[Senate Hearing 106-39]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-39
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: REVIEW OF PROGRAMS AND REFORMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CLEAN AIR, WETLANDS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 4, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
55-912 cc WASHINGTON : 1999
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington DC
20402
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
one hundred sixth congress
JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia MAX BAUCUS, Montana
ROBERT SMITH, New Hampshire DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming HARRY REID, Nevada
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri BOB GRAHAM, Florida
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho BARBARA BOXER, California
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah RON WYDEN, Oregon
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
Jimmie Powell, Staff Director
J. Thomas Sliter, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear
Safety
JAMES M. INHOFE, North Carolina, Chairman
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BOB GRAHAM, Florida
ROBERT E. BENNETT, Utah JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas BARBARA BOXER, California
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
FEBRUARY 4, 1999
OPENING STATEMENTS
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., U.S. Senator from the State of
Missouri....................................................... 2
Graham, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from the State of Florida......... 10
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 1
Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut.................................................... 12
WITNESSES
Colvin, Joe F., president and CEO, Nuclear Energy Institute...... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 72
Diaz, Hon. Nils, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission..... 7
Dicus, Hon. Greta Joy, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 6
Jackson, Hon. Shirley Ann, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Bennett.......................................... 69
Senator Bond............................................. 70
Senator Crapo............................................ 63
Senator Graham...........................................23, 67
Senator Inhofe........................................... 54
Jones, Gary L., Associate Director for Energy, Resources, and
Science Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development
Division, General Accounting Office............................ 26
Prepared statement........................................... 79
Lochbaum, David, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of Concerned
Scientists..................................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 85
Response to an additional question from Senator Graham....... 89
McGaffigan, Hon. Edward, Jr., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 8
Merrifield, Hon. Jeffrey S., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 9
Rhodes, James T., chairman and CEO, Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations..................................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 89
Sessions, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama...... 31
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS
Domenici, Hon. Pete V., U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico 39
Fetter, Steven M., Fitch IBCA, Inc............................... 92
(iii)
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: REVIEW OF PROGRAMS AND REFORMS
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands,
Private Property, and Nuclear Safety,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:12 a.m. in
room 406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James N. Inhofe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Inhofe, Bond, and Graham.
Also present: Senator Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
I guess I should open with an apology here. We originally
were going to have this set for last week, if you will
remember. Six months and a week ago we said we would have a
meeting in 6 months, but that was when they were starting to
take depositions in the impeachment matter, and I learned a
long time ago that when you're in recess, you don't have
hearings because there's no one around. Well, I don't have too
many here right now.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. But they are going to be here. I understand
that Senator Graham is on his way, and Senator Sessions and
some others.
We have a little bit of a timing problem, ladies and
gentlemen, in that I just came from the National Prayer
Breakfast; it didn't occur to me when we set this up that it
was at the same time. And because of going back into trial, we
are going to be having both the Democratic and Republican
Caucuses, so we're going to go ahead and expedite this and
maybe try to get it through in approximately 2 hours, maybe.
So I will go ahead and start with an opening statement.
I would like to recognize the new members of our
subcommittee, who are not here yet but will be here: Senator
Voinovich, Senator Bennett, and Senator Hutchison. Senator
Hutchison, as we speak, is speaking at the National Prayer
Breakfast, so she's going to be a little bit late.
We are going to have a very busy Congress in both oversight
and on legislation, including both FEMA and wetlands
authorization bills, and I think we have 12 oversight hearings
that we are scheduling at the present time.
One of our last hearings last year was on oversight of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We held that hearing exactly 6
months and 1 week ago, and at that time Chairman Jackson said
we could ``expect these results in 6 months.'' Well, you've had
6 months and 1 week, so we're going to have a lot more results
than we thought we would have.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. At the July hearing we invited the
commissioners back, and the witnesses from the second panel, to
explain the impact of the changes that the NRC has implemented,
and comment on the changes that the NRC has proposed. So I look
forward to their testimony.
Since the July hearing, the NRC's effort to change has been
positive. I want to be sure that it works.
On the issue of reform, I would be judging success by three
measures. First of all, will the NRC meet its relicensing goal
of processing the applications within 30 months? You will
remember that 6 months ago we heard concerns that this could
last for an interminable time.
No. 2, will the general regulatory reform goals be
implemented throughout every level of the NRC?
And No. 3, will safety not be compromised?
The first and the third goals are self-explanatory.
Regarding the second goal, I am concerned that the reforms at
the NRC will be embraced by the commissioners and the senior
managers, but that they will not filter down through the NRC
workforce. What we need is a cultural change at the NRC. I
think we're all aware that Chairman Jackson will be leaving the
Commission at the end of her term--on June 30, I believe it is,
of this year--and yet, you can have changes at the top and they
don't filter all the way down through the ranks. We want to
make sure that that does happen.
So we look forward to this hearing. I would also comment
that we will have continued hearings. I think it is natural,
and it is built into any bureaucracy, whether it's the NRC or
anything else, if you don't have oversight, things tend to get
very lax and, of course, you're going to probably have more
oversight than you've had before, and this will be consistent;
not just one spurt of it now, but it will continue throughout
the years, at least as long as I chair this subcommittee.
At this time I would recognize Senator Bond, one of our
fine members from Missouri.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
certainly hope that our good friend, Senator Hutchison, is
putting in a few good words for us. We need them in these
days----
[Laughter.]
Senator Bond [continuing]. And I am glad she is covering us
on that base.
These are very busy times, as the chairman has mentioned. I
apologize that I have a whole bunch of other things going on,
but this is so important that I wanted to come by and extend my
best wishes to Chairman Jackson and members of the Commission,
particularly Commissioner Merrifield, whom we knew in a prior
life, and we certainly enjoyed working with him there.
I know the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has a very
important mission, and that is to ensure that civilian uses of
nuclear materials are done in a manner consistent with the
public's health and safety, our country's national security,
and in protection of environment.
I want to take a moment to let the subcommittee, as well as
the chairman and the members, know that I have some
constituents in Missouri that are extremely concerned about the
NRC's proposed revision of the medical uses of byproduct
material regulation. It is going to be self-evident to anybody
with whom I discuss this issue that I'm no expert on nuclear
issues. I got out of physics just about the time they really
started getting into that area, and I know very little about
nuclear medicine. But I do have some experts at home, and I
have experts located in St. Louis, MO, at Mallinckrodt. They
are good corporate citizens and leaders in the field of nuclear
medicine.
They have concerns that they have expressed to me, and I
share them with you, that the NRC is continuing to propose
regulations in areas where there is no statistically
significant radiation risk to workers, members of the public,
or patients. One of these areas is diagnostic nuclear medicine,
which uses trace amounts of radioactive isotopes, given to
patients to diagnose diseases such as cancer, heart disease,
Alzheimer's, and AIDS.
I understand that after having spent approximately $2
million of user fee money, the Commission rejected--with no
explanation--the recommendations of the National Academy of
Science Institute of Medicine report, and that report found
that for nuclear medicine, the risk and probability of harm
occurring to a patient or a member of the public is
extraordinarily low, and recommended that the NRC reduce its
focus in low-risk areas.
I will not be able to stay for the question and answer
portion. I will have my staff here. I would hope that you would
be able to address that.
Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to be able to submit
several follow-up questions for the record.
Senator Inhofe. Without objection.
Senator Bond. I would ask, Madam Chair, if you would keep
my office posted on this extremely important issue--not just to
the people at Mallinckrodt, but to the hundreds of thousands of
people whose health may be benefited by their work.
I assure you, we will be following the NRC's action on this
issue very closely. It is my hope that the NRC will work with
all parties and use the best scientific, medical, and
technological information available so that those who are
interested in the medical uses of byproduct material can be
sure that we reach a satisfactory outcome.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for the opportunity to
present these concerns, which are of great importance to me.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Bond. We will be having
a lot of written questions coming in, so we would certainly
welcome yours. I know that some of the other members--Senator
Sessions is going to be here in 40 minutes, and others will be
coming in and out--so you will probably receive more questions
in writing, which will expedite this hearing. Because of
today's schedule, that's probably a good idea.
The way we've divided the panels today is to start with the
five commissioners from the NRC. The second panel will consist
of industry groups and public interest groups and outside
interests.
I would like to give you an overview of how we will proceed
during the public hearing. We have nine witnesses who will be
testifying today. I will also mention that while some members
of the subcommittee couldn't be here today, their staff is here
and they will be submitting questions, as I said before.
Each witness will be allowed 5 minutes for an opening
statement, and as my little granddaughter says, ``red, yellow,
green, we all know what that means.'' So if you would try to
stay within that.
Jeff, since this is your first hearing as a new
commissioner, I am sure that you will adhere to your lights.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Merrifield. Indeed.
Senator Inhofe. After the comments we will be asking
questions; and then, of course, we will start with our next
panel.
I think that since some of the questions are going to be
for both, although it may be a little bit disruptive, we're
going to try to get everybody at the table at the same time,
and I think maybe we can do that with the cooperation of the
people sitting on the first row.
So with that, Chairman Jackson, I will recognize you to
begin with.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHIRLEY ANN JACKSON, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Ms. Jackson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to present
the substantial regulatory improvements that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has made in the 6 months plus 1 week
since our last hearing.
Our reforms, which are rooted in initiatives begun over the
last 4 years, have four goals: maintaining safety; reducing
unnecessary regulatory burden; streamlining NRC regulatory
processes, and enhancing our public credibility. I will
highlight for you some of the significant accomplishments.
First, we have streamlined the major NRC program offices,
reducing the number of managers, improving organizational
efficiency, and decreasing our overall resource requirements.
By the end of this fiscal year we will have 330 NRC managers
and supervisors, less than half the 700 we had in September
1993. Our fiscal year 1999 budget will achieve our stated goal
of an 8 to 1 staff-to-manager ratio.
Second, we have accelerated a fundamental shift in the NRC
regulatory paradigm. This shift is rooted in the Commission's
commitment to risk-informed and performance-based regulation.
In the past 6 months we have increased stakeholder involvement,
refined NRC internal license review practices, completed pilot
programs for risk-informed graded quality assurance, in-service
testing, and in-service inspection, and are considering risk-
informing the complete body of power reactor regulations.
In reactor oversight, perhaps the most substantial reform
is our development of a comprehensive revision to our reactor
assessment and inspection programs, built upon cornerstones of
safe licensee performance that must be monitored to ensure no
unacceptable risks in reactor operations.
Performance indicators, integrated with the results of
risk-informed baseline inspections, will allow the NRC to draw
objective conclusions and to take regulatory actions that are
linked clearly to licensee performance.
In the past 6 months we also have reduced substantially the
unnecessary NRC and licensee burden associated with low-level
enforcement issues, while retaining those features essential to
the oversight of licensee safety performance.
Third, we have established fair, effective, and timely
processes for license renewals, license transfers, and
associated adjudicatory reviews. As an example, the NRC staff
will complete the initial safety evaluation report and draft
environmental impact statement for the Calvert Cliffs
application on schedule, next month. In the absence of a
hearing, we anticipate a completed NRC review and Commission
decision on the Calvert Cliffs renewal application by May 2000,
which is 25 months after its submittal.
Despite these achievements, we clearly face continuing
challenges, such as ensuring the integrity of our public
petition process and examining our treatment of harassment and
intimidation allegations. Other open issues include fire
protection, the development of a risk-informed performance-
based revision to our medical use regulations, and ensuring the
readiness of our licensees for the year 2000.
In closing, I would like to emphasize to this subcommittee
the Commission's commitment to completing and
institutionalizing these regulatory reforms, as well as many
others discussed in our written testimony and others not in the
testimony, doing it in an enduring manner that will ensure
long-range NRC effectiveness. In part, we are building this
continuity through key rulemakings and Commission policy
decisions that will guide future actions. In the larger sense,
we are transforming the NRC regulatory culture and ensuring
long-term stability by incorporating these changes into our
agency-wide planning, budgeting, and performance management
process, which is driven by our multiyear strategic plan and
built upon the foundation of strategic assessment and
rebaselining begun in 1995.
Let me just assure you that this institutional framework
will assure not just short-time and short-term adjustments, but
building a legacy for the 21st century. We are communicating
with our stakeholders, both internal and external, especially
our staff, both continually and with focus, and we don't
underestimate the challenge of effecting and managing change,
especially internal to the NRC. But the NRC has an excellent
and dedicated staff, and the Commission and the NRC senior
management team are committed to leading change by
communicating and inculcating these reforms throughout the NRC
organization.
With your continued attention and support, we will succeed.
Thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions after my
colleagues.
Senator Inhofe. Well, thank you, Chairman Jackson, and
thank you for your service and dedication. We will miss you
when you are gone.
I would like to ask each one of you if you have any opening
statement. We will start with Commissioner Dicus.
I would also want to ask you to include in your opening
statements whether or not you agree with everything the
chairman has said.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF HON. GRETA JOY DICUS, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Ms. Dicus. That's going to be the beginning of my
statement, I think.
Good morning. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to
be here today and to be able to provide my views to the
subcommittee on the important topics receiving attention at the
NRC.
The written testimony presented by the Commission and
summarized in the chairman's opening statement was agreed to
and is supported by all of the commissioners. There is,
however, concern expressed about the commitment of the
Commission to continue down the paths in our testimony.
I can assure you that the Commission is committed to these
activities. It is both internally and externally recognized
that implementation of essential changes in the NRC's method of
regulation requires time before we shift the NRC's internal
regulatory culture, and for licensees to understand how to meet
and to best utilize new methods of regulation. After all, we
are asking professionals--those inside the NRC, together with
those outside the NRC--that have been used to one method of
regulation for a quarter of a century or more, to shift to a
fundamentally new regulatory methodology.
The fact that the process of integration of these changes
will take time should come as a surprise to no one. That
recognition, however, reinforces the need for the Commission to
be committed to pursuing these improvements so that a new
regulatory culture can develop in an effective manner.
Therefore, let me assure you that the Commission will
improve its regulatory structure for both nuclear power plants,
as well as our materials licensees. The Commission will reach a
determination on what constitutes an acceptable risk assessment
for power plants. The Commission will determine appropriate
regulatory use of those assessments. The Commission will find
ways for the NRC to operate more effectively and efficiently,
and the Commission will improve our ability to have early
identification of plants that may be headed for problems in
operations.
Given current commissioner terms, and if there are no
reappointments of sitting commissioners, I will be the last of
the commissioners at this table whose term will expire. My
current term does not end until June 30 of the year 2003. I
want to give you my personal assurance that as long as I am on
this commission, I will continue to pursue more effective and
efficient methods for achieving NRC's regulatory mission. My
goal is to see the initiatives that the Commission has begun
advance throughout the coming years to a point where the long-
term regulatory improvements currently planned are either
completed or nearing completion before I leave the Commission.
Whatever changes in the Commission's makeup may occur in
the coming years, I will continue to fully support, both
internally and externally, the systematic improvements on which
we have embarked.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. I want to thank you for that assurance,
Commissioner Dicus. We appreciate it very much.
Commissioner Diaz.
STATEMENT OF HON. NILS DIAZ, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Mr. Diaz. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I do
appreciate the opportunity to make a short statement.
I do strongly support the many efforts at regulatory reform
now underway at the NRC, and I do support the statements that
my fellow commissioners have made. I assure you that I will
work with my fellow commissioners to ensure that the
initiatives are continued.
I would like to call your attention to one aspect of the
activities that I have supported since my appointment as
commissioner. This can be loosely characterized as ``assuring
due process.'' By ``due process,'' I mean not just compliance
with the minimal requirements of the law, but implementation of
fairness and equity in all regulatory activities, as befits a
democratic society.
You will forgive me if I am a little passionate on the
subject of democracy, democratic institutions, and due process.
That comes from having known what it is like to live in a
society in which government is all-powerful and due process is
unknown. It is that experience which makes me feel strongly
that at every level of Government the rules must be clear, they
must be evenly, fairly, and equitably applied, and the rules
and the results communicated to the public without under-or
over-estimation of the safety implications.
I have emphasized that due process at the NRC must apply to
many things--to the senior management meetings and its watch
lists; to our policies on license amendment exemptions and
license renewal; to inspection assessment and enforcement; to
the hearing process; and to the protection of whistle-blowers,
with appropriate safety concerns, and to public communications.
A quick illustrative example. When I arrived at the
Commission, the basis for placement of a plant on the NRC watch
list was not transparent to either the Commission, the
licensees, or the public. As you may recall, the Commission
must now provide negative consent for the watch list.
Explanation for such action has been made clearer, and we are
revamping our entire inspection, assessment, and enforcement
process.
The Commission has made considerable progress in this and
in all other areas that I have mentioned, but we must ensure
that this progress not only continues but is propagated
throughout all our other activities.
In this respect, I believe the use of risk-informed
regulations will bring technical due process to how we ensure
safety by controlling risk and eliminating unnecessary burden.
A final point. I am very encouraged by the collegial
decisionmaking being exercised by the Commission. I am thankful
for the opportunity you have given me to make these remarks,
and I look forward to the very beneficial effects that your
oversight brings to the NRC.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Commissioner Diaz.
Commissioner McGaffigan.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD McGAFFIGAN, JR., COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. McGaffigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join my colleagues in thanking you for the opportunity to
testify today. As I said to you at the first hearing last July,
I firmly believe that such congressional oversight hearings are
essential, both for the Congress and for the Commission.
Mr. Chairman, I am very proud of the Commission's
accomplishments over the past 6 months. By any measure, this
has been one of the most productive periods in the 24-year
history of the Commission. Chairman Jackson has listed some of
the highlights. I want to call particular attention to the
policy changes made on low, safety-significant, so-called
``Level IV'' violations.
None of us could defend our policy as it existed last July,
nor did we try. Indeed, as we testified, we were in the process
of changing that policy.
The chart to the left, which was part of the chairman's
testimony, shows the reduction in Level IV violations requiring
licensee response in the last 5 months. We are no longer
diverting licensee resources to low safety-significant
violations found by the NRC. Licensees are putting such
findings into their corrective action programs and handling
them as they would problems that they uncover themselves.
This change came after extensive conversations with our
stakeholders, and was supported by both industry
representatives and by Mr. Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned
Scientists.
In the coming 6 months, Mr. Chairman, we will tackle
additional issues in our enforcement policy, such as the issue
of regulatory significance, as part of our overall effort to
have an integrated inspection, assessment, and enforcement
policy, and we will continue to involve our stakeholders in an
unprecedented fashion.
We could not have achieved all these policy changes without
the extraordinary effort of our staff. They are the ones who
achieved the results on the chairman's list, and many others as
well. They and we are managing and experiencing an
extraordinary series of simultaneous changes in programs,
processes, and people. It has been exceedingly difficult, but
also exceedingly rewarding, to manage these changes. We are
grateful to the Congress for giving us the buy-out authority
that was essential to achieving the 8 to 1 employee-to-manager
ratio in a fair fashion. We lost many good people in the last 6
months to retirement, but other equally capable people have
stepped forward to carry on the change process.
Our goal is to continue the pace of change in the coming 6
months without slipping into the dysfunction that can often
characterize institutions undergoing rapid change. I personally
would welcome another hearing by this subcommittee in 6 months
to check on our progress and to continue the productive dialog
that you began with us last July.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, commissioner.
The newest commissioner, Commissioner Merrifield.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Merrifield. Senator Inhofe, Mr. Chairman, thank you
very much for you kind initial comments. I don't have any
prepared remarks, but first I would like to associate myself
with the comments of my fellow commissioners. I do sincerely
believe that we are all in agreement on those matters.
I do want to share with you more informally some
observations that I have had since I have been a commissioner
at the NRC, now totaling about 13 weeks at this point.
When I first went to the Commission, I didn't have an
appreciation for the consistently high quality of the staff
that we have at the NRC. I knew that we had some high quality
staffers, but I didn't realize the consistency of that. What
brought that to my attention initially as a new commissioner
was that I had to staff my own office. I had to hire a number
of people to be part of my office, and I interviewed probably
50 or 60 people in all who are employees of the NRC right now.
One of the questions that I asked them went very much to the
issue--of the three that you mentioned, No. 2--do they believe
that the regulatory reform goals that we are initiating are
appropriate? And were they, as staff, committed to the cultural
change needed to make that happen?
The answer that I uniformly received was yes. I think the
staff does believe that the changes that we have been making
and that have been encouraged by your subcommittee are
important. They take the NRC into the 21st century and put us
in the regulatory environment in which we need to be. I think
that is instructive and helpful.
Similarly, in visits that I have made to plants around the
country, I have met with our regional inspectors, the folks at
the very plants who are doing the Level IV violation work, and
they too agree that we need to make that cultural change and
are committed to it.
Finally, I met with a number of CEOs over the course of the
last couple of months, many of whom have wanted to come in and
meet me as a new commissioner. They too, when asked, uniformly
agreed that the NRC is making the kind of changes needed to get
us in the right place. So I think that's a very appropriate
message.
A couple other things that I want to mention before I
close. We are going to receive some questions, I presume, about
where we stand on the Y2K issues, and I would be happy to
address those in the question period, as well as follow up on
some of the issues raised by Senator Bond on Part 35 that I
feel we do have an appropriate answer for.
One final thing that I have found as a new commissioner. I
think this is a unified Commission. I think that having five
commissioners is important; I think we work better that way.
One of the problems that has occurred at the Commission is that
we had a lapse; we had a period where we only had a few
commissioners.
As you are looking forward to making changes in our
authority, as the authorizing committee, one that I would
recommend is the notion of having an overlap so that the
commissioners can stay on to the end of the calendar year, when
their terms end. I think having a unity of the Commission is
important, and I encourage this committee, as soon as there is
a nomination, to move forward quickly with a replacement for
Chairman Jackson, who will indeed be missed.
Thank you for permitting me to testify.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Commissioner Merrifield.
So that you will be aware of it, you mentioned Y2K. I also
chair the Senate Armed Services Readiness Committee, and we're
going to be having a joint hearing between this committee and
the Readiness Committee on February 24, specifically on Y2K. So
we probably won't be getting into that at this time.
We have had a lot of interest shown--Senator Lieberman, who
is on this committee, has already submitted some questions, as
has Senator Pete Domenici, who is not on this committee. So
there is interest outside.
We have been joined by our ranking member on this
committee, and I would ask Senator Graham for any opening
statements or comments at this time.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB GRAHAM, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF FLORIDA
Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your holding this series of oversight hearings. I
think the Nation is well served by having men and women of such
distinction on the NRC. And as has been said by most, we have a
particular responsibility to see that the Commission continues
to not only be a functioning body, but more importantly, have
the confidence of the American people in the very important
regulatory activities that they conduct.
I welcome all the members of the Commission. I will have to
say that I have a particular welcome for my friend,
Commissioner Diaz, a fellow Floridian, who had contributed so
much to our State before coming to this national
responsibility. Before joining the NRC, Professor Diaz was
director of the Innovative Nuclear Space Power and Propulsion
Institute at the University of Florida. Our State is proud to
have one of its most distinguished citizens in such a critical
position.
Today we will be conducting an oversight hearing on
regulatory reforms and changes within the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. I have a particular concern that is going to be the
focus of my questions, so I would like to lay it out in my
opening statement.
This hearing comes at a critical stage in America's use of
nuclear power for commercial purposes. According to the Energy
Information Administration, the percentage of electricity
generated by nuclear power reached a peak of 22.5 percent in
1995. In the last 10 months of 1998, nuclear power generated
20.5 percent of our electric supply. The EIA projects that this
percentage will continue to decline. By 2010, only 18 percent
of our electric supply will be generated by nuclear power.
To summarize, over a 15-year period, from 1995 to 2010,
nuclear as a percentage of America's electrical generation will
decline from 22.5 percent to 18 percent.
I might say, I checked these numbers as they relate to my
State of Florida, which has five nuclear plants at three sites,
and found that the decline was similar. In 1995, 20 percent of
my State's electricity was generated by nuclear; by 1998, that
had declined to 16 percent, and the projection is on a similar
declining glide slope through the year 2010.
We are particularly proud of Florida's nuclear plants,
especially Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, one of the older
plants in the country, which for the last three rating periods
has received the highest scores available through the NRC.
During this decline in the percentage of our electric
supply generated by nuclear power, we are facing some extreme
challenges. A major set of those challenges relates to our
national and international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and avoid impacting the global environment through
climate change. Looking at carbon dioxide emissions alone, the
use of nuclear power plants instead of fossil fuel plants that
would have generated the same amount of electricity--nuclear
plants have avoided two billion tons, two billion tons of
carbon emissions, since 1973.
Today the size of our nuclear industry in the United States
has reached and passed its peak. There are no new plants
currently scheduled to come on line. Older plants are reaching
the end of their service lives. At the same time, the demand
for electricity in the United States is predicted to continue
to increase.
So this raises a series of questions. One of those is how
we are to meet these increasing demands for power while taking
responsible action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Now, I will submit one suggestion for response to that
question which came in the form of a letter from one of my
constituents, who is in the 4th grade at Callahan, Florida
Elementary School. His letter stated as follows:
The way we can stop from using so much oil is to make laws
about using so much power. What people need to do is live in
log cabins with nothing but lanterns and candles. That wouldn't
use so much power.
[Laughter.]
Senator Graham. While it is unlikely that we will adopt his
suggestion, this student identified a basic law of energy
economics--to reduce energy demand, we must change behavior. By
implementing energy conservation programs and seeking
alternative energy sources, we are moving toward this goal.
But projected increases in electricity demand indicate that
there is much more to be done. We need a plan. I recognize that
nuclear power's role in this plan is, to say the least,
controversial. I recognize the concerns associated with the use
of nuclear power and the waste it generates. I believe our
subcommittee is committed to addressing these issues.
As we proceed through today's hearing, I would like to ask
the committee members, the panelists, and the audience to keep
the following questions in mind:
Is the current state of decline of our nuclear industry
desireable?
Is the decline from 22.5 percent to 18 percent of America's
electrical generation in a period of 15 years a desireable
national policy and consequence?
What are the tradeoffs, including global warming
obligations, that we will need to make if we are to meet our
anticipated increased electric demands without a viable nuclear
industry?
What will be the changes in behavior required of other
sectors of our society and economy if we are to accept a
continued decline in the proportion of our electrical
generation met through nuclear power?
Is the current decline of our nuclear industry
irreversible? Are we in a situation in which we are dealing
with factors beyond our control, and thus rather than focus on
change, we must focus on consequences?
If it were desireable to do so, how could the NRC impact
the economic viability of the nuclear industry and reverse this
trend?
The answers to these questions will be an integral part of
our Nation's strategy to meet our future energy needs, and will
be a determining factor in the domestic impact of actions to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
I look forward to your comments and the comments of our
colleagues and the other panelists who will be with us today. I
also have a statement for the record from Senator Lieberman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, U.S. Senator from the
State of Connecticut
Thank you Mr. Chairman and I appreciate your holding this oversight
hearing on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As you know, I have
strongly advocated these hearings. I regret that I will be unable to
stay for this hearing, but I must attend a markup in the Armed Services
Committee.
This may be the last hearing before Chairman Jackson departs at the
end of her term in June to become president of Rensellear Polytechnic
Institute. I think there is widespread agreement that Chairman Jackson
has made a tremendous positive contribution to the functioning of the
NRC. I thank her for that contribution on behalf of the people of
Connecticut. Regaining the trust of the citizens of southeast
Connecticut in nuclear power has been a slow process, but the
chairman's openness and responsiveness to the community and her total
commitment to safety as a first priority have made an enormous
difference. We wish her well in her new challenges.
In response to the last oversight hearing of this subcommittee, the
NRC has set forth several performance goals: maintain safety, reduce
unnecessary regulatory burden, increase public confidence and increase
efficiency and effectiveness of key NRC processes.
These are worthy performance goals and they are well-stated. They
probably could gain widespread approval. However, I am concerned about
some of the details of these goals, and my concern comes from the work
that the GAO has been doing for me over several years. The GAO's most
recent project for me focuses on how the NRC defines safety, and
whether some new NRC initiatives will improve the safety of reactors.
One of these new NRC initiatives is known as risk-informed
regulation. On the surface, this sounds good: everyone wants
regulations to take into account information about risk, in other
words, make sure that the NRC and licensees focus resources in areas
commensurate with their importance to health and safety.
But the GAO today raises questions about whether this new approach
to regulation will actually make any difference in terms of improving
the safety of reactors. The GAO indicates that the NRC hasn't done the
analysis necessary to determine whether this new approach will improve
safety. The GAO also questions whether the NRC has the proper
foundation to move forward with risk-based regulation. This approach to
regulation assumes that the NRC and the licensees fully understand the
design basis of a reactor, and that the reactor is in compliance with
that design basis. Without this type of information, it is extremely
difficult to make well-informed decisions about which problem presents
the most risk and needs to be addressed first.
Unfortunately, however, our experience over the last several years
has shown that the NRC and licensees often lack basic information about
the design basis of a plant.
It's my view that before the NRC fully adopts this risk-based
approach to regulation, it needs to convince the public that the
approach will improve safety. I'm all in favor of reducing unnecessary
regulatory burdens on licensees, but we need to keep in mind our first
goal of insuring safety.
I'd like to take a few minutes to address one other issue, Mr.
Chairman.
One of my major concerns over the last several years--in fact it
was a big focus of my attention when I was the chairman of this
subcommittee--has been the NRC's handling of whistleblowers. As we've
learned from our experience at Millstone, whistleblowers can provide
invaluable information about what's going wrong at a plant.
In recent years, Chairman Jackson has made significant strides in
improving the way the Agency handles complaints from whistleblowers.
But I was very disturbed recently at the NRC's approach to
investigating allegations of harassment and intimidation associated
with the layoff of 106 employees at Millstone. I asked for the
Inspector General to investigate these layoffs, and he recently issued
a report critical of the NRC's actions.
To her credit, Chairman Jackson immediately appointed an
administrative law judge to do an independent review of the layoffs,
although there is some concern that the investigators assisting the
judge may not be independent of the Agency.
While I'm pleased with the chairman's swift response to the
Inspector General's report, I'm concerned that her personal commitment
to treating potential whistleblowers with seriousness and respect may
not be as widespread throughout the Agency as it needs to be. In other
words, it is important that policy directives from the top be
implemented at all levels and that the Commission itself follows
through on these policies.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I regret I cannot stay.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Graham.
To demonstrate the flexibility of this committee, my idea
has been rejected and we are going to go back to the original
format, where you would stay here for questions. But if you
could remain here while the other panel makes its
presentation--will all five of you be able to do that?--so that
in the event there is some contradiction, some of you can come
forward?
Thank you.
Chairman Jackson, since this is probably your last
appearance before this subcommittee, I again want to thank you
for all the help you have been and for your dedication. As I
said in my opening statement, I want to make sure that the
reforms are fully implemented. I know you've worked hard, but
you won't be here, and some of the other commissioners may not
be here later on when we want to make sure that this is
ongoing.
I just would ask you, Chairman Jackson, are you still on
track for finishing each license renewal application within 30
to 36 months?
Ms. Jackson. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Each milestone laid out in
our license renewal schedule for the Calvert Cliffs
application, and the Oconee application, each milestone has
been met up through December 31, 1998, and it's still on track.
There has been a high degree of management oversight. There is
a License Renewal Steering Committee that has been set up,
comprised of senior managers, who meet on a regular basis.
Their job is to ensure that issues can be resolved before they
become sticking points, and the executive council has been
directed by me to provide additional oversight to ensure that
resources get moved around and that any policy issues are
surfaced on a rapid basis.
But we have met all of our milestones; and, as you know,
there were petitions for intervention which our licensing
panels denied; and the Commission, in the case of the Calvert
Cliffs application, upheld that position. If there is no
contest, we expect to complete the Calvert Cliffs license
renewal in 25 months, and that's ahead of the originally
projected 30 to 36 months. But it is a very aggressive
schedule, and it assumes no hiccups, but so far we are
definitely on track.
Senator Inhofe. Well, that's good news, Madam Chairman.
I would like to ask each commissioner if they would like to
comment, at least whether you agree or disagree, and elaborate
if you wish.
Commissioner Dicus.
Ms. Dicus. Well, clearly I agree with what the chairman has
said. The information she has provided to you is accurate. We
are definitely, with Calvert Cliffs, a little bit ahead of
schedule; and certainly with Oconee, we are definitely on
schedule. Barring any unforeseen activities that would occur,
something that we can't anticipate, we should certainly finish
these as she said, Calvert Cliffs in 25 months and Oconee, if
not ahead of time, certainly on schedule.
