[Senate Hearing 105-611]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-611
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 14, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
------------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
49-392 cc WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Eisenstadt, Michael, Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, Washington, D.C................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Emerson, Steven, Middle East Affairs Analyst, Author and
Terrorism Expert, Washington, D.C.............................. 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Indyk, Hon. Martin S., Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs................................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Murphy, Hon. Richard W., Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign
Relations, New York, NY........................................ 33
Prepared statement........................................... 35
(iii)
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 14, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:40 p.m. In
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam
Brownback, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Robb.
Senator Brownback. The hearing will be called to order. I
appreciate all of you joining us today. Mr. Indyk, I appreciate
you gracing our committee yet again. It seems as if we get very
familiar with each other.
Although today--I know you have been involved a great deal
in the peace process. We are not going to be talking about that
today, unless you choose to do so, and make some great
announcements of the United States removing any pressure on
Israel and we are going to final status talks, but absent that
we will talk about Iran today.
I have had a great deal of concern, as you know, and a
number of Members of the U.S. Senate have, of what the Iranians
have been doing around the world, recent State Department
report on Iran having it as the lead exporter of terrorism
around the world.
They have a visual up for you. Unfortunately you cannot
particularly see it from where you are, but we will, if we
could--I tell you, why don't we give a sheet of this to Mr.
Indyk so he can see the various places.
We have put together a map of terrorism and fundamentalism
being exported by the Iranians, of activity around the world,
which is substantial, what they are doing and all the places
they have been involved in, many of them under your
jurisdiction and review.
The new leader of Iran seems to have some good intentions,
but I also believe that the United States foreign policy is not
about intentions, it is about actions, and in terms of actions
there has been no change. Iran remains a sponsor of terrorism.
It is still pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and
notwithstanding the very good interview on CNN, it still stands
as one of the United States' implacable enemies.
We will make a mistake if we make any moves on Iran on the
basis of impressions alone, I believe. When Iran changes their
policies I think we should be changing our policies, so I am
deeply concerned about some of the actions that I am seeing the
United States taking at this point in time, when we continue to
have a map that looks like this.
And by all consideration of what I am witnessing on the
ground, of what I am receiving of information, this map is not
contracting. This map is expanding, of Iranian influence and
actions throughout the world, particularly in these most
troubled spots, North Africa, and Central Asia.
So I hope you will be able to make some responses to us
about the administration's activities and reviews toward Iran.
I question some of the issues of so-called national interest
waivers that are being discussed, particularly in regard to
ILSA.
In addition, in light of India's nuclear tests this week,
it is all the more urgent that we do all that we can to alert
the world, and Iran in particular, that the United States will
neither tolerate an Iranian nuclear program, nor foreign
subsidies to the Iranian treasury to help it develop one.
Iran is pursuing its weapons program with unabated vigor.
Missile cooperation with Russia is increasing. Nuclear
cooperation is continuing. Iran is cooperating with China and
Russia on chemical and biological weapons development.
On the question of Iranian State sponsorship of terrorism
and support for fundamentalist extremism, all we need do is
look, again, at the map that we have posted. From Central Asia
to Africa to Europe, as well as throughout the Middle East,
Iran continues to sponsor assassinations, terrorism, and
Islamic radicalism. They do so with cash, military equipment,
logistics, and political support.
So Ambassador, I am open to believing Iran can change. I
would like the United States to renew relations with one of the
most important countries in the Middle East, but I and many of
my colleagues can never support embracing a nation responsible
for the deaths of so many, many Americans without proof
positive that the terrorism has ended, the weapons programs
have ended, and the foreign policy of hatred is behind them for
good.
So I look forward to your statement today of United States
position toward Iran of--hopefully you can tell me that the map
is receding rather than expanding and, if it is not, what we
are doing to see that that takes place, so we look forward to a
good dialog.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not have any
formal opening statement, but I think this is obviously a very
important and timely hearing, perhaps not as strictly timely as
the one that you called yesterday for India, but it is
nonetheless of critical importance, and you have laid down a
challenging agenda for Secretary Indyk in terms of the ground
that we might cover in this hearing.
There are some very tricky questions for the United States,
and the United States policymakers for our relationships with
Iran and Iran's relationship with all of its neighbors and some
of the other countries you referred to in terms of the export
of terrorism and allegations along those lines, so there is
plenty to talk about and update, and I look forward to hearing
first from Secretary Indyk, who has a long and distinguished
career in that part of the world, and then from our following
panel as well.
Senator Brownback. Very good. Ambassador Indyk, thank you
for joining us, and we look forward to your statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN S. INDYK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Mr. Indyk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure to be back here in front of you again, and I always
look forward to these opportunities and I hope we will have
many more such to exchange views, but I also appreciate the
opportunity you provide and the administration to both present
its approach to these issues that are vital to U.S. interest
and also to hear of your concerns and to take them into account
as we go forward.
Today, as you have pointed out, we are going to focus on
Iran, and I wanted to lay out to you how we address those
concerns and give you a sense of how we view what is happening
there and how we see the potential for change there affecting
our own approach.
The United States concerns regarding some aspects of
Iranian foreign policy practices remain unchanged, as does our
determination to effectively address them.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Indyk, would you mind pulling the
mike down a little bit and closer to you. I think it is pretty
directional.
Mr. Indyk. As I said, our concern about some aspects of
Iranian foreign policy practices, particularly in the area of
weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, those concerns
remain unchanged, as does our determination to effectively
address them.
As the State Department's recently published annual report
on terrorism made clear, Iran continues to be the most active
State sponsor of terrorism. Throughout 1991, Iran continued to
train and equip known terrorist groups, especially Hizbollah,
Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad, and to support the violent
opposition to the Middle East peace process.
Iranian agents assassinated at least 13 Iranian dissidents
abroad in 1997. At least two of those attacks occurred after
President Khatami's inauguration. The fatwa against Salman
Rushdie remains in place, along with a $2.5 million reward
offered for his murder.
The Iranian regime still seeks to protect its regional
influence through a conventional military buildup and through
the development of weapons of mass destruction and advanced
missile systems.
Iran continues to pursue nuclear technologies, chemical and
biological weapons components and production materials. Iran's
acquisition of ever more sophisticated missile technology
presents an increasing threat to our friends and allies, as
well as to our own military presence in the Gulf.
In particular, Iran's pursuit of an indigenous capability
to produce long-range ballistic missiles poses a threat to the
stability of the Middle East, a region of vital interest to the
United States. I know you, Senator Brownback, and you, Senator
Robb, have both been particularly concerned about this
development, as are we.
The international community remains deeply concerned by
Iran's human rights record. While the U.N. Special
Representative has documented some progress, particularly in
the area of freedom of speech, the U.N. High Commission on
Human Rights once again this year adopted a resolution
expressing concern regarding continuing human rights abuses
such as severe restrictions on freedom of religion, another
issue which I know you are concerned about, Mr. Chairman.
The United States has sought to address these issues by
obstructing Iran's ability to acquire the technology and
materials necessary to develop the weapons of mass destruction
and missile systems. This has been one of the highest
priorities of the Clinton administration, a challenge that the
President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State have
devoted considerable energy to confront.
We have made real progress with China and with the Ukraine
in restricting their nuclear cooperation with Iran. We have
begun to see the Russian Government taking tangible steps to
shut down the cooperation Iran has received from Russian
companies for its Shehab long-range missile program, but more
needs to be done.
We will continue to pursue this issue with the greatest
vigor with the new Government in Russia, which has recommitted
itself to a cooperative effort to end assistance by Russian
entities to the Iranian missile program.
In recent days, President Yeltsin has made strong comments
on the need to enforce export controls on WMD and missile
technology. Further, the Russian Government appears to be
issuing the necessary decrees and regulations to implement the
January 22, 1998 executive order issued by then Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin expanding the authority to control technologies of
concern.
You may have seen press reports today of those decrees
being issued, which would provide, amongst other things, for
the establishment of monitoring agencies within each company
that is involved in these areas of concerns.
But I should emphasize again that full implementation of
all of these measures will be critical.
We also work assiduously with our international partners to
improve cooperation between law enforcement intelligence
organizations to impede the ability of Iran or its surrogates
to carry out terrorist attacks, and also to punish the
perpetrators in the event of successful attacks. These measures
are by no means foolproof, but due to strong international
cooperation they are becoming highly effective.
Although we have an obligation to take the lead, we cannot
be fully effective in nonproliferation and counterterrorism
efforts if we act only alone. We need the cooperation of others
in the international community.
We continue to apply unilateral economic pressure on Iran
to make the point that there is a price to be paid for pursuing
policies which violate international norms. Unilateral
sanctions have proven costly to American business. However, we
believe that Iran poses threats so significant that we have no
choice but to accept those costs. Economic pressure has an
important role in our efforts to convince Iran to cease its
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and missiles and
its efforts to sponsor terrorism.
We will continue to seek the most effective means of using
this policy to further our goal of changing Iran's policies on
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and missile development,
and other areas of concern. Our basic purpose is to persuade
Iran that it cannot have it both ways.
It cannot benefit from participation in the international
community while at the same time going around threatening the
interests of its member States. It cannot improve its relations
and standing in the West and in the Middle East while at the
same time pursuing policies that threaten the peace and
stability of a vital region.
Mr. Chairman, Iran can play a constructive role in the
Middle East, and we would welcome that. Iran can have a
constructive relationship with the United States, and President
Clinton has made clear that he would welcome that.
We continue to advocate a Government-to-Government dialog
in this regard as the most effective means of addressing the
concerns of both countries, but as long as Iran threatens the
interests of the United States and our friends in the Middle
East, we will continue to oppose those policies.
We will continue to press for enhanced international
cooperation to counter the threat of Iranian weapons of mass
destruction and the threat from terrorism, and to address the
human rights situation in Iran. These are issues of fundamental
import to the United States.
For almost a year now since the election of President
Khatami we have watched events unfold in Iran with great
interest. Will Iran's Government change anything? We believe
the prospects for change are indeed there. President Khatami's
election in May 1997 reflected this desire for change on the
part of a large majority of the Iranian electorate.
Khatami was not the candidate of the regime's dominant
conservative faction and, since his election, he has continued
to make clear that he intends to challenge the rule of the
conservative clergy by meeting the demands of the Iranian
people for greater freedom, for more respect for the rule of
law, and for a more promising economic future.
The new Government's power and ability to achieve such
objectives have been questioned, yet since Khatami's
inauguration, one surprise seems to have followed another.
Parliament first of all approved all of his cabinet choices,
including the placing of a woman in a significant cabinet
portfolio. The United Nations Special Representative on Human
Rights in Iran noted in his most recent report that public
debate in Iran has now become more open. There is a vigorous
exchange in the Iranian press, even on delicate subjects such
as the rule by the clergy and the role of women in an Islamic
society.
President Khatami has spoken out on foreign policy issues,
and his rhetoric on terrorism in particular on the Middle East
peace process and the desirability of people to people dialog
with the United States has been in sharp contrast to previous
Iranian Government positions.
Iran's new Government has made it clear that it wants
increased cultural contacts between the United States and Iran.
This in itself is a significant change, if one remembers the
taking of American hostages and the burning of American flags.
Some steps have already been taken on both sides to encourage
such exchanges, and we expect these steps to continue.
Perhaps the most revealing incident since President
Khatami's inauguration was the arrest and then subsequent
release of Tehran's Mayor Karbaschi, whom the Iranian public
considers to be one of Iran's most effective public servants
and reformers.
His arrest on corruption charges sparked a potentially
serious confrontation between the supporters of President
Khatami, who believe the arrest to be politically motivated,
and opponents of the President from the conservative flanks.
University students demonstrated in support of Karbaschi and
President Khatami.
The crisis clearly showed the fault lines within Iran, and
the very real challenge that Khatami faces in reforming Iran's
domestic as well as its foreign policies.
Although President Khatami is challenging the conservatives
on important issues, the presidency of Iran has not typically
controlled national security policy, nor the critical Iranian
institutions like the military, the police, security and
intelligence services, and the Revolutionary Guards, all of
which have a critical role in national security policies.
These institutions remain the domain of the supreme leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei, and it is not clear how far President
Khatami is able to go to exert control in these areas, yet it
is precisely in the national security domain that Iran
continues to pursue policies of greatest concern to us.
If President Khatami is able to turn his constructive
rhetoric into real change in these areas of concern to us, that
would lay the foundation for an appropriate response on our
side, including better relations between our two countries. To
sustain any effort to improve relations, however, such changes
in actions, in policies, are essential, and in the meantime we
will continue to focus our energies on countering the effect
from Iran in these areas.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Indyk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martin Indyk
Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you
today on one of our most important foreign policy challenges, Iran. I
want to discuss our areas of concern regarding Iran and how we are
addressing those concerns. I will also discuss our current view of Iran
and what changes we see from the new government there.
U.S. concerns regarding some aspects of Iranian foreign policy
practices remain intact, as does our determination to effectively
address them. As the Department's recently published annual report on
terrorism made clear, Iran continues to be the most active state
sponsor of terrorism. Throughout 1997, Iran continued to train and
equip known terrorist groups, especially Hezbollah, Hamas and PIJ, and
to support their violent opposition to the Middle East peace process.
Iranian agents assassinated at least 13 Iranian dissidents abroad in
1997; at least two of those attacks occurred after President Khatami's
inauguration. The fatwa against Salman Rushdie remains in place, along
with the $2.5 million reward offered for his murder.
The Iranian regime still seeks to project its regional influence
through a conventional military build-up and through the development of
weapons of mass destruction and advanced missile systems. Iran
continues to pursue nuclear technologies, chemical and biological
weapons components and production materials. Iran's acquisition of ever
more sophisticated missile technology presents an increasing threat to
our friends and allies as well as our own military presence in the
Gulf. In particular, Iran's pursuit of an indigenous capability to
produce long-range ballistic missiles poses a threat to the stability
of the Middle East, a region of vital interest to the U.S..
The international community remains deeply concerned by Iran's
human rights record. While the Special Representative has documented
some progress, particularly in the area of freedom of speech, the UN
High Commission on Human Rights once again this year adopted a
resolution expressing concern regarding continuing human rights abuses
such as severe restrictions on freedom of religion and the use of
brutal and inhuman punishments such as stoning, and the use of the
death penalty for non-violent offenses.
The U.S. has sought to address these issues by first, obstructing
Iran's ability to acquire the technology and materials necessary to
develop weapons of mass destruction and missile systems. This has been
one of the highest priorities of the Clinton Administration ... a
challenge that the President, Vice President and Secretary of State
have devoted considerable energy to confront. We have made real
progress with China and Ukraine in restricting nuclear cooperation. We
have begun to see the Russian government take tangible steps to shut
down the cooperation Iran has received from Russian companies for its
Shehab long-range missile program. But more needs to be done. We will
continue to pursue this issue with the greatest vigor with the new
Russian government which has recommitted itself to a cooperative effort
to end assistance by Russian entities to the Iranian missile program.
In recent days President Yeltsin has made strong, helpful comments
on the need to enforce export controls on WMD and missile technology.
Further, the Russian government appears to be issuing the necessary
rules and regulations to implement its January 22 executive order
expanding authority to control technologies of concern. Again, full
implementation of all of these measures will be key.
We also work assiduously with our international partners to improve
cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence organizations to
impede the ability of Iran or its surrogates to carry out terrorist
attacks and to punish the perpetrators when an attack is successful
These measures are not foolproof, but due to strong international
cooperation, they are becoming highly effective. Although we must take
the lead, we cannot be effective in our nonproliferation and
counterterrorism efforts if we act alone.
We continue to apply unilateral economic pressure on Iran to make
the point that there is a price to be paid for pursuing policies which
violate international norms. Unilateral sanctions have proven costly to
U.S. business. However, we believe that Iran poses threats so
significant that we have no choice but accept these costs. Economic
pressure has an important role in our efforts to convince Iran to cease
its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and missiles and to
support terrorism. We will continue to seek the most effective means of
using this policy to further our goal of changing Iran's policies on
terrorism, WMD and missile development and other areas of concern.
Our basic purpose is to persuade Iran that it cannot have it both
ways: it cannot benefit from participation in the international
community while at the same time going around threatening the interests
of its member states; that it cannot improve its relations and standing
in the West and in the Middle East while at the same time pursuing
policies that threaten the peace and stability of a vital region.
Iran can play a constructive role in the Middle East. We would
welcome that. Iran can have a constructive relationship with the U.S..
President Clinton has made clear he would welcome that. We continue to
advocate a government-to-government dialogue as the most effective
means of addressing the concerns of both countries. But as long as Iran
threatens the interests of the U.S. and our friends in the Middle East,
we will continue to oppose it.
We will continue to press for enhanced international cooperation to
counter the threat of Iranian WMD and terrorism and to address the
human rights situation in Iran. These are issues of fundamental import
to the U.S.
