[Senate Hearing 105-351]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-351
BOSNIA: STATUS OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE DAYTON ACCORDS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 17, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43-745 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
RICHARD. G LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Abramowitz, Hon. Morton I., Acting President, International
Crisis Group................................................... 25
Review of the Dayton Peace Agreement's Implementation,
prepared by The International Crisis Group................. 27
Gelbard, Hon. Robert S., Special Representative of the President
and the Secretary of State for the Implementation of the Dayton
Peace Accords.................................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Heffernan, John W., Executive Director, Coalition for
International Justice.......................................... 31
Additional information submitted by Mr. Heffernan............ 33
Johnson, Harold J., Associate Director, International Relations
and Trade Division, General Accounting Office.................. 42
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from New Jersey, prepared
statement...................................................... 60
(iii)
BOSNIA STATUS OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE DAYTON ACCORDS
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THURSDAY, JULY 17, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon Smith,
presiding. Present: Senators Smith, Lugar, Hagel, and Biden.
Senator Smith. Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you to this
hearing on the European Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. I will begin with an opening
statement.
We expect Senator Biden will join us. We are very pleased
to have Senator Hagel with us. And I will begin as follows:
Today the committee is convened to discuss the current
situation in Bosnia, particularly the degree to which the
parties to the Dayton Accords are complying with the
obligations laid out in the agreement. Our first panel will
consist of Ambassador Robert Gelbard, the Special
Representative to the President and the Secretary of State for
Implementation of the Dayton Accords.
After we hear from Ambassador Gelbard, the committee will
welcome Ambassador Morton Abramowitz of the International
Crisis Group, Mr. John Heffernan from the Coalition for
International Justice, and Mr. Jim Johnson from the National
Security and International Affairs Division of the General
Accounting Office.
The tragedy in the former Yugoslavia was one of the most
brutal and widespread violence that has occurred on European
soil since Hitler's army swept across the continent. During the
most bitter days of the war, the Clinton Administration
struggled to formulate a coherent policy, even as the
architects of the war were implementing a ruthless strategy of
ethnic cleansing throughout the country.
Even as this brutality was taking place, the administration
continued to support an immoral arms embargo that prevented one
of the parties from gaining the means to defend itself. After 4
years of warfare, the administration realized without United
States leadership the conflict in Bosnia would continue to
rage.
After several weeks of negotiation, on November 21, 1995,
the parties to the conflict signed the Dayton Accords to end
the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Since that time, there
have been significant accomplishments, most notably no major
hostilities have erupted in Bosnia for over 18 months.
However, lasting peace will be impossible without an
ongoing international presence if the Bosnian Serbs, Croats,
and Muslims continue to defy the provisions of the Dayton
Accords, including those relating to war criminals, refugee
return, and the establishment of self-sufficient national
institutions.
I was pleased to learn that Secretary Albright made a
commitment this May that the administration will focus on the
full implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Clearly the lack
of such a commitment during the period that the Implementation
Force was deployed in Bosnia made necessary a continued
military presence after the IFOR mandate ended.
I am hopeful that promoting Dayton implementation this year
will allow the seeds of peace to take root more firmly in
Bosnia and ultimately permit the departure of U.S. troops in
Bosnia in June 1998, as scheduled.
Today I look forward to hearing from Ambassador Gelbard
about the concrete steps the administration is taking to
accomplish this goal. I am particularly concerned with the
continued presence of indicted war criminals in Bosnia.
Reconciliation simply is not possible without the removal of
these individuals from the country. They must be handed over to
The Hague and held accountable for their actions.
I congratulate the British soldiers who have engaged in a
successful operation to apprehend two such war criminals last
week.
I hope this is a sign of more vigorous interpretation of
the SFOR mandate with regard to the role that NATO forces
should play in arresting war criminals in Bosnia.
However, in light of the stabbing of a U.S. soldier
yesterday and several explosions directed against international
organizations since the British operation, I urge the
administration to make clear in no uncertain terms that
retaliation against NATO troops for such operations will be
harshly dealt with.
The issue of refugee return is also of utmost importance to
a lasting peace in Bosnia. I am distressed at the atmosphere of
fear and intimidation that prevents refugees from returning to
their homes if these homes lie in areas controlled by another
ethnic group.
The right of refugee return lies at the heart of the Dayton
Accords. The United States must stress to the parties that
upholding this principle is not optional. The United States has
a critical role in ensuring that the parties to the Dayton
Accords live up to their commitment.
Concurrently, we have an obligation to the American
taxpayers that the $7.7 billion we are spending on our
operations in Bosnia is not contributing to just an expensive
cease-fire.
I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses this
afternoon regarding their views of the status of Bosnia Serb,
Croatian, and Muslim compliance with the Dayton Accords.
Senator Hagel, do you wish to make an opening statement?
Senator Hagel. Only that I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for holding the hearing.
I last saw Ambassador Gelbard in Bosnia 2 weeks ago and
appreciated very much the time that you spent with our
delegation, which included the Senate Majority Leader. And I
know Senator Lott came away from that day in Bosnia with a
very, very strong base and sense of commitment that you and our
people, our forces, our allies, have made to make a difference
there.
And I would just say that I look forward to hearing from
Ambassador Gelbard and the other witnesses. Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Ambassador, should the ranking member--Senator Biden--
arrive, we will hear from him also and include his statement in
the record, if he would wish that. Until that time, we look
forward to hearing your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY STATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS
Ambassador Gelbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Senator Hagel, for your very kind words.
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee to discuss the current situation in Bosnia and our
efforts to accelerate peace implementation there.
With your permission, I would like to enter my entire
statement in the record.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
Ambassador Gelbard. Thank you, sir.
As Secretary Albright emphasized in her May 22 speech,
success in Bosnia is essential to U.S. security and foreign
policy interests in Europe. Our efforts to date to secure peace
in Bosnia should be a source of pride. The U.S.-led
international effort brought the war to an end and has kept the
peace in Bosnia.
The Bosnian mission has re-energized NATO becoming the
model of multi-national military cooperation. We are rebuilding
the country and returning people to their homes. National
elections were held and the governmental institutions mandated
by Dayton have begun to function.
We have given the people of Bosnia something all people
deserve, the chance to live in peace and the prospective of a
better future.
Obviously, much remains to be done, however. When I assumed
this job 3 months ago, I was asked by the President to
undertake a comprehensive administrative review of our Bosnian
policy with the goal of accelerating and strengthening the
peace implementation process.
As a result of this review, we have renewed our commitment
to fully implement Dayton, to strengthen multilateral efforts
and to use every single point of leverage available.
We are, as a result, more aggressively targeting economic
assistance for those who support Dayton and will continue to
deny political participation and other privileges to officials
who obstruct Dayton.
Our top priorities in Bosnia included, first, bringing
indicted war criminals to justice; second, improving the
ability and willingness of local law enforcement authorities to
provide public security for all Bosnians; third, promoting
military stability to minimize the prospects for renewed
fighting; fourth, advancing the development of democratic
institutions that govern in accordance with the rule of law;
fifth, securing the safe return of refugees and displaced
persons to their homes and to enable Bosnians to move freely
throughout their country; six, enhancing economic
reconstruction and commerce between the two entities, creating
a solid foundation for a lasting peace.
We have launched an intensive campaign to reinvigorate the
international effort since then, and our allies have been
completely receptive to these stepped-up efforts.
In Sintra, Portugal, at the end of May, the Bosnian peace
implementation ministerial council unanimously endorsed a
declaration that jointly demands far greater cooperation from
all the Dayton parties, setting specific deadlines for
achieving implementation milestones.
Subsequently, the summit of the aid in Denver reaffirmed
these principles in very strong terms. Then, and most recently
at the NATO summit in Madrid last week, another clear statement
was issued regarding our mutual determination to carry out our
policy fully with particular emphasis on the current situation
in the Republika Srpska.
During her recent visit to Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia,
Secretary Albright also personally stressed the need for
accelerated peace implementation. So have I in my five visits
to Bosnia in my 3 months in this job.
The leaders in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia now understand
that we intend to hold accountable for the lack of progress in
meeting any Dayton goals. Secretary Albright drove home these
points to Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic that their nations
cannot hope to join the West, or in the case of Milosevic the
rest of the planet, unless they demonstrate a genuine
commitment to Dayton, democracy, and basic human rights.
I have reiterated that point during my most trips to the
region with both of them, as well as with all of the leaders of
Bosnia. Our recent efforts to build international support to
delay international loans to Croatia are evidence of our
resolve on this front until Croatia does what they signed up to
do.
Since Sintra, we have had a number of important
implementation successes, many of them essential to building
the national institutions and infrastructure envisaged in
Dayton. After a good deal of U.S. pressure, the Bosnian
national parliament adopted a package of basic economic laws
which help to bind together Bosnia as a single country. This
includes for the first time a national budget, a national
customs and tariff regime, a single national central bank,
single currency.
Bosnia reached the London Club agreement with its
commercial creditors, deeply reducing its debt burden and
regularizing its relations with the international financial
community.
They have secured agreement on the outlines of an IMF
letter of intent. As a result of this progress, we will hold a
donors conference next week, which should garner close to $1.4
billion in pledges for Bosnian reconstruction.
OSCE has completed the registration of over 2.4 million
Bosnian voters for September municipal elections. Under the
able leadership of Ambassador Robert Frowick, the OSCE thwarted
significant efforts at fraud and manipulation during the
registration process for all three parties.
Refugee returns have begun to develop hopeful more backup
in the federation in many communities, including particularly
the middle of Bosnia, Canton, Stolac, Vares Bgwano.
Communities in the Republika Srpska have shown a
significant desire to participate in the U.N.'s open cities
program. And President Plavsic is demonstrating concrete
support to help make this happen.
Unfortunately, though, all three parties continue to show
reluctance in this area, and I particularly look to the Muslims
to take unilateral action undiluted with any links to anything
else to help restore Sarajevo to its previous multi-ethnic
status. This would have great symbolic importance.
Bosnian Muslim and Croat officials in Mostar, Neretva
Canton, has signed a critical agreement to integrate the
police, clearing the way for more rapid vetting and integration
of local police throughout the Federation under the auspices of
the International Police Task Force with training and equipment
provided largely by the United States.
And international forces, as you are well aware, captured
indicted war criminals in the Bosnian-Serb entity near Prijedor
and the Croatian-Serb area of Eastern Slavonia near Vukovar
before that.
I would like to say a few words in particular on the issue
of war crimes and the importance of the International War
Crimes Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia. Individuals, not
nationalities, ethnicities or religions, must be held
responsible for the crimes they committed against their
neighbors and countrymen during the war. Bringing war criminals
to justice fulfills the basic dictates of morality.
But it also it makes it hard to lay blame on an entire
population or ethnic group, the type of collective blame which
can become the source of future conflict. The recent NATO
operation to capture indicted war criminals in Bosnia was
within SFOR mandate and provides clear evidence of
international resolve to see justice done now and in the
future.
Our position on this issue is very clear. The parties to
Dayton are responsible for turning indictees over to the
tribunal. Some have complied fully; others not at all. If local
authorities continue to refuse to abide by their obligation to
arrest indicted war criminals, we will continue to look for
other ways to secure their capture. And this includes not just
Bosnia, but Croatia and Serbia.
As many of you are aware, there is a political crisis
unfolding in the Republika Srpska. An increasingly anti-
democratic climate and abuses of police authority, reminiscent
of the worst of Stalins days, are undermining basic human
rights and implementation of the Dayton Agreement.
We are working actively to ensure respect for
democratically elected authority and the expansion of
independent media to provide objective information to the
people of the Republika Srpska.
The Republika Srpska President Plavsic's message, that a
small group in Pale is enriching themselves while the rest of
Republika Srpska is sinking deeper into isolation and poverty,
has hit a responsive chord there.
It is time for Radovan Karadzic to be delivered to The
Hague and for the Republika Srpska government to function on
the basis of the rule of law.
Until that happens, the Republika Srpska will be denied its
share of the considerable international reconstruction
assistance presently available to Bosnia. Our allies agree on
this point, and President Plavsic, unlike their hard line
adversaries, seems willing to put the larger interests of the
Bosnian-Serb people ahead of the personal greed of the few in
Pale.
Our successes are considerable, but obstacles to Dayton
remain. Many leaders in each of the ethnic communities have
failed to move beyond the war or are working for personal,
political, and economic gain.
Elements of the Bosnian-Serb leadership have been
especially recalcitrant, but Bosnian Croat and Bosniak leaders
are also guilty of creating obstacles to refugee return and
freedom of movement.
Dayton is clear: everyone, as you said, Mr. Chairman, has
the right to return to their homes. But the reality is quite
different. More than 1.6 million Bosnians remain displaced.
Approximately 70 percent come from areas where they would now
be in the ethnic minority.
The United States is currently spearheading an effort to
promote the return of ethnic minorities. United States
officials, including the Secretary of State, have placed
significant pressure on Bosnian officials to allow ethnic
minorities to return to their homes.
Our government has also provided incentives to communities
that accept refugees from all ethnic groups in order to make
this a reality. It is still too early to judge, but more
minorities may return to their homes in both entities this year
than we had earlier thought possible.
While the numbers are not yet huge, these returns will help
destroy the myth that Bosnians from different ethnic groups can
no longer live together.
The United States made a long-term commitment to peace in
Bosnia and the reintegration of Bosnia to Europe. We have
invested U.S. prestige and resources in creating a peaceful,
stable Bosnia.
This long-term commitment means that we will continue to
stay engaged in Bosnia, providing assistance and international
leadership well beyond the end of the SFOR mandate in June of
next year.
The SFOR mission will end in June 1998. It is essential,
therefore, that we focus our energy between now and then on the
task at hand: rapid and full implementation of the Dayton peace
plan so that the process of nation building can proceed without
the threat of renewed fighting.
Our ability to achieve progress in the coming months will
determine the security environment next year and will dictate
what type of international presence is required.
Despite our best efforts, Bosnia will not enjoy a truly
sustainable peace until its people and its leaders demonstrate
the same determination to make Dayton succeed.
The United States has made clear its commitment to help,
and our firm belief that success in Bosnia is in the interest
of the U.S., of European security and of the Bosnian people. We
also have made clear that they must do their part.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gelbard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert S. Gelbard
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee to discuss the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
our efforts to accelerate peace implementation there.
As Secretary Albright emphasized in her speech on the U.S.S.
Intrepid on May 22, success in Bosnia is essential to the protection of
U.S. security and foreign policy interests in Europe. Instability in
Bosnia threatens stability in Europe and undermines our efforts to
create a unified, peaceful, and prosperous Europe as a global partner
for the U.S. As we expand NATO and forge a new security achitecture in
Europe, Bosnia is our first major test.
We have much to be proud of. The international effort led by the
U.S. has kept the peace in Bosnia for more than eighteen months, after
three years of terrible war. IFOR--and now SFOR--have done a
spectacular job. The Bosnia mission has reenergized NATO and is a model
of multinational military cooperation.
Through the international assistance effort, we have successfully
begun the process of rebuilding the country and returning people to
their homes. National elections were held and the governmental
institutions mandated by Dayton, though still fragile, have begun to
function. We have given the people of Bosnia something all people
deserve--the chance to live in peace and the prospect of a better
future.
Much remains to be done, however. That is why, as soon as I came on
board as Special Representative for Dayton Implementation, the
administration undertook a comprehensive interagency review of our
Bosnia policy, with the goal of accelerating and strengthening the
peace implementation process.
The result of this review was a renewed commitment to full Dayton
implementation, and a renewed conviction that the task was achievable
given allied cohesion and a willingness to fully use our considerable
leverage in the Balkans. We intend to use every point of leverage
available, including more aggressively targeting economic assistance to
those who support Dayton and denying political participation and other
privileges to officials who obstruct Dayton.
Our priorities in Bosnia are:
(1) bringing indicted war criminals to justice;
(2) improving the ability and willingness of local law enforcement
authorities to provide public security for all Bosnians;
(3) promoting military stability to minimize the prospects for
renewed fighting;
(4) advancing the development of democratic institutions that govern
in accordance with the rule of law;
(5) securing the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to
their homes and enabling Bosnians to move freely throughout
their country; and
(6) enhancing economic reconstruction and inter-entity commerce.
We have begun an intensive campaign to reinvigorate the
international effort. Several of our allies have recently also reviewed
their Bosnia policy and reached conclusions similar to our own. In
Sintra, Portugal at the end of May, members of the international
steering board governing Bosnia peace implementation unanimously
endorsed a declaration--based largely on the results of our policy
review--that demands far greater cooperation from the Dayton parties
and sets specific deadlines for implementation milestones. For example:
after August 1, the international community will only deal with Bosnian
ambassadors appointed by the new central government based on a
multiethnic formula; after August 1, if the Bosnian Civilian Aviation
Authority is not reconstituted and operational, the steering board will
recommend that international authorities cease to cooperate with the
existing body.
Our message of accelerated peace implementation was stressed during
Secretary Albright's visit to Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia following the
Sintra meeting, and was subsequently endorsed by the leaders of the
international community at the G-7 summit in Denver and the NATO summit
in Madrid.
Secretary Albright made clear to leaders in Bosnia, Croatia, and
Serbia that we hold them accountable for the lack of progress in
meeting the Dayton goals. In particular, Secretary Albright drove home
the point to Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic that their nations cannot
hope to join the West unless they demonstrate a genuine commitment to
Dayton, democracy, and basic human rights. Our recent efforts to build
international support to delay international loans to Croatia should be
seen as evidence of our resolve on this matter.
Since Sintra, we have had a number of important implementation
successes, many of them essential to building the institutions called
for in Dayton:
The package of basic economic laws was passed by the Bosnian
national parliament.
Bosnia reached a London Club agreement with its commercial
creditors, deeply reducing its debt burden and regularizing its
relations with the international financial community.
The outlines of an agreement with the IMF have been reached.
This clears the way for a new donors conference, scheduled for
next week. At the conference, we expect pledges by the
international community of $1.4 billion to continue the
reconstruction of Bosnia.
Registration for the municipal elections was successfully
completed, resulting in up-to-date voter lists. Over 2.4
million Bosnian voters registered. The OSCE, under the able
leadership of Bob Frowick, managed this process and thwarted
significant efforts at fraud and manipulation.
Agreement has been reached under the ``Open Cities'' program
for three municipalities in the Federation to accept minority
refugee returns. More such agreements are expected soon.
An agreement to integrate the police in the mixed Bosniak-
Croat Neretva Canton was signed, clearing the way for more
rapid vetting and integration of local police throughout the
Federation under international auspices.
Indicted war criminals were captured by international forces
in the Bosnian-Serb entity near Prijedor and in the Croatian-
Serb area of Eastern Slavonia near Vukovar.
I would like to say a few words, in particular, on the issue of war
criminals. It is imperative that we establish the principle of
individual responsibility, not only to fulfill the basic dictates of
morality, but also to avoid the collective blame that can become a
source of future conflict. We must drive home to the Bosnian people the
point that individuals, not populations, were responsible for the
horrible crimes witnessed during the war.
The recent capture of indicted war criminals in the Republika
Srpska and Eastern Slavonia is evidence of international resolve on
this issue. The position of the United States on this issue is very
clear. For all parties, we have made compliance with the War Crimes
Tribunal a prerequisite to our assistance. If local authorities refuse
to abide by their obligation to arrest indicted war criminals, we will
continue to look for other ways to secure their capture.
We are very concerned by the current political crisis in the
Republika Srpska (RS), where an increasingly anti-democratic climate
and abuses of police authority are undermining basic human rights and
implementation of the Dayton agreement. We are working actively to
ensure respect for democratically elected authority and the expansion
of independent media to provide objective information to the people of
the RS. RS President Plavsic's message--that a small group in Pale is
enriching themselves while the rest of the RS is sinking deeper into
isolation and poverty--has hit a responsive chord in the RS. It is time
for Radovan Karadzic to be delivered to The Hague and for the RS
government to function on the basis of the rule of law, rather than as
the private fiefdom of corrupt war-profiteers.
As long as the RS refuses to implement key aspects of the Dayton
agreement, it will not benefit from the considerable international
reconstruction assistance presently available to Bosnia. There is
complete agreement between us and our allies on this point. President
Plavsic seems to have also understood this message, and seems willing
to put the larger interests of the Bosnian-Serb people ahead of the
personal greed of a few in Pale.
Our successes, so far, have come through the hard work and cohesion
of the international community. Considerable obstacles remain, however,
to the goals laid out in Dayton. Many leaders in each of the ethnic
communities, unfortunately, have not yet moved beyond the war. Many of
these same leaders are working for personal political and economic
gain, rather than for the creation of a stable Bosnian state. The
Bosnian Serb leadership has been especially recalcitrant, but Bosnian
Croat and Bosniak leaders are also guilty of creating obstacles to
refugee return and freedom of movement. We will continue our pressure,
and as necessary increase that pressure, on all parties to fully comply
with both the letter and the spirit of the Dayton Agreement.
One of the continuing tragedies of the Bosnian war is the large
number of refugees and internally displaced people. Dayton is clear:
everyone has the right to return to their home. But the reality is
quite different. More than 1.6 million Bosnians remain displaced.
Approximately 70 percent of them come from areas where they would now
be in the ethnic minority.
The U.S. is currently spearheading an effort to promote the return
of ethnic minorities. U.S. officials--including the Secretary of
State--have placed significant pressure on Bosnian officials to allow
ethnic minorities to return to their homes. The U.S. Government has
offered incentives to communities to accept the return of refugees and
displaced persons from all ethnic groups.
While it is still too early to judge, recent positive developments
suggest that more minorities may return to their homes this year than
we had earlier thought possible. We are funding minority return
programs in five communities: three in Bosniak-majority areas, one in a
Croat-majority area, and one in the Republika Srpska. Intending
returnees from the minority ethnic group travel regularly and freely to
all five locations. We anticipate that these programs will enable
almost 200 families--close to a thousand people to return safely to
their former homes in areas where they will be in the ethnic minority.
