable; and fourth, they must serve the
interests of the United States.
The CWC does not meet the first criterion; it is not effectively
verifiable. However, the problem of verifying the production and
stockpiling of chemicals is more difficult than that of verifying the
existence and storage of ballistic missiles, bombers, and air delivered
weapons. I believe that under the CWC we stand to gain more information
than we might lose.
As for the second criterion, while the treaty is flawed, none of
the flaws, in my opinion, is a fatal one. Moreover, I believe that
continued discussions between the White House and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee can remove or mitigate some of the remaining flaws.
The third criterion is a critical one. No arms control treaty,
including the START treaties, of which I am proud, can stand alone. The
CWC by itself will not protect our troops or citizens, but it will be
useful if--and only if--we spend the funds to protect ourselves and
have the will to do whatever is necessary to enforce the terms of the
treaty.
Finally, we come to the vital fourth criterion, that the treaty be
in the best interests of the United States. The bottom line must answer
the question, ``Are we better off with the CWC or without it?'' Careful
analysis and my considered judgment lead me to conclude that we will be
better off with it than without it.
Accordingly, I respectfully urge the United States Senate to ratify
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. General Rowny, thank you.
General Scowcroft, welcome.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, PRESIDENT, FORUM FOR
INTERNATIONAL POLICY, AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
ADVISOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.
General Scowcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great
pleasure for me to appear before this distinguished committee
on such an important issue.
At the outset, I would like to make one thing clear.
Chairman Helms made some comment about support being
orchestrated by the White House. I want to make sure everybody
understands I am not orchestrated by the White House. I am
orchestrated by my concern for the national interest. It is in
that capacity that I appear.
We are talking about how best to deal with one of the
scourges of modern man, one of the three weapons of mass
destruction, and in some respects the most distasteful one.
I am going to be very brief, because I am going to follow
Senator Biden's prescription to keep my eye on the ball. I
think a lot of the debate this afternoon has been on
peripheries.
We are not starting a treaty here. We are finishing a
treaty. When you strip where we are now to its basic
essentials, what is facing us in the Chemical Warfare
Convention are very narrow and relatively straight-forward
issues.
First is: The United States is going out of the chemical
weapons business. We were forbidden many years ago, quite a few
years ago, by the Congress to modernize our chemical stocks by
building the so-called binaries; and subsequent to that we
agreed legislatively to mandate the unilateral destruction of
our chemical weapons stocks.
We are going out of the business. That is the first major
point.
The second one is that the Chemical Warfare Convention will
enter into force whether or not the United States ratifies it.
We are not dealing with a bunch of putty here that we can mold
any way we want.
So the basic question is really a very simple one: Is the
national interest served better by acceding to the treaty or by
staying outside the convention? The question is not whether
this is the perfect treaty.
As other witnesses today have said, there is no perfect
treaty for chemical weapons. Their manufacture is a lot like
insecticides and fertilizers. There is no truly verifiable
treaty. So that is not the issue before us.
There is not even a possible treaty written just as the
United States would like it; because some 160 nations have
signed this treaty, and any multilateral convention requires
compromise of one way or another.
There is only before us this particular treaty. Given the
real world situation we are in, therefore, I think the answer
to the question is a resounding yes to ratification of the
treaty, because it is in the national interest of the United
States. I want to digress to make just a couple of points about
some of the earlier questions. First is about the
Nonproliferation Treaty.
As Ambassador Kirkpatrick was winding up, I was waiting for
her real punch line, the logical conclusion to her remarks
which should be that we would be better off had there been no
Nonproliferation Treaty. I think General Rowny has clearly
pointed out, as have you, Senator Biden, that that is not the
case.
Is it flawed? Sure. Do I have problems with it? Sure. But I
think there is no question that the treaty played some kind of
role in the fact that--I think it was President Kennedy who
said that there were going to be 25 nuclear powers within the
next decade, but that has not happened.
So it is something better than nothing.
Article X of the CWC has come in for a lot of discussion
today. As I recall, the purpose for Article X was to help those
countries who abided by the treaty who might be threatened by
chemical attack to be able to defend themselves. Now that is a
pretty logical kind of thing. This is not some nefarious thing
that the negotiators just cooked up to make a bad treaty. It is
a very logical course of action.
Now as to the argument that one would never use chemical
weapons until one had this perfect defense and, therefore, that
is the real threat, I think that is not true. Chemical weapons
are the poor man's nuclear weapons. But chemical weapons have,
I think, demonstrated that they are not militarily useful
weapons. There were masses of stocks of chemical weapons in
World War II, which was certainly a no holds barred war.
Against an enemy that has defenses, chemical weapons are an
irritant; they are not overwhelming.
Chemical weapons are valuable as a terror weapon, and you
don't need defenses to fire missiles armed with chemical
weapons, aircraft dropping chemical weapons. Therefore I think
that is a very important aspect in which Article X needs to be
looked at.
As for reporting requirements, one of the things that has
been overlooked, other than to complain about the
administration's treaty, is that it does require reporting of
shipments of chemical materials and so on.
Right now, it is possible for a country to buy a few pounds
of a precursor here or a few pounds there, a few pounds
somewhere else, and to amass an abnormal supply without anybody
ever noticing it. That won't be possible anymore. Therefore, we
will have a better idea of what's going on and who the bad guys
seem to be.
We should ratify this treaty, recognizing that it is not a
silver bullet. It is just one weapon--a good one, but just
one--in our fight against chemical weapons, and we must
continue to employ every weapon in the U.S. arsenal to fight
this terror weapon. We cannot sit back and relax.
I think one of the things this sharp debate has brought to
the national attention is that this is important and we cannot
just sign it and forget about it.
Starting over, as was suggested this afternoon, I think is
pure fantasy. If we reject this treaty, we will incur the
bitterness of all of our friends and allies who followed us for
10 years in putting this thing together. It is not a matter of,
``Just well, let's scrap this and let's start over again.'' We
will throw the whole civilized world into confusion, and the
idea that we can then lead out again down a different path I
think is just not in the cards. We have got to deal with the
situation we face now, not an ideal one out in the future.
Let me close by saying that I spoke to President Bush this
morning, and he asked me to state for the record that he is a
strong and enthusiastic supporter of the Chemical Warfare
Convention and that it would be a severe blow to the U.S. role
in the world were we to repudiate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. General Scowcroft, as always, thank you.
Again, General Rowny, we are pleased to have you both here.
In consultation with my colleague, Senator Biden, what we
will do is go back to the 5 minute rule, if that is
appropriate.
Is that OK, Senator Kerry?
Senator Kerry. (Nods affirmatively)
Senator Hagel. I will begin. Picking up, General Scowcroft,
on your last comment about President Bush's continued
commitment, full support of the CWC, I am intrigued in that
yesterday we read a letter from former Secretary of Defense
Cheney. You and Secretary Cheney are both highly respected,
highly regarded, insightful leaders. You worked closely
together. You fought a war together.
My understanding is that President Bush has great
confidence in each of you. Could you explain to me how the two
of you have now come at this differently, why Secretary Cheney
can feel as he does and you feel as you do?
General Scowcroft. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would be uneasy
putting words in Secretary Cheney's mouth. He is a dear friend
of mine. We went through the last 4 years of negotiation of
this treaty and evolution in what we were going to do, whether
we were to going retain residuals until so many people
ratified--the whole gamut of things.
What I will say is that I think it is a fair statement--I
don't think Dick would contest this--that Dick Cheney does not
like arms control. He thinks we ought to do whatever we are
going to do for our own national defense interest and not do it
as an attempt to get somebody else to do something.
That he would not have chosen to have the treaty signed I
think is a fair statement. He did not resign over it. When
President Bush decided to sign the CWC, he didn't make any
comment on it. But I have talked to him, and he speaks for
himself. But we simply differ on this issue.
Senator Hagel. I don't know if you have had an opportunity
to see the letter that he forwarded to us.
General Scowcroft. I have not seen his letter. I talked to
him about 3 weeks ago.
Senator Hagel. If you're interested, we will give you a
copy of it----
General Scowcroft. I'd like that.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Because he gets into some
specificity, as much as you can in a one page letter.
Obviously you had some occasion, as you suggest, to work
with him a little bit and talk with him about this issue.
I have another question on Israel. My understanding is that
they have not ratified this yet. Do you know why that would be?
General Scowcroft. No, I really don't. As a matter of fact,
I think I assumed they had ratified it. I am not clear about
that.
My guess is that they are waiting for the United States.
Senator Hagel. General Rowny, would you care to make a
comment?
Ambassador Rowny. I subscribe to what Brent Scowcroft said.
In the first place, I don't know. But I think they are waiting
for the United States, and they want to follow our lead. I know
that they were very worried during the Gulf War that they would
be bombarded and, they were grateful for our help in trying to
knock down those missiles and so forth. They were very keen on
relying on our assistance to get a better defensive system, and
I am sure that goes over into the chemical field as well.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
I would be interested in both of your thoughts on this. I
think you each were here when the panel before you addressed
some of the issues. You will recall Ambassador Kirkpatrick,
Secretary Perle, and yesterday Secretary Schlesinger all talked
about the IAEA and some of the ramifications in this opinion as
to what has happened and has occurred. Would either of you like
to respond to some of what you heard today from some of the two
panels before you?
General Scowcroft. Let me just say that the IAEA was put
together in a way which was not very effective. The terms under
which it can inspect were not very effective. But we have some
experience, and now I believe we are undertaking a way to make
the IAEA very much tougher and to take over responsibilities
for inspections that are now the responsibility of UNSCOM and
so on.
Incidentally, UNSCOM has done a fantastic job. So I think
IAEA can be made a very effective instrument in nuclear
nonproliferation. But it could not if we did not have it--if we
did not have an NPT.
Again, I would say that what we are really arguing is does
this treaty help us at all. Since we are out of the chemical
weapons business, if it gives us some help, we ought to look
for help and take it anywhere we can find it; and I think we'd
get some help here.
Senator Hagel. General, thank you.
General Rowny, I want to hear your response as well.
Ambassador Rowny. My response is similar to that of General
Scowcroft, though I would go a little further.
The IAEA was initially inexperienced, but they have come a
long way. That is one of the reasons that I think we ought to
get in on the ground floor and the initial round of the CWC.
The United States has the best trained inspectors in the world.
Also, we have learned a lot about countering the
restrictions. In the old days, we could not go in unless Iraq
invited us to do so.
This treaty has many inspection provisions. There are pages
and pages of verification protocols which would bind any nation
trying to get around the CWC.
On the point that was made that we would train other people
to be able to circumvent this treaty, I think that is somewhat
overblown. Even if it is not overblown, I would take that risk.
I would rather be able to go in and inspect, knowing how to
inspect and having a lot of rules behind me, even if I knew
that I might be giving inspection secrets away.
Accordingly, I believe that this treaty would be more
easily enforceable than its predecessors.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
General Scowcroft, the point that you made I think is a
very important point to make, not merely about Secretary Cheney
who is a wonderful, fine, bright American. As a matter of fact,
just as an editorial comment, I thought for sure he was going
to be your nominee. I mean that sincerely.
This guy has a presence, an articulation. But I think the
point you made is an important one to make here generally.
If you look across the board, the bulk of the problem, the
bulk of the opposition comes from people who legitimately, and
truly consistent with their philosophy and intellectual
predisposition, if you will, do not like arms control.
One of the things that our distinguished Chairman said when
he spoke on the floor the first time on this is he quoted what
has been quoted 50 times by a lot of people. I do not say this
in a derisive manner. It is: As so and so said, America has
never lost a war or won a treaty.
That is doctrine among an awful lot of people. I do not
belittle it. I just think it is important that we put it in
focus.
I mean, we have in here a very bright young guy, Mr.
Gaffney. In all fairness to Mr. Gaffney, who is sort of the
intellectual engine on the right on this one right now, has he
ever seen a treaty he likes? It's kind of like: Do you ever
take yes for an answer?
I understand that. But it is really important that we all
understand it so that we can put into perspective some of the
criticism.
The second point I would like to make is, if you look at
the argumentation against the treaty, it is the ultimate Catch
22. The criticism my friends make of the treaty in terms of the
Fourth Amendment: If you want to guarantee there is no
possibility of ever arguing about it, you have to do something
they also do not support, which is these onsite inspections
without notification. If you eliminate those, then you have no
Fourth Amendment debate. But guess what happens. You eliminate
the ability for it to be verifiable and you diminish it.
You can go down every single argument. I think we should
just make this clear. There is no way to satisfy the critics,
the strongest and most articulate critics of this treaty, other
than by solving half of their problem. If you solve half their
problem, that is the most you can solve. You can't solve it
all, because it makes the other portions they criticize even
worse.
Now, General Rowny, I don't know whether people understand
something. I have been here 24 years. I don't know whether they
understand how significant your presence here is. I mean, I
really don't know whether people fully understand it.
In my humble opinion, in terms of bringing bona fides to
this debate, with no disrespect to anyone, from General
Scowcroft to the President of the United States of America, to
President Bush or anybody, you are, in my view, the single most
significant supporter of this treaty. You resigned--you
resigned--on principle over an arms control agreement you said
you didn't like. Here you are, a man whose credentials in terms
of being tough, yet still who believes some treaties are
useful, here you are supporting the treaty.
Now I realize there are ad hominem arguments. I realize
there are appeals to authority. I realize there are logical
fallacies. But one of the things that, in fact, impacts on this
debate overall is the vast majority of people do not have the
time to do what the acting chairman and I are doing or any of
the members of this committee, or that you all have done. You
know it, we hopefully know it, but the vast majority of
Americans do what we do on everything else. They are looking at
people they respect and are saying well, if it is good enough
for them, it is good enough for me as I respect them. Or if
they don't like it, I don't like it.
That is not an irrational thing to do. So, I want to tell
you that I think it is very important you are both here.
I think it is fair to say the three of us, you two and me,
have been on the opposite sides of more debates than we have
been on the same side.
General Scowcroft. I believe so.
Senator Biden. So I want to thank you for being here. I
would conclude, Mr. Chairman, since Mr. Kerry is not here quite
yet----
Senator Hagel. Just go ahead, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden [continuing]. By saying one of the things we
talked about in terms of inspections before. Mr. Perle, who is
always articulate, Mr. Perle made the point that what is going
to happen here is we are going to have these rogue nation guys
on the teams, meaning Iran, coming into the United States,
inspecting, carrying little gadgets in their pockets and
learning all there is to know about either trade secrets and/or
a capacity to make chemical weapons better when they get home.
On Part II, paragraphs 1 and 4 specify that we can deny
individual inspectors if we give notice.
So no Iranian ever has to inspect an American facility if
that is the decision we make.
It is not a requirement. The good news about this is you
may ask well, couldn't they deny us inspection. Yes. Yes, but
we have allies, like France, Britain, and Germany who are part
of this operation. We share with them a lot of this, our
technological capability of detection. So, the fact that we
would be denied inspection does not hurt us very much, having
an inspector on a team. But their being denied at least should
satisfy some of our critics of this treaty as to somehow they
are all of a sudden going to be able to learn all there is to
learn.
I find it interesting that when we thought, as a Nation,
and other nations thought that chemical weapons were a useful
tool of war, we did not have a vial of it, we did not have a
canister of it, we did not have a truck load of it, we did not
have a warehouse full of it. We had hundreds of tons of it.
So the idea when people say to me, isn't it true that in a
chemical plant, or a fertilizer plant, or a pharmaceutical
plant they could be producing chemical weapons, the answer is
yes, they could. We might not be able to detect it.
But let me tell you something. I think the image, General
Scowcroft, is people are thinking of a Japanese guy with sarin
gas in the subway taking on the U.S. Army. I really mean that.
I am not being facetious.
Listen to the distinguished Senator from California. It is
a legitimate concern.
I think we have to kind of remind ourselves. We are not
seeing the forest from the trees. Cheating will occur. But the
idea that enough cheating could occur that the U.S. military
would be in ulti-
mate jeopardy of losing a war--not a single encounter but a
war--that we would be prostrate is bizarre. It is absolutely
bizarre.
I just think in terms of keeping the focus here, when you
argue on the other guy's terms, you tend to lose the argument.
The terms we tend to argue on--at least I do, because I am so
acquainted with the detail of this thing. I get so into the
detail of it I argue about the specifics, when you can't lose.
That is why I conclude by thanking you, General, for your
overall statement of the generic approach to this thing and why
this is in our interest. It is in our interest, because the
idea that somebody can cheat is true. But the idea that
somebody could cheat enough to become a world power that is
going to defeat the United States of America, the idea that we
are going to be in a position where these rogue nations are
going to gain all our trade secrets and build better Chevettes
or Corvettes that we build, or our pharmaceutical products, is,
at best, to use your phrase, General Rowny--and you are always
a diplomat. You said you think this example is a little
overdrawn.
I think that is a mild understatement, a mild
understatement.
You will be glad to know that wasn't a question. I just
cannot tell you how much I appreciate people of your caliber
being here. I know it is not easy, General, to be here. All
those guys were here. You sat on the same side of the table
with them for a long, long time, as have you, General
Scowcroft. This is an issue on which reasonable and honorable
men can disagree. But I think the break point basically divides
generally those who think arms control can be a useful tool for
national security, who fall on this side (indicating), and
those who think arms control generally is a bad idea, who fall
on that side.
I think if you look down the line, that is the ultimate
distinguishing feature about where people fall on this treaty.
Ambassador Rowny. Senator, if I can elaborate on that, I
agree with you that there are people who believe that all arms
control treaties are good, and there are some who say all arms
control treaties are bad. I happen to have been all along for
good arms control.
Senator Biden. I know that, General.
Ambassador Rowny. When I resigned in protest over SALT II,
it was difficult, because I was drummed out of the Army. But
later, when we fixed the flaws of SALT II, we got a good
treaty: START I. START I reduced from 15,000 to 8,000 weapons
on each side.
As I said before, you cannot do this in a vacuum. You have
to always do it with the threat of being able to enforce the
treaty, and without that, I don't think arms control is useful.
That is why I would like to see pressure put on Russia now
to have the Duma ratify START II. I have been working on this
idea for 3 years, and believe that we should go even further by
moving to START III.
Senator Biden. I agree with you, General.
Ambassador Rowny. The idea is to get good arms control
agreements and also to have them bolstered with good,
enforceable methods of carrying them out.
Senator Biden. I'll make you a bet that I hope I never win.
If we do not ratify the CWC, the chances of the Duma ratifying
START II, irrespective of all other questions, I think is
remote. It is remote at best. It is difficult now and you are
right.
The only point I want to make--and, Mr. Chairman, I have
gone way over my time--is you are a man of principle, General.
That is the only point I was making or attempting to make. I
hope I made it clear. You are a man of principle. You gave up a
lot on a principle, a principle. So, when people suggest--and
no one here has, friend or foe--when people suggest that people
are orchestrated to come here, General Scowcroft is a man who
has taken on me in this committee, and the Democrats time and
again. He is a guy who in my view educated my best friend, Bill
Cohen, and that is why he is Secretary of Defense. General
Rowny is a man of absolute principle who thinks that good arms
control is as he defined it, and there is good arms control.
The fact that you both are here I think is a big deal.
It reinforces my view of this treaty, quite frankly,
because we all look to the people we admire as to whether or
not they like it; and it reinforces our sense of the place we
intellectually arrived at. The fact that you both are there
quite frankly just reinforces and makes me feel better about my
decision.
Senator Hagel. If I could follow up, General Rowny, on
something you mentioned earlier, you mentioned that you thought
this was a flawed treaty, like I believe you said most are, but
fixable. I think you mentioned specifically Paragraph 3 of
Article X.
What other areas do you think need to be addressed?
Ambassador Rowny. Just one other area, Senator. That is the
one on tear gas. I have never understood this. It has a long
history. As you know, President Ford issued an executive order.
Brent Scowcroft played golf with him a good deal, and he might
be able to understand that executive order at that time. But I
felt that the idea of prohibiting the use of tear gas in times
of war, I have always felt that was a mistake. I would like to
see that one fixed in some way.
That is the only other flaw that I see in the treaty.
Senator Hagel. To each of you, Admiral Zumwalt mentioned
sanctions on those signatories who might violate the
convention.
What realistically are we talking about when you say
sanctions? Iran is a signatory. They violate inspections. If we
find they have violated the convention, what do we do?
General Scowcroft. Well, I think sanctions run all the way
from doing something that makes you feel good when you really
don't want to take action but you have to do something to what
I would call sanctions on Iraq right now, which are effective.
They are good. UNSCOM is over there, they are rooting around,
and they are finding out all kinds of things. That is the
ultimate in sanctions.
Senator Hagel. Would the entire body, as you read this
treaty, be involved in the sanctioning process of a violating
nation?
General Scowcroft. I think in the end, Mr. Chairman,
sanctions depend on the national interest of the country
whatever a treaty says. We could have responded when Iraq used
chemicals against Iran or against its own people. Politically,
nobody did; and they didn't, because there were other kinds of
things that militated against it.
I think you always have to look at sanctions in that light.
Collective security is a chimera. It is never going to work,
because when you don't know who the enemy is, then you cannot
defend against it.
So every country is going to consult its own national
interest when it decides whether or not to go with sanctions.
That is where the United States is so important, because when
we decide, we can get a lot of people along with us. When we
sit on the sidelines, there isn't anybody else to pick up the
ball and carry it.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
General Rowny.
Ambassador Rowny. I have a less optimistic view about
sanctions. I think that sanctions can be helpful, but I think
in the end, you have to use more than sanctions in critical
cases. So I would say: use sanctions. If they work, fine. If
they don't, don't hesitate to use your military muscle, and I
think in some cases you have to.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is important; but we have a
more sinister set of circumstances facing us down the road, and
that is the biological warfare issue. The Biological Weapons
Treaty does not have any of the verification procedures
contained in the CWC. As you know, Russia denied developing
anthrax. Now there are reports that they have developed a new
biological weapon which is not detectable. There is a vast
difference between chemical and biological weapons. A chemical
weapon will disperse and you can protect against it. However,
biological weapons do not disperse but grow.
So I would hope as soon as this treaty is ratified that the
Senate, and this committee in particular, turn their attention
to the possible dangers of biological warfare, which, in my
view, are more devastating than chemical weapons.
In this connection, I would not hesitate to go beyond
sanctions and use whatever it takes to prevent against this
great scourge. If what happened with just a few whiffs of sarin
gas in Japan were to happen in this country, I think we would
never forgive ourselves.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. General, you just made, again, the point
that I think it is important to keep in mind. You heard the
last panel, all brilliant people, all decent, honorable people.
This is the dividing line again. They said not only is this
treaty bad, but if we ever tried to do anything in biological
weapons, which is less verifiable, it would be a disaster.
I just want to keep reinforcing the point here. I happen to
agree with you completely, General. People fall down on most of
these issues based on which side of this treaty line they fall
on.
As you heard spontaneously, three of the four witnesses
said by the way, this is bad, but if you guys ever start
looking at biological weapons, that would even be worse.
Now the question I would like to ask you is--or I guess I
would make more of a point and would ask you to respond. In my
view, when you were dealing and this administration was
dealing, General Scowcroft, with Korea's attempt at, desire to,
and potentially having achieved a nuclear capacity, nuclear
weapons, there was a lot of loose talk up here with guys like
me and others. It got all around. I refer not to you but to us,
to me.
We said if they do develop or are on the verge of
developing that capacity, we may very well have to use
preemptive military action. That was talked about around the
world.
I cannot fathom even being able to raise that issue had we
not been part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. If there
were not an international norm established, the idea that in
capitals--and I was in Europe at the time as well--the idea
that in capitals of the world there was no commitment to use
force, but no commitment to rule out the use of force, there is
no way, in my view, there would have been any--any--ability to
even contemplate that and to gain anything remotely approaching
international understanding for the possible need of
preemptively using force.
Now I am not suggesting that you suggested that, General. I
want to make the record clear.
General Scowcroft. I did.
Senator Biden. Well, OK. I am not speaking for you now. But
I was up here, as you will recall, saying the same thing that
you recommended.
So, again, I state it to reinforce a point that seems to
get lost as we focus on these individual trees in this forest.
This is that national and international norms make a
difference. They make a difference. They are not dispositive in
every case, but they make a difference.
Had we followed Ambassador Kirkpatrick's notion of never
having gone forward with the Nonproliferation Treaty, the idea
that we would have had the consensus to consider--and I
believe, General, your statements and recommendation were part
of the reason why, ultimately, it did not go to the point we
worried about it going. Now I am not now here positing where it
is.
At any rate, if you would like to comment, fine, but there
is no need to comment. I just think international norms make a
big difference.
General Scowcroft. Well, one of the things that we did not
really discuss this afternoon and that I thought about putting
in my remarks, but I did not want to be accused of being
``goody-goody'' is that the very fact that you mobilize world
opinion and say these things are bad, we are going to mobilize
the international community against them, this does put
pressure on the hold-outs. If they are doing things wrong, it
is easier to call attention to it.
We have no coordinated kind of social, if you will,
pressure on the rogue states right now in this area.
Senator Biden. That's right. I agree.
Senator Hagel. Senator, are there any more questions?
Senator Biden. No. Again, gentlemen, particularly for the
way you got bounced around by me in terms of timing on this, I
just cannot tell you how much I appreciate your being here and
how important I think it is that you are here.
Thank you both.
Senator Hagel. On behalf of the committee, thank you. Just
as the other panel, you all have brought a tremendous amount of
experience and insight to this. As you suggested, General
Scowcroft, this is a critically important issue for this
country and the world, and we need to spend as much time as we
have been spending and that we will spend to air it all out.
So on behalf of all of us, thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m. The committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 2:03 p.m. on Tuesday, April 15, 1997.]
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Brownback, Biden, and
Kerry.
The Chairman. The Committee will come to order, but we will
stand relaxed until the staff gets its act together. Both
parties are represented at another hearing, and it should not
be very long. [Pause.]
There is no Senate rule against a chairman doing what they
do on television when they have got more time left than they
expected. So they stretch it out.
Our first witness this afternoon will be a long time friend
of so many of us in the Senate. We have worked with him in
various capacities, including broadcasting to foreign
countries. Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., or Steve as he is known, is
one of the most remarkable friends I have ever known; and I am
going to give you one vignette for the record.
Some years ago I happened to be on the same campus with him
where he had spoken to the students, and following all of the
formal doings there was a reception, and the reception went on
and on and on, and he was shaking hands and answering of the
students, and along about 10 or maybe a little bit earlier I
sent word to Mr. Forbes that I would rescue him and he could go
out a certain door, get on his airplane, and go back to New
York. He said oh, no. He said, I have got some more friends I
wish to talk with.
Now, he was not a candidate for anything except the Kingdom
of Heaven, I think, at that time. But I want to say to you,
sir, that you won the hearts of those young people at that
university. I still hear about your staying there until 11
talking with them and answering questions. Maybe another fellow
would have gotten up and left, but you did not.
Mr. Biden, the ranking member of the committee, will be
here momentarily, and we will just bide our time.
We will have two panels, by the way. Steve Forbes, or
Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., will be the first witness and only
witness on panel one. Panel two will have businessmen: Mr.
Wayne Spears, President of the Spears Manufacturing Company and
so forth; Mr. Ralph V. Johnson, Vice President of Environmental
Affairs at Dixie Chemical Company; Mr. Kevin L. Kearns,
President of the United States Business and Industrial Council;
the Honorable Kathleen C. Bailey, Senior Fellow of the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
This hearing is the third in the final round of Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the dangerously flawed
Chemical Weapons Convention. Last week the committee heard from
seven distinguished foreign and defense policy leaders about
the national security implications of this treaty. This
afternoon, our purpose is to discuss the destructive effects of
this treaty, and what those effects will have on the American
business community, the new regulations will be imposed, the
intrusive and clearly unconstitutional inspections it will
authorize, and the potential of abuse of the treaty by our
foreign business competitors by industrial espionage.
I can think of no one--no one--who can better speak to
these issues than our lead witness today, Mr. Forbes. He is
chairman and CEO of Forbes Magazine. He is a leading voice of
American business, and in particular a champion of the small
and medium-sized enterprises that will be disproportionately
affected by this treaty.
Last week we heard eloquent testimony from four former
secretaries of defense of this country urging the Senate to
reject this flawed treaty, and I want to quote something one of
those witnesses said that day, because I think it will help us
frame the discussion this afternoon.
Let me preface what I am going to read by saying that there
have been repeated suggestions by the proponents of the treaty
implying that all businesses support this treaty. Well, this
simply is not accurate. Don Rumsfeld eloquently reminded us
last week that many big businesses, and he stressed the word
big, do support the treaty, but it is not the security of big
business that we need to worry about in this country, it is the
smaller businesses.
Here is what Don Rumsfeld said: Big companies seem to get
along fine with big government. They get along with American
government, they get along with foreign governments, they get
along with international organizations, and they have the
ability, with all their Washington representatives, to deal
effectively with bureaucracies. Indeed, Mr. Rumsfeld said, and
I am quoting him still, indeed, that capability on the part of
the big companies actually serves as a sort of barrier to entry
to small and medium-sized companies that lack that capability.
So I do not suggest, he said, for 1 minute that large American
companies are not going to be able to cope with the
regulations. They will do it a whale of a lot better than small
and medium sized companies, end of quote.
Mr. Rumsfeld made a vitally important point. It is small
and medium-sized businesses, the entrepreneurs who are creating
all of the jobs in our economy today, who will be hurt worse by
this treaty. It is they who will have trouble coping with all
of the new regulations and all of the red tape and all of the
intrusive and unconstitutional inspections and all of the legal
fees and potential losses of proprietary information.
The small businesses are the ones whose constitutional
rights will be trampled because this administration refuses to
require a criminal search warrant from involuntary challenge
inspections granted to foreign inspectors. These inspections
will be granted greater power of search and seizure than those
granted to U.S. Law enforcement officers. These inspectors are
the ones who may well confront officials from Iran and China,
knocking on their doors, demanding the right to rifle their
records and so forth and so on.
Speaking of the law enforcement officers, they will
interrogate the employees and remove chemical samples from
their facilities, all because this administration has refused
to ban inspectors from rogue regimes.
Now, we hear over and over again that the Chemical
Manufacturer's Association, which has been very active in
promoting the treaty, we heard that they support the treaty,
and we have had, certainly, the strong inferences, if not
declarations. But let me tell you something about this
association. And I speak as a guy who ran a pretty sizable
association some years ago. The CMA operates and represents
just 191 companies--1-9-1--but this treaty, at the
administration's most conservative estimate, will affect at
least 3,000 businesses, and may affect as many as 8,000.
So I hope we can put an end to the notion that the CMA
represents the interests of the thousands of small- and medium-
sized companies that will be hurt by this treaty. And as one of
our witnesses will tell us today, I believe, even within the
ranks of the CMA companies there is concern about the impact of
this treaty, including the cost of regulations and the
potential loss of confidential business information.
The fact is there are literally thousands of companies
across this country who do not know about this treaty, who do
not understand it in any detail, who do not realize that it
will affect them, who do not understand that they will be
subjected to inspections, and are not aware what kind of
unfunded mandates will be imposed on them should this treaty be
ratified as is.
Now, I have no doubt that the businessmen affected by the
CWC are patriotic Americans who love their country and are
willing to make sacrifices for our national security. And if
this treaty could actually reduce the danger of chemical
weapons, I am sure they would be willing to make necessary
sacrifices to get rid of those terrible weapons. But as we have
heard from so many experts, it just will not work.
This treaty will not work. It will do nothing to reduce the
danger of chemical weapons. If anything, we have learned that
it will make the problem worse by giving rogue nations even
greater access to dangerous chemical agents and technology and
defensive gear. Even the treaty's proponents admit that it will
not work, but they say we should ratify it anyhow; because it
is better than nothing; because, they say, it will establish
``norms.''
Well, I do not believe that ratifying the treaty that
cannot work just to make a statement is good policy; and when
you take into consideration the fact that it will also create
massive new burdens on businesses that are struggling to create
jobs, that it will cost them money, time, and energy while
trampling on their constitutional rights just to make a
statement and establish norms, I say that this treaty is worse
than nothing. The price of that kind of feel-good statement is
just too high.
So, Mr. Forbes, if you will take the seat in the middle, we
thank you for being here, and look forward to your testimony.
And I note that not only is Steve Forbes testifying today, he
announced this Sunday on Face the Nation that he will be
leading a public information campaign to bring the facts about
the treaty to light. So on behalf of the silent majority of
American businesses who do not realize what Washington has
cooked up for them with this dangerous and destructive treaty,
I thank you, sir, for all that you are doing.
I have just been handed a note saying that we should wait
for Senator Biden to come and make his statement. He said he
would try to be here by 2:15, so I suppose, Mr. Forbes, we can
just stand at rest and wait for Senator Biden. [Pause.]
The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much, and
I thank the witnesses. We have, as the Chairman well knows,
these things every Tuesday called caucuses where every Member
of each of our parties gets together and we discuss our
respective agendas. Ironically, I was to make a presentation in
my caucus today on the Chemical Weapons Convention, and I
appreciate the Chair doing this.
Mr. Chairman, I am happy you have called this hearing today
on the effect that the CWC would have on American business;
because, as we all know, there has been a great deal of
discussion pro and con on that very point. The charge, in my
view, that the CWC will harm American business, I think is dead
wrong when one considers the fact that the convention was
negotiated with an unprecedented input from the U.S. chemical
industry. Thanks to the industry's help, in my view, the
convention contains thresholds and exemptions that protect
businesses small and large from bearing an undue burden.
The American chemical industry has helped develop the
ground rules under which the inspections that will occur under
this treaty will happen, including provisions for protecting
the confidentiality of business information. Chemical
companies' representatives have also helped in the decision on
how to design the form, the written form, that represents the
only reporting obligation for 90 percent of approximately 2,000
companies that will have an obligation under this convention.
The U.S. chemical companies recognize that while they
produce goods intended for peaceful uses, their products and
inputs could be misused for nefarious purposes. That is why
they so actively have supported this convention. Their
involvement in the CWC has been a model, in my view, of good
corporate citizenship. Unfortunately, we will reward this
responsible behavior with a slap in the face, in my view, if we
fail to ratify this convention and subject the U.S. Chemical
industry to international sanctions, the same sanctions, I
might add, that we ourselves insisted be placed in this
convention under both President Reagan and President Bush.
The CWC was designed with high thresholds for common
industrial chemicals that ensure that only large producers of
those chemicals will be subject to reporting and inspection
requirements. Instead of throwing around old numbers and scare
tactics, I would like to take a look very quickly at the outset
here at the real requirements of this treaty.
Chemicals that are used to make chemical weapons have been
placed in three schedules. Schedule I chemicals are those that
are chemical weapons and direct precursors with little or no
commercial use. Schedule II chemicals are direct precursors
with limited commercial uses. And Schedule III chemicals are
indirect precursors with wide commercial use.
Now, both producers and consumers of chemicals on Schedule
I and two are subject to CWC reporting and inspection
requirements. For most Schedule II chemicals, though, there is
a one-ton threshold. As a result, only 11 American facilities--
11, 11 American facilities--will be subject to Schedule I
requirements, and less than 35 will be covered by Schedule II
requirements.
Turning to Schedule III chemicals, the rules change a
little. Only those facilities that produce, import, or export
more than 30 tons of Schedule III chemicals are covered by
those requirements--30 tons. That is not a vial of chemicals,
that is not a barrel, that is a lot of chemicals, and these
rules apply only to producers. Consumers of these chemicals are
not covered. As a result, only about 100 facilities face these
requirements. An even higher threshold applies to producers of
discrete organic chemicals. Everybody has an acronym in this
bill, so I will just continue to call them discrete organic
chemicals, or DOC's.
Facilities that produce more than 200 tons of discrete
organic chemicals are subject to reporting requirements, as are
those that produce 30 tons of chemicals containing phosphorus,
sulfur, or fluorine. But again, we are talking about producers,
and only producers of hundreds of tons of these chemicals--no
soap manufacturers, no cosmetic firms, all the things we keep
hearing about. You know: ``They are going to go in and find a
cosmetic firm is doing this or a soap manufacturer.'' We are
not talking about those companies. They are not producers of
these chemicals. They are consumers of these chemicals, these
discrete organic chemicals.
While reporting requirements for discrete organic chemicals
will apply to as many as 1,800 U.S. companies, I do not know of
too many Mom and Pop businesses that produce 200 tons of
chemicals a year. In addition, several industries have been
completely exempted from all CWC requirements. These include
explosives makers, hydrocarbon producers, oil refineries,
polymer makers, and facilities that make discrete organic
chemicals through biological processes. What does this mean? It
means that plastic companies, textile makers, and breweries
face zero--zero--obligation under the CWC.
The Commerce Department instructions for the brief data
declaration says that in black and white. And the Conference of
State Parties is also set to ratify these exemptions on May the
6th. So anyone who tells you differently, I would respectfully
suggest, is dead wrong.
There is more to say, and I had planned on saying more, but
I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my statement be
placed in my record, Mr. Chairman, and I would conclude with
one sentence: We are going to hear from four very distinguished
witnesses, one who believes that--well, I was going to read the
quote. I will not. Anyway, let me just put my whole statement
in the record since you were so kind to hold up for me, and I
will get on with hearing from the witnesses.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Biden
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy that we are holding this
hearing today on the effect the CWC would have on American business,
because perhaps no single aspect of this debate has seen more
misinformation.
The charge that the CWC will harm American business appears
preposterous when one considers the fact that the convention was
negotiated with the unprecedented input of the U.S. chemical industry.
Thanks to the industry's help, the convention contains thresholds
and exemptions that protect businesses, small and large alike, from
bearing an undue burden. The American chemical industry helped develop
the ground rules under which inspections will occur, including
provisions for protecting confidential business information.
Chemical company representatives also helped design the brief form
that represents the only reporting obligation for ninety percent of the
approximately two thousand companies that will have obligations under
the CWC.
U.S. chemical companies recognize that while they produce goods
intended for peaceful uses, their products and inputs could be misused
for nefarious purposes. That is why they so actively have supported
this convention. Their involvement in the CWC has been a model of good
corporate citizenship.
Unfortunately, we will reward this responsible behavior with a slap
in the face if we fail to ratify the CWC and subject the U.S. chemical
industry to international sanctions--the same international sanctions
that we ourselves insisted be placed in this treaty to punish countries
that do not ratify it.
The CWC was designed with high thresholds for common industrial
chemicals that ensure that only large producers of these chemicals will
be subject to reporting and inspection requirements. Instead of
throwing around old numbers and scare tactics, let's look at what the
real requirements of this treaty are.
Chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons have been
placed on three schedules. Schedule I chemicals are chemical weapons
and direct precursors with little or no commercial use. Schedule II
chemicals are direct precursors with limited commercial uses. Schedule
III chemicals are indirect precursors with wide commercial use.
Now, both producers and consumers of chemicals on schedules one and
two are subject to CWC reporting and inspection requirements. For most
Schedule II chemicals, though, there is a one ton threshold.
As a result, only eleven American facilities will be subject to
Schedule I requirements, and less than thirty-five will be covered by
Schedule II requirements.
Turning to Schedule III chemicals, the rules change a little.
Only those facilities that produce, import or export more than
thirty tons of Schedule III chemicals are covered by those
requirements. Thirty tons. That's not a vial, that's not a barrel,
that's a lot of chemicals. And these rules apply only to producers.
Consumers of these chemicals will not be covered. As a result, only
about one hundred facilities face this requirement.
An even higher threshold applies to producers of discrete organic
chemicals, or ``docs.''
Facilities that produce more than two hundred tons of these
chemicals are subject to reporting requirements, as are those that
produce thirty tons of a chemical containing phosphorus, sulfur or
fluorine. But again, we're talking only about producers, and only
producers of hundreds of tons of these chemicals.
While the reporting requirements for discrete organic chemicals
will apply to as many as eighteen hundred U.S. companies, I don't know
of too many mom-and-pop businesses that produce two hundred tons of
chemicals every year.
In addition, several industries have been completely exempted from
all CWC requirements. These include explosives makers, hydrocarbon
producers, oil refineries, oligomer and polymer makers, and facilities
that make discrete organic chemicals through biological processes.
What does this mean? It means that plastics companies and textile-
makers and breweries face zero obligation under CWC. The Commerce
Department instructions for the brief data declaration says that in
black and white. Some of these exemptions are already in the treaty,
and the Conference of States Parties is all set to ratify the rest on
May 6.
So anyone who tells you that these industries will be hurt by CWC
is just dead wrong.
In addition, there will be an exemption for facilities that
manufacture a product that contains a low concentration of a scheduled
chemical. The treaty explicitly directs the Conference of States
Parties to adopt such a rule.
For Schedule III chemicals, the ones with wide commercial
applications, the proposed threshold is thirty percent.
So a plant that makes soap or cosmetics or one that processes food
would not be subject to CWC requirements.
I also want to address the charge that the CWC will lead to
international inspectors rummaging at will through American businesses.
This too is entirely untrue.
Only a limited number of facilities will be subject to routine CWC
inspections, and these are mostly the large chemical manufacturers that
are supporting the treaty.
These routine inspections will be conducted on the basis of
facility agreements negotiated with the full input of the plant
involved in order to protect trade secrets.
And there will be no warrantless searches. If a firm does not
consent to an inspection, an administrative or criminal search warrant
will have to be obtained before the inspection goes forward.
Moreover, all challenge inspections will take place under the
principle of ``managed access,'' where our government negotiates with
the inspectors over the places, records, and data that may be searched.
So, all inspections will take place under the supervision of U.S.
government officials.
Our exposure to loss of trade secrets due to the CWC is also
greatly overstated.
The CWC contains an unprecedented level of protections for
confidential business information, all of which were negotiated and
supported by industry.
The combination of close supervision of confidential business
information, plus the deterrence of our domestic criminal laws, should
keep losses of trade secrets to a bare minimum.
The facts are that American industry and the executive branch have
worked cooperatively--both in drafting the treaty and in drafting the
proposed implementing legislation--to minimize the burden on U.S.
industry.
The chemical industry is to be commended for the role that it
played in helping to negotiate this treaty, and I look forward to
hearing the testimony of our witnesses today.
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
STATEMENT OF MALCOLM S. FORBES, JR., PRESIDENT AND CEO, FORBES,
INC., NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Forbes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing
me today to testify before your distinguished committee.
Senator Biden. Excuse me 1 second, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to point out one thing: Mr. Forbes won my State. I would
just like to point out that Delaware in the Republican primary,
voted for Forbes. So I want the record to note I smiled at him,
I have been very nice to him, I like him very much. We have
agreed very heartily. We are together on the radios, right, Mr.
Forbes? Tell them that, will you please?
Mr. Forbes. We are together on the radios, but I am keeping
on my Kevlar for protection.
There are many compelling reasons, I believe, to oppose
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The fact is
that the Chemical Weapons Convention significantly threatens
the freedoms we Americans cherish. It significantly diminishes
America's sovereignty and significantly increases America's
vulnerability to chemical warfare. It is as though we are being
asked to endorse a drug that worsens the disease it purports to
cure, and in addition has some highly dangerous side effects.
To explain just how dangerous the CWC side effects are,
just let me ask the distinguished members of this committee a
very simple question: What is the basis of America's greatness?
Why is it that although the international arena contains many
powers today, we are the world's sole superpower? Any adequate
answer to this ques-
tion would have to include such factors as the competitive
nature of our free market system, the unparalleled
technological sophistication of America's enterprises, but most
important, our basic freedoms. These are the sinews of our
power, the basis of our national greatness. It is precisely
these quintessentially American strengths that the convention
would undermine.
Let me begin by talking about America's competitiveness. As
I have strenuously argued on other occasions, maintaining
America's competitive edge requires a lessening of the tax and
regulatory burdens on the American people and on our Nation's
enterprises. Unfortunately, the CWC will have precisely the
opposite effect. It will burden up to 8,000 companies across
the United States. Remember, these are in the hands of an
international bureaucracy, not what we would like them to be,
with major new reporting regulatory and inspection requirements
entailing large and uncompensated compliance costs. These added
costs constitute an unfunded Federal mandate. Like so many
unfunded mandates, they are bound to retard our economic growth
and make our companies less competitive.
Is it not ironic, Mr. Chairman, meeting here as we are on
tax day and concerned as we all are with reducing the tax
burden on the American people, that we should even consider
ratifying a convention that amounts to a new tax on some of our
most innovative and productive companies? But it gets worse.
For in addition to the costs arising from heavy duty reporting,
the CWC subjects our chemical companies to snap inspections
that will allow other nations access to our latest chemical
equipment and information. No longer will violators of
intellectual property rights in China, Iran, and elsewhere,
have to go to the trouble of pirating our secrets. Incredibly,
we ourselves will effectively hand them the stuff on a silver
platter. No wonder former CIA Director and Defense Secretary
Jim Schlesinger has called the convention a godsend for foreign
intelligence services.
But it gets worse. The CWC also threatens the
constitutional rights guaranteed Americans under the Fourth
Amendment. As former Secretaries of Defense Dick Cheney, Don
Rumsfeld, and Cap Weinberger noted last September in a joint
letter to Majority Leader Trent Lott, quote: The CWC will
jeopardize U.S. citizens constitutional rights by requiring the
U.S. Government to permit searches without either warrants or
probable cause, end of quote. That is a serious statement from
these former defense chiefs, jeopardize U.S. citizens
constitutional rights.
Think about that, Mr. Chairman. And think about all the
criminal cases that our courts have summarily dismissed,
because in their view the defendant's constitutional rights had
been violated by police searches conducted without probable
cause. Are American businesses to receive less justice than
suspected felons? Of course not. The idea is preposterous. And
yet that is what compliance with the CWC would entail.
As Department of Justice officials publicly acknowledge in
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 9,
1996, in cases where private facilities do not voluntarily
permit access to inspection a criminal warrant would be
required. Obtaining such a warrant from a court, however, would
require demonstration of probable cause. This will be
impossible in many cases, be-
cause under the Chemical Weapons Convention the nation
requesting an inspection need not cite its reasons for making
such a request.
Hence, the treaty poses an insoluble dilemma. Should the
U.S. Government choose to respect its citizens Fourth Amendment
rights not to be subjected involuntarily to searches in absence
of judicial warrants? It will be creating a precedent that
other countries will assuredly cite to refuse onsite
inspections in their territories. If we do not do it, do not
expect them to do it. On the other hand, should the Government
choose not to respect the Fourth Amendment rights it will be
acting unconstitutionally.
But it gets worse, Mr. Chairman, for in addition to
threatening our Fourth Amendment rights, the convention also
undercuts our Fifth Amendment rights against having our
property taken by the Government without just compensation. You
are familiar with Judge Robert Bork, who noted in a letter to
Senator Hatch last August, quote, Fifth Amendment problems
arise from the authority of inspectors to collect data and
analyze samples. This may constitute an illegal search and an
illegal seizure, and perhaps constitute the taking of private
property by the Government without compensation. The foreign
inspectors will not be subject to punishment for any theft of
proprietary information.
Mr. Chairman, these are very grave constitutional issues
that need to be resolved before the CWC is ratified. To wait
until after the convention is ratified and its provisions
become the supreme law of the land would be an act of supreme
folly.
Yet there is another pernicious aspect of this convention
that I would like to touch on, the very different impact it
would have on large and small companies. As former Secretary of
Defense Don Rumsfeld noted in testimony before this committee
last week, big companies are generally better able than small
companies to withstand additional reporting, regulatory, and/or
government inspection requirements. Some might even regard such
burdens as a barrier to entry that can enhance their market
share at the expense of their smaller competitors.
Now, large chemical manufacturers are among the most
pervasively regulated industries in the world. These companies
can reasonably conclude that the burdens of this convention are
manageable. The same certainly cannot be said of smaller, less
regulated companies, many of whom still seem to be unaware that
this treaty could adversely affect them and their bottom lines.
The array of American companies that fall into this category is
simply mind-boggling. They include those in such diverse fields
as electronics, plastics, automotive, biotech, food processing,
brewers, distillers, textiles, nonnuclear utility operators,
detergents and soaps, cosmetics and fragrances, paints, and
even the manufacture of ball point pen ink. The Senate will be
ill-advised to ratify a convention that could do harm,
unintended harm, to so many American enterprises without truly
compelling reasons to do so.
But finally, Mr. Chairman, in discussing the harmful side
effects of the CWC, I would like to draw your committee's
attention, as many other witnesses have done, to Articles X and
XI. These provisions, which obligate the signatories to
facilitate the fullest possible exchange of technology directly
relevant to chemical war fighting will be cited by other
governments, and maybe even by some American companies, as
pretexts for doing business with Iran and Cuba with adverse
consequences for U.S. National interests.
These then, Mr. Chairman, are just some of the costs
associated with ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. They
are unacceptably high. Are there any offsetting benefits?
Unfortunately, the answer is no, there are not. In fact, and
this is critical, far from protecting us against an outbreak of
chemical warfare, the convention would increase the likelihood
of these awful weapons being used.
As former Defense Secretaries Jim Schlesinger, Cap
Weinberger, and Don Rumsfeld wrote in last month's Washington
Post, it was March 5th, quote, the CWC would likely have the
effect of leaving the United States and its allies more, not
less, vulnerable to chemical attack. How would the CWC increase
our vulnerability to chemical attack? By giving rise, and this
has happened before in our history, to a false sense of
security and a diminished program for defending our troops and
our people against the danger of chemical attack by leading the
American people to believe that with this convention we have
somehow rid the world of chemical weapons when in fact even the
CWC's defenders acknowledge that it will be unverifiable,
unenforceable, and ineffective in globally banning chemical
weapons.
Historically, Mr. Chairman, phony arms control treaties
have invariably translated into reduced efforts by the
democracies to defend themselves against the predatory
dictatorships. Sadly, there is no reason to suppose that the
CWC will prove an exception to this general rule.
Mr. Chairman, if some of our best defense experts warn us
that this treaty will harm our vital security interests, if it
will lead to the creation of a massive intrusive U.N.-style
bureaucracy costing taxpayers as much as $200 million annually,
and if on top of all that it will diminish our competitiveness,
render us more vulnerable to economic espionage, endanger some
of or constitutional rights, and impose unfunded Federal
mandates on thousands of American companies, many of whom do
not even make chemical weapons, why on Earth should the
convention be ratified? To demonstrate leadership? But surely,
real leadership requires a willingness to stand alone if
necessary to defend our vital interests and ultimately the
interests of freedom-loving people around the world, not to
sacrifice those interests on the alter of a misguided
bureaucratic global consensus.
Unfortunately, that apparently is not the way President
Clinton understands U.S. leadership. He would have us be a
leader in implementing a global agenda consisting of
multinational accords that a majority of the American people
simply do not support. Like the CWC, these multinational
accords, whether they relate to the environment, patents,
property rights, the way we educate our kids, defraying the
costs of U.N. operations, or protecting our homes, are
unwelcome intrusions on American sovereignty. The best way to
resist all of this is simply to stop the present treaty.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, it speaks volumes about what is
wrong with the present CWC that its proponents declare that the
United States might become a pariah nation like Libya, Iraq,
and North Korea, if we do not ratify it. Surely only hardened
anti-American propagandists, deluded one worlders, can ever
entertain the idea that the United States is akin to North
Korea, Libya, and other pariah states. After all, these pariah
nations are developing and manufacturing chemical weapons at
the same time that America is destroying its stockpile of such
weapons. It is a sign of desperation, as well as an insult to
all Americans that President Clinton and some of his allies are
advancing this argument in order to defend a convention that is
truly indefensible.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to testify before this
distinguished committee today.
There are many compelling reasons to oppose ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. The fact is that the Chemical Weapons
Convention significantly threatens the freedoms we Americans cherish,
significantly diminishes America's sovereignty, and, significantly
increases America's vulnerability to chemical warfare. It's as though
we were being asked to endorse a drug that worsens the disease it
purports to cure and, in addition, has some highly dangerous side
effects.
To explain just how dangerous the CWC's side effects are, let me
ask the distinguished members of this committee a simple question. What
is the basis of America's greatness? Why is it that although the
international arena contains many powers, we are the world's sole
superpower? Any adequate answer to this question would have to include
such factors as the competitive nature of our free market system, the
unparalleled technological sophistication of American enterprises, and,
most important, our basic freedom. These are the sinews of our power,
the basis of our national greatness. Yet it is precisely these
quintessentially American strengths that the Convention would
undermine.
Let me begin by talking about American competitiveness. As I have
strenuously argued on other occasions, maintaining America's
competitive edge requires a lessening of the tax and regulatory burdens
on the American people and our Nation's enterprises. Unfortunately, the
CWC will have precisely the opposite effect. It will burden up to 8,000
companies across the United States with major new reporting, regulatory
and inspection requirements entailing large and uncompensated
compliance costs. These added costs constitute an added federal
mandate. Like so many unfunded mandates, they are bound to retard our
economic growth and make our companies less competitive.
Isn't it ironic, Mr. Chairman, meeting here on Tax Day and
concerned as we all are with reducing America's tax burden, that we
should even consider ratifying a Convention that amounts to a new tax
on some of our most innovative and productive companies?
But it gets worse. For in addition to the costs arising from heavy-
duty reporting, the Chemical Weapons Convention subjects our chemical
companies to snap inspections that will allow other nations access to
our latest chemical equipment and information. No longer will violators
of intellectual property rights in China, Iran and elsewhere have to go
to the trouble of pirating our secrets; incredibly, we ourselves will
hand them the stuff on a silver platter. No wonder former CIA Director
and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, has called the Convention a
``godsend'' for foreign intelligence services.
But it gets worse. The CWC threatens the constitutional rights
guaranteed Americans under the Fourth Amendment. As former Defense
Secretaries Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger noted
last September in a joint letter to Majority Leader Trent Lott, ``the
CWC will jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights by requiring
the U.S. government to permit searches without either warrants or
probable cause.''
``Jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights''--think about
that, Mr. Chairman. And think about all the criminal cases that our
courts have summarily dismissed because, in their view, the defendants'
constitutional rights had been violated by police searches conducted
without ``probable cause.'' Are America's businesses to receive less
justice than suspected felons? Of course not--the very idea is
preposterous! And yet, that is precisely what compliance with the CWC
would entail.
As Department of Justice officials publicly acknowledged in
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 9, 1996, in
cases where private facilities do not voluntarily permit access to
inspection, a criminal warrant would be required. Obtaining a warrant
from a court, however, would require demonstration of probable cause.
This will be impossible in most cases, because under the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the nation requesting an inspection need not cite
its reasons for making such a request.
Hence, the treaty would post an insoluble dilemma. Should the U.S.
government choose to respect its citizens' Fourth Amendment rights not
to be subjected involuntarily to searches in the absence of judicial
warrants, it will be creating a precedent that other countries will
assuredly cite to refuse on-site inspections in their territories. On
the other hand, should the government choose not to respect those
Fourth Amendment rights, it will be acting unconstitutionally.
But it gets worse. For in addition to threatening our Fourth
Amendment rights, the Convention also undercuts our Fifth Amendment
rights against having our property taken by the government without just
compensation. As Judge Robert Bork noted in a letter to Sen. Orrin
Hatch last August:
* * * Fifth Amendment problems arise from the authority of
inspectors to collect data and analyze samples. This may
constitute an illegal seizure and, perhaps, constitute the
taking of private property by the government without
compensation. The foreign inspectors will not be subject to
punishment for any theft of proprietary information.
Mr. Chairman, these are very grave constitutional issues that need
to be resolved before the CWC is ratified. To wait until after the
Convention is ratified and its provisions become the ``supreme law of
the land'' would be an act of supreme folly.
There is yet another pernicious aspect of this Convention that I
would like to touch on--the very different impact it would have on
large and small companies. As former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld noted in testimony before this Committee last week, big
companies are generally better able than small companies to withstand
additional reporting, regulatory and/or government inspection
requirements. Some might even regard such burdens as a barrier to entry
that can enhance their market-share at the expense of their smaller
competitors.
Large chemical manufacturers are among the most pervasively
regulated industries in the world. These companies can reasonably
conclude that the burdens of this Convention are manageable.
The same certainly cannot be said of smaller, less regulated
companies--many of whom still seem to be unaware that this treaty could
adversely affect them and their bottom lines. The array of American
companies that fall into this category is simply mindboggling. They
include those in such diverse fields as electronics, plastics,
automotive, biotech, food processing, brewers, distillers, textiles,
non-nuclear electric utility operators, detergents and soaps, cosmetics
and fragrances, paints, and even manufacturers of ballpoint pen ink.
The Senate would be ill-advised to ratify a Convention that could harm
so many American enterprises without having truly compelling reasons to
do so.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, in discussing the harmful side effects of
the Chemical Weapons Convention, I would like to draw your Committee's
attention to Articles X and XI. These provisions, which obligate the
signatories to ``facilitate the fullest possible exchange'' of
technology directly relevant to chemical war-fighting, will be cited by
other governments--and, probably, by some American companies--as
pretexts for doing business with Iran and Cuba, with adverse
consequences for U.S. national security interests.
These, then, are some of the costs associated with ratification of
the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are unacceptably high. Are there
any offsetting benefits? Unfortunately, the answer is no, there aren't.
In fact, far from protecting us against an outbreak of chemical
warfare, the Convention would increase the likelihood of these awful
weapons being used. As former Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger,
Caspar Weinberger and Donald Rumsfeld wrote in last month's Washington
Post (March 5), ``The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the
United States and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical
attack.''
How would the CWC increase our vulnerability to chemical attack? By
giving rise to a false sense of security and a diminished program for
defending our troops and people against the danger of chemical attack.
By leading the American people to believe that with this Convention we
have somehow rid the world of chemical weapons when, in fact, even the
CWC's defenders acknowledge that it will be unverifiable, unenforceable
and ineffective in globally banning chemical weapons. Historically,
phony arms control treaties have invariably translated into reduced
efforts by the democracies to defend themselves against the predatory
dictatorships. Sadly, there is no reason to suppose that the Chemical
Weapons Convention will prove an exception to this general rule.
Mr. Chairman, if some of our best defense experts warn us that this
treaty will harm our vital security interests? If it will lead to the
creation of a massive, intrusive, U.N.-style bureaucracy costing
American taxpayers as much as $200 million annually? And if, on top of
all that, it will diminish our competitiveness, render us vulnerable to
economic espionage, endanger our constitutional rights, and impose
unfunded federal mandates on thousands of American companies, none of
whom even make chemical weapons, why on earth should the Convention be
ratified? To demonstrate ``leadership''? But surely, real leadership
requires a willingness to stand alone, if necessary, to defend our
vital interests and ultimately the interests of freedom-loving peoples
around the world--not to sacrifice those interests on the altar of a
misguided, bureaucratic global consensus.
Unfortunately, that apparently is not the way President Clinton
understands U.S. leadership. He would have us to be a ``leader'' in
implementing a global agenda consisting of multinational accords that a
majority of the American people simply do not support. Like the
Chemical Weapons Convention, these multinational accords--whether they
relate to the environment, patents or other property rights, or to the
ways in which we educate our children, defray the costs of the U.N.
operations or protect our homes--are unwelcome intrusions on American
sovereignty. The best way to resist them is to stop the present treaty.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, it speaks volumes about what is wrong with
the present Chemical Weapons Convention that its proponents declare
that the United States will become a pariah nation like Libya, Iraq and
North Korea if we do not ratify it. Surely, only hardened anti-American
propagandists and deluded One-Worlders could ever entertain the idea
that the United States is akin to North Korea, Libya, etc. After all,
these pariahs are developing and manufacturing chemical weapons at the
same time we are destroying ours. It is a sign of desperation, as well
as an insult to every American, that President Clinton and his friends
are advancing this argument in order to defend a Convention that is
truly indefensible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your gracious attention.
The Chairman. I suggest, anticipating that additional
Senators will appear, there are afternoon committee meetings
going on, as well, in other areas of the Capitol. I suggest
that we embark on about a 7.5 minute round of questions.
First of all, I am going to use a few minutes of my time to
say that my dear friend, the Senator from Delaware, never
disappoints me. Somehow he always comes up with statistics that
I do not know where they came from, and I do not know that he
can explain them, either. But here he did it again today. But I
am concerned, I must say to my friend, that the administration
has becoming expert in low-balling the number of businesses
that will be affected by the chemical weapons treaty, in order,
I think obviously, to avert concern in the Senate.
Now, back in 1993 the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment reported that the administration believed that over
11,200 facilities would be subject to this treaty. During the
past 4 years, that number has gone down like the Titanic. It
dropped to 6,300 in October 1994, and then to 3,000 in May
1996. Now, continuing the trend of the CWC's seemingly ever-
shrinking impact upon business, ACDA is now declaring that only
2,000 companies will be affected. Lord knows what it is going
to be tomorrow morning at 10.
Yet when I review the response codes on ACDA's industry
data base, it seems to me that the administration has simply
developed now new information about 5,583 of these facilities
to confirm or deny--confirm or deny--that they would be
affected by the CWC. In fact, as of last year only 668
facilities in the entire country had responded to ACDA in
recognition of the fact that they would have new regulatory
obligations under the CWC. This means that even CMA-owned
facilities have not responded to ACDA's industry survey
questionnaire.
Accordingly, I do not think it is appropriate for the
administration to reduce their estimates when the companies
themselves have not responded one way or the other, or to
confirm or deny that they use or produce the chemicals that are
subject to the treaty. Accordingly, I think there are serious
problems with the statistics that may have already been
presented today by my friend, or subsequent to that.
Now, Mr. Forbes, the CWC will require the Lord knows how
many American companies to fill out detailed data declarations.
Some companies have conducted comprehensive internal cost
reviews of their own, based on the instruction manual and draft
regulations compiled by the Commerce Department. The cost
estimates associated with the reporting burden range from
$1,500 to $2,000 for two small companies producing discrete
organic chemicals, up to $250,000 estimated by a large
diversified company.
Now, my question to you, sir, is do you think the
advantages of this treaty, if any, are sufficient to warrant
subjecting American companies to this new regulatory burden?
Mr. Forbes. Absolutely not. Even putting aside the fact
that other nations can easily circumvent this treaty, just as
other nations violated the 1925 accord banning the use of
poison gases, even if that is true it will impose a burden on
American companies, and to concentrate on trying to assess what
that burden is, trying to assess how we might reduce it, it
lies in the interpretation of a body over which we will have
little effective control.
And so I do not see what the advantages are to argue,
whether it is going to be 100 facilities or 10,000 facilities,
Mr. Chairman, when you were reciting those numbers I thought
for a moment you were talking maybe about the stock market
going down to 2,000.
But we do not know. It is uncharted territory. We do not
know what kind of inspections it will go to.
When the Iranians put in the request that they have spotted
a challenge inspection somewhere, we do not know. And if we do
not know, what are we doing it for? And given the history of
these agreements and given how easy it is to produce deadly
weapons, I mean, look at Iraq. The most trod on nation in the
world in terms of inspections. Yet Saddam stays one step ahead
of those inspectors. If it cannot work in Iraq, why are we
subjecting ourselves to this in the first place.
The Chairman. According to the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment, to which I referred a minute or so ago,
the U.S. Chemical industry is one of the top five industries
targeted by foreign governments, and the problem of industrial
espionage is growing. Do you agree with that statement?
Mr. Forbes. Yes, and we have seen an example of it last
year.
The Chairman. And because proprietary information is often
the basis for a chemical company's competitive edge, both
nationally and internationally, the theft of trade secrets can
result in major loss of revenue and investment. In fact, the
theft of trade secrets can cripple even a giant company,
according to this report, and can be fatal to a small
enterprise. I suppose that you agree with that assessment by
this government agency.
Mr. Forbes. [Nods affirmatively.]
The Chairman. But in any case, former Secretary of Defense
and Director of Central Intelligence Jim Schlesinger testified
last week, sitting almost where you are sitting right now, that
the CWC would be a godsend, and that is his word, a godsend to
foreign companies and governments engaged in industrial
espionage. My question, sir, is do you agree with Jim's
assessment of that?
Mr. Forbes. I am afraid so, yes.
The Chairman. The Chemical Manufacturer's Association,
which represents the largest--the largest--U.S. Chemical
companies, supports ratification of this treaty. This past
week, as you know, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
suggested that the reason for CMA's support may be due to the
fact that the large companies can cope with the new regulatory
burden and so forth, but these are not surmises, they are the
result of studies by a number of us. My question is how badly
do you think this treaty will harm U.S. industry, and why do
you think the association supports it?
Mr. Forbes. Well, large companies can cope with regulation.
In fact, historians of regulation in America point out that
larger companies often like regulation, often like government
intruding, because that makes it more difficult for competitors
to enter the business and compete. When airlines were
deregulated we got a whole host of new companies coming in.
When telephones were deregulated a whole host of new companies
came in. When railroads were deregulated, short lines
proliferated. So I think he is onto something.
It seems to be in human nature. They are obviously
supporting it with the most honorable of motives. They think it
will be good. But that begs the question. Here we are getting
into almost how many angels dance on a pin arguments about how
many facilities, what kind of chemicals, Schedule III, Schedule
II, which begs the question will this reduce the possibility of
production of poisonous chemicals around the world by nations
that wish to do it. The answer is no.
The Chairman. I thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes and Senator Helms, let me tell you where I got
my numbers. I got my numbers from an analysis done by the
Commerce Department, and the way it explains its previously
higher number--I am reading from a letter signed by former
Secretary of Commerce Mickey Kantor and Philip Lader,
Administrator of the Small Business Administration. And I
quote:
Previously, the administration had estimated that more
companies would be required to submit a data declaration.
However, additional analysis indicated that many did not cross
the CWC production threshold for reporting. Further,
administrative exemptions at the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will be crafted to
exclude entire industries from reporting--biomediated processes
(such as certain beverages), polymers (such as certain plastics
used in football helmets),* * *. In addition, plant sites that
exclusively produce hydrocarbons (e.g., propane and ethylene)
are completely excluded from reporting requirements.
That is why the number is different. Number 1.
Number 2, I might point out that these onerous reporting
requirements are a total of, for Schedule I, I believe, six
pages long, for Schedule II I think it is seven, and Schedule
III it is five. And of Schedule III and the so-called DOC's,
which total roughly 1,900 of the 2,000 companies we are talking
about, the total number of inspections under the treaty
allowed, period, in any 1 year is 20. Let us put this in
perspective--20.
Now, it does not go to the sovereignty argument Mr. Forbes
raised. I understand that. But it goes to the facts--20--t-w-e-
n-t-y--20. And if there are 1,800 of those 1,900 companies, as
I am saying, that are in Schedule III and the so-called DOC's,
if I am right about that, it is 20 out of 1,900. If it is
10,000 or whatever number my friend uses, or 6,000, it is 20.
That is Number 1.
Number 2, on this issue of search warrants, there is a
section in the treaty now, put in at the insistence, I am told,
of President Bush, and it deals with covering the Fourth
Amendment. It is good to see Mr. Gaffney here. Mr. Gaffney, you
staff more people than I have ever seen. You are a very, very
ubiquitous fellow. Every witness we have had against, you have
been staffing, and they are fortunate to have your expertise.
``In meeting the requirement to provide access as specified
in paragraph''--I am reading from the Verification Annex of
Challenge Inspections. ``In meeting the requirement to provide
access as specified in paragraph 38, the inspected State Party
shall be under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of
access, taking into account any constitutional obligation it
may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and
seizures.'' But assuming that was not sufficient, which it
clearly is legally, assuming that was not sufficient, we are
prepared to accept a condition to the treaty requiring search
warrants for challenge inspections and the establishment of
probable cause.
Now, I might also point out there is--this is black letter
law, what I am referring to now. We are not talking about any
hyperbole on my part about how search warrants work and do not
work. The Supreme Court, in Marshal v. Barlow's, Incorporated,
a decision argued June 9th, 1978, decided May 23rd, 1978, which
is the prevailing law, talks about administrative warrants,
criminal warrants, and those inspections where no warrant is
required. And I might add, Federal law authorizing warrantless
searches, which I am sure, I suspect Mr. Forbes, you would
disagree with all these, but in fact I am citing what the law
is. I am not implying that you agree what the law should be. I
would imagine you do not think there should be the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; or the Nursery
Stock Guarantee Act; or Immigration and Naturalization Act; or
Toxic Substance Control Act; Consumer Product Safety Act;
National Forest System Drug Control Act; Bald Eagle Protection
Act; Migratory Bird Treaty; Skies Act; Fisher and Wildlife Act
of 1956; Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982; Whaling
Convention of 1949; Tuna Convention of 1950; Eastern Pacific
Tuna Licensing Act of 1934, Endangered Species Amendments of
1982, Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, Antarctic Marine
Living Resources Convention of 1984, Lacy Act Amendments of
1981; Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act; Federal Meat Inspection
Act; Fisherman's Protective Act; Distillery Spirits Act;
Occupational Health and Safeties Act; Migrant Season
Agricultural Workers Act; Mine Safety and Health Act; Safe
Drinking Water Act; Surface Mining Control Act; Clean Water
Act; Resource Conservation Recovery Act; Clean Air Act;
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability
Act; and Federal Land Policy Management Act. I may have made
the case why the Government is over-reaching. But I also would
argue this makes the case that what is suggested in this treaty
is nothing--nothing--nothing--different than the way in which
the law has worked so far. None of these requires an act.
