[Senate Hearing 105-587]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-587
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
of the
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
__________
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
51-954 cc WASHINGTON : 1998
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman
J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice Chairman
JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio BOB GRAHAM, Florida
JON KYL, Arizona JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma MAX BAUCUS, Montana
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DAN COATS, Indiana
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Ex Officio
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
------
Taylor W. Lawrence, Staff Director
Christopher C. Straub, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held in Washington DC:
Wednesday, January 28, 1998.................................. 1
Statement of:
Allard, Hon. Wayne, a U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado 11
Baucus, Hon. Max, a U.S. Senator from the State of Montana... 10
Bryant, Robert, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.............................................. 26
DeWine, Hon. Mike, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio..... 88
Freeh, Hon. Louis J., Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.............................................. 27
Glenn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio...... 80
Hughes, Patrick M., Lieutenant General, USA, Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency................................ 70
Inhofe, Hon. James M., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Oklahoma................................................... 8
Kerrey, Hon. J. Robert, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Nebraska................................................... 5
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Indiana.................................................... 9
Oakley, Hon. Phyllis E., Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, Department of State............. 45
Robb, Hon. Charles S., a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth
of Virginia................................................ 96
Roberts, Hon. Pat, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas... 91
Shelby Hon. Richard C., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Alabama.................................................... 1
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director of Central Intelligence...... 12
Testimony of:
Bryant, Robert, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.............................................. 86
Hughes, Patrick M., Lieutenant General, USA, Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency................................ 70
Oakley, Hon. Phyllis E., Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, Department of State............. 43
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director of Central Intelligence...... 19
Supplemental materials, letters, articles, etc.:
Questions for the record, dated March 12, 1998, submitted to
the Hon. George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence. 105
Questions for the record, dated March 12, 1998, submitted to
the Hon. Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.............................................. 111
Questions for the record, dated March 12, 1998, submitted to
Lt. General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency........................................ 113
Questions for the record, dated March 12, 1998, submitted to
the Hon. Phyllis E. Oakley, Assistant Secretary of State
for Intelligence and Research, Department of State......... 118
Letter of transmittal, dated June 9, 1998, responses to
questions for the record from the U.S. Department of
Justice.................................................... 154
Letter of transmittal, dated June 12, 1998, responses to
questions for the record from Defense Intelligence Agency.. 167
Letter of transmittal, dated June 15, 1998, responses to
questions for the record from U.S. Department of State..... 122
Letter of transmittal, dated July 24, 1998, responses to
questions for the record from Central Intelligence Agency.. 133
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37
o'clock a.m., in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the
Honorable Richard Shelby Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Shelby, Lugar, DeWine, Inhofe, Roberts,
Allard, Kerrey of Nebraska, Glenn, Baucus and Robb.
Also Present: Taylor Lawrence, Staff Director; Chris
Straub, Minority Staff Director; Dan Gallington, General
Counsel; Don Mitchell, Professional Staff; and Kathleen McGhee,
Chief Clerk.
Chairman Shelby. The Committee will come to order.
Last year marked the 50th anniversary of the enactment of
the National Security Act, the legislation that created the
Central Intelligence Agency and established the national
defense and intelligence structure for the Cold War era.
This year, we approach an equally significant anniversary--
November 1999 will mark the tenth anniversary of the fall of
the Berlin Wall, the beginning of the end of the Cold War, and
the beginning of the post-Cold War era.
Today, it is fitting that the Committee meet publicly, at
the beginning of a new session of Congress, to hear the
Intelligence Community's views regarding the nature and extent
of the changing national security threats to the U.S.
The identification and analysis of these threats are
crucial to defining and conducting our nation's foreign policy.
Our intelligence on these threats provides the basis for our
defense strategy and planning, informs our budget and
procurement choices, and supports our military forces when they
go into action.
To be useful, intelligence must be timely and, of course,
accurate.
Equally important, the Intelligence Community must ``call
it as it sees it''--reporting the facts to policymakers without
bias, even if the intelligence findings do not support a
particular policy or decision.
Every day, U.S. policymakers and military forces rely on
Intelligence Community reporting. By its very nature, most of
this information must be classified to protect the sources and
methods from which it is derived.
Today we meet in open session so that, at a time of waning
interest in international affairs, the American people may
learn about the very real threats that we face in the post-Cold
War era.
We look forward to hearing from Director Tenet and other
witnesses on the broad range of threats to U.S. national
security.
Many of the issues we will discuss bear directly on
critical policy choices facing the administration and the
Congress today and in the near future, and raise a number of
complex questions. For example:
Once again, Iraq is refusing to allow UN inspectors full
access to its weapons programs.
How strong is Saddam Hussein within his own country that he
can defy the international community?
Is he, in fact, better off than he was before he instigated
the current crisis over weapons inspections? What is the status
of the Iraqi weapons programs? How quickly could these programs
be expanded or revived if sanctions were removed?
Is it true, as has been suggested in the press, that Iraq
tested biological and/or chemical weapons on human beings?
Will Saddam Hussein ever comply with the UN resolutions?
And on the other side of the Shatt al Arab, we have Iran.
Many of us saw Iranian President Khatami's recent television
interview. What do his remarks then and subsequently--and the
response of his hardline opponents--mean for US-Iranian
relations?
Most critically, has the Intelligence Community seen any
reduction in Iranian support for international terrorism, or
slackening in Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,
since the election?
How soon will Iran deploy new ballistic missiles capable of
threatening Israel and other U.S. allies?
Iran of course is only one of more than a dozen or so
countries which possess or are developing ballistic missile
systems, and one of over two dozen nations that are developing
weapons of mass destruction.
I am extremely concerned of the potential that such weapons
will be used, or that someone somewhere will plausibly threaten
to use such weapons, against the United States, our troops, our
allies or our interests in the not too distant future.
After all, it has already happened--the single greatest
loss of life by American forces in the Persian Gulf War came
when an Iraqi SCUD crashed into a barracks in Saudi Arabia.
How does the Intelligence Community assess the global
ballistic missile threat to the United States--the greatest
single threat to our national security?
The Committee is looking forward to reviewing in the very
near future the updated National Intelligence Estimate on this
subject, but we hope the witnesses will provide us with a
preview today.
The 1995 National Intelligence Estimate of ballistic
missile threats to North America was the subject of extensive,
and in my view largely justified, criticism.
What steps have been taken in the current intelligence
estimative process to address those criticisms? In particular,
I would be interested to hear how Iran's faster-than-expected
progress in its missile program comports with the assumptions
underlying both the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate and the
planned update?
And of particular concern to this Committee is the status
of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs. How does the
Community view the unfolding political, military and economic
developments in North Korea?
On another front, I would like to commend the Intelligence
Community for its support for the arrest of suspected war
criminal in Bosnia last week.
Although that matter did not receive the attention that I
believe its deserved, I know that your efforts were critical to
the success of that operation.
But tough questions remain: What are the prospects for a
meaningful peace in Bosnia? When, if ever, will conditions
there permit the withdrawal of US forces? What is the potential
for a terrorist attack on US troops deployed in Bosnia and the
region?
On the terrorism front, I am pleased to note that the past
year has yielded some significant successes, including the
rendition and conviction of Mir Aimal Kasi, who killed two CIA
employees outside CIA headquarters in 1993, and the recent
sentencing of Ramzi Yousef for his role in the World Trade
Center bombings and his plot to blow up U.S. airliners.
However, numerous other terrorist threats remain--in
Bosnia, in the Middle East, and around the world.
These include both traditional state-sponsored terrorist
groups, and other more independent actors such as Usama Bin-
Laden. Furthermore, the murderers of 19 U.S. servicemen in the
Khobar Towers bombing have yet to be brought to justice. I hope
Director Tenet and Deputy Director Bryant today will provide us
a status report on that investigation, including the
cooperation of the Saudi government, and any indications of
whether the government of Iran should be held responsible.
Turning now to one of our most significant foreign policy
and intelligence challenges of the 21st century: that is,
China.
I look forward to hearing the Community's assessment of the
status of China's proliferation of nuclear, missile, chemical,
biological and advanced conventional weapons technologies to
Iran, Pakistan, and other countries.
But today, we will also want to hear how China's extensive
military modernization is complicating our ability to carry out
military missions in support of key US interest in the region,
as well as the extent and purpose of China's nuclear force
modernization.
Nearly a decade after the end of the Cold War, the United
States continues to face a serious counterintelligence threat.
We look forward to hearing from Deputy Director Bryant on the
extent and the sources of this threat.
In particular, we hope the FBI will be able to share with
the American public its findings to date with respect to
allegations that the Chinese government has attempted to
illegally influence the American political process.
We are also interested in the recent revelation that a
former US government physicist passed classified information to
the Chinese government, and in other Chinese government
intelligence activities aimed at the United States.
While China poses new challenges for the U.S., Russia still
remains the only nation with the power to destroy the United
States with intercontinental ballistic missiles. The security
of Russia'snuclear arsenal, and the integrity of Russia's
nuclear command and control systems, are of vital importance.
So too are Russian sales of missiles and other technologies
of mass destruction to Iran and elsewhere. We look forward
today to hearing your assessments of the nature and extent of
these programs.
In addition to the traditional threats of a massive nuclear
attack, terrorism, espionage, and the proliferation of advanced
weaponry, we face new threats to our critical information
infrastructure from hostile states, terrorism groups, and
organized crime.
Recall the enormous disruption to the northeastern United
States and Canada caused by recent power outages. These
disruptions were caused by an ice storm.
Imagine if a computer operator in Tehran or Pyongyang could
create the same havoc and confusion--or worse--with a few
keystrokes.
We look forward to hearing the Intelligence Community's
current assessment of these threats.
US businesses today also face an unprecedented level of
industrial and economic espionage.
A recent report cited in the Los Angeles Times estimated
that U.S. businesses lost $300 billion worth of information in
1997 alone.
We look forward to hearing from Deputy Director Bryant on
the extent of this threat--the countries involved, their
methods, and what US technologies are most at risk.
I have spent enough time outlining my concerns and raising
questions regarding threats to the United States--it is time to
hear from the real experts--our witnesses.
Without objection, our four witnesses will submit their
written testimony for the record. Director Tenet will begin by
giving his statement.
After Director Tenet's opening statement, he will be
joined, as I think he already is, at the witness table by: FBI
Deputy Director Bob Bryant, Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research Phyllis Oakley, and Lt. General
Patrick Hughes, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
These witnesses will provide their perspectives on the
current and projected threats to US national security.
They have all submitted written testimony to the Committee,
although not necessarily in a timely fashion, and so they will
be asked to give brief summaries of their written testimony.
We will then open the session to 5 minutes of questions
from each Member of the Committee, based on the order in which
Members have entered the hearing room.
At 2:30 p.m. this afternoon in the Committee's hearing
room, SH-219, the Committee will meet in a closed session to
discuss classified matters related to threats posed to the
national security of the United States.
Director Tenet, Deputy Director Bryant, Assistant Secretary
Oakley, and General Hughes--I want to thank you all for
appearing before us today.
Today's hearings mark the frst time that the FBI has been
asked to participate in our annual threat hearings, and
representMrs. Oakley's first appearance before our Committee in
her new capacity. We look forward to hearing your perspectives on these
important issues.
Senator Kerrey.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would first just ask that my full statement be included
in the record.
Chairman Shelby. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kerrey follows:]
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Open Hearing on World Wide
Threats
Thank you, Mister Chairman. The Committee is starting out on the
right foot with this very important hearing. I join you in greeting our
witnesses, and in giving a special welcome to Secretary Oakley in her
first appearance before the Committee in her new position. Secretary
Oakley was born in Omaha, Nebraska, so her success was a foregone
conclusion. This is also the first appearance of the FBI at this annual
hearing, and I welcome Deputy Director Bryant.
In measuring threats, we must resist the politician's natural
tendency to follow the CNN curve, the pull of the international crisis
of a particular moment. We must take the long view and prioritize the
threats in terms of the life of our nation, the lives of our citizens,
and the livelihoods of our citizens. We should also make this
assessment in full awareness that Americans don't feel very much
threatened today, at least not from external sources. The threats are
more subtle now but they must still be identified and watched and
deterred. The cycles of history or our short-term preoccupation with
other matters do not absolve us of this duty.
If preserving our life as a nation is the first priority, then
Russia's nuclear weapons are still the first threat. The U.S. Strategic
Command continues to deter the use of those weapons and our
intelligence could have no more important topic. Nine years after the
fall of the Berlin Wall I am disappointed we have not done more to
reduce this threat further. The Russians have not done enough, either.
Action is overdue. The Russian Duma should ratify START 2 promptly, and
then we should discuss de-alerting the weapons of both sides together.
Beyond deterring the other side's nuclear forces, these weapons have no
purpose. But as long as they exist, we'll need all the intelligence on
them we can get.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons--and also chemical and
biological weapons--is a growing concern. When proliferation links up
with terrorism, we could face a high-order threat. Regional conflicts
such as the Yugoslav war of the early 90's or the chronic instability
of the Persian Gulf represent threats in the sense that the U.S.
military could be in combat there at any moment. The foreign threats
affecting the greatest number of Americans are probably the illegal
drugs and accompanying crime coming from south of the border. Our
interest in the stability and prosperity of a democratic Mexico, a
Mexico which can stop the drugs and crime before they get here, has
never been greater. This is about keeping Americans safe.
Two events of 1997, the Asian economic crisis and the Kyoto summit
on global warming, represent trends which are not traditional threats
but which can certainly affect the livelihoods of Americans. I look
forward to our witnesses' views on how much effort the intelligence
community should devote to these topics.
I want to highlight some of my concerns about intelligence as we
start this session of Congress. First, we must act this year to reverse
a fifty year trend and reduce government secrecy, including
intelligence secrecy. It is not only a question of saving the cost of
creating and keeping these millions of secrets. My goal is for the
American people to understand how necessary your work is and how well
you and our intelligence professionals do it. I want to counter the
presumption that everything you do is somehow sinister. It can't happen
unless we tell the people more. Also, we can't keep the secrets we must
keep unless we get the classification system under control and throw
the excess, unnecessary secrets overboard. The Committee has scheduled
a hearing on the Moynihan-Helms secrecy legislation, and I look forward
to it.
The opposite of secrecy is openness, and I want to see the
government and the public benefit from greater openness. All Americans,
not just policymakers and military commanders, need information about
our world to make decisions. I would like to see much more declassified
information, including images, available to the public.
The Intelligence Community should also be getting more of its
information from open, unclassified sources. In addition, a new set of
sources, the American commercial imagery industry, will soon have
products available to respond to many of the demands of intelligence
customers. I hope you will make use of them.
I also challenge you to find more intelligence technologies with
applications to benefit citizens. NIMA made a great start with image
interpretation technology which could also help doctors detect breast
cancer. But there is much more to be done and I urge you to redouble
your efforts.
We have not forgotten the whistleblower legislation which was
dropped in conference with the House last year. In fact, the Committee
will have a hearing on it next week. This legislation is about the
right of Congress to know, the right of government employees to come to
Congress with evidence of wrongdoing, and ability of both branches of
government to keep necessary secrets from leaking. We will pass it this
year.
After our questions about the threats have been asked and answered
today, I ask each of you to carry back to your agencies our
appreciation for what your people do. They are striving in anonymity to
keep our country safe, to keep policymakers informed, to give our
warfighters the edge, and some of your people take significant risks.
The overwhelming majority of them do this work in full accordance with
American law and American values. If there were less unnecessary
secrecy, more Americans would know that. Thank you, Mister Chairman.
Vice Chairman Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I would say this as well
to the public, that one of the questions that very often is
asked is why, and the Chairman alluded to it--why do we have an
open hearing on threat assessment. And I believe it is
important to do so in order to engage the American people in a
discussion, in a debate about what the threats are to this
country and to hear especially from the Executive branch
policymakers, how they prioritize the threats to the people of
the United States of America.
America, as a consequence of our leadership position of the
world, sometimes gets called upon to do things that we perhaps
would prefer not to do. Leaders always do get called upon to do
things that they perhaps would prefer to fall to somebody else.
We're an open society. We take sides in international
conflicts. We're involved extensively in trade. Nearly a third
of all the new jobs created in America today are created as a
consequence of sales abroad. So there are lots of reasons for
the United States of America to be engaged with the world, and
lots of reasons, as a consequence, for us to be at risk. We're
a target for very many reasons.
And as I see it, your work has two parts--one, and most
importantly, to provide accurate intelligence to the
policymakers, particularly to the Commander in Chief, so that
their decisions are good and so that their decisions enable
them to prevent a conflict. The best war we ever fight is the
one we avoid as a consequence of getting there ahead of time
and with diplomacy preventing it from happening; or to deter,
as a consequence of believing that somebody is not going to be
able to be persuaded; or to organize a military effort; or to
increasingly get to the bottom of some situation such as Khobar
Towers, where we have been under attack and we then have to
find out who it was that has done something against the United
States of America.
So good intelligence can reduce cost and increase the
likelihood of success.
I had the pleasure of working with General Hughes prior to
him taking over at DIA and the organization of the takeover
authority of Bosnia. And unfortunately, all Americans didn't
have an opportunity to see the value of intelligence in making
that operation a success.
Back in the Ice Age, when I was in the Vietnam War--and
General Hughes probably has similar experiences--there were
many things that we probably could have got done if we had
similar kind of intelligence. Our war fighters are much better
prepared, much more able to get the job done, much more likely
to be successful.
There are things that America can do today. I know, with
pride, the President's been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
I suspect that he, like I, would say that an awful lot of the
success of that operation was due to the fact that we were able
to get our war fighters good intelligence, enabling us to say,
here's what you have done, here's what you haven't done, and as
a consequence, get the warring parties to abide by the Dayton
Peace Agreement.
The most difficult thing for us to do is to prioritize the
threats, however. It's very easy to get sort of drug around in
this town in the current following the latest story, the latest
news event, especially in the last week. We've all been in this
black hole of conspiracy theories.
And it is very important for you to come to us and orient
us to the most important threats. And as I see them, as the
Chairman said, there's only one threat that can still take
every single citizen of the United States of America to their
grave, and that's a nuclear weapon.
And, I, for one, would have preferred the President to have
talked about that last night in the State of the Union. It's
been eight years since the Soviet Union fell apart. It's been
seven years since August of 1991, when the coup was
unsuccessful inside of Russia.
We still don't have the Duma ratifying START II. I don't
hear a vision of where we're going to go with nuclear weapons.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons are clearly a major
problem for us. And retargeting would be very easy for the
Russians to do. It seems to me that if you look at the threat
that can still take every single American down and the cost of
maintaining and the difficulty of maintaining with the nuclear
test ban in place, it seems to me that that ought to be top of
the list, and we ought to be trying to figure out what it is,
what's our strategy, what's our plan of attack to reduce that
threat to the people of America.
As I said, proliferation of all things--all matters--I was
pleased with the President's very strong statement last night
about Iraq. He went right to camera, right to Saddam Hussein,
right to the people of Iraq, saying that we're not going to
give you the capacity to use weapons of mass destruction again.
We're going to prevent that from happening. However, we all
know that until this dictatorship is gone, it's not likely that
we're going to feel safe and secure. It's likely you're going
to see a repeat of this kind of behavior in the future.
I'm pleased, Mr. Bryant, to have you here for the first
time. As I look at the radar screen of threats to us,
increasingly they're non-rational threats. You can't negotiate
with terrorists that aren't sent out by their government.
Certainly, we still have nations that are funding terrorism
throughout the world. But increasingly, we find, whether it's
the kind of thing that the chairman is alluding to with
information warfare or other kinds of terrorist activity,
especially those associated with the movement of drugs into the
United States of America, these are not being run by
governments. They make corrupt governments, and they make
governments less stable, and they may create problems for us in
lots of ways. But these are non-rational threats and much more
difficult to deal with, as a consequence.
And I hope as well in your testimony, Mr. Bryant, Mr.
Tenet, that you'll talk to us a little bit about your plans to
resolve the conflicts over this encryption legislation. It is
tied up in Avogadro's number of committees up here that have
some sort of jurisdiction. Everybody has got a point of view on
it. Almost none of us understand the technology. It is a very
important issue from the standpoint of the U.S. economy, from
the standpoint of U.S. values, of openness and personal
freedom.
But I'm also very much aware that if we want to make the
American people continue to feel safe, you and NSA and others
that have the responsibility of accumulating intelligence have
to be able to somehow deal not just with a complexity of
signals, but increasingly encrypted signals that are impossible
for us to break.
Next, I would say this committee intends to hold a hearing
on the legislation that has been introduced by Senator Helms
and Senator Moynihan on secrecy. Not only are the American
people our customers from the standpoint of making them safer;
they're our customers from the standpoint of informing them.
This is government of, by, for the people; if they suspect
we're withholding information, as we did for a short time, with
the National Reconnaissance Office building just to protect our
own mistakes, it's likely that they will suspect us, and it's
likely, as a consequence, they're not going to give us the
support that we need to keep those secrets that are essential
for the security of this country.
So we've got to make certain that this classification
system is done in a fashion that protects national security, in
order to protect the safety and security of the American
people, and not just there as a consequence of our desire to
have the American people not see how occasionally we can make
mistakes and be stupid and do things wrong.
The American people cannot make good decisions unless they
are informed. As I said at the beginning, if the United States
of America is going to lead, our people have to make good
decisions. And increasingly, they are having to make decisions
with open-source information. And I believe that though it's
very tricky ground, I think that the creation of NIMA gives us
the opportunity to use images in an open fashion to help the
American people make better decisions.
And I hope, Mr. Tenet, that we're able to over the course
of the next couple of years get the American people to
understand that they are our customers--their safety, their
security and their capacity to make good decisions.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this open hearing, and I look
forward to the testimony.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
I think I caught everything that Senator Kerrey said. And
everything I can remember, I do agree with. This hearing is
taking placeat the same time--at 10:00 o'clock we're having a
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on essentially the same thing.
And I have no choice, I have to be there.
But I was a little distressed last night in the hour and 20
minutes, we never did hear anything about what's happened to
our ability to defend ourselves, the nature of the threat
that's out there. And I think that's far more critical than
anything else that I heard last night.
Mr. Chairman, when you talked about the problems in Iraq
and when are we going to--are we going to see any cooperation
from Saddam Hussein, or when are we going to, I don't think we
are. I think our head is in the sand if we think that we're
going to get cooperation that he's going to do anything that he
doesn't have to do.
And as far as Iran is concerned, we do know there is--that
Iran does have weapons of mass destruction. There's a
communication and a transfer in trading of technology and
systems between both China and Iran and Russia and Iran. And I
really want to pursue this.
Senator Kerrey said, when he talked about the fact that we
are a target--and I agree with that--but he also asked the
question about having this as an open meeting. I think it's
very, very important to have this out in the open so that the
people of this country can get over this euphoric idea that the
Cold War is over and there's not a threat out there. There's a
huge threat out there and a threat that we're going to have to
face.
I see some good things happening. I was very pleased when
Secretary Cohen came out and now is talking about over 25
nations with weapons of mass destruction--biological, chemical
and nuclear--and the fact that we don't have a nuclear--a
defense system, a missile defense system. He also talked about
VX gas, that Saddam Hussein has enough to kill every man, woman
and child on the face of this earth in 60 minutes. That's huge.
That's very significant.
Unfortunately, I won't be able to stay for this meeting,
but I will be there at 2:30 and want to pursue this. I have
such a high degree of confidence in Director Tenet that I'm
very glad that at this very treacherous moment in our history,
that he is at the helm of our intelligence community.
I would, finally, say that I think that having open
meetings like this are helping a lot. Prior to the recent sex
scandals, virtually every national weekly publication has come
out with articles talking about the threat that we're facing
and our inadequate defense system.
So, I will be here at 2:30 and look forward to the closed
session.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling the
hearing in such a timely way, and I join you and Senator Kerry
in welcoming the witnesses.
I would just underline, again, a theme that was picked up
by you and Senator Kerry and Senator Inhofe. You alluded, Mr.
chairman, to the thought that there appears to be a waning
interest in foreign and security affairs. That is clearly not
true of this Committee or of the panel that we have before us
or those who have joined us in this hearing in the audience.
I would have appreciated, as all now have pointed out, if
the President had outlined--at least as the most crucial set of
facts facing our country--our security and our military
position. I think that really is essential, and we are working
with the cooperative threat reduction situation in Russia with
the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program in this country right now in a
quiet way, city-by-city, to prepare our citizens for what might
be a terrifying threat--biological or chemical weapons conveyed
by means other than missiles, by human beings, to those
communities.
The most dire threats right now to Americans, they come in
unconventional forms, and the Intelligence Community that is
represented here today is our major bulwark, because
information, uncovering, revelation of this, prompt activity,
coordination with state and local authorities, may make a very
large difference in the saving of American lives in a way that
we do not often think about as we think about more dramatic
foreign adventures.
So we look forward to this as a very, very important step
in commencing our Committee's work this year. And I thank you
again, Mr. Chairman, for your diligence in making certain we
are on the job--literally the morning after the State of the
Union.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Baucus.
Senator Baucus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and particularly our witnesses.
It is important that we establish this precedent of having as
our first hearing a threat assessment. I think it's a good way
to start the year, and again I compliment you and the Vice
Chairman for beginning the year this way.
As we look at threats, though, I think it's important--as
has been indicated by other Senators--that the definition of
threat has various meanings. It's changed and evolved over the
years. We no longer concern ourselves only with traditional
military threats as we did, say, during the Cold War. Rather
we're now concerned, in addition, with more subtle threats.
They may not be as dangerous as that presented by the Soviet
Union--certainly the threats during the Cold War--but we must
deal with them very clearly.
Let me give an example. Last month, I visited the
Philippines, Brunei, Thailand and Indonesia to investigate the
financial crisis that's affecting that region. Now this may
seem remote to some people, but it's not. In the last 100
years, we fought seven foreign wars, and five, in part or in
whole, were in Asia. But due to the political stability created
by growth and prosperity in Asia, along with our military
presence in the region, none of them happened in the last 20
years. But a prolonged period of high unemployment, high
inflation and recession could turn the clock back with very
serious implications for us.
At present, we also see very different responses to the
crisis in different Asian countries. One interesting point is
that democracies seem to be proving more capable of addressing
the crisis than authoritarian countries.
A second point is our failure to predict that economic
troubles in Thailand could, within days, cause an Asian-wide
financial crisis that's also affecting not only America but the
rest of the world.
Now this is not a swipe at the Intelligence community,
because neither the Congress, banks or Asian governments
themselves did any better. They did not anticipate this or take
measures to correct it. But I wonder what we can learn and how
we can do better in the future?
And I also hope to hear our witnesses' views on other
questions. What is the outlook in Asia? What are the short and
long-term implications of this crisis for the United States?
And how well are the respective governments poised to respond
to the challenges that they face?
Finally, by focusing on the economic questions, I do not
want to imply that the military threats have disappeared. They
have not. As my colleagues have mentioned, the threat of
nuclear weapons remains. We have American soldiers keeping the
peace in many part of the world. Other American military units
are watching the bad actors like Saddam Hussein.
Intelligence plays a crucial role in protecting them from
the unexpected and preparing them to act decisively when we
must. I am sure our witnesses will cover these issues in
detail, and I look forward to their testimony during this
hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Like other Members of this Committee, I'd like to thank you
for the hearing. I think it is appropriate that we do have
public hearings from time to time to remind the American public
that we still have some very dangerous spots in this world and
by no means is it--could we consider it a safe world.
Information plays a vital point in how we shape public
policy and many of the decisions that we have made in this
Committee as well as the Administration has to make.
So I am looking forward to this hearing. I think the
gathering of information certainly has to occur with the
cooperation of both domestic as well as foreign agencies. So
I'm glad to see you put together this panel for us this morning
so we can hear their perspective.
I think we also have to realize that what is happening in
the world of intelligence is many--corresponds in many regards
as what is happening in just the regular business world out
there as far as high technology and as far as drugs are
concerned. And I think the drugs in many cases become an
international currency, and I think our keeping track of what
happens with the--in the international markets, as far as
illegal drugs are concerned, leads to many other discoveries.
And so not only does it help from a domestic standpoint in
trying to control the use of illegal drugs, but I think it
gives us a better feel of what is happening in the
international area.
So I'm going to keep my remarks brief, Mr. Chairman. I'm
looking forward--because I want to hear what the panel has to
say. And I'd like to associate myself with your remarks and
those of my colleague from Oklahoma. I do believe that we live
in a dangerous world, and we need to work hard to stay on top
of it, and we shouldn't take anything for granted, and just
because we have no major powers out there other than ourselves,
I think. But we do have a lot of hot spots, and they can create
a lot of instability in the international environment.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we'll listen to the panel.
Chairman Shelby. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
holding these hearings, and I'll waive my opening statement.
Chairman Shelby. Director Tenet, before your testimony
begins, I have one brief administrative comment to make just
for the record. During the first session of Congress, I was
disappointed, and others on the Committee, in the performance
of the Intelligence Community in the timeliness of their
responses to questions for the record propounded by Members of
the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Of the 31 sets of questions submitted to you and others
over at the CIA, our hearings last session, 74 percent of the
responses were received late with an average tardiness of over
24 days. And there are at least four sets of questions from
hearings back in September and October that are still
outstanding. That's a long time. In addition, the community
does not seem--the Intelligence Community--to be respectful of
rule 8.5 of the Committee that requires witnesses to submit a
copy of their written testimony at least 72 hours in advance of
their appearance before the Committee.
For example, we received your testimony, Director Tenet,
for today's hearing only 16 hours ago. And General Hughes'
final testimony was not received until just a few moments ago.
Director Tenet, as a former staff director for this Committee,
I'm sure you may have even written the rule. I'm sure you're
well aware of the need to provide this Committee with timely
information so that the staff can adequately prepare the
members for hearings such as this.
I hope that you and the other leaders in the Intelligence
Community will work with the Committee to improve this in the
second session of Congress, and I believe you will.
Director Tenet. Mr. Chairman, you're right. We'll do
better.
Chairman Shelby. Okay.
Director Tenet, you may proceed, as you wish.
[The prepared statement of Director Tenet follows:]
Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address the
Committee again this year on the worldwide threats to our national
security. I have submitted a detailed Statement for the Record and
would like to summarize its key points in my opening remarks.
Before plunging into the details, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to step
back for a moment and put the threats to our security into a broader
strategic context. Scholars and pundits, as you know, are still
struggling to capture the essence of this post-Cold War world we live
in, but no one, in my view, has quite put their finger on the things
that make it uniquely challenging for US interests. From the
perspective of an intelligence officer, Mr. Chairman, I think it comes
down to three words: complexity, scope, and speed.
Let me explain what I mean.
I say complexity because, as my testimony will make clear, the
dangers facing the United States today--ranging from chemical warfare
to terrorism, regional crises, and societal turmoil--are linked in
unprecedented ways and frequently span multiple countries or
continents. Dealing with them therefore requires multiple intelligence
disciplines, along with the combined tools of diplomacy, law
enforcement, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD), internationalterrorism, drug trafficking, information warfare
and, most recently, the fallout from the Asian financial crisis.
Second, Mr. Chairman, the stakes remain high for the United States
in countries like China and Russia as they struggle through
unprecedented political and economic transformations.
Third, are the challenges facing us from countries that continue in
the post-Cold War era to view the United States with varying degrees of
hostility or suspicion--Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Sudan, and in a more
complicated way this year, Iran.
Fourth, we are challenged still by regional trouble spots that
could flare into conflict, whether in the Middle East, South Asia, the
Aegean, or Bosnia.
Fifth, we must continue to be alert to humanitarian emergencies--
caused by natural disasters, ethnic conflict, and foreign government
mismanagement--that emerge rapidly and place heavy demands on U.S.
military and financial resources.
challenge i: transnational issues
Mr. Chairman, in today's world few events occur in isolation, and
national boundaries are much less reliable shields against danger.
Emblematic of this new era is an assortment of transnational issues
that hold grave threats for the United States. That is where I would
like to begin today.
Proliferation.--I am most concerned, Mr. Chairman, about the
proliferation of WMD because of the direct threat this poses to the
lives of Americans. Despite some successes for U.S. policy and U.S.
intelligence, technologies related to this threat continue to be
available, and potentially hostile states are still developing and
deploying WMD-related systems.
Efforts to halt proliferation continue to be complicated, moreover,
by the fact that most WMD programs are based on technologies and
materials that have civil as well as military applications.
Finally, a growing trend towards indigenous production of WMD-
related equipment has decreased the effectiveness of sanctions and
other national and multinational tools designed to
counterproliferation.
Chinese and Russian assistance to proliferant countries requires
particular attention, despite signs of progress.
My statement for the record provides the details but some key
points should be made here. With regard to China, its defense
industries are under increasing pressure to become profit making
organizations--an imperative that can put them at odds with U.S.
interests. Conventional arm sales have lagged in recent years,
encouraging Chinese defense industries to look to WMD technology-
related sales, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, in order to recoup.
There is no question that China has contributed to WMD advances in
these countries.
On the positive side, there have recently been some signs of
improvement in China's proliferation posture. China recently enacted
its first comprehensive laws governing nuclear technology exports. It
also appears to have tightened down on its most worrisome nuclear
transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt sales of anti-
ship cruise missiles to Iran.
But China's relations with some proliferant countries are long-
standing and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is still out on whether the
recent changes are broad enough in scope and whether they will hold
over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in this area will
require continued close watching.
The Russian proliferation story is similar. On paper, Russia's
export controls specifically regulate the transfer of missile-related
technologies as well as missile components. But the system has not
worked well, and proliferant countries have taken advantage of its
shortcomings. Iran is one of those countries. When I testified here a
year ago, Mr. Chairman, I said that Iran, which had received extensive
missile assistance from North Korea, would probably have medium-range
missiles capable of hitting Saudi Arabia and Israel in less than ten
years.
Since I testified, Iran's success in gaining technology and
materials from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous
Iranian advances, means that it could have a medium range missile much
sooner than I assessed last year.
Following intense engagement with the United States, Russian
officials have taken some positive steps. Just last week Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin issued a broad decree prohibiting Russian companies from
exporting items that would be used for developing WMD or their delivery
systems--whether or not these items are on Russia's export control
list. If it is enforced, this could be an important step in keeping
Iran from getting the technology it needs to build missiles with much
longer ranges.
Without minimizing the importance of Russia's response, Mr.
Chairman, I must tell you that it is too soon to close the books on
this matter. Russian action is what matters, and therefore monitoring
Russian proliferation behavior will have to be a very high priority for
some time to come.
Mr. Chairman, in focusing on China and Russia, we should not lose
sight of other proliferators. North Korea is the most notable here, as
it continues to export missile components and materials to countries of
proliferation concern. Likewise, Mr. Chairman, in focusing on Iran's
acquisition of WMD technology--as we should since it is one of the most
active countries seeking such materials--we cannot lose sight of other
proliferants. Iraq retains the technological expertise to quickly
resurrect its WMD program if UN inspections were ended. Syria continues
to seek missile-related equipment and materials. Despite the UN
embargo, Libya continues to aggressively seek ballistic missile-related
equipment and materials. Despite the UN embargo, Libya continues to
aggressively seek ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, and
technology.
Asian Economic Instability.--Moving on to a very different
transnational challenge, Mr. Chairman, the recent financial troubles in
Asia remind us that global markets are so interconnected--and that
economics and politics are so intertwined--that economic problems in
one country can have far reaching consequences for others.
At the root of this crisis is a confluence of economic, social, and
political factors.
Soaring growth and financial systems that lacked adequate
regulation led to a speculative boom.
Lending decisions by banks and finance companies ignored
fundamental economic risks and when export growth began to slow
regionally in 1995, corporate borrowers had trouble repaying loans.
Faced with high levels of short term debt and limited foreign exchange
reserves, Thailand first and then Indonesia and South Korea were forced
to devalue their currencies. Because of the high level of economic
integration and reaction of investors, the currency crisis spread
rapidly to other countries in the region.
The crisis has been difficult to resolve, in part because
governments must take some politically risky steps like closing weak
banks and shelving projects that will add to unemployment
The current troubles in Asia will, of course, have economic costs
for the United States--most important, a reduction in US exports to the
region. But the troubles also carry political risks. Social tensions
which we already see in Indonesia and other states in the region, are
likely to increase as prices go up for things like food and fuel, and
as unemployment rises.
International Terrorism.--Turning now to terrorism Mr. Chairman, I
must stress that the threat to US interests and citizens worldwide
remains high. Even though the number of international terrorist
incidents in 1997 was about the same as 1996, US citizens and
facilities suffered more than 30 percent of the total number of
terrorist attacks--up from 25 percent last year.
Moreover, there has been a trend toward increasing lethality of
attacks, especially against civilian targets. The most recent examples,
of course, are the suicide bombings in Israel in 1996 and 1997 and the
attacks on tourists in Luxor, Egypt last November. Perhaps most
worrisome, we have seen in the last year growing indications of
terrorist interest in acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons.
In addition, a confluence of recent developments increases the risk
that individuals or groups will attack US interests. Terrorist passions
have probably been inflamed by events ranging from the US Government's
designation of 30 terrorist groups to the conviction and sentencing of
Mir Aimal Kasi and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef as well as the ongoing US
standoff with Iraq and frustration with the Middle East peace process.
Among specific countries, Iran remains a major concern, despite the
election of a more moderate president. Since President Khatami assumed
office in August, Iran has continued to engage in activities, such as
support for Hezballah and its Palestinian clients, that would not
require his specific approval. Iraq, Sudan, and Libya also bear
continued watching, both for their own activities and for their support
of terrorist organizations.
International Narcotics.--Turning to the international narcotics
threat, I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, that the illicit drug industry
is adapting to the counterdrug successes that we and other governments
have had in recent years. Most worrisome, the narcotics underworld is
becoming more diverse and fragmented. In addition, traffickers are
infusing their business with new technologies to enhance their
operations, hide their illicit earnings, and improve their security.
Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to downplay the impressive progress
that has been made against drug traffickers, especially those that deal
in cocaine.
You know of the arrest of the Cali kingpins in Colombia--which has
disrupted long-held smuggling patterns there and forced traffickers
still at large into hiding.
Drug interdiction efforts in Peru, once the world's leading
producer of the leaf used to make cocaine, have seriously damaged that
country's drug economy and led to a 40-percent decline in cultivation
over the last two years.
The cocaine trade, however, is still a formidable challenge--thanks
to the industry's ability to adapt.
Our success against the Cali kingpins has nurtured smaller groups
that now dominate trafficking through the Caribbean.
Violent Mexican drug cartels are exploiting the Cali mafia's
setbacks to wrestle away a greater share of the international drug
business.
Despite declines in Peru and Bolivia, coca production continues to
expand in southern Colombia--where the new ingredient is the
involvement of insurgents who tax drug profits to fund their war
against the state.
I'm also concerned, Mr. Chairman, about developments in
international heroin trafficking.
Worldwide production of opium--the source of all refined heroin--
continues at record levels.
And heroin traffickers are exploiting weak enforcement institutions
in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to expand traditional
heroin smuggling routes from the Golden Crescent and, to a lesser
extent, the Golden Triangle regions.
International Organized Crime.--As for international organized
crime, the globalization of business and technology have given crime
syndicates unprecedented opportunities for illicit activities. Yet law
enforcement authorities often remain constrained by national
sovereignty and jurisdictions. Trends that cause us the greatest
concern are:
An increasingly sophisticated financial system that includes
emerging financial secrecy havens, stretching from islands in the
Caribbean to the South Pacific.
A broader array of seemingly legitimate businesses that serve as
fronts for criminal enterprise.
The increasing role of gray arms brokers in arming rogue states,
terrorists, and criminal groups. The activities of arms brokers make it
even more difficult to judge when such actions are supported by
governments and when they are not.
Information Warfare.--As you know, Mr. Chairman, all of this is
occurring in what we all call the ``Information Age.'' With that in
mind, it is clear that foreign entities are aware that an increasing
proportion of our civil and military activity depends on the secure and
uninterrupted flow of digital information.
In fact, we have identified several countries that have government-
sponsored information warfare programs underway. It's clear that those
developing these programs recognize the value of attacking a country's
computer systems--both on the battlefield and in the civilian arena. In
addition, I believe terrorist groups and other non-state actors will
increasingly view information systems in the United States as a target.
Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that we are increasing our efforts
to uncover information warfare activities. We are also developing the
tools needed to improve our ability to detect and counter information
warfare attacks.
This is an enormously complex, sensitive, and innovative endeavor,
Mr. Chairman, that will require insights from law enforcement and the
private sector in order to fully succeed.
challenge ii: russia and china in transition
Moving beyond these transnational issues, Mr. Chairman. I want to
focus for a moment on a second major challenge: the still unsettled
state of affairs in key countries like Russia and China--one time Cold
War adversaries who now have the potential to be major partners.
Russia
Today we see hopeful signs that the seeds of democracy and a free
market economy sown in Russia just a few years ago have taken root.
Moreover, Moscow cooperates with the United States and the West in ways
that were unimaginable during Soviet times.
But whether Russia succeeds as a stable democracy, reverts to the
autocratic and expansionist impulses of its past, or degenerates into
instability remains an open question. The answer will depend in large
part on how Russia copes with several major challenges.
Democratic political institutions while developing, are not yet
deeply rooted. The executive branch and Communist-dominated Duma often
deadlock, while crime and corruption threaten to undermine confidence
in political and economic reform.
Russia has implemented many economic reforms and achieved a measure
of economic stability, but long-term steady growth is still dependent
on other reforms--namely ensuring that economic activities are governed
by the rule of law.
The Russian military, meanwhile, continues to suffer from serious
social and economic difficulties. Finding the wherewithal to pay the
retirement costs of over 250,000 redundant military officers will be a
particular challenge. Despite these difficult times for the military,
Russia retains a major nuclear arsenal--some 6,000 deployed strategic
warheads. As long as there is even the slightest doubt about future
political stability in Russia, those weapons must be a major
preoccupation for US intelligence.
We must also remain mindful that Russia continues a wide-range of
development programs for conventional and strategic forces.
Finally, while Russia continues to seek close cooperation with the
United States on matters of mutual concern, it is increasingly strident
in opposing what it sees as US efforts to create a ``unipolar'' world.
And Moscow continues to place a high priority on keeping others from
gaining undue influence in the New Independent--especially in the
energy rich Caucasus and Central Asia.
China
Turning now to China, the leadership there was a clear goal: the
transformation of their country into East Asia's major power and a
leading world economy on a par with the United States by the middle of
the 21st Century.
It is too soon to say what this portends, Mr. Chairman--whether
China in the future will be an aggressive or a benign power. What is
clear, though, is that China will be an increasingly influential
player--one what will have the capacity to, at a minimum, alter our
security calculus in the Far East.
Hong Kong's 1997 reversion to Chinese rule was peaceful but
involved important changes to the political system. The Chinese
Government disbanded the existing legislative council and installed a
hand-picked provisional legislature. A key question now is whether new
legislative elections scheduled for May will be free and fair.
Cross-strait relations with Taiwan are still tense, China has not
renounced the use of force and is placing its best new military
equipment opposite Taiwan.
Chinese military modernization remains a key leadership goal. China
is increasing the size and survivability of its retaliatory nuclear
missile force is taking important steps toward building a modern navy
capable of fighting beyond China's coastal waters.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the post-Deng Xiaoping leadership shows no
signs of abandoning Communist political ideology, although it has
committed itself to market-oriented economic reforms. These are eroding
State control over major sectors of the economy as well as over the
daily life of many Chinese citizens.
challenge iii: regional troublemakers
Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to states for whom the end
of the Cold War did not mean an end to hostility to the United States.
Iran
Among these countries, Iran in many respects represents the
greatest challenge we will face over the next year. It appears to us
that a genuine struggle is now underway between hardline conservatives
and more moderate elements represented by Iran's new President Khatami.
And so the challenge is how to cope with a still dangerous state in
which some positive changes may be taking place--changes that could,
and I stress could--lead to a less confrontational stance toward the
United States.
Khatami's strongest card is his electoral mandate--a 70 percent
vote representing mostly youth and women, as well as ethnic and
religious minorities in Iran. Since assuming office in August, he has
made limited but real progress toward fulfilling his campaign pledges
for political and social reforms.
He gained approval for a new cabinet that puts his people in key
posts such as the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Islamic
Culture.
Censorship is now less oppressive, with previously banned
periodicals reappearing and socially controversial films being shown.
And against this backdrop, there is even renewed debate about a
central tenet of the revolution--rule by a supreme religious leader.
Progress is likely to be fitful, however, and hard-line elements
remain formidable obstacles.
They still control the country's defense and security
organizations, for example, and therefore exert heavy influence on
issues most vital to the United States.
Statements by Khatami and his foreign ministry suggest he is trying
to play a more constructive role in the international community. It is
simply too early to tell, however, whether this will lead to
demonstrable changes in Iranian policies that matter most to the United
States. We have seen no reduction in Iran's efforts to support
Hizballah, radical Palestinians, and militant Islamic groups that
engage in terrorism.
Moreover, even as it attempts to improve its international image,
Tehran is continuing to bolster its military capabilities. Iran is
improving its ability potentially to interdict the flow of oil through
the Strait of Hormuz. It has acquired KILO-class submarines from Russia
and is upgrading its antiship-missile capabilities.
And, as I noted earlier, Iran continues its efforts to acquire the
capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea
Turning to North Korea, we also face a more complex challenge than
last year--some progress but in the face of a worsening economic and
social situation and a continued real military threat.
The North is still observing the terms of the Agreed Framework that
directly relate to freezing its nuclear reactor program. The IAEA has
maintained a continued presence at Yongbyon since the May 1994
refueling of the reactor, and P'yongyang and the IAEA continue to
discuss steps the North needs to take to come into full compliance with
its safeguards commitments.
Amidst these signs of progress, however, a combination of economic
stagnation and social decay continues to raise doubts about North
Korean stability.
North Korea's spreading economic failure is eroding the stability
of the regime of Kim Chong-il. Industrial and agricultural output
continues to drop. The North's most recent fall grain harvest was far
less than the 4.5 million tons the North needs to meet even minimal
rations. Crime, corruption and indiscipline, including in the security
services and military, are increasing, and people are more willing to
blame Kim Chong-il for their plight.
While Kim reportedly is aware of the economic problems and their
impact on soldiers and civilians, his legitimacy remains closely tied
to his father's legacy. As a result, P'yongyang likely will avoid an
avowedly reformist agenda and will try to package any reform
experiments in traditional ideological terms. As such, significant
improvements in the economy do not seem to be in the cards.
Its economic weaknesses notwithstanding, North Korea retains a
military with the capability to inflict serious damage on South Korea
and the 37,000 US troops deployed there.
The North's offensive posture along the demilitarized zone (DMZ)
means that it could go to war with little additional preparation.
And North Korea's long-range artillery and surface-to-surface
missiles near the DMZ, some of which could deliver chemical warfare
agents, can hit forward defenses, US Military installations, airfields
and seaports, and Seoul.
Iraq
Mr. Chairman, Iraq, under Saddam, continues to present a serious
threat to US forces, interests and allies. Our principal aim must be to
ensure that Saddam does not have weapons of mass destruction or the
capacity to regain any he has lost.
As my statement for the record points out in greater detail, we
assess that Iraq continues to hide critical WMD production equipment
and material from UN inspectors.
Continued UN sanctions can keep pressure on his regime and cast
uncertainty over Saddam's hold on power.
But, as you know Mr. Chairman, Saddam is pushing more aggressively
than last year to erode the sanctions regime.
More than seven years of sanctions have had a devastating effect on
Iraq's economy. Inflation is soaring, the civilian infrastructure is
deteriorating, and the Iraqi population continues to suffer from high
rates of malnutrition and inadequate services--in part because of
Saddam's manipulation of relief supplies. Key regime officials and
support organizations remain largely immune to the harsh living
conditions facing the general population and even live off revenues
generated through illicit trade--a fact that engenders resentment and
poses an underlying threat to Saddam and his family.
While its military force continues to slowly deteriorate under UN
sanctions and the arms embargo implemented after the Gulf War, Iraq
remains an abiding threat to internal oppositionists and smaller
regional neighbors.
challenge iv: regional trouble spots
Mr. Chairman, I propose again this year to provide you a brief
description of where we stand in several potential ``hot spots.'' As I
did last year, I will focus on the situation in the Middle East, South
Asia, and Bosnia.
Middle East
With regard to the Middle East, Mr. Chairman, my bottom line
message must be that the region is more volatile and more troubled than
when I testified here last year. Many of the threats I have discussed
today intersect in the Middle East, where the historic strife and
distrust that mark the region are now aggravated by the spread of
sophisticated weapons programs, an upsurge in terrorism, and
demographic trends that point to heightened social tensions.
Against this backdrop, the peace process has foundered, with
dangerous implications for all of the parties.
Iraq, as noted earlier, continues to defy the international
community's effort to deny it the means to again commit aggression.
And some of the fixed points have begun to change, Iran in
particular, but not so conclusively as to permit a dropping of our
guard.
Meanwhile, world demand for imported energy will ensure the
region's strategic importance, along with the active, and sometimes
competitive, engagement of many nations.
In short, Mr. Chairman, the period ahead is one of enormous
challenge for the United States as it seeks to ensure stability,
prosperity, and peace in this most critical of regions.
South Asia
In South Asia, relations between India and Pakistan remain poor.
The long-standing dispute over Kashmir remains a major sticking point.
A modest India-Pakistan dialogue is underway, though progress is
certain to be slow and subject to abrupt setbacks. We cannot be sure
this tentative dialogue will continue when a new Indian government
assumes office after national elections in March.
The stakes of conflict are high, because both countries have
nuclear capabilities and have or are developing ballistic missile
delivery systems. Although Indian and Pakistani officials say
deterrence has worked for years, it would be at risk in a crisis.
Bosnia and the Balkans
Turning to Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, the story is progress but with
significant remaining challenges. On the positive side, developments in
recent months have somewhat improved the prospect for Dayton
implementation.
The emergence in the Republika Srpska of a government backed by
Muslim and Croat deputies is a breakthrough that--if sustained--could
accelerate the pace of Dayton implementation.
At the same time, the High Representative is using his new
authority to impose solutions on the parties to reinforce central
institutions.
Bosnia's military forces remain demobilized with their heavy
weapons stored in sites that are regularly inspected by SFOR.
Furthermore, each army has significantly reduced its heavy weapons
under the Dayton-mandated arms control agreement.
Iran has terminated its military aid and training in Bosnia and has
focused its involvement on economic assistance.
Although Bosnians are a long way from regaining their pre-war
standard of living, significant economic growth has resumed and
unemployment is starting to decline.
Relatively little progress has been made, however, in implementing
minority returns and other provisions of Dayton relating to freedom of
movement and resettlement. The OSCE goal of 220,000 returns in 1997 was
only about half met, and the bulk of those who did return went to
majority areas.
Looking to the future, most Bosnians recognize that continued
international engagement is essential for keeping the peace. Such
involvement is required to continue weakening the hardline nationalists
who are obstructing Dayton, and national elections in 1998 might
increase the political clout of opponents of the nationalists who
currently dominate the three communities.
In addition, a number of volatile issues could still disrupt the
gradual process of reconciliation. These include the Brcko arbitration
decision--postponed last year but expected in March and the UN's stated
goal of returning 50,000 refugees to minority areas during the first
six months of 1998. In addition, continuing mutual distrust between
Muslims and Croats will hamper the effort to create a functioning
Federation.
I must also note the threat of instability in the southern Serbian
province of Kosovo, where animosity remains high between the 90 percent
Albanian majority and the local Serbian residents. There is increasing
support for violence as a way to resolve the situation.
The Aegean
Turning to the Aegean, there is reason for increased concern about
tensions between Greece and Turkey, particularly in the wake of the EU
summit decision to proceed with membership negotiations with Cyprus--
while rebuffing Turkey's application--and the expected arrival of SA-10
air defense batteries from Russia this summer. Ongoing disputes over
air and sea delineations in the Aegean have also heightened long-
standing Greek-Turkish animosity.
challenge v: humanitarian challenges
Mr. Chairman, last year I concluded my briefing by discussing with
you the challenge posed to US citizens and interests by humanitarian
crises whose origins often go back many years but which can escalate
with dramatic suddenness. I regret to say that the dimension of this
challenge remains unchanged.
The totality of the problem is similar to that I described last
year 34 million people worldwide unable to return to their homes; more
than 20 million internally displaced; 14.5 million refugees.
As it was last year, Africa is the region most troubled by these
crises--with attendant calls on US and UN resources to assist relief
operations and attendant risks to US citizens caught up in violence.
We have no reason to believe that 1998 in Africa will be any more
stable than was 1997. The instability in central Africa that led to the
overthrow of governments in Zaire and Congo (Brazzaville) last year
lingers, and it is probably only a matter of time until serious
problems erupt again in Burundi and Rwanda. Apart from ethnic and
political conflict, for the coming months the impact of El Nino,
particularly in southern and eastern Africa, will bear careful
watching--especially water shortages and consequent food scarcity.
concluding comments
I hope these and the other challenges I have discussed with you
today illustrate why I opened these remarks by referring to complexity,
broad scope, and speed as the touchstones of this new era. These
challenges will require the most sophisticated intelligence collection
and analysis that we can produce. Only by continuing to invest in this
kind of effort can the Intelligence Community play the role it must in
protecting American lives, guarding American interests, and sustaining
American leadership.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I would welcome your questions at this
time.
Director Tenet. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'm
pleased to be joined today by my distinguished colleagues.
The world we face today poses a complexity and scope of
problems that I believe is unprecedented for the United States.
The speed of technological change in the world magnifies these
threats.
I'm most concerned, Mr. Chairman, about the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction because of the direct threat
this poses to the lives of Americans. Despite some successes
for U.S. policy and U.S. intelligence, technologies related to
this threat continue to be available and potentially hostile
states are still developing and deploying WMD related systems.
Efforts to halt proliferation continue to be complicated,
moreover, by the fact that most WMD programs are based on
technologies and materials that have civil as well as military
applications.
Finally, a growing trend towards indigenous production of
WMD-related equipment has decreased the effectiveness of
sanctions and other national and multinational tools designed
to counter proliferation.
Chinese and Russian assistance to proliferant countries
requires particular attention despite signs of progress. My
statement for the record provides the details, but some of the
key points should be made here.
With regards to China, its defense industries are under
increasing pressure to become profit making organizations, an
imperative that can put them at odds with U.S. interests.
Conventional arms sales have lagged in recent years,
encouraging Chinese defense industries to look to WMD
technology-related sales, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, in
order to recoup. There is no question that China has
contributed to the WMD advances in these countries.
On the positive side, there have recently been some signs
of improvement in China's proliferation behavior. China has
recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing nuclear
technology exports. It also appears to have tightened down on
its most worrisome nuclear transfers. And it recently renewed
its pledge to halt sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.
But China's relations with some proliferant countries are
longstanding and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is still out on
whether the recent changes are broad enough in scope and
whether they will hold over the longer term.
As such, Chinese activities in this area will require
continued close watching.
The Russian proliferation story is similar. On paper,
Russia's export controls specifically regulate the transfer of
missile-related technologies as well as missile components. But
the system has not worked well and proliferant countries have
taken advantage of its shortcomings.
Iran is one of those countries, Mr. Chairman. When I
testified here a year ago, I said that Iran--which had received
extensive missile assistance from North Korea--would probably
have medium range missiles capable of hitting Saudi Arabia and
Israel in less than 10 years. Since I testified, Iran's success
in gaining technology and material from Russian companies,
combined with recent indigenous Iranian advances, means that it
could have a medium range missile much sooner than I assessed
last year.
Following intense engagement with the United States,
Russian officials have just taken some positive steps. Just
last week, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin issued a broad decree
prohibiting Russian companies from exporting items that would
be used for developing WMD or their delivery systems--whether
or not these items are on Russia's export control list. If
enforced, this could be an important step in keeping Iran from
getting the technology it needs to build missiles with much
longer ranges.
Without minimizing the importance of Russia's response, Mr.
Chairman, I must tell you that it is too soon to close the
books on this matter. Russian action is what matters, and
therefore monitoring Russian proliferation behavior will have
to be a very high priority for some time to come.
Likewise, Mr. Chairman, in focusing on Iran's acquisition
of WMD technology, as we should, since it is one of the most
active countries seeking such materials, we cannot lose sight
of other proliferants. My statement talks about Iraq, Syria and
Libya.
Moving on to the very different transnational threat that
Senator Baucus talked about, the recent financial troubles in
Asia remind us that global markets are so interconnected and
that economies and politics so intertwined that economic
problems in one country can have far-reaching consequences for
others. At the root of this crisis is a confluence of economic,
social and political factors. Soaring growth and financial
systems that lacked adequate regulation led to a speculative
boom. Lending decisions by banks and finance companies ignored
fundamental economic risks. And when export growth began to
slow regionally in 1995, corporate borrowers had trouble
repaying loans.
Faced with high levels of short-term debt and limited
foreign exchange reserves, Thailand first, and then Indonesia
and South Korea, were forced to devalue their currencies.
Because of the high level of economic integration and reaction
of investors, the currency crisis spread rapidly to other
countries in the region.
The crisis has been difficult to resolve--in part because
governments must take some politically risky steps like closing
weak banks and shelving projects that will add to unemployment.
The current troubles in Asia will, of course, have economic
costs for the United States. But the troubles also carry
political risks. Social tensions--which we already see in
Indonesia and other states in the region--are likely to
increase as the prices go up for things like food, fuel and as
unemployment rises.
Turning to terrorism, Mr. Chairman, I must stress that the
threat to U.S. interests and citizens worldwide remains high.
Even though the number of international terrorist incidents in
1997 was about the same as 1996, U.S. citizens and facilities
suffered more than 30 percent of the total number of terrorist
attacks--up 25 percent from last year.
Moreover, there has been a trend toward increasing the
lethality of attacks, especially against civilian targets. The
most recent examples, of course, are the suicide bombings in
Israel in 1996 and 1997, and the attacks on tourists in Luxor,
Egypt, last November. Perhaps most worrisome, Mr. Chairman, is
the fact that we have seen in the last year growing indications
of terrorist interest in acquiring chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons.
In addition, a confluence of recent developments increases
the risk that US individuals or groups will attack US
interests. Terrorists' passions have probably been inflamed by
events ranging from the US government's designation of 30
terrorist groups to the conviction and sentencing of Mir Aimal
Kasi and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, as well as the ongoing standoff
with Iran and frustration with the Middle East peace process.
Turning to international narcotics, I must tell you, Mr.
Chairman, that the illicit drug industry is adapting to the
counterdrug successes that we and other governments have had in
recent years. Most worrisome, the narcotics underworld is
becoming more diverse and fragmented. In addition, traffickers
are infusing their business with new technologies to enhance
their operations, hide their illicit earnings and improve their
security.
I do not mean to downplay the impressive progress that has
been made against drug traffickers, especially those that deal
in cocaine. You know that the arrests of the Cali kingpins in
Colombia, whichhas disrupted long-held smuggling patterns there
and forced traffickers still at large into hiding. Drug interdiction
efforts in Peru--once the world's leading producer of the leaf used to
make cocaine--have seriously damaged the country's drug economy and led
to 40 percent decline in cultivation over the last two years.
The cocaine trade, however, is still a formidable challenge
thanks to the industry's ability to adapt. Our success against
the Cali kingpins has nurtured smaller groups that now dominate
trafficking through the Caribbean. The violent Mexican drug
cartels are exploiting the Cali mafia's setbacks to wrestle
away a greater share of the international drug business.
Despite declines in Peru and Bolivia, coca production
continues to expand in southern Colombia where the new
ingredient is the involvement of insurgents who tax drug
profits to fund their war against the government.
I'm also concerned, Mr. Chairman, about developments in
international heroin trafficking. Worldwide production of
opium--the source of all refined heroin--continues at record
levels. And heroin traffickers are exploiting weak enforcement
institutions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to
expand traditional heroin smuggling routes from the Golden
Crescent and, to a lesser extent, the Golden Triangle regions.
As for international organized crime, the globalization of
business and technology have given crime syndicates
unprecedented opportunities for illicit activities. Yet law
enforcement authorities often remain constrained by national
sovereignty and jurisdictions.
Trends that cause us the greatest concern are an
increasingly sophisticated financial system that includes
emerging financial secrecy havens stretching from the islands
in the Caribbean, to the South Pacific; a broader array of
seemingly legitimate businesses that serve as fronts for
criminal enterprises and the increasing role of gray arms
brokers in arming rogue states, terrorists and criminal groups.
The activities of arms brokers make it even more difficult to
judge when such actions are supported by governments and when
they are not.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, all of this is occurring in what
we call the information age. With that in mind, it is clear
that foreign entities are aware that an increasing proportion
of our civil and military activity depends on the secure and
uninterrupted flow of digital information. In fact, we have
identified several countries that have government sponsored
information warfare programs well underway. It's clear that
those developing these programs recognize the value of
attacking a country's computer systems, both on the battlefield
and in the civilian arena. In addition, I believe terrorists
groups and other non-state actors will increasingly view
information systems in the United States as a target.
Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about Russia and China and the
transition they find themselves in.
With regard to Russia, today we see hopeful signs that the
seeds of democracy and a free market economy sown in Russia
just a few years ago have taken root. Moreover, Moscow
cooperates with the United States and the West in ways that
were unimaginable during Soviet times. But whether Russia
succeeds as a stable democracy, reverts to the autocratic and
expansionist impulses of its past or degenerates into
instability remains an open question. The answer will depend in
large part on how Russia copes with several major challenges.
Democratic political institutions, while developing, are not
yet deeply rooted. The executive branch and communist dominated
Duma often deadlock while crime and corruption threaten to
undermine confidence in political and economic reform.
Russia has implemented many economic reforms and achieved a
measure of economic stability. But long term steady growth, is
still dependent on other reforms, namely ensuring that economic
activities are governed by the rule of law. The Russian
military, meanwhile, continues to suffer from serious social
and economic difficulties. Find the wherewithal to pay the
retirement costs of over 250,000 redundant military officers
will be a particular challenge.
Despite these difficult times for the Russian military,
Russia retains a major nuclear arsenal--some 6,000 deployed
strategic warheads. As long as there is even the slightest
doubt about the future political stability in Russia, those
weapons must be a major preoccupation of US intelligence. We
must also remain mindful that Russia continues a wide range of
development programs for conventional and strategic forces.
Finally, while Russia continues to seek close cooperation
with the United States on matters of mutual concern, it is
increasingly strident in opposing as what it sees as US efforts
to create a unipolar world. And Moscow continues to place a
high priority on keeping others from gaining undue influence in
the newly independent states, especially in the energy-rich
Caucasus in Central Asia.
Turning to China, the leadership there has a clear goal--
the transformation of their country into East Asia's major
power and a leading world economy on a par with the United
States by the middle of the 21st century. It is too soon to say
what this portends, Mr. Chairman, whether China in the future
will be an aggressive or benign power. What is clear, though,
is that China will be an increasingly influential player, one
that will have the capacity to, at a minimum, alter our
security calculus in the Far East.
Hong Kong's 1997 reversion to Chinese rule was peaceful,
but involved important changes in the political system. The
Chinese government disbanded the existing legislative council
and installed a hand-picked provisional legislature. The key
question now is whether new legislative elections scheduled in
May will be free and fair.
Cross-strait relations with Taiwan are still tense. China
has not renounced the use of force and is placing its best new
military equipment opposite Taiwan. Chinese military
modernization remains a key leadership goal. China is
increasing the size and survivability of its retaliatory
nuclear missile force and is taking important steps toward
building a modern navy capable of fighting beyond China's
coastal waters.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the post-Deng Xiaoping leadership
shows no sign of abandoning communist political ideology,
although it has committed itself to market-oriented economic
reform. These are eroding state control over major sectors of
the economy as well as over the daily life of many Chinese
citizens.
Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about Iran, because you
mentioned it in your opening statement. Among the countries,
Iran in manyrespects represents the greatest challenge we will
face over the next year. It appears to us that a genuine struggle is
now under way between hard-line conservatives and more moderate
elements represented by Iran's new President Khatami. And so the
challenge is how to cope with a still dangerous state in which some
positive changes may be taking place, changes that could--and I stress
could--lead to a less confrontational stance toward the United States.
Khatami's strongest card is the electoral mandate, a 70 percent vote
representing mostly youth and women, as well as ethnic and religious
minorities in Iran.
Since assuming office in August, he has made limited but
real progress toward fulfilling his campaign pledges for
political and social reforms. He gained approval for a new
cabinet that puts his people in key posts, such as the
ministries of foreign affairs, interior and Islamic culture.
Censorship is now less oppressive with previously banned
periodical reappearing and socially controversial films being
screened. And against this backdrop, there is even renewed
debate about a central tenet of the revolution--rule by a
supreme religious leader.
Progress is likely to be fitful, however, and hard-line
elements remain formidable obstacles. They still control the
country's defense and security organizations, for example, and
therefore exert heavy influence on issues most vital to the
United States. Statements by Khatami and his foreign ministry
suggest he is trying to play a more constructive role in the
international community. It is simply too early to tell,
however, whether this will lead to demonstrable changes in
Iranian policies that matter most to the United States. We have
seen no reduction in Iran's efforts to support Hizbollah,
radical Palestinians and militant Islamic groups that engage in
terrorism.
Moreover, even as it attempts to improve its international
image, Tehran is continuing to bolster its military
capabilities. Iran is improving its ability potentially to
interdict the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. It has
acquired KILO-class submarines from Russia, and it is upgrading
its anti-ship cruise missiles.
As I noted earlier, Iran continues its efforts to acquire
the capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass
destruction.
Turning to North Korea, Mr. Chairman, we also face a far
more complex challenge than last year. Some progress, but in
the face of a worsening economic and social situation and a
continued real military threat, the North is still observing
the terms of the agreed framework that directly relate to
freezing its nuclear reactor program. The IAEA has maintained a
continued presence at Yongbyon since the May 1994 refueling of
the reactors, and Pyongyang and the IAEA continue to discuss
steps the North needs to take to come into full compliance with
its safeguard commitments.
Amidst these signs of progress, however, a combination of
economic stagnation and social decay continue to raise doubts
about North Korea stability. North Korea's spreading economic
failure is eroding the stability of the regime of Kim Chong II.
Industrial and agricultural output continue to drop. The
North's most recent fall grain harvest was far less than the
4.5 million tons the North needs to meet even minimal rations.
Crime, corruption and undiscipline--including in the security
services and military--are increasing, and people are more
willing to blame Kim Chong II for their plight.
While Kim reportedly is aware of the economic problems and
their impact on soldiers and civilians, his legitimacy remains
closely tied to his father's legacy. As a result, Pyongyang
likely will avoid an avowed reformist agenda and will try to
package any reform experiments in traditional ideological
terms. As such, significant improvements in the economy do not
seem to be in the cards.
Its economic weaknesses notwithstanding, North Korea
retains a military with a capability to inflict serious damage
on South Korea and the 37,000 US troops deployed there. The
North's offensive posture along the demilitarized zone means
that it could go to war with little additional preparation. And
North Korea's long-range artillery and surface-to-surface
missiles near the DMZ, some of which could deliver chemical
warfare agents, can hit forward defenses, US military
installations, and airfields and seaports in Seoul.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I'll talk about Iraq. Iraq under
Saddam continues to present a serious threat to US forces,
interests and allies. As my statement for the record points out
in great detail, we assess that Iraq continues to hide critical
weapons of mass destruction equipment and material from UN
inspectors.
Continued UN sanctions can keep pressure on his regime and
cast uncertainty over Saddam's hold on power. But as you know,
Mr. Chairman, Saddam is pushing more aggressively than last
year to erode the sanctions regime. More than seven years of
sanctions have had a devastating effect on Iraq's economy.
Inflation is soaring. The civilian infrastructure is
deteriorating. And the Iraqi population continues to suffer
from high rates of malnutrition and inadequate services--in
part because of Saddam's manipulation of relief supplies. Key
regime officials and support organizations remain largely
immune to the harsh living conditions facing the general
population and even live off revenues generated through illicit
trade--a fact that engenders resentment and poses an underlying
threat to Saddam and his family.
While its military forces continue to slowly deteriorate
under UN sanctions and the arms embargo implemented after the
Gulf War, Iraq remains an abiding threat to internal
oppositionists and smaller regional neighbors.
Mr. Chairman, I'll stop there. I'll enter the rest of my
statement into the record. There's much more ground to cover.
Perhaps we would be best suited to do that in questions and
answers.
Chairman Shelby. Thank you, Director Tenet.
I'll ask the other witnesses to briefly sum up their
testimony--take five minutes or less. As I said earlier, your
written testimony will be made part of the record in its
entirety.
Deputy Director Bryant of the FBI, we're glad to have you
here. We understand that Judge Freeh, the director, is awaiting
the imminent birth of his sixth son. Is that correct?
Mr. Bryant. Yes, it is. He's at home with his family, and I
think his sixth son is due at any moment now.