Programs funded by the European Community and the UN will enable
additional minorities to return to their homes in these and other
communities.
The significance of these returns for Bosnia's future is far
greater than the numbers suggest. Our objective this year is to destroy
the myth that Bosnians from different ethnic groups cannot live
together. The safe return and reintegration of several hundred ethnic
minorities to areas controlled by each ethnic group will contribute
significantly to the achievement of this objective.
One of the priority areas for refugee returns is in and around the
city of Brcko. Under the leadership of the Deputy High Representative
and International Supervisor for Brcko, Bob Farrand, we are committed
to making Brcko a model of reconciliation and reintegration in Bosnia
We are targeting international resources, both funding and manpower, on
Brcko to bring this about.
The U.S. has made a long-term commitment to peace in Bosnia and the
reintegration of Bosnia into Europe. We have invested a great deal of
U.S. prestige and resources into creating a peaceful, stable Bosnia.
This long-term commitment means that we and our allies will continue to
stay engaged in Bosnia to provide assistance and international
leadership well beyond the end of the SFOR mandate in June of next
year.
The President has always said that the SFOR mission will end in
June 1998. It is essential, therefore, that we focus our energy between
now and then on the task at hand: rapid and full implementation of the
Dayton peace plan. Municipal elections are coming up in September, the
final Brcko arbitration decision is scheduled for next March. The
result of these and other events will determine the security
environment next year and what type of international presence is
required at that time.
The international community cannot bring peace to Bosnia by itself,
only the people of Bosnia can truly bring peace to Bosnia. But we have
made a commitment to help and we will follow through on that
commitment. The success of our mission in Bosnia is in the interest of
the Bosnian people, in the interest of European security, and in the
national interest of the United States. Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
We are very pleased to be joined by two senior
distinguished colleagues, the ranking member Joe Biden and Dick
Lugar from Indiana. Senator Biden, do you have an opening
statement?
Senator Biden. Well, what I will do, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you very much, I will make a brief opening statement and
forego my questions to the end, so I do not take up both here.
Mr. Chairman, I apologize to the Secretary for being a
little late, although I caught most of his testimony.
We have, to state the obvious, four excellent witnesses
today. We just heard from one, and then we will hear from the
other three.
We are rapidly approaching the moment of truth in Bosnia.
With less than 1 year before the scattered departure of U.S.
ground troops, the fundamental policy question remains, what it
has been for the last 6 years, and that is, is putting a
peaceful, democratic, multi-ethnic Bosnia into place important
enough to the United States as the head of an international
coalition to devote enough resources to make it happen.
Mr. Chairman, until now I regret to say that our answer,
though unacknowledged, I think, has been no. True, our
significant and, I think, really incredibly capable fighting
women and men at the lead, first in IFOR and then in SFOR, have
succeeded in completely separating the warring armies and
putting most of the heavy weaponry in containment sites.
But less noticed, but equally heroic, has been the
contribution of USAID professionals in delivering
reconstruction assistance to thousands of Bosnians in desperate
need of shelter. Unfortunately, however, we have failed
woefully to enforce critical mandates of the Dayton Accords.
The overwhelming majority of displaced persons, as you have
pointed out, and refugees have been unable to return to their
homes if they lie in territory controlled by another religious
group.
And this sad fact means, unfortunately, that the well-
intended and sorely needed reconstruction assistance that USAID
has delivered has served to reinforce the results of the vile
ethnic cleansing that was carried out during the war.
Moreover, as everyone in the room knows, the efforts to
apprehend indicted war criminals until now has been only
minimally successful. I credit, quite frankly, Secretary
Albrights last visit to Bosnia as the reason that everyones
backbone got stiffened on this.
I firmly believe that Radovan Karadzic, whom I met 4 years
ago, and at that time he asked me, along with Milosevic, what I
thought of him, and I said, to his face, that I thought he was
a war criminal and should be tried as one. I said it then, I
say it now.
I think it is essential, quite frankly, as the Secretary
may or may not agree. I think absent the apprehension of
Karadzic and Mladic and their trial before the International
Court at The Hague, the likelihood of the Republika Srpska even
being able to stumble along with its present leadership is
remote. And the likelihood of there being any peace in the
region after we leave is nonexistent in my view.
We obviously have the means to capture these two criminals.
Only the political will has been lacking. I commend our British
SFOR partners for their exploits last week and for which we
provided logistical support. And I hope that we will be able to
coordinate with our French SFOR partners to move against
Karadzic and Mladic.
And I am not unaware, as we all are, of the press accounts
of the threats on the part of the Serbs. That is an old story.
They are a bunch of thugs. They have been doing that all along,
and every time we have stood up to them, we have prevailed.
But I do not want anyone here to suggest that because we
have done this, it means that there will not be retaliation.
There may very well be. There may very well be some deaths.
There may very well be some negative consequences. But no one,
including me, has suggested that this is cost free.
Everybody there knows it is a dangerous operation. And I
pray to God that no one, and particularly no American, loses
their life or limb as a consequence of what has to be done.
But it begs the question to suggest that because of a major
retaliation, we should not act. That was the story that existed
for 3 years and brought about, I think, the delay in action
when we had British and French forces on the ground, and every
time we would suggest that they move, the concern of
retaliation was raised, which was a legitimate concern. And we
essentially were numbed into doing nothing.
And it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, we must be unrelenting in
our pressure, consistent with what the Secretary said, our
pressure on Mr. Tudjman in Croatia. I have used this phrase
before, and my staff and wife do not like me to use it, but he
is no box of chocolates either. I mean, this guy is not one of
the good guys. And I had occasion to tell him that, too.
And the fact of the matter is, he is an impediment, not a
positive force at this point. And I think he and Milosevic are
still waiting for the Dayton Accords to fall apart to fulfill
what they had in mind at the front end, and that is to carve
Bosnia up into two separate entities, or three separate
entities.
And so we have to keep the pressure on him and his forces
in Herzegovina to become cooperative partners in the Federation
and to hand over indicted war criminals on Croatian territory.
This is not just the Serbs.
So I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important
hearing. I am eager to hear the testimony from the other
witnesses.
And as I said, I will--you were gracious enough to let me
deliver my statement late. I will waive against questioning and
question last, so I do not trespass too much on the committee's
time.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Biden. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a
brief statement.
Everyone agrees that the NATO at IFOR and the NATO at SFOR
peacekeeping forces have performed magnificently. There have
been no combat-related U.S. fatalities since the initial
deployment of IFOR to Bosnia in mid-December 1995. IFOR and
SFOR have enforced the cease-fire in the buffer zone separating
the warring factions and monitored compliance with the terms of
the peace agreement forged in Dayton.
The peacekeepers have helped protect civilians and other
personnel working to reconstruct Bosnia. The initial deployment
of IFOR was scheduled to terminate after 1 year, but
implementation of the Dayton Accords proved to be so difficult
and the likelihood of renewal of fighting so certain that the
follow-on stabilization force was approved by NATO ministers
last December.
The U.S. force was substantially reduced to about 8,500
troops, most of them in Bosnia. President Clinton announced
that the duration of this new deployment would be for 18 months
or until the end of June 1998.
More recently, the President stated that some international
force presence may be needed in Bosnia for sometime after June
1998. Both the House and the Senate, however, recently passed
legislation agreeing to the June 1998 troop pull out date,
though the Senate version, unlike the House, does not terminate
funding after that time.
Mr. Chairman, we all know the non-military mandate of
Dayton has not gone particularly well or especially smoothly.
Secretary Holbrook told this same subcommittee last fall that
absent an international force presence in Bosnia, lethal
fighting would almost certainly take place with devastating
results.
I fear the situation has not changed much, nor is it likely
to change very much for the better between now and next June. I
have followed events in Bosnia closely, and this is my
summation of the situation.
Under freedom of movement--there is still no real freedom
of movement across inter-entity lines. Displaced persons cannot
return home. And those who fled Bosnia to other countries
during the war are now being sent back only to find their homes
destroyed or occupied by others.
There is no secure environment for the return of refugees.
The bitterness, anger, and despair have deepened under this
lack of progress and large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina are
still dominated by Serbia and Croatia.
Under elections--Bosnian elections were held last fall, but
municipal elections were twice postponed because of anticipated
violence and widespread fraud. Once elected to municipal posts,
there is no certainty that those minority elected officials
will be allowed to serve or, if permitted to serve, would be
safe in doing so.
There is no secure environment for the installation of
elected officials. The seemingly intractable problems in Brcko
are the most acute, and no resolution to the incendiary
situation there appears to be imminent.
Under the category of war criminals--scores of indicted war
criminals roam the countryside, living off the misery of their
countrymen. They are protected by well-armed thugs and friendly
authorities, while undermining legitimate political authority.
They are running criminal activities which sap what little
economic vitality exists. They flout the international
communities, snub their noses at SFOR troops, ignore all
semblance of the rule of law and retard progress toward
reconciliation and reconstruction.
I am convinced there can be no real progress toward peace
and reconciliation in Bosnia as long as these war criminals
remain at large and pose an immediate and continuing threat to
the peace process. The Dayton peace process and the existence
of war criminals are incompatible.
Under reconstruction--while there has been some modest
success in housing, these have been offset by a dismal
performance, including the absence of a viable professional
police force. There has been minimal progress in building the
political and civic institutions needed for a more tolerant and
multi-ethnic state.
There have been very few projects that crossed inter-entity
lines, projects that if successful could begin to bind the
parties together, heal the breach that exists among the ethnic
groups and create a real stake in a future integrated state.
Under rearmament--reducing the lethal environment in Bosnia
was to be accomplished by reducing the number of heavy weapons
and by balancing the forces with an international equip and
train program to the federation side.
There have been credible reports that the parties have been
stockpiling weapons and preparing police forces as combat units
in preparation for renewed fighting once the SFOR departs. And
once SFOR departs, many, if not most, observers predict the
violent conflict will start all over again.
Now, Mr. Chairman, not all the record is as dismal as this.
As Senator Biden has pointed out, Secretary Albright's
proactive leadership on this issue has been reassuring. And
suffice it to say that a failure to assure the Dayton plan in
Bosnia would not be read as just a failure in the Balkans.
It would be read as a failure of NATO and a failure of U.S.
leadership. There can be no positive consequences for U.S.
interests from that.
If the Dayton Accords are not successfully implemented
because of the activities of the war criminals, because
ordinary citizens cannot enjoy freedom of movement, because
reconstruction projects do not take hold or because revenge and
hatred still dominate the sites of leadership, or because the
international community has diverted its attention, then we can
expect more turmoil in Europe and much more stress within the
NATO alliance.
At a minimum, we need to pay greater and more serious
attention to implementation of the Dayton Accords, and to
foreign policy matters in general. That has been lacking for
some time as we have become absorbed in so many other matters.
I fear indifference to Bosnia and to the success of the
Dayton Agreement is creeping into our priorities here in the
United States.
Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you. I am pleased you called
this very important and timely hearing.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Mr. Ambassador, I really have but two questions. My first
one my colleagues have spoken of very eloquently. That is the
issue of war criminals. When the President went to The Hague to
celebrate the Marshall Plan, I had the honor of accompanying
him.
And while he was engaged in his level of meetings, I went
to the War Tribunal and talked to the officials there.
And they were very frustrated. They had over 70
indictments, but a docket that was emptying quickly. They
wanted work.
The British have obviously added one person to that docket
for trial. And I wonder, as has been stated very well, whether
peace really has any chance if we do not go get war criminals,
or are we not then--if we do not, are we just engaging in a
very expensive cease-fire?
Ambassador Gelbard. Mr. Chairman, you will have noted that
in my opening statement I put the issue of war criminals first
on the list of priorities. I believe that along with the issue
of public security, which is to say a dramatically reformed
police system throughout Bosnia, that these two issues of war
criminals and police are not just priorities but conditions
precedent to being able to implement the rest of the Dayton
Agreements.
There is no question that the continued presence of Radovan
Karadzic in Bosnia, particularly in the Republika Srpska, is
creating a fundamental obstacle to implementation past a
certain point on a whole range of issues.
The decision by NATO, by the NATO Secretary General, to
order the operation in Prijedor--and I have to emphasize this
was a NATO decision. It was not a British decision--was taken
in carefully and taken in accordance with a careful look and a
clear look at the SFORs mandate.
We will continue to look at this issue on a case-by-case
basis. In the first instance, it is the obligation of the
parties to comply.
As I mentioned in my statement, too, and it has often been
neglected, there was an earlier operation involving a sealed
indictment just a couple of weeks before involving a man named
Zlatko Dukmanovic in Eastern Slavonia, who we believe was one
of the principal authors of the violence in Vukovar in Eastern
Slavonia in 1991.
When I met with Munkor Krieshnic, the Serb member of the
joint presidency in Bosnia, after Dukmanovic was arrested
there, he expressed enormous indignation about the fact that
there could be a secret list. I explained to him that in the
United States and many other countries the use of sealed
indictments is pretty common.
And I mentioned that in my previous position as Assistant
Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, I
was pretty familiar with that. And we think it is a good way to
proceed, something we have discussed with the prosecutor.
We want to continue to support the tribunal in every way
possible, and we intend to do so. We obviously do not want to
talk about what the options are for the future.
Senator Smith. But you are assuring us that you are
proactively----
Ambassador Gelbard. We are.
Senator Smith.--engaged in the apprehension.
Ambassador Gelbard. We are active in every aspect of
thinking on this issue. Senator Biden mentioned Croatia. I had
mentioned Croatia in my own statement. I fully agree with you
that the Croatian government is not doing enough.
And that is why the U.S. Government has taken the lead in
putting enormous pressure on Croatia, particularly, but not
only, to use its influence to hand over Bosnian-Croat
indictees, as well as to turn over people who are in their own
territory.
We hope to get strong support from our allies on this. And
we are looking for every means possible to assure that these
people will be turned up for trial in The Hague.
Senator Smith. Second, as you listen to Senator Lugar's
list of the difficulties, I wonder how realistic June 1998 will
be in terms of withdrawal. And yet that is the date that the
American people have been told we will in fact withdraw.
But I wonder if, in the administration or in NATO, are
there active plans ongoing now about our staying beyond that.
Ambassador Gelbard. Well, there are sensitive issues here.
I fully agree with Senator Lugar that there has not been nearly
enough--well, all of you have said have said this, but I said
it myself, that there has not been nearly enough progress in
implementation of the agreements.
We should not allow ourselves to fall into a trap, though,
of blaming ourselves. Fundamental in the first instance, the
obligations are with the parties to comply. These are the three
parties within the country and Croatia and Serbia outside the
country.
They have tried to engage in mutual blocking of efforts,
game playing of all kinds, to prevent infrastructure
development to prevent all the kinds of fundamental priorities
that Senator Lugar and all the rest of you, and I, mentioned in
our statements.
The mandate for SFOR ends in June 1998. We have to
concentrate on the task at hand, which is doing as much as we
can between now and June 1998. But our commitment does not end
then. What we need to do is try to develop the process to the
point that as many of the various aspects of this become self-
sustaining and the parties understand that they themselves have
an enormous amount to lose if they are not complying.
A military presence is not the only factor here. The
international community will walk away with its money, will
walk away with other kinds of support, if they do not comply.
At the donors conference next week, I do not expect that we
are going to be prepared to give the Pale group money out of
our pockets given their corruption and given their illegal
behavior.
What I hope to be able to do, and I will be the head of the
U.S. delegation, is perhaps establish an escrow account for
them and say: We know you need money. The poverty level in the
Republika Srpska has increased dramatically.
We do not want to see poverty, but we are not going to give
you our taxpayers money until you comply with the agreements,
and not selectively either.
Senator Smith. Thank you. Let us go to Senator Hagel. Do
you have some questions?
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
If I could follow on to what the Chairman was talking
about, Mr. Ambassador, in your remarks and what you were
referring to about what happens after June of next year, could
you take us through a little bit of what you would see as how
we would stay behind, the infrastructure of people, the
mission, troops in southern Hungary?
Certainly you have to think about that a little bit. What
kind of presence are you and the administration thinking about
that you would leave behind?
Ambassador Gelbard. I have to admit, Senator, that we have
not yet started thinking about this issue or having any formal
discussions about it. I am sure there is some thinking going on
in individuals' minds, but there have been absolutely no formal
discussions about any such possibility yet.
What is clear is that we are concentrating on what is
happening between now and June. And that is going to be hard
enough, to be very honest with you.
Senator Hagel. Well, you know, I was there 2 weeks ago and
spent some time with you. When we spent the day there, it was
obvious that this was not a kind of a game.
And I think everybody who has been there understands this
kind of mission, that in fact after that magic date comes in
June, something is going to have to be left behind, some kind
of an infrastructure, because we have a rather significant
investment, as you know more than anyone, as do our allies.
And I would hope that you start to focus on some of that,
because this is all part of the planning process. And you are
talking about a donors conference coming up next week. If I was
in the position of being a donor or entertaining the
possibility of investing in that part of the world, I would
want to ask that question, and I would want some answers.
And I would think--Bob, you know this, and I know that you
cannot say as much as maybe you would like to say here, but
this is to me very critical, because if you expect support from
this Congress, and you have already seen what has happened, as
Senator Lugar has talked about, those are the kind of questions
that are going to be asked, hard questions like that, if
nothing else to protect our investment over there.
Ambassador Gelbard. Senator, we are very well aware of
that, obviously. It is clear that there will be an
international presence in Bosnia after June 1998.
We are still working on the issues right now of both the
immediate crises, particularly things such as the current
Republika Srpska crisis that you and I discussed before the
hearing began, the issue of security for the international
community, which is a problem which we encounter today,
unfortunately.
Looking out over the next several months, in terms of SFOR
and troop levels, as well as concentrating with real
seriousness on accelerating the civilian implementation as much
as possible, we certainly will be addressing the future, there
is no question, in the coming months. And I would be very happy
to come back and appear before this committee at that time. But
as I say, we have not quite yet.
Senator Hagel. Changing the subject a little bit: return of
ethnic minorities. Could you give this committee a little more
definition than what you alluded to in your statement?
Ambassador Gelbard. This is a very high priority for us. We
have been working as closely as possible with the U.N. High
Commission on Refugees to make sure that all our programs are
in synch.
We have the added advantage of leverage through the use
funds, giving aid or not giving aid.
Recently, in fact, I met with some of the Bosnian-Croat
leadership and explained to them that we had made offers to a
number of communities in Central Bosnia to provide significant
economic reconstruction assistance, assuming they agreed to the
return of refugees and displaced persons. This included Muslims
and Serbs.
Most of them did agree; some did not. The ones that do
agree get money; those that do not get nothing. We are now on
the edge of having a plan with the Croats for refugee returns
for the entire Canton of Middle Bosnia. That would be a very
important step.
There have been, I think, about a dozen communities that
have now agreed to such planning, and in even some of the
communities that have surprised people.
There is a town called Stolac, S-t-o-l-a-c, where there has
been a dramatic flow of return of Muslim refugees recently.
There have been other towns held by the Bosniaks, the Muslims,
Vares Bgwano, where we have seen big increases of returns of
Serbs and Croats.
So we are keeping--we want to keep the pressure up to make
sure this works, and we have been very pleased to see that our
European allies have very much the same view we do.
Significant problems remain in the Republika Srpska, as I
alluded to in my statement. We have been working on what we
call this open cities program, and we have gotten agreement of
a number of mayors in key towns, such as Shepovo.
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the Pale group have
opposed this. Mrs. Plavsic supports it. And we are working to
try to make this a reality.
The key problem is in Brcko, as you know. And there we have
concentrated a lot of U.S. efforts with an American citizen, a
Foreign Service colleague of mine, as the supervisor for Brcko.
We have as a goal the return of up to 2,000 families by the end
of next year.
A really important symbol, as I mentioned in my statement,
is to achieve the return of Sarajevo as a multi-ethnic city.
And here I intend, and I know the rest of the international
community intends, to continue to put more pressure on the
Bosnians in order to make this happen, so that Serb and Croat
former residents can return to their homes.
This is a very high priority for the President, and we are
going to make this happen.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Ambassador, thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Mr. Ambassador, a couple things I need to
touch on quickly, and then I have a few questions you might
expand on.
Is there any doubt in your mind that the Dayton Accords
provide for the ability of military forces, in this case SFOR,
to be able to apprehend war criminals? The allegations and the
context of the allegations in this forum by one of our
colleagues, who is a strong opponent of our involvement in
Bosnia, is characterizing the British action as mission creep;
i.e., not within the purview of responsibility or the authority
of military forces in Bosnia to have, in one case, shot and the
other apprehended an indicted war criminal.
Ambassador Gelbard. Obviously there was serious examination
of the NATO--of the SFOR mandate before this operation
occurred, and there is----
Senator Biden. SFOR as laid out in Dayton.
Ambassador Gelbard. The SFOR follows from, flows from
Dayton.
Senator Biden. I know. That is a very important point,
though, to make sure we----
Ambassador Gelbard. That is right. And there is absolutely
no question in our minds, in the minds of the NATO Secretary
General and the minds of the British government and in the
minds of SACEUR that the SFOR troops were acting within their
mandate and under legitimate legal authorities.
Now I understand Dayton. Dayton gives the primary
responsibility for apprehending war criminals to the local
authorities. But in the event that they do not, it gives--there
is the ability of, within the mandate, of the NATO forces to
take such action.
We look at--there are several, there are multiple
instruments which lay out the authorities for this to happen.
We have looked at this very carefully. Dayton--the U.N.
Security Council resolution which clearly authorizes
apprehensions, if necessary, the implementing regulations of
the tribunal and the SFOR mandate.
