[Senate Hearing 105-846]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
52-952 CC
1998
S. Hrg. 105-846
CAMBODIA: POST ELECTIONS AND
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 2, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
52-952 WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming, Chairman
BILL FRIST, Tennessee JOHN KERRY, Massachusetts
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Brown, Frederick Z., Professor, School of Advanced International
Studies........................................................ 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Craner, Lorne W., President, International Republican Institute.. 20
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Roth, Hon. Stanley O., Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs...................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Tith, Dr. Naranhkiri, Chairman, World Cambodian Congress......... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Additional Material Submitted to the Committee
Statement Submitted by Sam Rainsy, President, Sam Rainsy Party,
Cambodia....................................................... 36
Letter Submitted by Prince Norodom Ranariddh..................... 37
Statement Submitted by Human Rights Watch, Asia Division......... 38
(iii)
CAMBODIA: POST ELECTIONS AND U.S.POLICY OPTIONS
----------
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Craig Thomas,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators
Thomas and Robb.
Senator Thomas. Call the committee to order, please. We are
delighted to have you here. This is a hearing that we had
scheduled sometime ago, as a matter of fact, and it has sort of
been set back. But I think it is still very appropriate to do
that. I will try to keep my comments brief.
By the way, we may have a vote at 10:30 or shortly
thereafter. So we will have to work that out.
With the economies of countries like Thailand and Indonesia
crumbling over the summer, the spotlight, of course, has
understandably focused on areas other than Cambodia. It was
focused pretty much there during the election process, which
began in May.
The first elections after the Hun Sen-led coup have come
and gone. And, not surprisingly, the outcome is still in
dispute. While international observers initially reported a few
irregularities, the supporters of the contestants, Ranariddh
and Rainsy, alleged widespread fraud and have refused to join
the government and work out the problems there.
I am interested in discovering which of these two points of
view is closest to reality, and, most important, I guess, what
the U.S. reaction to the elections has been, and more
importantly, how we deal and our formulation of our policy with
Cambodia in the future.
We had formulated a policy based, of course, on the--we
need to formulate one based on the elections. We had had one
somewhat based on the 1997 coup there in Cambodia. We had had
one somewhat based perhaps on some of the bombings and the
rallies. And now there have been allegations, at least, of
attacks by Hun Sen and others.
So that is kind of where we are. Before we begin, I would
like to clear up one point for the record regarding an
individual who requested the opportunity to appear at this
morning's hearing.
It has been the practice of this committee not to allow
foreign nationals to testify before us, especially regarding
internal political matters. The reasoning behind this exclusion
is to avoid the appearance that the committee, and by extension
the Senate, favors one political faction over another.
I believe the committee's practice is in most cases a wise
one. And as chairman, I have closely adhered to it. It was for
that reason and for that reason that I decided not to accept
the request of other panelists to appear this morning.
OK. This is likely to be our last hearing in the 105th
Congress. And I would like to take this opportunity to say to
Senator Kerry, who is not here yet, it has been a pleasure to
work with him and his staff.
Mr. Secretary, it has been a pleasure to work with you, as
well. And I have been very appreciative of your willingness to
come, not only for hearings, but to come and visit with us on
other occasions. I think it is important that we stay in touch,
and you have certainly worked very hard to do that. And I
appreciate it. So welcome. And if you would like to go ahead,
sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. STANLEY O. ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
Mr. Roth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me say
first that the sentiments are reciprocated. I think you have
set a standard for working on foreign policy issues in a
bipartisan or even nonpartisan fashion, and I have appreciated
the opportunity to work with you.
Furthermore, I want to commend you and subcommittee for
holding this hearing. With all the issues going on Asia right
now, the financial crisis, Japan's economic situation, the
North Korean troubles, Indonesia, it is all too easy to lose
track of Cambodia.
But you and the subcommittee, I think, have been amongst
the leaders in following events all the way through on that
process. And so I welcome this opportunity to really continue a
dialog that we have had continuously since my confirmation.
I do not want to take a lot of your time going over the
events prior to the election. I did testify in June, and I
think you are aware of the progress that had been made up to
that point through U.S. policy and working with the ASEAN
troika in terms of getting opposition leaders back into the
country, getting electoral laws passed and setting the stage
for the election itself. But let me review events since the
election.
First, to start with the good news, I think that is well
know. The fact that the conduct of the election on the election
day itself went much better than almost anyone had expected,
the fact that 90 percent of the people turned out, the fact
that it was quite peaceful, and the fact that the opposition
got almost 60 percent of the votes, I think suggests that in
fact efforts that I think we could argue were clear to try to
harass, intimidate and coerce the voters in one direction
failed.
This is a key point, because I think you will receive
testimony later from at least one witness suggesting that the
election was fundamentally flawed. And I think here--I hate to
get into semantics with you, but I think rather to deal with it
at the level of concept, nobody in the administration believes
that the election was not flawed. Obviously it was flawed.
There was not access to the media. And worse, there were
killings of opposition figures. There was clear harassment.
There was clear intimidation. So of course it was flawed.
The question is: Was it fundamentally flawed? So much so
that we need to cast the results out? And here, one of my
differences with the IRI is that despite all the problems, I
think the answer is: When 90 percent of the people turn out and
the opposition gets an overwhelming majority of the vote, I do
not see how you can say that the campaign was fundamentally
flaw.
In fact, I think you can say that the attempts at
harassment failed. So I think in that sense, that is the
difference that we have, not that we are in any way trying to
whitewash how the election was conducted or to say that should
be a standard by which elections should be measured. This was a
terrible electoral campaign. But we still think that the
results have given us something to work with, given the margin,
the 60 percent that the opposition got.
The question is: Where do we go from here? And I think that
the real problem has been trying to get a government coalition
put together that reflects the results of the election,
meaning, one that gives the opposition a meaningful role
reflecting the fact that they did get almost 60 percent of the
vote, but, two, also acknowledges the reality that Hun Sen got
the largest plurality.
And there is a very painful reality, Mr. Chairman, that I
think needs to be discussed, which is, had the opposition
united prior to the election, had Rainsy, Ranariddh and some of
the splinter parties not divided, they would not be in the
position they are in now, where they do not have the largest
plurality.
But the splintering of the opposition vote has resulted in
the situation we are in today, and that is just a painful
truth, that Hun Sen has the largest plurality and therefore is
going to have to be a major factor in coalition negotiations.
At the same time, let me be absolutely clear. This is not
praise for how Hun Sen has conducted himself either before,
during or after the election. It is very clear that the offer
that Hun Sen made after the election did not constitute a
serious offer of power sharing. He made an offer that basically
would allow him and his party to keep every major ministry,
and, if you will allow me to exaggerate only slightly,
essentially reduce the opposition to positions with the
significance of dog catcher.
And so I think that that was not a legitimate offer. And it
is no wonder that the opposition refused to embrace that offer.
Clearly, it is not the policy of the administration to force
the opposition leaders to enter into a coalition agreement in
which they have no meaningful role. I emphasize that
emphatically, because some people have wrongly tried to
characterize our policy in that regard.
What we would like to see is the opposition to enter into
coalition negotiations in which there would be a meaningful
role. And I think it is quite clear that the opposition is not
without significant leverage. It is not without significant
leverage because Hun Sen cannot form a constitutional
government without the support of FUNCINPEC and Ranariddh's
party. He does not have the votes.
So if he wants to have a legitimate government, he needs
the opposition's help. That should be the basis for a
negotiation. The precise outcome of that negotiation, I think,
should be between the parties. I could foresee many different
outcomes, ranging from different sharings of portfolios to
different electoral formulas for the national assembly. That is
for the Cambodians to decide. But there has to be some genuine
arrangement for power sharing.
What have we done to try to promote this outcome? First, we
have, unlike some other countries, refused to simply endorse
the results of the election. We did not say, as some other
countries unfortunately did, terrific election, let us get on
with it, Hun Sen won, he should form the government, let us
move on.
We have stood by our principle that there has to be some
outcome that reflects the opposition's role, given the fact
that they got 60 percent of the vote. We did not do what ASEAN
did. We did not do what Japan did. We have not tilted toward
Hun Sen and just, with Cambodia fatigue, said, OK, good enough,
let us check the box and go on to the next problem.
We have used the existing sources of leverage that I have
been discussing with you for all of the past year to ensure
that continued pressured is put upon the regime to enter into
coalition negotiations.
You will notice, for example, that no one this year made an
effort to give Hun Sen credentials at the General Assembly, a
major change from last year, when the United States had to take
a leadership effort in order to block Hun Sen's credentials.
This year, everyone has recognized that until a coalition
government is formed, or unless a coalition is formed, that he
is not going to get credentials at the United Nations General
Assembly.
ASEAN has played a very responsible role. I hope you are
aware that Secretary Albright took the lead last week at the
General Assembly in organizing a meeting between ASEAN and the
Friends of Cambodia to discuss the situation. This was the
night before the ASEAN foreign ministers were meeting to
discuss, amongst other issues, whether or not they were going
to admit Cambodia this year.
There is a December meeting in Hanoi, an annual summit of
ASEAN meeting. And we believe that ASEAN made the correct
decision, that it is not going to admit Cambodia until the
issue of the government's coalition is resolved. So that
important source of leverage, ASEAN membership, is maintained.
Third, the United States has made it clear that we have no
intention of resuming our aid, other than through
nongovernmental organizations for humanitarian purposes. We are
not going back to business as usual until the situation is
resolved.
So all three sources of leverage remain. The next question
is: Will it work? I wish I could tell you we knew the answer to
that question, but all I can tell you is that there is a
chance.
Belatedly, some of the other key international players have
caught up to the United States and have now started exercising
their influence in a productive fashion. We have seen the ASEAN
countries, through Thailand, send a very productive mission to
Cambodia, which led to the first meeting of the parties
themselves under King Sihanouk's auspices on September 22.
We have seen the convening of the national assembly. And we
have seen the beginning of negotiations amongst the parties to
see if they can work out a power-sharing arrangement. There was
a followup meeting on the 29th. The next meeting is scheduled
for October 5.
Japan has supported this effort and has worked with King
Sihanouk to try to get all the parties talking to each other.
The United Nations has played a very positive role in trying to
get all the parties talking to each other.
So I think now the international community is playing a
productive role in trying to get the outcome that we all want,
which is a genuine coalition government, in which the
opposition has a meaningful role.
No guarantees, Mr. Chairman, that this will work. I know
your own personal skepticism about this project based upon the
outcome of the last election and the fact that we have the same
cast of characters, the same players, that we had before. There
are no guarantees that they will reach a coalition or, if they
do, that it will work.
But I ask: What are the alternatives? I think that the best
chance we have is to build upon the results of an election that
was internationally monitored, in which the opposition won a
majority, to try to put together a genuine power-sharing
arrangement and then to continue to exercise the leverage that
we have, particularly aid leverage, to ensure that the
coalition functions better than we did before.
Why don't I stop at that point and open it for your
questions?
[The prepared statement of Secretary Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stanley O. Roth
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to address the
subcommittee on the situation in Cambodia. That troubled country is
once again at a critical juncture, so I appreciate this opportunity to
update the subcommittee on recent developments and consult with you on
how best to move forward.
When I last testified on Cambodia before this subcommittee in June,
progress had been made in moving Cambodia towards July elections.
Opposition leaders were back in-country and operating freely; all
political parties had been granted freedom to campaign; election and
party laws had been passed; an election commission had been
established; the requisite constitutional and magistracy councils had
been set up; international observers had been invited to monitor the
election process; and voter registration was in full swing. In short, a
framework--albeit an imperfect one--was in place in Cambodia in which
meaningful elections could be held.
The United States, in concert with ASEAN and other partners, had
worked hard to bring Cambodia to that point, pressing all parties to
take steps to create the conditions for free, fair and credible
elections. Despite progress achieved, however, two questions remained
unanswered as Cambodia moved into the official campaign period. First,
would opposition figures be granted media access for their campaigns?
And second, would the climate of fear and intimidation which had
prevailed since the bloody factional fighting of June 1997 persist?
Despite the intense efforts of the international community, neither
of these issues was ever adequately resolved. While the opposition had
substantial access to print media for the purpose of their campaigns,
TV and radio were essentially monopolized by the ruling CPP. And while
the climate of political intimidation had eased from earlier months,
the U.N. documented dozens of human rights abuses in the run-up to the
vote, including beatings, arrests, and worst of all, extra judicial
killings.
As the July 26 election date drew near, these flaws threatened to
invalidate the entire process. Many observers essentially wrote off the
possibility of a free and fair election, and the international
community braced for a worst-case scenario of violence and chaos on
election day. Despite the widespread pessimism, however, Cambodians
turned out in record numbers to cast their ballots, demonstrating both
a deep desire for a voice in their future and their continued faith in
the electoral process. Moreover, almost 16,000 domestic and
international poll monitors on the ground concurred that barring one
deadly attack by Khmer Rouge terrorists on poll officials, Cambodians
cast their votes in an environment that was peaceful, orderly, and free
from intimidation.
The election results indicate that Cambodians indeed voted freely:
some six out of ten voters chose a party other than the ruling
Cambodian People's Party (CPP). It may be useful to note, Mr. Chairman,
that had the opposition unified prior to the elections, they, and not
Hun Sen's CPP, would have primary responsibility for forming a new
government. Still, while in the end Hun Sen's CPP won a plurality of
the vote, the fact that almost 60% of votes were cast for the
opposition clearly demonstrates that efforts aimed at intimidating the
Cambodian electorate failed.
This was the good news of this election. Unfortunately, a conflict-
ridden post-election period has threatened to overshadow this
achievement. After the July 26 vote, opposition figures raised charges
of vote fraud and manipulation of the formula for apportioning
parliamentary seats. While the NEC and the constitutional councils
adjudicated some of the opposition's initial claims, these bodies
summarily dismissed a substantial number of recount requests and
refused to address the seat allotment controversy. It is true that
initial recounts carried out by the NEC substantiated the original vote
and proved many opposition allegations frivolous; still, wholesale
rejection of the opposition's claims of irregularities is not a
credible position, particularly in light of support for some of those
claims by independent NGOs and observers.
In abdicating their responsibility to resolve all post-election
disputes, the Cambodian electoral authorities lost a major opportunity
to strengthen the credibility of the election process and renew the
Cambodian people's faith in their national institutions. Nonetheless,
we must recognize that in the judgment of most international observers,
proper completion of the recounts would not have significantly altered
the outcome or deprived the CPP of its plurality. The limited recounts
thus far conducted showed no substantial change in numbers, and a
parallel vote conducted by the independent Cambodian NGO (COMFREL)
which fielded over 15,000 poll watchers also tallied a clear CPP
plurality.
Whither Cambodia?
The obvious question, Mr. Chairman, is where do we go from here?
Two things clearly need to happen if this electoral process is to be
brought to closure and Cambodia is to get on with the urgent task of
national reconstruction: legitimate electoral disputes must be
appropriately adjudicated, and the parties must, pursuant to the
provisions of the Cambodian constitution, negotiate a coalition
government which reflects the will of the people as expressed through
their vote. Hun Sen's initial attempts to form a government with the
opposition were simply not acceptable, having offered only token
appointments to the opposition while retaining all major ministries for
the CPP. At the same time, the opposition's efforts to provoke a
constitutional crisis by refusing to seat the Parliament by the
September 24 deadline were counterproductive, serving only to escalate
tensions and threaten instability.
U.S. policy throughout this tumultuous post-election period has
been clear and consistent: we have called for a thorough vetting of all
legitimate electoral disputes by the bodies charged with such duties;
negotiations toward a genuine power sharing arrangement; and restraint
on the part of all parties lest Cambodia once again explode in chaos.
Ambassador Quinn repeatedly stressed these points to both the
government and the opposition in Phnom Penh and made numerous
interventions with key government leaders in a largely successful
effort to minimize violence and encourage restraint.
