[Senate Report 106-83]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 161
106th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 106-83
_______________________________________________________________________
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
on
S. 305
June 21, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-010 WASHINGTON : 1999
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
one hundred sixth congress
first session
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mark Buse, Staff Director
Martha P. Allbright, General Counsel
Ivan A. Schlager, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic General Counsel
(ii)
Calendar No. 161
106th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 106-83
======================================================================
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act
_______
June 21, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. McCain, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 305]
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to
which was referred the bill (S. 305) ``A Bill to reform unfair
and anticompetitive practices in the professional boxing
industry'', having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill (as
amended) do pass.
Purpose of the Bill
The purpose of S. 305, as reported, is to protect
professional boxers from coercive and exploitative business
practices, reduce interstate restraints of trade, assist state
boxing officials to provide proper oversight of the sport, and
increase honest competition and the integrity of the industry.
Background and Needs
The Committee believes that a modest series of targeted
public interest reforms of the professional boxing industry can
have a very positive impact on the industry. The sport has no
league, governing body, or private sector association of
industry leaders to establish fair business practices and
discipline improper and arbitrary conduct. There has long been
serious public concern about the continuing scandals and
litigation which occur in professional boxing due to the lack
of responsible self-regulation on a national basis. The
Committee concurs with most credible members of the boxing
industry that problems stemming from the activities of major
promoters and sanctioning organizations cannot be adequately
addressed on a state-by-state basis. The Committee emphasizes
the vulnerability and lack of leverage most professional boxers
have with respect to various arbitrary business practices of
these entities in the sport. This legislation complements the
Professional Boxing Safety Act, the federal law enacted in 1996
which established a series of vital health, safety, and ethical
standards in the professional boxing industry.
Legislative History
The Committee held two full Committee hearings in 1998 on the
professional boxing industry. On March 24, 1998, a hearing was
held on business practices in the professional boxing industry.
Frederic G. Levin, attorney and negotiator for Roy Jones, Jr.,
light heavyweight champion, testified that long term
promotional contracts and options hurt the boxer and the sport,
and that ratings organizations do not have credible ratings
procedures. Mr. Levin recommended that all options and
promotional rights gained from a boxer seeking to compete in a
particular fight be prohibited. Jones submitted written
testimony recommending that promotional contracts should be
limited and that boxers and state commissions be advised of how
the revenues of a boxing event were distributed. Jones
recommended that ``options'' should be made illegal. Mr. James
J. Binns, Counsel to the World Boxing Association, testified
that the current ratings system does not function improperly,
and having several different champions in each weight division
increases opportunities for boxers. Promoter Cedric Kushner
testified that long term promotional contracts are necessary
for promoters to recoup their investment in a boxer. Mr. Greg
Sirb, Executive Director of the Pennsylvania State Athletic
Commission and president of the Association of Boxing
Commissions (ABC), testified that the proliferation of
sanctioning organizations is undermining the title of
``champion.'' Attorney Patrick C. English, who has represented
promoters and boxers in the sport, testified that sanctioning
organizations have inconsistent procedures, and stated that
state regulations do not adequately regulate promoter
contracts. Mr. English recommended that option clauses be
prohibited in certain contractual situations and that promoters
should be barred from requiring that a boxer hire a specific
manager. He also stated that certain rules of sanctioning
organizations could be antitrust violations.
On July 23, 1998, the Committee held a hearing on the
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, then numbered as S. 2238, as
introduced by Chairman McCain and Senator Bryan. Mr. Shelly
Finkel, a manager of several world champions, submitted
testimony stating that the bill would help end the exploitation
of boxers. Boxer Mike Tyson submitted a statement alleging that
he had over $65 million taken from him in less than 24 months,
and that his promoter took 30% of all his purse earnings. Tyson
stated that S. 2238 would be a valuable protection for
generations of fighters to come. Commissioner Larry Hazzard of
New Jersey testified that S. 2238 would help the New Jersey
State Board of Athletic Control protect boxers from coercive
and unfair business practices. Dr. James Nave and Marc Ratner
of the Nevada State Athletic Commission testified that it is
difficult for state commissions to individually monitor
promoter-boxer contracts, and that a federal mechanism should
be put in place to prevent hidden agreements. The Nevada
officials testified that expenses charged to the boxer by the
promoter shouldbe reported, and that option clauses controlling
a boxer for his entire career should be outlawed. Dr. Nave and Mr.
Ratner also testified that sanctioning organizations should comply with
public disclosure regulations on the federal level. Trainer Eddie Futch
testified that S. 2238 is a necessary and positive reform for
professional boxing. Mr. Walter Stone, Counsel to the International
Boxing Federation, testified that S. 2238 was flawed because it did not
address the role of television and cable networks in the boxing
industry. This viewpoint also was expressed by Dr. Nave and Marc
Ratner. They noted in their July 23, 1998 testimony before the
Committee that cable and pay-per-view organizations also are actively
involved in matchmaking, which also has resulted in the public and
boxers being denied great matches. They concluded that to address the
problems facing professional fighters comprehensively, any legislation
advanced by Congress should also convey cable and pay-per-view
networks. Mr. Jose Sulaiman, president of the World Boxing Council,
pledged the WBC's full support for the legislation in his testimony.
Mr. Sulaiman's prepared statement said that the bill's requirement to
provide notice to boxers on why their ratings had been changed would be
impractical.
On October 1, 1998, the Committee met in open executive
session to consider S. 2238 and by voice vote ordered the bill
reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. S.
2238 was passed by the full Senate by unanimous consent on
October 8, 1998.
The Ali Act was reintroduced, as passed by the Senate, by
Senators McCain and Bryan, with Senator Dorgan as cosponsor, as
S. 305 in the 106th Congress on January 25, 1999.
A full Commerce Committee hearing was held on issues of
reform in the professional boxing industry on April 22, 1999.
Former heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali appeared and had his
statement read by an associate. Ali stated that professional
boxing had become a travesty and that something must be done to
stop the manipulation of boxers. Ali stated that he had
experienced dishonest practices of many promoters and that
there is no credibility in the ratings of boxers. Senator Reid
of Nevada testified that S. 305 is a good start to protect
boxers from unprincipled individuals, but was troubled that the
bill contains criminal penalties for contractual violations.
Sen. Reid also testified that the bill should include
provisions on broadcasters, and recommended that S. 305's
contract reforms to protect boxers be replaced with a
requirement that boxers have competent representation. New York
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, head of the State
Attorneys General Task Force on Boxing, strongly endorsed S.
