[Senate Hearing 105-289]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-289
IRAN AND PROLIFERATION: IS THE U.S. DOING ENOUGH? THE ARMING OF IRAN:
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 17 AND MAY 6, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
40-187 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Iran and Proliferation: Is the U.S. Doing Enough?
Thursday, April 24, 1997
D'Amato, Hon. Alfonse M., U.S. Senator from New York............. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Einhorn, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Political-Military Affairs..................................... 15
Prepared statement (jointly with David Welch)................ 17
Spector, Leonard, Senior Associate and Director of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.......................................................... 34
Welch, David, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs................................................ 12
Prepared statement (jointly with Robert J. Einhorn).......... 17
Woolsey, R. James, Former Director of Central Intelligence....... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 31
The Arming of Iran: Who Is Responsible?
Tuesday, May 6, 1997
Bertsch, Dr. Gary, Director of the Center for International Trade
and Security, Professor of Political Science, University of
Georgia, Athens, Georgia....................................... 50
Carus, Dr. W. Seth, Visiting Fellow, National Defense University,
Washington, D.C................................................ 54
Milhollin, Dr. Gary, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control, Washington, D.C....................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Appendix
Prepared statement of Leonard S. Spector......................... 77
Export Controls in the People's Republic of China (PRC): Findings
and Considerations............................................. 88
Russia's Interests in Iran: Issues, Implications, and Policy
Tools for the United States.................................... 92
Chinese and Russian Suppliers to Iran............................ 96
Iranian Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: Implications
and Responses.................................................. 99
Statement submitted by Senator John Ashcroft..................... 107
IRAN AND PROLIFERATION: IS THE U.S. DOING ENOUGH?
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THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and,
South Asian Affairs,
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. In
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback, Smith, and Robb.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, U.S. SENATOR FROM
KANSAS
Senator Brownback. We will call the committee hearing to
order. Thank you all for joining us today on a hearing in the
Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, a hearing on Iran and Proliferation: Is
the U.S. Doing Enough? We certainly appreciate all the people
in attendance and we have got an excellent set of witnesses and
some tough questions to ask about U.S. policy toward the
Iranians.
Washington is a town where people can and will disagree on
just about anything. It is therefore my great pleasure to hold
a hearing on a topic about which there is little disagreement.
In the years since the Islamic revolution, Iran has developed
into a militant nation intent on exporting its particular brand
of Islam and using terror both internally and externally to
achieve its aims. It is a rogue state, seemingly unsusceptible
to reason, uninterested in international norms, and committed
to the development of weapons of mass destruction.
In the 19 years since the revolution, notwithstanding the
blandishments of its most important trading partners in Europe,
Iran has not lessened its support for international terrorism.
The German courts recently confirmed as much, branding Iran's
top leadership with responsibility for the gangland-style
slaying of four Kurdish dissidents living in Berlin.
The executive branch and the Congress, Republicans and
Democrats, we all agree that Iran represents a significant
threat to the American people, to our friends, and to our
interests in the Middle East and the world over. Yet, despite
broad agreement, our various policy prescriptions do not seem
to be working. The European policy of critical engagement has
proven ineffective and misguided. But our policy is not being
implemented as well as it should be, either.
President Clinton has stated on a number of occasions that
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses an
extraordinary danger to the United States. Clearly, the
Congress agrees and has helped put in place a set of laws aimed
at stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to
rogue states such as Iran. Yet only twice in recent memory,
twice, has any president invoked those laws to sanction nations
that sell missiles and nuclear weapons technology to Iran, and
neither sanctions case involved either Russia or China, the two
main proliferators to Iran.
I have in front of me a list of transfers to Iran of
everything from conventional cruise missiles to chemical
precursors to full-blown nuclear reactors. Obviously, there is
a substantial amount of classified material on these subjects,
but many of the details are available in the open press, and it
is upon open sources only that we have relied in preparing for
today's discussion.
I will cite only a few of these cases in the interest of
time.
Case No. 1: China, a signatory to the Chemical Weapons
Convention, reportedly sold chemical precursors, chemical
production equipment, and production technology to Iran. In a
hearing on Chinese proliferation just last week, the
administration admitted these were destined to Iran's chemical
weapons program.
It would be natural to conclude that such transfers were a
violation of Executive Order 12938, the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act, or the Iran-Iraq
Nonproliferation Act. Yet none of the applicable sanctions have
been imposed.
Case No. 2: Russia is allegedly assisting Iran's missile
program and has supplied technology and parts of the SS-4
missile system. The SS-4 has a range of 1250 miles and can be
loaded with a nuclear warhead. If this report is true, it would
be a violation of provisions of the Arms Export Control Act,
the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act, as well as the Foreign
Assistance Act.
Case No. 3: In mid-1995 reports surfaced about the transfer
by China of sophisticated missile guidance equipment to Iran.
It was later reported that there was unanimous agreement among
experts who had seen the evidence that the transfer constituted
a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
In the unclassified material, I can see the United States
demarched China on this issue and that U.S. officials traveling
to China discussed it. All of the reading I have done on the
subject, however, suggests no decision on sanctions was ever
made. If not, why not?
Case No. 4: In January and March 1996, both Vice Admiral
John Redd, Commander of the Fifth Fleet, and General Peay,
Commander of Central Command, told reporters that China had
supplied Iran with C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles against
which the U.S. Navy has no defense, and which clearly
endangered the men and women serving in the Gulf.
The sale of these missiles is clearly de-stabilizing, to
use the language of the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act. The
administration appears to have concluded, however, that the
known transfers are not of a de-stabilizing nature. That is
certainly poor comfort and support for our sailors in the Gulf.
Case No. 5: In 1995 Russia and Iran signed a contract for
the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to complete work on an
unfinished nuclear reactor in Iran. I understand that there are
ongoing discussions between Tehran and Moscow for three more
reactors. The administration has clearly stated its opposition
and asked the Russians to call off the deal. The Russians,
however, have indicated they will proceed.
Is this a sanctionable act? The transfer of reactors by
itself is not, because the Nonproliferation Treaty allows such
transfers to take place. But given that the administration has
told us again and again that Iran is aiming for a nuclear
weapon and that they are afraid that technology transfers
associated with the reactors will speed up Iran's quest for
nuclear weapons, there seem to be several laws that apply,
including the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, the Export-
Import Bank Act, and others. The administration apparently has
chosen not to impose sanctions.
Now, I have mentioned only five cases, but there are many
more, involving not only non-conventional weapons, but
conventional ones as well. While China is Iran's No. 1 supplier
of unconventional arms, Russia, according to the Department of
State, will be Iran's No. 1 supplier of conventional arms, and
will reportedly sell $1 billion worth of arms to Iran in 1997
and 1998.
It was just last Friday that President Yeltsin stated that
Russia has ``good positive cooperation with Iran, which shows a
tendency to grow.''
If it is indeed one of this administration's top priorities
to isolate Iran and to strangle Iran's ability to earn foreign
exchange that buys these weapons of mass destruction, why are
we not doing more about the suppliers? How, in the face of
almost overwhelming evidence, can the administration have
stated in a recent hearing that China and the United States
``recognize a shared interest in preventing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies''?
Now, I recognize that the use of sanctions is not always as
effective as engagement. But where do we draw the line? The
German government last week recalled its Ambassador to Iran
after the verdicts in the trial. The judge in the case stated
clearly that Iran's leadership was behind the plot and that it
was Germany's policy of engagement with the regime that led
Tehran to feel it could act with impunity on German soil.
Do we not at a certain point recognize what was recently
brought home so clearly to the German government, that Iran and
those who supply Iran with weapons of mass destruction believe
that because we have been so appeasing that they can continue
on with their programs with impunity?
What will happen when inevitably some companies violate the
terms of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act? In front of me I
have several articles describing the French firm Total's intent
to invest in Iranian oil fields to the tune of $850 million.
The Malaysian firm Petronas will be making a similar
investment, and what are we going to do? Will this
administration, for good reasons or bad, fudge on imposing
sanctions because they do not want to get into a tiff with
France or Malaysia?
Congress has passed a good deal of legislation to counter
the dangers of terrorist states like Iran getting nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver them.
The President has signed that legislation into law. Yet those
laws are for the most part lying around gathering dust.
I have got charts of both of those that we have up to my
right, to your left, about applicable laws that exist and the
sanctions that have been imposed, about weapons sales to Iran,
the countries of China and Russia involved with those. I have
to my left and to your right just a list of the headlines that
have taken place in recent newspaper articles about all of this
occurring. And if that is not enough, then we have the
Wednesday, April 16th edition of the Washington Times,
headlined ``Russia Sells Missiles to Iran, Terrorists to Get
Latest Arms.''
Is it just that sanctions are not useful? After all, that
is a valid answer, though not one I would agree with. Are the
laws not clear enough or not written tightly enough? Is there a
reason that the administration uses the loopholes that exist?
Take the recent case of Moscow's agreement to provide Iran
with nuclear reactors. Congress made clear its view that the
sale was not compatible with a continued U.S. assistance
program. The President disagreed and waived sanctions
associated with the reactor deal.
I am certain there are Members of Congress who are asking
themselves whether we should have given the President the
loophole he used. For my part, I believe that selling reactors
to Iran and receiving aid from the United States are mutually
exclusive. After all, why should Russia spend U.S. tax dollars
to support our avowed enemy?
The administration has told us again and again that Iran is
a threat, that we must contain that threat and stem Iran's
quest for a nuclear weapon. What are we waiting for? Is it not
time to ask ourselves whether our policy is really working?
That is what I look forward to exploring in this hearing
with the various witnesses that will be present to testify. I
think we have to have and need to have a good discussion, a
frank discussion, of what we are doing to contain Iran from
getting weapons of mass destruction. We will pursue that in
depth in this hearing.
I would like to turn to my colleague, Mr. Smith from
Oregon, if he would have an opening statement. The mike is
yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator. I am pleased to be here
with you and congratulate you on your first hearing of this
subcommittee. I am honored to be a member of it. I welcome
Senator D'Amato and am anxious to hear his testimony. I know I
share the concern he has about the prospective sales of new
NATO members to Iran and the impact that may have on Israel and
other neighbors.
So I look forward to these and am glad to be here.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Smith. We will have
others joining us.
I would call first to the witness stand Senator Alfonse
D'Amato from New York. I am well aware that we could sit here
and threaten Iran, decry their weapons program, sanction their
suppliers, and the Iranians would pay us little heed. That was
why we needed my esteemed colleague from New York to join us
today. Now at least we can be sure that President Rafsanjani
will sit up and take notice.
Senator D'Amato deserves kudos and gratitude from the
American people. At a time when the administration was
uninterested in confronting the growing problem in Iran and was
unwilling to prevent even U.S. companies from investing in
Iran, Senator D'Amato was out there calling for an investment
ban and sanctions. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act which he
authored is a blow to Iran's source of foreign exchange and a
much needed wakeup call to the regime.
The United States cannot sit back and permit one of the
world's most dangerous regimes to operate with impunity.
So therefore I welcome my esteemed colleague here today. I
congratulate you on the work that you have already done in this
area, and I look forward to your testimony of what else we need
to do to make sure to get this threat to our security and our
interests under control. Senator D'Amato.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW
YORK
Senator D'Amato. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
graciousness of your introduction, and I am very pleased to be
here with you and Senator Smith and Senator Robb.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset let me thank you for calling
these hearings. I think it is very important to focus on
exactly what has taken place, because little is really known
about the circumstances and how the legislation, which
basically says that we cannot nor should we do business with
those countries who permit unrestricted trade, and particularly
in the oil and gas production, of Iran and Libya as if all is
well.
The fact of the matter is that Iran is conducting a naval
buildup in the Persian Gulf. It is building and buying Chinese-
made C-802 cruise missiles, a danger to our Navy, and our
people are very, very concerned in that area. They are building
weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, as the chairman
has alluded. It is because of this and those things, Iran's
continued sponsorship of terrorism, that the legislation, the
Iran-Libyan Sanctions Act of 1996, was passed overwhelmingly
and enacted into law.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me divert from the very carefully
prepared remarks of my staff--and it is a great staff and they
have me engaged in all these nuances which very few people
understand--and get right to the issue. You know, you cannot
say to a rogue nation that, you are outside of the scope of
dealing with us and we are not going to do business as usual
and make international credits available to you and have you
continue to use these great resources that we, directly and/or
indirectly through our allies, help to finance. And I am
talking about the oil and gas resources that both Libya and
Iran have.
That is why we passed the Iran-Libyan sanctions act. Make
no mistake about it; that bill was destined to die in the House
of Representatives. It was going to die because of the interest
of the corporate structure, not only here in America but
throughout the world--business, business. People are willing to
do business with just about anything to make money--greed.
We have seen it in the past. We have seen people do
business with the most despicable characters in the world. With
the Swiss bankers, they were not neutral; they were the Nazis'
bankers during World War Two. Little has really changed.
Multinational corporations in the countries where the
various corporations operate, and particularly their own
national companies, seem to forget the lessons of the past and
so they deal with these petty tyrants and dictators and those
people who export revolution even in those countries
themselves.
We just recently had the case that the chairman alluded to,
in which the German court found four Iranian-Kurds who were
killed by the Iranians on orders of--and the court said
specifically--from the highest levels of the Iranian
Government. These executions took place on German soil, in
Berlin. This is the verdict of the German court.
I have to tell you, we would never have passed that bill
were it not for a terrible tragedy, the crash of TWA 800. It
was at that point in time when the bill had passed the Senate
and was being held in the House and being worked over, worked
over, being worked down, watered down, so that there would
really be nothing left of it.
That is just the same kind of policy that we had with Iran
and Libya for years, where we said we are not going to permit
their oil to come into this country, but we let our foreign
subsidiaries bring it in through the back door. Finally the
President put a stop to that. I proposed legislation to do it.
He did it by executive order. Fine, we did it.
But how do we sound to our allies when we say one thing and
do another? Are we really serious? What does that mean to the
people who we are attempting to get to act as responsible
citizens in the world, in the world community, and to stop
exporting to Iran and Libya?
Well, I have to tell you something. I think the American
people expect more of us, and I think this is more important
than that. I think that the recent killings demonstrate what is
taking place and how bold the Iranians are in exporting their
revolution even to the territories of those countries who have
been very sympathetic to them regarding trade.
Now let me tell you, there are some people who say, this
act is not worth anything, it is just divisive. Well, they are
wrong. Just look at this past January when Mohsen Yahyavi, a
senior Iranian Parliamentarian, was quoted as saying that this
act is having a very profound and detrimental impact, and he
says ``there is little or no foreign investment in the Iranian
petroleum industry.'' We want them to get that message. But if
you continue to do business with the killers and those people
who promote this kind of activity, well, why should they stop?
We are not suggesting that we go in and bomb them. We are
suggesting that we withhold the money from them with which they
pay for their aggression and terrorism.
Now, with respect to the oil-producing rogue states like
Iran and Libya, the sanctions policy should be viewed in terms
of U.S. national security. Any increase in Iranian and Libyan
petroleum revenues should be viewed as a threat to the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
I hope that our allies begin to understand this. But they
are not going to understand unless we show some determination.
U.S. sanctions against Iran and Libya are part of an ongoing
effort by our country and by Congress to fill the gaps in U.S.
policy. Congress through its law-making powers has passed
legislation against investment in Iran and Libya and sanctions
against countries that deal with Cuba, otherwise known as the
Helms-Burton Act.
It is this prerogative of Congress to do so--and I think we
have to remember that, despite a reluctance to deal with the
issue, eventually the President did in fact sign both measures.
I think we have to also remember that that law is really
only as good as its enforcement. Now, fortunately the
administration has reached an agreement with the European Union
regarding the implementation of the Helms-Burton Act and the
Iranian-Libyan Sanctions Act. This agreement was accomplished
due to the diligent work of Ambassador Stuart Eizenstadt, the
Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade. His
commitment to easing relations between the U.S. and the
European Union is unending, and it is important. We want to
keep our allies with us. And his work on this issue as well as
the question of the Holocaust victims' assets in Swiss banks
has been untiring and vital.
The agreement as it relates to the Iranian-Libyan Sanctions
Act is quite clear. It states:
The United States will continue to work with the European
Union toward objectives of meeting the terms: One, granting EU
member states a waiver under section 4 of the act with regard
to Iran; and two, for granting companies with the EU waivers
under section 9[c] of the act with regard to Libya.
Now, I think it should be clear that the terms in the law
for granting a waiver specifically with regard to Iran are very
simple. If the country where the company to be sanctioned is
situated imposes substantial measures, including the imposition
of economic sanctions--in other words, our allies have to join
with us--then and only then can a waiver be granted.
Any suggestion that the European Union should be granted a
blanket waiver without following the stipulations of the bill,
that is to join in this boycott, is simply mistaken. There is
no blanket waiver here.
In passing the legislation, Congress intended for this law
to be implemented in full, and if blanket waivers are provided
without just cause only Iran will benefit, and they will laugh
at us and they will continue their policy. So it comes down to
a question of how far our nation will go in implementing its
tools to defend itself, and I think using the great economic
power that we do have and hopefully to get our allies to work
with us is the proper way.
Now, there are some people what are talking about the
principles of dual containment and they argue that isolating
Iran will only radicalize the regime. They argue that through
the policy of dialog we can moderate the behavior of this rogue
regime. Yet despite all of its criticisms of our efforts, our
allies, with all of their moderate talk, with doing business
with them, with supplying them credits, have not been able to
moderate their policy. It is a flawed policy.
I think we had better learn the lessons of the past, and as
recently as the incident that took place in Germany. I think we
have to remember that terrorists are against all of the
principles that we stand for, and that if we, because of
economic expedience, look the other way so that we can continue
business and rack up profits, in the long run this policy will
become self-defeating.
Our allies can join with us and hopefully work with us and
become part of the solution in moving Iran into a civilized
nation that respects the rights of its neighbors.
I thank the chair.
[The prepared statement of Senator D'Amato follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Alfonse D'Amato
I would like to thank Chairman Brownback for inviting me to speak
here today about Iran before the Subcommittee.
The United States has chosen to attempt to deny the two foremost
sponsors of international terrorism the hard currency to fund their
support of terrorism and their attempts to obtain weapons of mass
destruction.
Iran is conducting a naval buildup in the Persian Gulf, buying
Chinese-made C-802 cruise missiles, which pose a direct threat to our
ships in the Gulf and this worries me. It is because of this and
because of Iran's continued sponsorship of terrorism that I introduced
and passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.
I am pleased to say the Act is working. Even a senior member of the
Iranian Parliament was quoted in January as saying the sanctions are
working. There is little or no foreign investment in the Iranian
petroleum industry.
Last week's conviction in Germany of four Iranian agents for the
killing of four Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Berlin in 1992, and the
courts' determination that the top Iranian leadership ordered the
assassination, European nations are hardly in a position to suggest
that the United States is being too harsh on Iran. The fact that
Iranian sponsored terrorism is being conducted on European soil should
make the Europeans rethink their opposition to economic sanctions on
Iran.
With respect to oil-producing, rogue states like Iran and Libya,
U.S. sanctions policy should be viewed in terms of U.S. national
security. Any increase in Iranian and Libyan petroleum revenues should
be viewed as a threat to the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States.
Our allies are providing Iran and Libya with the hard currency
enabling them to fund their aggression and are contributing to the
menace of terrorism. Through continued trade, extension of credits,
loan rescheduling at concessionary rates, and a stubborn adherence to
the misguided principle of ``critical dialogue,'' Iran has been
enriched by our allies who are themselves targets of Iranian terrorism.
Iran's aggression and support of terrorism is never really
considered by our allies when they engage in business deals with them.
For our part, we have chosen not to do business with these terrorist
states. We wish that our allies would do the same.
Unfortunately, in Europe, many politicians do not view the matter
this way. Many Europeans have suggested that the Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act was a political ploy, or a result of the recent American election
campaign. Nothing can be further from the truth. U.S. sanctions against
Iran and Libya are part of an ongoing effort by the United States
Congress to fill gaps in U.S. policy. Congress, through its law-making
powers, has passed legislation against investment in Iran and Libya and
sanctions against countries that deal with Cuba, otherwise known as
Helms-Burton. It is the prerogative of Congress to do so, and we must
remember, that despite a reluctance to deal with the issue, the
President did in fact sign both measures. We must also remember that a
law is really only as good as its enforcement.
Fortunately, the Administration has reached an agreement with the
European Union regarding the implementation of the Helms-Burton Act and
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. This agreement was accomplished due to
the diligent work of Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, Undersecretary of
Commerce for International Trade, who negotiated this agreement. His
commitment to easing relations between the U.S. and the EU is unending.
His work on the issue of Holocaust victims assets in Swiss banks has
also played a vital role in settling that problem. I am honored to work
with him on both counts.
The agreement, as it relates to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, is
quite clear. It states,
The U.S. will continue to work with the EU toward the
objectives of meeting the terms 1) for granting EU Member
States a waiver under Section 4.C of the Act with regard to
Iran, and 2) for granting companies from the EU waivers under
Section 9-C of the Act with regard to Libya.
It should be clear that the terms in the law for granting a waiver,
specifically with regard to Iran are very simple. If the country where
the company to be sanctioned is situated, imposes substantial measures,
including the imposition of economic sanctions, then a waiver can be
granted. Any suggestion that the European Union should be granted a
blanket waiver without following the stipulations of the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act is a mistake. In passing the legislation Congress
intended for this law to be implemented in full. If blanket waivers are
provided without just cause then only Iran will benefit.
It comes down to the question of how far a nation will go and what
tools it will use to defend itself. The United States as well as its
allies today face a new kind of war. This is not the kind of war that
comes with declarations of war by one nation upon another, but a
covert, cowardly attack on the institutions that we all once thought
were immune from attack.
Twenty years ago, no one rightly thought that someone would try to
blow up the World Trade Center, or blow up airliners full of innocent
men, women, and children. Attacks today are indiscriminate and devoid
of purpose. Even these acts are not without supporters and we know who
provides aid to these faceless terrorists. We know who trains them, we
know who supplies them, and we know who pays them.
Supporters of the principle of ``dual containment'' argue that
isolating Iran will only radicalize the regime. They argue that through
the policy of dialogue we can moderate the behavior of this rogue
regime. Yet, despite all of its criticism of our efforts, our allies
have thus far been unable to offer an example in which Iran's support
of terrorism has been lessened through talking to them.
We must remember that the terrorists are against all that we stand
for. No one is immune from attack, no one is safe. If our allies wish
to deal with the devil, then so be it. Our allies can either be part of
the problem, or part of the solution.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Senator D'Amato. We
appreciate that statement.
Let me ask you. I outlined five cases where weapons have
been or precursor chemicals or ingredients to missile guidance
systems have found their way to Iran from China and Russia and
some other places as well and yet nothing has happened. The
sanctions have not been imposed. What has been our failing to
date? Why are these items still finding their way to a nation
who is clearly considered a rogue regime and who is exporting,
officially exporting terrorism, even as is found by outside
courts? Why is that continuing to occur?
Senator D'Amato. Mr. Chairman, I think it is because we
have not pursued, not only this administration but past
administrations, a policy which says that you cannot say one
thing and then do another. You cannot say that you want to
normalize your relations with us and work with us as a nation,
whether it be China, whether it be Russia, and then undertake
the very activities that undermine this principle by supplying
various munitions and chemical weapons precursor materials that
are necessary to Iran, that will be used in a manner--and they
know it; the Russians know it, the Chinese government knows
it--in a manner to destabilize and create tremendous problems
throughout the world.
Now, how do you approach this? Do you approach it by making
public ultimatums? I do not think so. I think that would be a
mistake, and I do not suggest that. But by gosh, behind the
scenes when we are dealing with the Chinese and where they are
racking up $47 to $50 billion a year surpluses in trading with
us, we have the economic leverage to say to their leadership--
and I hope it has been done. Maybe the Vice President did it. I
do not know. But I think at the very highest levels they have
to be told: You cannot trade with us and work with us, as we
would like to build a relationship of mutual respect, and then
because you are going to receive a half a billion dollars in
hard currency sell weapons technology to Iran; and if you do
that you will be jeopardizing the mutuality of interests in
terms of commerce, in terms of mutual respect, because you are
imperiling our safety. You would not expect us to supply your
enemies with materials that would be dangerous and threatening
to you and to your people. We expect the same.
It never happens. And what happens when we talk about doing
something and using our vast power? My gosh, every single
business group comes running in: Oh no, you will cost the
American consumer money. Incredible, myopic.
We have not done this for years. And indeed, not only do
these groups come in and lobby, they lobby and just do business
as if every--just do business with them and they are going to
be nice and they are going to respect you. The fact that they
are selling, again, a half a billion dollars here and a half a
billion dollars there to the rogue nations of the kinds of
materials that will cause death and destruction and destabilize
this world, we just simply forget. It is on the altar of
economic greed.
Some of our own corporate boardrooms, the most wonderful,
outstanding citizens of America who make all kinds of
contributions--very little with their own money, generally from
their own corporations--to every kind of wonderful event there
is, they are the very people coming in and talking about, oh,
we are worried about the consumer.
Hell they are. They are just worried about their own
profits. I think that is a heck of a thing. But that is
democracy. You and I and the others have an obligation of
standing up and going beyond that, and sometimes it means some
of the interests that are in our own States and people that we
know who have businesses, good and decent people, and get
blinded because they want that business, they want those cheap
goods that come in because they are selling them at great
markups and they are making lots of money.
You think they are really worried about the American
consumer? That is a lot of nonsense.
Senator Brownback. We treat it as too much of a secondary
issue?
Senator D'Amato. Oh, yes, totally. In other words, this is:
So what? So they are selling a half a billion dollars a year of
chemical weapons and/or missile systems or nuclear technology
and, you know, we do not want to rock the boat.
I have heard about what a great basket of opportunity it is
and we should not do anything to imperil those trade relations.
I have had friends come to me, tell me that: Do not rock the
boat.
Well, I think there comes a point in time when behind the
scenes we have to say to them: Let me tell you, if you make
these sales, if your generals who are running some of these
plants both in Russia and in China are going to conduct this
kind of surreptitious sale, some of it not so surreptitious, to
these various countries, then you are going to imperil our
normal relationship and we are going to stop the business
intercourse between the two that normally flows.
I do not think that that is threatening. That is just
setting the record straight. That is protecting U.S. and world
interests for our security. It seems to me that makes sense.
Senator Brownback. I want to welcome to the committee
Senator Robb, who is the ranking on this committee, has a vast
amount of experience in the foreign relations field, one that I
am delighted to serve with you on this committee, am looking
forward to working with you, and I look forward to turning the
mike over to Senator Robb.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES S. ROBB, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our colleague from New York for joining us today.
He has never been one to hold back when he has some thoughts
that are relevant to a particular question, and certainly this
is one he has been very passionate about. There were several
comments that he made today that could lead to an interesting
followup, but I think, rather than keep our colleague here,
knowing that he has other business--indeed, I have two other
committees that are meeting as we meet here at the moment--I
will defer those questions until the matter comes up on the
floor of the Senate, where we may have opportunity to debate
this or other policy, and I want to hear from both the
administration panel and the other panel that follows. But I
join you in thanking our colleague for sharing his views with
us on this important topic today.
Senator D'Amato. Thank you, Senator Robb.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Senator D'Amato.
Our second panel will be Mr. David Welch, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and Mr. Robert J.
Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Proliferation
from the administration.
We are looking forward to a good dialog presentation. I
think there have been a number of points made. I hope the two
panelists, if at all possible, can address some of those points
that are made, some of the questions that have been out there.
I think it would be most--certainly to me most illuminating if
you can address those items, because these are matters that
come up frequently.
We do have your written testimony. We can take that into
the record. You can summarize it if you would like. I would
hope you could address some of these cases that have come up.
I know you both have a very difficult job, as Senator
D'Amato was just pointing out about the difficulties that
consecutive administrations have faced since 1979 dealing with
Iran. This has not been an easy issue.
I think also you know how strongly Congress has felt about
this and the number of laws that we have passed and how
frustrated we are that we do not seem to be making better
progress.
So Mr. Welch, the microphone is yours. We welcome you to
this committee hearing. Thank you for coming.
STATEMENT OF DAVID WELCH, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be one
of your first witnesses in this new capacity for you. It is a
rookie event for me, too, in front of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and I am glad you picked such an easy
topic for us to work on today.
If I might, I would like to take a few minutes to talk in a
general way about our policy. I am going to take advantage of
this opportunity because it is our first session together and I
think, when seen in the context of our overall effort, you will
discern a common purpose in what we are doing with respect to
Iran and with some of the ideas and efforts made by Senator
D'Amato.
Iran in our view poses a significant threat in a region
where we have vital national interests. Its policies have not
changed for the better over the last 4 years. It still seeks to
project its regional influence through a conventional military
buildup and through the development of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery.
We are particularly concerned by Iran's continued pursuit
of nuclear technologies, chemical and biological weapons
components, and production materials and missile technology.
Iran's acquisition of ever more sophisticated missile
technology from North Korea and China presents an increasing
threat to our friends and to our own military presence in the
Gulf.
Let me say, though, that Iran's threat is not limited to
the military arena. It seeks to expand its influence by
promoting violence around the world. It has used terror to
disrupt the Middle East peace process and against its own
people. Iran seeks to gain influence through disaffected
elements in neighboring countries and by promoting subversion
of neighboring governments.
It has supported terrorist activity in places as far away
as South America to the Far East. Its use of terror recognizes
neither allies nor frontiers, age nor sex, religion nor
ethnicity.
Not even Iran's own people are protected from its violence.
Its human rights record is among the worst in the world. Iran's
ethnic and religious minorities and women regularly feel the
lash of Iran's repressive system. Its disrespect for the right
of free expression is vividly demonstrated by the regime's
continuing public offer of money for the murder of another
country's citizen, Salman Rushdie, because of what he wrote.
Others who dare stand for freedom of ideas, like Iranian
writer Faraj Sarkuhi, also suffer for their courage. Iranian
oppositionists face less public but equally dire threats. 1
week ago, as you know, a German court found that the
assassination of four Iranians of Kurdish extraction at the
Mykonos restaurant in Berlin was ordered by the highest levels
of the Iranian government. These murders are part of a broad
pattern of state murder that has claimed the lives of 50
Iranian dissidents since 1990. What more tangible evidence
could I offer of Iran's willingness to use terror and violence
in pursuit of state goals?
As you know, we are also investigating an incident at the
Al-Khobar apartment complex in Saudi Arabia. We have not
reached any conclusions on that investigation. If the evidence
were to demonstrate involvement by Iran or, for that matter,
any other state, we will take appropriate action to ensure that
justice prevails.
What is the goal of U.S. policy on Iran? We seek to change
Iranian behavior through economic and political pressure, while
directly limiting Iranian capabilities. In the interim, we want
to constrain the resources Iran has to pursue activities that
threaten us and our allies. We seek neither to permanently
isolate Iran nor to overthrow the Iranian regime. We do not
object to Islamic government. We want Iran to abandon those
policies that have made it an international pariah.
Our approach includes nonproliferation and counterterrorism
efforts combined with economic and political pressure. To
combat global terrorism, we are developing a common agenda with
our European allies based on P-8 counterterrorism measures.
On nonproliferation, current legislation enables the U.S.
to pursue our objectives toward Iran. International cooperation
curtails, but has not eliminated, Iran's access to the
technology and equipment of proliferation concern. Current
sanctions covering the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, missile equipment technology, advanced
conventional weapons, and lethal military assistance to
terrorist list countries allow us to punish those who ignore
this international consensus. Nonetheless, some governments do
indeed continue to assist Iran with its weapons of mass
destruction and missile program.
That is why we have combined our nonproliferation efforts
with economic and political pressure. We want to demonstrate to
Iran that its policies will not only fail, but will bring a
significant cots to Iran's economic and political interests and
to the wellbeing of its own people.
Targeting weaknesses in Iran's economy, particularly its
need for technology and foreign capital, our unilateral efforts
have limited Iran's policy options. For example, as Senator
D'Amato noted, Iran has had difficulty attracting foreign
investment into its oil industry because of the threat of U.S.
sanctions. Iran must therefore choose, in effect, between
development of its resources and funding the very policies to
which we object. Similarly, our success in limiting Iran's
international influence and activity contrasts starkly with its
desire to be a regional power.
I have outlined to you our response to the threat posed by
Iran. Now I would like to discuss how I believe we could be
more effective. Our current legislative tools reach the limits
of effective unilateral initiatives. We would be much more
successful if we had a cooperative effort beyond
counterterrorism and nonproliferation with our allies to use
common political and economic clout to have a real impact on
Iran.
We have pressed our allies to adopt such an approach and to
restrict Iran's access to foreign capital and technology. We
seek a coordinated multilateral response that imposes clear
consequences on Iran for its choices. What would that common
approach look like? Steps taken on April 10 by the European
Union, including the recall of Ambassadors, suspension of the
so-called critical dialog, expulsion of certain Iranian
intelligence operatives, these are solid initial steps,
Senator.
A common strategy that brings us closer together with
Europe would obviously have a greater impact. It would make
clear to Iran that support for terrorist groups is
unacceptable, period. We must be perfectly clear on that point:
No support for terrorism for any reason, at any time, in any
place.
We must take an equally firm stand on proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. While the world community is
working to reduce and eliminate these weapons, we cannot remain
silent while Iran develops its own capabilities.
The Europeans have said that they will meet April 29 to
consider additional measures. We hope that the European Union's
decision will move our approaches closer together by including
measures that pose a tangible cost to Iran.
We want to create an impetus for Iran to change. What do I
mean by meaningful change? Not dialog for its own sake. Efforts
to engage Iran have not achieved any notable successes. Has
dialog stopped assassinations? No. Has dialog ended Iranian-
supported terrorism? No. Has dialog stopped Iran's use of its
embassies to coordinate arms procurement and terrorist action?
No. Has dialog even succeeded in limiting the threat against
Salman Rushdie? No. Current approaches have not conferred
immunity from terrorism nor caused Iran to change.
Iran's revolution continues to evolve. Periodically there
are internal voices that are raised which criticize the
regime's policies, internal and external, that put at risk
Iran's own development and stability. Unfortunately, those
voices are not being given a serious opportunity for expression
in next month's Presidential election in Iran. The candidates
in that election share a common investment in the status quo
and Iran's unacceptable policies.
As long as Iran continues to seek to project Iranian power,
violence, and terror in a way that threatens our interests in
international stability, we will work to isolate Iran and to
limit that threat. We will use all the tools at our disposal to
protect our friends and our interests, responding as we need to
to Iranian actions.
We call on our allies to join us in applying a real cost to
Iran. We hope that U.S. leadership and the growing realization
of European nations that Iran's behavior is unacceptable will
provide us an opportunity to work more closely together. We are
confident, however, that Iran will not prevail and that the
Iranian people will in their own interests eventually compel
their revolution to evolve and yield a regime that respects
international standards of behavior in the interest of all
Iranians and their government.
My colleague Bob Einhorn, who represents our Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs and is one of the State Department's
preeminent experts on nonproliferation issues, has some
comments about how the nonproliferation concerns apply in the
case of Iran.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Welch, for your
testimony. I look forward to some discussion of our statements
and some questions that I have.
Mr. Einhorn, welcome to the committee. I noted your
testimony last week, I believe in front of the Government
Affairs Subcommittee, on this same topic. We look forward to
your discussion here today.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. EINHORN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for the opportunity to testify before your subcommittee.
Despite its avowed support for nonproliferation and
disarmament, Iran is actually seeking the full range of weapons
of mass destruction, missile delivery systems, as well as
advanced conventional weapons. It has a clandestine nuclear
weapons development program that has sought to procure
facilities and technologies that have no plausible
justification in Iran's declared nuclear energy plans. Its
chemical warfare program is among the largest in the developing
world, producing some 1,000 tons of CW agent per year. It has
placed a high priority on acquiring biological weapons and is
capable of producing many different kinds of BW agent. It has
imported Scud missiles as well as components and technology
that would help them produce longer range missiles
indigenously, and it is buying conventional arms to give it the
means to intimidate its neighbors and threaten commercial and
military navigation in the Gulf.
Impeding Iran's acquisition of these capabilities has been
one of the Clinton Administration's highest priorities. We have
waged a vigorous campaign both bilaterally and multilaterally
to sensitize supplier governments to the growing threat and to
persuade them to adopt effective measures to ensure that
neither they nor exporters operating under their jurisdiction
will assist Iran's programs.
In the nuclear area, we have successfully urged all but a
very few suppliers not to engage in any nuclear cooperation
with Iran. At the highest levels we have pressed Russia to join
this near-consensus. While Russia continues to pursue
construction of the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, it has
agreed to limit significantly the scope of its nuclear
cooperation with Iran and in particular will not meet Iran's
request for a gas centrifuge enrichment plant or a plutonium-
producing heavy water research reactor. Nonetheless, we
continue to urge Russia to forego all nuclear cooperation with
Iran.
We urge the same of China. So far China has suspended its
sale of two power reactors to Iran, probably because of siting
and financing difficulties. Whatever the reason, it is a
positive step, and we will continue to call on Chinese leaders
to curtail nuclear cooperation with Iran.
Multilaterally, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, at U.S.
initiative, put in place in 1992 a regime to control nuclear-
related dual-use exports, a regime which has substantially
increased the obstacles to Iran acquiring the equipment and
technology it seeks. Also, learning from the Iraq experience,
the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency based in
Vienna, next month is expected to adopt more rigorous
safeguarding procedures aimed at detecting undeclared nuclear
activities.
Cumulatively, we believe the steps we have taken are real
impediments to Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations. They have
significantly slowed the Iranian program and posed obstacles to
its ultimate success.
In the chemical area, the U.S.-supported tightening of the
Australia Group's controls over chemical-related exports has
largely closed off European chemical and equipment companies as
a source of supply and forced Iran to look elsewhere,
particularly to China. The Chemical Weapons Convention will
also play a major role. It will outlaw any assistance to Iran's
CW program. If Iran joins the CWC, it will be subject to
challenge inspections. If it does not join, it will be subject
to sanctions and political isolation.