Indeed, against a backdrop of escalating protests and increasingly
provocative actions from all sides, Ambassador Quinn played a key role
in averting even greater bloodshed, providing assistance to political
leaders at risk and defusing explosive confrontations between the
opposition and the police--many of which took place right in front of
the American Embassy in Phnom Penh.
The international community has also gotten involved. As it became
clear that the electoral process was in danger of disintegrating into a
violent, undemocratic outcome, various friends of Cambodia abandoned
their initial reluctance to intervene and joined the United States in
reengaging Cambodia. Japan, the U.N. and Thailand made multiple
interventions with the King and other players--interventions which
ultimately led to the successful meeting of the opposition and the CPP
with King Sihanouk on September 22 and the convening of the National
Assembly on September 24. These meetings helped to initiate a
negotiating process that at least offers the possibility that a
coalition government may be formed that reflects the election results.
While the situation appears more hopeful than just a few weeks ago,
Mr. Chairman, events are moving quickly and the future remains
uncertain. We are thus working on a day-to-day basis to deal with
threats--including those to the personal safety of opposition
politicians--as they arise, while continuing to push our overall
objective of a genuine power-sharing arrangement. Can the parties work
out such an arrangement? And if they do, will it work?
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, it's too early to tell. The relevant
parties sat down together on September 29 and will meet again in the
next few days to continue negotiations. Hun Sen, moreover, lifted the
travel ban on most politicians, a fact evidenced by the recent arrival
in Washington of opposition leader Sam Rainsy. Still, despite these
encouraging signs, we simply don't know what lies ahead.
Ultimately, only the Cambodians themselves can determine their own
fate and future. Nonetheless, together with our like-minded
international partners, we are making every effort to move this process
forward. Last week, Secretary Albright used the occasion of the U.N.
General Assembly to organize a meeting of interested parties to discuss
the situation in Cambodia. I am pleased to report that this meeting
produced an overwhelming consensus to both stay engaged in Cambodia and
withhold U.N. credentials until a credible government is formed. In a
separate meeting, the ASEAN foreign ministers affirmed their commitment
to this approach, adding that ASEAN membership will be postponed until
Cambodia's domestic situation is resolved.
The next few days and weeks will be crucial. When and if a new
government acceptable to the Cambodian people is formed, we will want
to consult with the subcommittee on our long-term Cambodia policy,
particularly as to what more we can do to address Cambodia's pressing
humanitarian needs and strengthen its civil society. Let me conclude by
saying, Mr. Chairman, that we appreciate the leadership the Congress
and the Senate in particular have demonstrated on Cambodia throughout
this tumultuous period. The recent letter to Hun Sen by Senators McCain
and Kerry, urging Hun Sen to take responsible steps that will move the
process of national reconciliation in Cambodia forward, is just one
example of the many constructive efforts you and your colleagues have
made. We thank you for your engagement and your leadership, and look
forward to close and cooperative consultation with the subcommittee as
events unfold.
Senator Thomas. OK. Thank you.
If you put it in terms of evaluating this election, would
you say it is improved politically, or would you say it has
produced free expression for the people of Cambodia? On a scale
of 1 to 10 in those areas, how would you do that?
Mr. Roth. Well, I would say that in terms of getting an
expression of the people of Cambodia, it has a pretty high
rating, because the opposition, despite all the efforts at
intimidation, including all the way up the chain to murder,
turned out. And the opposition got 60 percent of the vote. That
seems a pretty good expression.
At the same time, I want to be very careful, because in no
way do I want to suggest that this was a terrific election
campaign. This was an awful election campaign. The fact that
opposition leaders were kept out of the country on ridiculous
pretexts for so long and had to come back under curious
circumstances, to say the least, the way the campaign was
conducted, the murder of individuals, the failure to
investigate these deaths, lack of access to the media, these
are all awful circumstances under which to conduct an election.
I think, in fact, one has to give extraordinary credit to
the Cambodia people, who, despite all these circumstances that
I have just described, turned out in extraordinary numbers and
voted freely.
Senator Thomas. Well, there seem to be some sort of mixed
reports from the foreign observer groups. Some accuse the U.N.-
sponsored group of being predisposed to be favorable in that
the Europeans and the ASEAN group wanted to move into normal
relations. Some, who were there from here, the International
Republican Institute, started out with a fairly favorable
judgment and now I think has revised that view some.
So what is your view of the foreign observer groups?
Mr. Roth. Well, I think that, as I have tried to explain in
my testimony itself, there is basically the difference between
IRI and the administration's position and many of the other
observer groups as one of judgment on that one specific issue,
whether the problems before the election and after the election
were sufficient to void the results of the entire election.
And our judgment is no; their judgment is yes. And that is
a judgment call. But I should point out that there are a lot of
observers, including a very large number of Cambodian
observers, including American finance and trained election
observers. And their results are very similar to the results
that came out of the electoral process itself. So that, you
know, you have many observers, not just the U.N. or the
Europeans or the Japanese saying that essentially the voting
practices were OK.
I think where the Cambodian government has massively failed
was in simply dismissing carte blanche hundreds, if not
thousands, of claims that were made afterwards, rather than
adjudicating that in a more serious fashion.
But I must say the initial results, based up by many
observers on the ground, have been that those claims that have
been investigated so far have not proved to be serious, or, in
other words, that the original count has in most cases been
justified.
I am not trying to tell you that this was a perfect count,
that there were no irregularities. I do not know an election
anywhere in the world in which there were no irregularities.
But we have yet to see sustained evidence that there were
substantial irregularities in the vote counts themselves.
But we do believe that the government made a mistake in not
following the process provided for in their own election laws
for adjudicating these claims and simply ruling out, I think it
was, 8,000 different claims.
Senator Thomas. I know this is fairly broad, but as you
look around the world today, you look at some countries in
Europe, Kosovo and others where people are being killed in
large numbers, you look at Iraq or some others where security
to the Middle East is threatened certainly, even North Korea
and so on.
What is our mission? What is our goal? Our goal there is
pretty clear, to stop killing, to do something about the threat
to security and so on. What is our mission in Cambodia?
Mr. Roth. I think our mission has been to try to basically
get the Paris Accords from the beginning of this decade
implemented, which is a Cambodia which, as a result of free and
fair elections, would have a democratic government that will
then go about trying to meet the needs of the Cambodian people,
which are formidable.
That is a hell of a job, and we are doing it against a very
difficult deck, given the fact that, unlike in the early
nineties, we do not at this point have some of the assets that
were available.
As you know from previous hearings, there was no sentiment
for an ASEAN peacekeeping force. There was no sentiment for a
U.N. peacekeeping force. There was no sentiment for an American
peacekeeping force. And so we did not have the circumstances we
did in the earlier election, when we had a significant UNTAC
Force to preserve order and prevent some of the abuses that
occurred this time.
But working within the parameters of the situation that we
did face, I think our goal was to provide circumstances first,
get the opposition back into the country and safe so they could
run, that happened; to get election laws that would allow for
the conduct of an internationally sanctioned election, that
happened; to make sure that there was minimal violence on
election day, that happened.
And now we are at the most difficult phase. With all of
that done, can we make it meaningful, meaning can we get the
outcome of the election reflected in the government? All of it
will be for naught. I am not here to tell you that we are so
pleased with what happened before, that now we are going to go
with any government that comes along.
The question is: Can we now, having gotten these steps
done, get a government that reflects what I have told, a
democratic government that we could support, that the rest of
the international community could support?
Senator Thomas. So that really is the implementation of the
Paris Accords, a democratic government that we can support.
Mr. Roth. Yes.
Senator Thomas. That is the mission, in short.
Mr. Roth. Yes.
Senator Thomas. What do you think the Clinton
administration's approach will be in the aftermath? Will we--I
think you already mentioned this, but will we go back to
restoring U.S. aid to Cambodia as it was before 1997? And if
not, what are the conditions in which that would be considered?
Mr. Roth. Right. Well, without by any means trying to
flatter you, I think you will have a large say in that
decision.
Our current intention is not to resume aid through the
government and through any means to do business as usual,
unless and until we are satisfied that, in fact, there is a
government formed that reflects the outcome of the elections.
In other words, a meaningful role for the opposition.
That if this process breaks down, Hun Sen forms an extra
constitutional government, we do not presently envision seeking
resumption of aid, other than humanitarian aid through NGO's,
provided we have continued support for that with the Congress.
Senator Thomas. How would you advise, or would you advise,
Prince Ranariddh and Rainsy to negotiate a coalition, or would
you?
Mr. Roth. Yes. I think that they have a significant amount
of leverage, because in fact they have almost 60 percent of the
votes, and that therefore their ability to secure a coalition
government in which they have a meaningful role is quite high.
Hun Sen has been denied things he wants, and he knows he is
not going to necessarily get them unless he has this kind of
legitimate outcome. Like he did not get ASEAN membership, which
he might have thought he was going to get 2 months ago. He did
not get U.N. General Assembly seats, which he might have
thought after election day he was going to get.
I think he has had as clear a statement as I can make today
that he is not going to get U.S. aid, if we do not get a decent
outcome. So I think that the opposition goes to these
negotiations, not from a point of weakness, but from a point of
strings in terms of bargaining for a legitimate role in the
government.
Senator Thomas. I think you mentioned, and I was not sure
what you said, how will the administration react to moves to
have Cambodia reconsidered for admission to ASEAN and occupy
the Cambodian seat in the U.N.?
Mr. Roth. I thought I addressed both, but let me make it as
clear as I can. First of all, we are delighted with the ASEAN
foreign minister's decision not to offer admission at this
point to Cambodia. They are waiting to see if----
Senator Thomas. I think at this point is the key.
Mr. Roth. Yes. Well, there is no indication that ASEAN has
any intention of admitting a non-constitutional, i.e., Hun Sen,
government without--if there is no agreement.
I think they are fully aware that they are just inviting
more trouble for ASEAN if they let an unstable country in with
a government that is not recognized internationally. I do not
think there is any difference between us and ASEAN at this
point, and I am very pleased about that.
On General Assembly, we are steadfastly opposed to the
credentials until there is a government that meets a legitimacy
test. And there was no effort last week--I emphasize none--for
anybody to challenge that.
Senator Thomas. The papers mentioned this week, I think,
alleged assassination attempts against Hun Sen. There have been
attempts, of course, against others.
Specifically, what can you tell us about an incident where
the wife of Nate Therer, a correspondent for the Far East
Economic Review, was accosted and apparently shot at? He
believe apparently that it was politically motivated. Do you
have any information on that?
Mr. Roth. We have been in constant contact, both with Mr.
Therer and with her. Let me state first in terms of what we
have done is that we have expressed our concern immediately at
the cabinet level in Cambodia, because we were not sure whether
this was political or not. But we did not want to take any
chances.
So Ambassador Quinn made an immediate representation about
this as a very threatening development and made an immediate
representation to the police chief in Phnom Penh as well. In
addition to that, we offered her an escort to the airport so
that she could get out of the country, which was her wish. She
actually has left Cambodia and is physically safe. She declined
the U.S. embassy escort to the airport. I am not sure why.
But we have taken this issue extremely seriously in terms
of providing for her protection. In terms of the actual facts
of the case, they are, unfortunately, like many in Cambodia,
confused. We do not know yet what happened. Some people say
there was a shot; some say there was not. Some say it was a
robbery; some say it was politically motivated.
I wish I knew. We are making every effort. One frequently
does not find out in these cases what happened. But obviously,
we have made every effort to provide for her personal safety.
Senator Thomas. What is the status, if there is one. Of the
FBI's investigation of 1997 rally. As you know, there were
thoughts and allegations that the embassy there had sort of
called off the FBI. And the report delivered to Congress in
April is inconclusive.
Mr. Roth. Right.
Senator Thomas. Relative to some of these other things that
are happening here, what is the situation with the FBI?
Mr. Roth. Well, I do not believe anything has progressed
significantly in recent days. There is a report, which is
before the committee. I assume you have looked at it. But as
you say, it is inconclusive.
The question is: After we put together, if we put together,
an acceptable coalition government in Phnom Penh, I think what
of the tests of its credibility will be how does it investigate
all these past abuses? This attack, other murders that have
taken place during the campaign, since the campaign. There are
going to have to be investigations of a lot of actions,
including this.
I would hope there would be circumstances where this
investigation could be pursued vigorously within the country
itself that witnesses would feel safe to come forward. But we
are going to have to see first what happens with the
government.
Senator Thomas. I presume you would not agree to the
allegation that the embassy was a party to slowing down or
prohibiting that investigation.
Mr. Roth. That is absolutely not true. I have had numerous
conversations with Ken Quinn about the chronology of this. I
think our main concerns have been to make sure that the FBI
team was safe, you know, in terms of coming in there. And
second, that witnesses who wanted to talk to them were safe
under very difficult circumstances.
But there is absolutely not intention whatsoever to
suppress the information or the investigation. I would like to
see it resumed, if it could be done.
Senator Thomas. As we review, do you think the embassy's
starting to have communications with Hun Sen early last year
after the coup was a reasonable thing to do?
Mr. Roth. I think the role of the embassy there is to be
talking to everybody. And I think there is an unfair impression
out there that somehow Ambassador Quinn has tilted toward Hun
Sen and is not talking to all the other parties.
In fact, he was the only Ambassador that came to the
airport to see Ranariddh the second time he came back to the
country. Ranariddh chose to get his house on the same block, if
not across the street, from the U.S. embassy. He has been in
constant contact with all the opposition officials as well.
Part of what we want him to do is to be able to communicate
messages to Hun Sen, including protests that we make when we
have concerns about all kinds of issues. And one of the things
I regret is that in recent weeks, Hun Sen has stopped receiving
all Ambassadors, not just ours, but Japanese, ASEAN, U.N.
officials.
And instead, we have had to deal with cabinet officials
instead of Hun Sen directly. But I think that is part of Ken
Quinn's job is to be able to deal with him, as well as
everybody else.
Senator Thomas. Well, it is a difficult thing. There is no
question about it. I presume, at least from a lay person's
point of view, the most difficult thing is to not tell them
what to do, that is not our role, but at what point we continue
to do the things that we may have done in the past or would
hope to do in the future, and that their activities and
behavior are such that we can continue to do that. And I
presume that is the question before us for the large part.
So thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Appreciate it. And
we will stay in touch.
All right. Let us go on to our second panel then, please.
Dr. Tith is Chairman of the World Cambodian Congress in
Washington, and I think also a professor at college. Mr.
Craner, President, International Republican Institute in
Washington. Frederick Brown, professor of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins.
Gentlemen, thank you. We appreciate your being here. Your
statements will all be included in the complete statements in
the record. So if you would care to summarize and make your
major points, that would be very good.
We will go as listed here. So Dr. Tith, if you would begin,
please.
STATEMENT OF DR. NARANHKIRI TITH, CHAIRMAN, WORLD CAMBODIAN
CONGRESS
Dr. Tith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am greatly honored to
be here today to testify in front your committee. I am very
grateful to you also, in spite of all the problem in Asia and
in the world, you still have time to give to Cambodia some
thought. I appreciate that very much.
I have written a paper, looking from the long-term point of
view underlying factors, hopefully that will serve for the
purpose of a proactive policy, not a reactive policy. My paper
is entitled A Long Term and Integrated Look at the Cambodian
Crisis: Some Suggestions for a Possible Solution.
Let me summarize it, first by stating that in my opinion
from almost 40 years of observing the Cambodian situation, and
particularly recently knowing all the actors, including King
Sihanouk and the political situation activities in Cambodia,
and particularly observing the recent election, I have come to
the conclusion that the election is neither free nor fair.
And the reason is that we should not take out at one
particular point in time, particularly during the election, and
Hun Sen is too smart, particularly the advice from certain
countries, that he has to behave during the election days. And
we take that out and do not look at before and then after. And
then we say that it is reasonable, fair and so forth, free.
