[Senate Hearing 105-376]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-376
U.S. AND MEXICAN COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS SINCE CERTIFICATION
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 29, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
44-791 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
CHARLES GRASSLEY, Iowa, Chairman
ALFONSE D'AMATO, New York JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
FRANK MURKOWSKI, Alaska BOB GRAHAM, Florida
JEFFREY SESSIONS, Alabama DIANE FEINSTEIN, California
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Banks, Samuel H., Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service,
Department of Treasury......................................... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Davidow, Hon. Jeffrey, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs............................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Ferrarone, Donald F., Former Special Agent-in-Charge, Houston
Field Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.
Department of Justice.......................................... 72
Prepared statement........................................... 75
Godson, Roy, Ph.D., Professor of Government, Georgetown
University, President, National Strategy Information Center.... 78
Prepared statement........................................... 80
Kneir, Hon. Thomas, Deputy Assistant Director, Organized Crime
and Drug Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation............... 58
Prepared statement........................................... 59
McCaffrey, Hon. Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy................................................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Milford, James, S., Jr., Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice......... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Appendix
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold............ 91
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Barry R.
McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms......................... 92
Questions Submitted by Senator Grassley...................... 103
Questions Submitted by Senator Biden......................... 105
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Jeffrey Davidow,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms......................... 108
Questions Submitted by Senator Biden......................... 111
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to James S.
Milford, Jr., Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Department of Justice
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms......................... 113
Questions Submitted by Senator Grassley...................... 117
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Samuel H. Banks,
Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, Department of
Treasury
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms......................... 119
Questions Submitted by Senator Grassley...................... 136
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Thomas Kneir,
Deputy Assistant Director, Organized Crime and Drug Branch,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms......................... 141
Questions Submitted by Senator Grassley...................... 143
U.S. AND MEXICAN COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS SINCE CERTIFICATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1997
Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control and Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control and
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations met jointly, pursuant
to notice, at 2:10 p.m. In room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Hon. Paul Coverdell and Hon. Charles E. Grassley,
presiding.
Present from Foreign Relations Committee: Senators
Coverdell, Hagel, Frist, Biden, Dodd, Kerry and Feinstein.
Present from Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control: Senators Grassley, Sessions, and Graham [Senators
Biden and Feinstein are members of both the caucus and the
committee].
Senator Coverdell. Ladies and gentlemen, let me bring to
order a joint meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee and
the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, chaired
by Senator Grassley of Iowa.
We're both going to make opening statements then turn to
our first panel, General McCaffrey, and I'm going to turn to my
good colleague, Senator Grassley, for his opening statement.
Senator Grassley. First of all, thanks to General McCaffrey
and all the other witnesses who are joining Senator Coverdell
and me and other members of the Caucus and the committee at
this critical hearing.
As everyone in this room knows, our growing contact with
Mexico is one of our most--in fact, you might say, the single
most--important relationship. And what both of our countries do
to deal with the calamity of drug production and use is one of
our most important efforts.
This hearing is to address concerns about the nature of
cooperation with Mexico. It follows up on questions raised
earlier this year about the extent of that cooperation.
Congress raised a number of concerns about the direction as
well as the scope of our joint efforts to deal with problems
that seem to undermine it.
I believe that the Congress made clear its concerns that we
not just have more high-level happy talk, but real results.
This is one of the reasons that the Congress asked for the
detailed report on progress to this point since March.
We received that report on September 15. While it contains
a lot of information, I believe that we need to hear more about
the subject. It is like a lot of government reports--it is long
on inputs, short on outcomes, and even some of the outcomes are
not all that they appear to be. The Congress is in the process
of making decisions on Mexico in the context of cooperation on
drugs. We need--the public needs--more substance.
The report, for example, talks about Operation Success that
resulted in the seizure of almost 3 tons of cocaine. That is
all well and good, but what is not mentioned is that the
seizure was of drugs fished out of the water. No one was
arrested. No boats were seized. No one knows who was moving the
drugs. In short, this was about Operation ``Partial'' Success.
The report also talks about working groups, and also,
individuals who have been trained. That is very important. But
what is left out is how many groups are truly operating, how
many arrests there were of key figures, how many extraditions,
how many prosecutions of major figures. The report skates over
these because the results are not there.
Now, I do not want to get into a numbers game or into so-
called ``body counts'', but we need to understand something.
While we definitely need cooperation to achieve a common
purpose, cooperation by itself is not a value. It is a means to
an end, it is ends that we are concerned about.
And the one--and one of the ways that we have of knowing if
that end is being achieved is through results. If the results
are skimpy, then maybe we need to take a long and hard look at
the nature of the effort, and I hope that is what we are doing
here and going to do here in this hearing. That is the intent
of it.
I would like to make just one more point--that concerns the
certification process. The debate over Mexican cooperation is
also a debate over this country's right to determine what
cooperation looks like.
I'm concerned about recent remarks by the--by our Nation's
leaders on a tool that the State Department makes clear is not
only working but is critical in ensuring continued cooperation.
I am concerned, if reports are to be believed, that our
Nation's leaders in the war on drugs have suggested on recent
trips overseas that we turn over one of our most important
foreign policymaking decisions to an international body--to a
body that cannot even make up its mind on non-controversial
issues, let alone one of this magnitude. I hope that those
reports are wrong.
There seems to be some confusion about certification and
what it is meant to do. There seems to be some concern that it
insults sensitivities overseas and the opinion in some quarters
seems to be that the United States has no business judging what
others do. The purpose of certification is not to be popular at
embassy cocktail parties, but to represent substantive concern
and to comment on real progress.
The intent behind the law was to insist that the
administration, any administration for that matter, and our
international partners, take seriously the threat posed by
international drug trafficking. That did not used to happen. It
does now and it should.
The vast majority of dangerous drugs consumed in America
are grown and processed overseas and then smuggled into this
country by well-organized groups. The damage that these drugs
then do to our children, to our neighborhoods, and to our
cities and communities cannot be measured.
Drugs yearly kill and maim more Americans than all the
international terrorist attacks against Americans in the last
10 years. Yearly, we lose tens of billions of dollars in added
health care costs, crime, on-the-job accidents, and family
violence directly related to the presence of drugs in our
society--all of this from substances produced illegally
overseas and smuggled in to America.
It was and remains the view of Congress that our
international partners have a responsibility. As members of the
international community, they too must take sufficient steps to
control production and the trafficking of drugs. They too must
combat money laundering and corruption.
The American public shares this view. We insist that other
countries help to combat terrorists. We insist that other
countries take steps to protect individual human rights and
intellectual property rights. We judge them on whether they do
so or not.
Similarly, we need to insist that other countries that are
the primary sources or major transit routes of illegal drugs
coming into the United States are doing their part seriously
and consistently to combat the problem. We need to at least be
as tough in our judgment of countries on drugs as we are on the
preventing of pirated CDs.
What the law requires is meaningful steps. This means not
just promises to curb drug production, to stop money
laundering, to punish the major criminals responsible, to seize
their assets, and to combat corruption. It means actions. It
eventually--it's got to be measurable actions.
It was and remains the congressional view that countries
that fail to meet a standard of adequate cooperation with the
United States or with international efforts should face
consequences. It is within our right to do this. It is also the
responsibility that we owe the American public.
We insist on such standards as a measure of behavior we
expect among civilized nations governed by the rule of law.
Whether we're talking about respect for human rights, efforts
to combat terrorism, prohibiting slave labor or guaranteeing
intellectual property rights, we require responsible actions as
a matter of basic principle.
Imagine, for a moment, that we insist that other countries
not support international terrorism, but did nothing if we
learned that they did. It makes a mockery of the idea of
standards.
If we are not prepared to enforce by some means our
commitment to a minimal set of standards, then we abandon the
idea of standards as a basis for relations among nations. If we
cannot and do not judge what is right or wrong, if we do not
when we have the ability in our hands to uphold such standards,
we might as well not have such standards. If we must give up
making judgments, we might as well tell other countries, ``It's
OK to produce and smuggle illegal drugs.'' This is not
acceptable; it is not responsible. If we are going to make
judgments, then we must also be prepared to act.
So certification is also then about concrete concerns. It
also engages U.S. interests. The certification process is part
of the domestic decisionmaking process on our foreign policy.
It is directly linked to considerations of national interest.
In this case, the issues involve the role of other countries in
being the base of operation of trafficking of dangerous drugs
to our country.
The standards for certification do not require that a
country succeed totally in its efforts. They do require
commitment, seriousness of purpose, sustained efforts, and
credible implementation. While the United States can and must
improve its own efforts, our present efforts meet these
standards.
Leaving that question aside, however, we still have a
responsibility as American people to uphold certain standards
of international behavior and to take steps to secure our
national interests. The certification process, while not
perfect, is one of the best means to ensure that we have the
necessary tools at hand to accomplish these purposes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Senator. I am going to make a
brief statement, and I amend my comment of a moment ago. We
will hear briefly from each of the members and then we will
come to our first panel, General McCaffrey.
Let me begin. This morning, there was an editorial in the
Washington Post on this subject. The first paragraph says--
ahem--``The customarily even mannered President of Mexico,
Ernesto Zedillo, snapped his cap the other day and told the
Inter-American Press Association that the United States should
pay his country reparations for the damage drug trafficking has
done it.'' The idea is absurd.
From the context, Mr. Zedillo evidently meant to express
Mexico's resentment to the process by which the United States
annually threatens economic penalties against countries it
deems unreliable partners in the anti-drug struggle.
But his fit of peak is bound to be taken as a flight from
Mexico's own responsibilities in the struggle. Neither side
needs this sort of contribution to the rhetorical wars, which
summarizes my view on the subject.
And it goes on to say ``The fact is that two countries, not
one, are accountable for the narcotics trade.'' It goes on to
say ``On each side, there is an evident disposition to blame
the other for what are mutual frustrations. This needs to stop.
Intensified enforcement without distracting recrimination needs
to become the common theme.''
``This admonition, however, cannot countenance the two
nations not discussing openly, in their governments and before
the people, the problems that they share.''
We have been at this a considerable period of time, some
longer than I. But in the last year, I have come to several
conclusions that are strikingly different from me than when I
first was introduced to this difficult question.
I think as I have traveled the country, we see a lot of
weary warriors that are out on the street every day and every
night and I think many of them have wondered now whether enough
of our nation care.
I think many Members of the Congress believe we can win
this war in Mexico and Colombia, Peru, Bolivia. I do not. If we
are going to win this war in my judgment, it will have to be
won in the United States. I do believe it is going to require a
new boldness, and I believe our panelist has been trying to
contribute to that--defined goals for which we are all held
accountable and manageable.
There are at least four initiatives that I think deserve
additional attention. First, the border. General McCaffrey has
indicated that there is technology and capacity that could
contribute substantially to altering the flow of illicit drugs
into the United States.
He ought to be given every cooperation to achieve that, and
we ought to have a deadline as to when we think we can get that
done.
Second, we know that the target of the international
narcotic today--flow today is a much younger audience than in
the previous epidemic. Strikingly, they are children age 8-14.
We should set as a goal, by the end of 1998, no child in the
United States age 8-14 does not at least understand that
narcotics are dangerous and can severely impact their lives and
their futures.
Simultaneously, we know that when parents are involved, the
risk of the use of narcotics is substantially reduced. And by
the end of next year, we should have recovered to the level of
several years ago where at least near 50 percent of our parents
are talking to these children. This is an achievable goal, and
measurable.
We have just appropriated some $195 million, and we need to
measure--and its goal ought to be within 12 months that these
aged children understand what they are up against.
Third, we must ask our law enforcement officials in charge
of the struggle what is necessary, what is necessary to break
the infrastructure of narcotic distribution within our own
borders? What does it take to bring down the most sophisticated
mafia structure in a half a century?
And fourth, we should continue in the effort to work with
our allies, but with an understanding we do not control those
sovereign territories, which is why the initial and main force
of the struggle, in my judgment, will be won or lost here.
Now, I want to share several statistics quickly with you
which may be the base line by which we all who are interested
in this subject can measure whether we are succeeding or not.
Teen drug use in 1992 was 5.3 percent. In 1996, it is 9
percent. Depending on whose statistics, that is between 1
million and 2 million more users than in 1992. Would not it be
reasonable that we set a reasonably short-term goal that we at
least get to the 1992 level of teenage use of drugs? If we do
so, we will save the lives of between 1 million and 2 million
children.
Parental involvement--in 1991/1992, 39 percent talked to
their children about drugs a lot. And we know that reduces the
use of drugs by between 30 and 50 percent. Today, only 31
percent do that. Is not it a reasonable goal that we return to
the 1991/1992 level of parental involvement?
This comes to the border question, General. In the first
quarter of 1993, cocaine was $112.33 per gram. In the first
quarter of 1997, it is $87.16. Marijuana was $12.78 in the
first quarter of 1993, and it is $5.24 in the first quarter of
1997--a 59 percent drop in the price. Heroin--$1,594.88 per
gram in the first quarter of 1993 to $984.18 per gram in the
first quarter of 1997, which speaks, I think, to the problem
the General has alluded to on the border.
In 1992, the United States stopped 440 kilograms of cocaine
and marijuana per day. In 1995, it was half that--205 kilograms
of cocaine and marijuana per day. And the drug interdiction
budget in 1991 was $2.03 billion. And in 1997, $1.44 billion.
General, you have talked about a decade, and I do not
disagree, probably decades of work. But I really do believe our
people and our warriors and our families need bold new strokes
with interim goals to be measured in the short-term so that
they can be emboldened by those goals and can be inspired by
those goals and can join us in this struggle which is so
paramount for the ongoing success of this country as we come to
the new century.
I will now turn to the ranking member-present, Senator
Biden of Delaware, for his opening statement.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank you and Senator Grassley for having this joint hearing. I
would ask unanimous consent that my entire statement be placed
in the record, and I will attempt to quickly summarize.
Senator Coverdell. Without objection, it will be placed in
the record.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman and General, we all know that
in terms of teen and pre-teen drug use, the moral
disapprobation of society and one's parents have as great an
impact as anything else that we can do.
And we all know that education, after-school programs,
treatment and enforcement, are all necessary. We have got to
learn to walk and chew gum at the same time. They are all
necessary components. Any one alone cannot do it.
The focus of this hearing is on Mexico. We could solve
every problem we have with Mexico and not solve our drug
problem. But it is also true that failure of Mexico to act more
effectively, regardless of how responsible the top leadership
may be, is due in some measure to the fact that the country's
police forces, and possibly the military, are riddled with
corruption.
And notwithstanding the fact they cannot solve our
problems, they exacerbate our problems, and I would argue
exacerbate their problems. If we had no problem at all, Mexico
would have a gigantic problem with the corruption that that
system, that democracy, has within it which is bound to eat it
alive.
And so, it seems to me rather than us focusing on our
differences, there is a mutual interest we have--it is as much
in Mexico's interest and President Zedillo's interest to root
out corruption for the future of his economy and the future of
his democracy as it is for us.
And we have wrestled with this problem of certification. It
is a very imprecise tool, and it implicated a number of other
foreign policy considerations that we have with Mexico. But
what I am going to be asking you and others today is whether or
not there is any reason for optimism in terms of action taken
by the Mexican Government.
We are here because last time around in this certification
process, we came up with a hybrid agreement to delay what we
all knew was, in truth, no real meeting of the certification
requirement by Mexico, but nonetheless, it was certified. And
we are here because of this interim report, which has been
submitted.
And it is important, I think, for those of us who, as
imperfect a tool as this is, think it is the only tool we have
available to us to be able to have some sense of what we are
going to faced with 4 months from now because this crisis is
going to occur 4 months from now.
Four months from now, the President will to have to certify
again or not certify. Every argument that we ran through 8
months ago will be re-run. And the crisis in the bilateral
relation will, once again, be emphasized.
And so, I think it is important that Mexico understand and
listen to what we are going through here today because I think
it is going to tell the tale of what is likely to happen 4
months from now.
I do not want to decertify Mexico; we have a number of
bilateral interests that extend beyond drugs.
But I do not know how we can avoid the issue of whether or
not notwithstanding the good intentions of the elected
leadership, whether or not there is really any progress being
made.
I will conclude by saying that going to the parochial
school I attended, whenever you got in trouble in class or out
on the playground, the nuns would have you stay after school
and write certain things on the board 300 or 400 times.
One of the things I had to write a lot--I know it is
surprising to think that I ever would have gotten in trouble,
but occasionally I did. And one of the things you had to write
on the board all the time, or I did, was ``The road to hell is
paved with good intentions.''
Well, the good intentions of the present elected Mexican
Government, which I do not doubt their good intentions, may
very well be paving the road to hell for tens of thousands of
Americans. And I acknowledge, Mr. Chairman, it is our problem.
All of the things you said are more important, quite frankly,
than what Mexico does.
But to suggest that what Mexico does or does not do is
unimportant or non-important in this fight would be a major
mistake, so we have got a balancing to do. And I would hope
with my friend, Senator Grassley, that we would move on quickly
to reauthorize your office and give you the kind of authority
that you need to be able to carry out whatever it is, whatever
the policy is, that has agreed to between the President and the
Congress.
But that is another issue, but it does relate to this. And
I am anxious to ask you questions about the interim report as
well as what you need for reauthorization to do your job.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. Why, thank you, Senator Biden. I--agree
with your remarks. I hope you did not interpret my focus or
conclusions to suggest that anything less needed to be required
of our relation with Mexico.
Senator Biden. I didn't. I understand your position.
Senator Coverdell. Very good. I now turn to my colleague
from Alabama, Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Senator Coverdell, I want to say that I
agree with you 100 percent on the items you delineated and on
your basic analysis of the drug problem.
I served as a Federal prosecutor for 12 years. One of the
greatest honors I ever received was an award from the Attorney
General for significant achievements in the war against drug
trafficking, and I said at the time I would be satisfied if
they put that on my tombstone.
It is a debilitating, terrible condition. We need to do
everything we can to stop it. But I do not believe that we can
solve this problem by blaming it on Mexico and Colombia. They
are quick to respond If you did not buy the drugs, we would not
be selling them. And there is some truth to that.
You delineated a series of items improving our effort at
the border, and increasing our ability to destroy. We can, with
the tough Federal Sentencing Guidelines, continue to improve..
I was there. I have used these guidelines. People plead guilty,
they confess, and they tell law enforcement about who else is
doing drugs. You can eliminate whole organizations. This is
being done in Federal court today.
We can do that. We do need more education. We have got to
have more leadership out of the Drug Czar position. I remember
when Mr. Bennett took over the Drug Czar, they said he was not
serious because he did not ask for more money. And he created a
climate, along with the President of the United States, that
drug use was unacceptable in America. Drug use went down by
every authoritative study for 12 consecutive years.
In the domain of this President, drug use has gone up every
year. This is a serious turnaround, I say, about the Drug
Czar's office--I think it can provide leadership. But frankly,
I must say, I do not think it has been as effective as it
could. I think we need to evaluate whether we keep it or not.
I do not see that there is any overriding strategy to deal
with this problem that was on the downswing and is now clearly
on the upswing. I believe we need fundamentally to focus on
what we can do here and improve our effort here. I believe we
need to keep pressure on foreign countries. But if we do not do
it at home, we will not achieve much, and it is going to take a
unified effort to do so. Thank you.
Senator Coverdell. I thank the Senator, and I now turn to
my colleague from Florida, Senator Graham.
Senator Graham: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
and your colleagues calling this hearing today. I will try to
be brief so that we can get on to our witnesses.
I am very pleased that our first witness is General
McCaffrey, who has served this country with great distinction
throughout his adult life. I had an opportunity to come to know
him first as the Commander of U.S. Southern Command which had a
principal responsibility and continues to have that
responsibility for U.S. drug efforts in Latin America.
In that position, he not only did an outstanding service to
his nation, but also helped build--strengthen relationships
between the United States and our allies in this war against
drugs.
The particular issue of Mexico is a vexing one. The
President of Mexico in the mid-19th century lamented about his
country when he said, Poor Mexico--so far from God, so close to
the United States of America. At least the second half of that
description continues today.
The fact is Mexico and the United States are inexorably
involved in a whole set of relationships, including the issue
of how we are going to deal with the issue of illicit drugs. I
think it is a sterile argument for either side to point to the
other and say, It is your responsibility because you consume
too much. It is your responsibility because you produce or
transport too much. The fact is it is both of our
responsibilities, and we are not going to win this war unless
we do it in some collaborative relationship.
I had the opportunity to visit Mexico in March of this year
as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee with
particular attention to drug-related issues and feel that I
came back with some greater appreciation of the difficulties
that this relationship will have in achieving its objective.
But I believe we have no choice but to try to stay the
course, which includes careful analysis and diagnosis of what
is currently happening; appropriate prescriptions to enhance
our efforts; and anticipation of what might be on the horizon
so that we can shape events and not just respond.
I anticipate that during the course of this hearing today
that we will get some valuable information on all three of
those important elements of diagnosis, prescription, and
anticipation and I appreciate your providing us with this
opportunity. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Senator. It is my
understanding, Senator Frist, that you do not have an opening
statement?
Senator Frist. I do not.
Senator Coverdell. Well, then, I would move to Senator
Hagel from Nebraska.
Senator Hagel. All I would say is welcome to our witnesses.
I am looking forward to hearing General McCaffrey and our other
witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Senator. I am now going to
turn to the ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Committee,
my good colleague--we have been at this quite awhile--Senator
Dodd of Connecticut.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
apologize to my colleagues for being a few minutes--coming over
late.
But let me thank you and Senator Grassley for holding this
joint hearing. I commend both of you. I think this is a very,
very worthwhile way to focus our attention on the issue, and I
would just like to take a minute or two if I could.
We are going to hear from some very, very knowledgeable
witnesses this afternoon and I particularly want to welcome
General Barry McCaffrey here who, in my estimation, has done a
fabulous job in a thankless task in many ways.
I happened to have the privilege and the--privilege and
pleasure, Mr. Chairman, of being with General McCaffrey on the
trip to Latin America. I know we had hoped you would be able to
join us on that trip. We had a bipartisan delegation, House and
Senate members, that went along--I think, in fact, our
colleague from Nebraska was going to try and make that trip as
well but it was late notice.
And one of the things that we did--General McCaffrey was on
that trip. I had the privilege of being with him in Sao Paulo,
where we attended jointly a DARE program in one of the favelas,
the very poor neighborhoods of Sao Paulo where children,
parents, teachers, and others are working on the issue of--not
so much the issue which we will address today, and that is the
transit, the money laundering--but their own concerns about
consumption in their own nations.
And I wish every American could have been present that
morning in that very, very, poor, poor barrio neighborhood of
Sao Paulo to hear General McCaffrey speak to these parents, to
these children, to police officers who have adopted the DARE
program we have in this country with those young students
talking about the dangers of drug addiction and narcotics.
The General had a number of other meetings. I did not
attend all of them with him. But I think he represented our
country very, very well. And I publicly want to commend you,
General, for making the stop and for visiting Colombia. You
took some heat about that from some other people. I think you
did the right thing by being there. If we do not engage these
countries and have the kind of discussions with them in talking
about how we can jointly work on these issues, there is going
to be little hope of making the kind of--having the kind of
success all of us would like to see. So I commend you immensely
for those efforts--anxious to hear, obviously, your testimony
today.
Clearly, the issue with Mexico, and I had--was pleased the
other night, Mr. Chairman, to at the invitation of General
McCaffrey, to have dinner with the delegation from Mexico and
the United States that had their high-level technology group
meeting and did not engage with them during the day when they
had their meetings, but was impressed by the remarks.
Our colleague, Dianne Feinstein, was there that evening,
and some other members. It was a general, kind of informal
discussion about the efforts that we were trying to make
together, so I thank him for that as well.
But clearly, this issue with Mexico is not simply one of
technical law enforcement matter. It is of concern, obviously,
that goes beyond that. It is widely acknowledged, of course,
that Mexico is the principal transit route for cocaine,
supplying one-half of the annual consumption--also, major
source of marijuana, methamphetamines.
The impact of the drug trade is--is simply profound, and it
affects all of us today. Just to give you some idea--there are
almost 13 million Americans now that use illegal drugs,
including in excess of 1.5 million cocaine users in the
country, 600,000 heroin addicts in the United States. Almost 10
million people use marijuana illegally every day, and it is not
just confined to our inner cities and the poor. It occurs among
every sector of our society.
Without doubt, the human and economic costs are enormous.
The related illness death in the United States in excess of $67
billion in 1996, including lost productivity, premature death,
and incarceration.
But what have we done to stem this? In 1981--since 1981,
rather, we have spent some $25 billion of taxpayer money on
foreign interdiction efforts, source country counternarcotics
programs. We have issued an annual certification report card
that has been the subject of, obviously, significant debate
here in the Congress. I am not going to go into that at this
point at all.
Yet, despite impressive seizures at the border and the high
seas and other countries, foreign drugs are cheaper and more
readily available in the United States than they were 2 decades
ago. Drugs have continued to flood our neighborhoods and wreak
havoc on our families and our communities.
The reason for this is simple, in my view--the drug trade
is an enormously lucrative business. Drug trafficking generates
estimated revenues of $400 billion annually--$400 billion, the
estimated revenues. Just think for a moment of what that kind
of money could do in comparison to the resources available to
combat the drug trade in countries like Mexico.
In 1995, the Mexican Government's total budgetary
expenditures were $54 billion, and its revenues, $56 billion.
It does not require much thought to comprehend the enormous and
daunting task facing Mexican and United States law enforcement
authorities with the resources they have available to combat
such huge sums of money associated with the international drug
trade.
It is obvious that Mexican resources alone are no match for
these well-heeled, criminal giants. Mexico needs our assistance
and cooperation in what is becoming a Herculean struggle to
protect the democratic institutions and principles that are the
bedrock of Mexican democracy and are under assault from drug-
related corruption.
When Presidents Clinton and Zedillo met last May in Mexico
City, they acknowledged the dangers posed by the drug abuse and
drug trafficking. To counter that danger, they forged an
alliance against drugs and set as their goal the construction
of drug-free societies in our two countries for the 21st
century. They also released a comprehensive and balanced
assessment of the bi-national drug treaty--drug threat
confronting our two nations.
Last month, General McCaffrey sent to Congress his latest
findings on the current state of U.S./Mexico cooperation on
drug matters. In my view, it was a comprehensive, and very
candid review. If I were asked to sum up the report in a few
words, I would say this: We are making some progress in
combating drug trafficking, but much, much remains to be done.
It is my hope, Mr. Chairman, that you will be able to
review this as much as we can here today. But again, I think by
having this kind of a hearing outside of the normal
certification process when it seems the only time we have these
heated debates about this subject is very well-advised, and I
commend both of our colleagues from Iowa and Georgia for doing
it in this environment here outside, if you will, that
certification process which ultimately we are going to have to
face again.
But again, I want to commend General McCaffrey and his
staff and others for the tremendous they are doing.
Senator Coverdell. I thank the Senator from Connecticut.
And I turn, I think, to our last member, Senator Kerry of
Massachusetts.
Senator Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.
Thank you very much for holding this hearing as others have
said, and I would just say--very quickly, because I know the
General has been very patient and we want to hear him.
I had the privilege of speaking on Monday to the LEON
Group, which is the group of eight sort of sub-ministerial
meeting where they are planning for the recommendations that
the Attorney General make with respect to international crime.
And it is very clear that countries are, all across the
globe, taking more seriously the rising threat of the
transboundary cartel influence that is having the significant
increased national security threat to all of us.
The linkages between the Colombian cartels and the drugs
they move through Mexico are linked also to Russia and Nigeria
and Asia and to the potential movement of nuclear materials.
There have been some 800 instances now of attempted theft or
known theft of nuclear materials from Russia--one such instance
found 363 grams of nuclear material in a lead-lined suitcase in
Munich in the possession of three former Soviet citizens with
an attempted sale price of $350 million in the black market.
And most people believe it was bound for North Korea.
So the truth is that what we are talking about here is not
just Mexico, and it is not just a standard of certification of
Mexico. It is really a standard of--international recognition
of the new national security threat, which is what the
President of the United States has called it, the Attorney
General has called it, the Director of the CIA has called it,
General McCaffrey has called it. And this is all linked.
And what Mexico does to assist in its capacity to be able
to not only save itself but to fight against the cartels'
capacity to use it as a transboundary transit area, is critical
to our other national security interests--vital national
security interests, I would add.
So it is my hope that this hearing can really get concrete.
We have been down this road before. I think it is, however,
very salutary that we are here, as others have said, when we
are--not waiting for the last minute; making a mid-term
assessment, in a sense; creating some benchmarks; hopefully,
deciding on some real short-term goals that we can measure.
But we will know the difference between that which is
cosmetic--the setting up of a bureau, the shifting of a few
people, a certain number of interdictions--versus that which
really seeks to ferret out what is endemic within a society,
and I think that is what we are really here to measure; at
least, that is what I am here to measure.
And that is why I think the certification process is so
important. We would not be here if it were not for it, I
venture to say. And we certainly would not have the significant
increased effort to lay the groundwork for how we will make
these kinds of judgments were it for the standards that were
originally put forward which we fought about last year on the
floor of the Senate with Senator Feinstein, yourself, Mr.
Chairman, and others.
So I welcome this opportunity to try to establish those
benchmarks but, hopefully, also to recognize the much larger
context within which we are dealing. This is not just ruffled
feathers between a neighbor. This is not just sensitivities
about the Great Colossus of the North and our history in our
relationship. This is much more significant than that today,
and we have to think about it in that context.
Senator Coverdell. I thank the Senator for his comments and
I think the linkage to a broader picture is absolutely on
target.
I spoke a moment too soon. We have now been joined by our
distinguished colleague, Senator Feinstein of California, and
if you have an opening statement, Senator, you would be welcome
to do so.
Senator Feinstein. I thank you, Senator, and I want you to
know it has been a great pleasure for me to work with you on
this issue and I want to thank you and Chairman Grassley for
holding this joint hearing.
I join those that last March was not--clearly not convinced
by the President's decision to certify Mexico. And I was not
convinced because I come from a State which is right next door
and has seen the intrusion of drugs, of the crime that is
related to drug trafficking, the growth of gangs that surround
these drugs, and the spread of corruption on both sides of the
border.
The President very graciously agreed to report back within
6 months as to the progress that had been made in Mexico's
cooperation with the United States. And, Senator, you and I
have had a chance to talk about this. I have had a chance to
have--be briefed by General McCaffrey. We have both sort of
tangled and tangoed on the subject. And I want him to know that
I do think that at this time, he is on the right track.
Having said that, I find myself very much in agreement
with, I think, the macro view of this that was just presented
by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. My conclusion
is that while there has been some limited progress made, the
report we received exemplifies that there is still a vast need
for improvement. There were, however, positives in the report.
Congressional pressure forced the administration to take
the problem, I believe, more seriously than they had. The
Mexican Government, too, was put on notice that half measures
and cosmetic attempts would not be acceptable. There was a
modest increase in cocaine seizures. General McCaffrey has
committed himself to take dramatic new actions to shut down
drug trafficking across our border, and confront the threat of
violence currently targeted on United States law enforcement.
I, for one, very much appreciate that. I want him to know that.
The Mexican Government has begun the process of
restructuring the Attorney General's office and implementing
new vetting procedures which may, over a long period of time,
succeed in establishing credible drug enforcement units in
Mexico. But it is not there yet, and it remains to be seen
whether this effort will be more effective than previous
restructuring efforts.
The Mexican Government has passed money laundering
legislation, is in the progress of promulgating the regulations
that will guide its implementation. Then we have to see if it
is, in fact, enforced and implemented.
There were many negatives, and I want to just cite some of
them. No Mexican national has been extradited to the United
States to this day on drug charges. Now, I have been
consistently told and was told again as late as just a week or
so ago at a dinner at which the Senator from Connecticut was
present with major officials from the Mexican Government, that
there would, in fact, be extraditions forthcoming of
individuals on drug charges. I wait to see if that, in fact,
will happen.
Mexican law enforcement is still riddled with corruption.
Vetting efforts have only just begun. No major drug cartel
leaders have been arrested. DEA agents working on the border
remain barred from carrying the arms necessary to carry out
their jobs in Mexico. And the border task forces envisioned as
our first line of defense against drug traffickers remain
severely underfunded. Essentially--to this day, I believe--they
exist only on paper.
The overall tone of the report is infused with a sense of
optimism, and I appreciate that. And I want to be optimistic,
too, because I am very fond, feel close to Mexico, recognize it
as a major ally, a major neighbor. And certainly to my State,
that is 100 percent true.
At best, one can say that the positive developments
indicate that we are at the early stages of really coming to
terms with this problem, that the administration is now taking
it much more seriously.
If I look to the contrary side, the worst, the report is a
spin placed on some cosmetic concessions made by the government
under pressure from its principal ally. But only time will tell
exactly what it is. The effort and the results must be
sustained.
The next certification report is due in less than 5 months.
By reading the report we have had so far, it is not clear
whether real progress has, in fact, been made. So between now
and then, I hope Mexican authorities will take swift and
comprehensive action to produce real results.
Cartel leaders must be arrested. Those wanted in the U.S.
must be extradited. DEA agents on the border must be allowed to
protect themselves. The border task forces must be revived.
Money laundering laws must be implemented. Air and maritime
agreements must be implemented. And the vetting process of law
enforcement officers must proceed apace.
Absent these, it will be difficult to make the case that
Mexico has fully cooperated with the United States in
counternarcotics by March 1 of 1998. I thank the Chair.
Senator Coverdell. I thank the Senator--General. I do think
we ought to acknowledge once again that the gentleman before us
represents a long and distinguished contribution and career to
the people of the United States, for which we are all very
grateful.
I think it was Senator Dodd who said in many ways this is--
could be considered one of those thankless tasks. I have
admired your enthusiasm and tenacity.
It is unusual for a hearing like this to have equally
represented bipartisan membership than 10 percent of the U.S.
Senate. And as you can tell, General, from the comments, it is
no longer perfunctory. There is a passion about this and the
nature of its impact on our nation as we come to the new
century.
So you are sitting in a very, very critical seat at a very,
very critical time. Thank you for your service. We welcome you
to our joint committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY R. McCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
General McCaffrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me thank both you and Senator Grassley and Senator Biden and
all of the other members of both committees who have made these
opening statements.
I must admit up-front that I find myself largely in
agreement with just about everything that was said. I welcome
your involvement and your oversight and will try and learn from
your own viewpoints.
Let me, if I may, particularly point out, Mr. Chairman,
your own continued support of the High Level Contact Group and
your own continued focus on Mexico as an issue.
Senator Grassley, if I may, I would like to underscore that
you may have done one of the more important things in the drug
strategy this year by your sponsorship of the Drug Free
Community Act. It seems to me you and Rob Portman have given us
a key to making a major effort to reduce drug demand in the
United States over the coming 5 years, and I thank you for your
leadership.
Senator Biden in particular has had a 15-year focus on the
issue and his support, particularly on the reauthorization
bill, I would suggest would be important as to how we deal with
these issues in the coming years.
The time is short. Let me, if I may, do two things. One is,
I would like to draw your attention to some material that I
will give you that I think your staffs and you need to take
into account. We have put literally thousands of hours of
effort into putting down on paper what we believe to be
accurate and ethically sound feedback, both to the Congress and
the Nation, on what we are trying to achieve in Mexican-U.S.
cooperation, and let me just make sure you know what documents
we have in front of you and we would offer for your
consideration.
First of all, we did give you in response to the
President's letter to Senators Coverdell and Feinstein a two-
volume report on cooperation with Mexico. It has three big
parts to it. There are two volumes because Volume 1, which is
complete in and of itself, is unclassified. Volume 2 has
classified both intelligence and law enforcement-sensitive
information.
I would ask you to take those two volumes into account
because these are the facts upon which the debate ought to
proceed as you consider policy alternatives in dealing with the
Mexican-U.S. Drug issue.
The unclassified report to Congress tries to put together
in a fairly coherent way three aspects. One is the Secretary of
State's contribution on thinking through the possibility of
multinational cooperation. We have separated that part of this
report, I might add, put it in Spanish, Portuguese. The
President and I shared it with Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina. I
took it up into Bolivia and Colombia. We intend to discuss this
whole concept of hemispheric cooperation, hopefully leading to
a more informed discussion in Santiago in April, and that's
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's lead.
We also have an enhanced truck inspections report. We tried
to get at the notion of how do we deal with these 39 border
crossings, with this massive 3\1/2\ million trucks a year, 82
million cars, 230 million people from our second biggest
trading partner? We have talked through that issue. Sam Banks
is here today and will be one of the later witnesses.
And then finally we dealt with the nine questions on U.S.-
Mexican cooperation that you asked. We tried to get a
comprehensive response and to put it in the context of where
Mexico was when President Zedillo took office.
These two volumes are the outline of my remarks today.
There is another document that I think gives you some facts
that are useful to know. This is the volume, Overview of Drug
Control Programs in the Southwest Border, that I put together
before going down the border again this summer in August. I was
on both sides, dealing with Mexican authorities and U.S. trying
to better understand the process of bilateral cooperation on
the drug issue in the context of our other political, economic,
and cultural ties with Mexico, and I have got to some people
here that I am going to introduce that are present who will be
available today and tomorrow to further respond to you and your
staff's interests.
We have also finally three products out of the high-level
contact group that you need to be aware of. One of them you
have heard me refer to before, a 97-page document, May 1997,
which is the U.S.-Mexico threat assessment. Many international
documents are largely empty of meaning. This one is specific.
It is a useful tool for police officers, prosecutors, and
policy analysts on both sides of the border.
We will probably revise this each year and try and
understand the dynamics of the drug issue as it relates to
these two nations, but that is a solid piece of work, and I
commend your attention to it.
We have also a very short document that on May 6 in Mexico
City the two Presidents, Zedillo and Clinton, signed the
Declaration of Mexican-U.S. Alliance Against Drugs. We are
working on this now, and we owe these two Presidents an answer
of a joint strategy by 31 December, the end of this year. We
will try and give Presidents Zedillo and Clinton an update on
it during the Zedillo visit in November. We are trying to
hammer out something that will be a good conceptual outline on
how to work with our neighbors to the south on this issue in
the coming years.
Finally, you may be aware we just finished the fifth
session of the high-level contact group. As you might imagine,
the level of talent that we have involved in the high-level
contact group on both sides of the border is pretty demanding.
We have a lot to do. We are investing time in this issue. We
are trying to come up with concrete results and document them,
and here is the output of the session we just completed in
consultation with Congress.
I might remind the two committees assembled here that part
of our dialog involves feedback to the two legislative bodies,
so I very much appreciate all of you taking the time to have
received these Mexican delegations now twice, and I would tell
you that I personally in my delegation have tried to consult
with Mexican legislative authorities twice in Mexico City.
Let me talk some people who are here with me today. First,
beginning with law enforcement, Dean Cooter, National Sheriffs
Association, is here representing some 3,000 county sheriffs.
One of our most important law enforcement pillars in the
country, Johnny Hughes, National Troopers Coalition, some
45,000 members.
I want to pay particular tribute to El Paso police chief
Russ Leach, who is here in the hearing. I asked him to come up
here and join us today and to go around and talk to some of the
folks in the interagency. Without meaning to embarrass him,
this is one of the most distinguished police officers in our
country, 20 years in the L.A.P.D., now in El Paso, and as I
went down that border for over a week, he is one of the
standouts of learning from a police officer how you can do
cross-border training and cooperation. It is remarkable what
can happen below the Federal-State level, and I think that he
is an example of another major push that we are going to work
in cooperation with Mexican authorities.
There are also six people here from the U.S. high intensity
drug-trafficking areas that are along the southwest border.
Dennis Usery, the director of the southwest border, Terence
Smith from the California region, Ray Vincek from Arizona, Jim
Jennings from New Mexico, Verne Parker from South Texas,
regional director, and Travis Kirkendahl from West Texas,
regional director.
The high-intensity drug trafficking areas is one of the
more useful tools we found to try and glue together local,
State, Federal law enforcement prosecution and to add in the
viewpoint of the prevention and treatment communities. They are
beginning to open lines of cooperation and contact with Mexican
authorities, and I want to thank them for their efforts.
There are also several people we asked to be here to listen
to this dialog: Al Zapanta, who is the president of the U.S.-
Mexican Chamber of Commerce, and Bob Berry from NationsBank and
others, to include two letters which if you will allow me to
submit for the record, from the Community Antidrug Coalition of
America, Jim Koppel, and also very important input from Harry
Montoya from the National Hispanic Latino Community Prevention
Network.
I asked these folks to come here to underscore that the
solution to the U.S.-Mexican drug problem is not necessarily
going to be found in Washington. It is going to be found in law
enforcement and other authorities in the four border States and
across the Nation.
Mr. Chairman, if I may also submit for the record my
written comments which we have put together over the last week.
We think they are fairly complete, and they try and capture in
general terms exactly what we are trying to achieve.
Steve, if you will--I am going to show you briefly five
charts that outline the problem we are working. Chart number 1,
that is the threat. Here is what we are working on. We are
working on a problem that brings 240 metric tons of cocaine
into the United States, about a third of the world's
production.
A good bit of it, maybe half, comes through Mexico. A lot
of the rest of it comes through the Eastern Pacific and Western
Caribbean approaches. It comes in by air, land, and sea. It
then moves across the border largely in trucks and cars,
sometimes, mostly through the ports of entry, the 39 border
crossings, and sometimes back-packed, rafted, or driven
somewhere across the border, on the 2,200 kilometers that
unites the U.S. and Mexico.
There are five criminal organizations that we have outlined
on that chart. That is somewhat deceptive. This is not the
Harvard Business School organization of criminal efforts.
There are probably an additional 33 major criminal gangs,
some of whom have 100 years of history who are smuggling
organizations and exist along that binational frontier, but
these five organizations are the most important. We are
targeting in cooperation with Mexican authorities their
actions, and they're principally the ones who move Mexican
heroin, a good bit of the Colombian heroin, and the cocaine
that comes out of primarily Peru, second Bolivia, and now,
increasingly, Colombia.
Then finally they smuggle a good bit of the marijuana. We
do not know how much marijuana the U.S. produces. My own sort
of teaching device is probably half of it comes in from outside
and half of it we are growing domestically.
Finally, new drugs are coming across that border such as
methamphetamines. I do not really know how much is produced in
Mexico. Again, my judgment would be half of it is made here,
half of it Mexico, some of it could be coming also from the
Pacific Rim, but by and large the U.S. is increasingly a drug-
producing Nation, methamphetamines, marijuana and other
threats.
Next. These are the three major assertions I would make on
continuing counterdrug cooperation with Mexico. It seems to me
we cannot solve it alone. We have to be part of a hemispheric
effort, and in particular when it comes to Mexico the U.S. and
Canada we must recognize we have to work in cooperation
particularly among law enforcement authorities.
We do believe that, as the Senators have commented, that
President Zedillo is committed to this. He has labeled it as
the number 1 national security threat facing Mexico.
And then finally I would argue we have a pretty decent 3-
year record of steady success upon which we are trying to
build, although I think Senator Feinstein's comments that we
have just begun is probably an accurate statement.
The next chart. We think there are some concrete signs of
progress. I do not think this is words. I do not think it is
rhetoric. I think I can walk through the report and show you
steady, inexorable, practical, concrete results on this effort.
I have got two backup charts that will talk to some of
them, but essentially the highest level of eradication of any
country in the nation, any nation on the earth, it is roughly
five times that of Bolivia and almost double that of Colombia.
Drug seizures are going up. Since 1994 there have been two
major changes in drug-smuggling process between the producing
fields in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, and the U.S. It was
South Florida, it was the Caribbean. Successful actions in the
early nineties moved it into Mexico.
It was then by and large general aviation, which we got
extremely good operating again, and then they moved to cargo
flights, which were devastating in their impact on us. It took
us well over a year to figure it out and to turn it off.
Then they moved to increasingly sea movement of drugs into
Mexican ports and then by land across the frontier, and Mexico
and U.S. intelligence authorities are at-sea and air efforts
are now increasingly focusing effectively on that new drug
threat.
We think the Mexicans have passed two major baskets of new
legislation that are vital, one dealing with money laundering
and the other with organized crime. The organized crime in
particular finally gives them 20th Century law enforcement
tools, witness protection, controlled deliveries, conspiracy,
illegal enrichment, wire taps. The kinds of authorities that we
got out of the forties and fifties and sixties dealing with the
Mafia are now available and beginning to be used by Mexican
authorities.
I will have another chart on extraditions. You know, I have
listened to the argument on it, is it serious or not. I will
show one chart that captures my own view of the growing
cooperation on extradition between the two nations.
Then, finally, we think there is a commitment to confront
corruption. Corruption and violence are a fact of life, coming
out of some $6 billion--who knows where that number comes
from--of corrupting money that started in the United States,
with $49 billion a year that we allege 6 percent of our
population is spending on drugs. That is an engine sucking up
illegal drugs principally through Mexico, and it is causing
both nations enormous distress.
Next graph. This chart tries to capture, where are we on
extradition, and I have a series of matricies that we could
dice it any way we wish, but what we are suggesting is the
first extradition of Mexican nationals by authority of the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Angel Carria, took place to the
United States in 1996. Four people came out. Two of them are
Mexican citizens. They are dual nationals. I and Mexican
authorities would agree that a dual national counts as one of
your own citizens, and they were extradited, and two of them
are on drug charges.
In 1997 we have had 20 bodies handed over by Mexican
authorities in response to U.S. requests. Seven were for drug
or money laundering charges. There are another 12 fugitives
that Secretary Carria has signed the order on. They are
appealing. Who knows how those appeals will come out. Six of
them are for Mexican citizens, of whom four are wanted on drug
charges. That is where we are.
Now, again, I do not think I should argue beyond the facts.
It is there, it is increasing, it is greater extradition
cooperation with any nation on the face of the earth except
Canada, and I think it is a sensitive matter because these are
not Government policies. These are national laws, and they are
by name, and there are two attorneys general, and they have to
satisfy the requirements of law in each nation or they do not
take place.
But I think there is clearly a commitment to moving ahead,
and at the initiative of the Mexicans we are on the verge of
developing a protocol which will allow us to extradite
temporarily citizens from one country to the other, to have
them stand trial, complete the trial phase in both nations, and
then start serving sentences in the two nations, which I think
will be a step forward. I think we are moving in the right
direction.
Next. The High-Level Contact Group. A lot of work goes into
this. The subgroups continue work throughout the year. We think
we will end up with a decent sense of organization not only on
a threat and a strategy but also practical cooperation among
Cabinet-level offices.
Without meaning to go into the detail on this, there are
hundreds of Mexican army officials trained in the United
States, 1,500 or more this year. There is a lot of equipment
transferred to Mexican authorities, 73-some-odd helicopters and
training packages. There are hundreds of Mexican navy officers
trained on counterdrug operations. We have a decent transfer of
technology software and training to their hacienda police on
money laundering.
There are 400-plus money laundering prosecutions that have
taken place now in Mexico. Some 20 are ongoing in cooperation
with us. There are in fact bilateral border task forces
standing up. I do not know when they will be done. They will
probably be a C-minus by the end of December, with vetted
officers who have gone through the FBI Academy, done the
polygraph, done the drug test, financial background visit to
the home and family.
There are more than 1,500 successful vettings of police
officers for other specialized counterdrug task forces inside
Mexico. The organized crime unit specifically is the one that
is probably most important to us.
I am prepared to respond to your questions in each of these
areas. When it comes to precursor chemicals or any one of these
points of contact, we are actually doing things.
Next. Finally, let me just talk about a corollary. You
called the hearing to develop policy options on U.S.-Mexican
counterdrug cooperation, and I think that is an important
aspect of it, and it is important to our future. There is 94
million Mexicans. We cannot ignore them. We barely have a
marked border.
But on the other hand, it seems to me, and you have already
made this point, we have a responsibility to the American
people to develop an adequate organization, doctrine,
technology, manpower, and resources so that U.S. Federal law
enforcement, principally the border patrol and the Customs
Service but also the DEA, the Coast Guard, INS, FBI and other
Federal law enforcement and the supporting packages that go
with it, whether it is U.S. attorneys to prosecute, or the
prison system, we owe the country an adequate system to protect
the southwest border, and we do not have it.
Now, we have had enormous improvement since 1990. It has
finally got fencing, low level light TV, border patrol has
almost doubled in size. We are making progress, but the
President has instructed Janet Reno and I and Bob Rubin and
others to come up with definitive plans to put this into place.
I think it is doable. I think we can put nonintrusive
inspection technologies at those 39 border crossings and over
the space of the next 5 years force this criminal conduct and
the absolute devastating damage it does on both sides of the
border out of the Mexican-U.S. Access and out to sea, where we
will try and work the problem in another venue that does not
involve so many innocent civilians.
So this is where we are going. The five HIDTA's are
important to us. The resources that Congress provided, 12
percent increase in 1996, 5-some-odd percent increase in the
1997 budget, I think we are moving ahead, and on that note, Mr.
Chairman, both chairmen, I thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you and respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Barry R. McCaffrey
Chairman Coverdell, Chairman Grassley, Co-Chairman Biden, members
of both the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics efforts. The Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) appreciates your longstanding
support, as well as that of the Committee and Caucus. The recently
enacted Portman-Grassley bill will help build community anti-drug
coalitions across the nation. The new $195 million youth media campaign
will, for the first time, allow us to use the full power of the media
to educate our children about the dangers of illegal drugs. Indeed, the
Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1997,
which is now before the Congress reflects a continuing and constructive
dialogue among committed Senators and Representatives, their expert
staff, and ONDCP.
The bipartisan support ONDCP has received because of your
leadership and hard efforts has had a direct and substantial impact on
the success America has enjoyed in reducing drug use. By focusing on
achieving real progress, each of you has made a difference we all can
be proud of Over the past 17 years, this bipartisan partnership has
contributed to a 50 percent overall reduction in the number of
Americans using drugs and a 75 percent reduction in the number of
Americans using cocaine. Nevertheless, if unchecked, America's drug
abuse problem will kill 140,000 Americans and cost our society $700
billion over the coming decade.
My commitment to the Congress when you considered my appointment in
February 1996 remains constant: to forge a coherent counter drug
strategy that will reduce illegal drug use and protect our youth and
our society. ONDCP remains committed to that goal and we look forward
to working closely with the Committee and Caucus as we implement the
objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy.
Executive Summary
The United States government's strategy is to build a partnership
with Mexico to confront the common threat of illegal drugs. Our
approach recognizes that we can only successfully disrupt and destroy
international drug trafficking organizations, which operate in both
Mexico and the United States, if we work cooperatively with the
government of Mexico. Unilateral strengthening of U.S. drug
interdiction capacity along the border will significantly reduce the
flow of drugs into this country if we couple border interdiction
efforts with a strategic U.S.-Mexican attack on major criminal
organizations. To reach these criminal organizations, which is also in
Mexico's interest, we must cooperate. We encourage cooperation by
accepting Mexico as a sovereign partner with whom we share mutual
objectives. Where it contributes to the achievement of our mutual
objectives, we are prepared to assist the government of Mexico and they
will equally support our efforts.
Through collaboration and cooperation with Mexico and other
hemispheric partners we are able to attack the entire chain of illegal
drug production, shipment and distribution. Close cooperation is the
key to magnifying our counter-drug efforts. Multinational solutions are
the best way to counter the multilateral problems of illegal drugs and
drug-related crime and corruption.
Our collaborative approach has produced a three-year record of
positive results. In May, the United States and Mexico released a U.S.
Mexico Bilateral Drug Threat Assessment, which represents the first
time our two nations have jointly defined the drug threat. This Threat
Assessment was followed by a report to the Congress on September 15,
and will be followed in December by a U.S.-Mexican Counter-drug
Strategy for mutually reinforcing cooperative action against illegal
drugs. Our two governments are continuing and enhancing our efforts
within the framework of our legal systems against the major trafficking
organizations. We have established better communication and cooperation
for the return of fugitives for trial, including approval of
extradition of Mexican citizens on drug charges. As a result we are
seeing the best opportunity yet for the destruction of major
trafficking organizations.
Mexico has made significant strides in preparing the legal and
institutional infrastructure to combat drug trafficking in a systematic
manner. Mexico has initiated fundamental reform of the governmental
institutions essential to the destruction of major drug trafficking
organizations. Mexico has created a Special Prosecutor's Office for
Crimes Against Health (replacing the National Counter-Drug Institute
(INCD), which had been compromised by General Gutierrez Rebollo and
others). The Zedillo administration has started a comprehensive vetting
program, which will be widely implemented in the Office of the
Prosecutor General of the Republic (PGR). Particular subgroups of that
office have been designed to concentrate on Organized Crime, and to
staff the Bilateral Border Task Forces. About half of the Organized
Crime Unit is now staffed with vetted specialists and the Bilateral
Border Task Forces will be fully staffed with their complement of
Mexican officers by the end of this year. So far as institutional
restructuring goes, the government of Mexico informs us that at the
beginning of October they had evaluated the fitness of 2,231 employees
in the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Public
Health (the drug crimes office). Of those, the results of the
evaluation were available for 1,058. Of that number, 462 were qualified
for employment and 596 were not approved. On October 1, the Special
Prosecutor's Office was staffed with 560 employees and the rest were
awaiting the vetting results before beginning employment.
Mexico has also passed new legislation that provides an expanded
range of modem investigative and prosecutorial tools for use against
drug traffickers. As they become more experienced with the use of
informants, legal wire taps, and plea bargaining, it is likely that the
success rate will improve for the investigation, arrest, prosecution,
and conviction of drug traffickers. Using these new tools, a total of
$41 million has been seized from the Carillo Fuentes organization
alone.
However, much remains to be done. President Zedillo has recognized
that corruption continues to be a significant threat to Mexico's
national security. Speaking before Mexico's Congress, Attorney General
Madrazo told legislators that organized crime is overwhelming the
nation's police forces, and he urged federal, state and local
officials, and the public to unite in efforts against crime and
corruption.
Reform has been and will continue to be painful, dangerous, and
time consuming. Reform has exposed Mexico to detailed scrutiny in the
international community as the extent of drug corruption was made
public with each new arrest. Nonetheless, President Zedillo has pursued
a policy of investigation, arrest, and prosecution of corrupt public
officials. The U.S. must guard against responding to the uncovering of
official corruption by a single-minded focus on the problems that
remain. The more considered U.S. analysis is that while problems
remain, these tough efforts demonstrate the resolve of the Zedillo
administration to face up to serious shortcomings.