Chairman Shelby. Well, we welcome you to the Committee.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT BRYANT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Bryant. I'll just take a few moments to summarize my
statement. But I want to hit a few key points.
We've seen a lot of changes in the world in the last dozen
years. Many of them have made a better world for us. But
certainly we have great challenges ahead of us. And before I
get into specific threats, I just want to hit one issue. I'm
speaking of encryption.
This is a critical problem. It is here right now and is
only going to get worse. Encryption has implications for our
ability to combat every threat to national security that we
see. Federal, state and local law enforcement officials
unanimously agree that the widespread use of robust non-key
recovery encryption will ultimately devastate our ability to
fight crime and prevent terrorism. There are all kinds of views
about this issue, but we see that this issue needs to be
addressed very quickly because it's going to harm all of our
abilities to do what is legal, ethical and for the best
interests of the American People.
I guess I would just say on the summary of the national
threats, from a law enforcement perspective--the drug issue
that faces the United States is a significant issue. We see it
in all the investigations that the FBI has; we see it in all
corners of our investigations. And it's of grave concern.
Whether it's methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin or whatever,
there's just great concern for that issue and what we're going
to do about it.
I guess the next issue I see is international terrorism. We
certainly have, from the DCI's statement, an agreement. We have
concerns over weapons of mass destruction and what they can do.
The FBI currently has investigations directed toward these
activities. Certainly, we've had help with legislation from
this body and that has been tremendously helpful. But I
consider this a priority that could have devastating
consequences for this great nation.
The next issue that I would go to would be international
terrorism organizations and terrorism generally. The FBI looks
at domestic terrorism as groups of individuals that are
American citizens using violence to commit * * *--to change--
for social or political change. The domestic side of it is an
issue with us. Certainly, the international side, as Mr. Tenet
said, the state sponsors, certainly the organized federations,
such as Hizbollah, Gama'at al-Islamiyyah, Hamas are areas where
we're very concerned.
I guess another issue I want to hit a little bit is this
critical infrastructure protection. We have a society that's
terribly dependent upon computers, and the service they perform
for this nation. It's helped our economy. We're probably world
leaders in computer technology. But it's also a vulnerability,
and it could be used and is being used by criminals, by
terrorists, by intelligence services and certainly by military
services. And we have to basically put in the infrastructure
and vehicles to protect this great nation from this type of
attack.
I guess I would just close and just say that certainly the
espionage issues. We've had--numerous cases have been
prosecuted in the last year. This is ever a threat that's been
here for--since the beginning of time. It's still here.
Chairman Shelby. Not getting any better, though, is it?
Mr. Bryant. It's probably as serious as ever.
Chairman Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Bryant. Just in passing, on economic espionage, the
Congress passed the economic espionage statute last year. This
statute has certainly brought about a change in the way
business is done, because our technology--we now have a law to
protect it. There are prosecutions going forward. And this has
been a great benefit, and can discuss this more in the question
and answer.
The only thing I would add, on the drug trafficking
situation--there are foreign-based groups that are bringing
vast amounts of drugs into this country. And ourself, the
Intelligence Community, with the DEA and Customs and the whole
government is trying to develop strategies to basically control
this issue.
I guess I would just close and say, on July 26, 1998, the
FBI will celebrate its 90th birthday. The FBI has been a
remarkable institution for many reasons, but not the least of
which its ability to change and evolve and face growing
threats. And we serve--we serve you all, we serve the American
people, but we see numerous threats that I've just enumerated
and hope we're part of the solution.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Freeh follows:]
Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Kerrey and Members of the
Committee. I welcome this opportunity to be part of this distinguished
panel to discuss threats to U.S. National Security.
The overriding concern now facing law enforcement is how rapidly
the threats from terrorists and criminals are changing, particularly in
terms of technology, and the resulting challenge to law enforcement's
ability to keep pace with those who wish to do harm to our nation and
our nation's citizens. This is why the encryption issue is one of the
most important issues confronting law enforcement and potentially has
catastrophic implications for our ability to combat every threat to
national security that I am about to address in my statement here
today. Law enforcement remains in unanimous agreement that the
widespread use of robust nonrecovery encryption ultimately will
devastate our ability to fight crime and terrorism. Uncrackable
encryption is now and will continue, with ever increasing regularity,
allow drug lords, terrorists and even violent gangs to communicate
about their criminal intentions with impunity and to maintain
electronically stored evidence of their crimes impervious to lawful
search and seizure. Other than some type of key-recoverable system,
there is currently no viable technical solution to this problem for law
enforcement.
This is not a problem that will begin sometime in the future with
theoretical implications. In many important investigations effective
law enforcement is being frustrated by criminals and terrorists using
non-recoverable encryption. For example:
Convicted spy Aldrich Ames was told by his Soviet handlers to
encrypt computer file information that was to be passed to them.
Ramzi Yousef and other international terrorists were plotting to
blow up 11 U.S.-owned commercial airliners in the far east. Yousef's
laptop computer, which was seized in Manila, contained encrypted files
concerning this terrorist plot.
A major international drug trafficking subject recently used a
telephone encryption device to frustrate court-approved electronic
surveillance.
Requests for cryptographic support pertaining to electronic
surveillance interceptions from FBI field offices and other law
enforcement agencies have steadily risen over the past several years.
From 1995 to 1996, there was a two-fold increase (from 5 to 12) in the
number of instances where the FBI's court-authorized electronic efforts
were frustrated by the criminal's use of encryption that did not allow
for law enforcement access.
Over the last two years, the FBI has also seen the number of
computer related cases utilizing encryption and/or password protection
increase from two (2) percent to seven (7) percent, to include the use
of 56 bit Data Encryption Standard (DES) and 128 bit ``Pretty Good
Privacy'' (PGP) encryption.
It is for this reason that the law enforcement community is
urgently calling for our Nation's policy makers to adopt a balanced
public policy on encryption. In our view, any legislative approach to
the encryption issue that does not achieve such a balanced approach
seriously jeopardizes the utility of some of our most important and
effective investigative techniques upon which law enforcement must
depend to ensure public safety and to maintain national security.
Several bills have been introduced in this Congress that address
certain aspects of the encryption issue. Unfortunately, most of these
legislative proposals would largely remove existing export controls on
encryption products, and would promote the widespread availability and
use of uncrackable encryption products regardless of the impact on
public safety and national security.
It is important to note that S. 909, the ``Secure Public Networks
Act,'' introduced by Senators Kerrey, McCain, and Hollings, comes close
to addressing law enforcement's public safety needs in the area of
encryption. However, law enforcement believes that the bill does not
contain sufficient legislative assurances to adequately address law
enforcement's public safety needs regarding the use and availability of
encryption products and service within the United States.
Conversely, the substitute bill adopted by the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on September 11, 1997, during
their mark-up of H.R. 695 does effectively address all of law
enforcement's public safety and national security concerns regarding
encryption products and services manufactured for use in the United
States or imported into the United States. The HPSCI substitute bill
would require all such encryption products and services to contain
features that would allow for the immediate access by law enforcement
to the ``plaintext'' of encrypted criminal-related communications or
electronically stored data pursuant to a court order.
We are now at an historic crossroad on this issue. If public policy
makers act wisely, the safety of all Americans will be enhanced for
decades to come. But if narrow interests prevail, law enforcement will
be unable to provide the level of protection that people in a democracy
properly expect and deserve. I do not believe it is too late to deal
effectively with this issue and would encourage the Committee to look
closely at the action taken by the HPSCI in their efforts to adopt a
balanced encryption policy.
intelligence threat
The counterintelligence mission of the FBI is to identify,
penetrate and neutralize foreign intelligence and terrorist activities
directed against the United States. This mission includes the
investigation of espionage. At the outset, I want to emphasize that the
``fall of communism'' has not reduced the level or amount of espionage
and other serious intelligence activity conducted against the United
States.
In many cases, the targets have not changed at all: there is still
a deadly serious foreign interest in ``traditional'' intelligence
activities such as penetrating the U.S. intelligence community,
collecting classified information on U.S. military defense systems, and
purloining the latest advances in our country's science and technology
sector.
In addition to these traditional intelligence operations, there
have been at least three changes in foreign intelligence activity that
have required the FBI to modify its counterintelligence programs.
The first change is intelligence activity by non-intelligence
personnel. Today, national security issues go beyond the passage of
classified military information. There have been many cases which show
that individuals outside the intelligence service apparatus, but who
are no less foreign sponsored, engage in clandestine activity that is
inimical to the security and economic well-being of the United States.
A second area of change has been the intelligence environment,
which includes the growing importance of maintaining the integrity of
our country's information infrastructure. Our growing dependence on
computer networks and telecommunications has made the U.S. increasingly
vulnerable to possible cyber attacks against such targets as military
war rooms, power plants, telephone networks, air traffic control
centers and banks.
Third, many traditional and non-traditional adversaries today are
technologically sophisticated and have modified their intelligence
methodologies to use advanced technologies to commit espionage. In
telecommunications, even some smaller intelligence adversaries now use
equipment the FBI is unable to monitor.
To address these changes in intelligence activity, intelligence
environment, and intelligence methodology, the FBI uses general
investigative strategy we refer to as the national security threat list
or NSTL. It is a concept adopted in 1992 to prioritize issues and
countries at which to direct our efforts. Our counterintelligence
investigative techniques include the recruitment of human assets,
double agents, undercover operations, various surveillance techniques,
and analysis. NSTL has given the FBI additional flexibility to approach
non-traditional intelligence problems from new perspectives.
In addition, the FBI also has created the Computer Investigations
and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center (CITAC), which draws on the
technical expertise of a number of other U.S. agencies in order to
bring more analytical power to bear defending our ability to peacefully
and securely enjoy important recent advances in our country's
information technology sphere.
Regarding the problem of monitoring advanced communications
techniques used by some of our country's intelligence adversaries, I
have already stressed that, the FBI supports pending legislative
proposals to allow law-enforcement access to encryption-recovery
information.
Let me summarize this general overview by stating that the simple
truth is that there has been no ``peace dividend'' in the form of a
reduced need for FBI counterintelligence operations. On the contrary,
foreign intelligence activities against the United States have grown in
diversity and complexity in the past few years.
Press reports of recent espionage cases involving Russia, South
Korea, and China are just the tip of a large and dangerous intelligence
iceberg. In addition to these and other covert intelligence operations
run by intelligence officers using standard intelligence methodologies,
however, the FBI these days is just as likely to encounter covert
activity on the part of non-intelligence people such as visiting
scientists or foreign businessmen.
Although I believe the FBI is well positioned for the
counterintelligence challenges before us, what some pundits have called
the ``end of history'' is definitely not the end of dangerous
intelligence attacks against the United States. Through our continuing
efforts to develop effective intelligence and through dedicated, hard
work, the FBI continues to strive to identify, penetrate and neutralize
foreign intelligence and terrorist activity directed against the United
States. We cannot accomplish this alone. Only with the continued
cooperation of other U.S. government agencies, the Congress, state and
local authorities, and the American public, can the FBI accomplish its
mission.
international terrorism
The threat of international terrorism directed at Americans and
U.S. national interests is following the general pattern we have
identified in terrorist activity worldwide. Although the number of
attacks directed at American interests remains comparatively low, the
trend toward more large-scale incidents designed for maximum
destruction, terror, and media impact actually places more Americans at
risk. As you are aware, and as recent tragedies demonstrate, this
threat confronts Americans both at home and abroad. America's
democratic tradition and global presence make Americans a fast, and
often all-too-easy, target for opportunities who are willing to kill
innocent victims to further their extremist causes.
The international terrorist threat can be divided into three
general categories. Each poses a serious and distinct threat, and each
has a presence in the United States.
The first category, state-sponsored terrorism, violates every
convention of international law. State sponsors of terrorism include
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. Put simply,
these nations view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. In recent
years, the terrorist activities of Cuba and North Korea have declined
as their economies have deteriorated. However, the activities of the
other states I mentioned continued and, in some cases, have intensified
during the past several years
The second category of international terrorist threat is made up
for formalized terrorist organizations. These autonomous, generally
transnational organizations have their own infrastructures, personnel,
financial arrangements, and training facilities. They are able to plan
and mount terrorist campaigns on an international basis, and actively
support terrorist activities in the United States.
Extremist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah, the Egyptian Al-Gamat
Al-Islamiya, and the Palestinian Hamas have placed followers inside the
United States who could be used to support an act of terrorism here.
The third category of international terrorist threat stems from
loosely affiliated extremists--characterized by the World Trade Center
bombers and rogue terrorists such as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. These loosely
affiliated extremists may pose the most urgent threat to the United
States at this time because their membership is relatively unknown to
law enforcement, and because they can exploit the mobility that
emerging technology and a loose organizational structure offer.
The FBI believes that the threat posed by international terrorists
in each of these three categories will continue for the foreseeable
future.
In response to these threats, the United States has developed a
strong response to international terrorism. Legislation and executive
orders enacted during the past 15 years to expand the FBI's role in
investigating international terrorism directed at American interests
has strengthened the ability of the U.S. Government to protect its
citizens.
As you are aware, recent Congressional appropriations have helped
strengthen and expand the FBI's counterterrorism capabilities. To
enhance its mission the FBI centralized many specialized operational
and analytical functions in the Counterterrorism Center.
Established in 1996, the Counterterrorism Center combats terrorism
on three fronts: International terrorism operations both within the
United States and in support of extraterritorial investigations,
domestic terrorism operations, and counterterrorism relating to both
international and domestic terrorism.
Within the Center, the FBI has deployed over 50 new intelligence
analysts since 1996. These highly skilled analysts work in every facet
of the Bureau's National Security Program from counterterrorism to
industrial security. This enhanced analytical ability helps to increase
the efficiency of the Bureau's overall investigative efforts in these
areas.
The Domestic Counterterrorism Center also represents a new
direction in the FBI's response to terrorism. Eighteen federal agencies
maintain a regular presence in the Center and participate in its daily
operations. These agencies include the CIA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the United States Secret Service, among others. This
multiagency arrangement provides an unprecedented opportunity for
information-sharing and real-time intelligence analysis among the
various components of the American intelligence community.
But the threat of international terrorism demands continued
vigilance. Today's terrorists have learned from the successes and
mistakes of terrorists who have gone before them. The terrorists of
tomorrow will have an even more dangerous arsenal of weapons and
technologies available to further their destructive ambitions.
Compounding the enhanced capabilities of contemporary terrorists is
another disturbing aspect of modern terrorism. As recent events have
shown, this ``web of terrorism'' perpetuates violence upon violence and
poses a particular challenge to nations that take a strong stand
against terrorism.
The November 1997 attack on foreign tourists in Luxor, Egypt, was
apparently carried out in an attempt to pressure the United States into
releasing Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Sheik Rahman is serving a life
sentence in a federal prison for his part in the plot to assassinate
the President of Egypt and bomb several sites in New York City in 1994.
Since his imprisonment in 1995, followers of Sheik Rahman have
issued several threats warning of violence in retaliation for his
continued imprisonment.
Likewise, a series of letter bombs addressed to the Washington, DC,
and New York offices of the Al-Hayat newspaper and the parole officer
at the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, in December 1996
appear to be part of an effort to force the U.S. Government to release
imprisoned fundamentalist terrorists. All of the bombs were rendered
safe by law enforcement. Each of the 12 letter bombs bore an
Alexandria, Egypt, postmark.
Circumstances surrounding the November 12, 1997, ambush of four
American businessmen in Karachi, Pakistan, suggest a link to the
conviction of Mir Aimal Kasi in a Virginia court for his 1995 attack on
CIA workers outside the agency's headquarters. Although no clear motive
has been established for the killings in Karachi, the attackers tracked
the activities of the victims for several days and launched the attack
within 36 hours of the verdict. Earlier, Kasi had predicted that ``his
people'' would retaliate for his prosecution.
In the 15 years since President Reagan designated the FBI as the
lead agency for countering terrorism in the United States, Congress and
the executive branch have taken important steps to enhance the federal
government's counterterrorism capabilities. The FBI's counterterrorism
responsibilities were further expanded in 1984 and 1986, when Congress
passed laws permitting the Bureau to exercise federal jurisdiction
overseas when a U.S. national is murdered, assaulted, or taken hostage
by terrorists, or when certain U.S. interests are attacked. Since the
mid 1980's, the FBI has investigated more than 350 extraterritorial
cases.
More recently, the Antiterrorism and Intelligence Authorization
Acts and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) have broadened the FBI's ability to combat international
terrorism. Enactment of the AEDPA will enhance the ability of the U.S.
Government to respond to terrorist threats. Section 302 of the Act
authorizes the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Attorney
General and Secretary of the Treasury, to designate as foreign
terrorist organizations (FTOs) groups that meet certain specific
criteria. This designation means that funds raised in the U.S. by an
FTO can be confiscated by the federal government. In time, the Act
could prove an invaluable tool to disrupt the fundraising capabilities
of international terrorist organizations.
During the past 3 years, the United States has sent a clear signal
to terrorists and potential terrorists. We will not tolerate attacks
against Americans and will make every effort to apprehend those who
perpetrate such acts. Thanks in large part to the expanded resources
Congress has committed to the fight against terrorism, we have been
successful in bringing to justice some of the most egregious terrorists
plotters of the recent past: Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, mastermind of the 1993
World Trade Center bombing, was extradited by Pakistan and made to
stand trial in the United States for his crime. In November 1997, he
was found guilty of his crime and on January 8 of this year was
sentenced to 240 years in federal prison.
On November 10, 1997, Mir Aimal Kasi was found guilty of capital
murder in a Fairfax, VA, courtroom. His conviction culminated an
intense 5 year investigation that began the day in 1993 when he opened
fire outside CIA headquarters in Langley, VA killing two CIA employees
and wounding several others. In June 1997, FBI agents had located Kasi
in Pakistan and ``rendered'' him to the United States to stand trial.
Because he had previously been convicted in absentia in an American
court for the attack, the FBI had the authority to apprehend Kasi in
Pakistan and return him to the United States to stand trial in person.
In 1995, Sheik Omar Rahman was sentenced to life in prison for his
part in a conspiracy to bomb the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and
several major landmarks throughout New York.
As satisfying as these and other recent convictions are, the battle
against international terrorism leaves little time to relish past
successes. The FBI and Saudi Arabian investigators continue to
investigate the attack on the Al-Khobar housing complex in Dhahran,
which left 19 Americans dead and wounded 500. Within hours of the truck
bombing on June 25, 1996, the FBI dedicated vast resources to the
investigation. In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, we sent 125
personnel to Dhahran, including a Special Agent in Charge, who directed
the crisis response and investigative effort. During the first months
of the investigation, personnel in Dhahran were supported by the FBI's
Legal Attache office in Rome. However, in 1997, the FBI opened a Legal
Attache office (or Legat) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which now
coordinates the joint investigation with Saudi investigators.
Terrorism is perpetrated by individuals with a strong commitment to
the causes in which they believe. An action in one location can bring
about a reaction somewhere else. The web-like nature of terrorism
underscores the need for vigilance in counteracting terrorist groups.
Unfortunately, American successes can spur reprisals. As the United
States develops a stronger investigative and prosecutorial response to
international terrorism, we may witness more attempts at reprisal both
at home and abroad.
Also, reliance on computers and other amazing technologies has
inadvertently created vulnerabilities that can be exploited from
anywhere in the world. Modern transportation and modern technology give
terrorists abilities unheard of only a few years ago.
domestic terrorism
Domestic terrorism investigations are among the highest priorities
of the FBI's National Security Division.
Domestic terrorist groups are those which are based and which
operate entirely within the United States, or its territories, and
whose activities are directed at elements of the U.S. government or its
civilian population. The threat posed by domestic terrorist groups has
remained significant over the past several years. Domestic terrorist
groups represent interests spanning the full political spectrum, as
well as social issues and concerns. However, FBI investigations of
domestic terrorist groups are not predicated upon social or political
beliefs; rather, they are based upon planned or actual criminal
activity.
The current domestic terrorist threat primarily comes from right-
wing extremist groups, including radical paramilitary (militia) groups,
Puerto Rican terrorist groups, and special interest groups.
Right-wing extremist groups
A basic philosophical tenet of many right-wing extremist groups is
a belief in the superiority of the white race and that blacks, Jews,
and other ethnic minorities are inferior racially, mentally,
physically, and spiritually. Much of their philosophy flows from
racist, anti-Semitic religious beliefs such as ``Christian
Identity.''Christian Identity teaches that white Aryans are God's
chosen race and that Jews are the offspring of Satan. Aryans who
cooperate with Jews and darker races are considered ``race-traitors.''
Many right-wing extremist groups also espouse anti-government
sentiments. In an attempt to live apart from ``inferior people,'' some
right-wing groups advocate creating a separate nation from the five
states comprising the northwest region of the United States--
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming.
Examples of right-wing extremist groups operating in the United
States are the Aryan Nations, True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, and the
Republic of Texas. You may recall that in April, 1997, three members of
the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan were arrested and have been found
guilty in Texas for planning to blow up a natural gas storage facility
as a diversionary tactic prior to robbing an armored carrier. This was
the FBI's ``Sour Gas'' investigation.
As another example, you may be familiar with the FBI's ``Rapid
Lighting'' investigation. This investigation involved a series of
criminal acts committed by individuals associated with a domestic
terrorist organization known as the Phineas Priesthood. The subjects of
the investigation were responsible for at least two bombing/ bank
robbery incidents in Spokane, Washington, in April and July, 1996.
Three subjects were arrested in October, 1996, and a fourth in 1997.
Since then, all four have been convicted of all eight felony counts for
which they were charged and have received lengthy jail sentences.
Militia groups
Militia groups are often multi-racial, but they are predominately
white. Their members often view themselves as ``sovereign citizens''
who are exempt from the laws and regulations of the U.S. government.
Many militia members subscribe to the theory that the federal
government is in a conspiracy with the United Nations that would result
in the creation of a one-nation world government, or ``New World
Order.'' This one-world government would use foreign troops in the
United States to seize all privately owned weapons and imprison and
execute patriotic militia members.
Many militia groups advocate stockpiling weapons and explosives and
conducting paramilitary training as part of their preparation for what
they believe will be an inevitable armed conflict with the government
and the impending U.N. invasion. Some militia groups openly advocate
the overthrow of the federal government.
Since 1992, the United States has seen a growth of militia groups.
While the majority of militia members are law abiding citizens, there
is a small percentage of members within militia groups who advocate and
conspire to commit violent criminal acts. Of particular concern to the
FBI is the potential for militias to be infiltrated by extremists who
seek to exploit militias and their members in order to further their
own violent terrorist agendas.
Militia members who engage in criminal acts commit a wide variety
of criminal activity, such as bombings, bank robberies, and destruction
of government property. They also file spurious lawsuits and liens
designed to harass law enforcement, elected officials, and others, as
well as to disrupt the courts. Militia members have engaged in
fraudulent financial schemes to raise funds.
As an example, I'd like to mention the FBI's investigation of the
Mountaineer Militia. This investigation was initiated in August, 1995.
The group had obtained the plans to the FBI Criminal Justice
Information Services facility in Clarksburg, West Virginia, and they
intended to destroy the facility as part of their war on the U.S.
government. The FBI began an undercover investigation and arrested
seven key members of the group in October, 1996. All seven have since
been convicted and sentenced to lengthy jail sentences.
Puerto Rican terrorist groups
Although the last terrorist incident involving Puerto Rican
terrorist groups was a bombing in Chicago in December, 1992, these
groups continue to be of concern. Between 1982 and 1994, approximately
44 percent of the terrorist incident committed in the United States and
its territories are attributed to Puerto Rican terrorist groups.
Efforts are continuing to locate fugitives still at large from these
incidents.
Puerto Rican terrorist groups believe the liberation of Puerto Rico
from the United States justifies the use of violence to obtain that
objective. These groups characterize their terrorism activities as
``acts of war'' against invading forces and, when arrested, they
consider themselves to be ``prisoners of war'' who must be treated as
such according to the Geneva Convention. Clandestine behavior and
security are of utmost importance in these group's activities.
The EPB-Macheteros has been the most active and violent of the
Puerto Rican-based terrorist groups it emerged in 1978. The FALN (Armed
Forces for Puerto Rican National Liberation) is a clandestine terrorist
group based in Chicago which emerged in the 1970s. The MLN (Movement of
National Liberation) is the ``above ground'' support group and
political arm of the FALN. The MLN is the major fundraiser for the
FALN.
Special interest terrorist groups
Special interest terrorist groups engage in criminal activity to
bring about specific, narrowly-focused social or political changes.
They differ from more traditional domestic terrorist groups which seek
more wide-ranging political changes. It is their willingness to commit
criminal acts that separate special interest terrorist groups from
other law-abiding groups that often support the same popular issues. By
committing criminal acts, these terrorists believe they can force
various segments of society to change attitudes about issues considered
important to them.
The existence of these types of groups often does not come to law
enforcement attention until after an act is committed and the
individual or group leaves a claim of responsibility. Membership in a
group may be limited to a very small number of co-conspirators of
associates. Consequently, acts committed by special interest terrorists
present unique challenges to the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies.
An example of special interest terrorist activity is the February
2, 1992, arson of the mink research facility at Michigan State
University. Rodney Coronado, an animal rights activist, pled guilty to
arson charges on July 3, 1995. Other acts of violence against animal
enterprise have occurred recently and are under investigation.
weapons of mass destruction
The FBI views the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) as a serious and growing threat to our national security.
Pursuant to our terrorism mandate and statutory requirements, we are
developing within the inter-agency setting broad-based, pro-active
programs in support of our mission to detect, deter, or prevent the
threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their delivery
system, and WMD proliferation activities occurring in or directed at
the United States.
Our programs cover the broad spectrum of Foreign
Counterintelligence (FCI), criminal and counterterrorism
investigations, focusing on persons or organizations involved in WMD
proliferation activities.
During 1997, the FBI initiated over 100 criminal cases pertaining
to nuclear, biological and chemical threats, incidents, or
investigations (excluding Proliferation cases). Many of these threats
were determined to be non-credible, however, this represents a three
fold increase over 1996. Credible cases have resulted in arrests and
prosecutions by the FBI, and state and local authorities. In support of
this growing problem, legislative changes by Congress over the past
three years have strengthened the FBI's powers to investigate and bring
to prosecution those individuals involved in WMD proliferation.
The FBI has also investigated and responded to a number of threats
which involved biological agents and are attributed to various types of
groups or individuals. For example, there have been apocalyptic-type
threats which actually advocate destruction of the world through the
use of WMD. We have also been made aware of interest in biological
agents by individuals espousing white-supremacist beliefs to achieve
social change; individuals engaging in criminal activity, frequently
arising from jealousy or interpersonal conflict; individuals and small
anti-tax groups, and some cult interest. In most cases, threats have
been limited in scope and have targeted individuals rather than groups,
facilities, or critical infrastructure. Threats have surfaced which
advocate dissemination of a chemical agent through air ventilation
systems. Most have made little mention of the type of device or
delivery system to be employed, and for this reason have been deemed
technical not feasible. Some threats have been validated. As an
example, during 1997, a group with white supremacist views pled guilty
to planning to explode tanks containing the deadly industrial chemical
hydrogen sulfide as a diversionary act to their primary activity, an
armored car robbery.
The FBI has experienced an increase in the number of cases
involving terrorist or criminal use of WMD. These cases frequently have
been small in scale and committed primarily by individuals or smaller
splinter/extremist elements of right wing groups which are unrelated to
larger terrorist organizations.
For example: As most of you will remember, on April 24, 1997, B'nai
B'rith headquarters in Washington D.C. received a package containing a
petri dish labeled ``Anthracis Yersinia,'' a non-existent substance and
a threat letter. Although testing failed to substantiate the perceived
threat, the significant response mobilized to mitigate the situation
highlights the disruption, fears, and complexity associated with these
types of cases.
On September 17, 1997, an individual was indicted in violation of
Title 18 U.S.C. Section 175(A)/Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act
for knowingly possessing a toxin (ricin and nicotin sulfate) for use as
a weapon and knowingly possessing a delivery system designed to deliver
or disseminate a toxin. On October 28, 1997, he pled guilty to
manufacturing a toxin (ricin) for use as a weapon. On January 7 1998,
he was sentenced to 12 years and 7 months in federal prison to be
followed by 5 years of supervised release.
In what the FBI considers a significant prevention, the FBI
arrested four members of a white supremacist organization in Dallas,
Texas, who planned to bomb a natural gas refinery, which could have
caused a release of a deadly cloud of Hydrogen Sulfide. This act was
planned to divert law enforcement attention from the group's original
objective of committing an armored car robbery. On video, the subjects
discussed their complete disregard for the devastating consequences of
their intended actions. The four were indicated on several charges to
include Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The group pled guilty to
several criminal charges and are awaiting sentencing.
The FBI's countermeasure initiatives, such as the Domestic
Preparedness Program which is being worked jointly with the Department
of Defense and other members of the federal interagency community to
train local ``first responders'' and about which the FBI has previously
provided testimony, is designed to address the potential widespread
consequences associated with WMD.
As a result of increased funding from the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Director supported and the
Attorney General approved an enhancement of 175 Special Agents to the
WMD program throughout our 56 field offices. Additionally, $21,200,000
from the 1998 FBI's Counterterrorism budget has been allocated to
ensure that state and local agencies have basic equipment and training
for responding to chemical or biological incidents and incidents
involving improvised explosive devices. The FBI's National Security
Division, Laboratory Division, and the Critical Incident Response Group
(CIRG) have received total funding in the amount of $8,000,000 from the
'FY 97 budget for equipment, training, and assistance to be provided to
the FBI field offices to address this growing problem.
Notwithstanding that which we have already faced and continually
plan for, the potential for WMD to damage our national security does
exist and trends are troublesome. The ease of manufacturing or
obtaining biological and chemical agents is disturbing. Available
public source material makes our law enforcement mission a continuous
challenge. Nevertheless, I can and will assure you that the FBI will
remain vigilant to the threat and continue to strive to prevent and
counter the use and proliferation of WMD.
critical infrastructure protection
In a few short months, on July 26, 1998, the FBI will celebrate its
90th birthday. The FBI has been a remarkable institution for many
reasons, not the least of which has been its ability to remake itself
to address new challenges to U.S. national security and criminal
justice. In the beginning, FBI agents were not authorized to carry
firearms. In response to the gang-era of the 1920s and 1930s, agents
were first issued handguns, and then the storied Thompson submachine
gun. In what is much more than a symbolic shift, today's agents are
issued laptop computers. This important advancement is the direct
result of an evolution in national security vulnerabilities.
As one consequence of technological innovation, deregulation, and
economic imperatives, critical infrastructure systems have become more
complex and interdependent. Digital control systems based on commercial
off-the-shelf hardware and software are being used to streamline
network operations and reduce personnel requirements. These control
networks frequently are connected by publicly-accessible
telecommunications systems and commercially available information
technologies--the National Information Infrastructure (NII)--a trend
that will accelerate as utility, transportation, and government
activities eliminate antiquated, expensive private telecommunications
networks. The result is a revolutionary and systemic improvement in
industrial and commercial processes that has been widely recognized and
exploited by both public and private sectors.
Public- and private-sector organizations that rely on information
technologies are diverse. Within the government, information
technologies provide leverage for performing traditional missions more
efficiently, e.g., law enforcement, intelligence gathering and
exploitation, and national defense. In the private sector information
systems allow rapid, efficient transfers of information and capital,
enable a new wave of electronic commerce, and enable far-flung,
technically complex operations to exist over vast geographic distances.
However, as commercial information technologies create advantages,
their increasingly indispensable nature transforms them into high-value
targets. Moreover, in practice these developments have resulted in
diminished systems redundancy and the consolidation of core assets,
heightening the risk of catastrophic single-point failures. These
vulnerabilities are accompanied by a more variegated threat picture.
The range of potential adversaries that may seek to attack U.S.
infrastructure systems is broad and growing. Disgruntled employees,
disaffected individuals or groups, organized crime, domestic and
international terrorists, and adversary nations are all potential
sources of attack.
Vulnerabilities
Hundreds of information system vulnerabilities are discovered every
day--many directly related to US national security. Dozens of
previously unknown computer system vulnerabilities are uncovered every
day by the vast yet interconnected community of technical experts. Most
of these vulnerabilities are subsequently posted publicly, usually on
the Internet first. For example, Internet mailing lists routinely
distribute vulnerability information and software that can be used to
exploit vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability publicity usually follows through a succession of
books, magazine and newspaper articles, electronic bulletin board
messages, and a growing list of World Wide Web sites that are targeted
at informing hackers, crackers, ``phreakers,'' and, potentially,
members of terrorist organizations and foreign intelligence services,
about the latest methodology for staging successful cyber attacks. List
of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) outlining the specifics of system
vulnerabilities are widespread. ``The Unofficial Web Hack FAQ,'' ``The
Hacker FAQ,'' and ``How to Hack a Website'' are popular, accessible,
and easily downloaded from the Web. These vulnerabilities are present
in the same commercial, off-the-shelf computer hardware and software
used by both private industry and government.
These developing phenomena are associated with another, perhaps
even more worrisome development. As information technologies and the
physical infrastructure systems they control become increasingly
complex, our ability to reliably anticipate system-wide behavior
diminishes. This is because as systems increase in complexity, the
effect of manipulating, degrading, or eliminating a single component is
difficult to predict. Accidents, even seemingly minor ones, can have
catastrophic effects. This creates a growing increase in the likelihood
of catastrophic, single-point failures--accidental or induced.
The details of the nation's infrastructure vulnerabilities are
clearly illustrated in both classified and unclassified arenas. For
instance, the myriad of government studies and reports on the matter
include one recently published by the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection. The report was preceded by similar
assessments by the Defense Science Board, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and the Office of Management and Budget.
Threats
With very few exceptions, attacks against the nation's cyber assets
can be aggregated into one of four categories: crime, terrorism,
foreign intelligence, or war. Regardless of the category, any country
or group can acquire the capability to conduct limited attacks against
information systems from friendly nations, commercial vendors, arms
dealers, hacker conferences, the Internet, and computer bulletin
boards.
Software is one weapon of information-based attacks. Such software
includes computer viruses, Trojan Horses, worms, logic bombs and
eavesdropping sniffers. Advanced electronic hardware can also be useful
in information attacks. Examples of such hardware are high-energy radio
frequency (RF) weapons, electromagnetic pulse weapons, RF jamming
equipment, or RF interception equipment. Such weapons can be used to
destroy property and data; intercept communications or modify traffic;
reduce productivity, degrade the integrity of data, communications, or
navigation systems; and deny crucial services to users of information
and telecommunications systems.
Where hackers formerly may have been motivated by the technical
challenge of breaking into a computer system, the motivation may be
shifting more toward hacking for profit. As more and more money is
transferred through computer systems, as more fee-based computer
services are introduced, as more sensitive proprietary economic and
commercial information is exchanged electronically, and as the nation's
defense and intelligence communities increasingly rely on commercially-
available information technology, the tendency toward information
threats emerging as national security threats will increase.
Terrorists, transnational criminals, and intelligence services are
quickly becoming aware of and exploiting the power of information tools
and weapons. This has beentrue in the past as new means of
communication, transportation, and secrecy have been introduced to the
public. For example, narcotics traffickers began using communications
advances such as pagers and cellular phones soon after their
introduction to the public.
Perhaps the most imminent threats today come from insiders.
Insiders have the advantage of not needing to break into computer
systems from the outside, but only to use, or abuse, their legitimate
access. A large portion of the computer intrusion reports that the FBI
and other law enforcement organizations receive have at their core an
employee, or a former employee, who has exceeded his or her access,
often in revenge for a perceived offense or wrong. These individuals
have the knowledge of where the most sensitive information is stored,
how to access the information, and, at times, how to steal or damage
the data.
One such example involves a U.S. defense contractor firm that
subcontracted with a foreign firm. The U.S. firm employed foreign
contractors onsite, and allowed these employees access to certain areas
of the premises that were necessary to their duties. However, the
foreign contractors used their knowledge of the company's computer
system to access other areas of the company's computer network that
were off limits to non-U.S. employees. The foreign contractors were
able to access proprietary and potentially classified information
regarding the U.S. company's government contracts. Their activities
jeopardized the competitiveness of the company and posed a potential
threat to U.S. national security.
Another insider incident occurred in October 1997 when a former
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. worker caused a widespread power outage in
San Francisco. Moreover, security experts have repeatedly and publicly
demonstrated the ease of compromising security at both private- and
public-sector facilities through social engineering--posing as an
insider to easily acquire information on internal security, passwords,
and system configurations.
In terms of the maturity of the threat, the numbers tell the story.
So far, in the month of January 1998 alone, there have been over forty
reported hacked web sites according to hacked.net, a website that
tracks such statistics. The FBI's load of computer intrusion-related
cases is more than doubling every year. Because of the uncertainties
associated with the evolutionary path of information technologies, the
threat picture fifteen years hence is difficult to predict. However,
some certainties apply: information technology is sure to proliferate,
and those who would exploit these technologies for nefarious purposes
are sure to multiply.
The FBI response
The FBI was among the first to recognize the importance of
predicting information-based attacks on critical infrastructures,
preventing their occurrence, and mitigating damage in the event such
attacks did occur. Since the 1992 creation of the National Computer
Crime Squad in the FBI's Washington Field Office, additional regional
computer squads in New York, San Francisco, Boston, Atlanta, Dallas,
and Los Angeles. In addition to regional squads, the FBI has created
computer investigative teams in each of its 56 field offices that will
respond to computer incidents within their geographical area of
responsibility.
The expansion of the National Computer Crime Squad was accompanied
by the creation of a new National Security Threat List (NSTL) issue
within the FBI's FCI program: Targeting the National Information
Infrastructure, which the Attorney General approved in September 1995.
The addition of this issue to the NSTL makes it possible for the FBI,
working within its FCI authority, to investigate information
infrastructure-related incidents perpetrated or coordinated by foreign
intelligence services. These attacks might be directed against the U.S.
Government or U.S. corporations, establishments, or persons and could
target physical facilities, personnel, information, or computer, cable,
satellite, or telecommunications systems. With the new NSTL issue,
these teams have responsibilities over both the criminal investigative
and the potential national security implications of computer
intrusions.
The FBI is responding to these novel threat and vulnerability
combinations through a coordinated interagency effort that includes,
among other important participants, the Department of Defense, the
National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
the infrastructure protection center
One important interagency attempt to meet the emerging threat to
the nation's critical infrastructures is the Infrastructure Protection
Center (IPC). The IPC, a government-industry partnership hosted by the
FBI, will provide a mechanism for assessing, warning, investigating,
and responding to attacks on interconnected interdependent
infrastructures. The IPC units will be staffed with representatives
from FBI and DOD, Intelligence Community, and agency detailees
experienced in computer crimes and infrastructure protection. To build
private confidence and information sharing, IPC will hire
representatives of private industry or private sector computer
emergency response teams (CERTs) making them an integral part of the
center. Direct electronic connectivity is also being established with
private industry and the CERTs.
Twenty-four-hour watch presence and connectivity maintained between
the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
and the Defense Information Systems Agency reinforce the respective
strengths these parties bring to the infrastructure assurance mission.
Future connectivity will include other government participants.
The IPC builds on and enhances close ties to the ``first
responders'' to an attack on critical infrastructures--state and local
law enforcement and government. Building on FBI's long standing
relationships and state and local law enforcement (through mechanisms
like the Joint Terrorism Task Forces), the IPC will conduct outreach,
provide training, share information, and coordinate interagency efforts
during an attack. The IPC would also establish direct electronic
connectivity to state and local governments building on existing FBI
programs such as the Law Enforcement On-line (LEO) and Awareness of
National Security Issues and Response (ANSIR) systems.
Though the national security threat from cyber-related issues is of
concern, the FBI, with its private- and public-sector partners, is
building a firewall of protection between malevolent actors and
critical U.S. infrastructure systems. The threat is real and growing,
but an effective response is underway. The IPC will embody the
collected interagency expertise in the infrastructure protection
mission, and exemplifies the depth of commitment the FBI has made to
this important law enforcement and national security issue.
economic espionage
Since I last appeared before this committee, the passage of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) has greatly assisted the FBI in
its battle against Economic Espionage. Important partnerships have been
formed with the Department of Defense and industry allowing for
successful investigative efforts.
Through the use of the EEA and other tools, the FBI has developed
significant information on the foreign economic espionage threat, to
include: (1) identification of the perpetrators of economic espionage,
(2) the economic targets of their spying and criminal activities, and
(3) the methods used to steal clandestinely and illicitly U.S. trade
secrets and technology.
The increasing value of trade secrets in the global and domestic
marketplaces, and the corresponding spread of technology, have combined
to significantly increase both the opportunities and methods for
conducting economic espionage. The development and production of trade
secret information is an integral part of virtually every aspect of US
trade, commerce, and business. Consequently, the security of trade
secrets is essential to maintaining the health and competitiveness of
critical segments of the US economy.
The Economic Espionage Act has helped to protect valuable US trade
secrets. The statute was the result of a Congressional mandate, coupled
with a joint effort on the part of the FBI and industry, to provide law
enforcement with a tool to deal effectively with trade secret theft.
The EEA resolved many gaps and inadequacies in existing federal laws by
creating two new felonies outlawing acts of economic espionage (Title
18, U.S.C. 1831) and commercial theft (Title 18, U.S.C. 1832), and by
specifically addressing the national security aspect of these crimes.
The FBI National Security Division sponsored a series of six
regional Economic Espionage Conferences. These conferences brought
together elements of industry and U.S. federal government criminal and
intelligence sectors which play a role in economic espionage matters.
Traditional threat countries and a number of non-traditional threat
countries continue their collection of US trade secrets. The US
counterintelligence community has specifically identified the
suspicious collection and acquisition activities of foreign entities
from at least 23 countries. Analysis of updated information indicates
that of those identified countries, 12 are assessed to be most actively
targeting US proprietary economic information and critical
technologies. This list has not changed since the 1996 Annual Report on
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage.
Foreign collection continues to focus on US trade secrets and S&T
information products. Of particular interest to foreign collectors are
dual-use technologies and technologies which provide high
profitability.
The FBI National Security Division's Awareness of National Security
Issues and Response (ANSIR) Program brings to the attention of U.S.
corporations their potential vulnerability to classic and economic
espionage, as well as other national security concerns. In each of the
FBI's 56 field offices, there is a Special Agent assigned as the ANSIR
coordinator who deals directly with the corporate security directors in
their region.
Through ANSIR, the FBI has undertaken several initiatives. ANSIR-
FAX is a facsimile transmission system for the dissemination of
unclassified counterintelligence and terrorism threat warning
information to approximately 25,000 corporate directors. ANSIR-FAX is
used to provide corporate America with updates on economic espionage.
Briefings have been provided to American corporations overseas.
Corporate security directors and other personnel in Australia, Ireland,
New Zealand, Panama, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have received
briefings on economic espionage. Local and national government
officials in the Czech Republic, Austria, the Slovak Republic, and
Hungry were also briefed.
Examples of some recent Economic Espionage Cases are:
Pittsburgh: On December 7, 1996, the first arrest under the new law
occurred in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Patrick Worthing and his brother,
Daniel, were arrested by FBI agents after agreeing to sell Pittsburgh
Plate Glass (PPG) information for $1,000 to a Pittsburgh agent posing
as a representative of Owens-Corning, Toledo, Ohio. Both subjects were
charged under Title 18 United States Code, Section 1832 (18 U.S.C.
1832; Theft of Trade Secrets). On April 18, 1997, due to his minimal
involvement, Daniel Worthing was sentenced to six months of home
confinement, five years probation, and 100 hours community service. In
June 1997, Patrick Worthing was sentenced to 15 months in jail and
three years probation.
Philadelphia: On June 14, 1997, Hsu Kai-lo and Chester H. Ho,
naturalized U.S. citizens were arrested by the FBI and charged with
attempting to steal the plant cell culture technology to Taxol,
patented and licensed by the Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) Company. On
July 10, 1997, a Federal Grand Jury for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania returned indictments, totaling eleven counts against Hsu,
Ho, and Jessica Chou (a Taiwanese citizen who was actively involved
with Hsu in attempting to obtain the Taxol formulas). Hsu and Chou are
employed by the Yuen Foong Paper Manufacturing Company of Taiwan, a
multinational conglomerate. Ho is a professor at the National Chaio
Tung University and the Institute of Biological Science and Technology
in Taiwan. Chou remains in Taiwan. Two of the eleven counts were
violations of Title 18 U.S.C. 1832. Taxol is a billion dollar a year
industry for BMS. The foreign market share is estimated to be $200,000.
Potential losses could have been in the billions of dollars over the
ten year period BMS holds the patent for the plant cell culture
technology.
Cleveland: On September 5, 1997, Pin Yen Yang, and his daughter
Hwei Chen Yang (aka Sally Yang) were arrested on several charges,
including Title 18 U.S.C. 1832. Also charged is the Four Pillars
Company, which has offices in Taiwan, and a registered agent in El
Campo, Texas. It is alleged that the Four Pillars Company, Pin Yen
Yang, Sally Yang, and Dr. Ten Hong Lee were involved in a conspiracy to
illegally transfer sensitive, valuable trade secrets and other
proprietary information from the Avery Dennison Corporation, Pasadena,
California, to Four Pillars in Taiwan. Dr. Lee, who is at present not
charged and is cooperating with investigation, has been an Avery
Dennison employee since 1986, at the company's Concord, Ohio facility.
Dr. Lee allegedly received between $150,000 and $160,000 from Four
Pillars/Pin Yen Yang for his involvement in the illegal transfer of
Avery Dennison's proprietary manufacturing information and research
data over a period of approximately eight years. Direct development
costs of technology transferred during this time is estimated to be in
the tens of millions of dollars.
On October 1, 1997, a Federal Grand Jury returned a 21 count
indictment, charging Four Pillars, Pin Yen, and Sally Yang with
attempted theft of trade secrets, mail fraud, wire fraud, money
laundering, and receipt of stolen property. On the same date, Dr. Ten
Hong Lee plead guilty to one count of wire fraud and promised continued
cooperation with the investigation.
Memphis: On October 3, 1997, the Memphis Division arrested Steven
Louis Davis, who was indicted in the Middle District of Tennessee on
five counts of fraud by wire and theft of trade secrets. Wright
Industries, the victim company and a sub-contractor of Gillette, had
fully cooperated with the FBI's investigation. Although the FBI knows
that Davis reached out to one foreign owned company (BIC), it is
unclear if he was successful in disseminating trade secrets overseas.
The FBI, however, has learned that a competitor in Sweden had seen the
drawings of the new Gillette razor. The case is pending.
Buffalo: Harold C. Worden was a 30-year employee of the Eastman
Kodak Corporation who established his own consulting firm upon retiring
from Kodak. Worden subsequently hired many former Kodak employees and
stole a considerable amount of Kodak trade secret and proprietary
information for use at his firm. The market share at risk could have
been in the billions of dollars. As a result of investigation, Worden
signed a plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western
District of New York in which he pled guilty to one felony count of
violating Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2314 (the Interstate Transportation
of Stolen Property). Worden was sentenced to one year imprisonment,
three months of home confinement with monitoring bracelet, three years
of supervised probation and a fine of $30,000. Investigation is
continuing in this matter. For additional information concerning the
Harold Worden case, see attached press release and judge's remarks at
sentencing.
Boston: This case involved unauthorized intrusion into a voice-mail
system by a disgruntled former employee. The victim was Standard
Duplicating Machines Corporation (Standard), whose main competitor was
the U.S. affiliate, Duplo Manufacturing Corporation of Japan (Duplo).
John Hebel was employed by Standard as a field sales manager from 1990
to 1992, when he was terminated. Through an unsolicited phone call from
a customer, Standard discovered Hebel had accessed Standard's phone
mail system and had used the information to compete against Standard.
Hebel was employed by Duplo at the time of the intrusions.
A civil suit was brought against Duplo by Standard with a final
settlement of close to one million dollars. On November 6, 1996, Hebel
was charged with one count of violating Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1343
(Wire Fraud). On March 14, 1997, Hebel was sentenced to two years
probation.
Recent press accounts have highlighted the high financial risk of
economic espionage to American businesses, communities and jobs. The
American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS) reported this month to
the FBI that over $30 billion in American intellectual property were
``placed at risk'' from attempted theft in 1996 alone. Over 270
separate incidents were confirmed in the ASIS study. ASIS presently is
finalizing its results for publication this year.
international drug trafficking
The President has stated in PDD-42 that international organized
come and drug trafficking are a threat to national security. A
Presidential Directive, however, is not required to convince law
enforcement and the citizens of the United States that the trafficking
in illicit drugs is a serious threat to all aspects of our daily lives
and consequently to our National Security.
Unlike traditional threats to national security, the drug threat is
not the result of the political agenda of a terrorist group or foreign
government. Instead, it is perpetuated by criminal enterprises that
conduct a myriad of egregious acts of violence, corruption, fraud,
murder and extortion, all generated by personal greed and a quest for
power. Extremist groups or foreign powers have yet to cause the level
of devastation to our communities and affect the fabric of our society
as that due to illicit drug trafficking.
The rippling effects of the political and/or economic
destabilization of other countries by drug trafficking organizations
indirectly impacts on our nation's security. Drug trafficking and
international organized crime groups often attempt to thwart
enforcement action by bribing or threatening foreign government
officials. In some instances, entire governments or sectors of
governments operate as criminal enterprises, using the appurtenances of
the state for illicit purposes. The United States is not immune to the
political, moral and societal debilitation that has occurred in other
countries due to the distribution of criminally obtained assets to buy
assistance or ensure ignorance from corrupt government officials.
The goal of the FBI's drug program is to identify, disrupt and
dismantle core trafficking organizations by attacking their command and
control structures. This is most effectively accomplished by using the
Enterprise Theory of Investigation, wherein the FBI conducts long-term,
sustained investigations targeting and exploiting all criminal
activities being conducted by the organization in furtherance of their
drug trafficking enterprise. Drug trafficking organizations do not
limit their criminal activity to Title-21 violations. They also commit
crimes of violence such as drive by shootings to eliminate rival
traffickers and kidnapping for ransom to settle unpaid drug debts. They
engage in concerted efforts to corrupt public officials and they commit
financial crimes to launder the illegal gains of their criminal
activity. The Enterprise Theory promotes a coordinated, multi agency
environment which allows law enforcement to attack criminal
organizations on multiple fronts, identifying and exploiting
vulnerabilities throughout the command and control structures of the
organization. The Enterprise approach also enables Federal Prosecutors
to utilize the Federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act and theContinuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE)
statutes. These prosecutorial tools carry maximum sentences for the
leaders of these enterprises.
The FBI has demonstrated the effectiveness of this drug strategy
through the dismantlement of the major drug trafficking Organization of
Juan Garcia Abrego (JGAO) which is a drug trafficking group based in
Matamoros, Mexico. The JGAO was headed by Juan Garcia Abrego, who is
presently incarcerated serving eleven life sentences in the U.S. for
drug trafficking, conspiracy, money laundering and operating a
continuing criminal enterprise. Before his arrest Abrego had an
estimated net worth of $300 to $400 million, and was described as ``the
owner of Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico.''
The FBI's drug program is structured to investigate and prosecute
illegal drug manufacturers and distributors, provide assistance to
other law enforcement agencies and strengthen international
cooperation. By concentrating resources on major areas of drug
trafficking the FBI is also able to enhance its intelligence base and
make informed projections of the future of the drug threat.
Southwest border
The FBI is currently focusing on the Southwest Border, Caribbean
Basin and emerging Asian, Russian and Nigerian Organized Crime groups
which we believe present the most significant drug threats to our
country. I will briefly summarize the situation in each area and
describe the ongoing FBI initiatives in place to address each threat:
Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations are among the most numerous
and pose the most significant crime threats facing the United States
today, due to their domination of polydrug trafficking across our
Southwest Border. The pervasive corruption of Mexican law enforcement
institutions and the increased threat of corruption of U.S. law
enforcement coupled with violent acts in furtherance of drugs and
weapons trafficking drug related gang violence and the overall effect
that drugs have on our economy and banking institutions effectively
constitute a threat to our national security. The FBI has identified
seven major Mexican drug trafficking organizations that pose the
greatest threat to the Southwest Border of the United States. Needless
to say there are numerous lesser known organizations which pose
problems for law enforcement at all levels These Mexican drug/criminal
enterprises import the majority of the cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and
a growing portion of the methamphetamine entering the United States.
The activities of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations present
pervasive crime problems which impact upon virtually every region of
the U.S.
The FBI plays an, integral role in the Southwest Border Project,
which is a comprehensive investigative and prosecutive strategy
targeting the major Mexican drug trafficking organizations. It features
the FBI, DEA, DOJ, USCS, and U.S. Attorney's Offices, as well as state
and local law enforcement agencies working in concert to attack the
complex organizations on a multi-disciplined level. This initiative
continues to have significant successes in identifying and disrupting
core organizations, as well as secondary organizations providing
transportation, distribution, and money laundering services throughout
the United States. As a part of this project, the FBI leads several
Corruption and Violent Gang Task Forces along the Southwest Border. Our
case successes are typified in the total dismantlement of the Surenos
13 Street Gang in Albuquerque, NM and the Logan Street Gang in San
Diego, CA, both of which feature youths capable of the most vicious
murders and violence.
Most recently, the FBI indicted Ramon Arellano Felix one of the
leaders of a major Mexican drug organization known as the Arellano
Felix Organization. The FBI Southwest Border Project, in coordination
with the FBI's Safe Streets Initiative, conducted an investigation
which spanned several years and resulted in an arrest warrant for Ramon
Arellano Felix for conspiracy to import cocaine and marijuana. On
September 11, 1997, Arellano Felix became the 451st person placed in
the FBI's ``Top Ten Most Wanted'' fugitive list. Intelligence indicates
that this action by the U.S. Government has adversely impacted Ramon
Arellano Felix's ability to move freely in Mexico and other countries.
It is a matter of time before he is brought to justice.
Another success was ``Operation Reciprocity'', a multi-
jurisdictional, multi-agency drug investigation conducted by the FBI,
DEA, and U.S. Customs Service which targeted various cells of the Amado
Carrillo-Fuentes Organization (AFCO) in ten U.S. cities. The operation
which was initiated in October, 1996, was based upon information
received from an FBI source who identified a money laundering cell of
the AFCO operating in New York. As a result of the evidence developed
in this matter, 53 high-level operatives of the AFCO were arrested on
various charges including conspiracy, distribution, money laundering
and importation. During this case, 7.4 tons of cocaine was seized along
with 2,794 pounds of marijuana and over $11 million in U.S. currency.
The FBI is a major contributor to other international counter
narcotics initiatives including the U.S. Mexico Bilateral Task Forces
vetting and operations, High Level Contact Group on Mexico, Mexican
Organized Crime Unit vetting and training Mexico's Sensitive
Investigative Unit and Resolution Six which assigns FBI agents to DEA
foreign offices.
The Caribbean
U.S. law enforcement agencies estimate that up to one third of all
U.S. bound cocaine is smuggled through the Caribbean basin. As many as
nineteen Caribbean drug trafficking organizations have been identified
by United States law enforcement as significant drug trafficking
threats. Puerto Rico is the gateway to the mainland as a U.S. territory
and is used as the major transshipment point for narcotics destined for
New York City and other East Coast destinations. The significant drug
trafficking organizations operating in the Caribbean are predominantly
Dominican, Jamaican and Colombian groups. These groups maintain
contacts with both the South American suppliers and the U.S. based
distributors of the drugs. Caribbean Criminal Enterprises have emerged
as a significant threat to the United States because of their ability
to transport large quantities of cocaine and Colombian heroin; their
emergence as both wholesale and retail drug distributors along the
eastern seaboard; and their propensity to use violent criminal activity
such as murder, extortion and kidnaping to further their criminal
activity. They also move enormous sums of money through ``customer
friendly'' Caribbean banks.
The scope and magnitude of emerging Caribbean criminal activity was
recognized by Attorney General Janet Reno two years ago when she
ordered that a comprehensive crime survey be conducted and the
implementation of a coordinated comprehensive inter-agency
investigative strategy be constructed to addresses all aspects of
Caribbean based criminal activity. A key feature of the Caribbean plan
is the establishment of the FBI managed Information Coordination Center
(ICC) under the HIDTA structure to fully exploit tactical and strategic
criminal intelligence which is developed and shared on an inter-agency
basis and intended to focus on major organizations operating in the
region. The ICC also serves as a clearing house for tactical
information which triggers deployment of enforcement assets. There have
been several notable successes attributed to the ICC this year. On 2/
10/97, an ICC source provided information which led to the interdiction
of 823 kilos of cocaine off the coast of Cabo Rojo, PR. On 11/10/97, a
different ICC source furnished information which led to the
interdiction of approximately 1,140 kilograms of cocaine. Several
federal fugitives have been located and apprehended as a result of
information disseminated by the ICC. An ICC source has contributed
significantly to a major DEA drug trafficking investigation, which led
to the seizure of property valued at over one million dollars and the
arrests of 15 individuals.
The FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Customs
Service and other U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies are
committed to a coordinated effort under HIDTA and have dedicated
additional field office resources to Caribbean matters which have
enormously improved investigative support in the Caribbean. For example
in 1997 and 1998, the FBI has assigned forty-nine additional Special
Agents and additional support personnel, formed three additional
Resident Agencies on the island of Puerto Rico and dedicated
significant additional resources to address the growing Caribbean crime
problem. The new Resident Agencies are designed to be joint operations
of the FBI, Police of Puerto Rico, DEA, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which will
address violent crime, gangs and drug traffickers. Joint drug squads
between the DEA and the FBI have been created and already proven to be
highly effective.
Other FBI counter drug efforts have been focused in the area of
emerging crime groups, such as Asian Criminal Enterprises, Nigerian
Criminal Enterprises, and Russian/Eastern European Organized Crime, all
of which pose an increased threat to the nation. These organized crime
groups and other emerging criminal enterprises represent an increasing
economic, criminal, and public safety threat. They are involved in a
myriad of crimes including heroin smuggling, money laundering, loan
sharking, murder and fraudulent financial schemes. As a result of these
emerging crime groups, the FBI has established specific initiatives to
address these new, yet significant, crime problems. To address the
Nigerian Criminal Enterprises (NCE), efforts are underway to: establish
task forces in U.S. cities which have been identified as having ongoing
NCE crime problems, to establish a joint U.S./United Kingdom (U.K.)
working group to exchange information regarding NCEs, and to coordinate
FBI participation in the Combined Agency Border Intelligence Network.
Wehave also adopted measures to acquire greater linguistic capability
in the African dialects to support investigations of these groups.
Although disrupting and dismantling major trafficking organizations
continues to be among our top priorities, the increase in drug related
violence and the emergence of violent, drug trafficking street gangs in
the early 1990's led to the initiation of the FBI's Safe Streets
Initiative in 1992. Under the Safe Streets Initiative, the FBI is
successfully targeting violent, drug trafficking street gangs through
the establishment of long-term, proactive task forces.
international organized crime
I would like now to turn my attention to the area of International
Organized Crime (IOC). The FBI defines an organized crime group or
enterprise as a continuing, self-perpetuating criminal conspiracy,
having an organized structure, fed by fear and corruption, and
motivated by greed. These groups have established hierarchies, are
criminally diverse, organizationally mature, and multi-jurisdictional
in their operations and influence.
IOC is an immediate and increasing concern not only for U.S. law
enforcement, but also for the worldwide law enforcement community. IOC
groups are engaged in a myriad of criminal activities that include:
murder, extortion; corruption of public officials; bribery; drug
trafficking; money laundering; financial fraud; kidnaping;
prostitution; arms smuggling; and alien smuggling.
The widespread political, economic, social and technological
changes and advances occurring within the last two decades have allowed
IOC groups to become increasingly active worldwide. These criminal
organizations are exploiting the increased ease of international
travel, liberalization of emigration policies, expansion of free trade,
high technology communications and sophisticated money laundering
techniques to further their criminal efforts. The ability of IOC groups
to adapt to these changes has hindered law enforcement efforts against
them.
The FBI's approach to combating IOC includes: (1) aggressive
investigations targeting IOC groups operating in the U.S.; (2) general
and specialized law enforcement training for foreign law enforcement
agencies; (3) the development of working group relationships with
selected foreign police agencies in an effort to address the increasing
threat of international organized crime; and (4) the operation of a
sound Legal Attache Program.
The FBI places IOC groups into three categories: (1) Russian/
Eastern European/ Eurasian (R/EE/E) Organized Crime Groups; (2) Italian
Organized Crime Groups; and (3) Asian Criminal Enterprises.
R/EE/E criminal groups will pose a significant domestic problem for
the U.S. in the future if they are not checked by law enforcement
efforts. Russian Federation Ministry of Interior (MVD), Organized Crime
Control Department (OCCD) officials report the existence of over 8,000
R/EE/E criminal groups. There are allegedly over 150 ethnic-oriented
criminal groups, including the Chechens, Georgians, Armenians and
Russian ethnic Koreans. Russian authorities also report the existence
of some 750-800 Russian so-called ``Thieves-in-law'', the
``Godfathers'' of the Russian Mafia.
To date, R/EE/E criminal groups in the U.S. have shown an ability
to work closely with established American criminal elements, including
the American La Cosa Nostra, Italian OC groups, and drug trafficking
organizations. In addition, as law enforcement efforts against
established OC groups in the U.S. become increasingly successful, it is
possible that the R/EE/E criminal elements will move to fill the voids
left by the other criminal groups.
Unlike some of the other ethnically-oriented OC groups that arrived
in this country, the R/EE/E criminal groups appear to gravitate at an
earlier stage toward complex criminal activities, such as gasoline tax
frauds, cyber security, bankruptcy fraud, insurance frauds, and health
care industry frauds. That level of sophistication, coupled with a
documented tendency toward violence, indicates that the R/EE/ E
criminal groups could be on the way to becoming significant criminal
elements in the U.S.
R/EE/E criminal groups in the United States are most visibly
organized in the major metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Philadelphia, New York, Newark, Boston and Miami. Factions
of this criminal group have aligned themselves with the New York LCN
families in certain criminal activities. While the so-called ``Russian
Mafia'' appears to prefer economic crimes such as credit card,
insurance and gas excise and other tax fraud for larger schemes, they
also engage in extortion, robbery, theft, murder, and drug trafficking.
Vyacheslav Kirillovich Ivankov is the only high level Russian
organized crime leader known to have taken up residence in the U.S.
Ivankov arrived in the U.S. in March 1992, reportedly to establish
control of and direct Russian/Eurasian organized crime activities in
the U.S. In 1995, Ivankov and five of his associates were arrested by
the FBI in New York on federal charges of conspiracy to commit
extortion. Much of the predication for this investigation was provided
by the Russian MVD and the Canadian RCMP. In 1996, Ivankov was
convicted and sentenced to a 9 year and 7 month term of incarceration.
Ivankov was clearly one of the most notorious Russian organized crime
figures operating at that time. Although he was based in New York, his
criminal enterprise was truly global and posed serious threats to a
number of countries.
The threat to the U.S. posed by Italian OC groups centers around
their drug trafficking and money laundering activities. The four
Italian Organized Crime (OC) groups currently active in the United
States are the Sicilian Mafia, Camorra, 'Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona
Unita (United Sacred Crown). Italian OC groups regularly cooperate with
other international organized crime groups in the trafficking of drugs
and other criminal activities. Their influence extends to parts of
Europe, Asia, North America, South America, the Caribbean and
Australia.
Italian OC members and associates in the United States are presumed
to be involved in criminal activities, both on an independent basis and
in conjunction with members of the American La Cosa Nostra (LCN). Most
of the Italian OC affiliates in the United States are concentrated in
the northeast; however, there is also significant Italian OC presence
in Florida, Southern California, and selected areas of the Midwest and
mid-Atlantic regions.
Italian OC enterprises have been involved in heroin trafficking for
decades and were the primary importers of heroin into the U.S. prior to
the Pizza Connection case in the early 1980s. In addition,
investigations have documented Italian OC involvement in cocaine
trafficking, often in collaboration with Colombian drug cartels.
The FBI works closely with international law enforcement agencies
to address Italian OC. For example, in 1991 the FBI initiated a joint
investigation with Italian police services, the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police and Colombian judicial authorities. This investigation targeted
members of the Sicilian Mafia, Camorra, and 'Ndrangheta who were
collaborating with Colombian drug cartels in the shipment of cocaine to
Italy and heroin to the U.S. This successful investigation resulted in
the arrest of 89 people in the U.S., Italy, Canada and Colombia. Thirty
people have been convicted in the U.S. alone and 50 individuals are
currently on trial in Italy. As recently as November, 1997, several FBI
agents traveled to Italy and testified at this trial.
The term Asian Criminal Enterprises (ACE) incorporates the
definitions used by the FBI to refer to Asian Organized Crime and Asian
Drug Trafficking Organizations. ACEs include Chinese Triads, criminally
influenced Tongs, the Japanese Boryokudan, Vietnamese criminal groups
and Korean criminal groups.
ACEs have emerged as a significant criminal force in the U.S. and
have displayed a considerable degree of violence in perpetrating crimes
such as murder, extortion, drug trafficking, kidnaping, gambling,
prostitution, weapons smuggling, money laundering and armed home
invasions.
ACEs are involved in a wide range of criminal activities that
transcend national and international boundaries. Many of these
enterprises bear allegiance to parent organizations in Asian countries,
necessitating a close working by the FBI relationship with foreign law
enforcement agencies where these groups are based.
The first priority of the law enforcement community pertaining to
IOC operations is the dismantling of these groups through coordinated
international and domestic investigations. With the growing
international nature of organized crime, law enforcement agencies must
continue to find innovative ways to develop a concerted, cooperative,
and global attack on the spread of organized crime.
conclusion
On July 26, 1998, the FBI will celebrate its 90th birthday. The FBI
has been a remarkable institution for many reasons, not the least of
which has been its ability to remake itself to address new challenges
to U.S. national security and criminal justice. On behalf of the men
and women of the FBI who work tirelessly toward protecting the American
people against the threats we are discussing here today, I wish to
thank this Committee for its support. I am certain that our efforts
will justify your commitment and confidence in this important area of
the FBI's responsibility.
Chairman Shelby. Our next witness will be Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Phyllis
Oakley.
Secretary Oakley.
Mrs. Oakley. Thank you, Chairman Shelby, Senator Kerrey,
Members of the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity
topresent the views of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, I&R. And I will certain shorten my already short remarks.
Let me just begin by saying that thanks to the
effectiveness of American diplomacy, military readiness and
intelligence capabilities, the dangers of nuclear attack,
large-scale conventional military attack and other threats to
our national existence are low. Most of our citizens are quite
safe most of the time and in most places around the globe. Our
world has become safer, but it certainly is not yet safe
enough.
We just ensure that we do our utmost to preserve that
safety, and in the State Department, of course, our focus is
providing information as quickly and as efficiently as we can
to support all of our diplomatic operations overseas.
The Committee's call for an annual review and ranking of
threats to our national security serves, as I'm sure you
intended, as a useful prod to reconsider how best to deploy our
intelligence resources.
This year's fresh look at the array of threats we face
produced the following observations:
First, although we could and did rank the threats and
priority order, we continued to believe that all of the threats
listed, from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
to international terrorism, the behavior and intentions of
specific countries, are sufficiently important to warrant
attention from both the intelligence and policy communities.
Second, we concluded that progress in certain areas made it
appropriate to rank threats differently than we had in 1997.
Accordingly, the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction joins terrorism at the top of our list. Iraq has
moved up in the ranking of problem states, and North Korea has
been accorded a lower, but still dangerous, ranking.
Let me just make a few brief comments. Certainly we believe
the spread of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose a
serious threat to US national interests at home and abroad.
Iraq's obstruction of UN Special Commission inspectors
underscores the need for continued vigilance. Political
incentives and opportunities for WMD proliferation are greatest
in the Persian Gulf and South Asia. North Korea, China and
Russia are the principal targets of acquisition efforts by
countries seeking WMD capabilities. The latter are also the
most active purveyors of WMD-related equipment and technology.
I think I don't need to dwell in Iraq, and I'll certainly
be happy to answer any questions that you have about that
later.
We agree that Russia continues to pose special problems,
and we cannot underestimate Russia's continuing capabilities.
And I think for us the greatest concern is this porosity of
Russia's military-industrial infrastructure and the prospect
for unauthorized transfers of materiel, equipment, know-how and
technologies.
For China, we certainly viewed that there had been positive
steps regarding China as a producer of nuclear, chemical and
missile related equipment. However, we have--there has not been
equivalent progress in other areas, particularly in the
ballistic missile field.
Terrorism, we remain deeply concerned about it. Terrorism
originating in the Middle East continues to pose the greatest
danger to US citizens and interests. The region remains home to
four of the seven officially designated state sponsors of
terrorism--Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya. It's also the locus of
violent opposition groups which regularly employ indiscriminate
terrorism as part of their campaigns to overturn policies and
regimes.
