[Senate Hearing 106-264]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-264
NONPROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL, AND POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 27, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-687 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Gottemoeller, Hon. Rose E., Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Nonproliferation and National Security, Department of Energy... 4
Prepared statement of........................................ 7
Newsom, Hon. Eric D., Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
Military Affairs, Department of State.......................... 12
Prepared statement of........................................ 15
Appendix
Responses of Assistant Secretary Newsom to questions for the
record submitted by Senators Biden and Kerry................... 33
(iii)
NONPROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL, AND POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 2:44 p.m., in room SD-562, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Biden, Kerry, and Feingold.
The Chairman. Good afternoon. I am the late Jesse Helms.
The committee will come to order.
The committee's hearing today, of course, as everybody here
knows, will be devoted to a discussion with Assistant Secretary
of State Eric Newsom and Assistant Secretary of Energy Rose
Gottemoeller--is that roughly----
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. That is in the ball park. Regarding various
arms control, nonproliferation, and political-military issues.
Now then, at the outset, I am obliged to make clear my
concern with the State Department's reluctance to approve a
sale to Taiwan of two defensive radar systems. And I view
support for these sales by the administration as a litmus test
for the administration's adherence to the legal requirements of
the Taiwan Relations Act, which has just seen its 20th
anniversary.
Now, Taiwan, quite reasonably, has requested much-needed
and well-deserved help from the United States regarding early
warning and air defense systems. Specifically, Taiwan has asked
for the long range early warning phased array radar.
Now then, when China fired missiles off Taiwan's coast in
1996, Taiwan was caught completely by surprise. Our ally did
not even know that those missiles had been fired until several
minutes after they splashed down. Now, this is particularly
troubling since one of China's primary objectives is to use
short-range missiles to disable Taiwan's air force on the
ground before the planes can get into the air.
Accordingly, Secretary Newsom, I will urge that you ensure
that this radar be sold to Taiwan in a timely fashion and with
the requisite capabilities. In addition to increasing the
survivability of Taiwan's air force, it would give Taiwan's
citizens 5 to 10 minutes advance warning in order to take cover
from an impending missile attack.
Now then, the second item that I understand the State
Department also is concerned about is the evolved advanced
combat system for naval anti-aircraft defense. A recent
Pentagon report to the Congress on the military balance in the
Taiwan Strait makes clear that China is making rapid strides in
establishing air superiority over Taiwan, and this defense
system will help rectify an increasingly desperate situation.
Now, sale of these two radar systems cannot be blocked by
the administration without betraying the legal obligation to
provide defensive--and I stress the word ``defensive''--weapons
to Taiwan.
Now, as some may know from my recent introduction of the
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, I believe we need to do more,
not less, in addressing a growing military imbalance between
Red China and our key ally and partner Taiwan. And I look
forward to your response to these concerns that I have stated,
Secretary Newsom.
Now, a second issue, ma'am, is the administration's plan to
build a mixed oxide nuclear fuel plant in Russia. Now, while I
share the administration's desire to ensure that Russian
nuclear weapons do not fall into the wrong hands, I am
convinced that this program will not accomplish the stated
objective. Rather, by encouraging Russia and others to utilize
MOX fuel, the administration is virtually guaranteeing that
weapons grade plutonium is spread around the globe, except that
this will happen under the guise of ``peaceful nuclear
cooperation.'' Now, given Russia's nuclear supply relationships
with countries such as Iran and India, I find this idea to be
exceedingly unwise, if not ridiculous.
Moreover, the MOX, as they call it, option will undercut
the decades-long, bipartisan effort by the United States to
make clear that plutonium use for commercial power generation
is a no-no. The administration intends to establish an
infrastructure here in the United States to burn excess weapons
plutonium in civilian power plants, and if this is done, our
decades-old nonproliferation policy will begin to unravel with,
I imagine, perilous consequences.
I strongly object to the MOX plan. It would be far more
prudent to pursue immobilization of Russian weapons material so
that it cannot ever, ever be retrieved. As for whether the
United States has excess plutonium to spare, I will reserve
judgment until the administration proves that it has considered
the impact this will have on the stockpile stewardship program
and the nuclear deterrent. I hope, of course, that you will
respond to my concerns during your comments, Madam Secretary.
Now then, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you for having this hearing today and keeping the
committee as active as you have.
To state the obvious, we have been a little preoccupied
with the Balkans and, in particular, Kosovo, Yugoslavia. But
even now there are actually more important objectives. As
involved as I have been and you have been in dealing with that
policy, that may be the most immediate, but there are other
broader issues that are even more important to our long-term
security than the fate of Yugoslavia.
The United States has been working hard to maintain
strategic stability and stem the flow of materials or
technology that would contribute to developing weapons of mass
destruction. When NATO decided to begin its air strikes in
Kosovo and in Yugoslavia, Prime Minister Primakov turned back
from a scheduled meeting with Vice President Gore, but Russia's
Minister of Atomic Energy stayed in Washington to work out
agreements relating to the disposition of weapons grade
uranium.
The reason I bother to point that out is both nations at
least at the moment seem to understand that, notwithstanding
their significant disagreement on Yugoslavia, that they are
keeping contact on those things which most directly impact
their long-term and vital interests. It seems to me that this
shows the United States and Russia can still remember and act
upon shared objectives.
We too have to act on those objectives and I hope our first
witnesses will discuss how we can do that.
Just a word about the witnesses, Mr. Chairman. It is not my
place, but because I have known Eric for as long as I have,
Eric is a former Foreign Service officer and served as minority
staff director on the Intelligence Committee and then as chief
staffer for the minority on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee
of the Appropriations Committee. I am pleased to welcome you
back, Eric.
I would say Secretary Gottemoeller has also had a
distinguished career, although I do not think she has ever
experienced the raw power and exhilaration of being an
Appropriations Committee staffer.
That is sheer, undiluted power. And I might add you will
note, those of you who are observers, on the floor, whenever
there is an appropriations bill, the only people that Senators
directly speak to and plead with on the floor, including other
Senators, are they seek out the appropriations staffers. That
is absolute power. They wield more power than any Member of the
Senate at that moment does. So, I doubt, Madam Secretary, you
have ever experienced that exhilaration.
But the truth of the matter is that you have taken on an
incredibly difficult job, nonproliferation programs that deal
with loose nukes in the former Soviet Union, and also the
President's expanded threat reduction initiative to extend
programs so as to reach still more Russian weapons, experts who
might otherwise decide that there is a place to sell their
wares and sell their skills.
In February, Madam Secretary, the General Accounting Office
issued a report, commissioned by our chairman, that found that
the Energy Department program Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention, or IPP, to be ``in our national interest.'' The GAO
also found management shortfalls of that program and made some
important recommendations.
I think the IPP program is actually a success story,
considering that in 5 short years, it has reached out and
assisted thousands of former Soviet scientists who may be
wandering in other places. But I agree that the time has come
to tighten management. That is why I have joined the chairman
in mandating an action plan to implement the GAO's
recommendations.
We did that in the authorization bill that this committee
marked up just last week under the leadership of the chairman,
and I have every hope that the Energy Department will improve
the management control and maximize the funds actually reaching
former Soviet scientists. And if so, I think the IPP program
will get strong congressional support for the next 5 years.
Again, Mr. Chairman, there's much to speak about. I have
only touched on a few issues.
Let me close by suggesting that there are a lot of things
that can be said about the chairman, and one is if he is your
friend, he is your friend. And Taiwan has never had a better
friend, except maybe as good a friend in Barry Goldwater. I
want to tell you something. Nothing is going to go very much
off the mark. There are only a few things I find, Mr. Chairman,
that get your absolute, undivided, immediate attention and
focus, and that is one of them. So, when the chairman indicates
that he hopes that you all will listen, he is a southern,
courtly gentleman. Translated in an Atlantic Senator's words, I
would pay a hell of a lot of attention because a lot else is
hanging in the balance here.
At any rate, I thank you for being here and look forward to
your testimony. I have other subjects I would like to raise. I
am sure my colleagues will as well.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Eric, Joe is exactly right about the reverence with which
we treat the officials of the Appropriations Committee. It is
not true, however, that I injured my two knees by kneeling,
begging.
But you were always very helpful to me and I shall not
forget it.
Senator Biden. Translated another way, Mr. Chairman, Eric,
you do not have nearly as much power here as you did then.
The Chairman. Well, in any case, let us practice ladies
first and invite you to go first, please, ma'am.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROSE E. GOTTEMOELLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and other members of the
committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today and present this statement for the
record on the work of the Office of Nonproliferation and
National Security. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
summarize my statement and have the rest placed in the record.
The Chairman. The entire statement will be printed in the
record.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Gottemoeller. It has been stated many times, but it
bears repeating: The world we face today is vastly changed from
the one we lived in during the cold war. The challenges are
more varied and less predictable. None of these is more serious
than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue
states and, even more worrisome, to terrorist organizations.
Within the Department, the Office of Nonproliferation and
National Security is unique in the range of our contributions
to national security and nonproliferation policy. The office is
responsible for national security missions in both domestic and
international settings. Our programs are part of the broader
Clinton administration's nonproliferation efforts and have been
fully coordinated as part of the President's expanded threat
reduction initiative with the Department of State and the
Department of Defense.
In Russia, Department of Energy employees and laboratory
experts are on the ground and actively working to improve the
security of hundreds of tons of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium at dozens of facilities. We are also working with
thousands of former Soviet Union weapons scientists to provide
them with non-weapons jobs and prevent them from straying into
work with countries of proliferation concern.
Here at home, we are accelerating our efforts to harness
the skills of the national laboratories to meet the growing
threats of chemical and biological weapons and the very serious
risk that such weapons will be used on U.S. territory. In
addition, my staff is ensuring the protection of U.S. nuclear
materials and of DOE sites and preparing for emergencies that
could affect the DOE complex.
I would like to first turn to the Department of Energy's
programs to reduce the risk of brain drain in the former Soviet
Union, and in this regard, I will address some of the issues
that Senator Biden raised.
Through our Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
program, we have worked with over 170 institutes and sponsored
collaborative scientific efforts with over 6,100 ex-Soviet
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons experts. This work
has helped keep these experts in Russia and the Newly
Independent States as opposed to selling their know-how to
rogue regimes, criminal groups, or terrorist organizations.
We are embarking on a much more challenging enterprise
which also seeks to develop alternative, non-weapons jobs for
weapons scientists, this time as part of our Nuclear Cities
Initiative. We are pleased that Russia is finally taking steps
to reassess and restructure their nuclear complex and has
approached us about helping to develop new jobs for weapons
scientists who will lose their defense work as weapons
facilities close.
The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention is a classic
brain drain program, focused on the elite of the Russian
scientific establishment and working to keep them at work in
their scientific laboratories. By contrast, the Nuclear Cities
Initiative is building off a Russian Government decision to
downsize and restructure its own nuclear weapons complex. It is
designed for scientists and technicians who are losing their
jobs in the weapons complex and are at risk of long-term
unemployment in the crisis-ridden Russian economy.
The Department of Energy and my office in particular, have
taken note of the concerns expressed in the General Accounting
Office's recent report on the IPP program, and we have also
taken note of the action plan that was put forward by this
committee. We are working aggressively to implement their
recommendations and believe that adoption of their comments
will greatly improve what is already a successful enterprise.