In my opinion, we have to look backward a little bit and
then forward what is going to happen. If you look backward
since the UNTAC intervention in Cambodia, there is a pattern,
definitely a pattern, deliberate pattern, by Hun Sen to derail
the United Nation effort in Cambodia.
And that is backed up by the recent declaration by two
former United Nations officials that were involved in Cambodia
during the 1992/1993 election organization, General Sanderson
and Mr. Maley. General Sanderson was the commander in chief of
the United Nations forces in Cambodia.
In his testimony to the parliament of Australia, he said
that there was definitely a deliberate pattern since 1991 by
Hun Sen to derail the United Nations UNTAC in Cambodia.
And we can observe that since the election--in 1993 Hun Sen
lost that election--but he bullied himself back into the
government by blackmailing, by having a secession of seven
provinces in Cambodia, then he was brought back into the
government and created these two heads of government, two prime
ministers, at the suggestion of King Sihanouk.
You have to know the story behind that scene, and I know
very well. If you have to have more details, I can talk about
that. I have heard the king was definitely implicated in that
secession of the seven provinces in 1993.
And again, the king supported Hun Sen, sided with Hun Sen,
as he has sided with the Khmer Rouge before. So the king is no
longer a neutral party in any negotiations in the future of
Cambodia. I am sorry to say that, but I know him very well. And
I have been following his action, and it has to be said.
Having said that, if you look at the election day, of
course it looks reasonable, because there was nobody killed.
But who can tell, with 500 people only from foreign observer?
Granted there are some people on the Cambodian side, observers.
But who can tell when all the administration, with either
provincial village level all controlled by the CPP or Hun Sen?
At nighttime, like the French say, at nighttime all the cats
are black. We cannot distinguish.
So Hun Sen definitely has all the support he wants to in
order to derail the election. Having said that, the result of
the election, as Mr. Roth has said, spoke clearly of the will
of the Cambodian people for change. That is, Hun Sen got only
about 41.5 percent, and 58.5 percent obtained by the
opposition. And that in itself clearly said that it is the will
of the people that want to change, they do not want Hun Sen.
But Hun Sen, again after the election, tried to force the
opposition into the coalition, again with the support of the
king. I do not think this should be done, because as the last
coalition, it did not work, because Hun Sen did not want it to
work.
But the only difference this time, Mr. Chairman, is that
Cambodia is no longer the country that it used to be 5 years
ago. One major difference is that in Cambodia in 2 years time,
according to two important independent global witness, who
observed the deforestation in Cambodia, in 2 years time, there
were no more forests left in Cambodia.
So what does it translate into operationally for the
Cambodian people? It means that in 2 years time the Cambodian
people will have at least, at least a majority of the Cambodian
people, 80 percent of them, that live on the countryside, live
on fishing, on forestry, on rice growing, they will have no
more means to live on.
And if you want to have an indication as to the devastation
of that kind of ecological imbalances or destruction, look at
China. Even the government of China has admitted that
deforestation has caused a tremendous flood in China, and still
causing it. So in Cambodia, there will be much worse than that.
So what you will have in 2 years's time, you will have a
lot of people starving to death, millions. And I know Cambodia,
I know many other countries. I know economic management, being
my profession. Hun Sen has no way to manage the country,
because he is the problem. He is the one that create all those
problem.
He is born of a culture of violence and a culture of
corruption. And his system is based on pervasive corruption. He
cannot have the support of the generals and of all the people
in the villages, if he does not pay them, if he does not
corrupt them.
So that is the picture. Now what are we going to do in 2
years' time, when the people of Cambodia will drop dead like
flies? 1 million, 2 million more? Maybe by that time we will
see that Cambodia does have a real crisis.
And who are the one that really create that crisis? It is
Hun Sen. Hun Sen is not a leader. He is a murderer. He is a
killer with sadistic inclinations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Tith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Naranhkiri Tith
I am very grateful to you Mr. Chairman for convening this hearing
at this critical time in the post election situation in Cambodia. I am
fully aware that you are all busy with the many critical problems in
the world today such as the Asian financial crisis and the Russian
economic and political crisis which are having a contagious and
negative impact on the US economy and that of the world. This hearing
shows once again that the US Congress continues to be sincerely
concerned about the plight of all oppressed people in the world,
including the Cambodian people. This hearing is only one of the many
that this committee under your chairmanship has frequently been holding
on the situation in Cambodia during the past few years. I thank you.
I am deeply thankful to you and your colleagues for having made
possible to have an independent Cambodian voice to discuss and analyze
as honestly and straightforwardly as I can, the quickly deteriorating
economic, political, and social situation in Cambodia, especially since
the bloody coup which was planned and executed by Second Prime Minister
Hun Sen against the duly elected First Prime Minister of Cambodia,
Prince Ranariddh.
To fully understand the depth of this ongoing Cambodian crisis and,
more specifically, the obviously Hun Sen staged and rigged July 26,
1998 election and its aftermath, one needs to briefly assess the role
and the motivation of different interest groups involved. The proposed
period of analysis starts just before the presence of United Nations
Transitional Authorities in Cambodia (UNTAC) in Cambodia (1992-93) and
continues until the present day. For analytical purposes, one can
divide these interest groups into two broad categories; 1) the domestic
factors such as the Cambodian political factions, the King, the
Cambodian NGOs and the local media, 2) the international community
encompassing the United Nations system, the major powers and regional
powers as well as the international NGOs and media.
i. domestic aspect of the cambodian crisis
A. Cambodian People's Party (CPP): origin, organization, ideology,
strategies, and policies
The CPP is a splinter group from the deadly and monstrous Khmer
Rouge Movement under the leadership of Pol Pot. All current senior CPP
members were senior Khmer Rouge cadre including Hun Sen, Chea Sim, Heng
Samrin, Sar Kheng, Tea Banh. The split came after Pol Pot started his
periodical purges against party members. The current CPP group fled to
Vietnam to save themselves from the P01 Pot purge and not because they
wanted to liberate Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge as Hun Sen and his
apologists have often stated. On December 25, 1978, the armed forces of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam invaded Cambodia and drove the Khmer
Rouge back along the border with Thailand. In January 1979, Vietnam
installed a new government, headed by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer rouge
general, and the regime was renamed the People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK).
Gradually, the PRK had no choice but to release its firm grip on
the economic organization of Cambodia. However, it kept firm control on
the economic, political, and social organizations of Cambodia.
Essentially, the PRK remained a communist organization with a centrally
controlled and hierarchical economic and political command system. This
centrally controlled command system is still in place today in
Cambodia. However, it now wears the mask of a market system. As all
typical communist organizations, the CPP remains a secretive
organization and a one party state-controlled system. It does not
tolerate any decent or political opposition however mild this may be.
Only with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the
subsequent halt of all Soviet financial and economic assistance to its
satellites did Vietnam officially announce its withdraw from Cambodia.
Without support from the socialist block the PRK was forced to start
opening up and negotiating with the United Nations which was backed up
by the major and regional powers for an election to set up a democratic
system and a market economy in Cambodia.
The successful conclusion of the second Paris Conference in
October, 1991 led to the establishment of UNTAC, under whose mandate an
election was organized and carried out in May, 1993. The result of the
election gave a clear majority to the non-communist parties which
garnered a total of 69 seats. These parties included FUNCINPEC (Front
Uni National pour un Cambodge Independent Neutre Pacific et Cooperatif)
led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Buddhist Liberal Democratic (BLD) led
by former Prime Minister Son Sann,, and Moulinaka (Movement de
Liberalization National du Kampuchea) led by Ros Roeun. Despite the
advantage of the incumbency and a deliberated, and vicious campaign of
intimidation and political killings of the members of the opposition
parties, the CPP (formerly PRK), led by former senior Khmer Rouge
officials, Chea Sim, and Hun Sen managed to grab 51 seats.
The elected representatives established a Provisional National
Assembly which succeeded in promulgating a new constitution. After a
threat of secession of seven eastern provinces by the CPP with a tacit
approval of the King, a new coalition government coalition was imposed
on the victorious non-communist parties. In coalition Hun Sen and his
CPP not only obtained the crucial post of Second Prime Minister, but
also the important post of Chairman of the National Assembly. To lock
in their minority position in any decision making in the National
Assembly, the CPP succeeded in imposing the rule of two thirds majority
in any vote in the national Assembly. FUNCINPEC was given the post of
First Prime Minister. They co-managed major ministries such as Defense,
Interior. The economic ministries were split between CPP and FUNCINPEC.
The army, the police, and civil administration remained totally in the
hands of the CPP.
The Royal Coalition Government of Cambodia (RGC) was a tenuous
coalition. Political infighting continued, both within and among the
parties in the government. Corruption was and continues to be
widespread. This combined with the extremely low capacity of government
to manage, was increasing the threat of destabilization, which
culminated in the July 5, 1997 bloody coup organized and executed by
Hun Sen against Prince Ranariddh.
Last year's coup was only a phase in a long term plan by Hun Sen
and his CPP to completely take economic, and political control of
Cambodia. Despite the claims by Hun Sen apologists, it was not a
reaction to preempt a so-called coup by Prince Ranariddh in collusion
with the Khmer Rouge. The CPP's long-term plan to derail and undermine
the democratic process which was established by UNTAC which was agreed
upon and paid for by the international community. This conspiracy was
clearly enunciated by two former senior UNTAC officials, Lieutenant-
General John Sanderson, Commander of UNTAC force, and Michael Maley,
Senior Deputy Chief Electoral Officer during a recent hearing at the
Australian parliament Foreign Affairs sub-committee in Canberra during
which they commented that the CPP has been deliberately, and often
violently, undermining the democratic process begun in 1993 by UNTAC.
They went on to say that the deficiencies of the recent elections in
Cambodia;
. . . were in no sense unavoidable or attributable to the
difficulties of conducting elections in a developing country.
Rather they flowed from conscious political acts by the ruling
clique, reflecting a lack of genuine commitment to the process
and to the rights of individual Cambodians \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a more complete view on how the CPP has been undermining
the UNTAC program, see Phnoni Penh Post (9/04/98) ``UNTAC officials
speak out on election.''
There were several bloody incidents which preceded the July 5
coup, such as grenade attacks against the opposition parties of Mr. Son
Satin in 1995 and a worse one against Sam Rainsy in March, 1997. These
were not isolated incidents. They were carefully planned and well
executed for specific purposes; first to silence the opposition, and
second to test the degree of commitment to the defense of democracy and
the rule of law in Cambodia by the international community.
After having rigged the July 26, 1998, election, Hun Sen started to
implement the last phase of his grand plan to gain complete control of
Cambodia's destiny. On September 7, he ordered the arrest of one of his
most outspoken critics, Mr. Sam Rainsy, (Under international pressure,
that order of arrest was subsequently withdrawn). Some of Hun Sen's
false accusations against Sam Rainsy include 1) plotting his own death
during the bloody incident in March, 1997 in which several peaceful and
lawful demonstrators were killed and over 100 other demonstrators were
injured including a US citizen, and 2) for having incited riots against
the government after the election. Regarding the grenade attack,
several eyewitnesses reported that they saw Hun Sen's personal security
guards prevent those who committed this crime from being caught by the
demonstrators. Up to today, nobody has ever been arrested for that
incident.
At first one is struck by the fact that unlike the other two major
totalitarian Asian countries, China and Vietnam, there are no political
prisoners in Hun Sen's Cambodia. The main reason for this anomaly is
the fact that Hun Sen does not take prisoners. He just has his
opponents murdered in the most savage way. If they are lucky, they are
sent into exile, despite the fact that the current constitution does
not permit such an action against any Cambodian citizen.
B. King Sihanouk's Role and His Influence in the Current Cambodian
Political Crisis
It is no simple matter for anybody, and especially for a Cambodian,
to criticize a national icon like King Sihanouk and to analyze his role
in the political life in the current Cambodian crisis. However, it
would also be irresponsible and imprudent to leave Sihanouk's role out
of any assessment of the contemporary political situation in Cambodia.
Right or wrong, and although being only a constitutional monarch, he
still can command a lot of influence both in Cambodia and
internationally.
On the bright side, he is a tremendously charismatic, charming,
shrewd, and talented person. However, on the dark side and from past
behavior, he was also known to be very unpredictable and mercurial, and
not very committed to moral or democratic principles. By birth, he is
an autocrat and behaves like one. Judging from his preferred places of
residence outside Cambodia (Beijing and Pyongyang) and the leaders he
admired and befriended with (Kim II Sung, Mao Tse Tung, Ceaucescu,
Hodja, Sukarno, to mention only the obvious ones) \2\ he is no friend
of democracy. The dark and Machiavellian side of Sihanouk was recently
revealed and well captured in an article in the Phnom Penh Post--a well
respected English language local newspaper--describing the role of
Sihanouk's role as a power broker in the current constitution crisis
resulting from the charge of frauds during the July 26, 1998 election,
when it wrote that;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For more details on Sihanouk's friends, see, Charisma and
Leadership, by Norodom Sihanouk, Yohan Publications, Inc., Tokyo, 1990.
The King is ``smiling his Bayon face'', as one Khmer politician
described it--the Bayon being the four faced god statue of
Angkor. Under this premise, Sihanouk selectively makes his
thoughts and advice known to all actors, much of it probably
contradictory--all the while muddying the waters further even
as many look to him for a solution \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Phnom Penh Post. (9/4/98) ``Relaxed Hun Sen Holds the Royal
Key.''
He has always allied himself with those with strong preference for
power, more specifically raw power. For instance, during the 1970's and
1980s, he worked very closely with the Khmer Rouge leaders such as Pol
Pot, Son Sen, Leng Saiy, and Khieu Samphan and has often proclaimed
publicly that they were the most patriotic people dedicated and the
best equipped to defend Cambodia's sovereignty. Recently, he appears to
have decided to switch his allegiance to Hun Sen even though he knows
that Hun Sen is no royalist. Why then did the King decide to choose Hun
Sen as his ally and to go against his own son, Prince Ranariddh and his
own brother, Prince Sirivudh in the current crisis? He refused to
pardon Prince Sirivudh who was framed by Hun Sen to have plotted his
assassination, while he has pardoned some of the most notorious Khmer
Rouge responsible for the Cambodian genocide, such as Leng Saiy (former
Khmer rouge foreign minister) and Ke Pauk (the executioner of the Toul
Sleng interrogation center). More recently, he reluctantly pardoned his
own son, Prince Ranariddh, only after a great deal of international
pressure.
To better understand this apparent contradiction. It is important
to analyze the King's motivation. It is a well-known fact in Phnom Penh
political circles that one of the King's main goals is to make his
beloved consort queen Monineath (formerly Monique Izzi) a reigning
queen after his death or incapacitation. To achieve his royal wish,
King Sihanouk needs the support of Hun Sen and the CPP. For that reason
Sihanouk has recently struck a deal with Hun Sen to have the
constitution changed \4\ to make possible a female to become a reigning
queen, which the present constitution does not allow for. Queen
Monineath, in turn, would groom her son, Prince Norodom Sihamoni to
become king of Cambodia after her retirement or death. Therefore, King
Sihanouk can no longer be considered to be a neutral party in this
current constitutional crisis and any future search for its solution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ As reported by the National Radio of Cambodia--a government-run
radio (AFS No. BK25081 42598)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is also important to point out that under Hun Sen there is no
credible legal or justice system. Hun Sen is the law. The members of
the National Election Commission (NEC) as well as the Constitutional
Court (CC), the highest institutions in which to settle constitutional
disputes are all stacked with Hun Sen appointees. That is why these two
influential institutions which have enormous power to determine the
outcome of any election have been consistently refusing to listen to
the complaints of the two major opposition parties regarding the
electoral frauds and intimidations before, during, and after the
election.