I think the last point I want to make is about the Asian
financial crisis. It has--I think we're all aware of the
advantages to the United States of globalization. But the
current financial crisis in Asia has highlighted a number of
vulnerabilities that while not on a par with traditional
threats to the security of our nation, have a direct or
indirect impact on American interests, though I certainly would
say that it's too soon to know exactly how various sectors will
be affected.
As I said at the outset, the world has become safer, but it
is not yet safe enough. Potential threats to the security of
our nation and to individual Americans remain unacceptably
high, and require our continued vigilance, intellectual rigor
and working together to reduce them.
Thank you.
[The prepared statements of Mrs. Oakley and General Hughes
follow:]
Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Phyllis E. Oakley
Chairman Shelby, Senator Kerrey, Members of the Committee. I
appreciate this opportunity to present the views of the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) on current and
projected threats to our national interests. Happily--and thanks to the
effectiveness of American diplomacy, military readiness, and
intelligence capabilities--the danger of nuclear attack, large-scale
conventional military attack, and other threats to our national
existence is low. Most of our citizens are quite safe, most of the
time, and in most places around the globe. Compared with threats in our
own recent past and with those currently facing many nations, the
threats we face today are less direct and more diffuse.
Our world has become safer, but it is not yet safe enough.
Individual Americans are vulnerable to terrorism, international crime
and criminal acts in other countries the perils associated with
narcotics and other illicit drugs, and to diseases transmitted over
long distances by tourists, migrants, and business travelers. On any
given day, millions of our fellow citizens are living or traveling
outside the United States many of them are in regions subject to ethnic
or religious tensions, political instability, and environmental risk.
We cannot protect all Americans from all dangers but we most remain
vigilant and aggressive in our efforts to identify and eliminate
threats to our safety as well as our security. This work involves more
than just gathering intelligence on potential adversaries and
buttressing our defensive and deterrent capabilities; it requires
vigorous effort to anticipate and ameliorate threats to all of the
national interests and goals articulated and in the administration's
Strategic Plan for International Affairs.
I recognize that the primary purpose of this hearing is to define
and prioritize direct threats to the national security of our country,
but before doing so I want to note the contribution that intelligence
can and must make to the attainment of our national objectives. Failure
to attain these objectives may be caused as much by what we do to
ourselves--by failing to act or overlooking opportunities--as by
foreign efforts to thwart or threaten us. History tells us that a
vacuum of power invites aggression or mischief Intelligence must
identify not just the threats we face, but the hidden opportunities,
the weaknesses of allies, and the strengthening or crumbling of foreign
powers. Thus, threats and opportunities, critically linked to each
other, must be considered in the context of our international
objectives.
The International Affairs Strategic Plan published by the
Department of State last September lists the following foreign policy
goals:
Secure peace, deter aggression, prevent, defuse, and
manage crises; halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
and advance arms control and disarmament;
Expand exports, open markets, assist American business,
foster economic growth, and promote sustainable development;
Protect American citizens abroad and safeguard the borders
of the United States;
Combat international terrorism, crime, and narcotics
trafficking;
Support the establishment and consolidation of
democracies, and uphold human rights;
Provide humanitarian assistance to victims of crisis and
disaster, and
Improve the global environment, stabilize world population
growth, and protect human health.
The first, third, and fourth of these goals address traditional
threats to the security of our country and our citizens and will be
discussed further in the pages that follow, but there is an important
sense in which failure to advance any and all of these objectives
entails dangers for the United States. To achieve these goals,
decisionmakers, diplomats, the military services, and the law
enforcement community must have timely, accurate, and correctly
interpreted intelligence. That is why the Department has made Support
for Diplomatic Operations a priority.
We must ensure that our diplomats have access to intelligence when
they need it and where they need it. Diplomacy is moving increasingly
fast and is increasingly mobile--intelligence must keep peace. The
Department of State has been working with the Intelligence Community to
identify innovative ways to harness technology to provide intelligence
support to our Chiefs of Mission, diplomats, and negotiators, both on
the road and at fixed locations. Intelligence is often called a ``force
multiplier'' with respect to the military; the same is true for
diplomats. Timely, tailored, all-source intelligence can increase our
diplomatic readiness and allow our diplomats to face challenges, seize
advantages, and identify opportunities in our complex global
environment.
The Committee's call for an annual review and ranking of the
threats to our national security serves, as I'm sure you intend, as a
useful prod to reconsider how best to deploy our intelligence
resources. This year's fresh look at the array of threats, challenges,
and opportunities we face produced the following observations. First,
although we could and did rank the traditional (and some
nontraditional) threats in priority order, we continue to believe that
all those noted below--from the proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction to international terrorism, and from the behavior and
intentions of specific countries to environmental degradation and eco-
migration--are sufficiently important to warrant attention from both
the intelligence and the policy communities.
Second, we concluded that progress in certain areas (e.g., the
start of Four Party Talks on the Korean Peninsula and the decline in
the number of terrorist incidents directed at Americans) made it
appropriate to rank threats differently than we had in 1997.
Accordingly, the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
joins terrorism at the top of our test, Iraq has moved up in the
ranking of problem states, and North Korea has been accorded a lower--
but still dangerous--ranking.
Third, INR's position on the frontline of Support to Diplomatic
Operations and the Secretary of State's mandate to deal simultaneously
with challenges and opportunities in every corner of the globe continue
to require that we deploy our resources to ensure both global coverage
and attention to the entire array of international affairs strategic
goals. The net result is that, although we have assigned relatively
more people--albeit still very small numbers--to coverage of the
highest priority threats, our small size--I have only 170 analysts to
cover all countries and issues--means that in INR the difference
between the number of people covering high- and low-priority topics is
small.
With that as prologue, I will now turn to the discussion of threats
to US national security.
proliferation concerns
The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to pose a
serious threat to US national interests at home and abroad. We have
seen some encouraging signs over the past year, but Iraq's obstruction
of UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors underscores the need for
continued vigilance. Effective diplomatic intervention, informed by
targeted and timely intelligence, is the key to limiting the transfer
of critical technologies and equipment.
To halt the spread of WMD, the United States and its partners must
both alleviate underlying regional tensions and instabilities and
address the motives and mechanisms of potential suppliers. Political
incentives and opportunities for WMD proliferation are greatest in the
Persian Gulf and South Asia. Entities in North Korea, China, and Russia
are the principal targets of acquisition efforts by countries seeking
WMD capabilities. Entities in these three countries are also the most
active purveyors of WMD-related equipment and technology.
Iraq
Saddam Hussein continues to defy United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) resolutions and to test the resolve of the international
community in general and the United States in particular. As UNSCOM and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicated in their
respective October 1997 reports, substantial gaps remain in Iraq's WMD
declarations. We do not yet have a complete understanding of Iraq's
past WMD programs and remaining capabilities.
There should be no doubt that Saddam will try to rebuild his WMD
programs at the earliest possible opportunity. There should also be no
doubt that Saddam will attempt to capitalize on perceived differences
of opinion among our allies on this issue. His recent efforts to
exploit French and Russian diplomatic initiatives to loosen the
sanctions regime are only the latest examples of such behavior.
Russia
Half a decade into the post-Cold War era, Russia continues to pose
special challenges to US national security interests. The good news is
that the dramatic political transformation of the former Soviet Union
and the development of a cooperative relationship between the US and
Russia have made it extremely unlikely that the Russian government
would attack the United States or our allies; detargeting has reduced
the danger of accidental launch, and existing command and control
safeguards make unauthorized launches both difficult and unlikely.
Budgetary problems and the difficulties inherent in reforming the
Russian military establishment also have reduced Russia's capability to
endanger US interests. Bilateral strategic arms control agreements are
gradually reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in both our
countries' arsenals.
Nevertheless, we should not underestimate Russia's continuing
capabilities. Russia maintains significant nuclear strike capability.
Largely owing to the same budgetary problems that have reduced the
overall Russian threat to US interests, Russia has abandoned its policy
of ``no-first-use'' and is relying more than ever before on nuclear
deterrence to compensate for its diminished conventional capabilities.
START II remains unratified, and though Russia ratified the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) last year, its CW stockpiles are enormous and
their destruction poses staggering ecological and economic challenges.
Moreover, very real concerns persist about the porosity of Russia's
military-industrial infrastructure and the prospect for unauthorized
transfers of materials, equipment, know-how, and technologies. The
leakage of missile technology and expertise from Russia's industries to
Iran has underscored this serious proliferation concern. Events over
the past year have demonstrated the ability of would-be proliferators,
notably Iran, to exploit Russia's missile development infrastructure.
If allowed to continue, access to Russian technology and expertise will
enable the Iranians to develop and field intermediate range ballistic
missiles faster than if they were left to their own devices.
The President last summer appointed Ambassador Frank Wisner as his
special envoy for this issue. Ambassador Wisner has met with Russian
counterparts several times since then, most recently on January 12-13.
The Russian government has taken initial steps--and made commitments to
take substantial additional steps--to crack down on Russian entities
supplying missile technology to Iran.
Fissile material in the former Soviet Union
Although we are heartened by reports of enhanced security at
several Russian nuclear installations, and by the decline since 1994 in
known smuggling incidents, we are by no means at a point where we can
speak of the inherent dangers in the past tense. We continue to regard
the possible acquisition of fissile materials and technology by
aspiring proliferators as a very real threat with potentially
catastrophic consequences.
Russia's nuclear weapons control system remains equal to the task.
We have no evidence that any Russian nuclear weapon is unaccounted for.
Russia's security system for fissile material suffers from a lack of
funds, modern equipment, and trained personnel. Joint US/Russian
efforts to strengthen Russia's nuclear material security and
accountability system, such as those being pursued under DOE and DOD
assistance programs, continue to play an important part in efforts to
rectify the most serious shortcomings, and significant progress has
been made. Initiative and persistencewill be essential to ensuring
Russia and the other NIS live up to their commitments to illicit
trafficking before it starts.
Chemical and biological weapons technology in the former Soviet Union
Russia's remaining chemical and biological warfare capabilities
pose an additional set of concerns. With losses in government funding
on the civilian side of the programs, many of the institutes which
developed and produced the Soviet Union's chemical and biological
weapons have faced serious problems and shortages of paying contracts.
As in the aerospace industry, some face temptations offered by would be
proliferators. Even seemingly innocuous ties between Russian chemical
and biological institutes and their counterparts in other countries
could hold the potential for conveying expertise in weapons of mass
destruction. This is particularly true in the biological sciences,
where medical and other scientific research can easily--and without
detection--veer off into research on biological warfare agents. The US
has a number of programs designed to help these institutes and their
employees convert these skills to production in civilian work. These
programs have had a positive impact on the Russian scientific
community.
China
As a major producer of nuclear, chemical, and missile-related
equipment and technology, China has a responsibility to subscribe to
internationally accepted nonproliferation standards. Successive
administrations have worked to bring China's behavior into line with
international norms. We have made significant progress with China in
the nuclear area over the past few years. China took steps in 1997 to
develop more effective administrative oversight of its nuclear industry
by promulgating nuclear export control legislation. China joined the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) exporter committee. China also
started the process for adoption of comprehensive dual-use export
controls.
China appears to be living up to its commitment--publicly offered
in May 1996--not to provide assistance to any unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities. This commitment is especially important because of China's
past assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. China also has
significantly curtailed its nuclear cooperation with Iran. While this
cooperation was fully consistent with China's Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) undertakings and subject to international safeguards, we
nevertheless have found the cooperation troubling because of its
ability to support a nuclear infrastructure and contribute indirectly
to Iran's effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, China has not made equivalent progress in other
areas. At least until mid-1997 Chinese entities have been the main
source of supply for Iran's CW program. In May 1997, the United States
imposed trade sanctions on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and
materially contributing to Iran's CW program. Over the past year, China
has made some progress in addressing the gaps in its export-control
policies, but some key loopholes remain. Specifically, we have urged
China to control the 20 Australia Group (AG) precursors not on the CWC
schedules, and AG-controlled chemical production equipment, regardless
of its end-use, and to adopt catch-all controls.
China has agreed to abide by the ``guidelines and parameters'' of
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and has committed not to
transfer ground-to-ground MTCR-class missiles. But China does not
appear to interpret its responsibilities under the MTCR guidelines as
strictly as the US and other MTCR members. By all indications China has
taken itself out of the business of exporting complete ballistic
missiles. This is an important step--one that has slowed the process of
military destabilization in South Asia and the Middle East. But it is
not enough. We would like to see China upgrade its commitments to
current MTCR levels and implement effective export controls.
Last year, Beijing created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a
separate division to address all arms control and proliferation issues.
We hope this development marks a turning point by introducing an arms
control and global security perspective into the export oversight
process. The Chinese have agreed to conduct regular dialogues at the
senior level on arms control, global security, and nonproliferation.
This dialogue will provide continuing opportunities to press our case,
to review Chinese commitments, and to address specific problems as they
arise.
Transfers of modern Chinese anti-ship missiles to Iran are
particularly troubling. China last fall agreed to end sales of anti-
ship missiles to Iran and reiterated this commitment during Secretary
Cohen's recent visit. The administration is reviewing, but has not yet
decided, whether the number and type of transfers to date trigger
sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act.
North Korea
The North Korean nuclear program remains frozen under continuous
IAEA monitoring in accordance with the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework.
However, we continue to have concerns about the North's missile
program. North Korea has been a leading supplier of missile technology
since the mid-1980s and is developing longer-range missiles. Of
greatest immediate concern is the North's 1,300-kilometer-range No Dong
missile. Though not capable of reaching the US, this system permits the
North to target Japan and the entire southern half of the Korean
Peninsula from deep within North Korean territory. But we must not be
complacent about the current low threat posed directly to the
continental United States--North Korean engineers are developing other,
more capable systems. The Intelligence Community will continue to
monitor the potential North Korean ballistic missile threat to the US
and report on any significant changes.
Unlike Russia and China, both of which have agreed to abide by MTCR
guidelines and parameters, North Korea has yet to accept any
constraints on its willingness and proven ability to sell missiles and
missile technology. US diplomats met with the North Koreans in 1996 and
1997 to discuss our concerns about their missile program and exports,
and we hope to meet with them again soon. Unless and until Pyongyang
agrees to restrict sales, it must be regarded as a dangerous
proliferator, not least because missile sales generate badly needed
foreign exchange and constitute one of the few significant bargaining
chips available to a regime determined to do whatever it takes to
survive in a world it perceives as hostile.
Iran
Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems have continued during the past year. Iran has made
some progress in its missile and chemical weapons programs, but it
apparently has yet to realize significant and tangible advances in its
nuclear program.
Iran's missile development work has captured global attention and
raised significant international concerns. Tehran has had Scud-type,
short-range missiles since the mid-1980s. Now there are clear
indications that Iran is developing a medium-range missile that
eventually will permit Tehran to project military power far beyond its
borders and to hold targets--including US troops and allies--at risk
throughout the Middle East. Iranian attainment of enhanced missile
capabilities will introduce a new element of instability into an
already troubled region. As noted above, Iran has received assistance
from Russian aerospace firms and enterprises.
South Asia
South Asia remains one of the few places in the world where
potential adversaries have the capability of using nuclear weapons
against each other, although the possibility of war currently is
remote. Neither India nor Pakistan is prepared to subscribe to
international regimes such as the NPT or the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), preferring to maintain a deterrent by keeping open the
``option'' of using nuclear weapons. Both countries have continued
increasingly public efforts to develop ballistic missiles. India is
producing the short-range Prithvi and continuing to develop the longer-
range Agni. Pakistani officials have vowed to have the capability to
respond to such systems; the Pakistani press recently noted efforts to
develop and deploy a 1,500-km missile to counter the Agni.
The United States has made control and eventual resolution of the
proliferation problem in South Asia one of its highest priorities for
the region. Attaining our goals in this regard will not be easy--strong
Support exists in both countries, and Indian and Pakistani governments
historically have been reluctant to take steps necessary to address US
concerns. India and Pakistan's intense rivalry, and Indian suspicions
about China, cause both to pursue aggressive indigenous development and
foreign acquisition programs.
Threat posed by proliferation of advanced conventional weapons
We also are concerned about the spread of Advanced Conventional
Weapons (ACW), particularly to the seven state sponsors of terrorism
(Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba). Although such
weapons are unlikely to be used directly against the US, they have the
potential to threaten US allies and US forces deployed abroad. For this
reason, and because such transfers have the potential to destabilize
regional balances, we monitor efforts to sell or acquire ACW, consult
regularly with other governments and implement relevant sanctions laws
as part of the effort to control exports of advanced weapons and
technology.
terrorism
We remain deeply concerned over the threat that international
terrorism poses to US officials, citizens, and property, both abroad
and at home. The most serious anti-US attack last year occurred in
November when four US businessmen were gunned down in Karachi by
unknown assailants shortly after the guilty verdict was handed down
against Mir Kasi for his 1993 attack at CIA headquarters. Even when
terrorism is not aimed directly at us, it can have a devastating impact
on our broader political objectives, particularly efforts to resolve
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Terrorism originating in the Middle East continues to pose the
greatest danger to US citizens and interests. The region remains home
to four of the seven officially-designated state sponsors of terrorism
(Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya). It is also the locus of violent
opposition groups which regularly employ indiscriminate terrorism as
part of their campaigns to overturn policies or regimes. It was a
matter of luck that no Americans were killed or injured in the November
random massacre of more than 60 tourists at Luxor, Egypt. The
apparently growing willingness of extremists to inflict large numbers
of casualties reinforces fears that terrorists in the Middle East may
be tempted to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.
Tensions that feed terrorism remain high in the region, especially
in the Persian Gulf and over the stalled Middle East peace process.
Hamas last year claimed responsibility for three suicide bombings in
Jerusalem that killed 24--including two American citizen bystanders--
and wounded several hundred. Renegade Saudi terrorism financier Usama
bin Ladin has issued more public threats against the United States. He
remains in Afghanistan in areas controlled by the Taleban. Terrorism is
rampant in Algeria's internal struggle.
Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 1997.
In April, a German judge found an Iranian and three Lebanese guilty of
the 1992 murders of Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Berlin's ``Mykonos''
restaurant, declaring that the killings had been approved at the most
senior levels of the Iranian government. Last year Tehran assassinated
at least 12 dissidents outside Iran, all in northern Iraq. Despite the
recent conciliatory comments of new Iranian President Khatemi, Iran has
continued to provide support--money, weapons, and training--for a
variety of Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah,
Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jidhad (PIJ). Tehran has encouraged
violent rejection of the Middle East peace process. In September the
new government reaffirmed the 1989 ``fatwa'' against author Salman
Rushdie.
American interests also are at risk in regions outside the Middle
East. In Colombia leftist guerrillas are increasingly active, in 1997
they conducted the most attacks ever against oil pipelines, partly
owned by US corporations. The guerrillas also facilitate coca and opium
cultivation and the production of cocaine and heroin much of which is
subsequently smuggled to the US by traditional traffickers. The risk of
terrorist attack remains a prime concern to SFOR elements securing the
peace in Bosnia.
the drug trade and international organized crime
The illicit international drug trade and the powerful international
crime syndicates that control it and myriad other illegal activities
pose serious threats to US security. In addition to having many adverse
effects on American society, the drug business corrupts foreign
governments at the highest levels, undermines judicial systems, and
distorts economies. Greater ease of travel and telecommunications makes
it easier for international criminals to expand and conceal their
empires.
The key drug threat to the US remains the Latin American cocaine
trade. Coca grown in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia is processed into
cocaine largely in Colombian laboratories and reaches the US market via
a number of smuggling routes, still principally through Mexico. In
addition to cocaine, heroin from Colombia and methamphetamines from
Mexico are gaining prominence in the drug threat from Latin America.
When traveling abroad, Americans are at risk from violence associated
with narcotrafficking. For example, Colombia was plagued by increased
violence from guerrilla and rightist paramilitary groups that exploit
the drug trade for money, and Mexico has seen a surge of narcotics-
related violence by traffickers, particularly in northern states that
serve as drug corridors to the United States.
The other major locus of the drug threat is Asia. Opium and heroin
production is concentrated in Burma and Afghanistan, where US influence
is extremely limited. Regimes in both countries appear to be tolerating
the drug business to shore up local political support and to prop up
their economies.
The expansion of international organized crime increases the threat
of physical violence to US citizens and businesses both at home and
abroad. American companies are disadvantaged when companies linked to
international organized crime secure contracts, export licenses and
customs exemptions, often through payoffs to corrupt officials.
Additionally, international organized crime has a destabilizing
influence on countries that are important to US national security. It
robs emerging democracies of badly-needed revenues, taints their reform
process, and undermines popular confidence in government at all levels.
Organized crime is also heavily involved in financial fraud schemes
and money laundering, as well as the international trafficking of
narcotics, aliens, and weapons, including to the United States. The
smuggling of weaponry to regional trouble spots further contributes to
instability in these areas. Growing ties among foreign criminal groups
further facilitates illegal activities. The underworld contacts,
clandestine networks, and extensive finances of international organized
crime organizations also raises the possibility that they could obtain
and sell nuclear weapons or their components.
threats against our economic interests
Dangers inherent in the global economy
The United States benefits greatly from participation in the global
economy, but globalism entails risks as well as rewards. The current
financial crisis in Asia has highlighted a number of vulnerabilities
that, while not on a par with traditional threats to the security of
our nation, have a direct or indirect impact on American interests.
Increasing dependence on foreign markets makes American firms and
workers vulnerable to economic difficulties far beyond our borders. It
is too soon to know precisely which crops, products, firms, and regions
of the United States will suffer most from greater budgetary discipline
in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and other affected economies, but
that some will be seriously disadvantaged is certain. American mutual
funds (many with a large component of pension funds) invested in Asian
markets have already taken a big hit, as have American sales to
companies no longer able to obtain the necessary financing. Likely
consequences for the United States include slower growth, constraints
on the creation of new jobs, and lower wages.
Covertly-obtained intelligence is not a particularly helpful source
of information for understanding the psychology of markets. The
Intelligence Community has no role in providing assessments and
insights to the private sector actors who make most of the key
decisions shaping the course of events. Policymakers, like business
leaders, want and need analytical judgments and informed predictions on
such questions as whether the contagion has been contained, what impact
economic difficulties will have on societies and political systems, who
else might be vulnerable, and what impact cutbacks in military budgets
will have on the military capabilities of allies and regional balances.
It would be easy to extend the list of questions, but my point here is
simply to note that economic--like environmental--vulnerabilities and
threats are far more numerous, complex, and difficult to anticipate
than are traditional threats to our national interests. The threats and
their impact are real and obvious. Less apparent is what role, if any,
the Intelligence Community should play in addressing such dangers.
Economic espionage
The overseas operations of US corporations are increasingly vital
to this country's prosperity. US proprietary secrets are vulnerable to
targeting by domestic corporate spies and overseas intelligence agents,
either performing classic private industrial espionage or linked to
foreign government attempts to boost national technical knowledge. The
increasing value of trade secret information and technology in the
global marketplace has increased and motivated foreign firms and some
governments to conduct economic espionage and information collection
against the United States. During the past year, the US Intelligence
Community has identified suspicious collection and acquisition
activities of foreign entities associated with at least 23 countries.
Unfair foreign competition
Unfair foreign competition is another threat to US interests. The
profits involved in large infrastructure, military, and aircraft
contracts lead to cut-throat and sometimes unfair competition. In
December, the 29 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and five additional countries signed an anti-
bribery convention. If the convention is ratified and enforced, this
now-recognized threat to American competitiveness will be alleviated,
but we foresee a continuing role for the Intelligence community in
monitoring compliance.
countries with global impact: russia and china
Russia and China are each undergoing dramatic social transitions
that complicate our efforts to assess trends and anticipate their
future roles. We have had successes in building constructive relations
with both countries, but many actual and potential problems require
continuing attention.
Russia
Russia's evolution remains uncertain. New institutions,
personalities, and habits of behavior continue to take hold, even as
others looking more to the past remain strong in some areas, such as
the Duma and the defense industrial establishment. Early in the year a
revitalized Yeltsin brought new impetus to reform by the appointment of
young reformers to positions of authority in the government. By the end
of the year, however, the Russian political scene became increasingly
dominated by infighting among factions and competition for access to
privatized state property. Yeltsin's intermittent absences from the
helm because of illness accentuated the sense of policy drift. The
coalition of political and financial leaders that worked to bring about
President Yeltsin's reelection in 1996 splintered. This falling out was
accompanied by a slowing of progress toward social and economic reform.
Among the reform programs identified by the new Russian team in
spring 1997--land, tax, legal, and military reforms as well as
repayment of back wages and pensions and adjustment of center-regional
relations--military reform has progressed the most, with
reorganizations of military commands already under way. But military
reform continues to face bureaucratic resistance. The tax code, sent to
the Duma in the spring of 1997, has been returned for further work;
land reform was discussed at a high-level meeting in December but
continues to be hobbled by Duma resistance; legal reform has made
little progress; the government claims that it paid back wages and
pensions in 1997, largely by forcing some big tax debtors to pay their
arrears, but continued grumbling suggests that problems remain. Center-
regional relations continue to be marked by unilateral initiatives by a
number of provincial governments. Although negotiation has replaced
violence as the principal mechanism for resolving the differences
between Moscow and Grozny, differences over Chechnya's status continue
to divide the two parties. They have agreed to settle the question of
Chechnya's status by 2001.
Economic stabilization brought declining inflation, a stable ruble,
and the end to a decade-long decline in economic output. For now,
Russia appears to have weathered the potential crisis in confidence
that accompanied Asian financial instability, but reserves have fallen
and government predictions for 1998 indicate little or no growth.
Inconsistent direction on government policy in 1997 meant that Russia
spent another year in its slump. Only a revitalized, engaged president
can make 1998 a better year than the past six.
President Yeltsin's and Foreign Minister Primakov's year-end
interviews indicated the Yeltsin government continues to see Russian
interests better served by engagement and cooperation than by isolation
or confrontation. The best example of this over the last year was
Moscow's decision to sign the Founding Act with NATO. This fall the
Russian parliament ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Russia
continues to adhere to START I and CFE. The Russians also continue to
play an active role in SFOR in Bosnia.
However Primakov has highlighted Russia's support for the notion of
a multi-polar world, which is intended to counter what many Russians
profess to see as US unilateralism. START II, CTBT, and Open Skies
still await ratification by the Russian parliament. While the Yeltsin
government continues to support the sanctions regime against Iraq and
the need for UNSCOM inspections, it has argued the need to show Baghdad
``a light at the end of the tunnel.'' On the nonproliferation front, we
are actively engaged in discussions to prevent any export of materials
or know-how associated with WMD and ballistic missiles. Though Russia
is now far less able to project power beyond its borders and to
challenge Western interests, economic realities are such that Russia
perceives the need to export arms in order to maintain its arms
industry, and Moscow continues to try to expand sales to old and new
customers alike. If done indiscriminately, such sales have the
potential of fueling regional tensions or exacerbating regional arms
races.
We remain both concerned and encouraged with the state of Russia's
strategic nuclear forces. Moscow continues to maintain a significant
strategic nuclear force. But it has become increasingly clear that the
Russian strategic nuclear force will continue to shrink in size as
Moscow finds it cannot afford to maintain the kind of ballistic missile
force the Soviet Union once had, and other strategic modernization
programs, such as the next-generation submarine-launched ballistic
missile, continue to suffer delays owing to wage shortages and R&D test
failures.
Further, while the Russian strategic command and control and early
warning system is functioning adequately, it is clearly showing its
age. Equipment breakdowns in this system could force Moscow to rely on
less reliable long-range strategic warning indicators that, without
clear and transparent political-military signals from the US, would be
likely to increase Moscow's uncertainties during an escalating crisis.
Despite these problems, nuclear forces are playing a larger role in
Russian security as military reform muddles along and defense budgets
are cut. Statements by senior national security officials seem to
confirm that Russia continues to look toward its nuclear weapons as a
deterrent against a variety of conventional and nuclear military
threats, including formally dropping the Soviet ``no first use''
declaration in 1993. This emphasized reliance on nuclear weapons to
deter even conventional threats is a graphic symbol of the weakness in
Russia's conventional military forces. Given the anticipated time
required to complete its military reform plans, Moscow probably will
continue to rely heavily on its nuclear forces for years to come.
China
Constructive partnership between the US and China is central to the
peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Over the past year, we
have revitalized our dialogue with high-level Chinese leaders,
highlighted by the visit to the US in late October of President Jiang
Zemin. We still have many unresolved issues and continue to hold
sharply different views on important matters, including human rights,
religious freedom, political expression, and freedom of association. We
plan to expand cooperation where possible and to work seriously on
areas where we have differences. Among the unresolved issues in our
relationship is that of nonproliferation. Through intensive dialogue,
we have reached a mutual understanding on a number of nonproliferation
issues, but disagreements continue over Chinese sales and technological
cooperation on potentially destabilizing weapons systems in sensitive
regions.
China continues to have the largest standing army in the world and
is steadily modernizing its ground, air, and naval weapons and tactics.
We must be attentive to China's growing military capabilities, as
demonstrated in the 1996 combined-forces exercises in and around the
Taiwan Strait.
China's military modernization continues at a steady pace, and
Beijing during the past year strengthened its arms-import relationship
with Russia. China is replacing its aging naval fleet with new
domestically-produced ships and submarines, and recently took delivery
of a third Kilo-class submarine and finalized a deal to purchase two
Russian naval destroyers that could be armed with modern SS-N-22
SUNBURN anti-ship missiles. While this growth in naval capability bears
watching, the gradual pace of Chinese modernization is having only a
marginal impact on the current naval balance in the region.
Though military and civilian leaders both agree that economic
modernization has priority over military development, China is embarked
on a ballistic missile modernization program. Although China's ICBM
force will remain considerably smaller and less capable than those of
Russia and the United States, Beijing views this modernization effort
as essential to maintaining a credible deterrent force.
China is expected to remain primarily a land-based ballistic
missile power, but continues to look at sea-based platforms and land-
attack cruise missiles as additional means of delivery. In the next 20
years, the number of Chinese ballistic missiles capable of reaching the
continental United States will increase marginally. The greatest
growth, both in numbers and capabilities, is expected to be in China's
short-range SRBM force--the M-9 and M-11.
We anticipate that the many transformations under way in China for
the past two decades will continue into the next century. The
cumulative effect of economic, political, societal, technological, and
military change will produce a China that is more powerful and, if we
are successful, more tightly integrated into global systems. We are
likely to see positive results from the impact of participation in the
global economy, exposure to information and ideas from around the
world, and the proliferation of shared interests which is intrinsic to
modernization everywhere.
middle east states: iraq, iran, libya, syria
Several Middle Eastern states threaten us by maintaining programs
for weapons of mass destruction, sponsoring terrorism often targeted
specifically at Americans, and by their hostility toward and active
opposition to our political and social systems and those of our friends
and allies. Assurance of energy security is critical to the political,
economic, and strategic interests of the US and its allies.
Iraq
As dramatically seen over the past several months, with Saddam
Hussein in power, Iraq continues to threaten regional stability and
pursue aims contrary to our national security interests. Iraq's refusal
fully to disclose its WMD capabilities, retention of a potent
conventional military, and support for terrorism against dissidents
threaten countries and peoples in the region and jeopardize a wide
array of US objectives. The 1994 movement of troops toward Kuwait and
the 1996 offensive in Irbil, violations of no-fly zones in September-
November 1997, the ongoing confrontation with UNSCON, and blatant
threats to the UNSCOM U-2 all attest to Saddam Hussein's continued
disregard for the will of the international community.
Baghdad threatens US interests not only with its military forces
and blatant defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, but also
through its attempts to manipulate broader Arab opinion against the US
in a variety of ways. This could greatly complicate and jeopardize the
attainment of US objectives in the region. It is no accident that much
of his propaganda during his recent challenge against UNSCOM has been
directed against the United States. In northern Iraq, Saddam wishes to
exclude the international community's involvement, and at the UN he has
sought to undermine every effort to ensure UN enforcement of, and Iraqi
compliance with, various aspects of UNSCR 687.
Iran
We are encouraged by the election of President Khatami, who
promises a more relaxed atmosphere at home and espouses the
implementation of international law and cooperation abroad, but we
remain concerned about several aspects of Iran's behavior that pose
threats to US interests. Moreover, we are not yet able to determine how
much Khatami is able or willing to address priority US concerns,
foremost of which is Iran's support for terrorist groups opposed to the
Middle East peace process. These include Hizballah in southern Lebanon,
and Hamas and the PIJ, whose terrorist attacks in Israel have taken
many lives, including those of some Americans. We also are concerned
about Iranian support for Islamic extremists in other parts of the
Muslim world, and activities such as Iranian surveillance of US
entities abroad. Finally, Iran has considerable WMD capabilities,
particularly extended-range missiles and chemical weapons, and is
continuing its efforts to enhance those capabilities, which already
pose a substantial threat to neighboring states and to US installations
in the region.
Libya
Despite repeated disclaimers and deceptions, the Qadhafi regime
continues to support terrorist groups--including support for the PIJ
and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). It continues to develop WMD,
particularly CW and missiles. Libya opposes the Middle East peace
process. Libya also seeks to exploit differences between Washington and
allied capitals on how to bring to trial those implicated in the
destruction of Pan Am 103.
Syria
Syria has been engaged in the Arab-Israeli peace process since the
1991 Madrid conference and has not been directly involved in planning
or executing international terrorist attacks since 1986. Nevertheless,
Syria continues to support international terrorism by allowing
terrorist groups to maintain a presence in Damascus and operate from
Syria-controlled areas of Lebanon. Some of these groups include
fundamentalist and secular Palestinian organizations, such as Hamas,
the PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFL-GC), as well as non-Palestinian groups, such as the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Syria acquired from the former Soviet
Union standard SCUD-B missiles, with a range of 300 kilometers, and a
smaller number of 500 kilometer SCUD-Cs from North Korea, it has had a
CW program since the mid-1980s. While there is no indication Syria is
planning to initiate a conflict with Israel, there is always a danger
that Syrian-Israeli tensions could lead to hostilities through
miscalculation by either side, particularly over the fighting in
southern Lebanon.
hot spots and uncertainties: bosnia/balkans; africa; north korea; south
asia; the aegean; cuba
Bosnia/Balkans
NATO and SFOR have proven their value in carrying out the
successful international military intervention ending the military
conflict in Bosnia and enabling implementation of the Dayton Peace
Agreement. The main threat to peace now stems not primarily from a
resumption of conflict among the three formerly warring armies, but
from the obstruction by Bosnia's leaders of certain aspects of civilian
implementation of the peace agreement, especially the return of
displaced persons and refugees to minority areas, apprehension of
fugitive war criminal suspects, economic rehabilitation, and
establishment of fully functional, truly democratic institutions.
Bringing intelligence to bear on these issues has been difficult, but
novel structures and processes to ensure its proper application have
been devised, and the need for it remains critical if the US and its
partners are to establish a stable, enduring peace in Bosnia.
The situation in Serbia (especially in Kosovo and increasingly in
Montenegro) remains volatile. The potential for conflict between ethnic
Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is considerable, oppressed Kosovars
increasingly resort to violent resistance to Serbian abuses of human
and civil rights. A Kosovo eruption could still ignite international
conflict, spilling potential refugees into The F.Y.R.O.M. and/or
Albania--which has pulled back only slightly from the edge of the
precipice of economic and social disintegration. Democracy remains to
be realized in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, and is still in transition
in Bulgaria and Romania. In the former three, political pluralism,
peaceful and effective transfer of power, and more responsive political
leaderships remain to be established.
Africa
Patterns of behavior stemming from the regional and civil conflicts
which dominated important parts of Africa in 1997 make the continent a
dangerous and unpredictable arena in 1998. Cross-border interventions,
touted by many Africans as legitimate defensive behavior, seemingly
have superseded the OAU principle of nonintervention and increased the
prospect of additional inter-state conflict.
African leaders are now both more willing and more able to project
force across national borders in pursuit of national interests. A
coalition of African states supported Kabila's ouster of Mobutu.
Kabila's government in Congo (Kinshasa) has not yet demonstrated that
it can draw together the many disparate elements of the country which
borders on none others, some of which are competing for dominant
influence. The stability of Nigeria, Africa's most populous state, is
increasingly shaky as its military leader maneuvers to transform
himself into an elected civilian president by next October. In Liberia,
the election last July of Charles Taylor as president has not stilled
concerns about the former warlord's inclinations toward repression at
home and adventurism in neighboring states.
Tensions also are increasing in southern Africa, particularly
Angola, which is finding it difficult to tie down the loose ends of a
peace accord ending the long struggle with UNITA. To undercut regional
support to UNITA, Luanda has intervened in Congo (Brazzaville) to
return Sassou to power, and is pressing democratically elected
officials in shaky Zambia to cut off aid to Savimbi.
The civil war in Sudan is now in its 14th year, having taken the
lives of 1.5 million people and forced 2 million more from their homes.
The regime in Khartoum continues to provide haven and support to
terrorists while sponsoring insurgent groups intent on destabilizing
neighboring regimes.
Ethnic and civil wars have caused millions of people to flee for
refuge and helped to further erode the sanctity of national borders.
Interconnected insurgencies in Rwanda and Burundi and related unrest in
eastern Congo (Kinshasa) define a large area in the center of Africa
where regimes seem powerless to stem the bloodshed or are inclined to
engage in unacceptable behavior toward certain groups. As a
consequence, there is a continuing likelihood of resurgent genocide.
North Korea
North Korea's military continues to be a threat to US and South
Korean forces, although the steady deterioration of the North Korean
economy and crumbling infrastructure, as well as another year of
critical food shortages, have further undercut Pyongyang's ability to
wage a sustained conflict. Despite reports of executions of some
ranking officials, the political situation appears stable, with Kim
Jong II fully in charge. Late last year, Kim assumed the title of
general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party. Diplomatically, the
situation has improved marginally. The North Koreans have entered four-
party talks with South Korea, China, and the US; are moving to improve
relations with Japan; and appear prepared to re-engage Seoul under the
new administration of Kim Dae Jung.
South Asia
South Asia is an area of multiple and growing US interests. Tension
between India and Pakistan, centered on their dispute over Kashmir,
contributes to concerns over regional instability. The proximity of two
populous, mutually suspicious states, each seemingly convinced that
nuclear weapons are an essential attribute of major power status, makes
this one of the world's more troubling regions. The originalmotive for
India's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capacity--a perceived threat
from China--remains salient to Delhi. Pakistan continues its own
nuclear program because of its security fears of a larger India.
India continues to charge that Pakistan supports Kashmiri Muslim
secessionists, while Islamabad contends it provides only moral support.
Though the Kashmir dispute remains a possible flashpoint for regional
war with the potential to escalate into a nuclear exchange, tensions in
the region have eased somewhat in recent years.
Fighting continues in Afghanistan, a country riven by ethnic,
tribal, ideological, and regional differences. International mediation
efforts have not yet resulted in a political settlement; the United
States continues to support the ongoing UN-led effort to help the
Afghans establish a broadly representative government. Afghanistan
remains a focus for meddling by neighbor states, a narcotics
trafficking center, a source for international terrorist training and
equipment, and hence a major source of regional instability.
The Aegean
Tensions between Greece and Turkey have almost led to open conflict
in the recent past and could easily do so again, whether over the
installation of air defense missiles on Cyprus by the Greek Cypriots,
competing claims involving tiny islets, or accidental clashes and hair-
trigger military exercises. Failure to find a real, long-term solution
on Cyprus and in the Aegean could raise tensions, undermine both NATO
and EU expansion (because of Turkish and Greek vetoes), and cause
serious problems in the Middle East peace process and in US relations
with Russia, which is becoming a major arms supplier to Cyprus.
Cuba
The threat that Cuba poses to US interests stems primarily from the
potential consequences of its own political and economic rigidities
rather than its past promotion of subversion or its faded attraction as
a model for other states and movements. An aging--and possibly ailing--
Fidel Castro refuses to make any concessions toward a more open
political system, and Cuba's overall human rights record remains the
worst in the hemisphere. Cuba's economy continues to founder, with a
dismal performance in the vital sugar sector largely nullifying gains
in tourism and nickel exports, and there is no sign of significant
reform in the domestic economic structure. With no real provision for
succession (beyond much of the same, only with Raul Castro at the
helm), the departure of Fidel could usher in a period of serious
instability under an inevitably less charismatic leader, possibly
leading to further mass migration and internal violence.
threats to democracy and human rights
The United States seeks to increase governments' adherence to
democratic practices and respect for human rights, not only because we
seek to promote these values, but also because they contribute to
regional stability. Bosnia is a current example of where democracy
promotion, human rights protection, and prospects for regional
stability are closely linked. While the Dayton Peace Agreement goals of
a reintegrated and viable Bosnian state have yet to be realized, 1997
did see a modest decline in short-term instability and the staging of
peaceful elections. Although the main instigators of the Bosnian
genocide remain at large and continue to pose a long-term stability
concern, their political power base has been eroded. Moreover the War
Crimes Tribunal has increased the number of Balkan war criminals it has
under detention and has several trials under way--a clear sign of
international interest in implementing justice against those
responsible for mass killings and regional instability.
humanitarian assistance and forced migration
Ethnic tensions, social inequity, lack of access to farmland and
water, poverty, and political disfranchisement often lead to violent
civil unrest, if not warfare. As cities in poor countries increase in
population and poverty, social instability could intensify. US efforts
to promote sustainable development are based on recognition of the link
between poverty and political instability, and the responsibility of
international lending and development agencies to reduce this threat.
Effective humanitarian assistance in response to complex
emergencies may help to stem forced migrations within and across
international boundaries--itself a destabilizing force as witnessed
over the last several years in the border region of Rwanda and eastern
Congo (Kinshasa). Early warning and preventive measures could minimize
the deployment of peacekeeping troops, including US forces, to manage
the consequences of a war-induced humanitarian crisis.
threats to the environment, stabilized world population growth, human
health
Environment
A key goal of US foreign policy is to protect the United States and
its citizens from environmental degradation. Under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change agreed to in December 1997 in Kyoto,
Japan, developed countries committed themselves to legally binding
action to lower the threat of global warming through proposed cuts in
greenhouse gases, as measured against 1990 levels. In contrast, most
developing countries did not commit to any targets. There is broad
scientific agreement that, left unchecked, global warming over the next
century would have such adverse impacts on the United States as coastal
flooding from sea level rise, volatile weather fluctuations with both
costly droughts and flash floods, and loss of sensitive habitats,
particularly the Everglades.
World population growth
From a mid-1997 population of about 5.8 billion, the world total is
expected to rise to about 8 billion by 2002--an increase of over 2
billion that takes into account already declining birth rates. Almost
all of this increase will be found in developing countries, where about
85% of the world's population will live. Many of these countries
currently fail to meet even minimum needs of their populations,
requiring annual food donations and other international assistance
merely to subsist. In addition to producing the tragedy of growing
numbers without adequate health care and education and with poor job
prospects, rapid population growth is likely to lead to substantial
increases in the number of frustrated young people able to move across
boundaries. Many born in rural areas will move to cities; many living
in poor countries will attempt to move to wealthier countries,
including the United States. With few opportunities, many could well
contribute to ethnic tensions, civil unrest, crime, and violence.
Reducing disease worldwide
The plight of Hong Kongs chickens at the end of December provides a
lesson in the problems of managing the ever-present threat of
infectious diseases that can affect all parts of the globe. Hong Kong's
``bird flu'' may have been imported along with poultry from China, just
as the United States imports many of its foodstuffs from countries
where food-borne disease monitoring is woefully inadequate. Hong Kong's
dense population provides a congenial urban environment for disease
transmission--as do most cities in the world. Finally, Hong Kong is a
``global city'' with international transportation connection--including
direct connections to many US cities--that ensure rapid worldwide
diffusion of any disease. Bacterial and viral diseases are both durable
and mutative ensuring they will never be completely eradicated.
Improved monitoring and rapid response is essential to curb this threat
to the health of Americans.
______
Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency-Global Threats And Challenges: The Decades
Ahead
Mr. Chairman, I am again pleased to have the opportunity to provide
the Defense Intelligence Agency's perspective on the threats and
challenges confronting the United States now and in the decades ahead.
The testimony I provided before the Committee last February
reflected the extensive analysis done by the Defense Intelligence
Community in support of the Joint Strategy Review and the Quadrennial
Defense Review. The conclusions drawn from that effort were based on
our understanding of the most important trends and factors shaping the
international security environment over the long term. Much of what I
testified to last year remains valid. The ``headline'' events of the
past year--confrontation with Uraq, developments in Bosnia, NATO
expansion, unrest in Central Africa, the troubled Middle East peace
process, rogue state efforts to acquire advanced weapons, and the
economic crisis in Asia--reinforce the central themes from that
testimony:
The turmoil and uncertainty that have characterized international
affairs since the end of the Cold War will last at least another
decade. During this transition period, the United States will continue
to face a dynamic, complex, and uncertain security environment.
The ``bi-polar'' (Cold War) security framework has given way to a
more generalized global set of partners, potential competitors, and
adversaries, the troubling proliferation of ``negative'' technologies,
and the advent of numerous persistent small-conflict circumstances. US
security policy planners and operators must reexamine their viewpoints
and re-think the circumstances in order to understand this new and
evolving global paradigm.
Despite our tremendous power and influence, threats and threatening
conditions exist today. Others will emerge over time. The most
important of these involve challenges posed by competing regional
powers, including a host of very complex and demanding local, regional,
and transnational circumstances and conditions.
The combined impact of rapidly advancing technology and human
ingenuity will continue to alter the nature of warfare and the
characteristics and capabilities of future threats. This change could
be very positive given the right circumstances, but the potential,
indeed the trend, for continued proliferation of missile technology
weapons of mass destruction, and related capabilities, is negative and
of growing concern.
critical assumptions
In attempting to analyze this uncertain environment, we make two
basic assumptions:
The United States will remain the dominant global power--
politically, economically, and militarily--and will continue its active
engagement in world affairs. It either our power or our willingness to
remain globally engaged diminish significantly, then the overview
outlined here would change accordingly.
The future unfolds along discernible (linear) lines, as reflected
in current trends and conditions. History tell us that this will not
occur--at least not in all of the dimensions addressed here. Thus, our
``best estimate'' will no doubt prove partially wrong. In order to deal
with this dynamic, we in Defense Intelligence will continue -to
consider and analyze alternative (nonlinear) futures.
Prolonged turmoil and uncertainty
The objective global conditions that have driven the turmoil and
instability of the post-Cold War era remain largely in effect. The most
important include:
Uneven economic and demographic growth-population in the developed
world remains relatively stable, but the number of people in the
developing world will increase some 25% over the coming two decades.
Rapid urbanization continues throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. Meanwhile, although we expect global economic growth to
continue over the long term (despite recent events in Asia) progress
will be sporadic particularly throughout the so called 3rd World. These
conditions will strain the leadership, resources, and infrastructure of
the developing states. Many will struggle to cope. Some will
undoubtedly fail.
Disparties in wealth and resource distribution--the developed
(mostly northern) world accounts for some three-quarters of global
wealth and consumes the lion's share of the world's resources, with
less than a quarter of global population. Local or regional shortages
of fresh water, arable land, food, fisheries, and energy are already
causing tensions. Resource shortages will be a source of regional
conflict and will retard environmental, health, and economic progress.
These general conditions will not ``improve significantly over the next
decade or so, exacerbating north-south and inter-regional tensions and
contributing to regional instability.
Ethnic, religious, cultural strife--political and cultural entities
will continue to align along ethnocentric, theocratic, and linguistic
lines. Tensions between and among various ethnic groups, and between
them and established governments, will continue. As evidenced by the
genocide in Bosnia, the Great Lakes region of Africa and the former
Zaire, ethnic-based conflict is often brutal and intractable.
Broad technology advances and proliferation--the rapid pace of
technological change is straining the social order in both developed
and developing nations. Technological competition is an increasingly
important aspect of relations between advanced states. The gap between
information and technology ``haves and have-nots'' will become a key
issue for future international relations. Meanwhile, the proliferation
of weapons and other military technologies will alter regional arms
balances and, in may cases, undermine stability.
Uncertain regional and global security structures-the dramatic and
complex changes underway in many regions continue to tax ``Cold War''
security structures precepts, and organizations. Many of these are ill
suited to the new era. As evidenced by the problems and tensions
associated with NATO expansion, the process of adapting old and
developing new structures is proving complex and sometimes
confrontational
International criminal activity--terrorism, drug trafficking, and
other forms for transnational crime will continue as criminal groups
and individuals take advantage of advances in global communications,
transportation, finance, and other favorable circumstances. The
potential for such groups to have access to and to use weaponsthat can
cause large numbers of casualties will increase Countering
international crime will become an increasingly important dimension of
US security policy.
Rogues, renegades, and outlaws--``isolated'' individuals, sub-
national groups, and states--for instance Iraq, Iran, and Libya--will
continue to exist. These ``rogues'' will frequently engage in behavior
outside commonly accepted international norms--violent extremism,
terror, and unacceptable use of military force--as they struggle to
improve their position while undermining the established order.
Western cultural expansion--the global expansion and perceived
dominance of ``western'' (and particularly American) values, ideals,
culture, and institutions is very threatening to some individuals,
groups, and states. Efforts to slow, halt, prevent, or undo this
phenomenon, though generally futile, will give rise to ``anti-
American'' behavior of all kinds. While there is not at present an
ideology that is both inimical to our interests and widely appealing,
one could conceivably arise under the rhetoric of providing a
counterpoint to western culture.
Natural disasters and environmental issues--natural disasters of
all types will continue to occur, often with little or no warning.
Global awareness of the human consequences will keep pressure on
governments and leaders to respond. Meanwhile, mankind's global
activities particularly population growth, resource consumption
pollution, urbanization, industrialization, ``desertification,'' and
deforestation--will increasingly impact climate and weather patterns,
strain fragile ecosystems, and put more pressure on health and social
support systems. All of these issues will take on increased national
security import.
Other critical uncertainties--Russia and China in transition,
Korea's evolution the viability of the nation-state, the outcome of the
Middle East peace process, the future of Bosnia, internecine conflict
in Africa, and an array of upcoming leadership changes, are but a few
of the many key uncertainties which add to the general turmoil in the
global condition.
No condition, circumstance, or power is likely to emerge over the
next decade or two, which is capable of transcending these sources of
uncertainty and instability and establishing a more stable global
order. The international security environment will remain dynamic,
complex, and challenging for US security policy planners and operators.
The new global threat paradigm
During the Cold War, the predominance of the Soviet threat, and the
bi-polar nature of superpower competition, allowed for substantial
continuity in US defense planning and force development. Defending the
`western way of life' against Soviet expansion provided the basic
context for US security policy decisionmaking. Meanwhile, Soviet
doctrine, warfighting concepts, and equipment--combined with Warsaw
Pact-NATO force ratios and mobilization potential, and the unique
terrain and geographic features of Central Europe--provided the basis
for our doctrine, strategy tactics and materiel development, our force
sizing criteria, our equipment, operational, and organizational
requirements, and our functional characteristics. Within this broad
``Soviet threat'' paradigm, other force requirements were generally
considered lesser-included cases, on the assumption that if the US
could handle the Soviets in Central Europe, we could also handle
everything else.
One of the more intriguing aspects of the post Cold War era is that
while the global strategic threat to US interests has diminished
greatly in comparison to the Soviet era, the residual regional and
transnational threats are much more complex and diverse and much harder
to plan for. For instance, Iraq and North Korea, currently our most
likely opponents in a major theater conflict, pose significantly
different challenges in terms of their tactics, equipment, and
capabilities, and the theater terrain and locale. Neither state
presents a pacing technology threat, although it is likely that North
Korea has a limited nuclear capability and the capability to engage in
chemical warfare. Meanwhile, Russia and our European and Asian allies
represent our most important military technological ``competitors,''
but we are not likely to face any of these states in a direct military
conflict during the next ten-to-twenty years. Similarly, our most
pressing current challenges terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other
criminal activity with national security implications--and the biggest
emerging threats--weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile
proliferation--have limited utility as the basis for sizing and
defining future force requirements.
This complexity and diversity presents a unique challenge for
Defense Intelligence: to discern from the general mix of global
political, economic, military, technological, and social conditions, a
specific characterization of extant, emerging, and potential threats
and circumstances. Our efforts to address this challenge and establish
a new threat paradigm center on three general factors:
A recognition of conditions that would threaten US interests--for
instance, the rise of an ideology inimical to US ideals, concepts, and
values, denial of access to key resources and markets; regional or
local instability in areas of US vital interest; and the emergence of
foreign economic, technological, or military capabilities that
undermine our general economic position, or our deterrent and
warfighting superiority.
An understanding of the reasons why peoples, leaders, and states
engage in warfare--to include competition grounded in antiquity,
internal or external pressures on leaders, governments, and states;
competition over access to or control of markets and resources; and
dissatisfaction with present conditions or the perceived ``likely''
future.
An understanding of the interaction between a potential enemy's
capability which we are generally very good at determining;
intentions--which are difficult to anticipate and understand without
indwelling or invasive sources and will . . . which is a function of
evolving conditions, as well as the emotions and perceptions of leaders
and citizens. Will is transient, ephemeral, and nearly impossible to
know with certainty.
Using this general analytic framework, and our assessment of the
key factors shaping the global security environment, we can outline the
three central features of the new global paradigm.
First, it is clear that the bipolar world has given way to a more
generalized multipolar, global set of partners, competitors,
adversaries, and conflict circumstances some of which do not conform to
traditional nation-state or alliance definitions but rather transcend
political boundaries and territorial limitations. We classify these
entities as follows:
Cooperative partners--who generally share US values and usually can
be considered allies (particularly in the military field).
Uncooperative partners--who generally share our values but may at
times be inclined to frustrate our policies to further their own
interests.
Competitors--who are generally neutral regarding our values and
interests, will compete with us in a variety of fora, but are not
military adversaries.
Benign adversaries--who generally conform to contrary values and
interests, but lack the economic or military wherewithal to actively
oppose us.
Renegade adversaries--who engage in unacceptable behavior
frequently involving military force and violence, are current or
potential enemies of the US, and against whom we must consider the
active use of military force.
It is important to note that, circumstantially, a nation-state or
non-state entity can be a cooperative partner, and uncooperative
partner, and even a competitor, concurrently, depending on the issue
and conditions extant.
And finaly--Emergency conditions--usually involving humanitarian
disasters, attempts at ``deconfliction'' of warning groups, and/or the
restoration of civil control--which could require the commitment of our
military forces, often in threatening and sometimes lethal conditions.
Second, the ``traditional conflict spectrum''--ranging from
conflict short of war at the low end, through conventional (both local
and regional) war, to global nuclear war at the high end--remains valid
in that the US military could conceivably engage in operations along
the entire spectrum. However, within the broad spectrum, some
conditions and circumstances are more likely than others:
Operations at the lower end of the spectrum--military assistance
various peacekeeping contingencies, operations other than war, etc.--
are most likely.
Limited local or regional conflict is likely to occur.
Large-scale regional war or global nuclear war is unlikely to
occur.
Chemical and biological warfare will probably occur, generally
within the context of very limited use and very restricted kinds of
conflict.
Terrorism will remain a transnational problem but will mainly be a
factor at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
New (or innovative modifications of old) forms of warfare, many of
which transcend the entire conflict spectrum, are emerging and will
likely be employed (these will be discussed in more detail in the
Future Warfare Trends section).
Informabon warfare--actions taken to degrade or manipulate an
adversary's information systems while defending one's own.
Cybernetic warfare--a form of information warfare involving
operations to disrupt, deny, corrupt, or destroy information resident
in computers and computer networks.
Transnational Infrastructure warfar--attacking a nation's key
industries and utilities--telecommunications, energy and power,
transportation, governmental operations and services, emergency
services, financial, manufacturing, etc.
Asymmetric warfare--attacking an adversary's weaknesses, avoiding
his strengths, while preventing him from doing the same to you, using
asymmetric means such as terrorism.
Asynchronous warfare--a pre-selected or delayed attack on an
adversary taking advantage of the passage of time to develop a
strategic opportunity or exploit a future vulnerability.
Third, the likelihood that several separate events or conditions
will occur simultaneously, or concurrently, over time, thereby
amplifying and compounding their impact. One related aspect of this
phenomenon is that the daily global engagement posture of the US
military will limit the forces and resources available to respond
immediately to multiple crises. Anticipating a threat environment in
which more than one situation will require a direct military response
at the same time is critical to contingency and operational planning.
Beyond this general description of the new global threat paradigm,
we are also able to identify a number of specific threats and
potentially threatening conditions.
The most important of these are outlined below.
Extant, emerging, and potential threats
No state has the potential to match the worldwide strength and
influence of the United States--in terms of combined political,
economic, technological, military, and cultural power--over the next
two decades. However, a select group of states--Russia, China, Japan,
Europe (collectively or a coalition of key European nations), and
India--will likely possess capabilities that are an echelon above other
regional powers and nations. These major powers will routinely exert
influence within their own regions, and in some cases or dimensions,
will also exert influence on a global scale. They will retain unique
capabilities to either assist or frustrate US interests and policies.
Each nation will also continue to compete for regional and global
influence and for access to or control of resources, markets, and
technology. Relations between and among these major powers and the US--
particularly the nature and extent of their competition--will be a
primary factor shaping the future global security environment. In this
regard, there are two potential--though unlikely--developments that
would be especially troubling for the US:
The formation of an anti-US alliance involving two or more of the
major powers or a similar regional alliance led by a single major
power.
An expansion of major power competition from the political-economic
to the military sphere.
Beyond this interaction between the major powers, there are a wide
variety of conditions, circumstances, and individuals who either now
do, or could in the future threaten the vital interests of the United
States. We generally classify these current and potential threats as
either transnational or regional.
key transnational threats and issues
Proliferation
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
missiles, and other key technologies remains the greatest direct threat
to US interests worldwide. More than 20 states are actively pursuing
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), motivated either by regional
competition or the desire to develop a deterrent or counter to the
concomitant superiority of others, including the US.
Nuclear proliferation--both weapons and technology--presents a
continuing significant threat. While nuclear weapons are generally
difficult and expensive to obtain, and counter-proliferation efforts
have been successful to date, we expect the number of nuclear states to
slowly increase into the next century. We are also concerned with the
threat posed by ``peaceful nuclear technology''--due to unsafe or
faulty technical designs, aging facilities, inadequate safeguards and
security, improper handling, etc.--which will grow as more nuclear
technology is used over the coming decades.
Chemical and biological weapons--being generally easier to develop,
hide and deploy than nuclear weapons--will be more widely proliferated
and have a high probability of being used over the next two decades.
The technology and materials to produce relatively sophisticated
chemical weapons are readily available, often as dual-use commercial
items. Many states see chemical weapons as a cost-effective alternative
to developing large conventional capabilities. Biological agents are
more difficult to weaponize, handle and store, but the information and
technology to do so is available. We are particularly concerned about
the increasing potential for chemical and biological weapons use by
sub-national groups or individuals--that are very difficult to identify
and to deter.
Ballistic and cruise missile proliferation presents a growing
challenge to deployed US forces worldwide. While the types of missiles
most likely to be proliferated will be a generation or two behind the
global state of the art, states that acquire them will have increased
(and in some cases unprecedented) capabilities for delivering WMD or
conventional payloads inter-regionally against fixed targets. We are
particularly concerned about two trends:
The significant increase we expect over the next two decades in the
numbers of ballistic missiles with ranges between 300 and 1,500
kilometers.
The potential for land attack cruise missiles to be more widely
proliferated.
Certain key technologies, such as nanotechnology--which allows
advanced functions to be achieved in very small and lightweight form--
are important to the development and effective delivery of WMD.
Information-related technology including encryption, high volume data
handling, complex computational capability and offensive and defensive
information warfare capabilities, are also critical proliferation
concerns.
Terrorism
Terrorism will continue as a global challenge so long as groups and
individuals oppose established political, economic, and social
processes due to perceived ethnic, religious, nationalist, political,
and other forms of discrimination. In some cases, the use of extreme
violence for some identifiable goal will be more criminal and less
political than in the past, blurring the line between terrorism and
common crime. The characteristics of the most effective ``terrorists
groups''--highly compartmented operations planning, good cover and
security, extreme suspicion of outsiders, and ruthlessness--make them
very challenging intelligence targets. The following emerging trends
are particularly noteworthy:
The terrorist threat to the US will increase--both abroad and here
at home--as groups exploit technological advances in communications and
transportation, counterfeiting/forgery, cover and concealment, weapons,
and explosives.
Middle East-based terrorism, which remains the primary politically-
motivated terrorist threat to US interests, will increase over the next
two decades, in part because of growing demographic and resource
tensions.
Many state sponsors will be less active than in the past, but Iran
and private entitles (such as Usama Bin Ladin) will continue to sponsor
a wide range of terrorist activities.
In some cases, such as in Algeria, internal terrorism will threaten
the viability of the national government and will lead to spiraling
violence.
Terrorists groups are becoming increasingly multinational, more
associated with criminal activity, and less responsive to external
influences.
Counterterrorism successes will lead to more ``unknown and new
name'' groups that are less likely to claim responsibility for their
actions.
Advanced and exotic weapons (including WMD) will be increasingly
available and will and intent of terrorists groups to use them will
likely increase. But terrorist capabilities to use such weapons will
remain limited for a number of technological, operational, and other
reasons.
Chemical or biological agents would likely be the choice if WMD
were employed. The Aum Shin-Rykyo chemical attacks are harbingers of
future possibilities.
Narcotics
International drug cultivation, production transport, and use will
remain a major source of instability, both within drug producing,
transit, and target countries, and between trafficking and consumer
nations. The connection between drug cartels, corruption, and
antigovernment activities (terrorism and insurgency) will increase as
the narcotics trade provides an important funding source for criminal
and antigovernment groups. States with weak democratic traditions and
poor economic performance and prospect will be particularly
susceptible. Counternarcotic activities will become more complex and
difficult to discern as new areas of cultivation and transit emerge and
traffickers exploit advances in technology, communications,
transportation and finance. Illicit synthetic drug production in urban
areas is a significant and growing threat.
other international crime
International organized crime will pose an increasing threat to US
interests. Criminal cartels are becoming more sophisticated at
exploiting technology, developing or taking control of ``legitimate''
commercial activities, and seeking to directly influence--through
infiltration, manipulation, and bribery--local, state, and national
governments, legitimate transnational organizations, and business.
Increased cooperation between independent criminal groups, including
terrorist organizations,is likely. We expect that greater interaction
between the US military and federal agencies will be required to
counter this growing threat.
key regional threats and issues
North Korea--a failing state
North Korea remains in crisis. As the pressure builds on the
economy, society, and military, the potential for internal collapse,
instability, and leadership change is rising. Some form of
significant--perhaps violent--change is likely in the next five years.
There are four basic alternatives: leadership change, government
collapse, negotiated accommodation with the South, or major economic
reform. Any of these scenarios will have significant security
challenges for the US.
In the meantime, North Korea's overall military readiness continues
to erode in line with its worsening economic situation. However,
because the North retains significant, forward-deployed strike
systems--artillery, missiles, rocket launchers, and aircraft--it will
maintain its capability to inflict enormous damage on heavily populated
northern areas of South Korea with little or no warning. In fact, over
the next several years Pyongyang's WMlD, missile, artillery, and
special operations force capabilities will likely improve, despite the
dire economic situation. Continued vigilance and readiness, for both
``implosion and explosion'' scenarios, is required.
China--another transition/transformation
China's top priorities will continue to be economic development,
modernization, and domestic political stability. The Chinese regime is
likely to become more responsive to the desires and needs of its
people, but not significantly more democratic or pro-Western. Beijing's
foreign policy will seek to avoid conflict and sustain the trade,
investment, and access to technology that are essential to economic
development. Within this cooperative framework, however, several points
of friction will persist:
The Taiwan issues remains the major potential flashpoint. US policy
supports peaceful evolution in cross-straits relations, but Beijing
believes US policy encourages the independence movement of Taiwan,
deliberately or inadvertently.
Beijing believes the US is bent on containing, dividing, and
westernizing China and will continue to pursue policies designed to
counter perceived US efforts toward that end.
China perceives Japan as its principal Asian regional rival, and
views US-Japanese defense cooperation as helpful only if it limits the
emergence of a long-term Japanese military threat.
Other regional territorial disputes may flare into period crisis.
China's ethnic separatist movements are another potential point of
conflict, especially in Tibet and northwest China.
China's military strategy will continue to emphasize the
development of a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability as a
deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by the United States,
Russia, or India. There is no indication that China will field the much
larger number of missiles necessary to shift from a minimalist,
retaliation strategy to a first-strike strategy.
China's conventional force modernization will continue at a
measured pace, with emphasis on developing a more credible military
threat against Taiwan (though not the large amphibious capability
necessary for invasion), and protecting claims in the South China Sea
against Southeast Asia rivals. China is not likely to build the
capability to project large conventional forces beyond its immediate
borders or nearby seas.
The Chinese military will decrease in size during the next two
decades to conserve funds for military modernization. Absent a major
resurgence of Russian military power, the air and naval threat from the
east is seen as much greater than the ground threat from the north.
China's top military priority will therefore remain modernizing its
air, air defense, and naval forces. With the exception of several
select units, the ground forces will continue to receive relatively low
priority.
Beijing emphasis on defense requires the PLA Navy in particular to
expand its operating area further out from the mainland. The Navy's
emphasis is on offensive strike capability against surface ships,
including more modern fighters, aerial refueling, and anti-ship cruise
missiles launched from surface, sub-surface, and aerial platforms.
China will continue to actively seek advanced technology, including
a much-improved knowledge base from ``overseas'' students, and from
cooperative nations and commercial partners, and will proliferate some
technical capabilities as it sells selected weapons systems to other
countries.
Russia--perplexing evolution
Russia will remain focused on internal political, economic, and
social imperatives for at least the next decade. The periodic turmoil
that has plagued Moscow since the late 1980s will continue. Immature
political institutions, economic weakness, organized crime, and
corruption will heighten the potential for political instability,
particularly during periods of leadership transition.
As with the other components of Russia's social order, economic
progress is the key to the future of Russia's military. Over the next
several years, Moscow will be hard pressed to maintain the modicum of
conventional military capability it now has. Barring a significant
increase in Russia's external threat perception, non-military issues
will continue to receive priority in terms of national leadership
attention, resources, and popular concern. Moreover, other para-
military and internal security forces will continue to compete with the
Ministry of Defense for scarce security resources.
There is little chance that Russia will reemerge as a global
military peer competitor to the US over the next two decades. During
this period, Russia's strategic nuclear forces will remain the backbone
of Moscow's military might, preserving Russia's perception of great
power status and protecting its vital security interests.
The size, characteristics, and capabilities of Russia's
conventional forces could vary widely over the next 20 years, depending
on the outcome of numerous unsettled issues. Among the most important
of these are: the timing, pace, and extent of Russia's economic
recovery; the ``urgency'' embodied in Russian external threat
perceptions; the ability to achieve political and cultural stability;
the size of Russia's defense investments; whether or not the national
leadership achieves consensus on a blueprint for Military Reform
(including restructuring and ``recapitalizing'' the defense industry);
and Moscow's success at restoring the ``intangible'' components of
military operational effectiveness (effective leadership, readiness,
morale, sustainment, etc.). There are two basic alternatives:
Military reform fails--due to continued underfunding, indecision,
and leadership indifference--and Russia's future conventional forces
present about the same (or even a reduced) level of threat to US
interests as does the Russian military today. This alternative becomes
more likely the longer Russia's economic problems persist, defense
budgets decline or remain relatively stagnant, there is no consensus on
the direction for defense reform, and the national leadership continues
to neglect the needs of the military.
Military reform succeeds and the Russian armed forces emerge
smaller, but more modern and capable. The keys to this future are that
the Russian economy achieves sustained, steady growth, Russia's defense
burden stabilizes, a national consensus on military reform emerges, and
the General Staff is ``put back in charge'' of the reform process.
These developments would allow the military to sustain adequate levels
of research and development, improve training, and complete the
restructuring of forces over the near term, to begin moderate rates of
series production of a new generation of combat systems around 2005,
and reemerge beyond then with greatly improved capabilities for
regional military operations.
Bosnia--progress with permanance
International Peacekeeping forces in Bosnia continue to operate in
a complex inter-ethnic environment that poses significant challenges to
the establishment of a stable and enduring peace. We believe the
Bosnian factions will continue to generally comply with the military
aspects of the Dayton Accords and Stabilization Force directives, and
will not engage in widespread fighting between themselves, so long as
Peacekeeping forces remain credible. However, if civil implementation
of Dayton lags, the prospects for renewed fighting would increase
significantly following the withdrawal of stabilizing forces, due to
the unrealized aims of the Bosnian factions. The threat to US and
allied forces from, organized indigenous military and police forces
will remain low. Nonetheless, the Stabilization Force continues to face
a threat from mines and various forms of low-level, sporadic and random
violence, which could include high profile attacks by rogue elements or
terrorists. Pervasive international engagement--both political and
economic--will be necessary to prevent de facto or even permanent
division of Bosnia along ethnic lines.
