[Senate Hearing 106-47]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-47
FISCAL YEAR 2000 FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET AND EMBASSY SECURITY FOR A NEW
MILLENNIUM
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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 24, MARCH 4, 11, AND APRIL 21, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
54-972 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
February 24, 1999
1999 Foreign Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 2000
Foreign Affairs Budget
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., Secretary of State.................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted to Secretary of State
Albright by Members of the Committee........................... 41
March 4, 1999
Fiscal Year 2000 Administration of Foreign Affairs Budget
Cohen, Hon. Bonnie R., Under Secretary of State for Management;
accompanied by Hon. Patrick Kennedy, Assistant Secretary of
State for Administration....................................... 88
Prepared statement........................................... 92
Nelson, Benjamin F., Director, International Relations and Trade
Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division,
General Accounting Office...................................... 128
Prepared statement........................................... 129
Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn, Inspector General, Department of
State.......................................................... 113
Prepared statement........................................... 117
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted to Under Secretary of
State Cohen by Members of the Committee........................ 141
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Harold Pachios, Chairman of the U.S.
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.................... 155
March 11, 1999
Embassy Security for a New Millennium
Carpenter, Hon. David G., Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security............................................ 182
Prepared statement........................................... 186
Crowe, Admiral William J., U.S. Navy Retired, Chairman, State
Department Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings 161
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted to Assistant
Secretary of State Carpenter by Members of the Committee....... 202
April 21, 1999
Markup: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2000-2001
Proceedings of the Markup Hearing................................ 217
(iii)
1999 FOREIGN POLICY OVERVIEW AND THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse A.
Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Grams, Brownback,
Ashcroft, Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone, and Boxer.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Madam
Secretary, did you get any sleep last night?
Secretary Albright. Not a lot. Not a lot.
The Chairman. Well, we welcome you. This is the 14th time
you have appeared before this committee since and including
your confirmation hearing. We are always glad to have you.
Let me say at the start, Senator Biden, that this lady has
been up all night working on this thing in France, negotiating
to resolve the Kosovo conflict peacefully, and if we happen
accidentally to ask you a question that involves a lot of
detail, just say, I will answer that in writing, because you
cannot be expected to remember everything, not having any more
than you have had.
Secretary Albright. Thank you.
The Chairman. Now, during the past 2 years we have worked
together on significant achievements as a result of the
enactment of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act.
This past October looked pretty good for us. Two Federal
agencies, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the
U.S. Information Agency will become a part of the State
Department. Their functions will be directly under your
control, which is where they ought to be, and almost as
significant the Administrator of the Agency for International
Development will hereafter report to you and be under your
direct authority and foreign policy guidance.
Now, it may be easier to achieve peace in the Middle East
than to straighten that place out. We are making certain that
U.S. foreign aid used to support U.S. foreign policy objectives
is now in your hands, so I commend you, Madam Secretary and
others in the executive branch responsible for preparing the
plan and report regarding reorganization as required by the new
law.
Now, much of the plan reflects the legislative intent. I
look forward to its interpretation, of course, and Senator
Biden and I have written to you outlining those areas of
disagreement, and I will submit that letter to you in today's
hearing record.
[The letter referred to by Senator Helms follows:]
U.S. Senate,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, February 24, 1999.
The President
The White House
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: We write regarding the reorganization plan and
report you submitted to Congress pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act.
At the outset, we commend you, the Secretary of State, and others
in the Executive Branch responsible for preparing the plan and report.
We recognize, and greatly appreciate, the considerable effort involved
in the preparation of such a comprehensive plan. More important, we
agree with much of the plan outlined in the report, and look forward to
its implementation. Having said that, we share several serious concerns
regarding the plan.
First, as we wrote to the Secretary of State in January 1998, we
are deeply concerned that, under your plan, the function of
verification and compliance of arms control treaties would not be
carried out by a separate bureau, as is now the case in the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Instead, these important duties
would be performed by a ``Special Adviser'' to the Under Secretary for
Arms Control and International Security Affairs, as well as staff
within the proposed Arms Control Bureau. We regard this proposed
structure as an unacceptable diminution of the verification and
compliance function.
We are committed, as we know you are, to vigorous enforcement of
arms control and nonproliferation agreements and statutes. We believe,
however, that this objective cannot be adequately achieved under the
proposal you submitted, because it submerges these important functions
to such an extent that they will undoubtedly be viewed as a second-
order priority.
Therefore, we strongly urge you to modify this portion of the plan
promptly in accordance with the authority of Section 1601 of the Act in
order to create an Assistant Secretary position for Verification and
Compliance. As the deadline for the integration of ACDA into the State
Department is fast approaching, we urge you to modify the plan to
include the Verification and Compliance bureau as soon as possible.
Second, we are concerned, for both legal and policy reasons, by the
proposal to combine the exchanges and information functions into one
bureau under the new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.
Legally, we seriously doubt that the proposal you submitted can be
sustained. Section 112(a) of the Fulbright-Hays Act provides that
``there is established in the U.S. Information Agency, or in such
appropriate agency of the United States as the President shall
determine, a Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.'' (emphasis
added). Thus, even with the abolition of the U.S. Information Agency,
there remains a statutory mandate for a bureau to carry out the
programs under the Act. Section 112(d) of the Act further provides that
``[the Bureau shall administer no programs except those operating under
the authority of this Act and consistent with its purposes.'' We
recognize that Section 1611(a) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act empowers the Secretary of State to ``allocate or
reallocate any function transferred to the Department [under the
Act].'' That same provision makes clear, however, that it ``does not
authorize the Secretary to modify the terms of any statute that
establishes or defines the functions of any bureau, office, or officer
of the Department.'' In our view, the proposal you have submitted
improperly modifies the functions of the Exchanges bureau. In sum, we
believe the Fulbright-Hays Act is clear: the bureau operating exchanges
and cultural affairs cannot carry out any other duties. It should go
without saying that legislative history cannot override this statutory
command.
As a matter of policy, we believe the responsibility of managing
educational and professional exchanges is too comprehensive to be
relegated to a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The U.S. budget for
exchanges conducted by USIA is approximately $200 million a year; with
the commitment of our foreign partners in the Fulbright program, of
course, the sum total of these programs is still higher. Just as other
major programs are operated by the State Department at the bureau level
(such as narcotics and crime, and refugees and migration), we believe
these programs should be carried out by an Assistant Secretary. Indeed,
we believe it unwise to relegate the management of such substantial
programmatic resources to a level below Assistant Secretary. Equally
important, we are concerned that your proposal to merge the two
functions (exchanges and information) could cause grave damage to the
reputation our exchange programs now enjoy. If joined organizationally
with our overseas public relations function, the exchanges programs may
be perceived by foreign publics and students as little more than a
``propaganda exercise'' rather than what they are intended to be: an
investment in mutual understanding.
Finally, we are unequivocally opposed to the proposal to establish
a new Eastern European Bureau in the Department of State based upon the
geography of the former Soviet Union. We do not accept the argument
that the European Bureau as currently constituted need be unwieldy. In
fact, any potential management benefit of dividing this bureau would be
far outweighed by the implications of separating our policy toward
Russia from our policy toward the rest of Europe. Such an action would
be unhealthy for Russia's neighbors, for the further integration of
Russia into the democratic West, and ultimately for U.S. foreign
policy.
The Administration has repeatedly stated its strategic vision in
this region to be the creation of a ``Europe, whole and free.'' The
draft proposal for a new Eastern Europe Bureau flies in the face of
this stated goal. We gladly will work with you in finding the necessary
resources to make the European Bureau function well. We will not,
however, support the creation of a new bureau.
We appreciate your addressing these issues prior to integration of
ACDA and USIA into the State Department.
Sincerely,
Jesse Helms,
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
The Chairman. Your most recent visit with us was exactly 1
year ago to discuss ratification of the protocols to permit
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to become parties to
NATO, and that was a move that I believe will strengthen NATO
and ensure peace and stability to some extent in Eastern
Europe, but much has happened around the world since your most
recent visit.
In Iraq, the sanctions regime has collapsed, and we are in
a low level shooting war with Saddam Hussein. The majority
leader and I are hopeful that with the passage and signature of
the Iraq Liberation Act the administration might embrace a
coherent policy to remove Saddam altogether, period and
paragraph.
In any case, I look forward to hearing what you have to say
on that.
Now then, in my meeting with you and several other Cabinet
members in late January regarding Iraq your comments were most
impressive. I said that privately to you, and I say it publicly
this morning. However, your marching orders to the people at
the State Department must be lost somewhere in the shuffle. I
have heard nothing from the Department except the word, can't,
can't train an opposition force, can't get the opposition
together, and I guess my favorite can't is, we can't spend
money Congress has given us.
Now, I am confident that you do not share General Zinni's
view that the Iraq operation was a bad idea, and I trust that
you do not share Secretary Cohen's view that we are not trying
to get rid of Saddam Hussein because, Saddam, if you are out
there listening somewhere, we are out there to get rid of you.
Madam Secretary, you and I have spoken several times in
recent weeks about the situation in Kosovo. In fact, Mr. Biden
and I have invited you, along with Secretary Cohen and General
Shelton, to appear before this committee at another early date
to discuss the details of the United States policy in Kosovo,
including the President's deployment of troops in that region.
In any event, given the grave consequences of sending U.S.
soldiers into harm's way, and that is something that bothers my
very soul, I expect that we will be able to arrange a mutually
convenient time for that hearing prior to the implementation of
any administration decision to deploy American troops to
Kosovo. I am confident that you agree that it is critical to
have an open discussion on this matter with the Congress and
the American people as soon as possible.
In China, we witnessed last year a lot of the chummy toasts
and dinners at the United States-China summit where President
Clinton, shall we say, quite graciously uttered Beijing's long-
awaited three noes on Taiwan, and then promptly passed our
allies, South Korea and Japan, on his way home. He may have
waved at them from the airplane window, but that is all.
Beijing, needless to say, returned those favors with a
draconian crackdown on dissidents and with increasing hard-
headedness on trade matters, plus a military exercise in
November that consisted of mock missile attacks on Taiwan and
United States forces in Japan and South Korea, so I hope we may
be forgiven for wondering out loud again, what are we getting
from our policy of so-called engagement with China?
You and I have discussed that, and I will appreciate your
discussion today.
This is also the first opportunity you have had to appear
before us since the tragic terrorist bombing of our embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania, and first of all I extend to the
families and friends of those who lost their lives in those
bombings your and my and all of us, our deep regret at that
loss, and to reiterate to these people that there is unanimous
agreement that we must bring to justice those who orchestrated
and carried out the bombings.
I am confident that I will speak for the committee in
saying that although Congress cannot and must not write a blank
check, we are determined to provide the support necessary to
upgrade the U.S. embassies, and you and I have discussed that,
and that they proceed to provide secure work environments for
U.S. Government employees working overseas; and parenthetically
I understand that AID initially resisted official requirements
to collocate its offices within the new embassy compounds that
will be built in Kenya and Tanzania, but they have seen the
light on this one finally, and I am glad they see it, and I am
confident that you had something to do with that.
Closer to home, I hope that we can cooperate closely on two
urgent projects in the Americas. First, we will do our part to
help our neighbors in Central America rebuild their countries
from the wreckage left by Hurricane Mitch, and I believe we
could support the Central American efforts to rebuild.
Now, this we have got to discuss publicly and privately,
Madam Secretary, and it is of grave importance to me and I
think to the country. I want to be as candid as I can as I do
it. Nobody needs to tell you that the world has changed a very
great deal since the ABM treaty was first ratified 27 years
ago. The United States faces new and very different threats
today, threats which are growing daily.
China has 19 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 13 of
which are aimed at the United States. Saddam is doggedly
pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the
long-range missiles to deliver them, and according to the
Rumsfeld Commission, Iran--and I am quoting--``has acquired and
is seeking advanced missile components that can be combined to
produce ballistic missiles with sufficient range to strike the
United States.''
Now, if Iran succeeds, the commission warns, it will be
capable of striking St. Paul, Minnesota. The ABM treaty is the
root of our problems, as I see it. So long as it is a
cornerstone of U.S. security policy, as Mr. Berger emphasized
last month, we will never, never be able to deploy a nationwide
missile defense that will provide real security for the
American people.
It is time for the administration to submit the ABM
protocols that would expand the ABM treaty to Russia and other
post-Soviet States and debate whether the ABM treaty should
remain a cornerstone of U.S. security policy. I will do my best
to lead the charge, saying a very loud no.
A lot of major issues, Madam Secretary, and I look forward
to discussing them. Thanks again for coming, and I hope you get
some sleep tonight.
Joe.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
thanking you in our meetings for organizing for this year, for
your generosity and your cooperation.
Madam Secretary, the chairman and I are good friends. We
came the same day to the U.S. Senate 26-plus years ago, and we
truly like one another, and we truly disagree with one another
on some very important things, and so I want to thank the
chairman for accommodating an opportunity to fight those areas
of disagreement out like we did last year, and there are going
to be a lot of fights this year, Madam Secretary, and that is
why I say to the chairman I am glad I have got Barbara Boxer on
the committee now, and Mr. Torricelli.
Now, all kidding aside, this is our first meeting. It seems
strange, but the first meeting of the committee since the
Senate has been sworn in, and I would like to formally welcome
Senator Boxer.
The Chairman. I join in that.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator Biden. And also Senator Torricelli, who has been
added on the Democratic side, and I look forward to working
with them.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that my entire
statement be placed in the record as if read, and let me
summarize as briefly as I can, Madam Secretary.
[The statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming the Secretary back to the
Committee. It's a long way from Paris, where she spent the last few
days, but we hope this hearing will not be as difficult as those
negotiations.
We congratulate you and your colleagues for bringing the Kosovo
talks to a successful conclusion. I hope Congress will support the
agreement and the troop commitment made by the President. You must be
prepared to make the case to Congress and the American people that--as
I strongly believe--preventing instability in Europe is in the interest
of the United States.
The attention focused on Kosovo at this moment should not deflect
us from several other pressing foreign policy challenges. Let me
highlight just a few.
A preeminent challenge lies in Russia. Though the installation of
Prime Minister Primakov has created a surface calm, just below that
surface is the danger of political and economic collapse--a collapse
that would have catastrophic consequences. We must make clear to Russia
that we want its democratic experiment to succeed, and that we are
prepared to help--but Russia must do more to help itself.
A primary danger to world security is the prospect that the vast
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction possessed by Russia will find
its way into the wrong hands.
We must expand our joint efforts to control not only ``loose
nukes'' but also ``loose chemicals'', ``loose pathogens'' and ``loose
missiles.'' To his credit, the President has proposed increasing the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici programs by sixty percent for the next five years.
As Russia's economy goes south, we must reduce the risk that its
weapons of mass destruction or expertise will literally go south--to
Iran, or Iraq, or who-knows-where.
Equally important, we must revive the strategic arms control
agenda. The second START Treaty, approved by the Senate over three
years ago, languishes in the Russian Duma. We must find a way to
convince Russia to approve the treaty, and move to still deeper
reductions in a third START Treaty.
Your task, Madam Secretary, has never been easy, and it has been
made more difficult by the rush to deploy a ``thin'' national missile
defense. Such a missile defense may be warranted by the emerging
threat, but there are profound ramifications for the strategic arms
control agenda which have yet to be fully debated.
Other proliferation challenges confront us, particularly in East
Asia, where must re-energize our effort to prevent North Korea from
developing nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. The Agreed
Framework has succeeded in temporarily restraining North Korea's
production of fissile material--and bought us time to strengthen our
conventional deterrence on the peninsula. But we are fast approaching
the point where North Korea must resolve the world's concerns over its
nuclear and ballistic missile programs, or the fading congressional
support for the status quo will lead us toward a real crisis.
Here in the Senate, we must take up the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. This fall, a review conference will be held among nations which
have ratified the treaty. Thanks to U.S. leadership, the two nations
which detonated nuclear devices last year, India and Pakistan, are
moving toward joining the treaty. It would be a strange irony, and a
serious blow to nuclear nonproliferation, if the United States fails to
ratify this treaty.
We also have some unfinished business in the Senate--paying our
arrears to the United Nations. In the last Congress, the Chairman and I
worked with you to forge an agreement that had broad support in the
Senate. It is essential to our many interests at the United Nations
that we resolve this issue quickly--and promptly put in place one of
our most capable diplomats, Dick Holbrooke, to help carry it out.
Finally, to advance our foreign policy we need a first-class
diplomatic corps. Unfortunately, funding for foreign affairs has been a
second-order priority in recent years. We must bring the State
Department into the 21st century technologically, and we must ensure
that our people serving overseas are well protected.
I share the concerns stated by Admiral Crowe last week that the
three billion dollars for embassy security requested over the next five
years may be insufficient; it would be a dereliction of duty for
Congress and the administration to ignore this pressing need.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your giving me a few minutes to outline
what I see as the key priorities for the coming year. I look forward to
hearing from the Secretary.
My mom has an expression. My mom, thank God, is alive and
well, and is an 80-year-old plus woman who looks like she is
60, and still takes care of all her kids and her grandkids and
great-grandkids. Every time we complain about something, my
mother used to say--my mother is a very devout Catholic. She
would say, dear--her maiden name was Finnegan, which explains a
lot. She would say, dear, the Lord never sends anyone a cross
that they cannot bear.
Well, you have been sent a whole hell of a lot of crosses.
You are about to--I think your plate at State is probably more
full with significant, very significant issues, that are going
to have long-term consequences for this country's foreign
policy and security, and I must say to you, the way you have
handled that responsibility from emergency circumstances of
consequence such as Iraq, the Middle East, Kosovo, has been
admirable, but as the chairman pointed out, we have some major,
major disagreements.
I have an inordinately high regard, and I mean this
sincerely, for my Republican colleagues on this committee. Some
of the most devoted and smartest folks in this place I think
are on this committee and on the Republican side of this dais,
but we have some real strong disagreements between them, among
us, and they relate first and foremost in my view to arms
control, the whole question of our strategic posture.
It is going to be the future of where we are going to be. I
think our strategic doctrine is going to be tested more in the
next 18 months than it has been at any time in the last,
probably since 1972. The chairman has been very forthright. He
would like to see ABM no longer the cornerstone. I believe it
is the essential cornerstone of our strategic doctrine, and so
we are going to have a real knock-down drag-out as we should, a
legitimate intellectual debate about what our strategic
doctrine should be.
In addition to that, Madam Secretary, we are going to be
dealing with very, very basic and significant issues relating
to proliferation. I have been letting my chairman know that I
believe the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, if the Lord came
along and said, Joe, you get one off the wish list to get
passed this year, I would say the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. My chairman says if there is one that is going to stay
on the list I think he would say Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The Chairman. [Nods.]
Senator Biden. So a lot is at stake, as you well know, but
there is some help. There is some progress going on. The
efforts that you in the State Department and the President had
underway with regard to India and Pakistan look like they may
be bearing a little bit of fruit here. It looks like there may
be a shot at it.
And I think what happens in Korea, will have a tremendous
effect. Senator Brownback has made me even more aware today, of
an incredibly difficult problem in Africa in terms of live,
potent and flourishing slave trade going on a la the 15th
century and 16th century.
So there are a lot of problems we face, but let me conclude
by saying to you I think that your overall budget which is one
of the purposes of this opening hearing is sound. You seek
$21.3 billion for international affairs and roughly $3 billion
in advanced appropriations for embassy security, which is an
unusual thing.
We do not do that. We do not often do that, commit and
appropriate and authorize 1, 2, 3, 4 years down the road. I
think it is a solid sound budget. I think it gives you a
platform from which to be able to begin to deal with or
continue to deal with some of these very difficult problems.
I hope, and it is the chairman's wish--as you notice, since
the chairman has taken over this committee he has felt very
strongly about the jurisdictional responsibilities of this
committee and us authorizing your budget, and if I may conclude
by saying, in our discussions the chairman has a desire to try
very, very early this spring for us to have an authorization
bill out of this committee.
So it is going to be a very busy time, Madam Secretary. I
look forward to working with you. There is going to be a lot of
places we can agree, but on some of the biggest ticket items in
terms of our strategic policy and our foreign policy there is
not a partisan disagreement for partisan purposes. There is a
genuine, ideological divide on some of these issues that is
reminiscent of what occurred 35 years ago, and I think it is
good for the country we have the debate. I think it is good for
the country we resolve it, but it is going to be very hard on
you, and I wish you well.
Again, I will end where my mother begins, the Lord does not
send anybody a cross they cannot bear. I am sure you will be
able to handle it, but I want you to know and understand the
incredible pressure and time constraints you are under, and
thank you for being here.
The Chairman. To which I say, amen. Now you may sing the
Doxology for us. Madam Secretary, we welcome you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Albright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Biden, and thank you for your understanding of my
condition. Makeup not aside, I have earned this face.
So I look forward very much to having a discussion with you
today, and I thank you very much for all the kind words about
the leadership role in the State Department. I am very proud of
the fact that I think we have the strongest State Department
that has existed in decades, and I have a very fine team. I
hope that you all will recognize that along with me, because I
think that it is a great team.
When I was still a professor, and shortly after the end of
the cold war, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, I remember
giving a lecture to one of the graduate classes and saying that
the world was going to be much more complicated and much more
dangerous than the period that we had just gone through. I had
no idea that I would be in a position where I would actually
have to deal with those dangers and complications and crosses,
but as you know, I am honored to be in this position and will
continue to work with you.
I am very much looking forward to the way you have both
framed this as important discussion. I think these are debates
that the American people have to hear, and I think this is the
best forum for those debates to take place, and so I look
forward to doing that with you.
And I thank you also very much for rescheduling this
hearing. It is very kind of you, and I will try to keep my
testimony short and get through some of the issues that you
have raised, but obviously we will do more in questions.
I am sure you are interested in Kosovo, which I will
discuss, but I want to at least touch on the many other
challenges that we face. As I have said before, Mr. Chairman,
the overarching goal of U.S. foreign policy is to bring nations
closer together around basic principles of democracy and law,
open markets, and a commitment to peace, and nowhere have we
made greater progress than in the community of democracies we
and our neighbors are building in this hemisphere.
I want to begin this morning by echoing the President's
request for funds to help the people of Central America and the
Caribbean recover from the terrible destruction of Hurricanes
Georges and Mitch. Recovering this region matters both from
human reasons and because economic dislocations there could
have a serious repercussion here, and we have strong interests
in helping Central America bolster its democracies and provide
a good life for its people at home.
Elsewhere in the region we are working closely with Mexico
to expand economic ties and achieve greater success in the war
against drugs. We are helping Colombia's new President as he
struggles to bring peace and the rule of law to his country,
and we are pressing Haiti's leaders to end their destructive
political deadlock, and we are taking steps to help the people
of Cuba without helping their repressive and backward-looking
ruler.
Across the Atlantic this year marks the 10th anniversary of
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the birth of a new Europe, and
it also marks the 50th anniversary of a remarkable alliance. In
2 months here in Washington we will meet with our allies to set
the course for NATO's second 50 years, and together we will
affirm NATO's success in safeguarding freedom, welcome the
alliance's new members, and prepare for the challenges of the
21st century, and as we do so, we bear in mind that although
NATO stands tall, it does not stand alone. The EU, OSC, NATO
and its partners form the core of a broader system for ensuring
security and promoting shared values.
We learned in Bosnia earlier this decade that such a system
is vital, and we face a test of that system now in Kosovo. Now,
as you know, I returned last night from France and efforts to
lay the groundwork for a lasting peace in Kosovo. We did not
reach full agreement, but we did hammer out a viable plan for
autonomy and democracy in Kosovo through an interim political
settlement, and we made progress on and clarified, although we
did not settle the security issues.
The parties have agreed to meet again on March 15. In the
interim, we call upon both sides to refrain from acts of
provocation and violence and respect fully the security of the
Kosovo verification mission. Officials in Belgrade know that
NATO's authority to use force if necessary remains in effect.
The proposed interim agreement is the best deal either side
will get, and it should be agreed to by both. If a settlement
does occur, the United States will participate with NATO and as
partners in implementing it.
There are compelling reasons for this. Kosovo lies within
the Balkans, where there is no natural border to conflict. A
new explosion of fighting in Kosovo could expand into regional
hostilities that could cause massive suffering, displace tens
of thousands of people, undermine stability throughout South
Central Europe, and directly affect our key allies.
As I said, Kosovo is also a critical test for NATO and
other institutions in which we have a vital stake. These
institutions are being challenged now, especially by Serb
President Milosevic, who has lied repeatedly to them. If we
fail in our resolve, we will weaken the institutions we rely
upon not only in the Balkans but also throughout the continent.
That is a weakness we cannot risk and must not allow.
We also have an interest in seeing that the situation in
Kosovo is resolved in a way that promotes ethnic tolerance and
democratic principles. Failure to achieve this could harm
progress elsewhere, especially in Bosnia.
Having returned from Rambouillet I can also tell you, Mr.
Chairman, that there is zero chance that the Kosovo Albanians
will sign on to this deal if the U.S. does not participate in
its implementation. The President has made it clear that others
must provide the lion's share of the troops, and we have seen
our allies step forward and offer to do just that.
The stakes in Kosovo are high, and I will not sugar-coat
the difficulties that we face. We did not achieve all we hoped
for at Rambouillet, but Rambouillet was not the end of the
road. The people of Kosovo, whether ethnic Albanian, Serb, or
other, deserve to live in democracy and peace. They deserve to
have their rights and heritage respected, and I am convinced
that by far the majority of respected leaders within the
Kosovar Albanian community support the interim agreement we
proposed and they helped to refine.
The primary obstacle to peace remains Slobadan Milosevic.
It was his brutal campaign of repression that gave birth to the
KLA, and it was at his orders that so much of the worst
violence and suffering has occurred.
Milosevic no longer has a choice. If the Kosovar Albanians
accept the interim agreement, Milosevic must, too, or face the
consequences.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me now move
on to the Asian Pacific, where we are working with allies and
partners to improve security cooperation, restore economic
momentum, and build democracy.
In this region, there is no greater threat to peace and
stability than the situation on the Korean Peninsula. With our
allies and Japan and China we are discussing with North Korea
the prospects for achieving a permanent end to tensions. We are
also engaged in direct talks with North Korea on ways to
resolve concerns regarding suspicious underground construction
activities and long-range missile programs. These concerns must
be addressed if North Korea is to improve relations with us and
others in the region. In addition, the agreed framework must be
implemented in good faith, and by all sides.
Also in East Asia we have continued our strategic dialog
with China, and since that dialog began, China has taken
positive steps on proliferation, moved ahead on economic
reform, and played a responsible role during the Asia financial
crisis. We need to recognize progress even as we press for
more.
At the end of this week, I leave for China, where I will
reaffirm our commitment to dialog and straight talk. I expect
serious discussions about possible Chinese accession to the
WTO, export controls, and the need to prevent renewed tensions
related to Taiwan.
I will also bring a strong message of support for
international norms of respect for human rights. This will come
as no surprise to Beijing. President Clinton has emphasized
this principle repeatedly, and in recent months we have
condemned the arrest of Chinese who sought peacefully to
establish an opposition political party.
Let me stress that in our relations with China engagement
is not endorsement. We continue to have sharp differences with
Beijing, but we also believe that the best way to narrow those
differences and to make progress where our interests coincide
is through regular contacts and dialog.
In the Middle East we have lost King Hussein, a great
leader and an eloquent partisan for peace. His memory should
inspire us all to even more vigorous efforts. The United States
will persist in supporting the peace process.
We are in regular contact with Israeli and Palestinian
leaders encouraging them to carry out the Wye River memorandum,
and I urge the committee to back the President's request for
funds to help them do that and ask expedited consideration of
$300 million in assistance to support Jordan at this critical
time. I have met with the new king, and am confident that he
will carry on the wise policies of his father.
In the gulf, we have shown again our willingness to use
force when required to respond to flagrant Iraqi violations.
Our strikes have reduced Iraq's aggressive potential and we
continue to defend our pilots patrolling the no-fly zone. At
the United Nations, we are working with the Security Council to
develop a basis for resuming inspection and monitoring of
Iraq's remaining weapons of mass destruction capabilities. We
are insisting that sanctions against the regime continue until
Iraq meets its obligations, although we support helping the
Iraqi people through an enhanced oil for food program.
Our policy toward Iraq is to counter the threat Saddam
Hussein poses to his neighbors, our allies, and our interests,
and to support the Iraqi people's desire to reintegrate
themselves internationally and free themselves from a leader
they do not want, do not deserve, and never chose.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the new century
will demand from us a fresh approach to the dangers and
opportunities of Africa. Today, with regional leaders, we are
searching for ways to end bloody conflicts from the Sudan and
Horn of Africa to Congo and Sierra Leone.
These immediate crises must not, however, cause us to
neglect our long-term goals. I urge your backing for our
efforts to assist the hoped-for transition to democracy in
Nigeria, to improve Africa's emergency response capabilities,
and to gain passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
which would help the continent's most determined reformers and
expand our trade with the world's largest underdeveloped
market.
Mr. Chairman, I will be blunt. There are some both inside
and outside Government who look at Africa's problems and throw
up their hands. Many others throw up their hands without even
the slightest glance at the cross-currents presently at work.
The sources of crisis in Africa are hardly unique to that
continent, and Africa does not lack the qualities out of which
a freer and more prosperous future may be built. Progress may
be neither universal nor as rapid as we would wish, but we owe
it to ourselves and to those striving to build a new Africa to
assist their efforts when and where we can.
Mr. Chairman, many of the measures we take to protect
American security and prosperity are directed at particular
countries or parts of the world, but others can best be
considered in global terms. These include our international
economic leadership, war against terror, drugs, and crime,
environmental measures, and initiatives to promote democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law. They also include our
strategy for safeguarding American security by preventing
weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them
from falling into the wrong hands.
The economic crisis in Russia adds urgency to this need.
The President is seeking $4.5 billion over the next 5 years for
threat reduction programs designed to safeguard critical
weapons materials and technology. We are determined that no
nukes should become loose nukes.
We are striving to ensure effective implementation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, to negotiate an agreement to end
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and to
bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force. This last
agreement holds the promise of a world forever free of nuclear
explosions, but if we are to fulfill that promise we must lead
the way in ratifying the CTBT just as we did in negotiating and
signing it, and I strongly urge the Senate to approve the CTBT
this year.
Mr. Chairman, as my written statement describes, we also
want to work with you and the members of this committee to
develop an effective and comprehensive response to the
potential dangers posed to our citizens by missiles that may
carry weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, perhaps the best way to begin the work of the new
year is to finish with that of the old. We have been trying, it
seems forever, to find a way to encourage further reform at the
United Nations while meeting America's obligation to pay our
arrears. This stalemate has dragged on for much too long, and I
hope we can work together in 1999 successfully this time to pay
our bills and thereby increase our leverage in keeping the U.N.
on the reform road. This would serve U.S. interests and
increase our leverage for further reform.
Senators, the efforts we make to advance our security,
prosperity, and values are essential to our future, but we
cannot lead without tools. It costs money to counter modern
terrorists, protect American jobs, cool regional disputes, aid
child survival, and spread the gospel of freedom, but these
costs are small compared to the price we would pay if we sat
passive while conflicts raged, criminals flourish, democracies
unraveled, and weapons of mass destruction spread unhindered
around the globe.
Unfortunately, despite the strong support from many in both
parties in Congress, we have lost grounds during this decade.
In real terms, funding to protect American interests abroad has
declined sharply. We have been forced to cut back on training.
We face critical infrastructure needs, and the embassy bombings
in Africa were tragic evidence of the imperative to do far
more, far more quickly to reduce the vulnerability of our
diplomatic missions.
So I urge the committee to support with enthusiasm and in
full the President's budget for international programs. By so
doing, you will serve both our Nation and your constituents
well, and you will give the people who protect American
interests overseas the backing that they have earned.
Fifty years ago, only a short distance from where we are
now, President Harry Truman delivered his first and only
inaugural address. In what came to be known as the four point
speech, he challenged Democrats and Republicans alike to lend
their support to international organizations, to continue
programs for world economic recovery, to join with free people
everywhere in the defense of democracy, and to draw on our
country's expertise to help people help themselves in the fight
against ignorance, illness, and despair.
Today, we are summoned to build new institutions adapted to
the challenges of our time, based on principles that will
endure for all time. In so doing, we must heed the central
lesson of this century, which is that problems abroad, if left
unattended, will all too often come home to America.
We Americans draw immense strength from the fact that we
know who we are and what we believe. We have a purpose and,
like the farmer's faith that seeds and rain will cause crops to
grow, it is our faith that if we are true to our principles we
will succeed.
Let us, then, do honor to that faith in this final year of
this turbulent century. Let us assume, not with complaint but
welcome, the leader's role established by our forebears, and by
living up to the heritage of our past, let us fulfill the
promise of our future and enter the new century free and
united, prosperous, and at peace, and to that mission I pledge
my own best efforts and respectfully solicit both your wise
counsel and support.
