[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING THE DRUG THREAT ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 24, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-135
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
66-078 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
BOB BARR, Georgia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
DOUG OSE, California JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Sharon Pinkerton, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gilbert Macklin, Professional Staff Member
Carson Nightwine, Professional Staff Member
Lisa Wandler, Clerk
Cherri Branson, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 24, 1999............................... 1
Statement of:
Fiano, Richard, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Department of Justice; Dorian Anderson,
Commander, Joint Task Force Six, Department of Defense;
Michael Pearson, Executive Associate for Field Operations,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of
Justice, accompanied by Gus De La Vina, chief, U.S. Border
Patrol; and Samuel Banks, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs
Service, Department of the Treasury........................ 93
McCaffrey, Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy............................................. 9
Rodriguez, Raul, Lieutenant, Metro Task Force, Nogales, AZ;
Dennis Usrey, Director, Southwest Border High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area, San Diego, CA; and Tony Castaneda,
chief of police, Eagle Pass, TX............................ 54
Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
Anderson, Dorian, Commander, Joint Task Force Six, Department
of Defense, prepared statement of.......................... 111
Banks, Samuel, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service,
Department of the Treasury, prepared statement of.......... 139
Castaneda, Tony, chief of police, Eagle Pass, TX, prepared
statement of............................................... 84
Fiano, Richard, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Department of Justice, prepared statement
of......................................................... 97
McCaffrey, Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, prepared statement of...................... 17
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 5
Pearson, Michael, Executive Associate for Field Operations,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of
Justice, prepared statement of............................. 121
Rodriguez, Raul, Lieutenant, Metro Task Force, Nogales, AZ,
prepared statement of...................................... 56
Usrey, Dennis, Director, Southwest Border High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area, San Diego, CA, prepared statement of..... 68
EXAMINING THE DRUG THREAT ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Mica
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Mica, Barr, Ros-Lehtinen, Souder,
Hutchinson, Ose, Mink, and Kucinich.
Also present from the House Border Caucus: Representatives
Bilbray, Kolbe, and Reyes.
Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief
counsel; Gilbert Macklin and Carson Nightwine, professional
staff members; Charley Diaz, congressional fellow; Lisa
Wandler, clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Earley
Green, minority staff assistant.
Mr. Mica. Good morning. I would like to call this meeting
to order. This morning our Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources is going to review some of the
problems relating to our U.S. Southwest border, examining the
threat among our various activities in regard to illegal
narcotics control.
I am going to open the subcommittee hearing this morning
with an opening statement. We want to go ahead and get started
because we will have votes this morning, and will be joined by
various Members, and I will recognize them as they come in. But
we do have the Director of our Office of National Drug Control
Policy and other witnesses. I think we have three panels today
that we want to hear from, and so we do want to proceed.
This morning our subcommittee is holding this oversight
hearing to examine our Federal policy to combat the flow of
illegal drugs and illegal aliens across our Southwest border.
The importance and difficulties of this mission are in fact
enormous. The Southwest border is the most active border in the
world. It is estimated that almost 4 million trucks, 100
million cars, and a quarter billion persons cross the border
annually through more than three dozen entry points.
From a law enforcement perspective, control of the U.S.
border in this area is becoming more and more elusive. Evidence
of the problem mounts every day. We have been told that in 1998
the U.S. Customs Service alone seized almost 32,000 pounds of
cocaine, 850,000 pounds of marijuana, and 407 pounds of heroin
along the Southwest border. Furthermore, the implementation of
NAFTA has made it easier for drug traffickers and those
entering the United States illegally to use the cover provided
by legitimate cross-border commerce and normal traffic.
It is estimated that up to 70 percent of the cocaine, 50
percent of the marijuana, and more than 20 percent of the
heroin in the United States now comes across the Southwest
border. Eventually, these drugs end up in our cities, in our
schools, businesses, and homes throughout the United States.
A recent DEA report indicates, ``It is now common to find
hundreds of traffickers from Mexico, many of them illegal
aliens, established in communities like Boise, Des Moines,
Omaha, Charlotte, and Kansas City, distributing multi-pound
quantities of methamphetamine.''
This border has also become the crossing point for an
incredible amount of methamphetamines that we have found
throughout the United States in various hearings that we have
conducted of this subcommittee.
The correlation between a loose border and human misery in
this country is obvious. With the Southwest border now
representing a major factor in the illegal trafficking of drugs
into this country, and with 14,000 drug-related deaths
occurring each year in the United States, our control of the
Southwest border represents a significant national security
threat.
The statistics on drug use, particularly among our young
people, is a constant worry in every American community for
every parent, and for every Member of Congress. Heroin use is
continuing to rise dramatically. Drug overdoses and deaths
continue to plague our metropolitan areas, our suburbs, and our
schools. Among our 12th graders, more than 50 percent of them
have tried an illicit drug, and more than one in every four may
be current users.
The statistics, too, as I point out often on the House
floor, relating to heroin production in Mexico, should be a
warning sign to everyone. Once a small producer of heroin,
Mexico now is the source of a much larger percentage of the
heroin consumed in the United States. That heroin then travels
across this border into our communities.
As chairman of this subcommittee and a close observer for
decades of our efforts to combat the scourge of drugs, I am
particularly concerned about our law enforcement strategy and
its implementation along our Southwest border. Congress has
poured substantial moneys into Southwest border initiatives to
combat drug trafficking and the entry of illegal aliens across
that border.
Today, it is critical that we examine the results of these
efforts and review our plans for the future. Are we making
progress, or are we losing ground? What more should we do? The
entry of illegal aliens and the border crossings of drug
traffickers must be stopped.
Since 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
budget has increased from approximately $1.5 billion to nearly
$4 billion. During the same period, INS staff grew from
approximately 17,000 to more than 28,000 full-time employees,
as of June 1999. Today, INS is the largest Federal law
enforcement agency in the U.S. Government.
Our subcommittee needs to know how this increase in funding
and staffing has slowed illegal immigration and illegal border
crossings, activities that result in more drugs, more crime,
more negative economic and social impacts on both our States
and our communities.
The Border Patrol has grown from 4,000 to 8,000 agents in 5
years. Where are these agents, and what are they doing? Are
they in the right places and assigned to the right tasks?
We have numerous agencies represented here today involved
in our Southwest border efforts. How effectively do they
communicate and share information? The administration has
suggested that a strong bilateral approach to law enforcement
with Mexico is necessary to achieve our mutual interests in
controlling our border and protecting our citizens. What
evidence is there that Mexico today is cooperating fully with
our efforts? How many drug cartels responsible for cross-border
trafficking have been dismantled? How many continue to operate?
Today, we will hear more about what the administration is
attempting to do, as well as the efforts of local law
enforcement officials who enforce laws daily along the
Southwest border.
Still, we must face certain irrefutable facts: increasing
and dramatic amounts of illegal narcotics are still coming
through this border from Mexico. They are ending up on American
streets. These drugs, and those who traffic in them, spread and
finance gang violence, destroy young lives, and undermine our
communities and the quality of life.
We have with us today law enforcement representatives from
local, regional, and Federal organizations who will tell us
more about these growing challenges. I am also pleased today
that we have with us a number of my colleagues in Congress,
particularly those who have worked with the Congressional
Border Caucus, who, are committed to addressing these
challenges and threats. I welcome their continued efforts and
support in this area, and I also welcome their participation in
this hearing.
Earlier this year, the ranking member and I led a
delegation to the Southwest border of the United States. We did
see in February, firsthand, some of the challenges that we
face. I can assure you that we do have some major problems.
Also, in a hearing and meetings that we conducted there, we
also heard of disorganization, lack of cooperation, and a
general disarray of our U.S. agency activities to bring our
borders and, again, drug trafficking under control.
We believe that we must move immediately to address these
problems more effectively. This is not a partisan issue. This
is not a Republican or Democrat issue. This is an issue that
faces our Congress very squarely as a challenge we must meet
together.
I must say that I am pleased with the announcement 2 days
ago just before this hearing that a major drug bust was
conducted along the Southwest border. I believe this operation
was called ``Operation Impunity.'' Still, it appears that such
busts should be a matter of routine if we are to fulfill our
border control responsibilities.
I must ask our witnesses: Are we going to see more of these
enforcement activities, and how soon? We strongly support these
efforts, and we want them to continue.
The protection of our citizens, the enforcement of our
immigration laws and policies, and putting a halt to border
trafficking in illegal narcotics, and the protection of our
territorial sovereignty are among the issues that we will
discuss today. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, as
we seek a better understanding of our border control efforts
and the national priority that it must represent.
I am pleased now to recognize our ranking member, the
gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. Mink.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6078.003
Mrs. Mink. I thank the chairman for convening this hearing.
As he indicated, several of us traveled the early part of this
year on an extensive investigation and inquiry as to not only
the trafficking of these drugs across the border, but the
extent to which we are really exerting the maximum energies,
expertise, and technology in interdicting the drugs that are
coming across the border.
And as we indicated at the time that we made the stopover
at the border, we were going to continue to investigate this
matter. So I welcome the convening of this hearing today, and I
look forward to the testimony of the witnesses that have been
called to testify. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I am also pleased to recognize for any opening
comment Mr. Reyes, the gentleman from El Paso, TX, also a
member of the Armed Services and Veterans Affairs Committees,
and active in these Southwest border issues. Mr. Reyes, you are
recognized.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I, too,
would like to echo my colleague's appreciation for calling this
hearing; and more than that, for calling attention to a very
serious issue that affects not just border communities, but our
whole country.
I also want to commend you for the diversity of the
witnesses this morning. And as you may or may not know, I spent
26\1/2\ years, prior to coming to Congress, as a border patrol
agent, the last 13 as a chief, both in south Texas and in El
Paso. I am pleased to see a number of my former colleagues that
are going to be offering testimony here this morning.
So I think this is certainly a step in the right direction.
There are a lot of things that we need to focus in on to help
our various law enforcement agencies, among the local, the
State, and the Federal level, to work together, to coordinate,
and ultimately, to make the streets of America safer. So I
appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. And thank you again for joining us
this morning.
I am pleased now to turn to our panels. We have our first
panel of one individual who is key to this entire effort, who
probably has the most difficult responsibility of anyone in
this administration for any assignment, and that is trying to
bring together our national effort on drug control policy.
He has done an outstanding job in trying to pull together
various activities that are so crucial. Among them, of course,
is trying to bring our agencies and the local governments,
States, and other efforts together into some coherent effort to
bring drug trafficking and the borders under control. So we are
pleased to welcome the Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, General Barry McCaffrey, back to our
subcommittee.
General, as you know, this is an investigations and
oversight subcommittee. If you would, please stand and be
sworn.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Mica. Thank you, and welcome back, General. We are
pleased to recognize you for your statements in regard to this
issue before the subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF BARRY R. McCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL POLICY
General McCaffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative
Mink and Congressman Silvestre Reyes who has been a tremendous
leader and example and a source of wisdom on this issue.
We have welcomed the chance to appear before Congress to
discuss the Southwest border. It has generated a very useful
review of ``Where are we?'' I think the subsequent panels will,
obviously, flesh out our view. What I will offer, if I may, is
a few short minutes of formal remarks: First of all, I would
like to place in the record our written statement. Mr. Pancho
Kinney from my office has pulled together throughout the
administration, from law enforcement, from the State
Department, from the Department of Defense, our best views on
the current state of affairs. So I offer those.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, the entire statement will be
made part of the record.
General McCaffrey. Also, Mr. Chairman, I have asked my
staff--particularly Mr. Joe Peters, who is our Acting Director
of State and Local Affairs--to go through our own
organizational concepts and offer for you and your staff and
your committee members the organizing documents that we have in
play.
First of all, you have in your packet the aspects of the
``strategy'' which we submitted for congressional consideration
in 1999 that relate to the Southwest border. That is what we
are trying to do, what we wrote in the strategy.
I have also extracted from the ``Performance Measures of
Effectiveness'' how we say we are going to assess how well we
are doing. And so these PMEs, which are really only a ``C-
minus'' state of execution right now, will be the organizing
way in which I try and monitor the compliance of my Federal
partners with this ``strategy.''
You also have in your packet the ``threat assessment.'' As
you know, Dennis Usrey, our Southwest border HIDTA Director, is
here. This is local, State, and Federal law enforcement's
viewpoint along the five Southwest border HIDTAs on the threat
they face. We are going to be updating this this coming winter,
but this is now the picture we see of where these criminal
organizations are trying to penetrate the Southwest border.
Two documents I think--first of all, they are a compliment
to the Congress--come from my own Center for Technology
Assessment. I have one document, ``Southwest Border Technology
Interest Areas,'' and the other one, ``The Counter Drug
Technology Transfer Program.''
Congress has put a significant amount of money into this
effort--I would argue, not yet enough--in which we are trying
to give local and State law enforcement throughout the United
States in this case, I will address the Southwest border some
of the tools that they can use to more effectively protect the
American people. I think it is a well regarded program, and one
you may wish to question your later witnesses about.
Two final documents, if I may: One is an attempt to capture
in a snapshot form Mexican achievements in the counter-
narcotics arena. And we have just given you some insights into
where we are now. Of course, we have a formal assessment we
will have completed by February 2000, but this gives you an
update from my last written input to your committee.
The final document is ``Counter Drug Intelligence
Architecture Review.'' The Congress asked me in the law to look
at the connection between U.S. intelligence collection and
support for law enforcement on the drug issue. This has been a
brutally painful and extended debate inside the administration.
There is a thicket of U.S. laws that we had to take into
account as we went about this analysis. They are sort of
obvious. You do not want to take your foreign intelligence
collection system and jeopardize it by putting in play sources
and methods in a Federal court hearing that might betray a
program that cost us millions of dollars and years to develop.
And conversely, you cannot afford to have your intelligence
system in any way violating U.S. Federal protection of privacy
of U.S. citizens.
But we have completed this process. The Attorney General,
the CIA Director, and I have agreed on the outcome. All other
Federal actors took part in it. We are going to now try and set
up a sensible, three-tier way of dealing with the intelligence
support responsibility we have to local and State law
enforcement in particular. And I would argue that currently it
is completely inadequate. We have the best intelligence system
in the world; but at the end of the day, it does not connect
effectively to law enforcement leadership.
Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just take note of some of
the witnesses who are in the room, as well as others who are
listening. We welcome the presence today of Samuel Martinez,
who is the executive committee member of the Hispanic-American
Police Commanders Association. Second, Mr. Al Zapanta,
President and CEO of the United States-Mexico Chamber of
Commerce, who has been an enormous help to me throughout the
last several years.
And finally, Mr. Jim Polly, director of government affairs,
the National District Attorneys Association.
And I mention him in particular, because it is obvious to
most of us who have studied this issue that we have a
responsibility to have a balanced system approach to the
border. And where we put resources in one area--for example,
the Border Patrol--but we do not have a corresponding support
mechanism to ensure that local prosecuting attorneys and local
law enforcement have the resources they need, we will break the
system. And so we very much welcome the involvement of the
National Sheriffs Association, the National District Attorneys,
and others.
My staff also had an extended meeting yesterday, and I had
an excellent session this morning, with representatives from
all five of our Southwest border HIDTAs. I would argue this is
one of the best programs that Congress has put together and
then supported financially in the last several years.
As you know, when we started this program in 1992, there
were five total HIDTAs. Now there are 31. You have given me the
resources we need to provide modest but effective support to
these efforts. So this morning I had a meeting with the
supervisor, David Torres, of the California Bureau of Narcotics
Enforcement; Lieutenant Jim Burns, from the California
Sheriff's Office, Imperial County; New Mexico HIDTA Sheriff
John Lee, sheriff of Otero County, who I found enormously
helpful in developing my own thinking. You have appearing as a
witness Director Dennis Usrey, who possesses great experience.
He is our director of the entire Southwest border HIDTA effort.
And Lieutenant Raul Rodriguez, who will also be one of your
witnesses, is a metro task force commander out of Nogales, AZ.
He has done this his entire adult life, and knows what he is
talking about when it comes to the support he expects to see.
Finally, again, we are grateful for the National Guard
Bureau support across the entire Southwest border, and Colonel
John Mosby, director of NGB Counterdrug Programs, was also part
of my preparation for this hearing.
Let me, if I may, start again by taking into account the
``National Drug Strategy.'' You have increased funding for the
``strategy'' in 4 budget years, from $13.5 billion to $17.8
billion. And a lot of that--thankfully--a 55 percent increase
went into prevention and education. The heart of this
``strategy,'' clearly, is goal No. 1: How do we minimize the
number of American adolescents who are exposed to gateway drug-
taking behavior?
You have given us a 26 percent increase in funding in 4
years for goal No.'s 2 and 3, relating to dealing with the 6
percent of us, the 13 million Americans, who are abusing drugs;
and in particular, the 4 million of us who are chronically
addicted.
In today's hearing you are asking me to focus in on goal
No. 4: How do we more effectively shield America's air, land,
and sea frontiers from the drug threat? And clearly, the
biggest threat to our defense against illegal narcotics still
comes across this enormous Southwest border, the biggest open
border on the face of the Earth.
Now, let me give you the bottom line. Mr. Chairman, in
1997, I reported to the President, ``Our current interdiction
efforts almost completely failed to achieve our purpose of
reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines
across the border.'' I went on to argue, ``We need to shift
from a manpower, physical inspection approach to one that is
intelligence driven and that employs emerging technologies to
conduct non-intrusive searches.''
My fundamental assessment has not changed. I believe we are
moving in the right direction. The resources you have given us
are being gainfully employed. The manpower is beginning to take
effect. But we have not yet achieved our purpose of
significantly reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and
methamphetamines across the border.
As you mentioned, it remains a principal threat. Some 55
percent of the drugs in the United States pass through the
Central American-Mexico corridor, and then across the United
States, generally speaking, by land, although some of it by
air.
Clearly, we have an enormous problem, and I have a little
chart that gives you a snapshot of it. We have a huge effort.
This is a $2 billion program, 11,000 Federal officers. It is
largely an open border; 1 percent of it is fenced. Much of it
is water that is easily crossed. A lot of it is remote, rugged
land area which is barely marked.
There are innumerable places where you can drive unimpeded
across that border with four-wheel-drive vehicles. And we are
facing people who have been smuggling across that border
literally for generations, and who know the terrain and are
willing to employ violence to achieve their purpose. So that is
the challenge as we look at it.