The U.S. policy with respect to Mexican counter-drug efforts
recognizes the complexities of our relationship with Mexico. The United
States and Mexico share a land border that is 2,000 miles long. Our
nations share growing economic ties vital to the competitiveness of
both nations. America's imports to Mexico increased by 127 percent from
1990 ($39.3 billion) to 1996 ($89.4 billion). In the first six months
of 1997: Texas' exports to Mexico alone were running at an annual rate
of $23.6 billion (up 62 percent from 1993); Arizona's exports to Mexico
were running at an annual rate of $2.1 billion (up 84 percent from
1993); and, California's exports to Mexico were running at an annual
rate of $5.2 billion (up 92 percent from 1993). \1\ Our people share
deep ties; nearly one in sixteen Americans is of Mexican descent. It
would be nearly impossible to sever these ties, but easy and counter-
productive to weaken them. However, by strengthening these ties we
continue to build a strong foundation upon which to build a lasting
partnership against illegal drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Trade benefits reach far beyond the border states. For example:
Florida's exports to Mexico were running at an annual rate of $1.7
billion (up 87 percent from 1993); Indiana's exports to Mexico were
running at an annual rate of $3.1 billion (up 151 percent from 1993);
Georgia's exports to Mexico were running at an annual rate of $815.7
million (up 126 percent from 1993); Iowa exports to Mexico were running
at an annual rate of $228.8 million (up 170 percent from 1993);
Minnesota's exports to Mexico were running at an annual rate of $877.4
million (up 71 percent from 1993); and, Massachusetts' exports to
Mexico were running at an annual rate of $494.5 million (up 26 percent
from 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. government is confident that with the continuing support
of Congress over the coming years, our two nations can significantly
reduce our common drug threat. The support of Congress is vital if we
are to continue building the substantive framework and bonds of trust
with Mexico necessary for progress against the threat of illegal drugs.
I. Introduction
Over the past three years, the United States and Mexico have laid
the foundation for a cooperative relationship to battle our common
problems of narcotics trafficking, and the associated crime and
corruption. Both nations are committed at the highest levels to
increasing cooperation and making further progress. However,
impediments to greater bilateral cooperation remain. Corruption remains
a serious problem for Mexico's law enforcement and judicial
institutions, counter-narcotics resources are sometimes scarce, and
historical factors hinder cooperation at operational levels.
Our common efforts to combat narcotics are part of a complex,
symbiotic relationship shaped, on the one hand, by history, culture,
and geography, and, on the other, by the dynamics of a modern global
economy. About six million people living in the United States were born
in Mexico, and several million American citizens--nearly one in
sixteen--are of Mexican descent. More than one half million Americans
live in Mexico. The busiest border in the world, stretching two
thousand miles, connects our two nations. Each year more than 250
million people, 75 million cars, three million trucks, and almost
500,000 rail cars cross the border. The hundreds of millions of legal
border crossings and the estimated four million or more illegal
crossings that occur annually demonstrate the depth and intensity of
our relationship, and the real concerns that bilateral cooperation must
address.
During 1994 and 1995, Mexico faced its worst financial crisis in
the last 60 years. In 1995, the value of the Mexican peso fell by half
against the U.S. dollar, interest rates soared above 80 percent,
official unemployment more than doubled, and Mexico's GDP contracted
substantially. Thanks to solid macro-economic discipline and the policy
framework NAFTA helped lock in, Mexico's recovery has been much more
rapid than expected. Inflation is under control, interest rates are
falling, employment and consumer spending are turning upward, and GDP
growth rates are approaching five percent. Our bilateral trade rose to
nearly $130 billion in 1996, and Mexico recently surpassed Japan as our
second largest market for U.S. exports (after Canada). Our provision of
$13.5 billion in emergency loans and loan guarantees in the wake of the
peso crisis was instrumental in bringing about this recovery. All those
loans have now been repaid to the U.S. Treasury--with interest.
Mexico is in the process of a profound political transition, which
in the long-term will assist in our joint accomplishment of the
counter-narcotics task. Over the next few years, the increasingly open
and accountable government will strengthen the focus of Mexicans on the
institutional renewal needed to combat the corrosive effects of drug
trafficking and associated corruption. Already, there is wide agreement
in Mexico on the serious threat to Mexican institutions and society
posed by narcotics trafficking. Agreement also exists about the
critical need to confront this threat.
Within the context of this period of transformation, the U.S. and
Mexico have laid the foundation for unprecedented binational
cooperation against our shared narcotics threat. President Clinton's
visit to Mexico in May 1997 was pivotal in establishing this foundation
for cooperation embodied in the signing of the Declaration of the U.S.-
Mexico Alliance Against Drugs. President Zedillo's determination after
his 1994 election that narcotics trafficking poses the number one
national security threat to Mexico has prompted the Mexican Government
to take new and important drug control measures.
However, laying a foundation is only the beginning. Our day-to-day
interactions with Mexico in the common fight against drugs represent
the steady building of a lasting partnership against drugs. In certain
areas cooperation is proceeding smoothly. For example, Mexico has
criminalized money laundering, facilitated counter-drug overflight and
refueling, helped halt large cargo plane cocaine shipments from
Colombia to the U.S., and invited U.S. technical support to strengthen
its counter-drug institutions and judicial infrastructure. We are
building a strong framework.
In other areas cooperation is moving more slowly. Certain law
enforcement cooperation is constrained by a lack of mutual confidence
and understandable political sensitivities and restrictions. Mexico's
law enforcement institutions are afflicted by corruption and in some
instances have been penetrated by the very cartels they target.
Extraditions of Mexican nationals on narcotics-related charges remain
difficult.
The Administration is convinced that the most effective approach to
combating drug trafficking is through a highly collaborative
relationship with the Mexican Government and the Mexican and U.S.
publics. Efforts with Mexico and other nations of the hemisphere to
create partnerships for the future must form the base of strength from
which we can address the shared threat of drugs. Bilaterally and
multilaterally, we must strengthen our hemispheric coordinated counter-
drug efforts as we build increased linkages between our societies and
economies. Our focus must be on joint and common progress, not finger
pointing. Our efforts with Mexico demonstrate the soundness of this
approach.
Nowhere is this cooperation more clear than with respect to the
U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group meetings held last week in
Washington, D.C. During these meetings, we made solid progress in
developing the bilateral Counter-drug Strategy agreed upon by the
Presidents in May of this year. We expect the Strategy that will emerge
from these negotiations to cover the full range of antidrug
initiatives--from prevention to interdiction, from precursor chemicals
to money laundering. We anticipate having this bilateral Strategy
before the American and Mexican people and the U.S. and Mexican
Congress by year's end.
My purpose today is to review our efforts toward a collaborative
counter-narcotics approach over the past three years, and to
demonstrate how these efforts have brought about real progress both in
combating drugs and in building stronger and more democratic societies.
A more comprehensive summation is contained in the September 1997
Report to Congress.
II. Mexico's Record of Progress in Fighting Illegal Drugs
A. Increasing Levels of Seizures and Eradication
In each year since 1994, Mexico has increased the quantity of
illegal drugs seized and led the world in destruction of illegal drug
crops. Mexico is currently prepared to match its 1996 eradication
campaign, which resulted in a record of more than 37,000 hectares of
illicit drug crops destroyed. In the first eight months of 1997, Mexico
reports eradicating 12,706 hectares of opium poppy and 10,756 hectares
of marijuana. Mexico has already seized more cocaine in eight months of
1997 than in all of either 1995 or 1996. While eradication and seizure
statistics are imperfect measures of political will or operational
effectiveness, they nonetheless are valid indicators of a government's
commitment to fighting drugs.
B. Improving Extradition Cooperation and Strengthening Enforcement
Against Fugitives
Last year, President Zedillo broke precedent by deciding to
extradite two Mexican nationals. Mexican law permits nationals to be
extradited in ``exceptional cases,'' but never before had this
authority been invoked by a Mexican President. The first Mexican
national extradited to the U.S. was Francisco Gamez Garcia, on child
molestation charges. The government of Mexico (GOM) also extradited
Aaron Morel Lebaron, a U.S. citizen who was Mexican by birth, on murder
charges. The GOM also extradited to the U.S. two individuals with dual
U.S.-Mexican citizenship on drug charges. Mexican citizenship in these
cases was acquired by marriage.
There has been steady improvement in the extradition relationship
between Mexico and the United States over the last three years, with
sustained achievements over the past six months. Mexico has extradited
eleven fugitives to the United States from January through October 26,
1997, numbers substantially equivalent to those achieved in 1996, but
vastly improved over previous years. Six of the fugitives were U.S.
citizens. Of the ten cases, five individuals were extradited for drug
crimes. Also in 1997, four Mexican nationals have been found
extraditable by the Mexican Government, but cannot be surrendered until
either their appeals or sentences are completed.
Over the past six months, the primary developments in extradition
of major narcotics traffickers requested from Mexico include the death
of one of our primary fugitives (Amado Carrillo Fuentes the leader of
the Juarez gang) and the arrests in Mexico of three significant Mexican
defendants--Oscar Malherbe, Jaime Ladino, and Jaime Gonzalez Gutierrez
(also known as Jaime Gonzalez Castro). Gonzalez Gutierrez and Ladino
were arrested by Mexican authorities at the request of the U.S. and are
now in custody solely for extradition purposes. Mexico has approved
extradition of Malherbe, a key lieutenant of Juan Garcia Abrego. He
will be eligible for extradition upon completion of his sentence.
However, he has filed an appeal to his extradition. Appeals are still
pending in four other cases in which extradition has been granted.
Three of these cases involve Mexican citizens: Tirso Angel Robles,
Martin Avalos Tescuano, and Rosendo Gutierrez. The other involves a
U.S. citizen with a claim to Mexican nationality through marriage:
William Brian Martin.
To address the problem of ``temporary extradition,'' the United
States and the GOM have agreed in the Declaration of Mexico-U.S.
Alliance Against Drugs signed by Presidents Zedillo and Clinton in
Mexico City on May 6, to negotiate a protocol on temporary extradition.
This agreement would authorize the temporary surrender of such
individuals for prosecution and their return after prosecution to
complete the judicial process or sentence in the apprehending country.
The U.S. Department of State, in May 1997, submitted a draft protocol
text to the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE) for its
consideration. Agreement was reached ad referendum on a text during the
recent October 1997 HLCG discussions.
C. Strengthening Law Enforcement and Fighting Corruption Through
Reforms
As seizure statistics and progress on extradition matters reflect,
under the Zedillo administration, Mexico has made substantial progress
in reorienting its domestic priorities, policies, and institutions to
enhance cooperation with the U.S. against drug trafficking. Most
importantly, the GOM has recognized the magnitude of the drug
trafficking threat it faces, and has mobilized the resources of society
to confront this threat.
1. Strengthening Laws and Empowering Law Enforcement
Mexico's most significant longer-term achievement may be in the
area of legal reform. Legislative change to Mexico's Penal Code for the
first time criminalizes money laundering. This new law provides for
longer jail time for violators and enhanced penalties for government
officials convicted under its provisions. Similarly, the new Organized
Crime Law (OCL) provides Mexico with a new arsenal of investigative and
prosecutorial tools, including electronic surveillance, witness
protection, plea bargaining, and prosecution for criminal association.
This new legislation also permits the seizure and forfeiture of assets
used in illicit activities.
In the last six months, positive trends have continued as Mexico
has begun implementing the organized crime and money laundering laws
and regulations. The Organized Crime Unit (OCU) has been established
within the Attorney General's Office (PGR) to implement the law and has
received considerable support from the USG. The GOM reports that there
are currently 77 prosecutors, investigators, and other personnel
assigned to the OCU, which will eventually consist of 307 fully vetted
and trained personnel. In addition to its role in the important
investigation of former INCD head General Gutierrez Rebollo, the OCU is
currently conducting more than 30 cases involving the Carrillo Fuentes,
Arellano Felix, and Amezcua Organizations. Under the OCL's asset
forfeiture provisions a total of $41 million has been seized from
associates of the Carrillo Fuentes organization alone.
Similar progress is being made under the new money laundering law.
In March of 1997, Mexico's Hacienda issued new regulations governing
certain financial institutions to enhance the ability to detect and
track incidences of money laundering, including requirements for:
reporting currency and other transactions in excess of $10,000;
reporting suspicious transactions; and, maintaining customer and
account identification and transaction records. These rules are now
being implemented.
Each of these laws is not without its own limitations. For example,
the money laundering law's customer identification provisions fail to
apply to beneficial owners, which could be a serious oversight since
many laundering efforts are undertaken by individuals acting on behalf
of others. However, taken as a whole, these laws represent substantial
progress. The United States is working with the GOM to minimize the
inherent limitations and maximize the ability of the GOM and the United
States to work together to combat narcotics.
2. Progress Fighting Corruption, But Much Remains to be Done
Notwithstanding the goodwill and determination of both governments,
obstacles to both bilateral cooperation and institutional reform
remain. Mexican counter-drug authorities face an uphill struggle
against widespread corruption. Drug trafficking criminals use their
immense wealth, power, and capacity for violence to bribe or otherwise
neutralize the effectiveness of law enforcement and other government
officials.
However, even here we are seeing real progress. In a significant
departure from the past, Mexico increasingly recognizes the dimensions
of the problem of corruption and is determined at the highest levels of
government to confront it. President Zedillo has acknowledged that
corruption is deeply rooted in Mexican institutions. He has demanded
that public officials lead a society-wide effort to create a culture of
respect for law. He has confirmed the determination and demonstrated
the resolve of his Administration to combat and eventually eliminate
official corruption. President Zedillo's understanding and resolve now
permeates his administration; Attorney General Jorge Madrazo, in an
appearance before Mexico's new Congress on September IO, said that
organized crime is overwhelming the nation's police forces, and urged
federal and state officials and the public to unite in efforts against
crime and corruption.
The Zedillo Administration's commitment to root out corruption has
had far-reaching consequences for Mexico. In February, Brig. Gen. Jesus
Gutierrez Rebollo, then the Commissioner of the National Counter-
narcotics Institute (INCD), was arrested on narco-corruption charges.
Subsequently, President Zedillo launched extensive restructuring of
Mexico's drug law enforcement organizations. The INCD was dissolved and
the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes Against Health (FEADS) was
announced as the first phase of a comprehensive Mexican strategy to
reform the entire PGR. The GOM is attempting to rebuild its critical
drug law enforcement institutions from the bottom up. The Gutierrez
Rebollo case, and other highly publicized cases involving law
enforcement, military and other government officials, underscore an
invigorated GOM policy of openly attacking corruption.
The GOM has taken a number of important substantive steps towards
reducing drug corruption in the ranks of law enforcement. The
dissolution of the INCD has been accompanied by the creation of new
vetted units within the PGR, namely the FEADS and the OCU discussed
above. Vetting for these units is both more thorough and more
widespread than in past efforts. The GOM plans to screen all employees
of the PGR; according to the GOM, to date, 2,231 employees have been
examined, results are in on 1,058, and of that number 462 qualified for
employment. The Attorney General has also ordered comprehensive drug
testing for PGR officials and is prosecuting officers found to test
positive. The GOM has also applied the Organized Crime Law in its
investigation and prosecution of General Guiterrez Rebollo. Recent
press accounts indicate that as many as 34 senior officers have been
identified for disciplinary action for their alleged ties to narcotics
trafficking. These initiatives are tangible evidence of an increased
willingness and commitment on the part of the GOM to deal with the
threat of narcotics-driven corruption.
III. Bilateral Counter-Drug Cooperation
Since the formation of the United States-Mexico HLCG in March 1996,
and President Zedillo's declaration that drug trafficking is the main
threat to Mexico's national security, Mexico and the United States have
worked more closely to coordinate counter-drug policy and elevate the
priority of drug control issues. The U.S. and Mexico reached agreement
on the nature of the drug threat to our two societies in the United
States Mexico Bilateral Drug Threat Assessment published in May 1997.
In May of 1997, Presidents Clinton and Zedillo also signed the
Declaration of the U.S.-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs (See attachment
3). The Alliance established counter-drug objectives and committed both
nations to sixteen specific counter-drug goals. These goals are:
reducing demand through information, education and rehabilitation;
reducing the production and distribution of drugs; focusing law
enforcement efforts against criminal organizations in both countries;
strengthening law enforcement cooperation and coordination; bringing
fugitives to justice, including through facilitating temporary
extraditions for trial purposes; targeting firearms traffickers;
developing hemispheric agreement outlawing illegal arms trafficking;
conducting joint efforts to enhance the success the U.N. Special
Session on Illicit Drugs; combating corruption; controlling precursor
chemicals; implementing laws to detect and penalize money laundering;
seizing drug proceeds and directing them to anti-drug efforts;
improving the capacity to interrupt drug shipments by air, land, and
sea; expanding training and technical cooperation; enhancing
cooperation along both sides of the common border; and, improving
information sharing and coordination between our counter-drug forces.
Institutional cooperation between United States and GOM agencies on
counter-drug activities improved measurably in 1996 and has continued
to improve in 1997. In 1996-1997, Mexican law enforcement institutions
underwent rapid personnel turnover as they were rocked by revelations
about the degree to which drug traffickers had penetrated law
enforcement. In the last six months, Mexican institutional reforms have
helped stabilize the situation and create the basis for law enforcement
cooperation in an atmosphere of trust. Nonetheless, there is still need
for greater law enforcement cooperation, and our efforts reflect this
need.
The HLCG continues to provide an effective cabinet-level forum for
coordinating counter-drug policy at the national level. As directed by
Presidents Clinton and Zedillo in May, the work of the HLCG is now
focusing on developing a Joint U.S.-Mexico Counter-drug Strategy. The
process of developing the joint strategy has led to a greater mutual
understanding of national capabilities and limitations and has provided
the impetus for enhancement and integration of ongoing cooperative
efforts across a broad spectrum of activities.
A. Building Stronger Working Relationship Between Law Enforcement
Organizations
The United States and Mexico have established a multi-tiered
structure for cooperation on law enforcement matters. The HLCG provides
a policy framework for joint counter-narcotics cooperation. A working
group of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission meets regularly to
address a full range of law enforcement issues. Closer to the
operational level, the Senior Law Enforcement Plenary Group, chaired by
a U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General and the Mexican Deputy
Attorney General, deals primarily with operational matters related to
drugs. Much of the substantive work and progress overseen by these
groups is accomplished by technical working or consultative groups,
which cover specific areas such as money laundering, chemical control,
demand reduction, prisoner transfer, extradition, and mutual legal
assistance. These working groups meet regularly to exchange information
on laws and regulations, discuss procedures and problems, plan joint
strategies, promote expanded information sharing, and organize
training.
We also expect to see further improvements in operations level law
enforcement cooperation through the Bilateral Border Task Forces
(BTFs)--bilateral drug law enforcement units established along the
U.S.-Mexico border by a 1996 Memorandum of Understanding. The BTFs were
designed to be the key units and cornerstone for U.S.-Mexico
cooperative enforcement efforts targeting the major drug trafficking
organizations along the border.
Reflecting administrative and operational problems, the BTFs are
among the first PGR units to undergo vetting and reorganization. (In
April, Mexican Attorney General Jorge Madrazo and Special Prosecutor
Mariano Herran announced that BTF personnel would be replaced by
properly vetted, top graduates of the May 1997 PGR Academy class.) The
time required for training and screening of the new personnel has
slowed BTF efforts. However, in the long run these initiatives will
strengthen the base of trust upon which greater gains can be made.
Additionally, the BTF's are somewhat constrained because the full
complement of U.S. personnel has been prevented from joining the groups
for security reasons The safety and security of U.S. personnel in this
and other counter-narcotics related activities in Mexico is of great
concern to the Administration. To help ensure the safety of BTF
personnel, the GOM has agreed to provide official-acts immunity to U.S.
participants in the BTFS. Building upon these gains, in July, the GOM
formally authorized an increase in the number of U.S. law enforcement
personnel assigned to Mexico, adding six DEA and six FBI Special Agents
to support U.S. investigations and work with Mexican counterparts.
Several of those resident agents will be assigned as liaison with the
BTFS.
B. Expanding Information Sharing and Coordination
Information sharing is critical to the effectiveness of both
national and bilateral counterdrug efforts. One of the most critical
elements in this process has been the effort by the GOM to improve its
information security practices, including intensified security
screening for Mexican personnel who handle U.S.-provided information.
These ongoing GOM screening efforts will be critical to building trust.
However, it must be understood that to the extent that concerns about
security of information remain, greater information sharing will be
constrained. We must be aggressive in seeking opportunities for
cooperation, exchange and coordination, but continue to be prudent in
implementing these efforts.
1. Sharing Prosecutorial Information
The U.S. and Mexico have been developing new ways to improve the
use of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) to fashion stronger
cases against individuals involved in transborder narcotics trafficking
and related crimes. Specifically, as an incentive for Mexican prisoners
to appear as witnesses in U.S. proceedings (as required by the MLAT)
Mexican authorities have recently agreed to use the Organized Crime Law
to seek a reduction in a witness' Mexican sentence based upon full and
truthful cooperation with both U.S. and Mexican prosecutors and
investigators.
2. Sharing Strategic and Tactical Information and Improving
Coordination
The development of strategic and tactical information sharing
institutions and practices has improved understanding of drug
trafficking organizations and increased law enforcement effectiveness
in both countries. One of the most important advances is the
Information Analysis Center (IAC), an interagency multi-source
intelligence fusion center located in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City,
which develops strategic intelligence for use by U.S. and Mexican law
enforcement agencies.
Additionally, the IAC plays a key role in the tactical information
sharing process. A secure communications link between the IAC and
CENDRO has been in place since December 1996 to share sensitive
information and has been used with increasing frequency. The link is
especially valuable for sharing real-time tracking information to
support Mexican end game operations, for example:
In January 1997, the IAC passed locational data to Mexican
naval units, which boarded the vessel ``Viva Sinaloa'' and
seized more than three metric tons of cocaine.
In July 1997, the transfer of extensive real-time tracking
information on airplanes and fast boats resulted in a 1,000-
kilogram cocaine seizure on the waters north of San Andres
Island in the Caribbean.
During the first seven months of 1997, IAC air alerts
resulted in a foiled airdrop in Mexican waters; the seizure of
175 kilograms of cocaine, 32 kilograms of marijuana, an
aircraft, and a vehicle; and the arrest of four persons on
drug-related charges.
Given the changing face of trafficking patterns, with increases in
the use of maritime shipments, we are presently examining ways to
improve our information sharing and coordination with the Mexican
Government.
3. Sharing Maritime Information and Improving Coordination
Recent meetings between high level USCG and Mexican Navy officials
have led to several agreements for increased cooperation with respect
to information sharing and communications. Since direct communication
and coordination for maritime counter-drug operations along the Texas/
Mexico border began in June 1997, information has been successfully
exchanged with the Mexican Navy on five separate occasions concerning
lancha (small boat) activity in the vicinity of the U.S.-Mexico border.
4. Sharing Financial Information
The governments of the United States and Mexico are cooperating to
attack the financial underpinnings of drug trafficking organizations.
U.S. and Mexican authorities now routinely share tax and financial
information via a series of formal agreements. These agreements (the
Financial Information Exchange Agreement, Tax Information Exchange
Agreement, and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty) allow each country to
assist the other in combating financial crimes by exchanging evidence
and other financial data.
5. Exchanging Information at the Border
Along the U.S.-Mexico border (particularly in the San Diego-Tijuana
area), special programs are being developed and implemented to exchange
information and evidence needed to arrest and prosecute transborder
criminals, for example:
Consultations continue to find better ways to ensure that
minor transporters of drugs across the border can be prosecuted
in their country of origin with the help of evidence collected
by the border immigration or customs authorities of the
excluding country.
The U.S. and Mexico recently established the Southern
California Border Public Safety Council, within the Border
Liaison Mechanism, to handle violent cross-border encounters
and facilitate investigations by officials from both nations at
crime scenes. (It is anticipated that the enhanced cooperative
measures developed by the Council will serve as a model for
similar bilateral groups across the border region.)
U.S. and Mexican Customs Port-of-Entry Directors can now
communicate with each other via a direct telephone link. As a
result, information on large scale public gatherings, mass
migrations of persons, and individuals avoiding law enforcement
efforts can be immediately passed to the affected U.S. or
Mexican port, making the border environment safer for citizens
and customs officers of both nations.
6. Exchanging Information on Precursor Chemicals
Enhanced communication has also occurred in the area of precursor
chemicals--due, in large measure, to cooperation through the Bilateral
Chemical Control Working Group. In 1997, Mexico implemented regulations
limiting the legal importation of precursor chemicals to seven
designated ports of entry. Since March 1997, at Mexico's request, the
United States provides advance written notification for each precursor
shipment being shipped from the U.S. to Mexico. The two countries are
exploring more direct communications through an electronic mail package
similar to the links the U.S. maintains with the European Union and the
International Narcotics Control Board.
C. Building Counter-drug Capabilities Through Training
Both nations agree that training will play a crucial role in
rebuilding Mexico's drug law enforcement institutions, particularly
with respect to strengthening law enforcement cooperation. At the May
meeting of the Presidents in Mexico City, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to
broaden Mexico's efforts to strengthen the core training and
professionalism of Mexico's federal police and prosecutors. The two
governments have focused their immediate attention on training and
equipping specialized anti-crime units such as the OCU, the BTFS, and a
Financial Intelligence Unit.
1. Training Law Enforcement
At the operational level, combined training for the OCU and
BTFs has already begun. Thirty-nine fully-vetted Mexican agents
have attended a four-week advanced training program in the U.S.
sponsored by DEA, FBI, the Department of Justice, and the
Department of the Treasury.
The Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division
(IRS-Cl) continues to provide training for criminal
investigators and prosecutors responsible for the enforcement
of Mexico's new financial crime and money laundering laws.
Two 1996 training programs on processing and analyzing
Suspicious Activities Reporting (SAR) and money laundering and
financial investigative techniques, marked the first time that
members of the Hacienda and PGR participated in joint training
to coordinate and maximize the effectiveness of the new anti-
money laundering legislation.
2. Training the Criminal Justice System
The USG and GOM are developing a project to provide
technical assistance and training to the PGR in a range of
areas including: strategic planning, training, resource and
personnel management, policy and procedure development, and
recruitment and selection.
The U.S. Agency for International Development has also
initiated a U.S.-Mexico Judicial Exchange Program. The program
has established a two-year series of bilateral seminars and
conferences on judicial topics, including organization and
administration, information management, organized crime,
extradition procedures, and rules of evidence.
3. Training and Equipping to Enhance Mexican Military Interdiction
Efforts
Given President Zedillo's decision to temporarily expand the role
of the Mexican military in counter-drug missions, development of
effective military counter-drug capabilities is essential. The two
governments are cooperating extensively on training and equipping
Mexican military counter-drug efforts, including:
The Department of Defense (DoD) has established a training
and equipment program for the development of an airmobile,
rapid-reaction, counter-drug capability to support drug
interdiction efforts in Mexico. In FY 96, approximately 300
Mexican military personnel completed counter-drug training
provided by DOD. In FY 97, more than 1,500 Mexican military
personnel will be trained in an expanded counter-drug training
program. Training is now focused on GAFE units (Grupos
Aeromoviles Fuerzas Especiales--elite Mexican Army Special
Forces units trained in air assault interdiction operations)
and the UH-1H squadrons that support their operations. Training
of GAFEs is scheduled to continue through FY 99. All GAFE
training includes a strong human rights component.
DoD is transferring 73 UH-1H helicopters to the Mexican Air
Force to support GAFE unit counter-drug operations and four C-
26 fixed wing turboprop aircraft for use in counter-drug
reconnaissance and support missions. These assets are a
significant improvement in Mexico's counter-drug capabilities.
To further bolster Mexico's longterm ability to maintain the
counter-drug UH-1H fleet, Section 1031 of the 1997 Defense
Authorization Act provided $8 million in counter-drug
procurement support to Mexico. Authority to continue these
vital efforts is being sought in the FY98 Defense Authorization
Bill; without this authority, we will be unable to continue
this support effort. These increased assets have produced
results. From December 1996 to August 1997, these aircraft
logged a total of 3,600 flight hours supporting counter-drug
missions. According to the GOM, through May 1997, UH-1H
flights: located 9,076 drug fields; identified 281 new
clandestine airfields; identified 30 previously unknown areas
suitable for clandestine airstrips; identified 56 previously
unknown possible border crossing points; and seized 4,605
kilograms of marijuana.
DOD, with the support of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), has
also developed a maritime counter-drug training program to
train Mexican naval forces for operations in a marine/coastal
and riverine environment. More than 600 Mexican Navy personnel
will receive this training in 1997. Mexico also acquired two
U.S. Knox class frigates for use in a maritime counter-drug
role, and DoD will provide training to assist in developing
this capability. To further assist the GOM in improving its
maritime law enforcement capabilities, the USCG also provides
training to the Mexican Navy in basic boarding and law
enforcement procedures.
D. Improving Interdiction Cooperation and Border Coordination
1. Enhancing Maritime Cooperation and Coordination
Maritime counter-drug operations gained new significance in FY 97,
as both governments recognized the increased threat posed by maritime
transport of cocaine, marijuana, precursors, and other related
contraband, both in commercial shipping and in smaller, high
performance ``go-fast'' boats. Mexico and the United States made
advances in the areas of training, information exchange, and
cooperative maritime law enforcement.
a. Maritime Air Patrols
The exchange of information between Mexico and the U.S. concerning
suspected maritime trafficking has enhanced coordination on
reconnaissance flights. In addition, Mexico's willingness to pursue
traffickers several hundred miles out to sea has greatly improved
maritime interdiction efforts. The result has been significant seizures
near the Yucatan Peninsula, and areas near the southern tip of Baja
California and the adjacent west coast of the Mexican mainland.
b. Cooperative Maritime Interdiction Operations
The USCG, in conjunction with other federal law enforcement
agencies, is also conducting maritime interdiction operations in the
coastal waters along our border with Mexico in both the Pacific and the
Gulf of Mexico. Operation GULF SHIELD is centered in Brownsville,
Texas. Operation BORDER SHIELD is centered in San Diego, California. In
conjunction with Operation GULF SHIELD, the Mexican Navy is conducting
Operation TAMAULIPAS 97 along the Texas/Mexico border. The Mexican Navy
has two warships with deployed helicopters in support of the operation,
and has expressed a desire to continue this operation indefinitely. In
addition, the Mexican Navy is requiring the registration of all small
boats and the sale of outboard engines larger than 75 horsepower.
The results of enhanced cooperation in maritime interdiction can be
seen in the success of Operation BORDER SHIELD. On August 11, 1997,
Joint Interagency Task Force West developed information on a smuggling
operation south of Acapulco involving the transfer of drugs from a
mother ship to a go-fast boat. The USCG Cutter BOUTWELL, a U.S. Navy P-
3, three Mexican Navy vessels, and a Mexican Navy aircraft responded.
USCS aircraft tracked the go-fast boat, which jettisoned more than 100
bales of cocaine. Despite the Mexican Navy's fast response, the go-fast
escaped under cover of darkness before the authorities could arrive.
However, BOUTWELL and the Mexican vessels recovered more than 2.7 tons
of jettisoned cocaine, which was transferred to the custody of the
Mexican Navy. The Mexican Navy support to this successful operation
showcases the potential for cooperative maritime law enforcement.
Similarly, at the Mexican Government's request, USCG Law
Enforcement Detachment Teams (LEDETS) deploy with increasing frequency
to Mexico to assist the Mexican Navy with dockside boardings using
IONSCAN equipment. During the course of one deployment in 1996, the
LEDETs boarded seven vessels suspected by the Mexican Navy of drug
smuggling. Although no contraband was discovered, several positive hits
indicated the prior presence of drugs. On the basis of this evidence,
Mexico seized all seven vessels with an estimated total worth of $3 to
$4 million. In January 1997, a LEDET team participated in the boarding
of the ``Viva Sinaloa,'' leading to the seizure of more than three
metric tons of cocaine. In addition, LEDET personnel have appeared in
Mexican courts three times to testify as expert witnesses against
suspected drug smugglers, most recently on July 22, 1997.
2. Expanding Air Interdiction Cooperation
The USCS Aviation Program has been involved in counter-drug
operations with Mexico since 1990, resulting in an excellent level of
cooperation. The GOM authorizes regular overflight and case-by-case
pursuit in Mexican airspace for USCS P-3 aircraft monitoring suspect
narco-trafficking aircraft, or responding to emergent intelligence.
Regular pre-authorized overflights require a Mexican national, in most
cases a representative from the PGR, to be present. The Mexican
representative aboard the USCS aircraft serves as a coordinator for
Mexican law enforcement assets involved in prosecuting the suspect
track.
USCS has proposed an exchange of liaisons between the DAICC and its
counterpart CENDRO (the Mexican national counter-drug coordination and
intelligence center). The DAICC offers the only means of monitoring
suspect low-level flights in northern Mexico. The U.S. believes that
the proposed liaison exchange will enhance communication between
Mexican and U.S. law enforcement and help improve apprehension rates
for drug trafficker aircraft over Mexico. Mexico accepted this offer
during our October HLCG meeting and both nations will soon have liaison
officers operating at the respective centers.
Air interdiction cooperation is expected to improve in the wake of
the GOM's agreement to enhance bilateral detection and monitoring
cooperation, as well as streamlining overflight and refueling request
procedures. Mexico recently provided immediate authorizations and
assistance for U.S. aircraft to overfly Mexican air space when
observing suspected drug trafficking aircraft flying into Belize and
Guatemala. This assistance included permission to refuel in Mexico and
agreement to keep airfields open while detection and monitoring
missions were airborne and in possible need of fuel. As the result of
high-level discussions during the Bilateral Working Group on Military
Cooperation meeting held in May 1997, Mexico has streamlined the
procedures by which U.S. aircraft and maritime vessels supporting
counter-drug missions can receive authorization to overfly or refuel in
Mexican territory.
Additionally, the capabilities of Mexico's own air interdiction
program have gown exponentially since its inception in 1991. For
example, in coordination with similar U.S. efforts, and with U.S.
support and training, Mexico has acquired Citation interceptor
aircraft, which are now carrying out interdiction efforts in the
Southwest border region. The record of success already achieved could
be strengthened with new initiatives in the future, perhaps including
cooperative operations to target ongoing suspect air activity occurring
just south of the U.S.Mexican border.
3. Improving Border Coordination
The USCS and Mexico have improved their communications and
cooperation. Port Quality Improvement Council's (PQIC) have been formed
in an effort by the major U.S. federal inspection agencies (USCS,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Department of Agriculture)
to coordinate the management of large Southwest Border ports-of-entry.
PQIC coordination and communication has been extended to Mexican
counterparts via the Border Working Groups operating at the local level
at Southwest Border ports. Increased communication between U.S. and
Mexican customs officials along the border has improved traffic
management and facility usage. Cargo and passenger facility hours of
operation are now coordinated, increasing the efficiency of both U.S.
and Mexican agencies.
a. Border Liaison Mechanism (BLM)
The U.S. and Mexico created the BLM in 1993 to improve local
communication on border incidents. The principal officers at U.S. and
Mexican Consulates in five border pair cities (Tijuana/San Diego,
Ciudad Juarez/El Paso, Nuevo Laredo/Laredo, Hermosillo/Nogales, and
Matamoros/Brownsville) chair quarterly meetings with law enforcement
officials, civic leaders and representatives of inspection agencies to
discuss ``border cooperation and any recent violent incidents.''
Additional BLMs have been added at Mexicali/Calexico, Reynosa/McAllen,
and Ojinaga/Presidio.
The BLMs have proven useful in resolving problems locally that
otherwise might have escalated to national-level issues. In addition to
narcotics-related issues such as border violence and customs
inspections, BLMs have also dealt successfully with other issues,
notably port management, border facilitation and immigration questions.
b. America's Narcotics Control Initiative (ANCI)
Through the ANCI program, USCS will assist exporters, carriers, and
port authorities in developing and implementing security programs and
initiatives that safeguard legitimate trade from being used to smuggle
narcotics and to assess border operations. ANCI will build upon the
current Carrier Initiative and Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition
programs, which USCS has promoted with industry in the hemisphere.
Mexico is one of the obvious target countries for the ANCI.
Conclusion
The U.S. strategy is to build a strategic partnership with Mexico
to counter the threat of drugs our two nations share. This strategy has
a three-year record of solid progress. Presidents Clinton and Zedillo
have signed an Alliance against drugs that sets forth tough but
achievable goals and markers. We are working with Mexico to develop a
historic bilateral Strategy to meet those goals. At the local level,
the Border Liaison Mechanisms along the Southwest border are building
trust and producing real results. Internally, the Zedillo
administration is demonstrating in tangible ways--not just in words--
its resolve to release Mexico from the choke hold of drug-driven
corruption. This a foundation upon which greater progress can be built
against drugs.
However, optimism must be tempered by realism. As President Zedillo
himself has recognized, drug-driven corruption threatens Mexico's
national security and even its national sovereignty. A climate of
violence exists along the U.S.-Mexico border that places the lives of
law abiding-citizens at risk as well as law-breaking criminals.
Traffickers continue to smuggle drugs across the border into America.
Problems remain. The issue is how best to confront them.
Our policies must reflect the complexities of our relationship with
Mexico. We cannot alter the fact that we share a 2,000 mile land border
with Mexico. Nor is it within our interests to undermine the economic
progress we are making as partners in a global market. Imports from the
United States to Mexico increased 127 percent from 1990 to 1996 ($39.3
billion to $89.4 billion). In the first six months of 1997: Texas'
exports to Mexico were running at an annual rate of $23.6 billion (up
62 percent from 1993); Arizona's exports to Mexico were running at an
annual rate of $2.1 billion (up 84 percent from 1993); and,
California's exports to Mexico were running at an annual rate of $5.2
billion (up 92 percent from 1993). Most importantly, given the
sensibilities and history at work, publicly cataloging Mexican
shortcomings may sometimes prove counter-productive in truly reducing
drug trafficking and use.
Both the United States and Mexico share blame and responsibility.
Despite recent declines in drug use in America, we remain one of the
world's largest drug consuming nations. It is our demand for drugs that
plays a major role in driving this deadly market.
Multinational attacks on the entire chain--from production to
consumption--offer the best solution to the international drug problem.
Given Mexico's political situation, we are more apt to attain better
results as a partner confronting this common problem than as a powerful
neighbor making demands. The Administration's collaborative efforts
with Mexico reflect this understanding and are producing measurable
results.
ONDCP looks forward to working with both the Committee and the
Caucus as we move forward in our collaborative work with Mexico and
other nations, and as we confront the problems of illegal drugs here at
home. The bipartisan Congressional support we have received has been
critical to the progress we have already made. Over the last 17 years,
the overall number of drug users in America has declined by 50 percent;
the number of Cocaine users has fallen by 75 percent. The past month
use of illicit drugs by children, ages 12 to 17, has dropped from 10.9
percent to 9 percent. Crack use among arrestees is down across the
nation, and according to the latest National Institute of Justice
study, the decline in crack use has contributed to the nation-wide
decline in homicides. Our ultimate goal is to reduce drug use in
America down to a historic low in the coming decade. We welcome your
continued help in making this goal a reality, including:
Support for the Administration's bill to reauthorize ONDCP;
Long-range counter-drug planning, including a 10-year
strategy supported by a five-year budget and performance
measures to assess our work; and,
Confirming the two ONDCP nominees now pending before the
Senate before recess.
Your support for these and other initiatives is vital to continued
progress in decreasing the availability and use of illegal drugs in
America.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify on U.S.-Mexico counter-
drug cooperation. We look forward to continuing to work together.
Senator Biden. Can I ask an explanation of that chart? Does
that mean the high intensity areas are red? That means all the
high-trafficking areas in the Midwest?
General McCaffrey. The chart is almost impossible for you
to read from back there. Let me also offer in your packet you
have a copy of the border, southwest border HIDTA's. There are
five of them, and this shows you what counties by law, 1988
law. I designate these HIDTA's and specify which county they
are. So the ones in black, you can barely see from up there,
cover the entire southwest border, and they are rigged
together.
There are now 22 HIDTA's, and growing.
Senator Biden. They are all in black, the HIDTA's?
General McCaffrey. No, they are in red also. You see the
northwest HIDTA up in the Seattle area. You can barely see.
There is a Florida HIDTA, Baltimore-Washington HIDTA. They are
across the country.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, can I get clarification on one
other thing? Can we go back a chart to the extradition chart?
General, I just want to understand. It says Mexico has
delivered 20 fugitives requested by the U.S. so far in 1997.
Are any of those Mexican nationals?
General McCaffrey. No. They are all multinational, mostly
U.S., but there are Canadians.
Senator Kerry. And then the next line it says, 12 more
fugitives have been ordered extradited by Mexico. Are any of
those Mexican nationals?
General McCaffrey. Yes, six.
Senator Kerry. So the six you referred to are in that
group?
General McCaffrey. Six this year. There were four in 1996.
Senator Kerry. Four in 1996, six this year, all dual
nationals?
General McCaffrey. No. Of the six Mexican nationals, if I
remember correctly, it is four are Mexican national only. That
is sort of a deceptive category, because we have criminals who
desperately try and establish dual nationality. The Mexicans
will rule on it and grant it yes or no, but regardless of
whether it is Mexican or dual nationality, they are treated as
Mexican citizens.
Senator Kerry. Would it be possible, Mr. Chairman, if the
General at a later time, if someone on the staff could just
inform our folks?
Senator Coverdell. I am sure the General will be more than
pleased to do that. This is a point of contention, Senator
Feinstein and the General.
General McCaffrey. And it should not be.
Senator Coverdell. It should not be, but maybe we can get
it cleared up following the hearing. I am going to suggest,
given the number that we have here, that we limit the time to
about 3 minutes.
Senator Dodd. Could you put that map of the United States
back up? Is Salt Lake City--I do not understand that. What does
the red mean?
General McCaffrey. The thing is color-coded by the year
they are established. You cannot see it from up there. So they
started in 1990 with five of them, and they are now up to 22.
There is too much granularity in the presentation for you to
see it from there. Those are 22 HIDTA's across the United
States, established sequentially over the years.
Senator Dodd. What is a HIDTA?
General McCaffrey. High intensity drug trafficking areas.
It is a designated group of counties that are there which
receive Federal money. They have an executive committee, and
they pull together local, State, and Federal law enforcement.
Senator Dodd. Am I to presume by this that these are also
the areas that have the highest density of drug problems?
General McCaffrey. They were principally began as transit
zones, so if you were a Miami, you were an access point for
drugs that were spreading out to other places in the United
States, You became a HIDTA. That tends to still be the theme,
but they have been added by Congress year by year with
differing logics.
Senator Dodd. Now the lights are beginning to come on. So
Federal money is going to some areas where there frankly is----
General McCaffrey. $148 million.
Senator Dodd. And New York is not included, and Boston, and
San Francisco.
General McCaffrey. No, New York is included. Miami, New
York, Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit.
Some of them are in the process of starting up, several of
them. Five of them were just added this year.
Senator Dodd. I think you have answered the question,
General. I think you are being very candid, and I appreciate
that.
Senator Coverdell. Let me begin the questioning with
Senator Grassley, our cochairman, and under the circumstances
let us say 5 minutes.
Senator Grassley. General McCaffrey, first of all, thank
you for your compliment about the Drug-Free Communities Act. I
appreciate that very much.
Before I read a question, I want to ask you to focus on
your statement about Mexico having a commitment to confront
corruption, kind of raising the question in my mind the extent
to which confronting corruption is actually--are they really
fighting corruption by confronting it, and then I guess, if I
were going to say what I view as the situation, how are we
changing a culture of toleration of corruption within Mexico?
But the question would start with your March 12 testimony
to Congress. You highlighted the actions that Mexico had taken
to fight corruption, including the firing of 1,200 officials.
Is it not the case that most of these people have been hired
back, but that is not the most important point in my question.
Outside of the raw numbers, which we both know can
sometimes be misleading, what events or action, if any, have
you seen in the Government of Mexico that the United States
should understand is a change in the level and nature of this
toleration of corruption?
General McCaffrey. An earlier comment reminded me of a
military maxim. Basically I am not paying much attention to
words, but instead actions. What are they doing? I mean, there
is going to be a constant swirl of allegations about many
figures in the foreign arena who may or may not be suspect, so
what we are doing is trying to watch as closely as we can. What
are they doing? What are they doing to further a joint
cooperative effort?
It is our own viewpoint that--and I say this meaning the
senior authorities of the U.S. Government, that President
Zedillo, Cervantas, Carria, Madrazo, the new Attorney General
and others are serious about this effort.
Particularly I think this whole issue with the arrest of
General Guttierez Rebollo was a terrible shock to them. They
brought in a guy who is one of the few stars in their
counterdrug effort, who had made three major busts, within 62
days of installing him in office found out he was a mole for
one of the five major drug gangs, and the busts were in
protection of Amado Carrillo Fuentes' gang against others, and
I think it was a terrible shock to them, and one of the things
they have done, which is an astonishing task they have taken
on, is fire 4,000 cops and start over, and they started over
with the director, and they polygraphed him, gave him a urine
test, gave him a financial disclosure form, checked his
background, and put him in office.
They are now up to a classified number of police officers,
but one at a time they are starting to rebuild what they are
calling FIADS, which will be their counterdrug police effort.
We are watching it. We are trying to support their leadership.
We think it is working.
They started a new organized crime unit with two cops, a
civilian, right, with a Ph.D in criminology, and did the same
thing with them.
We are watching their actions on corruption in the Armed
Forces, and I personally listened to the president of Mexico
tell the director, Mr. Cervantes, we will go after corruption
wherever we find it. They have arrested and imprisoned two of
their general officers. I believe the number is up to 41-some-
odd military people arrested. Guttierez Rebollo is being tried
by both civilian and military courts.
Some of these people they fired have been rehired. They
have administrative rights of appeal. Of the 1,200 fired in the
IMCD some 300 have been rehired, and none of them are in the
drug control area, so our view is that they are trying to be
serious.
Senator Grassley. My last point would be, in a recent
Washington Times article you dismissed Canadian Ambassador Marc
Perrone's criticism of the U.S. antidrug effort in Mexico. The
Ambassador was quoted as saying, ``I am an expert in the Middle
East, and when I got here in Mexico I thought I already knew
everything about corruption, but I was wrong.''
Continuing to quote, ``In the area of drug trade I believe
that all the pressure of the United States toward Mexico is
only a game that the American Government uses for political
ends which hides a much bleaker reality. The authorities say
they are working on fighting drug trafficking, and they put a
general in charge of fighting drug traffickers and he turns out
to be one of them. It is a joke. We are discreet about this,
but it is obvious things are not going well.'' End of quote.
At that point, you or your spokesman encouraged the
Ambassador to read the report that you recently put out, and
claimed that Mexico has made substantial progress in reordering
its priorities, policies, and institutions to enhance
cooperation with the U.S. against drug trafficking. End of
quote.
So General McCaffrey, what measures do you use to determine
that substantial progress has been made?
General McCaffrey. Senator, I actually made no comment
about that Ambassador's statement.
Senator Grassley. So the quote is wrong?
General McCaffrey. I had no comment about it. It did not
seem for me like a very useful thing for him to have offered.
But I think you are back to the question of are there real
results coming out of this cooperation or not, and the answer
is equipment, training, extradition, money laundering, 8,000
requests for tracing weapons, of which 11 percent have been
satisfied, an ATF link on trying to follow the gun-smuggling
effort, intelligence centers that are operating together,
Mexican liaison officers that are now going to Riverside Drug
Interdiction Center, the U.S. Customs Service, and so I think
in every area there are practical, real cooperative efforts
going on, and we have ourselves up on the start point of a 10-
year effort to knock out drug-smuggling, which is so
devastating in its impact on both societies. I think that is
what is happening.
Senator Coverdell. Senator Dodd, and thank you, Senator
Grassley. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me if I can, General, just raise two or three
questions, and then you can take the time to just quickly
answer them.
Just in a broad way, if you could give us some sense
briefly to compare the quality of the cooperation you are
receiving now from our neighbor to the south, as opposed to the
cooperation--and just get an initial overview of that.
Number 2, where are the areas that you think more
cooperation is needed if you had to prioritize that.
Third, I wonder if you might just quickly comment on what
the effects of the July elections were in terms of our ability
to get cooperation from the legislative body. In any way, have
those results impacted on the level of cooperation we are
getting?
And last, again I did not raise this in my opening
comments, but obviously we know a lot of time and effort and
personnel are devoted to the issue of certification, and we
talked about this. My colleague from Georgia--in fact, I have
said on numerous occasions that there is the genesis of what I
consider to be a very sound idea on how we might want to change
dealing with the old issue of certification so we get away from
the problems I think we create politically in these countries
by the United States sort of deciding who the winners and loses
are in this effort, but I wonder if you might comment on that
last point as well.
General McCaffrey. The level of cooperation now versus a
few years ago, and Senator Dodd, I do not pretend to be an
expert on Mexico or Latin America, but I have been in and out
of the region for my entire life. There is no piece of Latin
America, from Patagonia up to the border, that I have not
visited numerous times.
It is my own view that Mexico and the U.S. have had
historically a tremendous sense of animosity, of fear on the
part of Mexican authorities of being overwhelmed by an
intrusive, arrogant U.S. partner, and I think in the last 3 to
5 years that has changed dramatically.
In the last 2 years the level of cooperation on the drug
issue has been phenomenal, to the point that it would clearly,
it would seem to me, rank as one of the most dramatic
transformations I have seen in the region in the last 30 years.
Again, we started with almost no contact military to
military, police to police, no extradition, no money laundering
agreements, no legislation in Mexico to deal with the problem.
Now there is considerable.
There is considerable work to be done. One of the things we
have to do is, we have to sit down and hammer out a joint
strategy. We have to have a plan. We have said when we get the
plan written by 31 December we want to write performance
measures of effectiveness. We want concrete goals, which
Senator Coverdell started off this session with, to hold
ourselves accountable, and to not say that 10 years out it will
be solved, but what are we going to deliver each year.
That is what we are working on. We have to get a joint
strategy and performance measures of effectiveness.
July elections are an interesting and rather encouraging
thing to all of us. I would suggest to North Americans we have
94 million people who have now dedicated themselves to
democracy and free elections, and they have voter cards and an
honest electoral process, and for the first time in 67 years
the PRI no longer dominates either the State Governors nor the
legislative branch.
So we have a very dramatic revolutionary change in our
democratic partner to the south. I do not know where it is
going. I am not too sure Mexican authorities do. But it is very
encouraging, and that is one of the reasons I have been so keen
in having our U.S. delegation go back and consult with Mexican
legislators when we are down there.
Finally, the certification process, Senator, is by law, as
you know, the Secretary of State's responsibility. What we have
done, there was one bad article which suggested in Bolivia that
I had already agreed to turn over certification to the OAS. We
have deliberately not discussed certification. What we have
said is, we are going to try and construct sensible,
multinational cooperative efforts, and that if we can get these
working in a realistic fashion, then it may be appropriate to
discuss this binational certification process.
I would also tell you in private I have told most Latin
American authorities I deal with do not expect the
certification law to change in the near term, but I would hope,
as we understand that this is a cooperative effort, and as it
begins to work, and it will, we may at that point want to come
and talk to the Senate about certification.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. General, your last answer answered my first
question, which is that you have to have something in place
before you take out of place what is in place. Is that
essentially your view, or is that just a reflection of a
political reality?
General McCaffrey. Both.
Senator Biden. A second question I have relates quite
frankly to whether or not the next time we have the hearing you
are going to be here to talk to us, in terms of the
recertification of your office, or the reauthorization of your
office. Recertification we would not have any problem with, but
the reauthorization is a problem.
When I wrote this legislation back in 1987 creating the
office you now occupy I quite frankly had very, very basic and
I think still sound objectives.
One was that we had about 35 different Federal agencies all
claiming to have responsibility for some portion of the effort
relating to drugs, and yet nobody in charge, and there was no
place where a strategy resided, or no one responsible for
coming up with a strategy, and the second purpose was to, as a
consequence of putting one person in charge, generate an
accountability, and that is why it was a requirement that there
be a yearly, an annual strategy that was required to be put
forward. My purpose there was accountability.
Now, you come back and you have said, in the attempt at
reauthorization you have said you would like the deal changed a
little bit. You have said you would like to have annual
reporting and a 10-year strategy, is that correct?
General McCaffrey. Yes, Senator.
Senator Biden. Now, can you tell me how your reporting
requirement would meet the intention of the law, and I know the
intention of the law, because I wrote it personally, which was
requiring accountability on the part of the administration,
every President to be accountable on the drug issue. How would
your reporting, as opposed to a new strategy every year, meet
that responsibility?
General McCaffrey. Senator, it seems to me part of it may
be just using terms differently. I am trying to bring to this
the same logic we used in organizing resources and people in
machinery to achieve long-term outputs in the national defense
arena.
It occurs to me there is no reason why we should not be as
serious about the drug issue as a national security issue. The
strategy, a strategy to put a man on the Moon takes 10 years to
accomplish it. A strategy to build the interstate highway
system was 18 years. A strategy to put the Panama Canal into
place was the better part of 15 years. We need a long-term
focus on the drug issue, because the war is going to be won in
the value systems of our adolescent children, and we are going
to have to put treatment and prevention and law enforcement and
synchronous support.
We are going to get this $195 million tremendous gift the
U.S. Congress gave us to work the issue of the national youth
media strategy and change attitudes. It takes a long-term
focus.
Now, we have a draft proposal of performance measures of
effectiveness over here for congressional consultation, and
that is the deal. We have worked thousands of hours----
Senator Biden. Let me stop you there, because a lot of
people get confused about this. I happen to support the change
that you are proposing, but just as we are seeking certain
requirements be met for certification of Mexico, you are saying
to us that by issuing an annual report, which worries some of
my colleagues, as opposed to a strategy, that you are at the
same time in that report going to account for somewhere, as I
count it, nearly 100 specific detailed measures as to what kind
of progress or lack of progress you are making on the strategy.
Is that correct? Is that what you mean by the performance?
General McCaffrey. I come over here and say, here is the
resources you gave us, and here is the output function we
achieved in definable variables. Here is what we got with your
money.
Senator Biden. So that this will be not less specific, but
more specific.
General McCaffrey. Absolutely.
Senator Biden. Than a general strategy.
General McCaffrey. Absolutely.
Senator Biden. Now, a second point--and my time is up. I
will come back. I am sorry.
Senator Coverdell. General, I do not differ with the 10-
year strategy, but I think we do need bolder short-term goals
that everybody understands.
In other words, if you were a new coach at XYZ University
and said we are going to have a championship 10 years from now,
you probably would not be there very long.