Thank you very much, and I am now ready to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, good morning, I am
delighted to be here to testify regarding the President's proposed
Fiscal Year 2000 budget request for international affairs, and to
review the principles and practice of U.S. foreign policy around the
world.
I begin with the observation that we all know America's purpose. It
is freedom. We Americans are dedicated to the rights of all people. We
promote government with the consent of the governed. We believe in law.
We cherish peace. We seek prosperity.
Having said this, we have not said very much. For it is easy to
list goals. Our task, together, you and me, America and our friends
overseas, is to achieve them.
About a decade ago, our generation began a journey into a new era.
We set out free from cold war bonds, but were soon plagued by a viper's
nest of other perils. Along the way, we have not always put our foot
right, but overall we have made great progress.
Because the signposts of the past have fallen, history demands that
we be innovators and trailblazers, builders of new institutions and
adapters of old.
So in virtually every part of every continent, we work with others
to bring nations closer together around basic principles of democracy
and law, open markets and a commitment to peace.
We do this because it is right, but also because it is essential to
protect the best interests of our nation and people. In this era, our
security, prosperity and freedom hinge on whether others, too, have
access to these blessings. And the future depends on whether we can
help shape a world in which disputes are settled, prosperity is shared,
criminals are caught, aggressors are deterred and basic human rights
are respected.
i. american leadership around the world
(A) The Western Hemisphere
Nowhere are these truths more evident than in the community of
democracies we are building with our neighbors in this hemisphere.
Earlier this month, the President and I visited Mexico, with whom
we share a 2000-mile border and a host of common interests. We place a
high priority on our economic ties with Mexico, and on working through
the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission to enhance cooperation on matters
ranging from counternarcotics to environmental protection to
immigration. We also have an urgent and shared interest in helping the
people of Central America recover from the destruction caused by
Hurricane Mitch.
The President's trip to that region next month will remind the
world and our own citizens that, though the floods have receded, the
hard work of rebuilding from that terrible storm has just begun.
This morning, I ask your support for the President's request for
emergency supplemental funds to help our neighbors plant crops, replace
schools, reconstruct communities and resume normal lives.
An early and sustained recovery in Central America matters to us
both for human reasons and because economic dislocations in that region
could contribute to social conflict, illegal immigration and crime. We
have a strong interest in helping Central America strengthen its
democracies and provide a good life for its people at home. Sustained
recovery means expanding trade and creating jobs. These are the goals
of the enhanced Caribbean Basin Initiative legislation the
Administration will soon submit and for which I ask your support.
It is appropriate that we help our neighbors not only in Central
America, but also in the Caribbean and Colombia, to recover from recent
natural disasters. For this spirit reflects the flourishing partnership
that has grown out of the Summit of the Americas process.
That process began in Miami in 1994 and gained momentum in Santiago
last year. Its purpose is to build a hemispheric community based on
shared interests and democratic values.
On the economic front, we have forged a commitment to growth and
integration based on open markets, open books, better schools and
broader participation. Already, we export more to the Americas than to
any other part of the world. And the United States is firmly committed
to achieving a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005.
We are also working closely with Brazil and other countries in the
region to prevent the further spread of financial instability.
In the area of security, our hemispheric community has also made
great strides. With our help, and that of others, the troubling border
dispute between Ecuador and Peru has been resolved. In Central America,
after decades of fighting, differences are being settled by ballots,
not bullets. And overall counter-narcotics cooperation is stronger than
ever, because the understanding is broader than ever that the drug
plague threatens us all, and that we must all do our part in the
struggle against it.
At the heart of the Summit of the Americas process is a commitment
to democracy.
In nations such as Venezuela and Peru, Paraguay and the Dominican
Republic, we are helping democratic forces to assemble the nuts and
bolts of lasting freedom.
In Colombia, President Pastrana is committed to the rule of law and
a future of peace for his people. I urge your support for our efforts
to help him end his nation's bloody civil conflict, fight drug
traffickers, support alternative development, and create a climate in
which the rights of all Colombians may be respected.
In Haiti, the long-unresolved conflict between President Preval and
majority legislators has stalled economic reforms and led to the de
facto dissolution of Parliament. The Haitian people deserve better. It
is in our interest to continue assisting them as they struggle to build
better lives.
And in Cuba, we have taken a series of steps designed to help the
Cuban people without strengthening their repressive and backward-
looking rulers.
Our goal is to do what we can to help Cubans lay the groundwork for
civil society and prepare for a peaceful transition to democratic rule.
To this end, we have sought to make it easier for the people of Cuba to
be in touch with family and friends here in the United States; and
easier for the Cuban-American community to help those who remain on the
island.
(B) Europe and the New Independent States
We will mark this year the tenth anniversary of the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the birth of a new Europe--undivided, democratic and
working together for peace.
With allies and partners, we are creating new institutions and
adapting old ones to meet the challenges of the new era.
With the President's personal leadership, and crucial help from
former Senator George Mitchell, we have supported the people of Ireland
in their desire to end terror and live in peace through implementation
of the historic ``Good Friday'' agreement.
We have joined Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in signing the U.S.-
Baltic Charter, to show support for the freedom and security of those
nations and for their efforts to join western institutions. We are
pursuing our Northeast Europe Initiative to build bridges among the
nations of the Nordic and Baltic region.
We strongly support the expansion of the European Union (EU) into
central and eastern Europe, and Turkey's desire to be part of that
process. We are working hard to ease tensions in the Aegean and
continue to explore every opportunity for progress toward a settlement
on Cyprus.
We are among those striving to help the Organization for Security
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meet its potential as a catalyst for
democratic change, tolerance and respect for human rights.
And in 2 months, here in Washington, we will meet with our allies
to set the course for NATO's second fifty years.
The Washington Summit will be the largest diplomatic gathering at
the Head-of-State level in the history of our nation's capital.
Together, we will affirm NATO's success in safeguarding freedom, as we
formally welcome the three new members who will have joined our
alliance--a step made possible by strong Congressional support--and
have discussions with 25 other partners who will participate during the
Summit's second day.
Together, we will recognize collective defense as the core mission
of the Alliance; prepare to respond to the full range of threats the
Alliance may face; further develop our partnerships with other European
democracies; and coordinate our activities with key institutions such
as the EU and OSCE.
The NATO of the 21st Century will confront a changed and ever-
changing strategic environment. Possible threats include those posed by
international terror, dangerous regional conflicts and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that
deliver them. As we have already seen in the Balkans, these dangers
could emanate from well beyond NATO's borders, and while staying true
to our character as a Euro-Atlantic Alliance, we must prepare ourselves
to respond to them.
As we do so, we bear in mind that although NATO stands tall, it
does not stand alone. NATO and its partners, the OSCE, and the EU form
the core of a broader system for protecting vital interests and
promoting shared values. We learned in Bosnia earlier this decade that
such a system is vital. We face a test now in Kosovo to see how
effective the system we are developing can be under demanding and
complex circumstances.
As we have seen in both places, NATO's ability to use or credibly
threaten to use force can be essential in countering threats to
stability. But the efforts of other institutions and organizations are
required to prevent such dangers from recurring.
In Bosnia, we remain deeply committed to full implementation of the
Dayton Accords. Success here would remove a major threat to European
security, and establish a model for inter-ethnic collaboration that is
needed throughout the Balkans and around the world.
Since the peace accords were signed more than 3 years ago, enormous
strides have been made. The fighting has long since stopped; tens of
thousands of refugees and displaced have returned home; elections have
been conducted at all levels; the symbols and substance of nationhood
have begun slowly to come together; and we and our partners in SFOR
have begun slowly to reduce the international military presence.
It is essential, however, that we not allow events elsewhere in the
region to distract us, or conclude from past progress that the future
of peace in Bosnia is assured. The nation's bitter divisions are only
partially healed. The job of enabling refugees to return safely is
ongoing and difficult. Local authorities have not yet assumed the
responsibilities for democracy and peace that they must if Bosnia is to
become truly independent, united and free.
The Dayton Accords remain the linchpin of hopes for stability in
the Balkans. If those accords are to be implemented, the United States
must continue to help the people of Bosnia realize the benefits of
peace. The President's budget ensures that we will.
As we enter the last year of the old century, democracy and
economic reform have taken firm root in most parts of Central and East
Europe. However, much work remains to be done in the Southern Tier of
Balkan countries, particularly in Bosnia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We are helping to
sustain progress through the Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative
and other measures that support regional cooperation in sectors such as
trade and law enforcement.
Further to the east, toward the Caucasus and Central Asia,
democratic change remains very much a work in progress. In many
countries, respect for human rights and the rule of law is
unsatisfactory and economic reforms have been slowed by financial
turmoil.
With the aid of our soon-to-be-created Bureau of East European and
Eurasian Affairs, we will vigorously pursue diplomatic and programmatic
efforts to help countries in the region find the right road. We do this
for reasons of principle, but also because this part of the world is
critical to our own long-term security and prosperity.
I want to express my appreciation for past congressional
leadership, through Nunn-Lugar and the Freedom Support Act, to
safeguard the handling of nuclear materials and lay the groundwork for
economic and political reforms in the New Independent States. We will
need your continued help this year in providing the resources and the
flexibility we need to advance our goals, for we have entered a pivotal
period.
Every country in the region will hold parliamentary or Presidential
elections in 1999 or 2000. We hope to see progress on Nagorno-Karabakh
and on withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova. We will also renew
our request this year for legislation to repeal Section 907 of the
Freedom Support Act. And we will press for completion of CFE
negotiations by the OSCE summit later this year.
We attach high importance to our strategic partnership with
Ukraine, knowing that an independent, democratic, prosperous and stable
Ukraine is a key to building a secure and undivided Europe. In 1999, we
will continue to support Ukraine's economic and political reforms,
press for a free and fair Presidential election, deepen our cooperation
under the NATO-Ukraine Charter and strengthen our joint
nonproliferation efforts. Last week, I was able to certify--after
careful consideration--that the requirements of U.S. law with respect
to Ukraine's business climate have been met--albeit just barely.
We are also striving to strengthen our partnership with Russia.
During my visit to Moscow last month, I found a Russia struggling to
cope with economic setbacks, high rates of crime, and political
uncertainty. I was heartened by my meeting with leaders of Russian
civil society, and urged them to persist in efforts to build democracy
and to resist the forces of extremism and intolerance--including anti-
semitism--that are threatening progress.
On the official level, we continue to work closely with Russia. Our
constant communication helps us to manage differences and make progress
on important issues such as the CFE negotiations and Kosovo.
A peaceful and democratic Russia that is tackling its economic
problems and playing a constructive international role can make an
enormous contribution to the 21 Century. It should not be surprising
that the Russian transition from Communism to a more open system is
proving difficult. Our own democracy took many decades to mature and
remains unfinished. We have an enormous stake in Russian success and
will continue to help as long Russia is committed to the path of
reform.
(C) The Asia Pacific
In the Asia Pacific, we are working with allies and partners to
improve security cooperation, restore economic momentum and build
democracy.
Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of regional
security, and we are reinvigorating that alliance through the
implementation of new guidelines for defense cooperation. Clearly, with
the world's second largest economy, Japan is also an economic key. We
are encouraging Tokyo to expand its program of deregulation, open its
markets, and take other measures to restore growth.
There is no greater threat to peace and stability in the Asia
Pacific than the situation on the Korean Peninsula. With our Korean and
Japanese allies, and China, we are discussing with North Korea the
prospects for achieving a permanent end to tensions.
We are also engaged in direct talks with North Korea on ways to
resolve our concerns regarding its suspicious underground construction
activities at Kumchang-ni and its long-range missile development,
deployment and exports.
There can be no improvement in our relations until our concerns
about Kumchang-ni are resolved.
North Korea must also address our concerns about its missile
program if it wishes to enjoy good relations with nations in its region
and improve its standing in the world. Further, the Agreed Framework to
freeze and dismantle North Korea's ability to produce fissile material
must be implemented in good faith and by all sides--and we will need
the help of Congress in ensuring that our own obligations to the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization are met.
Also in East Asia, we have continued our strategic dialog with
China, a nation of increasing economic influence, diplomatic prominence
and military strength.
Since our dialog began, we have seen China move from being part of
the nuclear proliferation problem to becoming part of the solution. It
has endorsed extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; signed
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); become party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention; promised not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities; agreed to study membership in the Missile Technology
Control Regime; supported peace talks on Korea; and played a
responsible role during the Asian financial crisis.
These developments matter. China's international role is evolving
in a way that could aid regional prosperity and security for decades to
come. We need to recognize these gains, even as we press for further
progress.
Next week, I will visit China, and I will bear with me from
President Clinton a two-part message. The first is a firm commitment to
our continued dialog and to the spirit of mutual respect with which it
has been conducted. We will seek serious discussions about possible
Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization, export controls, and
the need to prevent renewed tensions related to Taiwan.
But I will also bring a strong message of American concern about
areas where we have differences, including human rights. This will come
as no surprise to Beijing. In recent months, we have condemned the
arrest, trial and sentencing of Chinese who sought peacefully to
establish an opposition political party. In our human rights dialog
with China, Assistant Secretary of State Harold Koh has emphasized the
importance of Chinese compliance with international human rights
standards, including a free press, freedom of religion and freedom of
political expression. And we have urged China to open a dialog with the
Dalai Lama regarding the protection of Tibet's religious, cultural and
linguistic heritage within China.
As I have said before, in our relations with China, engagement is
not endorsement. We continue to have sharp differences with Beijing.
But we also believe that the way to narrow those differences, and to
take advantage of the many areas where United States and Chinese
interests coincide, is through regular contacts and dialog.
Economically, the past 20 months have been extremely painful for
many in Asia. Governments have been challenged and millions of people
face the prospects of unemployment, reduced living standards and a more
uncertain future. Currently, we are working with a number of
governments and with the international financial institutions to
encourage policies that will restore growth, attract long-term
investment, improve financial transparency, sustain momentum toward
open markets, and help citizens adjust to change.
One of the central lessons of the current crisis is that nations
with strong democratic institutions are better able to withstand the
turbulence of the new global economy. This is a message I will carry
with me in my visits next week to Thailand and Indonesia.
In Thailand, I will convey strong United States support for the
government's economic reform programs and the efforts of the Thai
people to strengthen democratic institutions across the board.
To Indonesia, I will bring a message of concern and friendship from
the American people; including support for free, fair and credible
elections and a commitment to stand by the Indonesian people in what
promises to be an extended period of economic recovery and political
change. I will also discuss with Indonesian leaders the ongoing
negotiations to reach a peaceful resolution of the status of East
Timor. My emphasis will be on the need to minimize violence, promote
stability, and respect human rights as the transition to a new status
takes place.
Elsewhere in the region, we will continue to work with ASEAN, Japan
and others to strengthen democracy in Cambodia, and encourage a
meaningful dialog in Burma between the authorities there and the
democratic opposition, led by the National League for Democracy (NLD).
We are deeply concerned by the attempts made throughout the past year
to harass and intimidate NLD leaders. Burmese authorities must
understand that the path to international acceptance and economic
progress lies in movement toward a legitimate and popularly supported
government in Rangoon.
(D) South Asia
If the past year was a time of disappointment and unfulfilled
promise in South Asia, we are working hard to see that the coming year
is one of opportunity and progress. Following last May's nuclear tests,
we worked with India and Pakistan to prevent a nuclear arms race. Both
agreed to adhere to the CTBT by year's end, join negotiations for a
fissile materials production cutoff and tighten export controls. And
both have taken encouraging steps to improve bilateral relations with
the other. The two Prime Ministers just concluded a very successful
summit in Lahore. In the months ahead, we will be pressing for further
stabilizing actions.
Throughout the region, we will be working hard to advance our core
foreign policy objectives of strengthening democracy, enhancing
economic ties, countering terrorism, extending the rule of law and
promoting respect for human rights--including religious freedom, worker
rights and women's rights.
(E) The Middle East
In the Middle East, our primary objective remains a just, lasting,
and comprehensive peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors.
Earlier this month, this cause lost one of its great champions with
the passing of Jordan's King Hussein. As Secretary of State, I knew
King Hussein as an eloquent and deeply committed partisan of peace. I
hope his death will inspire us all to even greater efforts. In this
regard, we are seeking expedited congressional consideration of $300
million in additional assistance to support Jordan during this critical
transition period. I have met with the new King and am confident that
he will carry on the wise policies of his father; whose passing we all
mourn.
Let me also note that March 26 marks the 20th anniversary of the
signing of the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty, which remains the bedrock of
all subsequent regional peace efforts. The anniversary also marks the
beginning of our strategic relationship with Egypt, which continues to
contribute to peace and stability throughout the region.
In the months ahead, we will persist in our efforts to help the
peace process move forward. We are in regular contact with Israeli and
Palestinian leaders, encouraging them to focus on implementing the Wye
River Memorandum. To this end, I urge the Committee to support the
President's request for funds to help the parties carry out that
agreement.
In the Gulf, we will continue to work with our allies and friends,
and within the United Nations Security Council, to confront the threats
that the Iraqi regime's aggression and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) capability pose to Iraq's own people, its neighbors, the
international community and our own vital interests.
In mid-December, we joined our British allies in a military
operation that degraded Iraq's WMD capacity and its ability to threaten
its neighbors. We have since continued to enforce the southern and
northern No-Fly Zones and have repeatedly acted against Iraqi military
assets in the zones that threaten our pilots and aircraft.
At the United Nations, we are working within the Security Council
to develop a basis for resuming inspection and monitoring of Iraq's
remaining WMD capabilities. We will insist that sanctions against the
regime continue until Iraq meets its obligations, although we support
easing the burdens on the Iraqi people through an enhanced oil-for-food
program.
Our policy toward Iraq is to counter the threat Saddam Hussein
poses to his people, his neighbors, our allies, and our interests in
the region. We must and will persist in thwarting Iraq's potential for
aggression. And we will support the Iraqi people's desire to
reintegrate themselves into the international community and free
themselves from a leader they do not want, do not deserve, and never
chose.
Across the border from Iraq in Iran, there are clear signs of
popular support for a society based on the rule of law and a more open
approach to the world. We welcome that, though we are concerned that
Iran continues to pursue policies--on proliferation, terrorism, and
human rights--that violate international norms.
Iran's President Khatami has called for a dialog between our two
peoples. Last summer, I endorsed that call and expressed a willingness
to work with authorities in Tehran, when the time is right, to develop
a roadmap for more normal relations. The official Iranian response thus
far has been disappointing, but we stand ready for a dialog in which
both sides would be free to discuss all issues of concern.
America's interest in a stable and prosperous Middle East also
depends upon whether the nations there work together to reform their
economies, attract investment, move in the direction of democracy and
create opportunities for their people. In Algeria, we support a
credible, peaceful, Presidential campaign, which will transcend
radicalism and violence and carry out President Zeroual's stated
commitment to economic and political liberalization.
Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat is leading our North
African partnership initiative, which aims to encourage structural
reform in the region, increase regional commerce and improve political
relationships. I hope we will continue to have the Committee's support
for U.S. programs and policies that encourage progress in these
directions.
(F) Africa
The new century will demand from us a new approach to the vast and
diverse African continent, where both exciting opportunities and grave
dangers are present.
The good news is that dozens of countries are implementing
political and economic reforms. A majority of governments in sub-
Saharan Africa were democratically elected. Overall economic growth is
a healthy 4.5 percent. Africa's potential as a participant in world
trade has barely been tapped, and yet the United States already exports
more to Africa than to the entire former Soviet Union. Moreover, we
import almost as much oil from Africa as from the Middle East.
On the negative side, Africa is a major battleground in the global
fight against terror, crime, drugs, illicit arms-trafficking, and
disease. And an array of immediate crises demand our attention.
We are actively engaged with South Africa and other regional
leaders, and with the United Nations, in efforts to end the senseless
war in the Horn of Africa, salvage the peace process in Angola, achieve
a lasting settlement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, find a
solution to the decades-long strife in Sudan, and help the West African
peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, try to end the brutal fighting in Sierra
Leone.
We are also working with the World Health Organization and through
USAID to slow the spread of HIV/AIDS, which is causing incalculable
human suffering.
It is vital, however, that we not allow immediate crises to cause
us to neglect long-term goals. In Africa, as elsewhere, we must build
relationships and forge institutions that will serve as the foundation
for future progess.
This is the approach that drives our policy and for which I ask the
support of this Committee and the Congress.
For example, I urge your backing for efforts to assist the long-
delayed and often-betrayed transition to democracy in Nigeria, Africa's
largest nation.
I urge your support for our efforts to assist conflict resolution
through our Africa Crisis Response Initiative and the new African
Center for Strategic Studies, and to approve funding for key African
programs such as the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, VOA's new Radio
Democracy for Africa program, the African Development Foundation, and
USAID's assistance for development and democracy.
I urge you once more this year to approve the African Growth and
Opportunity Act, a trade measure that would afford greater market
access for selected products from the strongest reforming countries of
Africa. This proposal would also benefit American companies and workers
by expanding our trade with the largest underdeveloped market in the
world.
I ask you to listen to the voices of the African diplomatic
community here in Washington who have requested Senate approval of the
U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification. This is a Presidential
priority. And I invite members of this Committee to participate in next
month's first-ever U.S.-Africa Partnership Conference with senior
foreign ministry, trade and finance officials from 46 of the 48
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Mr. Chairman, I will be frank. There are those both in and outside
of public office in our country who look at the deep-rooted problems in
Africa and throw up their hands. Many others throw up their hands
without even the slightest glance at the cross currents presently at
work in Africa.
The sources of crisis in Africa, which include ethnic rivalry,
greed, unchecked ambition and ignorance, are hardly unique to that
continent. And Africa does not lack the qualities out of which a freer
and more prosperous future may be built.
Many in Africa are laboring hard to heal ethnic divisions, advance
the status of women, clear landmines, care for refugees, and build
civil society. An increasing number of leaders understand that the
continent's future prosperity depends on trade, and are committed to
the kind of market-opening and rule of law initiatives that will create
a sound environment for domestic and foreign investment. And I have
spoken with Africans from all walks of life who admire deeply the
democratic institutions they equate with America and urgently desire
our help in strengthening their own.
Looking ahead, we know that progress toward stability, prosperity
and democracy in Africa will be neither constant, nor universal, nor as
swift as we would wish. But we owe it to those striving to build the
new Africa, and to ourselves, to assist their efforts when and where we
can, understanding that our strategies must be based less on the
promise of short-term breakthroughs, and more on the potential for
long-term results.
ii. global opportunities and threats
Mr. Chairman, to protect the security and prosperity of our
citizens, we are engaged in every region on every continent. Many of
our initiatives and concerns are directed, as I have discussed, at
particular countries or parts of the world. Others are more
encompassing and can best be considered in global terms.
(A) Protecting American Security
The first of these is our strategy for ensuring the fundamental
security of our citizens and territory--a challenge that differs
substantially from the past.
The risks of cold war confrontation have ended, and for that we
remain grateful. But we face a variety of other dangers, some fueled by
technology's advance; some by regional rivalry; some by naked ambition;
and some by outright hate.
During the past year, we were witness to terrorist attacks against
two of our embassies in Africa, the testing of longer range missiles by
North Korea and Iran, periodic threats from Saddam Hussein, and nuclear
explosions in South Asia that challenged the global nonproliferation
regime.
The new year promises little relief from such perils. In his State
of the Union Address, President Clinton outlined plans for further
strengthening our military, reinvigorating our alliances, and
preparing--down to the community level--for the possibility of a
terrorist strike.
The defense of our country requires both the capacity and the will
to use force when necessary; and as the President made clear, we have
both. But force can be a blunt instrument and nearly always entails
grave risks.
So our security also requires the vigorous use of diplomatic tools
to bolster the forces of law and prevent weapons of mass destruction
and the missiles that deliver them from falling into the wrong hands.
The economic crisis in Russia and elsewhere in the New Independent
States (NIS) adds urgency to the need for effective action. The
President is seeking $4.5 billion over the next 5 years for threat
reduction programs in this region to dismantle or store strategic
weapons safely, secure fissile material components, and engage
scientists to prevent the proliferation of WMD expertise. We are
determined that no nukes become ``loose nukes.''
Around the world, we are engaged with allies and friends in a
multi-year, multi-faceted campaign to deter and defend against
terrorist acts; and to pursue, prosecute and punish the criminals who
commit them.
We are striving to ensure effective implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention. We have stepped up efforts to hammer out an accord
that will strengthen compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.
We have begun to make progress toward a treaty to end the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons.
And we are supporting the entry into force of the CTBT. This
Treaty, sought by U.S. Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower and John
Kennedy, holds the promise of a world forever free of nuclear
explosions, making it harder for other nations to develop nuclear arms.
But if we are to fulfill that promise, America must lead the way in
ratifying the CTBT, just as we did in negotiating and signing it. The
CTBT cannot enter into force without our ratification, and that of
other key countries, such as India and Pakistan. Those two nations have
pledged to adhere to the CTBT by September. We should not give them an
excuse to delay, nor should we lag behind. I strongly urge the Senate
to approve the CTBT this session.
During my recent visit to Russia, I emphasized the need to prevent
the destabilizing transfer of arms and sensitive technologies. This is
a problem we address not only with Moscow, but worldwide. We provide
material or technical assistance to more than two dozen countries to
enhance the effectiveness of their export controls. We also share
information. These efforts, although rarely publicized, have prevented
numerous transactions that would have threatened our allies, our
friends and ourselves.
Mr. Chairman, it is especially important that we work together on a
bipartisan basis to respond to the potential dangers posed to our
citizens, troops, territory and friends by long-range missiles that may
carry weapons of mass destruction.
We have lived with this danger for decades. But its character is
changing now as more nations develop the means to launch longer-range
missiles.
Our policy includes diplomatic efforts to restrain missile
development, an option that a number of countries have voluntarily
foregone. Almost three dozen nations are cooperating to limit
technology transfers through the Missile Transfer Control Regime. And
we are strongly urging nations such as North Korea, Iran, India and
Pakistan not to further develop or deploy missiles that could be de-
stabilizing.
We understand, however, that nonproliferation efforts may not be
enough. Our military power serves as a mighty deterrent against any
potential adversary. Further, to protect ourselves and our allies
abroad, we are working to develop theater missile defense systems, as
allowed under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
To protect ourselves at home, the President is requesting $10.5
billion between now and Fiscal Year 2005 for a national missile defense
(NMD) system, including the funds that would be necessary during this
period to deploy a limited NMD, should the technology prove viable and
a deployment decision be made. The purpose of such a system would be to
protect against attacks by outlaw nations.
I know that Congress may soon consider legislation that would
mandate deployment of a national system as soon as it is
technologically feasible to do so. The Administration opposes this
approach as too narrow. We believe a deployment decision should be
based on four factors. These include a thorough assessment of the
technology and the proposed system's operational effectiveness; the
status of the ballistic missile threat; and the cost of deployment. A
decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed within the
context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for achieving future
reductions in strategic offensive arms through START II and III.
I have personally made clear to Russian leaders that deployment of
a limited NMD that required amendments to the ABM Treaty would not be
incompatible with the underlying purpose of that Treaty, which is to
maintain stability and enable further reductions in strategic nuclear
arms. The ABM Treaty has been amended before, and we see no reason why
we should not be able to modify it again to permit deployment of NMD
against rogue nation missile threats.
We could not and would not give Russia or any other nation a veto
over our NMD decisions. It is important to recognize that our sovereign
rights are fully protected by the supreme national interests clause
that is an integral part of this Treaty. But neither should we issue
ultimatums. We are prepared to negotiate any necessary amendments in
good faith.
Mr. Chairman, the threat to the security of America and its
partners is most obvious from weapons of mass destruction, but that is
not the only danger. In many parts of the world, instability is fueled
by the unregulated and illegitimate sale of large quantities of
conventional arms. These are the sales that equip brutal rebel
movements, such as that in Sierra Leone, and make it harder to sustain
peace processes in places such as Angola and Afghanistan.
In response, the Clinton Administration has launched a small arms
initiative designed to curb the flow of weapons to Central Africa, and
to negotiate an international agreement aimed at making global
standards for the regulation and sale of firearms closer to our own. We
are also working to negotiate an agreement to control the export of
shoulder-fired missiles, which are ardently desired by many terrorist
and other criminal organizations, and which pose a severe danger to
civilian aircraft.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we also protect our security by
strengthening the rule of law in areas of potential misunderstanding
and conflict. That is why the Defense Department and our military
leaders have strongly urged Senate approval of the new and improved
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
(B) Sustaining American Prosperity
A second overarching goal of our foreign policy is to promote a
healthy world economy in which American genius and productivity receive
their due.
The American economy is strong today because of the energy,
innovation, and skills of the American people. We have the most
competitive economy on Earth. Our foreign policy cannot take credit for
that; but we can and do support it.
Since President Clinton took office, we have negotiated more than
240 trade agreements, including the Uruguay Round and agreements on
information technology, basic telecommunications and financial
services. This matters because trade has been responsible for almost
one-third of the sustained economic growth we have enjoyed these past 6
years. Today, more than ten million U.S. jobs are supported by exports,
and these are good jobs, paying--on the average--significantly more
than non-trade related positions.
I urge the Congress to restore the President's fast track trade
negotiating authority so that he may take full advantage of the
opportunities for further lowering barriers to trade in American goods
and services.
I ask your backing for our efforts to negotiate market-opening
aviation agreements, and an international policy on telecommunications
that could reduce the cost to our citizens of overseas phone calls and
mail.
And I hope you will lend your support to agencies such as the
Export-Import Bank, the Trade Development Agency, and the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, which help our businesspeople find new
markets abroad.
The State Department also supports prosperity by using embassy
expertise and contacts to provide appropriate help to American firms.
Under President Clinton, the Department has worked hard to develop a
dynamic partnership with the American business community and to ensure
that business interests are taken into account when foreign policy
decisions affecting them are made. As further evidence of this, we have
included in our budget this year a proposal for a modest pilot program
to help our smaller embassies work with our businesspeople to develop
markets in countries where other U.S. agencies are not represented.
During the past decade, the trend toward more open rules of
investment and trade has helped to spur record economic expansion and
raise living standards in much of the world. Over the past 18 months,
however, the financial crisis has applied the brakes to many national
economies and plunged a number, particularly in East Asia, into
reverse. Although the U.S. economy has remained healthy, important
sectors such as agriculture, aircraft and steel have been adversely
affected by shrinking export markets and increased pressure from low-
priced imports.
We have responded on two levels. First, we have rigorously enforced
our laws against unfair trade. For example, the Administration
expedited consideration of hot-rolled steel antidumping cases; helped
persuade Korea to curtail government support for its steel industry;
and urged the EU to take more steel imports. These efforts have borne
some fruit. Imports of steel mill products in December were 32 percent
lower than in November.
More broadly, President Clinton has responded with proposals
designed to restore world economic growth, reform international
financial institutions, ensure fair treatment for U.S. workers and
firms, and assist our trading partners in improving the management of
their financial sectors.
We have encouraged Japan to implement reforms that would help make
that country once again an engine of economic expansion. We have joined
forces with the World Bank and the IMF to prevent the financial
contagion from spreading further and to meet urgent humanitarian needs.
And we have made it clear, in promoting trade and supporting the role
of the international financial institutions, that serious consideration
must be given to environmental and worker standards.
Unfortunately, there are no quick or simple solutions to the
problems many countries now face. Success in the global economy
requires sound fiscal and monetary policies, transparent financial
systems, good governance and the rule of law. It is no accident that
nations with these attributes have fared best in the current crisis.
Nations with deeper problems must take the tough steps required to
develop broad-based and accountable democratic institutions that will
earn investor confidence and engender public support. It is in our
interest to help nations that are prepared to undertake these reforms
and we are committed to doing so.
One example of this is by calling attention to the crippling
effects of corruption on economic growth, investor confidence,
political stability and popular morale. I thank Congress for backing
U.S. participation in the OECD's landmark Convention against Commercial
Bribery. We will be asking your support for a broader convention
negotiated in the OAS. We are seeking support for anti-corruption
initiatives in Asia and Africa. And, as we speak, Vice President Gore
is chairing a conference with representatives from around the world to
discuss ways to fight corruption.
In recent years, trade and investment have played increasing roles
in efforts to foster development and raise living standards around the
world. But this does not diminish the critical role played by
professional development organizations such as USAID.
We know that many of our fastest-growing markets are in developing
countries where the transition to an open economic system is
incomplete. By helping these countries, we contribute to our own
prosperity while strengthening the international system, in which the
United States has the largest stake.
Over time, we hope that every country will have a seat at the table
in the international system, and that each will fulfill its
responsibility to observe global norms. This will not happen
automatically or by accident. Certainly, globalization and the free
market alone will not make it happen. It will never happen without the
right kind of hands-on assistance, in the right places, at the right
times, from those who understand how the process of development works.
So I urge your support for the varied and vital work of USAID. And
I hope you will embrace other economic and humanitarian assistance
programs such as the Peace Corps, our contributions to the multilateral
development banks and support for vital U.N. organizations such as
UNICEF, the U.N. Development Program, and the U.N. Population Fund.