We are deeply concerned that various Chinese entities have
transferred dual-use chemicals, production equipment, and
production technology to Iran, which we expect will use them
for its CW program. We have urged Chinese leaders to take
strong steps to prevent these entities from assisting Iran's
program and to strengthen China's still inadequate export
control system. We have also told them that we are actively
examining the transactions of which we are aware, to determine
whether they meet the requirements of our sanctions law.
In the missile area, our continuing efforts to strengthen
the Missile Technology Control Regime have effectively denied
Iran's access to most of the world's leading producers of
missile technology. We are extremely concerned, however, by
North Korea's supply of Scud missiles and Scud-related
technology to Iran, as well as by reports of missile-related
cooperation between Iran and Russian and Chinese entities. We
will be meeting bilaterally with North Koreans next month to
discuss their missile exports and will continue to press with
Russia and China at the highest levels to avoid any
contribution to Iran's long-range ground to ground missile
program.
We are also disturbed by Iran's efforts to buildup its
conventional force capabilities. We have persuaded the other 32
members of the Wassenaar Arrangement to join us in agreeing not
to transfer armaments to Iran and other countries of concern.
In connection with Wassenaar, President Yeltsin publicly
pledged in 1994 that Russia would not enter into new arms
contracts with Iran and that it would also close out existing
contracts within a few years.
Any transfers to Iran of advanced anti-aircraft missile
systems, such as those in the S-300 series, would violate
Russia's commitments. We have raised the issue of reported
transfers of such missiles with the most senior officials of
the Russian Government and have received firm assurances that
such transfers would not occur. Indeed, we have not determined
that any such transfers have taken place. But we will monitor
this issue very carefully.
We have also expressed strong concerns to Chinese leaders
about the transfer to Iran of C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles.
These missiles add to Iran's maritime advantage over other Gulf
states, put commercial shipping at risk, and pose a direct
threat to U.S. forces. We do not believe the C-802 transfers to
date meet the standards for imposing sanctions under our law,
but we are continuing to monitor this situation as well for any
additional transfers that might cross the threshold of
sanctionable activity.
Mr. Chairman, we have used a wide range of policy tools to
promote our goal of impeding Iran's acquisition of weapons of
mass destruction and other dangerous capabilities. Among those
tools are multilateral export control regimes like the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, international agreements like the Chemical
Weapons Convention, and active bilateral diplomacy. Another
tool we have used is U.S. nonproliferation sanctions laws. We
have sanctioned Iran twice for missile-related imports and
imposed sanctions on entities providing assistance to Iran's CW
program.
The threat or imposition of sanctions can under certain
circumstances be an effective complement to other
nonproliferation policies, but they are not a substitute.
Indeed, with all the laws currently on the books, we believe we
have reached the limits of effective unilateral initiatives in
this regard.
What is most needed is close cooperation among the world's
leading suppliers of sensitive goods and technologies and other
interested states. Fortunately, we have already managed to
build wide international support for the need to constrain
Iran's programs. Even in the cases where we have some
differences, such as with China and Russia, we believe there is
fundamental agreement on the need to prevent Iran from further
development of weapons of mass destruction.
We need to continue building on this foundation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Welch and Mr. Einhorn
follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Welch and Robert Einhorn
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on an issue
of vital national interest, U.S. policy on Iran. I want to review with
you Iran's pattern of unacceptable behavior, our response to that
behavior, our work to bring our friends and allies into closer harmony
with that response, and some prospects for the future.
Iran poses a significant threat in a region where we have vital
national interests. Its policies have not changed for the better over
the last four years. The Iranian regime still seeks to project its
regional influence through a conventional military build-up and through
the development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery. We are particularly concerned by Iran's continued pursuit of
nuclear technologies, chemical and biological weapons components and
production materials and missile technology. Iran's acquisition of ever
more sophisticated missile technology from North Korea and China
presents an increasing threat to our friends and our military presence
in the Gulf.
Iran's threat is not limited to the military arena. Iran seeks to
expand its influence by promoting violence around the world. Iran has
used terror to disrupt the Middle East Peace Process. Iran seeks to
gain influence through disaffected elements in neighboring countries
and by promoting subversion of neighboring governments. It has
supported terrorist activity from South America to the Far East. Iran's
use of terror recognizes neither allies nor frontiers, age nor sex,
religion nor ethnicity.
Not even Iran's own people are protected from its violence. Iran's
human rights record is among the worst in the world. Iran's ethnic and
religious minorities and women regularly feel the lash of Iran's
repressive system. Its disrespect for the right to free expression is
vividly demonstrated by the regime's public offer of money for the
murder of another country's citizen, Salman Rushdie, because of what he
wrote. Others who dare stand for freedom of ideas, like Iranian writer
Faraj Sarkuhi, also suffer for their courage.
Iranian oppositionists face less public, but equally dire threats.
One week ago, a German court found that the assassination of four
Iranian Kurds at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin was ordered by the
highest levels of the Iranian government. These murders were part of a
broad pattern of state murder that has claimed the lives of some 50
Iranian dissidents since 1990. What more tangible proof could I offer
of Iran's willingness to use terror and violence in pursuit of state
goals?
Meanwhile, the Al-Khobar investigation continues; we have not yet
reached any conclusions. If the evidence demonstrates involvement by
Iran or any other state, we will take appropriate action to ensure that
justice prevails.
What is the goal of U.S. policy on Iran? We seek to change Iranian
behavior through economic and political pressure while directly
limiting Iranian capabilities. In the interim, we seek to constrain the
resources Iran has to pursue activities that threaten us and our
allies. We seek neither to permanently isolate Iran, nor to overthrow
the Iranian regime. We do not object to Islamic government. We want
Iran to abandon those policies which have made it an international
pariah. To achieve that, we are, and always have been, willing to have
a dialogue with an authorized representative of the Iranian government.
Our approach includes counter terrorism and non-proliferation
efforts combined with economic and political pressure. To combat global
terrorism, we are developing a common agenda with our European allies
based on the P-8 counter-terrorism measures.
In the non-proliferation arena, Iran has demonstrated a determined
effort to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
ballistic missiles capable of delivering them and dangerous advanced
conventional weapons. In the nuclear arena, Iran has dedicated civilian
and military organizations that are acquiring nuclear facilities and
technologies that are inconsistent with a purely peaceful nuclear
program. Iran's chemical warfare program is among the largest in the
Third World, producing some 1,000 tons of CW agent per year, on top of
already existing stockpiles of CW agents. In the missile area, Iran has
a vigorous program to acquire completed ballistic missile systems as
well as the goods and technology that would allow Tehran to develop an
indigenous missile production capability.
Clearly, Iran poses one of the greatest proliferation threats. The
U.S. has pursued a vigorous international campaign to prevent the
transfer to Iran of facilities and technologies that could further that
country's efforts to develop WMD and their means of delivery as well as
advanced conventional weapons. Preventing such development remains one
of our top foreign policy priorities. We have worked closely with other
governments to sensitize them to the scope of the problem and we have
often cooperated with supplier governments to ensure that exporters
operating within their borders do not unwittingly cooperate with Iran's
WMD and missile programs.
The U.S. has been active in all the multilateral nonproliferation
regimes to make other states aware of the nature of Iran's procurement
practices as well as to strengthen international export controls. A
number of changes have been made in the way these regimes operate as a
result. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), for example, has adopted a
``Non-proliferation Principle'' calling on suppliers to authorize
transfers of nuclear components and technology ``only when they are
satisfied that the transfers would not contribute to the proliferation
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'' In other
words, suppliers have agreed to exercise caution in considering
transfers to states such as Iran even though they are parties to the
NPT with full-scope IAEA safeguards. The U.S. has similarly worked
within the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime
and we are actively opposing efforts by Iran to delegitimize Australia
Group export controls.
The U.S. has addressed the issue of conventional transfers to Iran
primarily in the context of the Wassenaar Arrangement where thirty-
three countries, including Russia, have agreed not to transfer
conventional armaments and sensitive dual-use technologies to countries
whose behavior is a cause for serious concern. Iran is one such
country. Further to Russia's participation in Wassenaar, President
Yeltsin publicly pledged in 1994 that Russia would not enter into new
arms contracts with Iran and would close out existing contracts within
a few years. The details of that commitment were finalized in 1995
during meetings between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin.
Any transfers to Iran of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems
such as those in the S-300 series, as has been reported in the press,
would provide Iran with new dangerous capabilities and would violate
the 1995 agreement. We have raised the subject of reported transfers of
missiles from Russia to Iran at the highest levels of the Russian
government and have received firm assurances that such transfers would
not occur. We continue to monitor this closely.
We remain concerned by the transfer from China to Iran of C-802
anti-ship cruise missiles. Such missiles, whether installed on land or
on patrol boats, will add to the maritime advantage that Iran already
enjoys over other Gulf states and will put commercial shipping in the
Gulf at risk. Especially troubling is that these cruise missiles pose
new, direct threats to deployed U.S. forces. We have concluded that the
C-802 transfers that have occurred so far do not meet the standards
defined in the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act and have not,
therefore, imposed sanctions on China because of the sale. Nonetheless,
we are very concerned about these transfers, and will continue to
monitor Chinese and Iranian activity for any additional transfers that
might cross the threshold of sanctionable activity.
The U.S. is working to strengthen other global agreements as well.
For instance, we have worked closely with the IAEA in developing the
so-called 93+2 enhanced safeguards program which will give the IAEA an
increased ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. We expect
the IAEA Board of Governors to approve that program in May. The
Chemical Weapons Convention will provide important new tools to impede
Iran's CW activities. It will outlaw any assistance to anyone's CW
program and either subject Iran to challenge inspections if it joins
the CWC or subject it to sanctions and political isolation if it does
not. On the Biological Weapons Convention, the U.S. is working with
other states on a protocol that will provide transparency and build
confidence in the BWC's provisions.
In the bilateral context, we approached a number of supplier
governments when we had information to suggest that companies that
operate within their borders might be exporting technologies, equipment
or materials that would contribute to Iran's WMD and missile programs.
We have been particularly active in the nuclear area. We have found
most supplier governments to be responsive to our approaches and our
actions have prevented the transfer of a number of items to Iran that
we believed were to be used in WMD and missile development. Most have
adopted policies of not cooperating with Iran's WMD and missile
programs. Most have also opted not to pursue any peaceful nuclear
cooperation with Iran, with Russia and China being notable exceptions,
because of the risk that such cooperation would be misused to advance
Iran's nuclear weapons program.
The U.S. has pursued a senior level dialogue with Russian and
Chinese leaders on this issue. Vice President Gore and Russian Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin have discussed in detail on a number of occasions
Russia's planned nuclear cooperation with Iran. Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin have also dealt with the issue on several occasions, most
recently at the Helsinki Summit. While Russia continues to pursue
construction of the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, Russian officials
have agreed to limit the scope of nuclear cooperation with Iran. We
will, however, continue to make clear to Russian officials our
opposition to any nuclear cooperation with Iran.
The U.S. has also engaged in a dialogue with Chinese leaders both
at the senior political and experts level and urged them to curtail
nuclear cooperation with Iran. While there continue to be differences
between our governments on the issue of nuclear cooperation with Iran,
we can point to some successes such as China's decision to terminate
negotiation for the supply to Iran of two power reactors, probably for
siting and financing reasons. Whatever the reason, we consider this to
be a positive step. China is currently seeking to put in place a
national nuclear export control regime that will allow China to have
the necessary political review of sensitive nuclear-related exports to
countries of concern. We have pressed Chinese officials to put in place
this revamped regime as quickly as possible.
On missile-related exports, we have, over the years, worked
successfully to bring Russia into the MTCR. We are, of course,
concerned by reports of Russia-Iran missile cooperation. We have
pursued this issue at the highest levels of the Russian government and
will continue to do so. Similarly, we have frequently raised with
Chinese officials information we have received about missile-related
cooperation by Chinese entities with Iran and urged Beijing to take
effective steps to avoid any Chinese contribution to Iran's missile
programs.
Because of Iran's determined effort to develop WMD and their means
of delivery and their continuing support for terrorism, we have
combined non-proliferation and anti-terrorism efforts with economic and
political pressure. We seek to demonstrate to Iran that its policies
will not only fail but will bring a significant cost to Iran's economic
and political interests and to the well-being of its people. Targeting
weaknesses in Iran's economy, particularly its need for technology and
foreign capital, our unilateral efforts have limited Iran's policy
options. For example, Iran has had difficulty attracting foreign
investment into its oil industry in part due to the threat of U.S.
sanctions, enacted by Congress last year in the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act. Iran must, therefore, choose between development and
funding the very policies to which we object. Similarly, our success in
limiting Iran's international influence and activity contrasts starkly
with its desire to be a leading regional power.
I've outlined for you our response to the threat posed by Iran.
Now, I'd like to discuss how we could be more effective. Our current
tools--economic sanctions such as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and
the President's embargo, the missile and CBW sanctions laws, the Iran-
Iraq Nonproliferation Act, the sanctions for lethal military assistance
to terrorist-list countries and the many nuclear sanctions laws--reach
the limits of effective unilateral initiatives. The U.S. has already
imposed sanctions on Iran for transfers in the WMD and missile areas.
We sanctioned Iran for missile-related transfers from North Korea and
we have imposed sanctions on entities providing assistance to its CW
program. The fact that very few supplier governments cooperate with
Iran's WMD and missile programs is testament to the strength of our
efforts and to the fact that most governments have developed a common
policy on the need to prevent the further development of these
programs. Even in cases where we have some differences, such as with
China and Russia, we believe there is fundamental agreement on the need
to prevent Iran from further WMD development.
We would be much more successful if we had a cooperative effort,
beyond counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, with our allies to use
our common political and economic clout to have a real tangible impact
on Iran. We have pressed our allies to adopt such an approach and to
restrict Iran's access to foreign capital and technology. We seek a
coordinated, multilateral response that imposes clear consequences on
Iran for its choices.
What would a successful common approach look like? The steps taken
on April 10, the recall of EU ambassadors, suspension of the Critical
Dialogue, expulsion of certain Iranian intelligence operatives, are
solid initial steps. A common strategy that brings us closer together
would have a greater impact. It would make clear to Iran that support
for terrorist groups is unacceptable, period. We must be perfectly
clear on that point. No support for terrorism for any reason, at any
time, in any country. We must take an equally firm stand on
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While the world community
is working to reduce and eliminate these horrible weapons, we can not
remain silent while Iran develops its capabilities.
The Europeans have said they will meet April 29 to consider
additional measures. We hope that the EU's decision will move our
approach closer together by including measures that pose a tangible
cost on Iran. We want to create an impetus for Iran to change.
What do I mean by meaningful change? I don't mean dialogue for its
own sake. Efforts to engage Iran have not achieved any notable
successes. Has dialogue stopped assassinations in Europe? No. Has
dialogue ended Iranian supported terrorism? No. Has dialogue stopped
Iran's use of its embassies to coordinate arms procurement and
terrorist action? No. Has dialogue even succeeded in lifting the threat
against Salman Rushdie? Again, no. Simple engagement has not conferred
immunity from terrorism, nor caused Iran to change.
Iran's revolution continues to evolve. Periodically, internal
voices are raised to criticize the regime's internal and external
policies that put at risk Iran's own development and stability.
Unfortunately, those voices are not being given a serious opportunity
for expression in next month's presidential election. The candidates in
that election share a common investment in the status quo and its
unacceptable policies.
As long as Tehran continues to seek to project Iranian power,
violence and terror in a way that threatens our interests and
international stability, the U.S. will work to isolate Iran and limit
that threat. We will use all of the tools at our disposal to protect
our friends and our interests, responding forcefully to Iranian
actions.
We call on our allies to join us in applying a real cost to Iran
for its policies. We hope that U.S. leadership and the growing
realization of European nations that Iran's murderous behavior is
unacceptable will provide an opportunity for us to work more closely
together. We are confident that Iran will not prevail and that the
Iranian people will, in their own interests, force their revolution to
evolve and yield a regime that respects international standards of
behavior in the interests of all Iranians and their regime.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Einhorn. We appreciate
your testimony.
Senator Robb, if you would not mind, I thought what we
could do is 7 minutes each and we will bounce back and forth on
that until either you are exhausted or it is time to move on.
We have got a series of questions, if I could, Mr. Welch.
So if we can get the time clock and make sure of the timing.
Mr. Welch, as you look around the world would you say that
Iran as a nation is our No. 1 security threat presently to this
Nation and to our interests, or is there another country that
you would deem more of a present security threat than the
Iranians are?
Mr. Welch. I would not want too many more to join those
ranks, but I would see Iran as a substantial security threat to
the United States, given the interests that we have in the
immediate neighborhood of Iran, in the Gulf in particular, but
also given the fervor by which they pursue their own perceived
national interests, which takes them further afield than the
Gulf, both practically and politically.
To use a political example as well as a practical one,
consider their position on the peace process. The leadership of
Iran has in effect targeted the peace process both in political
terms by its own actions in denouncing almost anything positive
that goes on and supporting almost anything negative that goes
on, and by practical steps, by its allegiance and support of,
allegiance with and support of groups that themselves conduct
actions of violence and terror against those involved in the
peace process.
So while I do have responsibility for a couple of other
places that fall into the category of rogue states, Iran is
certainly one that we regard as a very, very important national
security threat and a serious long-term one as well. I think
that is a judgment that many of our allies in the region and
outside it share.
Senator Brownback. So you are saying it may not be the only
one, but it is certainly in the class A category as far as our
most difficult security threats we presently have around the
entire world?
Mr. Welch. Graduated from class A to the pro leagues, yes.
Senator Brownback. I would judge that as well, it seems to
me. So what is so troubling to me, as I raised a number of
examples--and even you can go to this Wednesday's Washington
Times, as I did: ``Russia sells missiles to Iran.'' If they are
in the pro leagues for our difficult security interests that we
have, why are we not taking even further steps to try to limit
them, whether it is in the specifics of the missile sale or, if
you can enlighten me that these are not actually occurring, we
have additional sanctions that you do have available to use?
Why are we not stepping it up?
Mr. Welch. Senator, let me take a stab at this and then ask
Bob to comment about the specifics raised by, among other
things, that newspaper article.
First, we agree this ought to be a priority foreign policy
concern of the United States. We think that in very real terms
this administration and those that preceded it have
demonstrated that Iran is a very fundamental concern of ours.
We have in unilateral sanctions and in unilateral policy
probably the most robust and vigorous effort against Iran's
behavior of any nation in the world.
We are also seeking to expand that in both the
nonproliferation and other areas, by reaching greater areas of
common agreement with our allies that will enable us to target
those behaviors that are specifically of concern to us. We have
in some cases chosen to extend our unilateral reach. The Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act is an excellent example of that. The
administration worked very closely with the House and Senate in
order to forge a consensus behind this measure. It is a
powerful deterrent to foreign investment in Iran's oil and gas
sector. That in turn denies Iran the ability to get resources
that it can use for some of the things that we find
problematic.
While it is a new piece of legislation, I think Senator
D'Amato is absolutely right in saying that it seems to be
working, that those who are attracted to the idea of investment
in Iran's petroleum sector are having second thoughts about
doing that as a result.
We need to go beyond that. We would like further economic
and political steps by our friends.
Senator Brownback. Let us talk about ones that we can do. I
do not mean to interrupt, but I want to get to this point if I
could. We have aid that we give to Russia. They are providing
nuclear reactors into that region. According to this and other
articles, they are selling missiles into that region. We could
step up pressure on those suppliers of these sort of weaponry,
whether conventional or unconventional, to the Iranians. And we
are not.
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on that?
Senator Brownback. Please, because I want to get on that
point toward the suppliers, because we have done a lot toward
Iran itself, but we are not getting at the people getting the
items into Iran.
Mr. Einhorn. First of all, you cited the newspaper story.
As I mentioned in my statement, we have not concluded that any
of these transactions have taken place, these transfers of
advanced missiles have taken place. But we need to watch that
very carefully.
But on your general point, the suggestion you make I think
is that because we have not invoked sanctions in all of these
cases or even in many of these cases we are not pursuing
conscientiously and vigorously a nonproliferation policy. In my
view the premise of that question puts too much reliance,
expects too much of our sanctions laws. Our sanctions laws have
a variety of very specific requirements that have to be met in
order for sanctions to be triggered. They are very technical
and they are very detailed.
One, for example, in the chemical weapons sanctions law is
that the exporting entity needs to know, to be conscious that
its export is going to a chemical weapons program. Now, what
happens is that a lot of these chemical weapon aspiring states
use front companies and intermediaries, and it may be very
difficult for us to know whether the exporter in fact was
knowledgeable about the destination. So we have to look at that
very carefully, examine it very carefully.
So the requirements of the sanctions law may not be
triggered even when we know that a worrisome transaction has
taken place.
Now, that does not mean we do not take action. Because we
are aware of such transactions and their destabilizing impact,
we will take very vigorous action, and we have even without
invoking sanctions. So sanctions are not synonymous with an
effective nonproliferation policy.
In terms of, you mentioned the Russia-Iran transfer of a
power reactor. This has been one of our highest priorities
since 1993. This has been dealt with by President Clinton with
President Yeltsin, Vice President Gore with Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin. It is a constant topic in our discussions, and we
have put a lot of pressure on Russia.
As a result, Russia has constrained significantly the scope
of that transaction and it has canceled the transfer of some
very sensitive technologies, like a gas centrifuge enrichment
plant. It has cut it way back, and it is because of the effort
that we have put into this.
I can go down the list, but we are concerned about these
transfers and we put a lot of effort into persuading suppliers
not to make them.
Senator Brownback. I appreciate that, but I could also go
down the list of items that have made their way into Iran and
have, so that this has not worked today.
Senator Robb, and I look forward to some additional
questions.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You made reference
to an article today in the Washington Times. I am going to
start with a reference to one that appeared in the Washington
Post by Jim Hoagland, who frequently writes on issues of this
sort, and it is a particularly provocative piece, entitled
``Iran, Murder by Proxy,'' in today's Washington Post that I am
sure both of you have seen.
I take advantage of this opportunity because, particularly
looking directly behind Mr. Welch, I see a former DCI and,
since I serve also on the Intelligence and Armed Services
Committees, I do not have to even take a chance on referring to
any matters that would not be appropriate. Some of the
questions, frankly, that I would like to ask would be more
appropriate for closed sessions. But a couple have come to mind
immediately.
If, as Mr. Hoagland writes in this morning's Washington
Post, there are, quoting him, ``emerging indications'' that
Iran was behind the Khobar Towers bombing, and if this
characterization is correct, murder by proxy or something along
those lines--and I would say, having just returned from the
region and met with a number of officials--I will not be more
specific because I do not know how specific they wanted to be
with some of their comments, but certainly, the comments that I
received in the country where it happened in particular were
not inconsistent with some of the things in this particular
article--the question I have for you is: Are retaliatory
military strikes against terrorist targets inside Iran
appropriate, using as the premise the article that appeared in
today's Washington Post?
Mr. Welch. Senator, on this one I am going to have to
apologize. I am in a different position in answering your
question than you are in asking it.
Senator Robb. I understand the difference. And I am not
asking you, incidentally, for targeting lists or intentions. I
am simply asking a broader question, about whether or not that
is an--an--appropriate response if the predicate is satisfied.
Mr. Welch. Setting aside for a moment the predicate, and my
answer will have no reference to that, in general were we
confronted with a situation of this sort, where an action has
been taken against Americans, official or unofficial, we have a
range of options to respond. We take a look at all those things
in such circumstances. None are discarded a priori or accepted
a priori. We do not rule anything in or anything out. That is
our general response.
With respect specifically to the incident in question, I am
obliged to say, as I did in my prepared testimony, knowing that
this question might come up, that this is a matter that is
still under investigation. We have not reached any conclusions
yet. But when we do we will take an appropriate action.
Senator Robb. Again without committing you to a particular
response, and given the fact that there is still some
uncertainty, at least in terms of the official position of the
United States with respect to the cause or the perpetrators of
this particular action, the question I would ask you has to do
with what you think the reaction of such an action on the part
of the United States might be within the Arab world.
Mr. Welch. I think that is a difficult hypothetical
question to answer, Senator. A lot depends on what provoked our
response, the nature of our response.
Senator Robb. Well, again I am using the provocation as
some clear finding that indeed this was, using the author's
terminology, ``murder by proxy'' that was carried out by the
Iranian government.
Mr. Welch. You are asking me a question that, because it is
hypothetical and on a sensitive subject, I am simply not
prepared to go into in open session. I would like to be able to
talk to you about that and we have other ways we can do that.
Senator Robb. Let me just ask another question. I realize
these are sensitive and I have got others that I was thinking
about asking that I have decided not to, so you can imagine
what I am not going to put to you at this point.
I will ask another question, though, that probably falls in
the same general category, and I cannot help but noting
editorially a smile on the face of the former DCI, that he is
glad that you are in the seat this time and he is not with
respect to any official response.
In that same article, reference is made to the possibility
of an idea that has been circulating in some circles about
extending the naval blockade that is now in force against Iraq
to cover Iran as well. The question: Is that logical? Is it
feasible in your judgment?
Mr. Welch. Again, setting aside that this is a matter that
remains under investigation, to answer the kinds of
hypothetical questions that you are asking, I am simply not
comfortable doing that in public, in an open session.
We have a variety of tools that we can use in these
situations. We are not ruling any of them in, any of them out.
Senator Robb. Let me move to a different area then that
might be easier to deal with. Moscow pledged during past
meetings of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission that it would
cease further arms sales to Iran after current contracts were
fulfilled in 1999. Mr. Einhorn, I believe you made reference to
the fact that Russia has transferred SS-4 missile technology to
Iran.
My question is, if that is the case, would not that be a
violation of the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty and the MTCR which
Moscow has agreed to abide by?
Mr. Einhorn. Senator Robb, I alluded to the reports that we
have both seen about possible cooperation on the SS-4-related
technology. I cannot comment on that. This is difficult in open
session, but we are concerned about the point.
Senator Robb. The only question I said is if. If that is
true, would not that be a violation? I am not asking you
whether it is true, but I am just asking for an interpretation
of the agreements.
Mr. Einhorn. The MTCR--Russia's MTCR obligations would
prohibit--Russia's MTCR's obligations would indicate that they
have to exert extreme caution in dealing with items that are on
the MTCR list. SS-4 components would be on the MTCR list.
Whether they would be so-called Category I or Category II
items, you would have to know what items you are talking about.
In the case of Category I items or Category I technology,
MTCR says there would be a presumption to deny such exports. So
it is very difficult to talk about this in the abstract. It
depends. You need to know what kind of technology, what kind of
items may have been transferred. But as I say, we are concerned
about these reports, and the reports apply not just to SS-4-
related technology, but other kinds of missile equipment and
technology, and we are examining them and we are approaching
Russia leaders at the highest levels.
Obviously, if such reports were to be true there would be
very real concern, because they would add to Iran's ability to
produce long-range ground to ground missiles indigenously. So
we are following this very carefully.
Senator Robb. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I thank
both of our witnesses for their circumspect and diplomatic
responses.
Senator Brownback. I have a few more questions, and if you
have some we will try that as well.
Mr. Einhorn, I want to be very specific on one question. If
C-802 transfers do not meet the standards defined in the Iran-
Iraq Proliferation Act, Nonproliferation Act, would you support
an amendment to that Act that would change the standard for
imposition of those sanctions?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I am not suggesting any change
in the law. I am just saying that the standard for sanction
ability at this time has not been met in our view. The standard
is destabilizing numbers and types, does the transfer so far
constitute a destabilizing number and type? And we say so far
no, but we will monitor the situation for any additional
transfers that would cross that threshold of sanction ability.
Senator Brownback. So you do not think those transfers, the
C-802 transfers, meet that standard yet of destabilizing?
Mr. Einhorn. The administration does not believe transfers
to date meet that standard. More importantly, the Department of
Defense in analyzing this very carefully--and of course, DOD
has a tremendous stake in this--has concluded that so far these
are not sanctionable transfers.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Welch, you mentioned that--I gather
in your testimony you are saying that we have reached the
limits of what we can do unilaterally and we need to go
multilateral. I have some question of, if that is indeed the
premise which you operate under, you do have additional grounds
that you could cover unilaterally, that we can take against
particular supplier nations. We have identified a number of
those that are up on these boards.
If you dispute that, I would certainly want to know how or
where, or how we might change the law to give you more tools.
But taking your premise that we need to go more multilateral at
this point in time, are you committed, is the administration
committed, to doing something with the EU before April 29th
when they meet on this issue to prod and to push them as
aggressively and as hard as possible to tighten their sanctions
in working with us against the Iranians?
Mr. Welch. The simple answer is yes. We want to work with
our allies on this. We think we have a moment of opportunity,
given the Mykonos verdict. We believe that their steps so far
have been good ones. We would like to do more. We will have
those discussions with them.
In fact, Senator, they have been under way, both before and
in the immediate aftermath of the verdict, and there will be
more. We have a variety of ways we do that. And let me add that
it is done at a variety of levels, too, up to and including the
senior leadership of this administration.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Welch, if I understand your
testimony correctly, you would agree with me that we have not
been effective in limiting the Iranians' ability to get either
precursor chemicals, items that could lead toward a nuclear
weapons development program, that we have not been effective to
date in getting their access? Maybe, Mr. Einhorn, you are the
correct person to answer that.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No, I would not agree
with that. I would state that we have been quite effective in
limiting Iranian access to sources of supply. In the chemical
area, I pointed out the Australia Group, that is a multilateral
export group, has tightened its controls. And we see it, that
Iran has shifted its procurement efforts away from Europe
because of the effectiveness of these controls. It now is
relying primarily on cooperation with Chinese entities as a
source of foreign supply.
Senator Brownback. So are they getting the items?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, yes, we do see transactions in dual-use
chemicals, production equipment, production technology. We see
this happening. Now we are working very hard with the Chinese,
trying to persuade them to take very seriously the Chemical
Weapons Convention obligation they are about to assume and to
clamp down, to develop good export controls, and to prevent
Chinese entities from engaging in this kind of cooperation.
Senator Brownback. So the products remain getting into
Iranian hands?
Mr. Einhorn. Yes, for the time being they are getting into
Iranian hands. And similarly in the nuclear area. The United
States has launched a major diplomatic campaign to get nuclear
suppliers not to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran. We
have gotten near-unanimous support for that campaign. So now
you have essentially two nuclear suppliers, Russia and China,
still engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran. But even those
two we have persuaded to constrain that cooperation, and we
will continue to work on that in the hope that they will agree
to terminate that cooperation.
Senator Brownback. Is it not time to take action against
those two suppliers, whatever force and effect the United
States has, economic sanctions, whatever, to stop those
products from reaching Iranian hands?
Mr. Einhorn. If you are talking about nuclear cooperation,
we are taking action.
Senator Brownback. With all due respect, I understand what
you are saying with that, but you do have additional unilateral
tools available to you toward supplier nations, whether those
toward Russia, aid issues, whether it is Eximbank issues or
funding, or toward the Chinese, the amount of trade that we
heard Senator D'Amato talking about.
I am not suggesting you link those together, but I am
saying that, if you look at the set of tools and resources you
have and you look at the products that are getting into one of
our major opponent's hands, they are coming from a couple of
places and you do have additional tools.
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, let me give you an example of
how we use carrots as well as sticks. In the area of nuclear
cooperation, a government needs a special agreement for
cooperation with the United States if the U.S. is to supply
nuclear reactors, major components, nuclear fuel, and so forth.
Neither Russia nor China has such an agreement in effect now.
Both Russia and China would like to engage in nuclear
cooperation with the United States because they respect
American reactor technology. We have told the Russians that we
are not prepared to enter into a negotiation with them for
nuclear cooperation unless we could resolve this question of
cooperation with Iran.
Similarly, we do have with China an agreement, negotiated
in 1985 but never implemented because of legislation that
requires the President to make certain certifications that
China is not assisting non-nuclear weapons states to acquire
nuclear weapons. We are been working very hard with the Chinese
on this. They have begun to deal seriously with our concerns,
and one of our concerns is their cooperation with Iran, and
they have begun to curtail that cooperation. We want to
continue pushing that and using the inducement of this, of
implementing this agreement for cooperation, as an incentive.
Hopefully, we will be able to use this effectively to
encourage a curtailment of this nuclear cooperation with Iran.
Senator Brownback. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will turn to some economic questions that might be a
little less prickly. The state of the revolution in Iran--your
testimony in both cases and by Senator D'Amato and others would
indicate that things are not going well. There is high
unemployment, lower petrodollar income certainly compared to 10
years ago, an outdated oil production infrastructure,
widespread poverty, et cetera.
The question is, in light of these deteriorating economic
conditions, can the ideological cohesion remain in Iran? And I
guess the broader question: Is the revolution in the process of
imploding in your judgment?
Mr. Welch. Well, you are right, Senator, that economic
conditions there are worse. In fact, this is one of their
significant vulnerabilities over the longer term. In a word,
the revolution has done a lousy job in using the rich natural
resources of this country. Oil production in 1979 I think was a
couple times higher than it is today, just to give you one
example. That is one of the reasons that our legislation has
targeted this sector.
More broadly, I think they have benefited in the last year
actually from slightly higher oil prices, and that has given
them a bit of a cushion, a cushion that they have used to
respond in a number of ways to what they perceive as the
economic warfare being waged on them by the United States.
How has the revolution survived despite this? The
revolution, after all, has been in Iranian terms more or less
broadly popular for years. It has begun to decay in popularity
in recent years, to the extent that some Iranians today
describe it as sort of hollow.
That said, they have a strong, fairly authoritarian
political establishment. Their method of governance is
sufficiently strict to avoid the emergence of any credible
local opposition inside Iran. They have used the tools that a
modern state has very effectively in denying their people those
opportunities. And, you know, even though they hold elections,
they are very carefully designed to assure that the types of
candidates that come forward to run for those seats are sort of
one frame of mind, and they have managed to get along.
Is this a situation that is sustainable over the long term?
I am not able to make a judgment on that right now. Let me say,
though, that quite apart from whether it is or not, the things
that they are doing which are a problem for us are the focus of
our attention. We have not got a candidate in their
Presidential race one way or the other. In our mind, the
Iranian people ought to have a greater freedom of expression
than they have today. That would be very good, if that
happened. But the key issue for us at the moment is what this
current Iranian regime is doing. That is the focus of our
policy.
Senator Robb. Well, given the eternal quest for finding the
``Iranian moderates,'' is there any alternative emerging that
is viable in your judgment?
Mr. Welch. We do not subscribe to the theory that there are
emerging Iranian moderates. We do not subscribe to it today. We
have not before.
Senator Robb. You made reference to the election that will
be held next month. The leading candidate, as I understand it,
is the speaker, although there may be others. Is there any
sense that anyone who is elected would bring about a
substantial change in terms of the relationship with the United
States? Is there any likelihood under any circumstances that
you can foresee that that would improve? Certainly, anti-
American sentiment is frequently used by campaigns and/or
appeal to nationalism, if not fundamentalism, in many countries
quite successfully in stirring up the population or in
achieving a particular electoral result.
But do you see any possibility of a positive change or do
you see any inevitability in a decline if the most likely
victor is successful?
Mr. Welch. I see little prospect for meaningful change. On
the contrary, I think there is substantial continuity in what
this leadership and its likely successors want to do, and they
are likely to continue doing it unless there are substantial
costs to them for what they are doing.
I do not want to give Mr. Nateknuri or any of his
competition a campaign plug, so I will avoid specific comment
on them. But I do not see any important attraction in any of
the candidates.
Senator Robb. Do you want to speculate on why Mr.
Rafsanjani may have consented to an interview that turned out
to be interpreted by defense folks in defense ways, what his
postelection plans might be?
Mr. Welch. They from time to time give interviews, and I
think it is part of an effort to influence and in some cases
more than that, propaganda. I think their actions are more
important than their words, though I would like a few of their
words changed as well. I think that some of those are
gratuitous. For example, on the peace process I cannot see what
Iranian national interest that particularly serves.
That said, what they are doing is more important than what
they are saying.
Senator Robb. I think that is an appropriate place, Mr.
Chairman, to leave it. I thank you and I thank the witnesses.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Robb. I appreciate
that.
You have stated that China's nuclear cooperation with Iran
is suspended. Is that truly the case? We can certainly say
that?
Mr. Einhorn. Let me clarify, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. I would love a yes on that.
Mr. Einhorn. I would love a yes on it, too. But
unfortunately, what I have to say is that it has cut back
certain planned cooperation. It has rejected Iran's request
that it provide a heavy water research reactor optimized for
the production of plutonium. It has also suspended the sale of
two power reactors, I pointed out, probably as much for siting
and financial reasons than because of our urgings. But
regardless, it is a good step.
There are certain other elements of cooperation we have
urged them to suspend as well. I think they are taking our
concerns seriously. We hope to see further curtailment, but
there is still some ongoing cooperation.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, panel members. You
have a tough job and we share an objective. I have to tell you,
I am disappointed with where we are today with this threat. I
will keep watching. The committee will keep watching. We may
have you back up again near-term on this, because I just do not
think we are getting the job done, as witness what actually is
occurring.
I do appreciate your commitment to working this issue
aggressively. I know your concern and you view the threat very,
very seriously, and I appreciate that.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Welch. Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Next, our third panel will be the
Honorable James Woolsey, the former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and Mr. Leonard Spector, the Senior
Associate Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project for the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, will be the two
gentlemen we will call up.
I would state to them and to others watching that at 4
o'clock we have a vote that will be taking place on the floor.
So what I would like to do if we could, Senator Robb and
members of the panel, is try to conclude by that time, so that
we would not be interrupting things as we bring things on back.
So that would give us about 30 minutes to do that.
Senator Robb. Mr. Chairman, that would be fine with me. As
a matter of fact, I was going to have to depart anyhow. I want
to catch the end of the Intelligence hearing that is taking
place right now in the budget that I should attend. If the
witnesses make relatively brief opening statements, I was going
to wait for them. If they are not, I will have to look to the
record for their statements. But I can certainly do everything
to assist you in meeting that deadline.
