[Senate Hearing 106-263]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-263
THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-057 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
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For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Senator Joseph R., Jr., prepared statement................ 15
Coverdell, Senator Paul, prepared statement...................... 1
Einhorn, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation Affairs, Department of State.................. 2
Prepared statement of........................................ 16
Fertel, Marvin S., senior vice president, Nuclear Infrastructure,
Support, and International Programs, Nuclear Energy Institute.. 9
Prepared statement of........................................ 18
Helms, Senator Jesse, prepared statement......................... 15
Jones, Gary L., Associate Director for Energy, Resources and
Science Issues, Resources, Community and Economic Development
Division, General Accounting Office............................ 11
Prepared statement of........................................ 22
(iii)
THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Coverdell
presiding.
Present: Senator Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. On behalf of Senator Helms, Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I on his behalf call
this meeting to order on the question of the Convention on
Nuclear Safety. I will be strictly as a facilitator on his
behalf today, administrator, facilitator.
Each witness will be given 5 minutes for their testimony.
The hearing record will be open for 5 business days for
statements and questions by members. If you would indicate you
are inserting material--I will be inserting statements for
Senator Helms and Senator Biden in the record.
[The statements referred to are in the appendix on page
15.]
Senator Coverdell. Let us see. The first--we have two
panels and the first presenter will be Mr. Robert Einhorn,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation
Affairs.
I will be inserting my own opening statement into the
record formally, and I turn that over to you, Alex. And we will
proceed with you, Mr. Einhorn. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Coverdell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Paul Coverdell
I am pleased to convene this hearing today on the issue of nuclear
safety standards and, specifically, the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
Let me say from the outset that I believe that this Convention stands a
chance of making a modest contribution to the improvement of
international nuclear safety. This Convention seeks to achieve and
maintain a high level of safety for countries around the world that
operate civil nuclear power reactors. It also provides the United
States with a mechanism to encourage countries with civilian nuclear
programs that do not meet Western safety standards to improve the
safety at their installations. I think we all agree on the importance
of ensuring that the use of nuclear energy is safe and well regulated.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety is a step towards this goal, and I
therefore am willing to support its ratification.
I believe that the U.S. secures several key objectives in the
Convention. First, the treaty is limited to land-based civilian nuclear
power plants designed for commercial electricity generation and does
not include other nuclear facilities such as nuclear power reactors
with military applications. Second, the convention articulates core
principles for nuclear safety, rather than a detailed itemization of
standards or rules. Third, the Convention does not establish a new
international bureaucracy but rather relies on each ratifying country
to prepare a report of its nuclear power program. While this might have
weaknesses of its own, I think it is preferable to the creation of
another international bureaucracy.
However, there are some shortcomings in the Convention that we need
to be candid about and that I hope some of our witnesses will touch on
today. For example, the method to ensure and to review compliance with
the treaty has not, to my knowledge, been finalized. As it is written,
the Convention does not impose sanctions for noncompliance but seeks to
encourage compliance through peer pressure. Each ratifying country will
prepare a self-assessment report of its nuclear power program, which
will be looked at by a ``review group'' of other member countries at
periodic meetings. The potential problem with this approach is that the
U.S. may not be in the ``review groups'' of countries who receive U.S.
nuclear safety assistance. We need to make sure that the U.S. is
present in all review meetings where a country receiving U.S. nuclear
assistance is being reviewed.
There are other potential weakness that I will not go into great
detail on today. But I would mention that it is my understanding that
the costs to implement the treaty have not been fully determined. And,
also, that the number of organizations dealing with nuclear safety
issues continues to increase rapidly, often at the expense of the U.S.
nuclear industry. I think we need to take measures to eliminate
redundant or duplicative U.S. nuclear safety activities.
Despite these weaknesses, I believe that the Convention is a
positive step toward the strengthening of nuclear safety standards
around the world. I look forward to working with all of you in the
coming years to move ahead with the implementation of this treaty.
Before our distinguished panelists begin, I would like to introduce
the witnesses today and thank you for your participation. The witness
on the first panel is Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Nonproliferation Affairs. Thank you for appearing before the
committee today and we look forward to hearing the administration's
views on this treaty. On the second panel, we will hear from Marvin
Fertel, Senior Vice President for Nuclear Infrastructure, Support and
International Programs from the Nuclear Energy Institute, and Gary
Jones, Assistant Director for Energy, Science, and Resource Issues from
the General Accounting Office. I know that our own domestic nuclear
power industries set the lead for developing and maintaining nuclear
standards around the world, so I especially look forward to hearing
from you. Thank you all for your participation.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. EINHORN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be
here today to discuss with you our views on the Convention on
Nuclear Safety and to ask that you take urgent action on the
administration's request for advice and consent.
I have provided a longer written statement to the committee
and I request that you include it in the record.
Senator Coverdell. It will be inserted into the record.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you very much.
The United States played a central role in drafting and
negotiating the Nuclear Safety Convention. It was open for
signature in September 1994 and entered into force in October
1996. The 49 contracting parties include all states with
significant nuclear programs except the United States and
India.
The convention can make an important contribution to
raising levels of nuclear safety worldwide. It is the first
international instrument to establish legal obligations on the
safety of nuclear power plants. It codifies principles judged
vital by technical experts to improve nuclear power safety
worldwide. It reflects a longstanding U.S. interest in
promoting an effective nuclear safety culture worldwide.
The convention covers land-based civilian nuclear power
plants. Such facilities pose the most significant safety risks
due to the magnitude of their inventory of radioactive
material, the complexity of their technology, known
deficiencies in certain older reactor designs, and weak
regulatory regimes and nuclear safety cultures in certain
countries.
A key focus of the convention is on the requirement for all
states parties to establish a strong and effective nuclear
regulatory body with adequate authority, competence, and
financial resources to perform effective and independent
oversight. The convention also addresses safety at the facility
level, with specific provisions for siting, design,
construction, and operation of nuclear power plants. The United
States fully meets all provisions of the convention.
I also want to emphasize what the convention does not do.
It does not create a new multilateral regulatory body or
another international organization or bureaucracy. Nor does the
convention impose detailed prescriptive standards or rules.
Instead, the convention advances fundamental principles and
obligates each party to implement those principles consistent
with the requirements of differing reactor technologies,
differing legal systems, and other national factors.
The convention will provide an important tool that
regulators and operators can use to argue for the national
resources they need to meet their safety obligations. The
information provided by the national reports can also help
nuclear safety assistance donors, such as the United States, to
target their assistance more effectively.
On the key issue of financing convention activities, the
modest secretariat functions for meetings of the parties will
come from the IAEA--that is the International Atomic Energy
Agency's--regular budget. The United States will also expend
limited resources to prepare and review national reports and to
attend meetings.
Senate advice and consent is needed next week to enable the
United States to participate in the first review meeting of the
parties, which begins April 12. Unless we ratify before that
meeting, we will not be able to participate in the formal
review of the national reports of other parties, including
Russia and other recipients of U.S. nuclear safety assistance.
If we are to be able to ratify--if we are able to ratify
the convention quickly, we can seek agreement from the states
parties to waive the requirement that parties ratify 90 days in
advance of a review meeting in order to participate in that
meeting.
In conclusion, the administration believes that the
convention can make a significant positive contribution toward
raising levels of nuclear safety worldwide, particularly in the
New Independent States, in Central Europe, in Eastern Europe,
and in the developing world.
The U.S. nuclear industry has been kept informed of
developments on the convention through periodic briefings. The
industry supports the Nuclear Safety Convention as a means of
enhancing the global safety culture, which can improve public
acceptance of nuclear power and improve business opportunities.
We urge your favorable action. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn is in the appendix
on page 16.]
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Einhorn, as I said a moment ago, the
chairman has several questions that he would pose. If you will
forgive me for reading those, but these are--I am facilitating
this, as I said, for the chairman.
Question No. 1: Mr. Einhorn, one benefit of the Nuclear
Safety Convention to the American taxpayer is that once it is
ratified the administration will be able to scale back
participation in other redundant areas. We are a member by last
count of at least eight defense nuclear safety clubs and
groups, most of which duplicate activities to be performed
under the convention.
Do you agree that we should focus our efforts and our
limited resources on performing nuclear safety activities under
the auspices of the treaty rather than through a variety of
nonbinding international clubs?
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, we agree that
our participation in the safety convention will be a critical
focus of our international effort on safety. But there are a
number of other efforts that are complementary and not in any
way duplicative.
We support the committee's resolution of ratification,
which addresses this point. There is a provision in section 2
of the resolution of ratification which requires the President
to make a certification, and he is asked to certify to the
appropriate committees that the U.S. Government will not engage
in any multilateral activity in the field of international
nuclear regulation or nuclear safety that unnecessarily
duplicates a multilateral activity undertaken pursuant to the
convention.
We will be pleased to recommend that the President provide
that certification, because we do not believe there is
duplication here. Other international efforts we are engaged in
we believe are complementary.
Senator Coverdell. I thank you.
Mr. Einhorn, the chairman wanted to ask you about one of
these international clubs in particular, the International
Nuclear Regulators Association, INRA. In a February 21, 1997,
letter, the chairman of the NRC mentions that she sent to you
an INRA terms of reference for your review. So I assume you are
familiar with them.
Mr. Einhorn, in your mind is there a difference between
INRA's purpose and that of the Nuclear Safety Convention?
Mr. Einhorn. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I believe there are very
important differences between these two, these two groups. The
Nuclear Safety Convention, of course, is a formal, legally
binding international agreement. There are 49 contracting
parties today. We hope the United States will be the fiftieth
contracting party.
The INRA, the International Nuclear Regulators Association,
is an unofficial group, an informal group, a very small one. It
consists of the senior official involved in nuclear programs in
eight of the advanced industrialized countries, countries with
advanced civil nuclear power programs. As I say, it is an
informal group. They do not meet pursuant to a legal
obligation.
They meet twice a year, whereas the Nuclear Safety
Convention requires its parties to have review sessions once
every 3 years.
The purposes are very different. The Nuclear Safety
Convention sets up a system of national reporting and peer
reviews that provide strong peer pressure to ensure that all
the contracting parties are meeting their obligations to meet
international safety standards.
The INRA has a very different function. These are
individuals who meet informally twice a year, and their purpose
is to exchange views on emerging nuclear regulatory challenges.
Each of them have certain responsibilities in their own
government. They look at various trends they see in the
regulatory world, and it is an informal exchange of views. It
is helpful to each of them in performing their own national
responsibilities, but they are not in that capacity speaking
for the U.S. Government.
So we see these organizations as very different. These are
apples and oranges.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Einhorn, the chairman of the NRC has
argued that one principal difference between INRA and the
convention is membership. Specifically, she has claimed that
INRA is important because it only brings together like-minded
western countries with advanced regulatory systems rather than
the global community, as is the case under the convention.
When asked by committee staff, however, if she would assure
the committee that membership in INRA would remain limited to
like-minded countries, she refused. The chairman thinks he
knows why. According to United States negotiating guidance at
the time of INRA's creation, the delegation was instructed to
ensure that INRA would discuss at the earliest possible
opportunity steps to be taken to broaden the initial
membership. ``Further, the issue of extending membership to
nations without nuclear programs should be discussed.''
So it hardly seems like the administration intends to keep
INRA just a group of like-minded western countries. Do you
agree?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, frankly, I am not aware of any
plans for expanding membership. But one of the reasons that the
group now consists of like-minded countries or representatives
of like-minded countries is that it provides a good forum to
discuss issues of real sensitivity. Unlike the national reports
that will be widely shared, these discussions will be rather
private and they can touch on matters of real sensitivity, and
it could enable these representatives to speak with great
frankness.
Senator Coverdell. Let me just read this U.S. Government
position on INRA. It relates back to the question, and then I
can look up and actually listen to your answer for a moment.
``The U.S. delegation should request INRA discuss at the
earliest possible opportunity steps to be taken to broaden the
initial membership, taking into consideration such criteria as
geographical distribution, activity of programs, and inclusion
of other national policy-setting regulators, example those with
environmental or health responsibility.
``Further, the issue of extending membership to nations
without nuclear programs should be discussed in light of the
widespread use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials.''
Mr. Einhorn. Because this record is important and we have
to move quickly if we are to meet our deadline, rather than get
back to you with an answer for the record, let me just consult
my colleagues.
Senator Coverdell. Please.
[Pause.]
Senator Coverdell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding off for a
moment.
What you read is a position of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. The chairman of our NRC, of course, represents the
NRC on this group. This is not a U.S. Government position that
you were reading.
I understand from my colleagues that participants----
[Pause.]
Senator Coverdell. Let me do this. It is the committee
staff's view these are instructions issued to the chairman of
the NRC. I have said the record will be open for 5 days. This
is obviously a critical point to the chairman, so we will
clarify the question. The source of this is redacted, so we
will clarify where we feel--where this emanates from, and give
you an opportunity then to respond formally following the
meeting.
Mr. Einhorn. That is a very good idea. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The following response was received subsequent to the
hearing:]
The Committee's question concerns a preliminary draft of the
instruction cable for the first meeting of the International Nuclear
Regulators' Association (INRA). At the request of another NRC
Commissioner, the cable instructed NRC Chairman Jackson to recommend,
at the first meeting of the INRA, that future expansion of the group's
membership be discussed at that meeting. She did raise this matter at
the first INRA meeting, held in Paris May 29-30, 1997. The consensus
reached was that the group would begin small, with only the eight
original members (nuclear regulators from the U.S., U.K., Canada,
Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, and Japan). Only after an initial two-
year period of consolidation (which coincided with NRC Chairman
Jackson's chairmanship of the group) might the question of membership
be reconsidered.