Senator Dodd. At Connecticut you might. [Laughter.]
Senator Coverdell. At Georgia, no. [Laughter.]
Senator Coverdell. Coming to the border, you said a moment
ago 5 years. Could that be accelerated, and a couple of
questions about it. Can we accelerate that? Can we define it?
Can we--and I would like your comment on how we prepare
ourselves for shifted strategy on their part.
I mean, we closed the Caribbean. They ended up in Mexico.
It is clear that if we are successful on the border between
ourselves and Mexico, then we have to be aware of the other
entry ports.
And last, in your discussions with the Mexican Government,
can they perceive what we are doing on the border as being in
their best interest and not this forcible wall between the two?
I hope we can achieve that, because I believe both countries,
and the tensions that are being built between us because of
this issue, would have to be ameliorated if we had a managed
border instead of an unmanaged border.
General McCaffrey. Senator, I think both your comments are
good ones.
The first thing, arguing by analogy is a shaky thing to do.
We won the Gulf War not in a 100 hours of armed combat. We won
it in 15 years of hard work to build the tool we used, and so I
do believe there ought to be short-term, dramatic efforts to
protect the American people from drugs, and you are going to
see them. We have seen them already. You have given us a 12-
percent increase. We are up to $16 billion. You have given us
serious resources, and they are in effect.
We have now half the treatment capacity of the country. We
have an invigorated 21-percent increase in drug prevention
programs. We have almost doubled the size of the border patrol.
Sam Banks will tell you he is about to deploy six more giant X-
ray machines that are movable. The Coast Guard has a very
serious effort going in the Caribbean.
We are doing a lot of things, and I would hope that next
year we are going to come down and show you definitive bites
into some of these problems. It may be you are already seeing
it, a little bit premature to say. My guess is next year we are
going to see some definitive steps forward, and the reason I
say that is, we did get a decrease in the household survey of
drug use rate this year.
We told the press carefully it was not statistically
significant, but what was significant, for the first time in 5
years, it did not go up, it went down, and crack cocaine
arrestees went down, and methamphetamines and arrestees went
down, and emergency room episodes went down, so we think we are
going go make progress on this.
Now, back to the Mexican issue. I think there is more we
can do. You know, I had in my opening remarks, which I did not
use, a series of rather dramatic improvements since 1990 you
have made in manning of DEA, manning of INS, manning of the
border patrol. Things have already begun to happen, but I think
it is going to take us some time to do these things. I really
do.
I think you are going to have to construct a border patrol
and a Customs Service adequate to protect the American people.
We are going to have to put in the kinds of things that now
appear in this tiny California-Mexican border. We put in 46
miles of fencing. We put in a decent border patrol presence. We
put in two X-ray machines.
And so in one place, Tijuana-San Diego, you have a border
liaison mechanism, tremendous cooperation between the two
nations. Murders have gone from 65 a year 3 years ago to zero.
Drugs seized at the border have gone from over 10,000 pounds a
year to 6 pounds last year, and more important, if you look at
the beach there, the coastal waterfront, there are families out
there on the beach now. That would not have happened 3 years
ago.
So it is active cooperation between Mexican and U.S.
authorities. If you talk to this distinguished police officer,
Russ Leach, back here, the Juarez and El Paso Police
Departments absolutely are integrating their approach to crime
on the two sides of the border. The toughest issue is drugs,
because of the corrupting influence of hundreds of millions of
dollars.
So I think they are moving forward on it, is the bottom
line, but a long way to go.
Senator Coverdell. General, we are going to have a vote
here at 4:15, and I wonder if we should not move to the new
panel rather than another round, and thank the General.
Senator Dodd. If we could submit some questions.
Senator Coverdell. We will leave the record open for 3 days
for formal questions that maybe could not be dealt with.
Senator Coverdell. It has been a rather long afternoon for
you, General. As you listened to the statements, I hope they
were helpful. We thank you for taking the time to appear before
us today, and I am going to invite the next panel to come
forward at this point. Thank you, General.
General McCaffrey. Thank you.
Senator Coverdell. If I could ask that those in attendance
with conversations remove them from the committee room, we are
going to proceed with this panel.
Our guests are FBI Deputy Director Thomas--let us see,
get--Kneir, I guess that is the right, correct pronunciation--
Kneir; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs--of course, Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow; Director of
U.S. Customs Agency, Samuel Banks; and Deputy Administrator of
the Drug Enforcement Agency, James Milford.
Why do not I go in the order of your seating and begin with
you, Mr. Ambassador, with each of your comments? And we will
come on down and then have questions following each of your
testimonies.
Ambassador Davidow?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY DAVIDOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Davidow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I recognize that we
have a time problem, and with your permission, I will submit my
testimony for the record and abbreviate it in my oral
statement.
Senator Coverdell. Their--your testimony will be entered
into the record.
Mr. Davidow. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Grassley, I wanted to pick
up on something that Senator Biden said when he was talking
about his parochial school education and the helpful role that
the nuns played there in his formation in which he said that he
had to write many times The road to hell is paved with good
intentions. He is absolutely right.
I think the question that is being asked by Senator Biden
and others is Are we seeing anything else but good intentions
on the part of the Mexican Government? There is a widespread
belief in this town that President Zedillo and his cabinet are
honorable men who are trying to do their best, but are those
intentions being translated into action?
And I think while there remains--and we all recognize
this--a tremendous amount of work that has to be done, we have
seen in the past year, particularly since the events of the
Guttierez Rebollo arrest, a series of actions which are very
important and which go beyond good intentions. And if I could
go over some of those with you, I think it might be useful.
A new vetting process was established for special law
enforcement units that incorporate extensive background checks
and regular polygraph testing. Mexico established a new special
law enforcement branch, the Special Prosecutor for Crimes
Against Health, to replace the discredited National
Counternarcotics Institute, INCD. I think this is an important
point. What has happened in Mexico this year is the entire
gutting and restructuring of their counternarcotics apparatus.
New Mexican vetted units were established under Mexico's
Attorney General and have become operational to implement
Mexico's new organized crime law and to provide an analytical
capability against the major trafficking organizations.
These units have begun to develop information in cases.
Based on Mexican reports, Mexico exceeded in the first 9 months
of 1997 its 1996 record for eradication of illegal--of illicit
drug crops and drug seizures.
Mexico's seizures of narco-traffickers' cash and assets
reached record levels. The government of Mexico agreed to
accredit 12 new FBI and DEA agents in-country and provide
consular privileges and immunities to 22 additional U.S. law
enforcement officers for the bilateral border task forces.
Mexico agreed to streamline refueling, overflight, and
overnight procedures for U.S. drug detection and monitoring
assets. Mexico enhanced operational coordination with U.S.
interdiction forces, especially in the maritime arena.
In coordination with the United States, Mexico conducted an
aggressive pursuit of top trafficker Amado Carrillo Fuentes,
which ultimately drove him to plan to flee the country. After
altering his appearance, he, as you know, died after undergoing
plastic surgery.
I continue. The Mexican Government approved the extradition
of Mexican citizens and has worked closely with U.S. law
enforcement authorities on extradition priorities.
This year, the government of Mexico has agreed to the
extradition of four Mexican nationals wanted on drug charges.
These individuals have not yet been surrendered. The
extradition has been agreed to but they have not yet been
surrendered, pending appeals in Mexican courts.
Mexico and the United States have reached agreement on the
text of a protocol to our bilateral extradition treaty, which
will permit sequential trials in the two countries in cases
where there are charges against an individual in each country.
It would clear the way for consecutive prosecutions where that
currently cannot occur. We have just reached agreement on this.
It is a protocol to the extradition treaty which will be signed
shortly.
And Mexico has arrested a number of major drug traffickers,
including Juan Garcia Abrego, Jose Pereira Salas, Manuel
Rodriguez Lopez, Oscar Malherde, Adan Amezcua, and Jaime Arturo
Ladino.
I mention all of these things because I do believe that we
are going beyond good intentions and we are building a process
which in the years to come will require a whole lot more
activity. But we are on the right road.
I do want to comment also on Senator Grassley's comments on
the certification process, which have been echoed by others. We
are indeed, yes, trying to find ways to increase multilateral
cooperation in the drug fight.
Part of the report that the President submitted to Congress
on September 15 outlined our strategy to get other countries in
the hemisphere to develop national plans of drug control and
drug interdiction, to work cooperatively with us and with other
countries, to use organizations such as the OAS' Inter-American
Drug Committee.
But I also want to stress, and make this perfectly clear,
that certification is the law of the land. We are committed to
it. It is not a perfect instrument, as Senator Grassley said,
but it is a useful instrument. What we are trying to do with
multilateralization, in getting other countries to cooperate
with us, is designed to complement our national legislation,
including certification, not to replace it or other laws that
we have.
Mr. Chairman, let me just say as a final point, some notes
on the problem of corruption. While the Zedillo administration
is committed to taking aggressive action against drug
trafficking, it acknowledges that Mexico's justice and public
security institutions remain seriously flawed.
Police and military forces lack the tools and training
needed to counter decisively the major criminal organizations
operating in Mexico. They also lack the pay scales, job
security, strong public support, and other incentives to resist
intimidation and bribes by the criminal organizations.
The government of Mexico is taking the first steps needed
to enhance the capabilities and security of its personnel, to
establish checks and balances within the system, and to combat
entrenched corruption. This is a process that will take a long
time. But it has begun and it has begun seriously and it is
more than intentions.
Let me end by noting, Senators, that in 2 weeks, we will be
visited by President Zedillo of Mexico who is coming to
Washington for an official visit. He will, of course, meet with
President Clinton. It is my understanding that he will also
seek to meet with the members of this body, and the House, to
talk about the very full relationship between the United States
and Mexico. And, of course, he will be talking about the very
issues that we are discussing here today; that is, Mexico's
anti-narcotics fight. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Davidow follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey Davidow
U.S.-Mexico Counternarcotics Cooperation
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss our
counternarcotics cooperation with Mexico. This is a priority aspect of
one of the most important relationships we maintain in the world.
Taking into account the depth, complexity and importance of the overall
relationship with Mexico, counternarcotics is not the only in that
relationship. At the same time, we recognize that the relationship will
be much more difficult if we cannot make progress on fighting drug
trafficking.
Mr. Chairman, your convening this hearing today is timely; just
last week we held a meeting of the High Level Contact Group on Drug
Control (HLCG), marking another step forward in our bilateral
cooperation. And on November 14, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo will
make an official working visit to Washington. Among a number of other
issues, he and President Clinton will be discussing the course of our
counternarcotics cooperation since.the two Presidents signed the
Declaration of the U.S.-Mexican Alliance Against Drugs last May in
Mexico City, as well as our plans for developing further our
cooperation in the months to come.
Both the United States and Mexico remain firmly committed to
efforts to counter the growing threat of large-scale drug trafficking
and other serious organized crimes. The President's ``Report to
Congress'' on U.S.-Mexican counterdrug cooperation, released in mid-
September, chronicles the course of Mexico's efforts to reform its
counternarcotics legal and institutional structures and increase
cooperation with the U.S. against narcotics trafficking. The report
does not gloss over the difficulties in our counternarcotics
cooperation, including corruption and what some have called ``the
culture of impunity'' in Mexico, institutional and resource weaknesses,
lack of progress on protection for U.S. law enforcement agents in
Mexico and continued problems on extraditions.
These problems notwithstanding, what is significant is that the
Government of Mexico continues to cooperate with the United States on a
broad range of counternarcotics activities. Mexico's senior leadership
recognizes that such cooperation must be real, regular, and reliable.
How well Mexican political will can be translated into effective action
against narcotics trafficking will be a major determinant of Mexico's
success in developing capable counternarcotics institutions and
confronting widespread corruption. Institutional reform is now underway
in Mexican law enforcement agencies and the Mexican criminal justice
system. As institutional and legal reform continue to take root, Mexico
will be an increasingly effective partner in the fight against drugs.
The ONDCP Report
As the President's report notes, Mexico scored several counter-drug
successes this year and implemented a number of changes the U.S. viewed
as critical to effective bilateral cooperation. In major developments:
In the wake of the arrest of General Gutierrez Rebollo, a
new vetting process was established for special law enforcement
units that incorporates extensive background checks and regular
polygraph testing.
Mexico established a new special law enforcement branch--the
Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS) to replace
the discredited National Counternarcotics Institute (INCD).
New Mexican vetted units were established under Mexico's
Attorney General and have become operational, to implement
Mexico's Organized Crime Law and to provide an analytical
capability against the major trafficking organizations. These
units have begun to develop information and cases.
Based on Mexican reports, Mexico exceeded in the first nine
months of 1997 its 1996 record for eradication of illicit drug
crops and drug seizures.
Mexican seizures of narco-traffickers' cash and assets
reached record levels.
The Government of Mexico agreed to accredit twelve new FBI
and DEA agents in country and provide consular privileges and
immunities to 22 additional U.S. law enforcement officers for
the Bilateral Border Task Forces. Mexico agreed to streamline
refueling, overflight, and overnight procedures for U.S. drug
detection and monitoring assets.
Mexico enhanced operational coordination with U.S.
interdiction forces, especially in the maritime arena.
In coordination with the U.S., Mexico conducted an
aggressive pursuit of top trafficker Amado Carrillo Fuentes,
which ultimately drove him to plan to flee the country after
altering his appearance; he died after undergoing cosmetic
surgery.
The Mexican Government approved the extradition of Mexican
citizens and has worked closely with U.S. law enforcement
authorities on extradition priorities.
This year, the GOM has agreed to the extradition of four
Mexican nationals wanted on drug charges. Their surrender has
been postponed pending the completion of their appeals or
sentences for crimes committed in Mexico.
Mexico and the United States have reached agreement on the
text of a protocol to our bilateral extradition treaty which
will permit sequential trials in the two countries in cases
where there are charges against an individual in each country.
It would clear the way for consecutive prosecutions where that
currently cannot occur.
Mexico arrested a number of major drug traffickers,
including Juan Garcia Abrego, Jose Pereira Salas, Manuel
Rodriguez Lopez, Oscar Malherbe, Adan Amezcua and Jaime Arturo
Ladino.
Enhanced Multilateral Drug Control
We are also seeking to enhance multilateral counterdrug cooperation
throughout the region. Circumstances in the hemisphere increasingly
lend themselves to a greater emphasis on multilateral initiatives. Our
multilateral objective is to establish a counterdrug alliance for the
hemisphere, which would have explicit counternarcotics goals,
commitments, and responsibilities for nations in the region. As part of
the Miami Summit follow-up, a hemispheric counternarcotics strategy was
negotiated, which was centered around both the 1996 anti-drug strategy
for the hemisphere established by the CICAD (the inter-American drug
abuse control commission) of the OAS and the 1988 UN Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Specific
actions have been taken to execute this strategy. Working through
CICAD, more than 40 recommendations for implementing the principles of
the strategy have been elaborated.
The ONDCP report identifies further steps needed to implement such
a hemispheric alliance. First of all, countries should develop national
plans to reduce drug use, trafficking, and production, with methods for
evaluating their own progress. In the report we recommend that CICAD
should be charged with establishing a multilateral group to monitor
progress in implementation of national plans and to promote
opportunities for enhanced hemispheric cooperation. The United States
will seek hemispheric support at the 1998 Summit of the Americas for
implementing the steps necessary for establishing such a hemispheric
counternarcotics alliance. Our efforts to improve multilateral drug
control efforts will complement and reinforce our bilateral
counternarcotics programs. The creation of a hemispheric
counternarcotics alliance will also strengthen our own national efforts
to control drug production, shipment, and consumption.
Increasing Bilateral Cooperation
The U.S. is moving methodically to consolidate advances in
bilateral counternarcotics cooperation with Mexico across a broad
front, including law enforcement and intelligence cooperation,
training, information sharing, and extradition. Progress in these areas
will occur at different rates, as some pose greater sensitivities for
the Government of Mexico and some Mexican institutions are able to
accommodate change faster than others. Our objective is to make
consistent broad progress in as many areas as possible.
Mexican accomplishments collectively illustrate the improvements in
our bilateral anti-narcotics cooperation. One key to further progress
lies in the continued development of Mexican judicial and law
enforcement institutions. Reflecting the acknowledged importance of
counternarcotics progress, there is continued aggressive engagement
with the drug issue by the senior leaders if the Mexican Government.
They recognize that counternarcotics and anti-corruption reforms are
critical not only to U.S.-Mexican relations, but to Mexico's national
security and public safety, and to developing greater confidence by the
Mexican people in governmental institutions.
The Problem of Corruption
While the Zedillo Administration is committed to taking aggressive
action against drug trafficking, it acknowledges that Mexico's justice
and public security institutions remain seriously flawed; police and
military forces lack the tools and training needed to counter
decisively the major criminal organizations operating in Mexico. They
also lack the pay scales, job security, strong public support and other
incentives to resist intimidation and bribes by the criminal
organizations. The Government of Mexico is taking the first steps
needed to enhance the capabilities and security of its personnel, to
establish checks and balances within the system, and to combat
entrenched corruption. In a September 10 speech before the Chamber of
Deputies, Mexican Attorney Madrazo said:
``. . . the people's most serious concern is public security.
The citizens feel impotent against crime and perceive the
authorities as inefficient to combat it. The public is equally
afraid of criminals and the police.''
Corruption cannot be reined in instantaneously or even in the short
term. The Zedillo Administration has demonstrated the political will
and initiated the actions to begin the long process of change through
institutional transformation. For example, the Government of Mexico is
now using new counter-drug units to attack major trafficking
organizations. These units include the Organized Crime Unit under the
Attorney General, and the military Air-mobile Special Forces units.
These units have been carefully vetted and increasingly well trained,
paid and equipped. The U.S. has provided extensive training and
substantial material assistance to these units. They are manned by
Mexican officers we trust and with whom we can cooperate, share
sensitive information, and from whom we can receive dependable
information and assistance.
Still the building of reliable institutions is still at a very
early stage. The specialized units to which I referred, particularly
those under the Attorney General, are brand new and have only recently
begun operations. A much larger task will-be the establishment of the
new Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health, to
replace the now dismantled anti-narcotics institute which was
dismantled following the arrest of Gen. Gutierrez Robollo in February.
The Government of Mexico has plans for the recruitment, vetting and
training of this new force, but its establishment as an effective force
will be a long-term effort.
Other Problem Areas
In other areas, our cooperation is improving less rapidly than we
would like. Certain law enforcement cooperation is still hampered by
residual mistrust of national motives and understandable political
sensitivity to cross-border operations. Extraditions of Mexican
nationals remain painfully slow and not in step with comparable U.S.
extraditions to Mexico. However, cooperation on extradition should
improve. For example, we have negotiated a protocol to our bilateral
extradition treaty which would allow temporary surrender of suspects
for trial in one country while charges are pending in the other. We
expect that the numbers of persons extradited and deported to the
United States will continue to rise slowly. It is important to note
that the Government of Mexico has agreed that narcotics offenses are
among those for which it is prepared to extradite its citizens to the
United States. As Foreign Secretary Gurria told a number of members of
Congress during a meeting with them last week, in discussing the
problem of extradition for serious crimes, ``in considering the
requests by the U.S. for extradition, we focused not on the nationality
of the individual but on the seriousness of the crime.''
HLCG Meeting (October 22-23)
We had an opportunity last week to review with the Mexican
authorities both the problems and the accomplishments in our common
effort against narcotics use and trafficking, in a regular meeting of
our Cabinet-level body which oversees these matters, the so-called High
Level Contact Group for Drug Control. This group, under the
chairmanship of General McCaffrey on the U.S. side and of Foreign
Secretary Gurria and Attorney General Madrazo on the Mexican side, is
responsible for setting the overall direction of our counternarcotics
efforts, and for monitoring our performance. We talked about many of
the things that I mention in this statement. In particular, we talked
about progress in developing a common strategy to meet the narcotics
threat to our two countries, an effort which is well along. Overall, I
was impressed over the course of a day and one-half of intense
discussions with the seriousness of purpose of both governments in
trying to make progress against narcotics smuggling, and with the
pragmatic approach adopted by participants on both sides. No one at
these meetings underestimated the magnitude and difficulty of the task
which confronts our two governments. No one expected to see immediate,
or even rapid, progress. I think this kind of hard-headed attitude is
exactly what is needed. And I believe that these regular meetings of
the High Level Contact Group are essential to keeping both our
governments working at peak efficiency. We use these meetings both to
identify and resolve differences and to keep our bureaucracies driving
forward.
Counternarcotics in Context
Our bilateral relationship has shown a better sense of common
purpose and pragmatic cooperation under President Zedillo than at any
time in recent memory. Our objective is to continue the long process of
developing a qualitatively different bilateral relationship with Mexico
in which mutuality of interests and the health of the overall
relationship are strong enough to weather the inevitable ups and downs
of individual issues. Improvements in the broader nature of the
relationship will in turn help us in pursuing cooperation on specific
issue areas, such as counternarcotics. Changing the fundamental
assumptions underlying the relationship will require great sensitivity,
however, as the Mexican Government sometimes finds it politically
difficult to reorient toward greater cooperation with the U.S. We are
thus engaged in a long-term enterprise in which patience and steadiness
of purpose will pay us dividends in the end.
President Zedillo's Visit
As was noted at the outset, just two weeks after these hearings
President Zedillo will make an official visit to Washington.
Counternarcotics will be high on the agenda for his discussions with
the President, as befits an issue of great importance on both sides of
the border. The Mexican Government is also very aware of the vital role
our Congress plays in bilateral relations. President Zedillo will
therefore seek an opportunity to meet with Congressional leaders and
committee chairmen in areas of bilateral interest. Among the many
issues making up the complex mosaic of the U.S.-Mexico relationship,
counternarcotics cooperation would certainly be prominent in the
discussion at any such meeting.
Senator Coverdell. I appreciate the comments, Mr.
Ambassador, and appreciate your trying to facilitate the time
as well. I would now turn to Deputy Administrator, DEA, Mr.
Milford.
STATEMENT OF JAMES S. MILFORD, JR., ACTING DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE.
Mr. Milford. Mr. Chairman, again, I would ask that my full
statement be included in the recorded.
Senator Coverdell. Certainly.
Mr. Milford. And I will discuss a short statement. Mr.
Chairman, you and the members of the committee are well aware
that within the past several months--years, major trafficking
organizations from Mexico have emerged as major players in the
international drug trade and have become almost as powerful as
the traffickers from Medellin and Cali.
Do--drug traffickers, or drug trafficking organizations
from Colombia and Mexico, are popularly referred to as cartels,
a phrase which is inaccurate and misleading because it implies
that cartel leaders are a legitimate businessmen.
In truth, drug trafficking organizations operating today
from headquarters in Cali, Guadalajara, Tijuana, Juarez,
Sonora, and the Gulf Coast are international organized crime
syndicates which control the cocaine trade by growing portions
of the heroin trade and the vast majority of the
methamphetamines trade entering the United States.
DEA considers the traffickers from Mexico, because of their
involvement in poly drug activity, their proclivity for extreme
violence, and their geographic proximity to the United States,
to be a more distinct and eminent danger to the United States
than the Colombian organizations.
The leaders of Mexico's international organized crime drug
trafficking syndicates are well known to U.S. law enforcement,
and many of them are--are charged in numerous indictments in
the U.S. Only two major trafficking figures no longer operating
there--are operating their lucrative businesses.
One, Garcia Abrego, who held dual citizenship, was turned
over to the United States for prosecution in 1996, and is
currently serving 11 life term sentences. However, the Amado
Carrillo--and also, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, who died after
having plastic surgery in the hospital in Mexico City. However,
the Amado Carrillo organization is functioning as a major
trafficking organization despite its leader's death.
One of the most notorious traffickers in Mexico, Ramon
Eduardo Arellano-Felix, considered the most violent brother of
the Arellano-Felix organization, is based in Tijuana. On
September 11, 1997, he was added to the FBI's Ten Most Wanted
List and has--and a provisional arrest warrant has been sent to
Mexico for his arrest.
Ramon was indicted in San Diego, California, on charges
relating to importation of cocaine and marijuana. A joint task
force comprised of DEA, FBI, and California State and local
authorities, is continuing in its investigation into the
Arellano-Felix organization, including his brother, Benjamin--
for cocaine trafficking, of course.
Our goal is to investigate and prosecute the entire
Arellano-Felix organization as a continuing enterprise--
continuing criminal enterprise. The violence associated with
the international drug trafficking syndicates today does not
take place only in Mexico. Unfortunately, it is also on the
streets of San Diego and El Paso, Texas, which have been
besieged by these trafficking activities.
With the death of Amado Carrillo Fuentes this July, rivals
and associates of his organizations engaged in a campaign of
violence which transformed Juarez, Mexico and El Paso, Texas,
into battle zones. More than 18 people were killed in a bid for
control over his organization. For the time being, that wave of
violence has abated.
One of the major areas--one area of major concern over the
past several months has been the increase in the number of
threats, brazen assaults, and murders against Mexican law
enforcement officials and sources of information, and also the
press.
Threats have also been received against U.S. law
enforcement officials and prosecutors. Traffickers from Mexico
have assumed a major role in drug trafficking operations within
the United States, not only dominating the wholesale trade in
the West and Midwest, but now have moved in traditional
locations such as Queens, New York, and the Northeast, which
was traditionally held by Colombian traffickers.
Our operations, the DEA and FBI operations Limelight and
Reciprocity clearly demonstrated the expansion of these Mexican
syndicates into lucrative East Coast markets. The problem of
drug trafficking from Mexico is a complex issue, and must be
addressed on both sides of the border. Because of this,
international drug trafficking organizations does not--do not
respect national borders.
An essential element of our strategy is working closely
with the government of Mexico and its enforcement organizations
to identify, target, locate, arrest, and prosecute these major
criminals.
We have launched over the past several years an initiative
called the Southwest Border Initiative, which is designated to
dismantle the sophisticated organizations, and we are working
today to improve that effort. Operation Reciprocity and
Operation Limelight, which was part of our Southwest Border
Initiative, highlighted the importance of law enforcement's
ability to successfully target this communications effort.
As a result of this effort, 11.5 metric tons of cocaine,
over $18 million in currency, and almost 14,000 pounds of
marijuana were seized, and I must include there was also 101
defendants that were also arrested.
In closing, I would like to say that we continue our
efforts. We have, as you have heard today, many efforts with
the vetting process, with working with the different units that
have been put in place within Mexico. We are in the process
stage at this point.
We have several people, and we have said all along that
we--that what--that the only thing that U.S. law enforcement
wants is the ability to work with Mexican officials. We have
several officials today, as a result of these activities and as
a result of these talks, that we are working with. We are
passing information, and we are hopeful that this will lead to
some success. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Milford follows:]
Prepared Statement of James S. Milford
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Thank you for the
invitation to testify before your Committee and the Caucus this
afternoon, on the subject of anti-narcotics cooperation with the
Government of Mexico. As you are well aware, traffickers from Mexico
pose a significant threat to the United States, as well as to the
citizens of Mexico. Within the past several years, major trafficking
organizations from Mexico have emerged as major players in the
international drug trade, and have become almost as powerful as the
cocaine traffickers from the Medellin and Cali drug organizations were
at the pinnacle of their careers.
In order to appreciate the nature and scope of the drug trafficking
activities in Mexico, it is necessary to look at the historic role of
traffickers from Mexico and assess their role in today's global drug
trafficking enterprise.
Drug trafficking organizations from Colombia and Mexico are
popularly referred to as ``cartels'', a phrase which is inaccurate and
misleading because it implies that cartel leaders are legitimate
businessmen. In truth, the drug trafficking organizations operating
today, from headquarters in Cali, Guadalajara, Tijuana, Juarez, Sonora
or the Gulf Coast are international organized crime syndicates which
control the cocaine trade, a growing portion of the heroin trade, and
the vast majority of the methamphetamine and marijuana trades which
impact the United States. The leaders of these organizations conduct
their sophisticated businesses with the assistance of thousands of
employees, high grade weapons, state of the art communications
equipment and almost unlimited sources of income to bribe and
intimidate those who might challenge their operations.
Unlike the leaders of organized crime who, during the past decades,
resided in the United States and conducted their business within our
national borders, these drug traffickers oversee a huge network of
employees and resources from thousands of miles away. It is therefore
necessary for the U.S. Government to work cooperatively with the
Governments of Colombia and Mexico, as well as many other governments
around the world, to identify, target, arrest, prosecute, convict and
incarcerate these international organized crime leaders.
During 1995 and 1996, the brave men and women of the Colombian
National Police, under the leadership of General Rosso Serrano,
successfully pursued and arrested many leaders of the Cali mafia.
Today, the top leadership of the Cali syndicate is in prison after
surrender or arrest, and others--are dead. With the incarceration of
the major Cali traffickers, criminals from Mexico began gaining
prominence in the cocaine trade.
Traffickers from Mexico have traditionally been involved in
smuggling cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine and marijuana into the
United States, but in many cases, they served as the transportation arm
of the Colombian organizations. During the late 1980's, the Cali group
worked closely with traffickers from Mexico to transport cocaine using
727 aircraft and landing areas in Mexican territory. The aircraft also
returned bulk cash payments to Colombia after they were smuggled into
Mexico.
In the early 1990's, traffickers from Mexico began receiving
payment for their transportation services in the form of cocaine. They
then expanded their already well-established distribution networks in
the United States to distribute the cocaine, effectively increasing
their profit margin by 300% per shipment. Today, the majority of the
cocaine entering the United States comes from Colombia through Mexico
and across U.S. border points of entry. There is evidence that
traffickers in Mexico have gone directly to the sources of cocaine base
in Bolivia and Peru in order to circumvent Colombian middlemen.
Additionally, traffickers from Mexico are the primary source of
methamphetamine in California, the Southwest and increasingly the
Southeast regions of the United States, and recent DEA statistics
indicate that 20% of the heroin seizures made in the United States in
1996 were of Mexican origin. Two recent DEA operations also indicated
that traffickers from Mexico have now become direct distributors of
cocaine in New York, a role which had been dominated by traffickers
from Colombia and the Dominican Republic.
DEA considers the traffickers from Mexico, because of their
involvement in poly drug smuggling, their proclivity for extreme
violence and their geographic proximity to the United States, to be a
more distinct and eminent danger to the U.S. than the Colombian
organizations.
Major Traffickers from Mexico
The leaders of Mexico's international organized crime drug
trafficking syndicates are well known to U.S. law enforcement, and many
of them are charged in numerous indictments in the U.S. Only two major
drug trafficking figures are no longer operating their lucrative
businesses: Juan Garcia Abrego, who held dual citizenship, was turned
over to the United States for prosecution in 1996 and is currently
serving 11 life terms after his conviction in Houston; and Amado
Carrillo-Fuentes, who died after plastic surgery in a Mexican hospital
this past July. However, the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes Organization (ACF)
is still functioning as a major trafficking group, despite its leader's
death.
The Amado Carrillo-Fuentes Organization: Carrillo-Fuentes was known
as the ``Lord of the Skies'' because of his renown in transporting
plane loads of cocaine for Colombian traffickers. Before his death,
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes had extensive ties to the former Commissioner of
the INCD, the National Institute to Combat Drugs, General Gutierrez-
Rebollo, and he was reported to have shipped $20-30 million to Colombia
for each major operation. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes' organization is based
in Juarez, and is associated with the Cali Rodriguez-Orejuela
organization and the Ochoa brothers of Medellin. In addition to cocaine
smuggling, the ACF organization is responsible for heroin and marijuana
trafficking, and has bases in Guadalajara, Hermosillo and Torreon where
drugs are stored before shipment to the United States.
Amado's brother Vicente has been indicted in the Northern District
of Texas for cocaine violations and a warrant was issued for his arrest
in late 1993. At the time of his death, Amado Carrillo-Fuentes was
charged in numerous U.S. indictments in Florida and Texas, and was a
fugitive on heroin and cocaine charges. An associate in the ACF
organization, Oscar Malherbe, once a lieutenant for Juan Garcia-Abrego,
was responsible for the shipment of 2,000 kilograms of cocaine from
Colombia to Mexico each week. He was arrested on February 27, 1997, on
drug trafficking and weapons charges and a provisional arrest warrant
has been forwarded by the U.S. to Mexico. Formal extradition documents
were presented in late April. The Mexican Foreign Ministry has declared
him extraditable but, according to the Mexican Government, extradition
will be deferred until the conclusion of Mexican legal proceedings and
any subsequent sentence imposed by the Mexican Government.
While the full impact of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes' death has not been
totally assessed. it is clear that a power struggle ensued this summer
as rivals and associates sorted out business arrangements and turf. It
is also clear, however, that after the arrest of General Gutierrez-
Rebollo in March, Amado Carrillo-Fuentes had been feeling pressure from
law enforcement in the U.S. and Mexico, and he had made efforts to
disguise his appearance and relocate some of his operations to Chile.
The Caro-Quintero Organization: This group is based in Sonora,
Mexico and is involved in cocaine and methamphetamine smuggling, and
marijuana production and trafficking. It is headed by Miguel Caro-
Quintero, whose brother, Rafael, is in jail in Mexico for his role in
the 1985 killing of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena.
After receiving bribes, a Federal judge in Hermosillo, Mexico
dismissed charges against Miguel Caro-Quintero in 1992, and since that
time, he has operated freely within Mexico. He is the subject of
numerous U.S. indictments and is currently also the subject of our
provisional arrest warrant in Mexico issued in the United States. A
request for the extradition of Miguel and Rafael Caro-Quintero was
forwarded to the Government of Mexico by the U.S.
The Arellano-Felix Organization: Based in Tijuana, this
organization is one of the most powerful, violent and aggressive
trafficking groups in the world. The Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO)
has high level contacts within the Mexican law enforcement and judicial
systems and is directly involved in street level trafficking within the
United States. According to extradition documents submitted by the
Government of Mexico in San Diego, members of the AFO reportedly
dispense an estimated $ 1 million weekly in bribes to Mexican federal,
state and local officials to ensure they will not interfere with the
group's drug trafficking activities.
The Arellano family, composed of seven brothers and four sisters,
inherited the organization from Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo upon his
incarceration in Mexico in 1989 for his complicity in the murder of DEA
Special Agent Enrique Camarena. Alberto Benjamin Arellano-Felix has
assumed leadership of the family enterprise and provides a
businessman's approach to the management of their drug empire.
AFO maintains well-armed and well-trained security forces,
described by Mexican enforcement officials as paramilitary in nature,
which include international mercenaries as advisors, trainers and
members. Ramon Arellano-Felix's responsibilities consist of the
planning of murders of rival drug leaders and those Mexican law
enforcement officials not on their payroll. Also targeted for
assassination are those AFO members who fall out of favor with the AFO
leadership or simply are suspected of collaborating with law
enforcement officials. Enforcers are often hired from violent street
gangs in cities and towns in both Mexico and the United States in the
belief that these gang members are expendable. They are dispatched to
assassinate targeted individuals and to send a clear message to those
who attempt to utilize the Mexicali/Tijuana corridor without paying the
area transit tax demanded by the AFO trafficking domain.
The AFO also maintains complex communications centers in several
major cities in Mexico to conduct electronic surveillance and counter-
surveillance measures against law enforcement entities. The
organization employs radio scanners and equipment capable of
intercepting both hard line and cellular phones to ensure the security
of AFO operations. In addition to technical equipment, the AFO
maintains caches of sophisticated automatic weaponry secured from a
variety of international sources.
Ramon Eduardo Arellano-Felix, considered the most violent brother,
organizes and coordinates protection details over which he exerts
absolute control. On September 11, 1997, he was added to the FBI's IO
Most Wanted List. Ramon was indicted in San Diego, California, on
charges relating to importation and conspiracy to import cocaine and
marijuana. A Joint Task Force, composed of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation in San Diego,
California, and state and local officers, is continuing its
investigation into the Arellano-Felix Organization, including Benjamin
Arellano-Felix, Chairman of the Board, for cocaine trafficking. Our
goal is to investigate and prosecute the entire Arellano-Felix
Organization as a continuing criminal enterprise that has sent multiple
tons of cocaine from Mexico into the United States in this decade.
The Amezcua Organization: The Amezcua-Contreras brothers, operating
out of Guadalajara, Mexico, head up a methamphetamine production and
trafficking organization of global proportions. Directed by Jesus
Amezcua, and supported by his brothers, Adan and Luis, the Amezcua drug
trafficking organization today is probably the world's largest smuggler
of ephedrine and clandestine producer of methamphetamine. With a
growing methamphetamine abuse problem in the United States, this
organization's activities impact on a number of the major population
centers in the U.S. The Amezcua organization obtains large quantities
of the precursor ephedrine, utilizing contacts in Thailand and India,
which they supply to methamphetamine labs in Mexico and the United
States. This organization has placed trusted associates in the United
States to move ephedrine to Mexican methamphetamine traffickers
operating in the U.S. Jose Osorio-Cabrera, a fugitive from a Los
Angeles investigation until his arrest in Bangkok, was a major
ephedrine purchaser for the Amezcua organization.
Joaquin Guzman-Loera: Although his brother, Arturo Guzman-Loera,
has now assumed the leadership role, Joaquin Guzman-Loera began to make
a name for himself as a trafficker and air logistics expert for the
powerful Miguel Felix-Gallardo organization. Guzman-Loera broke away
from Felix-Gallardo and rose to patron level among the major Mexican
trafficking organizations. Presently, he is incarcerated in Mexico;
however, Mexican and United States authorities still consider him to be
a major international drug trafficker. The organization has not been
dismantled or seriously affected by Guzman-Loera's imprisonment because
this organization continues to transport cocaine from Colombia through
Mexico to the United States for the Medellin and Cali organizations and
is also involved in the movement, storage, and distribution of
marijuana, as well as Mexican and Southeast Asian heroin. This
organization controlled the drug smuggling tunnel between Agua Prieta,
Sonora, Mexico and Douglas, Arizona through which tons of cocaine were
smuggled.
Guzman-Loera, who has been named in several U.S. indictments, was
arrested on June 9, 1993 in Talisman, Mexico for narcotics, homicide,
and cocaine trafficking and is presently incarcerated at the Puente
Grande Prison, Jalisco, Mexico.
Impact of Mexican Drug Traffickers on the United States
The violence associated with the international drug trafficking
syndicates does not take place only in Mexico; unfortunately, cities
like San Diego, California and Eagle Pass, Texas have been besieged by
the actions of drug trafficking organizations smuggling drugs into the
U.S. from Mexico, and many Americans have been victimized by the
violence and crime attendant to the drug trade.
With the death of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes this past July, rivals and
associates of the AFO engaged in a campaign of violence which
transformed Juarez, Mexico and El Paso, Texas into battle zones. More
than 18 people were killed in a bid for control over the Carrillo-
Fuentes organization. For the time being, that wave of violence has
abated and the power struggle may have been sorted out.
One area of major concern over the past several months has been an
increase in the number of threats and brazen assaults and murders
against Mexican law enforcement officials and sources of information.
Threats have also been received against U.S. law enforcement officials
and prosecutors. A number of Mexican journalists have been targets of
violence, or had their lives, threatened, possibly as part of an effort
on the part of drug traffickers to silence attempts by the media to
shed light on their heinous actions.
Traffickers from Mexico have assumed a major role in drug
trafficking operations within the United States, not only dominating
the wholesale cocaine trade in the West and Midwest, but also have
become significant traffickers operating in major east coast cities.
Two recent DEA Operations, Limelight and Reciprocity, which I will
discuss later, clearly demonstrated the expansion of Mexican syndicates
into lucrative east coast markets.
The problem of drug trafficking from Mexico is a complex issue, and
must be addressed on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican Border. Because
international drug trafficking organizations do not recognize or
respect national borders, and because they conduct their business from
headquarters in Mexico, while their employees and surrogates wreak
havoc in U.S. cities and towns across the nation, it is essential that
activities on both sides of the border be targeted with aggressive and
co-equal strategies.
The Southwest Border Initiative
An essential element of the strategy is working closely with the
Government of Mexico and its law enforcement organizations to identify,
target, locate, arrest and prosecute those major international
organized crime figures responsible for drug trafficking and violence
within the U.S. and Mexico. DEA and the FBI have launched the Southwest
Border Initiative (SWBI), designed to dismantle the sophisticated
leadership of these criminal groups from Mexico by targeting their
command and control functions and building cases on the surrogate
members and their U.S.-based infrastructure. The SWBI is anchored in
our belief that the only way to successfully attack any organized crime
syndicate is to build strong cases on the leadership by attacking their
command and control functions. With the assistance of foreign
governments, the long-term incarceration of the leadership will leave
entire organizations in disarray. The effectiveness of this strategy is
hampered only by the difficulty of incarcerating the leadership of
these trafficking empires who hide in foreign safe havens like Colombia
and Mexico.
This strategy now combines the resources of the DEA, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice Criminal
Division, the United States Attorneys' Offices, The High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area Program (HIDTA), the United States Customs Service
(USCS), and a host of state and local counterparts. Through this
initiative, we have been able to harness the investigative,
intelligence and operational functions of all of the members and
coordinate joint investigations against the major drug trafficking
organizations. The investigations stemming from the Southwest Border
Strategy are not confined to the border region of the U.S., they target
trafficking organizations which affect the whole country. Most of the
major international cases, such as those which were part of Operations
Limelight and Reciprocity, begin with cases first made on U.S. soil.
Operation Reciprocity and Operation Limelight, which were part of
the Southwest Border Initiative, demonstrated the importance of law
enforcement's ability to successfully target the communications of the
upper echelon of international criminal organizations. These operations
targeted U.S.-based cells of the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization
and resulted in the seizure of 11.5 metric tons of cocaine, over $18
million in U.S. currency, almost 14,000 pounds of marijuana and the
arrest of 101 defendants. The operations, which began with seizures in
the United States, took apart drug trafficking organizations that were
expanding their reach from Mexico across the border into the United
States, as far into the country as the New York City region.
We started Operation Reciprocity, nearly a year ago, in October
1996, by identifying the command elements of the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes
organization dealing drugs in New York and Los Angeles. Working through
the multi-agency and multi district investigative approach and
attacking their communication systems, we identified how the
traffickers transported cocaine across the country in tractor trailer
loads, and returned the illicit profits to Mexico in the form of bulk
cash in the same tractor trailers, using drivers hired largely from the
Grand Rapids, Michigan area. Reciprocity resulted in 40 arrests, over
$11 Million in cash, 7.4 tons of cocaine, and 2,700 pounds of
marijuana.
Operation Limelight began in August 1996, in Imperial County,
California, and focused on the Alberto Beltran transportation and
distribution cell of the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization. Again by
targeting the command and control communications systems of this group,
we identified cross-country smuggling routes that employed tractor
trailers that hauled tons of cocaine to California, Texas,
Pennsylvania, Illinois, and New York. Limelight resulted in the seizure
of 4,012 kilograms of cocaine, 10,846 pounds of marijuana, over $7
Million in cash, and the arrest of 48 persons.
Operations Limelight and Reciprocity, like their predecessor
operations Zorro I and II, demonstrated that law enforcement can strike
major blows against these foreign drug syndicates only if we maintain
the ability to target their command and control communications. These
communications are critical to the efficient operation of their
organizations and are, at the same, time their greatest vulnerability.
This vulnerability will only continue as long as law enforcement has
access to their communications. With sophisticated communication
encryption equipment and software becoming available to these wealthy
traffickers, our access to their key communications could be severely
limited or completely eliminated in the near future if law enforcement
is not given access to encryption decoding devices and means.
Cooperation with Mexico on Counternarcotics Matters
It is DEA's intention to remain actively engaged with law
enforcement counterparts from Mexico in our mutual efforts to dismantle
the violent international drug trafficking syndicates. However, because
of a number of factors--frequent reorganizations and changes in
counterpart agencies, as well as a lack of adequate training and
security mechanisms--progress in full cooperation with counterparts
from Mexico is slow.
Since March of this year, however, some encouraging developments
have taken place, indicating a willingness on the part of the
Government of Mexico to improve their drug organizations, as well as
their overall performance in investigating the organized crime
syndicates in Mexico who exert absolute control over the flow of
cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin into the U.S. from Mexico.
After the arrest of General Gutierrez-Rebollo in February, the
Government of Mexico dismantled the National Institute for the Combat
of Drugs [INCD]. The reconstitution of the anti-drug institutions in
Mexico is an enormous task, and we are committed to assisting Attorney
General Madrazo in the formation of a quality drug law enforcement
team. We recognize the absolute necessity that professional counter-
drug units be established, if our two countries are to succeed against
the drug lords in Mexico. In place of the INCD, the Government of
Mexico established a new anti-drug unit, the Special Prosecutor's
Office of Drug Crimes, the Fiscalia Especializado para Atencion Delitos
contra La Salud, or FEADS. It was apparent that, in order to be
effective, Mexican law enforcement organizations needed to be staffed
with high-caliber, trustworthy individuals who are deeply committed to
drug control efforts. FEADS is responsible for drug law enforcement
under the office of the Mexican Attorney General, Procuraduria General
de la Republica, or PGR, and is headed by Commissioner Mariano Herran-
Salvetti, an attorney. Attorney General Madrazo and Commissioner Herran
have instituted a program of selecting and ``vetting'' employees
involved in counterdrug activities. The Mexican vetting process
involves a psychological assessment, financial background checks,
urinalysis, and polygraphs. DEA and the FBI have also worked with the
Government of Mexico, at the Mexican request, to help train individuals
who are further vetted, and who will work on more sensitive law
enforcement projects.
FEADS currently employs approximately 870 agents, of which 200 are
``vetted'' by the Mexican Government, and a portion of those have been
vetted further. Plans call for a total of 2,000 fully Mexican-vetted
employees and both the DEA and FBI are committed to assisting the
Government of Mexico reach that goal.
Under the auspices of FEADS are two specialized units, including
the Organized Crime Unit (OCU), and the bilateral Border Task Forces
(BTF's). Both specialized units report to Dr. Samuel Gonzalez-Ruiz, who
is also an attorney. These units, in which Americans and Mexicans work
in conjunction, are charged with the responsibility of gathering
intelligence and building cases against the most significant drug
traffickers in Mexico. Both organizations are comprised of cleared and
U.S.-vetted employees, although neither is fully staffed yet.
The Bilateral Task Forces, which were originally established in
Tijuana, Juarez, and Monterrey, were conceived on a framework of
frequent and continued interaction between the United States and
Mexican law enforcement officers at the operational level and a free
flow of information. The goal was to ultimately create a unit in each
city which could coordinate the joint resources of Mexico and the
United States against syndicate leaders. Unfortunately, the BTF's have
never reached their full potential as DEA, FBI, and Customs have had to
adopt a less effective operational strategy.
Because of the inexperience of the new BTF staff and inadequate
funding, they have not initiated investigations against the major
traffickers in Mexico. The only way these BTF's can become truly
effective is with law enforcement from both countries working side-by-
side on both sides of the U.S./Mexican border to build substantive,
prosecutable cases against syndicate leaders. The success of the BTF's
is vital as we seek to stem the violence and corruption attendant to
the drug trade in Mexico from spilling across the border into our
cities and towns.
Conclusion
DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and
arresting the most significant drug traffickers operating in the world
today. In order to meet this goal, it is essential that we have
trustworthy and competent agencies in Mexico working side-by-side with
us. We will continue to assist the Government of Mexico as they work to
improve their law enforcement capabilities. We believe that progress
will not occur overnight, and substantial time is necessary for real
improvements in Mexico's law enforcement organizations to bear fruit.
The ultimate test of success will be if the Arellano-Felix brothers,
the Amezcuas, and the leaders of the other Mexican drug syndicates are
brought to justice in either Mexico or the United States and sentenced
to prison terms commensurate with their crimes against society.
Thank you for your invitation to appear today before the Committee,
and I will be happy to answer any questions you might have for me.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Milford. Director Banks,
let us turn to you if we might. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF SAMUEL H. BANKS, ACTING COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS
SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
here. If I could submit my testimony in the record, I will
abbreviate my statement.
Senator Coverdell. We appreciate it, thank you.
Mr. Banks. As the primary border drug interdiction agency,
we had our second banner year this last year. Last year, we
seized over one----
Senator Coverdell. You need to pull your mic just a little
closer to you.
Mr. Banks. Last year, we seized over one million pounds of
narcotics nationally coming into the United States. On the
Southwest border specifically, it was 630,000 pounds of
narcotics including cocaine, marijuana, heroin.
I am not trying to claim success. I am not trying to say
that is the answer or that we have solved this problem. We have
a long ways to go. We have a lot more to do.
As far as cooperative efforts with Mexico, we have a number
of points of convergence. One, we have an attache office in
Mexico City. We have three other offices in Mexico. You heard
about those money laundering laws being passed. We are working
hand and glove with the Mexicans to try to work money
laundering cases to put those laws into actuality, to make them
actually happen in the street.
Another thing--and I think where it really makes the
difference and General McCaffrey talked about it--is the border
liaison mechanism and the local contacts that we have at the
actual borders. The cooperative efforts locally are probably
better than they have ever been to try to resolve disputes, to
try to handle some of the more dangerous border safety issues
that we have, and to at least achieve a certain level of
cooperation.
We have done extensive training with Mexican officials on
everything from trying to bring their industry into the battle
on narcotics to try to do money laundering training to try to
help them in terms of their container inspection and truck
inspection efforts.
In the air interdiction area, we have actually been working
with Mexico since 1991. We have two Citation aircraft, jet
aircraft, stationed in Mexico. We have 11 air crew and support
personnel down there on a rotating basis. In addition to that,
we provide Customs Citation support on a 24-hour basis at our
air units along the Southwest border, and again, it is to try
to support the government of Mexico's ability to acquire,
track, and apprehend these aircraft targets.
We have also trained over 180 Mexican officers in air
interdiction training. We have made a little bit of progress
recently in terms of ability for overflight, and ability for
refueling, on a case-by-case basis.
I will say that in our cooperative efforts with Mexico, we
are aware every day corruption is an issue. Even the Mexican
Government has more than highlighted this as a particular
problem. We take it into consideration every time we sit down
with them and try to work in an enforcement environment or to
share information.
I want to say one thing about some progress I think that
the Mexicans have made. The Mexican customs service really does
not do narcotics per se. They do revenue, they do inspections
on commercial goods. But even in that venue, the Mexicans have
tried to build technology systems to eliminate or at least to
minimize the amount of corruption that can occur.
They put in place a red light/green light system for trucks
going in. It is no longer a human decision. They have built in
a number of other systems. They do not have their officers
collecting money. The money gets collected through the banking
systems. They use industry people to actually do most of the
classification/evaluation work. They are making really strong
efforts in order to try to at least address this corruption
issue.
That does not mean that we do not need to do a lot more
work. I would say to you that we are still looking for
additional cooperation. We still think we need greater
cooperation and open communication in terms of some of the air
interdiction programs. And Mexico, I think, has been very
willing to listen and to work with us on that.
We hope to send our officers into Mexico's airports and
seaports to work with their industry to try to build security
programs, and to try to build better information systems, so
that we can have information on which to target of all of those
3.5 million trucks that cross that border.
And regarding the ocean-going containers that come out of
Mexican ports, we certainly would like to, again, be
participating in the border task forces because one thing that
we need operating on that border is actionable intelligence.
That is probably the biggest gap that we have, and obviously we
will want to continue to work with the Mexican authorities on
border safety because border violence is a major issue that we
are all contending with.
And with that, I express my appreciation to you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Banks follows:]
Prepared Statement of Samuel H. Banks
Chairmen and Members of the Committee and Caucus, it is a pleasure
to testify here today with several colleagues from other federal
agencies involved in U.S. drug control efforts. My testimony today will
focus on the smuggling threat, our cooperation with the Government of
Mexico, and issues that hamper our cooperative efforts with Mexico.
As the primary border interdiction agency, the U.S. Customs Service
faces a diverse, complex and multifaceted drug threat. For example, in
FY 1997 over 5 million containers crossed our land borders and over 4
million containers arrived by sea. Of this total, over 4 million
originated in high-risk countries. This does not even take into account
aircraft, non-commercial vessels, private vehicles, air passengers and
pedestrians. The staggering number of conveyances, cargo and passengers
arriving into the United States each year continues to present Customs
with complex targeting and interdiction challenges that we are
confronting through a variety of intelligence, investigative and
operational approaches.
The Smuggling Threat
Our intelligence and operations indicate that a variety of illicit
drugs, including cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine, are
smuggled into the United States from Mexico. Also some of these drugs,
such as marijuana and heroin, are produced in Mexico, others, such as
cocaine, originate in other countries and are then shipped through
Mexico into the United States.
The U.S. Customs Service has addressed the ever-changing and
constant threat that narcotics smugglers from Mexico and elsewhere
impose on our nation by wedding technology and diversified narcotics
examination procedures within the air, land and sea ports of entry to
adversely impact narcotics smuggling organizations. This is coupled
with both reactive and proactive investigative activity aimed at
significantly disrupting drug smuggling organizations' command and
control centers and money laundering systems.
Since the inception of U.S. Customs layered enforcement
examinations in both the passenger and commercial cargo environment,
Customs has had a dramatic effect on smuggling organizations. Along the
Southwest Border, the total amount of cocaine, marijuana, and heroin
seized in Fiscal Year 1997 surpassed 630,000 pounds, a 9 percent
increase over Fiscal Year 1996 seizure levels. Additionally, in the
Southwest Border Commercial Cargo Environment, Customs seizures of
cocaine and marijuana increased for the fourth straight year. Customs
made 61 cargo-related narcotics seizures, totaling over 42,000 pounds,
a 7 percent increase over Fiscal Year 1996 levels.
While we are proud of the success of our domestic counterdrug
efforts--which range from enforcement initiatives such as Operation
Hard Line to private sector cooperation through programs such as the
Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition--the focus of my testimony today is
on our cooperative efforts with Mexico.
Cooperation with Mexico
Cooperative efforts with Mexico take place at all levels of
government from the U.S.-Mexico High-Level Contact Group to individual
agents and inspectors in the field.
The High-Level Contact Group
The U.S.-Mexico High-Level Contact Group (HLCG) was formed
approximately 18 months ago by President Clinton and Mexican President
Zedillo to invigorate the U.S.-Mexico partnership in the battle against
narcotics. The Treasury Department is represented at the HLCG by Under
Secretary for Enforcement Raymond W. Kelly.
The most recent meeting of the HLCG was held on October 23-24,
1997, in Washington, D.C. The primary topic of this meeting was the
preparation of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Drug Control Strategy, a
follow-up to last year's Binational Threat Assessment. In addition to
the strategy, meeting topics also included: demand reduction, chemical
diversion, money laundering, interdiction, and criminal organizations.