For almost a year now, since the election of President Khatami, we
have watched events unfold in Iran with great interest. Will Iran's new
government change anything? We believe the prospects for change are
there. Mohammad Khatami's election in May 1997 reflected this desire
for change on the part of a large majority of the Iranian electorate.
Khatami was not the candidate of the regime 5 dominant conservative
faction.And since his election, he has continued to make clear that he
intends to challenge the rule of the conservative clergy by meeting the
demands of the Iranian people for greater freedom, more respect for the
rule of law and a more promising economic future. The new government's
power and ability to achieve such objectives have been questioned. Yet,
since Khatami's inauguration, one surprise has followed another. The
Parliament approved all of Khatami's cabinet choices. The UN Special
Representative on Human Rights in Iran noted in his most recent report
that public debate in Iran has become more open, even on delicate
subjects such as rule by religious leadership and the role of women in
an Islamic society. Khatami has spoken out on foreign policy issues,
and his rhetoric on terrorism, the Middle East peace process and the
possibility of people-to-people dialogue with the U.S. has been in
sharp contrast to previous Iranian government positions.
Iran's new government has made it clear that it wants increased
cultural contacts between the U.S. and Iran. This, in itself, is a
significant change. Some steps have already been taken on both sides to
encourage such exchanges. We expect these to continue.
Perhaps the most revealing incident since Khatami's inauguration,
was the arrest and release of Tehran' 5 mayor, Gholamhossein Karbaschi,
whom the Iranian public consider to be one of Iran's most effective
public servants. His arrest on corruption charges sparked a potentially
serious confrontation between Khatami supporters, who believed the
arrest to be politically motivated, and opponents of the President.
University students demonstrated in support of Karbaschi and Khatami.
The crisis clearly showed the fault lines within Iran and the very
real challenges Khatami faces in reforming Iran's domestic as well as
foreign policies.
Although President Khatami is challenging the conservatives on
important issues, the presidency typically has not controlled national
security policy, nor critical Iranian institutions like the military,
the police, the security and intelligence services and the
Revolutionary Guards. These remain the domain of the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei, and it is not clear how far Khatami is able to go
in these areas. Yet it is precisely in the national security domain
that Iran is pursuing policies of greatest concern to us.
If President Khatami is able to turn his constructive rhetoric into
real changes in the areas of concern to us, that would lay the
foundation for an appropriate response on our side, including better
relations between our two countries. To sustain any effort to improve
relations, such changes are necessary; in the meantime, we will
continue to focus our energies on countering the threat from Iran in
these areas.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Indyk.
If I could get somebody on the staff, I want to get this
chart around here so we can both look at it, because I want to
go through some of the places where Iran is operating.
I appreciate your statement and the difficulty of dealing
with the present situation that we have, and the hope and the
promise of new leadership that is in Iran, yet the actions that
go contrary to that--and you seem to struggle with the same
issues in your statement.
I do not think that you quarrel any with my point that Iran
is operating on our map that we have here in 21 different
countries around the world, or has actions in 21 different
countries around the world today. Is that correct, or do you
know the number?
Mr. Indyk. I do not have the number off-hand, but when I
look at your map I think it is a pretty good depiction of many
of the areas of concern.
Senator Brownback. I have heard reports of additional
countries that are not on this map of operation by the
Iranians, so they are there, they are active, they are pursuing
expansionist desires.
I was in Uzbekistan recently. I have been in Azerbaijan,
very concerned about the expansion of Iranian-supported groups
in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, in these weak, weak
countries.
What I am concerned about, Ambassador, is that it seems as
if the statements coming out of the administration and the
rumors I am getting are that we are trying to make nice with
the Iranians at this point in time when they continue a very
expansionist agenda.
The statements coming out--and I support dialog and
discussion, and wrestling is good, glad to see that, but then I
hear pretty reliable rumors that the administration is making a
decision on the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act regarding the Total
and Gasprom deal, that they are looking at a national interest
waiver under 9(c) with that.
I would hope you would illuminate me as to, is the
administration going to grant that, and this seems quite a
strong positive step, given what actions the Iranians are
currently taking around the world.
Mr. Indyk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would
emphasize our public record. As you very well know, there are a
lot of rumors that are produced by the rumor mill, particularly
in this town, but I appreciate the opportunity to come before
you so we can deal with what the reality is, and I think that
you would agree that we pull no punches in our State Department
report on terrorism.
The question that you ask on ILSA is one that is difficult
for me to answer at this moment. It is an issue which is under
active consideration. I think it is correct to say that a
decision is imminent. Under Secretary Eizenstadt will be
briefing you and other Senators and Congressmen I think in the
next few days, but because the decision has not been made, it
is not appropriate for me to talk about it in public session,
the decision itself.
What I will say, however, in response to your question is
that it is important to understand that whatever the decision
turns out to be, it will be made on the basis of a commitment
of the administration to uphold the law and the purposes of
this particular piece of legislation.
This, the ILSA legislation's purposes, as I think you are
very familiar with, was to encourage cooperation to help us in
our efforts to prevent the activities you are talking about,
particularly terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
proliferation, and at the same time to discourage foreign
investment in Iran's oil industry.
Senator Brownback. If you could, Mr. Ambassador, in looking
at that map, do you know of another country anywhere in the
world that is as expansionist or as terrorist-oriented as Iran?
Mr. Indyk. It is our judgment that Iran continues to be
the leading sponsor of terrorism.
Senator Brownback. Is there another country in the world
that is any more expansionist-oriented than Iran at the present
time?
Mr. Indyk. I am not sure what you mean by expansionist-
oriented, because----
Senator Brownback. The spread of their ideology and
philosophy to other nations.
Mr. Indyk. I think that in that regard we have seen a
change under President Khatami. There has been an effort since
the hosting in Tehran of the OIC, the Organization of Islamic
Countries summit, by the new Government in Iran to reach out,
particularly to its neighbors, many of the countries on this
map, and to try to turn a new page in their relations with
those countries, particularly in the Gulf, where the--actually
you could color in some more of the map here, I see, because
countries like Kuwait and Bahrain and UAE, there has been some
real concern, and of course in Saudi Arabia, at the activities
of Iran to promote terrorism and subversion.
And you can be sure that when these Governments, our
friends and allies in the region, receive these overtures from
the new Government of Iran, that the issues that you are
talking about that you are discussing today were uppermost on
their agenda, and I think that they made clear to the Iranians
that if there was to be an improvement in relations, then this
kind of activity had to cease.
And the interesting thing is that, although the jury is
still out on this one, that what we hear from those Governments
is that the level of activity has decreased, their level of
concern has decreased in this area, so I do not want to
exaggerate it, but there is a change afoot in terms of Iran's
efforts to repair its relations with its near neighbors and
terrorism and its support for subversive elements is very high
on their agenda in that regard.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Ambassador, with all due respect, I
do not see how it is in our national interest for a national
interest waiver under ILSA, to put a waiver in place for Iran
operating on this map 21 different countries, and as you know
there are some others to put on here, to allow Iran to have
several billion dollars flowing into their coffers off of the
proposal to allow Total and Gasprom to operate so they can pour
that into weapons programs or terrorism programs.
They are the lead sponsor of terrorism around the world.
How can it be in our national interest to provide a waiver if
the U.S. expects to deter any other countries from operating or
investing in Iran, given our willingness to roll over on this
issue? How could it be in our national interest to provide a
waiver if they can justify the all-out U.S. embargo on Iran
which denies profits to American companies and then waive on
this issue for Total or Gasprom?
I realize decisions are imminent, and that is why we are
holding this hearing. That is why I am trying to make these
points to you, is that I fail to see how, under any category,
under any category that you could see that this is in our
national interest to provide a waiver to Gasprom or Total under
ILSA. I do not see how that can possibly be interpreted as
being in our national interest.
Mr. Indyk. I hear you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you understand
my difficulty in responding, given that the decision has not
yet been made, so I will have to make a general response, which
I started to make before, which is that whatever the decision,
the assessment of the administration in making this decision
will be based on an assessment of how best to promote the
purposes of the legislation, which is not only the law, but its
objectives are those that we hold in common with you.
There is no disagreement about the objectives of wanting to
find ways to discourage Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction or sponsor terrorism, and the judgment will
have to be made by the Secretary of State based on that
assessment, but the objective is clear, and the assessment has
to take into account how best we can achieve one of the
objectives of the legislation, which is cooperation from other
members of the international community in the pursuit of those
objectives that I just outlined.
Senator Brownback. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
compound the difficulty for just a moment, if I may on that
subject, and look at the other side of the equation.
And I understand your reluctance to be more definitive,
given the fact that the decision has at the very least not been
formalized and announced at this point, and recognizing that
there is frequently a constructive interplay between the
executive and legislative branches where the legislative branch
gets to play bad cop and the administration can play good cop
and elicit some cooperation under a variety of different
circumstances from various nations, in part under the threat
that we will just let that nasty Congress have their way with
you, and see what we are saving you from, and it has worked, or
at least arguably it has worked in a number of cases, I am
thinking.
I do not want to give any final judgments on any of these
things, but I am just thinking of the recent--I think it was a
Sense of the Senate that we did with respect to China and the
Human Rights Commission and what-have-you and, of course, we
have a number of instances under Helms-Burton that have given
almost everyone indigestion no matter how they came down on it.
Let me just ask you to speculate, if you will, on the
reaction of, say, the French if we were to carry out the
sanctions on Total and other European allies, and what kinds of
reaction we might expect from the international community, just
so that we can look at both sides of the question, some of the
things that you obviously are putting on the table as you
prepare to provide advice and counsel to the President, who
will have to stand behind this recommendation, although it may
be announced by the Secretary of State or yourself at the
appropriate time.
Mr. Indyk. I do not think it will be announced by me.
The issue of secondary boycotts, which the ILSA legislation
effectively provides for, is something that no Governments
particularly welcome, and we ourselves have not welcomed it in
other cases. In fact----
Senator Robb. That particular statement does not elicit any
controversy, I can assure you.
Mr. Indyk. And so when you ask about the reaction of the
French, I do not have to speculate. We know pretty clearly what
the reaction of the French Government and other EU countries is
to this legislation and Helms-Burton. We have seen their
vigorous opposition and the considerable heartburn that it
causes, and in this particular case, even among our closest
allies. The sanctions under ILSA are seen as an attempt by the
United States to penalize their companies, companies from their
countries, for activities that their Governments regard as not
only legal but, from their point of view even desirable.
That is clearly not our point of view, and that is why we
have worked with the Congress first of all to tailor the
legislation in a way that would make it effective, and then
have worked with Congress to implement it.
But you asked about their view, and their view is very hard
over. They do not see why their companies should be punished
for things which they consider to be the right thing to do in
terms of international commerce, and they view the legislation
as an issue of extraterritoriality, where we are trying to
extend our law to other countries and other companies.
So their reaction is very negative, and that is what I was
suggesting when I said that one of the purposes of the
legislation is to try to encourage cooperation from these
countries, and we are only going to be effective--I mean, there
are certain things we can do on our own that we are doing
unilaterally, but in order to be effective against the threats
that we see here, we need international cooperation, and there
is always a question of what is the best way to achieve that
international cooperation.
Senator Robb. The chairman's question essentially, though,
is what if we do not get it? What does that say to others, and
what does that say to U.S. companies that might have similar
economic interests in developing trade with a targeted country,
in this case Iran?
Mr. Indyk. Well, we have to do our best to get it. That is
the objective here, and if we do not get that cooperation, then
the purposes of the act are not going to be fulfilled. We would
have to then look at it.
I am not sure whether that answers your question.
Senator Robb. I am not sure that I think I really want you
to answer the question quite as fully as I would like you to
answer the question, because it would, number 1, end up
resulting, I guess, in an additional speculation, and I might
make your job even more difficult.
I fully appreciate the difficulty you are in, but since you
are already dealing with the question I wanted to at least look
at it from both sides so that we could have a reasonable
representation of the kinds of factors you are going to be
considering when you make that decision.
But my time has expired.
Senator Brownback. Go ahead.
Mr. Indyk. If I might respond just again, Mr. Chairman, to
say that one of the reasons that this process has taken some
time is that we have been engaged in intensive efforts to stop
the investments and to gain the cooperation of our allies and
friends in the international community that can affect Iran's
behavior and the legislation----
Senator Robb. Excuse me, may I interrupt? Do you consider
progress on a separate front to be significant enough to offset
a lack of cooperation in the specific entity, in this case the
gas programs, or Total and Gasprom?
Mr. Indyk. I am not sure what you mean by separate front.
If you mean progress on cooperation against terrorism or
weapons of mass destruction, yes, that is the purpose of the
legislation.
Senator Robb. Some other objective that would, in effect,
mitigate your concern about the specific violation of ILSA.
Mr. Indyk. We have to be careful with terms here, but if I
understand your point, what I am saying is that the purpose of
the legislation is to achieve a change in Iranian behavior in
these areas of concern that we share, and the purpose of the
legislation is to encourage cooperation in that regard, and
that is why the legislation has built into it--it has built
into it a very extensive waiver provision with all sorts of
different options, because the legislators recognize that this
could be used as a vehicle for trying to achieve the ultimate
objective.
And so that is the context in which we have been trying to
work, and we countries, not just the countries that have
companies involved in the particular transaction at South Pass
Field, but also other countries, to try to assure maximum
effort to counter these areas of concern by Iran.
Senator Robb. I guess--and I am not trying to split hairs
here, but progress with respect to the targeted country, or
progress with respect to Iran on countering terrorists or
terrorism activities?
Mr. Indyk. Policies with regard to the policies pursued by
the countries that are affected by this legislation, or other
countries that have dealings with Iran and can therefore
influence Iran. In that sense, it is an indirect approach. We
are obviously trying to deter investment in Iran. That is also
part of the purposes of the legislation, and that is, as it
were, the direct approach, but the indirect approach is to try
to change the policies of the countries involved to step up
their cooperation in these areas of concern.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, Mr.
Ambassador. We appreciate your appearing in front of the
committee, and we appreciate your comments, and hopefully we
can have a good decision coming out of the administration and
not waiving ILSA in this regard. Thank you for joining us.
I have a need to get to the floor. There is a proposal that
is up that I have to be on at the present time. We need to take
a break if we could before our next panel comes up, in looking
at the clock, hoping we can get restarted at 2:45, so if we
could, let us take a short recess.
I apologize to the witnesses and to those in the audience,
but we have the India matter up on the floor now, with the
defense authorization bill, and I have to be over there for a
moment. We will reconvene at 2:45. [Recess.]
Senator Brownback. It turns out I got queued up later in
the line, so we will go ahead and proceed. I apologize, and beg
your indulgence.
Our second panel will be Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, senior
fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Hon.
Richard W. Murphy, senior fellow on the Council on Foreign
Relations, and Mr. Steven Emerson, Middle East affairs analyst
and author and expert on terrorism.
So I appreciate very much this panel. I apologize for the
back-and-forth. This is the U.S. Senate. These things happen,
it seems like fairly often.
Mr. Eisenstadt, we appreciate your joining us. I think we
will run the time clock at a 5-minute interval, and we can
accept your written testimony into the record, if you would
like to summarize, if you would like to read off of it. The
clock will give you some indicator of where you are. We do not
want to rush you, but at the same time I would like to get
succinct comments put into the record. So Mr. Eisenstadt, thank
you for joining us.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL EISENSTADT, SENIOR FELLOW, WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
inviting me to address the subcommittee.
I would like to make a few comments about American policy.
I have in my written comments my assessment of what we have
seen in terms of the Khatami Government's activities in the
areas of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the Arab-
Israeli conflict. In short, I would say there is a lot more
continuity than change in that area, apropos to your comments
before and the statement by Ambassador Indyk.
With regard to U.S. policy, I would say this. Overall I
think the most important achievement of United States policy
toward Iran to date is its success in containing Iran. That is,
limiting its trouble-making potential, its ability to threaten
U.S. allies and interests in the region by denying it access to
arms, technology, and the hard currency necessary to acquire
these arms and technology.
U.S. pressure, diplomatic demarches, and interdiction
operations have thwarted several major conventional arms
transfers and countless smaller ones to date. Moreover, Iran's
economic woes, which have been exacerbated by United States
sanctions, have forced Iran to cut procurements since 1989 by
more than half, and delayed its efforts to acquire conventional
arms and weapons of mass destruction.
Lacking the funds to sustain a major across-the-board
military buildup, Iran has had to content itself with
selectively enhancing its military capabilities.
Continuing these efforts to deny Tehran loans, credit, and
hard currency at a time of economic distress caused by low oil
prices will compel Iran to continue to spend more on butter
than guns in the coming years so that it could meet its debt
service obligations and heightened expectations among its
people that President Khatami can improve living conditions in
that country.