Mr. Chairman, Senators, I want to underscore that we have
welcomed these recommendations and we are eager to work
together with you to ensure that the recommendations are fully
implemented. These include a strengthened review process to
ensure that no Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
projects have any potential benefits for Russian military
programs and an increased effort to refocus available funds so
that more money reaches Russian and NIS scientists, rather than
staying in DOE labs.
I will next turn to our Materials Protection, Control, and
Accounting Program.
The members of this committee are keenly aware of the
importance that Russia plays in our overall nonproliferation
strategy. For several years we have been building up a legacy
of trust and personal relationships that has allowed us to
cooperatively pursue security upgrades throughout the Russian
nuclear weapons complex. The importance of this work, carried
out under our MPC&A program, cannot be overstated. We have
completed security upgrades for 30 tons of weapons-usable
nuclear materials and expect to bring a total of 100 tons under
complete security systems by the end of the year 2000. We have
made considerable progress with regard to improving the
security of nuclear materials in Russia, but we understand that
there is much still to be done. Particularly, the situation has
been exacerbated by Russia's economic collapse in Russia, and
we have seen among our Russian colleagues an increased
awareness of the insider threat from the Russian nuclear
complex.
I would like to say just a word, if I may, about the
absolutely incredible men and women who have been working on
this program day and night for the past several years. The
image of the civil servant and Government bureaucrat is
sometimes impugned, but I would like to say that members of our
team are working constantly throughout the nuclear complex of
the former Soviet Union in some of the most remote and least
hospitable sites in the world. They spend weeks away from their
families and make repeated trips to such locations, and they
are really doing a fantastic job to facilitate and complete
their assignments in that regard.
Sir, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few
words about your comments with regard to MOX and immobilization
and Pu disposition, plutonium disposition.
As you are aware, we have been pursuing a very firm policy
with Russia to get them to the negotiating table on plutonium
disposition. This is an area where in the past it was rather
difficult to get them to the negotiating table and get them to
face up to the many issues that must be addressed with regard
to disposal of the enormous amount of weapons plutonium that
they have available in their system. We have found that by
pursuing a dual-track strategy involving both MOX and
immobilization and they have, indeed, been willing to work with
us. It has brought Russia to the table and gained their
commitment to active disposition of plutonium.
I would just take note of the fact that in the Department
of Energy, the lead on this issue is Ms. Laura Holgate in the
Office of Materials Disposition. Of course, the overall
negotiations are led by the Department of State by Mr. John
Holum.
I think, Mr. Chairman, with that I will close my remarks
only to say that, indeed, we view nonproliferation challenges
as addressing an entire spectrum of problems, ones that stem
from problems in the former Soviet Union in Russia, in the
nuclear weapons complex. We work there on potential sources of
the problems, and in the domestic context, we are constantly
working in the DOE complex, as well as with the overall
community concerned with the potential chemical and biological,
as well as weapons of mass destruction terrorism. We will
continue to do so. We are quite focused on the necessity of
approaching the nonproliferation problem as a broad spectrum
problem that requires attack. It requires solutions at many
levels, and we are fully committed to engaging at many levels.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rose E. Gottemoeller
introduction
Thank you, Chairman Helms, Senator Biden and other members of this
Committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today to present
this statement for the record on the work of the Office of
Nonproliferation and National Security.
It has been stated many times, but it bears repeating: the world we
face today is vastly changed from the one we lived in during the cold
war. The challenges are more varied and less predictable. None of these
is more serious than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
to rogue states and, even more worrisome, terrorist organizations. The
President has declared the threat of weapons of mass destruction
proliferation to constitute a ``national emergency'' and I am proud of
the role the Department of Energy, and my Office in particular, is
playing in responding to that emergency.
Within the Department, the Office of Nonproliferation and National
Security is unique in the range of our contributions to national
security. The Office is responsible for national security missions in
both domestic and international settings. Our programs are part of the
broader Clinton Administration's nonproliferation efforts and have been
fully coordinated as part of the President's Expanded Threat Reduction
Initiative. Moreover, they have been coordinated and prioritized within
the inter-agency, including the Departments of State and Defense. In
Russia, Department of Energy employees and laboratory experts are on
the ground and actively working to improve the security of hundreds of
tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium at dozens of facilities.
We are also working with thousands of former Soviet Union weapons
scientists to provide them with nonweapons jobs and prevent them from
straying into work with countries of proliferation concern. Here at
home, we are accelerating our efforts to harness the skills of the
national laboratories to meet the growing threats of chemical and
biological weapons and the very serious risk that such weapons will be
used on U.S. territory. In addition, my staff is ensuring the
protection of U.S. nuclear materials and of DOE sites, and preparing
for emergencies that could affact the DOE complex.
initiatives for proliferation prevention and nuclear cities initiative
Let me first turn to the Department of Energy's programs to reduce
the risk of ``Brain Drain'' in the former Soviet Union. Our efforts to
engage and orchestrate alternative employment for underemployed and
unemployed ex-Soviet weapons scientists is a critical part of the
Clinton administration's approach to the threat posed by the break up
of the former Soviet Union's nuclear complex. Through our Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention program, we have worked with over 170
institutes and sponsored collaborative scientific efforts with over
6,100 ex-Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological weapons experts. This
work has helped keep these experts in Russia and the Newly Independent
States, as opposed to selling their know how to rogue regimes, criminal
groups or terrorist orgarnzations.
We are embarking on a much more challenging enterprise which also
seeks to develop alternative, non-weapons jobs for weapons scientists,
this time as part of our Nuclear Cities Initiative. The ten closed
nuclear cities in Russia are the jewels in the Russian nuclear crown.
We are pleased that Russia is finally taking steps to reassess and
restructure their nuclear complex and has approached us about helping
to develop new jobs for weapons scientists who will lose their defense
work as weapons facilities close. We are approaching this endeavor with
a mixture of commitment and pragmatism, realizing that such efforts
will take time. But the goals of keeping the Russian weapons scientists
at home, and helping to reduce the size of the Russian nuclear
infrastructure, contribute directly to U.S. security.
The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention is a classic ``brain
drain'' program, focused on the elite of the Russian scientific
establishment and working to keep them at work in their scientific
laboratories. It is geared toward projects with a high science and
technology content, increasingly with an emphasis on commercial
application. By contrast, the Nuclear Cities Initiative is building off
a Russian government decision to downsize and restructure its own
nuclear weapons complex. It is designed for scientists and technicians
who are losing their jobs in the weapons complex and are at risk of
long-term unemployment in the crisis ridden Russian economy. This
program is focused on creating new jobs in the Russian nuclear cities,
whether technology-based or not. Both programs share the goal of
keeping ex-Soviet weapons know how from aiding the weapons of mass
destruction acquisition programs in other countries.
The Department of Energy, and my Office in particular, have taken
note of the concerns expressed in the General Accounting Office's
recent report on our Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program.
We are working aggressively to implement their recommendations and
believe that adoption of their comments will greatly improve what is
already a successful enterprise. These include a strengthened review
process to further ensure that no Initiative for Proliferation
Prevention projects have any potential benefits for Russian military
programs and an increased effort to refocus available funds so that
more money reaches Russian and Newly Independent State scientists.
The Department of Energy also contributes to other science-based
engagement programs in the former Soviet Union. The International
Science and Technology Centers, which are administered by the
Department of State and rely on the technical expertise of the
Department of Energy's national laboratories to review and assess
proposed projects with ex-Soviet weapons scientists. This interaction
is a clear example of how the United States Government agencies are
working together and pooling U.S. assets to achieve the greatest
possible security benefit for the American people.
material protection, control and accounting
Next I will turn to the situation in Russia with regards to the
protection of nuclear materials. The members of this committee are
keenly aware of the importance Russia plays in our overall
nonproliferation strategy. For several years, we have been building up
a legacy of trust and personal relationships that has allowed us to
cooperatively pursue security upgrades throughout the Russian nuclear
complex. The importance of this work, carried out under our Material
Protection, Control and Accounting program, cannot be overstated. Our
programs have been key to international efforts to prevent the
acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists or would-be nuclear
states. We have completed security upgrades for 30 tons of weapons-
usable nuclear materials and expect to bring a total of 100 tons under
completed security systems by the end of the year 2000. In this goal,
we have made considerable progress, but we have recognized that the
task before us is much greater than we understood when this program
began in 1994. Russia's economic collapse in August has forced us to
re-evaluate our methods and priorities and brought, from the Russians
themselves, a renewed sense of urgency to our cooperation. This now
includes an increased awareness of the ``insider threat'' of nuclear
materials diversion and an understanding that the size, and geographic
scope of the nuclear enterprise is larger than had been appreciated in
1994.
A word, if I may, about the absolutely incredible men and women who
have been working on this problem night and day for the past several
years. The image of the civil servant and government bureaucrat has
been impugned for years in our society. I know that the members of this
committee are well aware that the average civil servant is motivated
and hardworking, but I have been struck since I became director of the
Nonproliferation and National Security office by the absolute
dedication of our Material Protection, Control and Accounting task
force and the almost superhuman level of their efforts. Their work
sites in the nuclear complex of the former Soviet Union include some of
the most remote and least hospitable locations in the world. They spend
weeks away from family and basic comforts and make repeated trips to
such locations in order to facilitate and complete their assignments.
The work load for the average Task Force member is extreme, as we had
sought to limit the task force size to one appropriate for a limited
duration project. This is an issue that we are examining extremely
closely at the present time, in the expectation that the team will
become larger and longer range in its organizational outlook.
While we still have considerable work ahead of us to upgrade
security around Russian nuclear materials, we are also striving to
address other sources of proliferation risk and concern in the former
Soviet Union. We consider our work at nuclear sites to be the first
line of defense against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
second line of defense is the internal borders of Russia, and helping
to ensure that any stolen or misappropriated materials cannot leave the
country. Our Second Line of Defense program has already installed
nuclear material detectors at the main international airport in Moscow
and at the Caspian seaport of Astrakhan. We have identified 22
additional border crossings that for tactical or strategic reasons
warrant the installation of similar equipment. This is yet another
example of how a relatively small investment can help protect ourselves
and our friends against the greatest of threats.
doe's role in the inter-agency process
The Department of Energy is an active and full participant in the
U.S. Governmental inter-agency process. Working together with the
Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, the intelligence community and
the National Security Council, DOE provides critical technical and
policy inputs into the development of U.S. arms control,
nonproliferation and national security policy.
DOE is able to bring its considerable technical and policy assets
to bear on acute national security threats in the international arena.
In the former Soviet Union, the implementation of effective security
over nuclear materials and our work to support inter-agency efforts to
end the production of plutonium, construct a storage facility for
nuclear materials released from weapons, ensure the disposal of 50
metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium, and pursue new and more
effective means for reducing the nuclear legacy of the cold war are
indicators of the integral role DOE plays in the inter-agency process.
In addition, the Department of Energy works continually with the
other national security agencies within the government to design,
evaluate and implement effective policies to control the export of
materials and technology useful in the acquisition and use of weapons
of mass destruction. Our role in maintaining the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Zangger Committee, and the Wassenaar Arrangement is a vital
piece of the inter-agency's role in these effective international
export control arrangements.