To walk on your estate to find out whether you are shooting
bald eagles, which I am sure you are not, Mr. Forbes, they are
allowed to do that without a warrant, old buddy. They are
allowed to do that. So there are a lot of things you are
allowed to do without a warrant. But there is a second category
here. Nothing in here can be done without that kind of warrant
if, in fact, any business objects.
There is a second category in the Supreme Court law, and it
is called an administrative warrant. And it says for purposes
of administrative search such as this, and I am reading from
the case and there was an OSHA inspector who wanted to come on,
probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be
based not only on specific evidence of existing violations, but
also on showing that reasonable legislative, administrative
standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular establishment. That is an
administrative warrant.
And third, there is a third kind of warrant, and that is a
criminal warrant.
So we are willing to add a condition to this treaty
requiring a criminal warrant in addition to an administrative
warrant, where I might add under our Constitution and our
Supreme Court now in similar circumstances--because the Court
uses all this test on all Fourth Amendment cases--they use this
notion of whether or not there is reason to believe the party
involved thought they were protected from this kind of
intrusion, whatever it is. And they argue that pervasively
regulated industries start off without the benefit of the
presumption that they would not be inspected without a warrant.
That is the basis on which the Supreme Court could uphold all
of these warrantless inspections or searches.
We are not talking about that. We are talking about
criminal warrants in areas where there are challenge
inspections. And so I hope when you see the condition, which I
would be happy to show you Mr. Forbes, your concern on at least
that one issue will be mildly allayed.
Mr. Forbes. By the way, Senator, I do not shoot bald
eagles, and I do not shoot Democrats, either.
Senator Biden. Well, I will tell you what, if anybody could
shoot Democrats and do it effectively, you are very good at it;
and I mean that in a complimentary way. The way I saw you take
my State by storm, I am glad I was not a Republican standing in
the way of your shots.
Mr. Forbes. Some of my best friends are Democrats.
Senator Biden. And mine Republican.
The Chairman. I have just got one question. Did you
understand the question?
Senator Biden. Well, I did not hear the answer, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. I am trying to be diplomatic, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Welcome, Mr. Forbes. Good to have you with us.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagel. As you know, every time I have an
opportunity to be a part of this committee, it is a rather
didactic experience, listening to my colleagues.
I never knew, Senator, that we had that many acts. And the
way you went right through them was magnificent.
Let me, before I ask you a question, Mr. Forbes, make this
observation. I think all my colleagues on this panel and in the
U.S. Senate are coming at this issue based, first, not on what
is good for business, what is bad for business, but what is
good for America, what is in our best security interest.
Mr. Forbes. Right.
Senator Hagel. That is the way I am looking at it.
Obviously we have other elements and dynamics that are involved
in this discussion. We should debate them. We should hear your
views, as the next panel's views will be, I suspect, somewhat
different. But I think it is important that we not lose sight
here of what we are about. And that is dealing with the reality
of a very unstable, very dangerous world. And everybody's
opinion must be heard, but, in the end, it seems to me, and I
think I can speak generally for my colleagues, that we must do
what is right for the security interests of this country.
In particular, the young men and women of our armed forces,
who may some day be called upon to fight in a theater against a
nation that is using chemical weapons. And I think the defining
question for all of us is, does this treaty help them or hurt
them?
Now, with that said, I would like for you to delve in a
little more into Articles X and XI, the transfer of technology,
the obligations of what we share with our treaty friends and
allies. That has gotten an awful lot of attention during the
course of this debate, which I think it should have and is
appropriate. And I noted you mentioned it in your testimony.
And I would like for you to define more of that, if you would.
Mr. Forbes. Well, under Articles X and XI, there is the
very real possibility that if we, one of our companies, we come
up with a way of defending against chemical weapons, that that
technology may end up in the hands of countries around the
world. Countries who sign on to this convention have the right
to request that technology. And we may be obliged to provide
that technology.
And I think that that is a very real danger. The fact that
four defense chiefs believe that we may have to give up
information and technology that could be used for defensive
purposes and would therefore allow a rogue nation to reverse
engineer, to figure out how to possibly get around these
defenses is, I think, a good reason to pause and say, is this
the best way to protect our people in the future?
And if you look at the history of treaties, especially in
the twenties, simply saying you are against poison gases,
against war, as we did in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, or
against armaments, as we did in the Naval Disarmament Treaty of
1922, guarantees, ultimately, nothing. In the 1980's, for
example, Iraq used poison gases against Iran. Iraq used poison
gases against the Kurds. The international community did
nothing, despite that 1925 Geneva agreement.
So the possibility that they could get that kind of
technology and put it to uses to which we do not want it to be
put to use is something that, as I say, should give us real
pause.
Senator Hagel. In your opinion, can this treaty be fixed?
Mr. Forbes. I think you have to ask a very basic question.
Given the nature of chemicals, given the fact that you can take
compounds--what they call precursors or ingredients--that in
and of themselves are harmless, put them together in a basement
laboratory and come up with something that is deadly, should
make us think, is this the best way to protect our people,
where we are subject to interpretations on inspections, but
those who want to do it can do it?
Take Iraq again. They have inspectors on their soil. They
were humiliated in a war. Yet the head of the agency that is in
charge of those inspections said recently that the Iraqis have
more than a handful of missiles, and it looks like they are
playing games again with biological and chemical weapons. If
they can do that under that kind of supposedly severe regime,
who knows what Iran is doing.
We know what Libya is doing in the areas of biology, thanks
in no small part to the Germans. So does this treaty make us
more secure or does it end up being one of those situations
where, despite its good intentions, it does more harm than
good?
I, so far, based on the evidence I have seen as a citizen,
I think it does more harm than good, especially when you look
at the treaties of the twenties. What good did they do when
violators were there?
Senator Hagel. Should we have a chemical weapons treaty?
Can, in your opinion, we produce one?
Mr. Forbes. Well, there is a bill, I understand, Senator
Kyl and others have been putting together that might do
something in terms of something substantive. I have not seen
the bill. So maybe there is a better way to do it. But,
clearly, this convention is not the way to do it, given the
flaws that those defense chiefs and others have pointed out.
Senator Hagel. If I could also refer back to your
testimony, your point about it giving rise to a false sense of
security. Which, I think, by the way, has been overlooked in
some of our deliberations here, and has been easily dismissed,
because it is one of those intangibles that is easy to dismiss.
Would you like to elaborate a little bit on your comment about
a false sense of security?
Mr. Forbes. Well, the classic case are the three treaties
of the twenties, the Naval Disarmament Treaty of the early
twenties, the prohibition against poison gas in the mid-
twenties, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the late-twenties,
that led the British and the democracies--not so much the
French, but certainly the British--to believe that they did not
have to take adequate measures for defense. And once you start
on that slope, it is very hard to reverse it. Because there are
always pressing domestic priorities. We see it today.
We are now downsizing to where our defense spending as a
proportion of our GDP is getting down to below Pearl Harbor
levels. But it is very hard to reverse, given the pressures
that we face each day.
So, also, too, given some of the treaties we had in the
sixties and seventies--look at SALT I--that did not prevent the
Russians from a massive armaments program, which necessitated
our building up in the 1980's. So it goes right up to modern
times.
And also, too, in the early nineties, we did sign an
agreement with the Russians on chemical weapons. And the
evidence indicates that they are going ahead and developing and
producing deadly chemical weapons. They are ignoring what we
signed 6 or 7 years ago.
Senator Hagel. Is there a particular way you get at the
Russian chemical weapons program, in your opinion?
Mr. Forbes. Well, you publicize it. You make it very clear
that this is going to affect our bilateral relations. In other
words--I will give you an example outside of the defense area.
A little over a year ago we were ready to sign an agreement, a
worldwide agreement, on telecommunications. To its credit, this
administration said this is pretty weak stuff, we can do better
to open up those markets. Everyone said, oh, no, this is going
to--our international allies will be upset at us. But, to its
credit, Kantor and others said no, we are going to go for a
better deal.
A few months ago they got a better deal. Because we took
leadership. We had a clear idea on what we wanted. And here are
two signatories, supposedly, of this convention. And here is
the headline: China helps Iran--it was just in the paper on
Sunday--develop chemical arms. The treaty is not worth the
paper it is written on the way it is now.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The Chairman. What do you think, about 2 or 3 minutes a
piece for the next round? You name it.
Senator Biden. Three. If you give me the choice, I will
take the higher.
The Chairman. You go first.
Senator Biden. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes, it is interesting, you cited these treaties and
agreements in the twenties as being useless, yet no chemical
weapons were used in World War II.
Mr. Forbes. They were not used in World War II, because
both sides felt it would be counterproductive to their own
interests.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Forbes. Not because of a treaty.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Forbes. In the 1980's, when Iraq thought it was in its
interests to use it, it did. And the international community
did nothing.
Senator Biden. Right. Now, you acknowledge that does not
have anything to do with whether there is a treaty or is not a
treaty, right?
Mr. Forbes. I am saying it takes U.S. leadership, in terms
of national security, to make things happen. Signing a piece of
paper will not, in and of itself, do it. As you know,
enforcement is key. But, unfortunately, the history of these
treaties suggests that in a democracy, where we would rather be
doing other things, like bettering our lives, than having to
worry about defense, these treaties do have a lulling effect,
where we do not take the necessary steps.
Senator Biden. Well, we did all these arms control treaties
and the cold war is over. Not because of that, but not in spite
of that. I mean it is over. You know, all this stuff, these
horrible treaties we signed and these arms control treaties, it
is amazing, the Soviet Union is gone, in spite of the fact that
we lulled ourself to sleep with all those things. It just
amazes me how that happened.
Mr. Forbes. No. What happened, as you know, in the late-
seventies, we were in serious trouble. We were in serious
trouble here at home. The Soviet Union was on a major arms
buildup. It gratuitously, because it did not respect our
leadership, invaded Afghanistan. And that led, as it does in a
democracy, in the American democracy, to a sense of alarm, a
sense of renewal. And that is how we got the buildup of the
eighties. Ronald Reagan stood strong, and we won the cold war.
If we continued the policies of the seventies, we would
still have the cold war today.
Senator Biden. Well, what you are saying is, if we continue
the policy of being strong and staying vigilant and have arms
control treaties, they work in tandem. That is what Reagan did,
did he not? He is the guy that gave us START. He is the guy
that had this buildup and also got rid of the nuclear weapons,
right?
Mr. Forbes. Because he did it--he had credibility to make
the agreements work.
Senator Biden. I see. I see.
Mr. Forbes. And this agreement, even if you have Ronald
Reagan--he said--Ronald Reagan said ``Trust, but verify.''
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Forbes. The villains here are not trustworthy.
Senator Biden. And he drafted the treaty.
Mr. Forbes. The villains here are not trustworthy, and you
cannot verify what the North Koreans are doing or even what
signatories like the Iranians or the Chinese may be doing. So
this is a treaty, unlike some of the earlier arms agreements,
this is one where the U.S. leadership is going to be for
naught. You cannot do it.
Senator Biden. Have you seen an arms control agreement you
like?
Mr. Forbes. The test ban of 1963 was good, sure.
Senator Biden. How about the one now? How about the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty now?
Mr. Forbes. Fine. Fine. That is where judgment----
Senator Biden. Mr. Gaffney just blanched. He is going to
work on you on the way out.
I expect, by next campaign, you will have a different view.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Why do not you go ahead. I will go last.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes, would you go back and talk a little bit about
your earlier statements, the effect on smaller, less regulated
companies, in your opinion, this treaty would have.
Mr. Forbes. Well, this is, as you can see by the numbers
that are being bandied about and how you interpret what is in
the convention and what we promise we might add to the
convention, makes it a whole murky area. We are on uncharted
waters. And to say gee, it is going to be simple, the initial
requirements, given the nature of bureaucracies--we know they
do not say give us less paper--usually one thing leads to
another.
Senator Hagel. Well, I was interested very much in Mr.
Rumsfeld's comments when he was here last week. What he was
going beyond getting to was it would have, in his opinion, this
treaty, a very inhibiting factor on young, small companies. And
Senator Biden has, I think, addressed some of that. And I guess
where we all have to come down to is where is the truth here.
And I had an opportunity to be with Senator Biden last week on
some of this. But that is a factor that I think is very
important here. Because these young companies that are the
engines of our economy should not have to carry a
disproportionate burden here if we would go forward with this
treaty or some form of this treaty.
And if you would like to, especially from your perspective,
come at this in some way, I would be grateful for any other
comments you want to make on this.
Mr. Forbes. Well, as you know, it is conceptual, because we
do not know how the new body in The Hague is going to--how
vigorous it is going to be in terms of these intrusive
inspections. We also do not know about the so-called challenge
inspections, whether they are going to be used against a
smaller company, which could put it out of business. This is
uncharted territory. But history shows that when you have
regulations, when you have to keep track of things not for a
business purpose but for a potential inspection or actual
filings, it does have a cost and an inhibiting effect.
And you can see the nature of bureaucracies. Look what
happened to telecommunications. We passed a bill a little over
a year ago that said it was supposed to remove some of the
shackles. The way it has been interpreted by the courts and the
FCC, it is just as regulated as before--almost as regulated as
before.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes, what do you think of the drop
dead date of April 29th? They say that the whole thing will
collapse and we will be at the mercy of all these rogue nations
if we do not ratify this treaty by the 29th, but we will have
to pay one-fourth of the cost nonetheless. Does that make any
difference to you?
Mr. Forbes. Yes. And unfortunately, when you urge other
nations to ratify something in order to trigger a date like
April 29th, I think that shows a lack of good faith. And this,
again, gets to leadership. If we were truly interested in
looking at this in a timely but reasoned way, without an
artificial deadline, maybe we could strengthen the treaty. I do
not think so. But to put an arbitrary date and say the world
will come to an end, when we help engineer that date, I think
we should say----
The Chairman. Well, it was clearly put there, do you not
think, to stampede the Congress, or the Senate, to say that
boy, we got to do this by the 29th of April or the whole world
collapses? I have heard it over and over and over again, and it
does not hold any water at all.
But let me tell you what has happened. I think that the
effort by some in the media, the Washington Post and the New
York Times and some like that, that have advocated this treaty
to the point of absurdity--there have been other newspapers--
the Wall Street Journal has done a good job, your magazine has
done a good job, and some others--but for the most part, the
American people were not paying any attention to this treaty
actually. So the result was that they could say 73 or 83
percent of the people approved the treaty.
Well, all of a sudden, the worm turned and the contents of
this treaty were being analyzed in the media, particularly on
the radio and in television. And I have a poll here that shows
a total sample, total support as of April the 5th was 31
percent for the treaty--31 percent of the people support the
treaty; 60 percent oppose it.
Now, in my own office they keep track of the calls,
particularly when I am involved in an issue. And even in my
home State a lot of people, even though they support me, they
kept reading in the liberal media that this was such a great
and grand thing and only idiots would oppose. And so that had
some effect. It was about 50/50 in my State. Now it is about
80/20. And in our telephone calls, we had 83 calls yesterday
relating to this treaty.
How many do you think supported it?
Three. Eighty now oppose it. So I think they have
overplayed their hands.
I see Senator Kerry is here. And we had agreed on 3 and a
half minutes. Is that what we said? We are glad to have you,
sir.
Senator Kerry. Well, that is time for a good dialog, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes, I have been interested to see that the Chemical
Manufacturers' Association, the Synthetic Organic
Manufacturers' Association, the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers' Association of America, the Biotechnology
Industry Organization, the American Chemical Society, the
American Physical Society, the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers, the Council for Chemical Research, and several other
chemical trade organizations all strongly support the CWC. And
they urge us to vote to ratify it. And they all insist that it
will not pose an undue burden on business.
The National Federation of Independent Businesses responded
to treaty opponents' claims that they were opposed by saying
that those claims were 100 percent incorrect, according to the
Wall Street Journal, which also quotes an NFIB official as
predicting its members are not going to be impacted, contrary
to your statement about small business.
So I really need your help in understanding what is the
documentation here. On what do you base this notion? If the
chemical industry, which is the industry that subjects itself
to inspections, is for it, and they are threatened by the loss
of some $600 billion worth of business, why are you so
convinced they are wrong? And what evidence do you have to
support that they are wrong and cannot look out for their own
interests?
Mr. Forbes. Well, first of all, as a general matter, there
is no way that--the CWC is unverifiable and unenforceable with
states like Iran, China, not to mention those that are not
going to even sign the thing. The question now comes, how
intrusive will it be on the United States?
Don Rumsfeld, who had testified here last week, who has
been in a large business, made the point that historians have
made. And that is big businesses can cope with regulations
better than small businesses. As a matter of fact, when you
have a regulatory regime, it makes it harder for small
businesses to get in and compete. And they figure that since
they are heavily regulated anyway, they can put up with this
kind of regime.
But the fact of it really is not whether it is good for the
Chemical Manufacturers' Association, the question is, is it
enforceable, is it verifiable, is it good for the interests of
the United States? Because if it is not good for America, then
we should not do it just because a trade association says it
might benefit our members. So big companies, as a rule, can
cope with regulations, but small businesses can less cope with
regulations. And the real problem is not just routine
inspections--we can cope with those--but so-called challenge
inspections. And that is unchartered territory.
Senator Kerry. Well, the challenge inspections, according
to every observer, are going to take place primarily at
military facilities. Nobody anticipates a series of major
challenges at the commercial facilities.
Mr. Forbes. Well, given the nature, as you know, of----
Senator Kerry. And we are not looking at small
manufacturers here. I mean you are aware, are you not----
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Given, Senator, the nature of the
manufacture of chemical weapons, since it can be done in a
basement or a bathtub----
Senator Kerry. Correct.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. It may need to be--experts say it
should not need to go beyond military bases. But with chemical
weaponry, since you can manufacture it almost anywhere, you may
need a challenge inspection.
Senator Kerry. Well, let us follow that through. It can be
manufactured anywhere, correct? It can be manufactured
anywhere, even as we sit here today, correct?
Mr. Forbes. Well, you look at Iraq----
Senator Kerry. Just follow me through. Just follow the
thinking.
Mr. Forbes. Yes, OK.
Senator Kerry. It can be manufactured anywhere, as we sit
here today, can it not?
Mr. Forbes. Yes.
Senator Kerry. And this regime, this CWC, you are aware, is
going to take effect no matter what we do; you are aware of
that?
Mr. Forbes. Yes.
Senator Kerry. So as of April 29th, a date that you want to
discard, something is going to happen, is it not? Correct?
Mr. Forbes. Not if we take leadership.
Senator Kerry. No, no matter what we do, something happens.
You are absolutely incorrect.
Mr. Forbes. No, Senator----
Senator Kerry. On April 29th, the group that organizes the
process of inspections takes its work without the United States
of America, because we have not ratified it. Only those who
have ratified are part of that; is that not correct?
Mr. Forbes. OK.
Senator Kerry. So, no matter what we do, on April 29th, I
think it is 70 nations are going to sit down at a table and
say, OK, how do we go about the business of doing what the
United States asked us to do, but now does not want to do,
correct?
Mr. Forbes. That is one way to put it. There is another way
to put it.
Senator Kerry. Is that not accurate?
Mr. Forbes. What is your question? Because I believe----
Senator Kerry. My question was very simple. Is not that
fact going to happen? Are they not going to sit at a table,
without the United States, if we do not ratify it?
Mr. Forbes. They may sit at a table, but if the United
States takes the lead, that treaty can be rewritten. We helped
trigger that April 29th date by asking other nations to ratify
that convention, so that trigger date came in. It was a cynical
ploy by this administration to put the Senate in a box and say,
if you do not ratify this, you are harming the future by
allowing chemicals out there. They are using symbol over
substance. And I think it is a shame that we have been put in
that box. And we should say no.
As I pointed out earlier, in a whole other area, in
telecommunications, for once this administration took a proper
lead, over a year ago. There was a bad agreement on the table.
Kantor said we can do better. Our allies said we cannot do
better. He said we can. We went back to the table. We got a
better agreement. And it was put on the table again this year
and everyone praised it as being better than it was for
American interests a year ago.
So we put ourselves in the box, and a great nation should
say, if we put ourselves in a box and it is not good for
America and not good for the world, we can take ourselves out
of the box.
Senator Kerry. Well, let me address that. You are a
promoter and have been--and I admire what you and your family
have done to promote capitalism and the notion of
entrepreneurship. As an entrepreneur, having signed on to this
treaty--72 nations is the number that have ratified it--they
will now be in a position where they can engage in a formal
trade, under Schedule II, chemicals. But any nation that is not
a participant is not going to be able to engage in that,
correct?
Now, as an entrepreneur, if you were part of a nation that
has signed on to it, you are going to be greatly advantaged.
Because the United States of America's chemical companies are
not going to be allowed to engage in the transfer of these
chemicals under this treaty. So all of the entrepreneurs in
these other countries are going to be sitting there licking
their chops and saying, wow, we sure have a great capitalist
opportunity here to make money at the expense of the United
States of America.
That is what all our chemical companies think today.
Mr. Forbes. Senator, if a treaty is not good for America,
then we should not ratify it.
Senator Kerry. Well, what do you think about what I just
said?
Mr. Forbes. And if that is blood money, selling chemicals
to nations that should not have that stuff in the first place,
like Iran and China and some others, we should not be making
those sales in the first place. We denied ourselves sales
during the cold war, hurt our commercial interests, because we
felt it was in our national interest. We should not hesitate to
do so again.
Senator Kerry. But we do not sell to any of those
countries, because they are all embargoed under trade
restrictions.
Mr. Forbes. Yes, but under the----
Senator Kerry. It is not blood money to us. We do not sell
to them.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. But you just said before we are
going to lose sales opportunities.
Senator Kerry. We are going to lose sales opportunities,
because we are not allowed to trade among the ratified
countries.
Mr. Forbes. Iran and China are signing on to this thing
apparently.
Senator Kerry. But then they are subject to challenge
inspection.
Mr. Forbes. Big deal. Iraq is the most regulated nation in
the world in terms of inspections and the U.N.--and the chief
inspector has just told us that Saddam still stays one step
ahead. He is still making the missiles. He is still making and
doing biological and chemical research.
Senator Kerry. We are not talking about Iraq.
Mr. Forbes. He is even still fooling around with nukes. If
it can happen in Iraq, it can happen anywhere. I do not care
how many inspections you have.
Senator Kerry. We are not talking about Iraq. We are
talking about Iran.
Mr. Forbes. No. We are talking about Iraq is the most
inspected nation on Earth today. And my point is that we have
more inspections----
Senator Kerry. And we know exactly what they are doing
pretty much.
Mr. Forbes. Yes, right. Exactly.
Seriously, the head of the agency, Senator, who did the
inspection, just told us the other day that Saddam is still
doing stuff he should not be doing.
Senator Kerry. Correct.
Mr. Forbes. And they have a hard time keeping up with him.
If they have a hard time keeping up in Iraq, what of North
Korea, Iran, Libya?
Senator Kerry. But, you see, what you seem to--and I think
many of the critics of the treaty--seem to ignore is the fact
that we are not going to produce these weapons anyway, Number
1. We do not sell to these people anyway, Number 2. And we do
not have a regime today for any kind of inspection of
accountability on the transfer of the precursor chemicals.
Therefore, what you gain with this, while not perfection--none
of us have alleged that any treaty--well, I will not say any
treaty--that almost any treaty provides you with a foolproof--
certainly as to chemical weapons and biowarfare weapons, I do
not think there is any such thing as a verifiable, foolproof
treaty, because of where you can produce this.
The question is, are you better off with a structure that
affords you some mechanism of tracing precursor chemicals, some
responsibility of companies for reporting, some system of
accountability through challenge and regular inspection, or
none at all, as well as being outside of the sales? Now, that
is really the issue.
The Chairman. We will let Mr. Forbes answer that without
interruption, and then we will go to the next panel.
Mr. Forbes. OK. The ease with which you can make chemical
weapons today--you can do it in a basement, you can do it in a
bathtub--the ease with which you can do it makes this treaty
unverifiable and unenforceable. The danger from doing this
treaty, especially in a democracy, as we saw in the twenties
and thirties, it will give us a false sense of security that,
by golly, we have dealt with it.
Now, you have said, and I admire your candor, it is not
perfect. But, yet, the administration goes out there--he did it
with the newspaper editors and he has done it in speeches,
making it sound like this is a foolproof protection for our
kids, we have got to do it or they are all going to be blasted
away. So a bill of goods is being sold.
At best, this is a flawed treaty that is going to do little
or no good. And so, therefore, why lull ourselves with a false
sense of security? I think we saw in the twenties and thirties
where that led. We saw it in the seventies, where that led. Why
repeat history?
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank you so much, Mr. Forbes, for being
here with us today and for coming. I know it is some
inconvenience to yourself on short notice.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
it.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Biden. See you in Delaware, Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Now we will have panel Number 2, consisting
of seven distinguished ladies and gentlemen. [Pause.]
Senator Biden. If you all can agree on your seating, I am
sure then that we can work this treaty out.
The Chairman. Our second panel consists of friends of all
of us. Sometimes you have to agree to disagree agreeably, and
that is the way we will do it. But in Joe's case, in one or two
instances, he will say huzzah, hooray and so forth.
The panel, from my left to my right, is Mr. Wayne Spears,
who is president of the Spears Manufacturing Company at Sylmar,
California; and Mr. Ralph B. Johnson, vice president of
Environmental Affairs, Dixie Chemical Company, of Houston; Mr.
Kevin L. Kearns, president of the United States Business and
Industrial Council.
Senator Biden. It is good to see you.
The Chairman. The Hon. Kathleen C. Bailey--and how you do
add to the looks of this crowd, I tell you that--senior fellow
at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore,
California; the Hon. Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant
Secretary of Commerce; Fred Webber, whom we have all known,
president of the Chemical Manufacturers' Association; and the
Hon. William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration.
And Mr. Spears, you may lead off, because that is the order
they said that I was supposed to follow.
Senator Biden. Perhaps Mr. Kearns could go first.
The Chairman. Oh, you want Mr. Kearns. All right. Mr.
Kearns, we will hear from you. Go right ahead.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN L. KEARNS, PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES BUSINESS
AND INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL
Mr. Kearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
back testifying before this committee, where I served as a
State Department Pierson Fellow on Senator Helms' staff from
1988 to 1989. When I went back to the State Department, I
headed an office called the Office of Strategic Trade, and we
dealt with many of the issues that are before this committee
today.
Since I left the State Department, I have been president of
the U.S. Business and Industrial Council. We represent mainly
family owned, closely held businesses--what I would call
medium-sized business. There is not a good definition, really,
of size below large business. But our employers have between
100 and 800 employees. They are involved in various fields.
Some of them are specialty chemical manufacturers, autos, food
processing, brewing, you name it, USBIC members are in these
industries. And we have been around since 1933. We do not lobby
for a specific industry or a company; we are here to give a
voice to small- and mid-sized businesses in public policy
debates.
We take strong exception to the Chemical Weapons
Convention. We do not believe it is in the best interest of the
United States or American business. Many of the reasons have
been discussed by Mr. Forbes and were brought up by the three
secretaries last week.
We believe that, first of all, the CWC represents an
unjustifiable erosion of American sovereignty. It seems, time
after time, treaty after treaty, decade after decade, the U.S.
gives up a bit of its sovereignty to one international body or
another. And the results, generally, I think, are not good for
the United States. When I look at the world today, it is not a
hospitable place. And I do not feel comfortable that
international bureaucrats, drawn from so many of these
countries where there is strife or repression or many other
problems, are the best guarantors of American interests.
At the Business and Industrial Council, we believe that the
single best guarantor of American interests is American
strength and power. We have wielded that, for the most part,
over the centuries well. And we do not place our hopes for the
future and the future of our kids on supranational
organizations.
USBIC members are little guys, compared to perhaps some of
the members of the Chemical Manufacturers Association or
others. We have trouble with red tape now, with OSHA, with EPA,
with the IRS, with State regulatory agencies, in the sense that
they add a tremendous burden to the costs of our doing
business, without adding another burden, or other burdens,
under this treaty.
The large-sized companies, these large-scale companies, can
afford big lobbying organizations in Washington. They can
afford representation before international bodies. They all
have offices, or many of them do, in Brussels, before the EC,
et cetera. They have offices in various Asian capitals. They
have the staff, they have the resources to cope with regulatory
burdens. Smaller businesses are already drowning in a sea of
red tape.
And I might add that the Fortune 500 have not created a
single net new job in this country in 20 years. It is small
business and mid-sized business that are creating jobs in this
country, not these large multinationals, which feel free to
move their factories around the world, seeking less regulation,
seeking less bureaucratic red tape, seeking the cheapest labor
available.
One element that I would like to address is the National
Federation of Independent Business, which has come up several
times in this discussion. To say that NFIB members will not be
affected by this treaty is a tautology. That is, the vast
majority of NFIB members are microbusinesses. They are small
businesses, run out of the home. They are luncheonettes. They
are insurance agencies, et cetera.
So I think the fact that people are citing NFIB as a voice
of American business that says American business is not going
to be harmed is wrong. No, that segment of very small
businesses are not going to get challenge inspections--at a
luncheonette, for example. And, believe me, I am not putting
down NFIB members. They are the heart and soul of so many of
our communities, if not all of them. It is just simply
irrelevant to the discussion of this treaty. They are not
people that are involved, by and large, in manufacturing. They
do not handle chemicals. So it is simply irrelevant.
When we look at these various inspections that may be
required under this treaty, I think the fact that Senator Biden
led off with the statistics and how many companies may be
subject to it and what the effect would be on those companies
indicates, really, that the average American business, that is,
a manufacturing business, that is potentially subject to this
treaty really does not know what is going on. I commend the
Chairman and this committee for the efforts made previously and
for these hearings. These businesses really do not understand
the scope of what is happening.
We believe that Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights are in
danger. I do not agree with you, Senator Biden, that the forms
that the Department of Commerce has put out--yes, actually,
filling out the form may take only 2.5 hours. It is the hours--
the hundreds of hours, perhaps, in gathering the information,
seeing if you are using these chemicals, if somehow they are
involved in your manufacturing process, either as something
that you incorporate or that has been incorporated at an
earlier stage. It is very difficult.
The fact that a company may be subject to a fine up to
$50,000 would put many of my members out of business or put
them in a very difficult situation. So you can be sure they are
not going to take 2 hours and simply fill out the form as
quickly as possible. They are going to do their homework. They
know what it is when there is an unannounced OSHA inspection or
an EPA inspection, for instance, coming into their plant or
factory.
So, to conclude--the time goes very fast, I know--the U.S.
Business and Industrial Council opposes this treaty. We do not
think it is in the best interest of the United States, first
and foremost, before we get to the business issues. And we
think it places unnecessary and very heavy burdens on small-
and medium-size business potentially.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Kearns. And if you wish to add
to your statement for the printed record, please do.
Mr. Kearns. Yes, I will submit the rest for the record.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kearns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin L. Kearns
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: My name is Kevin L. Kearns
and I serve as President of two organizations: the United States
Business and Industrial Council and the Council For Government Reform.
The first is a business league and the second is a grassroots lobbying
group. While both groups oppose the Chemical Weapons Convention for the
same reasons, I would like to highlight the business concerns in my
testimony.
First though I would like to thank the Committee for allowing me
the opportunity to testify against what I believe is an ill-advised
treaty. I realize that there are many patriotic Americans on both sides
of this issue, including many distinguished former Cabinet officials
and high-ranking military officers. And that there are difficult issues
involved. However, I believe that on balance the treaty will harm U.S.
interests far more than advance them.
The US Business and Industrial Council was established in 1933 to
give a voice in public policy debates to the thoughts of mid-sized,
family-owned and run American companies. We are an advocacy
organization that takes a national interest approach to public issues.
USBIC is not a trade association and we don't have a PAC. We don't
lobby for an individual company or an industry. We are funded through
memberships from individuals and American firms representing more than
1,000 member companies with over 250,000 employees nation wide.
I believe that USBIC differs from other business organizations
because of the size and composition of our members. They are primarily
family-owned or closely-held companies that maintain close ties to
their community. USBIC members live and work along side their employees
in the city or town where their company is located and believe that
there is more to running a company than just the bottom line on a
balance sheet.
Mr. Chairman, The United States Business and Industrial Council
opposes the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) because we believe that
it is an irreparably flawed treaty. Although we understand that Sen.
Helms is laboring mightily with Sen. Biden to correct both the excesses
and deficiencies, we do not believe that process can correct all the
treaty's problems. First, the CWC represents an unjustifiable erosion
of American sovereignty. Second, the CWC presents a clear threat to
national security of the United States since it increases rather than
decreases the likelihood that chemical weapons will be used effectively
against Americans. Third, the Chemical Weapons Treaty is unverifiable
and will not stop outlaw states or others that wish to do so from
hiding the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Fourth, the
CWC presents a grave challenge to the U.S. Constitution. The CWC's
inspections will strip American businesses of their Fourth Amendment
Rights. Fifth, the CWC represents another unfunded mandate from
Washington placed squarely on the back of those businesses that can
least afford it. CWC will add to the costs of manufacturing companies
through new compliance costs. Finally, CWC will allow unparalleled
opportunities for industrial espionage.
At the Business and Industrial Council we believe that the only
certain guarantor of American interests is American wealth and power.
We do not place our hopes and the future of our children on
supranational organizations. Thus each new treaty or agreement that
comes along--whether in the field of disarmament, trade, the
environment, law of the sea, etc.--whittles away at American
sovereignty. One wonders why we bother to have a federal government at
all if international bureaucracies are better suited to represent the
aspirations of the American people.
During the Cold War many believed that the only way to achieve
peace was to lay down our sword. But that notion proved as illusory as
the CWC is today. The U.S. won the Cold War by relying on our military
strength and relying on our deterrent capability. Just as arms control
was not the answer, we believe that the Chemical Weapons Convention is
not the solution. Our best defense and deterrence to chemical weapons
are having military capabilities that will allow a swift and sure
response.
President Clinton has concluded that this treaty will end the
threat of chemical weapons worldwide. That is, I am sure, a sincere
hope but a false one. There is simply no way to eliminate chemical
weapons in the world. The chemical terrorist incident that recently
occurred in Japan shows the difficulties in finding covert chemical
manufacturing operations. Manufacturing facilities are easily concealed
due to the small area needed for production.
USBIC believes that the Chemical Weapons Convention represents a
major infringement of U.S. sovereignty and the proprietary rights of
manufacturers. The Chemical Weapons Convention clearly strips away our
members' Fourth Amendment rights by authorizing and enforcing illegal
search and seizure. CWC empowers a U.N.-style agency that may conduct
detailed inspections of facilities on both regular and surprise basis.
They can carry out these inspections without justification of suspected
illegal activity or even a search warrant.
America's large multinational chemical companies have endorsed CWC.
But, if the Senate ratifies CWC, the CWC will create many problems for
small and medium-sized chemical manufacturers and other non-related
industries that process chemicals as part of their manufacturing
operations. Included may be autos, auto parts, brewers and distillers,
electronics, food processing, pharmaceuticals, paint and tire
producers, and a host of other manufacturing industries.
Mr. Chairman, large, multinational companies do not care about the
CWC's massive regulatory burdens because they have the legal, financial
and bureaucratic resources to absorb compliance costs. But, small
companies have neither the resources nor staffs to absorb these costs.
The Chemical Weapons Convention will force businesses to hire more
lawyers plus add additional compliance personnel that must specialize
in new regulation that CWC will present.
Clearly, the CWC will place these small companies at a competitive
disadvantage with their larger competitors. This is a key reason large
companies are for the CWC and the small companies are against it. These
inspections could cost individual companies anywhere from $10,000 to
$500,000--a substantial unfunded mandate. CWC inspections could require
up to eighty-four hours to complete and involve $50,000 fines even if
inadvertent errors are made.
There will never be an arrangement in CWC to stop it from
effectively authorizing industrial espionage. The CWC offers no
protections for company formulas and other trade secrets that
inspectors may steal. Moreover, nothing would prevent unscrupulous
countries from placing intelligence officers on the inspection team.
The CWC will cost the American government millions simply to join
up. Companies and the American taxpayers will pay $50 to $200 million
for the privilege of handing over industrial secrets to competitors
while not preventing chemical warfare or terrorism. An agreement to
complete all inspections of chemical samples in the United States is
not the answer. Corrupt countries will find covert ways to obtain
chemical samples. Why should American businesses allow international
inspectors the opportunity to obtain these chemical samples?
Finally, abroad CWC inspections will not substantially reduce the
proliferation of chemical weapons around the globe. Russia, with its
huge stockpile of chemical weapons and massive production capability,
has not ratified the CWC and will only ratify if American taxpayers
will pay for it. Also the world's most notorious terrorist nations,
Syria, North Korea, and Libya, refuse to ratify. China, a proliferator
of nuclear and missile technologies, has not ratified.
I think all Americans would support a treaty that ended the threat
of chemical weapons. That is why we signed the Geneva Convention. USBIC
believes an effective addition to the Geneva Convention would be the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997, S. 495,
sponsored by Senator Kyl (R-AZ). This bill would provide criminal and
civil penalties for the unlawful acquisition, transfer, or use of any
chemical or biological weapon.
Our companies are constantly fighting against overregulation. Mid-
sized and small American businesses are fed up with the government
policies that favor multinational corporations. Too often government
overregulates and makes it harder for smaller companies to survive. For
example, we have an estate tax so high that too often our members are
unable to pass their business on to the next generation. The Chemical
Weapons Convention is a bad treaty that will only add to the heavy
burden our companies face today.
On behalf of the 1,000 member companies of the United States
Business and Industrial Council (USBIC), I strongly urge you to oppose
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The Chairman. Now, Mr. Wayne Spears is the kind of American
I admire. He has started at the bottom, as I understand it, and
heads a substantial company now. How many people do you employ?
Mr. Spears. One thousand one hundred.
The Chairman. One thousand one hundred. Well, we are so
glad you came. And you may proceed.
Mr. Spears. I will give it a shot.
The Chairman. I know you will do well.
Mr. Spears. It was a last-minute deal.
The Chairman. You just relax and let us hear from you.
Mr. Spears. I am not a real good spokesman. It is not my
thing, but I am going to give it a shot.
The Chairman. Very good. You will do well.
STATEMENT OF WAYNE SPEARS, OWNER AND CEO, SPEARS MANUFACTURING,
INC., SYLMAR, CALIFORNIA
Mr. Spears. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a
statement.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Spears. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the
committee for having this hearing on the many ways in which the
Chemical Convention threatens to affect American business. I
especially appreciate the opportunity you have given me to
describe how it looks from the perspective of one of the
companies that may be harmed by this treaty.
My wife and I started Spears Manufacturing in 1969, in a
2,000-square-foot little building in Burbank, California. Today
we employ over 1,000 people--1,100. We have over a million
square feet of manufacturing space, 400,000 square feet of
warehouse space in 10 States, Washington, Utah, California,
Colorado, Texas, Georgia, Florida, Kansas, Illinois, Idaho, and
Pennsylvania. And we started out in California. We are moving
out of California as quickly as we can because of the
regulations. The State is so tough. I mean, just to get a sewer
permit takes forever.
In regulations, what all of us are afraid of is what the
gentleman just brought up. We manufacture plastic pipe fittings
and valves for use in everything from agriculture--we even make
plastic pipe fittings that are suitable for fire sprinkler
fittings, for silicon chips and for industrial. And we
manufacture in size from one-eighth-of-an-inch fitting up to a
32-inch-diameter fitting--huge things.
We do use some chemicals. We use acetones, and we use some
vinyl ester resins. We do not know what we will have to report
or what is going to be reported. And, to add to that, we plan
on putting in another half-million square feet of manufacturing
space. And we have been sort of kicking it around, to try to
get it done this year, to employ a couple of hundred more
people. Not with the uncertainties of this treaty--we will not
do that. That would be foolish on my part to do that.
I solely own the company. I do not know what is going to
happen. I do not trust what has happened. I do not trust this
administration and what burdens they are apt to put on me. And
I think that there is a lot of small business and medium-sized
businesses like myself that just never gets around--we are so
busy trying to run our business, we do not have time to pay
attention to these things. And this thing was brought to my
attention by one of my Senators from Idaho, who says that you
better look into this; this may affect you. That is how I got
involved.
I did everything in the world to keep from coming here.
Although I feel very honored. I feel very honored by all of
you. I really do.
Senator Biden. As Lincoln said, but for the honor----
Mr. Spears. I am just a poor, old Okie boy. In all honesty,
I hitch-hiked from Oklahoma to California. I did not have
anything. I did well. I want to try to give some of that back
to the American people. And I am going to. I have wrote over
10,000 letters against this--over 1,000 to my employees. I have
over 8,000 customers worldwide. And we do do business
worldwide. We actually compete with the Taiwanese and all those
kind of people. And, might I add, we do a very good job.
We do some very unique things, because I love mechanical
things. And we have been able to be very competitive. We
actually sell--trademark things and put it on for other
manufacturers. You may see our fittings around that have other
people's names on them. We do such a good job that they cannot
compete with us in Europe. We do it.
And there is no way I want some guy coming into my plant,
seeing what we do--one of these surprise inspections. I just do
not want it. I do not even want to take a chance on it. Why
would we, the American people, ever allow that to happen or
even take a chance on it happening? We are the strongest
country in the world. Let us not tear it down.
As Mr. Forbes said, let us do it for America.
That is about all I have got to say. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, you said it very eloquently, too, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spears follows:]
Prepared Statement of Wayne Spears
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the Committee for having this
hearing into the many ways in which the Chemical Weapons Convention
threatens to affect American businesses. I especially appreciate the
opportunity you have given me to describe how it looks from the
perspective of one of the companies that may be harmed by this treaty.
My wife and I started Spears Manufacturing in 1969 in a 2,000
square foot space in Burbank, California. Today, we have over 1 million
square feet of manufacturing space and about 400,000 square feet of
warehouses in 10 states--Washington, Utah, California, Colorado, Texas,
Georgia, Florida, Kansas, Illinois, Idaho and Pennsylvania. We employ
more than 1,000 people.
Our principal products are plastic pipe fittings and valves used
for everything from agriculture to fire sprinklers to silicon chip-
manufacturing to industrial applications. The sizes range from one-
eighth-of-an-inch to 32-inches in diameter.
We have established a unique niche in the world market with high
quality, low-cost products that simply cannot be matched by any of our
competitors, foreign or domestic. Naturally, we want to keep it that
way, but others don't.
We take very seriously the dangers posed by commercial espionage
and other means of jeopardizing our proprietary technological edge. And
because of our advanced technology and competitive position we have
reason to believe we are at real risk of being targeted for these
purposes.
Let me say right up front that, as a businessman, I want less
regulation, less red tape and less interference in my company's affairs
from government bureaucrats. The way many of these folks are doing
their jobs has the effect of making it a lot harder for me--and
countless other American entrepreneurs--to bring good products to
market at competitive prices and as efficiently as possible.
For what it is worth, I believe the commitment the Republican Party
has made to these principles has been a key ingredient in its success
in achieving--and maintaining--control of the Congress.
Therefore, I have been amazed to discover that a Republican Senate
might actually consider approving a treaty that would add to the
burdens imposed on thousands of American businesses by our own
government. This Chemical Weapons Convention would also give foreign
bureaucrats new powers that will add to the costs for companies like
mine.
There are others on this panel far better equipped to discuss all
the fine points of this Convention. I look forward to learning more
from them about this treaty and exactly how it will affect companies
like mine--a subject that is creating great uncertainty at the moment.
This is particularly important to me since I currently have plans
to expand my operations by another half-a-million square feet,
employing another 200-300 people in good-paying manufacturing jobs
across the nation. It would be irresponsible for me to proceed with
those plans without knowing if the CWC will jeopardize my company's
competitive edge.
Especially worrisome is the prospect that foreign inspectors could
demand entry into my plants, gaining access to my records, procedures,
inventory and customers data. These involve proprietary information
that could, if stolen, cause my company real harm. And, from what I
understand, there is every reason to believe that this could happen.
The challenge inspections authorized by the CWC would be very
different from the sorts of site-visits conducted periodically by U.S.
government agencies assigned to monitor our compliance with
environmental and health and safety regulations. Those American
inspectors do not concern themselves with our sensitive manufacturing
technology, just our employees' safety and our emissions.
The CWC will put us in a position of having to open our doors to
people well versed in our manufacturing techniques, who want our
advanced technology and who are trained to collect this sort of
information. We are so concerned about this problem that we do not even
permit the suppliers of our manufacturing equipment to come into our
plants.
Even if my company's facilities are not challenge-inspected, the
burdensome reports we might have to provide could be enough to tell
foreign competitors a lot about how we do what we do.
Mr. Chairman, I am sure I speak for many of my colleagues in
American industry when I say that if this Chemical Weapons Convention
really did get rid of chemical weapons, it would be worth it to us to
accept some additional costs and risks associated with implementing
such a treaty. As long as this Convention's defects make it unlikely to
reduce the chemical warfare problem in any significant way, I find it
unacceptable to impose these very high costs and risks on our
businesses.
I hope that instead of forcing this treaty on the American people
and--on thousands of companies that have little knowledge about the
implications of this deal--the Congress will approve S. 495, a bill
cosponsored by you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Jon Kyl and most of the
Republican leadership. This legislation seems to me to offer a valuable
alternative to the CWC. It does practical things, like making it a
crime for private U.S. citizens to make poison gas, while avoiding
totally impractical actions like the Convention's verification regime
which will hurt our business interests--but be ineffective in catching
nations that cheat on their international commitments.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your brave leadership on this treaty. I
very much hope that my testimony--and that of others who are critical
of the CWC--will be useful to you in preventing this defective
Convention from binding the United States at the expense of so many
American businesses, their stockholders and their employees.
The Chairman. Mr. Johnson.
STATEMENT OF RALPH V. JOHNSON, VICE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS, DIXIE CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC., HOUSTON, TEXAS
Mr. Johnson. Good afternoon.
The Chairman. Good afternoon.
Senator Biden. Good afternoon.
Mr. Johnson. My name is Ralph Johnson. I am vice president
of Environmental Affairs for Dixie Chemical Company. Dixie
Chemical is a small, privately held chemical company, with its
general offices in Houston, Texas, and its manufacturing plant
is located in Pasadena, Texas. Dixie Chemical engages primarily
in the manufacture of specialty organic chemicals, and we
employ about 200 people.
Dixie Chemical fully supports the intent of the Chemical
Weapons Convention treaty. It is difficult to imagine how
anyone would not support the removal of chemical weapons as a
threat to mankind. At Dixie, we have expertise in the
manufacture of specialty organic chemicals and the regulations
associated with this manufacture. We have no expertise in
foreign policy. Whether this treaty is a viable vehicle to
eliminate chemical weapons is a question for this committee and
for the Senate of the United States.
As you Senators on this committee weigh the effectiveness
of this treaty, you will need to be aware that this treaty
presents some potentially serious problems to Dixie Chemical.
At Dixie Chemical, we produce no chemical weapon chemicals, nor
any precursor chemicals. We do not produce any Schedule I, II,
or III chemicals. However, at Dixie, we would be required to
submit a declaration that we produce discrete organic
chemicals.
Discrete organic chemicals is a category of lower-concern
chemicals, and it encompasses virtually the entire universe of
organic chemicals. This declaration would require some
additional time on our part, but is not unduly burdensome.
However, once we are declared as a discrete manufacturing
chemical organic site, we then become subject to foreign
inspections. If we use EPA inspections as an example, these
foreign Chemical Weapon Convention inspections could cost up to
maybe $50,000 per site. That is not a perfect number, but that
is not a total guess either. These inspections would be very
costly and burdensome.
The biggest problem with these inspections, however, is not
their cost but rather our highly probable loss of confidential
business information. An inspector observing one of our
reactors would know, for the product being observed, our
operating pressures, temperatures, catalysts, reaction time,
ingredients, purification methods, pollution abatement methods.
We would no longer have any confidential technology,
methodology, or know-how relative to this product. It would be
gone forever.
Specialty chemical manufacture is vastly different from
that of large volume commodity chemicals, which are produced in
continuous dedicated single product units operated by major
chemical companies. Operating conditions and know-how for these
commodity chemicals such as ethylene, propylene, high density
polyethylene, can be licensed and/or purchased from
manufacturers and engineering companies, both domestic and
foreign.
These operating conditions can also be found in the
literature. Since the technology for commodity chemicals is
widely available, competitive success usually depends on world-
scale plants, percent of volume utilization, location to
markets, and cost to feed stocks. Therefore, inspections would
not necessarily result in any probable loss of confidential
information, nor change the commodity producer's competitive
position.
On the other hand, specialty organic chemicals are made in
low volume batch operations where the expertise and process
know-how lies solely within the realm of the individual
producer. Production volumes typically range from a few
thousand pounds a year to a few million pounds. Several
specialty organic products are usually made intermittently on a
campaign basis in nondedicated multipurpose operating units.
The process technology for these products has been
internally developed by the individual producer, and it is the
core of his competitive position. His technology is not
licensable or purchasable unless he plans to go out of business
on that specific chemical.
Therefore, maintaining the confidentiality of this
expertise is of paramount importance, and is the heart of the
continuing existence of specialty organic chemical manufacture.
Thank you for this opportunity to comment on this vital and
perplexing problem.
The Chairman. We thank you very much, sir. All right. I am
advised a little bit belatedly that the Hon. Kathleen C. Bailey
is going to read a couple of letters before she begins her
testimony, so hold the light.
STATEMENT OF HON. KATHLEEN C. BAILEY, SENIOR FELLOW, LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Ms. Bailey. Yes, sir.
This is the testimony of Paul L. Eisman, senior vice
president for refining of Ultramar Diamond Shamrock
Corporation, hereinafter called UDS Corporation.
Mr. Chairman: UDS is pleased to offer the following comments on the
proposed Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC treaty, which is being
considered for ratification by this committee.
Although UDS agrees that the production of chemical weapons should
be halted, we think that this treaty as presently crafted provides
little, if any, protection from the devastating impacts of chemical
warfare.
We find it ironic that this proposed treaty places a significantly
greater regulatory burden on legitimate business operations that are in
no way related to the production of chemical weapons, while not
imposing similar requirements on countries such as Libya, Iraq, Syria,
and North Korea, some of the very countries about which we should be
most concerned.
Our concerns relate to two specific issues, the increased paperwork
and compliance costs created by the reporting requirement, and the
significant risk of industrial espionage resulting from the presence of
international inspection teams in our facilities.
Increased paperwork is an enormous concern for UDS. In just the
manufacturing portion of our business, over which I have direct
responsibility, our production costs have increased significantly over
the past few years to satisfy the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements of new regulatory programs. This cost ultimately is passed
on to our customers.
A petroleum refinery uses many different chemicals in the
production of gasoline and diesel. Based just on a cursory review of
the treaty requirements, UDS would have to report the following
chemicals at a minimum: chlorine, sulfur, hydrogen, hydrogen chloride,
sulfuric acid, ammonia, and sodium hydroxide. Many of these chemicals
are crucial for making gasoline and diesel to comply with existing U.S.
and California reformulated fuel requirements.
UDS cannot comply with the proposed reporting requirements with our
current staff. We estimate it could cost as much as $500,000 per year
to comply at all three of our U.S. refineries. We expect that these
costs will be reflected in the higher prices at the pump.
In addition, the reporting requirements will greatly reduce our
operating flexibility because of the 5-day advance notification
requirement for changing processes in which reportable chemical
processes are used. Many factors often outside our control influence
how our refinery operates from day to day.
The advance notice requirement means that a change in our crude
slate or in the availability of feed stocks, or even an equipment
malfunction, could put our operations in violation of the reporting
requirements and subject us to a $5,000 fine. Such a burden on business
is untenable, particularly given the ubiquitous nature of the chemicals
included on the reportable list.
UDS is not prepared nor do we want to receive an international
inspection team in our facilities. We understand that the Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment estimates that these inspections could
cost $10,000 to $50,000 per visit. It should be noted that these costs
are in addition to the estimated yearly costs of compliance. Given the
complexity of a modern refinery, we think that those costs are
extremely optimistic.
Moreover, there are no safeguards to ensure that the inspection
teams will not gain access to unrelated or propriety information, nor
are there any sanctions provided for inappropriate use of information
thus gathered. All of the trade protections that we now receive under
U.S. Law would thus be placed in jeopardy. This is an unacceptable
security risk to place on U.S. Industry, especially when the most
egregious users of chemical weapons will likely not even be covered by
the treaty.
UDS does not have a thorough understanding of the provisions of the
CWC. However, what we do understand causes us grave concern. For the
reasons cited above, enforcement and verification will be a nearly
impossible task even in those countries with a strong compliance
commitment, but if such countries as Libya, Iraq, Syria, and North
Korea are refusing to be a party to this treaty, the likelihood of
eliminating chemical warfare are slim indeed.
The unacceptably high cost of business, coupled with the extremely
low probability of success, leads us to conclude that this proposed
treaty is bad for U.S. Economic and security interests. We urge you to
reject this treaty unless and until the serious costs, security and
enforcement problems it creates can be resolved.
Sincerely,
Paul L. Eisman,
Senior Vice President for Refining,
Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation.
Ms. Bailey. the next letter I have is from Sterling
Chemicals, to the Hon. Jesse Helms, Chairman, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. It is dated April 15.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Sterling Chemicals, Incorporated strongly supports a
worldwide ban on the production, possession, and use of chemical
weapons, but we are concerned about the mechanics and cost impacts
associated with the proposed CWC. We had made our concerns known to the
Hon. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison last August. Highlights of our
concerns are:
1. We have serious misgivings about the ability to protect
confidential business information. Having a foreign inspection team
inside our facility with almost unlimited access to process knowledge
and data is not acceptable to Sterling.
2. Cost impact will be significant. We project costs just to
prepare for managing and completing an inspection to be at least
$200,000 to $300,000. This does not include performing duplicate
sampling and analysis as well as calibration and verification of
process instrumentation.
3. We cannot comply with the threat provisions within our current
annual budget and head count. Sterling has reduced head count to
maintain our competitiveness. We are doing more with less. We believe
the additional datakeeping, recordkeeping and paperwork burden
associated with this treaty cannot be managed with existing resources.
4. The EPA and OSHA, while participating as part of the inspection
team, may become overzealous with their enforcement philosophy and
begin citing violations as part of their own agenda while they are
supposed to be monitoring the inspection team.
Sterling Chemicals is not a foreign policy expert, yet we have
serious misgivings about the foreign policy implications of the
proposed CWC. For example, how will chemical weapon control be enforced
in other countries such as Mexico, Colombia, North Korea, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Libya, Croatia, et cetera? Since they probably will not
cooperate, how does this treaty produce a worldwide ban?
How will international security and foreign policy issues related
to protection of trade secrets be handled?
Will the cost and implementation of the treaty put American
industry at a competitive disadvantage with foreign industry, whose
compliance is less regulated?
Sterling emphasizes its desire to see a worldwide ban on chemical
weapons. We hope this submittal provides the information you seek for
an informed decision which is best for America.
Sincerely,
Robert W. Roten,
President and CEO of Sterling Chemicals.
Ms. Bailey. And now, Mr. Chairman, may I proceed with my
own testimony?
The Chairman. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bailey. I am Kathleen Bailey from Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
am pleased to appear before you today to address the
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC. I have
studied this treaty for some years, first as Assistant Director
of the Arms Control Agency and then as principal author of a
major technical study sponsored by the U.S. Defense Nuclear
Agency on the issue of how nations might cheat under the CWC.
I am currently a senior fellow at my laboratory, but the
views I express today are my own and not necessarily those of
the University of California, my laboratory, or any other
institution.
Today, I will focus my remarks briefly on the impact of CWC
challenge inspections on U.S. companies and on U.S. national
security facilities. My bottom line is that the use of treaty
inspections for espionage is easy, effective, and all but
impossible to detect.
The U.S. intelligence community officials have advocated
ratification of the CWC, arguing that it would be ``another
tool in the tool box'' for intelligence collection. Rarely, if
ever, is it mentioned that the tool is every bit as effective
in the hands of foreign intelligence services.
One could argue that, indeed, the advantage is to foreign
nations and to foreign companies, because it is the United
States that has the most to lose in terms of classified
national security information and confidential business
information.
Challenge inspections will rely on collection and analysis
of samples to determine the presence or absence of key chemical
compounds. A principal tool for analysis is the gas
chromatograph mass spectrometer, or GC/MS for short, an
instrument which can identify chemical compounds.
This information can be used to determine not only what
chemicals are in use at a particular site but also what
processes are being employed. Such data is useful for
determining whether a facility might be making chemical
weapons, but it is also useful for gleaning confidential
business information as well as classified national security
data.
I would like to quote now from a paper prepared by Dr. Ray
McGuire, a chemist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
on the results of mock inspections conducted by the U.S.
Government. In my written testimony I quote from this at
length, and would like to submit it for the record.
But briefly let me say that a mock inspection was held at a
propellant production facility. Samples were taken outside of
that facility and later analyzed using a variety of means, and
the results did reveal classified data not only about the
composition of the pro-
pellant, such as oxidizers, binders, and burn rate modifiers,
but also process information.
Furthermore, a mock inspection was conducted at two
industrial chemical plants using GC/MS technology. Batch
production of a certain chemical could be detected at least 3
weeks after the production ended. Furthermore, other
confidential business information was revealed. While this
information may not be considered to be of much commercial
value, it could be in cases where a foreign national is
attempting to analyze and obtain confidential business
information.
I will submit my written statement for the record. It
contains additional information on the Fourth Amendment issue,
but I will close now given my time is short.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bailey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathleen C. Bailey
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am very pleased to appear
before you today to address the issue of ratifying the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). I have studied this treaty for some years, first as
Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and then
as principal author of a major technical study sponsored by the U.S.
Defense Nuclear Agency on the means by which nations might cheat under
the CWC. I am currently a Senior Fellow at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, but the views I express today are my own and not
necessarily those of the University of California or any other
institution.
Today, I will focus my remarks on the impact of CWC challenge
inspections on U.S. companies and on U.S. national security facilities.
My bottom line is that use of treaty inspections for espionage is easy,
effective, and all-but-impossible to detect.
The Threat of Espionage
US intelligence community officials have advocated ratification of
the CWC, arguing that it will be ``another tool in the tool box'' for
intelligence collection. Rarely, if ever, is it mentioned that the tool
is every bit as effective in the hands of foreign intelligence
services. One could argue that indeed the advantage is to foreign
nations and companies, because it is the United States that has the
most to lose in terms of classified national security information and
confidential business information.
CWC challenge inspections will rely on collection and analysis of
samples to determine the presence or absence of key chemical compounds.
A principal tool for analysis is the gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometer (GC/MS) an instrument which can identify chemical
compounds. This information can be used to determine not only what
chemicals are in use at a particular site, but also what processes are
employed. Such data is useful for determining whether a facility might
be making chemical weapons agents, but it is also useful for gleaning
confidential business information as well as classified national
security information. I would like to quote from a paper prepared by
Dr. Ray McGuire of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on the
results of mock inspections conducted by the U.S. Government:
In one of the early experiments, soil and water samples were
collected in the near vicinity (a few feet to a few meters) of
rocket propellant production buildings. No samples were
collected from the inside of the buildings. These samples were
analyzed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for both
organic and inorganic constituents.
* * * While it was not possible to reproduce exact
formulations from the results of this work, a significant and,
in some cases, alarming amount of information could be
extracted. The nature of the facilities--rocket propellant
production--was easily determined. The general type of
propellant being produced, strategic vs. tactical, could be
defined in most instances. Certain key ingredients of some
classified formulations, such as oxidizers, energetic binders
and burn rate modifiers, were determinable.
In three additional collections (involving wipe samples from
building interiors and machinery in one case, and soil and
waste water samples from just outside buildings in the others),
the analytical techniques cited above were used with the
addition of gamma ray spectroscopy for determining radioactive
materials. In both these instances, it was possible to
determine the materials being processed in the facilities
examined and some, but not all, details of the processes
themselves. In all of these cases, major portions of the
information are classified for security reasons.
In all of the cases cited above, classified data were
disclosed. It was necessary in all cases to combine a series of
analytical methods in order to obtain the sensitive results.
Many of the techniques used would not be germane to CWC
inspections.
However, it was not necessary to employ a variety of
sophisticated analytical tools to acquire sensitive information
in exercises carried out at two industrial chemical plants. In
one case, the batch production of a certain chemical could be
detected at least three weeks after the production ended.
While this information might not be considered to be of much
commercial value, the results of the second ``inspection''
were. In this instance, not only was the product of the
operation determined, but certain process details such as
intermediates, reducing agents, were also detectable. This
information was gathered from soil and water samples collected
exterior to the buildings and used on GC/MS for analysis.
[emphases added]
CWC negotiators were aware that sample analysis could reveal
sensitive information and sought to limit the potential for abuse by
limiting the ``library'' of compounds for which inspections could look,
and by assuring that samples would not be taken off-site unless it were
necessary to resolve questions that on-site analysis could not answer.
Despite these precautions, it is quite easy to acquire samples for
later analysis. One means is analysis of residue remaining in the GC/MS
equipment. Research conducted at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory proved
that even thorough decontamination does not remove all residue. To
prevent subsequent analysis off-site of that residue, the company or
facility concerned would have to purchase and retain all of the GC/MS
components that were exposed to the sample. This would cost
approximately $15,000 per inspection.
A more likely scenario for espionage would be clandestine sampling.
Sample collection could be as simple as taking swipes with a
``handkerchief'' or collecting air in a vial disguised, for example, as
a ballpoint pen. It would be all-but-impossible to detect, let alone
halt, such secret sampling.
Although I have emphasized sampling and analysis, it is also
possible to use inspections for espionage in other ways. A
knowledgeable inspector can learn much by observing the way a facility
is configured, how operations are performed, temperatures, and other
features. Equally important may be the opportunity to ask questions of
facility employees and to review records and data. The fact that
inspectors will have the opportunity to take pictures adds to the risk
that secrets will be compromised.
It is worth noting that some treaty proponents dismiss these
concerns, saying that if there were a genuine risk, companies and
facilities with something to lose would have objected. There are ready
answers why they have not. First, there is ample evidence that most
companies which will be directly affected have either not heard of the
treaty, or not focused on it. Second, there is a pervasive belief that
inspections--even challenge inspections--will apply only to companies
that manufacture chemicals. When I told a Bay Area biotechnology firm
that it could be challenge inspected, the attorney for the firm
replied, ``No one would want to inspect us. We don't manufacture
chemicals.'' When I explained that challenge inspection could be of any
site, regardless of its activity, the attorney replied, ``The
Constitution protects us against things like that.''
The Fourth Amendment Issue
The company representative whom I quote is probably right. The
fourth amendment guarantees against warrantless searches and seizures
and requires that probable cause be demonstrated prior to issuance of a
criminal warrant. A private citizen or U.S. company may chose to
decline a request for a CWC challenge inspection, thus requiring a
criminal warrant for the inspection to proceed. Probable cause must be
demonstrated before proper authorities can issue a criminal warrant. In
the case of CWC inspections, this raises a problem because the country
making a challenge inspection request is not required to provide
evidence that would fit the requirements for probable cause--it may
simply assert wrongdoing without providing substantiation. The
requesting country does not have to identify the name or exact location
of the company to be inspected until 12 hours before international
inspectors are due to arrive at the port of entry. Thus, without the
proper information to demonstrate probable cause to a U.S. judicial
official, it will be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to
gain a timely criminal warrant for a challenge inspection.
A related question is that it is unclear whether a criminal warrant
may be administered in effect by foreign nationals. Can OPCW officials
substitute for U.S. officials in a search?
If indeed challenge inspections can be rejected under the U.S.
Constitution, there will be negative repercussions not only for the
CWC, but for the future of arms control. The CWC verification regime,
which will cost the taxpayers greatly, will not be implemented in any
meaningful way. More importantly, such a scenario would surely cloud
the future of arms control. Other nations would follow the example of
the United States in rejecting challenge inspections as well as any
treaties which are based on the CWC model.
The Issue of Preparing National Security Facilities
In closing, I would like to raise an issue to the Committee which I
feel is important, but which has not been considered as yet--the need
to assess the costs of preparing U.S. national security facilities for
CWC challenge inspections. This preparation must take place well before
any potential inspections, and requires a substantial budget.
Last year, preparation of Savannah River Plant for a Russian visit
cost approximately $400,000. Estimates of cost requirements to prepare
a facility within Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for a CWC
inspection are $250,000. The Department of Defense facilities are
expected to require between $200,000-$500,000 each. Of course, some of
these costs are non-recurring, but some will arise any time an
inspection is to occur.
Mr. Chairman, if there is confidential or classified data that can
be lost through use of GC/MS equipment, from observation, or from
interviews, preparation may be futile in the event that a determined
spy poses as an inspector. However, to minimize losses and to protect
the data that is protectable, U.S. national security facilities must be
prepared. Preparation will require substantial effort and resources.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am. I know the answer to the
question, but I want it for the record. Have you served in any
administration under any President?
Ms. Bailey. Yes, sir. I served as Assistant Director for
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under President Reagan.
The Chairman. Do you know whether President Reagan ever
endorsed a treaty of this sort?
Ms. Bailey. Not to my knowledge and, sir, I would add that
this treaty as it ultimately ended up is not at all as Reagan
officials, at least as far as I knew, envisioned it.
The Chairman. Well, I have had several people prominent in
the Reagan administration say that they never saw it in this
form. They never approved it, and they are confident that
Ronald Reagan himself never approved a treaty like this. Mr.
Merrifield.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE MERRIFIELD, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF COMMERCE
Dr. Merrifield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My doctorate is in
physical organic chemistry, and I have been in the chemical
industry most of my life, starting with Monsanto and ending up
as vice president of Continental Group, the Continental Can
Company.
I came to the Commerce Department to head up the technology
function there during the Reagan administration, and I was also
Under Secretary of Economic Affairs for a time. Since then I
have had an endowed chair at the Wharton Business School, as
professor of entrepreneurial management; but I have also
started a company, a high tech company, which is a major
breakthrough in electrical energy storage, and it has a lot of
process technology which is highly proprietary.
But my mission at Commerce, of course, was to try to renew
the industrial competitiveness of the United States, since we
were not competitive at that time. The Japanese were putting
together vertically integrated consortia, and we could not even
talk to each other. They were capturing all of the consumer
electronics and mass memory business in semiconductors and so
forth.
So a critical problem then was, first, to get the antitrust
laws changed, those 100-year-old laws. President Reagan, when I
first met him said, Bruce, why don't you change the antitrust
laws.
Well, it took about 4 years. Subsequently, I started
hundreds of consortia while I was at Commerce, including
SEMATECH and a lot of others. My office also put through the
tech transfer acts of 1984 and 1986, which cut the Government
out of owning its technology and made billions of dollars
available of R&D to the private sector.
The Baldrige Award, the technology medal, the process
patent technology which strengthens our process patents were
enacted. Process technology was very critical at that time,
because anybody operating outside this country could operate
under our process patents and then export to the United States.
We got that changed. The patent extension act was another
success. We did a lot of good things, increasing at least the
environment for industrial competitiveness here; and as a
result we are now the most competitive country in the world,
and that is very important.
This law would mitigate that capability, that competency,
very significantly. Through industrial espionage somewhere
between $25 billion and $100 billion is lost each year. It is
important now, in that this CWC law would open the floodgates
of espionage to our proprietary technology, which is the heart
of our competitiveness.
Technology is the engine of competitiveness, and it is
important that we maintain it. We have an incredible thing
going here in this country. We currently spend about $25
billion a year in basic research, much more than any other
country in the world can spend or has the capability to spend
or match in any reasonable time. As a result, we get most of
the Nobel prizes. We make most of the seminal discoveries.
It is that basic technology that is the heart of our
competitive advantage in this country, and it is terribly
important that we protect that. It is awfully important that we
not allow it to slip away with these challenge investigations
that give you 12 hours' notice, with people showing up at your
door without you even knowing they are going to be there.
Basically this all started with Vanover Bush back in 1945.
We made thousands of liberty ships and advanced aircraft and
the Norton bomb site and radar, and we detonated the atomic
bomb, which absolutely stunned the scientific community. As a
result, Vanover Bush captured the euphoria of the moment in a
report to the President calling research the endless frontier.