Senator Brownback. Well now, there is a motivation.
Mr. Woolsey, would you care to give us your brief opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Ambassador Woolsey. I would be delighted, Mr. Chairman. As
Senator Robb knows, I do not read opening statements except
when absolutely required to as an administration witness, and I
certainly am not that now.
Senator Robb. Mr. Chairman, I might also add, however, that
he is not easily intimidated.
Ambassador Woolsey. But I would be delighted, if it is all
right, to talk through a few points briefly that are in my
opening statement and have it inserted in the record and try to
integrate some answers to one or two questions that you asked
other witnesses as I go. It might save a little bit of time for
the two of us.
I think, Mr. Chairman, the key issue with respect to Iran
is that its combination of support for terrorism around the
world and its program of acquiring advanced conventional
weapons, and particularly weapons of mass destruction and the
means to carry them, ballistic missiles, that together--and
they are very much part of a militant spirit and an attitude
toward the West and toward many other countries in the East and
Mideast as well which is a product of the Iranian revolution.
But it is also a set of views, particularly with respect to
terrorism, that is not widely supported in Iran. I compare in
my statement the situation in Iran today to the situation in
Spain in the 1490's at the time of the Spanish Inquisition
under Ferdinand and Isabella and Tomas de Torquemada. The
clerics who support the terror--and that is the word for it--in
Iran today have strong critics within the Shia clergy in Qum,
in Iranian society. They are not real representatives of the
spiritual tradition of Iran or of the clergy of Iran or
certainly of the people of Iran.
What we have is a regime which, as Mr. Welch said, there
are no moderates stepping forward. And the attitude which some
of our European colleagues have fostered from time to time,
that we had the moderate Rafsanjani and the hard line clerics,
I think is nonsense. I think that approach has been
substantially undercut by what the court has set forth in the
Mykonos verdict in Berlin.
The government and those clerics that work with it are
indeed very much the enemies of the West and common sense, and
of the people of Iran.
I do believe that if we find that something as clear-cut as
Iranian government support for the terrorist act at Khobar
Towers can be shown convincingly to be the case, the United
States has no real option but to take extremely decisive
action. The sort of action that I would think should be
seriously considered would be, as you suggested, perhaps what
Jim Hoagland wrote about in the Post this morning or perhaps
the mining of their harbors.
But that, if it was carried out by the Iranian state
through its intelligence services, was as close as one can come
to an act of war, and we should treat it as forcefully as we
possibly can. We are the world's superpower and no Iranian
state should get away with that kind of conduct against the
United States.
Now, in the circumstances that we are in with respect to
the export of weapons of mass destruction, particularly from
Russia and China--and they are now the problem. Other countries
have been a problem in the past, but, as the two administration
witnesses pointed out, there has been progress with respect to
other countries, and there has been some progress with respect
to Russia and China, but not nearly enough, as I think the
chairman and you, Senator Robb, both suggested.
I believe that it is important to consider seriously taking
other legal steps in the current circumstances. One reasonable
one was mentioned by the chairman, such as amending the recent
statute to clearly include such steps as the cruise missiles,
the C-802's that now are quite threatening to U.S. Naval forces
in the Gulf.
It would be feasible, I think, to look at some of the
provisions that dropped out of the legislation when it was
being considered in the House and Senate and to bring
unilateral sanctions to bear on a secondary basis as the
statute operates in cases other than investment in the oil and
gas industry in Iran, to broaden it to include other
investments there, because their Achilles heel really is their
economy.
The mullahs have done a terrible job of managing the
economy, and we have helped them do a terrible job with the
sanctions. Our sanctions have not been totally successful, but
they certainly have been in some cases useful to crippling the
Iranian economy or at least making it limp a bit.
I think that if we focus on substantial steps that we can
take to affect the Iranian economy, even in the absence of a
judgment about Khobar Towers, and if it turns out that they
were responsible for Khobar Towers strong and very decisive
acts to cripple the Iranian economy, I believe we will be
operating with tools that we can use better than most, tools
that will be ones that we can bring allied and other support to
bear on, and I think that we have a reasonable chance of
turning this ridiculous policy of the Iranian government, its
support for terror and its acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction, around, not in short order, not in a few months,
probably not even in a very few years. But with resolution and
firmness, I think we do have some reasonable chance of success
here.
I very much commend the committee for its interest and for
holding these hearings.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Woolsey follows:]
Prepared Statement of R. James Woolsey
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is an honor to be asked
to testify before you on this important subject.
The current American policy toward Iran--containing it, using
economic sanctions against it, and pressing others to join us--is not
rooted merely in disagreement with Iran's foreign policy and the
rhetoric of some of its leaders. Even less is the current policy
grounded in opposition to Iranians' religious beliefs, or to Iran's
being an Islamic state. The United States has cordial and cooperative
relations with many countries with whom it has major disagreements. It
has close and friendly relations with states where Islam, including
Islam of a fundamentalist character, is the predominant, even the
governing, religion. Of course we will always strongly promote respect
for basic human rights. But unless such are threatened, Iran's internal
affairs are its own business.
American policy is heavily driven by a key decision that the
government of Iran has made: to be the world's principal state sponsor,
encourager, and bankroller of terrorism. It is a shame that George
Orwell is not still around to write a second installment of ``Politics
and the English Language'', because until the verdict last Thursday in
Berlin in the 1992 Mykonos Cafe killings--in which the German court
forthrightly set out the evidence that terror from Iran emanates from
the ``highest levels'' of its government--a number of European and even
American observers were showing substantial phraseological creativity
in subtly disparaging the notion that the Iranian government has
actually chosen a terrorist role for itself. These writings and
speeches--urging a ``critical dialogue'' with Iran and promoting
various types of economic and political openings to it--would have
given Orwell a rich array from which to select fresh examples of the
lengths to which some people will go to avoid unpleasant political
facts.
Until the verdict last Thursday many of these individuals were
calling for more ``hard evidence'' of Iranian government sponsorship of
terrorism than had been made public up to that point. Such demands of
course run into an obvious problem: some of the convincing detail (hard
evidence indeed) must remain in the hands of governments in order to
protect intelligence sources and methods. Unfortunately, if governments
were to inform the public about a number of details regarding Iranian-
sponsored terrorism they would also perforce inform Mr. Fallahian, the
head of Iranian Intelligence, who would promptly see to it that we
didn't learn any more about how the Iranian terror apparatus does
business.
But there is plenty of information available publicly now, despite
the absence of some details, to satisfy any unbiased observer. Both
former Iranian President Banisadr and a recent important defector
testified at the trial of those who carried out the assassinations of
four Kurdish dissidents in 1992 that such killings are routinely
approved not only by Mr. Fallahian, but also by President Rafsanjani
and Ayatollah Khamenei through a ``Council for Special Operations.''
The German court made public many facts about the Iranian government's
terror and assassination apparatus. The embarrassment among the Iranian
government's apologists in Europe mirrored that of its apologists in
Near East last fall when, according to a number of press reports,
Mahmoud Abbas, senior member of the PLO's Executive Committee,
identified Iranian Intelligence as being involved in an attempt to kill
Yassir Arafat, and the PLO consequently found it necessary to dismiss
seventeen of Mr. Arafat's bodyguards.
The Iranian government's denials about its responsibility for
terrorism should not be credited: Iran controls Hezbollah, funds Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command and other violent terrorist groups, and it generally
oversees, encourages, helps plan, and provides several different types
of support for a wide range of terrorist actions around the world.
Incidents of assassination abroad by Iran have substantially increased
under Rafsanjani and Khamenei compared to the days of rule by Ayatollah
Khomeini. The press has reported some facts which suggest Iranian
government involvement in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
When this choice to use terror is made by a government (as was the case
when the former South African government used terror abroad to support
its policy of apartheid), such an act legitimately makes that nation
subject to ostracism and to the admittedly imperfect but sometimes
justified weapon of international economic sanctions. Sanctions are not
a silver bullet, nor is Iran the only source of support for
international terror. If Iran changed its policy international
terrorism would not evaporate. But it would be substantially reduced
and crippled.
The policies of the Iranian government, supported by some Iranian
clerics, have produced much domestic resentment within Iran both
because of repression and because of mismanagement of the economy. The
destructive collaboration between the Iranian government and a sub-set
of clerics, including in the support of terror, has also drawn
articulate dissent from some prominent and brave Iranians, including
several leading Shia clerics.
It is a major mistake for Western observers to blame Islam, or Shia
Islam, for this state of affairs in Iran today. The problem is rather
that a few men, in the government and among Iranian clerics, have
chosen terror to be a major tool of the Iranian State. Just as it would
be unfair to tar the entire Catholic Church of the time with the
outrages of the fifteenth century Spanish Inquisition under Tomas de
Torquemada and some of his fellow Dominicans (whose close partnership
with Ferdinand and Isabella has some parallel to the collaboration
today between the Iranian government and a portion of Iran's clerics),
so it would be most unfair to blame Islam, Shia Islam, Iranian Twelver
Shia Islam, or the majority of Iran's Shia clerics for the outrages of
those who have brought about and who implement the policy of terror.
In her fine recent book, God Has Ninety-nine Names, Judith Miller
clearly describes the widespread resentment in Iran today against those
who sponsor terror both at home and abroad and the courageous
resistance of important clerics and other public figures. Prestigious
Ayatollahs, heads of Islamic Institutes in Qum, academics, and others
are calling for those clerics who manage and support the government's
terror apparatus to abandon that path and to ``return to Qum'', to the
traditional role of advising and providing moral guidance to the people
and the government. But it would seriously undercut the possibility
that this popular resentment and these brave individuals will prevail
in moving Iran toward sanity if we were to move now to accommodate the
sponsors of terror before they change their ways.
Iran is also involved in a buildup of certain extremely troubling
military capabilities. Although the state of its economy--partially
attributable to its own mismanagement, partially to the effect of the
various steps that the U.S. has taken and urged others to take--
somewhat limits the resources available to it, Iran has focused on
acquiring technologies and systems that pose serious threats to U.S.
forces and to friends and allies of the U.S., especially to Israel and
the states of the Gulf. In these efforts Iran has been the beneficiary
of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean willingness to proliferate these
systems and technologies.
One of the more dangerous developments in this line has been
Russian assistance, since January of 1995, to complete Iran's Bushehr
nuclear reactor, begun by Germany in 1974; through the operation of
this reactor the Iranians will develop substantial expertise which will
be relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. Russia completed its
shipment of three Kilo-class diesel submarines to Iran a little over a
year ago. Russia pledged in June 1995 not to enter any new arms
contracts with Iran and not to transfer any uranium enrichment or other
technology or advice that could assist a nuclear weapons program. The
Washington Times reported yesterday, however, in an article by Bill
Gertz, that Russia is in the process of selling advanced air defense
systems to Iran, including the latest version of a hand-held anti-
aircraft missile that will be given to Hezbollah terrorists. And I know
from his background and from personal experience that Russia's Foreign
Minister, Mr. Primakov (who was head of the SVRR, the successor to the
foreign side of the old KGB, during the time I was Director of Central
Intelligence), is extremely interested in building a close relationship
between Russia and Iran. Clearly we need to stay tuned to the Russian-
Iranian relationship.
According to press reports, Mr. Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, whom I understand will appear
before this committee, testified last week that China has now become
the number one supplier of conventional weapons to Iran, replacing
Russia. Most serious in this regard are the advanced C-802 cruise
missiles that can threaten U.S. naval forces in the Gulf. China is also
supplying components for chemical weapons to Iran as well as technology
and advice to help with missile tests. Although China has promised not
to proceed with a 1993 contract to provide two nuclear reactors to Iran
and also not to provide a uranium enrichment device, clearly the
Chinese-Iranian arms relationship requires constant monitoring.
Moreover, like the Russian-Iranian relationship, it requires us to
continue to search for leverage to exert against Russia and China in
order to dissuade them from at least the most damaging and
destabilizing transfers toward which those two nations and their
military-industrial firms seem repeatedly to incline.
North Korea has long been in a class by itself in many ways--in the
pathological weirdness of its ideology and its leaders, in the total
failure of its economy, in the immediacy of the military threat that it
poses to an important U.S. ally, South Korea, and U.S. forces located
there, and in its willingness to be a source of proliferation. Press
reports earlier this year suggest that North Korea has promised not to
deliver Nodong I missiles to Iran; the range of these would come very
close to bringing Israel within range of Iranian missile attack. Our
leverage over North Korea is small, but whatever we have we should use
to block such a transfer.
We may have some opportunity in the aftermath of the Mykonos
verdict in Germany and the European nations' reaction to it to rally
support for increased leverage against Iran to discourage its support
both for terror and for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missiles. Security Council action to, for example, ban
flights to and from Iran, cut its diplomatic representation abroad, or
ban exports to it of petroleum-based technology should be considered.
But realistically, the almost certain opposition of Russia and China in
the Security Council would probably doom such efforts--not to speak of
the even more ambitious (but potentially far more effective) notion of
a comprehensive embargo on Iranian oil exports. It may be worth
proposing one or more of these steps, even if we are likely to fail in
the LTN, as a precursor to taking further unilateral steps of our own.
Generally speaking, I believe that secondary sanctions should be a
tool of last resort in international relations; in my judgment the
stresses they produce with friends and trading partners should mean
that they are used only in very extreme cases. But this is such a case.
Iran today, by its clear adoption of terror as a consistent tool of the
state, has put itself in a different category than any other nation in
the world. In my view, this is the key issue. If we were to be able to
bring enough pressure on Iran to get it to halt its support for terror,
it would be evidence of such a major change in the culture of the
government of Iran that I believe other issues--such as proliferation--
would be considerably easier to deal with. Thus terror is, in my view,
at the heart of the matter. Under these circumstances, not only do I
believe that secondary sanctions are justified against what it is now
clear to any objective observer is the world's primary terror state, I
believe it would be worth considering a strengthening of such steps--
for example, by applying sanctions to foreign persons that export
energy-related technology to Iran or even to those that conduct a range
of commercial relations with Iran beyond the energy sector.
Iran is a wonderful country with a rich history and a talented
people who follow a great religion. There are no fundamental strategic,
religious, or other reasons why Iran and the United States should not
have cordial, even friendly, relations. If those who govern Iran will
stop murdering those who disagree with them, the path could and should
be open to move toward both the removal of sanctions and progress on
other issues as well. But if the United States loses its resolve before
the terror stops, it will thereby tell Iran's contemporary Torquemadas
that their support of terror is no longer a major issue with us--it
will tell them that, essentially, they've won. As is the case on many
difficult security issues, the rest of the world will not act
constructively on this matter unless we lead. On the issue of Iranian
terror the U.S. government has an obligation to Americans and to the
rest of the world to be firm, resolute, unswerving, and uncompromising.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Woolsey. I appreciate
that and appreciate your service to your country and your
continued service. Mr. Spector, a brief opening statement.
STATEMENT OF LEONARD SPECTOR, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND DIRECTOR OF
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Spector. Thank you. I will attempt to summarize my
statement and I would request that the entire statement be put
in the record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
Mr. Spector. Thank you.
I think I would like to sort of pick up in a certain sense
on some of the themes that Bob Einhorn was presenting,
especially the notion that there are many tools in the tool kit
that the administration has and the United States has to try to
curtail the availability of weapons of mass destruction to
Iran.
He mentioned a number of them, but there are others as
well. In particular, we have got a very solid inspection regime
in the nuclear side. We are going to have a new Chemical
Weapons Convention, whether we join it or not, that is going to
be available, that is going to put certain constraints on the
chemical weapons side for Iran. And we have, of course, these
multilateral regimes to try to control exports going into Iran.
In addition, there are other tools which I would like to
come back to, and these are the cooperative threat reduction
and Nunn-Lugar programs, which are critical in containing
nuclear and other very dangerous materials in the former Soviet
Union so that they do not leak out. And also I think it is
important to appreciate the counter-proliferation program of
the Department of Defense, which really has to be brought to
bear in these instances where the adversary is over the hump,
where they have chemical weapons or biological weapons or
missiles, and we are confronting not just an effort to stop the
next stage in their development, but we are confronting actual
capabilities that may be used against our forces.
A second point to make is that it really is worthwhile
going down a list--and I happen to have 11 items on my list; I
will not go through all of them now--which sort of
differentiate the different programs. We know in the nuclear
fuel, for example, that Iran is trying along three different
routes, I would say, to advance its nuclear capabilities. It
wants to acquire these reactors and so forth openly, and maybe
it will learn a lot of the tricks of the trade by open nuclear
energy development. It wants to acquire material clandestinely
from Russia, and that is why controlling that material in
Russia is so important. And it also is trying to develop
clandestine facilities in Iran to manufacture this material on
its own, and there I think we have pretty much stopped things
as far as I can tell.
If you go down the list, biological weapons is another
area. There is a program I guess where they are part way home.
They seem to have stocks of biological weapons which the CIA
has acknowledged. But there are many advances to be made yet.
So it is important to differentiate sort of where we are and
what we should be targeting.
I think the important target on BW is to make sure they do
not learn how to mate it with missiles, and that is a difficult
thing to do. Maybe we can be intervening through export
controls and other measures.
In the chemical area, there are two programs, really. There
is sort of the World War One style chemicals, which they have
in large supply. And when Bob Einhorn mentioned 1,000 tons per
year, I think it was, those are the old-fashioned gases, as I
understand it. The more dangerous nerve gases--VX, Sonan,
Teblin, and some of the others--are still under development. So
in some ways we have lost the game, on the simple weapons. They
are dangerous, they could be used in the battlefield. The more
dangerous chemical weapons are still there for us to try to
prevent the acquisition of.
I think the same is true in the missile area. Short-range
Scuds they have got in large numbers, but they want to go to
longer range systems, sophisticated systems, and we have a
chance to fight the battle.
If I can just say a few more words about the nuclear area.
I would say a point that really we would want to emphasize is
the critical importance of American programs dealing with
Russia to gain control over the Russian nuclear arsenal and
over these materials. There are hundreds of tons of nuclear
materials under poor security in Russia. The major push in
Russia to get these under control is coming from us by virtue
of the Nunn-Lugar and Nunn-Lugar-Domenici programs. It is
really, really critical that those be sustained.
There is a report that I was just part of a panel at the
National Academy of Sciences which goes into this in some
detail. It commends the administration for some very important
work it has done, urges a couple of changes, but the
fundamental message of a year's work is we have got to keep up
the effort, it must have Congressional support to continue with
this. The report is called ``Nuclear Concerns'' and in my
testimony I have got a footnote giving some additional details.
It is being released today by the National Academy of Sciences.
In the biological and chemical areas, I think we do have to
look a little bit at the counter proliferation options,
defenses that we can have, vaccines, various chemical
equipment. We have to anticipate that we are going to be
confronting these in the battlefield.
I think this is also true in the missile area. I know there
is a big debate over national missile defenses, but I think
there is a national consensus that theater missile defenses are
a useful tool in dealing with a threat that already exists and
perhaps anticipating some types of threats that will be coming
along.
You focused on sanctions with great emphasis. I have to say
some of the information I have had is that a number of the
cases that you have been alluding to--the Chinese transfers of
chemical weapons, Russian transfers of missile technology, and
so forth--are not sort of getting the first once-over now in
the administration. Some of these cases have been around for a
long time and they have gotten a lot of attention, and what we
have seen is in a way deliberate inaction, perhaps for
political reasons in terms of wanting to maintain a high level
dialog with the Chinese with the summit coming up and so forth.
But the impression I have is that some internal decisions
have been made about how serious the cases are, who is
involved, what might be done, what sanctions laws might be
triggered, and there has been a reluctance to carry forward and
actually bite the bullet and impose sanctions in some of these
cases.
Let me just make one final point, and that is to sort of
put on the table an area that we have used as an incentive in
the past to gain support from the Chinese and the Russians in
the area of missile controls. This is our willingness to give
them access to the commercial satellite launch market. In other
words, we export satellites to them, our industry does, and
they get the launch, they get the payment for launching this
into space. They have, both the Chinese and the Russians, very
excellent space launches, despite some recent setbacks.
But this is something of real value, and it benefits their
missile industry. In the Chinese case the same firms are
involved that are making some of the exports we are unhappy
with. In the case of the Russians, although different entities
are involved, if we in a sense threaten the ones that are
making money off of this, they may put pressure on the other
entities that are trying to sell a few missiles on the side.
We have done this in the past. There was a big episode in
1990 to 1993 where the Soviets and the Russians were selling
something to India and we sort of said: If you stop that, we
are going to open up all this commercial stuff. But the deal
was they were supposed to be very disciplined, and I think we
have seen some slackening on the Russian side, and in China as
well. I think this would be a very useful, targeted sanction.
It can be applied discretionarily. It does not have to have
statutory authority, and I think it is a good area to explore
as you push forward on the missile question.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spector appears in the
Appendix.]
Senator Brownback. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Robb, for
joining us as well.
Let me just followup on this. It strikes me that, looking
at this from the outside, that what we have done particularly
concerning China and Russia, a number of known, known and
publicly reported instances of products and items going to Iran
that we do not want going there, that we have basically treated
it as a secondary issue. We have said it is more important to
us for our relationship with China or Russia than it is to stop
these items from going on forward.
That is an outsider's observation. Is that an accurate one?
Mr. Spector. Well, it is. I think it may be a legitimate
observation and it may be a legitimate policy. I am certainly
committed to non-proliferation. This is sort of what I have
spent my professional career on. But you also have to realize
that the overarching American interest, let us say vis-a-vis
Russia, is to have a democratic Russia sustained, moving
forward, getting some economic stability, and growing in a way
that we want. So one could imagine totally pulling the plug on
Russia with no foreign aid, for example, which is how one of
the laws is framed. There is a waiver provision which the
President has exercised so that foreign can continue.
On the other hand, you know, we want to pull the plug if
there was absolutely no response from the Russians. But there
has been. The worst elements of the nuclear collaboration have
eased off and we are dealing with one item still, this nuclear
power plant that will be under inspection. There will be some
safeguards in terms of the kind of plant it is. So I would
hesitate to say now is the time to cutoff foreign aid.
But let us go over to the missile area. In the missile
area, you could identify a targeted sanction that would affect
one sector that is getting a lot of income from the United
States, and you might say: We are going to penalize you there.
Maybe that is not the right sector. Maybe we would find a
different one, and sort of try to make the punishment fit the
crime a little bit and catch their attention in a more focused
fashion.
I think you can do that with a couple of these areas.
When we try to deal with the Chinese and Pakistan, maybe it
is a different issue. There there is much more at stake for
China than money. They have a relationship with Pakistan and it
is harder to push them away. But in a lot of these other cases
it is really money, and if there is money, a penalty that is
threatened to the Chinese or the Russians which is much greater
than the financial benefit they get from some of these exports,
I think you may be able to prevail without having to do the
wholesale pulling back of foreign aid and so forth that I think
can be very tricky.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Woolsey, you care to comment on
that, whether we treated it secondarily?
Ambassador Woolsey. Over the last 2 years, I probably would
not be the best witness on that, Mr. Chairman. I have a general
impression in some of the areas that I have followed, such as
ballistic missile defense issues with Russia, that we have
soft-pedaled our objections to them too much and that we have
been unwilling to be as forceful and clear as I think it is
normally productive to be when negotiating with the Russian
government.
I think it is fair to say, though, as Mr. Spector said and
the two administration witnesses, that with respect to Russia
on this nuclear issue there has been some progress. We would
very much like to see them just stop on Bushehr, because
Bushehr will let the Iranians develop an expertise in managing
nuclear programs that will redound to their benefit and will
help them in their illegal nuclear weapons programs, and we
would very much like to see Bushehr stop.
But it is in fact the case that we have gotten something
done, the U.S. Government has gotten something done with Russia
with respect to the nuclear exports to Iran.
Senator Brownback. What about Mr. Spector's suggestion,
which I found intriguing? What about the commercial satellite
launches? Is that a way that--we have heretofore used a carrot
and stick approach, but we failed to pull the stick out because
I guess we feel like the stick is too big or it whacks us when
we use it. But here is a narrower one.
Ambassador Woolsey. One has to look at specific cases. For
some--I am not familiar with the whole range of our cooperation
with Russia on propulsion, but there are some cases in which
the joint ventures and cooperation between American companies
and Russian companies work in such a way that a Russian
component has become important for American purposes as well.
This has been part of the sort of growing partnership in some
technological areas.
So we would want to make sure that if we did something like
that, we did not do it in such a way that we undercut some
capability that we as the United States wanted and needed. But
as a general proposition, I think the thrust of his remarks are
on the money.
Senator Brownback. I want to thank both of you for laying
out this basis, because what I was curious to get at was other
assessments of what is taking place in the region and other
options that we might have that are available to us. I view
this as an extremely serious present threat that we have for
the United States.
I appreciate particularly, Mr. Woolsey, your statement that
if these terrorist activities are directly linked to the
government of Iran that clear and decisive action on our part,
including a potential for military action, be considered. I
think that is a brave and a good recommendation on your part.
Ambassador Woolsey. If I could just add one point, Mr.
Chairman. I think what we should not do is put a few cruise
missiles on a building or a radar in the middle of the night,
or even a terrorist camp. Terrorists have a way of being able
to move out of camps and tents and the like. We should do
something that would seriously hurt the Iranian economy.
The two things that come to mind are one that Mr. Hoagland
mentioned, the blockade, and that requires constant
maintenance, constant patrols, confrontations with other, ships
of other countries. It might be worth it. We might have to do
it. But I must say the notion of mining Iranian ports and
harbors strikes me as a very interesting and potentially
appropriate response to the murder of a number of American
servicemen if it in fact turns out to be the case that they did
it.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Spector, do you have any thoughts on
that that you care to put forward?
Mr. Spector. I think I would like to be a little cautious
on this, but I do think there is a tendency to imagine that,
because we have this enormous military capability in the region
and globally, that we can take action without a response. We
are dealing in this particular instance with a nation, Iran,
that seems to have a global reach of its own, and we have seen
episodes in Argentina, the bombings of the Israeli embassy
there, we have seen activity in Europe, assassinations.
We will not necessarily be able to make our response and
have that be the end of the issue. We may have a further
response and we may find ourselves embroiled in more.
Not to respond is unthinkable if this in fact how things
emerge, that we have a smoking gun. But I think as we take such
action we also have to appreciate that we are doing this at
some risk of further continuation of a dangerous relationship.
Senator Brownback. So if we can establish undeniably that
this is attached to the Iranian government's decision, this
bombing that took place, in your estimation we must respond,
but that there are consequences even in our response? Am I
hearing you correctly?
Mr. Spector. Well, I think to the extent that we can
respond with others, perhaps. I do not know how much further we
can take the economic blockade. We might find that that was
more decisive in the certain sense that there was no way for
Iran to respond. If you take a very precise military action--
mining--it gives them a focus. We again become the target, and
they have measures they can take back if they care to take the
risk.
So I think as one measures out the punishment one has to be
aware of the fact that there may be further steps that go
beyond and try to develop a response that deals with that as
well.
Senator Brownback. Are economic sanctions sufficient for a
bombing activity?
Mr. Spector. Well, I do not know if you had--these are
difficult questions, so I do not mean to suggest a decisive
response. But if you could imagine a total, a global embargo or
a virtual global embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil that
all of our allies supported, including Japan and the Western
Europeans, because they too are outraged by this, that would
have a devastating effect on the Iranian economy of the kind
that we were just talking about, but it would not have a
military dimension and it would not be only America.
If you take military action and you risk lives of, let us
say, Iranian sailors or what have you, and you have only the
United States acting, you do create a target. I am not saying
that you might not decide it was appropriate to do it anyway.
You might very well decide it was appropriate to do a
unilateral military act. But as you weigh that decision, you
need to appreciate the other dimension.
Ambassador Woolsey. That would be preferable, I agree. But
given their behavior over the last several years, I rather
despair of our European friends being willing to pay higher oil
prices in order to effectively retaliate against the killing of
American servicemen.
Senator Brownback. I just pose an interesting question. Do
you think that other Security Council members would go along
with economic or military actions if this bombing is laid at
the feet of the Iranians?
Mr. Spector. Well, I think it is very hard to speculate. My
fear is that, although we may be convinced--and do not forget,
some of the evidence that is going to be coming before you, let
us say, and before the President will be very classified
evidence. We are not going to have the whole story out before
the public that we can display and build a case the way we did,
let us say, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. It is going to
be a different matter, and I think we are going to have
difficulty going to the Security Council.
But in other means behind the scenes, working with allies,
we might at least imagine an alternative. And you might reject
the alternative. You might decide military action was best. But
as I say, it may not be cost-free.
Senator Brownback. Gentlemen, I appreciate this very much.
This has been the opening hearing for me as chairman of this
subcommittee. I think it has been very enlightening. It is
certainly a tough subject, but it is one that we agree upon for
action. Maybe we do not agree quite which actions to take, but
I hope we can continue to move forward.
I continue to be disappointed about how ineffective I think
we have been to date in stopping the things we want to. We have
had some success, but we have not gotten near where we need to
get to.
So we are going to keep watching this issue, and we would
appreciate any further input that you might be willing to give
and I would look forward to that.
Ambassador Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much. Thank you all for
attending.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
THE ARMING OF IRAN: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and,
South Asian Affairs,
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. In
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Feinstein.
Senator Brownback. We will go ahead and proceed with this
hearing. Thank you all for joining us this morning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, U.S. SENATOR FROM
KANSAS
Senator Brownback. On April 17, this subcommittee held a
hearing on the problem of Iran and proliferation. As a result
of the testimony heard at that hearing, I concluded that the
United States has not, is not doing enough about the problem of
proliferation to Iran.
Our approach to the problem I believe must be two-fold.
First, we must seek to deny the Iranians the foreign exchange
they need to promote terrorism abroad and continue with their
massive military buildup. The United States has done its part
toward that with an embargo on trade with Iran. I commend
Senator D'Amato for forcing the administration to take that
step.
We have also tried to create disincentives for other
nations to invest in Iran's oil sector. But the truth is that,
in a world thirsty for oil, we will never succeed in stopping
all trade with Iran.
Any doubts about the limits of this policy should have been
put to rest by the recent criminal verdict in Germany. A German
court has told the people of the world that the highest
leadership of Iran was behind the assassination on foreign soil
of regime opponents. But the European Union, despite
exhortations from the United States to take a hard line,
decided to do nothing more than end the so-called critical
dialog and suspend high level diplomatic contacts.
In other words, there were no economic sanctions, just a
frown, and a diplomatic slap on the wrist.
This explains why it is essential that we have a second
prong in our strategy for dealing with Iran. In addition to
denying Iran hard currency, we must also deny Iran the
possibility of purchasing arms and weapons of mass destruction.
The Europeans have an arms embargo in place. But the Chinese
and the Russians do not.
The Clinton Administration has done too little to impress
upon China and Russia that our relationship cannot remain the
same if those nations continue to arm Iran.
It is little wonder the Europeans pay the United States no
heed on what to do about Iran. They see us pushing our own
companies around but continuing to coddle the nations that
persist in directly arming the Iranians.
The message we are sending could not be clearer: cutting
off Iran's access to arms and weapons of mass destruction is
less important to us than maintaining good relations with
Russia and China.
Consider that the United States is aware that Russia is
selling a nuclear reactor to Iran, that Russia is contemplating
a major new arms deal, that Russia has discussed the delivery
of ballistic missiles to Iran, and more and more.
Yet the President, who is required by law to cutoff the
hundreds of millions in assistance the United States provides
Russia every year without a waiver, has granted that waiver.
Consider, in addition, that China has negotiated the delivery
of nuclear reactors to Iran, provides Iran with chemical
weapons precursors, has delivered missile guidance equipment,
and more.
We cannot pretend that we have a policy aimed at isolating
Iran if we continue to aid and abet Iran's suppliers.
Before us today we have three experts on proliferation. I
have asked them here because I want to hear about the Russian,
Chinese, and North Korean companies that are arming Iran and
the governments that are doing nothing to stop them.
As in our first hearing, we will work only from
unclassified information. You may also notice that there are no
representatives from the administration here today. Let me
assure you they were invited and requested to come, but they
decided not to attend and testify. I hope they are here
monitoring the hearing to hear what the testimony of these
three witnesses has to say.
Finally, I will ask our witnesses and others to think about
these names: China Precision Engineering Institute, China
Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation; MINATOM;
Rosvoorouzhenie; Aviaexport; Lyongaksan Import Corporation;
Changgwang Sinyong Corporation.
Between them, these companies have helped Iran move closer
to a successful confrontation with the United States or with
our allies.
Now think about this. In at least one instance I am aware
of, the U.S. Government was licensing sales to a company we
knew was engaged in proliferation of nuclear technology. How
can we pretend to have a serious nonproliferation policy?
I do not believe these companies should do business with
the United States. I do not believe their executives should be
allowed into the United States, and I do not believe these
companies should benefit from U.S. subsidies. I do not think
there is a man or woman in this Congress who would disagree
with me.
Either way, I intend to test that premise because in the
coming weeks I intend to offer legislation that will affect
some of the steps I believe must be taken to address this
problem.
We have a panel of experts joining us today to testify
about the issue of proliferation and who is supplying the
Iranians with these weapons, both conventional and those of
mass destruction. I am delighted to have this panel with us
today.
They are: Dr. Gary Bertsch, the Director of the Center for
International Trade and Security, Professor of Political
Science, University of Georgia; Dr. Gary Milhollin, Director of
the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; and Dr. W. Seth
Carus, Visiting Fellow with the National Defense University.
By prior discussion and arrangement, Dr. Milhollin will be
the first to testify and then Dr. Bertsch, and Dr. Carus will
be the last.
What we would like to do, gentlemen, is to invite your
testimony, either as written or you can summarize if you would
like. We will take the full written testimony into the record.
Then we would like to have an exchange regarding questions.
Particularly, at the end of it, once we site to who is doing
the supplying of these arms, what then should the response of
the U.S. Government be to this situation?
I am thankful for all of you joining us. I very much
appreciate it.
Dr. Milhollin, you are first up and the microphone is
yours. Welcome to the committee.
STATEMENT OF DR. GARY MILHOLLIN, DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Milhollin. Thank you very much, Senator. I am honored
to be here.
I hope I can shed some light on this very important, but
difficult, question.
I would like to start by saying that I don't think there is
any doubt that Iran is aggressively trying to develop weapons
of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. I think
there is a general consensus on that subject, at least in this
country.
Second, Iran's progress in this domain, her progress has
depended on outside help and will continue to depend on it in
the future, just as Iraq's did. So this is kind of the classic
case of export control. Can you isolate a country
technologically and keep its program from developing?
So far, we have made some progress, but it is not nearly
good enough.
In my testimony, I have listed several specific cases, and
I have attached them as an appendix to the testimony. I will
just go through them briefly here.
Who is supplying Iran? Well, first, the question of anti-
ship missiles has come up. I think you, Senator, have alluded
to this previously. We know that China Precision Machinery
Import-Export Corporation is supplying or has supplied the
anti-ship missiles to Iran. What we don't know or at least I
have not seen anywhere yet, is the fact that the United States
actually approved a series of dual-use exports to that very
company during the time when its missiles were being developed.
I have listed those in my testimony in the appendix.
One of them is a computer work station for the simulation
of wind effects. That would be quite useful in designing an
anti-ship missile. These exports are of sensitive technology
controlled for export purposes by the Commerce Department and
approved to Iran and to this particular company.
My project publishes a data base called ``The Risk
Report,'' which gives details on foreign companies that
contribute to the building of weapons of mass destruction. I
have included a printout in the appendix which describes China
Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation. It is Case
Number 1. Also, I have listed there the exports by the United
States to that company.
So if the question is who is helping Iran build anti-ship
missiles that threaten our sailors, the answer may well be the
U.S. Commerce Department because it approved those exports.
The second case I would like to describe is a case of air
surveillance radar.
Iran recently imported a powerful surveillance radar from
the China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation. It
can detect targets 300 kilometers away, and if the United
States ever comes to blows with Iran, American pilots will have
to contend with that radar.
When that radar was being developed, that is, from 1989 to
1993, the U.S. Government approved the export of $9.7 million
worth of sensitive equipment to China National Electronics. The
approvals included equipment for microwave research, a large
scale system for testing integrated circuits, and $4.3 million
worth of computer gear. All of this equipment seems to me quite
useful for developing radar. But it was all licensed to this
Chinese company, which then turned around and supplied a
surveillance radar to Iran.
So, again, it seems that our own Commerce Department may be
one of the culprits in this drama in which Iran is getting
important outside supplies.
I would like to point out that in these two cases the
exports were all approved under the Bush Administration. I urge
this subcommittee, and I have urged the full committee for some
time, to obtain the exports approved, the records of the
exports approved under the Clinton Administration. Since the
Clinton Administration has become more pro-export than the Bush
Administration was, I suspect that, if the committee looks at
the record, it will see that many Chinese companies are
receiving U.S. products and then turning around and marketing
things to Iran and Pakistan.
One of the reasons why Iraq was able to import so much
dual-use equipment before the Gulf War was the absence of
Congressional oversight of the export licensing process. I urge
the committee not to let this happen again and to exercise its
very important role of oversight on the export licensing
process. The committee should get the records, it should look
at them and evaluate them, and see whether the Chinese
companies that are supplying Iran are getting U.S. products.
I am very strongly suspicious that they are.
The third case in my testimony is a fusion reactor. It was
supplied to the Iranians by the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
The fusion reactor is used for nuclear training. But, as we
know, the Iranians are using their nuclear knowledge to build
nuclear weapons.
The Academy of Sciences also helped develop the DF-5
intercontinental ballistic missile, which is the only Chinese
missile that can reach the United States. Despite these
activities and despite its supply of Iran, the Chinese Academy
managed to import an American super computer just last year.
That super computer is now in a network at the disposition of
any Chinese scientist or engineer who is designing a long-range
missile for a nuclear weapon.
Case number 4 is uranium exploration. I have attached to my
testimony some pictures from our data base, ``The Risk
Report,'' which shows the Beijing Research Institute of Uranium
Geology prospecting for uranium in Iran. Any uranium that this
Chinese institute finds will go into Iran's nuclear weapon
program.
