[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
GOVERNMENTWIDE SPENDING TO COMBAT TERRORISM: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
VIEWS ON THE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL REPORT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-6
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-509 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon ------ ------
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California (Independent)
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida TOM LANTOS, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
LEE TERRY, Nebraska (Independent)
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois ------ ------
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Michele Lang, Professional Staff Member
Jonathan Wharton, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 11, 1999................................... 1
Statement of:
Hinton, Henry L., Jr., Assistant Comptroller, National
Security and Internal Affairs Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office, accompanied by Norman J. Rabkin,
Director of Administration of Justice Issues, General
Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, and
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino, Assistant Director of National
Security Analysis, National Security and International
Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office........... 3
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Blagojevich, Hon. Rod R., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Illinois, prepared statement of............... 8
GOVERNMENTWIDE SPENDING TO COMBAT TERRORISM: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
VIEWS ON THE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL REPORT
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 pm., in room
2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays,
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Blagojevich and Mica.
Also present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; Michele Lang, professional staff member; Jonathan
Wharton, clerk; Earley Green, minority staff assistant; and
David Rapallo, minority counsel.
Mr. Shays. I'd like to call this hearing to order.
Events like the World Trade Center bombing and the release
of poison gas in a Tokyo subway crystalize our fears and
galvanize our determination to confront terrorism. In response
to a threat that approaches our shores from many directions in
many forms against many potential targets, more than 40 Federal
departments, agencies and programs will spend $9.2 billion this
year to combat terrorism.
Today we examine those governmentwide efforts to detect,
deter, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, continuing
work begun by this subcommittee's previous chairman, Speaker
Hastert. We ask how a sprawling and growing anti-terrorism and
counter-terrorism program is being coordinated across the
notoriously previously bureaucratic barriers.
We ask how priorities are set, how risks are measured and
how responses are designed to augment, not duplicate or replace
existing local, State and Federal capabilities.
These are not easy questions. By its very nature terrorism
is unpredictable, even irrational, and may confound standard
methods of risk analysis. For example, current threat
assessments conclude conventional weapons, guns and bombs,
remain the terrorists most likely choice, but the most unlikely
threat, the use of biological or chemical weapons to inflict
mass casualties would have the most devastating consequences.
Our challenge as a Nation lies in reconciling those aspects
of the terrorist threat, and calibrating the appropriate
response.
How do we do that? According to a series of studies
undertaken through the subcommittee by the General Accounting
Office [GAO], the answer has to be better but not good enough.
Fragmentation and duplication persist in a number of military
and civilian response units, and in confusing and disjointed
equipment programs and training efforts.
While some progress has been made in coordinating crisis
management and consequent management missions, GAO still sees
the need for a more risk-based strategy, defined program goals
and governmentwide budget criteria to ensure the effectiveness
and efficiency of the effort against terrorism.
Two years ago, to improve coordination and accountability,
Congress directed the President and the Office of Management
and Budget, OMB, to track terrorism-related spending
governmentwide and report annually on priorities and
duplication.
The second annual report issued March 3d describes a far-
reaching and balanced program on which the administration
proposes to spend $10 billion next year, $10 billion next year.
According to GAO, the report gives us the first strategic
insight into the magnitude and direction of Federal funding for
this priority nationally, security and law enforcement
concerns. But the report says little about priorities guiding
the effort, and says less about duplication.
Early today the subcommittee received a classified briefing
from Mr. Richard Clark, the National Security Council's
National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure, Protection
and Counter-Terrorism. And from Michael Deish, the program
Associate Director for General Government, Bob Kyle, program
Associate Director for National Security, both with the Office
of Management and Budget.
It was the first administration briefing on the March 3d
report and offered us the opportunity to discuss both
procedural and substantive issues candidly.
The battle against terrorism may be a major focus of this
subcommittee's work over the next 2 years. Not may be, but will
be.
Today and in future hearings we will say much about
duplication, about the successes and failures of current
programs, and about the need for clear priorities in meeting
terrorist threats.
Mr. Hinton, Mr. Rabkin and Ms. D'Agostino, welcome. The
subcommittee values your work on these important issues and
looks forward to your testimony.
At this time, if you would stand, I'll administer the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. For the record, all three of our witnesses
responded in the affirmative. I think Mr. Hinton, you have a
statement and then all three of you respond to questions?
Mr. Hinton. Correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. You have the floor.
Mr. Hinton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. And given that you are our only witness, just
feel free to make your statements as you think you need to.
Mr. Hinton. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF HENRY L. HINTON, JR., ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY NORMAN J. RABKIN, DIRECTOR OF
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ISSUES, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AND MS. DAVI M. D'AGOSTINO,
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY ANALYSIS, NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Hinton. Mr. Chairman, we're pleased to be here to
discuss our past and ongoing work and observations on Federal
funding to combat terrorism. To my right is Ms. Davi
D'Agostino. She's a key person in leading all the work that we
have been doing, looking across the government programs to
combat terrorism. And to my left is Mr. Norm Rabkin who is the
Director for our justice issues group at GAO.
As you know, over the past 3 years we have studied and
reported on a number of issues concerning Federal agencies,
programs and activities to combat terrorism for this
subcommittee. We previously reported that key Federal agencies
with responsibilities to combat terrorism spent about $6.7
billion in fiscal year 1997 for unclassified activities and
programs.
That report led to legislation requiring OMB to establish a
system for collecting and reporting information on executive
agencies' spending and budgets for combating terrorism.
Legislation also required the President to annually report this
information to Congress.
OMB's recent report identified $10 billion requested for
programs to combat terrorism in fiscal year 2000.
My testimony this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, will address
three issues. First, I will briefly describe the threat as we
understand it from intelligence analyses. Second, I will
provide some of our overall observations based on our work. And
finally I will discuss some steps the executive branch has
taken for improving cross cutting management and coordination
and our preliminary observations on OMB's reports to Congress.
Let me turn to the threat, Mr. Chairman. The U.S.
intelligence community has continually assessed the foreign
origin and domestic terrorist threats to the United States.
According to intelligence agencies, conventional explosives and
firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists.
Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological
weapons, at least partly because they are more difficult to
weaponize and the results are unpredictable. However, some
groups and individuals of concern are showing interest in
chemical and biological weapons.
With the elevated concerns about terrorism that you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, let me focus on the Federal response
and our observations about it.
The Federal response has been significant and is evolving.
As I mentioned earlier, we reported that certain Federal
agencies spent about $6.7 billion in 1997. For 1999, the
Congress authorized $9.7 billion, and for 2000, the President's
budget proposes $10 billion.
Among the major recipients of this money is the National
Security community including DOD and intelligence agencies and
the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy and State.
At the agency level, this growth in the budget has
translated into rapid increases in funding for selected
programs and activities to combat terrorism. For example, HHS
has increased its spending from $7 million in 1996 to about
$160 million for 1999, and has requested $230 million for 2000
for its bio-terrorism initiative.
This initiative is intended to improve disease surveillance
and communication systems, establish laboratories and continue
to establish a national pharmaceutical stockpile, conduct
research into new vaccines and drugs and expand the number of
local emergency medical teams.
Justice has also experienced rapid growth in funds budgeted
for its State and local domestic preparedness programs. Funds
have increased from zero in 1997 to $21 million in 1998 to $120
million in 1999, to a fiscal year 2000 budget request of $162
million to provide training and equipment to local first
responders and to fund national training centers.
The FBI more than doubled its resources for combating
terrorism from about $256 million in 1995 to about $581 million
in 1998.
Mr. Chairman, one of our key observations is that the rapid
program growth has occurred in the absence of, one, a
governmentwide strategy that includes a defined end-state; two,
soundly established and prioritized program requirements; and
three, cross-cutting analyses of agencies' budget proposals to
ensure that unnecessary duplication and waste are avoided and
existing Federal, State and local capabilities are fully
leveraged.
In this connection, Mr. Chairman, threat and risk
assessments are widely recognized as sound decision support
tools to help define and prioritize requirements of a properly
focused program of investments in combating terrorism.
Let me highlight the rapid growth in two program areas for
you that has taken place in the absence of sound threat and
risk assessment. They are domestic preparedness programs and
public health initiatives.
Domestic preparedness funding increased from $42 million in
1997 to about $1.3 billion requested for a number of agencies'
preparedness activities in fiscal year 2000. For example, the
2000 budget proposes an additional $611 million for training,
equipment and exercising cities' first responders in
preparation for a potential terrorist attack and for
strengthening public health infrastructure.
There are many similar program initiatives across several
agencies to train and equip local emergency response personnel,
such as those in fire, police and emergency medical services to
deal with the consequences of an attack.
For example, Justice has sponsored training programs and
implemented equipment programs for State and local responders.
It is also establishing a center for domestic preparedness at
Ft. McClellan, AL. FEMA and its National Fire Academy have
longstanding resident and non-resident training programs in
emergency management and hazardous materials. FEMA has
requested about $31 million for fiscal year 2000, a $13 million
increase over its 1999 funding; $29 of the $31 million in
fiscal year 2000 is to train and equip State and local
responders.
HHS has been establishing metropolitan medical response
systems with trained and equipped local emergency teams in 27
cities that also participate in the domestic preparedness
training and equipment program. HHS has requested 2000 funding
to include 25 more cities in the program.
We have also noted growth and potential overlap in Federal
agencies' response capabilities to support State or local
incident management. The National Guard's Rapid Assessment and
Initial Detection teams, also commonly known as RAIDs teams,
are being created to supplement numerous local, State and
Federal organizations that can perform similar functions.
For example, there are over 600 existing local and State
hazardous materials response teams that can respond to
terrorist events, including those involving highly toxic
industrial chemicals.
Included in the fiscal year 1999 appropriations are $52
million to establish, train and equip the first 10 of
potentially 54 RAID teams. We are currently reviewing the roles
and missions of these teams in response to a request from this
subcommittee.
In the public health area, HHS has received about $160
million in 1999 appropriations and a request of $230 million in
2000 for a number of initiatives related to the possibility of
a terrorist event using biological agents.
HHS expects that creating a national stockpile of millions
of doses of vaccines for smallpox and anthrax, antidotes for
chemical agents, antibiotics for other diseases and respirators
will cost $51 million in 1999 and $52 million in 2000.
Our preliminary observations are that HHS did not perform a
complete and formal risk assessment to derive and prioritize in
accordance with the most likely threats the Nation will face,
the specific items it plans to procure.
Several of the items HHS plans to procure do not match the
intelligence community's judgments on the more likely chemical
and biological agents a terrorist group or individual might
use. For example, smallpox and plague are not among the
intelligence community's list of biological agents that are
most likely to be used by terrorists, but HHS plans to
stockpile against these agents and threats.
Also we are currently reviewing the scientific and
practical feasibility of a terrorist chemical/biological threat
for this subcommittee, Senator Spector and Senator Rockefeller,
and Congressman Skelton, and we will be reporting on the
results of that review later this summer.
Last, Mr. Chairman, let me highlight some of the steps the
administration is taking to address the management and
coordination of these programs and activities.
We believe that the OMB reports on governmentwide spending
and budgeting to combat terrorism are a significant step toward
improved management and coordination for the complex and
rapidly growing programs and activities. For the first time,
the executive branch and Congress have strategic insight into
the magnitude and direction of Federal funding for this
priority national security and law enforcement concern.
The 1999 report provided additional analyses and more
detailed information than the 1998 report on budgeting for
programs that deal with weapons of mass destruction.
In discussing the reports, OMB officials told us that a
critical piece of the budget and spending in this picture,
threat and risk assessment--that would suggest priorities and
appropriate counter-measures.
We have not fully evaluated the processes or the
methodologies the executive branch agencies used to derive the
information in these reports. As a result, we're not in a
position to comment on whether or to what extent the reports
reflect the best possible estimate of costs associated with
programs and activities to combat terrorism.
However, notably absent from the report was any discussion
about established priorities or efforts to reduce or eliminate
duplicate programs or activities across government.
Another important step toward improving inter-agency
management and coordination was the Attorney General's December
1998 classified 5-year inter-agency plan on counter-terrorism
and technology crime.