(C) Fighting International Crime and Narcotics
Mr. Chairman, a third global objective of our foreign policy is to
fight and win the struggle against the hydra-headed evil of
international crime. Drug cartels and the criminal empires they finance
threaten us every day whether we are traveling abroad or going about
our daily business here at home.
President Clinton spoke to this danger last spring when he unveiled
a comprehensive strategy to integrate all facets of the Federal
response to international crime. Led by our Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the State Department is a key
partner in this effort, which is designed to extend the first line of
defense against crime far beyond U.S. borders.
To this end, we are working with other nations as never before to
train police, prosecutors and judges, seize drug assets, help farmers
find alternatives to illicit crops, expose and close front companies,
halt money laundering, track criminals and bring smugglers of
contraband to justice.
These efforts have paid off in significantly reduced coca
cultivation in Bolivia and Peru, and the promise of a more concerted
anti-narcotics program in Colombia.
In Africa, Nigeria is a key, and we are encouraged by the prospect
of a democratic transition in that country. It is essential, however,
that we have the flexibility in administering our anti-narcotics and
crime programs to devote a higher percentage of our resources to this
continent. Thirty percent of the heroin interdicted in the U.S. is
traceable to African smuggling organizations.
In Asia, we are handicapped by the repressive nature of the
authorities in the world's two largest producers of heroin, Burma and
Afghanistan. We are doing our best to address the problem by working
through neighboring states, regional organizations and the U.N.
Around the world, we strive to disrupt the vicious criminal empires
which endanger citizens and threaten democratic values from Moscow to
Manhattan.
There are no final victories in the fight against international
crime, but--as our increased budget request for this year reflects--we
are pushing ahead hard. Our purpose, ultimately, is to create a tightly
woven web of agreements, laws, inspectors, police and judicial power
that will deny drug kingpins and other criminals and the space they
need to operate and without which they cannot survive.
(D) Safeguarding the Environment
The United States also has a major foreign policy interest in
ensuring for future generations a healthy and abundant global
environment and in working to prevent environmental problems that could
lead to conflict or contribute to humanitarian disasters.
The wise stewardship of natural resources is about far more than
aesthetics. Misuse of resources can produce shortages that breed
famine, fear, flight and fighting. And as societies grow and
industrialize, the absorptive capacities of the Earth will be severely
tested.
That is why we have incorporated environmental goals into the
mainstream of our foreign policy, and why we are pursuing specific
objectives through regional environmental hubs in every part of the
world.
It is why we are seeking an international agreement to regulate the
production and use of persistent chemical toxins that have global
impacts.
It is why we are working hard to bring into force better standards
for preserving biological diversity and managing marine resources.
And it is why we will be working to limit the emission of
greenhouse gases that most scientists believe cause global warming.
Last November, in Buenos Aires, parties to the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change agreed to an action plan for advancing the
agenda outlined in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. In that Protocol, leading
industrialized countries agreed to binding limits, at reduced levels,
on greenhouse gas emissions and adopted, in key respects, the U.S.
market-based approach to achieving those reductions.
In the year to come, we will continue our vigorous diplomatic
efforts to implement the Buenos Aires work plan and to encourage
developing country participation, without which international efforts
to control global warming cannot succeed.
(E) Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law
American policy is to promote democracy, the rule of law, religious
tolerance and human rights.
We believe, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights affirms,
that ``the will of the people . . . expressed in periodic elections''
should be the basis of government everywhere. We are working actively
to promote the observation of this principle around the world.
Earlier in this statement, I mentioned some of the specific
programs we use to aid democratic transitions, support free and fair
elections and help democratic forces build civil society.
These programs reflect our ideals and serve our interests.
When we support democratic leaders, we are aiding our natural
partners and helping to forge a community of democratic nations that
will work together to defend freedom where it exists and promote it
where it does not.
We also know from experience that democratic governments tend to be
more successful at preventing conflicts and coping with the turbulence
of the global market than regimes that do not answer to the people.
Our support for the right to democracy is part of our broader
effort to elevate global standards of human rights and respect for the
rule of law. Our goal is to enter the 21st Century moving ahead in
these areas, not just settling for the status quo.
Accordingly, the United States will continue to support democratic
ideals and institutions however and wherever we can effectively do so.
We will continue to advocate increased respect for human rights,
vigorously promote religious freedom and firmly back the international
criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia.
We will support efforts to help women gain fair access to the
levers of economic and political power, work with others to end the
pernicious trafficking in women and girls, and renew our request for
Senate approval of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women.
As the President pledged in his State of the Union Address, we will
continue working through the International Labor Organization to raise
core labor standards, and to conclude a treaty that would ban abusive
child labor.
And we will remain leaders in the international effort to prevent
harm to civilians from anti-personnel landmines. Through the
President's ``Demining 2010'' Initiative, we are working with official
and nongovernmental organizations everywhere to detect, map, mark and
destroy mines; increase mine awareness; improve mine detection
technology; and care for the victims of mines.
iii. unfinished business
Mr. Chairman, perhaps the best way to begin the new year's work is
to finish with old business. We have been trying, it seems forever, to
find a way to encourage further reform while meeting America's
obligation to pay our arrears to the United Nations and other
international organizations.
This stalemate has dragged on far too long. We need to stop
treating the United Nations like a political football. We need a fresh
start based on a bipartisan consensus that falls somewhere between
those who have nothing but praise for the U.N. and those who would like
nothing better than to bury it. Most Americans are in this mainstream.
With their backing in mind, we need an approach that is realistic,
grounded in U.S. interests, and based on a small number of constructive
and pragmatic principles, of which I would offer four.
First, we should recognize that the United States has important
interests in the work that the U.N. and other international
organizations do. These range from our security interest in U.N.
peacekeeping and multilateral sanctions against Iraq and Libya; to our
economic interest in the protection of intellectual property rights and
fair worker standards; to our humanitarian interest in feeding
children, fighting disease and caring for the world's refugees.
Second, we should be realistic in our demands and expectations of
the U.N. The U.N. provides no guarantee of global peace or prosperity.
But in peacekeeping, development and other areas, it can play a vital
role as catalyst and coordinator, and as a bridge spanning the gaps
between the contributions of others.
Third, we must maintain pressure for reforms that will make the
U.N. more effective. With help from the United States and other leading
nations, the U.N. system has achieved more reform in the last half
decade than in the previous 45 years. It is better led, more ably
managed and far more disciplined that it was when I arrived in New York
as our Permanent Representative to the U.N. in 1993. We should do all
we can to see that this process of modernization and reform continues.
Finally, while insisting that others do the same, we must--as the
President proposes in his budget--pay our bills. This is not just a
question of dollars and cents. It is a matter of honor, of keeping our
word. It is also a question of national interest because we will be far
more influential--and far better able to spur further reform--within
the U.N. system and other international organizations if we are meeting
our obligations to them.
iv. world-class diplomacy
The efforts we make to advance our security, prosperity and values
are essential for our future. But we cannot lead without tools.
It costs money to counter modern terrorists; protect American jobs;
cool regional disputes; aid child survival; and spread the gospel of
freedom.
But these costs do not begin to compare to the costs we would incur
if we stood aside while conflicts raged, terrorists struck, democracies
unravelled and weapons of mass destruction spread unhindered around the
globe.
Unfortunately, despite strong support from many in both parties in
Congress, we have lost ground during this decade. In real terms,
funding has declined sharply. We've been forced to cut back on the
life's blood of any organization, which is training. We must modernize
our information systems. We face critical infrastructure needs. We have
seen the proportion of our nation's wealth that is used to support
democracy and prosperity around the globe shrink steadily, so that
among industrialized nations we are now dead last. And the embassy
bombings in Africa were tragic evidence of the imperative to do far
more, far more quickly, to reduce the vulnerability of our diplomatic
missions.
On this last point, let me stress my own personal commitment to do
all I can to protect our people. Last year, Congress approved our
request for $1.4 billion to enhance security through construction
upgrades, new personnel and improved equipment. The President's Fiscal
Year 2000 budget includes funds to sustain those efforts. And we are
asking $3 billion in advance appropriations over 5 years to build new
and safer posts. Meanwhile, I am in regular contact with White House
and other senior officials to assess security threats and needs. This
is a year-round, around-the-clock, concern.
Given all this, I urge the Committee to support the President's
budget request for international programs in its entirety. By so doing,
you will serve our nation and your constituents very, very well. And
you will give deserved support to the foreign service officers, civil
service personnel and foreign service nationals--who work every day,
often under difficult and dangerous conditions, to protect our
interests around the world.
v. conclusion
Fifty years ago, only a short distance from where we are now,
President Harry Truman delivered his first and only inaugural address.
In what came to be known as the Four Point speech, he challenged
Democrats and Republicans alike to lend their full support to
international organizations; to continue programs for world economic
recovery; to join with free people everywhere in defense of democracy;
and to draw on our country's vast storehouse of technical expertise to
help people help themselves in the fight against ignorance, illness and
despair.
Today, we are summoned to build new institutions, adapted to the
challenges of our time, based on principles that will endure for all
time.
In so doing, we must heed the central lesson of this century, which
is that problems abroad, if left unattended, will all too often come
home to America.
We Americans draw immense strength from the fact that we know who
we are and what we believe. We have a purpose. And like the farmer's
faith that seeds and rain will cause crops to grow; it is our faith
that if we are true to our principles, we will succeed.
Let us, then, do honor to that faith. In this final year of this
turbulent century, let us assume, not with complaint, but welcome, the
leader's role established by our forebears.
And by living up to the heritage of our past, let us fulfill the
promise of our future--and enter the new century free and united,
prosperous and at peace.
To that mission, I pledge my own best efforts, and respectfully
solicit both your wise counsel and support.
Thank you very much. And now I would be pleased to respond to your
questions.
The Chairman. Very well, Madam Secretary. By the way, I am
counting. I think we have about 11 Senators here, and I will do
a little bit of arithmetic and say maybe we had better limit
the questioning to 5 minutes per Senator for the first round.
Now, Madam Secretary, we figured up yesterday that 649 days
have passed since the President made a legal commitment to
submit the ABM treaty amendments for the Senate's advice and
consent. We talked about that earlier this morning.
Now, I have been accused from time to time of holding
treaties hostage, but it seems to me that the shoe may be on
the other foot, really, because it is the President who is
refusing to allow the Senate to vote on this treaty.
Now, he pledged to submit the changes to the treaty almost
2 years ago. Do you think it appropriate for the President to
leave office without fulfilling that promise?
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, let me say that, as we
have said, we will send this agreement to the Senate along with
the START II protocol after the Russians have ratified START II
and its protocol. Prior to the implementation, we are committed
to seeking the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of
the memorandum of understanding related to the ABM treaty
succession, and to the two agreed statements related to the
demarcation, but I think we fully understand the necessity of
sending this forward.
The Chairman. Good.
Secretary Albright. But as we have said, it is related to
the Russian action, and it is my understanding from when I was
there last that they are planning to have this on their
calendar in March.
The Chairman. On another subject, I was pleased and
gratified to hear your statement last month, when you flatly
stated that our sanctions on Cuba can be lifted only if Castro
undertakes basic democratic reform, but last week we got Mr.
Castro's reply to this message as he applied more draconian
crackdowns on dissidents and independent journalists.
Are you in a position to assure this committee that the
administration will stick to the reasonable conditions in our
present law for lifting the embargo, or normalizing relations,
which are that Cuba must first release all political prisoners,
respect basic human and political rights, and dismantle that
secret police gang that he has?
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have taken
a great deal of interest personally in what is going on with
Cuba and our relationship with it. We have no plans to lift the
embargo, but what we are doing is systematically following up
on some of the openings created by the Pope's visit to Cuba,
and our own desire to build on the Torricelli bill and the
Libertad Act to try to consistently help the Cuban people.
I have been saying that what is really going on is that
Castro has an embargo against his own people. We are trying to
break that embargo by providing the possibilities for ordinary
Americans now to send remittances to the Cuban people so that
they have more elbow room to operate outside of their very
restricted regime.
We also wish to expand the number of flights going back and
forth. There are a number of measures, as you know, we have
taken while making very clear that the embargo is the law of
the land and systematically penetrating the system.
I was very honored to be able to be in Miami 2 weeks ago,
to open the new studios of Radio and TV Marti with a much
stronger signal. I delivered a very strong statement myself
over that broadcast saying that we wanted to support the people
of Cuba.
The Chairman. On another subject, very quickly, do you
think that inasmuch as credible evidence has been made and
delivered and made public that Iraq could assemble a nuclear
weapon in as few as 6 months, provided it has the required
fissile material? Given this, do you think we ought to actively
pursue the immediate removal of Saddam from power?
Secretary Albright. Senator, let me say that we have
consistently, ever since the Gulf War, been pursuing a policy
of containing Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass
destruction. The administration earlier, I believe starting
last year, added something to that element, which is
containment plus, the plus being regime change. This will
enable the people of Iraq to have a leader who is
representative of them or will allow them to choose a leader.
We are following up systematically on the Iraq Liberation
Act. As you know, the President has designated some seven
opposition groups that are eligible for assistance. I have
named a very trusted and very capable U.S. diplomat, Frank
Ricciardone, who has taken over the role of a coordinator for
the transition. He will be working with these various groups as
well as working on a number of plans to add, as I said, the
plus to the containment plus.
We believe that Iraq would be better off without Saddam
Hussein. I pride myself on many things. I most of all like it
when you all have something nice to say about me, but next to
that I like it a lot when Saddam Hussein has something terrible
to say about me, and his newest name for me is sorceress.
So I feel OK today.
The Chairman. I think the answer to my question was yes,
sort of.
Secretary Albright. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Madam Secretary, again, we appreciate your being here, and
there is a lot to cover. I am not going to go into detail,
because there is no time in 5 minutes, but I would like to ask
unanimous consent that I would be able to submit to you a
series of detailed questions on ABM, ABM modification, the test
ban treaty, and ask you as soon as your staff can get a chance
to look at them we would appreciate the answers to these in
detail.
Now let me ask you a more generic question. The Senator has
pointed out accurately that the administration is committed to
submit the protocol, submit the demarcation changes to the ABM,
and the administration has consistently said it will do that
when the Duma acts on START.
Now, we are about to--the calendar dictates a lot of
things. Hopefully in March that will happen with the Duma, but
in February, next week, we are going to start a debate here on
the floor of the Senate on the Cochran bill that would make it
the U.S. policy to deploy a missile defense system as soon as
technologically possible.
Could you give me a brief comment on what impact, if any,
and it may not have any, such an action, assuming it were to
pass the Senate, and it may very well, would have upon the
circumstances in the Duma, in your view, or in Russia
generally, in terms of them moving on START, or is there any
causal connection?
Secretary Albright. Well, one of the interesting
discussions that I had when I was in Russia was the whole
connection from their perspective of the ABM treaty and our
national missile defense discussions. I think it is very
important if it is at all possible for them to be able to have
their ratification of START take place in a way that does not
put all these pieces together, because they know that we will
not put our ABM ratification process forward until the START
treaty is in place. I believe they have a whole discussion
process of their own which also needs to go forward.
I think that this goes to something that the chairman said.
I do believe that the ABM is a cornerstone of our strategic
stability, and that we are committed to continued efforts to
strengthen that treaty and enhance its viability. That does not
mean, however, that it is not possible for us at some stage to
amend it. It has been amended before, but I think that it is
very important for the Russians to have their debate.
The administration has put forward a statement of
administration policy on going forward with the National
Missile Defense Act--that is, the Cochran bill--and we think
the decision regarding this NMD deployment has to be addressed
within the context of the ABM treaty and our objectives for
achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms through
START II and START III, and I think it is very important to
keep that in mind.
We have made clear to Russia that deployment of a limited
NMD that required amendments to the ABM treaty would not be
incompatible with the underlying purpose of the ABM treaty.
That is, to maintain strategic stability and enable further
reductions in the strategic nuclear arms.
But I think that obviously no other Nation shall have veto
over our requirements, and we have our sovereign rights. We
think that, as S. 257 suggests, that neither the ABM treaty nor
the objectives for START II and III are factors in an NMD
deployment decision, and enactment of this legislation would
clearly be interpreted by Russia as evidence that the United
States is not interested in working toward a cooperative
solution, one that is both in our national security interests.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, my time is almost up--it
will be in about 10 seconds--and I want to ask you one more
quick question. It is very simple. Security, embassy security.
Admiral Crowe has indicated and issued a report suggesting that
maybe for financial and security reasons we might very well
talk about regional embassies as opposed to embassies as we do
now, where every country has an embassy.
This notion of doing away with universality in terms of our
embassies, I am frank to tell you, I have not thought that
through yet. On the surface, it does not seem to be a good idea
to me, but do you have any general thoughts on that, on Admiral
Crowe's recommendation?
Secretary Albright. Yes, sir. First of all, I do believe
that we need to maintain universality. I think that is a very
important element of our foreign policy. But that does not mean
that it is not possible to have certain embassies which can
provide for certain services regionally, so as we are
rebuilding Nairobi, for instance, it is going to contain a
number of computer possibilities, and a variety of
technological possibilities that can serve the region that do
not have to be duplicated in all the embassies in the African
region.
But I do think universality is important, and I say that
not just because it is nice to have a U.S. flag in every
country, but I think people need to think of embassies to a
great extent as aircraft carriers or platforms which carry on
them and within them a number of other activities beyond just
diplomatic activities, our commercial services, economic
ability to deal with the problems of terrorists, a whole host
of issues, and therefore there are many reasons for
universality.
But I can assure you that as we look at rebuilding
embassies we will be looking at ways to make some of them
regionally more capable.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Welcome, and
thank you for the good work you are doing for our country.
I want to ask a couple of questions regarding Kosovo. In
light of the fact that we have allowed two deadlines to pass
without moving forward on NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia, the
first part of the question is, do you think that will affect
NATO and U.S. credibility in that part of the world?
Secretary Albright. No, I do not. I think that the talks
themselves were very productive and useful in getting parties
together, and I think that we have to remember that the
deadlines, while passed, certainly focused people's minds at
the time, and NATO credibility depends on the ability to carry
through when necessary.
What I am saying now is that that threat still exists. I
think if you remember the scenarios, if there was a clear yes
from the Albanians and a clear no from the Serbs, that is what
brought the bombing. There was not a clear yes from the
Albanians. They want to go back, and they did what one might
say initialed the agreement, and they want to go back for a
couple of weeks and get the support of their people.
You know, interestingly enough, they are trying to develop
a democracy. As far as the Serbs are concerned they just need
one phone call to the leader to decide how they would respond.
We also still have another NATO factor effective, which is
that if the Serbs do not comply with the agreements of October,
which is to cut down the numbers of the military forces and
their special police in Kosovo, then they are subject to NATO
strikes in that regard also. I had a discussion with Secretary-
General Solana on that subject, and he is watching it very
carefully, and we are doing all the warning, as did all the
NATO contact group members yesterday.
Senator Hagel. There appears to be, at least according to
the news reports, a rather significant buildup of forces along
the borders of Yugoslavian, Serbian forces. What is the
trigger? What is the threshold that we are using in order to
determine whether we will attack Serbian forces, that is,
Milosevic's forces?
Secretary Albright. Well, we have issued various warnings.
Secretary-General Solana I believe did again yesterday, and I
believe will do so again.
Basically, it is a matter of what we are seeing on the
ground and what they are doing there under warning right now. I
cannot tell you specifically. I do not think it is appropriate,
what the specific thing is, but they are very much under
warning right now that they are not to use those forces
offensively. And, they are supposed to be drawing back to the
agreement that they made in October.
Senator Hagel. Is there any sense on your part why they
have moved forward that kind of heavy armor, or heavy
artillery, troop concentration, if they are at all serious
about coming to an agreement?
Secretary Albright. My reading of this would be that they
are getting ready for a spring offensive of some kind here, and
we are going to work very hard to make it clear to them that
that would be a grave mistake.
Interestingly enough, Senator, during these discussions
they did begin to engage somewhat on the political part of the
agreement, and the progress that was made was, as you know,
they stripped Kosovo of its autonomy in 1989. Through their
response to the negotiators yesterday they in effect admitted
again that Kosovo could be independent. They just did not add
the fact that it could have democratic institutions, but they
did begin to engage on that. They engaged not at all on the
military part of the document, which would allow there to be a
peaceful invited implementation force and therefore I think,
while they are engaged in some part of the discussion, they
have not yet given up their ideas about their spring action,
and our goal in the next 2 weeks is to make sure that they
change their way of looking at this.
It is not easy, I have to tell you. This is a very tough
negotiation, and we have to keep pushing back.
Senator Hagel. Madam Secretary, I have not a minute but
seconds left. I would go back to something you said that I
think is critically important, and that is, you said in essence
that this is a classic example of why we cannot lose sight of
American leadership, and when we defer the tough decisions we
only complicate matters.
I would say first of all that I agree with that completely,
and if we are to accomplish the hope and opportunity and
potential of the world, which I think we can, it is going to
require American leadership.
But on Kosovo we all recall what President Bush said in
December 1992 in the strong warning, and what Margaret Thatcher
said early on, before we had the slaughter in Bosnia. Senator
Dole has talked about Kosovo for a number of years, and I only
bring that out because you have inherited a mess. You are
sorting it out as best you can.
But for the record and for this hearing I think it is very
important, and it goes back to what Senator Biden said. We are
going to have a very significant debate in this country, and we
should, over the next year and a half, about what is the
appropriate role of America and the world, what kind of
leadership should we provide.
This again points up to how dangerous the world is, and
uncertain it is, especially when we do not have American
leadership.
Thank you.
Secretary Albright. Could I just make a point here? I think
if we go forward with an implementation force, I think we will
have managed what I would hope suits most of the people in the
Congress that are concerned about whether we are leading, how
much we are leading, and are we doing everybody else's work.
Because what we will have done is to have a NATO-led force,
that is, with American SACEUR General Clark in charge of it, a
force of around 28,000, with an American force which is under
4,000, which in effect lets the Europeans do the lion's share
of the work, but we continue to have a leadership role. I think
this is just the right balance of us being a part of the system
not letting down the credibility of NATO and not letting down
the credibility of our leadership in NATO.
There are those who think we do not let anybody do
anything, and there are those who think we do everything, and a
line that I think kind of suits this is, if we wanted to be
Rambo, I would not have gone to Rambouillet, and I think that
we are capable of having the leadership role but have others do
it with us, and if we go forward on this plan I think we have
managed that balance very well.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Madam
Secretary, welcome. I am once again impressed by your level of
energy, knowing the travel schedule that you have kept in the
last several days, and to be here this morning addressing as
forcefully as you have the issues that are before us.
There are a number of issues here, and I am just going to
run down a couple of them very quickly, and then we will give
you a chance to respond.
Just as a personal note, I want to commend the Department
of State on how it is working with this Y2K issue, the year
2000 issue. Senator Bennett of Utah and I chair the committee,
and are watching very carefully how various agencies are
responding and the Department of State according to the General
Accounting Office, Mr. Chairman, is one of the better agencies
in terms of its own computer systems and so forth. It has one
of the more difficult jobs, because worldwide it is not a good
story outside of the borders of this country, but I wanted to
begin on that note.
Madam Secretary, the supplemental that is coming up for the
victims of Hurricanes Mitch and Georges in Central American and
the Caribbean, February 16 is awfully late to get that
supplemental. I do not know what the administration's plans on
this area, whether you want to tie it to the Jordanian
supplemental or not, but the President is planning I think
sometime shortly to be going down to the area, and whether or
not Congress is going to move on this is an important question.
Second, with regard to Cuba, and my good friend the
chairman and I have had our disagreements over the year on how
to address this issue. I have had an opportunity to express
myself to the Secretary and others about this. I just express
here, 24 of us, including Senator Grams and Senator Warner and
others, really without any effort at all, recommended the
establishment of a commission, much as we did on Central
America, to examine the issues of the Cuban-United States
relationship. That suggestion was rejected.
I am not, certainly, pleased with the Cuban reaction to the
decision earlier with regard to several steps we took or tried
to take back 4 or 5 weeks ago, but I just hope at some point
here--we have 11 million people less than 100 miles off our
shore, and we had better start talking about how we are going
to transition that.
I do not want to dwell on that in 5 minutes here today, but
would just say that there is a growing number of us up here,
not on one side of the aisle or the other, who would like to
see some new thinking about how we address these issues.
That is not in any way to be perceived, I hope it is not,
as trying to do any favors for Mr. Castro, but it is how we
watch out for our own interests in this hemisphere, so I just
want to suggest that there is more than one point of view on
this issue up here, and it needs to be brought into some
consideration.
I am pleased with your answer on the embassy issue. I think
creating large embassies regionally become a target of
opportunity as well as the issue you have raised of
universality, which I think is important, and let me hope that
the Agency and the Department will watch very carefully.
In Central America, for instance in certain embassies back
in the 1980's, some of the steps that were made for security
purposes were mind-boggling, one wall that cost over $1
million, $1 million to build a wall, and I hope as we look at
this issue, legitimate issue of protecting American personnel
and protecting our people in these embassies and residencies
around the world, this does not become a spending boondoggle
for people out there. It can happen if we are not careful.
We want to make sure our people are secure. We also do not
want to see people take advantage of a legitimate opportunity
and be abusive in terms of how dollars are spent.
Mexico decertification is a critical issue coming up here
very quickly. I know my colleague from California has some
thoughts and ideas about this that are very important.
Last, on sanctions, we have imposed sanctions now 70 times
in the last 6 years. Most of them, a lot of them are universal
sanctions. Senator Hagel, myself and others, and Senator Grams
have tried to come up with some different ways on how we can
address this issue.
This ham-stringing the President, it ham-strings you, Madam
Secretary. It has become the option of choice up here every
time a country does something we rightly disapprove of. We have
got to have a better response than just imposing sanctions. I
think it is hurting our ability to conduct foreign policy. Too
often it targets the wrong people, not the policy centers, and
it constrains our ability to act with some flexibility in an
ever-changing world, so I would hope we might get some
additional indications of support on that issue.
I apologize for jumping around here on you, but when you
have 5 minutes you have got to try to get in what you can, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Very good. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Madam
Secretary for taking the time to be here.
I would like to followup on an important security issue
that the chairman raised, and that was the issue of collocating
U.S. Government entities within chancery compounds. It just
caught our attention because after the August terrorist
bombings AID headquarters decided not to move their missions in
Kenya and Tanzania into the more secure embassy compounds that
are going to be built.
Now, this was in opposition to State Department guidelines
which stated--I will quote--``all U.S. Government offices and
activities subject to the authority of the chief of mission are
required to be collocated in chancery office buildings or on
the chancery consulate compound.''
After hearing from us and listening to U.S. officials in
both Kenya and Tanzania, AID reversed itself; Madam Secretary,
I would like to hear from you about this now that the
Administrator reports to you and is under your direct authority
and foreign policy guidance, pursuant to the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act. First, can we agree that when the
issue of collocation comes up, no exception to the above-
mentioned guidelines will be made unless it can be
demonstrated, of course, that it would be in the best U.S.
interest to leave our people in higher-risk situations?
Secretary Albright. Senator, let me just say that as far as
I know, what was happening in Kenya is that I think they were
having a hard time finding a place where they could all be
together. And some of it had to do with their decision on the
ground about sufficient security.
As far as I am concerned, I think that it is very important
as a policy matter to be collocated, and that there needs to be
some demonstrable reason for not doing so. It is my hope that
as we go into this whole, finally reworking the reorganization
of the State Department, that the purpose for it is for us to
have a comprehensive policy which allows us all to work
together, and proximity does help in that regard, aside from
security reasons.
If I might make a point, and it goes back to something
Senator Dodd said about security. I think that none of us can
ever feel that we have done enough in terms of protecting our
personnel, and I think we are all working on it very hard. It
is something that lends itself easily to finger-pointing and
blame-placing. Everyone is saying that they would have done
more, or it requires more money. There is never enough money,
and ultimately I have to say there is no such thing as perfect
security.
The thing about which I would like to assure all of you, as
well as the American people, is that we are doing everything we
can within the resources that are available and pushing for
additional resources to provide security for our personnel. But
a final point is, it does not do us any good to have totally
secure buildings with nobody inside them and no money to carry
on programs, so we have to find the right balance while always
thinking about the security. At the same time, however, being
able to do America's business abroad is what we are working on
right now.
Senator Grams. I agree with you on that, but going back to
the collocation question, too, if you would.
Secretary Albright. I would say that we want to have them
collocated, and we would need to have a good reason why that
policy is not being carried out.
Senator Grams. Would it make sense to modify the current
procedures so that the Secretary would sign off on any
diplomatic security decisions, or the decision to grant any
waivers?
Secretary Albright. Let me check on what the right
bureaucratic procedure would be on it.
Senator Grams. Also, Madam Secretary, given that this is
the first budget request which reflects the ACDA and the USIA
that are going to be folded now into the State Department, I
would like to know whether this consolidation to date has
resulted in any budget savings in the fiscal 2000 year
submission.
Secretary Albright. It is my understanding, Senator, and as
I said even when I was testifying about reorganization, it is
not possible for us to have any short-term savings on this. We
said then that would not be possible because it requires us to
move people, get computers integrated, and a variety of other
steps in order to really have this happen.
While I think that one of the desires for the
reorganization was money-saving, in my discussions with the
chairman and with all of you I think we had an even larger
goal. That was to have a rational foreign policy, to try not to
have duplication, and to try to make sure that both the
proliferation issues and the development issues became central
to American foreign policy. So cost-saving up front right now
is not something that I can tell you is taking place.
Senator Grams. Do you expect some though in the future?
Secretary Albright. Yes, we do in the future, absolutely.
However, at this moment you can imagine that as we are trying
to collocate people, trying to get computers in place that are
Y2K functional, and also trying to integrate, it is very hard
to point up short-term savings.
Senator Grams. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Madam Secretary, especially for the tremendous efforts you are
making with regard to Kosovo.
I do want to turn now to Nigeria, to the situation there.
For years, many of us have been concerned about the human
rights situation, and we have introduced various pieces of
legislation in that regard. Of course, this weekend Nigeria
will elect a civilian President who is scheduled to take office
in May, so it has elements of hope and, as you indicated, we
are always looking for success stories in Africa, and none
could be more important than Nigeria.
But at the same time, I hope the administration continues
to calibrate and pace any direct assistance, particularly plans
to work with the military, until we can be actually assured
that the old habits of the past are really gone. It is so
tempting to look at each positive step in Nigeria and think
that everything is going to be all right, but I hope we are
careful about that.
In that light, if all goes well, what are the
administration's plans for Nigeria after the transition to
civilian rule? A second part is, what is your analysis of
recent violent disturbances in the oil-producing regions and
the Nigerian Government's response to that?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all let me say that we
have been looking generally about how to support democracy
where we can, and as we look out at the next 2 years we are
hoping very much that it will be possible to take certain
countries that are on the verge of really crossing over the
line to see if we can make sure that they really get there.
Nigeria is obviously one of the countries that we are hopeful
about, and the elections that are approaching are clearly part
of what we are looking at.
With regard to your concerns, Senator, we have tried very
hard to do what we can to make sure that the elections are free
and fair and that there are a number of NGO's and organizations
that have gone in there as monitoring.
We will also have a congressional delegation going to
observe the elections on February 27. We are going to be
working further in terms of supporting various democratic
institutions, trying to ensure civilian control over the
military, advancing a variety of institutions, an independent
judiciary, et cetera, that we consider the building blocks of a
functional democracy.
We are concerned, as we have been for some time, about the
fact that Nigeria, a huge country, has a variety of ethnic
groups within it. It is actually a very rich country, and
looking at how the oil revenues are dispersed and how they are
used is part of the issue, so I can just tell you that I have
decided that we need to have a whole country approach to
Nigeria in looking at how it deals with its environmental
problems, its oil problems, its narcotics issue, helping to
develop the domestic functioning democratic institutions, and
controling the military. It is one of our target countries in
terms of trying to bring it over the line.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I would just add the obvious
point, the tremendous impact that Nigeria has on other
conflicts in the area such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and others.
It is such an essential country.
The other country situation I would like to ask you about
is another occasion for cautious optimism. It is East Timor.
Many of us on this committee and in the Senate have for years
advocated for the rights of the people of East Timor, and there
are some hopeful signs. I am encouraged that the Government of
Indonesia has seen fit to move Sunamma Guzmal from prison to
house arrest, which I interpret as a gesture of goodwill, but
the situation is very complex, and there is violence on the
island.
You mention that you are going to Asia next week. I urge
you to continue your efforts to call for the release of
political prisoners, and the withdrawal of troops from East
Timor in order to help during this transition period, and the
question I would like to ask you is what you see happening with
regard to the United Nations role during a transition period.
It will probably be crucial to have an international
presence in East Timor during such a period of transition to
whatever form of self-determination may occur. Would the United
States support a monitoring or a peacekeeping operation in East
Timor?
Secretary Albright. If I could just go back to one thing on
Nigeria and your point about it helping in other areas, they
have been very important, first in Liberia and now in Sierra
Leone, and we have been trying to support ECOMOG, which is the
overall organization that does that, and Nigeria, even in its
worst days, actually, was very helpful in terms of its support
in trying to deal with peacekeeping matters.