There is also another picture with some individuals, which
is fairly interesting. It shows the head of the Iranian nuclear
program standing next to the deputy chief of the China National
Nuclear Corporation. The China National Nuclear Corporation is
the same company that just sold the ring magnets to Pakistan
that got so much press attention. It will be the key player in
any nuclear cooperation between the United States and China.
Right now, the administration and Westinghouse are trying
very hard to get the agreement for cooperation, which has lain
dormant since 1984, revived so that the United States can begin
supplying nuclear technology to this company--this company that
has just supplied the ring magnets to Pakistan and that is
prospecting for uranium in Iran now.
So if we look at this pattern, we see that the United
States itself could do a lot more just in controlling our own
exports and in controlling our own cooperation to control the
success of Chinese companies that we know are helping Iran, or,
I guess, to restrict the growth and success of Chinese
companies we know are helping Iran.
Also I would like to just mention, if I could, patterns of
supply.
It has now been admitted by the State Department that China
is continuing to supply poison gas ingredients, equipment, and
so forth, to Iran. I know that this has been going on for at
least 5 years.
It would be nice to think that we are doing something about
this, but we are not. The policy of constructive engagement we
have been following toward China is basically out of gas.
There are a number of studies the State Department has done
which analyze the facts and the law necessary to impose
sanctions on China for its exports to Iran. Those studies have
lain dormant for at least 6 months.
The State Department does not want to finish the
administrative process because, if it did, it would have to
apply sanctions which would disrupt, and perhaps end, its
engagement policy.
I urge the committee to get copies of these studies and to
query the State Department. Ask the State Department why it is
that these studies have simply been ignored, are not being
implemented, and why it is that the administrative process is
not being completed.
In the nuclear domain, I think we are looking at blackmail.
It is a gentle, sort of constructive engagement type of
blackmail, but there it is nevertheless. The Chinese have
threatened, in effect, to supply the Iranians with a plant to
produce uranium hexafluoride and with a research reactor. Those
two deals are now suspended, or on hold, pending the outcome of
China's talks with us about a nuclear cooperation agreement. I
think the message is fairly clear: if the agreement does not
happen, that is, if we do not start selling China American
nuclear technology, then China will go through with the deals
for the uranium hexafluoride plant and the research reactor.
Russia is playing the same game. It agreed to give the
Iranians a plant for actually enriching uranium and also a
research reactor. Those two deals, as well, did not go through.
But they still could.
In effect, we are being told if you don't like what's going
on now, it could be worse.
The final point I would like to make is that our export
controls are not realistic.
The administration has taken the position that you can open
the doors to exports of sensitive technology to everybody in
the world except a few countries that you designate as
``rogues'' and that that kind of system will work. Well, it
does not work. The rogues can get things through retransfers,
and if you are not going to be credible with respect to China,
then other countries are going to use that lack of credibility
to justify their own behavior with respect to Iran.
For us, Iran is a rogue. For Germany, Iran is a top
customer. We are following an engagement policy toward China,
which amounts to holding your nose and exporting.
The Germans look at us and say well, why can't we follow
the same policy toward Iran? ``We will hold our nose and export
to Iran.'' We are following the same policy, in my opinion, now
toward Iran--I'm sorry, toward China--excuse me. We are
following the same policy toward China now that we, the United
States, followed toward Iraq before the Gulf War. It was
basically constructive engagement then. The idea was that we
could bring Saddam into the mainstream of nations if we just
did not isolate him; and if we isolated him and cutoff U.S.
exports, then the Europeans would just get the business. That
policy failed. But we are still using that policy with respect
to China today, and I think it is also failing with respect to
China.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Milhollin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary Milhollin
I am pleased to appear today before this distinguished
Subcommittee, which has asked me to discuss the question of who is
helping Iran build weapons of mass destruction. The Subcommittee has
also asked whether the United States needs to do more to discourage
Iran's helpers.
There is no doubt that Iran is aggressively trying to develop
nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. There is also no
doubt that Iran has already built chemical weapons. Iran's progress in
all these efforts has depended almost entirely on outside help, and
will continue to depend on it in the future.
Specific cases
A great deal is known about who is supplying Iran. I would like to
begin by looking at some specific cases. I have listed them in the
appendix to my testimony:
Case #1: The C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles
Iran recently imported this new anti-ship missile from the
China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC).
Admiral John Redd, our naval commander in the Persian Gulf,
took the unusual step of complaining publicly about the sale.
Iran appears to have up to 60 of these missiles so far, plus
fast attack boats to carry them. The missiles are a threat to
our sailors and to commercial shipping in the Gulf.
Unfortunately, these missiles may have been built with help
from the United States. In the appendix to my testimony, I have
listed the sensitive equipment that the U.S. Commerce
Department approved for export to China Precision Machinery
from 1989 to 1993. It includes things like computer
workstations for the simulation of wind effects, flight data
recorders, and navigational instruments. The ability to
simulate wind effects is something the designer of an anti-ship
missile could find quite useful. I would like to emphasize that
all of this equipment was deemed so sensitive that it required
an individual validated export license to leave the United
States.
I have also attached a print-out from the database that my
Project publishes. It is called the Risk Report. It lists the
companies around the world that are suspected of contributing
to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It
includes China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation,
which was sanctioned in 1993 by the United States for exporting
missile components to Pakistan. It markets the M-family of
nuclear-capable missiles.
If the question is: Who has been helping Iran build anti-ship
missiles to threaten our sailors? The answer may well be: The U.S.
Commerce Department.
Case #2: Air surveillance radar
Iran recently imported a powerful surveillance radar from the
China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation. The radar
is now part of Iran's air defense system, and it can detect
targets up to 300 kilometers away. If the United States ever
comes to blows with Iran, American pilots will have to contend
with it.
This radar too seems to have been built with help from the
United States. In the appendix to my testimony, I have listed
the sensitive, controlled equipment that the U.S. Commerce
Department approved for export to China National Electronics
from 1989 to 1993. It totals $9.7 million. It includes things
like equipment for microwave research, a very large scale
integrated system for testing integrated circuits, equipment
for making semiconductors, and a shipment of computer gear
worth $4.3 million. All of this equipment appears highly useful
for developing radar, and all of it was deemed so sensitive
that it required an individual validated export license to
leave the United States.
If the question is: Who has been helping Iran build air defenses?
The answer again, may well be: The U.S. Commerce Department.
I would like to point out that in these two cases, the exports were
all approved under the Bush Administration. I urge the Subcommittee to
obtain and study the exports approved under the Clinton Administration.
This Subcommittee has the right to obtain all Commerce Department
records on export licensing. The generally pro-export stance of the
Clinton Administration leads one to suspect that China is importing
even more sensitive high-technology from the United States today. I
cannot emphasize too strongly the need for effective Congressional
oversight of our export licensing process. The lack of Congressional
oversight was one of the main reasons why so the Commerce Department
approved so many sensitive American exports to Iraq before the Gulf
War.
Case #3: A fusion reactor.
In 1993-94, the Institute of Plasma Physics of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences transferred a nuclear fusion research
reactor to the Azad University in Tehran. The reactor is a
training device ostensibly used for peaceful purposes. As we
know, however, Iran is using its nuclear knowledge to build
nuclear weapons. In addition to supplying Iran, the Academy has
helped develop the flight computer and the nose cone for the
Chinese DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S.
cities with nuclear warheads. The Academy has also studied the
effects of underground nuclear weapon tests and ways to protect
against nuclear explosions.
Despite all these activities, and despite being a well-known
contributor to Iran's nuclear program, the Academy of Sciences
managed recently to import an American supercomputer. In March
1996, California-based Silicon Graphics Inc., sold the Academy
a powerful supercomputer without bothering to obtain a U.S.
export license. The computer is now part of a network linking
all of China's high-tech institutes and universities, which
means the computer is accessible to anyone in China who is
designing a nuclear weapon or a strategic missile.
So if the question is: what happens to a Chinese organization that
helps Iran do nuclear research? The answer is: It can import an
American supercomputer.
Case #4: Uranium exploration
The Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG)
prospects for uranium around the world. Attached to my
testimony is a picture of this Institute prospecting in Iran.
Any uranium, it finds is likely to go directly into Iran's
nuclear weapon program. This Institute is part of the China
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). I have also included a
picture of the Deputy Chief of the China National Nuclear
Corporation posing with Reza Amrollahi, Vice President of Iran
and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.
CNNC has been implicated in the sale of ring magnets to the
A. Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan, which enriches
uranium for nuclear weapons. CNNC is also involved in the
development of Pakistan's secret nuclear reactor at Khusab and
a CNNC subsidiary is currently constructing a power reactor for
Pakistan at Chashma. CNNC would be the key player in any
nuclear cooperation agreement that might be implemented between
the United States and China. Right now, the Administration,
under pressure from Westinghouse, is planning to revive the
cooperation agreement that has been stalled since 1984 because
of China's bad proliferation behavior.
If the question is: What happens to a Chinese organization that
helps Iran prospect for uranium and helps Pakistan make nuclear
weapons? The answer is: Westinghouse and the Clinton Administration try
to find a way to sell it American nuclear technology.
Patterns of supply
In addition to these specific cases, there are patterns of supply.
These too are well known. In 1995 I discovered, and wrote in the New
York Times, that the United States had caught China exporting poison
gas ingredients to Iran, and that the sales had been going on for at
least three years. The State Department sanctioned the front companies
that handled the paperwork, but did nothing to the Chinese sellers for
fear of hurting U.S. trade relations.
China's poison gas shipments have only become worse since then. In
1996, the press reported that China was sending entire factories for
making poison gas to Iran, including special glass-lined vessels for
mixing precursor chemicals. The shipments also included 400 tons of
chemicals useful for making nerve agents.
The result is that by now, in 1997, China has been outfitting Iran
with ingredients and equipment to make poison gas for at least five
years. When I spoke to U.S. officials recently, I asked them whether
there was any change in China's export behavior on poison gas. They
said that the poison gas sales had continued to the present time,
unabated. On April 10, 1997, in testimony before a subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Einhorn confirmed this fact.
There is no reason to think this pattern will change as long as the
United States follows its current policy of ``constructive
engagement.'' Last fall, the executive branch finished a number of
studies on China's missile and chemical exports to Iran and Pakistan.
The studies contained all the legal and factual analysis necessary to
apply sanctions, but they have lain dormant since then. The State
Department has chosen not to complete the administrative process
because if it did, it would have to apply sanctions and give up its
engagement policy. At present, the sanctions law is not achieving
either deterrence or punishment, as Congress intended.
This lack of an American reaction has encouraged China to harden
its position. China is now saying, explicitly, that it will not even
talk to us about missile and chemical proliferation unless we are
willing, at the same time, to discuss restraints on our arms sales to
Taiwan. The arms sales, of course, are caused by China's threat to
Taiwan. And to make matters worse, the Chinese are beginning to
complain about our policy of providing theater missile defenses to
countries like Japan that might be vulnerable to Chinese missile
attacks. The Chinese say that this is another form of missile
proliferation.
Nuclear blackmail
In addition to poison gas technology, China is also helping Iran in
the nuclear domain. China has agreed to sell Iran a 25 to 30 megawatt
nuclear reactor, which is an ideal size for making a few nuclear
weapons per year. And China has also agreed to sell Iran a plant to
produce uranium hexaflouride from uranium concentrate.
The hexaflouride plant is essential to enrich uranium for use in
atomic bombs. Bombs fueled by enriched uranium have become the holy
grail of developing countries trying to join the nuclear club. Such
bombs are easier to make than those fueled by plutonium because uranium
is easier to work with, less toxic, and easier to detonate with
confidence that a substantial nuclear yield will result. Iraq was close
to making a uranium bomb when the Gulf War began. The first bomb ever
dropped was a uranium bomb that the United States released over
Hiroshima without having to test it.
There is no peaceful use for enriched uranium in Iran. Enriched
uranium is used to fuel reactors, but the only reactors in Iran that
could use such fuel are being supplied by Russia, which is also
supplying their fuel. The conclusion has to be that Iran wants to use
this plant to make atomic bombs. The fact that China is even
considering this deal shows that China is quite ready to put nuclear
weapon-making capability into the hands of what the United States
regards as a terrorist nation.
These two sales have not been finalized. In effect, they are being
held over our heads like swords. If we don't agree to implement our
stalled nuclear cooperation agreement with China, which would allow
China access to American nuclear technology, then China will complete
these two dangerous export deals with Iran. This is essentially nuclear
blackmail.
Russia is Iran's other main nuclear supplier. In 1995, Russia
agreed to supply Iran two light water power reactors plus a string of
``sweeteners.'' The 44 ``sweeteners'' are sensitive items that should
not in good conscience be exported, but which suppliers throw in to
sweeten a larger deal. In this case, the sweeteners were a centrifuge
plant to enrich uranium, a 30-50 megawatt research reactor, 2000 tons
of natural uranium, and training. The centrifuge plant was canceled;
the training is apparently going forward; the status of the research
reactor and the uranium is unclear.
This deal too included some blackmail. The enrichment plant would
only serve to make nuclear weapons, for the reasons I have already
stated, and the same is true of the natural uranium. The research
reactor would have been ideal, like the Chinese one, for making a bomb
or two per year. Minatom, the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry, was
quite prepared to supply all of these items. Minatom only agreed to
cancel or suspend them in a ``compromise'' to make the power reactor
deal look better. The message from the Russians is clear: If you don't
like the reactor deal, how would you like a centrifuge deal?
Missiles
Both China and Russia are helping Iran make missiles. In June,
1995, the New York Times reported that the Central Intelligence Agency
had concluded that China had supplied ``dozens and perhaps hundreds''
of missile guidance systems to Iran, along with computerized machine
tools. In July, Jane's Defense Weekly reported that U.S. officials had
confirmed that China had sold Iran rocket propellant ingredients as
well as the guidance components. This case is the subject of one of the
studies that is now languishing in the State Department.
In February of this year, the Washington Times reported that Russia
had sold Iran plans for building the 1,240-mile range SS-4 missile,
together with guidance components, and that U.S. Vice President Al Gore
protested the sale during talks with Russian Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin. If this report is true, it could help Iran take an
important step forward in its nuclear missile program. According to the
Nuclear Weapons Databook, the SS-4 is a single-stage, liquid-fueled
missile capable of carrying a one megaton nuclear warhead. Its diameter
is 1.65 meters (65 inches), almost twice that of Iran's existing Scud-
B. The larger diameter of the SS-4 would allow Iran to mount a much
larger warhead, thus reducing the problem of miniaturization for a
first-generation nuclear device.
Realistic export controls
Because the United States has little diplomatic leverage with Iran,
export controls are the main vehicle for impeding Iran's efforts.
Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration's decision to slash export
controls had made it much easier for Iran to get what it needs.
Dubai is an example. In our database, we have listed 22 Iranian
companies operating in Dubai's free trade zone, the main purpose of
which is to handle re-exports, frequently to Iran. These companies are
legally off-limits to American exporters because of the U.S. embargo
against Iran, but the companies are probably getting U.S. goods anyway
because U.S. exporters have no way of knowing the companies are
Iranian. The U.S. Commerce Department has never published a list of
Iranian companies operating in Dubai. In fact, after the Commerce
Department's recent decontrol of high-speed computers, U.S. companies
can now ship powerful supercomputers (operating at up to 7 billion
operations per second) to buyers in Dubai without an export license.
And because Dubai has no effective export control system, there is
nothing to prevent these supercomputers from going on to Iran or
anywhere else. Iran now imports more goods through Dubai than through
its own ports. The lesson here is that you cannot slash controls on
exports to everyone in the world except the ``rogue nations'' and
expect the rogues not to get things through retransfers.
We need a global policy on export controls, but we don't have one.
The United States is following the same policy toward China today that
it followed toward Iraq before the Gulf War. It can be summed up as:
``Hold your nose and export.'' China's nuclear, chemical and missile
exports to Iran and Pakistan have been greeted by the same American
silence that greeted Iraq's effort to smuggle nuclear weapon triggers
out of the United States before the Gulf War. Rather than apply
sanctions, or even complain publicly about Iraq's violation of the
Nonproliferation Treaty, the State Department chose ``constructive
engagement.'' It would be better to maintain our influence with Saddam
Hussein through trade, the State Department argued. By selling him what
he wanted, we would bring Saddam into the mainstream of nations.
Sanctions would only hurt American exporters and allow the Europeans
and the Japanese to get all the business. It is now clear what that
strategy produced. The United States was lucky. If Saddam had not been
foolish enough to invade Kuwait, we would be facing a nuclear-armed
Iraq with its shadow over most of the world's oil supply.
America's European allies are also following this same policy of
constructive engagement toward Iran--a policy that the United States
officially deplores. The United States now maintains a complete trade
embargo against Iran, but our European allies have refused to join.
They have refused in part because they want the export earnings, but
also because they regard the U.S. position as hypocritical. They justly
observe that the Clinton Administration, while giving lip-service to
arms control and nonproliferation, routinely subordinates these
objectives to commercial interests. The Administration decided at the
outset of its tenure to promote U.S. exports as its primary foreign
policy objective. But if the United States can hold its nose and trade
with China, why can't the Europeans and the Russians hold their noses
and trade with Iran? In fact, most of the countries that worry
Washington are interconnected, so the failure to confront proliferation
by one usually means there will be a failure to confront proliferation
by others.
I believe that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons within the next
ten years unless something intervenes to stop the current effort. If
the Gulf War had not intervened to stop Iraq, Saddam Hussein would have
had nuclear weapons by now. When Iran does get the bomb, the Clinton
Administration's decision to slash export controls will be one of the
main reasons for Iran's success.
[Additional information submitted by Dr. Milhollin appears
in the appendix.]
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Dr. Milhollin. I
appreciate the specificity of your testimony. We will engage in
some discussion about that a little bit later.
Dr. Bertsch, we are delighted to have you here at the
committee as well. As I stated earlier, if you would like to
submit your full statement for the record, you can, and you can
just discuss or summarize. Or, if you would like to present it
by reading it, that would be fine as well. It is up to you,
your choice. Welcome to the committee.
STATEMENT OF DR. GARY BERTSCH, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SECURITY, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, ATHENS, GEORGIA
Dr. Bertsch. Thank you, Senator. I wish to thank you for
the invitation to appear today.
My colleagues and I at the University of Georgia are
involved in studies of issues being addressed by this
subcommittee. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador
Martin Hillenbrand, and I put together a program at the
University of Georgia looking in depth at American and
international export control policy. We are pleased to share
our work with you and Members of the Congress today.
In addition to my formal statement, the associate directors
of our center, Dr. Richard Cupitt and Dr. Igor Khripunov, have
prepared separate statements on the Chinese-Iranian and
Russian-Iranian issues respectively. I ask that these reports
also be entered into the record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Dr. Bertsch. Finally, I am releasing two new University of
Georgia Center reports. The first is entitled ``Restraining the
Spread of the Soviet Arsenal.'' The second is a special issue
of our quarterly report, ``The Monitor,'' on ``Terrorism and
Weapons of Mass Destruction.'' Both reports contain
considerable research and reporting of relevance to your
hearings today.
I am happy to make copies of both of these new reports
available to you and your staff.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. We would accept those and
appreciate them.
Dr. Bertsch. Last week, Secretary of Defense William Cohen,
Senator Richard Lugar, Sam Nunn, Jim Woolsey, and others joined
us at the University of Georgia to address the issues of
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and U.S. security. All
agreed that we are dealing with a major threat, that Iran is a
critical problem, and that China and Russia are parts of the
problem, and, I might add, can be important parts of the
solution.
I commend you and your colleagues for keeping attention on
these issues, for promoting a fuller understanding of the
problem, and for reassessing what the United States can do and
should do to address these problems. I read with interest the
transcript of your April 17 hearing. The issues addressed there
and at today's hearing are critical and require ongoing, long-
term attention.
I appreciate Gary Milhollin and Seth Carus providing some
of the details on these issues. I would like to address two
questions briefly: what is happening, and what is and what can
the United States do about it?
First is the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian connections. In
order to assess what is happening, we have to understand how
Russia and China view Iran and what they are doing or not doing
to control strategic exports into the region.
First, as for Russia and Iran, you know and I know, but it
is still important to remember, that Russia views Iran
differently than does the United States. Although some informed
Russian officials are aware of and concerned about the security
threats emanating from Iran, most Russian officials view Iran
as a neighbor with common economic, political, and security
interests.
For example, many Russian officials consider Iran a
valuable asset in resisting the northward influence of the
Taliban religious forces in Afghanistan and as an ally in other
regional security issues. Most see Russia as having a large
stake in economic relations with Iran, including billions of
dollars in oil and gas deals, military contracts, and nuclear
energy projects.
While the United States sees much of this as the arming of
Iran, Russia sees it as energy and economic cooperation with a
close neighbor.
Although Russia is less sensitive to the security threat
from Iran than is the United States, it is not oblivious to its
national and international nonproliferation responsibilities
and interests. On the nuclear issue, it intends to verify the
peaceful uses of equipment supplied to Iran. It is attempting
to further develop its nonproliferation export control system.
For example, in 1996, it approved two new sets of
procedures that are intended to reduce proliferation risk.
Government edicts numbers 574 and 575 were intended to enhance
Russian controls on the export and import of nuclear materials,
dual-use equipment, and related technology.
Furthermore, just last month, Russia and Iran signed a
memorandum of understanding on export controls.
As I am suggesting and as my colleague, Dr. Khripunov,
details in his statement submitted for the record, Russia wants
to maintain close economic, political, and security relations
with a neighbor. This does and will continue to raise
legitimate security and proliferation concerns in the United
States and West. We should be concerned and we should do
everything possible to lessen the risk.
Keeping attention on these issues is critical and
continuing to engage Russian officials at all levels about
nonproliferation in the region is very, very important.
Now I believe it should be noted that the U.S. Government
has done much to heighten proliferation concerns and bolster
export control responsibilities in Russia and the other new
states of the former Soviet Union. A committee of the National
Research Council, a part of the U.S. Academy of Sciences on
which I served, released 2 weeks ago this report, entitled
``Proliferation Concerns.'' This report, I might note, gives
high marks to U.S. governmental programs and efforts to promote
nonproliferation export controls and policies in Russia and the
other post soviet states.
Although much remains to be done, progress is being made.
The United States is promoting, I think it is fair to say, more
responsible, nonproliferation behavior in Russia and the other
former Soviet states through its national security policy of
engagement and enlargement.
Now I have a few words about China and Iran.
China is clearly not adequately concerned about the
proliferation threat in Iran. It is interested in expanding its
economic and political relations with Iran. It is seeking
political favor, hard currency, and oil.
It views its relations with Iran as, and I quote, ``Normal
cooperation in peaceful areas.'' This is troubling for a number
of reasons, including the following.
There are numerous strategic exports from China to Iran,
some of which Gary Milhollin referred to, and of which members
of this subcommittee are fully aware, that are reasons for
proliferation concern. These exports raise doubts about
Beijing's commitment to nonproliferation norms and their
capacity to control the export of sensitive items from Chinese
territory.
The U.S. Congress, executive agencies, and intelligence
communities have responsibilities to follow these developments
closely. U.S. Government officials should continue to express
their concern to Chinese authorities.
Second, as my colleague, Dr. Cupitt, indicates in his
statement for the record, China has much to do to develop more
effective export controls. Our research at the University of
Georgia shows that PRC export controls remain far from being
complementary in practice to Western standards and to the
systems of neighbors in its region, including Russian. Russia
has a far stronger export control system than China.
At the same time, it is fair to report some positive
developments in Chinese export controls. These include an
improved legal framework, development of control lists,
administrative regulations, and governmental structures to
review and approve licenses, and, third, use of administrative
sanctions to punish Chinese individuals and enterprises that
have violated export control procedures.
Yet many problems in Chinese nonproliferation export
controls exist. These include: (1) an overwhelming lack of
export control knowledge and transparency; (2) suspicion that
the United States, Japan, and others are pushing export control
measures on China to undermine Chinese sovereignty and
commercial interests; and (3) waning Chinese governmental
control over industries and enterprises. This is placing
immense pressures on their underdeveloped export control
system.
Chinese strategic transfers to Iran and elsewhere are
matters of significant U.S. concern. Washington should continue
to engage Chinese leaders and officials at all levels on these
issues and do all that they can to encourage and support the
development of more effective export controls in China.
Finally, what about U.S. responses? There is much that the
United States can do and is doing to address the arming of
Iran. It has been vigilant and it has regularly raised its
concerns with high level Russian and Chinese authorities. Its
bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation efforts are
important and their impact should not be underestimated.
For example, through U.S. influence, Ukraine pulled out of
the Bushehr nuclear power project in Iran. And, while Russia
remains unwilling to forego much of its nuclear cooperation
with Iran, it has agreed to limit its scope and to be more
vigilant.
The same can be true for China. Multilaterally, U.S.
leadership has brought about a broad international consensus on
the need to limit Iran's programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction.
It has helped put multilateral nonproliferation export
control regimes in place that have imposed serious obstacles
for Iran. The Iranians are finding it increasingly difficult to
acquire the WMD related equipment and technology that they
want. The Chemical Weapons Convention outlaws any assistance to
Iran's chemical weapons program. The Nuclear Suppliers Group
and IAEA have created real impediments to Iran's nuclear
weapons aspirations.
The Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar
arrangement are doing the same in missile and conventional
weapons areas.
Regrettably, some Chinese and Russian items that raise
proliferation concerns are still flowing to Iran. We should do
all that we can to persuade the Chinese and Russians to refrain
from this. But I do not believe that sanctions on Russia and
China now are the best instrument.
Considerable scientific research shows sanctions to be
ineffective in most cases such as these. Sanctions are unlikely
to change Chinese and Russian behavior in the specific Iranian
case, and there are more effective ways to bring about their
cooperation.
I believe the United States can convince the Chinese and
Russians that the costs of arming Iran with nuclear or chemical
weapons or increasing Iranian missile capabilities exceed the
economic return resulting from the export of such items.
I am confident that the United States can make persuasive
arguments that will demonstrate to the Chinese and Russians, as
we have done with the Ukrainians, that their futures are
brighter if they are part of an international consensus
resisting the development of weapons of mass destruction in
Iran.
In this environment, the United States can engage the
Russians and Chinese further in improving their
nonproliferation export control systems and in complying with
the International Export Control Regimes.
Much has been accomplished with Russia in recent years.
More remains to be done. Much more needs to be done with China.
In a policy of engagement enlargement, U.S. pressure and
encouragement will do more to tighten Chinese and Russian
nonproliferation export controls than any sanctions are likely
to do at this point.
In conclusion, I believe the United States should continue
to lead and build an international consensus restraining WMD
transfers to Iran. It should encourage Chinese and Russian
participation in this consensus and responsibility in their
behavior.
Finally, it should work with China, Russia, and other
potential proliferants to build effective national export
control systems and multilateral regimes that will insure that
proliferation related transfers do not take place.
Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Dr. Bertsch. I
appreciate your testimony and look forward to engaging you in
questions as we look at this.
Dr. Carus, thank you very much for joining us and being
with us in the committee. We can take your written statement,
if you would like, or you can summarize, or you can present
your written statement. The choice is yours and we welcome you
to the committee.
STATEMENT OF DR. W. SETH CARUS, VISITING FELLOW, NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Carus. Thank you very much. It is an honor to testify
before this subcommittee.
I think there are very few issues of greater national
security interest to the United States than Iran's acquisition
of nuclear weapons.
Senator Brownback. Would you get a little closer to the
microphone and lower it a bit, please? Thank you. The
microphone is pretty directional.
Dr. Carus. Let me know if you can hear me now?
Senator Feinstein. That's better. Thank you.
Dr. Carus. There are very few issues of greater
significance, national security significance, to the United
States than Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons. For that reason, I am grateful for this
opportunity to present my views to the subcommittee.
Before continuing, let me note that my testimony does not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense
University where I am a Visiting Fellow or the Center for Naval
Analyses, which is my home organization, or the Department of
Defense. In addition, the comments I am going to make today
summarize a presentation I prepared earlier this year for the
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom. With your permission, I
will submit a copy of that paper for the record and will just
focus on some key issues.
Senator Brownback. Without objection, that will be put in
the record.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Dr. Carus. Specifically, I want to focus on four main
issues to provide a somewhat broader framework for our national
security concerns about what is going on with Iran.
The first thing is I think we have to continue to assign a
high priority to countering Iranian efforts to acquire NBC
armaments and the means to deliver them. The available evidence
convincingly suggests that Iran wants to acquire such weapons.
Moreover, it appears they are attempting to expand both the
size and sophistication of their activities. As a result, I
would agree with what the previous speakers have said, that we
have to accord a very high priority to our efforts to constrain
Iranian efforts.
In general, the United States has taken an appropriately
hard line against Iran's activities. Despite the general
weakening of export control policies by the United States and
this administration, the imposition of sanctions specifically
against Iran ensures that we maintain tighter controls on Iran
than for other proliferation countries of concern.
Fortunately, there is little controversy about the need to
take such steps. This policy has bipartisan support in this
country that dates back to the early 1980's, when we first saw
evidence of Iranian interest in resuming efforts to develop NBC
capabilities.
Our allies, who generally do not support U.S. policies
toward Iran, actually do agree in principle on the need to
constrain Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs. Even
Russia, which has been willing to supply sensitive technology
to Iran, appears to accept in principle that we do not want
Iran to acquire such capabilities.
The only real exceptions to the international consensus on
constraining Iran are North Korea and China, which I think is a
significant point.
Second, the most serious problem we face in constraining
Iran's weapons programs is the support they receive from
foreign individuals, organizations, and governments. Without
such support, Iran would be limited in the size and
sophistication of its programs. With such support, they could
potentially develop highly capable NBC weapons and pose a
serious threat to the interests of the United States and its
friends and allies in the region.
As a result, we must be willing to devote considerable
political capital in our efforts to persuade other countries to
limit their support for Iranian NBC activities.
The importance of external assistance to the success of the
NBC and missile programs in Iran reflects the difficulties that
Iran appears to face in developing indigenous weapons
capabilities. Many of the most talented Iranian scientists and
engineers left Iran at the time of the revolution, and efforts
to convince such people to return to Iran have had limited
success. Those remaining in Iran appear to lack the range of
skills needed to support large-scale efforts to develop NBC
weapons and missile delivery systems.
In addition, the Iranians have shown limited ability to
manage large weapons development programs. In this regard, I
believe it is significant that Iran has had to turn to North
Korea for missile production technology. The SCUD type missiles
that Iran is producing are relatively unsophisticated, and one
would think that Iran would be able to produce them on its own.
The fact that the Iranians had to turn to a country as
technologically backward as North Korea is a significant signal
of the management problems that the Islamic Republic appears to
face.
An additional problem with covert assistance is that it
might make it difficult to ascertain the true capabilities of
Iran's weapons programs. This is especially troubling with
regard to Iran's nuclear weapons program since, if Iran
acquires fissile material through covert purchases from
existing stocks in a third country, Iran could hide its weapons
capabilities since the fissile material will not necessarily
present the kind of obvious signature of, say, a production
facility.
As a result, we might have to treat Iran as a nuclear
capable state if we discover that it has covertly acquired even
a small quantity of fissile material since we may not be able
to ascertain the true quantity involved.
It is for these reasons that we should worry about foreign
assistance to Iran's NBC programs and their missile programs.
Unfortunately, Iran has been able to receive extensive
assistance in these areas from several suppliers, especially in
the area of nuclear technology, including Russia, China, and
North Korea. Moreover, Iran has considerable experience in
developing overseas networks for the illicit acquisition of
technologies and supplies.
In the past, the Iranians have been able to acquire
equipment even out of U.S. military stockpiles so that we know
they can evade even the tightest security in their acquisition
efforts.
Finally, we should worry about the possibility that we may
not know the full extent of Iranian successes in technology
acquisition. Recent experience with Iraq has demonstrated the
potential weaknesses of our proliferation intelligence.
Accordingly, the intelligence community needs to continue
to treat Iran's weapons acquisition programs as one of our
highest priorities.
Third, we should also not exaggerate the extent of Iran's
accomplishments. While Iran has significantly enhanced its NBC
capabilities since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, these
capabilities do not yet pose a strategic threat to U.S.
interests in the region. According to public statements by U.S.
officials, Iran is years away from acquiring nuclear weapons.
While Iran may possess a substantial chemical weapons
inventory, we are also told that it includes agents like
hydrogen cyanide, which are virtually ineffective.
Indeed, the fact that Iran has acquired agents like
hydrogen cyanide suggest that it lacks the manufacturing
infrastructure needed to produce more sophisticated agents and
has to rely on agents that are normal byproducts of commercial
chemical manufacturing.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the Iranian
military has the expertise to effectively employ its chemical
weapons. Given the limited employment of chemical agents
attributed to the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War, there is
no reason to believe that the Iranians gained the operational
experience at that time.
And, indeed, if we look at one recent report, where we have
been told that Iran deployed chemical artillery rounds on the
island of Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf, it appears to be
extremely puzzling because the island is so small that it would
be difficult to use artillery rounds against hostile military
forces. While you could fire them against ships, it is not a
very effective thing to do. It is so difficult to hit moving
ships that most of the rounds would fall harmlessly into the
water. You really don't get much compared with conventional
weapons.
Now these comments are not offered to minimize our concerns
about Iran's NBC capabilities. Clearly, we should be worried
about what they are doing. But we do not want to impute to Iran
capabilities they do not possess.
Indeed, to the extent that such weapons would be used by
Iran to fulfill political objectives, actual possession may be
less important to them than the appearance of possession. By
imputing capabilities to Iran that they do not possess, we can
actually provide Tehran with a tool that it can use in its
efforts to coerce other countries in the region.
Accordingly, it is critical that we neither ignore nor
exaggerate Iran's real capability.
Fourth, I think we have to realize that eliminating Iranian
capabilities is going to take a long time. They are not going
to disappear, even when the Islamic Republic finally
disappears. While we may abhor and fear the Islamic Republic,
these parts of these programs originated before the revolution,
clearly in the case of the nuclear program.
Moreover, many of the concerns that probably motivate
Iranian acquisition of NBC weapons are unlikely to disappear
any time soon. Specifically, any Iranian regime is likely to
desire such capabilities out of fear of Iraq, the country
responsible for killing and maiming hundreds of thousands of
Iranian soldiers and civilians.
In addition, insofar as all Iranians view possession of
such weapons as a key indicator of Iran's status as an
important regional power, the motivation to pursue such
capabilities will remain.
We also cannot allow the Iranians to believe that by
possessing NBC weapons they can deter the United States. We
don't want Iran's leaders to believe that NBC weapons can keep
the United States from using military force against them,
whatever the provocation. If we let them believe that, then we
insure that Iran will remain committed to the possession of NBC
weapons.
Only by convincing the Iranians that their weapons
ultimately do not contribute to their national security will we
be able to achieve the elimination of these capabilities.
Now what steps should the United States take to enhance our
security and that of our friends and allies in the region?
First, and I think this is really critical, we have to continue
with the multilateral and unilateral efforts to constrain
Iran's acquisition programs. Even if such steps create friction
with other countries, they are an essential first element in
any effort to curtail Iran's ambitions.
Let me diverge a little bit from my prepared testimony to
recall our experience with the Rabta chemical plant in Libya.
Back in 1989, it was reported in the press that a small German
company was responsible for designing and managing the
construction of this particular facility.
Even though the Government of Germany was fully aware that
the United States had hard intelligence confirming this, German
officials vehemently and officially denied that there was any
possibility that a German company was involved. It was only by
taking a hard stance and pressing the case that eventually the
Germans were forced to admit that, in fact, German companies
had been involved and to take steps to prosecute those
involved.
I think the Rabta case is a good example of how it is
possible to push the issue of illicit exports with a friendly
country without ultimately disrupting our relations with that
country but also without sacrificing either our principles or
our national security interests. I think it is a lesson that
this administration might do well to study carefully.
Unfortunately, I also do not believe that we are going to
be able to solve the problem totally through export controls.
It is something we have to do, but it is not guaranteed to
resolve the problem. As a result, I think we also have to
strengthen our military responses.
If the United States intends to operate in the Persian
Gulf, we need to provide our military forces with the full
range of counter proliferation tools being developed by the
Department of Defense. This means developing missile defenses
to counter Iran's ballistic missiles. It means improved
chemical and biological defenses. It means improved
counterforce capabilities to destroy NBC capabilities before
they are used, even if the weapons are hidden in heavily
protected bunkers. And it means strengthening our ability to
detect NBC assets, even if Iran tries to hide them.
Finally, we must understand the extent to which Iran's NBC
programs present the potential threat to our friends and allies
in the region, especially the potentially vulnerable countries
of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
The United States needs to develop an integrated policy of
deterrence and reassurance. This means convincing the GCC that
we will take whatever steps necessary to protect them from
Iran's NBC weapons. It also means convincing them that we will
take no actions that will unnecessarily expose them to Iranian
retaliatory attacks.
If we take actions that frighten our allies to such an
extent that they feel a need to distance themselves from the
United States, we will have allowed the Iranians to win.
Ultimately, our success in the region depends on the extent
to which our allies continue to rely upon us to enhance their
security.
I will conclude with that remark.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Dr. Carus. I appreciate that.
Thank you all for your testimony.
Senator Feinstein, if you would not mind, I thought we
would each have 7 minutes of questions and we will just bounce
back and forth until we are done. I appreciate very much your
joining the committee for this good panel.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Let me start off.
We have sighted in on three nations, China, Russia, and
North Korea. Does any of the three of you know of any other
nations that are supplying weapons, either conventional or mass
destruction weapons to the Iranians? Is any of the three of you
familiar with any other nations or companies within those
nations?
Dr. Milhollin. I think you cannot disregard the export of
dual-use equipment which is not specifically intended to be
used for military purposes but which can be, if diverted.
Iraq is an example. Iraq built up its mass destruction
capabilities with dual-use equipment, most of it from Germany
but a lot from Switzerland, a lot from England, and it bought
its electronics from us.