The plan includes goals, objectives, performance indicators
and recommends that specific actions be taken to resolve inter-
agency problems and issues that are identified, and assigns
relative priorities to the actions.
The classified plan represents a substantial inter-agency
effort, and was developed and coordinated with 15 Federal
agencies with counter-terrorism roles.
As with the OMB report, Mr. Chairman, the plan generally
does not lead to recommended actions and priorities to budget
resources, although the document states that the agencies hope
to improve the link between the plan and resources and
subsequent updates
In May 1998, last year, the President designated a National
Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection and Counter-
Terrorism. We heard this morning, he was not to direct
agencies' activities, but is to integrate the government's
policies and programs on unconventional threats to the homeland
and Americans abroad, including terrorism.
The National Coordinator is also to provide advice in the
context of the annual budget process regarding the budgets for
counter-terrorism. We understand he has established a number of
working groups, Mr. Chairman, but we have been unable to obtain
any further information about their roles.
In summary, the Federal agencies have been moving out with
a variety of initiatives to create new Federal response
elements, new training and equipment programs and facilities
for State and local responders, and a number of the
preparedness programs.
The Congress has been supporting these initiatives and
activities to prepare for a possible terrorist incident with
regular, supplemental and emergency authorizations and
appropriations.
Our message today is not that the government should not be
spending funds on programs that combat terrorism. Our message
is that we see some very important things missing from the
picture.
First, what is missing is a strategy with a vision of an
end-state. What I mean is, how do all these individual agency
initiatives fit together with each other, and importantly, with
existing Federal, State and local capabilities and assets.
Is the vision of the end-state for the Nation that every
city, town and rural community in American have its own organic
capability to respond to a chemical and biological terrorist
attack?
Second, we are missing sound threat and risk-based
requirements for the many programs, activities and initiatives,
and linked with those assessment requirements, governmentwide
activities and programs being prioritized along the lines for
more likely threats and high-risk incidents that the Nation may
face.
Without such assessments, requirements and priorities, one
cannot be confident that you're spending moneys on the right
programs and in the right amounts.
Third, we would expect to see a comprehensive inventory of
existing Federal, State and local assets and capabilities and
assurances that they are being leveraged, and not excessively
duplicated.
And finally, we would expect to see a process established
and implemented to identify duplication and overlapping
capabilities and programs.
We have made a number of recommendations, Mr. Chairman,
that, if properly implemented, would result in a more focused
approach to investing in combating terrorism from a
governmentwide perspective than what we have observed.
For example, we have recommended that the National Security
Council in consultation with the Director of OMB and the other
executive branch agencies take steps to ensure that
governmentwide priorities to combat terrorism are established.
We also recommended that OMB review on funds budgeted and
spent by executive departments and agencies to among other
things ensure that programs are based on analytically sound
threat and risk assessment, and avoid unnecessary duplication.
Unfortunately the executive branch has not fully embraced
those recommendations to date, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my
statement. My colleagues and I will be prepared to answer your
questions.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Hinton. Before I
recognize Mr. Blagojevich, who is the ranking member, I just
would ask unanimous consent that all the members of the
subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the
record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose. Without objection so ordered, and I'll also ask for
the unanimous consent that our witnesses be permitted to
include their written statements in the record. Without
objection, so ordered.
Do you have any statement you would like to make before
we----
Mr. Blagojevich. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman. I have a
statement, and in the interest of time and brevity I will put
it in the record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Rod R. Blagojevich
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6509.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6509.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6509.003
Mr. Shays. Mr. Hinton, maybe I could ask you, do you have
any comment that you would want to put on the record based on
the briefing that we had earlier in the day? Is there any
statement that you think would make sense to put on the record?
Mr. Hinton. Yes, I would offer a few comments, Mr.
Chairman. I think the OMB and NSC description that this whole
area and the Federal response is evolving. I think that it's
true, I think there have been some significant steps on the
part of the administration based on the work that we have seen,
and that is the OMB reports. I think that is offering
tremendous insight in terms of the funding that is planned that
we've seen in the 1998 and 1999 programs.
Second, I think the 5-year plan of the Attorney General--
that's the classified plan I made reference to, I think in
terms of what its outlined as some recommendations for the
inter-agency community. This is another important step.
What I haven't seen, Mr. Chairman, yet, is what a spending
plan might look like across government outyears, and what the
chief priorities may be within that spending plan. That would
give us some insight as to where the dollars are going, and
what these programs would really be going after in terms of the
gaps that they're trying to fill.
Mr. Shays. Is it your view that the March 12, 1998 report
from Mr. Rands and the March 3, 1999 report of Mr. Liu--they're
both Directors at OMB, have been helpful documents?
Mr. Hinton. Yes, sir. In terms of bringing some insight
into the spending. Notably absent is linkage to chief
priorities that we would expect to see over time. There is a
statement in the plan that they hope shortly to be making
linkages from the dollars that we're seeing to some of the
broader priorities for the effort. And I think as that evolves,
that will be tremendously helpful to this committee and the
other authorization and appropriations committees up here on
the Hill.
Mr. Shays. The position that was established by the
President, the National Security Council's National Coordinator
for Security Infrastructure, Protection and Counter-Terrorism,
occupied by Mr. Richard Clark--he's not a terrorist czar? He
doesn't have the same powers and responsibilities that the drug
czar has, for instance?
But he has the task of coordinating all the various Federal
efforts. In a sense, he has the opportunity to cross
interdisciplinary, he can go from one department to another.
Now, I had made an assumption that your division had that
same unique characteristic, but really it relates to national
security internal affairs division, your part of the puzzle.
Do you have the jurisdiction as an assistant controller to
organize the rest of GAO to focus attention on terrorism?
Mr. Hinton. Yes, we've worked across, on units within GAO,
and working with the Justice side. I work with Mr. Rabkin in
working with those agencies who oversee HHS. I work with Mr.
Hembra, my counterpart who handles those areas.
Mr. Shays. Is there any one person, though, that's
responsible? Have you been given the authority to use the other
resources at GAO? I think Ms. D'Agostino is--you work actually
in the same division.