As a result of that, we started the National Science
Foundation. Since then, we have pumped about $1 trillion into
our academic community, our universities and our government
labs. That is the capability that is unique in this country. It
is our competitive advantage. We need to protect it. Those are
our crown jewels, and it is awfully important that we not let
that slip away.
Competitive advantage, industrial competitiveness, is the
primary concern of America, and this convention certainly is
not going to help that at all. It is going to mitigate that
capability.
Let us not forget for a minute that we have this incredible
capability. We have 15 million companies in this country that
can translate new discoveries into useful things. No other
nation has that. We have this entrepreneurial culture which has
permission to try and fail and try again until we succeed
without fear of personal loss or penalty.
We have the most flexible capital development capability.
We have the world's largest market. We have one common
language. We have everything in spades. We need to protect and
nurture it, and it is important that we not allow it to be
mitigated by some naive, well-intentioned law such as this one.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Has
anybody called you that lately?
Dr. Merrifield. I'm sorry?
The Chairman. I said, ``Mr. Secretary, thank you very
much.'' Has anybody called you ``Mr. Secretary'' lately?
Dr. Merrifield. Not lately.
The Chairman. Sir, please pronounce your name for me
correctly.
Mr. Reinsch. It's ``Reinsch.''
The Chairman. Thank you. You are recognized, sir. Thank you
for coming.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM A. REINSCH, UNDER SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Reinsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be here to talk a little bit about the Commerce Department's
prospective role in the implementation of this convention if it
is ratified.
We expect to have a key role for industry liaison, and I
want to assure you from the beginning that, taking into account
the need for full and effective implementation of the
convention's verification regime, we are committed to
minimizing costs to the industry and to maximizing the
protections of company confidential information in the two
major areas which will affect the U.S. commercial sector, which
are data declarations and inspections. I would like to speak
briefly about each of those, if I may.
Commerce has developed user friendly draft data declaration
forms and instructions to complete them. No information is
requested that is not specifically required by the CWC.
These materials have been field tested and refined based on
comments from industry, including the Chemical Manufacturers
Association. We have also provided copies of these forms to the
committee's staff. I am pleased to note that we have
consistently received positive feedback from those who have
reviewed them.
The administration estimates that about 2,000 plant sites
will be required to file data declarations. Of those 2,000, we
estimate that over 90 percent belong to a category called
unscheduled discreet organic chemicals, or DOC's, as the
gentleman from Dixie Chemical referred to them.
The DOC data declaration is a very simple form that asks
the company to specify the location of the plant site and its
general range of production--e.g., this plant site produced
over 10,000 metric tons of DOC's last year, or whatever it was.
Mr. Chairman, I brought one along to demonstrate for you
how simple I think it is. It consists of three pages. Page one
is essentially name, address, type of declaration, with a
couple of boxes to check. Page two is location of the facility
and point of contact there, with a box or two to check. Page
three, which is about a half page, consists essentially of
checking the box as to what your level of production is. This
is not a complicated form. It is not a complicated process, and
it is not a complicated set of instructions.
Now, to ensure that the treaty remains focused on the most
relevant industries, certain other industries have been
exempted from the CWC data declaration process. For example,
these exemptions apply to plant sites that produce explosives
exclusively, produce hydrocarbons exclusively, refine sulfur
containing crude oil, produce oligimers and polymers, such as
plastics and synthetic fibers, and produce unscheduled
chemicals via a biological or a biomediated process, such as
beer and wine, which I know will be of great comfort to many
people.
About 10 percent of the data declarations focus on the
CWC's scheduled chemicals. These declarations are more
involved, but still do not constitute a heavy and complicated
reporting burden for the 140 or so firms that will be asked to
comply. Most of these are larger companies and members of CMA,
who are likely to have accumulated much of the needed
information for other purposes.
In any event, I want to assure you that Commerce will
provide substantial assistance to industry in the data
declaration process if it turns out to be needed. We will help
firms determine if they have a reporting requirement. We will
develop a commodity classification program similar to the one
we have for export licensing.
If a company does not know if its chemicals are covered, it
can ask us for a determination. If firms do have a reporting
requirement, our technical staff will assist them in filing
their declarations.
We will also seek to put in place a system that enables
firms to complete and file these forms electronically. This is
a system that we already have in place for our export licenses.
Firms also want this data to be fully protected from
unauthorized disclosure. We fully understand that concern and
have substantial experience through our export licensing system
in protecting company confidential information as part of our
current responsibilities. Our CWC information management system
will be in a secure location and will be only accessible to and
operated by staff with appropriate clearances.
Now with respect to inspections, we will be charged with
managing the CWC process inspections for U.S. commercial
facilities. That applies to both routine and challenge
inspections. We will identify firms that are likely to be
subject to routine inspection and work with them to develop
draft facility agreements that will protect company
confidential information.
These agreements will set forth the site specific ground
rules for the conduct of inspections. We estimate that about 40
U.S. com-
mercial plant sites each year will be subject to routine
inspections. Our objective is to develop draft facility
agreements before these inspections take place in order to give
firms an opportunity to identify their confidential information
and processes.
In this regard, we will work with firms to determine what
constitutes company confidential information and will protect
U.S. firms against any unwarranted request by international
inspectors.
We anticipate very few challenge inspections. In the event
there is one of a non-defense commercial facility, we would
have the lead role managing access to ensure that the
international inspectors obtain, by the least intrusive means
possible, only the information and data that are relevant to
specified noncompliance concerns. Firms would be under no
obligations to answer questions unrelated to a possible
violation of the CWC.
As with routine inspections, we will work closely with
firms to determine what constitutes company confidential
information, and we will protect firms against unwarranted
requests that may be made by international inspectors.
Mr. Chairman, I can stop now or I can keep going for about
1\1/2\ more minutes, whatever you prefer.
Senator Biden. I'm not the chairman but I would hope he
would let you go for 1\1/2\ minutes since Ms. Bailey got to
read 2 letters.
Senator Hagel (presiding): I guess I am the only Republican
here. It's great the way it works around here.
Senator Biden. Let's vote.
Senator Hagel. I'm the Chairman. Do you want to get it over
with, Joe?
Senator Biden. Yes.
Senator Hagel. Please continue.
Mr. Reinsch. I will talk fast, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Take your time.
Mr. Reinsch. Let me make a brief comment about the
Australia Group and about export controls, since that is part
of my responsibility.
Some critics have expressed concern that the treaty will
undermine the existing chemical nonproliferation export
controls that have been developed by the Australia Group. I
want to assure you that that is not the case.
Article I of the CWC commits States Parties to refrain from
assisting any chemical weapon program in any way. The Australia
Group's regime of export controls is end user/end use driven
and is fully consistent with our obligations under Article I.
It is not a regime of trade restrictions aimed at impeding any
country's economic development. Rather, the Australia Group's
controls focus exclusively on restricting transfers to end
users of concern.
Accordingly, we will continue to strongly support the
Australia Group after the CWC enters into force. We will not be
required by the CWC to liberalize nonproliferation export
controls to rogue nations, such as Iran and Libya, even if they
ratify the CWC.
However, when considering export controls, it is important
to note that the CWC mandates trade restrictions that affect
countries who do not ratify. Senator Kerry made this point in
his dialog with Mr. Forbes.
The real concern regarding export controls is that our
allies and friends who have ratified the CWC will be required
to impose controls on us that will have an adverse impact on
U.S. industry if we do not ratify. Further, if we fail to join
the CWC as part of the responsible family of nations, our
overall leadership role within the nonproliferation community
will be severely eroded and our ability to maintain a strong
presence within the Australia Group will be lost.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I will stop now and ask
you to put the full statement in the record.
Senator Hagel. Without objection, yes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reinsch follows:]
Prepared Statement of William A. Reinsch
Good Morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am
pleased to be here today to discuss the Commerce Department's
prospective role in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) is expected
to have a key role for industry liaison, and I am here to assure you,
that taking into account the need for full and effective implementation
of the convention's verification regime, we are committed to minimizing
costs to industry and to maximizing protections of company confidential
information in the two major areas that will affect the U.S. commercial
sector--data declarations and inspections.
Data Declarations
Commerce has developed user-friendly draft data declaration forms
and instructions to complete them. No information is requested that is
not specifically required by the CWC. These materials have been field
tested and refined based on comments from industry, including the
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA). Copies of these forms have
also been provided to the committee's staff. I am pleased to note that
we have consistently received positive feedback from those who have
reviewed the forms and their instructions.
The administration estimates that about 2,000 plant sites will be
required to file data declarations. Of these 2,000, we estimate that
over 90% belong to a category called ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic
Chemicals'' (DOCs). The DOC data declaration is a very simple form that
asks the company to specify the location of the plant site and its
general range of production (e.g., this plant site produced over 10,000
metric tons of DOCs last year). No specific chemical identification,
product mix or other substantive information is requested, and the
declaration can therefore be completed quickly and without revealing
sensitive data. I want to stress that the DOC declaration does not ask
for any information on acquisition, processing, imports, or exports.
To ensure that the treaty remains focused on the most relevant
industries, certain other industries have been exempted from the CWC
data declaration process. For example, these exemptions apply to plant
sites that produce explosives exclusively, produce hydrocarbons
exclusively, refine sulphur-containing crude oil, produce oligimers (o
lig i mers) and polymers (such as plastics and synthetic fibers) and
produce unscheduled chemicals via a biological or bio-mediated process
(such as beer and wine).
About 10% of the data declarations focus on the CWC's scheduled
chemicals. These declarations are more involved but still do not
constitute a heavy and complicated reporting burden for the 140 or so
firms that will be asked to comply. Most of these are larger companies
and members of CMA who are likely to have accumulated much of the
needed information for other purposes.
In any event, I want to assure you that Commerce will provide
substantial assistance to industry in the data declaration process if
it turns out to be needed. We will help firms determine if they have a
reporting requirement. We will develop a commodity classification
program similar to the one we have for export licensing. If a company
doesn't know if its chemicals are covered by the CWC, it can ask
Commerce for a determination. If firms do have a reporting requirement,
Commerce technical staff will assist them in filing their declarations.
In short, we do not believe that firms will be required to hire outside
consultants to complete the CWC forms. We will also seek to put in
place a system that enables firms to complete and file data
declarations electronically.
Firms also want this data to be fully protected from unauthorized
disclosure. We fully understand that concern and have substantial
experience in protecting company confidential information as part of
our current export licensing responsibilities. I want to assure you
that our CWC Information Management System will be in a secure location
and will be only accessible to and operated by staff with appropriate
clearances. I also want to stress that the administration's draft CWC
implementing legislation provides strong protections for company
confidential information, and I hope this legislation will be taken up
as soon as possible after the Senate's vote on ratification.
Inspections
The Commerce Department will be charged with managing the CWC
inspection process of U.S. commercial facilities. There will be two
types of inspections--routine and challenge.
Routine inspections are conducted to confirm the validity of data
declarations and the absence of Schedule I chemicals. They are not
based on any suspicion or allegation of non-compliance with the CWC.
Inspectors will not be permitted unrestricted access to U.S. facilities
under this regime, because the inspection may not exceed the limited
purpose for which it is authorized. I can assure you that no ``fishing
expeditions'' will be permitted as part of the CWC inspection process,
because the Commerce Department will not permit it to happen.
Commerce will identify firms that are likely to be subject to
routine inspection and work with them to develop draft ``Facility
Agreements'' that will protect company confidential information. These
Facility Agreements, which must be concluded between the U.S. and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, will set forth
the site-specific ground rules for the conduct of inspections. We
estimate that about 40 U.S. commercial plant sites each year will be
subject to routine inspections. Commerce's objective is to develop
draft Facility Agreements before inspections take place in order to
give firms an opportunity to identify their confidential information
and processes. In this regard, we will work with firms to determine
what constitutes company confidential information and will protect U.S.
firms against any unwarranted requests by international inspectors.
Under the implementing legislation, firms will participate in the
preparations for the negotiation of Facility Agreements and the right
to be present when the negotiations take place. This is yet another
reason why Congress should take up the implementing legislation as soon
as possible after passage of the Resolution of Ratification.
Challenge inspections are conducted based on an allegation of
noncompliance. These inspections may only be requested by a State Party
to the CWC and can be directed at declared and undeclared facilities.
We anticipate few challenge inspections. In the event that there is a
challenge inspection of a non-defense U.S. commercial facility,
Commerce would have the lead role ``managing access'' to ensure that
the international inspectors obtain by the least intrusive means
possible only the information and data that are relevant to the
specified noncompliance concerns. Firms would be under no obligation to
answer questions unrelated to a possible violation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
As with routine inspections, Commerce will work closely with firms
to determine what constitutes company confidential information and will
protect U.S. firms against any unwarranted requests that may be made by
international inspectors. Since Commerce will be responsible for
``managing access,'' we will abide no administrative harassment of U.S.
companies or ask them to reply to any questions not directly related to
CWC compliance.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to stress that the CWC gives us the right
to screen the list of inspectors before any foreign national is
permitted to conduct verification activities on our soil. We certainly
intend to exercise our right to screen that list and to disapprove any
individuals we find unsuitable.
With regard to the overall CWC inspection process, I understand
there have been concerns raised about Constitutional protections
regarding unreasonable search and seizure. No treaty that is
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution has U.S. legal effect, and the
CWC involves no such inconsistency. We anticipate that most firms will
permit CWC inspections on a voluntary basis, but in cases where access
is not granted voluntarily, the U.S. Government would always obtain a
search warrant before proceeding.
Australia Group and Export Controls
Mr. Chairman, some critics have expressed concern that the treaty
will undermine the existing chemical non-proliferation export controls
that have been developed by the ``Australia Group.'' As head of the
agency that administers dual-use export controls, I want to assure you
that this is not the case. Article I of the CWC commits States Parties
to refrain from assisting any chemical weapon program in any way. The
Australia Group's regime of export controls is end-user/end-use driven
and is fully consistent with our obligations under Article I of the
CWC. It is not a regime of trade restrictions aimed at impeding any
country's economic development. Rather, the Australia Group's controls
focus exclusively on restricting transfers to end-users of concern.
Accordingly, we will continue to strongly support the Australia Group
after the CWC enters into force, and we will not be required by the CWC
to liberalize non-proliferation export controls to rogue nations such
as Iran and Libya--even if they ratify the CWC.
However, when considering export controls, it is important to note
that the CWC mandates trade restrictions that affect countries who do
not ratify. Therefore, the real concern regarding export controls is
that our allies and friends who have ratified the CWC will be required
to impose controls on us that will have an adverse impact on U.S.
industry if we do not ratify. Further, if we fail to join the CWC as
part of the responsible family of nations, our overall leadership role
within the nonproliferation community will be severely eroded and our
ability to maintain a strong presence within the Australia Group will
be lost.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the time has come for us to join the growing
consensus to ratify the treaty that we have promoted for so many years
under both Republican and Democratic administrations. I believe that we
are far better off with the CWC than without it. The United States has
always been the world leader in fighting the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and we must not shrink from that challenge at this
critical juncture. Further, we must not abandon the American chemical
industry who worked with us for so many years to develop this treaty
and who would be disadvantaged in world markets if we fail to act
responsibly. In short, the CWC will not impose unreasonable burdens on
U.S. industry, but failure to ratify the CWC will certainly damage our
overall international economic and non-proliferation interests.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Webber, you are no stranger around here.
It is good to have you.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK WEBBER, PRESIDENT, CHEMICAL
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Webber. Thank you, Senator. First of all, I want to
reassure you that you are not the only Republican in the room.
Second, being an old Marine, I am used to being
outnumbered, and I see that we are very much outnumbered here
today. But I sort of like those odds.
My name is Fred Webber, and I am president of the Chemical
Manufacturers Association. I would like to enter into the
record a letter that my board signed yesterday. We had our
spring board meeting. It is a letter endorsing the Chemical
Weapons Convention. There are 50 men on my board representing
America's chemical companies of all sizes. And, by the way, a
third of our membership, which is almost 200 chemical
companies, is made up of companies with sales less of less than
$100 million. So, indeed, we consider those to be small
businesses.
Senator Hagel. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
April 15, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Senate Majority Leader,
United States Senate, Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Senator Lott: We, the undersigned members of the Chemical
Manufacturers Association's Board of Directors, are writing to ask you
to support the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
We believe the Convention is a fair and effective international
response to the international threat of chemical weapons proliferation.
Ratifying the CWC is in the national interest.
The CWC is a natural extension of existing U.S. policy. In 1985,
Congress voted to end production of chemical weapons by the military
and to begin destroying existing stockpiles.
For years, the United States has imposed the world's strongest
controls on exports of weapons-making ingredients. Our nation is the
standard bearer in preventing the spread of chemical weapons.
The CWC requires other nations to do what the United States is
already doing. That's why President Reagan proposed the treaty to the
United Nations in 1984. It's why President Bush signed the treaty in
Paris in 1993. And it's why President Clinton is asking the Senate to
ratify it.
The chemical industry has thoroughly examined the CWC. We have
tested the treaty's record-keeping and inspection provisions. And we
have concluded that the benefits of the CWC far outweigh the costs.
Ratifying the CWC is the right thing to do. We urge you to vote for
the Convention.
Sincerely,
Frederick L. Webber, President & CEO, Chemical Manufacturers
Association
J. Lawrence Wilson, Chairman & CEO, Rohm and Haas Company; Chairman,
Board of Directors, Chemical Manufacturers Association
John E. Akitt, Executive Vice President, Exxon Chemical Company
Phillip D. Ashkettle, President and CEO, Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.
Bernard Azoulay, President and CEO, Elf Atochem North America
William G. Bares, Chairman and CEO, The Lubrizol Corporation
Jerald A. Blumberg, Executive Vice President, DuPont; Chairman, DuPont
Europe
Michael R. Boyce, CEO & President, Harris Chemical Group
Vincent A. Calarco, Chairman, President & CEO, Crompton & Knowles
Corporation
William R. Cook, Chairman, President and CEO, BetzDearborn Inc.
Albert J. Costello, Chairman, President & CEO, W.R. Grace & Co.
Davis J. D'Antoni, President, Ashland Chemical Company
John R. Danzeisen, Chairman, ICI Americas Inc.
Earnest W. Deavenport, Jr., Chairman of the Board and CEO, Eastman
Chemical Company
R. Keith Elliott, Chairman, President & CEO, Hercules Incorporated
Darryl D. Fry, Chairman, President and CEO, Cytec Industries Inc
Michael C. Harnetty, Division Vice President, 3M
Richard A. Hazleton, Chairman & CEO, Dow Corning Corporation
Alan R. Hirsig, President & CEO, ARCO Chemical Company
Gerald L. Hoerig, President, Syntex Chemicals, Inc.
Jack L. Howe, Jr., President, Phillips Chemical Company
Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Vice Chairman, Huntsman Corporation
Donald M. James, President & CEO, Vulcan Materials Company
Dale R. Laurance, President and Sr. Operating Officer, Occidental
Petroleum Corporation
Raymond W. LeBoeuf, President & CEO, PPG Industries, Inc.
James A. Mack, President & CEO, Cambrex Corporation
Hans C. Noetzli, President & CEO, Lonza, Inc.
Robert G. Potter, Executive Vice President Monsanto Company
Arthur R. Sigel, President & CEO, Velsicol Chemical Corporation
Enrique J. Sosa, Executive Vice President, Chemicals Sector, Amoco
Corporation
William Stavropoulos, President & CEO, The Dow Chemical Corporation
F. Quinn Stepan, Chairman & President, Stepan Company
S. Jay Stewart, Chairman and CEO, Morton International, Inc.
Robert O. Swanson, Executive Vice President, Mobil Corporation
Rudy van der Meer, Member, Board of Management, Akzo Nobel nv
Jeroen van der Veer, President & CEO, Shell Chemical Company
George A. Vincent, Chairman, President & CEO, The C.P. Hall Company
J. Virgil Waggoner, President & CEO, Sterling Chemicals, Inc.
H.A. Wagner, Chairman & CEO, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.
Helge H. Wehmeier, President & CEO, Bayer Corporation
Ronald H. Yocum, President & CEO, Millennium Petrochemical Company
Mr. Webber. I might also add, Mr. Chairman, that Virgil
Wagner, Vice Chairman of Sterling Chemical Company and a member
of our board signed that letter yesterday afternoon at 11:00--
excuse me, yesterday morning--and that, second, Mr. Robert
Potter, Chairman and President of the new Monsanto Company--
your old company, sir--firmly endorsed that letter. Monsanto
has always been on record supporting the Chemical Weapons
Convention. So I was rather surprised today to hear about that
letter and the concern.
The industry I represent is America's largest export
industry. We sell over $365 billion worth of chemicals. We
export over $60 billion of those. We employ about 1.1 million
people in what I would call well-paying jobs.
As you know, we have been a firm and frequent advocate of
this convention. We have appeared before this committee on four
separate occasions. We have the major voice of the regulated
business community on the convention. We have 20 years of
experience working closely with Republican and Democratic
administrations. We know how this treaty indeed affects our
commercial interests.
Our long-standing support for the convention is rooted in
the belief that the treaty is the right thing to do, and it is
the right way to control the spread of chemical weapons.
The chemical industry does not produce chemical weapons. We
do, however, make products used in medicine, crop protection,
and fire prevention, which can be converted into weapons
agents. The industry has a special responsibility to prevent
illegal diversions of our products. We take that responsibility
very, very seriously.
That is why, frankly, I am outraged by the remarks made
before this committee about the U.S. Chemical industry, remarks
that strongly suggest that our support for the Chemical Weapons
Convention is motivated by a desire to supply dangerous
chemicals for rogue nations. I am very disappointed in Mr.
Forbes' comments about blood money. I thought they were very,
very unfortunate.
Remarks that also suggest that we are trying to gut the
U.S. export control regime and dismantle multilateral control
organizations, like the Australia Group, frankly, again, deeply
offend us. The chemical industry is proud of its record of
support for U.S. antiproliferation efforts. We have long
supported this Nation's tough export control laws, the toughest
export control laws in the world; as they are necessary
measures to assure that commercial interests do not contribute
to the spread of chemical weapons.
No one has done more than the U.S. chemical industry to
make the Export Administration Act an effective control system.
No one has done more to build and support multilateral control
organizations like the Australia Group. The charges made here
last week against our industry are shameful and, frankly, they
bring dishonor and discredit to those who make them.
We support the convention because it is a logical extension
of U.S. policy. It will make our Nation's antiproliferation
objectives more reachable by applying our high standards to
other nations.
The treaty simply forces other nations to do what we are
already doing--destroying our chemical weapons stocks. We have
been committed to the success of the CWC for over 20 years.
Indeed, one of the great leaders was a man by the name of Will
Carpenter, again of Monsanto Corporation. We have been a true
partner of the U.S. Government in negotiating this treaty.
We began with many of the same concerns about the treaty
that have been voiced here. We have worked hard to protect U.S.
industrial interests, especially proprietary information. We
helped to de-
velop the protocols guiding the treaty's inspection and
recordkeeping requirements, and we put those protocols to live
fire tests over and over again.
Protecting confidential business information was our
industry's top priority. We think we achieved our goal in the
treaty text and the inspection procedures developed to
implement the treaty. In addition, we field tested the
declaration formats and concluded that the requirements are
reasonable and manageable.
Some claim that the CWC will impose a massive regulatory
burden on companies. That is not true.
I have about 1 minute to go, sir, if I may.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Webber, go right ahead. Take your time.
Mr. Webber. Thank you.
The treaty was specifically drawn to focus attention on a
relatively narrow segment of the chemical industry. Only some
200 facilities have both reporting and inspection obligations
under the treaty. Most of these are member companies of CMA.
Our involvement in preparing this treaty has made it a
measurably better product than it would have been otherwise.
As I said, our board yesterday reaffirmed its strong
support for the convention. In summary, we believe the treaty
is not a threat to U.S. business. This treaty passes muster.
The chemical industry supports it.
Again, we think the treaty is the right thing to do and we
thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Webber follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frederick L. Webber
Good afternoon. My name is Fred Webber, and I am President and
Chief Executive Officer of the Chemical Manufacturers Association.
The industry I represent is America's largest export industry, with
over 1 million American jobs.
As you well know, CMA has been a frequent and vocal advocate for
the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have appeared before this Committee
on four separate occasions to testify on why the U.S. chemical industry
believes this treaty is in the national interest.
We are the major voice of the regulated business community on the
Convention. We have 20 years of experience working closely with
Republican and Democratic Administrations. We know how this treaty
affects our commercial interests.
Our long-standing support for the CWC is rooted in the belief that
the treaty is the right thing to do. It is the right way to control the
spread of chemical weapons.
The chemical industry does not produce chemical weapons. We do,
however, make products used in medicine, crop protection, and fire
prevention, which can be converted into weapons agents.
The chemical industry has a special responsibility to prevent
illegal diversions of our products. We take that responsibility very,
very seriously.
That is why I am outraged by remarks made before this committee
about the U.S. chemical industry--remarks that strongly suggest that
our support for CWC is motivated by a desire to supply ``dangerous
chemicals'' to rogue nations.
Remarks that also suggest that we are trying to gut the U.S. export
control regime and dismantle multilateral control organizations like
the Australia Group deeply offend us.
The chemical industry is proud of its record of support for U.S.
anti-proliferation efforts.
We have long supported this Nation's tough export control laws--the
toughest export control laws in the world--as necessary measures to
assure that commercial interests do not contribute to the spread of
chemical weapons.
No one has done more than the U.S. chemical industry to make the
Export Administration Act an effective control system. No one has done
more to build and support multilateral control organizations like the
Australia Group.
The charges made here last week against my industry are shameful
and bring dishonor and discredit to those who make them.
We support the CWC because it is a logical extension of U.S.
policy. It will make our Nation's anti-proliferation objectives more
reachable by applying our high standards to other nations.
The treaty simply forces other nations to do what we are already
doing, destroying our chemical weapons stocks.
CMA has been committed to the success of the CWC for close to 20
years. We have been a true partner of the U.S. Government in
negotiating this treaty.
We began with many of the same concerns about the treaty that have
been voiced here. We worked hard to protect U.S. industrial interests,
especially proprietary information. We helped to develop the protocols
guiding the treaty's inspection and recordkeeping requirements, and we
put those protocols to live-fire tests over and over again.
Protecting confidential business information was our industry's top
priority. We achieved our goal in the treaty text and the inspection
procedures developed to implement it. In addition, we field tested the
declaration formats, and concluded that the requirements are reasonable
and manageable.
Some claim that the CWC will impose a massive regulatory burden on
companies. That's not true. The treaty was specifically drawn to focus
attention on a relatively narrow segment of the chemical industry. Only
some 200 facilities have both reporting and inspection obligations
under the CWC. Most of these are members of CMA.
Our involvement in preparing this treaty has made it a measurably
better product than it would otherwise have been.
CMA's Board of Directors yesterday reaffirmed their strong support
for the Chemical Weapons Convention. A copy of the CMA Board letter
will be submitted for the Committee's record.
In summary, we believe the treaty is not a threat to U.S.
businesses. This treaty passes muster. The chemical industry supports
it. The CWC is the right thing to do.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Webber, thank you. Thank you all for
your time and your contributions.
Senator Biden, I think Senator Helms wanted to stay with
the 7.5 minute questioning, if that is agreeable to you. Why
don't you start and I will follow up.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Mr. Webber, thank you. You would expect me to thank you and
others would expect me to thank you. But thank you for such a
clear, absolutely precise statement. I began to wonder. I say
this again. You know, chemicals in my state are not a small
operation. They are 51 percent of the manufacturing base of my
state.
I have not heard anybody in my state out there who
manufactures chemicals coming to me and saying this is a bad
idea, and I think almost all of them belong to your
organization. I may be mistaken. Maybe somebody does not, but I
think they all do.
Mr. Webber. I believe they do.
Senator Biden. Ms. Bailey, I don't expect you to answer
this, but the Diamond Shamrock example, Ultramar, the letter
read, if they produce any of the chemicals mentioned in the
letter--and I don't know if they produce them or use them--but
if they produce them, they will, in fact, come under an
inspection regime--if they produce at least 30 tons for some or
200 tons for others, which are still not subject to routine
inspections. Still, out of the whole mess there are only 20 a
year that can occur. That's Number 1.
Number 2, I am going to write the president of the company,
too, to assure him he need not be as concerned as you are. And
if they do not produce those chemicals, they don't have any
requirement. If they use them or if they purchase them, there's
no requirement--no requirement.
So I would have to find out, and it is hard to tell from
the testimony, whether they produce the chemicals listed or
whether they only consume them and do not produce them.
I would like to ask a question of Mr. Reinsch. I assume in
your testimony, when you were talking about you, the Commerce
Department, being required, being involved under the regime of
how these inspections will take place, any inspection, when it
takes place, is as a consequence of the language in the
convention. The Confidentiality Annex, subsection (c) says:
Measures to protect sensitive installations to prevent
disclosure of confidential data--et cetera. It talks in there
about how inspection teams will be guided and the requirement
that there be facility agreements, that there be arrangements.
Translated into every day English, that means there has to
be a deal that you sign off on, on how an inspection team is
able to, under what circumstances, what part of the facility
they can go into, when they can go in, how many people they can
go in with, what they can look at, whether the system has to be
turned on or off--all of those things. Right?
Mr. Reinsch. That's correct.
Senator Biden. I think that is a very important thing,
because part of the problem I find here is this. Just as
somebody said, I believe it was Mr. Kearns--and, by the way,
you did a heck of a job when you were on this committee. You
did a really fine job. You and I were on the same side then on
the fighter. We are on a different side now.
But as he points out, a lot of people, including individual
companies, do not know a lot about this treaty, any more than I
suspect any of your members would know about the treaty if we
sent them a poll. This is complicated stuff.
But what I find is the more we talk about it, the more we
explain the mechanics of it, the lot less onerous it appears,
even to people who are opposed to it. That is the reason I
bother to mention that section of the treaty.
Now, one of the things that I am concerned about is this.
And by the way, Mr. Johnson, I like witnesses like you. I mean
this sincerely. You are the kind of person I like testifying.
You don't mince any words. You go to the heart of what you
think is wrong with whatever is being discussed and what you
think is OK.
Your concern, I think were I you, is a legitimate one, and
that is whether or not the processes your particular company
uses would be able, in effect, to be pirated just by the mere
fact someone can see how you line up the line, or what
temperatures you run at, and so on and so forth.
Mr. Johnson. That is correct.
Senator Biden. I think were I you, I would be concerned
about that, too. But I also appreciate your putting to rest, at
least to some degree, how onerous the paperwork is and how
onerous the inspections are--all the stuff we are hearing from
the opponents. You do not say that. But you are worried, and
with good reason, I think, if I were you sitting there.
That is where the Commerce Department comes in. Now, how
would you take care of a fellow like Mr. Johnson who, in all
likelihood, will have about as much chance of being inspected
as win-
ning the lottery, because we are talking about how there are
only going to be 20 inspections in the whole year that could
take place. There are a couple of thousand outfits it could
take place in--well, maybe he has a little better chance than
winning the lottery, but it's not likely.
Mr. Johnson. I will buy my lottery ticket, Senator.
Senator Biden. You will buy your lottery ticket. Good
point. Touche.
How would you deal with this. Let's say the treaty passes,
as I hope, and I would hope, Mr. Johnson, that the first thing
he would do is come to you and say OK, guys, if we get an
inspection, how are we going to do this. Can we for the hour it
takes place, or 20 minutes, or 5 hours, shut down a particular
process so that they can't see what temperature we are doing
this at?
Will you actually facilitate that kind of thing? Will it be
that specific?
Mr. Reinsch. Well, if it came to that, Senator Biden. In
the first instance, this is Dixie.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Mr. Reinsch. These are discreet organic chemicals. In the
first instance, he is not going to have any inspections, at
least for the first 3 years.
Senator Biden. I didn't want to mention that. Yes.
Mr. Reinsch. Beyond that, it would be up to the
international body to ultimately decide if there were going to
be any inspections.
Senator Biden. And if it had any inspections, it would only
be 1 of 20.
Mr. Reinsch. Correct. So this is way down the road. But
let's assume the worst case for the moment and that in the
fourth or fifth year he is going to have an inspection.
What we would do in that case, as part of trying to create
a facility agreement with him, is to come in, meet with him,
talk to him about his confidential business information, his
proprietary information, and try to set up a structure in which
he would tell us what he does not want anybody to see, what
parts of the plant he does not want them to go into, what kind
of procedures he does not want them to observe, and we would
construct an agreement that precludes the inspection of those.
Senator Biden. The bottom line in the treaty, all that it
requires is that you supply sufficient proof that you are not
supplying, or producing----
Mr. Reinsch. You are not producing a Schedule I chemical.
Senator Biden.--Schedule I stuff.
Mr. Reinsch. That's correct.
Senator Biden. So it is not something that is an automatic
thing. I just want to establish--and my time is about to be
up--I just want to establish that, even if an inspection took
place in such a circumstance, it is not willy nilly unlock the
doors, open the books, here they come, and the Iranian team is
coming in to figure out how to transport all of this stuff to
Iran. Right?
Isn't that a fair statement?
Mr. Reinsch. That's correct, Senator. That is exactly
correct.
Senator Biden. Last point--and Mr. Spears is gone. I've got
good news for him. He will not be inspected at all. He is not
even in the game. So someone ought to write him a letter--I
will write him a letter--based on what he told us. He is not
even subject to any inspection at all. That is really good news
to him.
Maybe I should give it to Mr. Gaffney and he can give it to
him. There is no need. He is not even in the game.
That does not mean that he shouldn't be opposed to the
treaty. He made other, larger, objections to it, which I
respect. But he does not have to worry about his pipe company.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Again, thanks to
all of you for coming today.
I apologize that we all had to jump out and vote. But I
would like to get back, Ms. Bailey, to your testimony, and I
left right at the beginning.
I would like, if you would, for you to expand a little bit
on one of your subheadings in your testimony, the threat of
espionage. Would you talk a little bit about where you see this
treaty? And maybe you do not. I have not read what you said.
But that has been brought up by former Secretary Schlesinger
and others, that this is a treaty that is on some pretty thin
ice when it comes to opening up our facilities to foreign
espionage.
Ms. Bailey. Yes, sir. The greatest threat in terms of
espionage to U.S. companies and U.S. national facilities, such
as my own laboratory, comes from challenge inspections which
might be used specifically for the purposes of espionage.
Hypothetically, an inspector could either be an
intelligence official assigned to be an inspector or could
later sell information to a company or country abroad that
reveals either classified or CBI, confidential business
information, that they might have gleaned through the process
of gathering samples and analyzing them.
I described in my testimony the GC/MS, the gas
chromatograph/mass spectrometer, which can reveal not only what
chemicals are being used at a site but also the processes being
used. And in the case of the propellant production facility
that was the subject of a mock inspection, we were able to
analyze samples taken from that facility and determine not only
what kind of chemicals, which chemicals were in the rocket
propellant, but also a lot of process information. All of this
was classified data.
This mock inspection, sponsored by the U.S. Government,
proved the point that somebody can come in and use the very
tools that will be used by inspectors in the challenge
inspection regimes to look at classified information.
The counter argument to this is that they are only going to
be looking for a specific library of types of information, such
as the scheduled chemicals. The problem is you cannot limit it
to that.
Our laboratory did a project last year for the Department
of the Army which determined that samples an be acquired even
from the GC/MS after it has been decontaminated and can reveal
the same classified information.
We have also done research that indicates that an inspector
could come in with a ball point pen that is really a sampling
device, suck some air up in it, or water, or whatever, and take
it away, analyze it, and get the same type of information.
Mr. Reinsch. May I comment on that, Senator?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Mr. Reinsch. I have two quick points, if I may.
With respect to the GC/MS, I am advised by the Defense
Department's Onsite Inspection Authority that they have studied
this kind of equipment and have developed procedures for its
use by escorts during the inspections to ensure that only
appropriate information is provided to the inspector.
Now beyond that, I will leave it to the engineers and the
chemists to argue about that. But that is what I am advised.
The only other point I would make is Ms. Bailey has not
mentioned the issue of managed access. What we would do in a
challenge inspection is go in and consult with the company
about where their intellectual property is, what it is that
they are trying to protect from the very thing she is concerned
about, and devise a plan for the inspectors' access that would
prevent them from seeing those items.
Senator Hagel. Is that now part of the convention, that
wording?
Senator Biden. That's what I was talking about. Yes.
Ms. Bailey. Neither of those points are relevant, however.
The first one, the idea that they are only going to look for
specific kind of chemicals is this ``library of chemicals''
argument I was using.
Mr. Reinsch. That is not the point I made.
Ms. Bailey. It doesn't matter, because you can
clandestinely take samples and get the same data offsite. It
just doesn't matter.
Mr. Reinsch. We would manage access to protect intellectual
property.
Senator Hagel. I think she is kind of over that point.
Ms. Bailey. In the mock inspection which I cited, the
samples were taken outside of the propellant facility building.
So you didn't even have to go into the building to get it.
So the whole idea that managed access is somehow going to
prevent the acquisition of classified or confidential
information is not legitimate.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I am on a timeframe, and if one of the other
Senators wants to come back, or I can come back to this again.
But I want first to get to Mr. Webber on this point.
Mr. Webber, what is your understanding of the inspection
process? Are you concerned at all for your companies that the
Iranians might come in or somebody would come in and what Ms.
Bailey is talking about gets underneath some of the corporate
issues, the national security issues? I mean, do you think you
and your companies, Mr. Webber, have a good understanding of
the process?
Mr. Webber. Certainly we were concerned early on. That is
why we got deeply involved in the deliberations and, frankly,
in the drafting sessions of this treaty, hoping that we could
clear up some of these problems.
Under the procedures we helped negotiate on the CWC, our
companies, frankly, have significant protections today against
an inspection team knowingly or inadvertently disclosing
proprietary information. First, the convention gives our
companies, subject to routine onsite inspections, the right, as
was mentioned earlier, to negotiate a facility agreement. That
agreement will govern the in-
spection process and provide a means of assuring that trade
secrets will not be routinely made available to the inspectors.
Second, the inspectors will be subject to personal
liability and sanctions for wrongful disclosure of information.
Again, we were concerned about the possibility. We think
the treaty tackles that problem head-on. We helped draft the
verification procedures; and, again, we just think the benefits
far outweigh the costs.
Senator Hagel. So that is no longer a concern of you, your
people, or your companies?
Mr. Webber. We think the language in that convention gives
us the protections we need.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Does anybody else want to respond?
Ms. Bailey. Mr. Webber is referring essentially to routine
inspections, whereas the inspections I was talking about are
challenge inspections. Those are the ones that are likely to
target, for example, a biotechnology firm, a pharmaceutical
company, any company that might have confidential business
information to lose or facilities such as my laboratory, where
there are national security data.
We won't be subject to routine inspections. We would be
subject to challenge inspections.
Senator Hagel. I think that is part of the issue that we
are trying to get at here; at least that is most important in
my mind. I am not diminishing the importance of commerce here.
But, again, I go back to my opening statement. I will vote on
this treaty based on the national interests of this country.
Everything else is important, but not nearly as important in my
mind as what is most important in the national security
interests of this country.
I suppose I am about out of time, Mr. Chairman, so I will
defer to whoever is up next. Thank you.
The Chairman. I am not going to call you ``Mr. Webber.'' I
am going to call you ``Fred,'' because we have been on the same
side many times.
Mr. Webber. For a long time, sir.
The Chairman. I welcome you as I do all of our
distinguished witnesses today.
I want to know if you or any other CMA representative has
stated in the past that no companies which manufacture what
they call ``discreet organic chemicals'' will be subject to
foreign inspections.
Mr. Webber. First of all, as was pointed out just a few
minutes ago, not within the first 3 years. They will not be
inspected within the first 3 years.
As you know, again----
The Chairman. I'm sorry. Please repeat that. You're a
little far away from the microphone.
Mr. Webber [continuing]. I'm sorry. Not within the first 3
years. They are not going to be inspected. And, indeed, if they
are to be challenge inspected later on, I think the odds,
again, are what--20 out of--what is the rule? It is going to be
a very low percentage if there is, indeed, to be a challenge
inspection. A challenge inspection relies on an allegation. So
we feel fairly comfortable that the protections that I just
described earlier will indeed apply to manufacturers of
discreet organic chemicals.
The Chairman. Have you read the committee, part 2 of the
Verification Annex, paragraphs 9-21 lately? Are you familiar
with it?
Mr. Webber. If I read it, sir, it was a long time ago, and
I can't quote it now.
The Chairman. It says nothing about any 3 years. And yes,
they will be inspected.
Now I just want to be sure here.
You are talking about challenge inspections and we are
talking about challenge inspections. What is your answer to my
question based on that?
Mr. Webber. Well, sir, I think the International Inspecting
Authority, if I read the convention correctly, has to make the
decision early on as to what the time schedule will be to
indeed, first of all, inspect those 200 facilities that will
naturally come out of the convention mandate and then decide
what to do with those discreet organic chemical manufacturers.
And if, indeed, they decide to allow challenges early on, sure
they will be subject to the treaty if there is a challenge to a
company like Dixie.
The Chairman. Well, this has not changed, and your
predecessor, a distinguished gentleman named Dr. Will
Carpenter, supplied for the record a copy of his remarks before
the American Association for the Advancement of Science on
January 16, admitted in 1989, in which he noted, ``Those of us
who manufacture chemicals that are only a step or two away from
chemical weapons, and that means a large number of us in the
CMA, have already accepted the reality that a good treaty means
significant losses of information that we consider
confidential.''
Is that still your position?
Mr. Webber. It is not our position today. Again, that
statement, indeed, was made by Dr. Carpenter of Monsanto in
1989. But he has been a forceful presence and a strong
supporter of the convention.
The Chairman. Did he speak in error when he said that? Was
he wrong when he said that?
Mr. Webber. Today he would tell you, sir, that the industry
has pressure tested the treaty and he feels very comfortable
now that the needed protections are there.
So I think he would testify right along those lines. That
is an 8 year old statement, when we were still working on the
treaty, working with the government to make sure that those
problems would be corrected.
The Chairman. But what was true in 1989, unless it has been
changed, would be true today. So you are saying he was wrong in
1989?
Mr. Webber. Sir, we were in the midst of negotiating on
that treaty. There were a lot of open-ended issues. A lot of
progress has been made since then.
I have met personally with Dr. Carpenter in the last 6
months. He is a strong advocate of the treaty who feels today,
as it is presently written, that it provides us with the
protection we need.
The Chairman. So you are saying here that it is a good
treaty?
Mr. Webber. Oh, yes, sir. We strongly support the treaty.
The Chairman. Are you mystified by the number of your
members who are rejecting your appraisal of this treaty?
Mr. Webber. There are always, in any organization, say of
200 companies, you will find a few.
The Chairman. But you had said in the past that you were
representing all of the chemical companies.
Mr. Webber. We represent 192--92--today to be exact. We
have one at the table that has concerns. They have not said
that the treaty ought to be defeated. They are concerned about
confidential business information and the cost of inspections.
The Chairman. We have heard some say definitely that it
ought to be defeated.
Mr. Webber. Well, I just heard a letter read into the
record from Sterling Chemical expressing concerns. And yet,
their vice chairman yesterday, along with the CMA board, signed
that letter endorsing the treaty, and that letter is going to
Senator Trent Lott today. And, by the way, Mr. Chairman, we
enter that for the record.
[The letter from Sterling Chemical was read into the record
by Kathleen Bailey and appears on page 183; the letter to
Senator Lott appears on page 194.]
The Chairman. Well, not so long ago, less than a year ago,
on November 26 of 1996, you made the claim that the U.S.
Chemical manufacturers will ``lose''--and these are indicated
as your words--``as much as $600 million a year in export
sales'' if the CWC is not ratified.
Then, on March 10 of this year, you revised your estimate
to say that the upper bound of lost sales would be $227
million. So you have come down. And also I have a list provided
to the committee and the Majority Leader's Office by CMA which
makes clear that the amount of sales of Schedule II chemicals
will total less than half of what you have previously claimed.
Now that ball is bouncing crazily around the lot. What do
you do, just reach out, get a figure, and say whatever is
likely to excite the people?
Mr. Webber. Oh, Mr. Chairman, you know I wouldn't do that.
We have known each other for too long.
The Chairman. Oh, I'm not sure. A lot of things are being
said about this treaty that are simply not so, and the people
who are saying them know that they are not so.
Now I want to know whether you are revising your figures
and where are the figures now?
Mr. Webber. I appreciate the opportunity to correct the
record and, indeed, it needs correction.
In September 1996, we estimated that the potential impact
of the ban on trade in Schedule II chemicals would, if applied
against the United States, impact some $600 million in
exports--in exports. Since that time, CMA carefully reviewed
the data available from the government and industry sources.
Our conservative estimates today are that $500 million to $600
million in two-way trade--and here we stand corrected, but it
is two-way trade, both exports and imports--will be affected by
the Schedule II ban.
These numbers are the best estimates that we have been able
to get throughout the debate.
By the way, Mr. Chairman, we feel that this is the tip of
the iceberg. But these numbers we are prepared to stand behind.
But it is two-way trade, not one-way trade, not just exports.
The Chairman. Well, let's see how well they will stand,
Fred, and I say this as a friend.
Mr. Webber. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Exports of Amiton, a pesticide--is that the
way you pronounce that--A-M-I-T-O-N?
Mr. Webber. Yes. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. That is a pesticide. I am advised, quite
reliably, that the U.S. exports of Amiton total more than half
of your new figure. And yet, the United States sells this
pesticide largely to countries that have not ratified the
treaty and are not going to participate in it.
Am I wrong about that?
Mr. Webber. I'm not sure, Senator. I would have to look at
the numbers. But the fact of the matter is all of our major
trading partners, all of the major trading partners in the U.S.
chemical industry, are signatories already to this convention.
I don't know how else to approach the answer.
We could dig into the numbers, but I am trying to question
the relevancy of it and the sale of it. It goes to our trading
partners, and those trading partners have signed the
convention.
The Chairman. Well, half of what you say that they will
lose involves one chemical, Amiton--and I hope I am pronouncing
that right.
Mr. Webber. Yes, you are, sir.
The Chairman. And yet, the United States sells this
pesticide almost entirely to countries that have not ratified
the treaty.
I have just been handed, as your man is handing you
information I am being handed information, too, and what the
hell would we do without our staff. Western companies cannot
use this chemical, can they? You tell him.
Mr. Webber. If we understand correctly, U.S. law does not
prohibit production of this chemical, this pesticide, for
export purposes.
The Chairman. I understand that. But that is not what I
asked you, though.
I asked you if you didn't send it to companies that are not
participating. It is not a U.S. law. It is a European law that
you are talking about in the first place. But environmental
regulations are prohibiting the use of Amiton in Europe and
elsewhere. Is that not correct?
Mr. Webber. I am at a disadvantage. I don't have the
information or the numbers on that specific chemical. I would
be delighted to work with your staff to dig into that to really
see not only what is happening but what the significance of it
is.
The Chairman. Well, let me tell you what bothers me about
the proponents of this treaty.
I have caught them in so many misstatements of fact, and
for a while, you know, I said we all make mistakes. But I have
almost reached the conclusion that most--not all, but most--of
the loud advocates of the treaty--and I am including the
editorial writers--they don't know what they're talking about
and they don't care. They just get a statement out of thin air,
throw it out there, and then the rest of us have to chase it
down to see whether it is accurate. And nine times out of ten
we find out it is not accurate.
That is the reason I have made the conclusion that we ought
to defeat this treaty unless it is substantially modified and
we go ahead and do it right. I am just exactly like Steve
Forbes on this treaty. I thought he made good sense, as he does
always.
Well, my time is up.
What shall we do about another round? Would you like
another round?
Senator Biden. Well, since we have so many witnesses here--
we really have two panels in one--I would like to have another
round, if that is OK with you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. OK. How many minutes per Senator?
Senator Biden. Do you mind if we have, if we could have one
more round of 7.5 minutes, I think that will end it. At least I
have about that much to ask.
Do you mind?
The Chairman. Not at all. I think it is a good idea.
Senator Biden. OK.
You know, I understand the Chairman's frustration. I am
going to ask Mr. Webber to comment. I want to pursue that again
in a moment.
But, you know, it is so easy. This is such a complicated
issue. It is so easy to scare the living daylights out of
proponents and opponents of this treaty by taking things,
taking the worst case scenarios that have probabilities that
are incredibly low.
For example, what Ms. Bailey was talking about is these
challenge inspections, these challenge inspections of outfits
that are the small outfits, the biochemical firms, the biotech
firms, the pharmaceutical firms, who, I might add, signed on to
these treaties, both their organizations.
Let's review what the treaty calls for if there is a
challenge inspection.
If there is a challenge inspection, first of all a country
has to, say Iran--we're all talking about Iran. We assume the
French are not going to do this bad thing to us, or the
Germans, the Brits, or whatever. We usually use Iran as the
worst case.
Say an Iranian says I want to find out what that biotech
firm is doing. I want to find out what that pharmaceutical firm
has out there, because I want to steal their secrets, or I want
to steal weapons-grade capability from someone.
So they say, ``we think Company X, Diamond Shamrock''--
assuming they were in the deal, and I'm not sure they are--``We
want a challenge inspection.'' What happens mechanically?
Mechanically, that request goes to the Director General of this
outfit. The Director General then takes a look at it after
looking at the evidence presented by the country asking for the
challenge inspection. They just can't say, you know, I kind of
think they make a lot of money over there at Diamond Shamrock,
and I would kind of like to find out how they do it. I want to
challenge. You know, like a kid in a pick-up game, ``I
challenge.''
You can't do that. You have to supply a rationale. You have
to say why you think they are violating this treaty.
Then the Director General takes it. He looks at it. Then he
has to take it to the Executive Council. And if the Executive
Council believes that the allegations offered, allegations of
cheating under the treaty, have no merit, they have to have a
super majority to say no inspection. They have to have, say,
three-quarters. It's three-quarters.
And, by the way, if it turns out it is an abusive request,
like abusing the courts with frivolous lawsuits, that kind of
thing, they also then have to pay a penalty, ``they'' the
country making these frivolous requests.
But even after that, let's assume it goes through the
sieve, Iran says I want to know what's happening up at duPont-
Merck. I think they have a deal there, and I would like to
figure out how it works. No inspector from that country is
allowed on the team. So the Iranians have to have somebody
else. They have to go to Country Y and say here is a deal we
will make together. You send your inspector in with this little
thing he is going to put in his pocket to find out all this
information and then, when you get it, you give it to us. This
is because you can't send an inspector in.
OK. Assume they go through all of that. Then they get to
the end of the day, they come to the United States, they go to
duPont-Merck or some small outfit. Guess what? In a challenge
inspection, they need a search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment, and they must establish before a court of law
probable cause to determine that the company is violating the
Chemical Weapons Convention--in a Federal court. It's just like
you have to have probable cause now for a search warrant.
Now, Mr. Johnson, if your company is worried about that
part of the process, or anybody else who actually runs a
company, you either don't have very good lawyers who work for
you now to be able to explain this to you or you are one of
those people who assumes you are going to get struck by
lightning on those days when there is lightning out there.
It could happen. I acknowledge it could happen. Iran could
make a deal with China--and, by the way, neither one is in the
treaty yet, and if they are not in the treaty, they don't get
to have an inspector; they don't get to be involved. They'd
have to make a deal. There has to be collusion. They have to
agree to share the information. They then have to go in with
another inspector not from their team, but they have to get by
the Director General, and the Director General then has to get
by the Executive Council. And the Executive Council is probably
not real crazy about Iran, either.
Then, even if they do that, they have to get by a Federal
judge.
Now it can happen. It can happen. A good friend of mine,
Billy Haggerty, got struck by lightning the other day in a
park. It happens. Now I walk in the same park, in the same
lightning storm--and I'm not joking, he really did get struck
by lightening. But that's about what we are talking about here.
With regard to this issue, Mr. Webber, I assume the point
of the question was--though I may be mistaken about this
particular chemical--is that you really are not going to suffer
a penalty, the industry, if you already trade it to a country
not covered by the treaty. This is because the only penalties
would be import sanctions that would be imposed upon us, or
exports, which are imports to that country. A country could say
you can't sell your chemical in our country. We're a member of
the treaty and you are violating the treaty or you are not in
the treaty. You're not in.
I assume the Senator's point was this stuff is sold to
countries that are not in the treaty, therefore you would
suffer no loss if we were not part of the treaty.
Mr. Webber. If they are otherwise not controlled by the
Export Control Act.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Webber. That's correct.
Senator Biden. Otherwise not controlled by the Export
Control Act, which is a separate piece of legislation.
Mr. Webber. Correct.
Senator Biden. Can you supply for the committee an analysis
of this particular matter?
Mr. Webber. Yes.
Senator Biden. I see my train just left.
You know I care about this treaty, Jesse, if I miss the 5
train and there are no votes.
The Chairman. I wish you had gone home.
Senator Biden. Did you hear what he said, he wished I'd
gone home.
I don't blame him.
Can you supply for the record a more detailed response
based on your analysis to the Senator's question about 50
percent of the loss is attributed to one chemical and a
significant portion of that chemical sale goes to countries not
covered?
Mr. Webber. Yes. Your clarification is very helpful.
I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I didn't clearly understand the
question. We would be delighted to supply for the record that
analysis.
[The information referred to was unavailable at the time of
printing.]
Senator Biden. Well, I'll stop. I have so many more
questions that I don't want to get started.
I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I can have somebody drive you to the station.
Senator Biden. The train has already gone. I am here for
another hour, unless you can call Amtrak. After 24 years, I
have never been able to hold an Amtrak train, so you know I
don't have a whole lot of power.
Ms. Bailey. Senator Biden, you made so many statements that
I think can be challenged.
Senator Biden. Well, please do challenge them. I'd love to
hear it.
Ms. Bailey. I know your time is out.
Senator Biden. Oh, no. I have another minute. Then I can
respond to you.
Ms. Bailey. Starting with the frivolity question, in other
words, if an inspection request comes in from a country----
Senator Biden. A challenge inspection.
Ms. Bailey [continuing]. A challenge inspection request
comes in from a country, and they want to go to a
pharmaceutical firm in the U.S.; they don't have to specify the
name of the company. They don't have to say the exact site.
They don't have to give information which would qualify as
being substantial for demonstrating probable cause.
Senator Biden. No. I didn't say they have to establish
probable cause. They have to give a reason.
Ms. Bailey. I'm just saying the information they give is
not sufficient to establish probable cause.
Senator Biden. I agree with that.
Ms. Bailey. They don't even have to say the name of the
site that they are going to until 12 hours before the
inspectors arrive at the port of entry.
Senator Biden. But then they have to say it.
Ms. Bailey. So this whole charade about frivolity being
questioned by the Executive Council is----
Senator Biden. Are they allowed to have an inspector?
Ms. Bailey. Sorry?
Senator Biden. Is the country asking for the challenge
allowed to have an inspector on the team?
Ms. Bailey. No. That's not the issue. The issue is you
cannot determine frivolity in advance, because you may not even
know what site they are asking to go to. That is the first
point.
Senator Biden. I don't think it is frivolity. I thought it
was a trick and a device to find out how to get information. I
thought that was your point.
Ms. Bailey. It is my point. I am just trying to argue that
your case that there is this Executive Council that is going to
sit there and look at a challenge inspection request and render
a judgment as to whether it is frivolous or abusive is not
going to save U.S. companies. It is not going to save them,
because there will be insufficient data for that Executive
Council to reach a reasonable decision until 12 hours before
they enter.
Now I would like to agree with you--it's so rare--I would
like to agree with you that it is quite possible that a company
that does not want to have a challenge inspection request can
say, ``no way; you get a criminal warrant.'' All right.
Senator Biden. Correct.
Ms. Bailey. Fine. Let's imagine a hypothetical situation in
which there were credible evidence presented that substantiates
the criminal warrant. The company, meanwhile, suffers
tremendously because of the negative press it will get.
Senator Biden. The same way criminals do. The same way
people accused wrongly of crimes do. You've got it. If there is
probable cause, under our Constitution, if there is probable
cause a crime has been committed, and then it turns out you are
innocent, you suffer.
Ms. Bailey. There was a real case I would like to tell you
about.
Senator Biden. Sure.
Ms. Bailey. The United States and Russia exchanged
reciprocal visits to pharmaceutical facilities. We went over
there and said, ``you know, there are real problems here. It
looks to us like you are producing biological weapons, or
either have been, are going to, or just were yesterday.'' Then
the Russians came over to the United States and went to a
pharmaceutical firm here. The Russians walked out the front
door and, in Russian, thankfully, gave a press briefing in
which they said this pharmaceutical company is involved in
biological weapons production.
It was not picked up by the press here.
Senator Biden. That's why it can't be bilateral. That's why
this treaty cannot be bilateral. That's why it's multilateral.
Ms. Bailey. The point I am trying to make is that U.S.
firms can be accused of nefarious actions by these foreign
inspectors with no basis.
Senator Biden. Can I stop you there for just a second and
take that example?
The inspection team is going to be made up of a number of
people. Unless you assume the whole world conspires against us,
the team is not going to walk out and say, tit for tat. Now if
you assume that, and I can understand that you might, if you
assume that the entire inspection team is going to do exactly
that--we know how the Russians work. Whenever you expose them
of something, accuse them of something, or prove something,
they come back and say double on you, your mother wears combat
boots, so do you. We know how they deal.
But you have to assume the entire regime, all these members
of this treaty, whatever group of inspectors--they are not just
going to be Russians or one or two people; they are going to be
a group. You're going to have to assume that all of them are
going to be as venal as the Russian example you gave me. That's
a heck of an assumption.
Ms. Bailey. No, I don't think so.
Senator Biden. No?
Ms. Bailey. You see, my argument is that the company that
is being challenge inspected will be so worried about negative
press that there will be pressure on them to succumb and not
stand up for their constitutional rights under the Fourth
Amendment to say no foreigners are going to come in here and
look at my process data or look at the way I have my company
set up.
Senator Biden. No, that's not what they're going to say.
That's not what they are allowed to say. They may want to say
that and they won't. You're right. What they'll say is there is
no evidence, credible evidence, to suggest that we, in fact,
are doing anything wrong. Therefore, you cannot come in. That's
what they're going to say.
Ms. Bailey. And then the President will have a----
Senator Biden. You see, I practiced law, you practice
inspections. I represented people like this where, in fact, the
government came and said we want to do something. We want to
search your home, your business, or you. I know how it works. I
represented them. I know how they think--not all of them. But I
have as much experience as you do in that regard.
I see no reason to believe your scenario. But the bottom
line is this, and I will stop, Mr. Chairman.
You have to assume in your scenario that the entire
inspection team is going to be venal.
Ms. Bailey. That's not true.
Senator Biden. Sure it is. Look, the Russian walks out and
says you know, they are making chemical weapons in there.
Ms. Bailey. It only takes one person to make that
accusation.
Senator Biden. No, it doesn't, because then what happens is
you've got the other five people there, or three people, or
seven people.
Ms. Bailey. This is all prior to an inspection taking place
at this facility.
The Chairman. Joe, you are out-shouting the lady. Give her
a chance to answer you.
Senator Biden. I'm sorry. You're right and I beg your
pardon.
The Chairman. You rest your tonsils just a little bit.
Not one iota of evidence is required by the CWC to start a
challenge inspection. Is that correct--not one iota?
Ms. Bailey. That's correct. No data.
The Chairman. And it's impossible to stop----
Senator Biden. No ``data.'' There's a distinction.
Ms. Bailey. The Senator is correct--no data, no evidence.
The Chairman. What's the difference?
Senator Biden. Well, there's a difference between ``data''
and an ``assertion.''
Ms. Bailey. No data or evidence.
The Chairman. Anything else?
Senator Biden. No.
The Chairman. OK.
It's impossible to stop an inspection once it's started, is
that correct?
Ms. Bailey. Yes.
The Chairman. You have to get 31 of 41 diplomats to vote
against the inspection within 12 hours to stop it.
Ms. Bailey. Three-quarters of 41. Yes.
The Chairman. Yes. Now all you have to do to start an
inspection is to say where you want to go. You don't have to
have any evidence, is that correct?
Ms. Bailey. You do not have to have any evidence.
The Chairman. Nowhere in the treaty, nowhere in the treaty
does it say you have to say why you want an inspection. Is that
correct?
Ms. Bailey. All that is required is that a country say that
they suspect that there is a violation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
The Chairman. All right.
Now you already addressed this earlier on, so I won't get
into that.
I think we have gone about as far as we can go, Senator.
Senator Biden. I have one last question, and I won't even
comment. I'll just ask the last question.
The Chairman. Ask it, then.
Senator Biden. OK.
Madam, at the end of the day, if the facility for which a
challenge inspection is sought, 1 second before they cross the
threshold says you cannot come in, you do not have a search
warrant, is it not true that they will be required to go to a
Federal judge and establish probable cause? You and I should
not guess their motivation. If they do, if they say you cannot
cross the threshold, is it not true that you have to go to a
Federal judge and establish probable cause as to why there is a
violation? Is that correct?
Ms. Bailey. Do you want to limit me to a yes/no? Could I
say ``yes'' and then comment?
It is true. But I have two comments. The first one is why
would we want to sign an arms control treaty which we know we
are not going to apply ourselves in terms of challenge
inspections in the future? In other words, any company that
says no, or private individual that says no, can say no----
Senator Biden. Can I answer your question?
Ms. Bailey [continuing]. That's the first part. Do you want
both parts now?
Senator Biden. Do you want me to answer your question?
Ms. Bailey. Yes, but both parts first?
Senator Biden. OK. I'll do it either way you want.
The Chairman. Let her make her case.
Ms. Bailey. That's the first one. The second one is that if
it is a U.S. national security facility, meaning a place like
my laboratory, they will not be able to say no and foreigners
can come in and use these GC/MS and other techniques to gather,
to glean national security data. And that is something that is
not covered by what we talked about so far.
But I think it is a terribly important issue worthy of your
attention.
Senator Biden. Can I answer your question?
Ms. Bailey. Sure.
Senator Biden. The answer to your question as to why we
would be part of such a regime that would allow our Fourth
Amendment to work is because the underlying philosophy of the
treaty is challenge inspections are not intended to be
frivolous. That is the underlying assumption.
Therefore, we are totally consistent with the spirit of the
treaty when we say if you want to challenge us, you have to
give us some good reason under our Constitution why you are
saying that. That's why we should want to be a part of a treaty
and want to enforce our Constitution. That's why.
Ms. Bailey. Do you think Iran will want to amend its
constitution----
The Chairman. Exactly.
Ms. Bailey [continuing]. To add Fourth Amendment rights----
The Chairman. Or Russia, for that matter.
Ms. Bailey [continuing]. Once they see us using them as a
means of avoiding inspections?
Senator Biden. The answer is that may very well be. But it
is kind of interesting how those of you who oppose the treaty,
there is a weakness you see in the treaty and any correction of
that weakness makes another part of your criticism worse. For
example, if we did not have the Fourth Amendment guarantees
built in here, you'd be saying it is a violation of the
American Constitution, therefore we should not be part of the
treaty. Right?
Ms. Bailey. Right.
Senator Biden. Now that we have Fourth Amendment
guarantees, then you say we don't want to do that, because it
renders the treaty less likely to be efficacious against other
countries. Right?
Ms. Bailey. They're both true.
Senator Biden. Right. And you have used them skillfully. I
think you are a lawyer.
The Chairman. Anything else to come before the committee?
Mr. Johnson. I would like to bring up one point.
The Chairman. Sure.
Mr. Johnson. Senator Biden, in part 9----
Senator Biden. Pardon me?
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. In part 9 of the treaty, they get
into a discussion of the number of discreet organic chemical
inspections that can happen in a year. In the third year, as I
read it, in the third year they are limited to 5 percent of the
facilities available, plus 3, or 20 whichever is the smallest
number.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Johnson. In our case, in the United States, that
undoubtedly will be 20.
Now in that third year or fourth year, I am not sure which,
this issue of number of inspections on discreet organic
chemicals will again be addressed. You know, that could cut
either way. We could maintain the number of 20, or it could
become less, or it could become more. That is a little bit of a
concern.
Senator Biden. If I may respond, sir, that is a good point
that you make. My understanding is--I will withhold my
understanding until I have staff check to see if I am right
about whether or not the 20 could be changed--if it is a
fundamental change, if it is a change in the treaty, to go from
20, say, to 30, 50, 100, 1,000 or whatever it is, it is an
amendment to the treaty. Under a condition that we are going to
add to this ratification--and there's no way you'd know this--
we are going to add to this that it would have to come back to
the Senate for ratification if they were going to change that.
So that would change the whole ballgame and it would change
the requirement. They could not do that, could not bind us
unless we ratify it as an amendment to the treaty.
But the second point is this. My understanding--and I would
stand to be corrected, because I am not certain--hold on for
just 1 second.
My understanding is--and I will check this for the record
because I had not approached this before and it is a good point
you raise, separate and apart from the requirement that we
would have to get the Senate to sign off on it with a super
majority vote again--my understanding of Section 9, relating to
the companies you are talking about, which would fall into the
category of being 1 of the 20 inspections, is that the 3-year
period does not go to whether or not that can be upped from 20
to any other number. It goes to whether or not there will be
any inspections--any inspections. There are no inspections now.
So it will go to whether or not there will be any inspections.
Now because you have been so straight with me, with us, I
promise you I will for the record--and I am sure the Senator
and the staff will remind me--I will go back and give you a
written analysis of my view. I may be wrong, but I will send
you a copy of that. But my understanding is the 3 year period
means for now there can be no inspections for the next 3 years
and at the end of 3 years they are going to decide whether
there will be any for the covered category--not that there can
be 20 of the covered category now and it may be amended to be
30, 40, or 50.
But even if that is true, such an amendment would have to
come back to the United States Congress--the Senate, to be
precise, not the Congress--and be ratified by the Senate before
it would be binding on the United States of America, before it
could be binding on the United States of America. But you raise
a good point. I will check it out.
I always learn something at these hearings, and I now have
to go back and find out whether my analysis, which I just told
you, is absolutely accurate. I think it is. But I am not
positive.
I am positive about the treaty part. I am not positive
about the 20.
[The information referred to follows:]
May 21, 1997.
Mr. Ralph Johnson,
Vice President, Dixie Chemical Company, Inc.,
Houston, TX 77219.
Dear Mr. Johnson: Thank you for taking time on April 15 to testify
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Chemical Weapons
Convention. I appreciate your concern about how our country is
governed. As you know, the Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention on April 24 by a 74-26 vote, and the treaty entered into
force on April 29.
During last month's hearing, you inquired as to whether the
treaty's limitation on inspections in the United States could be
revised upward after the treaty enters into force. As you are aware, no
more than twenty American producers of Schedule III and unscheduled
discrete organic chemicals can be subjected to routine inspection in
any one year.
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has informed me that
while this limit, in theory, could be revised upward with the support
of the countries that have ratified the treaty, such a change is highly
unlikely and would be strongly opposed by the United States Government.
The Secretary General of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons could seek approval from the Executive Council to
revise this limit. While the mechanism by which the Executive Council
would rule on such a request has yet to be determined (whether by
consensus or super majority), the United States will have a seat on the
Council and would be in a strong position to oppose such a proposal.
More important, ACDA assures me that it is highly unlikely that
such a proposal would ever be made. Because the purpose of routine
inspections is to verify the declarations made by each country that has
signed the treaty, the Organization is unlikely to focus as many as
twenty inspections on any one country. Because the number of inspectors
is limited, it is more likely that inspections will be conducted in as
many countries as possible to determine the compliance of different
nations.
I hope that this information answers any concerns you had about how
the Chemical Weapons Convention might affect your business. If you have
any further questions about the Chemical Weapons Convention and its
effect on industry, please contact me or John Lis of my staff at (202)
224-5042.
Sincerely,
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Ranking Minority Member.
Mr. Johnson. OK. Thank you.
The Chairman. Whoever has something he wants to say, please
do. I have one more question and then we will sing the doxology
and depart.
Mr. Webber. Thank you, sir.
I want to elaborate on the $600 million figure.
Mr. Chairman, I said earlier that this could be the tip of
the iceberg. As you know, Germany, the U.K., Japan, and other
major trading countries have already signed the convention. Our
greatest fear is that if we are a non-party, a non-signatory,
we are going to see some trade barriers being erected that will
impact a good part of our $61 billion in exports that we
produce annually.
For example, Germany has already announced that it is going
to impose new restrictions on trade with nonmember nations
commencing 29 April. That, in part, is what drives us. We want
to be reliable trading partners. We have been up to this point.