Chairmanship of INRA has now passed to Mr. Laurence Williams,
Director and Chief Inspector of the United Kingdom's Nuclear
Installation Inspectorate. At this time the consensus of all INRA
members, including the U.S. member, is that the membership should
remain limited to the current eight heads of nuclear regulatory
agencies, all from Western developed countries with substantial civil
nuclear power sectors.
Senator Coverdell. I am going to--please.
Mr. Einhorn. I was just going to say that the members of
INRA now do have in mind that this group stay small so that it
can operate with frankness on sensitive issues. Some of the
members have an interest in some expansion, but we understand
that they are not interested in making this a large and
unwieldy body.
It is primarily because they themselves have neighbors or
friends that, for a variety of reasons, they may wish to bring
into the group or the club, as you mentioned. But it is not any
intention of ours or of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
expand this group. Its value is in its being compact and its
ability to operate in an informal manner.
Senator Coverdell. Well, both in the resolution you have
and in the nature of the questions and the opportunity to
respond, I think there is a clear sense where the chairman of
the committee is moving, and the exchange might reinforce the
view you just expressed.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That comes through
very clearly, but I do not think there is a real difference
between us on this. We are not interested in promoting a large
body that in any way rivals or duplicates the functions of the
Nuclear Safety Convention.
Senator Coverdell. I thank you, Mr. Einhorn. I have two
more questions and then we will move to the next panel.
The chairman has a question about the negotiating position
taken by the United States on INRA. The guidance states that
the group will not create a super--supra-national organization
nor engage in oversight of national programs or site visits.
Yet, according to information provided the committee by an
anonymous source within the administration, the chairman of the
NRC uses her position at NRC to acquire access for the
foreigners to facilities, such as Lawrence Livermore National
Labs, the Plutonium Facility, and AVLIS, A-V-L-I-S.
I am reading from a memorandum on the letterhead, ``United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,'' from Shirley Ann
Jackson, dated February 11, 1998. The first paragraph says:
``The International Nuclear Regulators Association, INRA, held
its second meeting January 8th through 9th, 1998, at the NRSC
Walnut Creek Field Office in California. The meeting was
extended to include a facility visit to Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California and the Yucca Mountain site
characterization project in Nevada.''
I will not proceed with this. I think you have the thrust
of the question here.
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, these colleagues of the chairman's
were the kinds of officials in other regulatory agencies of
other countries that would normally visit her and her
colleagues in the NRC, that would visit various kinds of sites
in the United States in their own national capacities. It is in
my thinking not their participation in INRA that gives them any
kind of a special access to these facilities. These are the
very individuals who would normally be interacting with the NRC
in this fashion.
Senator Coverdell. If you will give me just a moment.
[Pause.]
Senator Coverdell. I am going to read from the anonymous
source two paragraphs. It alludes to: ``The fifth document is a
letter from the chairman of Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council.
Taiwan has wanted to join INRA from its inception, but was
refused. Instead, at the last meeting the People's Republic of
China was asked to join. The potential for harm to the U.S.
Government foreign policy from this move could have
repercussions in the future.
``The seventh document shows that, notwithstanding
Jackson's claim that the INRA would take less than one FTE and
no dollars from the NRC budget, she is hosting the INRA
participants, has stationery and pamphlets specifically
designed and printed for INRA, and, more importantly, Jackson
uses her position at the NRC to acquire access for the
foreigners to facilities such as Lawrence Livermore National
Labs, the Plutonium Facility, and AVLIS''--which is a
restatement of the question I just issued.
Would you have any additional comment?
Mr. Einhorn. Just to say, Mr. Chairman, that China was not
asked to join INRA. It was asked at a certain point to make a
presentation. It is not under consideration for membership in
INRA.
On the question of access, again, INRA participation is not
being used as a basis to invite colleagues to certain
facilities in the United States. These colleagues would be
invited to these kinds of facilities in performance of their
normal national responsibilities in any event. It is not as if
INRA gives them a special claim to access.
Senator Coverdell. I thank you very much.
The final question, then. The chairman says he is puzzled
by a January 23, 1998, letter on INRA stationery from the
chairman of the United States NRC to the U.S. Secretary of
Energy. At the outset Ms. Jackson states: ``I am writing on
behalf of the International Nuclear Regulators Association,
INRA, concerning preparations for the energy ministerial
scheduled for March 30th to the 31st in Moscow.''
Mr. Einhorn, do you believe it is appropriate for a senior
U.S. Government official to lobby another senior U.S.
Government official regarding the United States' negotiating
position at an upcoming summit on behalf of an international
club of countries?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, it was not clear from the
passage you read that this was an effort to lobby another
member of the U.S. Government to take any kind of position. It
was not clear at all what the request was of the Secretary of
Energy.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Einhorn, what I am going to suggest
we do here--I am seeing the letter for the first time. I do not
know whether you have seen it or not. I think the chairman
could rightfully draw, just from my quick perusal, rightfully
draw the conclusion that is embraced in his question. So in the
5-day period for exchange, this is obviously a letter that you
can see, and you might review the letter and then formally
respond to the question that I just gave you.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you. I would like the opportunity to do
that.
[The following response was received subsequent to the
hearing:]
In the spring of 1996 the U.S. and other G-7 governments plus
Russia held a special Summit meeting in Moscow to address issues of
nuclear safety and security. Since that special Summit meeting these
matters have been important elements of the agenda for each G-7/G-8
Summit. The January 1998 letter in question was written by U.S. NRC
Chairman Jackson in her capacity as Chairman of the International
Nuclear Regulators' Association (INRA) to inform Secretary of Energy
Pena. It contained the views of INRA members on the importance of
sustaining safety as the first priority in nuclear plant operations as
competition and deregulation of the electricity industry grow. These
views were particularly relevant to the G-7/8 process, since INRA's
membership is comprised of the heads of nuclear regulatory agencies of
the eight Western countries with the most advanced nuclear industries.
Six of the eight INRA governments are also G-7 members. The INRA
members also offered some thoughts on technical safety issues and their
view that safety should remain on the Summit agenda. The INRA members
proposed that energy ministers ``reaffirm their commitment to safety as
the fundamental requirement for a nuclear program'' and ``reaffirm the
principles and elements recently codified in the Convention of [sic]
Nuclear Safety.'' The heads of these nuclear regulatory authorities
further state that ``Parties to the Convention should actively
participate in this peer review process in the most transparent,
candid, serious, and technically competent manner.'' The views
expressed in the letter are shared by the Administration. We hope the
Committee and other Members in Congress are supportive as well.
Senator Coverdell. All right. Mr. Einhorn, I appreciate
very much your testimony and your responsiveness to the
questions.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you.
The second panel will consist of Mr. Marvin Fertel, senior
vice president, Nuclear Infrastructure, Support, and
International Programs, Nuclear Energy Institute, and Ms. Gary
Jones, Associate Director for Energy, Resources and Science
Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development
Division, General Accounting Office.
We will begin with you, Mr. Fertel. Thank you for coming.
STATEMENT OF MARVIN S. FERTEL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR
INFRASTRUCTURE, SUPPORT, AND INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR
ENERGY INSTITUTE
Mr. Fertel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and may I request that
my full statement be included in the record.
Senator Coverdell. It will be included in the record.
Mr. Fertel. Let me first express our gratitude to you,
Senator Coverdell, for taking the initiative to facilitate, in
your terms, this hearing today and for really providing an
opportunity for getting the convention ratified in time for the
first review meeting coming up in April.
The Nuclear Energy Institute sets policy and positions on
various issues affecting our industry. NEI represents over 275
companies, including every U.S. utility that operates a
commercial nuclear plant in this country. We also have all of
the vendors, fuel suppliers, and engineering firms that support
those people.
Mr. Chairman, the nuclear energy industry supports
ratification by the U.S. Senate of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety. The Nuclear Energy Institute's executive committee in
1997 passed a resolution encouraging Senate ratification of the
convention and that resolution is included with my prepared
remarks.
Before I discuss the importance of ratification of the
convention, I would like to briefly provide the committee with
a sense of the benefits provided by nuclear energy in the
United States and the world. Today nuclear power plants produce
about 20 percent of America's electricity. It is our second
largest source of electricity. Nuclear power plants are also
our largest source of emission-free electricity, an important
consideration as Congress and other policymakers recognize the
growing nexus of energy and environmental policy. Globally, 441
nuclear plants in 33 nations generate 17 percent of the world's
electricity.
Within this broad context, ratification of the convention--
--
Senator Coverdell. Excuse me for interrupting. Would you
repeat that number again?
Mr. Fertel. Yes; 441 nuclear plants in 33 countries
generate 17 percent of the world's electricity.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you.
Mr. Fertel. I caught a sore throat from my wife over the
weekend.
Senator Coverdell. I have been dealing with the same
subject here for a while.
Mr. Fertel. I apologize.
Within this broad context, ratification of the convention
by the United States is important for the following reasons.
First, the U.S. Government and the nuclear energy industry have
provided leadership in shaping the convention and it reflects
the safety practices, programs, and culture inherent in the
U.S. program. The industry believes these programs are
necessary for the safety and reliability of nuclear programs
worldwide.
Second, as Mr. Einhorn said, all other countries that have
significant nuclear energy programs except the United States
and India have already ratified the convention. We believe that
U.S. participation and particularly leadership is necessary.
Third, the convention provides a forum for the United
States to systematically review the nuclear programs for
countries such as Russia and the Ukraine, to which the United
States provides nuclear safety program assistance.
Finally, the convention also provides an excellent
framework and process to support the development of new safe
nuclear power programs in countries that may be looking to
establish such programs.
In implementing the convention, the industry encourages the
administration to ensure that the Government gets appropriate
input and involvement of the U.S. industry prior to and
possibly at review meetings. Also, U.S. ratification of the
convention should not impose any new regulatory requirements on
the U.S. industry beyond those already required to meet Nuclear
Regulatory Commission regulations.
Moreover, the administration should not fund activities
associated with implementing the convention from user fees
collected from NRC licensees for the agency's regulatory
activities. Rather, we believe, given the benefits to the
Nation, funds should be appropriated from other sources.
The administration should also--and it sounds like the
ratification resolution does this--look to eliminate existing
governmental activities that are intended to achieve benefits
that would be derived through the convention.
Given the scheduled April 12, 1999, review meeting, NEI
urges the committee and the U.S. Senate to act promptly to
ratify the convention so that the United States can attend this
first review meeting. U.S. leadership and participation is
essential for successful implementation of the convention and,
given the importance of assuring safe operation of nuclear
plants worldwide, it is clearly in the best interest of our
Nation and the world at large.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety establishes a framework
for improving nuclear safety among all countries that operate
nuclear power plants and provides a basis for dialog with those
countries planning to build and operate commercial nuclear
facilities.
In conclusion, the U.S. industry encourages prompt Senate
ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and is
committed to working with the U.S. Government on implementation
of the convention.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fertel is in the appendix on
page 18.]
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Fertel.
Ms. Jones.
STATEMENT OF GARY L. JONES, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR ENERGY,
RESOURCES AND SCIENCE ISSUES, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would also like to request that my full statement be
included for the record.
Senator Coverdell. It will be included in the record.
Ms. Jones. Thank you.
Let me briefly summarize our work on the Convention on
Nuclear Safety. We have issued two reports since 1993 that have
tracked the convention's development and implementation. My
comments this afternoon will focus on its objectives and scope,
the process for reviewing compliance, the dissemination of
information related to convention proceedings, and
implementation costs.
The need for a global focus on nuclear safety was
underscored when radioactive materials from Chernobyl were
carried beyond the national boundaries of the Soviet Union to
East and West European countries. The Convention on Nuclear
Safety is viewed as one of the chief policy instruments to
promote a nuclear safety culture and encourage countries with
Soviet-designed nuclear reactors to improve their safety.
The convention is not viewed as a solution or a quick fix,
but as a positive step toward improving nuclear safety
worldwide. It does not provide sanctions for noncompliance, nor
will it require the closing of unsafe nuclear reactors. Rather,
as Mr. Einhorn noted, it seeks to achieve its safety objectives
through adherence to general safety principles, such as
establishing an independent body to oversee safety, rather than
by requiring compliance with binding technical standards.
The convention's peer review process is central to its
success. Countries submit self-assessment reports detailing the
measures they have taken to implement the convention. Groups of
countries will then critically examine and comment on those
reports to encourage countries to improve their nuclear safety
programs.
However, the convention does not specify the form and
content of the peer review process. Therefore it is unclear how
the process will actually work and how peer pressure will
accomplish change.
Another issue that will impact the success of the peer
review process is the quality of the individual country self-
assessment reports. Because of the differences among the
countries and nuclear safety programs and available resources,
NRC officials told us that they anticipated unevenness in the
quality and detail of these reports, and that could affect the
level of review and analysis.
The convention also allows for countries that are outside a
particular country grouping to submit comments or questions as
an observer. NRC believes that this will enable the concerns of
the United States about any country's report to be heard.
However, we will not really know how effectively this will work
until after the first peer review meeting.