In the international negotiation and verification of arms control
agreements, DOE is again a key participant. Our unparalleled
understanding of nuclear materials and weapons will become increasingly
important when the United States and Russian negotiate to pursue lower
levels of deployed nuclear weapons in the strategic arms reduction
(START) process, and as START begins to consider more challenging areas
of monitoring, including those related to actual warhead dismantlement.
Moreover, our contributions in the area of arms control verification,
including but not limited to our work on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and efforts to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile
materials for nuclear weapons, have been critical additions to the
negotiation and policy formulation processes.
I am very proud of the role that DOE plays within the Clinton
administration's overall nonproliferation and national security
activities. As the main repository of technical skills and capabilities
within the government, in many cases DOE is where the rubber meets the
road. DOE contributes its technical skill in numerous areas, including
the protection of nuclear materials in Russia, the canning of spent
fuel in Kazakhstan and North Korea, the transhipment of abandoned
highly enriched uranium in Georgia or Kazakhstan, development of
verification tools for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and detection
equipment for chemical and biological agents, and assessment of
proposed export licenses and recommendations for modifying
international export control lists.
By providing a technical set of skills to the inter-agency
discussion of key security issues, the Department helps define what is
possible and helps expand the envelope of what can be achieved in the
international field. This is a critical component to defining and
implementing effective policy decisions. In addition, as an experienced
party on the ground in many of the countries where the United States is
working on security and nonproliferation problems, DOE can bring a
special understanding to inter-agency discussion on international
policy.
national security challenges
Our work in Russia, as important as it is, must not and does not
distract our attention from our critical and considerable domestic
activities. The changed situation abroad is matched by a changing
picture at home. The President highlighted his concerns about new
domestic threats in January at a National Academy of Sciences event in
which he stated that ``The enemies of peace realize they cannot defeat
us with traditional military means. So they are working on two new
forms of assault: cyber attacks on our critical computer systems, and
attacks with weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological,
potentially even nuclear weapons. We must be ready--ready if our
adversaries try to use computers to disable power grids, banking,
communications and transportation networks, police, fire and health
services--or military assets.''
President Clinton, and his entire national security team, are
increasingly concerned about these threats. We are, at the President's
direction, making concerted and coordinated efforts to meet these
growing challenges. Let me explain what DOE and NN are doing in this
area.
chemical and biological threats
Among the Secretary's top priorities is responding to the growing
threat of chemical and biological attacks inside the United States. The
Department of Energy, drawing upon the diverse and extensive expertise
of the national laboratories, has extraordinary assets in the fields of
biology and chemistry, pursued for both the pure and applied scientific
value. With relatively modest sums of money, the Department is seeking
to leverage these skills and experience to improve our ability to
detect and identify biological and chemical agents.
To pursue this work, we are requesting a total of $32 million,
which is a $13 million or 70 percent increase over our 1999
appropriations. The focus of these efforts is to better equip first
responders with the tools to identify and categorize chemical and
biological agents. The tools we seek to develop must be portable, fast,
accurate and simple, so that they can be put to immediate use in the
field, serving to protect the American public from hoaxes or, worse,
actual attacks.
Again, Mr. Chairman, defining the challenge is as simple as
answering it is complex. There is, on average, one anthrax threat in
the United States every day. In January, the shortcomings of our
current capabilities were made glaringly clear, when an anthrax threat
was directed at the 7th floor of the Department of State. While this,
fortunately, turned out to be a hoax, we need to do better in fielding
smart systems capable of detecting potential chemical and biological
agents. Today, there are no simple, portable and reliable detection and
identification tools for biological agents available to those officials
who are assigned the role of getting to the scene of a chemical or
biological attack first. Delays in assessing the credibility and
severity of specific incidents create confusion, waste resources, and,
in the event of a real attack, costs lives. In sum, our limited
abilities in this area actually increase the ``terror'' effect of such
attacks or hoaxes, thus inviting additional events. The sooner we can
field the types of portable detection equipment we are working on, the
sooner we will be able to deter and reduce the number of such attacks.
There are questions raised from time to time about why involve the
Department of Energy--whose weapons expertise is focused in the nuclear
arena. To be direct, the Department of Energy and its laboratories have
a broad range of ongoing programs in biological and chemical areas
which provide it with a unique set of skills to apply to this problem.
Although originally developed in the service of our primary nuclear
mission, these world-class capabilities can be leveraged for critical
chemical and biological detection work. Programs such as the human
genome mapping project or chemical spill remediation efforts are also
being drawn upon to better protect our citizens against the most
insidious of attacks.
The Department recognizes, however, that it does not have
operational responsibilities for protecting the public from chemical or
biological attack. As a result, our work is focused on meeting the
needs of our customers, namely agencies within the government
responsible for directly responding to such threats. An example of this
close relationship is the work we are engaged in with the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency to conduct a joint demonstration of our
modeling and detection technologies at the upcoming Winter Olympics in
Salt Lake City.
research and development
The larger part of our research and development program, for which
we are requesting $221 million in total, is dedicated to other ground
breaking and vital efforts to improve our national security. Within my
office, our Research and Development activities are working to ensure
the early detection of proliferation-related activities and to improve
our ability to verify existing or planned international treaties. We
are pursuing a number of important avenues which will help detect, with
increasing reliability, efforts to produce and refine nuclear
materials, as well as new and better ways to detect and characterize
nuclear tests and activities contrary to international norms or U.S.
security interests.
In addition to the our efforts on the chemical and biological
weapons detection systems mentioned above, our program is focused on
developing and demonstrating: sensor systems for remote detection of
effluent signatures indicative of proliferation activities using active
and passive optical techniques; sensor systems for remote detection of
physical signatures indicative of proliferation activities using radar,
multispectral, optical, and radio frequency techniques; nuclear
radiation detection sensor systems to enhance nuclear material
accountability and control as well as deter nuclear smuggling
activities; and developing and producing ground and satellite-based
sensors and systems to enable effective U.S. monitoring of nuclear test
ban treaties.
Requirements for the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation
Research and Development Program are derived from Presidential and
Congressional direction and from our customers within the interagency
community. The program is closely coordinated at the working level with
operational users and other developers, and is reviewed at the more
senior level by interagency bodies like the Counterproliferation
Program Review Committee and the Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Technology Working Group. An example of the close interagency
cooperation is the program's Multispectral Thermal Imager small-
satellite scheduled for launch in early FY 2000. The demonstration
satellite developed by the DOE is being launched as part of the Air
Force Space Test Program, with the Air Force paying for the launch
costs.
domestic security
Our domestic responsibilities within the DOE complex also play an
important part in our overall nonproliferation activities. DOE's Office
of Safeguards and Security sets policy and reviews implementation of
physical and information security within the Department of Energy. In
full cooperation with the Department s counter intelligence office and
the Secretary's initiatives to further improve the security situation
at the national laboratories, the Department is meeting its
responsibilities to protect what are among this nations most important
national security assets.
Ongoing developments in this field are having a dramatic impact on
the way we do business at the national laboratories. Secretary
Richardson and the entire Department of Energy is committed to ensuring
that we have the best possible security at these critical facilities.
As the Secretary has stated, however, this facilities cannot operate in
a vacuum if they are to remain the pre-eminent scientific
establishments that exist today. With proper precautions, we can and
will ensure that the laboratories fulfill their many critical national
security missions.
emergency response
Even as we prepare to address the risk of attack here at home,
including our CBW detection efforts and our domestic security work, we
are constantly preparing for how to respond should an emergency
develop. The Office of Emergency Response is a critical resource for
the Department and the United States Government as a whole. This
extensive communications network and dedicated staff are vital assets,
and enable the Department's leadership to receive and process updates
and help manage the response to a large variety of contingencies. These
include enviroumental concerns associated with the management of DOE
sites, to the more extreme cases of attack or sabotage. As with the
other offices within my responsibility, I have been extremely impressed
with the professionalism and dedication of the staff within this
program office. Their efforts help reduce the likelihood of a crisis
and enable us to reduce the consequences, should one arise. Their
efforts are generally underappreciated in the eye of the public,
largely due to their skill and success in their jobs.
conclusion
I would like to end where I began, and thank the Chairman and the
entire Committee for their support for the Department and my Office as
we address the nation's critical national security missions. I look
forward to our continued work together. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC D. NEWSOM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Newsom. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden. I
appreciate those kind words. When people in the State
Department ask me what it was like to change from working as a
Senate staffer to coming down there, I say that I was a
powerful, influential staffer on the Senate Appropriations
Committee and now I am an Assistant Secretary of State. I have
to have 20 people sign off on everything that I do. The
contrast is actually very sharp.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, I am
pleased to appear before you today, along with my friend, Rose
Gottemoeller. I just would deliver a short statement and if I
could ask that my full statement be inserted in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, it certainly will be.
Mr. Newsom. Sixteen months ago, the Senate confirmed me as
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs,
and I would like to express my very strong appreciation to this
committee for taking the time at the end of what I know was an
extraordinarily busy session to deal with my confirmation. I
appreciate the confidence that you expressed in me by that act,
and I am very grateful to the President and the Secretary of
State for appointing me to this position.
One piece of business I left unfinished at that time was my
appearance before you, and so I look forward today to
discussing with you the range of issues covered by the
Political-Military Bureau.
Of course, a significant event has occurred since my
confirmation, that is, the merging of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency into the State Department. Before April 1,
the Political-Military Bureau dealt with a wide range of
important national security issues. Now, its former arms
control and nonproliferation responsibilities have been placed
into new bureaus. In this sense, the reorganization has brought
the Political-Military Bureau back around full circle, closer
to its original mission when it was first set up in the early
1960's.
The main functions of Political-Military Affairs at that
time were twofold: to be the Secretary of State's principal
resource on significant political-military matters and to be
the Department of State's primary liaison with the Department
of Defense.
With the loss of arms control and nonproliferation
responsibilities in this reorganization, once again the
Political-Military Bureau's primary focus is on regional
security policy issues, arms transfer policies, and on
coordination with the Defense Department on a broad range of
security matters, including planning for contingencies.
Despite this now more sharply focused agenda of the
Political-Military Bureau, its mission remains daunting and we
must now meet these demands with a much reduced staff. That
will, of course, require careful setting of our goals, and I
would like to outline to you what I see as the principal
priorities of this new Political-Military Bureau.
First, the arms transfer policy and decisionmaking process.
Arms transfers are a key tool in protecting U.S. national
security. Ensuring that our allies and friends have the
military capabilities to play their part in protecting shared
values and interests is vital to our own national security and
to ensuring that we need not do so alone. But as this committee
knows so well, an effective arms transfer policy has additional
benefits. Relationships built by supporting our friends and
allies with appropriate systems for legitimate national defense
serves our national security interests as well. And there are
also important economies which accrue to the Department of
Defense.
I am firmly committed to continued high quality decisions
in this area and to improvements in the complex process and to
close consultations with this committee, which I believe have
been very constructive.
Confidence and security building measures. Reducing the
threat of war and supporting peaceful means for managing and
resolving conflicts has long been a major American leadership
characteristic and a contribution to international security.
Confidence and security building measures, or CSBM's, are an
important tool for increasing regional security and stability.