Iraq--continued belligerence
Iraq will remain capable of limited incursions against its
neighbors but incapable of holding against a determined ``western''
counterattack. Saddam retains the goal of dominating Kuwait, but his
options to destabilize the Gulf region and the GCC will remain limited
so long as UN sanctions are in place and effective.
Iraq's military capability continues to erode. Saddam's forces have
significant weaknesses--in leadership, morale, readiness, logistics,
and training--that would limit their effectiveness in combat.
Iraq continues limited efforts to preserve and expand its missile
and WMD capabilities and to hide that activity from the international
community. If sanctions are removed these efforts will receive
increased emphasis, along with efforts to improve Baghdad's air defense
and ground forces capabilities.
Iraq will remain a threat to US regional policies and interests and
to the safety and security of Iraqi opposition groups, so long as
Saddam remains in power. His presence demands the continued enforcement
of UN sanctions to limit Iraq's military expansion, and the continued
commitment of US power to deter Iraqi aggression.
While predicting the nature of a post-Saddam government is highly
speculative, Iraq is likely to maintain its regional ambitions, and
will continue to place a high premium on military power, well into the
future. The perceived threat from neighboring nations will also
motivate any future Iraqi government to sustain and enhance Baghdad's
military capability.
Iran--a chance for change
Iran is deliberately building up its military and developing new
capabilities, motivated by its desire to provide a means to intimidate
its Gulf Arab neighbors, to limit the regional influence of the west--
particularly the United States--and to deter a resurgent Iraq or any
other potential aggressor. Tehran will gradually overcome its near term
economic difficulties, although progress will be slowed by the dual
challenges of a rapidly growing population and uncertainties over the
pace and extent of internal reform. Over the longer term, Iran will
probably eschew some of its more visible unacceptable practices abroad
and seek better relations with the US--although its early moves in this
direction are likely to be tactical expedients. However, Tehran will
not abandon its drive for regional hegemony and circumstantial
domination or for increased WMD capabilities.
Iran recognizes that it cannot hope to match US military power
directly and therefore seeks asymmetric and asynchronous means to
challenge the US indirectly; through subversion and terrorism directed
against US and western interests; the development of air, air defense,
missile, mine warfare, and naval capabilities to interdict maritime
access in the Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz; and the pursuit of
WMD designed to deter the US and intimidate Tehran's neighbors. These
efforts reflect a clear intent to build an offensive capability well
beyond Iran's defensive needs. Iran will continue to seek more
effective ways to use its single best defense asset--the geography and
terrain of the country.
Given its internal difficulties, Iran's rearmament will proceed
gradually. Over the next decade, Tehran will likely develop and deploy
additional WMD and missile capabilities, make moderate progress in its
ability to interdict shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz and
the Gulf, and limited progress in its air defense programs. Thereafter
depending on the pace of Iraq's military modernization, Iran will
likely devote ad1itional resources to develop its ground forces, which
are its principal means of deterring and defending against Baghdad, as
well as a significant internal and regional control mechanism for
Tehran to use in its version of the future.
Despite these gradual force improvements, the Iranian military will
retain many of its current conventional force shortcomings-particularly
command and control maintenance, training, and equipment-which will
limit its effectiveness against Iraq and the west.
lndia--Pakistan--dangerous circumstances
The tense rivalry between India and Pakistan remains an important
security concern. India's economic growth is likely to continue at a
brisk pace, while Pakistan's prolbems--including weak infrastructure,
high illiteracy, weak political institutions, and the slow pace of
reforem--will temper economic growth. As a result, India's considerable
military advantage is likely to increase, leaving Pakistan felling more
vulnerable, and more dependent on international moderating influences
and its WMD, especially nuclear, deterrent. Both countries will remain
beset by numerous internal challenges to national unity. While India
will continue to pursue improved ties to other Asian states and the
west, proliferation concerns will remain a source of friction.
In the military sphere, India and Pakistan both continue to view
their security relationship in zero-sum terms, possess sufficient
material to assemble a limited number of nuclear weapons, have short
range ballistic missiles, and maintain large standing forces in close
proximity across a tense line of control. In short, although the
prospect for major war between India and Pakistan is low at present, we
remain concern about the potential, particularly over the near term,
for one of their occasional military clashes to escalate into a wider
conflict. Over the longer term, however, the threat of large-scale war
should diminish.
Latin America--hopeful progress
The outlook for democracy in Latin America is good. The acceptance
of military subordination to civil control will expand and should be
commonplace over the next two decades. Nevertheless, there will be a
continuing susceptibility to setbacks and stresses rooted in the
persistent political, social, and economic problems of many countries.
The scourage of narco-trafficking, related money laundering, weapons
and contraband smuggling, illegal migration, and insurgency will remain
the principal obstacles to stability and democratic progress.
The prospect for interstate warfare in Latin America will remain
low. Historic, unresolved border issues--such as the dispute between
Peru and Ecuador--have the potential to erupt abruptly into armed
conflict, but these conflicts will generally be limited in scope and
duration.
With some notable exceptions, relations between Latin America
states and the US will remain positive and friendly. There is virtually
no threat of armed conflict with the US. However, the US military is
likely to deploy to Latin America for operations at the lower end of
conflict spectrum--natural disaster requiring humanitarian assistance,
counterdrug operations, military assistance, etc. Evolving conditions
in Cuba, Haiti, and several drug producing and transit countries may
lead to some greater concern.
Greece-Turkey--flashpoint
The situation in the Aegean will continue to be fragile. Though
diplomacy has helped contain tensions, the potential for conflict
remains. Ongoing disputes over territorial claims and Cyprus, advanced
weapons proliferation into the region, and contentious economic issues
have furthered tensions between the two NATO members.
Ankara's failure to obtain European Union membership has raised the
sense of isolation form Turks, while others have been ``vindicated'' in
their anti-western rhetoric. Security assistance and economic
cooperation with the US will help alleviate Turkish concerns, but any
withdrawal of US interests in the next few years will exacerbate
Turkish fears and frustration. These conditions could foster more
extreme nationalism, and could undermine the government's efforts to
sustain secular stability.
Sub-Saharan Africa--tribal and cultural confrontation
Perhaps the greatest challenge for the future of Africa is the need
for good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.
Protracted tribal competition and conflict will continue to destabilize
the Sub-Saharan region, exacerbated by population growth, poverty, and
poor humanitarian conditions.
Despite these festering problems, there are productive efforts by
many Sup-Saharan countries to more toward more representative
government and the pursuit of political pluralism. Some are addressing
security concerns through greater regional cooperation and collective
participation. Other African states have pursued security arrangements
through private firms in lieu of state-to-state assistance.
Black and gray arms markets will continue to be the primary venue
for military forces to acquire new equipment. Small arms and light
weapons--which are cheaper, easier to transfer, and require minimal
maintenance--will be emphasized.
Relations between Sub-Saharan countries and the US will generally
be friendly and positive as these nations seek increased US trade and
economic investment.
Central Asia and the Caucasus--future challenge
The Caspian Macro region will be attractive as a relatively new
global market for energy resources and infrastructure projects.
International interest and investment in the oil and gas fields of this
region will continue to grow in concert with the global demand for
energy. Russia will like]y acquiesce to both western and Asian
investments as long as Russian entrepreneurs and included in the
concessions. Turkey, Iran, and China will pursue greater economic and
political involvement.
The region will continue to experience ethnic, tribal, and other
forms of internecine conflict and it is probable that Central Asian
problems and Central Asian involvement in ethnic issues will
``spillover'' into both China and Russia. Relations between the US and
the various states of the region should remain ``fair-to-good'' as many
explore economic ties to the west.
the impact of technology--technowar
The rapid pace of military technology advancement-particularly in
the areas of precision weapons, information and communications will
continue. Major technological breakthroughs are likely in the next two
decades. Some aspects of our technological dominance--especially those
with commercial and industrial applications--will be difficult to
maintain because the transfer of these capabilities will initially
appear as purely civilian events. Perhaps our greatest challenge is
that a rogue nation or sub-national group might acquire key
technologies, which would lead to some form of strategic technical
surprise.
Overall, the impact of applied automation and computers,
electromagnetic warfare, brilliant sensors, and the other technologies
listed below will lead to the rise of a military-techno culture in
which time, space, speed, and other fundamental conditions are
radically changed. These developments have the potential to
dramatically alter the nature of warfare and the characteristics of
future threats.
Nuclearization and the proliferation of WMD capabilities;
precision munitions;
electrodynamic weapons;
``conventional'' weapons of mass destruction;
non-lethal weapons;
information technology and cybernetic warfare;
camouflage, cover, concealment, denial, and deception (C3D2);
techno-terrorism;
nanotechnology; and
applied biotechnologies.
To date the development and integrated application of the most
important military technologies and concepts has been limited to the
advanced western militaries--particularly the United States. One key
reason is economic. In general, these technologies are very expensive
to develop and maintain and most nations have emphasized other
priorities since the end of the Cold War. In fact, non-US global
defense spending has dropped some 40 percent since the late 1980s, and
the ``military modernization accounts''--research and development, and
procurement--have been hit even harder. Moreover, during the same
period, the global arms market has decreased by more than 50 percent.
With reduced domestic procurement, declining foreign consumption, and
other spending imperatives, many nations have had neither the
motivation, the resources, nor the capability to pursue high technology
military endeavors. Over the next decade, however, as post Cold War
defense reorganizations are completed, defense industries stabilize,
and funding (potentially) increases, these areas could see additional,
albeit still limited, emphasis.
new (modified) forms of warfare
Technology, combined with the creative genius of military thinkers
around the world, is leading to the development and application of new
forms of warfare, and the innovative modification of traditional
military practices. While the US and its allies are the source of much
of this innovation, others are motivated by the dominant military
position of the US, and our demonstrated commitment to maintaining our
military lead. This basic reality is forcing many of our adversaries
(current and potential) to seek other means to attack our interests.
Some of the more important are listed below:
Information Warfare (IW) involves actions taken to degrade or
manipulate an adversary's information systems while actively defending
one's own. Over the next two decades, the threat to US information
systems will increase as a number of foreign states and sub-national
entities emphasize offensive and defensive information warfare
strategies, doctrine, and capabilities. Current information on our
vulnerabilities, and foreign intelligence initiatives in general, point
to the following threats:
Trusted insiders who use their direct access to destroy or
manipulate the information or communications system from within.
Modification of equipment during transport or storage.
Physical attack of key systems or nodes, including the insertion of
modified or altered hardware.
Network penetration to include hacking, exploitation, data
manipulation, or the insertion of various forms of malicious code.
Electronic attack of various interconnecting links, sensors that
provide data to the system. or other system components.
Empowered agents including ``sponsored'' or individual hackers,
cyber-terrorists criminals, or other individuals who degrade, destroy,
or otherwise corrupt the system. In the most advanced case, empowered
robotic agents, embedded in the system,could be used to take autonomous
(timed) actions against the host or remote systems or networks (cyber
war).
Cybernetic warfare (CYW) is a distinct form of information warfare
involving operations to disrupt, deny, corrupt, or destroy information
resident in computers and computer networks. One particularly troubling
form of ``war in cyberspace'' is the covert modification of an
adversary's data and information systems. This form of warfare will
grow in importance as technology makes new methods of attack possible.
Cybernetic warfare defies traditional rules of time and distance, speed
and tempo, and the conventional or traditional military capabilities of
the opposing elements.
Transnational Infrastructure Warfare (TIW) involves attacking a
nation's or subnational entity's key industries and utilities--to
include telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation, water,
government operations, emergency services, energy and power, and
manufacturing. These industries normally have key linkages and
interdependencies, which could significantly increase the impact of an
attack on a single component. Threats to critical infrastructure
include those from nation-states, state-sponsored sub-national groups,
international and domestic terrorists, criminal elements, computer
hackers, and insiders.
Asymmetric warfare--attacking an adversary's weaknesses with
unexpected or innovative means while avoiding his strengths--is as old
as warfare itself. In the modern era, many forms of asymmetric attack
are possible--to include the forms of warfare outlined above,
terrorism, guerilla operations, and the use of WMD. Because of our
dominant military position, we are very likely to be the focus of
numerous asymmetric strategies as weaker adversaries attempt to advance
their interests while avoiding a direct engagement with the US military
on our terms. If forced into a direct conflict with the US, those same
adversaries are likely to seek ways of ``leveling the playing field.''
Asynchronous warfare involves a preselected, or delayed (timed)
attack on an adversary, taking advantage of the passage of time to
develop a strategic opportunity or to exploit a future vulnerability.
In a preselected attack, the operation has a latent effect on the
adversary. Human or technical assets are strategically placed well
before--sometimes years before--the actual confrontation. In a delayed
attack--often carried out as an act of reprisal months or even years
later--the operation is conducted after an opponent has lowered his
guard.
other warfare trends
Ground Forces
Many ground forces throughout the world are being reduced due to
diminished threat perceptions and other, mostly economic, imperatives.
Many developing nations--who still see ground forces as the essential
force component--are saddled with outdated equipment that is either
non-operational or in serious disrepair. These states hope to
``modernize''--within economic limits--with surplus Cold War stocks.
For many, however, overall combat effectiveness will remain limited due
to persistent shortfalls in training, maintenance, leadership,
operational concepts, and morale.
The developed states are in various stages of modernization, but
ground forces are a low priority for many of these countries. In terms
of doctrine, few states have either the inclination or the capability
for anything other than old western or Sovietera equipment and
practices. Training and logistics are generally in tandem with
modernization and doctrinal advancement. Most nations do little beyond
battalion level training and few have any proficiency at joint or
combined arms operations.
To balance the demands of responding rapidly to local or regional
contingencies, while maintaining the capacity to mobilize for large
scale war, many states are adopting a two-tiered readiness structure
consisting of a few ``ready'' units (smaller, more mobile, better-
equipped, trained, and manned), and a larger component of ``not-ready''
units (usually large units, with older equipment, manned at pre-
mobilization or cadre status).
Those nations with the motivation and resources to upgrade their
armies will generally be able to acquire improved tanks and fighting
vehicles (primarily with western fire controls, night-vision devices,
add-on passive or reactive armor, threat warning and obscurant systems,
and, in the more distant future, active protective systems).
Naval Forces
The foreign naval threat in the next 20 years will consist of both
larger numbers of older weapons systems and a smaller yet more diverse
set of modern systems. Naval warfare will become more complex, with a
wide variety of potential adversaries, situations, and forces capable
of confronting the US during the execution of overseas presence and
warfighting missions. This is especially true in littoral regions.
The majority of the world's fleets will consist of ships not larger
than destroyers and frigates, although a select few will retain or
build aircraft carriers. New ship designs will emphasize improved
multi-mission capability, endurance, reduced signatures, and increased
system automation and firepower.
The submarine threat will remain significant especially in coastal
or contiguous waters where many smaller navies are confined in operate.
Russian submarines, sensors, and weapons will continue to pose the
pacing undersea technology challenge for the US.
Mine warfare threats will increase as maritime nations continue to
see mines as cheap and effective weapons against ships and submarines,
and more sophisticated mine systems become widely available.
Anti-ship cruise missiles will be more widely proliferated, posing
an increasing threat to naval and civilian maritime traffic.
Air and Air Defense Forces
Global combat aircraft inventories will decline over the next two
decades, but residual aircraft will be more technologically capable and
lethal (extended ranges, multirole mission capability and multiple
engagement capability). The proliferation of advanced air-to-air
missiles precision-guided munitions, land attack cruise missiles, and
``smart weapons'' will increase the defensive and strike capabilities
of air forces globally. Most countries will focus on modified and
upgraded versions of proven airframes.
Overall, however, resource shortfalls, qualitative training
deficiencies, and limited C3I, electronic warfare, logistics, and
maintenance capabilities will limit the combat effectiveness of most
air forces.
Cognizant of the advantages afforded those nations possessing
superior air warfare capabilities, and unwilling or unable to bear the
high cost of advanced air superiority aircraft, many nations will place
a high premium on improving their groundbased air defenses. Across-the-
board upgrades in missiles and sensor capabilities--improved seekers,
propulsion, guidance, and control--will occur. However, most states
will lack the resources and technological sophistication necessary to
acquire and field integrated air defense networks and systems. As a
result, the operational effectiveness of these advanced weapons systems
will remain limited, albeit challenging.
Space Warfare
While the US will remain the world's dominant space power, over the
next two decades, increased foreign military and civilian space
capabilities will erode the relative US advantage in satellite
reconnaissance, communications, mapping, and navigation. The space
systems of 2018 will be much more capable and more widely used than
those of today. By that time, nearly 40 countries will have their own
satellites (compared with about two dozen today), and more than a dozen
commercial consortia will provide satellite services (imagery, geo-
spatial data, communications) to the rest of the world. As part of this
general commercialization of space, the number of countries capable of
using space-based platforms or capabilities for military purposes will
increase. We must also consider the increased potential for future
adversaries to employ a wide variety of means to disrupt, degrade, or
defeat portions of the US space support system.
conclusion
As the protracted transition from the Cold War order to an
uncertain future continues the United States will remain the world's
dominant power. Beyond the enduring challenge posed by the strategic
nuclear forces of Russia and China, the global threats facing the
United States are diminished in magnitude when compared to the Cold War
ear. This relative ``strategic hiatus provides the opportunity for a
breathing space in which the US gains time at reduced risk.
However, the world remains a very dangerous and complex place and
there is no relief from the high tempo of operational activity short of
war at US forces respond to a broad spectrum of challenges resulting
from the general global turmoil. A wide variety of operations--
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counternarcotics, humanitarian
emergencies, non-combatant evacuations, military assistance, and
limited conflict when necessary--will continue to place our military
personnel at risk. Operational environments in these contingencies
range from relatively benign, to nonpermissive, to hostile.
A number of nations, especially rogue states like North Korea and
Iraq, retain capabilities to directly threaten US interests. This
condition demands constant US vigilance and the retention of
demonstrable warfighting capabilities.
Various transnational threats--weapons smuggling, terrorism, drug
trafficking and other forms of criminal activity--continue to plague
the international environment and pose the most direct daily threat to
US citizens, forces, property, and interests. Some aspects of these
threats have national security implications and will continue to
involve US military forces and capabilities in the future.
The changing nature of future warfare--including the application of
new technologies and innovative doctrinal concepts, and the development
of new forms of warfare--presents a constant challenge for US strategy,
doctrine, force structure, and materiel development.
The continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
missiles, and related technologies, will result in a broadly increasing
threat to stability and a specific direct threat to US military forces.
The global presence of the United States--our tremendous power,
influence, and willingness to remain engaged--is the key factor
affecting the future shape of the international security environment.
We in the Defense Intelligence Community re main committed to providing
the best possible military intelligence support to US and allied
leaders engaged in planning for and acting in any contingency or
crisis.
A final thought--we are trying to maintain military superiority and
to use military capability in positive and constructive ways in an
environment in which espionage and the selective public disclosure of
US classified information is commonplace. Unless we make progress in
preventing espionage and stopping the unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information, we should anticipate a steady erosion of
confidence in our abilities and the real loss of advantage to our
adversaries.
Chairman Shelby. Our next witness is Lieutenant General
Patrick Hughes, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
General Hughes.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK HUGHES, DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Hughes. Thank you very much for the opportunity to
address you this morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee.
I remain convinced that the turmoil and uncertainty that
have characterized the post-Cold War world will last at least
another decade. I say this because most of the underlying
factors remain in place: uneven economic and demographic
development; disparities in wealth and resource distribution;
continued ethnic, religious and cultural strife; broad, rapid
technology advances and attendant proliferation of advanced
weapons; certain regional and global security structures,
international criminal activity with national security
overtones; the continued existence of rogue, renegade and
outlaw states, resistance to the rapid expansion of Western
ideas and culture; natural disasters and environmental issues;
and numerous other critical uncertainties. These factors all
bring great stress to the international order. No condition,
circumstance or power is likely to emerge over the next 10 to
20 years which will somehow transcend them and lead to a more
stable global order.
In fact, one of the more intriguing aspects of the post-
Cold War period is that while the global strategic threat to US
interests has greatly diminished in comparison to the Soviet
era, the residual transnational and the regional threats are in
many ways more complex and diverse, and much more difficult to
plan for.
This brings me to my next theme--a new security paradigm is
evolving, one in which the United States faces a generalized
global set of competitors and potential adversaries, the
troubling proliferation of negative technologies and the
existence and emergence of numerous persistent small conflict
situations and conditions.
US security policy planners and operators must carefully
study these emerging circumstances in order to understand this
evolving paradigm. The new global condition affects every
aspect of the US military, including the planning and execution
of current operations, and the development of the strategy,
organization and equipment that will shape and define our
future forces.
The most important challenge facing defense intelligence is
to discern from the general mix of global conditions, more
specific and useful characterizations of extant, emerging and
potential threats and circumstances. We are doing this now.
That sort of threat identification forms the basis for my
next theme. The United States is likely to remain the world's
only superpower in terms of combined political, economic,
technological, military and cultural strength for the next two
decades. Despite our tremendous power and influence, however,
threats and threatening conditions exist today, and others will
emerge over time.
We generally group these extant potential and emerging
threats into either trans-national or regional categories.
Regarding trans-national threats, I am most concerned with
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,
missiles and other key technologies which can be applied in
decidedly negative ways. Two aspects of this trend are
particularly troubling. Activities that would provide our
adversaries with increased or enhanced capabilities for
delivering weapons of mass destruction or conventional payloads
interregionally. And those that will allow a rouge nation, or
sub-national group to surprise us with a covertly acquired or
innovatively applied new technology.
Terrorism, narcotics traffcking, illicit weapons transfers
and other international criminal activity, with national
security overtones, pose direct daily threats to US citizens,
property, resources and interests worldwide. The terrorist
threat to the US will probably increase both abroad and here at
home as various groups exploit technological advances in
communications and transportation, forgery and counterfeiting,
cover and concealment, and weapons and explosives.
International drug cultivation, production, transport and
use will remain a major source of instability and tension
within producing, transit and target countries, and between
traffcking and consumer nations. Of particular concern is the
connection between drug trafficking and insurgency.
Regarding the most pressing regional threats, North Korea,
Iraq and Iran remain generally hostile. Each retains the
capability to directly attack US and allied interests with
relatively little advance warning. These conditions require
continued vigilance and the retention of demonstrable
warfighting and deterrent capabilities.
Russia and China, two major powers undergoing lengthy and
generally positive but challenging transitions, will continue
to demand our attention. While neither state is likely to pose
a dramatically increased military threat over the next decade,
both have significant military capabilities and the potential
to threaten our vital interests.
Other regional issues and hot spots, to include the
uncertain situation in Bosnia; tensions in the Aegean; ethnic,
tribal and religious conflict throughout many parts of Africa;
continued hostility between India and Pakistan; ongoing border
disputes between several nations; and ethnic and political
conflict in resource rich Central Asia, all have the potential
to erupt abruptly into larger conflicts that could result in
the requirements for US military involvement.
Finally, it is important to note that the rapid pace of
military technology advancement, particularly in the areas of
information and communications, will continue. Major
technological breakthroughs in military capability are likely
in the next two decades. Some aspects of our technological
dominance, especially those with commercial and industrial
applications, will be difficult to maintain. We can expect our
adversaries to develop and apply new or innovative forms of
asymmetric and asynchronous warfare as they seek to advance
their interests while avoiding direct military engagement with
the United States on our terms.
A final thought. We are trying to maintain military
superiority and to use military capacity in positive and
constructive ways in an environment in which espionage and the
selective public disclosure of US classified information is
commonplace. Unless we make progress in preventing espionage
and stopping the unauthorized public disclosure of classified
information, we should anticipate a steady erosion of
confidence in our abilities and the real loss of advantage to
our adversaries.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shelby. Thank you, General Hughes.
Director Tenet, Saddam Hussein continues to defy the United
Nations Security Council's resolutions requiring the
dismantlement of his capability to produce weapons of mass
destruction. Once again, we find ourselves in a confrontation
with serious implications for the security and the stability of
the vital Persian Gulf region.
First, would you please describe for the Committee today
the current status of Iraq's missile, chemical, biological and
nuclear programs. And even if full inspections were resumed
today, how confident could we be that we could find and we
could eradicate all of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs,
especially his chemical weapons and biological weapons
programs?
Director Tenet. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it's fair to
say that the UN inspection regime has been absolutely critical
in keeping those programs in a box. We have destroyed a lot of
his Scud capability. We have destroyed much of his chemical
weapons capability. We are, quite frankly, still worried about
his biological weapons capability, because as you know, much of
that information came to us through the defection of his son-
in-law in 1995.
Chairman Shelby. We're also getting very close to
sensitive, probably critical areas, and hence the defiance,
right?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir. But the fact is--the fact is, is
that he understands very well that unfettered access is what is
required of hi;n. We understand that someone with his track
record of aggression--he's used aggression against his Arab
brothers, he's used aggression against his own people, he's
launched Scuds against Israel, he's used chemical weapons
against the Kurds: He has a track record.
We understand what he's about and what he would do if he
were unfettered from UN sanctions and relevant resolutions. He
understands he has to comply.
Now, we are at an enormously sensitive stage in thinking
through all this. Diplomacy is being used. We've moved forces
into the region. We are taking this very seriously. And at any
moment in time--and I'm always interested in newspaper stories
about whether he's better off or worse off--at any moment in
time, it should come as no surprise to anybody, that he is
trying to exploit the current diplomatic situation for his
benefit.
At the end of the day, he's a desperate man, in terrible
shape. I wouldn't want to play his deck of cards in a card game
when he's dealing with the international community that I
believe the United States has kept united throughout this
period.
Chairman Shelby. Director Tenet, how quickly could these
programs be expanded, the programs that he has--chemical
weapons, biological weapons and so forth--or revived if
sanctions were removed?
Director Tenet. Well, I don't think sanctions are going be
removed anytime soon, Mr. Chairman. But I will make the
distinctions and ask my colleagues to comment on this as well.
Look at this in a continuum. Biological weapons, biological
capability I think could be reconstituted very, very quickly in
a matter of weeks. Chemicals in the continuum take some time of
a--some kind of a longer time period, but I believe six months
is not unreasonable. Ballistic missile capability is something
that takes much, much longer to reconstitute.
Chairman Shelby. Director Tenet, in recent months, as we
all know, Saddam Hussein has successfully, up to now, defied
the United Nations, widened the split within the UN Security
Council, and dealt his old benefactor, Russia, back into the
Middle East as a major player. Seven years after the Gulf War,
he retains significant portions of his weapons programs and a
significant capability to threaten the Persian Gulf region, if
not immediately, then on relatively short notice.
Do you agree that Saddam Hussein is better off today than
he was before the showdown began?
Director Tenet. No I do not, Senator, I think he's got less
options.
Chairman Shelby. Do You think he's more desperate today?
Director Tenet. Senator, there's substantial force in the
region. Operation Northern Watch. Operation Southern Watch. No-
fly zones. No-drive zones. We have this man in a box. And he's
going to stay in a box. And at this moment in time, that's
exactly what we should be saying to him. No other statement
would be fair to our men and women who may have to go do
something about this guy.
Chairman Shelby. What are the key factors, Director Tenet,
that you believe have encouraged Saddam Hussein to pursue his
path of confrontation and defiance? Is it desperation? Or is it
a hopeful split of the UN Security Council?
Director Tenet. Well, Senator, I don't know him, never met
him, haven't talked to him, and don't know what's in his mind.
But I think he's someone who's--people often say he makes
mistakes. I think he's also very adroit and clever at seeking
the split the international coalition, taking advantage of
different partners at various points in time. And he will
continue to do that.
But the fact is that we have maintained the integrity of
the Security Council and the UNSCOM process, and unfettered
access remains the goal of the UN Security Council today. I
think as long as that position is maintained and is firm, I
don't think he'll be able to exploit our position.
And I'd welcome Mrs. Oakley's and General Hughes' comments.
Chairman Shelby. Secretary Oakley.
Mrs. Oakley. Well, I would certainly agree with this. I
think it's important to understand that in all the years of the
UNSCOM inspections that have gone on, Iraq has never really
come clean. And they have never really given us the complete
information on the baseline for their activities on biological,
chemical, nuclear and ballistic missiles.
So that there are a lot of things we don't know. We had to
surmise various things, and therefore it's very diffcult to say
how long it would take to restart all these things. And it's
not just that we want to prevent any future development, which
we would agree he will try immediately if sanctions are lifted.
But we need to really understand where he was starting from,
how long it will take, what are the key factors in his
projects.
And I think that is very important to understand--that not
only do we need to keep him from moving ahead, but we really do
need to find out what he was doing.
Chairman Shelby. What some people have talked about--a lot
of the pundits, a lot of people that make policy in this
country said, basically, this Administration has only a
reactive policy to Saddam Hussein. Do you agree with that?
Mrs. Oakley. No, I don't.
Chairman Shelby. Well, tell me why you don't.
Mrs. Oakley. Well, I don't agree with it because I think
the thrust of everything that we have been doing is to keep the
pressure on Saddam Hussein and to keep him in the box that
George Tenet has talked about.
It is Saddam Hussein who keeps pushing the envelope to see
what he can get away with.
Chairman Shelby. But then we react to that, do we not?
Mrs. Oakley. Well, of course we do.
Chairman Shelby. Isn t that a reactive policy?
Mrs. Oakley. Well, it is reactive if you look at it one
way. We can also say it is a warning to him not to go any
further.
Chairman Shelby. For how long can we continue to warn him
if he continues to defy us? And we hear it over and over.
Shouldn't we have a definite policy to decide where we're going
to go at the end of the day? And I'm not sure we have that
policy today--at least, it's certainly debatable.
Mrs. Oakley. Well, let me just say we're getting into
policy issues that certainly the Department of State's INR
branch is very close to. But I think some of those policy
questions are more properly directed at other places.
What we have done is to present the facts. These are the
gaps in our knowledge. This is what we think he's trying to do.
And with the evaluation that we think he will--that there's no
way to stop him without pressure on him to stop trying to push
the envelope.
Chairman Shelby. But when you're dealing with what a lot of
people would term an international scoundrel--you know, someone
you have no reason to really believe the integrity of his--his
regime has not been known anywhere for truth and veracity. We
have got to be very careful and very cynical in dealing with
him, or we should say very realistic.
Mrs. Oakley. I would say that we are very realistic in
dealing with Saddam Hussein. I think that none of the people
with whom I work have any illusions that he is going to have a
conversion or will not pursue these issues.
The question of what we do about it and how we approach is,
I think, in the policy realm. But let me just reiterate that
there are no differences in the Intelligence Community on the
dangers from Saddam Hussein.
Chairman Shelby. I know I'm running out of time, but I will
be generous with anyone else's including your's, Senator
Kerrey.
But Director Tenet, is your current statement about Saddam
Hussein's position consistent with current intelligence, or is
it a policy wish? Is there new intelligence which is reflected
in your statement that maybe perhaps I didn't pick up? And if
yes, can we discuss it or should we discuss it in a closed
session?
Director Tenet. Well, I think a more fulsome discussion can
occur this afternoon. But I'm not expressing any policy wishes.
You know, at any moment in time, anybody can make a judgment
about whether somebody is better off or worse off if you--on
the left hand side of the column, if you rack it all up--look
at his military, look at his economy, look at his people, look
at how he terrorizes them--these are not the actions of a man
who is in control of his own destiny in the way that I
understand it, in any event. And while at any moment in time
the diplomacy gets rough and your partners may move in
different directions, that has nothing to do with his strength
or weakness. That has everything to do about how we lead this
coalition and bring them to the right conclusion.
And there are sensitive deliberations going on, and I think
the Congress and your leadership at some point will bring into
everything that's being thought about. But the fact is, I think
there is a course, and the course is to use diplomacy and to
use force and to bring the carrot and stick together to try and
resolve this outcome in a way that satisfies US national
interests.
Chairman Shelby. Do you believe that he has, in fact, made
certain accommodations with his neighbors? I wouldn't say
friends, but neighbors. And a lot of neighbors believe that he
is going to be there perhaps after we're gone and are
evaluating it from a long-term perspective.
Director Tenet. I've seen no evidence that the's made any
accommodation with any of his neighbors, Senator.
Chairman Shelby. Well, have they made some with him out of
fear----
Director Tenet. I've seen none, I see no----
Chairman Shelby [continuing]. Not respect?
Director Tenet. I see no evidence of that.
Chairman Shelby. Secretary Oakley, you want to comment?
Mrs. Oakley. I would like to comment on that, because I
think that there has been a certain amount of attention to that
in the press. Back to the comments that you made earlier that
certain people have said that he has scored successes and that
he has done various things.
I think that in regard to Iran, we can say that his
relationship there is marginally better, that certain
arrangements have been made----
Chairman Shelby. Define marginally.
Mrs. Oakley. Well, there have been a visit during the OIC
conference. They have been able to work out some arrangements
for pilgrims coming to shrines and things like that. But I
don't think our analysis would lead us to think in any way that
that's a great improvement in relations. As I say, I think
those issues are on the margins. They've eased it.
There's no doubt that Saddam Hussein has made a great play
for better relations in the area. And I would agree that he is
very skillful and he does this. He has certainly played on the
issue of the suffering of the Iraqi people, and there is no
doubt that the neighborhood is tense. It is tense over what he
is trying to do from the instability that his continuing
defiance of the United Nations Security Council resolutions has
produced.
But I would agree that when you look at the hard facts,
away from what people say, that he is not better off, and if
you will, is in a desperate situation where he has faced strong
US resolve. That doesn't make him less dangerous, because I
think we all know, as has been said, that he's capable of
making mistakes. But I think you really have to look at that
almost country-by-country and issue-by-issue.
Chairman Shelby. But we have to agree, and assuming that
he's still there--I think he is; I hadn't heard anything--so
that's a problem.
Is it, Director Tenet, the Intelligence Community's view
that the only way Iraq will destroy its weapons of mass
destruction and rejoin the world community is under a leader
other than Saddam Hussein? And what would an Iraqi leader other
than Saddam Hussein look like in your opinion, not that we
think it's imminent, but is it always a possibility?
Director Tenet. Let's talk about that in closed session.
Chairman Shelby. Closed session.
Senator Kerrey, you've been very patient.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just look
like I've been patient.
Chairman Shelby. Well, I was charitable, you know. [General
laughter.]
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I appreciate that, too.
Well, Mr. Tenet, your answer qualifies you to be Secretary
of Defense.
Director Tenet. I don't want to be Secretary of Defense.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I want to ask you about the secrecy
legislation, but I would feel compelled to comment on Iraq. I
do think that the--it must be said that our current policy is a
dual-containment policy. Contain Iraq, contain Iran. Prior to
that, our policy was to support Iraq. And one of the problems
we have got with Iraq right now is we didn't voice much
opposition to their use of chemical weapons when they were
using it against the Iranians. And so our previous policy was
not containment. Our previous policy was support.
And I think one of the difficulties that we are having is I
think as long as we have a policy of containment of a
dictatorship in Iraq we're going to struggle. And I hope at
some point, we can begin to discuss a change of that policy to
replace the dictatorship with democracy, because I think it's
possible and clearly desirable.
I said earlier that the best war we fight is the one we
avoid, and the ones that we have avoided are the ones where
there has been a transition from dictatorship to democracy.
That's why the trend lines are good in Russia today. I mean,
that's why I am encouraged even in the face of doom and gloom
coming out of Asia, we have a liberal constitution now in
Thailand. There was a military coup in the early 1990s. I mean
this--democracy brings stability. Democracy decreases the
threat.
And I know that we have fear, well, it can't be done; the
risk is high and so forth. But remember all the fears that we
had going into Bosnia or the fears that a lot of us had going
into Desert Storm. I mean, we typically underestimate our
ability to do good and wonderful things. We have great power.
We have diplomatic skills. We have, I think, the intelligence
and the force to accomplish this miracle. And we ought to put
that as the goal, not containment. I say it with great respect.
I know it's difficult. I know it's not an easy change to make.
I have great respect for you and your answers that you have
given. But I do see the opening of the border with Syria, the
problems that Jordan is having. I mean there's been some--the
Pope has made a statement during the recess in opposition to
the impact of the sanctions, that we can see in the Security
Council the deterioration of support of a policy of
containment.
And it seems to me that we need to change direction. We are
not the Foreign Relations Committee. We are not the Armed
Services Committee. We're the Intelligence Committee. But I
felt compelled to make once again a comment on that particular
situation.
Could you comment, Mr. Tenet, on S. 712? We have had some
discussion about that. I know you're concerned about the--this
is the bill that Senator Helms and Senator Moynihan have
introduced. And I would appreciate very much if you would
include in your answer, if you could, some of the concerns very
eloquently raised by General Hughes at the end of his testimony
having to do with the giving up of secrets that put us at risk.
Could you talk a little bit about this secrecy legislation?
Director Tenet. Senator, you know that--you and I've talked
about this, and we're trying to work our way through. I want to
sit down with Senator Moynihan. We're working through the
Administration in terms of a final position.
What matters to me the most is that we are more open, we do
more on the openness front, but I have the ability to control
and protect sources and methods.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Can you talk--Mr. Tenet, one of the
values of an open session, it gives us a chance to have a
conversation with the American people about this. Can you--and
General Hughes at the end expressed with great passion the
concern that he's got with the deterioration of our ability to
acquire things that enable us to keep our soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines, as well as the people that are doing
operations that are out there trying to keep the American
people safe.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. The giving up of a secret is a crime,
and it's a crime because it puts our people at risk, it risks
lives. You know, the loose lips sinks ships line has real
practical application even today.
And I just want you to talk a little it about the
importance of secrecy, why do we have it, what's the purpose,
what do we accomplish as a consequence, and why do you think
it's important for you to retain primacy of classification.
Director Tenet. Well, Senator, the fact is, is that if you
look at the leaking that's gone on in the last couple of years,
it is unprecedented in our history, from my perspective. And it
may make interesting reading for people, and there are people
in this government who think it's in their interest to provide
secrets that compromise sources and methods. We know what we
know about what goes on in the world because of our ability to
collect information. And embedded----
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Mr. Tenet, can I just get you to--
with great respect, and I apologize for interrupting; I know
It's not polite to do so--but when you use the phrase, sources
and methods, I mean, in closed session we all understand that.
But in an open session, put it in human terms. I mean, when you
say source and method, aren't we talking about men and women
who are out there doing things to help us keep this country
safe? And aren't you talking about the possibility that they
could die as a consequence of being compromised as well as not
being willing to cooperate with us and provide the intelligence
necessary to keep America safe?
Director Tenet. I think we should switch places. You're
doing a better job of this than I am.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Kerrey is right, Director Tenet,
on this. When we talk about sources and methods, we know what
we're talking about basically. But do the American people
understand? And I think it's very important that they
understand where we're going.
Director Tenet. Well, they need to understand that when I
talk about terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction, and
Iranians and Iraqis, that we have men and women all over the
world who are putting their lives at risk every night to try
and collect information to provide to the President that makes
a difference to our security. They need to understand that
technologically we have the means to collect intelligence that
make a difference as to whether the men and women in uniform
prevail when they go into conflict. All of those capabilities
are put at risk when people freely and without regards for the
consequences throw real secrets out into the public domain and
jeopardize our nation's interests. They shut down our ability
to do our job. They make it impossible for us to protect
Americans. And I think they undermine the national security of
the United States. And it's become a free good in this country.
Everybody believes they have a right to a secret, and it's got
to stop. And we're doing the best we can with the FBI to find
people who are doing this. And when we do, we will fire them. I
don't necessarily have to prosecute them. But firing them and
making a public example----
Chairman Shelby. Why not fire them?
Director Tenet. Well, I'll settle for firing them, Senator,
and humiliating them for what they've done to the country.
Prosecution at times is a diffcult standard.
Chairman Shelby. But is that enough, though?
Director Tenet. No, it's not enough, It's not enough.
Chairman Shelby. That's not enough. So why give them a tap
on the wrist when they put people in harm's way, and perhaps
cause people to lose their lives?
Director Tenet. Senator, we're not going to tap anybody on
the wrist.
Chairman Shelby. Okay.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Will you give--just in a minute
response, and I'll let the other Members ask questions.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. In the legislation there is a
national declassification center. And you've at least privately
expressed some concerns about that. And again, I don't think
you're going to be undercutting your authority or your capacity
to work with either Senator Helms or Moynihan to talk openly
about this. But you have some concern about what the center
would cost and the way that it could undercut your capacity to
do your job, do you not?
Director Tenet. I have the ability to ultimately--since I
originate--we originate, under my authority, so much classified
information, I have to have the ability to be in the debate
about something that is or isn't classified, and meets the
public interest tests or doesn't meet the public interest test.
We need more checks and balances into this system to ensure
that I can have the confidence that I need to protect sources
and methods.
Now, I have a whole declassification factor that we've
built out at CIA to start churning more and more material out
about our historical record. We have a commitment to do that.
But we need to do it with the proper checks and balances. We
have an obligation to the America people to talk to them about
our history and things that have gone in our history that where
intelligence has played a vital role. But at the same time, we
have a responsibility to protect real secrets. And I think
Senator Moynihan's heart's in this place. He wants to protect
real secrets. He wants----
Vice Chairman Kerrey. And Senator Helms.
Director Tenet. And Senator Helms.
He wants to remove impediments that lumps everything into
that real secret category, and I want to sit down with him and
look at the cost, because it costs a lot of money, it's labor-
intensive. A lot of people are involved. We have 25 percent
fewer people thanwe've had. We're being asked to do many, many
difficult things that requires the time and energy of people.
Technology may or may not help. But I think there's a balance that we
can meet here with Senator Moynihan and with Senator Helms and with
this Committee in moving a piece of legislation that satisfies what I
believe are competing and legitimate requirements. And I've heard
nothing from the Secrecy Commission or Senator Moynihan that would
indicate he's opposed to any of that. And I want to sit down and work
with him.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Well, they are competing and they are
legitimate in both cases. And I think it's terribly important,
both from the standpoint of being able to maintain our ability
to keep secrets, to keep the American people safe, and also
from a standpoint of keeping their confidence that we aren't
unnecessarily classifying just to protect ourselves.
So I appreciate not only your testimony but General Hughes'
comments earlier, because I think they're very constructive and
it will make it more likely that we'll change the law and be
able to resolve those two conflicts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shelby. Secretary Oakley, did you have a comment?
Mrs. Oakley. Let me just add a footnote on that. I cannot
underline enough the importance of confidentiality in
diplomatic exchanges. It's not quite the same thing as
information to DIA or CIA. But without that, diplomats cannot
do their job. And I would simply say that you've got to
remember that. And if we do think of diplomacy as our first
line of defense, not secrecy, but confidentiality has to be
kept in mind.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Glenn.
Director Tenet. Senator----
Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Tenet. Senator Glenn. Mr. Bryant's getting lonely
here. He'd like some questions.
Senator Glenn. I'll do my best.
Chairman Shelby. He's going to get some.
Senator Glenn. I'll do my best. Let me just comment on
about the security breaches here. You know, we crawl all over
you, George, out there at CIA every time there's a problem that
comes up and somebody leaks something or purportedly has leaked
something. But I think one of the biggest problems is right
here on the Hill. More leaks come out of here for political
reasons and I know you--I'm not asking you to comment on this,
but you were up here long enough to know that we need action
right here, too, and we ought to tighten up our own operation
here on the Hill. That's just a comment.
Director Tenet. Senator, can I comment on that for a
minute?
Senator Glenn. At your own peril, yes. Go ahead.
Director Tenet. I must tell you that this is--I'm not
trying to ingratiate myself to you, but the Executive branch
leaks like a sieve. I'm here to tell you that right now. And
there's no doubt about that. And you look at it carefully, and
there's guilt everywhere here. But the Executive branch and
everybody sitting behind me knows it all too well, and it's a
major frustration. And there are people all over this Executive
branch who are violating a trust. So it's not one side or the
other. There's plenty of blame to go on our side.
Senator Glenn. I just didn't want anybody to think that all
the leaks were in the Executive branch, at CIA, that's all.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Glenn, if you would just yield for
10 seconds.
Senator Kerrey, the Vice Chairman, and I, as you know,
Director Tenet, Mr. Bryant knows, Judge Freeh knows, we have
asked the FBI on several occasions to do an extensive
investigation regarding leaks. Everywhere, everybody, every
source, because we want them to stop. I share Senator Glenn's
concerns. I think it's widespread. I appreciate your
acknowledgement because I know it to be true.
Thank you. Sorry, Senator.
Senator Glenn. No, thank you. That's all right. I probably
should have used my opening--when everybody was making opening
statements, I should have availed myself of that five minutes.
But I want to make sort of a general statement here and
then get your response to it. We may be able to go into it in
more detail this afternoon when we are in classified session.
I think we have new dimensions to our intelligence
gathering and new dimensions to our security problem. These
hearings are always titled National Security Threat, and I
think that threat is changing, and changing rather
dramatically. And I'm not at all sure that we're keeping up
with it.
We're accustomed to going through these things nation by
nation--who's developing weapons, who's doing what. And we go
nation by nation--China and all the rest of them. And in the
past that's okay, but I think what's happening is over the past
few years we've seen the availability of technology go to
nations that are tiny little nations in the big scheme of
things, or to terrorist groups or small groups, where these
groups can have a firepower available to them or a mass
destruction capability available to them that was only
available to major nations in times past, 15 or 20 years ago,
just that recently. In other words, they carry a big stick now.
And this is tough to keep up with.
Now, it's in two areas. In the WMD area. I--this sounds a
little crazy maybe, but I'm not that much concerned about the
nuclear matter now as much as I am about the BW and CW, but BW
in particular, because we can keep up with satellites and
everything else, we keep up with what's going on with regards
to the huge industrial complex necessary for nuclear weapons.
We can't keep up with stuff like--I asked Judge Webster once
when he was here, when he was out at the CIA, I asked him in
another hearing over in Governmental Affairs one day, what size
room would be necessary for a valid chemical or biological
weapons plant? He turned around and consulted one of the people
on the first row and said, an area about the size of this
hearing room.
Now you folks can't--that's difficult to keep up with all
over the world on every group that might have a BW plant that
any graduate chemist can set up. And that's the tough part. And
so this is now spreading to where it's--you know, we can--we
say, well, but they can bring in nuclear weapons in suitcase
size. But it still takes a very, very high degree of
sophistication of nuclear knowledge and development capability
to make the smaller weapons.
And we have these 70- to 80-pound chest pack-types that are
available in the military, and we're aware of those. But it
still takes a very high degree of sophistication to make these
things. So--but the BW, you think a BW brought in a suitcase,
not monitorable, going through airports, things like that,
brought in and then sprayed out of the back of a cab driving
around Wall Street in New York and people start dropping dead,
and you've done the same damage as far as casualties go over a
period of five days or six days. You probably have the same
number of people die as if you'd nuked the place. And that's
not an exaggeration. It's true. That's the kind of threat that
I think we have to think a lot more about.
And we still tend to think of the--you know, we tend to
think in terms of big nuclear weapons and all this, and I'm
concerned about those. But I think we have a new dimension to
the threat that we really haven't dealt with yet.
Now, that's one area. The second area--and you've alluded
to this several times through this morning already--we have an
international, a worldwide dependence on computers now that is
unbelievable. The President mentioned last night in his speech
the cyberspace thing that we're into here, that just in a few
years things that used to be available only to the most skilled
scientists in the computer area are now available to everybody.
And what does this mean? Well, it means, for instance, a
hearing I conducted over there also some years ago was on the
six electrical nodes, control centers, that we have in the
Northeast United States, controls the whole electrical grid for
that area. And they're computer-controlled now. And you have
hackers getting into that thing. You just dump the whole
electrical grid for the Northeast if somebody wants to get in
there and do it. And you have Defense hackers trying to get in
the Pentagon. We've had hearings on that. We have economic
hackers. We had one Russian a couple of years ago that we're
all aware of that dumped some of the accounts out of New York
into his accounts in LA and another account in Zurich. And this
is what's going on right now with the--we are becoming more
computer-dependent around the world and yet more computer-
vulnerable than I think most of us realize.
The purpose of war is to bring the enemy to its economic
knees. We've usually done that by bombing and knocking the
devil out them until we could march in and take over. We can
bring a nation to its economic knees right now if you had the
right trained computer hackers to get into the Defense
Department. But not only that, but you get into Wall Street.
You transfer some funds out of the Fed to George Tenet, George
Tenet to me, and I get rich. And it's all over the place.
You've got things all criss-crossed. And a few hundred hackers
trained to do this could just wreak havoc. It could be--the
results could be like war without the bombs. And I think it's
that serious that we have to plan for.
Now I don't know how we keep up with all this. It's the
international flow of money. It's the transfer of accounts.
It's economic hackers. It's--I've gone out to NSA and been
briefed several times on this. They're very concerned about all
this, as we--all you are very much aware also.
So my question or comment that maybe we'll get into more
this afternoon--but how do we keep up with this thing? Do we
needdouble our HUMINT people that are out dealing with these
things? Do we need a whole new emphasis on HUMINT or SIGINT or a
combination thereof? What resources do you need? How do we keep up with
what these threats are? Are we cooperating with other nation's
intelligence, because other nations are concerned about this, too? It
can hit them as hard as it hits us.
You can imagine in this recent economic crisis in the Far
East if we had suddenly dumped some computer hacker problems
into Hong Kong and screwed things up there royally, that would
have reverberated around the world immediately. So it's not a
small item.
What I'd ask you all is, what's our status now? What do you
see? What--where--are we able to keep up with what the secret
groups are or what nations might be developing this kind of a
capability? You folks have a very tough job. It's--intelligence
is always vital, first as a warning, and second as a force
multiplier. But now we have all these new problems, and it's a
very tough one. And we expect you to be clairvoyant and all-
knowing when you're not in areas like this. But how are we set
up to handle these things of technology advances that give WMD
capability to almost anybody that really wants it and gives
it--and computer vulnerability that I don't think we're even
beginning to learn how to deal with yet?
That's a very long question, but if you could comment
briefly on that, and maybe we can get into more of it this
afternoon.
Mr. Bryant, I will call on you.
Thank you.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you.
I just want to comment first on the key to the best defense
to these two issues--WMD and the computer intrusions issues--is
number one, cooperation. The people that are sitting at this
table in the law enforcement community have to have a strong
partnership of exchange of candid information about what's
going on, not only information from the international scene,
from the Agency and DIA and other sources of information, but
that information has to come in and we have to deal with it.
From a law enforcement and a counterintelligence and
terrorism perspective, the FBI set up in 1992 a computer
intrusion squad in the Washington field office. Currently, we
have a group of individuals where we're proposing basically to
have a partnership with the Intelligence Community--DOD, the
Agency, et al., and state and local law enforcement where this
information would come in. And one, there would be an
analytical look at what the issue is, what's coming in, what
the threat is. And two, there would be an investigations
branch, where we're running right now about 500 computer
intrusion cases in the FBI. Those are coordinated with various
entities in the Intelligence Community or working with state
and local law enforcement.
This is a start. But this issue is going to do nothing but
get much bigger, and it's got to be a partnership. There's just
responsibilities in a lot of different places. But we're trying
to put together an Infrastructure Protection Center that would
basically would answer some of your questions.
As I said, the current state of the threat is increasing
daily. And as far as the Weapons of Mass Destruction, with help
of the Nunn-Lugar money for Defense and FEMA and the FBI and a
lot of agencies, there's a lot of training going on, first-
responder training. But once again, it comes back to
prevention, which is our core issue here. It goes to your
Intelligence Community, our ability to stop these issues before
they occur.
Senator Glenn. Do you need more resources? The FBI?
Mr. Bryant. Oh, I think yes.
Senator Glenn. Okay. Good answer. [General laughter.]
Who else wants to address this?
General Hughes. Well, from a defense standpoint, sir, I'll
mention that I think we understand these new threat conditions
that you outlined quite will. We have been working on them for
some time. We do know with regard to intelligence gathering
that they pose new challenges in collection of information. And
it's technical as well as human.
I think you hit on the issues of human intelligence being a
critical factor here, but the technical intelligence gathering
to give us information about these new circumstances is very
important.
Senator Glenn. Let me ask, is HUMINT, is that the most
important factor, or is HUMINT minimal compared to SIGINT, or
do these groups all have contact with each other so you can
intercept what they're doing or both?
General Hughes. I'd prefer to address the details of that
in closed session, sir.
Senator Glenn. Okay.
General Hughes. I should also mention that new defensive
mechanism are called for. The protection of our civil
infrastructure and our attendant military infrastructure
against the kind of threats that you mentioned, such as
organized or nation-state or subgroup-sponsored intrusion is
very important. We have to work on that in the future.
I'd also like to say with regard to weapons of mass
destruction that new sensor technology is vital. We have to be
able to sense the presence of these kind of weapons in
proximity to not only our military forces, but our civilian
infrastructure--ports, airfields, and cities. And that kind of
sensor technology is being developed, but there are some
technical hurdles to it right now, and we need to proceed with
that on--in my view, on a national basis.
Senator Glenn. Who else? Mrs. Oakley, do you have any
comment?
Mrs. Oakley. I think the State Department is also very
concerned about this issue, particularly as it affects our
relations with other countries. And I think that we have begun
to focus on certain countries who may be developing an
information warfare capability. I'd be glad to discuss this
with you this afternoon in closed session. It's how you put
that developing capability in the context of other concerns
about terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, how we mount an
effective diplomatic and law enforcement campaign to deal with
that.
I would say that I think it's something that we're going to
have to give a great deal more attention to, and I would
certainly agree that we've got to work together with all these
agencies if we're going to get our hands around the problem.
Senator Glenn. Mr. Tenet, do you have adequate resources?
Do you think it's HUMINT, SIGINT? Do you need to double the
size of any of those or what do you need to really keep up in
this area?
Director Tenet. I don't have an answer on the resource
front for you. My intuitive answer is it is probably yes, given
all the other things we're trying to manage in the technology
arena. But this is something we should work through together in
our budget cycle, because there's a lot of room here for
growth, but we need a strategy that's sound first before we
start asking for money and people.
Senator Glenn. Yes. Well, my time is up, Mr. Chairman. But
I think we need to spend a lot of time on this, because I think
it's a real danger and a real hazard, and I want to set up to
manage this as best we can. This is a very tough one. And when
everybody has this kind of information available to them, some
people are going to misuse it. And people that are willing to
sacrifice their lives for whatever their misguided purpose may
be, with this kind of technology are a real danger to us. It's
a new way of making warfare.
Thank you.
Chairman Shelby. Thank you, Senator Glenn.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
I want to bring up an area that I don't think anybody has
talked too much about, but it's been in the news lately, and
that's Cuba, with the Pope's visit down to Cuba. I'm curious to
know just your interpretation of the current status as far as
Cuba is concerned.
Do you think that there is some possibility that we can get
a transition to democracy if--maybe the change of philosophy
within the current administration there or perhaps maybe a
successor that may follow up from behind Fidel Castro?
Director Tenet. I don't have any raw facts to throw at you,
Senator, that informs my judgment in that regard. I mean, we
all hope that there is a transition. Certainly, the Pope's
visit we would hope ends up strengthening the institution of
the church and that that institution becomes more vibrant in
the pursuing of themes that really lead to a transition on the
island. But I have nothing that I could say that says I've got
an estimate in place that say, he will be gone, or there will
be an automatic transition there. We would all be hopeful of
that fact, certainly.
But I don't--you know, there is--this is a place that's
economically hasn't, you know, is not doing very, very well,
and there are a lot of problems, But I have no--there is no
opposition that I can point to. There is no ferment that I can
point to at this point that leads me to tell you that--
everything in my gut tells me that there will be a transition
at some point. All the factors are in place. How, when, the
pace, who is involved--I don't have answers.
Senator Allard. Now, strategically, they're certainly--
would you agree that they're not as big a threat as they were a
decade ago?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir, I would agree with that.
Senator Allard. What is happening as far as drugs, you
know. As I mentioned in my comments, I have a real interest in
drugs and how they are coming into this country. And I know
that there has been a shift in some of the way that they have
been coming back. And certainly, the Caribbean countries are
part of that and sitting right in among those islands is Cuba.
And do we have some overflight issues with Cuba in some of
these ways that might be coming into Florida?
Director Tenet. Senator, I have to----
Senator Allard. Or any other part of the continental United
States?
Director Tenet [continuing]. Take that one for the record.
I'm not certain that I can take you and a drug connection to
the Cuban mainland at this point. The transition to the
Caribbean has been quite palpable. But I'd have to go get you a
solid answer on that question.
Mrs. Oakley. I----
Senator Allard. Go ahead.
Mrs. Oakley. May I just put in something about that? I
think that ail through the Caribbean, in the State Department
we view that all airspace at some time or another has been used
by drug traffickers and has evaded law enforcement activity.
But in our view, the available information does not suggest
that Cuba has been a major route for drugs en route to the
United States. I think that their military capabilities have
kept that to a minor degree. It is, or course, always a
concern, and there are always possibilities for corruption of
officials, particularly in a weakening economy.
Senator Allard. Let me ask the question just more directly.
Are there narcotraffickers overflying Cuban airspace to bring
drugs into the United States? And if they are, to what extent?
Mrs. Oakley. I think--I would agree that we'd have to take
that question. I think my general statement that I can give you
here in the unclassified session stands. But I would have to
get back to you in a classified manner on specific instances.
Senator Allard. I would respect that.
General Hughes. I'll just give you a short answer here,
sir.
The monitoring of airspace over Cuba and in the surrounding
area is a military issue. And it is inappropriate for us to
discuss that in this setting. We can give you an answer later
today.
Senator Allard. Okay, very good. I appreciate that.
Thank you.
Again, I'd like to follow up a little bit on what Senator
Glenn was talking about in regards to the infrastructure. Are
we prepared to deal with a sort of a major disinformation
effort by some adversary as far as our computer systems in this
country are concerned. I mean, there is that possibility with
all the development on the Internet and what not. And there is
a lot of information that comes out on the Internet. Some of it
is bad and some of it is not so good. And obviously, there are
enough people that are beginning to tune in and be conscious of
what's happening on the Internet, including the media, is there
a plan in action to deal with any kind of disinformation effort
over the Internet?
Mr. Bryant. Any type of disinformation campaign, wherever
it is, once we know about it--and there's a lot of issues there
as far as guidelines and what we can do and look at under our
legal authorities--but if we're aware of a disinformation
campaign from a counterintelligence view, or a criminal view,
we're going to respond to it with whatever resources in the
government are necessary to prevent it from becoming a major
damage to our national security.
And we do see--we have seen disinformation campaigns and we
have frankly, stopped their effectiveness by basically
notification and curtailing the damage.
Senator Allard. Is there an attempt to monitor what's
coming on the--I don't understand why there would be legal
restrictions on----
Mr. Bryant. According to the Attorney General----
Senator Allard [continuing]. Just checking into the
Internet and following it?
Mr. Bryant. No. We cannot, as an investigative law
enforcement agency, or counterintelligence, counterterrorism
agency, under our guidelines, monitor the Internet. If we have
a specific reason, certainly, we go look at it.
Senator Allard. Even though--this is a mixed audience. I
mean, it's an international audience. It's not only Americans,
but it's people in Europe, South America----
Mr. Bryant. Right.
Senator Allard [continuing]. Africa, all the continents.
Mr. Bryant. Right. But we have to have some specific cause
or reason under an investigative authority to look at it. I
mean, we just can't sit there and wholesalely, wholesale
monitor that medium.
Senator Allard. Is that true with all the enforcement
agencies?
Mr. Bryant. Well, it's true of the law enforcement agencies
affected by the Attorney General guidelines----
Senator Allard. I see.
Mr. Bryant [continuing]. Which is what we operate under.
Senator Allard. So this basically is a policy that was set
up by the Attorney General?
Mr. Bryant. Right. It's a guideline.
Senator Allard. And there wasn't any legislation that put
that policy in place? She did that by herself?
Mr. Bryant. Well, it's been in effect for many years.
Senator Allard. I see.
Mr. Bryant. And it's come out of other issues where they
thought that the FBI in particular was using techniques that
were possibly intrusive. And so, as a matter of policy, we
don't.
Senator Allard. But it's--I'm having a hard time
understanding this concept because to sit down and read a paper
is not intrusive. You can print off a paper on the Internet.
What is the difference?
Mr. Bryant. I, as an individual private citizen, can go to
my home computer and do whatever I want to, but as an
investigative agency, I cannot direct investigative resources
to wholesalely go on a public medium and monitor it for
criminal or counterintelligence or counterterrorism.
Senator Allard. So you can't even assign anybody according
to the Attorney General's guidelines to read a paper on a
regular basis, searching for some clue that might indicate that
there's drugs being distributed in this country, for example?
Mr. Bryant. I think if we have an indication of criminality
or some area where we have jurisdiction, certainly we can
monitor it. But as far as a wholesale review of the Internet,
we don't do it.
Senator Allard. That's kind of an interesting area. Maybe
we ought to check into that a little bit. I didn't realize we
had that kind of constraints on something as public as the
Internet.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Allard, if you'd yield just for an
observation. Mr. Bryant, you're not saying, are you, as I
understand it, that the FBI, if they had reason to believe that
the Internet was used directly and indirectly for heavy drug
trafficking you wouldn't investigate that?
Mr. Bryant. No, that's not what I'm saying.
Chairman Shelby. What----
Mr. Bryant. What I'm trying to make clear here----
Chairman Shelby [continuing]. Are you saying?
Mr. Bryant [continuing]. We as a practice do not have
analysts sitting down in front of the Internet reviewing all
material. If we have reasonable belief----
Chairman Shelby. OK.
Mr. Bryant [continuing]. That there's some criminal or
counterintelligence or counterterrorism activity that we can go
to that medium and certainly use it. But we have to have
basically an investigative interest to go to this medium.
As I said, I as a private citizen can do whatever I want to
do. But we have to have an investigative interest, namely a
case.
Senator Allard. Well, have you ever considered the
possibility of maybe checking out the Internet from time to
time for clues as to whether you have a problem or not?
Mr. Bryant. Certainly, if we have an investigation. We do
it.
Senator Allard. OK.
Mr. Bryant. But we have to have the investigation.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Chairman Shelby. Mr. Bryant, are the guidelines required by
the Executive Order, a certain Executive Order, is that
correct?
Mr. Bryant. Yes.
Chairman Shelby. OK. Do you know who first brought out that
Executive Order? Was this this Administration or was it a prior
Administration?
Mr. Bryant. No, I think it was a prior--Senator, I think it
came out of some issues regarding issues many years ago
regarding, I think, the CISPES investigation.
Chairman Shelby. OK.
Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
George, let me turn, again, to Iraq. And I'm sure we'll get
into this in more detail in the closed hearing this afternoon.
But it's been pointed out these open public hearings do have a
real purpose. And I think that is to help not only educate us
but to educate the American people. But you talked about and
some of the other members of the panel talked about the
sanctions and what that has been able to do and what would
happen if the sanctions were removed, and how quickly they
would be able to get some of these production capabilities up.
The other variable, though, is inspection. And that's what
the American people keep reading about in the paper is the
inspection problem. Describe for us what the problem is.
Describe for us what the UN should be able to do. And compare
where we are today versus where we were a year ago or two years
ago. I mean, Saddam has not exactly been cooperative during the
entire post-Gulf War era. He's never been, you know, totally
cooperative. So what's the difference today? What's going on
today that was--anybody? Ms. Oakley?
Mrs. Oakley. Let me just say that----
Senator DeWine. Let me just say, just, you know, put this
into terms that the average American can understand. What's the
problem? What's different today?
Mrs. Oakley. I think what we're seeing--and again, I go
back to what I said earlier--there are two basic problems in
Iraq that we don't know what they were doing before, and we're
not confident that we know where they are--what has been
destroyed, what it would take to get back to their production
and development of all of these weapons of mass destruction.
What the inspections have enabled people to do is to find
out a lot of information, but we also know that that
information is incomplete, and so the inspections that continue
help us fill in those gaps of our knowledge. The inspections
also prevent further development from going forward. People in
the inspections have gone in and they put seals and tapes on
various machines and various facilities. And so they know when
they go back to inspect that people have not been in those
places because the seals have not been broken. And I'll be able
to get into more detail about what we do know.
What has happened now is that Saddam Hussein has said, all
right, some of these sites that you've been visiting, you can
no longer see. So we don't know what they've moved in those
sites of their past activity, and we don't know what they're
doing now for the future in those sites.
Senator DeWine. So, excuse me.
Some sites that we did have access--the UN did have access
to, now no longer have access. That's one change.
Mrs. Oakley. Well, that is one change. And there has been
some discussion about the number of sites that would now be
off-limits to UNSCOM inspectors. That number has been whittled
down. But the physical dimensions of those sites are large
enough that we don't know what they've moved into those sites
and, if we can't get at them, we won't know what they're doing
with them now. That's the major problem.
Senator DeWine. And how do you know--speaking to the whole
universe, how do you know what the universe is? I mean, how do
you know that you've already in previous times identified all
the sites?
Mrs. Oakley. Well, you're----
Senator DeWine. How do you know you know the universe to
begin with, let alone----
Mrs. Oakley. That's what we know we don't know. We don't
know what the universe was. Saddam Hussein's government and
officials and technicians, in our view, have never come clean
on the extent of what they were doing before. It would
certainly make it easier for future inspections if we knew what
they had had before.
But when we talk about information that you can put it on a
disk, you put formulas, you can put production techniques,
things like that, it makes it very difficult. The people who've
gone in--andI would like to reiterate, what we have learned
from the UNSCOM inspections is an incredible amount. But there are
enormous gaps in what we know about where they were on the development
of these weapons of mass destruction.
Senator DeWine. Anybody else?
General?
General Hughes. If I could just make a comment to try to
put this into the context that you asked for. Much of what
Saddam Hussein has done in the past and perhaps in part what
he's doing now is done to create perceptions that will be
favorable to his goals. And as you know, he's brought us to the
brink on two or three occasions in the past since the Gulf War,
probably to generate some support inside his own country and to
create a favorable climate in the surrounding nations and in
the Arab world.
This time, it's a little different because the adversarial
nature of his belligerence is so difficult for us to accept and
understand. We do have essential control of Iraq's external
capabilities. They are not able to attack anyone or to project
a military force or to undertake aggressive conflict against a
neighboring nation. Even a small event would be met with
immediate retaliation and resistance by not only us, but our
allies.
What we lack is the control of the internal circumstances
inside Iraq so that we can prevent this kind of generation of
crisis and this belligerent attitude that is resistant to the
inspection regime and the sanctions regime.
My personal view--and I hope it's somewhat reflected in
intelligence--is that we probably are faced with some kind of a
decision point here in the next few weeks and months, where we
have to decide what it is we want to do with Iraq in the
future. I agree that the circumstances that have developed over
time have got us to a point where continuing everything that's
happened in the past is very difficult. This is once again a
policy issue that someone else will have to decide.
From a military and from a intelligence standpoint, this is
the context we're now in. Saddam Hussein has the capability to
generate a crisis, and there's not much we can do about that
right now except respond to the crisis.
Senator DeWine. With the chair's indulgence, I just want to
make sure again, in very simplistic terms, making it clear what
you're saying, or I understand what you're saying. We have the
ability to stop them from projecting, is what you said,
external.
General Hughes. That is correct.
Senator DeWine. We do not have the ability to stop them
doing this internally?
General Hughes. Essentially, that is correct.
Senator DeWine. A simplistic question would be then, what
is--define then the danger to the neighboring countries and the
danger to the United States.
General Hughes. Well, in----
Senator DeWine. What's the danger?
General Hughes [continuing]. A narrow band of danger--there
may be other dangerous conditions that could result--but the
unfettered or continued development of weapons of mass
destruction is a critical issue for all of us, and certainly
for the surrounding nations.
Now we--my personal belief is that he has somehow protected
the essential knowledge and some few capabilities that he still
has at his command to continue with weapons of mass destruction
capabilities at some later time. And that's why he's being so
difficult with us now--to protect that core capability he's
managed to conceal from us.
But much of what he had has been taken or destroyed by us,
and that's very appropriate. And the countries that surround
Iraq know that, and I believe appreciate it, on a national
level.
Senator DeWine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the
panel for your patience. I note with interest that our five-
minute question and answer timeframe is very comparable to the
President's 20 minute State of the Union speech last night.
I have several observations, and then a question. Senator
DeWine and myself, along with the majority leader, Senator
Lott, went to five countries in six days in Central America.
And then later on I went with CODEL Stevens to Australia and
New Zealand. And I want to acknowledge the comments by Director
Tenet and General Hughes and others in relation to the drug
interdiction programs. The briefings we received in the field
are certainly commensurate with your observations. The same is
true in regards to the briefing we received from Admiral
Prueher in regards to the Asian flu, what the temperature is,
what we can do as an antidote, more especially with Indonesia.