305, stating that it would curb anti-competitive and fraudulent
business practices in professional boxing. Attorney General
Spitzer advocated that an independent organization to rank
boxers be developed, and recommended the use of a new Consensus
Scoring system in professional bouts to maximize competitive
results. Attorney General Spitzer also testified that state
commissions should exercise exclusive control over the
appointment of all referees and judges. Greg Sirb, President of
the Association of Boxing Commissions, testified that state
commissions should never delegate their authority for
regulating boxing events to business interests in the sport.
Sirb stated that S. 305 will significantly help state
regulators in their oversight of a complicated sport. Promoter
Dan Goossen of America Presents testified that the poor public
perception of professional boxing warrants reforms measures to
restore public confidence. Goossen called for the formation of
a school, funded by promoters, to properly train boxing
referees and judges. Former boxing referee and Nevada county
judge Mills Lane testified that sanctioning organizations have
gained too much influence, and that their involvement in boxing
should be reduced. Judge Lane criticized the practice of
promoters forcing boxers to give options in return for getting
a title fight. Boxing writer Wallace Matthews of the New York
Post testified that promoters and sanctioning organization
heads improperly benefit from the unregulated nature of the
professional boxing industry. Matthews criticized the ability
of inexperienced, politically appointed state commissions to
regulate the sport. He recommended that a federal boxing
overseer be appointed, and that promoters should be prohibited
from paying the expenses of ringside judges. International
Boxing Federation Counsel Walter Stone testified that
controversies about scoring fights could be reduced by
prohibiting rounds being scored as even. Mr. Stone said ratings
organizations are sometimes inaccurately criticized, and noted
that the IBF allows its boxers to fight the champions of other
organizations after they have twice defended their IBF title.
S. 305 was favorably reported out of the Commerce Committee
by voice vote, with a McCain-Bryan amendment, at the Executive
Session held on May 5, 1999. Senator Abraham asked to be listed
as a co-sponsor of S. 305 at the markup.
Summary of Major Provisions
As reported, S. 305 would require boxer-promoter contracts to
contain specific terms regarding number of bouts and duration;
would limit certain promotional rights gained from a boxer to
one year; would prohibit conflicts of interest between managers
and promoters; and would prohibit promoters from requiring
boxers to hire an individual as their manager. The bill would
require sanctioning organizations to establish objective
ratings criteria; to create a written appeals process; to
notify boxers of the reason for their rating having changed;
and to disclose their bylaws publicly. S. 305 would require
promoters to file complete contracts with state athletic
commissions, and notify the commissions of all charges and
costs they impose on a boxer, and all payments made to
sanctioning organizations. It would also amend the federal
boxing safety law to require state commissions to honor
suspensions pertaining to boxer misconduct that are imposed by
other state commissions.
Estimated Costs
In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the
following cost estimate, prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, May 17, 1999.
Hon. John McCain,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 305, the Muhammad
Ali Boxing Reform Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Mark Hadley
(for federal costs), Theresa Gullo (for the state and local
impact), and Keith Mattrick (for the private-sector impact).
Sincerely,
Barry B. Anderson
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
Enclosure.
congressional budget office cost estimate
S. 305--Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act
Summary: S. 305 aims to protect professional boxers from
unfair business practices of managers and promoters. The bill
would stipulate that certain provisions be included in
contracts between boxers, managers, and promoters; prohibit
managers and promoters from having shared financial interests;
and require the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to provide
information about organizations that sanction professional
boxing matches. S. 305 would allow the FTC to charge the
sanctioning organizations fees to offset the costs of providing
such information. The bill also would make violations of
certain provisions of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of
1996 federal crimes. Finally, under the bill, boxers'
identification cards would be valid for four years rather than
two, as under current law.
Based on information from the FTC, CBO estimates that
enacting S. 305 would have no significant impact on the federal
budget. Implementing the bill would require far less than
$500,000 a year in additional discretionary spending during the
2000-2004 period. That cost would be at least partially offset
by fees, resulting in little or no net impact. S. 305 would
affect direct spending and receipts, so pay-as-you-go
procedures would apply, but CBO estimates that those effects
would also be less than $500,000 a year.
The bill contains an intergovernmental mandate as defined
in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA); however, CBO
estimates that the costs of complying with this mandate would
not be significant and would not exceed the threshold
established in the act ($50 million in 1996, adjusted annually
for inflation).
S. 305 would impose several private-sector mandates on the
boxing industry, mainly on promoters and on organizations that
sanction professional boxers. In general, the new mandates on
promoters relate to the protection of boxers from exploitation.
The bill also would impose procedural requirements on
sanctioning organizations. In total, CBOestimates that the
private-sector mandates identified in this bill would not exceed the
statutory threshold established in UMRA ($100 million in 1996, adjusted
annually for inflation) in any of the next five years.
Estimated Cost to the Federal Government: Based on
information from the FTC, CBO estimates that enacting S. 305
would require new spending subject to appropriation of far less
than $500,000 a year during the 2000-2004 period, and that such
amounts would be at least partially offset by collections of
fees. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function
370 (commerce and housing credit).
Enacting S. 305 could increase government receipts from the
collection of criminal fines, but CBO estimates that any such
increase would be less than $500,000 annually. Criminal fines
are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and are spent in the
following year. Thus, any change in direct spending from the
fund would also amount to less than $500,000 annually.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures
for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO
estimates that any increases in governmental receipts and
direct spending would each total less than $500,000 a year.
Estimated impact on State, local, and tribal governments:
The bill contains an intergovernmental mandate as defined in
UMRA, but CBO estimates that complying with the mandate would
not result in significant additional costs to states. State
boxing commissions would be required to establish procedures to
ensure that no boxer is permitted to box while under suspension
in any state due to unsportsmanlike conduct. Current law
already requires state boxing commissions to have procedures in
place to prevent boxers suspended for other reasons from boxing
in their states. Therefore, CBO estimates that the additional
costs to states to comply with this new requirement would not
be significant. Enactment of the bill would impose no other
costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
Estimated impact on the private sector: S. 305 would impose
several private-sector mandates on the boxing industry, mainly
on promoters and organizations that sanction professional
boxers. The most significant provision in the bill affecting
promoters is a one-year limit on promotion contracts that the
boxer is required to sign in order to participate in a match
against another boxer under contract to that promoter. Based on
information from industry sources, CBO believes that this
provision could impose significant costs, but only on a few
promoters.