Today, as we sit across the table, they are looking at us
with a jaundiced eye wondering why this treaty has not been
ratified and wondering what actions they ought to take
commencing 29 April. And we have already seen, and it has been
in the newspapers, the action that Germany plans to take. They
are going to take a look at all of our chemical trade, and we
have no idea what kind of nontariff barriers are going to be
erected. But we know it is going to be very, very difficult
down the road to continue to trade in chemicals with this very
large trading country.
The Chairman. How many of your member companies are owned
by Europeans? Glaxo is one of them.
Mr. Webber. I think a little under 30 percent of our entire
membership is represented by foreign owners.
The Chairman. Do you mean the Europeans are going to put up
trade barriers against their own companies in the United
States?
Mr. Webber. Sir, we are unbelievably competitive on a
global basis, and that signal that we got from Germany is very,
very serious, indeed. We feel we have legitimate concerns here.
The Chairman. My last question, and I will let anybody
answer this, though perhaps it is best directed to you, Fred,
or Mr. Webber, is this. During these hearings, the committee
has heard testimony from a number of foreign policy experts who
are very concerned that Article XI of the treaty will be used
by nations to pressure the United States to lower its export
controls and to eliminate the Australia Group. Have you heard
that?
Mr. Webber. Yes, sir, I have. In your absence, I tried to
respond to that in my testimony.
The Chairman. OK. Let me get through this.
Now the administration has promoted the CWC as an arms
control treaty, but some clearly view the CWC as a treaty
designed to facilitate trade in chemicals and in technology.
Mr. Carpenter, in testimony before this committee, stated
that one of the reasons for the Chemical Manufacturers
Association's support of the CWC was the anticipation that, and
I'm quoting him, ``An effective CWC could have the positive
effect of liberalizing the existing system of export controls
applicable to our industry's products, technologies, and
processes.''
Now my question to you is did your association write a
letter of support for H.R. 361, which allowed for the licensing
of free trade in chemicals among the CWC members, and does CMA
continue to favor the reduction of U.S. export controls on the
dual use chemicals controlled by the CWC?
Mr. Webber. Let me take a stab at what I think Mr.
Carpenter meant when he said we want to see trade liberalized,
if you will.
As I said in my formal testimony, we have a long history of
support for U.S. export control law, and the Australia Group,
and limited multilateral control regimes like the Australia
Group.
We think the CWC is a logical extension of those control
systems. It broadens the scope, makes more nations live up to
the high standards set by our own country, the U.S.
So we don't think CWC will replace existing U.S. export
controls or the Australia Group. Both will be around, as you
know, sir, for a long time.
As confidence in the treaty grows, we think it will
eventually be possible to create a single, integrated export
control regime under the banner of CWC. But, of course, that is
down the road. But that's what we mean when we say
``liberalizing trade,'' and I think that is what Dr. Carpenter
meant.
The Chairman. Well, did you or did your association not, or
did it, write in support of H.R. 361?
Mr. Webber. I have been advised that we were part of a
coalition that indeed supported that bill. But we did not
specifically focus on any particular provision of the bill. But
we gave general endorsement.
The Chairman. So you didn't write a letter? You were just
among those present?
Mr. Webber. No, we wrote a letter in support, as part of
the coalition in support.
The Chairman. What I needed there was just a yes or no.
Mr. Webber. Yes.
The Chairman. Now you understand that that bill proposed to
reduce U.S. export controls. Is that not correct?
Mr. Webber. Yes.
The Chairman. And, too, it offered to license free trade,
did it not?
Mr. Webber. Yes.
The Chairman. And you still favored it?
Mr. Webber. We have not supported any elimination of export
controls over precursor chemicals, and I think that is the key
statement that we would stand by.
The Chairman. Please repeat that?
Mr. Webber. We would not advocate the elimination of any
export controls having to do with precursor chemicals.
The Chairman. Well, didn't you do that when you advocated
this bill?
Mr. Webber. We don't think so, sir.
The Chairman. You don't?
Mr. Webber. No.
The Chairman. I might want to put that letter into the
testimony here.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you strike the gavel,
I'm not going to ask a question. I just want to make an
admission.
Mr. Johnson may be right, because Part 10 is part of the
Annex, Mr. Johnson, and the Annex means that it may not be
covered by a requirement to have the U.S. Senate ratify any
change. But I will still get you the full answer. I just wanted
to make sure that I tell you my staff points out it is the
Annex, not the body of the treaty. So you may be right. Let me
check it out.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. The skies are going to fall.
No, he has admitted he has made a mistake--in 1987.
Senator Biden. No, in 1972, when I ran.
The Chairman. We enjoy each other; and I respect Joe, and
he knows that.
Senator Biden. As I do you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Lady and gentlemen, thank you very much for
spending this afternoon with us. I did not intend for it to go
so long. But you have made a substantial record, and I
appreciate your going through the trouble of being here and
testifying as you have.
If there be no further business to come before the
committee, we stand in recess.
Senator Biden. Thanks, Jesse.
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
[Whereupon, at 5:25 p.m. the committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 10:07 a.m., Tuesday, April 17, 1997.]
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel,
presiding.
Present: Senators Hagel, Biden and Kerry.
Senator Hagel. The committee will come to order.
Congressman Goss, thank you, and welcome. You probably were
expecting Chairman Helms. I am sorry to disappoint you and the
other members of the second panel. Chairman Helms had a couple
of responsibilities to attend to this morning and has asked me
to fill in, and I am privileged to do so.
As a 4-month United States Senator, Congressman, we make
progress quickly over here, as you can see. So, if you work
hard and do the right thing, you are Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee after 4 months. That is the way it works.
So we are very, very pleased to have you, as well as our
distinguished panel who follow you, Congressman. And I will
just briefly acknowledge our panel, and then I know you may
have a vote coming up soon, so we would get right to business.
The opportunity to have you over here, Congressman, is
significant, because we all know you chair the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. Your observations, insights
and contributions will be important to this body, in helping us
make a very difficult decision.
Then, after you are completed with your testimony--I
understand you will have to leave immediately after that--we
will have a panel following you, consisting of General Bill
Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency; Mr. Ed
O'Malley, former Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and head of the FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence
Operations; and the Hon. Ronald Lehman, former Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. So we are very privileged
to have all of you.
And, again, Mr. Chairman, welcome, and we look forward to
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. PORTER J. GOSS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
FLORIDA
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate
you on your meteoric rise and wish you continuing success in
your endeavors, and I hope you will give my compliments to the
Chairman when he is back.
I also compliment you on the quality of your second panel.
It is obviously made up of folks who know a good deal about
this subject as well. And I greatly appreciate the opportunity
to be here this morning.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you have clearly
an awesome responsibility in deciding whether to ratify the
Chemical Weapons Convention. As a Member of the House, who does
not have a vote on this matter at this threshold, I am very
especially honored that you have asked for my views as you
pursue your advice and consent obligation.
My testimony today is generally based on my knowledge and
experience, including of course committee assignments on the
House International Relations and the Intelligence Committees.
But I also come as a Member of Congress, charged with
representing views of the good people of Southwest Florida,
views I consider a very rich slice of America.
We all understand that the stakes are extremely high in
what is about here today. No margin for error. Chemical weapons
are so dangerous, so frightening and so difficult to control
that is only natural and proper that the global community seeks
to contain and eradicate them. The question is how to do it
effectively.
I know that those of us charged with our Nation's security
have given this matter very much thought and carefully reviewed
the commentary of many distinguished former leaders, public
servants who have come down on opposite sides of this issue. I
remain deeply troubled about the CWC's ability to meet the
promise of its title and of its proponents. Given my review and
my concerns, Mr. Chairman, in general, I conclude that I cannot
support this treaty. Primarily and specifically, effective and
balanced verification is too doubtful.
My comments today focus on the critical issue of
verification, and then seek to broaden the debate somewhat with
a discussion of how the control of chemical agents and weapons
fits into the overall strategy we all seek to ensure protection
for the American people, for American interests, and for
American allies.
Finally, I want to briefly discuss a very real and
practical aspect of CWC that has great significance to all of
us as we embark on our annual budget process that will not be
news to anybody here--the cost of implementation.
Going to verification, first, Mr. Chairman, let me discuss
this. At the outset, I want to state that I am not an
individual who believes that arms control is a worthless
endeavor. Mr. Lehman, I am sure, will agree with that. We have
talked about this subject many times. On the contrary, I
believe that our arms control efforts during the cold war were
a critical component of a strategy that resulted in the end of
the cold war and, subsequently, the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
Arms control truly has its place in our foreign policy and
national security objectives. The process of arms control and
the treaties that result can build a level of trust between
signatories, and it can provide a measure of insight and
information that is useful to the Nation. Obviously, if this
were the only yardstick needed to measure the worthiness of the
treaty, then CWC would be an undeniably valuable and worthwhile
endeavor.
Certainly, through the provisions found in CWC, some
information would be available, and cooperation among most
signatories could likely benefit our Nation to a degree. In
fact, the acting Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. George
Tenet, rightly stated to the Senate Intelligence Committee that
there are some tools in the CWC--namely, inspections and data
exchange--that, as an intelligence professional, he would find
beneficial. And I certainly concur with that.
For the intelligence community, it is clearly true that
more information and insight is beneficial to analysis.
However, the decision to ratify a treaty is not based on
whether the intelligence community can get more data, but, in
part, on whether we can monitor the provisions of the treaty
and whether we, as a government, can verify that these
provisions have been met or are being broken.
And here, Mr. Tenet confirms what his predecessors have
already stated and what I, too, believe. Monitoring compliance
with CWC provisions will be very difficult. As you have heard,
former DCI Woolsey, who negotiated the CFE treaty, an
understands the complexity and importance of being able to
monitor the provisions of a multinational treaty, stated that,
quote, the chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an
intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high
confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially
on a small scale, unquote.
Mr. Tenet, more recently, confirmed that assessment when he
told the Senate Intelligence Committee--again, I will quote--I
will say that our ability to monitor the CWC provisions
probably is still not very good, unquote.
Mr. Chairman, I must say that given the statements of those
who have been in the position of managing intelligence
resources and understanding their capabilities, combined with
my own experience as an intelligence professional--a long time
ago, I would add--and as a member and now chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, I believe that our ability to monitor
the CWC is very questionable.
I believe that is certainly true if you consider the more
traditional and accepted definition of, quote, effectively
verifiable, unquote. That is, the effectively verifiable means
having a high level of assurance in the intelligence
community's ability to reliably detect a militarily significant
violation in a timely fashion. I do not believe we have those
assurances.
But even if you consider the much more watered down
definition that has been promoted by the current
administration, our capabilities are called into question--and
I am not sure we can fulfill even that mandate. Former DCI John
Deutch, when he was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated to
the Senate Armed Services Committee that a CWC verification
regime, quote, should prove reasonably effective, unquote, over
time.
As this committee has heard several times, the language of
the classified National Intelligence Estimate from August 1993
looms very large. And again, I will quote from it. The
capability of the intelligence community to monitor compliance
with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely limited and
likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. The key
provision of the monitoring regime, challenge inspections at
undeclared sites, can be thwarted by a na-
tion determined to preserve a small, secret program, using the
delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention,
unquote.
I think that Chairman Helms had some interesting comments
on industrial espionage as well, which he put in the record
back--I think it was--on the 19th of March, which fall
generally into this area.
Moving from verification to a broader perspective, Mr.
Chairman, I think that in viewing the CWC, one must put into
perspective what we need do regarding the spread and potential
use of chemical weapons in terms of our own national security.
And I am not discounting our allies or other interests, but
national security comes first.
Put simply, what is the threat and what do we do about it?
I would argue that the threat has continued to evolve over
the past 4 years, since CWC was signed. Among obvious evidence
of the types of new challenges we face was the incident in
1995, when the Aum Shinrikyo cult clandestinely produced sarin
gas and deployed it into a Japanese subway. Although some may
argue that this was simply an act of religious fervor, I fear
that this is precisely the type of MO that terrorist groups may
employ in the future.
The transnational issues of proliferation--and here I refer
specifically to the production and proliferation of chemical
weapons and terrorism, whether state-sponsored or not--directly
affect our Nation's security, perhaps almost as dramatically as
the threat introduced by the incorporation of nuclear weapons
into the inventories of the Soviet Union that we all remember.
But the thought of small-scale production and employment of
chemical weapons by a terrorist organization is one that should
frighten anyone knowledgeable of the ease with which such
weapons of terror can in fact be made. This type of threat must
get special focus from our intelligence community--focus that
could be drawn away by the need to monitor the CWC. It would be
sad, indeed, if while creating a false sense of security by
attempting to monitor this treaty, we found that we had
diminished capacity to attack these transnational threats
specifically.
Then, Mr. Chairman, there is the larger issue of state-
sponsored chemical weapons programs. Some would argue that an
advantage of CWC is the overall pressure that it would place on
states that are not part of the agreement to do the right
thing. Although this may have been true during the cold war at
some time, I am not as confident that it is true today, or will
be tomorrow, for those countries that concern us most. After
all, we call these countries ``rogue'' for very good reasons--
they do not conform and do not care about international norms,
nor accepted behavior.
Let me use the first START treaty to illustrate my point on
what could be the likely effects of CWC on some of these
nations. START is a treaty that has proven to be very effective
and extremely valuable to our national security. Because of the
treaty provisions that can be monitored by the intelligence
community and verified by our government, we have reduced the
threat that once had many of us learning how to take shelter
under our desks at school. Thank heavens those days are gone.
One of the noted values of START was the example it set for
others, by saying that nuclear weapons were bad and that even
the superpowers understood that we needed to walk back from
that brink. However, it is clear that the START treaty did not
set an example that was so dramatic that it prevented other
rogue countries from pursuing their own nuclear weapons
programs, as we all know.
In some cases, these are the same states as those we are
now worried about regarding chemical weapons programs and
whether they might adhere to CWC. Having witnessed the types of
actions and activities of these countries during this decade,
it is hard to believe that they will somehow now cave to the
threat of international reason promoted in the CWC.
The fact is that reasonable nations will abide by
international norms. Efforts like the Australia Group regime
can be effective with reasonable nations. They are good
efforts. The same is probably true for the CWC. But our
greatest concern, certainly from an intelligence perspective,
is not states that we term ``reasonable.'' If everyone were
reasonable, would we be here discussing this today?
Another question is the wherewithal of our signatories to
enforce treaty provisions substantially and to engage actively
non-signatories in adopting CWC principles. I noted with
interest the recent statement by James Schlesinger, former DCI,
regarding the world's incredibly mild reaction to the use of
chemical weapons by the Iraqis, in clear and unambiguous
violation of the Geneva Convention. I have little doubt that
CWC could well suffer the same fate, coming under the same
geopolitical yoke that often tempers the need for forceful,
direct international actions.
And at this point, I am going to insert some recent
history. I must say that I have reservations about our own
government's seriousness in this regard. Just this morning I
learned that this administration made yet another attempt to
sidestep direct action regarding chemical weapons
proliferation. In this case, I understand that the State
Department has attempted to modify its statements to the
Senate, taking a more relaxed approach to the transfers of
dual-use chemicals to Iran. This was recently reported in the
Washington Times, and I am relieved to see that there is
bipartisan outrage to this.
This is not the first time that this administration has
attempted to downplay China's activities in order to protect
China from necessary, lawful sanctions. Many members of the
House Intelligence Committee, on both sides of the aisle--and I
stress that--are increasingly questioning this administration's
response--or, more appropriately, their lack of response--to
blatant proliferation of ballistic missiles and chemical agents
or weapons, as has been reported in the press.
I think Senator Stevens had it right when he indicated that
this administration is so narrowly interpreting our laws that
we will be unable to do anything about the proliferation
problem. And that concerns me. I am very concerned that in
continued attempts to protect policy, the administration
appears willing to ignore the spirit and possibly the letter of
the law. With this in mind, I wonder what hope we have of
implementing the CWC accords in a way that will really be
effective.
Mr. Chairman, regarding the task ahead with those countries
that we know are the bad actors, I point to the hurdles that we
have encountered related to the United Nations inspections in
Iraq. In what many would term a more robust inspection regime
than CWC, proof of a chemical weapons program was concealed
from U.N. inspectors for a great deal of time, and the full
extent of such a program is likely still unknown. This is, in
part, a factor of the ease with which chemical weapons can be
concealed.
I am afraid, however, that some of this probably has to do
with the fact that today much more is known about our national
technical means and other techniques of information collection
and analysis than at any other time in our history. Some of
this has to do with the fact that the technological explosion
that we have witnessed over this decade has made people and
countries generally more knowledgeable. We have lost some of
our edge. Denial and deception is an unresolved challenge that
leaves unacceptable gaps in verifiability.
Unfortunately, another aspect is that we have made our own
job harder. Mr. Chairman, it saddens me to say that I have just
received a highly classified document in my office that relates
to the damage to the effectiveness of some of our sensitive
sources and methods. It appears this damage may have been the
result of a very cavalier--or at least misguided--attitude
toward declassification of information within the Department of
Defense and the intelligence community, apparently in order to
pacify political pressures from senior leaders in the
government. And that is not a good reason.
Obviously, I cannot go into any detail here on this issue,
but I assure you that my colleagues and I on the Intelligence
Committee, and I am sure our counterparts on the Senate side,
will be examining this problem in detail over the next few
weeks and months. Suffice it to say, however, that if
interpreted correctly, the bad actors could well have a leg up
on their ability to conceal activity and our ability to detect
that they did not have previously.
The final area I would like to briefly address for you to
consider, Mr. Chairman, is that of the implementation costs
associated with monitoring CWC provisions. I know that you have
received reports on the overall costs associated with
implementation, and that the United States may pay up to 25
percent of those overall costs. I would like to highlight the
possible effects on the intelligence community.
Often, because monitoring of our agreements and treaties
with other nations is a matter of great importance to us,
obviously, the priority placed on such activity is high in
terms of our requirements, and the costs and the allocation of
our resources are commensurate. I think that this is generally
the right approach. Sometimes, however, this can lead to
intelligence programs and a collection and analytical emphasis
that can place greater priority on monitoring specific
technical aspects of a treaty than on filling in the
intelligence gaps. This is not a complaint of the intelligence
community; it is merely an observation.
My concern about this issue stems from the fact that
dollars for intelligence and defense are at risk in the current
budget environment--and we all know that. Yet, even though the
intelligence community is significantly smaller, the demands
for intelligence have significantly increased. Consequently,
budget decisions within the community and within the
intelligence committees of Congress become more and more
problematic. And that is probably an understatement.
At the end of the day, I must wonder whether intelligence
dollars will be better spent on trying to effectively monitor
CWC provisions that may in fact be unverifiable or focusing on
comprehensive efforts against transnational threats. I use that
term to refer to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical weapons, terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, and of course international organized crime.
As the Intelligence Committee reviews this year's budget
submission, the potential tradeoffs between monitoring the CWC
and focusing on other measures against the transnational
threats could be a risky proposition.
Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt that the CWC can be
important. And I know that the motives of those supporting it
are certainly very well intentioned, and I take nothing away
from that effort. But the threat of the so-called transnational
issues is so great that I must wonder to what degree the CWC
helps us meet those challenges ahead. We need your support to
make sure that we have a robust, flexible intelligence
community in the future that can take on all of the challenges
that we have. Unfortunately, when I look at the tradeoffs, the
CWC comes up somewhat short of that mark.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to insert
my views.
Senator Hagel. Chairman Goss, thank you.
I have been joined here by my distinguished colleague from
Delaware, Senator Biden, who is the ranking minority member of
the Foreign Relations Committee. Welcome.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have you
here. I served on the Intelligence Committee for 10 years, but
you have served in the intelligence community. You are one of
the only folks here that has that hands-on experience.
I must say, I apologize for not being here for your whole
testimony; the Judiciary Committee is meeting, as well. I know
you know the problem. But I will read your whole statement and
take what you have to say seriously.
The one thing you have said that I do agree with, and I am
not sure how much more relative to CWC, is the need for us to
have a robust intelligence capability unrelated to CWC. I was
one of those guys, back when we had this--when we started the
committee you now chair, that came out of the--that is how
old--that is how long I have been here--it came out of the
Church committee. And I was one of the so-called charter
members. And I remember how upset everyone was in my party and
my part of the party, because I kept proposing spending more
money on the agency.
And I would just say--and I realize it is slightly
extraneous--but it seems to me, at a time when the wall is
down, when other armies are weaker, when we have an
overwhelming predominance of military capability, when we are
cutting our military, this is the time to expand our capacity
and not diminish our capacity relative to two things. One, the
intelligence community and the other, the Foreign Service. This
is a time to move out, not pull in. And so I agree with your
overall admonition to be careful about what we are not doing
for the community.
I think we have a little disagreement on--I know we have a
little disagreement on the efficacy of the CWC, but I will not
engage you in that now. I am told you are off. I know how busy
you are. I appreciate you, as they say, making that long walk
to the other body. It is a long way over here, I know that.
Mr. Goss. Thank you, Senator. I want to congratulate you
for your vision in setting up the oversight committee. It has
proved to be a totally appropriate and worthwhile enterprise.
Senator Biden. I cannot take credit for setting it up. That
was Senator Church. I just got put on it. I was just one of the
first ones put on the committee.
Mr. Goss. Well, if you were there, your fingerprints are on
it, and you will have to accept the praise.
Senator Biden. I am afraid they are.
Mr. Goss. I also want to commend very much the comments you
made last evening. They were very informative to me, and I
think will be very informative in this process. And I was
extremely impressed with your leadership on that point.
Senator Biden. Well, you are very gracious. Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goss. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
If we could now have the second panel come to the witness
table. Thank you. [Pause.]
Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, thank you.
I have introduced all three of you, and unless my
colleague, Senator Biden has any opening statements, why do not
we get right to it. And we will just go, at least from Senator
Biden and my perspective, we will go left to right, and we will
start with you, Mr. Lehman.
Senator Biden. Does it matter if we let the General go
first.
Senator Hagel. No. That is fine with me. If you would
prefer to have General Odom go first.
Mr. Lehman. I never made general, so I think it is a
protocol question.
Senator Hagel. Well, I am a former sergeant, so I always
put the generals at the back.
Senator Biden. General, were you ever a sergeant?
General Odom. No, I was not, unfortunately.
Senator Biden. Well, then, he outranks you in this man's
army.
Senator Hagel. I am glad we got that straight.
General, let me just reintroduce you, so that everyone
knows, here in the hearing room, who you are and the expertise
that you bring. You are the former Director of the National
Security Agency. You spent a lifetime in the military. You come
to this panel this morning with considerable experience and
expertise. So, we are grateful. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM ODOM, GENERAL, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), FORMER
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
General Odom. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Biden, minority ranking member. It is a pleasure and an
honor to testify before you today. You have asked me to express
judgments on the verifiability and the verification regime of
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Now, initially, I considered the Convention rather benign,
a treaty that would probably not prevent any determined state
from violating it secretly, but probably having some marginal
deterrent effect and, therefore, favorably.
In general, I think the public--certainly, the media and a
lot of opinion-makers and Washington political leaders--tend to
favor arms control treaties, not because these treaties
necessarily control arms, but because the sentiments and the
intentions are noble. And to oppose them in this climate is to
appear to be against virtue and for sin.
Unfortunately, I think the record of arms control
agreements is not objectively tracked and audited. And if it
were, and widely published, I think the image of virtue would
become seriously tarnished in several cases. But such a record
is not kept to moderate these illusions and, therefore,
whenever the potential damage for an arms control treaty is not
very great and it may have some marginal advantage or gains,
prudence allows us to support them responsibly, lining up with
public virtue against sin.
Now, upon a little examination of the verification regime,
I began to realize it was not as benign as I had assumed. The
length of the treaty itself immediately raised my suspicion.
Now, one need go no further than the definitions of the terms
at the beginning of the text to see the possibilities for
dangerous ambiguities. This is not to suggest that the
definitions have not been set forth with great care and
thought. It is merely to underscore that some aspects of the
definition task inherently must include ambiguities.
For example, toxic chemicals and precursors, as clear
categories, begin to be vitiated when purposes not prohibited
by this convention are enumerated, especially where they
concern international trade in chemicals. For another example,
production capacity, is not easy to define in all cases with
great certainty. The surge capacity of production facilities is
often deceptive.
Now, moving to the guidelines for schedules of chemicals,
one has to wonder if in the context of rapid technological
change in chemistry, whether or not these schedules can be kept
updated in a practical way. For example, in the early 1980's,
when I was Chief of Army Intelligence, we were concerned with
the possible Soviet production of mycotoxins, substances that
rest ambiguously on the boundary between chemical and organic
substances. A research chemist and a molecular biologist could
debate that, and they could probably provide you numerous other
such ambiguous examples that we will have to deal with if this
treaty goes into effect.
The drafters of the text have probably done about as well
as is possible in these circumstances. That is the point. The
circumstances are not very amenable to arms control treaties.
As a result, the length and the complexity of the treaty is
such that very few people have the depth of expertise--
scientific, technical, legal, military, and intelligence--to
say with even low confidence what the likely consequences of
the treaty would be if implemented.
I am surprised, therefore, that senior officials in the
administration assert their support for it in such an
unqualified manner. And I seriously doubt that any but staff
specialists have read it carefully. And if they have, I doubt
that they fully understood it.
I am not surprised, however, to learn that the acting
Director of Central Intelligence has reconfirmed the
community's position that the treaty cannot be verified today,
nor does he see prospects that it can be in the future.
Now, looking at the verification regime as a former
official of the intelligence community, I am disturbed by it,
not just because it is impossible to verify with a high degree
of confidence, but because it also complicates our security
problems. Take, for example, the U.N.-like organization set up
to make inspections. All of the appointed members may have no
intelligence links whatsoever initially. As they find that they
can tramp around in all kinds of U.S. production facilities,
however, foreign intelligence services are likely to offer to
supplement their wages for a little technology collection
activity on the side. And they will probably provide truly
sophisticated covert technical means to facilitate these
efforts.
Over time, therefore, it is only prudent to assume that a
few members of this group will not be entirely trustworthy. If
the KGB could penetrate the CIA, it and other intelligence
services are likely to be able to penetrate this U.N.-like CWC
inspection agency.
Now, I understand that other witnesses have already raised
questions about Article X and Article XI, which give all
signatories the right to participate in the fullest exchange of
information concerning the means of protection against chemical
weapons. Such information inevitably includes knowledge of
offensive means. Because, without it, one cannot know how to
defend against them.
It seems, from the treaty language, that each signatory is
left to judge what information is to be included in sharing.
And that implies as many interpretations as their are
signatories. If all such information is available, then every
signatory's interpretation governs its further distribution.
Now, the incentive to exploit this ambiguity will only be
great where the most innovative and effective offensive
chemical means are concerned. That is, the very ones one would
hope the treaty would be most effective in restricting.
Pondering the implications, I am forced to conclude that the
treaty could become the mechanism for proliferating the most
dangerous offensive CW means, while becoming reasonable
effective against the far less offensive means.
This highly perverse and probable consequence of the treaty
gives me pause, to say the least.
Another aspect of the treaty puzzles me deeply. This thick
document is entitled ``Instructions to Industry: Chemical
Weapons Convention Data Reporting Requirements,'' which was
drafted by the Commerce Department. It defines a very complex,
tedious reporting system. Unless I am mistaken, one of the
major concerns of the Congress in the last few years has been
to reduce costly and burdensome regulations on U.S. business.
Now, this document, required for the verification regime,
looks like a costly and troublesome stack of regulations. My
discovery of it made me highly suspicious of the convention
itself. Do all of the affected U.S. firms know that they are
about to face these instructions? Do they really know what the
data reporting will cost? Do they know the costs of an
intrusive inspection, even an occasional one, not just in
direct monetary costs, which they must bear, but also the
inherent costs of shutting down production during an
inspection?
Now, when I ask congressional staffers why the business
community was not up in arms about this aspect of the treaty, I
learned that several large chemical companies actually support
this and agree to accept the costs. I also learned that not all
businesses to be affected are aware that they will have to bear
these costs. And, recently, it seems that some such firms,
those in the aerospace industry, for example, have awakened to
the implications and do not like them.
And when I asked why the large chemical firms so happily
accept the idea of paying hundreds of thousands of dollars to
carry the regulatory burden of the convention I got no good
answers. The answers were no more satisfying to my questions
about whether all the firms which will be affected actually
know that they will be, and have considered the cost and the
inconveniences.
Now, today, I pose another kind of question. The red tape
morass, this kind of red tape morass, required by the
verification regime--and even if the U.S. is willing to accept
its costs and impose it on U.S. industry--what are the
prospects that other countries will take equally comprehensive
steps to monitor their own relevant industrial firms? As one
who has devoted more than a little time to studying the nature
of foreign domestic governments and political systems, I doubt
that more than a few dozen have the administrative capacity to
do so. And when the matter of costs is added, their incentives
for making such a system effective will be negative, not
positive.
Now, I am inclined to believe, therefore, that if the
United States ratifies the convention, only it and a few other
states--none of which really needs the treaty to restrain them
from developing and using chemical weapons--will be tying
themselves up in a tangle of red tape while the rest of the
world largely ignores these requirements, even if they promise
to abide by them. And those states posing the biggest problems
for verification will not cooperate in any case.
Now, if one thinks through the implications of these
regulations, therefore, one is encouraged to conclude that a
few countries who do not need to be tied down by the convention
will be engaged in the costly activity of checking one another
while most states in the world go about their business ignoring
the whole affair. Where states sign and ratify the convention
and then are found by inspectors not to have regulations, what
do we do then?
What do we say when they complain that they cannot afford
them? Do we then finance them from our own budget, as we are
doing in Russia in connection with other arms control
agreements? Even if we agreed to do that, whatever the cost, it
would not work; because lack of administrative capacity, not
shortage of funds, is the critical problem in most of these
states.
These are some of my reactions to learning more about the
convention.
As I considered the additional concerns expressed by
several former Secretaries of Defense, I found them also very
compelling. For those who were not persuaded by their
arguments, however, and who approach the convention looking for
reasons to support it, willing to accept only marginal
advantages as sufficient for justifying the ratification, I
strongly advise against following that inclination. The best
intentions can sometimes produce highly undesirable outcomes. I
see more than sufficient evidence to convince me that the CWC
is clearly such a case.
It is not enough to resort to detailed technical arguments
to score debating points against some of the objections I have
raised. The treaty is so complex that it is possible to isolate
a particular concern and to find arguments that seem to allay
the fear. Within an hour of further examination, however, one
can find yet another concern and another, almost endlessly.
This assessment does not mean the drafters and negotiators
did a sloppy job. On the contrary, it means they were asked to
apply an arms control solution to a problem that essentially
defies its very nature. Common sense tells us this unhappy
truth.
It is also implicit, I think, in acting Director George
Tenet's rather candid letter to Senator Kyl about the
intelligence community's own view of its present and future
capacity to verify the treaty.
Now, I think to push ahead in such circumstances strikes me
as imprudent, not a modest step toward controlling chemical
weapons. Rather, it is an effort to use a hopelessly complex
treaty to escape political and military responsibilities that
we will eventually have to face. The several editorials in the
Washington Post on the CWC show this tendency--a growing
recognition that the complexities really are beyond the reach
of treaty drafters, but not yet willing to accept the
implications.
The most recent one today comes remarkably close to
admitting the treaty's perversity, its enormous potential for
very bad outcomes, hidden in its complicated verification
regime, and wrapped in deceptive appeals to our best instincts.
Now, if we deceive ourselves for a number of years by the
illusion that we have escaped these responsibilities, the price
will be higher than had we faced up to them all along.
Ratifying the convention, therefore, strikes me as
unambiguously imprudent, not a close call, by no means a risk
worth taking, certainly not a harmless step that puts us on the
side of righteousness.
Thank you.
Senator Hagel. General Odom, thank you very much.
Let me now introduce Mr. Edward J. O'Malley. Mr. O'Malley
is the former Assistant Director for Counterintelligence,
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. O'Malley, thank you.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. O'MALLEY, FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE), FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. O'Malley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Senator Biden. Something you just said reminded me of an
incident that happened many years ago.
Judge Webster, then director of the FBI, and I were
testifying on the FBI's foreign counterintelligence budget
before one of the two intelligence committees--I do not recall
which one--and he was asked the question whether he thought he
was really asking for enough money for the Bureau's foreign
counterintelligence program, that the committee was quite
willing to give him more.
I have never heard such a question before or since, but
something you just said reminded me of that.
Yes, I did head the FBI's foreign counterintelligence
program. After I retired, I have been employed for about 10
years in private industry, including with IBM, where I worked
out of the Office of General Counsel and was involved in
countering on IBM's behalf those who would steal IBM's trade
secrets, including, I might add, the Japanese and the French.
Alvin Toffler, the futurist, has stated, the 21st Century
will be marked by information wars and increased economic and
financial espionage. The race for information of all kinds will
be motivated not only by a desire to lead, but will be required
to avoid obsolescence.
The energy released in competition for market share has
significantly replaced but has not eliminated the energy that
once drove the cold war military strategies of the West and its
adversaries. The shift from acquisition of global power by
force to one of acquisition by competitive strategy marks what
promises to be a remarkable revolution, remarkable not only in
the sense of its relevance to national power, but also in a
sense of the increasingly disparate nature of the competitors,
which run the gamut from many of the traditional cold war
adversaries to traditional friends and allies.
In terms of a traditional classical espionage threat vis-a-
vis hostile intelligence operations in the United States,
intelligence services of the former Warsaw Pact, the People's
Republic of China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea, were
of major concern from a counterintelligence standpoint.
The activities of the former Soviet Union and others are as
aggressive as ever, and remain a major threat. What is new,
however, is the increased importance given by them to the
collection of American corporate proprietary information.
Another change in terms of the foreign threat is that it now
includes not only a nation's intelligence services, but also
other governmental ministries and/or corporations.
Chief among their strategies is the acquisition, licit or
otherwise, of the battlefield's strategic targets, a
corporation's sensitive business information and intellectual
property. I think it is clear to anybody that the lifeblood of
any corporation rests on intellectual property, and I might say
the same thing, in my opinion, applies to the lifeblood of a
country.
All of this has not gone unnoticed by our intelligence
community and the Congress, both of which have been very much
engaged in addressing espionage concerns of whatever variety
such as was done in the 1970's. My testimony today will focus
on what was done by both--that is, the Congress and the
community--in the 1970's to address the threat as it existed
then, and what has been done in the 1990's to meet an ever-
increasing and complex intelligence threat.
I will also comment on the concerns I have with the
Chemical Weapons Convention as it relates to certain
counterintelligence initiatives, and also to the extent that
its ratification will result in mixed signals from the Congress
to the counterintelligence community.
I am not arguing that the ratification of the CWC should
succeed or fall because of counterintelligence concerns. What I
am suggesting is that those involved in the strategic
decisionmaking process ought to consider these current concerns
along with many others, such as recently expressed by General
Odom.
Historically, whatever other benefits may have resulted
from the period of detente, there was no corresponding
diminution of intelligence activities in the United States by
the former Soviet Union or, for that matter, its Warsaw Pact
allies. In fact, analysis by the American counterintelligence
community in the 1970's documented a substantial increase in
such activities undertaken with the hope that they would be
overlook because of detente-generated goodwill.
These hostile intelligence services and their counterparts
in other areas of the world used every means at their disposal
to enhance their intelligence collection in the United States,
including the use of their diplomatic establishments, the
United Nations Secretariat, commercial and trade delegations,
students, ``illegals,'' third country operations, false flag
operations, recruitment of third country nationals, and active
major operations. No stone was left unturned in their efforts
to obtain classified American political, scientific, and
military information.
Although all had sophisticated human intelligence
recruitment techniques to recruit their intelligence targets,
it must be stated that volunteers also did a substantial amount
of harm.
The common thread and the most important motivation of
those who betrayed their country was money. This should not be
forgotten in terms of today's threat, and I will comment a bit
later on that point.
Having done its homework in terms of the seriousness of the
intelligence threat, the counterintelligence community made its
case to Congress in the seventies in terms of resources needed
to meet the threat. Congress responded and approved the
resources, enabling the enhancement of the quality and quantity
of people involved, the equipment, analysis, and training.
The many counterintelligence successes of the 1980's were
not accidental. They were the result of close cooperation
between Congress and the counterintelligence community. Let me
now switch to the nineties and the post cold war developments
which are taking place.
During the early 1990's, the United States became
increasingly aware of the economic espionage threat to its
interests on several occasions, the last occurring in February
1995. The White House published national security strategies
which focused on economic security as crucial not only to U.S.
interests but to U.S. national security.
This was further delineated by testimony of Secretary of
State Christopher before the U.S. Senate on November 4, 1993,
when he stated that in the post cold war world our national
security is inseparable from our economic security, emphasizing
the ``new centrality'' of economic policy in our foreign
policy.
To be sure, the intelligence services of Russia, the
People's Republic of China and others remain a very significant
force to be contended with vis-a-vis classical espionage. For
example, the Russian SVR, the successor to KGB, and the Russian
military intelligence service, the GRU, have sustained their
activities aimed at the collection of national defense
information; but they have also begun to pay added attention to
American economic, scientific, and technological information.
President Boris Yeltsin made this perfectly clear in a
policy statement dated February 7, 1996. It was seconded by
Ifgani Primakov, the former head of KGB. I think we ought to
listen to these gentlemen.
It should be recognized that the economic espionage against
the United States should not be considered only in the
abstract, as something which should be only of concern at some
ill-defined time in the future. Know this future is now, and
there is more than ample evidence not only of the threat, but
of the implementation of the threat by human and technical
intelligence as well as significant resulting damages.
Again, it became clear to the counterintelligence community
in 1990 that our counterintelligence policy had to be changed
not only to meet classical espionage threat but also to mirror
more closely the total spectrum of today's economic
intelligence threats to the U.S. and corporations. The
allocation of a large percentage of its counterintelligence
resources to the former Soviet camp and the People's Republic
of China had left it somewhat blind as to whether intelligence
activities were occurring in the United States.
As in the seventies, it was realized that something had to
be done. That something was a new counterintelligence policy
approved by the Attorney General in 1992 known as the national
security threat list, which provides a road map for the
redirection of FBI counterintelligence resources.
The national security threat list contains two elements, an
issue threat list and a country threat list. The latter is
classified. I would like to concentrate, if I may, on the issue
threat list.
Two of the issues significantly involve countering by the
FBI of foreign intelligence activities aimed at illicitly
collecting information regarding weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical weapons. The second issue involves
countering attempts by foreign services to collect proprietary
information of U.S. corporations.
Given the importance of these two issues to U.S. national
interests, the FBI will provide counterintelligence coverage
irrespective of the country involved. A bit more on chemical
weapons later.
In 1994, the FBI initiated an economic espionage
counterintelligence program. In 1 year's time the number of
cases doubled from 400 to 800. In 1995, the Attorney General
revamped the national security threat list to give greater
emphasis to countering foreign economic espionage.
The Director of the FBI testified publicly before Congress
in February 1996 regarding economic espionage, calling it
``devastatingly harmful'' in terms of billions of dollars of
losses and hundreds of thousands of jobs lost. He focused on
economic espionage by some foreign governments which steal U.S.
technology and proprietary information to provide their own
industrial sectors with a competitive advantage.
Economic intelligence collection operations come in various
guises and under different sponsors. There have been
Government-sponsored operations such as France's Direction
Generale de la Securite Exterior, the DGSE, the French
counterpart of CIA, with which I have some familiarity, which
not long ago prioritized a collection effort aimed primarily at
U.S. aerospace and defense industries.
Other operations have been sponsored and run by foreign
competitor firms without the assistance of their government,
and there are examples of operations which combine foreign
governments and industry.
In the late 1980's, IBM learned that IBM France was
penetrated by the DGSE through the recruitment of French
nationals within the company. The information acquired by DGSE
was passed to French companies, including Companie de Machine
Bull, the IBM of France, which was then owned by the French
Government.
There is current information that France has been
developing in the last 2 years a substantial economic espionage
capability involving its business community, the French
commercial attaches, and other. Its principal target is
purportedly the United States.
Despite all the efforts by the FBI and other governmental
agencies, despite all the public and in camera testimony before
Congress, and despite all the recognition on the part of the
White House, the Department of State and others regarding the
relevance of economic security to national security, Director
Freeh and others recognize that in the final analysis there was
little chance in stopping foreign economic espionage because
Federal statutes simply did not allow the government to counter
or deter this activity in any way remotely commensurate with
the damage it was inflicting on the U.S. economy.
As in the 1970's, the Department of Justice and the FBI
again made their case to Congress, this time that a new law was
needed to facilitate the stopping of foreign economic
espionage. Once again, the Congress responded and passed the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.
The EEA was passed with two goals in mind. First, to thwart
attempts by foreign entities to steal trade secrets of American
corporations. The more severe penalties of the act reflect this
overriding concern regarding a foreign threat.
Second, to allow the Federal Government to investigate,
which had not been done before, at least in the sophisticated
sense, to investigate and prosecute those engaged in economic
espionage. Importantly, section 1839 of the Economic Espionage
Act precludes--precludes--any Federal prosecution for trade
secret theft unless its owner ``has taken reasonable measures
to keep such information secret.''
Let me now conclude by commenting on my counterintelligence
concerns with the Chemical Weapons Convention as it relates to
what I have said and what is going on now.
While the national security threat list, supra, directs the
FBI to focus its counterintelligence resources to prevent the
illicit acquisition of chemical weapons information, the CWC
would appear to facilitate the acquisition of such data through
its challenge inspections. There is not an unrealistic
possibility that these inspections could facilitate collection
of the very kind of chemical weapons information that the FBI
is charged to protect under the national security threat list.
If I were a foreign intelligence officer and my country
needed offensive or defensive information regarding chemical
weapons, I would focus on a group of inspectors to be stationed
at The Hague.
As I indicated previously, there can be no Federal
prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act unless the owner
of the trade secret has taken measures to keep it secret. This
is standard trade secret law.
The list of chemicals covered by the CWC is huge and open-
ended, and will encompass companies beyond chemical companies
such as pharmaceutical companies, computer companies, and
others with no relationship to chemical weapons or the CWC
except the manufacture of chemicals covered by the convention.
One of the greatest concerns of companies that I have read
about, and I have read a number of letters from major companies
and major associations of companies, all of which--the common
thread running through all of them is their concern that the
CWC will open them up to economic espionage. I think their
concerns are well-justified.
One of the greatest concerns of the companies I have read
about, as indicated, concerns the loss of trade secrets through
inspections, including dual use technologies to foreign
competitors. There seems to be mixed signals to the corporate
world in that the Economic Espionage Act requires them to
protect trade secrets, while the CWC requires them to hand over
to inspectors what they may regard as trade secrets, and which
they otherwise would have treated as such. This confusion in my
opinion ought to be cleared up.
I might add, there was one more issue on that national
security threat list, and that was entitled, national critical
technologies. Again, like proprietary information, the Bureau
was charged with doing what it can from a counterintelligence
perspective to protect against the illicit acquisition of these
national critical technologies, which was decided by a panel at
the White House. In other words, the panel said that these
technologies are crucial to a superior military posture and
also to a strong national economy.
If you read these lists of national critical technologies,
and it is unclassified, materials synthesis processing,
electronic photonic materials, ceramics, composites, a flexible
computer-integrated manufacturing, software, biotechnology,
aeronautics, et cetera, et cetera, you can see that there is a
nexus between some of the chemicals which are mentioned in CWC
and those which are involved with these technologies.
So again, you have somewhat of an inconsistency in terms of
charging the FBI to protect these critical technologies on the
one hand and CWC in effect possibly opening them up to
compromise on the other hand.
Again putting myself in the shoes of a foreign intelligence
officer, I would not bother to go through all the complicated
recruitment efforts to recruit someone within XYZ company. I
would simply recruit an inspector who would be able to
interview XYZ's employees, inspect documentation and records,
have photographs taken, and take samples. I would achieve the
same end, but would be doing so in a way sanctioned by the CWC.
The acquisition of American trade secrets has become a high
stakes business involving billions and billions of dollars, and
I would be able to pay an agent handsomely to acquire such
information.
Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Mr. O'Malley, thank you. We appreciate your
testimony.
Ronald F. Lehman, former Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. Ron, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Mr. Lehman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin with a
bit of a personal note. I was in California 2 days ago when the
staff called and asked if I would come and testify, and of
course I said I would.
I did so in part because of the friendships and the
relationships I have had with this committee over the years,
but there actually is another part of it that I think is a
principled thing, and that is that this is a great deliberative
body, and we need a marketplace of ideas, and we need to work
together to get the facts out, and we need to do that
throughout the negotiating process and beyond that into the
implementing process; and so I will help as best I can.
The second thing is, as I think most of the Members here
who have known me know, I believe that the United States ought
to be the real leader of the world, and I believe that our
military power ought to be unequaled. I am a hawk, and the
Constitution gives me one very powerful tool, especially in the
arms control business, and that is that a third of the Senate
plus one can block a treaty.
You are my ally. I do not need all of you on my side. I
need a third plus one on my side, and I have got a hell of a
lot of leverage. Let me give you just one example. Back in the
Wyoming Ministerial in 1989, we were trying to finish up the
verification protocol on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and we
had concluded pretty much most of the technical details that
remained, and we had met all of the concerns of the
intelligence community, all of the concerns of the JCS and the
Defense Department writ large.
Everybody was happy, except I was not happy because I had
not met Senator Helms' standards, so the negotiator and I got
together, and we developed an approach to strengthen that
protocol just a little bit more, and that protocol in the
treaty which--the treaty had been sitting around since 1974--
passed the Senate 98 to noth-
ing. I think that working together with the Senate strengthens
the United States.
The marketplace for ideas gives us better ideas. I had
hoped that it would also improve understanding. I am a little
puzzled that we have a treaty that we concluded 4 years ago
that is very similar to the treaty we tabled 10 years before
that, and negotiated over 10 years, in which essentially all
the issues that were out there today were present throughout
that whole process, but that is why I am here.
Now, I am a straight shooter. I think Senator Biden will
tell you that many times I have told him I have disagreed with
him.
Senator Biden. If I could interrupt you, Mr. Secretary--if
I could interrupt you for just a second, while you were sitting
there I leaned over and I said to my new colleague, and I said,
Lehman, he and I have been on opposite sides of the table. You
find out one thing about him. He is a straight shooter. I used
the exact words you just used.
Senator Hagel. I think he was a little more graphic than
that.
Senator Biden. But I did use the words, straight shooter.
They were modified. There were adjectives attached to it, but
you are a straight shooter.
Mr. Lehman. Let the record show I respect your views toward
me, and your right to have them.
The point I want to make is basically this. I am here, I
represent myself. I am going to give you my views. These are my
personal views. They are not the views of any organization I am
associated with now or in the past or in the future,
necessarily; but I am going to give you my best estimate of
where we are, and let me try to give at least something of a
summary, and then I am yours.
You have asked me to comment on the Chemical Weapons
Convention and on the verification issue. Although the issues
are complex, my advice is straightforward. Ratification of this
convention is essential to American leadership against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; but ratification
alone is not enough. Strong followup involving all branches of
government will be vital.
This hearing should not signal the end of your deliberative
process, but rather the beginning. You must hold the executive
branch's feet to the fire, and you must hold your own feet to
the fire as well, and you must use your powers of oversight and
the purse to bring about the most effective use of the tools
that will be made possible by this treaty.
In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, its
contribution to our security will be determined more by what we
do in the future than what we have done in the past. The past,
however, has given us some important lessons, and the CWC was
designed to take advantage of that learning process.
The CWC offers us important tools which give us more data,
greater access, and more leverage. The chemical weapons threat
is serious, and will grow worse without the CWC. Even with the
CWC, we will never be able to let up on our defenses; but with
the CWC we will have more tools, more allies, and more options.
The United States will be in the lead.
If we now walk away from the CWC, which was carefully
crafted over many years to serve American security interests,
we may try to lead, but few will follow.
I support your giving consent to ratification, because it
is time to take that lead and to get on with the job. The time
has come to stop giving lip service to nonproliferation, and in
this regard I share many of the views of my friend Bill Odom,
and to get on with the hard work.
I am more than aware that the CWC is not a perfect treaty.
No treaty can be perfect, but the challenges facing a treaty
trying to ban chemical weapons are among the most daunting. We
knew that from the beginning. What is more surprising is that
we made as much progress as we did.
The treaty we negotiated is stronger overall than the
treaty we first tabled, and our ability to implement it has
been strengthened in many ways. That was made possible by a
number of factors, some of which I would like to enumerate
briefly today.
First, we did not rush into this treaty. We engaged in a
10-year process of deep and careful study with the widest range
of concerns reflected in the analysis and decisions.
Second, we were able to build upon lessons learned from
both the successes and the disappointments of earlier arms
control experience.
Third, the end of the cold war as we knew it improved some
security considerations, such as reducing the possibility of a
large land war in Western Europe.
Fourth, the collapse of the eastern bloc brought greater
access to what were once incredibly closed regimes, and reduced
the necessity for such heavy reliance, often solely, on
national technical means of verification. Indeed, political
change has given us new sources of information which often
multiply the value of our National Technical Means (NTM).
Fifth, the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in
the Gulf War generated greater support for a hard-nosed
approach to nonproliferation here and abroad.
Sixth, the conjunction of the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the defeat of Saddam Hussein created, at least for awhile,
much stronger international support for American leadership and
the American view of how to proceed. It was in that period that
we concluded the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Seventh, we could build upon and learn from the experience
of the U.N. special committee and the enhanced IAEA challenge
inspections in Iraq.
Eighth, although no technological silver bullet permits us
to monitor all chemical weapons activity with confidence, some
improvements, including new forensic techniques, continue to
appear.
And ninth, and I hope Senator Biden understands this, we
really were prepared to walk away from this treaty if we didn't
get what we wanted.
Senator Biden. I never had a doubt about that, Mr. Lehman.
Mr. Lehman. This negotiating from strength was very helpful
in getting the provisions we wanted, including in the area of
verification. The real problem initially was to know exactly
what we wanted.
Early on, it became clear that NTM alone could not do the
job. At the same time, even as political pressure built upon
all nations to accept the traditional U.S. approach of more
intrusive onsite inspection, our studies indicated that
inspections were not magic, either. Worse, existence of
inspection regimes could raise false expectations of the
effectiveness of constraints and, if improperly done, the
inspections themselves could produce false positive or negative
results while endangering proprietary and national security
information.
Many of us who raised these concerns throughout the
negotiating process, or the specific concerns we raised, are
often cited in opposition to the convention. What is important
to understand, however, is how we address the problems, and why
we can support the convention on its merits.
Again, we begin with the understanding that monitoring most
CWC activity is a major challenge. In the past, we relied upon
a comprehensive deterrence strategy which included as one
element the ability to respond in kind with chemical weapons.
That element is no longer realistically available to us,
not because of the treaty, but because the United States, both
Congress and the executive branch, including the military, no
longer desire to keep its offensive chemical weapons
capability. Thus, unlike so many other arms control agreements
such as INF, START, or CFE, we are not directly constraining a
military capability we would otherwise retain.
This is an important part of the verification
consideration. Let me explain. Verification has always involved
more than estimates of the likelihood that a specific,
prohibited act could be monitored by NTM. The intelligence
community likes to remind you that they do not make
verification judgments. They make monitoring judgments. They
take great professional pride in that point. It involves a
calculation of risks and benefits.
At the beginning of the administration of President Ronald
Reagan a review was conducted of how we should approach arms
control, including verification. A view had emerged among many
in the arms control community that verification of a nuclear
treaty would be sufficient if the overall military balance
could not be altered by cheating.
The problem was that some of these same people expressed
the view that no amount of inequality or cheating could upset
the nuclear balance. The implication of this, thus, was that no
treaty could be insufficiently verifiable, except, said some,
perhaps at or near zero.
President Reagan, who recognized that absolute verification
was not possible, wanted a different approach which would serve
better the national security of the United States and his
strategy for countering totalitarian regimes. The new, stricter
approach to verification took into account a far wider range of
considerations than just the state of the overall military
balance.
Military significance remained at the core of this
approach, but more based upon standards of equality, stability,
and specific benefits and risks. More attention was to be given
to details, including insistence on detailed verification
provisions actually within the treaties. Emphasis was placed
also on the interaction of restraints, and the clarity of
draftsmanship.
An analysis looked at the incentives to cheat, the
alternatives available to us and to the cheater, and the prices
paid or the gains made, including those associated with greater
access on both sides.
It stressed that intelligence estimates should not be
politicized, and that we should be honest about monitoring
confidence of specific provisions of the treaty. It also took
into account the important questions of deterrence of cheating
by generating the fear of discovery, deterrence of any attack
through strong military forces, the existence of defensive
measures, and the enhancement of compliance enforcement when
you find a violation.
What does this mean for the CWC? Clearly, it meant that the
CWC was going to take a long time to complete, and it did.
Certainly it meant that we would have to develop an approach
which was intrusive and aggressive to take into account the
monitoring challenge. Above all, it required that we do more
than strengthen the international norm. We had to have the
tools and the mandate to put together the support to do
whatever we needed to do, including the use of military force
in coalition or unilaterally to deal with violations.
To the soldier who is wounded by it, every bullet is
militarily significant. The same is true of the use of gas
against our forces, even if it does not deny us victory. A
violation is a violation to be punished and corrected. The CWC
was designed to get more of our allies and other nations to
join with us and to support us. That is, to build upon and go
beyond the experience with Iraq.
With this background in mind, those who oppose U.S.
ratification of the treaty need to address some important
questions. Why should we make it easier for others to use
chemical weapons against us? With the inherent difficulties in
monitoring chemical weapons activities we need all the help we
can get.
We do not have the highest confidence that we will detect
cheating, but the cheater must still worry that we might.
Should we deny ourselves the strategic warning that comes from
the detection of indications of chemical weapons activity, even
if there is not complete proof?
And then, why should we let it be legal for rogue states to
accumulate CW which, if discovered, is then not considered the
basis for tough action because it is legal?
These are some of the many questions which must be
considered.
Mr. Chairman, in my previous statement to the committee,
which I have again made available, I discussed the work we did
in dealing with the balance between intrusive inspections to
deter cheating and the measures necessary to protect sensitive
information.
Today, I would simply like to add that the tradeoffs
between the two are not a zero-sum game. We discovered in our
many studies and trial inspections that, although there will
always be some tension between the two, we could find measures
which would enhance one without too much cost to the other.
Also, I would like to add that our experience with Iraq
continues to point the way to better ways to implement
inspections. It is a contest between skills and tools on the
part of the inspectors, and in evasion techniques by the
proliferators.
What we have learned is that as we gain experience, and as
we learn more and more about legitimate activities for
comparisons, we have gotten better and better at ferreting out
the discrepancies, the inconsistencies, and the outright lies
of those concealing a program. As technology improves, we may
get additional help.
Having Americans involved in the experience was essential.
With respect to the CWC, we need to continue to take the lead
in strengthening enforcement. The time has come to give us the
tools and let us get on with the job.
[Mr. Lehman's 1994 statement appears in the appendix.]
Senator Hagel. Mr. Lehman, thank you, and to all our
panelists we are grateful for your time this morning, your
insights, and your willingness to stay a little longer for
questions. Since it is just my colleague, Senator Biden, and I,
we have agreed that we will just enter into somewhat of a
colloquy here back and forth, and we will handle it that way.
I will begin. General Odom, would you go back into your
testimony and elaborate more on some of the specifics of
Articles X and XI that you referred to?
We have heard an awful lot about that over the last month
in testimony, and I know you would probably have more to say
about it; but there is a legitimate concern about transfer of
technology and what exactly does X and XI say and mean, and
whose interpretation, and I would be interested in your
clarification of those areas, since you brought it up in your
testimony.
Specifically, we have heard a lot about reverse engineering
and that transfer. How deep does that transfer go, in your
opinion?
General Odom. Let me just say first, I do not claim to be
the great expert in this, but I have read it and took it for
what it seemed to mean, and I began to conclude fairly quickly
that, as I said in my testimony, that if you are required to
share all the information, information concerning means of
protection against chemical weapons, part of the means of
protection against chemical weapons requires knowledge of what
they are.
When I was Chief of Army Intelligence, one of the major
concerns in collecting information for our defensive
production, production of defensive equipment such as MOP
suits, gas masks, et cetera, was to know what the agents were
and to understand the chemistry of the agents; and, therefore,
if you are going to develop effective defensive means, it
requires the leading edge knowledge of offensive means or you
cannot produce them.
Therefore, it would seem to me that were I a signatory
under this I could share knowledge of the leading edge
technologies in offensive weapons with anybody, even to the
degree I am obliged to do so.
And then when that crossed my mind I said, well, who makes
the judgment; and it appears in the treaty that it is up to the
signatories, so any signatory can decide with whom he shares
what information, as long as he can make the argument that it
is in the spirit of information concerning the means of
protection against chemical weapons. It would be hard to take
issue with him.
And as I said in my testimony, the kinds of information
that you will be most concerned about from a defensive point of
view are the most vicious and threatening offensive things.
Therefore, the incentives would seem to be to cause the spread
of knowledge about those most advanced and threatening
offensive means and to pay less attention to the less
threatening ones.
From that, it seems to me, as very often is the case in
public policy, the intended consequences turn out not to be
those we anticipated; but we end up getting a very perverse
consequence that was almost impossible to foresee.
Senator Biden. Can I ask a clarification?
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. General, assuming you are correct on that,
if we are not a signatory to the treaty, the same thing
happens.
General Odom. Absolutely.
Senator Biden. I mean, whether or not we are signatory of
that treaty is not--and what you are talking about here is the
motivation of the countries in question who are in the treaty
and we have to assume, in order to reach the conclusion that
you have reached, that the countries that have this advanced
technology, most of whom are our allies, are going to want to
spread this technology around that we do not want spread,
right?
General Odom. And I assume that, and I also assume that our
chemical companies are going to want to do that; and I suspect,
I do not know, that may be why they are for the ratification of
this, so that I think if you are talking about other hidden
land mines of unintended consequences, this brings us right to
that one.
Senator Biden. Well, General, it says the States Parties.
It does not say XYZ company. We are attaching a condition that
everyone is at a disadvantage in this regard.
Senator Helms and I have been negotiating, our staffs for
the last couple of months, and one of the conditions is going
to be, if and when this treaty gets to the floor, will be that
the United States will declare up front that it will only
transfer--it will only--it reads, the paragraphs in question,
as saying that it can choose what to transfer, and it will, if
it transfers anything, only transfer that which has some
medical--what is the exact term of art?--antidotes and medical
treatments capability, so that no American company is going to
be able to go and transfer that material.
I understand your concern, but I think it is one that it
seems as though the negotiators took into consideration when
they were drafting the treaty, but I may be mistaken about
that. I do not know.
General Odom. Senator, let me respond to that. As I said in
my testimony, I think you can take each one of these issues out
and make very good arguments that seem to allay the fears, and
as you have allayed the fear on a particular one out of
context, you can easily--if I want to go down the list I can
bring up others, and we get into sort of an infinite regress
here.
As I said, I came to this thing saying basically it is all
right. I would even say today that I would not get upset if
this treaty would go into effect with no verification regime.
You know, I just do not see why we should have this, when
we know--when you and I are agreeing that it is going to have a
triv-
ial or maybe even perverse effect; and I would be willing to
stand up with those who are against chemical weapons.
So, I have said earlier, I think this is a misconceptual
approach. We have asked the negotiators to do a task that
cannot be done. It is sort of like asking somebody to reach the
wall by going half the remaining distance. By definition, you
never get there.
Therefore, I think we are applying an arms control solution
where it simply is not conceptually appropriate. It makes us
feel good. It is hard to be against it in spirit, but when I
work my way into it I am inclined to say this really is not
very compelling.
Senator Biden. General, as usual your integrity and
intellectual rigor are always apparent. It seems to me this is
the division, the dividing line, between those who support the
treaty and those who do not, and that is not so much whether
any of these provisions are as dangerous or as bad as critics
say. But it seems to me as I look down the dividing line it is
people who say: Look, bottom line is you cannot have a treaty
relating to chemical weapons or biological weapons, ergo I am
against the treaty, notwithstanding the fact you can give me an
argument on each of my criticisms.
I think that is a legitimate, intellectually defensible
position, one with which I disagree; and it comes down to where
we are better off.
But I think when you cut through it, when you and I cut
through it all, in my view most of the criticisms, specific
criticisms of the treaty, have specific answers that are
specifically--I am not saying you agree with this--in my view--
but the bottom line that separates 95 percent of those who fall
on for or against is this issue of, it starts with--and it is
not your view or my view; it is my understanding--that we have
never lost a war or won a treaty.
I might add, by the way, you laid waste to that old saying
when you did START; because if we did not win that treaty I do
not know what in God's name anybody would consider not having
won.
Then it goes from there, I think, General, to people who
say: Look, you just cannot deal with chemical weapons, period.
And if you adopt that view--and I respect it; I disagree with
it, but I respect it--then all these other things kind of
become irrelevant, and you kind of fall from one side or the
other of that spectrum, it seems to me.
General Odom. Can I add one more point on the logic of
this? And I do not mean to be just scoring debating points, but
I am sure you are very familiar with the Luddite movement of
the 1830's.
Senator Biden. Yes, smash the machinery.
General Odom. Right, stop technology, put the lid on it.
One of the things that struck me--I have a colleague at Yale
today who has just done a little paper, Martin Shubick, showing
that the price of killing people is going down. He has done
some calculations, and it happens to be in the BW and CW area
that this calculation turns out to have great effect.
This whole technology area is not standing still. It is in
a state of rapid change.
Senator Biden. See, that is why guys like me and guys like
Lehman would argue you have got to get in it. That is the very
argument why we have got to get in it.
General Odom. Well, but to get in like Ned Ludd is not the
way to get in. We need to get in in a way to recognize that it
is dynamic and that we are probably not by statutory means or
by international agreements going to be able to contain it.
I am not saying we ought not to do something about it, and
I have said I am prepared to sign a treaty, support a treaty
that puts us on the right hand of God in this regard. But when
you get into the details of whether this really delivers
anything you promised, it is hard to be convinced.
Senator Biden. I thank you, General.
I am sorry.
Senator Hagel. No, I think when we have got just a couple
of us we can jump in and do this.
Senator Biden. Mr. Lehman wanted to say something.
Mr. Lehman. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make a point
here. I agree with Bill Odom that we have got to watch the
implementation of each and every provision. I am not privy to
what the negotiations are on these various conditions and
understandings, but anything you can do to reinforce where we
were going with this treaty we would certainly appreciate.
But I would like to make a comment about the Article X,
Article XI situation, just some general remarks; because it is
an important question of subsequent practice, what do we do.
Senator Hagel. I would say incidentally, Mr. Secretary,
that this is one of the key elements of the discussion of the
convention in question, and my guess is if that is not resolved
in some way here this convention is not going to be passed.
Mr. Lehman. Well, I hope you can resolve it. I like to
think we resolved it in the negotiations, and let me explain
why. The issue of assistance--both these issues are not new--
they came up fairly early. In fact, assistance was, I think, in
the initial draft that we tabled back in 1984. So these were
not new issues.
We made it very clear throughout the negotiations that all
of this was subject to Article I, which is the fundamental
obligation not to assist. So we reiterated that again and again
and again.
But the most important, I think, telling factoid in support
of the U.S. interpretation is the fact that after the
convention was done so many of the usual list of suspects were
so unhappy that they did not get what they wanted in these
provisions. That is why I wish the critics would be a little
more careful about asserting that they did get what they
wanted, because they did not.
Now, if you can further strengthen that, then God bless
you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
I would like to stay with you, Secretary Lehman, on another
issue. We heard an awful lot of conversation last month, and
appropriately so, about how do you really deal with the
uncivilized nations that we refer to as the rogue nations,
those who are most unlikely to sign this--North Korea, Syria,
Iraq, Libya.
Does that give us, if we would ratify this convention, a
leg up, a moral high ground? I mean, does it give us more
ability, better ability to deal with those nations? I mean, we
know from 1925 on we have had the Geneva Convention and other
treaties, conventions, agreements. But when you are dealing
with uncivilized nations, they will resort to uncivilized
means.
I think that is an important part of the dialog here.
Incidentally, I appreciate very much your opening comments
about information, because that is what this should be about.
This should not be about Republican-Democrat, conservative-
liberal. This should be about doing the right thing for this
country. So I appreciate very much your thoughts.
Mr. Lehman. Well, I will tell you, on rogue states we have
such a record of successes and failures that I can package them
any way you want. But I will tell you what I personally think,
which is there comes a time when you simply must not tolerate
this sort of thing and you must take action. And if other
nations will join you, as they did in the case of driving
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, then that is what you have to do.
If you have to act alone, as we did in the case of Libya, you
do it.
You have got to make sure that the rogue states understand
that there are severe consequences of their actions.
Again, let me echo Bill. I was in the Pentagon when, in the
very last month of the Reagan Administration, we had the CW use
conference in Paris. Our position was--you name Iraq--but you
know, the foreign policy people were all divided over that, the
allies were divided over that. We did not name Iraq.
My view was that was a big mistake. My administration made
it. I was a part of that administration. I opposed it, but we
did it. OK, we are guilty, too.
There is a consequence to that, and the consequence was
that this policy of sort of constructive engagement with Iraq
because Iraq is this viable Arab country of the future led us
to too often keep a low profile on the enforcement question. As
a result of that, we ended up having a war in which we could
have faced these weapons, and there is still some debate of
what the consequences of the weapons existence was.
I think you have to take a strong stand. I will tell you
right now, Bill alluded, I think, to Korea.
General Odom. No.
Mr. Lehman. I thought I heard you say Korea. But anyway, I
have got Korea on the brain, I guess.
General Odom. Assume I did. It is all right.
Mr. Lehman. Maybe I read something you said some time back
on Korea. But in any case, I will not attribute anything to
Bill any more.
In the early days of this administration, they did in
essence what we did at the Paris CW use conference, on not
supporting the IAEA suspect site inspections on Korea. Indeed,
we had people backgrounding that--what a terrible thing it
would be if North Korea were to withdraw from the NPT--and
therefore we could not do anything to rock the boat.
What we were sending was the signal that we would rather
have a violator stay in the treaty than hold them accountable
for their violations. It was a terrible thing to say. It has
continued to complicate our nonproliferation policy. I am
hoping that the administration has moved beyond that. Things
are developing in North Korea. Some things are not under our
control. Maybe it will all work out fine.
But I think we made some mistakes. We can learn from those
mistakes, though, and move on, and that is what we ought to be
doing.
I think in the CWC have got additional tools and we ought
to use them.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
We have been joined by our colleague Senator Kerry from
Massachusetts. What I think I will do is go back to a 7\1/2\
minute time level so that everybody gets a fair shot at this,
and I do not know who else may come.
Would you defer to Senator Kerry?
Senator Biden. I interrupted him in asking a question.
Senator Hagel. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for taking time to join us
today.
It is my understanding, Mr. O'Malley--correct me if I am
wrong, because this is just a staff summary, and I was not able
to hear you. But your principal objection I understand is on
the issue of corporate secrets, trade secrets, intrusive
inspection; is that correct?
Mr. O'Malley. Yes.
Senator Kerry. Help me, if you would, to understand that. I
mean, we have got an industry that obviously has a lot at
stake, the chemical industry, correct?
Mr. O'Malley. Yes.
Senator Kerry. The chemical industry itself supports this
treaty. These are the people that are going to be inspected.
The Synthetic-Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association of
America, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the American
Chemical Society, the American Physical Society, the American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, the Council for Chemical
Research, they all support it.
They even went to the extent of creating seven test
inspections to determine how it really worked and what the
threat to them might be. In addition to that, they have the
right to object to any particular inspector coming in that they
suspect of espionage or have reason to believe might spy.
What is it that you know that they do not know?
Mr. O'Malley. Well, I am not sure what I know that they do
not know. In my opinion, though, the kinds of companies that
might be affected by this convention transcend the chemical
companies that you just spoke about. I have an equal number of
letters from different kinds of associations, the aerospace
industry and others, which express serious concerns about the
Chemical Weapons Convention as it relates to industrial
espionage.
Senator Kerry. Well, are they going to be inspected?
General Odom. Yes.
Mr. O'Malley. Yes.
Senator Kerry. By virtue of a challenge, conceivably,
correct?
Mr. O'Malley. Conceivably.
Senator Kerry. But the challenge requires an appropriate
showing. First of all, there is going to be a guarantee,
because we are going to even--I think, with Senator Biden's
leadership--go further on the search and seizure to guarantee
our constitutional rights. Is that correct, Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. That is correct, we are going to have a
provision requiring probable cause be established before a
Federal judge to get a search warrant.
Senator Kerry. Would that change your feeling about it a
little bit?
Mr. O'Malley. It would be helpful, but I am not sure that
that would be totally significant in terms of protecting the
intellectual property.