Public dissemination of information about the country's
progress in meeting the terms of the convention can play a role
in influencing compliance and will enhance the credibility of
the process. However, it is uncertain how much information from
the peer review meeting will be available to the public. The
countries can limit distribution of their reports. At least one
report that has been prepared for the April 1999 peer review
meeting has not been made public, but others are available to
the public. Some can be accessed on the Internet.
The convention also provides for the public distribution of
a report summarizing the issues discussed and the decisions
reached during the peer review meeting. However, it appears
that the report will be generic and will not identify countries
by name. NRC officials told us that the convention did not
specifically provide for the kind of openness that they would
prefer, but they believe that over time more information would
be made available.
Costs to the United States to prepare for and attend the
first review meeting will be significantly less than the $1.1
million we reported in 1997. Since the United States has not
ratified the convention, U.S. officials have not participated
in the full range of meetings and activities related to the
convention.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement, including attachments, of Ms.
Jones, is in the appendix on page 22.]
Senator Coverdell. Thank you both.
Mr. Fertel, you obviously followed the drift of the
questions of the chairman and you alluded to some concerns as
related to those questions in terms of overlapping and
redundant responsibilities and costs and their effect on your
members.
You might comment on it now, but, more importantly,
measuring these questions, your institution may want to respond
to those, use those questions as an opportunity to clarify more
fully your concerns with regard to costs, treaty costs and
other associated costs through these other organizations,
clubs, whatever. You are welcome to comment if you would like.
Mr. Fertel. I think sharing within the nuclear industry is
part of the culture and has tremendous value. That is how we
try and avoid safety problems, with openness and sharing. Just
speaking from the industry side, having said that and we
encourage it and we foster it as much as we can, we find in our
own industry we have loads of special interest groups. We have
not called them clubs, but we call them special interest
groups, which often divert our resources from what they should
be doing, with all the best intentions.
Generally what we find is that it is useful, but very
duplicative of other things that are going on and generally not
something that management when they look at wants to continue.
I think that the statement in the resolution of ratification
for the Government to take a hard look across the spectrum of
activities probably has real value.
Senator Coverdell. Has the General Accounting Office,
citing that redundancy section of the resolution, had any
reflections or thoughts with regard to redundant costs that are
pointed to by the questions of the chairman and-or are noted in
the section in the resolution?
Ms. Jones. Actually, Senator, the chairman of the committee
has asked GAO to look at the duplication between INRA and other
organizations that you have alluded to in the questions today.
So we have just started our work in that area, so we are not
able to comment on that today. But we will when our work is
completed.
Senator Coverdell. Do you have any idea as to how long it
will take for that work to be completed?
Ms. Jones. We are looking to get back to committee staff in
a couple of months and let them know what our preliminary
thoughts are on that issue.
Senator Coverdell. With that, I am going to thank our panel
for its presentations. As I said, we have included your full
statements in the record. There are 5 days open for other
committee members and-or others to insert questions in the
record. We welcome you to elaborate to any greater extent that
you would like in that open period.
With that, we will adjourn the meeting.
Ms. Jones. Thank you.
Mr. Fertel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms
I am pleased that the Committee will undertake consideration of a
resolution of ratification for the Nuclear Safety Convention. This
resolution enjoys the support of the Administration, Senator Biden, and
myself.
The Convention, if used to its fullest potential, could serve as an
important tool to encourage countries (most particularly, those
possessing Soviet-era nuclear power plants) to improve their safety
procedures. It will do so without harming the U.S. nuclear industry or
imposing foreign pressure on the United States' domestic regulatory
process.
I am pleased that the administration secured a number of critical
U.S. objectives in the process of negotiating the Convention.
Specifically, I note that the treaty is limited to land-based civilian
nuclear power plants and does not cover nuclear power reactors with
military applications.
Second, the Convention simply establishes a few fundamental
principles for nuclear safety, rather than a detailed itemization of
standards or rules. Detailed technical provisions would unnecessarily
intrude on our sovereig authority to regulate the U.S. nuclear
industry.
Third, the Convention does not establish any new international
bureaucracy.
For these reasons, I support the treaty and urge adoption of the
resolution.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
I want to thank Chairman Helms for scheduling today's hearing and,
especially, Senator Coverdell for chairing this hearing.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety is a modest step toward improving
nuclear power safety around the world, especially among countries that
lack the many years of experience that we have with these systems. The
convention is sensible and low-cost, and the Senate should give its
advice and consent to ratification before the Easter recess.
One concern has been the costs of implementing this convention. I
am pleased that the Contracting Parties have decided to conduct nearly
all of their work in English, to minimize translation costs. I also
note that the United States has to pay its share of the costs whether
we join the convention or not. That is because the convention is
administered by the International Atomic Energy Authority, with the
costs included in our regular IAEA contribution. In practice, the U.S.
share of administrative costs for the convention is expected to be
under $100,000 per year.
This convention creates a process in which, once every three years,
each Contracting Party submits a report on its nuclear power safety
procedures. Then each of the other Contracting Parties may request
further clarification or critique that report. This will give
experienced countries like the United States a forum in which to
critique the reports submitted by countries with less nuclear power
experience.
The first reports have already been submitted, as this convention
came into force many months ago. (It was signed in September 1994 and
submitted to the Senate in May 1995.) The first Review Conference will
take place next month, and it would make sense for the United States to
become a Contracting Party before that conference, so that we could
comment on those reports. Otherwise we will have to wait three years
for that opportunity. So I urge quick action on a resolution of
ratification.
______
Prepared Statement of Robert J. Einhorn
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am pleased to provide the
Senate with our views on the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The
Administration strongly supports United States adherence to the
Convention and hopes the Senate can take prompt action to permit
ratification.
background
The process of developing this Convention was formally launched by
a resolution of the 1991 General Conference of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States was a key supporter of that
resolution and played a central role in drafting and negotiating the
Convention. After three years of work by over 120 experts from 50
countries under IAEA auspices, the Convention was opened for signature
in September 1994. There are currently 65 signatories, including the
United States. Most countries with major nuclear power industries moved
quickly to ratify the Convention, and it entered into force in October
1996. The 49 Contracting Parties include all states with significant
nuclear power programs, except for the United States and India.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ To date the Contracting Parties are: Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic
of Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico,
Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and
the United Kingdom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
what the nuclear safety convention can do
The Convention can make an important contribution to raising levels
of nuclear safety worldwide. It is the first international instrument
to establish legal obligations regarding the safety of nuclear power
plants. It codifies a comprehensive range of principles judged vital by
technical experts to improve nuclear power safety worldwide. The scope
of the Convention is limited to land-based civilian nuclear power
plants. Such facilities pose the most significant safety risks due to
the magnitude of their inventory of radioactive material, the
complexity of the technology, known deficiencies in foreign-designed
reactors in some countries, and the fact that regulatory regimes and
nuclear safety culture in some countries are weak.
A key focus of the Convention is on the requirement for all States
Parties to establish a strong and effective nuclear regulatory
authority. The Convention obligates States Parties to maintain a
national regulatory body with adequate authority, competence, and
financial and human resources to perform effective oversight.
Regulatory responsibility must also be effectively separate from
nuclear power promotion and utilization responsibilities. In this
respect, among others, the Convention implements long-standing U.S.
policy to support development of an effective nuclear safety culture
worldwide for civilian nuclear power programs.
The Convention establishes key obligations for States Parties.
Governments are committed to take appropriate steps to ensure that:
Priority is given to safety;
Licensed plant operators have the prime safety
responsibility;
Both the operator and the nuclear regulator have adequate
financial and human resources to meet their safety obligations;
Quality assurance programs are established and implemented;
Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are made
throughout a reactor's life, and are verified;
Radiation protection measures keep population exposure as
low as reasonably achievable;
Off-site and on-site emergency response plans are in place
and tested routinely.
The Convention also addresses safety at the facility level, with
specific provisions relating to siting; design and construction; and
operation of nuclear power plants.
The United States fully meets all provisions of the Convention.
However, this is not the case for all countries, and some States
Parties will need to take further actions to comply with these
obligations. Identifying and facilitating those further actions is a
primary purpose of the Convention.
The Convention is implemented in part by a process of national
reports subject to peer review. The States Parties convene a Review
Meeting not less frequently than every three years. Before the meeting
each State Party submits a national report addressing how it is meeting
its responsibilities under the Convention. Each national report is then
subject to rigorous peer review by competent officials from the other
States Parties at periodic meetings. The first Review Meeting will
begin April 12, in less than four weeks. States that are now Parties
submitted their national reports to the Convention's Secretariat at the
International Atomic Energy Agency in October 1998. These reports were
distributed to all States Parties for review and analysis before the
first Review Meeting.
what the nuclear safety convention does not do
It is important to note what the Convention does not do. First, it
does not create a new multilateral regulatory body, or another
international organization or bureaucracy. Nor does the Convention
impose detailed prescriptive standards or rules. Instead, the
Convention advances fundamental principles. Detailed technical
provisions would intrude on the responsibility of national governments
to regulate their nuclear industries consistent with the requirements
of differing reactor technologies, legal systems, and other factors.
Further, negotiating such technical provisions might have resulted in a
Convention with lowest common denominator requirements.
We believe, from experience, that peer reviews are an effective
mechanism for inducing change. The Nuclear Safely Convention is
frequently referred to as an ``incentive'' convention. It is intended
to help countries bring their nuclear safety systems up to an
acceptable international level through a process that does not alienate
those governments with weak safety systems, but rather gives them
motivation to join and tools to evaluate and strengthen their programs.
The Convention can also provide an important means for regulators and
operators to argue for needed national resources to ensure they can
meet their safety obligations. The information provided by the national
reports can also help nuclear safety assistance donors, such as the
United States, to target their assistance more effectively.
On the key issue of financing Convention activities, the modest
secretariat functions for the meeting of the parties not less than
every three years will come from the IAEA's regular budget. The U.S.
will also expend modest resources to prepare and review national
reports and to attend meetings of the parties.
why the u.s. should ratify
At the April 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit, and at the Denver
and Birmingham G-8 summits in 1997 and 1998, and the March 1998 Energy
Ministerial in Moscow, the participants committed to ratifying the
Convention as soon as possible as a keystone of their nuclear safety
actions. Our G-7 partners and the Russian Federation have since become
parties to the Convention and continue to urge all countries to become
parties to it. Delay in U.S. ratification would give some the
inaccurate impression that the U.S. is not as committed to the
principles of nuclear safety agreed to at successive Summits. Delay
would also make it harder for the U.S. to argue persuasively that
others should raise their safety standards, and could encourage others
not listen to us on safety issues. More immediately, however, Senate
advice and consent next week is needed to enable the U.S. to
participate in the first Review Meeting of the Parties, beginning April
12. Unless we ratify before that meeting, we will not be able to
participate in the formal review of the national reports of other
Parties, including Russia and other recipients of U.S. safety
assistance.
The U.S. chaired three meetings of signatories (in March and
November 1995; and June 1996) to develop options and alternatives for
implementing the Convention. The U.S. has worked actively to protect
U.S. interests, including undue intrusion on our own nuclear industry
and domestic nuclear regulatory process. In January 1997, at the
request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) presented an update of its 1993 report on the
Convention, focusing on (1) how the Convention will be enforced, and
(2) what the expected costs to the U.S. will be in implementing the
Convention.
At an April 1997 Preparatory Meeting the States Parties took
decisions that respond directly to these concerns. At that meeting
implementing procedures--guidelines regarding the review process,
guidelines regarding national reports, and rules of procedure and
financial rules--were reviewed and recommended for adoption. In
addition, decisions were taken on languages to be used, with English
designated as the single working language for most aspects of the
review process; and on the conduct of country group discussions.
The issues which the GAO report highlights were also discussed at
the April 1997 Preparatory Meeting. Despite having played a leading
role in developing the Convention, as a non-party the United States
could not participate in that meeting. However, we were able to make
U.S. views known informally through like-minded delegations, and as a
result the decisions taken reflect our views.
The important Organizational Meeting was convened September 29-
October 4, 1998. At that time national reports were submitted. The
Contracting Parties were organized into country groups of 6-8 members,
and group Rapporteurs were selected. Contracting Parties have had over
four months to review all national reports and submit questions or
requests for clarification to Rapporteurs. Outside of one's assigned
country group, participation in group discussions will be permitted for
those countries which submitted questions to the Rapporteur at least
two months before the first Review Meeting, which begins April 12, not
quite four weeks from today.
It is essential that the U.S. continue its strong influence on the
development of these activities. Our inability to participate in the
Organizational Meeting was unfortunate. However, if we are able to
ratify the Convention before the end of March, we can seek agreement
from the States Parties to waive the requirement that Parties ratify 90
days in advance of a review meeting in order to participate in that
meeting. With Senate advice and consent next week; if the United States
is able to complete and distribute our national report before the
meeting; and if the other States Parties agree to waive the 90 day
requirement, we will be able to participate in this very important
first review of national reports. As you know, some of the governments
submitting reports receive assistance from the United States to
strengthen their nuclear reactor safety programs, and participating in
this first Review Meeting would provide important insight into the
degree to which that assistance is having effective results.
in conclusion
The Administration believes that the Convention can make a
significant positive contribution towards raising levels of nuclear
safety worldwide, particularly in the New Independent States, in
Central and Eastern Europe, and in the developing world.