They have a direct impact on everything from threat perception
to peacekeeping operations to arms transfer decisions. So, I
intend to pursue conventional arms related CSBM's as a high
priority for the new Political-Military Bureau.
Critical infrastructure protection. This is a very new
field, but one which we believe is becoming incredibly
important to our national security. We are all aware of the
advantages that technology has given us, but we are also
vulnerable in the information age to attacks on our critical
infrastructure by hostile states, terrorists, or hackers. Under
the President's directive of last year, PDD-63, the State
Department is responsible for international outreach on this
issue. Our goal is to work with other countries to develop
policies and procedures designed to promote political and
military and defense cooperation on protection of critical
infrastructures where we share common dependencies or where
infrastructure stability is critical to U.S. interests.
Defense analysis. In this complex and changing global
environment, it is more important than ever for our foreign
policy and national security goals to be closely in harmony. I
am working closely with OSD, the Joint Staff, the regional
CINC's to try to further this goal through developing
capabilities in P&M and relationships with senior levels of
those agencies to look at how Department of Defense plans,
programs, and activities might be better integrated into our
overall foreign policy goals. We need to do a better job in
this area, and I think you will find persons from the Defense
Department, the uniformed services, and within the State
Department who will say up front that this is an area which
needs a great deal of attention.
Humanitarian demining. Eliminating the scourge of land
mines from past wars and regional conflicts is of great
importance to regional security around the world. This program
has expanded considerably in the past few years and now we are
supporting programs in 26 mine-afflicted nations and another 4
or 5 are likely to join the program in the next year. Our
support, along with that of other donors, is making a
substantial difference. Land mines are coming out of the
ground. Casualty rates are going down. Refugees are returning
to their villages. Roads and highways are being cleared.
Businesses and industries are restarting. We have enjoyed
considerable support from Congress and in particular from this
committee, Mr. Chairman, for which I express our thanks. We
hope that working together we can continue to make substantial
additional progress in this area.
Contingency planning. Secretary Albright has spoken of two
key policy requirements for peacekeeping and crisis response:
We must do the right thing, and we must do the thing right.
Almost 2 years ago, the President mandated the establishment of
a process for interagency planning for peacekeeping and for
other complex political-military operations to ensure that we
do the thing right.
The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, charged as the
leader in the Department of State on this process, works
closely with the Department of Defense, the NSC staff, and
others in the interagency community to do political-military
planning in anticipation of future contingencies so that we do
not have to decide in the midst of a crisis how to handle
ourselves, what the relationship between the military and the
civilians will be in a given situation.
Regional security. For success in our goals of economic
prosperity and democratic values, the world must be safe and
secure. Regional security and stability are key building blocks
of this aspect of our foreign policy. I chair an interagency
working group on Persian Gulf security issues and, along with
my two Deputy Assistant Secretaries, conduct over 20 security
dialogs each year with countries in every region of the world
addressing regional security issues. In these dialogs, we take
a special effort with the emerging democracies of Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union. In addition to the Gulf,
regional security in the Aegean, the Caucasus, and East Asia
remain areas where we continue to focus a large part of our
efforts.
In an increasingly austere fiscal environment, maximizing
the use of our scarce resources is critical. Over time,
security assistance has become a smaller and smaller tool in
our foreign policy toolbox. That is why, more than ever, we
must make sure these funds are applied to our highest
priorities and used to maximum effect in pursuing those
priorities. I believe that the International Military Education
and Training program, or IMET, gives America the biggest bang
for the security assistance buck. We do not fully appreciate
how IMET and similar programs impart American values to the
recipients in foreign militaries both directly and indirectly.
I am going to curtail the rest of this and just simply
close by saying, Mr. Chairman, that this reorganization, while
it did take away a major part of the responsibilities of the
Political-Military Bureau and shifted them to other places, I
believe it does give us an opportunity now to focus more on
very important missions for security policy and the integration
of security policy with diplomatic policy. Of course, the
political-military, arms control, and nonproliferation issues
cannot be totally separated, and all three of these bureaus now
will continue to work closely together, just as we did when it
was ACDA and P&M in the past.
So, I thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for the opportunity to appear before you here today,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Newsom follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eric D. Newsom
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to appear
today before this Committee, along with DOE Assistant Secretary for
Non-proliferation and National Security, Rose Gottemoeller.
It has now been over six months since the Senate confirmed me as
Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs. I would
hike to express my appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, and the rest of
the Committee for taking the time at the end of the last Congressional
session--a period which is always very busy--to address my
confirmation. I appreciate the confidence you have expressed in me, and
I appreciate the confidence expressed by the President and the
Secretary in appointing me to this position.
One piece of business left unfinished at that time was my
appearance before you. I look forward today to discussing with you the
range of issues covered by the Bureau of Political Military Affairs.
Of course, a significant event has occurred since my confirmation:
the merging of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the
Department of State. Planning for the reorganization leading up to
April 1, and getting the reorganized Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs running smoothly since then, has taken up much of my time and
that of my colleagues. The changes have been more than merely shuffling
personnel and changing the names of offices. It also has resulted in a
much more sharply focused mission for the Bureau.
Before April 1 the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs dealt with
an exceptionally wide range of issues important to our national
security. Now, however, the arms control and nonproliferation
portfolios have been placed into new bureaus. In a sense, this
reorganization has brought the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
full circle to its original mission, when the Office of Politico-
Military Affairs first became a bureau in 1969.
The main functions of that Bureau were two-fold: to be the
Secretary's principal resource on key political-military matters, and
to be the Department's primary liaison with the Department of Defense.
In preparing for this reorganization, I have consulted widely and given
a great deal of thought to the goals and mission of the new Bureau of
Political Military Affairs.
I believe this Committee and the Bureau of Political Military
Affairs have together resolved some very difficult and serious issues
concerning the foreign policy and national security of the United
States. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continuing to work closely and
collaboratively with you and the other Members of the Committee.
priorities of the bureau of political military affairs
Despite the more sharply focused responsibilities of the new
Bureau, its mission remains daunting. In addition to a broad range of
political-military issues, we face a number of conflicts around the
world. And we must meet these demands with a much-reduced staff. This
problem will, of course, require a careful setting of our goals. The
following is what I see as our key priorities.
Arms Transfer Policy/Process
Arms transfers are a key tool in protecting U.S. national security.
Ensuring that our allies and friends have the military capabilities to
play their part in protecting shared values and interests is vital to
our own national security, and to ensuring that we need not do so
alone. But as you know well, Mr. Chairman, an effective arms transfer
policy has additional benefits. For a number of reasons beyond our
control, the United States today may not have the same ability to
influence countries around the world that we have enjoyed in the past.
The relationships that result from supporting our friends and allies
with appropriate systems for legitimate national defense, are
significant. So are the economies accrued to the Department of Defense.
However, no other Committee in Congress knows better than this one the
efforts my Bureau goes to make the very best transfer decisions, often
under difficult circumstances. I am firmly committed to continued high
quality decisions and improvement in process in consultation with this
committee.
Confidence and Security Building Measures
Reducing the threat of war and supporting peaceful means for
managing and resolving conflict has long been an American contribution
to international security. Confidence and security building measures
(CSBMs) are an important tool for increasing regional security and
stability. CSBMs have a direct impact on everything from threat
perceptions to peacekeeping operations to arms transfer decisions.
Traditional, conventional arms-related CSBMs are a high priority for
the new Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Together with other
bureaus in the Department, we will share our expertise and experiences
with other countries in the areas of conventional weapons
nonproliferation, arms reduction, military transparency, and confidence
and security building measures. We will design specific security
solutions for regional problems when requested by affected states, and
build constituencies for regional arms control and support for
negotiated security agreements. While we have routinely discussed CSBM
issues in our security dialogues and in making arms transfer decisions,
I am directing additional resources into these efforts. The Bureau of
Political Military Affairs is an active participant on CSBM issues on a
global basis, particularly contributing to CSBM work through the
Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity.
Critical Infrastructure Protection
The relentless development of more sophisticated information
technologies, as well as the increasing dependence of the U.S., with
other countries on these technologies, have been a blessing and a
curse. We are all aware of the advantages of technology. We are also
all vulnerable in the information age to attacks on our critical
infrastructures by hostile states, terrorists, or hackers. Under the
President's directive, known as PDD-63, the State Department is
responsible for international outreach on the issue. As part of this
effort, I chair an interagency group focusing on the political-military
and defense aspects. Our goal is to develop policies and procedures
designed to promote political-military and defense cooperation on CIP
issues in countries with which we share critical dependencies or whose
infrastructure stability is critical to U.S. interests.
Defense Analysis
In this complex and changing global environment, it is more
important than ever for our foreign policy and national defense goals
to be in harmony. I am working closely with OSD, the Joint Staff, and
the CINCs to further this goal through a serious analysis of how we are
preparing to use the Department of Defense to advance our foreign
policy goals. Not only does my staff engage their Defense counterparts
on a daily basis, but I meet regularly with the senior leadership in
OSD and the Joint Staff, as well as directly with the CINCs. We need to
do a better job in this area.
Humanitarian Demining
Eliminating the scourge of landmines from past wars and regional
conflicts--returning land to productive use and people to peaceful and
productive lives--is of great importance to countries around the world.
The Secretary has personally embraced this goal. Responsibility for
managing the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program has been placed in the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. This program has
expandedconsiderably in the past few years, and we are now fully
engaged in supporting 26 mine afflicted nations, with another four or
five likely to join the U.S. program in the next year. The objectives
of the program are to reduce the number of civilian landmine
casualties; to return to their homes refugees and internally displaced
persons who have been denied access to them by landmines; and to
enhance the political and economic stability of nations affected by
landmines. Our support, along with that of other international donors,
is making a difference. We are making progress; landmines are coming
out of the ground; casualty rates are going down; refugees are
returning to their villages; roads and highways are being cleared; and
businesses and industry are restarting. We have enjoyed considerable
support from the Congress, and particularly this committee, Mr.
Chairman, and we thank you for that support. We hope that, together, we
can continue to make progress.
Contingency Planning
The Secretary has spoken of two key policy requirements for
peacekeeping and crisis response: we must ``do the right thing,'' and
``do the thing right.'' Almost two years ago the President mandated a
process for interagency planning for peacekeeping and other complex
political-military operations. His Directive (PDD-56) aims to ensure
that when the United States is the lead or a key actor in such
operations we ``do the thing right.'' The Bureau of Political Military
Affairs works with the Defense Department, NSC staff, and others in the
interagency community on political-military planning for complex
contingencies. Sometimes we lead the process. At other times, we draft
a section of the plan or work in tandem with the Joint Staff on the
military aspects. In every case, a core mission of this Bureau is to
contribute to the ``unity of effort'' necessary for effective U.S.
leadership and participation in complex operations--to do the thing
right.
Regional Security
For the United States to successfully pursue its goals of economic
prosperity and democratic values, the world must be a safe and secure
place. Regional security and stability are key building blocks of this
aspect of our foreign policy. We conduct nearly thirty security
dialogues each year with countries in every region, of the world. These
dialogues include special efforts with the emerging democracies of
Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Most recently, we have
focused priority attention on Persian Gulf security issues. Regional
security in the Aegean, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and East Asia
remain areas where we continue to direct a major part of our efforts.