Senator Inhofe. Commissioner Diaz.
Mr. Diaz. I totally agree. I do believe that a significant
thing that has been done is to upgrade the way we conduct the
hearing process. I think the changes that we are making there
have been very beneficial.
Senator Inhofe. Commissioner McGaffigan.
Mr. McGaffigan. Sir, I also agree. I think the staff-
licensee dialog has been extraordinary. We are talking almost
weekly in public with both Duke and BG&E, Baltimore Gas &
Electric, and that's a real change. But we have much better
communication in this process than I think we've had
previously.
Mr. Merrifield. I would agree. And perhaps anticipating
your next question, I think there's a uniformity among the
commissioners and the staff to ensure that as we go along this
process, we continue to find ways of saving time. And I think
that internally we should be shooting for a shorter time period
as we go through this renewal process.
Senator Inhofe. I would also like to ask any of you--maybe
you, Chairman Jackson--can you foresee any reason why this
would be delayed, anything that is out there that we may not be
aware of right now that could cause an obstacle or a problem in
meeting this schedule?
Ms. Jackson. Well, I would say that there are always two
potential vulnerabilities. One is that the public, with
appropriate standing, does have the right to intervene, and the
National Whistleblower Center did petition for a hearing. As I
say, that was denied; the Commission upheld that. But they have
the right to appeal that, and they have done that, and so
really, that is a vulnerability, depending upon how the Appeals
Court rules.
The other type of vulnerability is whether one gets stuck
on any particular technical review issues that create a
problem, and that's why we have the degree of oversight built
into the process. And of course there's a third, having to do
with the environmental impact statement process. But at this
point we don't see any roadblocks in that regard.
Senator Inhofe. Any other comments?
Mr. McGaffigan. Sir, there is one additional one. The
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has a statutory
responsibility to look at each of these. We have built that
into the process. We met with them yesterday, and they are
trying to work in parallel. They look at the safety evaluation,
not the environmental evaluation, and we have built in from
November to February, approximately, for them to do their job,
and they're starting it now. They're not going to wait until
November; they're going to start getting briefed now. But that
process at times can be a little bit of a wild card.
Ms. Jackson. But I do believe that they are committed to
trying to work with us.
Senator Inhofe. But you have, in anticipating that--that's
not totally unforeseen----
Mr. McGaffigan. Yes. That's totally anticipated.
Senator Inhofe. Good.
Any other comments?
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. One of the concerns you always have, or
that I would have, is that other distracting issues might get
in the way. Our concern is to make sure that this equipment is
working safely and properly for the next 30 or 40 years or
whatever the licensing is, but other issues could come up in
there, like reliving the plant siting issues and all that,
things that I would want to guard against.
Do you have any process to ensure that site issues aren't
thrown into the renewal process?
Ms. Jackson. The way the staff reviews are structured, they
are predicated on review plans; we call them standard review
plans, and they are built squarely on two regulations, one
having to do with the actual technical reviews, 10 CFR Part 54,
and one for environmental reviews.
In fact, a couple of years ago the Commission revised both
the Part 54, but also Part 51, to allow more generic resolution
of environmental issues. So those are what we've done to try to
keep things on track.
But in the end, if you're having technical reviews, the
staff has to do those reviews in a complete and a fair way.
They are much more focused than they might have been otherwise.
And the environmental reviews are being done in a fair and
complete way, and the whole environmental impact statement
process is also a public process.
So those are the kinds of things that are not totally
within our control, but what we can control is the tightness of
the review and adherence to our own schedule.
Senator Inhofe. Any other comments about that?
Mr. Merrifield. I would add one other thing. One of the
ways in which we can get off track is if the Commission doesn't
provide the right instructions to the staff, and we give them
side issues and send them off into areas that they shouldn't be
in. I think, speaking only for myself, license renewal is a top
priority, and whenever I have an opportunity to meet with
staff, I make it clear that that's an issue where they ought to
be putting their attention.
Ms. Dicus. Just to add, the issues that we're dealing with
with license renewal are what I call the ``going forward''
issues, the issues that have to do with aging, to ensure that
the plant can be operated safely. It's not the past issues. For
example, siting--that's been determined; that is not an issue
that we will go back to during license renewal.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Senator Graham--I do have another question, but I would
like to defer to Senator Graham for questions at this time.
Senator Graham. I know that a number of other plants which
are reaching the end of their current permitted life are
deferring an application for extension until they see the
results of these first two plants. Do you think that is a
desireable policy, for other plants to defer until these two
are resolved before making a decision? Or would you recommend
that those who feel that they want to extend the life should
submit their applications while the two current ones are still
in process?
Ms. Jackson. Well, Senator, if I may start, in fact I think
we've been ``invitational'' relative to having licensees come
forward with license renewal applications. I think we've
invited those.
The point we have made--and we are in dialog with a number
of licensees who we expect within the next 2 years to submit
license renewal applications, and that dialog is important so
that we can stage those reviews and plan and make sure that we
have the resources in place to do those reviews in as timely a
manner as we can.
Second, we in fact have a group that meets with an NEI
group on license renewal to continue to talk about issues, both
generic and specific, to refine the process so as to give
potential license renewal applicants more comfort that the
process is getting better all the time.
And so my statement to you is, ``invitational'' and focused
on planning is where we are.
Senator Graham. Did anyone else want to comment on that
question?
Mr. Diaz. I just wanted to say that a little bit of delay
sometimes is not bad, because the jury is still out. I think
they are looking to see how the process works.
Also, it's a very complex economic decision that has to be
phased into what are the other expenses that the plant will
have to go through.
So a little bit of delay actually works OK for some people;
however, the Commission would like to get the applications as
early as possible so that we can put them into our license
renewal process.
Ms. Dicus. The issue that the chairman brought up, about
being almost invitational, we continue to hear of more and more
applicants--utilities--that are considering license renewal, to
the point where we are having those conversations with the
industry to try to ``gate'' some of these renewal applications
so that we do not get a large number in 1 year where we're not
prepared to deal with it. So we are discussing that with the
industry.
Mr. McGaffigan. Sir, I would add that we do have budgeted,
I believe, four for fiscal year 2000. We know that Arkansas
Nuclear 1 announced that it is coming in in December; Turkey
Point may be soon thereafter; and others, and we welcome that.
The best endorsement we're getting at the moment is from
the applicants who are in the process. Mr. Mike Tuckman of Duke
at a recent NEI meeting that I attended with Chief Nuclear
Officers said, and I'm pretty close to a quote, ``The water is
good, come on in,'' to his fellow Chief Nuclear Officers at the
plants around the country.
So I think that the process is working. We will improve it,
as Commissioner Merrifield said, as we go forward, but we have
a pretty sound process right now.
Senator Graham. If I could, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask
this panel the first of a series of questions that I outlined
in my opening statement, and that is--I recognize that you're a
regulatory body, not a macropolicymaking body, but you also are
in a unique position to evaluate some of the most significant
aspects of the macro issues surrounding this industry, such as
the fundamental safety and compatibility of these plants with
adjacent neighborhoods, the environmental consequences of the
operation of nuclear, and so forth.
I indicated the statistics relative to what is happening
now, a rather precipitous decline in the proportion of our
electrical energy being generated by nuclear. Do you consider
that this current state of decline in our nuclear industry is a
desireable national trend?
Ms. Jackson. Well, I am a proponent of nuclear power. I
regulate it, but I believe in it. So no, I don't think it is
desireable to have a decline. I think having a diversity of
energy supply from an economic security point of view is an
important goal.
In addition, I think as you implied in laying out the
series of questions that you would like us to address, you
spoke to the issues of global warming and mitigation of
greenhouse gases, and I think we all recognize that nuclear
represents an emissions-free source. But there is no free
lunch. One has to maintain a compact with the public that
allows nuclear power to flourish, and that does require the
safe operation of the plants, and they are safe, but it also
requires a belief by the public in the safe operation of the
plants.
And then the final thing I would mention is that the issue
of disposition of spent fuel and high-level waste does have to
be resolved, because in the end that does affect both public
credibility, and it has environmental impact if it is not
addressed. It may not have impact relative to air quality, but
it can have environmental impact in terms of grounds and
contamination and the like. But we feel our regulatory regime
at the moment allows for the safe storage of spent fuel and
high-level waste onsite for as long as 90 years, but in the end
there has to be a resolution.
Ms. Dicus. I agree with everything the chairman has said
wholeheartedly.
I might also add--I can't quote the exact figures, but it's
my understanding that if we continue to have a decline in use
of nuclear-generated power, we will have to more than double
our efforts to meet our greenhouse gas reduction goals, and at
tremendous additional cost to the Nation.
Senator Graham. I remember a statement made by the
Assistant Secretary of the Department of Energy with
responsibility for energy statistical analysis, that if the
United States in the year 2015 had the same proportion of its
electrical generating capacity in nuclear that France does
today--and I recognize that that is a theoretical but
unrealizeable goal, but to use it as a standard--that if in
2015 we had the French standard, we would meet between 80 and
120 percent of our year 2015 greenhouse obligations. So it's an
enormous strategic component of the Nation's obligation under
the Kyoto agreement, and for our own national concern.
I think we need to think about the use of nuclear in terms
of what are the consequences if we don't have nuclear, how much
other behavioral change will be required elsewhere in our
society and in our economy in order to make up for the lost
opportunity to meet a substantial amount of our obligation
through the use of nuclear-generated electricity.
So if I could, Mr. Chairman, just ask--the last question in
my series was, if it is desireable to reverse this trend, how
could the NRC impact the economic viability of the nuclear
industry and contribute to such a reversal?
Ms. Jackson. If I may begin, I believe there are four ways
that the NRC has impact.
The first is how we conduct our business, and that is what
has been the focus of this committee's attention. We are
shifting the regulatory paradigm to become risk-informed and
performance-based. We are shifting the regulatory paradigm to
implement a new assessment, inspection, and enforcement program
that is focused on the right things, that has clear thresholds
built into it, and that provides a baseline level of oversight
and burden, but no unnecessary burden beyond that. We are
improving our internal operations through our planning,
budgeting, and performance management process that is outcomes-
focused and meant to make us more efficient and accountable.
And we are being responsive to our various publics, to all of
our stakeholders.
The second has to do with our facilitating continued
operations of existing plants, and that is what license renewal
is all about. We think that we have a good process, but one
that has to be--and is--protective of public health and safety.
Third, we have to be responsive to new ownership
arrangements as the electric utility industry restructures, and
we think we have the basis for that in how we've been aligning
ourselves in terms of license transfers. The Commission made a
decision to add a part to 10 CFR Part 2 to allow more informal
hearings for license transfers. But in addition, we have
aligned ourselves internally in terms of the various reviews we
have to do.
And finally, the fourth is that we have to be prepared to
license new plants. We have laid the groundwork for that. There
is a regulation that existed before any of us arrived on the
scene; that's 10 CFR Part 52, but we've laid out a review plan
relative to that. We have done design certification rulemakings
for two advanced reactors, the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
and the Combustion Engineering System 80+, and last year we
completed the final design approval for the Westinghouse AP-600
design.
So those four ways--how we conduct our business, allowing
continued operations of existing plants, being responsive to
new ownership and business arrangements in the electric utility
industry, and preparing and laying the groundwork for license
renewal--are four ways that we as regulators can do our jobs,
but all in a way that is protective of public health and
safety.
Mr. Merrifield. Senator Graham, I would like to associate
myself with the remarks of the chairman, both in her response
now and in her previous response. I completely agree with them.
The only other thing I would add is this. For those of us
who are supportive of the uses of nuclear power, there is an
issue that we all have to grapple with now, and that is the
practicalities of the cost of alternative forms of energy, such
as coal and oil, which do have an impact on the decision of a
utility to move forward with a new plant. And that's certainly
something that we have no control over.
Finally, there is ultimately an issue of a utility deciding
to move forward and build a plant. I think we've put ourselves
in a position of being ready to act on that selection, with a
design certification moving forward. We also have a process
available if a utility would like to pre-designate a new site
where they would like to build a plant; we can certify that
selection as well and allow them to put that site on the shelf
for future use.
So I think we have done what is necessary to move forward,
and we are ready, willing and able if a utility moves forward
with a plant design, and we will move forward and work on
licensing that facility.
Mr. Diaz. Senator, if I may add something?
In this process of reversing this trend, which I believe
should be reversed, there are a series of political issues that
need to be resolved. There are a series of economic issues that
need to be resolved. There is the issue of the effectiveness of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is a very important
issue; that's one that we can deal with in a very tight and
controlled manner.
And then there is the issue of public communications. This
is a vital issue because unless this is addressed, there will
always be the question out there whether this is really a
viable and safe technology.
The composite of those political, social, economic, and
regulatory issues is what could make it viable, to reverse the
trend.
Mr. McGaffigan. Sir, one last comment, if I could.
The heart of the rule that Chairman Jackson mentioned was
to take a two-step process and make it a single-step process in
getting a combined operation and construction license. That was
endorsed by Congress in 1992; former Senator Johnston was the
prime mover in getting that endorsement of the Commission rule.
Our hearing process will obviously be challenged by any
such application, and I think there is probably some concern
about our hearing process. We have done what we can in the last
few months, but the issue is very much before us, whether there
are further reforms that we need to make in our hearing process
to make it more streamlined for new applicants.
I just wanted to call that to your attention.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Graham. I think those
last two questions will be appropriate questions for the next
panel, also.
Let me just wind this up. Last July I asked a question
stemming from the two quotes, the one of the former
commissioner, Dr. Remick, and another from the former head of
the INPO, Dr. Pate. Let me read these quotes again and ask each
of you to respond in terms of the cultural change and what you
are anticipating in the future.
Dr. Remick said,
The Commission does not know in detail how the Agency's
programs are being performed in the field. The overemphasis on
blind adherence to strict compliance in every confusing
regulation, to strict compliance with documents never intended
for that purpose, is in some cases diverting attention from
more safety-related activities.
And Dr. Pate said,
Headquarters and regional personnel routinely--every day, and
indeed, every hour--impose requirements on the plants that the
Commission or other senior managers would not support if, in
each instance, you knew what was happening.
Since we read those quotes 6 months ago--why don't we start
with you, Chairman Jackson, as to how you see this changing;
not just what has happened over the last 6 months, but for the
future.
Ms. Jackson. OK. Senator, if I may, a member of my staff
had a picture of a contorted road that he gave me not long
after the hearing last July, and at the bottom was a phrase
that said, ``A bend in the road is not the end of the road
unless you fail to make the turn.''
[Laughter.]
Ms. Jackson. So what I would like to posit is that, in
fact, the Commission and all of the NRC is making the turn at
the bend in the road, and we're doing that by virtue of the
overall new assessment, inspection, and enforcement process
that we are designing. It is not in place yet, one has to be
honest, but we have worked with stakeholders, with NEI, with
the Union of Concerned Scientists, in developing this. But I
think we've taken some very specific short-term steps having to
do with low-level violations, and you saw the trend graph; that
is real. We have changed the enforcement process that way. But
also, over the next couple of months we are going to align the
overall enforcement program with the assessment and inspection
program.
We are renormalizing the inspection program. We are
creating what we are calling a risk-informed baseline
inspection; it's what is the minimum that we need to do to
assure public health and safety, but only go beyond that for
cause. And that's going to cause a major change.
But we have an educational job to do--training,
communication, education, coaching--with the staff, but you
have arrayed behind us an excellent management team, and these
folks have been making hard decisions, working themselves to
death and working those who work for them to death, and they
are working to drive all of the change through the
organization.
I think that, coupled with the commitment you have heard
from this Commission, is the greatest opportunity we have to
ensure that we complete that bend.
Senator Inhofe. I think that is very well said.
Does anyone have any disagreement with that statement?
[Chorus of noes.]
Senator Inhofe. How about you in the audience? Any
disagreement out there?
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Well, I appreciate that very much.
Do you have any further questions for this panel, Senator
Graham?
Senator Graham. No, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Merrifield. Senator, I agree with what the chairman
said. I think it's a long road. We have made part of the travel
on that road, but we are not there yet. The chairman mentioned
Level IV violations; I think that's a measure of our progress.
Another one which wasn't mentioned is the issue of confirmatory
action letters, where we send out a letter to a licensee and
want to confirm that they're taking an action. We have used a
significant number of those in the past and have had a dramatic
decrease in the number of those issued in the course of the
last 6 months because of more stringent changes made.
We do need to keep on top of making sure that the decisions
that we make as commissioners, that are implemented by our
staff in Rockville, are followed through with our regions, and
that is something that we need to continue to make more
progress on. I think the efforts toward investigations and
enforcement are a further effort to try to achieve that goal,
and I certainly believe that it's something that we need to
keep on top of in order to make sure that the actions that
we've taken that have made progress in Level IV are consistent
throughout the Agency and our regions.
Mr. Diaz. Senator, if I may add something?
I have labeled this Commission an ``engaging'' Commission,
and sometimes--I don't know whether it's at the right level or
not--but one thing that we have been asking continuously is,
what is happening at the interfaces among the different levels
of the staff, between headquarters and the regions, between
their staff, licensees, and stakeholders? And maintaining
communication with the Commission will bring accountability to
those interfaces. It is a very important way to effect the
cultural changes that need to be made, so that the entire
Commission and entire staff are actually focused on those
changes.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, Commissioner Dicus?
Ms. Dicus. If I could, just for a few minutes, I agree with
everything that has been said so far, because clearly we have a
ways to go. We're not where we need to be yet, but we do have a
map of the road and we know where we're going.
I think when we do get our enforcement policy redone, it
will be a major step to completion, but also ensuring that we
do provide the constant oversight and training necessary for
those interfaces on the one-on-ones, the people who actually
work closely with the licensees.
When I am in plants, I also talk to our resident
inspectors. I get their feedback and I make them aware that
this is something that is definitely on the Commission's plate.
Senator Inhofe. Good.
Yes, Commissioner McGaffigan.
Mr. McGaffigan. Just to make a point, the communications
that we are having today, both with our stakeholders and
internally, are a revolution. One of the NEI staff, Tony
Petrangelo, has called it ``NRC Glasnost.''
We are trying very, very hard to be open with our staff,
and I think we do know what's happening in the field today, and
we partly know it directly and we partly know it through much-
improved communication with our stakeholders.
So if there is something that has changed--and I think you
challenged us on this at the last hearing--if there is a really
major, fundamental change that is going to help, it is a
revolution in communications. Dr. Rhodes is going to mention it
later. We are fully aware that when we make extraordinary
changes, the communication channels have to be open.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Ms. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, if you would just be indulgent
with me for 30 seconds?
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Ms. Jackson. I do want to say it, so that you can have a
concrete example. I actually have gone to all of our regions,
as well as in headquarters, to have what are called ``Chairman-
staff dialogs,'' where I actually meet with groups of
employees--not their management, just the actual employees, in
groups of 15 or 20--to talk about what's going on, to talk
about the change, the need for change, how it's going to impact
them, to find out their concerns and discomfort, to walk it
through.
In addition, the executive director for Operations, Dr.
Travers, has begun doing a similar kind of activity, because it
takes that kind of investment.
Senator Inhofe. Well, it does, Madam Chairman, and I
appreciate that very much.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. The responses to those last questions
prompted an idea to which I am not going to ask for an answer
now, but I would like to plant a question, and maybe you could
respond in writing.
I do not believe that Congress should become involved in
micromanaging an agency. I do believe we have the
responsibility for oversight of the macro issues in the sense
of whether the Agency is accomplishing its intended direction,
the reason that it was established.
I would like to ask, how do you think this subcommittee
could best carry out its function? For instance, what are the
kinds of questions that we should be asking on a recurrent
basis that relate to the fundamental policy issues affecting
your agency and your relationship to the public interest in
commercial applications of nuclear energy? What are the data
bases that you would use to respond to those questions that we
ought to be directed toward to monitor?
We can't exercise oversight by having a hearing once every
8 months. As any CEO of a large conglomerate would have, we
have to have a continuous information flow that allows the CEO
to have a sufficient command of what's happening to have a
comfort level that the individual components of the
conglomerate are making their contributions toward the
corporate objectives.
What are the questions? What are the data files that we
ought to be monitoring as they relate to the NRC's
responsibility to the Nation's commercial nuclear industry?
I would like the answers to that in writing.
[Response to the question follows:]
We agree with you that the subcommittee's responsibility is
for the oversight of macro issues and, as you state, not micro-
managing an agency. In this regard, we respectfully believe
that the subcommittee's oversight function can take place in
several arenas. First, the subcommittee can provide oversight
of the Agency to ensure NRC is protecting the public's health
and safety by conducting its regulatory mission consistent with
the national priorities of streamlining regulatory burdens
while increasing our openness to the American public. For
example, the subcommittee could provide oversight of NRC's
efforts to avoid dual regulation in the decommissioning area.
As you know, the interactions with other Federal agencies,
particularly the EPA, have gone on for several years, and
subcommittee guidance regarding the interpretation of our
respective roles would be most welcome.
Second, notwithstanding our being an independent
Commission, the subcommittee can enhance NRC's efficiency by
involving us early in legislative initiatives of national
import that could affect NRC's mission. For example, as the
committee reviews CERCLA and/or RCRA legislation, the NRC can
be a contributor to those discussions, since some of the
affected sites are NRC licensees or are located in Agreement
States.
Third, the Government Performance and Results Act provides
a viable process that could assist the subcommittee in carrying
out its oversight responsibilities. It includes interaction
between the agencies and Congress to formulate agreed upon
strategic goals and performance objectives, and to monitor the
Agency's progress in achieving those goals and performance
objectives. We are currently revising our strategic plan and
performance metrics to clarify the direction of the Agency and
the regulatory improvements we have underway to respond to
congressional and stakeholder concerns. We plan to revise the
plan in stages and to get feedback from our stakeholders
through the process. We welcome and encourage the participation
of the committee in revising our strategic plan.
Fourth, regarding potential metrics that NRC could be
measured by, we suggest that the committee work closely with us
on the following key documents: NRC's annual Performance Plan
and our Monthly Status Report of Licensing Activities and
Regulatory Duties. The Performance Plan will assist in
measuring our success in implementing our new initiatives and
the Monthly Status Report of Licensing Activities and
Regulatory Duties has and can continue to be a vehicle to
provide Congress information about how NRC is meeting its
mission statement and objectives. Some refinements to the
documents may be required to ensure that they provide both the
subcommittee and NRC with the types of information and metrics
that are necessary.
Lastly, we would also recommend more frequent informal
interaction between subcommittee members and the NRC to discuss
issues of importance and the status of the NRC's regulatory
improvements. This can come in the form of periodic meetings
between commissioners and subcommittee members as well as
subcommittee staff attendance at NRC meetings on significant
regulatory, strategic, and budgetary matters, visits to
licensed nuclear facilities, and enhanced use of communication
tools such as accessing information via the Internet from the
NRC web site. All of the above would serve as an excellent
forum to view NRC/stakeholder interaction and participate in
discussions pertaining to issues and concerns facing the NRC
and our licensees.
We believe that active subcommittee oversight can add value
to NRC processes already on the way. It is our intent to
continue to work with Congress and our stakeholders to ensure
that our plans, recommendations, and initiatives for regulatory
reform are appropriate, implemented, monitored, and reported,
and that there is a continued focus and understanding of the
initiatives and the success to be achieved.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that question. We look forward
to getting the answer.
Senator Inhofe. I now ask that our second panel come to the
witness table. As I said before, if the five of you wouldn't
mind remaining, maybe on the first row, if others could help
accommodate that request--that way you can be close-by.
Panel 2 includes Mr. Joe Colvin, president and CEO of the
Nuclear Energy Institute; Ms. Gary Jones, associate director,
Energy, Resources, and Science Issues, Resources, Community,
and Economic Development Division, U.S. General Accounting
Office; Mr. David Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of
Concerned Scientists; and Dr. James T. Rhodes, Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations.
You heard the instructions to the previous panel. I won't
repeat those, but the same rules will apply.
We'll start with Joe Colvin, if you would start off with
your presentation.
STATEMENT OF JOE F. COLVIN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, NUCLEAR ENERGY
INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Colvin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning. Senator
Graham, good morning. I am Joe Colvin----
Senator Inhofe. Let me comment to all four of you that we
are going to try to hold onto our time on this because of the
change, what's coming up on the trial and all that.
Go ahead. You are recognized.
Mr. Colvin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you are aware, I am the president and chief executive
officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute. My association
represents the nuclear energy industry and sets industry
positions and policies on major strategies and issues affecting
the industry, including Federal regulations that ensure the
safety of the 103 operating nuclear plants, operating in 31
States.
I want to thank you, Chairman Inhofe, for your leadership
and thank the subcommittee for its continuing oversight of the
regulatory process for our industry.
Issues concerning the regulation of our nuclear power
industry are particularly important in the context of Senator
Graham's discussions and at a time when Congress and other
policymakers are recognizing the growing nexus between energy
supply, energy needs, environmental policy, and the important
role that nuclear energy must play in our Nation's energy mix
now and into the future. I would be happy to comment on that
more during the question and answer period.
In the 6 months since this subcommittee held its first
hearing, the NRC commissioners and staff have made tremendous
progress in taking the initial steps toward meaningful reform.
Many longstanding issues are being brought to resolution, and I
compliment the commissioners and the NRC staff for their
efforts.
In this time period they have demonstrated that difficult
issues can be resolved and important decisions can be made in
an efficient and timely manner.
Nevertheless, the single most important challenge facing
the nuclear energy industry, certainly in the near term, is the
regulatory process that consumes licensee and NRC resources on
issues that have little or no safety significance and that
produce inconsistency in assessing plant performance and
enforcement. In that light, it is very important that Congress
continue to provide ongoing oversight of and support to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in this transition to a risk-
informed, performance-based regulatory process.
We are at the beginning of a very long journey, and the
task at hand is to make the appropriate changes in a timely
manner and sustain the efforts begun last year. In that regard,
I would like to summarize five recommendations for the
congressional involvement needed to sustain these efforts that
will, in our view, result in meaningful NRC reform.
First is that Congress should direct the Agency to prepare
a multiyear strategic plan to achieve a safety-focused,
results-oriented regulatory process. The NRC's long-range plan
should include measurable goals and objectives to demonstrate
progress toward reform of the regulatory systems and, more
importantly, describe how these incremental changes,
collectively, will achieve the desired goals.
Second, Congress should schedule another hearing by June of
this year and direct the commissioners to provide this
multiyear strategy for reforming the regulatory process at that
time.
I believe the subcommittee should also continue to hold
hearings approximately every 6 months until you are satisfied
that the progress in reforming the process is proceeding in the
right direction, at the proper pace, and that it will be
sustained.
Third, the subcommittee should request the NRC to identify
legislative changes needed to proceed with timely regulatory
reform, issues such as amending the Atomic Energy Act in the
area of antitrust reviews, foreign ownership, adjudicatory
hearing processes, and so on.
Fourth, Congress should ensure that the Agency complies
fully with the requirements of the Omnibus Budget and
Reconciliation Act of 1990. The Agency should submit
legislation, if necessary, to modify the Agency's fee structure
so that nuclear power plant licensees will be assessed fees
only for those programs from which they directly benefit.
Additionally, the Agency's ability to collect user fees should
be authorized annually by Congress until the Commission
completes its regulatory reform initiatives.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I think this subcommittee should
resolve the impasse between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and the Environmental Protection Agency over the establishment
of dual regulations for radiation protection standards. This
subcommittee has jurisdiction over both Federal agencies and
should clarify that the proper scientific and regulatory
authority to establish these standards should rest solely with
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that continued oversight of the NRC
by this subcommittee is important for the reasons described to
ensure that necessary steps toward broad reform of the Agency
are being taken and will be taken in a comprehensive and timely
manner. We've seen the Agency make significant progress in
recent months, but we see the need to establish a longer-term
vision and working plan with the appropriate metrics to ensure
that the regulatory changes indeed are implemented, and that we
sustain these improvements.
Thank you, and I would be happy to respond to your
questions during the question and answer period.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Colvin.
Ms. Jones.
STATEMENT OF GARY JONES, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, ENERGY, RESOURCES,
AND SCIENCE ISSUES, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning.
Good morning, Senator Graham.
Since this committee's hearing last July, we would agree
with NEI that NRC has accelerated many activities needed to
implement a risk-informed regulatory approach and has
established milestones for many others. We hope that momentum
continues, because NRC still has an enormously complex task
ahead. One of the messages of our testimony today is that NRC
needs a road map to guide the implementation of the very
activities it has under way.
Let me spend just a few moments highlighting some of the
major activities still to be accomplished.
First, there are several basic issues that are not resolved
after many years of addressing them. For example, for some
plants, NRC does not have current or accurate design
information, or confidence that final safety analysis reports
have been updated. The 50.59 process that allows plants to make
a change without prior NRC approval needs to be improved. These
safety documents and the change process are the foundations on
which safety regulation--deterministic or risk-informed--is
based. For example, what is the potential impact if a utility
does not have complete and accurate design information, or an
outdated final safety analysis report? One result might be that
evaluations relying on these documents can lead to wrong
conclusions and jeopardize safety.
NRC and the industry view risk assessment as one of the
main tools to be used to identify and focus on those
structures, systems, and components of plant operations having
the greatest risk, yet neither NRC nor the industry has
standards or guidance that define the quality, scope, or
adequacy of risk assessments.
Until recently, NRC did not consider whether and to what
extent the Agency should revise all its regulations pertaining
to nuclear plants to make them risk-informed. NRC staff have
recommended to the Commission that changes to the regulation
occur in a phased approach, beginning by defining ``important
to safety'' and ``risk-significant,'' and then requiring a
higher level of safety assurance for those structures, systems,
and components that are critical to safety under those
definitions.
NRC has also not determined if compliance with risk-
informed regulations will be voluntary or mandatory for the
utility industry. NRC staff recommended to the Commission that
implementation be voluntary, noting that it would be very
difficult to show that requiring mandatory compliance would
increase public health and safety. Voluntary compliance could
send a signal that current plants are less safe and could
create two classes of plants operating under two different sets
of regulations.
Changing to a risk-informed approach will be an economic
decision for each individual plant. The cost to comply may
outweigh the benefits for doing so, particularly for plants
nearing the end of their operating licenses. Currently there is
little cost-benefit data available.
Mr. Chairman, NRC continues to work on all these issues and
many other issues impacting a risk-informed approach. However,
NRC has been considering applying risk to the regulatory
process for more than 10 years, and NRC officials predict it
will be another 4 to 8 years before changes it has proposed
have been implemented.
We found that NRC has about 150 separate activities under
way that affect risk-informed regulation. It has developed or
is planning to develop implementation plans for many of these
activities. However, given the complexity and interdependence
of NRC's requirements and the results of ongoing activities,
such as industry pilot projects, it is critical that NRC
clearly articulate how the various initiatives will help
achieve the goals set out in the 1995 policy statement on risk-
informed regulation. Although NRC's tasking memo and the
implementation plan establish tasks and expected completion
dates, they do not ensure that the short-term efforts are
building toward NRC's longer-term goals and do not link the
various ongoing initiatives. They also do not help the Agency
determine appropriate staffing levels, training, skills, and
technology needed in the timing of those activities to
implement a risk-informed approach. It provides no link between
the day-to-day activities of program managers and staff and
NRC's overall goals for risk-informed regulation.
Given that NRC is essentially changing every aspect of how
it regulates safety, a strategic plan would help ensure that
NRC meets the challenges it has set for itself.
Although the Office of the Inspector General's 1998 report
stated that the NRC staff had a strong commitment to protecting
public health and safety, it admitted that they are confused
about the new directions in the regulatory practices and
challenges facing the Agency. While NRC is developing and
implementing many mechanisms for better communication, a
strategic plan that provides a clear path forward and connects
all the ongoing activities would help staff understand when and
if activities will affect them, what type of training they will
receive, and how various activities interrelate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Ms. Jones.
Dr. Rhodes.
STATEMENT OF JAMES T. RHODES, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, INSTITUTE OF
NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS, ATLANTA, GA
Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Chairman, thank you and the other members
of the subcommittee for the opportunity to represent the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations at this hearing.
At the July hearing I discussed the improvement our
industry has made in the past decade, as measured by a number
of performance indicators. Today I am pleased to inform you
that the industry has continued this solid progress into 1999.
Although the year 1998 began with a number of plants struggling
with extended shutdowns, the industry made a strong comeback
during the year. In fact, overall performance improved more in
1998 than at any time in recent years. Let me share with you a
few key indicators of that improvement.