Indonesia I have to tell you is another one of the
countries that I have targeted for trying to move over the
line. They are going to have elections. They have undertaken
some significant reforms, although not enough, and I will be
going to Indonesia on this trip after I leave China.
The East Timor developments are truly fascinating, and I
think are very hopeful. We are supporting the U.N. action
there, and the U.N. Special Representative there is looking at
a variety of ways for us to be able to help move that forward.
I will be discussing the issue actually today again with
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and I think we need to figure out
what the most supportive thing is that the United States can
do.
There have been discussions about an international or U.N.
presence. I do not think they have jelled yet, but we clearly
do see what is happening there as an opportunity to deal with
one of the most troublesome issues that has been out there for
all of us.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could follow
Senator Boxer. She has been sitting here the whole time, and I
had a conflict, so I will follow her.
The Chairman. By all means. Again, we welcome you to the
committee and look forward to working with you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for your
graciousness since I got onto the committee, the same with
Senator Biden, and Senator Wellstone carries on that spirit,
and I am very grateful, because I have a commitment coming up
on the Brady bill that I have to go forward to.
I want to say, Madam Secretary, how proud I am of the work
you are doing. I have seen you look tired because there are
reasons to. You need to get rest. You need to get rest.
Senator Wellstone. I was going to say that, too.
Senator Boxer. I know. Paul and I say you need to get rest.
The Chairman. Well, I think you look pretty good myself.
Senator Wellstone. You look wonderful, just exhausted.
Senator Boxer. You look good and tired.
I am going to go very quickly through, because some of the
issues we have covered, and there are so many more issues we
could not do justice to your portfolio.
I wanted to quickly mention what Senator Dodd said. I am
working on an alternative to the Mexican situation so that we
do not have to choose between certification, basically, and
decertification, and Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to
presenting that to you for your consideration, because I am
excited that I have come up with some ideas on that, and we
hope it will be bipartisan.
I thought because I am the only woman on the committee I
might take a different tack to my questions, so let me speak
quickly and leave enough time for you to comment. At least one
woman dies every minute from causes related to pregnancy and
childbirth, and in developing countries maternal mortality is
the leading cause of death for women of reproductive age.
These are terrible trends, and I know we are all trying to
bring our own background to solve this, but in the
congressional fog we have been in for about 6 weeks there was a
very important Hague forum, and the Hague forum, without going
into details, pointed out that developed countries are not
doing enough to financially help with family planning and child
and maternal health, and they said, it is interesting,
developing countries are doing more than we are doing in
proportion to our ability to help.
Now, this administration has taken a step in the right
direction. We have $25 million in your budget for the U.N.
population fund, and I know it is very controversial, but yet
we have to talk about these issues.
The UNFPA operates in more than 140 countries, and one of
your Under Secretaries in a speech, it was Under Secretary Loy,
said that just last year's contribution would have prevented
the deaths of 1,200 mothers and 22,000 babies, as well as would
have prevented 200,000 abortions, because family planning, when
done right, stops the unwanted pregnancy and women do not have
to go seek abortions, so I wanted to let you know I support
this, and I would like to get your view as to whether you
subscribe to those numbers.
Another issue of great concern is the Taliban's treatment
of women in Afghanistan. Anyone who has seen the burka, what
they have to wear--and Mr. Chairman, I have one I want to show
you, what women are forced to wear living under Taliban rule.
They are not allowed to go to school. They are not allowed to
go to work. If women are seen in public with as much as a bare
ankle, they are beaten by the police, and we have to continue
to denounce this. I wanted to ask, I know you have already done
some, do you have plans to talk about this more?
In a related issue, I wanted to express my support for the
convention to eliminate all forms of discrimination against
women. This is a very important treaty. It would set
international standards regarding discrimination on the basis
of gender. It would establish rights for women, and we were an
active participant in drafting the convention. President Carter
signed it 1980.
Twenty years later, 162 nations have ratified the
convention. We have not, and I know that we did make a push. We
could not get it done for reasons that have to do with what I
consider to be ancillary issues. I was going to ask if you
would speak about that.
So if you could comment on that estimate that 22,500
infants lives would have been saved if we had made that
contribution to UNFPA, 1,200 mothers, also, are you still
committed to this convention to eliminate all forms of
discrimination, and could you speak a minute about the Taliban?
Secretary Albright. Yes. Thank you very much, Senator
Boxer, and I cannot tell you how pleased I am to have you on
this committee. It is going to be a pleasure to work with you.
First of all, as in 1999, the President has again requested
$25 million for family planning, and I think that is, given all
the various priorities that we have, a sign of our really
strong commitment to population and reproductive health
programs.
I do not have the exact numbers, but I am sure those are
correct. I had met with a number of the NGO's before they were
going over to the Hague, and we discussed these kinds of issues
and the fact that there are so many problems caused when women
are not allowed to have access to information.
I think there is such a misunderstanding about something,
and I think it needs to be stated flat out. U.N. family
planning programs do not fund abortion services. I think people
get this all confused. There is a difference between family
planning and funding abortions and, categorically, the United
States does not fund abortions, and the majority of activities
support maternal and child health care programs, including the
provision of voluntary family planning.
And I think also something that should be noted, the U.N.
family planning funding supports programs aimed at the spread
of HIV/AIDS, and trying to prevent that. I think if you look at
the maps of how that is spreading, I think that is something
that is very important, and enhancing the status of women.
Senator Boxer. Maybe just a yes answer, because my time is
up. Will you speak out on the Taliban, and do you still support
the convention against discrimination?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all on the Taliban, of
course, and I visited with women before, and I do everything I
can. And Mr. Chairman, the Convention on the Status of Women is
something that is so important to all of us.
I speak very often on our support for that. Our desire for
support for that always gets an applause line. It is very
important to the women of the United States, and I do hope
very, very much that we can move this. I think it would be a
tribute to the work that we do together if we could move this.
I would be very grateful.
The Chairman. Very well. Now, I would say to you two ladies
that even the Iranians describe the Taliban as medieval, so it
is pretty universal that people hold their noses about it, but
thank you, ma'am. I welcome you to the committee.
Last but not least at any time, the Senator from Minnesota.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize
profusely. Something I have been working on for a year, Madam
Secretary, came up with a press conference. It had to do with
kids and mental health, and that is where I was.
Let me thank you for your heroic work. You have really been
at it, and I will be hoping and pulling for you and the people
of Kosovo and for all of us. Thank you very much for what you
are trying to do.
Madam Secretary, this question will not surprise you. We
are probably going to have a freestanding resolution, thanks to
the support of the chairman today, which basically says it is
the sense of the Senate that at the 55th session of the United
Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, Switzerland, the
United States should introduce and make all necessary efforts
to pass a resolution criticizing the People's Republic of China
for its human rights abuses in China and Tibet, and I think we
will probably get 96 votes. This is a bipartisan resolution.
During your visit to China next week, do you intend to
inform the Government that the United States is ready to
sponsor a resolution on China at this U.N. Commission on Human
Rights?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, Senator Wellstone,
I think you know my views on human rights in China, and I even
went to their celebration of the 20th anniversary of
normalization and told them how critical I was of their human
rights. I do not think usually people are invited to a party
and then do something like that.
What we are doing, and I am very much aware of
congressional expressions of support, we are now considering
what our approach should be, which would be the most effective
approach to try to get China's attention on this.
I will be discussing human rights when I am in China. It is
very much a part of my agenda, but we have not yet made a final
decision about how we are going to deal with Geneva.
Senator Wellstone. So we have not made a final commitment
as to whether or not we will introduce this resolution. Have we
made any commitment if the European Union by some chance does
it that we would join in?
Secretary Albright. Well, we are exactly at this moment
consulting with our allies. Assistant Secretary Koh has been
over there consulting, and I just cannot tell you at this
moment what our strategy is going to be. I will get back to you
on that.
Senator Wellstone. Do you have any idea as to when the
administration will make this decision? You know, we went
through this last year. I do not think there have been
improvements since the President's visit. If anything--and you
have spoken out about that.
Secretary Albright. Yes, I have.
Senator Wellstone. I really believe, and I think the Senate
believes and the Congress believes that our Government ought to
be the leader here. We ought to respond to this resolution in
Geneva. Do you know when it will happen?
Secretary Albright. We have it under active consideration.
It is a priority decision for the administration. I am just
trying to collect all the information on it now.
Senator Wellstone. Let me just switch and say to you that I
appreciate your response, for I was hoping you would say yes, I
am going to go there, I am going to inform them, we are going
to do this. Please let us know as soon as you have made a
decision.
Secretary Albright. I will.
Senator Wellstone. I really hope that our Government will
take the lead. I think it is long past the time to do so.
Could I ask you real quickly, this is another area that is
certainly near and dear to my heart. This is the country that
my father lived in before he fled persecution. For a quick
briefing on your part--maybe you have done it in response to
other questions about relations with Russia. I have the sense
that we have seen some strains, and I am trying to figure out
how we repair this. Could you give us just a quick overview?
Secretary Albright. Strobe Talbott is there right now, and
I was there 3 weeks before. I think we do have some very
serious strains at the moment, and they have to do with some
disagreements that we have about how to handle regional issues,
one specifically now Kosovo, and we have some questions about
Iraq.
At the same time, we are very concerned about their
economic situation and how we can help them help themselves.
Part of the problem is that they are having trouble helping
themselves. They have now passed a budget. I think that will
help us in the IMF to be able to give greater assistance.
What we are concerned about also, as I mentioned in my
testimony, is the fact that it, as an economy, does not do
well, and they have a great many things out there that can be
sold that do not help our proliferation policy, and a great
many scientists who are unemployed.
The President's threat reduction proposal is one that I
think does two goods. It helps to transfer some hard currency
into the Russian system, but in a way that makes sure that it
goes to the right people so that some of these scientists are
employed, that the materials are not sold.
I do think, Senator, that we are yet again at a tense time
with the Russians, but both Prime Minister Primakov and Prime
Minister Ivanov and I in our discussions understand the
importance of the overall Russian-United States relationship,
and the importance of keeping it on an even keel as we deal
with the START and ABM and various issues, that while we may
disagree on certain elements, that we understand the importance
of keeping the relationship going in a positive way.
I can assure you we will work on this, as we do consider
that a key element of our foreign policy.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, I had hoped that I could
fulfill my commitment to get you out of here at 12:30, but you
have provided so much information for the members, and
everybody is interested.
For the record, before I recognize Senator Grams, the
record will be kept open for 5 days, and also Senator Lugar and
others who wanted to be here are presiding over subcommittees
and could not be here, so that means that you may be receiving
some written questions to which you can give written answers.
I thank you so much for coming. It is always a pleasure to
see you. I do not know when number 15 will come up, but I hope
it comes up soon.
Before you leave, Senator Grams wants to ask you one more
question.
Senator Grams. Three short ones. We will get this done
within an hour. We will wrap this up.
Just briefly, Madam Secretary, I could not leave without
asking you some questions about the United Nations. Madam
Secretary, it appears that there is a lack of focus on our part
at the U.N. at this time. Why didn't the United States support
the U.N. budget outline for the year 2000-2001 biennium?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all I think that they
are in a very preliminary part of the U.N. budget
considerations, and we will continue to be as tough as we have
been in terms of trying to keep the U.N. budget within the
basic caps. We are working and will continue to work on that.
Senator Grams. But that is when we should really have a
loud voice in the preliminary part. Why didn't the U.S.
decision, again, to disassociate, which is basically voting
present and not taking leadership there--invoke the Kassebaum-
Solomon condition, which requires withholding if there is not a
consensus budget at the United Nations? Even though it is in
the preliminary stages of the U.N. budget process, doesn't that
vote just go against our position?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, the United States
and Japan made clear our opposition to the budget outline,
which was a preliminary step for the 2000-2001 biennium, which
exceeds the current budget level.
But as I said, this is a first step in the process. We have
made our position clear. The outcome is ultimately going to be
determined at the General Assembly in December, and the U.N.
has made clear that additional savings could reduce that
number.
As I mentioned, I am going to have lunch today with Kofi
Annan, and we will talk about this again, because this is
something that is obviously of great importance to us, but I
have to say it is a little hard to keep threatening what we are
not going to do or do if we do not give them any money in the
first place.
Senator Grams. We passed that bill, you know.
Secretary Albright. I know, but I am just saying that this
is the problem.
Senator Grams. It did not make it through the White House.
One final thing, Madam Secretary. What is the status of the
U.N. Secretary-General's reform proposals to establish a sunset
mechanism for all new U.N. programs?
Secretary Albright. I think he is working on it. Again,
this is one of the questions that I have planned for him this
afternoon.
Senator Grams. Thank you. Madam Secretary, I also have some
other questions that I would like to submit in writing. Mr.
Chairman, if I could do so. I appreciate your time.
The Chairman. Very well. Thank you again, and there being
no further business before the committee, we stand in recess.
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
everything.
The Chairman. It has been a pleasure to have you here.
[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted to Secretary Albright by
Members of the Committee
Questions Submitted by Senator Helms
u.s. support for unfpa's china program
Question. In light of AID Administrator, Brian Atwood's, pledge in
a September 10, 1995 letter to me that, ``. . . if there are not
significant improvements in China's population program, the United
States will not support continued UNFPA assistance to China beyond 1995
when the current program ends,'' and given the fact that decisions to
start or renew UNFPA programs are made by consensus by UNFPA's board
(thereby allowing the U.S. to single handedly veto any proposal)--as
well as the fact that there are no ``significant improvements'' in
China's one child per family population control program--why then did
the Administration choose to renege on the above-mentioned pledge and
actively support UNFPA's proposal for a new program in China at the
January 19, 1998 UNFPA Board meeting?
Answer. Official Chinese policy opposes coercion in family
planning. However, Chinese programs have included numerical targets or
quotas for family planning staff which can create pressure that can
lead to abuses.
Removing targets and quotas at the family planning service provider
level should help reduce such pressure and encourage non-coercive
behavior by officials and service providers. This is what China agreed
to do in the 32 counties participating in the UNFPA program.
We believe that this is an important step by the Chinese. It is a
new feature of UNFPA operations in China, which took two years to
negotiate and, as such, marks a significant improvement in Chinese
policy.
I should clarify that the U.S. did not ``actively support'' the
proposed China program in January 1998. We stated very clearly our
continued concerns regarding UNFPA assistance to China. Every other
Board member supported the program and, given its significant merits,
we did not oppose consensus.
administration decision on unfpa's china program
Question. Why did the Administration choose not to consult with the
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee or, to my knowledge, any
other member of the Foreign Relations Committee before the decision
(notified to Congress on February 13, 1998) to renege on the above-
mentioned promise?
Answer. We endeavor to have periodic informal discussions with
Congressional contacts on China and other issues of interest, and to
consult more formally with Members when needed.
As noted in my response to your earlier question, we followed USAID
Administrator Atwood's pledge not to support UNFPA assistance to China
in the absence of significant improvement in China's population
program.
As our February 13 letter noted, the UNFPA program reflects the
principles of voluntarism and non-coercion which we and the
international community have been asking China to adopt, and begins to
address many of the concerns we have about China's family planning
policy.
u.s. contribution to unfpa
Question. If UNFPA is really interested in receiving $25,000,000
from the United States, why cannot it simply terminate its $5,000,000
program in China?
Answer. UN agencies do not want to close down country programs that
are fully consistent with agency mandates, that are needed, and that
can be effective, in order to increase their revenues.
As a multilateral organization, UNFPA's major interest is in
meeting its mandate to help developing countries, at their request, to
improve reproductive health care and to promote sustainable
development.
UNFPA negotiated with China for two years to develop a program
which follows the principles, including voluntarism and non-coercion,
that 180 nations agreed to at the 1994 International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD).
An ICPD-consistent program to improve reproductive health care and
promote sustainable development in a country with one-fifth of the
world's population is a very significant effort for UNFPA.
UNFPA's management, all other members of UNFPA's Executive Board,
and this Administration believe that ICPD-consistent UNFPA programs are
most needed in countries--and there are many--where reproductive rights
and reproductive health services are deficient. That is where
improvements can be made, and people can be helped.
voluntary nature of unfpa's china program
Question. UNFPA claims that its new $5,000,000 program in China is
``voluntary'' (this is the basis for U.S. support). How can the United
States be fully confident that it is truly ``voluntary'' and verify
this in an oppressive, totalitarian regime such as Communist China?
Answer. We can be reasonably sure of the voluntary nature of
population activities in UNFPA program counties because of the high
level of access and oversight afforded by UNFPA, the Chinese
authorities, and our China mission.
Program monitoring is an integral part of UNFPA's China program,
and includes explicit Chinese agreement for external monitors.
The State Family Planning Commission (SFPC) has invited UNFPA
Executive Board members and representatives from their Congresses to
visit and monitor the UNFPA program. We have begun talking with
Congressional contacts, other Executive Board members, UNFPA management
and our China mission about possible monitoring trips.
For independent checks on local compliance with UNFPA's program
requirements, last year the Department requested our Embassy and
consulates in China to add monitoring visits to UNFPA program counties
to their travel and reporting plans. We asked them to report on issues
such as the presence/absence of birth quotas and targets, public
awareness of quota/target policy changes, and other measures to enforce
family planning policies.
Our officers in China have attended SFPC meetings with program
county officials, talked with family planning staff at various levels,
and visited a number of program sites. Reports so far indicate that
SFPC officials have been spreading the message in all UNFPA program
counties that targets and quotas are not to be used.
Our monitoring will continue throughout the four-year program
cycle.
u.s. bilateral population assistance
Question. To your knowledge, does any other single country in the
world contribute more bilateral assistance to international population
programs than does the United States?
Answer. We can be proud that, in its bilateral population
assistance, the U.S. has consistently been--as you suggest--the world's
largest single donor. This reflects the recognition by one
Administration after another that international population and
development efforts are critical to human well-being, require long-term
attention, and deserve continued U.S. support.
That said, it is also true that bilateral U.S. population
assistance has shrunk dramatically in recent years. It was reduced by
Congress almost 30 percent in just two years, from fiscal 1995 to
fiscal 1997, and has been completely flat since then.
Furthermore, while the U.S. is the largest bilateral donor, we are
far from the most generous in terms of our economic size and wealth.
Proportionally, Denmark provides almost four and a half times more
international population assistance than the U.S. ($371 per one million
dollars of GNP in 1996, compared to $84 from the U.S.) Norway, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, the U.K., and Australia also provide
proportionally more than we do.
government of honduras
Question. As Congress is considering a multi-million dollar
humanitarian relief package for Hurricane Mitch affected countries, the
Government of Honduras has yet to pay (pursuant to a legal contract
more than a year old) an American company, Advanced Navigation and
Positioning Corp., for a Transponder Landing System for Toncontin
Airport at Tegucigalpa. Inasmuch as this is a security concern for
Americans traveling to Honduras, as Toncontin Airport is one of the
most dangerous airports in the world in which to take off and land,
will you recommend that the resolution of this case be placed on the
agenda for the upcoming meeting between Presidents Clinton and Flores?
Answer. The Department places a high priority on ensuring that U.S.
investors abroad are treated fairly and that their rights are
respected. We also convey to foreign governments the message that the
existence of unresolved investment disputes against them may send
foreign investors negative signals about the investment climate in
their countries.
Officials from our Embassy in Tegucigalpa have raised this matter
with senior officials of the Honduran Government and have facilitated
discussions between government officials and representatives of
Advanced Navigation and Positioning Corp. in an effort to resolve the
dispute.
These discussions are ongoing and our Embassy in Tegucigalpa will
continue to monitor their progress with interest.
cambodia: fbi investigation of 1997 grenade attack
Question. It has been nearly two years since the grenade attack in
Cambodia which killed nearly 20 people and injured an American citizen,
prompting an FBI investigation. At the time, many people suspected that
Prime Minister Hun Sen's forces were involved. After two years, have
you been able to make any kind of judgment as to whether forces close
to Hun Sen were involved?
Answer. The FBI's report on the grenade attack was delivered to
Congress late last year. According to the report, all investigative
leads are complete and the FBI has presented its findings to the
Department of Justice for a prosecutive opinion.
We understand that the Committee has discussed this report further
with the FBI. We cannot comment on discussions to which we were not a
party.
pressure on cambodian government to solve 1997 grenade attack/hun sen
claim that sam rainsy was involved
Question. What kind of pressure are we bringing to bear on the Hun
Sen regime to find the perpetrators of this crime? Do you give any
credence to Hun Sen's claim that Sam Rainsy staged the attack on
himself?
Answer. Any questions on the current status of the FBI's
investigation of this incident should be directed to the FBI. Any
questions regarding responsibility for this crime should also be
directed to the FBI, which stated in its report to Congress that it has
presented its findings to the Department of Justice for a prosecutive
opinion.
Again, we understand that the Committee has discussed this report
further with the FBI. We cannot comment on discussions to which we were
not a party.
denial of visa for cambodian general nhiek bun chhay
Question. Last month your Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth made the
decision to deny a visa to Cambodia General Nhiek Bun Chhay based upon
the General's alleged connections with the Khmer Rouge. Given that most
of the dominant CPP in the Cambodian Government, including Foreign
Minister Hor Nam Hong, who visited the U.S. in October, are former
Khmer Rouge, and that most everybody in Cambodia, including King
Sihanouk, have in one way or another had contact with the Khmer Rouge,
how can we justify singling out this one man?
Answer. General Nhiek Bun Chhay applied for a visitor visa last
December. He was found ineligible under U.S. law for a visa based on
his coordination last year of military activity and active cooperation
with the Khmer Rouge, a designated terrorist organization under U.S.
law.
The relevant section of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(section 212) states that a visa cannot be issued to an individual who
has engaged in: ``the providing of any type of material support . . .
to any individual the actor knows or has reason to believe has
committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity.''
We have conducted a careful review of this case drawing on numerous
sources in reaching a decision to refuse the visa.
engagement
Question. Just recently, the Chinese Government initiated a
draconian crackdown on dissidents, reportedly conducted military
exercises that consisted of mock missile attacks on Taiwan, as well as
on U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea. They have made additional
aggressive moves in the Spratly Islands. Our trade and investment
problems with China also seem to be growing. All of this despite the
fact that last year we declined to sponsor the annual UN resolution on
human rights in China, held a summit in July, and yielded to Beijing's
``three no's'' on Taiwan. What benefits do you see for us and for the
Chinese people in our policy of engagement with the Chinese Government?
Why don't we seem to be getting more?
Answer. Put simply, engagement is aimed at producing closer
cooperation and concrete results that benefit U.S. interests. As the
President noted in Guatemala, had we not engaged China, we would not
have seen China accede to the CTBT and CWC, would not have seen
restraint on transfers of sensitive materials and technologies to Iran
and Pakistan, and would not have had close cooperation on the Korean
peninsula and on nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Sharp differences
do exist, particularly on human rights, and we do not hesitate to raise
them frankly and directly. In this regard, engagement provides us a
channel to communicate these concerns at all levels of the Chinese
Government, even when it cannot always produce agreement.
Moreover, not engaging is simply not an option. China's presence as
a permanent member of the UN Security Council, remarkable economic
achievements and potential markets, increasing diplomatic prominence
and growing military strength, all mean that we must deal with China in
order to protect significant U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region
and around the world. Not to seek to influence China's actions that
have a critical bearing on U.S. interests would be irresponsible.
un commission on human rights (unchr)
Question. Will the U.S. support a UNCHR resolution on China this
year?
Answer. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in
Geneva is an important multilateral mechanism for encouraging change in
China. The Administration supports the Geneva process, and intends to
participate vigorously in this year's Commission activities.
I am aware of Congressional expressions of support in favor of a
resolution, and assure you that your concerns are being considered
seriously in our ongoing decision-making process.
Last year, our Government did not sponsor a resolution because of
positive steps the Chinese had taken, but made clear that we were
keeping our options open for the future.
At this time, we are consulting within the Administration and with
our Allies about the specific actions we will undertake at Geneva and
how best to promote human rights in China.
russian arms sales to china
Question. I understand that China is to take first delivery of
Russian destroyers equipped with the supersonic Sunburn missile by mid-
year. What are we doing to discourage this transfer?
Answer. We monitor Russian military sales to China closely in order
to assess their impact on the region and on U.S. strategic planning.
Russian and U.S. arms transfers are a subject of regular bilateral
discussion with Russia. We are aware of the contracts that China has
signed to purchase Russian destroyers. We have made clear to the
Russians our view that promoting regional stability should be an
important consideration in arms transfer policy.
No international treaty or understanding proscribes transfers to
China of such arms, nor does U.S. law penalize conventional arms
transfers by third countries to the PRC. Russia is a member of existing
international regimes to control conventional arms transfers (e.g. the
COCOM-successor Wassenaar arrangement, which monitors destabilizing
arms accumulations). We expect that Russia will abide by its
commitments.
Question. What are we doing to prepare our forces and Taiwan's
forces for this threat? Does this situation perhaps dictate that we
rethink our refusal to sell submarines to Taiwan?
Answer. The Administration remains firmly committed to fulfilling
the security and arms transfers provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA). We will continue to assist Taiwan in meeting its legitimate
defense needs in accordance with the TRA and the 1982 Joint Communique
with the PRO.
Consistent with our obligations under the TRA, we regularly consult
with Taiwan on its defense requirements.
south china sea
Question. Do we believe that the structures China is building on
Mischief Reef are military in nature, or are they just fishing
structures, as the Chinese claim? What are we doing to dissuade the
Chinese from continuing their aggressive unilateral actions on Mischief
Reef and the Spratly Islands in general? Are we prepared to assist the
Philippine military upgrade its capabilities as a response to this
situation?
Answer. We believe the reinforced concrete ``castle-style''
structures constructed by the PRC on Mischief Reef have dual-use
capability.
The United States has repeatedly spoken out, both publicly and
through diplomatic channels, against unilateral actions that increase
tensions in the region and has called for all claimants to resolve
their differences in a peaceful manner, consistent with international
law. We have strongly denounced the use of force or the threat to use
force to resolve the conflicting claims.
We regularly remind claimants of their past statements on the South
China Sea, including the December 1997 joint statement by China and
ASEAN, which have indicated a willingness to resolve territorial
disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with universally
recognized international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea. We have urged all claimants to use all appropriate
diplomatic channels to resolve the dispute. In this regard, we are
pleased to see that China and the Philippines are scheduled to hold
bilateral experts' meeting talks in Manila on confidence-building
measures (CBMs) in the South China Sea.
While the United States takes no position on the legal merits of
competing claims to sovereignty in the area, we have made clear that
maintaining peace and stability in the region and freedom of navigation
are fundamental interests of ours. Unhindered navigation by all ships
and aircraft in the South China Sea is essential for the peace and
prosperity of the entire Asia Pacific region, including the United
States. Construction activities by various claimants have raised
tensions in the region and are not helpful to achieving a peaceful
resolution of the competing claims; however, such activities to date
have not hindered freedom of navigation.
As we have repeatedly stated, the basis of our defense cooperation
relationship with the Philippines is not linked to the current
situation in the Spratlys/South China Sea. We seek to maintain a normal
and appropriate security relationship with the Philippines.
Ratification by the Philippines of the proposed Visiting Forces
Agreement now before the Philippines Senate will help form the basis
for strengthening our defense relationship by enabling us to resume
ship visits to Philippine ports, to hold joint military training
exercises, and to undertake other forms of military-to-military
cooperation in order to enhance our overall security relationship.
taiwan & wto
Question. Given that Taiwan is so far ahead of Beijing in its
preparations for WTO membership and is nearing fulfillment of its
requirements, are we prepared to launch a vigorous push for Taiwan's
membership, ahead of Beijing if necessary?
Answer. The Administration does not link the applications of China
and Taiwan to the WTO. The Administration finalized its market access
agreement with Taiwan in August 1998. We are now actively working with
Taiwan to resolve outstanding multilateral issues.
We have publicly expressed our support for Taiwan's accession on
its own commercial merits. Final action, however, on Taiwan's
application will require a consensus decision by the members of
Taiwan's Working Party and a two-thirds majority vote of the WTO
membership.
dprk: suspect underground construction
Question. How long are we prepared to give North Korea to grant us
access to the suspect underground site which we were informed of last
summer? Why haven't we given them a deadline?
Answer. Since last summer, the U.S. held four rounds of talks about
the suspect underground construction at Kumchang-ni.
In the fourth and latest round, the U.S. reached an agreement with
the North Koreans on access to the suspect underground site at
Kumchang-ni.
Under the terms of the agreement, the first visit to the suspect
site will be in mid-May, with follow-up visits continuing as long as
our concerns about the site remain.
During each visit, the U.S. team will have access to the entire
site.
dprk: suspect underground construction
Question. Is there any evidence that North Korea has attempted to
sanitize the site?
Answer. This question is best directed to the intelligence
community.
It is also a question that can be discussed in closed session only.
dprk: only one suspect site?
Question. Is the site at Kumchang-ni the only suspect site in North
Korea, or do we believe there are others?
Answer. This question would be best directed to the intelligence
community.
It is also a question that can be discussed in closed session only.
If the Administration were to receive information about another
site which prompted serious suspicion about the DPRK's compliance with
the Agreed Framework, we would raise the issue with the North Koreans
and take appropriate steps.
dprk: agreed framework
Question. Should North Korea continue to delay us access to its
suspect sites, engage in proliferation, and conduct provocative actions
such as its missile launch over Japan, how long are we prepared to
continue subsidizing North Korea through the Agreed Framework.
Answer. The U.S. does not subsidize North Korea through the Agreed
Framework.
The Agreed Framework requires the DPRK to freeze, and eventually
dismantle, its nuclear-related facilities at Yongbyon and a 200MW
reactor under construction at Taechon. Additionally, this freeze is
monitored by the IAEA, which also has placed approximately 8000 spent
fuel rods, or over 98 percent of the estimated total, under seal. In
effect, this prevents the DPRK from using these facilities and nuclear
material to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. This is in the U.S.
security interest.
In return, KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization) is obligated to provide the DPRK with two proliferation-
resistant, light-water reactors (LWRs). Pending the completion of the
first reactor, KEDO also provides heavy fuel oil (HFO) as an
alternative energy source.
This Administration has made absolutely clear to the DPRK that we
saw its cooperation in resolving our concerns about the suspect
underground construction at Kumchang-ni as essential to the survival of
the Agreed Framework and to continued improvement in U.S.-DPRK
relations.
We were thus pleased to have reached March 16 an agreement with the
North Koreans that--if implemented fully--addresses all of our concerns
about both the current and future use of the site through multiple
visits beginning in mid-May of this year.
The North Korean missile program represents a different but related
threat to regional and global stability.
The U.S., along with our ROK and Japanese allies, continues to
press North Korea to cease all development, testing, deployment and
export of long-range missiles and related missile technology. We have
made clear to Pyongyang, as have our allies, that any further long-
range missile tests would have very serious consequences for our
relations with North Korea.
The next round of missile talks with North Korea is scheduled for
March 29.
iraqi opposition
Question. Where are we on putting together a viable opposition to
get rid of Saddam Hussein?
Answer. We are working with groups inside Iraq, outside of Iraq,
and neighboring states who share the common goal of wanting to work
towards a new regime in Iraq, one that respects its own people and
accepted norms of international behavior.
The Secretary has named a senior foreign service officer, Frank
Ricciardone, as the new Special Coordinator for the Transition of Iraq,
and he took up his activities full-time on March 1.
We are implementing the Iraq Liberation Act. In early February, the
President formally designated seven opposition groups as eligible to
receive assistance under the Act. We are intensifying our contacts with
Iraqi groups and will consider how we can help them more effectively
oppose Saddam's rule and help Iraqis to achieve the kind of government
they deserve and desire.
We are assisting the Iraqis in their efforts to restore Iraq to its
rightful place in the region. We are funding INDICT in its
international campaign to indict Iraqi war criminals. We are looking at
ways to help Iraqis outside Iraq work more cooperatively, and we are
also looking at ways we can help Iraqis inside Iraq, such as by
providing election preparation assistance in advance of likely
elections in northern Iraq later this year.
We have made important progress in reconciling the Kurdish parties
in northern Iraq. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs traveled to the region in January to
encourage them in their efforts to unify the regional government
apparatus and to care more equitably for the needs of the people in the
region.
We are also looking at ways to provide assistance to:
leadership confidence building seminars and organizational
meetings;
Iraqis who will make their case before international
organizations such as UN agencies; and
seminars that explore ``the day after'' and such topics as
constitutional modeling, debt restructuring and rebuilding a
health care network.
un/libya/pan am 103
Question. The press is telling us that an agreement with Libya on
releasing the two suspected bombers of Pan Am 103 is close. Apparently,
Qadhafi is looking for assurances that once his two agents are in
custody, nothing will be done to try and tie his regime to the bombing.
Has Qadhafi received such assurances? Press accounts of Secretary
General Annan's letter to Qadhafi on the matter lead me to believe that
is a possibility. It has also been reported that UNSYG Annan sent
another letter to Qadhafi last week. Was that letter coordinated with
the U.S. Government? Did it contain further reassurances?
