[Senate Hearing 105-304]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[[Page 1]]
S. Hrg. 105-304
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
REVIEWING THE EFFECTS OF GREENHOUSE GASES ON GLOBAL WEATHER CONDITIONS
AND ASSESSING INTERNATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE THE NEGATIVE
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
__________
JULY 10 AND 17, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
45-112cc WASHINGTON : 1998
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington DC
20402
[[Page (ii)]]
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia MAX BAUCUS, Montana
ROBERT SMITH, New Hampshire DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Idaho FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma HARRY REID, Nevada
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BOB GRAHAM, Florida
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas BARBARA BOXER, California
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado RON WYDEN, Oregon
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
Jimmie Powell, Staff Director
J. Thomas Sliter, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
JULY 10, 1997
REVIEW OF THE SCIENCE
OPENING STATEMENTS
Allard, Hon. Wayne, U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado...... 9
Baucus, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from the State of Montana......... 3
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., U.S. Senator from the State of
Missouri....................................................... 5
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California... 16
Chafee, Hon. John H., U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island 1
Hutchinson, Hon. Tim, U.S. Senator from the State of Arkansas.... 6
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 9
Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New
Jersey......................................................... 13
Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut.................................................... 14
Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada.......... 11
Thomas, Hon. Craig, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming....... 4
Wyden, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon........... 8
WITNESSES
Barron, Eric, professor, Department of Geosciences, and director,
Earth System Sciences Center, Pennsylvania State University.... 17
Articles:
Consequences: Nature and Implications of Environmental
Change................................................. 69
Evaluating Policy Decisions Based on Climate Model
Predictions............................................ 81
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Baucus........................................... 90
Senator Boxer............................................ 93
Senator Reid............................................. 92
Christy, John R., associate professor, Department of Atmospheric
Science, University of Alabama at Huntsville................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 94
Responses to addition questions from:
Senator Baucus........................................... 104
Senator Boxer............................................ 108
Jorgenson, Dale, professor, Economics Department, Harvard
University..................................................... 28
Article, Economic Effects of a Carbon Tax.................... 172
Prepared statement........................................... 158
Lindzen, Richard S., Alfred P. Sloane Professor of Meteorology,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.......................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 110
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Baucus........................................... 118
Senator Boxer............................................ 119
Schneider, Stephen H., professor, Department of Biological
Sciences, Stanford University.................................. 25
Article, Achieving Carbon Dioxide Targets Cost-Effectively:
What Needs To Be Done Now? 141
Prepared statement........................................... 120
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Baucus........................................... 150
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Senator Boxer............................................ 155
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JULY 17, 1997
INTERNATIONAL POLICY REVIEW
OPENING STATEMENTS
Baucus, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from the State of Montana......... 199
Chafee, Hon. John H., U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island 197
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 199
Kempthorne, Hon. Dirk, U.S. Senator from the State of Idaho...... 201
Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada.......... 205
WITNESSES
Fay, Kevin J., executive director, International Climate Change
Partnership.................................................... 227
Letters to:
President William Clinton................................ 249
Under Secretary of State Wirth........................... 247
Membership list, International Climate Change Partnership.... 261
Prepared statement........................................... 246
Proposal, Issues in the Climate Change Protocol Negotiations. 250
O'Keefe, William F., chairman, Global Climate Coalition.......... 229
Letter, response to comments by Under Secretary of State
Wirth...................................................... 265
Prepared statement........................................... 255
Responses to additional questions from Senator Chafee........ 267
Wirth, Hon. Timothy E., Under Secretary of State for Global
Affairs, Department of State................................... 206
Prepared statement........................................... 243
Yellen, Janet, chair, Council of Economic Advisers, National
Economic Council, Executive Office of the President............ 202
Prepared statement........................................... 236
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Chafee........................................... 239
Senator Boxer............................................ 241
Senator Lieberman........................................ 242
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Article, Greenhouse Forecasting Still Cloudy, Science magazine... 262
Letter, Association of American Railroad......................... 273
[[Page (1)]]
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
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THURSDAY, JULY 10, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Washington, DC.
REVIEW OF THE SCIENCE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room
406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. John H. Chafee (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Chafee, Warner, Inhofe, Thomas, Bond,
Hutchinson, Allard, Sessions, Baucus, Lautenberg, Reid, Graham,
and Wyden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Senator Chafee. We want to welcome everyone this morning.
We've got quite a turnout here, so if there are any seats,
please take them. If people leave, please do so quietly and the
others fill into the seats quietly.
This morning, we will receive testimony on one of the most
important and challenging environmental, economic and political
matters of our time. That is global climate change. It is a
serious issue that requires immediate attention.
To help us better understand some of the fundamental
scientific and economic issues which underpin the current
policy debate, we've assembled some of the world's leading
experts. The full committee will conduct a follow-up hearing 1
week from today on July 17 to receive testimony from the
Administration on the upcoming international negotiations over
amendments to the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The issue of global climate change is certainly politically
contentious, both here and abroad. For years now, we've had one
side forecasting a scenario of rising seas, recurrent drought,
and a blistering heat, all of which they say will result in a
ravaged economy.
On the other side are those who claim that meaningful
policies to control emissions of greenhouse gases are
premature, unwarranted and unfounded and would result in a
ravaged economy.
What's going on here? What are the scientists saying?
Consider this quotation. ``Would it not be possible that the
Earth's temperature had decreased during periods of low carbon
dioxide and increased when the protective carbon dioxide had
been present to a higher degree.''
[[Page 2]]
As our distinguished witnesses are aware, this hypothesis
was not culled from the text of some suspect environmental
organization's manifesto; it was delivered in an 1896 lecture,
101 years ago before the Stockholm Physics Society by the Nobel
Prize winning Swedish chemist, Sevante Arenious.
Professor Arenious was the first to predict that large
increases in carbon dioxide from humans could result in warming
of the globe. What have the world's scientists told us at
different intervals over the last 101 years since Professor
Arenious first identified the warming effects of carbon
dioxide? Here is a sample.
In 1924, U.S. physicists speculated that industrial
activity would double atmospheric carbon dioxide within 500
years, roughly 2424. Current projections are for a doubling
sometime before 2050, 400 years earlier than predicted 70 years
ago.
In 1957, scientists from Scripps reported for the first
time that much of the carbon dioxide emitted into the
atmosphere is not absorbed by the oceans as some had argued,
leaving significant amounts in the atmosphere.
In 1967, the first reliable computer simulation calculated
that global average temperatures may increase by more than 4
degrees Fahrenheit when atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are
double that of preindustrial times.
In 1985, a conference sponsored by the United Nations, the
WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions forged a
consensus of the international community on the issue of
climate change.
In 1987, an ice core from the Antarctic analyzed by French
and Russian scientists revealed an extremely close correlation
between carbon dioxide and temperature going back more than
100,000 years.
In 1990, in an appeal signed by 49 Nobel Prize winners and
700 members of the National Academy of Sciences said, ``There's
broad agreement within the scientific community that
amplification of the Earth's natural greenhouse effect by the
buildup of various gases introduced by human activity has the
potential to produce dramatic changes in the climate. Only by
taking action now can we ensure that future generations will
not be put at risk.''
In the same year, 747 participants from 116 countries took
part in the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva. They
reported, ``If the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations is
not limited, the predicted climate change would place stresses
on natural and social systems unprecedented in the past 10,000
years.''
In 1992, we had the framework of 153 nations, including the
United States, sign the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
In that year, they committed the signatory governments to
voluntary reduction of greenhouse gases.
The Senate consented to ratification of this landmark
environmental treaty on October 7 with a two-thirds majority
vote. That was in 1992.
In 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
representing thousands of climate scientists, concluded ``The
balance of evidence suggests there's discernible human
influence on global climate.''
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It must be stated that recent IPCC conclusion is based on
numerous variables and we're all eager to learn more about
these variables and about the certainties from our witnesses.
So today we will hear about this evolution of scientific
understanding.
I'm convinced the science in this matter has and will
continue to evolve. The question is, do we know enough to
support legally binding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
as proposed by the United States and numerous other countries?
Are we prepared to accept the risks associated with the
decision to postpone further action to address potential
climate change?
What is being called for? What might be the impacts to our
economy? Some say we must stabilize carbon dioxide emissions at
1990 levels by the year 2010. At least one economic model
forecast this sort of action would result in economic losses of
about 2.4 percent of the GDP. This, of course, is significant.
Others, using more optimistic models, believe that the U.S.
economy could withstand significant emissions reductions while
prospering as never before. Some 2,500 economists declared in
February of this year that cost-effective means are available
for the United States to address the threat of climate change.
Let me conclude by identifying what I see as the
fundamental questions before us today. First, how much warming
might occur as a result of human actions and how soon might
such warming occur? What is the range of impacts and when might
they be conclusively identified? What do economic modeling and
empirical data tell us about the various policy responses?
We look forward with great interest to the witnesses.
Senator Baucus, do you have a statement?
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAX BAUCUS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF MONTANA
Senator Baucus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am looking
forward to the hearing. We have today scientists and economists
who are very imminent in their field.
I was at Rio de Janeiro, as you were, Mr. Chairman, in 1992
and was filled with the expectation and the promise that we're
going to finally do something about world environmental
problems, including climate change.
Since then, I think the results have been poor, that is
actions taken by countries and probably for some good reason.
That is, this is not an exact science. That is, we're making
lots of guesses here, there's lots of modeling and it's very
difficult to know exactly what's happening.
Nevertheless, since 1992, we have a lot more data, we have
a lot more studies and we're now in a better position than we
were then to know what we should or should not do.
I'm also very pleased that today's hearing is somewhat
focused on the science of climate change and also a bit on what
some of the actions could be to take to the degree that global
climate change is causing quite significant adverse conditions
on this planet. That is, we're not yet getting to the policy
discussions until next week, but rather, focusing much more on
the science today.
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I think that's very good and I hope all of us and the panel
today do focus on the science because it's important to get the
facts before we then proceed to making policy determinations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Thomas.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CRAIG THOMAS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF WYOMING
Senator Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a statement I wish to put in the record if I may and
just let me say that I think it's very important that we do
talk about this as we prepare for the negotiations that will
take place both in the next month and then in December.
I happen to be a member of the Energy Committee as well as
Foreign Relations, as well as this committee, and we've had
hearings of this nature in all three committees. So far, we've
focused on the science, we've focused on the policy, but I
guess it's important to continue to do that again.
What are the issues? Of course, what should be done; what's
the United States' role vis-a-vis other countries; do we put
controls on our country and not on others; and what impact does
that have? I think those are very important issues.
I am an original cosponsor of Senate Resolution 98 with
Senator Byrd calling basically that if we have these binding
commitments that they also apply to others. I also hope that
those testifying today might give some thought and some
consideration to what the EPA regulations that have recently
been announced might, in combination, mean as we move on to
this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll submit my statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thomas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Craig Thomas, U.S. Senator from the State of
Wyoming
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for taking the time to schedule this
hearing to discuss the Clinton Administration's policy on global
climate change. As world negotiators prepare for meetings in Bonn later
this month, with an eye toward Kyoto, Japan, in December, it is
critical that we do all we can to make sure the scientific facts are
available and credible. Using good science, rather than emotional
rhetoric, ensures we will be spending our limited resources on actual
problems.
As some of my colleagues may know, both the Energy and Natural
Resources and the Foreign Relations Committees have had hearings on
this topic. I am a member of both and, if there is one thing I can
report, it's that the science at this point is not ``clear and
compelling.'' Furthermore, there is currently no consensus that would
compel us to rush into an agreement that will hurt America's economic
competitiveness for questionable benefits. Nevertheless, the
Administration already seems to have its mind made up by stating that
``the science is over.''
Before the United States enters into any formal binding agreement,
we must first be sure that the effects of global warming are real and
the economic consequences are better understood. Unfortunately, the
Administration is withholding the fine print details of its proposal
from the American people. To the extent that there is a global warming
problem, all countries must participate and play by the same rules. If
this does not happen, the result is a diminished American economy and a
worse worldwide environment. Everyone ought to contribute to the cause.
Asking all nations to contribute will help the environment, help U.S.
industries stay competitive, and help build new exports as we send our
environmental technology and expertise around the globe.
I have repeatedly stated my opposition to legally binding targets
and timetables on the U.S. and other developed countries to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, while
[[Page 5]]
at the same time exempting heavy polluters like China, India, Mexico,
South Korea and Brazil from those identical requirements. It doesn't
take a genius to figure out that they will not have to meet the
uncompromising restrictions that will be placed on our industries. Mr.
Chairman, by the product of government regulation, we could potentially
drive the relatively cleaner U.S. industries out of business, thus
increasing emissions of dirtier plants in undeveloped nations. That
just doesn't make sense.
I am an original cosponsor of Senate Resolution 98, introduced by
Senators Byrd and Hagel, calling on the Clinton Administration not to
agree to any measure which would commit the U.S. to a binding
international treaty for developed countries, but exclude those
standards on China, India, Mexico and others. Although we should
constantly work to reduce air pollution around the world, this must be
done in a manner that does not threaten jobs or our international
competitiveness. I am pleased to report that 62 of my Senate colleagues
share this same view and have cosponsored this important initiative.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, we have some expert witnesses and I look
forward to their testimony. I would hope that they expand their
comments and touch on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
particulate matter and ozone rule which President Clinton recently
endorsed. Although 250 Members of Congress, 27 Governors, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors and many State and local officials and business
leaders alike have expressed disapproval and opposition to the new
standards, the president turned a deaf ear. I, for one, believe the
impacts of a binding global climate treaty, coupled with the EPA's new
air regulations could prove devastating to America's energy-intensive
businesses, our Gross Domestic Product (GDP), American jobs and our
global environment. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Fine.
Senator Bond.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I really appreciate your scheduling this hearing today on
the science and economics surrounding global climate change.
Unfortunately, I have to be on the floor to participate in a
debate on a very important amendment that is up, so I'm going
to have to read the testimony of these witnesses, but I am very
much interested in knowing what it is we know on global climate
change. It is my assumption that after this hearing, we may
have more questions than answers.
The chairman read some statements from a century ago, and 5
years ago, we saw headlines ``As Earth summit nears, consensus
still lacking on global warming cause.'' Six years ago, the
Washington Post had articles that we're still trying to find
answers.
Yesterday, I read a very interesting piece by Mr. Samuelson
in the Washington Post ``Dancing Around the Dilemma.'' He made
some interesting points. He said, ``The problem with global
warming is that we don't yet know whether it represents a
genuine national threat, and if so, how large.''
``Economic growth requires more energy and fossil fuels
provide 85 percent of all energy. Without a breakthrough in
alternative energy--nuclear, solar, something--no one knows how
to lower emissions adequately without ultimately crushing the
world economy.''
He ended, ``Hardly anyone wants to admit candidly the
uncertainties of global warming. It's politically incorrect to
question whether this is a serious problem that serious people
ought to take seriously.'' I'm glad we are taking it seriously.
Mr. Chairman, in my position as chairman of the Small
Business Committee, I've been hearing for months from small
businesses who already have a tough time and have to weave
through a mo-
[[Page 6]]
rass of regulations that they are concerned they will face
unsustainable costs.
An opinion piece by Karen Kerrigan, President of the Small
Business Survival Foundation, addressing the proposed global
warming treaty stated, ``For America's small businesses, the
treaty could be especially harsh. Energy intensive operations,
such as bakeries, drycleaners, auto repair shops, small
manufacturers and ironically, recycling businesses, would be
immediately hit.''
Finally, I picked up a book that I have found to be very
informative, a book called ``Facts, Not Fear, A Parents Guide
to Teaching Children about the Environment,'' which contains
information on subjects from endangered species to global
warming.
The book points out that back in 1989, ``Some scientists
were predicting an increase in global temperatures between
3.5--5 degrees Celsius perhaps as early as the middle of the
21st Century.
``In 1990, an intergovernmental panel of scientists
projected an increase of 3 degrees Celsius by the year 2100,
but the latest estimate is that temperatures may increase by
between 1 and 3 degrees Celsius by the year 2100.''
Mr. Chairman, some consensus has been reached in the
scientific community on some very basic points. First, we do
burn large quantities of fossil fuels that add carbon dioxide
to the atmosphere which may affect greenhouse gases. Two, the
Earth's temperature has increased slightly over the last 100
years.
In my opinion, that's about all the consensus we have. I
will be very interested in hearing the chairman's opinion and
nobody asked for my opinion, but I'm going to give it to you
anyhow. If and when we can develop consensus that global
warming really is a problem, then we're going to have to make
some tough choices.
Mr. Samuelson said one of the alternatives is to go to
something or nuclear power. In this country, we've had hysteria
about nuclear power that shut down our nuclear power generating
industry. Nuclear fission is something that has engendered a
great deal of hostility and fear, but it is not a generator of
carbon dioxide, it is not burning fossil fuel and if we want to
get serious about global warming, then we have to deal with the
realities of nuclear power, nuclear fission in the next 10, 20,
or 30 years until we develop the capability of using nuclear
fusion energy and that's going to have to be our challenge.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can develop a sound
scientific basis for determining whether we are going to get
serious about global warming, whether it is a serious trend,
and I look forward to reading, though I will not be here to
participate in questioning and hearing firsthand the testimony
of these distinguished witnesses.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hutchinson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM HUTCHINSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would ask that my full statement be entered into the
record.
It's interesting when I first came to the Senate, the first
hearing that I participated in, the first hearing of this
committee was a
[[Page 7]]
hearing on the science dealing with the proposed clean air
standards. It's like deja vu and I really applaud the chairman
for looking at the science.
If there's one thing I learned from the clean air hearings,
it is that oftentimes scientists are not in agreement as to
what the status of true science is regarding any particular
subject and I suspect that's what we will be hearing today as
well.
I, like Senator Bond, am a cosponsor with over 60 other
Senators, of the Byrd Resolution opposing the United States
agreeing to any terms in Japan in December that unfairly harms
the United States.
If the developed countries alone are responsible for
reducing the world's emissions, these nations could face
serious economic disadvantages. In Arkansas, where agriculture
is the leading industry and is so very important to the
economic status of our State and to the livelihood of tens of
thousands of Arkansans, we cannot afford to give such a
competitive advantage to these developing countries such as
China.
We, in Arkansas, are the leading producer of rice--40
percent of the State's rice is exported out of the country. The
State's economy relies heavily on rice productions and yet,
China produces 24 times the rice of the United States. So if we
limit rice production or hinder it in any way, it will not deal
effectively with global warming but will put States like
Arkansas, and particularly the Mississippi Delta area, which is
already an impoverished area, at a tremendous disadvantage and
would truly be devastating.
I want to thank the chairman for calling this hearing and
for the witnesses who will testify today. I look forward to
hearing that testimony and hopefully establishing some factual
basis for the decisions that will be made.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tim Hutchinson, U.S. Senator from the State
of Arkansas
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to hear testimony
regarding the scientific basis behind the Global Climate. This is kind
of a deja vu experience, because one of my first hearings in the Senate
and the first hearing in this committee was a science hearing on the
EPA's clean air proposal.
Today we have a similar hearing, this time focusing on the science
of the greenhouse effect on the United States. If there is anything I
have learned from the Clean Air hearings is that many times scientists
do not agree on the science. Despite the fact that it seems to be the
common assertion that humans are causing the greenhouse effect, in
reality there is some disagreement regarding our actual effect.
There is agreement that humans are adding some greenhouse gases,
the disagreement, however is whether these additions are causing
significant changes in the Earth's temperature. I have an Associated
Press article, that if we have time I might ask the panel to comment
on, which states that it is possible that North America's ecological
systems have always been in flux.
According to the article, not long ago ice sheets two miles thick
covered the entire northern half of the continent. The article goes on
to say that as recently as 1850, temperatures were few degrees cooler
than they are today and that any warming we may be experiencing now
this is merely the continuation of a natural warming trend that began
150 years ago.
These scientific uncertainties are disturbing, especially when
considering we are faced with the administration's support for legally
binding reductions of greenhouse emissions. Even more frightening,
perhaps, than the U.S. being legally bound to re-
[[Page 8]]
ducing emissions, is the prospect that ``developing'' nations, such as
China and Mexico will not be required to implement similar reductions.
I question whether this will do any good at all for the reduction
of greenhouse emissions. If humans are causing a great warming of the
earth, then all humans must be concerned with this trend, not just the
countries that are developed.
This December in Kyoto, Japan, the world will decide what needs to
be done to reduce the threat of global warming. I, along with 58 other
Senators, cosponsored the Byrd resolution opposing the United State's
agreeing to any terms in Kyoto that unfairly harms the United States.
If the developed countries alone are responsible for reducing the
world's emissions, these nations could face serious economic
disadvantages. In Arkansas, where agriculture is the leading industry,
we cannot afford to give such a competitive advantage to these
developing countries, such as China.
Arkansas is the leading producer of rice in the United States.
Forty percent of the State's rice is exported out of the country. The
State's economy relies heavily on rice productions, yet China produces
24 times the rice of the U.S. If we limit rice production, or hinder it
in any way, the Mississippi Delta, an already impoverished area would
be devastated.
Again, I want to thank the chairman for calling this hearing and
for the witnesses who will testify today. I hope we can establish some
facts today.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Senator Wyden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF OREGON
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, have a number of meetings this morning but I wanted
to come especially today because my State is the first State in
the country to legislate mandatory standards for controlling
carbon dioxide emissions.
I think the challenge for this committee as we get into
this issue is to show that it is possible to lead in this
effort to control greenhouse gas emissions without producing an
economic meltdown. For real concrete evidence of that, you can
just come to our State because what we have shown is that we
can make this work, both for the economy and for the
environment.
Mr. Chairman, just very briefly, there were really three
things that we sought to do in terms of trying to make this
system work. The first is we phased in CO2 emission
standards as part of the siting process for new power plants.
What happened then was the standards became part of the design
criteria for new plants so the developers were actually
encouraged to design plants that are more efficient and we
reduced the plants' operating costs.
The second thing we focused on was a market-based approach
to achieve these standards. We created a bidding process where
new energy plant developers compete for plant permits with
CO2 emissions as one of the criteria for awarding
the permit.
Finally, we gave credit to developers for creative
approaches when they were in a position to mitigate
environmental impacts. For example, developers got credits for
tree plantings and offset for CO2 emissions because
trees absorb CO2 from the air, retain the carbon and
release oxygen.
Mr. Chairman, I think we all know this is an
extraordinarily difficult issue. I've heard several of my
colleagues--Senator Hutchinson--make points that I consider
extremely important. Certainly we're concerned about the
question of what happens when the United States takes a
leadership role on these issues.
[[Page 9]]
I would hope that as we tackle this issue in the days
ahead, we could look to my home State because I think we have
shown a concrete case of how it is possible to control
greenhouse gas emissions in a fashion that makes sense for
long-term economic growth that our citizens want.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for your leadership.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Allard.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WAYNE ALLARD, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF COLORADO
Senator Allard. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to
thank you for holding this important hearing and I hope that we
can continue to hold these on an annual basis to continue to
review the scientific data because I think in order for us to
make good policy decisions, it has to be based on good science.
I'm absolutely delighted with the panel that you've brought
forward which is going to do the best they know how to present
their scientific view of what is happening as far as global
warming is concerned. I'm very much interested in hearing what
they have to say.
I don't think enough has been said about the buffer system
within the whole context of ecosystems in the whole world. I
happen to feel that we do have a total buffer system that is
very effective.
For example, people talk about the problem of too much
CO2 in the air, but they don't recognize as alluded
to by my colleague that trees use CO2 to kick out
oxygen and there is a balance between animal life and plant
life. Obviously because of that, there is a large buffer
system. Maybe that buffer system is greater in Oregon than it
is in Colorado where we don't have so many trees.
I think these are things that have to be thought through.
I've been searching the scientific literature for good, solid
facts. I'm aware that we are having some information coming
down from our satellite systems that indicate there really
isn't any real change as far as temperature. In fact, I've seen
one report where maybe it's cooled a little bit.
I also realize that there is some modeling out there, and I
think we have to be careful with our modeling, about what we
put into those models, what we hold as stable fact and what we
hold as variable fact.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I'm looking forward to this panel's
discussion and the committee's discussion.
Thank you very much.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Like the rest, I have a statement to be entered into the
record. I'll spare you that.
As those who are testifying this morning, I recall that
many years ago--in fact, 48 years ago, I was in junior high
school and I remember a professor who was absolutely convinced
that because
[[Page 10]]
of the global changes that the southwestern two tiers of States
in the United States would slide into the ocean and he gave a
very persuasive case. By Senator Reid's presence here, we can
see that hasn't happened 48 years later.
I'm disappointed in the lack of cooperation that we've had
from the Administration. The Administration has not given us
information we've requested.
I was with Congressman Tom Bliley from Virginia yesterday
and he tells me it's been months now that he's requested
information that he has not been able to get.
I've seen some analogous things with what we're going
through as has been mentioned by some of my colleagues over
here with the ambient air quality standard changes that were
proposed by the Administration.
I, as chairman of the committee, had the scientific hearing
first and I applaud you for doing the same thing, Mr. Chairman,
because I think when we listen to the hysterical things out
there such as we went through on ambient air, they first said
it was going to result in some 60,000 premature deaths a year,
then that was dropped down to 40,000 and after about six
hearings, it's down to below 1,000 now.
The Administrator had said initially it was going to cost
$6 billion and now, according to the Reason Foundation in
California, it's up to somewhere between $90 and $150 billion.
So we need to get beyond the hysteria and start looking at the
facts.
I, too, am a cosponsor of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. I feel
if we're going to enjoy this, we want everyone else to get in
there with us.
I'll be looking forward to this hearing probably more than
any others we're having because the science is unclear to me
and maybe it will be clearer after this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Inhofe, U.S. Senator from the State of
Oklahoma
Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing today. The debate
on global climate change is an important one that deserves considerable
attention.
As a cosponsor of the Byrd/Hagel Sense of the Senate Resolution, my
position has been clear. I do not support a binding committee for
emissions reductions that does not also bind developing nations. In
addition, I have serious concerns and questions regarding the
underlying science and the economic considerations.
I appreciate Senator Chafee bringing in this panel of experts today
to help educate the committee. I am concerned that the Administration
has been unwilling and uncooperative in providing the necessary data to
Congress regarding the underlying models they are using in their
international negotiations. I know Congressman Bliley has been
requesting this information for months and his requests have gone
unanswered. Therefore we will have to rely upon ourselves to obtain the
necessary information.
I know the President has announced that he will convene a White
House Conference on Climate Change later this year, but because of the
Administration's past record of withholding information and silencing
critics, I will be looking at the composition of this panel carefully.
I hope the President will ensure that all sides of the debate are
treated equally, if the purpose of the panel is to truly uncover the
facts.
As the President also pointed out in his remarks, this debate is
very similar to the debate on the proposed new standards for ozone and
particulate matter. He believes that the new standards are the first
step toward addressing the climate change issue. I am concerned that
some in the Administration and the EPA are using the ends to justify
the means for both climate change and the NAAQS debate.
[[Page 11]]
If the climate change science is as incomplete and uncertain as the
particulate matter science, then the Administration is in trouble on
this issue.
Because of this, it is my intention to hold Oversight hearings in
my Clean Air Subcommittee on the use of the Clean Air Act under this
Treaty prior to any Senate vote on Treaty ratification. Again I would
like to thank Senator Chafee for calling this hearing today, and I look
forward to working with him on this issue in the months to come.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reid.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEVADA
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, I say to my friend, Senator
Inhofe, we, in Nevada, have always been envious of States that
have beachfront property.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reid. I would also say that I'm sorry that Senator
Bond is gone, my friend from the State of Missouri, but I will
say to him, and I'm sure the message will be carried by others,
that maybe some of those old lead mines in Missouri could be
used for nuclear waste disposal if he thinks it's such a good
idea.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reid. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that my full
statement be made a part of the record.
I'd also say that I'm one of those that appears today to be
in a minority on this committee that think we do have problems
with global warming. I think it is a problem, I think that the
scientific evidence is clear that there are changes in weather
patterns that are significant in nature, not the least of which
is on our own continent where we've had these storms, these
floods that are happening in recent years which just aren't by
happenstance. It appears that the same amount of water is
coming from the sky; it's just coming in a much shorter period
of time.
I think the hurricanes we've had off the coast of Florida
are also not just by chance. I think the fact is we know the
surface temperature of the ocean only has to raise a very small
amount, less than a degree, to cause problems.
I think it's very important, Mr. Chairman, that these
hearings take place. I commend and applaud you for approaching
this. The hearings are balanced. You have people who have
different points of view and our job is to weigh the evidence.
I would say to those who say that the things we do
legislatively may not be of significance, we look back 25 years
ago when the Clean Water Act was passed and we did that because
the Cuyahoga River kept catching fire and the third time, it
was decided that we should do something about it.
As a result of that legislation, we've done a remarkable
job of making our rivers and streams much better than they used
to be. In fact, about 80 percent of the rivers and streams were
polluted at the time this Act passed and now, only 20 to 30
percent of them are polluted. So the things we do here have a
long-range impact.
I'm confident that this fact-gathering that we're going to
be doing here in this committee on global climate change will
be significant.
I'm only going to be able to stay through the rest of these
brilliant opening statements and miss the meat of the hearing
because
[[Page 12]]
we have overlapping jurisdiction hearings that are taking
place, but I'm very interested in what is taking place here and
I'm going to give it as much attention as I can.
[The prepared statement of Senator Reid follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Harry Reid, U.S. Senator from the State of
Nevada
Good Morning. I want to share a few thoughts on the science and
economics of the global climate change debate. Although the committee
has wisely chosen to hold one hearing on science and economics, and
another on the on-going international treaty negotiations, my comments
cannot be so easily separated.
There is a discernible human influence on global climate. Since the
dawn of the industrial age, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere has risen by 30 percent. Most experts now agree that the
buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due to the combustion of
fossil fuels and other human activities is happening. To many this is a
troubling phenomenon. Although we are not sure what the exact adverse
consequences of this buildup will be, mere common sense dictates that
we, at a minimum, begin preparing to deal with it.
The Senate approved the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change in 1993, which called for all signatory nations to adopt
policies and programs to limit their greenhouse gas emissions on a
voluntary basis. The United States had hoped to stabilize emissions in
the year 2000 at 1990 levels. Unfortunately, we have fallen well short
of that mark.
The United States is, at the moment, the world's biggest consumer
of fossil fuels and producer of greenhouse gas emissions. As such, it
is important that we must show international leadership in terms of
analysis, research, and, if necessary, in reducing these emissions.
As part of the on-going international treaty negotiations, the
Administration has moved toward supporting mandatory, legally binding
limitations on greenhouse gases for the nations of the World. Within
limits, I am supportive of these efforts.
Unfortunately, I share the concern of many of my colleagues that
the current negotiations do not seem to require a firm time table for
reductions from the nations of the developing world.
The U.S. currently emits more greenhouse gases than developing
nations, such as China and India. However, this will not be the case
for much longer, especially if the U.S. begins to curb our emissions.
While I am not eager to perpetuate the poverty in these nations by
mandating that they participate equally and immediately in making
reductions, I have economic and competitive concerns about requiring
nothing from them.
I cannot, in good faith, ask the citizens of Nevada, who have
worked very hard to develop and accommodate environmentally friendly
transportation policies and clean industries, to now make more
sacrifices without some guarantee that the developing nations will not
make similar efforts soon.
In a global economy, we are often forced to compete with other
nations that have different labor laws and practices than our own,
different rules of resource protection, and yes, often weaker
environmental laws. Unfortunately, cheap labor, wasteful resource use,
and weak environmental laws often add up to a mighty competitive retail
price.
On an issue of such wide-ranging economic impact and consequence,
it is unfair to our citizens to let other nations do nothing while we
make the necessary sacrifices.
Again, I absolutely acknowledge that the United States must do its
part to try to avert any adverse climate change. We are a part of the
problem and we will be an important part of the solution.
I would prefer that Senator Byrd's resolution recognize that the
nations of the developing world will need some extra time, perhaps as
much as 10 years, to put their binding reductions in place.
However, given a choice between sending U.S. negotiators to Kyoto
offering unilateral economic disarmament on this subject, and sending
them into final negotiations with a stance that demands worldwide
equality of treatment now, I must choose to protect the best interests
of the United States.
Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lautenberg.
[[Page 13]]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. I'll be brief, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend you for holding this hearing because with
all of the doubt and with all of the debate, I think that we
kind of miss the point. I sense that, as my colleague, Harry
Reid said, and nobody caught your joke about the brilliant
opening statements and I don't think mine is going to change
your mind, but the fact of the matter is we see changes around
us that we don't understand. We see changes that are making a
huge difference. I've heard reports of rain at the poles. These
things aren't just the coincidence of the moment.
We talk about peer reviews and everybody enjoys kicking EPA
and some of the agencies around because we disagree with them,
but given a task and saying, look, we want peer-reviewed
material, and there was a concern that EPA was using less than
adequate backup before acting.
However, the critics who demanded peer-reviewed research
before we take action seem to have no trouble discounting peer-
review research when it suits their purpose.
The tobacco industry comes to mind when we saw evidence,
400,000 people dying each and every year and all kinds of
respiratory diseases, suddenly learning that 50,000 fatal heart
attacks take place as a result each year of secondary smoke, we
had hundreds of thousands of pages of reports galore, the best
medical research in the world couldn't convince the industry
that cigarettes cause cancer or are addictive.
The plea was, listen, we don't want to put these people out
of jobs. No, I don't want to put them out of jobs either, I
don't want to prevent the farmers from making a living, but
frankly, I must tell you I hear some of the same things being
discussed here today.
We really don't know--well, thank goodness, we're going to
have a hearing, we're going to have a chance to find out.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my full
statement be inserted in the record and I would like to make
one observation because I listened to the Senator from
Missouri's references to the Samuelson article.
Through it, he does say that some of this is a gushing
source of national hypocrisy at the top. That doesn't mean that
he's right and everybody else is wrong. Throughout the article
he describes what has to be done politically to make things
right even though he doesn't buy into the fact that this thing
is really the kind of threat that many of us feel it is.
In his last sentence, he says, ``But it would be political
suicide to do anything serious about it, so shrewd politicians
are learning to dance around the dilemma.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Lautenberg, U.S. Senator from the
State of New Jersey
The EPA, along with other health, environment and safety agencies
are under congressional pressure to use good science: peer reviewed
research before taking actions to protect the Nation's workers and
children. The concern is that EPA was using less-than-adequate backup
before acting. However, the critics who demand
[[Page 14]]
peered research before we take action to protect the environment, seem
to have no trouble discounting peer reviewed research when it suits
their purpose. The tobacco industry comes to mind. Hundreds of
thousands of pages of the best medical research in the world can't
convince the industry that cigarettes cause cancer or are addictive. At
today's hearing, we are talking about global warming. An unprecedented
number of scientists around the world, thousands of peer reviewed
research and projects all point to the fact that global warming is
happening--it is a threat to our environment and we have a moral
imperative to act.
A few fringe scientists, generally paid for by industrial
polluters, disagree. Essentially, their work is not peer reviewed.
However, they are heard because millions of dollars are spent to give
these scientists a megaphone that drowns out the undisputed consensus
of an overwhelming number of the world's scientists. The threat of
humankind changing the climate is real. In New Jersey, we are concerned
that global warming will lead to rise in sea level that will devastate
our coastal beach resources. As all Americans, we are watchful of
extreme weather events and wary of changes in precipitation patterns
that could led to floods, droughts and inadequate water for crops.
I look forward to these hearings on what many believe is the most
critical environmental issue facing our globe.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
I want to remind all the Senators that a week from today,
namely July 17, we will have an additional hearing and there,
the Administration will be present, so I hope everybody will be
present for that hearing likewise.
I want to explain to the panel that you may see some of
these Senators come and go. As has been mentioned earlier, we
have a series of conflicts today with the Thompson hearings and
the conference with the House on the tax bill and so forth and
the defense bill on the floor.
There are statements from Senators Lieberman and Boxer that
I'd like to have put in the record.
[The prepared statements of Senators Lieberman and Boxer
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, U.S. Senator from the
State of Connecticut
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings on climate
change. I regret that I will be unable to stay for the testimony and
questions because this is a very important issue.
Climate change is one of the most serious global issues we face
today and in the future. After spending more than 3 years analyzing
hundreds of peer-reviewed scientific studies, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change--a group of 2,500 expert scientists
representing more than 50 countries--concluded that as a result of
human emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly by combustion of
fossil fuels, ``there is a discernible human influence on the global
climate.'' The IPCC included a diversity of members from individual
disciplines who, based on sheer odds alone, are likely to hold widely
ranging views within the scientific community. I've been told that
getting scientists to agree to anything is as challenging as herding
cats. So the fact that consensus has been reached within the IPCC on an
emerging scientific issue of such complexity and variety is remarkable,
and makes its conclusions very impressive.
The IPCC has tied the increase of atmospheric greenhouse gases to
long-term changes in prevailing patterns of temperature and
precipitation. Without action to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases,
we are likely to see temperature changes in the next 100 years many
times those experienced in the last several centuries. The IPCC
predicts the number of extreme weather events--floods, heat waves, and
droughts--will increase. We know our weather already is becoming
increasingly peculiar. In the last few years the frequency and
magnitude of floods have been altered dramatically in many regions of
the US, along with heat waves, record heat days, severe rains, and dry
spells. IPCC experts also predict sea level will rise substantially.
The number of citizens in the U.S. living in coastal areas at risk of
serious ocean flooding likely will double due to sea level rise. The
amount of urbanized
[[Page 15]]
land likely to be vulnerable to extreme weather events is large,
raising economic issues of disaster relief, damage repairs, and
relocation in many regions.
Changes in climate have major implications for human health, water
resources, food supplies, infectious diseases, forests, fisheries,
wildlife populations, urban infrastructure, and flood plain and coastal
developments in the United States. Although uncertainties remain about
where, when, and how much climate might change as a result of human
activities, the changes--when they happen--may have severe impacts on
many sectors of the U.S. economy and on the environment. These are
serious risks that we must start considering.
The fundamental question as we consider a climate agreement is
whether the U.S. can develop policies that will achieve significant
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions without harming the economy. The
news here is promising and suggests that we can afford to meet
realistic emissions reductions. First, the National Academy of Sciences
concluded in 1991 that ``the efficiency of practically every end use of
energy can be improved relatively inexpensively . . . and that the
United States could reduce or offset its greenhouse gas emissions by
between 10 and 40 percent of 1990 levels at low cost or at some net
savings.'' More recently, over 2,500 American economists, including
eight Nobel laureates, stated that there are many potential policy
options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions for which the total benefits
outweigh the total costs. These policies would slow climate change
without harming American living standards, and may in fact improve U.S.
productivity in the longer run.
We won't find a silver bullet to solve the problem. Luckily,
climate change lends itself to flexible solutions. Because it's all one
atmosphere, it doesn't matter where or how the reductions are made. It
only matters that fewer greenhouse gases are emitted. The 2,500
economists found that the most efficient approach to slowing climate
change is through market-based policies such as an international
emissions trading agreement. We know from our experience with programs
like the acid rain title of the Clean Air Act that emissions trading is
very cost-effective because it provides businesses with the maximum
flexibility to make choices about how to achieve the necessary
reductions.
Given the potential impacts of climate change, it is not surprising
that nations of the world agreed to find more effective ways to
understand and deal with the problem. If we don't agree to long-term
greenhouse gas limits soon, and instead wait to see how our climate
changes, it may be too late. Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere
for decades to centuries, and there is a long lag time between when
gases are emitted and when the climate consequences of those emissions
appear. So we need to begin reductions soon to have any long-term
effect. And, a new generation of energy-efficient technologies requires
a long lead time for development and implementation. This won't happen
without clear signals to the market.
Recent discussions in the Senate regarding the international
agreement have emphasized the role of the developing countries. I
concur that this is an important issue, and developing countries ought
to make commitments consistent with their historic responsibility for
the problem, as well as their current capabilities.
At the same time, I am concerned that elevating one issue to a
level of importance that will overshadow other key matters may harm the
United States' efforts to ensure that the climate agreement is
realistic and achievable. For example, the need for flexibility in
implementing a treaty is critical. Some countries, such as members of
the European Union, would prefer highly prescriptive policies and
measures to meet reduction targets. The United States' negotiating team
has made flexibility an absolute prerequisite for any agreement, and I
want to commend them for this approach. I believe that to be
acceptable, our businesses must have the most flexibility possible to
find the least-cost ways to reduce emissions. This means the agreement
must contain provisions that are so important to our business
community: emissions trading, joint implementation between nations, and
appropriate credits for those companies that have already made certain
emissions reductions.
As we grapple with the human judgments and values that inevitably
will determine how we handle climate change, we must base our actions
on the facts--the scientific evidence of climate change, the physical
effects that are likely to result from it, and the costs of our
``insurance policy'' to prevent these changes. Mr. Chairman, I look
forward to working with you and the members of the committee as we face
these challenges.
[[Page 16]]
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from the State
of California
Mr. Chairman, today will be the first of two hearings dealing with
global climate change, a topic of critical importance to the citizens
of our country, and indeed critical importance to all living things on
our planet. Global climate change does not recognize State or national
boundaries. We are ALL affected by global climate change.
Scientists tell us that human activities since the Industrial
Revolution have contributed billions of tons of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere. These activities include the burning of fossil fuels to
power our automobiles and industries, as well as certain industrial
activities and deforestation. As a result of these emissions, the heat-
trapping capability of the Earth's atmosphere has increased
significantly, and a majority of scientists agree that there are clear
signs of global warming.
The potential changes we will hear about today are alarming. I am
very concerned about the potential effects of global climate change
because the economy and quality of life of Californians is so closely
linked to climate.
effects on agriculture
California is the No. 1 agricultural State in the Union,
contributing more than $22 billion per year to our nation's economy
while employing more than 1.4 million people. Farmers in my State are
concerned that global climate changes will cause highly unpredictable
weather and changes in water availability resulting in reduced crop
yields.
effects on water supplies
Californians depend upon reliable sources of water for their
livelihood and quality of life. Warmer temperatures due to increased
greenhouse gases could cause more precipitation to fall in the form of
rain instead of snow. A reduced snowpack, especially in the Sierra
Nevada, could lead to a change in the timing of runoff and potentially
greater flooding during the winter and dryer conditions in the summer.
effects on health
Warmer temperatures will likely lead to increased incidents of
heat-related mortality and illness, and will have its most disastrous
effect on infants and the elderly. Air quality improvements we have
realized over the years in California could be severely affected.
Other ramifications include adverse impacts upon forestry, tourism,
animal and plant diversity, and ocean shorelines. These impacts are of
equal concern for other States.
Finding a solution to this truly global problem will not be easy,
nor will it occur overnight. But we must start.
The United States can have a significant impact on reversing global
warming.
First, we must listen to the scientific community. The vast
majority of scientists agree that global climate change is a reality,
and that it is attributable to emissions of greenhouse gases associated
with human activities.
Second, we must move swiftly to stabilize and if possible reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The United States has only 4 percent of the
world's population, yet we produce more than 20 percent of the
greenhouse gases. Measures we take within our country will have
dramatic effects on reducing the amount of greenhouse gases worldwide.
For example, if we were to raise Corporate Average Fuel Economy
standards from 27.5 miles per gallon to 45 miles per gallon we would
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by almost 560 million tons per year.
Other measures we can take could have similar effects.
Finally, we must develop policies and technologies that will help
us meet our global responsibilities and protect our living standards.
I am convinced that there is widespread agreement within the
scientific community that global climate change is a reality and a
major cause of that change is the emission of greenhouse gases. We need
to bring this portion of the debate to a close and for the sake of
future generations, focus on solutions. We owe those future generations
nothing less than our full attention to this critical issue.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. I know that Senator Sessions wanted to be
here. He is chairing a Judiciary Committee hearing today and
particularly, Dr. Christy, he wanted to welcome you here. He
spoke to
[[Page 17]]
me about your presence and we're very glad you're here. I know
that Senator Sessions regrets that he can't be present.
We will start with Dr. Barron.
Gentlemen, if you will note, here is the green light, then
the yellow will come on after 6 minutes and then the red light.
So you'll get about 7 minutes apiece.
Go to it and there will be questions for all of you. What
we're going to do is have each of you give your statements and
then we will have questions from here.
Senator Inhofe. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Chafee. Sure.
Senator Inhofe. I notice we have five witnesses and I think
we only received information from four. Was one added at the
last moment?
Senator Chafee. Dr. Barron's testimony apparently came in
late. We'll get it for you.
Dr. Barron, go to it.
STATEMENT OF ERIC BARRON, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF GEOSCIENCES,
AND DIRECTOR, EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCES CENTER, PENNSYLVANIA STATE
UNIVERSITY
Dr. Barron. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators, members
of the Senate staff and public participants, I believe that the
prospect of future human-induced climate change is one of the
most complex and serious science and societal issues that we
have to face in this century and going into the next century.
We know that humans are altering the environment; we know
that they are altering the land surface; we know the
composition of our atmosphere has changed. If we look at the
very best scientific assessment of these changes, it appears as
if the climate response will be something that is large and
something that is significant.
At the very same time we say that, we also have to
recognize that the air of ours or the uncertainties about those
predictions are very large. So really, the major question comes
down to the fact of what do you do when the scientific
community, and the best scientific assessments we have, suggest
that the change is going to be large and that in a sense, we
need to look out because the future climate is going to be
dramatically different than the present climate.
At the same time, the scientific community is hotly
debating the size of the warning label that should be applied
to this particular problem.
We have two lines of evidence on which we have to focus.
One of them is observations and one of them is the development
of predictive models. If we look at the observational record,
what we see is that instrumental record is extremely short and
at the same time, it was never designed to take the temperature
of the planet or the pulse of this earth.
Instead, it was designed to provide weather safety
information and weather forecasting information. This means its
use in some ways, in terms of climate, has become limited.
At the same time, when we do look at this record, we're
beginning to see the signs that the latter half of the century
is distinctly
[[Page 18]]
different in terms of precipitation and temperature from the
earlier half of the century.
If we go back in the geologic record and look further back
over thousands of years, we even see that in some places on the
Earth, the record of climate of the 20th Century appears to be
unique, but at the same time, if we go even further back in our
history on the order of say 10,000 years and 15,000 years, we
have to conclude that modern humans have yet to experience the
extent of natural variations in climate that we see recorded in
that record.
What that means is that we have a ways to go before we can
understand the character of this variability and what the
distribution of that variability is. We can turn to climate
models and look at predictive models and look at what is the
best and most comprehensive assessment of what the climate
system is like and we also see that there are distinctive
limitations.
If we're referring to numbers that are global, what the
warming might be within 100 years and we provide that answer
within a range, then we tend to see agreement among the
scientific community that the warming is likely to occur in
that range.
As soon as we move to saying what will happen in a
particular decade to a particular region of the Earth for a
particular phenomenon, like whether or not we'll experience
more intense storms, then we begin to have substantial
disagreement and controversy. Unfortunately, at that scale is
the very place the climate intersects and interacts with human
systems.
We made tremendous progress in the last decade in
addressing all of those different issues, but it would be a
mistake for any of us to promise you that the solutions to a
lot of those issues are going to be addressed rapidly and are
just around the corner.
As a matter of fact, I'm willing to bet that in the
newspaper articles that we will read 10 years from now, the
newspapers will continue to seek out the poles of opinion to
put in those papers in order to appear to be giving a balanced
view on this particular issue, no matter what the mass of
scientific sentiment is on this particular field.
So in the middle of a great deal of public confusion that
ends up as a product of this combining the poles of opinion
every time you want to discuss this particular topic, we're
still stuck with the problem that the models, the records,
suggest the Earth is changing and the models suggest some of
those changes may be severe.
What should we do? What kind of strategy can we come up
with? I think that strategy has to have two elements. One
element of that strategy is that we have to maintain a very
strong research, observation and modeling program in this
country.
It's almost tragic that we have an observational system
that we pay for but we don't spend the additional small
investment to make sure that observational system can be used
to assess climate. It's almost tragic that we have a whole
series of satellite observations providing us all sorts of
information, but we don't have the continuity of those
measurements to ensure that our conclusions from them are going
to be robust.
We need to make sure that we work hard to advance on the
limitations and high resolution in climate model predictions.
We see a number of other countries--Japan and Germany with less
robust
[[Page 19]]
economies than we have--right now actively pursuing major
observational and modeling efforts. They do this because they
realize this advanced information and predictive capability has
economic significance.
The second thing is we need some litmus test to be able to
decide at what point we should worry about these particular
issues. My particular feeling is this litmus test has to be
based on the degree to which we're vulnerable or at risk.
If we look around this Nation and take, for example, water
resources as an example, if your region, your State is already
vulnerable to natural variability, there are droughts and
floods, and in addition to that, you see that in these
predictions and assessments that there is a continuation of
this risk or that risk is even enhanced, then it strikes me
since we're already having problems with that water
availability, that should be a call for action.
If you look at other areas in which there is potential for
significant risk, say for human health issues, so that you see
a heat wave brings substantial mortality in major cities like
St. Louis, Chicago, Philadelphia or Washington; if you look at
the fact that the distribution of mosquitoes that are vectors
for disease like dengue fever or malaria, have the potential
because of natural variability or climate change to move into
more northern States and present the possibility of health
risks; if you already have evidence that something like the
deadly hanta virus occurred because of natural climate
variability in wet-dry cycles or that lyme disease is actually
closely tied to how warm winter temperatures are; if you begin
to assess these things and realize you have risk for both
natural variability and climate change, then I think that
becomes a call for action.
The bottom line, basically, of my testimony is that I think
we're going to have to live with a certain level of
uncertainty. The only way that we can tackle that uncertainty
is No. 1, to make sure we have very healthy programs that are
addressing these issues; and No. 2, that we begin to make
careful assessments of what the vulnerabilities and risks are.
Thank you very much.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Dr. Barron.
Dr. Christy.
STATEMENT OF JOHN R. CHRISTY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT
OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT HUNTSVILLE
Dr. Christy. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I'm
honored to be here to provide you with a little bit of
information about the climate system.
In the late 1980's, the potential catastrophe of human-
induced global warming began receiving a lot of attention,
thanks in part to a couple of warm but not recordbreaking
summers here in the eastern United States.
The predictions were horrifying--we were going to have
rapid temperature rises, coastal flooding, massive hurricanes
and so on.
As a student of climate, I and others, were concerned with
the lack of proper data to describe the Earth's system and the
lack of perspective in which to judge these events as being
extreme or not.
[[Page 20]]
In 1989, Dr. Roy Spencer, a NASA scientist with similar
concerns, and I set out with an agenda to provide an accurate
dataset of truly global observations of atmospheric
temperature. These data would not be plagued, as the
traditional surface data are, by changing locations or
dependence on transient shipping or lack of coverage in very
large areas.
We did not know what that dataset would show. Our goal was
precision and accuracy, to provide the scientific community
with excellent, truly global temperature data.
An added incentive for us, in creating the Microwave
Sounding Unit dataset, was that two of the atmospheric layers
we were closely examining happened to be two layers which
climate models indicated the largest and most rapid responses
would occur, if climate change were occurring.
A warming of the troposphere, faster even than the surface,
and the cooling of the stratosphere--the troposphere is about
the surface to 20,000 feet and the stratosphere is up above
50,000 feet.
Two ways have been used to measure the temperature of the
lower atmosphere since 1979, our work, the satellites, and by
instruments carried aloft by balloons. I'm a working stiff
atmospheric scientist, so I still have transparencies.
This is just a little picture to show you that satellites
measure the direct emissions from the atmosphere and balloons
carry instruments aloft and they can measure the same layers.
Balloons, however, are only released in scattered locations
around the Earth where people live and the polar-orbiting
satellites see the entire planet every day.
I compared our satellite measurements with those from
balloons from 97 stations in the western-northern hemisphere.
That was the result, almost essentially perfect agreement.
Senator Chafee. I think that will need a little
explanation.
Dr. Christy. OK. You see a dotted line and a solid line.
One is the balloons and one is the temperature of the satellite
system that we have generated for 97 places on the Earth where
balloons are located. So it's a satellite looking at the same
places where the balloons are, a correlation of .97 trends are
almost exactly the same.
Senator Baucus. The dotted and the solid lines are the
same?
Dr. Christy. Yes, that's what the correlation .97 means.
Senator Chafee. The balloons must be at a far lower
altitude. What altitude?
Dr. Christy. They go up to the upper stratosphere. They
measure exactly the same layer of the atmosphere. The agreement
is astounding. These are completely independent ways to measure
the troposphere.
So the satellites were providing the precision we had hoped
for. Again, I did not, nor did Roy, have any agenda in terms of
what the data would show. We were providing a precise record of
the atmospheric temperature. This is what we found when we
looked for the entire globe. By the way, these are in your
verbal remarks, these transparencies.
This is what we found, the troposphere since 1979 has gone
up and down but virtually no trend in either direction. The
stratosphere has had a significant downward decline in
temperature. You can see it is truly affected by volcanic
eruptions. Those two red
[[Page 21]]
spikes in the temperature record in the stratosphere are due to
volcanic eruptions.
The year-to-year fluctuations due to volcanoes and ocean
temperatures affect the top line, the tropospheric temperature.
All the ups and downs are not caused by anything with long-term
effects; it's mostly the volcano and ocean situation.
So you cannot look at that and really judge if a warming or
cooling is taking place because of the length of record. Dr.
Richard McNider, a UAH colleague, and I published a paper that
calculated and removed the impacts of varying oceanic and
volcanic influences to see if a longer-term trend was present.
We looked at that temperature record, calculated the
effects from the ocean, which is the second line, calculated
the effects from volcanoes which is the two blue impacts there,
the fourth line, and the fine result is the fifth line which is
the temperature once these oceanic and volcanic effects are
removed.
It does show a slight warming trend of .06 degree per
decade. It's small enough to be easily placed within the bounds
of natural variability, but I can't be certain about that.
Humans may be having a slight impact on the global tropospheric
temperature. The trend is small.
Senator Baucus. You go back how many years?
Dr. Christy. 1979 it begins.
Senator Baucus. Thank you.
Dr. Christy. This is a measurement of temperatures from
1979 to 1996, 18 years for the troposphere at the top. These
are with balloons and satellites, completely independent
comparisons of the tropospheric temperature.
The bottom is the surface record from three different
surface datasets. We see the temperatures look like they're
going in different directions. The troposphere is pretty steady
or slightly downward, we all agree with that. The surface
records are upward, roughly around a tenth of a degree per
decade.
No climate model I have seen indicates the troposphere
should cool while the surface warms for human-induced climate
change. With these observations which cover the period of the
greatest human impacts on climate, if they are to be evident,
that is what we see.
If we had regular weather measurements for the past 5,000
years, we would see centuries in which the temperature rose and
when it fell. There would be observations of far more
observations of devastating floods, droughts and blizzards more
than we have seen in the past 100 years. I'm confident of that.
Focusing on just the 20 years of the satellite record or
just 100 years of thermometers doesn't give one a good idea of
what has happened in the last 5,000 years or so. If we look at
the somewhat murky world of proxy data--tree rings, et cetera--
most records do not show this century as remarkably different
from the others.
Our present weather woes have always been part of the
planet's history, whether it's a drought in the 1930's or the
Red River flood in 1997.
I agree with Eric Barron that without a continuing program
of observation and research that places climate variations in
proper perspective and reports with improving confidence on
their causes,
[[Page 22]]
we will be vulnerable to calls for remedies to combat ``climate
change'' because climate change now seems to be blamed for
every weather woe that comes along. Such remedies are likely to
be unproductive.
The satellite and balloon data, the top line, show that
catastrophic warming is not now occurring. The detection of
human effects on climate has not been convincingly proven
because the variations we have observed are not outside the
natural variations of the system.
The stratospheric temperatures which I showed earlier
suggest something is going on, but separating the massive
effects of the volcanoes is not easily done. If the global
atmosphere is our patient, I would say that we've taken its
temperature at a few points and there seems to be a slight
fever, but we're not sure.
Sensible precautions can be taken. However, my view is that
the planet needs a thorough physical to more clearly determine
what might be wrong, along with a complete assessment of how
effective any medicine would be before it's administered.
Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Dr. Lindzen from MIT.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD S. LINDZEN, ALFRED P. SLOANE PROFESSOR OF
METEOROLOGY, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Lindzen. Thank you, Senator Chafee, members of the
committee and staff.
You've heard I think already a certain amount of
conflicting information, although what is interesting is the
conflict has been larger among the Senators on the committee
than the scientists thus far.
I think the reason for that is that 10 years ago when this
issue became publicized, it was put forward as simple. The idea
was we have gases that absorb heat or infrared, they're
increasing, and that will cause the Earth to warm. The gases
were known as greenhouse gases.
You perhaps don't understand why such a simple picture has
become so complicated and why it's called into question. There
are problems with that picture. The Earth's surface does not
cool primarily by radiation. It cools by evaporation and
convection. The main greenhouse gas is not carbon dioxide; it's
water vapor. Water vapor has phenomenal temporal and spacial
variability.
We don't even have records that are worth mentioning for
water vapor, so we don't even know what's happened to total
greenhouse gas. It isn't even a matter of total amount of
greenhouse gas. One molecule of water vapor at 10 kilometers
has the same effect as 1,000 molecules at the surface.
None of this would be a problem if the models were
trustworthy, but satellite measurements of upper tropospheric
humidity, some of which have come from Marshall Space Flight
Center, Huntsville, are in complete disagreement with models at
a level which is profoundly important for climate change.
I'll give you an example later but I might as well mention
it now. John Bates at NOAA has analyzed the satellite data and
he finds
[[Page 23]]
latitude by latitude models overestimate humidity by about 20
percent. Just for purposes of comparison, 20 percent represents
five times the radiative forcing that a doubling of carbon
dioxide gives.
In any event, that's a place where we are and you would
think that under the circumstances, the situation would be more
chaotic than it is. I think, however, there are some areas of
agreement and one of them is that I think virtually everyone I
know working on climate dynamics agrees that increasing
CO2, carbon dioxide, should have some impact.
The argument is about whether this impact is significant
and, in this case, significant has a fairly precise meaning.
It's been repeated several times. We're dealing with the
climate; it's a naturally variable system. I should point out
that means even if you change nothing, it varies.
We've adapted to the natural variability. Significant has
to mean that it's bigger than the natural variability.
Otherwise, we pretty much know how to adapt to it.
The IPCC, which has been mentioned, came out with a
statement that was quoted by Senator Chafee. I think that
statement has led to a great many claims by other people than
scientists.
The statement is an extraordinarily weak statement. I
should tell you of over 20 IPCC reports approximately--I think
it's 17 and one is three volumes--since 1990, this is the
weakest report. I don't mean weak scientifically but the
weakest in its claims.
There hasn't been a progression upward, the numbers go down
and down, but let me read the full text of the statement that
Senator Chafee quoted.
Our ability to quantify the human influence on global
climate is currently limited because the expected signal is
still emerging from the noise of natural variability and
because there are uncertainties in key factors. These include
the magnitude and patterns of long-term, natural variability
and the time-evolving patterns of forcing volume responses to
changes in concentration of greenhouse gases, aerosols and land
surface changes. Nevertheless, the balance of evidence suggests
there is a discernible human influence on global climate.
What it says, they explain, is that it is unlikely that all
of the change in the last century is due to natural variability
is simply not true. They make no statement, and they are very
explicit on this matter, about the amount of expected change.
We said that's what the argument is about. Indeed, except for
the peculiar fact that the studies from which the statement is
drawn probably are wrong, the statement is nothing to disagree
with. Some impact is likely. They're saying it's some. It may
be very small, it may not.
As such, it is virtually a trivial statement except that it
depends on models replicating natural variability which we know
they don't. They don't get major sources of natural variability
correct like Enso and El Nino, the quasi-biennial oscillation,
etc.
Indeed, a recent study by Polyak and North showed the
remarkable fact that models are structurally different from the
atmosphere.
The study on which the IPCC study is based is from Santer.
It fails the most elementary test of statistical significance,
namely the relation doesn't remain when you extend the data
record a little. That is the kind of mess we're in: that we
have weaker and weaker statements after 10 years of saying it's
a self-evident issue and billions of dollars on research
expense.
[[Page 24]]
What is perhaps more remarkable from the point of view of
policy rather than science are the uses made of this very weak
statement. It's a statement which is borderline trivial, says
nothing.
Senator Chafee. You're referring to the IPCC?
Dr. Lindzen. Yes, that sentence of discernible influence.
For instance, environmental groups--I just got a mailing
from the Union of Concerned Scientists--they do the obvious
thing, they start out with that sentence, they change and leave
out the front end, as was done here. They say instead,
predictions of global climate change are becoming more
confident and then they associate it, as I'm afraid Senator
Lautenberg did, with everything from heat waves and droughts
and forest depletion, forest security and so on, and then
conclude we should sign a treaty at Kyoto.
Senator Lautenberg. Are you attributing that whole
statement you just made to me?
Dr. Lindzen. No, to the UCS. You only made the one about
weather variability. I think Dr. Christy correctly pointed out
there has been no discernible change in that. The IPCC
certainly hasn't identified any that were predicted.
There are all sorts of statements that lend themselves to
misuse. One of my favorites is ``many recordbreaking years,''
Andy Solow and Broadus at Woods Hole showed many years ago, as
did someone called Bassett, that it is an inevitable
statistical consequence of reaching one record, that you'll
have many recordbreaking years following; there is independent
information associated with the claim.
Let me finish up, since I'm near the end, with what can we
say about increasing carbon dioxide? What can we say it does?
If you just increase carbon dioxide alone, leave out the
feedbacks, you'll get something between \1/3\ of a degree and
one degree for a doubling of CO2 in equilibrium.
This depends crucially on what you mean by holding all other
variables constant. That is generally reckoned not to be
severe. Everything else depends on feedbacks, of which the
largest is the water vapor feedback, which doubles the response
and increases the responsiveness to other feedbacks.
The data does not support the ability of models to actually
handle that feedback. I think Senator Allard brought up the
philosophical issue--I'm not sure if it was he--that in an odd
way, it's a philosophical issue. Do we believe that the Earth,
when we perturb it, acts to make everything worse or do we
believe--I think it was Senator Hutchison who said that--or do
we believe that it has some resilience; apparently we're
committed to the first view, that the Earth is vindictive.
The last thing I want to say is on policy, namely what
would happen if we stabilize emissions at 1990 levels or reduce
them a bit because the talk here is climate could be a serious
problem and we should do something. Is that doing something?
At MIT at the Center for Global Change Science, what Figure
4 in my testimony tells you is what will happen is determined
by the sensitivity of the climate system. We don't know that,
but if we assume it's a sensitive system, you'll get a lot of
warming with emissions reductions and you'll get almost the
same warming, maybe a bit more if you do nothing. If the system
is not sensitive, naturally policy won't matter.
[[Page 25]]
So we're not talking about policy to prevent global warming
if it's going to occur. We're talking about policy that will
have very little impact.
Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Dr. Schneider from Stanford.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF
BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Schneider. It's an honor and a pleasure to appear again
before this committee on the issue of climate change and its
potential impacts, particularly since my initial appearance was
exactly 20 years ago.
I decided to skim through that testimony because it's often
interesting to decide whether you're going to be happy or
embarrassed at what you said before.
Several things struck me. First, it was a very cordial
exchange among ourselves and the panel and Senators then--
Domenici, Wallop, McClure, Gravel and Vincent. If I can indulge
in a personal note for a second, it was a pleasure for me to
read a transcript where the issues were the primary question,
and where the level of contention and personal acrimony was
low, as I've been personally distressed in the last 10 years
that such a high level of exchange has not always been there.
I'm delighted that the chairman and this committee are
beginning to reverse that acrimonious trend by focusing on
issues and the questions of science, so I commend you all for
that and hope we can continue that style. With that personal
indulgence aside, let me continue the debate and contrast what
we were talking about then, 20 years ago, to now.
I was struck by how much of the current debate was already
anticipated in those days. I think Senator Hutchinson mentioned
that this was deja vu. I was thinking of the Yogi Berra cliche
about deja vu--one ``over again'' isn't enough. There are many
``over agains'' but, on the other hand, that is important when
issues have lots of uncertainty and lots of contention. I think
it's necessary that each generation go over the issues and see
what we've learned in the intervening generations.
I want to briefly address that rather than all the details
which are in my written testimony and the other witnesses' as
well.
One of the things I had said then, and I'll just quote it
briefly and see how it stands up over the test of time:
There are scientists who believe that the particles, the
aerosols, could lead to cooling and to CO2 to
warming.
I personally don't think the issue is resolved, although I
think the present majority of climatologists would come out on
the long-term warming side.
That was 1977. I don't think it's all that different in a
sense that it reflects some of the debate that we would hear
now.
Since 1977, we've still learned a lot. One of the things we
learned, for example, is that aerosols are implicated not just
in climate, but in health risks. They're involved in lung
diseases and other things of concern, and as a result of that,
we've had a Clean Air Act in an attempt to try to remove the
aerosol particles.
[[Page 26]]
What we've discovered is that the control technologies
which were originally predicted to be highly expensive turned
out to be not nearly as expensive as we thought when we applied
market-based systems, such as tradable permits and other such
things to them. I think there is an instructive metaphor there.
There is also a climate-related component, which is, if
aerosols can be removed quickly when people put health as a
high priority. I think that has occurred in more wealthy
societies; some of the projections of the amount of aerosols
we'll see in the next century may not be nearly as severe as
some people have said.
Indeed, as we've been talking about the past 20 years, the
prime problem of the next century may very well be if we
continue business as usual, then carbon dioxide emissions which
start to swamp all the other factors.
So I think there is more confidence today than there was 20
years ago, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has
stated, that the combination of global warming from greenhouse
gases, including not just CO2 but methane and other
greenhouse gases, and a lesser but still significant regional
cooling from aerosols, has indeed left its ``discernible'' mark
in that famous sentence that everybody quotes.
Remember, that discernible remark was in the sense of
preponderance of evidence, not proof beyond doubt. As one of
the lead authors of that report, I know we debated that
sentence quite literally for hours. Many of us wanted to use
the word ``preponderance'' to convey that sense of civil rather
than criminal trial levels of evidence.
The reason that ``preponderance'' was not included was that
it simply didn't translate well into all the languages of the
various countries participating and that's why the ``balance of
evidence'' came out instead.
So it was in that sense that ``discernible'' appeared. We
were not using a statistical standard of 99 percent
significance. In fact, that wouldn't be very meaningful because
it's hard to define every aspect in those kinds of terms.
Climate variation isn't a dice game or a coin flip. There's
lots more complexity here.
Let me continue and dwell on this issue of uncertainty
because I would argue that it would be a mistake for us to
interpret these bland statements about things which are
uncertain as if somehow all aspects were equally uncertain.
We have a very ordered set of knowledge here and that is
the repeated assessment over every 5 or 7 years that keep
coming out from the National Research Council and now several
from the IPCC. What they tell us is, there's lots of aspects
about the problem that are well understood aspects over which
there is a strong consensus. There are aspects for which we
have fairly good information and a decent guess and then there
are aspects that are highly speculative.
It's always a personal frustration for me when these
aspects all get lumped together, particularly in the media
debate, as Eric Barron said earlier, and then people become
understandably confused and think that nobody knows anything.