So all of them make----
Senator Biden. The only thing that is operative is the
political sense. My colleagues and I, we all are basically of
one mind here. You are not getting an accurate reflection of
the sense of the Senate from the four of us. We may have
differences in degree in how we approach these things, but I
think we are pretty--we are basically seeing it from the same
angle and probably the same page.
Just so you understand--I know you do understand, but I
want to make it clear for the record, that the legitimacy of
our presence in Bosnia is tethered in the minds of many of our
colleagues, not to any U.N. resolution, not to anything other
than Dayton, where we participated, we were involved, we were
the prime mover.
And so if it is not in the Dayton Accords, it is going to
be argued that it is not within the delegated authority of the
United States, the President of the United States, vis-a-vis
the Congress, having authorized him to use American forces
abroad. This is the indirect way in which this connects. And so
that is why I focus on Dayton.
Ambassador Gelbard. We are very comfortable about the
authorities that derived from Dayton.
Senator Biden. Now, the other point is that you gave, Mr.
Ambassador, a very thorough and a very State Department-like
answer to the chairman about what you would do in terms of
apprehension.
Ambassador Gelbard. And we are doing all in our power,
Senator. The fact is that, at least in the French sector, it is
not--no one has to go searching for Mladic or Karadzic. No one
wonders where they are. I mean, they walk down the street. They
are seen in broad daylight. They are--it is not like they are
members of the IRA, you know, running from safe house to safe
house.
Senator Biden. So I am going to have to be a little less
diplomatic. If in fact an indicted war criminal, sealed or
unsealed indictment, in effect walks under the nose of American
military personnel, is it their--are they authorized to or
directed to apprehend that person?
Ambassador Gelbard. The SFOR mandate makes it clear that
SFOR troops have the authority to apprehend indictees whom they
come across.
Senator Biden. They have always had the authority. And I
will not embarrass you by pursuing it beyond this. They have
always had the authority.
As we all know, and notwithstanding the fact that there are
a number of countries involved in SFOR, there is an American
commander who commands an American force located in a specific
geographic location. And that commander takes his orders from
an American, a part of the NATO force.
Moreover, what does an American captain think when he or
she is sitting in a coffee shop and Mladic walks and sits down,
you know, across from them?
I am not being facetious. It sounds like I am, but I mean,
I am not. I mean, that is not as likely to happen now as it has
been happening. But is there any clear understanding on the
part of American military forces as part of SFOR what they
should do when they--if they were to stumble upon an indicted
war criminal?
Ambassador Gelbard. Yes.
Senator Biden. Can you tell us what it is?
Ambassador Gelbard. I would rather not get into anything
operational. Let me just say, Senator, I think it is
important----
Senator Biden. You have said enough.
Ambassador Gelbard. I think the important point is a
broader point.
Senator Biden. To you it is, not to me. The important point
to me is what I just asked you. That is important to me. Now
you can go and tell me what is important to you.
Ambassador Gelbard. Thank you. What has occurred over the
last few months has been a dramatic acceleration of much more
aggressive action on the part of the U.S. Government and the
allies in all aspects of our policy. I started to talk about
this in my statement.
When I took this job at the request of the President, I
undertook a review of how we could accelerate and have much
more effective implementation. President Clinton, Secretary
Albright, Sandy Berger, Secretary Cohen, and the other relative
members of the National Security Cabinet have all been working
very closely to make this happen.
Senator Biden. And some have slightly different views than
the one you made, because we all know each of them personally.
We all know they are not singing from the same hymn.
Ambassador Gelbard. I actually think they are, sir. Our
allies now are strongly in synch with us, and we are working
very closely to use every bit of conditionality, leverage, and
linkage we have. I do not think it is any coincidence that over
the last 3 months now we have seen a serious acceleration in
terms of the use of this conditionality, as well as suddenly a
couple of cases of apprehensions.
Senator Biden. For that, I compliment you. I read it the
way you state it, that it is a, if not change in policy, a
decision to be more forceful in implementing the policy. I
think it is your leadership and the American leadership that
put the British in the position to take the action they took.
I hope it is a continued acceleration, because you know
better than we, we do not have much time. Between now and the
time the Dayton withdrawal is set--and I will come back to
that, if we have a second round--there is going to have to be a
heck of a lot more progress. And I am not being critical. I am
being supportive.
Ambassador Gelbard. I fully agree with you, Senator.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Ambassador Gelbard, if more criminals came
to the tribunal, is the tribunal ready and able to handle the
job? From time to time there are thoughts that they might not
be. What is your general impression of the tribunal that would
try these people? And are they likely to be able to do that?
Ambassador Gelbard. We are concerned that the tribunal does
need more surge capacity. As was pointed out fortuitously in
today's Washington Post, we have been very concerned about a
U.N. ruling which forced us to remove people that we had
offered to the tribunal, people who we were sending on detail.
Other governments have had the same experience. I believe
this came about because some other governments objected that
only the richer countries could afford to do this. But we had
prosecutors, investigators, Foreign Service people, we had
others, who were detailed there.
Not only that, but the U.N. was charging us 13 percent
overhead for each individual. So the more we cooperated, the
more it cost us. There is something wrong with that.
We hope to get that changed, and I am personally working
very hard on this, as is Secretary Albright, who also visited
the tribunal during that visit to The Hague. I am in close
contact with the chief prosecutor, and we are trying to do
everything to help her.
Senator Lugar. I appreciate that response and the detail of
it. The general public listening to all of this must assume
that there is a court all set up waiting for action to occur.
But as you suggest, there is, in a way, but not set up well
enough for a surge capacity.
What if we were to become active in the country and several
people not only were indicted but apprehended, and the world
then watched as these people are assembled and there is no one
there to try them?
Ambassador Gelbard. I think, Senator, that now with some of
the concrete results that the tribunal has been showing, such
as the 20-year sentence that Totej just received, recent
apprehensions in Eastern Slavonia and Republika Srpska, the
other current trials that are going on, there is more concrete
proof to the U.N. management, as well as to U.N. member
countries that these people are serious.
Justice Louise Arbour, the chief prosecutor, is
outstanding. There is also a former Los Angeles prosecutor who
is working for her name Terry Bowers. There is a former Federal
judge who is also one of the judges on the tribunal who is also
doing an outstanding job. But we want to make sure that they do
have this capacity.
Senator Lugar. This hearing gives us a good opportunity,
that is, those of us who have frustration about Bosnia, to
communicate. And so I wanted to do that for a moment just in
general, because it took some time before the United States
decided to come involve in this Bosnian issue.
And we did so at the behest of our friends, and finally
because we saw, through NATO, a way of becoming engaged and
doing so effectively.
Throughout this time, there always has been the question,
first of all, whether we were going to be involved and then how
long. In the last hearing we had in October of last year, the
administration witnesses were reticent to say very much.
Without assigning praise or blame, the fact is we needed
Secretary Holbrook, who is much more forthcoming, to spell it
out as he saw it from outside the administration; he indicated
we would be there. The President did not indicate this until
after the election.
In my judgment, he could have done so many weeks before,
but he did so after. This brought a certain amount of cynicism
which we are now dealing with again.
The dilemma again and again for our government is not only
the American public and their understanding of what the
President is saying and what we are all saying, but our allies.
The fact that, simultaneously, as you more than anybody else
knows, we are in the process of integrating three new nations
into NATO, and a whole new situation will be coming before the
Senate about the same time next year that this June withdrawal
deadline is approaching.
And this is a source of concern for everybody. The
credibility of this is of the essence now. This is why many of
us are pressing for clarity and leadership. Clearly there is
debate, and has been in the administration, as to what we do.
For a long time the thought was that we have military forces,
and they have done their job and done a good job. They have
separated the forces. They have kept the peace.
But they have also stayed out of harm's way, and with no
casualties. And that is a very important objective for all
Americans, to minimize casualties. But if that is the basic
objection, then we have a problem.
And clearly, we have a problem in the Senate among senators
who would say that apprehending indicted war criminals is
mission creep, in essence, it is going out and apprehending
somebody and taking risks well beyond what we ought to be
doing.
And this is why we have to wrestle this to the ground both
in the Senate--better doing it with the administration, better
out there in NATO. But my judgment is that it has not yet been
wrestled to the ground.
When this occurred the other day with the violent instance
in the British zone, it was a flash point here in which some
people took sides and said, thank goodness, somebody finally
saw the light, but others said this is dangerous, you had
better cut this off right now.
No, we do not have a consensus, and the President has to
lead on this. And, you know, I am hopeful that you will offer
some counsel to him.
Ambassador Gelbard. First, the President, I think, has been
showing extraordinary leadership on this issue. When he asked
me go through this administration review on policy, we ended up
going through this in great detail with him personally.
We had two meetings with him in which I have been present,
long meetings where we have gone through it. He has been deeply
engaged on the Bosnia issues, as recently as this weekend, when
he spoke out very strongly, or this week when he spoke out very
strongly, on these issues.
He deeply cares about and is tremendously informed about
the issues in Bosnia and is determined to make this a success.
That is why he took the lead in instructing Secretary Albright
and appointing me to make this work. And I am determined to
make this work.
There is no mission creep involved. I want to be very clear
about what happened last week. That was not mission creep. As I
said, it was within the mandate. Our military are not fighting
in any way. Our military and SFOR as a whole are deeply
involved in many aspects of implementation, and I am
tremendously proud of them.
General Crouch, who is the current SFOR commander, has done
an outstanding job, as has General Meigs, who is the American
commander in NND North, who is just leaving, I think. They have
shown enormous leadership, and now I think the same thing could
be said with General Joulwan, who just left, finished his term
at SACEUR last week, whom I had worked with in Latin America
before that.
With the arrival of General Wes Clarke, who was involved
with Dick Holbrook in the Dayton negotiations, we have somebody
who is equally knowledgeable about all these issues. And I have
already been holding extensive conversations with him. I am
seeing him next week again.
We are also working very, very closely together. Literally,
the last thing I did in my office before coming here was to
take a call from General Shalikashvili, and we were talking
through various aspects of these issues.
We are really working very closely to make this a success,
and there is a sense of real urgency about precisely what you
are discussing.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, could I
intervene to followup on something the Senator said?
You have named four people. I would only indicate to you
that I spoke to one of them at length recently, of the
principals you named. And that particular person told me that
in addressing our colleagues in NATO and their representatives,
their perm reps, he put a list on a board.
And he said, ``Now, these are the indicted war criminals.
We can get each of those people. I need to know, though, that
if the military in SFOR takes that action, that there will be
political support from all of you for having done that. Now how
do you vote?''
And he said the room was deafeningly silent, not a single,
solitary NATO representative said: Go get them, Charlie. None.
This particular military man turned to me and said, ``Joe,
you keep pushing for this action. I do not disagree with you.
But there is no political will.''
Admittedly, this was 2 weeks ago or longer. Admittedly,
there has been at least one instance of change. I think what
the Senator is saying--please correct me, Senator, if I am
wrong--is unless the President of the United States says: We,
the United States, and we, the NATO forces, have as a policy
the apprehension of these indicted war criminals, then we are
going to be in this netherland.
Well, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, whom I have great
respect for, stands up and introduces legislation and talks
about all this mission creep right after I stand up and say,
``Go get them. Great.''
I am not suggesting at this point that I am right and she
is wrong, only to reinforce the point of the Senator from
Indiana. So the whole place in the Senate kind of breaks down,
and people are coming up to--I am not sure I speak for all of
them, but some know we are all deeply involved, and they assume
that we have some knowledge of Bosnia and they say, what is the
deal. I mean, did they do the right thing? Did they do the
wrong thing?
As you know, there is a division of labor up here. When I
want to know something about the tax bill, I can go speak to
Senator Roth or someone else, or if they want to know something
about foreign policy, they come to people who hopefully they
have some respect for.
And they say: Well, gees, I do not know. So and so just
said such and such.
I realize I am being awfully anecdotal here, but I hope--I
have a friend named Bob Gold, great guy--we went to school
together, and I still work with him.
I will say, ``Bob, do you understand?''
And he will look me in the eye, and he will say, ``Joe, I
not only understand, I overstand.''
You probably overstand the point that we are making here.
But something definitive has to----
Ambassador Gelbard. Senator, all I pointed out to you is
that I have a pretty good guess who that military man might
have been.
Senator Biden. I am sure you know exactly who it is.
Ambassador Gelbard. Yes. First, the fact remains, as you
yourself pointed out, that the operation in Prijedor did take
place 2 weeks later. And those very same perm reps knew about
this and approved it.
Senator Biden. Good.
Ambassador Gelbard. So I rest my case.
Senator Biden. Well, no.
The perm reps knew about it, and they signed on. I say
hurrah, great, let us let everybody know that, because the way
it was played up here, it was like a great play. I should not
say ``was played.''
The way it came across was, you know, Madeline went over
there, and Madeline started to bark. And that emboldened some
folks to act. The Brits acted with our knowledge, and they
moved.
I am sitting here saying, ``Is this the beginning or is
this the end of the beginning?''
You just said something that I----
Ambassador Gelbard. I am not going to be in a position to
tell you whether this is about operational issues. I will say
to you, though, once again, this was an SFOR operation done
under the authority and at the instruction of the Secretary
General of NATO. And it should be clearly understood as such.
It was not an independent British operation. It was not an
independent British/U.S. operation. This was an NATO/SFOR
operation.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Thank you for allowing
me to interrupt.
Senator Smith. Are there further questions?
Senator Biden. I have one further question, because I think
this particular witness may be the most qualified to answer it,
if I may. And maybe you spoke at the beginning of your
statement about this. If you did, I apologize, and I will read
in the statement about what I am about to ask you.
There have been institutions through the good work of this
administration and NATO that we have attempted to set up. One
is the tripartite presidency. One is the Muslim/Croat
Federation. There is the council of ministers. There is the
parliamentary assembly and so on.
Can you give us some sense as to how much--I have to write
this down. Military operations, I think we have all said, have
been remarkably successful, and geared to what the public
thinks is, and views their responsibility to be, separate the
warring factions, stop the carnage, et cetera.
Then there is the aid and reconstruction piece of this
operation, which has been less successful because we have
rightfully, in my view, not gone forward with some of it
because the conditions precedent to going forward have not been
there; I.e., resettlement, et cetera.
There is a third piece, the political piece. And I do not
know--I am artificially separating them, but there is the
political piece. The political piece is the Muslim/Croat
Federation; is there a limited joint military command that is
actually training together and actually doing something?
Is there an actual functioning of the central bank that has
some cohesion to it?
And so if you could just for a moment talk to us about the
success barrier or the status of the maturation of any of these
institutional structures that are designed to bring about a
political apparatus that can be in place whenever it occurs.
Ambassador Gelbard. I talked about this a bit in my opening
statement, but let me go into more detail on this.
First on the joint institutions, they have begun to develop
in a reasonably positive way. We are now seeing the joint
presidency functioning, actually producing good results. It was
not easy at the beginning, but now they are actually doing it.
And concrete examples of that are the central bank and
single currency law, which I brokered, along with my colleague
David Lipton of the Treasury. The central bank will be up and
running fully by September, but it does exist.
Single currency. Unfortunately, Mr. Krieshnic held out on
currency design at the last minute and had some designs that
were not acceptable. But we are pretty close on that.
There is now a national budget for the first time. There is
a national tariff and customs regime. And we are seeing other
institutions beginning to function.
I mentioned that the three parties did successfully and
together negotiate a debt rescheduling agreement that was
outstanding for their benefit with the commercial banks a
couple weeks ago. They have now done all the substance for an
IMF agreement, which is important.
The co-prime ministers are working well together, Solosich
and Bosich. And we are beginning to see some--the joint
parliament has approved all these laws that we are seeing.
The one joint institution which still has not quite taken
place is the standing committee on military matters, which had
its first meeting when Secretary Albright and I visited. The
Serbs are holding out again right now, but General Crouch and I
have been lobbying together to make this work in the right way.
In the Federation, we are seeing very positive developments
based on the Washington agreement. The train equip program that
we run is moving exceedingly well.
Senator Biden. Is it?
Ambassador Gelbard. Yes.
Senator Biden. Now is that a change from just 4 months ago?
Ambassador Gelbard. It is a change from about 6 months ago.
Senator Biden. Six months.
Ambassador Gelbard. We have seen dramatic progress, thanks
to Ambassador Pardew's efforts and efforts of others. Really
good work by the MPRI contractors, good cooperation between the
Croat and Bosniak sides. And they just reached agreement on the
set of ranks within the military, but it is functioning well.
Senator Biden. And it is integrated.
Ambassador Gelbard. It is integrated. They have agreed on
ratios of staff at all the various levels between the two
groups, generally at 2.5 to 1, more or less.
The Federation police, we have now established a Sarajevo/
Canton police. We made a tremendous breakthrough thanks to the
efforts of our charge, Bob Becroft, and my pressuring the
Croats in particular in direct at Canton, which is where Mostar
is. That agreement was signed on the 16th finally.
Once we get that up and running, which we expect will
happen on July 21--and I have to say, the Croatian government
did finally help on this a lot. We see this as the gateway to
the Cantons.
Senator Biden. Well, I have taken more time than I should.
That is the most encouraging, your last litany is the most
encouraging thing I have heard.
Ambassador Gelbard. One last point, economic aid. While we
are withholding it in the Republika Srpska, we are also not
getting any progress there on the police because they have this
old line, Communist style repressive police, and we are
insisting on the form. Otherwise they are not going to get
anything from us.
We do have good economic reconstruction progress in the
Federation, and employment has increased 50 percent in the last
year. We are seeing good export agreements that have now been
signed with Croatia. They are exporting energy through the
joint energy grid.
So there is a lot of room for hope here, although we are
still obviously not there yet.
Senator Smith. Ladies and gentlemen, there is a vote on the
Senate floor. We have about 5 minutes to get to it. And so we
are going to take a seventh inning stretch, and we will be
right back with our second panel. So thank you.
Ambassador, thank you very much. [Recess.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, ACTING PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Ambassador Abramowitz. Mr. Chairman, Members of the
committee.
Thank you for inviting me to participate at this hearing.
Bosnia has been a subject of deep interest to me for a number
of years.
I have not prepared a formal statement, but as Acting
President of the International Crisis Group, I would like to
submit for the record a brief status report on the
implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which was put out
yesterday by our International Crisis Group team in Bosnia.
Mr. Chairman, I returned from Sarajevo last Friday and
would like to make a few points very briefly.
First, I believe we are at an important juncture in the
implementation of Dayton which can lead to greater progress
than we have seen so far. That is largely due to the change in
policy which permits SFOR to actively seek out and arrest
indicted war criminals.
Also very important is the political turbulence in
Republika Srpska. President Plavsic's statement that many of
the former and present leaders of Republika Srpska are crooks
is remarkable.
I believe the impact of economic restrictions on Srpska has
been greater than I imagined. Economic straits offer hope that
leaders will be generated within Republika Srpska who are
prepared to cooperate with the West in implementing Dayton so
that they attract Western assistance. Whether or not this will
happen is obviously uncertain, but to me prospects seem a
little more promising than 3 months ago. Arresting war
criminals, however difficult, remains a key to progress.
Second, though things may be somewhat more promising, they
are unlikely to change sufficiently by June 1998 to allow a
withdrawal of NATO forces. A premature withdrawal would
undermine the progress that has been made and likely lead to a
renewal of hostilities.
I recognize the concern of many in Congress on continuing
to keep U.S. forces in Bosnia, but I believe that Congressional
insistence on withdrawal by June, 1998, undermines
reconciliation and reconstruction in Bosnia, reinforces
nationalist leaders' unwillingness to cooperate with Dayton,
and undercuts the West's huge moral and material investment in
Bosnia. I think Congressional insistence is a big blow to
successful implementation of Dayton.
Finally, I believe Serbia and Croatia are crucial to real
progress in Bosnia in Dayton implementation. It is extremely
important to continue to withhold international lending and
financial assistance to these countries. The administration
only recently got religion until they seriously cooperate in
the implementation of Dayton.
I would like to make two other points which are not in my
statement, having listened to the testimony. First, I think the
administration, any administration, occasionally speaks with
forked tongue. And this Administration is no different than
many other administrations.
Referring here to Dayton and to their perspective on
Dayton, when they do not want to do anything in the case of war
criminals, they say it is incumbent on the parties. And that
was their position for 2 years. Now, you know and I know when
Dayton was signed; and although it says the parties were
responsible for turning over indicted war criminals, nobody
believed the parties, nobody believed the war criminals who
controlled the governments would give themselves up.
If anything were to be done, it had to be done by the
outside world. And finally that is beginning to happen.
Second, part of the problem of getting action on war
criminals is, as you well know, although it is not discussed
here, is the Pentagon. The Pentagon has refused for a long time
to go after war criminals, to expand the mission, to expand the
mission into a robust one. That has fortunately changed, at
least in regard to war criminals, and I am pleased to see it.
That is all I have to say, sir.
[The report referred to by Ambassador Abramowitz follows:]
Review of the Dayton Peace Agreement's Implementation
16 July 1997, Sarajevo
[prepared by the international crisis group]
I. Introduction
The fortunes of the peace process and prospects for a lasting
settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been improved in the past
month by the successful arrest of an indicted war criminal and the
political turbulence in the Republika Srpska. The cycle of impunity
which had hitherto characterised the wars in the former Yugoslavia has
been broken. The psychological impact cannot be over-estimated. Though
implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) has to date been
disappointing, a window of opportunity has now been opened. Moreover,
the 12-month countdown to the withdrawal of NATO troops in June 1998 no
longer appears set in stone. The DPA is a complex treaty ending a long
and bitter war and its successful implementation requires a firm,
ongoing, long-term commitment. Without such a commitment, the
nationalist leaders will be able to obstruct implementation in the
expectation that they can outwait the international community.