One of the developments at the meeting was Customs commitment to name a
permanent representative to the Chemical Control Working Group, a
subgroup of the HLCG.
U.S. Customs Cooperation with Mexico
U.S. Customs has been a long-time proponent of international
cooperative counterdrug efforts. Customs has maintained an attache at
the Embassy in Mexico City for more than 30 years and signed a Customs
Mutual Assistance Agreement with Mexico in 1976. We also have Customs
representatives working in other major Mexican cities. These U.S.
Customs personnel conduct their own investigations and also work with
Mexican Government officials on issues of mutual concern. In so doing,
Customs personnel work not only with Mexican Customs, but also with
personnel from the Attorney General's Office (PGR) on aviation issues,
the Mexican Defense Ministry on interdiction issues, and the Finance
Ministry (Hacienda) on anti-money laundering efforts.
Customs-to-Customs Cooperation
While Mexican Customs lacks the authority to deal with most
narcotics issues, U.S. Customs has increased its working relationship
with Mexican Customs in the last few years on other issues. The Border
Liaison Mechanism and the recently inaugurated Forum Fronterizo are
praiseworthy representations of Mexico's commitment to the developing
accord between U.S. and Mexican Customs. Both groups have been
developed to build a binational network among elected officials and
business, media, and academic leaders from both sides of the
international border.
Also at several cities along the border, the Mexican Consulate
office has been very proactive in addressing mutual concerns. An
example of this is the assignment of a full-time consular
representative to the San Ysidro border crossing within the past year.
In addition to the coordination of hours of operation and other
commercial-related activities, most Arizona ports have established
mutual alert systems between themselves and their Mexican counterparts.
For example, in Nogales an alarm system was jointly developed whereby
U.S. Customs officials will utilize the alarm system to alert Mexican
Customs officials of a high-speed chase approaching the port of entry.
At Douglas, Mexican and U.S. Customs monitor a radio frequency that
allows instant communication when problems arise.
While we are not yet at the point to declare totally open
communication with Mexico in the areas of narcotics intelligence and
operational strategies, the local relationship is incrementally
discovering areas in which to work together.
Enforcement Training in Mexico
From 1994 through 1997, Customs held counterdrug training and
assistance programs for our Mexican counterparts on the Carrier
Initiative Program, Cargo Container Inspection, a Train-the-Trainer
Workshop, and, in conjunction with the Criminal Investigation Division
of the IRS, Money Laundering.
Cooperation with Aircraft Surveillance
Customs is engaged in a cooperative effort with the Government of
Mexico to use aircraft to interdict the flow of cocaine through Mexico.
This program has developed significantly since 1990. In 1991, Customs
began interceptor/tracker training operations in Mexico. Since that
time, Customs has provided air interdiction training, both in the U.S.
and in Mexico, to over 180 Mexican officers. Two Customs Citations and
11 aircrew and support personnel are normally in-country at any given
time. Operations in Mexico are also supported by Customs Citations on
24-hour alert at Air branches and units along the Southwestern Border.
This ongoing cooperative US/GOM program has resulted in a notable
improvement in the Government of Mexico's ability to acquire, track and
apprehend suspect aircraft targets.
Because of mission priorities which are based on national policies,
60 percent of U.S. Customs (USCS) P-3 AEW sorties have been dedicated
to Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South for Source Zone
operations in recent months. The remaining 40 percent is divided
between the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) for
Arrival Zone operations and JIATF-East for Transit Zone operations.
Missions to support Mexico are derived from this 40 percent.
Mexico does derive a benefit from the P-3 AEW sorties devoted to
the DAICC, which are generally flown along the southwest border. The P-
3 AEW radar range allows the crew to detect suspect aircraft well into
Mexican airspace. Two additional Customs P-3 AEWs will be available for
counterdrug operations in mid to late 1999.
The Government of Mexico (GOM) has recently agreed to three U.S.
Government proposals which will facilitate more responsive support to
the Government of Mexico needs. U.S. proposals for routine P-3 AEW
overflight will be approved by the Government of Mexico on a quarterly
vice monthly basis. In exceptional situations the Government of Mexico
will approve refueling stops and overnight stays on a case-by-case
basis for intelligence-cued P-3 operations over Mexico. The Government
of Mexico will also respond within 24 hours to requests for P-3
overflight based on intelligence-cued scenarios.
While cooperation has improved, Customs continues to identify areas
where we can enhance coordination.
Money Laundering
In addition to interdicting drugs, Customs also focuses on seizing
drug traffickers' profits.
Operation Choza Rica, launched by Customs Special Agents in
McAllen, Texas uncovered and subsequently dismantled a major Mexican
money laundering network along the Southwest border. This intricate web
involved Mexican Casas de Cambio and established banks in the United
States and Switzerland. In a series of criminal indictments, managing
directors of several major Mexican Casas de Cambio and U.S. Banks to
include American Express Bank International, First City Bank, Lone Star
National Bank, and International Bank of Commerce were indicted for
laundering money for the Juan Garcia-Abrego cocaine smuggling
organization. In excess of 60 million dollars in cash and other assets
were seized and forfeited in this investigation. AEBI forfeited 44
million dollars to the Treasury Forfeiture Fund representing the
largest forfeiture ever by a domestic corporation.
Mexico, as well as a large number of other countries, is carrying
out actions to prevent, detect and combat money laundering, which
include: updating its legal framework, coordination between several
government agencies, exchange of information and documentation with
other countries, pursuant to International Treaties, carrying out joint
coordinated investigations, regulating financial entities regarding
suspicious and outstanding currency transactions, creation of a
Financial Information Unit (FIU), and imparting training and technical
expertise to personnel in charge of preventing, detecting, and
combating money laundering transactions.
On April 29, 1996, the Mexican legislature added Article 400 Bis
to the Criminal Code, establishing for the first time the criminal
offense of money laundering, which became effective on May 14, 1996,
and is denominated as ``Transactions with resources from illicit
origins.''
Constraints on Cooperation
Although cooperation with Mexico is increasing, two issues continue
to constrain our cooperative efforts: concerns about corruption of
Mexican officials and the safety of our agents and other personnel.
The Question of Corruption
In order to be effective and carry out our mission, the U.S.
Customs Service must continue to deal with Mexican Customs and other
authorities. These interactions, however, historically have been
constrained by concerns over corruption.
In recent months, the Government of Mexico has arrested high-
ranking military officials, aviation personnel, and other law
enforcement officials on narcotics charges. While these arrests
demonstrate a commitment by the Government of Mexico to ensure the
integrity of Mexican law enforcement personnel, they also confirm our
need to be circumspect in our dealings with Mexico. Given this level of
concern, our agents must make judgments about the nature and caliber of
the information they can share and the persons with whom they can share
it. The recent arrests, however, are encouraging and our efforts at
cooperation have improved.
Agent Safety
Border safety is a major concern. We want our officers to operate
in as secure an environment as we can create.
Chairmen and Members of the Committee and the Caucus, this
concludes my statement. I will be glad to respond to any questions you
may have.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Director. Let me turn to
you, Mr.--did I pronounce that correctly? Ka-near?
Mr. Kneir. Kneir.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS KNEIR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG BRANCH, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION.
Mr. Kneir. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my entire
statement be submitted for the record, and----
Senator Coverdell. It will.
Mr. Kneir. Since the late hour and the vote coming up, I
will make my comments brief.
Mexican drug organizations are among the most significant
crime threats facing the United States today. In addition to
importing illegal drugs, these criminal enterprises are
responsible for a variety of violent crimes, corruption of
public officials, and alien smuggling.
The activities of the Mexican drug trafficking
organizations affect a myriad of crime problems in virtually
every region of the United States. The unilateral efforts of
the United States law enforcement agencies do not effectively
address the crime problem. In order to be effective, we must
address this organized criminal threat in partnership with the
government of Mexico and Mexican law enforcement.
I am pleased to report that we have made much progress in
this area and we have many reasons to be optimistic about the
future between U.S. and Mexican cooperative efforts.
In the past year, the government of Mexico passed
constitutional amendments and laws against organized crime and
money laundering as well as enacted legislative authority to
conduct legal wiretaps in Mexico. These new laws will give the
Mexican law enforcement the tools they need to address
sophisticated criminal enterprises much as we have seen in this
country.
An excellent example of the increased cooperation with law
enforcement agencies in Mexico is illustrated in an
investigation in our San Diego office--Operation Logan Sweep.
This targeted criminal activity of the Logan Street Gang, a San
Diego, California, gang.
It was determined through that investigation that the
Arellano-Felix organization was using members of the gang to
distribute cocaine and marijuana and act as enforcers. This
investigation resulted in the indictment of numerous gang
members to include Ramon Arellano-Felix, the most violent of
the Arellano brothers.
Due to his extreme violent nature and its impact on the
American public, Ramon Arellano-Felix was announced as a Top 10
FBI fugitive. I might add that the cooperative effort of the
Mexican law enforcement in this case was essential.
The government of Mexico has also acted swiftly in the
apprehension of criminals. In July 1997, I would like to talk
about--a key witness of DEA being kidnapped at his business in
McAllen, Texas. The witnesses stated that individuals dressed
in Mexican police officers' garb entered the business and
removed a Mr. Salinas at gunpoint. Three days later, Salinas'
body was found in Mexico.
In August 1997, a criminal complaint was filed against four
individuals for kidnapping. Again, this was a good cooperative
effort with Mexican law enforcement to bring this case to a
resolution. Two of those individuals have been arrested.
Also, the assistance of Mexican law enforcement was
instrumental in a recent armored car robbery that the FBI
investigated out of Jacksonville, Florida. Over $18 million was
taken. Mexican authorities conducted a search warrant near
Mexico City for us. We took that information and did a search
warrant in the United States, and recovered $18.7 million of
that money.
I have talked to our legal attache in Mexico City and he
believes that the spirit of cooperation with our Mexican law
enforcement could not be better. Again, what we have talked
about here today is, are we on the upswing with cooperation or
are we moving backward?
Certainly, the arrest of the Mexican Drug Czar last
February was certainly a very dark moment. But since that time,
through the vetting process, I believe that we have now begun
to work with the vetted units, and really we see a brighter
day. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kneir follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas J. Kneir
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee and Caucus, good afternoon.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to present the FBI's views
regarding U.S.-Mexican cooperation on counter-narcotics efforts. I am
Thomas J. Kneir, FBI Deputy Assistant Director for Organized Crime and
Drug Matters.
Mexican drug trafficking organizations are among the most
significant crime threats facing the United States today. In addition
to importing the majority of cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine and a
growing portion of the heroin entering the United States, these
criminal enterprises are responsible for a variety of violent crimes,
the corruption of public officials, and alien smuggling. The activities
of Mexican drug trafficking organizations effect a myriad of crime
problems in virtually every region of the U.S.
The unilateral efforts of United States law enforcement agencies do
not effectively address the crime problems stemming from Mexican drug
trafficking organizations. In order to be effective, we must address
this organized criminal threat in partnership with the Government of
Mexico and Mexican law enforcement. I am pleased to report that we have
made much progress in this area and we have many reasons to be
optimistic about future U.S. and Mexican cooperative efforts. However,
I must also state that a number of obstacles remain and there should be
no doubt in anyone's mind that we still face challenges toward
achieving the level of cooperation needed to successfully address the
crime threat attributed to Mexican drug criminal enterprises.
First, I would like to highlight some of the major advances that
the Government of Mexico has made in addressing the pervasive crime
problems generated by drug cartels. In the past year, the Government of
Mexico promoted constitutional amendments and laws against organized
crime and money laundering, as well as, enacted legislative authority
to conduct legal wiretaps in Mexico. The restructuring of the attorney
general's office, known as the Procuraduria General de la Republica
(PGR), is progressing and the Mexican Government is promoting greater
coordination between Federal, State and municipal law enforcement
organizations.
One example that highlights the increased cooperation that the FBI
has experienced with law enforcement agencies in Mexico as illustrated
by an investigation in our San Diego office. ``Operation Logan Sweep,''
was initiated in February, 1996, and targeted the criminal activities
of a violent San Diego gang known as the Logan Street Gang. During the
course of this investigation, it was determined that the Arellano Felix
organization was using members of the Logan Street Gang to distribute
cocaine and marijuana and act as ``enforcers'' in the furtherance of
their drug trafficking organization. This investigation resulted in the
indictment of numerous gang members to include Ramon Arrellano Felix
the most violent brother. Due to his extreme violent nature and it's
impact on the American public, Ramon Arellano Felix was announced as an
FBI top 10 fugitive.
The significance of the case is that it was accomplished by a joint
Federal, State and local task force with the assistance of Mexican law
enforcement. The cooperation of Mexican law enforcement proved to be
invaluable to this investigation, in that they assisted the
identification and subsequent relocation of several critical
cooperating witnesses.
The Government of Mexico has also acted swiftly in the apprehension
of criminals who have a nexus to U.S. investigations. For example, in
July 1997, Hector Salinas-Guerra, a local San Antonio businessman who
was key witness in a DEA case, was kidnaped from his business in
McAllen, Texas, near the Mexican border. Witnesses stated that at least
three armed individuals dressed as Mexican police officers entered the
business and took Mr. Salinas out at gunpoint. Three days later,
Salinas' body was found in Mexico. The seven defendants that Mr.
Salinas was to testify against were acquitted and released. In august
1997 a criminal complaint was filed charging four individuals with
kidnaping violating title 18 U.S. Code, section 1201. Two of these
individuals have been identified, located and arrested by the Mexican
authorities, while the others remain at large. Efforts on the part of
Mexican law enforcement in this matter has been conducive in bringing
these individuals to justice and is another positive example of the
cooperation that the FBI enjoys with our Mexican law enforcement
counterparts.
The assistance of Mexican law enforcement was also instrumental in
the recent 18.8 million dollar armored car robbery investigation in
Jacksonville, Florida. At the request of the U.S., the Mexican
authorities executed a search warrant in a suburb of Mexico city
believed to be the hideout of the subject, Philip Noel Johnson, a vault
guard for the Loomis-Fargo Corporation. Johnson fled to Mexico after
committing the robbery and kidnaping an employee of the company. The
search recovered a money order receipt for a mini-storage garage
located in North Carolina. Based on this information, a subsequent
search warrant was executed at the mini-storage garage and 18.7 million
dollars was recovered. Johnson was later arrested while attempting to
enter the U.S. through the southwest border.
Progress has also been made in the area of training. To date
approximately 95 Mexican Federal agents and prosecutors of their newly
formed organized crime unit have completed the FBI/DEA investigative
analysis course, a four-week long training seminar held at the Xerox
Training Center near Washington, DC. These individuals were fully
vetted prior to receiving the training, which is designed to enhance
their investigative and technical skills, familiarize them with
Mexico's new organized crime law, and solidify their working-
relationship with their U.S. Counterparts. Indications are that this
venture has been mutually beneficial for the U.S. law enforcement and
Mexico. Within the past year, a total of over 700 Mexican law
enforcement officers have received training from or sponsored by the
FBI, including specialized schools given in Mexico, elsewhere and at
Quantico through the FBI National Academy.
Other examples of visible increases in cooperation include several
recent requests from the Government of Mexico for the assistance of FBI
evidence response teams to process crime scenes and provide guidance in
forensic science. On one such occasion, members of an FBI evidence
response team were deployed to process the crime scene in the April,
1997, murder of two Mexican PGR agents in Mexico City. In June, 1997,
we also deployed an evidence response team at the request of the
Government of Mexico to identify the body of drug kingpin Amado Carillo
Fuentes, who died during plastic surgery.
The FBI legal attache in Mexico considers the level of liaison and
cooperation with Mexican law enforcement to be at an all time high. It
is the most cooperation and the best attitude he has ever seen. This
assessment applies not only to the presidential staff and the Mexican
federal judicial police but also to Mexican state and local law
enforcement agencies.
Although there have been many positive developments in U.S. law
enforcement's working relationship with our Mexican counterparts,
public and law enforcement corruption in Mexico remains a serious
problem. This is a problem that is openly acknowledged at the highest
levels of Mexico's government. The highly publicized dismissal and
arrest of Mexico's top anti-drug official, General Jesus Gutierrez
Rebollo, this past February, graphically illustrates the problem.
Gutierrez is alleged to have been closely associated with the Amado
Carrillo Fuentes drug trafficking organization and provided them with
protection in exchange for money and other bribes.
The Government of Mexico is taking steps to address the corruption
problem. In April, 1997, Mexican Government abolished the National
Institute To Combat Drugs (INCD). The INCD was their main federal anti-
drug agency and was roughly equivalent to the DEA in the United States.
A number of former INCD agents have been transferred to the Attorney
General's new Organized Crime Unit. Members of the newly formed
Organized Crime Unit are polygraphed to ensure that they are not
working for drug traffickers.
It is important to note that corruption exists on both sides of the
border. Mexican drug trafficking organizations engage in concerted
efforts to corrupt and recruit public and law enforcement officials not
only in Mexico but in the United States as well. Recognizing this, the
FBI initiated its southwest border public corruption initiative in 1991
to prevent and eliminate corruption among U.S. Federal, State and local
law enforcement along the southwest border.
The FBI's southwest border public corruption initiative has had an
impact on law enforcement corruption along the southwest border. Since
1991, a total of sixteen Federal, one government official and seventeen
State and local law enforcement officials have been convicted through
FBI investigations.
Another important aspect of U.S.-Mexican law enforcement
cooperation which has still not come to fruition is the implementation
of bilateral task forces located in the border cities of Tijuana,
Juarez and Monterrey. Once staffed with fully vetted Mexican personnel,
it was envisioned that these bilateral task forces would conduct
investigations based on timely intelligence from other law enforcement
entities to include FBI and DEA field offices located along the
southwest border. These task forces would also collect and disseminate
criminal intelligence.
However, these task forces are not fully functional at this time as
they are being restaffed with vetted Mexican officers. Further, the
Mexican Government has promised to adequately fund the task forces.
In conclusion, there have been some significant successes and
noteworthy progress in U.S.-Mexican cooperation on counter-narcotics
efforts. However, many challenges remain and the concerted, joint
efforts and resources of both the U.S. and Mexican Governments are
needed to address these challenges.
Mr. Chairman, at this time I would be happy to answer any
questions.
Senator Coverdell. I appreciate the testimony of each. And
as you have all requested, your full statements will be entered
into the record. I am going to turn to Senator Grassley for the
first round of questions and we will again keep this limit of 5
minutes in place.
Senator Grassley?
Senator Grassley. Yes. My questions, unless otherwise
indicated, would be to all of you.
First question--Mexico recently received 70 helicopters
from the United States for use by the Mexican military. The
original justification for those aircraft as far as I
understand was to help in air interdiction, obviously.
But now, Mexican officials are saying that the major
smuggling threat is land or maritime, especially in commercial
vehicles and cargo.
In your evaluation, has this shift occurred? And if that
shift has occurred, then what is the justification for
providing the helicopters? What are those helicopters being
used for today if not air interdiction? And what measures are
being taken to deal with a maritime threat--in other words,
generally, what is our strategy?
First, are the facts correct?
Mr. Milford. Well, as far as the facts, as far as the
smuggling, yes, you are absolutely correct, Senator. There is
no question today. And this is not only into Mexico, but also
into South Florida and also over into the Caribbean.
Senator Grassley. So then----
Mr. Milford. The maritime smuggling of drugs is the primary
means of moving drugs from Colombia.
Senator Grassley. So have we wasted our money in giving the
7 helicopters--70 helicopters?
Mr. Milford. I would not think so. I think if we moved into
the--into just looking at the maritime, they would move back to
the air interdiction. One of the--early on, one of the biggest
problems for us was the movement of aircraft into the central
part of Mexico where we could not respond.
Senator Grassley. Well, then, we--if the strategy has
changed, or I mean if their tactics have changed, to what
extent have we changed our tactics then to meet the maritime
method of transportation?
Mr. Milford. Well, I think, again, we are meeting those
with a lot of the deployments in the Caribbean and moving that
way--hopefully. We are basing a lot of our activity, and I will
defer to Mr. Banks in a minute here, but we are also looking at
intelligence and at intelligence-based activities, not only
with the air interdiction but the sea efforts, and also
movement over the border.
So we really have to--base most of our operations today on
intelligence-based activities, not only through Mexico, but
through the entire quarter.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Banks, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Banks. Yes, if I could, Mr. Chairman.
As far as the change, the shifting of the smuggling
patterns, we do not necessarily think the entire air
interdiction problem is solved. But it does appear that they
are bringing drugs, especially cocaine, across the border from
Guatemala into Mexico. It appears that there are internal
flights within Mexico to move the drugs up to the border.
We are seeing at least certain groupings of landing areas
in suspect areas, so we still think that there is a legitimate
need for an air interdiction program within Mexico.
As far as the movement into maritime, there is no question
that they are pursuing that. There is enough intelligence out
there to show that.
One of the things that we are doing, in conjunction with
the Drug Enforcement Administration, is we are going down into
Mexico to their seaports to go in and try to work with the
ocean carriers, to try to work with the ports' authorities, and
to try to work with the exporters and the shippers and the
forwarders (1) in order to buildup a better security system for
the transiting, so that there is less opportunity to conceal
drugs within those containers and on board those conveyances;
and (2) we try to design with them better security processes so
that there is less opportunity to conceal drugs.
We also try to build sources of information as we work with
DEA, especially within those areas, from the people that are
involved in that transportation industry. So we are indeed
trying to at least meet the shift if not be ahead of the curve.
Senator Grassley. Mr. Milford, on another point--and it is
improper to talk about active cases so I am not doing that.
But as an example, can you highlight the level and type of
cooperation your agency received from the Mexican Government in
your efforts to track the whereabouts and activities of Amado
Carrillo Fuentes?
Mr. Milford. Yes, I can. There was a lot of activity over
the past year, leading up to the July 4th demise of Mr.
Carrillo Fuentes.
There was a lot of pressure, both on this side of the
border as far as passing information and leads down into
Mexico. That information was utilized by the Mexicans, the
Mexican military.
Senator Grassley. Was it accurate and timely?
Mr. Milford. Yes, sir, it was. It was passed to the
Mexicans and also the Mexican Government themselves really
heightened their operations against Amado Carrillo Fuentes.
That led Amado--because of the pressure--to look for other
avenues and places to really--to move his activities. And what
we saw--and again we were working in coordination with the
Mexican authorities and then finally with the Chilean
authorities--we saw him set up a base of operations.
We did not locate him directly but we saw his people move
their--his base of operations down to Santiago, Chile. That was
being investigated at the time of his death and we fully
anticipated that Mr. Carrillo Fuentes was moving himself and
his family down to that location under a cover of false
identification which he built and was trying to build when he
was--passed away as a result of the plastic surgery.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Senator. Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. Out of curiosity, Mr. Milford, was his
passing helped?
Mr. Milford. I do not see any--I do not have any
information to believe it was helped. I think it was helped----
Senator Biden. Is the doctor still alive?
Mr. Milford. I am not sure. We really do not know.
Senator Biden. If he is, it probably was. I just--that is
just a point of curiosity. Mr. Banks, several years ago, I had
a--a group come up the port of Wilmington, Delaware to
demonstrate a new technology that was--looked like what when we
were kids you would call a ray gun. It was a gun. You could
literally aim it. It was a laser would go through a container,
identifying holes or gaps or changes in consistency in the
cargo.
Suppose that we purchase a whole lot of those--there is
very few of them? How many--first of all, is that equipment
useful for you in your efforts?
Mr. Banks. Absolutely, sir. It is very useful.
Senator Biden. How much of that equipment do you have at
the border?
Mr. Banks. We have an incredible array of technology. The
first thing that I would say to you is that we have large scale
X-ray systems. It is a low X-ray because we have to put
foodstuffs through it. We even get aliens smuggled in through
these trucks.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Banks. And you have to keep the footprint fairly small
within the import lot areas that we are dealing with.
As the General said, we have two 18-wheeler X-rays in
California.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Banks. We also have another one up now in Pharr Texas.
Senator Biden. How many do you need?
Mr. Banks. We would like one at every single crossing
that----
Senator Biden. I am serious. I am not being facetious
because what we hear--you know, I mean, I have been frustrated
by this for the last 6 years.
We have a lot of technology that is available, and we even
set up, as you well know and DEA knows, we set up a mechanism
with former Secretary of Defense Cohen when he was a Senator
here. He and I and others worked on using military applications
in technologies, in research that was available in this drug
war, some of which was very promising, some of it classified.
The bottom line is I do not think you have gotten the money
to do what--let me put it this way. It is not--we do not have
to invent any new technology to have these machines. I mean,
the machines exist that--what we were just talking about for
the 18-wheelers.
You would need another--another 50 of them, do not you?
Mr. Banks. Well, we could put them to good use, no
question.
Senator Biden. No, I am not being facetious now. I am being
serious.
Mr. Banks. I would like at least one at every crossing
where we get commercial traffic.
Senator Biden. And how many crossings?
Mr. Banks. I would also like the higher energy X-rays at
every seaport where we get these ocean-going containers, at
least one.
Senator Biden. Give me an example--I mean, give me an
estimate of how many crossings we are talking about.
Mr. Banks. We have 39 crossings along that Southwest
border.
Senator Biden. Now, do you know the cost of one of these
machines?
Mr. Banks. Well, it depends which one it is.
Senator Biden. The best one.
Mr. Banks. There are different ones for different purposes.
The large-scale X-ray is about $2.5 million.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Banks. There is a mobile truck X-ray that gives us
capacity to actually move it to where the threat is.
Senator Biden. Right.
Mr. Banks. And that is about $1.9 million.
Senator Biden. So, $2.5 million. You are talking $100
million could get you all that you needed in terms of this X-
ray machinery?
Senator Coverdell. That is right.
Senator Biden. Correct?
I would propose that Senator Coverdell and I and others try
to get you that money, just try to appropriate that money. I
think if we force our colleagues to focus on this--every one of
our colleagues talks about how horrible it is and all this is
coming across the border.
But, I mean, sometimes you have got to put your money where
your mouth is.
But you can use it--you have no doubt that you can use it
with efficacy and quickly, correct?
Mr. Banks. Yes, sir. However, it is not that easy to put up
quickly.
Senator Biden. When I say quickly, I mean assuming the
money were appropriated, what timeframe do you need to cover
all of these crossings?
Mr. Banks. I would actually have to talk to the contractors
to go that far. It will take over 3 years to complete
installation of all eight truck X-ray systems. Once we get
started, of course, it gets easier.
One of the things I want to mention on this is General
McCaffrey and the Drug Czar's office and the Department of
Defense have been instrumental in making this happen.
Senator Biden. Oh, I know that. McCaffrey has been pushing
hard for it.
Last question--my time is up. New York Times earlier this
year reported--and this is for Mr. Milford, Mr. Kneir, and
anyone else who wants to take a crack at it--reported that the
administration had been considering proposing a freeze on the
assets of commercial front ventures of the Mexican traffickers.
Similar sanctions, if I remember correctly, were imposed on
about 100 companies linked to Colombian cartels in 1995. To the
best of my knowledge, no such action has been taken yet. Is it
still under review, or do you--can anyone comment on it? Yes,
Mr. Milford?
Mr. Milford. I can comment on it, Senator. It--first of
all, it was a tremendous success, as you well know, in
Colombia. We were able to identify those organizations and
companies over many years of investigation.
We, in a multi-agency type approach with Customs, the FBI,
and everybody else at the State Department, are working to
identify the companies that are held by these people. I must
say that the investigation of Amado Carrillo Fuentes and his
activities, not only in Mexico but in Chile, have resulted in
the seizure of about $56 million in Mexico that has been
frozen.
That information was then--and information from that
seizure--was then used to seize on two different seizures, one
of $26 and one of $24 million--money in two different New York
bank accounts. We are moving in other areas and looking for
other bank accounts, not only with Amado but the other AC--the
other traffickers. And I think it is a--it is a way to go, you
are absolutely right, and we should continue it.
Senator Biden. One of the few things that I ever initiated
here that had some real impact was the asset forfeiture
legislation back in--because I found a very simple proposition
talking to all you experts over the years. Nothing has
changed--follow the money.
That you are always going to have in these hydra-headed
monsters a new leader that is going to rise to the top. But
they need money. And if you can freeze the assets and you can
seize the assets, it is a big asset--no pun intended.
Senator Coverdell. Senator, if I could----
Senator Biden. I would hope that the administration is
considering pursuing with even greater vigor the companies that
we can--that you can identify.
Mr. Milford. If I may add, Senator, one of our biggest
concerns now is the movement of bulk cash down through not only
into Mexico via the same cargo that is--that they move the
drugs up, but also into Colombia.
In that Operation Reciprocity, we have confirmed that $100
million was moved over a period of about a year and a half from
one arm of a transportation group. It was a trucking company
out of Battle Creek, Michigan that moved $100 million just out
of that one operation in the Amado Carrillo Fuentes
organization.
Senator Biden. Again, my time is up. I appreciate your
efforts and I am going to see--and I am sure Senator Coverdell
agrees--we will see what we can do at least in embarrassing
people to vote against coming up with the money because this is
a national security issue.
Senator Coverdell. That and we want to use it. Senator
Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. 11 minutes.
Senator Sessions. Let me ask you this, perhaps all of you.
I know you are working hard on this. Everybody is putting a
positive spin on this--the situation with Mexico. But I am
having a difficult time following that.
Would you not agree that over the last 6 to 8 years, there
has been a major shift in the importation of drugs into the
United States through Mexico? And that has to be a failure,
would it not?
It was going from Colombia to Miami. Now it is going
through Mexico. That is a major failure.
One of the things that indicates a serious belief by a
nation that they are going to do something about drugs is
whether they will extradite citizens who are charged with
serious drug offenses?
Let me ask you--has any Mexican citizen been extradited in
the last 4 years to your knowledge?
Senator Coverdell. Can I add to that?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Senator Coverdell. This--this area is one of contradiction,
and it is something we ought to clear up so that both the
Congress and the administration are working off the same
number.
I have note that there are 90 drug-related provisional
arrest warrants outstanding in Mexico from the United States,
and only three Mexicans have been arrested and none extradited.
Now Senator Feinstein--and I wish she could be here--takes
exception with this data.
We ought to be able to at least clear it up but I will let
you all respond to the Senator from Alabama.
Mr. Milford. Senator, first of all, there is optimism but
there--but of course, there is a lot, again, as I mentioned at
the closing of my statement.
We are in the process phase right now. There has been a lot
of concern over making sure that we have a unit in Mexico that
we can actually work with like we worked with law enforcement
units in the United States.
Senator Sessions. You mean there is not a unit in Mexico
that United States law enforcement can even work with to get
somebody extradited?
Mr. Milford. I think today there is. There--we have some
leaders in place. Attorney General Madrazo has been very
positive in putting leaders in place. There are DEA--our DEA
office in Mexico has developed a relationship with several key
members of the organizations that are responsible for drug
enforcement--yes, we have that.
As far as the----
Senator Sessions. Well, you do not have anybody extradited
and have not had anybody for all practical purposes.
But when I was a United States Attorney, we indicted a
major cartel member in Mexico. He was reportedly involved in
the Kiki Camarena matter. Within days of the time my Assistant
United States Attorney was to go to Mexico to oversee the
extradition, he, quote, escaped, and I am not aware of anyone
being extradited, certainly not from Colombia.
And so we have got a problem there. I do not think we can
put a very good spin on that.
They have a money laundering statute, but a statue is not
worth much unless it is utilized. They do not have a forfeiture
statute in Mexico, do they--forfeituring of assets? I am not
aware that they do.
Mr. Milford. I do not, sir.
Senator Sessions. And I do not believe that very much has
been done with the money laundering statute. Colombia is
bragging about having a forfeiture in a money laundering
statute. What good is it if you do not use it? So that is a
matter of concern to me.
Let me ask you this, Mr. Milford, I was just looking over
the record of prosecutions by this Department of Justice of
which you are a part. And even though the prosecutions are up
about 12 or so percent, our cocaine, powder cocaine, cases, as
it is normally imported into the country. Is that not correct?
Mr. Milford. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Have actually been down over the last 5
years. What is happening? Why are the prosecutions down, the
number of personnel up, the amount we are spending up, the
prices are plummeting on drugs. Our use is up by teenagers
dramatically. We have had an utter failure in the last number
of years, and to sit around here and talk about Mexico might be
getting better and might do something in the future, that has
been said for the last half a dozen decades. That is over a
decade we have talked about that.
Do you have any insight into what we can do?
Mr. Milford. Sir, number one, as far as the prosecutions, I
am not going to address that. What I will address is the
investigative expertise and the type of programs that we have
in place.
We are working national coordinated cases with not only the
Federal Government, but the State and local governments. We
have investigations that have identified the command and
control, not only in Miami but along the Southwest border. What
we have been doing as Federal investigative agencies--because
of our lack of ability to work within Mexico over the past
several years, is work from the border inward.
We are--we have had some significant strides in, for
example, in the----
Senator Sessions. How can you do that if----
Mr. Milford. Operation Reciprocity and the Operation
Limelight. We have done those. There have been vigorous
prosecutions and indictments who we can touch in the United
States.
What we have realized over working with Colombia and some
of the other countries is that most of the investigations and
most of the successes we have have resulted from investigations
initiated within the United States, and then passing the
information to our counterparts in other countries. It was
tremendously successful in Colombia, where we went after the
cartel--the Cali members, and that was successful.
What we are trying to do and hopefully trying to do----
Senator Sessions. The cartels are still operating and that
is not a successful operation. We give Mexico 70 helicopters.
We might as well have spent that money on these X-ray machines,
it seems to me. My view is if we are going to give a country
helicopters, let us give it to a country that does not send us
dope. Let us send it to a country that does not do that and
does enforce the law.
And with regard to Mr. Carrillo Fuentes, his death down
there--is there any indication that has reduced the flow of
drugs into the United States?
Mr. Milford. No.
Senator Coverdell. Let me do this, Senator Sessions. I--I
am going to suggest that if I can ask the panel, these two
Senators need to vote, and I would like to keep you impaneled
for about another 5 minutes. I have a question or two.
I would think you would be finished within 15 minutes, but
we do need to go over there to vote and return and then we
would have assembled a new panel.
If you are under a--any of you are under a schedule that
does not allow you to wait another 15 minutes, we would
certainly understand. You are certainly at leave to go if you
need to. Otherwise, I am going to ask you to hold right where
you are. [Recess]
Senator Coverdell. All right, I thank the panel for its
indulgence.
I think I will be pretty close to keeping my promise to
having you out of here.
I think that the issue that seems to develop from time to
time--Senator Sessions' inquiry raised it, Senator Feinstein
and others from time to time. We are caught in the dilemma of
seeking cooperation in a very tense environment. And the
President of Mexico took some umbrage with my and Senator
Feinstein's statements.
But I, through emissaries, have said you need to read the
entire report which is--there are some positive things
happening and there are some things that are not.
We are going to--we are just months away from being in a
very difficult environment. I think none of us on either side
of the border can accept silence, and not talking about our
problems openly to the people of both of our countries. We are
not going to get anywhere doing that.
And in the long run, even though it might have a temporary
ameliorating effect, in the long run it will have a devastating
effect. And I think you see that being expressed here.
My specific question deals with the coordination. I would
like each of you to comment. Do you feel today that the State
Department, DEA, Customs, FBI, are adequately coordinating and
I would like each of you to tell me who do you view as the lead
coordinating agency in terms of measuring the assets that we
have to bring to bear here and coordinating their utility?
I will just start with you, Mr. Kneir.
Mr. Kneir. I think right now the coordination among the
Federal law enforcement agencies is probably as good as it has
ever been, especially with DEA, FBI, and U.S. Customs. We truly
have a coordinated effort and utilize each other's intelligence
and utilize co-location in HIDTAs that were elaborated along
the Southwest border.
The Department of Justice is what we look to for the
guidance for drug matters in the United States.
Senator Coverdell. The Justice Department?
Mr. Kneir. Yes.
Senator Coverdell. Do you all meet regularly in a
coordinated task force?
Mr. Kneir. Yes, we do.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. I would also say that I think the level of
cooperation between the U.S. federal law enforcement agencies
is at an all-time high. I would add not only DEA and the FBI, I
would also add the Coast Guard and the Immigration Service/
Border Patrol.
The interdiction work that we do with the Coast Guard--it
is virtually seamless in terms of how some of it happens. Tom
Constantine and I, along with Mr. Milford--almost 2 days ago--
--
Mr. Milford. Two days ago.
Mr. Banks. Two days ago, we had special agents-in-charge
both for Customs and for DEA together resolving issues. We were
trying to put issues on the table, trying to figure out how
could we coordinate our activities.
So are we meeting? Absolutely we are meeting.
I guess what I would say to you is we probably look to the
Drug Czar's office, ONDCP, as a central feature for a lot of
the coordination. He calls together a lot of meetings where we
are jointly, trying to resolve issues.
He has focused us at least on a combined strategy. He has a
documented strategy and he tries to drive us together--the
high-level contact group. There is a variety of other
circumstances.
I am not taking anything away from the Department of
Justice or my boss within Treasury. But the Drug Czar's office
does call a lot of combined meetings to focus on issues.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Director. Mr. Milford?
Mr. Milford. Again, as you have heard, we do have a
tremendous cooperative here in the United States, and we are
talking specifically about Mexico. What we are looking today
now is to develop the same type of cooperation in Mexico as we
have--as we have had with other countries in this cooperative
effort in the United States.
I think we are at a starting point. As I mentioned earlier,
we have several individuals, officials, and a few of the vetted
units that we are working with. It is by no means working
perfectly. It is again, as I mentioned to you earlier, it is in
the process of developing.
We are not in the results area. There have been very few
results when you look at the amount of trafficking activity and
the number of traffickers that are actually in Mexico operating
today. Every one of those major organizations are working in
sending a tremendous amount of drugs into the United States.
Do we have a cooperative effort? It is beginning. We need
to do a much better job. As far as actually--using actionable
information, the Mexicans using actionable information, to
identify, arrest, and incarcerate and prosecute these
individuals.
We need to get at--the border operations, the border task
forces up and working. They are an integral part of this whole
operation. And once we get that, we can utilize the
intelligence developed in the United States, pass it, and know
it is going to be passed and utilized and actually acted upon
in Mexico.
That is what we are looking for. That is what--that is the
only effort that we have ever asked for from the Mexicans.
Senator Coverdell. Where do you look for your--as the top
of this?
Mr. Milford. The Department of Justice.
Senator Coverdell. Ambassador?
Mr. Davidow. Senator, if I could just add a different
perspective, it seems to me that so much of the coordination
has to be done on the ground, in the field as it were, in our
embassies overseas.
In our embassy in Mexico, for instance, there are 28
different government agencies represented. I would guess that
fully half of those have some role to play in the anti-
narcotics fight. It falls to the chief of mission, the
Ambassador, or the charges to coordinate those activities in
the field.
It seemed--this is important because coordination is not
something that is done once and can be forgotten. It is a daily
activity, and we rely on our Ambassadors in the field for that
guidance and organizational capacity.
Senator Coverdell. Just as a--I was recently--I am going to
turn to Senator Grassley. I was recently in a--how many of you
have visited with a teenager or teenagers that have been nailed
by this in the last 12 months?
I am going to recommend something that you do. I have been
to a youth detention center, and there were about 20 young
women age 13-16. And just--I tell you what it will do for you,
because I know this gets weary. It will just remind of what
this is all about. And I would recommend each of you do it--it
is really vivid. You will never forget it.
Senator Grassley?
Senator Grassley. Yeah. I was also recently in my State at
a school that is for teenagers that are involved with the
courts. And I found--and they had me speak to these students.
And every student in explaining why they were there, there
was drugs involved in each of them. And that was clear. And one
of the things that every student told me was a major problem as
far as they had found in their life is that their parents were
not strict enough--that would include not only drugs but a lot
of other things.
But they were there. Drugs were involved in every one of
their cases. Mr. Milford, got to clarify something on what
might be the official position of the DEA.
In the past, your agency has made clear that there are real
problems with Mexico. I sense today that you are painting a
picture of sweetness and light. Is that what we are to
understand is the official view of the DEA in regard to our
drug problems with Mexico and their cooperation or not with us?
Mr. Milford. Senator, I do not want to paint a rosy
picture. As I said, we are in a process stage that we are
trying to develop an organizational structure that we can
actually work with.
There are several people that we actually pass information,
and it has been successful. They have used the information
effectively. But it needs to be developed, the program needs to
be developed. We have to have the border task forces up and
running and in place. They are there. There are Mexicans who
are--Mexican officials who are actually a part of them, but
there is no U.S. presence in those.
We need to look at--across the country of Mexico so our
counterparts can have information passed to them in Juarez,
Tijuana, Monterrey. We have to look that way.
So what I am telling you is there is hope. I do not in any
way----
Senator Grassley. But there are still problems?
Mr. Milford. Absolutely.
Senator Grassley. OK. Now the other question of each of you
is just very short, and it is procedural, not substance.
But has there been any attempt to censor your remarks for
the hearing today?
Mr. Davidow. No, sir.
Mr. Milford. None.
Mr. Banks. No.
Mr. Kneir. No, sir.
Senator Grassley. And, second question--the same yes or no.
Was there no effort to remove information from your statements?
Mr. Davidow. No, sir.
Mr. Milford. Not that I know of, sir.
Mr. Banks. Some in mine. They thought my statement was way
too long. They thought it had extraneous material, a lot of
fluff in it. So, yes.
Senator Coverdell. You ever going to run for office?
[Laughter.]
Senator Grassley. But you do not see that as an effort to
change the direction of your testimony?
Mr. Banks. I do not believe it changed the direction of my
testimony, but there is no question my testimony was
significantly shortened.
Senator Grassley. Mr. Kneir?
Mr. Kneir. No, sir.
Senator Grassley. Thank you. I am done.
Senator Coverdell. All right. I am going to adjourn this
panel and call the next. I thank each of you for your service
to your country and for your willingness to be with us here
today. We appreciate it very much. Thank you.
Senator Grassley. Thank you . Senator Coverdell. I wonder
if we can go ahead. Mr. Ferrarone and Dr. Godson, you have had
sort of a long hearing to witness. I think we will operate
under the same admonition: if you can limit your remarks to 5
minutes, and then we will have a question or two and let you
enjoy the balance of the evening.
Let us begin with you, Mr. Ferrarone. And I need to mention
that you are a former head of the DEA Office in Houston. We
appreciate very much your being here, and we appreciate what I
would characterize as almost unlimited patience. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DONALD F. FERRARONE, FORMER SPECIAL AGENT-IN-
CHARGE, HOUSTON FIELD DIVISION, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Ferrarone. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to come before you today.
Although I am somewhat worried, after what I heard out
there, there is, I think, a picture that I am a little
surprised at. I retired 9 months ago. I covered that border. I
had 1,200 miles of the border under my jurisdiction. But it was
not long ago that I was a member of the U.S. Government and, on
occasion, testifying before Congress on matters of narcotics
and international organized crime. But today I am here as a
private citizen.
I am going to go through my statement here, because I think
it will tie into a lot of things that were said. My formal
presentation is going to be short. I will leave the majority of
my time open for any questions, although I know everybody is in
a rush.
Before I start, however, I wish to say for the record that
nothing that I will say, either in my opening remarks or later
in the question-and-answer period, is aimed directly at or
against those who fight against this very serious problem that
we have in the United States and around the world. I have
worked too long beside almost everybody in this room that I saw
today, as well as many of my counterparts overseas.
In addition, I also with to state that criticism of the
Mexican Government and the minority of Mexican criminals should
not be mistaken as criticism of the Mexican people. And I am
really very cognizant of reactions that come about when these
kind of statements that will follow are publicized.
On the contrary, it is actually my belief that the people
of Mexico suffer in ways that we could not imagine in the
United States, nor tolerate, at the hands of a violent drug
trafficking trade on the ascendancy, and a crumbling judiciary
that is unable and, oftentimes, unwilling to deliver justice.
And I am not here today, as well, to say that the time has come
for us to chart a new course or any of that kind of thing. That
time was upon us many years ago.
To those of us in law enforcement, none of what we see
today in Mexico is really new. What has changed, however, is
the intensity of the problem. I cannot address the enormous
demand of drugs in the United States that drives the engine of
this criminal enterprise with seemingly unlimited amounts of
cash. I will leave that to others who are more qualified.
But to those who say this is the root cause, I would only
say back to them that it is nearly impossible to raise a
youngster anywhere in the United States today and not have the
daily fear that your kid will succumb to the ever-present
street trade. And I have, Senator, over the last month, been in
a number of schools and worked with a lot of the kids that are
facing what you talked about earlier.
I believe we bear a great deal of responsibility in the
United States and in North America in general. I do not
believe, however, that we can slow this phenomenon down in any
appreciable manner when we have at our border such a wide open
and uncontested safe haven for major drug trafficking.
Now, before I start the next section here, I would like to
lend my support to General McCaffrey's efforts. I know the
General quite well, and I am a big fan of what he does. What I
really like about the General is that he has not only trained,
but he has actually accomplished, he has actually done things
in his life of great importance. And so we in the law
enforcement community always like to separate those that do the
talking and those that actually do the thing.
Senator Coverdell. Do the doing, walking and talking.
Mr. Ferrarone. Yes, exactly. I did not want to say that.
But I do have some disagreement on his analysis of the
current situation, however. The Mexican Government, in my
opinion, facilitates the traffic in narcotics across our
border. Every indicator now and over the last 20 years reveals
that the Government Mexico consistently works together with
major drug trafficking families, seeing to it that drugs,
either homegrown or shipped from South America, are off-loaded
securely, protected, shipped cross-country, under convoy,
stored, and safely transported to our border.
Now, the oft-asked question of exactly what the definition
of Government of Mexico involvement should be or, in other
words, when is official involvement official, remains open for
debate in some circles. I do not believe the law enforcement
folks have that debate.
The Institutional Revolutionary Party is the core of the
problem in Mexico. Politic shifts within Mexico show some
potential for change in the future, providing these new
participants in democracy do not view their country, as have
the PRI in the last 60-plus years, as a food source. The
Mexican judiciary is bankrupt. Federal, state and local police,
together with prosecutors and judges, are in the pocket of the
trafficking families. This guarantees the absence of justice
not only in matters relating to drug trafficking, but most
other criminal and civil cases.
Once again, the Mexican people are the first to suffer
under this phenomenon.
The Mexican military has been involved as well. The Mexican
Army and Navy have been frequently called upon by the drug
trafficking families for assistance over the past 25 years.
While the U.S. Government has prioritized measures against drug
trafficking, what ultimately develops in practice reveals that
economic and national security issues almost always overtake
the narcotics question. Over time, this has been partially
responsible for the uncontested and systematic penetration by
the drug families of leading institutions within Mexico.
In my opinion, we suffer from the phenomenon of always
being in a huddle and never running a play. High-level contact
group, U.S.-Mexico binational commissions, senior law
enforcement plenary group, technical, and consultative groups,
threat assessments, fill many a bureaucrats day, while nothing
of substance ultimately materialize. Law enforcement by
committee is the rule. Gridlock is generally the result.
Now, recommendations. I have skipped briefly here, just to
move this along a little bit. The recommendations here.
Once again, I think that the General's concept of setting
in motion long-term planning that will span not only this
administration, but will also survive elections in Mexico, is
absolutely critical. This problem has been let go for so long
that it is going to take a long time to fix it. So the long-
term planning, and what I listened to and read over the last
couple of days, is very, very important.
I want to make one point. And that is that when you are--
and I have had experience in this, because I have been all over
the world and I have assisted in helping to reconstruct police
departments, as a partner, in many, many countries. It is
important to get these things in the right order.
For example, if you vet 1,500, which I heard for the first
time today--they are doing as many as 1,500 police and military
and others, and the numbers are actually quite high--if you vet
these folks and you go to all that work and you train them,
then you bring them on board and you do not give them a living
wage, within a week, that young man or young woman is out
trying to find out how they can feed their family.
If you put that team on a plane in Mexico City and you say,
you are going to go to work an operation in Guadalajara and you
do not--excuse me--you do not put them on the plane, you tell
them to get to Guadalajara--and they go there with no money to
pay for the ticket, bus, car, thumbing, however they get there,
no money to survive, it is only a short period of time--and I
mean it is literally days, when people are out there--folks are
out there trying to do this.
I think that this is--there are a number of issues in this
institution-building side of the house in which it is very
important to say that the steps that are taken have to be in
the right order. If you are going to build an institution, you
build the Mexican institutions first, firmly. You do not train
them with high-level, sophisticated American technology or any
other technology in advance of the institution being stable.
Because it has been my experience that that training is very
quickly used in exchange for the payments that these people
need to survive with by the drug trafficking organizations. And
it has happened.
Stay the course. I will make this one sentence. We need to
have a 2-, 5-, 10-, 15-, and 20-year planning cycle with this
problem. We need a partnership with Mexico. The idea of sharing
this among other nations might be something that will stimulate
some real activity. But, in any event, we have to have a very
long outlook on this.
Demand true measures of effectiveness. I heard all this a
number of times. The true measure of effectiveness should be
how many of the trafficker organizations are dismantled at the
end of the year. That is the authentic measure of
effectiveness.
I also have a pet peeve, which is our U.S. policy,
generally, steps back when push comes to shove, when it comes
to narcotics trafficking in Mexico. We do not seem to be able
to blend in the narcotics issue, together with the economy and
the national security issues. I would argue that holding Mexico
to an international standard on this matter, both of how they--
setting up a court system that works, having police that are
not working most of their time on the wrong side, will not
destabilize Mexico.
I do feel that as we continue to let this thing go--and we
have let it go for a long time--that the long-term penetration
and just exactly what happened last year, when literally
whole--very large sections of the Mexican judiciary collapsed.
Yes, they fired all these people. But there is another way of
looking at that.
So, once again, I am here as a private citizen. Thanks a
lot.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ferrarone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald F. Ferrarone
I appreciate the opportunity to come before you today. It was not
that long ago that I was a member of the U.S. Government and, on
occasion, testifying before both Congress and the Senate on matters
relating to Narcotics and International Organized Crime. Today I am
here as a private citizen.
My formal presentation will be short by design. I will leave the
majority of my time before the Committee open for your questions.
Before I start however I wish to state for the record that nothing that
I will say, either in my opening remarks or later in the question and
answer period, is aimed directly at or against those who fight against
this terrible plague of drugs. I have worked too long beside tireless
self sacrificing individuals, both in the U.S. and abroad, to have
anything but the deepest respect for their work.
In addition I wish also to state that criticism of the Mexican
Government and the minority of Mexican criminals should not be mistaken
as criticism of the Mexican people. On the contrary it is my belief
that the People of Mexico suffer in ways that we could not imagine at
the hands of a violent Drug Trafficking Trade on the ascendancy and a
crumbling judiciary that is unable, and often times unwilling, to
deliver justice.
I am also not here today to say that the ``time has come'' for us
to chart a new course--to develop a more comprehensive policy with
respect to the Mexican situation. That time was upon us many years ago.
To those of us in Law Enforcement, none of what we see today in Mexico,
is new. What has changed however is the intensity of the problem.
I can not address the enormous demand for drugs in the United
States that drives the engine of this criminal enterprise with
seemingly unlimited amounts of cash. I will leave that to others more
qualified. To those who say this is the root cause, I would only say
back to them that it is nearly impossible to raise a youngster anywhere
in the United States today and not have the daily fear that your kid
will succumb to the ever-present street trade. I'm speaking more as a
father now than a retired law enforcement official. I believe we bear
great responsibility for this as North Americans. I do not believe
however that we can slow this phenomenon down in any appreciable manner
when we have, at our border, such a wide open and uncontested safe
haven for major drug trafficking.
The Situation in Mexico
The Mexican Government Facilitates The Traffic--Every indicator now
and over the last twenty years reveals that the Government of Mexico
consistently works together with the Major Drug Trafficking Families
seeing to it that the drugs, either home grown or shipped up from South
America, are off loaded securely , protected, shipped cross country
under convoy, stored and safely transported to our border. The oft
asked questions of exactly what the definition of Government of Mexico
(GOM) involvement should be--or in other words when is ``official
involvement'' official--remains open for debate in some circles. The
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is at the core of the problem.
Political shifts within Mexico show some potential for change in the
future providing these new participants in Democracy do not view their
country, as have the PRI in the last sixty plus years, as a ``food
source''.
The Mexican Judiciary Is Bankrupt--The Federal, State and local
police, together with the prosecutors and judges are in the ``pocket''
of the Trafficking Families. This guarantees the absence of justice not
only in matters relating to drug trafficking but most other criminal
and civil cases. The Mexican people are the first to suffer under this
phenomenon. Entry level Police recruits are not generally paid a living
wage and are often forced to purchase the position.
The Mexican Military Is In The Soup As Well--The Mexican Army and
Navy have been frequently called upon by the Drug Trafficking Families
for assistance over the past twenty five years. It was no surprise when
Gen. Jose Gutierrez Rebollo turned up in the employ of Amado Carrillo-
Fuentes. Gen. Rebollo has further outlined GOM Military involvement
while under investigation stemming from his arrest some months ago. The
GOM Military has a strong core of patriotic and professional personnel
that are attempting to stem this tidal wave of corruption.
U.S. Policy--While the USG has prioritized measures against Drug
Trafficking, what ultimately develops in practice reveals that Economic
and National Security Issues almost always overtake the Narcotics
question. Over time this has been partially responsible for the
uncontested and systematic penetration by the Drug Families of the GOM
leading to the degradation of vital Mexican institutions. We suffer
from the phenomenon of ``always being in a huddle and never running a
play.'' High Level Contact Group, U.S. Mexico Binational Commission,
Senior Law Enforcement Plenary Group, technical and ``consultative''
groups, Threat Assessments etc. fill many a bureaucrat's day while
nothing of substance materializes. Law Enforcement by committee is the
rule. Gridlock is the result.
The Drug Families--It becomes painfully obvious that Mexican
Trafficking Families are in control of their destiny when the single
most significant law enforcement event of this year in Mexico is the
death of the most important kingpin at the hands of his plastic
surgeon. Those within the law enforcement community, on both sides of
the Border, will confirm that the Drug Families of Mexico are as
powerful and unimpeded as ever, quite possible at their zenith.
Recommendations
Develop A Long-Term Plan--In a partnership with Mexico, the U.S.
should develop a plan that spans Administrations and elections. We have
waited too long to solve this problem and so the remedy will require
years of repair. Much of the new legal framework being developed at
this time is an important step. Institution building is vital and
probably the first and most important step. Short term disruptive
operations should be designed and implemented while the laborious task
of rebuilding the Mexican Judiciary is underway. Small insignificant
teams, which are being developed at this time, will have little or no
impact.