President Khatami's election and his opening to the
American people, however, have greatly altered the rules of the
game and greatly complicated Washington's calculations in a way
that will require the United States to modify its approach
toward Iran.
Washington will need to muster a degree of sophistication
and subtlety that has been largely lacking in U.S. policy till
now if it is to avoid the dangers and grasp the opportunities
created by these new circumstances.
Past efforts to deny Iran arms, technology, an funds have
yielded a number of important achievements, and such efforts
should remain at the heart of United States policy toward Iran.
However, the United States can no longer rely exclusively
on such measures. In formulating its policy toward Iran, the
United States needs to consider the implications of its efforts
on three sets of actors, (1) the Iranian Government, (2) the
Iranian people, and (3) key third parties such as our Arab Gulf
and European allies.
Specifically, the United States needs to better understand
how its policy toward the Iranian Government affects its
standing in the eyes of the Iranian people and its relations
with the Gulf Arabs and its Western European allies.
Most Iranians like Americans and admire the United States
and what it stands for. This reservoir of goodwill is a
precious American asset that must not be squandered and,
because the Iranian people is the main engine for political
change in that country, it is a source of leverage over the
Iranian Government.
The potential offered by this leverage was most clearly
demonstrated by President Khatami's CNN address to the American
people, which more than anything else, in my mind at least, was
a nod to public opinion in Iran which strongly favors
normalizing relations with the U.S.
Moreover, to the degree that the recent Saudi-Iranian
rapprochement was motivated by Saudi desires to distance itself
from the United States following the Khobar Towers bombing to
avoid being caught in the middle of an Iranian-American clash,
efforts to reduce tensions with Tehran would reassure some of
our Arab Gulf allies that we are, in fact, not headed toward a
confrontation with Iran.
This is crucial, since ongoing efforts to contain Iran will
require the continued cooperation of our Arab Gulf allies.
Finally, demonstrating a willingness to increase contacts
with the Iranian people and to explore the possibility of
official contacts with Tehran would strengthen Americans' case
with its European allies, since it would demonstrate that
United States policy toward Iran is not driven by domestic
politics, and that the United States is eager to test Iran's
intentions. This would better enable the United States to make
the case to its European allies that dialog and pressure can go
hand-in-hand.
On the other hand, it would be a severe setback for United
States policy if the Iranian Government could make a credible
case to the Iranian people and to our Arab Gulf and European
allies that the United States had spurned President Khatami's
call for a dialog between peoples and other Iranian gestures.
Small, tangible steps by Washington to relax tensions with
Tehran would thus help the United States test Iranian
intentions and, perhaps more importantly, avoid an erosion in
its standing with both the Iranian people and key allies.
Moreover, through its actions, the United States must make
it clear to the Iranian people that it is their Government that
is the main obstacle to increased contact and better relations
between the two countries. This could lead to additional
pressure for change in Tehran.
Now, what does this mean in terms of specific policy
recommendations? First, with regard to the Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act, the United States should avoid issuing a determination of
sanctionability regarding the Total deal for as long as
possible to retain the deterrent value posed by the threat of
sanctions, to avoid a fight with the Europeans, and to avoid
the appearance of responding to Khatami's opening to the
American people with what could be perceived or portrayed as a
slap in the face.
Second, in responding to these new circumstances in Iran,
the U.S. should be flexible in areas where it can afford to,
while continuing to maintain pressure in areas where it needs
to. That is, with regard to weapons of mass destruction,
terrorism, and obstruction of the Arab-Israeli peace process.
There are a number of steps we could take, such as
streamlining visa applications where this is consistent with
United States security concerns, support for people-to-people
contacts, and a Presidential speech to the Iranian people along
the line of Khatami's CNN interview.
Finally, because Russia and China have demonstrated
repeatedly a disturbing tendency to violate commitments made to
the United States by transferring sensitive arms and technology
to Iran when they believe they can get away with it, sanctions
that punish Russian and Chinese companies that engage in such
transfers and that deny Iran the hard currency required to fund
these transactions will have to remain an essential component
of United States policy toward Iran for the foreseeable future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Eisenstadt \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The author is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy. He previously served as an analyst with the U.S.
Army, and as a researcher for the U.S. Air Force Gulf War Air Power
Survey (GWAPS). He is author of ``Iranian Military Power: Capabilities
and Intentions'' (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The May 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami as president of Iran has
raised hopes and expectations of change in Iran's domestic and foreign
policy. In the foreign policy arena, it is possible to discern a new
vocabulary (emphasizing ``detente,'' ``stability,'' and a ``dialogue
between civilizations'') and efforts to defuse tensions with former
adversaries. The latter includes a diplomatic ``charm offensive'' to
mend fences with its Arab Gulf neighbors--most notably manifested by
its recent rapprochement with Saudi Arabia (which in fact antedated
Khatami's election), and an opening to the American people in the form
of Khatami's CNN interview in January of this year.
However, other aspects of Iran's foreign and defense policy show
more continuity than change. With regard to weapons of mass
destruction, Iranian policy has essentially been characterized by total
continuity. Iran continues to expand its arsenal of missiles and its
civilian nuclear program--which most analysts believe is intended to
serve as the foundation for a nuclear weapons program. Iran, likewise,
continues to support groups that engage in terrorism, and it continues
its attacks on oppositionists--though it seems at a reduced pace since
Khatami's election. Finally, while Iran remains unremittingly hostile
toward Israel, it is possible to discern perhaps the first faint signs
of change with regard to Iran's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Iran continues to devote significant resources to its WMD programs.
\2\ Most notably, it has continued with efforts to build up its
strategic missile forces, and it continues efforts to expand its
civilian nuclear infrastructure, which it probably intends to use as a
stepping stone to a nuclear weapons program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ By contrast, Iran's conventional weapons procurement effort
seems to have run out of steam. The last major conventional weapons
system delivered to Iran was its third Kilo class submarine in January
1997. This is not because Iran no longer feels the need to expand and
modernize its conventional forces, but apparently because it believes
that given current financial constraints, available funds are best
spent augmenting its WMD and missile delivery capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran has been trying since the mid-1980s to acquire a missile
production capability, in order to end its reliance on external sources
of supply. This effort was plagued by various bottlenecks, including a
shortage of skilled personnel, special materials, technological
expertise, and adequate financing. As a result, until recently, Iran
had little success in creating an indigenous missile production
capability. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), A New Challenge
After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Moscow: FIS, 1993), in JPRS-TND, March 5, 1993, p. 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This may be changing, however, thanks to aid provided by Russia,
China, and North Korea during the past 3-4 years. This assistance
includes equipment, machinery, components (including guidance systems),
and special materials required to produce missiles. At present, Iran
can produce Scud missiles domestically, \4\ and it is reportedly
building two hybrid liquid-fuel systems with substantial help from
Russia: the Shehab-3, based on the North Korean Nodong-1, is expected
to have a range of 1,300km, while the Shehab-4, based on the Soviet SS-
4, is expected to have a range of 2,000km. In 1997, Iran conducted 6-8
static ground tests of the motor for the Shehab-3, indicating that work
has gone well beyond the design stage. According to leaked intelligence
estimates, the Shehab-3 is likely to make its first test flight within
1-2 years, and the Shehab-4 its maiden flight within about 3-4 years.
\5\ Iran is also believed to be building a short-range solid-fuel
missile known as the NP-110 (with a range of about 150km) with Chinese
help. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ DoD, Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997.
\5\ Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1997, pp. A1, A6; Washington
Times, September 10, 1997, p. A1; Washington Post, December 31, 1997,
p. A1; Washington Post, January 18, 1998, p. A9.
\6\ Defense News, June 19-25, 1995, p. 1; Washington Times, May 22,
1997, p. A3; Washington Times, June 17, 1997, p. A3; Washington Times,
September 10, 1997, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The introduction of these missiles will not transform the strategic
landscape of the Persian Gulf region, since Iran's Arab neighbors
already live under the shadow of its Scud-B and -C missiles. Their
deployment will affect the security of other U.S. allies, as the
capitals of Turkey and Egypt, and all of Israel, will now be in range
of Iranian missiles, and could constrain US military options in a
future crisis in the Gulf, if Tehran is able to deny the U.S. use of
staging areas or bases in Egypt or Turkey through its ability to
directly threaten these key allies.
Iran's known nuclear technology base is at present rather
rudimentary, although it is building an extensive civilian nuclear
infrastructure that could serve as a springboard for a weapons program.
In particular, its efforts to acquire nuclear research reactors, power
plants, and fuel cycle-related facilities, its apparent investigation
of various enrichment techniques (gas centrifuge enrichment in
particular), and reports of Iranian efforts to obtain fissile material
in the former Soviet Union have raised questions about Iran's
intentions.
Iran's strategy seems to be to build up its civilian nuclear
infrastructure while avoiding activities that would clearly violate its
NPT commitments, using its new contacts in Russia and China to gain
experience, expertise, and dual-use technology that could assist in
creating a military program. Tehran could probably acquire a nuclear
capability within a few years if it were to obtain fissile material and
help from abroad; without such help, it could take Iran 5 or 10 years--
and perhaps even longer--to do so. There is no doubt though, that the
acquisition of research reactors, power plants, and nuclear technology
from Russia and China will ultimately aid this effort. Without such
outside help, Iran will probably face formidable obstacles to realizing
its nuclear ambitions. \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and
Intentions (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, 1996), pp. 9-
25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Developments during the past year show that Iran's civilian nuclear
program faces a number of formidable obstacles, but that it is
continuing efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle related technologies
from Russia and China.
Shortly after President Khatami's inauguration last August, he
appointed Oil Minister Gholamreza Aghazadeh to head the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI). Aghazadeh's predecessor, Reza Amrollahi,
was widely regarded as incompetent, and it was feared that Aghazadeh--
generally regarded as a competent administrator at the oil ministry--
might revitalize the effort. Upon taking his new job, Aghazadeh
announced that he intended to continue Iran's civilian nuclear program,
with the purchase of several new reactors following the completion of
the one currently under construction at Bushehr. (This new order
reportedly would include two 300 MWe units from China, possibly to be
located at Darkhovin, and two 440 MWe units and another 1000MWe unit
from Russia, to be located at Bushehr.) \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Reuters, October 3, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bushehr, however, continues to experience problems. The program is
behind schedule, and Russia recently announced that it would take over
parts of the project previously run by Iran, to prevent the project
from falling further behind schedule. Current estimates of the
anticipated completion date vary between 2000-2003. \9\ Bushehr
suffered an additional setback when the U.S. prevailed upon the Ukraine
earlier this year to agree not to transfer turbines for the reactor.
These can be manufactured in Russia, but production facilities there
will need to be retooled to do so, imposing additional costs and delays
to construction. \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Washington Post, February 22, 1998, p. A30.
\10\ Washington Post, February 8, 1998, p. A25; New York Times,
March 7, 1998, p. A3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are also disturbing signs that both China and Russia are
prepared to renege on recent commitments to the U.S. concerning nuclear
technology transfers to Iran. In January 1998, the U.S. reportedly
obtained intelligence indicating that Iran and China had discussed the
transfer of a uranium conversion plant to Iran, despite the fact that
China's President Jiang Zemin promised President Bill Clinton last
October that China would cease all nuclear cooperation with Iran. China
reportedly quashed the deal after Washington protested to Beijing. \11\
Recent press reports likewise indicate that Russia may still be
considering selling Iran a 40MWt research reactor and a gas centrifuge
enrichment facility included in a January 1995 nuclear cooperation
accord with Iran. \12\ Russia had signaled the U.S. in a May 1995
summit between Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton that it would
not go forward with these components of the accord, after the U.S. had
pressed Russia on this issue. These transfers would significantly
augment Iran's civilian nuclear infrastructure, and could contribute to
Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Washington Post, March 13, 1998, p. A1; Washington Times,
March 13, 1998, p. A1. What is particularly disturbing about this is
that China had promised the U.S. one or two years prior to this
incident that it would cancel the conversion plant deal.
\12\ Ha'aretz, February 18, 1998; Washington Times, May 7, 1998, p.
A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is also worth noting that in January 1998, Iran formally joined
the CWC, which obligates it to declare its inventories of chemical
weapons within 30 days and to destroy them within 10 years. Iran has
not yet submitted its declaration yet (many other countries--including
the U.S.--also have not), though it seems inconceivable that Iran would
give up a potentially important tactical force multiplier and the core
component of its strategic deterrent while Iraq may still retain a
chemical and biological warfare capability. It will be interesting to
see how Iran handles this issue, which will be a key indicator of its
willingness to meet its international arms control commitments.
In this regard, remarks two weeks ago by Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Yahya Rahim Safavi during a closed meeting
with IRGC naval officers--leaked to the Iranian press--have raised
unsettling questions about the willingness of at least some
conservative hard-liners to adhere to Iran's arms control commitments.
In his comments, Safavi reportedly asked his audience rhetorically:
``Can we withstand American threats and domineering attitude with a
policy of detente? Can we foil dangers coming from America through
dialogue between civilizations? Will we be able to protect the Islamic
Republic from international Zionism by signing conventions to ban
proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons?'' \13\ The fact that is
was Safavi who made these disparaging comments about the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
is particularly important. The IRGC is believed to be in charge of
Iran's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, and its
operational chemical and biological weapons inventories and missile
forces. His opinions on these matters carry great weight, and Safavi is
therefore likely to have some--perhaps a decisive--impact on Iranian
decisionmaking pertaining to the CWC and NPT. In both cases, it would
seem that Safavi's preference would be to clandestinely circumvent
these treaties, one way or another. It remains to be seen if he will
carry the day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ AFP, April 29, 1998; Reuters, April 30, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terrorism and Opposition to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process
Despite some positive public statements, Iran continues to support
groups engaged in terrorism, and to assassinate opponents of the
clerical regime. Since President Khatami's election, several senior
officials have condemned terrorism. In November 1997, Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharazzi condemned a terrorist attack by Egypt's Islamic Group on
tourists; in early January 1998 Foreign Ministry spokesman Mahmoud
Mohammadi condemned attacks on civilians in Algeria; and President
Khatami condemned attacks on innocent civilians, including Israelis, in
his January CNN message to the American people. These are all positive
steps. \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997. In his
CNN interview, Khatami stated that ``any form of killing of innocent
men and women who are not involved in confrontations is terrorism'' and
that ``terrorism should be condemned in all its forms.'' CNN, January
7, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, Iran still funds, trains, and arms groups that engage in
terrorism; senior Iranian officials continue meeting with
representatives of terrorist groups such as Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and
Hezbollah (Khatami himself met with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah in Tehran one month before Hezbollah tried infiltrating a
suicide bomber into Israel); Iranian intelligence continues to stalk
American personnel in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf, and Tajikistan, to gain
information that would be needed for terrorist attacks on Americans,
and perhaps to send a message to the U.S. that they can target American
interests should they decide to do so; and Tehran continues to attack
opponents of the regime. \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Washington Times, December 9, 1997, p. A6; Hillary Mann,
``Iranian Links to International Terrorism--The Khatami Era,''
PolicyWatch no. 269, January 28, 1998. IRGC chief Safavi implied that
Tehran was capable of conducting terrorism on a global basis when he
declared in an September 1997 speech that the IRGC and its Basij
militia were prepared to respond to foreign aggression by retaliating
not just in the Persian Gulf region, but around the world. IRNA,
September 19, 1997, in FBIS-NES-97-262, September 22, 1997.
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In recent years, Iran has generally restricted attacks on
oppositionists to northern and central Iraq. This marks the continued
evolution in Iranian policy since the early-to-mid 1990s away from high
profile terrorist actions in the heart of Europe (which had a harmful
impact on Iranian relations with countries such as France and Germany)
toward less conspicuous acts in less politically sensitive locations.
It also shows that Iran is sensitive to the political costs of its
involvement in terrorism, and that it may be possible to alter Iranian
policy in this area. Another hopeful sign is the apparent decrease in
attacks on oppositionists since Khatami's election. According to one
U.S. government official, of the thirteen or so assassinations that
occurred in 1997, at least two occurred after Khatami's inauguration.