The U.S. nuclear industry has been kept informed of developments on
the Convention through periodic briefings. The industry supports the
Nuclear Safety Convention as an effective mechanism to improve the
global nuclear safety culture, which can improve public acceptance of
nuclear power and improve business opportunities.
We urge quick and positive Senate action on advice and consent to
ratification. Your favorable action will permit us to seek agreement of
the other States Parties to participate in this very important first
meeting on the Convention. This will give us the opportunity to review
national reports and use the information to better focus our assistance
programs. In this way we can work more effectively to realize our
objective of an effective global nuclear safety culture, one that
establishes effective, independent nuclear safety regulatory
authorities in all countries with nuclear power programs to enforce
safety at the plants.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
______
Prepared Statement of Marvin S. Fertel
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Biden and distinguished members of the
committee, my name is Marvin Fertel. I am the senior vice president for
nuclear infrastructure support and international programs at the
Nuclear Energy Institute, the Washington, D.C., policy organization for
the nuclear industry. I am pleased to testify this morning in support
of U.S. ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
The Nuclear Energy Institute sets industry policy positions on
various issues affecting the industry, including federal regulations
that help ensure the safety of 103 operating nuclear power plants in 31
states. NEI represents 275 companies, including every U.S. utility
licensed to operate a commercial nuclear reactor, their suppliers, fuel
fabrication facilities, architectural and engineering firms, labor
unions and law firms, radiopharmaceutical companies, research
laboratories, universities and international nuclear organizations.
summary of key points
The nuclear energy industry supports ratification by the U.S.
Senate of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Nuclear power plants
produce nearly 20 percent of America's electricity--the second largest
source of electricity. Nuclear power plants also are our largest source
of emission-free electricity--an important consideration as Congress
and other policymakers recognize the growing nexus of energy and
environmental policy. Among the Congress, and indeed across the United
States, there is a growing awareness that this is a proven industry
with more than 2,000 reactor years of operating experience and with a
product that will become even more valuable as we meet the demands of
the 21st century.
Globally, 441 nuclear power plants in 33 nations generate 17
percent of our electricity. These nuclear energy facilities are
becoming more important as the clean air benefits of nuclear energy,
energy security considerations and economic factors are prompting many
countries to pursue the expansion of their existing nuclear power
programs, or the development of new nuclear power programs.
Ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety by the United
States is important for these reasons:
The U.S. government and the U.S. nuclear energy industry
have provided leadership in shaping the Convention and it
reflects the safety practices, programs and culture inherent in
our programs. The industry believes these programs are
necessary to the safety and reliability of nuclear programs
worldwide;
All other countries that have significant nuclear energy
programs, except the United States and India, have already
ratified the Convention;
The Convention provides a forum for the United States to
systematically review the nuclear programs for countries, such
as Russia and the Ukraine, to which the United States provides
nuclear safety program assistance; and
The Convention also provides an excellent framework and
process to support the development of new, safe nuclear power
programs in countries that may be looking to establish such
programs for energy security and environmental reasons.
The Nuclear Energy Institute's Executive Committee, representing
the leadership of the U.S. commercial nuclear industry, passed a
resolution in 1997 encouraging prompt Senate ratification of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety. The resolution noted ``that in
implementing the Convention, the U.S. government is encouraged to fully
engage the U.S. industry through NEI and to include industry expertise
through representation on the U.S. delegations to deliberations under
the Convention.''
The industry fully supports ratification of the Convention, and
encourages the Administration as part of its implementation to ensure
that appropriate input and involvement of the U.S. industry prior to,
and possibly at, review meetings. U.S. ratification of the Convention
should not impose any new regulatory requirements on the U.S. industry
beyond those required to meet Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
regulations.
Moreover, the Administration should not fund activities associated
with implemention the Convention from user fees collected from NRC
licensees for the agency's regulatory activities. Similarly, the
Administration should eliminate existing governmental activities that
are intended to achieve benefits that would be derived through the
Convention.
Given the scheduled April 12, 1999 review meeting, NEI urges the
Committee and the U.S. Senate to act promptly to ratify this Convention
so that the United States can attend this first review meeting. U.S.
leadership and participation is essential for successful implementation
of the Convention, and given the importance of assuring safe operation
of nuclear plants worldwide, it is clearly in the best interests of our
nation and the world at large.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. commercial nuclear industry is committed to
achieving and maintaining a high level of safety at commercial nuclear
power plants worldwide. The Convention provides an internationally
accepted and reasonable framework for enhancing the already high levels
of safety at commercial nuclear power plants in the United States and
internationally.
Without nuclear energy, the United States and many other nations
will find it impossible to meet increasing electricity demand, domestic
clean air goals or global efforts to reduce the effects of carbon
dioxide on the global climate. U.S. nuclear power plants provide clean
air benefits while producing electricity at a competitive price with
production costs that are a fraction of a cent higher than coal-fired
electricity and more cost-effective than natural gas, solar or wind
power. Members of Congress and other policymakers increasingly are
recognizing the important benefits of nuclear energy to our cconomy,
our environment and our energy future.
background
The United States has the largest commercial nuclear power industry
in the world, and we are the global leaders in the development of
advanced nuclear power plant technology. Between 1973 and 1996, nuclear
energy met 40 percent of the increase in demand for electricity in the
United States. Over this same period, U.S. nuclear power plants
displaced 2.3 billion barrels of oil, 3.4 billion tons of coal, and
12.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The oil alone would have cost
$74 billion (in constant 1996 dollars). Worldwide, nuclear energy
displaced 10 billion barrels of oil between 1973 and 1995, valued at
over $290 billion. During the same period, nuclear energy displaced 56
trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 8.9 billion tons of coal.
In 1997, nuclear energy generated more electricity--631 billion
kilowatt hours in the United States than any other fuel source except
coal. More than 100 nuclear power plants achieved an average capacity
factor of 70.3 percent. (Capacity factor, a yardstick for plant
performance, measures the amount of electricity actually produced
compared with the maximum output achievable.) The 1997 average is
nearly 16 percentage points higher than the 1980 average. Nationally,
each percentage point increase in capacity factor is roughly equivalent
to adding 1,000 megawatts of generating capacity to the electricity
grid. Improved nuclear power plant performance thus helps meet the
growing demand for electricity in the United States.
Since 1980, more than 40 U.S. nuclear power plants have entered
service The number of nuclear power plants in commercial service now
stands at 103 up from 68 in 1980.
In providing one-fifth of U.S. electricity supply, nuclear energy
is our nation's largest source of emission-free electricity. Nuclear
energy also provides clean air benefits at a competitive price with
production costs that are a fraction of a cent higher than coal-fired
electricity and more cost-effective than natural gas, solar or wind
power. Most U.S. nuclear power plants compete as low-cost electricity
providers today and are well-positioned as states open their
electricity markets to competition. Measured solely by economic
factors--operating and maintenance costs plus fuel costs, ongoing
capital requirements and general and administrative expenses--most
nuclear units will be very competitive in a deregulated electricity
market. In fact, many nuclear plants should be able to improve their
economic performance even further.
Production costs at nuclear power plants in the last three years
continue to fall well below those the nuclear energy industry incurred
at the start of the decade. Meanwhile, plant performance measured by
the capacity factor of plant operation has in the last two years
reached record high levels.
The industry has built a solid record of safe, efficient
performance at nuclear power plants as it enters a new business
environment. But the industry's continued commitment to safe nuclear
plant operation must be accompanied by the NRC's ability to fulfill its
mission as a strong and credible regulator. Both are essential to build
and maintain public trust and confidence in nuclear energy.
Unlike any other electric generation source, nuclear power is
unique because the costs of the entire electricity production
lifecycle--including the uranium fuel manufacturing process, NRC
regulation, waste management and plant decommissioning--are included in
the cost of electricity to consumers. To remain competitive with other
generation sources that do not internalize many of these expenses, all
costs in the nuclear fuel cycle must be appropriate and reasonable.
Plants will close if they cannot compete, raising potential electricity
system reliability problems. Moreover, the nuclear electric generation
will be replaced by power plants that emit greenhouse gases and other
air pollutants. If that scenario unfolds, the United States will find
it impossible to meet increasingly stringent U.S. clean air regulations
and international carbon dioxide reduction goals.
The foundation for the United States' leadership role in the
nuclear energy industry is the extensive use of nuclear power in this
country and the industry's improved safety performance. The industry's
commitment to excellence in plant operations has resulted in dramatic
gains in both safety and efficiency. Since 1985, for example, NRC data
shows that the average number of significant events at U.S. plants has
declined from nearly 2.5 per unit in 1985 to an average of .04 per unit
in 1998. Moreover, improvements in nuclear plant operating efficiency
since 1990 are equivalent to adding 11 large generating units to the
national electric grid--further evidence of the industry's contribution
to serving new electricity demand while meeting our nation's clean air
goals
Next week will mark the 20th anniversary of the accident at the
Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania. Notwithstanding the
reality that the accident hurt the unclear energy industry's public
image, the practical reality is that Three Mile Island was the catalyst
for significant institutional and operational changes that translated
into dramatic improvements in plant safety and efficiency.
Disciplines in training, operations and event reporting that grew
from the lessons of the accident have made the nuclear power industry
demonstrably safer and more reliable. During the 1980s, U.S. utilities
committed to a major nuclear power plant improvement program. Its
success is partly due to the initiatives of the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations (INPO), an industry-sponsored organization that works
to ensure the highest levels of safety and reliability in all aspects
of nuclear plant operations.
Teams of qualified and experienced specialists visit each U.S.
plant about every 18 months, but at least every 24 months. They perform
a two-week examination of workers' performance, the condition of the
plant systems and equipment, the plant's operating history, the quality
of programs and procedures and the effectiveness of the management. The
teams then report their findings to plant and corporate management--
including recommendations for improvement--based on the best practices
found in the nuclear industry worldwide.
Since 1983, INPO has collected performance data from each nuclear
power plant and published annual industrywide performance indicators.
This data helps utilities evaluate how well each plant is performing
and sets specific goals for operating excellence.
As part of its program, INPO monitors 10 key performance
indicators, such as unplanned automatic shutdowns and safety system
actuations. INPO collects these data from each nuclear unit, then
calculates national averages, and submits them to the World Association
of Nuclear Operators (WANO). Each of WANO's performance indicators
reveals that nuclear power plants are operating more safely, more
productively and more competitively.
u.s. nuclear regulatory regime is a global model
The United States has the most mature commercial nuclear regulatory
regime in the world. Within the context of exceptional plant
performance, both the industry and the public still need and demand a
credible and effective regulatory oversight process to ensure adequate
protection of the public health and safety.
Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been an effective
regulator during the first decades of nuclear power plant operation,
the agency has recognized the inherent value of changing the existing
regulatory process to make it more effective and safety focused. In
this new regulatory process, regulation must have a clear nexus to
objective safety standards. The key to reform is in the efficient use
of risk insights, which can greatly improve the safety focus of
regulatory requirements. In conjunction with risk-informed regulation
is a need for a performance-based approach, where the NRC would decide
how best to meet those goals. Performance-based regulation is more
sharply focused on safety than the current approach, because resources
are applied to plant systems and components commensurate with their
importance to safety.
The Nuclear Safety Convention would augment national regulatory
programs, like the NRC, reaffirming the commitment to a high level of
safety worldwide. U.S. leadership in international nuclear development
has been critical to ensure safe, reliable and environmentally
beneficial uses of commercial nuclear technology around the world. The
United States has been a leader in technical exchanges with other
nations that operate nuclear power plants. Together, industry leaders
and plant operating personnel from the West and the East have
recognized that nuclear power safety and operations transcend national
boundaries. They have worked side by side with peers from all over the
world to provide assistance and operating experiences.
Shirley Jackson, chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
said in a speech earlier this month that ``nuclear operators long have
recognized the value and the imperative of combining their national
efforts in the cause of enhanced safety.'' Indeed, the United States
has been extremely active in cooperative assistance efforts, including
those designed to address the safety of Soviet-designed reactors in
Central and Eastern Europe. The Convention on Nuclear Safety would
augment International Atomic Energy Agency efforts in international
safety. By ratifying the treaty, the United States would maintain U.S.
leadership in ensuring that nuclear power plant designs in Eastern and
Central Europe, as well as in developing countries, are safe. Although
it does not address the full scope of global safety issues, the
Convention promotes a nuclear safety culture worldwide by providing
technical cooperation on safety-related issues.
U.S. participation in implementing the Convention on Nuclear Safety
is an important component of providing this U.S. leadership.
Importantly, the treaty will ensure that all contracting parties will
report, for review, all measures they have taken to implement the
safety obligations in the Convention. This reporting is thorough and is
not subject to national confidentiality.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety establishes a framework for
improving nuclear safety among all countries that operate nuclear power
plants and provides a basis for dialogue with those countries planning
to build and operate commercial nuclear facilities. The U.S. nuclear
industry is committed to working with the United States government on
the Convention and urges U.S. companies to continue their long-standing
assistance programs to improve efficiency, reliability and safety of
nuclear power plants worldwide.