This bill would also impose mandates on sanctioning
organizations. According to representatives from such
organizations, the costliest of those mandates would be the
requirement to notify boxers and the Association of Boxing
Commissions of any rating change of a boxer within or moving
into the top ten rated boxers. Based on information from the
major U.S. sanctioning organization, CBO estimates that the
cost of notification would be less than $30,000 annually for
each sanctioning organization.
S. 305 would also impose mandates with minimal costs on
managers, licensees, matchmakers, and judges. CBO estimates
that the total direct costs of mandates in this bill would be
far less than the private-sector threshold ($100 million in
1996, adjusted annually for inflation).
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Mark Hadley. Impact on
State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Theresa Gullo. Impact on
the Private Sector: Keith Mattrick.
Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Regulatory Impact Statement
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the
following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the
legislation, as reported:
number of persons covered
Several thousand boxers in the U.S. would benefit from the
contract and other business practice reforms contained in S.
305. Numerous promoters in the U.S. would be affected by the
contract and related reforms established by S. 305. The numbers
of officials and employees of sanctioning organizations who
would be affected by S. 305 is likely under thirty.
economic impact
The expected economic impact of S. 305 is minimal. The
reforms proposed by the legislation should increase competition
in the industry, due to a reduction in anti-competitive
restraints of trade. There would be increased free market
bidding by promoters seeking to sign boxers, which will benefit
boxers, as will a more consistent and legitimate ratings
system. The Committee believes the reforms contained in S. 305
will help encourage an increase in the prominent bouts that are
major draws for fans, and thus will increase revenues and
public interest in the sport.
privacy
S. 305 will require sanctioning officials to make public
rosters of their officials who vote on the ratings of boxers.
Promoters are required to file complete versions of their
contracts with boxers, due to the problem of boxers being
exploited by hidden agreements. State boxing commissions are
required by the bill to protect the confidentiality of these
contracts.
paperwork
The amount of paperwork required to meet the public interest
disclosure requirements is small. On an annual basis,
sanctioning organizations engaged in interstate commerce are
required by the bill to submit their bylaws and related
information to the Federal Trade Commission, or place this
information on a Internet website. Sanctioning organizations
will be required to provide notice when changing the rating of
certain boxers, which can be done on a single sheet of paper.
Most sanctioning organizations already have extensive
adjudicatory appeals procedures in place, so the written
appeals procedure required by S. 305 is minor. The requirements
on major promoters to protect boxers from exploitative
practices can largely be complied with in several sheets of
paper, as well. The Committee has exempted promoters of boxing
events of fewer than 10 rounds from certain disclosure
requirements to alleviate administrative burdens on promoters
of ``club'' boxing shows.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 designates the short title of the bill as the
``Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act.''
Section 2. Findings
Section 2 provides a series of findings which describe the
problems that exist with respect to arbitrary and anti-
competitive business conduct in the professional boxing
industry on an interstate basis.
Section 3. Purposes
Section 3 lists the purposes of the bill, which are to
protect professional boxers against certain exploitative and
unethical business practices; assist State boxing officials in
their oversight of the boxing industry; and increase
competition within the boxing industry.
Section 4. Protecting boxers from exploitation
Section 4 amends the existing federal boxing law, the
Professional Boxing Safety Act, by adding a new section 15
aimed at protecting boxers from exploitation.
New section 15 seeks to curb several of the most restrictive,
onerous, and anti-competitive contracting practices which
promoters have imposed on professional boxers. It requires all
contracts between a boxer and a promoter to include mutual
obligations between the parties, and specify a number of bouts
for the boxer, and the duration in time of the contract.
Requiring a mutuality of obligation attempts to prevent
promoters from securing promotional rights or portions of a
boxer's purse, without providing any compensation or
consideration to the boxer. Specifying a minimum number of
bouts for the boxer protects a boxer from having the boxer's
career stalled or damaged by a promoter who refuses to provide
the agreed-to number of bouts. Requiring the promoter to
stipulate the specific period of time for the contract's length
is an important protection for boxers. Promoters in the
industry have utilized contracts with vague or unspecified
terms regarding how long the contract will be in effect,
thereby permitting the promoter to control a boxer for
virtually the boxer's entire productive career.
Historically, promoters in the industry have required an
exclusive long term promotional contract with a boxing
challenger as a condition precedent to permitting a bout
against another boxer that the promoter has under contract. The
Committee believes, and hearing witnesses and industry members
strongly concur, that this tactic is the key contracting
practice that has been used by promoters to gain undue control
over boxers and championship titles, to the clear detriment of
the sport. Promoters have used this practice to extract
``exclusive promotional options'' from boxers who already have
a promoter, and who would not otherwise enter into a contract
with a new promoter. The athletes would be better served, as
would open competition in the sport, if boxers were free to
contract with those promoters they personally choose, rather
than being coerced to contract with a promoter who is in the
position of barring a lucrative bout.
This practice also has enabled a single promoter to gain
control over a majority of championship bouts in a weight
division becauseit results in one promoter having control over
both the champion and the challenger. No matter which boxer wins a
title bout, the promoter remains in control over who may compete for
that title, since he has both contestants under exclusive contract. If
a boxer who seeks to challenge a champion (or a more established boxer)
refuses to provide long term contractual rights to the promoter, the
boxer will be denied the right to compete in the bout. This practice
frustrates the years of determined training and arduous competition
that boxers endure, for they will be denied the opportunities that
their successes in the ring have earned. No boxer will ever be able to
compete for the title in that division unless they sign away future
promotional rights to that promoter. The promoter thus has gained total
control over an entire segment of a major professional sports industry.
This contracting practice allows a promoter to achieve a monopoly on a
substantial portion of championship-level competition in that
particular weight division.
This practice of coercing options from boxers is also
utilized by promoters and sanctioning organizations against
``mandatory challengers''--those boxers who are rated by a
sanctioning organization as the top contender in a weight
division. The top-rated contender is supposed to be assured of
having a bout against the champion of that division, within a
specific period of time. Despite the fact that top-rated
challengers have clearly earned the right to compete for a
title, sanctioning organizations have abetted restrictive
contracting practices by allowing promoters of championship
bouts to require options from them. As one hearing witness
noted, this is akin to forcing a professional tennis player or
golfer to sign an exclusive, long term contract with the
promoter of whatever event they were seeking to win. The
athlete would then only be able to compete when the promoter
approved, against only those opponents who also were forced to
agree to terms with that promoter. In self-governed and well
organized sports industries such as tennis and golf, such a
business practice would be strongly challenged as an
unreasonable restraint of trade. In professional boxing, it is
business as usual.