We also note, favorably, the 100 million Mexicans to our
south, are our second-largest trading partner on the face of
the Earth. So we are trying to sort out criminal activity from
among 278 million people crossing that border a year, 86
million cars, 4 million trucks and rail cars. That is the
challenge that is summarized on this chart.
Now, how are we doing? I would say, if you look back over
the last 4 years in which I have been studying the issue: Not
very well. When you look at inspection of trucks and rail cars,
which is essentially where a lot of this illegal cargo is
concealed, if you try and get at it with physical searches,
with downloading 18-wheelers of frozen food cargo, of drilling
holes in the wall, of inspecting it manually, of looking for
other intelligence tips and then trying to pull aside the right
vehicle out of these millions of POVs and rail cars: It simply
will not work. In 1997, six truck or rail cars found with
cocaine; in 1996, 16. There is just no reason why brute force
will solve the problem.
We do believe that the technology--and I am going to talk
about this--that you have deployed to the border will change
the shape of the smuggling envelope. So I think that and the
intelligence program, which are moving ahead, are going to make
this a quite different viewpoint from the criminal organization
effective in the coming years.
Now, if you will, let me also note that Congress recognized
the problem 2 years ago. You instructed me in the 1999 Omnises
Appropriations Act to study the problem, along with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General; a review to
include consideration of all Federal agencies' coordination
with State and local law enforcement agencies, and to report
back to you. We are going to comply with that law.
I have tasked the Interdiction Committee, which is chaired
by Mr. Ray Kelly, the Customs Director--who I would argue is
one of the best cops we have had in this country--to put
together a comprehensive assessment of counterdrug efforts
along the Southwest border, and present for inter-agency
consideration an operational concept, a force structure, and a
coordination mechanism that will address the issue.
Let me also tell you that we are aware that you have given
us significantly enhanced resources. Just taking snapshots of
what has happened in the last 4 years: You have upped the
Customs budget for Southwest border programs by 72 percent. You
have increased DEA special agents that we have been able to
assign down there by a third. You have increased INS agents
since fiscal year 1993 by more than 100 percent. We have
doubled. The DOD drug control budget for the Southwest border
has gone up 53 percent. The number of U.S. attorneys has gone
up by 80 percent. So the manpower is starting to come online to
get a handle on this problem.
I would argue, even more importantly, you have given us
non-intrusive inspection technologies. And a lot of this
material is new. It has only been down there in the last year
or two. Until it is at all 39 border crossings, we are not
going to have presented a wall of resistance to drug smuggling.
But you do have eight fixed truck x-ray sites, and two mobile
truck sites, and one fixed gamma-ray inspection system now
deployed.
There are other efforts that we are now undergoing. And by
the way, let me, if I may, quickly put in context that although
Mexico is where the drugs, 55 percent of them, we say cross our
frontier, that is not where a lot of it starts. If you want to
find the center of gravity of the drug problem, it is Colombia,
as you so well brought out in the last hearing we had here.
Eighty percent of the cocaine that enters America
originated in, or transited through, Colombia. Probably, 70
percent or so of the heroin that we seized--and I underscore
``seized''--originated in Colombia. And a good bit of the rest
of it in Mexico, especially in the western half of the United
States.
I underscore seizures because I think the percentage is
that high because of good police work by the DEA and Customs in
particular, and the Coast Guard, because it represents that
higher proportion of the total heroin use. But they have
focused on it.
There is the picture that evolves. The Defense Intelligence
Agency does the cocaine flow analysis for us. I believe we now
know what we are talking about, as we watch the movement of
cocaine and heroin from the production area, through the
transit area, into the arrival area. That picture is updated
formally every 6 months.
Here is where we seized the drugs, and we get a lot of it.
We should never disregard the impact of moving out of public
consumption, literally, hundreds of tons of drugs:
methamphetamines, heroin, marijuana, et cetera. Here is where
it comes in. The Southwest border, as you are looking at it,
accounts for half the drug seizures we make with Federal
authorities.
A huge problem: What is the most dangerous drug problem in
America? It is an American adolescent, probably in the 7th
grade through about the 10th grade, who is involved in heavy
use of marijuana, alcohol, and other drugs, inhalants, heroin,
et cetera. We should not disregard the enormous destructive
impact of significant use rates of cannabinoids in our society,
and it is coming across the Southwest border. Some of it does
not originate there. It comes out of Colombia or elsewhere; but
it is crossing the border in record amounts. When you look at
the seizure rates, it is almost unbelievable.
Methamphetamines: Arguably, the most destructive drug that
we have ever seen in America. It started as a sort of a niche
market, West Coast biker drug. It is now all across the
country. It is a huge problem, obviously, in the Western
States. It is now probably the major drug problem in the
central part of America and it has hit the East Coast. It is
all over Georgia and other places.
It is tremendously addictive and destructive of human
development. It creates people who are extremely dangerous, in
particular to law enforcement authorities. And unfortunately,
it can be manufactured easily. The recipe is on the Internet.
The compounds are available in many pharmaceutical houses, and
it is being manufactured all over the United States.
Literally, 2,000-some-odd cooking operations were taken
down in the last 18 months. Now, a lot of these are ``Beavis
and Butthead labs'': a few grams, people cooking for their own
use, for their friends. But it is an enormously destructive
drug, not only to the individual using it, but to the family
that is associated with its use or cooking, and to law
enforcement authorities, and to the ecology.
And there are two major methamphetamine producing locations
on the face of the Earth. One is Mexico; the other is
California. It is also, of course, throughout the Midwest. And
now it is showing up in Georgia and other places. That is where
the seizures are.
Then heroin, finally: Although seizures are constant, that
is more a reflection of the cunning of these criminal
organizations, with this enormously valuable cargo. Heroin
availability in the United States has never been greater.
Purity has never been higher. The price is low, and American
adolescents are unaware of the addictive and destructive
potential of heroin, even when snorted or ingested.
A lot of our youngsters think that if you are not injecting
it, it could not be all that dangerous--And correspondingly, we
have seen in your district among others, an enormous death rate
among American kids from this very potent form of heroin.
Finally, let me mention that we do have a series of
initiatives that we are now working in the inter-agency
process. There has been some first-rate cooperation,
particularly Donnie Marshall and DEA, the INS team along the
border, Ray Kelly in Customs, and others, and all the law
enforcement agencies involved.
The HIDTA program, which Dennis Usrey will talk to you
about, has been a great payoff. I would make one point, if I
may, Mr. Chairman. These five Southwest border HIDTAs tend to
be in areas with extremely low population density. A lot of
Americans do not live there. So a local sheriff's department or
police department has modest resources at their disposal.
As we find a major threat to the entire 270 million of us
developing along the border, I would argue we need to provide
Federal resources to back up these local and State authorities,
because they are acting on behalf of all of us as a law
enforcement shield on that border. And they are simply being
overwhelmed.
When I say that, I do not mean just the sheriff's
department. I also mean the prosecutor, the local detention
facilities, et cetera. Our prosecutorial guidelines now, with
this level of drug smuggling, have gone up to the point where,
literally, at 500 pounds of marijuana and below this is a
``Turn it over to State and local authorities'' situation. We
are going to have to provide them meaningful levels of support.
I am going to ask Congress to seriously consider substantial
increases in funding for the five Southwest border HIDTAs.
Bullet No. 2, the Border Coordination Initiative, you will
learn more about this by talking to Treasury and Justice
representatives. The BCI initiative is an attempt to get 23
Federal agencies and four major departments of government to
operate more coherently at the border. It took two of those
departments, Treasury and Justice, and gave them coequal
coordinators and a plan to manage their affairs at the 24 ports
of entry.
I applaud the initiative. I think it is going to be
extremely helpful. But I must be unequivocal in saying it is an
inadequate approach to providing a coherent Federal management
response, in my judgment, either at the POEs, in the four
border States, or across the border in general.
One of the major failures is it still does not give local
and State law enforcement a single point of contact in their
sector that they can go to and expect to get intelligence
support and operational responses. And I think, if you talk to
local law enforcement, which I do up and down that border
continuously, they feel our efforts in support of their very
courageous defense of their own counties is inadequate.
Now, that even includes things like intelligence. We have
the best intelligence in the world now coming online at EPIC,
the El Paso Intelligence Center. But it does not connect
reliably to sheriffs and police chiefs along that 2,000-mile
border.
No. 3, the Port and Border Security Initiative: That is up,
and moving forward. I think it is going to have a big payoff.
The bottom line is, use technology cued into intelligence, and
you will find the drugs. There are some spectacular successes,
particularly at the Miami port of entry; New York; Eagle Pass,
TX; El Paso--some really excellent work going on.
We have talked about harnessing technology. I think
Congress is giving us the tools to do our job now.
Drug control cooperation with Mexico: It is going to be a
challenge; there is no question. I have included in your packet
the ``U.S.-Mexico Drug Cooperation Strategy.'' We are working
closely with Attorney General Madrazo, with Minister Cervantes.
There are extraditions taking place. There have been nine this
year for murder, drug related crimes, et cetera. They are
trying to create a new counterdrug police agency. They have put
their own efforts into a vetting system, so that their agents
are polygraphed, drug tested, and financially over-watched.
But having said that, it is clear to all of us that this is
a generational effort for Mexico to create law enforcement
agencies and a criminal justice system that is responsive to
their own needs. They are doing a lot better, when you talk to
these law enforcement officers, in cooperating with U.S.
authorities on murder, or cross-border car theft. But when it
comes to drugs, the money and violence associated with drugs is
so intense that it provides a special limitation on our ability
to work across that border.
The counterdrug architecture, bullet No. 6, refers to
intelligence coordination inside U.S. ranks. I think we are
moving in the right direction. We have some more work to do,
but I think now, between Director Tenent, Attorney General
Reno, and I, we do have a scheme to move forward and be more
responsive to our law enforcement counterparts.
Finally, I think we ought to expect a lot out of public-
private partnership. At the end of the day, we encourage the
cross-border economic traffic. So you can have trusted
travelers, trusted corporations, who invest in their own
counterdrug programs at the factory site: that the inspection
process is understood to take into account not just crossing
the border, but from the time that truck is loaded in Mexico,
all the way to its delivery point; and that you have technology
now that will allow these vehicles to cross the border with
machine-read license plates, with registered drivers; and where
the corporation puts at risk this very good economic
opportunity if they are caught not searching out and preventing
drug smuggling. I think we are going to see a lot come out of
this in the future, where business will be asked to pay for the
enhanced economic cross-border activity.
Finally, this is just a summary of some of the inspection
systems that are going into place. I think they are beginning
to pay off. But again, what the drug criminal organizations are
doing is reading the battlefield with enormous effectiveness.
When we do something that does not work, they ignore us. When
we do something that does work, they adapt. And what they are
doing now is going around the systems we are putting into
place. That does not mean they are not working; they are. But
it does mean that there will have to be a seamless web, not
based on raw manpower, but on intelligence and technology up
and down this border.
There are some holes in this entire system. We still, in my
view, have inadequate support to some sub-elements of the
system. One of them is the U.S. Marshals Service. They are
handling enormously increased requirements now based on drug
smuggling, and I do not believe they have the manpower or the
Federal transfer centers to support this Southwest border
effort. We are going to have to think very carefully about
that.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to
appear before your committee, and I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCaffrey follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you, General, for your statement and
testimony. A couple of questions, if I may. First of all, one
of the points that you raised was that there was not a point of
contact for the local officials, local and State officials. We
have many Federal agencies involved in this effort, and we do
have the problem of the lack of someone, say, in charge. Who
would you recommend be in charge? If not you, then who? How
would you structure this?
When we were at the Southwest border, we heard problems of
lack of communication, lack of coordination, and complaints
about inter-agency turf wars. It seemed like there was no one
in charge. You said that there is no point of contact for local
officials to go. It appears that the Federal agencies are in
disarray, with a lack of coordination, and each operating
independently. How could we better structure this to put
somebody in charge of these efforts?
Also, we have this HIDTA structure. We have a number of
HIDTAs along there. Should it be based around those efforts?
But again, somebody in charge, or somebody coordinating this
massive effort: Is it possible, and how should we do that?
General McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, one of the interesting
aspects, when you start looking at the problem, there is
something floating around called the ``Burkhalter Report,
1988,'' done for Vice President George Bush. It is not a bad
snapshot of the problems. We are working on the same problems
today in 1999.
I do not think there is any particular magic to this. And
let me again reiterate, just in the 4-years I have been
privileged to watch this process, we have more resources, more
technology, better intelligence, better coordination among
Federal law enforcement, and better coordination across that
border. I would argue it is still inadequate.
And although I think it is a weak analogy, I would almost
suggest, we went a couple of hundred years in the military
service of the United States where no one had the authority to
coordinate the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, until
Congress passed a law and told us to do it. So I would argue
for----
Mr. Mica. So are you recommending--And again, we are
looking for solutions. Maybe we need to pass a law that says
there must be a joint approach that someone is in charge. Would
you do that on a unified basis across the board, or in
divisions, or a combination, so that there is some structure?
The problem is, again, you have a half-dozen, maybe a
dozen, Federal agencies, local efforts, National Guard: again,
just multiple partners and participants, but nobody really in
charge. Plus, your focus has been to improve technology and
intelligence. We are doing both, and I think we are making some
progress in that area. But we have a mass of people that we
have sent to this border, and they seem to be all going off in
their own direction--and again, lack of some structure.
Again, any specific recommendation as to how you tier this
structure and organize it?
General McCaffrey. I would like to offer a couple of
comments. First of all, what I would not try and do is start
over and create a single border agency for the U.S. Government.
It cannot be done. We would waste years fighting with each
other. So I would recognize that there will be, and should be,
separate Customs Service, INS, DEA, et cetera, with their own
budgets, manpower, unions, et cetera.
The second thing is, I would not assert that we need
operational direction at the border; that is, somebody in
command of the DEA-Customs investigations, et cetera. Law
enforcement and prosecution, particularly through the HIDTA, do
extremely well pulling together complementary investigations.
I do believe the problem is that there is no coordinator
for any given POE or any sector of the border for Federal
authorities. I still go to a border crossing, and I get a
brilliant briefing by the port chiefs for the Customs Service,
the INS, the Department of Agriculture, and anyone else who is
there, the National Guard Bureau, et cetera. There ought to be
a coordinator. In my view, that should be the U.S. Customs
Service. Because primarily, what we have at the POE are
millions of people and vehicles with the economic vitality of
these two huge nations at stake.
In sectors of the border, it seems to many of us that the
Border Patrol is the obvious logical actor to coordinate
Federal law enforcement efforts, and to do so in cooperation
with Mexican authorities. We have thousands of National Guard
troops out there, engineers, military intelligence, supporting
the effort. The Department of Interior, Transportation, and
other Federal agencies have huge responsibilities. Somebody has
to coordinate it.
And then finally, I have argued that El Paso already has
Joint Task Force Six. You are going to have Brigadier General
Dorian Anderson, one of our better soldiers we have on active
duty. That is where we coordinate military support. We have
EPIC there, the intelligence center. We have ``Operation
Alliance'' there, where we try and broker law enforcement
demands on the feds. A lot of the activity is there. I think
there ought to be a border coordinator for counterdrug
activities.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. One final question. You have
mentioned--well, we talked about cooperation among our agencies
and local officials and that structure. One of the other
elements of this has been--and the Administration has put an
emphasis on it--cooperation among and with Mexican officials
along the border.
I am really concerned, dismayed, at recent reports I have
had as recently as the last week, for example, along the Baja
Peninsula. It appears that that State or province has basically
been taken over by narcotraffickers, that the situation is
basically out of control as far as corruption. There have been
hundreds of deaths. And the corruption runs from the lowest
level to the highest level.
I am also concerned even with reports we have had in the
last week. This Mario Mossieau, who committed suicide, he
implicated, I guess, in his suicide note that even the
Presidency of Mexico may be compromised. We have had testimony
from a Customs official to that effect in a prior hearing that
we had.
Are we able to deal with these folks at all in some efforts
to make some meaningful cooperation? Or are we dealing with the
drug dealers and narcoterrorists at every level with Mexico
today?
General McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I think what
we ought to do is watch what people do, not what they say. What
we are trying to do is achieve the best possible defense of the
American people by working with Mexican actors who we think are
producing results for us.
I think it is unarguable that when we deal with the Mexican
Attorney General, with Mr. Mario Herran, who is the head of
their counterdrug law enforcement effort, when we deal with the
Minister of Defense and others, they are cooperating. There are
actors who we can talk to and share intelligence with, and we
are doing just that.
Concerning the Mexicans, clearly, their people are getting
murdered and kidnapped and brutally tortured. They are fighting
back. When we pulled ``Operation Impunity''--one brilliant
piece of work by Customs, DEA, and others, with the FBI
involved in it--we did work with Mexican authorities during
that investigation. As you know, they seized more than 12 tons
of cocaine, $20 million, tons of marijuana, and arrested almost
100 people. And we were able to keep that one reasonably close
hold.
We have watched the Mexican Navy arrest at sea with two
gigantic cocaine seizures. That is a fact. They have done that.
We have watched the Mexican Army and police on their southern
border, which is where they are putting their x-ray machines,
down on their Guatemalan-Belize border. They have bought a
couple of hundred small boats, and they are trying to seal off
from the south entrance to Mexico.
I think they are serious about it. Now, at the same time,
it has never been more dangerous inside Mexico or on that
border for United States law enforcement and Mexican law
enforcement. One of the officers this morning told me the
Mexican smugglers now get murdered if they do not get through.
So these people and their families are at risk, they are armed,
and they are dangerous. They are dangerous to the Beta Group in
the south on the Mexican side of the border, and they are
dangerous to our law enforcement officers. And we are losing
local and Federal law enforcement officers.
So I think it is a very challenging situation. But, yes,
the Mexicans are working with us; and, yes, we are achieving
results from it.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Mrs. Mink.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The issue is really
quite mind-boggling. We have a dizzying array of individuals,
agencies, local, State, Federal, involved in this whole matter
of trying to bring under control the invasion of these drugs
that are coming across our border.