\16\ While it is distressing that these activities continue, it is
important to note this figure; hopefully this trend will continue this
year and Tehran will move to curtail its involvement in terrorism
across-the-board. This has not yet happened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ According to a wire service report released in early January
1998, eight Iranian dissidents were murdered abroad since Khatami's
inauguration in August 1997 (eleven in all of 1997), compared to eight
in all of 1996. AP, January 9, 1998. By comparison, the Department of
State's Patterns of Terrorism 1997 claims that ``Tehran conducted at
least 13 assassinations in 1997, the majority of which were carried out
in northern Iraq.'' Information about trends for the first half of this
year are unfortunately not yet available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran continues to arm and train the Lebanese Hezbollah
organization, which has engaged in terrorist attacks on Jewish and
Israeli targets in the past, including the bombing of the Israeli
embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, an attempt to infiltrate a
terrorist into Israel to plant a bomb on an Israeli airliner in April
1996 (who was critically injured when his bomb exploded prematurely in
his hotel room), and most recently, an attempt to infiltrate another
bomber into Israel in November 1997 (following Khatami's inauguration,
it should be noted). \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ This most recent attempt involved a German convert to Islam,
Stefan Josef Smyrek, who had undergone military training with Hezbollah
in Lebanon. Washington Times, December 26, 1997, p. A13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the past, Iranian intelligence personnel have been involved
directly in terrorist attacks in Israel and on Israeli interests. Iran
is believed to have at least had foreknowledge of the Hezbollah bombing
of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992 and the attempt to
infiltrate a bomber into Israel in April 1996, and may have been
actively involved in both incidents. \18\ Moreover, Iranian
intelligence operatives have been implicated in an attempt to bomb the
Israeli embassy in Bangkok in March 1994, the bombing of a Jewish
community center in Buenos Aires in July 1994, and attempts to incite
Jordanians to attack Israeli tourists in that country in December 1995.
\19\ Iran is not known to have been associated with any such attempts
since President Khatami's election. On the other hand, Iran's continued
refusal to cooperate with Argentina's investigation of the 1992 and
1994 bombings have led to a deterioration in relations between the two
countries in recent days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1992, p. 22;
New York Times Magazine, November 10, 1996, p. 45.
\19\ The Iranian arrested for attempting to bomb the Israeli
embassy in Bangkok was sentenced to death by a Thai court in July 1996.
AFP, June 10, 1996. The cultural attache at Iran's embassy in Buenos
Aires--who is also the prayer leader of a local mosque--is believed to
have played a central role in the bombing of the Jewish community
center. He was declared persona non grata after leaving Argentina in
1997. New York Times, May 17, 1998, p. A15. The Iranian diplomat who
had incited Jordanians to attack Israeli tourists was expelled from
Jordan in December 1995. Mideast Mirror, December 11, 1995, p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is worth noting that some U.S. government intelligence analysts
believe that Khatami and his supporters ``wish to change Iranian policy
with regard to terrorism . . . in a direction that would relieve some
of the impediments to improved relations between Iran and western
countries'' but he has been unable to do so because he does not control
the relevant levers of power in Tehran. \20\ Clearly, the U.S. has to
base its policy on the actions of Iran's government, and not the words
or the inferred desires of its President or other senior officials, but
developments in this area bear careful watching, as this might be the
first area where a change in Iranian policy concerning the three issues
of primary concern to the U.S. (terror, opposition to the Arab-Israeli
peace process, and WMD) could become manifest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Washington Post, May 5, 1998, p. A9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iranian leaders from Khatami to Khamene'i continue to show
unremitting hostility toward Israel in their public utterances, and
there is little difference between them in this regard. However, Iran's
approach toward the Arab-Israeli peace process and the possibility of
an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon has changed somewhat since Khatami's
election. In a meeting during the December 1997 Islamic Conference
Organization summit in Tehran, Khatami reportedly indicated to Yasser
Arafat that while he had little faith that the Madrid process would
produce a lasting Arab-Israeli peace, Iran was prepared to accept any
terms that the PLO agreed to, and that it would not actively oppose or
seek to undermine a peace agreement. \21\ Khatami struck this general
theme during his CNN interview, stating that ``We have declared our
opposition to the Middle East peace process [but] we do not intend to
impose our views on others or to stand in their way.'' \22\ However,
given the difficulties that the peace process is currently facing, it
seems unlikely that this Iranian commitment will be tested anytime
soon. More recently, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi indicated that if
Israel withdrew from Lebanon, ``the aims of the resistance would have
been achieved in reality.'' \23\ In the past, Iranian officials would
have welcomed an Israeli withdrawal as a first step on the road to the
liberation of Jerusalem. In this light, Kharazzi's recent statement is
worth noting, though it could be seen as a simple statement of fact,
that does not speak to what would happen after an Israeli withdrawal--
which will be determined first and foremost by Hezbollah, and not Iran
(though Tehran could certainly influence such a decision).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Los Angeles Times, January 30, 1998, p. A6.
\22\ CNN, January 7, 1998. It should be noted, however, that former
President Rafsanjani made a similar promise in 1994, saying that ``we
do not wish to intervene in practice and physically disrupt the [Arab-
Israeli peace] process,'' at the same time that Iran provided
political, economic, and military support to Lebanese and Palestinian
groups opposed to the peace process. Mideast Mirror, June 8, 1994, p.
15.
\23\ Reuters, March 30, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implications for U.S. Policy
U.S. policy toward Iran since the 1979 revolution can claim both
accomplishments and failures. The most significant accomplishment
relates to Washington's success in curbing Tehran's ability to threaten
U.S. allies and interests, by denying Iran access to arms and
technology, and the hard currency necessary to fund such arms and
technology transfers. U.S. pressure, diplomatic demarches, and
interdiction operations have thwarted several major conventional arms
deals and countless smaller ones; \24\ cut Iran off from Western arms
and technology sources--forcing it to rely on less advanced suppliers
such as North Korea, China, and Russia; and hindered procurement of
spare parts for its armed forces, thereby making it more difficult for
Tehran to maintain its existing force structure. This has made Tehran
very careful to avoid a confrontation with the U.S. that could lead to
losses that it knows it could neither absorb nor afford to replace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Most recently, in October 1997, the U.S. purchased some 21
MiG-29 fighters from Moldova to prevent their purchase by Iran.
Washington Post, November 5, 1997, p. A23; New York Times, November 5,
1997, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, Iran's economic woes--which have been exacerbated by U.S.
sanctions--have forced it to cut military procurement since 1989 by
more than half \25\ and delayed its efforts to acquire conventional
arms and WMD. Lacking the funds to sustain a major, across-the-board
military build-up, Iran has had to content itself with selectively
enhancing its military capabilities. Continuing these efforts to deny
Tehran loans, credit, and hard currency at a time of economic distress
caused by low oil prices, high debt service obligations, and heightened
expectations of socio-economic change, will compel Iran to continue to
spend more on butter than guns in the coming years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ According to one U.S. Government estimate, Iranian foreign
exchange expenditures on arms dropped from a high of $2 billion in 1991
to less than $1 billion in 1997. Bruce Riedel, ``U.S. Policy in the
Gulf: Five Years of Dual Containment,'' PolicyWatch no. 315, May 8,
1998, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Khatami's election and his opening to the American
people, however, have significantly altered the rules of the game and
greatly complicated Washington's calculations in a way that will
require the U.S. to modify its approach toward Iran. Washington will
need to muster a degree of sophistication, restraint, and subtlety that
has been largely lacking in U.S. policy toward Iran until now if it is
to avoid the dangers and grasp the opportunities created by these new
circumstances. Past efforts to deny Iran arms, technology, and funds
have yielded a number of important achievements, and such efforts--
including economic sanctions--should continue. However, the U.S. can no
longer rely exclusively on such measures. In formulating its policy
toward Iran, the U.S. needs to formulate its policy toward the Iranian
government with an eye toward how its actions affects its standing in
the eyes of the Iranian people, and its relations with the Gulf Arabs
and its Western European allies.
Most Iranians like Americans and admire the U.S. and what it stands
for. This reservoir of good will is a precious American asset that must
not be squandered. And because the Iranian people is the main engine
for political change in the country, it is a source of leverage over
the Iranian government. The potential offered by this leverage was most
clearly manifested by President Khatami's CNN address to the American
people, which more than anything else was a nod to popular opinion in
Iran, which strongly favors normalizing relations with the U.S..
Moreover, to the degree that the recent Saudi-Iranian rapprochement
was motivated by a Saudi desire to distance itself from the U.S.
following the Khobar Towers bombing--to avoid being caught in the
middle of an Iranian-American clash--efforts to reduce tensions with
Tehran would reassure some of our Arab Gulf allies that we are in fact
not headed toward confrontation with Iran. This is crucial, since
ongoing efforts to contain Iran will require the continued cooperation
of America's Arab allies in the Gulf.
Finally, demonstrating a willingness to increase contacts with the
Iranian people and its readiness to reestablish official contacts with
Tehran would strengthen America's case with its European allies, since
it would demonstrate that U.S. policy toward Iran is not driven by
domestic politics, and that the U.S. is eager to test Iranian
intentions. This would better enable the U.S. to make the case to its
European allies that dialogue and pressure can go hand-in-hand.
On the other hand, it would be a severe setback for U.S. policy if
the Iranian government could make a credible case to the Iranian people
and to our Arab Gulf and Western European allies, that the U.S. has
spurned President Khatami's call for a dialogue between peoples and
other Iranian gestures. Small, tangible steps by Washington to relax
tensions with Tehran would thus help the U.S. test Iranian intentions
and maintain the momentum of such efforts, and just as importantly,
avoid an erosion in its standing with both the Iranian people and key
allies. Moreover, through its actions, the U.S. must make it clear to
the Iranian people that it is their government that is the main
obstacle to increased contact and better relations between the two
countries. This could lead to additional pressure for change in Tehran.
What does this mean in terms of specific policy recommendations?
First, with regard to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, the U.S. should
avoid issuing a determination of sanctionability regarding the Total
deal for as long as possible, to maintain the deterrent value of the
legislation vis-a-vis additional investments, avoid a fight with the
Europeans, and avoid the appearance of responding to Khatami's opening
to the American people with what could be perceived or portrayed as a
slap in the face.
Second, in responding to the new circumstances in Iran, the U.S.
should be flexible in areas where it can afford to, while continuing to
maintain pressure--through sanctions and other means--in areas where it
needs to (specifically with regard to terrorism, the Arab-Israeli peace
process, and WMD). There are several ``easy'' things that Washington
can do to indicate its desire to reduce tensions with Tehran and signal
its support for the Iranian people that would not cost it a thing, and
would in fact advance its interests:
Streamline visa application procedures to reduce obstacles
for Iranians who want to visit the U.S., to the degree that
this is consistent with U.S. security concerns. Consider
stationing a consular official in Tehran to facilitate this
process.
Remove Iran from the list of major illicit-drug producing or
transit countries if the facts merit such a step, in
recognition of Iran's efforts in this area.
Ensure that the new Farsi language service of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty adheres to factual, critical reporting
without engaging in gratuitous and provocative bashing of the
regime in Tehran.
Support efforts to intensify people-to-people contacts
involving, for instance, artists, agricultural and medical
specialists, and American non-governmental policy analysts who
are broadly supportive of U.S. policy in the region.
Consider an extended television address by President Bill
Clinton to the Iranian people along the lines of Khatami's
January CNN interview.
Though Tehran's human rights policies are no longer an
official U.S. ``subject of concern'' (as are terrorism, efforts
to obstruct the peace process, and WMD), the U.S. should
continue to stress the importance of improvements in this area
in its public diplomacy.
Finally, Russia and China have demonstrated repeatedly a disturbing
tendency to violate commitments made to the U.S. by transferring
sensitive arms and technology to Iran when they apparently believe that
they can get away with it. Therefore, sanctions that punish Russian and
Chinese companies that engage in such transfers, and that deny Iran the
hard currency required to fund these transactions, will have to remain
an essential component of U.S. policy toward Iran for the foreseeable
future.
Senator Robb. (presiding) Thank you, Mr. Eisenstadt. The
chairman was given plan 3, which was like plan 1, which means
he had to go to the floor. I agreed to remain in my post and
continue to take testimony so that we would not in effect be
jerking you back and forth in terms of timing and perhaps delay
other commitments you might have Mr. Emerson, would you
proceed?
STATEMENT OF STEVEN EMERSON, MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS ANALYST,
AUTHOR AND TERRORISM EXPERT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Emerson. Thank you very much.
Ever since the election of Muhammad Khatami as president in
May 1997 the world has been debating the meaning of his victory
and the significance of his statements and actions. Has Iran's
support for terrorism diminished? How has Khatami affected the
Iranian terrorism apparatus, and has there been any
quantifiable, measurable change in the conduct of Iran? What
can we say, if anything, about Khatami and the effect of
American sanctions over this past year on his personal effects
in Iran?
The new openness and bold expressions of dissent seem to
have been bursting at the seams in the Iranian society. It is
very, very encouraging, and something very welcome to the West.
There have been public statements issued by President Khatami
that, relative to other statements by others in Iran have
sounded soothingly moderate, particularly to western ears
accustomed to the steady drumbeat of the demonization of the
West.
Although President Khatami may, and I emphasize may, be the
first Iranian leader since the revolution to seek a genuine
accommodation with the United States, the fact remains that he
does not speak for nor represent the other domains of power in
the Iranian regime, whose support for anti-American and
antiwestern policies remains a staple of the Islamic
revolutionary identity.
As the United States grapples with the genuine policy
conundrum of how best to encourage Khatami and other moderate
forces, the enthusiasm bred by the prospect of engaging in a
dialog with a postrevolutionary leader, if we can call him
that, must not blind us to the realities that the Iranian
terrorist apparatus is very much alive, intact, and presently
engaged in supporting acts of terrorism and violence against
the United States and our European allies.
Iran continues to fund and train members of the Hamas and
Palestine Islamic Jihad in carrying out mass terrorist
operations and planning them against Israeli civilians. Iran
has recently, in the last 7 months, developed a network of
militant recruits in Jordan designed and orchestrated to attack
Jordanian, Israeli, and other targets.
Iran continues to operate training camps for terrorists in
Iran for attacks against United States targets in the Persian
Gulf and against pro-western Arab regimes.
Iran has provided weapons and training to the vast network
of growing Hizbollah terrorist infrastructure now operating in
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, as well as Europe, Asia, and
even North America.
Iran's extensive network of front companies, religious
organizations, student groups, throughout the western countries
continue to collect intelligence, carry out surveillance,
threaten or attack Iranian dissidents, prepare for future
terrorist operations, and acquire illicit advanced technology
for Iran's chemical, biological, and nuclear programs.
Tehran continues to serve as a central meeting place and
sanctuary for top Middle Eastern terrorist leaders, and
finally, Iran continues to affirm the death sentence and bounty
against the writer, Salman Rushdie.
Iranian agents have been implicated in the deaths of
Americans abroad, and they continue to work in the senior
levels of Iranian Intelligence. Ahmad Sherifi, a senior Iranian
Intelligence officer and a top official in the Revolutionary
Guard, met with Hani Abd Rahim Sayegh, the alleged getaway
driver in the Khobar bombing in Saudi Arabia which killed 19
American servicemen. Sherifi reportedly met with Sayegh in Qom,
Iran, and later met with him in Damascus.
Sherifi also recruited members for the military wing of
Hizbollah-Bahrain in Qom, and later wrote checks to Bahraini
members of Hizbollah.
The notion of Iran's support for terrorism is something
that we must keep at the fore, despite any attempts to be
lulled into a sense that there is a new postrevolutionary Iran.
Iran provides direct military and financial supplies to the
Hizbollah, as well, in Southern Lebanon for attacks against
Israel, attacks against Jordan, as well as Hizbollah operators
in Europe and South America.
One of the vehicles, the primary vehicles, is through
weapons flows to Hizbollah in Lebanon. The precise amount that
Iran provides is probably impossible to ascertain, but most
reliable intelligence estimates claim that the yearly subsidy
between Iran and Hizbollah in Lebanon is between $75 and $150
million.
Iranian military supplies are usually delivered through an
air bridge through Damascus. According to western intelligence,
more than 50 military supply flights were conducted from Iran
to Syria in October 1997 alone. There were up to 11 terrorist
training camps operating in Iran during the past year, where
militant volunteers from around the Middle East have
participated in operational training.
Iran support to Hamas and Jihad continues unabated, and
continues to this very day. Just 2 weeks ago, Sheikh Ahmed
Yassin, the leader of Hamas, was entertained in Iran where he
received promises of support, military and financial, from the
Iranian leadership.
I would say that in the end we face the prospect of maybe
changing our policy, but the bottom line is that the U.S.
should not change its overall policy, its sanctions against the
regime, at this point. We should perhaps approach a policy of
what I call incremental reciprocity, exchanging ad hoc economic
and political incentives for demonstrable changes in Iran's
support for terrorism.
The economic sanctions thus far have caused serious
dislocations to the Iranian economy, which have, in fact, bred
mass discontent, which have led, in turn, to the election of
President Khatami. Loosening of these sanctions at this point
would only result in the resolidification of the power base of
the radicals.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Emerson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Emerson
tehran and terrorism: iran under president muhammad khatami
Ever since the election of Muhammad Khatami as President of Iran in
May 1997, the world has been debating the meaning of his victory and
the significance of his statements and the actions of the Iranian
government. Has Iran's support for terrorism diminished? How has
Khatami affected the Iranian terrorist apparatus? Has there been any
quantifiable change in the conduct of Iran? And what if anything can we
say about Khatami and the effect of American sanctions and the policy
of containment?