The Committee believes that sensible, pro-competitive
limitations on these onerous practices by promoters are
warranted. New section 15 would put a time limit of one year on
all promotional rights that a promoter secures from a boxer (or
another promoter) as a prerequisite to the boxer participating
in a particular bout. This situation will generally involve a
boxer being selected as an opponent/challenger by a promoter
for a boxer who they already have under contract. The most
common example of this is when a boxer seeks to compete against
a famous champion. Currently, the champion's promoter may
require this challenger to give the promoter exclusive
promotional rights on their career for an extended term of
years or fights. If the boxer refuses he will be rejected from
the bout. The Committee believes that no boxer should be forced
to contract for long term control of the boxer's career against
the boxer's will. In situations where a boxer is a mandatory
challenger, the bill would prohibit promoters from securing
promotional options from the boxer (or the boxer's promoter).
The Committee feels that the contracting requirements and
limitations contained in new section 15 will protect the
freedom to contract of boxers, increase competition in the
sport to the benefit of fans, and reduce improper interstate
restraints of trade.
It is important to note that the duration of basic boxer-
promoter contracts is not limited by the bill. The Committee
does not seek to limit contracts reached as a result of
legitimate arms length bargaining between an unattached boxer
and promoter. The one-year limitation applies only to those
situations where a promoter secures promotional rights from a
boxer (or another promoter), as a condition for that boxer to
compete in a particular bout. The one-year limitation is not
intended to apply to a contract where a promoter and boxer
consensually enter into a long term contract, with the first
bout for the boxer being specifically named, and in which the
opponent is not under contract to the promoter. The Committee
notes that after the one year limitation expires, the boxer is
free to then contract with whatever promoter the boxer chooses,
including the promoter in question. However, the one year
limitation will at least provide the boxer with the ability to
seek the highest bidder for his or her services after one year,
or give them the freedom to simply choose the promoter the
boxer determines will best further the interest of the boxer's
career.
The Committee also notes that many States have boxing
regulations which wholly proscribe any exclusive contractual
arrangement between a promoter and a boxer, and declare them to
be unenforceable under state law. These include some of the
most prominent boxing states in the U.S. However, these
contractual protections for boxers are rarely, if ever,
enforced. This is at least partially due to the fact that if
one State begins to impose more stringent regulations on
promoters, promoters will simply take the boxing event and the
accompanying substantial commercial activity and tax revenues
it generates to a less regulated jurisdiction. The Committee
feels that this amplifies the need for limited federal reforms
to curb coercive and restrictive business abuses in the boxing
industry.
This section also prohibits a promoter from forcing a boxer
to hire an individual, such as a relative or business
associate, as the boxer's manager or similar capacity.
Testimony presented to the Committee described the practice
wherein a boxer is forced to hire a relative of a promoter as
the boxer's manager, which results in the boxer then having to
surrender a third of all earnings in the ring to an individual
associated with the promoter. It is wrong for promoters to
force boxers into a position where the person handling their
negotiations with a promoter is a relative or business
associate of the promoter. Coupled with the aforementioned
practice of forcing boxers into long term business
relationships under the threat of being denied competitive
opportunities, skimming off a third of their earnings via an
unwanted manager or other appointed employees is an especially
egregious practice. Boxers should not be forced into hiring
unwanted management personnel.
The final protection for boxers established in this section
is the prohibition of conflicts of interests between promoters
and managers. Most boxers have limited educational backgrounds
and, as the top promoters in the sport readily concede, are no
match for experienced promoters during contractual discussions.
While the role of managers has been diminished in the sport
over the last decade,it remains essential that managers, if a
boxer does hire a manager, that the manager serve and protect the
interests of the boxer. They should not be serving the financial
interests of the promoter, while simultaneously taking a 33% earnings
cut from the boxer for biased representation as manager. It is not
plausible for a boxer to receive proper representation and counsel from
a manager if the manager is also on the payroll of a promoter. This is
an obvious conflict of interest which works to the detriment of the
boxer and the advantage of the promoter. The Committee received
testimony about instances wherein boxers had suffered significant
career and economic injury due to their manager's clear conflicting
interests. A manager must be a determined advocate for the boxer's
interests and not be influenced by financial inducements from a
promoter. This provision tracks a similar regulation of many State
boxing commissions.
Section 5. Sanctioning organization integrity reforms
This section amends the Professional Boxing Safety Act by
adding a new section 16 pertaining to sanctioning
organizations.
The rating of a boxer has a substantial effect on a boxer's
career trajectory. Yet the ratings system of professional
boxers is disreputable and illegitimate. Boxers pay substantial
amounts to ratings organizations, yet cannot rely on any
credible or objective process to assure that their performances
in the ring will be honestly rated. The ratings system in
professional boxing today is universally criticized as
arbitrary and manipulative by boxers, managers, state
officials, and sports journalists. Boxing rankings have more to
do with financial interests of sanctioning officials and
promoters than with the skills and achievements of boxers. A
representative practice is the fact that sanctioning
organizations refuse to rate the ``champions'' of their
competitor organizations. This can lead to the dubious
situation wherein a boxer may be universally considered to be
the best in the world by his fellow boxers, industry members,
fans, and the media, at the same time the boxer is not rated in
the top 20 of many of the organizations who profess skill in
rating fighters. Boxers may be able to move into the top ten of
a ratings organization more quickly by signing with an
influential promoter, as opposed to working their way there
with victories in the ring. The world of sport contains no
ratings system of athletes or sports teams that has as little
credibility, consistency, and athlete/fan confidence as
professional boxing's.
Sanctioning organization officials may receive lucrative
fees, tickets, airfare, and hotel stays for sanctioning an
event. As long as ``their champion'' continues to win and draw
ticket buying fans at the gate and on cable television, they
have a reliable revenue producer. If they objectively rated all
boxers according to their true skills, however, the champions
in each weight division would often change due to vigorous
competition. While this would be good for fans and those boxers
striving for a chance to compete for a title, it would not be
in the financial interest of the ratings organizations. They
might lose exclusive control over a champion and thus lose
their sanctioning fees or be forced to reduce them. Sanctioning
organizations would likely see their revenues dwindle as
championships in each weight division are unified. The fans of
professional boxing would benefit from a legitimate ratings
system by getting to see competitive bouts between the best
skilled boxers, and the sport's integrity would soar as true
``champions'' emerged systematically in all weight divisions.