U.S. computers went into almost every known weapon of mass
destruction site in Iraq. So to answer that question
thoroughly, you would have to look at dual-use exports of
sensitive equipment, controlled commodities, from Iran's main
suppliers. And Iran's main supplier is Germany.
So if you really wanted to answer your question, you'd have
to look at German exports to Iran.
I know that a few years ago, controlled commodities going
to Iran from Germany were worth about $1 billion a year. Now $1
billion a year of controlled commodities is a lot of controlled
commodities. You would have to build a lot of big buildings to
hold that many machine tools.
I don't know what the numbers are recently, but I cannot
believe that they are a lot lower than that.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Milhollin, after the recent German
court ruling, do you know, has there been any communication you
have received or are aware of of a shift in that sort of policy
of supplying from Germany?
Dr. Milhollin. I am not aware of any. One can only hope
that it might have had an effect. I don't want to label the
Germans unfairly here, but the numbers are there and the policy
is clear. The Germans do have a policy of constructive
engagement toward Iran.
So if it were possible to look at the record of German
exports, I think it would be a very interesting thing to do.
Senator Brownback. Indeed, you suggest that we should be
looking at our own exports and what has taken place there.
Dr. Milhollin. I suggest that we look at our own exports.
You know, if you are building a nuclear weapon or you are
building a long-range missile, 90 percent of what you need to
do that is dual-use equipment. There are very few things that
only have one purpose, machine tools being an example.
Senator Brownback. Is there another comment?
Dr. Carus, please.
Dr. Carus. May I make a comment to that? I think there is a
lot of reason to be concerned about this dual-use category.
We know the Iranians have an extremely large acquisition
network in Western Europe and I don't think we really know a
great deal about what they do.
We know during the Iran-Iraq War that they were able to buy
very sensitive military components globally. They were quite
good at that.
As a result, one has to worry about what it is we don't
know that this network is doing.
There have been some other examples that have come to light
over the last few years where other countries have been
involved in things that we would worry about here. For example,
a few years ago, a facility in Switzerland was struck by an
arson, done by somebody who apparently did not like the idea
that a Swiss company was supplying what appeared to be a
turnkey biological warfare facility to the Iranians.
Similarly, there have been concerns about exports by the
Indians of chemical precursors that people worried would go
into chemical weapons.
So, while the countries that I think we focus on as being
the most egregious actors are clearly Russia, China, and North
Korea, the Iranians are capable of operating globally and that
compounds our problem.
Senator Feinstein. What was that, please?
Dr. Carus. I'm sorry. The Iranians are capable of operating
globally. That means we cannot just afford to focus on the
worst actors.
Senator Brownback. Let me ask you this. On those three
countries--and I do want to focus there because we have tied
direct weaponry shipments from China, Russia, and North Korea
to the Iranians and I think we should be looking at this dual-
use technology. I appreciate your raising that. But of those
three nations, how much is the government control of supplier
companies, how extensive is that? I am hearing mixed statements
from some of you. Some are saying it is extensive. Dr. Bertsch,
you seem to suggest that the Chinese are a little too loose on
that so that maybe, if I am interpreting your statement
correctly, the Chinese are not actually agreeing to supply this
equipment to the Iranians. It just sort of happens as a process
of commercial business transaction in that they are not a bad
actor here, it is just a loose system.
Dr. Bertsch. Well, I think there is evidence both of state
complicity, that is, where the Chinese or Russian Governments
have permitted exports that we will disagree with in this
country. In addition to that, because of the chaotic economic
and political environment, particularly in Russia but also with
emerging freedom to export in the changing Chinese economy, it
is difficult for these state controlled bodies to make sure
that nothing gets from individuals of enterprises on Russian
and Chinese territory into Iran.
I mean, there is a terrible problem with corruption and
smuggling in both of these countries. The most important thing
that could be done to help cut down on the possibility for
smuggling is for healthy economies and stable governments. That
is why it is so important that Russia stabilize its economic/
political situation and why China not allow things to go out of
control.
But this is complicated. It requires a lot of good
intelligence both from governmental and nongovernmental
researchers to try to piece this together.
I would say the United States ought to keep the pressure on
both state decisions and where, states do not have control,
over their private entrepreneurs that exist both in China and
Russia, and ``private'' in the sense of the new entrepreneurs
who are out there who want to make money.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein, I am glad you could join us.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was very
interesting and I very much appreciate the comments of the
three gentlemen.
I would like to talk for a moment about our export
controls. Dr. Milhollin, as you pointed out, many of the things
on your list attached to your comments are off-the-shelf, dual-
use, computer related technologies. I come from a state,
California, which is a big producer of a lot of these
technologies and which generates a lot of pressure to ease our
export controls.
I particularly ran into this in the MTCR discussion. Hughes
had three major communication satellites involving encryption
for commercial purposes in China that got caught up in this. Of
course, the Germans were right there, ready to sell these same
satellites to the Chinese.
The question I have for all of you is what should we do to
toughen our export controls and, at the same time, to develop a
situation where one of our allies is not simply going to move
in and replace these sales, which, to me, seems to be the case
today.
Dr. Bertsch. I feel very strongly about this issue, and if
I can jump in first, I think it is a very good question.
We have been studying U.S. export control policies for 20
years at the University of Georgia. I think if there is one
thing we have learned--and that is to respond to your very
important question what can we do to be tough but not allow
Germans, Japanese, or others to go in and get these deals--I
think we have to continue to work multilaterally with these
countries, to say to Germany, Japan, and others listen, we are
following your export policy very carefully and we will just
not tolerate it when we deny an export to a country for
proliferation reasons and you go in. A lot of that has gone on
in the cold war and even into the post cold war period.
But I would give the United States high marks--the Bush
Administration, the Clinton Administration--on really pressing
this case, to make sure that not only Germany and Japan are on
board--and I think they are; I think by and large we have a
very effective multilateral consensus on this--but the new
challenge in the post cold war period is to bring Russia and
China on board. Then we will not be dealing with this kind of
issue today.
I think we have made tremendous progress in the last 3 or 4
years to get Russia on board with the United States, Germany,
and Japan. Now we have to keep them on board. The Ukrainians
are a little more on board. That is why they pulled out of this
nuclear project, Bushehr, in Iran. Now we have to bring China
in. We are only just beginning.
We have begun in our program discussions with the Defense
Department here in Washington, and the State Department and
Commerce Department about how we can do more to bring about the
cooperation that we need from China.
I am optimistic that, while it won't happen overnight, it
can be done.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Dr. Milhollin?
Dr. Milhollin. You will get a somewhat different response
from me and less optimistic, probably.
First of all, I think you need to look at export controls
with the perspective of how important they are and why we have
them. The amount of goods controlled now is about $10 billion a
year. If you do the arithmetic, you will see that that is a
fraction of 1 percent of our economy, a fraction of 1 percent.
The total amount denied--I'm sorry. Of the amount
controlled, 98 percent of that is approved. That is, if you
control this really economically minuscule amount of technology
for exports, you make people get licenses, 98 percent of the
licenses applied for are granted, or only 2 percent are turned
down.
Senator Feinstein. Are you saying the controls are tough
enough, that it is just the administration of the controls?
Dr. Milhollin. I am saying that the idea that we are
hurting our economy or cutting jobs in order to have export
controls is wrong. There is no way you can measure the
insignificant impact on our economy of export controls. But the
impact of the controls on our security is very high because an
instrument that may not cost very much can really enable
somebody else to move a program forward rapidly.
So that is why it makes sense to control exports.
The first point is that it is not really a jobs issue.
There is no measurement sensitive enough to measure the jobs
impact of our export controls. I think it is about 4 percent of
1 percent of our economy that is even controlled. The total
amount denied, the last time I looked at it, was about half the
cost of a single B-2 bomber.
That is what we are talking about in terms of denied
technology, the worth of it. It is insignificant.
The second point is that it makes sense to have unilateral
controls for a number of reasons. First is just an ethical
reason.
The United States is the only country I think that controls
the export of torture equipment--thumb screws, that sort of
thing. If you want to sell torture equipment, you have to get a
license in the United States.
Now it is true, theoretically, that other countries could
rush in and sell these torture devices that we are not selling.
It is also true that we don't sell missiles, for example, to
Iran, or to Syria. Other people do. They get the missiles
anyway. Our guys, our people, lose out on the sales of these
missiles.
We make better missiles than the North Koreans. We could
supply the Iranian market. We make better chemical weapons
plants than anybody. We could put those in Libya, but we don't.
The Germans got the business.
I don't hear anybody complaining that our industry missed
out on the two chemical weapon plants that Libya is building.
The third reason it is important to have unilateral
controls is leadership. The way it really works internationally
is somebody has to step out and do it first, and be the leader,
and have international controls, and other people join. That is
what we did in Iraq.
If we had waited until everybody, all of our allies had
agreed what to do about Iraq, we would still be talking. So you
have to have unilateral controls.
To make export controls stronger, we need to stop cutting
them. The Clinton Administration's export controls are a tenth
of what we controlled under President Bush. I think we have cut
it down to the bone and we are going into the bone. We need to
stop.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator.
Let me look now at China and Russia. Dr. Bertsch, you are
saying we should continue and increase pressure there to try to
bring them into the kind of ``league of nations'' in dealing
with the Iranians.
Dr. Milhollin, I am certain you would agree with that
statement as well, that we need to focus a lot there. Dr.
Carus, is that correct, as well? Russian and Chinese exports
are our clearest present danger on arming further the Iranians,
conventional and mass destruction as a present issue.
Dr. Carus. I think there are several reasons to focus on
those two countries. One is they have the largest capacity to
supply the kinds of things that Iran wants of all the potential
supplier countries out there.
For the kinds of reasons that Gary Milhollin just
mentioned, people in most countries will not sell Iran a
complete chemical weapons factory. Unfortunately, there are
people in China who are willing to supply them with such
facilities.
Senator Brownback. And then the directions on how to put
them together.
Dr. Carus. That's correct.
While I have a little bit of optimism that national
interest concerns will lead the Russians to be somewhat
constrained, I am less optimistic about the Chinese. The
history is just not very comforting in this regard.
Again, dredging up a little bit of ancient history, if you
recall back in 1987-1988, the United States was busy fighting a
little mini-war with Iran in the Persian Gulf. Remarkably, the
Chinese, who apparently considered themselves a friend of the
United States, were selling the Iranians anti-ship cruise
missiles at that same time. So they were perfectly willing to
supply weapons that they knew had the objective of sinking
American ships at a very critical point in time. And, while we
demarched the Chinese over this, it did not matter to them.
I am not sure things have changed that much in the
intervening decade.
Senator Brownback. Well, I am not sure that they have
changed that much, either, particularly--and I can direct your
focus on the charts and the boards that we have up here--- from
what we know has gone to Iran and from which countries, and
with no sanctions then involved toward those suppliers. I mean,
this is known, unclassified information.
Dr. Milhollin, you cited specific examples. And yet, we
have not stepped up to do anything further.
Now what is it we should be doing? What further should we
do, particularly toward the Chinese and the Russians, to cause
them to stop this arming of the Iranians?
Dr. Milhollin, please?
Dr. Milhollin. Well, I think the first thing we could do is
just implement our own law. We do have laws on the books.
Senator Brownback. And your contention is those have not
been implemented?
Dr. Milhollin. Yes. I think it is clear that they are not
being implemented today.
The State Department is basically admitting that the
Chinese are continuing to supply Iran with chemical weapon
technology. They somehow have convinced themselves that the
evidence is not sufficient. Well, it is sufficient. The studies
are done. They are adequate.
What we have is just a policy at the top of continuing to
pursue trade at the expense of national security. And until the
White House changes its view on that, I think we won't get any
progress in implementing the laws that exist.
Senator Brownback. Now if the White House will not
implement these laws, should we tighten them further to not
allow loopholes and to simply state if this occurs, this
sanction will happen?
Dr. Milhollin. I think the Congress ought to consider that
very seriously. Also, I think the Congress ought to look at the
whole group of sanctions laws.
There have been so many sanctions laws passed, sort of ad
hoc, that if you try to make a big chart of all the sanctions
laws, it is a redoubtable task.
Chemical sanctions, for example, are not very strong; that
is, even if we sanctioned the Chinese for chemical weapon
proliferation, what are the penalties? The companies cannot
sell things to the U.S. Government. How much does the U.S.
Government buy from Chinese chemical companies? Nothing. They
cannot import into the United States or export to the United
States from China. That is not a serious penalty.
I think we have to look at making the penalties more severe
and changing the triggering mechanism so that it is more
automatic. But that is going to take dissecting the present
labyrinth of sanctions laws and putting them back together in a
more rational form.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Carus, would you agree with that
statement, that they need to be tightened and made more
specific and workable if they are not currently?
Dr. Carus. Unfortunately, I think the ultimate problem is
the intent of whatever administration is in government at the
time.
I think this is demonstrated most starkly if you look at
what happened in the case of Pakistan with the M-11 missiles.
If the U.S. Government had said officially that Pakistan had
received M-11 missiles from China, we would have had to impose
sanctions.
What happens in those cases is everybody knew the M-11
missiles went to Pakistan. But because of the implications of
that decision, the intelligence process was corrupted. And, as
you followed in the press, somehow there was never a
determination that those missiles had ever gone there. And my
suspicion is effectively there never will be, even if you were
able to walk up to one, open it up, and see that it is a
missile. This is simply because if the executive branch decides
that they do not want to impose sanctions, they will start
corrupting the intelligence process to make sure there is never
a determination that some egregious event has happened.
Senator Brownback. Do you have to somehow design the law
such that the determination is not built or cannot be corrupted
by corrupting the intelligence system?
Dr. Carus. If there is a way to do it, it certainly would
be essential in the process.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Bertsch, I want to make sure to get
you in on this. I gather from your testimony that this is not
the way to go; that we need to get Russia and China in, but
that the current route is the route you would prefer to
continue.
But I want to challenge you on that. This current route has
produced substantial weaponry going to the Iranians from those
two nations.
Dr. Bertsch. It has, Senator. You are right, and I think we
should all be concerned with that.
However, in the absence of the present U.S. policy, to
which I give high marks, I think the problem would be much
worse.
I think we are fortunate that we have not seen more
transfers, and I say the reason why is a relatively effective
U.S. policy. I think we should not underestimate how effective
the U.S. Government is with U.S. congressional leadership, in
putting together a set of policies, and you have listed many of
them on the board. I also think that when we think about new
and tougher sanctions, and we should do that, we have to
recognize that many of our close allies, not to mention Russia
and China, look at their relations with other countries
differently because they are neighbors and because they feel
that economic and technological cooperation is in their
national interest.
They would also say that they think more of this is
peaceful cooperation. I think we have to continue to question
and do our intelligence work so that we know exactly what is
peaceful and what is not peaceful.
But I think that our most effective policy involves
sanctions but in a multilateral way, where we are not the only
ones imposing them. We need to have the Germans, the Japanese,
and ideally the Russians and the Chinese on board. I think we
are making some progress on that.
Just let me conclude by saying that sometimes during the
cold war years, we lost the cooperation of some of our allies
and things went too easily from countries like Germany to Iran,
or even to the Soviet Union at that time. Where we have been
more effective is where we can go to a country like Iran and
say there is a broad international consensus that your efforts
to develop weapons of mass destruction are going to be very
costly to you and we want you to recognize that this is not
just the United States unilaterally imposing very tough
sanctions that make us feel good but may not be as effective in
terms of the final goal of stopping WMD programs in Iran.
Dr. Milhollin. Could I respond to that?
Senator Brownback. Dr. Milhollin.
Dr. Milhollin. I think history teaches the opposite. If you
talk to Japanese export control officials, they say that export
control in Japan is divided into two epochs--before Toshiba and
after Toshiba. The sight of U.S. Members of Congress destroying
radios on the Capitol steps deeply shocked the Japanese, and
they changed their export laws.
I have talked to the Japanese regularly, and, believe me,
they have not forgotten that incident.
If you talk to the Germans about export controls--and I
talk to them, too--they say that the universe is divided into
two epochs: before Rabta and after Rabta. Their company,
Imhausen, was nailed publicly on television in Germany and in
the U.S. media as supplying, willfully, the chemical weapon
plant to Libya despite U.S. objections.
That only changed, that is, the big disaster only befell
the Germans when it all got into the newspapers and it was in
``Der Spiegel'' every week, and it was all over German
television. Finally, the Germans were humiliated publicly, and
they caved and changed their export laws.
That's what it took in those two cases.
The English are now going through the same experience. It
is called Matrix Churchill. The British say well, there is
before Matrix Churchill and after Matrix Churchill. Matrix
Churchill was a large machine tool scandal that has just been
the subject of an investigation and a long report in England.
The folks who regulate export controls are still under the
immediate shock of that experience.
So from my perspective, and I have been following this very
closely and working hard on convincing other countries to do
better, it takes a lot to get people to change their practices.
But it can be done. But it needs confrontation very often in
order to overcome the really very strong and consistent motive
for a profit.
Senator Brownback. Yes.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Just following along, Mr. Chairman, it
takes not only confrontation, I think it takes transparency. I
wanted to ask about two things, one being the United Nations
and the second China.
I thought one of the best things that President Bush did
was to begin that effort for increased transparency in the sale
of arms in the United Nations. As you gentlemen know, he had
great success. I think the vote was 150 to nothing in the
General Assembly. Then, of course, the F-16's were sold to
Taiwan and China vetoed this effort in the Security Council. So
it ended up going nowhere.
I have asked both Secretary Christopher and Secretary
Albright, and I think this is really worthy of an effort to
pursue in the United Nations, to get that kind of multilateral
alliance that you gentlemen were speaking about.
With respect to China, China originally denied that it had
sent the 3 dozen or so M-11's to Pakistan. I happen to believe
they were sent. But, nonetheless, there was to be a second load
which has never gone, to the best of my knowledge.
I think that when China knew that we knew, it triggered
some action on the part of Beijing.
Then we got into the ring magnet situation, $75,000 worth
of ring magnets, which are not complicated things. But
apparently--and I tend to believe this--some of the ministries
in China really operate in a much more uncontrolled and
unsupervised way than the world would like to believe they do,
and a lot of these transfers can take place really without
Beijing's full knowledge.
Do you find any substance in that? Could you inform us what
is the extent of governmental controls over supplier companies
in Russia, China, and North Korea? I am talking about
individual sales now. And at which level of the national
government are these controls exercised?
Dr. Bertsch. I will begin, if you would like, Senator.
I think you are absolutely right. That transparency is a
very important element to effective export controls and
nonproliferation, and that we should insist on it. If countries
can be too secretive, it will be very costly in terms of our
nonproliferation goals.
Let me remark first on Russia which I know the best. We
have had our researchers on the ground there for some years. We
have a lot of exchange with Russian export control officials,
both trying to understand better what is going on there and
also trying to assistant them in cooperation with the U.S.
Government in developing their export controls.
One of the bits of good news is that we, in the U.S.
Government, have launched an industrial outreach program into
Russian military-industrial enterprises to bring about more
export control compliance.
With the export imperatives in Russia today, there is the
possibility that these enterprises will export things and try
to ignore what Moscow and the government wants them to do. We
feel it is very important that, like American firms who are
very well informed, as in California, about U.S. export control
laws, Russian firms must be so equally well informed.
I think the Russians and America, Russia, and other
countries are working to make sure that Russian industry
follows international and national law. However, in a country
as large as Russia, with the military-industrial complex of the
size they have, this will be an ongoing challenge.
We have found even in America that, on occasion, some of
our firms will export something that is counter to U.S. law and
restrictions and they get into trouble. We want to see more of
these firms in Russia getting in trouble.
We know much less about China, but my colleague Richard
Cupitt, who has prepared a separate statement that we have
entered into the record, has been in China talking with
government officials, talking with industry and nongovernmental
groups to get to the bottom of this.
We think there is a lot that we ought to know more about,
and the U.S. Government and the Chinese Government first and
foremost can be concerned with it. Our feeling is that we could
probably bring about greater Chinese compliance if we could say
to the government we know that you, government officials in
China, are concerned about some of the things that your
enterprises are doing.
They sometimes feel in Beijing that they are losing control
over the provinces and the economic zones, and we can say to
them look, we have been dealing with the same problem in the
privatized American economy for decades and why don't we share
our expertise as we are doing with the Russians so that we can
work together.
We learn from one another. We learn more about what they
are doing and not doing when we engage them, anyway.
North Korea is the worst case, of course, because we have
no real knowledge of what is going on there. Fortunately, they
do not have the export capabilities and the military-industrial
equipment and weapons systems that will have as big an impact
as Russia and China.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Dr. Milhollin?
Dr. Milhollin. I would say that lack of government control
over people and things has not really been thought of as a big
problem in China--yet. Maybe we should start a rumor that
dissidents have infiltrated China's export corporations. Then
there would be total control overnight.
I think the problem in China is not lack of control, it is
a problem of corruption at high levels. People are making money
out of these exports who control these corporations from the
top.
The Chinese companies that are in our data base and that we
have talked about are state controlled companies.
Senator Feinstein. May I stop you right there?
Dr. Milhollin. Sure.
Senator Feinstein. Let me ask you something. Let's take
Pakistan.
I happen to believe that the Chinese have helped them
develop an indigenous nuclear capability by enriching uranium
above the 5 percent level.
Dr. Milhollin. Without a doubt.
Senator Feinstein. Having said that, it would just seem to
me that China at some point has to realize that having two
competing indigenous nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, right
over their border is not in their national interest.
Dr. Milhollin. I don't think China sees it that way. For
many years, China has used Pakistan as its window on the world.
That costs a certain amount.
Also, China has received the reactor order from Pakistan.
It is building a couple of power reactors which are quite
valuable.
You know, you mentioned the ring magnets. The ring magnets
follow a pattern. They are what are called ``sweeteners.'' They
are little things that you would not export by themselves
because they are very sensitive and they get you in a lot of
trouble. But what you do is you throw them into a larger deal.
That happens all the time.
If you look at the Russian deal with Iran, the enrichment
plant, the natural uranium, the little research reactor, these
are all things that are not very valuable on their own. But
when you are bargaining for a couple of big power reactors, you
want the sweeteners.
It is very hard not to provide the sweeteners.
So getting back to your question, I think that explains the
ring magnets. They don't make sense by themselves. But as part
of this relationship and as part of a big transfer of power
reactor technology, they make sense.
So China still uses Pakistan as a window on the world and
that costs a certain amount. And China is willing to pay that.
I don't think China is concerned about India's program.
India cannot threaten China now and it never has been able to
threaten China. And India is not doing the things that would be
necessary to really threaten China in the future. It does not
have an active testing program. It is not pushing its
intermediate range missile. India is not a threat to China.
Senator Feinstein. No, I didn't mean to imply that. But
with the India-Pakistan situation, the nondeployment of the
Prithvi missile, for example, our sale of some of the missiles
that could be carried on the plane which is part of the
leftover package of arms for Pakistan, that is potentially a
very dangerous situation between the two of them.
Dr. Milhollin. It is. But the Pakistanis are in a reaction
position with respect to India. India is much stronger
conventionally. India has a stronger economy. The Pakistanis
are always a step behind. They are always trying to catch up
and they are always trying to maintain some kind of balance
with India.
The first place they go when they get into trouble is to
the Chinese. Up to now, the pattern has been that the Chinese
have helped them, and I don't see this changing.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Brownback. If I could, there are a number of people
in Congress who would say we have bad actors in China, clearly
in the government, and in the private sector. So let's just
terminate MFN because it is too difficult to get at the
specific company or the specific group that is providing
weaponry to the Iranians.
I happen to really question that way to go at it. But
answer me this--and I am not sure who would be appropriate for
this. Can we target the specific company in China or the
extension of the government if it is that case that is
providing weaponry to the Iranians? Can we get in with that
narrow specific?
You have given several examples, Dr. Milhollin. Will we be
able to do that or will they shift it just to another shell
company before exporting it?
Dr. Milhollin. I think you could target specific companies.
The China National Nuclear Corporation is not going away. It is
going to be the source of nuclear technology for a long time in
China. It is going to be the entity that cooperates with us.
I think if you are convinced that they are continuing to
help Pakistan, you can easily sanction that company. And many
of the other companies that we have mentioned here are big,
established companies. They have sales networks. It would be
hard for them just to suddenly become something else.
If you imagine McDonnell Douglas suddenly becoming some
other company overnight, it is possible but there would be a
cost.
So by sanctioning those companies, we could impose a
significant cost on them.
Senator Brownback. And do you think that would be an
appropriate step to take?
Dr. Milhollin. I think it would. If the company is willing
to defy the world and supply a country we consider as a threat
to us and as a rogue, then I think we should basically
blacklist them and just not deal with them--not export to them,
not import from them--and do everything we can to discourage
their behavior.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Milhollin, you have provided a list
of a number of those companies in your specific examples. Is
that an all-inclusive list, or are there others that you
believe we should blackball in our dealing with them?
Dr. Milhollin. No. I think this is just, to invent a
metaphor, the tip of the iceberg here.
There are lots of other companies which I could provide to
the committee.
Senator Brownback. I wish you would. What I would like to
see us do is to target in specifically on the bad actors in
those nations, and particularly as we are approaching, again,
the China MFN debate, let's focus in and narrow in on that
specific company that is providing this sort of weaponry or
technology to the Iranians.
So if you could provide that to us really as soon as
possible, it would be most appreciated.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Senator Brownback. I don't know if either of the other
gentlemen would care to comment on this issue of narrowing in
on the specific company and bad actor.
Dr. Bertsch. I think there is value in that, and I think
that sanctions should be focused and targeted on those most
responsible.
I caution sanctions imposed on Russia and China of the MFN
character because we have to remember that we have much larger
security and strategic interests with these countries. We are
working with Russia right now on getting through this difficult
NATO negotiation, and if we were to impose sanctions of a broad
sort or withdraw MFN from them, in a way that would jeopardize
our larger strategic interests. It would be very, very costly.
I think that there are better ways of working on these
proliferation leaks and transfers, both in Russia and in China,
than imposing broad-scale economic sanctions on either of these
countries.
Senator Brownback. And you believe it to be doable as well,
that we could target in on that company, and you would support
such a policy that did target in and, if I could use the term,
essentially blackball a company?
Dr. Bertsch. I think so. I think in some cases that is
justified.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Carus?
Dr. Carus. Let me make two comments. In general, I am very
suspicious of sanctions that Congress imposes on the executive
branch simply because you get a corruption of the process, as I
described in the case of the Pakistan missiles, the
administration never admits the truth of what has happened.
Having said that, unfortunately, sometimes the only tools
you have available in terms of a dialog with an administration
are very blunt instruments. I think the history on export
controls has been that administrations have only reacted when
Congress has raised enough of a fuss that the administration
has been forced to take seriously things that they would rather
ignore.
Senator Brownback. That is what we are trying to do here,
raise enough of a fuss.
Dr. Carus. So having said that I am not particularly fond
of sanctions, under some circumstances, and I think we are in
that kind of situation today, it is the only option available
and should be pursued.
I think from this point of view, making it as targeted as
possible is the right way to go. Hopefully, the result would be
a dialog with the executive branch that would lead to perhaps a
modification in policy.
If you recall, in the early days of the Bush
Administration, it was willing to let Iraq buy just about
anything. By the end of its term, they had a much different
view on things. But, it didn't just happen overnight. It
happened over time because of pressure on the administration.
Senator Brownback. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. It would seem to me that if we were to
follow this course, then we would also have to apply the same
standards to Germany or the same standards to Russia and really
do it across the board to make it meaningful--not select one
country and impose a pinpointed sanction, but, really, all of
those businesses and corporations that do this kind of thing
with impunity.
Would you not agree?
Dr. Milhollin. I would certainly agree. It is always more
awkward, of course, to impose a sanction on a close ally. But
if the case is clear, as it was in the Imhausen case for Rabta,
then the world is better off if you take a strong position.
I think that case shows that to be true.
Senator Feinstein. Let me ask this question.
Iran is a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
IAEA inspections have never turned up any prohibited activity.
Nonetheless, everyone is certain that Iran is pursuing nuclear
weapons.
Iran has also signed, although not yet ratified, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and we believe Iran has a chemical
weapons program. What should we do in this situation about a
state like Iran, that is a member of arms control treaties,
that passes inspections, but that we believe is cheating? If we
cannot prove it, how do we get other nations to join us in
combating it?
Dr. Carus. Senator, if I may respond to that, I think we
are actually relatively fortunate in that in the broad outlines
I think most of our friends agree with us on this.
If you look at the nuclear issue, it is true that nobody
has ever found a violation of IAEA safeguards in Iran. Yet we
have now, essentially, a 15 year track record of convincing
other governments that it would be a bad idea to support
Iranian nuclear development programs. So, for example, back in
the early 1980's, when the Revolutionary Government wanted to
resume building the Bushehr reactors, we convinced the Germans
not to do it.
Over the years we have approached many governments and
convinced them that it would be a bad idea. So, in fact, I
think in this particular case we are quite fortunate that most
governments accept our arguments and, in fact, are concerned
about what Iran might do. This gives us a real leg up in the
case of Iran.
Unfortunately, there are a few major exceptions, and we
have been focusing on them today.
Senator Feinstein. May I ask you gentlemen to also provide
the subcommittee with any lists of the sales, with specificity
as to the companies or corporations in both Germany and Russia
as well?
Senator Brownback. Anywhere around the world, actually, if
you would not mind.
Senator Feinstein. That would be just fine.
Senator Brownback. Let's say if you know of bad actors in
this, let's get at it.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Senator Brownback. Have you anything further, Senator
Feinstein?
Senator Feinstein. Yes. Let me just ask you a status
question. Last year, we all had concern that China was going to
proceed with a nuclear enrichment facility in Iran. To my
knowledge, that has not taken place.
Do you have any information about this proposed sale? Do
you have any information as to why it has not gone forward? Is
Iran's inability to pay the reason, or has China really decided
it would be a better idea not to go ahead?
What is the status of the proposed sale of the two nuclear
reactors to Iran?
Dr. Milhollin. Are you speaking of the Chinese reactors?
Senator Feinstein. Yes.
Dr. Milhollin. If I could start, my impression is that the
Chinese arrangements with Iran are in a state of suspension at
this time pending the outcome of Iran's hope that it will be
able--I'm sorry. Let me start over.
China's sale of the hexafluoride plant and China's sale of
research reactors and so forth to Iran seems to be in a state
of suspension pending the outcome of our talks with China about
the nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.
I think the Chinese recognize that if tomorrow they
announce that the hexafluoride plant was going forward, there
would be no hope of an agreement with us.
So as I said in my testimony, I think it is sort of a
gentle form of blackmail. The Chinese supply pipeline is in a
state of remission at the moment, awaiting the outcome of our
discussions with them. That is my impression of what the status
is today of the nuclear cooperation between China and Iran.
Senator Feinstein. Does anyone have any other comments on
that?
Dr. Bertsch. I don't think I really have anything to add
beyond that and what was discussed at the April 17 hearing. But
it can be viewed as a policy of blackmail, although it also can
be viewed as a policy of U.S. influence on China, that if this
opportunity for expanded cooperation with the United States on
the nuclear front, China-U.S., keeps this deal in a state of
suspense, then we are serving our nonproliferation objectives.
Senator Feinstein. I have two other questions.
Last year, Congress passed and the President signed the
Iran-Libya Oil Sanctions Act which requires sanctions against
foreign companies that invest more than $40 million in Iran's
oil and gas industry.
How effective has this law been in depriving Iran of funds
generated by these oil and gas development contracts?
How much hard currency would you estimate Iran has lost so
far and are there companies who have invested in Iran's oil and
gas sector despite the threat of U.S. sanctions?
Have we imposed any sanctions against any of them? How
effective a tool do you believe this law is in preventing
proliferation in Iran?
I am sorry there are so many questions in one.
Dr. Carus. Senator, I do not consider myself an expert on
these issues, but I have followed them. My sense is that the
law and the U.S. pressure has been quite effective. They made
what appeared to be an already very unpromising market and made
it even less attractive for doing business.
If you look at the cases that have taken place, such as
Total's oil deal, the impression outsiders have is that because
the gas produced cannot be sold into the UAE, that it is a
money losing proposition for Total.
There are some other companies that are looking to get into
Iran, including a Malaysian company. But these are small actors
that cannot bring Iran the technology and the resources they
need.
Given that the Iranians need to spend an enormous amount of
money in their energy sector in order just to meet domestic
demand, if you consider sanctions as one of several negative
factors that are facing them, I think it has had an important
contribution.
Clearly, to the extent that the Iranians do not get
alternative sources of resources to pay for infrastructure, it
means that it is money that they do not have for their NBC
acquisition program.
Dr. Milhollin. I just have one comment on that.
It seems to me that the United States has two, big,
important, strategic assets. One of them is our market.
Everybody wants access to it. I think we should withhold it
from folks who do not merit access. And if you force them to
choose between access to the U.S. market and access to the
market of selling a few missiles and chemical weapon plans here
and there, the choice will always be the U.S. market.
Second, we have high technology, which everybody wants. I
think we should also restrict that to companies and countries
that we can rely on, that share our values.
Senator Feinstein. Those are two good points. I agree.
Doctor, do you have any comment on that?
Dr. Bertsch. No.
Senator Feinstein. Let me ask--I'm sorry. My red light is
on.
Senator Brownback. I was just going to wrap up the hearing.
So if you have another, please ask it.
Senator Feinstein. I just have one more question about
Europe.
Senator Brownback. Please go ahead.
Senator Feinstein. The EU has insisted on conducting what
they have called a ``critical dialog'' with Iran despite United
States efforts to get EU nations to isolate Iran.
In the wake of last month's German court decision, which
held that senior Iranian officials were responsible for the
Mykonos bombing that killed three Iranian dissidents in Berlin
in 1992, the EU has suspended its critical dialog.
What do you think the significance of this decision is? How
much has this dialog hindered our efforts to isolate Iran? How
much of a difference can the new EU policy make? Can we expect
more vigorous European efforts to isolate Iran or combat its
use of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction?
Dr. Bertsch. I would not expect too big a change in
European policy. I suspect that they are committed to their
basic policy of dialog and that this will go on, and that these
temporary developments are rather temporary.
Senator Feinstein. I don't mean to interrupt you, but the
problem I have is this is deeply troubling to me. If our
European allies, for whom we maintain NATO, with whom we have
this close relationship, won't support these policies, the
effect of that is to subvert them. I think that is a major
problem.
I happen to agree with what Dr. Milhollin said. But if
Europe won't provide the kind of support we need and will just
simply move in behind and sell some of these products, then our
efforts are somewhat wasted.
Dr. Bertsch. I agree, Senator. We have had a good bit of
problem with our European allies for some decades. But by and
large, they listen to the United States and they will work with
us.
I think that over a period of time, they are going to make
their own judgments about the terrorist threats emanating from
Iran.
I think this recent case in Germany helped better inform
the German public and German officials, and I think will make
it easier to work with our German and European allies.
At the same time, they look at economic cooperation and
political relations with countries such as Iran somewhat
differently than we do. We have to deal with that. We don't
always like it, but I think we cannot underestimate the value
of trying to bring a cooperative front with our European allies
and bringing other countries, as well, into it.
Dr. Milhollin. Senator, I would say that this court
decision has just produced a very strong shot of what you said
was good and necessary, which is transparency.
The public all know now that the Iranians are perfectly
capable of doing what the court said they did. I think that to
influence the Europeans over time on the subject of supplying
Iran, we have to start using the policy we used with respect to
Libya and the Imhausen case, which I mentioned before.
Our intelligence agencies know which German companies are
selling what to Iran. We, I think--I hate to say this--but I
think, until we start putting that out in the media, as we did
in the case of the Libyan poison gas plant, we are not going to
create the kind of public pressure that is necessary in order
to change the behavior of the European companies.
But I promise you that if our intelligence agencies did put
out what they know about what is going into Iran, it would
change behavior. It is just, I guess, that the powers that be
have decided that the diplomatic cost is not worth it. So we
don't see this information coming out.
Senator Feinstein. If you send it to us, we can put it out.
Senator Brownback. Yes.
Thank you all very much. I appreciate the panel and those
who have participated, and Senator Feinstein for her excellent
questions and participation in this hearing. I appreciate that
a great deal.
It strikes me that we may have a moment here where we can
step up the focus and the pressure on those who are supplying
the Iranians, who many have identified as our erstwhile present
danger that we have in the world, and that we can do something
of a targeted, specific, and efficient and effective measure.
The German court ruling I think is a part of that. With the
desires here on Capitol Hill, our relationships with Russia and
China, the upcoming China MFN debate, we may have a moment
where we can step forward and hopefully do something good and
constructive on this.
Thank you all for your attendance.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
APPENDIX
----------
Prepared Statement of Leonard S. Spector
It is an honor to testify before the committee this afternoon on
U.S. efforts to halt weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and missile
programs in Iran.
Iran's growing capabilities in these spheres already pose a grave
risk to U.S. allies and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region, but
this threat could greatly worsen in coming years, as Iran graduates to
even more potent weapons than it currently possesses, enlarges its
missile arsenal, builds longer-range systems, and learns to mate its
weapons of mass destruction with these advanced delivery systems.
As an independent observer who has not had access to classified
information on these issues, it is possible for me to offer only a
rough appreciation of the status of Iran's military programs and of
U.S. efforts to constrain them. Nonetheless, using published reports
and statements of U.S. and foreign officials, it is possible to develop
a framework for assessing the successes and failures of U.S. policy. I
hope the Committee will be able to employ this framework as it
evaluates the more complete information at its disposal.
The United States has many instruments in its tool kit to fight the
spread of WMD and advanced delivery systems. These include:
building and sustaining international non-proliferation
regimes and norms;
slowing the spread of dangerous technology through
unilateral and multilateral export controls;
employing targeted diplomatic initiatives, including
security guarantees, incentives, and sanctions;
working to reduce the regional security threats that spawn
interest in special weapons;
applying military resources through ``counter-
proliferation'' initiatives;\1\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In using this term, I have in mind the use of passive defenses,
active defenses (against theater-based threats), deterrence based on
the threat of massive conventional retaliation, and adjustments to
military operations and planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
implementing the ``Cooperative Threat Reduction'' program,
also known as the Nunn-Lugar program, aimed at helping to
secure weapon of mass destruction and WMD materials in the
former Soviet Union.