To be sure, an increasingly robust public debate has emerged in
Iran under President Khatami over the future direction of Iran,
although the debate is almost exclusively focused on internal politics
and economics. Sometimes, the debate has unfolded directly on the
merits of Iranian policies, but more often has become translated into
bitter proxy fights fought by indictments, riots, and allegations of
impropriety and religious infidelity. The election of Khatami himself
seemingly heralded a new willingness to challenge the conservative
religious monopoly under the existing revolutionary regime of Ayatollah
Ali Khamene'i in the area of social policy and market economy.
The new openness and bold expressions of dissent--in reality a
hallmark of traditional Iranian independence--seems to have been
bursting at the seams of society, churning beneath the repressive
religious and social chains imposed during the past 18 years. New
publications, books, radio programs, importation of foreign
periodicals, and even previously banned films have suddenly surfaced in
a society desperate for intellectual diversity and challenges. And
there have been several public statements issued by President Khatami
that, relative to others, have sounded soothingly moderate,
particularly to Western ears accustomed to the steady drumbeat of the
demonization of the West and its culture.
But in the end, a comprehensive assessment of the policies of the
Iranian government in the past year shows that support for
international terrorist organizations, particularly Hizbollah, Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, and the Sudanese National Islamic Front, has not abated.
Indeed, Iran has continued to provide financial and military support to
these terrorist groups while simultaneously operating its clandestine
intelligence gathering apparatus, front organizations, and false flag
agents of influence in the Middle East, Western Europe, the old Soviet
republics, and even North America.
Although President Khatami may be the first Iranian leader since
the revolution to seek a genuinely sincere accommodation with the U.S.,
the fact remains that he does not speak for nor represent the other
domains of power in the Iranian regime where support for anti-American
and anti-Western policies remains a staple of their Islamic
Revolutionary identity. As the U.S. grapples with a genuine policy
conundrum as how best to encourage Khatami and other moderate forces in
Iran, the enthusiasm bred by the prospect of engaging in a dialogue
with a post-Revolutionary leader ought not blind us to the realities
that the Iranian terrorist apparatus is alive, intact, and presently
engaged in supporting acts of terrorism and anti-Western and anti-
American radicalism in many parts of the world.
Khatami's own views and policies on militant Islamic terrorism are
now the subject of major debate in the U.S. intelligence community. Is
he a genuine moderate, seeking a historical reconciliation with the
U.S.? Or is he merely a pragmatist, aware that Iranian economic and
cultural isolation bred by the mullahs' ideological anti-American
fervor has perpetually doomed Iran to economic ruin? Even a critical
examination of the statements made by President Khatami himself
suggests that he still feels compelled to occasionally echo radical
sentiments that reflect an unremitting hatred of Israel, pro-Western
American policies and culture. How should we evaluate these statements?
Are Khatami's radical statements merely designed to protect his power
base as he singularly charts a new moderate course? Or is Khatami's
posture reflective of a calculated effort to lull the U.S. into a fall
sense of security--to drop the sanctions and relax the prohibitions on
investment and trade?
Nevertheless, even if we extend Khatami the benefit of the doubt
and accept as genuine views that Iran must stop its avowed
fundamentalist war with the U.S., the Iranian terrorist apparatus is on
automatic pilot.
Iran continues to fund and train members of the Hamas and
Palestine Islamic Jihad in carrying out mass terrorist
operations against Israeli civilians.
Iran has recently developed a network of militant recruits
in Jordan to attack Jordanian and Israeli targets.
Iran continues to operate training camps for terrorists in
Iran for attacks against U.S. targets in the Persian Gulf and
against pro-Western Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and
Jordan.
Iran has provided weapons and training to the vast network
of growing Hizbollah terrorist infrastructure now operating in
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, as well as in Europe and
Asia.
Iran's extensive network of front groups of religious
organizations, student groups, and front companies operates
throughout Western countries in collecting intelligence,
carrying out surveillance, threatening and attacking Iranian
dissidents, preparing for future terrorist operations, and
acquiring illicit advanced technology for Iran's chemical,
biological, and nuclear programs. Iranian agents and surrogates
help recruit and operate terrorist cells in the West.
Tehran continues to serve as a central meeting place and
sanctuary for Middle Eastern terrorist leaders.
Iran continues to affirm the death sentence and bounty
against the writer Salman Rushdie.
It is a matter of historical fact that the Islamic Republic in Iran
has used terrorism as an element of its foreign policy since its birth
in 1979. \1\ Iran's ties to terrorist groups exist on multiple levels.
The Iranian revolution has served as an example for Islamic extremists
who wish to create Islamic republics in their homelands. Iran provides
material support and trains operatives of several terrorist groups,
including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hizbollah. The list
enumerating Iran's hand in some of the most horrific terrorist attacks
is unparalleled: the bombing of Marine Barracks in 1983 in Beirut
killing 241 Marines; the bombing of the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in
Beirut in 1983 and 1984; the kidnapping and execution of American
hostages in Lebanon; the hijacking of American planes; multiple suicide
bombings against Israeli civilian targets; assassination of scores of
Iranian dissidents in Europe and the Middle East; and deadly bombings
of American facilities in Saudi Arabia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism
Internet Site (www.ict.org.il).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iranian agents have directly engaged in political assassinations.
For instance, the 1997 annual State Department Report on International
Terrorism reports Iran conducted at least 13 assassinations last year,
mostly against opposition figures in northern Iraq. Sometimes, Iranian
agents use other groups or agents to conduct terrorist attacks, as it
did in carrying out the assassination of four Kurdish leaders in the
Mikonos restaurant in Germany in 1992.
Iranian agents who have been implicated in the deaths of Americans
abroad continue to work in Iranian intelligence. Ahmad Sherifi, a
senior Iranian Intelligence officer and a top official in the
Revolutionary Guard, met with Hani Abd Rahim Sayegh, the getaway driver
in Khobar bombing in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 American Servicemen
in 1996. Sherifi reportedly met Sayegh in Qom, Iran, and later met with
him in Damascus, Syria. Sherifi also recruited members for the military
wing of Hizbollah-Bahrain in Qom, and later wrote checks to these
Babrainis, drawn from a Revolutionary Guard bank account in Iran. \2\
Sherifi still maintains his position in Iranian Intelligence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Washington Post, April 13, 1977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The importance of terrorism as a foreign policy tool in Iran is
demonstrated by the fact that Tehran has an organizational frame-work
set-up to handle terrorist activities. \3\ There are officials in the
Vevak, the Iranian intelligence apparatus, specifically assigned to
handle ties with terrorist groups. Iran has special terrorist units,
like the ``Jerusalem Forces,'' also known as the Al-Quds Army, that
operate in the field.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Former Iranian President, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, says there are
17 organizations in Tehran, located in different ministries that are
directly involved in terrorism (Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1,
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The government's support for terrorism is so deeply ingrained that
it would take a monumental shift to change the status quo. Based on the
critical balance of power between Khatami and the more conservative
mullahs who continue to run most sectors of the government as well as
control collection and distribution of funds, Khatami does not appear,
at this time, to have the power necessary to alter Iran's foreign
policy. Yet, the popular support Khatami has received for his free
market approach to the introduction of intellectual ideas into Iran has
galvanized major pockets of supporters among the population, further
solidifying the startling 70 percent majority he garnered in the May
1997 election.
Khatami's ascendancy to the Presidency has been accompanied by a
wave of optimistic speculation that he truly represents the genuine
Iranian moderate that the U.S. has searched for so long--sometimes
sought so desperately, as during the Iran-contra scandal--that American
policymakers have confused moderation with pragmatism with tragic
consequences. Yet, Khatami's portrayal as a moderate Iranian cleric who
desires some type of break with the existing anti-American identity of
Islamic Republic is not without some justification, although some of
the new U.S. advocates of dropping the ``Iran containment'' policy are
making leaps of faith that could prove counter-productive and dangerous
to U.S. national security if implemented.
Khatami's interview with CNN's Christianne Amanpour this past
January was highly publicized, and sparked debate about whether the
Clinton administration should engage Iran in talks. While Khatami may
indeed represent a reformist trend among Iran's clerical elite, his
ability to make major changes in his nation's foreign policy is at best
minimal. He can only tinker with the system, particularly when it comes
to foreign policy. Any real changes in policy would have to get the
explicit permission of Ayatollah Khamene'i, the ruling cleric, and the
real power behind the government who openly champions the need to
attack the U.S. as the rudimentary philosophy of Iran. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Shirley, Edward G., ``Good Mullah, Bad Mullah,'' The Weekly
Standard, January 19, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today's hearings attest to the fact that the U.S. is looking for an
opening, no matter how small it may be, to the Islamic Republic.
However, my research shows that the Iranian government has not altered
its long-standing support for Islamic terrorist groups. In its outlook
and practice, the regime in Tehran continues to view terrorism as a
legitimate arm of its foreign policy. Indeed, Iran's leadership appears
to have made a strategic decision to expand contacts with terrorist
groups, especially among Sunni militants. As a regime facing
overlapping, competing, and parallel centers of political, religious,
and military power, Iranian support for terrorism is more a product
today of a multi-compartmented government than a singular integrated
regime. Yet, even accounting for the competing spheres of influence,
Iranian support for exporting the Islamic fundamentalist revolution is
so ingrained at all levels that it is unlikely that Khatami will turn
out to be the Iranian Gorbachev.
Iran and Hizbollah
In its attempt to export its Islamic revolution throughout the
region of the Middle East, Iran provided support to the Hizbollah (The
Party of God) organization in Lebanon. The Department of State's
Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997 describes Hizbollah as a ``radical
Shi'a group formed in Lebanon; dedicated to creation of Iranian-style
Islamic republic in Lebanon and the removal of all nonIslamic
influences from area. Strongly anti-Western and anti-Israel. Closely
affiliated with, and often directed by Iran, but may have conducted
operations that were not approved by Tehran.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997, U.S. Department of State,
April 1998, p. 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The support that Iran provides is both financial and military. The
Hizbollah leadership is frequently entertained in Tehran by the Iranian
leadership which delivers directives for operations in southern
Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Hizbollah's operations also extend into
both Europe and South America. Despite Khatami's apparently moderate
stance regarding most areas of foreign policy, his stance toward
Hizbollah and its operations against Israeli targets receives his
blanket approval.
Hizbollah emerged in 1982 under the tutelage of a number of Shi'ite
clerics who followed the teachings of the Iranian mullahs and preached
of the oncoming Islamic revolution in Lebanon. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Kramer, Martin, ``The Moral Logic of Hizballah,'' Origins of
Terrorism, Walter Reich, Ed. (1990: Cambridge University Press), p.
133.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A review of statements made by Hizbollah officials during the
course of the past year indicates the close relationship between
Hizbollah and Iran undaunted by the election of a ``moderate''
president in Iran. For example, Hizbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah made the following statement when asked whether he felt
Iran's policy toward Hizbollah would change pending the elections
between Khatami and Ah Akbar Natek-Nouri, the alleged ``hard-liner'' in
the Iranian elections: ``Both those candidates will not allow
themselves to falter in any way in their support for Hizbollah and the
anti-Zionist resistance.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Tehran IRNA, March 6, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last October, Nasrallah was invited to Tehran--one of at least
eight known trips by leading Hizbollah officials during the past 12
months--where he was interviewed in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and stated, ``the
position of the Iranian leadership and of Muhammad Khatami's government
on the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and their right to fight the
occupation and liberate their usurped land has not changed at all from
Iran's former positions.'' \8\ This view, taken from the leader of
Hizbollah, sums up the solid nature of the relationship between Iran
and Hizbollah--regardless of who is in power--that Iran will support
the exporting of its revolution through Hizbollah.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ London Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 16, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the vehicles through which Iran supports the Hizbollah and
simultaneously solidifies its influence is by means of funding
religious, social, and welfare organizations in Lebanon. Although the
precise amount that Iran provides is probably impossible to ascertain--
insofar as it is disseminated through many Iranian official, unofficial
and derivative accounts, to a similar multiple tier of accounts in
Lebanon--most of the reliable intelligence estimates have estimated the
yearly subsidy between $75 million and $150 million. The recipients
include a host of welfare, Islamic, and social communal organizations
that simultaneously reinforce a militant Islamic fundamentalist
identity and an affiliation with Iran while providing an economic net
and incentive to those who become active with Hizbollah.
An intriguing story in Al-Watan Al-Arabi from November 28, 1997
alleges that President Khatami, recognizing the need to establish a
more pervasive and permanent influence in Lebanon that will outlive any
fluctuations dependent upon Syria or upon the Hizbollah directly,
embarked on an expansive long range plan to inject significant Iranian
funds into a much wider spectrum of Lebanese civil society to ensure
that Iran has a permanent level of support that transcends the Lebanese
political and religious continuum. Although the report has not been
confirmed, it reveals a political pragmatism on the part of Khatami but
not a corresponding political moderation.
Whatever degree of monetary support Iran provides to Hizbollah,
however, this is not the only way that it keeps its orbit of radical
influence alive. Another form of support that Hizbollah has received
from Iran has been through military training and the continuous supply
of increasingly advanced weapons. As recently as April 1998, according
to Al-Watan Al-Arabi, Hizbollah has been training a number of its
members in Iran under the instruction of Iranian officers in the
revolutionary guards. \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Al-Watan Al-Arabi, April 10, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iranian supplies are usually delivered via an air bridge through
Damascus. According to western intelligence, more than 50 military
resupply flights were conducted from Iran to Syria in October 1997
alone. Sophisticated radio frequency detonated bombs have surfaced in
attacks by Hizbollah in southern Lebanon thanks to Iran. Alarmingly,
some of this new lethal technology has found its way to the West Bank
and Gaza to Hamas terrorist groups who have been assisted by Hizbollah
and by Iran directly. The Associated Press reported on November 28,
1997 that the shelling of the Israeli village of Beit Lif by Hizbollah
yielded shells with inscriptions on them showing that they were made in
Iran. The report claimed that the weapons are flown from Iran to Syria
and trucked from Syria to Hizbollah in Lebanon.
It is clear that Hizbollah receives some of its directives directly
from Iran. Hizbollah continues to alternatively deny this logistical
connection--in order to maintain its integrity among its grassroots
membership--as well as laud its ties to Iran. The relationship between
Iran and Hizbollah has not always followed a surrogacy pattern yet as
the creator, spiritual father, and military guarantor of Hizbollah,
Iran shares responsibility for the proliferation of Hizbollah attacks
and operations throughout the Middle East.
A case where Iran likely dictated the actions of Hizbollah occurred
when the organization attempted to operate within Jordan. According to
the Jordanian newspaper Amman Shihan, the speaker of the Iranian Majles
(Parliament) met with Hizbollah leaders in Damascus, Syria in January
or February 1998 and agreed on a plan to carry out military operations
within Jordan. \10\ Soon after the meeting, a terrorist plot against
Israeli tourists at Petra, a popular tourist attraction in Jordan, was
uncovered involving members of the Lebanese Hizbollah organization.
\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Amman Shihan, April 18, 1998.
\11\ Amman Shihan, April 16, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Arab intelligence reports, up to 11 terrorist training
camps have been operated in Iran during the past year. At these camps,
militant ``volunteers'' and guerrilla regulars from Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan, Gaza, Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia have participated in
operational training and surveillance exercises. Amman Shihan, on
February 14, 1998, reported that five different organizations were
established by Tehran to maintain direct contact with militant agents
abroad, all directly answerable to Khamene'i. According to this report,
the names of the groups are: 1) Islamic Cultural Liaisons; 2) Islamic
Propagation Organization; 3) The Global Group Ahl al Bayt; 4) Office of
Islamic News; and 5) Ministry of Culture and Spiritual Guidance. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Amman Shihan, February 14, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Jordanian daily newspaper Amman Shihan reported on February 14,
1998 that Iran's budget for exporting its Islamic revolution increased
for 1998 by 15%. \13\ This, coupled with the other reports listed,
leads to the conclusion that little, if anything, has changed for Iran
with regard to the export of its revolution under the leadership of
President Khatami.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran's Connection to Radicals in Europe
Historically, Iranian agents have operated across Europe,
eliminating opposition figures, recruiting supporters, and coordinating
the activities of terrorist groups, specifically Hizbollah. For
example, the assassination of former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpur
Bakhtiar in August 1991 in Paris, was carried out by operatives from
Tehran. The Mikonos restaurant murder trial in Germany brought to light
Iran's terrorist operations in Europe, and serves as a good case study.