Answer. On March 19 Colonel Qadhafi told visiting South African
President Nelson Mandela that the PA 103 suspects would be transferred
to Dutch custody for trial by April 6. Libya confirmed its pledge in a
letter to the UNSYG. We welcome President Mandela's effort and now
await action by Libya.
In addressing Libya's requests for clarification, the SYG has
consulted the U.S. and UK Governments--and, particularly in the initial
phase, the Dutch Government--to ensure accuracy. His messages have
conveyed the same points we and the UK have made publicly. There has
been no negotiation.
Regarding the trial, our proposal calls for a trial under Scottish
law, with Scottish judges, in the Netherlands. It will be a criminal
trial focusing on the suspects' guilt or innocence in the bombing of PA
103. The prosecution will pursue the case just as would occur in any
similar trial in Scotland. I cannot predict how such a trial might
unfold. That is a matter for the court.
pa outlawing of militant/terrorist organizations
Question. Have all militant and/or terrorist organizations been
outlawed by the PA as required by the Wye Memorandum?
Answer. The Wye River Memorandum obligated the Palestinian side to
``inform the U.S. fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all
organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a
military, terrorist or violent character . . .''.
The Palestinians have provided to us a March 3, 1996 statement
issued by the Palestinian Authority stating that a meeting of the
Higher Palestinian National Security Council, chaired by Chairman
Arafat, had decided to ban the activity of all paramilitary groups,
including the armed wings of HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
We have some questions regarding the legal status of this
statement. We are discussing this with the Palestinians.
The Palestinian security services have been effective in taking
action against those terrorist groups.
We continue to press the PA to do everything possible to prevent
terror and to cooperate fully with Israel in this effort.
lebanon: terrorism list?
Question. Hezbollah, as well as several other terrorist groups,
continue to operate on Lebanese soil. Why have you made no
determination regarding Lebanon as a state sponsor of terrorism?
Answer. We have no evidence that the Government of Lebanon itself
is supporting acts of international terrorism.
Hezbollah and some other terrorism groups operate from parts of
Lebanon, such as the Bekaa Valley, that are not under effective
Lebanese Government control.
Some of these areas, particularly the Bekaa Valley, are under
Syrian control. Indeed, that is among the reasons that Syria is on the
list of state sponsors of terrorism.
india/pakistan--ctbt commitments
Question. Both India and Pakistan have made commitments of some
kind regarding signature of the CTBT. Have any reciprocal commitments
regarding the lifting of sanctions been made by the Administration to
India and Pakistan, implying that the lifting of sanctions could be
contingent upon signing the CTBT?
Answer. The Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers both made
conditional commitments in their speeches to the UN General Assembly
last fall to adhere to the CTBT by September 1999. Since then, their
governments have reiterated that it is their intention to do so. In the
South Asian press, there have been suggestions that they may be
considering signing the treaty before September. For example,
Pakistan's Foreign Minister was quoted to that effect recently.
Early, unconditional adherence to the CTBT has been among our
highest near-term priorities in the talks which Deputy Secretary
Talbott has conducted with his Indian and Pakistani counterparts.
We have carefully crafted a staged approach to these negotiations,
recognizing the importance to a successful outcome of acknowledging
progressive steps by India and Pakistan toward the nonproliferation
benchmarks.
In recognition of progress up to that time, the President on
December 1 exercised the waiver authority established by the Brownback
Amendment in a limited, targeted way.
The waivers, which expire on October 21, 1999, have permitted
Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corp., Trade
Development Agency, and International Military Education and--Training
programs to resume in India and Pakistan. Restrictions were also waived
on lending by private U.S. banks in India and Pakistan.
In light of Pakistan's dire economic straits, we also decided not
to block International Financial Institution lending to that country to
the extent necessary to support a one-time IMF rescue package.
However, legislative prohibitions on military sales and financing,
as well as on the export of military items and dual-use technology,
remain in place, as do other policy measures.
We believe the sanctions we now have in place are well targeted and
properly focused.
At the same time, we look forward in coming months to concrete
steps by both India and Pakistan to meet the nonproliferation
benchmarks that will make possible a reassessment of these sanctions.
We have no intention of waiving additional Glenn sanctions against
India or Pakistan, however, until they have taken additional
significant, concrete steps to meet the nonproliferation benchmarks.
haiti: policy challenges
Question. In Haiti, there seems to be little to show for 4 years of
work and more than $3 billion spent since the U.S. intervened to return
Aristide. There has been no Prime Minister or Cabinet in Haiti for 19
months. The Parliament has been effectively dissolved, as your written
testimony states. Local officials serve at the whim of President
Preval. The privatization process is stalled. Political murders remain
unsolved--and new murders have taken place. Drug trafficking is rampant
and Haiti has been decertified. Despite this abysmal track record, the
Administration plans to spend more than $100 million in Haiti in
FY2000.
How can you justify these expenditures given the current situation
in Haiti.
What is the Administration's ``exit strategy'' for Haiti?
When can we expect to see the U.S. troops depart and ESF funding
distributions adjusted to reflect other priorities in the Hemisphere.
Answer. Haiti's 21 month political impasse has caused
understandable frustration and impeded the flow of much needed
international assistance. The political gridlock prevented elections
last year that were needed to replace parliamentary and local officials
whose terms, according to the 1995 Electoral Law, were to end in
January. The dispute over whether these officials should continue in
office has added another complex dimension to the crisis. On the
positive side, President Preval and several parties have entered into
an understanding that appears to lay the basis for a way forward.
Pursuant to this understanding, the President has named a provisional
electoral council that shows promise of being capable of organizing
fair elections. For such elections to be credible and broadly
inclusive, considerable international support will be needed.
Consistent with U.S. law, we would expect to contribute to such
support.
As Haiti moves through and beyond its political impasse, we should
not lose sight of what has been accomplished. The government in Haiti,
held in check for many months by the stalemate, to date has only been
able to complete one privatization and one telecommunications licensing
agreement. Nonetheless, technical preparations for further
privatizations has continued, and the President remains committed to
seeing them through. While Haiti has not yet been able to take the
actions needed for its long-term development, we should bear in mind
that there is freedom of speech, association and commerce, and the
human rights situation in the country has steadily improved. Illegal
immigration, which surged to some 40,000 during the 1991-94 period of
de facto military rule, is now greatly reduced. The police, with less
than four years of experience, remains embryonic in capability. But it
has won the respect of all sides for being apolitical--and it is
clearly the best police or security force the country has had in recent
memory. Its anti-drug efforts, largely dependent on U.S. assistance,
have steadily improved over the past several months. A main reason that
Haiti did not achieve full certification last year was the political
impasse that prevented passage of effective anti-drug and money
laundering legislation.
Against this background, it is essential that neither the U.S. nor
the international community lose the will to stay the course.
Disengagement is not an option. We should not consider an ``exit
strategy'' from support for democracy. We will need to continue to
provide substantial assistance to Haiti for a long time. That said, we
expect that the level of such assistance will decline as Haiti begins
to take advantage of the quantities of international aid that is
available.
The U.S. Support Group has been engaged in mutually beneficial
engineering and medical training projects since 1996. Consistent with
our commitment to reduce and eventually withdraw our troops from Haiti,
in August 1998 the President approved a modest reduction in force
strength and in the frequency of engineering projects undertaken. For
the time being, these mutually beneficial exercises are continuing.
haiti: u.s. approach
Question. Current tactics are clearly not producing results. Don't
you think it is time for the U.S. to try a new approach and ask the
democracies of the OAS to step forward to address the political impasse
in Haiti? If not, why not?
Answer. Current tactics, in fact, are working in Haiti. On March
16, President Preval formed a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP),
which appears to have significant political acceptance and has begun
preparations for the delayed legislative and local elections. On March
24, President Preval announced an interim government that was formed in
consultation with five political parties.
The OAS has played an active and visible role throughout Haiti's
political crisis. OAS Secretary General Gaviria traveled to Port-au-
Prince January 28 at the height of tensions. The UN/OAS International
Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) continues its critical activities
in support of human rights and democracy. MICIVIH Executive Director
Cohin Granderson has been key in facilitating dialogue between
President Preval and opposition political leaders. In the absence of a
full legislature, MICIVIH monitors in the field have helped ensure the
continued apolitical behavior of the Haitian National Police (HNP). We
are concerned that the potential closure of MICIVIR would greatly
reduce the influence of the OAS in promoting democracy and human rights
in Haiti at a politically sensitive time.
In addition, five OAS members--the U.S., Canada, Argentina, Chile,
and Venezuela--participate in the UN Secretary General's ``Friends of
Haiti,'' a forum we have worked with actively in coordinating
international efforts to resolve the impasse and help Haiti move
forward.
haiti: privatization
Question. Has the Government of Haiti completed the privatization
of three of the nine major public entities slated for privatization?
Answer. The Government of Haiti has completed one of the three
major public entities slated for privatization. The Haitian flour mill
was legally transferred to a consortium of Continental Grain, Seaboard,
and Unifinance, a Haitian bank, on May 22, 1998. The new company, under
the name of Moulins d'Haiti, began operations in mid-November 1998 with
approximately 250 employees.
The GOH awarded the winning bid for the cement plant, another
public entity, on December 19, 1997 to a European/Latin American
consortium. (There were no U.S. bidders.) Because Article 12 of Haiti's
modernization law stipulates that sales of government entities must be
signed by the prime minister, the delay in the confirmation of a prime
minister has delayed completion of the sale. GOH officials told us
recently that as soon as Prime Minister Alexis forms an acceptable
government, he will sign the transaction.
Some of the other parastatals, especially the electricity company
and the phone company, are more complicated and politically sensitive.
The consulting firms preparing the bid documents for these two firms
must also write a regulatory framework under which the firms will
operate. While the Modernization Council has demonstrated a commitment
to push ahead with the program, both domestic politics and the
complicated nature of these two privatizations has retarded progress of
the program.
We, nevertheless, remain optimistic that privatizations will
proceed when the competent authorities are in place.
haiti: migration issues
Question. Has the Government of Haiti re-signed the bilateral
Repatriation Agreement with the United States?
Answer. The Haitian Government continues to enforce the terms of
our bilateral Repatriation Agreement although it has not yet been
resigned.
Question. Has the Government of Haiti been cooperating with the
United States in halting illegal emigration from Haiti?
Answer. The Government of Haiti's cooperation in halting illegal
emigration to the United States has been limited due to its lack of
resources and personnel.
Question. What contingency plans do you have for addressing refugee
outflows should the Government of Haiti decide not to cooperate?
Answer. INS is in charge of coordinating the USG's Caribbean mass
migration contingency planning effort. Since 1995 INS has worked with
the Coast Guard, the U.S. Southern Command, and FEMA to organize the
USG response. Eighteen agencies now have roles in mass migration
planning.
The main objective of current contingency planning is to detain
migrants away from U.S. shores so that processing may be done overseas.
Migrants who are detained will be screened for fear of persecution
before any are returned to their homeland. The decision as to which are
returned will be based on country conditions at the time of the crisis.
Yet, migrants often make it to U.S. shores, so domestic processing
centers are necessary.
The planning effort is guided by PDD 56, which grants the NSC
authority to oversee Caribbean mass migration contingency operations
during a crisis. The White House at the outset will identify funding
requirements for mass migration operations, since costs incurred will
exceed the budget of any single agency.
There are three phases to the mass migration planning process. The
first phase required INS to determine how to utilize its resources.
This phase is now complete. The second phase involves locating a
temporary staging facility in Florida suitable for short-term (24-72
hours) detention of migrants while they are screened and processed. The
objective of the third phase of the program is to identify temporary
staging facilities for migrants detained along the U.S. southwest
border. The Department of Justice is actively working on phase two and
three.
haiti: political killings
Question. Has the Government of Haiti conducted thorough
investigations into extrajudicial and political killings?
Are there ongoing investigations into murders committed after
President Aristide was returned?
In how many cases have they made substantial progress in bringing
to justice a person or persons responsible for one or more extrajudical
or political killings in Haiti?
How many of those cases involved any of the extrajudicial or
political killings committed in Haiti since the return of President
Aristide?
Is the Government of Haiti cooperating fully with United States
authorities and with United States-funded technical advisors to the
Haitian National Police in such investigations?
Answer. With the exception of the murder case of Antoine Izmery,
killed in 1993, the Government of Haiti has not brought to trial
individuals responsible for the political murders that occurred both
before and after the return of former President Aristide to Haiti. The
investigations, nonetheless, have contributed to the sharp drop in
political violence seen in recent years.
In part, the absence of convictions reflects the fact that key
suspects in several of the high-profile murders that occurred prior to
President Aristide's return in October 1994 have fled Haiti or cannot
be located. Two members of the gang allegedly involved in several of
the murders after Aristide's return are deceased. Police killed Eddy
Arbouet, the leader of the gang, in December 1997 in a failed arrest
effort. His bother, Emmanuel Arbouet, died of AIDS-related
complications in August 1998 while in police custody.
A further complication has been Haiti's dysfunctional judicial
system. Thus, despite the priority given by the GOH to the prosecution
of the 1994 killings in the town of Raboteau, efforts to bring the
alleged murderers to trial were derailed when the judge responsible for
the case fled to Canada at mid-year.
Politically motivated murders have clearly diminished since 1995,
and especially since the formation of the Haitian National Police's
Special Investigative Unit (SIU), the entity charged with investigating
political murders. In all, the SIU was assigned or worked on some 88
cases during 1998, including the recent murder of Senator Toussaint.
Nevertheless, there remain disturbing reminders that political violence
has not been completely ended. Some ten of these cases (in addition to
that of Senator Toussaint which, at this point, has not been
established as being politically motivated) involve high-profile
killings in the post-1994 period.
These ten cases were, among others, singled out for concern in this
year's Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-277). The Act
requires that the Secretary submit an annual report to Congress on the
Government of Haiti's investigation and prosecution of these murders,
and I will shortly submit this year's report. The report, as last
year's, will be classified in order to protect sensitive intelligence
and law enforcement information.
Without going into the classified details of the report, I would
note that we remain concerned that the Government of Haiti did not make
credible progress in investigating the crimes mentioned in the
legislation. While the SIU is vigorously pursuing the investigation of
Senator Toussaint's murder, the GOH's cooperation on some of the more
sensitive post-1994 murders has not been as complete as we have sought.
In particular, there has been an apparent reluctance to investigate
former members of the Presidential Security Unit that were allegedly at
the scene of one of the murder cases.
This is a matter of concern, and we remain committed to keeping
pressure on the appropriate Haitian authorities to fully investigate
all the murders.
haiti: removal from security forces of alleged murderers
Question. Has the Government of Haiti taken action to remove from
the Haitian National Police, National Palace and Residential Guard,
Ministerial Guard, and any other public security entity or unit of
Haiti all individuals who are credibly alleged to have engaged in or
conspired to conceal gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights or credibly alleged to have engaged in or conspired to
engage in narcotics trafficking?
Is the Administration confident that any individuals removed from
these positions are no longer associated with and/or working for any
public security entity in Haiti?
Answer. The Government of Haiti has removed individuals credibly
alleged to have been involved in political murders from the units in
which they were serving. As an example, former members of the
Presidential Security Unit who allegedly were present at the scene of
the murder of Pastor Antoine Leroy and Jacques Fleurival, and the PSU
leadership that ordered them to the scene of the murder, were separated
from the unit.
In addition, the Government of Haiti separated from the Haitian
National Police over 100 agents during 1998, many of them suspected of
involvement in narcotics trafficking.
The record is less clear regarding whether any of the individuals
who were removed have been reemployed with other public security units.
We are currently looking into the possibility that at least two
individuals previously removed are now back in different units. There
are also persistent reports that some of those removed still remain on
the GOH payroll.
In part, because of these unresolved issues, the Administration has
not been able to certify that Haiti has fulfilled all the conditions
contained in Section 561 of the 1999 Foreign Operation Act (P.L. 105-
277).
haiti: maritime agreement
Question. Has the Government of Haiti ratified the maritime
counternarcotics agreements signed in October 1997?
Answer. Haiti and the U.S. signed a six part comprehensive maritime
counternarcotics interdiction agreement on October 17, 1997. Haiti has
not yet ratified the agreement because of its political deadlock, which
has left its Parliament nonfunctioning.
Question. Is Haiti implementing these agreements?
Answer. The Government of Haiti is honoring the terms of the
comprehensive maritime counternarcotics interdiction agreement even
though it has not yet been ratified.
haiti: need for u.s. personnel
Question. Some observers of counter-drug operations in Haiti
believe that in the absence of U.S. personnel none of the ongoing
counternarcotics operations would be sustained. Do you agree with this
assessment?
Answer. We believe that the Government of Haiti is committed to the
counter-drug effort.
However, Haiti's comparatively new law enforcement agencies lack
the resources, training, experience, and professional traditions to
effectively combat narcotics trafficking on their own. As a result,
most of Haiti's counternarcotics law enforcement accomplishments are
those for which USG programs have provided firm structure, mentoring,
and support.
The presence of U.S. law enforcement agencies in Haiti--the U.S.
Coast Guard, the DEA, and U.S. Customs--are currently vital to the
counter-drug efforts of their Haitian counterparts. INL-funded training
and equipment provide critically needed support to Haitian law
enforcement.
Without this U.S. presence and assistance, Haitian efforts against
drug trafficking could not be sustained, the flow of drugs through
Haiti to the U.S. would increase significantly.
The purpose of our counternarcotics law enforcement training
programs is to develop the institutional capabilities of the Haitians
to the point where they eventually will be able to combat drug
trafficking without the intense level of effort currently required from
U.S. law enforcement agencies in Haiti.
haiti: 1997 elections
Question. Has a transparent settlement of the contested April 1997
elections been achieved?
Answer. We continue to urge Haitians to achieve a transparent
settlement of the contested April 1997 elections. We hope the selection
of a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) will facilitate such a
resolution.
haiti: provisional electoral council
Question. Has concrete progress been made on the constitution of a
credible and competent provisional electoral council that is acceptable
to a broad spectrum of political parties and civic groups?
Answer. President Preval announced March 16 the composition of a
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to carry out delayed legislative
and local elections. The initial response concerning the individuals
chosen has been broadly favorable. We are watching developments closely
and will remain engaged, together with the international community, to
encourage the broadest possible political consensus for the election
process.
haiti: election schedule
Question. A USAID grantee, the International Foundation for
Elections Systems, has set forth a nine month election calendar which
begins after the April 1997 elections are resolved and credible CEP has
been installed as the minimum requirement to organize ``good''
elections. Does the Administration accept this timetable? If no, why
not?
Answer. We hope to work with others in the international community
to help Haitians hold the delayed legislative and local elections in a
free and transparent manner as soon as the necessary conditions are in
place.
We are inclined toward the nine-month timetable laid out by the
International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES). We would
welcome, however, any efficiencies that would shorten the timetable
without jeopardizing the overall credibility of the elections.
haiti: micivih
Question. When asked about the MICIVIH by committee staff, the most
positive things that most Haitians have to say is ``inutile.'' To what
do you attribute the negative assessment that many Haitians appear to
have about this mission?
Answer. Many Haitians--including the Secretary of State for Public
Security and the Director General of the Haitian National Police
(HNP)--have told us the UN/OAS Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) has
been invaluable in monitoring, protecting, and promoting human rights
in Haiti. This sentiment has been shared by key international human
rights NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
the Lawyer's Committee on Human Rights.
MICIVIH's activities have directly contributed to the release of
numerous individuals illegally detained in Haitian jails--including
prominent lawyer Osner Fevry and former senator Reynold George. Its 80
monitors have documented and curbed police abuse throughout the
country. Its comprehensive and reliable reporting has provided an
international spotlight both on Haiti's progress and its many continued
problems in improving respect for human rights.
In the current atmosphere of executive branch-parliamentary
tensions, MICIVIH has played a prominent role in international efforts
to end the impasse. It has also been a strong proponent of political
pluralism, speaking out forcefully against interference in activities
of organizations such as a key opposition radio station, and the
International Republican Institute (IRI).
Haiti has one of the most oppressive and politically violent
histories in this Hemisphere. Haiti's nascent human rights community
continues to gain experience. A departure or cutback of MICIVIH,
however, would be premature at this point and put at risk all we have
achieved in improving the human rights situation in Haiti since 1994.
MICIVIH has sought to maintain impartiality and has called
attention to abuses against individuals from both sides of the
political spectrum. Among MICIVIH's critics are those who fault the
organization for defending individuals with opposing political views.
Other critics of MICIVIH focus on Haiti's continued human rights
problems without recognizing tremendous progress. There have been an
unprecedented four consecutive years of elected government, and the
level of political violence has diminished, due in large part to
continued attention by the international community through MICIVIH, the
UN Civilian Police Mission, and other bilateral and multilateral
programs.
murder of max dalton in costa rica
Question. What progress has been made by the Costa Ricans on the
investigation into U.S. citizen Max Dalton's murder in Pavones? Has
anyone been brought to justice for this crime? Do we expect that anyone
ever will be?
Answer. On November 13, 1997, U.S. Citizen Max Dale Dalton, a
resident of Costa Rica, was killed by gunfire during a confrontation
with squatters who were occupying his land in the town of Pavones,
Costa Rica. Embassy San Jose was aware of Dalton's problems with the
squatters for many years and had been assisting him in his efforts to
energize the Government of Costa Rica to protect him and his property
interests when he was killed. After Mr. Dalton's murder, the Embassy
actively engaged the Costa Rican Government to bring justice to his
killers.
The Costa Rican Police conducted an investigation regarding the
deaths of U.S. citizen Max Dalton and Costa Rican citizen Alvaro
Aguilar in Pavones on November 13, 1997. That investigation concluded
that the two men had shot each other.
It further concluded that Costa Rican citizen Gerardo Mora struck
Mr. Dalton with the back edge of a machete after Mr. Dalton fired a
pistol at him.
Gerardo Mora was charged with manslaughter in the death of Mr.
Dalton. No one else was charged with any crime in connection with Mr.
Dalton's death. The charges against Mora were dismissed at the request
of the prosecutor on March 9, 1999. The prosecutor concluded that the
evidence available was insufficient to convict and, therefore, decided
not to take the matter to trial.
We are not aware of any ongoing investigation into Mr. Dalton's
death or of any outstanding indictments. We do not anticipate any
further attempted prosecutions in this matter. The Dalton family lawyer
expressed regret that an appeal would be futile since key evidence was
lost through mishandling by the authorities.
costa rican land law
Question. What have the Costa Ricans done to close the loopholes in
existing law, which have been exploited by squatters to the detriment
of property owners in Costa Rica?
Answer. Landowners' problems with squatters have generally not been
the result of loopholes in legal statutes. Landowners, regardless of
nationality, have had problems obtaining enforcement of existing
statutes designed to protect property rights while preventing land from
becoming unutilized.
A more systemic problem is that Costa Rican law affords speedy
rights to people who openly and peaceably enter unused land and put it
to ``productive'' use. Acquisition of property rights through adverse
possession is well established in Costa Rican land law. Unlike our
common law, which grants rights for adverse possession after many
years, Costa Rican law grants protections to adverse possessors within
a few months after peaceable, unchallenged and open entry onto idle
land.
Costa Rican law clearly distinguishes between peaceful, uncontested
occupation of land and ``usurpation'' of land, which is a criminal
offense. The courts and law enforcement authorities take usurpation
statutes into account in squatter cases, but they are not applied
consistently or with equal force in all instances. This problem affects
Costa Rican and foreign landowners alike.
Question. What specific steps has the U.S. taken to encourage the
Costa Ricans to do so?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Costa Rica has raised these issues many
times with Costa Rican authorities at all levels and will continue to
do so. Our Consular Information Sheet on Costa Rica has been updated to
point out the many pitfalls in buying real estate in Costa Rica. We
continue to believe and articulate the view that a legal system that
allows quick and easy establishment of property rights through adverse
possession will, in the long run, discourage investment and act as a
brake on the country's development. To date, the Government of Costa
Rica has shown no willingness to change its laws concerning land
ownership.
In the most prominent squatter cases in the Pavones area, the
government has evicted squatters, has prevented them from reoccupying
the land from which they were evicted, and now provides better security
for property owners. It also is seeking other sites to which squatters
could be resettled. The government is also working on zoning plans that
could finally permit unambiguous titling of the land, or at least
clarify the property rights concessions in the highly desirable
maritime zone. These steps are all positive. We are currently waiting
to see if prosecutors or the courts will use existing law to charge
squatters criminally for land invasions.
monitoring use of hurricane reconstruction assistance
Question. What indigenous and international monitoring mechanisms
are in place or being put into place to ensure that post-hurricane
assistance will be used as it was intended to be used in Central
American and the Caribbean?
Answer. The transparent and effective use of funds is a top
priority. We have created an inter-agency working group in part to
coordinate donor efforts to guard against corruption. We are focusing
on solutions that ensure both the proper use of funds and the quality
of the reconstruction work.
The supplemental request includes up to $10 million to design and
implement anti-corruption programs. In addition, $12 million is slated
to help local governments manage reconstruction assistance, including
anti-corruption training for local officials.
The countries themselves have shown a commitment to creating strong
accountability mechanisms. The Nicaraguan Government has requested that
the IDB fund the creation of a body to work with the ministries
carrying out reconstruction and to report directly to donors. The
Hondurans have asked USAID to support an independent Inspector General,
and USAID has pledged $500,000. USAID is also providing $400,000 to
enhance the Honduran Comptroller General's auditing capability. In
Guatemala and El Salvador, controls are in place to monitor the flow of
assistance in support of the peace processes in those countries, and
these same mechanisms will be used to monitor the hurricane assistance.
Question. Are you satisfied that these mechanisms are sufficient?
Answer. We have made an excellent start, but this issue requires
constant vigilance over the long term. We have recognized the potential
for abuse since day one. Certainly, USAID will insist on transparency
and accountability in any of its projects.
As the reconstruction effort grows in scope and volume, we must not
only remain vigilant, but we must continue our efforts to help the
Central American countries improve their own anti-corruption
mechanisms.
impact on u.s. business operations
Question. What is the assessment of the impact of the natural
disasters in Central America and the Caribbean to U.S. business
operating in the regions?
Answer. The majority of damage to U.S. companies occurred in
Honduras, primarily in the banana and shrimp industries. The Embassy
reported that damage to U.S. business operations was in excess of $75
million.
Although the damage to the infrastructure of Nicaragua, Guatemala
and El Salvador was also extensive, and thereby affected the
transportation of U.S. imports, U.S. operations in those countries
suffered relatively little direct damage.
u.s. assistance for u.s. business operations
Question. What assistance is being provided to U.S. business
impacted by the hurricane in Central America and the Caribbean?
Answer. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the
Export-Import Bank of the United States (ExIm Bank) offer insurance and
other financing assistance to U.S. companies. Officials from both OPIC
and ExIm Bank have visited the region since the hurricane to promote
use of their services.
The insurance and financing provided by OPIC or ExIm Bank will
facilitate U.S. trade and investment in the region by offering
exporters and investors the means to reduce transaction and investment
risk.
On February 10, 1999, OPIC President Munoz and Citibank President
Menezes signed the $200 million Investment Facility for Central America
and the Caribbean. The facility offers loans ranging from $500,000 to
$40 million with terms of one to ten years. In El Salvador, Caterpillar
and the Salvadoran cement producer CESSA immediately made use of the
facility.
opic and central american and caribbean recovery
Question. What role will OPIC play in assisting the recovery of
U.S. business?
Answer. OPIC is working closely with several different U.S.
companies interested in doing projects in at least half a dozen Central
American and Caribbean countries. The investments in Central America
alone, if they go forward, would represent OPIC political risk
insurance and/or financing totaling $675 million.
This new investment will complement OPIC's existing support in the
Central American and Caribbean region, which today totals $1.5 billion.
This total includes the Latin American Investment Funds, which can
invest in some Central American countries.
The total also includes the new lending agreement that OPIC signed
in February with Citibank. It establishes a 22-country $200 million
investment facility for Central America and the Caribbean that will
help meet the need for medium- and long-term capital in the region. The
facility will encourage private sector investment in rebuilding the
economies of the countries that were devastated by hurricanes and
natural disasters.
Under a ten year agreement, OPIC will guarantee one half of each
loan made by Citibank under the facility for projects in the region and
will provide political risk insurance for the other half. Citibank will
perform credit screening and OPIC will assure compliance with such
standards as environmental protection, labor rights, and protection of
jobs here in the U.S.
argentina: intellectual property protection
Question. Argentina failed to provide adequate protections for
intellectual property of American companies, particularly the
pharmaceutical industry. In what ways do Argentina's IPR protections
fall short of U.S. expectations?
Answer. Argentina's lack of patent protection for pharmaceutical
products has been a contentious bilateral issue. In 1997 it cost
Argentina 50% of its GSP benefits. Argentina's IP regime does not yet
meet WTO standards.
Among the problems with the pharmaceutical patent law: it contains
onerous compulsory licensing provisions; it does not provide patent
protection until November 2000; and it does not provide WTO Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
consistent protection for exclusive test data.
Argentina remains one of the few major pharmaceutical markets in
the world without protection for pharmaceutical inventions. In addition
it is used as an export base for pirate products to countries where
legitimate products enjoy patent protection.
Two recent actions that appear to violate Argentina's current TRIPS
obligations provide evidence that IP protection for pharmaceutical and
agrochemical products is weakening. First, the GOA has failed to
provide Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMR) for a drug patented by a U.S.
firm, as required under TRIPS.
Second, in August, the GOA issued new regulations that eliminated
the 10-year data exclusivity period for the protection of confidential
data. Agrochemicals, which enjoy patent protection under Argentine law,
received protection of confidential test data until August 1998, when
this practice was changed.
Argentina's copyright laws are currently under review by the
executive branch.
Effective enforcement remains a problem. U.S. industry estimates
1998 losses due to copyright piracy, such as video and software piracy,
at $275.7 million.
Question. What is the annual cost of piracy by Argentina's drug
manufacturers to American drug companies?
Answer. The pharmaceutical industry estimates losses at nearly $600
million per year.
Question. What additional sanctions are under consideration to
demonstrate the importance of this issue to the U.S. Government?
Answer. We have thus far removed 50% of Argentina's GSP benefits.
Argentina is one of the countries which has lost GSP benefits because
they have not given intellectual property adequate and effective
protection.
We emphasized our concerns regarding Argentina's intellectual
property regime to the GOA during the recent visit of President Menem.
In consultation with industry, USTR is examining the possibility of
initiating WTO proceedings in the absence of progress.
We continue to consider all policy options at our disposal in
working to ensure that Argentina brings its IP regime into compliance
with its TRIPS obligations.
commission on human rights resolution on cuba
Question. What specific steps has the State Department taken to
ensure the adoption of a strong resolution condemning Cuba's human
rights record at the upcoming UN Human Rights Commission session in
Geneva? If no other country introduces such a resolution, will the U.S.
delegation do so, as Assistant Secretary of State Harold Hongju Koh
assured this committee would be the case? Has the Department made clear
to all member countries the importance we attach to this issue and
explained the negative impact on bilateral relations with countries
that fail to support such a resolution?
Answer. A number of members of the Commission on Human Rights have
expressed an interest in having a country-specific resolution on the
human rights situation in Cuba at the session which is starting this
week in Geneva.
The Czech Republic has announced that it will introduce a
resolution on Cuba at the 1999 session of the Commission on Human
Rights. The Poles have just announced that they are officially co-
authors of the resolution.
We have been consulting with government officials of countries who
are members of the Commission on Human Rights, and others, both in
capitals and with their representatives in Geneva, to urge their
support of a Cuba resolution.
new cuba measures
Question. Congressional authors of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of l996 have asserted that the Administration is
prohibited from licensing the sale of food to Cuba. Please provide a
thorough written explanation of the Administration's legal
justification for its contention that it has the right to license such
sales of food to Cuban independent non-governmental organizations.
Answer. On January 5, the President announced new measures to
support the Cuban people. These modest and reasonable adjustments to
the regulations that implement the Cuban embargo are in full compliance
with the law. In particular, they are well within the scope of the
President's licensing authorities under various provisions of law
already in force when the 1996 Libertad (Helms-Burton) Act was passed.
One of the new measures authorizes the licensing of sales of food and
agricultural inputs to independent non-governmental entities in Cuba.
The Libertad Act codified the Cuban embargo as of March 1, 1996.
This means that it codified the restrictions, but also preserved the
licensing authorities set out under prior provisions of law. These
provisions include section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act,
section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), the Export
Administration Act, the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), Presidential
Proclamation No. 3447 establishing the embargo, and applicable federal
regulations.
Section 5(b) of the TWEA provides the basic authority for
enforcement of the Cuban embargo. This law authorizes the President,
``through any agency he may designate, and under such rules and
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or
otherwise,'' to regulate or prohibit financial, trade and other
transactions with any foreign country or nationals thereof by persons
subject to U.S. jurisdiction. This statutory authority remains in
force.