Security Assistance
In an increasingly austere fiscal environment, maximizing the use
of our scarce resources is critical to advancing our political-military
goals. Over time, security assistance has become a smaller and smaller
tool in our foreign policy toolbox. That is why, now more than ever, we
must make sure that these funds are applied to our highest priorities,
and used to maximum effect in pursuing those priorities. I continue to
see International Military Education and Training (IMET) as the
security assistance that gives America the biggest bang for the buck. I
believe, for the most part, we do not fully appreciate how IMET and
similar programs impart American values to the recipients in foreign
militaries, both directly and indirectly. The stability we saw in
military forces around the world during recent radical decrease in
defense budgets in previous years would have resulted in coups which
today never materialized, in part because of the learned respect for
civilian control of the military.
Small Arms
Earlier I addressed the need for regional stability. While most
arms control efforts are focused on Weapons of Mass Destruction and
heavy conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons designed for
military use have done most of the killing in the post-Cold War era.
This is especially so for civilians, and particularly in Africa, where
Kalashnikov rifles are considered weapons of mass destruction. The
uncontrolled proliferation of these weapons exacerbates conflict,
contributes to regional instability, facilitates crime, and hinders
economic development. In many countries, non-secure stocks are often
stolen for use by indigenous criminal gangs, paramilitaries, or
insurgents, or sold for use in zones of conflict. I am making stockpile
security and destruction a focus of our international small arms
policy. Securing active stocks and destroying excess weapons is cheap,
often costing pennies a weapon for large stocks, and would pay great
dividends by decreasing crime, encouraging development, and permitting
reconstruction of societies attempting to recover from civil war and
ethnic conflict.
Theater Missile Defense
Theater missile defense supports, and presents significant
implications for, our regional security objectives. As I know you are
aware, Mr. Chairman, U.S. forces abroad, as well as our allies, face an
increasing threat from offensive missile proliferation. For this reason
many states have a growing interest in acquiring protection against
theater ballistic missiles. Working closely with DOD, the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs must determine which regions and allies are
most vulnerable to this threat, and how best to assist in providing the
protection necessary for our shared security objectives. As you can
imagine, not all states will share our judgments. Thus, the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs must assess and respond to the new
diplomatic requirements and opportunities created by the introduction
of TMD into already complicated regional security architectures.
In closing, State's recent reorganization gives the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs the opportunity to focus more clearly on
what I see as our primary and original mission. Of course, political-
military, arms control, and nonproliferation issues cannot be totally
separated, and my bureau will continue to work closely with our
colleagues in the new Arms Control and Nonproliferation bureaus, just
as the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and ACDA did before the
reorganization.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate my appreciation for the
time and effort taken last year by you and the other Members of the
Committee to approve my nomination. I also wish to thank you for the
opportunity to address the Committee today and look forward to
continuing to work closely with you. I would be pleased now to address
any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the main reason I was a bit
late today is because of the surprising interest in these two
nominations by other chairmen, other Senators, who were present
at our weekly policy luncheon, and part of my questioning may
reflect some of the bewilderment of the others. But in any
case, I know you both will respond fully and without
hesitation.
The first thing I want to ask you, what is--we are going to
have 7 minutes per Senator.
I want you to describe for me the State Department's policy
on direct contact with officials of pariah states. Can you do
that?
Mr. Newsom. I will give you my best understanding. This is
not an area of my specific responsibility and I would like to
supplement, Mr. Chairman, with a written answer.
Essentially we do not maintain direct contacts with
officials of the pariah states. I understand that there may be
certain unavoidable situations such as a U.N. meeting where
they will be present, but it is at least my understanding that
our general policy is that we do not engage in direct contacts
with their officials. But I would like to supplement that, if I
may, with a written response.
The Chairman. All right. Include in that statement, if you
do not already know it, when was this policy established, by
whom, and under what authority. Do you know the answer to that?
Mr. Newsom. I do not, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Be sure you include that in your response.
Mr. Newsom. I will.
The Chairman. And I suppose your response will be the same
to my next question. How was the policy presented and
promulgated?
Mr. Newsom. I will have to provide that to you too, sir.
The Chairman. All right. Maybe you can help now from your
own memory. Which states are considered for the purpose of this
policy to be pariah states?
Mr. Newsom. Well, certainly Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya.
I believe those would be considered the pariah states.
The Chairman. Well, the thing that created a problem in my
mind when I was discussing it earlier was that the Foreign
Relations Committee, now just inquiring about this, has not
been informed of this policy, and I wonder why we were not. If
you do not know the answer to that, I will invite you to put
that in the written response.
Mr. Newsom. Yes. I think it is safest to be clear that this
is not an aspect of our policy that I am personally engaged in,
and anything that I say would be likely to be wrong and get me
in hot water. I would like to provide it all in writing for
you, sir.
The Chairman. Could you do that fairly rapidly?
Mr. Newsom. I will endeavor to respond promptly.
[The information requested follows:]
topic: state department policy on contact with ``pariah states''
There is no definition in law or regulation for the term ``pariah
state'' and the Department does not designate any state as a pariah
country.
There are states with which the United States does not maintain
diplomatic or consular relations. As of today, these include: Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and FRY (Serbia and Montenegro). Guidance on
contacts with officials of these states is provided as needed by the
appropriate regional bureau in the Department.
The Chairman. Now, do you believe that sections 3(a) and
3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act take precedence over the arms
sale clauses of the August 1982 communique signed with
Communist China?
Mr. Newsom. Senator, I believe that United States law takes
precedence over other non-legally binding instruments, and so I
have to take the position that duly enacted laws of the United
States would supersede another instrument that did not have the
effect of law.
The Chairman. But the Taiwan Relations Act has the effect
of law. So, you are saying in response to my question that it
has precedence.
Mr. Newsom. Yes. I am acknowledging that as the law of the
United States, that it is legally binding.
The Chairman. Well, what weapons systems are we prepared to
provide Taiwan?
Mr. Newsom. Well, sir, consistent with the Taiwan Relations
Act and policies of this and previous administrations, we are
prepared to provide Taiwan with weapons to meet its legitimate
defense requirements.
The Chairman. Does that include an early warning system?
Mr. Newsom. Mr. Chairman, that is a topic which has been
under active consideration in connection with the current round
of discussions with Taiwan on their arms sales requests. With
all possible respect, Mr. Chairman, I have to state that by
agreement with Taiwan, those exchanges are confidential and I
am not able to go into them in the open session, although I
will be happy to do so in a closed session.
The Chairman. I will think about recessing this session and
getting an answer to my question because I want it. Or would
you prefer that we go ahead with the meeting and then
afterwards both sides meet with you privately?
Mr. Newsom. Mr. Chairman, I am at your disposal.
The Chairman. Or would you prefer to go back and check with
your folks and put it all in writing?
Mr. Newsom. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to do as you
require, if you wish to go into executive session or if you
wish me to remain behind. I am simply not able to do it in a
public setting.
The Chairman. Well, will you be able to do it in writing
within 24 hours and have it delivered to me?
Mr. Newsom. I believe I could do that, yes.
The Chairman. All right. Maybe we could stay after this
meeting is over for a few minutes to discuss it.
My time is just about up, so I am not going to start a
question. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, you indicated the Russians approached you
or your agency regarding civilian employment for Soviet
scientists. It may be useful in non-Washington speak--not that
you have done that, but literally how did that happen? Who
approached whom? How do you get to the point where we are
working closely enough with the Russians that you actually get
approached with an idea from Russia saying, hey, look, help us
employ our scientists? How did that happen? And if you can make
it brief in light of my time, I would appreciate it.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Certainly, sir. Perhaps I'll just review
for the committee the inception of the Nuclear Cities
initiative.
Senator Biden. No, no. Don't review it because I understand
the conception. Tell me, how did it happen? Was somebody at a
meeting? Did they walk up to you? Was it an official
communique? Did Gore get a letter from Primakov or
Chernomyrdin? I mean, how did it happen? I am an eighth grade
student. You are trying to explain to me how Russians and
Americans work together in this, how did we get contacted.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Summer before last, we received our
initial inklings that the Russians were beginning to decide to
downsize their nuclear complex. We heard from the NGO community
specifically that the Russian Government was beginning to talk
seriously about this. They had never done so in the past.
When I visited Moscow soon after arriving at the Department
of Energy in February 1998, I was approached--well, it was
actually my scheduled meeting with the then Minister of Atomic
Energy, Mr. Mikhailov, and he said that in fact the Russian
Government had begun to look at downsizing the nuclear complex
and that they were interested in learning from the experience
that the United States had had over the previous 3 decades and
would we be willing to work with them on an initiative with
regard to their 10 nuclear cities.
So, that is really the beginning of the Nuclear Cities
initiative, and I would like to underscore, sir, the link
between the kind of information and cooperation we have with
the non-governmental community and our very close cooperative
relationship, of course, with the Russian Government on such
projects.
Senator Biden. Well, I think it is important sometimes to
explain to the American people exactly how this works in
everyday life, that there is this notion that there is some
kind of a divine intervention that occurs and all these big
programs that we talk about, acronyms we use that nobody but
those of us in this room understand. So, the point is that they
had a problem and someone said, hey, look, to you. Your
counterpart said, you have been through this. You have
downsized your defense establishment. How do you do it? Can you
help? Is that----
Ms. Gottemoeller. Precisely, Senator. That is exactly what
happened.
Senator Biden. The second question is that the plutonium
disposition, a fancy word for saying get rid of the plutonium.
Now, this program that the chairman is critical of--in plain
English that average Americans can understand, what is the deal
here? They have got a lot of plutonium because they have broken
down all of these weapon systems they have agreed to break
down, and you have got weapons grade stuff sitting out there.
Right? That they own, right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir, that is exactly right.
Senator Biden. It is theirs. It was sitting on top of
missiles, on warheads that were aimed at us to blow us and
other people up. Right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, that is exactly right, sir.
Senator Biden. And so, with Nunn-Lugar, we went in there
and we just started chopping up these missiles, but you have
taken out the yolk of the egg here. You are taking out the
heart. The stuff that is left over--after you breakup all the
metal and the steel and the titanium, is you have this stuff
that is weapons grade material. Right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Biden. Now, the Russians own that. Right? Or do we
own it?
Ms. Gottemoeller. No. The Russians.
Senator Biden. The Russians because it was theirs. It was
in their missiles. Right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. That is correct.
Senator Biden. It is not anything we sold them. Right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Correct.
Senator Biden. Now, the issue is what are they going to do
with that. Right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. That is right, sir.
Senator Biden. Are they going to go out and sell it to
somebody else? Are they going to sell it to the Iranians? Are
they going to sell it to the Iraqis? Are they going to sell it
to the North Koreans? Are they going to give it to their
friends? Or are they going to use it to build more missiles?
Right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I think basically the concern is
very long-term storage by the Russian Government that could
result in, at some point, theft or diversion and it could end
up in the wrong hands.