One of UNTAC's legacies was the establishment of a vibrant and
sometime unruly written media. However, this press freedom is quickly
dwindling under Hun Sen's unrelenting assault which has included
assassinations of editors and reporters in broad daylight and
threatening grave consequences if they don't stop criticizing him and
his regime. Now most editors and reporters who opposed Hun Sen and the
CPP have either gone underground or are in hiding.
Another organization which came under Hun Sen's attack was the free
Cambodian labor movement which is now practically under total state
control. This in turn, raises the question whether the granting of GSP
to Cambodia is still legal under current US law. A representative of
the AFL-CIO in Bangkok has recently filed a petition to the Congress on
this issue calling into question the legality of the granting of GSP to
Cambodia.
The opposition parties are being literally torn into pieces.
Immediately after the 1993 elections the two main opposition parties,
FUNCINPEC and the BLD were subjected to systematic assaults through
bogus accusations against prominent politicians such as Prince Norodom
Sirivudh, former Deputy Prime Minister, by assassination during the
July 5, 1997 coup, and through corrupt practices such as buying the
allegiance of those opposition politicians who were ready to leave
their parties. In this latter case, the most favored tactic was to
create a splinter group and then allow the pro-CPP splinter group to
use-the old party name while refusing to allow the original members to
do so. This method was devised to confuse the international Community
and the Cambodian electorate. That is why the BLD became the Son Sann
party, and the old Khmer Nation Party is now the Sam Rainsy party.
ii. the international aspect of the cambodian crisis
A. The Ambivalent role of the international community in the current
Cambodian crisis
Despite the CPP's maneuvering, and intimidations before and during
the July 26 election the majority of the Cambodian people came out en
mass (90 percent) and courageously voted in favor of the opposition. As
a matter of fact, together FUNCINPEC and Sam Rainsy parties received
about 59 percent, while the CPP received only 41 percent of the total
popular votes. In other words, the opposition won the election.
However, because of the secret change in the seat distribution formula
by the NEC, the CPP received 52 percent of the seats in the new
National Assembly while the two major opposition parties together
received only 48 percent of the total. These numbers do not add up to
make the July 26 anywhere near the ``miracle on the Mekong'' as
suggested by former Congressman Steve Solarz. Additionally, the
European Union and ASEAN observers have prematurely declared that the
election was free and fair and ``broadly representative of the wish of
the Cambodian people'' without even bothering to wait for the electoral
process to be completed.
It is important to point out that the preconditions for a free and
fair election were never there to allow the election to move as
scheduled. Almost all of the independent organizations such as the
International Crisis group (ICG), the International Republican
Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, and numerous local NGOs have indicated
that the opposition parties were not allowed sufficient access the
electronic media, and that the NEC and the CC were not neutral. I would
like to also point out that some influential members of the US Congress
such as Congressmen Benjamin Gilman, Dan Burton, Tom Campbell, Dana
Rohrabacher, Chris Smith, and Gerald Solomon, have recently written a
letter to Secretary of State Albright to draw the attention of the
Secretary of State to the post-election intimidations and
irregularities and to ask her to have
. . . the State Department immediately deliver a firm statement
to Hun Sen informing him that all acts of violence and ballots
manipulation will not be tolerated. \5\
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\5\ See the letter dated August 6, 1998 from the six members of the
Congress to Secretary of State Albright.
There were also the issues of the politically-motivated killings of
opposition parties members prior to the election and continued impunity
for the perpetrators of politically motivated violence.
B. Wrong and damaging premises and double standard of judgment for the
support of Hun Sen by the international community
Why then was the international community including the Clinton
Administration so eager to push for the election to take place despite
all the major problems which were mentioned previously? The answer to
that is the fact that 1.) there is a general compassion fatigue and 2.)
the politics of expediency have been adopted by the major and regional
powers. The rationale for such realpolitik approach is based on two
wrong premises. The first premise is that the CPP is the only efficient
political organization which can maintain stability and promote
prosperity in Cambodia. The second premise is based on the perception
that the CPP is the only organization capable of defeating the remnant
Khmer Rouge force.
1. On the first premise that Hun Sen and his CPP can maintain
stability and promote growth is untrue, in fact Cambodia under Hun Sen
has wasted a lot of economic and financial assistance to maintain an
army whose main objective is to eliminate all opposition and to
maintain an atmosphere of permanent fear in which to subdue and to
control the majority of the population. In that sense, the CPP is a
very efficient organization in the tradition of communist countries
which destroy rather than builds the society.
One can cite many examples to illustrate the fiasco of the Hun
Sen's management of the Cambodian economy and society. For instance,
Cambodia is on the US list of narco-states. The other distinctive
failures of the Hun Sen regime include the pervasive presence of money
laundering, the exploitation of children for prostitution and labor,
the use of Cambodia as a staging area for illegal immigration to third
countries, the pervasive corruption and banditry and, last but not
least, a dismal record in human rights, and the mismanagement of the
environment, especially of forestry resources.
It is estimated by two independent and professional organizations,
Global Witness and the World Bank that at current rate of exploitation
there will be no more forest left in Cambodia within three years. This,
in turn, will deprive the majority of the Cambodian people the
necessary means to grow food and to raise animals for field works. The
impact of deforestation on the Cambodian society is well captured by
Kirk Talbot, Senior Director for Asia-Pacific at Conservation
International.
The Plunder of Cambodia's forest is viewed by many as close to
spiraling out of control. The resulting damage to the country's
natural resource base is huge, as the loss of revenue to its
government. And less tangible, but also important, is the
concomitant loss of the government's credibility as the
protector of the common good. As a result how Cambodia deals
with logging is vital to the country's economic and political
future. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For a detailed description of the devastating effects of
deforestation on the Cambodian people, and the corrupt practice in Hun
Sen regime, see ``Logging in Cambodia: Politics and Plunder'' by Kirk
Talbot in Cambodia and the International Community, Asia Society, New
York, 1998.
For these reasons, Cambodia may soon become a beggar nation waiting
for the international community to provide the basic food to survive.
Because of the more pronounced cycles of droughts and floods Cambodia
is already confronted with a growing and prolonged food shortage. This
problem will become more acute within two to three years. Are these
signs that the Hun Sen administration is efficient and capable of
promoting growth and stability?
2. On the second premise that only Hun Sen and the CPP are capable
of solving the Khmer Rouge problem, one should ask the following
questions. How did Hun Sen go about solving this problem? Where are
those Khmer Rouge now?
Hun Sen's immoral method of solving the Khmer Rouge problem was to
offer a general pardon to all Khmer Rouge except Pol Pot (who was
already dead), Khieu Samphan, Noun Chea, and Ta Mok. The rest of the
Khmer Rouge including the most notorious executioners of the two
million innocent Cambodians are all now integrated into the Hun Sen
government or army. In other words, Hun Sen has disregarded all the
basic principles of a modern society like justice, the rule of law, and
human rights.
The main reason why Hun Sen has been able to continue to oppress
and impose his tyranny on the Cambodian people, is the fact that the
international community has been too expedient and indifferent in
dealing with him. They lowered their standards in judging his behavior
in the and the management of Cambodian society. This point was
eloquently expressed by Martin Collacott, a former Canadian Ambassador
to Cambodia and chief Canadian observer during the July 26 election
when he wrote that;
The argument has been made that Cambodia has suffered
exceptional trauma and dislocation in recent decades and that
it is therefore not reasonable to apply the same standards we
expect of more settled and economically developed countries.
This approach makes sense up to a point. The fact is,
however, that, after an impressive start following the United
Nations-sponsored elections in 1998, there has for the most
part been more erosion than consolidation of democratic value.
\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``Cambodia's Flawed Election--Where to from Here,'' Phnom Penh
Post, September 4, 1998.
Only by comparing Hun Sen's management style and behavior to those
of the Khmer Rouge can there be any sign of progress. In contrast, the
Cambodian democratic movement has been judged according to the
international standard of value in terms of justice, the rule of law
and human rights.
This double standard way which the international community
including the State Department has been adopting to judge Cambodian
politicians has allowed Hun Sen to continue to destroy the Cambodian
society and to lead Cambodia to remain dependent on foreign assistance.
Based on his academic and professional experiences as an economist
specializing in the reform of many countries in transition, this writer
is convinced that Hun Sen does not even have a minimal grasp or
understanding of any democratic or civil society principles to lead
Cambodia toward a path of modernity and prosperity. Well schooled in
the Khmer Rouge culture of violence and corruption, Hun Sen can only
bring Cambodia down toward the path of permanent dependence and misery.
iii. what should the united states policy be with regard to the ongoing
crisis in cambodia?
Cambodia is a very small and poor country with only 11 million
inhabitants. However, its people have had their share of misfortune and
tragedy. The international community has spent more than US$ 3 billion
to help Cambodia return to normal conditions through the work of UNTAC.
On the surface, the international community has every reason to have
compassion fatigue. However, if the international Community decides to
drop Cambodia from its radar screen, this would only fulfill the wish
of Hun Sen and allow him to rule Cambodia as a primitive despot.
I argue that the Cambodian people, because of their courage and
tenacity in their belief in democracy and the rule of law still deserve
the attention of the international community only if one argues not in
economic or financial terms, but in humanitarian and ideological terms.
To allow Hun Sen to run Cambodia as his private fiefdom and to behave
like a tyrant oppressing the Cambodian people on a massive scale could
send a very strong but wrong message to countries like Indonesia,
Myanmar even China, where democratic movements are getting stronger and
more active, and like Russia where democracy and the market system are
being questioned.
For the reasons discussed earlier, the Clinton Administration
should recognize that its policy of picking Hun Sen as the only choice
for governing Cambodia is fundamentally flawed. I would like to suggest
that if the Cambodian people are to have any chance of escaping mass
starvation and permanent dependence on international generosity, the
Clinton Administration in consultation with the Congress should
consider the adoption of the following measures:
1. Disengage itself from the current policy of considering Hun Sen
as the only leader who can bring stability and prosperity for the
Cambodian people. This policy of expediently supporting Hun Sen, at all
costs, is contrary to the principles upon which President Clinton has
publicly and officially stated as the cornerstone of his administration
foreign policy; namely the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and
human rights in the world. Based on the above analysis, it is clear
that Hun Sen is not a ``born again democrat'' as some State Department
officials have been suggesting, and his political organization is only
efficient at destroying but not at building a nation.
2. Continue to deny Hun Sen the right to be represented at the
United Nations until he can sufficiently and sustainably demonstrate
his willingness to respect human rights, the rule of law and democratic
principles.
3. Strongly communicate to Hun Sen that he must make all efforts to
bring to justice all those responsible for the political killings prior
to and after the July 5, 1997 coup before the United States sends a new
Ambassador to Cambodia. This would send a strong message to Hun Sen
that the US means business if the current Ambassador can be withdrawn
from Phnom Penh as soon as feasible.
4. Continue to deny Hun Sen economic and financial assistance,
except humanitarian aid, from the United States and from the
international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank
until Hun Sen makes substantial and sustainable efforts to improve the
governance of the country, by eliminating corruption in general and
stopping the destruction of the environment in particular.
5. Review GSP for Cambodia as soon as possible to see whether the
current Cambodian government labor law and practice are conformed to
the existing US legal conditions for granting such an economic
privilege.
6. Make renewed and sustained efforts in bringing to trial all
Khmer Rouge senior officials whose records are on files with the
Cambodian Genocide Project and who are now under Hun Sen's protection
as soon as possible within the framework of an international criminal
court similar to those for Rwanda or Bosnia.
7. Refrain from pressuring the opposition leaders to join a
coalition government dominated Hun Sen, even if King Sihanouk supports
that idea. More specifically, the Clinton Administration should
instruct the State Department not to put pressure on the opposition
parties to enter into a CPP-dominated coalition government whose
economic and social policies will have no chance to succeed because of
the pervasive corruption and the absence of the rule of law within the
CPP organization.
8. Consider the possibility of establishing a caretaker government
in Cambodia in the near future. Only when Hun Sen and his CPP are
politically neutralized can the Cambodian situation really improve. But
this requires a firm commitment from the United States and its allies
to put this plan into action. The Cambodian situation is at such a
hopeless juncture that only a drastic policy change by the United
States, as the world leader in the promotion of democracy, the rule of
law, and human rights, can really have a lasting impact. This situation
has recently been forcefully and soberly argued by Henry Kamm of the
New York Times.
I see no other way but to place Cambodia's people into caring
and disinterested hands for one generation of Cambodians, who
will have matured with respect for their own people and will be
ready to take responsibility for them. Unrealistic? of course.
Unrealizable? No. \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Henry Kamm ``the Cambodian Calamity,'' The New York Review,
August, 13, 1998.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee for your kind
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
attention.
Senator Thomas. Thank you very much. You list in your
summary seven suggestions, and I appreciate you summarizing
them that way. Thank you. Mr. Craner?
STATEMENT OF LORNE W. CRANER, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
Mr. Craner. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invitation to
testify today.
Mr. Chairman, Cambodia's misfortune continues, and I fear
that those of us who observed the election as a group are
partly to blame. I say that because Cambodia's July 25 election
was the test for Cambodia's rejoining the rest of the world.
Based on a clean election day and the first half of the
ballot counting process, most observers gave the election their
blessing. But those criteria are insufficient for judging an
election.
Over the past 15 years, IRI has observed more than 60
elections in over 3 dozen countries around the world. In that
time, we have seen a number of countries seemingly holding
elections for international observers, as opposed to their own
people.
By that I mean that the portions most observers saw,
election day and the initial counting process, were pristine.
But the parts unmonitored by most foreign observers, the months
before the election, the conclusion of the counting, and the
months following the election were so fraught with problems
that they render election day meaningless.
In short, dictators were able to both steal and election
and to get the blessing of international observers. Such a
process has occurred in Cambodia.
I will summarize each of the four stages of the recent
election, pre-election stage, election day, counting and post
election, to illustrate my point.
Cambodia's pre-election phase, which began with the July
1997 coup, saw 100 opposition figures murdered, party leaders
in exile, party infrastructures destroyed, the widespread
intimidation of voters, and a bias election law and law
commission put into place, all before opposition leaders were
allowed to return between 4 and 6 months before the election.
These problems let a joint IRI National Democratic
Institute team--that is our sister institute--headed by Mort
Abramowitz, to conclude that the pre-election phase was
fundamentally flawed.
Election day itself was as good as many IRI has ever
observed, a high voter turnout with no evidence of election day
intimidation and an administratively well-done balloting
process. The initial counting also proceeded well. And it was
at this point that most foreign observers went off to write
their statements blessing the election.
The initial counting was halted when, according to a senior
election commission official, opposition parties gained the
edge. The election commission then announced a change in the
way votes won related to assembly seats won, giving the ruling
CPP party 52 percent of the seats, though they had won only 41
percent of the votes.
Finally, both the election commission and the
constitutional council, the initial and final arbiters of
election disputes, declined to hear all but a few of the
opposition's over 800 election complaints.
After the election, intimidation of opposition figures
resumed, including another attempt on the life of Sam Rainsy,
who is here with us today. The opposition nevertheless led
demonstrations, including a sit-in attended by thousands in
Phnom Penh.
In the next 2 weeks, at least twenty demonstrators were
killed before police ended the sit-in. Travel abroad by
opposition party leaders was banned until this week, but
remains in place for dissidents Kem Sokha. Under this pressure,
opposition leaders last week agreed to attend the opening of
Cambodia's new parliament, but have so far not agreed to join
Hun Sen in a coalition government. But that day will soon come.
And this goes to the issue of leverage for the opposition.
This is King Sihanouk on the opposition's leverage. Let me
quote him. In a Cambodia that is not a state of law and not a
full-fledged democracy, I have no other choice than to advise
the weak to choose the policy that avoids misfortune for the
people, the motherland and themselves.
Mr. Chairman, many will say that in a Third World country
like Cambodia we cannot expect a better election. Believe me,
we can. And I know because IRI has seen them in poor countries
like Mongolia and war-ravaged poor countries like Nicaragua.