Again, these worthwhile objectives are not in the financial
interest of the sanctioning organizations.
Most importantly for the Committee's considerations, the
manipulation of the ratings system has significant detrimental
effects on the career paths of boxers. Unlike other major
sports industries in the U.S., professional boxers do not have
an assurance that continued success in their competitions will
guarantee them a chance to vie for a championship. They must
instead often submit to contractual agreements with promoters
and sanctioning officials that rob them of short or long term
control of their careers, in return for a favorable rating
position. Boxers or promoters may be required to pay additional
sums to ratings organizations to settle ratings disputes. The
Committee has received extensive testimony and information
about the arbitrary and irregular activities of sanctioning
organizations in the industry. One notable example discussed in
the April 22, 1999 hearing was the fact that a particular
number-one ranked contender had not defeated an opponent with a
winning record in almost four years. For the talented boxers in
the U.S. who often rise from circumstances of severe poverty,
the disreputable ratings system in professional boxing deprives
them of a fair opportunity to succeed according to their
abilities.
New section 16 would require sanctioning organizations that
are engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S. to establish
objective and consistent written criteria for their ratings of
boxers. This new section requires these organizations to
develop criteria for rating boxers that can be evaluated and
monitored by members of the industry. Sanctioning organizations
would be required to establish an appeals process to afford
boxers a chance to contest the ratings, in writing, to the
sanctioning organization. The written response of the
organization would be sent to the boxer, the state boxing
commission of the boxer's domiciliary, and the President of the
Association of Boxing Commissions (ABC). The ABC is the
voluntary national association of state athletic boxing
commissioners in the U.S. They develop policies to improve
health, safety, honest competition, and ethical conduct in the
boxing industry. State boxing commissioners serve a unique role
in the sport by their regulation of boxing events on behalf of
the public interest. Members of the ABC are prohibited by
federal law from having any ties to the business side of the
boxing industry.
New section 16 requires sanctioning organizations to notify
boxers of their reasons for changing their ratings, and
publicly release their explanation. Since the often arbitrary
ratings system has a large impact on the career of a boxer, the
Committee believes this is an important measure to have these
organizations fairly explain why they have changed the boxer's
rating. The requirement only applies to those boxers who are
rated in an organization's top 10. The explanation must be
mailed to the boxer and the ABC, and posted on the
organization's Internet site, if they have one. It is hoped
that public disclosure of their ratings determinations will
encourage these organizations to make more credible ratings
decisions.
Sanctioning organizations conduct interstate business in the
U.S. with virtually no standards or ethical guidelines by
industry members, few state guidelines, and no federal
oversight. The Committee believes that increased public
disclosure is an essential part of reform of the professional
boxing industry. New section 16 establishes an annual public
disclosure mechanism for sanctioning bodies to disclose basic
aspects of their operations. Each sanctioning organization is
required to provide their bylaws, voting membership, and
appeals procedures on an annual basis to the Federal Trade
Commission. If the organization has an Internet website, this
information can be provided on the website.
New section 16 also seeks to prohibit conflicts of interest
between sanctioning organization officials and promoters. As
noted above, the rating of boxers should be made according to
their performance in the ring, not according to financial
inducements from a promoter or other interested parties.
Allegations of payments being made to gain a favorable rating
for a boxer have frequently occurred for over a decade, and are
the subject of an ongoing federal grand jury investigation.
This section would prohibit payments or other forms of
compensation from promoters and others to sanctioning
organizations, other than the customary fee and expenses the
organization is due to receive for sanctioning the boxing
event.
Section 6. Public interest disclosures to State Boxing Commissions
This section amends the Professional Boxing Safety Act by
adding a new section 17.
This section is designed to provide enhanced information to
State boxing commissions about the fees that sanctioning
organizations impose on boxers and promoters, and other revenue
sources of these organizations. A sanctioning organization must
advise the State commission of all revenues and benefits it
receives pertaining to a boxing event. Sanctioning
organizations must also disclose to a state commission if they
have received a payment for refraining from exercising its
authority or withholding its sanction of a professional boxing
match. Increased disclosure of key information is also required
of promoters. The Committee received testimony about how
promoters may significantly reduce what they pay to a boxer
(below what is reported to the relevant commission) by claiming
a portion of the boxer's purse, and assessing excessive
expenses and charges. Currently, promoters can improperly take
portions of a boxer's purse without knowledge of the
supervising state athletic commission. This is done by the
signing of the boxer to a series of hidden contracts, which can
result in reduction of the boxer's earnings below that
permissible under State law. For example, Nevada regulations
require that a boxer receive at least two-thirds of the purse
the promoter reports to the State Athletic Commission. However,
the Commission's only information about how much a boxer is to
receive is generally a one-page form contract which promoters
file for each event. Commissions have no information or
documentation to determine if the promoter is subsequently (and
illegally) taking back significant portions of the boxer's
purse. Therefore, the bill requires a promoter to provide the
supervising state commission with copies of any contracts with
a boxer, and to verify that there are no other agreements. The
bill requires state commissions to protect the confidentiality
of contracts that promoters provide to them.
The promoter is required by this section to provide a
statement to the commission detailing all costs and expenses
the promoter will impose on the boxer, and what portions of the
boxer's purse the promoter may be taking. Promoters are also
required to report what payments and benefits they provide to
sanctioning organizations for each boxing event. Furthermore,
promoters are required to disclose whether they, before the
boxing event occurs, have reduced the original purse amount
they promised to the boxer. The Committee is aware that
promoters have engaged in the practice of contracting or
pledging to pay a boxer a certain purse amount for a bout, but
then subsequently pressuring the boxer to accept a lower purse
shortly before the boxing event takes place. Knowing the power
that promoters have over their careers, few boxers would
legally challenge this coercive maneuver. This disclosure
requirement will alert state commissioners to this potentially
abusive practice. If requested, the promoter must also provide
the above financial disclosures to a State Attorney General's
Office. Additionally, boxing judges for bouts of ten rounds or
more are required by the bill to disclose to commissions all
payments and expenses they will receive from promoters or
ratings organizations pertaining to their participation in an
event. The Committee notes the inherent appearance of bias that
exists due to the fact that judges are paid by promoters, and
often selected by a particular ratings organization. As
described above, promoters and sanctioning bodies often have a
strong direct financial interest in one particular boxer
winning the bout. Testimony by one of the industry's most
respected referees described how judges are subject to subtle
pressures to favor a boxer who is affiliated with the promoter
or sanctioning body who has selected them. This leads to
allegations of corruption or collusion whenever a boxing event
is widely considered to be misjudged.