Senator Biden. In other words, they are going to put it
away somewhere. They have got to literally stockpile it. It is
in a pile somewhere, not literally a pile, but it is stockpiled
somewhere. And we are worried that it is either not going to be
adequately controlled because they are not as management
oriented as maybe we are or we are worried that it is going to
get in the wrong people's hands. Right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. So, what did you decide to do about it? What
is the negotiation you are talking about?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Again, we worked with the Russians,
beginning back in the mid-1990's, and at the April 1996 Moscow
summit, we agreed with them on an approach that would involve
both immobilization, that is, putting the plutonium in mixture
with glass or some other material and storing it so it could
not be used, it could not in any way be easily taken out and
turned into weapons, and also fabricating plutonium into mixed
oxide fuel, so-called MOX fuel, which would then be burned up
in nuclear power plants. So, two different approaches to
disposing, to getting rid of the plutonium agreed between the
two sides to be effective in this regard.
Senator Biden. But the idea was to get rid of the
plutonium.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Biden. You ought to just say that because the way
it sounds, understandably to people, when you hear of this
program, it sounds like we are somehow giving them plutonium in
order to be able to burn in their nuclear reactors for civilian
purposes that they can divert to military use, when in fact it
is military use plutonium, military ready plutonium that they
own that we are worried they are not going to control. And just
like with the scientists, we are trying to figure out how to
actively get it used in a way that is not a danger to us.
Right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. Or the least danger.
Ms. Gottemoeller. And that will get rid of it forever.
Senator Biden. All right. And because to burn it up, it is
gone, and they have gotten some benefit from it and we have
gotten some benefit from it.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. If it were a perfect world and they had no
plutonium, we would not be sending them any to burn in their
nuclear reactors, would we?
Ms. Gottemoeller. No, sir.
Senator Biden. Well, I am not being facetious because most
people--you all do this so much, you forget that average people
are pretty damned smart, but they do not understand all the
acronyms. And what they think is, what most people think--and
maybe even some of my colleagues think--somehow this is our
plutonium, we are giving it to them to help them with their
energy needs. It is their plutonium that they can control. We
are worried they are not going to control it, so we are going
to help them burn it rather than keep it stored. Right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Gottemoeller. To get rid of it forever.
Senator Biden. I am available as your press person.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you.
Senator Biden. I am available to make your case for you
because you all ain't making it very well, quite bluntly. It is
not being made well because that is what it is.
Now, it may be a bad idea at that, but that is what it is.
It may not be the best way to do it, but that is what it is. It
is not what a lot of people think it is.
My time is up and I will come back in a second round, if
the chairman permits, to ask a few more questions. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You are welcome.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. The issues of nonproliferation and arms control are
among the most important issues that face this committee and,
indeed, the full Senate.
I just want to use a couple minutes of my time to say again
that I have been a strong supporter of prompt Senate action on
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ever since President
Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate for its advice and
consent on September 22, 1997. It has been signed by more than
150 nations and prohibits the explosion of any type of nuclear
device, no matter the intended purpose.
India's and Pakistan's recent nuclear tests only underscore
the importance of the CTBT and serve as a reminder that we
should redouble our efforts to bring the entire community of
nations into this treaty. While I am pleased that both of those
countries have agreed to sign the treaty, they have done so
only after intense international pressure and only after they
conducted the tests they needed to become declared nuclear
states.
We have to do more to ensure that no further nuclear tests
take place. And, Mr. Chairman, I know you and I respectfully
disagree about this treaty, but I urge you to begin its
consideration in earnest at the earliest possible date. The
United States has to lead the world in reducing the nuclear
threat, and to do that, we have to become a full participant in
a treaty of this kind that we help craft.
Mr. Chairman, now I would like to turn to Mr. Newsom and
just ask a couple of questions about the treaty.
Many observers believe that the administration does not
have a strategy for promoting the Senate ratification of the
CTBT. How would you respond to that criticism?
Mr. Newsom. Senator, I think the President and the
Secretary have made clear that getting the CTB ratified in this
session is one of the top priorities. I believe that they seek
every opportunity that they can to press that point on the
Members of the Senate, pointing out that ratification of the
treaty, and especially ratification of the treaty this year, is
increasingly urgent for the United States.
On the one hand, there is the dialog that we have been
engaged in with India and Pakistan that you mentioned, and one
of the things that we have been pressing them very hard to do
in complying with the benchmarks that were laid down by the
U.N. Security Council is to commit to sign the CTB by
September. And we have secured that commitment from those two
countries.
As we approach the fall, there is going to be a conference
pursuant to article 14 of the treaty which will examine
measures and actions to help bring the treaty into force. The
United States really should be a full state party by the time
of that conference because we need to be there as a leader. If
we have not ratified by then, we will be permitted to be
present as an observer, but it will not be in the same role
that we would have, had we ratified the treaty.
I think another point that we really have to bear very much
in our minds is that the next NPT review conference is coming
up in the year 2000. Getting a CTB done was one of the major
agenda items of the first review conference. It is seen as part
of the nuclear powers obligation under article 6 of the NPT to
take reciprocal actions for disarmament. I think it is so
fundamentally, so profoundly in our interests to maintain the
NPT regime, strong and stable and permit no challenges to it,
that our having ratified the CTB will, I believe, be a very
important demonstration to these other countries that the
United States and other nuclear powers are moving ahead with
the agreed agenda in responding to their willingness under the
NPT to give up the right to have nuclear weapons, that we are
going ahead and doing the things that we are required to do,
that is, a CTB, hopefully get the START II treaty ratified,
well into START III negotiations. All of these things are going
to be very important to us in managing what could be quite a
difficult review conference for the NPT.
So, I echo your words and I think that the administration
is fully committed to making every reasonable effort it can to
get the treaty through this year.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate the answer and the renewed
commitment.
I would like to ask Secretary Gottemoeller a different kind
of question. A number of my constituents have contacted me
about and are very active in the sister city relationship
between the Fox Valley region of Wisconsin and the city of
Kurgan, Russia. Through this relationship, they are working to
help the people of that region adjust to the construction of a
chemical weapons disposal facility in their area. Participants
in this program have made several trips to Russia and a number
of the folks from Kurgan have also visited Wisconsin. My
constituents hope that their efforts to foster community
development in Kurgan in such areas as health care, women's
leadership training, democracy and civil society programs, and
infrastructure initiatives can be replicated in the other
nuclear cities that you mentioned throughout the former Soviet
Union.
Just say a bit about the relationship between weapons
destruction and disposal and community development and whether
you can really have one without the other.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. In fact, I am well aware of the
activities of your constituents. They have played a very
important role, particularly in looking at the overall health
situation in Kurgan and working with local hospitals in the
area and medical doctors and so forth. So, they have made a
very important contribution overall.
I would like to say that I consider their activities
actually as a kind of model for the kind of partnership that we
would like to develop between the government and organizations,
regional and state organizations, in building up relationships
that will enable the downsizing and restructuring of the
complex to occur as the Russian Government has hoped because,
as we are well aware in the DOE complex, having accomplished a
downsizing over the past 30 years, it is necessary to pay
attention to a wide range of factors, including the health of
the population and including the overall social situation in
the area.
And these are areas that, in fact, organizations in the
private sector and at the State and local level can make a
great contribution to. We have already developed a very good
relationship, for example, with the AID-sponsored sister cities
program which draws in sister cities from around the country to
work in the nuclear cities of Russia. There are many things
that the Government cannot and should not do. I believe that
areas such as those your constituents have been involved in in
working particularly the health problems are very valuable and
will help us essentially to take care of the whole spectrum of
problems as we are working in the downsizing of these nuclear
facilities.
Senator Feingold. I thank you for that answer. Both of my
questions, I want you to know, come really from a strong
interest on the part of my constituents in these matters. It is
not a Washington issue. People are very worried about these
matters in Wisconsin, and I thank you both for your work in
this area.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, a year ago this past
January, somewhere along the 15th or 12th or something, the
President certified to Congress that China had provided the
United States with ``clear and unequivocal assurances'' that
China will not assist any non-nuclear weapons state either
directly or indirectly in acquiring nuclear explosive devices.
Are you aware of any information suggesting that China, in
fact, has subsequent to that provision of the aforementioned
assurances, assisted such a country either directly or
indirectly, in acquiring a nuclear explosive device?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I am not aware, Mr. Chairman, of any such
actions.
The Chairman. Do you think if it happened, you would be
aware? Are you saying that it did not happen?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I am saying, sir, that in fact we have a
very great interest as a Government and as an administration in
this issue overall and that we are very attentive to such
issues. So, yes----
The Chairman. I do not want to be rude, and I am not trying
to lead you into a trap. But less than a month after President
Clinton certified China for nuclear cooperation with the United
States, the Pakistan press announced that the military
plutonium production reactor at a place called K-u-s-h-a-b,
Kushab, had been brought on line. Now, where do you think
Pakistan got the heavy water needed for this operation? Do you
have any interest in that?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well certainly, sir, we have a continuing
interest in proliferation issues of that kind and we do pay----
The Chairman. But you do not know anything about it.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I do not have at my fingertips a
great wealth of information on that particular issue.
The Chairman. What does that mean? Would you like to go out
and telephone and see if somebody will give you an answer to
that question? Because I think in your position you ought to
have it if it happened, and I think it happened.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, I would certainly be prepared to
provide you with full information because, sir, I think
probably the information resides in the classified realm, and
so it would be difficult for me to speak about it in this
setting.
The Chairman. Well, let me tell you this. This
classification thing in Washington, DC has become a dodge. Pat
Moynihan and I had a field day for about a year exposing the
fraud that classifying this and classifying that is just a way
to get around taking a position on it or taking any
responsibility for it.
Now, I am not saying that that is what you are doing. But I
want you to find out the answer to that question.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Certainly, sir. I would be happy to.
The Chairman. And I want you to find out if it came from
China, if so, when it came from China, and when was the
executive branch aware of this matter.
I am going to ask you to do exactly what I did to Mr.
Newsom, that is, to get that up in writing and get it to me
tomorrow because I tell you, I am not going to let this
committee act on nominations until I get all the information
that I need and want regarding this sort of thing. So, will you
get that to me tomorrow?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir, certainly.
[The information requested follows:]
Question. What was the extent of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's
unsafeguarded Kushab reactor? Who supplied the heavy water for Kushab?
When did the Executive Branch become aware of it? Why did the
Administration not notify Congress?
Answer. By mid-1994, the Intelligence Community had sufficient
evidence to evaluate Chinese assistance to Pakistan, which became a
factor in U.S.-Chinese negotiations. The most prominent case involved
the transfer of ring magnets for use in Pakistan's uranium enrichment
program. During the two years of discussions between the U.S. and China
with respect to implementation of the 1985 Agreement Nuclear for
Cooperation, the issue of Chinese assistance to Kushab also figured
prominently. At that time, U.S. policy officials made it clear to the
Government of China that, among other things, a ``no assistance''
condition regarding any unsafeguarded nuclear activity was absolutely
essential in order for the President to make the certifications to
implement the Agreement. The U.S. sought the following assurances from
China that it:
Would not assist unsafeguarded nuclear activities
Would cease all assistance to Iran's nuclear program once
two minor projects, then underway, were completed
Would promulgate/implement national nuclear export control
legislation/regulations, including ``catch all'' provisions
Would join the NPT Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee)
On May 11, 1996, China publicly assured the U.S. that it would not
provide assistance to any unsafeguarded nuclear facility.