Senator Kerry. Well now, you know that there is a
compartmentalization capacity with respect to inspections. The
only thing that is available to be inspected are those things
that are directly shown to be with respect to possible
production of chemical weaponry.
In fact, you are allowed to set up a procedure where you
actually close off or avoid any penetration of those other
areas where you may be doing something that is not involved at
all with chemicals.
Mr. O'Malley. Hopefully those procedures would work and
would be effective.
Senator Kerry. But is it not significant that the industry
itself believes they will work and supports the treaty? Is that
not significant?
Mr. O'Malley. Well, again, I do not know what the
motivation of the chemical industry is in this regard. I can
only speak of industry representatives that I have spoken to in
connection with the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, and they
have severe concerns about their inability to protect their
secrets, security or not, against professional foreign
intelligence services.
I mentioned earlier this list of national critical
technologies which the FBI is charged to protect, and it is
very, very broad. I think if you read this list and compare it
with the chemicals identified in the convention you will see a
nexus between those chemicals and the companies involved in
these technologies.
Senator Kerry. Well, let us try to go again to the reality
of this. Are you aware of the limitations on challenge
inspections that could be conducted in any 1 year in this
treaty?
Mr. O'Malley. Yes. If I may, though, you mentioned earlier
that the United States or whatever country is involved in terms
of inspection could object to the presence of an inspector
which they had reason to believe might be an intelligence
officer.
Senator Kerry. Right.
Mr. O'Malley. Well, that is much easier said than done. It
is not all that easy--it might be easy to identify an
intelligence officer, but it is significantly more difficult to
identify an agent of that officer. In other words, if I were an
intelligence officer I would try to recruit a chemical engineer
who might be appointed to be a member of this inspection team.
Senator Kerry. But the point is if you do not have
confidence in the person coming in you can peremptorily just
not let him in. You are only going to let people in you have
confidence in, number one.
Number two, under the budget, under the budget when this is
running at full tilt in 3 or 4 years, it is anticipated that
the most you would be able to have is conceivably two challenge
inspections per month, approximately 20 to 25 globally,
globally. Will you explain to me what the potential threat
ultimately to the United States is of that kind of rate of
challenge?
Mr. O'Malley. Well, you have got the challenge inspections
and you have got the routine inspections. I would not
distinguish between the two of them in terms of the ability to
collect proprietary information.
Senator Kerry. But the routine are as to a more limited
kind of grouping of entities.
Mr. O'Malley. Exactly.
Senator Kerry. More clearly defined.
Mr. O'Malley. What I am suggesting is an inspector does not
have to go into a company and get the total take as to what
that trade secret might be that would be helpful to the person
who had recruited him. There are bits and pieces of information
that can be acquired over a period of time that might add up to
a significant whole at some point in time.
Senator Kerry. So in essence--OK, I follow you. In
essence--I need to cut you off there simply because I
understand what you are saying. I want to be able to ask
General Odom something. But I sense--in essence, I mean, to
sort of reduce it to its lowest common denominator--you are
seeing the potential for some goblins and in effect others
directly involved are not concerned about it. And we just have
to weigh, is your sighting of this potential goblin weighty
enough to reject the treaty or is the sanguinity, if you will,
of the industry itself and those who will be inspected to be
taken at greater value? And I think that is the issue we have
to measure.
Mr. O'Malley. Two points. Number one, I would not label
them goblins. We are talking about the real world here, and to
label them goblins seems to diminish the seriousness of the
threat.
Senator Kerry. I believe in goblins.
Mr. O'Malley. Well, I do not.
Second, I mentioned earlier in my testimony that those who
are charged with making the strategic decisions regarding this
particular treaty ought to make that decision with a full deck
of cards, that it ought not rise or fall on any
counterintelligence concerns expressed by me or anybody else,
but they ought to be considered in the total context of all the
problems that are being considered by the policymakers.
Senator Kerry. Sure. I respect that. And when I say I
believe in goblins, I believe there are nefarious types out
there clearly who want to try to push the envelope. You have to
be on guard about it. But I suspect we would be.
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Lehman, comment on what Mr. O'Malley had
said, please.
Mr. Lehman. I agree with him that these are not goblins.
There is a real problem. But it is hard to imagine any issue we
spent more time on than this question of how do you balance
intrusive inspection with the risks of losing national security
or proprietary information.
A lot has been said on it. A lot has been said before. But
let me try to bring maybe some new twists or perspectives on
it, just taking into account what has been said. First is, we
ultimately came to the conclusion that there was a risk with
the inspectors, but it was not the biggest risk. So I guess
there I have not seen any study that says that is the big risk.
In fact, what I think we have gotten from industry is, and
of course what the national security community has found, is
that turncoats in your own system can do a tremendous amount of
damage. An inspector who comes in, who is escorted, who has got
rules, people are watching him, yes, he is bright; if he is
recruited, he can do some harm. But at least you have got a
feel for the problem.
If you have got a turncoat inside your system, be it
business or the intelligence community or in the military, you
have got a real problem.
Senator Biden. By the way, when I speak to these guys who
run these companies that is what they say. They would much
rather have the guy coming in in a team, as part of a team,
with the ability to have these management agreements and
facility agreements before they come in. If they were given a
choice of that or somebody coming in, either literally breaking
in, nefariously getting in, or be a turncoat within, there is
no question which side of that equation they would pick taking
their chances on.
You know it, because it is your business. That is how you
make your living, helping these guys prevent against the last
two categories. They would much rather have this than that.
Mr. Lehman. I said ``turncoat,'' but it is even a worse
problem than that. It is not even the question of the person
who is completely dishonest. It blurs into this whole question
of loyalty to your company, when do you change jobs, what
information do you take with you. It is a very complex area.
I share the analysis on the importance of proprietary
information to our leadership in technology. What I am saying
is this is not the big problem. We think we know how to handle
this. There are risks, but we think we worked that.
The other point I want to make is this. When we first
started getting involved, first with the national security
community and then with the national security community, on
this question of intrusive inspections, some strange things
happened. For example, they would say: We think it would be
dangerous to have an inspector come to a certain place. OK,
why? Well, they could learn all of this. OK, what keeps a spy
from coming to that place right now? You would be amazed the
number of times the answer was: Nothing. That in fact the
interaction between the negotiating process having to do with
these inspections and their intrusiveness helped the
counterintelligence community in some cases and helped industry
begin to understand that they had some problems that they
needed to deal with--with or without the CWC. They still need
to do a lot of work.
Whatever you decide to do in the Senate on the CWC, you
need to keep that process going of having the government
experts, including the intelligence community, find some way to
work with industry on this problem; because it is a serious
problem.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, the irony is that the
corollary to ``this will lull us to sleep,'' which is a
concern--I think it is the most legitimate argument against
this treaty in my view, is we will get lulled to sleep and not
have to expend the dollars, the effort, in implementing and/or
in continuing our efforts on countermeasures to deal with
chemical weapons use.
They are the two greatest--I think they are the two from my
perspective most legitimate objections to this treaty. The
corollary to that is, or the irony is, were it not for this
treaty, were it not for this debate, companies would not be
doing 80 percent of what they are doing now. All of a sudden
everybody is figuring out: Whoa, wait a minute, this
spectrometer guy who walks in, that guy does not have to be
part of a team. He can stand outside that company gate right
now.
All of a sudden what has happened is this has sort of
awakened, in my view, the outfits I am familiar with--the
chemical companies, the biotech companies, the pharmaceutical
companies. My colleagues know a lot about what their
constituencies do, because we have to learn. After 24 years, I
have learned about those companies. They are waking up. It has
been a wake-up call to them unrelated to the treaty.
One of the issues, though, that is raised and in the
remaining time I would like to get to, my remaining few minutes
here, is this issue people do think is very significant, and
that relates to the intelligence capacity of the United States
to detect cheating or anyone to detect cheating, and what
constitutes militarily significant.
If I am not mistaken, I remember it was during--I suspect
you may be responsible for it, although I do not know that for
certain. We went from the notion in the Carter administration
of ``adequately verifiable'' to ``effectively verifiable.'' The
terminology changed and so this debate about ``effectively
verifiable,'' what constitutes effective verifiability.
One of the things--and the intelligence community and two
members of our CIA are here today if we need them for any
input, are in the audience, who deal with this issue. The Joint
Chiefs have testified on this. So you are going to hear a lot
of debate, as I need not tell you or you, General Odom, about
this issue of what is effectively verifiable.
But it is a big deal what we determine. What we think is
effective, each of us individually determines whether or not we
think this is a verifiable treaty or whether we should vote for
it, at least as it relates to verifiability.
I want to talk about this notion of military significance.
By the way, Shalikashvili said one ton. What he was talking
about with one ton, he was talking about political impact and
terror capability, not militarily significant. Everybody talks
about the Joint Chiefs saying they have established that one
ton, if you cannot detect one ton, up to one ton, then this is
not effectively verifiable. The Chiefs never said that, but we
will have to deal with that on the floor. I know you both know
that.
One of the things that I get, I think we get confused about
and what confuses the public--and I am diverting slightly here
to make a larger point, trying to make a larger point or get to
a larger issue--is you asked the rhetorical question, Mr.
Secretary, why after all these years do so many people know so
little about this treaty? I think it is for two reasons.
One, those who are for it basically assume there is
inevitability. This is going to pass, because hard-nosed
administrations had ne-
gotiated this thing. Therefore there was sort of a credibility
given. I mean this sincerely. I think this is why. I think this
is the answer.
Second, those who are against it are usually those against
any treaties. Therefore, it is just kind of like there is
inevitability.
Well, everybody has forgotten, there is no inevitability to
this thing passing, so now people are focusing for the first
time, and our colleagues understandably do not know a lot about
it, because they have not, other than those who are involved in
it, they have not focused on it a lot.
Now, if I may, can I ask the question? I appreciate the
time.
So we get down to this verifiability issue and what
constitutes effective verification, and we hear talk from our
witnesses, not today, not from the General, but from many
witnesses we have had, and people use phrases like: well, one
vial, one vial of chemical weapons, and so on, and one ton. And
one ton sounds--God almighty, one ton of a chemical weapon
obviously can win a war, they think.
What I want to talk about is the distinction between a
tactical advantage that could be gained by the use of an agent
and a strategic advantage that could be gained by, say, the use
of up to one ton of an agent. Here is what I want you to talk--
I want you both, General Odom first and then Secretary Lehman.
If you think about the actual use of these weapons, in the
Iran-Iraqi War each side used tons and tons of this. They used
tens of tons of these weapons. And it did not give either the
capacity strategically to save the day.
Now, I think it is bad to use in any event. I am just
trying to get at this part about what constitutes a threat to
U.S. security if we do not detect it.
I would also point out that we have hundreds of thousands
of tons, we and the Russians. Now, the reason why our military
felt there was a need to have more than a ton, or 10 or a 1,000
or 10,000 tons, is because I assume we concluded that one ton
or anything that we possessed did not have the capacity.
One--one--missile, one nuclear warhead on top of a
Peacekeeper missile can ruin somebody's day. It can really
change the dynamic of everything. One ton of chemical weapons--
as the intelligence community tells me, the rule of thumb,
General, is you are about one ton, one square mile, and it
dissipates.
Now, as you said, General, for those troops who are within
that square mile this is militarily significant. It is big
deal. And if you have everybody gathered in a soccer stadium,
it is a big deal. And it is a big deal terror capacity.
But is it militarily significant in a strategic sense, in a
sense that our national security or a major portion of our
capacity in any conflict could be jeopardized by ``a ton''? And
I realize this is a bit artificial, to be using the ton. But it
has become almost a mantra among people who are concerned about
verifiability.
Can you talk a little bit about the significance of it in
that sense, General? Assume we could not detect up to a ton.
And some will argue we could not detect more than a ton. But
let us just artificially, just for the sake of discussion,
assume we could not detect up to a ton and countries, rogue or
otherwise, members of this or-
ganization who signed the treaty, could develop up to a ton and
use it. What consequence for you as a military planner does
knowing the other team had a ton of chemical agents available
to them?
General Odom. Well, Senator, you have made in my view one
of the strongest arguments against the treaty, for making it
largely irrelevant.
Senator Biden. That may be. That is why I want you to talk
about it.
General Odom. It is sort of in line with my argument here
earlier. I do not think--if you look at the record, when one
side has chemicals and the other does not, the probability of
it being used seems to be much higher. When both sides have it,
chemical weapons do not seem to be used.
Senator Biden. How do you explain Iran and Iraq, then?
General Odom. Well, they did not both have it at first.
Senator Biden. But they both ended up having it.
General Odom. Well, but when the Iraqis started out using
it the Iraqis were in trouble.
My own experience in learning to use, target chemical
weapons back when we had them, I was a young armor officer in
Fort Leavenworth doing map exercises. I became very unimpressed
with chemical weapons. You do not like them. They are
unpredictable. There are other ways to blow people away, and
you would rather have something that is easier to control. So I
think the more professionally trained military officers are
likely to be very much against these things.
When it comes to a ton or even 200 or 300 or 400 tons, I
think we have certain capabilities. The prospects of keeping
them from being used in a conflict are very high. And I do not
see that this treaty is going to affect this much one way or
another. It does not seem to bear on it. The people who really
want these weapons are going to get them anyway, and the ones
right now who are troublesome states are clearly not going to
be caught up in this.
Now let me make another point about that there is another
way to look at this. It is hard to weaponeer these new weapons,
but there is a lot of new technology emerging. I do not know
how to judge that. I mentioned Martin Shubick's piece earlier
that the price of killing people is going down because of
technological change in this regard.
It is easy to do that in sort of theoretical calculations.
Whether or not these new technologies can be weaponeered and
brought into the battlefield even for terrorist use is an open
question. So as I said earlier, we are in a period of dynamic
change and that makes me nervous that anybody can write any
kind of regime that is going to catch these kind of things.
That is why I say the spirit of the treaty I have no
trouble supporting. I just do not understand why one would want
to strap themselves to this regulatory system and pay the price
when the probable outcomes of it are trivial.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Lehman?
Mr. Lehman. Senator, you often hear people say chemical
weapons have no military utility. I do not believe that. I
think they can. During the mid-eighties when we faced the
Warsaw Pact at the Fulda Gap, I thought it was important to
maintain a continuum of deterrent capabilities and that a
modernized chemical weapons component with the binaries was an
important part of that.
The world has changed since then. We have alternative
weapons, advanced conventional munitions. What you saw in the
Gulf War was that clearly when you ask people who have to deal
with the logistics of warfare, what is it you need on station
ready to go, they wanted weapons they knew they were going to
have to use and they wanted them in large quantities, and they
did not want to waste space with having a chemical deterrent
there.
I remember going through the chemical training facility
down at Fort McClellan, putting on a suit and decontaminating
equipment with live nerve agent. I realized I did not want to
go to war wearing that suit.
In Vietnam I used to carry my gas mask with me on a lot of
the types of operations that we went on, and I hated having to
carry that.
One of the things I learned out of that experience to me
was that in today's world it is much more important--it is less
important that we have chemical weapons than that we do
everything we can to not have them used against our troops and
reduce the chances they will be used. But we also have to make
sure we maintain our defenses.
On the military significance question, I very much fall in
the category of those who say, you know, the bullet that wounds
you is militarily significant. Therefore, we need to have the
tools that deter the use, and we need to have the will to
enforce compliance.
But when you say your example of a ton, what does a ton
mean? Well, in certain types of scenarios a ton can be very
important. But remember, we are the United States. It ought to
make us awfully damn angry, and with the CWC it ought to mean
everybody ought to support us and we go in and we solve the
problem.
Senator Biden. Well, here is the point----
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, let me ask this. I want to
stay on time here, and I am going to ask a question. I am not
going to take my full 7\1/2\ minutes. I know Senator Kerry
wants to get back to it. I will get back to you as well.
What I want to do is go back to you, Mr. O'Malley, and I
would like you to develop more of your counterintelligence
insight, background, experience, as to how it relates to this
treaty. Where are the real vulnerabilities coming at it from
your years of working in the counterintelligence business?
Mr. O'Malley. I think, again, the concern that I have,
shared by certain elements of industry, is in the illicit
acquisition that this would facilitate, this convention,
illicit acquisition of proprietary information that this would
facilitate. It is not the only means, by any stretch of the
imagination, of acquiring American proprietary information. It
can be done in other ways, including technical means and the
Internet and so forth.
What this does, though, it would give those who are
desirous of collecting such information another avenue of
approach. I mentioned earlier this list of critical
technologies that the Bureau is charged with protecting. I
might also add that this also could con-
stitute essential elements of information, i.e., what the other
side is seeking.
So there is no doubt at all in terms of what Senator Biden
mentioned earlier, that any corporation would prefer to have
someone coming in rather than a recruited agent inside. I mean,
that is somewhat of a false choice in my opinion. That
recruited agent inside ultimately happens as a result of people
coming in and getting to know and have access.
I am not at all convinced that whatever security measures
are present in this Chemical Weapons Convention are adequate.
The primary mission of counterintelligence is to identify,
penetrate, and neutralize such systems. I can give you a
specific concrete example of such an instance.
I formerly represented the U.S. at something called the
NATO Special Committee, which consists of the
counterintelligence chiefs of the NATO member nations. We met
twice a year in Brussels. Security, as you might well imagine,
was extremely tight. They had all the usual bells and whistles.
Everyone was vetted as they should be. And we would meet in
camera and discuss sensitive information.
Lo and behold, one of our discussions ended up in a
Bulgarian newspaper. So something was wrong. The secretariat of
the NATO Special Committee asked for an FBI counterintelligence
officer. We assigned one to the committee and, lo and behold,
the secretary to the head of the secretariat was an East German
agent. None of these security measures were able to identify
this particular woman, who was a British national.
So I am not at all convinced that these security procedures
will be adequate. But if they are, if the government believes
that these security measures are adequate and in a sense acts
as a guarantor of these security measures. And if a company
does lose a trade secret as a result of these kinds of
inspections, then it seems to me it ought to be fair on the
part of the government to reimburse that company for the value
of that trade secret.
Senator Hagel. Mr. O'Malley, thank you.
What I am going to do for my colleagues, if this is
agreeable, I have just been given a note indicating that some
of our witnesses have some pressing time problems. So what I
would recommend that we do 5 more minutes each and then allow
our panel to leave. Senator Kerry, is that fine? We are going
to do 5 minutes each, and that way the panel can get to their
other business.
Senator Kerry. That is fine, absolutely. I have got to go
to another meeting, too, so I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have been struggling with this since one of
our earlier hearings, when I went back and read a little of the
history of the negotiations on this. We had Secretary Richard
Perle here, former Secretary Perle here. And when Ronald Reagan
and the administration first proposed this treaty--and they
were the first ones to propose it--they came up with a concept
called--you know, they wanted total verification, correct,
General? I mean, that was the great goal, being really
intrusive in our verifications.
So they came up with something called ``anywhere, any
time.'' We are going to go anywhere, any time. We are going to
be able to challenge anywhere, any time. That is the only way
we can be safe.
Then, whoops, all of a sudden people here said: Un-uh, we
do not want that. Correct?
General Odom. Exactly right.
Senator Kerry. Anywhere, any time? Oh my God, they could
come into one of our places and look anywhere any time. And so
we have got to be a little bit smarter about how we come at
this.
So the negotiators went to work and did a heck of a job, I
think, over a period of time. General Scowcroft, whom I have
great respect for, and General Powell, who this morning was
before the Veterans Affairs Committee testifying in favor of
this treaty, many other players of enormous military
background, intelligence background, national security
background, clearly with the United States of America's
security interests at the forefront of their thinking, said: We
are going to come up with a different scheme. And they did, to
protect our sort of black institutions, as we call them, from
being intruded, but to provide sufficient intrusiveness to be
able to do something effectively with this treaty.
Now, I sort of see the two of you setting up what I have
seen my colleagues on the other side of the aisle setting up
over the last few weeks, which is this Catch 22 situation. You
come in here, General, and you say: It is not verifiable, it is
not verifiable enough. We have got to have more intrusive
verification. But then on the other side, a whole bunch of
other people are sitting there saying: It is too verifiable; we
cannot have this, because you are going to get our secrets.
General Odom. I did not take that position.
Senator Kerry. I beg your pardon?
General Odom. I did not take that position.
Senator Kerry. You do not believe--you think the
verification is strong enough?
General Odom. I would vote for the treaty without
verification. I do not want to vote for the treaty with
verification. I think the verification is the big flaw in it
and that you have got a huge regulatory cost you are about to
strap on American industry. Most of them do not even know it is
coming. The ones who are in favor of it clearly want some other
payoff in terms of----
Senator Kerry. OK, fine, I accept that. It is even easier
to deal with, frankly, from my point of view. I am happier to
accept that.
But you are aware of people saying it cannot be verified
and that has been a major argument, correct?
General Odom. That is true.
Senator Kerry. So is there not a Catch 22 in that? I mean,
you just go around and around in a circle.
General Odom. My conclusion is that we should not bother to
negotiate the treaty. I said in my testimony I think it is a
misconceptual approach. The poor negotiators have been told to
take on a problem that defies being managed with this approach.
You know, I just do not think you can get there from here
with this kind of treaty. And as I made the point in my
testimony, I originally came to it believing that it was a
fairly benign thing and why not support it, it is on the side
of virtue and why should I stand up in favor of sin? But when
you get into it you begin to real-
ize that it has some costs. It probably creates some illusions
and, it just very well could produce a lot of unintended
consequences that we cannot fathom at all.
The length of the treaty was the first thing that raised my
suspicions. I have sort of a little rule: The length of the
treaty is related, inversely related, to its effectiveness.
Senator Kerry. You do not believe that that spells out the
obligations and crosses the t's and dots the i's so that people
really are held accountable?
My light is going to go off in a minute. I want to ask you
a comparative question here.
General Odom. Also, back on the early one when you talked
about the mutual intrusiveness during the Reagan
administration, I saw that coming and could not understand why
they wanted to go anywhere any time.
Senator Kerry. Well, let me ask. I wanted to ask Secretary
Lehman to respond to what I just asked the two of you and
simultaneously to answer this question if you would, because we
keep missing this point. Assuming that the treaty were either
rejected--Mr. Secretary, if you would answer, I want you to
answer the specific issue I just raised; but also add to that,
would you please, what are the implications for the United
States at this moment in time, where we now have 74 nations
that have ratified it--it is up--where we now have 160 or so
have signed it, we can anticipate that if we and Russia come on
board a whole lot of other people are going to, what are the
implications with respect to any possibilities of renegotiating
it, changing it, going back and fixing it in terms of other
countries, given the date and given the momentum of what will
take place here? If you could comment on both.
Mr. Lehman. I would be pleased to. Let me pick up a bit on
what Bill has said about any time anywhere and the Catch 22
aspect of that. There is a lot of--you know, we all look for
slogans to describe what we are doing, and ``any time,
anywhere'' was our way of trying to summarize what we were
trying to do.
But clearly, Ronald Reagan's policy was not to go back to
the old Biological Weapons Convention approach, where you ban
something and God knows what you do about it, you do your best.
But rather, he wanted to have treaties that were well crafted,
that had verification provisions, that gave us some tools.
I am sympathetic with Bill that I wish the treaty were not
so long. I am seeing right here in the debate in the Senate one
of the disadvantages of having long treaties is that you have
got to read the whole thing over a thousand times, and then you
have got to debate it, and then you may not yet have gotten it
right. So for that I apologize.
But what we discovered was in some cases it was very
dangerous not to have a longer treaty. You had to lay out
things. I can give you a lot of examples, but let me go to your
question and use that to sort of find an example, the question
of access and intrusiveness in inspection. When Bill says he
was concerned about this ``any time, anywhere,'' well, he was
not the only one. Ronald Reagan was, too. So the NSDD that was
drafted that implemented this said: Any time, anywhere, but by
the way you have got to protect national security information
and proprietary information; go figure out how, with some
general guidelines.
This notion of managed access was inherent. We did not
invent the phrase until later to bring some people together,
but it was clear from the beginning you were going to have to
balance these factors.
Also, take the question ``any time.'' What we really wanted
was to get to a site quickly. The more we did studies, the more
we discovered several things. One is some things that they hide
at a site, you cannot get there fast enough; it is going to be
gone. It will be gone in seconds or minutes or hours, but
certainly before your plane gets there.
On the other hand, there were other things it might take
months to get rid of, or maybe never, at least not in any human
lifetime. So we had to balance all of that.
Then there was this question of intrusiveness. I think we
could have simplified that, but we did not. The reason we did
not is that the intelligence community and the defense
community wanted more details spelled out in the treaty to give
them specific hooks and rights. And since I did not think we
could get this treaty through the Senate without making sure
that it met their standards, we negotiated to get what they
wanted into that treaty.
So a lot of that length is what the intelligence community
and the defense community wanted to protect themselves. That is
why all of that is in there.
Now, the implications of what happens if you do not ratify.
Well, you heard a lot of discussion of what it will mean for
nonproliferation. I think that is the important thing. We are
going to lose a lot of leadership.
There are some issues that will undoubtedly occur that
people will mention that I think are important, but we ought to
know them for what they are. A lot of people out there, the
rogue states, the usual list of suspects, will use this as an
excuse to do what they want to do anyway and we will just make
it easier for them. But I do not think we ought to excuse it,
no matter what we do.
Businesses will sit there and realize that if you try to
renegotiate you are probably going to see a number of our good
friends who are these very economic competitors decide they do
not want to negotiate; because, frankly they do not care if we
are in the treaty, because if that means more production goes
overseas to their countries and out--hey, you want to
negotiate, fine. But I do not think they are going to want to
fix this quickly.
Senator Kerry. That is because they have an advantage
written into the treaty.
Mr. Lehman. See, the problem is that, because the U.S.
wanted to try to promote universality, you have this provision
that limits certain types of trade. You can look at the near-
term costs, and you can dispute how much are direct and
indirect costs, and it all gets kind of subjective perhaps. But
the real reality is there, is that a lot of sharp-pencilled
businessmen are going to understand that they start moving
production around to take advantage of this treaty.
There are a lot of factors like that. But I will tell you
what my concern is. I am a national security person. My point
is this treaty gives us a lot of useful tools. John Deutch says
it, Jim Woolsey said it, George Tenet says it. We know that. I
think what we got out of the treaty was these very important
tools, and we want to use them.
If you follow Bill's logic, which I can respect, which is
basically the bad guys are going to try anyway and you are not
going to guarantee you are going to be able to stop them; his
real argument then is he says: I would go with the treaty, but
without the verification.
So what is the real issue? The real issue is are these
tools worth the costs? And I think that is a legitimate
question, and I think people can come out, reasonable people
can come out on a different point. What I am finding
fascinating is, though, that this is not a new issue. We
thought we had addressed those costs. We thought we had driven
up the benefits and driven down the risks and costs, and
sometimes it sounds like nobody heard us.
Senator Hagel. Secretary Lehman, thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I have a number of questions, but I do not
know how I could, quite frankly, better summarize where we are.
You have just said better than I have attempted to say it. This
really gets down to that fundamental question. I mean, when all
is said and done, all the talk about verification, all the talk
about the threat to individual companies through espionage, all
of that--I am not suggesting people who make those arguments
are not sincere--but the truth of the matter is it really is
not about that. It really does not get to that.
It gets to what General Odom is talking about, just are the
tools worth the cost? And some believe the costs are much
heavier, some believe they are onerous, and some believe they
are insignificant; or in relative terms clearly the benefits
outweigh the costs, the tools available outweigh the costs we
have to pay.
And from my standpoint, when I take a look at all of these
different scenarios of what it takes for the worst case to
happen, the worst case on the military side is we are in this
treaty, we are lulled asleep, one of the signatories, the 74
nations, is able to amass a significant chemical capability
with emerging technology in such a way that it allows them on a
battlefield and/or in an open conflict with the United States
or one of our allies to prevail or enhance their probability of
prevailing.
Well, the truth of the matter is an awful hell of a lot of
things have to happen for that to happen. It is not merely that
we do not detect one ton or two tons or twenty tons; we do not
detect the reorganization of their military apparatus; we do
not detect the fact of how they maneuver; we do not detect that
they are using protective gear in a different way than they did
before; we do not detect.
We would have to not detect a whole hell of a lot of things
unrelated to whether or not they are making chemicals, in order
to get into a position where our military circumstance changes.
With regard to the issue that Mr. O'Malley raises, we would
have to--one of the reasons, one of the things everybody
misses, Mr. Secretary, is what you did on this managed access
piece. Everybody misses that. Everybody misses that this is not
a matter of being able to come in with 2, or 2 to 15--I met
with the Intelligence, we all did, with the Intelligence
Committee last night for 3 or 4 hours, and we went over this
piece about managed access on these inspections.
It can be a team of from 2 to 15 people. You have to run up
a hell of a scenario to figure out other than how accidentally
some company, who by the way companies now are going to have
the Commerce Department, with the help of the intelligence
agencies, teaching them how they would deal with inspections so
there is transparency with regard to chemical production, but
not transparency with regard to trade secrets or unrelated
activities taking place.
That is a technology, if you will, that will emerge. So you
have got to come up with an incredible scenario other than pure
luck to figure out how such a team is going to either cause
great damage, as was suggested yesterday, by coming out and
implying the Dupont company is making chemical weapons. You
have got to have a lot of collusion for that to happen. You
have got to have a whole lot of things happen of not knowing
how to manage the access.
I mean, they are real stretches. They can be done. They can
be done. It can happen. It can happen. So for me to get to the
end, I get to where you are. If you look at the tools available
to us versus the risk we take, I do not even think it is a
close call.
Yet I do not, General, sit here and say: You know, this
treaty is the be all to end all. You know where I end up, Mr.
Lehman? I end up with your statement from 1994, which I would
like to ask permission to be placed in the record if I may.
Senator Hagel. Without objection.
Senator Biden. I end up at a place where the biggest
benefit from this treaty and us being in it will be the way we
will be able to impact on behavioral patterns of other
countries, behavioral patterns. That is, how it will impact
on--this new regime will not solve the end of chemical weapons,
will not prevent clandestine production of them. It will not.
But it takes a hell of a conspiratorial scenario and a lot of
luck for it to do any damage in my view, any real damage. And
on the other hand, it will modify behavior.
It is a little like what happens--if you want to be part of
the community of nations that are viewed as civilized and have
access to a thousand other benefits when you are in that
economically, you are going to change your thinking. This helps
change the thinking.
I will not take the time now to go back and recount your
statement, but you--actually, do you have that one paragraph--
where you ended your statement by talking about how the mind
set had begun to change. I will put it in the record, but it
goes to this larger issue. You say:
For my part, I believe arms control and nonproliferation
tools can be used to promote the national security and we must
ensure that they do. The Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly
a tool which can enhance our national security. I believe that
unsuccessful conclusion of arms control agreements need not
result in the neglect of our defenses, but it often has.
In giving consent to the ratification of the CWC convention
without reservation, the Senate should take real steps to
support implementation of the treaty, fund strong defense
programs, promote balanced national security strategy, and
recognize the United States must be a leader in a very
dangerous world. This world has undergone dramatic change and
arms controls have been rushing by. In such a world, if we do
not shape the arms control process to serve our interests we
can be certain that some nations will be pressing in the
directions that are not in our interest. The Chemical Weapons
Convention before this committee is in our interests. Again----
This is not the quote I wanted to read, but thank you.
Senator Hagel. Well, it was very eloquent.
Senator Biden. It was. You did very well. It is still
relevant. It is not the quote I am looking for. I will put it
in the record without holding us up.
[The material referred to follows:]
One can see this, in one small example, even in the way our
pursuit of a ban on chemical weapons reinforced our commitment
to the spread of democracy. We sought intrusive verification
measures so that we might reduce the threat posed by the Warsaw
Pact, but also because we knew that totalitarian regimes cannot
long survive when their citizens are exposed to contradictory
information. The requirement for detailed information on
chemical weapons stocks and facilities before reaching
agreement, at the time an innovative negotiating step which led
to the December 1989 U.S./Soviet Phase I data exchange and the
recent Phase II exchange, sparked a controversy which continues
in Russia even today over the history of the Soviet chemical
and biological weapons programs.
Our demand for trial inspections prior to completion of
negotiations aided in crafting a better treaty, but it also
caused Soviet citizens to ask why they themselves could not see
what Americans were allowed to see. Our insistence, first in
the U.S./Soviet Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) of 1990
and later in the CWC that destruction of chemical weapons
stocks be done in a safe and environmentally sound manner has
created a grassroots political process of ``NIMBY''--not in my
backyard--which has complicated agreement on a chemical weapons
destruction plan but also complicates a return of the old
system. One should not exaggerate the role that arms control
has played in promoting our national agenda, but one should not
ignore it either.
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you.
General Odom, did you want to respond?
General Odom. I just wanted to say, you made my objections
seem far less than they are, and you have made this sound much
more benign. I hope you do realize that I have said that the
very things that you are saying we are going to set in motion
here are likely to produce very serious adverse consequences,
not trivial consequences.
Senator Biden. Well, I did not mean to suggest you thought
they were trivial, General. If I did, I did not mean that. I am
just pointing out that I think that it takes a hell of a lot to
get to the worst case scenario that I think you are most
worried about.
Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, thank you. We are grateful, as
always. If there is anything additional that you want to add
for the record, we would be very pleased to receive that.
The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(1) Effect of Article XXII
Summary:
The Senate reserves the right to add reservations to the resolution
of ratification, despite the ban (in Article XXII of the Convention) on
reservations to the Convention. This condition asserts the Senate's
right under the U.S. Constitution, but does not exercise it.
Text:
(1) Effect of Article XXII.
Upon the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification.
The President shall certify to the Congress that the United States has
informed all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate
reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution, to offer advice and
consent to ratification of the Convention subject to reservations,
notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention.
(2) Financial Contributions (Helms #3)
Summary:
Requires statutory authorization and appropriation for payments or
assistance to the Organization.
Text:
(2) Financial Contributions.
(A) Notwithstanding any provision of the Convention, no funds may
be drawn from the Treasury of the United States for payments or
assistance (including the transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16
of Article IV, paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII,
paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision of the
Convention, without statutory authorization and appropriation.
(3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office (Helms #4)
Summary:
Requires the equivalent of an independent OPCW Inspector General's
Office by late December 1997; withholds 50 percent of regular U.S.
contributions to the OPCW, beginning April 29, 1998, if the required
independent oversight office has not been established.
Text:
(3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office.
(A) No later than 240 days after the deposit of the instrument of
ratification of the United States to the Convention (in this resolution
referred to as the ``United States instrument of ratification''), the
President shall certify to the Congress that the current internal audit
office of the Preparatory Commission has been expanded into an
independent internal oversight office whose functions will be
transferred to the Organization upon its establishment. The independent
internal oversight office shall be obligated to protect confidential
information pursuant to the obligations of the Confidentiality Annex.
The independent internal oversight office shall--
(i) make investigations and reports relating to all programs of the
Organization;
(ii) undertake both management and financial audits, including--
(I) an annual assessment verifying that classified and confidential
information is stored and handled securely pursuant to the
general obligations set forth in Article VIII and in
accordance with all provisions of the Annex on the
Protection of Confidential Information; and
(II) an annual assessment of laboratories established pursuant to
Paragraph 55 of Part II of the Verification Annex to ensure
the Director General is carrying out his functions pursuant
to Paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verification Annex;
(iii) undertake performance evaluations annually to ensure the
Organization has complied to the extent practicable with the
recommendations of the independent internal oversight office;
(iv) have access to all records relating to the programs and
operations of the Organization;
(v) have direct and prompt access to any official of the
Organization; and
(vi) be required to protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals
against, all complainants.
(B) The Organization shall ensure, to the extent practicable,
compliance with recommendations of the independent internal oversight
office, and shall ensure that annual and other relevant reports by the
independent internal oversight office are made available to all member
states pursuant to the requirements established in the Confidentiality
Annex.
(C) Until a certification is made under subsection (A), 50 percent
of the amount for United States contributions to the regular budget of
the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall
be withheld, in addition to any other amounts required to withheld by
any other provision of law.
(D) Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for the
first year of the Organization's operation, ending on April 29, 1998,
the United States shall make its full contribution to the regular
budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article
VIII.
(E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``internal oversight
office'' means the head of an independent office (or other independent
entity) established by the Organization to conduct and supervise
objective audits, inspections, and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the Organization.
(4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements (Helms #5)
Summary:
Requires cost-sharing for ``any new research or development
expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving the
Organization's regime for verification of compliance under the
Convention, including the training of inspectors and the provision of
detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and analysis
techniques.'' Permits programs to improve U.S. monitoring without cost-
sharing.
We would not want the United States to do all the expensive
research and development needed to maximize verification of compliance
with the CWC, and not be reimbursed by other countries for such
efforts. It will still be possible for U.S. agencies to pursue R&D
programs so as to improve U.S. monitoring of chemical weapons, however,
and cost-sharing arrangements need not be in place unless and until the
United States wants to share the results with the OPCW.
Text:
(4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements.
(A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a
report to Congress identifying all cost-sharing arrangements with the
Organization.
(B) The United States shall not undertake any new research or
development expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or
improving the Organization's regime for verification of compliance
under the Convention, including the training of inspectors and the
provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and
analysis techniques, or share the articles, items, or services
resulting from any research and development undertaken previously,
without first having concluded and submitted to the Congress a cost-
sharing arrangement with the Organization.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed as limiting or
constricting in any way the ability of the United States to pursue
unilaterally any project undertaken solely to increase the capability
of United States means for monitoring compliance with the Convention.
(5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards (Helms #6)
Summary:
Requires interagency Intelligence Community approval and
sanitization of intelligence information before release to the OPCW,
such that there would be only minimal damage from unauthorized
disclosure. The Director of Central Intelligence may waive these
requirements on a case-by-case basis, with notice to appropriate com-
mittees of Congress. Any unauthorized disclosure by the OPCW must be
reported to Congress within 15 days of after the executive branch
learns of it.
Text:
(5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards.--
(A) Provision of Intelligence Information to the Organization.--
(i) In General.--No United States intelligence information may be
provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
thereof, unless the President certifies to the appropriate
committees of Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, has established and implemented
procedures, and has worked with the Organization to ensure
implementation of procedures, for protecting from unauthorized
disclosure United States intelligence sources and methods
connected to such information. These procedures shall include,
but not be limited to--
(I) offering and provision of advice and assistance to the
Organization in establishing and maintaining the necessary
measures to ensure that inspectors and other staff members
of the Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity, pursuant to
subparagraph l(b) of the Confidentiality Annex, and in
establishing and maintaining a stringent regime governing
the handling of confidential information by the Technical
Secretariat, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality
Annex;
(II) explicit recognition, in each case in which intelligence
information is to be provided to the Organization or any
organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any
officials or employees thereof, of the risks of
unauthorized disclosure of the U.S. information to be
provided to the Organization, and determination that such
disclosure would result in no more than minimal damage to
national security;
(III) sanitization of intelligence information that is to be
provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
thereof, to remove all information that could betray
intelligence sources and methods; and
(IV) interagency United States Intelligence Community approval for
any release of intelligence information to the Organization
or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to
any officials or employees thereof, no matter how
thoroughly it has been sanitized.
(ii) Waiver Authority.--
(I) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence may waive the
application of clause (i) if the Director of Central
Intelligence certifies in writing to the appropriate
committees of Congress that providing such information to
the Organization or an organization affiliated with the
Organization, or to any official or employee thereof, is in
the vital national security interests of the United States
and that all possible measures to protect such information
have been taken, except that such waiver must be made for
each instance such information is provided, or for each
such document provided. In the event that multiple waivers
are issued within a single week, a single certification to
the appropriate committees of Congress may be submitted,
specifying each waiver issued during that week.
(II) Delegation of Duties.--The Director of Central Intelligence
may not delegate any duty of the Director of Central
Intelligence under this subsection.
(B) Periodic and Special Reports.--
(i) Periodic Reports.--
(I) In General.--The President shall report periodically, but not
less frequently than semiannually, to the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
on the types and volume of intelligence information
provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
thereof, and the purposes for which it was provided during
the period covered by the report.
(II) Exemption.--For purposes of subclause (i), intelligence
information provided to the Organization or any
organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any
officials or employees thereof, does not cover information
that is provided only to, and only for the use of,
appropriately cleared United States Government personnel
serving with the Organization or any organization
affiliated with the Organization.
(ii) Special Reports.--
(I) Report on Procedures.--Accompanying the certification provided
pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the President shall
provide a detailed report to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
identifying the procedures established for protecting
intelligence sources and methods when sanitized
intelligence information is provided pursuant to this
section.
(II) Reports on Unauthorized Disclosures.--The President shall
report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives, within 15 days after it
has become known to the U.S. Government, regarding any
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information
provided by the United States to the Organization.
(C) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or assign
the duties of the President under this section.
(D) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this paragraph may he
construed to--
(i) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section
103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(c)(5)); or
(ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
(E) Definitions.--In this section:
(i) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(ii) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established under the
Convention and includes any organ of that Organization and any
board or working group, such as the Scientific Advisory Board,
that may be established by it.
(iii) Organization Affiliated with the Organization.--The term
``organization affiliated with the Organization'' includes, but
is not limited to, the Provisional Technical Secretariat under
the Convention and any laboratory certified by the Director-
General of the Organization as designated to perform analytical
or other functions.
(6) Amendments to the Convention (Helms #7)
Summary:
Requires the United States to vote on all proposed amendments and
requires the executive branch to submit all amendments to the Senate
for its advice and consent.
Text:
(6) Amendments to the Convention.
(A) A United States representative will be present at all Amendment
Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or negative, on
all proposed amendments made at such conferences.
(B) The President shall submit to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification under Article 11, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States any amendment to the Convention
adopted by an Amendment Conference.
(7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export
Controls (Helms #11)
Summary:
Requires the President to certify, before depositing instruments of
ratification, that the CWC will in no way weaken the Australia Group,
and that each member of the Group agrees there is no CWC requirement to
weaken their export controls.
Requires annual certification that Australia Group controls have
not been weakened and remain effective or, if this cannot be certified,
consultation with the Senate on a resolution of continued adherence to
the CWC.
Requires the President to block any attempt within the Australia
Group to change the Group's view of its obligations under the CWC.
Text:
(7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export
Controls.
(A) The Senate declares that the collapse of the informal forum of
states known as the ``Australia Group,'' either though changes in
membership or lack of compliance with common export controls, or the
substantial weakening of common Aus-
tralia Group export controls and non-proliferation measures in force on
the date of United States ratification of the Convention, would
constitute a fundamental change in circumstances to United States
ratification of the Convention.
(B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that--
(i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States to accept
any modification, change in scope, or weakening of its national
export controls. The United States understands that the
maintenance of national restrictions on trade in chemicals and
chemical production technology is fully compatible with the
provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and
solely within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;
(ii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties,
unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export
controls on chemicals and related chemical production
technology for foreign policy or national security reasons,
notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
(iii) each Member-State of the Australia Group, at the highest
diplomatic levels, has officially communicated to the U.S.
Government its understanding and agreement that export control
and nonproliferation measures which the Australia Group has
undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions of the
Convention, including Article XI(2), and its commitment to
maintain in the future such export controls and
nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group members.
(C) (i) The President shall certify to Congress on an annual basis
that--
(a) Australia Group members continue to maintain an equally effective
or more comprehensive control over the export of toxic
chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing equipment,
human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins with potential
biological weapons application, and dual-use biological
equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group as of the
date of ratification of this Convention by the United States;
and
(b) the Australia group remains a viable mechanism for limiting the
spread of chemical and biological weapons-related materials and
technology, and that the effectiveness of the Australia Group
has not been undermined by changes in membership, lack of
compliance with common export controls and nonproliferation
measures, or weakening of common controls and nonproliferation
measures in force as of the date of ratification of this
Convention by the United States.
(ii) In the event that the President is, at any time, unable to
make the certifications described in subparagraph (C)(i), the President
shall consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
resolution of continued adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding
the fundamental change in circumstance.
(D) The President shall consult periodically, but not less
frequently than twice a year, with the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives, on Australia Group export control and
nonproliferation measures. If any Australia Group member adopts a
position at variance with the certifications and understandings
provided under subparagraph (B), or should seek to gain Australia Group
acquiescence or approval for an interpretation that various provisions
of the Convention require it to remove chemical-weapons related export
controls against any State Party to the Convention, the President shall
block any effort by that Australia Group member to secure Australia
Group approval of such a position or interpretation.
(E) For the purposes of this paragraph--
(i) ``Australia Group'' means the informal forum of states, chaired
by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical
and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national
export controls, chemical weapons precursor chemicals,
biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use production
equipment, and through other measures: and
(ii) ``Highest diplomatic levels'' means at the level of a senior
official with the power to authoritatively represent their
government, and does not mean a diplomatic representative of
that government to the United States.
(8) Negative Security Assurances (Helms #12)
Summary:
Requires a classified Presidential report regarding the impact of
CWC on U.S. options for responding to chemical or biological attacks,
and on the assurances we offer to other countries that foreswear the
use of nuclear weapons.
Some Members are concerned because ratification of the CWC will
leave the United States unable to threaten retaliatory use of chemical
weapons against a state that used chemical weapons on U.S. or allied
forces. The United States has no in-
tention of using chemical weapons, however, even in response to a
foreign chemical weapon attack. Even before the CWC was negotiated, the
United States committed itself to the destruction of nearly all U.S.
chemical weapons.
This condition requires the President to submit a classified report
on the impact of CWC upon U.S. ``negative security assurances'' to
other countries. Such assurances are the ``umbrella'' that we offer to
countries that agree to forego weapons of mass destruction.
Text:
(8) Negative Security Assurances.
(A) In forswearing the possession of chemical weapons retaliatory
capability under the Convention, the Senate understands that deterrence
of attack by chemical weapons requires a reevaluation of the negative
security assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
(B) Accordingly, 180 days after the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall submit to the Congress
a classified report setting forth the findings of a detailed review of
United States policy on negative security assurances, including a
determination of the appropriate responses to the use of chemical or
biological weapons against the United States military, United States
citizens, allies, and third parties.
(9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology (Helms #13)
Summary:
Requires the President to certify, prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification and annually thereafter, that
the legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms are not being significantly
harmed by the Convention.
The Administration is prepared to certify, both now and annually,
that the CWC's limits on the production and use of the most toxic
chemical weapons and their precursors are not significantly harming the
legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms.
Most of those firms played a major role in the negotiation of this
Convention, of course, so they have long since signed up to any
sacrifices that U.S. firms may have to make in order to limit the
ability of rogue states to obtain and use chemical weapons. And the
Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations have all taken extraordinary
measures to limit the impact of the CWC upon U.S. businesses.
Text:
(9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology.
Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, and on January 1 of every year thereafter, the President
shall certify to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives that the legitimate commercial activities
and interests of the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms
in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the
limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those
chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 contained in the Annex on
Chemicals of the Convention.
(10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance (Helms #14)
Summary:
Requires detailed annual country-by-country reports on chemical
weapons developments and U.S. intelligence coverage, as well as at
least quarterly briefings on U.S. actions to pursue CWC compliance
issues.
We all know that monitoring and verification of some aspects of CWC
compliance will be difficult. This fact of life has prompted
understandable concern on the part of some Members, and the
administration is prepared to accept a condition that requires both
periodic reports and prompt notice regarding world chemical weapons
programs and the status of CWC compliance. The executive branch would
also offer briefings on current compliance issues, including issues to
be raised in OPCW meetings and the results of those meetings.
Text:
(10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance.
(A) The Senate declares that--
(i) the Convention is in the interests of the United States only if
all parties to the Convention are in strict compliance with the
terms of the Convention as submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, such compli-
ance being measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or
commitments to comply; and
(ii) the Senate expects all parties to the Convention to be in strict
compliance with their obligations under the terms of the
Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification;
(B) Given its concern about the intelligence community's low level
of confidence in its ability to monitor compliance with the Convention,
the Senate expects the executive branch of Government to offer regular
briefings, not less than four times a year, to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of
the House of Representatives on compliance issues related to the
Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of all United
States efforts in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels and
forums to resolve compliance issues and shall include a complete
description of--
(i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise at
meetings of the Organization, in advance of such meetings;
(ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the Organization,
within 30 days of each such meeting;
(iii) any determination by the President that a party is in
noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner
inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Convention,
within 30 days of such a determination.
(C) The President shall submit annually on January 1 to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and
complete classified and unclassified report setting forth--
(i) a certification of those priority countries included in the
Intelligence Community's Monitoring Strategy, as defined by the
Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence
Staff and the National Intelligence Council, deter-mined to be
in compliance with the Convention, on a country-by-country
basis;
(ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an
identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising
with regard to the adherence of the country to its obligations
under the Convention;
(iii) the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or
in conjunction with another State Party--
(I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party
with the objective of demonstrating to the international
community the act of noncompliance;
(II) to call attention publicly to the activity in question; and
(III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant party into
compliance.
(iv) a determination of the military significance and broader
security risks arising from any compliance issue identified
pursuant to clause (ii); and
(v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party
in question to actions undertaken by the United States
described in the report submitted pursuant to clause (iii).
(D) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall submit to the Committees on Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate and to the Committees on International Relations, National
Security, and Permanent Select Committee of the House of
Representatives, a full and complete classified and unclassified report
regarding--
(i) the status of chemical weapons development, production,
stockpiling, and use, within the meanings of the Convention, on
a country-by-country basis;
(ii) any information made available to the U.S. Government concerning
the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling,
retention, use, or direct or indirect transfer of novel agents,
including any unitary or binary chemical weapon comprised of
chemical components not identified on the schedules of the
Annex on Chemicals, by any country;
(iii) the extent of trade in chemicals potentially relevant to
chemical weapons programs, including all Australia Group
chemicals and chemicals identified on the schedules of the
Annex on Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;
(iv) the monitoring responsibilities, practices, and strategies of
the intelligence community and a determination of the level of
confidence of the intelligence community (as defined in section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) with respect to each
specific monitoring task undertaken, including an assessment by
the intelligence community of the national aggregate data
provided by parties to the Organization, on a country-by-
country basis;
(v) an identification of how U.S. national intelligence means,
including national technical means and human intelligence, is
being marshaled together with the Convention's verification
provisions to monitor compliance with the Convention; and
(vi) the identification of chemical weapons development, production,
stockpiling, or use, within the meanings of the Convention, by
subnational groups, including terrorist and paramilitary
organizations.
(E) The report required under subparagraph (D) shall include a full
and complete classified annex submitted solely to the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Permanent Select Committee of
the House of Representatives regarding--
(i) a detailed and specific identification of all United States
resources devoted to monitoring the Convention, including
information on all expenditures associated with the monitoring
of the Convention; and
(ii) an identification of the priorities of the executive branch of
Government for the development of new resources relating to
detection and monitoring capabilities with respect to chemical
and biological weapons, including a description of the steps
being taken and resources being devoted to strengthening U.S.
monitoring capabilities.
(11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses (Helms
#15)
Summary:
Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are
capable of carrying out required military missions in U.S. regional
contingency plans, regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical
weapons, and that the U.S. Army Chemical School remains under the
supervision of an Army general.
Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and others have
asserted that ratifying CWC could lead to complacency regarding the
need for chemical weapons defenses. This concern is frankly a bit
mystifying. The fear of complacency persists, however, so the
administration has agreed to a condition requiring the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out required
military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, regardless of any
foreign threat or use of chemical weapons. This means not only
improving the defensive capabilities of U.S. forces, but also
initiating discussions on chemical weapons defense with likely
coalition partners and countries whose civilian personnel would support
U.S. forces in a conflict.
The Administration has also agreed to assure that the U.S. Army
Chemical School remains under the supervision of an Army general.
Text:
(11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses.
(A) It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) chemical and biological threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces
will continue to grow in regions of concern around the world,
and pose serious threats to U.S. power projection and forward
deployment strategies;
(2) chemical weapons or biological weapons use is a potential
condition of future conflicts in regions of concern;
(3) it is essential for the United States and key regional allies to
preserve and further develop robust chemical and biological
defenses;
(4) the United States Armed Forces are inadequately equipped,
organized, trained and exercised for chemical and biological
defense against current and expected threats, and that too much
reliance is placed on non-active duty forces, which receive
less training and less modern equipment, for critical chemical
and biological defense capabilities;
(5) the lack of readiness stems from a de-emphasis of chemical and
biological defenses within the executive branch of Government
and the United States Armed Forces;
(6) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely coalition
partners, as well as civilians necessary to support U.S.
military operations, are inadequately prepared and equipped to
carry out essential missions in chemically and biologically
contaminated environments;
(7) congressional direction contained in the Defense Against Weapons
of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 should lead to enhanced
domestic preparedness to protect against chemical and
biological weapons threats; and
(8) the U.S. Armed Forces should place increased emphasis on
potential threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces and, in
particular, make countering chemical and biological weapons use
an organizing principle for U.S. defense strategy and
development of force structure, doctrine, planning, training,
and exercising policies of the U.S. Armed Forces.
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are capable of carrying out required
military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, despite the
threat or use of chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are
effectively equipped, organized, trained and exercised (including at
the large unit and theater level) to conduct operations in a chemically
or biologically contaminated environment that are critical to the
success of U.S. military plans in regional conflicts, including--
(1) deployment, logistics and reinforcement operations at key ports
and airfields;
(2) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at critical regional
airbases; and
(3) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
(C) The Secretaries of Defense and State shall, as a priority
matter, initiate discussions with key regional allies and likely
regional coalition partners, including those countries where the U.S.
currently deploys forces, where U.S. forces would likely operate during
regional conflicts, or which would provide civilians necessary to
support U.S. military operations, to determine what steps are necessary
to ensure that Allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians
are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically- and
biologically-contaminated environments. No later than one year after
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
Secretaries of Defense and State shall provide a report to the
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate and to
the Speaker of the House on the results of these discussions, plans for
future discussions, measures agreed to improve the preparedness of
foreign forces and civilians, and proposals for increased military
assistance, including through the Foreign Military Sales, Foreign
Military Financing and the International Military Education and
Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
(D) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
ensure that the United States Army Chemical School remains under the
oversight of a general officer of the United States Army.
(E) Given its concerns about the present state of chemical and
biological defense readiness and training, it is the sense of the
Senate that--
(1) the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of the United
States Army Chemical School, the Army should not disrupt or
diminish the training and readiness of the United States Armed
Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare environment;
(2) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical Defense Training
Facility at Fort McClellan until such time as the replacement
training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is functional.
(F) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the President
shall submit a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Armed Services and the Committees on International
Relations, National Security, Appropriations, and Speaker of the House
on previous, current, and planned chemical and biological weapons
defense activities. The report shall include the following information
for the previous fiscal year and for the next three fiscal years--
(1) Proposed solutions to each of the deficiencies in chemical and
biological warfare defenses identified in the March 1996
General Accounting Office Report, titled ``Chemical and
Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve
Continuing Problems,'' and steps being taken pursuant to
paragraph (B) of this section to ensure that the U.S. Armed
Forces are capable of conducting required military operations
to ensure the success of U.S. regional contingency plans
despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons;
(2) An identification of priorities of the executive branch of
Government in the development of both active and passive
chemical and biological defenses;
(3) A detailed summary of all budget activities associated with the
research, development, testing, and evaluation of chemical and
biological defense programs;
(4) A detailed summary of expenditures on research, development,
testing, and evaluation, and procurement of chemical and
biological defenses by fiscal years defense programs,
department, and agency;
(5) A detailed assessment of current and projected vaccine production
capabilities and vaccine stocks, including progress in
researching and developing a multivalent vaccine;
(6) A detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities necessary to
protect and decontaminate infrastructure to reinforce United
States power-projection forces, including progress in
developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination capability;
(7) The progress made in procuring light-weight personal protective
gear and steps being taken to ensure that programmed
procurement quantities are suffi-
cient to replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and chemical
protective overgarments to maintain required wartime inventory levels;
(8) The progress in developing long-range standoff detection and
identification capabilities and other battlefield surveillance
capabilities for biological and chemical weapons, including
progress on developing a multi-chemical agent detector,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned ground sensors;
(9) Progress in developing and deploying layered theater missile
defenses for deployed U.S. Armed Forces which will provide
greater geographic coverage against current and expected
ballistic missile threats and will help mitigate chemical and
biological contamination through higher altitude intercepts and
boost-phase intercepts;
(10) An assessment of the training and readiness of the United States
Armed Forces to operate in a chemically or biologically
contaminated environment and actions taken to sustain training
and readiness, including at national combat training centers;
(11) The progress in incorporating chemical and biological
considerations into service and Joint exercises as well as
simulations, models, and wargames and the conclusions drawn
from these efforts about the U.S. capability to carry out
required missions, including with coalition partners, in
military contingencies;
(12) The progress in developing and implementing service and joint
doctrine for combat and non-combat operations involving
adversaries armed with chemical or biological weapons,
including efforts to update the range of service and joint
doctrine to better address the wide range of military
activities, including deployment, reinforcement and logistics
operations in support of combat operations, and for the conduct
of such operations in concert with coalition forces; and
(13) The progress in resolving issues relating to the protection of
United States population centers from chemical and biological
attack, including plans for inoculation of populations,
consequence management, and progress made in developing and
deploying effective cruise missile defenses and a national
ballistic missile defense.
(12) Noncompliance (Helms #16)
Summary:
In the event of noncompliance by a State Party, requires the
President to inform and consult with the Senate and to take a series of
actions designed to expose noncompliance and to force compliance. These
actions include making effective use of CWC provisions for challenge
inspections, high-level diplomacy and U.N. sanctions.
The President must also implement any sanctions required by U.S.
law. If the noncompliance should persist for a year, the President must
consult with the Senate regarding continued adherence to the
Convention.
Text:
(12) Noncompliance.
(A) If the President determines that persuasive information exists
that a party to the Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons
production or production mobilization capability, is developing new
chemical agents, or is in violation of the Convention in any other
manner so as to threaten the national security interests of the United
States. Then the President shall--
(1) consult with, and promptly submit to, the Senate a report
detailing the effect of such actions,
(2) seek on an urgent basis a challenge inspection of the facilities
of the relevant party in accordance with the provisions of the
Convention with the objective of demonstrating to the
international community the act of noncompliance;
(3) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the relevant party with the objective of
bringing the noncompliant party into compliance,
(4) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the relevant party
as required by law;
(5) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent basis
within the Security Council of the United Nations a
multilateral imposition of sanctions against the noncompliant
party for the purposes of bringing the noncompliant party into
compliance; and
(6) in the event that noncompliance persists for a period of longer
than 1 year after the date of determination made pursuant to
subparagraph (A), promptly consult with the Senate for the
purposes of obtaining a resolution of support of continued
adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding the changed
circumstances affecting the object and purpose of the
Convention.
(B) Nothing in this section may be construed to impair or otherwise
affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant
to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(c)(5)).
(C) If the President determines that an action otherwise required
under paragraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the authority of
the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure, he shall report that
determination, together with a detailed written explanation of the
basis for that determination, to the Chairmen of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence no later than 15 days after making such determination.
(13) Primacy of the United States Constitution (Helms #17)
Summary:
Makes clear that the CWC does not contradict the U.S. Constitution.
Some CWC opponents have said that on-site inspections would be
conducted in violation of the U.S. Constitution. This is simply not the
case. No administration would agree to a treaty that violated the
Constitution, no treaty ever takes precedence over the Constitution,
and only the United States interprets our Constitution.
This condition states those facts.
Text:
(13) Primacy of the United States Constitution.
Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or
other action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution of
the United States, as interpreted by the United States.
(14) Financing Russian Implementation (Helms #18)
Summary:
Requires the United States not to accept any effort by Russia to
make Russia's CWC ratification contingent upon U.S. financial
guarantees to cover Russian destruction costs.
None of us would want the United States to be stuck with the bill
for Russian destruction of their vast chemical weapons stockpile. So
there is agreement on a condition that the United States shall not
accept any Russian effort to condition its ratification of CWC upon the
United States providing guarantees to pay for Russian implementation of
CWC or of the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement.
Text:
(14) Financing Russian Implementation.
The United States understands that in order to be assured of the
Russian commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles,
Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the
implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, and
the Convention. The United States shall not accept any effort by Russia
to make deposit of Russia's instrument of ratification contingent upon
the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for
implementation of commitments by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral
Destruction Agreement or the Convention.
(15) Assistance Under Article X (Helms #19)
Summary:
Requires the United States not to contribute to the voluntary fund
for chemical weapons defense assistance to other States Parties, and
limits U.S. assistance to certain states to medical antidotes and
treatments.
Opponents of CWC assert that Article X would require the United
States to provide assistance and equipment to countries like Cuba to
improve their chemical weapons defense capabilities. This is a
misconception of paragraph 7 of Article X, which says: ``Each State
Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organization.''
Assistance may include ``detection equipment and alarm systems,
protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants;
medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective
measures.''
The rest of paragraph 7 of Article X makes clear that a State Party
may simply declare what assistance it might provide in response to an
appeal by the OPCW. CWC does not compel the United States to give any
country, let alone an enemy like Cuba, anything more than medical
assistance or advice.
Text:
(15) Assistance Under Article X.
(A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that the
United States shall not provide assistance under paragraph 7(a) of
Article X.
(B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that for any
States Party the government of which is not eligible for assistance
under chapter 2 of Part II or chapter 4 of Part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961--
(i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be provided
to the States Party; and
(ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other than
medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the States
Party.
(16) Constitutional Prerogatives (Helms #22)
Summary:
Sense of the Senate that U.S. negotiators should not agree to
treaties that bar reservations and that the Senate should not consent
to ratification of any such future treaties. (See also #1.)
Article XXII of the CWC states: ``The Articles of this Convention
shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention
shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and
purpose.'' Senator Helms rightly notes that although the United States
has ratified other treaties with similar provisions, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has maintained that ``the President's agreement to
such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's constitutional right
and obligation to give its advice and consent to a treaty subject to
any reservation it might determine is required by the national
interest.''
The U.S. Constitution vests in the Senate the power to give its
advice and consent subject to reservations. So I am happy to support
this condition that reminds the executive branch of the Senate's role.
Text:
(16) Constitutional Prerogatives.
(A) The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) The Constitution states that the President ``shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.''
(2) At the turn of the century, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge took the
position that the giving of advice and consent to treaties
constitutes a stage in negotiation on the treaties and that
Senate amendments or reservations to a treaty are propositions
``offered at a later stage of the negotiation by the other part
of the American treatymaking power in the only manner in which
they could then be offered.''
(3) The executive branch has begun a practice of negotiating and
submitting to the Senate treaties which include a provision
which has the purported effect of inhibiting the Senate from
attaching reservations which the Senate considers necessary in
the national interest or of preventing the Senate from
exercising its constitutional duty to give its advice and
consent to treaty commitments before ratification.
(4) During the 85th Congress, and again during the 102d Congress, the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate made its position
on this issue clear when stating that ``the President's
agreement to such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's
constitutional right and obligation to give its advice and
consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it might
determine is required by the national interest.''
(B) Sense of the Senate.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the past ratification by the Senate of treaties containing
provisions which prohibit amendments or reservations should not
be construed as a precedent for such clauses in future
agreements with other nations which require the advice and
consent of the Senate;
(2) United States negotiators to a treaty should not agree to any
provision which has the effect of inhibiting the Senate from
attaching reservations or offering amendments to the treaty;
and
(3) the Senate should not consent in the future to any treaty article
or provision which would prohibit the Senate from giving its
advice and consent to the treaty subject to amendment or
reservation.
(17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals (Replaces Helms #25)
Summary:
There may well be occasions where it is in our national security
interest to add new chemicals to the list of restricted and prohibited
chemicals when it becomes clear that they have chemical weapon uses.
However, some have expressed a concern that the addition of certain
chemicals to the annex on chemicals might introduce new burdens on U.S.
industry.
This condition requires that the executive branch inform Congress
when a chemical is proposed for addition to the Schedules.
Consultation with Congress at that stage would enable the United
States to object to routine adoption of a change that might have
serious impact upon U.S. companies. Such an objection would force the
OPCW to seek a two-thirds vote in the Conference of States Parties.
Text:
(17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals.
(A) Presidential Notification.--Not later than ten days after the
Director-General communicates information to all States Parties,
pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) of the Convention, of a proposal for the
addition of a chemical or biological substance to a schedule of the
Annex on Chemicals, the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the U.S. Senate of the proposed addition.
(B) Presidential Report.--Not later than 60 days after the
Director-General communicates information of such a proposal pursuant
to Article XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a positive
recommendation by the Executive Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c) of
the Convention, whichever is sooner, the President shall transmit to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate a report, in
classified and unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the
proposed addition to the Annex on Chemicals. Such report shall include,
but not be limited to--
(i) an assessment of the likely impact on U.S. industry of the
proposed addition of the chemical or biological substance to
the Annex on Chemicals;
(ii) a description of the likely costs and benefits, if any, to U.S.
national security of the proposed addition of such chemical or
biological substance to the Annex on Chemicals; and
(iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of the proposed addition on
U.S. obligations under the Verification Annex;
(C) Presidential Consultation.--The President shall, after the
submission of the notification required under subparagraph (A) and
prior to any action on the proposal by the Executive Council under
Article XV(5)(c), consult promptly with the Senate as to whether the
United States should object to the proposed addition of a chemical or
biological substance pursuant to Article XV(5)(c).
(18) Effect on Terrorism (Helms #27)
Summary:
Senator Helms and you have agreed to a condition by which the
Senate will find that the CWC would not have stopped the Aum Shinrikyo
group in Japan and that future terrorist groups will likely seek
chemical weapons.
Both of these statements are probably quite accurate, and no harm
is done by attaching them to the resolution of ratification.
Text:
(18) Effect on Terrorism.
The Senate finds that--
(A) Irrespective of whether the Convention enters into force,
terrorists will likely look upon chemical weapons as a means to gain
greater publicity and instill widespread fear; and
(B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo would
not have been prevented by the Convention.
(19) Constitutional Separation of Powers (Helms #30)
Summary:
This condition recognizes the Constitutional responsibility of the
Congress to pay the debts of the United States. It also declares the
Senate's view that the appropriation of funds for financial
contributions to the OPCW are beyond the control of the executive
branch, and that the United States should not be denied its vote in the
OPCW for failing to pay in full its assessed financial contribution.
Text:
(19) Constitutional Separation of Powers.
Article VIII, paragraph 8 of the Convention allows States Parties
to vote in the Organization if that member is in arrears in the payment
of financial contributions provided that the Organization is satisfied
that such non-payment is due to conditions beyond the control of that
member. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in Congress the
exclusive authority to ``pay the Debts'' of the United States.
Financial contributions to the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons may be appropriated only by the Congress and thus the
Senate declares that they are, for the purposes of Article VIII,
paragraph 8, beyond the control of the executive branch of the U.S.
Government. Therefore, the United States vote in the Organization
should not be denied in the event the Congress does not appropriate
fully funds for its assessed financial contribution.
(20) The On-Site Inspection Agency
Summary:
In 1994, the Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that
Congress authorize the DoD On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) to assist
private facilities in the escorting of CWC inspectors. OSIA has done a
fine job over the years in escorting arms control inspectors at U.S.
Government and defense contractor facilities, making sure that treaty
obligations are met with minimal risk to sensitive information.
OSIA's charter restricts it to DoD and contractor sites, so new
legislation will be needed--probably in the CWC implementing
legislation. (Note: The Armed Services Committee will support this so
long as the assistance is provided on a reimbursable basis, but may
object if DoD funds are to be used to help U.S. industry.)
Text:
(20) The On-Site Inspection Agency.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
In advance of any inspection, the On-Site Inspection Agency of the
Department of Defense should be authorized to provide assistance to
United States facilities subject to routine inspections under the
Convention or to any facility which is the object of a challenge
inspection initiated pursuant to Article IX, provided that the consent
of the owner or operator of such facility has first been obtained.
(21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations
Summary:
This declaration builds upon Section 33(b) of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act of 1961, which was originally intended to ensure that
the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would be
prohibited from taking any actions in furtherance of arms control
objectives that affect the armed forces of the United States without
the approval of either a two-thirds vote of the Senate or a majority of
both Houses.
This provision, which has been attached to major arms control
treaties in recent years, sets forth the Senate position that any
international agreement that would obligate the United States to limit
its forces in a militarily significant way will only be considered by
the Senate pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution.
Text:
(21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations.