Section 7. Enforcement
The enforcement of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996
includes criminal and civil sanctions. A person knowingly
violating the Act is subject to up to one year in prison, or
substantial fines. Section 7 of S. 305 provides for the
stiffest fine when the provisions of new section 15, 16, or 17,
relating to exploitation of a boxer, are violated. It is
important that monetary penalties are a sufficient deterrent to
promoters who may be engaged in exploitation and coercive
practices. In an industry where a single championship bout
between prominent boxers can achieve revenues easily exceeding
$60 million in the U.S. alone, fines for illegal practices
under the Act must be commensurate. Therefore, the Act provides
that fines can exceed $100,000 for any boxing events that
exceed $2 million in revenues. The Committee recognizes and
supports the fact that State commissions are the primary
regulators and enforcement entities in the professional boxing
industry. Section 7 of the reported bill therefore authorizes
State Attorneys General to bring injunctive, criminal, and
civil actions on behalf of their residents. Boxers who
themselves suffer economic injury from violations of the Act
are also authorized by section 7 to bring civil actions.
Section 8. Professional Boxing Safety Act amendments
This section contains additional amendments to the
Professional Boxing Safety Act. It requires State commissions
in the U.S. to honor the suspensions of boxers for
unsportsmanlike conduct that were ordered by other state
commissions. This will prevent boxers from engaging in serious
misconduct in one state, and then avoiding any suspension
period by simply traveling to another state to compete. The
amendment also requires license revocations to be treated
similarly as suspensions for the purposes of the federal law.
S. 305 would also extend the period for state commissions to
renew boxer identification cards from every two years to every
four years. This will lessen the administrative burden that
commissions face from renewing these identification cards. This
change has been recommended by state boxing commissioners from
across the U.S.
Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill,
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new material is printed
in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown
in roman):
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
[15 U.S.C. 6301]
For purposes of this Act:
(1) Boxer.--The term ``boxer'' means an individual
who fights in a professional boxing match.
(2) Boxing commission.--(A) The term ``boxing
commission'' means an entity authorized under State law
to regulate professional boxing matches.
(3) Boxer registry.--The term ``boxer registry''
means any entity certified by the Association of Boxing
Commissions for the purposes of maintaining records and
identification of boxers.
(4) Licensee.--The term ``licensee'' means an
individual who serves as a trainer, second, or cut man
for a boxer.
(5) Manager.--The term ``manager'' means a person who
receives compensation for service as an agent or
representative of a boxer.
(6) Matchmaker.--The term ``matchmaker'' means a
person that proposes, selects, and arranges the boxers
to participate in a professional boxing match.
(7) Physician.--The term ``physician'' means a doctor
of medicine legally authorized to practice medicine by
the State in which the physician performs such function
or action.
(8) Professional boxing match.--The term
``professional boxing match'' means a boxing contest
held in the United States between individuals for
financial compensation. Such term does not include a
boxing contest that is regulated by an amateur sports
organization.
(9) Promoter.--The term ``promoter'' means the person
primarily responsible for organizing, promoting, and
producing a professional boxing match.
(10) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the 50
States, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and any
territory or possession of the United States.
(11) Sanctioning organization.--The term
``sanctioning organization'' means an organization that
ranks boxers or sanctions professional boxing matches
in the United States--
(A) between boxers who are residents of
different States; or
(B) that are advertised, otherwise promoted,
or broadcast (including closed circuit
television) in interstate commerce.
(12) Suspension.--The term ``suspension'' includes
within its meaning the revocation of a boxing license.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 6305. REGISTRATION.
(a) Requirements.--Each boxer shall register with--
(1) the boxing commission of the State in which such
boxer resides; or
(2) in the case of a boxer who is a resident of a
foreign country, or a State in which there is no boxing
commission, the boxing commission of any State that has
such a commission.
(b) Identification Card.--
(1) Issuance.--A boxing commission shall issue to
each professional boxer who registers in accordance
with subsection (a), an identification card that
contains each of the following:
(A) A recent photograph of the boxer.
(B) The social security number of the boxer
(or, in the case of a foreign boxer, any
similar citizen identification number or
professional boxer number from the country of
residence of the boxer).
(C) A personal identification number assigned
to the boxer by a boxing registry.
(2) Renewal.--Each professional boxer shall renew his
or her identification card at least once every [2
years.] 4 years.
(3) Presentation.--Each professional boxer shall
present his or her identification card to the
appropriate boxing commission not later than the time
of the weigh-in for a professional boxing match.
SEC. 7. REVIEW.
[15 U.S.C. 6306]
(a) Procedures.--Each boxing commission shall establish each
of the following procedures:
(1) Procedures to evaluate the professional records
and physician's certification of each boxer
participating in a professional boxing match in the
State, and to deny authorization for a boxer to fight
where appropriate.
(2) Procedures to ensure that, except as provided in
subsection (b), no boxer is permitted to box while
under suspension from any boxing commission due to--
(A) a recent knockout or series of
consecutive losses;
(B) an injury, requirement for a medical
procedure, or physician denial certification;
(C) failure of a drug test; [or]
(D) the use of false aliases, or falsifying,
or attempting to falsify, official
identification cards or [documents.] documents;
or
(E) unsportsmanlike conduct or other
inappropriate behavior inconsistent with
generally accepted methods of competition in a
professional boxing match.
(3) Procedures to review a suspension where appealed
by a boxer, including an opportunity for a boxer to
present contradictory evidence.
(4) Procedures to revoke a suspension where a boxer--
(A) was suspended under subparagraph (A) or
(B) of paragraph (2) of this subsection, and
has furnished further proof of a sufficiently
improved medical or physical condition; or
(B) furnishes proof under subparagraph (C)
or (D) of paragraph (2) that a suspension was
not, or is no longer, merited by the facts.
(b) Suspension in Another State.--A boxing commission may
allow a boxer who is under suspension in any State to
participate in a professional boxing match--
(1) for any reason other than those listed in
subsection (a) if such commission notifies in writing
and consults with the designated official of the
suspending State's boxing commission prior to the grant
of approval for such individual to participate in that
professional boxing match; or
(2) if the boxer appeals to the Association of Boxing
Commissions, and the Association of Boxing Commissions
determines that the suspension of such boxer was
without sufficient grounds, for an improper purpose, or
not related to the health and safety of the boxer or
the purposes of this Act.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 9. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.