The momentum which has been generated in recent weeks will be lost
unless it is backed up with further arrests and, critically, a public
information campaign explaining carefully to the Bosnian public the
rationale behind this new policy. To ensure that the Dayton Peace
Agreement does go down in history as the treaty which ended the Bosnian
war, and not simply the start of an expensive cease-fire, the departure
of NATO troops must be tied to the completion of the overall mission--a
sustainable peace in Bosnia--not an arbitrary deadline.
II. Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia
Following 19 months of resistance by the authorities of Republika
Srpska, Croat-controlled parts of the Federation, Croatia, and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), NATO moved to arrest indicted war
criminals. In a bold and unprecedented action on 10 July, British SFOR
troops arrested Milan Kovacevic and killed Simo Drljaca in a shoot-out.
Both men were indicted for genocide, though their indictments had not
been published. These operations have given new credibility to the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Though the number of indictees who have been brought to justice remains
modest--of 78 named indictees, ten are in custody, while one who had
been in custody has died, and one was killed resisting arrest--there is
an expectation of more arrests.
Only the Bosniacs have handed over all indictees in their
jurisdiction. Croatia has turned over two out of 18 indictees believed
to be within Croat-controlled territory. In May, Croatia surrendered
Zlatko Aleksovski, a Croatian Macedonian, but only after the US
threatened to block a $500 million World Bank loan. And former Bosnian
Croat general Tihomir Blaskic ``voluntarily'' gave himself up after
intense pressure was brought to bear on Zagreb. Nevertheless, Croatia
continues to harbour key indicted war criminals, in particular Dario
Kordic, in territory it effectively controls. Meanwhile, the FRY and
Republika Srpska refuse to co-operate with ICTY.
The phenomenon of sealed indictments has contributed to the change
in fortunes of ICTY. Instead of publishing indictments, ICTY serves the
indictments and arrest warrants to SFOR. Even before the operation
against Kovacevic and Drljaca, ICTY had achieved an initial success
with its new policy by arresting Slavko Dokmanovic, a Croatian Serb
former mayor of Vukovar, in Eastern Slavonia in June. The policy has
led to much speculation about future arrests.
The Bosnian Serb media have reacted predictably and are attempting
to use the arrests to rally Bosnian Serbs behind Radovan Karadzic, both
in his internal power struggle with Biljana Plavsic and against the
international community in general. To build on the momentum generated
by these operations, it is critical to launch a sustained public
information campaign explaining the significance of the action to all
Bosnians, and in particular to Bosnian Serbs. Unfortunately,
international organisations have focused their media resources on the
handful of foreign journalists in Sarajevo and operated exclusively in
English. Until now, there has been no ``hearts and minds'' campaign.
However, this policy seems to be in the process of change. After the
arrests, SFOR published one-page advertisements in the local press
explaining the reasons for the arrests in the Bosnian languages. This
effort must be expanded.
III. Republika Srpska
The leadership of Republika Srpska has been stunned by NATO's 10
July operations, and it seems unsure about how to respond. The fact
that British troops within SFOR carried out the action has been
especially disorienting since the Bosnian Serb media have generally
portrayed the British as their eternal allies. Nevertheless, there have
been no serious reprisals to date save three token bombings which
appear to have been set deliberately to avoid casualties.
The arrests come on top of a long-running internal power struggle
in Republika Srpska. In essence, the battle is between the nationalist
Biljana Plavsic and the opportunists Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo
Krajisnik. The conflict has been evolving over many months, but it came
to a head at the beginning of July after Plavsic ordered the dismissal
of the Republika Srpska Interior Minister. Plavsic's objection to
Karadzic and Krajisnik is that they are ``raping'' Republika Srpska
economically and are, in the process, harming long-term Serb interests.
After her brief but humiliating detention in Belgrade, Plavsic went on
a remarkable media offensive giving details of financial
misappropriations by Karadzic and Krajisnik, and Karadzic's continuing
control of the SDS and government officials in Pale. Plavsic then
attempted to dismiss the Republika Srpska parliament and called for new
parliamentary elections on 1 September. At present these will not take
place because the Republika Srpska Constitutional Court has ordered a
stay of execution of Plavsic's decision. Now the parliament is back in
session.
The power struggle is likely to run for some time because Plavsic
is Republika Srpska's elected President and cannot be dismissed without
a referendum. Plavsic also enjoys the support of the international
community. Moreover, she appears to have support among ordinary people
in dire economic conditions and also within the Bosnian Serb Army.
However, the possibility of armed conflict between the entity army and
the police under the control of the Interior Minister and loyal to
Karadzic should not be ignored. Though Plavsic should never be
considered a moderate or a democrat, her criticisms of the rest of the
SDS leadership have been useful in undermining the strangle-hold they
currently have on society. She is also more likely to co-operate with
the international community in as much as she considers co-operation to
be in Serb interests.
Regardless of the outcome of the power struggle, in part
precipitated by the international community's witholding of economic
assistance to the entity, Republika Srpska will emerge changed and
hopefully more willing to cooperate in the implementation of Dayton.
IV. The Federation
Building the Federation remains a slow and painful process. More
than three years after its creation in March 1994, it remains divided
into Croat-and Bosniac-controlled territories and all aspects of life
are dominated by the two nationalist parties, HDZ and SDA. Federation
institutions, including a parliament, exist, but are often by-passed by
the party bosses. Only a handful of cantonal and municipal assemblies
function; in four municipalities interim assemblies have never
convened. The HDZ is currently boycotting sessions of the Federation
Parliament in protest at SDA refusal to endorse proposals for redrawing
municipal boundaries along ethnic lines. HDZ proposals are essentially
aimed at creating homogeneous Croat units throughout the Federation.
In May, hard-line Croats formed the ``Croat Community of Herzeg-
Bosna.'' This is supposedly not a geographic entity but a self-
appointed body to look after Croat interests throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In reality, the institutions of a separate Croat entity
continue to function, especially in Mostar. At the early July funeral
of Mate Boban, the Bosnian Croat leader who carved out the Croat
statelet through ethnic cleansing, Croatia's defense minister Gojko
Susak pledged that he would remain faithful to the course which Boban
had plotted.
Despite the self-serving optimism of some officials from both
communities, the Federation building process remains seriously flawed
and agreements remain unfulfilled.
V. Return of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees
Global figures on returns remain disappointing. Of 2.3 million
displaced persons at the end of hostilities, some 280,000 have returned
to Bosnia, mostly to areas in which they belong to the ethnic majority.
At the same time, however, more than 80,000 people, many of them Serbs
from the Sarajevo suburbs, have been forced from their homes in the
period since the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. With some 60 per
cent of the national housing stock destroyed or damaged during the war,
physical difficulties alone are daunting. Moreover, they have been
exacerbated, both by the deliberate and systematic destruction of
houses in both Croat-controlled parts of the Federation and in
Republika Srpska, and by discriminatory property legislation in both
entities which affect majority as well as minority returnees alike.
While the overall picture remains bleak, progress is being made
within the Federation in central Bosnia. Several municipalities, in
particular Busovaca, Gornji Vakuf and Konjic, have begun to grasp
financial incentives aimed at reintegrating minority peoples into the
community. In this way Croats are returning to Bosniac-controlled
territory and Bosniacs to Croat-controlled areas. In addition, UNHCR
reports that individuals in Republika Srpska have begun visiting their
offices to ask about the possibilities of returning to their homes in
the Federation. A year ago this did not happen. However, the number of
these minority return initiatives remains small.
VI. Brcko
The fate of this key strategic town on the Sava River which links
eastern and western halves of Republika Srpska will be decided by
international arbitration in March 1998. Whether it remains in
Republika Srpska or becomes a district of Bosnia and Herzegovina under
the administration of the common institutions, should depend on how the
DPA is implemented there this year. An American Supervisor, Ambassador
William Farrand, is overseeing implementation under the Office of the
High Representative. Instead of fulfilling the terms of the DPA,
however, both the Federation and Republika Srpska are being
obstructionist. The Federation boycotted voter registration for the
municipal elections during its first four weeks. This action was
defended on the grounds that since Brcko's status was still
undetermined, a single election should take place throughout the former
municipality, not separate polls in the Federation and Republika
Srpska. Moreover, the Federation rejects Republika Srpska identity
cards in Brcko with the result that Bosniac displaced persons are not
returning home. Republika Srpska is not prepared to issue its identity
cards to Bosniac and Croat returnees in a manner acceptable to the
Supervisor. Meanwhile, the Republika Srpska authorities abused voter
registration in an attempt to pack Brcko with Serbs and thus engineer
an absolute Serb majority. After the first four weeks of the
registration, the scale of the fraud was so great that registration had
to be cancelled and redone.
The most that can realistically be achieved in Brcko this year is
to begin the return process and thus destroy the ideology which
maintains that Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats cannot live together. If,
however, the current impasse is not broken, not even this modest goal
will be achieved. If this is the outcome, the arbitration award should
be given to Bosnia Herzegovina to reflect Republika Srpska's strategy
of non-compliance.
VII. Elections
National elections in September 1996 were deeply flawed and gave a
fresh mandate to many leaders who were responsible for the war and who
have no interest in implementing the peace agreement. After many
postponements, municipal elections are scheduled for 13 and 14
September. As a result of the impossibly high turn-out in the September
1996 poll, a completely new registration has taken place. The scale and
complexity of the task, however, has meant that even the most
meticulous preparations would have failed to eradicate fraud. Moreover,
the electorate of displaced persons currently living in Republika
Srpska has once again, often under duress, opted to register to vote
where they currently live, not where they were living in 1991.
According to the DPA, this option was supposed to be the exception, not
the rule. The extent of the fraud and its impact on the credibility of
the elections cannot be determined until the OSCE releases detailed
information on the registration figures at the end of July.
Nonetheless, the municipal elections appear likely once again to
confirm ethnic division.
VIII. Formation of Common Institutions and Reintegration
The rationale for holding the 1996 elections was that common
national institutions were required to help weld Bosnia and Herzegovina
back together. Progress, however, has been extremely slow. The three-
man collective Presidency has, nevertheless, been meeting regularly
since October 1996 and the Council of Ministers since January this
year. Breakthroughs, such as formation of a central bank, generally
require massive and sustained international pressure and obstructionism
continues to yield dividends.
Key legislation, known as the ``quick-start'' package and including
laws covering formation of a central bank and customs policy, was
passed after much delay by the Bosnian parliament on 20 June. In order
to reach agreement and persuade Republika Srpska to sign, however, the
laws were greatly watered down. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina is
to have one central bank, but it will be divided into main units. one
will be in the Republika Srpska and ``one or two'' in the Federation
and all will be able to hold reserve deposits from entity commercial
banks. The central bank will issue a new currency, the ``Convertible
Marka,'' once its design has been approved by the board of governors
and the Presidency. In the interim, the entities will be able to issue
temporary coupons and continue to use the foreign currencies--Yugoslav
Dinars, Croatian Kuna and German Marks--currently in circulation. The
entities are obliged to ``undertake all efforts'' to promote the use of
the Convertible Marka, but no deadline or penalties have been set lest
those efforts prove minimal. In effect, there may never be a common
currency throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The most recent meeting of the Peace Implementation Council, which
took place on 30 May in Sintra, Portugal, marked a change of approach
by the Contact Group States. For the first time, deadlines were set for
implementation of some civilian aspects of the peace treaty. The first
deadline is for telephone connections. The rival ethnically-controlled
networks must be linked up by 15 July. By 1 August the Bosnian
government must have appointed new ambassadors and approved laws on
citizenship and passports. And by 1 September a common flag must have
been agreed. After 1 January 1998, only cars with new national Bosnian
number plates will be allowed to cross international borders.
The European Union is financing reconstruction of the telephone
network in Republika Srpska, which was heavily damaged during NATO's
1995 bombings, and has been building capacity between the Federation
and Republika Srpska at three points within Republika Srpska. The 15
July deadline for inter-entity telephone links, will not be met before
the end of August. If the entities fail to hook up networks, the High
Representative will recommend ``appropriate measures to ensure
compliance.'' This could even entail SFOR making the connections.
Progress towards agreement on the other areas for which deadlines
have been set is slow. If agreement is not reached as stipulated,
however, it is likely that states will refuse to recognise existing
ambassadors and flags. This will have the greatest impact on Bosniacs
since at present they dominate the diplomatic service and the state
flag is effectively theirs. As a result, Serbs and Croats have no great
interest in speeding negotiations.
Otherwise, the nationalist media do all they can to keep tensions
high. RTV Srpska continues to portray Republika Srpska as an
independent state, is currently whipping up hysteria against the
international community following NATO's arrest operations, and places
news from the Federation in its ``foreign news'' section. The Croat
station, HTV Mostar, tries to maintain conflict between Croats and
Bosniacs. RTV BiH, the Sarajevo state broadcaster, though comparatively
moderate, backs the Bosniac leadership to the hilt and has little
positive to say about Bosnian Serbs and Croats.
IX. Reconstruction and a 1997 Donors' Conference
Agreement over a central bank has paved the way for a still-to-be-
finalised stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund worth
$100 million and a belated 1997 Donors' Conference. The conference,
which was postponed in mid-June for the fourth time because, among
other reasons, the Bosnian Parliament had failed to adopt the ``quick-
start'' package of laws, is expected to raise $1.4 billion for the on-
going reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which some 30 per
cent is likely to go to Republika Srpska. The conference has now been
set for 23-24 July.
$1.8 billion was pledged at the 1996 Donors' Conference, of which
some $1.5 billion was firmly committed. Most of this money went to
Bosniac-controlled parts of the Federation. Only, about 5 per cent went
to Croat-controlled territory and about 2 per cent to Republika Srpska.
Boosted by this money, the Federation economy grew by more than 50 per
cent in 1996, while unemployment has fallen to about 48 per cent.
Recovery in Srpska has been much slower and unemployment is estimated
at sixty percent.
At the end of June Bosnia and Herzegovina reached agreement with
the London Club of creditors effectively reducing the state's
commercial debt inherited from the former Yugoslavia by 87.5 per cent,
indeed a significant development. The country will have to service $404
million of its $1.04 billion debt. of this, $105 million will be at low
interest rates and $254 million will only become payable once the GDP
per capita rises to $2,800.
While the framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina's economic
reconstruction is now in place, unless political issues are resolved
first, international investment may only work against reintegration.
Money is generally channelled via authorities who are almost invariably
nationalist party stalwarts. In the process, therefore, the strength
and influence of nationalist parties are enhanced.
X. Implementation of Military Provisions of the DPA
In its initial months, the NATO-led Peace Implementation Force
(IFOR) successfully oversaw the ceasefire, the transfer of authority in
some areas, and the creation of the zone of separation. Since then,
IFOR and its successor, SFOR, have concentrated on patrolling the
Inter-Entity Boundary Line, while many other aspects of the Dayton
Agreement, including military aspects, remain unfulfilled. De-mining
has yet to begin in earnest, though the clearance of mines was supposed
to occur within 30 days after IFOR deployment and the transfer of
authority from the UN peace-keeping forces.
Progress in implementing the Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement
will be difficult. Republika Srpska is worried by the $400 million, US-
sponsored ``Train and Equip'' programme and is therefore likely to balk
at destroying large numbers of tanks and heavy weaponry. Two deadlines
for weapons reductions were set to arrive at a two to one ratio between
the Federation and Republika Srpska armed forces: (1) phase one to have
been completed by 31 December 1996; and (2) phase two to be completed
by 1 November 1997. The first deadline, which should have seen a 40 per
cent reduction in artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters,
and 20 per cent reduction of tanks and armored combat vehicles, was not
met. The second deadline looms over the horizon.
Republika Srpska has also refused to agree to the formation of a
Standing Commission on Military Matters, an advisory body which the
Presidency could use to help control the armed forces of both entities.
Senator Smith. As to that change, Mr. Ambassador, that you
note, would our presence in Bosnia just be a very expensive
cease-fire, presiding over an expensive cease-fire?
Ambassador Abramowitz. I believe you put it very well. In
fact, we used a similar phrase in our evaluation. That without
more robust implementation and if troops depart it would be
simply a cease-fire.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much.
Mr. Heffernan, welcome.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN W. HEFFERNAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
Mr. Heffernan. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this hearing today. I
support everything that Ambassador Abramowitz has said. He has,
as he said, worked on this issue for a long time.
My message today is that Dayton will fail if in fact war
criminals are not brought to justice, as many of the other
participants have been saying as well. I spent two-and-a-half
years as a refugee worker in the former Yugoslavia at the
height of the war.
I know firsthand that none of the admirable goals set out
in Dayton, from the return of refugees to the functioning of
joint institutions and economically sound reconstruction
efforts, will be achieved unless the architects of genocide and
their henchmen are captured and transferred to The Hague.
If you were a refugee, would you return to your home
knowing that a man who ran the concentration camp now works at
the local police station just down the street?
How free and fair can elections be if candidates running
for office from exile are prevented, once elected, from taking
office by ethnic cleansing that drove them from their
districts?
How much faith could you put in the future if the man who
raped your wife and terrorized your neighbors thrives on the
small fortune he made war profiteering?
Dayton calls upon parties to cooperate with the
International War Crimes Tribunal, yet 66 of the 78 publicly
indicted persons are at large living freely and openly in Croat
and Serb controlled areas of Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia,
I should say.
This list shows how easy it is to look at indicted war
criminals. The Coalition for International Justice 6 or 7
months ago, and is constantly updating it, compiled a list of
over half of these people whose whereabouts are widely known.
Some of these people have been indicted for, as you know, some
of the most heinous crimes of this century.
If Mr. Chairman permits, I would like to submit that list
for the record.
This past Tuesday the Coalition sent a letter to the
President signed by over 80 religious, ethnic, women's, labor,
human rights organizations representing millions of Americans.
I would also like to submit this for the record.
The letter was published in the New York Times and
introduced by former Senator Dole and Senator Lieberman at a
press conference. It says in part it is futile to repeatedly
state that the countries of the former Yugoslavia should arrest
their own war criminals. That just will not happen, and
everybody knows it. They have had the opportunity to do so.
The letter also states that thanks to the leadership of the
U.S., the Dayton Accords empower NATO troops deployed in Bosnia
to arrest indicted persons whenever and wherever they encounter
them. Yet, despite a number of encounters, only one indicted
war criminal has been arrested by NATO troops.
The absurdity of this was highlighted by Senator Dole when
on a recent visit to Bosnia a high level American authority
told him that when an American official went to Pale to meet
the representatives from the Republic of Srpska, he arrived at
the meeting place only to find that Radovan Karadzic's car was
parked outside of the building.
We are encouraged by the recent arrests by the British
forces in Prijedor and hope that this will be a sign of an
aggressive SFOR policy in the future. Who arrests the indicted
war criminals is not the issue. Whether it be a NATO force or
whether it be an International Alternative Force, the issue is
that it needs to be done.
Mr. Chairman, arrests, as has been said before, of course
do entail risks to American and other allied forces, but our
forces will likely confront far greater risks if the war
criminals undermining Dayton are not apprehended and
hostilities erupt.
Not to mention the billions of dollars--I think it was
Ambassador Gelbard who previously said 7.7 billion--we have
spent on this effort will have been wasted. Moving from an
absence of war to a sustainable peace cannot be achieved as
long as war criminals wield power over large swaths of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
As was recently stated by General Shalikashvili, who
initially opposed apprehending war criminals, and I quote, `` *
* * It is terribly important that a way be found to apprehend
those war criminals and bring them to justice.''
Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic and Dario Kordic must not
be allowed, as Senator Dole so eloquently put the other day, ``
* * * to exercise their noxious influence on the people who
they sought to destroy.''
Arresting war criminals is not a panacea for peace in
Bosnia. A staggering amount needs to be done, as indicated
earlier, and the war criminals are frustrating our efforts at
every single turn.
As long as war criminals are at large and justice is not
done, the wounds of war cannot heal. Refugees will not return,
there will be no reconciliation, there will be no recovery.
Thank you very much.
[The information referred to by Mr. Heffernan follows:]
July 15, 1997.
The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton,
President of the United States of America
The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
During the savage war against Bosnia--half a century after the
civilized world declared that it would ``never again'' allow genocide
to occur--over 200,000 men, women, and children were slaughtered in the
heart of Europe in a genocidal rampage euphemistically referred to as
``ethnic cleansing.'' Thousands of women were herded into camps where
they were systematically raped as part of a larger campaign designed to
humiliate, subjugate, and ultimately to destroy the Bosnian nation.
Many more people were tortured or forced to flee for their lives.
Some of the many men believed to have organized and commited these
crimes have been indicted as war criminals by the International War
Crimes Tribunal, which was established by the United Nations with the
active support of the United States. Thanks also to leadership by the
United States, the Dayton Accords empower NATO peacekeeping troops
deployed in Bosnia (SFOR) to arrest indicted perpetrators of these
crimes whenever and wherever they encounter them. Yet, despite numerous
such encounters and our intimate knowledge of where most of these men
live and work, only two attempted arrests have thus far been made by
these troops.
The undersigned organizations represent millions of Americans
across the United States. We are deeply distressed that these indicted
war criminals are living freely and with impunity, while American
soldiers--the largest contingent of the NATO force--have apparently
been denied the authority to make arrests. By pursuing such a policy,
the United States may have been colluding in the protection of
individuals charged with war crimes. We are encouraged by the recent
arrest in Prijedor by British NATO troops and sincerely hope that this
represents the beginning of a new, more aggressive policy by SFOR. We
call upon you, Mr. President, to exert your leadership and take
whatever diplomatic measures are necessary to ensure that the U.S.-led
NATO forces in Bosnia meet their moral obligation to bring the rest of
these men to justice without delay.