Resolution
WHEREAS, thirty-three countries operating four hundred and forty-
one nuclear power plants currently produce seventeen percent of the
world's electricity;
WHEREAS, environmental benefits of nuclear energy, energy
security considerations and economic factors, are causing many
countries to pursue the expansion of their existing nuclear power
programs, or the development of new nuclear power programs;
WHEREAS, the U.S. nuclear energy industry is committed to
achieving and maintaining a high-level of nuclear safety at commercial
nuclear power plants, worldwide; and
WHEREAS, the ``Convention on Nuclear Safety'' provides an
internationally accepted and reasonable framework for enhancing the
safety at commercial nuclear power plants worldwide;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED,
that NEI encourages the prompt ratification of the ``Convention on
Nuclear Safety'' by the Senate of the United States; and
that in implementing the Convention, the U.S. government is encouraged
to fully engage the U.S. industry through NEI and to include industry
expertise through representation on the U.S. delegations to
deliberations under the Convention.
______
Prepared Statement of Gary L. Jones
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are here today to provide information on the Convention on
Nuclear Safety--a multilateral treaty to improve civil nuclear power
safety. Our statement today summarizes (1) the Convention's scope and
objectives, (2) the process for reviewing compliaince with the
Convention, (3) the dissemination of information related to the
Convention's proceedings, and (4) the costs to implement the
Convention. We have issued two reports that track the Convention's
development and implementation. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nuclear Safety: Progress Toward lnternational Agreement to
Improve Reactor Safety (GAO/RCED-93-153, May 14, 1993) and Nuclear
Safety: Uncertainties About the Implementation and Costs of the Nuclear
Safety Convention (GAO/RCED-97-39, Jan. 2, 1997).
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In summary
The Convention on Nuclear Safety, which focuses on civilian
nuclear power reactors, is viewed by the United States as one
of the chief policy instruments to encourage countries with
Soviet-designed nuclear reactors to improve the safety of their
reactors. The Convention seeks to achieve its safety objectives
through countries' adherence to general safety principles, such
as establishing an independent body to oversee safety, rather
than binding technical standards. The Convention does not
provide sanctions for noncompliance nor require the closing of
unsafe nuclear reactors.
The Convention's peer review process is intended to
establish a forum where groups of countries will comment on
reports that are self-assessments of their nuclear programs and
thereby encourage countries to improve the safety of these
programs. However, the Convention does not specify the form and
content of the peer review process nor the quality of
countries' reports; therefore, it is unclear how peer pressure
will accomplish change or even whether sufficient information
will be contained in the reports.
Although public dissemination of information about the
countries' progress in meeting the terms of the Convention can
play a role in influencing compliance, it is uncertain how much
information from the peer review meetings will be available to
the public. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials told
us that the Convention does not specifically provide for the
kind of openness that they would prefer, but they believe that
over time, more information will be made available to the
public.
In January 1997, we reported that the United States
estimated that it could spend up to $1.1 million through fiscal
year 1999 to prepare for and attend the first review meeting.
However, according to an NRC official, the actual costs for
this time period will be significantly less because U.S.
officials have not participated in the full range of meetings
and activities to date related to the Convention.
scope and objectives of the nuclear safety convention
The development of the Nuclear Safety Convention is one of a number
of cooperative efforts being undertaken by the international community
to improve nuclear safety. The impetus for these efforts is based
largely on the continuing concern about the safety of the older Soviet-
designed reactors. Many of these reactors are operating without basic
safety features, such as protective structures to contain radioactive
releases and adequately trained personnel. Although the Convention is
not viewed as a panacea or ``quick fix,'' it is believed to be a
positive step toward improving worldwide nuclear safety. Importantly,
though, the Convention does not require any specific actions like
closing unsafe nuclear reactors, and its focus is limited to civilian
nuclear power reactors.
The Convention seeks to achieve its safety objectives through
countries' adherence to general safety principles rather than binding
technical standards. These principles include (1) establishing and
maintaining a legislative framework and an independent regulatory body
to govern the safety of nuclear installations; (2) establishing
procedures to ensure that technical aspects of safety, such as the
siting, design, and construction of nuclear power reactors, are
adequately considered; and (3) ensuring that an acceptable level of
safety is maintained throughout the life of the installations by such
things as considering safety to be a priority and establishing a
quality assurance program.
The majority of the country representatives that we met with during
the early drafting stages of the Convention supported these principles.
A few country officials stated, however, that without establishing
procedures for addressing existing problem reactors, including time
frames for upgrading their safety, the Convention would not improve
nuclear safety. Nevertheless, 65 countries have signed the Convention,
and 49 of the 65 have ratified it. As you know, the United States has
signed but not ratified the Convention.
peer review process is central to the convention's success
As noted, the Convention does not impose sanctions for
noncompliance. Rather, it seeks to encourage compliance through a peer
review process, which is considered central to the Convention's
success. According to officials of the Departments of State and Energy
and NRC, this process will enable countries' safety practices to be
brought before the ``bar of world public opinion.'' The Convention does
not specify the form and content of the peer review process but calls
on the parties to (1) submit sell-assessment reports of the measures
they have taken to implement the Convention and (2) hold meetings to
review these reports. As you are aware, the first meeting of the
parties will take place next month at the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria.
Review groups composed of members from participating countries
serve as the foundation of the peer review mechanism. Each group
includes members from several countries that have ratified the
Convention. As the process is currently envisioned, the countries with
the most operating nuclear reactors will participate in separate groups
along with several other countries that have ratified the Convention.
Within this group setting, all countries will critically examine and
review how each country is complying with the Convention. Because the
United States has not yet ratified the Convention, it has not yet been
assigned to one of the country groups. In our 1997 report, we pointed
out that NRC officials had expressed some concern about the potential
grouping of countries. For example, the United States, which has spent
tens of millions of dollars to improve the safety of Soviet-designed
reactors, will not be in the same review group as Russia, which
operates many of these reactors.
Although U.S. representatives had misgivings about the country peer
review groups, the Convention states that each country shall have a
reasonable opportunity to discuss and seek clarification of the reports
of any other party at the review meeting. As a result, NRC officials
believed that regardless of how the countries are ultimately grouped,
the United States would have ample opportunity to review and comment on
the self-assessment reports of all countries. According to NRC, the
procedures on the peer review process have been clarified since the
issuance of our 1997 report. The process will begin with discussions by
group members but will then allow countries that are outside a
particular group to obtain information of interest to them. Outside
parties will be permitted to sit in on the full discussion of any
report about which they have submitted questions or comments as
observers. NRC believes this process will enable the United States'
concerns about any country's report to be fully heard.
We would like to point out that this process is still somewhat
theoretical and neither we nor anyone else can be fully certain that it
will work precisely as described. Furthermore, it is unclear what form
peer pressure will take and how it will cause changes in a country's
nuclear power program. As we noted in our May 1993 report, overall
responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the country where a
nuclear installation is located.
Another issue that will affect the success of the peer review
process is the quality of the individual countries' sell-assessment
reports, which are expected to describe how the parties are complying
with the Convention. Because of differences in countries' nuclear
safety programs and available resources, NRC officials anticipate
unevenness in the quality and detail of the reports. In their view,
this unevenness could affect the level of review and analysis.
Similarly, an NRC official recently told us that there is no standard
format for the reports and that quality issues will remain problematic.
public access to information resulting from the convention's meetings
can influence compliance
The public dissemination of information about the countries'
progress in meeting the terms of the Convention can play a key role in
influencing compliance, according to some experts familiar with
international agreements that rely primarily on peer review. Although
U.S. andIAEA officials believe the Convention will encourage greater
openness about many countries' safety records and programs, it is
uncertain how much information resulting from the periodic meetings
will be made available to the public. According to NRC officials, the
countries can limit the distribution of their reports. While several
countries have made the reports prepared for the first review meeting
available to the public and even accessible on the Internet, an NRC
official told us that one country, for example, has not made its report
public. According to an NRC official, the United States plans to make
its report publicly available.
Our 1997 report pointed out some concerns about what type of public
record would result from the periodic meetings. We noted that the
Convention provides for the public distribution of a report summarizing
the issues discussed and the decisions reached during a meeting.
However, an NRC official recently told us that the report will be
generic in nature and unlikely to identify countries by name. Overall,
NRC officials told us that the Convention does not specifically provide
for the kind of openness that they would prefer but they believe that
over time, more information will be made available to the public.
Certainly, promoting greater openness about countries' nuclear safety
regimes will enhance the credibility of the process.
costs to implement the convention
In January 1997, we reported that the United States estimated that
it could spend up to $1.1 million through fiscal year 1999 to prepare
for and attend the first review meeting. However, according to an NRC
official, the actual costs for this time period will be significantly
less because U.S. officials have not participated in the full range of
meetings and activities to date related to the Convention.
The Convention states that IAEA will bear the costs of
administering the meeting of the parties, which were expected to total
about $1 million. Our 1997 report noted that IAEA planned to support
the Convention through its operating budget, which the United States
supports through an annual 25-percent contribution. NRC officials had
told us that they were concerned about IAEA's potential costs for
administering the Convention. The factors affecting IAEA's costs
primarily involve the number of languages used to conduct the meeting
of the parties and the corresponding translation services. Recently,
though, an NRC official told us that costs are being contained because
English will serve as the working language for the meeting of the
parties. If more languages had been used, then the costs would have
been higher given the corresponding costs for translation. As noted in
our 1997 report, IAEA's then Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety
told us that the Convention might uncover additional safety problems
that require attention. As a result, the countries with the most acute
safety problems may seek to use the Convention process as leverage to
obtain additional nuclear safety assistance.
This concludes our statement. We would be happy to respond to any
questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.
[Attachments.]
[GAO Report to Congressional Requesters--May 1993]
Nuclear Safety--Progress Toward International Agreement to Improve
Reactor Safety
U.S. General Accounting Office,
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,
Washington, DC, May 14, 1993.
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
United States Senate
The Honorable Bob Graham,
United States Senate
Representatives of nearly one-half of the 114 member states of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the United States,
have participated in the development of an international nuclear safety
convention--a proposed multilateral treaty to improve civil nuclear
power reactor safety. A preliminary draft of the convention has been
developed (referred to as the draft convention for this report), but
discussions are continuing, and when the final convention text will be
completed and presented to IAEA member states for signature is
uncertain.
This report responds to the former and current Chairman's request
that we provide information on the development of the nuclear safety
convention, including a discussion of (1) the draft convention's scope
and objectives, (2) how the convention will be implemented and
monitored, (3) the views of selected country representatives on what
provisions should be included in the draft convention, and (4) the
convention's potential benefits and limitations.
results in brief
The scope of the convention as currently drafted focuses on civil
nuclear power reactors. Thus, other nuclear facilities, including those
dealing with waste management, military activities, fuel cycle
activities--such as reprocessing and/or enrichment plants--and research
reactors, are not covered under the convention's provisions. For
example, the draft convention would not cover the nuclear reprocessing
facility at a military complex in Russia where an accident occurred in
April 1993.
The objectives of the draft convention are written in general terms
and call on countries to achieve and attain a high level of safety to
prevent nuclear accidents. Because the convention's premise is that the
regulation of nuclear safety is a national responsibility, safety goals
would be achieved through countries' adherence to general safety
principles, such as establishing a legislative framework and an
independent regulatory body to govern the safety of nuclear
installations, rather than to binding detailed technical standards. The
convention has been characterized as incentive-oriented, designed to
encourage widespread support, particularly among countries operating
Soviet-designed reactors that lack basic safety features.
The draft convention provides for a peer review process to monitor
adherence to the provisions of the convention. Through this process--
the details of which have not been determined--it is envisioned that
country representatives would have an opportunity to review other
countries' measures to improve safety and could exert peer pressure to
affect changes.
Although the convention concept is supported by a diverse group of
IAEA member state representatives, views differ regarding several
issues. For example, the United States and 6 other country
representatives told us that they favor a scope limited to civil
nuclear power plants, while 16 country representatives told us that
they support a broader convention covering, for example, radioactive
waste facilities or reprocessing facilities in addition to power
plants. One country did not provide a final position on the scope of
the convention. Representatives from 21 of the 24 IAEA member states
that we met with, including U.S. officials, told us that they favor a
convention based on general safety principles and oppose an
international enforcement mechanism because the safe operation and
maintenance of nuclear reactors is a national responsibility. Most of
these countries operate nuclear power plants. Representatives we spoke
with from three countries--none of which operate civil nuclear power
plants but do neighbor countries operating nuclear power plants--prefer
binding technical standards and an international regulatory body to
oversee the convention's implementation.
The majority of country representatives and some IAEA officials
believe the convention is a positive step towards promoting and
strengthening international nuclear safety and perhaps increasing
public confidence in the nuclear power industry. However, a few other
representatives and other IAEA officials were less optimistic. They
noted that without establishing procedures for addressing existing
problem reactors, including time frames for upgrading their safety, the
convention will not improve nuclear safety. In addition, they told us
that the convention could easily be considered weak and lacking in
substance by nuclear poweropponents; thus, unless the convention
addresses those reactors where perceived safety deficiencies exist, it
is technically flawed.
background
The development of the nuclear safety convention is one of a number
of cooperative efforts being undertaken by the international community
to improve nuclear safety. Financial and technical assistance from
various bilateral and multilateral sources, such as the Commission of
the European Communities, is under way to address some of the most
urgent safety problems. The impetus for these efforts is based largely
on the growing concern about the safety of the older Soviet-designed
reactors in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Many of these
reactors are operating without basic safety features, such as emergency
core cooling systems, protective structures to contain radioactive
releases, and adequately trained personnel. In addition, many of these
reactors are in countries that do not have independent or effective
nuclear regulatory organizations.