That's simply not an accurate reflection of the state-of-the-
art of the science.
[[Page 27]]
What we try to do is make sure that through the process of
assessment where a community of scientists gets together, we
can point out those aspects where there is strong consensus and
separate these out from the speculations so that we don't
misunderstand the nature of the science. That's a tough thing
to avoid.
Let me further elaborate on this issue of uncertainty. Of
course despite the considerable progress mentioned earlier,
there are still many remaining uncertainties. It's the cliche
of our era, but as I said, that bland statement by itself
throws away much useful knowledge that already exists in the
scientific and policy communities.
We know, for example, how to separate those aspects with
strong consensus and those parts which are plausible and thus
well established and those which are highly speculative, but we
can go beyond that because we've actually applied scientific
techniques to tap the subjective judgments of a variety of
expertise in climatology, atmospheric chemistry, agriculture,
ecology or economics.
What such formal studies show is the gradations of
uncertainty. What they do is quantify the subjective
probability assigned by surveyed experts on such issues as how
much the Earth might warm up if CO2 were to double.
I have a figure in my written testimony, Figure 1, which shows
examples of 16 different scientists, two on this panel, who
have made various estimates of that.
How much the economy might be damaged by different degrees
of global warming had also been assessed, as has how much of
that damage would accrue to market sectors, areas like
agriculture, which is clearly an important market sector,
forestry or energy demand as opposed to so-called non-market
damages to amenities like visibility, human health or
protection of endangered species or habitats.
So anyone who is a ``rationalist'', meaning we believe in
looking at balances between costs and benefits, clearly wants
to quantify both the costs and the benefits. Here is where the
uncertainty gets in the way because depending upon which end of
the spectrum of the range of uncertainties you can pick on both
the cost and the benefit side, you can come out with mild or
catastrophic conclusions.
So this is no different, in essence, than most risk
management problems that corporate executives face all the time
or that you face all the time in trying to determine how to use
a limited budget in dealing with a wide range of problems,
picking which are priorities. Therefore, you want as much
quantitative information as you can have, not just about what
can happen but also what are the odds that it can happen. By
selective information grabbed out of the context of the range
of the odds it might happen, it's very difficult for us to be
able to do that risk management job rationally.
My written testimony gives several examples of these formal
studies and they all possess a common attribute. Most, but not
all, experts assign a broad distribution of scientifically-
based, subjective probabilities to a range of climatic effects
or impacts. In most cases, the vast majority of experts assign
a small--5 or 10 percent probability--to outcomes like very
little change or catastrophic change.
[[Page 28]]
Of course in the value system of a risk prone person, a 5
percent change of a nasty outcome is small whereas to a risk
averse person, that possibility might lead to hedging
strategies like investing in insurance or redundant backup
systems. Therefore, we need to understand that value aspect all
the way through.
Let me conclude with a quote, which I think one of you will
recognize, and that succinctly summarizes my views--``If there
is one point I could make, Mr. Chairman, it is this. There are
a great many questions about the greenhouse effect that can't
be answered today, but I don't think we ought to let scientific
uncertainty paralyze us from doing anything. It is always
convenient to find an excuse not to do something and there is
always an excuse out there not to do something. I think the
issue before is what steps should we be taking today to help
solve the problem in addition to doing more scientific
research.''
I trust you remember when you said that, Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. One of the dangers of this job is resurrect
things you said in the past, but I'll stick by that.
Dr. Schneider. Good. That was the gamble I was taking.
Senator Chafee. You thought it was a pretty good statement.
Dr. Schneider. I thought so too and I think it's still
true. You said that in June 1988 in front of the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources when, in fact, those
heat waves, which were unusual but not extraordinary generated
all that public interest to the issue.
I think, as I said, it's as valid today as 9 years ago
except today I think we have a stronger consensus for dealing
with this issue than we did a decade ago. As the recent
statement calling for modest climate policy actions from more
than 2,000 economists attests--I will make a bold prediction
and that my colleague, Dale Jorgenson's testimony will likewise
conclude--that modest actions which try to balance costs and
benefits are not premature.
I thank you for your persistent interest in global
environmental issues, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify,
and of course, I stand ready to respond to any of the questions
or comments each of the committee members may have.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
Now, Dr. Jorgenson from Harvard, former chairman of the
Economics Department and Professor of Economics. We welcome you
here.
STATEMENT OF DALE JORGENSON, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, FORMER
CHAIR OF ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Jorgenson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Distinguished members of the committee, it's a great
pleasure for me to be here and to see the breadth of interest
in the subject that we're here to discuss.
I think it's very important for me to focus right away on
the fact that I'm going to deal with the economics of climate
change and not with the scientific issues that the other four
witnesses have just placed before you.
I was the author of the Economists' Statement on climate
change that attracted, as the chairman said, more than 2,500
signatures,
[[Page 29]]
including eight Nobel Prize winners. I'd like to use that as a
point of departure. That's in the material I distributed. It's
about halfway through the packet. I'm going to start by
summarizing the statement because it's an attempt to elicit
what turned out to be close to a consensus about an economic
approach to the problem.
First of all, let me say a few things about the economics
of the situation somewhat in the vein of Senator Chafee's
opening remarks about the science.
The science of global change is at least a century old. It
was originated, as the Senator pointed out, by Svante Arrenhius
and the qualitative features of the science of the problem
haven't changed even though the quantitative precision, thanks
to the excellent observations that you've heard about from Dr.
Christy and the modeling which Steve Schneider, among others,
has been involved in, we know a great deal more about the
quantitative features, but the qualitative features of climate
change go back at least a century.
The economics is much more recent and in fact, for the
benefit of the panel and also for the benefit of the staff and
maybe some of the members of the audience, I've included a few
recent references which are research reports that I think have
moved the economics forward by a good bit.
It turns out that these are very recent references. One of
them is to a World Bank report from June 1992. It was intended
to be available at the same time as the Rio Summit, but in
fact, arrived just as the Summit was beginning and therefore,
had no influence on the outcome.
The other references are to a book by William Nordhaus of
Yale University. I know, Senator, you are an alumnus of that
very distinguished university. William Nordhaus is a co-author
of the Economists' Statement as well as one of the leading
economists working in this area. Finally, there is a paper by
myself and Peter Wilcoxen, a former student of mine now at the
University of Texas, which is dated 1995.
Notice that all of these references are subsequent to the
Rio conference. In other words, what we know about the
economics of climate change is something that has arrived on
the scene very recently. I think it's very appropriate to
underline that by referring to the article that appeared
yesterday in the Washington Post--if your copy of the
Washington Post has already disappeared, you can find this also
in Newsweek Magazine, by Robert Samuelson, surely one of the
most distinguished economic journalists working in the area of
economic policy.
The phrase that he used is precisely the opposite of the
economic consensus. The phrase, which you quoted, I believe,
Senator Chafee, was that ``Effective action on climate change
would amount to crushing the world economy.'' That turns out to
be exactly the opposite of what I believe the economic
consensus appears to be.
It reflects a view of the economics of this problem which I
think goes back to the reactions to the Rio Summit and to the
definition of the problem that was adopted there which,
unfortunately, as I've already suggested, did not benefit from
the recent economic research that I want to discuss.
[[Page 30]]
Let's proceed with the Economists' Statement. That is about
midway through your packet if you'd like to refer to it but I'm
going to summarize it very briefly.
The first paragraph says that climate change involves
significant environmental risks and the preventive steps are
justified. The second paragraph summarizes economic studies
showing that there are policies available for educing
greenhouse gas emissions for which the benefits outweigh the
costs. The third paragraph describes policies in more detail
and emphasizes the importance of the approach you've heard from
a number of the other panelists and also from some of the
opening statements, many of which I found to be brilliant--I
hope Senator Lautenberg agrees.
These opening statements, a number of them, refer to
market-based approaches and that is, in fact, something that is
gaining a good bit of momentum in this area of environmental
policy and in others. That is the basic thrust of the
Economists' Statement.
Now, I'd like to lay out the approaches to practical
implementation. Again, this is on page 5 of your handout if
you'd like to look at that.
The first thing we have to focus on is how to choose an
appropriate objective. It's very clear from the testimony that
you've heard that there is certainly the possibility that
emissions of greenhouse gases will affect the climate.
Senator Chafee. Doctor, could you slow up here? I'm just
trying to get located. You said page 5 in the handout material?
Dr. Jorgenson. Right.
Senator Chafee. Is that the big print?
Dr. Jorgenson. Yes. This is the big print and talks about
practical implementation.
Senator Chafee. Yes, all right.
Dr. Jorgenson. That's exactly the page, Senator.
The first point is that we have to agree on an appropriate
target. That is something that was discussed at the Rio Summit
but in fact, the target that was suggested there, which is
stabilizing emissions, is not something that can be justified
on economic grounds. That is the first and most important
point.
When we think about setting the target, the Rio agreement
is the wrong starting point and we'll come back to the setting
of the target later.
The second point is we have to think of a means of
international implementation. This is where we come to the
issue of market-based approaches. I'm happy to say that the
Administration, which you will hear from at the next meeting of
this committee, has proposed a market-based approach based on
internationally tradable permits.
That has important limitations, some of which are the
subject of the Senate resolution by Senator Byrd and others,
including members of this panel, but that is something we can
discuss in more detail.
Now we come to the issue of domestic implementation. Here,
the issue is how to achieve reductions in emissions that
balance the costs against the benefits. The answer to that, and
this is discussed in great detail in my paper with Wilcoxen, is
that we need to think about a carbon tax, we need to think
about a tax on energy use
[[Page 31]]
that would have the effect of reducing the growth of carbon
dioxide emissions, not the most important greenhouse gas to be
sure, but the one for which atmospheric concentrations are
changing.
Now we come to Mr. Samuelson. Mr. Samuelson says, thinking
we're going to crush the world economy, that to have an
appropriate effect, the appropriate carbon tax would be $100
per ton of carbon. The appropriate tax discussed in my
testimony is, in fact, $10 a ton. In fact, that $10 figure is
for the year 2025. If we wanted to think about an appropriate
tax at present, what would be the tax that we should implement
immediately, the answer is about $5.29 a ton, in other words, a
totally different order of magnitude than what has been
suggested.
The conclusion is then that we have to think of this as a
three-step process. The first is determining an appropriate
target for an international agreement. Unfortunately, the Rio
Summit of 1992 got off on the wrong foot. What is required is
slowing the growth of emissions, not capping emissions at
something like 1990 levels.
The second point is that once we've agreed, hopefully in
Kyoto, but if not, then at some subsequent meeting, on an
appropriate target that is justified in terms of the costs and
the benefits that are associated with slowing climate change,
we then have to arrive at a means of international
implementation.
For that purpose, I think the Administration's position
involving a system of internationally tradable permits is
certainly an appropriate point of departure, but it's important
to combine that with the key feature that has been the subject
of the Byrd resolution which is bringing in all the parties, in
other words having an international agreement that is truly
comprehensive.
Now we come to the nub of the matter. We have a climate
change policy. It is, in fact, embodied in the U.S. Climate
Change Action Plan. If you look at the final exhibit in my
handout, you'll see the effect of the Climate Change Action
Plan.
There was an objective of trying to achieve by voluntary
methods a reduction in emissions by the year 2000 to 1990
levels. That was what was called for in the Rio Summit. That
has been, unfortunately, a total failure.
What we have found is that the emissions have grown very,
very substantially. Even by 1996, the last year for which the
most recent data are available, these have grown far beyond
what the Administration at that time--Senator Chafee alluded to
the Senate ratification of the Administration agreement by
President Bush at Rio--that there would be a growth of
emissions without this Global Climate Action plan that would go
far beyond stabilizing emissions. In fact, the growth of
emissions has been far beyond what was anticipated at the time.
Nonetheless, we come back to the basic point that the goal
of climate change has to be reconsidered and that economics is
really the key to understanding that issue.
Thank you very much.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Doctor.
What we will do is each of us will have 8 minutes to ask
some questions. I understand there is going to be a vote at
11:05 a.m., so I'd like to start off. Sometimes votes are
scheduled and don't occur.
[[Page 32]]
Dr. Barron, if I understood your testimony correctly, you
stated as a fact that there has been a global temperature
increase. Am I correct in that?
Dr. Barron. If you look at the surface observations over
the entire century, what you see is the differences that are on
the order of .4 to .6 of a degree Celsius. I don't think
anybody argues that over that span of time, that there isn't
some temperature difference.
Senator Chafee. You indicated that there must be a strong
research and observational system and apparently we don't match
the Germans and the Japanese in that. What are they doing that
we're not doing? We had the testimony from Dr. Christy about
the balloons and the satellites.
Dr. Barron. I think what you're seeing is just somewhat of
a change in attitude where if you look at our satellite
observation programs, they are under continual challenge, year
to year in terms of budget, in terms of scope, to the point
where we once again are moving into a mode where it will be
difficult to make sure we have continuity of our observations.
This was something where basically the United States just
ruled supreme in terms of these observations. Now we're seeing
that the Europeans and the Japanese are putting forth very
strong efforts along those lines.
If you look at the IPCC assessment, you see the unusual
circumstance that it is models from other countries providing
the long-term simulations that were the basis of a significant
portion of that report and I think much less participation on
the U.S. side.
There's a lot of different U.S. activities and a lot of
very healthy U.S. activities, but I just think it's important
to make sure that we continue to maintain those.
Senator Chafee. How do the Japanese make these
observations? They don't have satellites up there to the extent
we do.
Dr. Barron. Yes, they do. Unfortunately, they just lost
one, Addios, which just went dead because of some sort of power
failure and they have plans for the next launches of Addios and
we did have a U.S. instrument on board that satellite, a
windscatterometer.
Senator Chafee. Do you believe the global temperature has
increased due to an abundance of CO2 from the Earth?
Dr. Barron. I think there is a distinct probability that a
component of that warming is due to CO2, but I also
believe we have a very strong natural variability segment in
there that we have to address.
If you'll let me go back a little farther in Earth history,
I would tell you that every single time there was a warm time
period, there is evidence of higher CO2 and of
almost all the cold periods we have, there's evidence of
reduced CO2.
It's not that it is the primary cause in every single case,
but if we look through the entire spectrum of Earth history,
warm time periods have higher CO2, cool periods have
lower CO2, and it's very hard to escape that point.
Senator Chafee. How would we get the variations in
CO2 emissions say going back before the Industrial
Revolution? Would it be from volcanic eruptions or something?
[[Page 33]]
Dr. Barron. We have several sources of information. One is
an ice course.
Senator Chafee. I appreciate that. That would be a way of
measuring it, but what would the variations come from? What
would cause pre-Industrial Revolution variations in
CO2?
Dr. Barron. It's probably a whole broad range of factors.
On a very long time scale, it has to be the volcanic emissions
and the rate of uptake of that CO2 by actually
weathering of rocks, but you have all sorts of variations from
variations in the biology, variations in the climate for which
it becomes a feedback. It's a broad range of factors.
Senator Chafee. Dr. Christy, you indicated in your
conclusion that something is going on but you're not sure what.
What is the something? You reported since 1979, there's been a
very small increase in the temperature in the troposphere. Is
that the something?
Dr. Christy. No, it was the stratosphere that had the
largest signal, the remarkable decrease. The cause could be due
to ozone depletion, that seems to be a good culprit for that,
or the effects of volcanoes which is quite a natural phenomena.
Senator Chafee. If you were sitting up here, what would you
do? Would you worry and do anything or say, well, let's wait a
little while longer?
Dr. Christy. I've never been a Senator before.
Senator Chafee. You can pretend you're one, a lot of people
do.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Christy. I suppose whatever could be done, that which
is politically feasible, from your point of view.
Senator Chafee. No, don't put it on that basis. Let's say
we're trying to do the right thing up here. Long before it was
popular, we got into the chlorofluorocarbons, the CFCs, and as
you just mentioned, I think we did some good work there. It
wasn't immediately popular, but it was the right thing to do.
Just tell us what your recommendation would be to us.
Dr. Christy. To find out as much as possible, first of all,
about what the climate is doing and what effects a particular
control might have. The modest controls talked about here and
probably to be recommended will probably not have much effect
on the global climate, if it is being affected by the
greenhouse gases.
I'm not an expert on the economic issues and things like
that. I only know about pretty much one thing and that's the
satellite temperatures, so it's hard for me to answer that kind
of question.
Senator Chafee. Except that your satellite temperatures, as
I understood them, indicate some small increases in
temperature. Am I correct in that?
Dr. Christy. When adjusted for the natural variations of
the ocean temperature volcanoes, that's right, less than what
model projections show.
Senator Chafee. Dr. Schneider, you indicated that it's
unfair to label all uncertainties as being equally uncertain.
How certain are you that there's been an increase in the global
temperature?
Dr. Schneider. I'm highly certain that there's been an
increase in the global surface temperature. I'm less certain
about what the middle of the atmosphere is doing and I'm more
concerned about
[[Page 34]]
what happens to the surface because that's where we and the
bulk of living things are.
Senator Chafee. Could you put a figure on that?
Dr. Schneider. Remember, these probabilities are subjective
because there are many factors involved but so are the opinions
often of generals, doctors and others, so my subjective opinion
on this would be 95 percent likely that there is a global
warming trend, probably even higher than that because it isn't
just thermometers of the world which average out to show this 1
degree Fahrenheit warming in a century, but mountain glaciers
have been largely receding around the world and sea levels have
risen. There is a consistent pattern.
The issue isn't so much whether the Earth is warming, it's
why.
Senator Chafee. It's also important how much, isn't it?
Dr. Schneider. Yes.
Senator Chafee. Could you set a figure on that, how much?
Dr. Schneider. How much is a little tougher even at the
surface because you can't just stick a thermometer in somewhere
and get out the number. That's why many of us are pleased that
the satellite measurements have come along to provide a
supplement, yet there is a lot more adjusting that needs to
take place in coordinating the instruments.
Unfortunately, satellites were only flying in 1979, so we
have to try to guess about where there were inaccuracies and so
forth.
I think what the IPCC said and the National Research
Council said before, is that the standard best guess is
something like a half degree warming over the past century,
plus or minus a couple tenths of a degree, and there are four
groups around the world that continuously reanalyze this data
to try to take out biases and correct errors.
Senator Chafee. Senator Baucus.
Senator Baucus. I'd like to see if there is any agreement
among the panel first as to whether or not there's been an
increase in CO2 caused by man over the last 100
years? Does everybody agree there has been a significant
increase in CO2 caused not by natural causes, but by
man?
The figure I have is that 250 ppm to about 360 ppm over the
last 100 years.
Dr. Lindzen. It's closer to 280 ppm.
Senator Baucus. The range is from 280 ppm to----
Dr. Lindzen. To 360 ppm.
Senator Baucus. OK. The primary causes of that are what,
fossil fuels?
Dr. Schneider. Fossil fuels and deforestation. The initial
deforestation was in the now-developed countries. If we had a
balloon and we could have flown from the East to the West Coast
of the United States before the settlers were here, we largely
would have seen trees more so than farms and that carbon that
those trees then represented is now in the air. The same thing
is true in Europe.
Now we've been regrowing our forests and the bulk of the
net deforestation is taking place elsewhere.
Senator Baucus. So there is agreement that CO2
caused by man is increasing?
[[Page 35]]
Dr. Schneider. More than half is probably from
CO2 due to industrial emission.
Senator Baucus. More than half due to industrial.
Is there also agreement that the surface is warming, has
over the last 150 years? I'm not getting into the cause but
whether the surface has been warming?
Dr. Lindzen. I think the IPCC limit is \1/3\ to \2/3\ of a
degree. There is uncertainty in that. While there is widespread
agreement, for instance, it's been mentioned that there's
urbanization, I had to work with these records a few months ago
and I suddenly realized the IPCC listed Capetown, Johannesburg,
and Buenos Aires as rural stations.
Senator Baucus. But there is general agreement?
Dr. Schneider. There's general agreement, it's got a large
error bar and nobody knows why.
Dr. Jorgenson. Let me chime in at this point. if you look
at Figure 5.4 of my testimony, you can see what appears to be
the consensus about global mean temperature changing from 1865.
It's increased by a little over a degree (Farenheit).
Senator Baucus. The next question I want to ask you
scientists is to rate the probability of individual causes. The
cause of today's hearing basically is CO2 and other
greenhouse gases. Dr. Lindzen, you say water vapors is much
more.
Before we get into that, I just want to ask each of the
panelists to give his view of what's caused this warming, two
or three candidates and the best you can give a probability to
each of the two or three candidates.
I'll start with you, Dr. Barron, and answer very quickly
because I don't have a lot of time left.
Dr. Barron. I think there's a significant probability that
a good portion of that has to do with human activity.
Senator Baucus. With what?
Dr. Barron. With human activity.
Senator Baucus. Which human activity?
Dr. Barron. Emissions of CO2.
Senator Baucus. Emissions of CO2. You think
there is a significant probability?
Dr. Barron. I think there's a significant probability.
Senator Baucus. OK. Dr. Lindzen.
Dr. Lindzen. I would say at this point, the most likely
candidate is natural variability. As I point out, this is the
system that vacillates with no forcing, even according to
models and theory.
Senator Baucus. Dr. Schneider.
Dr. Schneider. If you consider the surface warming together
with the cooling of the stratosphere, which actually I think is
due not just to depletion of ozone but increased greenhouse
gases, they actually cause the stratosphere to cool and the
lower atmosphere to warm, I would say that it is maybe only a
10 or 20 percent change, in my opinion, that the warming trend
is a natural event.
There is an equal probability it could have been a cooling
event in nature. I don't know which it is, so I would rate it
more like 80 or 90 percent likely that we're part of the story
and that the bulk of that is probably emission of carbon
dioxide.
Senator Baucus. Dr. Jorgenson.
[[Page 36]]
Dr. Jorgenson. I'll defer to Dr. Christy.
Dr. Christy. I look at those records very closely and the
19th Century was one of the coldest of the last 1,000 years. We
are coming out of a very cold century right now. Most of the
temperature rise--and I sat on the IPCC panel that dealt with
this--the number was .42 was given to us by the latest results
of a degree Celsius warming.
Most of that is caused by natural variability, the rebound
from the 19th Century cold period. What part of that might be
caused by our activities of the .42, I would say at most, .1.
Senator Baucus. Caused by man?
Dr. Christy. Human activity.
Senator Baucus. Point 1. Did you say there's a 10 percent
change?
Dr. Christy. No. I would say at most that warming of .42
that we see, at most, .1 would be due to human cause, at most.
Senator Baucus. What lessons are there from the CFC matter?
Years ago, it was a big debate, were CFCs causing a hole in the
ozone layer in the stratosphere? Lots of industries said, no,
but we went ahead and worldwide enacted controls.
I'm just wondering if the state of knowledge here is in any
way parallel or similar to the state of knowledge back when we
first started to debate this issue? Does anybody want to take a
crack at that? Dr. Schneider?
Dr. Schneider. Sure. In fact, one of the prime confusions
in the lay world is that the ozone depletion issue and the
greenhouse effect question are the same. In fact, they are not.
They are very different but there is a component of them where
I think we can draw a lesson as you asked in your question.
When you use the atmosphere as a free sewer, if you will,
eventually something nasty might happen. It was determined that
those chemicals that were injected could be breaking down and
while nobody could precisely calculate the chemistry 15 years
ago, there was a possibility it could be significant. It became
a risk management question about whether to take the chance.
Now, the ozone hole that you mentioned, the irony in this
and the chief lesson, is the ozone hole was not anticipated by
most people. In fact, what we were expecting was a smooth, slow
loss of ozone. The ozone hole came as a surprise, which was
interpreted by some people who didn't see this as a problem.
They were saying, ``You see, we never really understood the
atmosphere because we didn't predict the hole.'' On the other
hand, it was interpreted by environmentalists and others as,
``See, when you mess around with Mother Nature at the global
scale, you're going to get nasty surprises.''
I think that it's almost certain that the rates at which we
modify the environment, both through land clearing and
atmospheric effects, will give us surprises. Some will be
pleasant, some will be nasty. The absolute prime message is
that when you start interfering with the natural rates of
things, you have to expect changes, as Eric Barron said.
What we are not capable of doing is honestly telling you
the precise range and details of those changes. If we did, we'd
be beyond our capacity. But we can forecast that the more
rapidly we force
[[Page 37]]
the system to change, the more likely it is that there will be
surprises like the ozone hole. I think that's a relatively safe
forecast.
Senator Baucus. I'd like to follow up very briefly on the
question the chairman asked, namely how do we go about getting
more data, either baseline data, more research, more facts so
that we can be a little more certain that our decisions are
better founded than they otherwise might be? Where is the
deficiency in either research or data gathering? What do we do?
Obviously this is a big problem--global warming, climate
change--and I think intuitively most people think something bad
is going on here, but we also want to make sure, as much as
possible, that we handle it the right way and make the right
decisions.
It seems to me that the best way to address that is, as you
all suggested one way or another, to get more data, do more
research and so forth. I don't know what it is. What do we do
to make sure we're getting better information, more facts? Any
of you?
Dr. Barron. I'd just add that I think there are some things
like, for instance, making sure when you're collecting weather
data that it's suitable for climate. A few simple rules and
policies and a little bit of investment would go a long way.
I think it's clear just by the debate where deficiencies
are in models.
Senator Baucus. If we could spend more money, where should
we spend?
Dr. Jorgenson. Could I check in on that? I think the thing
to focus on, Senator Baucus, is that we are spending $2 billion
a year on this problem. It's not as if our efforts are
insignificant in economic terms. We're putting a lot of money
into research and we're getting the benefits of that research
as you see before this panel.
I don't think it's a question of spending more money. It's
a question of absorbing the information that we have and
maintaining, as Dr. Barron suggested earlier, the observational
system that we've put up, making sure it continues.
Senator Baucus. But I understand that Japan, Germany, and
other countries are doing more.
Dr. Jorgenson. That's simply not true. If you look at our
effort by comparison with these other countries, it's very
large by comparison with our R&D effort and by comparison with
the size and scope of our economic activities. We are the
leaders in this field by a substantial margin.
Senator Baucus. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
We're in the last part of the vote. This is what I'd like
to do. We'll take a little recess now and we'll go over and I
think a lot of us want to hear these answers and we'll come
right back.
This is interesting to all of us. Why don't we all go and
vote and I personally am going to come back very quickly and
then we'll start again. I hope everybody will be here because
we're all interested in what you have to say.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Chafee. In our order of appearance, we had Senator
Thomas who is not here, Senator Bond is not here.
Senator Hutchinson.
[[Page 38]]
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the panel for their testimony and as I
listened, it seemed to me one word kept popping up and that's
the word ``uncertainty,'' that there was at least some
uncertainty regarding the scientific data that we have.
I think, Dr. Christy, the one thing that almost got lost
when you were playing Senator, was when you said that we need
to gather more data. There did seem to be a lot of uncertainty
to me.
I read an AP article not long ago that quoted a U.S.
Geological Survey ecologist who said he was uneasy about
attributing ecological changes to human-caused global warming
because North America's ecological systems have always been in
flux.
A mere 18,000 years ago, not long in geological time, ice
sheets two miles thick covered the entire northern half of the
continent and as they melted away, plants and animals claimed
the land the glaciers once covered.
He says there have been smaller climate fluctuations since
then as recently as 1850 at the end of a period known as the
Little Ice Age when temperatures were a few degrees cooler than
they are today and that leaves ecologists wondering whether the
changes they are now documenting are merely the continuation of
a natural warming trend that began 150 years ago.
I think it was Dr. Lindzen who questioned the models, the
accuracy of the models that are available, so I think of the
scientific uncertainty.
As I listened to the testimony, it also struck me that
there is uncertainty as to the impact of policy changes that
have suggested as to how dramatic a change we can really affect
by making the policy changes that have been proposed,
particularly the ones that have been proposed by the
Administration.
So we have, at best, a marginal impact. In fact, I think
I'm quoting Dr. Lindzen correctly when he said they would have
very little impact.
When you consider that the proposals that we have before
us, the Administration's proposals would limit the regulations
to developed countries, excluding and exempting the developing
nations like China and Mexico. It would seem to me that they
would even further marginalize the impact of any policy
changes.
So in the midst of all that uncertainty, it seems to me
there is one thing that is certain and that is there is going
to be enormous costs that's going to be imposed. While we are
uncertain about the scientific basis and that we need more
data, we're uncertain about the impact of policy changes, that
it may or may not be beneficial, but there is one thing that is
quite certain and that is, it is going to be expensive.
Dr. Lindzen, I'm going to direct this to you and I know
you're anxious to speak but I want to particularly look at the
area of agriculture. Agricultural production accounts for 20
percent of all human-caused greenhouse emissions according to
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
In their study, they further singled out rice as the No. 1
agricultural source of human-caused methane emissions, 20
percent of all human-causes from agriculture and rice being the
No. 1 contributor
[[Page 39]]
of that. Arkansas is the No. 1 rice producer and the
Mississippi Delta is the place that's grown.
Current negotiations only focusing upon developed nations
will put Arkansas and other areas at a great disadvantage. In
fact, in 1996, the United States produced 7,771 metric tons of
rice while China produced 188,000 metric tons of rice, 24 times
the amount the United States produces.
It seems to me if we're going to regulate, we're going to
limit American agriculture, which would be about 4 percent of
world production of rice, any impact is going to have to be
very, very minimal.
Here is the question. Is the proposal the Administration
has advocated the proper response in light of the uncertainty
that surrounds the issue?
Dr. Lindzen.
Dr. Lindzen. I think the issue of uncertainty has to be
dealt with with care. There are some things we're uncertain
about to be sure, but on the issue you asked about,
surprisingly there is rather less uncertainty than on many
matters.
We know, for example, that projected increases in methane
will contribute very little of any putative warming, no matter
what you think will happen; CO2 will dominate.
We know that stabilization of emissions involving India and
China at 1990 levels will, if you expect 4 degrees warming,
doing nothing much, knock you down to maybe 3 degrees.
We know that the No. 4 is very uncertain but we know if
that were the number, the proposed actions will not reduce it
to a number that would be small climate change.
Senator Hutchinson. You're saying the certainty is that the
policy changes would have minimal impact?
Dr. Lindzen. That's the part we're far more confident of
than the specific number we expect to be achieved in 2100, if
we do nothing.
Senator Hutchinson. Dr. Jorgenson.
Dr. Jorgenson. I'd like to expand on that. I think that
what you said, Senator, whatever we do is going to be very
costly is precisely the point of view that was expressed by
Robert Samuelson in his Washington Post piece.
That is predicated on the idea that we're going to continue
our failed policy of 1992. That's the policy that involves
stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. That is
not economically justified.
If you look at the figure in my testimony, Figure 5.2, what
you'll find is that the economic--this is at the end of the
handout and it's Figure 5.2 and describes greenhouse gas
emissions under the optimal economic policy.
Senator Chafee. This is a chart?
Dr. Jorgenson. That's a chart. What this shows is that the
optimum policy is one that does not stabilize emissions. That
scenario would indeed, Senator Hutchinson, be extremely costly,
and that's what Dr. Lindzen was alluding to.
Senator Hutchinson. That would be ineffective also.
Dr. Jorgenson. Not that it would be something that would be
effective in stopping climate change; but the point is it is
not economically justified.
[[Page 40]]
Weigh the costs against the benefits--as you have with your
example based on rice culture in Arkansas--but I think is
appropriate. Farming is the industry that is going to be most
affected by this policy. Whatever we do, we need to think about
very moderate measures.
Instead of Samuelson's $100 tax, what we need to think of
by the year 2025 is something like a $10 tax per ton of carbon.
That's a difference of order of magnitude. That is where the
economics of this boils down to. We need to take very moderate
measures, but we need to start now.
As far as the developing countries are concerned, the
important thing to focus on there is that at the present time,
developing countries are not going to be very substantial
emitters. However, we can anticipate the growth of emissions
from countries like China is going to be substantial.
Therefore, we need to bring them into the discussion.
Senator Hutchinson. Dr. Jorgenson, if China produces 24
times the rice that the United States produces and if it is
only a modest tax as you're advocating that would be imposed,
even a small differential between a developed nation like the
United States and China which is producing 24 times, it's hard
for me to imagine that's not going to have a dramatic impact in
markets and costs on American agriculture.
It also seems to me to argue that China is not a
significant emitter if it's producing 24 times the rice. That
doesn't equate with me.
Dr. Jorgenson. No, at the present time, China certainly is
a significant emitter. My point is that if you take developing
countries as a whole, they are far less significant than the
developed countries.
Focusing on the role of China, China, like the United
States, will have opportunities to participate in an
international agreement. They will benefit from looking at the
costs on the one side and the benefits on the other and what we
should try to achieve is an international consensus based on
the idea that we minimize the cost of whatever we do. We want
to minimize the cost of climate policy, whatever that policy
turns out to be.
For that purpose, I think the Administration's proposal of
internationally tradable permits, when expanded in due course,
to the developing countries, would be an appropriate market-
based instrument.
Senator Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has
expired but Dr. Schneider was wanting to respond and I would
like to ask permission.
Senator Chafee. Go ahead.
Dr. Schneider. I just wanted to clarify something. In the
charts that Dale Jorgenson showed with economic justification
for certain actions, including figures with three and four
decimal places of precision, although I agree in principle with
what he's trying to say, I have to remind us that these are
based upon economic models which assume what cost profiles will
be because they assume what the cost of technology will be.
They also assume what the damages to the economic system will
be from various levels of climate change.
[[Page 41]]
There is a wide range of uncertainty on both of those
factors. One of the things we learned after the OPEC price
rises, which were induced by political action, was that the
economy responded to those price rises through inventing much
more efficient technologies. We now have the indelible benefits
of the improved technology because of the inventive genius we
had once we had an incentive.
One of the hopes of those people who call for modest
solutions like a low carbon tax, for example, is not that it
will, under present assumptions, eliminate the climate problem,
but will help to induce the kind of learning by doing and
technological changes that can make it much, much cheaper to
abate carbon in the future and that those steps need to begin
now in order to get that process going.
I would commend the idea of what he said, not the three
decimal place precision. It's not conceivable that we could
have that kind of precision, given that we don't know yet what
our technology would be.
Just in your State, think about rice as you mentioned.
You're already in a warm summer state and therefore, the
question isn't just what the cost is of the rice emissions,
it's also what is the damage to the rice farmers if you
increase the numbers of a certain kind of heat waves. That's
what we call climate damage.
What we're trying to do in these optimizations is balance a
guess of how the world would be damaged by climate change
against a guess of what the costs would be to the economy of
say, increasing the price of energy.
That leaves out the whole range of surprises like the ozone
hole and other factors, so it could very well be cost effective
to have much more control than is on this chart if we were
unlucky and it turned out the damages were higher than the best
guess.
Senator Hutchinson. I'd like to agree completely with
everything Mr. Schneider just said.
Senator Chafee. Excellent.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to direct a couple or three questions to Dr.
Barron.
Dr. Barron, according to the 1995 IPCC report, there has
been some pretty substantial strides differentiating greenhouse
gases released naturally and greenhouse gases caused by humans.
Do you agree with that?
Dr. Barron. Do I agree with the precise numbers?
Senator Allard. No. Do you agree there has been substantial
advancement scientifically in being able to measure greenhouse
gases caused by natural causes as opposed to human origin?
Dr. Barron. I think that makes sense.
Senator Allard. Could you detail for me the amount of
greenhouse gases you would attribute to human sources as
opposed to natural sources?
Dr. Barron. I don't think in some precise number, it's a
number that I know what it is. Sorry. I work more on the
climate modeling side of things and less on the biologic-
chemical flux side of this.
Senator Allard. Do you know whether or not there's been an
attempt by the committee or anybody to break down these
emissions
[[Page 42]]
by country so that we would know the impact of the Annex I
countries, for example, versus developing countries?
Dr. Barron. There are all kinds of assessments that go
country by country.
Senator Allard. Did the IPCC try and break those down and
you do have some conclusions on that. OK. I'll want to run down
those conclusions and review those.
The 1995 report seemed to modify greatly certain
predictions that were made earlier, particularly if we look at
the 1990 report. The 1995 report estimates for an increase in
global mean surface air temperature one-third lower than those
estimated in the 1990 report.
The 1995 report indicated that sea level changes are 25
percent lower than estimated in 1990. Many of you had indicated
that there was considerable modification. If that's the case,
why shouldn't we maintain a good case of skepticism on the 1995
report? What's changed?
Dr. Barron. I think you should maintain a level of
skepticism and I think several people have mentioned this
uncertainty issue. Of course you've got to realize we're
trained basically almost at birth as prenatal scientists to
question everything and to focus on all the uncertainties of
every particular issue. It doesn't really release us from
responsibility on some of the decisionmaking.
Part of the progress that you will make over a period of
time between those assessments is that in some cases, you're
going to see that a focal point like aerosols and aerosol
effect on clouds wasn't as clearly recognized and for which
over 5 years, people began to look at that particular factor
may cause the estimates to be smaller or extend the time scale
of the warming.
You also see that there are time periods that the advanced
knowledge adds a level of uncertainty. We're just beginning to
realize that vegetation, if it changes with the climate that's
projected, is going to contribute to the climate change in
itself. It isn't just something that's passive.
So these things become initially areas of uncertainty and
as progress goes on, then we begin to add higher levels of
uncertainty. To tell you the truth, if I look back over the
broad history of this problem, the things we've had questions
about, we've had questions about for about 20-25 years because
it takes a long time to solve some of these things.
The broad picture of the warming is not dramatically
different.
Senator Allard. You bring up the balance of the plants and
the interaction. I'm trying to think in my own mind. If we
assumed on the plant side we had adequate nutrients and we
increase water or water vapor, we increase humidity and we
increase temperature, I would expect plants to grow more,
bigger, faster and I would expect the by-product from that
would be more oxygen.
I'm not sure there is enough discussion. In my comments, I
talked about the buffer part of the system. I don't think
there's enough discussion about that.
Dr. Barron. That is an issue that is really just beginning
to come on line in terms of how high latitude plants will
respond because we've gone from the point of looking at the
atmosphere with
[[Page 43]]
trying to couple all these different components of the system.
I know that's going to introduce uncertainty.
There are some areas that also build a little bit of
confidence that you know the climate system is sensitive and
you know these models can't be too far wrong in some ways. I'll
just give you one example.
We're now at the point where there have been literally
hundreds of experiments in trying to predict past planets
because we can predict the present day but that's how we built
the model. You predict the future, you don't know whether
you're right or wrong.
You can go back in the past and try to predict the last Ice
Age or the last warming episode. In the hundreds that have been
done with models all over the world, there is not a single case
of a model overpredicting the climate of the past, cold or
warm.
Senator Baucus. What do you mean by overpredicting?
Dr. Barron. That means that the geologic record says it was
cold and you used one of these climate models and it said it
was colder than what it actually was or you use one of these
climate models to predict a time period that was warm and it
actually made it warmer than it actually was in the past.
Senator Baucus. So they didn't overpredict?
Dr. Barron. In every single case, it underpredicts. There's
a lot we don't know.
Senator Baucus. Underpredict cold and warm?
Dr. Barron. Underpredict cold and warm. There's a lot we
don't know about the climate system, there's a lot we don't
know about that data, but it begins to be suspicious when you
look at every single time period and you discover you
underpredict.
One other example, you can take that same range, severe
storms leave a remarkable record in sediment, ripping up
sediment stones. You can take different continental positions,
different CO2 levels that geologists think occurred
and almost every storm deposit that we have that's been
recorded in the geologic record comes up under the model
predicted storm tracks.
I would say there's something about the characteristics of
those simulations that must be fairly robust. There's a lot of
things in there I wouldn't trust at all. I think you can come
up with this ordered list, but I think there's evidence that we
have a sensitive system on our hands.
Senator Allard. If I have time, I do have a question for
you, Dr. Schneider, but go ahead and respond.
Dr. Schneider. Briefly, I was going to clarify that the
comment you made before about how early reports suggested
warmings on the order of five degrees as the top number, then
that went down to three and the sea levels come down. There is
an important clarification and distinction I wanted to make.
There was no difference from the first report to the second
report of the IPCC or, in fact, over the last several reports
of the National Research Council, on the basic sensitivity of
the climate to a given change in carbon dioxide. That's not
what changed.
What changed was the assumption of what human behavior
would be, how much sulfate aerosols would be generated, for
example, and the assumption that was made in the 1995 report
was that China would have uncontrolled coal burning that would
produce
[[Page 44]]
lots of sulfate aerosols that would offset some of the global
warming.
Now the current assumptions are that they will not allow
that on health grounds and therefore, those combined global
warming numbers will probably, in the next assessment, creep
right back up. It was the difference in the assumptions as to
what people will do, not a difference in the sensitivity of the
models that caused the change in projections.
Senator Allard. I've been called to order by the chairman,
but hopefully we can come back and maybe continue some of this
discussion later.
Senator Chafee. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to cut
mine down to only 4 minutes because I'm running out of time. If
you can keep your answers short, I'd appreciate it.
Dr. Barron, I didn't see your testimony before the meeting,
but you said we maintain a sophisticated observation system. We
have the satellite but not the continuity. I don't know what
you mean by ``not the continuity.''
Dr. Barron. You can take, for instance, the MSU records.
There's a paper that just appeared in Nature which basically
looks at other techniques and thought there was an issue about
the trends because it's not a single satellite.
I have a great deal of faith that John Christy knows that
data inside and out, but here it becomes a matter of some
debate because it's multiple satellites. Now we've set about in
this Nation to create an earth-observing system with which we
can address issues like that and make sure that we can begin to
have this long-term record.
That system has gone through a tremendous amount of debate
and we don't want to launch the same thing over again. We've
finally come down to the point where we're going to launch a
couple of these satellites. We've got about 9 months to decide
on what the next set of satellites are like and we're not
ready.
Senator Inhofe. Dr. Christy, do you have any response to
that?
Dr. Christy. Just that, yes, we used nine satellites to
piece the record together but as I showed by the independent
validation, it was done correctly.
Senator Inhofe. Dr. Barron, you are predicating a lot of
these predictions on the computer models and I think last April
there was an article in the Washington Post, if you can help me
through this, where the National Weather Service was trying to
predict the cresting of the river in North Dakota. In a 2-week
period, they went from 49 feet to 50 feet to 52.5 and 54 and so
forth.
I guess the question I would ask is aren't there more
variables in predicting, as in your discussion, than there
would be in something like this? When you talk about a
timeframe of 2 weeks, wouldn't the incidence of accuracy be
damaged a little by looking at 100 years versus 2 weeks?
Dr. Barron. It's true, except you also have to realize that
weather prediction is quite different than climate prediction.
In weather prediction, you're basically starting at an initial
stage which is observed and you're carrying that forward based
on laws
[[Page 45]]
of physics into the future and you're updating it with the new
observations as you go along.
What that means is the error grows the farther you go into
the future and so that's basically weather prediction. To
predict something 2 weeks in advance is a very challenging
issue.
In climate prediction, you're basically looking at a set of
factors that forced the system to change and you're attempting
to see what is in equilibrium or balance with those particular
forcing factors. It has a completely different set of problems
and errors. We don't want to just accept what it says, it has a
completely different set but the two issues are quite distinct.
Senator Inhofe. Dr. Jorgenson, I have a quote from your
book. You submitted kind of an outline as opposed to the test
of your remarks, so one of my staff read your book, ``The
Economic Effect of Carbon Tax.'' It says, ``Stabilizing the
atmosphere and concentration of carbon dioxide which would lead
to an eventual stabilization of temperature would require
reducing emissions by 50 percent relative to 1990, a very
costly policy.''
My question would be, a minute ago you said we're not
talking about capping, we're talking about reducing the growth.
When I read this, my interpretation was capping. Was my
interpretation wrong?
Dr. Jorgenson. What I did in that paper was to look at the
consequences of various policies. I considered stabilizing the
climate, which is what you're referring to; I considered
stabilizing emissions, which is the objective of the Rio Summit
Agreement; and what I put in my written testimony and in the
outline you referred to is the economist's best policy defined
by the one that produces the most benefits relative to the
cost.
That doesn't involve capping the climate or capping
emissions. What it involves is reducing the growth of emissions
very, very modestly. That means that the climate is going to
continue to change and that we're going to have to learn to
adapt to that.
Senator Inhofe. But the treaty that we're going to be
looking at is talking about capping, isn't it?
Dr. Jorgenson. I think that it's to be determined because
at the moment, there are a number of proposals on the table.
The small island states needless to say, a relatively
insignificant group from the political point of view, is
talking about reducing emissions by 20 percent. The Europeans--
they don't agree on this, in particular the British don't agree
with this--have talked about reducing emissions by 15 percent.
The goal that is to be advocated by our Administration in
the Kyoto meetings and the meetings that lead up to it is to be
determined. They don't actually say what the goal is. What I'm
saying is it is up to you to determine that. That is what I
suggest you do. I've laid out what I believe that should be,
namely a very, very modest reduction.
Senator Inhofe. I am out of time. I have one last question
I'd like to ask. I know scientists cannot answer questions yes
or no, but I'm going to ask you to do that or not answer it at
all, starting with Dr. Barron.
It's a yes or no question. You mentioned, Dr. Barron, in
your testimony that the models have limitations causing
uncertainties. The
[[Page 46]]
Administration is moving forward with a treaty which will be
finalized in December. Will we have these uncertainties
answered by December, starting with you?
Dr. Barron. Absolutely not.
Dr. Lindzen. No.
Dr. Schneider. No.
Dr. Jorgenson. No.
Senator Inhofe. I do have other questions I'll submit in
writing.
Senator Chafee. Dr. Jorgenson, as I understand what you're
advocating is that we don't try and stabilize our emissions at
some year, but that we seek, I believe you used the term modest
reductions. Those I think you were seeking to achieve by what,
2023, or something like that?
Dr. Jorgenson. No. This would be a continuous process. I'd
like to begin as soon as possible and continue indefinitely.
This is not a problem that's going to go away.
Senator Chafee. The trouble is we have to have incentives
to make us take that tact, that approach, limitations of some
type. In other words, some witness said when the oil embargo
came, the country responded and came up with alternatives and
lowered fuel consumption. Yes, that's absolutely true but there
was a driving force; the driving force was the oil embargo.
We had the reduction in CFCs because we mandated them
pursuant to the Montreal protocol and so forth.
Therefore, it seems to me that in order to get these, we've
got to have some mandate to force us in that direction. This is
not easy. Let me just give you a tiny illustration.
Because of the Social Security Fund problems in 1983, we
enacted some social security reforms and indeed, increased the
retirement age from 65 to 67, being gradually phased in
starting at the turn of the century and extending up to 2023.
Also, many of us voted to make the Medicare age correspond
with that. You think that's pretty gentle, 2023. Nobody can get
too excited about that, but it doesn't turn out that way. There
is a lot of resistance to that. The House of Representatives, I
think will see that as this conference goes along.
Just because something is in the out years doesn't
necessarily make it much easier to achieve. It should work out
that way, but we've got to have a driving force. What are you
suggesting be that driving force?
Dr. Jorgenson. Senator, the driving force I think in
environmental policy is always the same, namely it's the
damages. These damages sometimes take the form of health
effects, as in the case of the Clean Air Act, we've talked
about sanitation associated with clean water standards,
cleaning up the Cuyahoga River and things like that.
In this case, we now have a substantial amount of economic
evidence and it's based on the following idea. That is that
changing the climate with all the uncertainties that have been
described by this panel is something that is going to have a
negative, not gigantic, but a negative effect on agriculture.
It's going to have a negative effect on forestry, it's going to
have a negative effect on our requirements for energy, for
heating and cooling. It's going to have a negative effect on
the coastal areas.
[[Page 47]]
It's easy to exaggerate that but nonetheless, we will be
confronted by coastal damage which will require efforts at
mitigation that involve building dikes and the sort of thing
that has been done in the Netherlands for centuries. All of
those things add up to about the equivalent of a whole year of
economic growth over the next century. That is not the most
dramatic problem you're ever going to confront in the
environmental arena, but it is nonetheless a very substantial
amount of damage.
That is the motivating force for the concern of scientists,
economists and others. How do we mitigate that damage? The
answer is that we do it very gradually. It's not something that
is dramatic and overwhelming. It's something that requires
modest but nonetheless substantial measures. That's what I've
tried to place before you.
I'd like to make one qualification. That is the emphasis in
this panel, both in terms of the questions that the panelists
have asked and the responses that you've heard from the
scientists is uncertainty. That is an argument in favor of
action, not an argument in favor of inaction.
That leads to the recommendation that now is the time when
we need to think about these things as you and your fellow
panelists have decided to do. I think that's the driving force.
It's the damages to our economy, the damages to our ecology,
the damages to our environment that will result from global
warming with the uncertainties that we've heard about.
Senator Chafee. Let me ask the panelists. You heard Dr.
Jorgenson recite the potential problems as he sees them. Do you
agree those problems exist--shall exist.
Dr. Barron. I think that if you start to make a list and
you go sector by sector. If you start to do that, then I think
there is a lot of reason to be concerned.
Senator Chafee. What do you say?
Dr. Lindzen. Yes, I'm very perplexed by Dale's remarks. If
the emission caps and emission reductions will lead to very
little mitigation of climate, then your more relaxed approaches
would have an unmeasurable effect on climate. So if they have a
benefit, it must be something unrelated to climate. What is the
benefit?
Dr. Jorgenson. I'm sorry. Maybe I didn't make myself clear.
The policies that I've advocated are precisely those that
reduce the damages and do it at minimum cost. That's the
economist's approach.
Dr. Lindzen. What damages with respect to climate do they
minimize?
Dr. Jorgenson. The measures that I proposed are measures
that involve reducing emissions and thereby gradually reducing
the change in the climate. That's something that will have
benefits for farming, benefits for forestry.
Dr. Lindzen. Excuse me, Dale. You keep saying that but what
you're proposing by emissions reductions, rate of increase will
have almost no impact on climate.
Dr. Jorgenson. It will have a very modest impact on
climate. I emphasized in my presentation, I hope, that the
climate will continue to change. We not only need to mitigate
the change in the way I've suggested, we need to adapt to the
change that's going to
[[Page 48]]
take place, which is your point. Therefore, I think we're in
agreement unless I misunderstood you.
Dr. Lindzen. No, no. I just didn't understand what the
point was at all in reducing the emissions vis-a-vis climate.
Dr. Jorgenson. Not to eliminate climate change. I certainly
didn't mean to suggest that there's any way that is
economically attractive of putting climate change at an end.
That is not the objective of the policy that I'm advocating.
What we need to do is to mitigate that change, to slow the
change, but the climate, as you've emphasized, will go on
changing.
Senator Chafee. I think you left him perplexed. You've got
me semi-perplexed. Now that I understand what you're saying,
I'm not sure I agree with you.
What you're saying is the climate is going to change
because of man's actions.
Dr. Lindzen. No. He's saying if it changes, any policy will
not impact that. If it isn't changing----
Dr. Jorgenson. That's not right. Why don't you try,
Senator.
Senator Chafee. Doctor, you can mark my blue book.
Dr. Jorgenson. I've never marked the blue book of a Yale
man.
[Laughter.]
Senator Chafee. What you're saying is that man's actions
are causing climate change. It will have, as we go into the
next century, significant effects on agriculture, forestry, the
oceans and so forth.
By starting now with modest mitigation efforts, namely
reducing some of the CO2 that we're releasing into
the atmosphere, we will reduce the effects. We're not going to
eliminate them, but we will reduce the effects and presumably
by reducing these effects, we will be able to adjust to these
effects as we go along.
Dr. Jorgenson. If you don't mind my marking that blue book
as A-plus. You got it exactly right.
Senator Chafee. I'll take it and move on.
Senator Baucus.
Senator Baucus. I'd just like to follow up. Frankly, I
think we're in a real dilemma here because if the efforts are
modest--$10 a ton by 2025, whatever--I don't know if that's
going to have a significant reduction on emissions.
At least now the economy is doing OK. As I see the utility
vehicles that people buy and the gas guzzlers, they buy big
cars and so on, I just don't know if that level is going to
have a significant effect at all which gets a little bit into
the other side of the coin. Sometimes we just need a shock to
force changes in peoples' actions, to develop new technologies
and so forth. The oil shock did it. Sputnik sure did. We woke
up and saw Sputnik flying around and that galvanized us into
action.
Generally it's my judgment politically nothing really
happens unless either there is a crisis or there is
extraordinary leadership. I don't see a lot of the latter.
Dr. Jorgenson. I think although it's invisible, we've had
serious efforts inside the Administration to formulate a
climate policy that would meet the objectives that I think all
of you are concerned about. I think you're going to hear more
of that. There is a lot of concern politically out there in the
population about climate issues.
[[Page 49]]
I think the focus needs to be the following. If we look at
the impact of the oil crisis--I think it's important to come
back to that--we had the benefit there of experience, namely
that increases in prices, just increases in prices by
themselves had the effect of stabilizing emissions.
Senator Baucus. Dramatic increases in prices.
Dr. Jorgenson. Dramatic increases in prices, stabilizing
emissions from 1973, the beginning of the oil crisis until
1987. That's the longest period in recent history for which
we've been able to stabilize emissions. So we know how to
achieve the goals of climate policy.
Now we come to the question Senator Chafee addressed which
is, what should those goals be. There, I think we don't need to
be dramatic. We need to say there is a need which I think
you've heard testimony on this morning and you're going to hear
more testimony on.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that but I think there's a
dilemma here. I don't think it's going to shock people into
change frankly and change behavior. I just don't know that.
Another question I have is with respect to other countries.
You mentioned developing countries don't produce much. An
exception is China.
Dr. Jorgenson. Right.
Senator Inhofe. I heard someone mention not too long ago
that if there is about 3 billion more tons of carbon produced
in the world in the next 20 years and one-third of it will be
produced in China because of their power plants primarily.
That's significant.
Dr. Jorgenson. That is significant, Senator, but let's just
focus on China. China is a country which has undergone a lot of
economic reform and it's been very successful in producing
economic growth.
The one thing they have left untouched is their market for
energy. They have continued to maintain energy prices well
below world levels. Think, by contrast, with the countries of
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which are also very
energy intensive. Those economies have reduced their emissions
dramatically as a result of moving their energy prices to world
levels. That is essentially the policy that we need to think
about for China, not something that involves endorsing an
international agreement. We need to get them to focus on
reforming part of their economy which is the energy sector. We
need them to move their energy prices, especially the price for
electricity to which you alluded, to world market levels.
What does that mean in practice? That means that they will
need fewer power plants than they otherwise would need. It
means they're going to make efforts to reduce their reliance on
coal. You can already see them moving in other directions just
by what they know about the forces that will be at work in the
future.
They have not taken the critical step and that's where we
can play a role. Namely, they have not decontrolled energy
prices in the Chinese economy, so they have not had the kind of
dramatic reductions in energy use that we've seen in the former
Soviet Union, another ex-communist country or in the countries
of Eastern Europe.
[[Page 50]]
I think there is an opportunity to do something about China
entirely outside the framework of the kind of international
agreement that will be debated at Kyoto. That should be the
goal of our diplomats specifically Under Secretary Wirth, the
Under Secretary of State in charge of global affairs. I hope
he's going to focus on that in Kyoto.
Senator Inhofe. Is El Nino at all relevant to anything
we're talking about here today?
Dr. Lindzen. Can I answer that a little bit?
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Dr. Lindzen. There have been a number of studies while
Wallace, Zhang and others at the University of Washington and
elsewhere. These are leading scholars on El Nino, looking at
the changes in El Nino and trying to decide whether they have
produced the changes of temperature in the 1970's or whether it
goes the reverse.
By and large, changing patterns associated with Enso seem
to have played a major role according to Wallace's papers in
the temperature change observed in the 1970's. This is part of
the autonomous variability of the system.
Dr. Barron. But that begs the question of why El Nino
changed.
Dr. Lindzen. That's all right but you take the view that
all changes occur because something forced them.
Dr. Barron. No, I wasn't. I was just saying there wasn't an
answer to a question there.
Senator Baucus. Dr. Schneider.
Dr. Schneider. First of all, El Nino is a natural phenomena
and has been for a long time, although there have been some
very unusual El Ninos in terms of prolonged ones and some very
intense ones, which has naturally raised the question, ``Gee,
it happened at the same time the climate was changing. Maybe
these are not independent events.''
The answer is we haven't got a clue what the answer is.
This could be another one of those imaginable surprises. It's
simply one of the risks we take when we modify the system. We
do not know if they are connected or disconnected--yet.
However, one thing we do know from El Nino is that social
and economic systems still remain vulnerable to extremes of
climate and weather. We can quantify how those rapid changes
can lead to significant impacts in terms of droughts, floods
and so forth.
That lesson tells us that we're vulnerable to natural
variability. But are we vulnerable to unnatural variability?
The answer is probably yes, but if we had some advanced
warning--that's where the research comes in--and if we knew
exactly what would be happening, we'd be more able to adapt
than otherwise.
The question is how can you reduce the most rapid rates of
change which, I would argue, would be more likely to cause
unpredictable extreme variability than slower rates of change.
Senator Baucus. What's your reaction to Dr. Jorgenson's
comments?
Dr. Schneider. I'm glad you asked but the red light kept
coming on so I kept not having them.
I was going to call your attention to a figure I had in my
written testimony, Figure 3, which Bill Nordhaus prepared. He
was frus-
[[Page 51]]
trated when he was trying to do exactly the same thing many
years ago as a pioneer of this kind of work--to try to balance
in an optimizing framework, the mitigation costs and damages
due to climate.
What you want to reduce first is the cost of abatement,
trying to mitigate CO2 by increasing the price of
energy, which might hurt the economy. He was attacked from all
sides because he picked 1 percent loss of GDP for his climate
damage function.
He was attacked by environmentalists because this value
underestimated, in their opinions, damage to nature and it
neglected health effects. He was attacked by others for the
point about resilience, that his 1 percent GDP damage estimate
neglected CO2 fertilization effects--which could be
benefits.
So he asked a number of people, about 18 or 19 people--I
was one of them--and he conducted a survey and said what do you
believe climate change damages would be? We recognize you can't
calculate it precisely, but you study the fields, so give your
best guesses.
In my testimony Figure 3 shows the two different scenarios
of change, 3 and 6 degrees, and what he found is that the
economists as a group tended to have lower climate damage
estimates but they were not negligible. They would assign a 10
percent chance of a benefit. Their 50th percentile estimate was
about half of a percent loss of GDP and then their 10th
percentile radical number on the high side was several percent
loss of GDP. So again, it's a risk question. They viewed
climate damage across a wide range.
When Nordhaus asked the natural scientists, they gave a
factor of 20 higher in their estimates of climate damages, to
which Bill quipped that, ``those who know the most about the
economy aren't so worried.'' I counter-quipped, ``those who
know the most about nature are.''
Part of the difference is that the natural scientists were
less optimistic about the resilience of nature than the
economists. But you can't know for certain. We're not going to
have the uncertainties resolved in time either. The sword of
uncertainty has two edges and one edge is we might be lucky and
things will come down. The other edge is we might not be so
lucky and it's back to risk management again.
To me, the best way to manage risk is to have flexible
management, because in a state of large uncertainty, you don't
want to make irreversible decisions. You don't want to make
irreversible decisions that damage the economy, nor do you want
to make irreversible decisions that damage the ecology.
My support for Dale Jorgenson's call for a modest tax is
not because I think that over the long term, I want to see only
a small percentage of climate change be mitigated, but I'd like
to get the experiment started of finding out how that tax would
induce technological change, how the prices of alternatives
would come down so there isn't an economic catastrophe from a
big change being needed later on.
If we don't start that process now, we'll be building power
plants which have 40-year life times that will emit a lot.
Senator Baucus. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Senator Sessions.
[[Page 52]]
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's a fascinating subject and I'm not going to ask a lot
of questions. I'm sorry I was unable to be here. I consider
this a most important hearing but I did have markup on a
juvenile justice bill on a committee I chair and it was
important for me.
Dr. Christy, first, I want to welcome you here. I'm
delighted that the chairman could invite you. I've read about
some of your work and have not had the chance to meet you.
I know you are funded by NASA and have done extensive work.
In some respects, it shows that parts of the atmosphere have
actually cooled in the last number of years, is that correct?
Dr. Christy. Yes. We're looking at the troposphere, a
region that should have warmed if climate models are correct in
their projections and that has not been the case to the extent
that the climate models have indicated.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I know Dr. Jorgenson
indicated that the cause is uncertain and there may be even
more need to act, but there are certain things that we can know
with certainty. That is, if we spent more money on emergency
rooms and certain medical treatment programs, we could save
large numbers of lives. So we have to decide what we're going
to expend our resources on as a Nation.
We're talking about a major environmental commitment when
we may have little, if any, benefit from it when we know there
are alternatives that we could expend our resources on that
would preserve benefits.
You see the situation about the Third World. How many lives
would be saved if throughout the Third World there were
electric generating plants as good as the ones in the United
States, polluting somewhat, but how many lives would be saved
if they had cheap electricity as we do in the United States.
That's really all I have to say. I'm interested in this
subject. I consider it important for the Nation and the world
and hope to learn more about it as we go.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, I've associated myself with the efforts of
Senator Byrd and others on this issue. The main reason I've
done so is couched in the question I'll put to all members of
the panel.
Given that the current negotiations are focused on
stabilizing and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from
developed nations only, has the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change determined if there will be any discernible--
that's the word I use, maybe there is a better one--discernible
environmental benefit in terms of the amount of projected
temperature increase or sea level rise as a consequence from
implementing these proposals only on the developed nations?
Dr. Christy or Dr. Schneider, why don't you start off?
Dr. Schneider. I want to make sure I understand the
question. The discernible benefit of?
Senator Warner. If you just apply it to the developed
nations and not the undeveloped, is there any likelihood there
is going to be any benefit?
[[Page 53]]
Dr. Schneider. Yes. I think there would be several benefits
but it would not be an optimal benefit.
Senator Warner. Not a what?
Dr. Schneider. Not an optimal one. It would be much better
to have everybody play. In that sense, I agree with you, but
let me clarify that. I'll try to do it briefly.
If nobody takes a first step, there will never be a step.
Who should take the first step, one would assume that those
people in a more economically favorable position to do so, and
that's been considered in the world forum to be at least the
richer nations.
The second reason is that since the richer nations have
contributed the largest amount of cumulative emissions, that
is, if you look back between now and what's been emitted over
the last century, the bulk of what's out there is due to our
activities.
In the future, that will change, there is no question of
that, but we got the problem started. We had the victorian
industrial revolution which even if powered by dirty power
sources led nonetheless to an improved standard of living and
there are other countries that would like to copy us in doing
that.
They see our attempts to impose higher prices on them as
trying to prevent them from doing what we were freely able to
do and we polluted and now we're asking them not to. I think in
that sense, there is a fairness argument.
However, you're all correct in saying that if we continue
the policy of just having small segments of the world reducing
emissions, that would not have nearly the impact as otherwise,
so what we're trading off is essentially an efficiency versus
equity argument.
If you'll indulge me in a cliche, I agree in this sense
with the Byrd resolution, that everybody has to play for us to
be effective but not necessarily everybody has to pay. We can
argue that within the next couple of decades China will have
larger emissions than the United States, but that will be in
absolute terms, not per capita terms. Therefore, we could, in
the sense of the planetary bargain in the international forum,
argue about what is fair for the distribution of cost.
Certainly you cannot have the developing world as nonplayers
for a long time and then make a difference.
Senator Warner. I think we've got your perspective. Anyone
else?
Dr. Jorgenson. Yes. I'd like to chime in on this. I think
the important thing is to think about the time dimension for
policy. You and your colleagues every year have to consider
taxes, you have to consider the budget, every year.
Senator Warner. We try to do it every other year. You're
speaking to very senior members of the tax panel when you look
at the chairman and ranking member of this committee.
Dr. Jorgenson. Right, but this is something that was
considered in 1992 and ended up with the treaty that was
ratified by the Senate in 1994. We are now 3 years later if
there is a treaty proposed in Kyoto, it will take a while to
ratify. I would say it's something that will extend over a
period of about 5 years.
There will undoubtedly be further climate negotiations.
That's the point. Bringing in the developing countries is going
to have a time dimension to it that will provide opportunities
to take advan-
[[Page 54]]
tage of the benefits of having those countries play. Who pays
remains to be determined by the negotiations.
It's not something that is a matter of great urgency and
it's not a reason that we ought not to take action now. We will
sacrifice some efficiency but that is going to be very, very
modest. What we ought to focus on is setting in course a
process that will bring those countries into the negotiating
arena and get them to be players at the appropriate time.
Senator Warner. Dr. Lindzen.
Dr. Lindzen. Yes. Could I answer it briefly? If you do not
bring in China, no matter what you believe about climate----
Senator Warner. You say if we do not bring China in?
Dr. Lindzen. If you do not bring in China and India, no
matter what you believe about climate, the impact on climate
will be very little.
I guess I hear underneath what you're saying is, the reason
you want to do something is to see how people would respond to
such regulations to get a better idea. That may be an
advantage, but the advantage will not be for climate due to
these actions.
Senator Warner. I thank the chair.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Senator Sessions, do you have any other questions?
Senator Sessions. Again, I'm troubled by the thought you're
willing to sacrifice some efficiency but I've learned in the 6
months or so that I've been here that group after group after
group comes before the U.S. Government and ask, it only cost a
little bit to do this program or this regulation only increases
costs a minimal amount, so incrementally pretty soon you have
hampered this Nation's ability to be competitive in the world.
We already are losing large numbers of jobs around the
world. I think, I for one, want to know that there is
identifiable sound science that indicates to a significant
degree we can improve this global climate before we take
action.
Would anybody like to comment on that and correct me if I'm
wrong in my thoughts?
Dr. Schneider.
Dr. Schneider. I certainly agree with you that we need to
base all judgments on sound science, but we have a definition
problem. Sound science does not necessarily mean certain
science. To me what sound science means is the best judgment of
the state-of-the-art of the community of the range of possible
outcomes.
That is what these reports (e.g., IDCC) try to do and in
that communication, there is always a fair degree of
uncertainty. As I said earlier, that uncertainty includes mild
and catastrophic outcomes as relatively low probability
possibilities and almost everything else in between more
likely.
As we continue to do more research, hopefully we'll be
narrowing those ranges of uncertainties but everybody agrees
they won't narrow that rapidly. Therefore, the question is
whether we fear more investing present resources as you said,
which have many good competitive uses, as a hedge against some
potential risk in the future or whether we fear more the
investment or whether we fear more having those risks unfold.
[[Page 55]]
What Dale Jorgenson was suggesting is a modest policy to
get started is probably a good way to go. I personally share
that view. It is an experiment on how well we can do things and
it is absolutely essential to reevaluate after every assessment
which pops up every 5 years--in my testimony I refer to them as
``rolling reassessments.''
We must continue to reassess, knowledge may change of both
the climate system and its impacts and the economic costs as
new technologies are developed and we need a policy instrument
flexible enough to crank up or down our concern as new
information occurs.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Lindzen.
Dr. Lindzen. I think Steve likes to emphasize the consensus
on certainty and he always likes to point to a survey where I
suggested there was less uncertainty, at least if I had to make
a best guess.