We are hopeful that a commitment by the United States to fulfill
this mandate will persuade our allies to complete the task of arresting
all war-crimes indictees now in Bosnia, especially the architects of
the genocide. If our allies are unwilling, however, the United States
must take the lead, accept the risk of confrontation, and act an its
own.
It is futile to repeatedly state that the countries of the former
Yugoslavia should arrest their own war criminals; it is clear they have
no such intentions. And so long as war criminals are at large and
justice is not done, the wounds of war cannot heal, refugees cannot
return to their homes, and reconciliation, lasting peace, and a civil
society cannot be achieved in Bosnia. A successful exit for U.S. troops
will not be possible, and their many good works will have been wasted,
if they leave behind a country in which persons indicted for war crimes
continue to wield significant power and make a mockery of the rule of
law.
Mr. President, at the dedication of the Holocaust Museum you
reiterated the pledge ``never again'' to permit genocide. If the War
Crimes Tribunal and the quest for peace in Bosnia should fail because
U.S.-led NATO troops are unwilling to apprehend indicted perpetrators
of crimes against humanity, the civilized world will have lost the
opportunity to restore some credence to this tarnished pledge. We
appeal to you not to allow this to happen.
Sincerely,
John W. Heffernan,
Executive Director,
Coalition for International Justice.
For:
Organizations
AFL-CIO
Action Council for Peace in the Balkans
African Methodist Episcopal Church, Commission on Missions
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
American Association of University Women
American Baptist Churches U.S.A., International Ministries, Africa,
Europe, and Middle East Desk
American Federation of State, County, Municipal Employees
American Indian Heritage Foundation
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
American Kurdish Information Network
American Muslim Council
American Nurses Association
Amnesty International, USA
Anti-Defamation League
Arab American Institute
B'nai B'rith
Business and Professional Women, USA
Central Conference of American Rabbis
Church World Service
Coalition of Labor Union Women
Columban Fathers' Justice and Peace Office, Washington D.C.
Communications Workers of America
Council on American-Islamic Relations
Episcopal Church, U.S.A.
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Lutheran Office for
Governmental Affairs
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Lutheran Office for World
Community
Evangelicals for Social Action
Feminist Majority
Friends of Bosnia
Hadassah
Hispanic National Bar Association
Human Rights Watch
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Human Rights Commission
International Campaign for Tibet
Institute for Public Affairs of the Orthodox Union
Jesuit Refugee Services
Jewish Council for Public Affairs
Jewish Women International
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights
Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers, Justice and Peace Office
Maryknoll Sisters, Office of Social Concerns
Ms. Foundation for Women
Muslim Public Affairs Council
Muslim Women's League
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium
National Association of Arab Americans
National Association of Social Workers
National Coalition for Haitian Rights
National Coalition of 100 Black Women, Inc.
National Congress of American Indians
National Council of Churches
National Council of Churches, Justice for Women Working Group
National Council of Churches, Racial Justice Working Group
National Council of Jewish Women
National Council of Negro Women, Inc.
National Hispanic Leadership Institute
National Organization for Women
North American Council for Muslim Women
Older Women's League
Physicians for Human Rights
Project on African Americans in International Law
Psychologists for Social Responsibility
Rabbinical Assembly
Rabbinical Council of America
Refugees International
SAGE: Students Against Genocide
Simon Wiesenthal Center
SPEAR: Sigma Public Eilucation and Research Foundation of Sigma Gamma
Rho Sorority
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
UNITE: Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees
United Church of Christ and Disciples of Christ, United Church Board
for World Ministries
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union
United Methodist Church Women's Division General Board of Global
Ministries
U.S. Committee for Refugees
United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
Women for Meaningful Summits
Women of Reform Judaism
Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
Women's League for Corservative Judaism
Y.W.C.A.
Individuals (organizational affiliation for identification only)
Morris Abram, former U.S. Ambassador at the United Nations
Morton I. Abramowitz, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Bert B. Beach, Vice President, International Religious Liberty
Association and Gen'l Secretary, Council on Inter-Church
Relations, General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists
Michael Berenbaum, President and C.E.O., Survivors of the Shoah Visual
History Foundation
Edmond L. Browning, Presiding Bishop, Episcopal Church, U.S.A.
Hodding Carter, III, former Assistant Secretary of State
Charles F. Dambach, President, National Peace Corps Association
Patt Derian, former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights
Paula Dobriansky, former Director of European and Soviet Affairs,
National Security Council
Michael J. Dodd, Columban Fathers' Justice and Peace Office
Robert J. Dole, former U.S. Senate Majority Leader
Bianca Jagger, human rights activist
Max M. Kampelman, former U.S. Ambassador for Negotiations on Nuclear
and Space Arms
Reverend Ted Keating, Director for Justice and Peace, Catholic
Conference of Major Superiors of Men's Institutes
Paul Nitze, former Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the
President on Arms Control
Roberts Owen, Dayton Accords negotiator
David Saperstein, Director, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism
George Shultz, former Secretary of State
John Silber, President, Boston University
Susan Sontag, author, director, literary theorist, and human rights
activist
Roberta Wohlstetter, historian and author, holder of the Presidential
Medal of Freedom
Miriam Young, Executive Director, Asia Pacific Center for Justice and
Peace
__________
Whereabouts of Indicted War Criminals in Bosnia
(Prepared by The Coalition For International Justice)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Location of
Name crimes Ethnicity Town/country Whereabouts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nenad Banovic.................. Keraterm......... Bosnian Serb..... Prijedor, Frequents ``Express''
Republika Srpska. restaurant in
Prijedor.
Lives at home in
Prijedor. Twin
brother to Predrag
Banovic. One of the
Banovic brothers was
seen driving a motor
scooter in Prijedor
in late November 1996
(Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 28,
1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Predrag Banovic................ Keraterm......... Bosnian Serb..... 31 Cirkin Polje Frequents ``Express''
Street, restaurant in
Prijedor, Prijedor.
Republika Srpska. Lives in Prijedor.
Twin brother to Nenad
Banovic. One of the
Banovic brothers was
seen driving a motor
scooter in Prijedor
in late November 1996
(Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 28,
1996).
Australian reporter
Gordon Weiss saw
Predrag Banovic at
Banovic's home, on 31
Cirkin Poije Street.
Local police stated
that the Banovics'
(Predrag and Nendad)
both work for reserve
police. They share a
red motor bike and
are often seen riding
through town. (``In
the Land of the War
Criminals'' By:
Gordon Weiss, The
Associated Press,
April 17, 1997).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mario Cerkez................... Lasva Valley..... Bosnian Croat.... Vitez, Federation Commanded an HVO
of B-H. brigade in Vitez in
1993 and is still
there (Tanjug, Nov.
13, 1995).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dragan Fustar.................. Foca............. Bosnian Serb..... Prijedor, Residence address
Republika Srpska. listed on the IFOR
wanted poster was 41
First of May Street
in Prijedor. A
journalist found
Fustar's mother and
wife both living
there in late
November 1996. The
number sign has been
pulled from the
house. His mother and
wife say that they
live at 37 First of
May Street, even
though the building
is located between 39
and 43 First of May
Street. He is now
unemployed (Christian
Science Monitor, Nov.
28, 1996).
Dragan Fustar visits
his mother in
Prvomajska street 41.
(The Associated
Press, May 25, 1997).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dragan Gagovic................. Foca............. Bosnian Serb..... Foca, Republika Chief of police in
Srpska. Foca (Sunday Times of
London, July 28,
1996).
In April 1997 Dragan
Gagovic was working
as a police trainer
in a police training
school in Trjentiste.
The school is run by
General Soric.
Gagovic owns a bar in
Foca and can be seen
in town driving a
green rabbit. (Thomas
Keenan, Princeton
University).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gojko Jankovic................. Foca............. Bosnian Serb..... Foca, Republika Seen by a journalist
Srpska. at a Foca cafe while
``French soldiers
from IFOR . . . leant
against a nearby wall
smoking cigarettes
and paying no
attention as
Jankovic, accompanied
by bodyguards,
casually ordered a
drink.'' (Sunday
Times of London, July
28, 1996).
Tried to get on the
ballot for municipal
elections. OSCE
spotted it and
stopped him.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nikica Janjic.................. Omarska and Bosnian Serb..... Banja Luka, According to friends
Keraterm. Republika Srpska. and his father, he
killed himself in
September 1995
(Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 28,
1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Goran Jelisic, Indicted for Brcko............ Bosnian Serb..... Bijeljina, Interviewed in his
Genocide. Republika Srpska. apartment in
Bijeijina (De
Volkskrant
[Amsterdam], Feb. 29,
1996).
Knows the telephone
number of Ratko
CESIC, also indicted
for Brcko (De
Volkskrant
[Amsterdam], Feb. 29,
1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drago Josipovic................ Lasva Valley..... Bosnian Croat.... Vitez, Federation A chemical engineer at
of B-H. the local Vitezit
explosives factory,
he lives in his
family home in the
village of Santici,
just east of Vitez
(Associated Press,
Nov. 9, 1996).
Works as a chemical
engineer in the
Princip munitions
factory. May also be
found at the local
Croatian Democratic
Party headquarters,
where his wife is
president (Washington
Post, Nov. 27, page
A21).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radovan Karadzic, Indicted for Sarajevo and Bosnian Serb..... Pale, Republika Pale house--large
Genocide. Srebrenica. Srpska; and house on a
Banja Luka, mountainside--pointed
Republika Srpska. out to Prof. Charles
Ingrao on trip to
Pale (New York Times,
Oct. 28, 1996).
Has a friend, Slavko
Rogulic, who runs a
gas station and hotel
for him in Banja
Luka. Also building a
house in Koljani
village near Banja
Luka.
``[M]akes little
effort to conceal his
daily movements''
(Associated Press,
Nov. 9, 1996).
Karadzic lives less
than a kilometer from
SFOR troops. He is
described as ``a
creature of habit.''
UN sources say that
he travels regularly
between his home and
his office (Industry
of Vehicles in Famos)
in a limousine.
(``NATO bid to
capture Karadzic'' by
Chris Stephen in
Agence France Presse,
May 20, 1997 and The
Associated Press May
25, 1997)
The Office of Carl
Bilt has ``hard
evidence'' that
Radovan Karadzic
holds meetings with
Momcilo, Krajisnik at
Karadzic's house in
Pale. (From interview
with Colum Murphy,
spokesperson for Carl
Bilt, BiHTV News
Summary, 27 May, 1997
and BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts,
June 21, 1997).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marinko Katava................. Lasva Valley..... Bosnian Croat.... Vitez, Federation Works as a labor
of B-H. inspector for the
Federation government
at desk in the town
hall in Vitez, and
lives in a pleasant
downtown apartment
(Associated Press,
Nov. 9. 1996).
Works in the town hall
in Vitez as an
employment inspector.
He may be at the
pharmacy run by his
wife. The family
telephone number is
printed on a sign in
the pharmacy window,
and the Katavas live
upstairs (Washington
Post, Nov. 27, 1996,
page A21).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dragan Kondic.................. Keraterm......... Bosnian Serb..... Prijedor, Said to have
Republika Srpska. connections witn
special police in
Ljubia.
Hangs out almost every
night at ``The Pink''
bar in Prijedor.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dario Kordic................... Lasva Valley..... Bosnian Croat.... Zagreb, Croatia.. Numerous reports have
him living in Zagreb.
On or about July 8,
1996, was
photographed in front
of an apartment in
Zagreb's Tresnjevka
district on the 4th
floor with no name on
the door; block is
owned by the defense
ministry (Globus
[Zagreb], as quoted
in Reuters, July 10,
1996).
Croatian ambassador to
the United States
says the apartment
belongs to Kordic's
parents, which means
the Croatian
government knows
where Kordic has been
living (Washington
Post, Nov. 11, 1996,
page A28).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Milojica Kos................... Omarska.......... Bosnian Serb..... Omarska, His brother Zheljko
Republika Srpska. Kos owns ``Europa''
restaurant in
Omarska, across the
street from the
Omarska camp
buildings; Milojica
Kos is frequently at
the restaurant.
Otherwise, he is
keeping a low profile
in Omarska (Christian
Science Monitor, Nov.
28, 1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radomir Kovac.................. Foca............. Bosnian Serb..... Foca, Repubiika A journalist said at
Srpska. the IFOR press
briefing on Nov. 19,
1996, that Kovac was
still working for the
Foca police. IPTF
spokesman Aleksandar
Ivanko replied, ``I
heard these reports.
We can't confirm
them. We have to take
[Bosnian Serb
Interior] Minister
Kijac at his word,
and he says nobody
who has been indicted
is working as a
policeman in his
letter to Peter
Fitzgerald, so for
the time being we'll
take him at his
word.''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mirjan Kupreskic............... Lasva Valley..... Bosnian Croat.... Vitez, Federation Can be found at the
of B-H. grocery store he and
his cousin Vlatko
KUPRESKIC run; he
lives in Pirici, just
east of Vitez
(Associated Press,
Nov. 9, 1996).
Runs a grocery shop in
Vitez not far from
Marinko KATAVA's
wife's pharmacy
(Washington Post,
Nov. 27, page A21).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vlatko Kupreskic............... Lasva Valley..... Bosnian Croat.... Vitez, Federation Can be found at the
of B-H. grocery store he and
his cousin Mirjan
KUPRESKIC run; he
lives in Pirici, just
east of Vitez
(Associated Press,
Nov. 9, 1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zoran Kupreskic................ Lasva Valley..... Bosnian Croat.... Vitez, Federation Can often be found at
of B-H. the grocery store run
by him, his brother
Mirjan KUPRESKIC and
their cousin Vlatko
KUPRESKIC (Associated
Press, Nov. 9, 1996).
Runs a business in
Vitez, not his
brother Mirjan
KUPRESKIC's grocery
shop. ``I have been
advised not to talk
to the press by the
guy in charge,'' he
said. ``But call my
brother Mirjan. Maybe
he will want to talk
to you,'' giving the
telephone number and
location of his
brother's shop
(Washington Post,
Nov. 27, page A21).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miroslav Kvocka................ Omarska.......... Bosnian Serb..... Prijedor, Works at Prijedor
Republika Srpska. police station
(Reuters, Oct. 2,
1996).
Put on leave (ABC
World News Tonight,
Nov. 26, 1996).
Put on 30 days leave.
Was the Prijedor
police duty officer
as recently as Oct.
23, 1996, but is on
temporary leave
(Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 28,
1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Milan Martic................... Zagreb, rocket CroSerb.......... Ulica Milosa ``[H]is place of
attack. Oblica 88, Banja residence has been
Luka, Republika precisely located . .
Srpska. . (Telegraf
[Belgrade], Feb. 28,
1996).
Believed living in
Banja Luka (London
Press Association,
Mar. 8, 1996)
Said to have regular
meetings with
Plavsic, et al.
Attended a public
event near Banja Luka
in July also attended
by IFOR personnel
(Human Rights Watch
press release, Nov.
8, 1996).
Seen in Banja Luka on
Nov. 5, 1996. Lives
less than 100 meters
from IFOR civilian
affairs center in
Banja Luka (Human
Rights Watch press
release, Nov. 8,
1996).
Gave a videotape
interview from his
office in Bania Luka
(ABC World News
Tonight, Nov. 26,
1996).
Milan Martic lives at
Ulica Milosa Oblica
88. (Mario Dederichs
in The Associated
Press, May 25, 1997).
The London Times
interviewed Milan
Martic in June 1997.
His house is within
walking distance of
the International
Police Task Force
building, the
regional office of
the High
Representative, and
other international
agencies. There are
5,000 British SFOR
soldiers five miles
away. (London Times,
June 10, 1997).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zeljko Meaki [also spelled Omarska.......... Bosnian Serb..... Omarska, Deputy commander of
``Mejakic''], Indicted for Republika Srpska. Omarska police
Genocide. station (Boston
Globe, Oct. 31, 1996,
page a6).
Put on leave (ABC
World News Tonight,
Nov. 26, 1996).
Put an 30 days leave.
On duty as recently as
Oct. 20 (Christian
Science Monitor, Nov.
28, 1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Slobodan Milijkovic............ Bosanski Samac... Bosnian Serb..... Kragujevac, Kragujevac is 60 miles
Serbia. southeast of Belgrade
(Time Magazine, May
13, 1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ratko Mladic, Indicted for Sarajevo and Bosnian Serb..... Han Pijesak, Lives inside his
Genocide. Srebrenica. Republika Srpska. headquarters
Belgrade, Serbia. (numerous sources).
Jans Pijesak..... Maintains an apartment
in Belgrade.
General Mladic lives
in the bunkered
command center Crna
Rijeka in the
mountains of Jans
Pijesak. (Mario
Dederichs, The
Associated Press, May
25, 1997).
General Radko Mladic
was to travel to
Belgrade to attend
his son's wedding
sometime in June.
Mladic was recently
seen in Montenegro
and Serbia on several
occasions. (Bosnian
Serb media and Extra
Magazine in Agence
France Presse, June
16, 1997).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Milan Mrksic................... Vukovar.......... Serb............. Banja Luka, General in the JNA at
Republika Srpska. the time of Vukovar;
then went to work for
the Krajina Serbs.
Reported to have been
in Banja Luka (New
York Times, Jan. 5,
1996).
Later, reported to
have retired and now
living a solitary
life in Belgrade
(Vreme, Apr. 6,
1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dragan Nikolic................. Susica........... Bosnian Serb..... Vlasenica, Either in the
Republika Srpska. Republika Srpska army
or the Republica
Srpska civilian
government (Reuters,
Feb. 16, 1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miroslav Radic................. Vukovar.......... Serb............. In the Serbian Operates a private
``provinces''. company ``in the
provinces'' of Serbia
(Vreme, Apr. 6,
1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mladen Radic................... Omarska.......... Bosnian Serb..... Prijedor, Works at Prijedor
Republika Srpska. police station
(Reuters, Oct. 29,
1996).
Put on leave (ABC
World News Tonight,
Nov. 26, 1996).
Put on 30 days leave.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ivica Rajic.................... Stupni Do........ Bosnian Croat.... Split, Croatia... Lived in a Croatian-
government owned
hotel, believed to be
the Zagreb Hotel, but
has since reportedly
left Split (Globus
[Zagreb]; reported by
Reuters, Oct. 23 and
24, 1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ivan Santic.................... Lasva Valley..... Bosnian Croat.... Unknown.......... Santic was described
as an engineer, the
director of the
Sintevit plant in
Vitez. and, at the
time the crimes
occurred, the mayor
of Vitez (Tanjug,
Nov. 13, 1995).
Interviewed by Inter
Press Service (Inter
Press Service, Dec.
14, 1995).
In 1994-95 (at least),
Santic was Deputy
Minister of Industry
and Energy in the
Federation (Vjesnik
[Zagreb], June 20,
1994, and Vecernji
List [Zagreb], Nov.
20, 1995). Federation
officials should know
his address.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dusko Sikirica, Indicted for Keraterm......... Bosnian Serb..... Unknown.......... Tried to get on the
Genocide. ballot for municipal
elections. OSCE
spotted it and
stopped him. OSCE
should know his
address.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blagoje Simic.................. Bosanski Samac... Bosnian Serb..... Bosanski Samac, Highest-ranking public
Republika Srpska. official in Bosanski
Samac, with an office
in the town hall
(Boston Globe, Nov.
1, 1996, page a1).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pero Skopljak.................. Lasva Valley..... Bosnian Croat.... Vitez, Federation An official in the
of B-H. HZHB Presidency
(Tanjug, Nov. 13,
1995).
``Still lives in
Vitez, where he runs
a print shop'' (Inter
Press Service, Dec.
14, 1995).
Now runs a local
printing company from
the ground floor of
his spacious home in
Vitez (Associated
Press, Nov. 9, 1996).
Still runs the
printing shop, though
his wife says he's
rarely there
(Washington Post,
Nov. 27, page A21).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Veselin Sljivancanin........... Vukovar.......... Serb............. Belgrade, Serbia. Reportedly had failing
out with his
superior, Gen. Milan
MRKSIC, also indicted
for Vukovar (New York
Times, Jan. 5, 1996).
Promoted to full
colonel and
transferred to
Belgrade (Agence
France Presse, Feb.
16, 1996).
Now head of the Center
of Advanced Military
Schools in Belgrade
(Svijet [Sarajevo],
Apr. 25, 1996). Also
referred to as an
instructor at the
Center of Advanced
Military Schools in
Belgrade (Vreme, Apr.
6, 1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radovan Stankovic.............. Foca............. Bosnian Serb..... Foca, Republika Working in the
Srpska. Republika Srpska
police in Foca as of
August, according to
IPTF spokesman
Aleksandar Ivanko. In
August, Stankovic
walked into IPTF
police station near
Sarajevo, but IPTF
did not recognize his
name. Local police
stopped him, asked to
see his driver's
licence, recognized
his name, ordered him
to come to a police
station, whereupon he
fled--later to file a
complaint with the
IPTF alleging that
the Bosnian police
fired shots at his
car (Reuters, Nov. 8,
1996).
In August, Stankovic
filed a complaint
against the Bosnian
police at an IPTF
office. ``After being
embarrassed by the
fact that journalists
discovered five
others indicted on
war-crime charges in
the Serbian police
force, U.N. officials
reacted by forbidding
their monitors to
discuss the Stankovic
case with reporters''
(New York Times, Nov.
9, 1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nedjeljko Timarac.............. Keraterm......... Bosnian Serb..... Prijedor, Works at Prijedor
Republika Srpska. police station
(Reuters, Oct. 29,
1996).
Put on leave (ABC
World News Tonight,
Nov. 26, 1996).
Put on 30 days leave.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevan Todorovic............... Bosanski Samac... Bosnian Serb..... Bosanski Samac, Deputy of the local
Republika Srpska. office of Republika
Srpska state security
in Bosanski Samac;
works the night shift
(7 p.m.-7 a.m.)