And I would feel remiss if I did not make a personal
comment, being a former Marine and always interested in the
esprit de corps business, I think without question our
intelligence agencies, more particularly the CIA, have been on
a moral roller coaster for the past several years. It was my
experience, I think Senator DeWine would back me up, I know the
Chairman would, that in terms of renewed commitment and purpose
and morale, thank you George for the job you're doing. We can,
in the Committee, feel very strongly--I know the Chairman does,
I know the Vice Chairman does--that we want to be of all
possible help in regards to the regular work that has to be
done. They're doing it and I certainly applaud your efforts
I have a little bit different view in regards to the
situation in Iraq. I wonder who has whom in the box? The
Chairman asked whether or not we were proactive or reactionary.
I was in Paris as part of the Trans-Atlantic partnership
meeting and had to give a response to M. Hubert Vedrine who is
the Paris, pardon me, the French Foreign Minister, who had more
sharp elbows to say about the United States than an NBA
forward.
It seems to me that obviously Russia wants their Iraq
arrearages paid, China wants the oil and certainly, France
wants to sell it. And so, we have a--just a remarkable change,
a significant change in the Security Council in that part of
the world. All three countries are saying no to economic
sanctions. All three countries are saying not to any kind of
military contingencies although we areworking on that. The
Arab-Israeli situation is changed vastly because of the leadership
changes since Desert Storm. The Arab states are sort of like, you know,
asking them in fact to say, will you give testimony against the Mafia
without a witness protection program, and they're not going to do that.
So, I think it is markedly different. And I think Senator
DeWine's questions are right on the money. And in terms of
practical effect, it affects our Security Council, it affects
the whole balance of power in the Mideast. I don't know who has
who in the box in this regards, and I'm not going to go into
it. But I think the Chairman was right on the money in his
remarks.
NATO expansion. Do we have--I'm going to quote General
Hughes. ``During this period, Russia's strategic nuclear forces
will remain the backbone of Moscow's military might, preserving
Russia's perception of great power status and protecting its
vital national security interests.''
And George, you've indicated, ``Finally, while Russia
continues to seek close cooperation with the United States on
matters of mutual concern, it is increasingly strident in
opposing what it seems as US efforts to create an unipolar
world.''
I understand in regards to NATO expansion that we planted
the flag. I understand it's probably going to happen. I
understand we want the historical rewrite of Europe. I
understand in terms of Hungary and Poland and the Czech
Republic, that they want their self determination and they want
entree to the European Common Market. I understand the
President wants to make a speech on the 50 year anniversary of
NATO. And I understand that we want to cage and tame the
Russian bear. But the Russians don't see it that way.
And in all of my discussions with the members of the
Russian Duma, staff members, others, Mr. Primakov is off the
reservation they're going to play the nuclear card to keep on
the world stage. I don't think we have any chance for START II.
I think it is fodder for the hard liners. And I think it's in
our vital national security interests to take a hard look at
this. What's the trade off?
I notice that we had some paragraphs or some short
sentences in regards to that. Could you respond, from an
intelligence standpoint, about the trade off on what I consider
to be vital national interests, START II and control of the
nuclear capability of Russia vis-a-vis in regards to NATO
expansion.
Director Tenet. Well, Senator, you've asked a lot of
questions. The point I was making in the testimony is that it's
clear to me that the Russians have a sense of their own
national interest and they're going to pursue it. And it's
going to conflict with our's in some way, shape or form, and we
have to be enormously mindful of it.
This whole crisis in the Middle East is illustrative of it.
They have economic interests. They have regional interests.
They have an ability to maintain their own sense of who they
are as a great power and they're about doing that. My only
suggestion is, is we have to open our eyes and understand that
that's what they're about.
We went through a number of different periods in our
relations with the Russians immediately after the Wall fell. I
think they were falling all over themselves to do whatever we
asked them to do. We're now at a period where this pragmatic
nationalism has set in. They have national interests that they
are going to pursue because they think they still remain a
great power, and they're going to do things that benefit their
own national interests and we have to just have our eyes wide
open and understand what that's all about. Because, it will be
a relationship that's both collaborative and competitive, and
they will do things that we don't like and we're going to do
things that they don't like, and we just have to accept that
fact. And that's simply where we are with the Russians at this
point in time.
But we are--we have our interests and we are pursuing them
and I don't think anybody is backing down from doing that. But
we have a Russian entity that is evolving, that is working
itself through who they think they are and what their interests
are, and what they stand for. And managing that relationship
will become more difficult than it has been in the past.
Senator Roberts. And in terms of the contingency
involvements that may take place, you are advising the
President and others in regards to NATO expansion in regards to
some of these hurdles and the law of unintended effects?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Anybody else have any comment?
One final question. If we lifted the economic sanctions is
that going to hasten the transition in Cuba in regards to Fidel
Castro? From an intelligence standpoint?
Director Tenet. I don't know the answer to that question,
Senator. I'll take that for the record. I don't know the answer
to that.
Senator Roberts. Now the Library of Congress can show you
in terms of economic sanctions, they're very usually counter-
productive unless it's in our national security interests. When
Senator DeWine and I were in Central America, the Southern
Command indicated 31 out of 32 countries now, they are
experiencing some form of democracy except one, and that's
Cuba. And they are not exporting revolution now.
It seems to me we would put Mr. Castro in a real pickle if
we simply lifted the economic sanctions. I say that obviously
without Senator Helms being here.
Director Tenet. Well, we may, Senator. That may also be
true. I'm no great lover of Fidel Castro and I would never want
to do anything that he could take advantage of to extend his
power as well. So, I understand all the academic discussions
here, and maybe someone should look at this. But we'll get you
a thoughtful answer from our community.
Senator Roberts. Thank you.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Robb, Senator Kerrey is going to
have to leave to go to a luncheon. He's got one quick question,
I believe. Is that correct, Senator?
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Mr. Bryant was starting to yawn and
nod off there, so I want to bring him back into this
conversation.
Chairman Shelby. Oh, the FBI never nods off. [General
laughter.]
Mr. Bryant. We're always alert.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Mr. Bryant, how do Director Freeh and
you and Mr. Tenet--I mean, how do you plan to break this logjam
that we've got right now on encryption legislation? We know--I
mean, industry and you believe the status quo is unacceptable.
The current law doesn't work. How do we bridge the differences?
I mean that's what we have to do. We have to bridge the
differences between where you are and where industry is and
where privacy people are. I mean, we're not going to get--we're
never going to get extremes on all sides.
But this legislation--this law needs to be changed, both
for the development of the market and for the development of
our capacity to keep the American people safe and secure. If
you could tell me what you think--what is the intent of the
Administration to organize this effort in 1998?
Mr. Bryant. Just a couple of statements. Just----
Vice Chairman Kerrey. You have to answer, don't you, Bob?
Mr. Bryant. Just to restate a couple of issues here.
The law enforcement community, in particular, believes that
the market-based solutions probably won't work, and we are
pretty concerned that we have to have--I don't want to tell
some--some father that we've lost a child because we couldn't
break the telephone conversation or we couldn't get to a
storage on a disk or something like that. And that's all we're
saying. We have to have--all we want are the authorities that
we have now. In other words, we want to be able to get a court
order to do electronic surveillance or to do a search and be
able to get into encrypted areas such as telephone
conversations or computers and do what we do now.
To break this deadline, we see the national--we're
concerned about it because the way this is going is we're all
aware that there's going to be a time and period that we're
basically not going to be able to use investigative tools that
are critical to national security and to law enforcement. And--
--
Vice Chairman Kerrey. But you also know that--I mean, I can
write out a code on a piece of paper and haul it out of the
country. This is not a difficult thing to prevent me from
exporting, and we know this thing is slipping away from us. So,
from your standpoint, the current law is not acceptable. From a
market standpoint, it's not acceptable. So what are we going to
do to break--what does the administration intend to do to break
this?
Mr. Bryant. Well, I will speak for the FBI.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Okay, good.
Mr. Bryant. The thing I see is that we have to have some
ability to have--to have a key recovery so that we can have
access to plain text information so we can use it for law
enforcement purposes and national security purposes. And I
think there are several bills floating around. I think you--I
think you sponsored one, and I think there's one that's come
out of HPSCI, and I think some of those bills that we're just
going to have to look at very carefully because I think it's a
critical national interest. And I think it's a very thoughtful
discussion because there's a lot of market forces here. But we
would like to see on U.S. manufactured devices and encryption,
that there be some kind of key recovery system or anything
exported in.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Yes, and let me just say to suggest
some language changes and ways to bridge the gap. I mean, I
think we can use the market to solve this problem. I don't
think the market all by itself is going to. We're going to have
to have law to intervene in the market in order to be able to
keep people safe. But I think we can use market solutions. I
mean, that's basically what we're doing. We're trying to set up
a mechanism where a market can develop for key recovery. I
mean, that's because key recovery is only being used by the
marketplace. If it wasn't being used by the marketplace, it
would be a much more difficult transaction to accomplish. I
mean, the language on both sides of this argument is so
provocative, it seems to me that what we need to do is get a
list of differences and try to resolve the ones we can.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Kerrey, can I----
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Just go down the list. I mean, I've
met with industry. I've met with the privacy groups. I've met
with you and NSA on a number of occasions. And it seems to me
that the differences are nowhere near as great as the rhetoric
would lead one to believe.
Chairman Shelby. Are you saying, Senator Kerrey, or are you
not saying that the marketplace will do it all? I doubt very
seriously that the marketplace will do it all. I have some of
the concerns that the FBI has.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. No, I am not saying that at all. I'm
not saying that at all. What we're trying to do is write
legislation that would enable the market to develop the
solution. We're going to use the power of market-based
solutions. I mean, you've basically got private sector people
out there, whether it's a banking institution or a power
company or a small business of any kind, saying I'm
communicating. I'm going to talk. You give me an individual.
I mean the goal of the McCain legislation is to develop a
secure public network for the purpose of developing commerce,
and for the purpose of enabling us to continue in national
security and law enforcement to do the business the American
people want us to do. So what I'm saying is that I think we can
bridge the rhetorical gap. What's needed is to make a list of
where there's differences and try, where possible, to bridge
them. But the current status quo leads me to have a very low
level of confidence that the current law's going to be changed.
That's bad for the American people from the standpoint of
domestic and international security. It's also bad from the
marketplace. Everybody loses if the current law's not changed.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Kerrey, I have one quick
observation just for the record here.
As part of the marketplace, as I understand it and have
witnessed it all my life, you're going to have a lot of illegal
activity in any marketplace that I believe that the law
enforcement people should have an opportunity to put a handle
on in some way.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Well, in fact, one of the things that
very often is not discussed--I mean, there's an article on the
12th of January 1998 and Jack Nelson from the Los Angeles Times
talking about U.S. firms estimating $300 billion of losses in
1997 coming as a consequence of espionage against them. So I
mean, there's an interest in the marketplace to develop
security that I think is consistent with your own goals and
objectives. I mean, what you're trying to do is help them
accomplish this job. You want to help them become more secure.
I think there are parallel interests here that don't seem
obvious because the rhetoric sounds so different. You listen to
one side describe it and you would think it was completely
different and there's no possibility of compromise because
they're very often presuming. I mean, the bill that came out of
Senator McCain's Committee contains some concessions in there
to the business community that I've talked to people on the
business side, they're completely unaware of it. They're
unaware of some of the things that were done, and I just--I'm
very fearful, sitting here in the early part of the session,
that we're going to end up in the last part of the session
having done nothing because we're presuming the differences are
enormous. And I think we need a process. And personally, I
think it's going to have to be led by the President in some
fashion, saying, okay, it's time to resolve the conflicts. It's
time to make a list of the differences and resolve as many as
we can, and if you can't resolve them, get it to the Floor and
get the law changed.
You know, we never get 100 percent of what we want. But we
know that the current law is not acceptable. We're experiencing
losses on the commercial side. We're experiencing loss of our
ability to be able to protect the American people. I mean, if
we drift on this one, I think that we're going to have very,
very unhappy outcomes.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Robb.
Thanks for your patience.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize that I could not be here for the earlier part
of the hearing. We're having a full Armed Services Committee
hearing at this time, and several Members serve on both
Committees, so we're moving between them. And so as not to
repeat any of the areas that have already been covered with
this panel, I asked Mr. Grant, a member of the professional
staff, ``What hasn't been covered so far?'' He said, ``Well,
encryption hasn't been covered.'' I said, ``Well, I'll just,
I'll take that one up very quickly.'' It's one that I have an
interest in, and my views are not necessarily entirely in sync
with the Vice Chairman's. And when he asked his question, I
thought, well, what else hasn't been covered? And Mr. Grant
said, ``Well, economic issues haven't been covered in any
detail.'' So let me take a quick shot at those. If they have
been covered, somebody was out of the room when they did. I'm
sure they have at least been alluded to.
And I might say, first of all, I was walking here with the
Chairman of the Australian Foreign Relations Committee and
visiting with him. He was observing some parallels between some
of the things they do and the way we do business here.
I might add--not for the benefit of any of the Committee
Members who are, at the moment, not here--that I hope that the
number of open hearings this Committee holds is very limited. I
think this threat assessment hearing and the confirmation of
DCIs are about the limit of what we ought to discuss in an open
hearing. There are other Committees for policy questions, and
both the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations
Committeethe appropriate venue for many of the matters to be
discussed. We've been having some internal discussions here on that
particular point.
But I think this hearing is important, and I only raise the
subject because when talking about key recovery in the
encryption area, we quickly get into areas that we would not be
able to discuss in public. I think economic analysis, however,
is one of the few subjects that lends itself relatively easily
and appropriately to public discussion.
There have been very severe problems recently in East Asia,
affecting most of the financial markets in Asia, around the
world, and in this country, many of the real experts are very
much concerned about what is happening. I had occasion to have
dinner with Hank Greenberg of AIG a few nights ago. It was an
off-the-record dinner, so I won't quote anything he said. He
gave a very succinct and important insight as a major financial
player in that area of discussion.
But I wonder what Mr. Tenet and others could tell us at
this point about your view of where things stand and what
actions--well, I won't get into the issue of our policy
response. Provide us an analysis of where things stand at this
point with respect to Indonesia and Korea and the possible
impact on Japan and China regarding the whole question of
economic security and financial markets.
Director Tenet. Well, Senator, in my opening statement, I
went through some of the factors that affect this crisis. I'm
going to say just a very few things, because I want to be
careful about what we say about this financial crisis. And the
less we say as an Intelligence Community, I think the better in
some respects in open session. I think one of the things that
we worry about
Senator Robb. I was searching for something that I could in
good conscience discuss in open session, and I thought this was
appropriate for open discussion. And I will accept your
admonition that----
Director Tenet. No. The concern I have----
Senator Robb [continuing]. Comments on this area
Director Tenet. The concern I have is people speak about
these crises, and then 20 minutes later the stock market
plunges by 50 points, and we're not economists, and I'm
certainly not an economist. But from the political stability--
--
Senator Robb. Don't clear your throat, whatever you do.
Director Tenet [continuing]. Perspective, these countries
are now being asked to do rather dramatic things internally
that will have political consequences and consequences for
their stability.
All of that matters a great deal to us. We have been deeply
engaged here. We see them as strategic partners. They have been
part of an emerging market boom. They believe that they've been
playing by the rules, and all of this capital has been infused
into their countries and they've been great consumers. And now
they see a way of life start to erode on them. And the
political turbulence it creates as they implement austerity
measures, as they're asked to clamp down, have consequences for
how they view us, what the long-term engagement of the United
States is in the region, and quite candidly, what the long-term
influence of the Chinese may be in taking advantage of this
crisis. Big, stable power with lots of hard currency reserves.
So those are the things we have to watch. I don't want to
opine on how it all turns out. But I think engagement on the
part of the United States in this region is absolutely critical
for our long-term security interests. So while people are
focusing on Wall Street's reactions and interest rates and bond
trading, we have, from a geopolitical perspective, invested a
lot here, and we have to help these countries work through
this. Because it has serious consequences for us.
I don't know if General Hughes wants to say anything or
not.
General Hughes. No. I don't wish to make any comment on
this topic in open session, sir.
Senator Robb. All right. Let me just ask one other question
that may be answerable in open session. I'll begin with an
observation that last night the President, in his State of the
Union message, covered a number of topics. One of the few that
seemed to have a relatively clear-cut delineation in terms of
response from the two sides of the aisle had to do with a
potential IMF bail-out.
Again, I won't ask you to go into the specific implications
there. But I would like you to discuss the relationship among
economic security and related conditions, political security
and related conditions, and military security and related
conditions as you see them, to the extent you think you can do
so in open session.
General Hughes. Well, I think it's very clear that there
are connections between the societal conditions brought about
by economic change and the security conditions attendant to the
society. That's probably obvious to everyone.
The nature of those conditions and how they evolve over
time is something that we need to keep our eye on and clearly
understand. Our involvement in those conditions is an entire
another matter. It requires very careful policy decisionmaking
and very careful activity.
What we can or cannot do in the military sphere to help
stabilize conditions or to help control circumstances is a
topic for discussion at another time.
But there are issues that we should examine from the
standpoint of our assistance to other nations, our work with
allies, and our approach to understanding their internal
security requirements and assisting them where we can. And the
U.S. military is well aware of that.
Senator Robb. All right, this one last question, Mr.
Chairman, if I may, to just follow up in this area.
Is it your sense at this point that our intelligence
institutions are capable of gathering most, if not all, of the
relevant information for economic analysis from open sources--
economic only.
Director Tenet. Well, let me turn the question around a
little bit. I mean, certainly from open sources, we can collect
everything that's out there. There's a more fundamental
question about whether we're positioned over the long haul to
do this kind of work in terms of people, capability and
collection profile. And I would--I would say to you that I
think the record is mixed in that regard, and this is something
that I'm paying a lot of attention to right now.
Senator Robb. Senator Moynihan had some pretty specific
views at one point in terms of past efforts in that area. But--
--
Director Tenet. Well, the question, Senator--this is an
important question. We don't want to do economic espionage. We
have no interest in any of that. The question is where----
Senator Robb. Well, let me just interrupt then. What if
we've been targeted for economic espionage, do you feel that we
have adequate resources in place to effectively counter
targeting our efforts?
Director Tenet. Let me--I'll turn that over to Mr. Bryant,
who can talk about how we counter those efforts. The point I
was making is how our community covers economic issues has to
be thought through more carefully than we have. We have to
identify the areas where we could really add value. There's
very little I can tell Secretary Rubin about what the markets
are doing today. I shouldn't try and recreate that capability.
But there are discrete issues where we may, on a macroeconomic
basis and a warning function, provide real insights to our
policymakers. And we need to carve that turf up and build it
over the course of the next 20 or 30 years, and be very, very
attentive to this area. That's what I would say.
Now on the economic espionage side, I'd ask Mr. Bryant in
terms of how you counter it. But on--in terms I'll
categorically state, we don't do it offensively, we won't do
it. It's not in our interest to do so. It makes no sense.
It's been one of the red herrings hanging around our neck
for years. It's not the kind of thing an Intelligence Community
should do for our private sector.
Senator Robb. Thank you.
Would you like to comment just briefly on our capability of
countering anything that might be targeted against us? Without
going into----
Mr. Bryant. Yes, just very briefly.
The passage of the economic espionage statute in 1996 was a
major step forward. And basically what that does is says--it
tells the world that we're going to protect our economic and
technological research and development. That's been a major
step forward.
There's a lot of other issues which I'll go into this
afternoon that I can talk then.
Senator Robb. Thank you.
Please.
Mrs. Oakley. Let me just make one comment on this. I think
that your remarks and what we've heard from my other colleagues
underlines one of the basic facts of the modern world--that so
much information is out there through open sources on markets,
the psychology of the market. What we really haven't talked
about is the handmaiden of intelligence, which is analysis. And
I think what all this has brought forward is the need to make
sense of all this information and to understand it and to
provide just not the raw data, but the analysis of what is
happening, why it happened, and what's going to happen in the
future. And this is an area where I think the Intelligence
Community, perhaps, needs to sharpen its tools to look to this
other side of analysis.
Senator Robb. Amen.
With that, I think that's a good place to leave it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your patience.
Chairman Shelby. I know it's lunch time for a lot of
people. But I've got a couple of more areas I'd like to get
into and I'll try to be brief.
Director Bryant, for some time now, the FBI has been
investigating reports that the Chinese government attempted to
influence the American political process by illegally funneling
campaign contributions into our electoral process. If these
reports are true, they go to the very heart of our system of
government. So far, the American people have had to read about
this investigation through leaks in the newspapers, television,
and so forth. I'm well aware of the sensitivity of the
intelligence in question and the fact that a number of counter-
intelligence and criminal investigations are ongoing.
But is there anything this afternoon that you can share
with the American people at this time? If not, when do you
expect to announce the results of these investigations?
Mr. Bryant. On that question, I do not feel free to comment
in this forum at this time. All I can----
Chairman Shelby. But you do acknowledge there is an ongoing
investigation that we all know.
Mr. Bryant. There is an ongoing criminal investigation.
Chairman Shelby. And there will be closure on that,
hopefully.
Mr. Bryant. There is an ongoing criminal investigation,
which I'm not free to comment on.
Chairman Shelby. We understand that.
Mr. Bryant. And the counterintelligence aspects, there's
been briefings made periodically to the Oversight Committees as
to the progress and what's going on as far as the
counterintelligence side.
Chairman Shelby. But there's nothing you can add to tell
the American people today at this point in time?
Mr. Bryant. No, there's not. There's nothing I can add at
this time.
Chairman Shelby. Director Tenet, I know that as head of the
CIA you're not charged with conducting a criminal
investigation. Is there anything that you could add today, from
a purely intelligence or counterintelligence view point to the
American people or will you await the outcome of the complete
investigation?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir, there is not anything I can add.
Chairman Shelby. Members of this Committee are very aware
of China's record of reckless proliferation of the most
dangerous and threatening weapons and technologies, which
reportedly includes helping Pakistan develop a nuclear weapons
capability, providing Pakistan with M-11 missiles and a factory
to build more such missiles. Selling Iran anti-ship cruise
missiles that threaten US naval ships and personnel in the
Persian Gulf, as well as the flow of oil from the region.
Selling Iran chemical and biological weapon related and missile
related materials and equipment. Assisting Iran's nuclear
program and other destabilizing actions.
In your discussion of China, I'm surprised that you do not
mention any of these matters, which are hard facts, things that
have happened and that have damaged and continue to damage US
interests in your testimony. Instead, you go into considerable
depthon all of the things that the Chinese are reportedly ready
to do or about to do to respond to our concerns about past behavior.
I'd like to turn to the issue of China's proliferation
activities. Both Secretary Oakley and General Hughes identify
the weapons of mass destruction as most critical threats to US
national security.
Secretary Oakley, I won't summarize all the points that's
been here. But I think it's fair to say that this litany
consists primarily of things that have not happened yet. And is
generally phrased in terms of what China has, as I have
alluded, agreed to do, or committed to do. Of course, China has
committed to do, or not to do a lot of things in the past with
respect to the proliferation of weapons. And our experience
with these commitments has not been a positive one yet.
Many of the transfers that I have described have violated
international treaties and agreements. Many of these actions
appear to have triggered the requirements for sanctions under
US law.
Secretary Oakley, you concede that even though China
appears to be--that's your phrase--living up to it's May, 1996
pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities, it, quote, ``has not made equivalent progress in
other areas.'' While in another area, your words, ``key
loopholes remain.''
You also note correctly that while China has apparently
taken itself out of the business of exporting ballistic
missiles, that this is not enough. The reason, I understand,
that it's not enough is that China has reportedly sold an
entire missile plant to Pakistan and so forth.
In short, I believe that your statement is long on hope,
with all due respect, but ignores a bitter experience, a long
experience. This seems to be, to me and other Members of the
Intelligence Committee, the Administration's position with most
of the issues relating to China.
It's especially problematic today when the Congress has
been asked to assent to the implementation of the 1985 US-China
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which is based on the
Administration's conclusion that China has now--has now,
Secretary Oakley--decided to be a responsible world power and
cease nuclear weapons-related assistance to any state other
than the five declared nuclear states. This conclusion is in
turn based largely on the Chinese commitments made at the
recent summit and its record of apparent but not unambiguous
compliance with the May '96 pledge.
I hope, I certainly hope, that China has changed its views
on the desirability of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. And I know you do. I have not yet had the
opportunity to read all of the agreements and the materials in
support of the Administrations decision that I understand have
been submitted to Congress for its review.
But I do know myself that the record to date, and therefore
I tend to agree with Director Tenet's statement, quote, ``that
the jury is still out on whether the changes in Chinese
proliferation behavior are broad enough in scope and whether
they will hold over the long term.''
Secretary Oakley, you're a very important member of that
jury, so I'd like to ask you this. Given the long history that
you're familiar with of Chinese proliferation activity, China's
poor record inkeeping previous commitments, the grudging, last-
minute nature of China's most recent promises, and a lack of a
meaningful track record on most of these recent pledges, do you feel
that the record supports a finding that China has changed its policies
sufficiently to support implementation of the '85 agreement? And if so,
why?
Mrs. Oakley. I think you've raised----
Chairman Shelby. I know that's a long----
Mrs. Oakley. Yes, it is. And it's a very important
question. We have submitted various views in my written
statement. I think that one has to understand the role of INR
in a question like this. We worked very closely with the rest
of the Intelligence Community to prepare what we call a
statement of facts or to present the facts on a situation.
I think you've put your finger on it, that often these are
not as clear-cut as we would like, that there is ambiguity.
Certainly the direction that China has taken----
Chairman Shelby. Ambiguity plus a history, has it not?
Mrs. Oakley. Ambiguity and a history and what they've said
and various things like that. All those factors, in the end,
have to be weighed by the people who make the decisions on
whether they have abided by these agreements.
If I may, I would like to discuss some of this very----
Chairman Shelby. In closed session?
Mrs. Oakley [continuing]. Very important question in closed
session this afternoon.
Chairman Shelby. That would be fine.
Director Tenet, when you say in your words, quote, ``the
jury is still out,'' what do you mean? What specific Chinese
activities do you have in mind? What would you like to see
before the jury? Would you like to discuss that later?
Director Tenet. Yes, well, Senator, I've submitted the
classified testimony which I think goes through all of the
facts in greater detail.
But I think the point I make--the lead sentence is the
Chinese have enjoyed very deep relations with proliferant
countries for a long time.
Chairman Shelby. Like Pakistan.
Director Tenet. And that's something you have to weigh. So
these relationships have to be watched very, very carefully.
And as you'll see from the classified statement of facts, there
is a mixed record. There are some positive things and there are
some negative things. And we can go through that this
afternoon, and I think----
Chairman Shelby. But when any nation signs an agreement,
agrees to something----
Director Tenet. It doesn't mean anything until they act,
Senator.
Chairman Shelby. Absolutely. But it should mean something,
shouldn't it?
Director Tenet.When you sign an agreement, you must abide
by the agreement. And our job is then to prove to you that
either one or the other is happening.
Chairman Shelby. Absolutely.
Getting into my last area of inquiry here and concern,
ballistic missile threat, the most critical threat that I
understand faces the US today is the threat of attack by
ballistic missiles bearing nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons. The Intelligence Community has no more serious
responsibility than to monitor this threat. Today, with more
and more nations--many hostile to the US that are seeking to
develop ballistic missiles to deliver weapons of mass
destruction, I believe it's very important that the community
faces this to identify and to monitor these new threats and to
alert and support policymakers in their efforts to eliminate or
counter those threats.
The Intelligence Community is in the process of completing
an update to the '95 National Intelligence Estimate of Emergine
Missile Threats to North America during the next 15 years. As
we all know, the previous National Intelligence Estimate was
the subject of a number of criticisms, many of which were, in
my view, justified.
Some of the most important deficiencies of that--especially
critical when the consequences of mistaken analysis are
potentially so enormous--were a failure to explore possible
alternative futures, a failure to identify key assumptions, and
a failure to quantify the level of certainty of the judgments
reached, and a failure to fully address all of the strategic,
political and psychological aspects of this complicated
problem--for example, by excluding Alaska and Hawaii from
certain key judgments or by simplistic assumption as to the
motives and likely courses of actions of hostile actors.
We have talked about this in open session before, and
closed. We've talked about it in the Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Defense, on which I serve, which Senator
Stevens chairs and which Senator Inouye--formerly the
Chairman--is the ranking Democrat. They voiced their concerns
before.
Director Tenet, would you describe for the Committee today
how the Intelligence Community has addressed these and other
deficiencies in preparing the current National Intelligence
Estimate?
Director Tenet. What I'd like to say to you, Senator, is--
one, I've seen a draft. It has incorporated many of the
challenges that you and Bob Gates laid down to us in reviewing
our last draft. I believe it meets all those challenges. We're
still working on it. We'll be here early with it. It won't take
until March to finish it and I think you will see a document
that reflects all of the concerns that were raised with it, and
it's very, very thorough, and very, very deep in terms of this
subject.
I think the thing that will jump out at you is, if there's
a headline out of it for me was the growing concern about the
introduction and proliferation of medium-range ballistic
missiles. Everybody focuses on longer-range missiles, but the
proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles and their
impact on US security, I think, is something that is heightened
and you will get a keen sense of that in this estimate. And I
think it's something that you--when you see the product, I
think you will agree that it's been very well done.
Chairman Shelby. The history of ballistic missiles is
largely, as everybody on this panel knows, is a history of
unpleasant surprises. For example, Soviet missiles in Cuba, the
Soviet ICBM buildup; Iraq's use of extended-range SCUDs during
the Iran-Iraq war; and the acceleration of Iran's missile
program with extensive, obvious Russian assistance.
Have your analysts addressed the uncertainties and
potential alternative futures inherent in analyzing this
difficult intelligence target?
For example, by the use of red teams, how have they
addressed potential variations, such as the transfer of missile
know-how and equipment from third countries? The substitution
of lighter biological warheads for heavy first-generation
nuclear devices? The effects of improvisation, corner cutting
and alternate technical paths? And the willingness of some
leaders to do what we call the unexpected, including things
that analysts with an American cultural background may find
very illogical or even crazy? Or to marshal a nation's
resources for high priority military goals?
General Hughes, I first want you to comment on that, if you
would.
General Hughes. Well, I can look you in the eye and tell
you that we have taken virtually all of the issues that you've
mentioned into account. I do think that----
Chairman Shelby. And these are issues that should be taken
into account.
General Hughes. They should be taken into account.
However, there are gaps in our knowledge base that we have
to continue to work on. That is particularly true in what I
would call the key technology referred to generally as
nanotechnology the ability to put very complex objects in very
small form and very reduced weight in operational capabilities
like missiles. And that challenge that technical challenge,
that is coming to us is something we don't fully understand or
have control over right now. We have a lot of work to do in the
future and we need to maintain constant vigilance.
The last issue is I'd like to characterize the three
components of threat that we work with--capability, intent and
will. I think we have a good understanding of the capability
now and in the future that most countries who seek medium and
long-range ballistic missiles have. What we do need a better
understanding of is their intent to use them and their will to
use them in a given context.
That's where most of the surprise actually has come from.
We were not technically surprised about the capability in the
past. We were surprised about the way in which or the
circumstances in which this capability was put to use. We need
to focus on that.
And speaking for the military side of the Intelligence
Community--and if Director Tenet will allow me, because I know
my colleagues in the CIA on this issue very well; we work
closely together--we are well aware of the need to understand
intent and will.
Chairman Shelby. Secretary Oakley, do you have any
comments?
Mrs. Oakley. I don't have any further comments. We, of
course, will be cooperating with this estimate as we do with
others. We are not equipped to really assess the capability. We
feel that our contribution is much stronger on the intent and
will chapters and we'll be working with them.
Chairman Shelby. Director Tenet, how--how important is it
that this estimate be well done? In other words be as
comprehensive as analysts can make it?
Director Tenet. It's extremely important to me, sir, as it
is to you.
Chairman Shelby. We thank the panel for being here. We look
forward to the closed hearing this afternoon.
The Committee is adjourned.
[Thereupon, at 12:35 o'clock p.m., the Committee was
adjourned.]
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, March 12, 1998.
Hon. George J. Tenet,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.
Dear Director Tenet: We appreciate your participation in our
January 28 hearing on the current and projected national security
threats to the United States. Your willingness to address this
important issue in open session was appreciated and made an important
contribution, not only to the work of our Committee, but to the
American public's awareness of U.S. national security interests.
We are submitting the attached questions for the record to you. The
unclassified responses to these questions will be an important part of
our hearing transcript which we hope to release as expeditiously as
possible. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if you would respond in
writing to these questions no later than June 1, 1998.
If there are any questions, please have your staff contact Don
Mitchell of our Committee. We appreciate your cooperation in this
matter.
Sincerely,
Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman.
J. Robert Kerrey,
Vice Chairman.
Enclosure.
Questions for the Record
russia's ballistic missile defense program
(1) Please describe the nature and extent of Russia's ballistic
missile defense effort. Where do you see Russia's ballistic missile
defense program heading over the course of the next 15 years?
russia's safeguarding of nuclear materials
(2) What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the adequacy
of Russia's safeguard of nuclear weapons and missile material?
(a) What about missile systems, components and technology? What is
the status of Russian nuclear command and control systems?
(b) Has there been any change in the last year regarding Russian
capabilities and programs in chemical or biological weapons? Does
Russia persist in unacknowledged CW programs and illegal BW programs?
transfer of technology from the former soviet union
(3) What general trends has the Intelligence Community detected in
the flow of scientists, technology, and conventional and unconventional
military equipment to other nations? What evidence have you detected
that Soviet nuclear materials, BW, CW, or ballistic missile-related
materials or technology, have found their way to the international
black market?
chinese proliferation
(4) Please describe all significant transfers over the past 5 years
of WMD-related technology or information from China to Iran, Pakistan
or other countries, to include advanced conventional weapons and
technology. Do you believe that this assistance could raise compliance
concerns with China's commitments to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)? How likely is it that
China will comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)?
north korea as a continuing threat
(5)(a) In this prepared testimony, General Hughes stated that
``[s]ome significant--perhaps violent--change is likely in the next
five years. There are four basic alternatives: leadership change,
government collapse, negotiated accommodation with the South, or major
economic reform.'' In your opinion, what is the likeliest scenario?
Why?
(b) How widely is this view shared in the Intelligence Community?
What do you view as the most likely scenario?
changes in south korea
(6) Talks on peace on the Korean peninsula involving North and
South Korea, China and the U.S., began in Geneva last December. Long-
time opposition leader Kim Dae Jung won last December's presidential
election in South Korea. What do these developments bode for change in
South Korea as well as prospects for normalized relations between or
reunification of North and South Korea?
saddam's hold on power
(7)(a) Do you believe that Saddam's hold on power is stronger today
than it was one year ago? What is the likelihood that Saddam will be in
power one year from now? What would be the characteristics and policies
of likely successors to Saddam? What are the chances that a successor
regime to Saddam will be worse?
(b) Will Saddam's fall lead necessarily to Iraq's disintegration?
If not, why?
(c) Has Saddam effectively regained control of northern Iraq?
support for iraq in the middle east
(8) Currently, how much support exists for Saddam in the region? If
military action were taken against Iraq, what would be the likely
reaction of other nations in the region? What, if any, governments in
the Middle East would be publicly supportive of military action against
Iraq?
the impact of sanctions on iraq
(9) Iraq has argued that the continued ban on oil exports are
causing mass suffering in Iraq, including unaffordable prices for food
and unavailability of medicine. What is your assessment of the nature
and extent of the suffering to the Iraqi people as a result of economic
sanctions?
iraq's weapons of mass destruction
(10) What is the current status of Iraq's BW, CW, nuclear weapon
and missile programs? How much activity has there been in each of these
areas since the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War? Do we have any
evidence that the Iraqi regime has tested CW or BW agents on humans
since the Persian Gulf War?
the new regime in iran
(11) Do you see President Khatami's election and reform agenda as a
watershed that could change the nature of the Iranian regime? What is
the possibility that Khatami's conservative critics will sidetrack him?
What is the likelihood that the Khatami government will still be in
power 3 years from now? Does his election signify a change in Iran's
support for terrorism and its acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction? Is there any evidence of such a change?
the impact of sanctions on iran
(12) Are sanctions likely to influence Iran's behavior over the
next 3 years? Why or why not? Late last September, Iran and France
confirmed the award of a $2 billion deal to develop Iran's South Pars
gas field to Total SA, and its minority partners Gazprom (Russia) and
Petronas (Malaysia). What does this deal say about the effectiveness of
the U.S. economic sanctions against Iran?
iranian forces in bosnia
(13) How large an Iranian presence currently exists in Bosnia? Is
this presence growing or diminishing? What is the extent of Iranian
influence on or penetration of the Bosnian government?
the palestinian authority
(14)(a) Please assess both the willingness and the ability of the
Palestinian Authority to control terrorist violence in Gaza and the
areas of the West Bank under its control.
(b) To what extent is Hamas receiving outside support, and from
whom is that support coming
(c) Please assess Chairman Arafat's health, comment on his likely
successor and describe the impact his departure would have on the peace
process.
the stability of the israeli government
(15)(a) Please give us your assessment of Prime Minister
Netanyahu's commitment to abiding by the Oslo Accords. Is he committed
to a land-for-peace formula, or does he want to kill the peace process
as currently formulated?
(b) How do you assess the longevity of the current Likud
government? How do you assess Labor's ability to win an election at
this point?
(c) Please assess Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai's recent
statements in support of United Nation's Resolution 425, which calls
for Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Does this
represent a significant change in Israeli policy? What has been the
response of the Lebanese and Syrians to Mordechai's statement?
the israeli presence in lebanon
(16) Please comment on the losses the Israelis have suffered in
Lebanon in the past year and the impact of those losses on Israeli
public opinion and the likelihood that Israel will initiate a
unilateral withdrawal from the Southern Lebanon. Do those losses
indicate that the Hizballah is becoming a more effective force? Please
comment on the military effectiveness of Israel's allies, the Southern
Lebanese Army (SLA) and describe the current military cooperation
between the Israeli Defense Force and the SLA.
egypt
(17)(a) What impact would a reduction in U.S. military aid to Egypt
have on U.S. Egypt relations, particularly if such a reduction is not
matched by a comparable reduction of U.S. military aid to Israel?
(b) Please assess the current strength of the Mubarak government
and its ability to prevail over terrorist internal opposition. To what
degree is that internal opposition receiving outside support, and from
whom?
political killings in haiti
(18) What is the status of investigations into the various high
profile political murder cases that have occurred in Haiti during the
last several years? Has any evidence of government complicity in those
murders been uncovered? In this regard, please provide an assessment of
the performance of the Haitian National Police's Investigative Unit and
Haitian Judiciary in solving these crimes.
mexico
(19) President Clinton's February 1997 certification of Mexico as
fully cooperative in drug control efforts prompted considerable
criticism in Congress. What is your current assessment of the nature
and extent of Mexico's drug control efforts? To what extent does
Mexican government corruption hamper these efforts?
monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban
(20) How high is the Intelligence Community's confidence that it
can effectively monitor the Comprehensive Test Bank Treaty? What are
the notable shortcomings? Is U.S. intelligence doing everything
possible to improve U.S. monitoring capabilities in this area? If not,
why not?
nuclear test at novaya zemlya?
(21) There was concern that Russia may have conducted a low-yield
nuclear test on August 16, 1997 at Novaya Zemlya. Is there any reason
to believe that the August 16 event was a nuclear explosion? Is this a
view that is commonly held through the Intelligence Community?
the chemical weapons convention
(22)(a) Over one hundred of the 168 signatories have ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). (Last November, both Iran and Russia
completed their CWC ratification.) Do you have any intelligence that
any of the signatories of the CWC have engaged in activities that raise
compliance concerns?
(b) The Intelligence Community has conceded that its ability to
monitor compliance with the CWC is limited. Has that capability
improved since U.S. ratification of the CWC?
north korea's taepo dong missiles
(23) North Korean Taepo Dong II missile (which is under
development) will have an estimated range of 4,000 to 6,000 kilometers,
and therefore qualifies as an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM). How confident are you in these range estimates? What U.S.
states or territories could the Taepo Dong hit? How soon could the
Taepo Dong I and Taepo Dong II become operational, and how firm is that
estimate? How has this assessment changed in the last year?
missile threats to the u.s.
(24) The proliferation of missile-delivered weapons is an issue
directly confronting the strategic interest of the United States and
its traditional allies. When will the updated National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on this subject be completed? What are the current
strategic missile threats to the United States and theater missile
threats to deployed U.S. forces? How have these threats changed in the
last year? What are the projected threats for the next decade? Is this
assessment shared by all components of the Intelligence Community? In
the wake of the criticism of the previous NIE on this subject, what
improvements have been made in the NIE process?
trends in economic espionage
(25) A recent survey by the American Society for Industrial
Security estimates that intellectual property losses from foreign and
domestic espionage may have reached $300 billion in 1997 alone. Does
this estimate seem plausible to you? A January 12 Los Angeles Times
article dealing with this issue states that currently pending before
the FBI ``are more than 700 foreign counterintelligence investigations
involving economic espionage.'' Is that an accurate number? Please
comment on trends in economic espionage directed against the U.S. How
effectively are you able to measure the level of economic espionage
against the U.S.? Has U.S. business reporting of economic espionage
improved over the last year? What other measures would help to stop
industrial espionage?
economic espionage law
(26) In last year's response to this Committee's question regarding
the effectiveness of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, the CIA stated
that the law clearly has attracted the attention of many of our key
economic competitors, but that it is ``perhaps too early to assess
whether the law has had an appreciable effect on the level of economic
espionage directed against the United States.'' Over the past year,
have you seen any results from the Economic Espionage Act? Do you have
information that the law has deterred economic espionage activity by
foreign governments of foreign corporations?
espionage by foreign corporations
(27) Last year, in response to a question by this Committee, the
definition of economic espionage was given as ``government-directed or
orchestrated clandestine effort to collect U.S. economic secrets or
proprietary information.'' To what extent are U.S. corporations
threatened by the theft of trade secrets by foreign entities that are
not ``government directed or orchestrated''? How do you distinguish
whether espionage government directed or not, especially if the foreign
corporation involved receives extensive government subsidies?
economic analysis
(28) Over the past several years, the CIA has emphasized an
increasing interaction with academic experts and an increasing use of
open source information in its economic analysis products. As the CIA
increasingly reports information based on open and public sources, does
this lessen the significance of the classified information in CIA
economic reporting? Does the CIA create analysis products that are
based entirely on open source or public information?
south korea economic crisis
(29) How well can the political institutions in South Korea manage
the socioeconomic repercussions of the economic crisis? What is the
likelihood of civil disorder--in South Korea as a result of layoffs,
high inflation, and other consequences of the economy's downturn? How
will the economic turmoil in South Korea affect their relationship with
North Korea? Do you believe that South Korean's economic problems make
conflict with North Korea more or less likely?
potential impact of asian economic crisis on china
(30) How will China react to the growing economic instability in
the region. Will the Chinese leadership view the crisis as an
opportunity to gain influence with other Asian nations? How do you
judge the likelihood that China will ``competitively devalue'' its
currency, the yuan, in order to ensure that its companies maintain
export market share? Will the ``Asian contagion'' spread to mainland
China? If so, how will economic problems affect the policies of China's
President Jiang Zhemin and his government? With unemployment already
rising in China's state-owned industrial sectors, will slower or
negative economic growth lead to civil strife in China?
the philippines' economic situation
(31) How will the economic crisis affect the upcoming Philippine
elections? Are that nation's democratic institutions strong enough to
withstand economic and financial turmoil? How likely is a return to
martial law in the Philippines?
potential bw/cw attacks on the u.s.
(32) What is the likelihood that the U.S. will be subjected to a
biological or chemical attack within the next 2-5 years? 5-10 years?
How is this attack likely to be carried out? Do you consider a BW/CW
attack against the U.S. as more likely than a ballistic missile attack
against the U.S.? How difficult is it for a group to construct and
deliver an effective chemical weapon? A biological or radiological
weapon? A nuclear device? What existing groups now have or are seeking
such a capability?
threat of information warfare by terrorists
(33) Our traditional definition of terrorism does not include such
things as computer attack intended to damage our telecommunications or
transportation infrastructure. Are we prepared to deal with ``virtual
terrorism?'' What steps do we need to take to focus Intelligence
Community counterterrorism efforts on this new threat?
threat to u.s. deployed forces in bosnia
(34)(a) What are the shortfalls in Intelligence Community support
to the Bosnia operation and what is being done to rectify these problem
areas?
(b) In recent months, SFOR troops (including U.S. soldiers) have
acted in support of Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic by
seizing radio and television transmitters, police stations and other
government installations controlled by her hardline opponents. Does the
participation of U.S. troops in such operations expose them to increase
risk of attach from hard-line supporters? Would hard-line response be
limited to stone-throwing civilian mobs, or could it escalate into
sniper attacks and other forms of armed conflict?
(c) What is the prospect and key action required for establishing
long-term stability in Bosnia?
(d) How many foreign Islamic fundamentalist fights still reside in
Bosnia? What countries do they come from? Who supports them? Do they
pose a threat to U.S. troops?
(e) Would more active participation by SFOR in civil implementation
tasks such as refugee resettlement increase the risk to U.S. Forces?
(f) What is the possibility that current low-level violence in
Kosovo in Serbia could escalate into major conflict, spreading into
Macedonia and endangering the security of U.S. troops there?
(g) Are you satisfied that the U.S. has sufficient HUMINT assets in
Bosnia to provide early warning of possible threat to U.S. forces?
(h) How do you deconflict your HUMINT collection assets for force
protection with those already deployed by DOD to prevent duplication?
counterintelligence threat to national laboratories
(35) A September 1997 GAO report regarding DOE's security controls
over foreign visitors to the National Laboratories noted that ``DOE's
procedures for obtaining background checks and controlling the
dissemination of sensitive information are not fully effective'' and
that as a result, ``sensitive subjects may have been discussed with
foreign nationals without DOE's knowledge and approval.'' In your
opinion, how significant is the counterintelligence threat to DOE in
general and the National Laboratories in particular? What is being done
to rectify this problem?
international crime
(36) How critical do you assess the current and future threat to
U.S. interests from international crime activities and networks? Is
there room for improvement in the FBI-CIA relationship in dealing with
international crime?
nato expansion
(37) What are the risks, if any, to U.S. intelligence personnel and
the Intelligence Community in general, in allowing Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary to join NATO?
information operations
(38) The Defense Science Board and the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection both issued reports during 1997
which identified our nation's vulnerability to both physical and
computer attacks on our nation's information infrastructure. These
reports noted that such an attack could come from a foreign government,
a non-state actor, a criminal organization, or an individual hacker.
How significant is the threat to our critical information
infrastructure in the short-run? In the long-run? How do you judge the
Intelligence Community's ability to collect intelligence on this
threat?
the threat posed by hiv
(39) To what extent has HIV had an impact on the health and
economies of foreign countries? How has HIV impacted foreign
militaries?
actionable intelligence
(40) Some analysts say that the increased emphasis on action-
oriented intelligence has come at the expense of other important--but
more mundane--work, like maintaining data bases and conducting in-depth
analyses on foreign militaries and political groups. Do you share this
concern? If so, how do you intend to deal with these competing needs?
intelligence community's role in the pow/mia issue
(41)(a) National Security Advisor Sandy Berger wrote to the Senate
Majority Leader last year and indicated that he had directed the
Intelligence Community to produce a Special National Intelligence
Estimate (SNIE) regarding POW/MIA issues with Vietnam. After consulting
with this Committee, the terms of reference were settled. When do you
expect to have this Estimate completed? Mr. Berger also indicated that
he would ask for an updated Intelligence Community assessment on the
so-call ``735'' and ``1205'' documents found in the Russian archives.
What efforts has the Intelligence Community made to acquire additional
information about these documents either in Russia or in Vietnam? As
per the Committee's request, have the 574 classified CIA documents on
the POW/MIA subject matter been reviewed and summarized? Do they shed
any light on the SNIE?
(b) In his letter, Mr. Berger offers assurances that ``collection
requirements pertaining to the POW/MIA issue [will] remain as a high
priority'' after administrative officials conceded that it had
mistakenly left off the POW/MIA issues from PDD-35--the document that
sets our intelligence collection priorities. Has this oversight been
corrected?
(c) In July 1993, the Secretary of Defense consolidated four DoD
offices charged with different functions of the POW/MIA issue. The
Intelligence Community's only POW/MIA analytical element, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Office of POW/MIAs Affairs, was then transferred
out from the oversight of both the DCI and the responsible
Congressional committees. Do you now have oversight of the Defense
Prisoner of War/Missing persons Office (DPMO) analytical section? If
not, who is responsible for oversight of this capability? Why is this
intelligence capability not reflected in the Congressional
Justification Books (National Foreign, Joint Military and Tactical
intelligence accounts) provided to the congressional oversight
committees?
a declining military threat
(42) In your testimony before the committee, you indicated that the
military threat to the U.S. was declining, and General Hughes concurred
with this assessment. Please elaborate on this critical issue and
discuss the impact it will have on the Intelligence Community.
______
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, March 12, 1998.
Hon. Louis J. Freeh,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
J. Edgar Hoover Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Director Freeh: We appreciate the participation of Deputy
Director Robert Bryant in our January 28 hearing on the current and
projected national security threats to the United States. His
willingness to address this important issue in open session was
appreciated and made an important contribution, not only to the work of
our Committee, but to the American public's awareness of U.S. national
security interests.
We are submitting the attached questions for the record to you. The
unclassified responses to these questions will be an important part of
our hearing transcript which we hope to release as expeditiously as
possible. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if you would respond in
writing to these questions no later than June 1, 1998.
If there are any questions, please have your staff contact Don
Mitchell of our Committee. We appreciate your cooperation in this
matter.
Sincerely,
Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman.
J. Robert Kerrey,
Vice Chairman.
Enclosure.
Questions for the Record
russian organized crime
(1) What general trends do we see in Russian organized crime? How
is organized crime impacting the Russian economy and the Russian
political system? To what extent is Russian organized crime involved in
the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction? What is your prognosis
for Russian efforts to combat this problem? How active is Russian
organized crime in the U.S.?
trends in economic espionage
(2) A recent survey of the American Society for Industrial Security
estimates that intellectual property losses from foreign and domestic
espionage may have exceeded $30 billion in 1997 alone. Does this
estimate seem plausible to you? A January 12 Los Angeles Times article
dealing with this issue states that currently pending before the FBI
``are more than 700 foreign counterintelligence investigations
involving economic espionage.'' Is that an accurate number? Please
comment on trends in economic espionage directed against the U.S. How
effectively are you able to measure the level of economic espionage
against the U.S.? Has U.S. business reporting of economic espionage
improved over the last year? What other measures would help to stop
industrial espionage?
economic espionage law
(3) In last year's response to this Committee's question regarding
the effectiveness of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, the CIA stated
that the law clearly has attracted the attention of many of our key
economic competitors, but that it is ``perhaps too early to assess
whether the law has had an appreciable effect on the level of economic
espionage directed against the United States.''
(a) Over the past year, have you seen any results from the Economic
Espionage Act? Do you have information that the law has deterred
economic espionage activity by foreign governments or foreign
corporations?
(b) To what extent have you been able to use the Economic Espionage
Act of 1996 as a tool against foreign economic spying?
espionage by foreign corporation
(4) Last year, in response to a question by this Committee, the
definition of economic espionage was given as ``government-directed or
orchestrated clandestine effort to collect U.S. economic secrets or
proprietary information.''
(a) To what extent are U.S. corporations threatened by the theft of
trade secrets by foreign entities that are not ``government directed or
orchestrated''? How do you distinguish whether espionage is government
directed or not, especially if the foreign corporation involved
receives extensive government subsidies?
(b) What steps are you taking to prevent corporate espionage that
is not directed by a foreign government?
working with u.s. corporations
(5) If you find evidence that a U.S. company is being targeted for
economic espionage or is the subject of unfair competition with a
foreign firm, what mechanisms are in place to remedy the situation? How
often does this situation occur?
economic espionage against the u.s.
(6) How do you distinguish between economic espionage and
aggressive but legitimate information gathering by a foreign government
or foreign corporation? Please describe the type of economic espionage
you see as the greatest threat to U.S. economic competitiveness. To
what extent is economic espionage against the U.S. supported and
coordinated by foreign governments?
potential bw/cw attacks on the u.s.
(7) What is the likelihood that the U.S. will be subjected to
biological or chemical attack within the next 2-7 years? 5-10 years?
How is this attack likely to be carried out? Do you consider BW/CW
attack against the U.S. as more likely than a ballistic missile attack
against the U.S.? How difficult is it for a group to construct and
deliver an effective chemical weapon? A biological or radiological
weapon? A nuclear device? What existing groups now have or are seeking
such capability?
possible retaliation for kasi sentencing?
(8) Mir Aimal Kasi has recently has been sentenced to death for the
killing of CIA employees outside CIA Headquarters. What is the
likelihood that there will be acts of terrorism against the U.S. as a
result of this?
economic terrorism
(9) Do you have any evidence that foreign governments, corporations
or individuals are targeting U.S. economic interests using technology
(such as a virus, computer hacking, etc.)? Do you see this as a near-
term threat, or more long-term?
terrorists' use of advanced infrastructure
(10) Terrorists are making more use of advanced computing and
telecommunications technology, their own communications and
intelligence gathering, and establishing a worldwide network of
contacts and support. Does this easy access to information,
communication and transportation make the job of intelligence gathering
more difficult or does it provide opportunities which you can exploit?
Are there steps that we can take to deny terrorists the ease of
movement and communication they now enjoy?
threat of information warfare by terrorists
(11) Our traditional definition of terrorism does not include such
things as computer attack intended to damage our telecommunications or
transportation infrastructure. Are we prepared to deal with ``virtual
terrorism?'' What steps do we need to take to focus Intelligence
Community counterterrorism efforts on this new threat?
executive branch organization on the counterterrorism issue
(12) How well is the Executive Branch organized to deal with
counterterrorism? Is there room for improvement in the CIA-FBI
relationship on counterterrorism matters? Should the FBI be given
primacy over both domestic and foreign counterterrorism intelligence
gathering?
counterintelligence threat to national laboratories
(13) A September 1997 GAO report regarding DOE's security controls
over foreign visitors to the National Laboratories noted that ``DOE's
procedures for obtaining background checks and controlling the
dissemination of sensitive information are not fully effective'' and
that as a result, ``sensitive subject may have been discussed with
foreign nationals without DOE's knowledge and approval.'' In your
opinion, how significant is the counterintelligence threat to DOE in
general and the National Laboratories in particular? What is being done
to rectify this problem?
international crime
(14) How critical do you assess the current and future threat to
U.S. interests from international crime activities and networks? Is
there room for improvement in the FBI-CIA relationship in dealing with
international crime?
encryption issues
(15) For a number of year, the United States Government and the
computer industry have wrestled over our nation's policy towards
encryption technology. While domestically there are no restrictions on
the use, sale or importation of encryption products, the U.S. still
maintains export restrictions on the sale of stronger encryption
products overseas. The computer industry argues that export
restrictions unnecessarily hinder the sale of American encryption
products abroad, which in turn adversely affects the global
competitiveness of the U.S. computer industry. However, the
Administration has argued that export restrictions are necessary to
protect law enforcement and intelligence equities. Otherwise, the
widespread use of unbreakable encryption products would enhance the
ability of narcotics traffickers, terrorists, international criminals,
and purveyors of child pornography to escape detection by the agencies
to which we entrust our national and domestic security. How has the
commercial availability of strong encryption products here and abroad
hindered the FBI's ability to perform its counterintelligence and
counterterrorist duties? What changes would you like to see in the
United States government's policy on encryption? Why do you believe
these changes are necessary?
information operations
(16) The Defense Science Board and the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection both issued reports during 1997
which identified our nation's vulnerability to both physical and
computer attacks on our nation's information infrastructure. These
reports noted that such an attack could come from a foreign government,
a non-state actor, a criminal organization, or an individual hacker.
How significant is the threat to our critical information
infrastructure in the short-run? In the long-run? How do you judge the
Intelligence Community's ability to collect intelligence on this
threat?
______
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, March 12, 1998.
Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
Dear General Hughes: We appreciate your participation in our
January 28 hearing on the current and projected national security
threats to the United States. Your willingness to address this
important issue in open session was appreciated and made an important
contribution, not only to the work of our Committee, but to the
American public's awareness of U.S. national security interests.
We are submitting the attached questions for the record to you. The
unclassified responses to these questions will be an important part of
our hearing transcript which we hope to release as expeditiously as
possible. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if you would respond in
writing to these questions no later than June 1, 1998.
If there are any questions, please have your staff contact Don
Mitchell of our Committee. We appreciate your cooperation in this
matter.
Sincerely,
Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman.
J. Robert Kerrey,
Vice Chairman.
Enclosure.
Questions for the Record
russian military capabilities
(1) In your prepared testimony, you state that ``[t]here is little
chance that Russia will reemerge as a global military peer competitor
to the U.S. over the next two decades. During this period, Russia's
strategic nuclear forces will remain the backbone of Moscow's military
might, preserving Russia's perception of great power status and
protecting its vital security interests.''
(a) Does the fact that Russia's strategic nuclear forces ``will
remain the backbone of Moscow's military might'' for the next 20 years
raises the likelihood that Russia might be more inclined to use nuclear
weapons if it feels that its interests are being threatened?
(b) What vital interests would Moscow perceive beyond its periphery
that would warrant its commitment of military force, including the
threat or use of nuclear weapons?
(c) If present trends continue, what will be the Russian military's
capability to conduct operations 5 years from now? Do these trends
indicate the possibility that Russia may soon have insufficient
military force to retain order within Russia?
(d) What is your assessment of the likelihood that military reform
will succeed in Russia?
russia's ballistic missile defense program
(2) Please describe the nature and extent of Russia's ballistic
missile defense effort. Where do you see Russia's ballistic missile
defense program heading over the course of the next 15 years?
russia's safeguarding of nuclear materials
(3) What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the adequacy
of Russia's safeguard of nuclear weapons and fissile material?
(a) What about missile systems, components and technology? What is
the status of nuclear weapons and fissile material?
(b) Has there been any age in the last year regarding Russian
capabilities and programs in chemical or biological weapons? Does
Russia persist in unacknowledged CW programs and illegal BW programs?
transfer of technology from the former soviet union
(4) What general trends has the Intelligence Community detected in
the flow of scientists, technology, and conventional and unconventional
military equipment to other nations? What evidence have you detected
that Soviet nuclear materials, BW, CW, or ballistic missile-related
materials or technology, have found their way to the international
black market?
china's military strategy
(5)(a) In your prepared testimony, you state that ``China's
military strategy will continue to emphasize the development of a
survivable nuclear retaliatory capability as a deterrent against the
use of nuclear weapons by the United States, Russia or India. There is
no indication that China will field the much larger number of missiles
necessary to shift from a minimalist, retaliation strategy to a first-
strike strategy.'' How confident are you of this assessment? What
trends do you perceive in the quantity and quality of Chinese ballistic
missiles capable of reaching the U.S.? Are these views shared by the
remainder of the Intelligence Community?
(b) Do you believe that China views its nuclear forces as a
deterrent to other non-nuclear, military or political actions by the
U.S. or other countries?
china and taiwan
(6) In your prepared testimony, you state that ``[t]he Taiwan issue
remains the major potential flashpoint. Beijing believes U.S. policy
encourages the independence movement of Taiwan, deliberately or
inadvertently.'' Please elaborate. What is the potential for armed
conflict between China and Taiwan? What would be the likely outcome of
such a conflict? Has the threat of a confrontation between the PRC and
Taiwan replaced North Korea as the number one security issue in Asia?
india and pakistan
(7) In your prepared testimony, you state that ``India and Pakistan
both continue to view their security relationship in zero-sum terms,
possess sufficient material to assemble a limited number of nuclear
weapons, have short range ballistic missiles, and maintain large
standing forces in close proximity across a tense line of control. In
short, although the prospect for major war between India and Pakistan
is low at present, we remain concerned about the potential,
particularly over the near term, for one of their occasional military
clashes to escalate into a wider conflict. Over the longer term,
however, the threat of large-scale war should diminish.'' Why do you
consider a large scale conflict between India and Pakistan likelier in
the short term than in the long term? Is this assessment shared by
other components of the Intelligence Community?
north korea as a continuing threat
(8)(a) In your prepared testimony, you state that ``[s]ome
significant--perhaps violent--change is likely in the next five years.
There are four basic alternatives; leadership change, government
collapse, negotiated accommodation with the South, or major economic
reform.'' In your opinion, what is the likeliest scenario? Why?
(b) You also stated in your testimony that ``[o]ver the next
several years Pyongyang's WMD, missile, artillery, and special
operations force capabilities will likely improve, despite the dire
economic situation.'' How do you account for this?
changes in south korea
(9) Talks on peace on the Korean peninsula involving North and
South Korea, China and the U.S., began in Geneva last December. Long
time opposition leader Kin Dae Jung won last December's presidential
election in South Korea. What do these developments bode for change in
South Korea as well as prospects for normalized relations between or
reunification of North and South Korea?
support for iraq in the middle east
(10) Currently, how much support exists for Saddam in the region?
If military action were taken against Iraq, what would be the likely
reaction of other nations in the region? What, if any, governments in
the Middle East would be publicly supportive of military action against
Iraq?
iraq's weapons of mass destruction
(11) What is the current status of Iraq's BW, CW, nuclear weapon
and missile programs? How much activity has there been in each of these
areas since the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War? Do we have any
evidence that the Iraqi regime has tested CW and BW agents on humans
since the Persian Gulf War?
iranian forces in bosnia
(12) How large an Iranian presence currently exists in Bosnia? Is
this presence growing or diminishing? What is the extent of Iranian
influence on or penetration of the Bosnian government?
the israeli presence in lebanon
(13) Please comment on the losses the Israelis have suffered in
Lebanon in the past year and the impact of those losses on Israeli
public opinion and the likelihood that Israel will initiate a
unilateral withdrawal from the Southern Lebanon. Do those losses
indicate that the Hizballah is becoming a more effective force? Please
comment on the military effectiveness of Israel's allies, the Southern
Lebanese Army (SLA) and describe the current military cooperation
between the Israeli Defense Force and the SLA.
syria
(14) Please assess the current military strategic threat Syria
poses for Israel and Syrian military capabilities in general. What is
the possibility Syria will exercise the military option to regain the
Golan? How do you interpret the Syrian military movement toward the
Golan within the last year?
libya's chemical weapons program
(15) What is the status of Libya's CW activities? What is the
status of their overall CW program? Is Libya making progress toward
obtaining any other weapons of mass destruction for their delivery
systems?
cuban military capabilities
(16)(a) Does Cuba, in any way, pose a strategic threat to the
United States at this time? Will Cuba pose a strategic threat to the
U.S. at any time in the next two to five years? What, if anything,
might change that assessment?
(b) Is Cuba currently attempting to undermine democratically-
elected governments in the Western Hemisphere? What support, if any, is
it providing opposition movements in Colombia and Peru?
cuba and narcotics trafficking
(17) Are Cuban government officials implicated in narcotics
trafficking? To what extent are narcotraffickers overflying Cuban
airspace to bring drugs into the U.S.? Do these overflights require
Cuban government complicity of any kind?
trends in illegal narcotics
(18) In your prepared testimony, you state that ``[i]llicit
synthetic drug production in urban areas is a significant and growing
threat.'' Please elaborate. Have we detected any change in the world-
wide supply or demand for illegal drugs? Are our efforts having any
effect on the drug trafficking organizations?
monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban
(19) How high is the Intelligence Community's confidence that it
can effectively monitor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? What are the
notable shortcomings? Is U.S. intelligence doing everything possible to
improve U.S. monitoring capabilities in this area? If not, why not?
nuclear test at novaya zemlya?
(20) There was concern that Russia may have conducted a low-yield
nuclear test on August 16, 1997 at Novaya Zemlya. Is there any reason
to believe that the August 16 event was nuclear explosion? Is this a
view that is commonly held throughout the Intelligence Community?
the chemical weapons convention
(21)(a) Over one hundred of the 168 signatories have ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). (Last November, both Iran and Russia
completed their CWC ratification.) Do you have any intelligence that
any of the signatories of the CWC have engaged in activities that raise
compliance concerns?
(b) The Intelligence Community has conceded that its ability to
monitor compliance with the CWC is limited. Has that capability
improved since U.S. ratification of the CWC?
north korea's taepo dong missiles
(22) North Korean Taepo Dong II missile (which is under
development) will have an estimated range of 4,000 to 6,000 kilometers,
and therefore qualifies as an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM). How confident are you in these range estimates? What U.S.
states or territories could the Taepo Dong hit? How soon could the
Taepo Dong I and Taepo Dong II become operational, and how firm is that
estimate? How has this assessment changed in the last year?
the proliferation of ballistic missiles
(23) In your prepared testimony, you state that ``[w]e are
particularly concerned about two trends: the significant increase we
expect over the next two decades in the numbers of ballistic missiles
with ranges between 300 and 1,500 kilometers; the potential for land
attack cruise missiles to be more widely proliferated.''
Pleaseelaborate. What countries' ballistic missile and cruise missile
programs are you most concerned about?
threat to u.s. deployed forces in bosnia
(24(a) What are the prospects and key actions required for
establishing long-term stability in Bosnia? While the goal of the
international military presence is to make it possible for the three
factions is to coexist peacefully, a threat against foreign forces
remains. What is the threat facing U.S. forces deployed in Bosnia?
(b) What are the shortfalls in Intelligence Community support to
the Bosnia operation and what is being done to rectify these problem
areas?
(c) In recent months, SFOR troops (including U.S. soldiers) have
acted in support of Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic by
seizing radio and television transmitters, police stations and other
government installations controlled by her hardline opponents. Does the
participation of U.S. troops in such operations expose them to increase
risk of attack from hard-line supporters? Would hard-line response be
limited to stone-throwing civilian mobs, or could it escalate into
sniper attacks and other forms of armed conflict?
(f) Would more active participation by SFOR in civil implementation
tasks such as refugee resettlement increase the risk to U.S. forces?
(g) What is the current status of efforts to remove land mines in
Bosnia? Do land mines still pose a significant threat to U.S. troops in
Bosnia?
(i) Are you satisfied that the U.S. has sufficient HUMINT assets in
Bosnia to provide early warning of possible threats to U.S. forces?
(j) How do you determine the extent of personnel required for
HUMINT collection operations for force protection?
nato expansion
(25) What are the risks, if any, to U.S. intelligence personnel and
the Intelligence Community in general, in allowing Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary to join NATO?
the threat posed by disease
(26) To what extent has HIV had an impact on the health and
economies of foreign countries? How has HIV impacted foreign
militaries?
the role of dod intelligence analysis
(27) As senior military intelligence advisor to the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, your production
units and activities around the world have been the producer of action-
oriented intelligence--the moment-to-moment reporting that enables
policy makers and military commanders to make tactical decisions with
timely information. How do you evaluate the Defense Intelligence
Community's performance in the production of threat assessments. What
contributions have been provided by the Reserve component?
actionable intelligence
(28) Some analysts say that the increased emphasis on action-
oriented intelligence has come at the expense of other important--but
more mundane--work, like maintaining data bases and conducting in-depth
analyses on foreign militaries and political groups. Do you share this
concern? If so, how do you intend to deal with these competing needs?
intelligence community's role in the pow/mia issue
(29)(a) In July 1993, the Secretary of Defense consolidated four
DOD offices charged with different functions of the POW/MIA issue. The
Intelligence Community's only POW/MIA analytical element, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Office of POW/MIAs Affairs, was then transferred
out from the oversight of both the DCI and the responsible
Congressional committees. Do you now have oversight of the Defense
Prisoner of War/Missing Persons Office (DPMO) analytical section? If
not, who is responsible for oversight of this capability? Why is this
intelligence capability not reflected in the Congressional
Justification Books (National Foreign, Joint Military and Tactical
intelligence accounts) provided to the congressional oversight
committees?
(b) This Committee is looking into intelligence information on the
January 1991 loss of a Persian Gulf F-18 aircraft and its pilot,
Lieutenant Commander Michael Scott Speicher. It has requested a report
that documents the chronology of the intelligence community's
activities. Will you share with us, what evidence exists that Speicher
was killed in action? What evidence exists to support the
classification ``missing in action?'' What specific collection actions,
by discipline, are underway by the Intelligence Community and by whom?
If not, why not? What office has the responsibility to keep
intelligence collection requirements on the books? At what point did
the Intelligence Community reduce its collection effort? Why? Who is
responsible for dedicated all-source analysis on the MIA topic in the
Intelligence Community? How is the current structure working?
______
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, March 12, 1998.
Hon. Phyllis E. Oakley,
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research,
Department of State, Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. Oakley: We appreciate your participation in our January 28
hearing on the current and projected national security threats to the
United States. Your willingness to address this important issue in open
session was appreciated and made an important contribution, not only to
the work of our Committee, but to the American public's awareness of
U.S. national security interests.
We are submitting the attached questions for the record to you. The
unclassified responses to these questions will be an important part of
our hearing transcript which we hope to release as expeditiously as
possible. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if you would respond in
writing to these questions no later than June 1, 1998.