Stay The Course--The U.S. must have a 2, 5, 10, 15 and 20 year
planning cycle. Mexico must establish the institutions, fund salaries
and expenses, train and retain a professional cadre, and strictly
enforce internal security and discipline. The U.S. must be prepared to
train and assist for the long haul. The order of this procedure is most
important.
Demand True Measures of Effectiveness--Progress should not be
measured by how many successful high level meetings take place over the
course of a year but rather how much of the Major Trafficker
infrastructure has been dismantled.
Develop a U.S. Policy That Authentically Includes The Narcotics
Issue--Holding the GOM to an international standard of behavior on the
narcotics question will not destabilize Mexico. Further progress on the
part of the Mexican drug families to penetrate the Government of Mexico
institutions will.
Once again, I am here as a private citizen. My years in Federal Law
Enforcement, together with the valuable insights of my colleagues in
all walks of this work, have led me to believe that while the picture
is grim a solution can be had. If we continue to wait, this crisis will
only worsen.
Senator Coverdell. Well, we appreciate your testimony.
Dr. Godson, if we could turn to you.
I tell you, Chairman Grassley is going to take over for me
in a few minutes, as we shift back and forth between our two.
Let me just make an assertion, and let Mr. Ferrarone respond to
it while you are here and I am here. I have to say that the
concept of managing another country's infrastructure strikes me
as a very high hurdle. And I do wonder about having that have
been our priority.
In other words, you fight battles from the high ground, the
high ground is the ground you control. We control the domestic
continental United States. We do not control Mexico. And for
the life of me I cannot quite imagine how we redesign their
judiciary and redesign their police force and redesign their
economy. And I am wondering if--and I am not saying we turn
from that effort, but if we make it increasingly difficult to
get here and to operate here, where we do control this
judiciary, we do control this police force, if we get that
done, making it more difficult for them to use us as a market,
you begin to affect the economy of that product.
And I am wondering if we have got the cart the horse turned
around here. Let us get our job done. And if we get out job
done, it is making their job, in terms of trafficking, much,
much more complicated and less lucrative. And then, in the
meantime, we keep trying to nurture the system. But the
sovereignty issue, and every time we try to interfere, it is
viewed as an intrusion.
What is your general comment to that?
Mr. Ferrarone. Well, a lot of the questions that I heard
earlier today were on things that only the Mexicans can do. And
I just want you to stop and think for just--let me give you two
quick examples. Two very important parts of successful
prosecution in law enforcement. One is that if somebody is on
surveillance, they see a bad guy do something, you write a
report, you put a report in a case file.
Second, when you make a seizure, you obtain evidence. It
gets locked up in a vault. Now, think about a police force that
has neither. And then we are asking them, we want you to
prosecute people. They do not have evidence. They cannot hold
on to it. That evidence is worth a fortune.
Or we ask them to go find somebody. They have no files to
go to. They have no data base.
I think, in the long run, we will be faced with having in a
partnership role, and I stress the word ``partnership,''
because this political will thing is really what this is all
about. In the long run, we are going to have to face this. We
are going to have to get in there in a partnership. Because,
after all, the cash-flow that drives the whole equation still
comes from here. We are going to have to do that.
I agree with you. You know, if you slow down the kids,
tighten up the border, work major operations within the United
States, then all of a sudden there is no market.
Senator Coverdell. I think the problem you are talking
about, and then I will turn to you, Dr. Godson, is the long-
term piece of it. One thing that I have taken some exception
with General McCaffrey about, and you alluded to it, meeting
and meeting and planning and planning, and something that is 10
and 20 years long. I think it has to be done. But if that
becomes the mode, if there is not a first quarter, second
quarter, third quarter or fourth quarter, it is just awfully
hard to make people play.
Mr. Ferrarone. It is that idea of finding a whole bunch of
smart people, and they are on the football field, and they are
running side to side. And they are running around obstacles
that, by the way, are set up by us, and then there is the
occasional trafficker obstacle. And when you get in with these
folks, you find them exhausted, you find some of them so happy
because they have actually overcome three or four of these
obstacles, not realizing that they are running sideways.
Senator Coverdell. Well, I appreciate it very much. Dr.
Godson.
STATEMENT OF ROY GODSON, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION
CENTER
Dr. Godson. Thank you, Senator, for this opportunity.
I guess I find myself supporting much of what the United
States and Mexico have tried to do in recent years. I have had
the advantage of being able to travel along the border and to
spend many hours talking with Mexican officials, as well as
many nongovernmental officials. And much as I have praise for
what has been attempted so far, I do share many of the concerns
of my co-panelist.
I also share your concerns. And I was very much encouraged,
as a citizen, and I think many other people would be very
encouraged to see the thought that you put into the critique of
American policy that you expressed earlier in the afternoon--
you just mentioned just now.
My testimony dwells on two major points. I am going to skip
very fast over number one and come to number two.
The first part concerns the strategy. I agree that we need
a strategy. It is not clear what our goals are in the long or
the medium term. I agree, further, that we have not set up
measurement yardsticks. We heard expressions about yardsticks,
but we have so far seen few. And the yardsticks that we have
are not adequate to the job.
I think the United States and Mexico talk in terms of
strategy and goals and measurements, but we see relatively
little measurement. We need a strategy in Mexico. We need a
strategy in the United States. And we need joint strategy. And
we do not yet have one.
But let me focus, rather, on one specific aspect of U.S.-
Mexico cooperation. And this is an area, Senator, which has
received almost no attention. I am surprised that after we have
learned the lessons in the United States and elsewhere that we
cannot leave major problems to the government alone, we
continue to talk exclusively about the role of government.
It is neither feasible nor is it desirable to leave our
major problems to government.
The ONDC report says almost nothing about the role of the
nongovernmental sector and the private sector. We are relying,
again, on government to solve all the people's problems.
Government cannot and should not undertake this burden alone.
Let me sketch out an approach that could be taken. And it
could be undertaken in the medium term, as opposed to just the
long term, which Senator Coverdell addressed earlier. That is
to say, we need to develop and to foster what I will call a
culture of lawfulness on the U.S.-Mexican border.
By a culture of lawfulness, I am referring to something
that we take for granted in much of the United States. That is,
that we should not rely on the government and law enforcement
to be the sole measure of how and why we follow the law day in
and day out in our lives. We follow the law because we accept
that the law is just. It is not perfect, and the system
enforcement is not perfect; but, basically, the system provides
us the best means possible to resolve our differences.
That is what I call a culture of lawfulness. It guides our
behavior every day for most of us.
Now, what I am talking about here is developing a culture
of lawfulness in an area of the world where such culture is
lacking. How can you go about developing such a culture?
There are many ways. One can address culture writ large. As
Senators you do this every day. You talk about various aspects
of American life, and you sometimes make suggestions, sometimes
criticisms about films and books and other mass media which
influence large numbers, particularly of young people. But
there is one particular way in which a culture of lawfulness
can be developed, and we have some very interesting examples
abroad of people who have to struggle against organized crime
and drug trafficking who have been reasonably successful.
And that is to make this culture of lawfulness specifically
school based. Almost all children--not all, unfortunately--but
almost all children attend primary and many attend secondary
school.
The idea would be to institutionalize school-based
education concerned with a culture of lawfulness. Senator
Coverdell addressed children and parents and so on.
Now, people in Hong Kong, faced with massive corruption and
organized crime that came from mainland China, particularly in
the fifties (the most important of which were the Triad
organizations), instituted a major education, a 6-through 18-
year-old program, and a program for parents, that has been
remarkably successful in Hong Kong.
It is showing some signs of wear; but, on the whole, one
would say this is a remarkably successful program. It is not
the sole approach. You do need a law enforcement approach. You
do need a strategy. You do need honest policemen and a system
to maintain honest policemen. But also the people of Hong Kong
did not rely on the government exclusively to do this. They
relied on community and school based programs, albeit assisted
by the law enforcement authorities.
The people of Sicily have done the same thing. Since the
1980's, there has been a massive cultural and school based
movement that is anti-Mafia. You have elected officials, the
Mayor of Palermo and the Mayor of Corleone, and I can provide
other Sicilian examples, of people who have been elected on an
anti-Mafia program. They are up for reelection right now, and I
suspect most of them are going to win.
And the schools in Sicily, the schools in Hong Kong are
major instruments for the development of a culture of
lawfulness amongst young people.
Senator Grassley. Don't you know, in American education
today, that it is just a terrible thing for somebody to decide
that something is right or wrong?
Dr. Godson. I hear in some places that is the case.
Senator Grassley. And that you just should not teach people
to be judgmental?
Dr. Godson. This is sometimes true, Senator. But I am glad
to say there are some programs which could be expanded.
Senator Grassley. Well, it is a major problem within our
educational system.
Dr. Godson. It is. But there are a number of promising
initiatives.
Senator Grassley. And I am not disagreeing with you.
Dr. Godson. Right.
Senator Grassley. If I sounded like I was disagreeing or
finding fault with you, I am just saying it is an attitude that
we have developed in our society that is going to be awful hard
to overcome.
Dr. Godson. Right. It is. It will be hard. And even in Hong
Kong this is becoming a problem, whereas it was not a problem
with the previous generation.
But recently I attended a meeting in Mexico City, which was
supported, I must say, by one major U.S. agency, the United
States Information Agency, in which there was a discussion
about this. And a number of senior Mexican officials,
particularly from the Attorney General's office, came along and
supported this idea of instituting school-based educational
program along this line. It was a very encouraging meeting. It
was a beginning. But, so far, there is no real plan in the
United States or in Mexico to develop a culture of lawfulness,
whether you use the schools or not.
And if you look at the ONDC report, there is not any
mention of it. Somehow it claims that government is going to
solve this problem all by itself.
This is inadequate. We do need a law enforcement approach,
but we do need to complement it. Otherwise, 2 or 3 years from
now--or 5 or 6 years from now--we will be here again saying how
many people we have trained, how many eradication programs we
have, and how many seizures we have made. I could not agree
more with my colleague that unless the Mexicans develop a civil
service and a career service and protect their people, both
physically and the families of those killed in the fight
against narco-trafficking, training alone will not be
sufficient.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Godson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Roy Godson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present my
views on current US and Mexican efforts to counter organized crime and
drug trafficking.
My name is Roy Godson. I am a professor at Georgetown University,
where for more than twenty-five years, I have offered courses on
governance, security, intelligence and law enforcement. I am also
President of the National Strategy Information Center, Inc. (NSIC), a
non-partisan public policy institute here in Washington, created in
1962. I have served as a consultant to the National Security Council,
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and agencies of
the United States government concerned with intelligence and law
enforcement. This work has enabled me to observe, and in a small way,
contribute to the work of these organizations. My testimony today,
however, reflects my own views, and I am here in my personal capacity.
In recent years, I have consulted extensively with police,
intelligence, and security services in many countries. I have also
traveled many times to the region that is the focus of these hearings,
spending weeks talking with and observing representatives of
nongovernmental sectors of the societies in these regions. My research
has also benefited from many scholars, journalists, and government
officials who participate in NSIC programs and projects, such as the
Project on Global Ungovernability and the Working Group on Organized
Crime.
Organized crime, corruption, and particularly drug trafficking,
threatens the quality of fife in many parts of the world. Some of the
reasons for the growth of this threat--economic, political, and
cultural--are not new. Others emanate from recent developments--the end
of the Cold War; the fragmentation of states; mass movements of people;
as well as from the increasing globalization of trade, finance,
transportation, communications, information, and culture.
The result is that criminal enterprises and their corrupt allies,
inside and outside government, are increasingly undermining human
rights and civil liberties; threatening legitimate business; and
distorting economies and economic development. They are also taking
advantage of globalization and more open borders to pursue lucrative
opportunities abroad and to elude or circumvent local and national
criminal justice systems and law enforcement.
Increasingly many governments, especially in the Americas, as well
as global and regional international bodies, such as the United Nations
and the Organization of American States, now recognize that regional
organized crime, corruption, and drug trafficking are threats that
require transnational governmental and nongovernmental responses.
The major governmental response in the region so far has been to
focus on enhancing national law enforcement capabilities and
coordinating the responses of regional and global enforcement bodies
and criminal justice systems in a manner consistent with human rights
and civil liberties. Much progress has been made in these areas.
However, there is still a long way to go before this regulatory
response is adequate to the challenge.
Specifically with regard to the US-Mexican response, I believe,
even without knowing the full extent of current cooperation, that
significant progress has been made at the governmental level, but that
more, much more, remains to be done. On the positive side, perhaps the
most important step is the demonstrated cooperation among high level
officials on both sides of the Border. Their will to seek methods of
cooperation and to begin to develop coherent strategy even in the face
of political risk and criticism is very encouraging. Second, the US
executive branch has demonstrated the commitment to devote significant
resources and attention over a sustained period, and many Mexicans have
demonstrated that they are willing to risk their most precious
possessions, their own lives, and the fives of their families, by
identifying with the fight against narco trafficking. Several hundred
already have paid the price and thousands of Mexican officials and
their families five daily under the constant threat of the most brutal
violence for standing along side us.
Third, there have been many untold improvements in the fight
against narco trafficking as a result of equipment, training, and
information sharing with US and Mexican officials.
On the other hand, there are worrying aspects to the announced
cooperative efforts. Perhaps most importantly, after a several years of
serious cooperative efforts, little real strategy can be perceived on
the US side or the Mexican side, or in joint efforts. By strategy, I am
referring to the identification of specific goals, the calibration of
reasonable means likely to achieve these goals, and specific benchmarks
that are indicative of success and enable us to hold to account those
who develop and implement the strategy.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Report presented
to Congress in September is long on generalities of success but
established few specific standards for success. Are seizures of
narcotics, arrests of individuals, increased resources and training
programs enough to measure the adequacy of the very general, if
laudatory, objectives stated in the report?
On the other hand, some benchmarks advocated by others may not be
as useful as their proponents intend. For example, stopping nearly all
the flow of narcotics into the US from Mexico and elsewhere in the next
three or four years is unrealistic. Similarly, benchmarks such as the
extradition of suspected narco traffickers, the ability of US law
enforcement to carry firearms in Mexico by public agreement with
Mexican officials, are not adequate to the task of developing,
implementing and evaluating strategy.
Now, sometimes there have been important successes in binational
cooperation efforts against organized crime, even without carefully
delineated strategy and benchmarks--for example the cooperative efforts
of the Italian American Working Group in the 1980s. However, it is
difficult for this observer to see how the courageous, well
intentioned, but disparate efforts of US and Mexican officials over the
next few years will lead to the kind of results that we are led to
believe will be forthcoming in the ONDCP Report. Will success take
longer? How much longer, and how will we measure success?
Furthering A Culture of Lawfulness
There is, moreover, a second and complimentary approach to fighting
organized crime and trafficking, not mentioned in the ONDCP Report--
securing the attention and mobilizing the resources of the
nongovernmental sector throughout this region. It is neither desirable
nor feasible to leave the increasing problem of crime and corruption
exclusively to governments and law enforcement bodies. There are not
enough law enforcement resources available and we would not want the
kind of society that would have the requisite police, surveillance, and
penal resources to rely exclusively on such an approach. Rather, civic,
business, labor, religious, social, and, educational organizations all
have a role to play in mitigating, if not eliminating, one of the
scourges of contemporary world society.
There are many ways in which nongovernmental organizations and
civic society can help. But one of the most important is fostering a
culture of lawfulness. Indeed one of the bulwarks protecting and
enhancing democratic society is such a culture. The average person must
come to believe that the legal norms and systems for changing,
administering, and enforcing the laws are basically just, and that they
enhance and protect the quality of life. Without such a culture, which
day in and day out influences expectations and behavior, no government
or law enforcement system can function effectively.
How to bring about and further such a culture is not self evident.
There are many potential paths and techniques. Some are addressed by
the culture writ large. Some are strategically focused on particular
segments of society and particular institutions that play a decisive
role in influencing society. With regard to the former, popular music,
books, films, video games and the national celebration of particular
heroes and acts can play a significant role in influencing culture. So
far, in recent years, they have done little to advance the culture of
lawfulness that can serve as a major barrier to drug trafficking and
the costs and evils associated with it.
With regard to strategic sectors--civic, moral, ethical, religious
and legal education, particularly of young people, and through them,
their parents and the local community, would appear to be one of the
most promising avenues. Reaching young people, as is well-known to
educators and parents, usually is not easy. There are a variety of
factors that affect the attitude and behavior of young people--family,
peers, experiences, and civic organizations. All seem to be important
and all need to be involved in furthering the culture we seek.
The Role of School-Based Education
However, the major players in the US-Mexican dialogue devote very
little attention to the role of formal education in the requisite
culture.
Fortunately, most but not all young people attend primary school
and more and more of them are completing secondary school. Moreover,
schools are amongst the most well-endowed civic organizations in any
society--they are located in every city and town, and in most villages
throughout the world. They have a building. They have teachers, who are
often respected not only by children, but also by parents and community
leaders. Most schools have books, curricula, and more and more they
have sophisticated technology.
Schools not only have formal curricula and instruction, they also
have the facilities and opportunities to organize extra-curricular
activities. Primary and secondary schools probably are amongst, if not
the single most important civic organization that can contribute to
furthering a culture of lawfulness, especially in the border regions
most at risk. This is not yet widely recognized, but it is coming to be
increasingly accepted on both sides of the border.
Now just how can schools that accept this role go about this
process? Several approaches to content have been developed. All of them
appear to be promising. However, none has yet been shown to be so
effective that it is clearly the best--the most effective method of
furthering a culture of lawfulness.
Diverse Approaches
Let me summarize these approaches. I will emphasize their
diversity. However, they are not mutually exclusive. In reality, there
are important similarities in these approaches and they sometimes
overlap.
One approach is to stress broad civic or citizenship education. The
focus here is to develop good citizens. Good citizens, who understand
that they have an opportunity and obligation to participate in the rule
making and governing of society, will accept a culture of lawfulness,
and hence they need no special focus on crime and corruption.
A second approach is to focus on legal socialization, particularly
the legal education of young people. Here the approach is focused on
teaching about the law, legal rule making and enforcement. Until now,
in these programs there has been little focus on the specifics of
organized crime and corruption.
A third approach is moral education--teaching children about their
opportunities and obligations to make moral and ethical decisions that
daily affect their fives and to draw implications from their decisions
that will pertain to legality and corruption.
Although there are a number of school-based education programs
focused on specific criminal behavior--drug use, juvenile delinquency--
so far only a few programs have sought to deal with substantive threats
emanating from local, regional, and transnational crime and corruption.
By organized crime, we are referring to individuals who have an
ongoing working relationship with each other, who make their living
primarily from a variety of profit making, covert activities that most
states deem criminal or illegitimate. The organization can take various
forms--from tight vertical hierarchies with life long commitments, to
much looser, more ephemeral ongoing horizontal relationships. Organized
criminal groups maintain the option to use or exploit the use of
violence and corruption and do not accept the norms of the community
which prohibit the use of these instruments.
By corruption, we are referring to the misuse or illegitimate use
of institutional power--public and private--for personal profit and/or
political gain. Although corruption exists without the presence of
organized crime, criminal narco trafficking enterprises on a local or
national level cannot long exist without the corruption and
collaboration of public and private sector officials.
School-based education that seeks to help tackle these problems
requires first a commitment on the part of national and local school
authorities on both sides of the border. This would mean a consensus
that part of valuable primary and secondary school time--either in the
formal curriculum or in extra-curricular hours--should be devoted to
the subject. Second, special curricula would have to be adopted from
the few pioneering projects that already have been tested and used,
focusing on the causes of organized crime and corruption; the evil
effects on society iff the short and long terms; and how, as
individuals, children and society as a whole are required to cooperate
nationally and regionally. Finally, and perhaps most important,
teachers would have to be trained to teach such a curriculum. There
would have to be an initial period of training in the new curriculum,
followed by periodic updates. Here, of course, there is a role for
professional law enforcement and judicial personnel. They not only
could assist teacher training, enriching the training with their
personal knowledge and experience on local crime and corruption, they
also could serve as resource personnel in the classroom or
extracurricular programs.
Whichever content and pedagogical approaches are chosen, and
whatever the levels of educational skill and commitment in any given
society, we should not expect school-based education to assume the full
burden of developing and furthering a culture of lawfulness. School-
based education nevertheless may be one of its most significant
ingredients.
Furthermore, we should not expect this approach to bring results
overnight. However, we should instead immediately begin to build on
very recent governmental and nongovernmental initiatives to further a
multi-year dialogue on this subject. We should examine school-based
programs in various parts of the world, and learn what we can from
these experiences. The US and Mexico should consider what it will take
to mobilize communities on both sides of the border to support
effective school-based programs. Last week, educational specialists,
curriculum planners, and government officials from various parts of the
world met in Mexico City to consider what kinds of resources,
administrative support, curricula, and teacher training needs will make
a real difference. They did not do this with the expectation that they
could ``solve'' the problem. Rather, they began the dialogue in the
expectation that furthering a culture that will help resist the inroads
of crime and corruption.
Some Mexican governmental and nongovernmental leaders were
supportive of this initiative. Similarly, some senior U.S. officials,
particularly in the United States Information Agency and in the Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the
Department of State, as well as in some American nongovernmental
organizations such as the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO,
echo this sentiment. Unfortunately, the broader role of a culture of
lawfulness was omitted in the ONDCP Report to Congress. And while I
believe the ONDCP initiatives are very important, and even more can be
done within the general parameters laid out in the Report, by
themselves, they are insufficient. We need a cultural barrier to
organized crime and corruption. We cannot place the full burden
exclusively on the military, intelligence, and law enforcement
agencies, as many leading professionals in these in agencies, on both
sides of the border, would affirm.
Senator Grassley. I assume your comment about a culture of
lawfulness was applicable on both sides of the border?
Dr. Godson. Yes, it is. And I travelled the border
recently. And I met with approval for this idea from almost
every single law enforcement official on both sides of the
border. They said they could not hold the line on their own, no
matter how much money we threw at the problem. In fact, they
said--they asked--if I had one message in Washington to give,
it was change the school system, change the culture, and we
will be able to hold the line. There was almost unanimity on
that point.
Senator Grassley. I know it is late, so I will only--unless
you give long answers, I will only keep you a few more minutes.
Let me start with Mr. Ferrarone.
You mentioned holding Mexico to a true standard of
international behavior. What do you think is the best way to do
that?
Mr. Ferrarone. Well, I heard some discussion today about
bringing in other countries. There is, as you know, a very
strong cultural bias against a North American. And it is built
in at a very young age to their system. I just feel that the
folks that we negotiate NAFTA and that we talk national
security issues with are oftentimes the same folks that have
been fooling around with the drug traffickers.
Senator Grassley. So at the highest levels of government?
Mr. Ferrarone. Well, there are--I am not saying that--see,
what happens is, we find out information during a current
regime, but we tend to ignore it, and we will attack the
previous one, because they are out. And that is kind of what is
going on right now.
I am not going to say how high it goes up, because I do not
know, but it is way up there. It is way up there if you
understand the design of the PRI as a political organization.
The architecture of the PRI is to reach down and use a lot--
anything that is making money within the borders of Mexico is
viewed as a food source for them. So the answer is, I think,
from our perspective, from our side--and I get this privately
from Mexican officials--is that you Americans, first, you do
not understand what is going on; second, turn up the heat on us
a little bit. You will be surprised what you get.
And I do not think our policy with respect to Mexico blends
the narcotics issue in to the--you know, we are very strong on
the economy and we are very strong on the national security
interests. However, from my perspective, the narcotics issue
has now started to link up with some of the national security
things.
So I think we have to change here, in the United States,
and have a stronger private--it does not have to be public
diplomacy--but it has to be a much more serious policy, and it
must have measures of effectiveness, and not preparing a paper,
not agreeing to do something that we find out 5 years from now
never happened, not giving them a whole bunch more helicopters.
We have given them hundreds of planes--hundreds--for the
narcotics fight. They are out there.
Senator Grassley. Is the certification process a useful
tool, and should we keep it as we know it now?
Mr. Ferrarone. It becomes an extremely nationalistic issue
on the Mexican side of the border. That is something right now
that the politicians, or those that are involved with the
traffickers, can pull up as a shield around them. I think it is
a healthy, once-a-year drill. It is clear, when we do things
like we did with Colombia or Burma, and we handle Mexico
completely different, that the application of that law is not
evenhanded.
I did not answer your question, I know.
Senator Grassley. Well, it is not an easy one to answer.
Well, I think you did answer it in a sense, if I could take out
just a small portion that you just said; that it is a healthy
process to go through once a year. And that is the purpose of
it.
It is interpreted by both people in this country and other
countries as something directed just toward us judging whether
or not that country is doing something according to helping
them meet their commitments to us in the war on drugs. But it
also is our own process working.
Mr. Ferrarone. Well, it goes back also to your first
question to me: How do we apply pressure? What is the world
standard for--if Mexico wants to be considered in that group of
industrialized nations that can really stand and walk on its
own, which it can and should, then they have to be held
accountable for these kinds of things.
Senator Grassley. Last question to you, unless you want to
join in answering others. In your experience of dealing with
the drug issues, do you see any signs of hope that the U.S.-
Mexican relationship--or in this relationship--that would led
you to believe that we can make progress, that cooperation can
work despite this corruption that we have talked about?
Mr. Ferrarone. General McCaffrey, I believe, is on the
right track in terms of the long-term planning. In terms of how
we do business with Mexico and in what order we do these things
and how we do it, I think we have got to be very, very careful.
Because there was a lot of optimism in here. And those of us in
law enforcement have seen this happen over and over again
within Mexico. And it is a cycle that you could actually chart
on a graph, to show how the peaks and the valleys go with our
relationships and how the traffickers fit in there. And it has
repeated. For the 28 years that I was in the business, this is
just a repeat of what I saw 28 years ago.
Senator Grassley. Dr. Godson, your written statement
identified a note of difference between cooperation on the one
hand and strategy on the other, and that the report submitted
to Congress is long on generalities on the results of
cooperative efforts, but has few specific standards for
success. So my question is, specific standards that you believe
should be presented in this strategy, and how would you measure
these standards?
Dr. Godson. That is a very good question, Senator. And it
is a better question than I can give you an answer to. I just
want to reemphasize what you discussed with General McCaffrey
and with the administration today. They claimed they were going
to produce a number of standards. And we need to look at those
standards very carefully.
I do not have such a list of standards, and I know of no
one who has such a list. But I share the concern that without
these standards, it will be very difficult to judge
effectiveness and people will become rather disillusioned and
tired, as they see that we claim success and yet the drugs keep
flowing.
I just want to encourage those who are pushing for
standards to keep pushing. I think sometimes standards are too
high and would be unrealistic. It would be unrealistic, in my
view, to expect, in 3 or 4 years, to eliminate 80 percent of
the drugs coming into the United States. But I just think it is
worthwhile having more specific standards than the
administration is currently using. And that is why I am pushing
on the standards question.
Senator Grassley. Considering the sovereignty of Mexico and
the respect for that, and that it might have its own reasons or
motivations for working with Washington in the war on drugs,
why do you believe that Mexico is cooperating with the United
States?
Dr. Godson. Viewed in historical perspective, those who see
a change in attitude in Mexico, I think are correct. At the top
and in many lower levels, there are people who really care, who
are willing to lay their lives on the ground, even though the
likelihood of protection for them and their families is almost
nonexistent.
This year alone, over 200 Mexican policemen have already
been killed, and more are certain to follow.
Now, it is true, a certain percentage of these policemen
are corrupt and are involved with narco-trafficking. But a
certain percentage are not. And so when you see policemen at
various levels, with little protection and little salary, being
willing to do this, and you see medium- and high-level
officials being willing to put in long hours and dedicate
themselves, then you have to recognize this change. And their
willingness to accept cooperation with us--details in the
McCaffrey report--about the extent of cooperation inside
Mexico, would be, I think, something that most countries, under
many circumstances, and certainly Mexico in the past, would
have refused to accept, and certainly to publicly acknowledge.
So, from my many, many hours of conversations with Mexican
officials under very social circumstances, sort of when they
let their hair down, I would agree with the conclusion that
they are beginning to cooperate with us in an important way.
However, we have a very long way to go. And just their
willingness to cooperate is not adequate. We have to develop a
much more sophisticated, coherent strategy. Our strategy is so
disparate, without good measures of measurement, that at the
current rate, I have to agree with my co-panelist that we will
not succeed unless we both change our governmental strategy and
our nongovernmental approach, which we have not even begun to
think about.
Senator Grassley. I would close. I do not have any
questions. I would close with two things. Obviously, I thank
you for your participation, and particularly for waiting the
long hours. Three-and-a-half hours of hearings is a very long
hearing in Congress.
Second, I think each of you did emphasize something that I
believe very strongly: that this cannot be just a government
effort and, for sure, not just a Federal Government effort. But
even if you take Federal, State and local governments together,
and we rely just upon government, it does not matter whether it
is rehabilitation or education or even law enforcement, we will
lose this war. It is only when we get all segments of our
society--and the government cannot do much more than give moral
leadership to this--but churches, families, educational
institutions, lots of community and nonprofit organizations,
and probably a lot more.
Until we get this collective effort and a collective
judgment by all elements of American society that drugs are bad
and we are in a crisis situation, and get everybody pulling
together, we are not going to win this war. I feel that we can
win this war. I think that America has, maybe too late
sometimes, observed a crisis and pulled together to overcome
that crisis. I do not think we have reached that point yet. And
we do not even hear enough from political leaders in America
about how serious this is.
So we have even got some education at that level of
political leadership, to make sure that we impact the rest of
society. But, hopefully, we move in that direction and we win.
Thank you very much for contribution. I am going to keep
the record open, because you might get some questions in
writing. We would appreciate, in a couple of weeks, if you
would have those responses back.
Senator Grassley. Thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
The massive amount of illegal drugs moving into this Nation from
Mexico undoubtedly poses a significant threat to both the U.S. and
Mexico. There can be no question that the bilateral anti-drug
relationship between the United States and Mexico is very complex and
challenging for the people of both nations. However, it is essential
that both of our countries work tirelessly to gain the trust and
commitment necessary to deal with this pressing problem. While we in
this nation must work diligently to combat drug abuse within our
borders, the influx of illicit drugs and narcotics from Mexico must be
stopped. This result will only occur with the full cooperation of the
Mexican Government.
In my view, the status quo in regard to Mexican anti-drug efforts
is unacceptable. For this reason I joined with my colleagues, including
Senator Feinstein, in urging decertification of Mexico earlier this
year. After the President chose nonetheless to certify our southern
neighbor as ``cooperating'' in anti-drug efforts, I supported the
bipartisan response offered in the Senate by Senators Feinstein and
Coverdell because I believed that it was the only legitimate
opportunity to hold the Mexican Government accountable for their
actions, or lack thereof. In my view, the burden of proof lies with the
Government of Mexico.
In reviewing the Mexican anti-drug efforts, one is confronted with
evidence of rampant corruption, a continuing failure to extradite
nationals, and a growing presence of a military which has historically
shown scant respect for human rights. These factors, among others, have
combined to allow the narcotics cartels to flourish in Mexico. As these
drug dealers increase in number and strength they not only dominate the
local communities in Mexico, they extend their operations into this
nation, spreading their poison onto American streets in a deadly and
unlawful version of free trade. Mexico may be a significant economic
partner of the United States, but the current level of illegal drugs
entering this nation unabated from the south is unacceptable.
In the time since the most recent certification decision was made,
the Administration has taken steps to engage the Government of Mexico
in a dialogue to address this most pressing problem. I want to commend
General McCaffrey for his dedicated efforts in this regard and look
forward to reviewing his testimony today as well as the report that he
submitted to Congress on this issue just last month. In my estimation,
the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States in
regard to anti-drug activities is at a critical juncture. In the not
too distant future, the Administration will again evaluate the Mexican
response as part of the certification process.
While some argue that there is reason for optimism in this area,
nothing less than tangible results against the drug trade and the
powerful cartels which operate this illicit enterprise will suffice.
Illegal drug trafficking poses a significant threat to citizens on both
sides of the border and our efforts to respond to this threat will not
be successful if delayed by further inaction and lack of commitment--on
either side of the border.
The weeks and months ahead will go a long way to determining the
true status of bilateral U.S./Mexican anti-drug efforts, and I look
forward to working with my colleagues on this issue of vital
importance. I also want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing
as well as the witnesses for their time here today. I look forward to
reviewing the testimony before the Committee.
__________
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Barry R. McCaffrey,
Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms
U.S. Border Interdiction Efforts
Question 1. What are your plans for deploying technology (such as
gamma ray truck and x-ray facilities) at each of the ports of entry on
the Southwest border?
Answer. The Customs Service is using large-scale non-intrusive
inspection systems (mobile and fixed site) at major Southwest Border
cargo processing facilities to improve the number and intensity of
commercial cargo examinations. Currently, there are three large-scale,
fixed-site truck x-ray facilities in operation at Otay Mesa and
Calexico, California and Pharr, Texas.
Having found this non-intrusive inspection equipment valuable, the
Customs Service is in the process of acquiring five additional fixed-
site truck x-ray units for major cargo processing facilities along the
border as indicated below.
Truck x-ray locations Date of operation
Otay Mesa........................................... 8/95
Calexico............................................ 3/97
Pharr............................................... 10/97
El Paso (Ysleta).................................... 12/97
El Paso (BOTA)...................................... 5/98
Nogales............................................. 8/98
Laredo (Colombia bridge)............................ 9/98
Los Tomates (New border crossing scheduled for 3/99) 3/99
In addition to the fixed-site truck x-ray systems, Customs is
procuring mobile and transportable commercial conveyance imaging
systems to support layered technology examination operations. These
mobile imaging systems will be utilized at Southwest Border ports of
entry to enhance commercial cargo environment enforcement operations at
locations that do not have fixed-site systems. Additionally, these
mobile systems will be utilized at the ports of entry to enhance and
augment commercial cargo enforcement operations. Currently, one mobile
truck x-ray system is in use in Laredo, Texas. A second, enhanced
version is under construction and is scheduled to be delivered to the
Southwest Border in early 1998. In addition to mobile x-ray systems, a
prototype transportable gamma imagery system designed for the
examination of tankers is in use in El Paso, Texas.
Customs is also installing a prototype passive potassium 40 portal
detector that is scheduled to be tested at the Ysleta Port of Entry in
El Paso, Texas, in January of 1998. This system was developed to detect
nuclear materials but is also capable of detecting bulk shipments of
marijuana.
In addition to developing and procuring various forms of non-
intrusive inspection systems, Customs is implementing a computer based,
advanced targeting technology through use of the Automated Targeting
System (ATS) in Laredo, Texas.
The Customs Service employs a wide variety of smaller scale
technology in conjunction with the large-scale imaging systems
indicated above. There are currently 17 stationary pallet x-ray systems
for cargo in use on the Southwest Border. Customs Service officers
utilize a wide variety of hand-operated technology to examine
commercial conveyance including BUSTERS (density detection devices),
fiber optic scopes (to examine tanks and confined areas/compartments),
and laser range finders (LRFS) (used to determine the length of a
conveyance to detect false walls and compartments.)
In addition to the current and future non-intrusive technology
advancements at Southwest Border ports of entry, the Customs Service is
developing and testing participle and vapor detectors, biosensors, and
higher energy x-ray systems for heavy cargo and sea containers, for use
at Southwest Border ports of entry, as well high-risk sea and air
ports.
Question 1. (continued) Do we have adequate Customs enforcement
personnel on the border today? What are the plans, if any, for
increasing inspectors on the border?
Answer. ONDCP has referred this question to U.S. Customs Service.
Question 2. With respect to the importance of ``intelligence'' to
identify contraband, do you think that Customs and other U.S. law
enforcement officials should be allowed more routine contact with
counterparts and others on the Mexican side of the border to gather
this information? We have been told that these personnel have to clear
all such contacts through our Embassy in Mexico City; is that correct?
Would it strengthen border cooperation if such contact were
decentralized?
Answer. The United States Customs Service (USCS) and other U.S.
organizations routinely coordinate with their Mexican government
counterparts. The USCS, for example, is actively pursuing with industry
cooperative programs that produce regular reporting on contraband.
Regarding drug intelligence reporting, a 1994 Memorandum of
Understanding between the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the
USCS gives DEA exclusive authority when developing contacts,
informants, or otherwise collecting drug intelligence in Mexico.
It is important that investigations carried out by multiple law
enforcement agencies be centrally coordinated. While it certainly may
be possible to improve implementation, we would not support abandonment
of central coordination.
Question 3. Railroad cars are almost impossible to search, and
Customs rail road facilities are insecure and inefficient. What
measures will you be taking to address the extraordinary volume of rail
cars crossing into the United States each day? What measures are being
taken to make it easier to inspect containerized shipments?
Answer. ONDCP has referred this question to U.S. Customs Service.
Bilateral Border Task Forces/Organized Crime Unit
Question 1. How many of these task forces will there be eventually?
Where? How many are fully in place today? Where? What is the total
complement of Mexican agents that will be assigned in all of these task
forces along the border?
Answer. There will be three Border Task Forces, with five satellite
offices, located in Tijuana (with satellites in Mexicali, San Luis Rio
Colorado, and Nogales), Juarez, and Monterrey (with satellites in
Reynosa and Matamoros). Tijuana and Juarez are fully staffed. Monterrey
is operational with 15 agents authorized and only eight currently
assigned. The other seven agents should be vetted by June 1998. The
total complement of Mexican agents that will be assigned the Border
Task Forces will include: 70 law enforcement agents, plus 150 Military
Special Reaction Forces, 50 in each of the three BTFS.
Question 1. (continued) How many Mexican agents today have been
fully vetted for these border task forces? Fully trained? On duty?
Answer. As of December 15, 1997, there were 46 fully vetted, fully
trained agents on duty.
Question 1. (continued) What is the specific timetable, by month,
for bringing each of the six task forces (Tijuana, Juarez, Mexicali,
Laredo, Monterrey, and Matamoros) on line in the upcoming months?
Answer. All of the Border Task Forces (BTF) are on line and
actively being staffed:
Tijuana (Operational, 15 agents authorized and 9 assigned).
Mexicali* (Operational, 5 agents authorized and assigned).
San Luis Rio Colorado* (Operational, 5 agents authorized and
assigned).
Nogales* (Operational, 5 agents authorized and 2 assigned).
Juarez (Operational, 15 agents authorized and 7 assigned).
Monterrey (Operational, 15 agents authorized and 8
assigned--other 7agents expect to be fully vetted by June
1998).
Reynosa* (Operational, 5 agents authorized and assigned).
Matamoros* (Operational, 5 agents authorized and assigned).
Laredo (There are no plans for a BTF in Laredo).
*Denotes satellite offices.
Question 1. (continued) How much money has the Mexican government
allocated to these task forces in the next year? How much have they
spent thus far?
Answer. The government of Mexico (GOM) does not disclose the amount
of funds allocated to the Border Task Forces (BTF). For this reason, no
figures are available. Although the U.S. does not know the exact dollar
figure the GOM has expended, the GOM has furnished the U.S. with a
complete listing of the equipment it has purchased or otherwise
acquired, such as seized vehicles, for the BTFS. Adequate funding by
the GOM for the BTFs remains a primary concern for the U. S.
government.
Question 1. (continued) How much if anything, is the United States
expected to pay in direct support to these task forces in the next
year, including training costs and equipment?
Answer. In 1997, the Congress made a special appropriation for
vetted units in several countries. $2.9 million of this appropriation
was allotted to Mexico for support of the BTFs and other vetted units.
Question 1. (continued) Compared to this time last year, how many
cases are BTFs investigating at this time?
Answer. Each BTF has one major target as it did last year. In
Tijuana, it is the Arellano Felix Cartel, in Juarez, the Amado Carrillo
Fuentes Cartel, and in Monterrey, the Amezcua brothers' methamphetamine
trafficking organization. All of these major investigations involve
multiple cases on the various transportation and money laundering cells
and the top lieutenants of each cell.
Question 2. What is the total complement of Mexican agents that
will be assigned to the Organized Crime Unit? How many Mexican agents
have been fully vetted for the OCU? Fully trained? On duty?
Answer. Approximately 300 Mexican agents will be assigned to the
Organized Crime Unit (OCU); approximately 100 have been fully vetted as
of November 24, 1997. The OCU has sections devoted to narcotics,
organized crime, money laundering, kidnapping, and terrorism. These
units have not been given specialized training in the U.S., but some of
the narcotics agents have attended the Basic Narcotics Course sponsored
by DEA and FBI in Leesburg, VA. Approximately 140 total personnel,
including support staff, are currently on duty.
Question 2. (continued) What is the specific timetable, by month,
for bringing the OCU up to full complement?
Answer. The government of Mexico plans to have the Organized Crime
Unit (OCU) fully staffed by the end of 1998. Key to fully staffing the
OCU is Mexico's purchase of polygraph machines and training of
polygraphers.
Question 2. (continued) How much money has the Mexican government
allocated to OCU in the next year? How much have they spent thus far?
How much, if anything, is the United States expected to pay in direct
support to the OCU in the next year, including training costs and
equipment?
Answer. The government of Mexico does not disclose the amount of
funds allocated for the Organized Crime Unit (OCU). For this reason, no
figures are available. As noted above, the Congress, in 1997, made a
special appropriation for vetted units in several countries, of which
$2.9 million was allotted to Mexico to support vetted units, including
the OCU.
Question 2. (continued) Compared to this time last year, how many
cases is the OCU investigating at this time?
Answer. As the Organized Crime Unit (OCU) was first established on
February 1, 1997 there were no cases investigated before this year. The
OCU currently has eight major investigations in progress.
Question 3. What is the total complement of Mexican agents that
will be assigned to the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health
(FEADS)? How many Mexican agents today have been fully vetted for the
FEADS? Fully trained? On duty?
Answer. The Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS)
will eventually have 3,000 agents assigned. According to the State
Department, 882 have been vetted by the government of Mexico and 880
were fully trained and on duty as of November 24, 1997.
Question 3. (continued) What is the specific timetable, by month,
for bringing the FEADS up to full component?
Answer. There is no monthly timetable for bringing the Special
Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS) up to full strength,
however, the government of Mexico (GOM) hopes that they will be fully
staffed by the end of 1998. Once Mexico has finished purchasing the
necessary polygraph machines and training the needed polygraphers, the
GOM will be better able to bring the FEADS up to full strength more
quickly.
Question 3. (continued) How much money has the Mexican government
allocated to the FEADS in the next year? How much have they spent thus
far?
Answer. The government of Mexico does not disclose the amount of
funds allocated to the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health.
For this reason, no figures are available.
Question 3. (continued) How much, if anything, is the United States
expected to pay in direct support of FEADS in the next year, including
training costs and equipment?
Answer. The major outlay for the Special Prosecutor for Crimes
Against Health in 1998 will consist of a computer project, funded by
the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement. We estimate the total cost of this project at about $4
million.
Question 3. (continued) Compared to this time last year, how many
cases in the FEADS investigating at this time?
Answer. As the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS)
was first established on April 30, 1997 there were no cases
investigated before this year. Currently FEADS has about 100 cases
open.
Question 4. What specific additional steps are needed to implement
the Organized Crime Law over the next year? Money laundering law?
Answer. The Organized Crime Law.
The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City reports that the implementation of
the Organized Crime Law is proceeding well. The Organized Crime Unit
has been established within the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) to
implement the law and has received considerable support from the USG.
In addition to its use in the important investigation of the former
Director of the National Counternarcotics Institute (INCD), General
Gutierrez Rebollo, the Organized Crime Law is currently being used in
more than 30 cases involving the Carrillo Fuentes, Arellano Felix, and
Amezcua Organizations. Under its asset forfeiture provisions a total of
$41 million has been seized from associates of the Carrillo Fuentes
organization.
While the new Organized Crime Law has given Mexican law enforcement
entities additional investigative tools and increased authorities, the
law alone is not sufficient. To conduct effective law enforcement
investigations in Mexico, specialized units must utilize sophisticated,
state-of-the-art investigative techniques, including court-authorized
electronic surveillance, undercover operations, and the like. In order
to use these investigative tools effectively, the GOM must first
establish guidelines and policies, and develop a cadre of competent and
trustworthy prosecutors and judges.
The law is missing some elements contemplated by the 1988 U.N.
Vienna Convention and Organization of American States/Counter Drug
Counsel (OAS/CICAD) models for an effective asset forfeiture regime.
For example, it lacks provisions for international forfeiture
cooperation and asset sharing, and does not provide for forfeiture of
assets where the organized criminal suspect has died or absconded from
Mexican jurisdiction.
The Organized Crime Law is an important step by Mexico in creating
a domestic and international forfeiture cooperation regime. Mexican
officials recognize, however, that they must do more in developing
forfeiture laws and regulations. The PGR is drafting measures that will
integrate Mexico's piecemeal forfeiture laws into one comprehensive
system for the seizure and forfeiture of assets related to the
commission of crime. The laws now being drafted, however, will not
provide for in rem civil forfeiture capabilities (such as exist in the
United States) to allow the forfeiture of assets belonging to one who
has died or fled the jurisdiction before being convicted of a crime
providing the basis for forfeiture.
Another important issue that the Mexicans are now addressing in
their efforts to draft comprehensive forfeiture laws and procedures is
the distribution of forfeited assets between the judicial and
prosecutive authorities for their official use. The draft legislation
will also regulate Mexican agencies involved in seizing assets by
setting guidelines on how to administer the seized assets so that they
remain stable until final adjudication.
Answer. (continued) The Money Laundering Law.
During 1996 and 1997, the government of Mexico (GOM) took a number
of significant steps to enhance its capacity to combat money
laundering. In May 1996, a new Mexican law made money laundering a
criminal offense for the first time. Under the prior law, money
laundering was a tax offense which could only be triggered through the
course of an audit of a financial institution. The new law also
provides for enhanced penalties for money laundering, increasing the
potential prison sentence to 5-15 years generally, and in cases of
government officials, the penalty may increase to as much as 22 years.
Implementation and enforcement of the money laundering law through
investigation and successful prosecutions are the tasks ahead.
In addition, in March 1997, Mexico's Hacienda issued new
regulations for specified financial institutions that should enhance
Mexico's ability to detect and track possible money laundering activity
through those institutions. Once fully implemented, the rules will
mandate that the specified financial institutions will: (1) report
currency and other monetary transactions in excess of $10,000; (2)
report suspicious transactions; and (3) obtain and retain customer
account opening and transaction information. The customer
identification regulations became effective on May 2, 1997, and the
regulations governing currency transaction reporting will become
effective January 1, 1998.
Although suspicious transaction reporting requirements became
effective May 2, Hacienda continues to work with covered financial
institutions to aid their development of standards for what constitutes
suspicious activity. The GOM reports that this process should be
complete by the end of 1997.
Rules of this sort--when fully implemented and enforced--have
proven to be effective tools for preventing and deterring money
laundering. They also generate valuable investigative information for
law enforcement authorities seeking to identify and dismantle
laundering operations.
The new laws and regulations will assist substantially in erecting
the kind of barriers that will prevent the placement of drug profits
and other criminally derived funds with Mexican financial institutions.
At the same time, because the regulations are the GOM's first attempt
at requiring currency transaction and suspicious activity reports, some
provisions of the rules raise concerns that will need to be addressed
with further amendments and refinements. For example, the requirement
to obtain and retain information on the identities of account holders
for transactions other than deposits does not apply to transactions
less than $10,000. As a consequence, transactions may be structured
below the $10,000 threshold with anonymity (although the financial
institutions may still file a suspicious transaction report), and in
some circumstances, there is no separate offense for structuring to
avoid reporting requirements.
The customer identification provisions also fail to apply to
beneficial owners--a potentially significant problem, since money
laundering transactions often are carried out by individuals acting on
behalf of others. Another concern raised with the GOM by U.S.
representatives is that willful violations of these regulations are
punishable only by civil penalties, rather than by criminal penalties.
Finally, the ``safe harbor'' provisions protecting financial
institutions from being sued by affected customers have not been tested
and could present problems. The U.S. will continue to work with the GOM
to address these legal and regulatory issues.
The Departments of Treasury and Justice have worked closely with
Hacienda to develop the new regulations, and have offered training for
both prosecutors and investigators. In June and July 1996, Treasury led
interagency missions to Mexico City for the purpose of joint U.S.-
Mexican examination of the GOM's existing anti-money laundering
capabilities, and development of suggested improvements.
Among other things, these missions resulted in the design by
Treasury' s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of a
computerized database for the information generated by Hacienda's
reporting regulations. The State Department has purchased the necessary
hardware and software for Hacienda; delivery and installation is nearly
complete.
Moreover, to implement the new regulations more effectively, the
GOM has established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) staffed with
analysts. Seven employees of the Flu received training by the FinCEN in
intermediate intelligence analysis on September 24-26, 1997.
Seizures by Mexico
Question 1. Do the Mexicans have an adequate strategy,
infrastructure and resources to inspect cargo entering and transiting
their country? Do they inspect the millions of containers arriving at
their ports from South America each year? For example, do they have
adequate customs inspection at their ports? How have they improved
their maritime operations? What steps have we taken to assist the
Mexicans to improve their own ``customs'' inspections?
Answer. ONDCP has referred this question to the U.S. Customs
Service.
Question 2. Does the U.S. government have any reports of drugs
seized by the Mexicans being stolen by Mexican authorities and being
resold in the market? Are the Mexicans fully cooperative with U.S.
efforts to monitor the destruction of seized drugs?
Answer. The Office of the Attorney General (PGR) is prosecuting
officers involved in the theft of cocaine seized by the Mexican
military and stored with the PGR in San Luis Rio Colorado (Sonora). On
September 1, 1997, the PGR arrested 18 personnel from its own aviation
division for allegedly smuggling illicit drugs in a PGR aircraft.
On occasion Mexico has asked the U.S. to attend the destruction of
seized drugs, however, there are no formal bilateral efforts to monitor
the destruction of drugs in either country.
Extradition/Arrests
Question 1. How many major Mexican drug kingpins have the Mexicans
arrested this year?
Answer. The exact number is not known, however, among numerous
important drug traffickers or associated criminals arrested or
otherwise eliminated from criminal activity in 1997, the following were
most prominent:
Oscar Malherbe de Leon, once operations manager for Juan Garcia
Abrego's Gulf Cartel (and the subject of a U.S. Department of State
reward offer issued at the same time as the offer for Garcia Abrego),
was arrested in Mexico City on February 26, and remains in maximum
security prison subject to a U.S. government provisional arrest
warrant;
Jaime Gonzales-Castro, a lieutenant in the Amado Carrillo Fuentes
organization (for whom arrest warrants are also outstanding in the
U.S.) and associate Jorge Barrela Martinez were arrested by the Mexican
military April 28 in Nogales, Sonora-Barrela was also charged with
attempting to bribe PGR officials to secure continued freedom, and
remains in jail;
Jaime Arturo Ladino Avila, a brother-in-law and alleged financier
for the Amezcua drug trafficking organization, was arrested by the PGR
in May in Tijuana, and remains in jail;
Amado Carrillo Fuentes, leader of the major Mexican organizations
based in Ciudad Juarez, died July 4 at a Mexico City hospital of
complications following cosmetic surgery to radically alter his
appearance to evade increasingly close pursuit by Mexican and
international authorities;
On July 30, Mexican authorities detained Manuel de Jesus Bitar
Tafich, a major money launderer for the Carrillo Fuentes organization
who sought to establish refuge for Amado Carrillo Fuentes in Chile-he
was indicted September 27, and remains in jail;
In August, the Mexican military detained Noe Brito Guadarrama, head
of security for the Amado Carrillo Fuentes organization, who remains
incarcerated;
Rodrigo Villegas Bon, an assassin for the Arrellano Felix
organization who is accused of participating in the May 1993 killing of
Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo at the Guadalajara Airport, was
arrested by Jalisco state police in Guadalajara on September 25, and
remains imprisoned;
On November 15, during a routine search for weapons at a highway
checkpoint, Mexican Army personnel detained Adan Amezcua Contreras, the
youngest of three brothers who control the world's largest
methamphetamine trafficking organization, who remains in GOM custody.
Arturo Paez Martinez, a prominent member of the Arrellano Felix
Organization, was arrested on November 11, 1997. Paez is charged with
conspiring to distribute more than 2,200 pounds of cocaine in the
United States, was arrested outside of a shopping mall by Mexican
federal agents, and remains in jail.
Question 1. (continued) How many provisional arrest warrants from
the United States are pending with the Mexicans?
Answer. Approximately 120 active provisional arrest or extradition
requests are pending with Mexico.
Question 1. (continued) How many persons have been arrested
pursuant to these U.S. provisional arrest warrants?
Answer. Since March 1996, the government of Mexico has arrested 35
and extradited 27 persons pursuant to U.S. arrest warrants; another 10
were deported.
Question 1. (continued) How many persons (broken down by Mexican
citizens and dual nationals) have the Mexicans extradited on drug
crimes to the United States since January 1, 1997?
Answer. The government of Mexico (GOM) approved the extradition of
4 Mexican citizens (Oscar Malherbe, Jaime Ladino, Jaime Gonzalez
Gutierrez (also known as Jaime Gonzalez Castro) and Tirso Angel Robles)
on drug charges in 1997. Mexico extradited five U.S. citizens and two
Cubans in 1997 on drug charges and expelled one U.S. citizen wanted in
the United States on drug charges this year.
Once Malherbe finishes serving his sentence in Mexico, he will be
eligible for extradition to the U.S. If the newly signed protocol to
our extradition treaty is ratified, Malherbe would be a candidate for
extradition under its terms. Gonzalez Gutierrez and Ladino were
arrested by Mexican authorities at the request of the U.S. and are now
in custody solely for extradition purposes.
Ladino was arrested on May 28, 1997, in Tijuana on the basis of a
U.S. provisional arrest warrant. He is a key lieutenant of the Tijuana-
based Amezcua Organization and the brother-in-law of leaders Jesus Luis
and Adan Amezcua. In order to ensure that Ladino remained in custody,
the GOM transferred him from Tijuana to Mexico City, where he remains
imprisoned pending Mexican action on the U.S. extradition request.
Gonzalez Gutierrez was arrested on April 28, 1997, in Nogales,
Sonora. Gonzalez Gutierrez is a lieutenant of the Miguel Caro Quintero
Organization, as well as a fugitive from justice in Tucson, Arizona.