(Boston Globe, Nov.
1, 1996, page a1).
Lives in the village
of Donja Slatina, a 3
minute, 30-second
drive from American-
staffed NATO base of
Camp Colt, with 1,000
soldiers. His
commuter route is
routinely traveled by
NATO patrols (Boston
Globe, Nov. 1, 1996,
page a1).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Simo Zaric..................... Bosanski Samac... Bosnian Serb..... Unknown.......... Simo Zaric can be
found at the Bosanski
Samac, ``A US soldier
checked his identity
card carefully, waved
to him and then
saluted''. (Mario
Dederichs, May 25,
1997).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dragan Zelenovic............... Foca............. Bosnian Serb..... Foca, Republika A journalist said at
Srpska. the IFOR press
briefing on Nov. 19,
1996, that Zelenovic
was still working for
the Foca police. IPTF
spokesman Aleksandar
Ivanko replied, ``I
heard these reports.
We can't confirm
them. We have to take
[Bosnian Serb
Interior] Minister
Kijac at his word,
and he says nobody
who has been indicted
is working as a
policeman in his
letter to Peter
Fitzgerald, so for
the time being we'll
take him at his
word.''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zoran Zigic.................... Omarska and Bosnian Serb..... Banja Luka, Believed to be in jail
Keraterm. Republika Srpska. in Banja Luka.
Reported to be in a
Bosnian Serb prison
for an unrelated
murder (Christian
Science Monitor, Nov.
28, 1996).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Smith. Thank you very much for that very eloquent
testimony.
Mr. Johnson.
STATEMENT OF MR. HAROLD J. JOHNSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRADE DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE
Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very
pleased to be here today.
As you know, we recently issued a fairly lengthy report. We
also have a very lengthy statement for the record that I am
sure will be entered. I will try to summarize some points as
quickly as possible.
Senator Smith. We will be very happy to receive any
materials that you would like, that any of you would like, to
include in our record today.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Our report and my statement today is based on three visits
to Bosnia, as well as work that we have performed here in the
States, at NATO and other locations in Europe.
I would like to say that our job is not one of advocacy, it
is one of trying to report objectively what we see. Even though
some of what I am going to say today may sound like advocacy,
it is simply reporting back to you what we learned during our
visits.
Obviously there have been some successes in the operation
in Bosnia. The military operation, I think no one would deny,
has been successful. War has ended. There are no hostilities,
and that has allowed time for the civilian aspects of the
Dayton Peace Accords to at least begin.
Despite this progress, despite these successes, a unified
multiethnic democratic government and one that respects the
rule of law has not taken root. This is due principally to the
failure of Bosnias political leaders to fulfill their
obligations under Dayton and to promote political and social
reconciliation.
Many Bosnian Serbs and Croat leaders still embrace their
wartime goals. The Bosnian Muslims would like to have a unified
and multiethnic state but, as some analysts have pointed out,
with themselves in control. So there are problems on all sides.
One of the key provisions of the Dayton agreement concerns
the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their
homes.
In the majority of these cases, that would mean returning
to areas that were ethnically cleansed. Because of the
resistance of political leaders of all three ethnic groups,
very few refugees or displaced persons have crossed ethnic
lines to return to their pre-war homes. The number, as we saw,
was about 9,000, a very small number.
Most of the returns that have taken place, and there have
been about 280,000 people returned, have been to areas where
they are in the majority. Bosnia's political leaders from all
sides have often blocked other efforts to link the ethnic
groups, both politically and economically. There are numerous
examples of this, linkages of rail, air, telecommunications,
and other areas.
As a result of strong international pressure, some progress
is being made on the initiation of institutions. They are
beginning to work, but very slowly.
During our June visit, nearly every official at all levels
that we spoke with expressed the importance of arresting or
somehow taking Radovan Karadzic off the scene. Other indicted
war criminals were not mentioned prominently, although it was
recognized that it also is important that they be arrested.
Mr. Karadzic was mentioned very prominently because it is
believed that he essentially controls what happens in the
Republic of Srpska. Even though some of the more moderate, and
I use that word advisedly, leaders have been willing to
cooperate, Mr. Karadzic blocks progress at almost every turn.
The view was, by almost everybody that we spoke with, that if
he remains in place, Dayton has very little chance of
succeeding.
There are a number of other issues that came up during our
most recent visit. One of these has to do with the concern
about the upcoming election, the municipal elections,
specifically the contentious issue of installing newly elected
officials in locations where they may be in the minority.
And the way the election is being structured, and as it
should be structured, there is a possibility that Serbs or
Muslims or Croats could be elected to municipal posts in areas
where they are no longer in the majority. There is a great deal
of concern about these officials' installation and the security
related to that issue.
Another issue that was raised prominently in the
discussions that we had has to do with the decision on Brcko. I
think it is recognized by most observers and international
officials that what happens in Brcko will indeed be the key to
what happens in Bosnia.
If they are unable to resolve that situation in a manner
that somehow satisfies both the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, both
sides have indicated that they would expect to go back to war.
We visited the operations center at the office of the
deputy high representative in Brcko. We could see that they are
working very hard, and they have a plan to begin implementing
some of the provisions of the Dayton agreement, but they are
going very slowly. We do not necessarily fault them at that; it
is a very difficult job.
From January of this year through June, 159 Muslim families
were brought back into their homes within the Bosnia Serb side
of the zone separation. When you consider that there are as
many as 30,000 Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats who were driven from
their homes in the area, the task is very large.
Finally, the topic of much discussion during our trip was
the need for continued international military presence in
Bosnia after SFOR's mission ends in June.
Again, the consensus was that the desired end-state, which
includes (1) political leaders demonstrating a commitment to
continue negotiations, (2) the establishment of civil
structures that would be sufficiently mature to assume the
responsibility for ensuring compliance with Dayton, (3)
political leaders of the three groups would adhere to a
sustained cease-fire, and (4) continued, ongoing nation-
building activities, has very little chance of being met by
June 30.
Almost to a person, the individuals that we spoke with
indicated that international forces would be required to
maintain the peace. And, in order for that international force
to have any credibility, the United States would have to have
some involvement and be on the ground and not over the horizon.
We heard that time and again, that having U.S. troops over
the horizon in Italy or in Hungary simply would not be
sufficient to have the credibility if the situation in Bosnia
continues as it is now, and as it is foreseen to be in June
1988.
Senator Biden. Excuse me, sir. Whom did you hear that from?
Mr. Johnson. Numerous people that we talked to, including
some NATO officers----
Senator Biden. And that assumed no NATO forces in Bosnia?
Mr. Johnson. No, there would be NATO forces in Bosnia. But,
there is a belief that NATO forces in Bosnia without a U.S.
presence on the ground in some form--we did not hear a
prescription as to what form that should take, but on the
ground in Bosnia in some form, credibility of the forces simply
would not be there. They have gone through that experience with
UNPROFOR----
Senator Biden. Did you hear that from NATO forces or did
you hear that from Bosnians----
Mr. Johnson. Mostly from international officials, OSCE
officials, the European Monitoring Mission and others. There
was a concern raised about the credibility issue among NATO
forces that we spoke with, but it came more strongly from other
international officials.
Finally, I would like to just briefly mention we have
continued to follow the cost of this operation. I know in your
statement you mentioned $7.7 billion. As a result of planning
now for increasing slightly the force levels during the
election, the price has gone up to $7.8 billion.
If the U.S. military continues beyond June, obviously the
price would go even higher. This is not an inexpensive
operation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Harold J. Johnson
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to provide our evaluation of
international efforts to promote an enduring peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina through the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Agreement. My
statement is based on (1) our May 1997 report on the Bosnia peace
operation, \1\ which provided the results of two visits to Bosnia in
July and December 1996 and (2) information on evolving issues and
progress we obtained during a visit to Bosnia in June 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton
Agreement's Goals (GAO/NSIAD-97-132, May 5, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
The internationally-supported peace operation in Bosnia, part of a
longer-term peace process, has helped that country take important first
steps toward achieving the Dayton Agreement's goals. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)-led forces have sustained an environment
without active military hostilities. This has provided time for the
peace process to move forward and has allowed the implementation of the
agreement's civil aspects to begin. Progress has been made in
establishing some political and economic institutions, and economic
recovery has started in the Federation. Nevertheless, the transition to
a unified, democratic government that respects the rule of law has not
occurred, due principally to the failure of Bosnia's political leaders
to fulfill their obligations under the Dayton Agreement and to promote
political and social reconciliation. Despite the Dayton Agreement, many
Bosnian Serb and Croat political leaders still embrace their wartime
aims of controlling their own ethnically pure states separate from
Bosnia. Bosnian Muslims, known as Bosniaks, continue to support a
unified, multiethnic state, but, according to some analysts, with the
Bosniaks in control.
Very few refugees and displaced persons have crossed ethnic lines
to return to their prewar homes, primarily due to resistance from
political leaders of all three major ethnic groups. Further, according
to human rights reports, Bosnians of all three ethnic groups could not
freely cross ethnic lines at will or remain behind to visit, work, or
live without facing harassment, intimidation, or arrest by police of
other ethnic groups. Essentially, true freedom of movement across
ethnic boundaries does not yet exist. Similarly, Bosnia's political
leaders from all sides have often blocked efforts to link their ethnic
groups politically or economically. Virtually all of the limited
progress on the civil aspects has resulted from strong international
pressure on these often resistant political leaders. As one
international official noted, the Bosnia peace process remains driven
from the outside rather than from within.
During our June 1997 visit, nearly every international and U.S.
official with whom we spoke, including senior NATO officers, were
adamant that Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian Serb who was indicted by the
war crimes tribunal, must be arrested or otherwise removed from Bosnia.
Most were unequivocal on this matter, and stated that he retains
political power and influence over political figures in Republika
Srpska, the Bosnian Serb entity. So far, according to these officials,
he has seen fit to block every significant move toward reconciliation.
Other key issues identified as being critically important to the
Dayton Agreement's success include the municipal elections scheduled
for September 13 and 14, 1997, specifically the potentially contentious
installation of some newly elected municipal governments; the outcome
of the arbitration decision concerning which ethnic group will control
the strategically important city of Brcko in Republika Srpska; and the
issue of whether an international military force, including the U.S.
military, should remain in Bosnia after the current NATO-led mission
ends in June 1998.
I should note that our field work in Bosnia was completed before
the recent political crisis in Republika Srpska, and my statement does
not address this issue. However, even if President Plavsic wins the
political struggle with more hardline Bosnian Serb political leaders,
we believe that full implementation of the Dayton Agreement--in other
words, full political and social reconciliation in Bosnia--will remain
a long and difficult process.
The executive branch initially estimated that U.S. military and
civilian participation in Bosnia would cost about $3.2 billion through
fiscal year 1997. The total estimated cost for U.S. participation in
the operation has since risen to $7.8 billion. The increase is
primarily due to the December 1996 decision to extend the presence of
U.S. forces in and around Bosnia until June 1998.
Progress Toward Achieving The Dayton Agreement's Goals
I will briefly review, and in some cases update, our report's
findings on progress made in achieving the Bosnia peace operation's
four key objectives. These objectives were to (1) provide a secure
environment for the people of Bosnia; (2) create a unified, democratic
Bosnia that respects the rule of law and internationally recognized
human rights, including cooperating with the war crimes tribunal in
arresting and bringing those charged with war crimes to trial; (3)
ensure the rights of refugees and displaced persons to return to their
prewar homes; and (4) rebuild the economy.
Progress in Providing a Secure Environment
The Bosnian people are more secure today than before the Dayton
Agreement was signed. Bosnia's Serb, Croat, and Bosniak armies have
observed the cease-fire, allowed NATO's Implementation Force and later
the Stabilization Force, known as SFOR, to monitor their weapons sites
and troop movements, and have reduced their force levels by a combined
total of 300,000. The U.S.-led ``train and equip'' program intended to
help stabilize the military balance in the region and integrate the
Bosniak and Bosnian Croat armies into a unified Federation army is
progressing, albeit slower than anticipated.
Nonetheless, Bosnian Serb political leaders have not fully lived up
to arms reduction agreements. According to a State Department official,
the United States could increase assistance under the Federation train
and equip program to provide a military balance if the Bosnian Serbs do
not comply with the arms control agreements. Bosnian Croat and Bosniak
political leaders have made some progress in reforming their civilian
police so that they provide security for Bosnians of all ethnic groups
and do not commit human rights abuses; however, Bosnian Serb political
leaders have refused to cooperate with the International Police Task
Force (IPTF) in reforming their police force in accordance with
democratic policing standards. Moreover, many international observers,
including some in the State Department, believe that keeping an
international military force in place is still the only deterrent to
major hostilities in Bosnia.
Progress in Developing a Unified, Democratic Bosnia
A unified, democratic state that respects the rule of law and
adheres to international standards of human rights has yet to be
achieved. Elections for institutions of Bosnia's national and two
entity governments (Republika Srpska and the Federation) were held in
September 1996, and many national joint institutions intended to unify
Bosnia's ethnic groups have met at least once. However, most of these
institutions are not yet functioning; Bosnia's three separate,
ethnically-based armies continue to be controlled by their wartime
political leaders; and many Bosnian Serbs and Croats and their
political leaders retain their wartime goal of establishing ethnically
pure states separate from Bosnia. Moreover, the human rights situation
worsened in the months after the election, particularly in Bosnian
Serb-controlled areas. And ethnic intolerance remains strong throughout
Bosnia, in large part because Bosnia's political leaders control the
media and use it to discourage reconciliation among the ethnic groups.
Additionally, as of July 10, 1997, 66 of the 74 people \2\ publicly
indicted by the war crimes tribunal remained at large, some openly
serving in official positions and/or retaining their political power.
While the Bosniaks had surrendered all indicted war criminals in their
area of control to the war crimes tribunal, Bosnian Serbs and Croats
had not surrendered to the tribunal any indicted war criminals in their
areas. U.S. and other officials view progress on this issue as central
to the achievement of the Dayton Agreement's objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ These figures do not include one person who was indicted by and
surrendered to the war crimes tribunal but who was released by the
tribunal for humanitarian reasons and later died. Also, other people
not included in these figures have been indicted by the war crimes
tribunal under sealed indictments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 10, 1997, NATO-led troops in Bosnia for the first time
attempted to arrest people indicted for war crimes, specifically two
Bosnian Serb suspects who had been charged under a sealed indictment
for complicity with commitment of genocide. British SFOR soldiers
arrested one suspect and, in self-defense, shot and killed the other
after he fired at them. U.S. officials have stated that this action
does not represent a change in policy regarding SFOR's mandate to
apprehend indicted war criminals. The policy remains that SFOR troops
will arrest indicted war criminals when they come upon them in the
normal course of their duties if the tactical situation allows.
Progress in Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons
Despite guarantees in the Dayton Agreement and extensive
international efforts to resolve the issue, the return of refugees and
displaced persons to their homes has barely begun in Bosnia. The
returns that did take place in 1996 and 1997 were mainly people going
back to areas controlled by their own ethnic group because returns
across ethnic lines proved nearly impossible. Of the estimated 2
million people who were forced or fled from their homes during the war,
in 1996 about 252,000 returned home (88,000 refugees and 164,000
displaced persons), while at the same time over 80,000 others fled or
were driven from their homes. Almost all of these people returned to
areas in which they would be in the majority ethnic group. For 1997,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) decided to
give priority to majority returns and projected that 200,000 refugees
would return to their homes, all to majority areas. \3\ As of March
1997, the pace of refugee returns exceeded UNHCR's target as about
17,000 refugees returned to Bosnia. In mid-June 1997, however, UNHCR
officials in Bosnia told us that this pace had recently fallen off, \4\
and, if the current trend continued, the number of refugee returns for
1997 would be lower than projected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ According to a UNHCR official, UNHCR has no estimates for
returns of displaced persons in 1997; however, it has an informal
target of 20,000-30,000 returns of displaced persons for the year.
\4\ According to a UNHCR official, 23,000 refugees had to returned
to Bosnia from January through May 1997. This is much lower than
UNHCR's target of about 57,000 refugee returns for that period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A number of factors have combined to hinder returns, such as fear,
stemming from lack of personal security; violence triggered by
attempted cross-ethnic returns; poor economic prospects; and lack of
suitable housing. Further, political leaders of all ethnic groups have
used nonviolent means to resist returns, including the retention of
existing, discriminatory property laws and continuing other policies
that place insurmountable barriers to returns. For example, according
to UNHCR officials, Bosnian Croat political leaders, as directed by
Croatia, have moved 5,000 to 6,000 displaced persons--including Bosnian
Croat army members and their families--into the formerly Serb-populated
city of Drvar, a policy designed to prevent Serbs from returning and to
cement the ethnic separation of Bosnia. This policy has been
implemented by all three ethnic groups during and after the war.
Recent efforts to address the return problem involved many aspects
of the Bosnia peace operation. For example, in spring 1997 UNHCR, with
support from the U.S. government, announced the ``Open Cities'' project
that is designed to provide economic incentives to those areas that
welcome and actively integrate refugees and displaced persons into
local communities. In April, the Federation refugee minister provided
UNHCR with a list of 25 cities and towns for participation in the
project. As of mid-June 1997, UNHCR was evaluating the level of
commitment of these and other communities that had indicated an
interest in the project. According to a U.N. official, in early June
the Republika Srpska Minister of Refugees was going to submit a list of
nine cities in Republika Srpska that wanted to take part in the
project. At the last minute, however, the minister was directed not to
participate by Radovan Karadzic, who effectively retains control of
Republika Srpska.
According to a State Department official, the U.S. embassy and
UNHCR in early July 1997 officially recognized the first three
communities to receive assistance under the ``Open Cities'' project.
The U.S. government is also funding minority return programs in two
other communities. Of these five communities, three are in Bosniak-
controlled areas, one is in a Bosnian Croat-controlled area, and one is
in Republika Srpska.
Progress in Rebuilding the Economy
Economic conditions have improved somewhat since the end of the
war, particularly in the Federation. Economic reconstruction has begun,
and about $1.1 billion in international assistance was disbursed in
1996 as part of the 3- to 4-year reconstruction program. \5\ Most of
this money has gone to the Federation. The U.S. government, primarily
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
committed $294.4 million during the program's first year. This money
went to, among other things, repair municipal infrastructure and
services, provide small business loans, and give technical assistance
for the development of national and Federation economic institutions.
By the end of 1996, there were many signs of economic recovery,
primarily in the Federation.
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\5\ To support these goals, the government of Bosnia, with the
assistance of the World Bank, the European Commission, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and other international
agencies and organizations, designed a 3- to 4-year, $5.1-billion
Priority Reconstruction Program. This program provided the
international community with the framework for the economic
reconstruction and integration of Bosnia. Fifty-nine donors--48
countries and 11 organizations--pledged $1.9 billion for the 1996
economic reconstruction program.
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At the end of 1996, however, economic activity was still at a very
low level, and much reconstruction work remained to be done.
Furthermore, many key national and Federation economic institutions--
such as Bosnia's central bank--were not yet fully functioning. The
biggest obstacle to progress in economic reconstruction and economic
institution building has been the lack of cooperation among Bosnia's
political leaders in implementing infrastructure projects and economic
institutions that would unite the ethnic groups within the Federation
and across the two entities.
The international community has made many attempts to use economic
assistance to encourage compliance and discourage noncompliance with
the Dayton Agreement. \6\ For example, during 1996, according to a
State Department official, all major bilateral donors had withheld
economic assistance from Bosnian Serb-controlled areas because Bosnian
Serb political leaders failed to comply with key human rights and other
provisions of the Dayton Agreement. Further, on May 30, 1997, the
Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, the organization
that provides political guidance for the civilian aspects of the
operation, reiterated previous Council statements on this issue, tied
assistance for housing and local infrastructure to acceptance of
returns, and gave priority to UNHCR's ``Open Cities'' project.
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\6\ The Congress has placed conditions on some U.S. assistance.
See, for example, Public Laws 104-107, section 584; 104-122; and 104-
208, section 101(c), Title II.
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Moreover, an international donors' conference, originally planned
to be held at the end of February 1997, was postponed because Bosnia's
council of ministers had not yet adopted key economic laws. On June 19,
1997, the donors' conference was again postponed because the government
of Bosnia, although it had made progress in passing economic laws, had
not made sufficient progress toward developing an economic program with
the International Monetary Fund. As of July 15, 1997, the donors'
conference had not been rescheduled. \7\
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\7\ According to a State Department official, the International
Monetary Fund favors holding the conference the week of July 21, 1997,
but the date may slip to July 28 or 29, 1997.
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Some international officials in Bosnia have questioned the
effectiveness of threatening to withhold economic assistance from
Bosnian Serb- and Croat-controlled areas in this conditional manner,
partly because these areas have received little international
assistance to date. \8\ According to a State Department official, when
the U.S. government decided on its conditionality policy toward
Republika Srpska, it knew from analysis that there would be no quick
results from the denial of this assistance.
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\8\ According to State officials, Bosnian Croat-controlled areas
received little economic assistance to date because they suffered
little war damage.
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State now believes there is increasing evidence that elected
officials of Republika Srpska are under mounting political pressure to
make the necessary concessions to qualify for reconstruction
assistance. In March 1997, State and USAID officials told us that some
Bosnian Serb political leaders, including the President of Republika
Srpska, had shown a willingness to accept economic assistance that
includes conditions such as employing multiethnic work forces. These
leaders, according to State, are willing to accept conditional
assistance because they see the growing gap in economic recovery
between the Federation and Republika Srpska. As of July 1997, there
were no tangible results in this area, primarily because attempts to
work with these leaders were blocked by Radovan Karadzic.