Mr. Hinton. Right.
Mr. Shays. But how many different divisions do you have to
interact with? I want to get a handle on the territory.
Mr. Hinton. Within GAO, all of them. And we have a lead
role, like a lead agency concept. Our division has the lead in
terms of strategically thinking through the programs and
bringing the other divisions to work with us on the issues as
we see the need to do so.
For example, we recently issued a report in December of
this past year on the FBI in terms of its role and its funding.
Mr. Rabkin did that as part of a network that we had within
GAO. And as we cut across the other issues, we'll do that. And
when I look at our units, Mr. Chairman, the role that we have
played in the division that I head up is looking across the
entire spectrum, and where we've had issues. It might go down
the HHS track or to Justice or the law enforcement community.
I've looked at the others, but take a vertical cut in doing
that work for us so that we can have a complete picture.
Mr. Shays. Let me be really specific. Do you have the
authority from the Comptroller to be the lead person? I mean
ultimately are you the one held accountable for the whole issue
of terrorism, or is that somewhat an unresolved issue?
Mr. Hinton. Within GAO I would probably say I have, at this
point, the largest responsibility within the----
Mr. Shays. That's not the same, though. And it's something
that I would want to talk to the Comptroller about, because
ultimately there needs to be one person who is held accountable
for this whole effort, I think, within GAO.
And that will be our responsibility, but you might express
a concern to the Comptroller.
Mr. Hinton. In answer to that, there is not an express
direction by anyone in GAO. What we have is a strategic
planning process that builds the elements for that----
Mr. Shays. Now, this committee parallels GAO in the sense--
I'm not talking about subcommittee, I'm talking about quorum
committee--we have this 360 degrees jurisdiction of government
programs, much like appropriations does. They have it for
spending, we have it for looking at waste, fraud and abuse in
government programs. So within your GAO there exists that 360
degrees jurisdiction.
What we did in this committee is we spun off some
responsibilities that we had to Justice, we spun off to another
committee, but we wanted to make sure that we focused on
national security, intelligence, veteran's affairs, we thought
they were all united. But the one thing we kept clear in the
360 degrees jurisdiction was terrorism.
So we have it for every element, and we intend to utilize I
think that opportunity. And the more we have been trying to
sort out what this committee is going to focus in on, the more
convinced I am that out biggest opportunity is to do what Mr.
Mica is doing on the drug side within every government agency
in prevention, interdiction and so on, we're going to look at
the terrorist side.
Let me conclude with this question: Do you concur, whether
you concur, let me put it this way. I believe, and I believe
many people who get involved in the terrorist issue believe
that a terrorist attack or attacks will occur in the United
States. And it's really a
question of when these attacks will occur, what kind of attack
and where.
And is it your general opinion that we have made good
progress in getting a handle in organizing both the anti-
terrorist and counter-terrorist effort; do you feel that we are
making significant headway in HHS and their role once a
terrorist attack occurs, that we're bringing in the Justice
Department and the FBI in terms of their responsibilities, FEMA
and so on; do you think that we have made significant progress?
Mr. Hinton. I think there has been quite a bit of progress
that has been made over the last couple of years on that score,
Mr. Chairman. In fact, I think in setting up Mr. Clark's
situation to oversee that, though he does not have an authority
to direct the agencies. Nevertheless, he is in a coordination
role.
But we have also seen money being made available to the
individual agencies to enhance their efforts and get the
initiatives going up. The questions that we have been raising
from our work, though, is that where does it all take us; what
is the end state, and how does the Federal game plan fit
together in a comprehensive way, and what is the long-term
spending initiative that we want to have.
And a key part of that is making some sound threat and risk
assessments as part of the process. We haven't seen that done.
Therefore the real question we have is where money is going
right now, are we targeting the money in the absence of these
risk assessments to the highest priority programs and
activities that we as a Nation need to be funding? That is not
clear yet.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Let me ask Mr. Blagojevich, and see
if he has any questions.
Mr. Blagojevich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hinton, in
your testimony you describe differences between conventional
threats and threats of chemical or biological weapons.
Although you state that terrorists are less likely to use
chemical and biological weapons, don't we also have to factor
in the potential harm which in the case of chemical or
biological weapons could be much, much greater?
Mr. Hinton. Yes. That's the concept that we work through,
yes.
Mr. Blagojevich. Could you elaborate on that, please?
Mr. Hinton. Well, I think that's one of the threats that
clearly we need to be cognizant of and try to plan how we will
react as a Nation against that threat and how we would manage
the consequences of an action that we did indeed have.
Mr. Blagojevich. The Attorney General also announced plans
to move the NLB Domestic Preparedness Program from the
Department of Defense to the Department of Justice. Somebody
suggested that FEMA should take the program because of their
traditional emergency response. Wouldn't it, moving it to
Justice, call for even greater coordination with some of the
training programs already operated by Justice?
Mr. Hinton. Sir, we haven't really done an assessment of
the pros and cons of that decision. I think there are probably
several alternatives available. FEMA could be one, EPA could be
one, surely Justice could be one.
Key, I think, in terms of looking at the decision as it is
made is to make sure that we understand the pros and cons of
it, and when that decision is indeed made.
Mr. Blagojevich. Can you give us a timeframe on when you
think you might have a decision on that?
Mr. Hinton. Right now we're not presently looking at that.
As you know, the tentative decision is to move responsibility
over in 2001. For the most part, I think that's where the
administration is leaning to do it.
I have not looked at the analysis around that. If that's
something that the committee would like, we'd certainly be
happy to entertain doing that.
Mr. Blagojevich. One of the concerns with the domestic
preparedness program that I've heard is that State and local
first responders were confused about the number of different
programs and resources that would be available to them. In a
hearing before this subcommittee the last time, representatives
of the Attorney General announced the creation of a new
national domestic preparedness office at the FBI.
Will this office be able to reduce confusion and streamline
equipment lists and personnel requirements?
Mr. Hinton. I think it's a step in the right direction,
Congressman. Through the work we have done, we've heard the
same concerns from people we have talked to. And I think
setting that office up and providing the services that are
planned for it to provide will offer a kind of one-stop
shopping for many of the training programs and will probably
help mitigate a lot of the confusion that is out there right
now. And I think from that vantage point it will probably be
viewed as a good step.