By the end of 1998, most of the plants that had begun the
year in long-term shutdown were back on line, some 9 of 14
units in that situation. In addition, nuclear electric
generation continued to increase during the year. For example,
Commonwealth Edison recently reported that its nuclear program
ended the year with a capacity factor of over 65 percent, more
than 10 percentage points higher than their goal for the year,
and more than 15 points higher than their 1997 results.
Also last July I reported to this committee that the trend
of significant events per unit per year had decreased from 2.38
in 1985 to about .1 in 1997, and that is shown on this graph
here. Today I am pleased to report even further improvement.
NRC event data, confirmed by our own experience, shows an
industry achievement of just over .04 events per unit this past
year, as shown on this bar chart here, a tremendous improvement
over this period, and even continuing through 1998.
The final noteworthy improvement is the number of plants in
INPO's ``excellent'' category. Following each plant evaluation,
which we perform about every 20 months for a 2-week period,
INPO provides an assessment on a 1 to 5 scale, with category 1
being the excellent performers. The standards are very high.
The levels of performance needed to earn an excellent rating
have risen over the years. At INPO's annual Chief Executive
Officers Conference in November we recognized 31 excellent
plants. This is a record achievement and a dramatic increase
from the six excellence awards first presented in 1986, and
this shows a trend of excellent plants over that period of
time.
Now I'd like to move to my second area of focus, the
regulatory changes that are important for continued improvement
in the nuclear power industry.
Many have said--and we certainly agree--that such changes
will play a central role in the health of our industry. We
continue to be encouraged by the openness that the NRC has
demonstrated in communicating with its stakeholders. The open
exchange of information and ideas is a key contributor to the
safe and reliable operation of our Nation's nuclear power
plants. This improved communication is evident through the
NRC's periodic stakeholder meetings, enhancements in the
license renewal process, and the ongoing development of the new
reactor oversight process.
The new oversight process is especially important. It
improves the Commission's ability to ensure public health and
safety by better allocating resources and eliminating
redundancies. Specifically, it will focus the inspection,
assessment, and enforcement processes on safety-significant
items. This will allow utilities appropriate control over
activities and issues that are not safety-significant, but are
vital to plant reliability and economic viability.
The proposed oversight process identifies several bands of
plant performance. To achieve and remain in the uppermost band,
nuclear plants will need highly effective self-assessment and
corrective action programs. Let me point out that plant
performance in these areas is routinely reviewed during INPO
plant evaluations and plant assistance visits. Therefore,
INPO's mission of promoting excellence in plant operations is
fully complimentary with the new oversight process.
The NRC is undergoing significant changes in philosophy,
processes, and personnel, including changes at the senior
leadership level. We have seen change programs succeed and fail
in the industry. To be successful, the NRC must have clarity of
purpose, constant communication, training, and--most of all--
persistence. This is hard work, but critical for success.
In conclusion, we at INPO believe the NRC is on the right
track with its efforts to improve, although much work needs to
be done. The changes focus directly on the Agency's mission,
the protection of public health and safety. We will continue to
work in cooperation with the NRC to help ensure the safe
operation of our Nation's nuclear power plants.
Again, I appreciate this committee's interest in the
regulation of a changing nuclear power industry. Your continued
support and guidance will play an important role in helping the
NRC provide truly effective regulation in pursuit of its
mission.
Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Mr. Lochbaum.
STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEER, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Lochbaum. Good morning.
After the subcommittee's hearing last July, the NRC
developed a plan to improve its reactor oversight program. The
NRC intends to phase these improvements in at a few nuclear
plants this year, and adopt them for all plants next year.
As I recently told the NRC commissioners, UCS believes that
the NRC has a good plan. However, the plan's quality is not the
most important factor in determining whether the NRC succeeds
in this mission. What matters most is how well the Agency
implements this program. Too often the NRC fails to follow its
plans and does not regulate in a consistent, timely manner.
The NRC Inspector General recently reported to Senator
Lieberman that the Agency failed to properly discharge its
responsibilities to the people of Connecticut and to the
workers at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. These failures
are particularly troubling because they involve the highest
profile nuclear facility in the country. The NRC created a
special projects office with responsibility for only that one
site. The Inspector General documented numerous regulatory
failures involving that office, despite its singular focus. The
Inspector General also reported that many of the failures were
caused by the NRC not following its own procedures and
policies.
The Inspector General's report is the latest example in a
long history of the NRC failing to follow through on its plans.
Let me cite fire protection as an old--yet still ongoing--
example.
The NRC created Appendix R, its fire protection rule, to 10
CFR Part 50 in January 1980 to address safety concerns
following the serious fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in
Alabama in March 1975. Nineteen years later, the majority of
nuclear power plants in this country do not now, and never
have, satisfied the Appendix R requirements.
When Representative Markey asked the NRC about this
situation in May 1997, the Agency replied in December 1997 that
it was considering a revision to Appendix R. Nearly 2 years
later, we understand the Agency is still thinking about doing
this.
Last December, Representative Markey asked the General
Accounting Office to investigate fire safety issues at nuclear
power plants. In the meantime, the majority of nuclear power
plants are operating in violation of these regulations. At the
Salem Generating Station in New Jersey, for example, both
reactors were shut down in 1995 through 1997 while its owner
made extensive repairs to safety equipment.
Numerous fire protection deficiencies remained uncorrected
during this lengthy shutdown. The NRC allowed both reactors to
restart, despite knowing that fire protection requirements were
not met. Not only that, but the NRC is content with the owner's
plans to leave these problems uncorrected for several more
years.
The NRC tolerates these violations because plant owners
have taken so-called ``interim compensatory measures.'' The
most common of these measures involves workers, called fire
watches, walking through the plants looking for smoke or
flames. Such ``interim'' measures have been used for more than
6 years at some nuclear power plants.
But interim measures are not a substitute for permanent
solutions. When I get a flat tire, I replace it with that spare
mini-tire. That's an interim measure I can use until I get the
flat fixed or buy a new tire. It would be irresponsible for me
to undertake a cross-country trip on that interim spare tire.
My poor judgment would place me and other travelers at undue
risk. Likewise, it is irresponsible for the NRC to rely on fire
watches indefinitely. This poor decision places millions of
Americans living around nuclear plants at undue risk.
The risk from fire is real. The NRC reported that fire
represents 7 to 50 percent of the overall core damage risk at
nuclear plants. According to this data, there is a plant where
the fire risk equals the risk from all other sources combined.
So, the fire risk is real, and the regulations created to
protect Americans from that risk are essentially being ignored
by the NRC.
We respectfully request that this subcommittee compel the
NRC to resolve the fire protection problems. The NRC must
either enforce or revise its fire safety regulations. Continued
neglect, predicated on ``interim'' compensatory measures and
``considerations'' of rulemaking, must end. The regulations
were promulgated in direct response to the serious Browns Ferry
fire. If another serious nuclear plant fire were to occur, the
American public would be very distressed to learn that these
fire protection regulations had simply not been enforced.
Your subcommittee's oversight hearings have accelerated the
NRC's change process. We sincerely appreciate the
subcommittee's efforts in this regard. We trust that this
subcommittee will not judge the NRC solely on its plans; we
hope that you will evaluate the results from these new and
improved processes, even though this data will not be available
until later this year. We respectfully request that this
subcommittee continue these efforts to ensure that the NRC
reaps the maximum benefits from these plans.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Lochbaum.
We have been joined by Senator Sessions, and I would ask if
Senator Sessions has any opening statement or comments at this
time.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
ALABAMA
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
enjoyed serving with you the last 2 years on this committee,
and I've had a good deal of interest in this particular
subject. I think it is important to raise it.
Mr. Lochbaum, I think you would agree that whether the NRC
is doing a good job or not, they have more regulators per
nuclear power plant than any other country in the world, so we
have a right, I think, to expect good regulation.
But at the same time, we are at a point, having been
involved with this committee on clean air issues, for example,
where we have to recognize the challenge that is facing us.
Ambassador John B. Rich to the International Nuclear--something
or other, appointed by President Clinton--spoke recently at the
Scottish Conference of the North Atlantic Assembly, and he made
some dramatic statements. I think everyone here ought to read
that address. It was a thoroughgoing analysis of all the issues
involving nuclear power. It was a ringing call for meeting the
challenge. Among other things, he stated that our electricity
demands will double by 2050 for the world, they will double by
2050, and he said that the one technology capable of meeting
large baseloads without greenhouse emissions is nuclear power.
That's so obvious as to be beyond debate, it seems to me. He
added,
In the century ahead, mankind must place great reliance on
harnessing the nuclear genie and using it to maximum effect if
our needs are to be met and our security preserved.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that we are at a point where
we have not brought on any more nuclear plants. Twenty percent
of our power today is from nuclear energy. If that were to be
eliminated, think how many tons of greenhouse gases and noxious
sulfur dioxides and other pollutants would be released into the
atmosphere. If other nations of the world move to coal plants
to meet their burgeoning demands for electricity, we will have
a serious worldwide problem of pollution. The best way to meet
that is to somehow meet this challenge.
Nuclear engineering schools are closing in this country.
Ms. Jackson and I shared some comments about that over dinner.
They are closing because there is so little demand, and this
country ought to be the world leader in major innovations
involving nuclear energy, and I hope that whatever comes out of
this, that we will make sure that we preserve the safety of the
nuclear energy industry, but at the same time we develop some
sort of window or light at the end of the tunnel that would
allow us to move forward with this energy source.
I believe that if it is done right, if the NRC helps
develop model plans for plants, they could be brought on at
much lest cost than the process that we've gone through before,
and that can be done. I consider it a serious national issue, a
matter of worldwide importance. We have to break down what I
consider to be an irrational fear of nuclear energy, and
``harness that genie,'' as Ambassador Rich has said.
Thank you for your leadership.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Statement of Hon. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama
I would like to first thank Senator Inhofe for his leadership and
commitment to exercise continued congressional oversight on the
activities of the NRC. Last July, Senator Inhofe held a hearing in this
subcommittee, which I participated in, to review the Nuclear Regulatory
Commissions' oversight of nuclear safety in the United States. I am
grateful Senator Inhofe has provided the opportunity for me to join the
Clean Air and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee again today to assess the
status of reform efforts by the NRC since the last hearing.
Nuclear Energy needs to remain a part of our domestic energy mix.
Over the last 2 years, I've had an opportunity to serve on the Senate
Environment and Public Works committee's subcommittee on Clean Air and
Nuclear Safety. During that time, the subcommittee held numerous
hearings illustrating the problems our nation faces in dealing with air
pollution. The Clean Air Act has helped our nation to battle the air
pollution problem by reducing the amounts of harmful air pollutants
emitted into the environment. Those hearings have shown we are making
significant progress, but as our energy needs rise, the technical
ability to reduce overall air pollutants from traditional fossil fuel
electricity plants becomes more and more limited.
Nuclear power provides over 20 percent of the electric power in
this country and offsets thousands of tons of sulfur, nitrous oxide,
carbon, mercury particulate matter and other pollutants each year.
Without nuclear energy as part of our energy mix, it is unlikely we
could have made the significant progress in reducing air pollutants
recorded over the last 20 years.
The Energy Information Administration predicts the U.S. will need
about a 30 percent increase in electricity generation by 2015. To meet
this need and win our battle against air pollution, Nuclear Energy must
continue to be harnessed safely and responsibly.
In November, I attended the 44th Annual Session of the North
Atlantic Assembly in Scotland. The Ambassador to the United Nations
International Energy Agency John B. Ritch III, appointed by President
Clinton, stated in his presentation that electricity demands will
double by 2050, and the one technology capable of meeting a large base-
load with negligible greenhouse emissions is nuclear power. He added,
``In the century ahead, mankind must place great reliance on harnessing
the nuclear Genie, and using it to maximum effect, if our needs are to
be met and our security preserved'' (A Nuclear Perspective for the 21st
Century, 44th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly).
In order to foster an environment which encourages the development
and implementation of safe nuclear power in the United States,
regulatory obstacles which do not relate to safety must be minimized or
removed. The nuclear industry has a stellar safety record in this
country. There has never been a serious accident in this country which
put the safety of our citizens in danger. The main reason the United
States nuclear industry has been so safe is because of the careful
oversight by the Atomic Energy Commission and later, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. All United States plants must adhere to strict
safety standards, with frequent inspections, redundant controls and
containment systems.
There is a balance to be met when monitoring the operation and
maintenance of nuclear power plants. While safety-orientated
regulations and procedures foster the safe generation of nuclear power,
subjective regulations which fail to focus on safety waste resources
and place unfair costs on the ratepayers. This over regulation has
detrimental effects on the operation of our current plants, discourages
the construction of new plants and can result in the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission overlooking real safety issues while focusing instead on
non-safety-related management practices. Micro-management of nuclear
plant operation, as illustrated by many of the NRC's Category 4
violations, discourages efficiency and may have the unintended
consequence of actually compromising safety. The NRC needs to look at
the safety of our nuclear plants and take decisive action when true
safety problems are identified. The agency need not however, be
involved in the oversight of non-safety-related management procedures
at our nuclear power plants.
Testimony from the Nuclear Subcommittee's hearing last July
illustrates that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be able to
operate in a more efficient manner if the Agency refocused its efforts
on safety and implemented a risk-informed regulatory approach.
Regulations and enforcement procedures developed by the Atomic Energy
Commission in the 50's and carried out by its successor, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission today, need to be updated to reflect the 90's
state-of-the-art nuclear technology. Unnecessary regulations must be
eliminated so that the NRC is better able to use its resources to keep
our nuclear power plants safe. The NRC needs to focus its efforts on
developing and enforcing proper safety regulations while at the same
time encouraging the regulated community to develop efficient ways to
meet those safety standards on their own.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission needs to continue its
streamlining efforts and learn to do more with less. Despite the
decline in the number of Nuclear plants operating in the United States
and the failure to bring new plants on line, the NRC continues to seek
increases in appropriations and the fees it levies on ratepayers. The
NRC has over 1600 employees to monitor 110 plants--a ratio of
approximately 14.5 NRC employees to each plant, while the UK has fewer
than 200 employees to monitor 35 reactors--a ratio of 5.7 to 1--with
Japan and France sharing statistics similar to the UK. The United
States has by far the highest number of regulators per plant.
Inefficient practices by the NRC delay licensing action and
discourage the construction of new state-of-the-art nuclear power
plants in this country. To keep nuclear power a part of our nation's
energy mix, the NRC must develop a system which allows streamlined re-
licensing of safe nuclear power plants nearing the end of their
operating license while at the same time clearing the way for the
construction of new plants in the future.
I am hopeful continued reform taking place at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission will help remove the regulatory hurdles faced by
the generators of electric power in this country. At the same time,
Congress and the Administration need to act responsibly to solve the
problem of nuclear waste to pave the way for the implementation of
safe, new technologies in the generation of nuclear power.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I associate
myself with your remarks. I would also observe that Senator
Graham expressed some similar interests in his opening remarks
and in his questions.
Let's quickly go into questions.
First, Mr. Colvin, I would like to ask you, do you think
that we can address these reforms that we've been talking
about, going all the way through the NRC without an overall
long-range strategic plan?
Mr. Colvin. No, sir. As I said in my comments, I think that
we have seen the Agency over many years undertake activities in
what I would call a ``disaggregated'' or ``incremental'' basis.
As we move forward to make the changes, as Ms. Jones from GAO
indicated to us today, we need to have an approach that
integrates the details of this plan and sets up the longer-
range goals, such that as we move forward we can identify our
progress against those.
With respect to that, we also need to identify the
appropriate metrics and measurement tools that allow us to
measure that progress. So I think we need to have a long-range
goal; we need to set that out; we need to have that ventilated
with the stakeholders and with this committee, and then this
committee through its oversight responsibility should measure
the progress of the Agency as it moves forward in its reform
activities.
Senator Inhofe. Let me make a request, then, Mr. Colvin,
since you have answered the question the way you did. Let us
ask you to help us--I know that the private sector is sometimes
better equipped to do this--if you could help us, in
consultation with other members of this panel, to develop a
plan, a summary, we would like that very much--along, of
course, with the Commission.
Mr. Colvin. Yes, sir, we would be happy to participate in
that dialog.
Senator Inhofe. I think the chairman is trying to say
something.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Come forward quickly, here.
Ms. Jackson. In point of fact, even though we have not
focused on it in these hearings, the NRC does have just such a
plan, focused on goals, activities to support those goals,
metrics that both act as filters for prioritizing and the
measurement after the fact in terms of achieving those goals.
It is a multiyear plan.
Senator Inhofe. Let me modify my request and ask that if
you take your plan--and I would like to have a critique of this
plan by the four members of this panel.
Ms. Jackson. That is fine, because the process has been
open. We have been working with Arthur Andersen in developing
these plans, and it would be nice if people would acknowledge
that.
Senator Inhofe. Why don't you remain up there, if you
would, Madam Chairman. Save you from running back and forth.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Colvin, last July you and a number of
the witnesses raised serious issues on problems with the NRC,
and now 6 months have gone by. I would like to have you tell us
what you think, briefly, about the progress that has been made
in the past 6 months.
Mr. Colvin. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think, as I indicated in
my brief oral comments, we have seen tremendous progress by the
Agency within this time period. But again, these are steps that
I consider to be some of the initial steps undertaken by the
Agency, and this is a long journey.
I think from the industry standpoint we are not, and we
cannot and should not be satisfied with the progress made
within the regulatory forum until we see the sustained
improvement out of the Agency that is necessary in this area.
I indicated in my comments that the singlemost important
issue facing our industry as we move forward to ensure the
continuity of energy supply, energy security and diversity, and
meeting our environmental goals is really the regulatory issues
that are affecting our ability to operate these plants
efficiently and in a cost-effective manner.
We have other major issues, such as stranded investment and
those related to the disposal of used nuclear fuel. But from
the investment community's perspective and from the nuclear
energy industry's perspective, the regulatory system is the
system that needs the most reform and needs it with the
greatest urgency, especially as we deregulate in various States
and localities and move forward to remain competitive in this
future deregulated market.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Ms. Jones, I am calling on your experience in reviewing the
NRC. Do you think the senior managers are communicating the
reform plans down through the Agency effectively at this time?
Ms. Jones. Well, I heard what the commissioners said this
morning, and I applaud the kind of communication networks that
they are setting up within the Agency. It sounds like they have
been working very closely with senior management and the senior
managers are talking with the staff.
However, we have had a lot of visuals this morning in terms
of where the Agency is going. We've talked about a road map. I
think the chairman talked about a ``turn in the road.'' We're
really just starting that turn; and I think it's really
critical that the staff at NRC understand what's going on and
are well-trained, and I think that's one of the points in terms
of our strategy, that all of that would be very clear to staff
in terms of the path forward.
Senator Inhofe. Well, let me make a request. If you would
take the time, if you can do this, and you can let us know
whether or not you can, to go through this and take a real
close look at the cultural changes and come up with some kind
of a preliminary report to us.
I'm going to call for the next hearing on this subject, on
the NRC, to be September 23, so the request that we have made
in terms of the critique of the chairman's plan, as well as the
request of the GAO--if you could have something at that time
that we could discuss so we could have a better monitoring
effect as to what is going on, where we're going from here.
Could you do that?
Ms. Jones. We would be happy to work with you on that, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Let me defer now to Senator Graham for questions, and I
have maybe one or two more.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have
to express my apologies, that when I finish these questions I
am going to have to leave for another commitment.
I would like to ask this panel--not for response today, but
for subsequent follow-up--the same question that I asked the
commissioners of the NRC. What are the kinds of questions, what
are the data files, that this committee should be monitoring on
an ongoing basis in order to exercise more effective oversight
of the macro policy issues affecting the industry, the public
safety, other public interests, and the NRC? I would be
interested in your response to that question.
I asked a series of questions in my opening statement, the
third of which was, is the current decline of our nuclear
industry reversible? And I was concerned about an article that
appeared in the January 27, 1999 Christian Science Monitor
about the state of the nuclear industry in Europe, which has
been much more committed to nuclear generally than we have. The
article primarily focused on Germany, where ``the German
government's decision to phaseout nuclear power generation, to
halt reprocessing of spent fuel, is causing a domestic and
international storm for the new Chancellor.'' It goes on to
point out that in Sweden there has been a referendum which
states that the country should be nuclear-free by 2010, and
that the government has announced that it will begin the close-
down of the first of its 12 reactors. Switzerland has announced
that it will draw up plans to phaseout its four plants. England
has taken steps to reduce its nuclear plans for the future. And
even France, which is the most advanced country, has indicated
that it was pledging more investments in alternative energy
development.
Are we running against a tide of resistance to nuclear that
is irreversible, and therefore we ought to be making our plans
in the context of the termination of an industry rather than
extension or expansion of an industry?
Mr. Colvin. Senator, I think the clear answer to that is
no. In the United States over this last 2-year period we have
seen what I would characterize as a ``rediscovery'' of the
benefits of nuclear energy. We have seen, as we transition to a
competitive marketplace and we look at protecting the
environment both from the carbon dioxide or CO2
area, the Kyoto Protocol issues, but more importantly from the
clean air issues in maintaining clean air compliance in sulphur
dioxides, nitrous oxides, ozone, particulate matter, and other
emittants to the environment, that nuclear power has tremendous
capability that has yet been untapped and unrealized.
Our policies in the United States, from the environmental
perspective, do not credit non-emitting technologies, be they
nuclear, hydro, or other types of renewables, from an economic
standpoint. As a Nation we need to level this playing field to
ensure that we can move forward with the appropriate
technologies and credit them accordingly.
It is interesting from the international perspective that
while they have had the primary growth and movement forward,
they are just now beginning to face some of the issues that we
have already addressed, especially in this transition to
competition.
The last point I would make is that it is very easy,
politically, to say that you're going to shut down 40 percent
of your electricity system and do so in a very short time.
Nuclear power can be the lowest-cost production. As we've seen
in Sweden and other countries, it is very difficult to create
an alternative energy that is competitive, cost-effective, and
still meets other issues, such as the environmental and clean
air concerns.
Mr. Lochbaum. I guess from our standpoint, there has been
some talk today and in the past about the intangible values of
nuclear power in terms of global warming and other aspects. We
would look at the value that the industry itself places on
nuclear power. Two plants traded hands last year, and the sale
prices were less than 10 percent of the book value of these
plants: the Pilgrim Plant and Three Mile Island Unit 1. That's
on an open market. That's what the nuclear industry values
these plants at. I think that's a very good indicator; money
talks. I think that sends a very good message as to the value
of nuclear power.
Senator Graham. Any other comments?
To me, this article--and other developments--raise the
question of sustained public acceptability of this industry. I
have indicated in my earlier comments, as the chairman stated,
that I think nuclear has a very important role to play for a
variety of our national interests. But I am frankly concerned
as to whether the general public shares that feeling and will
provide a sufficient amount of sustained support that will
create an environment in which those who have to make some very
significant financial investment decisions for their firms will
be willing to do so, and therefore reverse this trend of
declining nuclear as a percentage of our electric generation.
Mr. Colvin. Senator Graham, I think it is important to
realize that the public in general, over many years of public
opinion polls, supports nuclear energy and the continued use of
it in the United States. The polls typically indicate about
two-thirds of the general public is in support.
We recently ran some polls of college-educated voting
adults, those that participate in the public policy process.
And again, 65 percent of those support the use of nuclear
energy. In fact, when asked what would be the likely source of
fuel for energy and electricity in the year 2015, the answer
was overwhelmingly nuclear energy over solar or other types of
energy, from that body.
More importantly, however, we see that there is a
perception gap between what those individuals believe
personally and what they believe their peers, neighbors, and
others believe. And as a result we have undertaken, as an
industry, a major activity to try to provide the information to
these people to make the reasonable decisions, and I believe
that the public, when called upon to make a decision over
siting of a new power plant, be it of any type, will in fact
consider these issues and look at the various aspects of these
issues thoughtfully and come to the correct decision.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I'm afraid I'm going to have
to leave. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Graham.
I just have one, or maybe two, final questions, because
we're going to try to adhere to our schedule.
Mr. Lochbaum, at the November meeting of the NRC
stakeholders you compared the NRC's reaction to our Senate
hearings as ``a bad plant,'' one who reacts to an announced
inspection as running around, developing action plans to
address all the problems that they have been ignoring before,
and set up ``a good plant'' which brags about the results they
have seen from effective programs. Your analogy has not gone
unnoticed here by this subcommittee, but I would like to ask
you--you have been critical in the past, stating that the NRC
has ignored some of what you consider to be the real safety
concerns, while they pursue enforcement actions for minor
violations.
Do you think that the changes that have been taking place
at NRC have addressed these concerns that you have expressed in
the past?
Mr. Lochbaum. The new oversight program has more indicators
which should allow earlier detection of problems. But our
concern is, again, there were indications in the past that
there were problems at the Millstone, Salem, and other plants,
and these indicators were not responded to by the NRC. So we
are not concerned that there was a lack of indicators; we are
concerned that there was a lack of response. We are not sure
that the new plan addresses the lack of response issues.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Any other comments that anyone would like to make,
particularly referencing where we're going from here and what
you've observed in the past and your level of comfort and
satisfaction?
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. All right. We will wind up with Chairman
Jackson.
Let me say before you give your final remarks, we hope you
don't retreat to the log cabin that was referred to by Senator
Graham----
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe [continuing]. That you stay and remain
available, and perhaps return here after this service of duty
as a witness, so that we can continue to use your expertise.
Ms. Jackson. I would be pleased to do so. Since where I'm
going will require lots of energy, I have a vested interest in
ensuring that it exists.
Let me just say the following. What I have observed in the
time that I have been at the NRC is this. Obviously, if there
are longstanding neuralgias, whether they come from the side of
Mr. Lochbaum who feels that NRC has not implemented the program
that it has had the way it should--meaning, enforcing its
safety regulations--or it comes from the side of some of the
other witnesses, such as Mr. Colvin, who has indicated the
feeling that NRC has been overly draconian in how it has done
things, or as Ms. Jones says, that it just hasn't been clear
about what its standards are, the point of the matter is that
the NRC has begun to change. I think the kind of oversight that
this committee has provided has been very helpful in that. But
in point of fact, the kinds of changes that we're talking about
are not going to happen overnight, so the kinds of metrics that
you and Senator Graham have asked this group to provide that
would be good to look at the NRC in the large, I think, is a
good thing.
But just as it will take time to fully implement what has
been set in motion, these things didn't just start 6 months
ago. We would not have been able to achieve just what we've
achieved up to this point if the seeds had not been sown some
years ago.
But what I think this committee has done is, it has caused
the NRC to accelerate and to refocus where it needs to go, and
we thank you for that.
I think the real point now is for all of us to move forward
in good faith and try to stay on the path upon which we have
embarked, and I would be happy to come back at any time.
Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Well, normally I would like to come down
and thank you individually after such a hearing, but we're on a
very tight schedule right now so I'll just thank you from here,
and hope that you will recall what we're asking you for on
September 23, and we look forward to seeing you. We will be
notifying you of that meeting shortly.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,
to reconvene at the call of the chair.]
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Statement of Hon. Pete V. Domenici, U.S. Senator from the
State of New Mexico
I thank the chairman for his leadership in this committee and fully
support him in his efforts to facilitate change at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. I also thank him for allowing me to offer a
statement for the record at this time.
I congratulate Chairman Jackson on her new position. She has
accomplished much during her tenure as Chairman of the NRC, and she
deserves credit for her diligence and hard work as Chairman of the
Commission.
Several factors converge that spur me to put considerable effort
into creating an efficient and effective regulatory environment for
nuclear energy production. The threat of global warming and the
simultaneous push for deregulation require a concentrated effort on the
part of policy makers, scientists, and regulators to formulate good
solutions. One thing is certain, our energy mix will change in the very
near future. It is up to us to decide whether that change contributes
to the general welfare, health, and safety of the public as a whole.
This is, however, more than a matter of health and safety. U.S.
energy policy is a matter of national security. And I am talking about
both narrow and broad definitions of the term ``national security.''
With each step made toward deregulation, the anticipated rush to the
lowest cost, least capital-intensive energy source becomes more
tangible.
While I am a great believer in the regulatory wisdom of the
invisible hand, the future energy resources available to citizens of
this country should not necessarily be left solely to calculations
based on the principles of supply and demand today. I think everyone
would agree that we need to be careful to ensure sufficient energy
resources remain available for future generations. Moreover, the
choices we make today will have long-standing effects on the
environment our children inherit.
While there is much talk in the Administration and among
environmental groups about ``global warming'' and ``greenhouse gases,''
so far there has been little discussion about the merits of nuclear
energy in preserving clean air. I intend to force this into the debate.
At some point, persons serious about achieving the dual, and seemingly
contradictory, objectives of meeting increasing energy needs and not
emitting potentially harmful gases into the atmosphere will reach the
following conclusion: nuclear energy provides the only option of a
major base-load production capability that does not degrade air
quality.
Chairman Inhofe and members of this committee understand that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's actions directly effect the nuclear
industry's future prospects. In a deregulated environment, all sources
of energy will require increased attention to cost. At present, the
cost factor for nuclear energy is severely and adversely impacted by
the regulatory environment. Ensuring that nuclear energy remains
competitive as an energy source in a deregulated environment requires
focused attention on removing excessive, costly regulatory burdens.
I and other Senators have been pushing hard for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to move toward a risk-informed, performance-based
approach. Although it may seem counterintuitive for those who fear
nuclear-anything, streamlining regulatory processes and easing the
burdens faced by the nuclear industry will contribute to greater
safety. Under current circumstances nuclear power plant licensees are
forced to allocate resources in attending to aspects of plant operation
that present little or no safety risk. This heightens the concern that
important and risk-significant issues are not given appropriate
attention.
For example, the NRC must devise efficient and cost-effective
procedures for license renewal. Currently, 40 percent of our nuclear
plant licenses expire before 2015. Nuclear plants owners that will
require relicensing in the very near future are waiting to see how
quickly existing applications are handled before submitting their
applications. I understand that the Calvert Cliffs license renewal
process should be done by May, a quick turnaround compared to others. I
also know that there is still significant fat in even a 25-month
license renewal process. The NRC must continue to be aggressive in
trimming excess processes that have no bearing on risk to public health
or safe operation of nuclear power plants.
Ensuring that sufficient decommissioning funds are available upon
closure of nuclear power plants represents another critical issue. The
current regulatory framework and tax structure for decommissioning is a
concern confronting the nuclear industry, regardless of the regulatory
environment. In the past, the rate-making process had little or no
relationship to fee collection. Moreover, states' desire to keep energy
prices low kept these decommissioning fees artificially low. As a
result, the nuclear industry faces excessive uncovered financial
liabilities. Providing an assurance for meeting decommissioning
obligations is not only significant to the nuclear industry. After a
plant is shut down, the sole purpose of the decommissioning fund is to
provide the means for adequate cleanup.
A related issue is the existing inequity in tax treatment of the
decommissioning funds. These funds are not an asset and should not be
taxed as such. As is the case of surface mining operations or solid-
waste disposal, these funds represent a ``cost of service'' to ensure
future cleanup and safeguard public health and safety.
These are just two examples of many issues that require our
attention. I have several other concerns related to the nuclear
regulatory environment, and I will continue to pursue rigorous
oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's drive to achieve risk-
based regulation. I am also currently working on a series of
legislative measures to address my concerns--some of which concern the
NRC directly and others focused on the role of nuclear energy in
promoting low-impact energy sources.
Once again, I fully support the work of this committee and commend
the chairman for continuing to pursue regulatory change at the NRC. I
look forward to working with the members of this committee and others
to ensure our future energy security.
______
Statement of Shirley Jackson, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the Commission is
pleased to present to you the ongoing efforts of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to increase our effectiveness in nuclear safety
regulation.
continuous improvement through change
Overview
During our last hearing before this subcommittee, on July 30, 1998,
I described a broad range of proposed improvements in our regulatory
programs, with particular emphasis on the NRC oversight of power
reactor licensees. Our appearance before this subcommittee played an
important role in accelerating changes already underway at the NRC. On
August 7, on behalf of the Commission, I issued a Tasking Memorandum to
the NRC staff that established an aggressive agenda, including both
short-term progress and longer term strategies. The overall goal of
these reforms has been to maintain safety while reducing unnecessary
regulatory burden, streamlining our regulatory processes, and enhancing
our public credibility.