When the Mexican charges against Gutierrez failed and were dismissed by
the Mexican court, the GOM began processing the U.S. extradition
request based on federal narcotics charges filed in Tucson.
Malherbe has filed an amparo suit appealing his extradition and
appeals are pending in four other cases in which extradition has been
granted. Three cases involve Mexican citizens Tirso Angel Robles,
Martin Avalos Tescuano, and Rosendo Gutierrez. The other case involves
a U.S. citizen with a claim to Mexican nationality through marriage,
William Brian Martin. Bilateral efforts to locate and apprehend other
organizational members and principals sought by one or both countries
are continuing.
Question 1. (continued) When was the last time a Mexican citizen
(not including dual nationals) was extradited formally and turned over
to U.S. authorities for trial?
Answer. The last time a Mexican citizen (not dual national) was
extradited formally and turned over to U.S. authorities for trial was
in April 1996.
Question 1. (continued) Why has Mexico been more willing to
extradite Mexican citizens on other heinous crimes (such as child
molestation) than they are for drug crimes?
Answer. Mexico is not more likely to extradite Mexican citizens on
other heinous crimes, than they are for drug crimes. In addition to the
Mexico citizen extradited to the U.S. in 1996 on child molestation
charges, and a second extradited on murder charges, four Mexican
citizens have been approved for extradition on drug charges in 1997 and
one in 1995. One alleged Mexican child molester and one alleged
murderer have also been found extraditable in 1997, and they are
appealing those orders. As noted above, however, these extraditions
have been delayed because the individuals are serving time in Mexico or
have their case on appeal.
Question 2. How do you explain that the Mexicans have arrested far
fewer drug suspects than they did in 1992?
Answer. In 1992 the government of Mexico (GOM) arrested 24,461
people on drug charges compared to 8,766 thus far in 1997. It is
important to note that numbers are not always the best means by which
to analyze success, and that the organizational rank of the criminals
arrested should also be taken into account. The GOM has arrested and
incarcerated several high-ranking drug traffickers (see pps. 21-22)
this year upsetting the hierarchy of several drug organizations.
U.S. Law Enforcement Officers' Weapons-Carrying
Question 1. Is it true that DEA policy prohibits DEA agents from
traveling in Mexico without a weapon for self-defense? When Mexico's
border task forces are eventually established, how will DEA be able to
work with them securely if most of our DEA agents can't cross over the
border to meet with them in Mexico? Are you aware of any information
that Mexican personnel assigned to protect U.S. law enforcement agents
turned out to be corrupt?
Question 2. Do any DEA personnel assigned to Mexico carry weapons
today for their own defense? Which positions and what diplomatic
credentials do these persons hold? Isn't it correct that such officers
to whom the Mexicans have given full diplomatic immunities do routinely
carry their weapons in Mexico today? Will DEA ``commuter'' agents
assigned to the BTF's be authorized to carry weapons? Will the
``consular immunity'' that the Mexicans are offering to ``commuter''
agents offer them any protection from arrest or prosecution if they do
chose to carry their weapons?
Answer. Both the U.S. and Mexican governments are concerned with
the safety of law enforcement personnel, and are working hard to ensure
every measure available is considered to assure that safety. It is
counter-productive to discuss in a public forum what those measures are
or might be. ONDCP has referred these questions to the law enforcement
agencies for a more detailed response.
U.S. Air/Maritime Access and Interdiction Efforts
Question 1. In the last 9 months, have there been any instances in
which a U.S. plane or ship has been unable to get permission for ``hot
pursuit'' of suspect targets, conduct normal interdiction, or refuel in
Mexican facilities?
Answer. In the last 9 months, there have been no instances in which
a U.S. plane or ship has been unable to get permission for ``hot
pursuit'' of suspect targets, conduct normal interdiction, or refuel in
Mexican facilities.
Question 2. Are you concerned that the Mexicans rely too heavily on
U.S. interdiction efforts and have not invested enough to develop their
own capacity to do this key job?
Answer. We have no concerns about the Mexican Navy. Based on our
dealings with the Navy, they are supporting the interdiction effort to
the fullest extent of resources available and would expand if possible.
They are using their funding to try to expand their fleet of patrol
vessels, such as their recent unsuccessful attempt to buy Point Class
Large Patrol Craft from the United States. Despite extensive
counternarcotics training programs and equipment acquisition that
emphasizes counternarcotics operations, the Navy stands poised to do
more if resources are available.
DEFENSA (Mexico's Army and Air Force) currently uses various
methods such as checkpoints, patrols and airborne reconnaissance to
support interdiction. Through their ongoing development of Specialized
Military Units (GAFE) and airmobile capabilities, they are working to
enhance their interdiction capabilities. DEFENSA efforts pertain to the
Mexican land mass and are largely independent of U.S. interdiction
efforts. As DEFENSA's core values emphasize defending Mexican
sovereignty, U.S. interdiction efforts on Mexican territory would be
problematic as they would appear to infringe on Mexican sovereignty.
DEFENSA is not relying too heavily on U.S. interdiction efforts and is
pursuing their own counterdrug mission based on roles and
responsibilities determined by the government of Mexico.
Question 2. (continued) Why haven't the Mexicans installed ground-
based radar to protect their airspace from unauthorized flights?
Answer. Patterns of drug transportation to and from Mexico have
evolved since large-scale air shipments were noted several years ago.
Drug smugglers now rely much more heavily on land and maritime surface
transportation. Installation of an expensive ground-based radar system
at this time would commit a large proportion of Mexico's available
resources against a relatively small proportion of the drug traffic.
The GOM believes that a new radar system is not its most costeffective
counterdrug investment under current conditions.
Question 2. (continued) How have we or will we make up this ``blind
spot''?
Answer. It is not clear that the lack of an extensive ground-based
radar system in Mexico constitutes a significant ``blind spot,''
especially in view of the current narco-trafficking threat. U.S.
Embassy Mexico City believes the only way to get the government of
Mexico (GOM) to install groundbased radar is for the U.S. either to
subsidize, transfer on a non-reimbursable basis, or loan a ground-based
radar system. We are not yet convinced that the threat warrants such a
significant commitment of Mexican or U.S. resources.
Money Laundering Cases
Question 1. What priority do you attach to building money
laundering cases? Is it your policy that we should do more to increase
such prosecutions? What specific steps are being taken to build such
cases right here in the United States?
Answer. Presidents Clinton and Zedillo agreed to make the building
of money laundering cases a national priority by including it as
Alliance Point 12 of the May 1997 Declaration of the Mexican/U.S.
Alliance Against Drugs. The Declaration was the impetus to start
negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico to develop the U.S/Mexico
Common Drug Control Strategy.
Alliance Point 12 calls for both nations to implement more
effectively the laws and regulations to detect and penalize money
laundering in both countries, and to enhance bilateral and multilateral
exchanges of information and expertise to combat money laundering. On
November 13, 1997 a status report on the development of the strategy
was released with the following accepted in principle by both
countries:
Enhance U.S.-Mexico law enforcement efforts, including
prosecutions against money laundering, to disrupt and dismantle
major drug trafficking operations, and to increase the number
of coordinated investigations.
In accordance with international agreements in force between
both countries, improve the exchange of information to prevent,
detect, combat and penalize money laundering. Ensure that banks
and other financial entities and their officers and employees
in both countries comply with requirements established to keep
records and file transaction reports.
Periodically review the laws and regulations to prevent,
detect, combat and penalize money laundering in order to design
amendments or reforms, if necessary.
Coordinate efforts to design and develop specific training
plans and programs aimed at governmental personnel and
personnel in financial entities in both countries.
Convene an Annual Seminar designed for governmental and
financial institution personnel on the efforts of both
countries against money laundering.
U.S. agencies coordinate and exchange information regularly with
Mexican counterparts on potential money laundering targets, based and
operating in Mexico, that can be prosecuted in the U.S. by a U.S. law
enforcement agency.
Question 1. (continued) Does the Justice Department share the view
that money laundering cases should be treated as a priority? Has
Justice assigned sufficient personnel and resource to U.S. attorney's
offices to help prosecute these cases?
Answer. The Attorney General has identified the enforcement of our
anti-money laundering laws as a top priority for the Justice
investigative agencies and U.S. Attorney's offices. The Attorney
General has further stressed the importance and commitment of working
jointly with the Treasury Department investigators and regulators in
this effort.
Question 2. How much progress has Mexico made to date in setting up
its Financial Crimes Unit?
Answer. The government of Mexico has received approximately 95
percent of the equipment previously identified as being necessary to
carry out its intended Financial Crimes Unit (FCU) operations. Taking
into account additional equipment only recently identified by the FCU
as also being integral to fulfilling its mission, the equipment on hand
represents about 50 percent of the total requirement.
Question 2. (continued) When will that unit be fully operational?
Is that unit actually conducting investigations at this time?
Answer. The Financial Crimes Unit (FCU) became operational and
conducting investigations in May 1997. The USG has already delivered
initial basic information processing equipment and is continuing to
work with the FCU in identifying additional equipment needed to enhance
its capability.
Assets Forfeiture
The Report to Congress highlights deficiencies in Mexico's
forfeiture law. For example, the report notes that the law does not
provide for international forfeiture cooperation and asset sharing.
Question 1. Have the Mexicans applied these new laws with
sufficient vigor?
Answer. Presidents Clinton and Zedillo agreed to make the issue of
seizing and forfeiting the proceeds and instrumentalities of drug
trafficking a top priority in our law enforcement relationship by
including it as Alliance Point 13 of the May 1997 Declaration of the
Mexican/U.S. Alliance Against Drugs.
Alliance Point 13 states that both countries will seize and forfeit
the proceeds and instrumentalities of drug trafficking, and direct
these to the use of drug prevention and law enforcement, in accordance
with legal procedures in force in and between our countries.
In addition, as noted in the September 1997 Report to Congress on
Bilateral Counter-drug Cooperation, Mexico has made significant
progress with regards to forfeiture. The progress is in Mexico's
domestic efforts as well as in regard to cooperation with the United
States. Issues such as international forfeiture cooperation and asset
sharing form an important part of the U.S./Mexico Common Drug Control
Strategy, and are currently in the final stages of negotiation.
The Organized Crime Law provides for freezing and forfeiture of
assets related to the underlying organized criminal offense. Under the
law, seized assets can be used or disposed of, as determined by a
government council. The Organized Crime Law provides for the pre-trial
restraint and seizure of assets that might be subject to forfeiture, as
well as supervising the maintenance and custody of restrained assets.
The law is missing some elements contemplated by the 1988 U.N.
Vienna Convention and OAS/CICAD models for an effective asset
forfeiture regime. For example, it lacks provisions for international
forfeiture cooperation and asset sharing, and does not provide for
forfeiture of assets where the organized criminal suspect has died or
absconded from Mexican jurisdiction.
The Organized Crime Law is an important step by Mexico in creating
a domestic and international forfeiture cooperation regime. Mexican
officials recognize, however, that they must do more in developing
forfeiture laws and regulations. The PGR is drafting measures that will
integrate Mexico's piecemeal forfeiture laws into one comprehensive
system for the seizure and forfeiture of assets related to the
commission of crime. The laws now being drafted, however, will not
provide for in rem civil forfeiture capabilities (such as exist in the
United States) to allow the forfeiture of assets belonging to one who
has died or fled the jurisdiction before being convicted of a crime
providing the basis for forfeiture.
Question 1. (continued) Are we encouraging them go after the
Carrillo Fuentes and Garcia Abrego assets? What specific progress have
they made?
Answer. Under Mexico's current asset forfeiture provisions, a total
of $41 million has been seized from associates of Amado Carrillo
Fuentes. The laws, however, will not provide for in rem civil
forfeiture capabilities (such as those that exist in the United States)
to allow forfeiture of assets belonging to one who has died, as in the
case of Amado Carillo Fuentes, or fled the jurisdiction before being
convicted of a crime providing the basis for forfeiture. In addition,
information received from the government of Mexico has led to an
additional $50 million that has been frozen for forfeiture in the
Southern Districts of Florida and New York.
In January 1997, Garcia Abrego was sentenced to nine concurrent
life sentences, fined $128 million, and was ordered to forfeit $350
million as profits of his drug enterprise. While the monetary judgments
remain unsatisfied, the GOM's expulsion of Garcia Abrego opened the
door to this significant conviction and criminal forfeiture judgment.
Question 1. (continued) Have they been aggressive in putting these
seized assets back into anti-drug operations?
Answer. The Mexicans, in their efforts to draft comprehensive
forfeiture laws and procedures, are now addressing the distribution of
forfeited assets. This issue is also being addressed in Alliance Point
13 (as stated above) of the U.S./Mexico Common Drug Control Strategy,
currently in the final stages of negotiation.
Corruption
Question 1. Can you explain the measures that [the GOM has] adopted
in Mexico to ``screen'' law enforcement and anti-drug personnel?
Answer. The Office of the Attorney General (PGR) is undertaking
vigorous background checks of both current and newly-hired personnel,
to include financial, psychological, drug, physical, and polygraph
exams. The number of personnel completing full screening will increase
substantially when Mexico overcomes a backlog created by a lack of
polygraph equipment and trained operators. The PGR has recently
purchased additional polygraph equipment and is in the process of
training operators.
Question 1. (continued) How have Mexicans dealt with the fact that
the courts have ordered the reinstatement of hundreds of the ousted
police officers?
Answer. The entire Office of the Attorney General (PGR) is
undergoing a general reorganization that began in 1996 when former
Attorney General Lozano fired more than 1,200 PGR employees for
corruption or unsuitability, and continues under the plan announced by
Attorney General Madrazo on April 30, 1997. Nearly all of the
individuals dismissed last year appealed their dismissals, citing
procedural flaws in the terminations. According to the U.S. Embassy and
the GOM, the appeals have resulted in the PGR being ordered by Mexican
courts to reinstate 234 individuals with back pay as of August 1997.
Attorney General Madrazo stated on September 10 that an additional 270
PGR employees were fired between December 1996 and August 1997, and
that 192 of them face prosecution.
The PGR has assured the U.S. that the re-instated officers have
been placed in non-sensitive positions.
Question 1. (continued) Will this contaminate the new law
enforcement units?
Answer. The Office of the Attorney General (PGR) is working to the
best of its ability to train new agents who will be kept separate from
reinstated agents who might be corrupt.
The government of Mexico (GOM) has initiated procedures to conduct
thorough vetting for individuals considered for selection as members of
the special units. This vetting process, combined with enhanced
training, a minimum time commitment (U.S. agencies have suggested a
three-year minimum assignment), premium pay to reflect the additional
training, and ongoing integrity checks would increase U.S. law
enforcement confidence in the Border Task Forces (BTF) and Organized
Crime Unit (OCU). These measures would indicate that BTF and OCU
personnel are substantially free of corruption and are likely to
develop the competence to combat the highly sophisticated and violent
drug trafficking cartels.
The special vetted units described above will form the core of a
reorganized and fully vetted PGR. What distinguishes these
organizational changes from prior efforts to reform the PGR is the
vetting process that all prospective members of each unit must undergo.
In addition to being more thorough than ever before, vetting is
broader, with the GOM planning to screen all employees of the PGR. The
PGR has examined more than 1,300 officers in its vetting process and
plans to aggressively continue this procedure.
The GOM is also advancing a significantly enhanced package of pay
and benefits for the members of the vetted units. These units and their
continued expansion are part of a comprehensive GOM strategy to reform
the PGR overall. The PGR has improved its recruitment and selection
procedures, and has expanded its training course for judicial police
from nine months to two years.
The PGR is also making efforts to fight impunity throughout its
organization. Attorney General Madrazo has ordered drug testing for PGR
officials, and officials detected using drugs are being prosecuted. The
PGR is prosecuting officers involved in the theft of cocaine seized by
the Mexican military and stored with the PGR in San Luis Rio Colorado
(Sonora). On September 1, 1997, the PGR arrested 18 personnel from its
own aviation division for allegedly smuggling illicit drugs in a PGR
aircraft.
The major reorganization of Mexican counternarcotics and law
enforcement institutions has meant that Mexican institutions and
personnel must begin at a basic level to rebuild confidence, trust, and
cooperation with the U.S. This has led the U.S. and Mexico to develop
avenues for working level cooperation and information sharing as the
new Mexican institutions develop.
Question 1. (continued) Are members of the old BTF's eligible,
after reverting, to participate in the new BTF'S? If so, how many of
the agents vetted for these BTF posts thus far were previous BTF
agents?
Answer. Members of the old BTF's are eligible, after reverting, to
participate in the new BTF'S. Thus far, four agents vetted for BTF
posts were previous BTF agents.
Question 2. In addition to Gutierrez Rebollo, since January 1,
1997, how many Mexican military personnel have been implicated in
corruption?
Answer. We would be pleased to discuss with the Senator information
available to agencies of the Executive Branch in a classified setting,
understanding that we cannot comment on pending cases in the United
States and elsewhere.
Question 2. (continued) Is it true that Gutierrez has implicated
other generals as well as a number of President Zedillo's staff in
taking pay-offs from the cartel?
Answer. The former Director of the National Counternarcotics
Institute (INCD) has made allegations against several high-ranking
Mexican officials. None of these allegations has been proven, and many
of these cases are still pending.
Question 3. Have some Mexicans criticized President Zedillo's
decision to give the military such a prominent operational role in the
anti-drug effort?
Answer. Some Mexican citizens, including many members of the
military, would prefer that the military not be involved in law
enforcement activities. However, many of them also recognize there is
no alternate solution until civil law enforcement agents can be
properly trained and assume their duties. On the whole, public opinion
data show the military as more highly regarded than the police.
Question 3. (continued) Have some Mexicans raised constitutional
prohibitions against the military's prominent anti-drug role? Please
explain.
Answer. Some have raised the question, but we understand that the
Zedillo administration defends its actions as being entirely
constitutional.
U.S. Donated Helicopters
Question 1. How many of the excess UH-1H helicopters have the
Mexicans received to date?
Answer. The government of Mexico has received all 73 UH-1H
helicopters programmed to be transferred. The last 25 helicopters were
delivered in September 1997.
Question 1. (continued) How many are actually operational today?
Answer. The government of Mexico (GOM) is required to provide
actual UH-1H operational status on a bimonthly basis. According to the
latest GOM report, 41 UH-1H helicopters were operational on October 1,
1997.
Question 1. (continued) Does it concern you that senior Mexican
officials told Members of Congress last Thursday that 63 of the 73
helicopters ``are flying'' when that number turned out to be 16 of 48
(with 25 not even delivered)?
Answer. Yes, an official report from Mexico alleging 63 of the UH-
1H helicopters were operational during the estimated period in question
would concern us.
The U.S. Military Liaison Office in Mexico monitors the operational
status and supply status of parts ordered for the UH-1H aircraft. Also,
we review the status of each aircraft and major components for time
remaining before inspections and overhauls during End-Use Monitoring
visits.
The final 25 helicopters were delivered to Mexico in an operational
ready condition, during September. Of the 73 UH-1H aircraft available
on October 1, Mexico reported 41 were operational. Between October 1
and October 29, as many as eight additional helicopters could have been
repaired and made operationally ready. In any event, during the period
the comment was likely to have been made, we estimate the total
aircraft operational would not be more than 49. We can only speculate
on why a Mexican official might have reported 63 ``flying''.
Question 2. Is it correct that 80 percent of the missions flown by
these helicopters have been for ``reconnaissance''?
Answer. It is reasonable to estimate that eighty percent of the
missions flown by these helicopters have been for reconnaissance. Due
to the geography of Mexico and the operational limitations of the
single-engine UH-1H helicopter, it is inadequate for providing
effective airlift support in many regions of Mexico. Above 5,000 feet
altitude, the UH-1H has very limited lift capabilities. Major
production and transit areas in Mexico are commonly located at
altitudes of 8,000 to 11,000 feet above sea level. In lower altitude
regions such as the Yucatan Peninsula, the thick jungle canopy and
scarcity of landing areas frequently prevents the effective use of
helicopters as a transport. Therefore, the UH-1H aircraft are largely
used for reconnaissance and ground force coordination to support
eradication and interdiction operations.
Question 2. (continued) Why were we told by our government that
these helicopters were needed to enhance the Mexican military's rapid
mobility?
Answer. ONDCP has requested a response from the Department of
Defense.
Question 2. (continued) Have they used these helicopters in a
single interdiction to date?
Answer. Yes, Mexican UH-1H aircrews have specifically described
operations in which they have conducted reconnaissance to locate
narcotics trafficking and then coordinated with ground-based units to
intercept narcotics traffickers. In addition, they have identified
airfields, vehicles and other resources used by narcotraffickers.
DEFENSA (the Mexican Army and Air Force) has used this information for
subsequent interdiction operations. The helicopters have been deployed
to remote locations in support of interdiction operations that cannot
be adequately supported by surface transportation.
Question 3. Is it correct, as a senior Mexican official asserted
last week, that these helicopters do not provide adequate lift to carry
two men (plus crew)?
Answer. The single-engine UH-1H helicopter's performance is
adversely affected by high altitudes, temperatures, and humidity. In
regions such as the Yucatan and Baja California Peninsulas, the UH-1H
helicopters operate at low altitudes (relative to sea level) and can
effectively operate with a crew, passengers, and additional equipment.
However, Mexican narcotics production and trafficking largely occurs at
altitudes ranging from 5,000 to 11,000 feet above sea level.
Consequently, most UH-1H counterdrug operations occur at these high
altitudes. Due to performance limitations at these altitudes, the UH-1H
helicopters are often unable to carry more than their aircrew or a
small complement of personnel or cargo.
Question 3. (continued) Is it correct that Mexicans have purchased
16 MI-8 helicopters?
Answer. Actually, the government of Mexico has purchased more than
16 MI-8 helicopters. For example, 11 MI-8 and three MI-1/7 helicopters
were undergoing acceptance inspection and testing at Mexican Military
Air Base I simultaneously with the 25 UH-1H helicopters delivered in
September 1997. Mexico's Army, Air Force and Navy already had
operational MI-8/17 fleets prior to the delivery of these aircraft.
Question 3. (continued) Why didn't they purchase U.S.-made
helicopters?
Answer. There are principally three reasons why Mexico may have
decided to purchase MI-8/17 helicopters:
The initial purchase package was less expensive than that
offered by the U.S. for UH-1 aircraft.
The high altitude performance of the MI-8/17 helicopters is
better than the UH-1.
Depending on how the purchase of UH-1's was structured, it
could have included U.S. end use monitoring requirements. There
is no end use monitoring associated with the purchase of MI-8/
17 helicopters.
Questions Submitted by Senator Grassley
Accuracy in Labeling in Report
Question 1. In the September Report to Congress, you reference,
under a sub heading entitled ``Operation Success,'' a large seizure in
excess of 2.7 tons of cocaine in August of this year is highlighted as
an example of the benefits of increased cooperation. This shipment of
cocaine happened to be floating off the coast of Acapulco. U.S.
information was developed, and assets of U.S. law enforcement pursued
the smugglers. However, despite the Mexican Navy's response, the crew
of the ``go fast'' vessel jettisoned the drugs and escaped. There were
no arrests, no determination of who was responsible for shipment, who
was going to receive the drugs--and the boats that smuggled the cocaine
got away. All we have is the cocaine, which is not even a blip on the
screen. How do you call that success?
Answer. Objective 3 of Goal 4 of the National Drug Control Strategy
calls for improving ``bilateral and regional cooperation with Mexico as
well as other cocaine and heroin transit zone countries in order to
reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.'' Point 14 of
the Declaration of the Mexican/U.S. Alliance Against Drugs, signed by
Presidents Clinton and Zedillo in May, 1997 calls for our two countries
to ``improve our capability to interrupt drug shipments by air, land,
and sea.'' The events of August 1997, described in the Report to
Congress on Bilateral Counterdrug Cooperation under the heading
``Operational Success,'' are examples of successful drug interdiction.
Nearly three tons of cocaine were prevented from entering Mexico
for further transshipment to the United States. Certainly we would have
preferred to have arrested the crew of the go-fast vessel, but the
seizure of such a quantity of cocaine is nonetheless a success. The
Mexican Navy and U.S. law enforcement worked together to interdict
cocaine--a phenomenon we strongly encourage.
Extradition
Question 2. Mexico has extradited some criminals to the United
States, mostly foreign nationals. How many outstanding extradition
requests do we have for persons presently incarcerated or under arrest
in Mexico for drug offenses? What is the status of these requests? How
many major drug figures are included in these numbers?
Answer. The number of active extradition requests pending in Mexico
fluctuates. As a general matter, the United States has approximately
120 provisional arrests or extradition requests that are considered to
be active (the fugitives have either been arrested or located, or
information on their whereabouts has not been exhausted or negated).
Approximately one third of these active matters are narcotics-related,
although this percentage also fluctuates.
Our records show that as of December 18, 1997, 13 individuals for
whom we have sought extraditions for drug offenses are known to be
under arrest in Mexico. In five of those cases (four involving Mexican
nationals), extradition has been granted by the Government of Mexico,
but appeals are being pursued by the fugitives. In three other cases,
extradition has been granted, but the fugitives must complete their
Mexican sentences before being surrendered. One case involving a
Mexican national is still awaiting an initial decision by the presiding
court. In the remaining cases, the United States has not yet submitted
formal extradition petitions. It is difficult to characterize drug
figures as major and minor, but we would estimate that at least five of
the defendants included in the above-noted cases are or were in
significant positions in large drug trafficking organizations.
Question 3. Last week, before the House Judiciary Committee, Mr.
Hutchinson asked a former cartel member what he felt was the greatest
tool or weapon that law enforcement has against drug traffic. The
answer was simple and straight forward: Extradition. To quote, ``that
is the real weapon that the United States can wield to end the war
against drugs . . .'' I realize he was speaking of Colombia, but its
only logical that the same would hold true for Mexico. What actions is
the United States taking to pressure Mexico to extradite drug
traffickers? I am aware of the current list of those who have been
extradited or expelled, but how does this compare with the number of
outstanding requests that the United States has with the GOM? Do you
believe that the GOM would extradite Ramon Arellano-Felix, now on the
FBI's 10 most wanted list, to the US if he is arrested? Do you feel the
GOM is presently making a full faith effort to pursue and capture him?
Answer. The United States is continuing to work very closely with
our Mexican counterparts to improve the bilateral extradition
relationship not only with respect to drug traffickers, but also with
respect to violent and heinous criminals who flee across the common
border. The basic, if ever changing, numbers and statistics in the area
of extradition requests to Mexico are set forth in the response to
Question (2). Although there is clearly room for improvement in the
number of fugitive surrenders each year by both governments, the
extradition or expulsion of more than 20 fugitives by Mexico already in
1997 is a sign of continuing improvement. With regard to your question
about Ramon Arellano-Felix, there does seem to be a good faith
commitment by the Government of Mexico to locate and apprehend him,
particularly because of the increasing violence being perpetrated by
the Arellano-Felix Organization against law enforcement officials and
witnesses in Mexico.
Weapons
Question 4. My understanding is that Mexico has indicated that
there is no possibility of resolving the issue of U.S. personnel at the
borders carrying weapons on official duty in Mexico. In the past,
especially in the border areas, Mexican police assigned as security for
U.S. law enforcement have been in the pay of drug cartels. They have
been armed by those cartels. This means no security. It also means the
potential for compromising operations or information received by border
task forces. What are the chances for a resolution on this issue? How
do you plan to deal with the situation if a U.S. official is killed or
kidnapped?
Answer. Because of concern for the safety of U.S. law enforcement
personnel, we have decided not to assign them to the border task forces
until we are satisfied that adequate measures are in place to assure
their safety. Both the U.S. and Mexican governments are concerned with
the safety of law enforcement personnel, and are working hard to ensure
every measure available is considered to assure that safety. It is
counter-productive to discuss in a public forum what those measures are
or might be. If an agent were kidnapped or killed it would be a human
tragedy and a setback to our drug policy. We will take every reasonable
action to prevent such an event from happening.
Certification
Question 5. The most recent High Level Contact Group meeting
allowed for a careful review of the current state of cooperation
between the United States and Mexico. Last year seizures, eradication,
and destruction of labs and runways were all increased and all listed
as reasons for certifying Mexico. Do you believe that Mexican efforts
in these areas are equal to or greater than their efforts last year?
Should Congress then expect similar or greater numbers in these areas?
Answer. Bilateral counterdrug cooperation between the U.S. and
Mexico improved last year. The GOM has increased drug seizures, illicit
drug crop eradication, and the destruction of labs and runways. We
consider these actions important indicators of the strong political
will of the Zedillo Administration to combat drug trafficking.
Questions Submitted by Senator Biden
Transferring 73 UH-1H Helicopters to the Mexican Air Force
Question 1. You testified that the Department of Defense is
``transferring 73 UH-1H helicopters to the Mexican Air Force . . . and
four C-26 fixed wing turboprop aircraft'' for use in counterdrug
efforts. The reports submitted to Congress indicated that all
helicopters would be delivered by September. How many of these aircraft
have been transferred to date? Are all of the aircraft which have been
transferred fully operable? What is the average number of flying hours
per month logged by these aircraft? What type and how many similar
aircraft--in addition to these transferred assets--does the Mexican
Armed Forces devote to counter drug efforts?
Answer. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, the GOM has
received all 73 UH-1H helicopters programmed to be transferred. The
last 25 helicopters were delivered in September 1997. The GOM is
required to provide actual UH-1H operational status on a bimonthly
basis. According to the most recent published report 41 UH-1H
helicopters were operational on October 1, 1997.
The Department of Defense is responsible for End-Use Monitoring of
the aircraft in question, including review of the number of flight
hours logged for which type missions. The Department of Defense will
respond separately to these questions.
Enhanced Maritime Interdiction Cooperation
Question 2. Your statement indicated that there is enhanced
cooperation in maritime interdiction. Has there been any effort to
reach a formal agreement on cooperative maritime efforts with Mexico,
such as are currently in place between the United States and several
nations in the Caribbean? If not, why not? If so, what has been the
result of such discussions? Are these discussions likely to result in
an agreement in the near future?
Answer. The main objective of our maritime interdiction
relationships with transit zone countries is to achieve the most rapid
and effective response to drug smuggling cases possible. Formal
maritime counterdrug agreements help achieve that objective.
Mexico has significant constitutional and political obstacles to
entering into a formal maritime counterdrug agreement such as we enjoy
with other nations in the region. Mexico's military organizations are
prohibited from conducting combined operations with U.S. forces.
However, the Mexican government in general, and the Mexican Navy in
particular, is very aware of the maritime narcotics threat to their
nation. They are being proactive, within the bounds established by
their resources and Constitution.
The U.S. Coast Guard has a long standing cooperative relationship
with the Mexican Navy in the areas of search and rescue, marine
environmental protection, and fisheries law enforcement. They also
improved the level of cooperation with the Mexican Navy in maritime
drug interdiction. Communications links have been established for the
purpose of exchanging tactical interdiction information between USCG
and Mexican Navy operational units. The Mexican Navy has been
responsive in many cases, and has implemented their own operation to
complement Operation GULF SHIELD taking place at our Gulf of Mexico
border. The USCG and Mexican Navy also conduct ``coincidental''
operations which involve unique coordination procedures, but, in
essence, accomplish many of the objectives ``combined'' operations do
with other nations.
A good working relationship currently exists, and both sides are
working closely together at all levels, including the U.S.-Mexico High
Level Contact Group (HLCG), to block maritime transportation of illegal
drugs more effectively. We are moving ahead by continuing to build a
relationship of familiarity and trust through informal contact, and are
steadily expanding ``coincidental'' operational cooperation.
Question 3. The Washington Post of November 2, 1997 reported on an
incident involving a Border Patrol agent in Texas finding narcotics
stashed on a railway freight car. Does any agency of the Executive
Branch have reason to believe that any Mexican freight companies are
owned or controlled by organizations involved in narcotics trafficking?
Answer. We would be pleased to discuss with the Senator such
information as is available to agencies of the Executive Branch in a
classified setting, understanding that we cannot comment on ongoing
cases.
Asset Forfeiture
Question 4. The Report to Congress highlights deficiencies in
Mexico's asset forfeiture law. For example, the report notes that the
law does not provide for in rem civil forfeiture proceeding, and does
not provide for international forfeiture cooperation and asset sharing.
What steps is Mexico taking to remedy these deficiencies? What steps is
the United States taking to encourage Mexico to address these
deficiencies? Are assets which are seized under the Mexican law
converted for use by law enforcement authorities?
Answer. As noted in the September Report to Congress on Bilateral
Counter-drug Cooperation, Mexico has made progress in improving its
asset forfeiture laws. The GOM has engaged in a serious effort to
revise and enact legislation that should position it to confiscate the
proceeds of crime as part of its domestic prosecutions, and to
cooperate to an even greater extent with the United States and other
countries.
Mexico's Organized Crime Law was enacted in November 1996, and
provides for the freezing and forfeiture of assets related to the
underlying organized criminal offense. Under the law, seized assets can
be used and disposed of, as determined by a government council. Draft
legislation is currently pending that would regulate Mexican agencies
involved in seizing assets by setting guidelines on how to administer
the seized assets so that they remain stable until final adjudication.
The Organized Crime Law provides for the pre-trial restraint and
seizure of assets that might be subject to forfeiture, as well as
supervising the maintenance and custody of restrained assets.
Enhanced Maritime Interdiction Cooperation
Question 5. How much has the Mexican government expended, at the
national level, on counternarcotics efforts in 1997? How does that
compare to the previous two years?
Answer. Although the GOM does not disclose the amount of funds
expended for counternarcotics efforts, increased maritime efforts and
enhanced communication along the border suggest an increase in the
amount expended by the GOM.
Given President Zedillo's decision to temporarily expand the role
of the Mexican military in counterdrug missions, development of
effective military counterdrug capabilities was essential. The two
governments began cooperating on an extensive range of issues involving
U.S. and Mexican military counterdrug interdiction efforts. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has established a highly successful
training and equipment program for the development of an air-mobile,
rapid-reaction, counterdrug capability to support drug interdiction
efforts in Mexico. In FY97, Mexican personnel filled about 1500 quotas
in U.S. conducted counternarcotics training: this represents over 825
individuals trained in a mix of skills and the training was fairly
evenly split among Mexican Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel. In
FY98, Mexicans will fill over 1000 training quotas in counternarcotics-
related training. Among its training, this program includes aircraft
maintenance training, communications training, intelligence and
counterintelligence training, UH-1H pilot training, Special Forces
training, cadre development, and maritime counterdrug training.
Maritime counterdrug operations gained new significance in FY 97,
as both governments recognized the increased threat posed by maritime
transport of cocaine, marijuana, precursor and essential chemicals, and
other related contraband, both in commercial shipping and in smaller,
high performance ``go-fast'' boats. Mexico and the United States made
advances in the areas of training, information exchange, and
cooperative maritime law enforcement.
DOD and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) developed a maritime
counterdrug training program to train Mexican naval forces for
operations in a marine/coastal and riverine environment. More than 600
Mexican Navy personnel will receive this training in 1997. Mexico also
acquired two U.S. Knox class frigates for use in a maritime counterdrug
role, and DOD will provide training to assist in developing this
capability.
U.S./Mexico Cooperation
Question 1. How would you respond to the charge that all the
ongoing meetings between us and the Mexicans (the HLCG, the U.S./Mexico
Binational Commission, and technical and consultative groups), we
suffer from the phenomenon of ``always being in a huddle and never
running a play?'' Do you agree that the U.S. should be prepared to
assist Mexico by funding salaries and expenses for law enforcement
personnel as well as training them?
Answer. Regular, senior level drug policy meetings between
officials of both governments are essential because they maintain high
level attention and commitment to the drug issue and make progress on
specific issues more likely. The High Level Contact Group (HLCG), for
example, has produced a joint assessment of the drug threat and is
finalizing a common strategy against the drug threat. These documents,
along with the Declaration of the Mexican/U.S. Alliance Against Drugs,
help focus and prioritize cooperation on the common drug issue.
Attempting to work specific drug initiatives in the absence of higher
level governmental involvement would be futile.
As examples of concrete progress resulting from high level
cooperation, Mexico has criminalized money laundering and is working
with relevant U.S. agencies to develop a capability to implement and
enforce those new laws. Mexico has facilitated procedures to authorize
counterdrug overflight and refueling, and we are jointly exploring
enhanced counterdrug coordination at sea. Effective binational
information sharing and operational coordination halted the use of the
cartels of large cargo airplanes to ship cocaine from Colombia to the
U.S.-Mexico border region and onward into the United States. Mexico has
invited U.S. technical support in its effort to strengthen its
counterdrug institutions and is beginning the complex process of
restructuring the country's judicial infrastructure.
As a result of military-to-military cooperation and the efforts of
the bilateral working group, we achieved agreement on port visits,
refueling, overflight request coordination, and overnight stays. The
Mexicans have consistently supported this agreement and the resulting
cooperation has improved bilateral detection, monitoring, and
interdiction.
In its efforts to develop a corruption-free anti-narcotics force,
the government of Mexico (GOM) is advancing a significantly enhanced
package of pay and benefits for the members of the vetted units. These
units and their continued expansion are part of a comprehensive GOM
strategy to reform the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) overall.
The PGR has improved its recruitment and selection procedures, and has
expanded its training course for judicial police from nine months to
two years. We believe the U.S. could assist Mexico with salaries and
expenses for law enforcement personnel, if funds were made available,
however, Mexico has been unwilling to consider such assistance due to
sovereignty concerns.
__________
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Jeffrey Davidow,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms
1. Effects of Political Changes
Question. With the recent changes in the political makeup of the
Mexican House of Delegates, what impact do you see this will have on
the future of US-Mexico counternarcotics cooperation? Is there a role
for Congress to play in fostering this understanding?
Answer. Mexico's mid-term elections held in July marked a momentous
step in the country's political transition. The dominant Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its absolute majority in the Chamber of
Deputies (the lower house of the Mexican Congress) for the first time
in the party's 68-year history. The majority in the chamber is now
narrowly held by a combination of four opposition parties, the two
largest of which are the left-of-center party of the Democratic
Revolution (PRD) and the right-of-center National Action Party (PAN).
These four parties have formed an informal alliance in the chamber
which has held together so far. We do not expect this new political
alignment to affect bilateral counternarcotics cooperation in a
fundamental way although the Mexican Congress has made clear that it
expects the executive branch to consult it on these and other issues.
Both governments recognize that causes and effects of the drug menace
are found on both sides of the border and that the security of both
nations is seriously threatened by drug trafficking. There is also
widespread agreement that continuing and enhancing our bilateral
cooperation against drugs is the only path that will yield significant
positive results. The opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies are
nonetheless intent on making the legislature function as a co-equal
branch of the government with the executive and driving home the point
that the PRI no longer dominates the lower house. We expect, therefore,
that there will be modifications to some government programs, greater
scrutiny of government budget initiatives, and increased congressional
demands for information in many fields, including counternarcotics
cooperation with the U.S. We do not see this as a cause for alarm but
rather as the normal functioning of a pluralistic democratic system. We
believe our own Congress can play an important role in enhancing
communications with Mexico, and in particular with Mexican legislators
as they expand their own voice in policymaking. We seek to facilitate
as much direct contact as possible between U.S. and Mexican
legislators.
2. Extradition
Question. Last week, before the House Judiciary Committee, Mr.
Hutchinson asked a former cartel member what he felt was the greatest
tool or weapon that law enforcement has against drug traffic. The
answer was simple and straightforward: Extradition. To quote, ``that is
the real weapon that the United States can wield to end the war against
drugs . . . Its the law that is much more strict and there is no way of
fixing it up . . .'' I realized that he was speaking of Colombia, but
it is only logical that the same would hold true for Mexico.
What actions is the United States taking to pressure Mexico to
extradite drug traffickers? Do you believe that the GOM would extradite
Arellano Felix, now on the FBI's 10 most wanted list, to the U.S. if he
is arrested? Do you feel that the GOM is presently making a full faith
effort to pursue and capture him? How many outstanding extradition
requests does the United States currently have with Mexico?
Answer. Extradition of drug traffickers from Mexico who are under
indictment in the United States is a very high priority for us. We make
this very clear to the Mexican government, frequently, and at high
levels. Mexico's willingness to make use of the limited discretion
available under its national law which permits its nationals to be
extradited under ``exceptional circumstances'' contributes greatly to
the strength of our cooperative efforts on fugitives issues. Mexico has
utilized this authority in cases relating to drug traffickers, and has
indicated that it will continue to consider utilizing the authority in
major drug trafficking cases. The barrier to U.S. prosecution of
Mexican fugitives posed by Mexican law is being overcome, but the
process is slow, and we are pressing Mexico to improve the pace. As of
November 15 of this year, Mexico has extradited thirteen fugitives to
the United States. Of the thirteen cases, six were extradited for drug
crimes. In addition, Mexico expelled ten others to the U.S. whose
extradition was requested. Of the ten, one is for drug related crimes.
There were no Mexican nationals among the 33 extradited or expelled to
the U.S. to date in 1997. In 1996, Mexico extradited one Mexican
national and one dual national to the United States, neither for drug
crimes. This year, in addition to the thirteen extraditions noted
earlier, Mexico has found four Mexican nationals to be extraditable to
the U.S. The surrender of these individuals has been deferred pending
appeals or completion of domestic sentences for crimes committed in
Mexico. Of these four extraditions, three are for drug offenses. The
Arellano Felix organization has been the subject of intensified efforts
by the U.S. and Mexican governments, as noted in the President's
``Report to Congress on Bilateral Counter-Drug Cooperation'' issued in
September and the ``U.S./Mexico Bi-National Drug Threat Assessment''
issued in May 1997. in the past 15 months, ten individuals within the
cartel's hierarchy have been arrested and are in prison. Last month,
the GOM provisionally arrested a high-level member of the organization,
Arturo Everardo Paez Martinez, who is a Mexican and not a dual
national. We are pursuing his extradition as ``exceptional'' to enable
his extradition to the United States despite Mexican nationality. With
respect to Ramon Arellano Felix, the head of this criminal
organization, we have filed our request with the Mexicans for a
provisional warrant for his arrest and have stressed to the Mexican
government the importance of capturing him for extradition to the U.S.
As of October 1997, there are approximately 126 active extradition
matters pending with the Government of Mexico.
3. Role of Radar in Drug Interdiction
Question. The percentage of illegal drugs crossing our border from
Mexico continues at an alarming rate. One of the main modes of
transportation for smuggling ventures responsible for drugs being
transshipped from South America through Mexico into the U.S. is through
the use of various aircraft. The role of ground based radar has proved
successful in the interdiction of illegal narcotics in other areas of
the world, including where there is a radar net in place in Mexico.
However, intelligence indicates that drug traffickers have learned to
circumvent the existing radar system and use alternate smuggling routes
as a result of gaps within the existing system. When President Zedillo
visited Washington in March of 1995, he promised the U.S. that Mexico
would establish a radar net to fill these gaps. To date, no radars have
been installed. What is your assessment of the threat of air smuggling
into and out of Mexico?
Answer. Patterns of drug transportation to and from Mexico have
evolved since large-scale air shipments were noted several years ago.
Drug smugglers now rely much more heavily on land and maritime surface
transportation. The question thus has become one of where to invest
Mexico's limited counterdrug resources. Installation of an expensive
ground-based radar system at this time would commit a large proportion
of Mexico's available resources against a relatively small proportion
of the drug traffic. The Mexican government has said that it believes
that a new radar system is not its most cost-effective counterdrug
investment under current circumstances.
4. Arms Smuggling
Question. Drug cartels and criminal organizations are very well
armed to facilitate their illegal enterprises. What is the United
States doing to prevent the trafficking of illegal firearms into Mexico
from the United States?
Answer. The United States shares Mexico's concern over the problem
of transnational illicit trafficking in firearms in our hemisphere,
particularly as it affects both our nations. As the President and
President Zedillo agreed in their May 1997 Alliance Against Drugs, the
United States worked closely with Mexico and other hemispheric nations
to develop the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives
and Related Materials. The Convention was signed at the OAS
headquarters in Washington on 14 November with Presidents Clinton and
Zedillo in attendance. The Convention, the first of its kind in the
world, was based on a Mexican proposal presented to the RIO group of
the OAS earlier this year. The original draft underwent significant
changes over 6 months as various OAS member states, including the U.S.,
offered language to make the agreement not only comprehensive but
enforceable. The agreement does not require changes to existing U.S.
laws or regulations concerning the purchase, possession, or
commercialization of items covered by the Convention. The U.S. is
already fulfilling by law or regulation the requirements contained in
this instrument. Instead, the Convention seeks to prevent the illegal
traffic of these items across borders by requiring signatories to,
inter alia, mark all firearms at the time of manufacture or
importation; designate a point of contact to facilitate the exchange of
relevant information concerning matters covered by the convention; make
the crimes of illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms,
etc. an extraditable offense, and pledge to exchange relevant technical
information to improve their respective effectiveness in combating this
crime.
The United States also worked intensely over the last four years as
part of an OAS group of experts of the Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission's (CICAD) to develop a package of model regulations
to control the movement of firearms, ammunition and firearms parts and
components, which was approved in a CICAD general assembly held in Lima
in early November and which will complement the terms of the
convention. In addition, Mexico and the United States, through the
bilateral high-level group, have made significant progress in the areas
of confidence building among our respective law enforcement agencies in
information sharing, training, and the tracing of firearms used in
crimes.
5. Vetted Units
Question. I understand that U.S. agents who have been assigned to
the Border Task Forces (BTF) are often senior experienced
investigators. They are working with their Mexican counterparts who,
due in large part to the strict vetting process, are very inexperienced
and relatively new to law enforcement work. Currently, the BTF lacks
secure communications, and U.S. law enforcement personnel cannot bring
their firearms when they cross into Mexico. Earlier this year there
were also questions as to the availability of basic equipment for the
BTF.
What is the current state of readiness for the BTF? When do you
expect them to be fully operational? What U.S. or Mexican resources are
necessary to bring the BTF up to speed? Does this mean that we have
vetted units operational that are not working because they need
assistance from the experienced U.S. agents?
Answer. We are working steadily with Mexican authorities to get the
border task forces fully functional. The Zedillo administration's
pursuit of far-reaching institutional reform has had an impact on the
border task forces (BTF). In April, the Mexican government announced
that personnel of the BTFs would be replaced by the top graduates of
the May 1997 PGR Academy class, who would be properly vetted. The
vetting process examines them for drug usage, checks their personal
finances and lifestyle, and subjects them to polygraph screening. The
three border task forces are based in Tijuana, with satellites in
Mexacali, San Luis Rio Colorado and Nogales; Ciudad Juarez; and
Monterrey with satellites in Reynosa and Metamopas. All of these are
operational to a certain extent. Their actions since the restructuring
began in May have been limited to organizational activities as the new
personnel are screened and trained. In addition to 70 Mexican law
enforcement agents, there are 150 military special reaction forces
assigned to the three border task forces. In July, the GOM formally
authorized an increase in the number of U.S. law enforcement personnel
assigned to Mexico, adding six DEA and six FBI special agents to
support U.S. investigations and work with Mexican counterparts.
6. Money Laundering
Question. In May, 1996, Mexico passed legislation as part of the
Mexico Criminal Code that for the first time makes money laundering a
criminal offense. Because of the international aspect of money
laundering, cooperation between countries when investigating money
laundering cases is essential.
Has the level of cooperation and information sharing improved
between Mexico and the United States since this legislation passed? Has
any individual or organization been charged under this new law and if
not, why? Also, have any institutions been identified as laundering
problems? What kind of intelligence sharing between US and Mexican
investigators is occurring?
Answer. We engage the Government of Mexico on money laundering
primarily through a Treasury Department-led interagency working group
of the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group. Cooperation between the
U.S. and Mexico in the area of money laundering has increased in the
last year and a half. The U.S. and Mexico share information on
individual cases and are working together on a number of
investigations. On at least two occasions, Mexican officials have
testified in the U.S. Additionally, earlier this year, as the result of
a joint investigation with U.S. Customs, Hacienda agents seized
approximately 16 million dollars in 11 bank accounts belonging to
reputed drug trafficker Roberto Gaxiola-Medina. Mexico and the U.S.
also are exchanging some information to try to determine overall trends
in money laundering. The Government of Mexico, for example, has
provided Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) with
data regarding currency reports it receives on currency being brought
into Mexico from the U.S. FINCEN has compared this data to U.S.
information and provided the resulting report to the Mexican
government. In the past, the U.S. has voiced its concern regarding the
status of money laundering prosecutions in Mexico. The Government of
Mexico has indicated that 15 successful money laundering convictions
have been obtained in Mexico since 1994, and that there have been four
indictments this year under the new law. There have been no convictions
as yet. One major concern arises from a Mexican court ruling earlier
this year in a still ongoing case. A judge ruled in the case of money
laundering charges against Raul Salinas that such charges could not be
brought until Salinas had been convicted for the underlying predicate
offense. This could diminish substantially the incentive to prosecute
money laundering, and the prospects for a successful prosecution. The
Government of Mexico has reported that it is appealing the Salinas
decision and that it is considering legislative measures to clarify the
authority to prosecute money laundering under less stringent
evidentiary standards.
7. Secure Communications
Question. It is my understanding that as recent as two weeks ago
the availability of secure lines for communication with vetted units in
Mexico has not been resolved. In addition, I have heard reports that
there is no secure communications between our consulates and the
Embassy in Mexico City. As I am sure you are aware, secure
communications is essential to running not only a successful foreign
policy but in conducting a proper investigation. What is your
understanding of this problem and is there a solution underway?
Answer. Arrangements for secure communications with Mexican
military headquarters, the Border Task Forces (BTFs), and Mexican
military elements along the border are moving ahead, albeit slowly.
Much of the delay is caused by Mexican indecision on such factors as
how best to operationally employ secure communications with the U.S.
within the structure of the various Mexican organizations. We continue
working closely with Mexican authorities to resolve such questions and
move ahead with installation and testing of the necessary equipment.
With respect to secure communications between our Embassy in Mexico
City and consulates, classified communications currently exist by means
of secure voice and classified fax. In addition, links using STU-III
technology are being established between the consulates and the
Embassy's Classified Local Area Network (CLAN). This will allow users
in consulates to send and receive classified record communications
traffic as well as send and receive classified e-mail through the
Mexico City CLAN. The first link (with Consulate General Monterrey) is
being installed and tested during the first week of December 1997, with
country-wide installation scheduled for the following six months.
Priority will be given to the larger consulates.
Questions Submitted by Senator Biden
Question. In your statement, you indicated that the extradition of
four Mexican nationals wanted on drug charges in the United States were
``postponed pending completion of their appeals or sentences for crimes
committed in Mexico.'' Please provide the following:
The names of these individuals, and whether their
extradition has been postponed because of (a) appeal; or
(b)sentencing for crimes committed in Mexico;
the criminal charges that they face in the United States,
and the name of the jurisdiction in which those charges are
filed;
the expected date of the resolution of their appeals, where
applicable.
Answer. The requested information on the four Mexican nationals is
as follows:
1. Jesus Emilio Rivera Pinon is wanted in the Southern District of
Texas on cocaine trafficking and conspiracy charges. He is serving a
prison sentence in Mexico and his surrender will therefore be deferred
until March 2002.
2. Jaime Arturo Ladino Avila: extradition granted in September 97;
he has filed an appeal challenging the GOM decision to extradite him.
Expected date for the resolution of the appeal is unknown. He is wanted
on federal narcotics trafficking charges in the District of Oregon.
Expected date for the resolution of the appeal is unknown. It is
difficult to state with any certainty how long an appeal process can
take to be resolved in Mexico. In the past, some cases have been
resolved in a few months, others have taken over a year.
3. Oscar Malherbe: extradition granted July 97; surrender deferred
to allow domestic prosecution for charges pending against him in
Mexico. (Malherbe is a former high-ranking member of the Garcia-Abrego
crime cartel.) He is wanted by the Southern District of Texas for
narcotics and money laundering.
4. Tirso Angel Robles: Robles was convicted in the Eastern District
of California on federal drug trafficking charges, and sentenced to 20
years. After serving 3 years, he escaped to Mexico. He was arrested in
Mexico pursuant to our extradition request. Extradition granted in
March 97. He has filed an appeal challenging the GOM decision to
extradite him. Expected date of the resolution of the appeal is
unknown.
Question. You indicated in your statement that the United States
and Mexico have reached agreement on the text of a protocol to the
U.S.-Mexican extradition treaty which will permit sequential trials in
the two countries in cases where there are charges against an
individual in each country.
When will this protocol be signed?
Does the protocol make any other revisions to the current
provisions of the bilateral extradition treaty? Are any other revisions
to the treaty under negotiation?
Do you expect that it will be submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent? If not, why not?
Answer. On November 13, 1997, the United States and Mexico signed a
protocol to the 1978 Extradition Treaty enabling temporary surrender of
persons wanted for trial in both countries. The protocol will be
transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
The protocol does not alter any other provision of the extradition
treaty, nor are any other amendments or additions to the treaty under
consideration.
__________
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to James S. Milford, Jr.,
Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.
Department of Justice
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms
U.S.-Mexico Cooperation
Question 1. DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine asserted earlier
this year that there is not a single Mexican law enforcement agency
with which DEA has a completely trusting relationship. Is there a
single Mexican law enforcement agency with which the DEA has a
completely trusting relationship today?
Answer. When the Administrator made that statement last March, it
was an accurate assessment of the situation at the time. Since then,
mechanisms have been put in place within the Mexican government that
DEA believes will help improve the integrity of individuals and units
with whom we work. The ultimate proof however, will be whether these
organizations are able to make cases which lead to the arrest and
incarceration of Mexico's major traffickers. Following the arrest of
General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, the Mexican Attorney General's Office
announced that it would commence extensive institutional reforms aimed
at professionalizing its law enforcement personnel. Currently, the
Government of Mexico (GOM), with significant U.S. support, has
initiated an integrity assurance program (``vetting process'') that
consists of personnel undergoing a battery of background checks,
psychological testing, urinalysis testing, polygraph testing, financial
background investigations, and a home visit of the candidates.
Recently, the FEADS stated that their plan calls for having a total
of 3,000 employees who will be fully vetted under Mexico standards. The
FEADS anticipate to have this accomplished by the end of their fiscal
year which is December 1, 1998. At the request of the Mexican
Government, the DEA, FBI and USCS have assisted in a second level
vetting process referred to as ``Super Vetted.'' The failure rate for
applicants in the super vetting process is approximately 40 percent. As
of December 1997, a total of 206 Mexican Agents and Prosecutors have
been super vetted, and 92 of these super vetted personnel have attended
a four week investigators course in the Washington, D.C. area. DEA in
conjunction with DOJ, FBI and US Customs Service will conduct
additional training sessions during FY 1998 for super vetted agents and
prosecutors. The first class is scheduled to commence during January
1998 and will consist of 45 candidates.