The IAEA member state representatives developing the draft
convention, known collectively as the working group, have met three
times in Vienna, Austria, during the period May 1992 through January
1993. The Department of State heads the U.S. delegation to the working
group, which also includes representatives from the Department of
Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The group
plans to meet again in May 1993. A State Department official told us
that discussions have been complex and difficult because the convention
concerns the sovereign rights of nations to regulate and manage
important domestic industrial activities that will be affected by the
provisions of the convention when adopted. As a result, according to
the State Department official, a diplomatic conference will be
necessary to negotiate the final terms of the convention.
scope and objectives of the draft convention
The scope of the convention, as currently drafted, applies only to
civil nuclear power plants. Thus, other nuclear facilities, including
those dealing with waste management, military activities, and fuel
cycle activities--such as reprocessing and/or enrichment plants--and
research reactors, are not covered by the terms of the convention. The
convention as it currently exists would not cover, for example, the
nuclear reprocessing facility at a military complex in Russia where an
accident occurred in April 1993.
The objectives of the draft convention are written in general
rather than detailed, technical, and prescriptive terms. For example,
the convention calls on countries to take all appropriate measures to
(1) protect people and the environment from the harmful effects of
radiation and (2) prevent the occurrence of nuclear accidents. The
convention proposes that countries cooperate to reach these objectives
and achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety. The convention
does not seek to impose penalties for noncompliance.
The convention has been described as incentive-oriented designed to
maximize the number of countries that will support and sign it. A State
Department official said that a major reason for developing an
incentive-type convention was to make it acceptable and useful to
countries with problem reactors, particularly the former Soviet Union
and eastern European nations. According to U.S. officials, the main
purpose of the convention is to get these countries, as well as
developing nations, to make commitments to improve their reactors and
develop a safety culture.\1\ The U.S. officials believe that these
countries probably would not sign a prescriptive or stringent
convention that they could not comply with.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Safety culture implies individual and organizational awareness
of and commitment to the importance of safety. It also refers to the
personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in
any activity that has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The draft convention states that overall responsibility for nuclear
safety rests with the country where a nuclear installation is located.
Therefore, the convention seeks to achieve its objectives through
countries' adhering to general safety principles rather than to binding
technical standards. These principles, or safety fundamentals, embodied
in the draft convention represent international consensus by experts on
basic safety concepts for the regulation and operation of nuclear
installations. The principles comprise the most general level of
guidelines in the hierarchy of IAEA's nuclear safety series
publications. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ IAEA's safety series also includes more detailed standards,
guides, and practices. In total, these guidelines provide a reference
for developing national safety regulations in certain cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The principles, in part, call on each country to take the following
actions:
Establish and maintain a legislative framework and
independent regulatory body to govern the safety of nuclear
installations through regulations, licensing, inspection, and
enforcement.
Establish procedures to ensure that technical aspects of
nuclear reactor safety are adequately considered and
continuously evaluated throughoutthe life of the installation.
These technical aspects include siting, design and
construction, and operation and maintenance. For example,
countries would be required to establish procedures to evaluate
the impact of a nuclear installation's site selection on the
environment and ensure that the design of the installation
provides for levels of protection against the release of
radioactive materials.
Establish a safety management system to ensure that an
acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of
the installation. This is to be achieved by giving priority to
safety, establishing a quality assurance program, ensuring that
staff are adequately trained, performing periodic safety
assessments, and establishing an emergency preparedness plan.
convention to be implemented by peer review process
As currently drafted, the convention would be implemented by
periodic meetings of the signatory countries--a peer review process.
Although the details of this process have not been determined by the
working group, the draft convention contains proposals that the
meetings will (1) establish the structute, content, and time frames for
status reports to be submitted by the signatory countries; (2) review
and assess how the countries are meeting the convention's obligations;
and (3) carry out advisory functions to achieve and maintain a high
level of nuclear power plant safety.
These meetings are an essential element of the convention and
should provide a forum for reviewing countries' measures to improve
safety. At a February 1993 IAEA general conference meeting, the U.S.
representative noted that the convention should establish a mandatory
process for exerting peer pressure on countries with weak nuclear
safety programs to substantially improve them.
The role of IAEA--an agency that promotes improvements in nuclear
power reactor safety--in implementing the convention has not been
agreed upon, but it is unlikely that the agency will have any
enforcement or regulatory responsibility. As drafted, the convention
proposes that IAEA serve as the Secretariat to the meeting of the
parties. In this capacity, IAEA would (1) convene, prepare, and service
the meetings; (2) transmit reports and information to member countries;
and (3) perform other duties and provide support services and technical
expertise as requested. Most of the country officials, including the
U.S. delegation, believe that IAEA also can play a useful,
nonregulatory role in implementing the convention, such as technical
adviser.
Both the Director and Deputy Director of IAEA's Nuclear Safety
Division believe the agency can play an active role by more fully
utilizing the skills and expertise of the agency. They noted that in
addition to the proposed Secretariat role, IAEA could facilitate the
procedural meetings of the parties in a variety of ways. For example,
IAEA could (1) prepare reports for the meetings, (2) analyze countries'
status reports, (3) verify countries' progress in improving safety, (4)
establish criteria to serve as a benchmark for measuring progress in
meeting the convention's obligations, and (5) provide other technical
assistance as required.
country representatives expressed differing views on nuclear safety
convention
We interviewed representatives of 24 IAEA member state countries
\3\--18 of which operate 87 percent of the world's civil nuclear power
plants--to obtain their views on the convention's scope, whether they
favored a convention based on detailed technical standards or general
safety principles, if there should be a mechanism to ensure adherence
to the convention, and the convention's potential benefits and
limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ We interviewed representatives from Argentina, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands,
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
and the United States.
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Mixed Views on Scope of Convention
Various views exist among country representatives over what
facilities and elements of the nuclear fuel cycle should be included in
the convention. All of the representatives we spoke with agreed that,
at a minimum, the convention should cover civil nuclear power plants.
However, the majority of these representatives told us that the final
convention should not be limited to these installations. Of the 24
representatives, 16 favored a convention covering a wider range of
facilities and most frequently cited the need to include radioactive
waste disposal. Other facilities or elements mentioned were fuel
reprocessing, transportation of nuclear material, military facilities,
and research reactors. One country representative did not provide a
final position on the scope of the convention.
Representatives told us that a nuclear accident, regardless of its
source, is potentially dangerous. In their view, a convention
addressing other sources of radiation would demonstrate the
international community's recognition of the broader issues involving
nuclear safety. Many of the representatives who support a broader scope
for the final convention told us that their countries might be willing
to accept a convention limited to nuclear power plants as a first step,
with the understanding that additional nuclear facilities would be
addressed in future conventions.
Seven country representatives, including the United States, favor a
scope limited to nuclear power reactors, in part because they pose the
most serious risk. In addition, State Department and NRC officials told
us that it was thought early agreement could be reached on a final text
of the convention if it was limited to nuclear power reactors. In
addition, an NRC official told us that the United States is committed
to continuing the convention process and would be an active participant
in any future safety conventions addressing other nuclear facilities.
Most Countries Favor General Principles Over Binding Standards
Of the 24 countries whose representatives we interviewed, including
the United States, 21 support a convention based on general safety
principles, not binding safety standards. With one exception, these
countries have nuclear power plants in operation or under construction.
Several member country representatives said that the general principles
included in the draft convention are adequate to establish minimum
acceptable standards of safety. Officials from the United States and
several other countries noted that standards could infringe on national
sovereignty or conflict with national laws and policies. A DOE official
said that detailed standards are not well suited for development into
international standards. He said that the diversity of plants in
operation worldwide and of those planned for the future makes it
difficult for a set of detailed standards to be applied broadly and
still to provide recognition of individual reactor design requirements.
The representatives of the United States and other countries told
us that it would be time-consuming and complex to translate safety
standards into acceptable binding international language. Furthermore,
the United States has maintained that international standards could
commit the signatory countries to a less rigorous set of obligations
than many national programs have adopted--a ``lowest common
denominator'' approach to nuclear safety.
Representatives from three non-nuclear power countries, all of
which neighbor countries with operating nuclear power reactors, told us
that they favor a convention based on binding international technical
safety standards. Officials from these countries said that detailed,
prescriptive standards would provide firm obligations and serve as
criteria for measuring progress made toward nuclear safety. Two of
these countries' officials disagreed with the lowest common denominator
argument made by the United States. The officials said that the Western
nations already exceed the proposed international nuclear safety
standards. Furthermore, the officials believe that standards are
necessary to bring countries with problem reactors up to minimum
acceptable levels of safety.
While most countries do not favor a convention based on binding
standards, working group delegates are debating the value of using
standards as a reference to measure countries' progress toward
improving safety. Various countries in the working group favor using
international standards for this purpose. Furthermore, some
representatives that were opposed to a convention based on technical
standards supported the idea of using standards for the peer review
process. The U.S. delegation was among several countries opposed to
this idea, especially if the standards were to be assigned special
recognition in the convention. The United States based its opposition,
in part, on the belief that experience and expertise in operating
nuclear reactors are the key to the peer review process, not standards.
At the last working group meeting in January 1993, no agreement was
reached on what role, if any, standards should play.
Most Countries Oppose International Enforcement or Regulatory Body
Representatives of 21 countries, including the United States, told
us that they are opposed to having an international organization, such
as IAEA, enforce the convention. The same countries that favor general
principles over technical standards oppose international enforcement
for many of the same reasons. These countries are opposed to a
regulatory body, primarily because they believe it would infringe upon
their national sovereignty.
Several country representatives told us that countries with problem
reactors would be discouraged from signing an enforcement-oriented
convention. In their view, these countries should be part of the
process if the convention is going to have a positive impact on
improving international nuclear safety. Representatives from three non-
nuclear power countries told us that enforcement and verification
procedures are essential to ensure that countries are meeting their
obligations. Furthermore, two of these countries favor mandatory
international inspections, possibly by IAEA.
potential benefits and limitations of the proposed nuclear safety
convention
The nuclear safety convention concept enjoys broad support among a
diverse group of countries. Although many member country
representatives do not view the convention as a panacea or quick fix,
the majority believe it is a positive step toward improving
international nuclear safety. A U.S. government representative said
that theconvention's primary benefits would be (1) promoting a nuclear
safety culture and (2) obtaining improvements in nuclear reactors
located in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and developing
countries. Various member country representatives said that, in
addition to promoting a global safety culture, the convention could
increase public awareness and confidence in nuclear safety. Some IAEA
officials, who are assisting in the working group, believe the
convention is a worthwhile effort because it will bring countries
together to discuss safety issues as part of a systematic process.
A few primarily non-nuclear power countries, as well as some IAEA
officials, believe that the proposed convention has serious
limitations. One country representative said that the convention needs
to change the status quo and improve the safety of problem reactors.
However, in his view, the draft convention would not achieve this
objective. A few member country officials noted that without
establishing procedures for addressing existing problem reactors,
including time frames for upgrading their safety, the convention would
not improve nuclear safety. The Director of IAEA's Division of Nuclear
Safety told us that the convention could easily be considered weak and
lacking in substance by nuclear power opponents. The Deputy Director
noted that unless the convention addresses those reactors where
perceived safety deficiencies exist, it is technically flawed.
observations
Development of the draft international nuclear safety convention
has been complex and difficult. This is understandable, given the
various perceptions and expectations of countries as to what a nuclear
safety convention should contain and what it should accomplish.
Agreement has not been reached on the substantive provisions regarding
the scope and the level of technical detail of safety standards or
principles to be adhered to by member countries.
The sovereign rights of participating countries could be affected
by the final convention document. Although member states differ on the
elements that the convention should contain, they share the common goal
of wanting to improve nuclear power reactor safety through greater
international cooperation. The member states also seem to agree that
safety is an international responsibility because of the potential
transboundary effects of radiation released from an accident.
It is premature to assess the impact of the nuclear safety
convention, the success of which depends on many factors, including
getting most of the nations with nuclear power plants to sign onto the
convention and adhere to its terms. However, some preliminary
observations can be made at this time. The draft convention does not
provide measurable criteria to gauge the safety improvements of the
countries, particularly those with problem reactors. Using benchmark
criteria in the peer review process could aid in assessing and
monitoring progress in upgrading the safety of civil nuclear power
plants. In addition, although it is clear that most member state
representatives do not envision an enforcement role for IAEA, it is not
clear what role IAEA will ultimately serve. IAEA's technical expertise
and safety services could be used to facilitate the peer review
process.
agency comments
We discussed the facts presented in this report with the State
Department's Director, Office of Nuclear Technology and Safeguards;
NRC's Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research; DOE
officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Domestic and
International Energy and in the Office of General Counsel; and the
Counselor of Nuclear Policy, U.S. Mission to the United Nations System
Organizations. We discussed the report with the following officials
from IAEA's Division of Nuclear Safety: the Director, the Deputy
Director, and the Head of the Safety Standards and Coordination
Section. We also met with officials from IAEA's Legal Division.
In general, these officials agreed with the facts presented in this
report and gave us additional clarifying information. We have revised
the text as necessary. However, as requested, we did not obtain written
agency comments on a draft of this report.
scope and methodology
To obtain a broad range of views on the nuclear safety convention,
we judgmentally selected 24 IAEA member countries to include in our
review. As of December 31, 1992, 18 of the 24 countries operated 87
percent of the worid's nuclear power plants. Among this group of
countries, we wanted to ensure that we solicited the views of
representatives from both highly industrialized and less-developed
countries. We obtained the views of some of those countries with
Soviet-designed reactors, such as the Russian Federation and Bulgaria.