Significant Accomplishments
The Commission believes we have made substantial progress in this
6-month period, characterized by:
Developing a comprehensive revision to the NRC reactor
assessment and inspection programs;
Establishing and adhering to an aggressive schedule for
processing the Calvert Cliffs and Oconee license renewal applications;
Issuing the Final Design Approval for the Westinghouse
AP600 reactor design;
Issuing guidance for streamlining NRC adjudicatory
proceedings;
Initiating and completing a rulemaking to establish
informal legislative-style hearing procedures in license transfer
cases;
Achieving established milestones on the Three Mile Island
license transfer application;
Enhancing the timeliness of our reviews for improved
Standard Technical Specifications reactor license amendments;
Issuing Safety Evaluation Reports allowing risk-informed
graded quality assurance, in-service testing, and in-service inspection
at certain licensee facilities;
Facilitating safe and small, but cost-beneficial, power
up-rates at reactor facilities resulting in a net power up-rate, since
the beginning of the up-rate program, of 2300 megawatts electric across
the spectrum of all our licensees--the equivalent of two new large
reactors coming online;
Reducing unnecessary NRC and licensee burden associated
with low-level enforcement issues, while retaining those features
essential to the oversight of licensee performance;
Approving the issuance of proposed regulations for medical
use and high-level waste disposal that adopt a risk-informed,
performance-based approach;
Determining, in a timely fashion, that the proposed
privatization of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation met regulatory
requirements;
Achieving established milestones for reviews of several
dual-purpose spent fuel cask designs, including issuing a final
Certificate of Compliance for one design, and a draft Safety Evaluation
Report and draft Certificate of Compliance for another;
Realigning the three major NRC program offices and
eliminating the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
(AEOD), reducing the number of NRC managers, improving organizational
efficiency, and reducing our overall staffing and resource
requirements; and
Achieving Year 2000 readiness in NRC information systems.
The Commission is committed to completing and institutionalizing
these and other changes in a manner that will ensure long-range NRC
effectiveness. In part, we are ensuring this continuity through key
rulemakings and Commission policy decisions that will guide future
actions. In the larger sense, we are altering the culture of the NRC
and ensuring long-term stability by incorporating these changes into
our planning framework, which is built around our 5-year Strategic
Plan, our annual budgets and Performance Plans, and our dynamic
Planning, Budgeting, and Performance Management (PBPM) process (which
requires outcomes-focused operating plans for each program area).
organizational and planning initiatives
Realignments to Increase Effectiveness and Efficiency
As part of our efforts to be more effective and efficient and to
reduce supervisory overhead, the Commission is realigning the three
major NRC program offices.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) is reducing
from seven divisions to five, resulting in a net reduction of 15
managerial and supervisory positions. This realignment establishes
reporting lines that are consistent with major NRR program functions:
inspection, performance assessment, license renewal, and licensing.
The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) is going
from twelve branches to seven, eliminating 14 supervisory positions.
The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
(NMSS), despite growing program requirements, is eliminating 10
supervisory positions.
The Commission also has eliminated the NRC Office for
Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD), transferring its
functions to other agency offices. These functions (event assessment,
incident response, incident investigation, technical training, the
review of generic requirements, and backfit program oversight) are
being integrated with similar work in other NRC offices. The AEOD
realignment reduces overhead by approximately 10 FTE, and we expect
these synergies to improve effectiveness.
Other headquarters and regional offices will transition to new
organizational structures by the end of the fiscal year. In total,
these realignments will eliminate 88 managerial and supervisory
positions.
The Commission has made notable progress in improving the NRC
staff-to-manager ratio. When this effort was initiated in September
1993, the NRC had slightly over 700 managers and supervisors. That
number has declined steadily, and the realignments described above will
reduce it to 330 by the end of fiscal year 1999. Based on the NRC
staffing levels in the President's fiscal year 1999 budget, we will
achieve the stated Commission goal of an 8:1 staff-to-manager ratio.
We also have decreased the overall number of NRC employees,
expressed in terms of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff years, from 2985
in fiscal year 1998 to 2896 in fiscal year 1999. Through the NRC use of
buyouts, early retirements, and attrition, we project that actual
staffing levels will continue to decrease to about 2835 by the end of
this fiscal year. This pace of controlled staff reductions will allow
us to achieve fiscal year 1999 and 2000 staffing level targets without
compromising critical mission requirements. The NRC fiscal year 2000
budget request of $471.4 million and 2810 FTE, recently submitted to
Congress, will provide the necessary resources to continue the timely
implementation of the important regulatory changes discussed in this
testimony, while continuing to ensure the fulfillment of our public
health and safety mission. Based on the operational and regulatory
program efficiencies achieved and anticipated, our fiscal year 2000
budget reduces the NRC staff by 175 FTE compared with fiscal year 1998.
We expect that, as we make our regulatory program more risk-
informed and performance-based, we also will have opportunities to
continue improving our overall operational efficiency and effectiveness
through Planning, Budgeting, and Performance Management. There are,
however, ``up front'' investments required to realign our regulatory
approach and to put into place the supporting infrastructure that will
yield future savings. The appropriateness of further reductions will be
evaluated in terms of both meeting our public health and safety mission
and responding to the needs of the regulated community.
International Program Comparisons
At the July 1998 hearing, a Tim D. Martin & Associates (TDMA)
report was introduced that compared ``regulatory personnel loading per
unit of nuclear generation'' in the U.S. and other countries. The
report implied that NRC had proportionally far more regulatory
personnel than the other countries analyzed.
In response, we conducted a detailed review with our counterpart
regulatory agencies in France, Japan, and the U.K. The results, which
will be provided to the Congress as part of the final report,
demonstrate that the nature and scope of specific regulatory programs
in various countries differ substantially. Many U.S. programs, such as
license renewal and operational experience evaluation, are not
conducted in a substantive or formal way by other countries. Other
programs, such as inspection, research, and high-level waste
management, differ substantially in approach or infrastructure.
Functions which, in the U.S., are performed under the umbrella of
nuclear reactor regulation, in other countries reside in research or
technical support organizations whose work may be given direction by
the regulatory body. To be valid, any country-to-country comparison
would have to take these factors into account.
Moreover, infrastructure differences--such as the degree of
standardization of reactor design, the placement of licensees in the
public or private sector, or the number of licensees--generally are
outside of NRC control, but account for substantial variations in
resource levels. Differences in the NRC regulatory approach, while more
within our control, are shaped largely by expectations from the
Congress and the public. This includes such considerations as the
degree of independent verification required for licensee activities and
the degree of public participation in regulatory activities.
Finally, each of the four countries has implemented or is
considering major reorganizations and program reassessments. While each
country can gain insights about the regulatory approaches used by
others, the differences in industry and regulatory infrastructure,
funding mechanisms, and stakeholder interests must be considered before
drawing conclusions from broad comparisons. When these differences are
considered, the apparent disparities in resource levels per unit of
nuclear generation are diminished significantly.
Planning, Budgeting and Performance Management
As part of our efforts to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency
of agency operations, the NRC has implemented the Planning, Budgeting
and Performance Management (PBPM) process. In my testimony presented in
March 1997 to the House Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy
and Power, I reported that we had just initiated this system, and that
it was designed (1) to establish a sensible, reliable process for
defining agency goals; (2) to develop cost-effective strategies for
achieving those goals; (3) to determine the resources needed to
implement this strategic direction; and (4) to measure and to assess
our own progress and overall performance. Since that time, we have
expanded our use of this process as the dynamic core of our planning
framework, a framework that will ensure the longevity and endurance of
current regulatory reforms.
The fiscal year 1997-2002 Strategic Plan and fiscal year 1999
Performance Plan were the initial PBPM efforts, and both documents
received high marks from the Congress, the Office of Management and
Budget, and the General Accounting Office. The fiscal year 2000 PBPM
process integrates the NRC Strategic Plan and Performance Plan more
fully with our budget request. A recent Arthur Andersen evaluation,
currently under NRC staff review, found that the NRC PBPM process is
sound, and that it has improved our integrated planning efforts,
consistent with the Government Performance and Results Act. In
addition, the PBPM framework provides a means of ensuring the
accountability of agency managers. We are applying the PBPM process in
our three major program offices in planning our work and developing the
budget for fiscal year 2001. The continuing work of Arthur Andersen is
helping us to develop outcomes-based measures as ``filters'' to
evaluate, prioritize, and sunset activities. In the feedback process,
which PBPM requires, these measures also comprise the actual metrics
for gauging performance.
Institutionalizing Change
We are moving the NRC aggressively toward being a more risk-
informed and more performance-based organization. These efforts will
strengthen the linkage between our performance goals, strategies, and
resource requirements in the fiscal year 2001 budget. We are refining
our existing Strategic Plan and Performance Plan to reflect the
regulatory reforms underway. This approach will ensure that current
changes will be institutionalized in a manner that ensures long-term
organizational effectiveness.
shifting the regulatory paradigm
Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulation
The Commission is overhauling the NRC regulatory approach to become
more risk-informed and performance-based; to enhance safety focus; to
improve effectiveness, efficiency, predictability, and scrutability;
and to eliminate unnecessary regulatory burden in both the reactor and
materials arenas. The accomplishments of the past 6 months demonstrate
both an acceleration of existing efforts and the launching of new
initiatives. We have increased stakeholder involvement, refined NRC
internal practices, completed NRC pilot programs, and laid the
foundation for risk-informing NRC reactor regulations over the longer
term.
Increased Stakeholder Involvement: The Commission has increased
substantially the involvement of the nuclear power industry, public
interest groups, States, and other stakeholders through public
meetings, extended workshops, and the solicitation of public comments
through the Federal Register and the Internet. Stakeholder input
customarily has played an important part in the formulation of NRC
policies--for example, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) policy
statement and the formulation and initial use of NRC guidance on risk-
informed regulation. More recently, stakeholder interactions have
become even more integral to the development of options for Commission
consideration on risk-informed revisions to reactor regulations and
proposed improvements to NRC reactor oversight processes. The
Commission believes that this increased interaction will be of
substantial benefit, by ensuring a mutual understanding of technical
and safety issues, stimulating a healthy dialog among all participants,
promoting wider acceptance of our programs, and highlighting areas for
additional research.
Changes to NRC Licensing Action Review Practices: As part of our
commitment to risk-informed regulation, we have changed internal NRC
operating practices. This has included providing additional guidance,
training, and management attention to ensure that risk-informed
licensing actions are given the appropriate priority. The completion of
numerous plant-specific risk-informed licensing reviews has helped to
sharpen the focus on safety while reducing reduce unnecessary
regulatory burden. Two examples are:
Extending allowed outage times for some systems without
adverse effects on plant risk when certain precautions are taken, and
Reducing in-plant inspection requirements for reactor
vessel welds by as much as fifty percent.
In practical terms, these changes substantially reduce occupational
radiation exposure, plant operational costs, and unnecessary shutdowns
without adversely affecting public safety.
Progress on Pilot Programs: Risk-informed pilot programs have been
completed through the NRC review of prototypical license amendment
applications. We have approved pilot applications in three areas: (1)
graded quality assurance, (2) in-service testing of pumps and valves,
and (3) in-service inspection of important reactor plant piping. In
each of these applications, our consideration of risk information
provided a strong basis for a graded treatment of the regulated
activities at certain licensee facilities, which allows both NRC and
licensees to focus resources on equipment and activities with the
greatest risk significance.
In another pilot application, the NRC reviewed certain requirements
for post-accident hydrogen monitoring. By allowing more flexibility for
the initiation of hydrogen concentration monitoring during an accident,
reactor operator attention can be focused on more risk-significant
matters.
These pilots have demonstrated that the implementation of the risk-
informed programs can be accomplished without a significant change in
risk, and that an acceptable level of quality and safety will be
maintained. Lessons learned from the pilots will be used to improve
future applications and NRC reviews.
Longer-Term Initiatives: The Commission is considering a proposal
to redefine, in a broad-based manner, plant equipment needing special
treatment in such areas as quality assurance, environmental
qualification, operational controls, and engineering code requirements.
The Commission also is considering a recommendation to ``risk-inform''
the complete body of power reactor regulations. In addition, we are
facilitating the adoption of a risk-informed regulatory approach by
making infrastructure changes through staffing and training, additional
revisions to guidance documents, and the development of improved PRA
methods.
License Renewal
Establishing a stable, predictable, and timely license renewal
process is a top NRC priority. The Commission has issued a policy
statement laying out its expectations for a focused review of license
renewal applications, built upon our license renewal regulations. To
date, all milestones for the license renewal reviews have been met. I
have charged the NRC Executive Council with overseeing the license
renewal reviews to ensure adequate resources are applied and to raise
promptly any issues that require Commission review. Using case-specific
orders, the Commission has established an aggressive adjudicatory
schedule for reviewing the Calvert Cliffs and Oconee applications,
aimed at completing the license renewal process in 30-36 months. We
also have prepared procedures to control the reviews and to resolve
generic renewal issues. NRC management meets monthly with the
applicants to monitor progress and the resources expended, and to
resolve renewal issues.
The initial safety evaluation report and draft environmental impact
statement for the Calvert Cliffs application should be completed on
schedule next month. Last December, the Commission denied an appeal
from the petitioner on the Calvert Cliffs application and affirmed the
Licensing Board denial of a request for hearing. The petitioner has
sought judicial review. In the absence of a hearing, the NRC
anticipates completing its review and a Commission decision on the
Calvert Cliffs renewal application by May 2000, 25 months after it was
submitted.
Regarding the Oconee application, the licensee responses to NRC
requests for additional information are scheduled to be completed next
month. Last December, the Licensing Board denied a request for hearing
from the petitioner on the Oconee renewal application. The petitioner
has appealed this ruling to the Commission. The NRC anticipates
completing its review and a Commission decision on the Oconee renewal
application no later than December 2000.
We also understand that we will receive our next license renewal
application in December 1999 from Entergy for their Arkansas Nuclear
One plants. Other applications may follow quickly, and we have asked
for sufficient resources in our fiscal year 2000 budget to handle the
anticipated new applications. Lessons learned from the initial reviews
will help to streamline later reviews even further.
License Transfers and Adjudicatory Processes
The Commission has issued a final rule to establish an informal
streamlined hearing process for license transfers. Under this newly
adopted rule (Subpart M to 10 CFR Part 2), the Commission expects to
complete informal hearings and issue final decisions on most license
transfer applications within about 6-8 months of when the application
is filed.
The NRC has completed final Standard Review Plans (SRPs) for
antitrust and financial qualifications reviews, and a draft SRP for
foreign ownership issues. SRPs document the process and criteria to be
used by the NRC staff in performing its reviews, which improves the
focus, effectiveness, predictability, timeliness, and efficiency of the
process. During the coming months, the NRC expects to complete timely
reviews of license transfer requests from Three Mile Island Unit 1 and
the Pilgrim station.
The Commission currently is considering options for a more
comprehensive streamlining of its adjudicatory processes. Concurrently,
the Commission has been monitoring closely its adjudicatory tribunals
to ensure appropriate adherence to the substantive and schedular
provisions of the Commission Rules of Practice.
Other Licensing-Related Issues
Enhancements to License Amendment Review Processes: In July 1998,
the NRC participated in an American Nuclear Society licensing workshop
to identify opportunities for improving licensing processes both for
the NRC and for licensees. The NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) established a joint task force to pursue process improvements
based on recommendations developed at the workshop. In response to the
workshop and self-assessments, the NRC is working to improve the
timeliness of licensing reviews. Significant progress was made in these
areas during the first quarter of fiscal year 1999, as measured by
reductions both in the inventory of licensing actions and in the
average age of actions in the inventory.
Improvements to the 10 CFR 50.59 Change Process: In October 1998,
the Commission published for public comment proposed revisions to 10
CFR 50.59. Under this regulation, licensees are allowed to make certain
changes to their facilities without prior NRC approval. The revisions
to the rule are intended to clarify NRC requirements and to allow
changes that will have minimal impact on the facility licensing basis.
These revisions will both improve the effectiveness of this regulatory
process and reduce unnecessary NRC and licensee burden. The NRC staff
currently is analyzing the public comments and expects to complete a
final rule package for Commission review and approval within a few
months.
FSAR Guidance: Another NRC initiative is the development of
guidance on updating final safety analysis reports (FSARs). The updated
FSAR is used in routine safety analyses performed by the NRC, the
licensee, and other interested parties. NEI, with significant input
from the NRC, has developed a guidance document, outlining a voluntary
process for removing excess detail from the FSAR, thereby simplifying
both the FSAR and the updating process. We currently are considering a
proposed regulatory guide that endorses this NEI document. That
proposal should go out for public comment in the near future.
Improved Standard Technical Specifications: The NRC has improved
the timeliness of reviews for converting power reactor licenses to
improved standard technical specifications. This conversion improves
consistency in interpreting and applying these requirements. In total,
licensees for approximately 89 reactors have decided to convert to the
new technical specifications, which licensees have projected will save
from $150,000 to over $1M annually per site. To date, applications to
convert have been received from 57 units, of which 43 units have been
given approval, 17 since July 1998. We expect to issue approvals for an
additional 10 units during the remainder of fiscal year 1999, which
will eliminate the large backlog of applications under review over the
last 2 years.
Refining the Use of Generic Communications: In August 1998, the NRC
staff met with stakeholders to ensure an understanding of concerns
related to NRC generic communications. Based on the results of that
meeting, we are clarifying the definition and purpose of certain types
of generic communications, documenting the generic communication
process, and resolving related compliance backfit issues. As part of
this effort, we are reviewing proposed generic letters earlier, and at
a higher management level, and engaging stakeholders earlier in the
process.
Improving the RAI Process: We have improved discipline in the
process for requesting additional information (or RAIs) from licensees
for license amendments and other NRC reviews. We have revised internal
NRC guidance, trained appropriate NRC staff, held NRC staff and
management accountable for the timeliness and quality of reviews, and
developed an outline for general distribution that details the
qualities looked for in licensee submittals. These efforts should help
to reduce the need for, and the burden associated with, RAIs.
Reactor Inspection, Performance Assessment, and Enforcement
As previously stated, the Commission is taking a more risk-informed
and performance-based approach in overseeing nuclear reactors. Since
the July 1998 hearing, we have made considerable progress in
identifying necessary changes to the inspection, assessment, and
enforcement processes to improve their objectivity; to make them more
understandable, predictable, and risk-informed; and to focus on aspects
of performance that have the greatest impact on safe plant operation.
These efforts have been guided, in part, by four performance goals used
as ``filters'' to evaluate, prioritize, and sunset activities. Each
activity is examined to see how it: (1) supports the NRC safety
mission; (2) eliminates unnecessary NRC and licensee burden; (3)
increases public confidence; and (4) increases NRC internal
effectiveness and efficiency.
Assessment and Inspection Program Changes: The NRC staff has
proposed to the Commission a new assessment framework, which builds
upon the cornerstones of licensee performance that must be monitored to
ensure that nuclear power reactor operations do not pose unacceptable
risks to the public. The cornerstones support the NRC mission by
ensuring that: (1) accident-initiating events are reduced; (2) accident
mitigation systems are available, reliable, and capable of performing
their intended functions; (3) barriers are sufficient to limit the
release of radioactivity; (4) adequate emergency preparedness functions
are maintained; (5) licensees have implemented adequate programs to
protect the public and workers from radiation; and (6) security
measures are in place to protect against sabotage. As part of the
assessment framework, the NRC staff has identified performance
indicators, performance indicator thresholds, and risk-informed
inspections that would supplement and verify the validity of the
performance indicator data.
This assessment framework provides a natural basis for a risk-
informed baseline inspection program--a program that identifies the
minimum level of inspection required, regardless of licensee
performance, to ensure adequate NRC oversight and assessment of
licensee performance. Developed using a risk-informed approach, the
proposed baseline inspection program includes a comprehensive list of
inspectable areas within each cornerstone of the assessment framework.
As currently proposed, the assessment process will integrate the
performance indicators with the results of the risk-informed baseline
inspections. This integration will allow the NRC to make objective
conclusions regarding licensee safety performance, to communicate these
results effectively to the licensees and to the public. Even more
significantly, the process includes specific thresholds--tied to the
cornerstones of safety--that will trigger commensurate licensee and/or
NRC action if they are exceeded. The process will provide both
continual and periodic assessment of licensee performance.
We have developed these new processes through a series of
stakeholder meetings with extensive and constructive dialog. The
overall proposal was forwarded to the Commission on January 11, 1999,
and released for public comment the next day. On January 20, the
Commission met with the NRC staff and stakeholders to discuss these
proposals, which we are reviewing currently.
Although the exact form of the final process is still under
development, these broad-scale changes to reactor oversight clearly
will result in several direct benefits:
Increased objectivity by relying on performance
indicators, where possible, and the risk-informed baseline inspection
program, to provide the basis for determining performance, and from
using risk-informed thresholds to determine expected regulatory and
licensee response;
Enhanced scrutability by relating inspection information
and performance indicators more clearly to their impact on overall
safety performance;
Elimination of many current redundancies and
inefficiencies by using a single, integrated assessment process;
More direct consideration of risk insights in the new
risk-informed baseline inspection program, as well as in the
performance indicator thresholds;
Greater assurance of safety performance so that
appropriate licensee and NRC actions can be taken before performance
degrades unacceptably;
Reduction in unnecessary inspection and enforcement
burden; and
Enhanced public understanding of NRC assessments of
licensee performance, further strengthened through annual local public
meetings.
We have made considerable progress in reshaping these NRC
regulatory programs. As we transition our programs, we will make major
process changes incrementally, to allow testing and adjustment during
piloting and implementation. Much work remains in bench-marking,
conducting pilots, developing procedures, and training the NRC staff on
the new processes. In addition, several key policy issues still must be
resolved, such as whether changes are needed in NRC responses to events
at licensee facilities.
Successful implementation will require continuing stakeholder
involvement, as well as a significant investment of NRC staff and
management resources. As currently proposed, the transition plan will
include a 6-month pilot at two sites in each NRC region, beginning this
June. We will measure pilot program results against the success
criteria and conduct a joint NRC-stakeholder workshop prior to full
implementation. Existing processes, such as plant performance reviews
and senior management meetings, will be replaced by the new risk-
informed oversight process. The Commission already has suspended the
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) process, pending
implementation of the new process. To verify that our objectives are
being met, we plan to evaluate the revised oversight process after
about 1 year of full implementation.
Enforcement Program Changes: In parallel with these improvements to
our assessment and inspection programs, the NRC has made several
changes to its enforcement program to reduce unnecessary NRC and
licensee burden. On July 27, 1998, we issued enforcement guidance to
clarify our existing Enforcement Policy. The changes ensure that: (1)
licensees are given appropriate credit for identifying and correcting
violations; (2) NRC and licensee resources are not expended on
violations that do not warrant formal citations; (3) written responses
to Notices of Violation are not required when necessary information is
already docketed elsewhere; and (4) cases involving multiple examples
of the same violation are treated consistently. The agency-wide
implementation of this guidance has resulted in a significant reduction
in the number of low-level (Severity Level IV) violations, particularly
in the number of violations requiring a written licensee response.
On January 22, 1999, the Commission approved a change to the
Enforcement Policy that will expand the use of non-cited violations.
Except in limited circumstances, individual Severity Level IV
violations now will not be cited, so long as they have been entered
into the licensee corrective action program. Accordingly, the NRC
inspection program will place more emphasis on assessing the
effectiveness of licensee corrective action programs. This is
consistent with the thrust of the risk-informed inspection process
described earlier.
In addition to these short-term enforcement program changes, the
Commission expects that the Enforcement Policy will be changed and
integrated with the risk-informed inspection and assessment processes.
These changes should include an expanded policy supplement with
violation examples that reflect more accurately the risk significance
of potential violations in each topical area.
Continuing Challenges
Although we have made substantial progress in redesigning our
regulatory programs, much work remains in making these programs more
effective and efficient. Our efforts are far from complete. In
addition, we recognize that new challenges surely will arise as we
revamp our programs and take nuclear regulation into the 21st Century.
These continuing and future challenges include:
We are working aggressively with the nuclear power
industry and other licensed nuclear facilities to ensure that their
safety and security will not be adversely affected by the Y2K problem;
We are examining the effectiveness and integrity of our
petition processes, through which members of the public seek NRC action
to ensure compliance with requirements and adequate protection of the
public health and safety;
We are reviewing carefully the NRC treatment of
allegations involving harassment and intimidation at the Millstone
nuclear power plants (including a specific review of certain Millstone
harassment and intimidation cases), which we expect to lead to broader-
based enhancements to NRC enforcement and investigations functions; and
We are revising our regulatory programs for radioactive
material to make them more risk-informed and performance-based, and to
ensure that the regulatory burden is commensurate with the health and
safety benefits of such regulations, including our medical use
regulations in 10 CFR Part 35 and our fuel cycle facility regulations
in 10 CFR Part 70.
Conclusion
Over the past few years, we have made substantial progress in
improving our regulatory programs, and we have accelerated that
progress in the past 6 months. As stated earlier, our interactions with
this subcommittee have contributed to this success, and we welcome your
continued constructive oversight. With sufficient resources, strong
leadership, and broad support, we plan to continue our efforts to
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the NRC by pursuing the
paths that already have been charted. The Commission fully expects that
new areas will continue to arise, requiring attention and additional
effort. As with current areas of reform, we will continue to ensure
stakeholder involvement in the change process. We believe that we have
laid the groundwork not only for significant short-term adjustments,
but for enduring improvements to the NRC regulatory paradigm,
institutionalized and stabilized through incorporation into our
performance-based planning process.
Thank you for your attention and consideration. We will be happy to
answer any questions from the subcommittee.
Responses of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Questions from
Chairman Inhofe
Question 1. During the Hearing, Chairman Jackson discussed a long-
range plan for reforming the Agency. How does this plan relate to the
Tasking Memo? If they are different, please supply a copy of the long-
range plan. In addition, please explain the difference between the two
plans or the two goals.
Response. The NRC's long-range plan for reforming the Agency is
embodied in an integrated Planning, Budgeting, and Performance
Management (PBPM) process. This process, implemented with the FY 2000
budget cycle, sets the operational framework for the Agency to manage
its programs and operations. Key components are: the Strategic Plan,
the Performance Plan, the Budget and Operating Plans. We are updating
the Agency's planning documents to reflect the new directions, goals
and strategy for the Agency. The PBPM approach will ensure that current
changes will be institutionalized in a manner that ensures long-term
organizational effectiveness. Our latest draft Strategic Plan will be
shared with stakeholders, including Congress, for comment.
The August 7, 1998, Tasking Memorandum to the NRC staff established
an aggressive agenda for accelerating changes already underway at the
NRC, and making immediate additional, significant changes and
improvements in a number of key areas. The specific actions and
schedules in the tasking memorandum are incorporated into program
Operating Plans. The updated Strategic Plan and Performance Plan will
capture the higher level performance measures, goals and strategies
associated with these and other initiatives.
Question 2. Can you provide a list of those regulatory activities
that the NRC directly bills its licensees? How much of your fee income
is derived from each activity? What percent of your fee income is
derived from direct service fees?
Response. The NRC assesses two types of fees to its licensees: 10
CFR Part 170 fees for activities performed for a specific licensee or
applicant (based on Independent Offices Appropriation Act) and 10 CFR
Part 171 annual fees for the remainder of NRC's budget (based on the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990). Part 170 fees are assessed
for inspections and licensing activities, including pre-application
efforts and reviews of new license applications, renewal applications,
amendment requests, topical reports, standard plant designs, and
decommissioning plans. The annual fee recovers NRC's other regulatory
costs that are not recovered from Part 170 fees (e.g., research,
rulemaking, and incident response). The Part 170 fees collected in FY
1998 by the two main classes of licensees are:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Classes Licensing Inspection Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reactors.................................................... $28.2M $59.6M $87.8M
Materials................................................... $7.5M $4.3M $11.8M
Total..................................................... $35.7M $63.9M $99.6M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For FY 1998, of the total $459M collected in fees, $99.6M, or 22
percent was collected from Part 170 fees.
Question 2(a). The NEI witness, Mr. Colvin, stated that nearly 80%
of your fees are not directly tied to a particular service provided by
the NRC. Do you agree with that figure?
Response. No. The NRC mission to ensure the adequate protection of
the public health and safety recognizes that the NRC serves a broader
need than just providing a specific service to a licensee or applicant.
As stated in the response to the previous Question 2, approximately 20
percent of our budgeted costs are recovered through fees for licensing
and inspection activities performed by the NRC for specific licensees
and applicants (10 CFR Part 170 fees). However, this does not mean that
the remaining 80 percent does not benefit our licensees or the public
or is not necessary for the NRC to provide regulatory oversight. For
the NRC to carry out its mission, it must perform certain functions
that are not requested by specific licensees or applicants, but which
are, in fact, a service provided to categories or groups of licensees.
For example, we must perform rulemaking, safety research and generic
studies and maintain an incident response center. Such actions, either
directly or indirectly, are of benefit to certain groups of licensees.
The NRC does make an effort in assessing such fees to attribute these
costs to the groups of licensees receiving the generic benefits of
these regulatory activities. Also some costs, such as for licensing and
inspection services provided to Federal agencies and nonprofit
educational institutions, are recovered through annual fees because we
are precluded by law or policy from charging fees to those
organizations.
Question 2(b). Has the amount of general fees increased as a
percent of total fees charged to licensees over the past five years? If
so, would the NRC provide an analysis explaining the change?
Response. The percentage of fees collected through Part 171 annual
fees (general fees) to total fees has remained relatively constant over
the past 5 years. Over the past two years, the Commission has made
decisions which will result in an increase in Part 170 fee collections,
shifting costs away from annual fees. These decisions recognize that,
with few exceptions, agency work directly identifiable to a licensee
should be billed to that licensee. As a result of this change, the NRC
estimated Part 170 fee collection for FY 1999 will be approximately $10
million more than FY 1998. The Commission will be proposing rule
changes which would result in further increased collection of Part 170
fees.
Question 2(c). Do you agree with the industry's position that your
fees need to be more directly tied to services performed? Does your
current fee structure comply with the 1990 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act's requirement that fees be related to services
performed?
Response. We agree, in general, that an identifiable licensee or
applicant who receives agency services should be billed accordingly.
This objective is not always attainable for legal and policy reasons.
For example, current law precludes us from charging Federal agencies
Part 170 fees, and public comments have supported continuing to recover
costs for certain activities through Part 171 annual fees. As stated in
the response to the previous question 2(b), over the past two years,
the Commission has changed its policies so that more costs will be
recovered directly from specific licensees and applicants. However,
when NRC activities have a generic relationship to a group of
licensees, NRC sees nothing inequitable about apportioning the costs of
those activities to the appropriate group of licensees through Part 171
annual fees.
Our current fee structure complies with the provisions of the
Independent Offices Appropriation Act and the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990. The Inspector General has recently issued
an audit report that concluded that one area, Part 170 hourly rates,
needs to be reviewed to assure compliance with the full costs
provisions of OMB Circular A-25, ``User Charges.'' The CFO is
initiating a study by a multi-office team to review this matter.
Question 2(d). Doesn't it make sense, from both a safety and policy
point of view, that those licensees that are necessitating the most
regulatory action be assessed more fees?
Response. Yes. In general, licensees that require more licensing
and inspection attention will be assessed more fees under 10 CFR Part
170. In developing the annual fees by category, we also take into
consideration where the generic resources are being used and charge
those categories of licensees accordingly. Therefore, in both Part 170
and Part 171 fee assessments, the charges represent either a directly
identifiable benefit or a reasonable relationship to the NRC's cost of
providing the regulatory service to the licensee. However, to meet the
100 percent fee recovery requirement, the NRC's annual fees include
costs for activities that do not directly benefit licensees. These
activities are discussed in response to Chairman Inhofe's Question 3.
Question 2(e). Do you believe that your budget submissions as well
as your annual rule regarding fee schedules provide adequate
information for the industry and others to analyze, understand, and
critique those submissions?
Response. The budget submissions and our annual fee rules provide
sufficient information for our licensees and other interested parties
to analyze, understand and critique our submissions. Each year public
comments are solicited on an annual proposed fee rule which describes
the development of the proposed fees and outlines the Part 170 and Part
171 fee amounts. The final fee rule provides a response to those
comments. Each year when a proposed rule is issued, a copy with a
summary of the proposed changes is mailed to each licensee so that they
may quickly assess the impact of the rule. A copy of all working papers
providing backup data and other detailed information on the development
of the fees is made available for public review in the NRC public
document room. Additionally, the Agency responds to many inquires on
its fee policies and practices and periodically meets with individual
licensees to discuss particular issues.