DEA believes that this vetting process is our best chance at
ensuring integrity with our counterparts and we further believe that
the GOM is taking appropriate steps to minimize corruption in drug law
enforcement. That said, it must be noted that no system is failsafe
from the corruptive influences of the major drug trafficking
organizations. The vetting process requires continual revalidation and
is only as good as highest level official who has been cleared.
It is DEA's intention to remain actively engaged with law
enforcement counterparts from Mexico in our mutual efforts to dismantle
the violent international drug trafficking syndicates.
Question 2. What cooperation does the DEA have with Mexican
counterparts today? Is that practical cooperation more or less active
than it was 12 months ago?
The level of information sharing today between DEA and our
Government of Mexico (GOM) counterparts has improved since early
January 1997, when the then-head of the INCD, General Gutierrez-
Rebollo, was arrested on corruption charges. Subsequent to the Generals
arrest, DEA suspended all information sharing with Mexican counterparts
until we could fully assess the damage done as a result of this
compromise. DEA lifted the temporary ban on information sharing in May
1997, and our agents assigned to our Mexico Country Offices began
sharing limited information with elements within the Organized Crime
Unit, and the Binational Task Forces (BTF's). However, because of agent
safety issues, our agents assigned to domestic border offices are not
engaged in any active information sharing with the BTF'S, and will not
fully participate until the safety issues are resolved satisfactorily.
In response to General Gutierrez's arrest, the GOM announced the
disbanding the INCD because of rampant corruption, and the commencement
of extensive institutional reforms aimed at professionalizing its law
enforcement personnel. One of these measures includes the complete
screening of all personnel hired or retained by the PGR, as described
in Question # 1. This process--which includes significant U.S.
support--has resulted in the creation of specialized units with whom
DEA is sharing information on a limited basis. While this process is
still ongoing and not all units are fully functional, DEA is encouraged
by these steps. In particular, two current bilateral investigations
continue to progress and to date, no compromise of information or
intelligence has been detected. In addition, elements within the GOM
have been particularly forthcoming in sharing with DEA documents seized
during the course of raids on associates of major drug trafficking
organizations.
DEA recognizes that the vetting process is not the ultimate answer
to the corruption problem; however, we believe the process is a
significant step in the right direction. Since the inception of DEA
programs in Mexico, our agents have always been obliged to be
particularly circumspect in the sharing of information with Mexican
counterparts. The GOM has been wrestling with widespread corruption
among its law enforcement officers for decades. DEA Agents have been
forced to operate in a manner that requires a continual weighing of the
pros and cons of passing information to Mexican counterparts. Much of
the information we deal with is sensitive and thus cannot be passed
unless there are persuasive reasons to believe in the integrity of the
Mexican unit with whom we are dealing. The reality is that, although we
work with certain counterparts who are now deemed to have a high degree
of integrity, we have no control over the entire chain of command, and
cannot predict what will happen to the information that is passed on.
Question 3. With respect to the importance of intelligence to
identify contraband, do you think that the DEA and other US law
enforcement officials should be allowed more routine contact with
counterparts and others on the Mexican side of the border to gather
this information? We have been told that these personnel have to clear
all such contacts through our Embassy in Mexico City.
Guidance regarding clearance of contacts has been established by
US/GOM agreement and is further defined by US mission policy. The
guidance is meant to ensure agent safety and investigative
coordination, not to impede bilateral cooperation.
At each of our six offices in Mexico, DEA has direct contact with
our Mexican counterparts. With plans underway to open DEA offices in
Tijuana and Juarez, we anticipate that those contacts will expand.
Bilateral Border Task Forces/Organized Crime Unit
Question 1. The ONDCP report describes the border task forces as
the ``cornerstone'' of US cooperation. How has and how will the DEA
support these BTF'S? Are new DEA personnel accredited in Mexico posted
there yet? When exactly will DEA personnel be permanently posted in US
consulates on the border?
Answer. In 1996, DEA conceived of the idea of establishing three
Bilateral Task Forces (BTF) located in Juarez, Monterrey, and Tijuana.
These elite units were envisioned to be staffed by DEA, FBI, and U.S.
Customs Agents who would work hand in hand with Mexican counterparts,
utilizing investigative leads from all participating agencies to target
the major narcotics trafficking organizations operating on both sides
of the border.
However, the BTF's are not fully staffed and are not yet truly
operational. The primary hindrance to full implementation of, and U.S.
law enforcement participation in, the BTFs has been the issue of agent
safety. DEA realizes that this is a very sensitive issue with the GOM,
but until this issue is satisfactorily resolved, DEA will not assign
cross-border agents to the BTFS. Without active U.S. support and
direction, the prospects of future success of the BTFs are dim.
However, if and when the safety issue is resolved, DEA anticipates
supporting the BTFs as originally envisioned, with agents assigned to
work full-time in the BTFs and to share information with the BTFs on a
daily basis.
Besides the safety issue, there are other problems with the BTFS.
There has been a revolving door of Mexican officers assigned to the
BTFS, some of questionable integrity. The GOM has furnished only
$600,000 in equipment/resources to the BTFs in 1997. This assistance
has been in the form of vehicles, technical equipment, and small
purchases. This figure falls short of the $2.4 million originally
pledged by the GOM. As of mid-September, at their request, the GOM
began financing the expenses related to office/safehouse rent and/or
maintenance. As a result, DEA is not supporting the BTFs financially.
As of December 1997, The GOM has staffed the BTFs with 41 young
agents and 2 commandantes who have been super vetted, and who have
recently attended the training program in the United States. These
agents come from a variety of backgrounds, but have no prior law
enforcement experience. Some have college degrees in professions such
as accounting, engineering and law. Those who do not possess a college
degree have a high school education along with prior work experience.
All of the agents are assigned from other cities within Mexico, causing
them to live apart from their families, as well as operating in an area
where they do not have a working knowledge of the major drug
traffickers. The agents appear to be very eager and energetic; however,
they lack direction and a mission. In short, the agents are hindered by
their lack of law enforcement experience, their lack of familiarity in
the area to which they have been assigned, and a lack of leadership.
Until the safety issue is resolved, and DEA is able to assign
agents to the BTFS, we will be supporting the BTFs from newly-
established offices in Juarez and Tijuana. A primary responsibility of
the six new agents assigned to those two offices will be to support BTF
investigations. We anticipate those offices opening in early 1998.
However, each of these two DEA offices will have only three agents each
and their duties will include other responsibilities, such as,
providing equipment, training and financial assistance to our Mexican
counterparts and, providing investigative leads to our domestic
offices.
Question 2. What support has and will the DEA provide to the
formation and operation of the new Organized Crime Unit? Special Anti-
Drug Prosecutor's Office (FEADS)? Financial Crimes Unit?
Answer. DEA's primary support to the Organized Crime Unit (OCU),
FEADS, and BTF units consist of law enforcement training, investigative
advise and assistance in the screening process for new candidates. In
August and September 1997, DEA sponsored a four-week intensive
investigative analysis seminar at the Xerox Training Center in
Leesburg, Virginia for approximately 80 BTF and OCU personnel.
In addition, these units will become the primary recipients of
sensitive law enforcement information. In an effort to begin this
process, DEA agents from the Mexico City Office work daily with agents
and prosecutors of the SFU and OCU providing investigative guidance.
DEA's interaction with the Financial Crimes Unit is done through
the Fiscalia or FEADS, which interacts with the Hacienda, or Treasury
Office, of which the Financial Crimes unit is a part.
Seizures in Mexico
Question 1. Do the Mexicans have an adequate strategy,
infrastructure and resources to inspect cargo entering and transiting
their country? Do they inspect the millions of containers arriving at
their port from South America each year? For example, do they have
adequate customs inspection at their ports? How have they improved
their maritime operations? What steps have we taken to assist the
Mexicans to improve their own ``customs'' inspection? Does the US
Government have information that the same drugs seized by Mexican
authorities and credited to their seizure statistics later end up back
on the illicit drug market?
Answer. The U.S. Customs Service can more appropriately address
Customs-related issues, but on the question of adequate inspection of
cargo in Mexico, it is probably safe to say that no country, including
the United States, can thoroughly inspect the voluminous quantities of
cargo that transits its borders. DEA's interaction with the Mexican
Customs Service occurs primarily through the Information Analysis
Center (IAC), and consists of coordinating the passing of leads through
the IAC and CENDRO (Mexican Intelligence Center) to appropriate
response teams, including Mexican Customs. Mexican Customs is also
involved in drug seizures at highway checkpoints and other entry points
in Mexico. Our experience regarding these seizures is that oftentimes,
there is not a coordinated effort to conduct a follow-up investigation
subsequent to a seizure. Whereas for DEA, investigations begin when a
seizure occurs, to determine the source, controller, and recipient of
the drugs, in Mexico, the seizure itself represents the entire case,
with little or no follow-up investigation.
There have been sporadic reports of drugs seized by Mexican
authorities that end up back in circulation. For example, earlier this
year, 17 suspects--most of whom had some type of official position--
were arrested in San Luis Rio Colorado, in conjunction with the theft
of 476 kilograms of cocaine that had been seized and was in a holding
facility. The investigation into that incident is continuing.
In addition, neither DOS nor DOJ has any mechanisms in place or
agreements with the GOM for independent verification of the destruction
of seized drugs.
U.S. Law Enforcement Weapons-Carrying
Question 1. Do any DEA personnel assigned to Mexico carry weapons
today for their own defense? Which positions and what diplomatic
credentials do these persons hold? Isn't it correct that such officers
to whom the Mexicans have given full diplomatic immunities do routinely
carry their weapons in Mexico today? Will DEA ``commuter'' agents
assigned to the BTF's be authorized to carry weapons? Will the
``consular immunity'' that the Mexicans are offering to ``commuter''
agents offer them any protection from arrest or prosecution if they do
choose to carry their weapons?
Answer. In May 1997, the GOM agreed to grant privileges and
immunities (Consular Immunity) to 22 domestic Special Agents to cross
the border and participate in the BTF program. While this type of
immunity accredits DEA personnel, it is the lowest form of diplomatic
immunity and it does not protect them from personal, criminal, or civil
actions, nor does it allow them to carry firearms for self protection.
Thus, the firearms issue continues to be unresolved. Because of these
limitations, the DEA has decided that 22 domestic ``commuter agents''
designated for the BTFs cannot cross the border unarmed.
Thirty-eight (38) of DEA's in-country agents located at the
resident offices and at the Embassy also have been granted only
Consular Immunity status. The only DEA employee in Mexico with full
diplomatic immunity is our Country Attache.
If you require further details on the weapons issue, we are
available to discuss it in a closed meeting.
Money Laundering Cases
Question 1. What priority do you attach to building money
laundering cases? Is it your policy that we should do more to increase
such prosecutions? What specific steps are being taken to build more
such cases right here in the United States?
Answer. DEA places a high priority on the investigation of money
laundering cases. The ability to dispose of and legitimize their cash
has created a tremendous concern for drug traffickers. Today, the risk
of a theft of the traffickers' funds or the interception by law
enforcement is too great for the major trafficker. Their funds are
transferred from one account to another before the controlled
substances are exchanged. By following or tracing these drug proceed
transfers, we are able to build historical drug trafficking conspiracy
investigations.
A money laundering investigation is one of many tools within our
investigative arsenal that we employ consistently when investigating
drug traffickers. Today, DEA Headquarters as well as all Domestic Field
Divisions have groups of Special Agents dedicated to the initiation and
development of long term money laundering investigations. However,
intelligence indicates that the traffickers have now turned to the bulk
shipment of currency back to Colombia and Mexico, in lieu of investing
their proceeds in the U.S.
Currently, DEA has instituted steps to initiate more drug money
laundering cases in the United States. We intend to conduct more
financial investigative and asset forfeiture training. We further
intend to increase our staffing in that area, which historically has
resulted in voluminous seizures and extensive arrests. Additionally, we
believe as we increase the quality of our investigations, the increases
in prosecution will be a natural out growth of this endeavor.
Additional Questions From Senator Helms
Question 1. You indicated that ``plans call for a total of 2,000
fully Mexican-vetted employees.''
What is the projected timetable for accomplishing this goal?
What resources is the DEA committing to assist Mexico
achieve this goal?
Answer. Recently, the FEADS stated that their plan for having a
total of 2,000 employees who will be fully vetted increased to 3,000
employees. The FEADS anticipate to have this accomplished by the end of
their fiscal year which is December 1, 1998.
Presently, DEA's focus in this endeavor is assisting the FEADS and
PGR in the creation and maintenance of the special units, i.e., the OCU
and the BTFS. In addition to regular Mexican vetting standards, DEA,
FBI and USCS have assisted the Mexican Government in a second level
vetting process referred to as ``Super Vetted.'' The failure rate for
applicants in the super vetting process is approximately 40 percent.
Based upon GOM figures, as of December 1997, there are 796 employees
vetted under Mexican standards in the FEAD'S. Of these, a total of 206
Mexican Agents and Prosecutors have been super vetted, and 92 of these
super vetted personnel have attended a four week investigators course
in the Washington, D.C. area. DEA in conjunction with DOJ, FBI and US
Customs Service will conduct additional training sessions during FY
1998 for super vetted agents and prosecutors. The first class is
scheduled to commence during January 1998 and will consist of 45
candidates.
Question 2. In your testimony, you indicated that the Bilateral
Border Task Forces are not ``fully staffed'' yet, and have ``not
initiated investigations against the major traffickers in Mexico.''
What is the projected timetable for fully staffing the task
forces?
Have the task forces initiated any investigations at all?
Answer. The staffing requirements for the BTF's are set by the GOM.
As stated above, the GOM has staffed the BTFs with 41 young agents and
2 commandantes who have been super vetted, and who have recently
attended the training program in the United States. DEA has been
informed that more vetted agents will be assigned in the future. The
agents presently assigned come from a variety of backgrounds, but have
no prior law enforcement experience. Some have college degrees in
professions such as accounting, engineering and law. Those who do not
possess a college degree, have a high school education along with prior
work experience. All of the agents are assigned from other cities
within Mexico, causing them to live apart from their families, as well
as working where they are not familiar with the traffickers. The agents
appear to be very eager and energetic; however, they lack direction and
a mission. In short, the agents are hindered by their lack of law
enforcement experience, and their lack of familiarity in the area to
which they have been assigned
One of the primary programs for cooperative law enforcement efforts
with the GOM are the BTFS. These task forces have been established in
Tijuana, Mexicali, San Luis, Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, Monterrey and
Reynosa. Due to inexperience of the vetted agents, the ability of the
BTF's to collect intelligence and seize drugs has been limited. While
some of the BTF's have had limited success in pursuing low level
investigations, they have not met their primary objective of arresting
the leaders of the major syndicates and dismantling their
organizations.
In spite of the problems the BTF's have encountered over the last
few years, it seems that the Government of Mexico (GOM) has recently
made some effort to staff the BTF's with reputable personnel. Although
slow in coming, the GOM has also begun to support the BTF's with money
and resources. Despite the initial efforts by the GOM, the BTF's will
not be successful until they are staffed with experienced and reliable
management and senior personnel. This critical ingredient will be hard
to find, as qualified experienced law enforcement personnel in Mexico
are virtually nonexistent. This dilemma is manifested by the turnover
of personnel at the INCD and FEADS,since 1993. In the four years this
GOM narcotics enforcement agency has been in existence, there have been
six Administrators and five Attorneys Generals. To further complicate
the situation, in the spring of 1997, the INCD was disbanded and many
of its agents and managers were fired following the arrest of Gen.
Gutierrez-Rebollo. The BTF's and the FEADS are slowly rebuilding, and
without the guidance of DEA any success will be slow in coming.
Questions Submitted by Senator Charles Grassley
1. Trust vs. corruption
Question Mr. Milford, Administrator Constantine testified before
Congress this past year that ``there is not one single civilian law
enforcement institution in Mexico with whom DEA has a really trusting
relationship. That relationship is essential.'' He went on to say that
following the arrest of General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo on corruption
charges any information that was shared with Mexican officials was
considered compromised. What is the level of information sharing today
given that the corruption in Mexico is still a serious threat? Does the
DEA feel the working relationship and level of trust between law
enforcement agencies on both sides of the border has generally
improved, or do these same concerns exist?
Answer. The level of information sharing today between DEA and our
Government of Mexico (GOM) counterparts has improved from that of 10
months ago, when the then-head of the INCD, General Gutierrez-Rebollo,
was arrested on corruption charges. Subsequent to his arrest, DEA
suspended all information sharing with the Mexican counterparts until
we could fully assess the damage done as a result of this compromise.
DEA lifted the temporary ban on information sharing in May 1997, and
began sharing limited information with selected elements of the
Organized Crime Unit. However, we do not routinely share information
with the Binational Task Force Units.
In response to General Gutierrez's arrest, the GOM announced the
disbanding the INCD because of rampant corruption, and the commencement
of extensive institutional reforms aimed at professionalizing its law
enforcement personnel. One of these measures includes the complete
screening (``Mexican vetting'') of all personnel hired or retained by
the PGR. This process-which includes significant U.S. support--has
resulted in the creation of specialized units with whom DEA is sharing
information on a limited basis. While this process is still ongoing and
not all units are fully functional, DEA is encouraged by these steps.
In particular, two current bilateral investigations continue to
progress and to date, no compromise of information or intelligence has
been detected.
DEA also recognizes that no system is failsafe from the corruptive
influences of these major trafficking organizations. Since the
inception of DEA program in Mexico, our agents have always been obliged
to be particularly circumspect in the sharing of information with
Mexican counterparts. The GOM has been wrestling with widespread
incidences of corruption among its law enforcement officers for
decades. DEA Agents have been forced to operate in a manner that
requires a continual weighing of the pros and cons of passing
information to Mexican counterparts. Much of the information we deal
with is sensitive and thus cannot be passed unless there are persuasive
reasons to believe in the integrity of the involved Mexican unit. The
situation is exacerbated by the reality that, although we work with
certain counterparts who have demonstrated a high degree of integrity,
we have no control over the chain of command and eventual dissemination
of our information.
2. Vetted Units
Question With the arrest of the Mexican Drug Czar General Jesus
Gutierrez Rebollo on corruption charges, the existing vetted units were
disbanded. What is your assessment of the new expanded vetting process?
Answer. As discussed above, as a result of General Gutienez-
Rebollo's arrest, the anti-drug agency he headed was disbanded; however
not all of the vetted units were disbanded. DEA then imposed a
temporary suspension of information-sharing with the vetted units.
Since then, the GOM initiated a ``vetting'' process for all personnel.
This process includes background checks, psychological testing,
urinalysis, polygraph testing, financial checks and home visits. From
this cadre, personnel will be selected and undergo additional screening
as well as specialized training. Successful candidates will then be
assigned to a series of special units, i.e., the Bilateral Task Forces
and Organized Crime Unit.
Recently, the FEADS stated that their plan calls for having a total
of 3,000 employees who will be fully vetted under Mexico standards. The
FEADS anticipate to have this accomplished by the end of their fiscal
year which is December 1, 1998. At the request of the Mexican
Government, the DEA, FBI and USCS have assisted in a second level
vetting process referred to as ``Super Vetted''. The failure rate for
applicants in the super vetting process is approximately 40 percent. As
of December 1997, a total of 206 Mexican Agents and Prosecutors have
been super vetted, and 92 of these super vetted personnel have attended
a four week investigators course in the Washington, DC area. DEA in
conjunction with DOJ, FBI and US Customs Service will conduct
additional training sessions during FY 1998 for super vetted agents and
prosecutors. The first class is scheduled to commence during January
1998 and will consist of 45 candidates.
DEA believes that this vetting process is our best chance at
ensuring integrity with our counterparts and we further believe that
the GOM is taking appropriate steps to minimize corruption in drug law
enforcement. That said, it must be noted that no system is failsafe
from the corruptive influences of the major drug trafficking
organizations. The vetting process requires continual revalidation and
is only as good as highest level official who has been cleared.
__________
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Samuel H. Banks,
Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, Department of Treasury
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms
U.S./Mexico Cooperation
Question 1. DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine asserted earlier
this year that there is not a single Mexican law enforcement agency
with which DEA has a completely trusting relationship. Is there a
single Mexican law enforcement agency with which the U.S. Customs
Service has a completely trusting relationship today?
Answer. The Customs Service has a long history of working with the
Government of Mexico and continues to do so. Much of this cooperation
is with sections of the Mexican Finance Ministry (Hacienda), including
Mexican Customs. In the area of money laundering, for example, Customs
and Hacienda exchange information and work together on joint
investigations. While Customs is not at the point of declaring totally
open communication with Mexico, our experience of sharing information
with Hacienda on money laundering matters has been generally positive.
We have seen a positive change in Mexican Customs which began in
1992 with their ``clean sweep'' when, on a single day, the Mexican
Government terminated the old agency which had border responsibilities
and brought on an entire new force known as the Fiscal Police. The
personnel recruited for the new positions are better educated, better
paid, and highly trained.
Since then, the government has implemented other changes to
encourage integrity and minimize opportunities for corruption. No
longer are duties and other fees collected in cash at the border; all
financial exchanges are done via credit card arrangement and processed
through the special government bank. They have instituted a ``traffic
light'' system to identify shipments to be selected for close
inspection; when concerns arose that it might be vulnerable to
manipulation, they immediately set about perfecting it so that
selection is now absolutely random. Robot cameras have been installed
to monitor inspection personnel at all ports of entry.
Mexican Customs agents are now required to use official vehicles,
with the ``Hacienda'' identification prominently displayed on them, on
raids and other official business. Mexican Customs established an
Internal Affairs Division in 1993; personnel are regularly submitted to
random drug testing. New hires are routinely polygraphed. And, perhaps
most importantly, a civil service was approved by their Congress and
created effective in July of this year.
Besides Mexican Customs, U.S. Customs personnel also work with
personnel from the Attorney General's Office (PGR) on aviation issues,
the Mexican Defense Ministry on interdiction issues, and the Finance
Ministry (Hacienda) on anti-money laundering efforts. Customs has
maintained an attache at the Embassy in Mexico City for more than 30
years, and we also have personnel working in other major Mexican
cities. These U.S. Customs personnel conduct their own investigations
as well as work with Mexican government officials on issues of mutual
concern.
Although Customs routinely cooperates successfully with components
of the Government of Mexico, we remain concerned about corruption. The
highly publicized arrests of General Rebollo and other Mexican
officials confirms our need to be circumspect when dealing with Mexico.
Given this level of concern, our agents must make judgments about the
nature and caliber of the information they can share and the persons
with whom they can share it. The recent arrests, however, are an
encouraging sign that the Government of Mexico is committed to
improving the integrity of Mexican law enforcement personnel.
Question 2. What cooperation does the Customs Service have with
Mexican counterparts today? Is that practical cooperation more or less
active today than it was 12 months ago?
Answer. While we are not yet at the point to declare totally open
communication with Mexico in the areas of narcotics intelligence and
operational strategies, we are expanding ways in which to work
together.
The following reflects several positive strides that have occurred
at local levels between U.S. Customs and Mexico Customs:
The Border Working Group is a forum in which U.S. Customs officials
and Mexican Customs officials meet to discuss issues of mutual concern.
U.S. Customs is represented at these meetings by each of the four
Customs Management Center (CMC) Directors and/or their designees. (This
working group is attended by only U.S. and Mexican Customs Officials,
unlike the Border Liaison Mechanism.)
The Border Liaison Mechanism and the recently inaugurated Forum
Fronterizo, are praiseworthy representations of Mexico's commitment to
the development of accord between U.S. and Mexican Customs. Both groups
have been developed to build a binational network among elected
officials and business, media, and academic leaders from both sides of
the international border.
Also at several cities along the border, the Mexican Consulate
office has been very proactive in addressing concerns of mutual
interest. An example of this is the assignment of a full-time consular
representative to the San Ysidro border crossing within the past year.
In addition to the coordination of hours of operation and other
commercial related activities, most Arizona ports have established
mutual alert systems between themselves and their Mexican counterparts.
For example, in Nogales an alarm system was jointly developed whereby
U.S. Customs officials will utilize the alarm system to alert Mexican
Customs officials of a high speed chase approaching the Port of Entry.
At Douglas, Mexican and U.S. Customs monitor a radio frequency that
allows instant communication when problems arise.
Another avenue of joint cooperation between the United States
Government and the Government of Mexico is the U.S.-Mexico Chemical
Control Working Group. The group, consisting of representatives from
DEA, USCS, U.S. State Department, U.S. Department of Justice, and the
Government of Mexico, is developing common strategies to control
import/export of precursor chemicals, develop bilateral agreements,
prevent diversion of prescription medications, coordinate joint
investigations, and develop common port of entry practices. At the most
recent meeting on November 12-14, 1997, in Mexico City, the U.S.
Customs Service presented information on inspection techniques and uses
of technology. In addition, U.S. Customs presented 30 advanced drug
test kits for training of Government of Mexico officers.
The level of cooperation between the U.S. Customs Service and
Mexico on money laundering has improved. The Mexicans are providing us
with Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports (CMIR) to facilitate our
investigative efforts. Customs has analyzed some of the data provided
by the Government of Mexico and, as a result of the analysis, has
initiated investigations of currency smuggling along the Southwest
Border.
Recent joint investigations which led to arrests and convictions in
United States courts and in which Mexico provided assistance include:
1. Ines Calderon Godoy (1995)--Ines Calderon Godoy is a Member of
the Arellano-Felix Organization. Federal Court in Arizona charged
Calderon with money laundering charges and seized $1 million from him.
2. Heberto Francisco Garcia Valenzuela (1996)--He is the son of
Heberto Francisco Garcia. Federal Court in Arizona convicted Garcia of
drug trafficking and money laundering charges. He was sentenced to 25
years and his father, Heberto was sentenced to 18 years, and $4.5
million was also seized by the United States.
3. Francisco Javier Leon Reyes (Investigation opened in 1992 and is
continuing.)--Federal Court of Arizona convicted Leon for false
statements on a money laundering investigation. He was sentenced to
serve 57 months in prison and the U.S. seized $133,000.
4. Juan Garcia Abrecro (Investigation opened in 1996 and is
continuing.)--Federal Court in Houston, Texas, convicted Garcia on drug
and money laundering charges. Garcia was sentenced to serve life in
prison.
5. Jesus Echeaollen Barrueta (Investigation opened in 1994 and is
continuing.)--Federal Court in Brownsville, Texas, convicted Echeaollen
on drug and money laundering charges. Echegollen was sentenced to life
in prison and all of his belongings were seized. Associates of
Echegollen, Guillermina Chavez and Jacob Levy were also convicted and
Chavez was sentenced to 78 months in prison and had all of her
belongings seized. Levy received 10 months in prison and was fined
$15,000.
6. Mario Ruiz Massieu (Investigation opened in 1995 and is
continuing)--Mario Ruiz Massieu, former Deputy Attorney General of
Mexico, was arrested by Customs agents in New Jersey for smuggling
currency based upon information provided by the Government of Mexico.
Subsequent investigation led to the seizure and civil forfeiture of $9
million in drug proceeds maintained by Massieu in a bank account in the
United States. The civil trial took place in Federal court in Houston,
Texas.
Finally, U.S. Customs is an active participant in the Firearms
Trafficking subgroup on the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group, which
is responsible for establishing and maintaining cooperation between the
United States and Mexico on firearms smuggling issues. Earlier this
year, as an initiative under this subgroup, U.S. Customs established
liaison contacts at key Special Agent in Charge (SAC) offices along the
U.S.-Mexico border to share realtime enforcement information with
counterpart Mexican law enforcement officials on the illegal smuggling
of firearms and ammunition from the U.S. to Mexico. The program has
already resulted both in improved communication between U.S. and
Mexican officers, and in the seizure of significant quantities of
ammunition smuggled into Mexico from the U.S.
Question 3. With respect to the importance of ``intelligence'' to
identify contraband, do you think that the Customs Service and other
U.S. law enforcement officials should be allowed more routine contact
with counterparts and others on the Mexican side of the border to
gather this information? We have been told that these personnel have to
clear all such contacts through our Embassy in Mexico City.
Answer. The U.S. Customs Service is one of the primary border
agencies responsible for the interdiction of drugs smuggled into the
United States at our ports of entry. This responsibility is in direct
support of the ONDCP strategy to ``Shield America's Air, Land, and Sea
Frontiers from the Drug Threat.''
The Drug Enforcement Administration, per our 1994 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), is required to conduct foreign investigations in
Customs drug smuggling cases. DEA has the primary responsibility for
U.S. drug law enforcement activity outside the United States. DEA must
also service the requests of the host country and its domestic field
offices.
The development of additional drug smuggling intelligence for
interdiction/investigation would benefit Customs interdiction efforts.
In fact, one multi-agency investigation conducted by Customs, DEA, FBI,
the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Department of Justice/Criminal
Division (Operation Reciprocity) has once again raised the need for all
law enforcement agencies, in particular the U.S. Customs Service
(because of our unique border interdiction and investigative
responsibilities) to have improved levels of foreign drug smuggling
intelligence.
Operation Reciprocity disclosed that one drug smuggling
transportation organization located in Grand Rapids, Michigan,
distributed more than 30 tons of cocaine into New York and Chicago. The
truck drivers picked up the smuggled cocaine from various stash houses
in the El Paso area. The group then delivered more than $100 million in
drug proceeds to the El Paso area for illegal exportation to Mexico.
On the Southwest Border in FY 96, 3.5 million trucks and rail cars
entered the United States. More than 900,000 received a Customs
Examination; of those, 56 narcotics seizures were effected, but only
one with prior information from an agency other than Customs. In FY 97
there were 61 cargo related narcotic seizures, again only one with
prior information from an agency other than Customs. The shear volume
of cargo, passenger and rail conveyances entering this country
necessitates improved intelligence to effectively target conveyances
for examination.
As has been said many times ``in unity there is strength.'' Customs
realizes that the success of any effort to collect foreign intelligence
hinges on institutionalized partnerships with other law enforcement
agencies. Interagency collaboration, both domestic and foreign, is the
key to success. The more that agencies and operations reinforce one
another, the more they share information and resources, the more
effective will be the outcome of our activities. Currently, Customs is
involved in several important multi-agency cooperative efforts that
focus on the joint expertise and efforts of various law enforcement
entities against the major drug trafficking groups. These include: the
Southwest Border Initiative, which includes Customs, DEA, FBI, the U.S.
Attorney's Office, Department of Justice/Criminal Division, and state
and local authorities; the Customs, DEA, and FBI Special Operations
Division; and the Treasury/Justice Anti-Money Laundering Conferences
and working groups (investigators, prosecutors and regulators).
U.S. Border Interdiction Efforts
Question 1. What are your plans (including calendar) for deploying
technology (such as gamma ray truck and x-ray facilities) at each of
the ports of entry on the Southwest Border?
The Customs Service is utilizing large-scale non-intrusive
inspection systems (mobile and fixed site) at major Southwest Border
cargo processing facilities to improve the number and intensity of
commercial cargo examinations. Currently, there are three large-scale,
fixed-site truck x-ray facilities in operation in Otay Mesa and
Calexico, California and Pharr, Texas.
In an effort to expand on the success of this non-intrusive
inspection equipment, the Customs Service is currently in the process
of acquiring five additional fixed-site truck x-ray units for major
cargo processing facilities along the border as indicated below.
Truck x-ray locations Date of operation
Otay Mesa........................................... 8/95
Calexico............................................ 3/97
Pharr............................................... 10/97
El Paso (Ysleta).................................... 12/97
El Paso (BOTA)...................................... 5/98
Nogales............................................. 8/98
Laredo (Colombia bridge)............................ 9/98
Los Tomates (New border crossing scheduled for 3/99) 3/99
In addition to the fixed-site truck x-ray systems, Customs is
procuring mobile and transportable commercial conveyance imaging
systems to support layered technology examination operations. These
mobile imaging systems will be utilized at Southwest Border ports of
entry to enhance commercial cargo environment enforcement operations at
locations that do not have fixed-site systems. Additionally, these
mobile systems will be utilized at the ports of entry to enhance and
augment commercial cargo enforcement operations. Currently, one mobile
truck x-ray system is in use in Laredo, Texas. A second, enhanced
version is under construction and is scheduled to be delivered to the
Southwest Border in early 1998. In addition to mobile x-ray systems, a
prototype transportable gamma imagery system designed for the
examination of tankers is in use in El Paso, Texas.
Customs is also in the process of installing a prototype passive
potassium 40 portal detector that is scheduled to be tested at the
Ysleta Port of Entry in El Paso, Texas, in January of 1998. This system
was developed to detect nuclear materials but is also capable of
detecting bulk shipments of marijuana.
In addition to developing and procuring various forms of
nonintrusive inspection systems, Customs is implementing a computer
based, advanced targeting technology through use of the Automated
Targeting System (ATS) in Laredo, Texas.
The Customs Service employs a wide variety of smaller scale
technology in conjunction with the large-scale imaging systems
indicated above. There are currently 17 stationary pallet x-ray systems
for cargo in use on the Southwest Border. Customs Service officers
utilize a wide variety of hand-operated technology to examine
commercial conveyances including BUSTERS (density detection devices),
fiber optic scopes (to examine tanks and confined areas,/compartments),
and laser range finders (LRF's) (used to determine the length of a
conveyance to detect false walls and compartments).
In addition to the current and future non-intrusive technology
advancements at Southwest Border ports of entry, the Customs Service is
developing and testing particle and vapor detectors, bio-sensors, and
higher energy x-ray systems for heavy cargo and sea containers, for use
at Southwest Border ports of entry, as well as high-risk sea and air
ports.
Question 2. With respect to the importance of ``intelligence'' to
identify contraband, do you think that the Customs Service and other
U.S. law enforcement officials should be allowed more routine contact
with counterparts and others on the Mexican side of the border to
gather this information? We have been told that these personnel have to
clear all such contacts through our Embassy in Mexico City.
The U.S. Customs Service is one of the primary border agencies
responsible for the interdiction of drugs smuggled into the United
States at our ports of entry. This responsibility is in direct support
of the ONDCP strategy to ``Shield America's Air, Land, and Sea
Frontiers from the Drug Threat.''
The Drug Enforcement Administration, per our 1994 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), is required to conduct foreign investigations in
Customs drug smuggling cases. DEA has the primary responsibility for
U.S. drug law enforcement activity outside the United States. DEA must
also service the requests of the host country and its domestic field
offices.
The development of additional drug smuggling intelligence for
interdiction/investigation would benefit Customs interdiction efforts.
In fact, one multi-agency investigation conducted by Customs, DEA, FBI,
the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Department of Justice/Criminal
Division (operation Reciprocity) has once again raised the need for all
law enforcement agencies, in particular the U.S. Customs Service
(because of our unique border interdiction and investigative
responsibilities) to focus on improving the level of foreign drug
smuggling intelligence.
Operation Reciprocity disclosed that one drug smuggling
transportation organization located in Grand Rapids, Michigan,
distributed more than 30 tons of cocaine into New York and Chicago. The
truck drivers picked up the smuggled cocaine from various stash houses
in the El Paso area. The group then delivered more than $100 million in
drug proceeds to the El Paso area for illegal exportation to Mexico.
On the Southwest Border in FY 96, 3.5 million trucks and rail cars
entered the United States. More than 900,000 received a Customs
Examination; of those, 56 narcotics seizures were effected, but only
one with prior information from an agency other than Customs. In FY 97
there were 61 cargo related narcotic seizures, again only one with
prior information from an agency other than Customs. The shear volume
of cargo, passenger and rail conveyances entering this country
necessitates improved intelligence to effectively target conveyances
for examination.
As has been said many times ``in unity there is strength.'' Customs
realizes that the success of any effort to collect foreign intelligence
hinges on institutionalized partnerships with other law enforcement
agencies. Interagency collaboration, both domestic and foreign, is the
key to success. The more that agencies and operations reinforce one
another, the more they share information and resources, the more
effective will be the outcome of our activities.
Question 3. Railroad cars are almost impossible to search, and
Customs railroad facilities are insecure and inefficient. What measures
will you be taking to address the extraordinary volume of rail cars
crossing into the United States each day? What measures are being taken
to make it easier to inspect containerized shipments?
Answer. Please see attached document, ``U.S. Customs Service
Southwest Border Rail Operations.''
U.S. Customs Service Southwest Border (SWB) Rail Operations
Purpose
This document compiles inspectional, investigative, intelligence,
and high technology initiatives into a single, multi-year plan to
address the drug smuggling threat in Southwest Border (SWB) rail
operations. The U.S. Customs Service envisions a multi-year plan as
follows:
Present: Identified threat through existing intelligence,
increased inspections, increased seizure activity.
Present: Identified that smugglers have reacted to U.S.
Customs (USCS) and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) operations on SWB
by spreading activity into rail environment.
Present: Quantified the threat based on USCS rail threat
assessment and intelligence briefings.
Present: Responded to threat with concentrated Strategic
Problem Solving (SPS) inspection operations to further narrow
focus to the most vulnerable areas. \1\
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\1\ Strategic Problem Solving (SPS) is a creative, multi-functional
approach to detect and apprehend the willful violator. SPS builds upon
the traditional enforcement efforts of seizure and arrest, and moves
aggressively to the less traditional efforts of prevention, deterrence,
and displacement. SPS exercises include four basic elements:
identification of problem, listing of objectives/expectations, analysis
and alternatives, and testing/implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present: Evaluated results of SPS operations, presented
internal conspiracy findings to carriers, requested operational
changes. Presented findings to executives in Washington, DC and
requested support and leverage for carriers to provide
necessary infrastructure improvements.
Present: Commissioner of Customs convened an October 1997
meeting with railroad executives, received commitments to
construct facilities, received commitments to provide employee
background information.
Present: Committed first carrier to Railroad Carrier
Initiative Program (CIP). Encouraged business community to work
with rail ports under auspices of Business Anti-Smuggling
Coalition.
Year 1: Convene a conference of officials from SWB U.S.
Customs offices with rail operations, rail carriers,
intelligence community, business community, and other federal
agencies (particularly USBP).
Year 1: Conduct first foreign site surveys under rail CIP
and recommend security enhancements based on successful
initiatives from other CIP signatories.
Year 1: Allocate additional personnel to rail inspection
teams.
Year 1: Intensify rail inspections with coordinated
participation of all federal agencies.
Year 1: Office of Investigations assembles three teams
dedicated to railroad internal conspiracy cases. First three:
RAC, Laredo, TX; RAC, Brownsville, TX; RAC, Eagle Pass, TX.
Year 1: Attain DOD and Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) support for high technology initiatives--high
energy X-ray, Gamma Ray imaging systems, and the K40 system.
The K40 detects the presence of naturally occurring emissions
of Potassium 40 associated with organic substances such as
marijuana.
Year 2: Utilize new inspection facilities, identify
infrastructure needs, and work with RR to build facilities at
all rail ports. Use penalty off-sets for infrastructure and
security improvements.
Year 2: Seek funds for unpredictable/unannounced TDY
inspection blitzes based on lessons from previous SPS
operations. Also seek funds for investigative efforts including
surveillance equipment, Title III intercepts, agent support to
inspectional TDY operations.
Year 2: Conduct additional site surveys under CIP and
Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC) as well as Top 10
exporters via rail at each of the 8 rail crossings.
Year 2/3: Deploy first high technology systems at busiest
rail crossings as part of 5 year technology plan.
Year 3: Employ advanced targeting methods via Automated
Targeting System (ATS) and analysis of information provided by
rail carriers.
Year 3/5: Deploy remaining high technology systems.
Inquiries and concerns have been expressed by Members of Congress,
executives within the Department of the Treasury and the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and the Attorney General of the
United States regarding the vulnerability of the U.S. rail system to
drug smuggling. There are four major factors behind this warranted
interest. First is the privatization of the Mexican rail system and the
ability for potentially corrupt organizations to buy lucrative rail
lines; second, is the tremendous growth in current and projected rail
traffic along the Southwest Border (SWB); third, is the increase in the
number of drug seizures and total weight of drugs seized from rail
conveyances; fourth, is the vulnerability of the rail system to
Smuggling because of the sheer volume and difficulty in examining rail
cars.
This document has been generated to assess and outline the nature
and volume of rail traffic, the examination process, and results of
special enforcement operations. Additionally, the following document
also provides a summary of current investigative and interdiction
initiatives as well as long-term plans for enhanced rail inspections.
Overview
The United States and Mexico share a border that is over 2,000
miles in length. America's economic welfare is, to a large extent,
dependent upon the efficient movement of legitimate commerce and people
through 39 vehicle/pedestrian crossings and 8 major rail crossings
within the 24 ports of entry that exist along the Southwest Border. In
FY 1997, approximately 321,000 rail cars entered the United States from
Mexico. Each of these rail cars represents a window of opportunity for
those that would smuggle illegal drugs into the United States.
A comprehensive plan to increase SWB enforcement operations became
viable with Congressional support for Operation HARD LINE. The first
step included deployment of 657 new Customs Inspectors, Canine
Enforcement Officers, and Special Agents to SWB inspections and
investigations.
A comprehensive program designed to enhance the number and quality
of rail examinations is in the early stages of implementation. This
program includes new port of entry infrastructure, enhanced examination
methods, upgraded technology, partnerships with industry and use of
sophisticated intelligence gathering methods, to more efficiently
profile and target suspect rail shipments.
Background
Drug smuggling via rail along the SWB is fast emerging as a major
threat. The intensification of multiagency enforcement operations
within and between Southwest Border ports of entry (i.e., Operations
HARD LINE, GATEKEEPER, and HOLD-THE-LINE) increases the narcotics
smuggling threat within the ports, particularly in the rail
environment.
Smugglers are reacting to intensified operations in the passenger
and truck environment by increasing their activity in rail.
Accordingly, seizure activity has increased dramatically from levels of
the early 1990s, both in total numbers of seizures and average weight
per seizure. Significant activity has taken place this past year and
includes, as an example, 2,180 pounds of cocaine seized by USCS in one
incident involving an electrical transformer.
In addition to seizure activity, USCS and USBP personnel have
discovered numerous railroad cars (hoppers, boxcars, flatbeds, and
piggyback trailers) with empty false compartments. These false
compartments have been created to carry drugs into the United States
and to return the drug proceeds to Mexico. In addition, rail cars of
all types contain natural compartments which are being used to conceal
contraband.
The threat posed by internal conspiracies concerns all agencies,
especially when considered in the context of the rapid privatization of
the Mexican railroad system. Though there are many different types of
internal conspiracy problems, the most common forms involve employees
of carriers and shippers who choose to use otherwise legitimate
shipments to conceal the importation of narcotics. Internal conspiracy
initiatives are further explained under investigative efforts.
The privatization process has created a new avenue for smuggling
organizations to launder their proceeds while, at the same time,
acquiring lucrative rail transportation corridors. Additional areas of
concern include the abject level of physical security of train cars
(sitting in open, unsecured staging/storage yards for days), lack of
sufficient inspectional facilities, difficulty in examining bulk
commodities, and limited availability of high technology equipment.
Privatization of the Railroad System in Mexico
In February 1995, the Mexican Congress amended Article 28 of their
constitution by declassifying the railroad sector as a ``strategic
service.'' In May 1995, the Railroad Service Code was published, laying
down the guidelines for granting permits to private parties. Under the
code, permits or concessions will last for 50 years, with options for
renewal for another 50 years. It also provided for up to 49% foreign
capital participation. All these steps effectively allowed for the
privatization of the entire Mexican rail system.
A driving force for privatization is the poor state of the Mexican
rail system and the lack of sufficient public funds. Of the total
16,528 miles of track, approximately 12,500 miles (75%) were laid
before 1910. The total U.S. railroad network is 133,125 miles. This
limits the amount of freight moved by all Mexican railways to only 15%,
compared to 60% (U.S.) and 86% (Canada).
Commercial Trade Background
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the devaluation of
the Mexican peso, economic reform in Mexico, and expanding numbers of
twin-plant (maquilladora) operations, have increased the amount of
commercial cargo passing between Mexico and the United States. The
level of commercial trade originating in Mexico that enters the United
States is projected to steadily increase in the future, with a
corresponding increase in rail traffic. The volume of trade between the
United States and Mexico has increased 122% since 1990, from a level of
59 billion dollars to almost 130 billion dollars in 1996 (see figure 1
below).
One sign of Mexico's importance as a trade partner of the United
States is the growth of twin-plant (maquilladora) operations along or
near the Southwest Border. Maquilladora assembly operations on both
sides depend on the time sensitive movement of goods and merchandise at
various stages of assembly across the border between plants located in
Mexico and in the United States. Over 2600 maquilladoras on the Mexican
side of the border are working closely with their U.S.-based
counterparts in a mutual effort to manufacture products for worldwide
distribution.
The vast majority of twin-plant automobiles and automobile parts
enter the United States via rail. Though legitimate automobile
manufacturers are considered low-risk for drug smuggling, their
shipments are occasionally compromised in unprotected rail switching
yards.
Value of merchandise trade imported from Mexico and shipped via
rail:
FY 1996: $11.9 billion
FY 1997: $13.2 billion
(Source: USCS, Office of Strategic Trade)
Figure 1: (Source: USTR, Department of Commerce)
SWB RAH, Traffic
Over the last 5 years, the volume of SWB rail car traffic entering
the U.S. has increased approximately 75% percent from 184,000 rail cars
in 1992 to 321,000 rail cars in 1997 (see figure 2 below). In Laredo,
Texas, as many as 9 trains enter the United States during a normal 24
hour rail operation. This equates to an average of 600 rail cars
entering the U.S. at this border crossing every day. Many of these
trains arrive with little notice, during night hours, when inspections
are unsafe.
Officials of the Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR) predict annual
traffic increases of 25% at their largest SVVB crossing, Laredo, Texas.
UPRR presently handles about 90% of the rail traffic crossing the SYM.
This rate of growth poses a significant threat in a particularly high-
risk environment where no high technology inspection equipment is
currently available. In addition, most rail yards are situated in the
middle of town with no physical security features to prevent access to
rail cars, theft of merchandise, and removal of contraband prior to
Customs inspection.
Railcar Crossings (Northbound)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Port Code FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calexico, CA................ 2503 4,381 6,225 6,112 4,482 6,252 4,574
San Ysidro, CA.............. 2504 N/A 498 1,999 1,792 3,093 2,504
Nogales, AZ................ 2604 23,647 21,428 21,195 21,130 24,902 27,168
El Paso, TX................. 2402 17,258 19,299 22,366 21,628 19,992 23,637
Presidio, TX................ 2403 511 444 551 894 1,818 2,234
Eagle Pass, TX.............. 2303 25,214 28,897 33,684 38,585 61,475 61,285
Laredo, TX.................. 2304 89,910 97,452 105,825 109,791 117,927 148,384
Brownsville, TX............. 2301 22,650 20,915 25,269 26,846 49,862 50,906
Totals................ 183,571 195,158 217,001 225,148 285,321 320,692
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2: (Source: USCS Port Tracking System)
Southwest Border Rail Traffic, FY 1992-FY 1997
Figure 3: (Source: USCS Port Tracking System)
USCS Responses
U.S. Customs has responded to this increased threat by employing a
combination of (1) staffing increases (2) interdiction efforts, (3)
investigative efforts, and (4) intelligence assets.
1. Southwest Border Staffing Increases
The U.S. Customs Service has increased the level of inspection
staffing assigned to the Southwest Border ports of entry in order to
address the increase in commercial conveyance traffic and the ever
increasing narcotics threat. Since 1988, there has been an 87% increase
in the number of Customs Service Inspectors and a more than 500%
increase in the number of Canine Enforcement Officers assigned to
Southwest Border ports of entry. In FY98, Customs will dedicate
approximately 50 new Inspector positions to SWB rail operations.
Through Operation HARD LINE, Customs has provided an additional 392
Inspectors and 157 Canine Enforcement Officers in Fiscal Year 1997. A
significant number of the additional Inspector positions were assigned
to direct interdiction efforts including Contraband Enforcement Teams
(CET). At most SWB ports, CET Inspectors conduct the vast majority of
narcotics enforcement examinations in rail operations. In addition,
Operation HARD LINE funds provided for an additional 157 Canine
Enforcement Officers (CEO). CEOs are assigned to CET operations and
actively support rail inspection operations. To further complement our
rail inspection efforts, Customs utilizes National Guard personnel
dedicated to the SWB. In addition to this, Operation HARD LINE provided
funds for 65 new Special Agent positions as well as resources for
reassignments. (see figure 4 below).
Figure 4: (Source: USCS Office of Human Resources)
2. Interdiction Efforts
U.S. Customs interdiction efforts involve Inspectors, Special
Agents, Canine Enforcement Officers, and National Guard personnel as
members of cross-functional teams.
a. Training
Provisions of the U.S. Customs Narcotics Interdiction Guide were
followed to establish uniform Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for
each of the rail port Contraband Enforcement Teams (CET). Standardized
training is provided concerning concealment techniques, false
compartments, container search procedures, proper use of hand tools,
and safe inspection of hazardous materials. This and other information
is provided as part of the one week Southwest Border Interdiction
Training (SBIT) in Laredo, Texas. To date, 950 Inspectors have been
trained through this course. In August 1997, the SBIT curriculum for
the 10 courses in FY98 was modified to include rail training. Customs
has worked closely with UPRR security officials to prepare this
specialized training.
Targeting
The primary cargo targeting system in rail is the selectivity
module within the Customs Automated Commercial System (ACS). Entry
information for goods shipped by all types of conveyances is lodged in
this system. In addition, rail manifest information is provided
electronically from railroad companies to Customs. This manifest
information is transmitted in the Rail Automated Manifest System (AMS)
which is also part of ACS; or, via computer database links provided by
the railroads. AMS allows for the targeting Inspector to query volumes
of information through a series of pre-programmed screens. An added
benefit is that this information can be provided to us well before a
train arrives. All Customs releases, enforcement holds, and pending
actions are then transmitted electronically to the carrier. This
electronic exchange of information is possible because the railroad
industry is already highly automated. This automation has allowed rail
carriers to operate in a virtually paperless environment for many
years.
b. Special Operations
Customs has conducted innovative Strategic Problem Solving (SPS)
exercises to address the threat from rail which differs at each port.
These initiatives include team members from Customs, National Guard
units, state/local authorities, and railroad Special Agents. Training
on safe rail car inspections and concealment methods was provided with
the full support of railroad personnel.
Two such SPS rail inspection initiatives were recently completed; a
5 week operation in South Texas (Laredo, Eagle Pass, Brownsville,
McAllen-Harlingen, and Pharr) and a 20 day operation in Calexico,
California. These operations will be duplicated at the other SWB rail
ports in the near future.
The South Texas operation was organized with six main goals.
1. Greatly increase inspections, including the number of 100%
examinations. Concentrate staff to reduce inspection time,
thereby reducing exposure in unsecured areas. Perform more on-
site examinations which reduce the need to secure trains during
movement to other facilities.
2. Create a data analysis unit for targeting shipments during
the operation. Staff the unit with personnel from entry
selectivity sections and Intelligence Collection and Analysis
Team (ICAT) members. This unit utilizes existing Customs
targeting systems as well as information from rail carriers.
3. Maximize use of available technology including busters,
laser range finders, infrared camera systems, probes, pallet X-
rays, X-ray vans, fiber optic scopes, and Ion Track Itemizer
Contraband Detectors.
4. Establish a toll-free number for informant calls related
to railroad smuggling.
5. Establish a liaison network between Customs offices, other
federal law enforcement, state/local authorities, railroad
personnel, Canadian and Mexican authorities, and members of the
intelligence community. These will become permanent working
relationships involving Canadian Customs and Mexican Customs
(through our foreign Customs Attache offices).
6. Create multi-discipline, cross-functional teams known as
Railroad Enforcement Response Team (RERT) with counterparts at
other locations. The teams consist of Customs Inspectors,
Customs Special Agents, Canine Enforcement Officers, RR
security officers, state/local law enforcement officers, USBP
and other federal officers. Members of this team will then be
available to train future teams in other ports.
Results of the first SPS rail project in Texas are now available.
Our preliminary findings are as follows:
1. More than 10 railroad cars out of 2,600 inspected were
discovered to have false compartments. The compartments were
consistent with those seen in other seizures. In addition, one
of the targeted cars with a false compartment also contained a
piece of black cloth (tied to the exterior) which was
apparently used to identify the car for removal of contraband.
2. Numerous narcotic detector dog (NDD) alerts. These alerts
indicated the recent presence of narcotics in the rail cars;
however, intelligence indicated that internal conspirators
probably alerted smugglers to remove the drugs prior to
crossing into the U.S.
3. A locomotive conductor noticed the increased Customs
presence and responded by stopping his train in the U.S.,
reversing the engine, and returning to Mexico. The train
returned a short time later with 5 fewer cars.
4. Visible signs of breaking and entering to otherwise
innocuous shipments without the theft of any merchandise.
Again, this indicates that the drugs may have been removed
while the train staged its crossing on the Mexican side.
5. UPRR Special Agents participating in the operation
reported that truck drivers were warning each other of the
Customs presence via CB radio. The truckers specifically warned
each other that Customs was conducting special operations and
examining 100% of ``piggyback'' truck trailers. Intelligence
collected during the ICAT threat assessment indicated that
``piggybacks'' posed the greatest threat for smuggling. During
the Laredo segment of the operation, because of the radio
warnings, business at the UPRR piggyback facility dropped
significantly.
c. Customs Support to Other Agency Operations
U.S. Customs Offices in El Paso, Texas continue to provide support
to joint rail inspection initiative with the USBP. In addition, USCS
and USBP recently completed a joint rail inspection blitz in Eagle
Pass, Texas.
On Thursday, October 2, 1997, representatives from Customs met at
USBP Headquarters to begin coordination of joint rail operations across
the SWB. In addition, it was decided that the USBP would be an active
participant in a rail summit of SWB Port Directors and SACs tentatively
scheduled for January 1998.
d. High Technology
High technology specific to rail cars, though not currently
available, is being researched jointly through support from the
Department of Defense, Office of Counter-Drug Technology Development
Program and the ONDCP Counter-Drug Technology Assessment Center.
Through Operation Flint, Customs and DOD are developing new X-ray and
high energy Gamma ray imaging systems for examination of loaded
containers. It is believed that one of these high energy imaging
systems will be the first tool capable of imaging rail car. A prototype
Gamma Ray imaging system is currently being tested in rail in El Paso,
Texas. With this understanding, the first Gamma Ray imaging systems are
planned for SWB rail operations in Year 2/3 of this multi-year plan.