And if we read back or read through the transcript of your
testimony this morning, I think we would pick out quite a
number of places where you indicated that we were not doing
enough, that we could do better, that we looked forward to
better coordination or better efforts on the part of the
Federal Government to look at this as a truly national problem,
and not to leave the local and State officials dry in terms of
intelligence and other kinds of technical assistance which
might make their work more effective.
So having said all of that, and understanding that the
problem is very complicated, I am somewhat dismayed that you do
not recommend that we institute some one agency or individual
in charge of the Southwest border. I do not believe, frankly,
that by having task forces, meetings, joint ventures and more
coordination, or even one chief coordinator, you are going to
find a solution to all of these areas which you have enumerated
today as being areas of major deficits on the part of the
national government.
So I would like you to address that point. How could a
coordinator do any more than what is already being done in
joint task forces and HIDTAs and all these other operations
that we have put into effect, from whom we have heard; each one
indicating the maximum efforts that they are putting and trying
to achieve their potential? And yet, when you as the person in
charge of all of this overview recite to us these major
deficits, it seems to me it is time for us to consider some
very bold and much more decisive command.
This is an invasion, and I regard it that way. And I do not
think that we can say coordination is the answer.
General McCaffrey. I think I basically agree with your
sentiments. I think that in 1997 I went to the President and
laid out the problem and gave him the general shape of how we
ought to move ahead, and he agreed at that point, and so did
the White House Chief of Staff. What we are trying to do now is
struggle with 23 Federal agencies, and in particular four major
departments of government, to come to a common viewpoint.
These are professional people, by the way. This is not a
lack of intelligence or responsiveness. It is not narrow-minded
behavior. These are professionals who are very concerned about
some very different institutional missions. The Border Patrol
is not like the U.S. Marshals Service, which is not like the
DEA mission.
Mrs. Mink. Yes, but we cannot allow those bureaucratic
definitions which we have to deal with----
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Mrs. Mink [continuing]. To come to a point where it
interferes, interrupts, creates a barrier from effective
interdiction of all of these things coming across.
General McCaffrey. Right. I think much of this can be
solved.
Mrs. Mink. It seems to me like somebody has to be in charge
to solve those problems.
General McCaffrey. You are certainly talking to a person
whose background----
Mrs. Mink. Well, I was going to suggest that you start
this, in terms of how the military might approach this----
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Mrs. Mink [continuing]. From an overall command post.
General McCaffrey. I think a significant move forward would
be if there was a Federal coordinator from the same department
of government.
Mrs. Mink. We have the authority to make a decision.
General McCaffrey. Well----
Mrs. Mink. I do not mean to load on you today, General.
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Mrs. Mink. But I just feel so frustrated----
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Mrs. Mink [continuing]. In getting to these hearings, and
hearing the people discuss the issues, and this myriad of
complexities and different agencies, different
responsibilities. And it is agonizing to know that we do not
have that ability to put it all together so that somebody can
help that small sheriff----
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Mrs. Mink [continuing]. In a small town get the
intelligence that he needs, which is available, in order to do
a better job.
General McCaffrey. It goes beyond that. Basically, if you
are a sheriff in a county or a police chief, or a Mexican law
enforcement figure, who is it you are supposed to go to to
begin the process of coordination? And since we have
jurisdictions that are not congruent--the DEA, the FBI, the
Border Patrol, the Customs Service do not have the same
jurisdictions.
Mrs. Mink. Well, I could not even tell you what it is. If
somebody came to me, I would have to call up four people.
General McCaffrey. Right. I share your concern. I think
coordination is required. I am not sure we can ever get to
command; nor do I believe it is required. But I think we do
need to move forward.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. General, good morning to you. Just
following up a little bit, you mentioned the Burkhalter Report
of 1988. What did it say in reference to coordination among our
Federal agencies?
General McCaffrey. Let me, if I can, extract from it what
they recommended, because times have moved on and some of this
is not entirely appropriate. The problem is, I would argue,
they rented a very bright admiral and had him study the issue.
He captured some findings that are remarkably similar to what I
am now telling you. And 10 years later, we still have not
overcome the coordination shortfalls that he identified in
1988.
Mr. Hutchinson. What you are saying is, we have made
enormous strides in the coordination--at least, that is my
impression of law enforcement as a whole--through the HIDTAs,
and through the drug task forces. There is more coordination
between the agencies, but there is not any central command
post.
General McCaffrey. Right.
Mr. Hutchinson. Is that correct?
General McCaffrey. Neither at the POEs, the ports of entry;
nor in the sector; nor in the Southwest border.
Mr. Hutchinson. How much authority do you have?
General McCaffrey. Considerable: For budgets, for policy.
We have managed to pull together intelligence architecture. We
have managed to pull together a coherent technology initiative.
So a lot of that is moving in the right direction.
Mr. Hutchinson. On the budget side.
General McCaffrey. I have to certify everybody's agency
budgets, and if they are not found adequate I can decertify
them and order them to reconsider. I have to certify the
department budgets.
Mr. Hutchinson. Do you have authority to certify increases?
Do you have authority to recommend cuts?
General McCaffrey. Indeed.
Mr. Hutchinson. I mean, that should be a lot of leverage, I
would think.
General McCaffrey. I think it is. That is why I think the
budgets and the technology and the manpower are moving in the
right direction. There are more people, more x-ray machines.
Coordination architecture is better. I do not want to miss
that, and that is why I read into the record huge increases in
U.S. attorneys present on the border, 80 percent; 72 percent
increase in Customs manpower.
We are aware of an appreciative congressional response to
our initiatives for 5 years running now. But I have also tried
to outline for you the shortfalls. The shortfall is, there is
still no coordinator at El Paso, TX, for Federal counterdrug
efforts.
Mr. Hutchinson. I think your point is right on target. I
think there is agreement that there is a need there. But you
indicated that we waste too much time trying to combine or put
someone in charge. You pulled back from really having a
coordinator with power and punch. You are saying a coordinator
of information, and that is pretty weak. So how strong do you
want to go in this regard?
And you mentioned Customs. Would your office not be in a
better position to provide coordination than Customs, for
example?
General McCaffrey. I think everything works better from the
bottom-up than the top-down. So the thing I am most worried
about is having a coordinator at each POE. I would rather have
that than anything else.
Then the second thing I would rather have is somebody in
the States of New Mexico, California, et cetera, who is the
Federal coordinator for counterdrug efforts on the Southwest
border in that State.
Finally, I would like to see somebody parked in El Paso,
using the manpower of EPIC, Alliance, and Joint Task Force Six,
who is charged only with watching the Southwest border and
coordinating our counterdrug efforts.
I want to be a policy guy; not an operational person. If
Congress wants to change the law, I have spent most of my life
in charge of things; I am a policy, budget, and spokesperson
now. It will not happen here in Washington.
Mr. Hutchinson. To accomplish that coordinated office,
would it take legislative effort, or can it be handled at the
administrative level?
General McCaffrey. I have been trying to achieve it through
dialog and logic.
Mr. Hutchinson. OK. I yield back. I thank the General for
his comments.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first say
that I agree with the General, in terms of the necessity to
have a coordinator. But let me, perhaps, put it in perspective
of the context of how you are approaching a coordinator, as my
colleague from Arkansas said, of information, and why not
additional authority. Let me first give you some personal
experience and personal frustration, and why I think it is very
important that we do have a coordinator has some authority and
decisionmaking capability between the Federal agencies.
One of the big frustrations, even today, as a Member of
Congress, is the fact that INS, even though we fund them for
technology, can take that money and use it for something else.
We know that Border Patrol, for example, is going to be falling
short by some 650 agents in hiring the required 1,000 agents
this year.
In addition to that, there are gaping holes on the border
where they do not have the elementary type sensors that have
been around since I served in Vietnam some 30 years ago.
So part of the issue is in following three examples: The
ability of the border coordinator, border director, however we
want to phrase it, to be able to dictate to INS that money that
is to be spent for manpower or for technology be done
accordingly.
Part of the directive should be that if we have identified
a shortfall with the U.S. Marshals who are charged with
transporting our prisoners and making sure they show up for
trials, et cetera, and if there is a shortfall, this
coordinator should be able to have some influence over
additional marshals, relocation of marshals, those kinds of
things, to the border area.
The last thing is a tremendous shortfall in U.S. attorneys
and, by extension, Federal judges; although we get into another
arena when we talk about confirmation of Federal judges. But
the issue from my perspective--and I am talking from about 13
years frustration as a chief patrol agent--is we have a
situation where border law enforcement agencies work together,
not by design, but by the capability of individual chiefs,
directors, special agents and all, to get along and to say,
``Look, our resources are finite, so we do more if we work
together.'' This is well and good, if everybody is on the same
page; but oftentimes, they are not.
In regards to the issue of the port of entry, General, I
think you are on target. We need one agency in charge of each
port of entry, so they can make staffing decisions, so they can
make decisions in terms of strategies and things along those
lines.
I appreciate your position, because in my conversations
with members of the administration, I know that the
administration is opposed to your idea of a coordinator.
Mr. Chairman, that is something that we ought to seriously
take a look at from a congressional perspective. Because if we
leave it to the different Cabinet-level individuals, there is a
possibility of turf battles right on the front lines of the war
on drugs, and I have seen those same kinds of turf battles up
here in the political and in the bureaucratic arena.
So I would hope that we, as a Congress, take a look at
this. If we need to change the law, let us change the law.
Because in the long term, every year the issue of certification
comes up. We tend to project our frustrations, in the case of
the Southwest border, onto Mexico. I, for one, want to commend
General McCaffrey for every year standing up and saying,
``Look, the Mexicans are paying a tremendous toll for their
role in the war on drugs, and we ought to be looking at
ourselves.'' This is an opportunity for us to look at
ourselves, and to do something meaningful.
The last thing I would like to ask the General by way of a
question is, General, when we came up in 1992 with the HIDTAs,
and we had five original HIDTAs, they were a priority in order
to combat narcotics. From then to now, we have gone from 5 to
31, as you mentioned yourself.
In my mind, one of the frustrations is that if everything
is a priority, then nothing is a priority. They are no longer
focusing in on areas like El Paso and the Southwest border in
terms of funds and the ability for agencies and your office to
provide the extra resources.
I do not have anything against other parts of the country
being able to participate, but I think their participation is
at the detriment of those areas that are on the front lines. I
would like your comment on HIDTAs going from 5 to 31 today, and
perhaps 40 or 50 next Congress.
General McCaffrey. Mr. Congressman, I think your comments
are basically on the money. If I may, on the subject of
coordination versus being in charge, I think we ought to go for
what we can realistically achieve. I see no possibility of
getting the various committees of Congress, the various
departments of Federal law enforcement, to agree to place a
person in operational control of multiple Federal agencies. I
do not think it is achievable.
And by the way, from the start, the President of the United
States and the White House Chief of Staff have been supportive
of me trying to organize, as best I can, agreement among
competing interests. I think where we might get is to have a
coordinator, the Customs Service, at the POEs, and a
coordinator, Border Patrol, in sectors and States. So I would
like to move in that direction. But if you think more is
achievable, I would listen very carefully to your own
viewpoints.
Mr. Reyes. Well, General, if I could just interrupt you for
a moment. In 1993, I was told that we could never control the
border, when we put ``Operation Hold the Line'' and redefined
the strategy from one of chaos and apprehension to one of
prevention.
General McCaffrey. I agree. If we put the manpower, the
technology, the intelligence, and fencing in place, we can
regain law and order control of our border, working in
cooperation with Mexican authorities. I think we can do that.
And the HIDTAs, Mr. Congressman, are working spectacularly.
I would argue they would work with or without Federal dollars,
because smart cops do cooperate, and the prosecutors do. I go
to these HIDTAs in the Northwest and Minnesota and New York
City. You have given me enormously increased money. In 1991 it
started with five HIDTA's, $46 million. Now the total amount of
money for all the HIDTAs is $186 million. I am an unabashed
supporter of the HIDTA process.
I do believe we need to be careful that this is not micro-
managed by congressional actors, where the budget is placed for
political reasons in support of certain programs. I think we
are on the edge of losing control of it. You passed a law and
told me to identify where HIDTAs should exist and to recommend
to you that process, and then you asked me to identify the
budgetary recommendations. I am getting way too much help on
this process.
Mr. Mica. I think we are going to have to turn to one of
the other congressional actors. I appreciate your response.
Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to make a
couple of comments, and I have a few questions that I will put
together and that you can address because they are similar.
One is that I think anybody who looks at the numbers can
get so frustrated that they say--and this is what we are
starting to face at the grassroots level--``Well, this does not
do any good.'' That is simply not true, as you have pointed
out.
Let me make first a political statement. I believe that in
the first few years of this administration, drug use in this
country soared, as we backed up. But I also believe that, just
like your recent statistics you put out, we have made some
progress in the last few years. It will take a lot more
progress just to get us back to 1992; but at the same time,
since you have been working aggressively in your office and
given an organized public forum, and as this administration has
joined with us in the fight, we in fact have made progress.
And it is not true for people to say that we have not
reduced drug use in the United States, or reduced violent crime
in the United States. It is just very hard and very expensive.
And the more pressure we put on, in effect, the marginal costs
become greater. But I think it is very important to always have
that in the record, that in fact we have been making some
progress now for the last few years. It is not true that we are
``losing'' a drug war. We have in fact been gaining ground. We
just lost so much ground that it is hard to get it back.
Second, every time we visited Mexico or South America,
there is no way to separate. I want to put a couple of facts
into the record. Our exports to Mexico surpassed United States
exports to Japan, now making Mexico the second-most important
export market after Canada. We are Mexico's predominant trading
partner, accounting for 85 percent of Mexican exports and 77
percent of their imports. We are the source of 60 percent of
their direct foreign investment.
There is no way we are going to stop this trade process. I
say that as somebody who has had skepticism about NAFTA all the
way along, and who 2 days ago just lost another plant of 450
well-paid employees to Mexico; which now makes my record going
about every 30 days getting a plant closing in my district,
moving to Mexico. But the fact is, that is not going to reverse
itself. We have to figure out how to best deal with this.
And when you have the amount of trade we have, and the
immigration--in my district, I have seen a massive increase in
the number of Mexican immigrants, because our unemployment rate
is at 2.5 percent and the industry needs them. And we might as
well acknowledge that we are having some major things
interacting with the border control that make this question a
very complicated one, both international and domestic.
Now, I have a few questions that relate. I, too, am
hopeful. You said there were nine extraditions. And I believe
we have made some progress on the Mexican nationals that have
been extradited on drugs. That is one of the things we are
really watching.
A second thing is, in the vetted units, is there anything
we can do to accelerate that process, in training, in
additional dollars? Because it is clear we cannot control this
just on our side of the border; yet, there are nationalist
things in Mexico that we can and cannot do. You referred to the
importance of intelligence dollars. Does that include boosting
dollars related to tips? What things can be done? You said they
are working at the Guatemalan and the southern border, but we
really need their help at the northern border as well.
And my last question is--and that kind of ties in with the
intelligence question--as we have seen in Miami, they moved to
the airports and other things. As you have said, they are
smart. In other words, wherever we put the pressure, they put
around. Is it intelligence and some of the things like that you
are putting emphasis on? And could you identify a little more
what you mean by that? Because the general assumption that many
of us have is that is exactly what is happening: Wherever we
put the pressure, they adjust to that.
So what are some ways to directly deal with that problem?
Are there specific requests regarding intelligence, their
vetting units, their dollars, things we can do to help
strengthen their side of it, in addition to continuing to put
the money into our side?
General McCaffrey. The extradition process, Mr.
Congressman, I would ask you permission to submit for the
record a statement on how we are doing this year. There was one
huge challenge to us and Mexico concerning cooperation: they
got a bad court case they are trying to deal with. Essentially,
it appeared to be barring further extraditions of Mexican
nationals, in accordance with their own Constitutional
restrictions. Mexican authorities are trying to work to deal
with this in accordance with their own laws.
But I believe there is a common agreement on both sides of
the border that we will not allow a fugitive from justice to
violate our laws or theirs and hide on the other side of the
border. I think we are continuing trying to work that
successfully. And the two Attorneys General have secure phones
in their offices, and they do talk about not policy, but court
cases, by name, ``How are we going to get this criminal suspect
extradited to the other country?''
Vetted units: They are doing better. The sort of gross
number is, they have now vetted 6,000-some-odd people. They
have flunked a little under 1,000. They are trying to conduct
oversight of their own law enforcement agencies. But there are
huge institutional challenges to them building law enforcement
operations that will work.
There are vetted Mexican law enforcement military and
police units and intelligence units that are working in
cooperation with United States authorities, and that is
something we ought to be proud of. At the same time, there is,
as we understand, massive corruption implicit in local law
enforcement, and in some cases in the judicial system. It is
something to be dealt with, and I do not think we are going to
see our way around that for a generation.
When it comes to intelligence, I think we are making some
enormous progress. In an open hearing, with your permission, I
will be a little bit cautious about what I say. We are
identifying vulnerabilities of these criminal systems. CNC, the
CIA, acting as sort of the executive agent, has brought
together--we have periodic inter-agency meetings: How are we
going to target these people, collect evidence? How do we then
disguise where we are getting it? How do we then find cuing
systems so that U.S. law enforcement authorities, to include
the Coast Guard, are tipped off, without betraying sources and
methods? Then we are arresting people.
This process is working. There are huge seizures going on.
And this is, by the way, not just United States-Mexican
cooperation; this is global authorities. We are working very
closely with European Union partners, with Thai authorities.
Probably in a closed session we would be glad to lay out more
of that.
I think we are moving in the right direction. Funding is an
issue, and one that we have developed some new thinking that
may require new ways of looking at resources.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman, if I may just make one small
comment with that? If we can look at a discussion of what we
can do, I do not know that we can afford a generation. I mean,
I understand why you are saying that, as far as changing their
law enforcement. If there are any things we can do to
accelerate that, in boosting the pride, exchange programs with
our police academies, ways to give awards through other means
to get it to the Mexican Government to build the pride and
income in their law enforcement. Because, I mean, a generation
does not do much for us. And yet, I understand that unless we
kick that process, that is exactly what we are looking at.
General McCaffrey. Yes, I get your point.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Souder.