The authors of the study, which Steve never quotes, point
out that the behavior they see for the consensus is a herd
instinct, not a scientific instinct. I think one issue we'll
have to deal with in time, and I think John has been
contributing to that, is we've had for over 20 years the
estimates being based on models and the assumption that one of
them must be right. It hasn't changed in 20 years.
As Steve said, what has changed is they put in different
forcing by assuming that. That is a horrendous state that we
haven't focused in 20 years on pinning down this answer better.
I think some efforts are beginning to go toward that.
I think if you listen carefully to what you've heard here,
you'll find that John finds it's not warming. The models say it
should be warming throughout the atmosphere. Steve says let's
look at the surface.
If you wanted to focus, you'd say if there is a discrepancy
between the air and the surface, the surface then is not
greenhouse. You'd begin to focus on the problem, pin down the
science and get a firmer answer. I think we have to be worried
about a science that isn't doing that for 20 years.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Barron.
Dr. Barron. I was just going to say if you believe you
should control emissions, I think the developed countries have
to go first or else you're not going to get any of the other
countries to follow.
I also agree if you don't get China and India involved in
there eventually, the impact is going to be minimal.
Senator Chafee. When you say the impact will be minimal?
Dr. Barron. The impact on mitigating the projected climate
change.
Senator Chafee. The impact to the other nations.
Dr. Barron. Yes. I asked a class of 200 students every
semester to take all the numbers from emissions from different
countries and the United States and come up with a strategy
that would reduce them. It's practically impossible.
Tell you the truth, I personally, even though I also agree
this might get us some efficiencies and learn how to do things,
I personally don't think we're going to be successful until
there are emergencies.
[[Page 56]]
I suspect that the strategies we should involve ourselves
in are ones that are adaptation oriented. I think the focus we
have to take is to balance the economic issues that people are
talking about against the vulnerabilities to all these changes
and include natural variability. If you're vulnerable to
natural variability, then I think it suggests you have to make
an investment in these directions.
Dr. Jorgenson. Could I underline my agreement with what Dr.
Barron just said? The real issue in this area, Senator, is
adaptation. That's the most important, single issue we need to
focus on.
What we've been focusing on here to a good extent is the
need for mitigation. I've stated I think there is a need for
mitigation, but if you ask where the dollars are, where can we
do the most good, there's no doubt adaptation is far more
important and mitigation is something that has to take second
role.
Dr. Schneider. May I briefly add to that. There's an area
where mitigation and adaptation become almost the same thing.
For example, suppose it turned out that the damages were at
the more serious end--I would give that a coin flip, I don't
know in advance whether it's going to come out on the less or
more serious end--suppose we get a dramatic event or several
events in the weather that mobilized public opinion rightly or
wrongly, demanding urgent action and like the OPEC embargo, and
the damages to the economy were done because of the sharpness
of the price rise, not because of the price rise itself. Long-
term benefits came from the price rise but there was
significant damage from the sharpness. To return to my point,
if sudden events came along and the politics changed and there
was action with dramatic reversal of the nature of the energy
system (e.g., from coal to solar or nuclear), I think that
would be vastly more costly than if it were to take place
slowly.
So one potential form of adaptation is an R&D policy.
Whether that's direct subsidies or taxes or cap and trade or
other factors as I discuss in the appendix to my written
testimony and others can address, but if we could invest now in
making those future alternatives both possible and cheaper,
then you avoid the potential risk to the economy should that 50
percent eventuality come out that people want to really control
the climate problem more so in the future and you wouldn't be
hurt as badly.
In a sense, it is also adaptation to do that development of
the alternatives that allow you to mitigate at a lower cost in
the future.
Senator Sessions. I would just say it seems to me from what
I've heard, and I'll be studying this with my staff and reading
the transcript, but it seems to me what you're saying is it's
uncertain that we have global warming. No. 2, it's pretty
certain that if we act unilaterally, it's not going to have any
impact on the environment.
I'm worried about working Americans who would bear the cost
of a policy that wouldn't be effective if it were implemented.
I guess that's my troublesome position.
Senator Chafee. Dr. Lindzen, if I understand what you're
saying, it seems to me that your point is it doesn't make any
difference what we do.
Dr. Lindzen. It depends on what you mean not making a
difference. I'm saying if you believe models that say we're
going to get four degrees warming by 2100, which is well in
excess of what the
[[Page 57]]
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is saying, then if
you were to reduce emissions to 20 percent below 1990 levels,
which as everyone seems to agree, we can't do, you would end up
maybe with three degrees instead of four degrees.
I'm saying if you expect two degrees in 2100, we're not
sure, then the proposed policy which is again, this exceedingly
difficult policy, might bring it down to 1.6. At that point,
you're already at the level of natural variability.
However you view natural variability, we've shown we can
adapt to it, so I'm saying yes, no policy discussed and no
argument made so far would, if you believed in global warming,
stop it.
Obviously, if you think that global warming is not
occurring, it also has impact, but I make the point in my
testimony if our successors 50 years from now find there has
been very little warming, and we do introduce stabilization,
the one thing we can be sure of 50 years from now is if there
wasn't warming, it was not due to the stabilization. It was due
to our overestimate of the sensitivity.
Dr. Jorgenson. But there is a very important point I think
needs to be added and that is, among the different alternatives
that Professor Lindzen just rehearsed, the economic costs
differ enormously. The economic costs of reducing emissions to
something like 20 percent below 1990 levels are astronomical by
comparison with the benefits.
Therefore, what we need to do is focus on something that is
far more modest. That, I think, is what you should take away
from this, that if we take the uncertainties that are involved
and balance the cost against the benefits, we need to take a
modest step, not a dramatic step.
Senator Chafee. It seems to me that we don't know. There is
a lot we don't know about all this. However, there does seem to
be some global warming taking place. If that is so--I think it
is so--then we ought to do what we can about it.
Your point is there are some modest steps we can take that
aren't going to wrench around the economy and devastate it but
that would have some effects. I take it, Dr. Lindzen would say
those steps you're suggesting don't amount to much. Is that
unfair?
Dr. Lindzen. No, that's unfair. I'm saying more than that.
I'm saying what Dale is proposing, take the scenario you expect
four degrees, that would knock it down to 3.95. We couldn't
measure that impact, we couldn't even tell that it had an
impact. So you're engaging in a policy where no one can assess
whether you did anything.
Dr. Jorgenson. I beg to differ. If you look at Figure 5.4
in my testimony, the effect on global mean temperature in the
year 2105, which is the end of this graph, it's a good bit more
than that under the policy I would propose. It eliminates about
10 percent of the warming that would otherwise take place.
Ten percent is not a dramatic number. It's not 100 percent.
That is Professor Lindzen's point and I agree with him, but I
think you shouldn't underestimate the changes that would be
required and that can be justified on economic grounds.
I would say we need to focus on adaptation but there are
steps to mitigate the effects of climate change that could have
the effect of reducing some of the global warming. They are
not, as Professor
[[Page 58]]
Lindzen wants to emphasize, steps that will end global warming.
We are going to have some global warming if these figures are
correct.
Dr. Lindzen. Could I ask for one change in vocabulary?
We're using warming in two senses. We're using it in the
passive sense of change of temperature and we're also using it
in the active sense of man having done something to warm the
atmosphere.
So far there's data that suggests there's been very modest,
passive warming of the climate system over the last century. As
the IPCC made very clear, we're having almost no luck in being
able to attribute anything of this to man's activities.
I think if we could be careful in the use of the word
warming to distinguish the two rather than mixing them.
Senator Chafee. Wait a minute. That's quite a statement
you're making. If I understand what you're saying, it's yes,
indeed, the globe has warmed up, temperatures are higher but
it's due to passive activities.
Dr. Lindzen. No, no. I'm saying it's a matter of the
English language. We used the word ``warm'' to mean change of
temperature and we also use it as an active verb meaning we
have caused something.
I'm saying the passive part is the temperature has changed
a little bit. It really has been a little bit. Half a degree
centigrade is what the temperature change is while you wait for
the street light to change.
On the other hand, the IPCC has been very clear that they
have been unable to tell what fraction of that very small
temperature change has been due to man's activities. So we've
been unable to pin down what we're doing to it.
Dr. Christy. I'd like to add something there. I was on that
panel that looked carefully at the temperature record of the
past and we included a statement in the IPCC that this century
was the warmest of the past six. That's not a very remarkable
statement when you think about it, but you looked at the data
that we did have available to us but we're not quite as sure
about, centuries in the past were warmer than the present
century.
You go from one century to the next and there are large
changes. The 21st Century will be different than this current
one. It's definitely the case that the 19th Century was
unusually cool. Bouncing back from that, as Dr. Lindzen said,
is part of the natural variability which is why in my comment
earlier, I made the statement that most of what we've seen is
due to natural variability.
Dr. Barron. You just don't know whether we're bouncing back
from anything.
Dr. Schneider. How do you know we're bouncing back? How do
you know it wasn't stopped by the increase of emissions from
initial deforestation and industrialization? You're
presupposing you know the climate is random. We don't know
that. That's what we're interested in figuring out.
Dr. Christy. We're looking at temperatures that were warmer
in past centuries than today.
Dr. Barron. But how do you know that it wouldn't have
continued?
[[Page 59]]
Senator Chafee. What does he know what wouldn't have
continued?
Dr. Schneider. That the recovery is in fact a recovery.
Maybe it's induced. We don't know that. That's one of the
difficult issues where it might be partly related to some
changes in the energy output of the sun. There are a number of
aspects we can debate. That's what we're trying to figure out,
the relative amounts, but you can't presuppose that the recent
variations in the system are all natural.
Once we know that humans started changing the land surface
and started changing the atmosphere, which we began to do
significantly in the 18th Century, so we cannot actually rule
that potential influence out yet. That's part of the debate.
Dr. Barron. The objection occurs when he says the world is
bouncing back from an unusually cold period. It's just as
possible, because of the way natural variability works, that it
was in the midst of bouncing to an even colder century and
therefore we have an even bigger problem than we're thinking.
By saying that, he's presupposing he knows the mechanisms
and the way natural variability works.
Dr. Christy. I would say most of that occurred before these
events you're talking about affected the climate.
Dr. Schneider. I'm not saying humans created a little Ice
Age. What I'm arguing is that it's often said this is just the
recovery from that. Well, it's the recovery but that doesn't
mean that there wasn't a human component of that recovery and
that's what we're trying to figure out.
Dr. Christy. There's a variance about that and that's what
we said here earlier.
Dr. Schneider. The word modest has been the word of the day
and it's a very good word and it's one to which I subscribe.
I'd like us to have some modesty also as I said earlier, and
let me reinforce it, about let's not underestimate what the
technological capacity and the inventive genius our society is.
If engineers and the companies of the world, with I think
some government involvement as well--and that balance is for
you to decide--made it a determined plan to find alternative
technologies that could produce the service--we're not
interested in whether it's carbon dioxide, we're interested in
energy, the service that counts--we can abate carbon cost
effectively.
If we could produce the service by alternative means at
lower prices, then some combination of economic and ecological
environmental wisdom would move us in that direction, but those
technologies don't invent themselves.
Therefore, what we're talking about is what are the modest
policies that can help us as an insurance policy to develop
those technologies so we have that standby capacity should the
future lead us to, by bad luck, more serious outcomes.
Let me recall Dale's presentation--with Dick and Dale
arguing about how many tenths of a degree would be saved by
various optimized policies. Tim Roughgarden, an undergraduate
student who is in our senior honors program at Stanford, took a
look at the Nordhaus climate energy-economy model and instead
of using the damage function that Bill did--the 1 percent loss
of GDP--we used
[[Page 60]]
five published damage functions from other economists,
ecologists and others and he found there is about a factor of
10 difference in their estimate of climate damages.
The amount of carbon tax varies by a factor of five in the
optimum calculations just depending upon which one of those
damage functions you used. We don't know the answer to which is
correct yet and there may even be others.
Therefore, the amount of climate change policy response
needed substantially varies depending upon what you assume
about climate damage. I hope our modesty extends to also
understanding that optimal tax calculations have a very wide
range of uncertainty and there are many estimates that are much
larger than those used in Bill Nordhaus' study for which there
is a substantial scientific justification, although you can
also justify the more modest kind. Therefore, flexible
instruments seem to be the most important message of the day.
Senator Chafee. In that quote you had from that certain
Senator Chafee, I think it was 10 years ago?
Dr. Schneider. Nine.
Senator Chafee. As I recall, it was about doing something.
We don't know what's happening, but we'd better plan. Don't
take the rosiest view, take a different view because it might
occur. Could you read that quote?
Dr. Schneider. Sure. I'd be delighted to.
If there is one point I could make, Mr. Chairman, it is
this. There are a great many questions about the greenhouse
effect that can't be answered today, but I don't think we ought
to let scientific uncertainty paralyze us from doing anything.
It is always convenient to find an excuse not to do something
and there is always an excuse out there not to do something. I
think the issue before is what steps should we be taking today
to help solve the problem in addition to doing more scientific
research.
That was your quote from the Senate Energy Committee
testimony in 1988.
Senator Chafee. I approve of that quote.
Do you have anything else, Senator?
Senator Sessions. I would like to ask one question. Are you
satisfied as a Nation and the world, have we properly focused
on establishing the best science that we can to answer where we
are and do we need to do anything to improve our scientific
gathering of evidence?
Dr. Jorgenson. Senator, you came in, as you said, after
some of the presentations, but a number of people quoted a
Washington Post piece by Robert Samuelson that appeared
yesterday and that is also in the current issue of Newsweek in
which he presented his view of the economics of the problem.
I think great advances in the economic understanding are
called for. He was talking about measures that would involve a
$100 tax on carbon as opposed to the kind of measures that I've
been talking about which are $10, a totally different order of
magnitude.
Although I think a great deal of progress has been made in
the science, I think there is a great deal of need for better
economic understanding.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Christy, is anyone asking you from
the Environmental Protection Agency?
Dr. Christy. Give me more satellites and data.
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Senator Sessions. And you think you could determine whether
or not this is happening?
Dr. Christy. The upper atmosphere or the tropics, that's an
area where we have little understanding. Climate models are
clearly in error in that region. Balloon networks are falling
apart around the world. This is an international problem when
you're talking about surface observations.
Data is becoming very hard to get from other countries and
that hurts us in trying to understand how the system varies. So
if those barriers can be reduced and a systematic measuring
system carried forward, that would be my goal.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Lindzen.
Dr. Lindzen. Yes. I have a slightly oddball suggestion, but
I think if you want to solve problems with science, you need a
stable funding base for science so that scientists do not feel
that if a problem gets solved, there goes their funding.
Senator Sessions. Time and again, we do have groups come in
from various independent agencies and you wonder if they all
got together under good leadership and hammered out these
differences, could we reach a consensus.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing. I
congratulate you on your leadership on this issue over the
years.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Let me ask one final question if I might. The question is,
do you believe we know enough about the prospect of climate
change to embark upon a program to address it, some program?
I'm not saying x billion but some program in order to address
it?
Dr. Barron. I personally think a combination of what we
know about the potential for human-induced changed and what we
know about natural variability suggests to me there is a lot of
practical, maybe what you'd call win-win things that you can
and should do, so I do think you need to embark on something.
Basically, I look at this as say the issue is health and
you see the health is tied to both natural variability and
potential for climate change, it suggests that surveillance
efforts on some of these viruses, on the distribution of
vectors, the mosquitoes, an ability to have advanced warning
systems, and public awareness are all things that become
logical for which you can substantially reduce what the risk is
and it helps you adapt.
The same thing occurs in water resources. If you're sitting
there and you're in a state and you're living on the edge of
your resources, and in the case of natural variability, you go
through tremendous hiccups, problems or issues in terms of the
availability of the resource just by natural climate
variability, I think it makes sense to have some call to action
there.
In a lot of cases, it's win-win in the sense of the
benefits you'd get in not having the natural variability affect
you to such great degree, but we also discover that, for
instance, industry collocates with water availability.
Right now, in every single State in this Nation, they use,
withdraw from streams about 25 percent of the available
resource and there's a big difference in the availability of
resources across this Nation. That means the industry is
sitting there locating next to rivers and the same thing occurs
for recreation.
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So if you're at risk, just a natural variability and you
see this risk extends also to climate change. I think there is
a good reason to something now, but these are protection
against adaptation and the expectation that in doing something
now, you've saved yourself money.
Senator Chafee. Dr. Lindzen.
Dr. Lindzen. I think what Eric has said is hard to disagree
with. Fundamentally, one is saying no, we don't know--we know
enough right now to know there is no action we will take that
will change what will happen vis-a-vis climate, but there are
actions we can take to make our society more robust.
As has been said in the past, if you can think of things
that are worth doing anyway, my argument has been to justify
them on what they will do anyway. I think the difficulty here
is there may be things that can make the society more robust to
climate change. There is very little we can do to affect
whether there will be climate change or not.
Senator Chafee. Dr. Schneider.
Dr. Schneider. You called on us to make a conclusion, which
as you know, is a value judgment, namely do we fear more
investing present resources against something which might
happen or do we fear more letting it happen without trying to
slow it down.
Then you said how much information does it take for us to
make such a judgment. That's exactly the same question of how
much information does it take to decide how much insurance to
buy or how much national security to buy through military
investment. This is exactly that same kind of problem.
I'm a risk averse person. I have earthquake insurance. A
lot of my colleagues don't, living in California and the
question is, how much of it do we want to purchase.
Frankly we've been talking about what we've been saying
over the last 20 years. I thought we had enough scientific
information 20 years ago to do the kinds of policies Eric
Barron talked about, namely make ourselves less vulnerable to
the natural kind of variability. Dick Lindzen says, ``Well, do
that but don't say it's climate.''
I would disagree with Dick in this sense. I would say, ``Do
a little bit more as the insurance premium to deal with climate
change.'' I'm willing to make that investment personally and
try to convince people out in society they should make that
small investment in that insurance premium at the scale of our
planet to reduce the likelihood of the negative outcomes. If we
can make those investments in something that makes sense anyway
such as developing alternative energy systems that have less
air pollution, that can be cheaper in the future and be more
reliable, so much the better.
Dr. Jorgenson. Senator Chafee, I'd just like to sum up my
remarks. As you suggested, I've already laid out my proposals
but let me be explicit about it.
One thing we could do right away that would have a major
impact and is a ``win-win'' situation is to eliminate $14
billion in energy subsidies through the Tax Code and through
our expenditure programs that distort energy markets in the
direction of using too much energy.
Second, in terms of the Kyoto Summit, here is where we come
to Senator Sessions' very well taken point. We have an
opportunity
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to act in a way that is not unilateral. That's the point. It
doesn't make any sense to think about what I'm about to say on
a unilateral basis, but at Kyoto we have the opportunity to
bring about some kind of international agreement.
That would involve the kind of ideal agreement about a $5
tax beginning immediately on carbon. That's a very modest step
but it's one I would add to the $14 billion in subsidy removal.
Senator Sessions. How would that translate on a gallon of
gas?
Dr. Jorgenson. That translates to about 5 cents on the
gallon.
Let's focus on what we should recommend to China by our
diplomatic efforts and by efforts at the Kyoto Summit. We
should urge China to do what, in the last 10 years, almost
every developing and formerly socialist country has done, which
is to move energy prices to world levels.
That would have a tremendous benefit to China, it's a win-
win for them; and to the world economy. It's a win-win for the
rest of us as well.
I think there are concrete steps we can take and that would
be my list of three.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Do you list in here where that $14 billion comes from? Is
that in your testimony?
Dr. Jorgenson. That is not in my testimony, I'm sorry to
say. That is a study that was done by the Department of Energy
and I'd be happy to provide a reference and I'll send it to
you.
Senator Chafee. Could you? That would be helpful. Thank
you.
Dr. Christy.
Dr. Christy. To answer your question, it's a fairly vague
question so I think I could vaguely say yes, if you include the
conservation efficiencies and improved technologies and so on,
that kind of program would be worthwhile.
I agree pretty much with the generalities that have been
stated thus far.
I would say I use less energy today than I did before
because I have a daughter in college and that requires me to
not be able to spend as much on doing things and buying stuff.
So that's my level of conservation at the moment. I think it
will improve.
Senator Chafee. We thank you all very much for coming.
[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at the call of the chair.]
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Prepared Statement of Eric J. Barron, Earth System Science Center, The
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
The prospect of future human-induced climate change represents
perhaps one of the most challenging science and society questions of
the century. There is no doubt that humans are altering the
environment--both in terms of the land surface and the composition of
the atmosphere. In particular, greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxides) in the atmosphere have increased substantially
in concentration over the last several decades.
The best scientific assessments available suggests that the impacts
of these changes will be significant, yet the error bars, or
uncertainties, are also very large. The real question is how should
society respond when the best available science suggests that human
activity may substantially alter climate, but at the same time the
scientists are seriously debating the magnitude, timing and
distribution of the climate changes. Answers to this question depend on
two basic sources of information, climate observations and model
predictions.
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Figure 1b. Temperature trends for the United States. Solid circles
represent increases in temperature and open circles, decreases. The
size of the circle indicates the magnitude of the increase or decrease.
Karl's analysis also indicates (figure 2) that there has been an
increase in the amount of precipitation from extreme precipitation
events (daily events at or above 2 inches of rainfall).
Figure 2. Percent area of the USA with a much above normal proportion
of total annual precipitation from extreme precipitation events [daily
events at or above 2 inches (50.8mm)]
Combined land and ocean surface temperatures (figure 3) provide the
basis for examining global trends in temperature, and are the basis for
speculation on the importance of anthropogenic greenhouse gas increases
as an explanation of the warming. These analyses indicate that global-
mean surface temperatures have increased by .4 to .60 deg.C during the
20 Century.
[[Page 66]]
Figure 3.
However, our observations of climate change from instrumented
records are very short, and they rely on systems designed for weather
prediction--not one designed for taking the temperature or pulse of the
earth. We lack continuity of satellite observations, surface
instruments are subject to change and the level of accuracy is based on
weather safety and forecasting needs and not global temperature
analysis. Geologic records from ice cores, tree rings, corals and other
sources of data suggest that the Earth's climate is naturally highly
variable. The record of snowfalls on Greenland (figure 4) illustrate
this variation during the last 18,000 years. Changes in snow
accumulation rate are often abrupt, suggesting remarkably large climate
changes over periods of decades.
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Figure 4. Greenland snow accumulation rates
Tree ring data are equally intriguing. For example, Jacoby et al.
(1996; Science) report on Mongolian tree rings which indicate much
wider tree ring widths for the recent century--a phenomena associated
with warmer annual temperatures. The 20th century warming appears to be
unique over the last 450 years (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Ring widths for the last 450 years from Mongolia
illustrating a unique 20th century record indicative of warming.
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The recent record appears to be unique, but the simple fact is that
modern humans haven't experienced the range of variations which occur
naturally, nor do we have a real sense of their character or spatial
distribution. The record describes change, but without clear
attribution as to the causes. Significant natural variability should be
expected during the coming decades.
results from model predictions
The results from model predictions also have limitations. In large
measure, scientists agree when the topic is global and the predicted
changes are given as a range (e.g., a doubling of CO2 will
yield 1 to 4.5 deg.C globally averaged temperature warming), but we
have greater and greater uncertainty when we look at specific regions,
specific decades or specific phenomena, such as changes in hurricane
intensity or numbers. Yet it is at these scales that human systems
intersect and interact with climate.
The reprint that follows is a summary of predictions from climate
models with a ``ranking'' of the uncertainty associated with the
predictions. The rankings are based not on some specific criteria, but
rather the considered opinions of a large group of climate experts who
have sought to place model predictions in an ordered context which
would readily be understood by the educated United States citizen.
Within the text are two figures which illustrate results from
comprehensive climate models. Figure 1 in the reprint illustrates the
range in predicted changes in global-mean surface temperature, in
degrees Celsius, for the next 80 years based on results from seven
different General Circulation Models (the most comprehensive climate
models to date) with carbon dioxide increases included at the rate of 1
percent per year (IPCC 1995 assessment). All seven models suggest an
additional 1 degree global-mean increase in temperature by the year
2050. Figure 2 in the attached reprint gives the predicted geographic
distribution of an increase in mean-annual surface temperature that
would result from a doubling of carbon dioxide based on the GCM
simulation of Manabe and Stouffer (1994; Journal of Climate). Increases
for the United States range from 3 to more than 5 deg.C. The predicted
changes are substantial given that the 1988 heat wave and drought in
the Ohio River Basin was on average less than 1 deg.C above normal.
Climate model experiments designed to predict past climates, which
are very different from today also yield valuable insights. During the
last decade, hundreds of GCM simulations have been completed by a wide
variety of models in an attempt to predict climates both substantially
warmer and substantially cooler than at present. In no case did a GCM
overpredict the warming or the cooling in the geologic record. This
suggests that the GCMs may have a sensitivity to factors such as carbon
dioxide which is less than that required to explain past climates.
Other factors may also be important (e.g., identification of all the
factors which may have influenced past climates and difficulty in
extracting correct climate information from fossils), but the fact that
the models always have underpredicted the changes in the past may be
telling. It is also interesting to note that the major warm episodes
during the past are also associated with geochemical evidence for
higher atmospheric carbon dioxide levels.
The reprint which follows details the strengths and weaknesses of
current modeling programs nationally and internationally. It also notes
that progress on both observational and modeling fronts over the last
decade have been clear, but it is a mistake to promise quick answers.
Solution of many of the remaining issues will undoubtably take decades.
I suspect that for many years to come, newspapers will continue to
explain topics like global warming by quoting scientists who are poles
apart on specific points. Yet in the midst of the public confusion that
this approach promotes, we can't ignore the fact that even within the
range of climate model predictions, the consequences have significance
for our economic vitality and national security.
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evaluating policy decisions based on climate model predictions
Policy decisions about climate change are particularly challenging
given that (1) the results from comprehensive climate models suggest
significant changes over the coming decades, but the uncertainties are
also large--particularly when examining the aspects of climate model
predictions which are most significant for human activities and (2) the
increased surface temperatures and changes in precipitation patterns
recorded from surface instruments may be a result of human-induced
climate change, but may also be a product of natural climate
variations. Two types of actions address this conundrum.
(1) We must ensure that we have a healthy observing system and
modeling effort in this nation. Obtaining useful climate records is a
secondary priority of our current observing systems which has been
designed for weather safety and prediction. Relatively modest increases
in funding could address this issue. Programs designed to provide
continuity of satellite observations (e.g., NASA Earth Observing
System) are subject to annual review and budget reductions, increasing
the risk that continuity of critical measurements will be lost.
Interestingly, European countries and Japan are promoting strong space-
based observation programs as they recognize the value of these data
sets for decision-making and scientific advancement.
The U.S. climate modeling community has expressed strong concerns
about the effectiveness of our efforts in climate modeling, with
particular emphasis on the fact that IPCC assessments are increasingly
being based on long-term simulations completed by other nations.
Interestingly, countries like Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany are
promoting strong observation and modeling programs with less robust
economies than the U.S. The simple fact is that advanced knowledge has
economic and societal value.
There is also considerable prospect for advances in knowledge, and
at scales which allow us to examine more closely the potential impact
of climate change on societies. For example, recent techniques have
been applied to produce high resolution climate simulations by
embedding or nesting high resolution, limited area climate models
within global models. Global models provide the coarse spatial
resolution predictions of the large-scale atmospheric circulation,
while the high resolution model allows the incorporation of more
realistic elevations and model physics. Figure 3 in the reprint
illustrates the improvement in the prediction of precipitation for the
United States comparing (a) observations for spring 1980, (b) a GCM
prediction for spring 1980 showing a relatively poor simulation of this
important variable, and (c) the results for the same period from a high
resolution model embedded within the same GCM shown in figure 3b. The
improvement is dramatic, giving confidence that higher resolution
models may provide more useful predictions. Figure 6 illustrates the
results from this technique for a doubled concentration of carbon
dioxide. The results suggest substantial differences in precipitation
(figure 7). Winter precipitation is predicted to increase in the
Northwest and Northeast with modest increases across the northern
states. California and Arizona show significant decreases in winter
precipitation. In summer, the model simulation suggests the largest
increases in precipitation occur from Louisiana-Mississippi-Alabama
across the across the central U.S. to South Dakota. Again, California
has significant decreases. Such results must be viewed with caution--
they are a preliminary analysis using a new, and not thoroughly tested
technique to achieve high resolution predictions for specific regions.
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(2) We need to develop and apply a litmus test to action
which is practical and most likely to achieve positive results.
Risk and vulnerability to natural variability and climate
change must be a key aspect of this test. For example, if a
region is already historically and economically vulnerable to
droughts or floods, and predictions of fixture climate change
also exhibit such tendencies, or even enhanced tendencies, then
this should be a call to action. Water and water resources
provide a key example of potential vulnerabilities. Two figures
follow which describe vulnerability associated with water
availability and water quality. Figure 8 illustrates regions
with water demand problems in 1980. Each dot or shaded area
indicates a problem where water demand approached or exceeded
supply during the period of analysis. This suggests a
vulnerability to natural variability and to climate change (see
figure 1 and 7, for comparisons). Figure 9 illustrates water
withdrawals by industry. Note that the industrial withdrawal of
water is basically a percentage of the available resource (near
25 percent). This suggests that water is a critical resource to
industry and that industry is co-located with water, using far
more in regions where water is abundant. Many regions are
susceptible to water quality problems as a result of climate
variability or change. Interestingly, decreased river flow, or
increased extreme events with decreased median rainfall events,
has the potential to dramatically change the dilution power of
rivers for pollutants. Water quality may be an unheralded
global change issue.
Economic and societal risk should also be a key aspect of
decision-making. For example, the emergence or re-emergence of
infectious diseases, which are closely related to climate, have
become an issue of growing concern in the health community.
Human health issues have potential for tremendous costs
associated with human life. Human health risks are governed by
a large number of factors, ranging from socio-economic status,
to the availability of clean water and nutrition, to the
quality of the health care infrastructure--factors which
generally serve to limit U.S. risks. However, over the last
decade, climate and climate change have become recognized as
one of the significant factors influencing health risk within
the U.S. Climate change and variability can effect health
directly, through extreme thermal events like heat waves and
cold episodes, and through severe weather such as hurricanes
and tornadoes. Climate change can also influence human health
indirectly. The majority of the indirect influences involve (1)
changes in the range and activity of vectors and infective
agents, (2) changes in water and food-borne infective agents,
and (3) altered food (especially crop) productivity. A number
of examples of human health vulnerability in the United States
serves to illustrate the nature of this problem.
The increases in average temperatures associated with
global warming or with extremes in natural climate variability
will probably be accompanied by an increase in the number of
heat waves. The deaths of 726 people in Chicago during the
summer of 1995 heat wave is an example of the potential direct
impact of thermal extremes. Mid-latitude cities, already
characterized by large urban heat island effects, appear to be
the most susceptible to heat waves. The heat-related mortality
that has occurred in cities such as Chicago, St. Louis,
Washington D.C., and New York City disproportionally affect the
young, elderly, the economically disadvantaged, and the ill.
Phenomena, such as El Nino, are associated with changes in
rainfall, producing flooding and droughts in different regions.
Based on climate model predictions, climatologists have
speculated about whether anthropogenic warming will produce
increased intensity or an increased number of severe hurricanes
along the east coast of the U.S. Severe weather has well-known
potential to increase the number of deaths and injuries.
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Vector-borne diseases are a major cause of illness and
death across the world. These disease vectors (e.g., mosquitoes
and rodents) are strongly influenced by climate. For example,
Dengue fever is transmitted by the bite of a mosquito (Aedes
aegypti and Aedes albopictus). Both mosquitoes are currently
present in Florida and Texas (an outbreak of Dengue occurred in
south Texas in 1986) but U.S. cases are uncommon, most probably
because of high standards of housing, adequate water, sewer and
waste management systems. However, the mosquitoes that transmit
Dengue are strongly controlled by winter temperatures. Warming,
particularly in terms of minimum winter temperatures could
substantially increase the range of this Dengue vector,
including regions north of the mid-Atlantic states. Figures 10
and 11 show regions of potential outbreak, and the association
of the Dengue vector with warm winter temperatures. Malaria,
caused by the protozoan parasites of the genus Plasmodium and
transmitted by Anopheles mosquitoes, would also substantially
extend its range and activity under conditions of global
warming.
Wet-Dry cycles also influence human health risks because of
its influence on predator-prey relationships. Historically,
moving into a wet period following a few years of severe
drought, provides advantages to rodent populations which can
reproduce faster that their predators (e.g., owls, etc).
Population explosions of rodents eventually leads to invasions
into human habitats and human food stocks, increasing the risk
of disease. This is the primary explanation for the outbreak of
the deadly Hanta virus in the Four-Corners region of the U.S.
(figure 12).
Lyme disease, which is caused by a bacterium, has a strong
climatic association as well. Lyme disease is transmitted by
the bite of a tick (Ixodes scapularis) which feeds on the
white-footed mouse, the white-tailed deer and other mammals.
The number of Lyme disease cases is strongly correlated with
the size of the deer population, and in turn, the size of the
deer population is correlated with the severity of winter
conditions in the northeastern U.S. (figure 13).
The U.S. is less susceptible to problems of malnutrition
and crop productivity compared to much of the world because of
the breadth of food production and our capability for
technological adaptations. None-the-less, climate change and
variability may result in the need to change crops and planting
practices, and may also influence the activity or emergence of
crop diseases.
Health risks associated with climate change and variability
have implications for policy. Such policy should involve (1)
surveillance efforts, (2) increased research on changes in
range and activity of vectors associated with climate change,
(3) disease prevention programs, (4) education for medical and
public health communities, and (5) public outreach.
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summary
Two examples are given where action makes sense because of the
level of risk and the level of our vulnerability to natural variability
as well as the potential for future climate change. In the face of
uncertainties associated with the observed record and model
predictions, we must adopt practical strategies for dealing with the
potential impact of climate variability and change. These strategies
should be based on two elements: (1) a strong observation and modeling
research program within the U.S. designed to enhance economic vitality
and national security, and (2) a litmus test for decision makers based
on the level of risk and vulnerability to natural variability as well
as future climate change. These two elements provide the most logical
basis for policy decisions.
______
Responses by Dr. Eric Barron to Additional Questions from Senator
Baucus
Question 1. During the hearing, you stated that our strategies to
address increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases should be
adaptive in nature. In your opinion, what would be the most important
adaptation strategies to pursue.
Response. Decisions concerning adaptation strategies should be
based on assessments of risk and vulnerability that involve natural
variability in climate as well as the prospect of future climate
change. If society already exhibits vulnerability to natural
variability, and the prospect of climate change due to increases in
greenhouse gases may exacerbate that vulnerability, then the argument
for adaptive strategies becomes stronger. In my opinion, the strongest
arguments to pursue adaptive strategies because of climate and climate
change are for water resource availability and water quality, severe
weather hazards, and human health. The types of strategies to pursue
for these three areas are illustrated by examples. First, we already
have considerable problems with water resource availability associated
with climate variability. Water quality also frequently depends on the
dilution power of rivers and streams, and thus is dependent on water
availability. The adaptive strategies for this problem are varied and
range from protection of groundwater resources (e.g., controls on
growth and development in local recharge regions), assessment of water
use and priorities under different climate and climate variability
scenarios, planned changes in storage facilities where demand already
frequently exceeds supply, and efforts to promote greater water use
efficiencies. Second, increases in severe weather, as a product of
natural variability or human induced changes, would have a major impact
on property and human life, and has the potential to dramatically
change the insurance and re-insurance industry with an impact on
economic growth (based on the number of billion dollar natural
disasters during the last decade). This implies that we limit
rebuilding, for example in disaster-prone coastal regions, or
individuals should assume the risk. Third, the emergence and re-
emergence of infectious diseases and the heat-elated mortality of the
last decade are also suggestive of considerable vulnerability to
climate and climate vulnerability. In this case, the adaptive
strategies should involve such actions as disease surveillance, public
education, and maintenance of health care and research facilities. Each
of the above strategies has the potential to have positive impact on
society regardless of whether human-induced global change becomes a
major factor in the future.
Question 2. Dr. Schneider stated in his testimony that it was
difficult for plants and animals to adapt to a temperature increase of
5 deg.C over the 10,000 year period following the last Ice Age and that
many species would likely go extinct with a kind of rap id temperature
increase projected for the next century. Assuming, for the purpose of
this question, that the Earth experiences a temperature increase of
greater that 1.5 deg.C over the coming 100 years, what is the
likelihood that species will successfully adapt? If in your opinion,
this represents a threat to preserving biological diversity, to your
knowledge has there ever been a period in the paleoclimate record where
climate change has resulted in significant loss of species?
Response. Largely because of changes in the land surface due to
human activities we have already experienced, and will continue to
experience, major changes in biological diversity. I suspect that this
factor will continue to play the largest role in modifying biological
diversity, while a climate change of 1.5 deg.C would be a secondary
factor. However, there are two issues to consider. First, a 1.5 deg.C
temperature change is in the global average. Some areas, notably higher
latitudes and the continental interior regions of the mid-latitude
continents, are likely to experience substantially greater temperature
and water balance changes. Therefore, the vulnerabilities of species
may be very different from region to region. Second, human land use may
present a major issue in the migration and adaptation of different
species to climate
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change--in other words farms, cities and other human habitations may
present considerable barriers to migration. Adaptation may then also
depend on human actions and assistance. Given the importance of human
land use in biological diversity, I suspect it would be very difficult
to estimate how well species will adapt to climate change. There have
been numerous abrupt changes in biological diversity during earth
history, with multi-million year times for recovery of biological
diversity and the development of numerous new species. The causes of
such extinctions are a matter of considerable debate, but often climate
change is included as one of theories offered to explain these events.
Question 3. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to a natural
mechanism that would be employed by the Earth to counteract the
predicted climatic changes due to the effect of increased water vapor
in the atmosphere. Are you aware of any historic reference or specific
research that would support a theory of the existence of such a
mechanism?
Response. Dr. Lindzen's argument has been seriously debated by the
scientific community, with several research projects (particularly
associated with research in the Pacific tropics) directed to test these
ideas. To my knowledge, no conclusive proof that this mechanism exists
has yet been offered and some evidence has been supplied which is
negative. In my view, Dr. Lindzen's mechanism is far from acceptance,
however, he has provided an important service in focusing attention on
how poorly we currently measure water vapor in the upper troposphere
and in the dry regions of our atmosphere. I believe that he is correct
in recognizing that uncertainties in our observations in these regions
produces uncertainties in climate model predictions.
Question 4. Dr. Lindzen stated in his testimony that one specific
feature that led to the IPCC conclusion of a discernible human
influence on global climate, ``. . . disappears when additional data is
considered.'' Are you aware of specific ``additional data'' that was
not considered or erroneously applied that would cause the IPCC to
reach a different conclusion? Are you aware of a specific research
result or model that supports Dr. Lindzen's claim? If so, did you know
whether the IPCC considered it? Are you aware of other factors that the
IPCC relied upon to conclude that human activities were impacting
global climate?
Response. I am unaware of any specific ``additional data'' that was
not considered or erroneously applied that would cause the IPCC to
reach a different conclusion. On the contrary, I do believe that the
evidence is growing stronger. In my opinion, the IPCC assessment
process is well-reasoned and broadly reflective of the weight of
scientific opinion and evidence.
Question 5. Do you believe there is sufficient evidence of a
problem with human-induced climate change for us to keep pursuing some
kind of policy to limit CO2 emissions? If not, should we
stop funding research that would tend to prove or disprove the theories
that human activities are impacting global climate? If there is
sufficient evidence, what more, if anything, should we be doing?
Response. My answer to this question is based on several views.
First, 1 think the best scientific evidence available supports the view
that a 1.5 to 4 deg.C increase in globally averaged temperature will
occur with a CO2 concentration doubling. In my view, a
climate change of this magnitude will have severe consequences. Second,
I believe that continued increase in atmospheric CO2
concentrations are inevitable for many years to come because of the
increase in world population, the abundance of fossil fuels like coal,
and the push for higher standards of living in many developing
countries. Regardless of U.S. actions, the global experiment in
atmospheric chemistry will continue. Therefore, I personally believe
that much of the climate change due to greater concentrations of
greenhouse gases is inevitable unless the whole world takes action.
Third, as the greatest per capita user of fossil fuels, I believe that
concerted international efforts will not happen without the U.S. taking
action first. The problem is that any action by the U.S. which might be
publicly acceptable in our country is likely to be too small to impact
climate change because of world fossil fuel use. The argument for
emissions controls then becomes one of taking action for the purpose of
promoting efficiency (a valuable effort in its own right) and providing
the leadership necessary to begin a process of reduced global
emissions. My feeling is that such steps have the potential to bring
unexpected positive surprises, delays in the time of CO2
doubling, and greater efficiencies with positive benefits, but that
adaptive strategies are likely to be the major way we address
greenhouse warming over the next 50 years.
Research remains critical for several reasons. First, I believe
that observations and predictions, as they improve, will become
increasingly valuable. They may minimize risk and vulnerability and
they are likely to have positive economic value
[[Page 92]]
given the importance of most ``advance knowledge'' in our society.
Second, I believe that the ozone depletion problem and the greenhouse
gas problem are just examples of what lies in store for the world
population. Given the growth in population and the breakneck speed of
technologic change, humans are ever more capable of impacting the
nature of our environment. Greater knowledge of how the earth system
works will become increasingly important for each generation, because
our response time for providing solutions to problems may well get
shorter as world population grows.
Question 6. In your professional opinion, what is the probability
that there will be a doubling of CO2 concentrations since
pre-industrial times by the year 2100? A tripling? what are the impacts
of a doubling? what are the impacts of a tripling?
Response. In my opinion, the probability that there will be a
doubling of CO2 concentrations by the year 2100 is very
high, while the probability that there will be a tripling is much
lower. The article submitted as part of my written testimony on the
reliability of climate model predictions gives a precise account of my
views of the most likely impact of a doubling of carbon dioxide. The
impacts of a tripling of carbon dioxide are much less studied, but are
likely to be similar to the impacts of a doubling, but of greater
magnitude.
______
Responses by Dr. Eric Barron to Additional Questions from Senator Reid
Question 1. Much has been made of the newfound general consensus
that there is a ``discernible human influence on global climate.'' What
exactly does this mean?
Response. Climate varies on many different time scales in response
to many different factors (as a product of volcanic eruptions, or
simply the way that the atmosphere and ocean interact). Changes in
climate on the time scales of decades to centuries is therefore not at
all unusual. At the same time we know that human activities,
specifically the burning of fossil fuels, is increasing the level of
greenhouse gases in our atmosphere and that this increase will cause a
greater absorption of the energy being radiated to space from the
earth's surface, thus promoting warming. Therefore, we have more than
one factor operating which has the potential to influence our weather
and climate--the so-called natural variability and the human-induced
changes. We also know that the earth has experienced a global warming
of .4 to .6 deg.C over the last century. The question is one of
attribution, is this warming a product of human activity or of natural
variability. The consensus cited in the question means that the way
climate has changed over the last century is suggestive of a warming
due at least in part to the increases in greenhouse gases. Such a
conclusion depends on evidence that the nature of the change is unlike
the natural variations recorded in the past and that the changes have a
``fingerprint'' which matches the expected changes due to increased
greenhouse gases.
Question 2. During the 1980's, we heard a lot about global warming.
Now we are hearing a lot about global climate change. Are they the same
thing? How are they different?
Response. The topic hasn't really changed, only the perspective.
The nature of the climate changes associated with higher greenhouse gas
concentrations involves much more than temperature changes (e.g.,
changes in precipitation, sea ice distribution, snow cover, etc.).
Climate change incorporates a spectrum of factors that is greater than
just temperature. Second, greenhouse gases are not the only human-
induced changes. We are also changing the land surface dramatically and
the amount of aerosols (fine particles) in the atmosphere. Each of
these factors can influence climate. The term climate change is more
comprehensive than the term global warming.
Question 3. Assuming for the moment that greenhouse gases are
accumulating in the atmosphere, how long will it take to get them out?
If we are not likely to face real problems for 20 to 40 years or more
from now, is it really necessary to begin making reductions now? Would
the Nation be better served by waiting for the technology and other
efficiency improvements to develop further?
Response. Numerous studies have recently been undertaken to
determine how long the greenhouse gases that are accumulating in the
atmosphere will remain. Basically, the mechanisms for removal include
the productivity of plants, the uptake by the ocean, and the weathering
of rocks and minerals. Major increases in plant productivity would
remove carbon dioxide, but such changes are not rapid. Uptake by the
ocean, largely dependent on the sinking of water masses to depth is
very slow--centuries to thousands of years, and rock weathering
processes are even slower. Most studies suggest that if emissions were
to stop today, many centuries would be required for the atmosphere to
return to pre-industrial levels.
[[Page 93]]
Scientific certainty over having some level of impact grows after
the concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere approaches
levels of a doubling, but this does not mean that we are necessarily
unlikely to face real problems for 20 to 40 years. In terms of human
health issues, water resource availability, water quality and weather-
related natural hazards, we are already experiencing problems due to
some combination of natural variability and human-induced climate
change. However, as stated in my testimony, I believe that some climate
change is inevitable even with reasonable plans for emission reductions
because of the growth of world population and because the desire by
many nations to increase their standard of living will cause
CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere to continue to rise. In
my view, the efforts to control emissions are unlikely to make a marked
impact of the climate of the next 50 years because, in themselves, they
won't dent the level of global emissions. Rather, such emissions
controls would serve to promote the technology and efficiency
improvements that may lead to unexpected positive surprises, as well as
provide needed U.S. leadership in the world.
Question 4. Germany and the United Kingdom seem to be the only
nations that have made real progress toward achieving their voluntary
emissions reductions goals. How did they do it and are there lessons in
this for the United States?
Response. Although I am not a social scientist and have not studied
the spectrum of factors in other countries which promote emission
reductions, personal experience suggests that the higher prices for
fuels in the U.K. and Germany, combined with their records of economic
growth, are likely to be a reasonable explanation. Higher fuel prices
certainly promote greater efficiency or conservation.
______
Responses by Dr. Eric Barron to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. Are the effects of increased greenhouse gases
reversible?
Response. The earth system has many different feedbacks, and if
greenhouse gas emissions by humans were to be reduced substantially and
concentrations in the atmosphere were to return to pre-industrial
levels, the climate system would likely return to a state more similar
to the pre-industrial level after many centuries. However, climate
change is caused by many factors, including human-activities, and
therefore it is unlikely that any future climate will be identical to
the pre-industrial era.
Question 2. If we halt the increase in production of greenhouse
gases, would temperatures continue to rise or would they remain steady?
Response. If the increase in greenhouse gas emissions were halted,
then the concentration of greenhouse gases produced by humans would
tend to stabilize, and then the climate ``forcing'' of these gases
would tend to stabilize. Therefore the added tendency to promote
warming would be removed. However, the response time of the atmosphere
and ocean is not immediate, and the modem climate is unlikely to be in
balance with the current level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. For
this reason, I believe that it would still be a matter of decades
before the majority of the climate change due to current CO2
levels would be realized.
Question 3. In your opinion, should the lack of complete certainty
regarding the science of climate change result in a wait-and-see
approach?
Response. For many decades to come, there will remain substantial
uncertainty about global change. The question facing society is a tough
one. Climate models provide the best currently available assessment of
future climate change, and these models suggest substantial change due
to human greenhouse gas emissions, yet the models are associated with
substantial uncertainty. In my view the solution to this conundrum must
be to assess how vulnerable we are to climate change. Further, I
believe that we are already vulnerable to natural climate variability,
and climate change may exacerbate this vulnerability, and this is
sufficient reason to take action. In many cases this action should
involve adaptive strategies.
Question 4. We hear about natural climatic cycles. For example, we
know from geologic evidence that the earth has naturally gone through
cooling and warming cycles, usually on a scale of 10's of thousands of
years. Is it possible to identify cycles of a shorter scale?
Response. Geologic evidence suggests that the earth experiences
climate change on many different time scales from decades to millions
of years.
Question 5. Would we be able to detect variations attributable to
human activities in this natural cycle?
Response. It is not a simple task to attribute any climate change
to human activities precisely because of the natural variations that
occur. The key is to detect
[[Page 94]]
changes which are unlike the spectrum of natural variations over the
last several thousand years and to detect changes that ``fingerprint''
changes caused by a particular human-induced forcing factor, like
increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Through
model and laboratory studies we expect specific types of changes (e.g.,
cooling of the stratosphere at the same time the lower atmosphere
warms). These lines of evidence are the reason why the IPCC report now
states that some level of human-induced change is now detectable.
Question 6. We know that CO2 has the potential for
affecting the climatic balance of our atmosphere. Would it not make
sense to limit the amount of CO2 we put into the atmosphere
until we more fully understand the effects CO2 has on our
atmosphere?
Response. Ideally, it makes perfect sense to limit the amount of
CO2 we put into the atmosphere until we have more knowledge.
Unfortunately, carbon-based fuels are a critical underpinning of the
world economy. To control emissions to the point of having a real
impact on future climate change is likely to have major economic
impact. However, actions that begin control emissions may well produce
unexpected positive impacts on technology and efficiency that may help
limit the long-term potential for large climate changes. In my opinion,
over the next half century higher greenhouse concentrations are
probably inevitable and some level of climate change is likely to occur
despite efforts to control emissions.
______
Prepared Statement of John R. Christy, Department of Atmospheric
Science and Earth System Science Laboratory, University of Alabama in
Huntsville
1. concern for climate change
In the 1980's, Global Warming due to the enhanced greenhouse effect
came to be perceived as a serious threat to the planet's ecological and
societal sustainability. This concern was based primarily on estimates
of global warming and other climate changes from numerical models of
the Earth's climate system. (This perception was reinforced by a few
hot, dry summers in the eastern U.S. which constituted for some people
the ``smoking gun'' of climate change.) While the development of models
is critical to our future ability to examine what we may be doing to
alter the climate of the Earth, many scientists acknowledge that models
are still rather simple representations of the complex processes that
control the Earth's climate.
The observational evidence for enhanced greenhouse global warming
is also less than clearly defined. While all surface-based global
temperature data sets indicated warming of 0.3 to 0.6 deg.C since the
last century, the complete source of this warming is still unknown.
First, the Earth was evidently coming out of a relatively cold period
in the 1800's so that warming in the past century may be part of this
natural recovery. Data sparseness and reliability are somewhat suspect
in the early years of the thermometer climate record and remain a
concern even today when the shrinking network of stations is attempting
to capture relatively small variations. Local land use changes may also
have added additional warming not connected with greenhouse gases.
With this background, scientists recognized that we did not have an
observing system in place with adequate means to truly monitor the
health of the planet or to provide the data needed to validate and
improve the models of the Earth System. One obvious limitation of
information about the atmosphere was the lack of true global coverage.
2. the microwave sounding unit data set
I am here to report a success story--a story that involves U.S.
Government scientists and managers who collaborated closely and
productively with university scientists. In 1989, to test the ability
of satellites to monitor the Earth, Dr. Roy Spencer, a NASA scientist,
and I began investigating temperatures measured by the existing TIROS-N
family of weather satellites (average life span was only 4 years each).
These satellites were designed to provide information for daily weather
forecasts, not for answering questions about global climate change.
The instrument of interest to us was the Microwave Sounding Unit
(MSU), identical copies of which were flown on all of NOAA's
operational polar orbiters since 1979. The MSU measures the intensity
of weak microwave radiation emitted to space by oxygen in the air. The
magnitude of this intensity is proportional to air temperature, so with
global coverage by the satellites we could compute the true globally
averaged air temperature. Two specific layers have lent themselves to
accurate measurements: (1) the lower troposphere, or the lowest 7 km of
air next to the surface, and (2) the layer at 17-21 km, or lower
stratosphere.
[[Page 95]]
Putting together a climate record from multiple satellites involved
collecting a huge volume of data and was a remarkable achievement in
and of itself. It is a tribute to the current government system and the
vision of scientists at the National Center for Atmospheric Research
(NCAR) that those data (with little perceived market value at the time)
were saved and archived. The MSU data products are now almost priceless
in the global warming debate in having established a precise historical
record of the Earth's temperature over the last 18+ years.
It was our good fortune that my call to NCAR asking about the
possibility of obtaining the MSU data came 1 week before a previously
scheduled, major NCAR project was to begin to copy all satellite data
from an old, outdated storage system to a newer one. Thus, forewarned
that Spencer and I believed the MSU data were of some unique value,
NCAR kindly extracted the necessary data (only 2 percent of the total)
for us at only the marginal cost of the extraction process. This
relatively ``free and open'' attitude concerning data availability was
the key to our success in creating the MSU data set, since obtaining
the data from a cost-recovering data center would have been prohibitive
(the quote was over $1 million) for the speculative value of the MSU
data for climate monitoring.
The computing facilities for our own massive processing task were
provided by NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, and we had the
enthusiastic support of the Earth Science and Applications Division.
After several months of tedious data analysis, we were able to
construct various data sets with exceptional precision and continuity.
The particular technique we eventually developed allowed the MSU data
to be independently validated. In Fig. 1, I show the comparison between
MSU temperatures and those measured by radiosondes (balloons) in which
a weather instrument package is carried aloft. These two systems
(satellite and radiosonde) are completely independent in every way. In
Fig. 1 it is clear that both systems are measuring the same variations
in temperature to high precision.
For long term variations, I include in the table below comparisons
between large numbers of radiosondes and MSU measurements. It is again
clear that both systems are telling us the same story on temperature
variations since 1979. Note that none of the long-term trends differ by
more than 0.03 deg.C/decade.
Comparisons of trends since 1979 for MSU lower troposphere vs. various radiosonde-based tropospheric datasets which, except for the 850-300 hPa layer
temperature, are weighted to match the MSU weighting function.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Difference
No. stations Balloon Tr end MSU Trend for (Balloon minus Years
used C/dec. same region MSU)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global (850-300 hPa)1............................................. 63 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 79-96
No. Hemisphere2................................................... 250+ +0.01 +0.02 -0.01 79-96
So. Hemisphere2................................................... 50+ -0.11 -0.08 -0.03 79-96
Global2........................................................... 300+ -0.04 -0.04 0.00 79-96
W. No. Hemisphere3................................................ 97 +0.16 +0.14 +0.02 79-94
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Angell 1988 and updates.
2 Parker et al. 1997.
3 Stations in an area roughly bounded by Truk, South Pacific to Pt. Barrow, AK to Keflavik, Iceland to Trinidad. This is a comparison of sondes with
colocated MSU.
Our datasets begin with January 1979 and continue to this day. We
have been fortunate that two of the four MSU channels have performed
exceptionally well on each of the nine satellites that were launched at
intervals of about 2 years. It was critical that at least one satellite
in functioning condition was orbiting when a new satellite was
launched, because we required a period of overlap for precise
intercalibration. (Only two satellites are operational at a given
time).
3. the temperature of the lower atmosphere
The temperature of the global atmosphere is shown for the lower
troposphere and lower stratosphere in Figure 2 (courtesy R. Spencer).
Since we live in the lower troposphere, that time series has received
the most attention. You will notice that there are large variations,
both month-to-month and year-to-year. Because these variations are
independently observed by two satellites, we know they are real. The
trend in the time series is slightly downward (-0.05 deg.C/decade or
-0.09 deg.F/decade). It is this relatively flat trend when compared to
surface data (which show warming trends since 1979 of +0.09 deg.C to
+0.14 deg.C/decade, depending on which dataset is cited) that has
attracted attention to the Spencer/Christy MSU dataset.
[[Page 96]]
Though the MSU temperature record has demonstrated high precision,
there is also an element of ambiguity in the measurement. The layers
measured by the MSU are several kilometers deep. Any intra-layer
variability, therefore, would be masked by the vertical average. For
example, a warming trend at upper levels and a cooling trend at low
levels of one layer would be seen as no trend in the MSU vertical
average.
One of the reasons the surface thermometer data have shown greater
warming in the past 18 years is due to the fact that in continental
regions the surface temperature responds with greater variation than
the deep layer of air above. Over oceans (and in the global average),
the opposite occurs. In the past 18 years there has been a tendency for
the atmosphere over land areas to show warming (which is greater in the
surface air response) while the atmosphere over oceans has exhibited
cooling (greater effect in the MSU record). This pattern is thought to
be due to natural variations. The net effect in the global average is a
relative difference in the trends between surface air and the deep
atmosphere. Thus, the uneven warming/cooling distribution of the past
18 years accounts for part of the difference.
Other differences are due to areas poorly sampled or not sampled at
all by the surface network, as well as to some urban warming or land-
use changes around many of the thermometers. It is a monumental
achievement to construct a record of surface air temperatures, and most
of these data sets have been subjected to many careful corrections to
account for these non-natural temperature impacts.
Because of its precision and true global coverage, we believe that
the MSU dataset is the most robust measurement we have of the Earth's
bulk atmospheric temperature. At the same time, it is still a
relatively short data set for climate studies. As indicated in Figure
2, the data contain both long and short period fluctuations. To be
useful in the global warming debate one must understand and carefully
account for fluctuations in the data that may be masking or dominating
the anticipated enhanced greenhouse signal.
Recently, two colleagues have questioned the precision of the MSU
data. They believe the data have spurious jumps in 1981 and 1991 which
caused the overall trend to be downward rather than upward as they
believe it should be. Their basis for this allegation utilized no
observed data from the atmosphere. Since the time their allegations
were made public I have shown that the MSU data are indeed precise with
independent and direct observations of the troposphere (i.e. I used
real data). For example, in the most serious allegation, my two
colleagues speculated that the merging of one satellite, NOAA-7, into
the time series caused a spurious 0.25 deg.C jump in late 1981 in the
tropical time series. I show in Fig. 3 the temperature anomalies of two
satellites NOAA-6 and--7 for the tropics during that time. It is
important to note that these are completely independently calculated.
One can readily see that whether NOAA-7 was included or not, the time
series is still the same. Therefore, the addition of NOAA-7 into the
dataset did not cause a problem and the claim of my colleagues is
clearly in error.
4. the causes of the temperature variations
In a recent study, Dr. Richard McNider, also of the University of
Alabama in Huntsville, and I looked for the causes of the natural
fluctuations. We found that by accounting for the influence of tropical
ocean temperatures (El Nino) and the cooling effect of volcanoes, we
could explain over 60 percent of the monthly variations (Fig. 4). These
natural, shorter-term fluctuations indicate to us how much the global
temperature responds to specific causes. Once calculated and removed,
we see that without El Ninos and volcanoes, the temperature trend of
the past 18+ years is upward (+0.06 deg.C/decade or +0.11 deg.F/decade,
Fig. 4, bottom. The value varies from +0.05 to +0.10 deg.C/decade
depending on certain parameters specified.). What is causing this
upward trend? We do not know for sure. It may be the enhanced
greenhouse effect. At the same time there could still be a longer term
trend in the data due to variations in aerosols, water vapor, or other
unknown factors that are masking the true magnitude of the greenhouse
effect.
The latest results from global climate models, which include
improvements and the cooling effects of air pollution, indicate warming
rates for the Earth of +0.08 deg.C to +0.30 deg.C/decade for the latter
part of the 20th century. These are about half of the warming rates
predicted a few years ago, when only increases in greenhouse gases were
modeled. Note too, that according to the latest models there should be
more warming in the troposphere than at the surface. Therefore, the MSU
is ideally suited to provide information on the layers that should show
the greatest change. The present warming rate of +0.06 deg.C/decade
observed in the ``adjusted'' MSU data is just outside this model range,
and is not inconsistent with fully natural variations
[[Page 97]]
on decadal time scales. Therefore, uncertainty remains as to the
cause(s) of the trend the MSU has measured.
Why is there a discrepancy between the models' estimate of global
warming and what the MSU data have shown? One must remember that
temperature is essentially a response parameter. The MSU data in Figure
2 show us what has been happening to the climate but not why. A key
goal of efforts to study the planet from space is to provide heretofore
unmeasured data that can provide an understanding of why the Earth
system behaves as it does. I believe that new observables such as
aerosols, rain structures, water vapor distributions and surface
characteristics, when used in conjunction with the MSU data set will
provide answers to these questions. Our work demonstrates that
satellites can be used to monitor the Earth on decadal time scales and
that the vantage point of space offers the only truly global view of
the Earth system that can give robust measures of key variables.
The Spencer-Christy MSU data set has been used by some as evidence
that global warming is not important, which then undercuts the need and
urgency of programs to continue to study the Earth System. I strongly
disagree with this interpretation. By showing that the Earth's rate of
warming is slower than predicted by earlier models or surface data sets
(Fig. 5), it does, perhaps, remove the sense of urgency for those who
wish to enact greenhouse gas controls or to shut off scientific debate.
But most importantly, the slower warming rate in the last two decades
in effect gives us the security of time so that data from future
observations and research may be used within the debate.
I believe that honest and open scientific debate with precise data
is the key to making sound societal decisions. The cultivation of
diversity of scientific thought is critical to vigorous debate. The MSU
data set would not have been developed without the competitiveness and
entrepreneurial spirit fostered by having separate NASA science centers
and a broad university research program. Industry should recognize that
good science and good data are their allies, whether in debates on acid
rain or global warming. It is now more critical than ever that we study
the planet's health with new diagnostic devices. Any delays in doing so
may mean that the length of data records available to scientists will
be reduced and cannot be used in the societal debates.
The disagreement between models and the MSU simply illustrates how
little we understand about the complexities and factors that control
the Earth's climate. Every month Roy Spencer and I process the newly
arrived data and eagerly look at the month's temperature to see what is
happening to the Earth. If we knew everything we needed to know about
the Earth's system, we would not be as anxious about the results. I
look forward to the time when new data from planned satellite sensors,
coupled with an understanding of the Earth's climate system developed
under research programs emphasizing global change, make surprises in
the MSU global temperature as rare as being surprised by land-falling
hurricanes in this era of weather satellites.
5. the temperature of the lower stratosphere
The record of the lower stratosphere is fascinating in its own
right. Clearly, here is an example of global change on the scale of
years to decades (Figure 2). The two conspicuous warming events were
due to explosive volcanic eruptions--El Chichon (1982) and Mt. Pinatubo
(1991). The aerosols injected by these explosions high into the
stratosphere caused the warming through radiative interactions. Notice,
however, that once the aerosols settled out, the global stratospheric
temperature fell to levels below those observed at pre-eruption. It is
widely thought that the loss of stratospheric ozone, both naturally
from volcanic events and from human-generated chemicals, has caused
this overall cooling. The increase in greenhouse gases, which will
cause stratospheric cooling, is probably a factor as well, though
smaller.
The 1996 annual stratospheric temperature was the lowest annual
value ever measured by satellite, and March 1997, was the coldest
single month on record for the North Polar region. (Globally, the
temperatures have rebounded a bit for the first half of 1997.)
Something is changing in the lower stratosphere--the temperature tells
us that much, but cannot specifically indicate the cause. (Others have
much more experience here.) The extent of the stratospheric cooling
trend points to the need to fully understand its cause.
6. concluding remarks
Continued monitoring of global temperature through the Spencer-
Christy method is expected as long as our good fortune holds and the
two orbiting instruments do not fail (which almost happened recently).
Thus, we should continue to provide the scientific community with
precise temperatures for deep atmospheric layers.
[[Page 98]]
In any weather variable, e.g., temperature, rainfall, etc., it is
the shorter-term fluctuations (week-to-week) that cause the greatest
impact on human productivity. One valuable benefit of a program of
escalating Earth observations is the resulting improvement in weather
forecasts--particularly out to 2 to 3 weeks and even to seasonal
averages. The potential economic impact of improved long-range
forecasts would be enormous. Virtually every sector of our economy is
sensitive to weather, especially those related to energy production and
consumption, agriculture, transportation, insurance and recreation.
Improved knowledge of coming weather situations would be used to add
value to the products and services generated by these industries.
A strong and continuing program in atmospheric observation and
research has this more subtle benefit as well. There will be extreme
climate events in the near future because that is the nature of weather
and climate. Without a continuing program of research that places
climate variations in proper perspective and reports with improving
confidence on their causes, we will be vulnerable to calls for knee-
jerk remedies to combat ``climate change,'' which likely will be
unproductive and economically damaging. We can protect ourselves from
such pitfalls by improving our ability to measure what the climate is
doing and determine the causes for its variations.
In simple terms, the ``Global Climate'' is our patient. We have
taken its temperature in a few places and have seen just enough change
to cause concern. Before prescribing any powerful medicine though, the
patient should be given a complete physical as soon as possible, so we
may then make the proper diagnosis and chart a correct course of action
for the benefit of all.
references
Angell, J.K., 1988: Variations and trends in tropospheric and
stratospheric global temperatures 1958-87. J. Climate, 1, 1296-
1313.
Christy, J.R., 1995: Temperature above the surface layer. Climatic
Change, 31, 455-474.
Christy, J.R. and J.D. Goodridge, 1995: Precision global temperatures
from satellites and urban warming effects of non-satellite data.
Atmospheric Environment, 29, 1957-1995.
Christy, J.R. and R.T. McNider, 1994: Satellite greenhouse signal,
Nature, 367, 325 (27 January 1994). (Fig. 4 of testimony, updated,
taken from this article.)
Parker, D.E., M. Gordon, D.P.N. Cullum, D.M.H. Sexton, C.K. Folland and
N. Rayner, 1997. A new global gridded radiosonde temperature data
base and recent temperature trends. Geophys. Res. Lett., in press.
Spencer, R.W. and J.R. Christy, 1990: Precise monitoring of global
temperature trends from satellites. Science, 247, 1558-1562 (30
March 1990).
Spencer, R.W. and J.R. Christy, 1992: Precision and radiosonde
validation of satellite gridpoint temperature anomalies. Part I:
MSU channel 2. Journal of Climate, 5, 847-857.
[[Page 99]]
[[Page 100]]
[[Page 101]]
[[Page 102]]
[[Page 103]]
[[Page 104]]
Responses by John R. Christy to Additional Questions from Senator
Baucus
Question 1. During the hearing, Dr. Barron stated that our
strategies to address increasing concentrations of greenhouse gasses
should be adaptive in nature. In your opinion, what would be the most
important adaptation strategies to pursue?
Response. In my opinion, preparing an economy to cope with the full
range of natural weather variations (that will always occur) would
position society to accommodate any future climate change better than
simply adapting to a change after it occurs. For example, building a
typical structure on beach front property along the Gulf and Atlantic
coasts is not preparing for the full range of natural weather extremes
because eventually a powerful hurricane will come along and devastate
the region. However, development of cereal crops that can withstand
greater extremes while enjoying higher CO2 concentrations is
an obvious avenue to pursue. (I use the term extremes not to imply that
the future climate will have greater extremes, but that the crop could
withstand whatever might come along.) We are a most adaptive and clever
species, for example, being able to grow a single food (corn) in
climates ranging from North Dakota to Alabama.
In an odd sort of way, conservation of carbon is actually one
adaptive strategy because it is possible that the climate may cool in
the next century or so. A colder climate is probably far more
devastating than a warmer climate. Thus having carbon available for
energy production in such a climate would be wise. An adaptive strategy
is one that decreases our vulnerability to extreme events of all types.
As the IPCC has shown we still cannot identify regional weather
changes due to CO2 increases after over 100 years. And, in
my view, it will be many more decades before the regional signal may
(if ever) be extracted from the noise of natural variability. If
present infrastructures could be designed to cope with 99.9 percent of
the extremes on both sides (hottest, coldest, wettest, driest, etc.)
rather than the 90-95 percent as is done now, we will be in much better
position to handle what may happen in terms of climate change.