This is in line with proposals contained in the U.S. Customs 5 year
technology plan (See chart below).
Other ``low tech'' equipment such as busters, cherry pickers, laser
range finders, pallet X-Rays, X-Ray vans, and dilectrometers are used
daily in the rail environment.
Proposed Gamma ray systems (Year 2 & 3)
Laredo, Texas
Eagle Pass, Texas
Proposed Gamma ray systems (Year 3 & 5)
Calexico, California
El Paso, Texas
(Source: USCS Anti-Smuggling Division)
e. Industry Partnerships:
Industry Partnerships fall into two categories:
Carrier Initiative Program (CIP)
Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC)
Industry Partnerships
Business Community Helps With Enforcement
Believed by some to be a means of facilitating traffic and having
no real place in a law enforcement environment, Industry Partnerships
are often overlooked as a viable enforcement tool. When studied
closely, one quickly realizes the benefits to industry and the U.S.
Customs Service by embarking on such relationships.
Carrier Initiative Program (CIP)
Established in 1984, the Carrier Initiative Program is a joint
effort between air and sea carriers and the U.S. Customs Service. This
main goal of the joint initiative is to deter smugglers from using
commercial aircraft, vessels, trucks, and rail cars as conveyances for
their contraband. Currently, 105 air and 2,870 sea carriers have signed
up for the program, which encourages them to improve their security
practices in striving to prevent narcotics from getting onboard their
conveyances. Customs recently expanded the CIP to include railroad
carriers. This rail CIP, negotiated with carriers and the Association
of American Railroads, closely models the other successful CIPs with
air, sea and land carriers. The first rail carrier participant
committed to the program October 10, 1997. The benefits of the CIP for
Customs include prior information provided by the carriers as well as
incentives to invest in security improvements. The benefits to carriers
include expert training on inspection of their conveyances, more secure
foreign facilities, and penalty off-set provisions which encourage the
enhancement of security features at all their facilities. In FY97, CIP
participants provided 40% of all advance seizure information received
by Customs.
U.S. Customs provides the necessary training for enhanced security,
conducts site surveys and recommends methods of safeguarding freight
hauled by the participating carrier. Each port has dedicated resources
and a point of contact (POC) for the program.
Indicative of the benefits associated with industry partnerships,
over the last two years signatories to the Carrier Initiative Program
have provided information to Customs which resulted in our seizing
18,437 pounds of narcotics. Half of the total amount seized was
cocaine. These same carriers, through their own security operations at
their foreign operational sites were responsible for intercepting
59,181 pounds of narcotics that were destined for the U.S.
The Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (LBCIP)
Developed in the Spring of 1995 to address the threat of drug
smuggling along the southwest border, the purpose of the LBCIP is to
deter smugglers of illegal drugs from using land border commercial
conveyances to transport their contraband. As of July 1, 1996, all
importers who wish to have their merchandise cleared utilizing line
release must have their cargo carried by one of the 854 carriers that
have become LBCIP signatories to date. During 1996, signatories
provided information resulting in almost 1,800 pounds of marijuana and
cocaine being seized.
Over the past three years alone, with assistance of sea and air
carrier participants, this program has accounted for the domestic
seizure or foreign carrier based interception of over 80,000 pounds of
narcotics. The Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (LBCIP) was
developed in the spring of 1995 in an effort to extend the successes of
the sea and air Carrier Initiative Programs to land border carriers
operating along the Southwest border. This is a Customs-led program to
address drug smuggling via commercial land carriers and land
conveyances. This program provides background information on drivers
and trucking companies moving cargo across the Southwest Border.
Approximately 835 companies are approved and participating in this
program and over 6,000 drivers have been certified by Customs (via
background checks).
Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC)
Initiated in Mid 1996, the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC)
is a business-led, Customs-supported alliance created to combat
narcotic smuggling via commercial trade. BASC was designed to
complement and enhance the CIP and LBCIP programs. The ideology being
to examine the entire process of manufacturing and shipping merchandise
from foreign countries to the United States. The main goal of the
program is the creation of a more security-conscious environment at
foreign manufacturing plants to eliminate, or at least reduce, product
vulnerability to narcotics smuggling. Currently there are approximately
120 companies that have committed to this endeavor. In addition to the
heightened awareness with regard to narcotic smuggling that the program
is bringing to the import/export community, the BASC is responsible for
the seizure of over 3,000 pounds of cocaine.
As indicated by the results thus far, active "Industry
Partnerships" can contribute significantly to the enforcement posture
of any office. It is a tool that allows the business community to take
a shared responsibility in combating illicit narcotic trafficking.
e. Future Initiatives
The Customs Service is proceeding with several initiatives to
address the problems with smuggling via railroads. As an outgrowth of
intelligence from recent rail acquisitions, Attorney General Reno
convened a working group of professionals to determine proper
Department of Justice support for Customs, Border Patrol, and Federal
Railroad Administration enforcement missions. Customs is actively
participating in this group by providing vital information on rail port
activities, results of our successful SPS projects, and seizure/
forfeiture actions. In addition, a member of the Attorney General's
staff completed a week long tour of Laredo, Texas and Nogales, Arizona
operations with Customs representatives.
Customs plans to seek funds for high technology X-ray and imaging
systems, increased and unpredictable inspection "blitzes", surveillance
equipment, and Title III interceptions. These efforts will help to
effectively address the threat posed by internal conspiracies and drug
``rip-offs'' as rail cars wait in unprotected areas. This increased
enforcement activity should encourage rail carriers to invest in proper
security measures and needed infrastructure improvements.
3. Investigative Efforts
The Office of Investigations (OI) is actively involved in meeting
this threat. Their participation includes additional Special Agents and
Intelligence Analysts through HARD LINE funds and the reassignment of a
large number of Special Agents to the SWB. In addition, OI is an active
participant in the rail SPS projects, in coordinating state/local
agency contacts, in coordinating security matters with railroad
officials, and in following through with controlled deliveries. OI
confidential informants often provide prior information useful to line
Inspectors. As a result of the 2,180 pound cocaine seizure in New
Jersey, OI developed additional information which led to a second
seizure in Spain. In addition, OI was able to relay valuable
information to the SWB rail ports on the exploitation of transformers
as a means of smuggling narcotics.
a. Internal Conspiracy Initiatives
In FY 97, the Customs Office of Investigations has documented that
40% of all cocaine smuggling in sea and air operations is associated
with internal conspiracies. OI further believes that smaller loads
typically involve shipments directly to guilty importers.
Larger loads are often associated with innocent consignees who have
their shipment manipulated by corrupt workers or carrier employees
prior to delivery to the importer. Internal conspiracies offer the
relative safety associated with having conspirators directly handling
cargo shipments. The conspirators can be either in the exporting
country, the U.S., or both.
Method of Choice: Internal conspiracies, established by
sophisticated smuggling organizations are a very real threat. These
conspiracies are formed by corrupt employees who work in a given port
of entry (i.e. airport, seaport, rail yard, etc.) and use their
position, or the scope of their employment (freight handlers, dock
workers, warehouse employees, railroad employees, etc.), as a cover to
manipulate cargo, conveyances and/or baggage to smuggle narcotics. This
often involves the theft of additional drug laden boxes within a
legitimate shipment or the theft of unmanifested pieces of luggage
prior to Customs inspection.
Strategy: Customs proposes a short term strategy of employing
multi-disciplined Customs teams working in tandem with industry and
security officials using the SPS methodology.
Short-term efforts and goals include increased narcotics
seizure and arrest activity. When the ``cost of doing
business'' becomes unprofitable, smugglers will utilize other
methods such as using front companies to smuggle. This is
accomplished by a combination of increased examinations,
increased Customs presence in rail yards, and increased
investigative activities.
Long-term efforts include an aggressive and creative
investigative program to ensure prosecution of organized labor
personnel and identifies organized crime associates to disrupt
drug importation capacity. This includes intelligence sharing,
developing confidential sources, expanded use of T-III
electronic wire intercepts, undercover operations, state and
local police coordination, electronic investigative aids,
video/audio technology and equipment, long term surveillance,
controlled deliveries, cold convoys, and improved foreign
collection within the intelligence community.
4. Intelligence Efforts
The single largest issue hampering the commercial conveyance and
cargo examination process in rail is the lack of useful tactical
intelligence on drug smuggling in the Southwest Border commercial cargo
environment. Despite all efforts put forth by the federal government on
this issue, only a very small number of last years seizures in the
Southwest Border commercial cargo environment were a result of
intelligence that was generated by a non-U.S. Customs source.
The federal government is attempting to forge new or expand
existing partnerships with Federal, State and local law enforcement
agencies in an effort to provide timely tactical information to border
law enforcement agencies. Toward that end, Customs has Intelligence
Analysts for SWB operations through existing and HARD LINE resources.
This division also established cross-functional teams of Agents,
Inspectors, and other Federal/State law enforcement agencies known as
Intelligence Collection and Analysis Teams (ICAT).
There are currently seven of these multi-disciplined tactical
intelligence groups along the Southwest Border. These units are located
in:
Brownsville, Texas
Laredo,Texas
Nogales, Arizona
San Diego, California.
McAllen, Texas
El Paso, Texas
Calexico, California
The mission of the ICAT unit is to develop and disseminate real
time tactical intelligence and utilize Post Seizure Analysis (PSA)
information in order to link previous seizure activity to persons,
businesses, and conveyances to produce real-time actionable
intelligence on narcotics smuggling trends, patterns, and
transportation/concealment methods along the Southwest Border. These
units are supported by the National Operational Analysis Center (NOAC),
a clearing center for information received from multiple law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Since the inception of the ICAT concept in 1995, these units have
shown great promise, by generating information leading to the seizure
of over 15,000 pounds of narcotics in the commercial cargo environment
along the SWB. These units will continue to enhance the federal
government's ability to target and interdict narcotics shipments in the
future. A South Texas ICAT recently completed a thorough threat
assessment study of rail operations along the SWB.
In addition to ICAT units, the federal government is also pursuing
the aggressive use of the Purchase of Information (POI), Purchase of
Evidence (POE), and reward programs in order to obtain information.
These POI, POE, and reward programs generate valuable intelligence
leads to successful narcotics enforcement actions.
Oversight
The Customs Service cooperated with General Accounting Office (GAO)
in their recent audit of one Southern California rail line. This audit
studied the alien and drug smuggling threats posed by re-opening an
abandoned line near Campo, California. The USBP also contributed
significant information to the study.
The Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General is
currently conducting an audit of SWB rail activity in Texas and Arizona
as well as Northern Border rail operations in Port Huron, Michigan. The
focus is on inspections, policies, procedures, use of resources, and
enforcement capabilities.
Summary
Significantly enhancing rail examinations at ports of entry along
the Southwest Border is achievable. Enhancing inspections of any
conveyance is not a new problem, but rather, one that Customs has been
actively pursuing for years from many directions, including
improvements in infrastructure, technology, and staffing. The fact of
the matter is, as recent seizure data indicates, an increase in the
number of quality examinations produces an increase in the amount of
narcotics seized.
The influx of new enforcement positions (starting with FY96) has
already enhanced Customs narcotics enforcement efforts. By relieving
critical staffing shortages in SWB passenger and cargo operations,
Customs is now positioned to take the next logical step in Operation
HARD LINE: the dedication of additional staffing resources for the
emerging threat in rail.
Transportation and other industries, as well as the socioeconomic
issues that exist on both sides of the border, will continue to play
vital roles in the issues associated with increasing cross-border trade
and the associated narcotics smuggling threat. Working together with
private industry, including carriers, importers, and exporters, on both
sides of the Southwest Border, Customs continues to explore all
available avenues to decrease the level of narcotics smuggling.
Full implementation of this enhanced rail inspection plan along the
Southwest Border is still a number of years off. Further capital and
infrastructure improvements, technological developments, and increased
intelligence capabilities will continue to improve examination and
seizure successes. A critical factor for continued success and improved
efficiency will be sustained leadership and budgetary support from the
current Administration and Congress.
Question 4. How have the additional Border Patrol resources (under
the auspices of Operations Hold-the-Line and Hard Line) affected our
interdiction activities? Have Customs personnel increases kept up with
the additional Border Patrol resources? What plans are being made for
additional fencing?
Answer. The Customs Service has benefited from the Customs
reorganization by streamlining operations, aligning available resources
(personnel and equipment) to the areas of greatest workload, and has
employed high technology (x-ray and gamma-ray equipment) to address the
narcotics smuggling threat this country faces.
Under Operation HARD LINE the Customs Service further increased
inspectional staffing at the Southwest Border ports of entry.
Additionally, in our FY 98 budget, Customs received additional
inspectional positions for high-risk sea and air ports.
The direct impact of additional Border Patrol Agents conducting
enforcement operations between the ports of entry cannot be accurately
determined at this time. However, it is reasonable to assume that an
increase in enforcement activity between the ports of entry will result
in a subsequent increase in smuggling activity occurring within the
ports of entry along the Southwest Border.
Customs continues to do its part in being fiscally responsible
given the federal deficit, and has maintained reasonable requests for
additional inspectors, canine enforcement officers, and special agents.
Personnel increases implemented by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) at the Ports of Entry will have an impact
on Customs operations in several ways. First, the increase in staffing
by INS will allow for more primary staffing by INS and thereby allow
Customs to dedicate more inspectors to conduct more pre-primary roving
and Southwest Border Team Oriented Processing Operations (STOP). These
enforcement activities are employed in both the cargo and passenger
environments and rely upon targeting and selectivity techniques that
allow Customs to perform more and better enforcement examinations.
Additionally, as a result of this increase in staffing by INS, more
Customs personnel will be dedicated to conducting narcotics enforcement
examinations in the Commercial Cargo environment. This will allow
Customs to dedicate more personnel solely to the execution of cargo
examinations utilizing fixed site x-ray technology, and mobile x-ray
and gamma-ray inspection technology.
Question 5. Do adequate authorities exist by which Customs (and/or
Border Patrol) can provide excess equipment (such as cars, etc.) to
their Mexican civilian counterparts? Is there a need for such legal
authorities, and have you sought them from Congress?
Answer. Yes. Customs can transfer excess property to the Department
of State, through the General Services Administration (GSA). The
Department of State has the authority to then transfer the excess
property to Mexico. For example, this authority has been used to
provided vehicles to Mexican Customs and 30 new drug testing kits and
an Ion scanner to their drug testing laboratory.
Question 6. What specific steps is Customs taking to interrupt the
flow of currency back to Mexico? For example, do we routinely search
passengers and conveyances bound for Mexico, such as cruise ships,
etc.?
Answer. Customs has a broad grant of authority in the conduct of
international financial crime and money laundering investigations.
Jurisdiction is triggered by the illegal movement of criminal funds,
services, or merchandise across our national borders and is applied
pursuant to the authority under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), Money
Laundering Control Act (MLCA), and other Customs laws. Combined with
our border search authority, Customs enforcement efforts focus on the
most significant international criminal organizations (ICOS) whose
corrupt influence often impacts global trade, economic, and financial
systems. Customs efforts are not limited to drug related money
laundering but extend to the proceeds of all crime.
Customs has implemented an aggressive strategy to combat money
laundering. Our approach involves interdiction efforts by Customs
inspectors, criminal investigations by Customs special agents, and in
partnership with Treasury, FINCEN, and others, the design and
implementation of innovative regulatory interventions, unique to
Treasury, that disrupt and dismantle systems, organizations, and
industries that launder ill-gotten gains. Customs dedicates some 500
Special Agents worldwide to money laundering investigations.
Operation Choza Rica, launched by Customs Special Agents in
McAllen, Texas, uncovered and subsequently dismantled a major Mexican
money laundering network along the Southwest Border. This intricate web
involved Mexican Casas de Cambio and established banks in the United
States and Switzerland. In a series of criminal indictments, managing
directors of several major Mexican Casas de Cambio and U.S. Banks to
include American Express Bank International, First City Bank, Lone Star
National Bank, and International Bank of Commerce were subsequently
prosecuted and convicted for laundering money for the Juan Garcia-
Abrego cocaine smuggling organization. In excess of 60 million dollars
in cash and other assets were seized and forfeited in this
investigation. AEBI forfeited 44 million dollars to the Treasury
Forfeiture Fund representing the largest forfeiture ever by a domestic
corporation.
In March 1995 the Houston Asset Identification and Removal Group
(AIRG) located and subsequently seized 9.1 million dollars from a bank
account owned by Mario Ruiz-Massieu, the former Mexican Attorney
General, after he was arrested by Customs Agents in Newark for
smuggling currency. He remains in custody.
Specific steps that Customs is taking to interdict unreported
currency going to Mexico include the following: (1) forming dedicated
outbound enforcement teams to search outbound passengers, conveyances,
and cargo; and (2) conducting special outbound operations utilizing
shared enforcement inspectors (Contraband Enforcement Teams, etc.) for
outbound inspections. Customs has approximately 125 dedicated outbound
inspectors working on the entire Southern Tier of the United States.
These inspectors only process outbound passengers, cargo and
conveyances. Customs does not currently have the resources to
continuously conduct outbound inspections (as seen on the inbound side)
24 hours a day at all of the ports. Therefore, the shared enforcement
inspectors/teams supplement this need by conducting sporadic special
outbound operations.
Customs has also received additional resources to enhance our
outbound inspection capabilities. Customs is planning to build outbound
inspection facilities along the southern border. In addition, the
Customs Service is planning to provide our outbound inspection teams
with enhanced detection equipment and resources such as currency and
weapons detection canine teams.
Forfeiture funds are utilized to pay the overtime of state and
local law enforcement officers to assist the inspectors during these
operations. In FY 1998, Customs will more than double the amount of
forfeiture funds available to more than $800,000 to pay for state and
local assistance during the operations. Currency Canine Teams have
proven to be a great success in the interdiction of unreported
currency. There are currently 6 teams on the Southwest Border.
Seizures by Mexico
Question 1. Do the Mexicans have an adequate strategy,
infrastructure and resources to inspect cargo entering and transiting
their country? Do they inspect the millions of containers arriving at
their ports from South America each year? For example, do they have
adequate customs inspection at their ports? How have they improved
their maritime operations? What steps have we taken to assist the
Mexicans to improve their own ``customs'' inspections?
Answer. The U.S. Customs Service is not in a position to judge nor
does it have adequate information to answer questions on whether the
Mexicans have an adequate strategy, infrastructure and resources to
inspect cargo entering and transiting their country, or whether they
inspect the millions of containers arriving at their ports from South
America each year.
With respect to what steps we have taken to assist the Mexicans to
improve their own ``customs'' inspections, as a way to increase the
integrity of cargo entering the United States, the Customs Service
(with the support of the Department of State) has created the Americas
Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI). ACSI will build upon the success
of the Carrier Initiative Program and Business Anti-Smuggling
Coalition, by expanding our antinarcotics security programs with
industry and government, throughout Central and South America.
Beginning in January 1998, U.S. Customs officers from the Office of
Field Operations, office of Investigations, Office of International
Affairs, and the Office of Intelligence, will be regularly detailed to
assist exporters, carriers, manufacturers, etc., in developing and
implementing security programs and initiatives that safeguard
legitimate trade from being used to smuggle narcotics. This effort will
address the need for a continuous presence throughout the region, and
will endure until the end of fiscal year 1998, and possibly beyond.
Responsibilities of the ``ACSI'' teams will include providing
Carrier Initiative Training, Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition
Seminars, and performing security site-surveys at manufacturing plants,
container yards, and port facilities. Also, the team will conduct
timely post-seizure analyses, foster information exchange and follow-up
activities through established and consistent channels, and provide
advice on technology deployment and application.
Additionally, the ``ACSI'' teams will follow a ``Parallel Track,''
and work with foreign law enforcement agencies to improve their efforts
against the narcotics traffickers, and in developing industry
partnerships.
The goals of ``ACSI'' are
Strengthen cooperative efforts with legitimate businesses
involved in international trade to prevent narcotic smuggling
organizations from infiltrating their shipments and operations.
Increase actionable intelligence on narcotics and contraband
interdiction.
Increase the number of participants, and the level of
cooperation, in the Carrier Initiative Program and the Business
Anti-Smuggling Coalition.
Prevent narcotics from entering the U.S. via commercial
cargo and conveyances and cause total seizures of narcotics to
increase throughout the region.
Disrupt a major mode of smuggling through an aggressive
attack on internal conspiracies.
Force narcotics smuggling organizations to use methods more
open to detection and interdiction; i.e. air drops, speed
boats, etc.
Another way U.S. Customs has assisted Mexican Customs in improving
its customs inspections is by providing a Train-the-Trainer Workshop
for fourteen officers from Mexico Customs, the Federal Attorney
General's Office (PGR), and the Fiscal Federal Police in July 1997.
U.S. Customs officers trained these narcotics interdiction officers in
preparing lesson plans, delivery of the lessons, and general training
efforts. In addition, U.S. Customs, through International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Matters (INL)/State Department, provided a training
package to Mexican Customs, consisting of two overhead projectors, two
television monitors, two VCR'S, two camcorders, and a transparency
maker. This equipment was provided to Mexico Customs instructors to
assist with regional training. In January 1998, one of the U.S. Customs
instructors will return to Mexico to monitor training and determine the
end use of the training equipment provided.
U.S. Air/Maritime Access and Interdiction Efforts
Question 1. In the last 9 months, have there been any instances in
which a U.S. plane or ship has been unable to get permission for ``hot
pursuit'' of suspect targets, conduct normal interdiction, or refuel in
Mexican facilities? Is it true that U.S. Customs has had to reduce its
flights due to a shortage of fuel from the Mexican attorney generals
office?
Answer. Since 1990, the Government of Mexico has allowed Customs
aircraft to operate in various capacities within its sovereign
airspace. Permission to track a suspect target back into Mexico in
``hot pursuit'' is given on a case-by-case basis. Coordination of such
a pursuit is initiated by the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination
Center (DAICC) through the American Embassy, Mexico City. The Aviation
Liaison Officer (ALO) assigned to the Embassy contacts the appropriate
Mexican authorities to request overflight authority for the pursuing
Customs aircraft. At various times, permission has been obtained in as
little as 15 minutes. In the last 9 months, there have been no
instances where the Government of Mexico has denied ``hot pursuit'' of
a suspect target by Customs aircraft.
Funding constraints by the Government of Mexico have reduced non-
interdiction flights (i.e. patrol or training) by U.S. Customs to one
per week. The Government of Mexico has placed no restrictions on actual
interdiction missions and continues to be supportive.
Question 2. Are you concerned that the Mexicans rely too heavily on
U.S. interdiction efforts and have not invested enough to develop their
own capacity to do this key job? Why haven't the Mexicans installed
ground-based radar to protect their airspace from unauthorized flight?
How have we or will we make up this ``blind spot?''
Answer. Since 1991, U.S. Customs has stationed two of its Citation
interceptors in Mexico to provide training and assistance to Government
of Mexico officers in the tactics of interdicting drug trafficking
aircraft. This cooperative effort has resulted in dramatic improvements
in the Government of Mexico's air interdiction program. For example, in
FY 1996, Government of Mexico interdiction forces successfully assumed
control of 86 percent of the drug smuggling aircraft tracked to their
country as compared to 54 percent in FY 1992.
As far as the installation of ground-based radar in Mexico, we
cannot speak for the Government of Mexico on issues relating to the
closing of their ``blind spot'' or defense of their sovereign airspace.
Question 3. How significant is it that 18 members of Mexico's air
interdiction team were arrested last month for smuggling 165 pounds of
cocaine in their government aircraft? Were these personnel trained by
the United States government?
Answer. It is difficult to judge the impact of these arrests on the
Government of Mexico's air interdiction program. However, we believe
that any law enforcement effort, whether domestic or foreign, would be
damaged by such a compromise of integrity.
The U.S. Customs Service Air Interdiction Division has trained
approximately 184 Agents/Pilots through the Mexico Aviation Training
Initiative (MATI). Of the personnel we have trained, we are aware of
two who have been arrested: Ruben Partida Vargas, who attended the
first MATI school in December 1992, and Pedro Chang-Escobar, who
attended MATI in January 1994.
Questions Submitted by Senator Grassley
1. Current Threat
Question. Mexico recently received over 70 helicopters from the
U.S. for use by the Mexican military. The original justification for
those aircraft was to help in air interdiction. But now U.S. and
Mexican officials are saying the major smuggling threat is maritime,
especially in commercial vessels and cargo. In your evaluation, has
this shift occurred? If that is the case, then what is the
justification for providing the helicopters? What are these helicopters
being used for today, if not air interdiction? Does the bilateral task
force have access to/use of these helicopters?
Answer. The U.S. Customs Service was not directly involved in the
transfer of the 70 helicopters to the Mexican military by the U.S.
Department of Defense last year. Therefore, questions concerning the 70
helicopters should be addressed by the Department of Defense and/or the
Department of State. Customs can, however, discuss the evolving drug
threat.
Since its inception, the Customs Aviation Program has helped reduce
the flow of cross-border narcotics by general aviation aircraft by 75
percent. Since the early 1980's, the program has changed substantially
in terms of size and the geographic scope of our operations. our
success along the U.S. border led to a defense-in-depth strategy of
simultaneously attacking the smuggling threat in the source, transit
and arrival zones. Customs current priorities for its air program are
as follows:
1. Maintain the Air Program's success in deterring the use of
general aviation aircraft for smuggling drugs into the United States.
2. Provide air support to the investigative and enforcement
activities of Customs and other Federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies.
3. Provide operational support and training to foreign host nations
in their efforts to interdict drugs en route to the U.S., especially in
countries/regions such as Mexico and the Caribbean which border the
U.S. and its territories.
4. Support source zone efforts to disrupt cocaine transportation
networks in South America (Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-14).
The success of our air program has led to changes in smuggling
methods. While we can agree with the statement that the threat of drug
smuggling in the maritime environment has increased, there has not been
a concomitant decrease in the drug smuggling threat on the Southwest
Border. As reported by the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), seizures
of narcotics have increased in Puerto Rico by approximately 148%.
However, seizures along the Southwest Border have also increased during
the past fiscal year. Seizures from commercial cargo have increased
substantially. Seizures of narcotics from commercial cargo in FY 1996
were greater than the total seizures of narcotics from commercial cargo
for the years 1990 through 1995. In FY 1997 the seizures were increased
further. However, the smuggling threat in commercial cargo is found
both across our land borders as well as the maritime environment.
Currently there is limited intelligence regarding maritime
smuggling in general, and less about Mexican maritime smuggling. The
Customs Service is developing Intelligence Teams composed of Customs
Inspectors, Agents, Intelligence Analysts and Marine officers which are
set up as Intelligence Collection and Analysis Teams to fill the void
in intelligence on maritime smuggling activity. Nonetheless, based on
the evidence available, we have formed the following hypothesis: In the
maritime environment Mexican drug smuggling organizations are using a
wide variety of methods and means to not only receive drug shipments,
but to transship those drug loads into the United States. Intelligence
has identified several incidents involving various sized, Mexican
flagged fishing vessels in the Eastern Pacific which have received
large multi-ton cocaine shipments from Colombia and Panama-based mother
ships. These fishing vessels are believed to make landfall at points
along the western coast of Mexico where the drug shipments are then
moved overland to and across the Southwest Border.
Intelligence indicates that in the Caribbean, go-fast boats are
transporting loads of cocaine to points along Mexico's eastern coast
where the drug loads are sent overland across our border with Mexico.
In the Gulf of Mexico, there continues to be ``shark boat'' (small open
boats equipped with powerful outboard motors) activity in the south
Texas area north of Brownsville, Texas.
The Gulf of Mexico is vulnerable to exploitation by drug smugglers.
Bales of marijuana are floating up along beaches and inlets in various
places from the Louisiana coast to the west coast of Florida at
frequent intervals.
Mexican maritime smuggling is not limited to fishing boats; there
are indications that large container ships are also being used. In
February of last year, a Mexican-owned container ship grounded itself
by accident in the Florida Keys off Key West. It may have been off-
course while en route to a drop off point. Confidential sources
revealed that approximately 1 ton of cocaine was successfully offloaded
from the vessel before the crew reported their grounding to the Coast
Guard. It is believed, through the same confidential sources, the
shipment belonged to the Mexican Amado Carillo Fuentes organization.
2. Vetted Units
Question. With the arrest of the Mexican Drug Czar General Jesus
Gutierrez Rebollo on corruption charges, the existing vetted units were
disbanded. What is your assessment of the new expanded vetting process?
When will these newly vetted units come online?
Answer. A new ``vetting'' process, in which FBI/DEA have provided
technical support and assistance in the polygraphing, in addition to
the Mexican integrity screening process for the staff of the Bilateral
Task Force on the Mexican side of the border, began in the spring/
summer of 1997. All officers had to pass the new integrity screening
and most candidates were chosen from the recent graduating class of the
PGR Academy (further insurance that the officers should not yet have
had occasion to be tainted). In addition, these vetted officers have
come to the U.S. for additional training in advanced investigative
techniques, ethics, etc. These officers are now being deployed to the
Tijuana, Juarez, and Guadalajara areas. The U.S. Customs Service
believes that this process will enhance the quality and integrity of
the Mexican personnel.
3. Radars
Question. The percentage of illegal drugs crossing our border from
Mexico continues at an alarming rate. One of the main modes of
transportation for smuggling ventures responsible for drugs being
transshipped from South America through Mexico into the United States
is through the use of various aircraft. The role of ground-based radar
has proved successful in the interdiction of illegal narcotics in other
areas of the world, including where there is a radar net in place in
Mexico. However, intelligence indicates that drug traffickers have
learned to circumvent the existing radar system and use alternate
smuggling routes as a result of gaps within the existing system. When
President Zedillo visited Washington in March of 1995, he promised the
United States that Mexico would establish a radar net to fill these
gaps. To date, no radars have been installed. What is your assessment
of the threat of air smuggling into and out of Mexico?
Questions concerning ground-based radar in Mexico should be
addressed by the Department of Defense and/or the Department of State.
Customs can, however, discuss its role in responding to the air
smuggling threat.
Since 1991, U.S. Customs has based two of its Citation interceptors
in Mexico to provide training and assistance to Government of Mexico
officers in the tactics of interdicting drug trafficking aircraft. This
cooperative effort has resulted in dramatic improvements in the
Government of Mexico's air interdiction program. For example, in FY
1996, Government of Mexico interdiction forces successfully assumed
control of 86 percent of the drug smuggling aircraft tracked to their
country as compared to 54 percent in FY 1992. This would indicate that
the Government of Mexico continues to develop an independent air
interdiction program in response to the air smuggling threat.
While the U.S. Customs Service cannot directly address the air
smuggling threat across Mexico's southern land border we have
maintained a proactive air interdiction program, with operations
throughout the western hemisphere. This program is constantly adjusting
to new smuggler tactics, by quickly identifying emerging trends and
then formulating an appropriate response. We routinely assess our
performance and available resources in order to deploy the most
efficient and effective mix of aviation assets/technology. Overall we
have maintained an effective air interdiction program with operations
in the source, transit and arrival zones, in coordination with DOD,
DEA, Department of State and foreign host nations.
4. Arms Smuggling
Question. Drug cartels and criminal organizations are very well
armed to facilitate their illegal enterprises. What is the United
States doing to prevent the trafficking of illegal firearms into Mexico
from the United States?
Answer. The disruption of firearms trafficking activities along the
border with Mexico through the interdiction of illicit firearms
shipments and the investigation, prosecution and conviction of
individuals and groups responsible for those acts is a primary
objective of the U.S. Customs Service. Customs has established a border
liaison effort with the responsible Mexican authorities to facilitate
the sharing of intelligence relative to illicit trafficking in
firearms.
Customs is also involved in comprehensive firearms trafficking
training initiatives aimed at increasing the effectiveness of both
Mexican Customs and other Mexican law enforcement agencies' ability to
deal with cross border illicit firearms trafficking. These training
initiatives are conducted in cooperation with the Department of State
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).
The Customs Service has the Outbound Process which is responsible
for enforcement of export laws. Inspectors assigned to Outbound teams
conduct regular outbound enforcement operations at our land borders and
major airports and seaports. These operations are closely coordinated
with other Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and
designed to detect and intercept illegal export shipments.
Customs has also received additional resources to enhance our
outbound inspection capabilities. Customs is planning to build outbound
inspection facilities along the southern border. In addition, the
Customs Service is planning to provide our outbound inspection teams
with enhanced detection equipment and resources such as currency and
weapons detection canine teams.
The Outbound Process also works closely with Customs Office of
Investigations which coordinates with other federal agencies such as
ATF, to target and intercept illegal weapons shipments to Mexico along
our borders.
5. Money Laundering
Question. In May 1996, Mexico passed legislation as part of the
Mexico Criminal Code that for the first time makes money laundering a
criminal offense. Because of the international aspect of money
laundering, cooperation between countries when investigating money
laundering cases is essential. Has the level of cooperation and
information sharing improved between Mexico and the United States since
this legislation passed? Has any individual or organization been
charged under this new law and if not why? Also, have any institutions
been identified as laundering problems? What kind of intelligence
sharing between U.S. and Mexican investigators is occurring?
Answer. Mexico, as well as a large number of other countries, is
carrying out actions to prevent, detect and combat money laundering,
which include: updating its legal framework, coordinating several
government agencies, exchanging information and documentation with
other countries pursuant to International Treaties and agreements,
carrying out joint coordinated investigations, regulating financial
entities regarding suspicious and outstanding currency transactions,
creating a Financial Information Unit (FIU), and imparting training and
technical expertise to personnel in charge of preventing, detecting,
and combating money laundering transactions.
On April 29, 1996, the Mexican legislature added Article 400 Bis to
the Criminal Code, establishing for the first time the criminal offense
of money laundering, which became effective on May 14, 1996, and is
denominated as ``Transactions with resources from illicit origins.''
The level of cooperation between the U.S. Customs Service and
Mexico on money laundering has improved. The Mexicans are providing us
with Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports (CMIR) to facilitate our
investigative efforts. Customs has analyzed some of the data provided
by the Government of Mexico and, as a result of the analysis, has
initiated investigations of currency smuggling along the Southwest
Border.
Recent joint investigations which led to arrests and convictions in
United States courts and in which Mexico provided assistance include:
1. Ines Calderon Godoy (1995) Ines Calderon Godoy is a Member of
the Arellano-Felix Organization. Federal Court in Arizona charged
Calderon with money laundering charges and seized $1 million from him.
2. Heberto Francisco Garcia Valenzuela (1996) He is the son of
Heberto Francisco Garcia. Federal Court in Arizona convicted Garcia of
drug trafficking and money laundering charges. He was sentenced to 25
years and his father, Heberto was sentenced to 18 years, and $4.5
million was also seized by the United States.
3. Francisco Javier Leon Reyes (Investigation opened in 1992 and is
continuing.) Federal Court of Arizona convicted Leon for false
statements on a money laundering investigation. He was sentenced to
serve 57 months in prison and the U.S. seized $133,000.
4. Juan Garcia Abrego (Investigation opened in 1996 and is
continuing.) Federal Court in Houston, Texas, convicted Garcia on drug
and money laundering charges. Garcia was sentenced to serve life in
prison.
5. Jesus Echegollen Barrueta (Investigation opened in 1994 and is
continuing.) Federal Court in Brownsville, Texas, convicted Echegollen
on drug and money laundering charges. Echegollen was sentenced to life
in prison and all of his belongings were seized. Associates of
Echegollen, Guillermina Chavez and Jacob Levy were also convicted and
Chavez was sentenced to 78 months in prison and had all of her
belongings seized. Levy received 10 months in prison and was fined
$15,000.
6. Mario Ruiz Massieu (Investigation opened in 1995 and is
continuing) Mario Ruiz Massieu, former Deputy Attorney General of
Mexico, was arrested by Customs agents in New Jersey for smuggling
currency based upon information provided by the Government of Mexico.
Subsequent investigation led to the seizure and civil forfeiture of $9
million in drug proceeds maintained by Massieu in a bank account in the
United States. The civil trial took place in Federal court in Houston,
Texas.
Customs has a broad grant of authority in the conduct of
international financial crime and money laundering investigations.
Jurisdiction is triggered by the illegal movement of criminal funds,
services, or merchandise across our national borders and is applied
pursuant to the authority under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), Money
Laundering Control Act (MLCA), and other Customs laws. Combined with
our border search authority, Customs enforcement efforts focus on the
most significant international criminal organizations (ICOS) whose
corrupt influence often impacts global trade, economic, and financial
systems. Customs efforts are not limited to drug related money
laundering, but extend to the proceeds of all crime.
Customs has implemented an aggressive strategy to combat money
laundering and the flow of illegal proceeds into Mexico. Our approach
involves interdiction efforts by Customs inspectors, criminal
investigations by Customs Special Agents, and in partnership with
Treasury, FinCEN, and others, the design and implementation of
innovative regulatory interventions, unique to Treasury, that dismantle
and disrupt systems, organizations, and industries that launder ill-
gotten gains. Customs dedicates some 500 Special Agents worldwide to
money laundering investigations.
Operation Choza Rica, launched by Customs Special Agents in
McAllen, Texas, uncovered and subsequently dismantled a major Mexican
money laundering network along the Southwest Border. This intricate web
involved Mexican Casas de Cambio and established banks in the United
States and Switzerland. In a series of criminal indictments, managing
directors of several major Mexican Casas de Cambio and U.S. Banks,
including American Express Bank International, First City Bank, Lone
Star National Bank, and International Bank of Commerce were
subsequently prosecuted and convicted for laundering money for the Juan
Garcia-Abrego cocaine smuggling organization. In excess of 60 million
dollars in cash and other assets were seized and forfeited in this
investigation. AEBI forfeited 44 million dollars to the Treasury
Forfeiture Fund representing the largest forfeiture ever by a domestic
corporation.
6. Secure Communications
It is my understanding that as recent as 2 weeks ago the
availability of secure lines for communication with vetted units in
Mexico has not been resolved. In addition, I have heard reports that
there is no secure communications between our consulates and the
Embassy in Mexico City. As I am sure you are aware, secure
communications is essential to running not only a successful foreign
policy but in conducting a proper investigation. What is your
understanding of this problem and is there a solution underway?
Answer. The U.S. Customs Service is not responsible for providing
secure communications between the U.S. and our Embassy in Mexico.
However, the U.S. Customs Service does have the capability to
communicate in a secure mode with the Embassy and its occupants. In
fact, Customs does communicate with the Customs attache at the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico City on a daily basis using secure communications
including both fax and voice, and our capabilities are well established
in this arena.
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Thomas Kneir, Deputy
Assistant Director, Organized Crime and Drug Branch, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms
U.S.-Mexico Cooperation
Question 1. DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine asserted earlier
this year that there is not a single Mexican law enforcement agency
with which DEA has a completely trusting relationship. Is there a
single Mexican law enforcement agency with which the FBI has a
completely trusting relationship. Is there a single Mexican law
enforcement agency with which the FBI has a completely trusting
relationship today?
Answer. Since March of this year, some encouraging developments
have taken place, indicating a willingness on the part of the
Government of Mexico (GOM) to improve their counternarcotics
organizations, as well as their overall performance in investigating
the organized crime syndicates in Mexico.
After the arrest of General Gutierrez-Rebollo in February 1997, the
GOM dismantled the National Institute for the Combat of Drugs (INCD).
In place of the INCD, the GOM established a new anti-drug unit, the
Special Prosecutor's Office of Drug Crimes, the Fiscalia Especializada
Para Atencion de Delitos Control La Salud, or FEADS. It was apparent
that, in order to be effective, Mexican law enforcement organizations
needed to be staffed with high-caliber, trustworthy individuals who are
deeply committed to drug control efforts. FEADS is responsible for drug
law enforcement under the office of the Mexican Attorney General,
Procuraduria General de la Republica, or PGR, and is headed by
Commissioner Mariano Herran-Salvetti, an attorney. Attorney General
Madrazzo and Commissioner Herran have instituted a program of selecting
and ``vetting'' employees involved in counterdrug activities. The
Mexican vetting process involves a psychological assessment, financial
background checks, urinalysis, and polygraphs. The U.S. administers its
own polygraph tests for those units in which Mexicans and Americans
work side by side. DEA and the FBI have also worked with the GOM to
help identify, select and train individuals who are further vetted, and
who will work on more sensitive law enforcement projects.
FEADS currently employs approximately 870 agents, of which 200 are
``vetted'' by the GOM and a portion of those have been vetted further.
Plans call for a total of 2,000 fully Mexican-vetted employees and both
the FBI and DEA are committed to assisting the GOM reach that goal.
Under the auspices of FEADS are two specialized units, the
Organized Crime Unit (OCU) and the Special Investigation Unit (SIU),
and the Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's). Both the OCU and SIU report to
Dr. Samuel Gonzalez-Ruiz who is also an attorney. These units, in which
Americans and Mexicans work, are charged with the responsibility of
gathering intelligence and building cases against the most significant
drug traffickers in Mexico. Both organizations are comprised of cleared
and U.S.-vetted employees, although neither is fully staffed yet.
The FBI/Legat has a very trusting relationship with the Mexican
Attorney General's Office (PGR). The Legat has an excellent
relationship with the PGR, which is as good and professional as ever
before. Extraditions and deportations of U.S. fugitives are being
handled in an expedited manner. The system is not perfect because,
Mexican law rarely allows for the extradition of its nationals and also
allows for ``amparos'' (appeals), to go on for an extended period.
However, these are constitutional issues, and out of the control of the
PGR. Legat believes that the PGR has been clearly working well within
the law and should be commended for their assistance to our efforts. It
should be noted that Legat's dealings with the PGR are primarily in
non-drug trafficking cases.
Question 2. What cooperation does the FBI have with Mexican
counterparts today? Is that practical cooperation more or less active
today that it was 12 months ago?
Answer. Since the inception of the OCU, the FBI has received
excellent cooperation from the Mexican counterparts. This level of
cooperation is much more active and effective than it was 12 months
ago. Legat believes that our counterparts in the PGR are providing
practical cooperation at a greater level than 12 months ago. For
example, on 09/17/97, following a Legat request for a search warrant,
the PGR executed the warrant in Mexico City, which resulted in finding
items of evidence, which directly lead to the recovery of almost 19
million dollars in North Carolina. The money had been stolen from an
armored car in Jacksonville, Florida, several months earlier.
Another example that highlights the increased cooperation that the
FBI has experienced with law enforcement agencies in Mexico as
illustrated by an investigation in our San Diego office. ``Operation
Logan Sweep,'' was initiated in February, 1996, and targeted the
criminal activities of a violent San Diego gang known as the Logan
Street Gang. During the course of this investigation, it was determined
that the Arellano Felix organization was using members of the Logan
Street Gang to distribute cocaine and marijuana and act as
``enforcers'' in the furtherance of their drug trafficking
organization. This investigation resulted in the indictment of numerous
gang members to include Ramon Arellano Felix the most violent brother.
Due to his extreme violent nature and it's impact on the American
public, Ramon Arellano Felix was announced as an FBI top 10 fugitive.
The significance of case is that it was accomplished by a joint
federal, state and local task force with the assistance of Mexican law
enforcement. The cooperation of Mexican law enforcement proved to be
invaluable to this investigation, in that they assisted in the
identification and subsequent relocation of several critical
cooperating witnesses.
In a highly sensitive ongoing Southwest Border investigation, an
FBI undercover operation has wire transferred funds to a bank account
in Mexico for the payment of a large quantity of drugs. Coordination
between a newly created vetted Mexican unit and FBI Resolution 6 agents
has been initiated. The Mexican unit will attempt to track this money
in the Mexican banking system and potentially follow it to its ultimate
destination. This vetted Mexican unit has also assisted the FBI is
obtaining information regarding telephone numbers of individuals
involved in drug trafficking. These are but a few examples of the
cooperation and relationship that the FBI has developed with the PGR.
Question 3. With respect to the importance of ``intelligence'' to
identify contraband, do you think that the FBI and other U.S. law
enforcement officials should be allowed more routine contact with
counterparts and others on the Mexican side of the border to gather
this information? We have been told that these personnel have to clear
all such contacts through our Embassy in Mexico City.
Answer. In order to ensure maximum security and coordination
amongst U.S. agencies and between U.S. and Mexican agencies, a
centralized form of ``country clearance'', is necessary for U.S.
personnel to travel to the interior of Mexico to conduct official
business. However, the current border regulations of allowing U.S.
personnel to travel only 25 kilometers into Mexico should be expanded
to allow for increased contact with Mexican counterparts. This policy
is restrictive and is counter productive in that it limits the
gathering of intelligence.
Bilateral Border Task Forces/Organized Crime Unit
Question 1. The ONDCP report describes the border task forces as
the ``cornerstone'' of U.S. cooperation. How has and how will the FBI
support these task forces? Are new FBI personnel accredited in Mexico
posted there yet?
Answer. The BTF'S, which were originally established in Tijuana,
Juarez, and Monterrey, were conceived on a frame work of frequent and
continued interaction between the U.S. and Mexican law enforcement
officers at the operational level and a free flow of information. The
goal was to ultimately create a unit in each city which could direct
the joint resources of Mexico and the United States against syndicate
leaders. Unfortunately, because of the ``security'' issues, the BTF's
have never reached their full potential as FBI, DEA and U.S. Customs
have had to adopt a less effective operational strategy.
The FBI and DEA will continue to assist the GOM as they work to
improve their law enforcement capabilities. The FBI and DEA are jointly
assisting in the vetting of the Mexican agents assigned to the BTFS. In
addition, both agencies are conducting a one month training course,
held in the U.S., for all BTF and OCU agents. We believe that progress
will not occur overnight, and substantial time is necessary for real
improvements in Mexico's law enforcement organizations to bear fruit.
Question 2. What support has and will the FBI provide to the
formation and operation of the new Organized Crime Unit? Special Anti-
Drug Prosecutor's Office (FEADS)? FinancialCrimes Unit?
Answer. FEADS, the Organized Crime Unit (OCU) and the Financial
Crimes Unit have been supported by the FBI through the vetting process,
training and manpower. These units are charged with the responsibility
of gathering intelligence and building cases against the most
significant drug traffickers and organized crime figures in Mexico.
Both organizations are comprised of vetted employees, although neither
is fully staffed yet. The FBI is also prepared to provide advanced
training in areas of specialization such as Forensics, White Collar
Crime, Organized Crime, Money Laundering, etc.
Seizures by Mexico
Question 1. Do the Mexicans have an adequate strategy,
infrastructure and resources to inspect cargo entering and transiting
their country? Do they inspect the millions of containers arriving in
their ports from South America each year? For example, do they have
adequate customs inspection at their ports? How have they improved
their maritime operations? What steps have we taken to assist the
Mexicans to improve their own ``customs'' inspections? Does the U.S.
government have information that the same drugs seized by Mexican
authorities and credited to their seizure statistics later end up back
on the illicit drug market?
Answer. This matter falls within the jurisdiction and expertise of
the United States Customs Service, and therefore, this question should
be directed to them for an opinion.
U.S. Law Enforcement Weapons-Carrying
Question 1. Do any FBI personnel assigned to Mexico carry weapons
today for their own defense? Which positions and what diplomatic
credentials do these persons hold? Isn't it correct that such officers
to whom the Mexicans have given full diplomatic immunities do routinely
carry their weapons in Mexico today?
Answer. FBI personnel assigned to Mexico under Resolution 6 do not
have full diplomatic immunity, however, they do carry weapons in
accordance with DEA guidelines which are: all Agents will carry
official firearms in the performance of their duties. FBI Agents
assigned to the Legat in Mexico also do not have full diplomatic
immunity, however, they do carry weapons under the authorization of the
Chief of Mission and as required by FBI Headquarters. These Agents
carry Consular Employee credentials, only the FBI Legat and DEA Country
Attache carry Diplomatic Credentials (full diplomatic ``immunities'')
in Mexico.
Money Laundering Cases
Question 1. What priority do you attach to building money
laundering cases? Is it your policy that we should do more to increase
such prosecutions? What specific steps are being taken to build more
such cases right here in the U.S.?
Answer. Legat places a high priority on money laundering cases.
Approximately one year ago, the Mexican government passed an Organized
Crime Bill which allows for these prosecutions. Because it is new
legislation, the Government of Mexico (GOM) and specifically the
Hacienda (Tax) Department, which handles the bulk of these cases, are
just beginning to learn how to conduct and pursue these cases. Over the
past two years, the FBI has provided money laundering training to
Mexican law enforcement and will continue provide basic and advanced
money laundering training in the future. The FBI is optimistic that
significant prosecutions will take place in this area in the future
once the GOM gains experience
Questions Submitted by Senator Grassley
1. Extradition and Mexican Prosecution
Question. It is my understanding that an official to the Chamber of
Deputies who was recently elected has an outstanding bench warrant for
flight from prosecution. What comments, if any has Mexico made on this
situation? What pressure has the Justice or State departments brought
in this situation? What other reasonable actions have or could be
taken?
Answer. Since no name was provided, it is difficult to be sure that
our response refers to the person about whom you are inquiring. Our
research has determined that recently elected, former National Action
Party (PAN) Federal Deputy, Jose Adan Deniz Macias, was investigated by
the FBI in 1976 after information was revealed that he and his brother,
Francisco Javier Deniz, were deserters from the U.S. Navy and both
faked their deaths to collect insurance money. By Deniz's own
admission, he deserted the U.S. Navy in 1974 and collected money from
his fictitious death. When this information became public, he separated
himself from the PAN political party and currently holds his seat in
the Federal Congress as an independent.
FBI Los Angeles opened an investigation on Deniz in 1976, charging
him with Title 18, USC 1542, False Statement on a Passport Application.
A warrant for his arrest was issued on May 26, 1976. The passport
charges against Deniz were dismissed in 1978. Recently, due to the
publicity surrounding Deniz's election, this matter was brought to the
U.S. Attorney's office for a prosecutive opinion. Prosecution was
declined because the Statute of Limitations expired and that there has
been no ongoing criminal activity in this case.
The U.S. Navy currently has outstanding warrants for the arrest of
both Deniz brothers, for fraudulent enlistment, desertion, and
falsifying their deaths in order to receive death benefits. These
however, are not extraditable offenses. Therefore, at this time the
U.S. is not actively pursuing these charges.
2. Extradition
Question. Last week, before the House Judiciary Committee, Mr.
Hutchinson asked a former cartel member what he felt was the greatest
tool or weapon that law enforcement has against drug traffickers. The
answer was simple and straight forward: Extradition. To quote, ``that
is the real weapon that the United States can wield to end the war
against drugs . . . it's the law that is much stricter and there is no
way of fixing it up . . .'' I realize that he was speaking of Colombia,
but it's only logical that the same would be true for Mexico. What
actions is the U.S. taking to pressure Mexico to extradite drug
traffickers? Do you believe that the Government of Mexico (GOM) would
extradite Arellano Felix, now on the FBI's 10 most wanted list, to the
U.S. if he is arrested? Do you feel the GOM is presently making a full
faith effort to pursue and capture him?
Answer. Since 1996 the GOM has stated a willingness to extradite
fugitives involved in drug trafficking to the United States. However,
there have only been two extraditions from Mexico to the United States,
both occurring in 1996, and only one involved a significant Mexican
national drug organization leader for drug related offenses, Juan
Garcia Abrego. Efforts to effect the extradition of known drug
traffickers have encountered significant delays. One example of an
extradition delay is Oscar Malherbe DeLeon, one of Juan Garcia Abrego's
top lieutenants, who was arrested in February 1997, by Mexican
authorities while he was hospitalized under an alias name. In 1993,
Malherbe Deleon was indicted in the Southern District of Texas and
charged with a variety of drug trafficking offenses stemming from his
involvement in the Juan Garcia Abrego Organization. The DOJ has
requested the extradition of Malherbe DeLeon, who is a Mexican national
with no success to date.
The Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, is
continually addressing the extradition issue with the GOM and pursuing
such cases individually. The GOM will demonstrate its commitment to the
mutual fight against Mexican based drug organizations when significant
Mexican drug organizations members/leaders residing in Mexico, who are
indicted in the United States for drug trafficking activity, are
extradited with out lengthy delays and roadblocks.
Regarding the capture and extradition of Ramon Arellano Felix who
is on the FBI's 10 Most Wanted List, the GOM has outstanding arrest
warrants for the Arellano-Felix brothers and recently offered a reward
of $1 million for information leading to their capture. Therefore it
appears that the GOM is making a good faith effort to locate and
capture this dangerous fugitive. The United States has offered a $2
million reward for the capture of Ramon Arellano.
3. Corruption
Question. The threat of corruption at the border is tremendous. Do
you believe that we are getting the type of cooperation we need from
Mexico to combat the threat of corruption to U.S. personnel stationed
along the border? Do you feel that Mexico can deal with this problem
effectively? You are a participant in the HLCG; how has corruption been
addressed? Do you see the obstacles as a result of corruption
interfering with the goals of the working groups? Would you recommend a
separate working group specifically set up to address the growing
problem of corruption?
Answer. Corruption continues to be a significant issue, it remains
systemic and crosses all institutions, including the criminal justice
systems in Mexico. The depth of corruption was typified in February,
1997, by the arrest of General Jesus Gutierrez-Rebollo, then chief of
Mexico's lead antidrug agency, the National Institute to Combat Drugs
(INCD). General Rebollo was arrested for providing information to the
Amado Carrillo Fuentes Organization. In response to General Rebollo's
arrest, the GOM dismantled the INCD, and removed the majority of its
employees for corrupt activities. In an effort to combat corruption the
GOM created a new drug enforcement agency called the Fiscalia
Especializado para La Atencion De Delitos Contra La Salud (FEADS). This
new unit is staffed with vetted personnel who monitor the activities of
the Border Task Forces and the Organized Crime Unit. It is hoped that
the measures being taken by the GOM, such as creating special, fully
vetted law enforcement units will be successful in eliminating or
reducing corruption, which will allow successful cooperative bilateral
operations with U.S. law enforcement agencies.
As a member of the HLCG, I believe that the GOM needs to
continually address the issue of corruption and its effect on law
enforcement and the judicial system. I do not believe that there are
any obstacles resulting from corruption in the HLCG because we are
working with a selected group within law enforcement to avoid
corruption. However we are always cognizant of the potential threat of
corruption at all levels.
At this time, I do not see a need for a separate working group to
address matters of corruption. There are vetted groups formed that
currently address drug matters. Because corruption is so intertwined
with drug matters, these groups effectively address corruption matters
as well.