Ultimately, in return for the May 11 assurance, as well as
assurances on the other conditions noted above, the President was able
to provide certification to Congress that China was not assisting third
countries to develop nuclear explosives. At that time, the President
also forwarded to Congress both classified and unclassified reports
detailing Chinese foreign nuclear activities. The Agreement was
implemented March 18, 1998. The Congress was regularly briefed on all
relevant issues throughout the U.S.-China negotiations that led to
Presidential certification.
Additional details regarding past contacts between Chinese entities
and Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program can be made available on a
classified basis. Details related to the heavy water supply to Kushab
will be made available through classified channels as well.
[Note: Additional information regarding this question was received
in classified form.]
Question. Will you keep the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member
informed of all activities associated with the proliferation of nuclear
technology as required by Section 602 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act?
Answer. Yes. As you know the Department of Energy, as well as the
other agencies of the Executive Branch have various reporting
requirements to Congress on activities associated with the prevention
of nuclear proliferation, through Section 602 of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act. Specifically, the Department of Energy is
required to provide a detailed analysis of the proliferation
implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques,
advanced reactors, and alternative nuclear fuel cycles.
When reliable information associated with the supply of material,
equipment, or technology to any nuclear activity of concern (nuclear
explosive or unsafeguarded fuel-cycle) is brought to our attention, the
Department of Energy, in conjunction with the national laboratories,
will analyze the information and provide detailed input into the
Executive Branch's various reporting requirements to Congress,
including the Section 602 report.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Newsom, I have so many things I want to ask you.
Newsweek reported, not so long ago, that in 1997 the United
States uncovered a massive tunneling operation in North Korea.
Now, when were you first made aware of this, if you were at
all?
Mr. Newsom. I was not made aware of that for several months
after it was first made known in very closed circles.
The Chairman. Well, that makes me nervous that there is an
acknowledgement that it happened, which is what you have just
done.
Now, do you believe, sir, that North Korea's nuclear
weapons program is indeed frozen?
Mr. Newsom. I believe that we can verify that the
facilities at Yongbyon are shut down. We have IAEA inspectors
there. They are monitoring the 8,000 cans of rods, and so the
reactor is not operational. So, that facility, which is the
object of the agreement, is shut down, yes.
The Chairman. I am not trying to be heavy-handed about it,
but I want something exactly right, up-to-date in Kansas City
included in what you are already going to send me in writing.
It could be classified, if you want to do it. I would rather
have a yes or no question, but we will see about that.
Now, under section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act, the Secretaries of State and Energy have an obligation to
keep this committee fully and currently informed--and I am
quoting--with respect to proliferation issues. The law was
broken with respect to North Korea, and the committee was kept
in the dark for an extremely long period of time.
Now, this has got to stop. Both of you are brand new
Assistant Secretaries, and I am not trying to beat up on you
and I will not because you are blameless in this matter.
However, I am asking both of you if you will commit to me and
this committee now that you will personally ensure that Senator
Biden of Delaware and I and our designated staff, whom we may
choose, will be kept fully and currently informed pursuant to
section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Can I have
your assurance on that?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Newsom. I am in an awkward position, Mr. Chairman, in
that I have no responsibilities in that area under the
reorganization. I am not involved now anymore in
nonproliferation or related matters. What I can go do is get
the senior person who now is involved in that to give you that
commitment.
The Chairman. Well, you can be of assistance to this
committee by getting it for us.
Mr. Newsom. I will go seek it.
[The information requested follows:]
topic: briefings pursuant to section 602(c) of the nuclear
nonproliferation act of 1978
The State Department takes very seriously and will continue to
fulfill its responsibilities pursuant to section 602(c) of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 to keep you and the ranking minority
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ``fully and currently
informed with respect to . . . the current activities of foreign
nations; which are of significance from the proliferation standpoint.''
The State Department is prepared to commit to brief you accompanied by
an appropriately cleared member of you staff whom you designate. In
some cases the underlying intelligence is subjected to extremely
stringent dissemination controls by the originating agency, and in such
cases we have been authorized to brief only Members. In each case we
will work with you and the originating intelligence agency to ensure
that you are fully and currently informed consistent with section
602(c), while making every effort with originating agencies to minimize
the number of occasions on which information cannot be shared with
staff.
The Chairman. And I am going to repeat again that unless
and until I get the information, these nominations are not
going to move forward. I want to move them tomorrow if I can,
but you have simply got to cooperate with me and not dodge the
ball any further.
My time is up. Go ahead.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have a confession to make about 602, and I
would like, if either are able to speak, to clarify this.
As I understand it, the chairman and ranking member are to
be briefed contemporaneously, but I do not believe--and I would
ask staff to correct me on this or someone on your staff--we
are able to have our staffs briefed, that we are able to send
staff to be briefed. Is that correct?
What I am trying to get at here is it is true, to state the
obvious, that the chairman was not briefed. It is also true
that on two occasions I was briefed. I think the breakdown here
in part, Mr. Chairman, is that--and I happen to share your view
that staff should be able to be briefed.
The Chairman. Cleared staff.
Senator Biden. Cleared staff. I mean specifically cleared
staff at a very high level with Q clearance. I understand.
By way of explanation for the record, it would be a
slightly skewed picture to suggest that--if I let the record
stand and suggest that I was not briefed. I was briefed. It is
obviously more important the chairman be briefed than me be
briefed. I assumed that you were as well.
But I think what happened here was on those specific
briefings--now, maybe there are others that I am unaware of--it
has been the chair's position that cleared staff should be able
to be briefed, and I think it has been the administration's
position--correct me if I am wrong--that only Senators could be
briefed. I was unaware of that in terms of the majority being
briefed, which is obviously more important than briefing the
minority, but I just want the record to show that on those two
occasions I was briefed. The committee was briefed, quote/
unquote. The committee was not. I was as one of the two
parties, and I think we had a little thing between a cup and a
lip here, Mr. Chairman. We ought to get it straightened out
obviously.
The Chairman. Stop the clock. Start it over. I do not want
this charged against Senator Biden's time.
Senator Biden. At any rate, I thank the chair for that.
Now, Senator Kerry had to leave, and he as me and Senator
Feingold and others--as close as the chairman and I are, we are
at odds on some substantive issues, not nearly as many as you
think, but one of those substantive issues is the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. Now, the chairman has made very clear the
conditions under which or the circumstances under which he is
prepared to bring it up before the committee. And as we say in
this body, we agree to disagree on that, but since he has the
gavel, it is clear where the disagreement will lie.
But I would like to ask a few questions, particularly to
you, Eric, if I may. What are we doing to lessen the risk of
nuclear war between India and Pakistan in the wake of last
year's nuclear test and their continued missile test? What are
we doing, the United States of America?
Mr. Newsom. There has been an intensive process that was
launched soon after those tests, and the heart of it is a
series of bilateral discussions led by Deputy Secretary Talbot
with opposite numbers in both those countries. These
negotiations, these discussions are targeted at persuading
India and Pakistan to adhere to the benchmarks that were set
forth by the P-5 in Geneva and then later by the U.N. Security
Council basically identically.
Senator Biden. Well, how does India's and Pakistan's
adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty fit into this
whole piece?
Mr. Newsom. One of the most important benchmarks, a
centerpiece benchmark, was to get their adherence to the
Comprehensive Test Ban because it would require a permanent
cessation of testing.
Senator Biden. What good will this do? What is the
significance of them not being able to test?
You hear people say all the time that militaries in
respective countries will not deploy nuclear weapons that they
have not tested because they are worried about the reliability.
What is the value in having India and Pakistan adhere to
this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? How will it affect
outcomes?
Mr. Newsom. I think, Senator, you have to talk about that
on two levels. At the technical level, prevention of further
testing by them has got to have some impact on their level of
confidence in the weapons designs. They tested them already.
Clearly they felt a perceived need to have to test these
weapons. They were not prepared to take on confidence untested
designs. So, at the technical level, getting a CTB in place
would increase the difficulties of them achieving levels of
confidence that military people would want to have with a
weapons design. They would not have done further tests.
Senator Biden. In your view, are you confident--I know I am
interrupting you, but so I understand this, in your view are we
confident that had the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty been
signed by both 4 years ago, 2 years ago, would we have been
able to detect a violation of that treaty?
Back up. Would their testing that each country did be a per
se violation of the treaty? Were they at such range and level
that it would have violated the treaty had they been
signatories?
Mr. Newsom. Well, any test would have violated the treaty
because the treaty allows for zero yield testing. So, any test
of whatever dimension would have violated it.
Senator Biden. So, it would have been a violation.
Mr. Newsom. It would have been a violation of the treaty.
Senator Biden. What degree of certainty do we have that had
it been in place, we would have known without them announcing
it that they, in fact, had tested it? Because, obviously, if
they were signatories, they wouldn't announce they were going
to test or that they had tested.
Mr. Newsom. Well, we did detect all of the tests that they
conducted.
Senator Biden. I know this sounds very rudimentary, but it
is important for the record. I am a very basic guy here. I have
been doing this arms control stuff for 27 years, and one of the
problems we have is, as a predecessor on this committee once
said, we have a lot of nuclear theologians. We understand the
jargon, but it is easily translatable. We do not often do it.
So, the reason why it is important that the world community
and we thought important for India and Pakistan to agree in the
future to be part of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is
because nations that do not test usually do not deploy because
they do not have the confidence in the systems. Therefore, if
they agree not to test, it degrades their capacity to have
confidence in nuclear weapons. Correct?
Mr. Newsom. Yes. It is generally taken these days that a
very simple nuclear design could be done without a test, and
you probably would have some confidence it would go off. You
might not have very much confidence on what its yield would be,
what its effects would be, and your military would certainly
want to conduct tests so they understood what this weapon would
do.
If you were at a more advanced level of warhead designs,
going beyond just a simple fusion device, the requirements for
testing go much higher because it is a much more complex
operation that has to take place for this thing to do
everything that it is supposed to do. That is said to be one of
the most important security benefits of a CTB, that the
inability to test inhibits the efforts of any would-be
proliferator from taking a very simple design, in which they
would probably not have high confidence, and increasing its
complexity and then being able to test it to get levels of
confidence----
Senator Biden. If I can make an analogy, and I would like
you to correct me if you disagree with this. In my view we have
a vivid example of how easy it is for a young man or a woman in
the United States to go to the Internet and learn how to make a
pipe bomb. In the international community among military
forces, it is in a relative sense almost as easy for a nation
with any degree of scientific sophistication to make a
rudimentary atomic bomb, weapon. But the difference between
such a rudimentary weapon and a weapon that is used tactically
or strategically in war or in the threat of war by a nation
going from that unsophisticated device to a much more
sophisticated device that would be needed in that realm is a
difference in my view between a pipe bomb and plastic and how
it is used. It is much more difficult to do.
Is that a fair, rough, raw analogy?
Mr. Newsom. That is certainly my understanding from a lot
of discussions back during the CTB negotiating days, that one
of the most important benefits of a complete cessation of
testing would be that it would really raise the bar on
developing more advanced warhead designs. You cannot ever say
now, unfortunately, with technology out of the box, that you
can prevent them from building this very simple design. As you
say, it is the pipe bomb of nuclear weapons. But I would think
any meaningful military political leadership would have to
wonder what that thing would do and under what circumstances it
would be of any value to them.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one very brief
followup on this topic?