Mr. Blagojevich. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Hinton.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman. I would like to spend a
few minutes and ask a couple of general questions, and since I
just joined the hearing, excuse me if I repeat anything that's
been asked.
First of all, terrorist threats can be numerous. They can
be domestic, or they can be overseas involving an embassy or
our airlines. We've seen the World Trade Center, a commercial
center at risk. We have hundreds of thousands if not millions
of Americans around the world and American schools overseas
that could have a problem.
I have become more and more convinced as we examine this
whole problem area that you can't build a concrete wall or
bomb-proof barrier or terrorist-proof facility around every
individual facility.
What appears to be one of the wisest expenditures of funds
is for intelligence. Is that a proper assumption, and what kind
of emphasis is being placed in your opinion, your study, on the
question of intelligence versus hardening?
Mr. Hinton. Mr. Mica, there is no question from where we
sit that intelligence is a very, very important component of
the Federal picture back there. And it is very key, and it is
an enabler to help us prevent, help the government prevent any
known or planned actions against it.
And I think when you look across the entire government
plan, there has got to be balance in that, in the whole
strategy. Intelligence is a big part of it.
Taking other actions around physical security and also
consequence management, they are all components of the total
government plan. And so I think it becomes one of balance and a
funding decision.
Mr. Mica. Well, again, I'm wondering if you've done any
examination. We talked about risk assessment, and how much
money we were spending, again, on hardening versus
intelligence. Are there any specific recommendations that you
have for us? I haven't read through this report here, the
statement.
Mr. Hinton. Right. We have made recommendations, Mr.
Chairman, in terms of the threat risk assessments. We have not
seen them yet, but they've been done. We think that is an
important decision support tool that has been used in the
private and public sectors. It helps you look at your threats,
assess the vulnerabilities of those threats, prioritize efforts
to mitigate against those threats and helps decide on where you
want to put the funding.
Intelligence is a key part of that process too, the human
intelligence aspects are important, too. But it's part of a
process that helps you think through the risk that is involved
and helps you establish a good process for weighing the
resources that you're going to apply to assess risk.
Mr. Mica. I just left a closed briefing on the narcotics
issue. One of the things that was brought to light was the
resistance on the Senate side to spend adequate funds for
intelligence.
Are you aware of requests that have been unmet in the area
of, again, going after terrorist threats, anything that the
Congress hasn't done that should be done? You know, I'm not
asking you to point a finger, but I just was told that there is
reluctance on the part not so much of Members, but of staff on
the Senate side to not properly fund intelligence activities.
Mr. Hinton. Mr. Mica, I am not aware of that. It doesn't
mean that is not a real situation, I am just not aware of that
from the work that we have done.
Mr. Mica. And then the other question is the way the money
is spent. I sat on this subcommittee early on and I had the
unfortunate experience as a Member of Congress to speak at the
graduation of a young man in my district who several months
later, almost a year later, ended up serving in Saudi Arabia
and was killed, murdered in the Khobar Towers incident.
Of course we took every measure possible after that, and I
think we expended a third of a trillion dollars total in force
protection. We then went back to Saudi Arabia and some of our
other posts to look at how the money was spent.
I was sort of stunned at the array of gadgetry that had
been acquired. Do we overreact when we--we intended to try to
get in as much protection for the forces as possible, but I saw
some of these gadgets that had been purchased that may or may
not ever be used, may or may not be suitable to, say, desert
conditions.
What is your assessment of, again, the equipment? The same
thing happened after TWA 100, we spent a tremendous amount of
money. You go through the airport now and they've got these
very expensive, I understand, detection equipment for
explosives.
How cost-effective is this? Are we spending money that we
don't need to be spending when people suddenly have their
attention focused?
Mr. Hinton. Mr. Mica, you're raising a very good question
that comes back to the issue of having good, sound threat and
risk assessments. You go through and take those, you do it by
facility, you can do it by location, you can do it by sites or
whatever like that, and you ask a lot of key questions around
those assessments to try to gauge what the threat might be,
weigh the risk and if you have gaps in the known information
out there, you can set forth a plan of action that might
involve the type of equipment that you need to fill the gaps
that you see.
Because we haven't seen those types of threat and risk
assessments done in this area, we don't have the assurances
that we're putting the right money, in your scenario there,
maybe the right equipment, to fix some of the gaps that are out
there. We haven't seen that.
So I think your point is right on the mark. I think it
needs to be something that's asked constantly of the executive
branch when they come before you, and to ask well, what is the
request that you're asking for the funds truly based on, so
that you can have a gauge. Are we targeting the money to the
right programs and, is it the right level of the resources?
Mr. Mica. Again, with some of this equipment, I just
couldn't see the practical application. We fund the money, and
then it looks like a lot of the purchases of equipment that
should be utilized to minimize a threat, the purchases are
based on vendor promotion and vendor grabbing for the Federal
dollar that's been made available.
Do you focus on any of that or are you directed to that
problem?
Mr. Hinton. We haven't looked into it in depth, Mr. Mica.
We are aware of how the money has been allocated. Some of the
contracting that has been done. But we have not looked into the
economies and efficiencies around the individual actions.
Mr. Mica. Well, again, I strongly believe in risk
assessment, cost benefit analysis, and what makes sense to you.
Look at where the risk is, you go after it. That's why we come
back to intelligence.
If we had just a little bit more intelligence in Khobar
Towers, we wouldn't have had a Khobar Towers. And then you look
at practical solutions. I think we lost 19 young men there.
Things like mylar on some of the windows, a lot of people died
from glass shards. And just simple things.
I asked the State Department, I think it was last week,
based on the experience we had, about some of these simple
cost-effective measures, the cautionary things, programs to
enlighten personnel that are again, all over the planet at risk
1,000 different ways, 1,000 times a week, and I've been trying
to get a handle on what is cost effective.
To your knowledge are we taking what you consider cost-
effective steps to deal with the terrorism problem?