I am going to go to our vice chairman, and then I will go
to you two gentlemen, if you do not mind. Mr. Barr, you are
recognized.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McCaffrey, it is
always an honor to have you here, and we appreciate your work,
and I do personally very much, in support of our overall drug
effort. Although I was not here to hear your direct testimony,
I understand you commented on and provided some guidance and
thoughts on creating a better coordinating structure for our
Southwest border region. I think your ideas have a lot of
merit, and I appreciate your providing those to us.
Several years ago, when I served as the United States
Attorney in Atlanta, we had the problem of trying to extradite
individuals from Colombia to the United States. The Colombian
Government at that time paid a dear price for beginning the
process of trying to extradite some of their drug traffickers
to the United States. They do not just have to deal with harsh
words down there, the people, they bomb and kill large numbers
of people, including supreme court justices and political
figures.
One of the very first individuals that was extradited up
here to the United States was a cartel money launderer, and he
was extradited to Atlanta. We had him under indictment there.
Shortly thereafter, though--and I do not recall exactly when it
was--Marion Barry was seen on international TV with the
undercover tapes doing cocaine. And then shortly after that,
the verdict was rendered in his case, in which I think he was
convicted of a misdemeanor and did a small amount of time.
That had a direct and very negative, almost a chilling
effect--understandably so--on the willingness of the Colombian
Government to stick its neck out to extradite individuals up
here, because of the feeling that, ``The U.S. is not really
serious about fighting drugs internally, where you have--'' as
I remember seeing traffic ``--where you have the Mayor of your
own Nation's Capital doing drugs and basically getting a slap
on the wrist.'' It really chilled the process that was
beginning to move forward before that time of starting to
extradite some of these kingpins and top money launderers to
the United States.
We now have the prospect of drug legalization in the
District of Columbia--not just a mayor doing drugs, but large
segments of the population. We now know, for example, that
almost 70 percent of those who voted in a drug referendum last
year favor legalization of marijuana. And I have a great
concern that, if this process moves forward, it will send a
very, very negative message to those governments, those foreign
governments, that are the source countries or the transit
countries for the drugs moving into this country. Because
whether we have problems with them from time to time on
coordinating our activities or what-not, we do rely on them
having faith in our system so that when they engage in
activities in cooperation with us they are going to get the
support here in this country of fighting drugs.
So I do have a concern about the message that this will
send--that has already been sent by this drug referendum having
been on the ballot, and the results of it now being made
public. But of course, the President has that D.C.
Appropriations bill which contains, for example, the amendment
that I proposed during the appropriations vote that would
prohibit the District of Columbia from taking any steps to
implement any drug legalization initiatives.
Do you share my concern that we need to oppose efforts such
as the one in D.C. to legalize drugs?
General McCaffrey. Senator Inhofe has just invited me to
testify next Wednesday on just this issue, and I told him
yesterday I look forward to that opportunity. Unequivocally, we
are opposed to a State or District of Columbia referendum to
try and change the FDA-National Institute of Health system by
which we adjudge compounds to be safe and effective as
medicines. This is a goofy way to go about sorting out what
works in the best medical system on the face of the Earth.
We want to screen out Laetrile and Thalidomide. We want to
screen in the magic drugs that have made our system of medicine
so effective. We are unalterably opposed to doing that and we
will go say that again Wednesday in front of the Senate
committee.
I would also agree with you that it is probably a bad
signal. I am less worried about Colombian criminals reading
this the wrong way than I am about American 12-year-olds. You
know, ``If smoked pot is so effective as a medicine, if it is
so positive a compound, then is it or is it not really a threat
to my development as an adolescent?'' That would be my first
concern.
I think I would narrow the issue, though, Mr. Congressman,
to say that medical pot is an issue that ought to be decided on
science and medical basis, and not confused as a political
issue. As long as we stay on that basis, we will end up with
good policy. That is not what is happening. We have a very
clever group who is pushing a drug legalization agenda, using
industrial hemp and medical pot as their approach.
I do not argue that all of those who support medical pot
are for legalization of drugs. I think it has been a failure on
the part of those of us who understand the drug issue to
adequately communicate why these State referendums do not make
sense. The American people, when they get a reasonable
explanation of the pros and cons of the issue, normally end up
with a pretty sensible decision. I think we are failing in our
efforts to communicate that.
Mr. Barr. And with the D.C. pot initiative in particular, I
mean, there are all sorts--I mean, it is one of the goofiest of
the goofy that I have seen, providing for best friends can grow
the pot for you. It does not require even a piece of paper that
a doctor has written something on. I mean, there are all sorts
of easy ways to show why it is a bad idea.
If I could, Mr. Chairman, I would just ask two very, very
quick questions on followup. Has the President, or anybody on
his behalf, asked your opinion on the D.C. pot initiative and
the language in the D.C. Appropriations bill that would stop it
from moving forward?
General McCaffrey. Well, of course, Mr. Congressman, it
would not be appropriate for me to tell you what advice I have
given the President, or have not. It is clear that the
administration position is, in public, in writing, we are
opposed to deciding safe and effective medicines through public
referendum. That is unequivocal. There are other issues that
are going to be involved in this one, D.C. local authority. So
there will be other issues that are outside of my purview.
Mr. Barr. But on an issue within your purview, as Director
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and given your
very strong opposition to these legalization issues----
General McCaffrey. Secretary Shalala and I and Dr. Alan
Leshner and others are opposed to political initiatives which
attempt to legalize specific medicines. We do not want heart
medicines voted on in a public referendum; nor do we want
smoked marijuana made available through that approach.
Mr. Barr. But the language in the D.C. Appropriations bill
that would prohibit the District of Columbia government from
moving forward with any steps to legalize drugs or reduce the
penalties provided under Federal law, you support that
language, do you not?
General McCaffrey. I have not read the language. From what
you are saying, yes, I would support it. But again, what I
would like to do is say, if this is really a medical issue, if
you are talking about safe and effective medicine, then let us
make that the purview of the NIH, FDA, and the American Medical
Association, and make doctors stand up to the issue. They are
hiding on the issue.
Mr. Barr. Well, would your preference be for the President
not to veto the D.C. Appropriations bill, or any bill, simply
because it contains the language that prohibits D.C. from
moving forward with drug legalization?
General McCaffrey. We are adamantly opposed to the
legalization of any agents under the CSA. That is in writing.
There is no question of that. We are also adamantly opposed to
smoked marijuana bypassing the FDA/NIH process.
Mr. Barr. Therefore, would it be----
General McCaffrey. I really would not prefer to go ahead to
discuss Presidential action on language I have not read. Let
the lawyers read the action. What you have heard, though, is
not just my viewpoint; it is the viewpoint of Secretary
Shalala, Dr. Alan Leshner, and the others of us who watch this.
Mr. Barr. If I could, I am surprised that you have not read
the language. Would you take a look at that and give me your
views on it?
General McCaffrey. Sure.
Mr. Barr. The language in the D.C. Appropriations bill that
we inserted?
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I am going to recognize Mr. Bilbray.
He is not a member of this subcommittee, but he is from
California, represents Imperial Beach. And we have heard from
Texas; we will get a chance to hear from California now.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you. The gentleman from Texas and I are
probably the two who live and sleep within site of the border.
And let me just followup on comments made by my colleague from
Georgia. I would assume that the administration continues to
oppose the California initiative that passed a few years ago,
General?
General McCaffrey. Absolutely.
Mr. Bilbray. Does that include the President who opposes
that initiative?
General McCaffrey. There is no question that we are
adamantly opposed to using local referendums to decide which
medicines are safe and effective.
Mr. Bilbray. I just hope that with all the talk about
equity and local control, that the people of D.C. are given the
same protection as the people of California that have been
supported by the administration on this issue. But that aside--
I just want to point out that it is not just somebody picking
on D.C.; that the California initiative is consistent with the
administration's position on D.C.
General McCaffrey, as somebody who has worked along the
United States-Mexican border for over 20 years, I see a lot of
perceptions about Mexico and about the Mexican Government not
doing enough. And frankly, for those of us who have watched
what has happened in Mexico, we have seen that Mexico finally
woke up to the fact that you cannot sneak up on the drug
problem; you are going to finally have to get totally committed
and totally involved.
Yet the corruption issue is raised again and again. My
concern is that, as we point fingers on Mexico--remember, I
have been probably one of the worst critics of Mexico on a lot
of issues. But on this one, the fact is that Mexico took
dramatic action a few years ago; they went in and totally
changed their approach to drug interdiction along the border,
did they not, with the restructuring?
General McCaffrey. Exactly. They have made a major effort
to change this. They have increased the amount of money they
put in it dramatically, and they are trying to reorganize their
effort.
Mr. Bilbray. And not just that, but they changed who was in
control, how it was going to be managed.
General McCaffrey. They have, indeed.
Mr. Bilbray. It was pretty dramatic in San Diego--and I do
not know about along the rest of the border--where they
actually called in Federal agents, lined them up in front of TV
cameras, and said, ``We are going to ship you all to Mexico
this afternoon, and the military is going to come in and
preempt the operation, because of the concerns.''
I only wish that we will wake up and see this same kind of
commitment and not find excuses. In fact, in looking at Mexico,
I am trying to point out what they found about intercepting the
drugs.
I see searches every 50 miles along their highways. I see
the military being totally committed. I see their efforts; some
we would not even consider. And I think the reason why they
have taken those steps is the fact that they realized that they
are being taken over; that basically this issue is going to
totally absorb them.
With respect to the bureaucratic issue and coordination, in
the San Diego sector, we saw Alan Bursen come in, be appointed
by this President, and basically really come in, organize and
coordinate that effort. We saw dramatic changes. We saw
outreach across the border. And basically, as my colleague from
Texas said, you started seeing an attitude change that quit
finding excuses not to get the job done, quit walking around
it, quit dancing around the issue and go right for it. Why
could we not initiate that kind of policy across the entire
frontier from Brownsville to Imperial Beach?
General McCaffrey. Yes, I think that is exactly what is
required. And Mr. Bursen, Rhodes scholar, All-American football
player, remarkable personal leadership capabilities. And also,
with a local community that was fed up. I do not need to tell
you that. But southern California just had enough of this. So
there was a dramatic response.
And we see other people. Mr. Kelly in New Mexico is doing
brilliant work. All five Southwest border HIDTAs are doing a
tremendous job. So there is movement. But Mr. Kelly had no
authority over anyone but Justice Department actors; not the
Department of Agriculture, not the Customs Service, not the
Coast Guard, et cetera. There was cooperation with his
leadership. At the end of the day, I think we need
institutional coordination of this issue.
Mr. Bilbray. Well, but those of us that lived along the
border and do so today, we keep hearing Washington find excuses
of why extraordinary measures not only should not be taken, but
cannot be taken. And in fact, we have heard the excuses for
decades. Silvestre Reyes is a legend in San Diego, because he
was one guy who was willing to stand up and he said, ``We not
only can do it, we must do it.''
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would ask one question. How many drug
smugglers are intercepted every year along the border? Do we
know how many were intercepted last year?
General McCaffrey. I have a chart that shows tonnages of
drugs by types seized. I have a chart that shows number of
arrests. It is mind-boggling.
Mr. Bilbray. How many of those drug smugglers were
processed through the Justice Department, and how many were
released back into Mexico?
General McCaffrey. Many of them.
Mr. Bilbray. Now, if we are a country that says we are
absolutely committed to stop drugs, how can we justify looking
at the American public and saying, ``We are releasing drug
smugglers out of this country without processing them?'' Is the
excuse that we just do not have the resources?
General McCaffrey. Let me, if I can, underscore, because I
actually probably have a different viewpoint, Mr. Congressman.
We arrested 1\1/2\ million people last year on drug-related
crimes. We have now have 105,000 people in the Federal prison
system. Two-thirds of them are there for drug-related offenses.
That has doubled in 7 years. There is no question in my mind
that there has been a blowtorch-intensity response by U.S. law
enforcement and prosecution against drug-related crimes,
particularly those at retail sales and above.
Now, what we were almost overwhelmed by, and why I am in
favor of fencing and manpower and working with Mexico, is that
when you shotgun marijuana across the border and you are
arresting--as you know, you can go down and stand at Otay Mesa
and watch a drug bust every 30 minutes. We do not want to take
a 25-year-old Mexican mother with two borrowed children and
prosecute her, when she has carefully come in right under the
prosecutorial guidelines.
Mr. Bilbray. But what I am saying is, if I drove my two
children across the border with the same amount of drugs, would
you release me?
General McCaffrey. Well, I hope not. I hope you would be
doing California----
Mr. Bilbray. Well, doesn't this sound a little bit like a
violation of equal protection under the law? Or unequal
prosecution? That's the message here.
Let me just say this. I have been asked by the counties
along the border to say one thing to you. If you are not going
to prosecute the drug smugglers, if you do not have the
resources within the Federal system, then for God's sake, work
with the counties and the States and allow them to prosecute.
But as you release them, the message going back to Mexico is,
``Here is the game, guys. Stay under this artificial limit that
some bureaucrat has set up, and you can play the game. Make
sure you drip the drugs into America, and America will not only
accept it, but they will give you a free ride back.'' This is
the kind of process that I think that we have to take
responsibility for.
Mr. Chairman, I would just ask you to consider this. Can
you imagine what the reaction of the United States people would
be if Mexico was actively taking drug smugglers that they had
captured and driving them to the border and saying, ``Here, go
in the United States, and no problem''? That is the kind of
thing we are doing.
I am asking of one thing about that is substantive: the
commitment by the administration to prosecute everyone who is
in possession of drugs, be it a U.S. citizen or not, not to
tell U.S. citizens, ``We catch you, you are going to be
prosecuted. But we catch a foreign national, we are going to
send them home.''
General McCaffrey. Presumably, Mr. Congressman, you are
also talking about county prosecution and State prosecution,
also. Zero tolerance of drug smuggling? You would have your
local authorities do the same thing?
Mr. Bilbray. Well, the local authorities will say they will
do it. The trouble is to ask the counties, which tend to be
some of the poorest counties in this country, to do the
prosecution for the Federal Government without reimbursement. I
think we need to seriously talk about providing a fund to
reimburse for the prosecution.
General McCaffrey. Ignoring Federal violations, you are
suggesting absolute prosecution by county and State officials
for all drug seizures of any amount?
Mr. Bilbray. If possible.
General McCaffrey. To include in Los Angeles foreign
nationals encountered selling drugs in the streets of Los
Angeles?
Mr. Bilbray. No, look, I am talking about the fact that----
General McCaffrey. The only reason I point this out is, I
have respect for your viewpoint. I think this is a resource
issue. It is a prioritization issue. I think what many of us
would like to do is make sure we have a clever, seamless web of
Federal-State law and law enforcement across that border. But
we do not want to prosecute a rented dupe from Mexico, a 25-
year-old mother with a child with her. We want to go after
the----
Mr. Bilbray. Excuse me, but this is the whole point of a
``rented,'' one who is being paid to smuggle drugs is a drug
smuggler. This attitude of saying who is a dupe and who is not
is a problem. The dupe is the American taxpayer and the
American Government is sitting, allowing people to work the
system by saying, ``I was just a dupe.''
General McCaffrey. Remember, 60 percent--And again, I say
this respectfully, but it is put in context. Because I just had
a conversation with the mayor of Los Angeles which I found
curious. Sixty percent of the methamphetamines in America
probably are manufactured in southern California. I think we
have to remember that the problem of drug smuggling is not that
of Mexico; it is involved with a lot of us.
The same thing occurs up on our Northern border, for
example, in Vancouver, Canada: a huge external drug threat to
the United States.
Mr. Bilbray. I want to just make one comment on that. The
methamphetamine production in San Diego County was huge, and
now has been almost eradicated. The reason is that we put the
pressure on the county. They moved it to Tecate, the hills
behind Tecate, and now it is coming through over the Federal
border.
What good is it for the local people to go after the local
production and drive it out of their community, if it is just
going to be moved south and the United States is going to
continue to allow it to cross?
General McCaffrey. I think the prosecution of
methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin, we ought to have about zero
tolerance. I could not agree more.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman from California.
I would now like to recognize the gentleman from Arizona,
who also chairs one of the panels with great financial
responsibility over this issue, Mr. Kolbe.
Mr. Kolbe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
appreciate your making it possible for members of the Border
Caucus and those of us who are most affected by this problem of
drugs along the border on a regular basis to sit in on your
hearing today. I am very grateful for that.
I will be very brief, because since I do chair the
subcommittee that funds ONDCP I get an opportunity to have
General McCaffrey and others from his organization before my
subcommittee on a fairly regular basis. I am glad this hearing
has really focused on the problem of drugs along the border.
There is no doubt about it: We are facing an enormous
problem. And it is a dual problem for those of us in Arizona,
because we have become, unfortunately, the major crossing point
now for illegal aliens coming into the United States. As we
have been more effective in hardening the border in places like
San Diego and El Paso, it has acted like a funnel. So we have
the largest number of people who have been taken into custody
coming across the border in the last year having been,
ironically, in the rural parts of Arizona. We have even
succeeded in some of our cities in hardening it in Arizona, but
we have this massive flood of people coming through the fences
in the rural areas.
What we are finding as a result of that is that there is a
lot more of the drug smuggling coming this way. The border and
that area have become much more dangerous. There has been much
more violence. There have been many more shootings that have
been taking place along the border. It is a very serious
problem.
I have two questions that I would ask of you, General: What
are we doing to get more of the technologies that we need down
to the border? I do not mean just to the Federal law
enforcement agencies, but to the local law enforcement agencies
who are really on the front lines of dealing with this, as much
as Customs and Border Patrol, every day.
We have a lot of new technologies, and some of them are
those that can be used in checking trucks and vehicles as they
come across the border. It seems to me we are very slow in
really getting this technology down to the border areas.
General McCaffrey. I am not sure I disagree with you. It
has taken us 2 or 3 years to really energize this process. You
are giving us significant amounts of money. That is what we
have done with it. Although it says over the past 5 years,
essentially that is 2 years work. So it is starting to show up.
It works. The training systems work. The maintenance
program works. The problem is, as we have suggested, if you are
at Otay Mesa and San Ysidro, but you are not at the next,
Calexico crossing point, and if you are smuggling 200 kilograms
of cocaine, you do not go through the border at Otay Mesa. You
move down to Calexico. So we have said there has to be
coherency, a seamless web, and it has to be keyed to
intelligence. It is not going to sort out the truck with the
cocaine unless the intelligence system tells it which ones to
put through at nine per hour.