The Export Administration Act (EAA) sets forth additional licensing
authorities. Section 4 authorizes the Secretary of Commerce, ``under
such conditions as may be imposed by the Secretary which are consistent
with the provisions of this Act,'' to license the export of goods from
the United States. Section 6 authorizes the President to ``prohibit or
curtail the exportation of any goods . . . to the extent necessary to
further significantly the foreign policy of the United States . . .''.
The Department of Treasury's Cuban Assets Control regulations, 31
CFR, Part 515, and the Commerce Department's Export Administration
regulations, 15 CFR, Parts 730 et. seq., make up part of the regulatory
scheme that implements the Cuban embargo. These programs incorporate
reasonable administrative flexibility to ensure that they serve the
foreign policy objectives for which they were imposed without
unintended or counterproductive consequences.
Sales of food and agricultural commodities to Cuba require a
specific license and are generally subject to denial. The President's
new initiative does not remove the license requirement, but does
provide case-by-case review for a defined scope of commodities to non-
governmental end-users in Cuba. In particular, the Administration will
consider, on a case-by-case basis, applications for sales of food and a
limited range of agricultural commodities in order to support
independent non-governmental entities in Cuba.
Sales to independent entities not only will help get food to the
Cuban people, but will contribute to the development of a civil society
independent of the current Cuban government. This is a regulatory step
that furthers the foreign policy purposes of the embargo. This
represents a modest and reasonable exercise of licensing authority that
is fully consistent with the existing regulations.
Indeed, the Helms-Burton Act clearly contemplates actions that
provide support to the Cuban people. Section 109 of that Act, for
example, specifically authorizes, indeed encourages, support for
individuals and independent non-governmental organizations to support
democracy-building efforts for Cuba.
usg financial support for brazil
Question. How much financial support has the U.S. Government
committed to the international financial rescue plan for Brazil?
Answer. The U.S. Government has guaranteed $5 billion of the $41.5
international assistance package announced in November 1998. Other
contributions to the package included $18 billion from the IMF, $4.5
billion each from the World Bank and IDB, and $9.5 billion in bilateral
contributions from nineteen other countries.
Question. What is the financial exposure to U.S. taxpayers if
Brazil defaults on its obligations to the United States?
Answer. We certainly do not foresee that happening. Brazil has
taken major steps to reduce its government budget deficit and to enact
needed fiscal reforms, and we expect they will continue on this path.
Of the funds disbursed so far as part of the international package, the
U.S. share of the guarantee amounts to approximately $1.5 billion. We
anticipate these funds, as well as any additional funds that may be
disbursed up to the original $5 billion pledge amount, will be repaid
fully and in a timely manner.
Question. Which of the conditions imposed by international
financial institutions as part of the rescue package has the Brazilian
Government satisfied and which have yet to be fulfilled?
Answer. The original IMF program announced last November called on
the GOB to implement a substantial package of fiscal measures designed
to raise revenues and reduce expenditures. All of these measures--which
amount to a budget adjustment of about 2.6% of GDP--have been approved.
As a result of Brazil's change in exchange rate policy in January, a
new IMF program was developed to adjust monetary and other targets. The
new agreement was announced March 8, but it has yet to be formally
approved by the IMF Board. The agreement calls on the Government of
Brazil to take additional steps to further reduce the government budget
deficit and abide by strict anti-inflationary monetary policy targets.
The agreement also requires Brazil to persuade private sector
commercial banks to maintain credit lines to the country. So far,
Brazil has progressed in all these areas.
chile and mlat with spain
Question. If the Government of Chile were expressly to request that
the U.S. Government not provide documents to the Spanish court in the
Pinochet case inasmuch as doing so would recognize the competence of
the foreign court, would the State Department use its discretion under
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Spain to withhold documents in
the interest of good relations with the sovereign Government of Chile?
Answer. While we would certainly bring to the attention of the
Department of Justice any concerns expressed by the Government of
Chile, the United States is obligated to respond to the Spanish request
in accordance with the terms of the 1990 U.S.-Spain Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty (MLAT). As the Central Authority for the United
States under the treaty, the Justice Department is responsible for
making and receiving all legal assistance requests, and for
communicating directly with the Spanish Central Authority about
requests made to or from the United States. The Justice Department is
also responsible for deciding whether the exceptions to the requirement
of compliance under the treaty with Spain are applicable. As do most
other MLAT's, the treaty with Spain provides that compliance may be
refused where the ``security or similar essential interests'' of the
United States would be prejudiced. There has been no determination that
such extraordinary circumstances exist in this case.
chile declassification project
Question. What is the rationale for declassifying Pinochet-era U.S.
documents before Allende-era documents? Why is this not being done in
chronological and historical order? What is the estimated total cost
(not merely incremental cost) of the Chile declassification process
that is now under way in the State Department and in various U.S.
Government agencies? How does the Department intend to pay for this
declassification process? How does the Department justify these
expenditures?
Answer. On behalf of the President, the NSC asked State and other
agencies to undertake a compilation and review for release of documents
that shed light on human rights abuses, terrorism, and other acts of
political violence during and prior to the Pinochet era in Chile. The
Department is working to carry out that instruction.
In the first phase, agencies will retrieve and review documents
from 1968-1978. A second phase is expected to address the period 1979-
91. In conducting the review of documents in the first phase, agencies
will begin with documents from the 1973-1978 period. This corresponds
to the period of greatest concern regarding allegations of human rights
abuses in Chile.
A preliminary estimate of the total cost of State Department action
in compiling, reviewing and releasing documents covering the 1968-78
period is $825,000.
Many of these costs are fixed overhead. Department personnel have
added fulfillment of the NSC instruction to their other duties. The
Department is still examining options for funding the incremental
costs.
The Department believes that the expenditures related to the Chile
Declassification Project are fully justified by the fact that reviewing
such documents for declassification is an important element in the
Administration's foreign policy. Release of the information may assist
Chilean efforts to address such lingering questions as the fate of the
disappeared. This policy is consistent with other efforts by the
Administration, as in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, to clarify
the facts surrounding human rights abuses and terrorism by releasing
information in U.S. Government files as appropriate. It is also
consistent with the Administration's commitment to greater openness, as
exemplified by Executive Order 12958.
cuba: 1996 shoot-down
Question. Besides seeking an ICAO inquiry and UN inquiry, what
effective steps has the Administration taken to comply with President
Clinton's promise to surviving family members to bring to justice those
Cuban officials responsible for the February 1996 murder of the
Brothers to the Rescue pilots?
Answer. After the shoot-down, the Department of Justice launched an
investigation, which remains open. I refer you to the Department of
Justice for additional information about the investigation.
As the President said in 1996, the brutal shoot-down provided the
world with ``a harsh reminder of why a democratic Cuba is so important,
not only to us but to the people of Cuba.''
We are pressing forward in our efforts to promote peaceful,
democratic change in Cuba. Part of this effort is to provide
humanitarian support for the Cuban people and assistance in the
development of independent civil society.
We believe that increasing the flow of information to, from, and
within Cuba, fostering people-to-people contacts, and facilitating
outside support for independent groups increases chances that the
inevitable transition will be peaceful and take democratic directions.
The measures the President announced on January 5 are designed to
facilitate these goals.
alejandre case
Question 1. State Department official Michael Ranneberger asserted
in a declaration filed before the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida that the Cuban state-run telecommunications firm
Empresa de Telecommunicaciones de Cuba, S.A. (ETECSA) is ``a separate
legal entity'' from the Cuban state, i.e., having ``a legal status
distinct from'' the Cuban state. Did the Department rely on information
provided by ETECSA, the Cuban Government, or representatives thereof in
preparing the Ranneberger declaration (particularly those
characterizing in detail the inner workings of ETECSA)? If so, is it
sound judgement on the part of the Department or Mr. Ranneberger to
rely on information provided by Cuba, particularly since the Department
and Mr. Ranneberger are taking the Government of Cuba's side in a court
case against American citizens? What independent source of information
does the Department and Mr. Ranneberger have detailing in the inner
workings of a state-run Cuban entity? If the Administration considers
ETECSA an independent entity, would it consider ETECSA eligible to
purchase food from the United States under the measures announced in
January 1999? If not, why not? Does the Department of State possess
similar insight in the importation of cocaine to Cuba for transshipment
to the United States? If not, why not?
Answer. The U.S. Government intervened in the case of Alejandre v.
Republic of Cuba for the limited purpose of protecting U.S. Government
equities and the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States as set forth in the Cuba Democracy Act of 1992, P.L. 102-
484, Title XVII; 22 U.S.C. 6001 et seq. Section 6004(e)(3) of this Act
specifically authorizes the President to issue licenses in order to
permit telecommunications contact between individuals in the United
States and the people of Cuba. Both the Executive and Legislative
Branches have determined that maintaining direct telecommunications
services between the United States and Cuba is a critical element of
our policy towards Cuba. In particular, such services support our
policy of encouraging development of a civil society independent of the
Cuban Government and promoting an eventual peaceful transition to
democracy. In a declaration filed in that case, the Department asserted
that the Cuban company Empresa de Telecommunicaciones de Cuba, S.A.
(``ETECSA'') is a corporation organized under the laws of Cuba.
Declaration of Michael E. Ranneberger, Coordinator, Office of Cuban
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, para. 6. The Department further
asserted that ETECSA ``appears to conduct its business as a separate
legal entity.'' Id. At para. 7. As noted in the declaration, various
statements contained therein were based on information provided by
ETECSA. For your convenience a copy of the Ranneberger declaration is
attached.
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Southern Division
[case nos. 96-10126-civ-king, 96-10127-civ-king, 96-10128-civ-king]
Marlene Alejandre, individually
and as personal representative
of the Estate of Armando
Alejandre, deceased, et al
Plaintiffs
v.
The Republic of Cuba and
The Cuban Air Force,
Defendants
v.
AT&T Corporation (Formally, American
Telephone and Telegraph Company), et al
Garnishees
declaration of michael e. ranneberger
I, Michael E. Ranneberger, declare and say:
1. I am the Coordinator, Office of Cuban Affairs, in the U.S.
Department of State. I have held this position since July 1995,
and have been employed as a Foreign Service Officer by the
Department of State since 1975. Since July 1995, I have been
the director of the office within the Department of State
responsible for coordinating U.S. relations with Cuba,
including bilateral telecommunications matters. During the
course of these responsibilities, I have become familiar with
all aspects of our relations with Cuba, and have participated
in discussions with Cuban government officials on various
bilateral matters. The following is based on my personal
knowledge and information available to me as part of my
official duties.
2. In 1992, with strong bipartisan support, Congress enacted the Cuban
Democracy Act (the ``CDA'') (Pub. L. 102-484, Title XVII; 22
USC 6001 et seq.). The CDA declares that U.S. policy toward
Cuba should be ``to seek a peaceful transition to democracy and
a resumption of economic growth in Cuba through the careful
application of sanctions against the Castro government and
support for the Cuban people'' (22 USC 6002(1)). As part of the
policy of ``support for the Cuban people,'' the CDA authorizes
the resumption of direct telecommunications services between
the United States and Cuba (22 USC 6004(e)(l)). The law permits
the provision of telecommunications facilities ``in such
quantity and of such quality as may be necessary to provide
efficient and adequate telecommunications services'' between
the two countries (22 USC 6004(e(2)). The CDA also authorizes
the licensing of payments to Cuba of amounts due ``as a result
of the provision of telecommunications services,'' consistent
with the public interest, but not from blocked accounts (22 USC
6004(e)(3)).
3. Direct telecommunications form a critical element of ``support for
the Cuban people.'' The goal is to improve people-to-people
communications between the United States and Cuba, including
contacts between family members in both countries, to open the
Cuban people to new sources of information and ideas, and to
encourage the development of civil society independent of the
Cuban government.
4. Following enactment of the CDA, the Department of State and the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) developed policy
guidelines (issued in July 1993). Among other measures, the
policy guidelines authorize the Treasury Department to
``license each U.S. company or U.S. subsidiary to remit to Cuba
the fill share of Cuba's earnings from the service approved by
the FCC.'' The Department of State interprets the policy
guidelines, as well as the CDA, to authorize the licensing of
payments to Cuban nationals or entities separate from the Cuban
government, as well as to the Cuban government and its
agencies. Several U.S. companies subsequently negotiated
agreements to provide telecommunications services between the
United States and Cuba.
5. The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations to provide for
specific licensing on a case-by-case basis for certain
transactions related to telecommunications, including the
settlement of charges under the agreements (31 CFR 515.542(c)).
OFAC has issued eight licenses under this regulation
authorizing transactions related to telecommunications between
the two countries. The service agreements became operative in
November 1994, and licensed payments began to flow from U.S.
companies to their Cuban counterpart entity. The licensed
payments totaled about $39.5 million during the latest
available six-month reporting period (January 1 to June 30,
1998). These figures demonstrate that the telecommunications
policy authorized by the CDA is working, as intended, to
encourage enhanced people-to-people contacts between residents
of the two countries.
6. The payments from U.S. carriers under the agreements are made to the
Cuban company Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, S.A.
(``ETECSA''). According to information provided by ETECSA and
its legal counsel to the U.S. Government, ETECSA is a
corporation (sociedad anonima) organized under the laws of
Cuba. It has five shareholders: three are separate Cuban
government owned or controlled corporations with a combined 59%
share, the fourth is STET International of Italy (through a
wholly-owned subsidiary in the Netherlands) with a 29% share,
and the fifth is a Panamanian-registered corporation known as
Universal Trade and Management Corporation (UTISA) with a 12%
share. Under Cuban law, ETECSA is a ``joint venture,'' which is
defined as ``a Cuban commercial company which adopts the form
of a nominal share corporation, in which one or more national
investors and one or more foreign investors participate.''
Cuban Foreign Investment Act, Law No. 77 of September 5, 1995,
Art. 2(i). According to Article 13.1 of the same law, ``Joint
ventures imply the establishment of a legal status distinct
from that of any one of the . . . .'' Thus, under Cuban law,
ETECSA has a separate legal status from its shareholders.
7. In practice, ETECSA appears to conduct its business as a separate
legal entity distinct from the Cuban government. According to
information provided to the U.S. Government by ETECSA, its
funds are not intermingled with Cuban government funds. Unlike
wholly-owned entities of the Cuban state, ETECSA does not make
``contributions'' (aportes) to the Cuban government.
(``Contributions'' are fixed assessments set by the Cuban
government at the start of each year, which are determined
without regard to expected revenues or profits.) The only
direct payments from ETECSA to the Cuban government are taxes.
ETECSA bills the Cuban government for services rendered, just
as it does other customers. ETECSA works in other countries on
its own, not through Cuban diplomatic missions. The ETECSA
board of directors acts for the shareholders, which are paid
quarterly dividends. Members of the board do not hold positions
with the Cuban government.
8. The garnishment of debts owed or payments made by U.S. carriers to
ETECSA could result in the termination of direct
telecommunications services between the two countries. On
January 8, Ricardo Alarcon, President of the Cuban National
Assembly, speaking on Cuban television, said that if the
payments due the Cuban enterprise were not received, Cuba would
not allow the service to continue ``free of charge.'' This
point was reiterated in a demarche made to my office by the
Cuban Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Washington on
January 14. Referring to the possibility that payments due
ETECSA might be interrupted, the Cuban Interests Section said
that such a development would lead to the interruption of
telephone service between the two countries. The Department of
State takes these statements by the Cuban authorities very
seriously, and believes that a disruption in direct
telecommunications between the two countries would have serious
adverse consequences for U.S. foreign policy interests.
9. Congress and the executive branch both have strongly supported
direct telecommunications between the United States and Cuba,
as set forth in the CDA. In my judgment, the continuation of
these services advances the national interest of the United
States, and their disruption would cause serious harm to U.S.
policy toward Cuba. Direct telecommunications encourage
humanitarian contacts between families in this country and
their loved ones in Cuba, encourage other people-to-people
contacts between the two countries, open new sources of
information and ideas for the Cuban people and promote the
development of an independent civil society on the island.
Direct telecommunications form a critical element of U.S.
policy to promote a peaceful transition to democracy. The
garnishment of licensed payments owed by U.S. carriers to their
Cuban counterpart would disrupt the continuation of these
services, and frustrate the policy approved by the legislative
and executive branches.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the above declaration is true
and correct.
Michael E. Ranneberger
Coordinator, Office of Cuban Affairs,
Department of State.
Executed at Washington, D.C.
January 26, 1999.
re: the alejandre case
Question 2. Is it sound judgment on the part of the Department or
Mr. (Michael) Ranneberger to rely on information provided by Cuba,
particularly since the Department and Mr. Ranneberger are taking the
Government of Cuba's side in a court case against American citizens?
Answer. Mr. Ranneberger did not rely on the Government of Cuba for
information. The Declaration conveyed publicly available information
and information provided by ETECSA and made clear the source of the
information.
The USG is not ``taking the side'' of the Government of Cuba in
this case. The USG has intervened in the litigation to defend important
U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. These interests
include preserving the ability of the USG to use asset blocking
programs as a means of influencing the behavior of countries that
threaten our interests and our interest in ensuring that similarly
situated U.S. nationals with claims against the Government of Cuba are
treated equitably.
Question 2(a). What independent source of information does the
Department and Mr. Ranneberger have detailing the inner workings of a
state-run Cuban entity?
Answer. The Department has no independent source of information
that details or provides information on the inner workings of ETECSA.
Question 2(b). If the Administration considers ETECSA an
independent entity, would it consider ETECSA eligible to purchase food
from the United States under the measures announced in January 1999? If
not, why not?
Answer. The Administration did not say that ETECSA is an
organization independent of the Government of Cuba, but rather that it
is an independent legal entity. ETECSA would not qualify under the
regulations issued by the Department of Commerce to purchase food and/
or agricultural goods from a U.S. supplier.
Question 2(c). Does the Department of State possess similar insight
into the inner workings of the joint venture or Cuban ministry
implicated recently in the importation of cocaine to Cuba? If not, why
not?
Answer. We are aware of the recent attempted shipment of cocaine to
Cuba, which is still under investigation by Colombian and Spanish
authorities. What information is available indicates that the narcotics
were destined for Spain after a stop in Cuba. The Department has no
information on the ``inner workings'' of the joint venture firm
reportedly involved in this trafficking incident.
helms-burton title iv
Question. If the Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs has personal knowledge of activities by a company
doing business in Cuba that leads him ``reasonably to conclude'' that
such company is trafficking in the property of U.S. national, is not
the Assistant Secretary obligated under law and regulation to sanction
such company under Title IV of the LIBERTAD Act? In light of the
delegation of authority in U.S. regulations, does not the final legal
authority and obligations to enforce this provision rest solely with
the Assistant Secretary of Western Hemisphere Affairs, regardless of
whether or not other officials agree with such a determination?
Answer. In regulations implementing Title IV the Department has
stated that, ``Determinations of ineligibility and excludability under
Title IV will be made when facts or circumstances exist that would lead
the Department reasonably to conclude that a person has engaged in
confiscation or trafficking after March 12, 1992.'' The Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs has been delegated
authority to make determinations of excludability and visa
ineligibility under Section 401(a) of the Act. As a matter of practice,
the Assistant Secretary may consult with other agencies in making such
determinations. Nonetheless, authority for implementing Title IV rests
with the Assistant Secretary.
mexican law enforcement vetting
Question. How many persons have been vetted and are actively
pursuing their duties in each of the following Mexican law enforcement
units: bilateral border task forces, organized crime unit, special
prosecutor for crimes against health (FEADS)? How many persons from
each of these units have failed polygraph examinations or otherwise
been implicated in wrongdoing?
Answer. In accounting for personnel, the Government of Mexico
considers the Bilateral Border Task Forces (BTF) to be part of the
FEADS. All personnel in FEADS, including BTF personnel, have been
vetted. That is, 106 vetted law enforcement officers. All 106 are
considered on active duty, whether stationed on the border or on
airport interdiction duty.
No member of the FEADS has failed a polygraph test. However, five
have been implicated in wrongdoing. Two were arrested in September
1998, on kidnapping and drug trafficking charges. The U.S. Government
believes the allegations are unfounded. These two remain in jail. In
March 1999, three members were arrested and are in jail on extortion
charges.
The organized crime unit (OCU) has 194 agents, all of whom have
been vetted. All 194 officers are on active duty.
During a September 1998 re-vetting, 19 members of the OCU failed
polygraph examinations. All personnel who failed have either been
removed from the unit or re-assigned to sub-units of the OCU with no
access to counternarcotics information.
One member of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), a vetted sub-
unit of the OCU, was arrested in February 1999 for drug trafficking.
The agent escaped custody and his whereabouts are unknown.
immunity for u.s. law enforcement officers in mexico
Question. Has the Department of State requested full diplomatic
immunity, consular immunity, or other immunity for all U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency or Federal Bureau of Investigation agents who are
carrying out law enforcement activities in Mexico, in order to protect
them from arrest or conviction by Mexican authorities for carrying
weapons needed for their self-defense? If not, why not? If so, how has
the Mexican Government responded?
Answer. We have conveyed to senior levels of the Mexican Government
U.S. interest in having the immunities of DEA agents--and FBI
Resolution 6 agents assigned to the DEA contingent in Mexico--upgraded
from the consular level (i.e., criminal and civil immunity both limited
to official acts) to the administrative and technical level (i.e., full
criminal immunity, but civil immunity limited to official acts). They
would then enjoy the same level of immunity customarily accorded to law
enforcement agents at embassies.
DEA and FBI country attaches continue to enjoy diplomatic immunity
(i.e., full criminal and comprehensive civil immunity).
The Mexican Government has reaffirmed its commitment to the
physical safety of DEA personnel in Mexico. However, it has not agreed
to administrative and technical immunity for DEA agents.
extradition of u.s. customs agents
Question. What is the status of the Mexican Government's publicly
stated plans to seek the extradition of U.S. law enforcement officials
involved in Operation Casablanca? Would the U.S. Government ever agree
to extradite to Mexico or any other country any U.S. law enforcement
official for actions taken in good faith and in the line of duty?
Answer. The Mexican Government announced on February 7 that it had
not found evidence that U.S. Customs agents involved in Operation
Casablanca had violated Mexican law.
While we cannot rule out the possibility of extradition should a
very unusual case arise, we of course would generally not expect to
extradite U.S. law enforcement officials for actions taken in good
faith and in the line of duty.
mexican national extraditions
Question. How many Mexican drug kingpins were extradited and
surrendered to U.S. custody in 1998?
Answer. Based on U.S. Government records, there were three Mexican
national drug traffickers authorized for extradition in 1998: Jesus
Amezcua Contreras, Arturo Paez Martinez, and Florentino Blanco Mesa.
The Department of State has also received confirmation from the
Government of Mexico that Luis Amezcua Contreras was found, in February
1999, to be extraditable.
Mexico's legal system provides for the appeal of extradition orders
through the amparo process, similar to the U.S. due process right of
appeal. During 1998 all of the traffickers authorized for extradition
filed appeals which are being processed through the Mexican legal
system.
mexico's new counternarcotics initiative
Question. Mexico recently allocated $400 million to its anti-drug
efforts. Does this amount represent an incremental increase in funding
for such activities? How much of an increase is programmed on an annual
basis for such newly funded activities?
Answer. The Government of Mexico recently announced a new
comprehensive national effort to confront the top national security
threat it faces--illicit drug trafficking, production, and use. In
announcing its new counternarcotics strategy, the Government of Mexico
indicated that it would be spending up to $500 million over the next
three years to improve surveillance and rapid response capability and
strengthen land, air, and sea interdiction.
In 1999, Mexico has provided an initial investment of $160 million
to begin procurement of equipment. This investment will be in addition
to the $770 million counter-drug budget the Mexican Congress approved
for 1999.
While the Government of Mexico makes public the budget for various
government agencies, it has not previously organized or made public its
total counternarcotics spending. The 1999 budget is the first time
interagency counternarcotics spending is brought together in one place
and thus the relationship to prior years funding cannot be determined.
Further, future year funding is not yet known because the Mexican
Congress must approve annually the national budget. However, this
effort represents a major commitment by the Mexican Government to
participate fully in the fight against illicit drugs.
forward operating locations
Question. What specific alternatives is the Administration
considering for the forward operating locations to replace the U.S.
military bases in Panama? What countries have been asked to allow such
activities on their territory? Have any of these countries agreed to
such an arrangement? Is there any alternative more ideal than the
facilities in Panama (provided that the Panamanian Government concurred
in such a presence)? If the new president of Panama were to ask the
U.S. military to remain at bases in Panama, would you advocate doing
so?
Answer. We are actively discussing the establishment of forward
operating locations (FOLs) for the purpose of aerial counter-narcotics
interdiction with the Government of Ecuador and the Government of the
Netherlands regarding Aruba and Curacao.
We are not seeking the establishment of bases in these or other
countries, but rather access agreements for the use of existing airport
facilities. We believe the FOLs identified will satisfy our
requirements though we may seek and benefit from agreements with other
countries too.
Panama's new president takes office September 1. By that date, no
significant element of U.S. forces will remain in Panama. However,
nothing in the Panama Canal Treaty prevents future discussions with the
Government of Panama regarding a U.S. military presence.
nicaragua: u.s. citizen property claims
Question. What is the status of American-citizen property claims in
Nicaragua? Please provide a table indicating the number of settlements
of American-citizen claims by month during each of the last three
years.
Answer. Sandinista-era property disputes still figure prominently
in our bilateral policy concerns and are a significant impediment to
promoting economic growth. We take every occasion in meetings with the
Nicaraguan Government to press for the rapid resolution of pending
American citizen property claims. The Nicaraguan Government has been
responsive and has made significant progress over the years, as
indicated in the attached table.
Nevertheless, we would like to see the rate of resolutions
accelerated. Our Embassy in Managua works closely with American citizen
claimants and meets regularly with Nicaraguan officials to press for
the rapid and fair resolution of U.S. citizens' claims. A U.S. Foreign
Service Officer and two local employees work full-time assisting
American citizen claimants.
Since the 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, 796 American
citizens have filed 2,306 claims with our Embassy in Managua. 1,342 of
these claims have been resolved; 964 remain pending. 306 American
citizen claimants registered with the Embassy have had all of their
claims resolved, nearly 38 percent of the total.
The Nicaraguan Government has resolved another 941 American citizen
claims not registered with our Embassy--resolutions that the Embassy
has confirmed--for a total of 2,283 resolutions.
While the Nicaraguan Government has made significant progress
(resolution of 2,283 claims), newly naturalized American citizens
continuously bring new claims to the Embassy. Since January 1995, 758
new claims have been filed with us.
In addition, the Nicaraguan Government has resolved 98 claims
relating to properties held by the government. Only five are pending at
the current time and the Embassy, the claimants and the Nicaraguan
Government are actively working on resolving them.
The Nicaraguan Government has worked to raise the value of the
bonds used to pay compensation. They are in the process of
standardizing the bonds, making them more attractive to investors and
claimants. The Nicaraguan Government expects to have the new bonds
ready in April. Claimants would then be able to exchange their old
bonds for the new ones--or can choose to keep their old bonds.
Legislation is also pending in the Nicaraguan National Assembly
that would allow direct payment of bonds to the occupants of
confiscated properties in exchange for their agreement to return such
properties to their original owners.
This same legislation would also authorize land swaps, but would
first require the Nicaraguan Government to establish a ``land bank'' of
properties that would be available for exchange.
In addition, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court is in the process of
developing a mediation mechanism, along with new property courts, which
could encourage resolutions and accelerate processing of claims through
the judicial system.
We have encouraged the Nicaraguan Government to make greater
efforts to contact claimants and encourage them to pursue their claims.
As a result, the Vice Minister for Property began about two years ago
making regular trips to Miami to meet with claimants to discuss their
cases. This has resulted in a number of resolutions and saved claimants
the expense of traveling to Managua.
waiver year resolutions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aug-94........................... 8 Aug-95.......................... 7 Aug-96.......................... 33 Aug-97......................... 32 Aug-98......................... 32
Sep-94........................... 4 Sep-95.......................... 5 1-Sep........................... 27 Sep-97......................... 34 Sep-98......................... 34
Oct-94........................... 11 Oct-95.......................... 19 Oct-96.......................... 32 Oct-97......................... 20 Oct-98......................... 29
Nov-94........................... 89 Nov-95.......................... 83 Nov-96.......................... 26 Nov-97......................... 17 Nov-98......................... 28
Dec-94........................... 34 Dec-95.......................... 6 Dec-96.......................... 5 Dec-97......................... 16 Dec-98......................... 29
Jan-95........................... 29 Jan-96.......................... 21 Jan-97.......................... 7 Jan-98......................... 23 Jan-99......................... 64
Feb-95........................... 25 Feb-96.......................... 27 Feb-97.......................... 0 Feb-98......................... 23 ............................... ...........
Mar-95........................... 38 1-Mar........................... 40 Mar-97.......................... 22 Mar-98......................... 34 ............................... ...........
Apr-95........................... 44 Apr-96.......................... 102 Apr-97.......................... 43 Apr-98......................... 46 ............................... ...........
May-95........................... 36 May-96.......................... 88 May-97.......................... 65 May-98......................... 64 ............................... ...........
Jun-95........................... 100 Jun-96.......................... 92 Jun-97.......................... 78 Jun-98......................... 97 ............................... ...........
Jul-95........................... 4 Jul-96.......................... 46 Jul-97.......................... 15 Jul-98......................... 28 ............................... ...........
Additional..................... 118 ................................ ........... ................................ ........... ............................... ........... ............................... ...........
Total........................ 540 ................................ 536 ................................ 353 ............................... 434 ............................... 216
New Claims Filed:
Jan-95........................... 44 Aug-95.......................... 16 Sep-96.......................... 52 Aug-97......................... 8 Aug-98......................... 6
Mar-95........................... 16 Oct-95.......................... 46 Nov-96.......................... 28 Sep-97......................... 7 Sep-98......................... 6
Jun-95........................... 65 Jan-96.......................... 128 Dec-96.......................... 10 Oct-97......................... 7 Oct-98......................... 10
........... Jun-96.......................... 54 1-Jan........................... 7 Nov-97......................... 7 Nov-98......................... 0
........... Jul-96.......................... 31 May-97.......................... 79 Dec-97......................... 1 Dec-98......................... 0
........... ................................ ........... Jul-97.......................... 11 Jan-98......................... 9 Jan-99......................... 1
........... ................................ ........... ................................ ........... Feb-98......................... 30 ............................... ...........
........... ................................ ........... ................................ ........... Mar-98......................... 23 ............................... ...........
........... ................................ ........... ................................ ........... Apr-98......................... 4 ............................... ...........
........... ................................ ........... ................................ ........... May-98......................... 26 ............................... ...........
........... ................................ ........... ................................ ........... Jun-98......................... 17 ............................... ...........
........... ................................ ........... ................................ ........... Jul-98......................... 4 ............................... ...........
Total........................ 125 ................................ 275 ................................ 187 ............................... 143 ............................... 23
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
nicaragua: status of military-to-military relations
Question. What is the status of military-to-military relations
between the U.S. and Nicaragua? Has the Department of State abided by
its commitment to me and my House counterpart to withhold all such
formal contact until the Nicaraguan military has taken significant
steps to improve its notorious human rights record? Are there any
persons cited in the reports of the Nicaraguan Tripartite Commission
still in the ranks of the Nicaraguan military today? If so, who and
why? Are there any persons cited in the ``La Maranosa'' massacre still
in the ranks of the Nicaraguan military today? If so, who and why?
Answer. We do have relations with the Nicaraguan army in the sense
that we collaborate with them on issues of mutual interest. For
example, the Nicaraguan army provided invaluable security and
logistical support to U.S. armed forces personnel who recovered last
April the remains of pilots of a B-26 downed in the mountains of
northern Nicaragua after participating in the Bay of Pigs operation.
Similarly, but on a greatly magnified scale, the Nicaraguan army
collaborated closely and effectively with U.S. armed forces to ensure
that our humanitarian engineering and medical assistance to Nicaragua
following Hurricane Mitch (``Task Force Build Hope'') was delivered
promptly and had a beneficial impact. In both instances the conduct of
the Nicaraguan army was professional and competent.
In addition, we have facilitated Nicaraguan army participation in a
limited and carefully selected number of Southcom and other seminars
dedicated to issues of mutual and humanitarian interest. For example,
Nicaraguan civil defense personnel participated in a series of
Southcom-sponsored seminars and exercises on disaster preparedness and
relief. This experience unquestionably left the civil defense unit--a
part of the army--better prepared to respond to Hurricane Mitch.
Because of concerns about human rights and U.S. citizen property
cases, we have withheld other aspects of a normal relationship with the
Nicaraguan army, in particular the provision of training to Nicaraguan
military personnel and the accreditation of a Nicaraguan defense
attache in Washington (We do have a defense attache's office in
Managua). The Sandinista government pulled its Defense attache out of
Washington in 1989 in protest over Operation Just Cause in Panama.