Question 2. Dr. Schneider stated in his testimony that it was
difficult for plants and animals to adapt to a temperature increase of
50 deg.C over the 10,000 year period following the last Ice Age and
that many species would likely go extinct with a kind of rapid
temperature increase projected for the next century. Assuming, for this
question, that the Earth experiences a temperature increase of greater
than 1.50 deg.C over the coming 100 years, what is the likelihood that
species will successfully adapt? If, in your opinion, this represents a
threat to preserving biological diversity, to your knowledge has there
every been a period in the paleoclimate record where climate change has
resulted in significant loss of species.
Response. The significant loss of species has always been a feature
of the history of the planet. I understand that approximately 99
percent of all species which have inhabited the Earth are extinct.
Nature has been unmercifully severe for the vast majority of life
forms. It is difficult to separate out the role of climate as a cause
for extinction in comparison with other factors such as the evolution
of competing and opportunistic species or something as exotic but as
realistic as an asteroid collision.
Changes in global average temperature do not cause the loss of
species, rather it is the local change of climate. The greatest rise in
temperature due to the enhanced greenhouse effect (whatever its
magnitude) is predicted to occur for those regions which already
experience significant year to year and decade to decade variations
(midlatitude and polar regions). I think we shall find that nature is
rather resilient, though no one would expect the exact geographic
distribution of populations of various species to remain identical to
the present day. Perfect stability has never happened before. For
example, the Southeastern quad rant of the U.S. has experienced cooling
temperatures over the past 100 years with an associated southward
displacement of plant species. am told that citrus crops were harvested
as far north as southern Georgia around the turn of the century, yet
today they are found commercially only from central Florida southward.
This is due to the significant cold weather that the region has
experienced in the last few decades.
Rapid, natural changes have occurred in the past. Let me quote from
an issue of PAGES (Past Global Changes Programme, IGBP, 4, #3 Nov.
1996).
Climate variability at both a regional and a global scale
has, even within the boundary conditions prevailing during the
Late-Holocene [last 5,000 years], been significantly greater
than has been recorded during the short, recent period for
which instrumental records of climate variation exist. This is
conclusively demonstrated by recent research, is of crucial
significance for predicting future climate change and is not
recognized in the recent IPCC Report.
[[Page 105]]
Since rapid changes have occurred in the past, we may assume that
not every species survived the change. However, the species we see
today must have survived some combination of past rapid changes. One
wonders how many of today's species are actually here because a
particular rapid change altered the balance between competing species
in the favor of the present-day survivor. The system of life is
exceedingly complex, and attributing climate changes to particular
species survival is beyond my expertise.
I believe Dr. Schneider would agree that the number of species
which might experience extinction due to possible global warming is
much smaller than those we are losing today due to land-use changes,
poaching, human encroachment, etc. Just as the evolution and
redistribution of opportunistic species forced vulnerable species into
extinction in the past, we are seeing human-induced extinction
happening quite apart from climate change. We as a species are now one
of those very opportunistic species that is dangerous to many others.
If extinction is a concern, (and I believe it is) one should assess the
major causes and then address those with action that has the best
chance for producing results. However, I understand, having lived in a
Third World country, that it is a difficult problem to advise other
countries on this topic because (1) our own past haunts us and (2) the
idea of loss of sovereignty is keenly felt in any nation.
I lived in Kenya, East Africa for 2 years and lived among people
who were making decisions to destroy forests so they could raise food
to feed their families. I could understand their motivation for
survival as I witnessed people dying simply because they had no food.
The population growth in that region, believe, is the cause of
tremendous suffering and is the primary issue that must be dealt with
ahead of the issue of climate change (if there is a choice on where to
concentrate efforts). Of course, controlling population will probably
have an eventual benefit of lower fossil fuel consumption.
I suspect I agree with Dr. Schneider in this limited sense: a
significant fraction of the biosystem, relying only on evolution and
redistribution, would find it difficult to adapt to a changing
environment if the change occurred over time scales of centuries when
research indicates biosystem changes normally take millennia to adapt.
Question 3. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to a natural
mechanism that would be employed by the Earth to counteract the
predicted climatic changes due to the effect of increased water vapor
in the atmosphere. Are you aware of any historic reference or specific
research that would support a theory of the existence of such a
mechanism?
Response. Global climate models produce most of their warming
because they cause the troposphere (surface to 10 km altitude) to
become more moist than is presently observed. In other words, global
warming in the models is due more to additional water vapor than
additional CO2 in the atmosphere. This additional water
vapor enhances the natural greenhouse gas, trapping more radiant energy
in the lower atmosphere thus causing the surface temperature to rise
even further. Models are quite primitive in the ``rules'' or equations
they require the atmosphere to obey. In the case of greenhouse warming,
the models require that as soon as the temperature rises a little due
to CO2 radiative forcing, more water vapor is forced into
the troposphere, thus causing a ``positive feedback'' process: higher
temperatures lead to more evaporation which leads to more water vapor
in the atmosphere which leads to higher temperatures which leads to
more evaporation, etc.
The real atmosphere does not appear to be so inflexible. Current
research carried out by my colleague Dr. Roy Spencer of NASA/Marshall
Space Flight Center (Huntsville, AL), points to the possibility that as
the tropical system warms, the amount of vapor might actually decrease
(or at least not increase much) in the troposphere. There are certainly
periods (months or so, see Sun and Held, J. Climate 1996, pp. 665-675)
in which warming is not accompanied by the presence of more water vapor
as inflexible models require. The current warm El Nino event in the
Pacific will be an excellent test case to check whether the tropical
troposphere actually moistens or dries as the temperature rises.
Currently, models give one result: the atmosphere always moistens when
it is warmed.
The key mechanism to understand on this issue is that the heat that
is naturally lost to space is highly proportional to the amount of
vapor in the troposphere. Thus, the amount of water vapor in the
troposphere regulates the amount of heat that escapes and which
therefore would be unavailable to warm the surface. In fact, the vapor
in the troposphere is more important for this energy balance than the
vapor at the surface. A slight reduction of the vapor in the
troposphere (i.e. a drying) leads to a significant increase in the
outgoing energy. So, if there is a slight drying of the troposphere as
the world warms a little, the drier troposphere would act as an open
window to let more energy escape, thus reducing any feedback-warming of
the sur-
[[Page 106]]
face. Only slight changes in the tropical tropospheric humidity are
necessary to reduce the warming due to the enhanced greenhouse effect.
(The drying results from the fact warmer rain-clouds tend to lose more
moisture to rainfall than cooler cloud systems, thus expelling less
vapor to the troposphere.)
Considerable work is ahead of us on this area of research as theory
is only now being given observations that may help solve this issue of
tropospheric water vapor feedback. What we lack at this point is high
vertical resolution observations of temperature, winds, precipitation
and humidity of the extensive tropical atmosphere where so many
questions remain.
Question 4. Dr. Lindzen stated in his testimony that the one
specific feature that led to the IPCC conclusion of a discernible human
influence on global climate, ``. . . disappears when additional data is
considered.'' Are you aware of specific ``additional data'' that was
not considered or erroneously applied that would cause the IPCC to read
a different conclusion? Are you aware of a specific research result or
model that supports Dr. Lindzen's claim? If so, did you know whether
the IPCC considered it? Are you aware of other factors that the IPCC
relied upon to conclude that human activities were impacting global
climate?
Response. A paper had been submitted just before the final IPCC
science authors' meeting in Asheville, NC (Aug. 1995) which compared
upper air balloon data for 1964 to 1987 and climate model results for
the same period. The point of the paper was to show that the warming in
the observations of the troposphere was matched by model results, thus
the model was in some sense verified. I read the pre-publication paper
at this meeting.
I discussed a bit of this paper with one of the authors at the
meeting, pointing out that the early years were relatively cool in this
24-year period and the hottest year observed happened to be the last
year, 1987. Thus, the period selected for the model comparison did not
represent the actual climate variations for the longer period using
pre-1964 and post-1987 data, and for which the model results had less
agreement. The post-1987 data, showing cooling, were available to some
researchers as I had submitted a paper 2 years before (1993) using data
from this dataset which at that time were available through 1989.
However, it could be the case that these post-1987 data may not have
been in a form usable to the authors.
In Asheville, the author told me that he did not have available to
him the post-1987 data and that a follow-up study would be completed in
which such data would be utilized. I did not feel the author had
deliberately stopped at 1987 to produce a ``politically correct''
result and in my other dealings with the author found him to be highly
objective and credible. Utilizing the more recent data, however, the
model in question apparently does not reproduce the observations nearly
so well, especially the tropospheric non-warming that has occurred in
the past 18 years (see Michaels, P.J. and P.C. Knappenberger, 1996:
Sensitivity to the greenhouse fingerprint to data selection. Nature,
383, 12 December). Thus, the ``discernible human influence'' phrase may
be viewed as only slightly less strong.
The main lines of evidence used to substantiate the ``discernible
human influence'' statement as outlined in the policymakers summary
were:
1. The 20th century appears to be the warmest of the past 600
years.
2. Several models, using only natural factors, could not explain
all of the 20th century warming, thus implying that some fraction of
the warming was probably due to human factors.
3. The vertical patterns of change produced by models which include
human-factors match observed patterns of change for 1964-87.
The first statement is not as convincing as it seems because the
data we examined (I was a key contributor to the IPCC)--and which were
then used by the authors of the Policymakers Summary--were quite sparse
before 1400. We all knew, and stated such in the scientific text, that
the warming of the 20th century could largely be related to the natural
``recovery'' from the Little Ice Age, a cold period which existed, more
or less, in the 15th-19th centuries. Had we used the sparse data prior
to 1400, we would have reported that in many places on the planet, the
decades around 1000 A.D. were warmer than even today. In the next IPCC
report, this issue will probably be addressed in greater detail. What
caused the earth to cool in the last six centuries is a topic of
intense scientific research and it highlights the lack of understanding
we now posses in explaining natural variations in the global climate.
The second statement comes from several model simulations of the
last 100 years. These particular models could not reproduce all of the
0.40 deg.C temperature rise of the last century unless they included
the human factor of CO2 forcing. We know, however, that the
models are primitive and are essentially unable to reproduce other
natural variations (e.g., Barnett et al., 1996; Estimates of low
frequency natu-
[[Page 107]]
ral variability in near-surface air temperature. Holocene, 6, 255-263).
Barnett et al. concluded:
. . . our results should serve as a warning to those anxious
rigorously to pursue the detection of anthropogenic effects in
observed climate data: the spectrum of natural variability
against which detection claims, positive or negative, are made
is not well known and apparently not well represented in early
CGCM [coupled global climate model] control runs.
As I testified before the committee I agree with this second
statement that some fraction of the observed 0.40+C warming is probably
due to human factors.
The third statement relates to the paper I discussed earlier. I
should add that a source of the relatively high correlation between the
model and the observations was due to the strong cooling of the
stratosphere found in the model results and in the observations. The
main cause of this cooling is most likely ozone depletion, not
CO2. Thus, the CO2 effects were less involved in
the ``match'' with observations than was generally perceived by the
public.
Question 5. Do you believe there is sufficient evidence of a
problem with human-induced climate change for us to keep pursuing some
kind of policy to limit CO2 emissions? If not, should we
stop funding research that would tend to prove or disprove the theories
that human activities are impacting global climate. If there is
sufficient evidence, what more, if anything, should we be doing.
Response. There are many severe human-induced environmental issues
that I believe strongly overshadow the potential effects of global
warming. Dealing with these serious issues would, I believe, lead to an
associated reduction in CO2 emissions. Population increases,
habitat destruction, uncontrolled pollution of air and water by toxic
emissions and effluent (not CO2) are problematic now.
I believe we should continue supporting observations and research
of the global system. Some observations are now being scaled back, and
this reduces the base from which detection of any changes may be
substantiated. Better observations combined with more research has the
added advantage that forecasts, particularly extended-range forecasts,
would likely be more accurate. This would allow the public to plan for
weather impacts thus increasing their economic viability.
I can only comment as a non-expert in the realm of economic and
social consequences of legislative actions intended to deal with
climate change. What should we do? An idea I would put forth is to let
the U.S. Government take the lead in generating reductions of
CO2. The government owns thousands of vehicles, electricity-
intensive appliances, heavy equipment, inefficient buildings etc. By
setting for itself more stringent standards, and purchasing new
equipment and services within the free market, the government in effect
sponsors the R&D for these new products, allowing future costs for
these more efficient technologies to be lower to the public and
therefore more acceptable in the long run.
Such a large government program must begin with accurate data on
current emissions against which future reductions could be precisely
assessed. I would think every aspect of government use of
CO2 would be measured (i.e. field tested) and documented.
Then, a program to upgrade current vehicles, appliances, building
environments, and even military maneuvers, to reduce carbon emissions
could be instigated. The monitoring program would then be in place to
prove to the interested parties (i.e. international monitoring agencies
and the American public) that reduction in emissions is occurring. The
government then would become the laboratory out of which proven
technologies could be made available for the public, though some form
of incentives would likely be required to replace cheap but inefficient
equipment.
How would this program be paid for? My personal opinion is that a
nickel tax per gallon of gasoline (i.e. ``A Nickel for Nature''?) would
not cause great hardship for the vast majority of Americans and would
raise quite a bit of revenue for the government to proceed. Such a tax
might even be politically acceptable if promoted as a way for everyone
to help the environment and which is used entirely for its intended
purpose.
It is important to remember that modest reductions in
CO2 will have an indiscernible effect on climate no matter
what scenario of warming one may believe. Yet, I suspect modest
controls are all that the public will accept.
Question 6. In your professional opinion, what is the probability
that there will be a doubling of CO2 concentrations since
pre-industrial times by the year 2100? A tripling? What are the impacts
of a doubling? What are the impacts of a tripling?
Response. Thank you for asking this question as an ``opinion'' as I
do not perform research specifically related to the magnitude of
CO2 concentrations. I can only read the information
available, and the IPCC reports are my main source of information.
[[Page 108]]
The rise in CO2 since 1958 has been slightly more than 1
ppmv per year, and most recently growth has been at a rate of 0.4
percent per year. The preindustrial concentration was about 280 ppmv,
with today's value about 360 ppmv. By 2100, at this rate, the
concentration would be between two and three times the preindustrial
level. I believe there are factors yet unmodeled that will produce only
a doubling by 2100. This is strictly an opinion based on my view that
uncertainties are considerable in the present models and the economic
and industrial future is rarely predicted with accuracy.
My opinion (and that is all it is) on the climate effects of
doubling or tripling is that the effects will be fairly benign overall.
If warming occurs, it will occur slowly and modestly. I will mention
again that the effects of natural variability will continue to cause
the havoc we have always known.
I would be remiss if I did not address a major aspect of this
entire debate that has been basically ignored. It is popular today to
think that burning carbon is an evil and destructive activity. I've
lived in a Third World country, teaching physics and chemistry and
sometimes distributing food and medicine to people in great need. These
Africans were not nameless images on a TV screen to me, I knew them as
fellow human beings with names, families, friends and hope. We provided
for them that which they could not provide for themselves. What we gave
came from an American nation whose economic engine has fueled the
discoveries that have given our country a standard of living envied
throughout the world and whose benefits have lifted many millions of
non-Americans to a better life. I had a small part in that enterprise
because American people, who burn carbon, were generous in financing
experiences such as mine in Africa.
Today, the world's one and only superpower is dedicated to, among
other noble pursuits, free and open scientific inquiry, freedom of
faith and freedom of association. Such noble ideas are not expressed in
the economic models out of which various scenarios of future policy are
determined. What is their value? say they are invaluable. To be sure,
we have ``spent'' considerable amounts of carbon to achieve what we
have, but I believe it has largely been well-spent when one looks at
the entire picture.
I realize that reductions of CO2 are eventually going to
affect us, yet I wonder if those who advocate draconian measures truly
understand how the world as a whole would be affected. I've lived in a
part of the world for which a loss of American economic strength and
world leadership would probably cause greater suffering. As poorly as
we model the global climate, even these physical results are more
realistic than predictions of economic and social impacts which
buildupon the imperfect climate model output. In short, the impacts to
human existence of a doubling or tripling of CO2 are almost
impossible to predict when one considers our present level of ignorance
in these matters.
Question 7. Dr. Christy, if you add balloon temperature measurement
records to the 18 years of satellite temperature records, is there an
observable warming trend? How does that compare with the surface
temperature records.
Response. As I reported in the Hearing, the global balloon and
satellite record both show that the lower tropospheric temperature has
declined by--0.040 deg.C/decade since 1979. Two years ago I wrote a
paper which specifically addressed the comparison of various records of
upper air temperatures for the period since 1958 when balloon datasets
began: Temperature above the surface layer, Climatic Change, 31, 455-
474, (1995). I found that ``Beginning in earlier years, (relying only
on radiosonde data before 1979) the estimated warming trend since the
late 1950's is +0.07 to +0.110 deg.C per decade.'' One surface dataset
(GISS) shows a trend for the same period of +0.090 deg.C/decade, which
indicates that over this particular time period (1958-96), the surface
and troposphere experienced the same trend. It is important to note
that climate models project greater warming in the troposphere on all
time scales, a feature which has apparently not appeared in the actual
observations, and certainly is not verified in the observations since
1979.
______
Responses by John R. Christy to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. We hear about natural climatic cycles. For example, we
know from geologic evidence that the earth has naturally gone through
cooling and warming cycles, usually on a scale of 10's of thousands of
years.
Is it possible to identify cycles of a shorter scale?
Response. Variability of global and regional temperature occurs on
all time scales from minutes to millennia. Some of this variability
occurs in a true cyclic fashion, for example, seasonal changes of
temperature in which summer is warmer than winter or daily cycles in
which afternoons are warmer than mornings. These two
[[Page 109]]
examples represent the only regular cycles that can be identified.
understand the comment ``We hear about natural climatic cycles''
because I hear it quite often too. However, as one who has poured over
many records in detail, these alleged cycles are not as apparent as one
would be led to believe.
Natural temperature variations due to El Ninos, volcanoes, or
fluctuations in solar radiation, atmospheric aerosol loading, oceanic
circulations etc., are sometimes referred to as cycles, but they are
much less predictable than forecasting that the temperature will be
warmer in July than January. These other variations would not be
categorized as strictly cyclic because they do not repeat with
regularity.
Part of the problem here is that we are limited by the length and
quality of our data records. If we accept the ``global'' surface
temperatures for the past 100 years as having reasonable accuracy, even
they cannot tell us whether variations on 200, 500 or 1,000 year time
scales are occurring. Until we understand the magnitude and cause for
these longer variations, we will be unable to state with any confidence
that a human-induced global warming signal has been detected (unless
the world suddenly begins to warm at a very rapid rate). The present
rate of temperature change is not outside of natural rates observed in
the past. The IPCC was careful to remind the readers in the
Policymakers Summary that natural variability was a key uncertainty in
this scientific endeavor and was a major reason for the cautious words
``. . . balance of evidence suggests . . .''.
Further studies of the paleoclimate records will lead to a more
knowledgeable assessment of the scale of natural variations, and
therefore provide the context in which detection of human-induced
changes may be identified.
Question 2. Would we be able to detect variations attributable to
human activities in this natural cycle?
Response. We know that climate models, which try to detect natural
vs. unnatural changes, are primitive and are essentially unable to
reproduce natural variations on the longer time scales (e.g., Barnett
et al., 1996; Estimates of low frequency natural variability in near-
surface air temperature. Holocene, 6, 255-263). Barnett et al.
concluded
. . . our results should serve as a warning to those anxious
rigorously to pursue the detection of anthropogenic effects in
observed climate data: the spectrum of natural variability
against which detection claims, positive or negative, are made
is not well known and apparently not well represented in early
CGCM [coupled global climate model] control runs.
Thus, separating a slow, modest human-induced warming trend which
is apparently smaller than changes observed in paleoclimate records, is
a tenuous exercise at present. The problem here is that even more
rapid, natural changes have occurred in the past. Let me quote from an
issue of PAGES (Past Global Changes Programme, IGBP, 4, #3 Nov. 1996).
Climate variability at both a regional and a global scale
has, even within the boundary conditions prevailing during the
Late-Holocene [last 5000 years], been significantly greater
than has been recorded during the short, recent period for
which instrumental records of climate variation exist [last 100
years]. This is conclusively demonstrated by recent research,
is of crucial significance for predicting future climate change
and is not recognized in the recent IPCC Report.
I prefer the terminology ``natural variations'' vs. ``natural
cycles'' since the longer term variations are not strictly cyclic. I
believe future research will continue to show that some of the past,
natural changes were quite rapid and severe and that changes naturally
occur from any century to the next. This confounds ones attempts to
attribute any variation to human-effects. So, the short answer to this
question is that unless the warming is dramatic (which to date it has
not been), we will be hard pressed to prove that the present level of
climate variation is due to human-induced causes.
Question 3. We know that CO2 has the potential for
affecting the climatic balance of our atmosphere. Would it not make
sense to limit the amount of CO2 we put into the atmosphere
until we more fully understand the effects CO2 have on our
climate. If the consequences of choosing ``limitations on
CO2'' vs. ``unlimited CO2'' were similar, I would
readily agree that ``limitations on CO2'' should be chosen.
In the real world, however, forcing a limit on CO2
production has tremendous economic (and thus, political) consequences.
As we noted in the hearing, small or even moderate reductions in
CO2 production in the U.S. will do essentially nothing to
change any possible global warming.
Response. An idea I would put forth is to let the U.S. Government
take the lead in generating reductions of CO2. The
government owns thousands of vehicles, elec-
[[Page 110]]
tricity-intensive appliances, heavy equipment, inefficient buildings
etc. By setting for itself more stringent standards, and purchasing new
equipment and services within the free market, the government in effect
sponsors the R&D for these new products, allowing future costs for
these more efficient technologies to be lower to the public and
therefore more acceptable in the long run.
Such a large government program must begin with accurate data of
the current emissions so that future reductions could be precisely
assessed. I would think every aspect of government use of
CO2 would be measured (i.e. field tested) and documented.
Then, a program to upgrade current vehicles, appliances, building
environments, and even military maneuvers, to reduce carbon emissions
could be initiated. The monitoring program would then be in place to
prove to the interested parties (i.e. international monitoring agencies
and the American public) that reduction in emissions is occurring.
In this scheme, the government would become the laboratory out of
which proven technologies could be made available for public
consumption, though some form of incentives would likely be required to
replace cheap but inefficient equipment. How would this program be paid
for? My personal opinion is that a nickel tax per gallon of gasoline
(i.e. ``A Nickel for Nature''?) would not cause great hardship for the
vast majority of Americans and would raise quite a bit of revenue for
the government to proceed. Such a tax might even be politically
acceptable if promoted as a way for everyone to help the environment
and the revenues were explicitly used for that program.
I suppose my point here is this: there are some rather modest
programs that may be initiated to deal with what appears at this time
to be at most a modest problem. These programs would have a minuscule
effect of CO2 concentrations, but would perhaps nudge a new
set of technologies out into the market place due to the fact the U.S.
Government is a very, very big customer.
I would be remiss if I did not address a major aspect of this
entire debate that has been basically ignored. It is popular today to
think that burning carbon is an evil and destructive activity. I lived
in Kenya, East Africa for 2 years, teaching physics and chemistry and
sometimes distributing food and medicine to people in great need. To
me, these Africans were not nameless images on a TV screen. I knew them
as fellow human beings with names, families, friends and hopes. We
provided for them that which they could not provide for themselves.
What we gave them came from an American nation whose economic engine
has fueled the discoveries that have given our country a standard of
living envied throughout the world and whose shared-benefits have
lifted many millions of non-Americans to a better life. I had a small
part in that enterprise because American people, who admittedly burn a
lot of carbon, were generous in financing experiences such as mine in
Africa.
Today, the world's one and only superpower is dedicated to, among
other noble pursuits, free and open scientific inquiry, freedom of
faith and freedom of association. Such noble ideas are not expressed in
the economic models out of which various scenarios of future policy are
determined. What is their value? say they are invaluable. To be sure,
we have ``spent'' considerable amounts of carbon to achieve what we
have, but I believe it has largely been well-spent when one looks at
the entire picture.
I realize that reductions of CO2 are eventually going to
affect us, yet I wonder if those who advocate draconian measures truly
understand how the world as a whole would be affected. I've lived in a
part of the world for which a loss of American economic strength and
world leadership would probably cause greater suffering. As poorly as
we model the global climate, even these physical results are more
realistic than predictions of economic and social impacts which build
upon the imperfect climate model output. In short, the impacts to human
existence of a doubling or tripling of CO2 are almost
impossible to predict when one considers our present level of ignorance
in these matters.
______
Prepared Statement of Richard S. Lindzen, Alfred P. Sloan Professor of
Meteorology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
I wish to thank Senators Chafee and Baucus, as well as the members
of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, for the
opportunity to put forward my views on the issue of putative global
warming.
introduction
The issue of global warming is one of the more contentious issues
in science today. Superficially, it is frequently portrayed as a
`simple' issue. Gases which absorb infrared radiation (known as
greenhouse gases) inhibit radiative cooling of the earths
[[Page 111]]
surface and hence increasing greenhouse gases must lead to warming. The
issue is rendered more complex by the fact that the surface of the
earth does not cool primarily by means of radiation, but rather cools
by evaporation and convection. Moreover, the main greenhouse gas is
water vapor which is both natural in origin and highly variable in its
distribution. In the absence of good records of water vapor we aren't
even in a position to say how much total greenhouse gases have
increased. If this weren't bad enough, it isn't even the total amount
of greenhouse gas which matters; for example, a molecule of water vapor
at 12 km altitude is more effective than a thousand molecules near the
surface. All of this might not be relevant if models were trustworthy,
but satellite measurements of upper level water vapor show profound
discrepancies in model results. Under the circumstances, it is
surprising that there is any agreement among scientists, but, in fact,
most scientists working on climate dynamics would agree that increasing
levels of carbon dioxide should have some impact on climate. The real
argument is over whether the impact will be significant. The word
`significant,' in this context, has a rather specific meaning. The
climate is a naturally variable system. That is to say, it varies
without any external forcing. Human society already has to deal with
this degree of variability over which it has no control. For
anthropogenic climate change to be `significant,' it must be as large
or larger than natural variability. For smaller changes, the historical
record demonstrates our capacity to adapt. It is in this context that
the statement frequently drawn from the 1995 IPCC (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change) report assumes some relevance. It is
important, therefore, to know precisely what this statement does and
doesn't say. Although it is likely that the statement is also
incorrect, that turns out to be less important.
discernable influence
Let us begin by quoting this statement (which, in contrast to
earlier IPCC reports, gives considerable more attention to important
caveats):
``Our ability to quantify the human influence on global
climate is currently limited because the expected signal is
still emerging from the noise of natural variability, and
because there are uncertainties in key factors. These include
the magnitude and patterns of long-term natural variability and
the time-evolving pattern of forcing by, and response to,
changes in concentrations of greenhouse and aerosols, and land-
surface changes. Nevertheless, the balance of evidence suggests
that there is a discernible human influence on global
climate.''
What it says is that the climate's behavior over the past century
appears ``unlikely to be due entirely to natural variability (IPCC
1995, p. 412).'' As Chapter 8 of IPCC 95 points out, even this trivial
assertion, which, as I have noted, seems totally compatible with our
theoretical understanding and makes no claims concerning the magnitude
of global warming, is dependent on the assumption that natural
variability is replicated in models (IPCC 95 p. 430) an assumption
which is clearly untrue since major observed components of natural
variability like the quasi-biennial oscillation and El-Nino are either
not replicated at all or replicated very poorly. Indeed the very
structure of the circulation in models is different from what is
observed in the data (Polyak and North, 1997). The specific feature
which led Santer (the lead author of Chapter 8 of IPCC 95) to claim
discovery of the discernible impact of anthropogenic forcing fails the
most elementary test of statistical robustness: namely, it disappears
when additional data is considered. Chapter 8 concludes that our
ability to quantify the magnitude of global warming ``is currently
limited by uncertainties in key factors, including the magnitude and
patterns of longer-term natural variability and the time-evolving
patterns of forcing by (and response to) greenhouse gases and
aerosols.'' In brief, a decade of focus on global warming and billions
of dollars of research funds have still failed to establish that global
warming is a significant problem. Normally, this would lead one to
conclude that the problem is less serious than originally suggested.
While the IPCC 1995 report does not go so far as to state this
explicitly, it is certainly the most subdued and reserved of the
numerous IPCC reports issued since 1990.
It has been a remarkable example of semantic distortion that this
weak and unsupportable statement has encouraged environmental advocates
to claim that this report endorses various catastrophic scenarios. An
appeal issued a few days ago by one such organization, The Union of
Concerned Scientists, illustrates the general procedure. The statement
begins with a clear misrepresentation of the IPCC statement:
``Predictions of global climatic change are becoming more confident. A
broad consensus among the world's climatologists is that there is now
`a discernible human influence on global climate.' '' The UCS
immediately continues: ``Climate change is projected to raise sea
levels, threatening populations and ecosystems in
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coastal regions. Warmer temperatures will lead to a more vigorous
hydrological cycle, increasing the prospects for more intense rainfall,
floods, and droughts in some regions. Human health may be damaged by
greater exposure to heat waves and droughts, and by encroachment of
tropical diseases to higher latitudes.'' The UCS proceeds to then
associate climate change with forest depletion, water scarcity, food
security, and species destruction. It concludes that scientists must
endorse a strong climate treaty at Kyoto. The implication is that the
so-called IPCC consensus extends to these claims as well. This is
clearly a misrepresentation of the IPCC.. I use the phrase `so-called'
advisedly. The IPCC went to great lengths to include as many names as
possible among its contributors. Against my expressed wishes, even my
name was included. I can assure the committee that I (and the vast
majority of contributors and reviewers) were never asked whether we
even agreed with the small sections we commented on. Nevertheless, the
usual comment is that 2,500 scientists all agree with whatever it is
that the environmental advocates are claiming. To the credit of the
IPCC, it extensively documented the shortcomings of various
projections, and made few claims for any confidence. The document was
deeply biased insofar as it took as its task the finding of global
warming rather than the more objective approach of determining whether
it is indeed a significant problem. Such an approach could be
rationalized on the basis of sincere concern. However, even this
document puts forward comments which are misleading. For example, on
page 45 which deals with potential surprises, the possibility of an
instability of the West Antarctic ice sheet is mentioned without any
reference to the fact that such an unlikely instability is largely
unrelated to climate (Bentley, 1997).
Genuinely Misleading Statement
One of the common claims in support of the reality and seriousness
of global warming is that we have had a large portion of record
breaking warm years during the last decade or so. This is not a claim
used by the IPCC, and its presence in any discussion is a rather clear
piece of evidence of the intent to deceive (especially when the claim
is made by a scientist). As noted by Solow and Broadus (1989) and
Bassett (1992), this is an inevitable occurrence when one has a single
record breaker in a time series characterized by interannual
variability, interdecadal variability and an underlying trend or longer
period variability. Solow and Broadus show the clustered nature of
record breakers. For those who can follow some mathematics, the
situation is easily synthesized as follows.
[[Page 113]]
Let us represent the time series for temperature by the following
expression:
where the first term corresponds to interannual variability, the second
term to interdecadal variability, and third to longer term trends or
variability. This series is shown in Figure 1.
Not surprisingly, record breakers cluster in exactly the manner
found by Solow and Broadus (1989) in the observed temperature record.
The occurrence of such record breakers contributes no additional
information. Our prime concern remains with the determination of trend
and the identification of such trends with emissions of carbon dioxide,
and this remains a difficult and contested issue as the IPCC freely
acknowledges.
Scientific Waffling
S. Fred Singer has recently reported that the former head of the
IPCC, Bert Bolin, has denied claims by Vice President Gore and
environmental activists that ``any floods, droughts, hurricanes, or
other extreme weather patterns are the result of rising global
temperatures.'' Bolin is quoted as saying ``There has been no effect on
countries from any current change,'' adding that efforts by activists
to establish such a link ``is why I do not trust the Greens.'' Although
I was not present at the debate where Bolin is alleged to have made
this remark, my personal experience suggests that it may be true. In
1993 at a mock trial of global warming held by the BBC in which both
Bolin and I participated, Bolin made similar admissions. Nevertheless,
in response to Singer's claims, Bolin has issued a formal denial. It
may be of interest to look at this denial in some detail.
``Observations show that some extreme events are becoming more
intense (heavy rainfall events in some regions), some are becoming less
intense (cold spells), while others show no statistically significant
changes (hurricanes). These changes are consistent with the kind of
changes that would be associated with a warmer climate. While it cannot
yet be concluded that these changes are caused by human-induced changes
of climate, neither can this association be excluded. To state that
these sorts of changes that `are consistent' with the predicted effects
of climate change, as Vice-President Gore is quoted to have stated, is
a scientifically accurate statement and no cause for criticism.''
In saying this, Bolin parts company with normative science which
recognizes the virtual impossibility of disproving unverifiable
assertions and sticks to statements that are capable of
`falsification.' `Consistency,' in this context merely means that the
situation is so unclear that virtually anything is will `be
consistent.' In the long run, the replacement of the precise and
disciplined language of science by the misleading language of
litigation and advocacy may be one of the more important sources of
damage to society incurred in the current debate over global warming.
[[Page 114]]
What can be said of the influence of increasing carbon dioxide?
Since the Charney Report of the NRC in 1979, the range of expected
equilibrium global warming due to doubling carbon dioxide has been
stated to be from about 1\1/2\C to 5\1/2\C. This is simply a statement
of the range of results obtained by existing models, and assumes,
somewhat illogically, that the correct answer must be in the output of
at least one model. However, as frequently noted by the IPCC, the
correct answer depends on correctly simulating feedbacks which, at
present, are only poorly known and modeled. Despite this
uncertainty,there are some aspects of the problem that are somewhat
better known. In general, the response to doubled carbon dioxide (or
equivalent carbon dioxide where the effect of other anthropogenic
greenhouse gases is expressed in terms of `equivalent' carbon dioxide)
in the absence of feedbacks is taken to be the response when all other
atmospheric parameters are held constant. The changes due to
concomitant changes in other parameters are called feedbacks. There is
some disagreement over whether one should consider the distribution of
temperature change as a feedback. If one does, then the no-feedback
equilibrium response to doubled carbon dioxide is about 0.3\1/2\C
(Lindzen, 1995a); if one does not, then the no-feedback response is
about 1.2\1/2\C. The latter is much larger than the former because it
includes the warming effect at the surface of cooling in the
stratosphere. If one takes the latter approach, then the most important
feedback is due to upper level (above about 2 km) water vapor. In all
existing models (in the original models by explicit assumption), water
vapor, the most important greenhouse gas, increases at all levels as
surface temperature increases, doubling the no-feedback response to
doubled carbon dioxide. The presence of the positive water vapor
feedback in current models also increases the sensitivity of these
models to other smaller feedbacks such as those due to clouds and snow
reflectivity. The trouble with current models is that they generally
lack the physics to deal with the upper level water vapor budget, and
they are generally unable, for computational reasons, to properly
calculate a quantity like water vapor which varies sharply both
vertically and horizontally (Sun and Lindzen, 1993, Lindzen, 1995).
Indicative of these problems is the recent work of J.J. Bates and D.L.
Jackson at NOAA who found, using satellite data from infrared sounders,
that, on the average, current models underestimate zonally averaged
(averaged around a latitude circle) water vapor by about 20 percent.
This is illustrated in Figure 2. It should be noted that this
represents an error in radiative forcing of about 20 Watts per square
meter, as compared with the forcing of 4 Watts per square meter due to
a doubling of carbon dioxide (Thompson and Warren, 1982, Lindzen,
1995). More recent observational analyses by Spencer and Braswell
(1997), using satellite microwave data, suggest that even Bates and
Jackson have overestimated water vapor, and that the discrepancy with
models is still greater. Under the circumstances, there seems to be
little actual basis for the most important positive feedback in models.
Given our in-
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ability to detect expected warming in the temperature data, one might
reasonably conclude that models have overestimated the problem.
In some ways, we are driven to a philosophical consideration:
namely, do we think that a long-lived natural system, like the earth,
acts to amplify any perturbations, or is it more likely that it will
act to counteract such perturbations? It appears that we are currently
committed to the former rather vindictive view of nature.
What can be said of the implications of proposed policies for climate?
The above remarks dealt with the issue of global warming as a
phenomenon. However, the current political concern deals with the
proposed setting of firm emission limitations at the forthcoming Kyoto
meeting in December. The underlying assumption is that stabilization of
emissions at 1990 levels (or modest reductions of these levels) would
spare the world from global warming, should the more extreme model
forecasts prove correct (despite the patent shortcomings of these
models, and the absence of convincing confirmation in existing data).
It is important, therefore, to note that such emissions reductions
would have no such effect regardless of what one believes about global
warming. The effects of either lesser reductions or of restricting
emission reductions to the developed world would be even more
negligible in terms of climate impact. This is illustrated in Figures 3
and 4 taken from a recent report of Prinn et al (1997) based on the
model developed for MIT's Program on the Science and Policy of Global
Change. Figure 3 shows carbon dioxide levels for a variety of
scenarios. The levels by 2100 vary from about 590 ppmv to 950 ppmv.
Figure 4 shows global mean temperature change for various conditions
indicated by three letters. The first letter refers to emissions, with
H associated with the high values in Figure 3 and L with the low
values; R refers to a reference case. The second letter refers to the
ocean delay with H referring to short delay and L referring to long
delay. The third letter refers to climate sensitivity with H referring
to an equilibrium sensitivity to doubled carbon dioxide of about
4.5 deg.C, and L to a sensitivity of about 1.5 deg.C. We see that for
high climate sensitivity we will get pronounced warming regardless of
emission scenario, while for low sensitivity, emission scenarios will
not matter. It is important to note that emission caps proposed for
Kyoto, as difficult and expensive as they may prove, will not prevent
global warming if the climate should prove sensitive. The impact of any
proposed policy, currently reckoned as even marginally feasible, will
likely be impossible to ascertain regardless of what the climate
sensitivity is. However, what Figure 4 does tell us is that should
there be little warming over the next 50 years, it won't be because of
any policy we implement at Kyoto.
[[Page 116]]
references
Bassett, G.W. (1992) Breaking recent global temperature records.
Climate Change, 21, 303-315.
Bentley, C.R. (1997) Rapid sea-level rise soon from West Antarctic
Sheet collapse? Science, 275, 1077-1078
Bates, J.J. and D.L. Jackson (1997) A comparison of water vapor
observations with AMIP-1 simulations. In preparation.
IPCC 95 (1996) Climate change 1995: The science of climate change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 572pp.
Lindzen, R.S. (1995) The importance and nature of the water vapor
budget in nature and models. In Climate Sensitivity to Radiative
Perturbations: Physical Mechanisms and their Validation, H. Le
Treut (editor), pp. 51-66, NATO ASI Series 1: Global Environmental
Change, Vol. 34, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 331p.
Lindzen, R.S. (1995a) How cold would we get under CO2-less
sky? Phys. Today, 48, 78-80.
Polyak, I. and G. North (1997) Evaluation of the GFDL GCM climate
variability, 2, Stochastic modeling and latitude-temporal fields.
J. Geophys. Res., 102, 6799-6812.
Prinn, R., H. Jacoby, A. Sokolov et al (1997) Integrated global system
model for climate policy assessment: feedbacks and sensitivity
studies. In preparation.
Solow, A.R. and J.M. Broadus (1989) On the detection of greenhouse
warming. Climate Change, 15, 449-453.
Spencer, R.W. and W.D. Braswell (1997) How dry is the tropical free
troposphere? Implications for global warming theory. Bull. Amer.
Met. Soc., 78, 1097-1106.
Sun, D-Z. and R.S. Lindzen (1993) Distribution of tropical tropospheric
water vapor. J. Atmos. Sci., 50, 1643-1660.
Thompson, S.L. and S.G. Warren (1982) Parameterization of outgoing
infrared radiation derived from detailed radiative calculations. J.
Atmos. Sci., 39, 2667-2680.
[[Page 117]]
[[Page 118]]
Responses by Richard Lindzen to Additional Questions from Senator
Baucus
Response 1. Dr. Barron's suggestion was intentionally generic
rather than specific. Moreover, adaptive policies require something to
adapt to, and in the words of Bert Bolin, the former head of the IPCC,
``There has been no effect on countries from any current change. The
increases in temperature have been so small as to be barely
detectible.'' Thus, at the moment, there is nothing special to adapt
to. In the longer term, we can plausibly expect many things to change
over the next century including the climate (even without any influence
from man) in almost totally unanticipated ways. It thus behooves us to
continue to develop a society that can successfully deal with and
exploit change. The obvious tools for this are wealth and capital,
information and education, as well as flexibility, freedom and
intelligence.
Response 2. Frankly, I do not know the basis for Dr. Schneider's
remark. However, it is obvious that species respond to local rather
than global conditions, and locally, changes on the order of 1.5 deg.C
and more have occurred over the past century or even less. This has led
to some modest species migration and changes in agriculture, but not,
to the best of my knowledge, to extinctions. What I suspect Dr.
Schneider may be referring to is the fact that climate change in the
past, forced by changing patterns of heating, among other things,
rather than gross global heating, has been characterized by large
changes in the temperature difference between the tropics and the poles
rather than changes in global mean temperature. Thus, by some
reckonings during the last major glaciation global mean temperature may
only have been about 8 deg.C colder than at present. Indeed, both
glaciation and deglaciation led to species extinctions for creatures
that had specifically adapted to the earlier climate and terrain. Even
so, these were not among the major periods of species loss.
Response 3. First, let me state that predictions of large climate
change already require that these mechanisms act to amplify the changes
due to increasing anthropogenic greenhouse gases. There is no credible
evidence for this. The warming expected from a doubling of
CO2 even in the absence of any natural thermostatic control
would only be about 1 deg.C (and about 1.5 deg.C for a tripling; the
effect is not linear). This low level of warming calls for no mechanism
whatever to counteract the effect of increased anthropogenic greenhouse
gases. Predictions of greater warming actually require that water vapor
act in such a way as to increase the warming by a factor of two and
more. I intentionally refer to the action of water vapor rather than to
the amount of water vapor. Water vapor in the atmosphere is extremely
heterogeneous. There are regions that are very dry and regions that are
very moist. Most water vapor resides in the lowest 2-3 km of the
atmosphere, but it is water vapor above this level that is most
important to the greenhouse effect (E. Schneider et al, 1997, Shine and
Sinha, 1991). Moreover, most radiative cooling occurs in dry regions,
and cooling would increase if the dry regions increased in area even if
the net water vapor increased. Understanding the water vapor feedback
in dry regions is central to determining the feedback. Here, the budget
of water vapor consists in drying due to subsiding air and moisturizing
from the evaporation of ice thrown off by clouds rather than directly
falling as rain (Sun and Lindzen, 1993, describe the water vapor budget
in detail). If claims of an intensified hydrological cycle in a warmer
climate prove correct, then the drying term will increase. Moreover,
the amount of ice thrown off depends on the precipitation efficiency of
clouds. The more efficient the clouds, the less ice there is to throw
off According to every text on cloud physics written over the past half
century, precipitation efficiency increases with increasing temperature
(Fletcher, 1962, Mason, 1971, Rogers and Yau, 1989 for example). Thus
we expect the moisturizing to decrease. Both effects should lead to an
expansion of the dry regions which would counteract the effect of
increasing CO2. This is the opposite of what current models
display, which is not surprising since current models completely fail
to produce dry regions of the sort observed in satellite data (Spencer
and Braswell, 1997).
Response 4. The IPCC conclusion was based on the then unpublished
work of Santer et al (1996). This work used radiosonde (balloon) data
from sometime in the 70's until 1987. As shown by Michaels and
Knappenberger (1996) when the available radiosonde data until 1995 was
used, the effect that Santer et al claimed to have found (a correlation
between observations and model predictions) disappeared. Another study
by some of the same authors who participated in Santer et al also
reached the conclusion that the earlier study was not statistically
robust (Tett et al, 1996). In fact, studies examining the results in
Santer et al were not possible until after the publication of IPCC 95,
since the Santer et al paper had not yet appeared when IPCC 95 was
published. This, of course, is counter to the claimed policy of the
IPCC. That said, the Santer et al paper never claimed to quantify the
[[Page 119]]
impact of human activities. The paper, moreover, acknowledged that even
the meager result claimed was absolutely dependent on the assumption
that natural variability was well replicated by model variability--a
dubious assumption at best. Finally, the paper failed to consider
whether the observed behavior could be due to other factors. The Santer
et al paper and IPCC use of it are excellent examples of how virtually
meaningless statements by scientists can be found by non-scientists to
have dire import. In many cases, the scientists are by no means
innocent of exploiting this difference in perception.
Response 5. No, I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to
continue pursuing ``some kind of policy to limit CO2
emissions''. If the only reason you can imagine for supporting climate
research is the likelihood of catastrophe, then by all means stop
funding research. However, in the light of my answer to your first
question, this would seem short sighted indeed. Regardless of the
current evidence or lack thereof, it seems to me that it would be
unwise to make support of any science contingent on the projection of
catastrophe.
Response 6. Predicting industrial trajectories is as difficult as
any other kind of long term prediction. However, I personally think
that it is entirely possible, in the light of our present imperfect
knowledge, that atmospheric CO2 levels in 2100 will be
double present values. About the only effect of this that we are
presently reasonably sure of is that plant growth will increase, and
plant susceptibility to water stress will decrease. As concerns
climate, we have already had a 50 percent increase in `effective'
CO2 since the last century, and hardly anyone has noticed.
There is no compelling evidence that matters will change dramatically
with further increases.
references
N.H. Fletcher (1962) The Physics of Rain Clouds, Cambridge University
Press.
B.J. Mason (1971) The Physics of Clouds, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Michaels, P. J. and Knappenberger, P.C. (1996) Human effect on global
climate?, Nature, 384, 522.
Rogers and Yau (1989) A Short Course in Cloud Physics, Pergamon Press.
Santer, B.D., K.E. Taylor, T.M.L. Wigley, T.C. Johns, P.D. Jones, D.J.
Karoly, J.F.B. Mitchell, A.H. Oort, J.E. Penner, V. Ramaswamy, M.D.
Schwarzkop?, R.J. Stouffer, and S. Tett (1996). A search for human
influences on the thermal structure of the atmosphere, Nature, 382,
39.
Schneider, E.K., B.P. Kirtman and R.S. Lindzen (1997) Upper
tropospheric water vapor and climate sensitivity. submitted to J.
Atmos. Sci.
Shine, K.P. and A. Sinha (1991) Sensitivity of the Earth's climate to
height dependent changes in the water vapor mixing ratio, Nature,
354: 382.
Spencer, R.W. and W.D. Braswell (1997) How dry is the tropical tree
troposphere? Implications for global warming theory, Bull Amer.
Met. Soc., 78, 1097-1106.
Sun, D-Z. and R.S. Lindzen (1993) Distribution of tropical tropospheric
water vapor, J. Atmos. Sci., 50, 1643-1660.
Tett, S.F.B., J.F.B. Mitchell, D.E. Parker, and M.R. Allen (1996).
Human Influence on the Atmospheric Vertical Temperature Structure:
Detection and Observations, Science, 274, 1170.
______
Response by Richard Lindzen to an Additional Question from Senator
Boxer
Response. The most famous cycle of climate change we know of is the
100,000 year cycle of glaciation usually identified with orbital
variations. Numerous climate changes on shorter time scales have been
observed, though it is hardly clear that these are cyclic. Among the
more famous climate events of the holocene (the period since the last
ice age) are the mid-holocene optimum, the medieval optimum and the
little ice age. Traditionally, warm periods were referred to as optima.
Regionally, many regions have undergone climate change that may be
peculiar to those regions. In fact, regional variability is generally
much larger than global variability. Even within this century, there
appears, for example, to have been a significant winter cooling trend
in north Florida. On relatively short time scales, climatic variations
associated with El Ninos are beginning to be understood. However,
although strong interdecadal variability is evident in the data, its
cause is not understood. What is increasingly clear is that the
atmospheric system is capable of variability without external forcing,
and that variability is the norm rather than the exception. The
detection of change due to human activity amidst all this natural
variability is, indeed, a difficult task. However, it would not be
difficult if warming were to be progressing at the rate suggested in
the 1990 IPCC report (0.3 deg.C per decade).
[[Page 120]]
Your last question clearly transcends science. I would normally be
sympathetic to your suggestion if it were cost-free. However, as I
noted in my testimony, presently suggested policies like limiting
emissions to 1990 levels would have little impact on either
CO2 buildup or projected warming (regardless of model or
belief). Moreover, without the participation of all nations, the impact
would be essentially nil. Thus, we are suggesting potentially large
costs (both in terms of money and regulatory burden) for certifiably
small benefits. This really does not seem to make much sense on the
face of it.
______
Prepared Statement of Stephen H. Schneider, Professor, Department of
Biological Sciences, Stanford University
climate change: causes, impacts and uncertainties
I. Does Natural Variability Explain All Climate Change?
Twenty thousand years ago, a mere blink in geologic time, a visitor
to the now-productive Corn Belt of Illinois would not be sitting in the
heart of the world's foremost granary, but rather open spruce parkland
forest, where many of the tree species seen are the same kinds that are
found today 500 to 1,000 miles north in the Boreal Forests of Canada.
Similarly, if we could somehow have been flying over the Great Basin we
would have seen the massive fossil lakes, some stretching hundreds of
miles like former Lake Bonneville in Utah, and the now-fossil beaches
(currently visible flying into Salt Lake City Airport or over Mono
Lake) from those high water stands that date back 10 to 15 thousand
years ago. The Ice Age, which at its maximum some 20,000 years ago was
about 5 deg. to 7 deg.C (around 100 deg.F) colder than our current
global climate, disappeared in, what is to nature, a relatively rapid
period of about 5,000 to 10,000 years. The average rate of temperature
change from the Ice Age to the current 10,000 year period of relative
climate stability, our so-called Holocene Interglacial, is about
1 deg.C change for every thousand years. Of course there were more
rapid periods embedded within this timeframe, but I'm only giving the
sustained average rates.
Not only did such change correspond with radical alterations to the
ecosystems of the earth, but have been implicated in the extinction of
what is known as the charismatic megafauna (woolly mammoth, saber tooth
tigers, etc.). Fossil pollen evidence tells us that the vegetation
habitats during the more ``rapid'' parts of the transition from ice age
to interglacial around 10 to 12 thousand years ago saw what
paleoclimatologists call ``no analog habitats,'' that is, combinations
of pollen abundances which do not exist on earth today. All of this
change was natural, of course, and there are two reasons for mentioning
it in our context. First, to remind us that the climate and ecosystems
change by themselves, without need of humans (the latter is what we
call anthropogenic causation), and second, that climate change of about
several degrees on a global average basis is a very significant change
from the point of view of natural systems.
Explanations of the Ice Age vary, the most popular one being a
change in the amount of sunlight coming in between (a) winter and
summer and (b) the poles and the equator. These changes in the
distribution of seasonal or latitudinal sunshine are due to slow
variations in the tilt of the earth's axis and other orbital elements,
but these astronomical variations alone cannot totally explain the
climatic cycles. If these orbital variations and other factors (such as
the increased reflectivity of the earth associated with more ice) are
combined, our best climate theories (embodied through mathematical
models that are comprised of the physical laws of conservation of mass,
energy and momentum) suggest that the Ice Age should have been several
degrees warmer than it actually was--especially in the Southern
hemisphere. What could account for this extra cold? Perhaps the models
are not sensitive enough, that is they do not respond sufficiently to a
change in so called ``radiative climate forcing,'' that is the change
in the amount of radiant energy coming to the earth from external
factors like orbital variations or extra ice. Another (more likely, I
think) possibility is that something else also changed at the same
time.
These theories can be better reconciled with what happened between
ice ages and interglacials if one assumes that several watts of energy
over every square meter of the earth were taken away in the ice age by
some other mechanism at a global scale. But what could be such a
mechanism? The obvious candidate would be a change in the composition
of the earth's atmosphere which affects both its reflectivity and its
heat trapping capacity (e.g., decreases in the well-known greenhouse
effect or increases in atmospheric dust). But what evidence is there
that greenhouse gases, for example carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, or water vapor, had lower concentrations 20,000 years ago than
in the interglacial? About 15 years ago that
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evidence came through loud and clear from the ice caps of the world.
Air trapped in these glaciers provides a library of the history of the
earth's atmosphere back some 200,000 years. It shows that during the
past two ice ages carbon dioxide concentration was about 40 percent
less and methane half of the average value during the current and
penultimate interglacials. It also shows that since the Industrial
Revolution carbon dioxide has increased beyond any levels experienced
in the past 150,000 years (at least) by nearly 30 percent and methane
by 150 percent--two figures that virtually no knowledgeable scientist
disputes are a result of so-called anthropogenic emissions which are
driven by increasing numbers of people pursuing higher standards of
living and using technology to achieve those growth-oriented goals.
If the carbon dioxide and methane decreases in the last ice age
helped to explain the ice age coldness, can they tell us something
about how the anthropogenic increase of these gases due to human
activities might cause climate change in the future? The answer is
``not directly,'' for it is possible that there are other factors we
have not accounted for in the ice age story that could well have been
involved, and there are still many unanswered questions associated with
the Ice Age cycles. It is simply a circumstantial bit of evidence which
suggests that it is more consistent to explain the ice ages with the
heat trapping power of the greenhouse effect existing at the magnitudes
currently envisioned by most scientists--i.e. a doubling of
CO2 would raise surface temperatures by about 3 deg.C plus
or minus 1.5 deg.C. This is known as the ``climate sensitivity range.''
The magnitude of climate sensitivity that helps to explain the ice age
coldness best is 2-3 deg.C. If the best estimate were ten degrees
warming, which is twice the value at the high end of the climate
sensitivity range thought by the mainstream of scientist today (e.g.,
IPCC 1996a), then the ice ages should have been even colder than they
were. On the other hand, if the earth would only warm up by half a
degree or less if CO2 doubled, then it would be tougher to
explain the magnitude of the ice ages without finding some other
mechanism not yet understood. Of course, the latter is possible, but
what other lines of circumstantial evidence or direct evidence do we
have for estimating climate sensitivity?
We know from quite literally thousands of laboratory experiments
and direct measurements, millions of balloon observations and trillions
of satellites data bits, that the basic structure of the energy flows
in and out of the earth's atmosphere are relatively well understood. We
know that water vapor, carbon dioxide, or methane trap enough energy on
the earth to warm the surface up about 33 deg.C (60 deg.F) relative to
that which would occur in their absence.
This well known natural greenhouse effect is not under dispute, and
has been known for a century and a half. Nor is the 0.5 deg.C (plus or
minus 0.2 deg.C) globally averaged warming trend at the earth's surface
over the past century in dispute. In dispute is whether a small
increment since the Industrial Revolution in this envelope of
greenhouse gases, which our calculations tell us should have trapped
about two extra watts of energy over every square meter of Earth, would
produce a noticeable response (i.e. a ``climate signal''). The debate
over whether that signal has been detected has been intense lately and
this intensity has been based upon significant new pieces of evidence--
albeit each piece is circumstantial--and a few loud, well-publicized
denials that the totality of evidence has any meaning. In the absence
of clear, direct empirical evidence, one often has to use either
circumstantial evidence, or incomplete bits of direct evidence with
uncertainties attached. When the preponderance of such evidence gets
strong enough, then most scientists begin to accept, tentatively of
course, the likelihood of causal connections. Some people shed their
skepticism at different levels than others, so naturally there will be
a cacophonous debate over whether a climate signal has been detected,
let alone whether it could be attributed to human activities. One can
always find some scientist who will want 999 out of a 1,000 probability
of certainty, and others who will accept the proposition at eight or
nine chances out of ten. This is not science, but a value judgment
about the acceptability of a significant, but not conclusive, body of
evidence. The scientific job is to assess (A) what can happen, and (B)
what the odds are of it happening (see, for example, this discussion in
Chapter 6 of Schneider 1997a). Let me discuss this process further.
I have mentioned the ice ages since this is a ``natural
experiment'' that we use, not to forecast the future, but to build
understanding of climate processes and to validate the tools that we do
use to forecast the future--that is, our climate theories embodied in
mathematical models. Are there any other such natural experiments? The
answer is ``yes there are many,'' the two most prominent being (1)
episodic volcanic eruptions which throw dust in the stratosphere that
reflects for a few years a few watts per square meter of solar energy
that otherwise would have reached the lower atmosphere and (2) the
seasonal cycle. Let's consider volcanic eruptions first. Volcanic dust
veils should cool the planet. In fact, the last major eruption, Mt.
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Pinatubo in 1991, was forecast to cool the earth's lower atmosphere on
the order of several tenths of a degree by a number of climate modeling
groups--in advance of the actual data to confirm--and indeed, that is
roughly what happened. However, it could be argued that a few tenths of
a degree cooling, or warming for that matter, might be a natural
fluctuation in the earth's climate system, and indeed, fluctuations of
that magnitude are a part of the natural background ``climatic noise.''
How then could we distinguish the climatic signal of the volcanic
eruption from the noise of the natural variability? In any one eruption
it is difficult to do so since the signal to noise ratio is about one,
i.e. the magnitude of the cooling expected is about equal to the
magnitude of the natural fluctuations in non-volcanic years, and
therefore for any one event we cannot have very much confidence that a
signal has been observed. So the fact that the Pinatubo results showed
up about as predicted doesn't, by itself, give a lot of confidence,
although as a circumstantial bit of evidence is quite useful. However,
another volcanic eruption in 1983, El Chichon, was also followed by
several tenths of a degree cooling, as was the effect after Mt. Agung
in 1963 or Mt. Krakatoa in the Victorian period.
In other words, by looking at the results of several volcanic
eruptions and compositing, a number of scientists (including Mass and
Schneider, 1977) used this technique and discovered that indeed there
was a clear and obvious correlation which suggests that when a few
watts of energy over every square meter of the earth is removed by
volcanic dust veils in the stratosphere, the lower atmosphere will
indeed cool by a few tenths of degrees--the very magnitude predicted by
the same computer models that we use to forecast the effects of a few
watts per square meter of sustained heating from global warming.
What other natural experiments might we have to test climate
sensitivity? My favorite is one that happens every year--the seasons.
Winter predictably follows summer, being some 15 degrees colder in the
Northern Hemisphere and five degrees colder than summer in the Southern
Hemisphere. The reason the Southern Hemisphere has a smaller seasonal
cycle is because it has much more ocean than land, and water has a
higher heat retaining capacity than land or air. Since a season is not
long enough for the planet to reach an equilibrium temperature change,
therefore, the more land dominated Northern Hemisphere has lower heat
capacity and thus a larger seasonal cycle of surface temperature. How
well do the climate models do in reproducing this change? The answer is
``extraordinarily well.'' Although what the absolute temperatures
models may simulate can be off by as much as five or six degrees in
some regions of the world for some seasons, the models' capacity to
reproduce the amplitude of the seasonal cycle of surface air
temperatures, by and large, is quite good. (It is less good for other
variables, however, particularly hydrological systems.) Now, if we were
making a factor of ten error by either overestimating or
underestimating the sensitivity of the climate to radiative forcing, it
would be difficult for the models to reproduce the different seasonal
cycle surface temperature amplitudes over land and oceans as well as
they do. This is another piece of circumstantial evidence suggesting
that current estimate of climate sensitivity is not off by a factor of
ten, as some ``contrarians'' assert. Indeed, indirect evidence like ice
ages, volcanic eruptions and the seasonal cycle simulation skills of
models are prime reasons why many of us in the scientific community
have for the past 20 years expected that ``demonstrable'' (e.g., see
p.11 of Schneider and Mesirow, 1976--in which I projected just such a
change) anthropogenic climate change was not unlikely by the 21st
century.
In summary, then, in my opinion it is unlikely that natural
variability is the explanation of all climate change, especially that
which has been documented in the 20th century. However, since much of
the debate over detection and attribution of human-caused climate
change hinges on the projections of climatic models, it is necessary to
have at least a cursory understanding of how they work. Although it is
impossible to treat more than the highlights of the nature and use of
climatic models in a dozen pages, I nonetheless offer the following
section in the hopes of reducing somewhat the confusion that may exist
in many peoples' minds after listening to the often acrimonious and
technically complex debate over climatic models and their credibility.
II. Overview Of Climate Modeling Fundamentals
Engineers and scientists build models--either mathematical or
physical ones--primarily to perform tests that are either too
dangerous, too expensive, or perhaps impossible to perform with the
real thing. To simulate the climate, a modeler needs to decide which
components of the climatic system to include and which variables to
involve. For example, if we choose to simulate the long-term sequence
of glacials and interglacials (the period between successive ice ages),
our model needs to include explicitly the effects of all the important
interacting components of the climate
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system operating over the past million years or so. These include the
atmosphere, oceans, sea ice/glaciers (cryosphere), land surface
(including biota), land sub-surface and chemical processes (including
terrestrial and marine biogeochemical cycles), as well as the external
or ``boundary forcing'' conditions such as input of solar radiant
energy (e.g., see IPCC, 1996a).
The problem for earth systems scientists is separating out
quantitatively cause and effect linkages from among the many factors
that interact within the earth system. It is a controversial effort
because there are so many sub-systems, so many forcings and so many
interacting complex sets of processes operating at the same time that
debates about the adequacy of models often erupt.
Modeling the Climate System. So how are climate models constructed?
First, scientists look at observations of changes in temperatures,
ozone levels and so forth. This allows us to identify correlations
among variables. Correlation is not necessarily cause and effect--just
because one event tracks another doesn't mean it was caused by it. One
has to actually prove the relationship is causal and explain how it
happened. Especially for cases where unprecedented events are being
considered, a first principles, rather than a purely empirical-
statistical approach is desirable. However, observations can lead to a
hypothesis of cause and effect--``laws''--that can be tested (for
example, see Root and Schneider, 1995). The testing is often based on
simulations with mathematical models run on a computer. The models, in
turn, need to be tested against a variety of observations--present and
paleoclimatic. That is how the scientific method is typically applied.
When a model, or set of linked models, appear plausible, they can be
fed ``unprecedented'' changes such as projected human global change
forcings--changes that have not happened before--and then be asked to
make projections of future climate, ozone levels, forests, species
extinction rates, etc.
The most comprehensive weather simulation models produce three
dimensional details of temperature, winds, humidity, and rainfall all
over the globe. A weather map generated by such a computer model--known
as a general circulation model or GCM--often looks quite realistic, but
it is never faithful in every detail. To make a weather map generated
by computer we need to solve six partial differential equations that
describe the fluid motions in the atmosphere. It sounds in principle
like there's no problem: we know that those equations work in the
laboratory, we know that they describe fluid motions and energy and
mass relationships. So why then aren't the models perfect simulations
of the atmospheric behavior?
One answer is that the evolution of weather from some starting
weather map (known as the initial condition) is not deterministic
beyond about 10 days--even in principle. A weather event on 1 day
cannot be said to determine an event 20 days in the future, all those
commercial ``long-range'' weather forecasts notwithstanding. But the
inherent unpredictability of weather details much beyond 10 days (owing
to the chaotic internal dynamics of the atmosphere) doesn't preclude
accurate forecasts of long-term averages (climate rather than weather).
The seasonal cycle is absolute proof of such deterministic
predictability, as winter reliably follows summer and the cause and
effect is known with certainty.
Grids and Parameterization. The other answer to the imperfection of
general circulation model simulations, even for long-term averages, is
that nobody knows how to solve those six complex mathematical equations
exactly. It's not like an algebraic equation where one can get the
exact solution by a series of simple operations. There isn't any known
mathematical technique to solve such coupled, nonlinear partial
differential equations exactly. We approximate the solutions by taking
the equations, which are continuous, and breaking them down into
discrete chunks which we call grid boxes. A typical GCM grid size for a
``low resolution'' model is about the size of Colorado horizontally and
that of a ``high resolution'' GCM is about the size of Connecticut. In
the vertical dimension there are two (low resolution) up to about 20
(high resolution) vertical layers that are typically spanning the
lowest 10 to 40 kilometers of the atmosphere.
Now, we've already noted that clouds are very important to the
energy balance of the earth-atmosphere system since they reflect
sunlight away and trap infrared heat. But because none of us have ever
seen a single cloud the size of Connecticut, let alone Colorado, we
have a problem of scale--how can we treat processes that occur in
nature at a smaller scale than we can resolve by our approximation
technique of using large grid boxes. For example, we cannot calculate
clouds explicitly because individual clouds are typically the size of a
dot in this grid box. But we can put forward a few reasonable
propositions on cloud physics: if it's a humid day, for example, it's
more likely to be cloudy. If the air is rising, it's also more likely
to be cloudy.
These climate models can predict the average humidity in the
gridbox, and whether the air is rising or sinking on average. So then
we can write what we call a para-
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metric representation or ``parameterization'' to connect large scale
variables that are resolved by the grid box (such as humidity) to
unresolved small scale processes (individual clouds). Then we get a
prediction of grid box-averaged cloudiness through this
parameterization. So-called ``cumulus parameterization'' is one of the
important--and controversial--elements of GCMs that occupy a great deal
of effort in the climate modeling community. Therefore, the models are
not ignoring cloudiness, but neither are they explicitly resolving
individual clouds. Instead, modelers try to get the average effect of
processes that can't be resolved explicitly at smaller scales than the
smallest resolved scale (the grid box) in the GCM. Developing, testing
and validating many such parameterizations is the most important task
of the modelers since these parameterizations determine critically
important issues like ``climate sensitivity.'' The climate sensitivity
is the degree of response of the climate system to a unit change in
some forcing factor: typically, in our context, the change in globally
averaged surface air temperature to a fixed doubling of the
concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide above pre-industrial
levels. This brings us to one of the most profound controversies in
earth systems science, and one of the best examples of the usefulness,
and fragility, of computer modeling.
The Greenhouse Effect. If the earth only absorbed radiation from
the sun without giving an equal amount of heat back to space by some
means, the planet would continue to warm up until the oceans boiled. We
know the oceans are not boiling, and surface thermometers plus
satellites have shown that the earth's temperature remains roughly
constant from year to year (the interannual globally averaged
variability of about 0.2 deg.C or the 0.5 deg.C warming trend in the
20th century, notwithstanding). This near constancy requires that about
as much radiant energy leaves the planet each year in some form as is
coming in. In other words, a near-equilibrium or energy balance has
been established. The components of this energy balance are crucial to
the climate.
All bodies with temperature give off radiant energy. The earth
gives off a total amount of radiant energy equivalent to that of a
black body--a fictional structure that represents an ideal radiator--
with a temperature of roughly--18 deg.C (255 deg.K). The mean global
surface air temperature is about 14 deg.C (287 deg.K), some 32 deg.C
warmer than the earth's black body temperature. The difference is due
to the well-established greenhouse effect.
The term greenhouse effect arises from the classic analogy to a
greenhouse, in which the glass allows the solar radiation in and traps
much of the heat inside. However, the mechanisms are different, for in
a greenhouse the glass primarily prevents convection currents of air
from taking heat away from the interior. Greenhouse glass is not
primarily keeping the enclosure warm by its blocking or re-radiating
infrared radiation; rather, it is constraining the physical transport
of heat by air motion.