But your money is going to pretty good work. I think as we
see this go into place in the coming several years, it is going
to pay off. We have also have the maritime flanks. The Coast
Guard and the Border Patrol and Customs are also working. It is
tied into a cross-border effort inside Mexico. I think the
seizures, for example, this year are going to be up
dramatically on the Southwest border and in Mexico. The
Mexicans are doing pretty well.
The second thing you have given us is money for a
counterdrug technology transfer program--I would suggest not
enough, although you give us more than we ask for each year. It
is still a modest program. Those sheriffs departments and
police departments along that border cannot afford--this
morning I was listening to Sheriff Lee out of New Mexico--the
vehicles to prosecute law enforcement in their own counties,
given the level of threat they are facing.
So we probably do need to look at enhanced resources for
technology transfer. We are moving in the right direction; a
lot of work to be done.
Mr. Kolbe. Well, it seems to me, if that is the case, we
are not getting enough to you, but it is more than the
administration has requested. You need to be a louder voice
within the administration for trying to beef up that transfer
of technology. I happen to believe that that transfer of
technology is exceedingly important to what is going on.
General McCaffrey. I agree. Yes.
Mr. Kolbe. Is the coordination along the border what it
should be? We have these HIDTAs, we have the Southwest border,
we have the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas in each of
these areas there, we have JTF-6 in El Paso. Is the
coordination of the effort what it ought to be?
General McCaffrey. No, I do not think so.
Mr. Kolbe. What have you recommended about changing that?
General McCaffrey. We have a paper that I sent over to
Congress that outlines the concept that we are trying to
achieve. Pieces of it have happened. There is no question that
the intelligence architecture that Congress asked me to pull
together is now being completed, and Director Tenent from the
CIA, the Attorney General, and I and the other actors will now
move to create a better system to make sure intelligence
supports law enforcement on drug systems.
It is clear we have more manpower. You have given us more
resources, so you are seeing now the payoff of those programs;
in southern California certainly, and pieces of the rest of the
Southwest border. You can see fencing going in, and adequate
manpower and technology.
Mr. Kolbe. Even though the fences were opposed originally?
I point out fences were opposed originally. You know, all those
physical barriers originally were opposed.
General McCaffrey. There are a wealth of viewpoints on
that, Mr. Congressman. Mine is very supportive of fencing, low-
light TV, sensor technology, manpower, aviation to the Border
Patrol.
Mr. Kolbe. I, too.
General McCaffrey. Bottom line, Mr. Kolbe, is I think what
we lack is a coordinator at each port of entry who State and
local authorities and Mexican authorities know is capable of
integrating horizontally the activities of the Federal law
enforcement in that zone or sector. I think we need that. I
think we need one in El Paso to integrate the Southwest border.
Having said that, there is a BCI initiative by Customs and
INS, so each of the 39 border crossings now does have a
committee which is pulling together in a very enhanced way
those two departments of government. And that is good, and we
ought to be proud of that. But there are four major departments
of government, and 23 agencies involved. It is my own view that
we can do better in orchestrating this, and make it simpler on
the sheriffs and police chiefs who have to work with us.
Mr. Kolbe. Well, I would agree with you. Mr. Chairman, I
will not ask to have any further questions.
I would just agree with you. I think we have a very
piecemeal operation. I see it every day, when I am there and
talking to these people. Coordination is missing. And I do not
have an easy answer as to how to do it. There is a tremendous
amount of turf protection by law enforcement at all levels.
Everybody wants to have a piece of the action. Everybody wants
to be top dog. And the only ones that must be laughing about
all of this are the drug dealers, who benefit from our
willingness to spend more of our time fighting each other than
fighting them. I think that happens all too often.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. Thank you for your comments and your
participation.
Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, in terms of the drugs transiting the Southwest
border, from a source standpoint, do they originate in Mexico,
or elsewhere?
General McCaffrey. All the cocaine originates elsewhere.
What we have said is that 80 percent of the cocaine in America
originates in or transits through Colombia, which is now the
leading producer of cocaine on the face of the Earth.
A tiny fraction of the world's heroin is produced in
Mexico, about 5\1/2\ metric tons; another small amount, 6
metric tons, in Colombia. However, since we probably only
consume around 11 metric tons, our law enforcement intelligence
says that a little more than 70 percent of the heroin seized in
America came out of Colombia, in particular. But a lot of that
is just superb police work by Customs and DEA in particular.
There are still huge amounts of Burmese heroin in America, as
an example.
Mr. Ose. The reason I ask that question is that we have a
particular initiative we have been working on for 3 or 4 years
relative to some assistance we are trying to provide to
Colombia, as it relates to some helicopters. You know we have
had this conversation before. I saw that we got six Hueys down
there recently.
Could you give us a status report on that particular
initiative as it relates to the various helicopters we are
trying to get to Colombia?
General McCaffrey. It would probably be best to give you a
written update from the State Department. Essentially, there
are 150 helicopters there. There are more en route. I believe
it is 18 UH-1Ns and 6 Blackhawks that are still to go. The UH-
1Ns, I believe some of them are now there, and others are being
certified and shipped. The Blackhawks go in this fall.
We are trying to train pilots, get maintenance systems, et
cetera. But that is moving faster than I would have expected.
It should have been a 3-year process to build the chopper and
to bring together the crews. I think they will be in there this
coming fall, or later. That is about where the mobility is.
Mr. Ose. Fall started, I think, last night, technically. I
do not know if that is accurate or not. But when you say fall,
you mean prior to December 23rd?
General McCaffrey. The six Blackhawks--I had better give
you an answer for the record--you have to train the crews, get
the maintenance system in place, and ship them. And it is
moving forward. I believe they will be there in the fall, if I
understand it.
Mr. Ose. I do want to pass on a compliment. That is I did
see where the six Hueys were delivered. I am appreciative of
that. I do not think this is only along the border that we need
to deal with this problem.
General McCaffrey. Right.
Mr. Ose. With respect to Colombia in particular, I cannot
overemphasize my interest in providing our friends in Colombia
with the tools in which we have committed, so that we can help
them help us.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I think we have run the full gamut
here. If there are additional questions, I think we can submit
them to the Director for response.
Again, we appreciate your cooperation with our
subcommittee. As you can see, there is incredible interest on
behalf of the Members of Congress. I think we have every border
State represented here, chairs of some of the subcommittees
involved, and ranking members. So we are pleased that you have
responded. We look forward to working with you. It is a
tremendous challenge, but hopefully we can do a better job on
the Southwest border while working together.
There being no further questions of the witness, you are
excused. Thank you.
General McCaffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I would like to call our second panel, if I may.
We have Lieutenant Raul Rodriguez, who is with the Metro Task
Force, Nogales, AZ; Mr. Dennis Usrey, Director of the Southwest
Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, the HIDTA in San
Diego, CA; and Chief Tony Castaneda, and he is the chief of
police of Eagle Pass, TX.
I think this may be your first time testifying before us.
This is an investigations and oversight subcommittee of
Congress. We do swear in our witnesses, so if you would stand,
please, and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. The witnesses answered in the affirmative. I
would like to welcome our three panelists. We do ask, if you
have any lengthy statements, that they be submitted for the
record, and I will be glad to recognize a request for those
submissions.
With that, I would like to recognize and welcome Lieutenant
Raul Rodriguez, with the Metro Task Force in Nogales, AZ. You
are recognized, sir.
STATEMENTS OF RAUL RODRIGUEZ, LIEUTENANT, METRO TASK FORCE,
NOGALES, AZ; DENNIS USREY, DIRECTOR, SOUTHWEST BORDER HIGH
INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, SAN DIEGO, CA; AND TONY
CASTANEDA, CHIEF OF POLICE, EAGLE PASS, TX
Mr. Rodriguez. Chairman Mica, present Representatives,
distinguished Members, it is an honor to testify before you.
Mr. Mica. You might pull the mic up as close as you can.
Mr. Rodriguez. It is an honor to testify before you. I have
some oral remarks I would like to offer, and I have also
prepared a written statement which, with your permission, I
would like to provide for the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, the written statement will be
made part of the record. Proceed.
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Lieutenant
Raul Rodriguez, from Santa Cruz County in Nogales, AZ. I am
commander of the Santa Cruz Metro Task Force. It is a multi-
agency: a Federal, State, and local agency, investigative and
interdiction centerpiece Task Force located in Nogales, AZ.
The Task Force is co-located with U.S. Customs
Investigations. Participants in the Task Force are the Santa
Cruz County Sheriff's Office, the Nogales Police Department,
the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the U.S. Customs Service,
the U.S. Border Patrol, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Arizona Attorney General's Office, the Arizona Department
of Public Safety, Patagonia Marshal's Office, and the Santa
Cruz County Attorney's Office.
Our problem in Nogales, AZ and in Santa Cruz County is vast
because we are one of the smaller counties in Arizona. It
encompasses only 1,200 square miles. Nogales, AZ is the county
seat, but Nogales, AZ is also the major port of entry for
commercial and pedestrian traffic for Arizona. We have strong
commercial ties between Nogales, AZ and Nogales, Sonora,
Mexico, which is south of our city.
Arizona shares approximately 370 miles of border with
Mexico, which is approximately 25 percent of the total United
States-Mexican border. Santa Cruz County has approximately 53
miles of border with Mexico.
The Task Force efforts deal directly with marijuana, which
continues to be the most abused and commonly encountered drug
on the border. Backpacking of marijuana continues to be the
most common method of smuggling from Mexico to Arizona. Tucson,
AZ remains the transshipment location for marijuana cargo
destined for other regions throughout the United States. The
current trend is that marijuana is smuggled on a year-round
basis. It used to be seasonal. Statewide seizures for marijuana
total up to 228 metric tons for 1998.
Cocaine remains the second popular drug of choice in the
county and Arizona. Cocaine seizures in our county have
increased by 194 percent, according to figures from 1998 and
1999, and we have not finished 1999. Nogales, AZ continues to
be a focal point for cocaine seizures in southern Arizona.
Tucson and Phoenix remain the primary transshipment location
for transportation of cocaine via passenger vehicle and
tractor-trailers.
Heroin use is also on the rise in Arizona, also in our
border community. Recently, we did an undercover operation with
U.S. Customs O.I., which netted 2.4 pounds of heroin this year
in Nogales, AZ. Our problem is established Mexican drug
trafficking organizations operate freely and uninhibited within
the border community of Nogales, AZ, Mexico, and the
surrounding area.
The corruption and the potential of violence along the
United States-Mexico border are factors that directly and
indirectly affect enforcement efforts. The influx of
undocumented aliens has caused increased facade incursions
along the border to hide illegal smuggled contraband along the
border region.
Established Mexican drug trafficking organizations have not
eased their efforts to continue smuggling drugs across the
border and into this country. The Task Force was the lead
investigative agency which uncovered two secretly dug tunnels
in January of this year. This case made national news. The
tunnels were constructed and connected to a series of storm
drains that led directly underground to Mexico. The
investigation of this tunnel revealed that drug seizures made
in California could be traced back to the covert operation of
the drug tunnels.
The drug threat in this community has affected the
frequency of violent crimes that are committed against law
enforcement and the public in this border region. In 1991, my
supervisor for the Task Force, Sergeant Manny Tapia, was shot
to death by a drug smuggler during an arrest. The 19-year-old
suspect was transporting 140 pounds of marijuana in his vehicle
when he shot and killed Sergeant Tapia.
In April of last year, four marijuana smugglers on the west
side of Nogales, AZ assassinated U.S. Border Patrol Agent Alex
Kurpnick. Increased violence against U.S. Border Patrol agents
along the border, with rock-throwing attacks, laser beam
pointing, and actual incoming fire from Nogales, Mexico are on
the increase.
Our Task Force in 1998 was responsible for 53 percent of
all felony filings in two superior courts within the
jurisdiction of this county. The majority of crimes committed
in this county are drug-related.
Funding for the Task Force, however, has been stagnant. We
receive our funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Grant and
the HIDTA grants. This year the Byrne Grant Fund was decreased
by 8 percent; the HIDTA grant was not increased. Funding is a
critical part of the joint policing efforts against drug
crimes. Without the available resources, the Task Force will be
hindered in its labors.
That is all I have right now as a statement. I would
entertain your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodriguez follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you. We will get back to questions after we
hear from the other witnesses. Next, Mr. Dennis--is it
``Usrey''?
Mr. Usrey. ``Usrey,'' yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. ``Usrey,'' OK. The Director of the Southwest
Border HIDTA, from San Diego. You are recognized, sir.
Mr. Usrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Mica,
Representative Mink, other distinguished members of the
subcommittee and certainly the Border Caucus who have shown
their interest here today, it is indeed an honor to testify
before you. And I want to thank the committee for the
opportunity to discuss the drug threat along the Southwest
border.
Your interest and support for this vital region of our
country is evident, and sincerely appreciated. I have some more
remarks I would like to offer, and I also have prepared a
written statement which, with your permission, I would like to
provide for the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, that will be made part of the
record.
Mr. Usrey. Thank you. I have served as the Director of the
Southwest Border HIDTA since 1995. Part of that time, I served
as the first Director of the San Diego and Imperial County
Narcotic Information Network, a HIDTA sponsored and funded
intelligence center. I have had the opportunity to observe the
positive impact of this program, but I am not here claiming
success; only to say that we have made progress along a very
long and difficult journey. Much is yet to be done.
We operate with the premise that drug trafficking across
the Southwest border affects not only our communities, but also
the entire Nation. The Southwest border marks the end of a
transit zone for South American cocaine, Mexican and Colombian
heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine and, importantly, the
chemicals that are used to manufacture methamphetamine. The
Southwest border region has long been burdened with smuggling
and drug-related crime and violence.
Since designation in 1990 as a HIDTA, the Southwest border
has taken an innovative approach to drug law enforcement. As
one of the original gateway HIDTAs, the Southwest border is
unique in its progress in integrating the efforts of 86 local,
17 State, and 12 Federal drug enforcement agencies.
Throughout its 9 years of operation, and especially since
the reorganization into the five regional partnerships in 1995,
the Southwest border HIDTA has achieved an array of successes.
Several examples are detailed in my written testimony, and you
will hear others today, and have heard others.
Funded at $46 million for fiscal year 1999, the Southwest
border HIDTA supported 84 intelligence, enforcement,
interdiction, prosecution, and support initiatives within the
45 designated counties located in the four border States of
California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.
The Southwest border is a collaborative venture involving
local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies that develop
and implement regional threat assessments and strategies to
reduce drug trafficking. This program is responsible for
providing for a coordination umbrella for joint operations,
instituting team work through continuous joint planning and
implementation of enforcement operations, and providing for the
promotion of equal partnerships amongst Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies. And I think it is unique in
that context.
Notwithstanding the successes of this program, the work is
not over. Law enforcement agencies along the border need your
continued support, if we are to make substantial and long-
lasting impact on the problem. The entire criminal justice
infrastructure at every level of government is severely taxed
and unable to keep pace with the demands of enforcing the law
along our border.
Interdiction is primarily a Federal responsibility, but it
cannot be successfully accomplished without State and local
participation. These agencies do not shy away from the
responsibilities in providing this assistance, but need
additional resources to meet their many responsibilities.
The Southwest border was quick to realize that the total
infrastructure of narcotics law enforcement has to keep pace.
The HIDTA program's initial emphasis on investigations and
interdiction resulted in the impact in other areas of the
criminal justice system; most specifically, prosecutions and
jails.
For example, increased emphasis and resources directed to
interdiction initiatives at and between the ports of entry
produced numbers of defendants that soon overloaded the ability
of the U.S. Attorney's Office to prosecute. As a result,
prosecutions initiatives were developed by the HIDTA to bring
into play cross-designated local and State prosecutors to close
this gap, by handling the dramatic increase in cases as a
result of the enforcement efforts. For instance, the local
prosecutors in San Diego at the D.A.'s office are prosecuting
close to 2,000 cases per year, which can be primarily
attributed to border interdiction efforts.
It is likewise important to recognize that there must be
sufficient detention facilities capable of handling the
increased number of defendants as a result of the HIDTA
enforcement initiatives. Often, defendants have to be lodged in
facilities a substantial distance from the jurisdiction. I know
we have prisoners from California housed in Texas for periods
of time. And, you know, the logistics of that is mind-boggling,
to say the least. Often, in more extreme cases, operations have
been delayed until adequate jail space can be obtained for the
people to be arrested.
In summary, the agencies engaged in this effort have
benefited greatly from the support you have already provided.
The HIDTA program has increased in effectiveness and
cooperation. However, our work is not done. As you have already
heard, additional manpower, technology, and equipment are
needed by the men and women who defend this Nation's border in
a very difficult and dangerous environment.
Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Usrey follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony.
I would like to recognize now Chief Tony Castaneda, the
chief of police of Eagle Pass, TX. You are recognized. Welcome,
sir.
Mr. Castaneda. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this
subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate the invitation that I
received to come before you and express our concerns. I commend
you for the effort that you are doing for the American people.
I have prepared a statement that I would like to be entered
into the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, the entire statement will be
made part of the record.
Mr. Castaneda. This statement is prepared for the purpose
of outlining concerns that we face along the Southwest border
of the United States. On February 25, 1997, I appeared and
testified before this U.S. House of Representatives
subcommittee on ``Counter-Narcotics Efforts in Mexico and Along
the Southwest Border.''
At that time, my testimony was to bring to light the lack
of Federal law enforcement efforts in the areas of personnel,
equipment, and other tangible resources on the Southwest
border. Our citizens, mainly the ranchers and their families
that lived along the Rio Grande River, lived in fear of
narcotraffickers romping through their properties, spreading
fear, and leaving behind paths of destruction of private
property.
Since that time, we have witnessed a steady but slow
process of hiring Federal law enforcement personnel. During
this same time, we continued to witness the steady increase of
narcotics seizures and arrests. However, the true issue is that
we are not stopping the steady flow of narcotics into our
country. This is also a true reflection that the Southwest
border of the United States is poorly understaffed to meet the
challenging issues surrounding the fight against
narcotrafficking.