We also sought views from two countries that do not currently operate
civil nuclear power plants but are constructing them--Cuba and Romania.
Finally, we met with representatives from four countries that do
not currently have active civil nuclear power programs--Austria,
Ireland, Italy,and Portugal. We selected these countries to ensure that
we included the views of non-nuclear power countries that neighbor
countries operating civil nuclear power plants.
We met with officials from all of these countries to obtain their
views on the draft convention. These officials included country
representatives to IAEA, legal and technical experts, and other
knowledgeable government officials. Whenever possible, we sought to
verily foreign countries' positions by comparing their representatives'
views with formal statements provided at IAEA general conferences and
other available information. We provided officials from each country
with a summary of information and requested that it be reviewed by
other cognizant government representatives for accuracy and
completeness. Representatives from all 23 foreign countries responded
between December 1992 and March 1993. One country's positions were
presented as preliminary and subject to further review.
To obtain the views of the U.S. government, we met with officials
from the Departments of State and Energy and NRC. We also met with
officials from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations System
Organizations, Vienna, Austria; and the U.S. Mission to the European
Communities, Brussels, Belgium. We obtained pertinent documents that
detailed U.S. positions on the safety convention.
To help identify key elements and objectives of the convention, we
attended the October 1992 and January 1993 sessions of the nuclear
safety working group in Vienna, Austria. We reviewed pertinent
convention-related reports prepared by IAEA and other relevant
documentation prepared by the participating countries. We also obtained
the views of officials and additional documentation from IAEA the
Paris, France, Center of the World Association of Nuclear Operators;
the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development; and the Commission of the European Communities.
We performed our review between August 1992 and March 1993 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Victor S. Rezendes,
Director, Energy and Science Issues.
appendix i
COUNTRIES ATTENDING THE NUCLEAR SAFETY CONVENTION WORKING GROUP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Civil nuclear power
Country Operating civil nuclear reactors under Not operating civil
power reactors construction nuclear power reactors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Algeria.............................. ....................... ....................... X
Argentina............................ X X .......................
Australia............................ ....................... ....................... X
Austria.............................. ....................... ....................... X
Belgium.............................. X ....................... .......................
Brazil............................... X X .......................
Bulgaria............................. X ....................... .......................
Canada............................... X X .......................
China................................ X X .......................
Croatia\1\........................... ....................... ....................... X
Cuba................................. ....................... X X
Czech Republic\2\.................... X X .......................
Denmark.............................. ....................... ....................... X
Egypt................................ ....................... ....................... X
Finland.............................. X ....................... .......................
France............................... X X .......................
Germany.............................. X ....................... .......................
Greece............................... ....................... ....................... X
Holy See............................. ....................... ....................... X
Hungary.............................. X ....................... .......................
India................................ X X .......................
Indonesia............................ ....................... ....................... X
Iran................................. ....................... X X
Ireland.............................. ....................... ....................... X
Israel............................... ....................... ....................... X
Italy................................ ....................... ....................... X
Japan................................ X X .......................
Republic of Korea.................... X X .......................
Luxembourg........................... ....................... ....................... X
Malaysia............................. ....................... ....................... X
Mexico............................... X X .......................
Netherlands.......................... X ....................... .......................
Nigeria.............................. ....................... ....................... X
Norway............................... ....................... ....................... X
Pakistan............................. X ....................... .......................
Peru................................. ....................... ....................... X
Philippines.......................... ....................... ....................... X
Poland............................... ....................... ....................... X
Portugal............................. ....................... ....................... X
Romania.............................. ....................... X X
Russian Federation................... X X .......................
Saudi Arabia......................... ....................... ....................... X
Slovak Republic\2\................... X X .......................
Slovenia\1\.......................... X ....................... .......................
South Africa......................... X ....................... .......................
Spain................................ X ....................... .......................
Sweden............................... X ....................... .......................
Switzerland.......................... X ....................... .......................
Thailand............................. ....................... ....................... X
Tunisia.............................. ....................... ....................... X
Turkey............................... ....................... ....................... X
Ukraine.............................. X X .......................
United Kingdom....................... X X .......................
United States........................ X X .......................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Not all countries listed attended all meetings of the working group.
\1\ Yugoslavia attended the May 1992 meeting. Two former Yugoslavian republics of Slovenia and Croatia attended
the later meetings.
\2\ Czechoslovakia attended the 1992 meetings. Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on December 31, 1992,
the Czech and Slovak Republics attended the January 1993 meeting.
Source: IAEA, December 31, 1992
[GAO Report to Congressional Requesters--January 1997]
Nuclear Safety--Uncertainties About the Implementation and Costs of the
Nuclear Safety Convention
U.S. General Accounting Office,
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,
Washington, DC, January 2, 1997.
The Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate
The Honorable Bob Graham,
United States Senate
The 1986 explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power reactor in
Ukraine underscored the global importance of nuclear safety, as
radioactive material was carried beyond the national boundaries of the
Soviet Union to East and West European countries. In the aftermath of
the Chernobyl accident, representatives of over 50 nations participated
in the development of a Convention on Nuclear Safety, a multilateral
treaty that seeks to increase the safety of civil nuclear power
reactors. As of December 1996, the Convention had been signed by 65
countries, including the United States. The Secretary of Energy signed
the Convention on behalf of the United States in September 1994.
However, in order for the United States to become legally bound by the
Convention, the U.S. Senate must ratify it. In May 1995, the
administration transmitted the Convention to the Senate, but the Senate
has yet to take action. (See app. I for a list of countries that have
signed--or signed and ratified--the Convention.)
As requested, this report provides information on (1) how
compliance with the Convention's terms and obligations will be reviewed
by the ratifying countries (hereinafter, also called parties) and (2)
the potential costs to the United States to participate in the
Convention.
results in brief
The method to review compliance with the Convention on Nuclear
Safety has not been finalized. The Convention does not impose sanctions
for noncompliance but seeks to encourage compliance through peer
pressure. The Convention relies on each ratifying country to prepare a
self-assessment report of its nuclear power program. These reports
will, in turn, be reviewed by other member countries at periodic
meetings to determine how each country is complying with the
Convention. The level of detail to be included in these reports has not
been finalized, nor has the process by which countries will critically
review these reports been fully determined.
As the method is currently envisioned, groups composed of five or
six countries would form the core of the review process. The countries
with the greatest number of operating nuclear reactors--the United
States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Russia--would
participate in separate review groups made up primarily of several
other countries with operating reactors. Although U.S. government
officials did not originally favor the country-grouping approach, they
believe the United States will have adequate opportunities to review
the safety programs of all countries through other mechanisms
established by the Convention.
The costs associated with the United States' participation in the
Convention have not been fully determined. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy have
estimated that it could cost as much as $1.1 million to (1) participate
in planning meetings to develop the Convention's policies and
procedures; (2) prepare the first U.S. self-assessment report; (3)
review other countries' reports; and (4) participate in the first
review meeting, which will probably be held in April 1999. These costs
are made up primarily of U.S. government-related salaries and benefits.
Other costs--a portion of which the United States will incur--
associated with the International Atomic Energy Agency's administration
of the Convention are less certain but could range up to $10.3 million
through the first review meeting, according to a 1993 estimate. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission officials believe, however, that the actual costs
will be significantly less--about $1 million to administer the first
review meeting. The costs for subsequent review meetings have not been
estimated.
background
The Convention on Nuclear Safety, which became effective for the
ratifying countries on October 24, 1996,\1\ seeks to achieve and
maintain a high level of safety for all nations that operate civil
nuclear power reactors. (According to the International Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA], as of December 31, 1995, 32 countries operated 437
nuclear power reactors.) The U.S. government views the Convention as
one of the chief policy instruments to encourage Russia and other
countries with reactors that do not meet Western safety standards to
improve safety. The Convention calls on countries to take action to,
among other things, (1) establish and maintain a legislative framework
and independent regulatory body to govern the safety of nuclear
installations; (2) establish procedures to ensure that technical
aspects of safety, such as the siting, design, and construction of
nuclear power reactors, are adequately considered; and (3) ensure that
an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of the
installations by such things as giving a priority to safety, providing
adequate financial resources, and establishing a quality assurance
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Under the terms of the Convention, any country that ratifies
the Convention subsequent to October 24, 1996, must wait 90 days to
participate in it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of State, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have participated in the
development and implementation of the Convention.\2\ NRC, in its
capacity as the U.S. civilian nuclear regulatory authority, will play a
central role in implementing U.S. obligations under the Convention. The
Convention establishes IAEA as the Convention's secretariat primarily
to (1) convene and prepare for the meetings and (2) transmit reports
and information to member countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See our report entitled Nuclear Safety: Progress Toward
International Agreement to Improve Reactor Safety (GAO/RCED-93-153, May
14, 1993) for more information about the development of the Convention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
process to review compliance has not been finalized
The method to review countries' compliance with the Convention has
not been finalized. The Convention relies on the ratifying countries to
prepare reports (self-assessments of their nuclear power programs) that
are expected to describe how they are complying with the Convention.
However, the reports' level of detail and specifics and the process for
examining the reports have not been fully determined. Although U.S. and
IAEA officials believe the Convention will encourage openness about
countries' safety programs, it is uncertain how much information will
be made available to the public.
Peer Review Process Is Central to the Convention's Success
The Convention does not impose sanctions for noncompliance but
seeks to encourage compliance through peer pressure. To determine
compliance with the terms of the Convention, countries are required to
meet periodically to review one another's safety programs.\3\ State,
DOE, and NRC officials have stated that this peer review process is
central to the Convention's success, noting that it will enable the
countries' safety practices to be brought before the ``bar of world
public opinion.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Convention requires that the first meeting of the parties
to review the self-assessment reports occur within 30 months of the
Convention's entry into force, which means not later than April 24,
1999. Subsequent meetings are to be held at intervals not to exceed 3
years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Convention does not specify the form and content of the peer
review process but calls on the parties to (1) submit self-assessment
reports of the measures they have taken to implement the Convention and
(2) hold meetings to review these reports. Representatives of over 40
countries, including the United States, have met on several occasions
over the past 2 years to develop options for implementing the peer
review process. The United States has chaired these sessions. In June
1996, the representatives agreed on a model to implement the peer
review process, but final decisions will not be made until all of the
ratifying countries meet no later than April 1997, as required by the
Convention.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Because the Convention provides that a country must wait 90
days after ratification, the United States would not be entitled to
participate in the April 1997 meeting unless it ratified the Convention
by January 24, 1997. NRC officials told us that it is likely that some
form of informal participation could be arranged, however, if the
United States ratified before the April meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the process is currently envisioned, the five countries with the
most operating nuclear reactors--the United States, France, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and Russia--would participate in separate groups made
up of several other countries that have ratified the Convention. The
remaining countries are placed in each group on the basis of the number
of reactors in each country, as shown in table 1. Within this group
setting, all countries would critically examine and review how each
country is complying with the Convention. IAEA officials told us that
the country-review groups form the core of the peer review process.
TABLE 1.--POSSIBLE GROUPING OF COUNTRIES FOR THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Countries (number of reactors)
Group --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A United States Republic of India China Argentina Armenia Italy
(109) Korea (10) (3) (2) (1) (0)
............. (11) ............. ............. ............. ............. .............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B France Sweden Spain Slovak Lithuania Slovenia Romania
(56) (12) (9) Republic (2) (1) (0)
............. ............. ............. (4) ............. ............. .............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Japan Ukraine Belgium Hungary Mexico Pakistan Cuba
(51) (16) (7) (4) (2) (1) (0)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D United Germany Bulgaria Finland The Kazakhstan Philippines
Kingdom (20) (6) (4) Netherlands (1) (0)
(35) ............. ............. ............. (2) ............. .............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E Russia Canada Switzerland Czech South Africa Brazil .............
(29) (21) (5) (4) (2) (1) .............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers in parentheses show the total number of reactors operating in the country as of December 31, 1995.
The table assumes that all of the countries had ratified the Convention.
Source: June 1996 Meeting of the Signatory Countries to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and IAEA.
NRC officials have expressed some concern about the potential
grouping of countries. In their view, this approach may not provide the
most meaningful, professionally technical review. For example, the
United States, which spent about $89 million through March 1996 to
improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors, would not be in the
same review group as Russia or Ukraine, countries that operate the
majority of these reactors. In addition to its ongoing safety
assistance program, the United States also has significant technical
expertise and years of practical experience working to improve the
safety of these reactors and improve these countries' civilian nuclear
regulatory capabilities.
The United States had earlier supported a different approach in
which each country's self-assessment would be reviewed by separate
subject matter committees. This review would be based on three main
elements of the Convention: (1) governmental organization; (2) siting,
design, and construction; and (3) operations. The U.S.-favored approach
was replaced by the country-grouping model proposed by France and the
United Kingdom. Representatives of these countries maintained that the
smaller groups of countries would allow for a more thorough and unified
review of a country's report than would a functional review of part of
a country's report, as initially envisioned by the United States.