Like its predecessors, the Clinton Administration has attempted to
use all of these mechanisms, at various times and in various
combinations, to restrain Iran's WMD and missile advances. In the end,
whether one or another of these mechanisms has been used to its fullest
extent is less important than whether, by taking advantage of its
entire tool kit, the Administration has obtained results.
From my perspective, the record is mixed. There have been some
important successes with respect to Iran's nuclear program and,
possibly, with respect to aspects of its missile program. But there
have also been some serious setbacks, especially with respect to Iran's
development of biological and chemical weapons.
One useful way for filling in the Administration's non-
proliferation scorecard vis-a-vis Iran is to identify the principal
Iranian programs of concern and assess the results of the
Administration's efforts in each case.
Based on the open record, Iran can be thought of as pursuing WMD
and missile programs along at least eleven distinct paths, including:
1. Nuclear weapons (clandestine production of nuclear weapons
material)
2. Nuclear weapons (purchase of nuclear weapons material)
3. Nuclear weapons (open, civil nuclear energy program)
4. Biological weapons (domestic production, with some outside
assistance)
5. Basic chemical weapons (domestic production, including sulfur
mustard, phosgene, and cyanide, with outside assistance)
6. Advanced chemical weapons (domestic production of agents such
as, Soman, Tabun, Sarin, and VX, with outside assistance)
7. Scud missiles (purchases--including Scud-Cs with a range of 500
km)
8. Longer range ballistic missiles (purchases--North Korean 1,000
km No-Dong)
9. Scud and other short range missiles (indigenous production--
including Scud-Cs with a range of 500 km--with outside assistance)
10. Longer range 1,000 to 1,400 km ballistic missiles (indigenous
production, with outside assistance)
11. Cruise missiles (acquisition of the Chinese C-802 and the
domestic development of land-attack derivatives)
To keep my remarks brief, I will only outline developments in each
of these areas, but I would be pleased to expand my comments on
particular points in response to questions from the Committee. For the
convenience of the Subcommittee, I have appended to my testimony an
annotate table, prepared by my colleague Gregory Koblentz, listing
alleged transfers of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile
equipment and technology and the U.S. response, with particular
reference to the imposition of sanctions.
1. Nuclear weapons (clandestine production of nuclear weapons
material). Despite reports dating back a number of years that Iran is
seeking to develop the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons material,
to date it has not been reported that Iran is building any of the key
installations needed for this purpose. Iran is constrained by its
status as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to
accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections and has voluntarily allowed wide-ranging monitoring that
goes beyond the IAEA's normal oversight. To date, although the IAEA is
now privy to U.S. intelligence, it has not unearthed any clandestine
facility in Iran needed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and, as
I noted earlier, there have been no reports that such a facility
exists. Several reports indicate, moreover, that Iran's efforts to
import equipment for a clandestine nuclear effort have been thwarted in
particular cases, suggesting that U.S. intelligence and Western export
controls are being used to advantage in this battle.\2\ Recently, U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum testified that
in the past two years, Iran has made little or no progress down this
path--or any other path--toward nuclear arms.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Con Coughlin, ``Britain Seizes Bomb-Grade Steel Cargo,''
Washington Times, August 12, 1996, p. 8; Mark Hibbs, ``No German
Nuclear Equipment Getting to Iran, Bonn Vows,'' Nuclear Fuel, April 10,
1995, p. 5; Thomas W. Lippman, ``Stepped-Up Nuclear Effort Renews Alarm
About Iran,'' Washington Post, April 17, 1995; Elaine Sciolino, ``Iran
Says It Plans 10 Nuclear Plants But No Atom Arms,'' op. cit.;
PPNNNewsbrief, Third Quarter 1995, p. 17; Mark Hibbs, ``Investigators
Deny Iran Smuggled Weapons Material From Germany,'' Nucleonics Week,
February 1, 1996, p. 14.
\3\ ``Testimony of John Holum, Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency,'' before the House International Relations
Committee, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights on
the FY 1998 Authorization for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, March 5, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, it is also generally accepted that Iran is
conducting suspicious research and is attempting to import equipment
and technology relevant to the production of nuclear-weapons material.
Tentative conclusion. This facet of Iranian activities remains a
continuing danger. However, the Clinton Administration's efforts to
assist the IAEA in implementing inspections under the NPT, together
with multilateral efforts (supported by U.S. intelligence) to restrict
clandestine nuclear equipment and technology transfers to Iran, have
kept Iran on the defensive and have significantly constrained this
Iranian effort.
2. Nuclear weapons (purchase of nuclear weapons material). It is
widely understood that security over nuclear weapons materials in the
former Soviet Union falls far short of international standards and that
the risk of diversion and smuggling of such materials out of the Soviet
successor states remains high, particularly from Russia, where the vast
proportion of the materials are stored. U.S. officials have testified
that Iran has been seeking to obtain such materials at installations in
the former Soviet Union. So far, however, Iran is not known to have
succeeded in this effort.
The Clinton Administration, with the strong support of Congress,
has worked aggressively to cooperate with Russia and other successor
states to upgrade security at facilities housing such materials. The
United States is also purchasing some 500 tons of weapons usable
uranium from Russia for conversion into reactor fuel (which will take
it out of harm's way) and, in an extraordinary initiative known as
Operation Sapphire, the United States quietly removed 500 kilograms of
highly enriched uranium from an insecure facility in Kazakhstan.
Very serious dangers remain, however. As highlighted in a National
Academy of Sciences report being released today, the U.S. program to
work with Russia to enhance material protection, accounting, and
control is now starting to bear fruit and ``tons'' of weapons material
are now under world-class security in Russia as a result of the
program. But, the report continues, ``tens of tons'' are under only
partial control and adequate security for ``hundreds of tons'' has yet
to be provided. The report concludes that it is essential that the
program, which has now built substantial momentum, continue with
funding at least at current levels--or higher if new opportunities to
enhance security arise.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain
Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former
Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences, April 17, 1997.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tentative conclusion. Iran's bid to purchase weapons-grade nuclear
materials clandestinely remains a grave threat. U.S. programs are
beginning to make important headway in addressing this danger, but
years will be needed to bring it under control. Continued Congressional
support is essential.
3. Nuclear weapons (civil nuclear energy program). Inasmuch as all
facilities in the open Iranian nuclear energy program will be subject
to IAEA monitoring, the concern in this sphere is not that particular
installations will be misused for nuclear weapons, but that a large
civil nuclear energy program will indirectly support the Iranian
nuclear weapons effort by training scientists, technicians, and
engineers in nuclear specialties. These individuals, in turn, could
then switch over to work in a clandestine nuclear weapons program and
use their training to help in the construction and operation of
possible parallel undeclared nuclear installations.
In 1992, Washington succeeded in persuading China to postpone
indefinitely the sale to Iran of a plutonium-producing research
reactor.\5\ In addition, in 1995, China suspended its plans, announced
three years earlier, to supply two 300-megawatt nuclear power reactors
to Iran.\6\ More recently, China canceled plans to transfer to Iran a
sensitive uranium ``conversion'' plant, able to produce uranium
hexafluoride--a feedstock for the process used to produce weapons-grade
uranium. This decision is apparently the result of the diplomatic
intervention of the Clinton Administration.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See Mark Hibbs, ``Iran Sought Sensitive Nuclear Supplies from
Argentina, China,'' Nucleonics Week, September 24, 1992, p. 2; Steve
Coll, ``U.S. Halted Nuclear Bid by Iran,'' Washington Post, November
17, 1992.
In December 1996, there were indications that China might revive
the sale of the research reactor to Iran. See Mark Hibbs, ``China Has
Far to Go Before U.S. Will Certify, Agencies Now Say,'' Nucleonics
Week, December 12, 1996, p. 1.
\6\ Supplementary materials submitted by Barbara Larkin, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. State Department,
Hearings on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States and its Interests Abroad, Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. Senate, February 22, 1996 (supplementary materials
supplied May 23, 1996), p. 135.
\7\ Interview with Chinese official, Washington, D.C., March 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian assistance to the Iranian nuclear program has also slowed.
Moscow's plan for the sale to Iran of a sizable research reactor,
suitable for the production of plutonium, appears to have been
suspended. Secondly, under U.S. pressure in mid-1995, Russia canceled a
contract to supply a highly sensitive uranium enrichment plant to Iran.
Russia, however, remains committed to its sale of nuclear power
reactors to that country, the first of which it is now building at
Bushehr. This sale is consistent with international rules. However, the
Administration continues to emphasize its opposition to the sale to the
Russian government.\8\ Recently, the United States placed another
obstacle in the path of the project--which is already far behind
schedule--by persuading Ukraine not to sell Iran the (non-nuclear)
turbine for the facility.\9\ At the same time, the Administration has
been reluctant to undermine other elements of U.S. relations with
Russia by treating this as the most important issue between our two
countries; as a result, the Administration has twice waived the
provisions of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act that would
require a termination of U.S. foreign assistance to Russia unless it
ceased all transfers of nuclear equipment and technology to Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ One aspect of the Russian reactor sale of particular concern to
the United States are the arrangements for the disposition of the
plutonium-bearing spent fuel that the Bushehr unit will produce.
According to U.S. officials, as of December 1996, Russia and Iran had
not yet concluded an agreement for the return of the spent fuel to
Russia, a valuable non-proliferation measure traditionally included in
Russian nuclear reactor sales contracts. Mark Hibbs, ``Iran May Keep
Russian Spent Fuel Or Take Plutonium, REPU, Waste,'' Nuclear Fuel,
December 18, 1995, p. 1; Mark Hibbs, ``Iran, Russia Still Settling
Countertrade Terms for PWRS,'' Nucleonics Week, October 5, 1995, p. 9.
\9\ Michael Gordon, ``Ukraine Decides Not to Provide Reactor Parts
to Iran,'' New York Times, April 7, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tentative conclusion. By diplomatic interaction with China, the
Administration persuaded Beijing to suspend the transfer of the most
sensitive of the civilian nuclear plants that Iran has recently sought
to purchase. Although Russia has delayed plans to build a sensitive
research reactor in Iran, Washington has enjoyed less success in
halting Russia's construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, but,
at least, it has slowed this project somewhat.
4. Biological weapons (BW). Controlling the spread of this weapon
of mass destruction is probably the most daunting non-proliferation
challenge facing the United States and its friends. The necessary
technology is widespread in civilian industry, the manufacture of BW is
relatively less difficult, and, because BW can be manufactured rapidly
and in small-scale facilities, detecting BW programs can be extremely
demanding. International controls lag far behind those currently
covering nuclear weapons or those that will shortly cover chemical arms
under the Chemical Weapon Convention.
The U.S. intelligence community believes Iran has been developing a
substantial biological warfare program, and that, as of May 1996, it
had acquired its first stocks of biological weapons. If true, this
would be the most disturbing act of WMD proliferation during that year.
The agency estimates that Iran currently possesses a limited stockpile
of biological weapons that it could deploy using artillery, mortars,
rockets, and aerial bombs.\10\ The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is
concerned that Iran has the potential to develop a biological warhead
for its ballistic missiles, but does not expect this to occur before
the end of the century.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The CIA has stated that while Iran's BW program is mostly in
the research and development stages--likely investigating both toxins
and live organisms as BW agents--Iran has ``the technical
infrastructure to support a significant BW program and needs little
foreign assistance.'' ``Supplementary Materials Submitted by John H.
Moseman, Director of Congressional Affairs, Central Intelligence
Agency,'' Hearings of the Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad, Select Committee
on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, February 22, 1996 (supplementary
materials supplied May 10, 1996), p. 82.
\11\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China has been implicated in supporting aspects of Iran's BW
activities, but the extent of such involvement is murky and,
apparently, has not raised the issue of sanctions.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ U.S. officials have not publicly indicated whether China is
implicated in Iran's BW program, but has apparently received
intelligence that BW-related transfers have been made. Bill Gertz,
``Albright Concedes `Concern' Over China-Iran Transfers,'' Washington
Times, January 24, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Let me point out that at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam
Hussein possessed twenty-five missiles with BW warheads, which he
considered a part of his ``strategic'' arsenal--able to cause mass
casualties if used against the cities of an adversary. It is possible
that Iranian efforts to achieve a parallel capability will be detected
and might be discouraged or deterred.
Given Iran's progress in the area of biological weapons, the United
States and its friends must be prepared with counter-proliferation
measures to contain this threat--especially, defenses, deterrence, and
adjustments in military doctrine and strategy.
Tentative conclusion. The Iranian BW threat is already very serious
and is likely to worsen. However, Iran still has far to go to develop a
mature, missile-based BW capability, and it may yet be possible to
block these advances. New strategies need to be developed to address
this threat.
5. Basic chemical weapons (including sulfur mustard, phosgene, and
cyanide). The CIA has stated that Iran is continuing to expand and
diversify its chemical weapons program, already among the largest in
the Third World. The agency estimates that Tehran currently controls a
CW stockpile of several thousand tons that includes sulfur mustard,
phosgene, and cyanide agents, and has the potential of producing 1,000
tons of these agents each year. The delivery means for these agents
include ``artillery, mortars, rockets, aerial bombs, and, possibly,
even Scud warheads.''\13\ Importantly, the chemical agents that Iran
possesses are World War I era weapons; it has yet to produce more
advanced nerve agents, such as Soman, Tabun, Sarin, or VX.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ ``Supplementary Materials Submitted by John H. Moseman,
Director of Congressional Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency,''
Hearings on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States and Its Interests Abroad, op.cit, p. 82. The DIA has
projected that Iran may have as much as 2,000 tons of CW agents in its
stockpile. ``Supplementary Materials Submitted by Lieutenant General
Patrick M. Hughes, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,''
Hearings on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States and Its Interests Abroad, op. cit., p. 206.
\14\ W. Seth Carus, ``Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction,''
presented at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, February 20, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on technology dating back to World War I, these CW agents are
easy to manufacture. Chinese firms have apparently played a role in
supplying CW precursors to Iran, leading to the imposition of sanctions
against several firms and persons in 1994 and 1995.\15\ In November
1995, referring to Iran's CW program, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Near East and South Asia Bruce Reidel testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Gary Milhollin and Meg Dennison, ``China's Cynical
Calculation,'' New York Times, April 24, 1995, p. A17.
In the chemical arena, we have seen some evidence that China
has provided some assistance or Chinese firms have provided
some assistance, both in terms of the infrastructure for
building chemical plants and some precursors for developing
agents. I would point out here that the Chinese chemical
industry is very rapidly growing at this time, and not all
facets of it may be under the fullest scrutiny of the Chinese
government.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ ``Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near
East and South Asia Bruce Reidel,'' Hearings before the House
International Relations Committee, U.S. Policy on Iran, November 9,
1995.
Chinese assistance for either the Iranian basic or advanced CW
program is apparently continuing, inasmuch as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Robert Einhorn recently testified that the
Administration is reviewing the possible imposition of CW sanctions
against Chinese entities. It is not clear to an outsider how extensive
Chinese assistance may have been, nor is it clear to what extent the
transfers to Iran have been deliberate Chinese policy or have been the
result of unscrupulous exporters and a poorly differentiated Chinese
export control system.
Tentative conclusion. Obviously, the Administration has not been
successful in halting Iran's basic CW program. It is possible that with
more active enforcement of the U.S. chemical weapons sanctions
legislation the Clinton Administration might have achieved more, but
the details needed to make this assessment have not been made public.
It is also important to note that, as yet, Iran has not graduated to
the more modern and more potent CW agents that Saddam Hussein
possessed. In addition, the entry into force of the Chemical Weapon
Convention later this month will reinforce the norm against the
possession of chemical armaments and will enhance multilateral export
controls, developments that will provide added support for U.S. efforts
to curb Iran's activities in this sphere. To meet the challenge posed
by Iran's existing CW capabilities, the United States and its friends
will have turn to counter-proliferation measures: defenses, deterrence,
and adjustments in military planning to account for this threat.
6. Advanced chemical weapons (such as, Soman, Tabun, Sarin, and
VX). In the case of Iraq, VX nerve gas, mated with Al-Hussein missiles
formed the second component of Saddam Hussein's strategic arsenal.
Fortunately, Iran has yet to produce these agents, but it is
undoubtedly attempting to do so. As noted in item 5, above, China may
be assisting this effort.
It is important to stress that Saddam Hussein made the transition
from basic CW agents to more advanced ones in the course of four to
five years, with few restraints on his access to outside assistance.
Iran, ten years after acquiring basic CW agents, still has not achieved
a more advanced capability, suggesting that U.S.-led international
efforts to curtail its access to needed technologies may be
succeeding.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Defense, 1996), p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tentative conclusion. Given the greater difficulty in producing
these agents and the fact that Iran apparently does not yet possess
them, assertive U.S. diplomatic efforts--including the imposition of
sanctions against supplier states--could make the critical difference
in arresting this dangerous aspect of Iran's WMD program.
7. Scud missiles (purchases--including Scud-Cs with a range of 500
km). Iran possesses two versions of the nuclear-capable, North Korea-
supplied, Scud ballistic missile--the Mod. B (300-km range) and the
Mod. C (500-km range).\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ It also has in its inventory the Chinese-supplied CSS-8 missile
with an estimated range of 150 kms. ``Statement by Joseph S. Bermudez
Jr.,'' before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights,
September 14, 1993; William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The
International Missile Bazaar (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p.
65; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response, op. cit., p. 16; Also see ``Iran Said Seeking Scud Know-How
in Germany,'' Reuters, December 15, 1994; Barbara Starr, ``Iran Gets
`Scud' TELs From North Korea,'' Jane's Defense Weekly, May 13, 1995, p.
5.
Iran has in its possession a contingent of strike aircraft which
could be modified to carry nuclear weapons, including U.S.-origin F-4s,
F-5s and F-14s, as well as Soviet-origin MiG-29s and SU-24s. See Office
of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December
1993), pp. 237-242; International Institute of Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 6, 1992, the United States imposed sanctions under missile
non-proliferation provisions of the Arms Export Control and Export
Administration Acts against the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces Logistics and against two North Korean entities for engaging in
``missile proliferation activities.''\19\ According to U.S. officials,
the activities involved were the transfer by North Korea to Iran of
Scud missiles and production technology for such missiles, which
resulted in the imposition of ``Category I'' sanctions, the harsher
sanctions under the above-noted laws.\20\ On May 24, 1996, Washington
imposed less severe Category II sanctions against the Iranian Ministry
of Defense Armed Forces Logistics, the Iranian State Purchasing Office,
and the Korea Mining Development Trading Bureau for engaging in missile
technology proliferation activities.\21\ The precise nature of the
activities leading to the sanctions remains classified, but U.S.
officials have indicated that they involved the provision by North
Korea of missile components, equipment, and materials rather than
complete missiles, production technology, or major subsystems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ``Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against North
Korean and Iranian Entities,'' Federal Register, April 7, 1992, p.
11767. The North Korean entities were Lyongakasan Machineries and
Equipment Export Corporation (North Korea) and the Changgwang Credit
Corporation (North Korea). The sanctions expired twenty-four months
later.
\20\ Interview, March 6, 1997, Washington, D.C.
\21\ Federal Register, June 12, 1996, p. 29785; ``Daily on U.S.
Government Notice of Sanctions Against DPRK,'' Chosen Ilbo, June 30,
1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-127, July 3, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the period between the two episodes, the United States and North
Korea engaged in an extended dialogue, as they negotiated and
implemented the October 1994 Agreed Framework, aimed at curtailing
North Korea's nuclear weapon program. As one element of this dialogue,
the United States has made clear that it considers North Korea's
missile exports and development of longer range missiles to be issues
of great concern. Washington and Pyongyang have yet to hold more than
preliminary discussions on this matter, however. Nonetheless, it would
appear that between 1992 and 1996, North Korean exports of complete
Scud missiles ended and, judging from the fact that the United States
imposed only ``Category II'' sanctions in 1996, it would seem that
North Korean missile related exports to Iran slackened.
Even as it tries to slow further expansion of Iran's arsenal of
Scud's, the United States must come to terms with the threat currently
posed by Iran's existing Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. In this respect,
U.S. theater missile defense programs will play a critically important
role and need to be sustained.
Tentative conclusion. For reasons that remain unclear, but which
may include the impact of U.S. diplomacy, North Korea is apparently no
longer exporting Scud's to Iran.
8. Longer range missiles (purchases--North Korean 1,000 km No-
Dong). Another component of the Iranian missile program is its effort
to acquire the 1,000-km range Nodong missile from North Korea, a
capability that would enable Iran to target Israel for the first time.
The status of the Nodong is not certain at this time. There have
been some indications that Pyongyang's efforts to develop the system
have stalled; according to the published literature, for example, it
has been flight tested only once. A recent report in the Japanese press
however, states that North Korea has now deployed the system. There
have been no reports that North Korea has exported the Nodong, however.
Despite U.S. expressions of concern about the system to North
Korea, U.S. officials assume that technical or financial factors,
rather than U.S. diplomacy, have delayed the production and/or transfer
of the system. The Administration is hoping to halt production and
transfer of the Nodong as part of its on-going talks with North Korea
on missile exports.
Tentative conclusion. A window of opportunity remains for halting
this transfer. With the United States enlarging its diplomatic
engagement with North Korea, it may be possible to reach an
understanding with Pyongyang to kill this project.
9. Scud and other short-range missiles (indigenous production).
Iran is thought to be developing the capability to manufacture the
Scud-C indigenously. Presumably, elements of this capability were
originally provided by North Korea, and Pyongyang may be supporting
this effort through continued exports of missile-related equipment and
technology.
However, U.S. officials have indicated that China and Russia may
also be contributing to this Iranian effort.
Chinese assistance. In June 1995, U.S. intelligence reports were
quoted in the press as stating that evidence ``strongly implicates''
China in the transfer to Iran of equipment, materials and scientific
know-how that could be used in the manufacture of advanced ballistic
missiles--possibly a missile similar to the Chinese M-9 or M-11.\22\ In
July 1995, China was reported to have transferred ``dozens, perhaps
hundreds, of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools''
to Iran, as well as rocket propellant ingredients that could be used on
its current stockpile of Scud Mod. Bs and Cs, as well as on Scud
variants that Iran may produce domestically in the future.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ R. Jeffrey Smith, ``Iran's Missile Technology Linked to China,
Report Says,'' Washington Post, June 17, 1995; Barbara Opall, ``U.S.
Queries China on Iran,'' Defense News, June 19-25, 1995, p. 1; ``China
Denies Violating Missile Treaty,'' United Press International, June 20,
1995; Jim Mann, ``U.S. Says China May Have Aided Iran Missile
Program,'' Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1995; ``Testimony of Michael
Eisenstadt,'' before the Committee on International Relations, U.S.
House of Representatives, September 12, 1996.
\23\ Elaine Sciolino, ``CIA Report Says Chinese Sent Iran Arms
Components,'' New York Times, June 21, 1995; ``Chinese Shipments
Violate Controls,'' Jane's Defense Weekly, July 1, 1995, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All such transfers would violate pledges that China made to the
United States in February 1992 and reaffirmed in October 1994, in which
China agreed to abide by missile technology transfer restrictions of
the MTCR. These transfers could also violate U.S. missile non-
proliferation laws.\24\ I am told that the analysis of these cases has
been completed, but that the Administration is refusing to take action,
apparently because of concern that the reimposition of sanctions
against China would adversely affect overall bilateral relations at a
time when the Administration is attempting to conduct a ``high-level''
dialogue with Beijing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ China pledged to the United States in February 1992 that it
would abide by the standards and parameters of the MTCR and reiterated
this pledge in October 1994, when it also declared that it would not
transfer surface-to-surface missiles inherently capable of carrying a
500 kg payload to a distance of 300 km or more. U.S. officials fear
that Beijing interprets these undertakings as permitting transfers of
missile-production technology and missile components, however.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian assistance. I have been told that there are a number of
transactions involving support for the Iranian Scud production
capability that have been traced to Russia but that the Russian
government has not been responsive to U.S. efforts to obtain a serious
investigation of U.S. concerns.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Interview with U.S. official April 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It appears that the Clinton Administration believes it lacks
sufficiently clear evidence to invoke U.S. sanctions laws against
Russia or against the Russian entities that may be involved. The matter
is made more complicated by the fact that Russia is a member of the
MTCR, a status which exempts properly authorized missile-related export
activities from U.S. missile-export sanctions laws. The United States
can, however, impose sanctions under these laws against Russian
entities which make exports not authorized by the Russian government or
which fraudulently obtain such authorizations. To encourage Russia to
resolve the cases that the United States has brought to its attention,
the Clinton Administration should remind Russia of this provision of
U.S. sanctions law.
On the other hand, if Russia is authorizing missile-related exports
to Iran, the United States has other mechanisms for penalizing its
behavior. These include the selective denial, as a matter of executive
policy, of export licenses benefiting the Russian aerospace sector
(such as licenses of U.S. communications satellites for launch on
Russian launch vehicles) or the refusal to extend current agreements
granting Russia access to the international commercial space launch
market. The Clinton Administration originally permitted Russia access
to this market on condition that it adhere to the MTCR; Russia's
apparent deviations from MTCR rules should provide grounds for
revisiting this question.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Even though the Russian firms that may be exporting missile
technology to Iran may not be those that are the beneficiaries of
access to the commercial satellite launch market, the latter
organizations are powerful players within Russia and would have much to
lose if their access to that market were foreclosed. As occurred in
1993, these organizations could be expected to exert pressure within
the Russian bureaucracy and the Russian space/missile industry to halt
improper sales that could jeopardize their lucrative commercial launch
business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tentative conclusion. Iran's ability to manufacture Scud type
missiles is apparently dependent in important respects on outside
assistance that appears to be continuing at this time. Intensified U.S.
diplomatic efforts, backed up by the threat of new sanctions against
the Chinese and Russian aerospace sectors, are needed to help contain
this danger. The development of theater missile defenses must also be
an important element of the U.S. strategy for meeting this challenge,
if non-proliferation efforts fail.
10. Longer range 1,000 to 1,400 km missiles (indigenous production,
with outside assistance). Israel has expressed increasing concern about
Iranian efforts to develop this system. Again, Russia is alleged to be
assisting this program.
A number of recent press reports suggest that Russia is assisting
in this endeavor, possibly providing technology from its retired SS-4
strategic nuclear missile.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Robin Wright, ``Russia Warned on Helping Iran Missile
Program,'' Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The application of U.S. sanctions laws and policy is comparable to
that outlined in item 9, above: Russia, though largely exempt from such
laws, appears to be violating the rules of the MTCR, creating a basis
for discretionary sanctions by the United States in the form of
suspension of export licenses, especially those directed at the Russian
aerospace sector and commercial space launch industry.
Tentative conclusion. Iran's ability to manufacture this longer
range system appears to be dependent in important respects on outside
assistance, and Iran appears to be receiving such assistance at this
time from Russia. Intensified U.S. diplomatic efforts, backed up by the
threat of new sanctions, are needed to help contain this danger. Given
the new dangers that Iranian longer-range missiles would bring to the
Middle East, halting this program must remain a top priority of the
Clinton Administration.
11. Cruise missiles (acquisition of the C-802 and the development
of land-attack derivatives). China is the supplier of Iran's inventory
of land-based and shipborne anti-ship cruise missiles and is believed
to be assisting Iran in the development of anti-ship missiles based on
Chinese prototypes.
Because the range/payload capabilities of the C-802 are below the
thresholds of the MTCR these transactions do not appear to violate U.S.
missile-export sanctions laws. Nor do the exports appear to violate the
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Robert Einhorn testified last week that the number of missiles
transferred does not appear to be sufficient to trigger the sanctions
provisions of that legislation.
It is apparent that Iran's WMD and missile capabilities are
growing, in some areas dramatically, and along with them, the dangers
that Iran is posing to U.S. forces and friends in the Middle East.
Using a wide variety of non-proliferation tools, the Clinton
Administration has had a measure of success in containing Iran's bid to
acquire nuclear weapons. Its job has been made somewhat more manageable
because nuclear arms are very difficult to manufacture, requiring
considerable time, expense, and difficult-to-conceal facilities.
Moreover, the tools in the nuclear non-proliferation tool kit--
treaties, export controls, inspections, and international norms--are
more potent than those applicable to other weapons of mass destruction
or to missiles. The single most important measure needed to continue to
constrain the Iranian nuclear weapons program is sustained
implementation of the U.S. Nunn-Lugar program in Russia and other NIS
states.
U.S. efforts to curb the Iranian BW threat--an extremely demanding
task--have not succeeded. However, Iran has yet to achieve a mature,
missile-based BW capability, and it may yet be possible to block these
advances. U.S. counter-proliferation efforts will also play an
important role in containing the Iranian BW challenge.
Similarly, although Iran now possesses a substantial arsenal of
basic chemical weapons, it still has far to go before acquiring a
modern, fully developed chemical arsenal, and preventive, non-
proliferation diplomacy can still be effective in slowing or blocking
Iranian progress in this sphere. Stricter enforcement of U.S. sanctions
laws is needed to achieve this result, and the Chemical Weapon
Convention will also help to limit Iranian advances. Continued
development of counter-proliferation measures to address the existing
Iranian CW threat will also be needed.
Iran's existing Scud-B and Scud-C missiles already pose a serious
threat to U.S. forces and friends in the Persian Gulf. Iran is
apparently not purchasing additional missiles, however. To deal with
the existing threat, the Clinton Administration must continue its
efforts to develop robust theater missile defenses. The Administration
must push China and Russia more aggressively to halt their support for
Iran's efforts to produce missiles indigenously, especially longer-
range systems. Stricter enforcement of existing sanctions laws against
China and the threat of discretionary sanctions against the Russian
aerospace sector are essential if these efforts are to succeed.
Finally, the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. which imposes sanctions
on foreign entities that invest $40 million or more in Iran's energy
sector, seeks to limit the funds available to Iran's WMD programs by
limiting Iran's future energy sector revenues. Recent reports suggest
that the sanctions law is curtailing foreign investment in this sector.
Given the great costs of WMD and missile programs, it is possible that
this legislation will make an important contribution to slowing Iran's
bid for unconventional arms and advanced delivery systems.
Chronology of Alleged Transfers of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and
Missile Technology, Equipment and Material Involving Iran
Nuclear Episodes
January 8, 1995: Russia and Iran sign an agreement on the
completion of the two partially constructed nuclear reactors at
Bushehr. In December 1995, Congress approved legislation that
would prevent the United States from providing any economic
assistance to Russia unless Russia halted the reactor deal or
the President certifies every six months that the aid was
``important to the national security interests of the United
States.'' The President issued that certification on May 9,
1996 and November 9, 1996.
Missile Episodes
March 6, 1992: The United States imposes sanctions on the
North Korean entities, Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment
Export Corporation and Changgwang Credit Corporation, and
Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics for
missile proliferation activities. The sanctions include a two-
year ban on all government contracts with, export licenses to,
and imports from, the entities listed above as well as all
North Korean firms in the missile, electronics, space systems
and military aircraft industries. These sanctions were imposed
for the transfer of items in Category I of the MTCR Annex which
substantially contributed to Iran's missile program. The
sanctions expired March 6, 1994.
March 1992: China pledges in writing to abide by the MTCR.
September 1993: Russia signs an agreement pledging to abide
by the MTCR.
October 1994: China promises not to export any surface-to-
surface missiles ``inherently capable'' of delivering a 500
kilogram payload to at least 300 kilometers and to abide by the
guidelines and parameters of the MTCR.
May 13, 1995: Jane's Defense Weekly cites a CIA report that
North Korea recently shipped 4 Scud Transport-Erector-Launchers
(TELS) to Iran.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Barbara Starr, ``Iran Gets `Scud' TELs From North Korea,''
Jane's Defense Weekly, May 13. 1995, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 1995: Reports emerge that the CIA had concluded that
China had delivered guidance systems, rocket fuel ingredients,
production technology, and computerized machine tools to Iran
to assist that country in improving imported ballistic missiles
and producing its own missiles.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Barbara Opall, ``US Queries China on Iran,'' Defense News, June
14-25, 1995, p. 1; Elaine Sciolino, ``CIA Report Says Chinese Sent Iran
Arms Components,'' New York Times, June 21, 1995, p. A1. ``Chinese
Shipments Violate Controls,'' Jane's Defense Weekly, July 1, 1995, p.
3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 1995: Russia joins the MTCR.
January 1996: Iran is reported to have tested a C-802 anti-
shipping cruise missile provided by China. The United States
examines the sale of the C-802s for sanction ability under the
Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act and determines that the
transaction did not cross the threshold of ``destabilizing
types and numbers.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Barbara Starr, ``Iran Adds New Threat With Cruise Missile
Test,'' Jane's Defense Weekly, February 7, 1996, p. 14; Bill Gertz,
``China Sold Iran Missile Technology,'' Washington Times, November 21,
1996, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 24, 1996: The United States imposes sanctions on the
North Korean firm Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (aka the Korea
Mining Development Trading Bureau) and Iran's Ministry of
Defense Armed Forces Logistics and the State Purchasing Office.
The sanctions include a two-year ban on all missile-related
government contracts with, and export licenses for, the listed
entities as well as North Korea's entire missile, electronic,
space, and military aircraft industry. These sanctions were
imposed for the transfer of items in Category 11 of the MTCR
Annex. These sanctions are still in effect.
July 1996: Iran's Defense Industries Organization reportedly
transfers equipment to Syria for the production of solid-fuel
rocket motors.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Bill Gertz, ``China Sold Iran Missile Technology,'' Washington
Times, November 21, 1996, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 1996: China Precision Engineering Institute
reportedly agrees to sell gyroscopes, accelerometers and test
equipment that could be used to build and test missile guidance
systems to Iran's Defense Industries Organization.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1996: An Israeli article states that Iran is
developing a missile based on the 2,000 km range SS-4 with the
help of Russian scientists.\6\ Israeli intelligence revealed,
and the United States verified, that detailed plans on how to
build the SS-4 as well as some of its parts, reportedly
guidance components, were acquired by Iran.\7\ The United
States protested the transfers during a meeting between Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin and Vice President Gore in February and
during the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in March.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Iran Said to Be Developing Long-Range Missile,'' Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, December 5, 1996.
\7\ Robin Wright, ``Russia Warned on Helping Iran Missile Program,''
Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1997, p. A1; Bill Gertz, ``Gore Raises
Sale to Iran With Chernomyrdin,'' Washington Times, February 13, 1997,
p. A10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 1997: An Israeli press report states that Iran had
transferred 50 Scud-C missiles and 50 aircraft to Syria. The
aircraft were transferred in December 1996, but the date of the
missile transfer is not given.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``Israel: Intelligence Sources Report Growing Iran-Syria
Cooperation,'' Yedi'ot Aharonot, March 27, 1997, p. 19 in FBIS-TAC-97-
086, March 28, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 1997: According to an unnamed White House official,
Russians are assisting Iran in upgrading the guidance systems
and engines of the Scud missiles in its inventory.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Philip Finnegan and Steve Rodman, ``Israel Tries to Curb Russian
Aid to Iran,'' Defense News, April 14-20, 1997, p.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 1997: Israeli sources report that Iran recently
ground-tested the engine for a 1,000 kilometer-range missile
being developing with Russian assistance and is also developing
a missile with a range of about 1,500 kilometers with Russian
help.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``Israel Says Iran, Russia Ground Test Missile,'' Reuters,
April 13, 1997; ``Israel-Iran,'' Reuters, April 13, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CW Episodes
July 1993: The United States protests to China about the
shipment of CW precursors for mustard gas to Iran aboard the
vessel, Yin He. In late August, the ship was inspected jointly
by Saudis, Americans, and Chinese and no CW precursors were
found.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Arms Control Reporter 1994, p. 704.E-2.104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 16, 1994: The United States imposes sanctions an
Israeli for using British and Polish front companies to ship CW
precursors, strongly suspected to be from China, to Iran.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Gary Milhollin and Meg Dennison, ``China's Cynical
Calculation,'' New York Times, April 24, 1995, p. A17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 19, 1994: The United States imposes sanctions on
Manfred Felber (Austrian), Luciano Moscatelli (Australian) and
Gerhard Merz (German) for shipping Chinese CW ingredients to
Iran.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ibid.; State Department official.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 18, 1995: The United States bars three Hong Kong
companies from selling goods in the US for at least one year
for shipping CW ingredients from China to Iran. The companies
are Asian Ways Ltd., WorldCo Ltd., and Mainway
International.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Ibid.; State Department official.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 1995: An article states that the United States has
been monitoring shipments of CW precursors to Iran over the
past three years.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 1995: Referring to Iran's chemical weapons program,
Bruce Reidel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near
East and South Asia, testifies, ``In the chemical arena, we
have seen some evidence that China has provided some assistance
or Chinese firms have provided some assistance, both in terms
of the infrastructure for building chemical plants and some
precursors for developing agents. I would point out here that
the Chinese chemical industry is very rapidly growing at this
time and not all facets of it may be under the fullest scrutiny
of the Chinese government.''\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ ``Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near
East and South Asia Bruce Reidel,'' Hearings before the House
International Relations Committee, US. Policy on Iran, November 9,
1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 1996: An unconfirmed report in a Hong Kong paper
states that the Customs Department is investigating a Chinese
state-owned arms manufacturer for smuggling arms, including
chemical weapons, to the Middle East.\17\ Another report
indicates that the Hong Kong firm, Rex International
Development Co., Ltd., is 52% owned by state-owned arms
manufacturer China North Industries Group (Norinco).\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``Hong Kong: SAR `Definitely Not' Arms Smuggling Transit
Center,'' Hongkong Standard, January 21, 1997, p. 4 in FBIS-CHI-97-013,
January 22, 1997.