I represent a Texas community, Eagle Pass, of about 45,000
residents, that borders a Mexican community with a population
of close to 350,000. Our local U.S. Border Patrol leads their
sector in apprehension and seizures of narcotics and its
traffickers. They have become our most important drug
interdiction force defending the Southwest border of this
country.
I have been the chief of police of our department for the
past 5 years, and over that time I have seen the steady
increase of narcotics-related crimes in the community. Most of
the apprehended criminals have an extensive history of
involvement in narcotics.
Over the years, we have established an outstanding
professional relationship with our Federal law enforcement
counterparts. Our department has six officers assigned to the
local DEA office and three to the U.S. Customs Office of
Criminal Investigations. Their efforts are commendable.
It is an overwhelming battle, and certainly, Federal
attention needs to be serviced in this area in order to
maintain the American quality of life that all of us are
entitled. The protection of our quality of life is essential to
the economic and social stability of our border communities.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Castaneda follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank each of you for your testimony and
participation today.
First question: You represent different border States:
Arizona, California, Texas. I guess, generally, you are seeing
an increase in narcotics trafficking along the border. Let's
see, Arizona?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, we are.
Mr. Mica. You said you are seeing an increase in cocaine?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, 194 percent.
Mr. Mica. And heroin, also?
Mr. Rodriguez. And in heroin.
Mr. Mica. What about California?
Mr. Usrey. Yes, sir. The statistics which have been
displayed demonstrate that there has been an upsurge, at least
in the amount of drugs that have been confiscated.
Mr. Mica. Texas?
Mr. Castaneda. Absolutely. In 1997, we seized 31,000
pounds. This year, 1999, with the fiscal year still not
closing, we are at 41,000 pounds.
Mr. Mica. Are you seeing also increased violence along
these areas, Arizona?
Mr. Rodriguez. I started office as a narcotics agent when
the sergeant was killed in 1991. Then, we were three agents in
the Task Force. Comparing then to now, the last two homicides
of law enforcement officials in our county have been drug
related during the course of a drug smuggling operation.
Mr. Mica. So you are seeing increased violence?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes.
Mr. Mica. In Arizona?
Mr. Rodriguez. In Arizona. The rock-throwing incidents
around the Nogales and Santa Cruz County areas is just as
severe. Patrol agents have to have wrought iron metal plates
over their windshields because they keep on breaking them.
Mr. Mica. California?
Mr. Usrey. Yes, sir. It is sort of a unique situation, if
you will, because we are seeing some decreases in violence in
some of our major cities. Yet, as we increase the tension on
the border, as we become more successful, we have created a
situation where the drug traffickers themselves become more
violent. That violence has flowed over into the California
side.
We have seen Border Patrol agents taken under sniper fire.
We have seen an increased evidence of weapons in vehicles, and
so forth. So we are seeing some violence associated with drug
trafficking, even though overall the statistics out of San
Diego show an improvement in the homicide rate.
Mr. Mica. Texas?
Mr. Castaneda. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Within the city limits of
Eagle Pass, we have confronted several high-speed pursuit
chases involving narcotics traffickers, endangering our local
residents, public streets, and highways. I have heard reports
of Border Patrol agents encountering armed and violent
narcotics traffickers. So the tension is there. The situation
is there. The narcotics continue to be there.
Mr. Mica. My last question is to each of you. You heard
today the problem we have with 23 Federal agencies and four
departments, plus local and State efforts, in trying to
coordinate these border activities. You also heard concerns
from the panel about no one being in charge. How would you make
this process and these activities of Federal agencies more
effective? What can we do?
I think we had testimony in here that, of course, the
resources to local governments and the decrease in the Byrne
grants affected you. But structurally and operationally, as far
as the Federal agencies, how could we do a better job? We will
start maybe in reverse order. Chief.
Mr. Castaneda. As I closed my statement, Mr. Mica, we have
an excellent relationship that I can attribute to a good
working relationship with our Federal counterparts. However, I
see an attitude of turf. This is nerve-racking, and also
unhealthy for our efforts. I have heard from my officers--as I
mentioned that I have officers assigned to the DEA and to the
Office of Investigations of the U.S. Customs Service--where one
agency is spearheading, for instance, a wiretap that requires a
lot of man-hours and a lot of time, and being limited in staff.
They are not bringing in DEA resources to assist them.
I see this as very counter-productive. You know, certainly,
somebody needs to be overseeing this. I liked the comment that
the gentleman from California mentioned about the Mexicans
bringing the truckload and bringing the Federal officers and
lining them up and saying, ``We are going to bring in the
military and ship you all out, if you do not do what we pay you
to do.'' Basically, that is what we need to do, to call the
shots.
Sir, I do not know if you are the one that made the
comment, but I wholeheartedly agree with that.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. There are turf wars. There is no doubt about
it, Representative, as you know, from being in the Border
Patrol. I was born and raised in Nogales, AZ. I am a local boy.
But when it gets down to doing an operation, a case, I have to
be the mediator. Because I am a local; I have to play. You
know, these people that come in and head up these eight Federal
agencies, they see me coming, and they know what I am going to
be asking. I am going to be asking for their help. And I am not
going to leave them until they give me their help.
Some of them do not like me coming around. The thing is, I
am not going to protect my community and my officers with turf
wars. The only way we are going to put bad people in jail is by
working together, which is what we have been doing. Operation
Cebias with the HIDTA initiatives is working. We are talking to
each other. We are co-located, which we never were, with the
U.S. Customs Office on Enforcement. It is improving, but there
is a lot of work to be done.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Usrey.
Mr. Usrey. Thank you. And I certainly share the concerns of
the committee, General McCaffrey and my cohorts here. But I
would like to briefly discuss operation COBIJA an initiative
that was touched on. That operation brings together the
Federal, State, and local agencies in a coordinated fashion,
through the use of regional coordination centers. These
regional coordination centers--and they are located in the
counties of San Diego, Imperial Valley, in Arizona and New
Mexico--are under the joint supervision of the Border Patrol
and the local sheriffs.
Under that umbrella, everyone comes to lay out their plans
and to coordinate operations. An interim step, but it seems to
be a step in the right direction. I think the officers out
there want to do the right thing and they want to be
operationally effective. Sometimes turf issues come from areas
higher than the officers on the street who are out there doing
the job.
The point that was made by Lieutenant Rodriguez was very
good. The State and local officers in leadership along the
border, play a very important role as mediators. They are able
to come to a HIDTA executive committee--and Representative
Reyes has sat on those committees--and mediate and bring
everyone to a common purpose. It is awfully hard to have
disagreements among the Federal agencies in front of their
State and local counterparts. I think that is a very positive
influence, and has worked well as a start toward this area of
coordination and mediation.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by
thanking all three gentlemen for being here, and for the job
that you do and the role that you play on the front lines of
the Nation's war on drugs.
I want to ask you to comment on a number of different
areas. The first one is, as Mr. Usrey had mentioned I
definitely appreciate the role that you play in funding the
HIDTAs. The question that I asked the General earlier, in terms
of the number of HIDTAs that exist today versus the initial
five that we started out with in 1992, can I get an opinion
from you in terms of my comment that if everything is a
priority then nothing becomes a priority?
What is your perspective of the Southwest border being the
focal point in terms of this Nation's war on drugs, and then
not getting, perhaps, the attention or the support for those
five HIDTAs?
Mr. Usrey. Thank you. I do share that concern. I think it
is shared by all of us particularly, the original five gateway
HIDTAs. It was clear that these HIDTAs were not only attacking
the drug trafficking problem in their area, but also they had
an impact outside that area.
And, while I think that there is a compliment there
someplace that the HIDTA system must be working, because people
want to copy it and have more HIDTAs throughout the country--I
think that is probably a positive thing--we have been very
concerned that it would take away from the prioritization and
the resources to the border.
I will say that we have received increases. As late as the
Emergency Appropriations bill, we received additional money for
the Southwest border. So it has not been a totally bleak
picture, but basically one of level funding.
The other thing that has impacted us, and General McCaffrey
addressed it, is that some of the discretion has been taken
away from ONDCP. So where there is a necessity for additional
resources--say, in El Paso and New Mexico, or any one of the
other areas--there has been very little discretionary money.
And some of that new money has been prioritized prior to the
time it reaches ONDCP. I think has created some difficulty.
Mr. Reyes. In your role as the director or overseer of the
five HIDTAs for the Southwest border, what is the process in
terms of funding those within the money that you get for the
Southwest border? I ask that question because we have all heard
the testimony, and I have recently seen the statistics from
EPIC about the West Texas HIDTA in El Paso and the west Texas-
southern New Mexico area being the major entry point for
narcotics; yet it ranks, I believe, last in funding for the
Southwest border HIDTAs. Can you explain to us how that process
works?
Mr. Usrey. ONDCP is the funding mechanism, and they make
the funding decisions; of course, in accordance with the
guidance provided to them by Congress. And that, I think, is a
direct result, as I mentioned, of the lack of discretionary
funds; that when there is a need, such as in El Paso, there is
no money there that can be programmatically provided. Instead,
it has taken exterior efforts to identify money to put into the
program earmarked for particular HIDTAs.
My role is as an advocate. I try to look at all the
programs along the border, each one of the five regional
HIDTAs; determine where the needs are; and then go forth and
try and advocate for additional resources, both to ONDCP, the
congressional Representatives and so forth.
Mr. Reyes. Then are you in agreement that the West Texas
HIDTA faces the largest challenge, in terms of the statistics,
and has the lowest funding of the five HIDTAs?
Mr. Usrey. It is like talking about my five children here.
I think that they all have individual problems. They all have
individual needs. It is hard to say that any one of them needs
more resources than any of the others. But El Paso certainly
has a major problem. They have continued to have a problem.
They have been very successful in the development of some of
their initiatives which, you know, are really successful and
the types of initiatives that we try to duplicate along the
border. And yet they are the lowest funded, and definitely
deserve more money.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. In the context for the other two
gentlemen, explain to us your opinion, or your concerns.
Because often in Congress, we hear a lot about the corruption
that comes with drug trafficking. Can you give us an opinion on
what you have seen there at the front lines regarding
corruption?
Mr. Rodriguez. Corruption on the United States or Mexican
side?
Mr. Reyes. Well, in general. Because I know it exists on
both sides.
Mr. Rodriguez. We are one of the few HIDTA initiatives to
have actual corruption agents from the FBI corruption squad
assigned to the Metro Task Force. We are real fortunate to work
with them, because our source was involved directly with the
actual arrests and prosecution of four INS agents down in
Nogales, AZ.
There is a corruption issue. There is a corruption element
there. There is a price that we all pay in law enforcement when
that happens. But we have to learn how to deal with that, and
foresee and act on those aggressions toward our unity, I think,
in fighting drugs.
It is a large money. We seized about $300,000 in that
operation. But the FBI does have a corruption squad in southern
Arizona to combat that.
On the Mexican side, we do have working relationships with
the Mexican authorities in Nogales, AZ. We do have a working
relationship with the consulate in Nogales, AZ. But we are
aware, I am aware, the agents are aware, of the corruption
issue that is in Mexico. We take it on a case-by-case basis.
Based on the homicide of Border Patrol agent Kurpnick last
year, they were very helpful. Groupo Vetto was very helpful in
apprehending one suspect in Nogales, Sonora. The FBI was very
successful in extraditing two of those suspects, and they just
prosecuted one of the smugglers that was involved in that
assassination.
Mr. Reyes. OK, thank you. Chief.
Mr. Castaneda. As you know, corruption wherever it is--
local, Federal--it always leaves a black eye on police
personnel. In 1997, when I came here and reported to a similar
question of yours, we had several officers within my department
that were suspected of that. I am glad to report that those
officers are no longer with us.
It is something that we keep an eye on, on things of that
nature, because in the narcotics trade, as my colleague
Lieutenant Rodriguez mentioned, large sums of moneys exchange
hands, and the integrity level of the individual engaged in the
counteroffensive has to be real high. So it is something that
is always under the watchful eye.
As far as my Mexican counterparts, recently in late July, I
was a special guest to President Zedillo in Mexico City. We had
a private audience with Mr. Medrazo. As General McCaffrey was
reporting, Mexico was reporting to us at the time of their
efforts to implement basic things that we usually do when we
recruit people: polygraph, background investigations, urine
analysis. I am talking about their Federal preventative police
that they are trying to get off the ground.
I left with very mixed emotions, along with my colleagues
that were present at the seminar. Nevertheless, it is a clear
indication that Mexico is trying to remedy a problem they
recognize that they have been having in their back yard for so
many years. Now they are trying to clean it up, in order for
them to maintain good grace with us.
Mexico is one of our biggest trading partners. Certainly,
it is something that pressure needs to continue to be applied
by our end for them to be doing this reform in their policing.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Mr. Bilbray.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you. I appreciate the testimony. I want
to just clarify one thing, though. I think too many people in
the United States miss the point that Mexico is not fighting
corruption, or any issue short of their own national
sovereignty. And I want to say that to the chairman, that we
have just got to understand that Mexico right now is under the
greatest threat to their national sovereignty. It dwarfs
General Scott marching into Mexico City.
And so it really is not just a PR thing. It is the fact
that an elected official, like the Governor of Baja, lives in
fear, not just for himself, but his family and anyone else he
knows. It's a matter of survival. And they are fighting for
their national sovereignty. And I think we need to remember
that.
The corruption issue, though, when we talk about it, I
worry that Americans talk about corruption and think about the
dollar signs, and do not realize that the ``mordida'' is only
half of the issue. The other half, at least on Mexico's side,
is the assassination attempts and rates.
There is a term in Mexico, and I am sure my colleague can
articulate it appropriately, that is basically ``Lead or
Gold.'' Do you want gold, or lead? Do you want to get paid off,
or do you want to be killed? And we have seen that extensively,
have we not, south of the border?
Do you want to talk in public about our assassinations
north of the border? Which is a concern that I have. Mr.
Chairman, I just want to point out a mile north of where I live
we have had over three assassinations along the Silver Strand
by hired hit-people. It is something that I think that we need
to be very concerned about; not just because of Mexico.
I would ask you this, gentlemen. I got a lot of credit for
asking for an investigation in San Diego, that someone said,
``Well, did you have inside information about corruption?''
when I asked about it. It was not that; it was just that when
someone has to work in close proximity to an environment where
there is so much corruption, so much violence, so many
problems, and so much money, I think it is rather naive, if not
ridiculous, for us in the United States to think that
international border, that artificial line, is going to stop
that from crossing into our infrastructure.
I am just worried that if we do not wake up to the fact
that the violence side of the corruption does not end up with
our agents: with the low morale, or the problem of morale, of
not having the infrastructure; the morale of releasing people
that they wish they did not have to release, because there are
not enough jails; added into that, the huge amount of money
involved; and then, if we get to the next step, the threat of
violence, not just to the agents and the people on the border,
but the fact that these assassins are working in the United
States.
Do you guys want to comment on that aspect of it, and try
to educate this body about just how great that potential is and
how it is so unique to the border region?
Mr. Castaneda. I would like to lead off on that, because in
my area we have witnessed several assassinations on the Mexican
side. One of the unique cultural aspects of living on the
border is the enmeshing of the families. I have a lot of family
in Mexico, myself, and as Mr. Reyes will attest. It makes it
hard to penetrate narcotics rings. We have officers that are
involved with families on the Mexican side.
But Mexico, like you mentioned, Congressman, ``Plata O
Oro,'' you know, meaning ``Bullets or Gold.'' It is so
prevalent and so very real, and has filtered into this country.
I do not have the intelligence to put the numbers and say how
many of these murders that have occurred on this side of the
border originated from orders from Mexico. Nevertheless, it is
an issue that needs to be dealt with and needs to have a very
serious look.
Mr. Rodriguez. In my area, it is along the same lines. But
we, as citizens of the United States, should be vocal, and not
seeing their actoins 2 miles away from the border as
acceptable. The term in Nogales, AZ, in translation, is ``The
Settling of Accounts.'' They settle accounts, all accounts. It
does not matter who you are, or from where you are.
We have been fortunate that we live on the border. I also
am aware. I know the threat. I keep it away from my family. At
the same time, I will never answer the door without knowing who
is there.
Mr. Usrey. I would certainly agree with my fellow panel
members here and the observations you have made. I have been in
law enforcement for over 30 years, and I thank God no one ever
put a gun to my head and said, ``Here, take this $100,000, or I
am going to blow your brains away, and I am also going to
assassinate your family.'' I have a lot of sympathy for the
individuals who find themselves in that situation. Irrespective
of how they got there, that has to be a very, very difficult
situation.
We have had a number of threats that have been made,
particularly against Federal law enforcement personnel on our
side of the border. For the most part, those are designed as
retribution for doing a good job. The key officers and agents
that are out there have been identified in the forefront of
some of the efforts, as Lieutenant Rodriguez said, and that is
of continued concern.
So I concur with your observation that is a potential that
we have to look forward to, and not readily, it is something
that could happen. We do know that drug traffickers use what
works. And if it works in Mexico, I would be very concerned
that they would try those same tactics here in the United
States.
Mr. Bilbray. I only want to point out that there was 1
year, Mr. Chairman, where we lost nine police officers in
Tijuana who were assassinated. A police chief was assassinated
and two Federal prosecutors were assassinated. And in fact, the
police chief announced that he was offered a bribe, and went
public that he was turning down the bribe, and within 42 hours
he was dead. That is how brazen it is. And so, as we confront
our Mexican colleagues, we have also got to realize how
sensitive it is.
Our challenge is to make sure that we do not allow this to
happen--this cult of corruption. There was a culture of
corruption that was very small. And it was not that; it was
like giving public officials tips, the ``mordida.'' The trouble
is, that allowed the gap for this huge amount of money and
violence to go into the Mexican culture and drive this hideous
problem that is going on now. Our challenge is to make sure
that culture of corruption does not transfer across the border.
And it is, to some degree. It is a real challenge that we have
to confront.
I wish that we would look at all of the people that are
dying on both sides of the border on this issue, and be as much
outraged, and put the resources in along our ``frontiera'' to
the south as we would in Europe. You know, we get all fired up
about how the media cover that. It is really interesting how
this has not been something that is covered in the U.S. media,
and it has not been something we have discussed on our side.
Remember, the bullets and the money that are used in this
corruption are coming from our side of the border.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman for his comments and
questions.