[15 U.S.C. 6308]
[No member] (a) Regulatory Personnel._No member or employee
of a boxing commission, no person who administers or enforces
State boxing laws, and no member of the Association of Boxing
Commissions may belong to, contract with, or receive any
compensation from, any person who sanctions, arranges, or
promotes professional boxing matches or who otherwise has a
financial interest in an active boxer currently registered with
a boxer registry. For purposes of this section, the term
``compensation'' does not include funds held in escrow for
payment to another person in connection with a professional
boxing match. The prohibition set forth in this section shall
not apply to any contract entered into, or any reasonable
compensation received, by a boxing commission to supervise a
professional boxing match in another State as described in
section 4.
(b) Firewall Between Promoters and Managers.--
(1) In general.--It is unlawful for--
(A) a boxer's promoter (or a promoter who is
required to be licensed under State law) to
have a direct or indirect financial interest in
that boxer's licensed manager or management
company; or
(B) a licensed manager or management company
(or a manager or management company that, under
State law, is required to be licensed)--
(i) to have a direct or indirect
financial interest in the promotion of
a boxer; or
(ii) to be employed by or receive
compensation or other benefits from a
promoter,
except for amounts received as consideration
under the manager's contract with the boxer.
(2) Exception for self-promotion and management.--
Paragraph (1) does not prohibit a boxer from acting as
his own promoter or manager.
(c) Sanctioning Organizations.--
(1) Prohibition on receipts.--Except as provided in
paragraph (2), no officer or employee of a sanctioning
organization may receive any compensation, gift, or
benefit directly or indirectly from a promoter, boxer,
or manager.
(2) Exceptions.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
(A) the receipt of payment by a promoter,
boxer, or manager of a sanctioning
organization's published fee for sanctioning a
professional boxing match or reasonable
expenses in connection therewith if the payment
is reported to the responsible boxing
commission under section 17; or
(B) the receipt of a gift or benefit of de
minimis value.
SEC. 10. ENFORCEMENT
[15 U.S.C. 6309]
(a) Injunctions.--Whenever the Attorney General of the United
States has reasonable cause to believe that a person is engaged
in a violation of this Act, the Attorney General may bring a
civil action in the appropriate district court of the United
States requesting such relief, including a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order,
against the person, as the Attorney General determines to be
necessary to restrain the person from continuing to engage in,
sanction, promote, or otherwise participate in a professional
boxing match in violation of this Act.
(b) Criminal Penalties.--
(1) Managers, promoters, matchmakers, and
licensees.--Any manager, promoter, matchmaker, and
licensee who knowingly violates, or coerces or causes
any other person to violate, any provision of this
[Act] Act, other than section 9(b), 15, 16, or 17,
shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than
1 year or fined not more than $20,000, or both.
(2) Violation of anti-exploitation, sanctioning
organization, or disclosure provisions.--Any person who
knowingly violates any provision of section 9(b), 15,
16, or 17 of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
imprisoned for not more than 1 year or fined not more
than--
(A) $100,000; and
(B) if the violations occur in connection
with a professional boxing match the gross
revenues for which exceed $2,000,000, such
additional amount as the court finds
appropriate,
or both.
[(2)] (3) Conflict of interest.--Any member or
employee of a boxing commission, any person who
administers or enforces State boxing laws, and any
member of the Association of Boxing Commissions who
knowingly violates section 9 of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be imprisoned for not more than 1 year or
fined not more than $20,000, or both.
[(3)] (4) Boxers.--Any boxer who knowingly violates
any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
fined not more than $1,000.
(c) Actions by States.--Whenever the chief law enforcement
officer of any State has reason to believe that a person or
organization is engaging in practices which violate any
requirement of this Act, the State, as parens patriae, may
bring a civil action on behalf of its residents in an
appropriate district court of the United States--
(1) to enjoin the holding of any professional boxing
match which the practice involves;
(2) to enforce compliance with this Act;
(3) to obtain the fines provided under subsection (b)
or appropriate restitution; or
(4) to obtain such other relief as the court may deem
appropriate.
(d) Private Right of Action.--Any boxer who suffers economic
injury as a result of a violation of any provision of this Act
may bring an action in the appropriate Federal or State court
and recover the damages suffered, court costs, and reasonable
attorneys fees and expenses.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 15. PROTECTION FROM EXPLOITATION.
(a) Contract Requirements.--
(1) In general.--Any contract between a boxer and a
promoter or manager shall--
(A) include mutual obligations between the
parties;
(B) specify a minimum number of professional
boxing matches per year for the boxer; and
(C) set forth a specific period of time
during which the contract will be in effect,
including any provision for extension of that
period due to the boxer's temporary inability
to compete because of an injury or other cause.
(2) 1-year limit on coercive promotional rights.--
(A) The period of time for which promotional
rights to promote a boxer may be granted under
a contract between the boxer and a promoter, or
between promoters with respect to a boxer, may
not be greater than 12 months in length if the
boxer is required to grant such rights, or a
boxer's promoter is required to grant such
rights with respect to a boxer, as a condition
precedent to the boxer's participation in a
professional boxing match against another boxer
who is under contract to the promoter.
(B) A promoter exercising promotional rights
with respect to such boxer during the 12-month
period beginning on the day after the last day
of the promotional right period described in
subparagraph (A) may not secure exclusive
promotional rights from the boxer's opponents
as a condition of participating in a
professional boxing match against the boxer,
and any contract to the contrary--
(i) shall be considered to be in
restraint of trade and contrary to
public policy; and
(ii) unenforceable.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed as pre-empting any State law
concerning interference with contracts.
(3) Promotional rights under mandatory bout
contracts.--Neither a promoter nor a sanctioning
organization may require a boxer, in a contract arising
from a professional boxing match that is a mandatory
bout under the rules of the sanctioning organization,
to grant promotional rights to any promoter for a
future professional boxing match.
(b) Employment As Condition of Promoting, Etc.--No person who
is a licensee, manager, matchmaker, or promoter may require a
boxer to employ, retain, or provide compensation to any
individual or business enterprise (whether operating in
corporate form or not) recommended or designated by that person
as a condition of--
(1) such person's working with the boxer as a
licensee, manager, matchmaker, or promoter;
(2) such person's arranging for the boxer to
participate in a professional boxing match; or
(3) such boxer's participation in a professional
boxing match.