\18\ ``Customs Probe China-Linked Arms Sales to Middle East:
Report,'' Agence France Presse, January 20, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 1996: An article reports that the United States had
been tracking shipments of chemical weapons-related equipment
from China to Iran for more than a year. The trade is described
as ``recent and ongoing.'' The issue will be raised by National
Security Advisor Anthony Lake with his Chinese counterpart, Liu
Huaqiu. In February, China passed legislation to tighten
chemical exports.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ R. Jeffrey Smith, ``Chinese Firms Supply Iran With Gas
Factories, U.S. Says,'' Washington Post, March 8, 1996, p. A26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summer of 1996: Iran reportedly takes delivery from China of
400 metric tons of chemicals, including carbon sulfide, a
precursor for some nerve agents.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Bill Gertz, ``China Sold Iran Missile Technology,'' Washington
Times, November 21, 1996, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 1996: An article reports that an Indian firm agreed in
early 1996 to build a plant in Iran capable of producing
phosphorous pentasulfide, a precursor to tabun and other nerve
agents.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Con Coughlin, ``Iran Secures Aid To Make Poison Gas In Deal
With India,'' Washington Times, June 23, 1996, p. A7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 1997: Secretary of State Madeline Albright tells a
Senate committee that the US has not determined whether or not
to impose sanctions on the Chinese entities shipping CW-related
equipment, technology and material to Iran.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Bill Gertz, ``Albright Concedes `Concern' Over China-Iran
Transfers,'' Washington Times, January 24, 1997, p. A6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 1997: According to Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation, the United States is
actively investigating sales of precursors, production
equipment, and production technology by Chinese entities to
Iran's chemical weapons program.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, International Security,
Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee, Proliferation: Chinese
Case Studies, April 10, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BW Episodes
November 1995: According to Secretary of State Madeline
Albright, the United States received reports in November 1995
that Chinese firms had supplied Iran with dual-use equipment
that could be used in a biological weapons program.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Bill Gertz, ``Albright Concedes `Concern' Over China-Iran
Transfers,'' Washington Times, January 24, 1997, p. A6; Carol Giacomo,
``Albright Sees China Concerns, Russia initiative,'' Reuters, January
20, 1997.
Alleged Transfers of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Equipment and Technology, and the U.S. Response
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Episode Supplier Date Relevant laws U.S. response Status
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear
Nuclear Reactors................... Russia................ Jan 1995.............. `96 For Ops App...... Waiver/Protest....... Delayed
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missile
Missiles & Production.............. DPRK.................. Mar 1992.............. AECA/EAA............. Sanctions imposed.... Talks Pending
Missile TELs....................... DPRK.................. May 1995*............. AECA/EAA............. ?.................... ?
Missile Components & Production China................. June 1995*............ AECA/EAA............. ?.................... ?
Technology.
Cruise Missiles.................... China................. Jan 1996*............. IINA................. Protest.............. No Sanctions
Missile Components................. DPRK.................. May 1996.............. AECA/EAA............. Sanctions imposed.... Talks Pending
Missile Production Equipment....... Iran (to Syria)....... July 1996............. AECA/EAA............. ?.................... ?
Missile Components................. China................. Aug 1996.............. AECA/EAA & IINA...... ?.................... ?
Missile Components & Technology.... Russia................ Dec 1996*............. AECA/EAA & IINA??.... Protest.............. Promise to stop?
Missiles........................... Iran (to Syria)....... Mar 1997*............. AECA/EAA............. ?.................... ?
Missile Technology................. Russia (Scud)......... April 1997*........... AECA/EAA & IINA??.... ?.................... ?
Missile Technology (1,000+ km Russia................ April 1997*........... AECA/EAA & IINA??.... ?.................... ?
range).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemical Weapons
CW Precursors...................... China................. July-Aug 1993......... AECA/EAA............. Inspection of Yin He. No precursors found
CW Precursors...................... China................. July 1994............. AECA/EAA............. Sanctions on front ?
company.
CW Precursors...................... China................. Nov 1994.............. AECA/EAA............. Sanctions on front ?
company.
CW Precursors...................... China................. Mar 1995.............. AECA/EAA............. Sanctions on front ?
company.
CW Precursors & Infrastructure..... China................. Nov 1995*............. AECA/EAA............. ?.................... ?
CW Equipment....................... China................. Mar 1996*............. AECA/EAA & IINA...... ?.................... ?
CW Precursors...................... China................. Summer 1996........... AECA/EAA & IINA...... ?.................... ?
CW Plant........................... India................. June 1996*............ AECA/EAA & IINA...... ?.................... ?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biological Weapons
BW Equipment....................... China................. Nov 1995.............. AECA/EAA & IINA...... ?.................... ?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*=Date Reported
1996 For Ops App: The FY96 Foreign Operations Appropriations contains a measure to cut-off aid to Russia for its support of Iran's nuclear program.
AECA/EAA: Arms Export Control Act/Export Administration Act sanctions for missile and CBW proliferation.
IINA: Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act sanctions for shipments of advanced conventional weapons to Iran and, after February 10, 1996, for assistance to
Iran's NBC programs. ??=Unclear whether IINA applies to Iran's ballistic missile acquisitions efforts.
Italicized entries indicate sanctions imposed by the United States.
Prepared by Gregory Koblentz for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
__________
Export Controls in the People's Republic of China (PRC): Findings and
Considerations\1\
[Prepared by Richard T. Cupitt, Associate Director for Research, Center
for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, Athens,
Georgia.]
The PRC: Proliferator or Partner?
With its ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention on April
7, the People's Republic of China (PRC) took another step toward
integrating itself into the nonproliferation community. For decades the
PRC denounced international efforts to stem proliferation. More
recently, the PRC has begun to seek a new voice in shaping the norms,
rules and procedures of various nonproliferation regimes. Consequently,
the PRC is now a party to all the major nonproliferation treaties and
conventions, and it supports some additional measures favored by the
United States, such as a comprehensive test ban.\2\
Integration into the nonproliferation community carries many
obligations with it--some explicit, some implied. Among the most
important responsibilities facing each country is insuring that its
exports do not foster nuclear, chemical, biological weapons programs in
other countries. Allegations that military goods and dual-use nuclear,
chemical, and missile items have gone from the PRC to countries of
proliferation concern, particularly Iran and Pakistan, raise doubts
about the commitment of Beijing to nonproliferation norms and the PRC's
capacity to control the export of sensitive items from its
territory.\3\ In addressing these concerns, some questions to consider,
among others, are:
How does the PRC control trade in military and dual-use
(goods, services, and technologies with both military and
commercial applications) items?
What factors inhibit effective development or implementation
of PRC export controls?
Current PRC Export Controls
Chinese officials assert that the PRC maintains strict control over
the export of military and sensitive dual-use items. Certainly, before
the central government began experimenting with market-oriented
economic reforms in 1979, the PRC had direct control over the
production and distribution of all sensitive goods. The transformation
of the economy, however, gave new responsibilities and authority to
individual enterprises and local officials. This undermined the old
communist command economy-style system of export controls. In response
to this situation, and to international pressure, the PRC began to
adopt new regulations on the transfer (import or export) of sensitive
technology as early as 1985.
From a nonproliferation perspective, the export control systems of
most members of the four key supplier groups--the Australia Group, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), and the Wassenaar Arrangement--share similar standards of
effective protection, including comparable legal frameworks, licensing
practices, interagency processes, control lists, verification
practices, customs authority, penalties, and more. PRC export controls
remain far from being ``complementary in practice'' to multilateral
standards and to the systems of some of their neighbors. Based on an
assessment methodology developed at the University of Georgia, PRC
export controls include about 38% of the common policies, structures,
and practices of supplier group members. This number increases to about
50% when those policies, structures, and practices are weighted for
importance (see Table 1).
Despite these discrepancies, the PRC is developing a more
comparable export control system, even if the pace is deliberate. Some
positive cues include:
An improving legal framework. The Foreign Trade Law of 1994
already specifies that the government can restrict trade for
national security reasons or to fulfill its international
obligations. It requires enterprises to get government licenses
to trade in restricted items, such as heavy water, dual-use
chemicals, materials associated with the production of toxins.
Allegedly, the Science and Technology Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC)
currently approves about 100 such export licenses a year,
conforming to this legislation. Reportedly, the State Council
and various departments are preparing specific legislation on
nonproliferation export controls for the next National People's
Congress.
The development of ``catalogues'' or lists of controlled
chemical, nuclear and other items of proliferation concern.
China, for example, already appears to have a list of
controlled chemicals roughly in line with the Verification
Annex of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The existence of bureaucratic structures to review and
approve licenses of military and dual-use items. For military
items, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Headquarters
of the General Staff of the PLA, the Commission of Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), MOFTEC
and others have a voice on the coordinating body (the State
Administrative Committee on Military Products Trade), with
guidance from the Central Military Commission and the State
Council. For dual-use items, MOFTEC coordinates with other
appropriate bodies, such as the Ministry of the Chemical
Industry and the General Administration of Customs, to review
and approve licenses, under the authority of the State Council.
Reportedly, the State Council is forming a new body
specifically for arms control issues that will likely have an
impact on nonproliferation export control policy.
The punishment of violators. Allegedly MOFTEC has used
administrative sanctions to punish enterprises and individuals
that have violated export control procedures. Punishments
ranged from warnings, cessation of trading rights, confiscation
of items, and firings, although these are difficult to verify.
Increasing attention to export control issues. Although very
resistant to threats, Chinese officials have made some
concessions to the United States on the transfer of nuclear and
missile items. The PRC also began attending the annual Asian
Export Control Seminar sponsored by Australia, Japan, and the
United States in 1996. This year, the PRC raised the level of
its delegation to the 4th Asian Export Control Seminar, which
is one of the few settings in which both representatives from
Beijing and Taipei sit at the same table and discuss security
issues. Contacts with the Chinese Academy of Engineering
Physics and other key organizations in the Chinese nuclear
community about export controls have also increased.
Obstacles to Effective PRC Export Controls
Many concerns mitigate many of these positive developments. Often,
these hurdles reflect fundamental differences between policy-making in
democratic, market-oriented societies and the Chinese policy process.
Some of these problems include:
An overwhelming lack of transparency. Within government,
only a tiny fraction of officials appears to have even
rudimentary knowledge of either Chinese or multilateral export
controls. Almost complete lack of knowledge about export
controls exists, for example, in the small community of experts
in nuclear nonproliferation issues, many of whom are involved
in the transfer of nuclear goods and technologies. Export
regulations are not freely available, often limited to a small
circle of officials or the staff of a few trading companies, or
not published at all. Government officials also provide little
information on export controls to representatives of other
governments or multilateral corporations.
Suspicions about the purpose of export controls. Many
Chinese believe that the United States, Japan, and other
nations use export controls and the supplier groups to subvert
Chinese national sovereignty and thwart its legitimate military
and commercial interests. The many practitioners of Realpolitik
in the PRC point to sanctions against China, leaks of
inaccurate intelligence information on violations, demands for
pre-license checks and post-shipment verification, arms
shipments to Taiwan, discrimination between the ``haves'' and
``have-nots'' in nonproliferation regimes and other behaviors
as evidence that export controls are meant to keep China weak.
Supporting a strict view of sovereignty also makes Chinese
officials reluctant to verify the assurances of end-users of
its own technology exports.
Other problems stem from the transformation of the Chinese economy:
Increasing numbers of entities with authority to conduct
foreign trade. According to Chinese officials, only a few
foreign trading corporations (FTCS) have rights to trade in
sensitive items (i.e., four-five in chemicals, two in nuclear,
and one-two in missile items), which helps China maintain
control on sensitive exports. These numbers apparently include
not only large enterprises such as Great Wall, but also
research institutes that first gained FTC status in 1993. This
seems to underestimate the current number of entities involved
in the transfer of dual-use items. Moreover, the number of
entities gaining FTC status seems likely to grow at a rapid
pace. As central control over many industries and enterprises
wanes, the increase in private sector activity will no doubt
put immense strains on the modest capabilities of the current
export control system.
The increasing commercialization of many defense enterprises
and research institutes has had some pernicious effects. To
increase working capital, some enterprises look to increase
exports of military or sensitive dual-use items. Although the
ratio of civilian to military production in defense enterprises
has shifted dramatically in favor of civilian production (now
about 80% civilian), this increased problems in verifying the
end-use of sensitive items as military and civilian production
lines can share many facilities, equipment and personnel. In
addition, many Chinese assume that at least some defense
officials transferred control over newly-created subsidiaries
to family members, who then operate outside emerging legal and
regulatory constraints with little fear of reproach.
Eliciting PRC Compliance in Nonproliferation Export Controls
Integration of the PRC into the nonproliferation community through
constructive engagement, as Ambassador James R. Lilley noted at a
recent hearing, faces some severe limits. When the United States has
sought to impose its views unilaterally or through threats of unlikely
economic sanctions, we have failed to gain their cooperation. Even
where well-focused sanctions proved effective (as in response to the
initial M-11 transfers), the impact was transitory.
Given the differences in the political and economic systems in the
PRC and the United States, close coordination on nonproliferation
export controls is unlikely. Cooperation, however, remains a
possibility. In the past, more permanent cooperation has emerged where
the United States and the PRC share common security concerns, as in
Afghanistan and North Korea. As for cooperation on nonproliferation
issues with Iran and Pakistan, the United States might pursue some
supplemental tactics in its current strategy to increase this sense of
mutual interest.
Foster those elements of the Chinese government that see
export controls as a means of reaffirming some central control
over an increasingly decentralized economy. Despite the risk of
slowing the process of economic reform, proliferation is a
higher priority on the U.S. national security agenda in the
short and long term. In addition, the exercise of at least
minimal control over exports is a prerequisite for even the
most liberal of governments.
Seek a more compelling rationale for China to control its
sensitive exports. Many Chinese officials see the proliferation
consequences of the transfer of arms and dual-use items outside
East Asia as removed from its core military security interests.
What is more important, proliferation concerns raised by these
transfers are quite remote from its primary interest in
strengthening the Chinese economy. If the United States could
make a more compelling case that proliferation in the Middle
East or South Asia, as well as in East Asia, would weaken the
demand for Chinese exports and reduce foreign investment in
China, then PRC officials might address the problem more
aggressively.
Developing more U.S.-PRC cooperation will be more difficult than
working with Russia in the post-Cold War era. Russia, in whatever
rudimentary form, has become a democratic, market-oriented nation.
Building a cooperative relationship with the PRC, however, should be
less contentious than the U.S.-Soviet relationship. An exact Chinese
equivalent to the successful Nunn-Lugar (Cooperative Threat Reduction)
program for Russia is inappropriate, for example. Unlike Russia, the
PRC has a booming economy coupled with an underdeveloped technology
sector, military or civilian. Chinese officials are unlikely to adopt
export control standards common to members of the suppliers groups
because it identifies with a U.S. led security community (which it does
not), nor because the United States or its friends and allies offer
economic side-payments. The PRC might do so, however, if it sees that
proliferation directly threatens its military security or its overall
economic prosperity.
Fully integrating the PRC into the nonproliferation community,
other than by transforming the PRC into a democratic, market-oriented
country, requires the creation of a culture of nonproliferation in the
PRC. Nurturing this culture will take considerable time, effort, and
persistence by the United States and its allies, and success is not
assured. At the same time, failing to draw the PRC into the
nonproliferation community, much less driving it into the arms of rogue
states, will sabotage nonproliferation efforts to great cost to the
United States, its allies, and its friends.
Endnotes
\1\ Much of the evidence outlined here comes from interviews
conducted by the author and a colleague in Chengdu and Beijing in
November 1996. For a more detailed view of export controls in the PRC,
see Richard T. Cupitt and Yuzo Murayama, Export Controls in the
People's Republic of China, Occassional Paper (Athens, GA: Center for
International Trade and Security, forthcoming). The Japan Foundation
Center for Global Partnership and the University of Georgia provides
support for this research.
\2\ See Wendy Freiman, ``New Members of the Club: Chinese
Participation in Arms Control Regimes, 1980-1995,'' The
Nonproliferation Review, 3, 3 (Spring-Summer 1996), pp. 15-30 for an
excellent overall view of PRC nonproliferation policies.
\3\ For an excellent, and succinct, discussion of these issues, see
Joshua Michael Boehm and Zachary S. Davis, ``The 1985 U.S.-China
Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation: Moving Towards Implementation?'' CRS
Report for Congress, 97-440 ENR, Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, The Library of Congress.
Table I: Comparison With Model Nonproliferation Export Control Systems
(Based on 1996 data)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of
Percent of elements in common
elements in common with model system
Political unit with model system (weighted score by
(raw score) importance of the
element)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRC............................. 38.2 50.1
Taiwan.......................... 66 74.9
Hong Kong....................... 86.1 91.6
Japan........................... 96.5 96.8
South Korea..................... 89.6 90.5
Russia.......................... 79.9 82.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Richard T. Cupitt, ``Nonproliferation Export Controls in East
Asia,'' The Journal of East Asian Affairs (forthcoming) and Richard T.
Cupitt and Yuzo Murayama, Export Controls in the People's Republic of
China, Occasional Paper, Athens, GA: Center for International Trade
and Security (forthcoming).
__________
Russia's Interests in Iran: Issues, Implications, and Policy Tools for
the United States
[Prepared by Igor Khripunov, Associate Director, Center for
International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, Athens,
Georgia.]
Iranian parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri's visit to Russia
in April of 1997 provides an insight into a web of increasingly
intertwined interests of these two countries. In the wake of the German
court's decision implicating Iran in terrorism, President Yeltsin's
statement that the present level of bilateral contacts with Iran
``gives reason to believe that these relations will grow stronger and
further develop'' must be taken seriously as reflecting Russia's
emerging geopolitical priorities. In addition to President Yeltsin, the
Iranian guest--who is the most likely winner of the presidential
election scheduled for May 23--was warmly received by a host of other
high government officials and the leadership of the Federal Assembly.
Potential benefits of Russia's evolving relations with Iran are readily
acknowledged both by communists and nationalists, on the one hand, and
by liberal reformers, on the other.
Close Neighbors
Signs of rapprochement between these two countries which are
neighbors geographically despite the recent disintegration of the
Soviet Union should not come as a surprise. However, the most recent
visibly revived interest in Iran can be traced to the stage of
relations between Russia and the West which is often referred to as
``the end of the honeymoon.'' In January 1996 the then Russian Foreign
Trade Minister said--echoing other similar statements--that Russia's
new ``strategic line'' approved by President Yeltsin would focus on
enhanced trade relations with China, India and Iran. Below is a list of
the geopolitical and other realities that have driven and keep driving
Russia closer to Iran:
Faced with the prospect of NATO expansion Russia has been
looking for other countries willing to share its sense of
frustration and disapproval. While speaking on Moscow's
television, Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri condemned ``the West's
intrigue against the East'' and backed Moscow's opposition to
NATO expansion. According to a statement by Yeltsin's spokesman
during the Russian-U.S. summit in Helsinki ``If NATO expansion
continues under the harshest and most negative scenario for us,
Russia will have to review its foreign policy priorities. We
are developing good relations with China and India and on some
issues with Iran.''
Iran is a valuable asset to Russia in halting the northward
march of the Taliban religious army in Afghanistan. Jointly
with Russia, Tehran is supporting Afghanistan's northern
warlords separating the Talibans from the former Soviet
republics of the Southern tier. Iran has accused Taliban rulers
of following a brand of Islam not in accord with the teachings
of Koran. Also, Iran's current and future role in settling down
the internal conflict in Tadjikstan is highly appreciated by
Russia.
Moscow views Iran as a natural ally in countervailing the
emerging Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukrainian alignment supported by
Turkey. This alignment has a pro-Western and anti-Russian
thrust. In this context Iran backs Moscow's position on the
status of the Caspian Sea, limits the impact of Turkey in
Central Asia and maintains increasingly good relations with
Armenia with which Russia has successfully negotiated an
agreement on its military presence.
Russia's most influential nonmilitary interest groups have a
stake in expanding economic and trade relations with Iran. The
oil and gas industry--which is the largest contributor to the
federal budget and has enjoyed, until very recently, the
unchallenged protection of Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin--
is about to receive a lucrative $2 billion deal in Iran.
Russia's aerospace industry is gaining ground in Iran including
building a plant for the construction of IL-114 turbo-prop
passenger planes. Samara-based Russian aircraft manufacturer
Aviakor will sell to Iran Tupolev transport aircraft TU-154M
and TU-154-100 for a total of $100 million. It is estimated
that Russian-designed or manufactured aircraft may soon account
for about 70 percent of Iran's entire fleet. These two groups
undeniably have a strong clout in the domestic politics.
Nuclear Cooperation
Nuclear cooperation with Iran presents a special challenge. The
Russian government is determined to move ahead with the construction of
a nuclear power plant at Bushehr. The overwhelming majority of Russia's
officials--especially those representing the nuclear industry--
vehemently deny that this bilateral project may enhance Iran's
potential in developing nuclear weapons. U.S. objections to the deal
are dismissed as unreasonable and aimed at depriving Russia's nuclear
industry of lucrative cash generating contacts. The relative influence
of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, a principal promoter of nuclear
cooperation with Iran, is based, among other things, on its being an
important exporter of high-tech items which still constitute a small
fraction of Russia's total. The Ministry symbolizes one of the few
remaining trappings of Russia's former status as a great power. One of
the very few critics of the Iranian deal is Aleksei Yablokov, a well
known Russian environmentalist who believes that the completion of the
nuclear station at Bushehr in combination with the training of the
personnel could give Iran access to the technology that would
facilitate the development of nuclear weapons.
In the view of other Russian observers, the threat of nuclear
proliferation in Iran should be taken quite seriously but there is no
need for Russia to rescind the contract worth $800 million or more
because eventually other potential contractors may step in. According
to this line of thinking, Russia, as an exporter of reactors, has the
right to insist on tough conditions for the verification of peaceful
uses of equipment supplied to Iran as provided for under the IAEA
safeguards or even its own stricter standards. This should primarily
involve a thorough detailing of procedures for overseeing the process
of loading and unloading the nuclear fuel. Russia should also demand
that spent fuel assemblies be sent to Russia for reprocessing and
should require continuous monitoring by Russian specialists of the
operation of the Bushehr nuclear power station, and Russian inspections
of other Iranian nuclear facilities. Russia's intelligence and security
services must focus on Iran and cooperate with their counterparts in
the West in sharing information on Iran's nuclear projects.
There have been two recent developments that potentially mitigate
the impact and future risks. The Russian government approved in 1996
two sets of export procedures, one for controlling the export of
nuclear dual-use equipment and materials (government edict No. 575 of
May 6, 1996) and the other for controlling the export and import of
nuclear materials, equipment, special nonnuclear materials and relevant
technologies (No. 574 of May 8, 1996), as a result of which Minatom has
lost its previously unchallenged role. In the past, this ministry
played the ``first fiddle'' in approving nuclear export operations
while other interagency participants played secondary roles or were
even kept in the dark. In 1992, taking advantage of its monopoly
position under previous government edicts, the Ministry of Atomic
Energy entered into negotiations with Iran on completing the Bushehr
nuclear power station. The first Russian-Iranian MOU was concluded by
minister Victor Mikhailov on his own authority. Now, it is the
interagency EXPORT CONTROL commission, rather than the Ministry of
Atomic Energy, that is responsible in the framework of the new 1996
procedures for issuing findings as to the eligibility of exporting
items with a high risk of proliferation.
Secondly, Russia and Iran finalized and signed in April 1997 a
memorandum of understanding on export controls which according to
Russian Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov would finally dispel fears
that Moscow's relations with Iran ``contradict international
standards.'' Of course, it remains to be seen how effective these
arrangements will be in practice and to what extent Russia will be
willing to enforce their provisions.
Weapons Deals
Russian arms exporters consider Iran one of their best customers
after India and China. In 1996, Russia's military contracts with Iran
reached $1 billion. According to a source in Russia's weapons exporting
agency ``Rosvooruzhenie,'' Iran has been traditionally oriented toward
Russia as weapons supplier and the Russian government intends to
maintain this course. ``Rosvooruzhenie'' has its full-time
representative in Tehran. By comparison, in 1996 Russia exported
conventional weapons worth more than $3.4 billion--continuing the
increase from $1.7 billion in 1994 to $3 billion in 1995. Last year the
Russian government announced a special program aimed at boosting
weapons export before the end of the century to $10 billion.
However, under the existing tradeoff, Russia was admitted to the
Wassanaar Arrangement (COCOM's replacement) as a founding member in
exchange for its commitment not to sign new weapons deals and to halt
weapons exports to Iran after the expiration of the ongoing agreements,
i.e., by 1999. Currently, export licenses for weapons are considered
and issued by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade in
coordination with the Ministry of Defense. However, smuggling and
unauthorized deals are rampant. One recent example is illegal
deliveries to Armenia in 1996 of over $1 billion worth of heavy weapons
including tanks and, reportedly, SCUD missiles and launchers. Russia's
General Prosecutor's Office is investigating this case.
It has also been reported that small quantities of ready-made
missiles (S-4 Sandal or SS-23) along with the technology, components,
material and expertise to expedite Iranian indigenous efforts were
delivered to Iran ``from the North.'' Russian officials denied this
charge claiming that ``no contracts on a government-to-government level
involving the sales to Iran of missile technologies of any type ever
existed.'' Any evidence challenging this statement would put into
question Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty and/or the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to which it is a party. Otherwise,
three other explanations are possible: Iran's technological espionage;
smuggling from Russia; transfers of SS-4 technologies from Ukraine,
Belarus, Kazakstan or Uzbekistan (none of these latter states are
parties to the MTCR).
Russia's Export Controls
Because Russia inherited the Soviet nonproliferation bureaucracy,
it has had export control structures, personnel and policy upon which
to build. Since 1992 it has developed an impressive array of decrees,
control lists, and agencies tasked to control weapons and weapons
related exports. Russia has harmonized its export control lists
(nuclear, missile, chemical, biological, and dual-use) with those of
the international regimes and has joined all of them (Nuclear Suppliers
Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar
Arrangement), except the Australia Group, as a full-fledged member.
In April 1992 an interagency commission on export control (Russia's
EXPORT CONTROL) was established to provide coordination as well as
organizational and methodological supervision over export control
operations. The key ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade, Ministry of Economics, Foreign Intelligence
Service, Federal Security Service and others are represented in the
Commission at the level of heads or deputy heads. A First Deputy Prime
Minister chairs the Commission. The working body of Russia's export
control mechanism providing technical support for EXPORT CONTROL is the
Federal Service for Currency and Export Control which currently enjoys
the status of a ministry.
Though there is no specific export control legislation, the Law on
State Regulation of Foreign Trade Activity adopted in 1995 filled in
some gaps as an umbrella law. Article 16 of this law specifies that the
export control system was established to defend Russia's national
interests while conducting foreign economic activity, and for
compliance with Russia's international obligations on nonproliferation
of WMD and other weapons. According to the law, selected types of arms,
military hardware, some types of raw materials, and equipment,
technologies, scientific and technical information and services that
are or can be used for developing WMD, missile delivery systems and
other weaponry, are determined by the lists established by presidential
decrees. The decrees come into force not earlier than three months
after their official publication. The procedures for implementing these
decrees are approved by decisions of the government. These two types of
documents constitute the normative and legal basis of Russia's export
control.
All commercial entities, regardless of form of ownership, are
required to receive permission for exporting controlled goods and
services. This entails the issuance of an export license necessary for
customs clearance. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
or its agents issues export licenses in different regions of the
country. The decision to issue an export license depends upon the
finding of Russia's EXPORT CONTROL as to the eligibility to export
controlled goods or services. Specialists of the Federal Service for
Currency and Export Control or outside experts prepare findings after
required interdepartmental analyses of necessary documents and
circumstances surrounding the export deal are submitted.
As specified by current regulations, the exporter must produce a
guarantee from an importer to utilize dual-use goods and services
strictly for declared purposes not related directly or indirectly to
designing and developing weapons of mass destruction or their missile
delivery systems, and not to re-export them to third countries. These
requirements constitute one of the necessary conditions for receiving
Russia's EXPORT CONTROL permission to export dual-use goods or
services.
The system of providing such guarantees for domestic use in Russia
includes procedures for issuing a Russian Import Certificate, Delivery
Verification Certificate, and End-User Certificate which would formally
register the obligations of Russian enterprises and organizations as to
the import of dual-use goods and services into the Russian Federation,
their use for the declared purposes, nontransfer to other business
entities on the Russian territory, and nonreexport to third countries.
Despite Russia's laudable efforts to create an interagency system
for export licensing and the execution of export control policy, the
system is the scene of continuous revamping and bureaucratic in-
fighting. Russia's system of export control continues to be severely
under financed and understaffed. In a state with so much weaponry and
weapons-related trade to license and control, there is insufficient
money and well trained personnel for export control. The legitimation
and overall status of Russian nonproliferation export control
institutions and policy have to be enhanced in order to perform as
required.
The enforcement side of Russia's export control system is still
weak. Article 189 of the new Criminal Code makes punishable illegal
export of technologies, scientific-technical information and service
which can be used for developing weapons of mass destruction, their
delivery means, weapons and military hardware with regard to which
special export controls have been established. The punishment as
specified by this article is a fine equivalent to a minimum of seven
hundred to one thousand dollars, or the total salary or other income
drawn by the convicted person for a period of seven months to one year,
or imprisonment from three to seven years. Although the previously
enacted Criminal Code contained a similar provision, there has been
little evidence of prosecutions.
There is also a problem of transparency in the export control
arena. Whether the opacity stems from fear that admitting weakness
would threaten Russia's status or just a legacy of Soviet sensitivities
remains unknown. However, little information is available on statistics
surrounding license applications and denials. The Russian
representative to the NSG from MINATOM has yet to report even one
denial to the regime, which maintains a database of denials to ensure
that NSG partners do not undercut one another. The lack of transparency
also leaves exporters confused and frustrated at overcoming numerous
and unexpected bureaucratic hurdles.
Other major obstacles in the way of efficient export controls are
organized crime and corruption, as well as porous borders.
Reintegration trends manifesting themselves throughout the CIS may
further complicate things. Kyrgyzstan has joined the recent customs
union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakstan, with Uzbekistan and
possibly Tajikistan joining. Both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have
controls that are even less sophisticated. The original CIS
configuration comprising sovereign states posed considerable
proliferation risks, and the same can be said for turning the CIS into
a single economic space with some of its parts seriously lacking export
control expertise and systems. According to certain Russian Customs
Committee sources, eliminating Russian customs posts would open the
floodgates to drugs from Central Asian republics and the unrestricted
export of Russian strategic materials. Once goods flow into Kazakstan
and Central Asia, it is difficult to determine where they will go. The
Caspian Sea and other Central Asian borders are particularly accessible
to smuggling operations to Iran.
Russia and other NIS lack a culture of nonproliferation that helps
restrain individuals and enterprises from transferring sensitive items
to countries or groups of concern. Russia will need to undertake major
education and outreach programs within the Military Industrial Complex
(MIC) as more and more enterprises receive the freedom to export.
Export controls under the former system of state monopoly were much
easier to enforce than they will be within a privatized system with
hundreds of aggressive, export dependent firms. Russian officials have
recently acknowledged the importance of developing export compliance
programs in such firms, but they clearly lack money and manpower for
the implementation of such vitally important programs.
Undoubtedly, the Russian export controllers will have a difficult
sell. Many industrialists view export control as a tool that was once
used by the West to deny Russia critical technologies and now one that
is being used by the West to deny Russian companies foreign market
share. Despite arguments that export controls will allow Russian firms
to trade internationally and elevate Russia to the status of a reliable
partner in global nonproliferation efforts, many industrialists and
some members of the Duma see Russia emerging as the loser because many
of its old client states including Iran are now the target of
multilateral export control regimes.
Conclusions
Russia will continue to gravitate toward the East including Iran,
unless the controversy over the NATO expansion is resolved to the
mutual satisfaction of both sides. If, concurrently with the signing of
a NATO-Russia charter, efforts are made in a consistent manner to get
Russia fully integrated into other institutions (e.g., G7, World Trade
Organization and Paris Club) there will be powerful incentives for the
Russian government to be sensitive to Iran-related concerns and
leverages for the West to downsize Russian-Iranian cooperation.
As to the Bushehr project specifically, halting Russia's
involvement may be a difficult challenge unless hard evidence is
produced implicating Iran in the development of nuclear weapons. In the
absence of this, two possible options can be explored. First, the
United States will make available to Russia adequate funding and
sophisticated instruments in order to develop and deploy at Bushehr an
unprecedently stringent monitoring system. Increased presence of
Russian personnel on a continuous basis would be, among other things,
an additional hedge against possible diversion. Secondly, Russia has
expressed its willingness to participate in the Korean Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) whose objective under the agreement
between Washington and Pyongyang is to replace heavy-water reactors
built earlier in North Korea under the Soviet assistance with light-
water ones. Russia's Nuclear Energy Minister Victor Mikhailov set two
conditions for such participation: that all Russia's previous
investments of about $50 million in the development of North Korea's
nuclear energy sector be counted as its contribution to this
international project and that Russia be accorded a deputy chairman
position on the equal footing with South Korea and Japan. There are
grounds to believe that if the Bushehr project for some reasons slows
down, Russia will be even more willing to seek a compromise in the KEDO
framework backing off from the Bushehr project.
Reports on missiles and missile technologies transfers to Iran from
the former Soviet Union must be treated with utmost seriousness as
possible violations of the INF Treaty and/or MTCR. The United States
has the right to seek information and raise these issues through
established channels. If this case is proved to be a result of the
ineffectual operation of Russia's export control system or negligence,
efforts could be made to rectify the situation and until then the West
may be willing to go as far as freezing Russia's membership in the
international fora requiring as a precondition effective export
controls.
It is unlikely that strictly unilateral actions by the United
States against a Russian producer or supplier involved in a
questionable deal (similarly to the arrangements against Glavcosmos in
the framework of Soviet/Russian-Indian cryogenic agreement) would
produce results consistent with the U.S. security interests. For
example, any sanction against MINATOM would potentially halt security
assistance under the Nunn-Lugar program covering a wide range of
important projects including the fissile materials storage facility.
Also, unilateral sanctions against Russia would give rise to anti-
American feelings, play into the hands of communists and nationalists
and risk to wreck a NATO-Russian charter should it materialize in the
near future. Conversely, agreed upon multilateral sanctions have a much
better chance for success given Russia's good record of compliance with
them.
__________
Chinese and Russian Suppliers to Iran
[Information submitted by Gary Milhollin, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear
Arms Control, Washington, D.C.]
CASE #1
Product: C-801 and C-802 Anti-Ship Missiles
Supplier: China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC)
Comments: Iran has been steadily increasing its military presence
in the Persian Gulf, and according to Admiral John Redd, Commander of
U.S. naval forces attached to the Central Command, has tested a ship
borne C-802 anti-ship cruise missile in January 1996. These missiles
are deployed on Hudong Fast Attack Craft also supplied by China in
1994. Iran is believed to have obtained about 60 of the missiles, which
are capable of destroying a warship, and could also pose a significant
threat to commercial shipping in the Gulf Iran reportedly tested a
shore-launched C-802 in December 1995.
The China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC)
manufactures and markets the C-802. It is a long range, sea-skimming,
multi-purpose anti-ship missile, powered by a turbojet engine. It can
be deployed on warships, coastal bases, and aircraft. It can carry a
warhead at high subsonic speed (Mach 0.9) to a range of 120 kilometers
(75 miles) and is considered to be more sophisticated than the older
Silkworm.
Iran has also obtained and deployed the C-801 anti-ship missile
from CPMIEC. The smaller C-801 has a range of 40 kilometers and can
also travel at high subsonic (Mach 0.9) speeds.
China Precision Machinery was sanctioned by the U.S. government in
August 1993 for missile proliferation activities.
U.S. Exports: U.S. Commerce Department records show that the
following items were approved for export to CPMIEC from 1989 to 1993:
computer equipment for color enhancement--$19,502
modems for data transmission--$32,628
modems for data transmission--$6,630
replacement parts for a numerical control system--$11,698
controller--$455,000
cables and adapters for a macro ware system--$45,834
mechanical seals for pumps--$11,949
spare navigational instruments--$83,762
machine parts--$385,000
computer workstation for simulation of wind effects--$43,700
flight data recorder and spare parts--$28,442
analyzers--$4,876
computer equipment--$7,707
Total: $1,136,728
CASE #2
Product: JY-14 Three-Dimensional Tactical Air Surveillance Radar
Supplier: China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation (CEIEC)
Comments: According to U.S. Naval Intelligence, Iran recently
acquired this tactical air surveillance radar from China. It can
provide long-range tactical surveillance as part of an automated
tactical air defense system. It can detect targets up to 300 kilometers
away and at altitudes up to 75,000 feet, even when subjected to high
electronic clutter or jamming. The system also provides automatic
tracking and reporting of up to 100 targets. CEIEC also manufactures
cryptographic systems, radars, mine detection equipment, fiber and
laser optics, and communications technologies and is overseen by the
Ministry of Electronics Industry (NMI), which is also known as the
China Electronics Industry Corporation (CEIC) or Chinatron.
U.S. Exports: U.S. Commerce Department records show that the
following items were approved for export to CEIEC from 1989 to 1993:
radio communication service monitor--$21,754
computer equipment and software--$4,375,000
personal computers and processor boards--$1,579,830
protocol tester for telecommunications--$4,100
equipment for basic microwave research--$10,916
traveling wave tube amplifier--$33,600
microwave frequency counter--$6,124
statistical multiplexer systems and accessory boards--
$75,632
statistical multiplexers for use in data communications
network--$65,120
integrated circuits--$17,326
computer equipment--$46,022
computer equipment--$29,094
equipment for circuit board design--$9,580
computer chips--$1,820
computer software--$105,000
equipment for semiconductor manufacture--$107,000
equipment for sweep generators for resale to Ministry of
Machine Building and Electronics Industry--$32,000
equipment for semiconductor wafer testing--$82,610
computer equipment--$1,924
computer equipment--$10,457
computer equipment for oil reservoir numerical simulation--
$92,916
computer equipment--$32,500
switching exchanges--$1,269,047
phosphorus oxychlofide (nerve gas precursor) for transistor
manufacture--$7,397
export telephone system--$15,000
circuit design software--$243,160
VLSI system to test integrated circuits--$1,315,000
transistors and amplifiers--$13,648
electronic equipment--$32,610
equipment for electronic component testing--$60,000
Total: $9,696,117
CASE #3
Product: Tokamak Nuclear Fusion Reactor
Supplier: Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Plasma Physics
Comments: The Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Plasma
Physics transferred a HT-6B Tokamak nuclear fusion research facility to
the Azad University in Tehran in 1993-94. The Institute designed and
developed the Tokamak in the mid-1980s and successfully operated the
unit for 10 years, after which it was transferred to Azad. In 1994, the
Institute sent technicians and engineers to Azad to assist in the
unit's installation and debugging, with the understanding that the two
sides would continue joint nuclear fusion research in the future.