Four members of an Iranian Kurdish opposition group were gunned
down at the Mikonos restaurant in Berlin, Germany on September 17,
1992. The subsequent trial of the members of the ``hit squad'' who
committed the killing helped unveil the organization of the Iranian
regime's terrorist network, specifically the part pertaining to Europe.
The Berlin court issued its ruling in April 1997. Presiding Judge
Frithjof Kubsch said the order to kill the Kurdish opposition figures
came from the very highest levels of the Iranian government. \14\ He
said the court found the Iranian government had a special committee to
direct assassinations called the ``Committee for Secret Operations,''
whose members included President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Foreign Minister
Ali Akbar Velayati, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, and Intelligence chief Ali
Fallahian. The Judge said the Committee assigned Fallahian the task of
carrying out the murders, and he in turn transferred the matter to
lower level intelligence agents. One of the primary contact agents in
Germany was a man named Darabi, a member of the Pasdaran (Iranian
Revolutionary Guards). Darabi was also a liaison with Hizbollah, and he
used his contacts to recruit Hizbollah operatives for the ``hit
squad.'' Two of the members of the ``hit squad'' received military and
ideological training in Iran. This is how the Iranian government
terrorist network in Europe worked. The German court issued an arrest
warrant for Fallahian, who is no longer intelligence chief, but he has
yet to be apprehended. \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Munich Focus (May 5, 1997) reports that former high-level
Iranian Intelligence agent, Abolghassem Mesbahi, supplied the court
with decisive evidence to support this point.
\15\ The information on the German court's ruling comes from a
transcript of the Mikonos verdict summary, as published in Frankfurt/
Main Frankfurter Rundschau, April 12, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Tehran appears to be pursuing the same ends today, its agents
are not likely to be the primary actors anymore. Iran has been
assiduously setting up a network of Hizbollah and other Islamic
operatives to carry out the work formally performed by Iranian agents.
This network is being financed through Islamic religious groups and
banks. The Iranian diplomatic mission to the United Nations in Geneva
is one of the nerve centers for the European network. Iranian agents
should have little trouble finding new recruits; there are an estimated
600 Hizbollah adherents in Germany alone. \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The alternative Hizbollah network has allowed Iran to extend
the reach of its terrorist activities. This is illustrated by the case
of Steven Smyrek. Smyrek is a German citizen, who converted to Islam,
and was recruited by Hizbollah's European operatives. He trained in
Hizbollah camps in Lebanon, and then returned to Europe. Soon after,
Smyrek boarded a plane for Israel, with the intention of committing a
terrorist attack. Before he could carry out his intended attack,
however, Israeli authorities apprehended him. Smyrek is currently in an
Israeli prison, awaiting trial. German authorities are preparing a case
against him in preparation for an extradition request from Israel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hamas and Iran
Ties between Hamas and Iran have developed significantly since the
end of the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. Despite a clear convergence of
interests in the destruction of the State of Israel and the
establishment of an Islamic State in Palestine, prior to the Gulf War,
ideological-sectarian differences between Hamas, a Sunni organization,
and Iran, a Shi'a Muslim State, had earlier prevented the development
of close ties between the two entities.
The Gulf War and its aftermath witnessed a historical rapprochement
between Iran and Hamas. In June 1990 and February 1991, Hamas
representatives traveled to Iran to discuss the situation in the Gulf
with Iranian officials. \17\ Hamas officials returned to Iran in
December 1990 and October 1991, to attend two conferences hosted by
Iran in support of the armed Palestinian uprising and to sabotage the
US-sponsored peace process. At the October 1991 conference, a fatwa (a
religious edict) was issued that forbade abandoning the obligation of
Jihad for Palestine. \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Filasteen al Muslima, March 1991.
\18\ Hatina, Meir, ``Iran and the Palestine Movement,'' Orient 38,
1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1991, Hamas and Iran agreed to open a Hamas information office
in Tehran, headed by then-Chairman of Hamas' Internal Committee Imad
al-Alami. Iranian financial and material assistance for Hamas, which
has ranged from $20 million to $30 million per year, began shortly
thereafter. \19\ Some intelligence reports maintain that Iran's
contribution constitutes half of Hamas' annual fundraising collection
of $60 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Al Sha'ab, December 28, 1993, Al Sharq al Awsat, October 26,
1997, Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iranian support and ties to Hamas and Islamic Jihad have continued
unabated during the past year. In June 1997, one month after the
election of Iranian President Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Muhammad Khatami,
Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister 'Abbas Maliki stated that Iranian
``support to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) was part of the
responsibility that his country bears toward the Palestinian people.''
\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Jordan Times, June 16, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to western intelligence sources and published reports in
a Persian Gulf newspaper, in early July 1997, Iran dispatched
emissaries to Lebanon to meet with senior Hizbollah, Hamas, and other
Palestinian terrorist groups to actively prepare for a new round of
terrorist attacks against Israel to be instigated from outside the West
Bank and Gaza. The Iranian instructions were clear and unambiguous.
Hamas suicide bombings in Mahane Yehuda and Ben Yehuda killed scores of
Israelis just two months later. This July 1997 contact between Hamas
representative Mustafa al-Liddawi and Iranian backed Hizbollah
surrogate leader Nasrallah was not an isolated incident. The two
organizations train together in Lebanon. \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Al-Watan Al-Arabi, January 2, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last month, in April 1998, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Spiritual Leader of
Hamas, spent six days visiting Iran, as an official guest of the
government, where he met with top Iranian officials and received
political and financial backing to continue the jihad against Israel.
During his visit to Iran from April 28-May 3, 1998, Sheikh Yassin met
with Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi, Deputy Foreign Minister
for Arab and African Affairs Seyyed Mohammad Sadr, Revolution Leader
Ayatollah Khamene'i, Expediency Council Head Hashemi Rafsanjani, and
President Khatami. The trip to Iran was Yassin's fourth country on a
tour of the Middle East. He had just come to Iran from Saudi Arabia,
where he had secured $100 million in donations to Hamas. \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Amman Shihan, May 5, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As with his trip to Saudi Arabia, Yassin's trip to Iran was also in
pursuit of financial and material support. \23\ Iranian leaders
welcomed Yassin, lavished praise on Hamas, and spoke about Iran's
commitment to providing Hamas with assistance. The whirlwind tour of
Iran by Yassin made front page news and received top billing on Iranian
television through the visit. After meeting with Yassin, Ayatollah
Khamene'i stated on Iranian television: ``The Palestinian nation's
jihad is a source of honor for Islam and Muslims . . . God's promises
will undoubtedly come true and the Islamic land of Palestine will some
day witness the annihilation of the usurper Zionist rule and the
establishment of a Zionist government nation . . .'' \24\ The report on
Iranian television concluded with the statement that ``Sheik [sic]
Ahmed Yassin described the next century as the century of Islam,
referring to the certain annihilation of the superpowers, including
America.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ On April 28, 1998 Israel TV in Arabic reported that
Palestinian Authority officials were concerned about Yassin's
fundraising during his visit to States in the Arabian Gulf.
\24\ Tehran IRNA, May 2, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following a separate meeting with Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi,
Yassin vowed to ``continue our struggle until the liberation of
Palestine and freedom from the occupiers' oppression.'' \25\ Kharrazi
endorsed Yassin's call to enlist support in the Arab for the
``liberation of all the occupied lands.'' In its lead editorial, the
semi-official Kayhan International proclaimed Yassin's visit as an
opportunity to ``mobiliz[e] Arab and Islamic powers to overthrow the
Zionist-imperialist alliance which tries to give legitimacy to Zionist
occupation through the so-called peace process.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Tehran IRNA, April 29, 1998.
\26\ Kayhan International, May 2, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hamas and Iran are typically effusive when asked about financial
support arrangements. In an interview with Paris Radio Monte Carlo on
May 2, 1998, Sheikh Yassin was asked about his trip to Tehran and
whether there would be greater coordination between Hamas and Iran.
Yassin asserted, ``The relationship is of course strong and good. Hamas
has a bureau in Tehran. We hope this relationship will continue. There
is material, political, and social assistance for us. We ask our
brothers to use their resources to extend aid to us.'' \27\ When asked
specifically about Iranian financial commitments to Hamas, Yassin
commented that Hamas was .... given favorable promises during our tour
of the Arab and Islamic countries that we visited, particularly Iran.''
\28\ In the same interview, Yassin came to the defense of Iran when
asked about U.S. policy,
\27\ Paris Radio Monte Carlo, May 2, 1998.
\28\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My brother, first of all we wish to state that the U.S. is
the origin of arrogance and tyranny in the world. . . . They
accused Iran of terrorism and accused us of the same. This is
our path . . . We would like our brothers in the Arab and
Islamic world to support our cause and call . . . That is why
we say we will cooperate with our kinfolk and brothers in the
Arab and Islamic world, especially Iran. . . .
In addition to the substantial Iranian financial pledge to Hamas,
the weekly Al Hadaf confirmed that Hamas was also promised technical
assistance, including new explosive devices to assist in suicide
attacks against Israel. \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Al Hadaf, April 30, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Hamas Political Bureau Head Khalid Mish'al, ``We
accept donations from any quarters, be they popular or official,
provided that these donations are donations with no strings attached.''
\30\ Sheikh Yassin has also claimed that Hamas is ``not dependent on
any country, neither Iran nor anyone else.'' \31\ In Palestinian
politics, the charge of being an agent of another country is a brush
used to tar--with varying effectiveness---political opponents. At times
when the PLO has wanted to challenge Hamas, the PLO charged that Hamas
was a surrogate for Iran--although the PLO has also maintained
relations with Iran at the same time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 26, 1997.
\31\ Israel TV, Jerusalem Channel 2, January 24, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to a report in the weekly Al Hadaf on April 30, 1998,
Iranian officials asked Sheikh Yassin and other senior Hamas leaders in
Lebanon to consider moving operational headquarters to Tehran. In the
aftermath of the attempted assassination of Hamas leader Khalid
Misha'l, Iranian officials suggested that the move to Iran would enable
Hamas leaders to evade Israeli attack and to start new military planing
in Tehran without Israeli interference. \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Al Hadaf, April 30, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The joint training of Hamas and Hizbollah is indicative of an
Iranian strategy to continue the export of revolution and to ensure the
continued jihad for the recapture of Palestine and Jerusalem. According
to Consultative Assembly Speaker 'Ali Akbar Natek-Nouri, Iran will
continue to provide material and military support to the factions
confronting Israel--both in and outside of Lebanon. \33\ Toward this
end, it was reported in April 1998, that Natek-Nouri held meetings in
Damascus with leaders of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Amman Shihan, April 18, 1998.
\34\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Although the Islamic Jihad is a militant Sunni movement, it has
flourished with the inspiration and support of Shi'a Iran. According to
Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, Secretary General of the Islamic Jihad
Movement, ``Our ties with Iran date back to the first days of our
movement, just after the Islamic revolution took over in Iran . . .''
\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Beirut Al-Shira', July 28, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shallah, secretary general of the Islamic Jihad since October 1995,
has been a frequent participant at various meetings featuring leaders
of major terrorist groups attended by and often sponsored by Iranian
government officials. At a February 1996 meeting in Damascus, Iran's
First Vice-President, Hassan Habibi met with radical Palestinian
leaders including Shallah at the Iranian Embassy. According to Maher
al-Taher, the spokesman for Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) who was present at the meeting, ``Habibi expressed
Iran's support for all Palestinian strugglers who are continuing their
fight to liberate their lands from the Israeli occupation. '' \36\
Others attending this meeting included PFLP leader, George Habash,
AIlmed Jibril, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the head of the Fatah
uprising, Colonel Abu Mousa. According to al-Taher, ``The Palestinian
leaders praised Iran's position, which is supporting the just causes
and those who are confronting pressures from the U.S..'' ``Both sides
also agreed to boost bilateral cooperation, especially in the coming
period,'' he added. \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Reuters, February 28, 1996.
\37\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June of 1996, Ramadan Abdallah Shallah attended a clandestine
meeting in Tehran where a joint communique' was issued by several
terrorist leaders. The plan was to coordinate terrorist attacks and
activities. It was agreed that the ``al-Quds Army,'' a unit of the
Iranian intelligence service that deals with secret missions worldwide,
would determine which operations were to be approved.
Iran's logistical and spiritual support of the Islamic Jihad is
clear. In early November 1997, Mehdi Rezae'i, the Secretary of Iran's
Expediency Council, memorialized former Islamic Jihad leader Fathi
Shikaki at a special ceremony at Tehran University commemorating the
second anniversary of his death. Also present to pay tribute to the
terrorist leader were Abu-Jihad and Abu Hamdan, the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad representative was the Hamas representative in Tehran. \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Tehran IRNA, November 3, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iranian Links to Sudanese State Supported Terrorism
Iran has a long documented history of involvement with the
terrorist supporting state of Sudan. The relationship between Sudan and
Iran has been characterized by a confluence of interest in terrorism
and the export of Islamic revolution. Iran provides funding, military
advisors, weaponry, and material assistance to Sudan. In return, Iran
receives port privileges at Port Sudan and Suakin. \39\ This
cooperation does not appear to have abated since the election of
Khatami.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iranian technical ``experts'' train Sudanese government soldiers
and operatives at the terrorist training camps in Sudan. \40\ It was
reported as recently as January 1998, that the Iranian government was
sending military advisors and weapons shipments to Sudan. \41\ In
addition to Iranian military advisors in Iran, there have been reports
of Iranian mercenaries in Sudan who ``undertake terrorist activities
with the coordination of the Sudanese government.'' \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Opposition leader Brigadier General 'Abd al Aziz Khalid
Uthman, quoted in Al Akhbar, February 19, 1997.
\41\ EIU Country Profiles, January 5, 1998.
\42\ Eritrean foreign minister, Radio Ethiopia External Service,
Addis Ababa, July 3, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A sensitive intelligence source revealed that Togan Camp, an
Eritrean Islamic Jihad terrorist camp in Eastern Sudan, was overrun by
a democratic militia opposing the Turabi government. \43\ A search of
the camp uncovered files of Farsi-language documents, as well as a
large cache of Iranian-issued weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ The Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is attempting to overthrow
the democratically elected government of Isayas Afewerki. EIJ is allied
with the Islamic Government in Khartoum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Much of the money used by Sudan to train and equip foreign
insurgents is provided by the Pasderan, (Iranian Revolutionary Guard).
\44\ According to an August 1997 report published in the Indigo
Intelligence Newsletter, following the assassination of Hamas terrorist
leader Yehyia Ayyash, Mohammed Daif, a senior Hamas operative in Gaza
fled to Sudan and opened a new branch of Ezzedine al Qassam. The new
branch's operations, including recruitment and operating costs, are
said to come from Iran. \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1, 1997.
\45\ Indigo Publications, Intelligence Newsletter, August 28, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran has built and operates a radio station in Eastern Sudan, which
broadcasts militant Islamic propaganda to several countries in North
Africa. \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terrorist Conference in Iran
One of the Iranian government's mechanisms for coordinating the
activities of terrorist groups is by hosting conferences, which are
attended by a variety of terrorist leaders. In the past, these
conferences took place on a regular basis, and involved high level
Iranian officials and terrorist leaders. The June 1996 conference in
Tehran, for example, which was attended by Ramadan Shallah (Palestinian
Islamic Jihad), was also attended by Ahmad Salah (Egyptian Jihad), Imad
Mugnyeh (Lebanese Hizbollah), Ahmad Jibril (PFLP-GC), Imad al-Alami and
Mustafa al-Liddawi (Hamas), George Habash (PFLP), and a representative
of terrorist financier Osama bin-Ladin. \47\ The election of Muhammad
Khatami has not changed the Iranian regime's policy of hosting such
conferences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Information about this conference comes from ``Rise of
Hizballah International,'' in Defense and Foreign Affairs' Strategic
Policy, August 31, 1996 and Paris Al-Watan Al-Arabi, July 19, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 1997, another terrorist conference was held in Tehran.