Although most of the earth's surface and thick clouds are
reasonably close approximations to a black body, the atmospheric gases
are not. When the nearly black body radiation emitted by the earth's
surface travels upward into the atmosphere, it encounters air molecules
and aerosol particles. Water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, ozone, and many other trace gases in the earth's gaseous
envelope tend to be highly selective--but often highly effective--
absorbers of terrestrial infrared radiation. Furthermore, clouds
(except for thin cirrus) absorb nearly all the infrared radiation that
hits them, and then they reradiate energy almost like a black body at
the temperature of the cloud surface--colder than the earth's surface
most of the time.
The atmosphere is more opaque to terrestrial infrared radiation
than it is to incoming solar radiation, simply because the physical
properties of atmospheric molecules, cloud and dust particles tend on
average to be more transparent to solar radiation wavelengths than to
terrestrial radiation. These properties create the large surface
heating that characterizes the greenhouse effect, by means of which the
atmosphere allows a considerable fraction of solar radiation to
penetrate to the earth's surface and then traps (more precisely,
intercepts and re-radiates) much of the upward terrestrial infrared
radiation from the surface and lower atmosphere. The downward re-
radiation further enhances surface warming and is the prime process
causing the greenhouse effect.
This is not a speculative theory, but a well understood and
validated phenomenon of nature. The most important greenhouse gas is
water vapor, since it absorbs terrestrial radiation over most of the
infrared spectrum. Even though humans are not altering the average
amount of water vapor in the atmosphere very much by direct injections
of this gas, increases in other greenhouse gases which warm the surface
cause an increase in evaporation which increases atmospheric water
vapor concentrations, leading to an amplifying or ``positive'' feedback
process known as the ``water vapor-surface temperature-greenhouse
feedback.'' The latter is believed re-
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sponsible for the bulk of the climate sensitivity (IPCC, 1996a). Carbon
dioxide is another major greenhouse gas. Although it absorbs and re-
emits considerably less infrared radiation than water vapor,
CO2 is of intense interest because its concentration is
increasing due to human activities. Ozone, nitrogen oxides, some
hydrocarbons, and even some artificial compounds like
chlorofluorocarbons are also greenhouse gases. The extent to which they
are important to climate depends upon their atmospheric concentrations,
the rates of change of those concentrations and their effects on
depletion of stratospheric ozone--which in turn, can indirectly modify
the radiative forcing of the lower atmosphere thus changing climate--
currently offsetting a considerable fraction of the otherwise expected
greenhouse warming signal.
The earth's temperature, then, is primarily determined by the
planetary radiation balance, through which the absorbed portion of the
incoming solar radiation is nearly exactly balanced over a year's time
by the outgoing terrestrial infrared radiation emitted by the climatic
system to earth. As both of these quantities are determined by the
properties of the atmosphere and the earth's surface, major climate
theories that address changes in those properties have been
constructed. Many of these remain plausible hypotheses of climatic
change. Certainly the natural greenhouse effect is established beyond a
reasonable scientific doubt, accounting for natural warming that has
allowed the coevolution of climate and life to proceed to this point (
e.g., see Schneider and Londer, 1984). The extent to which human
augmentation of the natural greenhouse effect (i.e., global warming)
will prove serious is, of course, the current debate.
Model Validation. There are many types of parameterizations of
processes that occur at a smaller scale than our models can resolve,
and scientists debate which type is best. In effect, are they an
accurate representation of the large-scale consequences of processes
that occur on smaller scales than we can explicitly treat? These
include cloudiness, radiative energy transport, turbulent convection,
evapotranspiration, oceanic mixing processes, chemical processes,
ecosystem processes, sea ice dynamics, precipitation, mountain effects
and surface winds.
In forecasting climatic change, then, validation of the model
becomes important. In fact, we cannot easily know in principle whether
these parameterizations are ``good enough.'' We have to test them in a
laboratory. That's where the study of paleoclimates has proved so
valuable (e.g., Hoffert and Covey, 1992). We also can test
parameterizations by undertaking detailed small-scale field or modeling
studies aimed at understanding the high resolution details of some
parameterized process the large-scale model has told us is important.
The Second Assessment Report of IPCC (IPCC, 1996a) Working Group I
devoted more than one chapter to the issue of validation of climatic
models, concluding that ``the most powerful tools available with which
to assess future climate are coupled climate models, which include
three-dimensional representations of the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere
and land surface. Coupled climate modeling has developed rapidly since
1990, and current models are now able to simulate many aspects of the
observed climate with a useful level of skill. [For example, as noted
earlier, good skill is found in simulating the very large annual cycle
of surface temperatures in Northern and Southern Hemispheres or the
cooling of the lower atmosphere following the injection of massive
amounts of dust into the stratosphere after explosive volcanic
eruptions such as Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991.] Coupled
model simulations are most accurate at large spatial scales (e.g.,
hemispheric or continental); at regional scales skill is lower''.
[sentence in square brackets added]
One difficulty with coupled models is known as ``flux
adjustment''--a technique for accounting for local oceanic heat
transport processes that are not well simulated in some models. Adding
this element of empirical-statistical ``tuning'' to models that strive
to be based as much as possible on first principles has been
controversial. However, not all models use flux adjustments, yet nearly
all models, with or with out this technique, produce climate
sensitivities within or near to the standard IPCC range of 1.5 to
4.5 deg.C. Flux adjustments do, however, have a large influence on
regional climatic projections, even if they prove not to be a major
impact on globally averaged climate sensitivity. Improving coupled
models is thus a high priority for climate researchers since it is
precisely such regional projections that are so critical to the
assessment of climatic impacts on environment and society (e.g., IPCC,
1996b; IPCC, 1997).
Transient versus Equilibrium Simulations. One final issue needs to
be addressed in the context of coupled climate simulations. Until
recently, climate modeling groups did not have access to sufficient
computing power to routinely calculate time evolving runs of climatic
change given several alternative future histories of greenhouse gases
and aerosol concentrations. That is, they did not perform so-called
transient climate change scenarios. (Of course, the real Earth is
undergoing a transient experiment.) Rather, the models typically were
asked to estimate how the Earth's
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climate would eventually be altered (i.e., in equilibrium) after
CO2 was artificially doubled and held fixed indefinitely
rather than increased incrementally over time as it has in reality or
in more realistic transient model scenarios. The equilibrium climate
sensitivity has remained fairly constant for over 20 years of
assessments by various national and international groups, with the
assessment teams repeatedly suggesting that, were CO2 to
double, climate would eventually warm at the surface somewhere between
1.5 and 4.5 deg. C. (Later on we will address the issue of the
probability that warming above or below this range might occur, and how
probabilities can even be assigned to this sensitivity.)
Transient model simulations exhibit less immediate warming than
equilibrium simulations because of the high heat holding capacity of
the thermally massive oceans. However, that unrealized warming
eventually expresses itself decades to centuries later. This thermal
delay, which can lull us into underestimating the long-term amount of
climate change, is now being accounted for by coupling models of the
atmosphere to models of the oceans, ice, soils, and biosphere (so-
called earth system models--ESMs). Early generations of such transient
calculations with ESMs give much better agreement with observed climate
changes on Earth than previous calculations in which equilibrium
responses to CO2 doubling were the prime simulations
available. When the transient models at the Hadley Center in the United
Kingdom and the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg, Germany were also
driven by both greenhouse gases (which heat) and sulfate aerosols
(which cool), these time evolving simulations yielded much more
realistic ``fingerprints'' of human effects on climate( e.g., Chapter 8
of IPCC, 1996a). More such computer simulations are needed to provide
high confidence levels in the models, but scientists using coupled,
transient simulations are now beginning to express growing confidence
that current projections are plausible.
Transients and Surprises. However, such a very complicated coupled
system like an ESM is likely to have unanticipated results when forced
to change very rapidly by external disturbances like CO2 and
aerosols. Indeed, some of the transient models run out for hundreds of
years exhibit dramatic change to the basic climate state (e.g., radical
change in global ocean currents). Thompson and Schneider (1982) used
very simplified transient models to investigate the question of whether
the time evolving patterns of climate change might depend on the rate
at which CO2 concentrations increased. For slowly increasing
CO2 buildup scenarios, the model predicted the standard
model outcome: the temperature at the poles warmed more than the
tropics.
Any changes in equator-to-pole temperature difference help to
create altered regional climates, since temperature differences over
space influence large-scale atmospheric wind patterns. However, for
very rapid increases in CO2 concentrations a reversal of the
equator-to-pole difference occurred. If sustained over time, this would
imply difficult to forecast, transient climatic conditions during the
century or so the climate adjusts toward its new equilibrium state. In
other words, the harder and faster the enormously complex earth system
is forced to change, the higher the likelihood for unanticipated
responses. Or, in a phrase, the faster and harder we push on nature,
the greater the chances for surprises--some of which are likely to be
nasty.
Noting this possibility, the Summary for Policy makers of IPCC
Working Group I concluded with the following paragraph:
Future unexpected, large and rapid climate system changes (as
have occurred in the past) are, by their nature, difficult to
predict. This implies that future climate changes may also
involve ``surprises.'' In particular these arise from the non-
linear nature of the climate system. When rapidly forced, non-
linear systems are especially subject to unexpected behavior.
Progress can be made by investigating non-linear processes and
sub-components of the climatic system. Examples of such non-
linear behavior include rapid circulation changes in the North
Atlantic and feedbacks associated with terrestrial ecosystem
changes.
Of course, if the Earth system were somehow less ``rapidly forced''
by virtue of policies designed to slow down the rate at which human
activities modify the land surfaces and atmospheric composition, this
would lower the likelihood of non-linear surprises. Whether the risks
of such surprises justify investments in abatement activities is the
question that Integrated Assessment (IA) activities are designed to
inform (IPCC, 1996c). The likelihood of various climatic changes, along
with estimates of the probabilities of such potential changes, are the
kinds of information IA modelers need from earth systems scientists in
order to perform IA simulations. We turn next, therefore, to a
discussion of methods to evaluate the subjective probability
distributions of scientists on one important climate change issue, the
climate sensitivity.
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Subjective Probability Estimation. Finally, what does define a
scientific consensus? Morgan and Keith (1995) and Nordhaus (1994) are
two attempts by non-climate scientists, who are interested in the
policy implications of climate science, to tap the knowledgeable
opinions of what they believe to be representative groups of scientists
from physical, biological and social sciences on two separate
questions: first the climate science itself and second impact
assessment and policy. Their sample surveys show that although there is
a wide divergence of opinion, nearly all scientists assign some
probability of negligible outcomes and some probability of very highly
serious outcomes, with one or two exceptions, like Richard Lindzen at
MIT (who is scientist number 5 on Fig. 1 of Morgan and Keith).
In the Morgan and Keith study, each of the 16 scientists listed in
Table 1 were put through a several hour, formal decision-analytic
elicitation of their subjective probability estimates for a number of
factors. Figure 1 shows the elicitation results for the important
climate sensitivity factor. Note that 15 out of 16 scientists surveyed
(including several IPCC Working Group I Lead Authors--I am scientist 9)
assigned something like a 10 percent subjective likelihood of
negligible (less than 1 deg.C) climatic change from doubling of
CO2. These scientists also typically assigned a 10 percent
probability for extremely large climatic changes--greater than 5 deg.C,
roughly equivalent to the temperature difference experienced between a
glacial and interglacial age, but occurring some hundred times more
rapidly. In addition to the lower probabilities assigned to the mild
and catastrophic outcomes, the bulk of the scientists interviewed (with
the one exception) assigned the bulk of their subjective cumulative
probability distributions in the center of the IPCC range for climate
sensitivity. What is most striking about the exception, scientist 5, is
the lack of variance in his estimates--suggesting a very high
confidence level in this scientist's mind that he understands how all
the complex interactions within the earth-system described above will
work. None of the other scientists displayed that confidence, nor did
the Lead Authors of IPCC. However, several scientists interviewed by
Morgan and Keith expressed concern for ``surprise'' scenarios--for
example, scientists 2 and 4 explicitly display this possibility on
Figure 1, whereas several other scientists implicitly allow for both
positive and negative surprises since they assigned a considerable
amount of their cumulative subjective probabilities for climate
sensitivity outside of the standard 1.5 to 4.5 range. This concern for
surprises is consistent with the concluding paragraph of the IPCC
Working Group I Summary for Policymakers quoted above.
IPCC Lead Authors, who wrote the Working Group I Second Assessment
Report, were fully aware of both the wide range of possible outcomes
and the broad distributions of attendant subjective probabilities.
After a number of sentences highlighting such uncertainties, the Report
concluded: ``nevertheless, the balance of evidence suggests that there
is a discernible human influence on the climate.'' The reasons for this
now-famous subjective judgment were many, such as the kinds of factors
listed above. These include a well validated theoretical case for the
greenhouse effect, validation tests of both model parameterizations and
performance against present and paleoclimatic data, and the growing
``fingerprint'' evidence that suggests horizontal and vertical patterns
of climate change predicted to occur in coupled atmosphere-ocean models
has been increasingly evident in observations over that past several
decades. Clearly, more research is needed, but enough is already known
to warrant assessments of the possible impacts of such projected
climatic changes and the relative merits of alternative actions to both
mitigate emissions and/or make adaptations less costly. That is the
ongoing task of integrated assessment analysts, a task that will become
increasingly critical in the next century. To accomplish this task, it
is important to recognize what is well established in climate theory
and modeling and to separate this from aspect that are more
speculative. That is precisely what IPCC (1996a) has attempted to
accomplish.
III. Assessing The Impacts Of Climatic Change Projections
One of the most dramatic of the standard ``impacts'' of climatic
warming projections is the increase in sea level typically associated
with warmer climatic conditions. An EPA study used an unusual approach:
combining climatic models with the subjective opinions of many
scientists on the values of uncertain elements in the models to help
bracket the uncertainties inherent in this issue. Titus and Narayanan
(1996)--including teams of experts of all persuasions on the issue--
calculated the final product of their impact assessment as a
statistical distribution of future sea level rise, ranging from
slightly negative values (i.e., a sea level drop) as a low probability
outcome, to a meter or more rise, also with a low probability (see Fig
2). The midpoint of the probability distribution is something like half
meter sea level rise by the end of the next century.
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Since the EPA analysis stopped there, this is by no means a
complete assessment. In order to take integrated assessment to its
logical conclusion, we need to ask what the economic costs of various
control strategies might be and how the costs of abatement compare to
the economic or environmental losses (i.e. impacts or damages as they
are called) from sea level rises. That means putting a value--a dollar
value of course--on climate change, coastal wetlands, fisheries,
environmental refugees, etc. Hadi Dowlatabadi at Carnegie Mellon
University leads a team of integrated assessors who, like Titus,
combined a wide range of scenarios of climatic changes and impacts but,
unlike the EPA studies, added a wide range of abatement cost estimates
into the mix. Their integrated assessment was presented in statistical
form as a probability that investments in CO2 emissions
controls would either cost more than the losses from averted climate
change or the reverse (e.g., Morgan and Dowlatabadi, 1996). Since their
results do not include estimates for all conceivable costs (e.g., the
political consequences of persons displaced from coastal flooding), the
Carnegie Mellon group offered its results only as illustrative of the
capability of integrated assessment techniques. Its numerical results
have meaning only after the range of physical, biological and social
outcomes and their costs and benefits have been quantified--a Herculean
task. Similar studies have been made in Holland by a Dutch government
effort to produce integrated assessments for policymakers. Jan Rotmans,
who heads one of their efforts, likes to point out that such modeling
of complex physical, biological and social factors cannot produce
credible ``answers'' to current policy dilemmas, but can provide
``insights'' to policymakers that will put decisionmaking on a firmer
factual basis (Rotmans and van Asselt, 1996). Understanding the
strengths and weaknesses of any complex analytic tool is essential to
rational policymaking, even if quantifying the costs and benefits of
specific activities is controversial.
William Nordhaus, an economist from Yale University, has made
heroic steps to put the climatic change policy debate into an
optimizing framework. He is an economist who has long acknowledged that
an efficient economy must internalize externalities (in other words,
find the full social costs of our activities, not just the direct cost
reflected in conventional ``free market'' prices). He tried to quantify
this external damage from climate change and then tried to balance it
against the costs to the global economy of policies designed to reduce
CO2 emissions. His optimized solution was a carbon tax,
designed to internalize the externality of damage to the climate by
increasing the price of fuels in proportion to how much carbon they
emit, thereby providing an incentive for society to use less of these
fuels.
Nordhaus (1992) imposed carbon tax scenarios ranging from a few
dollars per ton to hundreds of dollars per ton--the latter which would
effectively eliminate coal from the world economy. He showed that, in
the context of his model and its assumptions, that these carbon
emission fees would cost the world economy anywhere from less than 1
percent annual loss in Gross National Product to a several percent loss
by the year 2100. The efficient, optimized solution from classical
economic cost-benefit analysis is that carbon taxes should be levied
sufficient to reduce the GNP as much as it is worth to avert climate
change (e.g., the damage to GNP from climate change). He assumed that
the impacts of climate change were equivalent to a loss of about 1
percent of GNP. This led to an ``optimized'' initial carbon tax of
about five dollars or so per ton of carbon dioxide emitted. In the
context of his modeling exercise, this would avert only a few tenths of
a degree of global warming to the year 2100, a very small fraction of
the 4 deg.C warming his model projected.
How did Nordhaus arrive at climate damage being about 1 percent of
GNP? He assumed that agriculture was the most vulnerable economic
market sector to climate change. For decades agronomists had calculated
potential changes to crop yields from various climate change scenarios,
suggesting some regions now too hot would sustain heavy losses from
warming whereas others, now too cold, could gain. Noting that the U.S.
lost about one third of it's agricultural economy in the heat waves of
1988, and that agriculture then represented about 3 percent of the U.S.
GNP, Nordhaus felt the typically projected climatic changes might thus
cost the U.S. economy something like 1 percent annually in the 21st
century. This figure was severely criticized because it neglected
damages from health impacts (e.g., expanded areas of tropical diseases,
heat-stress deaths, etc.), losses from coastal flooding or severe
storms, security risks from boat people created from coastal
disruptions in South Asia or any damages to wildlife, fisheries or
ecosystems that would almost surely accompany temperature rises at
rates of degrees per century as are typically projected. It also was
criticized because his estimate neglected potential increases in crop
or forestry yields from the direct effects of increased CO2
in the air on the photosynthetic response of these marketable plants.
Nordhaus responded to his critics by conducting a survey, similar to
that undertaken by Morgan and Keith, but this time focused on the
impacts of several scenarios of climatic change on world
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economic product--including both standard market sector categories
(e.g., forestry, agriculture, heating and cooling demands) and so-
called non-market amenities like biological conservation and national
security.
When Nordhaus surveyed the opinions of mainstream economists,
environmental economists and natural scientists (I am respondent #10,
in Nordhaus, 1994), he found that the former expressed a factor of 20
less anxiety about the economic or environmental consequences of
climate change than the latter (see Fig.3--Scenario A is for 3 deg.C
warming by 2100 A.D. and Scenario C for 6 deg.C by 2100 A.D.). However,
the bulk of even the conservative group of economists Nordhaus surveyed
considered there to be at least a 10 percent probability that typically
projected climate changes could still cause economic damages worth
several percent of gross world product (the current U.S. GNP is around
five trillion dollars--about 20 percent of the global figure). And,
some of these economists didn't include estimates for possible costs of
``non-market'' damages (e.g., harm to nature). One ecologist who did
explicitly factor in non-market values for natural systems went so far
as to assign a 10 percent chance of a hundred percent loss of GNP--the
virtual end of civilization! While Nordhaus quipped that those who know
most about the economy are less concerned, I countered with the obvious
observation that those who know the most about nature are very
concerned.
We will not easily resolve the paradigm gulf between the optimistic
and pessimistic views of these specialists with different training,
traditions and world views, but the one thing that is clear from both
the Morgan and Keith and Nordhaus studies is that the vast bulk of
knowledgeable experts from a variety of fields admits to a wide range
of plausible outcomes in the area of global environmental change--
including both mild and catastrophic eventualities--under their broad
umbrella of possibilities. This is a condition ripe for
misinterpretation by those who are unfamiliar with the wide range of
probabilities most scientists attach to global change issues. The wide
range of probabilities follows from recognition of the many
uncertainties in data and assumptions still inherent in earth systems
models, climatic impact models, economic models or their synthesis via
integrated assessment models (see Schneider, 1997a,b). It is necessary
in a highly interdisciplinary enterprise like the integrated assessment
of global change problems that a wide range of possible outcomes be
included, along with a representative sample of the subjective
probabilities that knowledgeable assessment groups like the IPCC
believe accompany each of those possible outcomes. In essence, the
``bottom line'' of estimating climatic impacts is that both ``the end
of the world'' and ``it is good for business'' are the two lowest
probability outcomes, and that the vast bulk of knowledgeable
scientists and economists consider there to be a significant chance of
climatic damage to both natural and social systems. Under these
conditions--and the unlikelihood that research will soon eliminate the
large uncertainties that still persist--it is not surprising that most
formal climatic impact assessments have called for cautious, but
positive steps both to slow down the rate at which humans modify the
climatic system and to make natural and social systems more resilient
to whatever changes do eventually materialize.
IV. Policy Implications
What Are Some Actions to Consider? Decisionmaking, of course, is a
value judgment about how to take risks--gambling, if you will--in the
environment-development arena. Despite the often bewildering
complexity, making value choices does not require a Ph.D. in
statistics, political science or geography to comprehend. Rather,
citizens need simple explanations using common metaphors and everyday
language that ordinary people can understand about the terms of the
debate. Once the citizens of this planet become aware of the various
tradeoffs involved in trying to choose between business-as-usual
activities and sustainable environmental stewardship, the better will
be the chances that the risk-averse common sense of the ``average''
person may be thrust into the decisionmaking process by a public that
cares about its future and that of its planet, and knows enough not to
be fooled by simple solutions packaged in slick commercials or
editorials by any special interest.
What are the kinds of actions that can be considered to deal with
global change problems like climate change. The following list is a
consensus from a multi-disciplinary, business, university and
government assessment conducted by the National Research Council in
1991. It is encouraging that this multi-discipline, ideologically
diverse group (including economist Nordhaus, industrialist Frosch and
climatologist Schneider) could agree that the United States, for
example, could reduce or offset its greenhouse gas emissions by between
10 and 40 percent of 1990 levels at low cost, or at some net savings,
if proper policies are implemented. Here is the Council's entire
suggested list:
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(1) Continue the aggressive phaseout of CFC and other halocarbon
emissions and the development of substitutes that minimize or eliminate
greenhouse gas emissions.
(2) Study in detail the ``full social cost pricing'' of energy,
with a goal of gradually introducing such a system. On the basis of the
principle that the polluter should pay, pricing of energy production
and use should reflect the full costs of the associated environmental
problems.
(3) Reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases during energy use and
consumption by enhancing conservation and efficiency.
(4) Make greenhouse warming a key factor in planning for our future
energy supply mix. The United States should adopt a systems approach
that considers the interactions among supply, conversion, end use, and
external effects in improving the economics and performance of the
overall energy system.
(5) Reduce global deforestation.
(6) Explore a moderate domestic reforestation program and support
international reforestation efforts.
(7) Maintain basic, applied, and experimental agricultural research
to help farmers and commerce adapt to climate change and thus ensure
ample food.
(8) Make water supply more robust by coping with present
variability by increasing efficiency of use through water markets and
by better management of present systems of supply.
(9) Plan margins of safety for long-lived structures to take into
consideration possible climate change.
(10) Move to slow present losses in biodiversity.
(11) Undertake research and development projects to improve our
understanding of both the potential of geoengineering options to offset
global warming and their possible side-effects. This is not a
recommendation that geoengineering options be undertaken at this time,
but rather that we learn more about their likely advantages and
disadvantages.
(12) Control of population growth has the potential to make a major
contribution to raising living standards and to easing environmental
problems like greenhouse warming. The United States should resume full
participation in international programs to slow population growth and
should contribute its share to their financial and other support.
(13) The United States should participate fully with officials at
an appropriate level in international agreements and in programs to
address greenhouse warming, including diplomatic conventions and
research and development efforts.
This NRC (1991) assessment produced a remarkable list, considering
the diversity of the participants' backgrounds and their varying
ideological perspectives. But in the crucible of open debate that
permeated that assessment activity, self-interest polemics and media
grandstanding are incinerated. This group didn't assert that
catastrophe was inevitable, nor that it was improbable. We simply
believed that prudence dictates that ``despite the great uncertainties,
greenhouse warming is a potential threat sufficient to justify action
now.''
Integrated assessments of the policy options offered by the
National Research Council Report are actively being pursued with a
variety of models.
It is interesting that this comprehensive list of 13
recommendations from the National Research Council report still ignored
two fundamental aspects: the desperate need for (1) an intelligent,
non-polemical public debate about global change and (2)
interdisciplinary public education that also teaches students about
whole systems and long-term risk management, not only traditional areas
of isolated specialization.
Environment and (or versus) Development? While the NRC report did
acknowledge the importance of international dimensions of global change
policymaking, it was still largely a developed country perspective.
Developing countries often have very different perspectives. First of
all, LDCs are struggling to raise literacy rates, lower death rates,
increase life expectancy, provide employment for burgeoning populations
and reduce local air and water pollution that pose imminent health
hazards to their citizens and environments.
Protecting species or slowing climate change are simply low on
their priority lists as compared to more mature economic powers like
the OECD nations. It is ironic, even if understandable, that LDCs put
abatement of global change disturbances so low on their priority lists
despite the fact that nearly all impact assessments suggest that it is
these very countries that are most vulnerable to climatic change, for
example.
There is a phrase in economics known as ``the marginal dollar.'' In
our context it means that given all the complexity of interconnected
physical, biological and social systems, climate abatement may not be
perceived as the best place to invest the next available dollar so as
to bring the maximum social benefit to poor coun-
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tries. I have heard many representatives of LDCs exclaim that until
poverty is corrected, preventable disease stamped out, injustice
redressed and economic equity achieved, they will invest their precious
resources on these priorities. My response has been that climatic
changes can exacerbate all of those problems they rightly wish to
address, and thus we should seek to make investments that both reduce
the risks of climate change and help with economic development
(transfer of efficient technologies being a prime example). It is a
great mistake, I believe, to get trapped in the false logic of the
mythical ``marginal dollar,'' for it is not necessary that every penny
of the next available dollar go exclusively to the highest priority
problem whereas all the rest (particularly problems with surprise
potential and the possibility of irreversible damages) must wait until
priority one is fully achieved. To me, the first step is to get that
marginal dollar cashed into small change, so that many interlinked
priority problems can all be at least partially addressed. Given the
large state of uncertainty surrounding both the costs and benefits of
many human and natural events, it seems most prudent to address many
issues simultaneously and to constantly reassess which investments are
working and which problems--including global change--are growing more
or less serious.
It takes resources to invest, of course, and since the bulk of
available capital is in developed countries, it will require
international negotiations--``planetary bargaining'' it has been
called--to balance issues of economic parity and social justice with
environmental protection. Such negotiations are underway under U.N.
auspices, and will likely take many years to work out protocols that
weigh the diverse interests and perceptions of the world's nations.
There is a lively debate among economists, technologists and
environmentalists about what are the most cost-effective strategies for
abating carbon emissions which also can reduce potential impacts of
climatic changes to below the undefined ``dangerous'' levels referred
to in the Framework Convention on Climate Change language. Most
economists argue that some policy to ``internalize the externality'' of
potential climate damage is already appropriate, reflecting the
recommendations already published by the National Research Council in
1991. Environmentalists usually argue that major efforts to spur
immediate abatement of carbon emissions are necessary if climatic
changes less than one more degree Celsius are to likely be avoided
(which they typically define as ``dangerous''). Most economists, on the
other hand, often argue that new technologies will be able to
accomplish carbon abatement more cheaply in the future as such
technologies are discovered and deployed (Wigley et al, 1996). Thus,
their logic suggests that a cost-effective time profile of abatement
would be to postpone most carbon reductions until later in the 21st
century. This seemingly implacable debate will echo in Kyoto chambers,
I am sure, in December 1997.
My colleague, the Stanford University economist Lawrence Goulder,
and I have used state-of-the-art economic modeling tools to study this
debate, and conclude that both the stereotypical environmentalist (who
argue to abate now) and economist positions (abate later) are actually
not incompatible, but complimentary! We show (please see the Appendix
in which our submitted Commentary to Nature magazine is reproduced)
that although the economist view that future abatement is likely to be
cheaper is probably correct, so too is the environmentalist argument
that current actions are urgently needed, since such technologies
referred to in economic cost-effectiveness studies won't simply invent
themselves. In other words, policy actions to help induce technological
changes are needed now in order to bring about a profile of cost-
effective abatement in the decades ahead. We also address the relative
economic efficiency of alternative policy instruments: contrasting
carbon taxes versus research and development subsides. Although we
recognize the political reluctance of many to embrace any new taxes, in
truth, most economic analyses show that a fee for the use of the
atmosphere (currently a ``free sewer'') will reduce incentives to
pollute, increase incentives to develop and deploy less polluting
technologies, and can be more economically efficient than other
policies--particularly if some of the revenues generated by a carbon
tax were recycled back into the economy. R&D subsidies can be
economically efficient, our conventional economic analyses suggest, to
the extent that current R&D markets are already subsidized or otherwise
not optimally efficient--a likelihood.
Therefore, it is my personal view that all parties should recognize
that potential damages to a global commons like the Earth's climate are
not mere ideological rhetoric, nor are solutions necessarily
unaffordable. Moreover, ``win-win'' solutions in which economic
efficiency, cost-effectiveness and environmental protection can happily
co-exist are possible--if only we put aside hardened ideological
positions.
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V. Personal Observations On The Global Warming Media Debate
A very intense, too-often personal and ad hominem, media debate has
attended the global warming problem in the past 5 years. As a
participant in this process, I can attest to the frustration one
experiences in seeing a complex scientific problem with many policy
implications often trivialized into an ideological boxing match in
which polar extremes are pitted against each other and the work of the
vast bulk of the knowledgeable community is marginalized. A baffling
array of claims and counter claims appears, particularly in op-ed
pieces, and a general state of public confusion is fostered. It is my
belief that this confusion does not reflect the ordered state of
knowledge, in which many aspects of the climate change issue enjoy
strong consensual views, other aspects are considered plausible,
whereas yet others are clearly (to insiders at least) highly
speculative. Public dialog would be much richer if we all strove to
separate out what is well known from what is speculative, an effort not
attempted often enough in most public accounts of the issue. How is
this best accomplished?
For 20 years the scientific community, or at least the broad cross
section scientific community represented by the deliberations of the
National Research Council, IPCC and other international assessment
groups, have suggested that if CO2 were to double and be
held fixed, then at equilibrium (i.e. the change in steady state after
a few hundred years) the earth's temperature would warm up some one and
a half to four and a half degrees centigrade--the uncertainty, as noted
earlier, in this climate sensitivity range largely being associated
with the well recognized processes that we treat crudely in our climate
models, mostly clouds and water vapor. The reason that very few
scientist set the climate sensitivity range above four and a half
degrees or below one and a half degrees is primarily because of natural
experiments such as ice ages, volcanoes and seasonal cycles, as well as
other technical questions dealing with theory and modeling (see IPCC
1996a for details). Nevertheless, a few have asserted, some with very
high confidence, that global warming from CO2 doubling would
only cause a few tenths of a deg.C equilibrium temperature rise, and
even have argued that certain processes that they can name, but cannot
demonstrate to have global scale effects, would be responsible for this
diminishing effect (e.g., Lindzen, 1990). Such debates (e.g., see
Schneider, 1990) are very difficult for the lay public to penetrate,
and even for relatively skilled but still non-professional observers,
they are hard to follow. It is for such reasons that groups like the
National Research Council or The World Meteorological Organization and
the United Nations Environment Program have called a community of
scientists holding a spectrum of views, but all knowledgeable in the
basic art, to meet together to debate the relative merits of various
lines of evidence and to provide assessments which give the best guess
as well as a judgment for the ranges of uncertainty of a variety of
climate changes, as well as their potential impacts on environment and
society and the costs of mitigation from alternative policies. Indeed,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 1996a, b, and c) is
now the premier such assessment activity and represents the effort of
hundreds of directly involved scientists and thousands of indirectly
involved scientists, industrialists, NGO's or policymakers who serve as
reviewers and commentators.
The IPCC Peer Review Processes. Let me contrast the IPCC process
with that of some of its critics. In July 1996 an extraordinary meeting
of about six dozen climate scientists from dozens of countries took
place. It was the third installment of a process to write a Second
Assessment Report for the IPCC. This meeting, in Asheville, North
Carolina, was designed to make explicit the points of agreement and
difference among the scientists over exceedingly controversial and
difficult issues, including the signal detection and attribution
chapter--the most controversial. Chapter 8 was controversial since new
lines of evidence had been brought to bear by three modeling groups
around the world, each suggesting a much stronger possibility that a
climate change signal has been observed and that its pattern (or
fingerprint) is much closer matched to anthropogenic caused changes
than heretofore believed. Scientists are by nature a skeptical lot, and
typically submit their work for peer review before publishing. When
scientists have new ideas or new tests, as the dozen or so representing
these modeling groups in fact had, they typically write a journal
article and submit it for publication. The journals, peer reviewed of
course, typically send the article out to two or three peers, who write
anonymous reviews, (unless the reviewers have the courage to confess as
I, the editor of the journal Climatic Change, encourage my reviewers to
do). The authors then rewrite their article in response to the
reviewers and the editor serves as referee. The process usually goes
back and forth several times with several revised drafts of the article
until a suitable compromise is achieved among reviewers, authors and
the editor.
Contrast this normal journal peer review process in which a few
people are involved, with what happened in Asheville in 1995 at the
IPCC's third workshop. Ben
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Santer from Lawrence Livermore National Lab, who had assembled the
results of a number of modeling groups and was the first author of the
submitted manuscript (Santer et al, 1996) on climate signal detection
and the Convening Lead Author of Chapter 8 of the IPCC report (the
controversial IPCC chapter on signal detection and attribution),
presented the results of his group's effort not to just the half dozen
Lead Authors of Chapter 8, as is typical in IPCC meetings, but to the
entire assembled scientific group at Asheville. Not only did Santer
have to explain the work of him and his colleagues (many of whom were
there) to his most knowledgeable peers, but also to scores of others
from communities as diverse as stratospheric ozone experts like Susan
Solomon and Dan Albritton, to satellite meteorologists like John
Christy or biospheric dynamics experts such as Jerry Melillo.
Climatologists such as Tom Karl or myself were also present, along with
heads of weather services and other officials from several countries
who served on the IPCC's assessment team as a member of the scientific
delegations of the various nations. Not everybody was equally
knowledgeable in the technical details of the debate, of course, but
even these less familiar participants served an essential role: of
witnesses to the process of honest, open debate. Perhaps only twenty-
five percent of those assembled had truly in-depth knowledge of the
full range of details being discussed. However, all understood the
basic scientific issues and most know how to recognize slipshod work--
to say nothing of a fraud or a ``scientific cleansing''--when they see
it. This remarkable session lasted for hours, was occasionally intense,
always was cordial, and never turned polemical. As a result, words for
Chapter 8 were changed, ideas and concepts altered somewhat, but by and
large basic conclusions were unchanged because the vast bulk of those
assembled (and no one proclaimed to the contrary) were convinced that
the carefully hedged statements the lead authors proposed were, in
fact, an accurate reflection of the state of the science based upon all
available knowledge--including the new results. This was not only peer
review, but this was peer review ten times normal! As the editor of a
peer review journal it would be inconceivable for me to duplicate this
process, as I have to hope that a few referees and myself can serve the
peer reviewing role half as well as this remarkable, open process at
Asheville. Moreover, after the Asheville meeting there were two more
IPCC drafts written and reviewed by hundreds of additional scientists
industrialists, policymakers, and NGO's from all over the globe.
Contrast this open IPCC process then, to the harsh critics of the
IPCC, alleging ``scientific cleansing'', ``herd mentality'', and first
presenting their detailed technical counter arguments in such
``refereed scientific literature'' as the editorial pages of the Wall
Street Journal (Singer 1996, Seitz 1996,). Some had the temerity,
although I do not understand how they could do it with a straight face,
to allege that Chapter 8 conclusions were all based upon non peer
reviewed work, despite the fact that the Asheville process was ten
times normal peer review, to say nothing of the hundreds of scientific
reviewers of the next draft of the IPCC report that followed. In the
wake of all these reviews, textual alterations needed to be made, and
these were minor, but were done over the course of time. The last round
of changes were made by the Convening Lead, Ben Santer. Some interests
subsequently alleged that these minor changes dramatically altered the
report and, with no evidence, asserted they were politically motivated
(``scientific cleansing'' one charged--and launched a vicious personal
attack on one of the least political, most cautious scientists, Ben
Santer). Any honest evaluation will reveal that this irresponsible
charge--published in the unrefereed opinion pages of a business daily--
is utterly absurd. In fact, the most famous line in the IPCC report
(that there is a ``discernible'' human effect on climate) appeared as
one sentence in a short paragraph that was 80 percent caveats! The IPCC
report essentially ``drips'' with caveats.
Moreover, the ``discernible'' line is not a radical statement, as
it reflects a lowest common denominator consensus view of the vast bulk
of people exposed to the evidence. It does not assert climate signal
detection to be proven beyond any doubt, nor do I or any other
responsible scientists I know of make such assertions. Nor can such
evidence of human effects be dismissed as wholly random at a very high
probability by responsible scientists--except perhaps in the opinions
section of some newspapers. To ignore such contrarian critics would be
inappropriate, I agree. However, to give them in news stories
comparable weight to a hundred-scientists, thousand-reviewer document,
as if somehow a small minority of scientists who are skeptical deserve
equal weight, without informing the readership or viewership that the
contrarians represent a tiny minority, is to mislead a public who
cannot be expected to look up for themselves the relative weights of
conflicting opinions. And to publish character-assassinating charges of
``scientific cleansing'' without checking the facts is simply
unethical--at least in any system of ethics I respect.
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VI. Concluding Remarks
A condensed summary of the principal conclusions I would like to
draw is as follows, beginning with the more narrowly technical issues
and proceeding to broader generalizations about impacts, uncertainties
and policy choices:
Hierarchy of models. A hierarchy of models, ranging from simple
zero or one-dimensional, highly parameterized models up to coupled
three-dimensional models that simulate the dynamics and thermodynamics
of connected physical and biological sub-systems of the earth-system
are needed for climatic effects assessment. The simpler models are more
transparent--allowing cause-and-effect processes to be more easily
traced--and are much more tractable to construct, run and diagnose,
whereas multi-dimensional, dynamical models can provide geographic and
temporal resolution needed for regional impact assessments and--
hopefully--provide more realistic and detailed simulations, even if at
much higher costs for construction, computation, diagnosis and
interpretability. Since the real climate system is undergoing a
transient response to regionally heterogeneous (patchy) forcings (e.g.,
aerosols and greenhouse gasses combined, which both vary over time and
space), eventually it will be necessary to run fully coupled three-
dimensional earth systems models in order to ``hand off'' their results
to a variety of regional impact assessment models. In the interim,
lower resolution ``simple'' climate models can be hybridized into more
comprehensive models to produce hybrid estimates of time-evolving
regional patterns of climatic changes from a variety of emissions and
land use change scenarios. Such estimates may be instructive to
policymakers interested in the differential climatic impacts of various
climate forcing scenarios and/or various assumptions about the internal
dynamics of both climate and impact models.
Sensitivity studies are essential. It is unlikely that all
important uncertainties in either climatic or impact models will be
resolved to the satisfaction of the bulk of the scientific community in
the near future. However, this does not imply that model results are
uninformative. On the contrary, sensitivity analyses in which various
policy-driven alternative radiative forcing assumptions are made can
offer insights into the potential effectiveness of such policies in
terms of their differential climatic effects and impacts. Even though
absolute accuracy is not likely to be assured for the foreseeable
future, considerable precision concerning the sensitivity of the
physical and biological sub-systems of the earth can be studied via
carefully planned and executed sensitivity studies across a hierarchy
of models.
Validation and testing are required. Although it may be
impractical, if not theoretically impossible, to validate the precise
future course of climate given the uncertainties that remain in
forcings, internal dynamics and unpredictable surprise events, many of
the basic features of the coupled physical and biological sub-systems
of the earth can already be simulated to a considerable degree. Testing
models against each other when driven by the same sets of forcing
scenarios, testing the overall simulation skill of models against
empirical observations, testing model parameterizations against high
resolution process models or data sets, testing models against proxy
data of paleoclimatic changes and testing the sensitivity of models to
radiative forcings of anthropogenic origin by computing their
sensitivity to natural radiative forcings (e.g., season radiative
forcing, volcanic dust forcing, orbital element variation forcings
etc.) comprise a necessary set of validation-oriented exercises that
all modelers should agree to perform. Similarly, impacts models should
also be subjected to an analogous set of validation protocols if their
insights are to gain a high degree of credibility.
Subjective probability assessment. In addition to standard
simulation modeling exercises in which various parameters are specified
or varied over an uncertainty range, formal decision-analytic
techniques can be used to provide a more consistent set of values for
uncertain model parameters or functional relationships. The embedding
of subjective probability distributions into climatic models is just
beginning (e.g., Titus and Narayanan, 1996), but may become an
important element of integrated assessment modeling in future
generations of model building (e.g., see the discussion of the
hierarchy of integrated assessment models in Schneider, 1997b).
``Rolling reassessment.'' It is obvious that the projection of
climatic effects and related impacts will continue to change as the
state-of-the-art in both kinds of models improves over the next few
decades. Therefore, the most flexible management possible of a global
commons like the Earth's climate seems a virtual necessity, since the
potential seriousness of the problem--or even the perception of that
seriousness--is virtually certain to change with new discoveries and
actual climatic and other environmental or social events. Therefore, a
series of assessments of climatic effects, related impacts, and policy
options to prevent potentially dangerous impacts will be needed
periodically--perhaps every 5 years as IPCC has chosen for the repeat
period of its major Assessment Reports that treat climatic effects,
impacts and policy issues as separable assessments. It seems important
that whatever policy in-
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struments are employed (to either mitigate anthropogenic forcings or
help reduce damage from projected climatic effects) be flexible enough
to respond quickly and cost-effectively to the evolving science that
will emerge from this rolling reassessment process.
Consider surprises and irreversibility. Given the many
uncertainties that still attend most aspects of the climatic change and
impacts debate, priority should be considered for those aspects which
could exhibit irreversible damages (e.g., extinction of species whose
already-shrinking habitat is further stressed by rapid climatic
changes) or for which imaginable ``surprises'' have been identified
(e.g., alterations to oceanic currents from rapid increases in
greenhouse gasses). For these reasons, management of climatic risks
needs to be considered well in advance of more certain knowledge of
climatic effects and impacts.
``Win-win'' strategies. Economically efficient, cost-effective and
environmentally sustainable policies have been identified and others
can be found to help induce the kinds of technological innovations
needed to reduce atmospheric emissions in the decades ahead. Some mix
of emissions ``cap and trade'', carbon taxes with revenue recycling, or
technology development incentives can provide ``win-win'' solutions if
all parties to the environment-development debate would lower the
intensity of their ideological preconceptions and work together for
cost-effective and equitable measures to protect the global commons.
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Schneider, S.H. 1997a. Laboratory Earth: The Planetary Gamble We Can't
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Responses by Dr. Stephen H. Schneider to Additional Questions from
Senator Baucus
Question 1. During the hearing, Dr. Barron stated that our
strategies to address increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases
should be adaptive in nature. In your opinion, what would be the most
important adaptation strategies to pursue?
Response. I agree with Dr. Barron that adaptive strategies are the
most sensible. The reason I feel that they are sensible, as I also
pointed out in written and oral testimoneys, is that it is very likely
that further information on both climatic effects and impacts is likely
to change our perceptions of the damages that climate could cause to
environment and society, as well as the costs of mitigating those
damages as new technologies are invented and implemented. Therefore,
whatever policy instruments we adopt should have the maximum
flexibility to be able to take advantage of, what I called in my
written testimony, ``rolling re-assessment.'' That is, every five or so
years some groups (like the IPCC) will produce the assessments, and the
state of knowledge so assessed might indicate more serious (or less
serious) concern over climate change than previous assessments.
Therefore, policy instruments that are most flexible will allow the
highest degree of adaptive management. In my personal view, although I
recognize that political realities (currently in the United States at
least) stand in its way, a carbon tax is probably the most flexible
instrument (see the Appendix to my written testimony, which contains
the commentary, now accepted, for Nature magazine by Professor Larry
Goulder and myself defending the flexibility and economic efficiency
aspects of a carbon tax as opposed to other carbon policy instruments).
But regardless of whether a carbon tax, cap and trade arrangements, R&D
subsidies or other instruments are the ultimate policies of choice,
minimizing ``hardwiring'' would seem to me the best strategy.
There are other areas where I think adaptive measures should also
be considered. I have long advocated ``anticipatory adaptation'' as one
of the responses to the possibility of negative effects of climatic
changes. For example, a new water project could well increase the
height of a dam, the width of a channel, or the amount of free
coastline before expensive infrastructure would be allowed to be built,
all in anticipation of the not unlikely possibility of increased
extremes of drought and flood or sea levels. Building extra margins of
safety into currently planned or future infrastructure is usually very
inexpensive relative to the cost of retrofit. Thus, such anticipatory
adaptation can substantially reduce the overall lifetime cost of the
project, particularly if currently foreseeable but not certain impacts
like sea level rise or extreme floods were to occur. Likewise, it is
well-known that building more efficient houses and cars at the outset
is much less costly than trying to retrofit them once they have been
built.
Another way in which anticipatory adaptation can take place is to
make investments in agricultural research. For example, we know that if
there is an increase in the probability of droughts and floods, as it
is appearing to be increasingly likely, then agronomic research in
which crop varieties or farming techniques that are more resilient to
large climatic variations would provide a measure of security against
those variations as they unfold. And even if they did not unfold, such
resilience would help us deal with the ordinary climate variability,
which already causes substantial year-to-year variations in
agricultural productivity, even in technologically advanced countries
like the United States.
Finally, a form of adaptive strategy is simply the development of
alternative energy technologies. That is, should the world decide in
the next decade or so that it really does wish to avert the potential
for ``dangerous interference'' in the climate system as the FCCC words
it, it would be much more expensive to replace these conventional
energy systems if there were no previous enhanced research and
development efforts to experiment with nonconventional alternatives in
advance of their urgent need. Therefore, investment in alternative
energy systems to conventional fossil energy provides a measure of
anticipatory adaptation that would make future adjustments much less
expensive than if we simply pretend that business is usual is the
safest and best path, and luck turns against us as new studies prove
climate change to be in the mid-to-upper range of currently projected
damages.
Question 2. You stated in your testimony that it was difficult for
plants and animals to adapt to a temperature increase of 5 deg.C over
the 10,000 year period following the last Ice Age and that many species
would likely go extinct with a kind of rapid temperature increase
projected for the next century. Assuming, for the purpose of this
question, that the Earth experiences a temperature increase of greater
than 1.5 deg.C over the coming 100 years, what is the likelihood that
species will successfully adapt? If, in your opinion, this represents a
threat to preserving biological diversity, to your knowledge has there
ever been a period in the paleoclimate record where climate change has
resulted in significant loss of species?
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Response. Let me answer the last part of Senator Baucus's question
first. There are a number of periods in paleoclimatic records where
rapid climate change resulted in dramatic loss of species. The obvious
example is the famous ``Cretaceous/Tertiary boundary'', in which
temperature changes on the order of 10 degrees per year likely
accompanied an asteroid collision with the earth. Half the existing
species in the world disappeared, including dinosaurs. Fortunately, no
one envisions such a catastrophic rate of change! However, climate
change is not the only factor by which humans disturb nature. It has
long been argued by ecologists that the fragmentation of habitats,
forcing wild species into smaller and smaller refuges with fewer
resources and higher competition than they would normally experience,
is a threat to preserving biodiversity. Indeed this ``conventional
ecological wisdom'' has led such luminaries as E.O. Wilson at Harvard
to predict a mini-extinction crisis, which, viewed from the perspective
of hundreds of years, might look in some future geological record
almost as if an asteroid had hit the earth today.
But, if we combine the fragmentation of habitats, the introduction
of thousands of chemicals for which most creatures have no evolutionary
experience and which are often toxic, the transport across natural
biogeographic barriers of so-called ``exotic species,'' and combine
these stresses on natural systems with climate change at rates of
degrees per century (as opposed to degrees per thousand years that are
more typical in the past 10,000 years), then I am confident that it
would be very difficult for many species to survive such a combination
of human pressures without an unnaturally large number of extinctions.
Whether such extinctions would be counted ``only'' in the several
percent range or the tens of percent range, as many ecologists predict,
is of course impossible to know now. But, it would seem to me almost
certain that a dramatic increase of unnatural extinction rates would
occur from this combination of fragmented habitats and rapidly changing
climate. Even if we were to substantially expand our network of
reserves and to interconnect them to allow migration corridors, actions
that would certainly reduce somewhat our damages to nature, I still
doubt we could prevent substantial loss of biodiversity. However,
careful conservation practice, maintaining conservation areas,
ecosystem restoration, maintenance of adequate wetlands, and cost-
effective priorities for conservation investments, probably could go a
long ways toward offsetting a significant fraction of the damages that
we would likely otherwise inflict on nature.
Finally, without requiring an asteroid collision and its
unbelievably rapid, large climate change, we do know that extinctions
occurred at the end of the last ice-age, in which the ``charismatic
metafauna'' such as mammoths and saber-toothed tigers disappeared. This
is a time in which there were many ``no analog'' habitats, brought
about by nature's typical sustained rates of climate change: on the
order of degrees per millennium. I am virtually certain that degrees
per century of climate change sustained over a century or more and
combined with fragmented habitats would, as stated earlier,
substantially increase the extinction rates of species all around the
world.
Question 3. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to a natural
mechanism that would be employed by the Earth to counteract the
predicted climatic changes due to the effect of increased water vapor
in the atmosphere. Are you aware of any historic reference or specific
research that would support a theory of the existence of such a
mechanism?
Response. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to natural
mechanisms that could counteract the rate of climate change, as he has
done many times in the past and in different contexts. A number of
years ago, he asserted, without proof, that increasing surface
temperatures would decrease the amount of moisture in the upper
troposphere (between about 5 and 10 miles up). However, a number of
observational studies show that when the North Pacific region warmed,
the moisture content of the upper troposphere actually increased, as
the computer models suggest, not as Dr. Lindzen speculated. He later
``recanted'' his position (at least temporarily) when pressed by then
Senator Gore at a Senate hearing.
Dr. Lindzen frequently points to physical processes that are known
to occur on small-scales, and asserts that since they are not
explicitly treated in computer models, that the models necessarily are
inaccurate, and, furthermore, he implies this inaccuracy is only in one
direction--an overestimate of climate sensitivity. He has never
demonstrated that the neglect of such small-scale processes makes any
difference at the scale at which these models operate (hundreds of
kilometers across). A scientist must demonstrate how small-scale
processes matter to events at large scales, and then demonstrate that
the poor treatment of such processes will change the climate
sensitivity in a given direction. Neither Dr. Lindzen nor anyone else
has demonstrated that poor treatment of each of these small scale
processes necessarily matters at large scales, let alone in what
direction a better representation of them
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would alter our predictions. Quite simply, these are theoretical
speculations and Dr. Lindzen has asked the world to wait until these
complex, technical issues are thoroughly resolved before paying
attention to the current state-of-the-art--imperfect as it is--in
modeling.
To me, what is essential is the validation of existing tools, not
their theoretical completeness (see my written testimony on this).
Validation studies produce mixed results, of course, but, generally
support the basic predictions of the magnitude of change in the climate
models, not a tenth of that magnitude that Dr. Lindzen repeatedly
asserts is the most likely outcome.
Furthermore, in his written testimony, Dr. Lindzen said that
satellites suggested that the computer models underestimated the amount
of water vapor in the upper troposphere sufficiently to cause an error
of about 20 watts per square meter in the models' natural greenhouse
effect calculations. He compared this 20 to the 4 watts per square
meter that a doubling of CO2 would add in terms of trapped
infrared heat and implied we somehow can't detect a consequence from
about 4 watts per square meter heat trapping when the absolute error in
the models is 20 watts? Dr. Lindzen knows, as we have personally
debated this issue before, that this is a misleading comparison. Since
any error a model may make in the absolute amount of energy that it
calculates the natural atmosphere traps is also an error that would
take place both in the model's control experiment, and in the
experiment in which carbon dioxide were increased. In other words, the
error would subtract out from these two experiments, leaving no
difference at all unless the processes involved are what we call
``nonlinear.'' Indeed, processes are nonlinear in the climate system,
but Dr. Lindzen has never shown that any such nonlinearity would reduce
the sensitivity of the climate, as it could increase in sensitivity.
The scientific community is well aware of these issues, tries to test
them as best as possible, and would never confuse relative and absolute
accuracy. By way of analogy, if I normally weighed 180 pounds, got on
my scale and it said 190 pounds, I would be angry at the absolute error
in my scale, but would get used to it over time. If a month later,
after overindulging in too many desserts, I step on the scale and it
read 193, I would be remiss to say that because the 3-pound relative
increase is less than the absolute error of 10 pounds in the scale,
that therefore the 3-pound increase can't be taken seriously.
Obviously, had the scale been properly calibrated to 180, it still
would have come out at 183, or perhaps 182 or 184 if the scale were
slightly ``nonlinear.'' But by and large, the absolute error would make
very little difference in the sensitivity of the scale to measuring
change. That is the fallacy in Dr. Lindzen's comparison of the 4 watts
per square meter CO2 doubling heating effect with the 20
watt per square meter absolute error in the baseline calibration of the
models he claims exists. I apologize for the technical complexity of
this answer, but I feel that it is important to focus on that statement
so as to emphasize the very little credibility that it deserves.
Question 4. Dr. Lindzen stated in his testimony that the one
specific feature that led to the IPCC conclusion of a discernible human
influence on global climate, . . . ``disappears when additional data is
considered.'' Are you aware of specific ``additional data'' that was
not considered or erroneously applied that would cause the IPCC to
reach a different conclusion? Are you aware of a specific research
result or model that supports Dr. Lindzen's claim? If so, did you know
whether the IPCC considered it? Are you aware of other factors that the
IPCC relied upon to conclude that human activities were impacting
global climate.
Response. This is a very complicated issue, which I will try to
answer as briefly as possible, but still will take several paragraphs.
In short, IPCC in 1995 had not considered the additional data that Dr.
Lindzen refers to, because it was not available to the analysis team at
the time the analysis was performed. However, the very same authors who
performed the analysis have not only considered such data recently, but
they have incorporated it into subsequent analyses and their
conclusions remain the same, in fact, they are strengthened. I strongly
urge that you contact Dr. Ben Santer from the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, who will be able to explain this further. There is
a debate in Nature magazine (12 December 1996 issue) in which you can
find further technical details. In short, the argument is simply this.
The first analysis that the IPCC debated was based on a calculation at
Lawrence Livermore National Lab, in which carbon dioxide increases and
aerosol increases from pre-industrial values to present were used and
compared to carbon dioxide increases alone. The agreement between the
models and observations was much better when the aerosols were
included, which is what one might expect since aerosols also are part
of the human impact on climate in the real world. However, the real
world did not experience a fixed increase in either carbon dioxide or
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aerosols, but rather these ``radiative forcings'' changed with time--
what we call transient experiments (see my written testimony).
The first studies which Dr. Santer and his colleagues performed
involved equilibrium experiments. It turns out, and government
officials should be proud of this, that environmental controls on air
pollution that generates sulphate particles (because of their potential
hazards to human health) caused a reduction in the emissions of such
sulphates from the mid-seventies through the 1990's in North America
and Europe. Therefore, a better way to perform the climate experiment
would not be to put in a fixed amount of sulphate, as was done in the
initial Santer et al. experiments, but to allow Northern Hemispheric
sulphate to increase rapidly from post-World War II to the mid-1970's,
then allow it to reduce due to air pollution controls, and then start
to increase again in the 1990's because of Chinese emissions. Since the
IPCC 1995 report, additional transient experiments with such time-
varying sulphate forcing patterns have been performed, and that Dr.
Santer and colleagues (as reported briefly in the previously cited
Nature debate) have shown that when this more correct sulphate forcing
is applied to climate models, it gives a particular shape of response,
which is similar to the shape that is observed when the ``additional
data,'' to which Dr. Lindzen refers, is included. So the reason Dr.
Lindzen asserts that the additional data invalidates the original
conclusion is because Dr. Lindzen is applying the additional data to
the equilibrium experiment--and the agreement becomes worse. But when
this new data is applied to the transient experiment, the agreement
between model and observations becomes even better. Since the transient
experiment is the better representation of reality, the ``additional
data,'' in my opinion, would improve one's confidence that a
``discernible human influence'' on climate has occurred.
Finally, let me say that it is absolutely incorrect to assert (as
Dr. Lindzen does in his written testimony) that the IPCC lead authors,
and I was one of them, used the ``discernible'' phrase because of this
one additional ``specific feature'' that Dr. Santer and 11 other
colleagues presented. Indeed, there were many lines of evidence, of
which this ``specific feature'' was one, and if any one of them
collapsed, it would not eliminate the preponderance associated with the
others. These other factors include (1) a well validated theory of heat
trapping, (2) a well established century-long 1/2 deg.C warming trend
of the earth, (3) geographic patterns of climate change with
CO2 and aerosols which begin to match observed patterns, (4)
mountain glacier retreats, (5) rising sea level, (6) ability of the
models to reproduce the different seasonal cycles of surface
temperature in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, and (7) the
capacities of models to reproduce cooling of the lower atmosphere
following volcanic eruptions in roughly the same amount as was
observed. The ``discernible'' statement was clearly not based on one
line of evidence.
Question 5. Do you believe there is sufficient evidence of a
problem with human-induced climate change for us to keep pursuing some
kind of policy to limit CO2 emissions? If not, should we
stop funding research that would tend to prove or disprove the theories
that human activities are impacting global climate? If there is
sufficient evidence, what more, if anything, should we be doing?
Response. With due respect to Senator Baucus, asking the question
about ``sufficient evidence'' to ``keep pursuing some kind of policy to
limit CO2 emissions'' is clearly asking me for a value
judgment. However, since I have been asked for my values many times,
and they are well documented on the record through many congressional
testimoneys and four published popular books (most recent being
Laboratory Earth: A Planetary Gamble We Can't Afford to Lose, Basic
Books, 1997), I will not hesitate to restate that opinion here.
Indeed, as I said in my oral testimony on July 10, I have believed
that there has been ``sufficient evidence'' for the past 20 years to
limit CO2 emissions, not because I was certain of the
precise nature, timing, and distribution of consequent damages, but
simply because I am a risk-averse person who doesn't believe in taking
irreversible chances--especially with the life-support systems of the
planet, particularly when alternative energy systems already exist, and
modest research development programs, along with incentive programs
that could be spurred through more realistic energy pricing, could very
well reduce substantially our impacts on the atmosphere. This, to me,
is fundamental planetary insurance against the first decimal place odds
chance of substantial damages, particularly in areas such as
biodiversity loss.
With regard to whether we should stop funding research that would
``prove or disprove the theories,'' I have two reasons to disagree. The
first is plain self-interest: as a scientific researcher interested in
understanding how nature works, it would be hard for me not to advocate
pursuing further knowledge for its own sake. With that self-interest
aside, the second reason may prove more compelling to some in
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the Congress. That is, we need to understand how the system works, and
how it changes, and how we might or might not be damaging it not only
to help us decide how much carbon emissions to mitigate--the adaptive
management issue referred to in question 1--but simply to help us learn
how to adapt more effectively to whatever change might occur. Suppose
we chose as a matter of policy to take the risk that climate change
will not be serious and allow the earth to ``perform the experiment''
for us. Let us also suppose, that some damages unfold (both not
unlikely assumptions, I'm afraid). In that case, the amount of damages
that would eventually occur would depend upon on our capacity to
forecast accurately what further changes would take place. For example,
it is much easier for farmers to adapt to changes that are known in
advance, for water supply planners or health officials to make
contingency planning to deal with known changes than random or
unforecasted changes. Likewise, wildlife managers could deal with
artificial wetlands or migration corridors or other more cost-effective
planning activities if they knew precisely what changes would unfold
than if changes simply occurred unanticipated. Therefore, even if we
choose to do nothing now to abate carbon--believing that any amount of
uncertainty is sufficient grounds to do nothing (which I think is
inconsistent with most personal and business investment practices)--we
still would need the kinds of scientific information that the research
community can provide in order to make adaptations more efficient and
ultimate damages to incur lower costs.
Since I argue that more research is important, you ask ``what
more'' should we be doing. First, I think we need to integrate work in
physical, biological, and social areas. I think that most areas of
physical climate research are already in relatively good shape, and the
most important thing in this area to watch is some continuity in
funding, so that research groups aren't always spending so much time
fighting for new grants. The amount of effort scientists put into grant
writing these days because of unreliable funding often starts to equal
the amount of effort they put into their own research. So, continuity
and stability would strike me as more important than any particular
increase in overall effort in physical science or climatology. With
regard to biological research, I think there needs to be more
coordination so that interdisciplinary activities across biological and
physical research groups could continue to expand. The rewards systems
in science don't often provide incentives to interdisciplinary
researchers, and I think that universities and government labs could
use some encouragement from Congress and funding agencies to support
such applied, but fundamentally interesting, interdisciplinary work.
Finally, I think we have put too little relative effort into asking the
question, ``So what if the climate changes?'' I think more coordinated
efforts to perform ``integrated assessment'' of the human activities
which threaten to create climate change, which affect how we could
adapt should such changes occur, and which evaluates the distribution
of damages need a boost. Even more than for physical scientists,
funding is spotty and unreliable, and impact assessment researchers
spend a large fraction of their time in defensive posture pursuing
grants rather than basic work. Furthermore, academic institutions are
less likely to employ such people as they are not always valued as
highly as ``basic researchers.''
Finally, I think the economics community has taken major strides
toward studying the potential costs of carbon abatement as well as the
benefits of such abatement. Although all that work has accelerated, it
is still at a relatively early stage of development, and not only does
more of such work need to be done, but it needs to be better
coordinated with those who study climate damages and the community that
produces climate systems research. In a nutshell, it would be nice if
we had, as the now defunct National Climate Program Office was supposed
to do when it was first mandated by Congress in 1978, some central
tracking office to make sure that wasted overlaps do not occur, and
that serious research gaps do not also occur. Some office needs to help
provide some continuity of funding for observations and modeling so
that the research community can spend most of its time working, rather
than frantically pursuing the next grant dollar for survival.
Question 6. In your professional opinion, what is the probability
that there will be a doubling of CO2 concentrations since
pre-industrial times by the year 2100? A tripling? What are the impacts
of a doubling? What are the impacts of a tripling?
Response. The probability that there will be a doubling of
CO2 concentrations since pre-industrial times by the year
2100 is very high. If we include the combined effects of carbon
dioxide, methane, and fluorocarbons, I think the probability is very
close to one. It will be exceedingly difficult to turn off the
population growth, economic growth and fossil fuel growth engines of
this planet before the equivalent carbon dioxide concentration (i.e.,
CO2 plus methane, fluorocarbons, etc.) reaches the heat
trapping equivalent of 550 parts per million CO2--probably
before the middle
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of the next century. However, if we begin to invest in alternative
technologies, and turn lose the impressive capacity of our industries
to invent and deploy more efficient systems, I think there is no
justification to go beyond that equivalent doubling of CO2.
Indeed, we could hold heat trapping from CO2 well below a
doubling if we were to aggressively pursue all ``no-regrets'' energy-
efficiency options now, as well as perform the needed research to
enhance efficiency and lower the costs of less carbon-intense
alternative energy systems. I also believe we would have to engage in
``planetary bargains'' with countries like China and India, especially
if the differential cost of their building more efficient, less
polluting power plants were borne by richer countries. In this way, the
Chinese would not lock in inefficient, high CO2-producing
coal burning power plants now whose operating lifetime could be near
five decades. Since I do not believe it is likely that such an
international effort will get very far in the near future, I give a
fairly high probability to the equivalent doubling of CO2. I
believe also that the equivalent tripling of CO2 by 2100 is
quite likely if the world pays no attention to the alternative pathways
for energy development, and the continuation of international non-
cooperation on energy and protection of global commons is maintained. I
am hopeful that will not be the case, although I am fearful this may
only happen if environmental disasters motivate attention--something I
recall Senator Baucus said in his oral remarks during the hearing and
that I unhappily, but professionally, agree with.
With regard to the impacts of doubling of CO2, I think
that there is a 5 or 10 percent chance that that doubling could be
relatively modest in its effect on climate (on the order of 1 deg.C or
less temperature rise), and I think that there is probably a 10 percent
chance that it could be potentially catastrophic (something like 4-
6 deg.C or more). I think it is most likely that 2-3 deg.C will occur
as a result of that doubling, but that alone occurring over a century,
would, as I said in answer to question 2, likely cause serious damages
to nature in the form of biodiversity loss and dramatically altered
habitats, as well as increases in the frequency of hydrological
extremes, such as droughts, floods, and sea level rises, and other
disruptions to our normal activities that depend on climate. I feel the
impacts of a tripling would be substantially worse than those of the
doubling, for a tripling could well cause climate changes of 5 deg.C or
more, and in such instances major surprises, such as a flip-flop in
North Atlantic ocean currents, large releases of stored carbon
compounds in soils and bogs, and other currently ``imaginable
surprises'' would be much more likely to occur. I think that virtually
any currently imaginable definition of ``dangerous climate change''
would insist on holding the future amount of carbon dioxide for
doubling or less, and indeed a cogent case could be made for holding
the increase to no more than 450 parts per million, although I
recognize that to do that would require significant policy actions
right away.
______
Responses by Dr. Stephen H. Schneider to Additional Questions from
Senator Boxer
Question 1. We hear about natural climatic cycles. For example, we
know from geologic evidence that the earth has naturally gone through
cooling and warming cycles, usually on a scale of 10's of thousands of
years.
Question 1a. Is it possible to identify cycles of a shorter scale?
Response. Yes, there are shorter scale cycles, but the very large
ones occur on tens of thousands of years (like ice ages and
interglacial cycles, whose peak-to-peak temperature differences are in
the order of 5 deg.C--9 deg.F). Smaller scale cycles usually involve
changes that are 1 deg.C or less. Remember, we are talking about the
``best guess'' for human-induced climate changes in the next century of
several degrees, larger than the short scale effects. For example,
during the early part of the current millennium, exploration of
Greenland in a so-called ``medieval climatic optimum'' took place, in
which temperatures in the North Atlantic region were perhaps one to two
degrees warmer than now. However, on a globally averaged basis, it is
unlikely surface temperatures were even 1 deg.C warmer. A few centuries
ago, Europe and parts of North America were particularly affected by a
so-called ``little Ice-Age,'' between about 1500 and 1800. Again,
temperature decreases in northern latitudes were on the order of
1 deg.C colder relative to today, and globally probably 1/2 deg.C or
less. Thus, the magnitude of unnatural change that is typically
projected as likely in the next century swamps these short-term cycles,
which is why scientists frequently discuss the tens of thousands of
years scale cycles for points of comparison, noting how rapid the
typically projected human-induced climate change is likely to be
relative to the large changes between ice ages interglacials.