There is, in fact, no excuse for such a bad election,
except the desire of a dictator to stay in power. Beyond his
years with the Khmer Rouge in the seventies, beyond his
authoritarian rule in the eighties, Hun Sen has shown his
desire to remain in power by rejecting the 1993 election
results, by the 1997 coup and now, for the fifth time, by the
1998 elections.
As the New York Times recently put it, since the Khmer
Rouge came to power in 1975, Cambodia has suffered under an
assortment of dreadful governments, and Hun Sen has been in all
of them. He has not only been in all of them. For 20 of the
last 23 years, he has effectively headed that assortment of
dreadful governments.
At this moment, we have to deal with him. But that does not
mean we must deal on his terms. He craves legitimacy,
especially that accorded by the U.S. Cambodia's government has
not yet been given the UNC international financial assistance
or U.S. aid cutoff after last year's coup.
Finally, you will soon decide whether this is the time to
confirm a new envoy to Phnom Penh.
My written testimony contains yardsticks by which to
measure a restoration of democracy that should be our major
reason for dealing with Hun Sen. In sum, we should look for in
the next few weeks a resolution of opposition election
complaints and a coalition government of substance that
involves true power sharing.
Over the next few months, we also have a right to expect an
improvement in the overall human rights situation, including
safety for Hun Sen's opponents and their families and changes
in the judicial system that could be proved by investigating
and prosecuting those responsible for past human rights abuses.
Mr. Chairman, this election was set as a test, and it was
found wanting. If we fail to act firmly and instead acquiesce
to this election, we will again consign the people of Cambodia
to darkness.
But accepting this election will have reverberations beyond
Cambodia. Mr. Chairman, it would invite other dictators to take
a page from Hun Sen's play book. Dictators around the world
would feel free to repress their opposition and the voters for
months or years either side of an election, confident that the
international community will certify the process as long as
election day looks good.
Mr. Chairman, when I was younger, I wondered if those old
phrases describing the U.S. as a beacon of freedom or a city on
the hill were just cliches. I found in my travels around the
world, as IRI's president, that people everywhere do indeed
still look to the U.S. as the bastion of freedom.
We should not let them down, and we should not give
elections a bad name by assenting to recent events in Cambodia.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Craner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lorne W. Craner
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to testify before you today in the
Senate, where I worked during the 1980s for Senator McCain, and as the
State Department's liaison during the Bush administration.
Election standards
Election observation has come a long way since those days. Ten
years ago, the events of election day, whether citizens were able to
cast their ballots freely, in an orderly fashion, was the standard by
which the democratic process was judged.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of dictators taught us
a lesson, that the events surrounding the election are often more
important than the day itself Specifically, authoritarians realized
that, to steal an election, they did not have to stuff the ballot
boxes, but could instead achieve their objective in the months
surrounding election day by means less apparent to traditional
observers.
In effect, for IRI and other observation groups, a one part test
for judging an election had to become a four part test if we were to
accurately evaluate how representative of a country's democracy an
election was.
the first part to be evaluated is the months long pre-
election phase, during which the central issues are whether
candidates and their supporters are allowed to campaign freely,
whether they have equal opportunity to access both the media
and the election commission itself, and whether voters are left
free to decide for whom they will vote;
the second part of the test is the conduct of election day
itself as outlined above;
the third phase immediately follows election day: were
ballots counted in an orderly, accurate manner, and were there
opportunities for reasonable appeal of results doubted by some?
and finally, in the longer term, after voting and counting
ballots, did all parties respect the election's results and
work together to form a new government?
IRI's experience
Since 1983 IRI has observed more than 70 elections in over three
dozen countries. In doing so, we have only one asset that matters, and
that is a reputation for impartiality--a willingness to call an
election process like we see it, and to do so without regard to who won
or lost.
Most recently, our approach led IRI to call the 1995 Haitian
elections flawed, leading to criticism from some Democrats here in the
Senate. It also led IRI to judge the 1996 Albanian elections flawed,
leading to criticism from some in my own party who admire President
Berisha.
Cambodia's election
Our willingness to call it like we see it leads IRI to judge
Cambodia's 1998 election process similarly flawed, and among the worst
we have observed since 1993.
The events that lead IRI to condemn it occurred not on election
day, but in the days, weeks and months before and after the balloting.
While the July 26th election day itself impressed observers, including
IRI, those of us who monitored the pre-election process, and remained
to observe the counting and longer-term post-election events, believe
that, taken as a whole, this election fell below an acceptable
standard.
Let me divide Cambodia's elections process into the four phases I
mentioned before to show how IRI reached its judgment.
In a July 14th joint statement, IRI and the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) judged the preelection phase ``fundamentally flawed''
because of:
the July 1997 coup, and subsequent destruction of opposition
party infrastructures;
the failure to allow opposition leaders to return until less
than six months before balloting, the denial to them of access
to media once in-country, and the murder of up to 100
opposition members without any resolution to the crimes;
the overwhelming ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP)
domination of the 11 member National Election Commission (NEC),
with all but one of the non-CPP party seats given to CPP-backed
splinter groups of opposition parties, and a hastily formed,
biased Constitutional Council, the ultimate arbiter in election
matters;
more than 100% of those thought to beof voting age
registering in some areas;
the widely reported intimidation of voters, leading to a
common belief that their votes were not secret. (This is one of
the most problematic areas--in past elections where
authoritarians controlled the process, a key factor leading to
a genuine election result has been the voters' belief that they
could cast their ballots in secret and therefore without fear
of reprisal);
an election law and regulations that were debated and
approved by the CPP and splinter groups of the opposition
parties. The legitimate leaders and elements of the opposition
parties were in exile in Bangkok, still fearing for their lives
from the coup. (After his return to Phnom Penh, Prime Minister
Ranariddh was able to have one element of the election law, the
location of ballot counting, changed).
In short, during the pre-election period, the CPP wrote the rules
and controlled the process.
As the IRI-NDI July 28th preliminary statement indicated, the
second test, Cambodia's election day administration, was as good as
many we have seen over the past five years, and deserves a high mark:
the election administration ran very smoothly at most places
observed;
few of our delegates saw any sign of election day
intimidation;
over 90% of those registered turned up at the polls.
There remains a question of whether pre-election day intimidation
pre-ordained the votes of many Cambodians (most voters we asked
directly said they were not intimidated). That said, had subsequent
portions of the Cambodian election run as smoothly as the election day
activities we observed, one could say that some pre-election problems,
though unacceptable, were, in context, to a significant degree
ameliorated.
Unfortunately, that is not the case. After a promising start, the
third part of the election, the counting process immediately following
election day, must be judged as deliberately incomplete:
counting proceeded smoothly for part of July 27th;
counting was halted in mid-afternoon of July 27th. According
to a source high in the National Election Commission, this
pause was ordered by CPP officials after the opposition took
the lead in ballot counts;
during the counting process, with little explanation, the
NEC revealed that the formula relating ballots won, to assembly
seats won, had been changed before the election. While the
original formulas would have left the CPP with a minority of
assembly seats, the formula finally decided upon gave the CPP a
majority.
while legally obligated to do so, the NEC declined to
address all but a few of the more than 800 election day and
counting irregularities charged by the opposition;
the Constitutional Council, supposedly the final arbiter of
elections appeals, like the NEC refused to hear the majority of
opposition complaints and sided completely with the NEC on
issues important to the opposition, including used and unused
ballots, recounts, and assembly seat allocation;
In the longer term, after voting and counting have ended,
Cambodia's government has failed to act in the way one would expect in
a democracy:
intimidation of the opposition resumed with the departure of
observers;
Sam Rainsy himself narrowly missed being killed in an August
20th drive by shooting and grenade attack shortly after a media
interview outside the ministry of interior. Rainsy was then
detained for questioning in connection with the attack;
at least 20 people, according to the U.N. Center on Human
Rights, are known to have been killed, and others went missing,
during a three week period of demonstrations and a sit in at
Phnom Penh's ``democracy square''. The sit in and
demonstrations were forcibly ended after two grenades exploded
outside Hun Sen's house while he was outside of town;
following the grenade explosions, Hun Sen ordered the arrest
of Rainsy, charging him with the attack. Rainsy took refuge
with the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General
in Phnom Penh's Cambodiana Hotel;
Cambodia's opposition politicians were also banned from
traveling abroad after the grenade attack. After Rainsy and
Prince Ranariddh defied the ban, it was lifted for
parliamentarians, but remains in place for a number of
opposition figures who do not have seats in parliament;
summons were issued this week for Rainsy, Kem Sokha and Por
Thei (the President of the Dharmacracy Women and Nation Party)
on charges of incitement to racial violence and damaging state
property relating to the demonstrations;
one bright spot is last Tuesday's agreement between the
opposition and the government that used, unused and spoiled
ballots should be reconciled. Still unresolved are the
opposition's request that the second formula for the allocation
of assembly seats be rescinded (in favor of the original
formula), for the release of jailed demonstrators, and for a
general amnesty for their members.
The events of the last week, with FUNCINPEC and the Rainsy party
agreeing to attend the opening of Cambodia's Parliament, under duress,
should come as no surprise. Beyond the international pressure (mainly
from Japan and ASEAN countries) exerted on the opposition to come to
terms with Hun Sen, as King Sihanouk put it ``in a Cambodia that is not
a state of law and not a full fledged democracy, I have no other choice
than to advise the weak to choose a policy that avoids misfortune for
the people, the motherland and themselves.''
Cambodia's 1998 election constitutes a deliberate attempt to take
advantage of the weaknesses in 1980s-style observation to have the
process declared legitimate. Cambodia's government conducted an
election day up to international standards, hoping that observers would
ignore the hundreds of days of repression surrounding it. To a large
degree, the strategy worked.
Excuses, excuses
We are already hearing excuses about why Cambodia's election fell
so short of international standards. After every bad election, the two
most common are:
Americans are judging the state of a country's democracy from
the perspective of a nation with two hundred years of freedom
(this was a common refrain from South African politicians
seeking to extend apartheid in its dying days); or
The country in which the election took place is poor, and
that the bar for an acceptable election should therefore be
lowered.
At IRI, we hear these arguments after every badly conducted
election, and in IRI's experience of observing six dozen elections,
such arguments are specious. I can say that because IRI has seen
textbook elections in countries that are as poor as Cambodia, and while
these countries have not experienced the trauma of Cambodia's killing
fields, many have a longer history of dictatorship.
For example, a ruling party does not need to head a wealthy, long-
time democracy to refrain from murdering its political opponents.
Mongolia, a nation nearly as poor as Cambodia, with a longer history of
dictatorship, had an election run--and lost--by former communists in
1996 without any election-related murders.
Nor must a country be a longstanding, wealthy democracy to properly
count and recount ballots. One of the most well conducted elections IRI
has observed was the 1994 Autonomous Council election on the remote
Miskito coast of Nicaragua, the poorest region of a poor country
emerging from war and decades of dictatorship.
Ramifications of accepting Cambodia's election
To accept this election would, in fact, devalue the worth of
elections in building democracies around the world. Other dictators
would feel free to kill opposition members, gut opposition party
infrastructures, name a biased election commission, intimidate voters,
conduct questionable ballot counts and refuse recounts, all the while
confident that the international community will certify the process, as
long as election day looks good.
Observers from the U.N. team (which included China, Vietnam, and
Burma) are apparently willing to give such a certification to
Cambodia's election, but the U.S. has a duty to billions around the
world who look to us to uphold a higher standard of democracy. To agree
to low standards for elections lowers the expectations of democracy for
those voting. The U.S. should not give elections a bad name by
assenting to recent events in Cambodia
Cambodia's election and U.S. policy
So where does this leave U.S. policy? We have a choice between
accepting or not accepting the elections process. Both the House and
Senate versions of the fiscal year 1999 Foreign Operations bill, makes
clear the unwillingness of Congress to accept Cambodia's elections.
This is not a case of trade sanctions being put in place against
Cambodia, nor should withholding U.S. aid leave Washington alone in the
world. While ASEAN may already have concluded that they are satisfied
with the election, the Europeans (with the exception of France) have
not. Leadership by the United States in setting forth our position and
working with others to follow it has, in the past, produced results.
Action such as that contemplated by both houses of this Congress
would also have a high likelihood of producing results. His role in the
events of the 1970s, 1980s, 1993, 1997 and 1998 should by now have made
clear that Hun Sen is not a democrat. Any hope for democracy lies not
with Hun Sen, but with Cambodia's opposition, whom we should support.
Pressure should be placed on Hun Sen to change his ways, and not on the
opposition to simultaneously risk their lives while debasing their
understanding of democracy. The worldwide disgust that followed last
July's coup had much of the desired effect on Hun Sen, largely because,
unlike the 1980s, Moscow and Vietnam are unable to bankroll and guard
his rule. Moreover, as anyone familiar with Hun Sen can tell you, he
craves legitimacy, and, in his eyes, the ultimate legitimacy is
acceptance by the U.S.
As you contemplate further steps, including whether the U.S. should
back International Financial Institution assistance for Cambodia, the
issue of Cambodia's U.N. seat, and whether a new U.S. ambassador should
be confirmed, let me suggest some yardsticks by which democratic
progress can be measured:
the first is implementation of last Tuesday's agreement for
the reconciliation of electoral ballots;
the second is agreement and action relating to the
opposition's request regarding the formula for Assembly seat
allocation, the release of jailed demonstrators, and a general
amnesty for opposition members;
the third pertains to the broader issue of Cambodia's
democracy, and that is the extent of true power sharing in any
coalition government. This can be measured in three ways:
--the allocation of the most important Ministries between the
presumed coalition partners, FUNCINPEC and the CPP. The three
most important Ministries in terms of democratic rule are
Interior, Justice, and Finance. Also important are Defense and
Foreign Affairs. (Hopefully, any of these Ministries given to
FUNCINPEC would come with their current powers);
--the extent of FUNCINPEC control over any of these
ministries allocated; and
--the extent to which coalition partners share power in
provincial and district governments. After 1993, FUNCINPEC
governors served over a largely CPP-controlled provincial
bureaucracy (as openly admitted in 1995 by the FUNCINPEC
Governor of Sihanoukville, Thoam Bun Sron) with predictable
results;
The separation of state and party control over Cambodia's
judicial branch;
the general state of human rights in Cambodia, including the
extent of press freedom, the ability of labor unions to
organize, the fate of elected and non-elected opposition
members and their families, the ability of non-government
aligned NGOs to function free of impediment and intimidation,
and the ability to demonstrate freely; and
the results of long-promised government investigations into
and prosecutions of those presumed responsible for human rights
violations in Cambodia, including the 1995 grenade attack
against the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party Congress, the
Easter, 1997 grenade attack on Sam Rainsy, and the murders of
opposition figures during the July 1997 coup.
Taking advantage of my appearance before you, I would also
respectfully request your assistance on a related issue.
The results of the FBI's investigation into the Easter 1997 grenade
attack on Sam Rainsy should be made public. I appeal for your help on
this for two reasons. First, among the reasons given by Hun Sen for
threatening Rainsy's arrest is Rainsy's supposed attack on himself in
the incident (a charge dismissed by the head of the U.N. Human Rights
Office, which itself investigated the attack). The second reason I
request your assistance is because an IRI employee, Ron Abney, was
injured in the attack, precipitating the FBI investigation under U.S.
anti-terrorism laws. Along with the Congress, both men deserve to know
who ordered and carried out the attack.
Conclusion
Cambodia has suffered conflict for almost thirty years. I am not
among those who believe that U.S. policy during the Vietnam war
resulted in the 1975 Khmer Rouge victory, but I do believe that, with
the exception of 1991-1993, Cambodia for too long has suffered from the
neglect of the international community. This was especially true during
the last five years, when U.S. policy towards Cambodia at best
consisted of building roads at the expense of building democracy, and
at worst suffered from egregiously poor judgment.