Again, representatives from a variety of terrorist groups reportedly
attended. Alimad Jibril, Ramadan Shallah, and Imad Mugnyeh were there,
as was Usamah AbuHamdan (Hamas), Abd-al-Hadi Hammadi (Hizbollah),
representatives of the Egyptian al-Gama'at Islamiya, and a delegate
from branches of Hizbollah in the Persian Gulf. Senior Iranian
officials hosted the meeting. General Mohsen Rezai', former head of the
Revolutionary Guards and currently in charge of reorganizing Iranian
security services, reassured his guests the Islamic Revolution would
never abandon their movements. He reportedly presented a plan for
terrorist actions against the U.S., Turkey, and Israel. The actions
would apparently come in the form of assassinations and attacks on
diplomatic, commercial, and military targets. \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Paris Al-Watan Al-Arabi October 10, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statements
President Khatami speaks with a voice similar to his predecessors
in some ways. Though he issues moderate-sounding thoughts and ideas, he
still toes the hard-line of the clerical elite when it comes to foreign
policy. In a speech broadcast on Iranian television on January 26,
1998, interrupted by shouts of ``Death to America,'' Khatami said: ``We
had and have major enemies, whether before the revolution or after the
revolution: Those who have harmed our interests, our independence, our
freedom, and our greatness. Above all, we have received the greatest
harm from unjust policies of America.'' \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network, January 26,
1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the same speech on January 26, 1998, Khatemi excoriated
Israel. He stated: ``Which factor is stronger than the racist, Zionist
regime in creating tension? The root of tension in the region is the
Zionist regime. And the all-round support for that regime is one of
America's wrong policies. The root of tension is Israel and the cause
of tension is America's wrong policies in supporting that racist,
bullying regime, that focal point of state terrorism.'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his first news conference after his election as President,
Khatami blamed the U.S. for the poor relations between the U.S. and
Iran: ``As long as America formulates its relations with us on the
basis of efforts to harm our independence and national interests, no
relations can be established between the two countries. We are not
prepared to accept bullying and hegemonistic policies, and any change
in our policies toward America will depend on changes in the attitude
and policies of America toward our revolution and country.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Tehran IRNA, May 27, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his February 11, 1998 address commemorating the Anniversary of
the Islamic Revolution, Khatami pandered to anti-American sentiments,
criticizing the U.S. and its presence in the Persian Gulf. Referring to
the U.S., Khatemi stated: ``The foreign presence in the region is the
cause of tension and it means disrespect for the nations of the
region.'' \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Tehran First Program Network, February 11, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During his Friday Sermon on May 8, 1998, Iranian Supreme Leader
Khamene'i testified to the continued Iranian support for
``combatants,'' a euphemism for terrorist organizations. He said ``We
support the Palestinian combatants to achieve their legitimate rights .
. . we are proud of supporting the Palestinian combatants and deem it
as our duty.'' \53\ Later in his sermon, Khamene'i praised Hamas leader
Sheikh Yassin, who had recently completed his visit to Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Tehran IRNA, May 8, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rushdie Fatwa Reconfirmed Under Khatami
Optimistic expectations that the election of a new president would
result in the suspension of the religious death sentence against Salman
Rushdie, the British author of ``Satanic Verses'' have not been
realized. In February 1989, Iranian Revolution leader Ayatollah
Khomeini issued a fatwa, a religious edict, calling for the death of
Rushdie. Khomeini died in the summer of 1989, but the fatwa lives on--
as does Rushdie, who is still in hiding, under the protection of
British Secret Service.
With the election of Khatami, some observers opined that the
Rushdie fatwa might be canceled or repealed. Contrary to these
expectations, since the election of Khatami, Iranian officials have
defiantly affirmed the legitimacy of the fatwa. On February 15, 1998,
during a speech marking the anniversary of Khomeini's death sentence
fatwa, Majles Speaker Ah Akbar Natek-Nouri ``expressed hope that the
death sentence on apostate Salman Rushdie will be executed by Muslim to
teach a lesson to those who oppose God and the divine prophets.'' \54\
In April, Natek-Nouri stated that ``. . . the fatwa or religious edict
should be viewed equally in the context of freedom of expression of
which the west considers itself a champion.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Tehran IRNA, February 15, 1998.
\55\ Tehran IRNA, April 5, 1998
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has also
maintained that Rushdie must die. An IRGC statement issued on February
14, 1998 stressed that the fatwa is ``always enforceable,'' and added:
``The apostate Rushdie must receive the right desert for his shameful
deed of offending the belief and sanctities of more than one billion
Muslims.'' \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Tehran IRNA, February 14, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Rushdie death sentence fatwa has been reconfirmed by the
Iranian Foreign Ministry, as recently as March 2, 1998. During an
official visit, UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson apparently
misrepresented the Iranian position on the Rushdie issue. In a
subsequent clarification to the press, the Deputy Foreign Minister of
Iran reiterated that the Khomeini fatwa against Rushdie was
irrevocable. \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Tehran IRIB Television, March 2, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
It is clear that a comprehensive review of Iranian actions and
activities during the course of President Khatami's tenure has not
diminished in any way the level of support for international terrorism
by Iran. While the level of financial and military support to radical
Islamic groups remains intact, casting doubt about the speculation by
several foreign policy specialists and former officials that have
claimed that Iran has moderated its support of international terrorism,
the Iranian regime today, bent on acquiring nuclear, biological, and
ballistic missile capability is a threat to its neighbors, to the
survival of pro-Western Middle Eastern governments, and to the security
of the U.S. and its allies in the West.
In the end, U.S. policy towards Iran should largely remain intact,
in keeping with the political and economic pressure on the Iranian
regime. To the extent that President Khatami does represent a sincere
change in reversing Iranian radicalism, the U.S. ought to adopt the
approach of incremental reciprocity, i.e., exchanging ad hoc economic
and political incentives for demonstrable changes in the Iranian
regime's support for terrorism. Economic sanctions have caused serious
dislocations to the Iranian economy, breeding massive discontent which
in turn led to the election of President Khatami. Loosening of these
sanctions, at this point, would only result in resolidifying the power
base of the radicals. If Khatami is not sincere, or is merely a
pragmatist seeking to soften Western opposition to investment and
technology transfer, then the policy of loosening containment will end
up reversing Iran's political incentives to change.
I would like to submit for the record a recent article from The
Weekly Standard, by Edward Shirley, a pseudonym for a former senior
U.S. intelligence official. The article pinpoints the issue with
extraordinary clarity and insight, citing two operative items that
succinctly highlight the issues that now confront U.S. policy.
[A copy of the article to which Mr. Emerson referred has been
maintained in the Committee's files.]
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Emerson.
Mr. Murphy, there was a time when you appeared on panel one
instead of panel two, but we are delighted to have you here in
this capacity, and we would welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD W. MURPHY, SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure to be back. No matter what position, your lights start
just as bright as ever.
Let me just comment in passing on this map that you have
been looking at all this time. I think it would be a lot more
meaningful if that map had some dates on it. I am not disputing
the fact of incidents, but I think it is relevant to see how
these incidents have occurred in the timeframe, and in
particular to look at very closely--and I do not have access to
this intelligence, but to press our intelligence sources for
information on who died last year at the hands of Iranian
services and where.
But that said, I have submitted a brief statement for the
record. Let me make even briefer comments. I think the time is
at hand for a reevaluation and possibly some moves by the
United States concerning our relations with Iran for two
reasons, the political developments in Iran over the past year,
and the increasing tensions with some of our closest allies
over the way we are dealing with that country.
That said, there are constraints both in Washington and in
Tehran over how to move in a new direction. Suspicions continue
in both capitals about the other's intentions over what they
are trying to do.
Now, President Khatami set the scope for contacts, no
official exchanges. He has encouraged the cultural educational
representatives to come, journalists to visit. Washington has
been positive in its response, though hoping for official
exchanges.
One of the three main charges we have had against Iran has
been its support for violent opposition to the peace process. I
would draw the subcommittee's attention to two statements of
the past several months, one on Lebanon and one on the peace
process more broadly.
When the Iranian foreign minister said about Hizbollah that
its mission would be over when the Israelis withdrew from
Lebanon scarcely--I mean, quite welcome news, I would think, in
Washington, to have that statement of principle out there, and
that would imply, obviously, a cutoff in Iranian training,
funding, equipping of that militia.
And the second was concerning the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations. If they are able to reach an agreement--and he
did say acceptable to the Palestinians, and obviously there
will not be an agreement unless it is acceptable on both
sides--that would not cause any problem for Iran. They would
accept what the Palestinians accepted.
We have talked and heard a good deal of references to
terrorism. I would like to look at certain other areas where I
think the Congress, working with the administration, should at
least have a look at possible moves by us.
We are caught in the position right now of saying those
words are very nice, but what about some actions. Well, they
are saying just the same thing in Tehran about us. President
Clinton's statement was welcomed, his messages to Tehran over
the radio have been welcomed, but where is the American
actions?
And four actions I would like to suggest, four things to
keep in mind. One is--and it may sound to you as far out, but
to give some thought to an arms control regime for the Persian
Gulf, Iran, Iraq, and the six States of the Gulf Cooperation
Council. Whether we can play a useful lead role, I am not sure,
but I think it will take considerable input on our part to get
it going.
But that area remains dominated by fear, fear on the part
of each State of its neighbor, and part of it certainly is fear
of the weapons of mass destruction. Now, the Iranians have
expressed interest in the past in a nuclear-free zone. Some
Iranians have alluded to having a weapons of mass destruction
free zone in the Gulf. Let us examine how that might be built
upon and see how much substance there is behind those
statements.
The statement today out of Tehran shows a deep concern
about the Indian testing, and I am sure that is related to what
Secretary Cohen referred to just yesterday as the potential
chain reaction should Pakistan follow in Iran's steps. Well,
the Pakistani-Iranian relationship is edgy, and you would see
the chain reaction moving in that direction.
Second, on the pipelines, that question is under very
intense study here and in the executive branch. I would ask
that everyone take a step back and recognizing how negative the
state of mind set here is about Iran--this is not necessarily
forever, but a pipeline is for a good long time in the future,
and once that line is decided, in place, it is going to
determine political and economic relations for a generation.
So unless the companies themselves are pressing for a
decision, unless they have to move because of the nature of
their investments, the timing of their investments, I would
hope that Washington would not move preemptively at this point
in time, closing the door on a possible moving across Iran.
Third, the long-running Hague Tribunal in effect trying to
settle Iranian-American claims against each other has had
considerable success over the years. It ought to be closed down
with a global settlement, and we should be ready again to test
how serious the Iranians are about their interests in a global
settlement.
I understand they represented it at The Hague, at this
tribunal, as hinted that they might be interested in an overall
settlement, a fair package.
And finally, obviously the Iranian situation is of deep
concern to Israel. It is of deep concern, not just to our
Government, and I would urge that we stay in close touch with
Israel, in close touch with AIPAC to explore ways to identify
and build on trends which would be favorable to our interests,
to Israeli interests.
There has been public debate in Israel some months back
about the possible improvement of Iranian-Israeli relations.
AIPAC certainly played a key role in past congressional
consideration of sanctions on Iran and its support for any
change in direction would obviously be desirable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Murphy
The time has come to reshape American policy toward Iran. For
nearly two decades, the difficulties we have had with that country have
left a bitter legacy for American leaders and the American public.
However, Iranian domestic political developments over the past year and
increasing tensions with some of our closest allies over how to treat
that country make a US policy reevaluation imperative.
Since President Mohammed Khatemi's election last May, the
atmosphere for each side to consider a US-Iranian dialogue has
improved. The start up of this dialogue will take some time given the
inhibitions prevailing in both capitals. As Washington considers a new
relationship, it should recognize the depth of its ignorance about
present day Iran which was always noted for the complexity of its
politics and government structures. The 19 years since the revolution
have surely created no less complex a scene today. We are less equipped
to understand its domestic politics than when we had a major embassy in
Tehran.
I recommend that Washington consider sponsorship of an arms control
regime initially to include Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council
states; defer decisions on the issue of routing gas and/or oil
pipelines from the Caspian states; and be prepared with a proposal for
a global settlement of the outstanding claims at the Hague Tribunal.
These thoughts are developed in the second half of this paper.
Since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, our Iran and Iraq
policies have been tightly linked. During the Iran-Iraq war we
gradually tilted towards Iraq. Since 1993, Washington has followed the
so-called ``Dual Containment'' policy. This linkage has reinforced our
tendency to think about both Iran and Iraq primarily in military terms,
as threats to US interests in the Gulf region and beyond. The ``Dual
Containment'' formula has served to stifle debate in Washington about
alternative ways of dealing with these two countries.
Presidential executive orders restricted and ultimately banned US-
Iranian trade and investment. Those orders in conjunction with the Iran
Libya Sanctions act of 1996, in which the Administration acquiesced
under congressional pressure, will constrain any initiatives which the
Administration might want to take to chart a new course. Similarly in
Tehran, President Khatemi, who has declared his respect for Western
achievements and the necessity for Iran to learn from them, is not free
to authorize an official dialogue with the US. Instead he has proposed
a period of increased cultural and educational exchanges. Washington
has agreed and in response will simplify its visa procedures for
Iranian applicants and encourage Americans to visit Iran in such
exchanges. It has also reaffirmed its long held position that it is
ready to deal with an authorized Iranian government representative to
discuss our respective charges.
President Khatemi presumably expects that a period of unofficial
exchanges will make it easier for Tehran one day to engage in official
meetings. He may share the views of more junior Iranian officials who
have spoken of the embarrassment suffered by some Iranian officials who
had backed the signing in 995 of an oil exploration agreement with
CONOCO when Washington forced that company to cancel it. Prominent
American officials have reinforced Iranian suspicions that basically we
still want to overthrow the Islamic Republic regime. Despite an
apparently cordial encounter earlier this year between Speaker Gingrich
and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Iranians are quick to recall the
Speaker's earlier call for an appropriation to undermine the regime. A
further example of what Tehran sees as an effort to destabilize it came
earlier this month in the congressional call for creation of a ``Radio
Free Iran.'' The annual State Department report on terrorism again this
year repeats harsh language about Iran some of which reads as out of
date. However, the investigation into the al-Khobar towers bombing
remains open and evidence of Iranian government complicity could
prejudice improvement of relations.
The Iranian revolution has lost some of its original steam but the
present leadership includes clerics who resent our dominant world
position, who see American culture as hostile to what they want for
Iran and who deeply oppose America's military presence in the Gulf.
Despite the encouraging substance and tone of the new President's
statements we know that he is not the sole decision maker and must
assume, for example, that he does not control all of Iran's several
intelligence services. These services owe their allegiance to various
clerics many of whose attitudes towards the West in general and the US
in particular are not as benign as those which Khatemi professes. They
could take initiatives which could complicate improvement in our
bilateral relations This is not said to minimize the significance of
Khatemi's views or of his electoral victory last May when he won 70% of
the popular vote in a campaign most assumed had been rigged in favor of
another candidate.
Despite their evident concerns that Washington has not moved to
amend its policy towards Tehran, Iranian leaders have continued to send
out positive political signals concerning issues of deep interest to
Washington. Foreign Minister Karrazi's recent comments related to the
Arab-Israeli peace process are intriguing. First was his comment about
Israel's stated readiness to withdraw from south Lebanon in accordance
with UNSC 425. Karrazi said this withdrawal would effectively end the
mission of the Hizbollah militia. Second, and equally welcome, was his
comment that Iran would not oppose a Palestinian-Israeli agreement
acceptable to the Palestinians.
Proposals for US Actions
Regional Arms Control. Arms control steps such as hot lines,
transparency of exercises and discussions of mutual needs and force
structures could prove useful. Arms control talks never resolved basic
political issues or averted security competition between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union but they did help moderate and stabilize
confrontations on the margin.
On the assumption that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will
continue to be studied and perhaps developed in the Persian Gulf and
broader Middle East, I propose American promotion of a regional arms
regime for the Persian Gulf states, i.e. Iran, Iraq and the six states
of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Including Iran and Iraq would be a
goal for which, I believe, we would find support in Moscow and Europe
and one which China would not oppose.
Fear of one's neighbor prevails throughout the Gulf region and many
predictably, if privately, will justify their intent to develop weapons
of mass destruction in the name of assuring their national security. As
for Iran, some of its senior diplomats have suggested that they would
welcome discussions about the Gulf as a nuclear free zone. Currently
there are severe economic pressures on both Iraq and Iran as a result
of the devastating wars they have endured and the depressed prices for
their oil. Such pressures conceivably could increase their readiness to
discuss taking some initial steps in an arms control process.
The Iraq situation has sensitized us as to how cheap it is to make
chemical and germ warfare agents and how easy it is to hide them.
Nevertheless, we may discover that the Gulf situation contains some of
the same problems with which we once wrestled in negotiating arms
control with the Soviet Union and may present some similar
opportunities.
We appear to be more concerned about WMD in the Middle East than
many of the regional countries themselves are. Regional leaders seem to
doubt the massive destructive power of these weapons. Those leaders who
are friendly to Washington assume that if weapons of mass destruction
are all that important then the US will somehow manage to resolve the
issue. To reassure them and to get the Gulf region as a whole thinking
about a regional dialogue with each other on any kind of arms control
regime will require a US lead. If successful it could greatly benefit
American interests in the Gulf region and in the broader Middle East.
Pipelines. If the international oil companies working in Central
Asia do not need to start construction of new pipeline routes
immediately, the US Government should not lock the door prematurely
against the prospect of a new pipeline transiting Iran. The routing of
new pipelines will have profound political and economic implications
for years to come. Today, some in the Administration and Congress
fiercely resist any easing of US sanctions on Iran. Depending on how
the US-Iranian dialogue develops, these elements may be more ready to
rethink their positions in the coming months and years.