I want to thank each of the panelists for their
participation today. Hopefully, through your testimony and your
recommendations, we can do a better job in coordinating our
Federal efforts, working both with the HIDTAs and local
governments. Again, we thank you, and we will excuse you at
this time.
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I will call our third panel. Our third panel
today consists of four different witnesses. The first one is
Mr. Richard Fiano. He is the Chief of Operations of the Drug
Enforcement Administration and with the Department of Justice.
Next, we have Brigadier General Dorian Anderson, Commander of
the Joint Task Force Six with the Department of Defense. We
have also Mr. Michael Pearson, Executive Associate for Field
Operations of INS. I believe Mr. Pearson is going to also be
accompanied by Mr. Gus De La Vina, Director of the U.S. Border
Patrol. We have Mr. Sam Banks, Deputy Commissioner of the U.S.
Customs Service with the Department of the Treasury.
As I indicated to our previous witnesses this morning, this
is an investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. We
do swear in our witnesses. We also ask, if you have any lengthy
statements or documents you would like to be part of the
record, that you do summarize your remarks and present 5
minutes of oral testimony. We will, by unanimous consent,
submit those lengthy written statements or documents to the
record. With that, I would like to ask each of those who are
going to testify to stand and be sworn.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. This is answered in the affirmative. I would like
to welcome our panelists and participants. First, I will
recognize Mr. Richard Fiano, Chief of Operations of DEA with
the Department of Justice. Welcome, sir, and you are
recognized.
STATEMENTS OF RICHARD FIANO, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; DORIAN
ANDERSON, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE SIX, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE; MICHAEL PEARSON, EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE FOR FIELD
OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, ACCOMPANIED BY GUS DE LA VINA, CHIEF, U.S. BORDER
PATROL; AND SAMUEL BANKS, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS
SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Mr. Fiano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Mica and
members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear today at this hearing regarding the drug threat along
the Southwest border. I would first like to thank you and the
subcommittee for your continued support of the DEA and your
overall support of drug law enforcement. I have submitted and
offer my complete statement for the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, that will be made part of the
record.
Mr. Fiano. I think it is extremely appropriate to focus on
the drug threat along the Southwest border. As you mentioned in
your opening statement, this past Wednesday the DEA announced
the conclusion of a 2-year international investigation which
culminated in the arrest of 93 individuals linked to the Amado
Carillo Fuentes organization headquartered in Cancun, Mexico.
The investigation, known as ``Operation Impunity,'' was a
multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency investigation conducted by
DEA, the FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service, and a host of State
and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United
States. The investigation ultimately culminated in the
dismantling of an entire criminal drug trafficking organization
and the seizure of over 12,000 kilos of coke, a half a kilogram
of heroin, 4,000 pounds of marijuana, and over $19 million in
U.S. currency and assets. The operation demonstrates an
extensive and coordinated and cooperative effort on the part of
U.S. law enforcement, which exacted a devastating blow against
one of the largest Mexican drug trafficking organizations
operating along the Southwest border.
As you are aware, DEA's primary mission is to target the
highest levels of international trafficking organizations
operating today. Due to the ever increasing legitimate cross-
border traffic and commerce between the United States and
Mexico, several international organized crime groups have
established elaborate smuggling infrastructures on both sides
of the Southwest border.
Furthermore, it has long been established that in addition
to drug trafficking these international criminal organizations
spawn violence, corruption, and intimidation that threaten the
safety and stability of surrounding border towns, cities, and
States. The Southwest border remains your major point of entry
for approximately 70 percent of all the illicit drugs smuggled
into the United States. that are ultimately transported to and
sold in our neighborhoods across the country.
In response to this continued threat along the Southwest
border, DEA has established several initiatives which employ a
multi-prong strategy which utilizes and combines law
enforcement operations, intelligence operations, and provides
for law enforcement assistance in order to achieve success in
combating criminal drug trafficking organizations operating
along the Southwest border.
The objective of these initiatives is to disrupt and
ultimately dismantle criminal organizations that smuggle
illicit drugs into the United States, by linking Federal,
State, and local investigations domestically and mobilizing
multilateral enforcement efforts abroad. In order to combat
drug production and trafficking networks operating along the
United States-Mexican border DEA, in concert with other Federal
agencies, established the Southwest Border Initiative, an
integrated, coordinated law enforcement effort designed to
attack the command and control structure of organized criminal
enterprise operations associated with Mexican drug trafficking
organizations. The strategy focuses on intelligence and
enforcement efforts, targeting distribution systems within the
United States, and directs resources toward the disruption of
those principal drug trafficking organizations operating across
the border.
DEA, in cooperation with other Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies, is focusing increased intelligence,
technical resources, and investigative expertise on the major
Mexican drug trafficking organizations responsible for
smuggling vast quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and
methamphetamines across the border.
Apart from this effort, DEA and the FBI also provide
operational planning, intelligence, and training to the
Government of Mexico law enforcement authorities, to strengthen
their capacity to collect drug intelligence, attack production
capabilities, conduct trans-shipment interdiction investigation
and asset seizures, and prosecute key traffickers.
The Southwest border strategy targets specific Mexican drug
trafficking organizations operating across the border, and
attacks their command and control infrastructures, wherever
they operate. These organizations routinely utilize violence as
well as sophisticated encrypted telecommunication methods in
order to protect their organizations' illicit activity. The
Southwest border strategy includes a joint DEA, FBI, U.S.
Customs, and DOJ projects that resides within DEA's Special
Operations Division.
The Special Operations Division is a joint national
coordinating and support entity comprised of agents, analysts,
and prosecutors from DOJ, Customs, the FBI, and DEA. Its
mission is to coordinate and support regional and national
criminal investigations and prosecutions against trafficking
organizations that most threaten the United States.
As presently configured, we have sections in the Special
Operations Division, two sections that target Southwest border
major Mexican drug trafficking organizations, one that targets
methamphetamines, one that targets Colombian trafficking
organizations, and one that targets heroin investigations in
Europe and the Middle East.
The intelligence collection process is critical to the
interdiction of drugs. In response to the DEA, the Department
of State established a joint information collection center
program managed and operated by the El Paso Intelligence
Center. The program is a multilateral, multi-agency effort
designed to collect and analyze data related to the trafficking
of drugs with international origin and transshipment points.
Domestically, highway interdiction programs are central to
drug enforcement, especially on the Southwest border, since a
vast number of seizures occur at checkpoint stops within 150
miles of the border in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and
Texas. The highway interdiction program is promoted and
monitored by the El Paso Intelligence Center, but carried out
by State and local law enforcement officials. The operation is
active along the highways and interstates most often used by
drug organizations to move drugs north and east and illicit
money south and west.
Despite our many efforts and successes in identifying and
apprehending the leadership and members of these international
drug trafficking organizations, too often these drug lords are
not apprehended by our international counterparts. Even if they
are arrested, justice is seldom carried out which fits the
magnitude of their crimes.
The DEA, however, continues to work bilaterally with our
law enforcement counterparts in Mexico, with the hope that our
efforts will result in successfully diminishing these criminal
organizations' ability to utilize the Southwest border.
Mr. Mica. If you could, begin to conclude here.
Mr. Fiano. I will, sir.
Mr. Mica. We are going to have a series of votes.
Mr. Fiano. Yes, sir. Perhaps the recent arrest of
``Operation Impunity'' defendant Jaime Aguillar Gastelum in
Reynoso, Mexico by Mexican authorities is indicative of the
GOM's future commitment to such joint ventures. However,
continuing reports of corruption and the rapidly growing power
and influence of the major organized criminal groups in Mexico
cause great concern about the long-term prospects for success.
DEA recognizes the drug threat along the Southwest border
diminishes the quality of life of our citizens across the
Nation. We are hopeful that new initiatives in our cooperative
efforts with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies will enhance our ability to combat these drug
trafficking groups operating along the Southwest border, and
have more successes such as ``Operation Impunity.'' Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fiano follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you. I would like to recognize General
Anderson.
General Anderson. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you
today. I have prepared a statement to be entered into the
record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, your entire statement will be
made part of the record. Proceed, please.
General Anderson. Joint Task Force Six represents the
Department of Defense Title 10 commitment to provide military
capabilities in support of domestic law enforcement agencies'
efforts against the flow of the illegal drugs into the United
States. Joint Task Force Six does not initiate counterdrug
operations. Instead, we support the operations of competent and
professional law enforcement agencies. We take pride in
providing that support.
My official statement provided for the record details my
mission. There are three words, however, in the mission
statement that I would like to highlight: support, integrate,
and synchronize.
I emphasize the word ``support.'' With domestic law
enforcement agencies in the lead, military units provide a
capability that supports their efforts. Joint Task Force Six
provides support in three categories: operational, engineering,
and general support.
Operational support includes ground reconnaissance and
sensors, aviation reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and
transportation. Engineering consists of assessments, roads,
fences, barriers, border lights, shooting ranges, and
facilities. General support includes intelligence analysts,
mobile training teams, intelligence architectural assessments,
maintenance and technology missions.
In the fiscal year 1999, we will execute a total of 413
missions in support of law enforcement operations, such as
``White Shark,'' ``Rio Grande,'' ``Hold the Line,'' and ``Gulf
Shield.'' Our priority of effort is the Southwest border. The
majority of my operations directorate focuses its efforts on
support to law enforcement agencies and High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas along the Southwest border.
In conclusion, Joint Task Force Six provides Department of
Defense capabilities from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps, active duty, reserve, and National Guard, in support of
law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. The
multi-service, multi-agency nature of our support is
challenging, complex, and necessary.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak before you
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Anderson follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you, and we will suspend questions until we
have heard from all witnesses.
Mr. Michael Pearson, with INS.
Mr. Pearson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss illegal immigration and drug
smuggling on the Southwest border. I am accompanied by Gus De
La Vina, Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol.
I want to assure you that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service shares your deep concern about the
impact these increasingly intertwined criminal activities have
on the quality of life not just along the frontier with Mexico,
but in communities across the country.
I have provided a written statement that details INS' role
in drug interdiction, our strategic approach to border
management, and how it strengthens our efforts to counter
illegal immigration and drug trafficking, and how these efforts
are fortified further through cooperation with other Federal,
State, and local agencies.
Let me summarize the major points. The primary enforcement
mission of INS is to prevent the unlawful entry of migrants
into the United States, remove those who are here illegally,
and ensure that all those who enter the country at land, air,
and sea ports are authorized to do so.
Carrying out these responsibilities has put INS on the
front line of our Nation's fight against drugs. INS' vital role
in our national counterdrug effort is attributable to changing
patterns in both narcotics smuggling and illegal migration.
In response to the increased complexity of illegal
immigration, INS developed an innovative multi-year strategy to
strengthen enforcement of the Nation's immigration laws along
the Southwest border. The strategy treats the entire 2,000-mile
border as a single seamless entity integrating enforcement
activities between the ports of entry with those taking place
at the ports.
Under the strategy, we deployed additional personnel to
targeted areas, backing them with force-multiplying technology
such as infrared scopes, and underground sensors, and
infrastructure improvements. The strategy would not be as
successful as it has been without one vital element: the
cooperation and coordination with other Federal agencies, as
well as State and local enforcement.
Our comprehensive border control strategy has produced
impressive results in both deterring illegal immigration and
combatting drug smuggling. In fiscal year 1998, for example,
apprehensions of undocumented migrants in the San Diego sector,
which at one time accounted for nearly half of all
apprehensions nationwide, fell to an 18-year low. Thus far this
fiscal year, Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors
working along the Southwest border seized more than 1 million
pounds of drugs destined for American streets.
Simply seizing record amounts of drugs is not enough. We
need to dismantle the criminal networks involved in drug
trafficking. This is where our cooperation with other agencies
is critical. Both at and between ports of entry, we work
closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], U.S.
Customs, and others, to ensure that drug traffickers are
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
For example, in two separate incidents this week, Border
Patrol agents in McAllen, TX discovered more than a ton of
marijuana hidden in a compartment of a trailer they were
inspecting, and 1,400 pounds of cocaine in a truckload of
rotten watermelons. The drugs, valued at a total of more than
$46 million, were turned over to DEA, which will develop the
case against the drivers and others who may have been involved.
I am proud of the role INS personnel play in combating the
scourge of illegal drugs. It is a role they have embraced, even
though, in carrying it out, they often place themselves at
great personal risk. For example, last year alone, six Border
Patrol agents were killed in the line of duty, three of whom
were killed by drug smugglers or by individuals under the
influence of drugs.
We have made great strides in protecting our borders
against illegal immigration and drug smuggling, but our efforts
need to be strengthened. I look forward to working with
Congress to achieve this. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify before the subcommittee. I will be pleased to answer
any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pearson follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Mr. Banks, how long is your statement?
Mr. Banks. Very brief, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. OK. You are recognized.
Mr. Banks. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you. Mr. Chairman,
Commissioner Kelly asked me to personally thank you for your
support, and to recognize your recent participation at the
event we had for the B3 domed radar aircraft.
U.S. Customs is responsible for enforcing the Nation's laws
at our borders. We protect American industry from unfair
competition, the public from unsafe foods. We even check for
weapons of mass destruction. But our No. 1 enforcement priority
is drugs and drug money. On a typical day, Customs officers
seize 3,654 pounds of narcotics and $1.2 million in currency.
Our primary focus on the narcotics effort is the southern
tier of the United States and, specifically, the Southwest
border. This job to ferret out drugs on our border with Mexico
is huge: 278 million people, 86 million cars, 4 million trucks.
Our work force has remained relatively stagnant in recent
years, but narcotics seizures have continued to increase. This
is because we have pursued a variety of initiatives.
Two of the initiatives I would like to mention are the
Border Coordination Initiative and our 5-year technology plan.
The Border Coordination Initiative [BCI], was designed to
improve coordination amongst the Federal law enforcement
resources along our Southwest border; to give us a seamless
process for moving these volumes of traffic through our ports,
and to improve our interdiction efforts of narcotics, aliens,
and other contraband.
We in INS set out a very aggressive agenda to design how we
would manage our ports, how we would link our tactical
interdiction operations, how we would provide unified
investigative and aviation support and enhance our integrity
programs. BCI has been a force multiplier: Cocaine seizures are
up 27 percent, marijuana by 23 percent, and heroin seizures by
33 percent; in part, we believe, attributable to better
integration of our enforcement efforts.
We have doubled our controlled deliveries, which is when we
take a seizure up the narcotics organization food chain. The
Border Patrol has joined our tactical intelligence units along
the border, and they recently told General McCaffrey it was one
of the best resource investments they have made.
Our technology plan for the southern tier, which Congress
supported with funding last year, has placed eight large truck
X-rays at our major commercial crossings along that Southwest
border. We are now in the process of acquiring mobile truck x
rays and mobile gamma ray systems that produce images of the
contents and even show false walls in the containers--even into
double-walled propane tankers.
We are testing a variety of new technologies, such as a
pulse fast neutron analysis. We are installing gamma ray
imagers for rail cars and high-energy x ray systems to examine
sea containers. This is coupled with a whole series of other
hand-held and information technology systems that we have
designed. We can do the narcotics work and not have to
seriously impact traffic.
With the support of the National Guard, we have loaned
mobile x rays to help Border Patrol with special operations at
their checkpoints. Our systems are designed to be multi-
purpose, so that they support more than one agency. They do not
just look for narcotics, but they can also spot people that are
hidden inside these rail cars that are coming in. They can even
find radioactive materials inside these containers.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Banks, I am going to cut you short, here.
Mr. Banks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. There are four votes. We are going to recess the
committee for 1 hour. We will come back at 1:40. If you have
any comments at that point, we will finish at that juncture,
and we will also have an opportunity for questions. The
subcommittee is in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Mica. I would like to call the subcommittee back to
order. When we concluded, Mr. Sam Banks, Deputy Commissioner of
U.S. Customs, was testifying.
Did you want to conclude, sir?
Mr. Banks. Mr. Chairman, yes, I would like to very briefly.
In addition to the Border Coordination Initiative, in
addition to the technology piece that I talked about, the
Commissioner of Customs chairs which is called the Interdiction
Committee. It is the heads of all law enforcement agencies that
are linked to drug interdiction. That committee is now engaged
in developing a coordinated, fully integrated, multi-agency
plan developed for what is called the ``arrival zone.'' It is
really where the drugs first arrive into the United States, so
it is heavily tied to the borders. This is being done in full
support of ONDCP.
As a first step to boost this level of inter-agency
coordination, we are taking the Border Coordination Initiative
and looking to integrate the activities of the Coast Guard, to
integrate DEA more into it, to bring the State and local law
enforcement agencies closer, and to link it with the high-
intensity drug trafficking centers.
So this whole drug interdiction thing obviously is a
difficult, complex job to do with the limited resources we
have, but we believe we are continuing to make progress in
having a united front to deal with it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Banks follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you. I think we have heard from everyone
now. Mr. De La Vina is available for questions. You did not
have an opening statement.
General Anderson, when we were looking at the operation
along the border, we were concerned about reports we have had
about this organization, turf wars, lack of inter-agency
cooperation. How would you describe the situation now, as far
as improvement since January of this year, in September?
General Anderson. Yes, sir. I would like to address that.
Being in JTF-6 and primarily responsible for providing support,
we are actually in a very good seat to have an objective view
of the cooperation between the agencies, since we touch almost
every one of those agencies in executing our missions.
I will tell you, since I last talked to you and today, I
have seen a great deal of cooperation through, as an example,
the different HIDTAs. We have what I call the command presence
program, where senior officials from my organization go out and
visit the HIDTAs. We visit the intelligence analysts where they
are. We visit every one of our missions. We talk to those that
we are providing support for.
What we are finding is that many of the law enforcement
agencies, local, State, and Federal, are all on the same sheet
of music for those types of operations. From my point of view,
we have very good cooperation between the agencies.
Mr. Mica. Well, the drug czar testified just a short time
ago that he still felt that there was not a sufficient point of
contact, or someone in charge, to help coordinate these
activities. We have the HIDTA structure, we have the JTF
structure, and 23 agencies in four departments. If you were to
restructure or assign someone with full responsibility for
coordinating, how would you structure that, with all of these
folks in play and agencies and activities, General Anderson?