The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval
international agreements that would obligate the United States to
reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a
militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power as set
forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
(22) Treaty Interpretation
Summary:
This provision, commonly referred to as the ``Biden Condition,''
has been attached to all major treaties since the INF Treaty. It states
the Constitutionally based principle that the shared understanding that
exists between the Executive branch and the Senate at the time the
Senate gives advice and consent to ratification can only be altered
subject to the Senate's advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or
protocol, or the enactment of a statute.
Text:
(22) Treaty Interpretation.
The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the
Constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in
Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF
Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF Treaty,''
refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum
of understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
(23) Chemical Weapons Destruction
Summary:
This condition requires the President to explore alternative
technologies for the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile. It recognizes that the deadline set in the Convention for
the completion of stockpile destruction, 2007, supersedes the 2004 date
established in an earlier law. It also reassures us that the
requirement under the Convention to submit a plan on the method of
destruction does not preclude the later use of alternative
technologies. Finally, should a safer and more environmentally friendly
alternative technology be discovered, but its employment circumscribed
by the 2007 deadline, the President would need to consult with the
Congress to determine whether the United States should exercise its
rights under the Convention and request a brief extension of the
destruction deadline.
Text:
(23) Chemical Weapons Destruction.
Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification of the Convention, the President shall certify to the
Congress that all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) Exploration of Alternative Technologies.--The President has
agreed to explore alternative technologies for the destruction
of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons in order to
ensure that the United States has the safest, most effective
and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its
obligations under the Convention for the destruction of
chemical weapons.
(B) Convention Extends Destruction Deadline.--The requirement in
Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for
completion of the destruction of the United States stockpile of
chemical weapons by December 31, 2004 will be superseded upon
the date the Convention enters into force with respect to the
United States by the deadline required by the Convention of
April 29, 2007.
(C) Authority to Employ a Different Destruction Technology.--The
requirement under Article III(l)(a)(v) of the Convention for a
declaration by each state party to the Convention, not later
than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force
with respect to that party, on general plans of the State Party
for destruction of its chemical weapons does not preclude the
United States from deciding in the future to employ a
technology for the destruction of chemical weapons different
than that declared under that Article.
(D) Procedures for Extension of Deadline.--The President will consult
with Congress on whether to submit a request to the Executive
Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons for an extension of the deadline for the destruction of
chemical weapons under the Convention, as provided under Part
IV(A) of the Annex on Implementation and Verification to the
Convention if, as a result of the program of alternative
technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons carried
out under Section 8065 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104-208),
the President determines that alternatives to the incineration
of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more
environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United
States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention.
__________
The Case Against The Chemical Weapons Convention ``Truth or
Consequences''
Prepared by The Center for Security Policy
introduction
As the Senate resumes formal consideration of the controversial
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)--following the Clinton
Administration's decision last fall to withdraw it in the face of
certain defeat--the Center for Security Policy has undertaken to
provide detailed analyses of many of the issues in dispute.
These papers, most of which have been previously issued as part of
the Center's Truth or Consequences series, have been compiled and
organized to maximize their usefulness to those who will be
participating in the coming debate. They address in particular claims
being made by the proponents that appear ill-informed, at best, and
highly misleading, at worst.
The Center for Security Policy, whose mission is to stimulate and
inform debate on vital defense and foreign policy matters, is gratified
by the level of attention now being focused on the problematic Chemical
Weapons Convention. Such attention--if informed and sustained--is
essential to the proper functioning of the deliberative process of a
democracy like ours.
Rarely is that deliberative process more important than with
respect to decisionmaking on a treaty such as the CWC, with its ominous
implications for U.S. national security, proprietary business
information and constitutional rights. For these reasons, efforts now
being made to circumscribe, foreshorten or otherwise attenuate the CWC
debate are to be strenuously resisted.
The Center hopes that the following pages will prove helpful to
those interested in determining the fate of the Chemical Weapons
Convention on its merits. For additional background on the treaty and
future analyses by the Center, please consult our site on the World
Wide Web--www.security-policy.org.
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.,
Director, 8 April 1997
__________
``Truth or Consequences:'' Center Analyses on the CWC Debate
Table of Contents
Issues Relating to the Senate's Role In Treaty-Making
Truth or Consequences #10: Clinton's White House Snow Job Cannot
Conceal The Chemical Weapon's Convention's Defects (No. 97-D 49, 4
April 1997)
Republicans' Senate Leadership Offers Constructive Alternative To
Fatally Flawed Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 43, 21 March 1997)
A Place To Start On Campaign Finance Reform: CMA Should Refrain
From Putting Senators In Compromising Positions On The Chemical Weapons
Convention (No. 97-D 34, 26 February 1997)
Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need To Sacrifice
Sensible Scrutiny Of CWC To Meet An Artificial Deadline (No. 97-D 18,
31 January 1997)
Clinton's Chemical Power Play: Bad For The Senate, Bad For The
National Interest (No. 97-D 7, 13 January 1997)
Here We Go Again: Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of
Flawed, Unverifiable, Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5,
8 January 1997)
The CWC's Impact on the U.S. Military and National Security:
Just Which Chemical Weapons Convention Is Colin Powell Supporting--
And Does He Know The Difference? (No. 97-D 48, 3 April 1997)
Truth or Consequences #7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld And Weinberger
Rebut Scowcroft And Deutch On The CWC (No. 97-D 37, 5 March 1997)
Gen. Schwartzkopf Tells Senate He Shares Critics' Concerns About
Details Of The Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 35, 27 February
1997)
Truth or Consequences #3: Clinton `Makes A Mistake About It' In
Arguing The CWC Will Protect U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997)
The CWC's Impact on U.S. Intelligence:
Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
Continuing Opposition To Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February
1997)
The CWC's Impact on U.S. Business:
Truth or Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good For Business--To
Say Nothing Of The National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February 1997)
The CWC's Impact on the U.S. Constitution:
Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges Administration Efforts
To Distort, Suppress Debate On CWC--Dangers To Americans'
Constitutional Rights (No. 97-D 14, 28 January 1997)
The CWC's Impact on International Terrorism:
Truth or Consequences #6: The CWC Will Not Prevent Chemical
Terrorism Against The U.S. Or Its Interests (No. 97-D 30, 22 February
1997)
The CWC's Impact on Chemical Weapons Proliferation:
Truth or Consequences #8: The CWC Will Exacerbate The Proliferation
Of Chemical Warfare Capabilities (No. 97-D 38, 6 March 1997)
Miscellaneous Issues Pertaining to the CWC:
New National Poll Shows Overwhelming Public Opposition to a Flawed
Chemical Weapons Convention (No. 97-P 50, 10 April 1997)
Truth or Consequences #9: CWC Proponents Dissemble About Treaty
Arrangements Likely To Disserve U.S. Interests (No. 97-D 46, 27 March
1997)
The Weekly Standard Weighs In On the CWC: `Just Say No To A Bad
Treaty' (No. 97-P 40, 17 March 1997)
Truth or Consequences #4: No DNA Tests Needed To Show That Claims
About Republican Paternity Of CWC Are Overblown (No. 97-D 24, 16
February 1997)
__________
No. 97-D 49
4 April 1997
Truth or Consequences #10: Clinton's White House Snow Job Cannot
Conceal the Chemical Weapons Convention's Defects
(Washington, D.C.): The latest installment in the Clinton
Administration's campaign to browbeat the U.S. Senate into ratifying a
fatally flawed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) failed to live up to
its advance billing--in more ways than one. Despite repeated press
reports to the effect that former President George Bush and General
Colin Powell were to play active roles in an ``event'' on the South
Lawn of the White House, the former was nowhere to be seen and the
latter had a letter he signed acknowledged by the President, but was
otherwise scarcely in evidence. (The Center for Security Policy would
like to think that the force of its argument in a paper released last
night \1\ encouraged these two influential figures to reconsider the
active role as flacks that the Clintonistas have in mind for them.)
Please
Even more disappointing was the case the President made for this
treaty. On issue after issue, he persisted in grossly overselling the
benefits of this Convention, misrepresenting its terms and/or
understating its costs. Consider the following:
Item: The CWC Will Not `Banish Poison Gas'
The President declared that by ratifying the CWC, the United States
has ``an opportunity now to forge a widening international commitment
to banish poison gas from the earth in the 21st Century.'' This is the
sort of wish-masquerading-as-fact that has been much in evidence in
Presidential statements to the effect that ``there are no Russian
missiles pointed at our children.''
The truth--as even more-honest CWC advocates acknowledge--is that
not a single country of concern, or for that matter any sub-national
terrorist group, that wishes to maintain a covert chemical weapons
program will be prevented from doing so by this treaty. Neither are
they likely to be caught at it if they do. And even if they are, there
is a negligible chance the ``international community'' will be willing
to punish them for doing so. This is hardly the stuff of which
effective banishment is made.
Item: `Poisons for Peace'
The President claimed that: ``The Convention requires other nations
to follow our lead, to eliminate their arsenals of poison gas and to
give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the
future.'' There is clearly no such requirement on the rogue states that
decline to participate in this treaty (e.g., Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan
and North Korea).
What is more, the Convention's Articles X and XI may well
accelerate the proliferation of chemical weapon technology. This is
because these provisions obligate parties to ``facilitate the fullest
possible'' transfers of technology directly relevant to the manufacture
of chemical weapons and those used to defend against chemical attack--a
highly desirable capability for people interested in waging chemical
wars. \2\
Item: The CWC Will Not `Help Shield Our Soldiers'
President Clinton repeated a grievous misrepresentation featured in
his State of the Union address: On the South Lawn he declared, that
``by ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention ... we can help shield
our soldiers from one of the battlefield's deadliest killers.'' As
noted above, the CWC may actually make our soldiers more vulnerable to
one of the battlefield's deadliest killers--not least as a result of
the insights shared defensive technology will afford potential
adversaries about how to reverse-engineer Western protective equipment,
the better to exploit its vulnerabilities.
Item: The CWC Will Not Protect Our Children
President Clinton shamelessly claimed that ``We can give our
children something our parents and grandparents never had--broad
protection against the threat of chemical attack.'' Just how
irresponsible this statement is can be seen from a cover article
published last month by Washington City Paper. The report disclosed
that the people of the Washington, D.C. area and, indeed, the rest of
the Nation are sitting ducks for chemical attacks. \3\ This problem,
which arises from a systematic failure to apply resources to civil
defense that are even remotely commensurate with the danger, will only
grow as people like the President compound the CWC's placebo effect of
this treaty by exaggerating its benefits.
Item: The CWC Will Not Help in the Fight Against Terrorism
While the President proclaimed that ratifying the CWC will
``bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism,'' the reality
is that this treaty may actually facilitate terrorism. This could come
about as a result not only of the dispersion of chemical warfare
relevant technology and the placebo effect but also by dint of the
sensitive information the Convention expects the United States to share
with foreign nationals. At least some of these folks will be working
for potentially hostile intelligence services--including those of
states, like Iran, known to sponsor terrorism. Compromising what U.S.
intelligence knows about international terrorists and their sponsors
will only intensify the danger posed by such actors. \4\
Item: Flogging a Phony Deadline
The President further claimed that ``America needs to ratify the
Chemical Weapons Convention and we must do it before it takes effect on
April 29th.'' While the treaty will enter into force on that date, with
or without the U.S. as a party, the dire consequences that are
endlessly predicted if America is not in are being wildly exaggerated.
Anytime the United States joins, the 25 percent of the tab that it is
supposed to pick up will give Washington considerable influence in the
new U.N. bureaucracy set up to implement the CWC.
The Clinton Administration's real--but largely unacknowledged
concern--is that this arms control house-of-cards may collapse if the
United States does not ratify the treaty. After all, in its absence,
not one party to the Convention is likely to be an acknowledged
chemical weapons state. The unfunded costs, combined with the inability
to inspect American companies while possibly exposing their own to
undesired inspections, will almost certainly prompt most states parties
to think better of the whole idea. \5\
Item: The CWC Will Harm American Business Interests
President Clinton further claimed that, ``If we are outside this
agreement rather than inside, it is our chemical companies, our leading
exporters, which will face mandatory trade restrictions that could cost
them hundreds of millions of dollars in sales.'' The truth is that no
one has yet been able to document the $600 million cost the Chemical
Manufacturers Association incessantly claims will arise from trade
restrictions on U.S. industry if America is not a treaty party.
What is more, the actual cost (probably closer to $30 million)
arising from such restrictions will be insignificant compared to the
additional costs treaty participation will impose on taxpayers and
private companies (conservatively estimated to be in the billions of
dollars). \6\
Jane's Underscores the Irresponsible Nature of the Clinton
Snow-Job
Today's CWC photo opportunity at the White House seems all the more
ignominious against the backdrop of a news item carried in this
morning's Washington Post. It seems that the forward to Jane's Air
Defense 1997-98, a highly respected London-based defense publication,
confirms that Russia has developed a new variant of the lethal anthrax
toxin that is totally resistant to antibiotics''--in flagrant violation
of an earlier ``international norm'' governing biological weapons
activities.
More to the present point, Jane's notes that the Russians have also
developed three nerve agents ``that could be made without using any of
the precursor chemicals, which are banned under the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention.'' It added that ``two of the new nerve agents are
eight times as deadly as the VX nerve agent that Iraq has acknowledged
stockpiling, while the other is as deadly as VX.'' (Emphasis added.)
Unfortunately, this information is but the latest indication of bad
faith on the part of the Russian government of Boris Yeltsin. One would
have thought, for example, that the Kremlin's complete reneging on the
Wyoming Memorandum and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement would have
shamed their co-author, former Secretary of State James Baker, into
staying away from the White House fandango for a CWC that was supposed
to have been critically underpinned by these earlier agreements. \7\
The Bottom Line
The Center for Security Policy believes that it is becoming
increasingly clear why the Clinton Administration and its allies on the
Chemical Weapons Convention are relying on razzle-dazzle powerplays
like today's--and eschewing opportunities for a real debate: The CWC is
unlikely to be approved if its fate is determined on the merits.
By contrast, critics of the CWC are committed to fostering a real,
thorough and informed debate. Toward that end, it looks forward to the
start of hearings next week in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
led off by three of this century's most distinguished American public
servants: Former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger, \8\ Donald
Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger. Let the debate begin!
notes:
\1\ See Just Which Chemical Weapons Convention Is Colin Powell
Supporting--And Does He Know The Difference? (No. 97-D 48, 3 April
1997).
\2\ For more on the absurd `Poisons for Peace' aspect of the CWC,
see Truth or Consequences #8: The CWC Will Exacerbate The Proliferation
Of Chemical Warfare Capabilities (No. 97-D 38, 6 March 1997).
\3\ See ``Margin of Terror: In the two years since the Tokyo subway
incident, local and Federal officials have had a chance to prepare
Washington for a devastating chemical or biological attack. So why
haven't they?'' by John Cloud in the 14 March 1997 issue of the
Washington City Paper.
\4\ For more on the threat of chemical weapons, see Truth or
Consequences #6: The CWC Will Not Prevent Chemical Terrorism Against
the U.S. or its Interests (No. 97-D 30, 22 February 1997).
\5\ For more on this fraudulent timeline, see the Center's Decision
Brief entitled Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need To
Sacrifice Sensible Study of CWC to Meet an Artificial Deadline (No. 97-
D 18, 31 January 1997). For more on the non-declaration problem, see
Truth or Consequences #9: CWC Proponents Dissemble About Treaty
Arrangements Likely To Disserve U.S. Interests (No. 97-D 46, 27 March
1997).
\6\ For more on the costs--both direct and indirect to American
firms--see the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#5. The CWC Will Not Be Good for Business--To Say Nothing of The
National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February 1997).
\7\ For more on Russia's chemical weapons programs, its behavior on
the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and their implications, for the
Chemical Weapons Convention, see the Center's Decision Brief entitled
Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
Continuing Opposition to Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February
1997).
\8\ While all three of these gentlemen have held other,
distinguished positions, it is noteworthy in the present context that
Secretary Schlesinger also served as a Director of Central Intelligence
in the Nixon Administration and as a Secretary of Energy for President
Jimmy Carter, a Democrat.
__________
No. 97-D 43
21 March 1997
Republicans' Senate Leadership Offers Constructive Alternative To
Fatally Flawed Chemical Weapons Convention
(Washington, D.C.): The Senate Republican leadership (i.e.,
Majority Leader Trent Lott, Majority Whip Don Nickles, Republican
Conference Committee Chairman Connie Mack and Conference Secretary Paul
Coverdell) has joined the chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and
Intelligence Committees (Sens. Jesse Helms and Richard Shelby,
respectively) as sponsors of critically important legislation
introduced yesterday by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ). This bill, known as the
``Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997'' (S.
495) makes it clear that the debate over the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) is not, as some treaty proponents contend, a dispute
between those who are opposed to chemical weapons and those who favor
poison gas.
S. 495 establishes, instead, that the Senate has a real choice--
between a Republican leadership approach toward dealing with the threat
of chemical weapons that is operationally oriented, practical,
enforceable and relatively inexpensive and the CWC approach that is
declaratory, ineffective, unenforceable and costly. This should not be
a hard choice for any thoughtful legislator.
Highlights of the CBW Threat Reduction Act include the following:
Creating civil and criminal penalties for the acquisition,
possession, transfer or use of chemical and biological weapons.
Lays out a range of sanctions to be imposed upon any country
that uses CBW against another country or against its own
nationals. These include suspending: U.S. foreign assistance,
arms sales and the associated financing, multilateral trade
credits, aviation rights and/or diplomatic relations.
Calls for adding enforcement mechanisms to the existing,
multilateral Conventions concerning chemical and biological
weapons.
Establishes as U.S. policy the goal of preserving existing
national and multilateral restrictions on chemical and
biological trade. These arrangements are at direct risk from
the CWC's Article XI.
Affirms existing U.S. policy governing the right to use Riot
Control Agents (RCAs) in both peacetime and wartime. This would
countermand President Clinton's plan to deny American
servicemen and women the ability to use tear gas and other RCAs
during wartime search-and-rescue operations and when combatants
and non-combatants are intermingled.
S. 495 makes clear the United States' intention to dismantle its
existing stockpile of chemical weapons and to participate in sensible,
effective non-proliferation efforts. It is a valuable contribution to
the debate on curbing the threat posed by chemical weapons--a debate
that is expected to become much more intense as the Clinton
Administration tries to coerce the Senate into rubber-stamping the
Chemical Weapons Convention by the middle of April.
__________
No. 97-D 34
26 February 1997
A Place To Start on Campaign Finance Reform: C.M.A. Should Refrain From
Putting Senators in Compromising Positions On the Chemical Weapons
Convention
(Washington, D.C.): Last night, the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA), an organization representing some 190 large American
and multinational chemical producers, held a Washington fund-raiser for
the Senate Majority Leader, Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS). This event
presumably will help the distinguished Republican leader prepare his
war chest for future electoral campaigns. It seems inconceivable,
however, that this event could have the effect CMA probably hoped for--
namely, inducing Senator Lott to disregard the serious concerns he has
expressed about the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to secure the
treaty's prompt ratification.
After all, such an initiative occurs at the very moment that Bill
Clinton's presidency is undergoing a Chinese water-torture (pun
intended) of daily revelations about fund-raisers buying access,
influence and policy changes. This event, and other Capitol Hill
occasions like it sponsored by interested parties such as CMA, can only
complicate the position of Senators obliged to act on the controversial
CWC.
The CMA is, nonetheless, reportedly investing millions of dollars
in its campaign for CWC ratification--a campaign being carefully
coordinated with the Clinton Ad-
ministration and others. As the Center has documented in recent weeks
in its Truth or Consequences series of Decision Briefs, \1\ this effort
appears intended to obscure the key problems with this convention that
have been identified by an array of knowledgeable experts--problems
called to the attention of the Senate a few months ago by no less a
figure than Senator Lott.
Senator Lott, On the Record
In fact, on 9 September 1996--shortly before the administration
realized that it did not have the votes to approve the Chemical Weapons
Convention and asked that it be withdrawn from consideration--Senator
Lott made an important floor speech concerning the CWC's myriad flaws.
Highlights of his remarks included the following:
``...As we near consideration of [the CWC], I wanted to share
with my colleagues some of the correspondence that I have
recently received. Late on Friday of last week, I received a
letter of opposition to the Convention signed by more than 50
defense and foreign policy experts, including two former
Secretaries of Defense, former members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and many others.
``The letter made four fundamental points: The Chemical
Weapons Convention is not global, it is not effective, and is
not verifiable, but it will have significant costs to American
security. Their letter concludes by stating that, `The national
security benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do
not outweigh its considerable costs. Consequently, we
respectfully urge you to reject ratification of the CWC unless
and until it is made genuinely global, effective, and
verifiable.'
``This is not my judgment. It is the judgment, however, of
Caspar Weinberger, William Clark, Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ed
Meese, Dick Cheney, and many others who served with distinction
under Presidents Reagan and Bush. I think their views deserve
serious consideration from every Member.
``As you will note, two of those names that I read are former
Secretaries of Defense and certainly highly respected. Our
colleague from the House of Representatives, Dick Cheney, is
one that I really had not known exactly what his position was,
so it was of great interest to me to see what his thoughts
might be.
``I have two other letters that I encourage Members to
review. First, the National Federation of Independent Business
wrote to me today expressing serious concern about the impact
of the CWC on the more than 600,000 members of the NFIB. The
letter notes that under the CWC, for the first time small
businesses would be subject to a foreign entity inspecting
their businesses. The concerns that are expressed concerning
increased regulatory burden of the Chemical Weapons Convention
on American small business I think should be weighed very
carefully before coming to a decision about his or her attitude
and what the position would be of that Senator on the
convention. I know my colleagues do not want to vote first and
ask questions later when it comes to small business, which
already bears a disproportionate share of the regulatory burden
from the Federal Government.
``I also received a letter today from retired Gen. James A.
Williams, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency with
almost four decades of experience in intelligence. General
Williams raises very serious concerns over the potential of CWC
being used to gain proprietary information from American
business. He concludes that `there is potential for the loss of
untold billions of dollars of trade secrets which can be used
to gain competitive advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, and to
steal U.S. market share.' Many businesses have contacted my
office and the offices of other Senators expressing these and
similar concerns about Senate action on this convention. ...
``I wanted to call to the Senate's attention this
correspondence that I have outlined because it is very
important that a range of views be made available to all
Senators. The administration has been making its case for quite
some time, but opponents of the convention have just begun the
serious examination the convention really deserves. ...
``My own personal greatest concern is the question of
verification. What do we do about Iraq? If we pass a convention
like this, that would be applicable to us, sort of the law-
abiding citizens of the world, how do we make sure what is
happening in Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, the renegade
countries of the world? Is this going to be a situation where
we go forward with this convention, this Chemical Weapons
Convention, yet those who are the real threat do not
participate, or deny that they are involved, or we are not in a
position where we can verify what they are actually doing?''
The Bottom Line
As the foregoing remarks indicate, Senator Lott has approached the
controversial Chemical Weapons Convention in a fair, reasonable and
statesmanlike fashion. He has been responsive to the Clinton
Administration's insistence that the treaty be scheduled for a vote
last fall, its request on 12 September 1996 that the order for a vote
be vitiated (in the face of certain defeat) and its demands this year
for negotiations aimed at reviving the CWC's prospects and/or fixing
the accord's shortcomings. At the same time, he has striven to ensure
that the concerns of his colleagues and others opposed to this treaty
are not given short shrift.
It would be a grave disservice to the Majority Leader, to the
institution he manages so ably and to the Nation if the appearance that
strings were attached to the Chemical Manufacturers Association's
largess were to sully Senator Lott's future stewardship of the top CMA
legislative agenda item--the CWC. The Center for Security Policy calls
on CMA to refrain from using its deep-pocketed Political Action
Committee in ways that could compromise the integrity of the debate on
the Chemical Weapons Convention and put key participants in that debate
in compromising positions.
notes:
\1\ These papers--dealing with issues like the Convention's impact
on the U.S. military, on American businesses, on citizens'
Constitutional rights, etc.--can be accessed via the Center's site on
the World Wide Web (www.security-policy.org) or by contacting the
Center.
__________
No. 97-D 18
31 January 1997
Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need To Sacrifice Sensible
Scrutiny of CWC To Meet an Artificial Deadline
(Washington, D.C.): A centerpiece of the Clinton Administration's
campaign to obtain expedited Senate action on the controversial
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the argument that something
terrible will happen if the treaty is not ratified by April 29th.
Precisely what the terrible something is--and what its implications for
U.S. interests will be--has proved to be a little hard to pin down. The
reason for this is because there will be no significant harm if the
Senate declines to rubber-stamp this ill-conceived Convention in
response to what amounts to a wholly artificial deadline.
The CWC Is Incomplete
Clinton Administration officials claim that if the United States
doesn't ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention before 29 April, it will
be unable to participate in deliberations at the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which will ``flesh out'' some
critical issues. The Administration thus admits that the treaty
awaiting the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate is not a finished
document.
In the Bush Administration's haste to have a Convention ready for
signature prior to its departure from office, a number of details--for
example, particulars concerning the conduct of on-site inspections--
were left unresolved. They were to be finalized by a preparatory
commission prior to entry-into-force. Such details can have important
consequences.
CWC advocates point to this reality as a compelling reason for
getting the United States to ratify the treaty before April 29th (the
date on which the Convention is supposed to enter into force). But they
cannot have it both ways: If the details yet to be worked out may
materially affect the acceptability of the treaty, the Senate is being
asked to sign on to a work-in-progress--or perhaps a pig-in-a-poke
since the negotiations may or may not come out acceptably. On the other
hand, if the treaty is ripe for Senate approval, the details that
remain to be sorted out should not be so important. In that case, the
argument that the United States must participate in their negotiation
as a state party is not compelling.
The United States is Already Involved in the Ongoing Negotiations
The truth is that the United States is already participating in the
preparatory commission's negotiations on the CWC's outstanding details,
even before the Senate gives its advice and consent. As a result, the
administration is being represented, notwithstanding the fact that the
U.S. has yet to become a state party.
Russia Is Not a State Party, Either
Another nation has to have a keen interest in the outcome of these
negotiations: Russia. In fact, the Kremlin has already served notice
that if the OPCW proceeds to finalize the CWC's implementation and
other outstanding particulars in ways unsatisfactory to Russia's
interests, Moscow will never agree to ratify.
European and other states parties appear to have taken this Russian
threat seriously and seem increasingly disinclined to complete work on
the treaty's details pending Russia's ratification. \1\ If so, the
United States should feel no undue pressure to complete its own
ratification debate. In any event, it is far from clear why the U.S.
should feel compelled to ratify the treaty before Russia does. After
all, Russia has the world's largest arsenal of chemical weapons,
continues to produce new and more dangerous chemical arms and is widely
expected to continue to do so even if Russia becomes a state party.
The United States Will Have Considerable Influence Irrespective of When
It Joins the CWC
By virtue of the immense size, technological advantages and
valuable products of the U.S. commercial chemical industry, the United
States will inevitably be the ``600-pound gorilla'' in the OPCW if and
when it decides to become a state party. The contention that the
preferences of the United States will be ignored in the implementation
of the CWC is, consequently, implausible.
This is particularly true since Washington will be expected to pay
25 percent of the OPCW's operating costs--a substantially larger
portion of the organization's budget than will be borne by any other
nation. Even if, as the Clinton Administration claims, this tithe will
amount to no more than $25 million annually, \2\ such a sum represents
an obvious source of leverage should the United States need to exercise
it to protect its interests in OPCW deliberations.
The United States Will Have Standing Irrespective of When It Ratifies
the CWC
CWC proponents suggest that, if the United States does not ratify
the treaty by 29 April, it will not be an original state party--
condemning it to second-class status with adverse implications for its
ability to have its personnel participate in on-site inspections. In
fact, by virtue of its being among the first nations to sign this
Convention, the United States will in accordance with standard
diplomatic practice be considered to be an original state party
whenever it chooses to join the treaty regime.
While it is true that, until that time, the United States will not
be able to have its personnel conduct on-site inspections, this may
well prove to be the case even if the U.S. does ratify the CWC! In
fact, countries being subjected to challenge inspections have the right
to deny individual inspectors entry. Those nations unfriendly to the
United States and, presumably, of greatest concern from a compliance
point of view, are likely to exercise this right to preclude U.S.
monitors. After all, if there is any prospect that an on-site inspector
will be able to detect an illegal, covert chemical weapons program,
chances are that it will be an American that does it.
(Unfortunately, those chances are likely to be reduced dramatically
should the Clinton Administration succeed in an initiative now being
discussed in the interagency process, one that would start sharing with
the OPCW sensitive U.S. methods for detecting clandestine programs.
Similar training given to the International Atomic Energy Agency gave
representatives of Saddam Hussein's government and other rogue states
invaluable lessons in how to defeat international monitoring and on-
site inspection regimes.)
For its part, however, the United States will find it difficult--if
not impossible as a practical matter--to object to all of the foreign
inspectors whose participation in challenge inspections in this country
will be of concern. Needless to say, this will not be because of any
danger that a covert American CW program will be detected since the
U.S. will have no such program. Rather, it will be because such
individuals will assuredly try to expropriate confidential business
information (CBI) or other sensitive data from the targeted U.S.
facilities.
The Bottom Line
In short, the April 29th deadline is an artificial one, promoted
principally so as to try to force the U.S. Senate to complete action on
the Chemical Weapons Convention without further, substantive
consideration of this accord's myriad shortcomings. So artificial is
this deadline that the Clinton Administration bears considerable
responsibility for creating it. After all, the administration last
October vigorously encouraged Hungary to become the 65th nation to
deposit its instruments of ratification, thereby starting the clock on
the 6-month run-up to entry-into-force. Its trans-
parent purpose in doing so was to intensify pressure on the Senate to
provide its uninformed advice and consent.
If anything, the Administration's efforts to try to foreshorten or
confuse the debate about the Chemical Weapons Convention suggest that
the Senate would be well advised to defer U.S. ratification until after
the treaty enters into force. Doing so would afford an opportunity to
validate--or disprove--the various concerns being expressed by this
treaty's knowledgeable critics. It may, in fact, be the only way such
concerns can be fully and authoritatively addressed without grave risk
to American security, commercial and taxpayer interests.
Last but not least, it must be said that a treaty not worth
ratifying is assuredly not worth ratifying quickly. For reasons
described at length elsewhere, \3\ it would be unsafe to ratify the CWC
at any speed.
notes:
\1\ There are as-yet-unsubstantiated rumors circulating in The
Hague (where the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
or OPCW is located) that the date of entry into force may be postponed,
rather than have the CWC come into effect without the participation of
nations such as Russia and possibly China (which has yet to deposit the
instruments of ratification).
\2\ The truth is, however, that the OPCW is constantly revising its
budget estimates in an upwards direction. A more realistic estimate--
derived from actual experience with another U.N. bureaucracy--the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--suggests that the budget is
more likely to be on the order of $266 million, which would translate
into a U.S. share of at least $66 million per year.
\3\ See, for example, Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges
Administration Efforts to Distort, Suppress Debate on CWC (No. 97-D 14,
28 January 1997). Other products detailing the CWC's fatal flaws can be
obtained via the Center's site on the World Wide Web (www.security-
policy.org).
__________
No. 97-D 7
13 January 1997
Clinton's Chemical Power Play: Bad For The Senate, Bad For The National
Interest
(Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration is mounting a
campaign against the leadership of the U.S. Senate that has all the
subtlety of a Mafia hit. The immediate object of its intimidation is
Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), whose knees are at risk of being broken
(presumably, figuratively) unless he bends to the President's will. To
do so, however, the Majority Leader will, in turn, have to ``take out''
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse
Helms (R-NC)--and with him, the Senate's rules concerning the
consideration of treaties and that institution's way of doing business
more generally.
The Administration is resorting to such tactics for a very simple
reason: Senator Helms is in a position indefinitely to bottle up a
highly controversial treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Incredible though it may seem Secretary of State-designate Madeleine
Albright declared last week that ratification of this Convention was
the Clinton team's top, near-term foreign policy priority.
Unfortunately for them--and happily for the national interest--Senate
procedures permit Chairman Helms permanently to pocket veto this treaty
by declining to bring it up for a vote in his Committee.
Jesse Helms--Horatius at the Bridge
This is fortuitous for the national interest because, to his
lasting credit, Senator Helms correctly concluded in the course of
intensive Senate consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention last
fall that this treaty was fatally flawed. Since a sufficient number of
Senators agreed with him in September 1996 to defeat the CWC, the
Administration decided to withdraw it--hoping it would meet a different
fate if presented later. Apparently, such is the Clinton team's
contempt for members of the Senate--which is exceeded only by its
disdain for their constitutional role in treaty-making \1\--that it
thinks legislators either have forgotten what is wrong with this
Convention or can be euchred into agreeing to it, if only enough
coercive pressure is brought to bear.
Thanks to Chairman Helms and thoughtful colleagues like Senator Jon
Kyl (R-AZ), though, the Senate will be reminded of the overarching
reason for opposing the Chemical Weapons Convention: It is likely to
contribute to the proliferation of chemical weapons, not eliminate it.
Not Global: After all, the Convention will not impose a global ban
on chemical weapons, let alone rid them from the world, as its
proponents often claim. In fact, it will not apply to every country
that has chemical weapons. A number of the most dangerous rogue
states--including North Korea, Syria and Iraq--have announced that they
will not become parties to the CWC. Such nations tend cynically to see
such ``international norms'' not as an impediment to pursuing
prohibited activities but as an invitation to do so.
Not Verifiable: What is more, thanks to the inherent
unverifiability of the Chemical Weapons Convention, even some of those
who do join the regime will retain covert chemical stockpiles. The
unalterable fact of life is that chemical weapons can be easily
produced. By using facilities that are designed, for example, to
manufacture fertilizers, pesticides or pharmaceuticals, they can be
produced in considerable (even ``militarily significant'') quantities
in relatively short periods of time. This is an objective reality that
means the CWC is not simply ``less than perfect''; it is an exercise in
futility.
Indeed, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated that on-site inspections
far more intrusive and timely than those provided for by the CWC cannot
confidently monitor the covert weapons programs of totalitarian regimes
governing closed societies. Consequently, few competent experts believe
that industrialized states like Russia and China will actually get rid
of their existing arsenals, let alone forego future production--
notwithstanding their status as signatories to the CWC.
`Poisons for Peace': Third, the CWC obliges the United States to
help other states parties--including countries like Iran and Cuba--to
gain state-of-the-art manufacturing capabilities that can readily be
used to produce chemical weapons. Unilateral trade embargoes and
multilateral technology control arrangements against such parties to
the CWC would be prohibited. This obligation is a recipe for rampant
chemical weapons proliferation. The prospect that it provides for
expanded overseas sales by U.S. chemical manufacturers, however, is a
principal reason why their powerful lobby is helping the Clinton
Administration make offers to Senators ``they can't refuse.''
Other Fatal Flaws: Opponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention
recognize that it will have other undesirable repercussions, as well.
For one, it will likely create a false sense of security that the
burgeoning problem of chemical weapons proliferation has been
meaningfully addressed. This placebo effect will almost exacerbate the
dangers of chemical attacks by reducing our preparedness to deal with
them. For another, the CWC--as interpreted by the Clinton
Administration--will have the absurd effect of denying our military the
right to use chemical-based Riot Control Agents like tear gas to
protect themselves in situations where the use of lethal force can, and
should, be avoided. Finally, the CWC will grant a U.N. agency the right
to inspect anyplace in America--private or public, factories,
facilities, even homes--on short notice, without a warrant, and without
compensation for the associated costs, including for any proprietary
information that might thus be lost.
The Bottom Line
Today, on the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, President Clinton issued a statement that declared
disingenuously: ``Early CWC ratification by the United States is
extraordinarily important. The security of our soldiers and citizens is
at stake, as is the economic well-being of our chemical industry.'' He
concluded by saying: ``I look forward to working with the Senate
leadership to get the job [of ratifying the Convention] done.''
Notice is thus served. Using such presidential statements and phone
calls, a drumbeat of sympathetic editorials and op.eds. And other
pressure tactics, the Administration hopes to squeeze Senator Lott to
break the CWC loose. It has even asked him to remove the Chemical
Weapons Convention from the jurisdiction of Senator Helms' committee.
Were Sen. Lott to agree, he would be creating a precedent that would
wreak havoc on Senate operations. Fortunately, while the Majority
Leader is committed to cooperate with the President where possible, he
is unlikely to accommodate an Administration power play where
cooperation is neither in the interest of the Senate as an institution
nor the Nation as a whole.
notes:
\1\ See the Center's Press Release entitled Will the Senate Let
Clinton Rewrite the C.F.E. Treaty Without Its Advice and Consent? (No.
96-P 86, 18 September 1996).
__________
No. 97-T 5
8 January 1997
Here We Go Again: Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval Of Flawed,
Unverifiable, Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty
(Washington, D.C.): In recent days, the Clinton Administration has
launched a new campaign to secure Senate advice and consent to
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Such a campaign
was made necessary by its decision last September to withdraw the
treaty from scheduled Senate consideration, rather than risk its
certain defeat.
Now, sympathetic columnists like the Washington Post's Mary McGrory
have been enlisted to hammer Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS)
to bring the CWC back to the Senate floor. Retired flag officers like
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt are being trotted out to declare that the military
strongly supports this Convention. And just yesterday, the President
used the occasion of the receipt of the interim report of his
commission on Gulf War syndrome--which may be related to widespread
exposure of U.S. servicemen and women to Iraqi chemical weapons--to
imply that ratification of the CWC would ``protect the soldiers of the
United States and our allies in the future'' by ``mak[ing] it harder
for rogue states to acquire chemical weapons in the future.''
Senator Lott has responded to such pressure by announcing yesterday
that he would ask the ``appropriate committee members and chairmen'' to
reopen hearings on the treaty early in this session with a view to
seeing what can be done to address the scourge of chemical weapons and
the threat they pose to world peace. That decision puts the ball
squarely back, first and foremost, in the court of Foreign Relations
Committee chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC), whose opposition to the CWC was
critical to the treaty's withdrawal from consideration last fall.
Let the Debate Begin, Again
The Center for Security Policy welcomes the prospect of new
hearings into the Chemical Weapons Convention, presumably before not
only Sen. Helms' panel but also before the Armed Services, Intelligence
(under new management) and perhaps other committees. With the
installation yesterday of new Members comprising nearly one-fifth of
the Senate, there is clearly a need to review the gravity of the
problem posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons and the
regrettable fact that this convention will not only prove no real
impediment to such proliferation--it will probably serve actually to
exacerbate the problem.
The Center looks forward to continuing during such a review the
educational role it performed last year. As part of that function, it
is attaching for the information of all Senators--and in response to
Adm. Zumwalt's op.ed. In Monday's Washington Post--a letter sent to
Senator Lott on 6 September 1996 by 68 distinguished former senior
civilian and military officials, including notably former Bush
Administration Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. They conclude
authoritatively that the CWC should be rejected in its present form
since it will not be global in its scope, verifiable or effective. The
Center is confident that sufficient Senators will reach a similar
conclusion should the Foreign Relations Committee decide to report the
treaty out for action by the full Senate.
September 9, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, United States Senate,
Washington, DC 20510.
Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to
take final action on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on or before
September 14th. This Treaty has been presented as a global, effective
and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As individuals with
considerable experience in national security matters, we would all
support such a ban. We have, however, concluded that the present
convention is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among
others.
The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for example,
Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed to join the treaty
regime. Russia is among those who have signed the Convention, but is
unlikely to ratify--especially without a commitment of billions in U.S.
aid to pay for the destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then,
given our experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its
repeated refusal to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement
on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be expected.
The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control
possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal weapons
purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two chemical agents that
were employed with deadly effect in World War I--phosgene and hydrogen
cyanide. The reason speaks volumes about this treaty's impractical
nature: they are too widely used for commercial purposes to be banned.
The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence community has
repeatedly acknowledged in congressional testimony. Authoritarian
regimes can be confident that their violations will be undetectable.
Now, some argue that the treaty's intrusive inspections regime will
help us know more than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however,
is whether any additional information thus gleaned will translate into
convincing evidence of cheating and result in the collective imposition
of sanctions or other enforcement measures. In practice, this test is
unlikely to be satisfied since governments tend to took the other way
at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will create a
massive new, U.N.-style international inspection bureaucracy (which
will help the total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as
much as $200 million per year). It will jeopardize U.S. citizens'
constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. government to permit
searches without either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a
costly and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000
companies across the country may be subjected to new reporting
requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs of between thousands
to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year to comply. Most of these
American companies have no idea that they will be affected. And perhaps
worst of all, the CWC will undermine the standard of verifiability that
has been a key national security principle for the United States.
Under these circumstances, the national security benefits of the
Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its considerable
costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject ratification of
the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global, effective and
verifiable.
Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical
Weapons Convention
As of September 9, 1996; 11:30 a.m.
Former Cabinet Members:
Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense
William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the President
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State (signed on September
10)
John S. Herrington, former Secretary of Energy (signed on September 9)
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General
Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense (signed on September 10)
Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense
Additional Signatories (retired military):
General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding General,
Training and Doctrine Command
Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Aviation
General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Commandant of
U.S. Marine Corps (signed on September 9)
Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director
for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (signed on September 9)
Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic
Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Naval
Nuclear Propulsion
General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force
Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation
General John. L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force
General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Commander,
Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems Command
Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander 3rd
Fleet (signed on September 10)
Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Additional Signatories (non-military):
Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
Affairs (signed on September 9)
Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space Council
Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters
Angelo Codevilla, former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute (signed on
September 10)
Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization
J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Midge Decter, former President, Committee for the Free World
Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of Intelligence Programs,
National Security Council
Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory Council
Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Services
David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President
E.C. Grayson, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Stefan Halper, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (signed on
September 10)
Thomas N. Harvey, former National Space Council Staff Officer (signed
on September 9)
Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic Trade Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense
Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Army
Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science
and Technology
Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National Security
Council
Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the President
John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy
John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, National Security
Council
Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy,
Department of Commerce
Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer
James C. McCrery, former senior member of the Intelligence Community
and Arms Control Negotiator (Standing Consultative Committee)
J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy (signed on
September 10)
Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert specializing in
Iraqi affairs
Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine
Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Economist, National Security
Council
Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and former Director of the Policy Planing
Staff, Department of State
Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
for Arms Control
Carl M. Smith, former Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee
Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security Council
Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of Science and
Technology
William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and Defense Policy
Coordinator to the President
Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator
Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for Technology
Policy, Department of Commerce
Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica
Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
__________
No. 97-D 48
3 April 1997
Just Which Chemical Weapons Convention Is Colin Powell Supporting--And
Does He Know The Difference?
(Washington, D.C.): Starting tomorrow, the Clinton Administration
intends to make General Colin Powell--the former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff--its Poster Child for the campaign to gain Senate
approval of the controversial Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
According to the Associated Press, this campaign will be kicked off at
a ``highpowered, bipartisan gathering of treaty supporters ...
featuring Congressmen, veterans' group leaders, arms experts, religious
organization heads and military leaders, past and present,'' including
Army Gen. Colin Powell.
Does Powell Know What He Is Endorsing?
A warning to General Powell is in order, however: The Senate was
recently treated to the spectacle of another accomplished retired flag
officer, General Norman Schwarzkopf, who had to acknowledge that--while
he is on record as supporting the CWC--he is not familiar with its
details. For example, under questioning by Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK),
chairman of the Armed Services Committee's Readiness Subcommittee, the
following exchange occurred:
Sen. Inhofe: ``Do you think it wise to share with countries
like Iran our most advanced chemical defensive equipment and
technologies?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Our defensive capabilities?''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Yes.''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Absolutely not.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Well, I'm talking about sharing our advanced
chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which I believe
under Article X [they] would be allow[ed] to [get]. Do you
disagree?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``As I said Senator, I'm not familiar with
all the details--I--you know, a country, particularly like
Iran, I think we should share as little as possible with them
in the way of our military capabilities.''
Beware the `Bait and Switch'
General Powell and others who served under President Bush should
also be aware that there have been--as the Center noted on 10 February
1997 \1\--significant changes in a number of the assumptions,
conditions and circumstances that underpinned the Bush Administration's
judgment that the Chemical Weapons Convention was in the national
interest. These changes have prompted several of General Powell's
former colleagues--including Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Air
Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak, Assistant Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency Director Kathleen Bailey, Assistant to the Secretary
for Atomic Energy Robert Barker and Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch--to urge that the present treaty be
rejected by the Senate.\2\
A sample of the changes that have materially altered the
acceptability, if not strictly speaking the terms, of the Chemical
Weapons Convention include the following:
Item: Russia's Evisceration of the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement
The Bush Administration anticipated that a Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA) forged by Secretary of State James Baker and his Soviet
counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze in 1990, would critically underpin the
Chemical Weapons Convention. As the Center for Security Policy observed
in early February,\3\ this agreement obliged Moscow to provide a full
and accurate accounting and eliminate most of its vast chemical
arsenal. The BDA was also expected to afford the U.S. inspection rights
that would significantly enhance the more limited arrangements provided
for by the CWC.
These assumptions about the BDA have, regrettably, not been
fulfilled. To the contrary, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
declared last year that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has
``outlived its usefulness'' for Russia. What is more, it is now public
knowledge that Russia is continuing to produce extremely lethal binary
munitions--weapons that have been specifically designed to circumvent
the limits and defeat the inspection regime of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.\4\
Item: On-Site Inspections Won't Prevent Cheating
When the Bush Administration finalized the CWC, there was
considerable hope that intrusive on-site inspections would meaningfully
contribute to the detection and proof of violations, and therefore to
deterring them. Five years of experience with the U.N. inspections in
Iraq--inspections that were allowed to be far more thorough, timely and
intrusive than those permitted under this Convention--have established
that totalitarian rulers of a closed society can successfully defeat
such monitoring efforts.
In a 4 February 1997 letter to National Security Advisor Samuel
Berger, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms noted
that:
``Unclassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate
on U.S. Monitoring Capabilities [prepared after Mr. Bush left
office] indicate that it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able
to detect or address violations in a timely fashion, if at all,
when they occur on a small scale. And yet, even small-scale
diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons production are
capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far in excess of a
single ton [which General Shalikashvili described in
congressional testimony on 11 August 1994 is a level which
could, `in certain limited circumstances ... have a military
impact.'] Moreover, few countries, if any, are engaging in much
more than small-scale production of chemical agent. For
example, according to [the 4 February 1997] Washington Times,
Russia may produce its new nerve agents at a `pilot plant' in
quantities of only `55 to 110 tons annually.' ''
Item: Facilitating Proliferation: `Poisons for Peace'
In the years since the Bush Administration signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention, it has become increasingly clear that sharing
nuclear weapons-relevant technology with would-be proliferators simply
because they promise not to pursue nuclear weapons programs is folly.
Indeed, countries like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan,
Argentina, Brazil and Algeria have abused this ``Atoms for Peace''
bargain by diverting equipment and know-how provided under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prohibited weapons purposes.
Unfortunately, commercial chemical manufacturing technology can, if
anything, be diverted even more easily to weapons purposes than can
nuclear research and power reactors. For this reason, recent experience
with the NPT suggests that the Chemical Weapons Convention's Article
XI--an article dubbed the ``Poisons for Peace'' provision--is
insupportable. It stipulates that the Parties shall:
``Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would
restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.''
Such an obligation must now be judged a recipe for accelerating
proliferation of chemical weapons, not restricting it. Even if the
United States were to become a party to the CWC and choose to ignore
this treaty commitment, other advanced industrialized countries will
certainly not refrain from selling dual-use chemical manufacturing
technology if it means making a lucrative sale.
Item: U.S. Chemical Defenses Will be Degraded
When the Bush Administration signed the CWC, proponents offered
assurances that the treaty would not diminish U.S. investment in
chemical defenses. Such assurances were called into question, however,
by an initiative unveiled in 1995 by the then-Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens. He suggested cutting $805
million from counter-proliferation support and chemical and biological
defense programs through Fiscal Year 2001.
This was followed by a recommendation from JCS Chairman General
John Shalikashvili in February 1996--a few weeks before he told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Department of Defense is
committed to a ``robust'' chemical defense program. He sought to slash
chemical/biological defense activities and investment by over $1.5
billion through 2003.
The rationale for both these gambits? Thanks to a perceived
reduction in the chemical warfare threat to be brought about by the
CWC, investments in countering that threat could safely enjoy lower
priority. Such reductions would have deferred, if not seriously
disrupted, important chemical and biological research and develop-
ment efforts, and delayed the procurement of proven technologies. While
the Owens and Shalikashvili initiatives were ultimately rejected, they
are a foretaste of the sort of reduced budgetary priority this account
will surely face if the CWC is approved.
Changes in the military postures of key U.S. allies since the end
of the Bush Administration raise a related point: Even if the United
States manages to resist the sirens' song to reduce chemical defenses
in the wake of the CWC, it is predictable that the already generally
deplorable readiness of most allied forces to deal with chemical
threats will only worsen. To the extent that the U.S. is obliged in the
future to fight coalition wars, this vulnerability could prove
catastrophic to American forces engaged with a common enemy.
Item: Clinton Repudiates Bush Commitment to the JCS on
R.C.A.s
At the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992, President
Bush signed an executive order that explicitly allowed Riot Control
Agents (for example, tear gas) to be used in rescuing downed aircrews
and in dispersing hostile forces using civilians to screen their
movements against U.S. positions. The Clinton Administration initially
indicated that it intended to rescind this executive order outright
once the CWC is ratified. The result of doing so would have been to
compel U.S. personnel to choose between using lethal force where RCAs
would suffice or suffering otherwise avoidable casualties.
In the face of Senate opposition to such a rescission, Mr. Clinton
has apparently decided to allow tear gas and other RCAs to be used in
these selected circumstances, but only in peacetime. In wartime,
however, such use would be considered a breach of the treaty. The
Administration has yet to clarify under what circumstances the Nation
will be considered to be ``at war'' since there has been no declaration
of that state of belligerency in any of the conflicts in which the U.S.
has engaged since 1945.
What is particularly troublesome is the prospect that the Clinton
reversal of the Bush Administration position on RCAs will impinge upon
promising new defense technologies--involving chemical-based, non-
lethal weapons (for example, immobilizing agents). If so, U.S. forces
may be denied highly effective means of prevailing in future conflicts
with minimal loss of life on either side.
Other, No Less Distinguished, National Security Experts Disagree
with General Powell
In a letter sent to Senator Trent Lott last fall, when the Chemical
Weapons Convention was last under consideration by the Senate, a host
of former top civilian and military officials expressed their
opposition to this treaty in its present form. Among the distinguished
retired flag officers were:
General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding
General, Training and Doctrine Command; Vice Admiral William Houser,
U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Aviation; General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps; Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S.
Army (Retired), former Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic; Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired),
former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion; General Merrill A. McPeak,
U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force;
Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former
Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation; General John. L.
Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force; General Bernard Schriever, U.S.
Air Force (Retired), former Commander, Air Research and Development and
Air Force Systems Command; Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy
(Retired), former Commander 3rd Fleet; and Lieutenant General James
Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Among the civilian leaders who signed the open letter to Sen. Lott
were: Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense; William P. Clark,
former National Security Advisor to the President; Alexander M. Haig,
Jr., former Secretary of State; John S. Herrington, former Secretary of
Energy; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations; Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General; Donald
Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense; and one of General Powell's past
bosses, Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense.
The Bottom Line
The Center regrets General Powell's decision to lend his authority
to a treaty that even he has freely acknowledged is completely
unverifiable. It fears that he may also come to regret it. In any
event, the Nation surely will, if the Clinton-Powell razzle-dazzle
campaign induces the Senate to take its eyes off the ball--namely, the
fatal flaws that make the Chemical Weapons Convention unworthy of that
institution's advice and consent.
notes:
\1\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#4. No D.N.A. Tests Needed To Show That Claims About Republican
Paternity of CWC Are Overblown (No. 97-D 24, 10 February 1997).
\2\ See the Center's Transition Brief entitled Here We Go Again:
Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of Flawed, Unverifiable,
Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5, 8 January 1997).
\3\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing the CWC Will Protect
U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997).
\4\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Russia's Covert
Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms' Continuing Opposition
to Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February 1997).
__________
No. 97-D 37
5 March 1997
Truth or Consequences #7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld and Weinberger Rebut
Scowcroft and Deutch on the CWC
(Washington, D.C.): Today's Washington Post featured an op.ed.
article by three of the most distinguished public servants of the
latter Twentieth Century--James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar
Weinberger--concerning the reasons for opposing the present Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). Written in response to an earlier op.ed.
favoring this treaty which was authored by former National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft and former Director of Central Intelligence
John Deutch, the Schlesinger-Rumsfeld-Weinberger essay (a copy of which
is attached) should be required reading for every Senator and American
citizen following and/or participating in the debate on the CWC.
That should be the case in part simply because of the stature of
the signatories. Dr. Schlesinger, Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Weinberger all
served with distinction in the position of Secretary of Defense,
respectively for Presidents Nixon and Ford, Ford and Reagan. It also is
relevant to the present deliberations that Dr. Schlesinger's views are
informed by his service as Director of Central Intelligence under
President Nixon and Secretary of Energy under President Carter.
The joint op.ed. should also command careful attention because of
the clear and persuasive way it, first, applauds Messrs. Scowcroft and
Deutch's admissions about the CWC's flaws (notably, with respect to the
Convention's unverifiability and the treaty's lack of global coverage)
and, second, underscores their warnings about the dangers inherent in
the accord's ratification (notably, with respect to inspiring a false
sense of security, reduced investment in defensive technologies,
transferring chemical weapons-relevant production and defensive
technology to countries of concern and limitations on the use of
chemical-based non-lethal technologies, such as tear gas).
Finally, the Schlesinger-Rumsfeld-Weinberger essay is of singular
importance by virtue of the powerful rebuttal it offers to the
Scowcroft-Deutch argument that the CWC is ``better than nothing.'' The
three Secretaries conclude to the contrary that--due to the combination
of these defects and dangers inherent in the treaty, combined with its
unacceptably high costs for American businesses and taxpayers--the U.S.
would be better off not being a party than becoming one.
The Bottom Line
The Center for Security Policy commends former Secretaries
Schlesinger, Rumsfeld and Weinberger for this latest in a long line of
real contributions to the national security and commends their article
to all those who will be affected by or responsible for this fatally
flawed accord.
No to the Chemical Arms Treaty
[by James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and Donald Rumsfeld]
The Washington Post/March 5, 1997.--The phrase ``damning with faint
praise'' is given new meaning by the op-ed by Brent Scowcroft and John
Deutch on the Chemical Convention [``End the Chemical Weapons
Business,'' Feb. 11]. In it, the authors concede virtually every
criticism made by those who oppose this controversial treaty in its
present form.
They acknowledge the legitimacy of key concerns about the
Convention: its essential unverifiability; its lack of global coverage;
the prospect that it will inhibit non-lethal use of chemicals,
including tear gas; and its mandating the transfer of militarily
relevant chemical offensive and defensive technology to untrustworthy
countries that become parties. It is our view that these problems are
inherent in the present treaty.
Take, for example, Scowcroft and Deutch's warning against cutting
investment in chemical defensive measures. Unfortunately, treaties such
as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)--which promise to reduce the
menace posed by weapons of mass destruction but which cannot do so--
inevitably tend to diminish the perceived need and therefore the
support for defenses against such threats.
In fact, in December 1995, the then-vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommended a reduction of more than $800 million in
investment on chemical defenses in anticipation of the Convention's
coming into force. If past experience is a guide, there might also be a
reduction in the priority accorded to monitoring emerging chemical
weapons threats, notwithstanding Scowcroft and Deutch's call for
improvements in our ability to track chemical weapons developments.
Scowcroft and Deutch correctly warn that the ``CWC [must] not [be]
exploited to facilitate the diffusion of CWC-specific technology,
equipment and material--even to signatory states.'' The trouble is that
the Chemical Weapons Convention explicitly obligates member states to
facilitate such transfers, even though these items are readily
exploitable for military purposes. What is more, the treaty commits
member states not to observe any agreements, whether multilateral or
unilateral, that would restrict these transfers.
In short, we believe that the problems with the Chemical Weapons
Convention in these and other areas that have been identified by Brent
Scowcroft and John Deutch clearly demonstrate that this treaty would be
contrary to U.S. security interests. Moreover, in our view these
serious problems undercut the argument that the CWC's ``imperfect
constraints'' are better than no constraints at all.
The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the United States
and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical attack. It could
well serve to increase, not reduce, the spread of chemical weapons
manufacturing capabilities. Thus we would be better off not to be party
to it.
Notably, if the United States is not a CWC member state, the danger
is lessened that American intelligence about ongoing foreign chemical
weapons programs will be dumbed down or otherwise compromised. This has
happened in the past when enforcement of a violated agreement was held
to be a greater threat to an arms control regime than was noncompliance
by another party. The United States and the international community
have been unwilling to enforce the far more easily verified 1925 Geneva
Convention banning the use of chemical weapons--even in the face of
repeated and well-documented violations by Saddam Hussein. What
likelihood is there that we would be any more insistent when it comes
to far less verifiable bans on production and stockpiling of such
weapons?
As a non-party, the United States would also remain free to oppose
dangerous ideas such as providing state-of-the-art chemical
manufacturing facilities and defensive equipment to international
pariahs such as Iran and Cuba. And the United States would be less
likely to reduce investment in chemical protective capabilities, out of
a false sense of security arising from participation in the CWC.
In addition, if the United States is not a CWC party, American
taxpayers will not be asked to bear the substantial annual costs of our
participating in a multilateral regime that will not ``end the chemical
weapons business'' in countries of concern. (By some estimates, these
costs could be over $200 million per year.) Similarly, U.S. citizens
and companies will be spared the burdens associated with reporting and
inspection arrangements that might involve unreasonable searches and
seizures, could jeopardize confidential business information and yet
could not ensure that other nations--and especially rogue states--no
longer have chemical weapons programs.
Against these advantages of nonparticipation, the purported down-
sides seem relatively inconsequential. First, whether Russia actually
eliminates its immense chemical arsenal is unlikely to hinge upon our
participating in the CWC. Indeed. Moscow is now actively creating new
chemical agents that would circumvent and effectively defeat the
treaty's constraints.
Second, the preponderance of trade in chemicals would be unaffected
by the CWC's limitations, making the impact of remaining outside the
treaty regime, if any, fairly modest on American manufacturers.
Finally, if the United States declines to join the present Chemical
Weapons Convention, it is academic whether implementing arrangements
are drawn up by others or not. In the event the United States does
decide to become a party at a later date--perhaps after improvements
are made to enhance the treaty's effectiveness--it is hard to believe
that its preferences regarding implementing arrangements would not be
given considerable weight. This is particularly true since the United
States would then be asked to bear 25 percent of the implementing
organization's budget.
There is no way to ``end the chemical weapons business'' by fiat.
The price of attempting to do so with the present treaty is
unacceptably high, and the cost of the illusion it creates might be
higher still.
James Schlesinger was secretary of defense under Presidents Nixon
and Ford, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger held the same post
under Presidents Ford and Reagan, respectively.
__________
No. 97-D 35
27 February 1997
Gen. Schwartzkopf Tells Senate He Shares Critics' Concerns About
Details of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(Washington, D.C.): Under questioning before the Senate Armed
Services Committee today, General Norman Schwartzkopf--commander of the
allied forces in Operation Desert Shield/Storm--acknowledged that he
was ``unfamiliar with all the details'' of the Chemical Weapons
Convention and shared some of the concerns expressed by those who
oppose it in its present form. This is a signal development insofar as
the treaty's advocates had made much of the General's recent
endorsement of the CWC during previous testimony on Gulf War Syndrome.
Q. & A.
General Schwarzkopf was questioned by one of the Senate's most
steadfast leaders on national security matters and a courageous critic
of the Chemical Weapons Convention--the new chairman of the Armed
Services Committee's Readiness Subcommittee, Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK)--
about several of the CWC's more troubling aspects as seen from a
military standpoint. Among the most noteworthy aspects of their
exchange (and a brief intervention by Deputy Secretary of Defense John
White, who also participated in the hearing) were the following points:
Sen. Inhofe: ``If the Chemical Weapons Convention were in
effect, would we still face a danger of chemical attack from
such places as Iraq [which has not signed the CWC]--or Iran
[which] actually signed onto it?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Senator, I think that the answer is
probably yes. But, I think the chances of that happening could
be diminished by the treaty only because it would then be these
people clearly standing up and thumbing their noses at
international law--and it would also help us build coalitions
against them, if that were to happen.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Aren't they still thumbing their noses right
now in Iraq?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``There's no question about it, Senator--I
mean the fact that they used it in the first place against
their own people but, I still feel--we have renounced the use
of them and I am very uncomfortable placing ourselves in the
company with Iraq and Libya and countries such as ... North
Korea that have refused to sign that Convention. The problem
with those kinds of things is that verification is very
difficult and enforcement is very difficult.
Sen. Inhofe: ``... General Shali[kashvili] I think in August
1994 ... said that `even one ton of chemical agent may have a
military impact.' I would ask the question: Do you believe that
an intrusive, on-site inspection--as would be allowed by the
Chemical Weapons Convention would be able to detect a single
ton or could tell us conclusively that there isn't a single
ton?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``No, no as I said earlier, we can't
possibly know what's happening on every single inch of every
single territory out there where this would apply.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``And as far as terrorists are concerned, they
would not be under this?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Of course not.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Like any treaty, we have to give some things
up, and in this case, of course we do ... and there are a
couple of things that I'd like to [explore] ... the
interpretation from the White House changed ... they said that
if the Chemical Weapons Convention were agreed to, that it
would affect such things as riot control agents like tear gas
in search-and-rescue operations and circumstances like we faced
in Somalia--where they were using women and children at that
time as shields. Do you agree that we should be restricted from
using such things as tear gas?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``I don't believe that is the case but I
will confess to you that I have not read every single detail of
that Convention so, therefore, I really can't give you an
expert opinion. I think you could get a better opinion here.''
Secretary White: ``I am going to hesitate to give a
definitive answer because there has been, in the
administration, a very precise and careful discussion about
what exactly, and in what situations, this would apply and when
this wouldn't apply. ...
Sen. Inhofe: ``Do you think it wise to share with countries
like Iran our most advanced chemical defensive equipment and
technologies?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Our defensive capabilities?''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Yes.''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``Absolutely not.''
Sen. Inhofe: ``Well, I'm talking about sharing our advanced
chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which I believe
under Article X [they] would be allow[ed] to [get]. Do you
disagree?''
Gen. Schwartzkopf: ``As I said Senator, I'm not familiar with
all the details--I--you know, a country, particularly like
Iran, I think we should share as little as possible with them
in the way of our military capabilities.''
The Bottom Line
After this morning's hearing, Senator Inhofe announced:
``It is clear to me that the Clinton Administration's full
court press to secure ratification of the Chemical Weapons
treaty ought to be slowed down until the American people are
fully apprised of what this agreement entails. I oppose this
treaty because I have examined it closely and believe there are
serious problems contained in its fine print.
``Before Senators vote to ratify this Treaty, it is
absolutely vital that they be `familiar with all the details.'
The American people should expect no less of their elected
representatives. All of us want to protect America from the
dangers of chemical weapons. But we have no business blindly
endorsing a treaty of nearly 200 pages without carefully
evaluating all of its provisions on their own merits.''
To this the Center for Security Policy can only add, ``Amen.''
__________
No. 97-D 21
6 February 1997
Truth or Consequences #3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing
the CWC Will Protect U.S. Troops
(Washington, D.C.): President Clinton used his State of the Union
address Tuesday night to launch his Administration's latest and highest
profile salvo on behalf of ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). Unfortunately, as with other aspects of this campaign
to induce the Senate to advise and consent to a fatally flawed arms
control treaty, Mr. Clinton made statements that simply do not stand up
to scrutiny. One of the most troubling of these was his declaration:
``Make no mistake about it, [the CWC] will make our troops safer from
chemical attack ... We have no more important obligations, especially
in the wake of what we now know about the Gulf War.'' \1\
Far from reducing the risks that American military personnel will
be exposed to chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention is
likely to exacerbate them. This reality has become increasingly evident
subsequent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsement of the CWC as
originally negotiated by the Bush Administration. For the following
reasons, it would actually be a great disservice to the U.S. armed
forces--and to the national interests they protect--were the Senate to
lend its support to the present convention:
Russia Remains a Chemical Threat
The cornerstone for the Chemical Weapons Convention was supposed to
be a Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) with Russia. Pursuant to
this agreement, Moscow promised to provide a full and accurate
accounting and eliminate most of its chemical arsenal--the world's
largest and arguably the one that poses the most serious menace to the
U.S. military. The BDA was also expected to afford the U.S. inspection
rights that would significantly enhance the more limited arrangements
provided for by the CWC.
Regrettably, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin declared
last year that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has ``outlived its
usefulness'' for Russia. He has also announced that the tab for Russia
to implement the Convention's demilitarization arrangements
(conservatively estimated to be at least $3 billion) would have to be
paid for by the West. Under these circumstances, even if the U.S.
agreed to shell out vast sums, chances are that Russia would retain a
sizable, covert chemical stockpile.
As the Center for Security Policy noted earlier this week,\2\ it is
now public knowledge that such a Russian stockpile will probably
include extremely lethal binary munitions--weapons that have been
specifically designed to circumvent the limits and defeat the
inspection regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention. There is reason
to believe that such weapons may also have been engineered to defeat
Western chemical defensive gear. This material danger to U.S. forces
can only grow if, pursuant to the CWC's Article X, the United States
winds up transferring chemical protective technology or equipment to
those inclined to reverse engineer and overcome it.
Other Nations Will Also Have Militarily Significant CW Arsenals
Russia is hardly the only nation likely to pose a chemical threat
to U.S. personnel in ``a world with the CWC.'' Some, like Iraq, Syria,
North Korea and Libya, will refuse to become states parties. Others
will do so, secure in the knowledge that the treaty's inherent
unverifiability will allow them to escape detection.
When the CWC was negotiated there was considerable hope that
intrusive on-site inspections would meaningfully contribute to the
detection and proof of violations, and therefore to deterring them.
Experience, however, with the U.N. inspections in Iraq--an operation
allowed to conduct far more thorough, timely and intrusive inspections
than will be permitted under this Convention--has established that
totalitarian rulers of a closed society can successfully defeat such
inspections.
This reality applies, as Senator Helms noted in a letter to
National Security Advisor Samuel Berger on 4 February, even to
militarily significant stockpiles of chemical weapons:
``General Shalikashvili testified on 11 August 1994 that `In
certain limited circumstances, even one ton of chemical agent
may have a military impact. ... With such variables in scale of
target and impact of chemical weapons, the United States should
be resolute that the one-ton limit set by the Convention will
be our guide.' ''
``Unclassified portions of the [National Intelligence
Estimate] on U.S. Monitoring Capabilities indicate that it is
unlikely that the U.S. will be able to detect or address
violations in a timely fashion, if at all, when they occur on a
small scale. And yet, even small-scale diversions of chemicals
to chemical weapons production are capable, over time, of
yielding a stockpile far in excess of a single ton. Moreover,
few countries, if any, are engaging in much more than small-
scale production of chemical agent. For example, according to
[the 4 February 1997] Washington Times, Russia may produce its
new nerve agents at a `pilot plant' in quantities of only `55
to 110 tons annually' ''
Facilitating Proliferation: `Poisons for Peace'
The Chemical Weapons Convention may actually contribute to the
spread of militarily relevant chemical technology. This could be the
result of a provision (Article XI) modeled after the ``Atoms for
Peace'' provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--which
promised to share dual-use technology with those who might abuse it if
only they promise not to do so. Article XI would oblige the United
States to share inherently militarily useful chemical manufacturing
technology and materials with countries like Iran and Cuba, if only
they become states parties. This is a formula for expanding the threat
to ``our troops'' posed by chemical proliferation, not effective
chemical arms control.
The CWC Will Encourage the Military to Lower Its Guard
A March 1996 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
determined that some elements of the U.S. military appear to be
inadequately prepared, trained, or equipped to operate in areas
contaminated by chemical or biological agents. A particularly troubling
finding was the fact that none of the Army's five active divisions
which make up the Nation's crisis response force and none of the
reserve units that are designated to be deployed early in crises (such
as Operation Desert Shield) were properly equipped to deal with a
chemical or biological threat.
In fact, these units were significantly unprepared in a number of
areas. According to the GAO, three of the ``front-line'' divisions had
fifty percent or greater shortages of protective clothing with
shortfalls in other critical gear running as high as eighty-four
percent. Training was also determined to be deficient in a number of
respects. This is not entirely surprising given that, in its first 4
years in office, the Clinton Administration decreased funding for
chemical and biological defensive purposes by some thirty percent, from
$750 million in Fiscal Year 1992 to $504 million in Fiscal Year 1995.