You know, again, specifically I pointed to the State
Department, the other agencies with proposals in here that may
cost us more money for equipment or personnel, but what about
cost effective approaches?
Mr. Hinton. Mr. Mica, I'm going to come back again and tell
you to see that analysis around the threat and assessment,
threat assessments that need to be done. You're not going to
know whether or not we're targeting that money to the right
programs and in the right amounts.
In terms of recommendations were made, were they all
implemented, the answer to that is we reported a couple of
years ago it was no, not fully. And I think we've got a lot of
history from those instances that we've got to learn from. At
the same time, as we think about making our investments to deal
with this issue of terrorism, I think it's very helpful to
weigh it through risk assessment, because that kind of sorts it
out for you, and you can look and say OK, even if I assess
something to be a low threat, you can also through doing the
proper assessments be able to prioritize certain types of
funding that you may want to place against those low threats.
And we have not seen that level of analysis as we've look
at this issue over the last few years, and that's been the
focus of the recommendations we've been making to the
administration.
Mr. Mica. One of the things that has been done by the
administration was this Presidential Directive last May to
designate a National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure
and Protection, and Counter-Terrorism. And you say you
understand some working groups have been established, but you
haven't obtained any information.
What's the problem? Is this not being followed through or
are they not cooperating in giving you the information you
need?
Mr. Hinton. Well, we have tried to establish a working
relationship with Mr. Clark's team at the NSC. To date we
haven't been successful in establishing that relationship so we
can understand where the work groups are going, to look behind
some of the work that they've done in terms of types of
analysis and those things, and we have not been able to get
access to it yet.
It's one of these things that----
Mr. Mica. Is that both domestic and international?
Mr. Hinton. Yes.
Mr. Mica. It is?
Mr. Hinton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. And on the domestic front do you know if there
are any working groups at State and local law enforcement
agencies?
Mr. Hinton. Yes, sir. There are some.
Mr. Mica. But you don't have enough information to
evaluate----
Mr. Hinton. Not just on that one part. I think what we
wanted to do, sir, was to establish at our level from GAO over
to the NSC team there, and try to look at what they were doing,
and then we would follow that down to the State and local
levels and see how the responses are being included in their--
--
Mr. Mica. Are you asking for a report on that?
Mr. Hinton. Yes, Mr. Mica, I can assure you that it's not
going to go off the radar screen. I had a conversation with Mr.
Clark this morning as part of this, and we're moving forward to
try to make an arrangement to talk about some of the acute
security issues. And we'll just have to work that and see if we
can work this out.
Mr. Mica. Well, it seems to be a key, I mean it's a key
initiative. The question is whether the results--is it
effectively being executed.
Mr. Hinton. Right, and we would agree with you on that
point.
Mr. Mica. Let me ask you, in addition to some of the things
I've mentioned about politics and the steps that have taken
about the cost effectiveness of the steps and also the
coordination of this. You can also do a risk assessment and a
threat assessment relating to the type of terrorist activity
we're going to see.
They are either going to use explosives or they are going
to use some from of chemical weapon maybe a little bit further
down the pike, getting a hold of some type of military
equipment. How do you think these should be ranked, and how do
we rank them as far as threats? Then I have a followup
question: what progress are we making in each of the areas?
Maybe you can elaborate.
Ms. D'Agostino. What we've been told by the intelligence
community is that there are a number of types of threats, and I
think we point out in our statement, that the weapon of choice
for terrorists is a conventional bomb. And further down the
list of likely weapons, are--and people aren't in total
agreement or consensus on this yet--certain chemicals and
certain biological agents.
We have seen various analyses in our threat briefings from
different parts of the intelligence community, on both the
foreign origin threats and the domestic threats. What the FBI
has seen in cases, et cetera.
In terms of whether the resources are completely aligned or
misaligned, I don't think we've done the kind of analysis that
would allow us to say, one way or the other. But these threat
and risk assessment processes would get you of the answers you
are looking for.
The threat and risk assessment model we have highlighted in
one of our reports incorporates methodology to get at the
appropriate countermeasures to deal with the higher risk and
more severe consequence scenarios that get generated by a
multidisciplinary team of experts.
And that is the way you get to targeted countermeasures--
through the threats that are the most likely to be faced.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, did you have anything?
Mr. Shays. No, sir.
Mr. Mica. I yield to Mr. Blagojevich. He's going to have to
leave.
Mr. Blagojevich. Thank you. I was a little concerned with
your discussion about the vaccination stock-piling program. You
mentioned that the HHS is dealing with this threat of risk
assessment.
Has GAO talked with anyone at HHS or CDC about the process
they are using for determining vaccines to stockpile, and if
so, who have you spoken with?
Ms. D'Agostino. We have spoken with HHS and we plan to
visit CDC, but the Office of Emergency Preparedness at HHS, Dr.
Bob Knouss, a Public Health Service official who is basically
responsible for this initiative under Dr. Margaret Hamburg,
Assistant Secretary. And the process they used is very unclear
that they have followed. To our understanding, according to Dr.
Knouss, there is no documented assessment, and it makes it
difficult to understand the process and methodology in how the
players in their process derived a list of items that they have
presented in their operating plan.
Mr. Blagojevich. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. I'm a pretty strong proponent, as you've heard,
of risk assessment and targeting, and I notice that toward the
conclusion of your comments to the subcommittee you said the
National Security Council has not fully embraced or implemented
all the recommendations as far as this type of an approach.
What's the problem?
Mr. Hinton. It's not fully clear to us yet, Mr. Mica. We
have been making that recommendation for the last 2 years, I
believe it has been, and I don't know what the reluctance is,
because I think that as you look at a threat and risk
assessment, that's really an assistance, support tool. And I
would agree with the administration that they really put a lot
into this over the last 2 years, but this has not been a
priority with them as they've gone through it.
The second part of that is, throughout the reporting by
OMB, we really haven't seen how they have sorted out the
priorities for the program. And we too think that relates
directly back to the threat and risk assessments, and until you
have those established linkages it's difficult to determine
what the priority is going to be in the spending and whether or
not, as I mentioned earlier, we've got the moneys going to the
right programs or not.