Hague Tribunal. Prepare proposals for a global settlement of the
remaining Iranian and American claims before the Hague Tribunal. I
understand the Iranian representative to the Tribunal has already
informally floated the idea of moving to a general settlement.
Israel. Consult closely with Israel and with the influential
lobbying group the American Israel Public Affairs Committee about how
to encourage trends in Iran which are supportive of US and Israeli
interests. Some in Israel have publicly debated whether Israeli policy
towards Iran might need changing. For its part, AIPAC was an important
player during Congressional consideration of the sanctions legislation.
Its support for any redirection of America's Iran policies will be
highly desirable.
Senator Robb. Thank you very much, Mr. Murphy. That is a
very thoughtful and--not provocative in the usual sense, but at
least thought-provoking list of matters to consider in this
particular venue.
I was attempting to take a number of notes here as we
proceeded, and I had specific questions. Let me work back, if I
may.
Mr. Murphy, you mentioned this map and suggested that we
try to get some sense of dates that were associated with the
numbers that were killed, or specific terrorist activities that
were carried out. Implicit in that comment, at least to me, was
that we may be looking at some very old actions or grudges. If
I am not interpreting that correctly, then please----
Mr. Murphy. No, just so. It does not mean their support
for terrorism is over and done with, by no means.
Senator Robb. But in terms of active promotion of terrorist
activities in each of these countries you are suggesting that
we ought to consider whether or not they have done anything
recently, or whether they appear to be continuing that type of
activity?
Mr. Murphy. Right, and can you graph out the intensity of
the incidents since 1979?
Senator Robb. Would you respond to that, because that is
your particular field of expertise, Mr. Emerson, and you
painted a pretty active picture. Are there areas that might be
included in this map or another map that certainly could
include a number of additional countries in which some type of
terrorist activity is known to have taken place, certainly in
open sources.
Mr. Emerson. Well, I think it is not a bad idea to have
more details, but I would say that, for example, if you look at
the Iranian terrorist activity in Argentina, Iran is believed
to be behind, and Hizbollah behind the 1992 bombing of the
Israeli embassy, as well as the Omni Center, and there is a
Hizbollah presence in the Triborder area.
However, there has not been any noticeable terrorist
activity by Iran in Buenos Aires since the bombing, and so the
question would become, should that be considered sort of on the
chart?
I would say with the right statement, yes, because Iran
continues to deny any responsibility as well as to harbor an
intelligence network that can be activated in any of the places
that are listed on this map, and you could have certainly added
Canada and the United States.
There was a recent case in Canada where Canadian court
documents revealed that Hizbollah members under the direction
of Iran were taking surveillance video of potential targets in
Canada. Now, that was back in 1991, 1992, and 1993. The
question is, is it happening today?
I have no open source information on that. However, based
on the pattern of how Iran operates, and the use of front
groups that periodically report to Iran and that can be
activated, it is fair to assume that, even if they have not
been active in the violent sense in the last 2 years in one
country, that violent intrusion can be felt within a matter of
hours if Iran so desired.
And so I would say that yes, I would like to see--I think
it would be helpful to have dates attached to the last violent
activity, but that does not account for the existence of the
infrastructure that can be activated at any moment, and that
continues to be in existence at this very time in most of those
countries.
Senator Robb. How about the question of the statement made,
if the mission in effect that Hizbollah was pursuing because of
Israeli occupation, putting it in the context of the Hizbollah,
if that were removed, there would be no need for Hizbollah and
its activities. Do you believe that that ought to be given
particular weight?
Mr. Emerson. It should be given a certain amount of
weight, but in the context of looking at everything else, there
also is a continuous flow of weapons, of very advanced weapons
by Iran to Hizbollah, including weapons now that really are, if
used against the United States in the Persian Gulf, would cause
a lot more casualties than we have seen.
So actions speak louder than words. I know that even
Khatami has questioned the value of the Hizbollah role in terms
of the long-range military confrontation with Israel. On the
other hand, he has also talked about the need to firmly implant
Iran's influence in Lebanon permanently by infusing more money
into social welfare groups and the political process, so he is
essentially thinking about transforming Iranian influence.
Now, whether that becomes a hot spot of continued Iranian
revolutionary activity remains to be seen, even with the issue
of the Middle East peace process.
There have been some welcome statements relative to others.
On the other hand, the statements that were just issued in the
past month and a half in conjunction with Ahmed's visit were
very discouraging. They promised additional weapons. They
promised additional funds. They talked about liberating all of
Palestine, and their notion of a satisfactory solution to the
Palestinian conflict is something that is really much more
attuned to the ideology of Hamas than it is to the PLO.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Excuse me, Senator Robb, can I jump in
here?
Senator Robb. Please.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Just on the issue of Foreign Minister
Harazi's statement about Lebanon and the map, I have here the
quote of his statement about Lebanon.
Now, on the on hand I would say it is important to say that
in the past Iranian officials would have welcomed an Israeli
withdrawal as a first step on the road to the liberation of
Jerusalem, so against that historical context the statement is
relatively moderate, but it is perhaps a welcome small change
over the past statements.
On the other hand, if you could read the statement in a way
which was--he said if Israel to withdraw, quote, ``the aims of
the resistance would have been achieved in reality.'' That is
simply a statement of fact, and it does not judge the issue of
whether Hizbollah would continue operations.
So it is positive in a historical context, but the way it
could be read, it is just simply a statement of, well, yeah,
they would have achieved their goal. It does not say what would
happen after that.
The other point I would like to make has to do with regard
to the map. The other thing I would point out, in addition to
the statements made by my colleagues, is that it does not
portray intensity of effort.
Now, my understanding--I do not focus on Central Asia very
much, but my understanding in talking to people who do is,
their impression is that Iran's level or intensity of activity
in terms of efforts to proselytize and exploit the revolution
in Central Asia is much lower than in other areas such as
Turkey in recent years, and among the Palestinians.
Anyhow, so I think it is important to look at the map in
that light.
There is another--I think there is a deeper truth which is
also portrayed by the map. I know this is a map which attempts
to show Iran's exports of terrorism and fundamentalism. The
important thing, though, is that Iran is not colored in this.
I think that shows a deeper truth, that we have seen in
recent years that the revolution in Iran is a spent force, and
the fact is that I heard recently from an Iranian academician
who went to Turkey, who said he was surprised to find that he
felt that Turkey was a more Islamic society than Iran was
today, meaning that the majority of Iranians are fed up with
having religion forced on them.
The Islamic Revolution has alienated the majority of the
Iranian people from Islam, and this affects Iran's ability to
serve as a model for Islamic movements elsewhere.
As a result, I think in the eighties our concerns, and
early nineties our concerns about Iran's ability to export the
revolution are much greater than they should be today. I think
their terrorism, their ability to engage in terrorism worldwide
still exists. They do maintain infrastructures that they could
activate.
We know they are stalking our people in various different
places and, in fact, the Rev Guard Commander Safavi in October
of last year, I think, said that if Iran was attacked they
would respond on a worldwide basis, and I think they have the
ability to do so, so I think that certainly still is an area of
concern for us.
Senator Robb. Let me ask you a question. You raised in your
opening comments about communication, and you separated into
three groups the Iranian Government, the Iranian people, and
the Gulf Arabs and Europeans as three different groups that we
have to consider separately as we consider what we say and what
others say in terms of what we say and what we do.
Tell me how we communicate effectively with the Iranian
people if we are not--the Government-to-Government
communications, while they have been broadly encouraged on our
side, they have not been welcomed by anybody else, probably
under pressure from the Ayatollah still, but in any event, that
level of communications is not currently open.
They are not going to open up in quite the same way that
CNN did, and do not have quite the same for Hatami's interview
here, and he clearly was using that to target the broader U.S.
audience, did not seem to followup in other comments that he
made that were not targeted in quite that way.
But in what way can the U.S. Government, or representatives
of the U.S. Government, or those who espouse the essential
philosophy that we are tying to suggest in terms of a non-
Islamic as opposed--and I do not mean in the religious sense,
but a secular pluralistic approach in terms of Governments, and
some sense of what our democratic principles stand for, how can
we communicate if we do not have any lines of communication,
and the Government will not permit Government-to-Government, or
permit us to communicate directly?
Mr. Eisenstadt. Actually, I think there are a number of
routes that we have available. For instance, the Farsi Service,
the Persian Service of the Voice of America, is one very
effective means, and there is also a TV Voice of America, TV
service, if I understand.
In addition, we know that there is proliferation of
satellite stations in the region which carry American programs,
and we know that there are many Iranians who have satellite
dishes. There is also the Internet.
And finally there is an Iranian-American community of 1 to
2 million strong, depending on who you talk to, who are in
contact with their relatives back home.
Senator Robb. I am aware of all of those. Indeed, we are
doing them all now.
But you are not talking about some new medium of exchange,
though, that would reach the people, other than the links that
are already there, some of which the Government really cannot
control. North Korea is probably the only country which can
truly control what their people hear, and even they are having
difficulty.
Mr. Eisenstadt. I guess what I was saying is less devoted
to the medium rather than the message. I was saying we need to
present a different image and different demeanor in dealing
with the initiatives of the Government.
Senator Robb. Increased awareness or consciousness on the
part of U.S. Government representatives that their message
might be misinterpreted by the Iranian people even though it is
delivered----
Mr. Eisenstadt [continuing]. to the Government, or it could
be spun by the Government in a way which undercuts our standing
in the eyes of the Iranian people and, again, that is our most
precious asset, and it is a source of leverage over the
Government there.
And there was an article by Robin Wright in the L.A. Times
a few days ago which discussed how Iranian officials are
disappointed by the lack of American response to their
initiatives and the like.
I think it was a tendentious listing on their part. I think
we have been more forthcoming than was given by them in that
article, but it raised in my mind the possibility that we could
be losing out, we could be losing the war for the hearts and
minds of the Iranian people which right now we have won.
And it is very important in considering our actions toward
the Iranian Government that we be aware of how what we do is
perceived, mainly by the Iranian people, and then also by our
Arab allies and the Europeans as well, but it is mainly the
Iranian people, because they are the engine for change in Iran
today.
Senator Robb. Let me ask a question that any of the three
of you could respond to, if you will. In my dealings with all
of the surrounding countries and those in the region almost
without exception, they are certainly willing to give Khatami a
honeymoon period, or whatever, in terms of developing a new
relationship.
How about the Iranian people, the two-thirds or so that
preferred him notwithstanding the Ayatollah's desires in that
particular election. How soon does he have to deliver? Is there
a timeframe that he loses credibility, and whatever possible
momentum for change?
Anybody want to take a shot at that? In other words, does
Khatami have to deliver to the people that elected him, and if
so, how soon, and what criteria might be used by the people to
evaluate whether or not this is the kind of departure we want
to make from what we have?
Mr. Emerson. If I can just point out, to a certain extent
he has already delivered, to the point that there has been an
introduction into Iranian society which is intellectual and
very independent of new publications, of new television
programming, of books, of previously banned foreign
periodicals.
In other words, he has really opened the free market
approach. He is introducing the free market approach in terms
of intellectual ideas, so there is more of a pluralism and
debate going on, so to a certain extent that has reinforced and
solidified his popular appeal.
One of the questions I guess you are getting at is, are
there other incentives, or other things that would help
solidify his base, or is this not going to be sufficient if the
economic dislocations caused by the sanctions, or whatever,
continue to undermine the Iranian people's belief that their
Government is representing them.
The U.S. has got a major dilemma here, because to a certain
extent we have to definitely encourage whatever trends are
there. On the other hand, we do not want to jump the gun
prematurely here, and it might end up in the long run that Iran
is willing to only go so far and that is it, and that its
revolutionary Islamic identity will not change.
Do we wipe the slate clean on the terrorists who have
carried out attacks on Americans who are now living freely in
Tehran, for which there have been some sealed indictments? I
mean, are we prepared to do that? Is the Iranian Government
prepared to extradite them? I doubt that, and that is an issue
that is going to be very, very sore, if it ever comes down to
even that level of discussion.
I mean, another level of discussion, of course, relates to
what the Ambassador referred to in terms of the dispute over
assets. I do not know whether a general settlement is possible,
but a discussion is worthwhile here, but in the end I think we
have to make sure that we pace ourselves, that yes, there
should be incremental approaches here, but they are going to
have to deliver.
If we save the regime, save Khatami, or resolidify him,
there really needs to be a quid pro quo in practice.
Senator Robb. Is Khatami in a position to establish a
dialog? At this point he cannot, but will there come a time
when he could accept the U.S. offer of a Government-to-
Government dialog?
Mr. Murphy. I think there is no question the time will
come. He did not feel it was possible when we restated our
readiness to meet with an authorized representative. He is not
in sole control, and so cannot make much more statement than
that.
But how soon does he need to deliver, and what does he need
to deliver? It is jobs. The economic situation is not good, and
the economic situation is probably not--its deterioration is
not to be credited to American sanctions.
I mean, there is mismanagement, there is problems and,
above all, for this past several months, and unfortunately for
the foreseeable future, there is stagnant oil prices, and with
an economy that is so heavily dependent on its oil production
and exports, he had a tough job to fulfill some of the hopes
that were placed in his election a year ago this month.
Senator Robb. But does he have to, in effect, to get
additional jobs, or whatever the case may be, bring about
through some actions that he would take, or at least that would
happen on his watch, that would cause the sanctions to be
lifted, which would be the likelihood of, I assume, the biggest
creation of jobs that could occur? Is that ultimately the quid
pro quo for his success and continued popularity?
Mr. Murphy. I think it would be a major, major element in
his success as president, but if we lift the sanctions, and I
do not sense any great tearing urgency in the Congress or the
administration----
Senator Robb. No. That is what I was wondering, if the goal
is realistic, or is it something--is he going to end up being
in effect sort of a Gorbachev, that puts a kinder face but
really does not have any major effect?
Mr. Murphy. Well, he could be a transitory figure between
the early days of the revolution and what lies ahead, but he
had made some statements which I think are encouraging from the
standpoint of American interest, and I hope we can find a way
to move ourselves--and I do not think we have moved in any
significant way yet, so when I hear this concern that we are
going to overturn the apple cart and totally change our course,
that is the least of the dangers.
But the oil prices, that is not our control. He would do
better economically if American sanctions did not exist and,
perhaps more importantly, if Americans were not discouraging
the World Bank and the IMF from investments in that country. I
mean, we do have a major influence there.
Senator Robb. They tend to go hand-in-hand.
Well, let me just ask one more question. Unfortunately,
there is a vote on, so we are being constrained by forces of at
least two different directions, and we are going to have to
close down here in just a minute.
Your suggestion of an arms control council with Iran, Iraq,
and the GCC States, has anything like that been tried within
that group, and in terms of arms control, would you anticipate
Iran and Iraq each negotiating arms control agreements
separately with the GCC States, because they have an existing
framework to negotiate in one body, although they have trouble
getting closure on a lot of matters as well.
But is this something that you bring it in in a sort of
United Nations fashion? I am just trying to flesh out in my own
mind, because it is an intriguing concept and clearly security
questions about neighbors permeates all of their thinking.
I agree with your premise.
Mr. Murphy. This is just a concept. At this point it needs
a lot of study, a lot of fleshing out. There are some pegs out
there, such as the Iranian statements on interest in a nuclear
or weapons of mass destruction free zone.
How serious? We are not going to know until they are
probed. I mean, you are in the odd situation where they deny
they have any nuclear program. Iraq says they disposed of all
of their weapons of mass destruction in the running gun battle
with the UNSCOM on that issue.
But with depressed oil prices, and the fact that you do not
have, as far as I am aware, any weapons of mass destruction in
the GCC States, there may be some common ground here. Anyway,
we are going to be carrying out some discussions within my own
organization at the council.
Senator Robb. Gentlemen, I apologize again. The chairman
had to go over and be on the floor to argue an amendment.
Unfortunately we all have to go to the floor at this point to
vote.
I am not sure but it is entirely possible there may be more
than one. I am not sure that he will get back, and I think all
three of you have had a chance to at least present your oral
testimony. We have your full statements in the record. We will
rely on those.
It is entirely possible that any member of the committee
may wish to followup with you in some written communication if
they may, but because of the constraints of the floor vote and
not wanting to have you wait unnecessarily for some additional
questions, I think we will go ahead and bring this hearing to a
close.
On behalf of the chairman, may I thank you for your
willingness to come and share your thoughts with us today. I
think that they were obviously timely.
We will have a decision here in the next couple of days
that will at least reverberate with some of the testimony that
we have heard, and we thank you for your participation.
With that, the hearing comes to a close.
[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]