Unfortunately, past experience suggests that matters will only be
made worse by an arms control treaty like the Chemical Weapons
Convention that purports to impose a global prohibition on chemical
weapons, seemingly making such defenses less necessary. For example,
after ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), U.S.
investment in relevant defensive technology, vaccines, detection
equipment, etc. declined precipitously. As a result of years of
inadequate attention to this threat, the United States found itself
extremely ill-prepared to deal with a potential BW threat posed by
Saddam Hussein's Iraq. (In fact, the U.S. may only have detected the
use of biological weapons against our forces after they started dying
en masse.)
That such a fate awaits U.S. chemical defensive efforts in the wake
of a CWC ratification was brought home by a 1995 initiative proposed by
the then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William
Owens. He suggested cutting a further $805 million from counter-
proliferation support and chemical and biological defense programs
through Fiscal Year 2001. This reduction would have deferred, if not
seriously disrupted, important chemical and biological research and
development efforts, and delayed the procurement of proven
technologies. His rationale: Thanks to a lowering in the chemical
warfare threat brought about by the CWC, investments in countering it
could safely enjoy lower priority. While the Owens gambit was
ultimately defeated, similar initiatives must be expected in the future
if the CWC is approved--resulting in increased vulnerability, not
improved safety, for ``our troops.''
Even if the United States manages to resist the siren's song to
reduce chemical defenses in the wake of the CWC, it is predictable that
the already generally deplorable readiness of most allied forces to
deal with chemical threats will only worsen. To the extent that the
U.S. is obliged in the future to fight coalition wars, this
vulnerability could prove catastrophic to American forces engaged with
a common enemy.
Prohibitions on Tear Gas, Other Non-Lethal Technologies
The Clinton Administration has made clear that it intends to
reverse a Bush executive order issued at the insistence of the Joint
Chiefs in 1992--an order that explicitly allowed Riot Control Agents
(for example, tear gas) to be used in rescuing downed aircrews and
dispersing hostile forces using civilians to screen their movements
against U.S. positions. The result could be to force our troops to use
lethal force where it is not necessary or to suffer otherwise avoidable
casualties.
Worse yet, one of the most promising new defense technologies--
involving chemical-based, non-lethal weapons (for example, immobilizing
agents)--may be restricted or prohibited by this Convention. The CWC
defines chemical weapons as ``toxic chemicals and their precursors,
except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with
such purposes.'' It goes on to define a toxic chemical as ``any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or
animals.'' As a result of the CWC, ``our troops'' may be denied highly
effective means of prevailing in future conflicts with minimal loss of
life on either side.
The Bottom Line
In its present form, the Chemical Weapons Convention cannot be
justified by the contribution it will make to the safety of our men and
women in uniform. If anything, the ``contribution'' that will be made
will be a negative one for ``our troops.''
A question that may not be as easily dispensed of is: Precisely
what did President Clinton mean when he said ``in the wake of what we
now know about the Gulf War''? Is that an acknowledgment that chemical
weapons were used against U.S. forces there, after all? Does it mean
that the President is now convinced that American forces were
inadvertently exposed to chemical agents in the process of destroying
Iraqi bunkers--accounting for Gulf War Syndrome? Or is he simply
acknowledging that U.S. chemical defenses are already inadequate and
that ``our troops'' will likely be exposed to chemical threats--even if
the enemy does not initiate their use--with or without the Chemical
Weapons Convention?
notes:
\1\ The fallaciousness of another Presidential declaration--``if we
do not act by April the 29th when this Convention goes into force--with
or without us--we will lose the chance to have Americans leading and
enforcing this effort''--was addressed last week in the second paper in
this ``Truth or Consequences'' series on the Chemical Weapons
Convention, entitled Truth or Consequences #2: Senate Does Not Need to
Sacrifice Sensible Scrutiny of CWC to Meet an Artificial Deadline (No.
97-D 18, 31 January 1997). A third erroneous claim concerning the CWC's
value in fighting terrorism will be the subject of a forthcoming
Decision Brief.
\2\ See the Center's Decision Brief from earlier this week,
Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
Continuing Opposition to Phony C.W. Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4
February 1997).
__________
No. 97-D 19
4 February 1997
Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms'
Continuing Opposition to Phony C.W. Arms Control
(Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration's campaign to
railroad Senators into approving the fatally flawed Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) ran into a major new obstacle today: The Washington
Times disclosed that a report published recently in the classified
Military Intelligence Digest confirms that ``Russia is producing a new
generation of deadly chemical weapons using materials, methods and
technology that circumvent the terms of [that] treaty it signed
outlawing such weapons.''
Word of this frightening development was originally leaked by a
Russian scientist, Vil Mirzayanov, who had been involved in the
Kremlin's covert development of a new class of chemical arms. In an
article he courageously published in the Wall Street Journal on 25 May
1994, Mr. Mirzayanov wrote about a new Russian binary weapon [i.e., one
which uses two relatively harmless chemicals to form a toxic agent
after the weapon is launched]:
``This new weapon, part of the ultra-lethal Novichok [Russian
for ``Newcomer''] class, provides an opportunity for the
[Russian] military establishment to disguise production of
components of binary weapons as common agricultural chemicals
because the West does not know the formula and its inspectors
cannot identify the compounds.'' \1\
Now, More Details About Moscow's Ongoing CW Program
Excerpts of the secret intelligence report that appear in today's
Washington Times provide considerable detail about Russia's efforts to
maintain a deadly chemical arsenal, irrespective of its treaty
obligations. According to the Times, these include the following
(emphasis added throughout):
``Under a program code-named `Foliant,' a Russian scientific
research organization has created a highly lethal nerve agent
called A-232, large quantities of which could be made `within
weeks' through covert production facilities. ...''
``A-232 is made from industrial and agricultural chemicals
that are not lethal until mixed and that never had been used
for poison gas.''
`` `These new agents are as toxic as VX [a persistent nerve
agent], as resistant to treatment as Soman [a non-persistent
but deadly poison gas] and more difficult to detect and easier
to manufacture than VX.' ''
``The report says A-232 and its delivery means have `passed
Moscow's rigorous military acceptance testing and can be
quickly fielded in unitary or binary form.' ''
``Russia's State Scientific Research Institute of Organic
Chemistry and Technology created the agents and novel ways of
making them to avoid detection by international inspectors. `By
using chemicals not specified in the CWC schedules, the
Russians can produce A-232 and its ethyl analog A-234, in
unitary and binary forms within several chemical complexes.' ''
``The Russians can make the binary, or two part, version of
the nerve agent using a common industrial solvent acetonitrile
and an organic phosphate compound `that can be disguised as a
pesticide precursor.' In another version, soldiers need only
add alcohol to form the agent, the report says.''
`` `These various routes offer flexibility for the agent to
be produced in different types of facilities, depending on the
raw material and equipment available there. They also add
complexity to the already formidable challenge of detecting
covert production activities.' ''
``The Russians can produce the new nerve agent in `pilot
plant' quantities of 55 to 110 tons annually,' the report says.
Several Russian plants are capable of producing the chemicals
used in making A-232. One factory in Novocherboksarsk `is
capable of manufacturing 2,000-2,500 metric tons of A-232
yearly.' ''
``Several pesticide plants `offer easy potential for covert
production,' the report says. `For example, substituting amines
for ammonia and making other slight modifications in the
process would result in new agents instead of pesticide. The
similarity in the chemistry of these compounds would make
treaty monitoring, inspection and verification difficult.' ''
The Administration's Unconvincing Response: The CWC Will Solve the
Problem
The Clinton Administration's pollyannish response to these
revelations ought to be instructive to Senators weighing the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Although the Russians are violating their present
obligation not to produce chemical weapons and are doing so in ways
designed to circumvent the CWC's limitations and to defeat even on-site
inspection regimes, an Administration spokesman told the Washington
Times that ``the treaty would make it easier to investigate such
problems'' since ``agents and components can be added to the treaty's
schedule of banned chemicals.'' The National Security Council's David
Johnson is quoted as saying: ``Without the CWC and the verification
tools it provides, you don't have the means to get at problems like
this. With CWC, you do.''
Such a statement is, at best, wishful thinking. At worst, it is
highly misleading since, for reasons outlined above, the Russian
Novichok weapons (and counterpart efforts likely being pursued by other
chemical weapons states) are specifically designed to thwart the CWC's
``verification tools.''
A variation on this disingenuous theme is being circulated in
graphic form by proponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention. They
offer two world maps, one under the heading ``The World Without the
CWC,'' the other ``The World With the CWC.'' The former shows large
areas of the world--notably Russia, China, Iran, India and Pakistan--
with declared or suspected chemical arsenals. The latter, though, shows
the entire world except for Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and North Korea
as being without either declared or suspected chemical stockpiles.
It is deceptive to suggest that the Chemical Weapons Convention
will ensure that Russia, China, Iran, India or Pakistan will actually
eliminate their chemical weapons programs thanks to the CWC. In fact,
any country that is wishes to retain even militarily significant
chemical stockpiles and is willing to flout international law to do so
can be confident of its ability to escape detection and sanction. To
his credit, one of the Convention's preeminent champions and
distributors of these maps--retired Lieutenant General Tom McInerney--
responded, when asked whether he really believed that Russia and China
would give up their chemical arms if they became parties to the CWC--by
saying: ``Of course not.''
Enter Chairman Helms
As it happens, front-page treatment was also given today to another
aspect of the Chemical Weapons Convention drama. A 29 January 1997
letter from Senator Jesse Helms to Majority Leader Trent Lott
expressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman's strong
opposition to the present CWC was featured ``above the fold'' by the
Washington Post. In this letter, Senator Helms declares: ``I am
convinced that the CWC, as it now stands, is fraught with deficiencies
totally inimical to the national security interests of the United
States.''
Chairman Helms goes on to enumerate in an attached memorandum
specific conditions that ``are essential to ensuring that the Chemical
Weapons Convention enhances, rather than reduces, our national
security.'' In particular, he says preconditions are needed to address
six concerns which ``are best expressed in the letter [Senator Lott]
received on 9 September 1996 from Richard Cheney, William Clark, Jeane
Kirkpatrick, Alexander Haig, John Herrington, Edwin Meese, Donald
Rumsfeld, Caspar Weinberger, 12 Generals and Admirals and 47 [other]
officials from the Reagan and Bush Administrations'': \2\
Russian elimination of chemical weapons and implementation
of the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA);
Inclusion of countries other than Russia believed to have
chemical weapons;
Certification by the U.S. intelligence community that
compliance with the treaty can be monitored with high
confidence;
Specification of the actions that will be taken by the
United States in the event of non-compliance;
Establishing the primacy of the U.S. Constitution over all
provisions of the CWC; and
Protection of U.S. confidential business information (CBI).
Sen. Helms Rebuts the Administration's CWC Point Person
In addition, Senator Helms today sent National Security Advisor
Samuel ``Sandy'' Berger a strongly worded letter concerning
correspondence written by Dr. Lori Esposito Murray--the Special Advisor
to the President and ACDA Director for the Chemical Weapons
Convention--to members of the Senate in response to the Cheney et al.
missive. Calling the Murray correspondence ``offensive,'' the Chairman
of-
fers his own, detailed rebuttal of her claim that there were
``significant misinformation'' and ``misstatements'' in the letter sent
last fall by Secretary Cheney and his colleagues.
Specifically, Senator Helms affirms that:
``The CWC does not--in fact--effectively cover the types of
chemicals used to manufacture chemical weapons. Everything from
Sarin and Soman to VX can be manufactured using a variety of
chemicals which are not identified by the Schedules for the
application of the verification regime.''
``... The CWC will not do one thing to reduce the chemical
weapons arsenals of terrorist countries and other nations
hostile to the United States. ... Not one country of concern to
the United States has ratified this convention.''
``... The CWC is not `effectively verifiable' and Dr. Murray
should not have made representations to the contrary. ...
Declassified portions from [a] August 1993 National
Intelligence Estimate note:
`` `The capability of the intelligence community to monitor
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely
limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. The
key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge inspection at
declared sites--can be thwarted by a nation determined to
preserve a small, secret program using the delays and managed
access rules allowed by the Convention.' ''
The Bottom Line
The Center for Security Policy commends Senator Helms for his
leadership in insisting that the Chemical Weapons Convention's myriad,
serious defects be addressed and corrected before the Senate is once
again asked to give its advice and consent to this treaty. It looks
forward to working with him, Senator Lott and all others who share
Chairman Helms' determination to ensure that the CWC is only ratified
if it ``enhances, rather than reduces'' U.S. national security.
notes:
\1\ See in this regard Not `Good Enough for Government Work:'
Senate Needs to Hear About Russian Chemical Weapons From Russian
Experts (No. 94-D 100, 5 October 1994).
\2\ Copies of this letter, which was originally circulated by the
Center for Security Policy last fall, may be obtained by contacting the
Center.
__________
No. 97-D 27
17 February 1997
Truth or Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good for Business--To Say
Nothing of The National Interest
(Washington, D.C.): Proponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) now awaiting consideration by the U.S. Senate often declare that
industry supports this controversial treaty. That claim requires
careful consideration since, on its face, this arms control treaty will
have myriad, and possibly quite adverse, implications for many American
businesses. Such implications arise from the reporting, regulatory and
inspection requirements generated by the treaty's verification regime.
Who Will Be Affected?
A common misconception is that only chemical manufacturing
businesses will be covered by these requirements. To be sure, such
pervasively regulated companies will face additional reporting
requirements and be subjected to routine inspections by foreign
nationals. A trade association representing some of these companies--
the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)--has judged the impacts of
the CWC on its member companies to be acceptable, however.
(Interestingly, some CMA companies--for example, Dixie Chemicals and
Sterling Chemicals--have expressed opposition to the treaty on the
grounds that the costs entailed in further reporting requirements,
additional regulatory burdens and intrusive on-site inspections will be
unacceptable.)
In fact, thousands of companies that do not produce but simply use
a wide variety of chemicals or chemical compounds--notably, Discrete
Organic Chemicals (DOCs) \1\--will also be burdened with new and
potentially onerous responsibilities under the CWC. While the CWC's
proponents frequently claim that many of these companies will be able
to get away with filling out a simple, short form, there is reason to
believe otherwise.
For a good many of the affected companies, the CWC's reporting
requirements will entail a time-consuming, and assuredly expensive,
process of producing declara-
tions, filing reports and complying with new regulations. These
industries may also face challenge as well as routine inspections.
Challenge inspections permit the use of sampling procedures--for
example the use of mass spectrometers--that go beyond those to which
companies facing only routine inspections are exposed and that have
considerable potential for the loss of Confidential Business
Information (see below).
Among the industries facing such prospects are: automotive, food
processing, biotech, distillers and brewers, electronics, soap and
detergents, cosmetics and fragrances, paints, textiles, non-nuclear
electric utility operators and even ball-point pen ink manufacturers.
The following well-known U.S. companies--none of which has anything to
do with the manufacture of chemical weapons--have been identified by
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as subject to the CWC's terms:
Sherwin-Williams, Nutrasweet, Jim Beam, Archer Daniels Midland, Lever
Brothers, Kaiser Aluminum, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Xerox, Raytheon
and Conoco.
Last but hardly least, in addition to the obligations befalling the
foregoing industries, the Chemical Weapons Convention would allow any
site in the United States to be subjected to intrusive challenge
inspections. While proponents downplay the danger that such an
arrangement might be abused by foreign governments, there are no
guarantees that such abuses will not occur.
Who Speaks for All the Affected Industries?
While the Chemical Manufacturers Association has been the most
vocal industry advocate of the Chemical Weapons Convention, it
represents only some 190 of the companies expected to be covered by the
treaty. It has aggressively lobbied Senators and other trade
organizations on behalf of the treaty, evidently persuaded not only
that the CWC will not hurt its businesses but will actually benefit
them. Notably, CMA believes this accord's Article XI will clear the way
for a substantial increase in U.S. exports of chemical manufacturing
equipment and materials.
Since the bulk of this prospective increase may involve markets not
currently open to American chemical concerns--presumably, including
pariah states like Iran and Cuba--it is unclear just how willing
responsible companies and/or the U.S. Government will be to engage in
this sort of trade.\2\ Such exports are currently proscribed by the
supplier-control arrangement known as the Australia Group. If, as seems
likely, the CWC has the effect of vitiating the Australia Group
mechanism, CW-relevant exports may be permitted even to dubious
customers--but it will be hard to contend that the effect on curbing
proliferation of chemical weapons will be a positive one.
The truth of the matter is that no one can say for sure how many
companies will be caught up in the CWC's reporting, regulatory and
inspection regime. It is safe to say, however, that there will be
thousands affected (according to official U.S. Government estimates as
many as 3,000-8,000.) Even if one counts facilities, as few as two-
fifths of those affected are owned by CMA member companies. Indeed, as
Dr. Will Carpenter, formerly Vice President for Technology at the
Monsanto Agriculture Company and a CMA representative, noted in an
article in Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention:
``The leaders of the chemical industry, through the board of
directors of the CMA have always emphasized support of the
convention. There are, however, another 60 to 80 trade
associations whose members will also be regulated by the
National Authority [set up to implement the CWC]. ... An
overwhelming number of these companies are not aware of the
implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention despite a
continuing effort by ACDA, the CMA and other organizations to
get the word out.''
How Will American Businesses Be Affected?
The impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on American companies
will occur through two avenues:
(1) Impacts Due to New Reporting and Regulatory Requirements: The
data required by the treaty's verification regime differs in both
quantitative and qualitative respects from that already collected for
other regulatory purposes. For example, current environmental
regulations do not cover all of the chemicals relevant to the CWC.
Moreover, of those that are covered, the production thresholds
triggering current reporting requirements are set much higher than
would be the case under the CWC. In addition, some existing regulations
require reports concerning future actions (whereas the treaty imposes
obligations for considerable retroactive reporting). Some of these
current regulations apply to chemical producers, but not to industrial
processors or consumers of chemicals. And deadlines for reports
required by the CWC will be shorter, and necessitate more frequent
updating, than those presently demanded, for instance, by the
Environmental Protection Agency. For all these rea-
sons, new reporting requirements will have to be levied by the U.S.
government in the implementing legislation for the Convention.
These new requirements may prove to be viewed by large concerns as
simply a marginal additional cost of doing business. Smaller companies,
however, may find these additional requirements to be considerably more
burdensome. This is particularly true since some companies will be
obliged to file detailed declarations for the first time. Such reports
will also have to be updated on an annual basis. The associated costs
for preparing these reports are likely to run to the thousands--and
perhaps hundreds of thousands--of dollars per company.
What is more, the new U.S. bureaucracy dubbed the ``National
Authority'' to whom these reports will be sent, must be notified of
changes in declared activities 5 days before they occur. Complying with
this requirement is likely to prove problematic for companies unable to
predict their activities; it certainly will be burdensome. A failure to
comply with this reporting regime could result in civil and perhaps
even criminal penalties.
(2) Impacts Arising from On-Site Inspections: Any company that
provides declarations to the ``National Authority'' should prepare to
be inspected. Once the U.S. National Authority turns the information
thus supplied over to the new international bureaucracy created under
this Convention--the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) the OPCW's Technical Secretariat will have the authority
to conduct on-site inspections (both routine and challenge inspections)
to verify the data thus supplied.
Depending on the sorts of chemicals declared and the nature of the
inspections, the amount of notice, duration and degree of intrusiveness
of the inspection can vary. For example, advance notice can be as
little as twenty-four hours; the duration can extend to 96 continuous
hours; and the international inspectors can in some instances demand to
examine any data, files, processes, equipment, structures or vehicles
deemed pertinent to their search for illegal chemical manufacturing
activities.
What Will Be At Risk?
It is a virtual certainty that, in the course of at least some such
inspections, confidential business information (CBI) will be put at
risk. In 1993, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
identified examples of proprietary information that could be
compromised:
The formula of a new drug or specialty chemical
A synthetic route that requires the fewest steps or the
cheapest raw materials
The form, source, composition and purity of raw materials or
solvents
Subtle changes in pressure or temperature at key steps in a
process
Expansion and marketing plans
Raw materials and suppliers
Manufacturing costs
Prices and sales figures
Names of technical personnel working on a particular project
Customer lists
According to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the means
by which the foregoing and other sensitive business information could
be acquired by foreign inspectors (at least some of whom may be agents
of their governments' intelligence services and specialists in the
conduct of commercial espionage) include via the following:
manifests and container labels that disclose the nature/
purity of the feedstock and the identity of the supplier
instrument panels [e.g., networked computer monitors]
revealing precise temperature and pressure settings for a
production process
chemical analysis of residues taken from a valve or seal on
the production line
visual inspection of piping configurations and
instrumentation diagrams could allow an inspector to deduce
flow and process parameters
audits of plant records
A loss of confidential business information either through a
challenge inspection, or through sample analysis, could be particularly
troubling for those in the chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries. Many companies have not sought patents for such proprietary
information lest they be compromised by Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests, to which patents are subject. Even so, in August 1993,
the OTA estimated that the U.S. chemical industry loses approximately
$3-6 billion per year in counterfeited chemicals and chemical products.
If proprietary formulas are compromised by commercial espionage,
the cost can be very great. For example, it takes an average of 10
years and an investment of $25 million to perfect a new pesticide. U.S.
pharmaceutical companies must invest an average of 12 years and on the
order of $350 million in research and development to bring a
breakthrough drug to market.
Clearly, while it is difficult to assess the potential dollar
losses that may be associated with the compromise of proprietary
business data, information gleaned from inspections and data
declarations literally could be worth millions of dollars to foreign
competitors. A small company whose profitability (and economic
survival) derives from a narrow but critical competitive advantage will
be particularly vulnerable to industrial espionage. The OTA notes that
for a small company, ``even visual inspection alone might reveal a
unique process configuration that could be of great value to a
competitor.''
The Risk is Real
Unfortunately, these are not hypothetical or ``worst case''
scenarios. In preparation for the CWC, the U.S. has conducted mock
inspections at seven government and private sector industrial sites.
The results validate fears that even routine access by the OPCW's
international inspectors could result in the loss of commercial and/or
national security secrets. This would certainly be true of the access
allowed under more intrusive challenge inspection provisions.
These conclusions are evident, for example, in a report submitted
by the U.S. government to the Conference on Disarmament concerning the
third of these so-called National Trial Inspections. It was conducted
by U.S. experts at the Monsanto Agricultural Company's Luling,
Louisiana plant in August, 1991. The report said, in part:
``The Monsanto representative who was on the inspection team
to determine the extent of CBI he could obtain, determined
there would be a loss of such information. He stated he was
able to obtain enough information about the glyphosate
intermediate process merely by equipment inspection to save a
potential competitor considerable process development, time and
dollars. He said a knowledgeable inspector could compromise
Monsanto's proprietary business interests with no access to
their records beyond the quantity of phosphorous trichloride
consumed.'' (Emphasis added.)
Even Exterior Sampling Can Put CBI At Risk: Another mock inspection
revealed that soil and water samples taken even from the exterior of
buildings at a chemical plant three weeks after a production run
revealed the product of the operation and process details. This is
especially worrisome in terms of the implications for confidential
business information since the CWC's Verification Annex (Part II
paragraph (E)(55)) explicitly affords an inspection team the right to
take samples on-site using highly invasive mass spectrometers and, ``if
it deems necessary,'' to transfer samples for analysis off-site at
laboratories designated by the OPCW. And, as Dr. Kathleen Bailey of the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on 21 March 1996:
``Experts in my laboratory recently conducted experiments to
determine whether or not there would be a remainder inside of
the equipment that is used for sample analysis on-site. They
found out that, indeed, there is residue remaining. And if the
equipment were taken off-site, off of the Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory site, or off of the site of a biotechnology firm,
for example, and further analysis were done on those residues,
you would be able to get classified and/or proprietary
information.''
Matters are made worse by the prospect that the OPCW is likely to
allow a number of states parties' laboratories to conduct sample
analysis. Among the nations that have expressed an interest in
providing such laboratory services are several with dubious records
concerning non-proliferation and/or a record of using multilateral
organizations--among other devices--for intelligence collection
(including commercial espionage).
Conclusion
The Chemical Weapons Convention will entail real, if as yet
unquantifiable, costs for thousands of U.S. industries having nothing
to do with the manufacture of chemical weapons. Such costs might be
justifiable if the treaty were likely to be effective in ridding the
world of chemical weapons--or even in appreciably reducing the
likelihood of chemical warfare. Unfortunately, while the CWC's
verification regime will be sufficiently intrusive to jeopardize U.S.
proprietary interests, it is woefully inadequate to detect and prove
non-compliance by closed societies determined to maintain covert
chemical weapons capabilities notwithstanding their treaty
obligations.\3\ As a result, the burdens that American private
industries will be asked to bear--largely without their knowledge--
simply cannot be justified on national security or any other grounds.
notes:
\1\ The CWC defines DOCs only in the following, expansive terms:
``Any chemical belonging to the class of chemical compounds consisting
of all compounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides and metal
carbonates.''
\2\ In fact, ACDA Director John Holum has indicated that the United
States' obligations under the CWC would not be allowed to compel it to
sell CW-relevant technology to proliferating states. Even if that
position were actually adopted by the U.S. government after treaty
ratification, Article XI would still provide political cover for other
nations feeling no such compunction and deny Washington grounds for
objecting.
\3\ N.B. The UN's on-site inspection effort in Iraq (UNSCOM) has
been unable to ascertain the true status of Saddam Hussein's weapons of
mass destruction programs despite five years of challenge inspections
under a regime providing for far more intrusive, timely and
comprehensive inspections than those authorized by the CWC.
__________
No. 97-D 14
28 January 1997
Truth or Consequences #1: Center Challenges Administration Efforts To
Distort, Suppress Debate on CWC
dangers to americans' constitutional rights
(Washington, D.C.): Like a saturation bombardment of toxic gas on a
World War I battlefield, proponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) have suddenly unleashed a barrage of Cabinet-level public
statements and op.eds., departmental letters, government fact sheets
and interest group point papers. The purpose seems to be to asphyxiate
informed debate about this treaty with billowing clouds of false or
misleading information, even as the Convention's critics are wrongly
accused of doing the same thing.
For example, in a letter written to Senators on 14 January 1997,
Dr. Lori Esposito Murray--the Special Advisor to the President and ACDA
Director on the Chemical Weapons Convention--took strong exception to
correspondence authored by a large and distinguished group of former
senior civilian and military officials who oppose ratification of the
CWC in its present form. The latter include: former Secretaries of
Defense Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig
and former National Security Advisor to the President William Clark.
Dr. Murray declared that the Cheney et al. letter ``contains
significant misinformation about the Convention.'' She proceeds to cite
several portions of the letter (which was circulated by the Center for
Security Policy originally last fall and again earlier this month) \1\
which she characterizes as ``misstatements.'' In opposition to these
alleged ``misstatements,'' Dr. Murray offers what she calls ``facts.''
As a contribution to a real and informed debate about the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Center will be issuing a series of Decision
Briefs in the coming days briefly responding to each of Dr. Murray
points--and similar arguments on behalf of the treaty made by others--
that have the effect of confusing or distorting, if not actually
suppressing, such a debate.
CWC Will Impinge Upon Americans' Constitutional Rights
As Secretaries Cheney, Rumsfeld, Weinberger and their colleagues
noted in the joint letter: ``We are concerned that the CWC will
jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights by requiring the U.S.
government to permit searches without either warrants or probable
cause.'' Dr. Murray describes this as a ``misstatement'' and declares
as a ``fact'' that:
``The Administration expects that access to private
facilities will be granted voluntarily for the vast majority of
inspections under the CWC. If this is not the case, the United
States Government will obtain a search warrant prior to an
inspection in order to ensure that there will be no trampling
of constitutional rights.''
On 9 September 1996, Department of Justice officials publicly
acknowledged in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee that in
such cases a criminal warrant would be required. The problem is that
obtaining such a warrant from a court would require demonstration of
probable cause. This will be impossible in most cases because the
nation requesting an inspection need not cite its reasons for making
such a request.
Hence, the Clinton Administration faces a difficult choice. If the
U.S. government respects its citizens' rights not to be subjected
involuntarily to searches in the absence of judicial warrants, it will
be creating a precedent other countries will assuredly cite to refuse
on-site inspections on their territories. If it does not respect those
rights, it will be acting in an unconstitutional manner.
Judge Bork Is Concerned About the Treaty's Constitutional Impact
In a letter sent to Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch last
August, a respected constitutional scholar and distinguished Federal
judge, Robert H. Bork, expressed the view that ``there are grounds to
be concerned about [CWC provisions'] compatibility with the
Constitution.'' He wrote:
``Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns are raised by the
United States' obligation to open to on-site inspections any
facility, whether in the public sector or privately owned.
Apparently, no probable cause need be shown. A foreign state
will have the right to challenge inspection of a U.S. facility
without the grounds that are essential for a search warrant.
``The U.S. is required by the CWC to enforce inspection by an
international team, even over opposition from the owner. On-
site personnel can be compelled to answer questions, provide
data, and permit searches of anything within the premises--
including records, files, papers, processes, controls,
structures and vehicles.
``Whatever the merits otherwise of the claim that the
`pervasively regulated industries' exception avoids the Fourth
Amendment problems, it is my understanding that the majority of
the 3,000-8,000 companies expected to be covered are not
pervasively regulated.
``Additional Fifth Amendment problems arise from the
authority of inspectors to collect data and analyze samples.
This may constitute an illegal seizure and, perhaps, constitute
the taking of private property by the government without
compensation. The foreign inspectors will not be subject to
punishment for any theft of proprietary information.
``American citizens will have fewer rights to information
concerning investigations concerning them or their businesses
than they would if investigated by a U.S. agency. Freedom of
Information requests will not be permitted under the proposed
CWC implementing legislation. ...
``... The owner of a facility will [likely] be faced with an
international inspection team, backed up by the U.S.
government, demanding access to his property and demanding
answers and documents from his employees. No one will be shown
a search warrant and, so far as I can gather, the owner or
employee must decide on the spot whether he has a
constitutional right to refuse what is demanded. If he refuses
and turns out to be wrong, he will face punishment. At least a
citizen shown a search warrant knows that a judge has deemed
the search constitutional.
``The provision in question speaks of constitutional
obligations with regard to property rights or searches and
seizures. That does not cover the Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate oneself. Yet self-incrimination is a real danger
for people required to answer questions, turn over documents
and other matter.''
Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde is Also Concerned
On 28 August 1996, Chairman Hatch received a letter from his House
counterpart, Rep. Henry Hyde. It expresses similar misgivings to those
addressed by Judge Bork. Rep. Hyde asked:
``How can we accede to an arrangement that grants an
international inspection agency the right to demand access to
thousands of privately owned U.S. facilities without requiring
the foreign inspectors to demonstrate probable cause necessary
to secure a judicial warrant--except by compromising the
American owners' constitutional rights?
``Similarly, how can those owners be denied due process--or,
for that matter, the right to sue for damages in the likely
event that the foreign inspectors use their eighty-four hours
of on-site inspection to elicit sensitive proprietary data and
then that data finds its way into the hands of competitors
overseas? As you are well aware, there is growing concern about
illegal commercial espionage. If we are not careful, it would
appear that we may be creating through the CWC a legal
opportunity for carrying out such intelligence collection, to
the severe detriment of America's competitive position.
A further concern arises from the fact that the new
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will be
significantly less accountable than U.S. regulatory agencies
for information collected in the course of international
inspections of American businesses. I understand that the draft
implementing leg-
islation proposes to preclude requests about OPCW inspections that
might otherwise be made under the Freedom of Information act.
``... Whatever one thinks ... about the wisdom of ratifying a
treaty that is inherently unverifiable, unenforceable and
inequitable, the likelihood that it will compromise the
constitutional rights of many thousands of American companies
and their owners and employees should be sufficient grounds for
its rejection.''
The Bottom Line
Clearly, there are grounds for concern about the constitutional
impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention. These cannot be dismissed as
``misstatements'' or ``myths.'' Neither can consideration of such
issues be responsibly deferred--as some treaty proponents are arguing--
until after the CWC is ratified by the United States. At that point,
the theoretical option of building safeguards into the implementing
legislation will be a non-starter, at least from a practical point of
view, to the extent such protections would conflict with ``the supreme
law of the land,'' i.e., a ratified treaty. Accordingly, the Center for
Security Policy encourages members of the Senate to examine the
constitutional and other, serious problems with the Chemical Weapons
Convention prior to any further consideration of this accord.
notes:
\1\ See the Center's Transition Brief entitled Here We Go Again:
Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of Flawed, Unverifiable,
Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5, 8 January 1997).
__________
No. 97-D 30
22 February 1997
Truth or Consequences #6: The CWC Will Not Prevent Chemical Terrorism
Against the U.S. or its Interests
(Washington, D.C.): In recent weeks, proponents of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) have cited the contribution this Convention
would make to combating terrorists armed with chemical weapons as an
important justification for the Senate to approve its ratification. In
President Clinton's State of the Union address, in successive op.ed.
articles by former Bush Administration officials and in news articles
and editorials reflecting the administration's pro-treaty line, the
assertion is made that an admittedly grave problem will be alleviated
by the CWC's ban on the production, stockpiling or use of chemical
weapons.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Senator Richard Lugar--the
Chemical Weapons Convention's principal champion in the Senate--has
even taken to darkly warning his colleagues that they better vote for
the CWC lest there be a chemical terrorist incident in this country
which might have been prevented if only the Convention had been in
place.
The CWC Will Not Impede Terrorists
Such arguments are highly misleading, possibly dangerously so, for
two reasons:
(1) The `Home-Brew' Problem: The ability to produce toxic chemical
agents is so widespread--and the materials required are so universally
accessible and ordinary--that a treaty banning chemical weapons will
have no effect at all on small, non-governmental groups determined to
manufacture such agents. Lethal chemical substances can be manufactured
by virtually anyone with a good understanding of chemistry and access
to commercially available hardware and ingredients.
In fact, the Japanese cult, Aum Shim Rikyo, produced the toxic
nerve agent Sarin it used a few years ago in its terrorist attack on
the subways of Tokyo in just such a fashion--in a room with dimensions
of eight by fourteen feet. Suggestions that such terrorist incidents
will be precluded in the future by a prohibition on governmental stocks
of chemical weapons--a step said to eliminate the danger some chemical
weapons might be stolen and used in an unauthorized fashion--ignore the
reality of this ``home-brew'' option. The effect of the CWC on this
option will be roughly that an international treaty foreswearing bank-
robbery by governments would have on independent bank-robbers, which is
to say no beneficial impact whatsoever.
As a practical matter, neither the limits imposed by the Chemical
Weapons Convention's three schedules of chemicals nor the intrusive
inspection regime mandated by the treaty would prevent terrorist groups
like Aum Shim Rikyo from garnering chemical weapons capabilities. This
would be true even were they to produce quantities of chemical agents
deemed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John
Shalikashvili, sufficient to have a ``militarily impact'' (i.e., one
agent ton).\1\
On this point, a declassified Defense Intelligence Agency report of
February 1996 observed:
``Irrespective of whether the CWC enters into force,
terrorists will likely look upon CW as a means to gain greater
publicity and instill widespread fear. The March 1995 Tokyo
subway attack by Aum Shim Rikyo would not have been prevented
by the CWC.''
(2) The Problem of State-Support for Chemical Terrorism: A number
of the leading state-sponsors of terrorism--notably, Libya, Syria, Iraq
and North Korea--have indicated that they will not become parties to
this treaty. As a result, at least some of those who provide
infrastructural support, training and other assistance to terrorists
will be free to do so in the chemical arena, as well as with respect to
more traditional tools of the trade (e.g., Semetex plastic explosive,
fertilizer-based bombs and other high-explosives).
What is more, since the Chemical Weapons Convention's limitations
cannot be monitored with confidence, it is possible--perhaps even
likely--that at least some of the nations known to have supported
international terrorism who may become parties to the CWC (e.g.,
Russia, China, Iran and Cuba) will also be able to assist those
interested in performing acts of chemical terrorism. If the Convention
cannot ensure that such CWC counties are entirely out of the chemical
weapons business, it certainly cannot assure that those with whom these
countries deal covertly are out of that deadly business.
In the final analysis, of course, state-sponsorship of terrorism is
itself a violation of international law. The idea that nations that
routinely flout treaty obligations and international norms will behave
differently if only a new convention is adopted is absurd. The problem
is not a lack of laws or the ``tools'' they ostensibly provide to deal
with such nations and behavior. The problem is, rather, the absence of
will to use the available laws and tools to penalize state-sponsors of
terrorism and curb their malevolence.
The Bottom Line
The threat posed by chemical terrorism is a real one. Every
American should be concerned about this danger--and insistent that it
be seriously addressed by the elected and appointed officials charged
with providing for the common defense. The predictable effect of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, however, will be to reduce concern out of
a mistaken belief that the chemical threat from terrorists and others
has been appreciably lessened.
What is needed now is effective action, not placebos like the
Chemical Weapons Convention. The Antiterrorism Act demonstrates that
the United States can adopt legislation addressing the threats posed by
terrorists without being compelled to do so by international treaty.
That and other antiterrorism statutes can and should be strengthened so
as to impose severe criminal penalties on those who enable, help or
execute such attacks.
The existing, relatively verifiable international ban on use of
chemical weapons should be given teeth. U.S. intelligence efforts aimed
at identifying, penetrating and neutralizing groups that might be
inclined to engage in such activities need to be intensified and given
substantially greater resources. And a vastly increased effort should
be made to provide protection against chemical attacks not only to the
U.S. military but also to the American government and people.
By contrast, a treaty that will, in all likelihood, have the effect
of reducing investment in chemical defenses\2\ and possibly diminishing
valuable chemical-related intelligence collection by diverting efforts
to the inspection and other activities mandated by the CWC,\3\ may
actually make the U.S. more susceptible--not less--to terrorists
wielding CW. That could also be the case thanks to the treaty's
obligation on states parties to transfer chemical manufacturing
capabilities and defensive equipment to other member nations.\4\ Should
this obligation be honored by the U.S. and/or its allies, it will prove
a recipe for intensified threats emanating from terrorist-sponsoring
countries.
Finally, if--as virtually everyone agrees--chemical terrorism is
likely to occur in the future, Senators would be well advised to think
about whether they wish to be implicated by having voted for a treaty
falsely advertised as a means to prevent such incidents, but that will
be seen in retrospect to have done nothing on that score, and perhaps
actually served to make them more likely.
notes:
\1\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing the CWC Will Protect
U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997).
\2\ Ibid.
\3\ Douglas J. Feith, a leading critic of the CWC and founding
member of the Center for Security Policy's Board of Advisors, has
likened the Convention's intrusive inspection arrangements to those of
a drunk looking under a streetlamp for keys lost elsewhere simply
because the light was better there.
\4\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#5: The CWC Will Not Be Good For Business, To Say Nothing of the
National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17 February 1997).
__________
No. 97-D 38
6 March 1997
Truth or Consequences #8: The CWC Will Exacerbate the Proliferation of
Chemical Warfare Capabilities
(Washington, D.C.): In recent days, proponents of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) have taken to dissembling about the clear
meaning--and certain effect--of the treaty's Article XI. Article XI
says, in part:
``... States parties shall ... undertake to facilitate, and
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange
of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical
information relating to the development and application of
chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this Convention;
What is more--as noted in the attached article in the current
edition of the New Republic by Douglas J. Feith, a former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for chemical arms control
during the Reagan Administration and founding member of Center Board of
Advisors--Article XI goes on to say:
``[States parties shall] not maintain among themselves any
restrictions, including those in any international agreements,
incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this
Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the
development and promotion of scientific and technological
knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other
peaceful purposes. ...
In addition, the CWC's Article X declares that ``Every state party
shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, material and scientific and technological information
concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.''
`Poisons for Peace'
Any reasonable reading of this language shows that these provisions
would require the United States (in the event it ratifies the
Convention) to provide other states parties--including in all
likelihood countries like Iran, Cuba, China and Russia--with state-of-
the-art manufacturing capabilities and defensive technologies with
direct relevance to chemical warfare activities.
After all, advanced facilities designed to manufacture pesticides,
fertilizers and pharmaceuticals have the inherent capacity to produce
chemical weapons in substantial quantities. Supplying potential
adversaries with modern chemical defensive gear could equip them to
engage in chemical war. It could, in addition, aid in efforts to defeat
Western protective equipment. As the Center recently reported,\1\
General Norman Schwartzkopf recently reacted with incredulity and
horror when advised that the CWC, which he has endorsed, would have
such effects.
Will the U.S. Violate the CWC?
Remarkably, the Clinton Administration and other CWC advocates are
now claiming that the United States will not be compelled by this
treaty to transfer to nations like Iran and Cuba chemical technology
that will lend itself to diversion for military purposes. Presumably,
they think they will not have to abide by the treaty's ``obligation''
to provide chemical defensive gear to Teheran or Havana, either. Maybe
so. Still, it would be helpful to establish in advance--and formally
codify in any resolution of ratification--precisely which of the CWC's
provisions the United States will not observe. Such a step would do
much to protect against the predictable postratification demand from
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and State Department lawyers to the
effect that the United States must faithfully observe all of the
treaty's articles and obligations.
Even If We Don't, Who Else Will Observe Export Controls?
As Mr. Feith observes, even if the United States does selectively
adhere to the Convention and maintains export controls (not to say
embargoes) against Iran and Cuba, however, ``Articles X an XI will
invite other countries to transfer dangerous technology to them.
Germany can be expected to invoke the treaty against any U.S. official
who protests a planned sale of a chemical factory to, say, Iran.'' CWC
advocates' assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, voluntary
supplier control arrangements like the Australia Group are likely to
fall victim to the CWC-blessed, trade uber alles appetites of such
``friendly'' nations.\2\
What is more, one can safely predict that the prospect of foreign
competitors closing such sales will cause would-be American suppliers
to seize upon these same provisions to argue that Washington has
neither the right nor an interest in penalizing U.S. firms. This punch
has been telegraphed by the emphasis the frantically pro-CWC Chemical
Manufacturers Association has placed on the opportunity the Convention
will create for increasing exports, presumably to countries where such
U.S. exports are not currently permitted.
The Bottom Line
Douglas Feith's essay in the New Republic and an op.ed. by former
Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar
Weinberger which appeared in the Washington Post yesterday \3\ make one
point crystal clear: CWC Articles X and XI are but two of the myriad
reasons why the United States would be better off not being a party to
this Convention.
The Senate would be well-advised to give these arguments careful
consideration. Indeed, it would make sense to defer action on the
treaty's ratification until after it had been in force for some period
so as to evaluate whether these unintended and counterproductive
effects are as serious in practice as in prospect they would appear
likely to be. Either way, the Senate should resist the pressure to
rubber-stamp this accord--pressure that will only intensify as treaty
advocates realize that time is no more on their side than are the
merits of the case.
notes:
\1\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Gen. Schwartzkopf
Tells Senate He Shares Critics' Concerns About Details of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (No. 97-D 35, 27 February 1997).
\2\ For more on German behavior unbecoming an ally, see the
Center's Watch on the Rhine series, e.g., Watch On The Rhine: German
Efforts To Extort The Czechs, Forge Relations With Rogue States Are
Ominous Indicators (No. 96-C 127, 10 December 1996) and Watch On The
Rhine #2: Germany Proceeds With Bait-And-Switch Encouraging Sudeten
Claims And Moves To Reschedule Syrian Debt (No. 96-C 131, 19 December
1996).
\3\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth Or Consequences
#7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld And Weinberger Rebut Scowcroft And Deutch On
The CWC (No. 97-D 37, 5 March 1997).
Chemical Reaction: A Bad Treaty on Chemical Weapons
[By Douglas J. Feith]
It would seem an indisputable good: a treaty to eliminate poison
gas from Beijing to Buenos Aires. Yet the new Chemical Weapons
Convention is having trouble in the Senate. And the more the treaty is
debated, the deeper the trouble. In congressional hearings and public
forums, even the treaty's champions have been forced to concede our
severely limited ability to monitor compliance and enforce the ban.
As a result, the chief pro-treaty argument is no longer that the
CWC, as the treaty is acronymically known, will abolish chemical
weapons--for it obviously will not--but that the CWC is better than
nothing. Administration officials, in their standard pitch to skeptical
senators, now stress that the treaty is on balance worthwhile, if
flawed, and rebuke critics for measuring the treaty against an
unrealistic standard of ``perfection.'' ``The limits imposed by the CWC
surely are imperfect,'' former National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft and former CIA Director John Deutch contended in a recent
Washington Post op-ed, ``but ... it is hard to see how its imperfect
constraints are worse than no constraints at all.''
The it's-better-than-nothing argument has some potency. After all,
no decent person wants poison gas to proliferate. Conservatives and
liberals alike want to continue to destroy the entire U.S. chemical
arsenal regardless of what happens to the CWC. So even a small step in
the direction of global abolition would be valuable. But the treaty is
not such a step. It is not better than nothing. Indeed, it would
eliminate export controls that now impede rogue states from developing
their chemical warfare capabilities. And, as many senators have
discovered after examining the treaty's 186-page text, it would
exacerbate the problem of poison gas proliferation around the world.
Article XI, for instance, states that parties to the treaty shall:
Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would
restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.
What this means is that the United States must not restrict
chemical trade with any other CWC party--even Iran and Cuba, both of
which are CWC signatories. Similarly, CWC Article X obliges countries
to share with other parties technology relating to chemical weapons
defense. ``Each State Party,'' the article says, ``undertakes to
facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and
technological information concerning means of protection against
chemical weapons.''
Once Iran and Cuba ratify the treaty, our current export controls
against them will surely be attacked as impermissible. Furthermore,
those countries, upon joining the CWC, will claim entitlement to the
advanced countries' ``scientific and technological information'' on how
to protect their armed forces against chemical weapons. A crucial
element of an offensive chemical weapons capability is the means to
protect one's own forces from the weapons' effects.
Even if the U.S. government decides to maintain export controls
against Iran and Cuba, Articles X and XI will invite other countries to
transfer dangerous technology to them. Germany can be expected to
invoke the treaty against any U.S. official who protests a planned sale
of a chemical factory to, say, Iran. Indeed, Bonn could not only argue
that its firms are allowed to sell chemical technology to Iran, but
that they are actually obliged to do so, for Iran will have renounced
chemical weapons by joining the CWC.
Articles X and XI are modeled on similar provisions in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, called ``atoms for peace,'' which even
admirers acknowledge have spread the very nuclear technology the treaty
was intended to contain. When Iran, Iraq and North Korea became
signatories, they quickly gained access to this sensitive technology,
ostensibly ``for peaceful purposes.'' Yet it helped these outlaw states
to develop their nuclear weapons programs. The CWC encourages the same
abuse. Even Scowcroft and Deutch acknowledge ``we must ensure that the
CWC is not exploited to facilitate the diffusion of CWC specific
technology ... even to signatory states.'' Alas, the perverse product
of the CWC will be ``poisons for peace.''
Without the treaty, any country that wants to destroy its chemical
weapons can do so, as is the United States. But, for the sake of
declaring an unenforceable ban on chemical weapons possession, the CWC
will undermine existing export controls that are, in fact, doing some
good. It is a stunning, though not unprecedented, example of arms
control diplomacy resulting in the opposite of its intended effect. The
treaty brings to mind Santayana's definition of a ``fanatic'' as
someone who redoubles his effort upon losing sight of his goal. As this
absurdity impresses itself upon the Senate, that body appears intent on
rejecting the agreement, thereby sending the administration and the
world a beneficial message: arms control treaties should make us more
secure, not less.
Douglas J. Feith oversaw chemical weapons arms control as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy in the Reagan
administration.
__________
No. 97-P 50
10 April 1997
New National Poll Shows Overwhelming Public Opposition To A Flawed
Chemical Weapons Convention
(Washington, D.C.): On 4-5 April 1997, the Luntz Research Companies
conducted a national poll of 900 American adults concerning the
controversial Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This poll was intended
to ensure that public sentiments about the present treaty were properly
understood--an objective made all the more necessary by earlier canvass
performed by the Wirthlin Group. The Wirthlin poll suggested
overwhelming support for a treaty that ``would ban the production,
possession, transfer and use of poison gas.''
The Luntz Poll
This poll--which was sponsored by the Center for Security Policy, a
non-partisan educational organization specializing in national defense
and foreign policy issues--asked respondents whether they would support
the CWC if it had certain troubling characteristics and/or
implications. The text of the questions and the responses follow
(including a breakout of the views of the respondents who identified
themselves as having voted Republican in the 1996 congressional
election, since the treaty's fate will be decided by the Senate's GOP
members): \1\
``President Clinton will ask the U.S. Senate to vote in the
next few weeks for an arms control treaty called the Chemical
Weapons Convention. It is supposed to ban the production and
stockpiling of nerve gas and other chemical weapons worldwide.
Let me read you two opinions about the treaty [order of
following two paragraphs reversed in every-other question]:
``Treaty supporters point out that more than 160 countries
have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and believe it
would create international pressure to get rid of such
weapons--and punish those who keep them. They say that, even if
it does not work perfectly, it will still be better than having
no treaty at all.
``Treaty opponents--including four former Secretaries of
Defense--believe there are serious problems with this treaty.
If they are right, it will not rid the world of chemical
weapons and may, instead, have even more undesirable effects.
They believe that such problems could make the result of this
Convention worse than having no treaty at all.
``With these views in mind, I would like to ask you whether
you would strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose
or strongly oppose the Chemical Weapons Convention if it did
the following things:
``1. If only the United States and its allies wound up obeying it while
other, potentially hostile countries like Russia, China, Iran,
Iraq or North Korea keep their chemical weapons?''
Poll Results
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample
Republicans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15% Strongly support 13% Strongly Support
16% Somewhat support 14% Somewhat support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Support 31% Total Support 27%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16% Somewhat oppose 16% Somewhat Oppose
44% Strongly oppose 50% Strongly Oppose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Oppose 60% Total Oppose 66%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``2. If it would result in the transfer of technology that could help
countries like Iran, Cuba or China increase their ability to
fight chemical wars?''
Poll Results
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample
Republicans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9% Strongly support 7% Strongly support
10% Somewhat support 10% Somewhat support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Support 19% Total Support 17%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17% Somewhat oppose 14% Somewhat oppose
53% Strongly oppose 62% Strongly oppose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Oppose 70% Total Oppose 76%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``3. If countries that violated its prohibitions went unpunished?''
Poll Results
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample
Republicans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7% Strongly support 8% Strongly support
9% Somewhat support 8% Somewhat support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Support 16% Total Support 16%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17% Somewhat oppose 15% Somewhat oppose
56% Strongly oppose 61% Strongly oppose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Oppose 73% Total Oppose 76%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``4. If it would authorize UN inspectors to go to any site in the
United States, potentially without legal search warrants and
potentially risking American business or military secrets?''
Poll Results
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample
Republicans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10% Strongly support 6% Strongly support
12% Somewhat support 8% Somewhat support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Support 22% Total Support 16%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19% Somewhat oppose 19% Somewhat oppose
49% Strongly oppose 57% Strongly oppose
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Oppose 68% Total Oppose 76%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11% Other (No opinion/Don't know/Refused)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CWC Does Have These Flaws
Thanks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the
leadership of its chairman, Senator Jesse Helms, there is now little
doubt that the Chemical Weapons Convention awaiting Senate advice and
consent is defective in each and every one of these respects. In the
course of hearings the Committee held this week, an array of
unimpeachable authorities highlighted the treaty's flaws with respect
to its ineffectiveness, its technology transfer implications, its
unenforceability and its ominous implications for American
constitutional rights and businesses.
Such points were underscored by four former Secretaries of Defense
(James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Caspar Weinberger and Dick Cheney
[in the form of a letter]), a former Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (Fred Ilke), a former UN Ambassador (Jeane
Kirkpatrick) and two other, prominent former Defense Department
officials (former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith).
The Center anticipates with pleasure further hearings next week by
the Foreign Relations Committee that are expected to address in greater
detail the business, constitutional, intelligence and military issues
associated with the Chemical Weapons Convention. It calls upon the
Senate Armed Services Committee and Intelligence Committees to exercise
their respective oversight responsibilities as well before the full
Senate is asked to address this fatally flawed treaty. Such hearings
can only serve to inform the debate about the CWC and reinforce the
need for it to be conducted in a rigorous and deliberate manner--not
the artificially constrained, superficial and disinformed consideration
the Clinton Administration would prefer from the Senate.
notes:
\1\ The Poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.3%. Subtotals
reflect rounding of responses.
__________
No. 97-D 46
27 March 1997
Truth or Consequences #9: CWC Proponents Dissemble About Treaty
Arrangements Likely To Disserve U.S. Interests
(Washington, D.C.): In recent weeks, a number of arguments have
been advanced by proponents of the controversial Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) to counter concerns expressed by the treaty's critics.
The more important of these have been rebutted in previous papers in
this Truth or Consequences series.\1\ Several of the advocates' other
misrepresentations appear, by comparison, to be relatively
insignificant at this moment. To the extent that these statements
encourage Senators to underestimate the problems with this Convention,
however, it is important that the facts be clearly established with
regard to these issues, as well.
Generically, the statements in question fall in the category of
mechanics and other organizational aspects of the institutional
arrangements established by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Of
particular concern are the following points:
`The Laugh Test'--Ha!
In response to concerns that foreign governments might abuse the
CWC's intrusive inspection provisions to acquire proprietary
information from American companies, treaty advocates have claimed that
the Convention provides a mechanism for screening out any requests for
challenge inspections that are frivolous or abusive. Some have called
this colloquially the ``laugh test'': They note that, as long as three-
quarters of the Executive Council (excluding the requesting party and
the party to be inspected) of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--the new UN bureaucracy established in The
Hague pursuant to this treaty--determine that an inspection is
frivolous, the inspection can be foreclosed.
In practice, though, it is hard to see how this ``laugh test'' will
be able to protect American companies, including many that have nothing
to do with the manufacture of chemicals--to say nothing of any
involvement in the production of chemical weapons.\2\ After all, under
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the following factors will be at work:
No Timely Basis for Declaring an Inspection Frivolous: According to
the CWC's Article IX, paragraph 17, the OPCW's Executive Council will
have just 12 hours after receipt of an inspection request to determine
whether it is a frivolous or abusive one. Making such a determination
will be problematic, however, since there is no requirement at that
juncture for the challenging state party to identify the company or
site to be inspected.
The nation requesting the challenge inspection is initially
required only to identify the country in which the site is located, the
port of entry to be used by inspectors and the nature of the concern as
it relates to the treaty (Part X, Section B, paragraph 4). In fact, the
challenging party does not have to name the exact site to be inspected
until 12 hours before inspectors are to arrive at the point of entry
(Part X, Section B, paragraph 6). This will be well after the time by
which a ruling on frivolity must have been rendered.
No Opportunity to Object: There will, as a practical matter, be no
way for a country (or one of its companies) to object that an
inspection is frivolous. Not only will they not know of the precise
inspection request in time to appeal to the Executive Council for
relief but--in the unlikely event that they do learn of the location to
be inspected prior to the Executive Council's timeframe for acting--the
party to be inspected is precluded by the treaty from participating in
Council deliberations on the frivolousness of the request (Article X,
paragraph 17).
Little Chance of Prevailing in the Executive Council: Even if the
United States had the requisite information to argue that a challenge
inspection would be frivolous or abusive and was in a position to make
that argument before the Executive Council, the composition of that
body makes it unlikely that American objections would be respected by
three-quarters of the members. In standard U.N. style, the 41 seats
(held for 2-year terms) are apportioned regionally: 9 African nations,
9 Asian, 7 Latin American and Caribbean, 5 Eastern European, 1 rotating
between Asian or Latin and Caribbean nations and 10 Western European or
``other'' nations (the United States is an ``other'' nation for the
purposes of the CWC).
The United States has neither a guaranteed seat on the Council nor
a veto. If standard U.N. practice applies, Washington will find it hard
to muster a majority--let alone a super-majority of three-quarters of
the membership--in support of its positions. What is more, the U.S.
government will almost certainly be disinclined to object to
inspections of any but the most patently sensitive government
installations on the grounds that doing so will create precedents and
otherwise facilitate foreign efforts to impede valid inspections.
`No Go' on Adding Chemicals to the Schedules
In the wake of revelations that Russia has been covertly developing
new classes of extremely toxic chemical weapons using ingredients
deliberately left off the CWC's Schedules of Chemicals, treaty
proponents have claimed that such chemicals could easily be added to
the list. Unfortunately, such statements ignore two inconvenient facts:
Revealing Formulas for Chemical Weapons May Do More Harm than Good:
In the event the United States learns the composition of a novel
chemical agent--such as the Russian A-232 nerve agent--it is highly
unlikely that the U.S. would seek to add these chemicals (or their
precursors) to the Annex on Chemicals. After all, adding these
compounds to the Annex means making public the chemical structure of
the agent, thereby undermining efforts to limit the spread of chemical
weapons expertise and knowledge, especially to rogue states. Since U.S.
intelligence has low confidence in its ability under the CWC to detect
illicit Novichok-related activities in Russia (assuming Russia
ultimately decides to ratify the treaty) the costs of adding A-232 to
the Annex on Chemicals--measured in terms of abetting chemical weapons
proliferation--far outweigh any potential benefits.
Impediments to Adding Chemicals to the CWC's Schedules: Even if the
United States should wish to add an agent or precursor to the Chemical
Weapons Convention's schedule, the process is not the simple
undertaking that proponents have led the public to believe. To the
contrary, it is a long and complicated one.
For one thing, modifications to the Annex on Chemicals are not
treated as formal ``amendments'' to the Convention. ``Changes'' to the
Annex on Chemicals, including additions of new chemicals to the
schedules, are treated as administrative or technical in nature.
Consequently, special provisions and procedures apply (Article XV,
paragraph 4): Any state party may propose a change to the Annex on
Chemicals. The proposal is then sent to the Director-General, who
forwards it to states parties and the Executive Council (Article XV,
paragraph 5(a)).
Within 90 days of receipt, the Executive Council makes a
recommendation to states parties on whether to accept or reject the
proposal. The decision requires a simple majority of the Executive
Council (Article XV, paragraph 5(c)). If the Council recommends that
the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved unless a state
party objects within 90 days, and the changes will enter into force 180
days after formal notification of its acceptance by State Parties
(Article XV, paragraph 5(d) & (g)). If a state party objects, a
decision on the proposal will be taken as ``a matter of substance'' by
the Conference of State Parties at its next session (Article XV,
paragraph 5(c)).
Conferences are only held on an annual basis, however. Even then,
as the treaty puts it, decisions taken in such Conferences on ``matters
of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus.'' If
consensus is not possible, the Conference shall take a decision by a
two-thirds majority of members present and voting (Article VIII,
paragraph 18). Currently, this would entail garnering the support of 51
out of 70 state parties to the Convention.
To make this process less abstract, assume that the U.S. government
(a) knows the composition of a new chemical weapons agent (or
precursor) and (b) has reached inter-agency agreement to seek inclusion
of the compounds in the Annex on Chemicals--possibly over the objection
of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. The following is a scenario
describing what would be entailed in effecting such a change:
C-Day: The United States proposes the change to the OPCW's
Director-General;
C + 3 months: The Executive Council recommends acceptance of
the U.S. proposal;
C + 6 months: Russia, for example, objects.
C + 6-to-18 months: An annual Conference is held to address,
among other things, the proposed change. The United States
musters the two-thirds votes necessary.
C + 12-to-24 months: Change becomes effective--up to 2 years
after the initial request.
Alternatively, if the United States cannot enlist two-thirds
of the states parties, the change will not be adopted.
It is important to note that, even if the CWC's proponents were
correct in their representations that it will be easy to add chemicals
to the treaty's Schedules, it is not clear that U.S. interests would be
served by that arrangement, either. After all, addition of chemicals to
Schedules 1 or 2, or relocation from Schedule 3 to Schedule 2 over
Washington's objections could impinge significantly on the reporting
and inspection burden imposed on U.S. companies and on American
chemical export opportunities. In theory at least, changes in the
Schedules could broaden the treaty's scope so as to cover hundreds,
possibly thousands, of additional companies. The Senate would have no
say over such changes--even if they were to have the effect of
significantly altering the CWC's costs.
House of Cards
The Chemical Weapons Convention requires states parties to declare
whether they have chemical weapons and where they were produced within
30 days after the treaty enters into force. Since the preponderance of
the CWC's reporting, regulatory and inspection arrangements hinge on
voluntary declarations, unwillingness of parties to provide full and
accurate reports of their capabilities will significantly diminish even
the putative value of this Convention.
Of the countries that have so far ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention, not one has publicly affirmed that it has chemical weapons.
While they will not be obliged to make a formal declaration until May
29th, the fact that not even India--which is widely believed to have
chemical warfare capabilities--has intimated that it is a CW state
bodes ill for the candidness of future disclosures. What is more, there
is no reason to believe that China, Iran, Pakistan or other states
judged to have active chemical warfare programs will acknowledge that
reality. Even Russia, which has, under the now moribund U.S.-Russian
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, affirmed that it is a chemical weapons
state, has consistently understated and otherwise misrepresented the
nature and size of its chemical arsenal.
It will only be possible to calibrate the gravity of this problem
thirty-days after entry into force (or after countries like Russia,
China and Iran) deposit their instruments of ratification. The United
States would be well-advised to wait until that point to become a state
party.
The Bottom Line
While these issues may appear relatively minor compared with the
Chemical Weapons Convention's other major defects--notably, the United
States' inability to monitor compliance with the treaty with even
moderate confidence; its prospective costs in terms of Americans'
constitutional rights and their businesses' proprietary information;
and the danger that the CWC's Articles X and XI will actually
exacerbate the chemical warfare threat while the treaty's placebo
effect diminishes U.S. preparedness to deal with that threat. Still,
the truth about these ``mechanical'' aspects of the treaty once again
belie assurances provided by the CWC's proponents and further compound
the down-sides associated with U.S. ratification of the present
Convention.
notes:
\1\ To obtain copies of these papers, please check the Center's
Website (http://www.security-policy.org) or contact the Center at 202-
466-0515.
\2\ See Truth or Consequences #5: The CWC Will Not Be Good for
Business--To Say Nothing of the National Interest (No. 97-D 27, 17
February 1997) for more information about the number and kinds of
companies likely to fall under the purview of the CWC's reporting,
regulatory and inspection regime.
__________
No. 97-P 40
17 March 1997
The Weekly Standard Weighs in on the CWC: `Just Say No to a Bad Treaty'
(Washington, D.C.): According to the Washington Post, the debate
over the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has become one ``between
conservatives.'' A variation on this theme is the claim that it is a
debate ``between internationalists and isolationists''--read, ``good''
conservatives who appreciate the importance of American power and
leadership in the world and ``bad'' conservatives who believe the
United States can safely walk away from international affairs and
responsibilities.
Fortunately, the fraudulent nature of such characterizations is
revealed in the attached editorial which leads the current issue of one
of American conservatism's most influential periodicals--The Weekly
Standard. As the Standard puts it:
``What we really have here is the continuation of one of this
century's most enduring disputes. In the first camp are the
high priests of arms control theology, who have never met an
international agreement they didn't like. In the second camp
are those who take a more skeptical view of relying on a piece
of watermarked, signed parchment for safety in a dangerous
world. The case for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention
is a triumph of hope over experience.''
The magazine goes on to describe the debate over the CWC as one
essentially between those who subscribe to ``Reaganite
internationalism'' on the one hand and ``the more starry-eyed Wilsonian
version'' on the other--a difference it says is rooted in the principle
that ``treaties must reflect reality, not hope.'' Perhaps even more
important is its practical guidance to conservatives who would prefer
to be in the former camp rather than the latter:
``In the Reagan years, the treaty was mostly a sop to
liberals in Congress, an attempt to pick up some points for an
arms control measure at a time when Reagan was trying to win on
more important issues like the defense buildup and the
Strategic Defense Initiative. And President Bush pushed the
treaty in no small part because he had disliked having to cast
a tie-breaking vote in the Senate as Vice President in favor of
building chemical weapons. Republicans today are under no
obligation to carry out the mistakes of their predecessors.
``In one respect, the debate over the Chemical Weapons
Convention calls to mind the struggle for the party's soul
waged in the 1970's between Kissingerian detente-niks on one
side and the insurgent forces led by Ronald Reagan on the
other. Back then, conservative Republicans like Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott knew without hesitation where they stood.
They should stand where they stood before, foursquare with the
ideas that helped win the cold war, and against the Chemical
Weapons Convention.'' (Emphasis added.)
Just Say No To A Bad Treaty
The Weekly Standard/March 24, 1997.--The United States Senate must
decide by April 28 whether to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The press, the pundits, and the Clinton administration have treated the
debate over the treaty as another in a series of battles between
``internationalists'' and ``isolationists'' in the new, post-Cold War
era.
It isn't. What we really have here is the continuation of one of
this century's most enduring disputes. In the first camp are the high
priests of arms control theology, who have never met an international
agreement they didn't like. In the second camp are those who take a
more skeptical view of relying on a piece of watermarked, signed
parchment for safety in a dangerous world.
The case for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention is a triumph
of hope over experience. It is an attempt to reform the world by
collecting signatures. Some of the most dangerous nations--Iraq, Syria,
Libya, and North Korea--have not ratified the convention and, for all
we know, never will. Some of the nations that are signatories, like
Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba, are manifestly unreliable and are
already looking for ways to circumvent the convention's provisions.
The convention's most prominent American defenders admit that the
agreement is probably not verifiable. And it isn't. Chemical weapons
can be produced in small but deadly amounts in tiny makeshift
laboratories. The nerve gas used by terrorists to poison subway riders
in Japan in 1995, for instance, was produced in a 14 ft.-by-8 ft. room.
No one in the American intelligence community believes we would be able
to monitor compliance with an international chemical weapons regime
with any reasonable degree of confidence.
The Washington Post opines that these failings in the convention--
the very fact ``that the coverage of this treaty falls short and that
enforcement is uncertain''--are actually arguments for ratifying it.
Presumably, signature of a flawed treaty will make all of us work
harder to perfect it.
Great.
At the end of the day, the strongest argument proponents of
ratification can offer is that, whatever a treaty's manifest flaws, it
is better to have one than not to have one. How could it be bad to have
a treaty outlawing production of chemical weapons, no matter how full
of holes it may be?
Well, actually, such a treaty could be worse than no treaty at
all. We have pretty good evidence from the bloody history of this
century that treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention--treaties
that are more hortatory than mandatory, that express good intentions
more than they require any actions to back up those intentions can do
more harm than good. They are part of a psychological process of
evasion and avoidance of tough choices. The truth is, the best way of
controlling chemical weapons proliferation could be for the United
States to bomb a Libyan chemical weapons factory.
But that is the kind of difficult decision for an American
president that the Chemical Weapons Convention does nothing to
facilitate. Indeed, the existence of a chemical weapons treaty would
make it less likely that a president would order such strong unilateral
action, since he would be bound to turn over evidence of a violation to
the international lawyers and diplomats and wait for their
investigation and con-
currence. And as Richard Perle has recently noted, even after Saddam
Hussein used chemical weapons in flagrant violation of an existing
prohibition against their use, the international bureaucrats
responsible for monitoring these matters could not bring themselves to
denounce Iraq by name. In the end, it would be easier for a president
to order an airstrike than to get scores of nations to agree on naming
one of their own an outlaw.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is what Peter Rodman calls ``junk
arms control,'' and not the least of its many drawbacks is that it
gives effective arms control a bad name. Effective treaties codify
decisions nations have already made: to end a war on certain terms, for
instance, or to define fishing rights. Because they reflect the will of
the parties, moreover, the parties themselves don't raise obstacles to
verification.
But treaties whose purpose is to rope in rogue nations that have
not consented, or whose consent is widely understood to be cynical and
disingenuous, are something else again. They are based on a worldview
that is at best foolishly optimistic and at worst patronizing and
deluded.
One of the important things separating Reaganite internationalism
from the more starry-eyed Wilsonian version is the understanding that
treaties must reflect reality, not hope. The Chemical Weapons
Convention turns the clock back to the kind of Wilsonian thinking
characteristic of the Carter administration. It is unfortunate that
among its strongest backers are some prominent Republicans who have
served in key foreign-policy positions. It is true that the origins of
the Chemical Weapons Convention date back to the Reagan years, and the
convention was carried to fruition by the Bush administration. But
let's be candid. In the Reagan years, the treaty was mostly a sop to
liberals in Congress, an attempt to pick up some points for an arms
control measure at a time when Reagan was trying to win on more
important issues like the defense buildup and the Strategic Defense
Initiative. And President Bush pushed the treaty in no small part
because he had disliked having to cast a tiebreaking vote in the Senate
as vice president in favor of building chemical weapons. Republicans
today are under no obligation to carry out the mistakes of their
predecessors.