If there are questions, please have your staff contact Don Mitchell
of our Committee. We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman.
J. Robert Kerrey,
Vice Chairman.
Enclosure.
Questions for the Record
russian military capabilities
(1) What is your assessment of the likelihood that military reform
will succeed in Russia?
russia-iran missile relationship
(2) In your prepared testimony, you state that ``[e]vents over the
past year have demonstrated the ability of world-be proliferators,
notably Iran, to exploit Russia's missile development infrastructure.
If allowed to continue, access to Russian technology and expertise will
enable the Iranians to develop and field intermediate range ballistic
missiles faster than if they were left to their own devices?'' How has
Russian assistance enhanced the capabilities of Iranian ballistic
missiles? What are current projections about the range capabilities of
Iranian missiles over the next 15 years? What are the implications for
U.S. national security?
chinese proliferation
(3) Please describe all significant transfers over the past 5 years
of WMD-related technology or information from China to Iran, Pakistan
or other countries, to include advanced conventional weapons and
technology. Do you believe that this assistance could raise compliance
concerns with China's commitments to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)? How likely is it that
China will comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)?
the future of hong kong
(4) On July 1 of last year, Hong Kong reverted from British to
Chinese sovereignty. What is your long-term assessment of the
likelihood that Hong Kong will continue to have strong economic growth,
foster a friendly and supportive businessenvironment and provide an
atmosphere allowing significant scope for individual freedom? What are
the economic implications of this for the U.S.?
north korea as a continuing threat
(5) In his prepared testimony, General Hughes stated that ``[s]ome
significant--perhaps violent--change is likely in the next five years.
There are four basic alternatives: leadership change, government
collapse, negotiated accommodation with the South, or major economic
reform.'' In your opinion, what is the likeliest scenario? Why? How
widely is this view shared in the Intelligence Community? What do you
view as the most likely scenario?
monitoring the north korean framework agreement
(6) In 1994, North Korea signed the nuclear framework agreement and
promised to forgo further development of nuclear weapons in return for
assistance from the U.S. and others. Has North Korea been living up to
its commitments under the framework agreement? Do we expect continued
compliance? Does the economic situation in North Korea make compliance
more or less likely? How high is your confidence that the U.S.
Intelligence Community can adequately monitor North Korea's compliance
with the U.S.-North Korean Framework Agreement?
changes in south korea
(7) Talks on peace on the Korean peninsula involving North and
South Korea, China and the U.S., began in Geneva last December. Long
time opposition leader Kim Dae Jung won last December's presidential
election in South Korea. What do these developments bode for change in
South Korea as well as prospects for normalized relations between or
reunification of North and South Korea?
iraq and u.n. inspections
(8) Iraq has recently barred a U.S.-led team from conducting
inspections in Iraq, claiming that the team composition was
``unbalanced'' and the U.S. team chief was a spy. Saddam Hussein has
vowed to suspend cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors if they do
not finish their work by May 20. What is your assessment of the
likelihood that Saddam is serious about his threat to suspend
cooperation with the inspectors? What is the likelihood that military
action against Iraq will alter Saddam's behavior?
the impact of sanctions on iraq
(9) Iraq has argued that the continued ban on oil exports are
causing mass suffering in Iraq, including unaffordable prices for food
and unavailability of medicine. What is your assessment of the nature
and extent of the suffering to the Iraqi people as a result of economic
sanctions?
the new regime in iran
(10) Do you see President Khatami's election and reform agenda as a
watershed that could change the nature of the Iranian regime? What is
the possibility that Khatami's conservative critics will sidetrack him?
What is the likelihood that the Khatami government will still be in
power 3 years from now? Does his election signify a change in Iran's
support for terrorism and its acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction? Is there any evidence of such a change?
the impact of sanctions on iran
(11) Are sanctions likely to influence Iran's behavior over the
next 3 years? Why or why not? Late last September, Iran and France
confirmed the award of a $2 billion deal to develop Iran's South Pars
gas field to Total SA, and its minority partners Gazprom (Russia) and
Petronas (Malaysia). Will the U.S. impose sanctions on these countries?
What does this deal say about the effectiveness of the U.S. economic
sanctions against Iran?
the palestinian authority
(12)(a) Please assess both the willingness and the ability of the
Palestinian Authority to control terrorist violence in Gaza and the
areas of the West Bank under its control.
(b) To what extent is Hamas receiving outside support, and from
whom is that support coming?
(c) Please assess Chairman Arafat's health, comment on his likely
successor and describe the impact his departure would have on the peace
process.
the stability of the israeli government
(13)(a) Please give us your assessment of Prime Minister
Netanyahu's commitment to abiding by the Oslo Accords. Is he committed
to a land-for-peace formula, or does he want to kill the peace process
as currently formulated?
(b) How do you assess the longevity of the current Likud
government? How do you assess Labor's ability to win an election at
this point?
(c) Please assess Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai's recent
statements in support of United Nation's Resolution 425, which calls
for Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Does this
represent a significant change in Israeli policy? What has been the
response of the Lebanese and Syrians to Mordechai's statement?
the israeli presence in lebanon
(14) Please comment on the losses the Israelis have suffered in
Lebanon in the past year and the impact of those losses on Israeli
public opinion and the likelihood that Israel will initiate a
unilateral withdrawal from the Southern Lebanon. Do those losses
indicate that the Hizballah is becoming a more effective force? Please
comment on the military effectiveness of Israel's allies, the Southern
Lebanese Army (SLA) and describe the current military cooperation
between the Israeli Defense Force and the SLA.
syria
(15) Under what conditions will Syria withdraw from Lebanon? Do you
see those conditions being met in the near future?
the security environment in lebanon
(16) Please comment on the general security environment in Lebanon
and the safety of Americans who travel there, now that the U.S. travel
ban has been partially lifted. If the Israelis should withdraw their
forces from southern Lebanon, are the Lebanese Armed Forces capable of
controlling southern Lebanon and preventing Hizballah attacks against
Israel?
egypt
(17)(a) What impact would a reduction in U.S. military aid to Egypt
have on U.S.-Egypt relations, particularly if such a reduction is not
matched by a comparable reduction of U.S. military aid to Israel?
(b) Please assess the current strength of the Mubarak government
and its ability to prevail over terrorist internal opposition. To what
degree is that internal opposition receiving outside support, and from
whom?
the taliban militia in afghanistan
(18) The Taliban militia has overtaken significant portions of
Afghanistan. What is the likelihood that the Taliban will come to
dominate Afghanistan over the long-term? If the Taliban sustain their
dominance over Afghanistan, what are the likely implications for Iran-
Afghanistan relations?
castro's hold on power and succession
(19)(a) What is the state of Fidel Castro's health and the
prospects for a peaceful transition of democracy in Cuba within the
next two to five years? Who is a likely successor?
(b) Please comment on the short, medium and long-term impact of
Pope John Paul's recent visit to Cuba. Will the Catholic Church in Cuba
begin to play a more aggressive oppositionist role in Cuba as a result
of the visit?
(c) Please characterize the strength of the current opposition to
the Castro government. Does the opposition pose a serious challenge to
the regime? If not, do you anticipate that it will within the next 2-5
years?
cuba's economy
(20) How would you characterize Cuba's current economic health?
What impact has the Helms Burton legislation had on foreign investment
in Cuba?
political killings in haiti
(21) What is the status of investigations into the various high
profile political murder cases that have occurred in Haiti during the
last several years? Has any evidence of government complicity in those
murders been uncovered? In this regard, please provide an assessment of
the performance of the Haitian National Police's Investigative Unit and
Haitian Judiciary in solving these crimes.
colombia
(22) Please assess the strength of the Colombian guerrilla movement
and its chances for military success against the government of
Colombia. To what extent have the various guerrilla movements in
Colombia become involved in narcotrafficking? What role do they play in
drug trafficking and have they in effect become one with the country's
narcotraffickers? Please assess the current human rights situation and
the relative involvement of both government and guerrilla forces in
committing such abuses.
mexico
(23) President Clinton's February 1997 certification of Mexico as
fully cooperative in drug control efforts prompted considerable
criticism in Congress. What is your current assessment of the nature
and extent of Mexico's drug control efforts? To what extent does
Mexican government corruption hamper these efforts?
monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban
(24) How high is the Intelligence Community's confidence that it
can effectively monitor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? What are the
notable shortcomings? Is U.S. intelligence doing everything possible to
improve U.S. monitoring capabilities in this area? If not, why not?
the chemical weapons convention
(25)(a) Over one hundred of the 168 signatories have ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). (Last November, both Iran and Russia
completed their CWC ratification.) Do you have any intelligence that
any of the signatories of the CWC have engaged in activities that raise
compliance concerns?
(b) The Intelligence Community has conceded that its ability to
monitor compliance with the CWC is limited. Has that capability
improved since U.S. ratification of the CWC?
the situation in indonesia
(26) How will Indonesia's economic problems affect the security
situation in that nation? How do you assess President Suharto's ability
to prevent civil strife that may arise as a result of slower if not
negative economic growth, and likely higher unemployment and inflation?
If Suharto is not re-elected or not able to fulfill his seventh term as
president, is there a credible successor available that could lead
Indonesia through this economic downturn in the coming years? How
likely is the Indonesian military to intercede in the political
process?
threat to u.s. deployed forces in bosnia
(27) What are the shortfalls in Intelligence Community support to
the Bosnia operation and what is being done to rectify these problem
areas?
intelligence support to the war crimes tribunal
(28) How is the U.S. Intelligence Community supporting the War
Crimes Tribunal?
nato expansion
(29) What are the risks, if any, to U.S. intelligence personnel and
the Intelligence Community in general, in allowing Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary to join NATO?
the threat posed by disease
(30) In your prepared testimony in which you discuss the
implications of Hong Kong's ``bird flu,'' you note that ``[b]acterial
and viral diseases are both durable and mutative, ensuring they will
never be completely eradicated. Improved monitoring and rapid response
is essential to curb this threat to the health of Americans.'' What
diseases pose the greatest threat to the U.S.?
______
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, June 15, 1998.
Hon. Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed are responses to the questions posed in
your March 12, 1998 letter to Assistant Secretary Oakley. Please let us
know if we can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosures: As stated.
1. russian military capabilities
Question 1. What is your assessment of the likelihood that military
reform will succeed in Russia?
Answer: The Russian military continues to be short of funds and
afflicted with a series of problems that have sharply lowered morale.
Efforts at reform, begun in earnest last year by the new minister of
defense, have led to the consolidation of some commands and now await
approval of a comprehensive program to revamp the services. Yeltsin has
stated that he wants to reduce the military to no more than 1.2 million
men by the end of the decade. The main problems of money and will-power
remain, however, and, as in the case of the economy, entrenched
interests are proving difficult to dislodge.
2. the russia-iran missile relationship
Question 2. In your prepared testimony, you state that ``[e]vents
over the past year have demonstrated the ability of would-be
proliferators, notably Iran, to exploit Russia's missile development
infrastructure. If allowed to continue, access to Russian technology
and expertise will enable the Iranians to develop and field
intermediate range ballistic missiles faster than if they were left to
their own devices.'' How has Russian assistance enhanced the
capabilities of Iranian ballistic missiles? What are current
projections about the range capabilities of Iranian missiles over the
next 15 years? What are the implications for U.S. National security?
Answer. The Administration wants to prevent Russian assistance to
Iran's long-range missile program. This is why the President appointed
a special envoy for the issue in 1997 and why the U.S. continues to
urge Russia to take steps to ensure that Iran does not obtain
equipment, technology, training, or materials from the Russian
aerospace industry.
Assistance from Russian experts has saved Iran time and improved
the quality of the missile program, but we do not know exactly how much
time Russian assistance has saved Iran.
Iran's missile program was not starting from scratch when it began
recruiting Russian experts. Iran has an active Scud program and has
been looking at developing medium-range missiles for some time, at
least since the early 1990s when it negotiated to purchase North
Korea's No Dong system.
3. chinese proliferation
Question 3. Please describe all significant transfers over the past
5 years of WMD-related technology or information from China to Iran,
Pakistan or other countries, to include advanced conventional weapons
and technology. Do you believe that this assistance could raise
compliance concerns with China's commitments to the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)? How
likely is it that China will comply with the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC)?
Answer. (NPT/Iran) In late 1997 China announced it would phase out
existing, and not engage in any new, nuclear cooperation with Iran. In
the past, Chinese sales of nuclear facilities to Iran have been made
pursuant to IAEA safeguards. We do not believe China would knowingly
assist Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.
(NPT/Pakistan) China is providing assistance to Pakistan's civilian
nuclear program through construction of a nuclear power reactor that
will be subject to IAEA safeguards. But China also has cooperated with
Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program in areas that raise concerns.
Prior to China's NPT accession in March1992, the U.S. had concluded
that China had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives. In
May 1996, China stated publicly that it will not provide assistance to
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Our current information does not
provide a basis for concluding that China has acted inconsistently with
that statement.
(Missiles) The Department continues to be concerned about reports
of Chinese-supplied M-11's in Pakistan, and about reports of missile-
related assistance to countries such as Iran and Pakistan. In October
1994, China reaffirmed its 1992 commitment to abide by the original
guidelines and parameters of the MTCR. Beijing also committed to ban
all exports of MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles. We have no reason
to believe China has done anything inconsistent with that commitment.
(Chemical Weapons Convention) The U.S. for some time has been
concerned that various Chinese companies have been transferring
chemical weapon-related dual-use chemicals, production equipment, and
technology to Iran, which we believe Iran is using in its chemical
weapons program. In May 1997, the U.S. government imposed trade
sanctions on five Chinese individuals, two Chinese companies, and one
Hong Kong company for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's
CW program. We have no evidence that the Chinese or Hong Kong
governments were involved in the specific transfers that provoked these
sanctions. Beijing has said on many occasions that it is committed to
and is abiding by the CWC, and that it is opposed to the development of
chemical weapons by any nation.
4. the future of hong kong
Question 4. On July 1 of last year, Hong Kong reverted from British
to Chinese sovereignty. What is your long-term assessment of the
likelihood that Hong Kong will continue to have strong economic growth,
foster a friendly and supportive business environment and provide an
atmosphere allowing significant scope for individual freedom? What are
the economic implications of this for the U.S.?
Answer. Less than a year after reversion, Hong Kong continues to
play an important role as a regional finance center, actively
participating in efforts to address the Asian financial crisis. As a
member of the World Trade Organization and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation Forum, Hong Kong has pressed for further trade and
investment liberalization.
Beijing continues to take pains not to be seen as interfering in
Hong Kong's affairs. Mainland Chinese companies in Hong Kong are
subject to Hong Kong laws and supervision. The rule of law and the
independent judiciary remain in place.
China also has shown restraint and offered support in dealing with
Hong Kong during the Asian financial crisis. Last fall, while the Hong
Kong dollar was under enormous pressure, Beijing did not second guess
the SAR's decision to hold fast to the peg--and it noted that it too
had considerable reserves that could be made available for the defense
of the exchange rate.
The defense of the peg has required Hong Kong to deflate its
economy. As a speculative pressure on the exchange rate has diminished,
interest rates have retreated to close to where they were before the
crisis began. The banks appear to have withstood well the fall off in
property prices and other assets. Growth forecasts for this year range
from about 2 percent to 3.5 percent, significantly lower than in recent
years, and unemployment likely will rise slightly as demand for
services eases. The export services sector remains more buoyant than
anticipated because China's trade has not yet encountered sharply
increased competition from southeast Asian countries where exchange
rates tumbled.
The Hong Kong press remains free and continues to comment
critically on the PRC and its leaders, though some self-censorship has
been reported. Demonstrations--often critical of the PRC--continue to
be held. Western journalists and media focus on legislative elections
scheduled for May and adoption of laws on sedition, subversion, and
secession that might undermine fundamental human rights.
Reversion has not dimmed Hong Kong's attractions as an operational
base for U.S. companies because of its unduplicated regional strengths
in finance, shipping services, and communications. Hong Kong's longer-
term economic prospects are too bound up with China's to separate, but
as long as China's economy can sustain robust growth, Hong Kong's
economy will remain vibrant.
5. north korea as a continuing threat
Question 5. In his prepared testimony, General Hughes stated that
``[s]ome significant--perhaps violent--change is likely in the next
five years. There are four basic alternatives: leadership change,
government collapse, negotiated accommodation with the South, or major
economic reform.'' In your opinion, what is the likeliest scenario?
Why? How widely is this view shared in the intelligence community? What
do you view as the most likely scenario?
Answer. INR believes that there is a good chance that the North
will make enough economic adjustments and receive sufficient external
assistance to sustain a strategy of engagement and economic
regeneration over the next five years. We think the DPRK is most likely
to continue on its present path of:
Implementing the agreed framework and seeking broader engagement
with the United States.
Seeking foreign aid, trade, and investment to foster economic
growth without undermining political control.
Relying on and rewarding the military to ensure Kim Jong II's
position.
Reinforcing internal control and deterring challenges to the
regime.
As long as the DPRK stays on this course, the probability of war or
military conflict short of war on the peninsula should remain
relatively low.
6. monitoring the north korean framework agreement
Question 6. In 1994, North Korea signed the Nuclear Framework
Agreement and promised to forgo further development of nuclear weapons
in return for assistance from the U.S. and others. Has North Korea been
living up to its commitments under the Framework Agreement? Do we
expect continued compliance? Does the economic situation in North Korea
make compliance more or less likely? How high is your confidence that
the U.S. intelligence community can adequately monitor North Korea's
compliance with the U.S.-North Korean Framework Agreement?
Answer. At this stage of the Agreed Framework's implementation, the
specific nuclear-related commitments which the North has undertaken are
the freezing of the nuclear production facilities at Yongbyon, a halt
to construction on two uncompleted graphite-moderated nuclear reactors,
and the canning of the approximately 8,000 spent fuel rods that were
unloaded in 1994. We are satisfied that the North is living up to each
of these commitments. The facilities are frozen, construction has
stopped, and canning has been completed.
In another area we are not yet so satisfied. Although the North is
not obligated to come into full compliance with its safeguards
agreement with the IAEA until a ``significant portion'' of the LWR
project is completed, the IAEA feels it needs to take preliminary steps
to be able to deal with the question of verifying the accuracy and
completeness of the DPRK's initial inventory expeditiously when the
time comes. At the moment, there are differences between the North and
the IAEA on how to proceed on this question. We believe that, in the
spirit of the Agreed Framework, the North Koreans can and should be
more cooperative with IAEA requests.
We expect continued compliance from the North in areas where they
have already fulfilled their commitments, and we are constantly
focusing their attention on the need to be as cooperative as possible
with the IAEA, now and in the future. The Agreed Framework is
constructed to let us take one step at a time, and that is how we will
deal with future North Korean obligations.
One could image scenarios under which the North's desperate
economic situation might lead to circumstances where it would decide to
break the Agreed Framework. However, our view is that it is much more
likely that the North's economic situation will keep it focused on
efforts to improve relations with the United States, and that it fully
realizes that this goal would be unattainable if it were to stop
complying with its Agreed Framework obligations.
We have high confidence that the U.S. intelligence community can
adequately monitor the North's compliance with its specific commitments
under the Agreed Framework, freezing production of nuclear materials
at--as well as halting construction and eventually dismantling--the
designated facilities.
7. changes in south korea
Question 7. Talks on peace on the Korean peninsula involving North
and South Korea, China and the U.S., began in Geneva last December.
Long time opposition leader Kim Dae Jung won last December's
presidential election in South Korea. What do these developments bode
for change in South Korea as well as prospects for normalized relations
between or reunification of North and South Korea?
Answer. President Kim Dae Jung has said that he wants to make a
number of reforms. He aims to make the current financial situation and
IMF program an opportunity for Korea to achieve a more balanced
economic development.
He also has said that he is open to a North-South Korean summit,
and he believes in increased economic intercourse between the North and
South. The North Koreans have recently proposed resumption of
government-to-government talks at the vice-ministerial level, possibly
a first step in a broader reengagement with the south. Public North
Korean comment on the new South Korean administration has avoidedharsh
criticism, leaving the door open to exploring progress in inter-Korean
relations.
8. iraq and u.n. inspections
Question 8. Iraq has meetly barred a U.S.-led team from conducting
inspections in Iraq, claiming that the team composition was
``unbalanced'' and the U.S. team chief was a spy. Saddam Hussein has
vowed to suspend cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors if they do
not finish their work by May 20. What is your assessment of the
likelihood that Saddam is serious about his threat to suspend
cooperation with the inspectors? What is the likelihood that military
action against Iraq will alter Saddam's behavior?
Answer. The crisis has been resolved for now and UNSCOM inspectors,
including Americans, have inspected facilities previously off limits.
Nevertheless, significant gaps remain regarding Iraq's WMD programs,
especially in the biological weapons area. Additionally, Saddam's track
record suggests strongly that we need to remain vigilant and prepare
for additional challenges from his regime. This latest crisis was
resolved peacefully in large part because Saddam faced a credible
military threat.
9. the impact of sanctions on iraq
Question 9. Iraq has argued that the continued ban on oil exports
is causing mass suffering in Iraq, including unaffordable prices for
food and unavailability of medicine. What is your assessment of the
nature and extent of the suffering to the Iraqi people as a result of
economic sanctions?
Answer. The U.N. oil-for-food program initiated in 1996 has done
much to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people, and we are
prepared to look favorably on expanding the program. The Baghdad regime
finally accepted terms of the oil-for-food arrangement, which had been
available to Baghdad in one form or another since 1991. The arrangement
has noticeably improved Iraqi nutrition and medical care though the
overall economy remains hamstrung by shortages of imported raw
materials and spare parts, by inferior public services, and by a
dilapidated infrastructure. The Baghdad regime bears the onus for the
humanitarian costs of economic sanctions. The Iraqi government's
repeated flouting of U.N. Security Council resolutions precludes easing
of the sanctions regime. Moreover, the U.N. oil-for-food arrangement,
which was developed specifically to address the humanitarian issue, lay
dormant for six years because of Baghdad's unwillingness to allow the
U.N. to ensure equitable distribution of food and medicine.
10. the new regime in iran
Question 10. Do you see President Khatami's election and reform
agenda as a watershed that could change the nature of the Iranian
regime? What is the possibility that Khatami's conservative critics
will sidetrack him? What is the likelihood that the Khatami government
will still be in power 3 years from now? Does his election signify a
change in Iran's support for terrorism and its acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction? Is there any evidence of such a change?
Answer. Under Khatami, a number of changes are increasing prospects
for a more democratic and less ideological Iran. For example, many
press restrictions have been lifted and numerous new publications have
been started. Some fundamental ideological taboos have been broken,
most notably when Khatami praised American civilization and culture.
Khatami's conservative opponents have been able to slow the pace of
some of his reforms, but so far they have not stopped him. In April,
for example, he overcame an indirect conservative attack on him when he
won the release from prison of his ally, the mayor of Tehran, whose
arrest was ordered by the conservative-dominated judiciary.
Khatami appears to have worked out a modus vivendi with other key
leaders we expect him to complete his four-year term.
We do not know what Khatami's policies on terrorism and WMD are. He
has brought in a new intelligence minister, but so far we lack
sufficient evidence that would demonstrate reforms on terrorism.
11. the impact of sanctions on iran
Question 11. Are sanctions likely to influence Iran's behavior over
the next 3 years? Why or why not? Late last September, Iran and France
confirmed the award of a $2 billion deal to develop Iran's South Pars
gas field to Total SA, and its minority partners Gazprom (Russia) and
Petronas (Malaysia). will the U.S. impose sanctions on these countries?
What does this deal say about the effectiveness of the U.S. economic
sanctions against Iran?
Answer. We lack hard evidence that unilateral US sanctions have had
significant positive effects in changing objectionable Iranian
behavior. Tehran says the sanctions policy proves Washington's
hostility and its insincerity in calling for a reduction in tensions
with Iran. Even where the sanctions have had some effect, as in
increasing Tehran's costs in securing international financing, we lack
evidence that such costs affect Iranian policy on terrorism and weapons
of mass destruction. Multilateral controls to deny Iran sensitive
military and dual-use technology, however, have hampered Tehran's
efforts to develop its WMD program.
After extensive review, the Secretary on May 18 determined that the
Total-Gazprom-Petronas investment in the South Pars gas field was
sanctionable activity under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (the Act).
At the same time, the Secretary under authority of Section 9(c) of the
Act, determined it is important to the national interest to waive
sanctions against Total, Gazprom, and Petronas. The Administration does
not support the Total-Gazprom-Petronas investment and undertook
vigorous efforts to stop it, including representations to the highest
levels of the governments involved. All three companies, for varying
reasons, are insulated from any practical negative impact of the
imposition of sanctions, and were prepared to proceed with their
investment projects in Iran even in the wave of U.S. sanctions. The
administration concluded the Act's sanctions would not stop the South
Pars deal.
In reaching a decision, the Secretary took into account the Act's
objective of building an effective multilateral regime to deny Iran the
ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery
systems and to support acts of international terrorism. In the areas of
WMD and terrorism, the Administration has achieved significant enhanced
cooperation with the European Union, with whom cooperation was already
at a high level, and with Russia, which has undertaken some important
commitments and initiatives on non-proliferation, whose implementation
we will monitor for effectiveness. Malaysia has not been actively
engaged with us on nonproliferation issues, nor has it been a source of
proliferation concern, and it has acted as a force of moderation in
Islamic circles. The Administration fully recognizes the dangers to
Israel posed by the potential threat of development of WMD by its
adversaries in the region and we will continue to engage with Israel to
assure our cooperation supports Israel's ability to resist such
threats.
In reaching a decision, the Secretary also took into consideration
additional factors relating to our national interest. The waivers will
enhance our ability to work with the European Union, Russia, and
Malaysia on a host of bilateral and multilateral issues. Inter alia,
these include:
Russia's ratification of START II, further cooperation on
nonproliferation, and progress on internal economic reform;
Resolution of differences over Helms-Burton, including a new
discipline to deter investment in illegally expropriated property
worldwide, including in Cuba, and further EU support for democratic
change and human rights in Cuba, and creation of a new US-EU initiative
to further liberalize world trade;
Multilateral cooperation on Iraq to maintain the isolation of
Saddam Hussein and to bring about Iraqi compliance with UN Security
Council resolution, including cooperation with the UNSCOM/IAEA
inspections;
Progress on peaceful solutions to the issues of Kosovo and Bosnia
where the cooperation of our NATO allies is essential, and on other
European security issues;
Cooperation with European and Asian governments, including
Malaysia, in addressing the Asian financial crisis and the rapidly
unfolding events in Indonesia.
12. the palestinian authority
Question 12. (A) Please assess both the willingness and the ability
of the Palestinian Authority to control terrorist violence in Gaza and
the areas of the West Bank under its control.
(B) To what extent is Hamas receiving outside support, and from
whom is that support coming.
(C) Please assess Chairman Arafat's health, comment on his likely
successor and describe the impact his departure would have on the peace
process.
Answer. (A) (Control Over Terrorism) The Palestinian Authority (PA)
recognizes that it must fight terrorism and has taken steps to prevent
terrorist attacks. We believe that the PA must make a total effort to
fight terrorist groups. The President the Secretary, and other USG
officials have publicly and privately made this point to the PA. We
will continue to monitor the PA's efforts in this regard.
(B) (Outside Support of Hamas) Hamas receives a substantial portion
of its financing from private Palestinian and Islamist supporters
around the globe,especially in the Gulf states but also in the U.S. and
Europe. Most of this money is intended and used for Hamas charitable
activities, though some is siphoned off to Hamas' military wing. The
group also receives financial and training assistance from Iran and at
least some terrorist training from other terrorist groups in the
region, especially in Lebanon.
(C) (Arafat's Health and Successor) We have heard reports that
Chairman Arafat's health is deteriorating, however, U.S. officials who
meet with him often report that he seems vigorous and fully engaged.
Yasser Arafat holds two positions: ``ra'es'' (chairman or
president) of the Palestinian Executive Authority (elected in 1996),
and Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Arafat
is also head of Fatah, the dominant faction in the PLO. In the event he
vacates his posts due to death, resignation, or loss of legal capacity,
the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, currently Ahmed
Quray (Abu Alaa), takes over as head of the Palestinian Authority for
no more than 60 days, within which time elections must be held to elect
a new ``ra'es.''
There is no clear line of succession for Arafat in his capacity as
Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, although its Secretary General
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is considered a likely candidate to assume
this position. A successor would likely be from Fatah, the PLO's
dominant faction, a meeting of the Palestine National Committee (PNC)
might be called to confirm the new Chairman. Arafat himself remains,
for most Palestinians, the symbol of their cause. It is likely that
after a period of consolidation, Arafat's successor would continue to
negotiate the outstanding issues on the Palestinian-Israeli peace
track.
13. the stability of the israeli government
Question 13. (A) Please give us your assessment of Prime Minister
Netanyahu's commitment to abiding by the Oslo accords. Is he committed
to a land-for-peace formula, or does he want to kill the peace process
as currently formulated?
(B) How do you assess the longevity of the current Likud
government? How do you assess labor's ability to win an election at
this point?
(C) Please assess Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai's recent
statements in support of United Nation's Resolution 425, which calls
for Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Does this
represent a significant change in Israeli policy? What has been the
response of the Lebanese and Syrians to Mordechai's statement?
Answer. (A) (Netanyahu and the Oslo Accords) Prime Minister
Netanyahu has stated publicly he is committed to the Oslo accords, and
concluded an agreement with PA chairman Arafat in January 1997, which
led to the Israeli army's redeployment from Hebron.
(B) (Longevity of Likud Government) The government was elected to
serve a four-year term in accordance with Israel's electoral law.
(C) (Mordechai's Statement on Lebanon Withdrawal) Mordechai's
statement earlier this year led the Israeli cabinet, in a major policy
shift, on April 2 to endorse UNSC Resolution 425. Syrian and Lebanese
leaders have reacted negatively in public, calling the statement a
maneuver designed to reach a separate peace with Lebanon and an Israeli
tactic aimed at avoiding giving back the Golan Heights as part of a
peace settlement with Syria.
14. the israeli presence in lebanon
Question 14. Please comment on the losses the Israelis have
suffered in Lebanon in the past year and the impact of those losses on
Israeli public opinion and the likelihood that Israel will initiate a
unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Do those losses indicate
that the Hizballah is becoming a more effective force? Please comment
on the military effectiveness of Israel's allies, the Southern Lebanese
Army (SLA) and describe the current military cooperation between the
Israeli Defense Force and the SLA.
Answer. Israel's losses in south Lebanon have generated increasing
public calls for a troop withdrawal. Some Israelis support a unilateral
pullout; others, a pullout conditioned on security arrangements worked
out with Lebanon and Syria prior to Israeli withdrawal.
The government has stated that UNSC Resolution 425 provides for
negotiating security arrangements prior to an Israeli pullout.
Though most of the Israeli casualties last year were due to
accidents, Hizballah's military tactics have grown steadily more
sophisticated. Hizballah now regularly mounts coordinated operations
involving multiple units.
Israeli troops fight alongside the SLA, and Israel trains, equips,
and pays the SLA. There are indications of poor morale within the SLA
due to repeated Hizballah attacks and uncertainty about the militia's
future. The Lebanese government has indicted several SLA commanders on
charges of treason. The prospect of an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon
could only have a negative effect on SLA morale.
15. syria
Question 15. Under what conditions will Syria withdraw from
Lebanon? Do you see those conditions being met in the near future?
Answer. Syria relies on its forces in Lebanon to prevent inter-
factional strife and to ensure that the Lebanese government does not
act contrary to Syrian security and foreign policy interests. The
Syrian troop presence also provides a first line of defense against an
Israeli military move toward Damascus via the Bekaa valley. Lastly, it
facilitates Syrian support for Hizballah's guerrilla resistance
activities against the Israeli military presence in Lebanon.
The Taif Accord, which ended the Lebanese civil war, calls on Syria
to redeploy its troops to the Bekaa valley, but it does not call for a
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Syria has refused to redeploy, claiming
provisions of the Accord calling for curbing sectarianism and Israeli
withdrawal from southern Lebanon have not been implemented.
A comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement could result in
conditions more conducive to a Syrian withdrawal.
16. the security environment in lebanon
Question 16. Please comment on the general security environment in
Lebanon and the safety of Americans who travel there, now that the U.S.
travel ban has been partially lifted. If the Israelis should withdraw
their forces from southern Lebanon, are the Lebanese armed forces
capable of controlling southern Lebanon and preventing Hizballah
attacks against Israel?
Answer. Though the security situation in Lebanon has improved in
recent years the intelligence community continues to rate the terrorist
threat to U.S. interests--especially the official U.S. presence--in
Lebanon as high. The State Department strongly advises U.S. citizens
not to travel to Lebanon, but recognizes that some Americans may have
compelling reasons to accept the risks.
We believe the LAF has the potential to maintain security in all
parts of Lebanon, though it is not clear that it would be able to
prevent Hizballah or other groups from attacking Israel.
17. egypt
Question 17. (A) What impact would a reduction in U.S. military aid
to Egypt have on U.S.-Egypt relations, particularly if such a reduction
is not matched by a comparable reduction of U.S. military aid to
Israel?
(B) Please assess the current strength of the Mubarak government
and its ability to prevail over terrorist internal opposition. To what
degree is that internal opposition receiving outside support, and from
whom?
Answer. (A) (Reduction of Military Aid) Reducing U.S. military aid
to Egypt without a concomitant reduction of U.S. military aid to Israel
would be badly received in Egypt and could make the Egyptians less
cooperative on a host of strategic issues, including the Gulf, Africa,
peace-keeping activities and the Middle East peace process. Egypt has
long bristled at the fact that the U.S. has worked to ensure that
Israel maintains a qualitative military edge over all its neighbors. A
unilateral cut in U.S. military aid would make the Egyptians feel even
less secure about their regional military standing (despite their many
years of peace with Israel) and apprehensive that they were losing U.S.
political support.
(B) (Strength of Mubarak Government) Though Egyptian Islamist
extremists, including the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya and the
Egyptian al-Jihad, pose no immediate threat to the stability of the
Egyptian government, both groups have a proven ability to attack
government and civilian targets in Egypt. Following the November 17,
1997 Luxor massacre, which killed 58 foreign tourists, Egyptian
officials charged Iran and terrorist financier Usama bin Ladin with
supporting Egyptian Islamist extremists. Egypt also accused a number of
western governments, including the UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
with providing haven to Egyptian terrorists.
18. the taliban militia in afghanistan
Question 18. The Taliban militia has overtaken significant portions
of Afghanistan. What is the likelihood that the Taliban will come to
dominate Afghanistan over the long-term? If the Taliban sustain their
dominance over Afghanistan, what are the likely implications for Iran-
Afghanistan relations?
Answer. The Taliban are unlikely to dominate Afghanistan
permanently by military means. The two sides have reached approximate
parity in military strength, neither capable of making major permanent
gains against or defeating the other. Both seem to be growing weary of
the fight. While the northern opposition has always been fractious, the
Taliban has also experienced rising internal dissension. The southern
populace is increasingly concerned about Taliban failure to govern
fairly or effectively.
If the Taliban does succeed in dominating the country, relations
between Afghanistan and Iran would be tense. The Taliban have accused
Iran of being the chief supplier of war material to anti-Taliban
opposition forces and have threatened to reciprocate by supporting
Iranian opposition groups.
19. castro's hold on power and succession
Question 19. (A) What is the state of Fidel Castro's health and the
prospects for a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba within the
next two to five years? Who is a likely successor?
(B) Please comment on the short, medium and long-term impact of
Pope John Paul's recent visit to Cuba. Will the catholic church in Cuba
begin to play a more aggressive oppositionist role in Cuba as a result
of the visit?
(C) Please characterize the strength of the current opposition to
the Castro government. Does the opposition pose a serious challenge to
the regime? If not, do you anticipate that it will within the next 2-5
years?
Answer. (A) (Health and Succession) A number of foreign observers
over the last few months have reported that Castro has lost
considerable weight and appears to be in very poor health. Other
observers, his recent delivery of a seven-hour speech, and his
appearance during the just concluded papal visit do not support the
conclusion that he is in failing health.
Should Castro die or become disabled due to natural causes--the
most likely scenario for his departure from power--the Communist Party,
bureaucracy and military would likely continue running the country in
the short run, probably with Castro's brother and armed forces chief
Raul at least nominally at the helm. Over time Fidel Castro's departure
would open the door for reform, but instability and a migration crisis
could occur.
(B) (Papal Visit) The Cuban government, in preparation for the
papal visit, gave the church more space, but may withdraw some of it--
such as permission for outdoor religious events--and has shown no
inclination to undertake systemic change. The Pope's challenge to the
Cuban government to allow freedom of religion and to respect
fundamental freedoms and human rights will be difficult for Castro to
ignore. Castro's response--so far limited to small concessions to the
Church and the release of some prisoners--is likely to fall short of
the expectations raised by the Pope's visit. Whether the people of
Cuba, long accustomed to bending to the government's will and fearful
of its repressive security apparatus, will press for change is more
difficult to judge. The Cuban Catholic Church will likely continue to
focus its efforts in increasing space for its evangelical activities.
It now has the Pope's very public endorsement, making renewed
obstructionism by the Cuban government more difficult.
(C) (Opposition) The internal opposition remains small in number,
factionalized, isolated, and infiltrated by government security
operatives. Dissidents are subject to harassment and arbitrary arrest
on a variety of pretexts at virtually any time, and regime tactics have
prevented the formation of an effective opposition organization. At
present, the opposition does not pose a serious challenge to the
regime, and there is little indication that it is growing in strength.
Barring unforeseeable events that would change the basic political
environment in Cuba, it is difficult to envision the internal
opposition emerging into a force capable of mounting a serious
challenge to the regime within the next few years.
20. cuba's economy
Question 20. How would you characterize Cuba's current economic
health? What impact has the Helms-Burton legislation had on foreign
investment in Cuba?
Answer. After rising 7.8 percent in 1996, Cuba's economic growth
has slowed considerably, though the likelihood for economic collapse
such as occurred after the end of Soviet aid remains low. The Cuban
government reports GDP grew 2.5 percent in 1997 and predicts 1998 GDP
growth of between 2.5 and 3.0 percent. We have found Cuban economic
statistics unreliable and there is the possibility that real economic
growth will be lower
Cuba's current prospects have been hindered by a sharp drop in
nickel prices linked to the Asia crisis and the slowdown in the world
economic growth. At the same time, the crisis has cut Cuba's import
bill by lowering oil prices. Sugar prices have also dropped recently,
compounding Havana's continued problems in falling sugar harvests.
Helms-Burton has deterred some potential investment and has caused
the withdrawal of limited amounts of existing investment. The
legislation has also sharpened Cuba's financing difficulties, delaying
purchases of inputs to the crucial sugar sector and raising already
high lending rates to around 20 percent.
21. political killings in haiti
Question 21. What is the status of investigations into the various
high profile political murder cases that have occurred in Haiti during
the last several years? Has any evidence of government complicity in
those murders been uncovered? In this regard, please provide an
assessment of the performance of the Haitian national police's
investigative unit and Haitian judiciary in solving these crimes.
Answer. The special investigative unit (SIU) continues to actively
pursue investigations, but has not resolved any of the 80-plus cases
assigned to it. Major obstructions to resolution include insufficient
expertise of members of the SIU, reluctance of potential witnesses to
talk to the police, organizational rivalries between the SIU and other
security elements, and the ineffectiveness of the Haitian judiciary.
The SIU has not yet sought indictments in any of the cases it is
investigating. We do not know whether it has uncovered evidence that is
credible to support a charge of complicity against any past or present
government official.
22. colombia
Question 22. Please assess the strength of the Colombian guerrilla
movement and its chances for military success against the government of
Colombia. To what extent have the various guerrilla movements in
Colombia become involved in narcotrafficking? What role do they play in
drug trafficking and have they in effect become one with the country's
narcotraffickers? Please assess the current human rights situation and
the relative involvement of both government and guerrilla forces in
committing such abuses.
Answer (A) (Strength of Guerrilla Movement) Both the Colombian
Armed Revolutionary Force (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)
are robust guerrilla movements having grown in strength since 1990, and
presently numbering approximately 10-15,000 combatants. Both groups
also have expanded their areas of operation. Guerrillas are estimated
to control some 13 percent of Colombian territory, and have a presence
in about 67 percent of the country. FARC operates primarily in southern
and eastern Colombia though its presence extends beyond these areas.
The FARC is capable of denying the government a civil or military
presence in large areas of the countryside. The ELN, which operates
throughout the northern half of the country, is able to attack the
canolimon oil pipeline (owned by a consortium of U.S. firms and the
Colombian government) with relative impunity.
The guerrillas are not likely to overthrow the Colombian government
in the near future. Neither the FARC nor the ELN has made significant
operational inroads into Colombia's major cities, although increased
guerrilla attacks in urban areas remain a possibility. The guerrillas
can, however, deny government presence in large areas of the
countryside and carry out various attacks with relative impunity.
The government has been able to protect the cities--where 75
percent of the population lives--and vital economic areas like oil and
coal fields. While security forces will likely retain the overall
advantage in urban areas, their commitment there could result in
additional ground lost to the guerrillas in rural areas. The oil
pipeline bombings, while costly and annoying, are impossible to
completely prevent, and have not generally stopped production. The
pipeline attacks last summer, however, were exceptional because they
did, for the first time, successfully halt production.
The guerrillas have increased the boldness and sophistication of
their attacks and can coordinate successful operations involving
hundreds of widely scattered fighters. Moreover, the army lacks the
necessary training, resources and strategy to effectively combat the
guerrillas in the countryside.
(B) (Narcotrafficking) Over the past several years, the FARC, ELN,
and EPL guerrillas appear to have become increasingly involved in coca
cultivation, performing a security role for coca growers. In addition
to providing physical protection to coca crops, the guerrillas also
``tax'' coca growers, requiring a percentage of the revenue from
narcotics produced in a given area in exchange for permitting the
activity to occur. Guerrillas also require pay-offs for some narcotics
logistics operations, including the use of airstrips and the movement
of precursor chemicals. In some cases, the guerrillas have operated
their own cocaine production laboratories. The guerrillas, however, do
not constitute a new cartel, and we have not picked up anysigns of
significant guerrillas trafficking, export or distribution of cocaine.
Still, the narcotics industry--along with kidnapping and extortion--is
a major source of guerrilla financing.
We believe guerrilla involvement in the narcotics industry has
increased because coca cultivation itself has increased in areas
traditionally under guerrilla influence.
(C) (Human Rights) Colombia's human rights situation continues to
deteriorate due to the long-simmering guerrilla war, uncontrolled
actions by numerous paramilitary groups, and an inefficient and easily
corrupted judiciary.
While the number of politically motivated extra judicial killings
went up in 1997, the percentage attributed to government security
forces continued to decline, from 54 percent in 1993 to 7.5 percent in
1997. Paramilitary groups committed 69 percent of 1997 killings,
continuing an upward trend, while guerrillas committed 23.5 percent.
Although the government and the military officially treat
paramilitaries as criminals, they have done little to disband them and
prosecute human rights violators. Some military officers turn a blind
eye to paramilitary actions or even actively collaborate with them.
Colombia has the world's highest kidnapping rate, over 50 percent
committed by the guerrillas. Other problems include disappearances,
torture, arbitrary arrest, prolonged Pretrial detention, and internal
displacement.
23. mexico
Question 23. President Clinton's February 1997 certification of
Mexico as fully cooperative in drug control efforts prompted considered
criticism in Congress. What is your current assessment of the nature
and extent of Mexico's drug control efforts? To what extend does
Mexican government corruption hamper these efforts?
Answer: In general Mexico has stepped up its counternarcotics
performance. Cocaine seizures are at the highest level since 1993.
President Zedillo appears committed to forging a closer drug control
relationship with the United States.
President Zedillo has achieved mixed results in his ongoing
campaign to root out officials engaged in graft or drug-related
corruption. The arrest of former drug czar General Gutierrez and the
establishment of a new counternarcotics unit with personnel who are
more carefully selected are positive steps.
However, traffickers continue to suborn security officials to
facilitate the movement of large cocaine loads to the United States.
More disturbing, press reports of traffickers' in-roads to the military
hierarchy suggest corruption is probably more extensive than President
Zedillo initially believed.
24. monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban
Question 24. How high is the intelligence community's confidence
that it can effectively monitor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? What
are the notable shortcomings? Is U.S. intelligence doing everything
possible to improve U.S. monitoring capabilities in this area? If not,
why not?
Answer. The intelligence community will use a combination of
dedicated technical systems and national intelligence means to monitor
the treaty.
The U.S. intelligence community established specific yield
thresholds in various testing environments (underground, underwater,
atmosphere and space). Last year's national intelligence estimate
reviewed our technical monitoring capabilities and concluded that our
technical systems will generally monitor evasively tested explosions
down to required levels in areas of high interest with high confidence.
With lesser but still significant confidence, we can detect and
identify explosions at even lower levels.
The CTBT enhancement program, to be in place by 2005, is aimed at
improving our monitoring capabilities. Elements of this program
include: additional or upgraded seismic, hydro-acoustic, radionuclide,
and infrasound monitoring stations; establishment of a national data
center, replacement of existing satellite sensors; research into a
replacement airborne sampler; and research to optimize the use of
monitoring data from the above U.S. monitoring enhancements.
Enhancements to the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS)
and contributions from the CTBT's International Monitoring System (IMS)
will increase the amount of data, thus improving the U.S. monitoring
capability ten-fold.
The CTBT provides the U.S. with access to additional monitoring
stations that it would not otherwise have. With the planned
improvements in U.S. national technical capabilities and the addition
of the international sensors mandated by the treaty, the U.S. will have
more resources with which to monitor nuclear testing.
25. the chemical weapons convention
Question 25. (A) Over one hundred of the 168 signatories have
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). (Last November, both
Iran and Russia completed their CWC ratification.) Do you have any
intelligence that any of the signatories of the CWC have engaged in
activities that raise compliance concerns?
(B) The intelligence community has conceded that its ability to
monitor compliance with the CWC is limited. Has that capability
improved since U.S. ratification of the CWC?
Answer. (A) (Concerns) In many cases, we are still in the process
of analyzing declarations, so any compliance judgment would be
premature. In some cases, members' failure to provide the necessary
declaration information has complicated analysis of treaty compliance.
(B) (Monitoring Capability) CW production capabilities are
inherently dual-use, which further complicates the process of assessing
whether a country is in compliance with the convention.
We expect to gain additional insights into global CW programs as
implementation of the CWC matures, although some countries of concern
are not party to the treaty. The implementation of the CWC has already
revealed some new information on CW programs. We continue to monitor
activities of potential concern
26. the situation in indonesia
Question 26. How will Indonesia's economic problems affect the
security situation in that nation? How do you assess President
Suharto's ability to prevent civil strife that may arise as a result of
slower if not negative economic growth, and the likely higher
unemployment and inflation? If Suharto is not re-elected or not able to
fulfill his seventh term as President, is there a credible successor
available that could lead Indonesia through this economic downturn in
the coming years? How likely is the Indonesian military to intercede in
the political process?
Answer. As you are aware, Suharto resigned as President on May 21
and immediately had Vice President Habibie installed as his successor.
Habibie, who initially believed he would serve out a term that lasted
until 2003, quickly became aware that political and economic reform
would have to be at the top of his agenda if he is to survive in office
even as a transitional figure. Some formula for change must be found to
satisfy the demands of the students, who are now protesting Habibie's
presidency, for example through the calling of new elections or a
special session of the People's Consultative Assembly to change
election and party laws.
The military plays a major role in Indonesia and has a strong
commitment to and tradition of providing stability and security. There
is no history of military coupe, but the military is fully understood
to be a key political player, and will continue to play a significant
background role as the situation develops.
27. threat to u.s. deployed forces in bosnia
Question 27. What are the shortfalls in intelligence community
support to the Bosnia operation and what is being done to rectify these
problem areas?
Answer. The intelligence community has done a very good job in both
force protection and Dayton implementation coverage. Intelligence on
military developments and strengths among the former warring parties
remains excellent, as does coverage of internal political developments
in Bosnia and the Republika Srpska.
28. intelligence support to the war crimes tribunal
Question 28. How is the U.S. Intelligence community supporting the
war crimes tribunal?
Answer. The U.S. Government provides information support to the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Office
of the Prosecutor (OTP), primarily for lead purposes in war crimes
investigations.
Thousands of USG documents have been made available to the ICTY
prosecutor, including graphics, imagery and mapping materials, pursuant
to an arrangement with the OTP which protects confidential information.
Sensitive documents are stored in a secure area at the American Embassy
in the Hague
The war crimes unit, located within the Department of State's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, serves as the interagency
executive agent for the provision of USG-supplied information to the
OTP.
29. nato expansion
Question 29. What are the risks if any, to U.S. intelligence
personnel and the intelligence community in general, in allowing
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join NATO?
Answer. This subject is discussed in the intelligence community
assessment produced in March 1998 and referred to in the March 9, 1998
letter of Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Larkin
to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. INR and the State Department hold no
views at variance with the community judgments rendered in the report.
30. the threat posed by disease
Question 30. In your prepared testimony in which you discuss the
implications of Hong Kong's ``bird flu,'' you note that ``[b]acterial
and viral diseases are both durable and mutative, ensuring they will
never be completely eradicated. Improved monitoring and rapid response
is essential to curb this threat to the health of Americans.'' What
diseases pose the greatest threat to the U.S.?
Answer. While this is a question more appropriately directed to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention than to the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research recent international public health research
indicate a general resurgence of infectious diseases any one of which
could adversely affect the health of Americans, either living overseas
or in the United States. A recent report by the National Science and
Technology Council's Committee on International Science, Engineering,
and Technology Working Group on Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious
Diseases, entitled Global Microbial Threats in the l990s, lists a
number of disease threats from well known ones like AIDS and TB to
those that were once thought to be on the decline such as cholera,
malaria, and yellow fever. The study also notes the widespread problem
of stubborn bacterial resistance to antibiotics and the persistent
global threats from mutating strains of influenza.
While we cannot confidently predict when or even where the next
infectious disease outbreak will occur that will most affect Americans,
we now understand better the factors behind resurgence, which include:
population growth, particularly in already congested urban areas,
worldwide transportation linkages that facilitate increases in food
trade and international migration, inadequate public health programs in
poor countries; and misuse of antibiotics. Our realization of how
difficult it is to eliminate infectious diseases and our appreciation
for how fast these diseases can now spread across international borders
are behind our strong recommendation that we work with other
governments and international health agencies to establish a much more
vigorous and comprehensive monitoring and response network focused on
infectious disease vectors.
______
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC, July 24. 1998.
Hon. Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Per your 12 March 1998 request, enclosed is our
set of unclassified answers to the Committee's questions arising out of
your 28 January 1998 hearing. Note that these answers are current and
complete as of 15 June 1998.
An original of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman
Kerrey.
Sincerely,
John H. Moseman,
Director of Congressional Affairs.
Enclosure.
russia's ballistic missile defense program
(1) Please describe the nature and extent of Russia's ballistic
missile defense effort. Where do you see Russia's ballistic missile
defense program heading over the course of the next 15 years?
Russia's ballistic missile defense (BMD) effort consists of both
strategic and tactical (theater) systems. Its strategic anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) complexes are located around Moscow and consist of both
endo- and exoatmospheric interceptors as well as a large multifunction
radar collocated at the ABM complex near Pushkino. These sites are
fully operational and are in compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty, which
permits one ABM deployment location and a maximum of 100 total
interceptors.
Russia's strategic ABM system is provided early warning data by a
network of radars located along the periphery of the Former Soviet
Union. As conceived, the network would have provided highly redundant
coverage of the main US ICBM attack corridors. The break-up of the
Soviet Union, however, has left this network incomplete and reliant on
older-technology radars, while work on the newer radars--most located
in non-Russian states--has slowed or halted altogether.
Russia's theater missile defense (TMD) consists of two surface-to-
air missile systems, the SA-12 and SA-10, both of which are being
heavily marketed in direct competition with the US Patriot system. The
SA-12 (Russian designator S-300V) Russia's foremost anti-tactical
ballistic missile (ATBM) system, was deployed in the mid-80's to
counter US Pershing deployments in Europe. The SA-12 is a highly mobile
tactical system--deployed with the Russian ground forces--and consists
of several surveillance and long-range acquisition radars in addition
to the battery level engagement radar and suite of six launchers. The
SA-12 system employs two missile types, one for more traditional air
defense targets, the other reserved for tactical ballistic missile
targets having speeds up to 3000 meters per second. In early 1997
Russia debuted a new version of the SA-12, called Antey-2500. The
system reportedly offers improved capabilities in both conventional air
defense as well as tactical ballistic missile defense. It is not clear,
however, if Moscow intends to upgrade domestic SA-12 deployment with
the new version.
The SA-10 system is Russia's premier air defense system that boasts
some inherent ATBM capability. The system consists of a long-range
surveillance radar, and a dedicated low-altitude surveillance radar
(primarily to look for low-altitude aircraft and cruise missile
targets). At the fire unit level is a phased-array fire-control radar
and as many as 12 launchers (8 is typical--each containing four
missiles. Following Desert Storm the SA-10 was marketed as having
``capabilities equal to the US Patriot'' including the ability to
engage Scud-class tactical ballistic missiles. A newer version of this
system was debuted at the Moscow Airshow in 1997. Called S-300PMU2 or
`FAVORIT', the improvements to this SA-10 variant were described by
Russian designers as intended to improve its ATBM role.
Restrictions in Russia's military R&D, including a marked slowdown
of system testing programs, have resulted from severe funding problems
across all forces. Russian planners appear to be prioritizing weapon
development programs and keeping key developments alive with low-levels
of funding at the sacrifice of procurement of many lower-priority
systems that may be further along. Despite these efforts, however, the
net result almost certainly will be significantly slower pace of
improving existing systems and introducing new systems than was noted
during the Soviet era, requiring concerted Russian efforts to extend
the operational lifetime of existing hardware well beyond the
originally planned period of use.
russia's safeguarding of nuclear material
(2) What is the intelligence Community's assessment of the adequacy
of Russia's safeguard of nuclear weapons and fissile material?
Russian nuclear weapons-usable fissile material--plutonium and
highly enriched uranium (HEU)--stocks are more vulnerable to theft than
nuclear weapons or warheads. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, we
assess that all of the seizures in Russia and Europe of stolen nuclear
weapons-usable fissile materials were from research and fuel
fabrication facilities rather than from nuclear weapons manufacture or
disassembly facilities. For several years the US Department of Energy
has been carrying out cooperative programs at 39 sites in Russia and 10
sites in the Newly Independent States and the Baltics that are known to
have nuclear weapons-usable fissile materials. The programs include
assessing and improving nuclear material protection, control, and
accounting (MPC&A), installing equipment and training operators, and
providing instruction in safeguards and security. This effort has
improved security and accountability by preventing misuses or
diversions of materials at these sites. Nonetheless, these programs
still have at least several years to go and DOE has not yet been given
access to all of the facilities with nuclear weapons-usable fissile
material to fully assess the need for--and to develop plans for--MPC&A
upgrades.
Nuclear warheads in storage are relatively secure, but declining
morale and discipline in the military, as well as economic conditions,
raise our concerns about the potential for warhead theft:
Igor Valynkin, Chief, of the Defense Ministry's 12th Military
Directorate responsible for nuclear security, stated last year that
there have been no incidents of attempted theft, seizure. or
unauthorized actions involving nuclear weapons.
(a) What about missile systems, components, and technology? What is
the status of Russian nuclear command and control systems?
We regard the possibility of an unauthorized launch of strategic
nuclear weapons as very low due to the many safeguards built into the
system. An extreme political crisis, however, would raise our concerns
about the possible circumvention of the system.
(b) Has there been any change in the last year regarding Russian
capabilities and programs in chemical or biological weapons? Does
Russia persist in unacknowledged CW programs and illegal BW programs?
The US continues to have questions on certain aspects of the
Russian CW program. Russian scientists formerly involved in the
research and development of CW have alleged that Moscow is hiding a
program designed to ensure a continuing offensive CW capability despite
arms control commitments. The "Whistleblowers" have also described an
offensive program that is much more extensive than that describe in
official declarations. These allegations when combined with other
information give rise to concerns that at least some factions within
the Russian government desire to circumvent the CWC.
In September and October 1992, Russian chemical weapons scientist
Vil Mirzayanov stated in the Moscow press that the Russians were
developing a new generation of binary chemical agents. This new
chemical agent is reportedly 5-10 times more effective than VX, the
most lethal agent in the US CW inventory. The managers of the
development program, including retired General Anatoly Kuntsevich, were
awarded the Lenin Prize in the spring of 1991 for their efforts by
then-President Gorbachev.
Development of the new class of agents, known as Novichok--or
Newcomer--continued into early 1992 at a test site known as Nukus in
Uzbekistan--a site since closed down. Dr. Mirzayanov was employed at
the State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and
Technology, the Moscow institute which pioneered the research on binary
chemical agents in the 1970s.
With regard to the former Soviet offensive BW program, since 1992,
there have been several decrees and pronouncements by President Yeltsin
declaring offensive BW-related activities illegal.
In recent years, some research and development facilities have been
deactivated and many have taken personnel and funding cuts.
Other facilities, however, may retain the ability to produce BW
agents.
We cannot establish that Russia has given up this capability and
remain concerned that some of the individuals involved in the old
Soviet program may be trying to protect elements of it.
transfer of technology from the former soviet union
(3) What general trends has the Intelligence Community detected in
the flow of scientists, technology, and conventional and unconventional
military equipment to other nations? What evidence have you detected
that Soviet nuclear materials, BW, CW, or ballistic missile-related
materials or technology, have found their way to the international
black market?
The financial position of defense industries in the countries of
the former Soviet Union continues to be shaky, prompting many entities
to seek foreign contracts to keep operating. Government oversight of
the activity of these firms appears to be spotty, allowing them
considerable opportunities to transfer proscribed technology and
equipment. The financial condition of defense-related firms in these
countries is likely to remain difficult for several years, and many
firms are likely to continue to look abroad for business opportunities.
Increasingly scientists from the former Soviet Union appear to be
providing their expertise and know-how to solving weapons development
problems for foreign countries. Almost all of these scientists are
working in the countries of the former Soviet Union and are not
emigrating.
Companies in the former Soviet Union have remained a major source
of assistance for foreign military and WMD-related programs.
Export laws exist and, on paper, appear to provide an adequate
basis to stop most proliferation-related transfers, but enforcement
remains a major problem, given high levels of corruption, limited
expertise, and resource shortages.
Economic conditions at laboratories, institutes, and factories are
contributing to an increase of such sales. From 1992 through 1995,
there were several seizures of stolen nuclear weapons-usable fissile
material in Russia and Europe. The most notable seizure was 3 kilograms
of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in St. Petersburg in
June 1994. And, 2.7 kilograms of HEU were seized in Prague in December
1994. There have been no seizures of nuclear weapons-usable fissile
material since 1995. Contrary to numerous press reports, we have no
credible evidence that large organized crime groups are involved in the
proliferation of nuclear materials, although this remains a matter of
concern.
We are concerned also about the efforts of other countries to
acquire BW capabilities. Iran, for example, has been attempting to
develop a biotechnical trade relationship with Russia in recent years,
and we are concerned that some of the dual-use technology which the
Iranians are seeking may be used to support their BW efforts.
chinese proliferation
(4) Please describe all significant transfers over the past 5 years
of WMD-related technology or information from China to Iran, Pakistan,
or other countries. Do you believe that this assistance could raise
compliance concerns with China's commitments to the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)? How
likely is it that China will comply with the Chemical Weapons
Convention?
China's defense industries are under increasing pressure to become
profit-making organizations--an imperative that can put them at odds
with US interests. Over the past five years, Chinese defense industries
have looked to missile-, nuclear-, and chemical-related technology
sales, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, and conventional weapons
transfers in order to remain profitable. There is no question that
Chinese firms have contributed to WMD advances in these countries.
On the positive side, there have recently been some signs of
improvement in China's proliferation posture. China ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on April 25, 1997 and submitted its
initial declaration on May 29, 1997 within the treaty mandated time
requirement. The US is currently evaluating the Chinese CWC declaration
to determine if China is in compliance with the treaty. China also has
enacted its first comprehensive laws governing nuclear technology
exports, and at the beginning of this year renewed its pledge to halt
sales of C-801/C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. China has also
created a new arms control department in the Foreign Ministry to build
a cadre of officials knowledgeable about international treaty and
nonproliferation matters.
China's relations with some proliferating countries, however, are
long-standing and deep. Moreover, in many cases, Chinese firms are
selling dual-use technology, hardware, and expertise, which are not
always explicitly controlled under the various multilateral control
regimes. It remains to be seen whether recent positive developments are
broad enough in scope and whether they will hold over the longer term.
north korea as a continuing threat
(5) Is significant--possibly violent--change likely during the next
five years?
No one can predict how or when the current North Korean regime will
end or transform, but several factors suggest that fundamental change
is inevitable:
The tide of history--symbolized by the failure of communism to
serve as a viable alternative to capitalism in Russia, Eastern Europe,
China, and Vietnam--is against P'yongyang.
Most of North Korea's economic problems are systemic. Foreign aid
or tinkering with existing policies will not produce sustainable
increases in agricultural or industrial output.
North Korean leaders are rigid policymakers who rely on strategies
adopted in the 1950s--internal coercion and propaganda along with
external threats and aid--to survive.
changes in south korea
(6) South Korea. What impact will the election of Kim Tae-chung
have on South Korea and on prospects for normalized relations between
the Koreas?
The election of Kim Tae-chung was an important test of democracy's
strength in South Korea. He is the first opposition party candidate to
win the presidency and U.S. diplomats say the election last December
was the fairest in the country's history
Kim is capitalizing on the financial crisis to end government-
corporate collusion and reform economic policies based on strong
government guidance, protectionism, and debt financing. Even before his
inauguration in February, Kim was leading a reform charge that resulted
in the creation of an independent bank supervisory agency, the opening
of domestic financial markets to foreigners, and rules requiring
transparent bookkeeping and limiting conglomerates' ability to
subsidize unprofitable businesses.
Nevertheless, reform in the near term is contributing to
bankruptcies, layoffs, and inflation, which in turn could sap public
support for change and hamstring Kim's ability to govern effectively.
Kim is diverging from his predecessor's North Korea policy by
pledging to separate politics from economics. Accordingly, the
administration is raising the ceiling on private investment in the
North and easing restrictions on business, humanitarian, and tourist
travel, according to press. Kim also says he will disseminate North
Korean propaganda in the South and be patient in seeking improved
inter-Korean ties.
saddam's hold on power
(7)(a) Do you believe that Saddam's hold on power is stronger today
than it was one year ago? What is the likelihood that Saddam will be in
power one year from now? What would be the characteristics and policies
of likely successors to Saddam? What are the chances that a successor
regime to Saddam will be worse?
Saddam's control over Iraq is comparable to what it was one year
ago.
Saddam's hold on power is based almost exclusively on the strength
of his security services, whose status appears unchanged.
The two major Kurdish parties remain independent of Baghdad and
continue to reject Saddam's overtures.
Despite the regime's brutal efforts to suppress the southern
insurgency--including the draining of marshes and burning of villages--
Shia groups continue to stage hit-and-run attacks against regime forces
and installations.
Saddam is likely to remain in power during the next year. His
security services have been very successful in suppressing the
development of any organized political opposition groups and in
crushing internal dissent and plotting within the regime.
We continue to assess that if Saddam were to be overthrown, the
most likely successors would be Arab Sunni military leaders who
probably would share some of Saddam's policies and outlook, such as a
militarily strong Iraq and distrust of Kuwait. However, we believe
there are strong incentives for a successor regime to ``clean the
slate'' and moderate Iraq's behavior so that it can rejoin the
international community in good standing.
(7)(b) Will Saddam's fall lead necessarily to Iraq's
disintegration? If not, why?
A possibility clearly exists that the collapse of Saddam's regime
could lead to a period of anarchy in Iraq. We do not assess, however,
that Saddam's fall would necessarily lead to Iraq's disintegration.
Despite their long-standing opposition to Saddam's regime, the leading
Kurdish and Shia opposition groups have affirmed their support for a
united Iraq.
The specific outcome would largely depend on the nature of the
person or group that comes to power in Baghdad.
(7)(c) Has Saddam effectively regained control of northern Iraq?
No. Two major Kurdish parties--the Kurdistan Democratic Party and
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan--still control the region through
their independent militias. Iraqi media recently has issued calls for
the Kurds to enter into a dialog with Baghdad on allowing the regime to
reassert its control over northern Iraq, but the KDP and PUK continue
to keep Saddam at arm's length.
support for iraq in the middle east
(8) Currently, how much support exists for Saddam in the region? If
military action were taken against Iraq, what would be the likely
reaction of other nations in the region? What, if any, governments in
the Middle East would be publicly supportive of military action against
Iraq?
We assess that there is a great depth of regional support and
concern for the Iraqi people, rather than for Saddam or his regime.
Naturally, any military strike against Iraq would cause anxiety
throughout the region for its potential impact on the Iraqi people, but
the record shows that reactions vary widely according to the nature of
the event that precipitates a strike.
For example, another Iraqi threat to a neighboring state--such as
Baghdad's movement of forces toward the Kuwaiti border in October
1994--would probably generate widespread public support by regional
governments for military action.
the impact of sanctions on iraq
(9) Iraq has argued that the continued ban on oil exports is
causing mass suffering in Iraq, including unaffordable prices for food
and unavailability of medicine. What is your assessment of the nature
and extent of the suffering to the Iraqi people as a result of economic
sanctions?
General living conditions for most Iraqi citizens remain difficult,
despite the infusion of humanitarian supplies under the UN's oil-for-
food program. Indeed, inflation is running in triple digits, wages
remain stagnant, unemployment and underemployment are widespread, and
basic services have deteriorated. Many Iraqis are copying with poor
conditions by working multiple jobs, selling personal possessions,
moving in with relatives, and relying on remittances from relatives
abroad. The Iraqi middle class have effectively disappeared.
Segments of the Iraqi population have not yet felt the full
benefits of the UN's oil-for-food program and continue to face
nutritional and health problems.
UN studies confirm high rates of malnutrition among children and
young adults. Two primary reasons are the deficiency of nutrient-rich
food in the oil-for-food ration basket and the inability of average
Iraqis to supplement their diets with costly foodstuffs sold on the
open market.
The most serious problems facing Iraqi's health care system include
shortages of medicines, inadequate storage facilities, unreliable power
supplies, interrupted water supplies, and poor waste disposal systems.
Despite the deterioration, Iraq's economy is functioning
significantly above subsistence level. Economic growth, after having
fallen by two-thirds in the early years of the sanctions regime and
experiencing no growth more recently, may have risen last year by as
much as 25 percent with the implementation of the oil-for-food program.
Although growth was concentrated in the oil sector, the construction
sector also has been buoyed by public sector works programs, and the
building of presidential palaces. Agriculture has improved because the
regime is paying higher prices to farmers for their produce, and the
oil-for-food program is allowing farmers to market their crops more
freely.
Baghdad's claims about mass suffering and death are exaggerated.
Iraqi medical statistics are often contradictory and incomplete, and
their reliability is highly questionable as the regime often inflates
numbers to generate international support for ending sanctions.
Baghdad's claim that 1.5 million children have died since sanctions
were imposed, for example, implies an infant mortality rate close to
three times the US Census Bureau's recent estimate for Iraq. Child
mortality as high as this is suffered by only a few countries
undergoing extreme duress--Afghanistan, Rwanda, Mali, and Niger.
The oil-for-food program is slowly improving humanitarian
conditions in Iraq. Food supplies are relatively stable in northern
Iraq, and health care there has tangibly improved, as seen by the
increased number of outpatients, surgical procedures, and laboratory
investigations. Humanitarian conditions in central and southern Iraq
are improving more slowly because of the inefficiency of the Iraqi
bureaucracy and the lack of relief assistance from nongovernmental
organizations--most of which withdrew from the area in 1993 after
Saddam effectively prevented them from operating there.
iraq's weapons of mass destruction
(10) What is the current status of Iraq's BW, CW, nuclear weapon,
and missile programs? How much activity has there been in each of these
areas since the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War? Do we have any
evidence that the Iraqi regime has tested CW and BW agents on humans
since the Persian Gulf War?
Iraq currently is developing two ballistic missiles that fall
within the UN-allowed 150-km range restriction. The Al Samoud liquid
propellant missile, described as a scaled-down Scud has been flight-
tested. Iraq's pre-war Scud missile technicians are working on the Al
Samoud program and, while under UNSCOM monitoring, are developing
technology base improvements that could be applied to future longer-
range missile programs. The Ababil-100 solid propellant missile also is
under development, although progress on this system lags behind the Al
Samoud. Iraq could convert these programs into longer-range systems for
production after sanctions are lifted and inspections cease.
Iraq has an active missile force before the Gulf war that included
819 operational Scud B missiles (300-km range) purchased from the
Soviet Union, and advanced programs to extend the range of the Scuds
and to reverse-engineer the Scud for indigenous production. UNSCOM
believes it has accounted for all but two of the original 819 Scuds.