Question 1b. Would we be able to detect variations attributable to
human activities in this natural cycle?
[[Page 156]]
Response. This is an excellent and very difficult question, and one
of the most controversial ones in climate science. One thing that needs
to be stated first is that the words ``detect'' and ``attribute'' are
quite separate in the minds of scientists. For example, to detect a
climate change all we need to show is that it is relatively unusual
given the natural cycles that occur. A 1/2 deg.C warming trend of the
twentieth century is relatively unusual. I have estimated from looking
at paleoclimatic indicators that it is perhaps a 10 percent chance that
the twentieth century trend was entirely due to natural causes.
Furthermore, recent evidence from Dr. Tom Karl at NOAA in Asheville,
shows that since 1910 the U.S. has experienced a 10 percent increase in
precipitation, and that more than half of that increase in
precipitation occurred in the upper decile of precipitation intensity--
i.e. most of the increase occurred in ``gully washers'' rather than
gentle rains. The statistical significance of this finding is very
high--that is, there is little doubt that this is the detection of a
real climate change. The attribution problem is whether this is just
``double snake eyes'' from a perverse nature, or have we begun to
``load the climate dice''? The latter is much more difficult to
establish, and requires statistical testing, mathematical models,
multiple kinds of evidence and is precisely the kinds of activities
that the scientific community has been vigorously pursuing over the
past 10 years. The most recent IPCC report, in which roughly 100 lead
authors spent days debating this one point, led to the cautious, but
nonetheless strong assertion, that ``the balance of evidence suggests
that there is a discernible human impact on climate.'' I think this
cautious statement goes about as far as the bulk of the community would
allow, namely, a strong confidence that we are at least partly in the
act, but that given the large degree of natural variability, until
another decade or two elapses, in which case predicted effects should
become even larger and therefore the probability of perverse nature
even smaller, there still would be debate over this topic.
Question 2. We know that CO2 has the potential for
affecting the climatic balance of our atmosphere. Would it not make
sense to limit the amount of CO2 we put into the atmosphere
until we more fully understand the effects CO2 has on our
climate?
Response. This question, of course, calls for a value judgment
about whether one fears more performing unplanned experiments on what I
like to call ``Laboratory Earth'' or whether one fears more what the
economic or social consequences would be from those actions which tend
to reduce the pollutants. This is a balance of values question, and in
my value system, which is risk averse, I don't like to take potentially
irreversible chances with the life support systems of the earth. Nor do
I like to risk committing future generations to have to adapt to
potentially large changes that they had no participation in creating.
In my value system, when we pursue activities that benefit us with the
potential for irreversibility and the potential for causing harm to
persons other than ourselves, these conditions lead me to limiting the
amount of CO2, simply as planetary insurance that ethical
people would undertake until they were more sure of the relative harm
or benefits that our unplanned experiment could create.
Question 3. In your testimony, you mentioned the incentive that a
carbon tax would have upon emerging ``clean'' industries. What kind of
industries do you think would emerge?
Response. I feel that a carbon tax would have several positive
benefits, as explained in the Appendix to my written testimony (the
Commentary now accepted by Nature magazine by Professor Larry Goulder
and myself). First of all, a fee for dumping carbon in the atmosphere
sends the right signal to a market-based economy, that the atmosphere
is not a valueless commodity, and cannot be used as a ``free sewer.''
In other words, how can a market system be efficient, if not all costs
are part of the price. The price of energy is not simply extraction,
transport, storage and profit, but also damages that each system
differentially inflicts on people's lungs, sea level, nature, and so
forth. Those systems which damage more should be charged more,
otherwise a market system cannot work--these unpriced side effects are
what economists call externalities. Internalizing these externalities,
in my opinion, is most simply accomplished by a carbon tax, which, as I
said in answer to Senator Baucus's question, also is a highly flexible
policy instrument that can be cranked up or down as new knowledge tells
us that the perceived problem is more or less serious than currently
believed. Furthermore, a carbon tax not only causes billions of
individuals to be more conscious of the energy components of the
activity--that is, the energy component that produces carbon dioxide--
but serves as a major stimulus to alternative energy systems and to
energy efficiency. It is already a fact that when the OPEC countries
dramatically and precipitously increased the price of energy in the
early seventies, this caused significant economic harm because of the
precipitousness of the price shock. However, it is also a fact that
after a temporary adjustment, structured changes to the economy and the
inventive genius of
[[Page 157]]
our technologists caused a significant drop in the amount of energy it
took to produce a unit of GDP in the developed countries of the world.
In other words, we invented more efficient technologies and alternative
ways to run our economy (e.g., information in computers rather than
logs on tracks) on less energy. These effects have indelibly improved
our economy and part of the economic boom we now enjoy is because of
the structured changes and extra efficiency that was induced by that
temporary oil price rise. Only after the prices decreased in the 1980's
did we lose the great rate of progress that we were making in improving
energy intensity. In other words, despite the political resistance to
higher prices of energy, such price incentives have been demonstrated
to stimulate improved technology which actually helps the economy over
the long term. The key lesson is not to have any price rises which are
both unexpected and precipitous.
In addition to improving energy efficiency, alternative energy
systems would be encouraged by raising prices of conventional energy.
Investors in solar, wind, fuel cells, more efficient natural gas, and
perhaps even safer and cheaper nuclear energy would all feel more
investment opportunity if they knew that there were to be a sustained
increase in conventional energy prices that would give them a larger
potential market share. The more investors are willing to pump into
research and development activities in these alternative energy
systems, the more rapid progress would be made which will bring down
the ultimate price of those alternative energy systems. This is not
simply a way of reducing carbon more cheaply, but may very well in the
long term help our economy materially in the following way. We know
that oil is becoming increasingly scarce, and that after the next
decade or so world oil production will no longer increase each year,
despite further exploration activities, but will begin to decline, as
has been long predicted. Oil prices will then increase. The question
is, What will replace them? Isn't it better to replace them with
cleaner alternative energy systems than coal or oil shales, and how can
these cleaner systems compete with the dirty systems, unless the clean
ones have had adequate research and development opportunities.
Therefore, carbon taxes, or R&D subsidies, or other mechanisms that
provide incentives for research seem to me essential regardless of the
climate problem, as anticipation for dealing with the inevitable
increase in fossil energy prices over the long run, which will require
the development and deployment of substitutes, which, if we have
foresight and pursue more vigorously now, will not only reduce
greenhouse gases slightly today, but also will give us the opportunity
for dramatic greenhouse gas reductions (relative to ``business as
usual'') should new science prove that to be necessary. Development of
alternative economic and energy systems provides a measure of
protection against the inevitable increase in energy prices that will
accompany the scarcity in fossil fuels as the oil era winds itself down
in the first few decades of the 21st century.
Question 4. What are the three most important things that need to
be done to address global climate change?
Response. As I have said in my oral and written testimoneys, I
believe the first most important thing to do is to send a message that
the atmosphere is not a ``free sewer.'' That is, some charge for the
use of the global commons needs to be part of the price of doing
business, so that the true costs to both the economy and ecology can be
better incorporated into the price of commodities. The second thing is
to improve the resilience of our systems to whatever changes take
place--natural or human induced. In other words, developing more
resilient agriculture, water supplies, biological reserves, and so
forth, is an insurance policy not only against potential human-induced
climate changes, but also against natural variability that nature often
thrusts on us with or without climate change. Finally, I think one of
the important things to do to deal with climate change is one of the
important things to do for living in a secure 21st century-world:
putting the question of sustainable development at the top of the
world's agenda, not near the bottom. One poignant metaphor reminds us
that all in the ship are at risk when one end is sinking. Clearly,
developing countries have a right to be concerned that worries about
global commons like the atmosphere might just be another excuse of the
developed countries to restrain the competition that these developing
countries will provide as they industrialize. My view is that we should
be partners in that development, helping to transfer efficient and less
polluting technologies, even via concessionary terms, for which we get
back in exchange better relations, future customers, and less of a
legacy of pollution and degradation for us and our posterity. I
personally believe there is much too much emphasis around the world on
international competition and national competitiveness, and
insufficient attention to cooperative win/win solutions in which
countries like China can use high technology to jump over the Victorian
industrial revolution in which the now rich countries used inefficient,
polluting technologies to build their wealth. I recognize how large
these questions are and that
[[Page 158]]
planetary foresight is called for, and hope that the public education
needed to achieve political acceptability of such planetary bargaining
strategies becomes a reality, before large climate change and loss of
biodiversity, coastal flooding, and other kinds of tragedies finally
catalyze public consciousness after much preventable damage has
occurred.
______
Prepared Statement of Dale W. Jorgenson, Professor of Economics,
Harvard University
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee on Environment
and Public Works: I am very grateful for the opportunity to participate
in these Hearings on the scientific understanding of global climate
change. My testimony will focus on the economics of climate change. As
a point of departure I will use the ``Economists' Statement on Climate
Change'' included in my written testimony. I was one of five co-authors
of this statement, which was circulated in January of this year and has
now been endorsed by 2,600 economists, including eight Nobel prize
winners.
The first paragraph concludes that global change involves
significant environmental risks and preventive steps are justified. The
second paragraph summarizes economic studies showing that there are
policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions with benefits that
outweigh the costs. The third paragraph describes these policies in
more detail and emphasizes the importance of relying on market-based
mechanisms.
The economics of climate change can usefully be divided into three
parts. The first is determination of the overall objective of climate
policy. The economists' approach to this problem is to choose a policy
that produces the greatest margin of benefits over costs. Using
economic jargon, I will refer to this as the ``optimal'' policy. Such a
policy would stipulate a time path for future emissions of greenhouse
gases that could be embodied in an international agreement.
After an overall objective is chosen, the second step is to devise
a means of implementing this goal. Emissions of greenhouse gases would
have to be allocated among the signatories of an agreement. In
addition, emissions by countries that are not signatories would have to
be taken into account, since the global climate is affected by total
emissions. Third, given an allocation of greenhouse gas emissions among
countries, each country would have to implement its emissions goal by
devising policies that would hold emissions within the prescribed
quota. Furthermore, the international community would have to monitor
emissions for all countries.
Let me begin with an evaluation of our existing climate policy, the
Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) of 1993. This Plan consisted of
voluntary actions projected to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by the
year 2000. The goal was stipulated in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change ratified by the United States in October
1993.
The impact of CCAP is summarized in the final chart, which compares
a projection of U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases under the original
CCAP ``baseline,'' projecting emissions without the Plan. The CCAP
actions were projected to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by the year
2000. The third line on the chart gives actual U.S. emissions through
1996. These are above the CCAP baseline and far above emissions levels
required for stabilization. Clearly, we need to consider alternatives
to our existing climate policy.
The starting point for a discussion of climate policy is the
damages associated with a change in the climate. This is based on
combining a physical description of the climate with an economic
description of the world economy. This type of analysis is called
``integrated assessment'' and an assessment of this type has been
carried out by William Nordhaus of Yale University in his 1994 book.
The loss associated with climate change is 1.34 percent of world
product in 2050.
How large are the damages associated with climate change? They are
equivalent to the loss of about 1 year of world economic growth.
Obviously, this is sizable, but not overwhelming. In the view of the
signatories of the Economists' Statement on Climate change, this is
sufficient to justify preventive steps to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
Next, suppose we choose reductions in emissions that will produce
the maximum difference between costs and benefits. How large are the
benefits of this policy? Nordhaus has calculated the benefits for the
world as a whole to be equivalent to $271 billion dollars. This is only
0.04 percent of future consumption! While damages associated with
climate change are substantial, steps to mitigate these damages will
produce only very modest effects.
[[Page 159]]
Let me emphasize at this point that the policy I have described
conforms to the Economists' Statement on Climate Change. Preventive
steps are justified. Policies like the one I have described would
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and could employ market-based
mechanisms to do so. A policy appropriate for international
implementation would be the system of internationally tradeable permits
described in the U.S. Climate Change Proposal of January 17.
For domestic implementation of the optimal climate change policy an
appropriate market mechanism would be to impose taxes on greenhouse gas
emissions. These taxes would be relatively modest, amounting to an
initial tax of $5.29 per ton of carbon and rising to $10.03 per ton by
the year 2025. My paper with Peter Wilcoxen, ``The Economic Effects of
a Carbon Tax,'' analyzes the effects of a tax on emissions of carbon
dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas, in greater detail. Wilcoxen
and I calculate the cost of achieving various goals, including the
stabilization goal of the United Nations Convention. We also consider
different methods for ``recycling'' the revenues from a carbon tax and
find that the economic cost is highly dependent on the use of the
revenue. Finally, we consider the use of alternative tax instruments,
such as a ``Btu'' tax on energy and an ad valorem tax on energy.
Our overall conclusions are, first, that a carbon tax is superior
to other tax instruments. Second, by using the revenues to reduce the
most burdensome taxes, namely taxes on income from capital, economic
growth can be stimulated rather than retarded. Of course, reducing the
tax burden on capital by substituting other forms of taxation would
produce similar effects with no effect on emissions of greenhouse
gases.
To sum up: The economics of climate change is well understood. The
optimal policy, described in more detail in my written testimony,
involves a modest reduction in the growth of greenhouse gas emissions.
This should provide the basis for any international agreement that
would supersede the United Nations Framework Convention of 1994.
However, this involves smaller reductions than our existing climate
policy, the U.S. Climate Change Action Plan.
The U.S. Climate Change Proposal from last January contains a
useful contribution to international implementation by proposing a
system of internationally tradeable permits for emissions. Domestic
implementation requires a process for setting country-specific quotas
for emissions. This might impose lower or higher reductions in
emissions for the U.S., relative to other countries. After the U.S.
quota has been determined, the final step would be to impose a tax on
emissions like the carbon tax discussed in my paper with Wilcoxen.
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[[Page (197)]]
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 17, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Washington, DC.
INTERNATIONAL POLICY REVIEW
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:38 a.m. in room
406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. John H. Chafee (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Chafee, Inhofe, Baucus, Kempthorne, Reid,
and Wyden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Senator Chafee. This morning we have, as is not infrequent,
some challenges as far as time goes. What I'd like to do this
morning is have our opening statements, which I hope will be
rather brief, and then we'll vote. The first vote is on now. I
believe the leader has scheduled three votes.
I noticed Secretary Wirth isn't here yet, but I certainly
presume he'll be here when we finish our statements.
A week ago today, the committee received testimony from a
distinguished panel of witnesses on the science and economics
of global climate change. This morning we hope to learn more
about how the Administration has interpreted the current
scientific and economic understanding of the climate change
issue to form its domestic and international policies, how is
this all influencing us.
We will also receive views from two very knowledgeable
representatives of the business community.
What we did learn last week from our witnesses? I must say
it didn't all come out like the blinding light that hit Paul on
the road to Damascus, but information was there if we looked
hard enough. Many left the hearing even more sure that there
are too many uncertainties to commit the United States to
additional or legally binding greenhouse gas emission
reductions.
Others may now be further convinced that serious climate
change risks have been demonstrated sufficiently and that the
time for meaningful, preventive action is now.
Individuals possessing sound reason and good intent, of
which this committee has 18, could plausibly arrive at either
conclusion. That's a judgment call. Those of us in government
and here on this committee have to advance with the best
possible information.
[[Page 198]]
What are the facts? First, energy from the sun warms the
Earth. Second, greenhouse gases in the atmosphere trap heat
from the Earth that would otherwise radiate out into space.
Third, greenhouse gases make the Earth warmer than it otherwise
would be.
Fourth, water vapor is the most abundant, natural
greenhouse gas. Fifth, greenhouse gases emitted by human
activities are altering the pre-industrial composition of the
atmosphere. Indeed, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere has increased from about 280 parts per million 200
years ago to about 360 ppm today.
Importantly, the concentrations will not absolutely halt at
360 ppm. We will observe a doubling of pre-industrial
concentrations sometime in the early part of the next century
unless we take action.
Sixth, all nations are contributing to this buildup of
greenhouse gases. No one Nation acting alone can effectively
address this matter. Seventh, the United States is the largest
greenhouse gas emitter in absolute and in per capita terms.
China is the second largest greenhouse gas emitter in absolute,
but on a per capita basis, emits one-tenth of U.S. emissions.
Eighth, we have measured one degree of Fahrenheit temperature
increase globally over the past 100 year.
Finally, on the economic side, it is a fact that limiting
carbon dioxide emissions will mean significant changes in
energy use and energy sources.
The question is, has science provided enough information on
the relationship between these facts and actual changes in the
climate to warrant further action? Obviously, the
Administration has made its conclusion.
The United States and 160 other nations are negotiating
changes to the existing 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. These changes, if agreed to,
could require specific, legally binding, greenhouse gas
emission reductions commitments for the post-2000 period. These
international negotiations are to culminate at the third
conference of the parties in Kyoto in December of this year.
Should we be signatories to a Kyoto agreement? What role
should the developing countries play? What kind of emission
reduction requirements are appropriate? What are the likely
economic trade, competitiveness and job impacts? What are the
likely environmental impacts of acting or not acting? How will
such an international agreement be implemented domestically?
Finally, is it possible to embark upon a ``low regrets,''
or ``no regrets'' strategy which would minimize economic damage
or even improve our economic performance while responsibly
reducing the threat of climate change? Can we do some things
that are cost-effective, regardless of whether we believe in
reducing the treat of climate change, but indeed, will reduce
the threat of climate change? For instance, we talked the other
day about a certain type of bulb in our lights.
These are other topics will be our focus today.
Senator Baucus.
[[Page 199]]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAX BAUCUS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF MONTANA
Senator Baucus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have just a few brief remarks and observations from last
week.
No. 1, the scientists last week presented what I thought
was quite solid evidence and a thoughtful argument that future
changes in our climate caused by human activity is a
potentially serious, if not absolutely certain, outcome.
To me, that means the potential consequences are too
serious to ignore and if we begin to make modest steps now to
curtail greenhouse gas emissions, we may start making progress
toward that goal without encountering serious economic
disruptions.
As with many issues around here, our task is to find the
right balance between maximizing the benefits of a policy and
minimizing any adverse consequences from it. As we were told
last week, the sooner we start, the better this country will be
able to achieve that result.
My second point is that if we are to succeed in limiting
worldwide emissions and CO2 and other greenhouse
gases, we must have greater participation by at least the major
developing countries. After all, this is called global climate
change. If the major global players are not part of the
solution, the prospects for success will be slim.
Perhaps this is an area in which we need to broaden our
thinking. I've spent a good deal of time looking at China's
role in the world, particularly from the trade standpoint. The
United States has a lot of issues to deal with China on, some
issues on which we have fundamental disagreements, but there
are many others with China on which we share mutual interest.
Climate surely is one of them.
China has more people potentially at risk from rising sea
levels and violent weather than any other nation. It also has a
desperate need to increase its domestic energy supplies. If
there is no change, China will be contributing a full one-third
of the additional greenhouse gas emissions in the world over
the next 20 years, one-third.
Looking at the broad array of issues on the United States-
China table, we should be able to find ways to gain their
support on this issue. As I've said many times, our
disagreements with China should not stop us from engaging with
them on issues where we can both make some progress.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, whatever our ultimate policy on
climate change will be, it needs the support of the American
people. I believe there is a compelling case to be made and
it's why I welcome the President's decision to become more
personally involved.
The toughest issues for democracies to handle are those in
which the threat to society builds gradually but inexorably
over time. We deal well with immediate crises and I hope it
will not take such an event to spur action on this one.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[[Page 200]]
I do have a more lengthy statement that I will submit for
the record, but I want to mention a couple of things that do
concern me.
The Clean Air Subcommittee has already held one hearing on
climate change. One of the things that concerns me is I think
the disingenuous way we've gotten information and treatment
from the Administration. I have a list of contradictory
statements that have been made. I'll only mention one of them
and then submit the rest of them in my opening statement.
In June 1996, Mr. Palmeritz, who is an Assistant Secretary
over at the State Department, made the statement in response to
the question ``Are we going to agree to a legally binding
instrument in Geneva?,'' ``Are we going to agree to a legally
binding instrument in Geneva? No way.'' One month later,
Secretary Wirth, you announced that the United States supported
a legally binding emissions target.
This concerns me, the discrepancies that we are getting in
statements from the various departments.
I would like to just, in one sentence, outline five
conclusions that I felt we came to in our first subcommittee
hearing, Mr. Chairman, on this subject.
No. 1, while there is a large body of scientific research,
there is much controversy and disagreement and the scientific
facts are being misrepresented by the Administration and the
press.
No. 2, we don't know how much human activity has influenced
the climate. One scientist said less than 6 percent.
No. 3, if you look at satellite data, we are not sure if
there has been any global warming.
No. 4, even if we eliminate all manmade emissions, it may
not have a noticeable impact on the environment and the treaty
may only eliminate emissions here in the United States and not
the entire world.
No. 5, when asked, all five witnesses--these are the
scientific witnesses--they stated that we would not have the
uncertainties understood by this December when the
Administration plans on making a decision regarding the treaty.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be looking forward to asking
some questions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Inhofe, U.S. Senator from the State of
Oklahoma
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I am glad you called today's hearing, it is
important to hear from the Administration on this issue. Under
Secretary Wirth has testified in many Congressional hearings over the
last few years, and unfortunately he raises more questions than he
answers, but I hope today will be different.
Last week at our science hearing on this issue, a number of points
were made and I personally learned a great deal. I would like to
summarize a few key observations from the hearing:
(1) While there is a large body of scientific research there is
much controversy and disagreement and the scientific facts are being
misrepresented by the Administration and the press.
(2) We don't know how much human activity has influenced the
climate. One scientist said 6 percent.
(3) If you look at satellite data, we are not sure if there has
been any global warming.
[[Page 201]]
(4) Even if we eliminate all manmade emissions, it may not have a
noticeable impact on the environment, and the Treaty may only eliminate
emissions here in the United States, not the entire world.
(5) When asked, all five witnesses stated that we would not have
the uncertainties understood by this December, when the Administration
plans on making a decision regarding the Treaty.
I have read over the hearing records in the various congressional
committees over the last few years and I am very disturbed by the way
the Administration makes promises to Congress and then immediately
ignores them in international meetings. I would like to offer a few
examples.
In March 1995, in a House Commerce Hearing Congressmen Dingell and
Schaefer raised concerns that new targets may not apply to all
countries, on behalf of the Administration, Mr. Rafe Pomerance a Deputy
Assistant Secretary at the State Department said ``Our goal, Mr.
Chairman, is that all parties participate in this next round of
negotiations. We want to see that all governments participate and help
define the post-2000 regime.''
One month later the Administration signed onto the ``Berlin
Mandate'' to review the commitments made to reduce the greenhouse gases
and adopt targets for further reductions. The conference differentiated
between developed and developing nations. This was clearly at odds with
Congressmen Dingell and Schaefer's concerns and the Administration's
assurances.
In June 1996, before a hearing, Mr. Pomerance stated, ``Are we
going to agree to a legally binding instrument in Geneva? No way.'' One
month later in Geneva, Under Secretary Wirth announced that the United
States supported a legally binding emissions target.
In September 1996 before the Commerce Committee, Assistant
Secretary of State Eileen Claussen told Congressman Dingell that the
United States would not be bound before we have completed the economic
analysis and assessments. We learned this week that the Administrations
efforts to analyze the economic effects has failed. The models they
used did not work, and we will not understand the effect on our
nation's economy before December.
I have to conclude based on the Hearing records that the
performance of this Administration is somewhere between ``misleading''
and downright ``untruthfulness''. I hope today's witnesses can change
this record, but I will have to reserve judgment to see if today's
promises will be fulfilled.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. We have about 4 minutes left on this vote
and my suggestion is rather than racing through your statement,
that we go over and vote and then come back and we'll hear your
statement, Senator Kempthorne, and then proceed with the
witnesses.
Senator Kempthorne. If you don't mind, may I race?
Senator Chafee. We're certainly delighted to hear what
you've got to say if you're conscious of 3\1/2\ minutes. The
option is yours. I'm perfectly delighted to stay here. I was
going to let you proceed in a more leisurely manner when the
pearls you have to offer us will be easier observed in a calmer
atmosphere.
Senator Kempthorne. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to go ahead and
do this, but if the others would like to go, I understand that,
so I'll understand.
Senator Chafee. I'll wait with you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIRK KEMPTHORNE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF IDAHO
Senator Kempthorne. Mr. Chairman, I've always believed that
fundamentally, we're all environmentalists. We all want a
cleaner, healthier environment for our children and their
children.
I've always believed that the best way to achieve that
cleaner and healthier environment is not necessarily through
more Federal regulation and mandates. I believe there will be
better results achieved faster using incentives, flexible
programs and voluntary incentives.
[[Page 202]]
As I understand it, the push for more aggressive, global
climate change policy is being driven by evidence that suggests
that the global temperature has increased by one degree,
although it's unclear whether or not human-caused activities
are solely responsive for that increase. Nor do we know whether
it's significant.
The assumption is that we should do something about it
anyway, reduce or freeze greenhouse gas emissions to 1990
levels. While I won't dispute that conclusion here today, in
light of the uncertainty, I think it's important that we not
jump to impose more regulations on U.S. businesses risking jobs
in our economy when we really don't know if we are truly
addressing the problem.
We should also be concerned about what costs of any new
policy will, in fact, be and who will bear them. Providing
flexibility and greater opportunities for voluntary programs
will go a long way to controlling unnecessary costs and
increasing acceptance of any new policy.
Just as importantly, we should not put our U.S. industries
at a competitive disadvantage with their competitors in
international markets. Climate change is truly a global issue
and the solution must be a global one as well.
If the United States is going to agree to mandatory
reductions, our treaty partners, including developing
countries, must also. That's only fair. Ultimately, the
workability and cost of any new policy will be determined
largely by the specific target levels and compliance schedules
that the Administration negotiators decide to accept.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses as we discuss
this critically important issue.
Senator Chafee. We have to hasten over. Mr. Secretary, we
will be back shortly. There are three votes, but they are 10-
minute votes, so we will be back shortly.
There will be a brief recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Chafee. If we could have everyone's attention, we
will start the hearing again.
We apologize for the interruptions. I guess nobody
understands the interruptions better than the distinguished
Assistant Secretary of State, a former colleague who served in
this body with distinction.
We've completed all the statements and Mr. Secretary, go to
it. We'd be interested to hear what you've got to say.
Secretary Wirth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, if you have any desired order, we might ask
Dr. Yellen to lead off, if that would be all right.
Senator Chafee. That's fine. Go ahead, Dr. Yellen.
STATEMENT OF JANET YELLEN, CHAIR, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Ms. Yellen. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the
economics of global climate change. In a speech to the United
Nations in June, President Clinton emphasized that the risks
posed by
[[Page 203]]
global climate change are real and that sensible, preventive
steps are justified.
This assessment accords with the views of more than 2,300
economists, including 8 Noble laureates, who signed the
statement supporting measures to reduce the threat of climate
change.
At this time, the Administration has not settled on a
particular set of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Instead, the President indicated in his U.N. speech that he
intends to engage in a discussion with all interested parties,
Members of Congress and other elected officials, scientists,
economists, business and labor leaders, about the problems
posed by greenhouse gas accumulations and the costs and
benefits of corrective action.
This discussion is intended to inform the Administration's
decisionmaking process which will culminate in a U.S. policy
position in the international negotiations in Kyoto in December
of this year.
An important step in this, in any policy process, is
determining the impact a policy will have on the American
economy. President Clinton's top priority since his first days
in office has been revitalizing the U.S. economy, creating jobs
and investing in people and technology to enhance long-term
growth, and we have made tremendous progress.
Any policy the President ultimately endorses on climate
change will be informed by his commitment to sustaining a
healthy and robust economy. In my testimony today, I'd like to
describe some of the principle lessons that emerged from the
voluminous literature, much of it relatively recent, on the
economic impacts of policies to address global climate change.
Before I begin my discussion of the economic literature,
however, I'd like first to emphasize the uncertainties that are
associated with estimating both the costs and the benefits of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Just to provide some perspective, as you all know, it is
quite difficult to gauge exactly what impact, for example, the
balanced budget agreement will have on the U.S. economy's
growth rate, levels of employment, interest rates and
consumption over a period as long as the next 5 years.
With global climate change, it's orders of magnitude more
difficult to gauge the effects of policies on the economy.
We're concerned with not just the next 5 years and not just the
American economy, but rather, with economic and physical
processes that operate globally and over decades, if not
centuries.
Both the costs and the benefits of climate protection are
very difficult to quantify or predict with any certainty. So,
in short, if anybody tells you that he or she has the
definitive answer as to the costs and benefits of particular
climate change policies, I would suggest that you raise your
collective eyebrows.
Let me now turn to the economic literature and try to
summarize what I think we know so far about this difficult
topic.
The economic literature includes estimates using many
different models to evaluate numerous alternative emission
reduction strategies. In fact, because there are so many
different models, economists initially faced difficulties in
comparing results.
To solve this problem, thereby enabling meaningful
comparisons, many economists have calibrated the various models
by performing
[[Page 204]]
a standardized simulation. Specifically, they've assessed the
consequences of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990
levels by 2010 or 2020.
Within the Administration, a staff level working group, the
Interagency Analytical Team, has attempted to estimate some of
the economic implications of climate change policies.
They took the emissions scenario that's most often used in
the academic literature, that is stabilizing emissions at 1990
levels by 2010 as the starting point for their own analysis. I
emphasize that this scenario is not Administration policy.
Instead, it was picked to make comparison with other models
easier.
This modeling effort produced some useful lessons, but as
we found from peer reviewers' comments, it also suffered from
some serious shortcomings. I think both the lessons and the
shortcomings point to one clear conclusion which is that the
effort to develop a model or small set of models that can give
us a definitive answer concerning the economic impacts of a
given climate change policy is futile, but we are left with a
set of parameters and relationships that influence estimates of
the impacts.
I understand that a draft of the staff analysis was given
to this committee earlier this week, along with reviewers'
comments. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have
about this modeling effort. Let me say just a bit about the
lessons.
The modeling efforts, both inside the Administration and
outside, clearly indicate that economic analysis can do no more
than estimate a range of potential impacts from particular
policies and highlight how outcomes depend on underlying
assumptions about how the economy works and the ways in which
policy is implemented. I'd like to briefly summarize a few of
the key lessons we've learned.
First, the magnitude of the cost of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions in the various models depends crucially on a number
of key assumptions about how the economy works. Essentially,
the lesson is that the greater the substitution possibilities
and the faster the economy can adapt, the lower the costs.
Second, costs depend critically on how emission reduction
policies are implemented. It just boils down to this, if we do
it dumb, it could cost a lot, but if we do it smart, it will
cost much less and indeed, it could produce net benefits in the
long run.
The over 2,300 signatories of the economist statement
argued that any global climate change policy should rely on
market-based mechanisms. These mechanisms allow for flexibility
in both the timing and the location of emissions reductions,
thereby minimizing the cost to the U.S. economy.
The economists concluded, ``There are policy options that
would slow climate change without harming American living
standards and these measures may, in fact, improve U.S.
productivity in the longer run.''
The third lesson that emerges from a study of the economics
of climate protection is that developing, as well as developed,
countries must be part of the process. While developed
countries are responsible for most of the greenhouse gas
currently in the atmosphere, developing countries are starting
to catch up.
[[Page 205]]
The timetable for inclusion of developing countries is also
important. The sooner the developing countries face incentives
to move away from carbon-intensive energy sources, the less
likely it is they will become dependent on those types of fuels
to spur their own economic growth. In short, global problems
require global solutions.
Let me wrap up by saying that policies to promote economic
growth create jobs and improve the living standards and
opportunities of all Americans have been and always will be the
top priority of the President and the Administration.
In his remarks to the Business Roundtable on Global Climate
Change, the President said, ``Let's find a way to preserve the
environment to meet our international responsibilities, to meet
our responsibilities to our children, and grow the economy at
the same time.''
I believe that some of the lessons we've learned from the
economics literature will help us achieve the President's goal.
Thank you. I'd be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
Now what I'd like to do is proceed with Secretary Wirth.
Ms. Yellen. I do have a longer statement I'd like to submit
for the record.
Senator Chafee. That's fine. Do you have any urgency to
leave?
Ms. Yellen. No.
Senator Chafee. Why don't you go ahead?
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Yes.
Senator Reid. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my
statement be made a part of the record as if read.
Senator Chafee. Fine.
[The prepared statement of Senator Reid follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Harry Reid, U.S. Senator from the State of
Nevada
Good Morning. I want to share a few thoughts on the science and
economics of the global climate change debate. Although the committee
has wisely chosen to hold two separate hearings on this subject this
summer, one on science and economics, which was held last week and
today's on the on-going international treaty negotiations, my comments
cannot be so easily separated.
There is a discernible human influence on global climate. Since the
dawn of the industrial age, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere has risen by 30 percent. Most experts now agree that the
build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due to the combustion of
fossil fuels and other human activities is happening. To many this is a
troubling phenomenon. Although we are not sure what the exact adverse
consequences of this build-up will be, mere common sense dictates that
we, at a minimum, begin preparing to deal with it.
The Senate approved the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change in 1993, which called for all signatory nations to adopt
policies and programs to limit their greenhouse gas emissions on a
voluntary basis. The United States had hoped to stabilize emissions in
the year 2000 at 1990 levels. Unfortunately, we have fallen well short
of that mark.
The United States is, at the moment, the world's biggest consumer
of fossil fuels and producer of greenhouse gas emissions. As such, it
is important that we must show international leadership in terms of
analysis, research, and, if necessary, in reducing these emissions.
As part of the on-going international treaty negotiations, the
Administration has moved towards supporting mandatory, legally binding
limitations on greenhouse gases for the nations of the World. Within
limits, I am supportive of these efforts.
Unfortunately, I share the concern of many of my colleagues that
the current negotiations do not seem to require a firm time table for
reductions from the nations of the developing world.
[[Page 206]]
The United States currently emits more greenhouse gases than
developing nations, such as China and India. However, this will not be
the case for much longer, especially if the United States begins to
curb our emissions. While I am not eager to perpetuate the poverty in
these nations by mandating that they participate equally and
immediately in making reductions, I have economic and competitive
concerns about requiring nothing from them.
I cannot, in good faith, ask the citizens of Nevada and the rest of
the Nation, who have worked very hard to develop and accommodate
environmentally friendly transportation policies and clean industries,
to now make more sacrifices without some guarantee that the developing
nations will not make similar efforts soon.
In a global economy, we are often forced to compete with other
nations that have different labor laws and practices than our own,
different rules of resource protection, and yes, often weaker
environmental laws. Unfortunately, cheap labor, wasteful resource use,
and weak environmental laws often add up to a mighty competitive retail
price.
On an issue of such wide-ranging economic impact and consequence,
it is unfair to our citizens to let other nations do nothing while we
make the necessary sacrifices.
Again, I absolutely acknowledge that the United States must do its
part to try to avert any adverse climate change. We are a part of the
problem and we will be an important part of the solution.
I would prefer that Senator Byrd's resolution recognize that the
nations of the developing world will need some extra time, perhaps as
much as 10 years, to put their binding reductions in place. I am
hopeful that a compromise can be worked out to everyone's satisfaction.
However, given a choice between sending U.S. negotiators to Kyoto
offering unilateral economic disarmament on this subject, and sending
them into final negotiations with a stance that demands world-wide
equality of treatment now, must choose to protect the best interests of
the United States.
Thank you.
Senator Reid. I'd also like to tell the chairman and
especially my friend, Secretary Wirth, that I scheduled my time
to be here from 10 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. and that time has gone
and I will be unable to listen to his testimony. I apologize.
Senator Chafee. I know you made the effort and
unfortunately we had the intervention with those votes and
that's just life in the Senate. We're glad you were able to
come even though briefly.
Mr. Secretary, why don't you proceed?
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
GLOBAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Wirth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Baucus, Senator Reid, Senator Kempthorne, Senator
Inhofe, we appreciate your being here. We also appreciate the
great interest of this committee. I read with interest the
transcript of the science panel and discussion that you had.
Questions were raised earlier and we may have a chance to touch
upon them today.
My part of the discussion this morning is to focus on the
ongoing negotiations toward the next steps under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. These
negotiations began in August 1995 and are scheduled to end in
December at the third conference of the parties in Kyoto when
we hope to adopt a new protocol or other legal instrument.
In his address last month to the United Nations General
Assembly Special Session, President Clinton noted that, ``The
science is clear and compelling'' and the President committed
the United States to strong leadership on climate change.
The President, as well, committed himself to engage the
American people and the Congress in a dialog to explain the
real and imminent threats from climate change, the economic
costs and ben-
[[Page 207]]
efits involved, and the opportunities that American technology
an innovation can provide.
The President also committed to ``bring to the Kyoto
conference a strong American commitment to realistic and
binding limits that will significantly reduce our emissions of
greenhouse gases.''
In recent weeks, interest in the negotiations has
intensified, particularly in the Congress. The Administration
welcomes this interest, Mr. Chairman, and wants to encourage
the broadest possible dialog as we work toward a new agreement
in Kyoto and urges the Senate and House leadership to establish
observer groups with whom we can work even more closely in the
weeks and months ahead.
I would like today to focus on two concerns, first, how the
actions negotiated under the Climate Convention correspond to a
significant environmental objective and second, the need for
developing nations to acknowledge more fully their role in
meeting that objective.
I won't repeat the science here this morning. That is
familiar to all of you, particularly after your last hearing,
but let me just briefly make one comment on effects. Virtually
all the studies on the effects of climate disruption have
focused on a predicted doubling of atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases; but as Senator Baucus pointed out in his
opening statement, unless significant actions are taken early
in the next century, it is very likely that atmospheric
concentrations will, by the year 2100, nearly triple the pre-
industrial level and rise higher than at any point in the last
50 million years.
Changes to our climate system would also continue beyond
the effects the current studies predict. The risks would
increase dramatically as concentrations continue to rise.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that these additional
effects would be linear. They would most likely take
unpredictable and highly undesirable paths.
Let me now move on to the division of responsibilities
between the developed and the developing countries.
As I noted earlier, we know that man-made emissions have
increased the concentration by about 30 percent, from 280 ppm
in pre-industrial times to around 366 ppm today. We know that
the industrialized countries have put most of the carbon into
the atmosphere and that CO2 lingers there for 100 to
150 years. We know that the United States is the largest
emitter of greenhouse gases; we have 4 percent of the world's
population and contribute 22 percent of the carbon. We also
know that given current trends, the developing world will pass
the developed world as an emitter in about 30 years. At that
point, the developing world will have about 70 percent of the
world's population. China, with it's 1.2 billion people, will
probably pass the United States toward the end of the first
quarter of that century.
So action by the industrialized nations alone will not put
us on the road to safe concentrations of greenhouse gases. We
need action by the developing countries as well.
It's very clear from all our discussions and negotiations
to date that if the developed countries, with our current
economic capacity, technical capability and energy-intensive
lifestyle, don't go first, setting the example and reducing
emissions, then developing coun-
[[Page 208]]
tries will not act either. We must lead the way and we must
move soon.
If not, a doubling of concentrations becomes certain and we
put ourselves on the road to a tripling or even higher levels
of concentrations, the consequences of which are uncertain but
likely to be catastrophic.
The United States has put forward a number of proposals
which are outlined in my testimony and the attachments. Perhaps
most controversial is Article 16, our proposal which calls for
developing country parties to adopt by the year 2005, binding
provisions so that all parties have quantitative greenhouse gas
emission obligations and so that there is a mechanism or
trigger for automatic application of those obligations based on
agreed criteria.
In urging this policy of what we call evolution, the United
States is far out in front of almost all other countries and
we're being criticized accordingly. For example, several
developed countries believe that our proposal imposes unfair
burdens on developing countries. Most countries in the
developing world believe that evolution goes beyond the scope
of the Climate Convention and the Berlin Mandate. We think we
have the concept about right. No one should be exempt. We emit
the most, so we have to act first, but others have to phase in
over time.
The overall negotiation on climate change is extremely
complex, the most complex I've seen in 25 years of public life.
The evolution aspect is perhaps the most important of all. We
have put forward some proposals, some in Congress have as well.
Now we have to hammer out a final proposal and negotiating
position. We welcome your input, support and creativity as we
work to solve this problem and I look forward to hearing your
ideas, questions and comments today.
The issue is not whether developing countries, especially
the big and rapidly developing ones, take on quantified
commitments to limit or reduce their emissions of greenhouse
gases. Clearly, it will be impossible to abate the threat of
climate change unless they do. The issue is when such
commitment should begin and what criteria should be used to
establish them and to whom they would apply.
The Framework Convention, which President Bush signed and
to which the Senate overwhelmingly gave its approval,
established the principle that with respect to climate change,
the world's nations have common but differentiated
responsibilities and varying capabilities. Insisting the
developing nations immediately accept binding emissions targets
that industrialized nations are seeking to negotiate is neither
realistic, nor consistent with the Convention approved by the
Senate, but insisting that those developing nations now
responsible for a growing share of global greenhouse gas
emissions should have no further obligations to act until they
cross some threshold of national income or emissions per
capita, is equally unrealistic and inconsistent with the
Convention's ultimate objective.
The agreement reached in Kyoto will not solve the problem
of global climate change. No matter how ambitious, it will
represent only a second step along the much longer path toward
achieving the Climate Convention's ultimate objective. As we
prepare for Kyoto, we must also prepare for further steps
beyond it. In particu-
[[Page 209]]
lar, we must ensure that all nations responsible for a
significant share of current global greenhouse gas emissions
accept the need to limit or reduce their emissions and that
they begin to move in that direction.
What a Kyoto agreement can do is provide nations with the
tools they will need to achieve a significant, binding
greenhouse gas limitation and reduction commitment. These tools
include greenhouse gas emission budgets over multiyear periods
that will help smooth out annual fluctuations. They include
full national flexibility in the choice of policies and
measures to meet such binding emission budgets. They include
emissions trading among nations with binding emission budgets,
with the participation of the private sector in the trading
regime which we believe will help significantly lower the cost
of compliance. They include joint implementation for credit
between nations with binding emissions budgets and those that
do not yet have such budgets both to lower the cost of
compliance and to promote economic development and
environmental protection.
Mr. Chairman, we have charted an ambitious course for the
months ahead. The tremendous risk to our plant demand nothing
less. With your continued support and the support of other
Members of Congress, I am confident that we will obtain an
outcome in Kyoto that will represent a significant step forward
on the much longer path toward safeguarding the Earth's climate
system for present and future generations.
If I might, I'd like to have my statement included in full
in the record and we look forward to answering any questions
that the committee might have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
What we will do is have a round of questions. I would say
each member will have 6 minutes and we will go around and come
back so that everybody gets a chance.
You say in your opening statement, President Clinton noted
``The science is clear and compelling.'' I didn't get that
feeling. Could you summarize the science that is clear and
compelling?
Secretary Wirth. As you know, this is probably the most
peer-reviewed, carefully studied international issue that
mankind has looked at. The international community established
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in the 1980's.
That made its first report when you and I were at the Rio
Conference just before the 1992 Rio Summit. It's second report
was completed in the fall of 1995 and was published in the
spring of 1996.
The consensus of that study--of almost every climate
scientist in the world--was that man's impact on the climate
can now be seen. That was Volume 1.
Volume 2 pointed out what some of the impacts of this are
going to be. As Senator Kempthorne pointed out, there's a lot
of uncertainty as to exactly where, how much, how fast, and a
great deal of work to be done, but Volume 2 began to tease out
what some of the implications of this were.
Volume 3 contained work by a great number of economists as
well as people in the climate world as to what steps ought to
be taken. It's a very impressive piece of work.
[[Page 210]]
It was our judgment, in summary, looking at the science as
it comes to us it was important and prudent for us to establish
steps now to begin to take what many have called an insurance
policy.
There are still uncertainties, Senator Kempthorne, as to
exactly where, how much, how fast, and that is well recognized,
but the overall trend, in our opinion, is so compelling that we
believe we have to begin now to take steps. As Senator Baucus
pointed out, the earlier we take steps, the easier it's going
to be to make these kinds of changes, the less disruption we'll
have, the fewer costs we will incur. We have to begin to make
those steps now, in the form of the insurance policy described
in our proposals for Kyoto.
Senator Chafee. The big stumbling block probably will be
the developing countries and in your testimony, you indicated
it's very, very important to get them aboard. I think it is
important for us to recognize.
I believe from your testimony, you say we've got 4 percent
of the population and emit 22 percent of the CO2 and
those are startling statistics and statistics that the
developing countries know as well as we do.
When you seek the participation of the developing
countries, which means I would gather that they are going to
accept some legally binding emission reduction targets, how are
you going to do that in a timely manner?
Secretary Wirth. As I pointed out in my testimony, we have
a five-part approach for bringing the developing countries on
board. In summary, let me say that Senator Byrd had a very
appropriate metaphor for this, which I think is very helpful.
That is, we're all in the same boat together. This is a problem
that we all have to face and it's a very significant one. In
that boat, we begin with a bigger oar than the developing
countries but over a period of time, the size of their oar
phases in so that when we get to say 2030, 2040, we're all
pulling together oars the same size. That's not a bad metaphor
to understand the process of phasing in.
We have proposed a phase-in approach far beyond what almost
anybody else in the world has done. The developing countries
are required to advance their existing commitments on issues
like energy efficiency, elimination of subsidies, privatization
of energy, and the investment in renewable energy resources.
There are a whole series of things that we want them to be
pinned down to in advance.
Second, we would like to create what is called an Annex B.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Framework Convention has Annex I
countries and non-Annex I countries. The Annex I countries are
the developed countries and then there is everybody else. There
are a number of countries who, over a relatively short period
of time, are now graduating toward developed country status. We
think as they graduate, for example, as they assume membership
in the OECD, they also have to assume certain obligations, so
we are proposing a second sort of interim category.
Third, we're calling on developing country parties to adopt
by 2005, binding provisions so that all parties have
quantitative emission obligations.
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Fourth, we have very important joint implementation
processes which we think add real incentives to bring the
developing countries on board. It's in their advantage to do
so.
Finally, we're carrying out other bilateral initiatives as
part of our treaty obligations to promote energy efficiency,
forest protection and various technical country assessments.
This is the trickiest and most difficult issue in the whole
negotiation as you pointed out in your resolution, Mr.
Chairman. We appreciate your help and work on that and look
forward to working with you and other members of the Senate.
Senator Chafee. Many of us look back on the Montreal
Protocol and the CFCs and what we did there, but when you look
at that, it seems easy compared to this problem.
As you recall, we had binding limitations in that by the
year 2005, whatever it was, I can't remember the exact dates,
the production of a certain type of CFC had to be completely
banned. So we were able to achieve that, plus we had wonderful
cooperation from American industry on it.
I see my time is up. I'm going to give everybody else 8
minutes and I'll take two more myself and then everybody will
have eight.
Dr. Yellen, in the beginning of your testimony, you said,
``The Administration has not settled on a particular set of new
policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.'' Kyoto is 20
weeks away. That is not very far, so if you haven't settled on
it, you'd better hurry.
[Laughter.]
Senator Chafee. What is your answer?
Ms. Yellen. I should perhaps clarify and say there are some
elements as the Under Secretary has mentioned of the United
States approach that certainly are settled on. These have to do
with the joint implementation, international emissions and
other flexibility provisions that I think are very important.
With respect to targets and timetables, that isn't settled
and what that would entail in terms of domestic implementation.
The President has indicated that he really thinks it is
important before we settle on a policy to have a period in
which he and the rest of the Administration become personally
heavily engaged in hearing from broadly, Members of Congress,
elected officials, business and labor leaders, and others that
are interested, about their views on this topic. We would like
to get that kind of input before trying to settle on the a
policy.
Senator Chafee. On page 10 of the testimony you submitted
to us, you said, ``What a Kyoto agreement can do is provide
nations with the tools they will need to achieve significant
binding greenhouse gas limitation and reduction commitments.''
Are you saying there will be binding greenhouse gas
limitations? Is that what your thought is?
Secretary Wirth. Yes. It's our belief that we have to go to
a binding approach on this sort of thing.
Just as a quick aside, I might say that Geneva was not a
negotiation where we were making commitments; we were rather
proposing what ought to be done and that might be the
explanation.
We believe that the non-binding aim that was built into the
initial Framework Convention coming out of Rio has not been
adequate to the task. We're going to miss it, everybody else is
going
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to miss it except the United Kingdom which made a transition to
natural gas, which was very painful and difficult for them to
do and very laudable. They did that for a lot of other reasons,
for the most part. Germany will make it because they adopted
utilities in East Germany and shut them down which was
difficult for them to do.
Nobody else in the world is going to make the non-binding
aim of Rio. We believe that we need a binding agreement that
all nations really step up to, and really understand what
they're committing themselves to, to make very significant
progress.
A binding agreement gets us beyond rhetorical flourishes
into a kind of serious reality.
Senator Chafee. I agree you've got to have a binding
agreement if you're ever going to get the thing done.
My times is up. Senator Baucus.
Senator Baucus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, as you know, any treaty adopted by the
Senate requires two-thirds of the members of the Senate to vote
for a treaty. As you also know, Senator Byrd is sponsoring a
resolution which basically states that no treaty should be
adopted unless the developing countries are equally committed.
He has two-thirds of the members of the Senate as co-sponsors
of that resolution, and he's intending to push that resolution
quite quickly I would expect before Kyoto.
What is the Administration doing to turn that vote around?
It seems to me that the Administration has quite a difficult
job ahead of it because there is quite a feeling in the Senate
that yes, the United States must do something about greenhouse
gases. I think most of the Senators think that, although there
are some who do not think that, but certainly those who feel
the United States should not act, feel if we act that certainly
all countries should, in an appropriate way, be a part of this
solution. After all, we're all on this globe together.
India and China together should I think be close to 40
percent of greenhouse gas emissions.
We all know the facts and the figures and we're all trying
to find a solution here, but my question really is, what is the
Administration's plan or what is the Administration going to do
to persuade the Senators, by a two- thirds majority, that we
ought to adopt a treaty?
My advice to you is that we have to go farther than the
United States does in persuading not only developing countries,
but also the other developed countries that the developing
countries have to step up a little more than they have thus
far?
Secretary Wirth. We recognize the size of the challenge
that you lay out in your question. Let me just take pieces of
it if I might.
First of all, the engagement and leadership of Senator
Byrd, we applaud. I have met with Senator Byrd. I don't know
how many of you have had the opportunity to sit down and talk
with him, I suppose all 70 who signed on.
Senator Baucus. And some who have not signed have spoke
with him.
Secretary Wirth. And some who have not signed on.
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Senator Byrd's resolution, in our opinion, is largely on
the button and comes very close to the Chafee Resolution which
we also very much applaud and support.
The Byrd Resolution related to sharing of economics and
engagement of that one element of it. We thoroughly agree with
that. Second, we thoroughly agree with the engagement of a
Senate observer group in the process. Third, we very much agree
with the thrust of what he's saying related to developing
country commitments.
Exactly how those get defined is the thrust of our
proposals for Kyoto which I outlined, the five-point position
that we're taking.
China and India together are enormous producers of
greenhouse gases and are going to be at the same time a huge
market over the next 30 years. It is estimated that China and
India together will be building 1,500 megawatt plants in the
next 30 years. That is the equivalent of 50 percent of the
installed energy capacity in North America. That's a remarkable
opportunity for us.
Senator Baucus. That's why many have signed onto the Byrd
Resolution.
Secretary Wirth. We have to engage them both to get them to
recognize the imperative of them dealing with the problem.
China, as was pointed out in some of the earlier comments--I
believe yours, Senator Inhofe--has got major problems of their
own. They are starting to recognize those, they are starting to
move in this right direction.
We are negotiating as well with the Indians. We have to get
them to understand that it's in their interest. Joint
implementation, emission trading and other market mechanisms
can be helpful to them as they move along the course of
economic development.
Senator Baucus. As I understand it, the 2005 commitment for
developing countries--I don't want to put words in your mouth--
is essentially a proposed commitment by that date, talk. That
is, it is not a commitment to by that date, commit to certain
specific targets?
Secretary Wirth. Under the 1992 Climate Treaty, there are
certain existing commitments which the developing world is
required to undertake. We believe those ought to be more
broadly articulated, that those ought to be more carefully
defined. These existing commitments can be very significant if
they meet them. They are already required to do that.
We think that specificity in their requirements ought to be
part of the agreement that we reach. That's part of the phase-
in policy. It won't be the same targets and timetables that we
have now, but it's moving them into that over a period of time.
Senator Baucus. Can you describe the Annex B you talked
about? What is that about?
Secretary Wirth. The idea of an Annex B is that there are
certain countries that are developing very rapidly which have
assumed, for example, OECD status. They get that status, that
privilege of membership, but coming with that are obligations.
We believe there ought to be a sort of new interim category
into which countries move with different responsibilities in
the Climate Treaty.
[[Page 214]]
Senator Baucus. Why not follow that step a little further
and have not only Annex 1 but Annex B, C, D and E and all
countries commit but at different rates?
Secretary Wirth. That's generally the idea, that there will
be different rates.
Senator Baucus. But the point is they all commit to certain
targets?
Secretary Wirth. We would like to see that kind of
commitment from all countries. We're dealing with 150-some
signatories of the Climate Treaty, but we're really talking
about maybe 35 countries that make major contributions. If we
could get those 35 under the tent, as suggested by Senator
Kempthorne's questions, we would have made an enormous
difference.
Senator Baucus. Am I correct in assuming that some other
developed countries are not as interested as the United States?
Secretary Wirth. That's true. We're far out front.
Senator Baucus. Why is that? Why would the European Unions
not be as interested, including developing countries as quickly
as the United States?
Secretary Wirth. I don't want to get into the politics of
what may go on in Germany or wherever. I think they are a
little skeptical of our engagement in that because we haven't
put up numbers yet. I think some of that is their way of saying
to us, ``why haven't you put up your targets and timetables
yet, we're not going to agree with what you're saying until you
come forward with your targets and timetables.''
We'll do so later this fall and then I think it will be
easier for us to bring them on board.
There are also some suggestions that they don't want to get
far out front in placing demands on the developing world, that
maybe they can gain some economic advantage by having us out
front as being the guy really pushing on the developing
countries and they come back and say, we're the good guys.
Senator Baucus. If you had to guess, what's the main
reason?
Secretary Wirth. The main reason is that we haven't yet put
out our targets and timetables, so they're not going to pick up
our proposals until we put out clear indications of what we
believe we're going to do.
Senator Baucus. So you think if we do put out our targets
and timetables, then they too will then come in and suggest
that developing countries step up more quickly?
Secretary Wirth. Yes, I believe that's the case. We take
the lead, we're the key area in all of this. We do a reasonable
targets and timetables approach in Kyoto. We have that on the
table mid to late October, that's part of that negotiation;
then I think it's much, much more likely that we're going to
get our proposals on economic flexibility that Dr. Yellen was
outlining and it's much more likely then that they go along
with us in pushing for developing country participation.
We have then the opportunity and the Annex 1 countries or
the developed countries to begin then to make a much clearer
and coherent case to the developing countries to get on board.
As the chairman pointed out, getting the developing countries
on board is going to be the toughest part of this whole
negotiation.
[[Page 215]]
Senator Baucus. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wirth, these reductions on fossil fuels that
would be required by an agreement, where would they come from?
Let me put it this way, would the armed services be coming
under this requirement, would they be exempt?
Secretary Wirth. Our armed services are already making very
significant steps toward their own economic efficiencies in the
use of fuel, the recycling of materials and so on. We're way
out in front of any other armed service in the world on that.
Senator Inhofe. But I'm talking about are they going to be
required, as I've seen some of the requirements that are going
to be proposed, they would not be exempt in any way, would
they?
Secretary Wirth. I don't think Secretary Cohen would want
them to be exempt.
Senator Inhofe. I'm sure he wouldn't, but would you?
Secretary Wirth. No.
Senator Inhofe. So they would be included also. What about
political subdivisions, State and local governments?
Secretary Wirth. I think part of this process would be that
State and local governments, like my city of Denver, the State
of Colorado, would make very significant efforts to move toward
natural gas vehicles and so on.
I think there is a sense of shared responsibility. Of
course they'd be involved.
Senator Inhofe. I'm a former mayor, so I'm a little
sensitive to this type of thing. Do you think this would be, in
your mind, interpreted as an unfunded mandate?
Secretary Wirth. An unfunded mandate?
Ms. Yellen. A requirement to do something.
Senator Inhofe. An unfunded mandate, yes.
Secretary Wirth. I think most of the things we're proposing
are going to be, as the economic studies suggest, steps that
are going to end up like an insurance policy but most
importantly the guts items are going to pay for themselves, at
least for a long period of time.
Senator Inhofe. So you don't see there could be any costs
incurred by political subdivisions to comply?
Secretary Wirth. Over a period of time, I would think the
investments made in terms of energy conservation and efficiency
during a first phase like this would absolutely pay for
themselves.
We then get into a situation as we're looking at steps 20,
30 years down the line in which we're involved in very
significant technological investments where we're really
changing the nature of the way in which we fuel much of our
economy.
Senator Inhofe. But there will be costs incurred by State
and local governments, you agree with that, don't you?
Secretary Wirth. Sure.
Ms. Yellen. I'd just add that I think what's being proposed
here is a national cap on emissions and I think what you're
talking about would be particular emissions limits placed on
the armed services, on individual cities.
[[Page 216]]
Senator Inhofe. Exactly. They're going to have to be a part
of this. They're not exempt.
Ms. Yellen. We really have not reached a conclusion as to
how to go about implementing any overall national emissions
target domestically. Certainly one kind of system that one
could imagine, that one could think of----
Senator Inhofe. You do not anticipate that the costs
incurred by State and local governments would somehow be borne
by the Federal Government, or do you?
Ms. Yellen. I think that until we have discussed what kind
of scheme would be used in order to try to meet targets and
timetables, it's really impossible to discuss what the costs
would be.
Senator Inhofe. We've established there will be some
costs--they might be high, they might be low--but there will be
costs. My question would be, do you anticipate that the Federal
Government will step in or should step in?
Secretary Wirth. That would then be up to the implementing
legislation and what the Congress, in its wisdom, decided to do
based upon our consultations with the Congress. As Dr. Yellen
has pointed out, we haven't gotten there yet, but it is fair to
say that nobody is exempt, a developing country or whoever it
may be.
Senator Inhofe. Let me suggest that after you left this
body, we did pass legislation on unfunded mandates in terms of
political subdivisions. You may want to look into that.
I want to move on here. In my opening statement, Mr.
Palmeritz made a statement that ``Our goal, Mr. Chairman, is
that all parties participate in the next round of
negotiations.'' Let me find it here. ``Are we going to agree to
the legally binding instrument in Geneva, to a legally binding
instrument?'' and he said, ``No way.'' You were quoted a few
days after that as contradicting that. Who is right?
Secretary Wirth. Again, as I pointed out earlier, I'd have
to look at the context of that, but Geneva was not a
negotiating session in which we agreed to some thing and it's
part of a negotiation. That is not what Geneva was.
Geneva was a preparatory meeting and at Geneva, we laid out
the U.S. proposal and included in the U.S. proposal were
legally binding targets.
Senator Inhofe. That answers the question. I want to get to
the one I don't understand and I need to have it explained
because in your opening statement, which I did not read but I
was here during your opening statement.
You made several comments. I think you said it's not
realistic to assume that any product that comes out of here is
going to impose the same thing on developing nations as
developed nations. Is that correct?
Secretary Wirth. That's true, yes.
Senator Inhofe. And you said it several different ways.
This also you said is maybe the most contentious part of this.
Secretary Wirth. Most difficult, that's right.
Senator Inhofe. Just about 5 minutes ago, this Senate Joint
Resolution passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I
understand there are only two votes against it. To my
understanding, they have somewhere between 66 and 70 co-
sponsors. You've addressed this.
[[Page 217]]
As I read it, my interpretation is that if you don't treat
them the same, we're not going to ratify them. Is that a
different interpretation than you had?
Secretary Wirth. That is a different interpretation than we
have of that. Again, you would have to talk to Senator Byrd and
Senator Hagel about their intent on this. As I pointed out, I
thought the most useful metaphor in describing this was the
boat and the oars. Senator Byrd said we're all in the same
boat. We start with a bigger oar, over a period of time the
size of their oar phases in.
This is not dissimilar to what we've done in other
environmental treaties. I might say Senator Chafee raised the
Montreal Protocol. Under the Montreal Protocol, the developing
countries were given a longer period of time in which to phase-
in and as the Senator pointed out, that has been an
extraordinarily successful environmental treaty.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, but I
read this and I don't see that this is subject to
interpretation or legislative intent. I have talked to both
Senator Byrd and Senator Hagel. I'm going to read it. It states
very clearly that we're not going to ratify a treaty, an
agreement or a protocol which would--I'm directly reading from
paragraph A--``mandate new commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex 1 parties unless the
protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for developing country parties within the same
compliance period.'' What is ambiguous about that?
Secretary Wirth. We agree with that, unless the protocol or
other agreement also mandates specific scheduled commitments.
We're agreeing with that. That is in our proposal. It does not
say the same commitments.
If one followed your interpretation, Senator, as I
understand what you're suggesting, any new commitments under
line 1, mandate new commitments, that would then go to the end
of that sentence that those would be the same new commitments.
Nowhere in the Byrd Resolution does it say the same new
commitments for developing parties. That is not Senator Byrd's
intent.
Senator Byrd's intent is to start with a commitment which
is lower for the developing countries and phase that in to what
the developed countries do.
Senator Inhofe. Respectfully, Mr. Secretary--and my time is
up--I have to tell you I read this, it's in the record and it
says the same. It doesn't use the word ``same;'' it says, you
shall not expect anything from developed countries that you
don't also get from developing countries.
The reason I'm concerned about this is that you're going
into negotiations knowing in advance that if you don't treat
them both the same, you're not going to get ratification. You
don't agree with that?
Secretary Wirth. Senator, the word ``same'' in here applies
to the compliance period, not to the requirements. The word
``same'' is used as a way of defining compliance periods, not
requirements. That's what the Byrd Resolution says, will be in
the same compliance period but not the same requirements within
that compliance period.
[[Page 218]]
They will start with lower requirements in that same
compliance period. Over a period of time, those lower
requirements become greater and we all have the same size oar
over a period of time.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I don't know how
to word it any other way.
Senator Chafee. Senator Kempthorne.
Senator Kempthorne. Mr. Secretary, in your statement, you
said industrial nations like the United States have to go first
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions because the developing
countries won't act on their own.
You also stated that developing countries will emit more
greenhouse gases than industrial nations within the next 30
years.
Under the Administration's approach, wouldn't industrial
nations be required to reduce their emissions and limit
economic activity while developing countries would be allowed
to continue to increase their emissions?
Secretary Wirth. Yes, that will be one of the results in
this first period of time. We will be limiting our emissions.
We hope that we will get to a point of stabilization at a
particular time and that all developed countries will.
And soon thereafter, when the developing countries begin to
phase in their own requirements and steps, then we all end up
with the same kinds of requirements.
Senator Kempthorne. Are we, to follow your metaphor, going
to be retarding or holding constant the size of our oar, while
the other countries will be able to continue to grow their oar?
Secretary Wirth. The oar metaphor relates to the actions
that each of us takes. This gets a little stretched, Senator
Kempthorne. The oar relates to the power that we put behind
ultimately reaching the goal of stabilizing the concentrations
of greenhouse gases.
The goal in all of this is that all of us together,
sometime in the 21st century, will stabilize the concentrations
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The developed countries
have been the ones responsible for increasing the level of
concentrations, for the most part, from the historic level of
around 260 to above 360 today.
We have to say we were responsible, we'll take the first
step. We have the technology but you guys are coming along fast
and you've got to phase in, not dissimilar from the very
successful kind of phase-in approach that we did in the
Montreal Protocol.
Would these be legally binding on developing countries?
Secretary Wirth. Yes. We believe they should be and that's
the list of specific items that we have put out there in terms
of the enhancement or articulation of their existing
commitments.
Senator Kempthorne. How would we enforce that?
Secretary Wirth. In most international treaties, we have a
whole section, and I'll be happy to put that in the record if I
might, as to how one goes about reporting and meeting
requirements and compliance. That's not in my testimony but
I'll submit that to the record.
We have proposed a whole package of approaches ranging from
reporting to public disclosure of this to expert understanding
and expert analysis of what goes on. For the most part, Senator
Kempthorne, when you get to a legally binding treaty like this,
if a country goes through the process of examining what it has
to do
[[Page 219]]
and makes these commitments, then they're going to meet those
commitments. Nations, for the most part, do what they say
they're going to do.
Senator Kempthorne. I wish we had more time because I'd
really like to pursue that. At another date, we will.
Secretary Wirth. Let's do that. I'd be happy to get
together with you, Senator, at any time.
Senator Kempthorne. Dr. Yellen, you stated the effort to
model economic impacts based on alternative emission reduction
strategies was abandoned, correct?
Ms. Yellen. The search for a single model or a small set of
models. In the case of the IAT report, three were used. The IAT
analysis would produce forecasts that we could rely on or
regard as definitive. That search was abandoned, but I don't
mean to say that we don't expect to use a broad set of tools
including those models, and other models that are better at
understanding some other issues and many sorts of economic
analysis in defending any proposal we would put forward.
Senator Kempthorne. You also State in your testimony, in
short, ``If anybody tells you that he or she has the definitive
answer as to the costs and benefits of particular climate
change policies, I would suggest your raise your collective
eyebrows.''
How are you going to agree to different reduction
strategies if you can't estimate the impact of those strategies
on the U.S. economy?
Ms. Yellen. I believe I used the word definitive and to
have a single forecast of, for example, the amount of jobs to
be gained or lost in a particular industry in the year 2030.
That is a search I think we've abandoned and shouldn't try to
give you.
Certainly we need to produce economic analysis of any
proposal with respect to targets and timetables that the
Administration would put forward and try to estimate even if
it's only a range of potential impacts, what we think the
impact would be on the American economy.
We will, when there is a policy, certainly be prepared to
do that.
Senator Kempthorne. As we listen to this testimony, we take
it in light of what was discussed at last week's hearing, the
raised eyebrows, the abandonment of certain strategies, the
data that doesn't quite give us any conclusion.
You also stated, ``If we do it dumb, it could cost a lot.
If we do it smart, it could result in net benefits.'' You seem
to be telling us to trust the Administration to implement any
new requirements reasonably. How can we depend on the
Administration to do that when it seems that it cannot estimate
the relative costs of alternative strategies to reduce
greenhouse gases?
Ms. Yellen. The Administration has been engaged, for some
time now, in attempting to study and understand the potential
impact on the economy of an emissions reduction strategy.
While I used the term abandoned with respect to an attempt
to produce definitive forecasts of impacts, I certainly do not
mean to suggest that we have not learned a great deal from that
exercise about what makes a policy sensible as opposed to
costly and certainly reading a broader range of economic
analysis by economists
[[Page 220]]
outside the Administration, putting it together with what we
have done internally, points to some clear conclusions.