Mr. Mica. Well, since we're spending an incredible amount
of money on this effort, my other concern becomes a question
about duplication of effort and some of the information we've
been provided sounds a little bit like the Keystone Kops, where
you have agencies that are only duplicating activities or are
tripping over each other and involved in some of the threat
where there is an investigation or something of that nature.
Can you describe to the subcommittee what you see as far as
duplication, as far as this scenario out there of utilization
of agency resources?
Mr. Hinton. Right. As I alluded to in my opening statement,
what we've seen is a rapid growth in a lot of the Federal
programs and activities across a large amount of the programs,
and they all have similar focuses. And at the State and local
level we might be scratching our head and saying well, are they
all helping me or hurting me, because we've got so many coming
at us at one time.
We've seen efforts on the part of the Department of Justice
to set up an office, for example, to help sort through the
number of training programs that are being made available, and
in effect putting a one-stop shopping for those people at the
State and local levels to come to the Federal Government.
I think that would help in terms of mitigating a lot of the
confusion that is out there right now, but as we have watched
the dollars grow, and looked at the number of Federal agencies,
the objectives of the programs, we've seen a lot of overlap,
and it's been in the areas of training, equipment and those
type of things that would be what the first responders would be
using in the event of an incident.
Mr. Mica. What about equipment?
Ms. D'Agostino. The number of equipment programs have also
been growing, notwithstanding the new National Domestic
Preparedness Office. I think they are trying to do some good
things in that office. It's a very new office. The Attorney
General just announced it in November 1998.
I think they need to get underway. But it's not clear how
far that office can go in terms of eliminating or reducing
duplication going on. They can be the store front, as it were,
for the one-stop shop. But it's still not clear to us how
they're going to proceed to actually reduce the number and
rationalize the various programs for training and equipment.
Mr. Mica. So it's sort of----
Ms. D'Agostino. It's just not clear yet how far it's been--
--
Mr. Mica. They spend whatever they want without
rationalization and without any coordination, and this is sort
of an agency by agency spin?
Mr. Hinton. Well, we have a lot of agencies working this
issue right now, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. What about programs, to get back to my question
relating to coordination efforts from the May edict of last
year insofar as the counter-terrorism, the National Coordinator
and their efforts to assist local governments?
You said you don't have much information on that, and you
don't have that?
Mr. Hinton. Right, we have not gotten to that point. That
will be one of the areas we'll be pursuing.
Mr. Mica. Do you know if this coordinator is looking at the
sort of questions that are raised, that of Mr. Clark, relating
to duplication? Is his charter, and not that committee, to look
at many of these overlaps in jurisdiction, equipment?
Mr. Hinton. He's in a very integral role there as a
coordinator. This morning when we received the briefing, there
was a process described to us of how they work together as a
team, OMB and Mr. Clark, to look at potential duplication of
effort, and weed it out.
We have not seen any of that process. We have not seen
examples of that process--of where they have identified the
duplication and how they have constructively dealt with it.
Also, while it's a requirement that that be identified in
the reports that OMB provides up to the Congress annually,
that's one of the areas that we have not seen a discussion of
in the OMB reports as to how they went about it or some of the
areas that they've identified, and how they have dealt with it.
Mr. Mica. But because you have multi-agency jurisdiction,
and jealousies and just the difficulty of getting the things
done, do you think it would be wise to have someone with say,
the equivalent of the drug czar or terrorism czar? I'm not sure
of this National Coordinator has any of those abilities to
coordinate under the Presidential edict.
Do you think there should be something legislative to
consolidate and give some authority and oversight?
Mr. Hinton. I'm not at that point that I think I would
suggest that legislation is needed yet, Mr. Mica. I heard this
morning of how they have been working this issue. It was clear
to me that in dealing with it, it's a leadership issue. I don't
know that legislation is a complete answer.
If you had the right leadership, the right goals, the right
strategy and the teamwork, and if you can set out the
priorities for the program, and I think if you could get the
team working together you can help sort through some of the
duplication.
Our difficulty is we haven't seen how it's worked, yet. We
know there's been a lot of program growth. We've heard this
morning that they've been dealing with some instances of
duplication. We're not sure how that process is working the way
it is currently structured.
Mr. Mica. To your knowledge are there any inter-agency
working agreements in this regard, and if so, where and how
effective do you think they are?
Mr. Hinton. It was described to us this morning that the
inter-agency process is working well.
Mr. Mica. Do they have written formal agreements to that?
Mr. Hinton. They're working on them, and I need to mention
something. We have a report that we delivered to this committee
in December. It's restricted. It deals with that issue. And not
all of the key agreements have been worked out.
Mr. Mica. Is it possible to reveal to the subcommittee
publicly which agencies we're having difficulty with?
Mr. Hinton. No, some of the key areas of this agreement
which have not been resolved involve Justice, FBI, State and
Secret Service.
Mr. Mica. So we really don't have in place effective
working agreements, inter-agency agreements?
Mr. Hinton. On the ones that are cited in our report, they
are some of the key points. But I really can't go into those in
open session.
Mr. Mica. And do you believe that we could do a better job,
and probably some pressure needs to be brought to it?
Mr. Hinton. In the areas that we have reported on, I think
it is critical that they get resolved.
Mr. Mica. Did you have something that you wanted to add?
Ms. D'Agostino. No, I was just going to say that really in
the counter-terrorism area they have done a lot in terms of
putting together operating guidelines. They're still working on
finalizing those, since PDD 39 was issued in 1995. But they
have really done quite a bit of impressive work, and they
should get credit for that. But there are still areas where
they need to work out some rough spots. And it's a big
challenge, it's a huge challenge.
Mr. Mica. Well, I think this hearing reveals that that is
in fact the case, and I don't think anyone in the Congress,
particularly the members of this subcommittee, would hesitate
for a minute to expend whatever funds, provide whatever
resources are necessary to see that we combat terrorism.
I think our major concern is that the dollars that are
expended are expended in a wise, coordinated fashion, and that
we conduct some basic assessment, and that we expend those
moneys in a cost-effective manner.
I think that's the purpose of this whole exercise. I do
thank each of you for your testimony and for providing me with
answers to my questions.