Discrepancies in Iraqi accounting for the original 819 Scuds in
addition to incomplete explanations for indigenous Scud production
efforts, however, suggest that Iraq retains a small covert force of
Scud-type missiles.
Despite UNSCR-87, which limits Iraq to having or developing
ballistic missiles with ranges less than 150-km, Baghdad has not given
up its desire to build larger, longer-range missiles. UNSCOM inspectors
have uncovered numerous pre-war Iraqi design drawings, including multi-
stage systems and clustered engine designs, thatcould theoretically
reach Western Europe. In addition, computer simulations and drawings of
missile and space-launch-vehicle concepts that post-date the war have
been discovered in Iraq. If sanctions were lifted and inspections
ceased. Iraq could resume production of Scud-type missiles, perhaps
within one year.
On the basis of remaining gaps and inconsistencies in Iraqi
declarations to the UN, we assess Iraq could retain a small force of
Scud-type missiles, a small stockpile of chemical and biological
munitions, and the capability to quickly resurrect WMD production
absent UN sanctions and UNSCOM and IAEA monitoring.
UNSCOM and IAEA routinely monitor all known Iraqi facilities
capable of producing WMD, reducing Baghdad's ability to produce
prohibited weapons at these sites.
Iraq may have hidden WMD production components which would allow it
to continue small scale covert WMD efforts at locations unknown to
UNSCOM or the IAEA.
CW, BW and Nuclear activity since the war: After the Gulf war,
Baghdad rebuilt for civilian purposes many of the industrial facilities
involved in prewar WMD production, which are now under UNSCOM and IAEA
monitoring. In addition, Iraq retains sufficient technical expertise in
all WMD program areas to have continued covert WMD research and
development.
Nuclear: UNSCOM and IAEA inspections have hindered Iraq's nuclear
program but Baghdad continues to withhold information about enrichment
techniques, testing data, foreign procurement, and weapons design
needed to fully clarify its nuclear weapons capability. Iraq could be
conducting covert nuclear research and development that would be
difficult to detect.
Chemical: UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 CW
munitions and hundreds of thousands of liters of agents and precursors.
Absent inspections, however, Baghdad could restart limited production
of the blister agent mustard within a few weeks, full scale production
of sarin within a few months, and pre-Gulf war production levels--
including VX--within two to three years.
Biological: UNSCOM supervised the destruction of Iraq's largest
known BW production facility at Al Hakm, but Baghdad has failed to
provide the UN an even remotely credible picture of its prewar program.
Iraq is capable of restarting BW agent production virtually overnight
at facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as
vaccines.
the new regime in iran
(11) Do you see President Khatami's election and reform agenda as a
watershed that could change the nature of the Iranian regime? What is
the possibility that Khatami's conservative critics will sidetrack him?
What is the likelihood that the Khatami government will still be in
power three years from now? Does his election signify a change in
Iran's support for terrorism and its acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction? Is there any evidence of such a change?
President Khatami's election is an important step in the political
development of post-revolutionary Iran. Khatami's agenda of social and
cultural liberalization, coupled with his apparent desire to reduce
Iran's international isolation, could lead to real changes in the
Iranian regime.
Conservatives are attempting to slow the pace of liberalization,
but Khatami's popularity is allowing him to make slow but steady
progress on his agenda.
Khatami has sought to improve Iran's international image, and some
of his public statements suggest that he may seek to reform the
Ministry of Intelligence and Security--an organization that has
supported terrorist groups.
Khatami, however, does not have control over the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Revolutionary Guard--which plays an
integral role in Iran's sponsorship of terrorism--reports directly to
Supreme Leader Khamenei.
There is no evidence that Khatami has the inclination or ability to
reduce Iran's attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction--which he
probably views as legitimate means to ensure Iran's security.
the impact of sanctions of iran
(12) Are sanctions likely to influence Iran's behavior over the
next 3 years? Why or why not. Late last September, Iran and France
confirmed the award of a $2 billion deal to develop Iran's South Pars
gas field to Total SA, and its minority partners Gazprom (Russia) and
Petronas (Malaysia). What does this deal say about the effectiveness of
US economic sanctions against Iran? (U)
Tehran is offering more attractive projects for tender, a trend
that makes it harder to maintain a sanctions regime.
A large number of foreign firms have already expressed interest in
an upcoming round of oil and gas projects that Iran will tender in
early July.
Nonetheless, companies with significant assets in the United
States, such as Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum, will remain
sensitive to US concerns about foreign investment in Iran.
Companies from outside the EU, especially Japanese firms, may
remain reluctant to aggressively pursue Iranian projects until
sanctions are lifted or additional waivers are granted.
iranian forces in bosnia
(13) How large an Iranian presence currently exists in Bosnia? Is
this presence growing or diminishing? What is the extent of Iranian
influence or penetration of the Bosnian government?
Tehran operates an embassy in Sarajevo and a consulate in Mostar
which are staffed by personnel from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, as
well as a cultural center in Sarajevo. Iran probably also has
intelligence personnel operating in Bosnia. A number of organizations
affiliated with the Iranian Government--many of which are involved in
humanitarian efforts--are active in Bosnia, including the Iranian Red
Crescent Society and Iran's Ministry of the construction Jihad.
the palestinian authority
(14)(a) Please assess both the willingness and the ability of the
Palestinian Authority to control terrorist violence in Gaza and areas
of the West Bank under its control.
The Palestinian Authority's efforts against the two most active
terrorist groups--the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and the
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Palestinian-controlled areas have
enjoyed some notable successes apprehending terrorists, capturing
materiel, and disrupting support networks. While investigating the
death of prominent HAMAS bombmaker Muhi al-Din al-Sharif, the
Palestinian General Intelligence Organization arrested Imad Awadallah--
a leading HAMAS militant in the West Bank and one of Israel's most
wanted fugitives. Both Israeli and Palestinian press reports have
highlighted Palestinian security services' successes in uncovering
terrorist bombmaking facilities and weapons caches in recent months.
The Authority's antiterrorism campaign over the past year has
largely avoided targeting HAMAS political leaders--Arafat's main
competition--and legitimate HAMAS social service and charitable
institutions that provide relief to poor Palestinians. Although
Palestinian security services have occasionally detained HAMAS members
for incitement, Arafat's preferred approach is to attempt a ``unity
dialogue'' with political leaders and have the Authority fund rival
social and charitable organizations. This approach has left the
political, social, and financial structure of HAMAS largely intact and
left Arafat open to Israeli charges of not doing enough to dismantle
the terrorist infrastructure.
The Authority could order a broad crackdown on all aspects of
HAMAS's infrastructure as they did after the February and March 1996
bombings in Israel. Palestinian security services have shown the
capability to undertake severe and sustained measures, such as
arresting militant HAMAS members, closing HAMAS-affiliated charities,
and halting incitement by opposition press offices. Such actions
undermine the armed wing of HAMAS's ability to conduct terrorist
attacks, but also damage essential social service like education and
health care, and leave the Authority vulnerable to charges of human
rights abuse. Arafat's counterterrorism efforts are hampered by a
Palestinian public that is increasingly sympathetic to suicide attacks
according to polls, is upset over poor economic conditions, and angry
over Israeli unwillingness to be implement key peace accord
commitments.
(14)(b) To what extent is HAMAS receiving outside support, and from
whom is that support coming
HAMAS receives the majority of its annual budget--estimated to be
25-50 million dollars per year--from private donors and charitable
institutions worldwide. Wealthy individuals in the Persian Gulf region
are the primary source of these funds, but donors in Europe and the
United States also provide substantial amounts, usually through Islamic
charitable organizations.
Prominent HAMAS-affiliated charities include Interpol in the United
Kingdom and the Al Aqsa foundation in Germany. The Islamic Relief
Agency, Muslim Aid, and other Islamic charities not necessarily
affiliated with HAMAS also are key sources of support. Iran gives HAMAS
several million dollars per year.
(14)(c) Please assess Chairman Arafat's health, comment on his
likely successor and describe the impact his departure would have on
the peace process.
Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat has largely recovered from
the head trauma he suffered in a plane crash in 1992 and from
subsequent surgery to remove blood clots from his brain.
According to the 1995 Palestinian election law and draft basic law,
if a vacancy occurs in the position of president, the speaker of the
legislative council will take over for no more than 60 days, during
which time a new election for the head of the Palestinian Authority
will take place. The current speaker of the legislative council is
Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala), the primary negotiator of the 1993 Declaration
of Principles. The strongest party at present is Fatah, Arafat's
support base and the preeminent political movement in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Arafat has not publicly favored any candidate. The most
widely touted successor to Arafat, according to many middle East
commentators, is his deputy Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) Arafat's chief
peace negotiator and an architect of the breakthrough 1993 PLO-Israel
peace deal.
Arafat's departure could slow efforts at progress on the peace
process. Palestinian commentators have assessed that no other leader
could command the loyalty of disparate Palestinian groups and unite
them around such controversial goals.
the stability of the israeli government
(15)(a) Please give us your assessment of Prime Minister
Netanyahu's commitment to abiding by the Oslo Accords. Is he committed
to a land-for-peace formula or does he want to kill the peace process
as currently formulated?
Refer to the classified appendix for the response.
(15)(b) How do you assess the longevity of the current Likud
government? How do you assess Labor's ability to win an election at
this point?
Refer to the classified appendix for the response.
(15)(c) Please assess Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai's recent
statements in support of United Nations Resolution 425, which calls for
Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Does this
represent a significant change in Israeli policy? What has been the
response of the Lebanese and Syrians to Mordechai's statement?
Refer to the classified appendix for the response.
the israeli presence in lebanon
(16) Please comment on the losses the Israelis have suffered in
Lebanon in the past year and the impact of those losses on Israeli
public opinion and the likelihood that Israel will initiate a
unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Do those losses indicate
that Hizballah is becoming a more effective force? Please comment on
the military effectiveness of Israel's allies, the South Lebanese Army
(SLA) and describe the current military cooperation between the Israel
Defense Forces and the SLA.
Refer to the classified appendix for the response.
egypt
(17)(a) What impact would a reduction in US military aid to Egypt
have on US-Egyptian relations, particularly if such a reduction is not
matched by a comparable reduction in US military aid to Israel?
President Mubarak has reacted to reports of likely reductions in US
assistance by publicly saying that Cairo did not expect US aid to
continue forever and that its elimination will not mean an end to good
relations with the United States. Egyptian press commentary indicates
that the key elements to contain a potential Egyptian backlash to aid
reductions are to engage Cairo in discussions aimed at managing the
pace and targets of cuts, implement cuts gradually, and roughly retain
the post-Camp David ratio in allocating US assistance between Egypt and
Israel.
Significant changes to the Egypt-Israel funding ratio at Egypt's
expense are likely to be viewed with disfavor by Cairo rather than a
rational reallocation of US assistance. Egyptian progovernment
newspapers reacted angrily last year to reports that Israel was
pressing Washington to use Egypt's aid package to press Cairo to soften
its policy toward Israel.
(17)(b) Assess the current strength of the Mubarak government and
its ability to prevail over terrorist internal opposition. To what
degree is that internal opposition receiving outside support, and from
whom?
There is no indication that Egyptian mainstream Islamic opposition
or Islamic extremist groups pose a significant challenge to the
Mubarak's leadership. Nonetheless, the extremists' attack last November
at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists dramatically demonstrated
their continued ability to conduct acts of terrorism in Egypt. Despite
improved Egyptian security efforts following Luxor, the extremists
retain the capability to strike soft targets.
The Egyptian Government has accused Iran, Sudan, Usama Bin Ladin,
and Afghan militant Islamic groups of supporting Egyptian Islamic
extremist groups in Egypt and members abroad. Such support undoubtedly
plays a significant role in motivating these groups and sustaining
targets overseas.
political killings in haiti
(18) What is the status of investigations into the various high
profile political murder cases that have occurred in Haiti during the
last several years?
The Special Investigative Unit (SIU), which is mandated to
investigate a number of politically-motivated murders, is pursuing
several investigations but has not yet brought a case to trial.
The SIU has made limited progress in the last year on active cases
such as the 1995 murders of General Max Mayard and Air Haiti Director
Michael Gonzales.
In February, the SIU assigned a new team of investigators to the
case of Jean Hubert Feuille's 1995 murder in an attempt to jump start
the stalled investigation.
The SIU actively investigated the 1996 murders of opposition
politicians Antoine Leroy and Jacques Fleurival until the death of one
of the suspected triggermen, Eddy Arbrouet, during a SWAT raid last
December.
Seven of the 12 cases listed in the DeWine Amendment, however,
including the 1995 murder of rightwing lawyer Mireille Bertin, are not
under active investigation.
Has any evidence of government complicity in those murders been
uncovered?
There is no definitive evidence of high-level government complicity
in any of the political murders under investigation. Ten members of the
Presidential Security Unit--including its former chief and deputy
chief--were dismissed in July 1997 for their involvement in the Leroy-
Fleurival case.
In this regard, please provide an assessment of the performance of
the Haitian National Police's Investigative Unit and Haitian Judiciary
in solving the crimes.
The investigations into the political murders have been hampered by
a plethora of problems associated with the SIU and Haitian Judiciary
judiciary.
The SIU's progress has been plagued by its members' lack of
training, absenteeism, lack of initiative, and resource shortfalls. The
two US advisers have spearheaded almost all of the investigative work.
The judicial system remains in an embryonic stage and is ill-
equipped to prosecute any case that may be eventually brought to trial.
mexico
(19) President Clinton's February 1997 certification of Mexico as
full cooperative in drug control efforts prompted considerable
criticism in Congress. What is your assessment of the nature and extent
of Mexico's drug control efforts?
President Zedillo has made a strong effort to show he is committed
to counter-narcotics. He publicly has underscored the threat drug
trafficking poses to Mexican society, directed the military to continue
playing a significantly enhanced antidrug role, and engaged in
extensive contacts with US officials on antidrug matters. The Mexican
government also has had success at keeping drug crop production in
check and made some improvements in its narcotics seizures.
Nonetheless, Mexico's law enforcement efforts against the country's
powerful trafficking groups have not substantially undercut their
ability to ship illicit drugs into the United States.
To what extent does Mexican government corruption hamper these
efforts?
As with any country where trafficking is a major problem,
corruption is one of our top concerns and is an impediment to effective
antidrug operations. The arrest of former lead antidrug police director
Gen. Gutierrez Rebollo in 1997 points to the ability of Mexico's major
traffickers to corrupt officials even at senior levels of Mexico's law
enforcement and security forces to help insulate their massive drug
shipment and money laundering operations. At the same time, it
underlines Mexico's ability and willingness to search out and punish
high level corruption. In early June, a Mexican court increased
Gutierrez's prison sentence to 32 years after determining the original
14-year judgment for arms trafficking and official corruption was
insufficient. He still faces drug-related charges.
monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban
(20) How high is the Intelligence Community's confidence that it
can effectively monitor the CTBT? Where are the notable shortcomings?
Is US Intelligence doing everything possible to improve US monitoring
capabilities in this area? Why or why not?
The IC has drafted a national intelligence estimate on CTBT
monitoring in which our monitoring conclusions are presented in terms
of confidence levels. These conclusions can only be discussed in
classified channels.
The Treaty provides for the use of National Technical Means (NTM),
which will be supplemented by an international system of technical
sensors, a challenge on-site inspection (OSI) regime and voluntary
confidence-building measures (CBMs).
The President identified a set of desired capabilities to monitor
nuclear tests underground, underwater, in the atmosphere and in space,
roughly equal to a few kilotons of TNT-equivalent evasively tested, and
the IC currently is implementing an NTM enhancement program intended to
meet that goal.
The US is currently implementing an NTM enhancement program aimed
at meeting the monitoring requirements for clandestine explosions
underground, underwater, or in the atmosphere. However, these
enhancements plus the resources necessary for sustaining our monitoring
base do not come cheaply. As the CTBT ratification debate approaches,
we will be consulting closely with this committee on our capabilities,
their cost, and the tradeoffs involved.
Our confidence in monitoring the CTBT will also depend on the
verification tools provided by the Treaty, including international
technical sensors with a capability to detect and identify non-
evasively conducted nuclear tests down to a level of about one kiloton.
Recognizing the inherent limitations of OSI and CBM regimes, the
technical monitoring capabilities of our NTM and the International
Monitoring System take on every greater importance.
nuclear test at novaya zemlya?
(21) There was concern that Russia may have conducted a low-yield
nuclear test on August 16, 1997 at Novaya Zemlya. Is there any reason
to believe that the August 16 event was a nuclear explosion? Is this a
view that is commonly held throughout the Intelligence Community?
Refer to the classified appendix for the response.
the chemical weapons convention
(22)(a) Over one hundred of the 168 signatories have ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). (Last November, both Iran and Russia
completed their CWC ratification.) Do you have any intelligence that
any of the signatories of the CWC have engaged in activities that raise
compliance concerns?
The Intelligence Community assesses that around 30 countries
possess, once possessed but no longer maintain, or are possibly
pursuing CW capabilities. Of these `countries of concern,'
approximately half are States Party to the CWC. Most of these countries
may not have fully met their obligations under the CWC. In many cases
countries have not declared all of the facilities and/or past
activities required by the Convention. Reasons for incomplete
declarations may include bureaucratic difficulties in gathering the
required information, varying interpretations of the declaration
requirements, or political sensitivities in acknowledging past or
present offensive activities. Several States Party may be retaining or
continuing to pursue offensive CW capabilities.
(22)(b) The Intelligence Community has conceded that its ability to
monitor compliance with the CWC is limited. Has that capability
improved since U.S. ratification of the CWC?
The Intelligence Community's ability to monitor the CWC remains
limited due largely to the inherent difficulty of monitoring CW
programs, which are based on dual-use material and technology.
Nonetheless, steps are being taken that should--over time--improve that
capability. Additional resources are being directed against both
collection and analysis of information on CW programs and proliferation
worldwide. Likewise, the implementation process have revealed some new
information on CW programs and chemical capabilities in several
countries of concern and we expect more information will become
available in time.
north korea's taepo dong missiles
(23) The North Korean Taepo Dong II missile (which is under
development) will have an estimated range of 4,000 to 6,000 kilometers,
and therefore qualifies as an intercontinental ballistic missile.
(ICBM). How confident are you in these range estimates? What U.S.
states or territories could the Taepo Dong hit? How soon could the
Taepo Dong I and Taepo Dong II become operational, and how firm is that
estimate? How has this assessment changed in the last year?
No unclassified response.
missile threats to the us
(24) The proliferation of missile-delivered weapons is an issue
directly confronting the strategic interest of the United States and
its traditional allies. When will the updated National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on this subject be complete? What are the current
strategic missile threats to the United States and theater missile
threats to deployed US forces? How have these threats changed in the
last year? What are the projected threats for the next decade? Is the
assessment shared by all components of the Intelligence Community? In
the wake of the criticism of the previous NIE on this subject what
improvements have been made in the NIE process? '
The Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Missile Developments was
published and passed to the Congress on 3 March 1998. The report
updates judgments reached in NIE 95-19 Emerging Missile Threats to
North America During the Next 15 Years. The Annual Report also provides
the Intelligence Community's assessment of theater missile threats to
US interests worldwide. All components of the Intelligence Community
concur with the Report's conclusions, except as noted by either
alternate text or footnotes. The report remains classified.
In preparing the Annual Report the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) tried to respond to the criticisms leveled at NIE 95-19 by both
the Review Panel chaired by former-DCI Robert Gates and other critics.
Compared to the 1995 NIE, the Annual Report:
Has a more thorough presentation of the intelligence information
and analysis backing the IC's judgments on future missile threats to
the United States and its interests worldwide. It also has a more
thorough discussion of:
The likelihood that the IC will detect indicators of a long-range
ICBM development program.
Theater-missile developments that could threaten US forces and
interests overseas. The inclusion of theater missile developments
provides a more complete picture of foreign missile developments and
the impact of proliferation activities.
Russian and Chinese missile forces and the risk of an unauthorized
launch of a strategic missile.
The possibility of a country developing the capability to threaten
the United States with short- or medium-range cruise or ballistic
missiles deployed on forward based platforms, such as a surface ship.
More clearly lists its assumption and includes a discussion of
events that could alter the IC's assessment of future missile threats.
Was reviewed by outside experts, including some who were critical
of the 1995 NTE.
trends in economic espionage
(25) A recent survey by the American Society for Industrial
Security estimates that intellectual property losses from foreign and
domestic espionage may have exceeded $300 billion in 1997 alone. Does
this estimate seem plausible to you? A January 12 Los Angeles Times
article dealing with this issue states that currently pending before
the FBI "are more than 700 foreign counterintelligence investigations
involving economic espionage". Is that an accurate number? Please
comment on trends in economic espionage directed against the US. How
effectively are you able to measure the level of economic espionage
against the US? Has US business reporting of economic espionage
improved over the last year? What other measures would help to stop
industrial espionage?
Although the ASIS study is the best available estimate of the
economic costs of economic espionage, it is difficult to assess if the
study understates or overstates the cost.
The ASIS uses blind surveys of several thousand US businesses so
that US firms can report that they were victimized without suffering
embarrassment or damage to their stock price--a common reason for
underreporting.
Since corporate security officers often answer the survey, this
method could encourage overstating of numbers and costs of the events
to justify security programs.
The ASIS survey asks about copyright violations and trademark
infringements which, although illegal and damaging, are not typically
considered economic espionage.
Only known or suspected incidents are reported--successful
espionage goes undetected--which results in underestimating impact.
The response rate to the ASIS study is low--eight percent in the
1995 survey, a further indication that some economic espionage is
missed.
Estimating the economic impact of a single act of economic
espionage is itself quite difficult. For example, two companies--or
countries--could steal the sameproprietary information but use it in
different ways, resulting in widely different economic impacts. In
addition, a company's reaction to the loss of a trade secret, as well
as the general development of the market, also can affect the ultimate
economic impact of the theft. As a result, a company's knowledge that
it has been victimized and its efforts to mitigate the damage may
lessen the act's cost.
We defer to the FBI on the question of the number of ongoing
investigations as well as on what new measures would help stop
industrial espionage.
economic espionage law
(26) In last year's response to this Committee's question regarding
the effectiveness of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, the CIA stated
that the law clearly has attracted the attention of many of our key
economic competitors, but that it is ``perhaps too early to assess
whether the law has had an appreciable effect on the level of economic
espionage directed against the US.'' Over the past year, have you seen
any results from the Economic Espionage Act? Do you have information
that the law has deterred economic espionage activity by foreign
governments or foreign corporations?
We believe it is still too soon to gauge adequately the impact of
the US Economic Espionage Act. There have only been a handful of cases
since it was enacted, and only two that involved foreign individuals.
To foreign intelligence services, how the US Deploys resources to
uncover economic espionage and how aggressively the US prosecutes
economic espionage cases will be as important as the Act itself.
espionage by foreign corporations
(27) Last year, in response to a question by this Committee, the
definition of economic espionage was given as ``government-directed or
orchestrated clandestine effort to collect US economic secrets or
proprietary information''. To what extent are US corporations
threatened by the theft of trade secrets by foreign entities that are
not ``government-directed or orchestrated''? How do you distinguish
whether espionage is government-directed or not, especially if the
foreign corporation involved receives extensive government subsidies?
The EEA has separate provisions to prosecute economic espionage
conducted to benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.
We defer to the FBI and the Justice Department as to how this legal
standard is applied. From an intelligence standpoint, however, we would
look at connections between the foreign firm and foreign intelligence
and security services to decide whether they are government-directed or
orchestrated. Any communication or connection between these entities
regarding tasking, targeting, or execution of economic espionage
activity would, to the CIA, suggest government direction or
involvement.
economic analysis
(28) Over the past several years, the CIA has emphasized an
increasing interaction with academic experts and an increasing use of
open source information in its economic analysis products. As the CIA
increasingly reports information based on open and public sources, does
this lessen the significance of the classified information in CIA
reporting? Does the CIA create analysis products that are based
entirely on open source or public information?
Classified information continues to make a significant value-added
contribution to our economic analysis. The contribution in any given
assessment, however, ranges broadly from a small slice of the all-
source information used to a much larger input in the case of analysis
on closed societies and illicit economic activities, such as sanctions
busting and money laundering. Clandestine collection is targeted
against information that policymakers tell us they need but which
cannot be obtained in the public domain; it is especially critical to
helping us warn of economic trends and policy choices that could affect
US interests. We do not duplicate solid work done outside the
Intelligence Community. In the cases where the bulk of the raw
information to answer the policymaker need comes from open sources, the
value-added of our product is the range of information we can tap,
including foreign media, the timeliness of the product in meeting the
request, and the expertise we bring to bear in putting the information
in context, including how the current situation could change or affect
foreign policy and political decisions.
south korea economic crisis
(29)(a) How well can the political institutions in the South manage
the socio- economic repercussions of the economic crisis--is there a
likelihood of civil disorder?
Political institutions in South Korea are stable and there are no
signs of serious civil disorder. The election last December of long-
time dissident leader Kim Tae-chung as president is one indication that
democratic institutions are taking root.
The election was the cleanest on record, according to local
political observers, and the public was not swayed by the alleged
efforts of South's primary intelligence service to fan longstanding
suspicions about Kim's ``communist leanings.''
Kim has worked to minimize possible social unrest stemming from the
recession by co-opting the most likely source of disturbances--labor
unions.
Even before his inauguration in February, Kim sought to create an
atmosphere of shared sacrifice. He brought together union, government,
and business leaders to expand the social safety net, increase labor
flexibility, and encourage corporate restructuring.
Media opinion is running against union officials whose actions
appear to discourage foreign investment or delay economic recovery,
suggesting that South Koreans have little stomach for domestic
political turmoil.
Leaders of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)--the
more militant of the two major labor umbrella groups--have called-off
or shortened several job actions in the face of public opposition, low
participation rates, and threats of legal action from President Kim.
Strikes and demonstrations--even sporadic violence--are inevitable,
however. The unemployment rate in April topped 6.7 percent--1.5 million
workers--up from 2.5 percent last December, according to official
figures.
The huge conglomerates, or chaebol, are just beginning to
restructure and some private forecasters project unemployment will
exceed 10 percent by year's end.
(29)(b) How will the economic turmoil in the South affect its
relations with the North? Does it make conflict with the North more or
less likely?
South Korean President Kim Tae-chung takes the traditional view
that economic aid is Seoul's trump card in negotiating with P'yongyang.
His ability to extend largess to the North is constrained by Seoul's
financial crisis, however.
Despite Kim's pledge to separate politics from economics, South
Korean officials say North Korean concessions are necessary to generate
public support for aid.
Seoul during bilateral talks in April conditioned the provision of
fertilizer on progress toward reuniting families separated since the
war.
potential impact of asian economic crisis on china
(30) How will China react to the growing economic instability in
the region?
One way China will react to the Asian crisis is by stimulating
domestic demand to compensate for the anticipated drop in export
growth. Chinese government agencies predict exports--which grew 21
percent and accounted for about one-third of GDP growth in 1997--will
grow between three and ten percent this year. As a result, government
economists estimate investment growth must rise to between 15 and 18
percent from about 10 percent last year to achieve Beijing's 8-percent
official target for GDP growth. Premier Zhu Rongji in a nationally
televised press conference in March stated that the main method of
ensuring 8-percent growth this year would be by raising domestic
demand.
In particular, Chinese authorities will take some steps to develop
new sources of growth by raising investment in infrastructure, high-
technology industry, and residential housing. Increasing investment in
traditional labor-intensive export industries would merely add to
excess capacity--already below 60 percent in many industries--and
ultimately worsen the financial health of state enterprises and state
banks. Chinese leaders, therefore, are stressing the development of new
``growth points.'' For example, Vice Premier Li Lanqing told foreign
reporters earlier this year that China would spend $750 billion on
infrastructure investment during the next three years. Beijing by June
will issue a new housing reform plan--aimed at stimulating demand for
new construction--under which state enterprises will stop providing
workers with subsidized housing, according to Chinese press reports.
Beijing has also reacted to the crisis by accelerating structural
reforms, particularly in the financial sector. China's leaders last
November convened an extraordinary national financial conference--
attended by top central and provincial officials--to respond to the
crisis, and in January the central bank unveiled an ambitious program
of bank reforms to be completed by 2001. The package includes
restructuring the central bank by eliminating many provincial branches,
a similar reorganization of the four largest state banks, and
establishing over 200 new local banks. Other reforms to be completed
this year include scrapping mandatory credit quotas, installing a new
risk-based loan classification system, and the special bond issue of
270 billion yuan to recapitalize the four largest state banks. The
acceleration in financial reforms does not extend to liberalization of
capital account transactions; Chinese senior officials have repeatedly
stated that they have no timetable for achieving capital account
convertibility.
Will the Chinese leadership view the crisis as an opportunity to
gain influence with other nations?
Chinese officials have repeatedly touted Beijing's commitment not
to devalue the yuan as China's contribution to regional stability.
Premier Zhu Rongji in his March press conference, for example, stated
that the government must ensure China achieves 8-percent growth and
that the exchange rate is not devalued this year because this would
affect the ``prosperity and stability'' of Asia as a whole.
How do you judge the likelihood that China will ``competitively
devalue'' its currency, the yuan, in order to ensure that its companies
maintain export market share?
China's leaders since last November have repeatedly denied they
will devalue. They generally have not explicitly mentioned a timeframe
for this commitment, but statements by Premier Zhu suggest Beijing
intends to maintain this commitment at least through 1998. Financial
market speculation that China would devalue this year appears to have
somewhat subsided in the face of Beijing's repeated assurances. China's
lack of capital account convertibility and relatively strong balance of
payments make it unlikely that it will face external payments problems
during the next year that would force it to devalue; thus, Beijing is
in a position to maintain its commitment.
China has several political reasons to avoid a devaluation this
year. Devaluing after repeated assurances that this was not under
consideration would be a political embarrassment and would undermine
Beijing's goal of expanding China's influence in East Asia. A
devaluation also poses several significant economic risks. It would
raise pressures on the Hong Kong dollar and financial markets, risk a
further round of devaluations in the region, raise tensions with major
trading partners, and increase the costs of debt servicing and imports.
A devaluation cannot be entirely ruled out, however. Despite senior
leaders' repeated statements that a devaluation is not being
considered, a PRC-owned Hong Kong newspaper has published two articles
this year quoting Chinese government economists and mid-level Chinese
officials as recommending a moderate devaluation. If exports fall and
economic growth falls short of 8 percent in 1998, Beijing next year may
consider its commitment not to devalue.
Will the ``Asian Contagion'' spread to mainland China?
China's lack of capital account convertibility and relatively
strong balance of payments make it unlikely that it will face external
payments problems such as those that precipitated the crises in other
East Asian economies. Foreign debt levels are relatively manageable at
15 percent of GDP, and only a small fraction of foreign investment is
portfolio investment. China recorded a $40 billion trade surplus last
year, and--even with a sharp drop in export growth--will probably
record a substantial trade surplus in 1998.
China, however, shares some systemic economic problems with its
East Asian neighbors that could ultimately lead to a domestic economic
crisis if Beijing does not implement structural reforms. Many
industries are now operating at less than 60 percent capacity,
according to Chinese surveys, in part because of poor investments made
during the sharp credit expansion earlier in the decade. Commercial
real estate markets have slumped, occupancy rates in Shanghai, for
example, are less than 60 percent. Slower growth probably has also
compounded problems with nonperforming loans, which Chinese officials
acknowledge are 20 to 25 percent of total bank lending.
If so, how will economic problems affect the policies of Jiang
Zemin and his government.
Slower growth could lead Beijing to slow down enterprise reforms
that generate large layoffs. Unemployment in urban areas probably is
already eight to ten percent, based on unofficial estimates cited in
Chinese press, and considerably higher in some sections of the country
such as the industrial Northeast. Slower growth may also lead to
increased capital flight, which could cause Beijing to be even more
cautious about removing controls on capital account transactions and
opening financial markets to foreign participation. It may also lead
Beijing to adopt export subsidies and other measures that would
complicate its WTO accession negotiations.
With unemployment already rising in China's state-owned industrial
sectors, will slower or negative economic growth lead to civil strife
in China?
The chances of negative economic growth in China are extremely slim
and probably would only occur as a result of widespread civil strife or
political instability. Nevertheless, increased unemployment and labor
demonstrations during the next few years probably will lead Beijing to
further strengthen internal security forces to curb social unrest.
Although internal security forces appear to have been fairlysuccessful
so far in avoiding large-scale violent confrontations with workers
protesting layoffs and unpaid wages, the lack of training with non-
lethal methods of riot control could potentially lead to increased
numbers of violent incidents.
the philippines' economic situation
(31) How will the economic crisis affect the upcoming elections?
Are democratic institutions strong enough to withstand economic and
financial turmoil? How likely is a return to martial law?
The slowdown of the Philippines' economy due to the regional
financial crisis has helped the candidacy of recently inaugurated Vice
President Estrada, who ran on the slogan ``Estrada for the poor.'' He
won the election with an unprecedented 40 percent plurality in a field
of 11 candidates.
The business community--which once formed the core of his
detractors--is now cautiously optimistic of an Estrada presidency;
since the election, Estrada has toned down his populist rhetoric,
appointed mainstream technocrats to his cabinet, and focused on
promises to continue former President Ramos's reform policies.
Manila remains vulnerable to exogenous forces--in particular,
weakness in Japan's economy and continued turmoil in Indonesia--but its
openness to economic reform has placed it in a strong position to
weather the regional crisis. Democratic institutions, in particular,
have been strengthened during the Aquino and Ramos administrations.
Unlike many of its neighbors, the Philippines has strong civilian
institutions--including the Catholic church, non-government
organizations, and a vigorous free press--that are committed to the
preservation of constitutional democracy.
A return to martial law is extremely unlikely. The military appears
more professional and unified than at any time in the last 30 years and
has shown no inclination to intervene in civilian politics; many of its
highest level officers were promoted to their current posts in the
post-Marcos era.
potential bw/cw attacks on the us
(32) What is the likelihood that the US will be subjected to a
biological or chemical attack within the next 2-5 years? 5-10 years?
How is this attack likely to be carried out? Do you consider a BW/CW
attack against the US as more likely than a ballistic missile attack
against the US? How difficult is it for a group to construct and
deliver an effective chemical weapon? A biological or radiological
weapon? A nuclear device? What existing groups now have or are seeking
such a capability?
Nonstate actors appear to be increasingly interested in, and
developing capabilities for, employing chemical and biological
materials. International terrorism remains a significant threat,
whether conventional or unconventional, despite improved
counterterrorist efforts worldwide. The United States, as the only
superpower, is widely resented by radical groups worldwide and is a
major target of international terrorism. Terrorists probably will
continue to favor conventional tactics like bombings and shootings
because these means are more familiar and have proven successful, but
we judge that the potential for terrorist to use or attempt to use WMD
or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials is
increasing.
The relative ease with which some chemical and biological agents
can be acquired or produced in simple laboratories makes them
potentially attractive to terrorists, making it difficult to
anticipate, warn against, or disrupt such a terrorist threat.
Particularly appealing to some groups is the potential to produce large
numbers of casualties, cause residual disruption, and generate
significant psychological impact on a population and its
infrastructure. Delivery and dispersal techniques are also manageable
and can be made effective relatively easily.
Some groups, including the Aum Shinrikyo and the Chechen rebels,
have employed, threatened, or are interested in chemical, biological,
and radiological materials and the IC is monitoring this issue closely.
threat of information warfare by terrorists
(33) Our traditional definition of terrorism does not include such
things as computer attack intended to damage our telecommunications or
transportation infrastructure. Are we prepared to deal with ``virtual
terrorism?'' What steps do we need to take to focus Intelligence
Community counterterrorism efforts on this new threat?
Being prepared to protect against and take active measures to fight
this form of terrorism requires understanding it. Efforts to understand
terrorists who would attack or threaten to attack information systems
is the first step, one of many that has been taken within the
Intelligence Community (IC). The CIA has a variety of technical experts
dedicated to understanding this threat and defending against it through
a variety of means.
The CIA has recognized the importance of this threat and has hired
additional experts to address this issue. A new branch within the DCI's
Counterterrorist Center, which has Information Systems Terrorism (IST)
as a major focus, has taken steps to understand the nature of this
threat and its multiple facets by coordinating with the IC, academia,
and the private sector.
In October of 1997 the CIA convened a roundtable on Information
Systems Terrorism. Since October, the results of this roundtable have
spurred additional, on-going efforts to coordinate understanding on IST
within the IC. New collection requirements have been levied to focus on
IST. The results of this roundtable have been briefed and published in
classified IC Counterterrorism community publications to spur
understanding, coordination, and collection on this threat.
threat to us deployed forces in bosnia
(34)(a) What are the shortfalls in Intelligence Community support
to the Bosnian operation and what is being done to rectify these
problem areas?
No unclassified response.
(34)(b) In recent months, SFOR troops (including US soldiers) have
acted in support of President Biljana Plavsic by seizing radio and
television transmitters, police stations, and other government
installations controlled by her hard-line opponents. Does the
participation of US troops in such operations expose them to increased
risk of attack from hard-line supporters? Would a hard-line response be
limited to stone-throwing civilian mobs, or could it escalate to
attacks and other forms of arms conflict?
While the inclusion of US troops in the aforementioned activities
exposes them to greater risk and in theory increases the chances that
these operations will result in attacks by Serb hardliners, in practice
this has not been the case. US SFOR troops have not been attacked by
Bosnian parties after these actions. Moreover, the improved political
and security atmosphere in Bosnia has greatly reduced tensions over the
last six months, and has reduced the chances that Bosnian parties will
use violence against US personnel. We remain alert to the possibility
of attacks on US forces, however, and continue to dedicate significant
resources to force protection.
(34)(c) What is the prospect and key action required for
establishing long-term stability in Bosnia?
Refer to the classified appendix for the response.
(34)(d) How many foreign Islamic fundamentalist fighters still
reside in Bosnia? What countries do they come from? Who supports them?
Do they pose a threat to US troops?
The Intelligence Community estimate of the number of former Islamic
fundamentalist fighters remaining in Bosnia remains classified. The
former mujahedin who have remained in Bosnia have married Bosnian women
and obtained citizenship or are legally documented workers with
humanitarian organizations. The Intelligence Community and SFOR
continue to monitor the former mujahedin in Bosnia to safeguard the
troops against potential threats these individuals might pose.
(34)(e) Would more active participation by SFOR in civilian
implementation tasks such as refugee resettlement increase the risk to
US forces?
The improved security situation in Bosnia has reduced the chances
that resettlement efforts would result in significant violence. Refugee
resettlement, however continues to be resisted by all sides, especially
the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, and tensions could flare in some
local situations to the point that US SFOR troops find themselves in
the middle of ethnic violence.
(34)(f) What is the possibility that current low-level violence in
Kosovo in Serbia could escalate into a major conflict, spreading into
Macedonia and endangering the security of US troops there?
Increasing Yugoslav army and security forces in Kosovo and a
growing number of clashes between Serbian forces and Kosovar Albanians
along the Kosovo-Albanian border increase the chances that this dispute
could develop into a major conflict. It is too early to determine the
full consequences of such a conflict on neighboring states.
(34)(g) Are you satisfied that the US has sufficient HUMINT assets
in Bosnia to provide early warning of possible threats to US forces?
No unclassified response.
(34)(h) How do you deconflict your HUMINT collection assets for
force protection with those already deployed by DOD to prevent
duplication?
No unclassified response.
counterintelligence threat to national laboratories
(35) A September 1997 GAO report regarding DOE's security controls
over foreign visitors to the National Laboratories noted that ``DOE's
procedures for obtaining background checks and controlling the
dissemination of sensitive information are not fully effective'' and
that as a result ``sensitive subjects may have been discussed with
foreign nationals without DOE's knowledge and approval.'' In your (the
DCI's) opinion, how significant is the counterintelligence threat to
DOE in general and the National Laboratories in particular? What is
being done to rectify this problem?
(Note: The following response was provided by the Dept. of Energy's
Office of Counterintelligence.)
The Counterintelligence threat facing the Department of Energy and
the national laboratories is serious. In February 1998 the President
signed PDD/NSC-61, ``The Department of Energy Counterintelligence
program,'' to enhance DOE's CI effort. The PDD charges the Director,
Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) to conduct a 90-Day Study as a
basis for determining near-term and strategic actions for revitalizing
the department's CI program.
The Director, OCI shared preliminary findings and recommendations
of the 90-Day Study with SSCI staff on 11 June, and he intends to
formally brief the Committee and staff when the Secretary of Energy has
approved the report.
international crime
(36) How critical do you assess the current and future threat to US
interests from international crime activities and networks?
Several factors are in play that clearly indicate international
crime will be a growing threat to US interests, and so this issue is of
very high priority in US intelligence collection and analytical
efforts. The threats to US national interests from international
criminal activities and organizations are twofold:
International criminal activities directly affect the lives,
property, and livelihood of US citizens living or working at home and
abroad. Inside the United States, they have a corrosive effect on the
safety and integrity of communities across the country. These effects
include drug addiction, violence undermining of societal values and job
performance, and defrauding of individual citizens businesses, and
local state, and federal governments of hundreds of millions of
dollars. Overseas, international criminal activities can undermine US
business interests and competitiveness in global markets, as well as
threaten US citizens working and living in foreign countries.
Also important from a national security perspective, international
crime undermines political and economic stability in countries
important to US interests. Corruption of government, politics, and
business by criminal entities is antithetical to democracy wherever it
occurs. Nowhere is this problem more serious than in Russia and other
countries making the difficult transition to democratic and free market
systems.
The problem takes on an added dimension of urgency because the
globalization of international commerce, finance, transportation, and
telecommunications greatly facilitates the spread and scope of criminal
activities:
The breaking down of political barriers around the world since the
end of the Cold War has allowed international criminals unprecedented
freedom to operate and to move virtually without constraint across
national frontiers.
The globalization of international business--including multilateral
agreements reducing trade barriers in North America, Europe, and
elsewhere--has made it easier for criminals to smuggle contraband and
illicit financial proceeds.
The advanced telecommunications and information systems that
underpin legitimate international commercial and financial activity are
as easily used by international criminals.
As a result of these developments, international criminals have
been able to expand their networks and increase cooperation in illicit
activities and financial transactions.
The ease with which globalization allows international criminals to
conduct their activities across national borders makes the challenge
more difficult for both intelligence and law enforcement. Unlike
international criminals, who are not constrained by national
boundaries, governments and law enforcement agencies must respect other
countries' sovereignty and legal statutes in law enforcement
operations.
Is there room for improvement in the FBI-CIA relationship in
dealing with international crime?
Because of differences in mission and approaches--most
fundamentally, the CIA's focus on foreign intelligence to support
policy and the FBI focus on investigative intelligence to support
prosecutions--we have worked hard to establish an effective
collaborative relationship on the international crime problem. There is
now a mutual recognition that foreign intelligence can provide
significant benefits to law enforcement efforts against criminal
organizations and activities with international connections, and there
is an unprecedented level of commitment by the senior-most officials in
both agencies to work cooperatively together.
Programs are in place to join forces and capabilities against
common international criminal targets, and exchanges of personnel at
both working and senior levels have done much to enhance collaboration
and ensure that intelligence collection and analysis meets the highest
priority needs of law enforcement. Senior officials from both agencies
meet regularly to address important aspects of interaction and the
overall relationship between the intelligence and law enforcement
communities. The rules of the road for cooperation are consistent with
the National Security Act and are designed both to protect foreign
intelligence sources and methods, and to support law enforcement
investigations and prosecutions.
nato expansion
(37) What are the risks, if any, to US intelligence personnel and
the Intelligence Community in general, in allowing Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary to join NATO?
No unclassified response.
information operations
(38) The Defense Science Board and the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection both issued reports during 1997
which identified our nation's vulnerability to both physical and
computer attacks on our nation's information infrastructure. These
reports noted that such an attack could come from a foreign government,
a non-state actor, a criminal organization, or an individual hacker.
How significant is the threat to our critical information
infrastructure in the short-run? In the long-run? How do you judge the
Intelligence Community's ability to collect intelligence on this
threat?
Short-run threat
The information warfare (IW) threat is real and growing. The number
of known potential adversaries conducting research on information
attacks is increasing rapidly and it is clear that these foreign
entities are aware that an increasing proportion of our civil and
military activity depends on the secure and uninterrupted flow of
digital information. All are competent to conduct cyber attacks, but
the intelligence and military IW programs and state-sponsored
terrorists pose the greatest short-run risk to our critical
infrastructure because they have the greatest knowledge and resources.
Several countries have government sponsored information warfare
efforts underway (many countries also have excellent electronic
warfare, jamming, and command and control attack capabilities).
Equipment and systems necessary to conduct information warfare attacks
are increasingly available on the open market.
Trans-national and sub-national groups like terrorists and
organized crime have some capability to attack US information systems,
and the ability to conduct such attacks is growing as technologies and
tools spread around the world. We have noted increased interest in IW
techniques among terrorists, hackers narcotraffickers, and organized
criminals. We believe these non-state actors will increasingly view
information systems in the United States as a target.
Information systems attacks by terrorists are likely to be
undertaken for psychological or terror effects rather than for
strategic, or battlefield application. We estimate that computer-
literate terrorists could carry out damaging attacks against US
information systems with little risk or cost to themselves.
Long-run threat
More and more foreign governments and their military services are
paying increasing attention to the concept of information warfare.
Foreign military writings discuss the importance of disrupting the flow
of information in combat. The battlespace of the future will also
extend to our domestic information infrastructure, such as our electric
power grids and our telecommunications networks. We know that a number
of countries around the world are developing the doctrine, strategies,
and tools to conduct information attacks. At present, most of these
efforts are limited to information dominance on the battlefield; that
is, crippling an enemy's military command and control centers, or
disabling an air defense network prior to launching an air attack.
Many countries are observing US actions and public debates with
respect to information warfare and using them as a guideline or a
jumping off point for their own programs. They may not follow the US
lead, but rather select areas to concentrate on where they feel
information warfare will have an impact for them.
Intelligence community collection
We have taken steps to focus our collection and analytic resources
on this threat and have taken steps to increase the level of
cooperation between intelligence analysts and their counterparts in the
law enforcement community. Unfortunately cyber threats are a difficult
intelligence target. They are cheap, they require little
infrastructure, and the technology required is dual use. In short, they
are exceptionally easy to conceal.
Unlike traditional military preparations, where our technical
systems can reliably detect the movement and coordination of large
forces, preparation for an information warfare attack presents no such
opportunities.
The subtle and diverse nature of IW operations makes it difficult
to detect an attack even when it is actually underway, and the
cumbersome process of investigation these events inhibits effective
real-time tracing of the actual source of an attack.
In order to address this relatively new threat area, we are
pursuing a number of initiatives inside the Intelligence Community and
in cooperation with the law enforcement community, other government
agencies, and the private sector.
the threat posed by hiv
(39) To what extent has HIV had an impact on the health and
economies of foreign countries? How has HIV impacted foreign
militaries?
UNAIDS and the World Health Organization (WHO) recently released a
joint report that revises upward--to roughly 30 million--the total
number of people estimated to be infected worldwide through the end of
1997. This new estimate left unchanged the regional distribution of
HIV/AIDS cases, Sub-Saharan Africa still accounts for over two-thirds
of the world's HIV-positive population.
The social implications of the HIV infection will be felt between
2005 and 2010 with the deaths of a large number of those already
infected. Because the disease got an earlier start in Africa, gains in
Africa. Life expectancies achieved over the past few decades are being
canceled out by HIV.
The health systems in less developed countries are unable to cope
with the HIV epidemic, governments with limited resources are likely to
categorize HIV/AIDS patients as low priority in funding decisions, and
medical triage will result in AIDS patients receiving little or no
treatment for their illness.
World Bank and UNDP studies have found, however, that the disease
has had relatively little impact on economic development. For example,
in Africa, a recent World Bank model estimates HIV/AIDS lowers annual
per capita income by just half a percent in developing countries,
although the epidemic has driven the poorest families deeper in
poverty.
Many African countries are already accepting and retaining HIV
positive military personnel who pose some readiness problems for
national and joint--including peacekeeping--forces. Outside of Africa,
Thailand's military has the worst reported infection rates with some
military units having up to 60 percent HIV positive, according to a
recent journal article.
actionable intelligence
(40) Some analysts say that the increased emphasis on action-
oriented intelligence has come at the expense of other important--but
more mundane--work, like maintaining data bases and conducting in-depth
analyses on foreign militaries and political groups. Do you share this
concern? If so, how do you intend to deal with these competing needs?
The Directorate of Intelligence is working to strike an appropriate
balance between the production of current intelligence and in-depth
analysis. The DI's senior management has commissioned a series of in-
depth studies on fundamentally important issues. In addition, analytic
tool and production integration projects currently under way will bring
increased efficiencies to those ``mundane'' processes, thereby
providing analysts increased time to focus on longer term analytic
work.
intelligence community's role in the pow/mia issue
(41)(a) National Security Advisor Sandy Berger wrote to the Senate
Majority Leader last year and indicated that he had directed the
Intelligence Community to produce a Special National Intelligence
Estimate (SNIE) regarding POW/MIA issues with Vietnam. After consulting
with this Committee, the terms of reference were settled. When do you
expect to have this Estimate completed? Mr. Berger also indicated that
he would ask for an updated Intelligence Community assessment on the
so-called ``735'' and ``1205'' documents found in the Russian archives.
What efforts has the Intelligence Community made to acquire additional
information about these documents either in Russia or in Vietnam? As
per the Committee's request, have the 574 classified CIA documents on
the POW/MIA subject matter been reviewed and summarized? Do they shed
any light on the SNIE?
The National Intelligence Estimate on ``Vietnamese Intentions,
Capabilities, and Performance Concerning POW/MIA Issues'' recently was
published.
The Estimate was drafted by one of our most senior East Asia
specialists, and was actively supported by all elements of the
Intelligence Community. The drafter consulted closely with analysts at
DOD/DPMO and traveled to Thailand, Vietnam, and Honolulu to consult
with US officials involved in POW/MIA issues. Besides examining
material available in intelligence archives, relevant CIA documents,
and transcripts of interviews of Russian officials conducted by the
Joint Commission Support Directorate/DPMO, he also reviewed material in
SSCI files. (An Annex to the Estimate spells out in detail the nature
of the sources examined and the scope of the research.)
The completed draft was read by four distinguished outside experts
thoroughly familiar with the issue and representing a variety of
professional experience. All four praised its balance and thoroughness.
(41)(b) In his letter, Mr. Berger offers assurances that
``collection requirements pertaining to the POW/MIA issue [will] remain
as a high priority'' after administration officials conceded that it
had mistakenly left off the POW/MIA issues from PDD-35--the document
that sets out intelligence collection priorities. Has this oversight
been corrected?
POW/MIA issues on SE Asian countries such as Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia, have always remained priority collection requirements.
(41)(c) In July 1993, the Secretary of Defense consolidated four
DoD offices charged with different functions of the POW/MIA issue. The
Intelligence Community's only POW/MIA analytical element, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Office of POW/MIA Affairs, was then transferred
out from the oversight of both the DCI and the responsible
Congressional committees. Do you now have oversight of the Defense
Prisoners of War/Missing persons Office (DPMO) analytical section? If
not, who is responsible for oversight of this capability? Why is this
intelligence capability not reflected in the Congressional
Justification Books (National Foreign, Joint Military and Tactical
intelligence accounts) provided to the congressional oversight
committees?
The analytical component of DPMO is not a component of the
Intelligence Community, and the Director of Central Intelligence has no
oversight responsibilities for it. That responsibility belongs to the
office of the Secretary of Defense.
a declining military threat
(42) In your testimony before the Committee, you indicated that the
military threat to the United States was declining, and General Hughes
concurred with this assessment. Please elaborate on this critical issue
and discuss the impact it will have on the Intelligence Community.
It would be incorrect to characterize the military threat to the
United States as declining and conclusions drawn from general testimony
to that effect would be erroneous. While the threat of massive conflict
may have diminished, new or intensified challenges have emerged with
profound implications for the Intelligence Community.
Tracking WMD Development and Proliferation. A number of
dissatisfied states seek to alter regional balances through force of
arms. Unable to compete with US conventional arms, they seek to deter a
US response by threatening WMD use. Tracking the development and
proliferation of WMD programs, including delivery systems, is an
extraordinarily difficult mission. The number of states involved is
substantial, their programs lack signatures, and their use of denial
and deception is rapidly improving.
Force Protection Intelligence Support. The US military has always
concerned itself with force protection and the Intelligence Community
has assisted in that effort. Today, however, as regional rogues turn
more to asymmetric challenges to US presence abroad--including
terrorism, sabotage, and subversion--intelligence support for the force
protection mission has become more demanding and complex.
Global Coverage Support. During the Cold War, any adversary likely
to attack US interests was likely to have been equipped and trained by
the Soviets. In short, bycovering the Soviet target, US intelligence
was able to address a substantial range of issues of concern. Today by
contrast, potential adversaries may have received weapons, doctrine,
and training from any of a number of states. Tracking tomorrow's
threats requires a much broader coverage of an increasing set of
targets.
Forecasting Future Threats. Although the US may not be confronted
by conventional military peers today, over the longer term such
challenges may emerge. Forecasting the emergence of future challenges
is a daunting challenge, requiring an understanding of economic,
social, political, military, and technological trends in many regions
and for many states.
In addition to these challenges, the Intelligence Community is
called on to support the US military as it takes on new missions to
protect our global interests. US military operations have changed since
the end of the Cold War, to include increasing involvement in
operations other than war and lower-tier conflicts. In response, the
intelligence needed to support US military operations is changing, with
growing emphasis on the need to:
Monitor S&T/weapons developments that could lead to an introduction
of a technology surprise against US forces or interests. Aside from the
terrorist threats or acts of sabotage, the changing nature of our
military operations may encourage adversaries to pursue limited gains
in encounters with US forces--seeking to inflict damage against US
interests as opposed to pursuing a more traditional military victory.
This will require additional emphasis on ``tactical'' support to US
policymakers as well as the continued emphasis on strategic context.
Track foreign transfers of weapons systems or expertise to pariah
states or regions of potential conflict. The rising cost of some
advanced weapon systems is driving foreign suppliers to increasingly
pursue export opportunities during the research and development stage.
This could increase the rate at which new technologies become a threat
to US interests and result in a more diverse range of systems as
recipients pursue individual applications.
______
U.S. Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, DC, June 9, 1998.
Hon. Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Attached are the unclassified responses to
questions for the record resulting from the January 28, 1998, hearing
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on security threats to
the United States.
Please contact me if I can be of any further assistance.
Sincerely yours,
John E. Collingwood,
Assistant Director, Office of Public and Congressional Affairs.
Russian Organized Crime
(1) What general trends do we see in Russian organized crime? How
is organized crime impacting the Russian economy and the Russian
political system? To what extent is Russian organized crime involved in
the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction? What is your prognosis
for Russian efforts to combat this problem? How active is Russian
organized crime in the U.S.?
general trends in russian organized crime
The FBI has noted several emerging trends with respect to Russian
organized crime activity. First and foremost is the fact that this
activity is increasing not only in Russia but worldwide. Recent
statistics published by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
indicate that the share of crimes committed by ``mafia'' groups as a
percentage of total crimes committed in 1997 has risen throughout the
Russian Federation. This trend is magnified in the larger cities such
as St. Petersburg, Russia where regional law enforcement authorities
are reporting a 100 percent increase in the crime rate over the
previous year. Although this statistic includes all types of crime in
addition to those related to organized crime groups, it is nevertheless
indicative of the overall rise in violent crime which local officials
attribute to the criminal influence of organized crime groups.
Moscow law enforcement authorities have also reported a higher
incidence of contract murders of the type normally associated with
``turf'' battles between organized crime groups and mob style
retribution. Foreigners doing business in Moscow, including US
citizens, have not been immune to this trend. In November of 1996 US
businessman Paul Tatum was murdered in a mob-style execution in a
Moscow Metro station which was likely the result of his disagreements
with the local Chechen crime boss. This upsurge in violence involving
Russian organized crime continues to impact the international scene. In
February of this year three Russian nationals were killed during a gun
battle in Ostrava, Czech Republic which, police believe, resulted from
disagreements between rival organized groups. In this same month a
suspected Russian organized crime ``boss,'' believed to be involved in
prostitution and money laundering, was gunned down in Marbella, Spain.
Thus far Spanish law enforcement authorities have not ruled out a
``settling of scores'' as the motive for this killing.
The sheer number of Russian organized crime groups is also
increasing. In December, 1992 the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD) reported the existence of 4,352 organized crime groups in Russia,
with widely varying size, criminal activities and organizational
structure. In 1994, the MVD reported the existence of 5,691 organized
crime groups. In October 1997, Interior Minister Kulikov estimated that
the number of identifiable and operational organized crime groups in
Russia is more likely closer to 12,000.
There appears to be an emerging trend which suggests a growing
level of sophistication in the area of large scale financial
institution fraud and transnational money laundering involving Russian
organized crime groups. These groups are continuing to solidify their
control of a major portion of the banking industry within the Russian
Federation and Russian law enforcement sources estimate that as much as
one half of the country's financial sector may be affected. Russian
Ministry of Interior sources have reported that 550 banks, or nearly
half of Russia's credit and financial organizations, are controlled by
organized crime interests. This capability allows these groups to more
easily launder and to ultimately move large amounts of cash around the
world and to evade efforts by the government to collect taxes. This has
become an operational necessity due the large amounts of cash being
generated by their criminal enterprises. Russian organized crime
figures are also known to have purchased controlling interests in
banking institutions located in Cyprus and other ``offshore'' locations
such as Antigua and Aruba in the Caribbean. During the past years five
Russian owned banks have opened for business on the island of Aruba.
From these locations they electronically launder large amounts of cash
around the world. Due to strict bank secrecy laws it is extremely
difficult for law enforcement agencies to trace the origin of these
funds. This transnational banking activity has been accompanied by a
high level of violence directed against senior banking officials in
Russia and dozens of them have been the victim of contract murders.
Last year one prominent Moscow journalist compared the life expectancy
of a Russian banker in recent years to that of a bomb-disposal officer.
Russian organized crime groups are becoming increasingly more
diversified and professionalized. Former, and sometimes active,
soldiers of Russian Special Forces units have been recruited by
organized crime groups to perform as private bodyguards, hit-men, debt
collectors and security guards for smuggling operations. As increasing
numbers of these individuals are demobilized into an economy where
meaningful employment is scarce, the prospect of steady employment with
established organized crime groups is an attractive prospect. In
addition to active duty soldiers and military veterans, police officers
from a variety of Russian law enforcement agencies have become involved
in organized racketeering activity. Recently, a group of 12 Moscow
police officers were arrested and charged with murder, extortion and
robbery. Reports indicate that this group was led by a long serving
officer from the Interior Ministry's detective branch and included an
instructor from a Moscow police academy. In addition to attracting
these types of professionals into their ranks, Russian organized crime
groups are also utilizing the services of professionals from other
fields in the operation of their various criminal enterprises. These
include specialists in computer software applications, international
law and finance, intelligence gathering and corporate security (some of
whom include former KGB officers), international banking, casino gaming
operations and hotel and restaurant management. In many cases these
individuals are employed in seemingly legitimate ``front'' companies
which are proliferating around the world and which are used to
represent the interests of Russian organized crime groups in various
locales.
Russian organized crime activity is increasing in the area of
narcotics trafficking and human smuggling. In the last five years the
amount of drugs smuggled into Russia has grown by a factor of fifteen.
Former Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov recently announced that within
the Russian Federation drug related offenses have nearly doubled in
1997. Use of narcotic substances and drug addiction has increased
substantially throughout Russia and the resulting increase in consumer
demand has fueled an expansion of the drug trade. This has provided
Russian organized crimegroups with additional profit making
opportunities in this area and they are capitalizing on this problem by
expanding their drug smuggling and marketing operations. Russian
organized crime figures are known to have allied themselves with
members of the Cali Colombian drug cartel for this purpose and Russian
law enforcement authorities have stated that heroin and cocaine
originating from Colombia is being sold on the streets of Moscow.
Russian organized crime groups have furnished the Cartel with weapons
and combat helicopters in exchange for drug shipments. At one point
Cartel members were considering the purchase of a surplus diesel-
powered patrol submarine from Russian organized crime sources for drug
smuggling purposes but canceled the deal at the last minute. In
addition to establishing links to the Columbian cartels, Russian
organized crime groups are also believed to have developed ties with
Italian mafia groups for the purpose of coordinating narcotic
trafficking efforts.
As Russian organized crime groups become more firmly established in
the international vice trade, their involvement in the trafficking of
young women has increased dramatically. They are operating hundreds of
brothels and striptease bars throughout Europe and Asia and are
expanding their role in the worldwide prostitution industry. In many
cases young women from Russia and Eastern Europe are lured into a life
of sexual bondage with promises of lucrative legitimate employment made
by bar and casino operators associated with Russian organized crime.
Russian organized crime groups continue to generate a high level of
corruption among politicians, police officers, businessmen and other
officials within the Russian Federation and elsewhere. Not only has
this trend gained momentum in the Russian Federation but has surfaced
in other countries where Russian organized crime groups have
established a foothold. Israel's National Unit for Serious Crimes has
been redesignated as the National Anti-Mafia and Serious Crimes Unit
after it became obvious that Russian organized crime was seeking to
bolster its efforts to take over state assets and infiltrate the
government. Reports have surfaced which suggest that Russian organized
crime figures played a prominent role in selecting and supporting
certain candidates during Israel's recent national election. In
Colombo, Sri Lanka Russian organized crime figures are believed to have
coopted the majority of the local police force into providing security
for their vice and gambling operations.
impact of russian organized crime upon the russian economy and
political system
Russian organized crime groups have accumulated great wealth and
extensive social and political influence within the Russian Federation
and other republics of the former Soviet Union. They have successfully
exploited the period of political chaos which followed the collapse of
the Soviet regime. Previously, they had been silent partners of the
regime in the black market economy. Today, Russian organized crime
groups dominate the economic life of Russia by exerting control over
key economic sectors such as: petroleum distribution, pharmaceuticals,
and consumer products distribution. This control has allowed them to
dominate certain markets associate with a wide variety of consumer
goods and this has the undermined open market competition necessary for
normal economic development. Along with corrupt public officials and
unscrupulous businessmen they have perverted the all-important
privatization process by acquiring ownership of previously owned state
assets and then selling them off at tremendous profits which should
have accrued to the Russian government. Many of the most powerful
groups have close working relationships with senior public officials
and high-level politicians. Through bribery and coercion Russian
organized crime figures have obtained favorable consideration in
obtaining government contracts, various commercial licenses and tax
exemptions. Known organized crime figures have been elected to the
Russian Duma where they champion legislation favorable to their
business interests. However, the most destructive impact of Russian
organized criminal activity upon the Russian economy is in the area of
small business development, the backbone of any successful capitalist
economy. Most emerging private businesses are forced to pay protection
money to the local organized crime bosses in order to remain in
business. By some estimates, such protection payments, which are called
``krishas'' (roofs), amount to 20 percent of a private business's
turnover. The amount of money funneled to Russian organized crime
figures puts them in a position to corrupt widely the police, judiciary
and other government agencies, especially when measured against
abysmally low government and police salaries. In an environment where
journeyman level police officers earn an average salary of 200 dollars
a month and where they are frequently paid on an irregular basis,
organized crime groups are amassing tremendous influence. This was
highlighted in a recent newspaper poll in Russia in which the majority
of respondents believed that the ``Russian Mafia'' was more powerful
than the Duma.
To what extent is Russian organized crime involved in the
trafficking of weapons of mass destruction? What is the prognosis for
Russian efforts to combat this problem?
While purported nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material
have been offered for sale, at the present time, there are no known
instances in which law enforcement authorities have confirmed that such
materials were actually available for sale. There have been confirmed
illicit transactions in Europe which involve uranium and plutonium,
however, these nuclear materials have been well below the enrichment
and/or quantity levels required for weapons production. It is the
illicit trafficking in the relatively more common, commercially
available nuclear or radioactive materials that pose the most
significant potential for serious damage. Most of these incidents have
been determined to be frauds involving industrial or relatively
lowgrade nuclear materials perpetrated by petty criminals who believe
that a market exists for such items. These items have included
discarded nuclear reactor residue or radioactive substances associated
with various manufacturing processes or military applications.
Nevertheless such materials do pose a threat to public health and
environmental safety and are taken very seriously by law enforcement
agencies worldwide.
The FBI is not aware of any involvement by established Russian
organized crime groups at this time in nuclear weapons trafficking,
however, the potential for such involvement cannot be discounted. The
large potential profit associated with such trafficking may attract
rogue or otherwise undisciplined organized crime factions into this
arena. The more established organized crime groups would probably
discourage such activity since it would tend to adversely impact the
international status-quo and thereby interrupt currency markets,
investment climates, real estate valuations and international mobility.
Russian law enforcement authorities are very sensitive about the
issue of nuclear materials trafficking in light of Alexander Lebed's
recent statements concerning unaccounted for ``suit-cased'' sized
tactical nuclear weapons. Representatives of various Russian law
enforcement agencies have stated repeatedly that there is no higher
priority than to safeguard the disposition of nuclear weapons and
related material. In the event that such materiel is trafficked within
or through the Russian Federation it is likely that Russian law
enforcement authorities would respond with a massive effort directed at
recovery and prosecution.
How active is Russian organized crime in the US?
There are two basic types of Russian organized crime groups
presently operating in the US. These include the larger, traditionally
structured organizations which originate from Moscow, St. Petersburg
and other locales within the former Soviet Union and which are
attempting to maintain a foothold in the US, and the smaller fewer
structured groups of career criminals who have come to be known as
``fraudsters.'' The fraudsters share a common ethnic heritage and
usually engage in a variety of financial fraud schemes which employ
recently arrived Russian emigres. They have been primarily involved in
white collar crimes including various types of entitlement fraud such
as health care fraud (Medicare and Medicaid fraud), credit card fraud,
computer fraud, financial institution fraud, check kiting, visa and
immigration fraud, forgery of financial instruments, securities fraud
and contract fraud. While lacking in size when compared to the larger,
more structured groups, these groups are capable of causing losses in
the millions of dollars. They often operate in particular geographic
areas, primarily large urban areas, and are self-contained through an
informal networking system comprised of criminally oriented Russian
emigres. Although originally focused upon their own emigres'
communities with respect to their criminal activity, these groups are
continually expanding the range of their operations and are victimizing
others as well. It is also increasingly more common for larger Russian
emigre criminal organizations to ``muscle in'' on these groups and
extract a share of the profits in the form of ``protection payments.''
The larger, hierarchically structured groups have been found to
exist in cities such as Miami and New York. These groups typically
contain at least 100 members and have clearly defined leadership
hierarchies and some semblance of an organizational structure. The
members of these groups include veteran criminals who have served
sentences in Soviet prisons and who are highly skilled in the fine arts
of extortion, racketeering, smuggling, prostitution and large scale
fraud. Individuals associated with these groups are very mobile and
highly interconnected with confederates in the Russian federation.
These groups are also involved in the establishment of front companies
for the purpose of lending an air of business legitimacy to their
various criminal enterprises. They have laundered billions of dollars
of illicitproceeds and played the dominant role in channeling much of
the $200 billion in capital flight from the Russian Federation in the
last decade.
The FBI has approximately 250 pending investigations targeting
Russian organized crime groups in 35 field divisions in 27 states.
These cases encompass all major investigative programs including
Organized Crime/Drugs, White Collar Crime, Violent Crime/Major
Offenders and Racketeering Enterprise Investigations. These groups have
been found to be involved in a wide range of criminal activity
primarily in the areas of fraud, money laundering, murder,
prostitution, extortion and drug trafficking. As a result of these
investigations the FBI has identified elements of 25 distinct Russian
organized crime groups operating in the United States.
international crime
How critical do you assess the current and future threat to US
interests from international crime activities and networks? Is their
room for improvement in the FBI-CIA relationship in dealing with
international crime?
Current and future threat to US interests from international crime
activities and networks?
International organized crime is an immediate and increasing
concern of the worldwide law enforcement community. It is global in
nature and respects no political boundaries. The widespread political,
social, economic and technological changes which have occurred within
the last two decades have enabled these groups to become more firmly
entrenched on the international scene. The criminal activities of these
groups are likely to increase in scope, magnitude and diversity as
their operations expand worldwide. They are currently taking advantage
of more open immigration policies along with the increased ease of
international travel and international commerce to infiltrate existing
governments and legitimate businesses. These groups are becoming more
corporate in their outlook and more long-term in their planning. They
are utilizing high-tech communications and information technology to
increase the profitability of their criminal enterprises and to
transfer these funds around the world. Some of these groups have
demonstrated the capability to subvert or co-opt the governments and
law enforcement agencies in the countries in which they operate as they
have in Latin America. In short, international organized crime
represents a growing and serious threat to US interests both
domestically and worldwide.