Because the Commission has decided to rebaseline its fees in FY
1999, the Commission has directed the staff to ensure that the proposed
fee rule provides sufficient information for all its licensees to
analyze and understand. Rebaselining fees could result in significant
changes to the annual fees for many NRC licensees.
Question 3. You have agreed in previous hearings that certain
portions of your budget, such as the international programs, should not
be included in the user fees. Please submit to the subcommittee a list
of those programs, and their budgets, that do not directly benefit
licensees, for FY 1999 and FY 2000.
Response. The following chart lists programs and their budgets that
do not directly benefit licensees. These programs typically provide
either a significant indirect benefit to our licensees or are essential
for the NRC to effectively carry out its mission to protect public
health and safety and common defense and security. These estimates
include direct costs as well as the overhead and agency general and
administrative costs of providing these services. Estimates for direct
costs reflect resource allocations developed for the FY 1999 enacted
budget and for the FY 2000 President's Budget. Estimates for overhead
and administrative costs are based on hourly rates established by the
1998 fee rule and do not reflect changes that may result from the final
1999 fee rule.
Activities Proposed for Fee Exclusion
[Dollars in Millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 1999 Budget FY 2000 Budget
Activity Estimate Estimate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulation of Federal Agencies........ 3.0 3.0
Regulation of Nonprofit Educational 3.8 3.8
Institutions.........................
Regulation of Small Entities.......... 5.2 5.2
Regulatory Support to Agreement States 12.4 11.0
Site Decommissioning Management 5.7 7.4
Program..............................
Generic Decommissioning and 10.7 10.7
Reclamation Activities...............
International Activities.............. 4.2 5.0
Agreement State Oversight............. 5.5 5.3
Total............................... 50.5 51.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 4. At the hearing, Chairman Jackson indicated that the
license renewal application for the Calvert Cliffs Plant would be,
barring any glitches, completed in 25 months, well ahead of the
proposed 30-36 month schedule. Is the lack of intervention on the
Calvert Cliffs application primarily responsible for the reduction in
schedule? Are there improvements that can be made in the NRC review
process to further reduce the schedule?
Response. The Commission denied the only petition for intervention
in the Calvert Cliffs license renewal proceeding. Therefore, there will
not be an adjudicatory hearing in this proceeding. This is the
principal factor in the reduction in schedule to 25 months. There may
be additional opportunities to improve the NRC renewal schedule for
Calvert Cliffs and Oconee. After the NRC issues the renewal safety
evaluation report, the staff will meet with the licensees for Calvert
Cliffs and Oconee, Baltimore Gas and Electric (BGE) and Duke Energy,
respectively, to discuss the scope of safety issues that need to be
resolved and review and revise, as appropriate, the scope of the
license renewal reviews and schedule milestones. It should be noted
that the intervention petitioner has sought judicial review of the
Commission's decision to deny intervention. That issue is currently
before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The NRC is developing experience from the review of the first two
renewal applications, as well as the resolution of generic renewal
issues and technical reports, which will achieve further efficiencies
in the future.
Question 5. Aging of nuclear power plants is an ongoing process.
Many existing licensee programs as well as elements of NRC's regulatory
oversight focus on ensuring that aging is not detrimental to the safe
operation of the plants. In fact, the foundation for the license
renewal regulation is that continuation of current licensing basis
activities and regulatory oversight ensure the public health and safety
as plants move beyond 40 years of operation.
Given this principle, is the focus of the NRC review of a renewal
application on the aging that is not being managed under the current
license? Is the Calvert Cliffs review being conducted in this manner?
If it is not, can the process be made even more efficient without
impacting safety?
Response. The focus of the NRC's review of the renewal applications
is the adequacy of the aging management programs for specific passive
structures and components needed to ensure safe plant operation for the
period of extended operation. The renewal rule reflects a focused
review because those parts of the existing licensing basis related to
active components, system design, operating margins, emergency plans,
security and other matters that do not involve aging are excluded from
the scope of review under 10 CFR 54. Moreover, where a renewal
applicant proposes to rely on existing maintenance and surveillance
programs to manage aging effects for the structures and components
within the renewal review scope, the NRC's review effort is limited to
a determination of whether there is an aspect of aging that is not
being adequately managed. The staff is currently examining this aspect
of its reviews to determine whether changes to its review process are
appropriate.
The NRC is developing experience from the review of the first two
renewal applications, as well as the resolution of generic renewal
issues and technical reports, which will achieve further efficiencies
in the future. In particular, the NRC staff is developing a matrix of
the common aging management elements for each of the major existing
maintenance and surveillance programs. This effort is intended to
improve the review guidance for the NRC staff so that their efforts
will be focused even more than that provided by the 1995 amendment to
the license renewal rule such that further efficiencies can be
achieved.
Question 6. When will the Commission reach a decision regarding the
options that were presented to you by staff for risk-informing your
regulations and when do you believe you will complete the process of
risk-informing all of your regulations?
Response. The options were presented to the Commission in SECY-98-
300 for nuclear reactor regulations. The Office of the Secretary of the
Commission anticipates that a decision on these options will be
finalized within the next several weeks. These estimates range from
approximately 4 to 8 years depending on the option, or combination of
options, the Commission chooses.
Question 7. What do you believe the impact of risk-informing your
regulations will be on your budget submissions in the upcoming years?
Should Congress expect those submissions to reflect increases or
decreases once the process of risk-informing your regulations is
complete?
Response. The process of reviewing risk-informed reactor licensee
submittals (as allowed by current regulations) and the update of risk-
informed guidance documents is ongoing, and these activities are
already reflected in the current NRC budget.
With respect to the effort to modify reactor regulations, the
budget impact will vary as the project progresses. The NRC expects that
resource expenditures to risk-inform our regulations will be higher in
the first few years, with lower expenditures in subsequent years due to
the benefits of a more efficient process in the areas of licensing
reviews, inspection, and enforcement. These lower expenditures in later
years are expected to more than compensate for the initial, higher
expenditures.
The NRC staff has presented preliminary estimates of resource
expenditures in SECY-98-300 for risk-informing the NRC reactor
regulations. The impact on the budget over the upcoming years will be
dependent on the option, or combinations of options, that the
Commission decides on over the next several weeks. These decisions will
be integrated into the Planning, Budgeting, and Performance Management
Process which will identify the specific activities needed and the
resource allocations to deliver the improvements.
For materials regulations, it is anticipated that, as with risk-
informing reactor regulations, the resource expenditures for some
materials areas will initially be higher in the first few years, and
expenditures in the subsequent years may vary depending on the type of
licensed activity and the outcome of the risk assessments.
Question 8. In promulgating rules, what is the Commission's policy
on the timing and availability of implementation, inspection and
enforcement guidance? Is draft guidance available when a proposed rule
is noticed for comment, or is guidance developed after a rule has been
finalized?
Response. The Commission policy is that, when possible, the draft
guidance on implementation, inspection, and enforcement should be
available when the proposed rule is published. Some rules are
sufficiently simple or clear so that additional guidance on compliance
is not needed. When industry standards are cited in a rule, NRC-
specific guidance may not be necessary. In some instances guidance may
be developed after publication of the final rule. Industry may take the
initiative in developing guidance for implementing a rule and that
guidance may be endorsed by the NRC. In some instances, the effective
implementation date of the rule may be linked to the publication date
of the guidance document.
Question 9. The NRC paper (SECY-99-007) recommending changes to the
oversight process (assessment, inspection, and enforcement) is about
500 pages long. Is that much detail necessary to improve the clarity,
consistency, and objectivity of the process? Is the Commission
satisfied with the direction and progress on reforming the NRC's
oversight process?
Response. The level of detail provided in SECY-99-007 is necessary.
SECY-99-007 proposes a substantially revised process for overseeing the
performance of commercial operating reactors. In addition to describing
high level concepts related to the overall oversight framework and
approach, it describes specific proposed changes to the Agency's
inspection, assessment, and enforcement processes. SECY-99-007 serves
as the primary vehicle for making recommendations available to
stakeholders for review and comment. The level of detail included in
the Commission paper is necessary to provide an understanding of the
recommendations along with supporting rationale to enable respondents
to provide meaningful comments. The NRC also has prepared a condensed
summary of the proposed process. Having said this, the Commission did
direct the staff to ensure future papers associated with the new
oversight process are prepared in accordance with Vice President Gore's
``Plain English'' initiative.
Although the Commission is generally satisfied with the direction
taken by the staff in developing revisions to the reactor oversight
process, the Commission is continuing its review of the proposed
revisions and considering additional information provided by the NRC
staff in March 1999. While many significant challenges remain for the
NRC and the industry associated with completing process development and
successfully transitioning to full implementation, progress made to
date has been good and will support timely completion of this important
initiative.
Question 10(a). How are you ensuring that the principles embodied
in the revised oversight process result in a consistent approach to
assessment, inspection, and enforcement?
Response. The NRC will ensure that the oversight process
improvement initiative results in a consistent approach to assessment,
inspection, and enforcement by: (1) developing an overarching
hierarchical framework for the reactor oversight process along with
high level principles regarding process design, (2) developing the
inspection, assessment, and enforcement processes in accordance with
the framework and principles, (3) incorporating outcome-oriented
criteria for assessing performance, (4) ensuring the transparency and
scrutability of the process, and (5) routinely monitoring and
evaluating the NRC performance against performance measures. This
approach has been and will continue to be used by the NRC, working with
various stakeholders, as the Agency completes development and
integration of the various processes. This need for consistency will be
a principal focus of NRC headquarters systematic and ongoing review of
regional operations.
Question 10(b). What specific changes are you planning to make to
the enforcement process to improve its safety focus?
Response. Effective March 11, 1999, the NRC changed the way it
addresses relatively non-risk significant violations (i.e., Severity
Level IV violations) for operating reactors. The Commission recently
approved revising the enforcement policy to change the treatment of
Severity Level IV violations providing that except under limited,
defined circumstances, individual Severity Level IV violations will
normally result in Non-Cited violations. Additionally, closure of most
Severity Level IV violations will be based on their having been entered
into a licensee's corrective action program.
Importantly, this change does not change the expectation of
compliance with NRC requirements but it does recognize the relatively
low risk significance of these violations and the fact that most
licensees generally resolve these issues in their corrective action
programs commensurate with their safety significance. The net effect we
expect is that licensee and NRC resources will be better utilized and
available to focus on issues with greater risk significance.
Additional changes in our Enforcement Policy for both escalated and
non-escalated issues are being considered as part of our ongoing
efforts to redefine inspection and performance assessment processes.
These proposed changes are intended to integrate effectively the
reactor oversight processes of inspection, assessment, enforcement and
reporting and contribute to a more risk-informed performance-based
regulatory process. We will be prepared to discuss these changes during
the September 1999 hearing.
Question 10(c). What have you decided regarding the term
``regulatory significance''? If you are retaining the term, have you
defined it? How is ``regulatory significance'' different from ``safety
significance''?
Response. The concept of regulatory significance encompasses (1)
aggregation of violations, (2) willful violations including violations
associated with discrimination issues, and (3) violations that impede
the regulatory process such as reporting violations. Regulatory
significance is a subset of safety significance. As used in aggregating
violations, it addresses recurring or related violations for which,
because of their programmatic nature and potential impact on safety,
the root causes associated with the violations are more significant
than their actual consequences.
The staff is developing a proposal for the Commission concerning
the use of ``regulatory significance.'' The staff does not intend to
continue the use of the term. The aggregation of violations will not
need to be used for reactor violations considered under the assessment
process. It may continue to be used for other violations but with a
closer nexus to safety consistent with the current staff practice as
described in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 98-009 issued on November
25, 1998. Violations involving willfulness and those that impede the
regulatory process will be considered without the label of regulatory
significance.
Question 11(a). When does the NRC plan to systematically assess the
risk basis for cask licensing to ensure current and new requirements
are focused on those areas that can be demonstrated to have an impact
on safety?
Response. The NRC's Spent Fuel Project Office (SFPO) staff
continually uses available risk information and insights in assessing
current and new regulations impacting storage and transportation cask
safety.
The staff has continually used risk information to upgrade its
regulatory framework to clarify and improve the current storage
regulations and to ensure that the NRC regulatory program focuses on
safety. For example, in preparing a conforming change to 10 CFR 72.48
(concerning a change process similar to 10 CFR 50.59), the staff
proposed to expand the scope of the regulation to include the
certificate of compliance holders in addition to the current licensees.
After assessing comments from the industry, the staff decided to change
this regulation further to ensure consistency and enhance usefulness,
not only in the storage regulations, but in the transportation
regulations as well.
Also, the staff made early efforts during the 1970's to apply risk
assessment for the analysis of transportation risk, most notably, in
the ``Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of
Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes'' (NUREG-0170), and
``Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident
Conditions'' (NUREG/CR-4829, also known as the ``Modal Study''). More
recently, the staff has applied probabilistic risk assessment in
deciding to approve the one-time shipment of the Trojan reactor
pressure vessel, with internals, for disposal at the U.S. Ecology site
in the State of Washington. Also, the staff has nearly completed its
re-validation of NUREG-0170 in light of proposed shipments of spent
fuel to a repository (vs. reprocessing). The re-validation effort
should be completed by the last quarter of FY99 and includes a computer
evaluation of cask response to severe accidents and probabilities, the
use of current health effects models, and studies of population
distributions along likely shipment routes. The staff intends to use
the results of NUREG-0170 re-validation in its efforts to update the
Modal Study for the new generation of dual-purpose cask designs. The
Modal Study update will focus on confirming severe accident
probabilities and effects and will likely include partial or full-scale
package tests. Moreover, the staff is encouraging more risk-informed
decision-making with the U.S. Department of Transportation and the
International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, the staff intends to
continue to use risk information in implementing its regulatory
decisions.
Question 11(b). How and when does the Commission plan to address
generic issues in cask licensing, e.g., higher burn-up fuels, better
estimates of leakage rates and approval of innovative design
approaches, that are impacting private fuel storage licensing, plans
for licensing an interim storage facility, and decommissioning plants?
Response. The NRC's Spent Fuel Project Office (SFPO) staff is
currently addressing a number of generic issues related to dry cask
storage certification and licensing, as well as transportation package
approvals. Last year, the staff began to augment its standard review
plans with interim staff guidance documents (ISGs) to come to quick
decisions about technical and regulatory issues without waiting for the
standard review plan to be updated. This allowed the staff to continue
its review with a sound technical or regulatory decision on a real-time
basis. Currently, seven ISGs are in place and cover a range of topics.
This information is available to all members of the public on the NRC
Internet site.
Other ISGs are currently being developed, in cooperation with
industry representatives, related to various generic topics; e.g., high
burn-up fuels, burn-up credit, contents, rod buckling, and codes and
standards. These ISGs are expected to be completed within the next 3 to
6 months, long before the lack of such guidance would impact licensing
of Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., (PFS), the Central Interim Storage
Facility, or plant decommissioning. These ISGs and future ones will
enhance the technical and regulatory review for licensing independent
spent fuel storage installations and certification of dry cask storage
systems and transportation packages. Prior to issuing an ISG, the staff
typically discusses the ISG with industry representatives and other
stakeholders at a widely attended publicly noticed gathering. For
example, the ISGs in progress were discussed at a public industry
workshop on March 2, 1999, attended by approximately 150 persons.
Moreover, at this meeting, SFPO staff repeated that it does not desire
to stifle innovative design approaches that meet the current regulatory
framework. The staff does stress, however, that any innovative designs
must be openly discussed with the staff and must meet the regulatory
requirements that ensure public health and safety. Finally, the
industry itself must develop issue-specific criteria and provide
supporting data to the NRC so that the staff can develop an enhanced
regulatory approach.
The staff will always consider an exemption to the regulations
provided assurance of the public health and safety is maintained.
Notably, the Department of Energy-Idaho Operations Office requested and
was granted an exemption to the 10 CFR Part 72 seismic requirements
which was based, in part, on probabilistic information provided by the
Department. Additionally, to preclude the need for further similar
exemptions, the staff is working to modify its seismic and geologic
requirements for siting an independent spent fuel storage installation.
In a related matter, PFS was required to complete a thorough
seismic study for its site characterization work which had not been
completed at the time of the application. This is not a generic issue,
but is related specifically to the information required to be in the
PFS application concerning the site chosen by PFS.
Question 11(c). How does the Commission plan to address these
generic concerns without impacting the NRC's ambitious schedule for
licensing new cask designs?
Response. The NRC's Spent Fuel Project Office (SFPO) staff is
working on a number of issues in parallel with its technical and
regulatory activities. While SFPO staff considers safety-oriented
casework to be its prime focus and highest priority, staff has been
directed to develop resolution to those issues that may impact or
impede reaching a technical or regulatory decision.
Where required, the SFPO staff has sought assistance from others.
For example, NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research is assisting
in researching burn-up credit for final regulatory action. As stated in
the response to Question 11(B), the staff is developing interim staff
guidance so that an interim, but safe, regulatory decision can be
reached prior to the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research completing
its review.
Additionally, during FY 1998, the Department of Energy provided the
NRC with $4 million for the purpose of licensing a multi-purpose
canister (MPC) design. The DOE is now using a market-driven approach in
which private entities will apply to NRC for approval of spent fuel
storage and transportation designs, and therefore DOE has no further
interest in obtaining NRC approval for the MPC design. The NRC is now
working with the Appropriations Committees to allow use of these funds
for review of applications from private industry for approval of dual
purpose canisters and other generic activities pertaining to canisters
for the transportation, storage or disposal of high-level radioactive
waste and spent nuclear fuel.
Question 12(a). The backfit rule is a critical tool to assess the
risk posed by permanently shut down plants. When will the NRC apply its
backfit rule to all rules and guidance impacting decommissioning
plants?
Response. The Commission has approved the development of a backfit
rule (or modification to 10 CFR 50.109, as appropriate) specific to
plants undergoing decommissioning consistent with other competing
priorities. In the interim, the Commission has directed the staff to
continue to apply the current backfit rule to the extent practicable to
plants undergoing decommissioning.
Question 12(b). When will the Commission provide guidance
addressing the reduced risk posed by shutdown plants to ensure the
critical approvals needed to proceed with decommissioning can be in
place 1-2 months after a plant shuts down?
Response. In March 1999, the NRC initiated a reevaluation of all
ongoing decommissioning rulemaking activities to ensure that the
reduced risk associated with permanently shutdown reactors was properly
reflected in all decommissioning requirements. A public meeting with
Nuclear Energy Institute representatives has been scheduled to solicit
industry assistance in determining the level of risk posed by these
plants and the associated time periods after which many regulatory
requirements may be reduced. A new risk-informed framework and
schedules for these rules are expected by mid-1999.
Question 13(a). Is the NRC currently contemplating any changes to
the physical safety requirements placed on nuclear plants?
Response. The staff has proposed, and the Commission is
considering, changes in the safeguards performance assessment process
to better utilize industry and NRC resources while at the same time
assuring that plants maintain an appropriate level of readiness.
Depending upon the approach chosen by the Commission, changes to
regulations in this area may result. The Commission is also considering
a rulemaking plan which would ultimately result in allowing licensees
to revise security provisions during decommissioning commensurate with
the risk presented by these facilities.
Question 13(b). What are the perceived threats to security that the
current, and proposed, regulations intend to address?
Response. The NRC design basis threat (DBT) statements were first
promulgated in the late 1970's. Absent an historical basis of attacks
on nuclear facilities or of thefts of strategic special nuclear
material, the Commission concluded that the use of design basis threats
were appropriate. The threat statements, one for radiological sabotage
and one for theft and diversion, are hypothetical threats against which
physical security systems are designed, and they provide a standard
with which to measure changes in the real threat environment; are used
to develop regulatory requirements; and provide a standard for
evaluation of the performance of implemented safeguards programs. The
threat characteristics enumerated in the DBT are based on extensive
analyses of actual terrorist characteristics that were commonly
demonstrated and could reasonably be expected in an adversary, on
experienced analytical judgement, and on intelligence community
assessments.
To ensure the continued adequacy of the DBTs, NRC staff continually
review threat-related intelligence, including information on vehicle
bombings and other attacks worldwide. Staff also maintains an active
liaison program with other Federal agencies concerned with terrorist
threats and counterterrorism efforts, and performs DBT comparability
reviews with the Department of Energy. The results of these efforts and
staff conclusions are formally documented and provided to the
Commission every 6 months, or as needed. Based on current staff
analyses, no modification of the DBT is warranted at this time.
Question 13(c). Has the list of threats changed over the past
several years?
Response. Each of the design basis threat (DBT) statements used to
design physical protection systems has been changed once. The DBT for
theft of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) was modified in 1987
to include the use of a vehicle for transporting personnel and
equipment during an attempted theft. This change was made in order to
maintain comparability with DOE's threat guidance regarding protection
of SSNM. The design basis threat statement for radiological sabotage
was modified in 1994 to include: (1) use of a vehicle by an adversary
to transport personnel and equipment to power reactor vital areas, and
(2) the use of a vehicle bomb to attack the power reactor facility.
These changes were made in response to two events that occurred in
February 1993. In that month a vehicle intrusion occurred at the Three
Mile Island nuclear facility and the World Trade Center was bombed.
Subsequent to the Oklahoma City vehicle bomb attack on April 19, 1995,
and the twin vehicle bombing attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania on August 7, 1998, the NRC confirmed that the design basis
vehicle bomb remained valid.
Question 13(d). Over the past 10 years, how have the physical
safety requirements of nuclear plants been changed?
Response. With respect to rulemaking, the following table
summarizes rulemaking activities in the physical protection area from
1988 to the present. The ``Title'' column indicates both title and the
type of facility to which the rule applies. The ``Purpose'' column
gives a brief summary of the rule and indicates whether the amendments
increase or decrease security requirements.
Physical Protection Rulemakings--1988 to Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title Purpose
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``General Criteria for Security Amends medical examination
Personnel'' (53 FR 403), 1/7/88 (power scheduling. Neither
reactors and fuel facilities). increases nor decreases
security requirements.
``Licensing Requirements for the Establishes licensing
Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel requirements for
and High-Level Radioactive Waste'' (53 FR independent spent fuel
31651), 8/19/88 Independent Spent Fuel storage installations and
Storage Installations (ISFSIs). high-level radioactive
waste, including physical
protection requirements.
Increases security
requirements.
``Safeguards Requirements for Fuel Upgrades physical protection
Facilities Possessing Formula Quantities measures to include
of Strategic Special Nuclear Material'' tactical response force,
(53 FR 45447), 11/10/88 (fuel facilities). vehicle barriers, double
perimeter fence, etc., for
NRC/U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) comparability.
Increases security
requirements.
``Access to Safeguards Information (54 FR Implements Federal
17703), 4/25/89 (power reactors). legislation. Increases
security requirements.
``Fitness for Duty Program (FFD)'' (54 FR Requires FFD programs at
24468) 6/7/89 (power reactors). power reactors to assure
workforce is not under the
influence or impaired for
any cause. Drug-free
workplace. Increases
security requirements.
``Fingerprint Cards: Increase in Fee'' (55 Administrative change to
FR 3039, 1/30/90 (power reactors). fee. Neither increases nor
decreases security
requirements.
``Fingerprint Cards: Increase in Fee'' (55 Fee increase. Neither
FR 35563) 8/31/90 (power reactors). increases nor decreases
security requirements.
``Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Establishes an access
Power Plants'' (56 FR 18997), 4/25/91 authorization program.
(power reactors). Increases security
requirements.
``Fitness for Duty Program'' (56 FR Permits, under certain
41922), 8/26/91 (power reactors). conditions, employment
actions based on
preliminary test results.
Decreases security
requirements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Fingerprint Cards: Resubmittal Procedure Procedural amendment.
Change'' (57 FR 7645) 3/4/92 (power Neither increases nor
reactors). decreases security
requirements.
``Minor Amendments to the Physical Minor clarifying changes.
Protection Requirements'' (57 FR 33426), Neither increases nor
7/29/92 (power reactors and fuel decreases security
facilities). requirements.
``FFD Programs: NRC Partial Withdrawal of Responds to the U.S. Office
NRC Information Collection Requirements'' of Management and Budget's
(57 FR 5543), 11/25/92 (power reactors). finding that NRC failed to
demonstrate a compelling
need for certain
information. Neither
increases nor decreases
security requirements.
``Clarification of Physical Protection Clarifies Commission's
Requirements at Fixed Sites'' (58 FR regulatory intent. Neither
13699), 3/15/93 (fuel facilities). increases nor decreases
security requirements.
``Licensees' Announcements of Safeguards Increases the effectiveness
Inspections'' (58 FR 29521), 5/21/93 of unannounced safeguards
(fuel facilities). inspections. Increases
security requirements.
``FFD Requirements for Licensees Implements an FFD program at
Authorized to Possess, Use, or Transport Category I sites. Increases
Formula Quantities of Strategic Special security requirements.
Nuclear Material (SSNM)'' (58 FR 31467),
6/3/93 (fuel facilities).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Day Firing Qualification Courses for Revises day-firing
Tactical Response Team Members, Armed qualifications to enhance
Response Personnel, and Guards at skills. Increases security
Category I Facilities'' (58 FR 45781), 8/ requirements.
31/93 (fuel facilities).
``Modifications of FFD Program Reduces random testing rate.
Requirements'' (59 FR 502), 1/5/94 (power Decreases security
reactors and fuel facilities). requirements.
``Fingerprint Cards: Change in User Fee'' Administrative change.
(59 FR 661), 1/6/94 (power reactors). Neither increases nor
decreases security
requirements.
``Annual Physical Fitness Performance Provides increased assurance
Testing for Tactical Response Team that the licencee response
Members, Armed Response Personnel and force is able to perform
Guards at Category I Licensees'' (59 FR duties under strenuous
38347), 4/13/94 (fuel facilities). tactical engagements.
Increases security
requirements.
``Temporary Access to Safeguards Minor procedural changes.
Information'' (59 FR 38553), 7/29/94 Neither increases nor
(power reactors). decreases security
requirements.
``Protection Against Malevolent Use of Requires vehicle bomb
Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants'' (59 FR protection at operating
38889) 8/1/94 (power reactors). power reactors. Increases
security requirements.
``Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Applies physical protection
Plants'' (59 FR 48944), 9/23/94 (fuel requirements to gaseous
facilities). diffusion plants. Increases
security requirements.
``Reduction of Reporting Requirements Reduces licensee burden.
Imposed on NRC Licensees'' (60 FR 13615), Decreases security
3/14/95 (power reactors). requirements.
``Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Deletes a requirement, to
Requirements Associated with Containment decrease licensee burden,
Access Control'' (60 FR 46497) 9/7/95 without degradation of
(power reactors). physical protection.
Decreases security
requirements.
``Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Deletes certain requirements
Requirements'' (62 FR 63640), 12/2/97 associated with protection
(power reactors). against an insider threat,
to decrease licensee burden
without compromising
physical protection.
Decreases security
requirements.
``Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Clarifies physical
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste'' protection requirements for
(63 FR 26955), 5/15/98 (ISFSI). spent nuclear fuel and high-
level radioactive waste
stored at independent spent
fuel storage installations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Responses of Chairman Jackson to Questions from Senator Crapo
Question 1. Approximately one year ago, the NRC undertook several
pilot projects to investigate the appropriateness of NRC oversight of
Department of Energy nuclear reactor programs. The NRC adopted limited
programs at the Savannah River, Lawrence Berkeley, and Oak Ridge
facilities. How would you gauge the results so far?
Response. Although the pilot facilities selected by DOE represented
only a small portion of the DOE Complex, the results so far indicate
that DOE's non-weapons related programs can be effectively regulated by
NRC and continue to operate safely. Few changes in facilities,
procedures, safety programs, and safety documentation (including Safety
Analysis Reports) would be necessary. DOE initiatives such as WorkSmart
Standards and Integrated Safety Management Systems could easily be
incorporated into an NRC risk-informed, performance-based regulatory
framework. Most technical, policy, and regulatory issues, including
safety and safeguards and enforcement, encountered during the Pilot
Program could be handled adequately within the existing NRC regulatory
framework. However, to date the pilot program has concentrated on
individual facilities located on a much larger DOE site. The next
logical step in the pilot program would be to evaluate a pilot DOE site
with all of its individual facilities.
NRC could develop a regulatory framework that would be risk-
informed, taking into account the age, material condition, and
operating status of the DOE facilities. NRC brings a national
perspective to the regulation of DOE because NRC regulates a wide
spectrum of activities including the public and private sector and
facilities with a wide range of risks.
Based on the fact that the Pilot Program identified only a few
needed changes in DOE facilities or procedures, NRC anticipates the
cost to DOE of making the transition to external regulation would be
relatively small. However, the costs will vary depending on the degree
to which DOE facilities are already in compliance with DOE's own
requirements. For example, the costs for bringing the USEC gaseous
diffusion plants into compliance with DOE and NRC requirements has
proven to be significantly higher than what was indicated in the Pilot
Program because of the large costs required to bring the plants into
compliance with long standing DOE safety and security requirements. DOE
believes the costs to be much higher than the NRC believes. A program
to place a few facilities like the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory under NRC regulation might clarify this issue.
Question 2. Given the limited nature of the programs, would the
information uncovered from the studies give a good understanding of how
NRC oversight of an entire facility would function?
Response. Yes. Within its scope, the Pilot Program has provided NRC
with a very good understanding of how oversight of an entire site would
function. Although the Pilot Program included only one entire site,
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), and two facilities within
large complex sites, the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel at Savannah
River Site and the Radiochemical Engineering Development Center at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the Pilot Projects and associated
activities provided information on how NRC could oversee entire DOE
sites.
At LBNL, the NRC found the radiation safety program adequate to
protect public health and safety. NRC concluded that LBNL could be
licensed by the NRC using a broad-scope materials license, similar to
those issued at large universities.
During the Pilot Projects at the Savannah River Site and the ORNL,
it became clear that it would be more efficient to regulate an entire
site than a single facility within a complex site, because such
facilities depend on the shared-site infrastructure for many of the key
elements of safe operation (e.g. radiation protection, waste
management, emergency preparedness, safeguards and security). NRC did
conduct a brief overview of the non-defense facilities at ORNL in order
to better understand the shared-site issues.
Licensing reviews of DOE facilities would be facilitated by taking
credit for the reviews already performed by DOE. It is evident from the
Pilot Projects that DOE requirements, in general, provide a safety and
security envelope that is comparable to that provided by NRC
regulation.
Question 3. What is your impression of external (NRC) regulation of
DOE activities? Under what conditions would this be optimized?
Response. The NRC continues to believe that NRC regulation of DOE
nuclear facilities would result in the key advantages identified by the
DOE Working Group; i.e., that external regulation (1) would allow DOE
to focus on its primary missions, (2) eliminate the inherent conflict
of interest arising from self-regulation, (3) enhance safety and
stability, (4) lead to a safety culture comparable to the commercial
industry, (5) be consistent with domestic and international safety
management practices, (6) enhance DOE credibility by an open process,
and (7) enhance public confidence in DOE. In particular, external
oversight of DOE through an open process which allows involvement of
State governments and other stakeholders will increase public
confidence that DOE is taking the right action.
NRC is already regulating several DOE activities under existing law
and could potentially regulate others. These activities are identified
in the enclosed matrices, ``Existing Regulatory Relationships between
NRC and DOE and Privatized DOE Facilities/Activities Performed by
Private Companies only for DOE'' and ``Potential Regulatory
Relationships between NRC and DOE and Privatized DOE Facilities/
Activities Performed by Private Companies only for DOE.'' It has been
NRC's experience that the primary cost of external regulation has been
the cost for DOE to modify its facilities to meet its own requirements
prior to external regulation. Legislation that clearly indicates
responsibilities for NRC, DOE, and other Federal agencies may be the
best approach to resolving many of the issues that have arisen in the
Pilot Program. The NRC staff currently is preparing a white paper for
Commission consideration on the results of the Pilot Program and the
technical, regulatory, and legal issues that have been explored by the
Pilots.
Existing Regulatory Relationships between NRC and DOE and Privatized DOE Facilities/Activities Performed by
Private Companies only for DOE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facility/Activity Nature of Oversight Legal Basis Issues
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uranium Mill Tailings:...............
Title I site (Remedial action Review, concur on UMTRCA................. Law required completion
sites). remedial action plan of surface reclamation
and license DOE for by 9/30/98. All but 2
long term care. sites met date.
Title II site (Active sites)....... After termination of UMTRCA................. none
commercial license,
DOE becomes the
general licensee.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Level Waste Repository.......... Prelicensing Energy Reorg. Act 1974, Resolution of key tech.
consultation; license. Section 202, NWPA. issues at Yucca Mnt.