The Convention states that each country shall have a reasonable
opportunity to discuss and seek clarification of the reports of any
other party at the review meeting. As a result, NRC and IAEA officials
believe that regardless of how the countries are ultimately grouped,
the United States will have ample opportunity to review and comment on
the self-assessment reports of all countries.\5\ For example, according
to NRC and IAEA officials, countries may be permitted to participate in
other groups' meetings as observers and discuss their concerns in
supplemental meetings. Countries are also expected to have
opportunities to comment on the self-assessment reports at general
sessions held during the review meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ According to the June 1996 ``Draft Guidelines Regarding the
Review Process Under the Convention on Nuclear Safety,'' the self-
assessment reports of all countries will be submitted to IAEA 6 months
prior to the first review meeting. Each country may send questions and
comments on any report to the coordinators of the relevant groups up to
2 months before the first meeting. The coordinators would then
distribute the comments to all parties to the Convention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The detail and specifics of the self-assessment reports--which
serve as the basis for the meeting of the parties--have not been
finalized. These reports are expected to describe how the parties are
complying with the Convention. Because of the differences in countries'
nuclear safety programs and available resources, NRC officials
anticipate an unevenness in the quality and detail of the reports. In
their view, this unevenness could affect the level of review and
analysis. U.S. officials also stated that the countries with a
significant number of nuclear installations may produce a generic
rather than a plant-specific report.
Public Access to Convention's Proceedings Is Unclear
The public dissemination of information about the countries'
progress in meeting the Convention's obligations can play a key role in
influencing compliance, according to some experts familiar with
international agreements that rely primarily on peer review. Although
U.S. and IAEA officials believe the Convention will encourage greater
openness about many countries' safety records and programs, it is
uncertain how much information resulting from the periodic meetings
will be made available to the public. According to NRC officials, the
countries can limit the distribution of their reports. These officials
noted, however, that the United States plans to make its report
available to the public.
Although the Convention provides for the public distribution of a
report summarizing the issues discussed and decisions reached during
the review meeting, preliminary information indicates that this report
is unlikely to identify any country by name. IAEA officials told us
that they do not expect this report to provide detailed information
about the key issues addressed during the review meeting.
According to IAEA, the Convention explicitly prohibits
nongovernmental organizations from participating in the meetings. NRC
officials told us however that these organizations, such as public
advocacy or industry groups, might participate as members of their
national delegation or be called upon to review and comment on self-
assessment reports. U.S. nuclear industry representatives told us that
they would like to assist in developing the U.S. report and participate
in the meeting of the parties. NRC officials acknowledged that the
Convention does not specifically provide for the kind of openness they
would prefer, but they believe that over time, more information will be
made available to the public through the Convention process.
costs to implement the convention have not been fully determined
To prepare for and attend the first review meeting in 1999, the
United States estimates it could spend as much as $1.1 million. As the
Convention's secretariat, IAEA will also incur costs to administer
these meetings. IAEA's costs, which the United States will partially
fund, have not been fully identified but could range as high as about
$10 million, according to a 1993 estimate. NRC officials told us that
they believe IAEA's costs will be significantly less--about $1 million.
U.S. Costs to Implement the Convention
The United States estimates that it could spend between $700,000
and $1.1 million through fiscal year 1999 to prepare for and attend the
first review meeting, which is expected to be held in April 1999.
Additional costs to participate in subsequent review meetings, which
are expected to be held every 3 years, have not been estimated.
Officials from NRC, State, and DOE told us that the costs associated
with the first review meeting are based on (1) participating in four
planning meetings held between December 1994 and June 1996 to develop
the Convention's draft policies and procedures, (2) preparing the first
U.S. self-assessment report, (3) reviewing other countries' reports,
and (4) participating in the April 1997 preparatory meeting and the
first review meeting. The agencies' estimated costs include the
existing and planned travel costs associated with attending meetings at
IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and salary and benefit costs
related to the time spent preparing for these meetings. Figure 1 shows
the breakdown of estimated costs by agency through the first meeting of
the parties.
U.S. Government's estimated costs to implement the Convention on
Nuclear Safety through 1999:
--Department of State $42,000 (4 percent)
--Department of Energy $124,000 (11 percent)
--Nuclear Regulatory Commission $954,000 (85 percent)
Note 1: These costs include $99,500 actually expended in fiscal
years 1995 and 1996.
Note 2: These costs are based on a high range of costs projected,
as discussed in app. II.
Sources: NRC, DOE, and State.
Salary and benefits constitute 94 percent of the agencies' costs;
the remainder is for travel and per diem expenses. The salary and
benefit costs result from the efforts of agency staff to prepare the
first U.S. self-assessment report, review all other countries' reports
as part of the peer review process, and participate in all aspects of
the first review meeting. (See app. II for a breakdown of expenditures
by each agency.)
Full Costs of IAEA Support Are Not Known
In late 1993, a working group that participated in the drafting of
the Convention estimated that IAEA's costs could range from $10,800 to
$10.3 million for the first review meeting. NRC officials told us that
they believe that IAEA's actual costs will be significantly less--about
$1 million to administer the first review meeting. The factors
affecting IAEA's costs primarily involve the number of languages used
to conduct the meeting of the parties and the corresponding translation
and interpretation services.\6\ IAEA's costs to administer future
review meetings have not been estimated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The lowest range of estimates, based on English as the primary
language, was considered artificial, since a number of incidental
expenses were not included. The high end of the estimates is based on
the use of six languages--Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian,
and Spanish.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Convention states that IAEA will bear the cost of administering
the meeting of the parties. IAEA's cost of holding the meeting in
Vienna is expected to be funded from IAEA's operating budget, which the
United States supports through an annual 25-percent contribution.
IAEA's 1997 and 1998 budget shows that IAEA plans to dedicate about
$330,000 in 1997 and 1998 for Convention-related activities. According
to an NRC official, IAEA, whose regular budget has been subject to a
policy of ``zero real growth'' since 1985, may have difficulty
financing the initial review meeting. As a result, this official said
that additional financial assessments of participating countries may be
warranted to provide the necessary funds for IAEA to administer the
Convention. The need for additional financial assessments will have to
be addressed during the April 1997 preparatory meeting. NRC officials
told us they were concerned about IAEA's potential costs to administer
the Convention and that the United States will seek to keep these costs
to a minimum.
The Convention also permits participating countries to request,
after receiving consensus approval from the other countries, additional
support and administrative services from IAEA. IAEA's Deputy Director
General for Nuclear Safety told us that it is likely that IAEA will
receive requests for such assistance and would cover these costs from
its regular budget.
NRC and DOE officials told us that they believe the Convention will
not stimulate any significant requests for additional assistance to
upgrade unsafe reactors. An NRC official told us that as a result of
the meetings, there may be some reordering of assistance priorities,
but he noted that requirements have already been identified over the
past several years through regular multilateral and bilateral
assistance channels. A DOE official noted that by the time the first
meeting of the parties occurs in 1999, some Western assistance efforts
should be winding down, and many safety upgrades will have already been
made.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ For more information on assistance efforts, see our reports
entitled Nuclear Safety: Status of U.S. Assistance to Improve the
Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors (GAO/RCED-97-5) and Nuclear Safety:
International Assistance Efforts to Make Soviet-Designed Reactors Safer
(GAO/RCED-94-234).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IAEA's Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety told us, however,
that the Convention may uncover additional safety problems that require
attention. As a result, the countries with the most acute safety
problems may seek to use the Convention process as leverage to obtain
additional nuclear safety assistance.
agency comments
We provided copies of a draft of this report to NRC for its review
and comment. NRC obtained and consolidated additional comments from the
departments of State and Energy. On December 23, 1996, we met with NRC
officials, including the Director, Office of International Programs,
and State's Director, Nuclear Energy Affairs, to discuss their
comments. In general, these officials agreed with the facts and
analysis presented. They gave us additional clarifying information, and
we revised the text as appropriate. The officials noted that the
Convention is fairly well developed because of the significant amount
of work already done by various countries' representatives during
several preliminary meetings. In their opinion, it is very important
that the United States ratify the Convention before the April 1997
preparatory meeting in order to (1) shape the peer review process to
create the most rigorous and systematic analysis of the self-assessment
reports, (2) keep the implementation costs as low as possible, and (3)
use the United States' diplomatic and political strength to make the
Convention an integral component of a network of binding international
legal instruments that enhance global safety.
We also provided IAEA with a copy of the draft report. In its
comments, IAEA, including the Deputy Director General for Nuclear
Safety, suggested some technical revisions to the text, which we
incorporated as appropriate. IAEA noted that the April 1997 preparatory
meeting will provide countries with the opportunity to decide on the
review process and factors that will determine the costs to implement
the Convention. IAEA also views the Convention as a major
accomplishment that will assist in achieving and maintaining a high
level of safety worldwide. In its view, the Convention will provide for
a degree of openness about national safety programs that has not
existed in the past.
scope and methodology
To obtain information on how the Convention will be reviewed for
compliance, we examined relevant parts of the Convention and
interviewed agency officials from the Department of State, DOE, and NRC
and other officials knowledgeable about international agreements from
the Congressional Research Service, Georgetown University Law Center,
and New York University. We also discussed the Convention with
officials from IAEA, including the Director General, the Deputy
Director General for Nuclear Safety, and the Senior Legal Officer.
These matters were also discussed with officials from the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations System Organizations, Vienna, Austria, and the
Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington, D.C. We also reviewed relevant
documentation provided by these agencies and officials.
To identify cost information, we obtained cost data from the
Department of State, DOE, and NRC. We also obtained data developed by
IAEA's Division of Nuclear Safety. We did not independently verify the
accuracy of these data.
We performed our review from October 1996 through December 1996 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Copies of this report are being sent to the Secretaries of State
and Energy, the Chairman of NRC, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and other interested parties. We will also make
copies available to others on request.
Allen Li,
Associate Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues.
appendix i
COUNTRIES THAT HAD SIGNED OR SIGNED AND RATIFIED THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AS OF DECEMBER 1996
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of operating
Country Signed convention Ratified convention civil nuclear power
reactors\1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Algeria.............................. X ....................... 0
Argentina............................ X ....................... 2
Armenia.............................. X ....................... 1
Australia............................ X ....................... 0
Austria.............................. X ....................... 0
Bangladesh........................... X X 0
Belgium.............................. X ....................... 7
Brazil............................... X ....................... 1
Bulgaria............................. X X 6
Canada............................... X X 21
Chile................................ X ....................... 0
China................................ X X 3
Croatia.............................. X X 0
Cuba................................. X ....................... 0
Czech Republic....................... X X 4
Denmark.............................. X ....................... 0
Egypt................................ X ....................... 0
Finland.............................. X X 4
France............................... X X 56
Germany.............................. X ....................... 20
Ghana................................ X ....................... 0
Greece............................... X ....................... 0
Hungary.............................. X X 4
Iceland.............................. X ....................... 0
India................................ X ....................... 10
Indonesia............................ X ....................... 0
Ireland.............................. X X 0
Israel............................... X ....................... 0
Italy................................ X ....................... 0
Japan................................ X X 51
Jordan............................... X ....................... 0
Kazakhstan\2\........................ X ....................... 1
Republic of Korea.................... X X 11
Latvia............................... ....................... X 0
Lebanon.............................. X X 0
Lithuania............................ X X 2
Luxembourg........................... X ....................... 0
Mali................................. X X 0
Mexico............................... X X 2
Monaco............................... X ....................... 0
Morocco.............................. X ....................... 0
Netherlands.......................... X X 2
Nicaragua............................ X ....................... 0
Nigeria.............................. X ....................... 0
Norway............................... X X 0
Pakistan............................. X ....................... 1
Peru................................. X ....................... 0
Philippines.......................... X ....................... 0
Poland............................... X X 0
Portugal............................. X ....................... 0
Romania.............................. X X 0
Russia............................... X X 29
Slovak Republic...................... X X 4
Slovenia............................. X X 1
South Africa......................... X ....................... 2
Spain................................ X X 9
Sudan................................ X ....................... 0
Sweden............................... X X 12
Switzerland.......................... X X 5
Syria................................ X ....................... 0
Tunisia.............................. X ....................... 0
Turkey............................... X X 0
Ukraine.............................. X ....................... 16
United Kingdom....................... X X 35
United States........................ X ....................... 109
Uruguay.............................. X ....................... 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................ 65 29 431
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Number of operating reactors as of December 31, 1995.
\2\ The installation is a sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor.
Sources: Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency.
appendix ii
the nuclear regulatory commission's, department of state's, and
department of energy's estimated costs to implement the convention
This appendix provides information on the costs that have been or
may be incurred by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the
Department of State, and the Department of Energy (DOE) in implementing
the Convention on behalf of the United States. NRC, State, and DOE
estimated together they could spend about $1.1 million in travel and
salary and benefit costs to prepare for and participate in the first
review meeting, which is scheduled to take place no later than April
1999. This amount--based on the number of NRC staff needed to prepare
for and attend meetings--represents a higher-range estimate of a figure
that could be as low as about $700,000.
TABLE 2.--NRC's, STATE's, AND DOE's ESTIMATED COSTS TO IMPLEMENT THE CONVENTION
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Element of cost NRC State DOE Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travel.......................................... $45,000 $12,000 $8,000 $65,000
Salary/benefits................................. \1\909,000 30,000 116,000 1,055,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total....................................... 954,000 42,000 124,000 1,120,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Actual costs incurred to date by these agencies total $99,500 for fiscal years 1995 and 1996.
\1\ NRC's reported costs range from $450,000 to $909,000.
Sources: NRC, Department of State, and DOE.