If there is a people on earth who deserve better, it is Cambodians.
The United States, including the U.S. Senate, can and should help give
Cambodians the future they deserve.
Senator Thomas. There is about 5 minutes left on this vote.
So I think we will have to adjourn for a little bit and come
back.
In the meantime, however, let me welcome and call on
Senator Robb for any comments he might have.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately as is
often the case, I am sitting on both the Foreign Services
Committee deliberations over ballistic missile defense, which
is a very contentious item, as you know. And they adjourned a
little early.
I thought I could come here and at least pick up the
testimony. I understand that Secretary Roth has already
completed his testimony. I will take it with me.
I appreciate very much your holding the hearing on this
particular subject. It has been one of immense interest for a
very long period of time, and I plan to take with me the
testimony. And if I can finish up my questions in the other
hearing, I will come back to this one. But I think this could
not be more timely and appreciate your holding it.
I will just leave it at that for right now.
Senator Thomas. Thank you.
Well, I am sorry we are interrupted, but that is the way it
is. And if we can stand in recess for just a few minutes, I
will get back as soon as I can.
[Recess: 10:47 a.m to 11:10 a.m.]
Senator Thomas. Let me see. We are ready, I believe.
Professor Brown, if you will, sir. Thank you for your patience,
Professor Brown.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK Z. BROWN, PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Brown.Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this
opportunity to comment on the current situation in Cambodia. In
my written testimony, I comment briefly on what I call the
realities of the political environment in Cambodia in the wake
of the July 19, 1998 elections and the violence that took place
subsequently.
I also suggest several guidelines for U.S. policy over the
longer term, as the Cambodians attempt to rebuild their
country. Let me mention only two realities for starters.
During the past several years, we have seen an erosion of
the international community's consensus on Cambodia. The
governments of the Southeast Asian countries and Japan are now
far more concerned with their own economic problems than with
Cambodia. Compassion fatigue among economic assistance donors
has set in.
In the eyes of Cambodia's neighbors, and indeed of most of
the signatories to the Paris agreements in 1991, the political
situation in Phnom Penh is a nasty internal struggle. The
important thing for outsiders is to prevent any disruptive
regional expression of this struggle. There is a tendency to
view the stability of Cambodia as more important than the
character of its government.
In practical terms, I believe this means that the United
States must bear much of the burden in promoting a workable
solution that protects Cambodia's fledgling democratic spirit
and respect for human rights and which encourages the
development of a civil society.
The second reality, I think, is that it is painfully
obvious that Cambodia is less important to American national
interests than, for example, the future of the Japanese
economy, the North Korean missile threat and Indonesia.
Nonetheless, it seems to me that we have a commitment to the
Cambodian people and a responsibility under the Paris
agreements.
Let me offer three suggestions with regard to U.S. policy.
The first has to do with leadership. We should continue to
work closely with our friends in ASEAN, Japan, Australia,
Canada and France, despite differences in perspective regarding
the validity of the July 1998 elections, to find ways to move
Hun Sen and the CPP toward an acceptance of the opposition as
legitimate players in Cambodia's politics.
While the extent to which ASEAN is willing to modify Hun
Sun's script is limited, ASEAN clearly has an interest in
preventing Cambodia from becoming a rogue state for narcotics
trafficking or to otherwise disrupt the region.
At minimum the United States should seek common action by
ASEAN and United Nations agencies in pressing for investigation
into charges of vote counting fraud and investigating the use
of force in quelling the postelection demonstrations.
ASEAN has already indicated that Cambodia's membership in
the group is on hold until a legitimate government is formed.
The United States must encourage ASEAN to maintain this
position firmly. The same is true with regard to the seat at
the United Nations.
My second recommendation has to do with support for the
Cambodian nongovernmental organizations. Despite a zero-sum,
politically intolerant climate in 1993, Cambodians accepted the
basic concept of a democratic process as embodied in the U.N.-
sponsored elections. The surprise victory of FUNCINPEC
demonstrated the attractiveness of open elections to rural
Cambodians, as well as their resentment of the status quo.
One of the most important legacies of the U.N. presence was
the growth of mass participation in human rights organizations
and indigenous NGO's. NGO's were also a positive influence in
the 1998 elections. The indigenous poll-watching organizations
of COMFREL and COFFEL, thousands strong, demonstrated the
determination of many Cambodians to participate in their
political process even at serious personal risk.
Except for the Philippines, no other nation in Southeast
Asia has developed such a pattern of citizen political
participation. Although jeopardized by the July 1997 coup and
the political climate after the 1998 elections--before and
after, I should say--nongovernmental organizations retained
links with the international community. They also are fragile
elements of Cambodian society. And the Cambodian People's Party
probably sees them as a threatening force.
Nonetheless, indigenous NGO's are microscopic signs of
civil society that can provide a foundation on which the United
States and other international assistance programs can build.
USAID support for humanitarian programs of The Asia
Foundation and other NGO's with long involvement in Cambodia
should be continued and expanded to its previous broader scope.
At some point, assuming a satisfactory political accommodation,
development assistance to certain parts of the Cambodian
government--for example, the Ministry of Education--should be
considered.
My third recommendation has to do with staying involved.
The critical issue at the moment of this hearing is the degree
to which the election complaints of FUNCINPEC and the Sam
Rainsy Party can be satisfied in a manner which gives them fair
representation either in a coalition government, which now
appears to be the case, or as an opposition bloc within the
national assembly free of harassment and coercion. These are
rapidly changing tactical matters currently under intense
negotiation, which Secretary Roth has detailed in his
testimony.
The United States must stimulate common diplomatic pressure
on the current Hun Sen regime. It must continue broad
cooperation at the United Nations, demand the continuation of
the U.N. Center for Human Rights in Phnom Penh, and use
conditionality in the World Bank, UNDP and other international
financial institutions when financial support to the Cambodian
government is up for consideration.
The United States deals with many governments that engage
in heinous violations of human rights and repression of
democratic institutions. Some observers have suggested that the
United States refuse to deal with Hun Sen in an interim regime
or with whatever Hun Sen dominated regime is likely to emerge
over the next few weeks. I believe this would be an extremely
bad policy decision.
The American embassy in Phnom Penh is still accredited to
the Royal Kingdom of Cambodia, regardless of Hun Sen's
repressive record. To break that relationship would remove
whatever ability the United States has to affect the course of
events through dialog with Hun Sen himself or with members of
the CPP, who may be less than enthusiastic about Hun Sen's
autocratic rule.
In this regard, I wish to add my view that Ambassador Quinn
has done a highly professional job in an extremely difficult
situation.
Finally, I would point out that even if the opposition were
to eventually become the dominant group in a coalition with the
CPP, they, the opposition, now the ruling party, would still
have to rely almost exclusively on a government apparatus,
police, military, civil administration, from province capital
to local communes that are staffed by CPP adherents.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brown follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Frederick Z. Brown
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to comment on the
current situation in Cambodia. I was an international polling station
officer during the 1993 UNTAC elections in Cambodia and spent July 1997
there during the coup d'etat by second prime minister Hun Sen that
destroyed the coalition government put in place by UNTAC. I did not
observe the July 1998 national elections but have followed events in
Cambodia closely through the reports of the International Republican
Institute, the National Democratic Institute, the International Crisis
Group, Amnesty International, and other sources.
I would like to comment briefly on the realities of the political
environment in Cambodia in the wake of the July 1998 elections and the
violence that took place subsequently. Second, I would like to suggest
guidelines for U.S. policy over the longer term as the Cambodians
attempt to rebuild their country.
Prior to July 1997, first prime minister Norodom Ranariddh and
FUNCINPEC shared power, if unevenly, with Hun Sen and the Cambodian
People's Party (CPP). Today, the CPP and Hun Sen have a monopoly of
force through control of police, the internal security services, and
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. On the surface, the CPP's political
monopoly appears to be equally firm. Beginning in the 1980s, the CPP
created a countrywide Leninist political system with central Party
control. The CPP network was strengthened in the post-1993 period by an
infusion of pork barrel incentives flowing from international
assistance programs. The CPP systematically used intimidation and
physical coercion to prevent the development of alternative political
structures and opposing voices. After July 1997, FUNCINPEC's rural
organization was dispersed, its members co-opted by the CPP, forced to
flee or frightened into silence. The CPP now holds the political,
administrative, and security levers in the Cambodian provinces.
It is nonetheless clear from the results of the July 1998 elections
that the CPP and Hun Sen personally do not enjoy the genuine support of
the majority of the Cambodian people. In spite of widespread
intimidation, control of the electronic media, and a political machine
in almost every commune in the country, the CPP gained 41.4 percent of
the popular vote with FUNCINPEC receiving 31.7 percent and the Sam
Rainsy Party 14.4 percent. The relatively high figure for the CPP can
be explained in part by the Cambodian people's desire for an end to
political conflict and consequent improvement of their economic
conditions, a sentiment that translates into a disinclination to risk
activity that could be construed as ``against the regime''. Yet,
paradoxically, many Cambodians have not been cowed. Thousands of people
from the provinces have dared to demonstrate in Phnom Penh's streets in
recent weeks in an unprecedented expression of disapproval of the Hun
Sen regime.
The international consensus in support of the Cambodia peace
process, pluralism and respect for human rights has carried significant
political weight, especially from 1991 through 1993. In 1997-1998, the
``Friends of Cambodia'' group and the ASEAN ``troika'' of Thailand, the
Philippines, and Indonesia played essential roles in brokering the
return of National Assembly deputies from FUNCINPEC and other
opposition parties to Phnom Penh and in mitigating some aspects of Hun
Sen's repressive measures after the coup. Several countries (and the
United Nations) have helped calm the political frenzy following the
July 1998 election.
During the past several years we have seen an erosion of the
international community's consensus on Cambodia. Some ASEAN member
states have one-party political systems; others display little interest
in the human rights aspects of the Paris Agreements. The governments of
the Southeast Asia countries and Japan are now far more concerned with
their own economic problems than with Cambodia. Compassion fatigue
among economic assistance donors has set in. In the eyes of Cambodia's
neighbors and indeed of most signatories to the Paris Agreements, the
political situation in Phnom Penh is a nasty, internal struggle. The
important thing for outsiders is to prevent any disruptive regional
expression of this struggle. This attitude is demonstrated by the
statement from the head of the European Community's observer delegation
for the July 1998 elections that ``despite shortcomings in the post-
election period, the elections were sufficiently free and fair to
reflect the will of the Cambodian people''. Similar views have been
expressed by observer delegations from Australia, Canada, and Japan,
albeit with strong minority dissenting opinions. In the past, these
countries were the strongest supporters of the common effort to promote
political pluralism and respect for human rights in Cambodia.
In practical terms, this means that the United States must bear
most of the burden in promoting a workable solution that protects
Cambodia's fledgling democratic spirit and human rights, and which
encourages the development of a civil society. Consideration by other
members of the international community of human rights and
participatory governance will be tempered by pragmatic recognition of
Cambodia's enduring autocratic political tendencies. For most, the
``stability'' of Cambodia is more important than the character of its
government.
Recommendations for United States Policy
In Asia, Cambodia is less important to American national interests
than, for example, the future of the Japanese economy, North Korea, and
Indonesia. Nonetheless, we have a commitment to the Cambodian people
and a responsibility under the Paris Agreements.
1. Leadership. We should continue to work closely with our friends
in ASEAN, Japan, Australia, Canada, and France, despite differences in
perspective regarding the validity of the July 1998 elections, to find
ways to move Hun Sen and the CPP toward an acceptance of the opposition
as legitimate players in Cambodia's politics. While the extent to which
ASEAN is willing to modify Hun Sen's script is limited, ASEAN clearly
has an interest in preventing Cambodia from becoming a ``rogue state''
for narcotics trafficking or to otherwise disrupt the region. In this
sense, ASEAN cannot run away and hide. At a minimum the United States
should seek common action by ASEAN and United Nations agencies in
pressing for investigations into charges of vote counting fraud and in
investigating the use of force in quelling the post-election
demonstrations. ASEAN has already indicated that Cambodia's membership
in the group is on hold for the time being. The United States should
encourage ASEAN to maintain that position.
2. Support the Cambodian nongovernmental organizations. Despite a
zero sum, politically intolerant climate, in 1993 Cambodians seemed to
accept the basic concepts of the democratic process as embodied in the
UN-sponsored elections. The surprise victory of FUNCINPEC demonstrated
the attractiveness of open elections to rural Cambodians (80 percent of
the population) as well as their resentment of the status quo. One of
the important legacies of the U.N. presence was the growth of mass
participation in human rights organizations and indigenous NGOs.
NGOs were also a positive influence in the 1998 election. The
indigenous poll-watching organizations of COMFREL and COFFEL, 40,000
persons strong, demonstrated the determination of many Cambodians to
participate in their political process, even at serious personal risk.
Except for the Philippines, no other nation in Southeast Asia has
developed such a pattern of citizen political participation. Although
jeopardized by the July 1997 coup and the political climate after the
1998 elections, NGOs retain links with the international community. But
they remain fragile elements of Cambodian society, and the CPP, which
is opposed to change, probably sees them a threatening forces.
Nonetheless, these microscopic signs of civil society can provide a
foundation on which U.S. and other international assistance programs
can build.
USAID support for humanitarian programs of The Asia Foundation and
other NGOs with long involvement in Cambodia should be continued and
expanded to its previous broader scope. At some point, assuming a
political accommodation, development assistance to certain parts of the
Cambodian government (e.g. Ministry of Education) should also be
considered. It will be necessary to convince the government that the
NGO sector is a positive, non-threatening element of a civil society
that benefits the Cambodian people.
3. Stay involved. The critical issue at the moment of this hearing
is the degree to which the election complaints of FUNCINPEC and the Sam
Rainsy Party can be satisfied in a manner which gives them fair
representation either in a coalition government or as an opposition
bloc within the National Assembly free of harassment and coercion.
These are rapidly changing tactical matters currently under intense
negotiation. In principle, in addition to the actions suggested above,
the United States must stimulate common diplomatic pressure on the Hun
Sen regime; seek broader cooperation at the United Nations; demand the
continuation of the U.N. Center for Human Rights in Phnom Penh; and use
conditionality in the World Bank, UNDP, and other international
financial institutions when financial support to the Cambodian
government is up for consideration. The United States must be an
advocate within the international community for the vigorous use of all
these tools--no other nation has a genuine commitment to performing
such a function nor the political muscle to pursue it.
The United States deals with many governments that engage in
heinous violations of human rights and repression of democratic
institutions. Some observers have suggested that the United States
refuse to deal with Hun Sen in an interim regime, or with whatever Hun
Sen-dominated regime is likely to emerge over the next few weeks. I
believe this would be an extremely bad policy decision. The American
Embassy in Phnom Penh is still accredited to the Royal Kingdom of
Cambodia, regardless of the Hun Sen government's repressive record. To
break that relationship would remove whatever ability the United States
has to affect the course of events through dialogue with members of the
CPP who may be less than enthusiastic about Hun Sen's autocratic rule.
We would no longer be able to support indigenous NGOs. Finally, I would
point out that even if the opposition were to become the dominant group
in a coalition with the CPP, they would still have to reply almost
exclusively on a government apparatus--police, military, civil
administration from province down to local communes--staffed by CPP
adherents.
The United States Congress has rightly condemned the Hun Sen regime
for human rights abuses and contravention of the Paris Agreements. I
understand the political utility of such an expression of Congressional
views in a situation like Cambodia today. Yet, in my view, we should
not delude ourselves into believing that statements of disapproval and
threats will necessarily moderate the actions of the regime. The United
States seems to have become the conscience of the international
community. But we should not exaggerate our ability to bring about the
kind of political and social change we would like to see in Cambodia,
particularly in the absence of a genuine wish on the part of the
Cambodian political elites for compromise and reconciliation.
Senator Thomas. OK. Thank you very much. And thanks to all
of you for participating and for your views.