One of the things I think the report that we've submitted
to you does very well is to provide a general sense of what the
gains are when one uses what I've described as flexible or
smart strategies.
One of the strengths of the U.S. proposal, I believe, is
that it has emphasis on flexible, market-based, smart
strategies that provide flexibility with respect to emission
reductions when it comes to where they will take place and when
they will take place.
Within our own economy, coming back to Senator Inhofe's
earlier question, I think the framework that you had in mind
earlier was that you would imagine individual firms or State
and local governments potentially having clear mandates as to
how much emission reduction might be done.
We've not settled on policies but flexible could mean, for
example, tradeable permits where if one entity found it very
difficult or costly to reduce emissions, they wouldn't have to
do it, they could buy a permit to allow greater emissions.
Senator Kempthorne. I appreciate that. I want to slide in
one more question before that red light comes on.
Mr. Secretary, the developing countries have a much greater
population and are sure to pass, as you pointed out, the
industrial nations in greenhouse gas emissions in the next
quarter century. Given those facts, why is the Administration
arguing in support of a per capita limit on greenhouse gas
emissions rather than a proportionate share based on economic
productivity? Aren't we really arguing against our own best
interests?
Secretary Wirth. We've not argued anywhere there should be
a per capita limit. That would be a very, very unwise policy.
If we say we're going to have a per capita limit, that would
mean the United States would have the same per capita
limitations as India whose population is growing perhaps even
faster than their production of greenhouse forcing gases. That
would certainly not be a prudent thing for us to do.
Senator Kempthorne. I appreciate that.
Secretary Wirth. If I might comment on one piece about this
model. I'm not an economist. I view with some skepticism all of
the modeling based upon a lot of experience on these kinds of
issues.
I remember when Senator Baucus and I were freshmen Members
of Congress. The Arab oil boycott had first occurred and the
economic modelers came in front of the Congress and told us
that the cost of oil was going to be $110 a barrel and there
would be huge stacks of what were called petrodollars in the
Middle East and this was going to be a disaster for our
economy. Well, none of those things proved to be the case. The
modelers were wrong.
When we did the Clean Air Act, you remember, Senator
Chafee, the original model suggested that the reduction of a
ton of sulfur would cost about $2,000. We figured out the right
kind of a tradeable permit system in the United States and most
recently, the cost of that has dropped to $100. The modelers
were off by a factor of 20.
They are useful tools to help you begin to think about this
but, in summary, what I think we're saying is there is no
single model
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that is going to give you every dot as to what is going to
happen 10 years, 20 years or 30 years out.
Senator Kempthorne. I raise my eyebrow.
[Laughter.]
Senator Chafee. We've been challenged by your statement to
raise our collective eyebrows, Doctor. I'm not sure we do
anything collectively around here.
We will do 5 minutes in this round because we have another
panel and I want to make a sure they get a chance.
In the other areas we've worked on that are similar to
this, namely you mentioned the Clean Air Act. At that time, you
remember the whole acid rain problem was there and many of us
took trips abroad and saw what the acid rain had done to the
trees in the Black Forest of Germany or Switzerland.
When we came to the CFCs, there was a real concern because
there is a direct relationship between the destruction of the
ozone layer and the increase in skin cancer. So we could sound
the alarm, as it were. I find what is lacking here is the
sounding of an alarm.
In your statement, you state, ``Based on these warming
trends, sea level is projected to raise an additional 1.5 feet
by the year 2100,'' and 2100 is only 100 years from now. ``This
would, without adoptive measures, flood 9,000 square miles of
coastal areas in the United States, notably in Florida and
Louisiana and put about 100 million people worldwide at risk
each year from storm surges.'' That is an alarming statistic.
I think the Administration, as I see it, is very, very
cautious about going public with statements like that. I think
your case is helped by pointing out the dangers that lie ahead
if we do nothing.
One of our scientists, Dr. Benjamin Santa, gave a very
compelling statement, ``Although we will never have complete
certainty about the exact size of the past, present or future
human effect on climate, we do know beyond any reasonable
doubt, that the burning of fossil fuels has modified the
chemical composition of the atmosphere.
``The question is not whether but to what extent such
changes in atmospheric composition have already influenced the
climate of the past century and will continue to influence the
climate of the 21st century.''
I believe in that and my question to you is, isn't it
possible for the President or those who have a bully pulpit to
get out there and State what you have stated in your statement
to us here?
Secretary Wirth. I share your frustration about getting the
story out and telling the story. The President has really
picked up this cudgel. He began very aggressively with a
terrific speech at the United Nations 2 weeks ago. I would ask
that speech be placed in full in the record.
He has two strong paragraphs in there for making the case.
He has made it very clear that he's going to devote a great
deal of attention this summer, identifying why this is as
problem, pointing out to the American people that we have to
move on this, culminating in a White House conference in late
September-early October to bring together as much of this
evidence as we can.
The President was much taken, for example, by the World
Wildlife Fund, which pointed out that in Glacier National Park,
70 per-
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cent of the glaciers have melted. The evidence on glaciers
around the world, the man that was found in the Alps, why was
that man 15,000 years old or whatever, suddenly discovered? The
big glaciers had melted.
The young woman who was sacrificed and put into an ice cave
in the Andes a long time ago, suddenly found. Why was that? The
glaciers are retreating.
Look at south Florida and look at what insurance companies
are starting to do there in terms of saying maybe we don't want
to ensure here because the incidence of hurricanes may well be
going up because there is greater warmth in the water, greater
energy there, greater violence in these storms.
These are the kinds of stories and anecdotes that have got
to be put together so that people really understand what it's
going to mean to them day in and day out. The President has
dedicated himself to doing that.
Senator Chafee. I know it's easy for us to sit here and say
go to it, but I do have the feeling that the concerns haven't
gotten out there. That was what made us move successfully in
these past efforts I just mentioned, in which you were deeply
involved at the time.
I would encourage you and others who have a standing in
these areas and we have responsibilities likewise. It isn't
just all the Administration but I would urge the President to
speak out on these subjects.
I was not aware of this White House conference. That sounds
like a good idea.
Senator Baucus.
Senator Baucus. Thank you very much. I've been around once.
Senator Wyden. It's a pleasure to have Secretary Wirth and
Dr. Yellen here. I just have a couple of questions for the two
of you.
I'm from I think the only State in the United States that
has put in place carbon dioxide controls. We are convinced that
it is possible to do this in a fashion that is good for the
environment and also doesn't cause economic meltdown.
I'd like to ask each of you a couple of questions. One, Mr.
Wirth, if you could outline what you think are the most cost
effective strategies for controlling emissions? My sense is
this would give us a chance to compare some of the alternatives
that are relevant here as Congress goes forward on this issue.
Secretary Wirth. First of all, thank you, Mr. Wyden, for
your kind opening comments and we appreciate not only your
progressive State, but it's progressive representation.
We do not have, as Dr. Yellen pointed out, a specific
proposal at this point, so any comments that I might make are
not in the context of a specific Administration proposal.
Having said that, it's very clear there are very
significant efficiencies over a relatively short period of time
that can be had in our economy. We all worked on those together
on the Commerce Committee in the House of Representatives. What
was true then is true today.
The Japanese, for example, are about twice as fuel
efficient as we are, with an economy that is about close to
being two-thirds of
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our size. Those are rough numbers. There are great significant
efficiencies.
Second, there are real opportunities for us to create very,
very productive partnerships with large parts of American
industry. You might have seen the piece this morning in the
Washington Post by the chairman or president of Chrysler
talking about the partnership for a new generation of vehicles.
That's the kind of thing we think we can embark upon.
There are real opportunities. We look at deregulation in
the utility world. Think about the factor in the climate issue
which can be very helpful in coming to the right kinds of
economic decisions there. Getting the prices right is, of
course, a very important one, to remove subsidies from key
areas.
These are some of the items that we can do over a
relatively short period of time that can have a significant
impact. The automobile example is a longer term one but again,
the kind of promising steps that we might make.
A final note, and I would ask Dr. Yellen to comment, this
problem is not going to be solved, as you know, by these kinds
of short-term measures. This is a long-term pull over 40, 50,
or 60 years. The long-term solution is going to come from major
technological improvements, changes and innovations. That is
where the payoff is going to be.
The sooner we start to get the framework right for
developing those long-term technological solutions, the better
chance we have of meeting our obligations to our children,
grandchildren and great grandchildren.
Senator Wyden. Is it your sense that energy efficiency,
we've seen appraisals that would be in the vicinity of $2 a ton
plus tree planting and forest management strategies where
modest costs per ton would be sensible kinds of approaches that
we ought to look to first.
Secretary Wirth. We've already embarked upon a number of
joint implementation projects with some 17 or 20 of those
around the world today. We'd be happy to send you a list of
those. Many of those do relate to forestry practices and very
progressive forestry practices.
The sequestration of carbon is a very, very important part
of anything that we might want to do. Again, here is a good
example of where the opportunities for us to develop
partnerships with the agricultural community, with the forest
product community, are very significant. There's a lot of
carbon stored out there in sound agricultural practices.
Senator Wyden. I appreciate your saying that because there
is no question in our minds that looking at sensible forest
management strategies is the winner all around. You're going to
get more and higher value. Wood products are going to get
better habit for species, water quality and as you said, it's a
cost-effective way to sequester carbon.
Given that, can the Administration make a special push to
ensure that forest management and reforestation programs are a
significant component of a global climate treaty?
Secretary Wirth. We have made that point over and over
again and I would commit that to you here, that the commitment
and en-
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gagement of the forest product industry, agriculture overall,
is very important.
I've met with our former colleague, Hinson Moore, who
understands this and is a very, very effective spokesperson for
his industry. We've met and will continue to do so on this very
important issue.
Senator Wyden. Let me turn to your colleague for a moment.
Dr. Yellen, I'm interested in your thoughts about how a
region's economy absorbs the impact of some of these kinds of
changes as it relates to carbon dioxide emissions and in
particular, what we found in Oregon is that if one does nothing
else, nothing else other than look at a market-based kind of
system for dealing with these issues, and making a number of
the key ones prospective, such as the changes in the power
plant area, that alone constitutes a significant effort to deal
with this issue in a way that can be absorbed from an economic
standpoint. Do you agree?
Ms. Yellen. I would agree with your assessment. I think
that there are a variety of market-based approaches that we
could potentially use. Again, I want to emphasize that we
haven't developed policies in this area but we've had
experience in the United States. It's been very positive with
emissions trading of permits in the case of sulfur dioxide and
water trading.
We've had some experience in California and other places
and I think market-based systems really have the power to work
to greatly reduce the costs. They provide flexibility over time
with banking and borrowing of permits and across places. You
give incentives to firms or individuals who see an opportunity
there to make money when they can really reduce emissions very
effectively, very cheaply. They have now an incentive to do
more than they would otherwise be required to do because they
can profit from it and reduce the cost to others that would
find it costly.
Senator Wyden. I came in late.
Senator Chafee. You did come in late and the red light is
on. What we'd like to do is go to Senator Baucus.
We have another panel, I want to remind members of that and
we want to give them a fair shot, plus we want to have an
opportunity to ask questions. So I would like to move along
here.
Senator Baucus. We'll get back to you, Senator Wyden, if
you wish some more on this.
Senator Baucus. Secretary Wirth, one of the questions here
obviously is how we implement controls. You talked about
market-based mechanisms.
The first question I have, the degree with which we think
the emissions trading system which has worked under the Clean
Air Act, in sulfur in particular, was transferable to
greenhouse gases on a global level.
Ms. Yellen. My sense is, although we've not concluded a
study of that, an emissions trading system could be developed
that would work for carbon dioxide emissions if we wanted to go
in that direction.
That is why there are proposals here for international
trading.
Senator Baucus. Why is it that the Europeans are resistant
to that idea? I asked Secretary Wirth that question. I
understand the
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Europeans are resistant to the kinds of emissions trading
proposals for carbon dioxide that we have adopted for sulfur
dioxide.
Secretary Wirth. The Europeans have their own emissions
trading system in their proposal. I think disingenuous is too
tough a word but they are saying to us we don't want to have
emissions trading but the whole proposal made by the EU is
premised upon a bubble that would include all European
countries.
It would allow Portugal, for example, to increase their
numbers by 40 percent, while Germany decreases by 15 percent.
If that's not emissions trading, I don't know what is. So
they're saying you guys can't do it internationally, but we can
do it within the EU. We're saying, wait a minute.
Senator Baucus. Practically, they do because they practice
emissions trading but they will probably agree in a more
comprehensive way.
Secretary Wirth. I think they will when we get there.
Senator Baucus. My next question is, you mentioned Mr.
Easton's piece in the Washington Post. His main point is to
wait until there is better technology on how to deal with all
of this.
Are we expending enough effort in this country, not only in
cars but in coal-fired technologies, to be more fuel efficient?
Could we do a better job there?
Secretary Wirth. Fuel efficiencies of our energy
technologies are greater than any place in the world. Our new
technologies, you talk to someone like the Enron people about
what we can do and what we're promoting around the world and
the dramatic efficiencies from where we are with our best
technologies and elsewhere. You're familiar with all of these
Senator Baucus.
The automotive industry has told us that they would expect
to get very, very significant efficiencies, like 88 miles per
gallon.
Senator Baucus. This is a ``chicken before the egg''
question because I think we find efficiencies when we have to
very often. For example, the oil shock enabled us to find new
efficiencies.
This committee years ago asked the automotive industry to
develop the catalytic converter. First of all, they said they
couldn't do it. Then they did it and they found out in doing
so, they were much more efficient. They developed a much more
efficient engine and fuel exhaust system.
Again, sometimes this world is run by deadlines and when
you have deadlines sometimes you're more likely to do something
than when you're not.
I wish you well. This is a daunting task, but it's a
necessary one.
Thank you.
Secretary Wirth. I might say we believe that the framework
that we've laid out over a period of time provides exactly the
kinds of incentives and direction that is needed to do just the
sort of pressure and push for the next steps that have to be
taken.
Senator Baucus. Your key problem right now is getting
developing countries to commit to specific numbers by certain
dates.
Senator Chafee. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Just one question. To continue this point on
the economic impact for a second, Dr. Yellen. I think we've
seen in the State of Oregon, for example, how you can go about
making some emissions limits in a cost-effective kind of way.
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My sense is that to do nothing is going to have
extraordinarily bad economic consequences. I gather Secretary
Wirth talked about this as something of an insurance policy.
We recently had a conference in the Pacific Northwest where
a group of independent scientists predicted climate change
could bring a whole host of problems to the region's water
resources, forests, agriculture, energy, water shortages,
diseases forests, flooding, a variety of these.
Has there been any ballpark estimate given to calculate the
economic consequences of doing nothing? I know we have spent a
great deal of time thrashing around with these estimates on
what happens if you do this and this, particularly from some
who are not advocating action at all.
It would seem to me we also ought to try to get a ballpark
set of costs for what happens if you do nothing.
Ms. Yellen. Quantifying the cost of doing nothing with
respect to environmental damage, public health and other issues
is extremely difficult, very uncertain. Most modelers don't
even include the benefits side of addressing climate change in
their model. Indeed, in the report we sent to you, you'll see
no modeling of the benefit side.
There is some work in the economics literature and I could
try to get back to you and give you some of the results from
that literature, that have tried in a very rough way to
estimate the benefits from exactly what you're talking about
and they are significant. I'd be happy to send you some further
details.
Senator Wyden. The kind of example that would concern me is
if you mess up your water supply, for example, what we know in
the Pacific Northwest is that's going to make it hard to
attract high tech companies because one of the things they have
said again and again is that they need access to clean, pure
water.
It would seem to me that economic models that would address
doing nothing and what happens if your water gets fouled and
what happens when it has economic consequences for high
technology companies is important.
Your calculus now is that this would have major economic
consequences but modeling is difficult?
Ms. Yellen. It's hard to put a price tag on the
consequences, but certainly this is why we're talking about it
because obviously there are benefits from acting and there
would be costs from failing to act.
Senator Chafee. All right. Mr. Secretary, looking at the
greenhouse gas emission curves, how long do you estimate we can
afford environmentally to wait around before getting this
participation by not only the developing countries but the
developed countries as well?
Secretary Wirth. It depends on what assumptions you make
about what a harmful concentration of greenhouse gases may be.
Most of the environmental modeling has been done on a doubling
of parts per million of carbon in the atmosphere. We're 30
percent of our way there; we're probably going to get there
sometime in the second quarter and before 2040-2050, we're
going to get to doubling. That's where the sea level rise and
most of those predictions come.
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If we don't start to act now to break into that curve,
there is no way in the world that we can stop it doubling. We
have to start, as Senator Baucus pointed out, now. There are
some very sophisticated modeling curves about greenhouse gas
emissions and I would like to submit those for the record
because they do show where the curve and the breakpoints are.
If we start now, how likely is it that we can stop it
doubling. If we wait for 20 years, it's almost impossible that
we can stop it doubling and we'll move rapidly to tripling.
When you start to get between doubling and tripling, most
scientists would agree that the impacts become even more severe
and we're probably, as I pointed out, no longer into linear
impacts but we're going to see some major surprises along the
way.
Senator Chafee. That is a good presentation and I hope you
are able to sound that alarm publicly to a great extent.
Secretary Wirth. We appreciate your help in doing so,
Senator, and look forward to working with you.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
Secretary Wirth. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. We appreciate both you and Dr. Yellen.
Now, Mr. Kevin Kay, executive director, International
Climate Change Partnership and Mr. William O'Keefe. Will they
both quickly come to the table and we'll get started because we
want the opportunity to hear what you have to say.
What we'll do with each of you is if each of you could give
your statements in say 7 minutes, then we will have a chance to
ask some questions. Your statements obviously will go into the
record.
Go to it, Mr. Fay.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN FAY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE CHANGE PARTNERSHIP
Mr. Fay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.
My name is Kevin Fay. I'm the executive director of the
International Climate Change Partnership, a coalition of U.S.
industry representatives and associations as well as
international associations interested in the policy development
process with respect to global climate change. We appreciate
the opportunity to be here today.
ICCP was organized in 1991 to provide a forum to address
the issue of global climate change and to be a constructive
participant in the policy debate. We continue to recognize the
climate change issue as an important matter with which
government should be concerned. However, it is a very long-term
issue and extraordinarily complex in both its underlying
science and its entanglement with the very foundations of the
global economic structure.
We have recently communicated our views on the key issues
in the Kyoto negotiations to the Administration. I'm attaching
this correspondence to my testimony and ask that it be included
in the record.
Senator Chafee. Yes, it will be.
Mr. Fay. We have also communicated to the President on the
issue of the Administration's now incomplete economic analysis,
expressing our frustration at their lack of communication on
the matters of greatest concern to the private sector, namely
the potential
[[Page 228]]
economic impacts of a climate change agreement and the current
thinking of future implementation scenarios.
In light of the Administration's demurral on the economic
analysis, our frustration only grows. In our view, the
Administration made progress in its own deliberations and
offered a thoughtful policy framework at the second meeting of
the parties in 1996 and we have heard about that here today.
This policy outline includes a comprehensive approach,
identification of a long-term objective, identification of
developing country roles under the treaty, implementation of
flexibility through emissions trading, banking and joint
implementation, and avoidance of a laundry list of so-called
policies and measures.
The U.S. framework also included a call for a binding
commitment which the Administration has subsequently defined as
an emissions budget period of undetermined length to achieve
reductions of an undetermined size.
While most of the attention has been focused on this part
of the discussion, we continue to believe that it is not the
only key to a successful treaty agreement in Kyoto or after
Kyoto.
You will note in both of the letters we attached, we urged
the President and the State Department to reiterate to our
negotiating partners that the U.S. policy framework enunciated
last July is the only framework that can provide a climate
change agreement that is both environmentally beneficial and
economically feasible.
Our primary concern has been that the result of the
negotiations would focus on only one or two of the key issues,
some of which we have outlined in our letter, and that the rest
would be left until later.
To date, frankly, we have been disappointed in the progress
on most of these fronts and we are pessimistic on the ability
to achieve them between now and Kyoto. ICCP is not and never
has been interested in an agreement at the Kyoto meeting just
for the sake of reaching an agreement. This view will not
change.
With respect to the economic issues, which I referred to
earlier and the impacts of a climate change agreement on the
U.S. economy, jobs and the environment, we remain very
concerned. It is difficult to address this issue in any
effective way given the lack of dialog on these topics and the
lack of information being provided by the Administration.
We know that the economic analysis that has been performed
by the Administration and others tells us several important
things--that there are costs involved in reducing greenhouse
gas emissions; that the costs are likely to be reduced if
flexibility provisions are incorporated; that you cannot
achieve any reasonable goals either environmentally or
economically without developing country participation; and the
costs are less if you avoid premature capital retirement or
turnover and provide industry the opportunity to manage their
way into the technological innovation that will be necessary to
accomplish whatever long-term goal is established by the
parties to the Convention.
We need to know now, however, what analytical process might
be pursued in light of the Administration's current view of the
difficulty of completing what it has promised for more than a
year. In order for there to be an effective treaty, we believe
that the par-
[[Page 229]]
ties must first get the treaty structure right. We have a long
way to go before that will happen.
In closing, I believe it is useful to look at previous
examples for guidance that may provide a better perspective
than the intense pre-Kyoto focus.
More than 12 years ago, negotiators were struggling to
complete the Vienna Convention for protection of the ozone
layer after more than 5 years of negotiation. These
negotiations had taken on a bitter tone as parties, including
the United States and the European Union tried to----
Senator Chafee. When you say these negotiations, you mean
the ozone layer, the Vienna ones?
Mr. Fay. Yes. The United States and European Union tried to
push for adoption of their own preferred policy approach to
dealing with those depleting compounds. Instead, the parties
agreed to that convention without the regulatory protocol and
also agreed to establish a series of workshops and information-
gathering devices to better understand each others' views.
When negotiations resumed, approximately 2 years later, the
parties were much better informed and a treaty structure was
adopted that has since proven very durable. The Montreal
Protocol which was signed in 1987 has proven much more
effective than most of us thought possible at the time.
We raise this as an example not because we believe the
issues are identical. They are not and climate change is
certainly far more complex. We raise it because as we reach
this fevered pitch prior to Kyoto, we want to stress that an
effective framework is what counts, not an expedient framework.
The climate treaty needs to be durable for the next 100
years. Our companies have determined that the current State of
scientific understanding requires a prudent, long-term approach
to address this issue. This view is equally applicable to the
climate negotiations themselves.
We appreciate the opportunity to be here today.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. Fay.
Now, Mr. O'Keefe, chairman, Global Climate Coalition here
in Washington.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM O'KEEFE, CHAIRMAN, GLOBAL CLIMATE
COALITION
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am William
O'Keefe, chairman of the Global Climate Coalition. Our members
form the backbone of the U.S. economy and encompass companies
from manufacturing, agriculture, transportation, energy
utilities and mining.
The GCC commends this committee for holding these hearings
to discuss the scientific and economic realities of climate
change and the implications of the Administration's negotiating
strategy in a rational, logical, and open forum.
Recent Senate hearings have put a much needed spotlight on
the compelling scientific uncertainties that should permeate
every climate change policy discussion. A May 16 article in the
respected journal, Science, demonstrated convincingly that
based on our current State of knowledge, we do not face an
imminent crisis and so
[[Page 230]]
do not need to undertake precipitous actions that could badly
damage our economy.
As scientific knowledge about climate change has improved,
estimates of future temperature and sea level increases have
moderated. In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change estimated that the average global temperature would rise
4 degrees Celsius by 2100. In 1995, the IPCC reduced that
estimate by 50 percent. More recent British and United States
estimates reported in Science place it lower than that.
It is ironic that as estimates of the impacts have
moderated, the Administration's policy has shifted from support
of voluntary programs to legally binding commitments. Although
the Administration has not specified for the Senate the
critical details of what it might propose, Administration
officials have alluded to cutting carbon dioxide emissions back
to 1990 levels around 2010 and holding them there.
Such a goal would require more than a 25 percent reduction
in projected fossil fuel use. They have not told you, but I
will, there is simply no economically viable technology that
can replace that amount of energy that quickly. By implication,
the Administration may be planning to commit the United States
to a severe form of energy rationing. Nor will we escape
through allusions to an unproven and unworkable international
trading scheme to counterbalance the damage of self-imposed
energy rationing.
Other nations have already rejected such schemes. My
written statement cites the estimated loss in income, jobs, and
U.S. competitiveness that are likely to result from what the
Administration has in mind.
MIT economics professor, Richard Schmallensee has stated
the matter graphically, ``The economic impacts would feel like
the energy price hikes of the 1970's with a massive hangover.''
All of the sacrifice could be tolerated if significant benefits
would be secured, but the plain fact is that the Berlin
mandate, which is guiding the current round of negotiations,
exempts developing countries such as China, India, Mexico, and
Brazil, even though they will account for most of the future
growth in carbon dioxide emissions in the next century.
Any defensible emissions goal requires participation of all
nations. The 2,600 economists who signed a petition on climate
change and the 65 Senators who have co-sponsored Senate
Resolution 98, and virtually all others who have analyzed this
issue emphasize that all countries must participate in any
program that is to be beneficial. That program should be guided
by the limits of knowledge, anticipate that surprises will
occur and recognize the need to adapt as new knowledge is
created.
Climate policy is simply not a dichotomy of action versus
no action. We agree that action is justified but reject the
course being pursued in international negotiations. It is an
unjustified rush to judgment.
The major difference between the GCC and our understanding
of the Clinton administration is over approach, not need. We
believe that a wise policy on climate change is akin to driving
in a thick fog. The prudent course of action is to proceed at a
speed consistent with how well the car's headlights illuminate
the road ahead.
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The Administration approach appears akin to driving full
speed on the Autobahn on a clear day with no reason for
caution. That approach is flawed and risks a fatal crash.
By setting a pace that is consistent with the State of
knowledge and economic realities, actions can be taken to
achieve any justifiable, long-term goal at one-fifth the cost
of the approach being embraced by international negotiators.
We should also invest in information to reduce the
uncertainties and to better understand the implications of
alternative courses of action.
Finally, we should take steps that will produce benefits
under any set of circumstances. The GCC has developed several
of these no or low regret actions and have shared them with the
Administration. They are based on these points: No. 1,
encourage the economic turnover of the capital stock; No. 2,
focus investment and research to narrow the range of scientific
uncertainties; No. 3, invest in the development of new
technologies; No. 4, expedite diffusion of new technologies in
developing countries; No. 5, facilitate the investment of U.S.
private capital in countries with high emission levels; and
finally, No. 6, continue promoting voluntary programs for
reducing U.S. emissions.
As we make progress in reducing climate change
uncertainties, we can anticipate that additional prudent steps
will be revealed. By proceeding at a pace that scientific
understanding allows, we can greatly reduce the cost of dealing
with potential climate change.
It is a fact of life that precipitous actions driven by
current technology and today's knowledge will be vastly more
expensive and therefore, less effective than a balanced
approach that does not undermine our remarkable record of
economic growth and job creation.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Keefe.
I'm not sure what you meant in the second of your points
there at the end, let me start at the beginning. ``The business
community has shared these steps with the Administration which
are based on these points: encourage an economic turnover of
the capital stock.'' I'm just not sure what that means.
Mr. O'Keefe. The existing inventory of plant and equipment
represents long-lived investments. You should look for
impediments to turning those over at the end of their economic
life. Depreciation schedules, some provisions in Superfund law,
some provisions of the Clean Air Act, new source performance
standards and prevention of significant deterioration, all
encourage keeping plants in operation longer than would
otherwise be justified.
As they are replaced, those that replace them will be more
energy efficient. And, anything that will advance, on an
economic basis, greater energy efficiency will lead to lower
emissions.
Senator Chafee. Mr. Fay, it seems to me what you're saying
is that the position of your membership is that it accepts the
science of climate change. You see a problem there and I guess
it was Mr. O'Keefe that talked about the approach that you're
concerned with. Was that in your testimony?
Mr. Fay. That's correct, yes, sir.
[[Page 232]]
Senator Chafee. But Mr. Fay, as I understand it, you accept
that the best scientific information suggests that the human
component of climate change isn't small and that human
activities already are producing climate change signals that we
ought to pay attention to. Am I correct in that?
Mr. Fay. We would agree that the science requires us to pay
attention to it, yes.
Senator Chafee. What would you do about that? You heard the
Secretary's testimony a while ago about what will happen in the
middle of the next century, the first part or the middle of the
next century, and what do you say to that?
Mr. Fay. We've heard a lot of discussion. You need to cut
up the science probably into three different regions of
certainty. One is that our greenhouse gases are building up as
a result of human activity, yes. There is the scientific
consensus concerning temperature.
Senator Chafee. What's your answer to the first? Did you
say yes, are they building up as a result of human activities?
Mr. Fay. Right, but in terms of the temperature range, we
still think the temperature range and the sea level rise
projections, there's a wide band there. We agree that the
scientific consensus appears to have arrived at that range.
Much beyond that in terms of those other effects you get,
whether it's disease spread or agricultural impacts, we think
there is an awful lot of uncertainty associated with those, but
recognizing that the buildup of the gases themselves, if you
realize those effects, would take a long time to retreat from
them, it requires you to take a longer term view toward working
on that issue.
So we've acknowledged that it's appropriate to begin
developing a means to work on this issue.
Senator Chafee. Mr. Fay, you mentioned the Montreal
Protocol and as you recall, all the signatories had to agree to
a phaseout of the use of the ozone-depleting substances. You
cited that as something that worked well. What do you think
about following that procedure here?
Mr. Fay. Well, I think that in those negotiations, the
developing countries accepted the need for them to be
participants. I'm afraid I haven't seen that kind of
recognition from the developing countries in the current
negotiations. There is a continuing insistence on their part
with regard to climate change that they have no commitments,
despite the fact that the Administration continues to argue
they do have existing commitments which we welcome to be
elaborated under the existing treaty.
We're very concerned. I think Mr. O'Keefe mentioned the
fact that there is virtually unanimous agreement that you can't
achieve any reasonable climate change goals if you don't have
developing countries participating. You have to find a way to
get them on board. I haven't seen where we've achieved the
recognition by those countries, however, that they are willing
to do that.
Senator Chafee. To get them on board, Secretary Wirth
stressed we have to go first.
Mr. Fay. I think we already are going first, Senator. We're
already implementing the programs voluntarily. It is our
technology that is likely to lead us toward solutions on this
issue.
[[Page 233]]
What we have asked for is because of the fact a great
majority of the investment made by developed countries and
developed country industries is going into developing
countries, that you have to reach some decision as to what
their role is going to be in the treaty process, what their
commitments are going to be before we get into any kind of
binding period for our own countries and our own companies.
That's a minimum of what would be acceptable.
As I said, we're still a long ways away from that
recognition by the developing countries that while 80 percent
of the emissions may have been associated with our economies
over the last 100 years, 80 percent of the emissions over the
next 100 years are going to come from their economies.
Senator Chafee. Yes, but we've got a situation as we
pointed out before where we have I believe the statistic is 4
percent of the world's population and we emit 22 percent of the
carbon dioxide.
If I were in China or India and somebody from the west came
to me and said, you've got to reduce your CO2
emissions, I'd say, look, you ought to go first, you keep
wrecking the place, not us.
Mr. O'Keefe. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on that?
Senator Chafee. Yes.
Mr. O'Keefe. It is true that we account for 22 percent of
the world's CO2 emissions, but we also account for
at least that much and probably more in terms of the generation
of global wealth. CO2 and other greenhouse gases are
not typical pollutant. They are natural elements in nature and
increases of CO2 are the result of economic
activity. So when we produce a good and export it to another
country, the emission is attributed to us, while a benefit
accrues to the importing country.
I think it's much more complex than suggested by a simple
statistic.
It may sound good to say that we spoiled the nest or we
account for the bulk of the emissions, but we also account for
much of the wealth, the food production, the goods and services
those countries are using and that ought to be taken into
account as well.
Senator Chafee. That's a tough one to explain to somebody
in India, isn't it?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't think anyone is saying that they have
to have our technology tomorrow. We ought to do everything we
can to aid the growth in their economies because it's the
wealthier countries that have the technology that adapt and
protect against unforeseen events. So the faster they can grow
up the economic curve, the more efficient they will be in using
energy. But, they have to participate or else we're not going
to make any progress.
Mr. Fay. We have suggested, Senator, as a way of dealing
with this through the entry into force requirements for the
treaty that while perhaps our efforts may be more aggressive up
front, may take place prior to theirs, that you certainly have
to have a significant percentage of world greenhouse gas
emissions, and that would include India and China, and that you
have to have as parties to the treaty, a majority of developed
countries, a majority of developing countries, that you try to
negotiate a treaty that perhaps as there was in the Protocol,
there was a delay in the implementation of the requirements for
those countries, but we had them as parties.
[[Page 234]]
What we're not seeing is an indication that they are
willing to become parties in that sense. So it's a question of
how we assist them in growing smart, not how we stop them from
growing, how we get them to adopt the most efficient
technologies just as we need to be adopting the most efficient
technologies here.
Senator Chafee. As I understood the first part of your
testimony, Mr. Fay, you were lamenting the fact that there
didn't seem to be a dialog with the Administration with your
organization and perhaps Mr. O'Keefe's organization. Am I
correct in concluding that?
Mr. Fay. We have lots of talks, but it has been pretty
barren in terms of specifics, aside from the general framework
that they put out where they continue to emphasize the need to
do this in a rational, economic way.
We've asked them to define their specific objectives; we've
asked them to embrace the framework they put out there a year
ago; and we've asked them to come to us and say what is their
expectation of our industry sectors over the next two decades,
what is it you want us to do better? We have not had those
kinds of conversations. They've not defined a specific
objective. They've defined a general framework which we're
supportive of.
Now we want them to say that's the framework they have to
have in the negotiations. We want them to tell them what their
expectations are of our industries. Until we can get that, it's
going to be difficult for us to sign onto some blank check
Kyoto agreement where we don't know what they are expecting of
us or what their implementation regime may be when they bring
that agreement back to the United States.
These are reasonable questions for us to ask. We also think
it's reasonable information for them to have. It was
information we had as we were working through the Montreal
Protocol negotiations. We had a better description of
implementation schemes and those impacts.
Senator Chafee. It certainly seems to me that we should
expect in any agreement we entered into that the developing
nations are going to be a part of it. I can understand that
perfectly well and I think that's a reasonable point you're
making.
Mr. O'Keefe, in your testimony you talked about actions
being considered by negotiators that would require us to
suppress energy use by at least 25 percent in a little over a
decade. Where do you get that figure from? Where is that? Is
that being seriously considered by our negotiators, requiring a
response like that?
Mr. O'Keefe. Dr. Yellen used as the period 2010 to return
to the 1990 levels. In the State Department's report on the
voluntary programs, they talk about a 25 or 26 percent
reduction. All the independent economic analyses that have been
done on the subject assume that the most benign thing that's
being considered, that might be agreed to, is returning to the
1990 levels by 2010.
The best estimate is that we would have to suppress, reduce
energy consumption of fossil fuels by at least 25 percent below
the level being estimated today by the Energy Information
Administration.
Senator Chafee. From where we'd otherwise be?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes.
[[Page 235]]
Senator Chafee. Even though that might be more than the
1990 level?
Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, it will be. We don't have the technology
to make that kind of reduction in that short a time period--13
years. I think that Mr. Fay has made the same point.
We need a process that is predictable, that is realistic.
The Administration analysis is based on a trading program and
some new technology. The technology hasn't been identified and
other countries have rejected the trading scheme and many
economists believe that it's not feasible. Quite simply, other
nations will not agree to it.
Certainly, if it was going to be in place, it's going to
take a long time to get an agreement. So it might be better in
Kyoto to try and agree on a framework that all nations would
embrace and then, at a future conference, decide what the
target is and the time period for achieving it.
Senator Chafee. As I understand what both of you are
saying, both of you recognize that there is a problem there and
it's what to do about it where the contention comes. Is that a
fair statement?
Mr. O'Keefe. I think that there is a risk. I think there is
legitimate scientific dispute over the problem and the hearing
you had last week demonstrated that. The last page in Chapter 8
of the IPCC report, around page 439, makes it clear that there
is not a scientific consensus that we have a problem. But
that's not an excuse for inaction.
There is a potential risk and there is uncertainty and the
uncertainty goes both ways. Given the uncertainty and the
potential risk if we guess wrong, there is certainly a need for
prudent action, but the people who have also studied this say
we do have time to do it right. We do not face an imminent
catastrophe that justifies the kind of crash program to reduce
energy use that's being considered by the negotiators.
Senator Chafee. The problem we have with that is, and we
encounter this all the time. I'm on the Finance Committee and
we're dealing there with Medicare and we have come up with a
proposal that eligibility age for Medicare be increased to 67
to correspond with the eligibility age for social security.
There is great objection to that from many saying no, no,
no and we're doing it because there is a real problem out there
with the future of Medicare. So those like myself who are
proponents for doing something say there's always an excuse to
wait and delay things and it's always attractive to postpone
it. It seems to me there is a similar situation here.
I hardly think we've rushed into this, but your feeling is,
I think you just said, let's wait and do it right. Who knows
what right is?
Mr. O'Keefe. Let me be clear. I'm not saying we should do
nothing. There are hundreds of companies that are participating
in the voluntary programs. The petroleum industry, which I also
represent, is spending over $10 billion a year on achieving
environmental objectives. There is a lot of progress being
made. It's not whether we act; it's the rate at which we force
actions to be taken and the consequences of those.
By taking the time to do it right, and by that I mean the
time to turn over the capital stock, get new plants and
equipment in op-
[[Page 236]]
eration; and incentives to accelerate our improvement of energy
efficiency. We've reduced the energy component per dollar of
GDP over the past two decades by 30 percent. Incentives to
continue that. And to take our technology and get it in the
hands of other nations all take time.
Senator Chafee. What are the incentives now? You must be
doing it. Your companies aren't doing it because they're
worrying about global warming; they must be doing it because
being more fuel efficient saves them money. Hopefully that is
an incentive.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, they learn with new knowledge. We find
there are better ways to do it and people take into account
potential changes in law and regulation and knowledge. I can't
tell you what component of the decision may take into account
climate change, but certainly the possibility is taken into
decisions when you're making capital investments that will last
20 or 30 years.
Mr. Fay. I think that our companies do also take into
account the environmental issues as well, Senator. Our problem
is not so much that we've rushed into this that all of a sudden
we have these negotiations; our biggest problem I think is that
we're 5 months from the supposed deadline and we have some
fairly basic issues that this Administration either hasn't
talked to us about or hasn't made their own decisions on.
They've come in now after promising for a year this
economic analysis and they've come back and said, it's hard.
Well, we know it's hard. We have to make hard decisions every
day in the private sector.
We need to know what basis are they going to use then to
make their decisions. We think it's still possible to achieve a
treaty in December, but it's getting harder and harder as the
time grows shorter. We don't think a 2-day White House
conference is going to help all of a sudden produce the magic
answers of what we're going to do on climate change.
Mr. O'Keefe. It also doesn't help the Senate that has to
participate in the advice and consent process.
Senator Chafee. Thank you both very much for coming. Your
testimony was very helpful and we appreciate you being here.
That concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at the call of the chair.]
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Statement of Janet Yellen, Chair, Council of Economic Advisers
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate
the opportunity to discuss with you today the economics of global
climate change.
introduction
In his speech to the United Nations Special Session on Environment
and Development in June, President Clinton emphasized that the risks
posed by global climate change are real and that sensible preventive
steps are justified. This assessment accords with the views of the more
than 2,300 economists, including 8 Nobel laureates, who signed a
statement supporting measures to reduce the threat of climate change.
The economists endorsed the conclusions from last year's report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which said that
governments should take steps to reduce the threat of damage from
global warming, and went on to argue that market-based policies can
slow climate change without harming the American economy.
[[Page 237]]
At this time the Administration has not settled on a particular set
of new policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, the
President indicated in his U.N. speech that he intends to engage in a
discussion with all interested parties about the problems posed by
greenhouse gas accumulations and the costs and benefits of corrective
action. To this end, the President will hold a White House conference
on climate change later this year, and members of his Cabinet and other
senior Administration officials will meet with Members of Congress,
scientific and economic experts, environmentalists, local government
officials, and business and labor leaders on a regular basis over the
next several months to discuss issues related to climate change. This
process is intended to inform the Administration's decisionmaking
process, which will culminate in a U.S. policy position in the
international negotiations in Kyoto in December of this year.
An important step in this--and any--policy process is determining
the impact it will have on the American economy. President Clinton's
top priority, since his first days in office, has been revitalizing the
U.S. economy, creating jobs and investing in people and technology to
enhance long-term growth. And, we have made tremendous progress. The
President is not going to jeopardize that progress. Any policy he
ultimately endorses on climate change will be informed by his
commitment to sustaining a healthy and robust economy.
In my testimony today, I would like to describe some of the
principal lessons that emerge from the voluminous literature, much of
it relatively recent, on the economic impacts of policies to address
global climate change.
underlying uncertainties
Before I begin my discussion of the economic literature, I would
like first to acknowledge the uncertainties associated with estimating
both the costs and benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. To
provide some perspective: as you all know, it is difficult to gauge
exactly what impact the balanced budget agreement will have on the U.S.
economy's growth rate, levels of employment, interest rates and
consumption over the next 5 years. But with global climate change, it
is orders of magnitude more difficult to gauge the effects on the
economy: we are concerned with not just the next 5 years and not just
the American economy, but, rather, we are dealing with economic and
physical processes that operate globally and over decades, if not
centuries.
Although a great many scientists believe that global climate change
is already underway, the more serious potential damages associated with
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases are not predicted to
occur for decades. This means that the benefits of climate protection
are very difficult to quantify. And, while the potential costs of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions may be more immediate, they too, as I
will discuss below, are difficult to predict with any certainty. Many
unanswered questions exist about the biophysical systems, potential
thresholds, and economic impacts. In short, if anybody tells you that
he or she has the definitive answer as to the costs and benefits of
particular climate change policies, I would suggest that you raise your
collective eyebrows.
lessons from the economic literature
Let me now turn to the economic literature and try to summarize
what I think we know so far about this difficult topic. Most economists
have not addressed the benefits of climate protection, but rather have
focused on the costs associated with alternative paths for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. The economic literature includes estimates
using many different models to evaluate numerous alternative emission
reduction strategies. In fact, because there are so many different
models, economists initially faced difficulties in comparing results:
they could not sort out the extent to which differences in results
stemmed from differences in models and assumptions versus differences
in baseline emission paths and policies. To solve this problem, thereby
enabling meaningful comparisons, many economists have calibrated the
various models by performing a standardized simulation. Specifically,
they have assessed the consequences of stabilizing greenhouse gas
emissions at 1990 levels by 2010 or 2020.
Within the Administration, a staff level working group--the
Interagency Analysis Team (IAT)--has attempted to estimate some of the
economic implications of climate change policies. They took the
emissions scenario most often used in academic literature--that is,
stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by 2010--as the starting point for
their own analysis. I would emphasize that this scenario is not
Administration policy; instead, it was picked to make comparisons with
other models easier. The staff group employed 3 different models--the
DRI model, the Second Generation Model (SGM) and Markal-Macro model,
all commonly available in the public sphere.
[[Page 238]]
In running these models, the staff adopted a common baseline and, to
the--maximum extent possible, similar economic assumptions. This
modeling effort produced some useful lessons, but as we found from the
peer reviewers' comments, it also suffered from some serious
shortcomings. Both the lessons and the shortcomings point to one clear
conclusion: the effort to develop a model or set of models that can
give us a definitive answer as to the economic impacts of a given
climate change policy is futile. Rather, we are left with a set of
parameters and relationships that influence estimates of the impacts.
In my view, it is more productive to employ a broad set of economic
tools to analyze policy options than to seek to develop a single
definitive model.
I understand that a draft of the staff analysis was given to the
committee earlier this week, along with the reviewers' comments. I
would be happy to answer any questions you may have about this modeling
effort.
The Lessons
Modeling efforts both inside and outside the Administration clearly
indicate that economic analysis can do no more than estimate a range of
potential impacts from particular policies and highlight how outcomes
depend on underlying assumptions about how the economy works and the
ways in which policy is implemented. However, the economics literature
on climate change does point to several important lessons:
How the economy works
First, the magnitude of the costs of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions in the various models depends crucially on a number of key
assumptions about how the economy works. For instance:
If firms in the economy can shift from high-carbon to low-
carbon energy sources quickly, the costs of climate protection will be
lower.
If the economy has significant opportunities, even now, to
employ energy-saving technology at low costs, the costs of climate
protection will be lower.
If technological change occurs at a rapid rate, or is
highly responsive to increases in the price of carbon emissions, the
costs of climate protection will be reduced.
If the Federal Reserve pursues a monetary policy oriented
toward keeping the economy at full employment, transitional output
costs will be lower.
In short, the greater the substitution possibilities and the faster
the economy can adapt, the lower the costs.
How the plan is implemented
Second, costs depend critically on how emission reduction policies
are implemented. It boils down to this: if we do it dumb, it could cost
a lot, but if we do it smart, it will cost much less and indeed could
produce net benefits in the long run. The over 2,300 signatories of the
economists' statement argued that any global climate change policy
should be rely on market-based mechanisms. Such mechanisms allow for
flexibility in both the timing and location of emission reductions,
thereby minimizing the costs to the U.S. economy. The economists
concluded that ``there are policy options that would slow climate
change without harming American living standards, and these measures
may in fact improve U.S. productivity in the longer run.''
The speed at which emissions reductions are required can
have large effects on the estimated costs. It is important to allow
sufficient lead-time for orderly investment in new equipment and
technology. Alternatively, if emission reduction requirements are too
far off in the future, the incentives to adopt energy efficient
technologies are weakened because people may not view the policy as
credible.
A ``cap and trade'' system in which emission permits are
issued and then traded among firms can substantially reduce the cost of
meeting an emissions target by creating incentives for emissions to be
reduced by those firms and in those activities where costs are lowest.
International emission permit trading substantially lowers
costs by applying the same cost-minimizing principle globally.
So-called ``banking'' and ``borrowing'' of permits
increases flexibility and lowers costs by allowing firms to change the
timing of their emission reductions.
Joint implementation, whereby U.S. firms would receive
credit for undertaking emission reductions in countries with low
abatement costs, would also lower the domestic burden.
An additional aspect of implementation that profoundly affects the
costs of reducing emissions concerns ``revenue recycling.'' In many
model simulations, emissions are reduced by using various market
mechanisms. For many of these scenarios, the Federal Government
realizes an increase in revenues. Economic growth can receive
[[Page 239]]
a long-term boost if these revenues are used to reduce distortionary
taxes that diminish the incentives to invest, save or work, or if the
revenues are channeled into deficit reduction, thereby lowering
interest rates and boosting investment. In fact, in some models and
scenarios, emissions reduction generates a net economic benefit when
the revenues are recycled in a growth-promoting fashion.
Which countries participate
The third lesson that emerges from a study of the economics of
climate protection is that developing, as well as developed, countries
must be part of the process. While developed countries are responsible
for most of the greenhouse gas currently in the atmosphere, developing
countries are starting to catch up. By 2040, the largest fraction of
emissions is estimated to come from developing countries. Thus, any
comprehensive plan to deal with this global problem must include a
mechanism to bring developing countries into the process.
The timetable for the inclusion of developing countries is also
important. The sooner that developing countries face incentives to move
away from carbon intensive energy sources, the less likely it is that
they will become dependent on those types of fuels to spur their
economic growth. In short, global problems require global solutions. We
must find the technologies and solutions to lead the way.
conclusion
Let me conclude. Policies to promote economic growth, create jobs,
and improve the living standards and opportunities of all Americans
have been and always will remain the top priority of the President and
his Administration. In his remarks to the Business Roundtable on global
climate change, the President said ``[l]et's find a way to preserve the
environment, to meet our international responsibilities, to meet our
responsibilities to our children, and grow the economy at the same
time.''
Some of the key economic lessons we have learned that will help us
achieve the President's goal include:
Inherent uncertainty dictates that models should be
expected to generate only a range of economic impacts, not definitive
answers.
Key assumptions about how the economy works directly
influence the estimated costs of climate protection.
Implementation of any policy needs to be market-based and
flexible over time and space to achieve the lowest cost reductions.
All nations, both developed and developing, need to
participate.
Thank you I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
______
Responses by Janet Yellen to Additional Questions from Senator Chafee
Question 1. Dr. Yellen, you indicate at the beginning of your
testimony that the Administration, ``has not settled on a particular
set of new policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.'' We are now 20
weeks away from Kyoto. When will it? Is there still time for informed
public review and debate on the options?
Answer. The President, Members of the Cabinet and Senior White
House officials have been meeting with a wide range of parties
interested in the issue of global climate change. We have been
consulting with representatives from business and labor, environmental
groups, scientists, economists and others about the best, most cost-
effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. On October 6, the
White House will hold a conference to discuss the scientific evidence,
the economic impact and the international implications of global
climate change. These discussions are intended to inform the
Administration's decisionmaking process, which will culminate in a U.S.
policy position for the international negotiations in Kyoto in December
of this year.
With the lessons we have learned so far, the Administration has
established a broad framework within which this policy position will be
developed. For example, we support the use of flexible approaches, such
as international emissions trading. We support the requirement that
non-Annex I countries, as they become wealthier, abide by binding
emissions goals that are formulated in international treaty
negotiations. And, for domestic implementation, we support the use of
flexible, market based approaches.
Question 2. You also say in your prepared remarks that, ``the
effort to develop a model or set of models that can give us a definite
answer to the economic impacts of a given climate change policy is
futile.'' How are we to respond? What reliable tools do we have to
determine what, if any, agreement is best for the United States?
Answer. No one model, or even a small set of models, can give a
definite estimate of the effects of a policy on the economy 20 or 30
years into the future. The existence
[[Page 240]]
of modeling difficulties does not mean, however, that we can abandon
rigorous economic analysis. Rather, we must employ a broad set of
economic tools, and incorporate insights from the existing body of
research on climate change policies, as we analyze the policy options.
Some of these may have strengths on issues where the models used in the
Interagency Analytical Team (IAT) analysis were weak.
Drawing on this broad array of analytic tools allows an intelligent
evaluation of policy alternatives. I am confident that the analytic
tools and perspectives available to the Administration can provide us
with sufficient information to generate ranges of estimated economic
effects so that the Administration can make informed policy decisions.
Question 3. Is the Administration considering some form of new
energy tax to administer a new treaty, domestically?
Answer. At this time, the Administration has not settled on a
particular set of policies. The Administration is considering an array
of market-based approaches to implement climate policy.
Question 4. What advantages or disadvantages (economically or
environmentally) might a trading system have over energy taxes?
Answer. Tradeable emissions permits would provide greater certainty
than energy taxes of attaining a specified emissions cap. By specifying
a number of permits and allowing firms to trade these permits, the
country can ensure that it is meeting an agreed upon carbon emissions
goal. A tax, on the other hand, would provide greater certainty than a
cap-and-trade approach of limiting costs, since the increase in unit
costs would be determined by the tax. Taxes and permits may also differ
in their administrative and transactions costs and ease of enforcement,
particularly depending on how a permit trading system is implemented.
Question 5. In order to use flexibility instruments like the
proposed joint implementation and emissions trading, do we need to have
a cap on nations' emissions?
To what extent can these instruments reduce the cost of
implementation of greenhouse gas emissions reductions for the United
States and others? Is there reliable data available?
Answer. For international emissions trading, all countries
participating in the trading scheme will need to have their emissions
capped. For joint implementation, all countries can participate,
regardless of whether their emissions are capped. However, it will be
necessary to set standards for approving joint implementation projects
sufficient to ensure that the credit received by U.S. companies
actually results in incremental abatement activities abroad.
International permit trading allows emission reductions to occur in
areas where the costs of those reductions are lowest. If some of the
emissions reductions necessary to achieve the U.S. goal can be
undertaken in other countries at lower costs, then U.S. emissions
control costs will fall, by some estimates as much as two-thirds. While
every country is better off when it can voluntarily buy or sell permits
according to its respective emissions reduction costs, the ultimate
permit price and traded quantities depend heavily on the degree of
participation by developing countries and economic growth in Russia and
Eastern Europe.
Question 6. Some have argued that innovation toward less
greenhouse-intensive technologies will occur in the absence of any
market signal. Do you agree? Why or why not? If a market signal is
needed, how should it be provided?
Answer. Some shift toward a less energy-intensive economy occurs in
the absence of deliberate government influences on price, some believe
because of the changing composition of the U.S. economy toward less
energy-intensive sectors. Many studies suggest that energy use relative
to GDP falls each year, regardless of the price signal, by 0.5 to 1.25
percent. To the extent that energy use is associated with climate
change effects, and in turn causes damages not reflected in market
prices, the business-as-usual decline in energy use relative to GDP is
unlikely to be sufficient. Additional incentives to innovation, such as
price signals or support for R&D may be needed.
Question 7. Many are concerned that caps on industrialized nations'
emissions, without similar caps on developing nations' emissions, will
simply promote the flight of jobs, capital, and polluting activity to
developing nations. Is this a valid concern? How should it be
addressed? Would joint implementation help?
Answer. Certainly the participation of developing countries is key
to the long term success and cost-effectiveness of a global reduction
in greenhouse gas emissions. In the next century, developing countries
will likely reach and surpass currently developed countries in their
share of global emissions. Any emissions reductions that Annex I
countries achieve can be undone by others who do not so carefully
address
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the problem. In addition, the important opportunities for low cost
reductions created by developing countries' participation could reduce
the overall cost of achieving a given environmental goal by more than a
half by some estimates.
Some observers of the climate change issue have suggested that
capping only developed countries' emission will result in ``leakage'':
the escape of jobs, capital, and polluting activity to developing
countries. Even if caps are not initially placed on developing
countries' emissions, the economic evidence does not support the
argument that sensible climate policies will adversely affect overall
U.S. economic competitiveness.
First, non-tradeable sectors account for a substantial share of
carbon emissions. Transportation and residential and commercial
buildings account for approximately two-thirds of U.S. carbon
emissions. For these sectors, the ``competitiveness'' argument does not
appear applicable. Second, energy costs comprise only a small
percentage of total manufacturing costs. According to the 1995 Annual
Census of Manufactures, energy costs for manufacturing industries
averaged just 2.2 percent of total costs. Given the small share of
energy in total costs, differential shifts in existing energy prices
are unlikely to have substantial effects on location decisions and
trade flows. Third, our experience in this country with environmental
regulation has been that it does not cause significant leakage. Firms
that decide to relocate to other countries do so because of
international differences in input costs and exchange rate changes that
all swamp the costs of complying with environmental regulations.
______
Responses by Janet Yellen to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. In the Administration's economic analysis, it is stated
that, ``There is no evidence of a wholesale `capital flight' from the
United States resulting from an emissions reduction policy.'' Can you
please expand on this?
Answer. Certainly the participation of developing countries is key
to the long term success and cost-effectiveness of a global reduction
in greenhouse gas emissions. In the next century, developing countries
will likely reach and surpass currently developed countries in their
share of global emissions. Any emissions reductions that Annex I
countries achieve can be undone by others who do not so carefully
address the problem. In addition, the important opportunities for low
cost reductions created by developing countries' participation could
reduce the overall cost of achieving a given environmental goal by more
than a half by some estimates.
Some observers of the climate change issue have suggested that
capping only developed countries' emission will result in ``leakage'':
the escape of jobs, capital, and polluting activity to developing
countries. Even if caps are not initially placed on developing
countries' emissions, the economic evidence does not support the
argument that climate policy will adversely affect overall U.S.
economic competitiveness.
First, non-tradeable sectors account for a substantial share of
carbon emissions. Transportation and residential and commercial
buildings account for approximately two- thirds of U.S. carbon
emissions. For these sectors, the ``competitiveness'' argument does not
appear applicable. Second, energy costs comprise only a small
percentage of total manufacturing costs. According to the 1995 Annual
Census of Manufactures, energy costs for manufacturing industries
averaged just 2.2 percent of total costs. Given the small share of
energy in total costs, differential shifts in existing energy prices
are unlikely to have substantial effects on location decisions and
trade flows. Third, our experience in this country with environmental
regulation has been that it does not cause significant leakage. Firms
that decide to relocate to other countries do so because of
international differences in input costs and exchange rate changes that
all swamp the costs of complying with environmental regulations.
Question 2. The United States has far lower energy costs than
Europe and Japan. How would our costs of emission reductions compare
with theirs? How would this affect our ability to compete?
Answer. The costs of reducing emissions in the United States, and
in Europe and Japan, depend on how all of these countries implement
their policies. If the United States employs a market-based approach,
the costs will not be that high relative to Europe and Japan.
Regardless of the implementation approaches used in these countries,
the costs of emissions reductions are not likely to affect U.S.
competitiveness. As noted above, energy costs comprise a small share of
total manufacturing costs (2.2 percent). Further, two-thirds of carbon
emissions occur in non-tradeable sectors. The evidence on energy price
differentials across countries suggests that they are not sufficient to
spur firm relocation to other countries.
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Several analyses indicate that Western Europe will bear higher
costs for reducing carbon emissions than will the United States.
Western Europe already has high energy taxes relative to the United
States, and has already ``backed out'' of fossil fuel use to varying
degrees. This implies that a lot of the less expensive measures for
reducing carbon reductions have already occurred in Europe, so that the
United States has relatively more opportunities to inexpensively cut
carbon emissions. For example, 20 percent of all energy in France, and
a majority of its electricity production, is from nuclear power, while
only 7 percent is from coal. Since nuclear is not carbon-based, France
cannot further reduce carbon emissions from that energy source, and can
achieve relatively limited emissions reductions from its low use of
coal. In contrast, in the United States nuclear power comprises only 9
percent of total energy production, while coal comprises 23 percent.
Question 3. Dr. Yellen, we have heard horror stories of all the
catastrophic economic effects that embarking on a policy of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions would cause. Did the administration's analysis
consider the positive effects on health, environment, AND the economy
that reducing greenhouse gases would produce?
Answer. The IAT report did not assess the human health and
environmental benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In
addition, the IAT did not study the risks of effects of climate change
on economic activity. However, the report did assess the impacts of
climate policy on the economy. The IAT analysis confirms other economic
research (for example, the recent report by the World Resources
Institute) that smart climate policy could produce some benefits for
the economy. For example, the IAT analysis found that auctioning off
tradeable permits and using the proceeds of the auction to reduce other
taxes that distort work and savings decisions could produce economic
benefits that offset the costs of meeting a climate change goal.
Question 4. We heard last week that the longer we wait to implement
our reductions, the more costly it will be in practically all sectors--
health, environment, and jobs. This reminds me of the commercial where
the grizzled mechanic says, ``You can pay me now, or you can pay me
later.'' What did your analysis find in terms of the costs of delaying
action?
Answer. We believe it is important to take early, credible action
toward a long term strategy to control greenhouse gas emissions. More
gradual efforts to reduce our carbon emissions can significantly lower
the economic costs relative to very aggressive reductions efforts while
still achieving the same carbon dioxide concentration goal. For
example, some international proposals to reduce carbon emissions would
have Annex I countries cutting emissions to 20 percent below 1990
levels by 2005. Such a target and timetable would have very substantial
economic costs because it does not provide enough time for the capital
stock to turn over. It is very expensive to prematurely scrap the
existing capital stock while much of it is in the prime of its life.
Further, such a goal would require the economy to employ existing low-
carbon and carbon-free technologies while longer-term reductions would
provide more lead time to develop and implement superior technologies.
Given that it is the stock of carbon dioxide, not the annual emissions
of carbon dioxide, that drive global warming, flexibility in the timing
of emissions reductions can lower costs while not undermining our
commitment to achieving a given ultimate concentration.
Question 5. California has been a leader in development of new
energy technologies. Based upon your analysis, what industries are
likely to grow over the next 20-30 years?
Answer. It is very difficult to forecast the nature of the economy,
especially specific industries, 20 or 30 years into the future. If the
country embarked on a policy of reducing carbon emissions, obviously
the firms and industries that can creatively and cost-effectively
reduce their emissions will benefit relative to their competitors. It
is reasonable to envision that the products and services of industries
that develop energy efficient technologies and industries that develop
low-carbon based energy (such as renewable energy sources including
wind, solar, and biomass) would be in greater demand during a period of
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
______
Responses by Janet Yellen to Additional Questions from Senator
Lieberman
Question 1. Congressman Dingell suggested on 6/19/97 that the
Administration's analysis is ``too late to inform the process, and
likely will be used to justify what the Administration has already
decided to do.'' Please comment on his concerns.
Answer. The Administration's analysis on the issue of climate
policy has not occurred in a vacuum. In fact, climate change has been
one of the more active areas of research in economics this decade. The
economic literature on climate change,
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complemented by the IAT report, has already done quite a lot to inform
the policy development process. Based on the economic research, we have
identified some of the important characteristics of the climate policy
we will develop: international emissions trading, developing country
participation, emissions budgets, and market-based, flexible domestic
implementation. My interpretation of the role of economics differs--I
believe economics has informed the process, and I am confident that it
will continue to play an important role in our country's deliberations
over a climate policy position.
Question 2. If the economic impacts of climate policies cannot be
determined precisely, how will the economic analysis be used to develop
the Administration's specific positions on a target and a timetable?
Can the relative costs of different policies be evaluated with
confidence by the Interagency Team?
Answer. No one model, or even a small set of models, can give a
definite estimate of the effects of a policy on the economy 20 or 30
years into the future. The existence of modeling difficulties does not
mean that we can abandon rigorous economic analysis. Rather, we must
employ a broad set of economic tools and incorporate insights from the
existing body of research on climate change policies, as we analyze the
policy options. Some of these may have strengths on issues where the
models used in the Interagency Analytical Team (IAT) analysis were
weak.
Drawing on this broad array of analytic tools allows an intelligent
evaluation of policy alternatives. I am confident that the analytic
tools and perspectives available to the Administration can provide us
with sufficient information to generate ranges of estimated economic
effects so that the Administration can make informed policy decisions.
______
Statement of the Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary of State for Global
Affairs
Chairman Chafee and members of the committee, I am pleased to be
with you today to discuss the ongoing negotiations toward next steps
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. These
negotiations began in August 1995 and are scheduled to end in December,
at the Third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, with the
adoption of a new protocol or other legal instrument.
In his address last month to the United Nations General Assembly
Special Session, President Clinton noted that ``[t]he science is clear
and compelling'' and committed the United States to strong leadership
on climate change. The President committed himself to engage the
American people and the Congress in a dialog to explain the real and
imminent threats from climate change, the economic costs and benefits
involved, and the opportunities that American technology and innovation
can provide. The President also committed to ``bring to the Kyoto
conference a strong American commitment to realistic and binding limits
that will significantly reduce our emissions of greenhouse gases.''
In recent weeks, interest in the negotiations has intensified,
particularly in the Congress. The Administration welcomes this
interest, wants to encourage the broadest possible dialog as we work
toward a new agreement in Kyoto, and urges the Senate and House
leadership to establish observer groups with whom we can work even more
closely in the weeks and months ahead.
I would like today to focus on two concerns--first, how the actions
we are negotiating under the Climate Convention correspond to a
specific environmental objective; and second, the need for developing
nations to acknowledge more fully their role in meeting that objective.
I would like to begin with the science, because scientists were the
ones who drew our attention to climate change in the first place, and
because we continue to base our policies on the best evidence and the
most rigorous scientific analysis available. While I know many of you
are aware of the basic facts, I think it may be useful to reiterate a
few of the most crucial points that the scientific community has
established.
The ``greenhouse effect'' is caused by gases such as carbon
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, which accumulate in the atmosphere
and trap solar radiation, thus making the planet warmer than it
otherwise would be. The natural levels or concentrations of these
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere keep temperatures within a range
that can support life. Without the background level of greenhouse gases
in our atmosphere, the earth's temperature would be about 33 degrees
Celsius cooler.
Human beings increase the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere primarily by the burning of fossil fuels--coal, oil and
natural gas--and through a number of other industrial processes.
Changing land use patterns, particularly de-
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forestation and soil erosion, also play a role, by reducing the
capacity of the natural environment to absorb carbon from the
atmosphere. Since the industrial revolution in the 18th century, the
concentration in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide has risen 30 percent;
during the same period, methane concentrations have doubled, and
nitrous oxide concentrations have risen by about 15 percent.
Since pre-industrial times, the Earth has warmed about one degree
Fahrenheit. Scientists believe that the observed increase is unlikely
to be entirely natural in origin. In its most recent scientific
assessment, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
concluded that the balance of evidence suggests ``a discernible human
influence on the climate system.''
Projections of future climate change, based on complex climate
models and on our best understanding of the physics of the climate
system, suggest a rise of another 2 to 6.5 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100,
with an average increase greater than any seen in the last 10,000
years. This warming will not be uniform--it is likely to be greater at
higher latitudes and at the poles.
Based on these warming trends, sea level is projected to rise an
additional 1.5 feet by 2100 due to thermal expansion of the oceans and
to the melting of glaciers and ice sheets. This would, without adoptive
measures, flood 9,000 square miles of coastal areas here in the United
States, notably in Florida and Louisiana, and put about 100 million
people worldwide at risk each year from storm surges.
In other words, the path we are on is cause for significant
concern. Climate change is likely to have wide-ranging and mostly
adverse effects on human health. Both natural and managed ecosystems
are at risk. The viability and location of forest and agricultural
zones will change significantly.
Moreover, virtually all the studies on the effects of climate
disruption have focused on predicted doubling of atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases. But unless significant actions are
taken early in the next century, it is very likely that atmospheric
concentrations will, by the year 2100, nearly triple the pre-industrial
level and rise higher than any point in the last 50 million years.
Changes to our climate system would also continue beyond the effects
that the current studies predict; the risks would increase dramatically
as concentrations continue to rise. Moreover, there is no reason to
believe that these additional effects would be linear; they would most
likely take unpredictable and highly undesirable paths.
Let me now move on to the division of responsibilities between
developed and developing countries.
As I noted earlier, we know that man-made emissions have increased
the concentration by about 30 percent, from 280 parts per million in
pre-industrial times to around 366 ppm today. We know that the
industrialized countries have put most of the carbon into the
atmosphere, and that CO2 lingers there for 100 to 150 years.
We know that the United States is the largest emitter of greenhouse
gases; we have 4 percent of the world's population and contribute 22
percent of the carbon. We also know that, given current trends, the
developing world will pass the developed world as an emitter in about
30 years. (At that point, the developing world will have about 70
percent of the world's population.) China, with its 1.2 billion people,
will probably pass the United States toward the end of the first
quarter of that century.
So action by industrialized nations alone will not put us on the
road to safe concentrations of greenhouse gases; we need action by the
developing countries as well. But it is very clear from all our
discussions and negotiations to date that if the developed countries,
with our current economic capacity, technical capability, and energy
intensive life-style, don't go first--setting the example and reducing
emissions--then developing countries will not act either. We must lead
the way. And we must move soon. If not, a doubling of concentrations
becomes certain, and we put ourselves on the road to a tripling or even
higher levels of concentrations--the consequences of which are
uncertain but likely to be catastrophic.