HLW standards for
Yucca
Commission views on
viability assessment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Facilities:.
Fort St. Vrain..................... License................ Energy Reorg. Act 1974, none
Section 202.
TMI-2 Spent Fuel Debris............ License................ Energy Reorg. Act 1974, none
Section 202.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Reactors:......................
Cores.............................. Review................. Economy Act............ none
Transport/Packages Fuel Fabrication Certify................ Economy Act............ none
Nuclear Fuels Service.............. License................ AEA (AEC Regulatory Awaiting NFS submittals
Decision). for NRC review and
approval
BWX Technologies, Inc.............. License................ AEA (AEC Regulatory
Decision).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gaseous Diffusion Plants (leased by Certification.......... AEA, Energy Policy Act Backfit to meet seismic
USEC). of 1992, USEC design criteria; SAR
Privatization Act of upgrade
1996.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-site-specific central interim Review................. Energy Reorganization Report is non-site
storage facility topical report Act of 1974, Section specific
(SNF). 202.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOE dry transfer system topical Review................. Energy Reorganization Part of the central
report. Act of 1974, Section interim storage
202. facility
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOE burnup credit topical report..... Review................. Energy Reorganization none
Act of 1974, Section
202.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOE Transportation Packages (38)..... Review, certify........ AEA, HMTSA............. none
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
West Valley Demonstration Project.... Develop D&D criteria, WVDP Act, 1980......... Criteria for D&D;
review, consult. Reinstatement of
license for State
after completion
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WIPP Transportation.................. Review and certify WIPP Land Withdrawal none
packages. Act of 1992.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test of Tritium Production in Review; Issue AEA.................... Possible package
Commercial Reactors. conforming license review; Legislative
amendments. framework
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than Class C Waste Disposal.. License................ Low-Level Rad Waste Storage until disposal;
Policy Amendments Act Timely availability of
of 1985. disposal capacity;
Cost of disposal;
Impact on reactor
decommissioning
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel Review................. AEA.................... Public concern about
Shipments/Package. transportation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MOX Fuel Fabrication and use......... Prelicensing Energy Reorg Act of Need to update Part 51,
Consultation; License. 1974 as amended, AEA. S-3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential Regulatory Relationships between NRC and DOE and Privatized DOE Facilities/Activities Performed by
Private Companies only for DOE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facility/Activity Nature of Oversight Legal Basis Issues
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hanford TWRS......................... Technical Assistance; 1997 Approp. Act....... Legislation needed to
Potential License. authorize NRC
regulation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Savannah River Tanks (residues)...... Review; potential Economy Act NWPA; Application of
license for HLW Energy Reorg Act of incidental waste
residues. 1974. criteria to tank waste
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aluminum Based Spent Fuels dry Review................. Economy Act NWPA; Criteria for storage;
storage. Energy Reorg Act of Suitability for
1974. disposal
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brookhaven High Flux Beam Reactor.... Review; technical Economy Act............ Review start date
assistance.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
External Regulation Pilot Projects... Simulated regulation... 1999 Approp. Act....... Legislation needed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Privatization Spent Nuclear Fuel
Projects:.
Peach Bottom Unit 1 Cores I and II. Potential license...... Energy Reorganization DOE must declare as
Act of 1974. excess to R&D
Shippingport LWBR.................. ..................... .....................
TRIGA.............................. ..................... .....................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 4. What resources would the NRC need in order to regulate
DOE? How much more staff? How much more funding? How do these compare
with DOE internal regulation?
Response. The Pilot Program included only three facilities, which
do not represent the entire DOE complex. While the Pilot Program did
not gather enough information to support an estimate of the resources,
staff, or funding needed for NRC to regulate the entire DOE complex,
NRC did develop cost estimates for regulating the three facilities
included in Pilot Programs. Precise resource estimates for NRC to
regulate all or some of the DOE nuclear complex are difficult to
develop without the completion of additional, more complex, pilot
projects. These costs would be comparable to the costs for regulating
commercial nuclear facilities and would be comparable for similar
facilities with similar risks.
The following table provides the cost estimates for NRC to regulate
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC), and
Savannah River Site, Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC transition
Pilot costs NRC annual costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LBNL............................ 1 FTE............. 0.2 FTE
REDC............................ 2.8 FTE plus $200K 0.1 FTE with an
for technical additional 0.5
assistance. FTE for first few
years
RBOF............................ 2.5 FTE plus $100K 0.3 FTE
for technical
assistance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NRC does not have sufficient information to compare its
regulatory costs to those of DOE internal regulation. However, the cost
to DOE could be minimized, potentially resulting in a net savings, by
reducing the level of DOE oversight of the regulated activities to a
level consistent with a corporate oversight model. If DOE does not
decrease its oversight activities, costly, burdensome, dual regulation
may well result.
______
Responses of Chairman Jackson to Questions from Senator Graham
Question 1. In your testimony you state that the Commission has
aimed at completing the license renewal process for the Calvert Cliffs
and Oconee Plants in 30 to 36 months.
You also state that lessons learned from the initial reviews will
help to streamline later reviews even further.
Therefore, in the interest of establishing a stable, predictable
and timely license renewal process, will you be able to reduce the 30-
36 month time period for the later reviews for license renewal, and if
so, what is your estimate for the length of time?
Response. As stated in the chairman's testimony and discussed in
the response to Senator Inhofe's Question 4, the NRC expects to improve
the 30-month review schedule for Calvert Cliffs by at least five
months, which includes the time saved based on dismissal of the hearing
requests in that case. Aside from time savings related to case specific
hearing issues, the NRC expects that the 30- to 36-month review
schedule can be improved for future reviews, but those improvements are
anticipated primarily from the later review stages that have not yet
been performed for the Calvert Cliffs and Oconee reviews. When the
first two renewal applications are completed, the NRC intends to
reflect on the achievements and make additional improvements in the
schedule for future renewal applications.
Question 2(a). In your testimony you state that the initial safety
evaluation report and draft environmental impact statement for the
Calvert Cliffs application should be completed on schedule next month.
Do you have any preliminary results from these reports?
Response. The preliminary results of the safety review have been
discussed during public meetings with Baltimore Gas and Electric and
Duke Energy over the last few months, and are documented in associated
meeting summaries. The NRC staff used those meetings to expand the
public record relative to the NRC review of the scope and effectiveness
of aging management programs for Calvert Cliffs and Oconee, beyond that
described in the applications. That information is expected to provide
the necessary technical basis to complete the safety evaluation and
minimize the number of potential open items that would need to be
resolved before a renewed license could be granted.
The supplement to the environmental impact statement for Calvert
Cliffs was issued by letter dated February 24, 1999. Comments on those
findings are being sought during a public meeting on April 6, 1999, and
throughout the 75-day public comment period. The NRC staff issued the
initial Safety Evaluation Report on renewal of the Calvert Cliffs
license on
March 19, 1999.
Question 2(b). Were there any ``show stoppers?''
Response. No. The staff has not identified any safety issues thus
far that cannot be resolved with appropriate license conditions or
inspection requirements. The environmental review did not identify any
significant environmental impacts associated with license renewal.
Question 3(a). Is there a way that the NRC can more closely link
the fees levied against each licensee to the NRC resources expended on
each licensee?
Response. As discussed in Chairman Inhofe's Question 2(b), during
the past two years NRC has taken steps to improve the linkage of fees
levied against specific licensees to the resources expended on each
licensee. These decisions recognize that with few exceptions, agency
work directly identifiable to a licensee should be billed to that
licensee.
We will continue to link the generic regulatory costs, such as
rulemaking and research efforts to the classes of licensees that cause
us to incur the cost in accordance with the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990. These generic costs are assessed to
licensees as Part 171 annual fees. It should be noted that the NRC has
identified approximately 10% of its budget that would be more
appropriately funded from the General Fund. If legislation was enacted
to reduce the percentage amount the NRC must recover through fees, this
would more closely align agency efforts for licensees with the fees
assessed to those licensees. A listing of these programs and costs are
found in the response to Chairman Inhofe's Question 3.
Question 3(b). It seems that assessing licensees annual fees more
consistently with the regulatory oversight required may provide
financial incentives for plants to improve their performance. Do you
agree with this statement?
Response. In general, licensees that require more licensing and
inspection attention will be assessed more fees under 10 CFR Part 170.
In developing the annual fees by category, we also take into
consideration where the generic resources are being used and charge
those categories of licensees accordingly. Therefore, in both Part 170
and Part 171 fee assessments, the charges represent either a directly
identifiable benefit or a reasonable relationship to the NRC's cost of
providing the regulatory service to the licensee. That having been
said, we would point out that the NRC makes no deliberate attempt to
use fees as an incentive or disincentive for plants to improve
performance. The Commission believes that fees should not be a primary
factor in determining the work to be performed in response to NRC's
health and safety mission. NRC's safety-related decisions cannot be
driven by fees. The NRC must carry out its statutory mission which
recognizes that the NRC serves a broader need than just providing a
specific service to a licensee or applicant.
As the Congress is aware, the NRC is in the process of making a
comprehensive revision to its reactor assessment, inspection, and
enforcement programs. This will be built upon cornerstones of safe
licensee performance that must be monitored to ensure no unacceptable
public risks in reactor operations. As an outgrowth of that process,
licensees requiring more oversight and for which we expend the greatest
resources will continue to bear a proportionately higher share of the
Agency costs through Part 170 fees.
Question 4. A recent NRC Office of Inspector General report raised
some questions about how the NRC handled concerns that two or more
workers at the Millstone nuclear power plants in Connecticut may have
been let go because they raised safety concerns.
The Inspector General report concluded that the NRC staff at first
found that such discrimination probably had occurred, but then reversed
itself without providing the written documentation to support the
changed conclusion.
What steps is the NRC taking to make sure the lack of accountable
documentation of decisions does not recur?
Response. In response to the findings of the Inspector General, the
Commission directed the NRC staff to review the findings, assess
lessons learned, and recommend and take necessary corrective actions.
The NRC staff completed this review in January 1999. The Office of
Enforcement issued detailed enforcement guidance on January 14, 1999,
and February 26, 1999, that requires the staff to prepare and maintain
an internal status summary for each significant enforcement action the
Agency considers. Although this administrative form is not an official
record of the Agency decision, the staff has been directed to use it to
record important information related to the enforcement decision-making
process. The guidance also emphasizes the importance of updating the
form based on subsequent changes to the agreed-upon enforcement
strategy, including the rationale for the change.
The Commission has also directed an independent panel headed up by
the Acting Chief Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Panel to
review the cases reviewed the by Inspector General and the enforcement
and investigation process and make recommendations for process
improvements. This review was completed on March 12, 1999, and is
currently under Commission consideration. In addition, the NRC staff
has initiated a broader review of the Agency's investigation and
enforcement functions and will take appropriate actions.
Question 5. In your testimony you state that you are revising the
regulatory programs from radioactive material to make them more risk-
informed and to ensure that the regulatory burden is commensurate with
the health and safety benefits of such regulations, including medical
use regulations in 10 CFR Part 35.
When the proposed rule revising Part 35 was issued in early fall,
many stakeholders stated that the proposed rule was not risk-informed,
that there was insufficient time to offer meaningful comments, and that
both the comment period and date to finalize the rule should be
significantly extended. The Commission responded to these requests by
extending the comment period by 30 days. A number of groups including
the American College of Nuclear Physicians, Society of Nuclear
Medicine, American College of Radiology, and others requested that the
Commission extend the final rule date, which is now set for May 1999.
This request was also supported by the Organization of Agreement
States, which represents state radiation officials.
In light of the strong support by the regulated medical community
for an extension of this May 1999 date, would the Commission consider
extending the May 1999 date for finalizing the rule?
Response. In March 1997, in follow-up to several internal and
external reviews, the Commission directed that 10 CFR Part 35 be
restructured into a risk-informed, more performance-based regulation by
June 1999. The Commission's intent is to focus the rule on those
medical procedures that pose the highest risk, from a radiation safety
aspect, while decreasing the oversight of low-risk activities. The
Commission previously extended the public comment period by 30 days and
reviewed a significant number of insightful public comments. The
Commission is currently considering extending the schedule for the
final rulemaking to more adequately incorporate the significant number
of public comments reviewed.
Question 6. This next question is specifically addressed to
Commissioner Diaz. Commissioner Diaz, I am aware that you met with some
of the representatives of the nuclear medicine communities as well as
some of my constituents. Could you please summarize the outcome of that
meeting?
Response. As you may know, on January 28, 1999, I met with Dr.
Robert Carretta, President of The Society of Nuclear Medicine; David
Nichols, Society of Nuclear Medicine; and Mr. Roy Brown, Mallinckrodt
Medical. We discussed their concerns about the proposed regulation of
diagnostic nuclear medicine procedures in the new NRC Part 35. In
particular, they believe that these low-risk procedures would be over
regulated by the new rulemaking. In this regard, I expressed my belief
that a risk-informed Part 35 would differentiate between diagnostic and
therapeutic procedures; with the former (diagnostic procedures) having
many fewer requirements than the latter (therapeutic). In fact, I
believe that in the diagnostic area the NRC could regulate by requiring
that records be kept and made available to our inspectors. However, I
emphasized that in this and other issues regarding Part 35, I retain an
open mind, look forward to reading the public comments and would make
my decision based on the Part 35 rulemaking record.
______
Responses of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Questions from
Senator Bennett
Question 1(a). In response to inquiries by the Army Corps of
Engineers, the NRC has recently indicated that it will not assert
regulatory authority over certain uranium and thorium processed wastes
referred to as ``11e(2) radioactive byproduct material.'' In an
apparent change of position, NRC now contends that it does not have
jurisdiction over byproduct material located at sites that were not
licensed prior to 1978 when the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
Act (UMTRCA) was enacted. The NRC interpretation is referenced in two
pending RFP's in which the Army Corps indicates it will accept
proposals for disposal of 11e(2) radioactive waste at ordinary
landfills not regulated by the NRC.
What is the NRC's response to the pending RFP's by the Army Corps?
Response. As a general matter, the NRC has no regulatory
responsibility regarding the Army Corps' management of radioactive
material under the FUSRAP program.
In addition, the NRC does not consider its actions regarding FUSRAP
as a change in position. Earlier, the NRC said that it would not assert
regulatory authority over this material. Later, the NRC said that it
would not assert regulatory authority over this material because NRC
does not have legislative authority to regulate this material. This
later statement is not a change in position.
Question 1(b). What is the NRC's response to a 1998 resolution by
the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors which calls on
the Commission as a matter of public health and safety to regulate the
disposal of uranium and thorium mill tailings referred to as ``11e(2)''
radioactive byproduct material, even if it was generated prior to 1978?
Response. The resolution of the Conference of Radiation Control
Program Directors cannot, of course, confer jurisdiction on the NRC
where jurisdiction does not exist under Federal law. As discussed below
in the answer to Question 1.E, the critical question regarding NRC
jurisdiction is whether a site where this activity took place was
licensed by the NRC on or after the date the Uranium Mill Tailings
Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) became effective, not when the material
at the site was generated (Section 202; 42 USC 2111).
Question 1(c). If pre-1978 11e(2) byproduct material is not
regulated by NRC, can this radioactive waste be disposed in ordinary
solid waste landfills?
Response. NRC does not have jurisdiction over 11e(2) byproduct
material generated before 1978 unless it exists at a site that was
licensed by the NRC on or after November 8, 1978, the effective date of
new section 83 of the Atomic Energy Act. Pre-1978 11e(2) byproduct
material not regulated by the NRC is under the jurisdiction of other
Federal and State agencies, including the Department of Transportation
and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Question 1(d). If 11e(2) radioactive byproduct waste were disposed
of in regular solid waste landfills, wouldn't this again raise the
controversial specter of the Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) issue that
NRC confronted in 1990?
Response. The Commission developed criteria and procedures to
implement the concept of ``Below Regulatory Concern'' (BRC) in 1986 and
1990 consistent with Congressional directive in the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA). These
actions and procedures were eventually withdrawn by the Commission in
1993 as directed by Congress in the 1992 Energy Policy Act. The LLRWPAA
applies only to materials defined by that Act as low-level waste (LLW)
and expressly excludes 11e(2) byproduct material from the definition of
LLW (section 2(9)).
If NRC or an Agreement State authorized disposal of 11e(2)
byproduct material waste in regular solid waste landfills, it could
raise similar concerns to those expressed by the public in response to
the NRC's ``Below Regulatory Concern'' policy.
Question 1(e). How would the NRC's interpretation of 11e(2)
jurisdiction affect the licensing of companies such as the Atlas
Corporation in Moab, Utah, where radioactive byproduct materials were
created both before and after 1978?
Response. The language of section 83 of the Atomic Energy Act (42
U.S.C. 2113(a)) (AEA), was added to the AEA by UMTRCA. Section 83 a.
provides that any NRC license for covered activities in effect on or
after the effective date of section 83 (November 8, 1978) must include
the terms and conditions that the NRC determines are necessary to
assure that the licensee can comply with the decontamination,
decommissioning, and reclamation standards prescribed by the
Commission. The Moab NRC license was in effect on and after the
effective date of section 83 of the AEA. Therefore, all materials in
the tailings impoundment at the site are subject to NRC jurisdiction,
whether these were produced before or after 1978. The critical factor
in determining jurisdiction over the waste or tailings produced by the
processing of ore for its source material content is whether a site
where this activity took place was licensed by the NRC on or after the
date UMTRCA became effective, not when the material at the site was
generated.
______
Responses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Questions from
Senator Bond
Question 1. The NRC has collected data on medical
misadministrations since 1980. This data includes misadministrations
involving diagnostic Nuclear Medicine. On March 20, 1997, the
Commission directed that the revision of Part 35 be risk-informed and
performance-based. Please explain based on the data the NRC has
collected since 1980 what risks were identified specifically for
diagnostic Nuclear Medicine.
Response. Prior to initiating the revision of the regulations for
diagnostic nuclear medicine, the Commission thoroughly reviewed several
extensive assessments, including the external review conducted by the
National Academy of Sciences-Institute of Medicine (NAS-IOM), a 1993
NRC internal senior management review, and the Commission's Strategic
Assessment and Rebaselining Project. Although the Commission decided
not to adopt the NAS-IOM study recommendations, the Commission
considered the risk assessment information, including information on
comparative risks of ionizing radiation in medicine, in the NAS-IOM
report. Both the NAS-IOM Committee and the NRC Advisory Committee on
the Medical Uses of Isotopes recognized that quantifying levels of risk
in radiation medicine is problematic.
During the development of the overall revision of Part 35, NRC
staff considered risk information provided by members of the public and
professional societies, professional medical standards of practice, and
event databases maintained by NRC, to determine where oversight of low-
risk activities could be decreased and where there needed to be
continuation, or even broadening, of the regulations governing high-
risk activities.
Additional information on risk that was considered by the staff
included the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
Report No. 93, ``Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the
United States,'' NCRP Report No. 100, ``Exposure of the U.S. Population
from Diagnostic Medical Radiation,'' and NCRP Report No. 105,
``Radiation Protection for Medical and Allied Health Personnel.'' These
reports provide data on the exposure to a large number of medical
patients and workers, and, consequently, the large collective doses,
associated with this use of radioactive material.
The Commission proposed revisions to 10 CFR Part 35 and solicited
comments during a 120-day period, which ended on December 16, 1998. All
the risk information received in writing during the public comment
period, as well as the information received at the three public
meetings held during the public comment period, is being carefully
considered to determine if additional improvements should be made to
achieve the goal of restructuring Part 35 into a risk-informed
regulation.
Question 2. The regulated medical community has suggested that the
NRC, based on data by leading experts, (National Academy of Sciences-
Institute of Medicine, National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements, and a 1993 NRC internal management report), move to only
enforce the radiation protection thresholds of 10 CFR Part 20 and the
training and experience requirements of 10 CFR Part 35 for the
regulation of low-risk diagnostic Nuclear Medicine. James Smith, the
Technical Assistant to Chairman Jackson, first raised this proposal at
a November 5, 1998, meeting between representatives of the Nuclear
Medicine community and the Commission staff as one possible way to
address the concerns of the diagnostic Nuclear Medicine community while
also meeting the directives of the Commission to strive for a
``performance-based'' regulation. Why has there been no further
consideration of this proposal by the Commission or NRC staff working
on the revision to 10 CFR Part 35? Are 10 CFR Part 20 and the training
and experience requirements of 10 CFR Part 35 not sufficient in meeting
the NRC's requirements that the public, workers and patients be
protected and the physicians and technologists be properly trained?
Would this not be an example of true ``performance-based'' regulation?
Response. The Commission has been considering this proposal. During
the development of the proposed rule the staff eliminated requirements
in the current Part 35 that are contained elsewhere in the Commission's
regulations, such as the radiation protection requirements in Part 20.
In some cases, where justified by risk, more specific requirements were
maintained in Part 35. The majority of the requirements that were
maintained apply to the high-risk therapeutic uses of radioactive
material.
The proposed revisions to Part 35 include specific requirements,
not included in Part 20, that are necessary to protect occupationally
exposed individuals and the public, similar to requirements in Parts
31-39 for other materials licensees such as industrial radiography. For
example, the Part 35 requirement to provide instructions to operators
of therapeutic medical devices is not addressed in Part 20, but is
necessary for the protection of the operators.
Another reason why there needs to be specific requirements for the
medical use of byproduct material in Part 35 is that Part 20 does not
apply to doses received as a result of exposure of patients to
radiation for the purpose of medical diagnosis or therapy. The NRC does
not regulate the physicians' determination as to the correct doses to
be prescribed to patients. However, minimal requirements are needed,
for example, to ensure that the doses to patients are in accordance
with the physician's directions. In other words, the primary focus of
NRC regulation is providing that the correct patient receives the
correct dose of byproduct material at the correct site and via the
correct mode of administration.
The Commission agrees that Part 35 could be more performance based
and is considering the recommendations made by the diagnostic nuclear
medicine community and the commenters. NRC staff is in the process of
analyzing many comments received on the proposed rule. Staff will
consider the impact of maintaining the training and experience
requirements in Part 35 and eliminating all other diagnostic nuclear
medicine requirements. Some specific areas for consideration will be
deletion of requirements for: determining the activity of diagnostic
dosages prior to administration; labeling syringes and shields
containing byproduct material; and routinely calibrating survey meters
and instruments used to determine the activity of a radioactive drug
prior to administration.
Question 3. After having spent approximately 2 million dollars of
user fee money the Commission rejected, with no explanation, the
recommendations of the National Academy of Science-Institute of
Medicine report (NAS-IOM). This report found that for nuclear medicine,
the risk and probability of harm occurring to a patient or a member of
the public is extraordinarily low and recommended that the NRC reduce
its focus in such low risk areas. What scientific or other information
did the Commission base its rejection of the NAS-IOM report?
Response. The NAS-IOM study was conducted because NRC sought an
evaluation of whether the rules, policies, and procedures of the
current regulatory framework for medical uses of byproduct material
fulfilled the NRC's statutory responsibilities for protection of public
health and safety. Based on its review of the report and consultations
with relevant agencies, the Commission was not persuaded by the NAS-IOM
report's overall recommendation to Congress that NRC should not be the
Federal agency involved in the regulation of Atomic Energy Act
materials in medicine. The Commission continues to believe that the
conclusions in the report were not substantiated and that the
recommendations should not be pursued.
The report was not rejected on the basis of its analysis of risks
of ionizing radiation in medicine. In fact, the risk assessment
information in the report, including the information on comparative
risks of ionizing radiation in medicine, was considered during the
rulemaking process in developing proposed revisions to 10 CFR Part 35.
The NAS-IOM report concluded that ``no comprehensive raw data are
available to make exact comparisons'' between risks of medical
modalities (pg. 124). In addition, both the NAS-IOM report and the
NRC's Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes (May 8, 1997,
Commission briefing) recognized that quantifying levels of risk in
radiation medicine is problematic.
The Commission was not persuaded by the recommendations of the NAS-
IOM report with regard to regulation of byproduct material for medical
use. The Commission reached this decision, in part, based on comments
received from some State and Federal agencies on the report. Some State
and Federal agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human
Services, Food and Drug Administration, to which additional
responsibility would have fallen if the NRC adopted the
recommendations, indicated that they did not support the
recommendations in the report.
______
Statement of Joe F. Colvin, President and Chief Executive Officer
Nuclear Energy Institute
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Graham and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, my name is Joe Colvin. I am the president and chief
executive officer at the Nuclear Energy Institute, the Washington, DC,
policy organization for the nuclear industry. I am pleased to testify
this morning about the need for comprehensive reform of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's regulatory process that provides oversight of
the commercial nuclear energy industry.
The Nuclear Energy Institute sets industry policy positions on
various issues affecting the industry, including Federal regulations
that help ensure the safety of 103 operating nuclear power plants in 31
states. NEI represents 275 companies, including every U.S. utility
licensed to operate a commercial nuclear reactor, their suppliers, fuel
fabrication facilities, architectural and engineering firms, labor
unions and law firms, radiopharmaceutical companies, research
laboratories, universities and international nuclear organizations.
summary of key points
Nuclear power plants, which produce nearly 20 percent of America's
electricity, are our largest source of emission-free energy--an
important consideration as Congress and other policymakers recognize
the growing nexus of energy and environmental policy. Among the
Congress, and indeed across the United States, there is a growing
awareness that this is a proven industry with more than 2,000 reactor
years of operating experience and with a product that will become even
more valuable as we meet the demands of the 21st century.
Without nuclear energy, the United States will find it impossible
to meet increasingly stringent U.S. clean air regulations as well as
international carbon dioxide reduction goals. The nation's nuclear
power plants provide clean air benefits while producing electricity at
a competitive price--with production costs that are a fraction of a
cent higher than coal-fired electricity and more cost-effective than
natural gas, solar or wind power. Members of Congress increasingly are
recognizing the important benefits of nuclear energy to our economy,
our environment and energy future. This subcommittee's hearing last
year, the first Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversight hearing in more
than 4 years, is but one piece of tangible evidence of this increased
policymaker recognition.
The single most important challenge facing the nuclear energy
industry is a regulatory process that consumes licensee and NRC
resources on issues that have little or no safety significance and that
produces inconsistency in assessment and enforcement. Mr. Chairman, I
cannot overstate the importance of this subcommittee's oversight, which
has been instrumental in encouraging the NRC commissioners and staff to
complete work on many long-standing issues, including outlining a plan
to adopt risk-informed approaches to regulations for nuclear power
plants, and revising the assessment process to use objective plant
performance measures. The NRC has a number of promising regulatory
reform initiatives underway. However, much work remains to be done and
Congress should continue to provide the oversight that had already
initiated meaningful reform of the NRC's regulatory process. The task
at hand is sustaining the effort started last year.
Specifically, the NRC should be encouraged by this subcommittee to
develop and implement a long-term strategic plan as well as focusing on
activities that can be completed in the near term. The NRC's long-range
strategy should include these principles:
a safety-focused regulatory framework that incorporates
risk insights;
a more efficient and accountable regulator;
an integrated NRC strategy for achieving the objectives of
regulatory reform;
a specific timetable and milestones to ensure the NRC's
long-range plan is implemented on schedule; and
staff resources and a fully accountable budget that
supports fundamental NRC reform.
Congress plays a vital role in assuring that Federal nuclear
regulations recognize the transition to a competitive electricity
market while protecting public health and safety and preserving the
nation's energy security. In that regard, Congress should direct the
NRC to prepare a multi-year plan to achieve a safety-focused, results-
oriented regulatory process--with clear accountabilities within the
Agency--that protects public health and safety.
This multi-year plan should include an annual planning process that
establishes a meaningful set of NRC objectives with measurable results.
The long-range strategic plan should integrate the principles of
regulatory reform I described earlier, with measurable goals and
objectives to demonstrate progress to achieve reform of the regulatory
system. It also should recognize improved plant safety and performance
and account for new demands on the regulatory process as a result of
the transition to a competitive electricity market.
Mr. Chairman, the industry recommends that this subcommittee
schedule another hearing by June and direct the NRC commissioners to
present both the annual and multi-year strategies for reforming the
regulatory process at that time. The subcommittee should then continue
to hold hearings every 6 months until you are satisfied that progress
in reforming the regulatory process is proceeding in the proper
direction, at the proper pace and that it will be sustained. The
committee then should schedule hearings, perhaps annually, to oversee
NRC reform.
The NRC should also identify legislative changes needed to proceed
with timely regulatory reform, such as amending the Atomic Energy Act
with respect to foreign ownership, antitrust reviews and the
adjudicatory hearing process. The commission should also support tax
code amendments to ensure that nuclear plant decommissioning trust
funds receive the same tax treatment when plants are purchased or plant
licenses are transferred. Decommissioning must be adequately funded in
a competitive market and the trust funds should be protected from
bankruptcy.
Current law requires the NRC to collect approximately 100 percent
of its budget from user fees on licensees. Most of those fees are
collected as a generic assessment equally levied against all licensees,
creating, in effect, a ``miscellaneous'' category to describe nearly 80
percent of its budget. This practice is contrary to sound and
accountable budgeting. Congress should ensure that the NRC adheres
fully to the requirements of the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act
of 1990 and submit legislation, if necessary, to modify NRC fee
structure so that licensees are assessed fees only for those NRC
programs related directly to licensee regulation. Unrelated agency
expenditures, such as international activities and regulatory support
to agreement states or other Federal agencies, should not be included
in nuclear plant licensee user fees, but should be included in a
specific line item on the NRC's budget, subject to the authorization
and appropriations process. Additionally, the Agency's ability to
collect user fees should be authorized annually by Congress until the
commission completes its regulatory reform initiatives.
Finally, this subcommittee should resolve the impasse between the
NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency in setting radiation
protection standards. This subcommittee has jurisdiction over both
Federal agencies and should clarify that the proper scientific
authority for this issue rests with the NRC, which has the expertise in
setting standards for nuclear facilities. The commission's regulations
have proven effective in protecting public health and safety as well as
worker safety.
background
In July 1998, I testified before this committee during a hearing of
tremendous significance--one that has prompted the NRC to re-examine
its fundamental regulatory practices and to begin the transition to a
more focused, objective regulatory system for the nuclear power
industry. Today, there is a greater recognition of the need for change
at the NRC. The industry and other stakeholders have, during the past 7
months, participated with the commissioners and NRC staff in productive
dialog to better understand all perspectives as the Agency moves toward
meaningful reform. The increased support and oversight from Congress
has played a key role in this broad examination of the current
regulatory system, and continued support from Congress will be
essential to achieving sustained regulatory reform at the NRC.
As Commissioner Nils Diaz testified last July, the need to change
the NRC's regulatory approach ``is not an indictment of the past, but a
requirement of the future.'' Like the industry it regulates, the NRC
must adapt to a changing environment where the traditional cost-of-
service market is yielding to a competitive market that places a
premium on the ability of companies to provide excellent service safely
and efficiently. Nuclear power plants are competitive today, with
average production costs second only to coal-fired power plants. But in
a competitive market, inefficient regulation can detract from safety
and clearly impact nuclear plant economics.
Unlike any other electric generation source, nuclear power is
unique because the costs of the entire electricity production
lifecycle--including the uranium fuel manufacturing process, NRC
regulation, waste management and plant decommissioning--are included in
the cost of electricity to consumers. To remain competitive with other
generation sources that do not internalize many of these expenses, all
costs in the nuclear fuel cycle must be appropriate and reasonable.
Plants will close if they cannot compete, raising potential electricity
system reliability problems. Moreover, the nuclear electric generation
will be replaced by power plants that emit greenhouse gases and other
air pollutants. If that scenario unfolds, the United States will find
it impossible to meet increasingly stringent U.S. clean air regulations
and international carbon dioxide reduction goals.
I don't believe that that is the intent of Congress. In fact, the
hearing by this subcommittee last July demonstrated that, for the first
time since the mid-1980's, Congress has a strong interest in ensuring
that the industry is regulated in a manner that protects public health
and safety, but in a way in which the industry is not unduly burdened.
The United States has the largest commercial nuclear power industry
in the world, and we are the global leaders in the development of
advanced nuclear power plant technology. The foundation for this
leadership role is the extensive use of nuclear power in this country
and the industry's improved safety performance. The NRC's regulatory
approach must also recognize these substantial improvements in nuclear
plant performance. The industry's commitment to excellence in plant
operations has resulted in dramatic gains in both safety and
efficiency. Since 1985, for example, NRC data shows that the average
number of significant events at U.S. plants has declined from nearly
2.5 per unit in 1985 to an average of .04 per unit in 1998. Moreover,
improvements in nuclear plant operating efficiency since 1990 are
equivalent to adding 11 large generating units to the national electric
grid--further evidence of the industry's contribution to serving new
electricity demand while meeting our nation's clean air goals.