Issues Emphasized During June 1997 Visit to Bosnia
During our June 1997 visit to Bosnia, numerous U.S. and
international officials involved in trying to help implement the Dayton
Agreement emphasized four areas as being critically important to the
agreement's success: (1) the urgent need to arrest Radovan Karadzic;
(2) the upcoming municipal elections, specifically the potentially
contentious installation of municipal governments in areas that had a
different ethnic composition before the war; (3) the outcome of the
arbitration decision over control of Brcko; and (4) the need for a
continued international military force, along with a U.S. component, in
Bosnia after SFOR's mission ends in June 1998.
Urgency of Arresting Radovan Karadzic
As we previously reported, in 1996 and 1997 the international
community made some attempts to politically isolate Karadzic and remove
him from power. For example, under pressure from the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the international
community, Karadzic stepped down as the head of the ruling Bosnian Serb
political party on July 18, 1996.
According to international observers, however, these efforts to
remove Karadzic from power did not work; instead, he has effectively
retained his control and grown in popularity among people in Republika
Srpska. U.S. Information Agency polls showed that between April 1996
and January 1997, the percentage of Bosnian Serbs who viewed Karadzic
very favorably increased from 31 percent to 56 percent, and the
percentage who viewed him somewhat favorably or very favorably rose
from 68 percent to 85 percent.
During our June 1997 fieldwork in Bosnia, many officials with whom
we spoke were unequivocal in their opinion that Radovan Karadzic must
be arrested or otherwise removed from the scene in Bosnia as soon as
possible. They told us that Karadzic, a leader who is not accountable
to the electorate, is blocking international efforts to work with the
more ``moderate'' Bosnian Serb political leaders in implementing the
Dayton Agreement. For example, he has not allowed other political
leaders, including elected ones, to abide by agreements they have made
with the international community on small-scale attempts to link the
ethnic groups politically or economically. Observers also told us that
Karadzic still controls Republika Srpska police and dominates Bosnian
Serb political leaders through a ``reign of terror.''
According to a U.S. embassy official, the arrest of Karadzic is a
necessary--but insufficient--step to allow Dayton institutions to
function effectively and to encourage more moderate Bosnian Serbs to
begin implementing some provisions of the Dayton Agreement. Although
the arrest alone would not assure full implementation of Dayton,
without the arrest Dayton would have almost no chance to succeed.
Issues Related to Municipal Elections
Bosnia's municipal elections are scheduled to be held on September
13 and 14, 1997. OSCE and other officials with whom we spoke were
concerned about the volatile environment that will likely surround the
installation of some newly elected municipal governments, specifically
those in municipalities that had a different ethnic composition before
the war. Because people will be able to vote where they lived in 1991,
the election results in such municipalities could be very difficult to
implement. For example, it is possible that a predominantly Bosniak
council could be elected to Srebrenica, a city that had a prewar
Bosniak-majority population but was ``ethnically cleansed'' by Serbs in
1995; and Bosnian Serbs could win the majority on the municipal council
of Drvar, a town with a predominantly Serb majority before and during
much of the war but now populated in large part by Bosnian Croats.
To address these potential ``hotspots,'' an interagency working
group led by OSCE is developing an election implementation plan for the
municipal elections. An early version of this plan calls for a final
certification that confirms which municipal councils have been duly
installed by the end of 1997. \9\ This plan recognizes that candidates
who win office must be able to travel to municipal council meetings and
to move about their municipality without fear of physical attack or
intimidation. It calls for local police to provide security for council
members and for IPTF and SFOR to supervise the development of the
security plan and, together with OSCE and other organizations, monitor
its implementation.
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\9\ This plan calls for a two-step certification process for the
election: a technical certification of the final election numbers and
the final certification, on a municipality-by-municipality basis,
confirming which municipal councils have been duly installed. The
election process will close by the end of 1997. It will be followed by
a post-election period during which an interagency monitoring and
reporting structure would continue to monitor the proper functioning of
municipal assemblies to ensure that elected candidates are able to
carry out their duties as envisioned by the Dayton Agreement.
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According to OSCE and SFOR officials, SFOR's current force level of
33,000 will be augmented by 4,000-5,000 troops in Bosnia around the
time of the municipal elections; it is unclear, however, what SFOR's
force levels will be during the potentially contentious installation
period. To support the augmentation, as of July 10, 1997, the
Department of Defense (DOD) planned to increase the number of U.S.
troops in Bosnia from about 8,000 \10\ to about 10,250 during August
and September 1997. According to a DOD official, on October 1, 1997,
SFOR troop levels would be drawn down to either the current force level
or a lower number, depending on decisions that may be reached before
that date. OSCE and other officials in Bosnia told us that a further
drawdown of SFOR below its current force level should not occur until
the end of the installation process.
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\10\ As of July 6, 1997, an additional 2,600 U.S. military
personnel were also deployed to Croatia, Italy, and Hungary, in support
of SFOR.
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Outcome of Brcko Arbitration
Many international observers in Bosnia told us that the final
arbitration decision on which ethnic group will control Brcko will
likely be a major determinant of the ultimate success or failure of the
Dayton Agreement. This decision will not be made until March 1998 at
the earliest. Without a final decision, an interim supervisory
administration will remain in Brcko. In June 1997, the High
Representative, the coordinator of the civilian aspects of the peace
operation, stated that Brcko will signal to the rest of the world the
extent to which progress is being made in the implementation of the
Dayton Agreement.
First, some background on the Brcko arbitration process. At Dayton,
Bosnia's political leaders were unable to agree on which ethnic group
would control the strategically important area in and around the city
of Brcko. The Dayton Agreement instead called for an arbitration
tribunal to decide this issue. At the end of the war, Brcko city was
controlled by Bosnian Serb political leaders and populated
predominately by Serbs due to ``ethnic cleansing'' of prewar Muslims
and Croats, who had then accounted for about 63 percent of the city's
population, and settlement of Serb refugees there. We were told that an
arbitration decision that awarded control of the area to either the
Bosniaks or Bosnian Serbs \11\ would lead to civil unrest and possibly
restart the conflict because the location of Brcko makes it vitally
important to both parties' respective interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The parties to the arbitration are Bosnia's two entities, the
Federation and Republika Srpska.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In February 1997, the arbitration tribunal \12\ decided to postpone
a final decision as to which of the parties would control Brcko.
Instead, the tribunal called for the designation of a supervisor under
the auspices of the Office of the High Representative, who would
establish an interim supervisory administration for the Brcko area. The
tribunal decision noted that (1) the national and entity governments
were not sufficiently mature to take on the responsibility of
administering the city and (2) Republika Srpska's disregard of its
Dayton implementation obligations in the Brcko area had kept tensions
and instability at much higher levels than expected. On March 7, 1997,
the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board announced that the High
Representative had appointed a U.S. official as Brcko supervisor, and
the interim supervisory administration began operating on April 11,
1997. \13\
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\12\ The tribunal consisted of three members--an American, a
Bosnian Serb, and a Bosniak. The American arbitrator was selected by
the President of the International Court of Justice and was granted
authority to issue rulings on his own, including a final award, if the
tribunal could not reach consensus. Only the American member of the
tribunal signed the decision.
\13\ While the city of Brcko, the subject of the arbitration
dispute, is located in Republika Srpska, the Brcko Supervisor's area of
responsibility covers almost all of Brcko municipality, which extends
across the interentity boundary line into the Federation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The interim administration was designed to supervise the
implementation of the civil provisions of the Dayton Agreement in
coordination with SFOR, OSCE, IPTF, and other organizations in the
Brcko area: specifically, it was to allow former Brcko residents to
return to their homes, provide freedom of movement and other human
rights throughout the area, give proper police protection to all
citizens, encourage economic revitalization, and lay the foundation for
local representative democratic government.
According to the Brcko supervisor, known as the Deputy High
Representative for Brcko, the implementation process has just begun.
The Deputy High Representative and his staff have been working hard and
are developing a plan to return refugees and displaced persons in a
phased and orderly manner, but progress will take a long time and be
difficult. From January 1, 1997, through June 17, 1997, only 159
displaced families from the Bosnian Serb-controlled area of Brcko had
returned to their prewar homes; all of these homes are located in the
zone of separation. We were told that as many as 30,000 Bosniaks and
Bosnian Croats were driven from their homes in what is now Serb-
controlled Brcko. Further, freedom of movement does not yet exist in
the area, primarily due to the fear that Bosniak and Bosnian Serb
police have instilled in people from other ethnic groups. As in other
parts of Republika Srpska, Bosnian Serb political leaders refuse to
cooperate with IPTF in restructuring their police in accordance with
democratic policing standards. And the Deputy High Representative told
us that he has no ``carrots or sticks'' either to reward compliance or
punish non-compliance of the parties, particularly the Bosnian Serbs.
Brcko has also experienced implementation problems related to the
upcoming municipal elections that go beyond those of other areas of
Bosnia. For example, in June 1997 OSCE took action after it
investigated cases of alleged voter registration fraud by Bosnian Serbs
in Brcko. After finding that Bosnian Serbs were engaging in wholesale
fraud, OSCE attempted to correct the situation by (1) firing the
chairmen of the local election commission and voter registration
center, (2) reregistering the entire Brcko population and political
candidates, and (3) suspending and later reopening and extending voter
registration there, which ultimately ran from June 18 to July 12, 1997.
The interim supervisory administration is scheduled to operate for
at least 1 year. The arbitration tribunal may make a further decision
on the status of the Brcko area by March 15, 1998, if the parties
request such action between December 1, 1997, and January 15, 1998.
Need for a Continued Military Presence in Bosnia
In December 1996, the North Atlantic Council, the body that
provides political guidance to NATO, concluded that without a
continuation of a NATO-led force in Bosnia, fighting would likely
resume. Thus, NATO that month authorized a new 18-month mission, SFOR,
which is about half the size of the previous Implementation Force.
SFOR's mission is scheduled to end in June 1998. According to the SFOR
operation plan, the desired NATO end state is an environment adequately
secure for the ``continued consolidation of the peace'' without further
need for NATO-led military forces in Bosnia. The plan lists four
conditions that must be met for the desired end state objective to be
realized:
The political leaders of Bosnia's three ethnic groups must
demonstrate a commitment to continue negotiations as the means
to resolve political and military differences.
Bosnia's established civil structures must be sufficiently
mature to assume responsibilities for ensuring compliance with
the Dayton Agreement.
The political leaders of Bosnia's three ethnic groups must
adhere on a sustained basis to the military requirements of the
Dayton Agreement, including the virtual absence of violations
or unauthorized military activities.
Conditions must be established for the safe continuation of
ongoing, nation-building activities.
The SFOR operation plan asserts that these objectives will be
achieved by June 1998. However, international officials in Bosnia
recently told us that the likelihood of these end-state objectives
being met by June 1998 is exceedingly small. They based this projection
on their assessments of the current pace of political and social change
in Bosnia.
In their view, an international military force would be required
after June 1998 to deter renewed hostilities after SFOR's mission ends.
They said that to be credible and maintain international support, the
force must be NATO led and include a U.S. military component, and it
must be based in Bosnia rather than ``over the horizon'' in another
country.
Many participants of the operation told us that without the
security presence provided by such a follow-on force to SFOR, their
organizations would be unable to operate in Bosnia; a U.N. official
said that IPTF--which consists of unarmed, civilian police monitors--
could not function and would leave Bosnia under those conditions. As
one international official put it, the follow-on force--including a
U.S. military presence--needs to be ``around the corner'' rather ``over
the horizon'' to provide the general security environment in which the
rest of the peace process could move forward.
U.S. Costs and Commitments Exceed Initial Estimates
The executive branch initially estimated that U.S. military and
civilian participation in Bosnia would cost about $3.2 billion through
fiscal year 1997: $2.5 billion in incremental costs for military-
related operations and $670 million for the civilian sector. \14\ These
estimates assumed that U.S. military forces would be withdrawn from
Bosnia when the mission of NATO's Implementation Force ended in
December 1996.
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\14\ DOD costs are incremental costs; that is, they are costs that
would not have been incurred if it were not for the Bosnia operation.
For a more detailed discussion of DOD's costs estimates and costs see
Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Seem Likely to Exceed DOD's Estimate
(GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR, Mar. 14, 1996); and Bosnia: Costs Are Exceeding
DOD's Estimate (GAO/NSIAD-96-204BR, July 25, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The executive branch's current cost estimate for fiscal years 1996
and 1997 is about $5.9 billion: about $5 billion in incremental costs
for military-related operations and about $950 million for the civilian
sector. Almost all of the increase was due to the decision to extend
the U.S. military presence in and around Bosnia through June 1998. In
fiscal year 1998, the United States plans to commit about $1.9 billion
for the Bosnia peace operation: about $1.5 billion for military
operations \15\ and $371 million for civilian activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ DOD estimated its costs could increase by about $160 million
if the United States maintained an 8,500 force level through June 1998,
rather than being drawn down to 5,000 on October 1, 1997, as assumed in
current cost estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under current estimates, which assume that the U.S. military
participation in Bosnia will end by June 1998, the United States will
provide a total of about $7.8 billion for military and civilian support
to the operation from fiscal year 1996 to 1998. Some State and Defense
Department officials agreed that an international military force will
likely be required in Bosnia after June 1998. U.S. participation in
such an effort could push the final cost significantly higher than the
current $7.8 billion estimate.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee this concludes my
prepared remarks. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you
may have.
[The report to which Mr. Johnson referred, Bosnia Peace
Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's
Goals (GAO/NSIAD-97-132), is available from the General
Accounting Office and also on the Internet at http://
www.gao.gov]
Senator Smith. Thank you very much.
I just have a question, and any of you can answer it if you
have an opinion. I think the administration put a lot of stock
in the hope of national elections, that that would somehow
diminish the power of Radovan Karadzic. But it did not seem to.
He seems to have held on to power and perhaps consolidated
it in some way. Was the administration naive in believing that?
And, number two, how does he hold on to his power no matter
what the elections show?
Mr. Johnson. Well, we were told that he holds on to his
power by using a reign of terror. He controls the police force
in the Republic of Srpska. And by using those levers, as well
as other financial levers that he has available, he is able to
retain power.
He also enjoys some popular support among the Bosnian
Serbs. A poll that was taken, I believe, in July of last year
indicated that he had about 36 percent very strong support.
That has since increased to about 56 percent. So he does enjoy
some popular support, but primarily his control is by strong-
arm tactics.
Senator Smith. Ambassador.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Well, on the elections, Senator, I
was always troubled by the elections. I always felt that we
should have taken a principled position. The elections were
fraudulent, by and large, and they produced the results in
which the basic nationalist leadership were confirmed in their
positions.
However, there are other factors. The Administration felt
that it was important to start the process, partially because
they felt there were pressures from here and from elsewhere to
get out. And they felt it was important to start the process.
I think, personally, that was a mistake. I think it would
have been better to have persisted in a position in which the
elections had to be free and fair. They were acknowledged not
to be free and fair. But, nevertheless, that is water over the
dam right now.
I did want to correct, if I may, an impression I might have
created. I think the changes on seizing indicted war criminals
and the more fulsome way of dealing with Croatia are very
positive steps, and I support them. I was simply trying to
correct my unhappiness with a record on war criminals that
seems to be discussed publicly from time to time.
As to Karadzics power, I think it stems much from the same
reasons that were set forth. He controls the police, he has the
money and pays them, he controls the legislature and
parliament. And he is a popular figure. There is a lot of
support for him still in Bosnia.
Senator Smith. If he were removed, what would happen, in
your view?
Ambassador Abramowitz. I think if he were removed, two
things I think would happen, although I cannot be sure. It is
very uncertain.
Senator Smith. Sure.
Ambassador Abramowitz. One, I think there would be a very
significant psychological shift in terms of the willingness to
cooperate with Dayton. And second, I think it would be much
easier to get a new leadership which would embody that
willingness to cooperate.
I do not mean to say we are going to get a desire to have
an integrated multiethnic state, but we would get a desire to
cooperate with a Bosnian entity, to be part of a Bosnian
entity, and to begin the process of serious reconciliation.
I believe the process of reconciliation is terribly impeded
by the existence of Karadzic and company.
Mr. Heffernan. Just to add one thing, I think the role of
media has played a very significant role in him being able to
retain his power too. Obviously it is controlled by the State,
and he is the State at this point.
Senator Smith. And because of that fact, how realistic is
it to think that more elections will be beneficial, the
municipal ones that are anticipated? If he controls the media,
will they not determine the outcome?
Ambassador Abramowitz. Well, I think Mr. Heffernan was
correct about the importance the media. And we have been, I
think, insufficiently diligent in trying to change that.
I also believe, for example, in making our case to the
Srpska Republic we have also been remiss. We have done very
little in explaining why we are going after war criminals, what
it means, and the rationale for this. And I believe SFOR and
the U.S. Government should have early on put on a more massive
campaign to explain to the people of Srpska what is involved
here.
Senator Smith. I bet Joe Biden and I could figure out some
pretty good negative ads to run against this guy.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman. First, I want to thank all of
you for being here.
I must admit, Mr. Ambassador, I have not read the report
that I think was issued yesterday by your organization. I am
looking forward to it.
You said two things that I found particularly fascinating.
You said--and I suspect I saw your colleagues sort of nod their
heads. I think they are in agreement, but I do not want to put
words in their mouth.
How does Karadzic keep control of the police? You indicated
part of it was money. Where do you think he gets his money? He
was not born wealthy.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Well, according to Mrs. Plavsic, who
made a remarkable speech, and I would urge you all to read it,
he controls most of the monopolies, cigarettes, gasoline, and
the like that are sold in Srpska. And there is an enormous
rake-off in terms of pricing. I cannot give you----
Senator Smith. No, no. I----
Ambassador Abramowitz. I am merely repeating what Mrs.
Plavsic said 2 weeks ago.
Senator Smith. No, I am not taking issue with it. I think
it is important to be on the record. Second, what was amazing
to me--second, we at the outset, when the former Yugoslavia
made a split, when Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized in the
international community and problems began, there was no doubt
in my mind, and I suspect in each of your minds, that Milosevic
was a major player in facilitating--I will put it another way.
Had there been no Milosevic, had there been a responsible
leader in Serbia who did not embolden, supply, maintain, give
physical support and military support for, I doubt whether we
would have ever gotten to the point we are now.
So the haunting question for guys like me who, I must
admit, sometimes my judgment may be blurred because of my
vision, my view, my opinion of Milosevic. How involved, how
important is this Serbian, meaning the country of Serbia, the
Serbian connection in the ability of these war criminals and
their supporters in the Republika Srpska and elsewhere in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue to survive and wield the
power that we have all acknowledged they continue to wield?
Being a cog in the wheel, what part does, if you have an
opinion, Milosevic play at this moment?
Ambassador Abramowitz. It is very difficult for me to
answer that, and I can only really speculate. I think the most
tangible involvement probably is the support of the Yugoslav
army for the military of Srpska.
They pay most of the salaries, I believe. Certainly during
the way they supplied most of the ammunition and most of the
support. That is one thing.
Second, we also know that although there have been very
significant differences between Milosevic and Karadzic--I
personally do not know what the state of their relations is
right now--Milosevic has a big influence in the Srpska
political scene.
The nature of that influence, I cannot really say. But
everybody knows that he is a significant figure, although in
trying to broker a meeting between Pale and Banja Luka, he was
unsuccessful.
Third, in a larger sense, if there was no Serbia, Srpska
could not exist. It just could not exist. It would have to make
its peace with Bosnia and Herzegovina and be part of that
state. I am talking of a Serbia that is highly nationalist,
that still is interested in preserving an ethnic relationship
with its neighboring Serbs, although less so than years ago
because, after all, the principal thing that changed the
Bosnian situation, as you know, was the Croatian military
offensive. That changed everything.
Senator Biden. Exactly right.
Ambassador Abramowitz. That led to Dayton.
Senator Biden. Exactly right.
Ambassador Abramowitz. That particular development. And
Milosevic abandoned the Croatian Serbs, leading to so many
refugees in Serbia as well as in Srpska. And he has been hurt
in part because of this. Nevertheless, the overall power of
Serbia is still a major factor in----
Senator Biden. One of the disappointing conclusions that I
have reached is that the political difficulty Milosevic was
having within Serbia, seems to have moderated of late. The
people providing that difficulty, I assumed, I hoped at the
outset, were not nationalists with the same ultra-nationalism
that he represents.
And the thing that disappointed me as I was attempting to,
and others, embolden the administration to provide at least
some credibility for the opposition, was the conclusion I
reached that I was not sure there was much of a difference.
As old George Wallace used to say, and we are both old
enough to remember the phrase, ``There ain't a dime's worth of
difference.''
He was talking about the two political parties. There may
have been a quarter's worth of difference, but there did not
seem to be a dollars worth of difference between the opposition
forces and Milosevic, which leads me to the last question I
have for you, Mr. Ambassador. But then I would like to hear
from your two colleagues.
That is, what leverage, if any, do you think, and maybe
your report speaks to this, I do not know, what leverage do you
think remains of our power to exert on Serbia?
Because, as you point out, were there not a nationalistic
Serbia, regardless of whether there is a Milosevic adding
injury at this moment or anyone else, it would be virtually
impossible for the Republic of Srpska to continue to be as
obstreperous and counterproductive as they have been for a
whole range of reasons.
Is there any additional pressure we are capable of exerting
to bring about a more civilized behavior, enlightened behavior,
on the part of Serbia?
Ambassador Abramowitz. Before I try to answer that, let me
just observe that Milosevics nationalism was a highly cynical
nationalism. I do not know his genuine feelings, but he clearly
was using----
Senator Biden. Absolutely.
Ambassador Abramowitz.--Serbian nationalism to advance his
goals. He dropped it in the years 1993, 1994, 1995. Where he
stands now, I do not know.
And he clearly, as far as I am concerned, has not been very
helpful since Dayton in terms of helping to carry out the
provisions of Dayton, whether from war criminals to encouraging
Republika Srpska to get the people to cooperate.