What would be involved, Professor Brown, with--how would
the acceptance of the opposition as legitimate players play
out? What would be the role as you see it?
Mr. Brown.If the opposition actually forms a coalition as
part of the government, then certainly several cabinet- level
posts would have to be given to FUNCINPEC.
Also, there would have to be an accommodation with regard
to the leadership at province level. I do not know how that
would work out specifically, but certainly it would be improper
to have all the province chiefs and the deputy province
Governors affiliated uniquely with the CPP. Certainly those
would be two things.
Senator Thomas. How do you feel that the coalition
arrangement under the 1994 election worked out?
Mr. Brown.The 1993 election?
Senator Thomas. 1993.
Mr. Brown.Not very well, as it turned out. For the first
year, it worked adequately well, I would say, in the situation
in Cambodia immediately after the UNTAC period. Then it
disintegrated. And part of the disintegration, of course, was
that not only the CPP, but also the FUNCINPEC, were unable to
accommodate the presence of Sam Rainsy as minister of finance
and development. Then the situation deteriorated after that,
admittedly, into a very bad situation.
Senator Thomas. Dr. Tith, one of your views is to instruct
the State Department not to put pressure on the opposition to
enter into a coalition.
Dr. Tith. Yes, sir.
Senator Thomas. Do you have something of a different point
of view?
Dr. Tith. Yes, sir. The main reason for that is that, first
of all, I view a coalition in a really democratic system as to
be freely agreed upon. And I do not see under the circumstances
how this coalition could be that kind of freely agreed type of
coalition. That is one reason.
The second reason is that I see at the present time, as an
economist looking and particularly dealing with economic
management of more than 100 countries, I can tell you that Hun
Sen does not have the skill nor the commitment to manage the
economy.
The economy is really at the point of no return because of
the deforestation. So if the coalition is formed, Hun Sen can
only use their position to blame, because he has already blamed
the opposition. As a matter of fact, he was interview the other
day. Why did he not take care of the starvation issue which has
started in Cambodia, some provinces in Cambodia? He said that
because he blamed the opposition because they have
demonstrated. So it would waste his time to deal with this sort
of issue.
So to me, if you want to have really any kind of solution
down the road, is not to allow Hun Sen to deal with this
problem. And you can see clearly who Hun Sen is. And he will
not be able to manage the economy. It is simply that his base
is management on corruption and on a loyalty which is based on
purely on favor distribution.
There is no difference between CPP and the government in
Hun Sen. So you have, first of all, this kind of situation. How
could you manage the economy when it is not based on
meritocracy?
Senator Thomas. If you did not move toward a coalition to
govern, then what is your solution to the dilemma that now
exists?
Dr. Tith. To me, it seems to me that if the opposition
should play the role of opposition, there is a constitutional
crisis in the sense that because there is a two-third majority
required--this is of Hun Sen's making, by the way. He is the
one making that rule, because he wanted to corner the
opposition when he was the minority.
We can resolve that sort of thing, I think, through
negotiation, by, let us say, a simple majority, go back to
simple majority. The opposition can vote for that simple
majority and let Hun Sen run the government, and the opposition
remain in the opposition, constructive opposition. That is my
idea about how can we proceed.
Senator Thomas. It is my understanding, under the
circumstances, there are now, absent this coalition majority,
that there is basically no government that is legitimate.
Dr. Tith. Well, if it is a simple majority----
Senator Thomas. But it is not, is not? How would that come
about?
Dr. Tith. Well, the constitution has to change.
Senator Thomas. Dr. Brown mentioned, Mr. Craner, pressing
for an investigation into charges of vote fraud and
investigation of the use of forces. I presume you would agree
to that generally.
Mr. Craner. Yes, I would.
Senator Thomas. So what if you determined, what if there is
determined, there was vote fraud and so on? Then what happens?
Mr. Craner. In other countries that IRI has observed, if
there were cases of vote fraud, the elections at that
particular ballot place or in that particular province are
rerun.
Senator Thomas. OK. Would that happen here? Is there a
constitutional and a legal framework, assuming those
allegations were proved, would that require another election?
Mr. Craner. On paper there are such provisions.
Senator Thomas. Yes. That is what I mean. So you go ahead
and do the investigation, Dr. Brown. You find there is fraud.
So what?
Mr. Brown.Well, as I understand it, there are at least 800
complaints registered by the Sam Rainsy party and FUNCINPEC. I
am given to believe that of those 800, the estimate of the
administration is that many of them would not materially change
the outcome of the election in the individual location.
I doubt very much you could investigate all 800 in any kind
of reasonable timeframe. But it seems to me there ought to be a
process by which some of those charges which appear to be the
most serious could be investigated by the National Election
Commission, which did not really do its job entirely after the
election, or through some other international mechanism.
Senator Thomas. I guess my question is, assuming they found
that there is this kind of--and the International Elections
Commission says, so what? What happens?
Mr. Brown.Well, if it appears that an election in a given
province or in a given location did change the outcome with
regard to who was elected from that location, then the national
assembly composition would have to be adjusted accordingly, I
suppose, so that the balance between FUNCINPEC, the Sam Rainsy
party and CPP would change.
Senator Thomas. And you know about it more than I. But it
seems like we are assuming that their laws are similar, for
instance, to ours, where there is a constitutional provision to
change and a structure, a legal structure, to cause it to
happen. And I suspect that is not the case.
Mr. Brown.That could very well be that it would not happen.
But there has to be a serious investigation made and put on the
record.
Senator Thomas. I understand. What is--you know, in
elections anywhere, when you have more than two parties, it
tends to divide the vote. Is there generally agreement among
the two minority groups here on issues and so on? Why did they
have two separate elections instead of coming together to win
the majority that they now have jointly? Why did they not do
that together?
Dr. Tith. You mean in talking about FUNCINPEC and Sam
Rainsy party?
Senator Thomas. Yes.
Dr. Tith. Well, if you observed in Germany or observed in
any other country, when there are two parties that can get
together and form a majority, if it is a majority, then they
can run the country in the simple majority basis.
Senator Thomas. In a parliamentary system.
Dr. Tith. In a parliamentary system, yes. But this is the
problem, that Hun Sen change the formula, you see. Although the
popular vote, Hun Sen got only 41.5 percent, opposition got 58
percent, and this is why it is not representative of the vote
of the people.
But the seat, because of the formula, Hun Sen has 64 seats
out of 122. It does not make any sense. Arithmetic does not add
up. It does not retranslate into the majority in the parliament
for the opposition, which it should.
Senator Thomas. But it takes two-thirds, did you not say,
in the parliament?
Dr. Tith. Two-thirds, yes. That two-third is the rule right
now for any major issues.
Senator Thomas. So in any parliamentary arrangement you
need to get together to get two-thirds, and that is the case
here. You would not even have two-thirds if the two minority
parties got together, is that correct?
Dr. Tith. They will not get two-thirds. But that is why I
said I propose that the two-thirds majority should change first
to make it a simple majority, and then we proceed from there.
Because that two-thirds majority was an imposition by Hun Sen.
Senator Thomas. I understand that, but I guess I keep
coming back to here is where are.
Dr. Tith. Yes.
Senator Thomas. That is where you would like to see us be,
but that is not where we are at.
Dr. Tith. Right.
Senator Thomas. Yes, sir?
Mr. Craner. I think there is an assumption on the part of
some that had the two opposition parties joined together, they
would be sitting at the head of government today. But history
is instructive. They won in 1993, not with 60 percent of the
vote, but 66 percent of the vote against Hun Sen.
When Hun Sen saw that, he took his army off to the
provinces and said, I am going to split this country if you do
not share power.
So it is not at all clear that had they joined together,
and won 60 or 66 or whatever percentage of the vote, that Hun
Sen would have said: Oh, you won. I understand. I am a good
democrat.
Senator Thomas. Understand. Well, generally, I guess we
could assume that at least the two of you, Mr. Craner and Dr.
Tith, take a little stronger position than the administration
is inclined to.
Dr. Brown, I think you sort of endorse the administration's
position. Is that generally fair?
Dr. Brown; In the absence of a viable alternative, I would
have to endorse it. Yes.
Senator Thomas. You know--and just let me observe. And you,
again, are experts in this, but it is difficult, it seems to
me, for our policy to have the right balance. In other words,
some argue, well, you know, we ought to continue to work with
the country. We ought to continue to participate with aid and
so on in hopes that that is the best way to bring about change.
On the other hand, others argue, by golly, why should we
assist in something that is inconsistent with our values. It
seems like that is kind of where we are a little bit in this
arrangement. Would you argue with that?
Mr. Brown.I would comment only as I have done in my
testimony that there are elements in Cambodian society that are
very much interested in developing a civil society and the rule
of law and respect for human rights.
Democracy is a very difficult term to use with regard to
Cambodia, but there are people in Cambodia, people that we have
helped and supported. And to simply let them drop, it seems to
me, would be criminal on our part.
Now you have to work within the context that is, as you
say. And----
Senator Thomas. I do not think anyone would suggest that. I
guess the real issue before us, not only in Cambodia and other
places, how do we best accomplish that? That is the problem
with China. The same thing.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. I appreciate it. A letter
from Prince Ranariddh and a statement from Sam Rainsy will be
made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Statement Submitted by Sam Rainsy, President, Sam Rainsy Party,
Cambodia
Mr. Chairman, it is a distinct and unique pleasure for me to appear
before you today. I am honored to inform this Subcommittee of the
political situation in Cambodia following the July parliamentary
elections and to highlight the important role the United States can
play in bringing democracy, the rule of law, and lasting peace to my
country.
The last few months, weeks, and days have been among the most
difficult of my life, and it has been equally trying for all Cambodians
who support democracy. I know this Subcommittee is familiar with the
brutal crackdown of pro-democracy demonstrators in Phnom Penh by forces
of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). Buddhist monks and students have
been found tortured and murdered, and many continue to be missing. I
know you are familiar with the illegal and unconstitutional travel ban
that prevented me and all opposition members from leaving Cambodia one
week ago--a ban that was personally instituted by Hun Sen. And I know
that you are aware of the CPP-biased election machinery that denied
opposition parties due process in the counting of ballots and
resolution of election complaints.
There is no one more disappointed and saddened by the total failure
of the July elections than myself. However, the opposition in Cambodia
warned from the very beginning that democracy cannot be built on an
undemocratic foundation that lacks the rule of law. Throughout the
electoral process--even before we returned to Phnom Penh from exile in
Bangkok--we pointed out to the international community many serious
flaws in the political environment and in election preparations. For
example, our party structures and property had been totally destroyed
or looted during Hun Sen's July 1997 coup d'etat, and our membership
was traumatized. I could not agree more with the characterization of
the pre-election period as ``fundamentally flawed.''
Mr. Chairman, we were reluctant participants in this election and
at one point even withdrew from the process. But under heavy pressure,
we accepted the assurances of the international community that the
elections would be assessed fairly. We were wrong in accepting these
assurances, and today Cambodia is on the brink of affirming the rule of
man, not instituting the rule of law. I know this to be true, as I
spent ten days under the protection of the United Nations in Phnom Penh
because of Hun Sen's pointed threats.
The United Nations and many other sponsors and observers of the
election did not effectively challenge the conditions that made a fair
election impossible. Throughout the campaign, our activists were
harassed, threatened, and killed with complete impunity. While the
United Nations has done a commendable job in documenting the abuses of
the Cambodian government, not one human rights violator has been
prosecuted. And the killings and torture continue.
Other shortfalls in the elections included limited and unequal
access to state controlled media, an election framework that was biased
and that lacked transparency, a recounting process that failed to
conduct recounts, a reluctance to reconcile all ballots, and an illegal
change in the method for seat allocation that gave the ruling party a
majority of seats with only 41 per cent of the official vote.
The burden of proof that this election was legitimate no longer
lies with the opposition--as some asserted immediately after the polls
closed--it is now the responsibility of Hun Sen and the CPP.
The Cambodian people are confused, frustrated and angry. They don't
understand why many in the international community are supporting the
announced election results and pressuring the opposition to join a
coalition. Why isn't the Cambodian government pressured into obeying
Cambodian laws and its Constitution?
If the opposition is forced into a coalition without being able to
resolve underlying problems, Cambodia will continue to be under the
complete control of Hun Sen. History has shown that he will do whatever
it takes to stay in power. Over the past five years, under Hun Sen's
leadership, Cambodia has had unrestrained corruption, human rights
violations, and environmental destruction. He kept his political
opposition in check while building up his own political and military
machine, in part, by making deals with some of the worst Khmer Rouge
leaders and incorporating them into the government. Anyone who thought
Hun Sen was the solution to Cambodia's problems or that heoffered
``stability'' should know better by now.
I understand all of Cambodia's problem cannot be solved at once,
and the opposition has demonstrated its willingness to compromise.
However, there are some issues where compromise is impossible, such as
the resolution of election related disputes before a coalition
government is formed and the development of an independent judiciary
that enforces and protects the rights of all citizens, not only members
of the CPP.
Without proper and full resolution of election complaints, the
elections will have no credibility among the Cambodian people. For
better or for worse, the Cambodian people look to the United States as
the standard-bearer of democracy and the conscience of the world. It
was the United States that took Hun Sen's coup seriously last year and
the U. S. Congress that acted so swiftly to restrict official foreign
assistance to Cambodia. The reaction of Congress was one of the few
times that Hun Sen has received a message from the international
community other than one of accommodation.
Hun Sen expects that the world will legitimize his rule through
these elections and cloak his dictatorial behavior in the mantle of
democracy. Cambodian democrats are asking the United States to be the
standard-bearer again while there is still a chance to get Cambodia
back on the road to democracy. We call upon the United States to:
make it clear that it will refuse to recognize any Cambodian
government that is formed prior to the resolution of election-
related complaints filed by opposition parties, or any
government formed under duress;
strongly condemn the Cambodian government for its human
rights abuses and ongoing intimidation of opposition activists;
continue to withhold official aid, as it is currently doing,
and to oppose IMF and other multilateral lending. Let me make
clear that humanitarian and demining assistance should
continue;
vote to keep Cambodia's U.N. seat vacant and to oppose other
international recognition;
leave the U.S. ambassador's post vacant after the departure
of Ambassador Kenneth Quinn until a credible government is
formed and to ensure that next U.S. ambassador is someone with
strong credentials as a supporter of democrats;
intensify efforts to deter the Cambodian government's role
in illegal logging, drug-trafficking, money-laundering and acts
of terrorism such as the grenade attack on March 30, 1997 that
killed at least 16 people; and,
make public the Federal Bureau of Investigation's report
into the March 1997 grenade attack.
Mr. Chairman, as a target of assassination in 1997 and again just a
few weeks ago outside of the Ministry, of Interior, I know how
dangerous Cambodian politics can be. The United States has an
opportunity to make an historic contribution to Cambodia's future by
demonstrating its leadership and supporting democracy and human rights.
Today, I look to you for hope and assistance.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
__________
Letter Submitted by Prince Norodom Ranariddh
1 October 1998
Their Excellencies:
Senator Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations;
Congressman Benjamin Gilman,
Chairman, House International Relations Committee;
Congressman Gerald Solomon,
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific;
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher,
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics.
Your Excellencies, I am writing to express my gratitude for your
efforts to support democracy and freedom for the people of Cambodia.
During the past month, during a violent crackdown by Hun Sen on leaders
of democratic parties, students and Buddhist monks, the consistent
principled position of the U.S. Congress has saved the lives of
countless people and has led the international community to endorse a
non-violent political resolution of the current crisis. Unfortunately,
an atmosphere of intimidation and the threat of violence by Hun Sen and
his forces continues, with many pro-democracy advocates and Buddhist
monks still missing. In addition, there has been inadequate movement by
Hun Sen's political party to address serious charges of irregularities
in the ballot process and the allocation of Parliamentary seats.