The NRC has taken many steps to improve agency procedures since the
July 30, 1998, hearing. These initial steps represent the beginning of
the sustained agency commitment required to provide a transition to a
regulatory system that mirrors the industry's improvement. The NRC's
regulatory innovation must result in a safety-based regulatory process
that is focused on adequate protection of public health and safety. To
continue the process toward risk-informed, performance-based
regulation, the Agency should establish objective, clear regulatory
thresholds that clearly convey the NRC's regulatory expectations and
the associated actions of an accountable and responsible regulator.
With many states preparing to move toward a competitive electricity
market, it is imperative that the NRC begin now to implement the
following fundamental changes:
near-term priorities
Implement a new regulatory oversight process with plant
assessment rooted in a clear safety basis and inspection levels based
on objective plant performance. NRC enforcement activities should be
risk-informed and consistently applied so that licensee and NRC
attention is clearly focused on items that are directly related to
protecting public health and safety.
Undertake timely, efficient proceedings for nuclear power
plant license transfer and license renewal. For example, the NRC must
meet or better the 30- to 36-month target for responding to the license
renewal applications by Baltimore Gas & Electric Company and Duke Power
Company. Experience gained from these first two reviews should be used
to refine the process and allow the NRC to respond even faster to
subsequent license applications.
Adopt an initial set of risk-informed, performance-based
regulations, including those related to maintenance, and undertake
pilot projects to evaluate applying risk insights more broadly to the
entire nuclear power plant.
Apply risk-informed, performance-based regulations to the
licensing and oversight of major materials licensees, such as fuel
fabrication facilities, and to NRC regulation of medical applications.
intermediate priorities
In the 2000-2002 timeframe, the NRC must transition to
more objective, risk-informed nuclear plant regulation in which
regulatory requirements are commensurate with risk.
As the NRC moves toward reform of its regulatory process,
the commission must examine what appropriate levels of staffing and
budget are required. The industry believes the Agency should ultimately
optimize its resources, including an examination of its organizational
structure, to conform with the new vision of regulatory oversight. The
commission must allocate resources in a manner that ensures adequate
staff support to set the foundation for broad regulatory reform.
Reforming plant security requirements to ensure the
adequate safety of the plants from any threat, including terrorists,
while providing the balance to ensure that those security measures
don't impact plant safety during the operation of these facilities.
long-term priorities
Moving toward reforming the construction and operating
license process for new advanced reactor designs. The Department of
Energy's recent analysis of measures required to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to 3 percent below 1990 levels includes the construction of
42,000 megawatts of nuclear-powered electric generation. The energy and
environmental reality will require the industry and the NRC to begin
examining how to license new nuclear power plants in an efficient
manner.
Apply risk-informed insights to the remainder of the
Agency's regulations, including the design bases for both existing and
new nuclear power plants.
The regulatory environment is improving, but continued
congressional oversight of the NRC is an important factor for continued
improvement. For its part, the industry must continue to improve
nuclear plant performance and be vigilant in assuring adequate
protection of public health and safety. Similar to the industry's
process and cultural changes in the 1980's and 90's to establish world-
class safety performance, the NRC must undergo sweeping change,
including a cultural change within the Agency. This change requires
long-term vision and commitment, and must ultimately include clearly
articulated goals for the staffing and budgetary requirements of a more
efficient and safety-focused regulator. The industry recognizes the
need for the NRC to fully develop its strategic direction and
accurately identify the staff and organizational needs to make a
successful transition. However, the commission must ultimately optimize
its resources and examine its organizational structure once the
transition to a new regulatory process is complete.
nuclear power plants poised for success in competitive markets
In providing one-fifth of U.S. electricity supply, nuclear energy
is our nation's largest source of emission-free electricity. Nuclear
energy also provides clean air benefits at a competitive price--with
production costs that are a fraction of a cent higher than coal-fired
electricity and more cost-effective than natural gas, solar or wind
power. Most U.S. nuclear power plants compete as low-cost electricity
providers today and are well-positioned as states open their
electricity markets to competition. Measured solely by economic
factors--operating and maintenance costs plus fuel costs, ongoing
capital requirements and general and administrative expenses--most
nuclear units will be very competitive in a deregulated electricity
market. In fact, many nuclear plants should be able to improve their
economic performance even further.
Production costs at nuclear power plants in the last 3 years
continue to fall well below those the nuclear energy industry incurred
at the start of the decade. Meanwhile, plant performance--measured by
the capacity factor of plant operation--has in the last 2 years reached
record high levels.
In a restructured environment that eliminates the rate base,
earnings will be based solely on the difference between an electric
generating plant's going-forward costs and the market price of power,
and fully depreciated nuclear plants will demonstrate enormous
potential. Nuclear power's marketplace appeal is evident in the
purchase of Three Mile Island 1 by AmerGen, the joint operating company
formed by PECO Energy Company and British Energy, and the purchase of
Boston Edison Company's Pilgrim nuclear power plant by New Orleans-
based Entergy Operations Incorporated. Also, Baltimore Gas & Electric
Company and Duke Power Company have filed applications with the NRC to
extend operations at five nuclear units for an additional 20-year
period. Entergy Operations Incorporated in late January announced it
plans to extend the license of one of its nuclear units, with a formal
application expected in December. These events will become more
frequent as electric utilities reposition themselves in the wake of
state restructuring initiatives.
nrc must transition to safety-focused, results-oriented agency
The industry has built a solid record of safe, efficient
performance at nuclear power plants as it enters a new business
environment. But the industry's continued commitment to safe nuclear
plant operation must be accompanied by the NRC's ability to fulfill its
mission as a strong and credible regulator. Both are essential to build
and maintain public trust and confidence in nuclear energy.
As this subcommittee discussed last July, industry concerns over
NRC regulation go back many years. Over time, regulatory requirements
have become progressively more detailed and prescriptive. New
requirements often are layered on top of old ones, without weeding out
duplication and inconsistency. The result is that the regulatory
process has no objective, measurable safety threshold. Many of the
industry's regulatory concerns are long-standing, and previous NRC
reform initiatives have not been sustained.
Congressional interest in the NRC has helped spark greater progress
in many agency projects that are essential for a new regulatory
process. Chief among those projects is developing a risk-informed,
performance-based process for assessing plant performance. In a
performance-based approach, the NRC would establish basic requirements
and set overall performance goals, and plant management would decide
how best to meet those goals. This approach is more sharply focused on
safety because resources are applied to plant systems and equipment
commensurate with their importance to safety.
Last October, the NRC redirected resources to concentrate on the
development of a risk-informed, performance-based assessment process in
three overaching strategic areas: reactor safety, radiation safety and
plant security. This new process will provide a sharper focus on public
health and safety--and because it incorporates the use of objective
criteria--it will be much easier for the utilities and the public to
understand regulatory expectations for nuclear plant operations.
Consistent with the risk-informed assessment process, similar
changes are needed in the Agency's enforcement process. Last October,
the industry proposed changes to the NRC enforcement policy based upon
guiding principles that are consistent with broader reforms being
undertaken to improve NRC regulations and policies. These principles
include:
Enforcement should be risk-informed so that licensees and
NRC attention is clearly focused on items having actual consequences or
high-risk significance for public health and safety. Enforcement should
not result in the expenditure of NRC and licensee resources on non-
safety significant violations.
Enforcement should be consistent with the safety focus of
the performance assessment process, but should not drive the assessment
process or be used as a surrogate for assessment activities.
Enforcement should be based upon readily understandable,
objective criteria that are consistently and predictably applied.
Enforcement should not be based on new interpretations or expanding
views of compliance, or be driven by subjective terms.
The industry has strongly encouraged the NRC to apply these
principles as it reviews the enforcement policy. Such reform is
necessary to ensure that the policy is risk-informed, objective and
properly focused on safety.
signs of regulatory improvement
The NRC has made tangible progress in some areas toward
reforming the regulatory process since this subcommittee held its first
oversight hearing last July. The commission has initiated programs to
implement risk-informed regulation, inspection and enforcement
programs, and has made notable progress in several projects it already
had underway in 1998. The commission and staff should be commended for
their initial steps toward regulatory reform. Some specific areas in
which the NRC has made progress in recent months include:
The NRC staff has submitted to the commissioners a plan to
adopt a risk-informed approach to 10 CFR 50, the basic regulatory
oversight rules for nuclear power plants.
The release of final safety evaluations for in-service
inspection pilot programs. The NRC has adopted a risk-informed approach
to inspecting welds of reactor coolant systems. These inspections are
based on methodologies that rely on data from 20,000 previous weld
exams. This risk-informed approach to inspections is being piloted at
three nuclear plants. Industrywide, it is expected to reduce
occupational radiation exposure by 15 percent as well as reduce the
cost of inspection by $15 million to $25 million annually.
Revising the nuclear plant assessment process to use
objective plant performance indicators and risk-informed inspection
findings. These changes promote a more understandable and predictable
assessment process. Consistent with the new approach, the NRC has
suspended the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
program. The agency is considering eliminating the subjective SALP
program and the release of the ``watch list''--the list of those plants
requiring increased regulatory attention--by 2000.
A 30- to 36-month target for renewing licenses for
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company's Calvert Cliffs plant and Duke
Power Company's Oconee plant. By maintaining this timeframe, the NRC
can refine its process of reviewing license renewal applications and
target resources on the most relevant issues. Subsequent license
renewal applications should be reviewed more quickly.
The commission issued a rule in December 1998 to establish
a more efficient procedure for processing nuclear plant license
transfers. The number of license transfer applications has increased
from two to three per year to 20 in 1997 and 15 in 1998. The commission
must remain committed to efficient reviews of transfer applications.
Otherwise, the economic viability of licensees who must respond rapidly
to changing market forces will be placed at risk.
The NRC has established a process for reviewing
certification of containers for storing and transporting used nuclear
fuel within 1 year of a vendor's submission, which is a dramatic
improvement over past practices.
Despite these initial steps toward reform, Congress must sustain
this momentum by encouraging the NRC to continue improving its internal
processes, such as increasing the efficiency of reviews, safety
evaluations and the consideration of license renewal applications.
An efficient nuclear licensing process is especially crucial so
that nuclear operating companies can make timely business decisions
required in a competitive market. The economic viability of a license
transfer proposal can change entirely due to the length of a commission
review. The public interest can best be served when a relicensing
process is managed expediently and not delayed by an unnecessarily
lengthy, undisciplined hearing process. The NRC has recognized the
importance of swift action in these cases and should be commended for
its attention in 1998 to improving the licensing process. The
commission should continue to ensure timely reviews and disciplined
licensing board proceedings related to license transfers or amendments,
and ensure that issues raised by intervenors in NRC proceedings are
based on legitimate safety issues.
reducing user fees and eliminating duplicative radiation standards
Other industry issues also require agency reform and legislative
attention. Last year, Congress approved a single-year extension of the
NRC's authority to collect 100 percent user fees from licensees. The
Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1990, as amended, requires
that the Agency recover approximately 100 percent of its budget
authority by assessing licensees annual fees consistent with the
regulatory benefits derived. Most of those fees are collected as a
generic assessment equally levied against licensees, creating, in
effect, a ``miscellaneous'' category to describe nearly 80 percent of
its budget. This practice is contrary to sound and accountable
budgeting. Legislation is needed to modify the fee structure so that
licensees are assessed only for those NRC programs necessary to
regulate them. Unrelated agency expenditures, such as international
activities and regulatory support to agreement states or other Federal
agencies, should not be included in nuclear plant licensee user fees,
but should be included in a specific line item on the NRC's budget,
subject to the authorization and appropriations process. Additionally,
the Agency's ability to collect user fees should be authorized annually
by Congress until the commission completes its regulatory reform
initiatives.
On another front, this subcommittee is uniquely positioned to
resolve the impasse between the NRC and the Environmental Protection
Agency in setting radiation standards. This duplicative regulation
exists in many areas, but is most apparent in establishing radiation
standards for a national repository for used nuclear fuel. This
subcommittee has jurisdiction over both Federal agencies and should
clarify that the proper scientific authority for this issue rests with
the NRC, which has the expertise in setting standards for nuclear
facilities. The commission's regulations have proven effective in
protecting public health and safety as well as worker safety.
Conversely, EPA has little direct experience in regulating the use of
radioactive materials and relies on a regulatory philosophy that lacks
a scientific underpinning. The industry encourages this subcommittee to
take actions necessary to eliminate dual regulation of nuclear
facilities.
a road map for comprehensive reform
Mr. Chairman, Congress should continue its close oversight of the
NRC and support effort to replace its outdated regulatory scheme with a
risk-informed, performance-based process that is focused on those areas
most important to safety. I cannot overstate the importance of this
subcommittee's oversight, which has been instrumental in the NRC
commissioners and staff completing work on many long-standing issues,
including outlining a plan to adopt a risk-informed approach to NRC
regulations and revising the assessment process to use objective plant
performance indicators.
Congress plays a vital role in assuring that Federal nuclear
regulations recognize the transition to a competitive electricity
market while protecting public health and safety and preserving the
nation's energy security. In that capacity, allow me to summarize the
industry's recommendations for congressional action:
Require the NRC to prepare and maintain a multi-year
strategic direction to achieve a safety-focused, results-oriented
regulatory process--with clear accountabilities within the Agency--that
protects public health and safety. This long-term strategy should
incorporate the principles discussed in this testimony and include the
use of annual plans, which include meaningful regulatory reform
objectives with measurable results. The commission should apprise
Congress of its progress through periodic status reports.
Schedule a hearing in June and direct the NRC
commissioners to present the Agency's multi-year strategy for reforming
the regulatory process at that time. The NRC should ultimately optimize
its resources, including an examination of its organizational
structure, to conform with the new vision of regulatory oversight.
Ensure the NRC adheres fully to the requirements of the
Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act and submit legislation, if
necessary, to modify the fee structure so that licensees are assessed
fees only for those NRC programs related directly to licensee
regulation. Most of those fees are collected as a generic assessment
equally levied against licensees, creating, in effect, a
``miscellaneous'' category to describe nearly 80 percent of its budget.
This practice is contrary to sound and accountable budgeting. The
agency's ability to collect user fees should be authorized annually by
Congress until the commission completes its regulatory reform
initiatives.
Resolve the impasse between the NRC and the Environmental
Protection Agency in setting radiation protection standards. This
subcommittee has jurisdiction over both Federal agencies and should
clarify that the proper scientific authority for this issue rests with
the NRC, which has the expertise in setting standards for nuclear
facilities. The commission's regulations have proven effective in
protecting public health and safety as well as worker safety.
Mr. Chairman, the industry requests that this subcommittee continue
its close oversight of the NRC to ensure the necessary steps toward
broad reform of the Agency are being taken in a comprehensive and
timely manner. The NRC has made tremendous progress in recent months,
but it must establish the long-term vision and work plan for making the
regulatory framework for the commercial nuclear energy industry risk-
informed and performance-based, and focused on those areas most
important to protect the health and safety of the public.
______
Statement of Ms. Gary L. Jones, Associate Director, Energy, Resources,
and Science Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development
Division, General Accounting Office
nuclear regulatory commission: strategy needed to develop a risk-
informed safety approach
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: We are here to
testify about the actions that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
has taken to move from its traditional regulatory approach to an
approach that considers risk in conjunction with engineering analyses
and operating experience-termed risk-informed regulation. NRC believes
that a risk-informed approach would reduce unnecessary regulatory
burden and costs, without reducing safety.
Our testimony today is based on ongoing work we are conducting for
Senators Lieberman and Biden. Specifically, our testimony discusses the
(1) issues that NRC needs to resolve to implement a risk-informed
regulatory approach and (2) status of NRC's efforts to make two of its
oversight programs--overall plant safety assessments and enforcement--
risk-informed. In addition, in January 1999, we provided the Congress
with our views on the major management challenges that NRC faces.\1\
Our testimony discusses these challenges and their relationship to
NRC's efforts to consider risk in its regulatory activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management
Challenges and Program Risks: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (GAO/OCG-
99-19, Jan. 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, we are finding that:
Since July 1998, NRC has accelerated some activities
needed to implement a risk-informed regulatory approach and has
established and set milestones for others. However, NRC has not
resolved the most basic of issues; that is, that some utilities do not
have current and accurate design information for their nuclear power
plants, which is needed for a risk-informed approach. Also, neither NRC
nor the nuclear utility industry have standards or guidance that define
the quality or adequacy of the risk assessments that utilities use to
identify and measure the risks to public health and the environment.\2\
Furthermore, NRC has not determined if compliance with risk-informed
regulations will be voluntary or mandatory for the nuclear utility
industry. More fundamentally, NRC has not developed a comprehensive
strategy that would move its regulation of the safety of nuclear power
plants from its traditional approach to an approach that considers
risk.
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\2\Risk assessments systematically examine complex technical
systems to attempt to quantify the probabilities that a potential
accident will occur and the resulting consequences. By their nature,
risk assessments are statements of uncertainty that identify and assign
probabilities to events that rarely occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 1999, NRC released for comment a proposed
process to assess the overall safety of nuclear power plants. The
process would establish generic and plant-specific safety thresholds
and indicators to help NRC assess overall plant safety. NRC expects to
phase in the new process over the next 2 years and evaluate it by June
2001, at which time NRC would propose any adjustments or modifications
needed. In addition, NRC has been examining the changes needed to its
enforcement program to make it consistent with, among other things, the
proposed plant safety assessment process. For many years, the nuclear
industry and public interest groups have criticized the enforcement
program as subjective. In the spring of 1999, NRC staff expect to
provide the Commission recommendations for revising the enforcement
program.
In January 1999, we identified major management challenges
that limit NRC's effectiveness. The challenges include the lack of a
definition of safety and lack of aggressiveness in requiring utilities
to comply with safety regulations. NRC's revised plant safety
assessment and enforcement initiatives may ultimately help the Agency
address these management challenges and carry out its safety mission
more effectively and efficiently.
background
NRC is responsible for ensuring that the nation's 103 operating
commercial nuclear power plants pose no undue risk to public health and
safety. Now, however, the electric utility industry is faced with an
unprecedented, overarching development: the economic restructuring of
the nation's electric power system, from a regulated industry to one
driven by competition. According to one study, as many as 26 of the
nation's nuclear power plant sites are vulnerable to shutdown because
production costs are higher than the projected market prices of
electricity.\3\ As the electric utility industry is deregulated,
operating and maintenance costs will affect the competitiveness of
nuclear power plants. NRC acknowledges that competition will challenge
it to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden while ensuring that safety
margins are not compromised by utilities' cost-cutting measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\World Energy Service: U.S. Outlook (Standard & Poor's, Apr.
1998).
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Since the early 1980's, NRC has been considering the role of risk
in the regulatory process, and in August 1995, NRC issued a policy
statement that advocated certain changes in the development and
implementation of its regulations through an approach more focused on
risk assessment. Under such an approach, NRC and the utilities would
give more emphasis to those structures, systems, and components deemed
more significant to safety. The following example illustrates the
difference between NRC's existing and a risk-informed approach. One
particular nuclear plant has about 635 valves and 33 pumps that the
utility must operate, maintain, and periodically replace according to
NRC's existing regulations. Under a risk-informed approach, the utility
found that about 515 valves and 12 pumps presented a low safety risk.
The utility identified 25 components that were a high risk but would
have been treated the same as other components under the existing
regulations. If the utility concentrated on the 120 valves, 21 pumps,
and 25 components that have been identified as having a high safety
risk, it could reduce its regulatory compliance burden and costs.
nrc has not resolved many issues needed to implement a risk-informed
regulatory approach
NRC staff estimate that it could take 4 to 8 years to implement a
risk-informed regulatory approach and are working to resolve many
issues to ensure that the new approach does not endanger public health
and safety. Although NRC has issued guidance for utilities to use risk
assessments to meet regulatory requirements for specific activities and
has undertaken many activities to implement a risk-informed approach,
more is needed to:
ensure that utilities have current and accurate
documentation on the design of the plant and structures, systems, and
components within it and final safety analysis reports that reflect
changes to the design and other analyses conducted after NRC issued the
operating license.
ensure that utilities make changes to their plants based
on complete and accurate design and final safety analysis information.
determine whether, how, and what aspects of NRC's
regulations to change.
develop standards on the scope and detail of the risk
assessments needed for utilities to determine that changes to their
plants' design will not negatively effect safety.
determine whether compliance with risk-informed
regulations should be mandatory or voluntary.
Furthermore, NRC has not developed a comprehensive strategy that
would move its regulation of nuclear plant safety from its traditional
approach to an approach that considers risk.
Utilities Do Not Have Accurate and Reliable Design Information for Some
Plants
Design information provides one of the basis for NRC's safety
regulation. Yet, for more than 10 years, NRC has questioned whether
utilities had accurate design information for their plants. Inspections
of 26 plants that NRC completed early in fiscal year 1999 confirmed
that for some plants (1) utilities had not maintained accurate design
documentation, (2) NRC did not have assurance that safety systems would
perform as intended at all times, and (3) NRC needed to clarify what
constitutes design information subject to NRC's regulations. As of
November 1998, NRC had taken escalated enforcement actions for
violations found at five plants--Three Mile Island, Perry, H.B.
Robinson, Vermont Yankee, and D.C. Cook. NRC took these actions because
it did not have assurance that the plants' safety systems would perform
as intended. One utility, American Electric Power, shut down its D.C.
Cook plant as a result of the inspection findings.
NRC does not plan additional design team inspections because it
concluded that the industry did not have serious safety problems. NRC's
Chairman disagreed with this broad conclusion, noting that (1) the
inspection results for the five plants indicate the importance of
maintaining current and accurate design and facility configuration
information, (2) the inspections did not apply to the industry as a
whole but to only certain utilities and plants within the industry, and
(3) other NRC inspections identified design problems at other such
nuclear power plants as Crystal River 3, Millstone, Haddam Neck, and
Maine Yankee. The commissioners and staff agreed that NRC would oversee
design information issues using such tools as safety system engineering
inspections.
The 26 inspections also identified a need for NRC to better define
the elements of a plant's design that are subject to NRC's regulations.
NRC staff acknowledge that the existing regulation is a very broad,
general statement that has been interpreted differently among NRC staff
and among utility and industry officials. According to NRC staff, it is
very difficult to develop guidance describing what constitutes adequate
design information. Therefore, NRC has agreed that the Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI) would provide explicit examples of what falls within
design parameters.\4\ NEI plans to draft guidance that will include
examples of design information and provide it to NRC in January 1999.
Concurrently, NRC is developing regulatory guidance on design
information. NRC staff expect to recommend to the Commission in
February 1999 that it endorse either NRC's or NEI's guidance and seek
approval to obtain public comments in March or April 1999. NRC
officials could not estimate when the Agency would complete this
effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\NEI has members from all utilities licensed to operate
commercial nuclear plants in the United States as well as nuclear plant
designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication
facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and
individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry. NEI establishes
unified nuclear industry policy on such matters as generic operational
and technical issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Does Not Have Confidence That Safety Analysis Reports Reflect
Current Plant Designs
At the time NRC licenses a plant, the utility prepares a safety
analysis report; NRC regulations require the utility to update the
report to reflect changes to the plant design and the results of
analyses that support modifying the plants without prior NRC approval.
As such, the report provides one of the foundations to support a risk-
informed approach. Yet, NRC does not have confidence that utilities
make the required updates, which results in poor documentation of the
safety basis for the plants.
NRC published guidance for the organization and contents of safety
analysis reports in June 1966 and updated the guidance in December
1980. NRC acknowledges that the guidance is limited resulting in poorly
articulated staff comments on the quality of the safety analysis
reports and a lack of understanding among utilities about the specific
aspects of the safety analysis reports that should be updated. On June
30, 1998, NRC directed its staff to continue working with NEI to
finalize the industry's guidelines on safety analysis report updates,
which NRC could then endorse. Once the Agency endorses the guidelines,
it will obtain public comments and revise them, if appropriate. NRC
expects to issue final guidelines in September 1999.
Erroneous Evaluations Can Erode Design and Safety Margins
According to NRC documents, if a utility does not have complete and
accurate design information, the evaluations conducted to determine
whether it can modify a plant without prior NRC approval can lead to
erroneous conclusions and jeopardize safety. For more than 30 years,
NRC's regulations have provided a set of criteria that utilities must
use to determine whether they may change their facilities (as described
in the final safety analysis report) or procedures or conduct tests and
experiments without NRC's prior review and approval.
However, in 1993, NRC became aware that Northeast Nuclear Energy
Company had refueled Millstone Unit 1 in a manner contrary to that
allowed in the updated final safety analysis and its operating license.
This led NRC to question the regulatory framework that allows licensees
to change their facilities without prior NRC approval. As a result, NRC
staff initiated a review to identify the short-and long-term actions
needed to improve the process. For example, in October 1998, NRC
published a proposed regulation regarding plant changes in the Federal
Register for comment; the comment period ended on December 21, 1998.
NRC requested comments on criteria for identifying changes that require
a license amendment and on a range of options, several of which would
allow utilities to make changes without prior NRC approval despite a
potential increase in the probability or consequences of an accident.
NRC expects to issue a final regulation in June 1999.
In addition, in February 1999, NRC staff expect to provide their
views to the Commission on changing the scope of the regulation to
consider risk. NRC's memorandum that tracks the various tasks related
to a risk-informed approach and other initiatives did not show when NRC
would resolve this issue.
Making Its Regulations Risk-Informed Will Be a Challenge to NRC and the
Industry
Until recently, NRC did not consider whether and to what extent the
Agency should revise all its regulations pertaining to commercial
nuclear plants to make them risk-informed. Revising the regulations
will be a formidable task because, according to NRC staff,
inconsistencies exist among the regulations and because a risk-informed
approach focuses on the potential risk of structures, systems, or
components, regardless of whether they are located in the plant's
primary (radiological) or secondary (electricity-producing) systems.
With one exception, NRC has not attempted to extend its regulatory
authority to the secondary systems.
NRC staff and NEI officials agree that the first priority in
revising the regulations will be to define their scope as well as the
meaning of such concepts as ``important to safety'' and ``risk
significant'' and integrating the traditional and risk-informed
approaches into a cohesive regulatory context. In October 1998, NEI
proposed a phased approach to revise the regulations. Under the
proposal, by the end of 1999, NRC would define ``important to safety''
and ``risk significant.'' By the end of 2000, NRC would use the
definitions in proposed rulemakings for such regulations as definition
of design information and environmental qualification for electrical
equipment. By the end of 2003, NEI proposes that NRC address other
regulatory issues, such as the change process, the content of technical
specifications, and license amendments. After 2003, NEI proposes that
NRC would address other regulations on a case-by-case basis.
NRC staff agreed that the Agency must take a phased approach when
revising its regulations. The Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research, said that, if NRC attempted to revise all provisions of the
regulations simultaneously, it is conceivable that the Agency would
accomplish very little. The Director said that NRC needs to address one
issue at a time while concurrently working on longer-term actions. He
cautioned, however, that once NRC starts, it should be committed to
completing the process. At a January 1999 meeting, NRC's Chairman
suggested a more aggressive approach that would entail risk informing
all regulations across the board. NRC's memorandum that tracks the
various tasks related to a risk-informed approach and other initiatives
did not show when the Agency would resolve this issue.
NRC Does Not Have A Standard for the Content of Risk Assessments
NRC and the industry view risk assessments as one of the main tools
to be used to identify and focus on those structures, systems, or
components of nuclear plant operations having the greatest risk. Yet,
neither NRC nor the industry has a standard or guidance that defines
the quality, scope, or adequacy of risk assessments. NRC staff are
working with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers to develop
such a standard.
However, this issue is far from being resolved. The Society is
developing the standard for risk assessments in two phases (internal
events and emergency preparedness). NRC staff estimate that the Agency
would have a final standard on the first phase by June 2000 but could
not estimate when the second phase would be complete. To ensure
consistency with other initiatives, in December 1998, NRC staff
requested the Commission's direction on the quality of risk assessments
needed to implement a risk-informed approach. Since it may be several
years until NRC has a standard, the Commission should also consider the
effect that the lack of a standard could have on its efforts to
implement a risk-informed regulatory approach.
NRC Has Not Determined Whether Compliance With Risk-Informed
Regulations Would Be Mandatory or Voluntary
NRC has not determined whether compliance with revised risk-
informed regulations would be mandatory or voluntary for utilities. In
December 1998, NRC's staff provided its recommendations to the
Commission. The staff recommended that implementation be voluntary,
noting that it would be very difficult to show that requiring mandatory
compliance will increase public health and safety and could create the
impression that current plants are less safe. In its analysis, the
staff did not provide the Commission with information on the number of
plants that would be interested in such an approach. In January 1999,
the commissioners expressed concern about a voluntary approach,
believing that it would create two classes of plants operating under
two different sets of regulations.
Utilities may be reluctant to shift to a risk-informed regulatory
approach for various reasons. First, the number of years remaining on a
plant's operating license is likely to influence the utility's views.
NRC acknowledged that if a plant's license is due to expire in 10 years
or less, then the utility may not have anything to gain by changing
from the traditional approach. Second, the costs to comply may outweigh
the benefits of doing so. Considering the investment that will be
needed to develop risk-informed procedures and operations and identify
safety-significant structures, systems, or components, utilities
question whether a switch will be worth the reduction in regulatory
burden and cost savings that may result. Third, design differences and
age disparities among plants make it difficult for NRC and the industry
to determine how, or to what extent, a standardized risk-informed
approach can be implemented across the industry. Although utilities
built one of two types of reactors--boiling water or pressurized water
reactors--each has design and operational differences. Thus, each plant
is unique, and a risk-informed approach would require plant-specific
tailoring.
NRC Has Not Developed a Strategic Plan to Implement a Risk-Informed
Approach
Since the early 1980's, NRC has considered applying risk to the
regulatory process. NRC staff estimate that it will be at least 4 to 8
years before the Agency implements a risk-informed approach. However,
NRC has not developed a strategic plan that includes objectives, time
lines, and performance measures for such an approach.
Rather, NRC has developed an implementation plan, in conjunction
with its policy statement on considering risk, that is a catalog of
about 150 separate tasks and milestones for their completion. It has
also developed guidance for some activities, such as pilot projects in
the four areas where the industry wanted to test the application of a
risk-informed approach. In one case, NRC approved a pilot project for
Houston Lighting and Power Company at its South Texas plant, and the
utility found that it could not implement it because the pilot project
would conflict with other NRC regulations.
Given the complexity and interdependence of NRC's requirements,
such as regulations, plant design, and safety documents and the results
of ongoing activities, it is critical that NRC clearly articulate how
the various initiatives will help achieve the goals set out in the 1995
policy statement. Although NRC's implementation plan sets out tasks and
expected completion dates, it does not ensure that short-term efforts
are building toward NRC's longer-term goals; does not link the various
ongoing initiatives; does not help the Agency determine appropriate
staff levels, training, skills, and technology needed and the timing of
those activities to implement a risk-informed approach; does not
provide a link between the day-to-day activities of program managers
and staff and the objectives set out in the policy statement; and does
not address the manner in which it would establish baseline information
about the plants to assess the safety impact of a risk-informed
approach.
In a December 1998 memorandum, NRC staff said that once the
Commission provides direction on whether and how to risk-inform the
regulations and guidance on the quality of risk assessments to support
their decisions for specific regulations, they would develop a plan to
implement the direction provided. The staff did not provide an
estimated timeframe for completing the plan.
the status of nrc's assessment and enforcement processes: many
unanswered issues remain
For many years, the nuclear industry and public interest groups
have criticized NRC's plant assessment and enforcement processes
because they lacked objectivity, consistency, predictability. In
January 1999, NRC proposed a new process to assess overall plant
performance based on generic and plant-specific safety thresholds and
performance indicators. NRC is also reviewing its enforcement process
to ensure consistency with the staff's recommended direction for the
assessment process and other programs.