Since 1995, however, the Nicaraguan military has made important
strides on both human rights and property:
Human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan army have dropped
significantly. Communication and respect between the army and
Nicaraguans in rural areas--where most abuses had previously
occurred--has improved dramatically. The OAS (Organization of
American States) and the CRS (Catholic Relief Services), which
are involved in grassroots human rights organizations known as
peace commissions, verify these findings. Moreover, in the most
significant abuse to have occurred in the last three years, the
killing of a young woman in Wamblan in December 1996, the army
collaborated in a civilian judicial process that found six army
personnel guilty in absentia of murder. The six soldiers
deserted during the investigation and their whereabouts are
unknown.
Effective March 12, 1999, the Nicaraguan army retired the
former head of the Sandinista secret police and four other
senior members of the Defense Intelligence Directorate, who
also would have had close ties to the former secret police.
In addition, the army has taken a more active and cooperative
role in trying to resolve property cases in the hands of the
army as an institution, which are claimed by American citizens.
One case was resolved in December 1998. Of the remaining three:
the Embassy and the Nicaraguan Government have been waiting
since October 1998 for one claimant to present necessary
documentation; in the second case, the Embassy and the
Nicaraguan Government are analyzing recently presented
documentation; and, in the third case, the claimant is waiting
for the suspension of judicial action relating to property
cases to be lifted in order to continue her case in the
Nicaraguan courts.
We were impressed with Nicaraguan army actions in these two
important areas, even before the close and effective cooperation
necessary in the Hurricane Mitch relief and reconstruction effort
increased contact between our militaries.
We know of one military officer cited in the Tripartite Commission
reports who remains on active duty; we have encouraged the Nicaraguan
Government to comply with the recommendations contained in the
Commission's various reports. Those recommendations focus principally
on reopening judicial processes in individual cases.
We have not yet determined whether the officer mentioned in
judicial proceedings related to the ``La Maranosa'' case remains in the
army. We would note, however, that a civilian judicial process
acquitted this officer.
guatemala: murder of bishop gerardi
Question. What is the status of the investigation of the murder of
Bishop Juan Jose Gerardi in Guatemala? Has the U.S. Government offered
technical support for this investigation? If so, what has been the
result of this assistance? If not, why not? Does the U.S. Government
have any information that implicates any member of Guatemala's security
forces or other government official in this heinous murder or in any
effort to impede the investigation. If so, please explain in detail.
Answer. The investigation is open and active. Recent and ongoing
activities include taking testimony and a crime scene reconstruction (a
common procedure in Guatemala criminal investigations).
At the request of the Government of Guatemala, the USG has provided
technical support for the investigation. The FBI has been involved from
very early in the investigation. FBI investigators have traveled to
Guatemala to provide assistance at various times. Material evidence has
also been brought to the FBI crime laboratory for testing.
I refer you to the FBI for additional details. Since the
investigation is ongoing, the results have not been made public.
We are not aware of any concrete information implicating members of
Guatemala's security forces or other government officials in this
heinous murder. However, because the Bishop's murder occurred so soon
after his public delivery of a report which held the military, military
commissioners and civil patrols responsible for approximately 80
percent of war-related rights violations, some observers suspect a
political motive for the crime.
There are allegations of impropriety in the investigation. The
apparent failure of the original prosecutor to investigate thoroughly
all reported leads has raised questions about the efficacy and
impartiality of the investigation. That prosecutor withdrew from the
case in December.
We have and will continue to urge a thorough investigation to bring
to justice the perpetrators of this deplorable crime.
paraguay
Question. What steps has the U.S. Government taken to support
constitutional democracy in Paraguay?
Answer. Since the restoration of democracy in Paraguay in 1989, the
United States has played a crucial role in support of Paraguay's
democratic consolidation. In 1996, when the democratically elected
government of Juan Carlos Wasmosy was threatened by then-Army General
Lino Oviedo, the USG called an urgent meeting of Foreign Ministers at
the OAS and supported the Government of Paraguay (GOP) in Asuncion as
it successfully stood up to Oviedo. In 1998, the USG supported the GOP
as it carried through with scheduled national elections, in the face of
attempts by some senior civilian and military leaders to postpone the
elections unconstitutionally. Following the election of President Cubas
and an opposition legislature in 1998, the USG has repeatedly urged all
sides to work out their differences through constitutional processes.
While the democratic process has been severely strained, the
institutions of democracy continue to function and are seeking, through
constitutional means, to resolve the current impasse.
The USG has further supported democracy in Paraguay throughout the
last decade through programs of several agencies (e.g., State
Department, USAID, USIS, Peace Corps, ODC, DEA, NIMA). The USG provided
critical support to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal that enabled it to
carry out the 1998 elections in a transparent manner. We continue to
support a civil-military dialogue aimed at helping the military
establish its role in a democratic society.
Question. What more can be done to stress the importance of
resolving this crisis?
Answer. USG officials have made clear to President Cubas, the
military, Vice President Argania, all factions of Congress, and the
Supreme Court our support for democratic institutions and the rule of
law. We have been especially clear that the independence of the
judiciary is key to any democracy. We have emphasized that the
international community would react sharply to any rupture of
constitutional order.
Question. Please list all forms and amounts of U.S. assistance
(including trade benefits) as well as international financial
institution loans or assistance for Paraguay.
Answer. USAID plans to provide $5.3 million in assistance in fiscal
year 1999. This aid, much of which will go to non-governmental
organizations, will strengthen local government, help ensure democratic
elections, improve the criminal justice system, combat corruption,
promote civil-military dialogue, increase coverage and quality of
family planning services, and help develop and manage environmental
reserves. $200,000 in IMET training funds will encourage military
professionalization. The State Department is currently planning to
provide $250,000 in counter-narcotics funds and $111,000 in anti-
terrorism training.
In 1998, Paraguay received $66 million in approved loans and
guarantees from the Inter-American Development Bank and $40 million in
approved World Bank loans.
Question. Has the U.S. Government considered suspending such
assistance if the Paraguayan Government continues to ignore the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Oviedo case?
Answer. The USG has made it clear to President Cubas that we
disagree with his decision to not carry out the order of the Supreme
Court in the Oviedo case. With the exception of a small military-to-
military cooperation program, the GOP currently receives very little
direct assistance from the USG. Most USG assistance to Paraguay goes to
non-governmental organizations and is in areas of priority interest to
us (e.g. environment, population) and of less immediate concern to the
GOP. We have made it clear that a rupture of the constitutional process
would have sudden and severe consequences for the GOP from the U.S. and
the international community.
Questions Submitted by Senator Biden
security funding
Question. Do you agree that the Department probably requires more
than the $3 billion you have requested to meet its security needs?
Answer. Yes, I agree that the Department needs more than the $3
billion requested. However, the Department's budget request for
security, as well as for other international affairs programs and
operations, was limited by the provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act
and addressed the need to eliminate deficit spending.
The security requirement will most certainly not be met in the next
five years--a multi-year, sustained level of investment in buildings,
equipment, and personnel is essential. The $3 billion requested in
advance appropriations is only the start of this multi-year program.
Far more will be required.
A viable construction program requires careful planning--from
ascertaining the number of personnel to be housed (not just today but
into the future), designing the building, acquiring an appropriate
site, awarding the construction contract, and then proceeding with the
construction and outfitting of the facility.
The Department is now well-positioned to execute an aggressive
construction program. We have made great strides since the tragic
bombings last August. We must move out smartly to ensure that our
people and facilities overseas are adequately protected from threats of
terrorism.
administration conflict resolution measures in africa
Question. In the past year, the security situation in sub-Saharan
Africa has taken a dramatic turn for the worse. There are now four new
major conflicts underway across the region. Civil war has broken out in
Angola and Sierra Leone. Fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea
escalates each day. Perhaps most alarming is the unprecedented
involvement of eight sub-Saharan states in the war in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Nations that have enjoyed good relations may
potentially have troops facing each other over the barrel of a gun.
The State Department has sent several envoys to the region to try
to mediate these various disputes, including Assistant Secretary of
State Susan Rice, and Special Envoys Anthony Lake, Howard Wolpe, and
Jesse Jackson. I support these efforts; the suffering and loss of human
life in each of these situations is tragic. The Administration must
continue to be actively engaged in trying to bring peace to the region.
What specific measures is the Administration taking to help African
States resolve the conflicts currently underway? What additional steps
are planned?
Answer. Armed conflict continues to hinder development and
democratic transformation in Africa. Peace and stability are the
foundations upon which economic growth and democratic transitions are
built. The USG supports Africa's search for peace and contributes to
conflict resolution in four ways.
First, we actively mediate in conflict situations. Assistant
Secretary Susan Rice has traveled throughout the continent in support
of mediation efforts in various areas of conflict. Former NSA Anthony
Lake has sought to mediate the border dispute between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, visiting the area four times since October 1998. President
Clinton has also been active in trying to resolve the Ethiopian/
Eritrean dispute and has written and called both leaders on the matter.
Former Congressman Howard Wolpe, Special Envoy to the Great Lakes, has
interceded with all eight Africa nations that have forces fighting in
the Congo. Special Presidential Envoy Jesse Jackson has facilitated
peace talks in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and other West African
nations.
Second, we support conflict management capabilities within Africa.
The USG has contributed nearly $9 million over five years to the OAU to
build and equip a Crisis Management Center within OAU Headquarters and
to equip a 100-man Rapid Deployment Military Observer Force. OAU has
deployed military observers to Comoros, and has mediated in every major
conflict on the continent. The USG has supported financially the
efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to
find peaceful solutions to the civil wars in Somalia and Sudan. The USG
also spends nearly $20 million annually to train African military units
in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations under the African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). ACRI-trained personnel and equipment
are employed in peacekeeping operations in Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone,
and the Central African Republic. The Department of Defense has
allocated $41.7 million over the next five years to build an African
Center for Security Studies modeled on the Marshall Center in Germany.
Third, we directly assist with our Africa regional peacekeeping
operation funds. In FY 1998, the U.S. contributed $6.7 million in
support of ECOMOG peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia,
and plans to contribute over $10.8 million this year for ECOMOG/Sierra
Leone, pending Congressional approval.
Fourth, we assist African conflict resolution activities through
multilateral organizations like the UN. In FY 1998 the USG provided $37
million for the UN Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA), $2.5 million for
the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), and $6.5 million for
the War Crimes Tribunal in Rwanda (ICTR).
We also aggressively engage other donor nations to assist in
conflict prevention and resolution, and support for non-governmental
organizations such as the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the
National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the African Center for
Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).
Question. It would appear that, in the post-Cold War era, our
influence in sub-Saharan Africa has declined.
Has our influence in sub-Saharan Africa waned so profoundly since
the end of the Cold War that we are unable to effectively encourage our
African allies to resolve their disputes?
Do we still have the same amount of leverage that we once did? If
so, can you cite specific examples of when we have done so? If such
leverage exists, and we have not used it, why haven't we?
Answer. Our influence in sub-Saharan Africa may be stronger since
the end of the Cold War since we have no colonial history in Africa,
and are not choosing to back rulers in Africa based on Cold War
alliances. We are more actively engaged in regional, sub-regional, and
bilateral relations than ever before. Notwithstanding our engagement,
we cannot always successfully influence events in Africa, as evidenced
by the conflicts ongoing from the Horn, across the continent, to West
Africa. Even so, our posture and influence in Africa is highlighted by
the historic, first-ever U.S.-Africa Ministerial meeting, which
attracted 46 sub-Saharan African countries and a number of African
regional organizations in March 1999. President Clinton has forged a
long-term partnership with Africa. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, OAU
Secretary General Salim Salim, and others have underscored their
support for U.S. engagement and efforts to work with Africa to promote
sustainable development, combat transnational threats, prevent the
spread of HIV/AIDS, and create a brighter future for the youth of
Africa.
Also, over the recent years there have been a number of successes
and improvements in democracy and stability in Africa to which we have
contributed: Mozambique, South Africa, Chad, Liberia, Guinea Bissau,
and most recently, Nigeria. In June, South Africa will hold its second
national democratic elections following its shedding of apartheid, and
in Nigeria, a steady transition to civilian, democratic rule is well on
track. Over half the region's countries will have completed a second
set of national elections by the year 2000--this on a continent almost
universally dominated by one-party states in 1990.
There are also a number of specific examples of our leverage and
ability to influence key events in Africa. Although the border dispute
continues between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the President was able to
broker an important air strike moratorium between the two countries. A
visit to Kigali by Assistant Secretary Susan Rice resulted in the
Government of Rwanda publicly announcing that it had military forces
operating in the DROC--an important admission for mediating the dispute
in the Congo. In the Horn, we influenced the establishment of a
Permanent Secretariat in IGAD for exclusive support to the Sudan peace
talks, and we are working toward the establishment of a continuous,
sustained mediation process. Through U.S. initiatives, the IGAD process
has been revitalized, and dialogue on the civil war in Sudan has
resumed. Our direct involvement in the Burundi peace talks in Arusha
has had a substantial impact on the direction and progress of
negotiations in the Arusha Accords. In West Africa, we leveraged
significant African and international support for the ECOMOG missions
in Sierra Leone and Liberia. ECOMOG has become Africa's most consistent
and reliable peacekeeping force. Finally, African endorsement of the
African Crisis Response Initiative and the Department of Defense's
African Center for Security Studies are also examples of the influence
that we continue to enjoy in Africa.
These successes in Africa are due in no small part to our influence
and programs that cross the entire spectrum, from conflict resolution
to economic development, democratization, good governance, and respect
for human rights.
Even with our successes, we readily admit that there are limits to
our leverage in Africa, and that our ability to influence is not the
same in all situations. Our leverage is amplified when we are able to
move in partnership with African interests, and with the multilateral
support of the Europeans and the UN. It is also amplified with the
confidence and support of Congress--an essential element for us--as we
address the magnitude of evolving challenges in Africa. In that
endeavor, we need to better identify and address the systemic causes of
conflict in Africa, including arms flows, illicit diamond and resource
sales that finance the arms and sustain conflict, and the transnational
entities that are entering into the equation more and more.
inviolability of african borders
Question. Since the end of colonialism, sub-Saharan African states
have largely adhered to the principle that the inherited boundaries
between them should remain inviolate and that the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of African states should be respected. This
principle is clearly spelled out in the charter of the Organization of
African Unity and was cited by Robert Mugabe as one of the main reasons
for Zimbabwe's involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In the past two years, we have seen a gradual shift away from
the principle, the most obvious example being the aforementioned war.
Have the rules among African states changed regarding the
inviolability of borders and sovereignty?
If so, what are the implications for African international
relations and interstate conflict, and how will this affect U.S.
foreign policy in the region?
Answer. In recent years, as internal conflict has weakened several
African countries, others with the ability to project force have
intervened--sometimes at the request of the government, sometimes not.
However, in general we do not believe the rules have changed among
African states regarding sovereignty and the inviolability of borders.
To abandon these principles, after decades of adherence to them, would
only exacerbate instability in Africa. We believe that African
governments on the whole continue to support these principles endorsed
by the OAU. (NB--The Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict involves a border
dispute over frontier locations.)
The DROC government invited Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia to assist
it in the fight against the rebels and the troops from neighboring
countries who had violated the borders of DROC.
The United States spoke against the Angolan troops in Congo-
Brazzaville and the non-invited forces in DROC.
Although three SADC states, led by Zimbabwe, have intervened
militarily in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, SADC is also
attempting to mediate the conflict there. We support these mediation
efforts to secure a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces and have
encouraged national dialogue in the Congo. We remain hopeful that
mediation will succeed.
iraq: regime change
Question. What can you say today to assure the Iraqi people that
were they to rebel against Saddam Hussein, that we would not stand idly
by as we did in 1991?
Answer. The U.S. looks forward to the time when Iraq can be
restored to its rightful place in the region, a time when the Iraqi
people can once again be proud to be Iraqis. We do not believe this is
possible as long as Saddam Hussein rules Iraq. We are working with
Iraqis inside Iraq, outside Iraq and others who share the goal of
regime change.
We have designated seven Iraqi based groups as eligible for
assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act. We are considering what
further assistance we could provide to them under the Act. However, we
are not going to take any precipitate action that might risk more lives
unnecessarily. We will proceed in a deliberate manner in addressing
this very serious issue.
In the meantime, we continue to enforce the No-Fly zones in
northern and southern Iraq. These zones were designed to prevent Saddam
from using even more lethal air power against Iraqis living in the
north and south.
As we have stated, we are also committed to responding should
Saddam Hussein move against the people of the north.
Questions about any specific response we might take would have to
be addressed to DOD.
Question. I'm sure that you are familiar with the plan advocated by
some which calls for raising an ``Iraq Liberation Army,'' inserting it
in American-protected enclaves, and supporting it with U.S. military
power as it marches toward Baghdad. What is your assessment of this
plan?
Answer. In November, the President stated publicly that the U.S.
supports regime change in Iraq. In accordance with the Iraq Liberation
Act, the President designated seven Iraqi opposition groups as eligible
to receive assistance under the Act. We are considering how to proceed.
We have of course heard a variety of descriptions for a plan for
inserting Iraqi fighters into Iraq and supporting them. For a military
assessment of the feasibility of such a plan and the likely USG
commitment to either support or extract the Iraqi fighters, we defer to
colleagues at Defense.
However, it must be clear that for any such plan to be seriously
contemplated, the support of at least one neighboring country to
provide logistical and other assistance would be essential. Our policy
of continuing to contain Saddam while working toward regime change has
met with mixed responses in neighboring countries. Most regional states
agree stability and security would be well served by a new government
in Baghdad. But they have traditional reservations about openly
advocating what could be considered as interference in domestic
affairs. They also have little confidence in the ability of Iraqis
outside Iraq to be able to effect such change.
For our part, we believe that Iraqis outside Iraq have a role to
play in the effort to achieve regime change through delegitimizing the
regime, developing a unity and coherence of purpose and demonstrating
through discussions and cooperative action that there can be a better
future for Iraqis. However, we currently believe that Iraqis inside
Iraq are better placed to effect serious regime change.
Question Do you envisage supplying lethal arms and training to
Iraqi opposition groups? If so, when could that begin?
Answer. No decision to drawdown any goods or services under the Act
has yet been taken. We are considering several options, among them the
possibility of providing lethal arms, non-lethal equipment and
training.
While we remain committed to implementing the Iraq Liberation Act,
we are also committed to ensuring that our actions move the process
toward a better day for the Iraqi people and do not needlessly or
precipitately subject Iraqi citizens--or Americans who might be called
upon to support or extract them--from unnecessary risk or loss of life.
Question. What incentives can you offer to a new leadership in
Iraq? What can we do to guard against some of the dangers that might
accompany regime change?
Answer. The biggest incentive for a new leadership in Iraq is
clearly the possibility to lead Iraq forward into the community of
nations where it can once again participate within the normal pattern
of international discussion and interaction.
Such a future assumes that a new leadership would meet Iraq's
outstanding obligations under the UN resolutions, be prepared to live
in peace with its neighbors, respect its own citizens and maintain the
territorial integrity of Iraq.
We are supporting Iraqis who have begun thinking and publishing
about the key issues that a new government would face, from
participatory government to debt restructuring to restructuring and
renewing the key sectors of the economy, from oil to health. It seems
clear to us that not only the U.S., but the entire international
community would welcome such a new regime and seek to facilitate its
re-entry into the family of nations as a proud and positive participant
for peace. We would do everything we could to promote such a response
on the part of the international community.
Regime change, once begun, is unpredictable. We are very conscious
of this fact, as are the Iraqi people. That is why we want to work with
groups inside and outside Iraq interested in creating a better future
for Iraq so that they may work with greater coherence and mutual
respect. Change, when it comes, must provide real and lasting benefit
to the Iraqi people. We are not prepared to precipitously advocate
change--change that might inadvertently lead to great risk of Iraqi--or
American--life.
But let me also be clear. We cannot and will not make these
decisions for the Iraqi people. Change, when it comes, must be brought
about for Iraqis by Iraqis. It cannot be imposed from outside.
Question. How effective do you believe containment has been in
serving our fundamental objectives? Do you believe containment is
eroding, or is it sustainable, especially given Saddam's continuing
reckless actions and statements? Is there a tension between containment
and an overt and aggressive policy of regime change?
Answer. Containment has been and remains a key U.S. and
international policy in dealing with Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
Containment, through the international sanctions and arms control
regimes provided for in UNSCRs, has gone far to disarm Saddam of his
weapons of mass destruction and to ensure that he does not have the
ability to reconstitute those weapons. At the same time, by allowing
Iraq to export oil but controlling the revenue from those exports, the
UN has been able to mitigate the effect of sanctions on the Iraqi
people by providing needed humanitarian assistance.
The U.S. and others have backed up the policy of containment
through the threat of force and, when necessary through the use of
force.
Since 1991, Saddam's regime has consistently refused to comply with
Iraq's obligations to the international community. There is general
frustration with Saddam's defiance of the international community, just
as there is genuine concern about the long-term effect of sanctions on
the people of Iraq. But there is no division about the fundamental
issues: Iraq under Saddam Hussein must be disarmed and monitored and it
must comply with its obligations under all the relevant UNSCRs.
After eight years of prevarication and obfuscation, it is plain for
all to see that Saddam Hussein will not meet his international
obligations. That is why we publicly have stated our support for regime
change.
No other nation openly supports a policy of regime change. In fact,
many nations have expressed concern with a policy that both seeks to
force Saddam to cooperate with the international community while at the
same time calling for regime change.
We agree that there is an inherent tension in the policy, but we
believe firmly that containment must remain a pillar of U.S. policy
until such time as there is regime change.
iraq: french and russian proposals
Question. What is your view of recent proposals on weapons
monitoring and inspections made by France and Russia?
Answer. Neither the French nor the Russian proposal adequately
addresses the dangers posed by Iraq's continuing refusal to disclose
and destroy its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as
required by UN Security Council resolutions. Nor can we support lifting
UN sanctions on Iraq until Iraq has complied with all of its
obligations.
We are actively engaged with the French, Russians and other members
of the Security Council to reestablish an effective disarmament and
monitoring presence in Iraq.
A UN assessment panel is meeting now to review disarmament issues.
We expect that its conclusions, due in mid-April, will provide a
baseline for further Council discussion.
indicting saddam hussein
Question. Why haven't we sought a resolution in the U.N. Security
Council to establish a Commission of Experts that would systematically
gather evidence as a prelude to a possible war crimes prosecution of
Saddam Hussein?
Answer. Saddam Hussein and members of his inner circle are
responsible for numerous incidents that bear investigation as war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
These incidents range from the use of chemical weapons against
Iraqi civilians at Halabja and other locations in northern Iraq in
1988-89, to the ongoing draining of the southern marshes, to the use of
civilian ``human shields'' to deter military operations. As I noted a
year ago, Saddam Hussein is a ``repeat offender.'' Finding a way to
hold him accountable for these crimes is a key goal we have long
supported.
We are supporting the work of a number of non-governmental
organizations that are working to educate the international community
about the war crimes of Saddam Hussein and his regime. We announced the
first of these grants last week, to the INDICT organization, and we
hope to support other groups, notably the Human Rights Alliance and the
International Monitor Institute, that are doing important work in this
area.
To be successful, all of these efforts require a great deal of
careful preparatory work on which we are well embarked. David Scheffer,
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Affairs is leading the effort inside
and outside the USG to move this process forward.
russia: political and economic stability
Question. What is your assessment of Russia's prospects for
maintaining a reasonable degree of stability in the near-to-medium
term?
Answer. As President Clinton stated in Moscow in September, Russia
can build a prosperous and stable future for itself if it completes the
transformation begun seven years ago. As I said in Chicago last fall:
``The drama of Russia's transformation from a dictatorship and an
empire to a modern democratic state is far, far from over . . . A true
and lasting transition to normalcy, democracy, and free markets in
Russia is neither inevitable nor impossible. It is an open question,
the subject of a continuing debate and struggle.''
Russia has accomplished a great deal in its transformation in the
last seven years. Three democratic elections, two for the Duma, and one
for Presidency. Governments have been chosen according to procedures
established in the Russian constitution. Russians enjoy more basic
freedoms than ever before in this history, and those freedoms rest on
better constitutional foundations. Those freedoms will be particularly
important as Russia holds Duma elections in December and then
Presidential elections in June of 2000.
Russia is going through difficult economic times. And there is no
doubt that Russia's 74-year experience with communism makes a
transition to a free-market economy a difficult one. No one is seeking
to impose a specific type of market economic system, but economic
realities exist that any country ignores at its own peril. Russia must
deepen its reform effort if it wants to enjoy the benefits that
increased investment (foreign and domestic) could bring. We should be
supportive, but at the same time we must acknowledge it is up to the
Russian leadership, together with the Russian people, to build sound
economic policy that ultimately helps guarantee political stability.
russia: u.s. policy and russian domestic politics
Question. How likely is Russia to have a new leader with whom we
can deal? Are we beginning to prepare for a post-Yeltsin Russia?
Answer. U.S. policy has been to support Russia's transformation to
a democratic, free-market oriented society, rather than any single
leader or personality. President Yeltsin has been elected twice by the
Russian people to serve as President of the Russian Federation. In that
capacity we work with him and his government on issues of concern to
our two countries.
At the same time, we maintain regular contact, through our Embassy
in Moscow, with Duma deputies of all parties and with political leaders
throughout the country. We also encourage regional leaders and Duma
deputies to visit the U.S., some through U.S. Government-sponsored
exchange programs.
Russia faces Duma elections in December of this year followed by
Presidential elections in June, 2000. Although we are watching
developments closely, it would be premature to speculate now on what
might happen in Russian domestic politics in the next eighteen months.
Questions Submitted by Senator Brownback
pa outlawing of militant/terrorist organizations
Question. Have all militant and/or terrorist organizations been
outlawed by the PA as required by the Wye Memorandum?
Answer. The Wye River Memorandum obligated the Palestinian side to
``inform the U.S. fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all
organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a
military, terrorist or violent character. . . .''
The Palestinians have provided to us a March 3, 1996 statement
issued by the Palestinian Authority stating that a meeting of the
Higher Palestinian National Security Council, chaired by Chairman
Arafat, had decided to ban the activity of all paramilitary groups,
including the armed wings of HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
We have some questions regarding the legal status of this
statement. We are discussing this with the Palestinians.
The Palestinian security services have been effective in taking
action against those terrorist groups.
We continue to press the PA to do everything possible to prevent
terror and to cooperate fully with Israel in this effort.
revolving door for palestinian prisoners?
Question. Has the ``revolving door'' policy whereby security
offenders are subjected to token arrests and then released come to an
end?
Answer. We have been outspoken publicly and directly with the
Palestinian leadership that there can be no ``revolving door.''
Earlier this year, the Palestinians have released people without
consulting us. We told the Palestinians of our dissatisfaction with how
those releases were handled.
We have explored these releases of Palestinian prisoners thoroughly
with both the Palestinians and the Israelis. Based on everything we
know, we do not believe that the Palestinians have released individuals
who pose a threat.
Although it is no longer being alleged that the PA released
prisoners who were responsible for the killing of Americans, I want to
make clear that we have investigated this issue thoroughly and, from
all available information, there is no evidence that anyone suspected
of such involvement has been released.
We believe the Palestinians recognize the seriousness of our
message on the handling of any future releases, and have made some
improvements in the mechanism for carrying out such releases.
The Palestinians will discuss these with us and the Israelis.
We made clear to the Palestinians that there should be no surprises
in future releases.
illegal firearms
Question. Could you tell us how many illegal firearms have been
collected? How many do you estimate are still unaccounted for?
Answer. From early December through early February the Palestinians
confiscated 124 weapons. We have not received updated figures since
then, but we are aware that registration of weapons by Palestinian
police is ongoing, with some confiscations as appropriate.
Additionally, the Palestinian Civil police recently destroyed a number
of munitions, explosives, and other confiscated materials.
We do not have an estimate for the number of illegal weapons in
areas under PA jurisdiction. Clearly, there are grounds for concern
regarding weapons possessed by extremist elements. Civilian Police
statistics demonstrate an exceptionally low level of crime committed
through the use of individually owned weapons; for example, there was
only one recorded-armed robbery in all of 1998.
size of palestinian police force
Question. Have the Palestinians cut their police force to the
agreed upon size of 30,000?
Answer. The Wye River Memorandum obligates the Palestinians to
provide a list of its policemen to the Israeli side in conformity with
the prior agreements between the Israelis and Palestinians.
It was agreed at Wye that the Palestinian police force should
number no more than 30,000.
The Palestinians have prepared a list of all those who would remain
in the trimmed-down police force. The Palestinians and Israelis have
yet to come to agreement on how such a list should be handled, and that
is the reason the Palestinians have not yet handed the list over to the
Israelis.
The Palestinian have prepared and provided to the USG a list
detailing the excess number above the agreed limit. We are encouraging
the parties to come to agreement directly on this issue.
commission on international religious freedom funding
Question. I am disappointed that the Administration did not request
any funding for the Religious Liberty Commission formed by the
International Religious Freedom Act. The budget made no provisions for
the functions of the Commission which was authorized at $3 million by
last year's legislation. Can you please ensure that this $3 million is
included in both the FY 1999 Supplemental Appropriations bill and the
FY 2000 Appropriations bill?
Answer. It is our understanding that the Congress intended the
Commission to be independent. Specifically, the Act authorizes a
Congressional appropriation to the Commission, while not providing the
Executive Branch with direct authority to fund the Commission.
The Act does, however, call on the Secretary of State to provide
administrative support for the Commission.
Within tightly constrained Department resources, we have already
allocated funds to facilitate the Commission's startup and
administrative support ($125,000 for the remainder of fiscal year
1999). We have also established an office of International Religious
Freedom, headed by Robert Seiple, the Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom, and staffed by four professional
officers.
While the Department will provide administrative support to the
Commission, as called for in the Act, we must recognize that the Act
did not appropriate money to support the activities of the Commission
described in the Act. Without such an appropriation, the Commission
will be unable to carry out its mandate up to its own expectations and
those of Congress.
We hope that the Congress provides the $3 million appropriation for
the Commission under the authority provided in the Act.
funding for radio free asia
Question. What is your budget submission for Radio Free Asia? Is
this amount adequate to allow RFA to continue its 24-hour per day
broadcasting to China, as well as to its other 5 mandated countries?
Answer. Of the FY 2000 appropriations requested for International
Broadcasting Operations, $23 million would be allocated for Radio Free
Asia.
RFA is confident that this will allow it to continue its 24-hour
per day broadcasts to China, as well as to fully maintain its regular
broadcasts of two hours per day in the vernacular to Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam.
Question Submitted by Senator Coverdell
protection of u.s. investments in the dominican republic
Question. What specific actions are being taken to protect U.S.
investments in the Dominican Republic and to guarantee the rights of
U.S. companies in their contractual relations with the Dominican
Government? Specifically, I am concerned at the Dominican Government's
failure to comply in a timely manner with its contractual obligations
to pay U.S. companies for services and products provided.
Answer. Protecting U.S. investment, resolving property and
investment disputes, and ensuring that the Dominican Government
respects its contractual obligations are at the forefront of our
bilateral economic agenda.
Our Charge d'Affaires Linda Watt in Santo Domingo has been
intensely involved in supporting the interests of U.S. independent
power producers, which have particularly complained about difficulties
in receiving timely payments. In addition, U.S. officials in Washington
as well as in the Dominican Republic have been actively involved in
pressing institutional reform in this sector, as well as across the
economy.
Our Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Pete
Romero, has also raised our concerns on this issue, including directly
to President Fernandez.
The Dominican Government has recently improved its payments records
to U.S. independent power producers and has reaffirmed to us its
readiness to work to resolve outstanding claims and to improve the
investment climate.
Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold
angola: renewed conflict
Question. It is depressingly clear that the civil war in Angola has
resumed with vigor, and I fear for the health and safety of all
civilians. What are your observations about this turn of events in
Angola?
Answer. We share your concerns about the impact of renewed conflict
in Angola on innocent civilians. The administration has devoted over
$50 million annually since 1994 in support of humanitarian relief for
the tens of thousands of Angolans displaced by the civil war. We
continue to coordinate with other donors in responding to the
humanitarian needs of the approximately 100,000 Angolans newly
displaced by the upsurge in fighting, and believe UN humanitarian aid
workers should have access to displaced populations throughout Angola.
In an effort to help ensure that this conflict does not result in
gross violations of human rights, we have made clear to both UNITA and
the Government of Angola (GRA) that they have an obligation to respect
the rights of non-combatants, to treat prisoners of war with dignity,
and to ensure the safety of humanitarian aid workers assisting the
victims of war.
Regrettably, this conflict is likely to continue for several more
months, with additional civilian casualties, before a negotiated
settlement becomes viable. The GRA has rejected new talks for now, and
Jonas Savimbi's purported readiness to negotiate will not be taken
seriously until he demonstrates that UNITA has taken concrete steps to
fulfill some of its remaining obligations under the 1994 Lusaka
Protocol. UNITA remains subject to three sets of UN sanctions that were
imposed between 1993 and 1998. We are concerned, however, by reports
that UNITA continues to use regional states as conduits for acquiring
arms and munitions.