In 1992, the world community adopted the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change in an effort to begin coming to grips with
this environmental threat. Under the Convention, developing nations
agreed to take a variety of actions to mitigate climate and to
facilitate adaptation to it's consequences. Industrialized nations
agreed to take the same actions, but in addition, they agreed to take
steps aimed at returning their emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990
levels by the year 2000.
In 1995, the Parties to the Climate Convention decided the existing
treaty commitments were not adequate to address the threat.
Accordingly, they agreed to begin a process to negotiate next steps.
Since the ``aim'' set for industrialized nations expires in the year
2000, they began to consider the goals that should guide their efforts
in the decade or two after the year 2000. Industrialized nations agreed
to establish quantified targets to limit and reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions over yet-to-be-determined time periods--such as 2005,
2010 or 2020. At that time, devel-
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oping nations, many of whom had only begun to implement their existing
commitments under the Convention, argued strenuously that the
negotiating process should not result in new commitments for them. They
agreed, however, to continue to advance the implementation of their
existing commitments.
The U.S. proposals in the current negotiations attempt to move the
process. The U.S. proposal acknowledges that the list of ``developed
country Parties'' established by the Convention's Annex I in 1992 no
longer reflects current realities. A number of developing countries
have joined the ranks of the developed world, through membership in the
OECD and in other ways, and more are poised to do so. Our proposal to
establish an ``Annex B'' would enable such countries, on a voluntary
basis, to move beyond their current non-Annex I status, and take on
binding greenhouse gas emissions obligations, reflecting their rapidly
changing economic status, and enabling them to engage in emissions
trading with industrialized nations.
Similarly, Article 16 of the U.S. proposal calls on developing
country Parties to adopt, by 2005, binding provisions so that all
Parties have quantitative greenhouse gas emissions obligations and so
that there is a mechanism or ``trigger'' for automatic application of
those obligations, based on agreed criteria.
In urging this policy of ``evolution,'' the United States is far
out in front of almost all other countries, and we are being criticized
accordingly. For example, several developed countries believe that our
proposal imposes unfair burdens on developing countries. Most countries
in the developing world believe that ``evolution'' goes beyond the
scope of the Climate Convention and the Berlin Mandate. We think we
have the concept about right: no one should be exempt; we emit the
most, so we have to act first; but others have to phase in over time.
The overall negotiation on climate change is extremely complex--the
most complex I have seen in 25 years of public life (including 12 years
on this challenging committee!)--and the ``evolution'' aspect is
perhaps the most important of all. We have put forward some proposals;
some in Congress have as well. Now we have to hammer out a final
proposal and negotiating position. We welcome your input, support and
creativity as we work to solve this problem, and I look forward to
hearing your ideas, questions and comments today.
The issue is not whether developing countries, especially the big
and rapidly developing ones, take on quantified commitments to limit or
reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases clearly, it will be
impossible to abate the threat of climate change unless they do. The
issue is when such commitments should begin, and what criteria should
be used to establish them, and to whom they would apply.
There are significant disparities in national income between those
in industrialized nations and those in developing nations. There are
enormous differences in per capita levels of greenhouse gas emissions.
Some developing countries argue that these gaps must narrow before they
will accept quantified emissions limitation or reduction commitments.
While this argument is understandable, it misses two key points.
First, the environmental threat posed by global climate change cannot
be averted if nations wait to act until levels of national income or
per capita emissions converge at some theoretical point in the future.
Second, industrialized nations simply will not make significant efforts
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions if their efforts will be
undermined by an unlimited increase in emissions from the developing
world.
The Framework Convention, which President Bush signed and to which
the Senate overwhelmingly gave its advice and consent, established the
principle that, with respect to climate change, the world's nations
have common but differentiated responsibilities and varying
capabilities. Insisting that developing nations immediately accept
binding emissions targets that industrialized nations are seeking to
negotiate for themselves is neither realistic nor consistent with the
Convention approved by the Senate. But insisting that those developing
nations now responsible for a growing share of global greenhouse gas
emissions should have no further obligations to act until they have
crossed some threshold of national income or emissions on a per capita
basis is equally unrealistic and inconsistent with the Convention's
ultimate objective.
The agreement reached in Kyoto will not solve the problem of global
climate change. No matter how ambitious, it will represent only a
second step along the much longer path toward achieving the Climate
Convention's ultimate objective. As we prepare for Kyoto, we must also
prepare for further steps beyond it. In particular, we must ensure that
all nations responsible for a significant share of current global
greenhouse gas emissions accept the need to limit or reduce their
emissions, and that they begin to move in that direction.
What a Kyoto agreement can do is provide nations with the tools
they will need to achieve to achieve significant, binding greenhouse
gas limitation and reduction commitments. These tools include
greenhouse gas emissions budgets over multiyear
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budget periods that will help smooth out annual fluctuations. They
include full national flexibility in the choice of policies and
measures to meet such binding emissions budgets. They include emissions
trading among nations with binding emissions budgets, with the
participation of the private sector in the trading regime, to help
lower the costs of compliance. And they include joint implementation
for credit between nations with binding emissions budgets and those
that do not yet have such budgets both to lower the costs of compliance
and to promote economic development and environmental protection.
Mr. Chairman, we have indeed charted an ambitious course for the
months ahead. The tremendous risks to our planet demand nothing less.
With your continued support and the support of other Members of
Congress, I am confident that we will obtain an outcome in Kyoto that
will represent a significant step forward on the much longer path
toward safeguarding the Earth's climate system for present and future
generations. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______
Statement of Kevin J. Fay, Executive Director, International Climate
Change Partnership
Good Morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My name is
Kevin Fay; and I serve as the Executive Director of the International
Climate Change Partnership (ICCP), a coalition of U.S. industry
representatives and associations, as well as international
associations, interested in the policy development process with respect
to global climate change. We appreciate the opportunity to appear
before the committee today on the subject of a global climate change
convention.
ICCP was organized in 1991 to provide a forum to address the issue
of global climate change and to be a constructive participant in the
policy debate. Five months before the Third Conference of Parties
meeting in Kyoto, the issue has certainly raised the interest of many
of us in the private sector and the Congress.
ICCP continues to recognize the climate change issue as an
important matter with which governments should be concerned. However,
it is a very long-term issue and extraordinarily complex in both its
underlying science and its entanglement with the very foundations of
the global economic structure.
We have recently communicated our views on the key issues in the
Kyoto negotiations to the Administration. I am attaching this
correspondence to my testimony and ask that it be included in the
record. We have also communicated to the President on the issue of the
Administration's as yet unreleased economic analysis, expressing our
frustration at their lack of communication on the matters of greatest
concern to the private sector--namely the potential economic impacts of
a climate change agreement and the current thinking of future
implementation scenarios. This letter is also attached.
Our views have been based on the premise that the only agreement
that is acceptable is one that is comprehensive and can work with
flexibility, maintain national sovereignty, ensure participation by all
countries, maintain a competitive level playing field, and is guided by
effective science and includes a long-term objective that will guide
future policymakers and future negotiators.
You will note that in both letters, we urge the President and the
State Department to reiterate to our negotiating partners that the U.S.
policy framework enunciated last July is the only framework that can
provide a climate change agreement that is both environmentally
beneficial and economically feasible.
Since prior to the first meeting of the parties in Berlin, we have
consistently argued that the time is not yet right for a climate change
agreement. Unfortunately, the parties established an artificial
deadline under the Berlin mandate to reach an agreement by the third
meeting of the parties, now scheduled to be held in December of this
year.
In our view the Administration made progress in its own
deliberations and offered a thoughtful policy framework at the second
meeting of the parties in 1996 which we have heard about here today.
This policy outline includes a comprehensive approach; identification
of a long-term objective; identification of a developing country role
under the treaty; implementation flexibility through emissions trading,
banking, and joint implementation; and avoidance of a laundry list of
so-called ``policies & measures.''
The U.S. framework also included a call for a binding commitment,
which the Administration has subsequently defined as an emissions
budget period of undetermined length to achieve reductions of an
undetermined size. While most of the attention has been focused on this
part of the discussions, we continue to believe that it is not the only
key to a successful treaty agreement in Kyoto or beyond Kyoto.
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We should point out at this time, however, that we have been
provided with no analysis to justify any particular target or timetable
that might be advocated.
Our primary concern has been that the result of the negotiations
would focus on only one or two of the key issues, some of which we have
outlined in our letter, and that the rest would be left until later.
This would be unacceptable to us. This worst result would be for the
Administration to agree to some target and not achieve the entire
policy framework it has advocated.
An agreement on a target and timetable in Kyoto, and nothing else,
would be unacceptable to the ICCP. An agreement in Kyoto on a target
and timetable, including a developing country schedule, but with none
of the flexibility or other provisions as articulated last year by the
Administration, would be just as unacceptable.
To date, we have been disappointed in the progress on most of these
fronts and we are pessimistic on the ability to achieve them between
now and Kyoto absent strong signals by the White House to reinvigorate
the negotiations. ICCP is not and never has been interested in an
agreement at the Kyoto meeting just for the sake of reaching an
agreement. This view will not change.
With respect to the economic issues and the impacts of a climate
change agreement on the U.S. economy, jobs, and the environment we
remain very concerned. It is difficult to address this issue in any
effective way given the lack of dialog on these topics and the lack of
information being provided by the Administration. We know that the
economic analysis that has been performed tells us several important
things:
that there are costs involved in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions;
the costs are likely to be reduced if flexibility
provisions are incorporated;
that you cannot achieve any reasonable goals either
environmentally or economically without developing country
participation; and
the costs are less if you avoid premature capital
retirement or turnover, and provide industry the opportunity to manage
their way into the technological innovation that will be necessary to
accomplish whatever long-term goal is established by the parties to the
convention.
It is difficult to know how the costs compare to the benefits
because we have yet to see any analysis that includes the benefits of
mitigating climate change or facilitating adaptation strategies.
In order for there to be an effective treaty, we believe that the
parties must first get the treaty structure correct. We have a long way
to go before that will happen.
In closing, I believe it is useful to look at previous examples for
guidance that may provide a better perspective than the intense pre-
Kyoto focus. More than 12 years ago, negotiators were struggling to
complete the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone layer after
more than 5 years of negotiation.
These negotiations had taken on a bitter tone as parties, including
the United States and European Union, tried to push for adoption of
their own preferred policy approach to dealing with ozone depleting
compounds. Instead the parties agreed to the convention and to
establish a series of workshops and information gathering devises to
better understand each other's views.
When negotiations resumed, the parties were much better informed,
and a treaty structure was adopted that has since been proven very
durable. The Montreal Protocol, signed in 1987, has proved much more
effective than most of us thought possible at the time.
We raise this example not because we believe the issues are
identical. They are not and climate change is far more complex. We
raise it because as we reach a fevered pitch prior to Kyoto, we want to
stress that an effective framework is what counts, not an expedient
framework.
A climate treaty needs to be durable for the next 100 years. Our
companies have determined that the current State of scientific
understanding requires a prudent long-term approach to address this
issue. This view is equally applicable to the negotiations themselves.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and we
look forward to answering your questions.
______
International Climate Change Partnership,
June 6, 1997.
Hon. Timothy Wirth,
Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Wirth: You have requested our views on specific issues
under consideration as part of the negotiations on implementation of
the Berlin Mandate for a pos-
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sible protocol or other legal instrument to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change. We are pleased to provide these comments on specific
issues of concern to the members of the International Climate Change
Partnership (ICCP) with respect to the treaty negotiations. We are also
writing, however, to express our concern with the current lack of focus
to the negotiations or linkage of these issues with the important
relationship between the international treaty and domestic
implementation schemes.
ICCP continues to recognize the climate change issue as an
important matter with which governments should be concerned. However,
it is a very long-term issue and extraordinarily complex in both its
underlying science and its inextricable entanglement with the very
foundations of the global economic structure. We are concerned that
this complexity is exposing an overly ambitious timeframe for current
negotiations and that the cohesive activity necessary to ensure a
viable foundation for future action under this important treaty simply
has not come to be. It is equally disturbing that there has been little
public discussion of the economic impacts of the range of climate
change mitigation by any of the parties, including the United States.
ICCP commended the U.S. position enunciated in its statement in
July of last year as a reasonable framework, and was particularly
supportive of its efforts to force into the negotiations greater focus
on the long-term character of the issue and its economic implications.
However, we have made clear that our support is for the entire
framework, and not for individual components. Some have misconstrued
this position as support for early targets and timetables. It would be
incorrect to read our position as such. While ICCP members have
recognized the possibility that negotiators would agree on a mid-term
emissions target, we could not specifically support such a target given
the current lack of understanding of the implications of such a target
or how it would be implemented.
In our view, the issue of a binding target is not the most critical
element of the negotiation. We view it more important to provide
definition to the treaty structure through a long-term objective and a
mechanism to ensure that all parties, developed and developing, have
clearly defined roles before we enter into a binding commitment period.
It is also important that the parties are able to achieve these goals
with flexibility through emissions trading, banking, and true joint
implementation. We appreciate that the United States has recognized
this need for flexibility.
It is of great concern to us that little progress appears to have
been made on many of these issues concerning flexibility and the role
of developing countries. While the United States has elaborated its
views on these positions in subsequent statements and its protocol
draft, we have detected little movement by the other parties on these
issues. Since we are not privy to your bi-lateral discussions or the
behind the scenes meetings, it is difficult for us to determine the
current status of these topics.
It is not acceptable to us for the negotiations to conclude in
December with an agreement on a binding commitment toward a mid-term
target with all details on other key provisions to be negotiated later.
As you recall, we have consistently expressed our view that 1997 is
too soon for a credible technical assessment process which would
support an agreement by the parties on these issues. The apparent lack
of progress to date, the dearth of information available to us
regarding how these issues may be resolved, and the failure to
thoroughly discuss the economic implications for an agreement, have
only served to confirm this view.
We have pledged to work responsibly with the United States and
other parties on the development of an effective framework to address
the climate change issue consistent with the need for all nations to
sustain economic growth. We remain committed to this principle. It is
not clear, however, that these issues can be resolved satisfactorily by
the Kyoto meeting. ICCP will, of course, reserve any judgment on the
results of Kyoto for the implementation process.
We urge the United States to remain focused on and committed to
delivering concrete results on all the points outlined in the statement
delivered last July and elaborated on in its subsequent submittals.
Further, we believe that the United States should indicate its
commitment to its proposed climate change policy structure at the
upcoming meetings of the G-7 and the United Nations General Assembly
Special Session on the Environment.
Concurrently, we believe the economic impacts of a possible
agreement should be communicated with industry and other policymakers
so we can have an effective dialog. Failure to discuss some of these
issues in advance will make it extremely difficult to build support for
ratification and implementation of the international agreement.
[[Page 249]]
We look forward to working with you and appreciate the opportunity
to discuss the specific views on the attached position paper in the
very near future.
Sincerely,
Kevin J. Fay,
Executive Director.
______
International Climate Change Partnership,
June 6, 1997.
President William Clinton,
The White House, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: On behalf of the International Climate Change
Partnership, I am writing to express our concern for the status of the
economic analysis for purposes of the international negotiations on
climate change and the apparent lack of progress in making the economic
issues an integral part of these negotiations. The ICCP is a coalition
of companies and industries around the world committed to responsible
participation in the climate change policy process.
ICCP continues to recognize the climate change issue as an
important issue with which governments should be concerned. However, it
is a very long-term issue and extraordinarily complex in both its
underlying science and in its entanglement with the very foundations of
the global economic structure. ICCP commended the U.S. position
enunciated in its statement in July of last year as a reasonable
framework, and was particularly supportive of its efforts to give the
negotiations greater focus on the long-term character of the issue and
its economic implications.
It is disturbing to us that, for nearly 1 year, there has been
little public discussion of the economic impacts of the range of
proposed climate change mitigation strategies by any of the parties,
including the United States.
The Administration had promised the results of its economic
analysis to the Congress, its negotiating partners, the private sector
and the non-governmental organizations. While we applaud the
recognition of the need to peer review this work, the slow pace at
which this activity is occurring raises concerns that it is either not
being seriously pursued, or that the results are not being shared.
Neither of these reasons, if true, bodes well for constructive private
sector support of the Administration's efforts or for any result
produced from the Third Conference of Parties meeting to be held later
this year in Kyoto.
This matter is further complicated by the recent resignation of
Under Secretary of Commerce Ehrlich, who was coordinating the
analytical effort. His departure suggests a possible further loss of
momentum on this important effort at a critical time.
Those who may be able to provide constructive input into the
analysis and assessment being pursued by the Administration wonder what
must be done to understand how specific industry sectors are being
examined and what steps are being contemplated in order to pursue your
climate protection goals. At a minimum, the Administration should be
able to immediately publish the policy assumptions being used for
individual sectors.
In addition, aside from frequent references to implementation of
flexible, market-based approaches, there has been little discussion of
what may be suggested as implementation steps for a Kyoto agreement.
Failure to discuss some of these issues in advance will likely make it
difficult to build support for ratification of the international
agreement and for development of implementing legislation.
We respectfully urge you the Administration to provide an outline
of the economic information and policy considerations, as well as a
meaningful timeframe for the release of this information.
Finally, we understand that you are preparing to attend the
meetings of the G-7 and the United Nations General Assembly Special
Session on the Environment. We urge you to reiterate the United States'
support for these key economic issues as critical elements of any
future agreement on climate change. It is only with these key policy
provisions that we will have a climate change agreement that is both
environmentally beneficial and economically feasible.
Sincerely,
Kevin J. Fay,
Executive.
[[Page 250]]
International Climate Change Partnership Views on Key Issues in the
Climate Change Protocol Negotiations (In Alphabetical Order)
developing country role
The United States has outlined a specific proposal for dealing with
the developing country role as part of the Kyoto agreement, including
definition of obligations under Article 4.1 of the Framework
Convention, establishment of an Annex B of countries which would
voluntarily adopt emissions budgets, and a date certain by which all
parties would have emissions budgets.
As stated by Bert Bolin, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) at the March 1997 meeting of the Subsidiary Body
on Science and Technological Advice (SBSTA) in Bonn, ``[I]t is obvious
from this graph that no reasonable future reductions by Annex I
countries would stabilize global emissions.'' Therefore, it is
imperative that developing countries be part of this agreement.
Furthermore, as stated in the Administration's recent economic work, a
significant percentage of infrastructure and industry investment by
developed countries is occurring in developing countries. Finally,
because of the strong linkages' between population growth and
greenhouse gas emissions, it is important that we recognize that seven
of the current non-Annex I countries represent two-thirds of the
world's population.
The Administration has been forthright in its insistence that the
developing country role be defined. ICCP recognizes the potential
limits of the current Berlin Mandate with respect to new commitments
for non-Annex I Parties. It is clear, however, that the Berlin Mandate
contemplates definition and elaboration of Article 4.1 commitments for
all Parties, including the developing countries.
Additionally, it is imperative that additional developing country
participation, including emission budgets, must be defined prior to the
start of the first binding budget period for the current Annex I
parties. It is only through such definition that governments and the
private sector can ensure that investment flows are not distorted.
entry into force
ICCP has noted that six countries, including India and China,
currently account for 55 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. In order
for the treaty to enter into force, it is imperative that a significant
percentage of greenhouse gas emissions be represented by ratifying
countries. In addition, a significant percentage of Annex I countries
and developing countries should ratify the treaty before it enters into
force.
We also believe that it is inappropriate for a regional economic
organization to be allowed to represent both itself and the voting
rights of its individual members. The EU has argued that it should be
allowed to bubble its emissions and is proposing to allocate emissions
internally. It is unfair that the EU be granted this concession to
bubble its emissions when it declines to support similar flexibility
for other Parties. Therefore, the EU should have to decide to either
bubble and count as one vote, or to not bubble and to be counted
individually.
greenhouse gas comprehensive approach
The protocol negotiations should continue to focus on a
comprehensive approach at the international level. Recent proposals
from the European Union suggested a protocol on only three gases--
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide--with the notation that
fluorocarbon compounds should be covered by policies and measures and
added to the basket in the year 2000. ICCP strongly opposes the EU
approach. The gases that can be measured should be covered
simultaneously in a comprehensive manner. The key to a comprehensive
approach is for Parties to focus on achieving the most efficient
emission reductions possible; and therefore, it is unproductive to
segregate gases from coverage until a later date or to treat gases
differently in an international agreement.
long-term objective
ICCP has urged the negotiators to provide for a long-term focus or
objective. We believe such an objective provides clarity to
negotiators, as well as to those charged with implementation of
commitments. It is our understanding that the United States has
performed some analysis of this issue, and that such analysis could be
useful to the negotiators currently. Furthermore, we applaud the
article in the U.S. protocol proposals which contemplates a long-term
objective.
[[Page 251]]
This objective will be an important guide to future decisionmaking,
including private sector investment planning. We note that several
participants, including the EU, and certain environmental organizations
have suggested certain objectives characterized as atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases, and that the IPCC documents present
their analysis according to atmospheric loading of greenhouse gases
measured in parts per million (ppm) of CO2 equivalent.
ICCP has not advocated a greenhouse gas concentration as the
appropriate measure for the long term objective. A long-term objective
could be defined as a combination of adaptation, impacts, and
concentration measures.
Recent analysis of the economics of climate change controls have
indicated that the long-term objective is not as relevant as the path
charted for the emission reduction. In our view, it is impossible to
develop a meaningful path without knowing the point of departure and
the intended goal.
We recognize that the current State of science does not provide a
precise ``correct'' answer. Science does provide a basis for making an
informed political judgment on the objective, and scientific assessment
through the IPCC and elsewhere is critical to future reassessment of
any potential long-term objective.
policies and measures
It is imperative that each Nation maintains maximum national
flexibility with respect to implementation of its climate commitments.
It is neither appropriate nor productive for the negotiators to
determine the manner in which each country should achieve its
commitments. ICCP is opposed to any listing of specific annexes of
policies and measures in any manner, i.e., mandatory, regional
coordination, voluntary, or exemplary.
target/budget/accountability period
There have been several proposals for specific point targets and/or
budget periods as part of the protocol proposals that are currently
before the Parties. ICCP has not endorsed the notion of a binding
``target.'' We do, however, recognize that all of the government
proposals to be considered in Kyoto do contemplate such a step as a
starting point.
The lesson from the non-binding commitment of the 1992 FCCC
agreement is that, despite the best of intentions, a specific point
target is very difficult to administer due to fluctuations in economic
conditions, weather conditions, etc. Therefore, we believe it is
imperative that the long-term objectives be utilized to examine a
reasonable path that minimizes short-term economic disruption and
stimulates the longer-term technological innovation necessary to
significantly reduce worldwide greenhouse gas emissions.
The United States has indicated a preference for an emissions
budget period and a binding commitment to achieve that budget. In our
view, the practical timetable for ratification and implementation of a
Kyoto climate agreement, including subsequent definition of a
developing country role, suggests that meaningful program
implementation steps could not be up and running with confidence any
time soon after a Kyoto agreement. There has been a great deal of focus
on the beginning of such a so-called budget period.
In our view, the beginning of the budget period is not as important
as the end of the budget period, i.e., the point at which the principle
of ``binding commitment'' actually has the potential to impose penalty
or sanction. In light of the uncertainties stated above, ratification,
implementation, developing country role, and some level of experience
with the implementation process, we believe that it would be
inappropriate to end the first binding budget period before the year
2020. This timeframe will allow industry to develop its programs, and
gain confidence in their performance.
ICCP also believes this timeframe is consistent with its previous
position that policies at the outset of this effort must take into
account a reasonable period for capital stock turnover. This will
provide a period for industry to ``ramp up'' its climate change
responses.
If the budget period is to be adopted, we believe that it should be
long enough to encompass weather and economic cycles, but not so long
as to present an impossible horizon to provide both industry and
policymakers with some certainty. Therefore, it appears that a 10-year
budget period is better than a 3- or 5-year period.
technology assessment
Although not specifically included as part of the current protocol
proposals, ICCP continues to believe that the FCCC must be grounded in
sound scientific and tech-
[[Page 252]]
nological assessment processes. This function, as currently served
primarily through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
is inadequate.
The IPCC is currently considering restructuring proposals including
the adoption of working group outlines that incorporate an effective
role for private sector expert participation. We encourage support for
these proposals.
Finally, it is also important that we de-politicize the IPCC
process to the maximum extent possible. Its credibility can be
sustained only if it is truly seen to be the work of scientific and
technical experts, and not subject to the whims of the diplomatic and
political process or other special interests.
trading, banking and joint implementation (ji)
Most available economic analysis continues to indicate that
flexibility through emissions trading, banking of emission credits, and
joint implementation policies can help to maximize greenhouse gas
emission reductions most cost-effectively. ICCP is fully supportive of
such mechanisms as part of any agreement in Kyoto and beyond.
We believe it to be imperative that such principles be included in
the first agreement and not be left to some future negotiations. We
also believe it is important that these provision not be relegated to
some pilot project with final decisions to be made at some future date.
Finally, it appears that flexibility is a positive inducement to
ensure maximum compliance. It also would allow us to avoid the use of
trade restrictions or trade sanctions as an enforcement mechanism in
the treaty.
[[Page 253]]
[[Page 254]]
[[Page 255]]
Statement of William F. O'Keefe, Chairman, Global Climate Coalition
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as chairman of the
Global Climate Coalition (GCC), I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before you on global climate negotiations. The GCC is the leading
representative of business and industry on this issue with members that
encompass manufacturing; agriculture; small and large businesses; air,
rail and barge transportation companies; domestic and international
vehicle manufacturers; oil, coal, natural gas and other natural
resource companies; municipal, co-op, investor-owned and independent
electric utilities; cement; iron and steel; forest and paper; and
numerous producers of chemicals, plastics and other industrial and
consumer products.
On behalf of this broad membership--the backbone of the U.S.
economy--I would like to take this opportunity to set the record
straight on five points that are key to the current public debate on
climate change. First, the science is not ``clear and compelling'' as
President Clinton claimed July 3 in his speech to the United Nations
General Assembly, Special Session on Environment and Development.
Instead, scientific uncertainties abound; enhanced global warming is
still a hypothesis. Second, statements on scientific uncertainties by
members of the GCC are consistent with those expressed in the May 16
issue of the respected journal Science [attached]. Advocates of
precipitous curbs on greenhouse gas emissions are the ones who are
unjustifiably representing climate science in promoting a rush to
judgment. Third, curbs on greenhouse gas emissions--which mean
suppressing energy use--will not be cheap and relatively painless as
some advocates encourage Americans to believe. Instead, curbs would be
brutally expensive in terms of lost income, lost jobs and lost U.S.
competitiveness on world markets. Fourth, business does not oppose
action as evidenced by its widespread participation in the
Administration's voluntary Climate Action programs. We support action
that recognizes the state of knowledge, the extent of uncertainty, and
balances the need for preserving robust economic growth with the
requirement for a cleaner environment. Fifth, the climate issue does
not represent a crisis requiring precipitous and dramatic actions to
prevent an imminent ecological catastrophe.
precipitous action on climate change serves an anti-industry agenda
Claims of imminent catastrophe are designed to create a crisis
atmosphere helpful in promoting other agendas. This strategy is
routinely used to advance ill-advised policies--the saccharin scare in
1977, predictions in the 1970's of famine and the exhaustion of natural
resources, the predicted cancer epidemic in the 1980's, and the Alar,
EDB and electromagnetic scares to name only a few.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a more complete listing of scares, see: Adam J. Lieberman,
Facts Versus Fears: A Review of the 20 Greatest Unfounded Health Scares
of Recent Times, prepared for the American Council on Science and
Health, May 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When these scares proved to be unfounded, the quest continued to
find the ultimate environmental problem that will require wholesale,
radical change in American lifestyles.\2\ The late Professor Aaron
Wildavsky wrote that ``warming (and warming alone) . . . is capable of
realizing the environmentalist's dream of an egalitarian society based
on rejection of economic growth in favor of a smaller population's
eating lower on the food chain, consuming a lot less, and sharing a
much lower level of resources more equally.''\3\ MIT Professor Richard
Lindzen has added that ``the great threat of warming fits in with a
great variety of preexisting agendas--some legitimate, some less so:
energy efficiency, reduced dependence on Middle Eastern oil,
dissatisfaction with industrial society (neopastoralism), international
competition, governmental desires for enhanced revenues (carbon taxes),
and bureaucratic desires for enhanced power.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For instance, the president of the World Resources Institute
wrote: ``Climate change isn't just any environmental issue. It's bigger
. . . it's tied to almost every facet of contemporary economic life.
How we travel, manufacture and ship goods, build buildings, farm, and
spend our leisure time all influences the tempo of climate change.''
[emphasis in original] See: Gus Speth, forward to The Greenhouse Trap
(World Resources Institute, 1990).
\3\ Aaron Wildavsky, ``Global Warming as a Means Of Achieving an
Egalitarian Society: An Introduction,'' introduction to Robert C.
Balling, Jr., The Heated Debate (1992), xv.
\4\ Richard S. Lindzen, ``Global Warming: The Origin and Nature of
the Alleged Scientific Consensus,'' Regulation, Vol. 15, No 2, (Spring
1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And so it is that climate change underpins the claims:
That the automobile is a greater threat than any enemy we
will ever face.
That suburbia should be phased out.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Worldwatch Institute, Beyond the Petroleum Age: Designing a
Solar Economy (December 1990), 48.
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[[Page 256]]
That human numbers must be drastically reduced.\6\
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\6\ Bill McKibben, The End of Nature (1989), 191-192.
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Obviously, evidence that climate change may not be an imminent
catastrophe undermines such visions of America in the 21st Century.
Indeed, unwavering allegiance to such agendas may explain why advocates
of precipitous action deny with vehemence the logical implications of
obvious scientific uncertainties.
True concern for the economic and environmental well-being of
people in this and other countries would surely lead negotiators to
balance their policy prescriptions with the state of scientific
evidence. After all, carbon dioxide (CO2) is not a pollutant
but a natural element necessary for survival, with man-made emissions
directly related to prosperity and economic progress. Curbing those
emissions unnecessarily would mean fewer jobs and less income--and
therefore less money for other health and environmental protection
measures. A less prosperous United States means a nation less able to
promote technological development which is essential to environmental
progress and to our continued ability to adapt in a changing world.
the science is not settled
The hearings of this committee a week ago--and those of the Senate
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade
Promotion chaired by Senator Hagel in June--have put a much-needed
public spotlight on the compelling scientific uncertainties that should
permeate every climate change discussion and negotiation. Climate
scientists and modelers simply do not know enough about possible human
impacts on the global climate system to justify taking near-term
actions being considered by international negotiators that would
require us to suppress energy use by at least 25 percent in little over
a decade.
That opinion is shared by scientists who participated in the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and wrote the 1995
Second Assessment Report, along with many other members of the
scientific community. That report does state that ``the balance of
evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate'' and
the Administration repeatedly quotes that sentiment--out of context--in
its statements that the ``science is settled.'' The May 16 issue of the
journal Science pointed out that Dr. Benjamin Santer, a lead IPCC
author, warned against such over-simplification when he stated that,
``It's unfortunate that many people read the media hype before they
read the [IPCC] chapter [on greenhouse warming] . . . We say quite
clearly that few scientists would say that the attribution issue was a
done deal.'' That same Science article also notes that ``[s]ome
scientists assert that developments since the IPCC completed its report
have, if anything, magnified the uncertainties,'' and quotes a noted
scientist as saying, ``There really isn't a persuasive case being
made'' for detection of greenhouse warming. At the article's end, the
author refers to a climatologist and IPCC contributor who concluded
that ``while researchers are firming up the science, policy-makers
could inaugurate `some cautious things' to moderate any warming.''
Unquestionably, the concentration of CO2 in the
atmosphere has increased. It has gone from about 280 parts per million
two centuries ago to about 360 parts per million today. It is generally
agreed that this increase is due to human activity, especially
combustion of fossil fuels. CO2 like several other gases in
the atmosphere, especially water vapor, traps heat. Without this
greenhouse effect, the average global temperature would be about zero
degrees and life as we know it would not be possible. In theory, if
CO2 is increasing, more heat might get trapped and the
temperature might rise.
But theory is not fact until subjected to the acid test of
scientific rigor to confirm or reject it. To date, no confirming
evidence has withstood tough scrutiny--as the May 16 Science article
explains. While it is a fact that there has been some warming over the
past century, it is within the range of normal variability.
Furthermore, most of it occurred before 1940, which was before any
significant increase in CO2 emissions. In particular, over
the past 20 years, when high-quality satellite measurements of
temperature began, no warming has been observed; and, in fact, there
has been a slight downward trend.
Moreover, Dr. Bert Bolin, the chairman of the IPCC, has repeatedly
said science has not established a link between human greenhouse gas
emissions and particular severe weather events. Yet, Vice President
Gore and other Administration officials made such an overstatement when
they associated the flooding in North Dakota earlier this year with
global warming. President Clinton made a similar overstatement when he
said on June 30 in New York City that greenhouse gases have ``led to
the most disruptive weather patterns anybody can remember over the last
4 or 5 years.'' Members of the GCC and of the business community are
only being accu-
[[Page 257]]
rate when they point out that such claims go beyond what can be
supported by climate science.
exempting the developing countries guarantees failure
Dr. Bolin has also cautioned against expecting global temperature
benefits from emission reductions by developed countries alone. Yet,
the Berlin Mandate agreed to by international negotiators in 1995
exempts developing countries from any new commitments to curb
emissions. Dr. Bolin, during his February 25, 1997 presentation in Bonn
to international negotiators, said that the proposals applicable only
to the industrialized nations ``would not be detectable on projected
temperature increases.''
The 2,000 economists who signed a petition on climate change--and
the 65 U.S. Senators who have signed Senate Resolution 98--emphasize
that all countries must participate in any program to address
``global'' emissions. China, India and other developing countries will
account for most of the future growth in carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions in the next century but will be exempt from
any meaningful treaty obligations. This will create powerful incentives
to attract manufacturing investments and the jobs they create from the
industrialized countries--and also create powerful economic and
political constituencies for never curbing emissions. As Representative
John Dingell asked rhetorically in his testimony of June 19 before the
Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade
Promotion: ``Does anyone seriously believe China, or any other country
for that matter, will act on altruistic motives?'' Without the active
involvement of developing countries, the growth in global
CO2 emissions will not be reduced in any meaningful way.
the economic costs would be high
The Administration suggests that curbing energy use will impose
little economic sacrifice. Everett M. Ehrlich, former undersecretary of
commerce for economic affairs, wrote in The Washington Post of June 15,
1997 that ``the economic literature suggests that we could roll back
our CO2 emissions to their 1990 levels by 2010 for the
equivalent of a 25 cent gas tax. It's not free, but it's not the end of
the world.'' Few consumers would share this benign view of such a hike
in their energy bills. Some authors of the IPCC report even suggest
that curbing greenhouse gas emissions could be free--the environmental
equivalent of a free lunch--or even be economically beneficial!\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ These authors wrote: ``Despite significant differences in
views, there is agreement that energy efficiency gains of perhaps 10 to
30% over baseline trends over the next two or three decades can be
realized at negative or zero net cost (negative net cost means an
economic benefit).'' See: International Panel on ``Climate Change,
Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate
Change.'' Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1996), 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, however, every credible, independent economic analysis
confirms what common sense suggests: a substantial curb on the use of a
key economic resource will impose substantial costs. From an
Administration draft analysis circulated last May, one could reasonably
conclude that U.S. negotiators want to cut CO2 emissions
back to 1990 levels by sometime around 2010, and hold them there. This
would require more than a 25 percent reduction in projected fossil fuel
use. The Administration is placing its blind faith in unidentified
technological breakthroughs and an unproven--and probably unworkable--
trading scheme to counterbalance the economic damage of self-imposed
energy rationing.
However, economic studies more realistic about the probable
contributions of existing and new technologies paint a more sobering
picture. Studies by Charles River Associates, DRI, and the U.S. Energy
Information Administration indicate that energy taxes of $125 to $200
per metric ton of carbon would be needed to return emissions to 1990
levels by 2010 ($200 per ton is equivalent to an increase in the excise
tax on gasoline of about 60 cents a gallon). The annual impact of a tax
this size includes the following losses:
$100 billion to $275 billion in gross domestic product
(GDP).
$200,000 to $500,000 U.S. jobs.
$65 billion to $100 billion in fixed business investment.
$50 billion to $110 billion in consumer purchases.
the clinton administration has been slow to release its economic
analysis
DOE released on July 11, 1997 a study contracted with Argonne
National Laboratory early in 1996 to investigate ``the potential
effects (which may be either beneficial or adverse) on energy-intensive
industries in the United States of alternative
[[Page 258]]
scenarios for changes in world patterns of industrial energy prices
that might result from new climate commitments.'' Six industries were
selected and the study results show that the impact on each industry
would range from ``significantly adverse'' to ``devastating'' and
produce little, if any, environmental benefit.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The six industries studied were: aluminum; chemicals and allied
products; petroleum refining; cement; paper and allied products; and
steel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has attempted to put these
results in a favorable light by claiming that the study examines energy
price scenarios based on other countries' proposals ``of large
hypothetical energy price increases'' rather than the
``Administration's basic approach.'' However, the Administration has
not explained how its own goals for curbing emissions could possibly
avoid either high energy prices or highly restrictive regulatory curbs
on energy use. At the very least, the DOE's claim that the Argonne
study results apply only to the climate change proposals of other
countries is an open admission that this study lacks a direct analysis
of the Administration's own proposals. Hence, DOE's claim that the
study ``confirms the wisdom of the Administration's basic approach to
climate change'' is without foundation.
The delay in releasing this study and the release two days ago by
the Administration of its long-promised analysis and assessment of its
own post-2000 climate change proposals raises questions about its
negotiating objectives.
In March 1995, as the Berlin Mandate began to take shape, President
Clinton characterized U.S. objectives this way in a letter to
Representative John Dingell:
``We have said this process must include thoughtful analysis
and reflect the fact that global problems require global
solutions. Furthermore, I assure you the U.S. delegation will
not accept any outcome or agree to any process that adversely
affects the United States and its industrial competitiveness.''
DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) jointly held a
workshop in Springfield, Virginia to unveil the Administration's
initial analysis. At a June 19, 1996 hearing before the House Commerce
Committee, the DOE's Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy--Marc
Chupka--testified that the ``U.S. strongly believes that analysis and
assessment is central to the development of further commitments by
Annex I Parties and to the furtherance of existing commitments of other
parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change.'' When it was
announced last summer that Dr. Everett Ehrlich would assume the role of
directing and coordinating this analytic effort, he assured everyone
that the results would be available this past January. Over the next
several months, Under Secretary of State Tim Wirth repeatedly stated
that the Administration's analysis would be released soon. This did not
occur and yet negotiations proceeded.
This state of affairs led Representative Dingell in his Senate
testimony of June 19, 1997 to ask:
``Why are we [proceeding with negotiations] before we have
the most basic information about how climate change policies
will affect our economy? In short, has the Administration
bothered to do its homework? We were supposed to have the
vaunted analysis and assessment of the impact of climate change
policies on the U.S. economy by the end of last year. It has
not been completed yet, despite repeated promises to Congress
and industry that it would be available before important policy
decisions are made. But the State Department formally proposed
a cap-and-trade negotiating position in January. In short, the
analysis is self-evidently too late to inform the process, and
likely will be used to justify what the Administration has
already decided to do. Just as clearly, public participation
and comment on the analysis and assessment is irrelevant.''
Representative Dingell's remarks were insightful. Only two days ago
did the Administration release a draft copy of its baseline economic
analysis. While the GCC has not had time to examine this document
thoroughly--and we would ask the committee for the opportunity to
submit comments later--it is clear that the Administration still has
not provided its assessment of specific policies now under
consideration. It also has not explained how those policies would be
implemented domestically and internationally nor has it quantified the
impact of these policies on the U.S. economy, labor, industry and
trade.
This slow and partial release of the Administration's analysis and
assessment has meant that the United States Senate has so far been
unable to fulfill its Constitutional responsibility of ``Advice and
Consent.'' Senate Resolution 98, introduced by Senators Byrd and
Hagel--and now co-sponsored by 65 Senators reflects growing frustration
with the Administration's failure to consult and alarm over the con-
[[Page 259]]
sequences for the U.S. economy that will result from the current
negotiating strategy.
the gcc supports appropriate action
In spite of major scientific uncertainties, inadequacies in climate
models and the doubt that any enhanced warming will soon occur, it
would be imprudent to presume ``no problem.'' Global warming could have
serious consequences should nations make wrong choices in either
direction.
Therefore, a proper framing of the problem recognizes uncertainty--
as pointed out by the petition signed by 2,600 economists. The
Administration frames climate change as devoid of significant
uncertainty--an approach that is clearly flawed.
The basic structure for decision-making under conditions of
significant uncertainty is relatively simple even though the global
climate issue itself is complex. The first decision rule is to be slow
rather than quick to commit to a single course of action. This is
especially important when the costs of immediate action are known to be
high--perhaps equal to our Nation's current total annual environmental
expenditures--but the many scientific uncertainties prevent any
reliable estimate of the environmental benefits (if any) from that
action. In the case of global warming, we have time to address these
uncertainties. Nothing we do in the next 20 years will have any
appreciable impact on the world's average temperature in 2050 or 2100.
This fact is absolutely crucial, because costs are exceedingly
sensitive to timing. Many capital investments, including those in the
energy and automobile industries, are long term. If change can be
deferred until current equipment reaches the end of its useful life,
and until more efficient devices are on-line, costs can be
substantially less. Over the past 22 years, new technologies have
enabled us to reduce energy intensity per dollar of gross domestic
product by about 32 percent. This progress should continue. Analysis by
the Electric Power Research Institute and the Stanford Energy Modeling
Forum concludes that an orderly, long-term strategy for achieving a
scientifically justified CO2 objective would cost only one-
fifth as much as a program that requires near-term cuts.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ EPRI Journal, Nov./Dec. 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This leads to the second decision-making rule: invest in
information to reduce the uncertainties and to better understand the
implications of alternative courses of action. Indeed, the money
already spent on improving climate models has increased our
understanding of the climate system enormously with no indications yet
that we have reached the point of diminishing returns in improving
scientific knowledge and climate models.
Furthermore, as climate models have improved they have--so far--
suggested that much of the 1+F increase in average global temperature
over the past 130 years is due to natural variability and that any
future warming is likely to be much less than earlier models have
predicted. For instance, when the British Meteorological Office
recently improved its modeling of the effects of clouds and
precipitation, the model's response to a doubling of CO2
emissions was a decline in warming from 5.2 Celsius degrees to 1.9
degrees. The first results from the new climate model at the National
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado suggest--
according to the May 16 article in Science--that ``future greenhouse
warming may be milder than some other models have suggested--and could
take decades to reveal itself.''
With improved information indicating that the problem may be less--
rather than more--severe than originally thought, it seems only
sensible to continue improving scientific knowledge before committing
to expensive policies predicated on earlier estimates, as the
Administration appears determined to do. Although assessments of
potential future impacts have moderated over the past few years, the
Administration's policy has shifted from support of voluntary programs
to legally-binding commitments.
The third rule for decision-making under uncertainty is called ``no
or low regrets.'' Look for actions that will produce benefits under any
set of circumstances. The GCC has developed a list of emission-reducing
actions that would be worthwhile even if the threat of global warming
turns out to be another wildly exaggerated environmental scare.
The business community has shared these steps with the
Administration which are based on these points:
Encourage an economic turnover of the capital stock.
Focus investment in research to narrow the range of
scientific uncertainties.
Invest in the development of new technologies.
[[Page 260]]
Expedite diffusion of new technologies in developing
countries.
Facilitate the investment of U.S. private capital in
countries with high emissions levels.
Continue promoting voluntary programs for reducing U.S.
emissions.
These points establish that GCC members support an action-oriented
policy on climate change.
The fourth decision rule is to consider alternatives. Only two
decades ago, global cooling was the dominant concern. It is also
possible that some warming will occur but not be harmful--or that
developing adaptations to warming will greatly mitigate any harm. Sound
policies must allow for these possibilities, and not be based on a
single point estimate.
summary and conclusion
Many uncertainties about the climate system, and the current and
future impact of human activities on it, have been well documented.
Business has played a constructive role by drawing attention to these
uncertainties and the serious ramifications they pose for the
Administration's negotiating strategy.
Business agrees that action should be taken but rejects an
unjustified rush to judgment. The major difference between the business
community and the Clinton Administration is over approach, not the need
for action. We support what can be called ``Lewis and Clark'' planning,
after the famous explorers who successfully managed enormous
uncertainty by gathering new information, taking a limited number of
steps, reassessing and then repeating the process. In 1803, Lewis and
Clark could not plan a detailed water route to the Pacific--President
Jefferson's main goal. No one knew that the Rocky Mountains were in the
way. Lewis and Clark were successful because they respected the limits
of knowledge, anticipated surprises and recognized the need to adapt.
The Clinton Administration supports an approach that discounts
uncertainty. Minimal uncertainty allows detailed planning comparable to
an extended itinerary what can be called ``Cooke's Tour planning''
after the famous travel agency. The conditions for this type of policy
planning do not exist, and a Kyoto agreement that presumes they do will
be playing ``Russian Roulette'' with our economy.
[[Page 261]]
[[Page 262]]
[[Page 263]]
[[Page 264]]
[[Page 265]]
[[Page 266]]
[[Page 267]]
Responses By William F. O'Keefe to Additional Questions from Senator
Chafee
Question 1. Mr. O'Keefe, you say in your testimony that you support
``appropriate action.'' You want to encourage economic turnover of
capital stock, spur the development of new technologies, and expedite
their diffusion in developing countries. You also want to ``facilitate
the investment of U.S. private capital in countries with high emissions
levels.''
I assume by that last point you mean that you are interested in
spurring investment that reduces these high emissions, is that right?
(If yes,) now why would you be interested in reducing these emissions?
Answer. As I responded at the hearing when asked if there is a
climate change ``problem'', the GCC recognizes that there is a risk
that deserves to be addressed. Until the uncertainty surrounding this
issue is reduced by expanding our State of knowledge, we simply do not
know whether there is a genuine and serious ``problem.'' We do know
that there is a very real risk that precipitous action will cause
society's scarce resources to be wasted and our economic well being
damaged. The risk of human-induced climate change warrants current
efforts to ensure that we undertake emissions policies which are
generally termed ``no'' or ``low'' regrets. Such a policy, which
calibrates our national response to the still uncertain and evolving
understanding of human impacts on the climate system, is what I meant
when I urged ``appropriate action'' to reduce emissions. Such actions
include promoting research leading to more energy-efficient
technologies and their subsequent export to developing countries. The
expanded use of current and future energy-efficient technologies in
developing countries will contribute to their productivity improvements
and economic strength and is therefore a desirable goal in itself. It
also would limit GHG emissions growth in those countries and therefore
diminish the risk associated with higher CO2 concentration
levels.
I would like to stress, however, that today there is an entirely
legitimate scientific debate regarding the extent, if any, of human-
induced climate change and of what the impacts of change might be--
past, present, and future. Most regrettably, as the scientific
community publicly acknowledges the uncertainty, and as warming
predictions for the next century moderate substantially, the
Administration has declared the debate to be over and attacked the
patriotism and integrity of those who raise legitimate questions about
their apocalyptic visions.
As your first hearing on July 11 amply demonstrated the utter lack
of scientific consensus regarding human-induced climate change, I will
not address that fact further. However, I would like to draw the
committee's attention to the efforts by the Clinton Administration to
stifle the important and legitimate debate about inferences that can be
drawn from the current State of scientific knowledge and about policies
that are consistent with those inferences. On June 25, Vice-President
Gore spoke at Vanderbilt University on the topic of ``global warming''
and stated:
``There is a small group that likes to spread dissension and
skepticism, just like the big tobacco companies spent huge
amounts of money telling tobacco smokers smoking is not bad for
you. . . . That's ridiculous and unethical.'' The Tennesseean
(June 26, 1997).
On July 21, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt appeared on the Diane
Rehm Show, and stated:
``[I]t's an unhappy fact that the oil companies and the coal
companies in the United States have joined in a conspiracy to
hire pseudo scientists to deny the facts, and then begin
raising political arguments that are essentially fraudulent,
that we can't do this without damaging the economy . . . [T]he
energy companies need to be called to account because what
they're doing is un-American in the most basic sense.''
This type of extreme statement makes it more difficult for the
American people to gain a better understanding of the issue and for the
Senate to gain the type of information necessary for it to discharge
its constitutional responsibility. Very plainly, efforts to suppress
the free exchange of information, evidence, and opinion undermine
efforts to formulate a responsible national policy on climate change.
The passage of Senate Resolution 98 by a vote of 95-0 will hopefully
dissuade the Administration from continuing to pursue its ``rush to
judgment, cutoff debate'' strategy. It is now clear that an open policy
dialog--which necessarily includes an honest evaluation of the science
of climate change--will occur and the Senate will independently
distinguish the science from the pseudo-science.
[[Page 268]]
Question 2. Since you support ``appropriate action,'' I assume that
you would prefer smart action to dumb action. By ``smart action'' I
mean action that reduces emissions at lower cost than action that is
costly.
Well, the acid rain trading program under the 1990 Clean Air Act
has proven itself to be a smart kind of action, since it is reducing
emissions fast and cheaply, spurring innovation, and dramatically
lowering the costs of technologies.
I am told that a recent M.I.T. study has demonstrated this. It
sounds to me like you are making an argument in favor of the ``cap-and-
trade'' approach, with joint implementation or trading with developing
countries as a key component. That would address, in a smart way, all
of the concerns for ``appropriate action'' that you have raised. Your
thoughts?
Answer. Your assumption that my use of the term ``appropriate
action'' implies ``smart action [as opposed] to dumb action'' is
correct. Let me clarify, however, that determining ``appropriate
action'' is a two-step, sequential process:
(1) identify and substantiate the problem you are trying to solve
and what result or target is necessary to solve it; and
(2) how to achieve that result or target most cost-effectively.
The Administration has emphasized being ``smart'' solely with
respect to the second step above, without being ``smart'' on the
essential first step.\1\ Unfortunately, being ``dumb'' with respect to
the essential first step renders the entire two-step process ``dumb''.
Thus, joint implementation and emissions trading are options to be
considered in the second step above. The GCC has long supported the
concept of joint implementation, but questions the practicability and
enforceability of an international ``cap and trade'' system for
curtailing global greenhouse gas emissions. While ``cap and trade'' may
seem like an attractive concept, a ``cap'' means rationing, which is a
failed concept. However, the use of ``smart'', market-based tools to
achieve a result that is not, in fact, yet warranted by the evidence,
is not ``smart''. It is instead merely a ``smart'' way to address a
dumb conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Testimony of Dr. Janet Yellen before the Committee on
Environment and Public Works, July 17, 1997, p. 6: ``[C]osts depend
critically on how emission reduction policies are implemented. It boils
down to this: if we do it dumb it could cost a lot, but if we do it
smart it will cost much less . . .'' (emphasis added). The GCC is still
curious as to what the ``it'' is, as well as the justification for
``it.'' [Step One Above].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Your reference to the acid rain trading program of the Clean Air
Act of 1990 is a useful one because it highlights the advantages of
market mechanisms, the importance of serendipity, and the significant
differences between the SO2 trading program and an
international tradable permits program for greenhouse gas emissions.
First, the acid rain trading program did allow companies flexibility in
meeting a performance goal, and that allowed cost savings compared to
what would have occurred with a one-size-fits-all command and control
program. Second, while the current market value of an SO2
emission permit is below levels projected while the program was being
devised, to a large extent this is the result of serendipity. For
example, energy prices are lower than projected and deregulation in the
transportation sector has allowed much greater use of low-sulfur coal.
Third, there are immense differences between the United States
SO2 trading program and a program required for international
tradable permits in greenhouse gases. The SO2 program
involved one gas, in one industry, in one country and the application
of readily available technology. An international tradable permit
program for greenhouse gases would involve multiple gases, multiple
nations, plus every industry and every citizen in every country.
Furthermore, short of suppressing energy use there is no practical
technology for significantly reducing or sequestering CO2
emissions. Obviously, an international tradable permits system would
require a tremendous, unprecedented global monitoring and transactional
infrastructure to ensure its integrity and enforceability. Whether
political systems based upon national sovereignty could accommodate
such an infrastructure is a serious question. Many, such as Dr. Richard
Cooper (Harvard University) and Dr. Thomas Schelling (University of
Maryland) have carefully considered these issues and concluded that
``cap and trade'' as well as joint implementation programs are simply
not practical in any real sense. Cap and trade programs require
allocation of the cap, and there is no generally accepted basis for
such allocation. And to be cost-effective, both programs require major
commitments by developing nations--commitments that are clearly not
forthcoming. For these reasons, it is facile to suggest an easy
parallel between the SO2 trading permits program in the
United States and a global emissions trading scheme for GHGs.
Question 3. You state in your testimony that, curbs on greenhouse
gas emissions, ``would be brutally expensive in terms of lost income,
lost jobs and lost U.S. competitiveness on world markets.'' Curbs of
any kind?
[[Page 269]]
Answer. The GCC's consistent promotion of ``no'' or ``low'' regrets
measures to constrain the growth in greenhouse gas emissions obviously
implies that there are opportunities to reduce emissions that would be
benign economically and perhaps even beneficial. Many such
opportunities have been embraced by industry to support voluntary
efforts to achieve the ``aim'' of returning 2000 greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels. The U.S. Climate Action Report, released in
May, reveals that over 5,000 private sector organizations participate
in voluntary Federal climate mitigation programs, which are projected
to reduce emissions by an estimated 75 million metric tons by the year
2000; consumer and business savings are projected at $10 billion by
2000 and $50 billion by 2010. Importantly, the Report documents that 94
percent of the U.S. primary aluminum production capacity has joined the
Voluntary Aluminum Industrial Partnership; electric utilities
representing 69 percent of 1990 electric generation and utility carbon
emissions have signed the Climate Wise agreements; 2,300 companies now
participate in the Green Lights program; and the Gas Research Institute
has pledged $4 million of its annual budget to projects that reduce
methane emissions. Widespread voluntary efforts such as these are an
efficient, cost-effective way of speeding the adoption of economically
viable energy efficient technologies. Such programs should help
strengthen the already strong trend of increased U.S. energy
efficiency.\2\ In fact, the Energy Information Administration's 1997
reference case projection indicates annual decreases of 1 percent in
energy consumption per dollar of GDP through 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Between 1973 and 1986, energy consumption per dollar of GDP
declined 2.6 percent per year. Between 1986 and 1996, energy
consumption per dollar of GDP declined 0.4 percent per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, your quotation from my full Statement regarding ``brutally
expensive'' curbs on greenhouse gas emissions appears as point 3 in the
introductory summary. My detailed discussion of such costs relates to
the Administration's intimation of agreeing to a legally binding U.S.
commitment to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels in the next 12 years,
by 2010.\3\ In that regard all credible, independent economic analyses
of the costs of dramatically curbing near term emissions--to 1990
levels by 2010--indicate the same result: brutal expense to our economy
and people. Studies by Charles River Associates, DRI/McGraw Hill, the
U.S. Energy Information Administration and economists at our most
prestigious universities indicate that energy taxes of $125 to $200 per
metric ton of carbon would be needed to suppress demand sufficiently to
return emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 ($200 per ton is equivalent to
an increase in the excise tax on gasoline of about 60 cents per
gallon). A conservative estimate of the annual impact of a tax this
size includes the following losses:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Dr. Everett M. Ehrlich, who recently resigned his position as
Undersecretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs, wrote in the
Washington Post on June 15:
L ``. . . the economic literature suggests that we could roll
back our CO2 emissions to their 1990 levels by 2010 for the
equivalent of a 25 cent gas tax. It's not free, but it's not the end of
the world.''
In addition, on July 15 the Administration released its May 30
draft interagency study on the economic impacts of stabilizing
CO2 emissions by 2010 at 1990 levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
$100 billion to $275 billion in GDP.
200,000 to 500,000 U.S. jobs.
$65 billion to $100 billion in fixed business investment.
$50 billion to $110 billion in consumer purchases.
On July 11, the Administration finally released a study by the
Department of Energy (contracted through the Argonne National
Laboratory). The study focused on ``the potential effects on energy-
intensive industries in the United States of alternative scenarios for
changes in world patterns of industrial energy prices that might result
from new climate commitments.'' The study results described the impacts
on six industries (steel, cement, aluminum, paper, chemicals, and
petroleum refining) as ``significantly adverse'' to ``devastating,''
producing little, if any, environmental benefit.
In her testimony before the committee, Dr. Janet Yellen, Chair,
Council of Economic Advisers, reported that the Administration's
economic modeling efforts to predict the impacts of climate change
policy were ``futile.'' She stated that the Administration was left
only with ``a set of parameters and relationships that influence
estimates of the impacts.'' It is, however, noteworthy that the May 30
Draft Report of the Interagency Analytical Team revealed that ``[t]he
starting point scenario [assuming stabilized emissions at 1990 levels
by 2010] would raise the implicit price of carbon in the economy by
about $100 per ton of carbon.'' The Report then described that ``[a]
permit price of $100 per ton is the equivalent of a price increase of
26 cents per gallon of refined petroleum product, $1.49 per thousand
cubic feet of natural
[[Page 270]]
gas, $52.52 per ton of coal, and 2 cents per kilowatt hour of
electricity produced.'' Draft Report, Page 8.
This important effort, before it was abandoned by the
Administration, was tending to confirm the severely negative economic
costs of a policy to drastically curtail emissions in the near term. In
fact, Dr. Yellen emphasized in her testimony that ``[t]he speed at
which emissions reductions are required can have large effects on the
estimated costs. It is important to allow sufficient lead-time for
orderly investment in new equipment and technology.'' This conclusion
supports arguments made by the GCC in its July 1995 paper by David
Montgomery, Charles River Associates, ``Toward an Economically Rational
Response to the Berlin Mandate.'' Others, such as Wigley, Richels and
Edmonds in their January 18, 1996 article in Nature come to similar
conclusions, namely that ``[u]nanticipated changes will be costly. Time
is therefore needed to reoptimize the capital stock.'' The GCC agrees
and re-emphasizes that a 12-year period to return emissions to 1990
levels--requiring an approximate 25 percent reduction in projected
fossil fuel use--would be brutally expensive. Even using Dr. Yellen's
``remaining tools,'' we are unaware of any ``parameters'' or
``relationships''--or existing technology for that matter--which avoids
that result.
Question 4. Do you base your impacts assertions on the recent
economic modeling done by the Charles River and Associates group? (If
yes,) please talk some about the underlying assumptions in the Charles
River Associate model, because a model as you know only suggests
potential impacts. Does that particular model, for example, assume that
the economy suffers persistent transitional inefficiencies (from
actions to reduce emissions)?
Does it assume that there will be any energy source substitution?
Does it assume inclusion of joint implementation or emissions trading,
or any other flexibility instruments? Does it assume any benefits from
averting climate change or other pollution damages? Is it reasonable to
assume any of these at some level?
Answer. My statements regarding the economic impacts of policies to
drastically limit greenhouse gas emissions and U.S. energy use are
based on a broad spectrum of economic modeling efforts. In addition to
work done by Charles River Associates, work by other groups such as
MIT, the Energy Modeling Forum, DRI, and ABARE (Australian Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource Economics) are also relevant and provide
useful insights into the large impacts that should be expected from the
targets and timetables proposed in the Berlin Mandate negotiations.
The question states that, ``a model as you know only suggests
potential impacts.'' This applies to models that project climate and
the impacts of a change in climate, as well as to economic models that
focus more on the impacts of climate policy. There is an apparent
inconsistency in the Administration's confidence in modeling: why are
economic models deemed ``futile'' in terms of projecting impacts in the
next 20 years, while climate models predicting changes in the next 100
years are unquestioned? Thus, results of climate and climate impact
models that are used to promote climate policies of the type being
negotiated concern suggested potential impacts that might occur 100 or
more years into the future. While some economic models cover a similar
time horizon, most of the policy impact analysis done by the groups
mentioned above focus on the next 20 or so years and evaluate the
relatively near-term economic impact of proposed climate policies. It
is very hard to deny that climate and impact models 100 years out are,
by orders of magnitude, more unreliable than the economic models 10 or
20 years out. This is particularly true when you realize that the
climate and impact models, for 100 years out, require inputs from
economic models to even start their analysis. Assumptions regarding
population, economic activity, technology, and lifestyles are all
required before estimates of greenhouse gas emissions are generated for
the next 100 years. Without that information, the climate models either
have no emissions baseline to work with or are randomly picking
scenarios that may have no relevance to the real world.
Regarding the CRA model, it assumes that market mechanisms would be
used to create incentives for reducing energy use, thereby reducing
carbon emissions, below baseline projected levels. These market
mechanisms can be viewed either as carbon taxes or auctioned tradable
permits, which are viewed by economists as being the least-cost way of
reducing carbon emissions. Therefore, the model does not assume that
the economy suffers persistent transitional inefficiencies specifically
from actions to reduce emissions.
Transitional inefficiencies are more likely to be induced by the
use of various command and control policies. In fact, since the model
is of the type referred to as general equilibrium models, it arguably
omits some transitional costs to the economy of moving to a lower-
carbon trajectory, and therefore its impact estimates may be on the low
side.
[[Page 271]]
The CRA model does allow for substitution among different fossil
fuels, as well as to non-carbon fuels. This substitution occurs
depending on the relative prices of the fuels, including carbon taxes
or tradable permit market values that raise the cost of carbon
generating fuels. The CRA model, following the general structure of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change as well as the Berlin Mandate
language, assumes that each OECD country individually meets a proposed
emission target.
The model is designed to help identify the economic costs of
alternative emission reduction targets and timetables and does not
attempt to address any possible benefits of lower carbon emission
trajectories. While all policies should at least be evaluated with
respect to likely costs and benefits, one difficulty with the climate
change issue is that there are large near-term economic costs to
reducing emissions substantially over the next two decades while it is
unlikely that there would be any measurable benefits from reduced
carbon emissions during that same timeframe, especially if developing
countries are excluded from emission reduction requirements.
Returning to ``transitional inefficiencies,'' there is a recent
tendency to mischar- acterize how economic models address the issue--
are consumers efficient in their energy use and how efficient are they
in changing their energy use. The recent World Resources Institute
study, The Costs of Climate Protection: A Guide for the Perplexed is a
prime example. For example, one of the six criteria the WRI study used
to characterize model results was ``inefficient economic responses.''
More specifically, it asked: ``Is the model of the CGE type, which
assumes that the economy adjusts efficiently in the long-run, or it is
a macro model that assumes that the economy suffers persistent
transitional inefficiencies?'' This is a clear mischar- acterization of
the difference between model types, especially when the CGE results are
labeled ``optimistic'' and the macromodel results are labeled
``pessimistic.'' In reality the two types of models address different
questions: the former asks what are the economic consequences of
different equilibrium conditions (one with large carbon taxes and one
without), and the latter asks what sort of costs arise during a policy-
induced transition from one equilibrium to another. The difference
between the models is sort of like moving from Washington, DC. to
either Seattle or San Diego. The CGE model asks what life is like after
you moved, while the macromodel focuses more on how you get to either
location. It's like a vacation--getting there is at least half the fun,
but if you cannot afford the travel portion, you do not take the trip.
Question 5. You talk about actions being considered by negotiators
that would require us to ``suppress energy use by at least 25 percent
in little over a decade.'' What actions or proposals, now being
seriously considered by international negotiators, would ``require''
this sort of response?
Answer. With less than 4 months before the Kyoto Conference of the
Parties, United States negotiators still have not revealed to Congress
or the American people the specific targets and timetables they intend
to endorse. Apparently, the U.S. position will not be settled until
late in the Fall. However, U.S. Government officials have consistently
discussed and analyzed a commitment to return to 1990 emissions levels
by 2010.\4\ This past Spring, the European Union (EU) proposed a 15
percent reduction in 1990 emissions by 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See footnote 3 regarding statements by Dr. Ehrlich and the May
30 Draft Interagency Study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comparing such goals with official U.S. Government projections of
emissions clearly indicates that very large emissions reductions by the
United States would be required. For example, Table A9 of the Energy
Information Administration's International Energy Outlook 1997 reports
that U.S. carbon emissions for 1990 were 1.34 billion metric tons. The
reference case projection for 2010 is 1.72 billion metric tons. Thus,
to limit emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 would require a 22 percent
reduction in emissions from the baseline. To limit emissions to 15
percent below the 1990 level by 2010 would require a 34 percent
reduction in emissions from the baseline. As a practical matter, it is
difficult to comprehend how emissions could be reduced by \1/3\ off the
baseline in little over a decade. Only very large carbon taxes, very
high tradable permit prices, and/or an exceptionally long list of
highly onerous command and control programs could suppress energy use
sufficiently to achieve such emission reductions within that timeframe.
Question 6. If a treaty were signed that called for . . . let's
say, a return to 1990 emissions levels by the year 2015: is the only
way to get to that goal (that your group would support) a requirement
that all countries, regardless of poverty level or current emissions
contribution, take identical action at the same time? That is, should
Togo, for example, be required to take the same actions as the United
States and other OECD nations, and China, at the same time?
[[Page 272]]
Answer. Any impact GHGs have on climate is independent of whether
they come from developed or developing countries, and developing
countries' emissions are projected to grow rapidly in the next century,
outstripping those of the developed world by 2015, according to the
Energy Information Administration. The purposes of the ongoing
negotiations to amend the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(``FCCC'') are ostensibly to limit emissions, thereby limiting the
potential of climate change. The Berlin Mandate of 1995, which exempts
the developing world from assuming any treaty obligations, guarantees
that total global GHG emissions will increase in the next century. As
of now, therefore, the Berlin Mandate guarantees failure in addressing
the objective of the FCCC. In addition, the flight of capital, jobs,
and economic strength from participating developed countries to the
exempted developing world would be an inevitable consequence of the
Berlin Mandate.
In light of those realities, the relative burden of nations in
addressing a global environmental risk is a daunting challenge that was
recognized in the Berlin Mandate. Economic equity must be an essential
part of any treaty negotiation, in spite of the difficulty in pursuing
it. Many Senators supporting the unanimous passage of Senate Resolution
98 expressed the view that the Berlin Mandate, to which the
Administration agreed in 1995, was a ``fundamental error.'' President
Clinton himself stated on August 4: ``I believe the [Kyoto] agreement
has to be a global one. I think all nations, developed and developing,
should be a part of this.'' On this point, the GCC agrees with the
President and the 95 U.S. Senators who supported Senate Resolution 98.
Question 7. You State that unnecessarily curbing carbon emissions
will mean fewer jobs and less income. Does this prediction include all
the new jobs that will be created by the shift to new technologies and
industries?
Answer. Absent any identification of the ``new technologies'' that
will enable, at the least, a 22 percent reduction in our use of fossil
fuels within 12 years, it would be highly speculative to assume related
``new industries'' and ``jobs.'' If technology does not emerge to
accommodate an international commitment to reduce our use of fossil
fuels by at least 22 percent, then painful policies to ration that use
would be necessary. Prudent policymaking should prompt the question:
What is the risk that a technology will not emerge which will enable a
22 percent reduction in our fossil fuel use in 12 years? Economist
Robert Samuelson wrote in the July 9 Washington Post:
``Without a breakthrough in alternative energy--nuclear,
solar, something--no one knows how to lower emissions
adequately without ultimately crushing the world economy.''
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