(c) Enforcement.--
(1) Promotion agreement.--A provision in a contract
between a promoter and a boxer, or between promoters
with respect to a boxer, that violates subsection (a)
is contrary to public policy and unenforceable at law.
(2) Employment agreement.--In any action brought
against a boxer to recover money (whether as damages or
as money owed) for acting as a licensee, manager,
matchmaker, or promoter for the boxer, the court,
arbitrator, or administrative body before which the
action is brought may deny recovery in whole or in part
under the contract as contrary to public policyif the
employment, retention, or compensation that is the subject of the
action was obtained in violation of subsection (b).
SEC. 16. SANCTIONING ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Objective Criteria.--A sanctioning organization that
sanctions professional boxing matches on an interstate basis
shall establish objective and consistent written criteria for
the ratings of professional boxers.
(b) Appeals Process.--A sanctioning organization shall
establish and publish an appeals procedure that affords a boxer
rated by that organization a reasonable opportunity, without
the payment of any fee, to submit information to contest its
rating of the boxer. Under the procedure, the sanctioning
organization shall, within 14 days after receiving a request
from a boxer questioning that organization's rating of the
boxer--
(1) provide to the boxer a written explanation of the
organization's criteria, its rating of the boxer, and
the rationale or basis for its rating (including a
response to any specific questions submitted by the
boxer); and
(2) submit a copy of its explanation to the President
of the Association of Boxing Commissions of the United
States and to the boxing commission of the boxer's
domiciliary State.
(c) Notification of Change in Rating.--If a sanctioning
organization changes its rating of a boxer who is included,
before the change, in the top 10 boxers rated by that
organization, or who, as a result of the change is included in
the top 10 boxers rated by that organization, then, within 14
days after changing the boxer's rating, the organization
shall--
(1) mail notice of the change and a written
explanation of the reasons for its change in that
boxer's rating to the boxer at the boxer's last known
address;
(2) post a copy, within the 14-day period, of the
notice and the explanation on its Internet website or
homepage, if any, for a period of not less than 30
days; and
(3) mail a copy of the notice and the explanation to
the President of the Association of Boxing Commissions.
(d) Public Disclosure.--
(1) FTC filing.--Not later than January 31st of each
year, a sanctioning organization shall submit to the
Federal Trade Commission--
(A) a complete description of the
organization's ratings criteria, policies, and
general sanctioning fee schedule;
(B) the bylaws of the organization;
(C) the appeals procedure of the
organization; and
(D) a list and business address of the
organization's officials who vote on the
ratings of boxers.
(2) Format; updates.--A sanctioning organization
shall--
(A) provide the information required under
paragraph (1) in writing, and, for any document
greater than 2 pages in length, also in
electronic form; and
(B) promptly notify the Federal Trade
Commission of any material change in the
information submitted.
(3) FTC to make information available to public.--The
Federal Trade Commission shall make information
received under this subsection available to the public.
The Commission may assess sanctioning organizations a
fee to offset the costs it incurs in processing the
information and making it available to the public.
(4) Internet alternative.--In lieu of submitting the
information required by paragraph (1) to the Federal
Trade Commission, a sanctioning organization may
provide the information to the public by maintaining a
website on the Internet that--
(A) is readily accessible by the general
public using generally available search engines
and does not require a password or payment of a
fee for full access to all the information;
(B) contains all the information required to
be submitted to the Federal Trade Commission by
paragraph (1) in a easy to search and use
format; and
(C) is updated whenever there is a material
change in the information.
SEC. 17. REQUIRED DISCLOSURES TO STATE BOXING COMMISSIONS.
(a) Sanctioning Organizations.--Before sanctioning or
authorizing a professional boxing match in a State, a
sanctioning organization shall provide to the boxing commission
of, or responsible for regulating matches in, that State a
written statement of--
(1) all charges, fees, and costs the organization
will assess any boxer participating in that match;
(2) all payments, benefits, complimentary benefits,
and fees the organization will receive for its
affiliation with the event, from the promoter, host of
the event, and all other sources; and
(3) such additional information as the commission may
require.
A sanctioning organization that receives compensation from any
source to refrain from exercising its authority or jurisdiction
over, or withholding its sanction of, a professional boxing
match in any State shall provide the information required by
paragraphs (2) and (3) to the boxing commission of that State.
(b) Promoters.--Before a professional boxing match organized,
promoted, or produced by a promoter is held in a State, the
promoter shall provide to the boxing commission of, or
responsible for regulating matches in, that State--
(1) a copy of any agreement in writing to which the
promoter is a party with any boxer participating in the
match;
(2) a statement in writing made under penalty of
perjury that there are no other agreements, written or
oral, between the promoter and the boxer with respect
to that match; and
(3) a statement in writing of--
(A) all fees, charges, and expenses that will
be assessed by or through the promoter on the
boxer pertaining to the event, including any
portion of the boxer's purse that the promoter
will receive, and training expenses;
(B) all payments, gift, or benefits the
promoter is providing to any sanctioning
organization affiliated with the event; and
(C) any reduction in the amount or percentage
of a boxer's purse after--
(i) a previous agreement concerning
the amount or percentage of that purse
has been reached between the promoter
and the boxer; or
(ii) a purse bid held for the event.
(c) Judges.--Before participating in a professional boxing
match as a judge in any State, an individual shall provide to
the boxing commission of, or responsible for regulating matches
in, that State a statement in writing of all payments,
including reimbursement for expenses, and any other benefits
that individual will receive from any source for judging that
match.
(d) Information To Be Available to State Attorney General.--A
promoter shall make information received under this section
available to the chief law enforcement officer of the State in
which the match is to be held upon request.
(e) Exception.--The requirements of this section do not apply
in connection with a professional boxing match scheduled to
last less than 10 rounds.
(f) Confidentiality of Agreements.--Neither a boxing
commission nor an Attorney General may disclose to the public
any matter furnished by a promoter under subsection (b)(1) or
subsection (d) except to the extent required in public legal,
administrative, or judicial proceedings brought against that
promoter under State law.
SEC. [15.] 18. EFFECTIVE DATE.
[15 U.S.C. 6301 note]
The provisions of this Act shall take effect on January 1,
1997, except as follows:
(1) Section 9 shall not apply to an otherwise
authorized boxing commission in the Commonwealth of
Virginia until July 1, 1998.
(2) Sections 5 through 9 shall take effect on July 1,
1997.