NRC Is Trying to Make Its Plant Assessment Process More Objective and
Transparent
In 1997 and 1998, we noted that NRC's process to focus attention on
plants with declining safety performance needed substantial revisions
to achieve its purpose as an early warning tool and that NRC did not
consistently apply the process across the industry.\5\ We also noted
that this inconsistency has been attributed, in part, to the lack of
specific criteria, the subjective nature of the process, and the
confusion of some NRC managers about their role in the process. NRC
acknowledged that it should do a better job of identifying plants
deserving increased regulatory attention and said that it was
developing a new process that would be predictable, nonredundant,
efficient, and risk-informed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\Nuclear Regulation: Preventing Problem Plants Requires More
Effective NRC Action (GAO/RCED-97-145, May 30, 1997) and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission: Preventing Problem Plants Requires More
Effective Action by NRC (GAO/T-RCED-98-252, July 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 1999, NRC proposed a new plant assessment process that
includes seven ``cornerstones.''\6\ For each cornerstone, NRC will
identify the desired result, important attributes that contribute to
achieving the desired result, areas to be measured, and the various
ways that exist to measure the identified areas. Three issues cut
across the seven cornerstones: human performance, safety conscious work
environment, and problem identification and resolution. As proposed,
NRC's plant assessment process would use performance indicators,
inspection results, other such information as utility self-assessments,
and clearly defined, objective decision thresholds. The process is
anchored in a number of principles, including that: (1) a level of
safety performance exists that could warrant decreased NRC oversight,
(2) performance thresholds should be set high enough to permit NRC to
arrest declining performance, (3) NRC must assess both performance
indicators and inspection findings, and (4) NRC will establish a
minimum level of inspections for all plants (regardless of
performance). Although some performance indicators would be generic to
the industry, others would be plant-specific based, in part, on the
results that utilities derive from their risk assessments. However, the
quality of risk assessments and number of staff devoted to maintain
them vary considerably among utilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\The seven cornerstones are: initiating events, mitigation
systems, barrier integrity, emergency preparedness, and public,
occupational, and physical protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC expects to use a phased approach to implement the revised plant
assessment process. Beginning in June 1999, NRC expects to pilot test
the use of risk-informed performance indicators at eight plants, by
January 2000 to fully implement the process, and by June 2001 to
complete an evaluation and propose any adjustments or modifications
needed. Between January 1999 and January 2001, NRC expects to work with
the industry and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive set of
performance indicators to more directly assess plant performance
relative to the cornerstones. For those cornerstones or aspects of
cornerstones where it is impractical or impossible to develop
performance indicators, NRC would use its inspections and utilities'
self assessments to reach a conclusion about plant performance. NRC's
proposed process illustrates an effort by the current chairman and
other commissioners to improve NRC's ability to help ensure safe
operations of the nation's nuclear plants as well as address industry
concerns regarding excessive regulation. NRC's ensuring consistent
implementation of the process ultimately established would further
illustrate the commissioners' commitment.
NRC's Enforcement Process Continues to be In a State of Flux
NRC has revised its enforcement policy more than 30 times since its
implementation in 1980. Although NRC has attempted to make the policy
more equitable, the industry has had longstanding problems with it.
Specifically, NET believes that the policy is not safety-related,
timely, or objective. Among the more contentious issues are NRC's
practice of aggregating lesser violations into an enforcement action
that results in civil penalties and its use of the term ``regulatory
significance.''
To facilitate a discussion about the enforcement program, including
the use of regulatory significance and the practice of aggregating
lesser violations, at NRC's request, NEI and the Union of Concerned
Scientists reviewed 56 enforcement actions taken by the Agency during
fiscal year 1998. For example, NEI reviewed the escalated enforcement
actions based on specific criteria, such as whether the violation that
resulted in an enforcement action could cause an offsite release of
radiation, onsite or offsite radiation exposures, or core damage. From
an overall perspective, the Union concluded that NRC's actions are
neither consistent nor repeatable and that the enforcement actions did
not always reflect the severity of the offense. According to NRC staff,
they plan to meet with various stakeholders in January and February
1999 to discuss issues related to the enforcement program.
Another issue is the use of the term ``regulatory significance'' by
NRC inspectors. NRC, according to NEI and the Union of Concerned
Scientists, uses ``regulatory significance'' when inspectors cannot
define the safety significance of violations. However, when the use of
regulatory significance results in financial penalties, neither NRC nor
the utility can explain to the public the reasons for the violation. As
a result, the public cannot determine whether the violation presented a
safety concern.
NEI has proposed a revised enforcement process. NRC is reviewing
the proposal as well as other changes to the enforcement process to
ensure consistency with the draft plant safety assessment process and
other changes being proposed as NRC moves to risk-informed regulation.
NRC's memorandum of tasks shows that the staff expect to provide
recommendations to the Commission in March 1999 that address the use of
the term regulatory significance and in May 1999 on considering risk in
the enforcement process.
major management challenges and program risks
In January 1999, we provided the Congress with our views on the
major management challenges that NRC faces. We believe that the
management challenges we identified have limited NRC's effectiveness.
In summary, we reported that:
NRC lacks assurance that its current regulatory approach
ensures safety. NRC assumes that plants are safe if they operate as
designed and follow NRC's regulations. However, NRC's regulations and
other guidance do not define, for either a licensee or the public, the
conditions necessary for a plant's safety; therefore, determining a
plant's safety is subjective.
NRC's oversight has been inadequate and slow. Although
NRC's indicators show that conditions throughout the nuclear energy
industry have generally improved, they also show that some nuclear
plants are chronically poor performers. At three nuclear plants with
long-standing safety problems that we reviewed, NRC did not take
aggressive action to ensure that the utilities corrected the problems.
As a result of NRC's inaction, the conditions at the plants worsened,
reducing safety margins.
NRC's culture and organizational structure have made the
process of addressing concerns with the Agency's regulatory approach
slow and ineffective. Since 1979, various reviews have concluded that
NRC's organizational structure, inadequate management control, and
inability to oversee itself have impeded its effectiveness.
Some of the initiatives that NRC has underway have the potential to
address the first two management challenges. However, the need to
ensure that NRC's regulatory programs work as effectively as possible
is extremely important, particularly in light of major changes taking
place in the electric utility industry and in NRC. Yet changing NRC's
culture will not be easy. In a June 1998 report, the Office of the
Inspector General noted that NRC's staff had a strong commitment to
protecting public health and safety.
However, the staff expressed high levels of uncertainty and
confusion about the new directions in regulatory practices and
challenges facing the Agency. The employees said that, in their view,
they spend too much time on paperwork that may not contribute to NRC's
safety mission. The Inspector General concluded that without
significant and meaningful improvement in management's leadership,
employees' involvement, and communication, NRC's current climate could
eventually erode the employees' outlook and commitment to doing their
job. This climate could also erode NRC's progress in moving forward
with a risk-informed regulatory approach. According to staff, NRC
recognizes the need to effectively communicate with its staff and other
stakeholders and is developing plans to do so.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes our
statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions you may
have.
______
Statement of David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists
After the subcommittee's hearing last July, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission developed a plan to improve its reactor oversight program.
The NRC intends to phase in these improvements at a few nuclear plants
this year, and then adopt them for all plants next year.
As I recently told the NRC commissioners,\1\ UCS believes that the
NRC has a good plan. However, the plan's quality is not the most
important factor in determining whether the NRC succeeds in its
oversight mission. What matters most is how well the Agency implements
its program. Too often, the NRC fails to follow its plans and does not
regulate in a consistent, timely manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Union of Concerned Scientists, Presentation to NRC
commissioners, ``Looking for Goldilocks: The NRC's Inspection,
Assessment, and Enforcement Programs,'' January 20, 1999. (Attached)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NRC's Inspector General recently reported\2\ to Senator
Lieberman that the Agency failed to properly discharge its
responsibilities to the people of Connecticut and to workers at the
Millstone Nuclear Power Station. These failures are particularly
troubling because they involved the highest profile nuclear facility in
the country. The NRC created a Special Projects Office with
responsibility for only one site--Millstone. The Inspector General
documented numerous regulatory failures involving that office despite
its singular focus. The Inspector General also reported that many
failures were caused by the NRC not following its own procedures and
policies.
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\2\ Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspector General,. ``NRC Staff's
Handling of Harassment and Intimidation Complaints at Millstone (Case
No. 99-015),'' December 31, 1998.
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The Inspector General's report is the latest example in a long
history of the NRC's failing to follow through on its plans. Let me
cite fire protection as an old, yet still ongoing, example. The NRC
created Appendix R, the fire protection rule, to 10 CFR Part 50 in
January 1980 to address safety concerns following the serious fire at
the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in Alabama in March 1975.
Nineteen years later, the majority of nuclear plants do not now,
and never have, satisfied the Appendix R regulations. When Rep. Markey
asked the NRC about this situation in May 1997, the Agency replied that
it was considering a revision to Appendix R. Nearly 2 years later, we
understand that the Agency is still thinking about revising the
regulation. Last December, Rep. Markey asked the General Accounting
Office to investigate fire safety issues at nuclear plants.
In the meantime, the majority of nuclear plants are operating in
violation of fire safety regulations. At the Salem Generating Station
in New Jersey, for example, both reactors were shut down from 1995 to
1997 while its owner made extensive repairs to safety equipment.
Numerous fire protection deficiencies went uncorrected during this
lengthy shut down. The NRC allowed both reactors to restart despite
knowing that fire protection requirements were not met. Not only that,
but the NRC is content with the owner's plans to leave the problems
uncorrected for several more years.
The NRC tolerates violation of its fire protection regulations
because plant owners have taken so-called interim compensatory
measures. The most common of these measures involves workers, called
fire watches, walking through the plants looking for smoke or flames.
Such ``interim'' measures have been used for more than 6 years at many
plants.
But interim measures are not a substitute for permanent solutions.
When I get a flat tire, I replace it with a spare mini-tire. That's an
interim measure I can use until I get the flat fixed or a new tire. It
would be irresponsible for me to undertake a cross-country trip on that
interim mini-tire. My poor judgment would place myself and other
travelers at an undue risk. Likewise, it is irresponsible for the NRC
to rely on fire watches indefinitely. This poor decision places
millions of Americans living around nuclear plants at undue risk.
The risk from fire is real. The NRC reported\3\ that fire
represents 7 to 50 percent of the overall reactor core damage risk at
nuclear plants. According to this data, there is a plant where the fire
risk equals the risk from all other accident scenarios combined. So,
the fire risk is real. And the regulations created to properly manage
that risk are essentially being ignored by the NRC.
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\3\ Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1150, ``Severe Accident
Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,'' June 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We respectfully request that this subcommittee compel the NRC to
resolve the fire protection problems. The NRC must either enforce or
revise its fire safety regulations. Continued neglect, predicated on
``interim'' compensatory measures and ``considerations'' of rulemaking,
must end. The regulations were promulgated in direct response to the
serious Browns Ferry fire. If another serious nuclear plant fire were
to occur, the American public would be very distressed to learn that
these fire protection regulations had not been enforced.
Your subcommittee's oversight hearings have accelerated the NRC's
change process. We sincerely appreciate the subcommittee's efforts in
this regard. We trust that this subcommittee will not judge the NRC
solely on its plans. We hope that you will evaluate the results from
these new and improved processes, even though this data will not be
available until late this year. We respectfully request that this
subcommittee continue these efforts to ensure that the NRC reaps the
maximum benefits from its plans.
______
looking for goldilocks: the nrc's inspection, assessment, and
enforcement programs
The NRC staff is to be commended for the comprehensive and thorough
reactor oversight process improvement recommendations detailed in SECY-
99-007. They faced a daunting challenge while seeking a ``Goldilocks''
oversight process--one that is not too stringent or too lax, but just
right. A large number of our concerns have been addressed. On paper,
this process appears fundamentally sound and capable of successfully
meeting the stated expectations. However, it must be noted that, on
paper, so was the old process. It's not the process that will make or
break this effort, it's the implementation.
The process was developed with an objective of increasing public
confidence in the NRC's regulatory function. Key elements of the new
process are these seven cornerstones of plant safety:
(1) limit the frequency of initiating events;
(2) ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of
mitigating systems;
(3) ensure the integrity of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant
system, and containment boundaries;
(4) ensure the adequacy of the emergency preparedness functions;
(5) protect the public from exposure to radioactive material
releases;
(6) protect nuclear plant workers from exposure to radiation; and
(7) provide assurance that the physical protection system can
protect against the design-basis threat of radiological sabotage.
Even though these cornerstones are easier to understand than the
concepts evaluated in the SALP process, the proposed reactor oversight
process is substantially different than the old process. The public
needs a chance to understand the proposed process. The transition plan
has a column labeled ``Communication.'' Other than a few press releases
and a 30-day comment period for the overall process, there's not much
in the way of educating the public. The draft documents and SECY paper
may be useful working documents for the NRC and industry, but they
cannot be used to educate the public. They contain too much nukespeak
(i.e., technical jargon and acronyms). A brief, plain-English
description of the proposed process should be developed before the
comment period begins and provided in the Federal Notice.
Inspection Process
The NRC's limited inspections provide it with a very small slice of
the overall safety picture at nuclear plants. It is important that the
NRC properly characterize its findings. Based on my experience prior to
joining UCS, it appeared that inspection findings were graded on a
curve because the threshold for a non-conforming condition seemed lower
at a plant which the staff believed to have performance problems than
it was at a plant that the staff believed was doing OK. The staff's
feelings toward licensees must not influence inspection findings to
prevent a self-fulfilling prophecy situation.
Since the proposed baseline inspections will concentrate on areas
not covered by performance indicators, there will be little chance to
confirm or refute inspection findings. Findings that are too positive
or too negative will likely pass through to the assessment process
unchallenged. Findings that are ``just right'' are very important.
The NRC's Inspection Manual tells inspectors what to examine and
how often, but does not provide much assistance in the form of
objective acceptance criteria. As a result, inspectors are being asked
to evaluate the condition of a plant component or a plant owner's
process without benefit of an ``answer key.'' As the Inspection Manual
chapters is revised, the NRC should provide objective acceptance
criteria whenever possible. Otherwise, inspections findings may
continue to be influenced by the staff's perceptions of licensee
performance.
The NRC should post all the inspection reports issued for each
operating nuclear plant within the past year on its internet website.
Assessment Process
In Table 4.1, the staff listed the following success criterion for
the assessment process:
Number of executive over-rides (cases where the outcome is
something different than the input) at end-of-cycle review is less than
5 percent.
Since there are about 25 plants in each region, this would consider
one plant in each region or five plants in one region being handled
subjectively as a success. That is wrong. That would be carrying over a
major flaw of the SALP process into the new process. The appropriate
goal should be no executive over-rides. None. The staff, on occasion,
may be justified in over-riding the assessment results with its
judgment, but that situation should not be considered to be a
successful outcome of the assessment process. Executive over-rides
should be used very sparingly and not routinely accepted.
The proposed assessment process relies heavily on performance
indicators. We have the following concerns regarding the use of these
indicators:
The Reactor Coolant System specific activity PI has a
green-to-white threshold of >50 percent of the Technical Specification
limit. This PI is intended to monitor the integrity of the fuel
cladding barrier. In April 1998, UCS provided a technical report to the
NRC on our research which concluded that it is illegal and potentially
unsafe for nuclear plants to operate with any fuel leakers. We have
since submitted 2.206 petitions on the River Bend and Perry plants
because these plants are operating with known fuel leakers. In our
report and our petitions, we have challenged the bases for the RCS
specific activity Technical Specification. We respectfully request that
the NRC staff answer our nuclear safety concerns raised nearly a year
ago before adopting this PI.
The Containment Leakage PI has a green-to-white threshold
of >100 percent LA. Containment leakage is a virtually
meaningless indicator. The containment integrated leak rate tests are
performed every 18 to 24 months with the plants shut down. If leakage
exceeds 100 percent LA the plant will not restart. Thus, it
is highly unlikely that this PI will be anything but green. A PI that
doesn't ever change color is worse than useless because it provides a
false sense of security.
Speaking of false senses of security, the containment leakage PI
would have been in the green at DC Cook even though that facility's
containment spray and ice condenser systems were severely degraded. The
appropriate containment PI would be the reliability of the containment
heat removal systems.
The Safety System Performance Indicators suffer from the
same problem that afflicts the probabilistic risk assessments--they do
not properly account for system degradation caused by passive design
problems, or ``blunders'' to use Dr. Thadani's term. For example, the
Emergency Power PI has a green-to-white threshold of >0.025. In NRC
Inspection Report 50-213/96-201, dated July 31, 1996, the staff
concluded:
The most significant issue noted by the team was the failure of the
[Haddam Neck] licensee to appropriately consider design-basis scenario
loads on the Class 1E station batteries sizing calculations.
Specifically, the licensee's calculation did not account for all of the
loads associated with a LOCA coincident with loss-of-offsite-power, and
did not demonstrate that the battery voltage would remain above the
minimum level required for operation of equipment.
In other words, the safety-related batteries at Haddam Neck, which
passed the Technical Specification surveillance tests for years with
flying colors, would have failed in event of an accident due to a
design problem. Yet, design problems like these do not count against
the system reliability numbers. The PI's must reflect that reality or
they will provide misleading signals.
Curiously, while the Haddam Neck inspection report documented
numerous problems with systems intended to protect public health and
safety, the systems needed to generate electricity worked well.
For the Physical Protection cornerstone, both the
personnel screening process performance and the personnel reliability
program performance indicators have a green-to-white threshold of 3-5
reportable events. The time period is not specified. We assume it is 1
year, but it should be clearly defined.
Attachment 1, Table 5 provides the action matrix proposed for
assessment program results. The second column states actions the NRC
just might take for one or two inputs in the white. Is it one or is it
two? The appropriate threshold should be clearly defined.
The fourth column on Attachment 1, Table 5 states actions the NRC
may take for repetitive degraded cornerstones et al. While the proposed
response are prudent, the trigger for this response is too subjective.
Since this response level is that level which failed at Millstone,
Salem, DC Cook, etc., it is vital that it be as clearly defined as
possible to prevent repeating those oversight errors.
Enforcement Process
The current Enforcement Policy is rumored to be non-punitive. In
the current Enforcement Policy, the staff identifies an apparent
violation of Federal safety regulations and provides the licensee an
opportunity to explain its case at a pre-decisional enforcement
conference. The staff can then impose a civil penalty on the licensee.
The licensee can pay the fine or appeal it.
``Punitive'' is defined as ``inflicting, involving, or aiming at
punishment.'' ``Punishment'' is defined as ``a penalty inflicted on an
offender through judicial procedure.'' Thus, it seems reasonable to
conclude that a process which collects multi-million dollar civil
penalties from offending licensees through an administrative process
which affords the opportunity to both contest the violation and appeal
the penalty is, in fact, punitive. If it waddles like a duck, swims
like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it's a duck. Let there be no
mistake--the Enforcement Policy is punitive. The good news is that it's
supposed to be punitive.
The bad news is that enforcement actions are so randomly applied
that the policy is totally ineffective. While there are plenty of
examples to illustrate arbitrary and capricious enforcement actions,
the classic cases are those associated with the duration of the non-
conforming condition. The statute permits the NRC to assess a penalty
of up to $110,000 per violation per day that the violation existed. The
staff rarely invokes this provision. In 1996, the NRC fined the LaSalle
licensee for about 20 days of a problem. In 1998, the NRC did not fine
the DC Cook licensee a problem lasting about the same duration. The
staff must develop the means to consistently and meaningfully apply the
per day provision of the statute.
General Observations
The staff went to considerable effort to identify how the outcome
from the inspection, assessment, and enforcement processes will be
communicated to stakeholders. It is also necessary to complement these
communications with much better documentation of staff decisions that
produced the outcome. The nuclear industry is required by NRC
regulations to provide a paper trail for decisions affecting nuclear
safety. The staff's decisions have the same importance as those made by
licensees, yet the documentation standards are significantly less
rigorous. The staff must, as a minimum, meet the industry's standards.
______
Response of David A. Lochbaum to a Question from Senator Graham
Question. In your testimony you emphasize the risk of fire at
nuclear power plants. You support this emphasis by referring to an NRC
report from 1989 that states that fire represents 7 to 50 percent of
the overall reactor core damage risk at nuclear power plants. It is my
understanding that this report has been superseded by more recent
reports on risk at each individual nuclear power plant site.
Do the newer risk reports reach the same conclusions about the risk
of fire at nuclear plants?
Response. In October 1996, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
published NUREG-1560, ``Individual Plant Examination Program:
Perspectives on Reactor Safety and Plant Performance,'' which reported
on the Agency's review of the plant-specific risk assessments submitted
for each operating nuclear power plant site. While the fire risk is not
explicitly addressed in this document as it was in the 1989 document
(NUREG-1150) that I had referenced, Section 7.3 stated:
The average CDFs [core damage frequencies] from the NUREG-
1150 PWR analyses fall within the ranges of the CDFs estimated
for the PWRs in the IPEs [individual plant examinations].
Similarly, the average CDFs for the NUREG-1150 BWR analyses
fall within the ranges of the BWR IPE values. The mix of
relative contributions of accident sequences in the IPE results
is consistent with the NUREG-1150 results.
In July 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published NUREG-
1521, ``Technical Review of Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Methods
for Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Analyses.'' In Table 4.1 of
this document, the NRC provided the fire risk for twelve (12) nuclear
power plants. The fire risk for Indian Point 2 was listed as 68% of the
overall core damage risk while the fire risk for the Limerick 1 plant
was listed as 53% of the overall core damage risk.
In my presentation, I stated that the fire contributed up to 50% of
the overall core damage risk. It appears from this recent NRC data that
I underestimated the fire risk.
______
Statement of James T. Rhodes, Chairman, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am James T. Rhodes, chairman, president
and chief executive officer of the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations, based in Atlanta, Georgia. Let me thank you for the
opportunity to represent INPO and provide testimony at this hearing.
Today, I will focus my remarks on three areas. First, I will
discuss the progress made by the industry since my testimony to this
committee last July. Second, I will highlight regulatory initiatives
that have been and will continue to be a key factor in progress for the
nuclear power industry. And third, I will focus on the importance of
effectively managing the change process, particularly as it relates to
the regulatory initiatives. This last point is especially important
given the number of organizational changes taking place at the NRC,
including the announced departure of Chairman Jackson.
continuing industry progress
In July, I discussed the improvement our industry has made in the
past decade, as measured by a number of performance indicators. Today I
am pleased to inform you that the industry has continued this solid
progress into 1999.
Although the industry began 1998 with a number of plants struggling
with extended shutdowns, the industry made a strong comeback last year.
In fact, overall performance improved more in 1998 than at any time in
recent years. Let me share with you a few key indicators of that
improvement.
By the end of 1998, most of the plants that began the year in long-
term shutdown were back on line, producing electricity for their
customers. This includes plants such as Northeast Utilities' Millstone
Unit 3 and Commonwealth Edison's Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 and
LaSalle County Station Unit 1. In addition, current data indicate that
nuclear electric generation continued to increase in 1998. For example,
Commonwealth Edison recently reported that its nuclear program ended
the year with a capacity factor of 65.5 percent--more than 10
percentage points higher than their goal for the year, and more than 15
points higher than their 1997 results.
Also, last July I reported to this committee that the trend of
significant events per unit per year had decreased from 2.38 in 1985 to
about 0.1 in 1997--a reduction factor of more than 20. Today I'm
pleased to report even further improvement. NRC event data, confirmed
by our own experience, shows an industry achievement of only .04 events
per unit this past year. This data is represented on the graph below.
The final improvement of note is the number of plants in INPO's
``Excellent'' category. Following each plant evaluation, INPO provides
an assessment number--on a scale of 1 to 5--with category one being the
``Excellent'' performers. At INPO's annual Chief Executive Officers
conference in November, we recognized 31 such plants, the most ever.
The standards are very high, and the level of performance needed to
earn an excellent rating has risen over the years. This graph shows an
impressive, positive trend for the industry.
regulatory initiatives
Now I would like to move into my second area of focus--the
regulatory changes that are important to continued improvement in the
nuclear power industry. We applaud the regulatory initiatives that the
Commission has underway. The progress made so far demonstrates the
potential for ongoing improvements in the regulatory process. Many have
said, and I will reiterate, that improvements such as these will play a
central role in the health of the industry.
We continue to be encouraged by the openness being displayed by the
NRC in communicating with its stakeholders. This open exchange of
information and ideas is a key contributor to the safe and reliable
operation of our nation's nuclear power plants.
This improved communication is evident through the NRC's periodic
stakeholder meetings, the enhanced review and approval process for
license renewal, and the ongoing development of the new reactor
oversight process. This new oversight process is especially important.
It enhances the NRC's ability to ensure public health and safety by
more effectively allocating its resources and eliminating redundant
oversight. Specifically, it will focus the inspection, assessment and
enforcement processes on safety-significant items, allowing utilities
appropriate control over activities and issues that are not safety-
significant, but are vital to plant reliability and economic viability.
We recognize that for plants to achieve and remain in the upper
band of performance defined in the proposed new oversight process, they
will need highly effective self-assessments and corrective action
programs. Let me point out that among the many areas we look at, plant
performance in the areas of self-assessments and corrective actions is
routinely reviewed during INPO plant evaluations and during our plant
assistance visits. Therefore, INPO's mission of promoting excellence in
plant operations is fully complementary to the new oversight process.
Another example of beneficial change is the significant reduction
in items identified as Level IV violations. As you may be aware, these
violations relate to issues that are not--on their own--of serious
concern. As part of its progress toward risk-informed regulation, the
NRC has clearly recognized the benefits of restricting violations to
safety significant items, while using the inspection reports as the
appropriate tool for highlighting potential areas for improvement. This
in turn encourages the utilities to be even more rigorous in analyzing
their own operations. They can be confident that proactive self-
identification of minor, non-safety-related issues will not
automatically result in civil penalties.
effectively managing change
Having discussed the continuing improvements in the nuclear
industry, and the regulatory initiatives that have supported these
improvements, I would like to now turn my attention to the importance
of effectively managing the change process within the NRC. We have had
the opportunity to discuss this subject at recent stakeholder meetings
and feel it is important to cover it here.
INPO has had extensive experience with change management.
Currently, we have a series of initiatives underway to improve how we
carry out our mission to promote the highest levels of safety and
reliability in the operation of nuclear electric power plants.
Therefore, we appreciate what the NRC faces as it strives to change and
more effectively meet its regulatory responsibilities. NRC is currently
undergoing significant philosophy, process, and staff changes,
including changes at the senior leadership levels.
We've seen many utilities challenged with managing change. Some
have had success, others have struggled. Based on our observations and
experience, it is clear that change requires clarity of purpose,
constant communication, training, and, most of all, persistence and
hard work.
I'll begin with clarity of purpose. A clearly defined, long-term
plan and simple goals are necessary. With clarity and simplicity,
change leaders throughout the organization can help ensure strong
support at all levels.
Second, constant communication is critical for success.
Communication must be two-way, involving both sending information and
receiving feedback. The stakeholder meetings are good examples that
need to be applauded and need to continue. Being flexible enough to use
relevant feedback from the stakeholders throughout the change process
will contribute to the Agency's ultimate success.
Internal communications are equally important. We understand the
NRC commissioners and senior staff are communicating their expectations
throughout the organization. We all know that there can probably be no
such thing as too much communication. But then--just as importantly--
management must listen to employees to ensure that the messages are
being received and understood. Of course, follow-up action must be
taken where appropriate.
Third, preparing and training NRC employees for change, and helping
them succeed, is another fundamental ingredient. Our experience shows
that organizations often underestimate the effort required to engage
and train the work force on significant changes. The NRC must look hard
at the ability of its work force to digest and internalize the many
process changes being made. NRC staff will be asked to do different
things and in some cases to think differently about their jobs. Front-
line employees such as the site resident inspectors are important
interfaces with the plants and therefore critical points. They must not
only understand the changes but also be able to implement the changes
from day-to-day.
Also, additional skills training may be needed as the organization
changes, particularly in light of new assignments, work force
reductions, retirements and transfers of experienced employees.
Further, it is important that the NRC's award and recognition system
support employees who successfully implement change.
Finally, success comes down to persistence and hard work. What the
NRC is undertaking includes a change in culture. Cultural change takes
time, tremendous energy, and most of all, significantly more
persistence and hard work than is often expected. In time, change can
be anchored into the culture of the organization--but only through an
ongoing, systematic effort.
Overall, we're encouraged by what we see happening at the Agency
thus far. But as Chairman Jackson has said, ``Performance is what
performance does.'' We've seen many organizations with great intentions
have their change programs fall short because of poor implementation.
Given the far-reaching effects of the changes the NRC is initiating,
persistent and consistent execution of the change process is absolutely
crucial to success. This--as I said, and as you well know--will take an
immense amount of hard work.
In the meantime, we encourage the NRC to continue improving its
responsiveness to industry needs, such as timely license amendments,
transfers and renewals, and reducing administrative burdens.
Additionally, while maintaining appropriate data propriety, increased
information sharing may also help reduce duplication and administrative
burdens.
In conclusion, we at INPO believe the industry--and indeed the
public--wants and needs a more predictable, objective and responsive
nuclear regulator. We're encouraged by what the Agency is attempting to
do--that is, to become a more risk-informed, performance-based
regulator. We believe the NRC is on the right track with its efforts to
improve the inspection, enforcement and assessment processes, focusing
on items directly related to the Agency's mission--the protection of
public health and safety. We are encouraged by the fact that the
commissioners, the Executive Director for Operations, and the regional
administrators recognize the importance of change management. We at
INPO will continue to work in cooperation with the NRC to help ensure
the safe operation of our nation's nuclear power plants.
Again, I appreciate this committee's interest in the regulation of
a changing nuclear power industry. Your continued support and guidance
will play an important role in helping the NRC provide effective
regulation to help assure the safety of our industry.
Thank you very much.
______
Statement of Steven M. Fetter, Fitch IBCA, Inc.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf of Fitch IBCA in
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property
and Nuclear Safety's ongoing oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). Fitch IBCA is an international rating agency, based
in New York and London, with over 700 employees in 21 offices around
the world.
The manner in which the NRC carries out its responsibilities during
the electric utility industry's transition to competition will have a
profound impact as to the role nuclear power will play within the
restructured environment.
As I testified 6 months ago, the NRC is at the center of investors'
perceptions of the financial risks facing the U.S. nuclear industry. In
evaluating utilities that operate nuclear plants, debt and equity
investors study closely the processes and actions of the NRC. To the
extent that these regulatory responsibilities are carried out in a
consistent and predictable manner, investors find comfort with the
outlook for both individual nuclear utilities and the nuclear industry
as a whole.
I am encouraged that the constructive intentions offered by NRC
Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson and the other NRC commissioners at the
July 1998 subcommittee hearing appear to be bearing fruit. The NRC has
convened public sessions to seek out stakeholder views on a wide range
of technical and safety issues. It is input like this, from the front
lines so to speak, that will make it more likely that the NRC's and the
nuclear industry's goal of a more risk-informed and performance-based
regulatory approach will be achieved.
In July, I highlighted my hope that the processes to review nuclear
plant license renewal and transfer could be structured to proceed as
expeditiously as possible without compromising appropriate
consideration of safety issues. Early indications are that the NRC has
set the same goal.
The agency is aiming to complete the Calvert Cliffs and Oconee
license renewal cases within two to 3 years from the filing of the
applications, a target which, if met, will bode well for the timely
handling of additional renewal applications that will be filed in the
future.
Similarly, the NRC has issued a final rule providing for a
streamlined process for reviewing nuclear plant license transfers.
Under the rule, the NRC will seek to complete consideration of most
license transfer applications within a 6 to 8 month period after the
application is filed. The reviews of the transfer requests relating to
Three Mile Island Unit One and the Pilgrim Nuclear Station appear to be
on schedule.
While these recent activities at the NRC are encouraging, continued
oversight by this subcommittee is called for. It is important that the
ongoing transition within the membership of the NRC does not set back
these gains. As a former chairman of a state regulatory commission who
chose to move on to new life challenges, I know that some of my policy
initiatives survived into the new regime and some were cast aside. This
subcommittee can play an important role in assuring that the progress
made during the past year under Chairman Jackson is maintained under
new leadership.
For example, the movement to a risk-informed and performance-based
regulatory regime will take time, so periodic assessments by the NRC,
the Congress, and other stakeholders will undoubtedly help the process.
Likewise, the history of regulatory proceedings, both at the Federal
and State level, becoming unduly delayed because of contentious issues
is well-known.
It is important that the NRC maintain focus on the movement of
license renewal and transfer applications through the process. The
timetables the NRC is proposing for each of type of proceeding seem
appropriate both from a safety viewpoint as well as from the
perspective of the financial community. If the NRC is able to deliver
on the promise held out by recent events, I believe investors will be
supportive of nuclear power playing a key role in the competitive
utility world going forward.