The Angolan people have suffered enormously during a quarter
century of civil war. The international community must find a way to
end this senseless conflict and provide ordinary Angolans the
opportunity to live in peace. Accordingly, we are discussing with the
Government of Angola and the UN secretariat a way to maintain a
residual UN presence in Angola as a follow-on to MONUA, the UN
peacekeeping mission in Angola whose mandate ended February 26. We
envision UN personnel would help to coordinate humanitarian assistance,
monitor human rights, and facilitate negotiations if and when the
Angolan parties so desire.
In the meantime, the Administration will, in conjunction with the
UN, and others in the international community, seek to stay engaged in
the search for peace in Angola. We will continue to encourage the
Government of Angola to undertake the social, economic, and political
reforms needed to foster national reconciliation.
continued un presence in angola
Question. Specifically, what is your view about the potential for a
continued United Nations presence in Angola?
Answer. We are hopeful that the UN can maintain a presence in
Angola even after the MONUA force concludes its pullout.
The question is: what sort of presence will the Government of
Angola agree to?
The Angolans have already said that they would welcome humanitarian
workers and human rights monitors. The United States and its Security
Council are working for something more--a political presence headed by
a Special Representative of the Secretary-General that could play a
good offices role in addition to observing and reporting on the
security, humanitarian, and human rights situation.
We are still negotiating with the Angolans on this. We believe
strongly that this resumption of war is fruitless since, in our view,
the differences in the country cannot be resolved militarily. When the
two parties finally realize this, we want the UN to be positioned to
bring the Government and UNITA swiftly back to the peace table.
sierra leone
Question. The situation in Sierra Leone involves untold horrors
against innocent civilians, yet it is unclear what the international
community, and the United States in particular, is doing to assist the
situation. Our support, until now, for the peacekeeping and
humanitarian effort does not appear to be sufficient. What is U.S.
policy in Sierra Leone at this time? Is there more we can do, and if
so, what?
Answer. The Administration strongly supports the democratically
elected Government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and abhors the
violence that rebel forces have inflicted upon the people of Sierra
Leone.
The State Department is actively engaged in seeking an end to the
tragic conflict in Sierra Leone. Our four-part strategy in support of
Sierra Leone consists of: (1) support for regional diplomacy, (2)
increased support for the ECOMOG peacekeeping force, (3) ending
external support for the rebels, and (4) expediting humanitarian
assistance for the people of Sierra Leone.
We believe that the effort of West Africans to resolve the crisis
with a combination of diplomacy and peacekeeping is commendable and
should be supported. The rebel attack on Freetown forced us to evacuate
our diplomats from Sierra Leone on Christmas Eve. However, Joseph
Melrose, our Ambassador to Sierra Leone, is making regular trips to
Freetown to consult with Sierra Leone Government officials. The Rev.
Jesse Jackson and other Department officials are also working closely
with regional leaders and rebel representatives to help facilitate a
dialogue between the Sierra Leone Government and rebel leaders that we
hope will lead to a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
ECOMOG, the 12,000-man Nigerian-led West African peacekeeping
force, is doing its best to restore peace and stability to Sierra
Leone, but is woefully lacking in resources. Recognizing the need of
the Sierra Leone people for security, the State Department is
continuing to provide essential nonlethal logistical support to ECOMOG.
Moreover, we are urging our partners in the international community to
join us in this support.
In FY 1998, the Department provided $3.9 million in non-lethal
logistical support for ECOMOG. So far in FY 1999, we have provided
another $4.0 million in non-lethal logistical support to ECOMOG and $1
million in medical supplies and equipment to treat Nigerian ECOMOG
soldiers wounded in Sierra Leone. The State and Defense Departments are
developing a longer-term support package for ECOMOG which will include
at least an additional $5.8 million for non-lethal logistical support.
Britain recently announced a new 10 million (about $16
million) assistance package to support ECOMOG and retraining of a new
Sierra Leone Army. The Netherlands, Canada, Germany, China, Italy,
France, Norway and Belgium have also come to ECOMOG's aid. However,
much more is needed. Nigeria is reportedly spending a million dollars a
day to support ECOMOG's Sierra Leone operation. With stronger financial
support for ECOMOG operations, Nigeria's civilian government may be
more inclined to leave its troops in Sierra Leone until there is peace
and stability.
Reports that some African governments are supporting the insurgents
in Sierra Leone are especially troubling. We condemn support to the
rebels from any source and have made our position clear. In particular,
we continue to press the Government of Liberia to stop the support for
the rebels emanating from its territory and to play a constructive role
in ending the conflict.
The humanitarian crisis in Sierra Leone is fundamentally driven by
the rebel war, and the rebels brutality against the civilian
population. Rebel violence prevents relief agencies from delivering
assistance to those in need outside Freetown.
The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance
to Sierra Leone. USAID and the State Department have provided more than
$31 million in humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone and Sierra
Leonean refugees in neighboring countries since the beginning of fiscal
year 1999. This includes food aid, support for refugees, emergency
shelter, and medical, nutrition, water, sanitation and agricultural
assistance delivered through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In
FY 1998, the United States provided Sierra Leone with more than $55
million in earmarked humanitarian assistance for its refugees. Our
assistance to Sierra Leone will continue at similar levels as long as
there is a need and as long as security conditions permit humanitarian
agencies to function.
sierra leone crisis: international and united nations response
Question. The human rights atrocities in the Sierra Leonean
conflict have really challenged our imagination. What can the
international community do to help improve this situation? Does it make
sense to expand the United Nations monitoring arm, known as UNOMSIL?
Why or why not?
Answer. We support the efforts of the democratically elected
government of President Tejan Kabbah and ECOMOG peacekeeping forces to
restore peace and stability in Sierra Leone. We are actively engaged in
seeking an end to the tragic conflict in Sierra Leone along the two-
track approach--diplomatic and peacekeeping--adopted by the West
African heads of state and government at the October 1998 summit in
Abuja.
The Nigerian military has provided the majority of the troops in
the ECOMOG peacekeeping force that is attempting to curtail rebel
atrocities, restore peace and stability, and pressure the rebels to
begin negotiations in good faith. Ghana, Guinea and Mali are also
contributing troops to this effort. A total of more than 12,000 troops
have been deployed to date.
We and the British have provided logistical support to ECOMOG in
Sierra Leone since May 1997. In FY 1998 the USG provided $3.9 million
in logistical assistance to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, as well as 149
heavy duty trucks. We have committed our $4 million total peacekeeping
allotment for FY 1999 to support ECOMOG there, and are seeking
additional funds for this purpose. The USG has also provided
substantial humanitarian support in Sierra Leone.
Six ECOWAS countries are making diplomatic efforts to realize a
lasting peace accord, urging the rebels to cease fighting and to pursue
a dialogue leading to an end to the conflict and national
reconciliation. Some of those West African governments have also
strongly condemned support by external forces, primarily Liberia, to
the rebels in Sierra Leone and the atrocities being perpetrated by the
rebels against the civilian population.
The U.S. and UK have also lent their diplomatic efforts towards
these goals. The UN Security Council and Secretary General Annan have
repeatedly asked UN member states to assist the ECOMOG peacekeeping
operation in Sierra Leone, however, the response has been very limited.
The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) has never
exceeded 40 of the 70 military observers authorized in July 1998. Its
mandate is to help demobilize ex-combatants and to advise on human
rights and on building a police force.
After the January 1999 rebel assault on Freetown, total UNOMSIL
staff was reduced to eight. Staffing is now back up to fourteen.
UNOMSIL's mandate is under review; we expect it to focus on
facilitating a negotiated settlement.
If the parties to the conflict negotiate a settlement, then an
expanded UNOMSIL might be asked to assist the demobilization of ex-
combatants.
We will consider any proposed modification of UNOMSIL's mandate
under the Administration's peacekeeping policy and in consultation with
the Congress.
peacekeeping in sierra leone and car
Question. Why is it that the United Nations has seen fit to conduct
a major peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic but has
not proposed a similar operation for Sierra Leone?
Answer. The situations in these two countries are very different.
In the Central African Republic, the UN mission MINURCA is a
peacekeeping operation. In Sierra Leone, the UN Observer Mission
UNOMSIL oversees a peace enforcement action led by a West African
multinational force, ECOMOG. Both operations are appropriate in size
and structure for their respective missions.
MINURCA guarantees security in the CAR's capital while the
government implements crucial reforms. This reform program is based on
a series of internal agreements on measures to promote national
reconciliation and long-term stability.
MINURCA consists of a force of 1,350 troops, mostly infantry, who
safeguard Bangui during this transitional period.
There is no settlement agreement in Sierra Leone, however. The
Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG forces continue to fight a well-
entrenched and brutal insurgency.
The U.S. views this conflict as a threat to regional stability, and
we are providing substantial support to ECOMOG.
The UN has a limited monitoring and advisory role in Sierra Leone.
UNOMSIL includes fourteen military observers, plus civilian political
and human rights experts who report on the military situation and
provide expert advice to the Secretary General's Special
Representative.
The Special Representative relies on UNOMSIL's support in his
efforts to promote a peaceful settlement among the belligerents in
Sierra Leone.
We strongly support negotiations in Sierra Leone. Should talks
result in a peaceful settlement, the UN might be asked to play a
substantial role in implementing it.
We are prepared to examine any peacekeeping proposal for Sierra
Leone in the light of the guidelines established by the Administration.
radio democracy for africa
Question. One of the major initiatives to come from the President's
historic trip to Africa last year is his proposal for Radio Democracy
for Africa, which the President again highlighted in his State of the
Union address, seeking $5 million in the current budget request.
However, there are concerns about the impact a new program like this
will have on VOA's mandate. How does Radio Democracy for Africa help
the United States achieve foreign policy goals in Africa?
Answer. Like regular VOA programming, Radio Democracy for Africa
(RDA) news and informational programs are guided by the VOA charter and
journalistic code. By law, the news they offer must be accurate,
objective, and reliable. Public affairs programming such as
discussions, in-depth reports, roundtables, interviews, etc., are
balanced, responsible and present a range of views on controversial
issues of public importance.
RDA programs differ from regular VOA programs in that they are
targeted to and focus intensively on particular countries and regions.
News reporting on events in those countries is greatly increased, and
most of the additional news is gathered by journalists who live in the
targeted countries. For example, in Nigeria there has been intense
coverage of the electoral process and the transition to democratic
civilian government. In central Africa, there has been coverage of the
armed regional conflict and of ethnic, humanitarian, economic and
social issues. This highly targeted news can blunt the effectiveness of
domestic disinformation campaigns that may be waged by state-controlled
media or by irresponsible political organs such as the ``hate'' radio
which spurred on ethnic violence in Rwanda in 1994. RDA keeps open the
air waves to responsible parties and offers participation to those who
have been pushed to the political margins.
In announcing Radio Democracy for Africa last year, the President
said the VOA initiative would encourage progress toward freedom and
democracy, respect for human rights, and an independent and objective
media. RDA will have programming that promotes the U.S. policy goals in
Africa, such as conflict resolution and formation of democratic
institutions and an independent judiciary and civilian police forces.
Discussion of debt relief, economic development and trade will also be
featured in RDA programming. RDA will also strengthen both the public
and private press by training reporters in objective journalism. In
this way, RDA will build the capacity of an independent media.
sudan: prospects for peace
Question. What are the prospects for peace in Sudan?
Answer. We are not convinced the warring parties are ready to make
peace. There are elements on both sides, however, that appear convinced
that neither side can win a military victory.
We are currently working with other donors and with Kenya, which
chairs the peace talks under the auspices of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), to invigorate the Sudan peace effort.
Most significantly, we are planning to provide financial and technical
assistance for a permanent secretariat devoted to ensuring a sustained,
continuous mediation effort. We also are urging Kenyan President Moi to
appoint a special envoy dedicated full-time to moving the process
toward a peace settlement.
We and other donors also have formed a working group to devise ways
in which we can use incentives and pressures to nudge the parties to
negotiate seriously.
sudan: humanitarian assistance
Question. What is the status of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and
other humanitarian operations? What is the administration's position on
the UN's February appeal for $198.4 million in emergency humanitarian
assistance?
Answer. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) is now the largest emergency
food delivery program in history, having surpassed the Berlin Airlift.
Its job is complicated by warfare, floods, bandits, ruined
infrastructure, disease and flight bans imposed by the Government of
Sudan. Its performance has been remarkable in the face of these
difficulties, although there have been inefficiences for which we have
criticized the OLS. OLS responded well, and has taken steps to improve
its performance. This is the tenth year of OLS's operation. The
continuing food shortages will end only when the Sudanese civil war
ends.
The United States provides financial and diplomatic support to the
Sudan peace talks sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development. We are now engaged with Kenya, which chairs the peace
talks, and other donors to invigorate the peace process.
OLS's request for $198.4 million is in line with previous years'
requests. The United States typically pays about one third of OLS'
costs with the remainder paid by other donor nations. We also provide
funds to NGOs outside the OLS system which, unlike OLS, are able to
operate in the face of the occasional flight bans imposed by the
Government of Sudan.
sudan: effects of u.s. strike
Question. In the aftermath of the U.S. strike on the el-Shifa
facility in Khartoum, has there been a backlash against the U.S. that
has had an impact on either the humanitarian operations or the civil
war?
Answer. The U.S. strike on el-Shifa has had no discernible impact
on the humanitarian relief effort or on the civil war. A humanitarian
ceasefire has been in place in Bahr el Ghazal, the region hardest hit
by the famine of last year, since July 1998. Both the Government of
Sudan and the SPLA have agreed twice to extend the ceasefire, now due
to expire on April 15, 1999.
We had a difficult relationship with the Government of Sudan (GOS)
before the el-Shifa strike and that remains the case today. Although
the GOS withdrew its diplomats after the strike and told us our
diplomats were not welcome in Khartoum, our two countries continue to
maintain diplomatic relations. Since the el-Shifa strike, Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Pickering has met and
exchanged correspondence with Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustapha
Ismail, and Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice and Director of
East African Affairs David Dunn have met on separate occasions with
Sudan's ambassador to the United States and with its charge d'affaires.
sudan: impact of ethiopia-eritrea conflict
Question. What has been the impact, if any, of the conflict between
Ethiopia and Eritrea on the Sudanese civil war?
Answer. We are concerned that the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict is
having a negative impact throughout the region. Both countries were
strong supporters of the Sudan peace process conducted under the
auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), but
their energies and resources are now directed at one another.
Sudan has provided support to violent dissident groups fighting
against both governments. We are concerned that Sudan may try to take
advantage of the border dispute by encouraging such groups,
particularly those active in Eritrea.
There are some indications that both Eritrea and Ethiopia have
moved closer to the Government of Sudan since their conflict began.
Ethiopia, for example, approved the resumption of air service by
Ethiopian Airlines between Khartoum and Addis Ababa. However, we
believe that Eritrea and Ethiopia are aware of the long-term danger
Sudan poses and will remain cautious.
unchr china resolution
Question. Would the release of one or more prominent Chinese
dissidents as part of a deal to drop a resolution condemning China at
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva be acceptable to you?
Answer. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in
Geneva is an important multilateral mechanism for encouraging change in
China. The Administration supports the Geneva process, and intends to
participate vigorously in this year's Commission activities.
We are aware of Congressional expressions of support in favor of a
resolution, and assure you that Congressional concerns were considered
seriously in our decision to introduce a resolution condemning human
rights practices in China.
Last year, our Government did not sponsor a resolution because of
positive steps the Chinese had taken, but made clear that we were
keeping our options open for the future.
We based our UNHRC decision not on a token gesture on China's part,
but on overall human rights progress or retrogression over the year.
china: human rights
Question. What is your position on China's recent violations of
human rights?
Answer. As noted in our recently released human rights report for
China, the government's human rights record deteriorated sharply
beginning in the final months of 1998 with a crackdown on organized
political dissent.
We deplore the arrest, trial, and lengthy sentences meted out to
individuals who sought to peacefully organize and register an
opposition party in China. We have conveyed our concern to the Chinese
Government publicly and through diplomatic channels, most recently
during my March 1-2 visit to Beijing and during Under Secretary
Pickering's March 15 meeting with Ambassador Li.
Our position is clear. We believe the Chinese Government should
allow its citizens to peacefully express political and religious views
and release all those held in violation of international standards for
the exercise of these fundamental rights.
east timor
Question. What message have you given to the Indonesians on East
Timor?
Answer. I visited Indonesia March 4-5. East Timor figured
prominently in my discussions with senior Indonesian Government (GOI)
and military officials. I also met with East Timorese leader Xanana
Gusmao. I expressed deep concern with all my interlocutors about
reports from East Timor of escalating political violence, human rights
abuses, and growing humanitarian needs. I urged immediate adoption of
measures to break the cycle of violence. I reiterated, for example, our
call for a halt to distribution of arms to pro-Jakarta civilian
militias, and for collection back of those weapons already distributed.
I also expressed support for Xanana Gusmao's proposal for a council to
promote dialogue and reconciliation among East Timorese.
Because recent GOI willingness to consider independence for East
Timor, if East Timorese reject autonomy, had opened new opportunities
for an enduring solution, I urged all parties to work constructively
for realistic and peaceful transition arrangements to either autonomy
or independence. I stressed that identifying credible means for
determining the will of East Timor's people was essential.
I also stressed that preparations must begin immediately for a
modification in East Timor's status, so that East Timor can succeed
socially and economically. I believe that the international community
must play both immediate and longer-term supportive roles in East
Timor. In that context, I expressed U.S. support to the Indonesian
Government for an expanded international presence on East Timor, in
advance of a negotiated agreement, to reduce violence. I urged other
confidence-building measures, including troop reductions.
criteria for prioritizing security upgrades
Question. You have said that no overseas embassy can now be
considered a ``low threat'' post, if that is the case, what criteria
are you using to determine how security upgrades are prioritized?
Answer. We believe the threat from transnational terrorism extends
to all of our overseas posts. Following the attacks against our
embassies in East Africa, all overseas missions, regardless of threat
levels, were instructed to adopt ``high threat'' perimeter and access
control standards, wherever possible.
The methodology currently in use by the Department to help
prioritize major security upgrades combines political violence threat
assessments, including profiles of the local security environment
(capability of host government security forces, border controls,
availability of explosives, etc.), with existing physical
vulnerabilities of facilities. Priorities are also influenced by
project feasibility, complexity and resources requirements.
security and challenges at african posts
Question. Africa frequently has been considered a low priority for
American foreign policy. In light of attacks that have already taken
place against U.S. facilities on that continent, what measures is the
Department taking to ensure that the security needs of U.S. African
posts, beyond just Kenya and Tanzania, are given equal consideration to
those of more high visibility facilities? What are the particular
challenges U.S. diplomats face in Africa?
Answer. Let there be no doubt of this Administration's increased
attention to African foreign policy issues. In addition to the
President and the Vice President, the Secretary of State and numerous
other Cabinet level officials have visited Africa to address a whole
range of foreign affairs matters. The just-concluded U.S.-Africa
Ministerial is another example of this Administration's commitment
towards furthering its initiatives in Africa.
In the aftermath of the bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the
Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) and the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (DS) conducted a thorough analysis of the
vulnerabilities of all American embassies. This assessment of
chanceries worldwide is being used to help determine priorities for
constructing new embassies--subject to the availability of funding. In
recognition of the inadequate security conditions of our embassies in
Africa, the assessment confirmed that the majority of chanceries in
region are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Funding to design and
construct new facilities for some of the most vulnerable posts in
Africa is included in the FY 1999 Emergency Security Supplemental, as
well as the Department's $36 million request for worldwide security
upgrades in FY 2000 and in the $3 billion advance appropriation for FY
2001-2005. Posts in Africa are receiving equal attention when compared
to other posts worldwide regarding security upgrades.
The challenges facing American diplomats in Africa today are
similar to the ones that our colleagues faced thirty years ago--
communicable diseases, poor host country infrastructure, political
instability, and high crime, plus the palpable threat of transnational
terrorism. While the current Administration has placed a greater
emphasis on U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, years of insufficient
funding for Embassy operations has taken its toll on maintaining our
infrastructure at our posts in Africa. Although our employees are
prepared to deal with the issues of urban crime and other difficulties
overseas, the potential of terrorist attacks and the psychological
impact that terrorism plays on the lives of their families makes
serving in many African posts an even greater hardship than previously
acknowledged. Additional funding will assist the Department in
addressing this important issue.
criteria for troop deployment to kosovo
Question. What criteria will the Administration use in deciding
whether U.S. troops should be sent to Kosovo?
Answer. Successful implementation of the agreement's security
provisions will require a robust international troop presence.
Troops are especially required to supervise Serb withdrawal and KLA
demilitarization and related military tasks.
President Clinton has laid out the following key conditions for
considering use of U.S. troops:
The parties must agree to a strong and effective peace agreement
with an immediate cease-fire, rapid withdrawal of most Serb security
forces, and demilitarization of the KLA.
The parties must commit to implement the agreement and cooperate
with NATO.
The mission of the force must be carefully defined with a clear and
realistic exit strategy.
NATO is the only organization with the structure, experience and
skills to succeed in such a complex military task.
Moreover, NATO's political and military cohesiveness is a great
advantage that promotes the authority of the implementation force.
KLA confidence in NATO has been a key part of Kosovar Albanians
moving towards a ``yes'' on the Rambouillet agreement.
Potential troop contributors, NATO partners, and the parties all
have more confidence in NATO's capability and willingness for this
mission than in that of other organizations.
air strikes strengthen milosevic
Question. Some have argued that NATO air strikes against Serbia
would only strengthen the Milosevic regime and the resolve of the Serbs
in opposing a peace agreement with the Kosovar Albanians. Please
comment on this argument.
Answer. We disagree with this analysis.
NATO air strikes would degrade Milosevic's ability to pursue a
military option in Kosovo and would undermine the willingness of his
armed forces to carry out such a policy.
All indications are that neither the Serbian people nor the FRY
military support Milosevic's further international isolation and
confrontation for their country.
Air strikes would be planned to have maximum impact on the
leadership and the forces they use to repress the civilian population
of Kosovo, not on the Serb population at large.
In light of these factors, we expect air strikes to increase the
pressure on Milosevic to accept the just settlement the Contact Group
has proposed and the Kosovo Albanians have accepted.
Questions Submitted by Senator Grams
consensus and the un 2000-2001 budget outline
Question. It is my understanding that under Kassebaum-Solomon the
U.S. must join in the consensus for every major budget decision. How
was the Administration's decision to disassociate from the consensus on
the budget outline consistent with that obligation?
Answer. The United States fully supports the practice of consensus
decisionmaking as an effective tool to ensure that U.S. views are
reflected to the maximum extent in decisions reached on UN budgets.
The value of consensus and our commitment to it is demonstrated by
the fact that, over the past decade, the U.S. has been able to join
consensus in enacting every UN regular budget, which over time have
reflected increasing budget discipline (including, most recently, zero
nominal growth).
Regarding the UN budget outline for 2000-2001, we made clear our
opposition to exceeding the current budget level.
This outline, however, serves only as a guide for the preparation
of the actual 2000-2001 budget.
Throughout this year-long process, the U.S. will continue to make
our opposition evident and will fight to bring the budget in line prior
to its final consideration before the General Assembly session in
December 1999.
As part of this endeavor, we will continue to urge UN efforts to
make additional savings.
wye memorandum package
Question. Madam Secretary, while I support the three-year, $1.9
billion Wye Memorandum package, I am concerned about the ability of the
U.S. to ensure that these funds are not diverted to purposes for which
they are not intended. All too often U.S. aid is misused, wasted, or
mismanaged. What auditing or monitoring mechanisms are in place to
ensure the appropriate use of U.S. funds by the Jordanians and the
Palestinians?
Answer. Auditing and monitoring mechanisms are in place to ensure
the appropriate use of U.S. funds by the Jordanians and the
Palestinians.
In every case, USAID works through contractors or non-governmental
organizations which are chosen according to strict USAID procurement
and contracting regulations, and are closely and carefully monitored by
USAID. The contractors or NGOs also receive regular, comprehensive
independent audits.
In the case of the Palestinians, no financial assistance is
provided directly to the Palestinian Authority or the PLO. All funds
are used for development projects for the benefit of the Palestinian
people, including water and sanitation projects, private sector
development, and rule of law/democracy.
With AID providing $375 million in development assistance over the
last five years, there has been a clean track record regarding
accountability of funds.
bureau of educational and cultural affairs
Question. Is the Administration still considering the possibility
of creating a separate bureau for international exchanges and cultural
affairs?
Answer. Such a bureau will be created. Congressional views were an
important consideration in this decision.
The revised Reorganization Plan and Report of the President, sent
to the Congress on March 31, makes known the decision to create a
separate Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs once USIA
integrates with State on October 1.
Questions Submitted by Senator Wellstone
Question. Do you intend to inform the Government [of China] that
the U.S. is ready to sponsor a resolution on China at this U.N.
Commission on Human Rights?
Answer. As Congress urged, the U.S. sponsored a resolution on
China's human rights situation at the 55th session of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights. We tabled the resolution, which
acknowledged progress China has made and discussed areas where serious
problems remain, on April 16. We were successful in getting only one
cosponsor, Poland, before the vote on April 23. Despite a vigorous
lobbying effort we were unsuccessful in convincing any past cosponsor
to sponsor again in 1999. The E.U., which had cosponsored the
resolution with us in past years, declined to do so this year. Members
of the E.U. also declined to co-sponsor the resolution in their
national capacities. As it has every year that a China resolution has
been tabled, the Chinese introduced a procedural no-action motion. This
motion was passed 22 to 17 (a narrower margin than in 1997, the last
time a resolution was tabled) and the resolution did not come to the
floor for a vote.
We were disappointed by this outcome, but continue to believe that
tabling the resolution was the right thing to do. It was also an
important element of our policy of principled, purposeful engagement
with China. Our primary goal in sponsoring the resolution was to focus
international attention on the recent sharp deterioration in China's
human rights record. We believed--and continue to believe--that there
is no better place to do that than in the Commission, the world's
preeminent forum on human rights. We have accomplished this goal, even
though the Commission chose not to take action on our resolution.
children in armed conflict
Question. As the use of child soldiers has gained international
attention, the need for stronger international protections for children
in armed conflict is becoming increasingly clear. In the last year, we
have seen a number of initiatives in favor of establishing 18 as the
minimum age for recruitment and participation in armed conflict,
including a new United Nations policy establishing 18 as the minimum
age for UN peacekeepers, resolutions adopted by the European Parliament
and the World Council of Churches, and a growing number of countries
that are evaluating their recruitment policies with a view to excluding
those under 18 from military service. The U.S. Congress also passed a
resolution in October that condemned the use of child soldiers, and
urged the U.S. not to block efforts to establish 18 as the minimum age
for participation in armed conflict. Given these developments and the
urgent need for stronger protections for children, will the
administration withdraw its opposition to an international ban on the
recruitment or participation of children under 18 in armed conflict?
Answer. The United States strongly supports efforts to put an end
to the use of child soldiers in conflicts around the globe. In recent
years rebels, militias, and in some cases government forces have relied
on child soldiers, some of whom are not even teenagers. With individual
countries and through international agreements we have sought to stop
this abhorrent practice.
Article 38(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, like
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article
77(2)), provides that states parties should take all feasible measures
to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 15 years do not
take a direct part in hostilities, and that they are not recruited into
the armed forces.
In negotiations on a proposed optional protocol to the Convention
concerning involvement of children in armed conflict, the United States
has supported provisions to set the minimum age of enlistment at 17
years and to impose an obligation on states to take ``all feasible
measures'' to ensure that persons under 17 years of age do not take a
direct part in hostilities. Such a requirement would be consistent with
current U.S. law, which permits enlistment of persons age 17 with
parental consent, as well as admission to the U.S. military academies.
Other participants in the negotiations support an 18-year age
standard for both recruitment and participation in armed conflict. We
continue to believe that a 17-year age limit is likely to achieve wider
support in the UN General Assembly because it is easier to implement
and more consistent with the laws of many states, including our own.
rehabilitation of former child soldiers
Question. Accounts of the use of children as soldiers by the Lord's
Resistance Army in Uganda, and in the devastating Sierra Leone conflict
make clear that child combatants may suffer not only physical injury or
disability, but also psychological damage or rejection by their home
communities. Rehabilitation and social reintegration programs are
essential to help former child soldiers regain a place in civilian
society and help prevent their re-recruitment into subsequent
conflicts. How is the need for the demobilization, rehabilitation and
reintegration programs for former child soldiers in conflict areas
being incorporated into U.S. policy?
Answer. The United States places the highest priority on assisting
young children throughout the world who are victimized by human rights
abuses such as forced recruitment and abduction.
We are committed to working with other governments, UN agencies,
international and non-governmental organizations, and other partners to
address this problem.
Specifically, we are working closely with the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF with respect to programs to
rehabilitate children through counseling, reconciliation, education and
vocational training in the hope that these methods will facilitate
their reintegration into civilian society, help them readjust to being
children, and prepare them to lead constructive lives.
In 1998, the United States contributed over $7 million to
activities for refugee children, including over $4 million for UNHCR's
Children-at-Risk programs, which highlights particularly those children
affected by armed conflict, including child soldiers, and over $2
million for the Liberian Children's Initiative, a joint UNHCR/UNICEF
program to address the needs of children and youth in Liberia following
seven years of war.
Because of the particular vulnerability of refugee and internally
displaced children, the United States is working with UNHCR to
strengthen its infrastructure and activities in order to better address
the special protection and assistance needs of refugee children.
Specifically on the situation in Uganda, the United States condemns
in the strongest terms the reprehensible acts of the Lord's Resistance
Army and is helping the Ugandan Government in its efforts to end this
terrible problem. The Northern Uganda Initiative, announced by the
First Lady during a March 1998 visit to Uganda, is a 3-year, $10
million project to provide targeted U.S. assistance where it is most
needed. The United States is also providing monetary and training
assistance to the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) to improve its
effectiveness in defending Ugandans against terrorist and insurgent
attacks from Sudan. The training includes a focus on respect for basic
human rights. We are concerned that a military response is not enough
and have encouraged the Government of Uganda to pursue in parallel a
political track to resolve the crisis.
In Sierra Leone, USAID recently awarded a $1.5 million grant to
UNICEF for assistance to war-affected children, including documentation
and tracing of unaccompanied children and reunification with their
families, demobilization, elimination of the use of under-age
combatants, and community reintegration of former child soldiers. In
addition, to date in FY99, the United States has provided $5 million in
non-lethal logistical support to the West African ECOMOG peacekeeping
force that is attempting to restore security and stability to Sierra
Leone.
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator John Ashcroft
Mr. Chairman, this hearing could not be more timely, in my opinion,
to deal with an increasingly serious problem during this
Administration: the disorderly definition of U.S. national interests
abroad and the haphazard use of military force to achieve those
objectives. The still-likely possibility that U.S. troops could be
involved in Kosovo reinforces the longstanding concerns I have had
about how our armed forces are being used.
Whether it be an inconsistent policy toward Iraq, or repeated
deployments of U.S. troops for less than vital national security
interests, our military forces are often left to compensate for the
lack of foresight in this Administration.
The Senate is dealing with legislation right now to try and arrest
declining readiness and morale in our armed forces, forces that are
severely overextended. Defense spending has declined in real terms by
27 percent since 1990, but the pace of operations abroad has risen
dramatically.
In the 1990s, operational missions increased 300 percent while the
force structure for the Army and Air Force was reduced by 45 percent
each, the Navy by approximately 40 percent, and the Marines by over 10
percent. Contingency operations during this Administration have exacted
a heavy cost: $8.1 billion in Bosnia; $1.1 billion in Haiti; $6.1
billion in Iraq.
Generally speaking, the success of our diplomacy has an inverse
relationship to the number of times we send U.S. soldiers abroad. The
number of deployments under this Administration is perhaps the most
telling indicator of a incoherent foreign policy. In light of possible
U.S. involvement in Kosovo, I would appreciate the Secretary addressing
several issues.
What is the vital national interest in Kosovo and what can
be achieved by the deployment of U.S. forces there? The
Administration has put itself in a difficult position where
some sort of U.S. involvement in Kosovo is almost guaranteed.
If a settlement is not reached, we probably will bomb with NATO
warplanes; if the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians reach an
agreement, we send as many as 4,000 U.S. troops to enforce the
settlement. To what end is this commitment being made?
Nation-building exercises are questionable endeavors. Our forces
have been in Bosnia two years past the original deadline, with no end
in sight. Haiti's constitutional government is collapsing. Nation-
building exercises are tying U.S. forces down in peripheral areas and
undermining our ability to address real security threats.
More generally, what is the Administration's policy on
military intervention: If U.S. forces should be in Kosovo,
where 2,000 people have died, should they be in Sudan, which
has had 2 million casualties in its civil war? Should U.S.
forces be in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Angola or the
Caucusus?
These questions must be addressed. The American people need to have
a clear understanding of when their sons and daughters will be placed
in harm's way--they deserve a consistent policy for military
deployment, not just a reactive diplomacy where U.S. soldiers are sent
to the crisis receiving the most media attention.