In one respect, the debate over the Chemical Weapons Convention
calls to mind the struggle for the party's soul waged in the 1970s
between Kissingerian detente-niks on one side and the insurgent forces
led by Ronald Reagan on the other. Back then, conservative Republicans
like Senate majority leader Trent Lott knew without hesitation where
they stood. They should stand where they stood before, foursquare with
the ideas that helped win the Cold War, and against the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
__________
No. 97-D 24
10 February 1997
Truth or Consequences #4: No D.N.A. Tests Needed To Show That Claims
About Republican Paternity Of CWC Are Overblown
(Washington, D.C.): The Clinton Administration's hole card in its
bid to persuade a Republican-controlled Senate to agree to ratification
of the controversial Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) appears to be
the contention that the fathers of this treaty are Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George Bush. The most recent and visible manifestation of
this gambit was Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Mr.
Bush in Texas last Saturday to secure a public statement of his support
for the CWC.
The Administration's reasoning seems to be that Republican Senators
will be willing to disregard myriad, serious concerns about the
substance of this accord and vote for it simply because two Presidents
of their party were involved in its negotiation. This tactic may be
explained by the fact that any arms control for which Mr. Clinton is
seen as principally responsible will be viewed with skepticism by more
than a third of the Senate--a number sufficient under the Constitution
to defeat treaties.\1\ Still, the idea that demonstrating Republican
paternity for a flawed agreement will be sufficient to secure its
ratification suggests a low regard for GOP Senators and their sense of
responsibility when it comes to the Senate's constitutional role as
equal partner with the executive in treaty-making.
Not So Fast--This is Not Ronald Reagan's Treaty
This proposition is even more extraordinary since the degree of
Republican responsibility for the treaty as it now stands is, in
important ways, less than the Clinton Administration would have
Senators believe.
For example, in Sunday's New York Times, a letter signed by a
number of senior Reagan Administration officials takes strong exception
to the suggestion that the President they served is implicated in the
agreement ultimately signed in January 1993. The signatories are the
following distinguished former office-holders: Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency Director Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary of Defense
Fred Ikle, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and Deputy
Assistant Secretaries of Defense Douglas Feith and Frank Gaffney.
This joint letter notes, in part:
``It is a distortion of recent history for supporters of the
controversial new Chemical Weapons Convention to describe it as
a product of the Reagan Administration, implying that the
treaty has Ronald Reagan's imprimatur.
``The Convention now being debated in the Senate is a very
different document from the chemical weapons ban the Reagan
Administration was negotiating. The principal difference is
that the Chemical Weapons Convention is hopelessly
unenforceable. Cynical signatories like Iran, China, Russia and
Cuba know that they could ratify it, make and store nerve gas
in violation of it, almost certainly escape detection and
certainly escape serious penalty.
``The Clinton Administration has recently told Senate leaders
in considerable detail that it has no intention of imposing
meaningful punishment on treaty violators. It has also admitted
that American intelligence cannot certify confidence in our
ability to detect illegal production and stockpiling of
chemical weapons in secretive countries, even in militarily
significant quantities.
``We know that the Chemical Weapons Convention, in its
current form, would never have been accepted as consistent with
President Reagan's policies. President Reagan was clearsighted
and principled in his opposition to arms control treaties that
could be violated with impunity.'' (Emphasis added.)
Changed Circumstances Have Significantly Altered President Bush's
Treaty
What is more, there have been significant changes in a number of
the assumptions, conditions and circumstances that underpinned the Bush
Administration's judgment that the Chemical Weapons Convention was in
the national interest. These changes have prompted several top Bush
Administration officials--including Secretary of Defense Richard
Cheney, Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak, Assistant Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency Director Kathleen Bailey, Assistant to the
Secretary for Atomic Energy Robert Barker and Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch--to urge that the present
treaty be rejected by the Senate.\2\
An illustrative sample of the changes that have materially altered
the acceptability, if not strictly speaking the terms, of the Chemical
Weapons Convention include the following:
Item: Russia's Evisceration of the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement
The Bush Administration anticipated that a Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA) forged by Secretary of State James Baker and his Soviet
counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze in 1990, would critically underpin the
Chemical Weapons Convention. As the Center for Security Policy observed
last week,\3\ this agreement obliged Moscow to provide a full and
accurate accounting and eliminate most of its vast chemical arsenal.
The BDA was also expected to afford the U.S. inspection rights that
would significantly enhance the more limited arrangements provided for
by the CWC.
These assumptions about the BDA have, regrettably, not been
fulfilled. To the contrary, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
declared last year that the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has
``outlived its usefulness'' for Russia. What is more, it is now public
knowledge that Russia is continuing to produce extremely lethal binary
munitions--weapons that have been specifically designed to circumvent
the limits and defeat the inspection regime of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. \4\
Item: On-Site Inspections Won't Prevent Cheating
When the Bush Administration finalized the CWC, there was
considerable hope that intrusive on-site inspections would meaningfully
contribute to the detection and proof of violations, and therefore to
deterring them. Five years of experience with the U.N. inspections in
Iraq--inspections that were allowed to be far more thorough, timely and
intrusive than those permitted under this Convention--have established
that totalitarian rulers of a closed society can successfully defeat
such monitoring efforts.
In a 4 February 1997 letter to National Security Advisor Samuel
Berger, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms noted
that:
``Unclassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate
on U.S. Monitoring Capabilities [prepared after Mr. Bush left
office] indicate that it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able
to detect or address violations in a timely fashion, if at all,
when they occur on a small scale. And yet, even small-scale
diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons production are
capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far in excess of a
single ton, [which General Shalikashvili described in
congressional testimony on 11 August 1994 as a level which
could, `in certain limited circumstances ... have a military
impact.'] Moreover, few countries, if any, are engaging in much
more than small-scale production of chemical agent. For
example, according to [the 4 February 1997] Washington Times,
Russia may produce its new nerve agents at a `pilot plant' in
quantities of only `55 to 110 tons annually.' ''
Item: Facilitating Proliferation: `Poisons for Peace'
In the years since the Bush Administration signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention, it has become increasingly clear that sharing
nuclear weapons-relevant technology simply with would-be proliferators
simply because they promise not to pursue nuclear weapons programs is
folly. Indeed, countries like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan,
Argentina, Brazil and Algeria have abused this ``Atoms for Peace''
bargain by diverting equipment and know-how provided under the Nuclear
NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) to prohibited weapons purposes.
Unfortunately, commercial chemical manufacturing technology can, if
anything, be diverted even more easily to weapons purposes than can
nuclear research and power reactors. For this reason, recent experience
with the NPT suggests that the Chemical Weapons Convention's Article
XI--an article dubbed the ``Poisons for Peace'' provision--is
insupportable. It stipulates that the Parties shall:
``Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would
restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.''
Such an obligation must now be judged a recipe for accelerating
proliferation of chemical weapons, not restricting it. Even if the
United States were to become a party to the CWC and choose to ignore
this treaty commitment, other advanced industrialized countries will
certainly not refrain from selling dual-use chemical manufacturing
technology if it means making a lucrative sale.
Item: U.S. Chemical Defenses Will be Degraded
When the Bush Administration signed the CWC, proponents offered
assurances that the treaty would not diminish U.S. investment in
chemical defenses. Such assurances were called into question, however,
by an initiative unveiled in 1995 by the then-Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens. He suggested cutting $805
million from counter-proliferation support and chemical and biological
defense programs through Fiscal Year 2001. The rationale: Thanks to a
perceived reduction in the chemical warfare threat to be brought about
by the CWC, investments in countering that threat could safely enjoy
lower priority.
This reduction would have deferred, if not seriously disrupted,
important chemical and biological research and development efforts, and
delayed the procurement of proven technologies. While the Owens
initiative was ultimately defeated, it is a foretaste of the sort of
reduced budgetary priority this account will surely face if the CWC is
approved.
Changes in the military postures of key U.S. allies since the end
of the Bush Administration raise a related point: Even if the United
States manages to resist the sirens' song to reduce chemical defenses
in the wake of the CWC, it is predictable that the already generally
deplorable readiness of most allied forces to deal with chemical
threats will only worsen. To the extent that the U.S. is obliged in the
future to fight coalition wars, this vulnerability could prove
catastrophic to American forces engaged with a common enemy.
Item: Clinton Repudiates Bush Commitment to the JCS on
R.C.A.s
At the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992, President
Bush signed an executive order that explicitly allowed Riot Control
Agents (for example, tear gas) to be used in rescuing downed aircrews
and in dispersing hostile forces using civilians to screen their
movements against U.S. positions. The Clinton Administration has stated
its intention to rescind this executive order once the CWC is ratified.
The result could be to compel U.S. personnel to choose between using
lethal force where RCAs would suffice or suffering otherwise avoidable
casualties.
Worse yet, the Clinton reversal of the Bush Administration position
on RCAs may mean that promising new defense technologies--involving
chemical-based, non-lethal weapons (for example, immobilizing agents)--
may be restricted or prohibited by this Convention. If so, U.S. forces
may be denied highly effective means of prevailing in future conflicts
with minimal loss of life on either side.
The Bottom Line
The foregoing considerations make clear that Senators should
consider the Chemical Weapons Convention carefully on its merits. They
should, in particular, resist the Clinton Administration's pressure to
ignore this treaty's flaws out of some sense of duty to earlier
administrations. A treaty that has little in common with Ronald
Reagan's approach to arms control and that has undergone material
changes in circumstances since George Bush's presidency must be seen
for what it is: a defective agreement that is unworthy of the
intensive--and increasingly misleading--campaign being mounted for its
ratification by the current resident of the White House and his team.
notes:
\1\ Presumably, it is for this reason, that the administration has
strenuously resisted demands that major changes it has been negotiating
to the Conventional Forces in Europe and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
be submitted for the Senate's advice and consent.
\2\ See the Center's Transition Brief entitled Here We Go Again:
Clinton Presses Anew For Senate Approval of Flawed, Unverifiable,
Ineffective Chemical Weapons Treaty (No. 97-T 5, 8 January 1997).
\3\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences
#3: Clinton `Makes a Mistake About It' in Arguing the CWC Will Protect
U.S. Troops (No. 97-D 21, 6 February 1997).
\4\ See the Center's Decision Brief entitled Russia's Covert
Chemical Weapons Program Vindicates Jesse Helms' Continuing Opposition
to Phony CW Arms Control (No. 97-D 19, 4 February 1997).
__________
Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Others at White House, April 4,
1997 Chemical Weapons Convention Event
Also Speaking: Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Former Secretary of State
James Baker, Former Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker (R-KS)
Vice President Gore. Please. Be seated, ladies and gentlemen.
On behalf of the President it is my pleasure to welcome all of you
on this beautiful spring day to the White House.
I'm very pleased to be here this morning with a most distinguished
group of Americans joining the President here today: the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of
Commerce, our U.N. Ambassador, other members of the Cabinet and the
administration; leaders from the legislative branch, Senators Biden and
Levin and others; former government officials and current ones,
Democrats and Republicans; wise patriots like General Colin Powell and
former Secretary of State Jim Baker; Paul Nitze, other strategists; Ed
Rowny; leaders in our strategic thinking in America over the years;
former Senators Warren Rudman and Nancy Kassebaum Baker and David
Boren; General John Shalikashvili and other military leaders; and, I'm
sure, a bunch of others that I may have accidentally overlooked, but
this is quite a distinguished bipartisan gathering--Dick Holbrooke, the
negotiator of the Bosnia accord, and quite a few others.
You look at this group, and you go down the list, and you see
individuals--men and women in different political parties, different
points on the ideological spectrum--and you think immediately of dozens
of important issues that have faced America where these individuals
have argued with one another and been on different sides, passionately.
But on this issue, every single one of them is in agreement
because, looking at this from whatever point of view you want to look
at it, these individuals have concluded this is very definitely in the
best interest of the United States of America. The time has come to
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
From the killing fields of the Ardennes in World War I to those of
Halabja in Iraq, to Tokyo's subways and beyond, over all that distance,
chemical weapons have traced an insidious path of unspeakable horror
through our century. It's been a long time since World War I. Allow me
to say that the oral history of my own family teaches lessons about
what happened there. My father's older brother went from the hills of
middle Tennessee as a teenager to join the Army and served with our
troops in World War I in Europe. He came home a broken man because he
had been a victim of poison gas. He lived for a long time--coughing,
wheezing, limited in his ability to move around. He had one lung
removed and part of another. And his life--he made a lot of his life,
but it was very nearly ruined by that experience.
So many millions of families around the world came into personal
contact with the horrors of poison gas in World War I that the world
arrived at a rare moral consensus that chemical weapons ought to be
forever banned. And it lasted for a while, but then that consensus
started to erode. And when some started using these terrible weapons
again, as is always the case when memories had faded, the world said,
``Now, wait a minute, how should we react to that?'' Those who focused
on it clearly spoke up and said, ``We've got to react strongly, this is
awful, this should be condemned.'' Others were busy with other things,
and it's a natural process.
But now the world has focused again. The time has come to
reestablish that moral consensus. And as always, the world looks to the
United States of America for leadership, and we provided leadership,
starting in former President Reagan's administration when this was
begun. And then it was concluded in the negotiating phase in former
President Bush's administration. And now, in President Clinton's
administration, the cup passes to the Congress.
But our whole country has a chance to say to the Congress: Do the
right thing. Now is the moment, because now, on the cusp of a new
century, we can join in common cause to end this scourge. As we've done
with pride and conviction so many times this past century, we can once
again here in the United States lead the international community on a
new path toward safety and security. This is an opportunity to help
ensure that the 20th century is the first and last century in which our
soldiers and our citizens will live under the dangerous clouds of the
threat posed by chemical weapons. This is our chance to act in a manner
befitting a strong nation and a wise people, so that we can say
confidently to future generations that here in our time, we came
together across party lines, and we did everything we could to control
these weapons of mass and inhumane destruction. On this we must be
clear, bold, and united.
Now it is my pleasure to introduce the individual in the
President's Cabinet who is leading the charge on behalf of the
President to seek confirmation of this important agreement: our
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright.
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President.
The presence of so many distinguished backers of the treaty here
today demonstrates support that is broad, bipartisan, and growing.
There are some people who say the treaty is flawed because we
cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by outlaw states.
This is like saying that we should not pass a law against drug
smuggling, because we cannot assume full compliance by drug
traffickers. We cannot allow the rules of the international system to
be set by the enemies of the international system.
As Secretary of State and as an American, I'm also concerned about
our leadership in the fight to stop the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. If the Senate were to reject the CWC, we would be isolated
from our allies and on the same side as countries such as Libya and
Iraq. The problem countries will never accept a prohibition on chemical
weapons if America stays out and keeps them company and gives them
cover. We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support
strong action against violators if we ourselves refuse to join the
treaty being violated.
The time for Senate action is now. The treaty has been pending in
the Senate for 180 weeks.
It's been the subject of more than a dozen hearings and hours of
briefings. And we have supplied more than 1,500 pages of testimony,
reports, correspondence and answers for the record concerning it.
In summary, this treaty is a test of our ability to follow through
on commitments. It reflects existing American practices, and advances
enduring American interests. It is right and smart for America, and it
deserves the Senate's timely support.
Thank you. (Applause.)
Secretary Cohen. Thank you very much, Secretary Albright. As we
have all seen, you continue to throw the ball straight and hard and
right down the middle. (Laughter.)
Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, I believe, is
indeed a critical test of American leadership, but as Secretary of
Defense, I want to urge the Senate to ratify the treaty for another
important reason. Quite simply, this treaty is critical to the safety
of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. The Chemical Weapons
Convention is needed to protect and defend the men and women in uniform
who protect and defend our country. We live in a world today in which
we find regional aggressors, third-rate armies, terrorist groups and
religious cults who may view lethal chemical agents as the cheapest and
most effective weapon against American troops in the field. Our troops,
in fact, may be in greater risk of a chemical attack today than in the
past. Because America's forces are the world's most powerful,
adversaries are more likely to try to challenge us asymmetrically
through the use of nonconventional means such as chemical weapons.
So, to protect against this threat, we've developed an array of
tools, ranging from protective suits to theater missile defenses. By
limiting the chemical weapons threat, the CWC strengthens these tools
and our ability to protect our troops and our nation from chemical
attack. And that's why our military leaders who stand before us stand
firmly behind America's ratification of this treaty. They understand
that we can far better protect our nation working to abolish chemical
weapons from the world rather than stockpiling and threatening to use
them. They believe, as I believe that ratification of the CWC is
critical to America's security. And I am pleased to introduce someone
who has played a major role in negotiating this vital treaty, former
Secretary of State Jim Baker. (Applause.)
Mr. Baker. Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, distinguished guests,
ladies and gentlemen: As we've heard, the Chemical Weapons Convention
was negotiated under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
The argument that some have used against ratification of the CWC is
that it would somehow undermine our national security. Frankly, the
suggestion that George Bush and Ronald Reagan would negotiate a treaty
detrimental to this nation's security is outrageous.
Ratification of the CWC is at its core really a test of American
leadership. If we fail to ratify this treaty, we will forego the
influence we would otherwise have had in the continuing international
effort against chemical weapons. If we fail to ratify this treaty, we
will postpone indefinitely any progress on a ban against the equally
dire threat of biological weapons. And if we fail to ratify, we will
also isolate ourselves from our friends in the international arena, and
we will, as the Secretary of State has just told you, throw in our lot
with the rogue states which oppose this treaty.
But most importantly of all, my friends, if we fail to ratify the
CWC, we will be sending a clear signal of retreat from international
leadership, both to our allies and to our enemies alike. This is a
message we should never, never send. Instead, we should send another
message; we should send a message that the United States of America is
a nation aware of our international responsibilities and a nation
confident enough to assume them. In a word, we should send a message
that America is prepared to continue to lead. And that is why all of us
are here--Republicans and Democrats alike. And that is why the Senate
should immediately ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Now its my distinct privilege to introduce to you my kissin'
cousin, the former Senator from Kansas, Nancy Kassebaum Baker.
(Laughter, applause.)
Ms. Baker. Thank you. Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, and to
distinguished friends who are gathered here today, many of whom played
a key and important role over the years in the negotiations and debates
regarding the Chemical Weapons treaty, I'm sure that I would be
expressing on the part of most of the American people a deep sense of
appreciation and gratitude for your dedication which has brought us to
this point today.
As a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 16
years who strongly supported President Reagan's efforts to negotiate
this treaty, President Bush's efforts to complete it, and President
Clinton's efforts to ratify it, I can attest to the strong bipartisan
support for this convention over the years.
Our success in meeting the challenge of stopping the spread of
chemical weapons will depend on our vigilance. No treaty can have
perfect verification. No treaty will be 100 percent successful in
eliminating a threat. But if we hold out for perfection, we will
squander the opportunity, as has been said by all the speakers, to join
with a growing number of nations to deal now with this serious
challenge to our security.
Over the 4 years that the convention has been before the Senate,
valid concerns have been raised. There have been 13 hearings to date,
many questions answered, and numerous reports written. While to a
foreign observer our internal debate may seem confusing, it is in fact
the essential ingredient to forging a consensus. Our democratic
traditions provide the foundation on which U.S. Leadership is built.
I must commend President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott for the intense and productive negotiations which have been
undertaken to this date to address the concerns that have been raised.
I'm confident that these efforts will lead to a successful ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and continued U.S. Leadership on
this issue.
As David Boren, Brent Scowcroft, and myself recently wrote the
President, and I quote, ``We believe that the real issue at stake is
American leadership, not only on this critical issue of chemical
weapons proliferation, but also with ramifications far broader--on a
far broader array of issues which directly affect our interests.
It is for these reasons that we urge you, Mr. President, not to
waiver in your efforts to win ratification in the U.S. Senate.''
It's now my honor to introduce a colleague who came at the same
time as I did to the U.S. Senate, in 1978. We've worked together on
many issues. He now is the president of Oklahoma University. But his
leadership over the years in the U.S. Senate has been central to our
efforts to forge bipartisan consensus on such important issues as the
one before us today. David Boren.
Mr. Boren (Former U.S. Senator (D-OK)). Thank you very much,
Senator Kassebaum Baker, and it's a privilege to have another
opportunity to work with you on an important bipartisan cause for our
country.
During the 6 years that I chaired the U.S. Senate Intelligence
Committee, time and time again our intelligence experts came before our
committee to warn us that the greatest threat to our national security
and to the next generation is the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical weapons. This threat is intensified as
these weapons become available to some of the least responsible nations
in the world and to the terrorist groups which they shelter.
The decision we must soon make about the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention is one of those decisions on which history
will judge us, and I am proud to stand with those gathered today to
urge its ratification.
At the end of World War II, America faced a new world situation
with the beginning of the cold war. We provided as a nation the crucial
leadership through NATO, the Marshall Plan and other measures which
helped make this world a safer place for decades. Now, almost exactly
50 years later, with the end of the cold war, we once again face a
totally new world situation, with growing fragmentation and the spread
of dangerous weapons to rogue states. American leaders in the 1940's
met the test of history. Members of the U.S. Senate in the 1990's must
not fail it.
Congress, as has been said, has had 13 major hearings on the
convention for over 3 years. The issues are clearly understood. It is
time to act.
With the treaty due to take effect very soon, the United States
will make a mistake which we will long regret if we sit on the
sidelines with states we have criticized as being dangerous and
irresponsible.
We will lose our ability to play a major role in assuring
compliance with the weapons ban. But above all, we will lose the moral
basis of our leadership on an issue of urgent importance to our
national security.
As has been said, this is not a partisan issue. This is a question
of American leadership, as has been said by Secretary Baker. This is a
question of meeting our responsibility to the next generation. Earlier
leaders did not fail our generation, and we must not fail those who
will follow us.
And now it is my great privilege to present one who has called us
as a nation to meet our leadership responsibilities on this vital
issue. His effort deserves our strong bipartisan support. Ladies and
gentlemen, the President of the United States. (Applause.)
President Clinton. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Senator Boren, for your words and your
presence here today. We were laughing before we came out here--Senator
Boren and I started our careers in politics in 1974 together, but he
found a presidency that is not term-limited--(laughter)--and I want to
congratulate him on it.
Mr. Vice President, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, Secretary
Baker, Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, General Shalikashvili. Let me
thank all of you who have spoken here today for the words you have
said, for you have said it all. And let me thank all of you who have
come here to be a part of this audience today to send a clear,
unambiguous, united message to America and to our Senate. I thank
Senator General Colin Powell and Senator Warren Rudman; former arms
negotiators Paul Nitze, Edward Rowny and Ken Adelman; so many of the
Congressmen who have supported us, including Senator Biden and Senator
Levin, who are here; the truly distinguished array of military leaders;
leaders of businesses, religious organizations, human rights groups;
scientists and arms control experts.
Secretary Baker made, I thought, a very telling point, which others
made as well: This is, in the beginning, a question of whether we will
continue to make America's leadership strong and sure as we chart our
course in a new time. We have to do that, and we can only do that if we
rise to the challenge of ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention.
We are closing a 20th century which gives us an opportunity now to
forge a widening international commitment to banish poison gas from the
Earth in the 21st century. This is a simple issue at bottom, even
though the details are somewhat complex. Presidents and legislators
from both parties, military leaders and arms control experts have bound
together in common cause because this is simply good for the future of
every American.
I received two powerful letters recently calling for ratification.
One has already been mentioned that I received from Senator Nancy
Kassebaum Baker, Senator Boren, and former national security advisor
General Brent Scowcroft. The other came from General Powell, General
Jones, General Vessey, General Schwarzkopf, and more than a dozen other
retired generals and admirals, all of them saying, as one, America
needs to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, and we must do it
before it takes affect on April 29th.
Of course, the treaty is not a panacea. No arms control treaty can
be absolutely perfect, and none can end the need for vigilance. But no
nation acting alone can protect itself from the threat posed by
chemical weapons. Trying to stop their spread by ourselves would be
like trying to stop the wind that helps carry their poison to its
target.
We must have an international solution to a global problem.
The convention provides clear and overwhelming benefits to our
people. Under a law Congress passed in the 1980's, we are already
destroying almost all our chemical weapons. The convention requires
other nations to follow our lead, to eliminate their arsenals of poison
gas, and to give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in
the future.
By ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, as Secretary Cohen
said, we can help to shield our soldiers from one of the battlefield's
deadliest killers. We can give our children something our parents never
had--broad protection against the threat of chemical attack. And we can
bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism, of proliferation
all around the world.
If the Senate fails to ratify the convention before it enters into
force, our national security and, I might add, our economic security
will suffer. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue
states and terrorists; we will lose the chance to help to enforce the
rules we helped to write, or to have American serve as inter-
national inspectors--something that is especially important for those
who have raised concerns about inspection provisions of the treaty.
Ironically, if we are outside this agreement rather than inside, it
is our chemical companies, our leading exporters, which will face
mandatory trade restrictions that could cost them hundreds of millions
of dollars in sales.
In short order, America will go from leading the world to joining
the company of pariah nations that the Chemical Weapons Convention
seeks to isolate. We cannot allow this to happen. The time has come to
pass this treaty, as 70 other nations already have done.
Since I sent the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Senate 3\1/2\
years ago, there have been mom than a dozen hearings, more than 1,500
pages of testimony and reports. During the last 3 months, we have
worked very closely with Senate leaders to go the extra mile to resolve
remaining questions in areas of concern. I want to thank those in the
Senate who have worked with us for their leadership and for their good-
faith efforts.
Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, again I say, is
important both for what it does and for what it says. It says America
is committed to protecting our troops, to fighting terror, to stopping
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to setting and enforcing
standards for international behavior, and to leading the world in
meeting the challenges of the 21st century.
I urge the Senate to act in the highest traditions of
bipartisanship and in the deepest of our national interests.
And let me again say, the words that I have spoken today are
nothing compared to the presence, to the careers, to the experience, to
the judgment, to the patriotism of Republicans and Democrats alike and
the military leaders who have gathered here and who all across this
country have lent their support to this monumentally important effort.
We must not fail. We have a lot of work to do, but I leave here
today with renewed confidence that together we can get the job done.
Thank you. God bless you. And God bless America. (Applause.)
__________
False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention
Prepared by Empower America as part of its Ideas for the Next Century--
International Leadership Series, March 1997
False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
``The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations have not
agreed to join the treaty regime. * * * The CWC is not effective
because it does not ban or control possession of all chemicals that
could be used for lethal weapons purposes. * * * The CWC is not
verifiable as the US intelligence community has repeatedly acknowledged
in congressional testimony.''
--From a letter to Senator Trent Lott signed by Former National
Security Advisor William P. Clark, Former Secretaries of Defense Caspar
Weinberger and Richard Cheney, and Former US Ambassador to the UN Jeane
Kirkpatrick
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) purports to ban the
development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, as
well as the destruction of existing arsenals and weapons production
facilities. Various degrees of controls on and prohibitions against
production of and trade in certain chemicals are to be phased in over
several years. The alleged benefits of the CWC, however, are illusory
and obscure serious harm to US strategic, economic, and civil
interests.
While claiming to reduce and even eliminate chemical
arsenals, the CWC actually does nothing to remove such weapons
from those states most likely to use them--including Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, and Syria.
The CWC creates a mechanism that could lead to the
proliferation of chemical weapons technology among parties and
their client states.
The CWC's enforcement provisions would impose serious costs
and economic risks on US businesses, even those not directly
involved in defense industries, and pose serious challenges to
rights protected by the Constitution.
The Empty Threat of ``Being Left Behind''
``[T]he chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an
intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high
confidence in our ability to detect non-compliance, especially on a
small scale.''
--Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey
The CWC is due to enter into force on April 29, 1997. The dire
warnings of the Clinton Administration and others that failure to
ratify the Convention before that date will exclude the US from
involvement in the initial organization of the CWC's institutions and
subject US companies to trade sanctions are misleading.
Failure to participate in the organization of an inherently
ineffective regime is of questionable concern.
Failure of the US to join the CWC would inhibit trade only
to a limited degree. Even the administration's estimate of
potential losses to US companies totals only $600 million
annually, far less than the cost CWC compliance.
Selected Chemical Weapons Programs
Countries with declared programs: Iraq, Russia, US
Countries with undeclared programs: China, Egypt, India, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, Taiwan, Vietnam,
Ethiopia, Myanmar/Burma
*NOTE: Countries in bold either have or are developing ballistic
missiles.
False Promises
``The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the United States
and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical attack. It could
well serve to increase, not reduce, the spread of chemical weapons
manufacturing capabilities. Thus we would be better off not to be party
to it.''
--James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and Donald Rumsfeld,
Former Secretaries of Defense
The Clinton Administration and other supporters of the CWC
acknowledge that the Convention is ``no panacea'' in addressing the
threat of chemical weapons. The truth, however, is that the CWC is far
more ineffective than supporters contend.
Several of the states most likely to pose a chemical weapons
threat, including Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria, have no
intention of becoming parties to the CWC. Even states that have
signed the CWC, most notably Russia and China, are unlikely to
respect its provisions--least of all rid themselves of their
current arsenals--if they indeed ratify it. Russia alone has
already developed chemical programs designed to evade
inspections or utilize agents not addressed by the Convention.
The CWC does not ban most chemical weapons agents, because
most agents are used extensively for non-military purposes.
Indeed, chemical weapons remain the easiest weapons of mass
destruction to develop and produce in significant quantities
without detection, largely due to the widespread non-military
use of their ingredients.
US intelligence officials have acknowledged that significant
difficulties exist in detecting covert chemical weapons
programs. As a National Intelligence Estimate concluded in
1993, ``The capability of the intelligence community to monitor
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely
limited. * * * The key provision of the monitoring regime--
challenge inspections at declared sites--can be thwarted by a
nation determined to preserve a small, secret program using the
delays and managed access rules allowed by the Convention.''
Procedures exist for producing ready-to-use chemical agents
within so short a time that inspections prior to a conflict or
crisis could be meaningless. A recent Pentagon report details
Russia's development of chemical agents that could be produced
in a matter of weeks.
The CWC's provisions for punishing violators are
exceptionally vague. The UN Security Council would be charged
with addressing violations. In addition to the traditional
ineffectiveness of sanctions and other punitive actions ordered
by the Security Council, Russia and China could be expected to
limit or veto outright punishment of their client states and
allies.
While the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) supports
the CWC, it represents only a small fraction of the companies
that would be affected by the Convention. Indeed, thousands of
companies potentially affected are not even aware of their
exposure to CWC provisions.
The Chemical Manufacturers Association's support is likely
based on hopes for increased trade in dangerous chemicals due
to the elimination of restrictions in accordance with the
materiel and technology sharing mandated by the Convention.
Fatal Flaws
``The United States is abandoning * * * one of the most effective
deterrents to chemical use against itself and its allies: the right to
an extant and mature offensive chemical weapons program. * * * [T]he
Senate should understand that it will contribute to the weakening of
deterrence, not to its strengthening, by eliminating the ability of the
United States to respond in kind to chemical attack. A weakening of
deterrence means * * * that American * * * soldiers are more, not less,
likely to be attacked with chemical weapons.''
--J.D. Crouch, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Beyond the ineffectiveness of the CWC in meeting its purported
goals, its provisions would actually do great harm to the strategic and
economic interests of the US.
The CWC requires materiel and technology sharing with states
that would otherwise be denied such assistance; the CWC would
actually spread chemical weapons know-how to parties, such as
China and Iran, and their client states. Similar arrangements
regarding nuclear technology have contributed to the
development of nuclear weapons programs across the globe.
The CWC would require the US to destroy its entire chemical
weapons arsenal, while leaving untouched the substantial
arsenals of rogue states like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and
Syria, which are not party to the treaty. Even potential
parties such as Russia have persistently violated chemical
weapons reduction requirements of past agreements and are
already engaged in programs designed to defy and evade the CWC.
The US relies upon a strategy of retaliation to deter
chemical attacks. The CWC, however, would limit US options to
costly conventional operations or a nuclear strike. Contrasted
with a limited in-kind chemical-for-chemical exchange, these
two options are politically difficult to pursue and therefore
not very credible deterrents to a would-be aggressor.
As interpreted by the Clinton Administration and
Congressional backers of the Convention, the CWC would prohibit
the use of non-lethal chemicals such as tear gas, leaving US
troops with no effective response other than bullets to
threatening crowds or the use of civilian shields--such as
occurred in Somalia.
Almost 8,000 US businesses, even non-defense industries
utilizing potential chemical agents, would have to shoulder
significant reporting and other compliance costs and expose
themselves to the well-precedented risk of industrial espionage
during inspections. Realistic yearly costs related to CWC
compliance run as high as $200 million in government
expenditures and perhaps billions in costs to businesses. In
addition, Russia has already begun to link its ratification of
the CWC to billions of dollars in economic assistance, some of
which would be only tangentially--if at all--connected to
compliance with the Convention.
The inspection provisions of the CWC could lead to serious
violations of the Constitution's protection of due process and
privacy as international teams attempt to investigate private
US companies and their employees.
The well-precedented tendency of governments to ignore or
downplay violations of arms control agreements so as to
preserve the overall regimes, as well as the extensive
political and diplomatic capital that has been invested thus
far in the CWC, are likely to inhibit enforcement of the
Convention and the pursuit of more effective initiatives.
__________
Letters and Other Material Submitted in Support of Ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention
American Ex-Prisoners of War,
Watauga, Tennessee,
February 20, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Senator Lott: As National Commander of the American Ex-
Prisoners of War, I wish to express my support for the ratification of
the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty. This is an important step in
reducing the price that Americans who serve their country on the field
of battle must pay in defense of our freedom. Those captured in prior
wars know all too well the enduring price of those sacrifices even
without chemical weapons and their life-long disabling consequences.
While there may, of course, be some risk in adopting this treaty,
Americans must play a leadership role in international efforts to
reduce this price to the extent possible. These risks have been
thoroughly weighed by Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all have supported this treaty.
Sincerely,
Wm. E. ``Sonny'' Mottern,
National Commander
______
News Release,
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.,
Washington, DC 20002.
for release: vfw supports chemical weapons treaty
Washington, DC, February 13, 1997.--The Veterans of Foreign Wars
today announced its support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Treaty which would halt the manufacture, stockpiling and use
of chemical weapons.
VFW Commander in Chief James E. Nier, of El Paso, Texas, in calling
for support for the treaty's ratification said, ``The treaty will
reduce world stockpiles of such weapons and will hopefully prevent our
troops from being exposed to poison gases as we believe happened in the
Gulf War.''
Noting the support of three Presidents for the treaty--it was
initiated by President Reagan, negotiated by President Bush, and
submitted for ratification by President Clinton--and that the treaty is
supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nier said the VFW would support
efforts calling for the treaty' ratification.
``There are risks in adopting this treaty. However, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes the advantages outweigh the
shortcomings and Defense Secretary Cohen has assured me these risks can
be greatly reduced with the ongoing improvements in the defense posture
of our troops against chemical warfare,'' Nier said.
The VFW leader noted that, ``As combat veterans we support this
treaty, but in the future if we perceive that this treaty puts our
country and our troops at a disadvantage, we will be out front and lead
the way in calling for withdrawal from the treaty.''
______
Proposed Resolution No. 97-TS4
Reserve Officers Association of the United States,
Washington, DC.
chemical weapons convention
WHEREAS, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which would ban the
development, production, and stockpiling, as well as the use and
preparation for use of chemical weapons was negotiated by both the
Reagan and Bush administrations; and
WHEREAS, 65 countries, including virtually all of our friends and
allies, have already ratified the CWC; and
WHEREAS, under a law signed in 1985 by then-President Reagan, all
U.S. chemical weapons (many of which are nearly 50 years old) are to be
destroyed by the year 2004; and
WHEREAS, the Congress has repeatedly refused to authorize the funds
necessary to modernize our chemical weapons arsenal, leading us to
abandon that effort in 1991; and
WHEREAS, the CWC will go into force, with or without United States'
ratification, on April 29, 1997; and
WHEREAS, United States' failure to ratify the CWC will place us
among the great outlaw states of the world, including Libya, Iran, and
North Korea; and
WHEREAS, United States' ratification of the CWC will enable us to
play a major role in the development and implementation of CWC policy,
as well as providing strong moral leverage to help convince Russia of
the desirability of ratifying the convention;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Reserve Officers
Association of the United States, chartered by Congress, urges the
Senate to quickly ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Attest:
Roger W. Sandler,
Major General, AUS (Retired),
National Executive Director
Note: This is not an official ROA resolution until adopted by the
National (Convention/Council).
______
News Release,
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.,
Washington, DC 20004.
for immediate release: jwv supports ratification of chemical weapons
treaty
Washington, DC, February 5, 1997.--The Jewish War Veterans of the
U.S.A. (JWV) calls for the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) which was signed during the Bush Administration. The
need for the treaty is more critical today than ever before.
JWV National Commander Bob Zweiman stated, ``The events related to
the Gulf War Syndrome revealed that when it comes to chemical warfare,
there may either be an incapacity to recognize the dangers to our
troops in the field or, once shown to exist, there can be a penchant to
cover up the embarrassment for the failure to so recognize. But for the
actions of the Veterans Administration, our Gulf War veterans would
have found themselves without any current avenue of possible relief
and, even now, we must still be concerned with claim time limitations.
``While the CWC may not be perfect in all terms, it provides an
aura of international cooperation into the arsenal of the United States
protecting our national interests without compromising our freedom of
action. There are meaningful provisions in the CWC which will afford
and opportunity to impose economic restrictions and sanctions against
those who develop chemical weapons or deal with the threat of or use of
such chemical warfare.
``As is readily recognizable from the U.N. monitoring of the Iraqi
facilities, there can be no assurances for a security or for a real
defense capability against the use of chemicals by rogue nations or
terrorists without controls as may additionally be made available to us
by the CWC. We are honor bound to protect our Nation and our troops by
minimizing the chances from all obvious or hidden means of chemical
attack in the future.''
Founded in 1896, JWV is the oldest, active national veterans'
organization in America and is known as the ``Patriotic Voice of
American Jewry.'' JWV is currently celebrating its centennial year
which included JWV's hosting of Veterans Day ceremonies at Arlington
Cemetery on November 11, 1998.
__________
Prepared Statement of Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses
In hearings before this committee a year ago, I had the opportunity
to address a number of specific concerns about the benefits, costs, and
verifiability of the Chemical Weapons Convention and, in so doing, to
argue that the U.S. national interest is well served by ratification of
the Convention and U.S. participation in the new regime. Rather than
again offer a defense of the Convention, I would like to take the
opportunity to help to bring into better focus the nation's stake in
the pending CWC vote. Toward that end, I would like to describe five
messages that would be sent by your rejection of the CWC.
The first message would be that America's elected officials remain
firmly in the grip of the Cold War when it comes to arms
control
The current debate about the CWC was in fact scripted in the early
1980s, when most of the protagonists staked out their positions
(although at that point the treaty itself was nothing more than a
glimmer in the eye of negotiators). On the one hand were those who saw
arms control as a dangerous delusion--a sell-out to the Soviets. On the
other were those who saw any arms build-up as a dangerous folly--a
false remedy to Cold War confrontation. For each, the CWC was but one
front in the larger ideological battle. Today, CWC opponents savage the
treaty as fatally flawed, while administration supporters defend it as
useful for ridding the world of evil weapons. Moderates in both
parties, on the other hand, seem for the most part to have lost
interest and to have anticipated U.S. ratification as a ``no-brainer.''
The antipathy to CW arms control in the Cold War had much to do
with the specific strategic context in Europe. With NATO forces
overmatched by Warsaw Pact forces, if war came it seemed likely that
the West would have to rely on early use of its tactical nuclear
weapons. The Soviets quite possibly could have denied NATO a carefully
considered and effective use of its nuclear weapons with chemical
warfare. Sustained chemical attacks on NATO forces without fear of
reprisal would have enabled the Warsaw Pact to maintain high tempo
attacks with conventional forces and without themselves suffering the
consequences of chemical warfare--namely the cumbersome work of
fighting inside gas masks and chemical protection suits. Hence NATO
needed some in-kind retaliatory capability for the Soviet chemical
threat, which was provided by the United States with its chemical
arsenal. Hence the opposition to a chemical ban because of the belief
that even small-scale cheating on any such ban could have been sharply
destabilizing not just in Europe but to the central strategic balance.
But that strategic landscape is gone. Today, no country of
proliferation concern has the ability to deliver the quantities of
chemical agents with precision for days and weeks against U.S. forces
or to exploit the tactical circumstances created by their use to
inflict operational or strategic defeat on U.S. military forces. It
would take a great deal of cheating to create a chemical arsenal with
potential military significance when used against well-protected U.S.
forces, a scale of cheating that is beyond the reach of these states so
long as they must keep the program secret and underground. Even if they
were somehow able to create a massive chemical arsenal despite
international inspections, none of these states has the Soviet-vintage
capacity to overwhelm U.S. forces by conventional means or to escalate
to tactical and strategic nuclear attack. Their chemical attacks would
have nuisance value--perhaps high nuisance value--but they do not
promise to create the strategic predicament created by the Warsaw Pact.
Thus the United States need not concern itself with detecting any and
all acts of noncompliance by parties to the CWC, but only with
militarily significant cheating--so long as it sustains strong
antichemical defenses. Of course, it will not rely on the CWC to
understand the CW capabilities of potential enemies--that's why a great
deal of money is spent on proliferation-related intelligence
capabilities.
Moreover, the United States does not need to stoop to chemical
retaliation to punish the use of chemical weapons against its forces.
In the current environment, U.S. military interests are best served by
minimizing the role chemicals might play on the battlefield, so that
the superior conventional weaponry of the United States can be used to
best advantage. In fact, the United States has forsworn the right to
use chemical weapons under any circumstance, even in retaliation, in
the wake of the Persian Gulf war. Norman Schwartzkopf is only the
latest of many military commanders to say that the United States does
not need a chemical deterrent for the chemical threats it faces in the
proliferation era. This makes it possible for the United States to
trade its aging stockpile of chemical weapons, the vast majority
produced in the 1950s and 1960s, for a global ban.
This points to the conclusion that the critics' case against the
CWC has been made on the wrong national security criteria. Cold War
thinking says that only the strictest verification and compliance
standards are suitable for arms control and that chemical disarmament
weakens deterrence. Both judgments are wrong for the post-cold war era,
so long as the arms control in question does not touch on the
fundamentals of strategic nuclear stability. The CWC is neither panacea
nor folly. It is not a substitute for all of those other things that
must be done to meet the proliferation challenge. It does not eliminate
chemical weapons nor the risks of cheating. But it does meet strict
national security criteria. And it helps to keep the CW problem
manageable while adding new political tools to the arsenal of
political, economic, intelligence, and military measures that must be
used synergistically if the proliferation threat is to be kept in
check.
I for one am grateful that the debate on the CWC has not turned out
to be a ``no-brainer'', for we now have the chance to rise above the
tired debate of the past and to think through the larger questions of
arms control standards, national interests, and U.S. leadership in
terms suitable for the post-Cold War era. If the administration and the
Congress cannot come to a clearer agreement on these issues, the
national interest seems likely to suffer badly. At the very least,
disagreement will doom the six other arms control measures currently
awaiting U.S. ratification--and with them, some of the few tools
available to the United States for building future political
coalitions.
A second message is that the United States does not understand what is
at stake in stopping the proliferation of chemical weapons.
Chemical weapons proliferated dramatically in the 1980s, to more
than 20 countries. They have appeared, moreover, in precisely those
regions where the United States offers security guarantees and in the
hands of those states that sponsor terrorism. Stemming their
proliferation is essential to dealing with the more general problem of
the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, missile delivery
systems, and advanced conventional weaponry. If rogues can use NBC
weapons as trump cards against U.S. military action, or to conduct
attacks on American civilians, our world will change fundamentally--and
for the worse. If the end of the Cold War is what made the CWC
possible, proliferation is what made it necessary.
It would be nice if the CWC were to rid the world completely of
chemical weapons, but it won't (at least, as long as renegade states
exist). So what other interests might it serve vis-a-vis the
proliferation problem? The United States has an interest in preventing
the continued proliferation to ever more states. It has an interest in
getting out of the chemical warfare business those who are only
dabbling (intrigued by Iraq's use of chemical weapons in its war
against Iran). It has an interest in keeping the stockpiles of those
who remain in the business small and unsophisticated. It has an
interest in isolating by political and economic means those states that
remain in the business. And it has an interest in not being isolated
politically when it comes time to deal militarily with those
chemically-armed states that pose real and immediate military dangers.
The CWC will do a good job of safeguarding these interests. Its
verification provisions are sufficient to deter all but the most
committed CW producers. The charge that the CWC will be ineffective
because some important CW possessors are non-signatories misses an
essential point--by self-selecting out of the regime, these states
identify themselves as problem cases and make themselves objects of
suspicion and trade restraints. In each of these ways, the CWC promises
a tangible benefit to U.S. security (which is an answer to those
critics who allege that the CWC offers no such benefits for the United
States).
A third message of non-ratification is that the United States is going
to be irrelevant to the international effort to stem CW
proliferation.
Treaty opponents have offered up a number of substitutes. One is
``reinvigoration'' of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, whose signatories
agree not to use chemical weapons (although some states have reserved
the right to use such weapons in retaliation). The Protocol is
certainly in dire need of help--it was dealt a crippling blow by the
failure to respond to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons
throughout the 1980s in his wars against both Iranians and Iraqis.
Reinvigoration would presumably entail the addition of compliance and
verification provisions--just like those that turned the Protocol into
the CWC! Reinvigoration would also presumably entail some renewed
political commitment to the Protocol. But the United States can hardly
expect others to line up with it behind the Protocol as an alternative
to the CWC when even its closest friends and allies are moving on to
the CWC. Moreover, the United States carries the added burden of
lingering international resentment over its particular failure to
uphold the Protocol in the 1980s because of its grievances against
Iran.
Their second alternative is to supplement the protocol with a new
treaty analogous to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is
unique in the history of multilateral arms control measures in that it
grants to a set of states certain rights that are denied to others--in
this case, the right to possess nuclear weapons. Under the proposed
chemical parallel, the United States and presumably Russia would be
allowed to keep their chemical weapons while they try to police other
states from acquiring their own. But no countries would join with the
United States in this endeavor--all see U.S. and Russian disarmament as
essential to the political bargain embodied in the chemical control
regime. To suggest that a new treaty could be made without this
cornerstone, or simply imposed, is either naive or disingenuous.
Their third alternative is reliance on unilateral, domestic
measures, such as those detailed in SB495. In fact, most if not all of
those measures would be necessary adjuncts to CWC implementation. But
as a substitute for the CWC, SB495 leaves much to be desired. One
noteworthy, example is in the area of export controls: the United
States can anticipate growing friction with its partners in the
Australia Group process, most of whom will be among the original states
parties to the CWC, if it attempts to rely on economic sticks and
carrots while sitting aside from the CWC. Another example is in the
area of CWC compliance challenges: by walking away from the CWC, the
United States leaves its allies and other prospective coalition
partners to fend for themselves when it comes to dealing with
noncompliance by states parties to the CWC. The United States may be
there when the chips are down militarily, but for circumstances short
of war it will leave its friends and allies to manage largely on their
own the political and economic instruments of risk management. Despite
its many merits, SB495 is little more than window dressing on American
retreat from the CW proliferation problem. Its primary short-term
benefit would probably be in making some Americans feel good about
walking away.
In short, these alternatives are not viable. To reject the CWC is
to consign the United States to irrelevance to the international effort
to manage the CW proliferation problem. This is a course of action of
dubious political merit. The notion that somehow America should sit
aside while others do the hard work of dealing with proliferation will
be an insult to many Americans. Americans are not bystanders. But
rejection of the CWC will marginalize U.S. influence and turn us into
free-loaders on the efforts of others to implement the CWC despite our
having walked away. This is an insult to Americans rightly proud of the
nation's historic role of a power with both military strength and a
vision of a better world--and the will to lend its political prestige
to bring it into being. It is also an insult to the integrity of
American diplomacy--having given our word to participate as a party to
the convention, in the form of then-Secretary Eagleburger's signature,
non-ratification will erode the strength of American political promises
more generally. Others will rightly ask how America can expect to hold
others to their promises when it breaks its own?
A fourth message that would be sent by non-ratification is that America
is going to dish out some vigilante justice when it comes to
dealing with CW-armed proliferators.
Whether or not the United States ratifies the CWC, it enters into
force as international law on April 29. By walking away from the law it
helped to create, the United States will be relegating itself to the
role of vigilante whenever it chooses to undertake military actions
against CW-armed states--as one who professes a commitment to the rule
of law, but places itself above the law when it comes to dealing with
outlaws. By working from outside rather than inside the CWC normative
framework, the United States will turn military acts against
chemically-armed states into solitary exercises of U.S. military
prowess, rather than coalition campaigns to punish transgressors. The
United States will have no one to blame but itself for the political
isolation it will suffer.
This too is a course of action of dubious political merit. America
does not belong above the law--indeed, central to our national
conception is a belief in the moral basis of our politics and power,
and our mission to expand the rule of law. In our de facto role as
``world's policeman,'' will others think of us as a respectful steward
of the common weal or an unreliable bully whose lip service to the rule
of law is cynical and abandoned when it does not suit his needs? To
reject the CWC is to put us on the wrong side of history, especially
our own, and on the side with Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.
A fifth message is that America does not trust itself--more
specifically, that the Senate does not trust itself to do its
oversight job.
One of the arguments used by CWC opponents to persuade freshmen
Senators to join their cause is the so-called lulling effect of arms
control. The argument runs as follows: tyrants will get the better of
arms control with democracies because de-
mocracies want to believe that others are Good and will go far to
delude themselves that the tyrant is living up to his promises. This
delusion paralyzes democracies, which then ignore real military
vulnerabilities and, by looking duped, embolden the tyrant. By this
logic, arms control may lead to war.
This is a view of arms control derived from a rather peculiar
interpretation of the genesis of fascist aggression in the 1930s, one
which flies in the face of the experience of the Cold War when
democracies stood firm against totalitarianism for half a century.
Anyone who today thinks that chemical arms control will lull a sleepy
republic must overlook the huge sums of money invested annually in
chemical preparedness, the existence of an intelligence community
charged with monitoring arms control compliance, and a host of
``friendly critics'' who scrutinize arms control implementation.
For Senators to align themselves with a point of view that is
distrustful of democratic process would be especially odd. Should we
infer that they themselves believed that they are dupes--that they are
not confident that they can or will perform their oversight
responsibilities, by asking the right questions at the right times
about U.S. military readiness and compliance findings by U.S.
intelligence?
Like it or not, this is what the Senate will signal to the world--
and to the American voter--if it rejects the CWC. America as nostalgic
for the Cold War. America as ignorant of its special stake in stopping
NBC proliferation. America as free-loader. America as dupe of foreign
tyrants, timid and unreliable. An America enjoying unparalleled
military strength, but unable to bank on its strengths to take small
risks for large payoffs. An America that says no to change, that has
lost its bearings and its mission to promote the change that makes a
better world possible.
In short, the vote on the CWC comes down to a vote about U.S.
leadership. It presents the Senate with a basic choice. The United
States can lead, by safeguarding common interests and protecting U.S.
national interests by exercising a political-military influence
commensurate with the nation's weight and moral compass. It can follow,
by freeloading on the efforts of others while pretending that domestic,
unilateral measures are enough to meet its needs. Or it can get out of
the way, as a new wave of proliferation occurs and fuels the ambitions
of those who would try to use their weapons of mass destruction to
intimidate U.S. allies and to veto the use of U.S. military power to
honor its security guarantees.
Many on this panel had the privilege to serve with one of the great
American leaders of this century. Ronald Reagan's special gifts as a
leader, it seems to me, were his intuitive understanding of the
American public myth--our view of ourselves as a people with a certain
historic mission and a strong moral compass--and his ability to
translate the decisions of current moment into this larger framework.
He understood that Americans expect their country to stand tough
against aggressors--and to know how to safeguard that essential part of
the nation's political power that flows not from the barrels of
American guns but from its traditions and values. A vote for the CWC
would be consistent with this sense of national purpose. A vote against
would be an insult.
______
Brad Roberts is a member of the research staff at the Institute for
Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Va. The views expressed here are his
own.
__________
Letters Submitted in Opposition to Ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention
Sterling Chemicals,
April 15, 1997.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Sterling Chemicals, Inc. strongly supports a
worldwide ban on the production, possession and use of chemical
weapons, but we are concerned about the mechanics and cost impacts
associated with the proposed Chemicals Weapon Convention (CWC). We have
made our concerns known to the Honorable Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
last August. Highlights of our concerns are:
1. We have serious misgivings about the ability to protect
confidential business information. Having a foreign inspection team
inside our facility with almost unlimited access to process knowledge
and data is not acceptable to Sterling.
2. Cost impact will be significant! We project the costs just to
prepare for, manage, conduct and complete an inspection to be at least
$200,000-$300,000. This doesn't include performing duplicate sampling
and analysis, as well as calibration and verification of process
instrumentation.
3. We cannot comply with the treaty provisions within our current
annual budget and headcount. Sterling has reduced headcount to maintain
our competitiveness. We are doing more with less. We believe the
additional data record-keeping and paperwork burden associated with
this treaty cannot be managed with existing resources.
4. The EPA and OSHA, while participating as part of the inspection
team, may become over zealous with their enforcement philosophy and
begin citing violations as part of their own agenda--while they're
supposed to be monitoring the foreign inspection team.
Sterling Chemicals is not a foreign policy expert, yet we have
serious misgivings about the foreign policy implications of the
proposed CWC. For example:
1. How will chemicals weapon control be enforced in other countries
(Mexico, Columbia, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Croatia,
etc.)? Since they probably will not cooperate, how does this treaty
produce a ``worldwide ban''?
2. How will international security and foreign policy issues
related to protection of trade secrets be handled?
3. Will the cost and implementation of the treaty put American
industry at a competitive disadvantage with foreign industry whose
compliance is less regulated?
Sterling emphasizes its desire to see a worldwide ban on chemical
weapons. We hope this submittal provides the information you seek for
an informed decision which is best for America.
Sincerely,
Robert W. Roten,
President and CEO.
______
Small Business Survival Committee,
April 14, 1997.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Helms: On behalf of the Small Business Survival
Committee (SBSC) and its more than 40,000 members across the nation, I
wish to express our opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
treaty due to be voted upon soon by the U.S. Senate. Also, I apologize
for not being able to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee
due to severe time constraints.
It seems to us that a wide array of defense and foreign policy
experts have raised legitimate questions about the CWC, including
several former U.S. Secretaries of Defense. They see the CWC as non-
verifiable, non-enforceable and not serving U.S. national interests,
and SBSC agrees.
Though the CWC offers nothing in terms of improving U.S. security
interests, the CWC accomplishes much by way of raising regulatory costs
on already over-regulated U.S. businesses. For example, the CWC would
inflict the following on U.S. entrepreneurs and businesses:
For the first time, U.S. private industry would be subject
to foreign inspection as a result of a treaty. Inspectors would
come from a new international agency in the Hague, Netherlands.
Businesses must prove to the U.S. government and
international inspectors that they are not producing or
stockpiling chemical weapons, with noncompliance fines reaching
as high as $50,000 per incident. Forms would have to be filed
on chemical types each year and changes in a process using
certain chemicals would have to be reported five days in
advance. Noncompliance could result in a $5,000 fine. And of
course, with government bureaucrats issuing fines, the threat
that fines shift from a means of deterrence or punishment to a
source of revenues always looms.
Firms would be open to a real threat from international
industrial espionage. The loss of proprietary information could
seriously weaken international competitiveness. The treaties
protections are frivolous, and any court challenge likely would
come after the horse left the barn.
U.S. firms producing, processing, or consuming a scheduled
chemical will carry a paperwork/declaration burden. The U.S.
Department of Commerce estimated that it will take companies 9
hours to fill out paperwork for every Schedule I chemical, 7.2
hours for Schedule 2 chemicals, 2.5 hours for Schedule 3
chemicals, and 5.3 hours for each Discrete Organic Chemical.
Estimates range from 2,000 to more than 10,000 U.S. companies
that will be forced to bear these paperwork burdens.
Congress's Office of Technology Assessment estimated that
inspections will cost U.S. firms anywhere from $10,000 to
$500,000 per visit.
Smaller businesses will be hit hardest by increased
regulatory burdens. Interestingly, the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA) supports ratification of the CWC, apparently
claiming that the new regulations would not be a burden.
However, the CMA is a group of generally large chemical
manufacturers, and reportedly more than 60 percent of the
facilities likely affected by the CWC are not CMA members.
Large companies possess far greater resources and experience in
dealing with regulators of all kinds. Indeed, new regulatory
burdens can perversely give large firms a competitive edge over
smaller companies due to such resource and experience factors.
As economist Thomas Hopkins has shown, the per employee cost of
federal regulation runs almost 50 percent higher for firms with
fewer than 500 employees vs. companies with more than 500
employees--$5,400 per employee vs. $3,000 per employee,
respectively.
Chemical companies would not be the only types of businesses
subject to CWC regulations. Firms in the food processing,
pharmaceutical, paint, petroleum, biotech, electronics,
textiles, fertilizers, rubber, brewing, and distilling
industries would be impacted as well.
Significant legal questions arise for U.S. businesses as
well. Distinct possibilities exist that rights of due process
could be violated in relation to warrantless searches and
personnel being compelled to answer questions, and provide
information and access; and a ``takings'' could occur when
government reveals information harming a business.
There are CWC supporters who would have the public believe that
treaty supporters do not care about chemical weapons and U.S. security;
in fact, the exact opposite is true. Anyone who really cares should
stand up and oppose this deeply flawed, dangerous and costly treaty.
SBSC believes the Chemical Weapons Convention to be a deeply flawed
treaty that will do nothing to enhance and may indeed weaken U.S.
national security, while imposing new regulatory burdens on U.S.
businesses. The Chemical Weapons Convention should be rejected by the
U.S. Senate.
Sincerely,
Raymond J. Keating,
Chief Economist, Small Business Survival Committee.
__________
Statement by Ronald F. Lehman Before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, June 9, 1994
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of this Committee: In
Islamabad, Pakistan, last week, I received your invitation to appear
before the Committee to discuss ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. It was an honor to be asked to appear before you once
again, and I am particularly pleased to join several close and valued
friends who made major contributions to the revolutionary national
security and arms control achievements which took place during the
Reagan and Bush administrations. It is in that same spirit of public
service that they are here today.
The best friends of real arms control are those who have demanded
the highest standards. Better is not really the enemy of the good. In
particular, the U.S. negotiating position is always strengthened when
we negotiators are reminded that one-third of the Senate plus one might
someday decide that the treaty we conclude falls short of their
expectations for advancing the national interest.
During the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, I and
others consulted regularly with members of the United States Congress
including the members of this Committee. We sought your advice on how
to negotiate the best possible treaty. A process of consultation,
however, must never substitute for a rigorous examination of the final
product such as is now underway, taking into account the contributions
of critics as well as proponents.
For my part, I am a proponent. I speak today as a private citizen;
the views I express are my own and not necessarily those of any
institution or administration. Let me make clear up front where I
stand. I urge the Senate to give its consent to the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and to move quickly to complete a process
of careful deliberation. I say this, not because of my personal
involvement in its negotiation, but on its merits. I won't repeat the
many arguments which have already been made on behalf of the treaty,
but I would like to present a few additional considerations.
The negotiation and completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention
in the twilight of the Cold War was a valuable element in a bigger,
balanced strategy to increase the security of the United States and to
promote political change around the world. We negotiated from a
position of economic, political, and military strength. We energized
our technology and economy, while reducing subsidies to the Communist
bloc. We recognized the ``evil empire'' for what it was and rejected
attitudes of ``moral equivalence'', which undermine our resolve and
strengthen our adversary. We modernized our defenses, including our
chemical weapons deterrent, even as we made arms control an integral
part of that overall foreign and national security strategy.
One can see this, in one small example, even in the way our pursuit
of a ban on chemical weapons reinforced our commitment to the spread of
democracy. We sought intensive verification measures so that we might
reduce the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, but also because we knew
that totalitarian regimes cannot long survive when their citizens are
exposed to contradictory information. The requirement for detailed
information on chemical weapons stocks and facilities before reaching
agreement, at the time an innovative negotiating step which led to the
December 1989 U.S./Soviet Phase I data exchange and the recent Phase II
exchange, sparked a controversy which continues in Russia even today
over the history of the Soviet chemical and biological weapons
programs.
Our demand for trial inspections prior to completion of
negotiations aided in crafting a better treaty, but it also caused
Soviet citizens to ask why they themselves could not see what Americans
were allowed to see. Our insistence, first in the U.S./Soviet Bilateral
Destruction Agreement (BDA) of 1990, and later in the CWC, that
destruction of chemical weapons stocks be done in a safe and
environmentally sound manner has created a grassroots political process
of ``NIMBY''--not in my backyard--which has complicated agreement on a
chemical weapons destruction plan but also complicates a return of the
old system. One should not exaggerate the role that arms control has
played in promoting our national agenda, but one should not ignore it
either.
Arguably, the CWC is more important in today's violent and changing
world than it was when it was being negotiated during the Cold War. The
end of the Warsaw Pact, America's sole superpower status, its changing
global military missions, and its advanced conventional munitions have
reduced the circumstances under which the United States would decide to
deploy chemical weapons into an operational theater as a deterrent.
Increasingly circumstances are such that it is more important to reduce
the likelihood that others will use them than that we have them.
The Chemical Weapons Convention plays an essential role in our
efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery. In the long run, our non-proliferation,
counter-proliferation, or anti-proliferation efforts may be doomed to
failure if we cannot bring about political change and greater stability
around the globe. As I have suggested, the CWC continues to be a small,
but important part of that effort. In the near term, however, the CWC
may actually play its most important role.
We will fall dangerously short in our efforts to stop the
proliferation of more destructive nuclear and biological wcapons if we
cannot even codify and build upon the international norms which emerged
in the negotiation of the ban on chemical weapons. At a time when we
must build support for long term monitoring of Iraq and ``special
inspections'' by the International Atomic Energy Agency in North Korea
and elsewhere, entry into force of the CWC will commit ever more of the
international community to the unprecedented openness increasingly
necessary if we are to prevent disaster. At a time when the global
economy reduces trade barriers, but also undermines controls on
proliferation-related technologies, the CWC codifies the principle that
no nation should trade in dangerous materials with those who will not
accept international non-proliferation norms. At a time when threats to
international security may require military forces of the United States
to be deployed within range of the weapons of outlaw regimes, the CWC
can reduce the dangers our troops will face and help provide the basis
in international law and public opinion for strong measures that we and
others may be forced to take.
These are important external effects of the CWC, but what of the
substantive workings of the Convention itself? They are revolutionary.
Given the inherent technical difficulty of achieving a meaningful ban
on chemical weapons, they need to be. The text of the Chemical Weapons
Convention has pushed the envelope of multilateral arms control far
beyond what was once believed negotiable. It may be that the special
circumstances at the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War made it
possible for a very experienced international and American team to
achieve what otherwise could never have been done. But more than
opportunity was involved. Years of careful preparation and experience
led the way. The former Reagan and Bush officials here today played a
key role in that process.
Important lessons learned from the on-going arms control process
were applied over the course of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. In negotiation, we were not afraid to ask for far more than
an acceptable bottom line. Great emphasis was placed on more precise
draftsmanship, more detailed data exchanges, greater openness and
interaction, an organization with the power to conduct intrusive
inspections and recommend sanctions.
Every effort was made to make cheating by parties less attractive,
more difficult, more likely to be discovered, and more certain to
result in a stiff penalty. Nations which refused to become parties to
this new international norm would also pay a heavy economic and
political price. Nations which joined could expect reasonable
assistance if threaten by chemical weapons.
Although our process was not perfect, careful study came before
making most decisions. A marketplace of ideas often resulted in
disagreements, especially when facts were few and concepts vague. In
the end, however, a vigorous interagency process which ensured that all
of the relevant information was considered and that senior officials
were exposed to key technical information and alternative views
resulted in better decisions. Sometimes a consensus developed,
sometimes difficult, divisive decisions had to be made.
Diplomatic and political considerations often influenced fine
tuning and presentation, but I think the record will show that in the
CWC, as in the INF treaty, the START I and II treaties, and in the
Verification Protocol which made possible a 98-0 vote in the Senate for
consent to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, national security was
the overwhelmingly central determinant.
One example from the Chemical Weapons Convention is that of
challenge inspections. Everyone knows that no magic telescope exists
which will tell us where in the world on any given day someone will be
violating some provision of the CWC. But everyone also knows who are
the most likely threats and where potential threats to our forces must
be considered most seriously. Information is gathered, intelligence
estimates are made, and military precautions taken. In the past, it has
usually stopped there for lack of more intrusive measures including
challenge inspections which might provide a basis for international
action without compromising sensitive sources and methods. A
verification and enforcement regime for the CWC needed a challenge
inspection mechanism.
At the same time, we recognized that challenge inspections were not
magic either. They may or may not find the evidence you need, depending
on circumstances, procedures, and skill. Worse, such intrusive
inspections could be abused or backfire revealing important proprietary
information or national security secrets. Constitutional questions
related to property and privacy also needed to be addressed.
No technical challenge in arms control over the twelve years of the
Reagan and Bush administrations received more careful consideration at
all levels than that of implementation of a challenge inspection
regime. Working with professionals and experts inside and outside of
government, we sought to find a path which would maximize the
effectiveness of inspections while minimizing costs including the risk
to sensitive information.
We learned much along the way. More often than not, the real
problems and real solutions were to be found in the field and among the
operators rather than within the Washington-based bureaucracy. We found
that different sites and activities posed different problems. We
discovered that some sensitive information was less vulnerable than we
had believed, but that some was more vulnerable. We learned that with
or without a CWC, some security measures should be strengthened. We
discovered that at many sensitive sites concern about illegal chemical
activity could be dispelled without much risk. We also feared that at a
few sites we could offer little meaningful access without great risk.
Out of this continuous process, we developed an approach which can
work and which gives us what we need to protect highly sensitive
information. Conceptually, the approach was simple. Access would be
granted to any challenged site, but access would be managed at that
site to protect sensitive information. If, at a particular site,
timeliness or intrusiveness were not considered sufficient to resolve
legitimate concerns, then the inspected party had an obligation to
resolve those concerns by other means.
To meet diverse concerns, however, the desired U.S. package
involved some complexity. Moreover, it involved far more intrusiveness
than some nations desired and more rules for managed access than other
nations favored. The more nations studied the proposal, the more they
understood that it could work. To obtain the U.S. position as an
outcome was made easier because it could be portrayed as a natural
compromise between opposing views. In the end, however, I had no doubt
that we would get our position because we had made it clear that we
would not join consensus on a treaty that did not meet our security
concerns. Other nations understood that we had done our homework and
that we meant what we said.
Still, the conclusion of the CWC does not come without a price, and
its contributions to our security will not be fully achieved without
effective implementation not only of the CWC itself but also of a sound
foreign policy and national security strategy. One of the inherent
dangers of engaging in arms control negotiations is that success will
have a soporific effect on the nation's attention to its national
defense and that of its friends, allies, and interests around the
world.
When treaties are seen as solutions to our security challenges
rather than tools to be used to help address those challenges, danger
grows. When the Biological Weapons Convention was concluded, too many
people assumed the threat of biological warfare had been eliminated.
Research on defenses received inadequate support, and we saw too much
of the ``Sverdlovsk'' phenomenon--a propensity to explain away what one
does not want to be so. One hopes that we are not seeing this again
with respect to North Korea and the NPT.
Some would argue that this danger that arms control will lull us
into neglecting our defenses means that we should never negotiate or at
least never reach agreements. The problem with that conclusion is that
it assumes we cannot trust our own nation to negotiate in its own
interest or provide for its own defense. When this becomes a problem,
it is a problem the American people and its representatives have the
power to solve. We must make certain they get the facts. Hearings like
this are an important means for doing that.
For my part, I believe that the arms control and non-proliferation
tools can be used to promote our national security, and we must ensure
that they do. The Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly a tool which
can enhance our national security. I believe that the successful
conclusion of arms control agreements need not result in the neglect of
our defenses, but it often has. In giving its consent to ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention without reservations, the Senate
should take real steps to support implementation of the treaty, fund a
strong defense program, and promote a balanced national security
strategy which recognizes that the United States must be the leader in
a very dangerous world.
The world has undergone dramatic change, and arms control trains
have been rushing by. In such a world, if we do not shape the arms
control process to serve our interests, we can be certain that some
nations will be pressing in directions that are not in our interest.
The Chemical Weapons Convention before this committee is in our
interest. Again, Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Committee,
I believe that the United States Senate should give its consent to
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Thank you.