General Anderson. First, I would like to respond that my
mission is the same, and that would be to provide the support
but not anticipate----
Mr. Mica. Right. But you see it from your own perspective,
and it is hard. You work with these folks, I know, but we
appreciate some candor in this and some recommendations. Maybe
we can help structure this a little bit better.
General Anderson. I think the idea of what you can actually
gain, what you are really going to be able to gain, I believe
it is going to be found in the head of a coordinator first. I
do not believe that restructuring, a total restructure will
answer the most impending problem that we have right now. I
think the cooperative approach will in fact, and is answering
the problem right now.
Mr. Mica. The drug czar also seemed to think that the
Border Patrol should take a more active part in leading this
effort.
Mr. Pearson, or Mr. De La Vina, did you want to comment?
Mr. De La Vina. Yes, Mr. Chairman. You know, looking at it
from a logical perspective, there are basically three ways to
bring drugs in. That is through sea, through land ports, and we
are looking at the land port entries. What we are looking at is
Customs and INS pretty much have the control of the ports of
entry. We have between the ports of entry.
We have the largest personnel patrolling the border, which
is the U.S. Border Patrol. We are seizing a tremendous amount
of drugs. We are close to 1 million pounds of marijuana. We are
participating with the Customs effort at the ports of entry, as
well as with our own agency in the POEs with the inspections.
Customs has much control of that. We are trying hard to
make this work. We can control, or at least make a huge impact,
on narcotics between the POEs. Our cooperation with the ports
of entry is beginning to solidify, and that is beginning to
work. So we will be participating more. We are looking at more
intelligence. We are looking at more liaison. Hopefully, we
will have a better control of ports of entry as well as between
POEs.
Mr. Mica. Now, before this hearing, the drug czar said he
called folks together to prepare for this hearing, or at least
to update the drug czar and his staff on what was going on.
Prior to that occasion, how often have you been in contact with
the drug czar's office, Mr. De La Vina?
Mr. De La Vina. We work periodically with him.
Mr. Mica. Do they call a meeting from time to time, a
quarterly meeting, monthly meeting, weekly?
Mr. De La Vina. At the field level, we do not have as much
contact with the ONDCP, but at the national level, we do. Mr.
Pearson participates with that, so I will pass that to him.
Mr. Mica. Wait. Is it important that we have increased
contact, participation, at the field level? It is nice for
these people in Washington to meet, but the actual activity is
out there at the border. Is this something that is lacking?
Then we have the HIDTA structure and the JTF structure. Are
there adequate integration and meetings and coordination? What
is lacking? Just direction?
Mr. De La Vina. I think, first of all, the HIDTA. That is
much our local contacts working at the field levels. At the
national level, that works for policy and direction.
Mr. Mica. Everyone participates in the HIDTA?
Mr. De La Vina. Yes, correct, sir.
Mr. Mica. Do they have a chair of the HIDTA that is elected
among those?
Mr. De La Vina. That is correct. Our chief patrol agents
participate in that.
Mr. Mica. Is everyone meeting and then going their own way?
Is that part of the problem?
Mr. De La Vina. I think part of the problem is the lack of
coordination with the intelligence that could be forthcoming.
Out of the million pounds of marijuana that we have seized,
over 20,000 pounds of cocaine, most of the Border Patrol's
interdictions are cold interdictions. They are not based on
intelligence. We are out on the line.
Mr. Mica. Did you say ``cold?''
Mr. De La Vina. ``Cold.''
Mr. Mica. OK.
Mr. De La Vina. In other words, no----
Mr. Mica. Not based on intelligence.
Mr. De La Vina. That is correct. So that would be extremely
helpful for a coordinating element, if we could have a heads-up
as to either what is coming through the checkpoints or what is
coming through the line. But at the present time, all of our
seizures--the majority of our seizures, and I am talking about
close to 98 percent of our seizures--are cold; men and women
that are out there in the U.S. Border Patrol are seizing the
narcotics without any prior information, just based on
location.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Chairman, if you will yield for a moment?
Mr. Mica. Go ahead.
Mr. Reyes. I think it would be beneficial for you to
understand, if Mr. De La Vina would explain to you, the chain
of command. Because although he is the chief of the Border
Patrol, stationed at headquarters, he does not have any
supervisory oversight over the chiefs.
It would be beneficial, because I think that is where the
chairman is trying to understand what your role is.
Mr. De La Vina. The current structure of the U.S. Border
Patrol works in this manner. We have the Commissioner, we have
the Deputy Commissioner, and the Executive Associate
Commissioner, would be Mr. Pearson, who I report to. And from
that point, we have three regional Directors that are located
in the field, in Dallas, in California, and in the eastern
region in Burlington, VT.
Our chiefs report up the chain through the regional
Directors to Mr. Pearson. My role is much as a second-line
supervisor, in a manner of speaking, to the chief patrol
agents. structure.
Mr. Mica. That is a little bit----
Mr. Reyes. See, that is why, when you are asking him
questions, I wanted you to understand the way the system is, in
my opinion, broken. That is why we are trying to restructure
the INS. Because he does not have supervisory oversight over
the chiefs, and you are asking him if there is enough
coordination, at ground level if there is enough--well,
``coordination'' is about the only word I can use.
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Reyes. He does not have the ability to influence that.
The regional commissioners and then Mr. Pearson. He is actually
on a staff advisory level. So the ``Chief of the Border
Patrol'' is kind of a misnomer.
Mr. Mica. Is that established by agency rule, as opposed to
law?
Mr. Reyes. Right.
Mr. Mica. It is?
Mr. Reyes. It is within the agency.
Mr. Mica. So we can call the agency in and ask for a
restructuring on that.
Mr. Reyes. Right.
Mr. Mica. OK. It sounds like we have some organizational
and structural problems that can be corrected without
legislation.
Mr. Reyes. Right.
Mr. Mica. OK. Mr. Reyes, did you have questions?
Mr. Reyes. Yes. I am interested in getting the perspective
from both Mr. Banks and Mr. Pearson. Before I do that, I want
to publicly thank Mr. Banks for the support he has given us.
You and I were discussing the new post technology for the ports
of entry, and he has been very supportive. As a result of his
support, I think next March or April we are going to actually
field test that new technology, which I think is going to
really make a difference.
In addition to that, he has been very helpful in working
with the private sector. Because if that technology works, the
private sector is very excited about participating in defraying
some of the cost, because to them time is money, and money is
being spent by the trucks waiting in long lines, waiting for
Customs to inspect them. So I did want to thank you for that,
Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reyes. My question is regarding the comments by General
McCaffrey in terms of the port coordination. From what I am
hearing--correct me if I am wrong--the INS is OK with having
Customs take the lead at the ports of entry and the Border
Patrol take the lead in between the ports of entry. I would
like for each one of you to comment on that.
Mr. Banks. I do not know if it is quite as clean as that,
Congressman. But we really have, under the Border Coordination
Initiative, one person that we jointly designate between us as
the traffic manager. One person at the port will control those
operations.
Now, we each have our own missions to do. But part of this
effort with this coordination initiative was to get a seamless
process; one face of government to the traveling public and the
commercial process, also a single point to work on the law
enforcement arena. That is the reason we merged resources and
joined forces in our intelligence centers, is to provide
tactical intelligence.
Mr. De La Vina is correct; intelligence is probably one of
the things that we are missing the most. But we are starting to
make some real progress in getting tactical intelligence that
is good for the officers on the line. We have done it by
merging resources; not trying to take over resources or worry
about turf or anything like that, but simply getting together,
one place, one unit, to work on a common issue.
So I know that General McCaffrey is interested in having an
overall coordinator for the Southwest border. Treasury's
position is not necessary, that perhaps that is a redundancy,
another level of bureaucracy.
Can there be more done in terms of achieving effective
coordination between the agencies? Yes. Are we on track to do
that? Yes. Is it perfect? No. We still have a ways to go. But
we have HIDTAs. We have built this effort at the ports, to have
a single port management concept. We have merged intelligence
areas. We have border liaison mechanisms.
And adding another coordinating body in the midst of this,
if anything, I am not sure if it is going to add what everyone
is looking for. I think it is trying to somewhat impose a
military approach on a law enforcement issue.
Mr. Reyes. So if an individual like Mr. Rodriguez in the
previous panel goes to any port of entry, any of the 39 ports
of entry, and asks, ``Who is in charge?'' everyone at that port
of entry can tell him?
Mr. Banks. At least for that traffic issue. Now,
frequently, he is going to go for a migrant issue, or an
undocumented crossing issue. If he does, for the most part, he
is going to go to the head of the Immigration Service at that
port.
Mr. Reyes. So he will ask, ``Who is in charge?''
Mr. Banks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reyes. And somebody will say, ``Well, that depends''?
Mr. Banks. Yes, sir--No.
Mr. Reyes. You see, that is the problem. I have been at the
ports of entry with General McCaffrey, where he has asked that
question and we have gotten from 6 to 30 different answers, in
terms of who has the lead. It depends on what issue.
I think that is what feeds the frustration, and that is
what we heard earlier in the previous panel. Because I think
that if there had been an arrangement worked out by INS and
Customs and Agriculture and whoever else is at the port of
entry, we would not continue to hear the same issues that came
up in the previous panel, that came up with General McCaffrey,
and that, frankly, come up as you visit the border with the
delegations.
What we are trying to do is to decide what needs to be
done. part of the frustration is the fact that we are being
told at times it is being handled, but when we go back out
there and ask the same question, we get the same answers. That
tells us that it is not any better than it was, you know, 5
years ago.
Let me hear from Mr. Pearson, and then you can comment.
Mr. Pearson. Well, as you know, Congressman, I spent over
25 years in the Army, so I understand the issue of unity of
command and unity of effort. What we are trying to do here is
the unity of effort.
To ask somebody to walk in and say, ``Who is in charge'' is
for the most part immaterial. It is, ``What is the issue?'' In
much the same way, somebody walks into a police station and
says, ``Hey, this happened.'' Well, ``OK, you are in the city
police, but it happened in the county, so we need to refer to
them.'' Or it is county, city, or State or Federal.
When somebody comes in and has an issue, it does not matter
who they talk to. It gets put in the right channels right away.
That is what the port authority, the Border Coordination
Initiative, is all about. There is a team that runs that port,
and that team focuses all the efforts together. So there is no
duplication where it is not necessary, and there are no gaps in
it. It really should not matter when somebody walks in and
says, ``Who is in charge?'' It is, ``What is the issue? And we
will make sure the right people are handling it.''
Mr. Reyes. Except when somebody like Lieutenant Rodriguez
goes to a port of entry and says, ``I have a load--or a group
or whatever the issue is--coming in. And I need to talk to an
individual to get that authorized or OKed.'' And when they say,
``Well, it depends what the issue is,'' the issue is coming
into the port of entry, he needs to get it addressed. If the
issue is narcotics, it goes to the Customs, correct?
Mr. Pearson. That is correct.
Mr. Reyes. But then you also have to consider what kind of
documents those snitches have, or those informants. So
ultimately, what happens--and I am telling you this from what I
have heard personally and what at times I have experienced--the
issue becomes, ``Who has overriding authority?''
If you walk into a McDonald's today, and there is a dispute
about an order, and there is a shift supervisor, there is only
one manager of that McDonald's. There is only one person that
can literally make the decision, ``Yes, we will give it to you
free,'' or ``No, we are going to charge you,'' or ``You can
take a hike,'' whatever that is.
The frustration is that there is not one person at a port
of entry today that has that kind of authority or that kind of
flexibility. I have been with General McCaffrey when he has
been told about issues just like that; that in varying degrees
there is an issue of enforcement or an issue of inspection, an
issue of narcotics. The best scenario is that they have a mini-
conference of the three port directors: Agriculture, INS, and
Customs. In some cases, there is disagreement, and they have to
bump it up their chains of command; which means, ultimately,
that it becomes a bureaucratic nightmare.
I mention this so that you understand the frustration that
we hear. I have an advantage over colleagues like the chairman,
because I worked in that agency, and I understand exactly what
Lieutenant Rodriguez means when he says he has to step in and
referee from a local level a turf issue or a disagreement on
that level.
That is where I think we need to come to some kind of
understanding, or some kind of an agreement. That is why I
think it is important that we continue to pursue those kinds of
things, both at the ports of entry and in between the ports of
entry.
I do not know if you have any comments on that. I just
wanted to make sure that everybody understood what the issue
is.
Mr. Banks. I think we do have an idea on the issue. Go into
any major city in the United States, in their law enforcement,
and you have State police, city police, county police, and
sheriffs' departments. It is similar type situations on this.
Most of the work that gets done is through cooperation.
One of the things that would be of concern from Justice or
an Immigration perspective: If there is one person in charge of
drugs, then what happens to those INS resources? Will they be
committed to drugs, or are they going to be committed to the
immigration issues? You do not have somebody trying to dictate
that and diverting those resources. Instead, we work it out in
a cooperative way.
Many times, we support each other. In other words, if there
are not enough resources to go around, we either put in
additional resources, or the Immigration does, in order to
solve a particular problem. So in some ways, the cooperation
approach, this unity of effort, is a solution to a lot of the
issues out there.
Because a lot of these turf wars, what they are fighting
for is not turf; they are fighting for resources. They are
fighting for enough agents to be able to work an investigation.
They are fighting for enough people to man those lines and to
search those trucks. It is almost a turf battle for resources
on a particular issue, more than it is a battle amongst
agencies for who controls what. There is so much work out
there, none of us can control it.
Mr. Reyes. True, but the bottom line is, we still keep
hearing----
Mr. Banks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reyes [continuing]. People like General McCaffrey
talking about getting one coordinator, one person, where the
buck stops at that desk or at that office and who says either,
``Yes, you can come in, Lieutenant Rodriguez, with your case,''
or ``No, because of `X,' `Y,' `Z'.''
And that, I guess, takes it from a perspective of
constructive criticism.
Mr. Banks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Can I ask?
Mr. Mica. Go ahead.
Mr. Reyes. I want to just switch gears, and speak to
General Anderson. Because every year here with the Department
of Defense authorization we go through a yearly argument of
``Put military on the border.'' I would like to get your
perspective on whether the military has the resources, the
inclination, the interest, of replacing or supplementing the
Customs and the Border Patrol and DEA and everybody else, by
taking a first-line presence on our borders.
General Anderson. I think that is a bad idea. We are
trained to do other things, quite frankly. There are agencies
already in place that can operate within our national laws. You
will have to change our laws to allow us to operate to our
fullest capacity.
There is enough work around the world in the engagement
strategy that ties up those military resources. The way we are
organized now, and the capabilities we bring, the idea is those
capabilities are temporary in nature. That would allow then the
law enforcement agencies to not only use the resource, to learn
how to use it, and then possibly budget for it in the outer
years. I think we are doing that well. We do not meet all the
support requirements that come in; nor have we over our 10
years.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Congressman Reyes, one thing I would suggest,
however, is the National Guard, working under the auspices of
the Governors, is invaluable. You will see a lot of military
uniforms out there working in the cargo lots and working at the
ports.
Mr. Reyes. Right. Well, the issue is not----
Mr. Banks. Understood.
Mr. Reyes. You know, and the issue is not whether the
military can support enforcement agencies. Of course they can.
The biggest issue is--and we have had proposals here from
putting 10,000 soldiers on the border--the frustration of the
narcotics that are coming in and the impact that it is having
on our streets in the country.
Having worked in that area, I wholeheartedly agree that the
National Guard, JTF-6, do an incredible job in giving you the
resources to unload trucks. I think you divided it into
operations, engineering, and the third one was general support.
Now, all of those things are things that are very
beneficial. But my question was directed toward putting
actually armed soldiers on our border. I think it is a very bad
idea, and I wanted to make sure that I was not speaking just
from experience, but from hearing it also from the perspective
of somebody that actually--and in this case, General Anderson--
who is in charge of JTF-6 and in charge of the military
resources. So I appreciate it.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Fiano.
Mr. Fiano. Congressman, may I respond to the issue on the
coordination? As far as DEA is concerned, while on the surface
a coordinator looks like a practical solution, as an
investigative agency I would have some concerns about having
either a Customs port director or a Border Patrol port director
make a decision as, Congressman, you brought up, if Lieutenant
Rodriguez had a controlled delivery.
I would hope that Lieutenant Rodriguez could go to either
the Customs office closest to him, the FBI office, the DEA
office, regarding the controlled delivery. That way, it could
be coordinated. Because those controlled deliveries and
investigations like those usually target one of the larger drug
distribution networks within the United States. It may affect,
negatively impact, either a foreign investigation that DEA,
Customs, the FBI might be working jointly at a special
operations division, such as ``Operation Impunity.'' It may
affect one of the domestic cases.
I would like to see Lieutenant Rodriguez go to the DEA, the
FBI, the Customs Office, tell the Customs agent or an FBI
agent, ``I have this controlled delivery, it is targeting the
Rich Fiano organization,'' and then it will ultimately get to
the people who can coordinate that, who are sitting together,
FBI, Customs, and DEA. That way, we can pursue a larger
investigation, and not jeopardize anything that anybody is
doing.
Mr. Reyes. I think under ideal circumstances, that is
really the way it works, and it should work. But as you know,
sometimes these cases take a life of their own, and there is no
way that you can channel it. That is where it becomes critical
that there be one person, one contact point, that can make a
very critical decision. Because in some cases, a whole case can
turn on the ability of getting an individual cleared to go
through those ports of entry.
Mr. Mica. Well, unfortunately, we are running short on time
here. I am going to ask unanimous consent that we keep the
record open for at least 3 weeks. Without objection, so
ordered.
I will tell our witnesses we have a substantial number of
additional questions we would like answered for the record,
which we will be directing to each of the agencies and
witnesses here.
We do want to also thank you for your cooperation, whether
it is the Joint Task Force, DEA, Customs, INS, the Department
of Justice, and Border Patrol. As you can tell, there is a
certain degree of frustration of Members of Congress. We want
this to work. We need your cooperation. Some things that the
agencies can do a better job on in working together, we think
we can leave it to you. But we need your cooperation.
We do have an oversight responsibility and function. We
will continue to do that. We have poured incredible resources
into this effort. I think the Members of Congress are willing
to fund and support, but again, the results are important, and
cooperation is important. So we solicit your continued efforts
and cooperation to make this a success.
There being no further business to come before this
subcommittee this afternoon, this meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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