The leverage we have is, I think, still very great if we
can unite the world on it. And by uniting the world, I mean our
allies who, after all, have always been split on this issue.
We have always had a split with our allies as to how to
deal with Serbia. And there are a number of allies who have
wanted to, in the past few years, sort of make their peace with
Serbia, give them the benefit of the doubt, et cetera.
I believe that the biggest method we have--and it is hard
to measure when it will be effective. Obviously I do not know--
the biggest method we have is the continued sanctions on
Serbia, the continued isolation.
The thing that bothers me most about the events of November
in Servia is I think Milos has been a terrible drain on Serbia.
And we need a strong Serbia, and we need a dynamic and
progressive Serbia. He has brought this country to----
Senator Biden. I understand.
Ambassador Abramowitz. The problem was, I felt, that we did
not take advantage, no matter how divided some of the
opposition was, we did not take advantage of that enormous
opportunity to make better use the media. And it might not have
worked, but all that we had to try to make his position more
untenable. I think that was a terrible, terrible mistake.
Senator Biden. So do I. The reason I mentioned what I said
about the opposition was that I was making a case to anyone who
would listen. It was undercut by the fact they were able to
convince some of the opposition through their actions,
attitudes, speeches, statements, and state policies. So it was
not as if I had total high ground to make the case. I was not
suggesting that we still should not have done it anyway. I
believe we still should have done it.
As a matter of fact, as bizarre as it sounds, there are
folks around here trying to eliminate Radio Free Europe or
Radio Liberty.
One of the things I think we should be using, and we could
be using a hell of a lot more, are radios in Serbia, as well as
Croatia, I might add, for the same reason but with a different
message.
So I share your view and your frustration. But I am taking
too much time here.
Would either of you gentlemen like to comment on the areas
I have raised with the Ambassador? Otherwise, I will come back
after the Chairman finishes.
Mr. Johnson. I will just make one comment on the initial
question you asked about the relationship between Pale and
Belgrade. We heard from fairly high levels at the embassy that
decisions that are made in Banja Luka run to Pale, and then
they run to Belgrade.
I would also point out that Mrs. Plavsic was detained in
Belgrade, so that would indicate to me that there is some
linkage between Milosevic and Karadzic, at least for the
moment.
Senator Biden. Unless something has changed drastically,
and I realize this is anecdotal, but in my first trip to
Bosnia, I spent a lot of time, meaning several hours, in a
private meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade, well into the
night.
And if you have ever been to his office, there is a very
small conference table. It is one-third of the size of that and
a little more narrow. He sat on one side of that table and me
on the other and a staffer, and he had two people with him.
And literally until 11 oclock at night we were arguing with
one another about what he was doing or not doing, and we were
not making much progress. And he kept saying, Mr. Karadzic is
the one you have to speak to. But I have no control over him. I
have no control over him.
So literally, not figuratively, but literally, at about 10
minutes of 11 he said, ``Do you want to speak to Karadzic?''
And I said yes. With that, he got up and walked two paces
to a phone behind him on a corner table, picked up the phone,
said something in Croatian, which I did not understand, said
something.
He sat back down, and we continued our meeting, or argument
I guess it was. And literally, Mr. Chairman, 15 minutes later,
you can hear them coming up the steps, some of them running up
the steps.
And I must tell you, for a moment I sort of braced myself.
And then around the corner comes that fellow who we have all
come to know with that full head of hair, the only thing he has
that I think is worth having.
And then he sat down at the table. I thought he was going
to have a heart attack he was so out of breath.
And he said, ``Mr. President, I'm sorry,'' speaking
English, ``I'm sorry I'm late. I didn't mean it.''
So I looked across at Milosevic, who is a very short guy,
and I said, ``No control.''
And I realize that is anecdotal, and I realize I cannot
from that conclude with certainty that there is still a
relationship where there is no doubt who is the boss. But at
that time there was no question. We know the connection has
been sustained for a long time. And Mr. Karadzic knows what is
in store for him.
My view--and this is the last comment I will make and ask
any of you to comment on it--it is not surprising. It would
have been a travesty had Karadzic not been indicted. And he
knew from the outset 4 years ago he would be branded a war
criminal unless he totally succeeded.
We sat in that room, and I looked at him and I said, ``Mr.
Karadzic, it is a pleasure to meet you. Your voice sounds
exactly like it does on those tapes.''
He looked at me and said, ``What tapes?''
And I said, ``The directions you gave to the death and rape
camps.''
And I am not exaggerating when I say he turned as white as
that sheet.
And I said, ``So it is a pleasure to see you in person.''
This is a case where the tape and the voice match. And so I
am of the view that because he knows that if in fact he is
captured, if there is ever a case that is going to be able to
be made, it will be made against him. The longer he is out
there, the more dangerous it is.
This is not a guy who is going to go quietly into the
night. There is nothing he is going to be able to negotiate if
he ever gets to the Hague.
Ambassador Abramowitz. But there is also another factor,
and that is he probably has a very good case against Milosevic.
Senator Biden. Absolutely.
Ambassador Abramowitz. And, therefore, for Milosevic to
seize him is a potentially a very dangerous thing.
Senator Biden. You just answered the question I was going
to ask. I do not think there is any possibility of that
occurring. There is a risk to American personnel, but I know of
no other answer than to use whatever capacity we collectively
have and arrest him.
Does anyone disagree with that?
How would you assess the risk? I realize this is crystal
ball gazing. I mean, who knows. But do any of you have any
comment you would like to make on that?
And then I will stop, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Abramowitz. I cannot fully--I cannot even
partially assess the risks. But I think there are a number of
things here that would cause a certain amount of caution on the
Serb part.
One, NATO has the capacity, with all of their weapons, or
most of their weapons in storage sites, to destroy the
capabilities of the Serbian army, their whole capacity to
fight. That would be an extraordinary blow to the confidence of
the Serbs, and that is one thing.
Second, you know, conversely----
Senator Biden. You mean the J and A now.
Ambassador Abramowitz. No. I am talking about the----
Senator Biden. The Bosnians.
Ambassador Abramowitz.--Bosnian Serb. They are all in
Cantonments.
Senator Biden. No. I got it. They could destroy----
Ambassador Abramowitz. They will destroy it. The second
thing that strikes me is that, as I say, in a perverse way,
Bosnian Serbs need us--the balance of forces is a little
different.
And if hostilities were to emerge, they would for the first
time be at very great military risk. I am not saying that the
Muslim side is eager for a fight, but there is a difference in
capabilities from before.
Senator Biden. I think you are right.
Ambassador Abramowitz. And they would be at great risk.
That does not mean they will not try retaliation, it does not
mean--but there are limits, I believe, serious limits as to
what they can do.
Now, that requires a lot of fortitude on our side. It is a
risk. It is not only a risk to people, it is a political risk.
But I also believe there is a terribly important political
moral case to go after him.
Senator Biden. I do, too. And I think failure to take the
risk almost guarantees an outcome where the cost will be even
higher. I mean, in a purely selfish American sense the cost is
higher, as well as clearly the cost is higher on the ground.
And I think, quite frankly, Mr. Ambassador, we are talking
about expanding NATO. My friend and I have been deeply involved
in that process with the administration. I think were this to
come a cropper, you can begin to say goodbye to NATO.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me so much time.
Senator Smith. That is fine.
I only have a final question, Mr. Ambassador. I wonder in
your view does the presence of Croatia and Serbia have any real
control over the Croat and Serbian areas of Bosnia?
Ambassador Abramowitz. Absolutely.
Senator Smith. Do they have sufficient----
Ambassador Abramowitz. The whole Croatian, the whole
Herzeg/Bosnia thing is underwritten by Zagreb. The defense
minister went to the funeral of Mate Babich, the Bosnian Croat
leader.
And he said, ``We will continue''--Defense Minister Shoshak
of Zagreb, said, ``We will continue to carry out his ideals.''
And his ideals were an ethnic Croatian state. There is no
question in my mind that Tudjman, President Tudjman, if he
wanted to do something, one, on indicted war criminals, and
two, to enlist a greater collaboration from the Croatian
population of Bosnia with the other ethnic elements of Bosnia,
could encourage it enormously. I have no doubt about that.
Senator Smith. So if those ideals included the Dayton
Accords, they could implement the Dayton Accords.
Ambassador Abramowitz. I think Croatia has a big role in
implementing the Dayton Accords, which is why I believe it is
important not to let them escape that responsibility and to use
the financial club over their heads.
Senator Smith. That is my point. I thank you.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, can I make one parting comment
to my three colleagues?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Senator Biden. And I want to introduce two Delawareans that
are here. They do not expect me to do this, they do not even
know that I know they are here.
But Ms. Kingsley and Mr. Fisher, they moderated a debate on
this issue last fall at the University of Delaware, and both of
them were OSCE observers, if I am not mistaken, in Bosnia. And
I am glad to see them both here.
Excuse the parochial recognition, but it is nice to have,
at least from my parochial perspective, some very informed
people in my home state so that not everyone thinks I am crazy.
And, second, do any of you--I am going to state a
proposition, and I would just like your comment. It seems to me
that in order for us to manage the apprehension of Serbian war
criminals and marginally at least diminish the negative
consequences from that, we should aggressively move on Croatia
war criminals.
There are indicted Croatian war criminals, who as you point
out, Mr. Ambassador, Tudjman could easily, easily facilitate
delivery.
And I hope this policy is a policy of moving on war
criminals. And if it is, I sincerely hope that there is some
political thought given to the need to demonstrate that this is
not merely an attempt to punish Serbian war criminals. There
were war criminals in all three factions, I would argue
overwhelmingly in the Serbian sector. But they should move.
And, Mr. Johnson, it does not surprise me that you would
hear international observers and/or any of our NATO allies
indicating that there would be no credibility for a follow-on
force that did not include American forces even if they were
stationed in Hungary and Italy.
But if they examine what they have said and that is true,
it is fascinating for Europeans to acknowledge they have no
credibility and NATO has no credibility, if that is what it
would be saying.
And I make a prediction to you, which is a dangerous thing
to do in this outfit, but if in fact there is no follow-on
force that is complemented by U.S. strategic, logistical,
tactical, air, naval and a rapid deployment force capability,
if that combination, or something close to that, is not left in
place at the end of next year, I think this will all have been
for naught.
And I would argue, and I hope it will not be true, but our
ability--we happen to support the expansion of NATO--would be
significantly, significantly diminished here.
People have vastly underestimated, but vastly
underestimated, how difficult it will be to get the votes to
amend the Washington Treaty.
If all in/all out is the policy and things begin to blow, a
lot of people, and not just the American public but in this
body, will say, ``What is the value of NATO? Why are we going
to pay $200 million a year more when these folks cannot even
take care of their own backyard with our overwhelming
support.''
But I really hope, Mr. Johnson, that the President puts
together something very close to that. And I am one who thinks
we should not get out, one of only a few. But there better be
NATO forces there at the end of the day or we have a problem.
Senator Smith. Gentlemen, we thank you all for your
participation in this hearing. And for the record let me state
that Senator Lautenberg would like to submit a statement for
the record.
So it will be held open for him to do that if there is no
objection. And also for other Senators who may not be here but
wish to ask a question, the record will be left open for them
for 3 days.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, U.S. Senator from New
Jersey
I commend the Chairman and Ranking Member for holding this hearing.
I welcome the opportunity to share my views about compliance with the
Dayton Accords in Bosnia, particularly aspects related to the
apprehension and prosecution of indicted war criminals.
As a result of the horrifying extent of war crimes committed before
and during the war in Bosnia, the U.N. Security Council, in May of
1993, created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). One of only four international war crimes tribunals
ever established, its mandate is to prosecute ``genocide, crimes
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and
violations of the laws and customs of war'' committed in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia beginning on January 1, 1991.
When the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia signed
the Dayton Peace Agreement, they recognized that reconciliation could
not occur unless war criminals were brought to justice. As such, they
agreed to cooperate fully with the investigation and prosecution of war
crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.
With the exception of the Bosnian Muslims, however, the parties to
the Dayton Peace agreement have failed to arrest and transfer to the
Tribunal the vast majority of indicted war criminals in territory
within their control. Until the recent arrests of Milan Kovacevic, a
Bosnian Serb accused of sending thousands of Muslims to certain torture
and death in concentration camps in the former Yugoslavia, and Slavko
Dokmanovic, accused of participating in a massacre of 261 civilians in
a hospital in Vukovar, only one indicted war criminal had been sent to
the Tribunal in The Hague in the last year by regional authorities.
Sixty-six of the original 74 known fugitives remain at large. At this
rate, it would take another 66 years to put the remaining publicly
indicted war criminals behind bars.
Where are these and other war criminals finding sanctuary?
Many of the indicted war criminals have been sighted living openly
and freely in Croatia, the Croat-controlled areas of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro).
Last fall, one non-governmental organization, the Coalition for
International Justice, compiled a list of all public sightings of war
criminals. For example, according to the Coalition's research, Dario
Kordic, one of the most widely recognized war criminals in the former
Yugoslavia for his role in killings in Lasva Valley, was seen visiting
his parents' apartment in Zagreb, Croatia. About the same time, Ivica
Rajic, another highly sought after war criminal, was reportedly seen in
a hotel in Split, Croatia.
The list of public sightings of indicted war criminals goes on and
on. Associated Press correspondent Liam McDowall reportedly located six
Bosnian Croats indicted for war crimes living and working in the
Bosnian Croat town of Vitez. And in perhaps the most egregious case to
date, Boston Globe reporter Elizabeth Neuffer reportedly found Zeljko
Mejakic--indicted for crimes committed as commander of Omarska camp
where some 4,000 people were tortured to death and women were brutally
raped--working as the deputy commander of the Prijedor police station
in Republika Srpska.
This list may not be entirely up to date now, but it illustrates
graphically that many of the indicted war criminals could have been
arrested easily if the authorities in control of the territory where
they were located had chosen to do so. I believe that is still the case
today.
I appreciate the fact that the act of apprehending and transferring
indicted war criminals to The Hague presents a thorny problem for the
international community. While some argue that American and NATO
military personnel should plunge in and make the arrests, others argue
that using NATO troops to arrest these indicted war criminals would be
fraught with difficulties that could put American and other NATO troops
in unnecessary danger.
Discussions about the role NATO troops will play have been underway
in the apprehension of war criminals since NATO troops landed in the
region a year and a half ago. Although British NATO troops did recently
arrest a war criminal, 66 publicly indicted criminals continue to roam
the region with impunity. Meanwhile, the clock ticks ever closer to the
June 1998 withdrawal date for NATO. Make no mistake about it: if war
criminals remain at large when NATO troops withdraw, long-term peace
will be jeopardized. The apprehension of war criminals is essential for
reconciliation to occur.
While the international community continues to debate the wisdom of
using NATO troops to apprehend war criminals, it must not fail to use
economic assistance as leverage to secure the arrest of these
fugitives.
Secretary Albright has rightly concluded that the international
community should condition economic assistance on cooperation with the
War Crimes Tribunal. In late May, she was right to announce aboard the
U.S.S. Intrepid that ``we have made compliance by all parties with the
obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal a prerequisite to our
assistance . . .'' The U.S. must insist that authorities in the region
make substantial progress toward arresting and transferring indicted
war criminals if the international funding spigot is to continue
flowing. Billions of dollars in assistance is powerful leverage, and
the United States would be wise to use it effectively.
But tough talk needs to be followed by tough action. On May 13, the
U.S. sent the wrong signal when it rewarded the Croatian government
with a $95 million World Bank enterprise and financial sector
adjustment loan. Less than a month later, on June 10, the
Administration voted in favor of a $13 million loan for a Croatian
cement factory at the World Bank's International Finance Corporation
despite the fact that none of the 13 Croat war criminals at large were
arrested. The two votes were a setback for U.S. policy in Europe. To
its credit, the Administration did postpone votes on the most recent
proposals for aid to Croatia at the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, albeit under significant and persistent pressure from
the Congress.
Clearly, we need a law to block assistance to countries that fail
to arrest indicted war criminals. The U.S. must step forward and assert
greater leadership and a more consistent policy in this area. To
promote this stronger U.S. role, Senators Leahy, Lugar, Feinstein,
Mikulski, Murray, Moynihan, D'Amato, and Lieberman, and I introduced
legislation, S. 804, on May 23, 1997 to condition foreign aid to
countries that provide sanctuary to indicted war criminals who are
sought for prosecution by the War Crimes Tribunal. Senator McConnell,
Chairman of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee,
included our legislation in the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill
for fiscal year 1998, which was reported by the Appropriations
Committee on June 24, 1997.
Our legislation, S. 804, reinforces the obligation of the parties
to the Dayton Agreement to arrest and transfer those indicted for
genocide, rape, and other crimes against humanity to The Hague. To
secure their cooperation, it imposes conditions on America's portion of
the $5.1 billion in economic reconstruction funding to Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Under our legislation, regional authorities must meet a simple
standard. They must immediately arrest a majority of indicted war
criminals living in areas under their control, and within six more
months, they must arrest all war criminals. Failure to cooperate and
pass this test will result in an immediate suspension of U.S. support
for bilateral aid and multilateral aid. To give the U.S. government
carrots as well as sticks, the legislation allows for humanitarian and
democracy building assistance.
Our legislation recognizes that even the parties to the Dayton
Agreement may find it difficult to apprehend all indicted war criminals
immediately, and therefore does not require them to complete the
process all at once. Once a majority of the war criminals have been
arrested and turned over, they are given up to six months to finish the
job.
Because our goal is to promote greater cooperation and provide
carrots, democratic and humanitarian assistance would still be provided
even in sanctioned countries or entities. Humanitarian assistance is
defined to include food and disaster assistance and assistance for
demining, refugees, education, health care, social services, and
housing. Democratization assistance includes electoral assistance and
assistance used in establishing the institutions of a democratic and
civil society, including police training.
However, assistance for projects in communities in which local
authorities are harboring criminals or preventing refugees from
returning home would be strictly limited to emergency food and medical
assistance and demining assistance. And absolutely no assistance--
humanitarian or otherwise--could be provided to projects or
organizations in which an indicted war criminal is affiliated or has a
financial interest. These provisions are important to ensure that our
assistance is not being used to prop up war criminals and that only
communities that allow refugees to return are rewarded with assistance.
Our legislation recognizes that the realities of government control
in the former Yugoslavia do not always conform to the arrangements in
the Dayton Agreement. Recognizing that a constituent entity of Bosnia
and Herzegovina may not control all areas within its border, and that
Croatia or Serbia may have effective control of territory that reaches
beyond their borders, the legislation holds a government or constituent
entity responsible for indicted war criminals ``in territory that is
under their effective control.'' As such, the legislation is not meant
to impose sanctions on the Muslim-Croat Federation as a whole if an
indicted war criminal remains in a Croat-controlled area of the
Federation. Likewise, it would allow sanctions to be imposed against a
country, such as Croatia, for failing to secure the apprehension of war
criminals in areas of the Federation which it effectively controls.
These measures are not intended to be punitive. I and the sponsors
of this legislation have made every effort to ensure that humanitarian
assistance to the people in all parts of the former Yugoslavia will not
be affected. While we do not oppose reconstruction funding, we believe
there is value in using it as a carrot, to provide an incentive to the
parties to arrest and turn war criminals over to the Tribunal.
I and the cosponsors of S. 804 are not alone in this view. Our
legislation has been endorsed by the Coalition for International
Justice, Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, Action
Council for Peace in the Balkans, and the International Human Rights
Law Group.
U.S. and international aid can help rebuild roads, bridges, and
power grids. But money alone cannot heal the deep wounds that divide
communities and perpetuate the cycle of hatred. Only reconciliation
through justice will heal those wounds. Unless war criminals are
brought to justice, reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovnia will
remain an elusive goal.
The Washington Post, in a February 1997 editorial, said it well:
``U.S. forces [cannot] fulfill their mission--bringing peace to
Bosnia--as long as war criminals remain at large. Lately, it has become
popular to focus on economic reconstruction as the answer to Bosnia's
troubles. But war didn't break out for economic reasons, and economic
aid alone can't secure the peace. As long as alleged war criminal
Radovan Karadzic and his henchmen run things from behind the scenes,
economic aid actually will flow to the criminals. . . .''
Peace will not be permanent in Bosnia if the War Crimes Tribunal
cannot complete its work. Future stability and economic growth depends,
in part, upon the repatriation of refugees. Yet the ability of refugees
to return home and resume normal lives will be fostered only if the war
criminals who perpetuated terror, intimidation, and violence are
brought to justice. That end can only be achieved when war criminals
are arrested.
If we accept the premise that American foreign aid should promote
our nation's long-term foreign policy goals, we must deny assistance to
governments that have failed to cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal.
Leveraging aid moves the U.S. closer to justice for the victims of
genocide, rape, torture, and other war crimes. And it meets our
humanitarian responsibility to never again allow war crimes and
genocide to go unpunished.
No one has articulated the need for this legislation as well as
Justice Goldstone, Former Chief Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda when he spoke
at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in January of 1997: ``Where there
have been egregious human rights violations that have been unaccounted
for, where there has been no justice, where the victims have not
received any acknowledgment, where they have been forgotten, where
there's been a national amnesia, the effect is a cancer in the society.
It's the reason that explains . . . spirals of violence that the world
has seen in the former Yugoslavia for centuries. . . .''
Justice Goldstone was right. What is required is a genuine process
of reconciliation, which can never occur unless war criminals are
brought to justice. Without reconciliation, the spiral of violence will
only continue, and the military mission on which the American taxpayers
have literally spent billions will be for naught.
America stands for justice and reconciliation throughout the world.
We must stand up for those principles by ensuring that the war
criminals of Bosnia are apprehended and the victims are heard.
Senator Smith. If there is no objection, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]