Mr. Chairman, can I yield back to you?
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I just have one last question that
hasn't been asked, and that would be, what would you want to
see in next year's report that you don't see in this year's
report? Has that been asked?
Mr. Hinton. The one that would be coming up from OMB?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Hinton. I think what I would like to see is some
establishment of a process that yields a defined parties with
spending that's going to happen in the program, so that that
would give the Congress and it's authorization and
incorporation rules some sense of where the future priorities
are going to be.
What you have right now is an accumulation, which I think
is very important, that's an important first step to get a
handle on where the money has been going. What it does not show
is what the future is going to hold.
And Mr. Chairman, why I think that is important is that as
you go through and set up programs, when those moneys are made
available, they in effect start an infrastructure, they start
building programs. And once you start them it's sometimes
difficult to turn them off, as we've seen with weapons systems
and those type of things, and we're at some of the critical
junctures in this program right now. And I think that it's
important to make sure we understand what the future holds for
the spending priorities so that you can get a sense of how they
change from year to year.
And that's not in that report right now, and I think it
would be fairly constructive to have that.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Rabkin, did you have anything that you
wanted to share with the committee that you think we should put
on the record?
Mr. Rabkin. It's interesting that the analogy has been
drawn a number of times this morning and this afternoon about
the relationship between the counter-terrorism effort and the
executive branch and Congress and the drug war, and
acknowledging the differences there.
Mr. Mica asked about legislation to require or to set up
mandates and activities for the counter-terrorism czar, if
that's what you want to call Mr. Clark in his position.
The models that have been established for dealing with the
counter-terrorism effort and the drug effort are two different
models. I don't think either one is more effective than the
other, although there are advantages and disadvantages. And I'd
just like to suggest that one of the advantages of the
legislative route that was used by the Congress to establish
the drug czar is specifically defining the responsibilities in
one individual for the oversight, for the coordination of the
activities, for the preparation of the plan, for the reporting
of the budget, and more recently for the establishment of
performance measures.
Right now the counter-terrorism effort is split between the
National Security Coordinator and OMB. I think there would be
some advantage to combine responsibilities to get a strategy
that's typed in the budget and is also tied to performance
measures. They, the agencies, especially at the State and local
level, and the Congress can then understand where they're going
and whether they're making adequate progress with the resources
that would be invested.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Ms. D'Agostino, do you have any
comments before we close?
Ms. D'Agostino. I think another important thing to think
about when you try to think about solutions or whether a czar
is better than a National Security Council Coordinator is
accountability and the insight that Congress gets into where
we're going
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Mica, you have an advantage with
the drug czar that he basically has to report to Congress, he's
works out of the White House, but is he accountable to the
Congress?
Mr. Mica. That's true, but we can also call Mr. Clark in.
The problem is, without legislative authority you sort of just
suggest, how about you guys go out and work on this? He doesn't
have any clout. The problem that I have picked up here is that
we have inter-agency jealousies, and you have everybody going
after as many Federal bucks as you can to buy every gadget they
can. It's not being evaluated on a cost-effective basis or a
risk assessment basis, because that way there is, should we be
spending the bucks there.
It is sort of a grab bag, everybody trying to get what they
can. And if we go out there and see what they're buying, what
stuns me is a lot of the equipment, almost all the equipment I
saw like in Saudi Arabia, is foreign manufactured, and I just
went bananas when I saw a quarter of a trillion dollars being
spent.
Now, some of it may help. Some of it, I don't even know if
it was adaptable in that context to desert use. But I think if
you look at the Department of State with their terrorism
program, and then look at the FBI, the whole thing doesn't
sound like it's coordinated, like we're spending dollars
effectively, like we're targeting--what's most disturbing is
you have their testimony today that OMB is not using a risk
assessment approach, that they target different--and they're a
partner with Clark in this whole decision of what's going on
and where the bucks go.
So it needs some very thorough further examination in my
estimation, and I would hope to get Clark in here. There are
great questions about what has been done as far as his hard
actions to work with the agencies, and then I just heard there
are inter-agency agreements that are critical to this whole
thing that have not come together. I think DOD, Department of
Justice, FBI are a few that are more disturbing, and I think at
the Department of State, we have a lack of not only
cooperation, but direction, and a lack of financial
responsibility, lack of accountability, lack of using standards
that are appropriate for the expenditures of targeting taxpayer
dollars.
Other than that, everything looks fine!
Mr. Hinton. Actually, the irony is that we have made some
progress, so that tells you the state of affairs.
Mr. Mica. If you spend enough money you can make progress.
Mr. Hinton. Mr. Chairman I think it is very important to
recognize the accomplishments on two fronts. And Congress was
instrumental in having OMB do the annual reporting, what we're
spending, that was a key first step. I think the Attorney
General's 5-year report, where the agencies are going in terms
of combatting terrorism is another significant step that has
come, that's a very significant effort.
When you look across the universe of agencies that have
been involved in that, and thinking out a broad strategy, it's
bogged right now, but there's going to be something that is
going to evolve as we heard this morning as they fine-tune it.
And I think and even designating Mr. Clark, even though he
doesn't have a lot of authority to direct the agencies, that
too was a step. It's a step, Mr. Mica, that we took in the case
of the drug area, too, many years ago, and to where we've got
now, where we have a strategy, we've got measurable goals.
We're seeing some of that come out in the Attorney
General's report, too.
Mr. Shays. So you would argue that the drug czar model may
be a model that we might want to suggest for this position?
Mr. Hinton. Mr. Chairman, I think it's one model that's out
there. There may be others, and as we do our work and we can
look at what works and what doesn't work, I think that that's
something we can continue to discuss. And I think as we look
over this area that's very important, because right now, as I
mentioned earlier, while there have been significant steps that
have been taken by the executive branch to deal with this
issue, there are some key agreements that have not been fully
resolved.
It's the subject of a report that was delivered to this
committee in December that's restricted. And I think that's
very important in this very significant area.
Mr. Shays. I thank you. If there is no further business to
come before this subcommittee, I want to thank the witnesses
again for their participation, for their assistance and
testimony today.
This meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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