U.S. Exports: Despite being a well-known contributor to Iran's
nuclear program, the Academy of Sciences managed recently to import an
American supercomputer. In March 1996, California based Silicon
Graphics Inc., sold the Academy a powerful supercomputer without
bothering to obtain a U.S. export license. In addition to supplying
Iran, the Academy has helped develop the flight computer for the
Chinese DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S. cities
with nuclear warheads. The Academy's Mechanics Institute has also
developed advanced rocket propellant, developed hydrogen- and oxygen-
fueled rockets, and helped develop the nose cone for the nuclear
warhead of the DF-5. Its Shanghai Institute of Silicate successfully
developed the carbon/quartz material used to shield the tip of the DF-
5's reentry vehicle from the heat created by friction with the earth's
atmosphere. The Academy's Institute of Electronics has built synthetic
aperture radar useful in military mapping and surveillance, and its
Acoustic Institute has developed a guidance system for the Yu-3
torpedo, together with sonar for nuclear and conventional submarines.
In the nuclear field, the Academy has developed separation
membranes to enrich uranium by gaseous diffusion, and its Institute of
Mechanics has studied the effects of underground nuclear weapon tests
and ways to protect against nuclear explosions. It has also studied the
stability of plasma in controlled nuclear fusion. Its Institute of
Electronics has developed various kinds of lasers used in atomic
isotope separation.
CASE #4
Product: Uranium Mining Exploration
Supplier: Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG)
Comments: BRIUG conducts scientific exchanges with Iranian and
Pakistani nuclear scientists.
As part of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), BRIUG
carries out research on radio metrical and conventional geophysical
uranium prospecting methods and conducts geological interpretations
throughout China using satellite images. It develops and designs
spectrometers, laser fluorometers for trace uranium analysis, mineral
inclusion analyzers, scintillation radon analyzers, scintillation
spectrometers, laser analyzers for trace substances, and high and low
frequency dielectric separators. BRIUG also conducts research on
geological disposal of nuclear waste, and possesses scientific
equipment including neutron activation analyzers, electron microscopes,
electron microprobes, mass spectrometers, X-ray fluoro-spectrometers,
X-ray diffractometers, infrared spectrophotometers, ultraviolet
spectrophotometers, atomic absorption spectrophotometers, laser raman
spectrophotometers, fluoro-spectrophotometers, gas chromatography
analyzers, fluid chromatography analyzers, image processing system and
computer and color plotter systems.
BRIUG's parent, CNNC has been implicated in the sale of ring
magnets to the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan, which
enriches uranium for nuclear weapons. CNNC is also involved in the
development of Pakistan's secret research reactor at Khusab and a CNNC
subsidiary is currently constructing a power reactor for Pakistan at
Chashma.
CASE #5
Product: High-Grade Seamless Steel Pipes
Supplier: Rex International (Hong Kong)
Comments: Owned by China North Industries (Norinco), Rex is known
to have acted as a broker for numerous deals between Norinco and the
Middle East. Rex reportedly handled a shipment of high-grade seamless
steel pipes, suitable for use in chemical or explosives manufacturing,
to an Iranian chemical weapon plant. The consignee was Iran's Defense
Industries Organization (DIO), a notoriously bad destination. The pipes
were reportedly shipped from Spain to Hong Kong and then to the Iranian
port of Bandar Abbas.
Rex International Development was founded in 1982 as a joint
venture between Hong Kong entrepreneur T. T. Tsui and Norinco. It
functioned as a broker for Norinco's business in commercial high
explosives, served as Norinco's window on the world arms markets and as
a link to the international financial system through Hong Kong.
Employees of Norinco were indicted in 1996 by the United States for
illegally conspiring to import 2,000 fully automatic AK-47 assault
rifles into California intended for street gangs. In addition to AK-
47s, Norinco develops and manufactures armored fighting vehicles,
howitzers, mortars, rocket launchers, antiaircraft weapons, anti-tank
missile systems, small arms, ammunition, radars, sighting and aiming
systems, high-performance engines, and nuclear/biological/chemical
warfare protection systems, sensor-fuzed cluster bombs, optical-
electronic products, explosives and blast materials, light industrial
products, fire-fighting equipment, and metal and non-metal materials.
Norinco was established in 1980 with the approval of the State Council
of China, and is overseen by the Commission on Science, Technology and
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). Norinco subsidiaries in the
U.S. include: Beta Chemical, Beta First, Beta Lighting, Beta Unitex,
China Sports (California), Forte Lighting, Larin, NIC International
(New Jersey).
CASE #6
Product: ``Silkworm'' Anti-Ship Missiles
Supplier: China Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation
Comments: Iran has deployed Chinese HY-2 ``Silkworm'' anti-ship
missiles along the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf, on the island of
Abu Musa in the middle of the Persian Gulf, on Qeshm Island and Sirri
Island. The missiles are Chinese modifications of the Soviet SS-N-2
Styx missile, and can carry 1000 lb. warheads over a range of 50 miles
at high subsonic (Mach 0.85) speeds. They can be equipped with either
radar or infrared guidance systems, and thus can threaten U.S. and
other ships transiting the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz,
through which one-fifth of the world's oil supply passes. Iran used
Silkworms during its war with Iraq to attack shipping in the Gulf.
Iranian forces fired an improved version of the Silkworm missile during
military exercises in late November 1996.
U.S. exports: U.S. investigators believe that CATIC (China National
Aero-Technology Import-Export Corporation), a powerful state-owned
Chinese company, intentionally misled American officials in order to
import sensitive American machine tools that were later diverted to
forbidden military purposes. CATIC, China National Aero-Technology and
China National Supply and Marketing Corporation imported the machines
under export licenses issued by the U.S. Commerce Department with the
stated purpose of making civilian aircraft. The machines had been used
previously to make parts for the B-1 strategic bomber. The machines
were shipped to China between September 1994 and March 1995 by the
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation and were destined for CATIC's Beijing
Machining Center. The Machining Center, however, did not exist at the
time the licenses were granted and was never created. Instead, the
tools were illegally sent to other locations, including the China
Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company, maker of the Silkworms.
__________
Iranian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: Implications and
Responses
[This paper was prepared by Dr. W. Seth Carus for presentation on
February 20, 1997, before the Iran study group of the Nixon Center for
Peace and Freedom. It represents the views of the author, and not
necessarily those of the Center for Naval Analyses, the Department of
the Navy, or the Department of Defense.
The United States currently characterizes Iran as one of several
so-called ``rogue'' states that possess programs to develop weapons of
mass destruction, which include nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
weapons. Since the 1990-1991 confrontation with Iraq, these weapons are
viewed in Washington as a threat to the security of the United States
and its friends and allies.
Iran is said to possess chemical and biological weapons, and the
means to deliver them, and is reportedly working to acquire nuclear
weapons. Given the enmity that exists between the United States and
Iran, and the possibility that military hostilities could erupt between
the two countries, these Iranian weapons programs are a source of
serious concern to policy-makers in Washington.
In this short essay, I will briefly examine three issues that help
provide a better understanding of the implications of the Iranian NBC
program for the security of the United States and of the Middle East.
First, what is Iran doing in the NBC and delivery system arena, and
why is it pursuing those objectives?
Second, what are the implications of these capabilities for the
United States, for its allies and friends in the region, and for
others?
Third, what steps should the United States take in response to
Iranian activity?
Iranian NBC and Missile Programs
What follows is a summary of what is known about Iran's NBC
programs, focusing primarily on U.S. government assessments. There have
been numerous surveys of Iranian activities; no effort will be made
here to repeat what others have done more thoroughly.\1\ Rather, I will
concentrate on the officially stated views of the U.S. government,
since such statements reflect the intelligence reporting that guides
policymaking. However, I will assess the validity of the official
assessments to determine whether there is reason to be skeptical of the
official views.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Excellent accounts have appeared in the works of Anthony
Cordesman, Michael Eisenstadt, Ahmid Akhim, and Leonard Spector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Official assessments
Iran's nuclear weapons program originated prior to the 1979
revolution. It fell apart during the revolution, and was resuscitated
only in 1989 after the end of the Iran-Iraq War. According to a recent
Department of Defense estimate:
At this stage, Iran's scientific and technical base remains
insufficient to support major nuclear programs. The Iranians
recognize their dependence on foreign assistance and are
encouraging younger Iranians to study abroad to gain needed
technical assistance.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1996), p. 14.
Similarly, ACDA gave the following assessment of Iran's nuclear
activities: ``Although Iran's rudimentary program has apparently met
with limited success so far, we believe Iran has not abandoned its
efforts to expand its nuclear capabilities with a view to supporting
nuclear weapons development.''\3\ In 1993, the Central Intelligence
Agency calculated that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon in eight to
ten years. More recently, the Secretary of Defense stated that it might
take Iran from seven to fifteen years to develop a weapon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and compliance
with Arms Control, May 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Defense reports that Iran's chemical weapons
program started in 1983 as a response to Iraq's use of chemical
weapons. They produced their first chemical agent in 1984, but
cumulative production is ``a minimum several hundred tons of blister,
blood, and choking agents.''\4\ Some sources have claimed that the
Iranians might have as much as 2,000 tons of chemical agent, possibly
including nerve agent.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1996), p. 15.
\5\ Andrew Rathmell, ``Chemical weapons in the Middle East--Lessons
from Iraq,'' Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran's biological weapons program also was initiated in the early
part of the war with Iraq. According to the Department of Defense, Iran
``is conducting research on toxins and organisms with biological
warfare applications.''\6\ According to the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Iran probably has produced biological warfare
agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those
agents.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1996), p. 16.
\7\ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control, May 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assessing the assessments
What are we to make of these assessments?
Notwithstanding the official assessments, I remain intensely
skeptical about the ability of the Iranians to match their achievements
to their ambitions.
My skepticism reflects in part the singular lack of success of the
Iranians in pursuing ballistic missile programs. The Iranian ballistic
missile program dates to at least 1987. Although Iranian officials
claimed that the program had a high priority in early 1988 during the
so-called ``War of the Cities,'' there is no evidence to suggest that
Iran has been able to produce a single guided missile of indigenous
design. Indeed, Iran's entire inventory is composed of foreign-supplied
missiles, except for some missiles assembled in Iran from kits provided
by North Korea. Clearly Iran has ambitions to produce its own ballistic
missiles, including more accurate systems with greater range. Equally
clearly, however, it has found it difficult to make significant
progress in its efforts to do so.
Iran initiated a Scud production program in 1987. The Scud missile
is based on primitive technology dating to the 1940s. Indigenous
efforts to develop the Scud failed, and in the end the Iranians were
forced to go to North Korea for assistance. Given that there is nothing
in Scud technology that should be inaccessible to the Iranians, this
strongly suggests that Iran has considerable difficulty in systems
integration. Accordingly, one should be skeptical of blithe claims that
Iran will quickly implement design efforts to develop more
sophisticated systems.
This is evident from what appears to be a diminished level of
concern regarding the immediacy of Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons. This reflects the extent of the problems that face Iran as it
attempts to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons program. Iran lacks
the infrastructure needed to produce fissile material, and it will take
some time for it to acquire both the facilities and the expertise to do
so. Thus, the primary threat comes from illicit acquisition of either
fissile material or complete weapons from the stockpiles of the former
Soviet Union. It is impossible to assess the possibility that Iran
could acquire a nuclear capability through this route. U.S.
policymakers have given a high priority to efforts to forestall such
attempts.
Unfortunately, it will be difficult to verify Iranian possession of
nuclear weapons if it uses covert means to acquire the fissile material
or the complete weapon. As a result, we may be faced with a
circumstance in which Iran might have a nuclear weapons capability and
we would have no means of confirming the claim. This could be
especially problematic if the Iranians allowed rumors of nuclear
weapons to reach other countries, while publicly maintaining that it
had no such capabilities. Conversely, the Iranians could try to make
people think that they had nuclear weapons, even without actually
having them. In either case, the United States should expect to face an
increasingly ambiguous military and diplomatic challenge arising from
Iran's nuclear program.
Iran is credited with more success in its efforts to acquire
chemical and biological weapons. It has a stockpile of chemical agents,
and may have weaponized biological weapons. Estimates of Iranian
chemical weapons stockpiles should be treated with some caution. While
the size of the stockpile is potentially of military significance, the
quality of it is uncertain.
Some portion of Iran's chemical weapons inventory is reported to be
composed of hydrogen cyanide.\8\ There is only one problem with this
attribution: there is no evidence that anyone ever made hydrogen
cyanide into an effective chemical agent. Cyanide gas was extensively
used by the French during World War One, but German accounts suggest
that it probably caused no casualties. Indeed, the body naturally
detoxifies hydrogen cyanide and it is lighter than air, so that it is
difficult to produce concentrations sufficiently great to incapacitate.
Equally important, the US found that the burster charges in aircraft
bombs needed to disperse the hydrogen cyanide often ignited the
agent.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1996), p. 15.
\9\ For the First World War experience with hydrogen cyanide, see L.
F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), and Augustin Prentiss, Chemicals in
War: A Treatise on Chemical Warfare (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1937), p. 17. World War Two research is discussed in Stanford
Moore and Marshall Gates, ``Hydrogen Cyanide and Hydrogen Chloride,''
pp. 7-16, in Division 9, National Defense Research Committee, Office of
Scientific Research and Development, Chemical Warfare Agents and
Related Chemical Problems, parts I-II, Washington, D.C.: 1946).
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There is one other significant point to make about hydrogen cyanide
as a chemical agent. It is significantly less effective than other
chemicals. According to one estimate, twenty tons of hydrogen cyanide
is needed to equal the military effectiveness of one ton of sarin nerve
agent. Thus, if Iran possessed 100 tons of hydrogen cyanide, it would
have the operational significance of only five tons of sarin.
This discussion of hydrogen cyanide illustrates an important point.
Possessing a chemical agent is not the same as possessing a militarily
useful war fighting capability. Indeed, the history of chemical warfare
is replete with examples of technical surprises, where the chemical
agent does not operate as anticipated, or operational ineptitude, where
the employment of the agent significantly reduced its operational
effectiveness.
Moreover, the Iraqi experience also suggests some caution in
evaluating chemical weapons inventories. Iraq apparently had great
difficulty manufacturing and storing sarin, its standard nerve agent.
UNSCOM reporting suggests that the sarin deteriorated after production
because of impurities in the agent and poor storage techniques. For
that reason, it adopted a binary combination that was storable and
could be used to generate an extremely impure version of sarin
immediately prior to use.
There is no reason to believe that the Iranians would not face
similar obstacles in their efforts to produce chemical weapons
capabilities. Given the limited employment of chemical agents
attributed to the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war, there is no reason
to believe that the Iranians gained the operational experience needed
to teach them how to effectively use their chemical weapons.
This discussion suggests several conclusions. The Iranians have
been forced to rely on an ineffective agent that probably is for some
(unknown) part of its chemical agent inventory. It also illustrates the
extent to which it is possible to exaggerate the operational
significance of a chemical inventory if sufficient attention is not
given to the technical details of the arsenal in question.
These comments are not intended to minimize concerns for Iranian
efforts to develop NBC capabilities. Rather, they are intended to put
those efforts into some kind of reasonable perspective. NBC
capabilities should be evaluated with the same critical eye that any
military capabilities are considered. Just as we do not equate
possession of advanced weapons with possession of real military
capabilities, so should we attempt to carefully assess the real
military significance of Iranian chemical weapons inventories.
Very little can be said about the allegations of Iranian biological
weapons development. We believe that biological weapons, if properly
utilized, should pose a lethality similar to that of nuclear weapons.
What we do not know is the extent to which the Iranians have solved all
the problems associated with production and dissemination of biological
agents. Without such knowledge, it is impossible to assess the true
threat posed by Iran's biological weapons.
Motivations
There is limited data to support any sophisticated evaluation of
Iranian motivations for developing NBC weapons. While there have been a
few revealing statements by senior Iranian officials, we know little
about the inner decision making process involving Iran's NBC program.
As a result, we must rely primarily on imputed motives based on
analysis. The one key exception to this are Iranian views of missiles.
We have some interesting insights into Iranian thinking about missiles,
because at one point (March 1988) the senior Iranian leadership was
quite open about its views on these matters.
I would suggest that there are three factors that motivate Iran's
NBC and missile programs.
First, it appears that the chemical and biological weapons programs
and its efforts to acquire ballistic missiles were initiated in
response to the Iraqi threat. Given subsequent revelations about the
size and sophistication of Iraq's weapons programs, it is highly likely
that concern for Iraq continues to motivate Iranian efforts.
Second, Iranians probably view NBC programs as affirmations of
Iran's status as a regional power. Thus, there is a critical prestige
element in the activities.
Finally, Iran also probably views its programs as a potential
response to military threats from the United States and Israel.
The relative weight of these three items is difficult to assess.
What is clear is that Iran has powerful motivations to maintain NBC and
missile programs. In the absence of a potent security umbrella, Iran is
likely to pursue NBC capabilities even in the absence of hostile
relations with the United States and Israel. In particular, until
Iran's security concerns regarding Iraq are rectified, there is little
prospect that Iran will unilaterally abandon its NBC programs.
If this assessment is correct, Iran's weapons programs may be
targeted at the United States, but not exclusively. This suggests that
even if there is a rapprochement between the United States and Iran,
the rationale for the weapons programs will remain.
Implications of Iranian NBC capabilities
What are the implications of Iran's efforts to acquire NBC weapons,
especially for the United States and its friends and allies in the
Middle East?
For the United States
Iran has several alternative uses for its NBC capabilities against
the United States. Iran could use the weapons to deter the United
States from getting involved in a conflict with Iran. To implement such
a strategy, Iran could threaten to use its weapons against U.S. forces
deployed in the region, or it could threaten covert use of weapons
against targets in the United States.
If deterrence fails and the United States attacks Iran, the weapons
could be used to limit the scope of actions against Iran and the
regime. Thus, Iran could threaten use of its arsenal if certain
thresholds were crossed. In this way Iran could ensure that a limited
war remained limited.
The weapons also could be used to drive a wedge between the United
States and its friends and allies in the region. By suggesting that
countries hosting the United States might come under attack from
Iranian NBC weapons, Iran could ensure that no countries support U.S.
military actions and that they do not allow the United States to
operate from facilities in the region.
Finally, the weapons could be used as part of a war fighting
strategy to compensate for Iranian conventional weapons deficiencies.
Thus, Iran could target U.S. military forces, key facilities supporting
U.S. operations in the Gulf, or critical reinforcement nodes.
There are limits on Iran's ability to employ these alternative
strategies. Iran's leadership is certainly aware of the military
capabilities of the United States, and would need to find an approach
that minimized the risks of retaliation. Given the gross disparity in
military power between the United States and Iran, this will certainly
be evident to all but the most obtuse member of the regime. This tends
to suggest that Iranian use of NBC weapons is most likely to be
carefully considered and will involve a considerable degree of
subtlety.
For U.S. friends and allies
The possession of NBC weapons adds to the threat that Iran already
can pose to the GCC countries. These countries lack the military
capability to oppose Iran on their own, and are heavily dependent on
the protective shield offered by the U.S. military presence. Iran
presumably would seek to use its NBC weapons to undermine the
credibility and acceptability of the U.S. military presence. In
particular, Iran would want the GCC countries to believe that by
hosting the United States they are opening themselves up for NBC
strikes.
Iran would have to adopt a carefully modulated approach, since the
GCC countries will not want to become puppets of the Iranians. For
their own survival, they must find ways of protecting their
independence of action. If Iran is too blunt in its actions, the GCC
countries would have incentives to side with the United States despite
the risks. Thus, Iran needs to couple their threats with diplomatic
initiatives that give the GCC countries some reason to believe that it
will be possible to establish an acceptable relationship with Tehran.
U.S. Responses
What steps should the United States take in response to Iranian NBC
efforts?
Generically, the United States takes three approaches to the
proliferation of NBC weapons. First, it seeks to rollback existing
capabilities. Second, it tries to inhibit further proliferation.
Finally, attempts to manage the consequences of proliferated
capabilities. All three approaches are relevant to United States
approaches towards Iran.
Rollback existing capabilities
Efforts to roll back existing NBC programs have a higher priority
today than in the past. This includes both the voluntary and
involuntary destruction of capabilities. Current examples of such
efforts include verification of the elimination of the Soviet BW
program, of the Iraqi CBW and ballistic missile programs, and the South
African nuclear program. A new requirement during the 1990s will be
implementation of the Chemical Weapon Convention which will require
such programs for the numerous countries with arsenals of chemical
munitions. Depending on circumstances, it may be necessary to ensure
the elimination of nuclear, biological, and missile capabilities in
other countries as well.
Rollback initiatives may be the primary responsibility of
international agencies, such as the IAEA or the planned implementing
agency for the CWC, or of the United States as party to bilateral and
multilateral initiatives, as is the case with the Soviet BW program.
Even when international agencies are involved, however, the United
States will often take a leading role in providing support, or in
monitoring the success of the international initiative.
Specialized resources are needed for inspection and destruction of
equipment and facilities. This process needs to be tailored to the
specific circumstances of each case. In most circumstances, there will
be gaps in our knowledge of past activity, and as a result rollback
efforts cannot be based on pre-set target lists. In addition, it is
possible that concealment and deception will be used to protect
selected aspects of programs. For these reasons, it is critical that
experts intimately familiar with the activities of a program over an
extended period of time be included in rollback efforts.
Recent experience indicates that it can be extremely difficult to
uncover illicit weapons activities, even with highly intrusive
verification efforts. While the UN inspectors in Iraq have accomplished
much in the effort to control Iraq's NBC and missile programs, six
years of intrusive inspections have yet to reveal the full scope of
Iraqi activity. This suggests that we should not expect that arms
control measures will be able to bring Iranian programs under control
unless the Tehran regime wants to terminate those activities.
Inhibit further proliferation
A traditional focus of U.S. nonproliferation policy are efforts to
prevent countries from acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Because of the
extent to which countries have acquired capabilities, however, a
growing focus of such efforts are initiatives to prevent countries from
enhancing the size and sophistication of existing arsenals.
Despite some failures, there have been considerable successes in
our efforts to stem proliferation. Although more than two dozen
countries might be capable of developing nuclear weapons capabilities,
the actual number of nuclear capable states is relatively small.
Similarly, we have successfully slowed the spread of chemical,
biological, and missile capabilities.
In some cases, it may be possible to convince or force a country to
stop programs before they become operational. This is the importance of
the initiatives to halt the nuclear programs of Iran, Iraq, and North
Korea, and was the reason for the importance of the efforts to stop the
Argentinian and Brazilian nuclear programs and to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons among the newly independent states of the former Soviet
Union.
In other cases, inhibiting proliferation means slowing programs,
even though there is little reason to believe that they can be stopped.
Thus, much of our activity in the chemical arena is intended to deny
easy access to precursor chemicals needed to produce chemical agents,
thus raising the costs and slowing pace of capabilities acquisition.
Often we are trying to buy time, hoping that changing circumstances
will alter the cost-benefit assessment that encouraged the
proliferation activity in the first place. Alternatively, the time
allows us breathing space which can be used to develop counters to the
capability.
These approaches are particularly relevant in the case of Iran.
While the Iranians have made some progress in developing chemical and
biological weapons, as well as missile delivery systems, their existing
capabilities appear relatively rudimentary. Presumably, they have an
incentive to acquire more sophisticated agents and better delivery
mechanisms.
Managing the consequences of proliferated weapons capabilities
We may fail in our efforts to forestall proliferation. When that
happens, it is necessary to manage the potentially deleterious
consequences of the proliferation. In many cases, the task is primarily
diplomatic. Thus, we have conducted an active diplomacy to manage the
dangers posed by nuclear proliferation in South Asia, and may need to
do more during periods of intense conflict.
In some cases, we may wish to adopt diplomatic initiatives intended
to increase the costs or reduce the perceived benefits of possessing
such weapons. This could entail providing defense assistance to allies
(or even neutral and hostile countries, if appropriate), including CBW
defenses and missile defenses. Alternatively, it could involve use of
sanctions or military action by the U.S., depending on the
circumstances.
With the Defense Counter Proliferation Initiative, the Clinton
Administration recognized that it is possible that hostile third world
nations might be willing to use their NBC arsenals against the United
States or its friends and allies. This means we must be prepared to
operate in localities where our forces may be vulnerable to such
weapons.
Iran specific policies
Efforts by the United States to constrain Iranian NBC activities
are consistent with general U.S. nonproliferation and counter
proliferation policies. Since the early 1980s, the United States has
used a range of diplomatic tools to against Iran. Working with other
members of the international community, through such multilateral
institutions as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group,
the united States has attempted to limit Iran's access to the
technology and materials it needs to develop NBC weapons. In addition,
the United States has conducted aggressive bilateral diplomacy aimed at
countries still providing support for the Iranians.
These efforts have been remarkably successful. While some countries
continue to do business with Iran in the NBC arena (including Russia
and China), most countries have come to accept that efforts need to be
made to constrain Iranian NBC activities. Thus, Iran has only limited
access to the foreign suppliers that it needs to support its
activities.
Rollback
The ultimate objective of any nonproliferation program aimed at
Iran should be ensuring the termination of its NBC and missile
programs. This is not an easy task, but it is not impossible. This is
evident from examining the track record of the international community
in tackling nuclear proliferation.
Conditions for success
Nearly five years ago, Joseph Yager of SAIC conducted an
interesting study of what he called ``nuclear rollback,'' which he
defined as a ``voluntary and credible renunciation of efforts to move
closer to a nuclear weapons capability.''\10\ According to Yager's
study, twenty countries have made serious attempts to acquire nuclear
weapons capabilities. This total includes the five declared nuclear
weapons states, five additional countries deemed current
``proliferation problem cases'' (India, Israel, Libya, Pakistan, and
North Korea), four countries that abandoned programs due to military
defeat or revolution (Germany, Iran, Iraq, and Japan) and six cases of
rollback (Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, and
Taiwan). In his study, Yager focused on four of the rollback countries,
treating South Korea and Taiwan as special cases due to the leverage
exercised by the United States over their national security. Note that
Yager treated both Iran and Iraq as solved problems, a view that was
perhaps excessively optimistic based on our current knowledge of the
two countries.
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\10\ This analysis is based on data provided by Joseph A. Yager,
Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation Rollback, Discussion Paper, McLean,
Virginia, Science Applications International Corporation, July 2. See
also Joseph A. Yager, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation Rollback,
Seminar Report, McLean Virginia, Science Applications International
Corporation, August 14, 1992.
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Based on his study, Yager concluded that his four cases of rollback
shared five conditions essential for rollback. First, in each case the
leadership of the country reassessed the military utility of nuclear
weapons. Second, favorable domestic political developments enabled the
leadership to abandon weapons development programs. Third, external
pressures and inducements played a role in the decisions to rollback.
Fourth, none of the countries openly acknowledged an interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons. Finally, all the countries faced economic
constraints that limited their pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from Yager's analysis.
First, it is evident that nonproliferation activities do not defeat
nuclear weapons programs. Rather, they serve primarily to delay the
completion of nuclear programs and to raise the costs of public
declarations favoring acquisition of nuclear weapons. Second, the
domestic political context is critical in the termination of programs.
Rollback can occur only if those individuals or groups favoring
renunciation have the desire and the political power to enforce such
action. Finally, the international context is critical in the
evaluation of the military utility of nuclear weapons.
I would argue, however, that there are several other factors
significant in the decision to abandon nuclear weapons programs that
are of significance to countries like Iran. Yager chose to ignore five
countries (Germany, Iraq, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) that I
believe provide an important insight into decisions regarding nuclear
weapons. Consider the three defeated countries, Germany, Iraq and
Japan. While it is true that military defeat led to immediate
termination of nuclear weapons programs, that is not a complete
explanation. The Germans and the Japanese have had ample opportunities
to review their non-nuclear posture, and both have decided not to
pursue nuclear weapons programs. This, I believe, reflects an accurate
calculation that the benefits of acquisition are far outweighed by the
costs. In particular, the special importance that they assigned to
their security relationship with the United States and the Western
countries, as well as the anticipated reaction of other countries made
nuclear weapons both undesirable and counterproductive. This is
significant in the context of Iraq, also a defeated country but one
that appears reluctant to abandon its ability to pursue NBC and missile
programs. This suggests that when a leadership believes that it needs
such capabilities, military defeat is not a sufficient condition to
cause abandonment of the efforts.
It appears that these same considerations were significant in the
case of South Korea and Taiwan. While it is true that the United States
had extraordinary leverage over these two countries, this leverage
resulted largely from the import role that the United States played in
ensuring the security of those two countries. Thus, I would argue that
essentially the same conditions that applied to Yager's four cases of
rollback also are pertinent in other examples.
Whether these conclusions also apply to chemical and biological
weapons programs is less certain. There has been no effort made to
study rollback in the chemical and biological arena, although it is
known that some countries have abandoned their programs (Germany and
Japan had programs during the Second World War; the United States,
Britain, and Canada abandoned their programs when they adhered to the
BTWC). The context also is decidedly different. There is a treaty that
bans possession of biological weapons (the 1972 Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention), and there will soon be a similar treaty for
chemical weapons (the Chemical Weapons Convention, scheduled to enter
into force this year). In contrast, possession of nuclear weapons is
not generally proscribed, except for those countries adhering to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (and even it permits a country to
withdraw from the treaty).
From these additional observations, I would draw an additional
conclusion: that NBC programs can be terminated only with willing
agreement. There is no military solution to NBC programs. Despite
unfavorable conditions, a country will pursue NBC capabilities if they
appear sufficiently important.
Applying the criteria to Iran
It appears that three of the five criteria identified by Yager
apply to Iran, but that two do not.
The Iranians have never officially acknowledged an interest in
possessing NBC weapons. Despite some rather direct statements made by
Iranian officials about the value of NBC weapons, Iran cannot afford to
officially acknowledge such intentions. As a signatory to the NPT,
BTWC, and the CWC, Iran cannot adopt any other position without
undermining efforts to acquire NBC weapons. This is most clearly
evident in the case of nuclear weapons since, if Iran stated that its
ultimate aim was acquisition of nuclear weapons, then China and Russia,
both signatories to the NPT, would be forced to terminate their nuclear
assistance programs. Finally, Iran is faced by severe economic
constraints that limit its ability to pursue NBC programs.
While it is clear that three of Yager's factors appear positive for
rollback in the Iranian case, the other two factors are decidedly
negative. There is no reason to believe that Iran will decide that it
has no military rationale for its NBC capabilities, and there is little
reason to believe that the existing clerical regime will be inclined to
take steps to terminate these programs.
Accordingly, I would argue that two conditions are essential to an
Iranian decision to terminate its NBC programs. First, a regime must
come to power that can establish better ties to other countries in the
region. Specifically, the regime must be able to reconcile major
differences with the United States and with the GCC and other
significant Arab states. Second, the regime must be willing and able to
enter into regional security arrangements that accomplish many of the
same objectives as the NBC programs.
Yet, it is also true that the United States lacked leverage in many
of the cases where successes ultimately emerged. Crucial to the
ultimate success was persistence, ensuring that when the opportunity
arose we were positioned to pursue nonproliferation objectives. Thus,
the true objective is delay by preventing a country from acquiring
capabilities through raising costs.
U.S. military pressure on Iran
Note that threats of military response to Iranian NBC activities
can have either negative or positive consequences, depending on the
reaction in Tehran. The prospect that the United States might attack
Iran increases its sense of threat, and thus potentially makes NBC
capabilities more useful as a deterrent. At the same time, to the
extent that a small NBC capability increases prospects for a preemptive
attack, Iran's overall security is reduced.
From this perspective, the United States could pursue radically
different policies in the context of its broader approach towards Iran.
For example, if we believed that Iran was motivated to pursue NBC
capabilities because of the threat of U.S. military action, then we
could pursue a conciliatory policy intended to reduce Iran's sense of
threat from the United States, and to make it believe that it can cope
with regional threats using its own resources.
If, however, we believe that it has additional motivations to
pursue NBC capabilities, then a conciliatory approach might do little
to reduce the motivations to acquire such capabilities. This suggests
that NBC issues should not drive U.S. policy, but should be integrated
into the foreign policy objectives that the United States adopts
towards Iran.
Bottom Line
In conclusion, I would advance several observations about Iran's
NBC programs.
First, the United States has been remarkably successful in
constraining Iranian capabilities. While we have not stopped Iran from
pursuing development NBC weapons and missile delivery systems, the
capabilities that Iran has acquired so far are remarkably rudimentary,
and the time line for major successes appears lengthy.
Second, the real threat these capabilities pose is to the security
of our friends and allies in the region. These countries, and
especially the GCC countries, must believe that the United States will
protect them from Iran. This also means convincing them that the United
States will not provoke the Iranians. So long as they have confidence
in the United States, I believe that they have strong incentives not to
be coerced by Iran.
Third, we need to continue to pursue a strategy that mixes
multilateral and bilateral approaches. This is not a problem that can
be solved by unilateral U.S. action. We need the full support of like
minded governments around the world.
Finally, the problem is not uniquely tied to the current regime. A
fundamental shift in Iranian policy might facilitate rollback efforts,
but it is also possible that a new regime might pursue the same
policies. Moreover, while the United States might be willing to accept
a pro-Western regime in control of existing Iran's NBC programs, it is
unlikely that other countries in the region would feel similarly.
Hence, the problem is likely to outlast the current regime.
__________
Statement Submitted by Senator John Ashcroft
Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate you holding this hearing on
weapons proliferation to Iran. This is certainly a subject of utmost
importance for America's national security. We live in a complex world
today where threats to our national security are not easily identified.
We cannot afford to take for granted the victories we have won; we have
advanced freedom's cause and increased international stability
throughout the world. In this dawn of a new era, rising security
threats dot the horizon and must be addressed.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the
greatest national security threats we face in the post-Cold War world.
While weapons proliferation is a problem that involves numerous nations
around the globe, I am most troubled by Iran's efforts to acquire these
weapons. Iran is the worst state sponsor of terrorism in the world,
violently opposes the Middle East peace process, and poses a constant
threat to regional stability in the Persian Gulf.
Mr. Chairman, it may seem obvious to you and I that the strongest
measures are needed to isolate such regimes, but President Clinton
continues to overlook these arms transfers and refuses to impose
sanctions required by US law on the foreign governments who proliferate
these weapons.
While Iran has received weapons and weapons technology from
numerous states, let me focus on the sordid tale of China's involvement
in the Iranian arms sector. China is arguably Iran's leading supplier
of weapons of mass destruction technology and the missiles required to
deliver such weapons to distant targets. China has apparently had a
secret nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran since 1985, has trained
Iranian nuclear engineers, and has built a calutron system for uranium
enrichment in Iran similar to the system used by Iraq to develop its
nuclear program. China is also interested in building two 300-Megawatt
reactors in Iran in the next ten years. China hides behind the cloak of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which permits peaceful nuclear
transfers, but there is no doubt that Iran is diverting this nuclear
technology for military uses.
China has also been deeply involved in Iran's chemical weapons
program. In commenting on Chinese chemical weapons assistance to Iran,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bruce Reidel testified in
November, 1995 that ``Chinese firms have provided some assistance. both
in terms of the infrastructure for building chemical plants and some of
the precursors for developing agents.'' The assistance continued in
1996 as China reportedly transferred mixing vessels and an air
filtration system for producing chemical weapons.
As if the transfer of weapons of mass destruction technology to
Iran were not enough, China has also given Iran the missiles needed to
deliver these weapons to distant targets. China has transferred missile
guidance systems, advanced machine tools for the manufacture of
missiles, and complete missile systems to Iran. One of these missile
systems, the C-802, has a range which places 15,000 US soldiers at risk
in the Persian Gulf. Vice Admiral John Redd, Commander of the US Fifth
Fleet, has repeatedly expressed concern over the destabilizing effect
of these missiles in the hands of Iran.
Chinese involvement in Iran's arms program violates the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and China's commitment to abide by the Missile
Technology Control Regime. I have come to expect this behavior from
Beijing--dictators will be dictators. But what can be said of the
President's silence? In spite of all the evidence that China is
assisting the weapons program of the terrorist state of Iran, President
Clinton has refused to impose sanctions on China for the weapons
transfers. I see a disturbing trend in President Clinton's efforts to
confront these nations which threaten our national security. In
addition to an abysmal performance in enforcing US laws against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, President Clinton has
eviscerated provisions in the US Anti-terrorism Act of 1996 designed to
prohibit financial transactions with state sponsors of terrorism.
President Clinton claimed in an August, 1996 speech at George
Washington University that business as usual cannot proceed with
terrorist states, but issued regulations for the Anti-terrorism Act
that same month which allowed financial dealings to continue with
terrorist states like Sudan. Sudan has joined Iran as the worst of
state sponsors of terrorism, and I can assure you we will be exploring
the President's antiterrorism policy in the Africa Subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman, I am an original co-sponsor of a Senate Resolution
introduced this week urging President Clinton to enforce our laws to
prevent weapons proliferation to Iran. It is unfortunate that the
Senate is having to confront the President of the United States about
getting tough on rogue states like Iran and the communist dictators in
China. I applaud your efforts in bringing this critical issue to light
and hope that the attention will result in a positive change in U.S.
policy.