FBI-CIA relationship dealing with international crime?
The FBI and CIA are working closely on a daily basis concerning
international organized crime. Both agencies are regularly exchanging
criminal intelligence information for the purpose of countering
worldwide organized crime activity, especially that which threatens US
interests directly. The FBI and CIA also routinely exchange personnel
who are specialists in a variety of areas which contribute toward these
complex transnational investigations. This relationship is now regarded
by both agencies as being mutually beneficial and reinforcing and is
continually evolving in proportion to the growing threat and
sophistication of these groups. As personnel from the FBI and CIA
become more familiar with each other's procedures, techniques and
systems, it is expected that the relationship between the two agencies
will improve even further.
trends in economic espionage
(2) A recent survey by the American Society of Industrial Security
estimates that intellectual property losses from foreign and domestic
espionage may have exceeded $300 billion in 1997 alone. Does this
estimate seem plausible to you? A January 12 Los Angeles Times article
dealing with this issue states that currently pending before the FBI
``are more than 700 foreign counterintelligence investigations
involving economic espionage.'' Is that an accurate number? Please
comment on trends in economic espionage directed against the U.S. How
effectively are you able to measure the level of economic espionage
against the U.S.? Has U.S. business reporting of economic espionage
improved over the last year? What other measures would help to stop
industrial espionage?
Because trade secrets are an integral part of virtually every
aspect of U.S. trade, commerce, and business, the security of trade
secrets is essential to maintaining the health and competitiveness of
critical segments of the U.S. economy.
Prior to the passage of the Economic Espionage Act, the FBI was
already addressing hundreds of foreign counterintelligence
investigative matters concerning hostile economic intelligence
activities. That pace continues.
The FBI initiated its Economic Counterintelligence Program in late
1994, with a mission to detect and neutralize threats against U.S.
economic interests sponsored or coordinated by foreign powers. This
focused effort resulted in a dramatic increasein FBI investigations and
a realization that existing legal remedies at the federal level were
insufficient to address the scope and nature of the economic espionage
activities.
Directly after the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 was signed into
law, the FBI National Security Division sponsored a series of six
regional Economic Espionage Conferences. These conferences brought
together elements of industry and U.S. federal government criminal and
intelligence sectors which play a role in economic espionage matters.
The American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS) recently
completed a study on economic espionage against U.S. corporations.
Richard J. Heffernan, a consultant to ASIS for the study, stated
``while the number of incidents appears to have leveled off at a high
plateau, the damage caused by these incidents has drastically increased
since the last survey. The amount of intellectual property at risk,
through actual theft and targeting, is $44 billion for the survey
period, this is an annualized amount of $31 billion.''
Under FBI contract, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has
developed a methodology to objectively assess and determine the scope
of economic loss resulting from the theft and intellectual property.
This Economic Loss Model was first applied to the facts of a case
involving the theft of Intellectual Property from a U.S. corporation by
a foreign competitor resulting in the foreign competitor capturing the
market. The American firm was involved in a joint venture activity to
produce a major product for foreign markets.
Using the tool the misappropriation of Intellectual Property in
this case resulted in over $600 million in lost sales alone, the direct
loss of 2,600 full time jobs, and a resulting loss of 9,542 jobs for
the economy as a whole over a 14-year time frame. The analysis also
determined that the U.S. trade balance was negatively impacted by $714
million, and lost tax revenues totaled $129 million.
An actual increase or decrease in economic espionage is difficult
to assess, although the reporting has shown a distinctive increase in
the past year. It appears that as the FBI and large U.S. corporations
succeed and the press follows high visibility cases, the reporting will
continue to improve.
Additionally, the FBI has forged crucial partnerships with the
Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the private industry to
allow for prompt detection and successful investigative efforts in this
area.
A number of countries continue to pursue economic collection
programs. Foreign economic collection focuses on science and
technology, as well as research and development. Of particular interest
to foreign collectors are dual-use technologies and proprietary
economic information which provide high profitability. Proprietary
business information, e.g., bid, contract, customer and strategy
information, is aggressively targeted. Foreign collectors have also
shown interest in government and corporate financial and trade data.
economic espionage law
(3) In last year's response to this Committee's question regarding
the effectiveness of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, the CIA stated
that the law clearly has attracted the attention of many of our key
economic competitors, but that it is ``perhaps too early to assess
whether the law has had an appreciable effect on the level of economic
espionage directed against the United States.''
(a) Over the past year, have you seen any results from the Economic
Espionage Act? Do you have information that the law has deterred
economic espionage activity by foreign governments or foreign
corporations?
(b) To what extent have you been able to use the Economic Espionage
Act of 1996 as a tool against foreign economic spying?
Five case examples are offered to demonstrate the FBI's efforts to
combat foreign economic spying. To date four indictments have been
brought under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA 96). Two of the
four involve foreign nationals. One foreign corporation has been
indicted. Guilty pleas have been entered in four of the five cases. In
each instance, a significant economic loss was prevented. The estimated
aggregate loss prevented is estimated to be several hundred million
dollars. Prosecutions are still pending in two of the five cases. An
outstanding warrant presently exists for a Taiwan national
Each prosecution is a strong example of close cooperation between
the FBI and the targeted major American company. In two cases,
investigation continues to fully determine the extent of foreign
government involvement.
Recent cases
Pittsburgh: (U.S. v. Worthing, 2 guilty pleas, no foreign
involvement) On December 7 1996. the first arrest under the new law
occurred in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Patrick Worthing and his brother
Daniel were arrested by FBI agents after agreeing to sell Pittsburgh
Plate Glass (P.P.G.) information to a Pittsburgh agent posing as a
representative of Owens-Corning, Toledo, Ohio. Both subjects were
charged under Title 18 United States Code, Section 1832 (18 USC 1832,
Theft of Trade Secrets). On April 18, 1997, due to his minimal
involvement, Daniel Worthing was sentenced to six months of home
confinement, five years probation, and 100 hours community service. In
June 1997, Patrick Worthing was sentenced to 15 months in jail and
three years probation. Potential loss prevented was $20-$40 million.
Philadelphia: (U.S. v. Hsu, et al., awaiting trial, involves Taiwan
nationals) On June 14, 1997, Hsu Kai-lo and Chester H. Ho, naturalized
U.S. citizens, were arrested by the Philadelphia Division for
attempting to steal the plant cell culture technology of Taxol,
patented and licensed by the Bristol-Myers Squibb Company. On July 10,
1997, a federal grand jury for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
returned indictments, totaling eleven counts against Hsu, Ho, and
Jessica Chou (a Taiwanese citizen who was actively involved with Hsu in
attempting to obtain the Taxol formulas). Hsu and Chou are employed by
the Yuen Foong Paper Manufacturing Company of Taiwan, a multinational
conglomerate. Ho is a professor at the National Chaio Tung University
and the Institute of Biological Science and Technology in Taiwan. Chou
remains in Taiwan. Two of the eleven counts were violations of Title 18
USC 1832. Potential loss prevented is estimated in the hundreds of
millions of dollars.
Cleveland: (U.S. v. Yang, et al., 1 guilty plea, two awaiting
trial, Taiwan company indicated) On September 5, 1997, Pin Yen Yang and
his daughter Hwei Chen Yang (aka Sally Yang) were arrested on several
charges, including Title 18 USC 1832. Also charged is the Four Pillars
Company, which has offices in Taiwan, and a registered agent in El
Campo, Texas. It is alleged that the Four Pillars Company, Pin Yen
Yang, Sally Yang, and Dr. Ten Hong Lee were involved in a conspiracy to
illegally transfer sensitive, valuable trade secrets and other
proprietary information from the Avery Dennison Corporation, Pasadena,
California, to Four Pillars in Taiwan. Dr. Lee, who is cooperating with
the investigation, has been an Avery Dennison employee, at the
company's Concord, Ohio, facility since 1986. Dr. Lee received between
$150,000 and $160,000 from Four Pillars/Pin Yen Yang for his
involvement in the illegal transfer of Avery Dennison's proprietary
manufacturing information and research data over an approximate ten
year period. On October 1, 1997, a federal grand jury returned a 21-
count indictment, charging Four Pillars, Pin Yen, and Sally Yang with
attempted theft of trade secrets, mail fraud, wire fraud, money
laundering, and receipt of stolen property. On the same date, Dr. Ten
Hong Lee plead guilty to one count of wire fraud and promised continued
cooperation with the investigation. Economic loss estimated at $50-$60
million.
Memphis: (U.S. v. Davis, 1 guilty plea, 27-33 months) On October 3,
1997, the Memphis Division arrested Steven Louis David, who was
indicted in the Middle District of Tennessee on five counts of fraud by
wire and theft of trade secrets. Wright Industries, the victim company
and a sub-contractor of Gillette, had fully cooperated with the FBI's
investigation. Although the FBI knows that Davis reached out to one
foreign owned company (BIC), it is unclear if he was successful in
disseminating trade secrets overseas. The FBI, however, has learned
that a competitor in Sweden had seen the drawings of the new Gillette
razor. Davis plead guilty on January 23, 1998, to a ten-count
indictment pertaining to theft of trade secrets and wire fraud.
Potential loss prevented was in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
Buffalo: (Pre-EEA 96, 1 guilty plea, PRC-related) Harold C. Worden
was a 30-year employee of the Eastman Kodak Corporation who established
his own consulting firm upon retiring from Kodak. Worden subsequently
hired many former Kodak employees and stole a considerable amount of
Kodak trade secret and proprietary information for use at his firm. As
a result of investigation, Worden signed a plea agreement with the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Western District of New York in which he pled
guilty to one felony count of violating Title 18, USC, Section 2314
(the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property). Worden was
sentenced to one year imprisonment, three months of home confinement
with monitoring bracelet, three years of supervised probation. and a
fine of $30,000. Investigation is continuing in the case. Potential
loss prevented was in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
espionage by foreign corporations
(4) Last year, in response to a question by this Committee, the
definition of economic espionage was given as ``government-directed or
orchestrated clandestine effort to collect U.S. economic secrets or
proprietary information.''
(a) To what extent are U.S. corporations threatened by the theft of
trade secrets by foreign entities that are not ``government directed or
orchestrated?'' How do you distinguish whether espionage is government
directed or not, especially if the foreign corporation involved
receives extensive government subsidies?
(b) What steps are you taking to prevent corporate espionage that
is not directed by a foreign government?
The determination of economic espionage committed to the benefit of
a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, is
made through logical FBI investigative steps. The FBI works with a
number of different entities to determine foreign involvement in
potential cases of economic espionage.
Many of the steps taken to prevent corporate espionage that is not
directed by a foreign government are essentially the same as those with
possible foreign involvement.
The FBI National Security Division's Awareness of National Security
Issues and Responses (ANSIR) Program brings to the attention of U.S.
corporations their potential vulnerability to economic espionage. ANSIR
communicates via INTERNET ([email protected]) with thousands of American
firms in high technology and other industry. ANSIR representatives are
located at each FBI office nationwide. To date, the FBI has presented
its economic espionage program at lectures in ten countries and has
reached an audience of over 80,000.
Industry is obviously one of the front lines in the battle to
protect trade secrets. The FBI is currently working with industry to
develop an on-line system to facilitate the timely sharing of
information concerning incident reports, threat profiles, and referrals
between industry and the FBI.
The FBI has developed significant information on the foreign
economic threat, to include: (1) identification of the foreign
government sponsors of economic espionage; (2) the economic targets of
their intelligence and criminal activities; and (3) the methods used to
clandestinely and illicitly steal U.S. Government information, trade
secrets and technology.
Also, the FBI helped establish in 1998 the Department of Defense
Counterintelligence Science and Technology Protection Working Group.
This group was formed through the joint efforts of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the FBI to develop a forum to identify and
address defense-related technology protection issues. The group has
attendees from all DOD elements, OSD, NSA, NRO, and other U.S.
Government agencies such as DOE and CIA. The FBI participates both at
the executive committee and working group levels.
The FBI has initiated efforts to include operative language of the
EEA 96 in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The FAR provides
uniform policies and procedures for acquisitions by executive agencies
of the federal government. Current plans include placing a definition
of the law and how to handle a violation (to include reporting
requirements) in the Improper Business Practices section of the manual.
Also, the instances where the U.S. Government retains the intellectual
property rights to a particular unclassified technology, clauses will
be included in the actual contract defining the technology as a trade
secret belonging to the U.S. Government.
These efforts are helping to forge a closer working relationship
between the FBI and the various governmental and U.S. industry
organizations that can assist and benefit from FBI counterintelligence
programs.
working with u.s. corporations
(5) If you find evidence that a U.S. company is being targeted for
economic espionage or is the subject of unfair competition with a
foreign firm, what mechanisms are in place to remedy the situation? How
often does this occur?
Practitioners of economic espionage seldom use one method of
collection rather they have concerted collection programs that combine
both legal and illegal, traditional and more innovative methods.
Investigations have and continue to identify the various methods
utilized by those engaged in economic espionage and to assess the scope
of coordinated intelligence efforts against the United States.
An intelligence collector's best source continues to be a mole, or
``trusted person,'' inside a company or organization, whom the
collector can task to provide proprietary or classified information.
Recently, we have seen the international use of the Internet to contact
and task insiders with access to corporate proprietary information.
Other methodologies include the recruitment of foreign students, joint
ventures, and the use of well-connected consultants to operate on
behalf of a foreign government.
A number of remedies are available to levy against entities that
commit economic espionage. The FBI has used various statutes in
addition to the EEA 96 to combat the theft of U.S. trade secrets. These
remedies include, but are not limited to, Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud,
Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property, Conspiracy, and Money
Laundering.
economic espionage against the u.s.
(6) How do you distinguish between economic espionage and
aggressive but legitimate information gathering by a foreign government
or a foreign corporation? Please describe the type of economic
espionage you see as the greatest threat to U.S. economic
competitiveness. To what extent is economic espionage against the U.S.
supported and coordinated by foreign governments?
Logical FBI investigation is used to determine foreign involvement
in specific cases.
The United States' proprietary economic information, research and
development into cutting-edge technologies, and its overall science and
technology bases are the envy of most nations in the world. The open
nature of the United States is conducive to foreign targeting of
sensitive economic and technological information. For these two
reasons, U.S. science and technology research and development, and
proprietary economic information are all susceptible to intense
collection efforts.
The increasing value of trade secrets in the global and domestic
marketplaces, and the corresponding spread of technology, have combined
to significantly increase both the opportunities and motives for
conducting economic espionage. Traditionally hostile countries and a
number of allies continue their collection of U.S. trade secrets. The
U.S. counterintelligence community has specifically identified the
suspicious collection and acquisition activities of foreign entities
from at least 23 countries. Analysis of updated information indicates
that of those identified countries, 12 are assessed to be most actively
targeting U.S. proprietary economic information and critical
technologies. This list has been revalidated since the 1996 Annual
Report on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage.
All economic espionage is a threat to U.S. economic
competitiveness. Foreign collection continues to focus on U.S. trade
secrets and S&T information products. Of particular interest to foreign
collectors are dual-use technologies and technologies which provide
high profitability.
Specifically, throughout the past year, foreign collectors had
particular interest in targeting U.S. industry in areas such as
biotechnology, communications equipment, aerospace technology,
computer-related software/hardware, nuclear-related technology,
electronics, pharmaceuticals, missile systems, lasers, night-vision
equipment, encryption technology, stealth technology, and aircraft
systems.
potential bw/cw attacks on the united states
(7) What is the likelihood that the U.S. will be subjected to a
biological or chemical attack within the next 2-5 years? 5-10 years?
How is this attack likely to be carried out? Do you consider C/B weapon
attack against the U.S. as more likely than a ballistic missile attack
against the U.S.? How difficult is it for a group to construct and
deliver an effective chemical weapon? A biological or radiological
weapon? A nuclear device? What existing groups now have or are seeking
such a capability?
It is very likely that there will be continued instances of WMD use
in the United States in the next 2-5 years, since the U.S. has
experienced increases in the number of individuals producing,
possessing, planning and/or using chemical and biological materials. In
1997 there were in excess of 100 investigations ongoing by the FBI in
the WMD arena. While many of the threats were considered non-credible,
more arrests and preventions have taken place by local, state and
federal authorities. Although cases over the last two years did not
involve large groups with significant resources, they did affect U.S.
citizens where treatment and/or hospitalization was required in
selected cases. The FBI has observed a trend of increased interest in
WMD materials, especially biological agents. As the result of recent
events, significant threats over the past few years, and the increased
availability and proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical
materials, there is a growing concern for the potential of terrorist
incidents occurring in the U.S. involving WMD, specifically chemical
biological, and to a lesser degree, radiological, and nuclear.
Therefore, the need to increase awareness and vigilance in the WMD
prevention, mitigation, and response arenas is critical.
The probability of a major WMD incident in the next 2-10 years is
extremely difficult to quantify. Based on a number of factors, to
include an arrest in April, 1997 of extremist elements of a right wing
group who planned to blow up a natural gas refinery as a diversion to
an armored car robbery, the prospect of such an incidentoccurring in
the U.S. as we reach the millennium in the United States is increasing.
Some of these factors include the following:
(a) Certain WMD agents are relatively inexpensive to produce,
commercially available, and easy to acquire, especially biological
purposes.
(b) Basic knowledge required to manufacture C/B substances is
readily available, difficult to detect, and increased public awareness
through the movies, T.V. and the Internet.
(c) Certain state sponsors of terrorism have active WMD programs.
Additionally, non-aligned terrorists and certain cult type groups are
still a growing concern. Such efforts could result in a major WMD
incident, however, we hold no credible intelligence presently that any
such action is being contemplated.
(d) The majority of both credible and non-credible threats in the
U.S. has come from ``lone offenders.'' Motivation ranges from anti-
government sentiment, extortion, end of the world type logic to those
who are mentally unstable. Nonetheless, while many did not possess the
technical know-how, several individuals have had the intelligence and
ability to create such devices.
Based on case studies of threats/incidents and investigations, the
FBI believes that two likely scenarios of a postulated attack in the
U.S. would consist of a lone individual or small group of individuals
either (1) deploying a small amount of a crude biological agent,
probably a toxin, in an unsophisticated delivery system, resulting in a
relatively small amount of casualties, but with some deaths possible or
(2) theft and/or sabotage of a site storing industrial chemicals,
associated with conventional explosives, with the likelihood of causing
more significant widespread damage.
Less likely, but equally difficult to quantify, is the use of an
effective radiological weapon. Although technically feasible,
difficulty in dispersal associated with a relatively small casualty
rate makes this option less appealing to a would-be terrorist. Recent
cases do not demonstrate a significant increase in interest in
radiological devices. However, as with all WMD scenarios, the mere
threat of any of these options can cause concern and disruption. The
FBI does share concerns with the Department of Energy (DOE) on the ever
present threat of the use of an improvised nuclear or radiological
device and has embarked on a long term initiative involving Nuclear
Site Security with both the DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) which cannot be further discussed in an unclassified setting.
Internationally, as alluded to previously, the threat from state
sponsored and nonaligned terrorists exists, however, the FBI has no
intelligence professing imminent attack against the U.S. from these
elements. We do consider the use of C/B weapon in a smaller
quantitative attack, as noted above, a much more likely alternative
than a ballistic missile attack.
How difficult is it for a group to construct and deliver an
effective chemical, biological, radiological weapon or nuclear device?
Currently, no groups other than certain nations have the capability
to build a nuclear device. Technical expertise in designing a weapon,
and in obtaining the plutonium, or Highly Enriched Uranium (HEW) are
required. Obtaining this critical material is what slowed down one
known terrorist sponsored state's nuclear weapon developed program and
will be the main difficulty faced by any terrorist group.
Radiological devices in comparison are easier to build, but have
extremely limited effectiveness other than the terror they would induce
in people who fell threatened by the possibility of irradiation. There
are thousands of radioactive sources used in medical and industrial
applications. They could be stolen rather easily and dispersed by a
terrorist or individual with an explosive charge. The results of such
an explosion would be fairly limited and would depend upon the type and
form of radioactive material stolen.
The creation of a C/B weapon is within the ability of an individual
or group, although effective dissemination is a more complicated task.
A stressed in this testimony, we believe that C/B weapons would be the
weapons of choice in the WMD environment, noting that we still believe
that conventional terrorist weapons and methods, i.e., bombings, use of
firearms and kidnappings are still the primary methods of operation by
terrorists.
The most difficult question from a law enforcement perspective is
determining motivation, so that prevention can mitigate damage. As
recent cases have shown, the reasons for using WMD can be as simple as
creating a diversion for an armored car robbery or to take revenge on
the Government, an institution or an employer. These factors make the
task of accurate and timely prediction very difficult. While many in
law enforcement and the intelligence community believe that a WMD event
is in our future, there exists the proverbial argument of ``how small
or large will it be?''
possible retaliation for the kansi sentencing?
(8) Mir Aimal Kansi has recently been sentenced to death for the
killing of CIA employees outside CIA Headquarters. What is the
likelihood that there will be acts of terrorism against the U.S. as a
result of this?
On November 10, 1997, a jury in Fairfax, Virginia, convicted Mir
Aimal Kansi of capital murder. In January 1998 the court sentenced
Kansi to death.
The potential threat of retaliation against U.S. targets for
Kansi's sentencing takes two distinct forms. The threat of some type of
retaliatory attack on U.S. soil is low but not outside the realm of
possibility. The threat of retaliation against U.S. targets outside the
United States should be viewed as a somewhat more likely scenario,
although the FBI has no credible information indicating that such an
attack should be expected.
Kansi's January 25, 1993, attack on CIA employees appears to be
more a product of his own dementia than an organized conspiracy.
Although Kansi warned during his subsequent trial that ``his people''
would retaliate for his sentencing, this warning may again represent
more his delusional thought processes than a serious threat referring
to a concerted effort to average his sentence. The FBI has not detected
a support network within the United States that appears prepared or
willing to retaliate for Kansi's sentencing. Kansi's own family has
publicly distanced itself from his actions. The possibility of
retaliation within the United States would most likely stem from the
same type of rogue, lone attacker represented by Kansi himself. An
attack by such an individual would be difficult to detect beforehand,
or to prevent.
The killing of four American businessmen in Karachi, Pakistan, 36
hours after Kansi's conviction raised speculation that the killings
were carried out in response to Kansi's conviction. However, there has
been no indication that the killings in Karachi are related to Kansi in
any way. To date, there have been no confirmed attacks against U.S.
targets stemming from Kansi's conviction or sentencing. However, attack
on ``soft'' U.S. targets abroad (business persons, tourists,
nongovernmental facilities) could prove attractive to any individual or
group seeking to avenge Kansi's sentence.
economic terrorism
(9) Do you have any evidence that foreign governments,
corporations, or individuals are targeting U.S. economic interests
using technology (such as a virus, computer hacking, etc.)? Do you see
this as a near-term threat, or more long-term?
The FBI has, in numerous investigations, encountered evidence that
foreign governments, corporations, and individuals have targeted U.S.
economic interests using computer technology. Many of these
investigations are still pending and some are classified, thus,
detailed discussion is not possible in this format.
A well-known example of this targeting is the Citibank
investigation which revealed that individual Russian hackers had
intruded into Citibank computers and attempt to divert over $10 million
worth of electronic transactions. The FBI has pending investigations in
which foreign corporations have, or have attempted to, obtain
proprietary information from U.S. corporations using computer
technology (either to access the information without authorization or
to exceed an authorized level of access to the information).
The FBI has an extensive economic counterintelligence program which
has identified attempts by foreign governments and foreign government-
controlled entities to target U.S. economic interests. Many of these
attempts now involve the use of computer technology either to obtain
information from or about the U.S. targets, or as a means to facilitate
more traditional espionage (e.g., to transmit large amounts of data
abroad, to provide a secure means of communication).
The threat, then, is present now, and is likely to increase in the
long-term along with reliance on networked information systems. The
FBI's outreach efforts for both economic counterintelligence and
critical infrastructure protection purposes tend to suggest that there
is significant amount of activity that is not reported by the victims
or intended targets.
terrorist's use of advanced infrastructure
(10) Terrorists are making more use of advanced computer and
telecommunications technology, their own communications and
intelligence gathering, and establishing a worldwide network of
contacts and support. Does this easy access to information,
communication, and transportation make the job of intelligence
gathering more difficult or does not provide opportunities which you
can exploit? Are theresteps that we can take to deny terrorists the
ease of movement and communication they now enjoy?
Without question, the acquisition and use by terrorists of advanced
technologies make the work of intelligence collection and operational
countermeasures much more difficult. While a terrorist's uncritical
reliance on new technologies may occasionally offer a spectacular
opportunity for intelligence collection, such is the exception rather
than the rule. The availability of strong encryption further
complicates collection in these circumstances.
From the FBI's perspective, the most effective steps to take here
are those that enhance the FBI's ability to exploit collection
opportunities and to monitor terrorist communications. An important
initial step is to reinforce the FBI's technical resources, in terms of
equipment, expert personnel, and trained agents. Given the rapid pace
of technology development, it is essential that the FBI be able to stay
abreast of the latest commercially available technologies. The Computer
Investigations and Operations Section (CIOS) of the National
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) serves as the FBI's focal point
for computer intrusion investigations. CIOS investigators and technical
personnel currently support operations in other National Security
Division components when computer technology issues arise. The
technical expertise encompassed by the CIOS and other FBI components is
subject to ever-increasing demands for criminal, counterterrorism, and
counterintelligence assistance. Maintaining the appropriate level of
expertise, retaining experienced personnel, and extending training to
more counterterrorism agents are important steps in countering the
broad spectrum of challenges posed by emerging technologies.
It will also be important to ensure that the current legal
authorities for FBI counterintelligence operations adequately
correspond to the current technological environment. While Foreign
intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authority applies to electronic
communications, surveillance of the content of computer communications
alone is not always sufficient to determine the path or true origin of
the communication. ``Transactional'' or computer log data is often of
critical significance. Unlike the legal authorities for criminal
investigations, the counterintelligence authorities do not yet include
mechanisms (short of full FISA authority) for obtaining this data. The
Justice Department has proposed the creation of a counterintelligence
``pen register'' mechanism to address this situation, and this proposal
represents an important enhancement of our ability to deny terrorists
the opportunities offered by new technology.
threat of information warfare by terrorists
(11) Our traditional definition of terrorism does not include such
things as computer attacks intended to damage our telecommunications or
transportation infrastructure. Are we prepared to deal with ``virtual
terrorism?'' What steps do we need to take to focus Intelligence
Community counterterrorism efforts on this new threat?
The FBI's counterterrorism and infrastructure protection programs,
computer attacks on critical infrastructures, such as
telecommunications or transportation, are already considered weapons
available to terrorists. In fact, terrorist groups have, in at least
one incident recently made public, used a computer-based ``denial of
service'' attack targeting the facilities of a foreign government. An
effective response to this emerging threat depends on the rapid
analysis and sharing of infrastructure information so that seemingly
isolated computer intrusions can be recognized as coordinated attacks.
The FBI's goal is to consolidate in the NIPC all relevant computer
intrusion information, as well as all of the FBI's background
information about the architecture and vulnerabilities of our nation's
key infrastructures. The NIPC can then analyze information, determine
the nature and scope of an attack, rapidly disseminate that information
to FBI counterterrorism components (as well as the U.S. Intelligence
Community [I.C.] and the Department of Defense) and if appropriate,
issue public warnings to those at risk. Using NIPC analytical product,
FBI counterterrorism components can craft an investigative response
with the appropreations.''
The Defense Department recently has sponsored information warfare
exercises that featured computer attacks on critical infrastructures.
The NIPC participated in these exercises, which incorporated
representatives from the I.C., other government agencies, and the
private sector. These exercises, as well as other discussions in the
I.C., all identify rapid and effective information sharing as the key
component of a successful defensive strategy. The NIPC is intended to
serve as the focal point for this information sharing, which will be
accomplished in a variety of ways. First, the NIPC will incorporate
direct technical connectivity with relevant military and intelligence
community components. Second, the NIPC staff will include a significant
number of DOD and I.C. representatives who will be fully integrated
into the NIPC and will facilitate rapid dissemination of information to
their home agencies in accordance with legal requirements.
Our defensive strategy against computer attacks also must
incorporate the private sector owners and operators of the
infrastructures. The FBI, through the NIPC's outreach programs and
other initiatives, is seeking to open channels of communication with
the private sector. The NIPC will ultimately incorporate private sector
representatives on its staff and will generate analytical products
tailored to the private sector's need for threat information and
warnings.
executive branch organization on the counterterrorism issue
(12) How well is the Executive Branch organized to deal with
counterterrorism? Is there room for improvement in the CIA-FBI
relationship on counterterrorism matters? Should the FBI be given
primacy over both domestic and foreign counterterrorism intelligence
gathering?
During the past three years, the U.S. Intelligence Community (I.C.)
has significantly improved its information sharing capabilities. Much
of this improvement stems from a profound shift in the organizational
structure of the I.C. Two specific examples of this new approach--the
DCI Counterterrorist Center (Central Intelligence Agency) and the FBI
Counterterrorism Center--reflect this shift. Both centers integrate
personnel from a variety of federal agencies into their daily
operations. Currently, 18 federal agencies--including the CIA, the
Department of Defense, and the U.S. Secret Service--maintain a regular
presence in the FBI Counterterrorism Center. Likewise, the FBI has
assigned senior-level officials to the DCI Counterterrorist Center.
These exchanges--and the operational enhancements they have brought to
the cooperative relationship of the two agencies--have helped the FBI
and CIA move beyond the mutual distrust that sometimes marked their
relationship in the past.
This sense of cooperation extends to training as well. Since 1995,
the FBI and CIA have participated in several joint training conferences
around the country. In addition, the CIA now participates in 4 of the
16 joint terrorism task forces operating in communities around the
country. CIA representation to these task forces improves their ability
to prevent acts of international terrorism from occurring in the United
States.
The FBI has been designated as the lead federal agency in the U.S.
Government's response to terrorism, both within and outside U.S.
borders. However, the FBI lacks the statutory mandate or the overseas
presence to assume ``primacy'' in foreign intelligence gathering. Given
the information sharing and integrated intelligence analysis that marks
the U.S.I.C.'s response to terrorism, little would be gained from
designating one agency as the primary foreign counterterrorism
intelligence gathering arm of the U.S. Government. Agencies such as the
CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have developed effective
means to monitor international terrorist threats. The coordinated
effort now in place benefits from the individual expertise each agency
brings to the government's intelligence gathering effort.
counterintelligence threat to national laboratories
(13) A September 1997 GAO report regarding DOE's security controls
over foreign visitors to the National Laboratories noted that ``DOE's
procedures for obtaining background checks and controlling the
dissemination of sensitive information are not fully effective'' and
that as a result, ``sensitive subjects may have been discussed with
foreign nationals without DOE's knowledge and approval.'' In your
opinion, how significant is the counterintelligence threat to DOE in
general and the National Laboratories in particular? What is being done
to rectify this problem?
For reasons previously outlined to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI), and due to the sensitive nature of the material
involved, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Domestic
Espionage Unit, Eurasian Section, National Security Division, is unable
to respond to this question in the unclassified manner requested. The
CIS and Domestic Espionage Unit can provide a classified statement to
the SSCI if so requested.
information operations
(16) The Defense Science Board and the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection both issued reports during 1997
which identified our nation's vulnerability to both physical and
computer attacks on our nation's information infrastructure. These
reports noted that such an attack could come from a foreign government,
a non-state actor, a criminal organization, or an individual hacker.
Howsignificant is the threat to our critical information infrastructure
in the short-run? In the long-run? How do you judge the Intelligence
Community's ability to collect intelligence on this threat?
As discussed in the responses to questions 9 and 11, the FBI
regards the threat to the critical infrastructures as real and already
present. The significance of the threat in the long-run depends, to a
great degree, on the extent to which the private sector owners and
operators of critical infrastructures recognize and respond to the
threat. In many actual intrusions investigated by the FBI, as well as
in certain exercise scenarios, intruders were able to compromise
critical systems by exploiting widely known (and easily removable)
vulnerabilities. As awareness of the threat increases, and relevant
technical information about the nature of specific threats is
disseminated, the owners of critical systems should be able to reduce
the number of real vulnerabilities. Likewise, the deterrent effect of
successful investigations or other responses to infrastructure attacks
should begin to be evident.
However, even if these trends develop successfully, the size and
complexity of the critical infrastructures alone suggest that the
threat will persist. Gathering intelligence about threats posed by
foreign governments and terrorist groups operating abroad is the
responsibility of the foreign intelligence community and will depend on
both traditional intelligence gathering capabilities and technical
capabilities designed to address the use of newer technologies.
Gathering intelligence on individual actors or criminal organizations
is often more complex, and depends on the integration of law
enforcement and infrastructure protection efforts within U.S.
territory. The FBI envisions the NIPC as the focal point for the
interaction of law enforcement and infrastructure protection efforts in
relation to this threat. Through the NIPC, and in compliance with
applicable legal restrictions, analytical product derived from this
information can be generated and disseminated through the I.C. to
provide a current and full-spectrum portrayal of the threat to our
infrastructures.
All of these efforts assume a great deal: the creation of an
effective information sharing protocol for the NIPC, the cooperation of
the private sector and other government entities, and a successful
campaign of outreach and education to infrastructure owners. However,
this is the FBI's strategy for addressing the threat, and important
steps have already been taken to implement these plans.
______
Defense Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC, June 12, 1998.
To: Don Mitchell,
Professional Staff Member,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Subject: Transmittal of the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA's)
Response to Questions For The Record January 1998 Threat
Hearing.
1. This is in response to your 12 March letter to LTG Patrick
Hughes, USA, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in which you
provided 29 Questions For the Record (QFRs) which resulted from the 28
January Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing on the Worldwide
Threat.
2. The enclosures provide DIA's response to the questions posed.
The unclassified response to topics 12, 19, 20 and 29 could not be
provided due to the sensitivity and nature of the subject matter. We
have provided classified submissions for these four QFRs.
3. If we can be of any further assistance in this or any related
matter, please feel free to call the Congressional Liaison staff.
Sincerely,
E. John Hutzell,
Acting Chief, Legislative Liaison.
Enclosures.
topic (1): russian military capabilities
Question a. In your prepared testimony, you state that ``[t]here is
little chance that Russia will reemerge as a global military peer
competitor to the U.S. over the next two decades. During this period,
Russia's strategic nuclear forces will remain the backbone of Moscow's
military might, preserving Russia's perception of great power status
and protecting its vital security interests.'' Does the fact that
Russia's strategic nuclear forces ``will remain the backbone of
Moscow's military might'' for the next 20 years raise the likelihood
that Russia might be more inclined to use nuclear weapons if it feels
that its interests are being threatened?
Answer. While Russian strategic nuclear forces ``will remain the
backbone of Moscow's military might'' for the next 20 years, their
views on national security indicate that they perceive no major
external threat for the foreseeable future.
Question b. What vital interests would Moscow perceive beyond its
periphery that would warrant its commitment of military force,
including the treat or use of nuclear weapons?
Answer. Beyond a direct threat to the Russian homeland, some
writings have indicated that Russia would consider a threat to ethnic
Russians residing in other states of the former Soviet Union as
warranting commitment of military force. Large numbers of ethnic
Russians remain, for example, in the Baltics states and in Kazakstan.
However, Russia's ability to project sustained, effective conventional
power remains limited. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that Russia
would use or even threaten to use nuclear weapons as a means to protect
ethnic Russians in other countries.
Question c. If present trends continue, what will be the Russian
military's capability to conduct operations 5 years from now? Do these
trends indicate the possibility that Russia may soon have insufficient
military force to retain order within Russia?
Answer. The Russian military's fate hinges on the policy priorities
and leadership capabilities of the man who replaces Yeltsin as well as
on the condition of the economy. The responsibility for the maintenance
of internal order, however, rests principally with the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and other security organizations, although ultimately
backed up by the Armed Forces. The forces of the other power ministries
have enjoyed general priority over the MOD for funding, conscript, and
military equipment.
Question d. What is your assessment of the likelihood that military
reform will succeed in Russia?
Answer. The military reform process--intended to transform Russia's
top-heavy military into an affordable force capable of meeting the
threats facing Russia--remains stalled. A pattern of neglect and poor
management of hard decisions on fundamental issues concerning the
financing and implementation of reform have been the greatest stumbling
blocks. Due to this inadequate leadership, the Armed Forces have been
left on their own to struggle with ad hoc survival mechanisms. Only
systematic control of budgetary resources and clear efforts at
reduction and reorganization will improve the success of reform. This
will depend largely on who succeeds Yelstin.
topic (2): russia's ballistic missile defense program
Question. Please describe the nature and extent of Russia's
ballistic missile defense effort. Where do you see Russia's ballistic
missile defense program heading over the course of the next 15 years?
Answer. It is expected that only a few significant developments
will be made in Russia's ballistic missile defense effort over this
time period. They are developing both a new ICBM and SLBM within the
limitations of extant arms control treaties. Revenue from the export of
arms has helped Russia's defense programs to some extent. The latter
includes R&B and modernization efforts for strategic weapons programs.
As previously indicated, this is also consistent with the reliance on
strategic systems for Russian security interests.
topic (3): russia's safeguarding of nuclear materials
Question. What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the
adequacy of Russia's safeguard of nuclear weapons and fissile material?
Answer. The Russians have been consolidating some nuclear weapons
reducing the threat somewhat, however, the deplorable financial
situation has proven stressful for the Ministry of Defense and equally
so for the nuclear security system. Undoubtedly, risks will endure.
Question a. What about missile systems, components, and technology?
What is the status of Russian nuclear command and control systems?
Answer. Russia became a member of the Missile Technology Control
Regime in 1995. However, activities of Russian defense firms remain
problematic. The central government has also shown indications that it
lacks total control of some of its personnel and resources.
Russia currently has a safe and reliable system for controlling its
strategic nuclear forces. However, many of the components that make up
the infrastructure of Russia's strategic command and control system are
aging.
Question b. Has there been any change in the last year regarding
Russian capabilities and programs in chemical or biological weapons?
Does Russia persist in unacknowledged CW programs and illegal BW
programs?
Answer. Key components of the former Soviet biological warfare (BW)
program remain largely intact and may support a possible future
mobilization capability for the production of biological agents and
delivery systems. Moreover, work outside the scope of legitimate
biological defense activity may be occurring now at selected facilities
within Russia. Such activity, if offensive in nature, would contravene
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, to which the
former Soviet government is a signatory. It would also contradict
statements by top Russian political leaders that offensive activity has
ceased.
topic (4): transfer of technology from the former soviet union
Question. What general trends has the Intelligence Community
detected in the flow of scientists, technology, and unconventional
military equipment to other nations? What evidence have you detected
that Soviet nuclear materials, BW, CW or ballistic missile-related
materials or technology have found their way to the international black
market?
Answer. Russia continues to conduct some foreign sales related to
NBC programs as well as missile technologies. It is unclear whether all
or any of these marketing efforts are conducted officially or on the
black market. It is likely that related training and technology support
are inclusive to these same efforts. Russia does continue cooperation
with China in the field of nuclear related technologies. This is
worrisome since China also has similar market ties to Iran and
Pakistan. Russian defense firms reportedly have assisted missile
programs in South Asia, Middle East, and China. The ongoing poor
economic conditions in Russia will continue to provide an environment
for both sanctioned and illicit arms sales.
topic (5): china's military strategy
Question a. In your prepared testimony, you state that ``China
military strategy will continue to emphasize the development of a
survivable nuclear retaliatory capability as a deterrent against the
use of nuclear weapons by the United States, Russia or India. There is
no indication that China will field the much larger number of missiles
necessary to shift from a minimalist, retaliation strategy to a first-
strike strategy.'' How confident are you of this assessment? What
trends do you perceive in the quantity and quality of Chinese ballistic
missiles capable of reaching the U.S.? Are these views shared by the
remainder of the Intelligence Community?
Answer. There is a high confidence the Chinese will not produce
more than the required ICBMs and the additional nuclear warheads for
them over the ten years that would be needed for retaliatory strikes.
China's limited nuclear deterrent has been, and will remain, a crucial
component of its military strength and international prestige and is
seen as contributing to Beijing's ability to maintain an independent
foreign policy. China's defense expenditures are not expected to
increase significantly for nuclear defense modernization. The
Intelligence Community is in general agreement on these views.
Question b. Do you believe that China views its nuclear forces as a
deterrent to other non-nuclear, military or political actions by the
U.S. or other countries?
Answer. China considers the United States its principal military
competitor in Asia. China has put increased emphasis on procuring
nuclear forces designed to deter U.S. and the military involvement of
other nations in Asian affairs.
topic (6): china and taiwan
Question. In your prepared testimony, you state that ``(t)he Taiwan
issue remains the major potential flashpoint. Beijing believes U.S.
policy encourages the independence movement of Taiwan, deliberately or
inadvertently.'' Please elaborate. What is the potential for armed
conflict between China and Taiwan? What would be the likely outcome of
such a conflict? Has the threat of confrontation between the PRC and
Taiwan replaced North Korea as the number one security issue in Asia?
Answer. From China's perspective, Taiwan is the single most
important issue affecting Sino-American relations. Miscalculations or
provocations generally run at a higher risk when two perspectives
diverge as in the case of China and the U.S. on the issue of Taiwan.
Both Taiwan and China see advantages in avoiding confrontation in
achieving their long-term goals. Though China continues to modernize
its forces in part to present a credible threat against Taiwan, it has
not developed a significant amphibious capability that would be
required for an invasion of ``Formosa''. North Korea remains the number
one security issue in Asia.
topic (7): india and pakistan
Question a. In your prepared testimony, you state that ``India and
Pakistan both continue to view their security relationship in zero-sum
terms, possess sufficient material to assemble a limited number of
nuclear weapons, have short range ballistic missiles, and maintain
large standing forces in close proximity across a tense line of
control. In short, although the prospect for a major war between India
and Pakistan is low at present, we remain concerned about the
potential, particularly over the near term for one of their occasional
military clashes to escalate into a wider conflict. Over the long term,
however, the threat of large scale war should diminish.'' Why do you
consider a large-scale conflict between India and Pakistan likelier in
the short term than in the long term? Is this assessment shared by
other components of the Intelligence Community?
Answer. The risk of a major war between India and Pakistan, while
still low, has increased recently as a result of several factors: the
March election of the Hindu nationalist government in India; Pakistan's
provocative Ghauri missile launch in early 1998; and both the Indian
and Pakistani nuclear tests. Additional nuclear tests and missile tests
by one or both countries is likely, which would further inflame
tensions. Moreover, tensions over the disputed Kashmir region will
continue to add friction to the contentious relationship. Despite the
level of tensions, neither country wants war. Consequently, any
conflict is likely to be the result of escalation or miscalculation and
that is where our concern rests.
Major acts of terrorism occur in both countries, escalate
periodically and both sides are prone to holding the other responsible.
Although such acts will continue to contribute toward tension between
the two states, it is unlikely that individual acts of terrorism will
lead to war between Pakistan and India. However, a dramatic terrorist
incident, which one side ascribes to the other could cause an
escalation in tension and subsequent exchanges along the border, in
turn inadvertently leading to war.
topic (8): north korea as a continuing threat
Question a. In your prepared testimony, you state that ``some
significant--perhaps violent--change is likely in the next five years.
There are four basic alternatives: leadership change, government
collapse, negotiated accommodation with the South, or major economic
reform.'' In your opinion, what is the likeliest scenario? Why?
Answer. Of the four alternatives, we believe the most likely
scenario is leadership change and continue to assess that Pyongyang is
least likely to attempt major economic reform or a negotiated
accommodation with the South. Pyongyang's response to economic crisis
has been one of retrenchment and ideological exhortation, coupled with
rejection of economic reform which it fears would undermine both regime
legitimacy and control and hasten the demise of the current government.
Question b. You also stated in your testimony that ``over the next
several years Pyongyang's WMD, missile, artillery, and special
operations force capabilities will likely improve, despite the dire
economic situation.'' How do you account for this?
Answer. There is no doubt that North Korea continues to emphasize
these capabilities. WMD, missile, and artillery systems serve not only
as a deterrent. North Korea is always concerned with its geo-strategic
position particularly as a small country surrounded by powerful
neighbors. It likely sees these systems as a cost effective means to
maintain a credible military threat to control or destroy allied
defenses before full U.S. force engagement.
topic (9): changes in south korea
Question. Talks on peace on the Korean peninsula involving North
and South Korea, China and the U.S., began in Geneva last December.
Long time opposition leader Kim Dae Jung won last December's
presidential election in South Korea. What do these developments bode
for change in South Korea as well as prospects for normalized relations
between or reunification of North and South Korea?
Answer. This is basically a political question on which State has
the lead and is best qualified to comment. That said, we believe
prospects for normalized relations between North and South Korea depend
on North Korea seeking compromise and reconciliation rather than
confrontation. There is some ground to speculate that North Korea may
move gradually in that direction over the next few years--the Four-
Party Talks being one example suggesting that change may be possible--
but no solid evidence yet of any change in Pyongyang's intentions.
topic (10): support for iraq in the middle east
Question. Currently, how much support exists for Saddam in the
region? If military action were taken against Iraq, what would be the
likely reaction of other nations in the region? What, if any,
governments in the Middle East would be publicly supportive of military
action against Iraq?
Answer. There is very little support for Saddam Hussein or the
Iraqi regime in Middle Eastern ruling circles. Any reaction to military
action against Iraq would be greatly dependent upon the conditions that
could precipitate such action. Arab leaders remain concerned about the
possible domestic and regional repercussions of such an attack. A few
states could be expected to publicly support military action given that
such actions followed full UNSC support.
topic (11): iraq's weapons of mass destruction
Question. What is the current status of Iraq's BW, CW, nuclear
weapon, and missile programs? How much activity has there been in each
of these areas since the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War? Do we have
any evidence that the Iraqi regime has tested CW or BW agents on humans
since the Persian Gulf War?
Answer. Based on efforts conducted over the past few years in this
venue, Iraq has demonstrated a commitment to rebuilding and expanding
their WMD programs. The Iraqi nuclear program sustained considerable
damage during the Gulf War and lost most of its infrastructure.
However, they do retain critical knowledge gleaned by Iraqi scientists
and technicians. Iraq maintains a limited ability to revitalize its
chemical weapons program which also suffered during the Gulf War as
well as through the subsequent UNSC inspections. Though it is unclear,
the Iraqis may also retain a limited biological capability. The
difficulty with this field of weaponry is that much of it is dual-use
and can be found in Universities and similar commercial research labs.
Iraq continues to devote limited resources and funding to overall
development of these deadly programs. It is certain that if sanctions
are lifted, Iraq will proceed expeditiously with its NBC programs as
well as the corresponding delivery systems.
topic (13): the israeli presence in lebanon
Question a. Comment on the losses the Israelis have suffered in
Lebanon in the past year, the impact of those losses on Israeli public
opinion.
Answer. Israeli public opinion polls consistently highlight a
majority of support for occupying the security zone in southern Lebanon
until security requirements for northern Israel are met despite losses.
Question b. What is the likelihood that Israel will initiate a
unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon?
Answer. It is reasonable to assume that as long as the Hizballah
continue to operate in southern Lebanon, Israel will more than likely
seek to maintain some sort of presence.
Question c. Do the recent losses indicate that the Hizballah is
becoming a more effective force?
Answer. IDF losses in 1997 more than likely resulted from a variety
of factors.
Question d. Comment on the military effectiveness of Israel's
allies, the Southern Lebanon Army (SLA).
Answer. The SLA is of limited strength and consists of
approximately 2 to 3 thousand personnel. They operate primarily with
small arms, however, they do possess 20 to 40 pieces of armored
equipment.
Question e. Describe the current military cooperation between the
Israeli Defense Force and the SLA.
Answer. The IDF continues to train, equip, and support the SLA.
topic (14): syria
Question a. Assess the current military strategic threat Syria
poses for Israel and Syrian military capabilities in general.
Answer. Syrian military capabilities are severely limited and pale
in comparison to Israeli capabilities. Severe deficiencies in
maintenance skills, spare parts reserves, and transportation resources
limit Syrian sustainment capabilities. Syria recognizes its
deficiencies and has stressed the development of ballistic missiles and
chemical programs as a deterrent to Israeli superiority.
Question b. What is the possibility Syria will exercise the
military option to regain the Golan?
Answer. Syria is well aware of Israel's military superiority and
the high military and political risks associated with an attempted
land-grab on the Golan. As always, the chance of miscalculation remains
a factor in such contentious zones.
Question c. How do you interpret the Syrian military movement
toward the Golan within the last two years?
Answer. Syria retains the objective of regaining the Golan Heights
but as previously mentioned it recognizes its military shortfalls.
topic (15): libya's chemical weapons program
Question. What is the status of Libya's CW activities? What is the
status of their overall CW program? Is Libya making progress toward
obtaining any other weapons of mass destruction or their systems?
Answer. Libya maintains a heavy reliance on external assistance for
its chemical weapons program given that it is deficient with its
indigenous capabilities. Still, Libya has one of the most prominent
programs in North Africa and the Middle East. Libya lacks adequate
delivery systems for its chemical weapons. Nevertheless, the threat
must be considered. Both the Libyan nuclear and biological programs are
limited by a small technical base as well as very little outside
assistance. As an added shortfall, Libya has not proceeded very far in
regards to its ballistic missile program.
topic (16): cuban military capabilities
Question a. Does Cuba in any way pose a strategic threat to the
United States at this time? Will Cuba pose a strategic threat to the
U.S. at any time in the next two to five years? What, if anything,
might change that assessment?
Answer. Cuba poses a negligible threat to the U.S. and other
surrounding countries. Cuba's weak economy and lack of foreign military
benefactors will probably continue for the foreseeable future and
subsequently prevent the country from significantly improving its
fighting forces.
Question b. (U) Is Cuba currently attempting to undermine
democratically-elected governments in the Western Hemisphere? What
support, if any, is it providing opposition movements in Colombia and
Peru?
Answer. Throughout the 1990s, Cuba has focused on improving
relations with Latin American governments.
topic (17): cuba and narcotics trafficking
Question a. Are Cuban Government officials implicated in narcotics
trafficking?
Answer. There is no significant information to suggest the Cuban
government is involved in narcotics trafficking. Allegations that Fidel
Castro and his brother Raul are involved in narcotics trafficking have
been repeatedly denied by the Government of Cuba (GOC). Since the
celebrated trial and execution of top military and Interior Ministry
officials on drug smuggling charges in 1989, the GOC has refuted any
existence of narcotics-related corruption by government officials. The
US Attorney's Office in Miami drafted a proposed indictment in 1993
implicating Raul Castro, Manuel Pinerio and 13 other Cuban officials
for trafficking narcotics through Cuba. The case failed to proceed to
the indictment stage because US officials determined that there was not
enough evidence to warrant prosecution.
In July 1996, a press report identified Cuban Dictator Castro as
being personally involved in cocaine trafficking into the United
States. The newspaper also alleged that drug dealers busted with
thousands of pounds of cocaine from Cuba not only say that the cocaine
was brought into the United States with Castro's coordination, but also
that there are photos of Castro with the traffickers and video of
Castro assisted drug operations. Another report from the same press
source claimed that United States drug enforcement agencies suspected
the drugs were offloaded inside Cuban territory from a Colombian
freighter and the agency is investigating a photo which documents a
meeting between Castro and one of the drug smugglers arrested. The
veracity of this report has not been confirmed and a DEA analyst
indicated that the agency has no reporting to support these
allegations.
Question b. To what extent are narcotraffickers overflying Cuban
airspace to bring drugs into the U.S.?
Answer. Drug traffickers originating from Colombia and Jamaica
routinely exploit Cuba's airspace for transit of narcotics to the
United States.
Question c. Do these overflights require Cuban government
complicity of any kind?
Answer. Currently, there is no evidence supporting Cuban complicity
in drug trafficking overflights.
topic (18): trends in illegal narcotics
Question. In your prepared testimony, you state that ``illicit
synthetic drug production in urban areas is a significant threat.''
Please elaborate. Have we detected any change in the worldwide supply
or demand for illegal drugs? Are our efforts having any effect on the
drug trafficking organizations?
Answer. The Foreign Intelligence Community defers to the U.S.
domestic Law Enforcement Agencies to address the threat posed by
illicit synthetic drug production in domestic urban areas.
The Foreign Intelligence Community does not address the question of
the demand for illicit drugs in the United States. That information is
maintained by U.S. domestic Law Enforcement Agencies, as are the
available details on demand elsewhere in the world. In terms of any
changes in the supply of drugs, there are periodic shifts/ fluctuations
in the availability of both heroin and cocaine, based on such elements
as counterdrug operational successes, adverse weather in cultivation
areas, blight or other crop diseases, etc. However, none of these
elements has had a crippling impact on the availability of those drugs
in the United States. The supply continues to be more than adequate to
meet the demand.
As previously noted, counterdrug efforts have had some impact on
the regional availability of drugs in the United States. Such successes
primarily have been those making it more costly or inconvenient for
drug traffickers to conduct business.
Various key cocaine and heroin traffickers have been arrested or
imprisoned in recent years, disrupting operations and spawning
infighting among those seeking to assume power.
Operational successes have disrupted some traditional routes used
by traffickers to move drugs in and from South America, causing them to
increase use of alternative means of moving their products.
Some successes against the traffickers' financial assets (cash
flow, properties, etc.) have raised the cost of doing business both in
the United States and elsewhere.
Operational successes disrupting the supply of essential chemicals
have adversely affected the traffickers' production efforts.
Seizures of drug shipments (especially cocaine) have increased
traffickers' costs, possibly necessitating increased production to meet
demand.
These operations have not yet significantly reduced the supply of
heroin and cocaine throughout the United States. However, if they can
be sustained in the source and transit zones, it is much more likely
that counterdrug operations ultimately will reduce the supply of drugs
in the United States.
topic (21): the chemical weapons convention
Question a. Over one hundred of the 168 signatories have ratified
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). (Last November, both Iran and
Russia completed their CWC ratification.) Do you have any intelligence
that any of the signatories of the CWC have engaged in activities that
raise compliance concerns?
Answer. Due to ongoing concern about worldwide chemical warfare
(CW)-related activities, the Intelligence Community (IC) monitors the
spectrum of activities related to the CW issue.
Question b. The Intelligence Community has conceded that its
ability to monitor compliance with the CWC is limited. Has the U.S.
monitoring capability improved since U.S. ratification of the CWC?
Answer. The U.S. continues to seek ways to enhance its ability to
monitor CW programs and related proliferation activities through
enhancements in technology and personnel resources.
topic (22): north korea's taepo dong missiles
Question. The North Korea Taepo Dong II missile (which is under
development) will have an estimated range of 4,000 to 6,000 kilometers,
and therefore qualifies as an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM). How confident are you in these range estimates? What U.S.
states or territories could the Taepo Dong hit? How soon could the
Taepo Dong I and Taepo Dong II become operational, and how firm is that
estimate? How has this assessment changed in the last year?
Answer. North Korea lacks test experience on the Taepo Dong II and
the potential range remains as the theoretical projection. Potentially,
the Taepo Dong II system could conceivably provide Pyongyang with the
ability to reach Guam and parts of Alaska, but not Hawaii. Both the
Taepo Dong I and II are still in the early stages of development and it
could be sometime before actual flight testing begins and much depends
on the availability of resources.
topic (23): the proliferation of ballistic missiles
Question. In your prepared testimony, you state that ``we are
particularly concerned about two trends: the significant increase we
expect over the next two decades in the numbers of ballistic missiles
with ranges between 300 and 1500 kilometers; the potential for land
attack cruise missiles to be more widely proliferated.'' Please
elaborate. What countries' ballistic missile and cruise missile
programs are you most concerned about?
Answer. With regard to ballistic missiles, the developing programs
in the Middle East and East Asia are the most challenging to the
strategic and national security interests of the United States. Of
particular concern are the rogue states of Iran, Iraq, and Libya. In
South Asia, developments in missile capabilities have taken on greater
significance with both the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The
success of the North Korean missile programs and any subsequent
proliferation as well as the status of Russian programs are and will
remain chief concerns.
With regard to the land attack cruise missile threat, proliferation
will proceed via direct foreign military sales of complete systems, as
well as through indigenous developments. Both Russia and China have
been prime developers as well as exporters of land attack cruises.
topic (24): threat to u.s. deployed forces in bosnia
Question a. What are the prospects and key actions required for
establishing long-term stability in Bosnia? While the goal of the
international military presence is to make it possible for the three
factions to coexist peacefully, a threat against foreign forces
remains. What is the threat facing US Forces deployed in Bosnia?
Answer. To establish long-term stability in Bosnia, the economy
must be reconstructed, a legitimate, representative, political
leadership must be established; rule of law must be established and
enforced, free and open media must exist; and finally, the armed forces
must be integrated or kept in military balance. All of the above will
aid in reducing the mistrust and ethnic animosities all sides harbor.
Nonetheless, it is possible that it will be at least a generation
before Bosniacs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs can peacefully
coexist.
Creating a functional society will require a long-term commitment
by a united international community. As long as key western nations
pursue a focused and coordinated approach in implementing the civilian
aspects of Dayton supported by a credible military force, the prospects
for success are greatly improved. Anything short of such an effort will
likely result in failure.
All three of the entity armed factions have resisted full
implementation of the Dayton Accords at one time or another. Each
ethnic group will only cooperate as long as its perceived, long-term
interests are not forfeited or marginalized. Although the civilian
aspects of Dayton are lagging in their implementation, progress has
been made. Such progress has been achieved by holding all parties'
political leaders accountable for their actions.
The threat facing the forces in Bosnia remains low to medium. When
SFOR simply conducts its daily mission, the threats facing SFOR are
low. However, when SFOR engages in other actions such as seizing
communications towers or arresting war criminals, then the threat
increases temporarily, albeit not significantly. Recent events have
shown that low level violence initiated primarily by civilians, has
followed such SFOR actions. The threat could possibly increase and
elicit a stronger response if SFOR were to arrest more high-profile war
criminals. However, the longer Bosnia remains under international
supervision, the less it appears that such a move as the arrest of war
criminals will elicit a violent response.
The threat from the entity armed forces remains low. SFOR has taken
several steps such as monitoring all armies, permitting the entities to
train only with SFOR approval, and keeping all equipment in cantonment
sites, which has significantly reduced this threat. None of the
factions will risk taking any kind of overt military action against
SFOR. The Federation Army is receiving training and equipment from the
Train and Equip program which significantly modifies its attitudes and
behavior towards SFOR. The Bosnian Serb Army, which no longer enjoys an
overwhelming superiority in heavy weapons, poses very little threat to
SFOR as it is hampered by its own internal problems such as
insufficient funds for training, equipment modernization, maintenance,
and even pay and salaries.
Question b. What are the shortfalls in Intelligence Community
support to Bosnia operations and what is being done to rectify these
problem areas?
Answer. The Intelligence Community conducts a constant effort to
explore new or modified ways to best support operational forces in
Bosnia all in an equal attempt to avoid shortfalls.
Question c. In recent months, SFOR troops (including U.S. soldiers)
have acted in support of Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic by
seizing radio and television transmitters, police stations and other
government installations controlled by her hard-line opponents. Does
the participation of U.S. troops in such operations expose them to
increase risk of attack from hard-line supporters? Would hard-line
response be limited to stone-throwing civilian mobs, or could it
escalate into sniper attacks and other forms of armed conflict?
Answer. US forces are always at some level of risk and this can
recede or escalate dependent on misperceptions or miscalculations of
the indigenous factions.
(Note: Original request from SSCI did not contain Question d,
Question e, or Question h)
Question f. Would more active participation by SFOR in civil
implementation tasks such as refugee resettlement increase the risk to
U.S. forces?
Participating in refugee resettlement, freedom of movement, and
other civilian programs may expose U.S. forces to increased risk. The
international Community has proclaimed 1998 as the year of refugee
returns and it has begun to focus on moving people back to areas where
they are ethnically in the minority. Although the factions seem to have
accepted the increased role of the international community in advancing
the Dayton process return of refugees and displaced persons to minority
areas is likely to spawn incidents of local resistance. This resistance
has in the past and will likely continue to turn violent and draw SFOR
in to keep order. Refugees could also become again the pawns of
political disputes, as factions use them to pursue their political and
territorial agendas. The threat to SFOR could further grow should it
become involved in dealing with organized crime and corruption. The
criminal elements in Bosnian society are prone to violence and possess
the capability and determination to use it if they feel threatened.
Question g. What is the current status of efforts to remove land
mines in Bosnia? Do land mines still pose a significant threat to U.S.
troops in Bosnia?
Answer. This threat in the region of the former Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) is pervasive and the international community continues
efforts to locate and destroy these landmines. For the 4.5 years
between mid-1991 and the end of 1995, minelaying has been ongoing,
encompassing every imaginable method ranging from well planned and
emplaced, marked and recorded minefields to simple hand scattering of
antipersonnel (AP) mines. Additionally, sophisticated minelaying
techniques have evolved that enhance the obstacle while protecting the
mines themselves. The prevalence of low-metallic-content, difficult-to-
detect landmines requires heightened individual soldier skills,
particularly in the area of mine detection.
A serious threat from booby traps also exists. From the onset, the
former Yugoslav Army was extremely well equipped with mines, fuzes,
special booby trap devices, and explosives. The breakdown of natural
authority, open displays of ethnic hatred, time, and availability of
these devices has fostered a willingness to booby trap mines,
equipment, facilities, and buildings. Any heightened danger from booby
trapped mines is fully addressed by the combat engineer doctrine of
blowing mines in place.
The landmine situation faced by Bosnia is among the worst in the
world; only Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola have a clearly more
daunting problem. The mined area of Bosnia and Herzegovina is
approximately, 8,400 square kilometers. There are 18,086 known mine
fields, containing an estimated total of 246,262 anti-personnel and
49,507 anti-tank mines. While our information is not complete, it is
estimated that there may be between 600,000 and 1,000,000 landmines in
country (a lower figure than the 1.7 million previously estimated).
A few germane points to consider about the landmine problem in
Bosnia include the following:
The FRY was a major producer of landmines.
The vast majority of mines found in Bosnia were manufactured by the
FRY.
Many of the AP and AT mines are within the category of low-
metallic-content, difficult-to-detect mines.
All factions conducted mine-laying (including some of the UNPROFOR
peacekeeping forces).
More than 17,000 minefields have been identified with the FRY.
Most minefields are small, point minefields located at once
important checkpoints strategic locations, etc.
Multiple belt, extensive mine obstacles have been encountered.
Most main routes are safe.
Shoulders, bypass routes, and unapproved roads remain suspect.
UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR have operated successfully in the region
despite the prevasiveness of the mine threat. Random and poorly marked
often describe the minefields.
Question i. Are you satisfied that the U.S. has sufficient HUMINT
assets in Bosnia to provide early warning of possible threats to U.S.
Force?
Answer. The continued U.S. commitment to Bosnia forces us to
constantly evaluate the intelligence assets in country.
Question j. How do you determine the extent of personnel required
for HUMINT collection operations for force protection.
Answer. DIA provides resources but how other units are sized is
beyond our ken.
topic (25): nato expansion
Question. What are the risks, if any, to US intelligence personnel
and the intelligence community in general, in allowing Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary to join NATO?
Answer. As with any new military venture, there is a certain amount
of risk involved. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are working
hard to ensure compliance with NATO standards across the spectrum of
military cooperation and operations.
topic (26): the threat posed by disease
Question. To what extent has HIV had an impact on the health and
economies of foreign countries? How has HIV impacted foreign
militaries?
Answer. The HIV pandemic is worse than previously estimated by
World Health Organization and the United Nations. This fact was
verified last November when the UN Program on HIV/AIDS revised their
estimate of worldwide HIV infections upward to 30 million at the end of
1997; a 20 percent increase over their previous assessments.
As HIV infections develop in to AIDS cases, health systems will be
challenged to accommodate the cost of treating AIDS patients or to
develop alternative care schemes. In many underdeveloped countries,
AIDS treatment is likely to be reserved for leaders and those who can
afford costly pharmaceutical regimens. Developed countries will be
equipped to handle the cost of medications for a large infected
population, and have the health care structure to support and monitor
patients for compliance with treatments regimens. The problem will be
most acute in countries that are on the cusp of developed status, or
where the expectation of high-quality health care does not easily
permit diverting patients from traditional inpatient care, such as in
South Africa.
HIV infections, like other medical problems, have the ability of
significantly taxing health infrastructures depending on their
severity. This can be problematic in developing regions such as Sub
Saharan Africa where limited resources and facilities tend to further
exacerbate the difficulties.
HIV infection rates remain highest in Africa's militaries and to a
lesser extend those of Southeast Asia. Because of the deplorable state
of the economy in Russia and the Ukraine, necessary funds to properly
maintain medical facilities and resources has dropped placing the armed
forces of these countries at a greater health risk.
By itself, being infected by HIV does not affect the performance of
soldiers or their units. Only when HIV-infected soldiers become sick
does their performance become impaired and their unit's capabilities
degrade. The impact on the unit's overall capabilities depends on what
duties were performed by the sick soldiers and how easily those
soldiers can be spared or replaced. However, the impact of losing key
personnel, such as pilots, and technicians, or effective leaders, could
be severe and contribute to degraded readiness.
topic (27): the role of dod intelligence analysis
Question. As senior military intelligence advisor to the Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, your
production units and activities around the world have been the
producers of action-oriented intelligence--the moment-to-moment
reporting that enables policy makers and military commanders to make
tactical decisions with timely information. How do you evaluate the
Defense Intelligence Community's performance in the production of
threat assessments? What contributions have been provided by the
reserve component?
Answer. The demands for threat assessment production underscore the
need to strike the right balance between current and term intelligence
requirements. The Defense Intelligence Community is actively seeking
means and ways to strengthening its capabilities to support the
warfigher, decisionmaker, and planner with their demands. The turmoil
and uncertainly of the current and future security environment that was
highlighted in the testimony will continue to give credence to managing
our support most expeditiously and prudently. The Defense Intelligence
Community has and will continue to respond to customer requirements for
production for threat assessments.
Reserve component contributions are driven by active force tasking.
The theater/ service intelligence production centers and DIA may use
the already provided, Service Reserve-funded mandatory participation
time (drill and annual tour) of their wartraced reservists to fulfill
intelligence requirements. This concept, having the reservist ``do in
peacetime what would be done in wartime,'' is a basic tenet of the
January 1995 Deputy Secretary of Defense-approved implementation plan
to leverage reserve intelligence assets in peacetime against Defense
intelligence requirements. In essence, reservist mobilization readiness
is enhanced by having the reservist perform real missions in peacetime.
In addition to their mandatory participation time, reservists may
augment active organizations, proving intelligence support via special
man-day tours. There are several funding sources for those man-day
tours. Specific to the GDIP, DIA managed a reimbursable GDIP man-day
program, in FY 97 totaling $3 million, to meet its requirements, also,
the Services program for manage and execute GDIP monies for reserve
augmentation (in FY 97 over $3 million). Intelligence production
requirements are also supported by the JMIP. In FY 97, almost 35,000
JMIP-funded man-days were performed in support of CINC/CSA and Service
intelligence requirements, with approximately 46% directly supporting
intelligence production. To date for FY 98, reservists have performed
in excess of 22,000 JMIP-funded man-days with 49% directly in support
of intelligence production. The Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity
Program (JRICP) connects the Reserves with the rest of the Intelligence
Community, and allows the dynamic tasking of Reserve Intelligence
assets by the nine Unified Command Joint Intelligence Centers, the
Combat Support Agencies, and the Service Intelligence Organizations to
meet peacetime, contingency crisis, and wartime requirements in support
of military commanders. To carry out this mission, the JRICP is
integrating and deploying a fully capable and seamless production
environment consisting of workstations, software applications, secure
connectivity, technical support, and training to 28 Service-owned
Reserve production sites across the country. As an example, JAC
Molesworth has leveraged this infrastructure capability and its
reservists at three CONUS locations to levy over half of :its scheduled
production requirements for reservist accomplishment. Due to the heavy
tasking in EUCOM to support ongoing operations in theater, the JAC had
been primarily engaged in current intelligence and indications and
warning activities. As its scheduled production began to fall behind,
the JAC turned to the reserves to fill the shortfalls in its
intelligence production. In sum, the reserve component is a valuable
resource that can be used to provided additional capability, based on
active duty tasking, funding and reservist availability.
topic (28): actionable intelligence
Question. Some analysts say that the increased emphasis on action-
oriented intelligence has come at the expense of other important--but
more mundane--work, like maintaining data bases and conducting in-depth
analyses on foreign militaries and political groups. Do you share this
concern? If so, how do you intend to deal with these competing needs?
Answer. I do share the concern and know that we must ensure the
existence of a solid foundation for a long-term, basis intelligence
knowledge base over the next several years. This knowledge base that
has suffered from the many demands for analytic surge in support of the
large number of crises over the past decade. In order to posture the
Defense Intelligence Community to support the entire range of potential
missions, strengthening our capability of provide strategic warning is
one of the top priorities for all-sources analysis.