I regret that I am unable to travel to the United States at this
time because it is essential that I remain available to join in
political talks in Phnom Penh and to provide direct leadership to the
Members of Parliament of my party.
However, I have requested that my colleague, the Honorable Sam
Rainsy M.P., travel to Washington and to the United Nations to
represent the coalition of our respective parties and a number of
allied pro-democracy parties, who collectively totaled more than 51
percent of the popular vote in the July election.
We seek support of the U.S. Congress and the International
community to assure that any coalition government that is formed in
Cambodia is negotiated without force or coercion and represents the
will of the Cambodian people. Before a coalition is formed, the
credible charges of election irregularities must be investigated by
non-biased entitles, and the constitutionality of the seat allocations
dispute must be resolved. All threats of violence or arrest against the
democratic opposition must be lifted and force must not be used against
peaceful demonstrators and Buddhist monks. those who have committed
torture and murder must be brought to justice. Most essential, in order
to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis, Hun Sen must understand
that he will be accountable by the international community for
continued acts of violence.
Thank you for your continued support for freedom and democracy in
Cambodia. I look forward to meeting with Your Excellencies in the not
too distant future.
Please accept, Your Excellencies, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration and personal esteem.
Norodom Ranariddh,
President of FUNCINPEC Party.
__________
Statement Submitted by Human Rights Watch, Asia Division
human rights in post-election cambodia
The U.S. government has played a critical role in the months
leading up to, and following, this past July's election in Cambodia.
Unfortunately, at this time, there is little reason to be optimistic
about the short-term future, as the Cambodian government has failed to
address the fundamental human rights problems that plagued the pre-
election period, including political violence, extra judicial killings,
and official impunity for abuses. These same problems now threaten to
undermine prospects that any new government can gain the full
confidence and support of the Cambodian people.
We believe that the international community was too hasty in
endorsing both the elections process and the results as ``free and
fair.'' The creation of yet another antagonistic coalition government
between Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen offers little hope of stability or
human rights improvements.
While polling day itself drew large numbers of voters and was
relatively peaceful, most of the year preceding election day was
tainted by political violence, widespread intimidation, monopoly of the
broadcast media by the ruling party, and murders of opposition members
and supporters of Ranariddh.
Most of the international observer delegations flew in only days
before the elections, gave their approval, and left as quickly as they
came. Meanwhile, following the elections, hundreds of opposition
activists fled their homes in the provinces after receiving threats of
reprisals and death from local officials. In late August, unprecedented
numbers of people took to the streets in Phnom Penh to protest the
election results. Violence escalated, with a grenade attack at the
Ministry of Interior on August 20 when Sam Rainsy was inside the
compound. There were also mob killings of at least four ethnic
Vietnamese on September 3 and 4 in conjunction with rumors that
Vietnamese food vendors were poisoning the population.
On September 7, more than a week of civil unrest erupted in Phnom
Penh, and riot police used lethal force to disperse opposition
demonstrators. The protesters were mostly peaceful, though some did
engage in violence such as stone-throwing. Since September 7, two
deaths have been confirmed and more than thirty are under investigation
by human rights workers. At least sixty people were wounded in the
demonstrations, including fourteen who were sent to the hospital with
bullet wounds. In addition, security forces detained more than twenty
people, including students and monks, and many more people were
reported as missing.
U.S. Policy Recommendations:
We urge the Clinton Administration, and members of this Committee,
to insist upon concrete action by the Cambodian government--as outlined
below--before the U.S. restores any bilateral or multilateral aid to
Phnom Penh. We continue to strongly favor assistance to Cambodian NGOs,
however.
The U.S. should publicly and privately support the efforts of the
U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative, Thomas Hammarberg, who
has called on the Cambodian government to:
publicly acknowledge all instances of arrest and detention
in connection with the demonstrations earlier this month;
make known the names of all detainees and their whereabouts,
and any charges against them; in the absence of credible
charges, they should be immediately released;
open all places of detention to the International Committee
of the Red Cross;
investigate and prosecute those responsible for
disappearances since the September 7 crackdown as well as those
that took place prior to the elections;
fully investigate and prosecute the apparent killings of at
least 16 people whose bodies have been found in recent weeks
floating in rivers, irrigation ditches and shallow graves
around Phnom Penh;
cease all threats to arrest and prosecute opposition
leaders, such as Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha (former head of the
parliamentary human rights committee), for exercising their
rights of free speech and political participation.
Until the Cambodian government demonstrates a willingness to begin
taking these steps, the U.S. should continue withholding direct
government aid and urge other donors to do the same.
The U.S. should also help provide protection to courageous
Cambodian NGOs, including human rights monitors, who are struggling to
lay the groundwork for long term peaceful change. We are deeply
concerned about police threats against the staff of the U.N. Centre for
Human Rights in Phnom Penh.
In addition, we believe it is crucial that the United Nations
continue to maintain a visible presence in Cambodia during this
transition period. It is likely that political violence, arrests and
killings will continue, and perhaps even accelerate, once agreement is
reached on the composition of a new government. Acts of retaliation and
retribution have been all too common in Cambodia in the past.
We hope the Administration will endorse the continuation of the
mandate of the U.N. Secretary General's Personal Representative, Mr.
Lakhan Mehrotra, as well as the mandate of the Cambodia Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (COHCHR)--which Second Prime
Minister Hun Sen has repeatedly tried to shut down. The COHCHR is
currently due to operate until March 1999. But in light of the commune
level elections scheduled for sometime next year, and ongoing reports
of abuses, it should be extended and if possible, additional funding
provided for the staff to be expanded.
Finally, we appreciate the efforts of the United States--in the
face of general donor weariness or ``Cambodia fatigue''--to encourage
ASEAN, members of the European Union, Japan, and other key donors to
press for basic human rights improvements, which are clearly essential
to bringing about reconciliation, stability, and long-term economic
development in Cambodia. The statements of some ASEAN governments at
the U.N. General Assembly in New York on September 28 were particularly
encouraging, and it appears that Cambodia's ASEAN membership remains on
hold until ASEAN is confident that a legitimate and stable government
is in place. The U.S. and other donors should also continue to
vigorously condemn violent attacks on ethnic Vietnamese living in
Cambodia.
Human Rights Developments
Hun Sen began to lay the groundwork for the 1998 elections in late
1997 by sending a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on
October 22, guaranteeing the safe return of opposition politicians who
fled after the coup and pledging to organize fair elections. By the end
of November, the office of the United Nations Secretary-General's
Representative in Cambodia (OSGRC) had created a new unit of
international personnel, mandated to monitor the physical security and
safety of returning political leaders, their freedom from arrest and
detention, and their ability to engage in political activities. By
early 1998, most had returned. These included Prince Ranariddh's party,
Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et
Cooperatif, or FUNCINPEC; Sam Rainsy's Khmer Nation Party (KNP); and
the Son Sann faction of the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP).
Throughout the first half of the year, the CPP was virtually the only
party able to freely and actively conduct political activities
throughout the country. It was not until May that opposition parties
were legally recognized and not until June that they were fully
registered to participate in the election.
Until mid-February, a political impasse over Prince Ranariddh's
ability to participate in the elections threatened to block
international donor support for the vote. Hun Sen charged that Prince
Ranariddh had imported illegal weapons in 1997 and mounted an armed
opposition with Khmer Rouge support against government forces. In
February, however, a group of donor and neighboring countries known as
the Friends of Cambodia endorsed a peace initiative put forward by
Japan, and Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh agreed. Dubbed the ``Four
Pillars'' plan, it called for an immediate cease-fire and reintegration
of resistance forces into the government army, the severing of by
Prince Ranariddh's ties with the Khmer Rouge, the trial of Ranariddh in
absentia followed by his pardon by King Sihanouk, and government
guarantees of Prince Ranariddh's safe return to Cambodia.
A pattern of violence against lower-level opposition party workers
in remote areas of the countryside began to emerge early in the year,
especially after activists in some provinces made tentative first steps
to reactivate grassroots networks. A National Election Committee (NEC)
was formed in January to organize and monitor the elections and verify
the accuracy of the final tally, but it was dominated by the CPP.
Similarly, the Constitutional Council, the nation's highest appeals
body, which was mandated to resolve electoral disputes and verify the
accuracy of the final tally, had a disproportionate number of CPP-
affiliated members and was established too late to address most
election-related disputes. At party congresses in Phnom Penh in March,
two leading opposition parties changed their names because of legal
battles with pro-CPP rival factions. The KNP became the Sam Rainsy
Party, and one faction of the BLDP became the Son Sann Party. During
political party registration, which began on March 28, thirty-nine
parties were approved by the Ministry of Interior and the NEC.
March and April were characterized by a wave of political violence.
High-ranking FUNCINPEC officials were targeted prior to Prince
Ranariddh's return on March 30. General Thach Kim Sang was gunned down
on a busy Phnom Penh street in broad daylight on March 4; Lt. Col.
Moung Sameth was assassinated on March 3 in Kien Svay district near
Phnom Penh, and Lt. Col. Chea Vutha, was killed on March 28 also in
Kien Svay district. Local activists in the countryside were also
targeted, as for example in the April 26 grenade attack against Son
Sann Party members in Takeo, in which two people were killed.
In April the CPP turned its attention to getting its members
appointed to the provincial and commune election commissions and
launched a heavy-handed but generally nonviolent party recruitment
campaign. Local officials and militia went house to house or conducted
mass meetings to solicit thumb prints and pledges from the populace to
vote for the CPP, confiscated and recorded identification numbers on
voter registration cards, and conducted ``mock elections'' before the
actual polling, in which people were pressured to vote for the CPP.
Although voter registration got off to a rocky start on May 18, the NEC
reported that 92 percent of the estimated 5.6 million eligible voters
eventually registered to vote.
Top opposition leaders such as Prince Ranariddh and Rainsy began to
make high-profile visits to the provinces in May, but the ongoing
threat of political violence discouraged activity by local-level
opposition members outside Phnom Penh. A May 13, 1998 memorandum from
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in
Cambodia detailed forty-two killings and six long-term
``disappearances'' of people presumed killed since the initial forty-
one killings that took place in the immediate aftermath of the July
1997 coup. A U.N. report prepared in April concluded that the
government had not launched any serious investigations into coup-
related abuses and that no investigations were planned.
On June 8, the co-prime ministers signed a directive establishing a
National Human Rights Committee. The fact that the committee was led by
two top advisers to Hun Sen, and that this was the fourth time since
July 1997 that Hun Sen had pledged to set up such a commission, did not
inspire confidence that it was a serious effort. A National Task Force
on Security for the Elections was established the same month,
responsible for investigating election-related violence. Headed by
National Police Chief Hok Lundy, himself linked to political murders,
the task force concluded that all of the cases it received stemmed from
personal motives such as revenge or robbery.
In the final two months preceding the elections the Cambodia Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights received more than four
hundred allegations of voter intimidation, death threats, acts of
violence against individuals, illegal arrests and detention, forced
removal or destruction of party signs or shooting at party offices,
coercion of voters to join the CPP, temporary confiscation of voter
registration cards by local authorities, and barring of party members
from access to communities. More than one hundred of the complaints
were deemed credible.
In the elections themselves, 94 percent of the registered voters
turned out to vote, observed by the Joint International Observation
Group (JIOG), a U.N.-coordinated body of thirty-seven countries. The
JIOG dispatched only 250 pairs of observers to cover more than 11,000
polling sites and 1,600 counting centers. Additional observation was
handled by Cambodian observers under the auspices of well-respected
electoral monitoring NGOs, such as the Committee for Free and Fair
Elections (COMFREL) and the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections
(COFFEL). Meanwhile, counting continued well into the third week in
August.
The JIOG issued its assessment that the voting was free and fair on
July 27, before the counting was even completed. The Asian Network for
Free Elections (ANFREL) was the only international observer delegation
to avoid making a snap judgment, calling on the NEC on July 30 to
investigate complaints of polling and counting irregularities as well
as reports of widespread intimidation and threats against opposition
party members following the elections.
In preliminary results released by the NEC in August, the CPP was
declared the winner, but the opposition rejected the results and
demanded a recount. However, after cursory examination of only a
fraction of the opposition's complaints, both the NEC and the
Constitutional Council declared the appeals process closed. On
September 1, the NEC announced the final results: the CPP received
sixty-four of 122 National Assembly seats, or a slight majority, while
FUNCINPEC got forty-three seats and the Sam Rainsy Party fifteen. The
opposition refused to join a coalition government proposed by the CPP,
which had not won enough seats for the two-thirds majority required to
form the new government on its own. In late August the opposition
launched three weeks of protest marches and rallies in Phnom Penh and
set up a tent city in front of the National Assembly, which they called
``Democracy Square.'' Unprecedented numbers of people took to the
streets to call for Hun Sen to step down. Government officials declared
that the demonstrations were illegal and threatened to arrest Sam
Rainsy.
Anti-Vietnamese sentiments flared in some of the demonstrations and
rallies, with opposition politicians charging that Hun Sen and
Vietnamese ``puppets'' were intent on eliminating the Cambodian people.
On August 30, demonstrators attempted to destroy a stone memorial in
``Democracy Square'' that commemorates Cambodia-Vietnam friendship,
smashing it with hammers and setting it on fire. On September 3 and 4,
at least four ethnic Vietnamese were killed in mob violence in Phnom
Penh as a result of rumors than more than seventy people had died from
contaminated palm wine that had been poisoned by Vietnamese people.
Following a grenade attack on September 7 on Hun Sen's residence in
Phnom Penh, government forces found a pretext to move against the
demonstrators, opening fire outside the Cambodiana Hotel, where Sam
Rainsy had taken refuge, killing one man and provoking widespread
anger. Over the next week daily clashes broke out between riot police,
pro-CPP demonstrators and opposition supporters. Bulldozers were
brought in to destroy the tent city, and riot police used electric
batons, fire hoses, rifle butts and bullets to disperse protesters
around the city. At least two people were killed as a result of the
unrest and human rights workers are investigating more than thirty
suspicious deaths in and around Phnom Penh that occurred at the same
time. Dozens more people, including monks, women, and students, were
beaten or injured by government security forces, and more than twenty
people were arrested. The government banned dozens of opposition
politicians from leaving the country and threatened that some would be
arrested.
Under intense pressure from the international community and King
Sihanouk, the opposition called off the demonstrations and began to
make accommodations with Hun Sen. On September 22, the king hosted a
meeting in Siem Reap between Hun Sen, Prince Ranariddh, and Rainsy.
This facilitated the swearing in of the new National Assembly on
September 24.
Fundamental freedoms of association, assembly, and expression faced
periodic threats during the year, although large numbers of people,
sometimes tens of thousands, were able to gather for political rallies,
labor demonstrations, and protest marches, and, for the most part,
candidates were able to speak freely during the campaign. In the course
of the crackdown on opposition supporters protesting the election
results, however, the government issued a statement on September 9 that
banned ``unauthorized gatherings,'' particularly those that might
disrupt public order and security.
Opposition parties had virtually no air time on broadcast media
during the year, except for the thirty-day official campaign period,
when NEC regulations provided for somewhat more equitable media access.
Even during the campaign, however, the privately owned Apsara and Bayon
stations continued to give disproportionate coverage in the first half
of July to the CPP, which appeared 446 times, with FUNCINPEC appearing
six times and the Sam Rainsy Party nine times.
The court system remained virtually powerless in 1998, with the
judiciary subject to political pressure. While no move was made against
officials suspected of rights abuses, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
in August announced the creation of a Commission of Experts to assess
evidence of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity committed
by the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot, who died on April 15, only days after
the United States announced its intention to capture him and his top
deputies and bring them to trial. Questions persisted as to the status
of other ranking Khmer Rouge leaders who are still alive, including
those who remain in hiding as well as more than a dozen influential
Khmer Rouge who have defected to the government since 1996.
__________
Senator Thomas. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]