The Chairman. Sure.
Senator Biden. We have sanctions now on India and on
Pakistan, correct, with the exception of we lifted them
relative to wheat and a wheat sale that we had? But there are
sanctions on India and Pakistan now. Is that correct?
Mr. Newsom. There have been some--Eximbank has been lifted
and OPIC and TDA, but yes, most of the others remain in force.
Senator Biden. In order to lift all sanctions, is it the
administration's position that they have to sign this
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
Mr. Newsom. Signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may
well lead us to consider some further positive measures, but I
do not believe that we would see that as sufficient to remove
all sanctions because----
Senator Biden. Absent signing the treaty.
Mr. Newsom. Absent signing the treaty. And there are other
of the important benchmarks which need to be achieved.
Restraint on their missile activities, for example. So, in and
of itself, their signing the CTB would be a very positive act,
and if everything else was going well, we might want to
reciprocate on a positive act. But I do not think that we would
see that without the right kind of progress on the other
benchmarks which are also extremely important, that that would
justify complete removal.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the extra
time. With your permission, I would like to ask unanimous
consent that I be able to submit--I have--this will not
surprise you, Mr. Chairman--another half a dozen questions on
this subject on behalf of both Senator Kerry and myself. If I
could submit those in writing to the committee.
[See responses to additional questions in the appendix,
page 33.]
The Chairman. Well, as a matter of fact, we are going to
keep the record open for a couple of days. Let us say 3 days
for Senators, who would like to have been here but could not,
to file their questions. And I have some to file myself.
But I thank you very much for your interest in coming here
today. Now, I do need some information from you, as we
discussed earlier, and I will appreciate your haste in getting
it to me.
Your point, Senator Biden, about this business of
designated people, staff members, Bud Nance ought to be cleared
for anything. Hell, he was in the Navy for 38 years, skipper of
the Forrestal and all the rest of it. I think we can trust him,
do you not?
Mr. Newsom. I would.
The Chairman. I think he would be trustworthy and his
designees on the staff. It is probable that I was getting my
knees replaced at the time----
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I think it was--and let me say
one other thing. Having in the good, old days chaired a very
busy committee myself, I think what sometimes administrations,
past and present, do not fully understand is the schedule of a
chairman versus a ranking member is decidedly different. I
would like to be busier again and be chairman. But the truth of
the matter is that when I chaired the Judiciary Committee for
years, over a decade, the Justice Department used to say they
would brief me and the ranking member and not staff, and it was
not practical because, quite frankly, I ended up having to do
in those days a heck of a lot more, as you have to do a lot
more than I do. So, maybe we can work it out.
But I just wanted to make the point to you, Mr. Chairman, I
truly think the administration thought they were--thought they
were--meeting the goals of 602 because I remember going up to
407 and being briefed on two occasions at the moment, I mean,
urgent calls and insisting I come. I think one of those times
at least you were in the hospital if I am not mistaken.
The Chairman. There were rare days when I was not in the
hospital.
Senator Biden. That is true, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
There being no further business to come before the
committee, we stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Responses of Assistant Secretary Eric D. Newsom to Questions Submitted
by Senators Biden and Kerry
Question 1. Stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of
the main objectives of the CTBT. The nuclear tests last year by India
and Pakistan--who are not signatories--forced many policy makers,
including many members of the Senate, to reconsider the political and
security benefits of the CTBT. However, it also drove home to many the
importance of U.S. ratification of the CTBT, in order to increase the
pressure on other nations to refrain from conducting any further
nuclear tests. Please outline for us the importance of the CTBT to
accomplishing U.S. nonproliferation objectives. How important is
ratification of the CTBT to continued U.S. leadership in international
efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons?
Answer. The CTBT is a key element in accomplishing U.S. non-
proliferation objectives. On the one hand, it makes it much more
difficult for non-nuclear weapon states to develop nuclear weapons in
which they would have confidence. On the other hand, it is a further
contribution by the nuclear weapon states in implementing their
commitment to nuclear disarmament--a commitment made in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970, and
reaffirmed in the course of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference.
The United States provided leadership during the negotiation of the
CTBT, and President Clinton was the first to sign the Treaty when it
was opened for signature in September 1996. U.S. ratification will be a
strong endorsement of the key role the U.S. has played in pursuit of a
CTBT and underscore the importance the U.S. attaches to nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation. The U.S. voice will carry much more
weight in convincing others, including India and Pakistan, to ratify,
so that the CTBT can enter into force, and in enabling the U.S. to
continue to lead on such multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation
efforts as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. If the U.S. does not
ratify the CTBT, other states--uncertain if we will follow through on
our commitments--will be less likely to follow our lead in these other
areas.
Question 2. Please explain how ratification of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) relates to the maintenance of U.S.
leadership regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Would other
countries view U.S. failure to ratify the CTBT as non-compliance with
Article VI of the NPT? Was there any specific invocation of the CTBT as
a sign of our good faith in return for the non-nuclear weapons states
agreeing to the indefinite extension of the NPT?
Answer. A close link between the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
and a test ban treaty has existed from the beginning. The NPT's
preamble recalled the determination of the Parties to the Limited Test
Ban Treaty to prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions. One of three
decisions agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was a
document entitled ``Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament.'' That document identified as a key
objective the conclusion of CTBT negotiations no later than 1996.
Moreover, by tying the objective to a date, the NPT parties indicated
the urgency attached to this goal.
Thus, while no express link exists between the NPT or its
indefinite extension and the CTBT, NPT parties have made clear that the
continued health of the nonproliferation regime and their support for
the NPT depends on steady progress towards nuclear disarmament. Banning
nuclear testing is a key measure in that regard. The United States
played a leadership role in both the indefinite extension of the NPT
and in the negotiation of the CTBT. If the U.S. failed to ratify the
CTBT, a treaty it was instrumental in bringing into existence, the U.S.
would have great difficulty in maintaining its leadership on non-
proliferation, as NPT parties would question the U.S. commitment to its
obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
Question 3. Until the United States ratifies the CTBT, the Treaty
cannot come into force. If there were prolonged U.S. failure to ratify
the CTBT, what would the implications be for nuclear non-proliferation,
aside from those related to Question 1? To what extent is the CTBT
intended to buttress the NPT by giving non-nuclear weapon states the
added assurance that their neighbors have foresworn all nuclear
explosions? Would prolonged failure of the Treaty to come into force
make such countries take a second look at whether to remain non-
nuclear?
Answer. The United States has always recognized that the CTBT
supports both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. It will
buttress the non-proliferation regime by adding another barrier to the
development of nuclear weapons by potential proliferators. By providing
an additional level of confidence to that provided by the NPT that
states have given up nuclear weapon test explosions or any other
nuclear explosions, it will help assure their neighbors that they are
not developing nuclear weapons.
Even in the absence of a CTBT that had entered into force, we and
our allies will make it a high priority in our diplomatic efforts to
ensure that no parties to the NPT abandon their non-proliferation
commitments by developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, prolonged
failure of the Treaty to come into force would gravely undercut the
nonproliferation regime.
south asia--status of negotiations
Question 4. The United States has been engaged in intense
negotiations with the governments of India and Pakistan since their
nuclear tests, to convince them to agree to sign the CTBT and abide by
its obligations. In addition to making this commitment, what other
steps must India and Pakistan take before the Administration will
consider lifting U.S. sanctions? In your opinion, what are the
prospects for the successful conclusion of these talks?
Answer. Our long-term objective is universal adherence to the NPT,
including India and Pakistan's participation as non-nuclear weapon
states. In the meantime, we are working with both countries to prevent
a nuclear and missile arms race in the region.
In addition to CTBT adherence, we have focused most intensely on
several objectives which can be met over the short and medium term:
moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and other explosive devices, pending conclusion of a
formal treaty; and constructive engagement in negotiations on a
FMCT;
restraint in missile and nuclear weapon programs;
controls meeting international standards on exports of
sensitive materials and technology.
Our dialogue has yielded some progress:
Both governments--having already declared testing
moratoria--have given qualified commitments to adhere to the
CTBT by September 1999.
Both are working to upgrade their controls on sensitive
exports by drafting new legislation and regulations.
Both have withdrawn their opposition to, and agreed to
participate in negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
in Geneva.
We also welcomed steps by both countries to resume their high-level
dialogue on the fundamental issues dividing them, including peace and
security concerns and Kashmir. We found encouraging the successful
summit meeting of the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers on February
20-21 in Lahore, in which they committed their governments to intensify
efforts to resolve the issues that have divided their countries.
In recognition of this progress and to promote further positive
steps, the U.S. relaxed some sanctions last November: e.g. Exim, OPIC,
TDA, IMET. In light of Pakistan's dire economic straits, we also
supported International Financial Institution lending to that country
to the extent necessary to support a onetime IMF rescue package.
We have told both India and Pakistan that we will ease sanctions
further when they take concrete steps to meet the benchmarks.
In general, Indian and Pakistani progress toward meeting our
objectives has been slow and may be complicated by the election in
India, but there has been some encouraging movement. We plan to
continue our dialogue with both countries and remain hopeful that they
will take steps such as the ones we have suggested that are designed to
do what they themselves have said they want--to avoid an costly and
destabilizing arms race in South Asia.
Question 5. What U.S. efforts will be needed to get such countries
as Israel and North Korea to ratify the Treaty? Are there any other
countries whose ratification will remain in doubt even after the United
States ratifies the Treaty?
Answer. The most compelling action we can take to get such
countries as Israel and North Korea to ratify the CTBT is to ratify the
Treaty ourselves. Once we have taken that step we will have much more
influence and credibility in urging others to join us in ratifying the
Treaty.
During the negotiations the U.S. worked closely with Israel to
ensure that the CTBT would enhance, not harm Israel's security
interests. We believe Israel realizes that the Treaty is in its
interest and, assuming that we make good our own commitment to ratify
the Treaty, will take appropriate action itself.
Twenty-seven of the 44 required ratifications remain to be
achieved, although several of these states have indicated that they
plan to ratify in the next few months. It is likely that Russian and
perhaps Chinese ratifications would follow U.S. actions. In any event,
U.S. leadership should provide a stimulus for others to ratify.
Question 6. The CTBT allows for a conference to determine how to
bring the Treaty into force. Why does it matter whether the United
States ratifies before that conference? What will the conference be
able actually to do to bring the CTBT into force, if some nuclear-
capable states still have not ratified the Treaty?
Answer. The article of the Treaty that provides for the conference
(Article XIV) makes a clear distinction between states that have
ratified the Treaty, which can make the decisions at the conference,
and signatories, which can attend as observers. If the U.S. wishes to
participate fully in the Article XIV conference and be part of the
decision-making process, it must ratify the Treaty before the
conference convenes.
In our view, the conference can play an important role by
sustaining international interest in and positive momentum toward
speedy entry into force of the CTBT. Participants could adopt a final
document emphasizing the value that the international community places
on the Treaty's role in ensuring a world without nuclear explosions.
They could establish a coordinated action plan to accelerate the
remaining ratifications and facilitate early entry into force,
including practical measures to assist governments in these efforts.
The conference could also provide a valuable opportunity to underline
the commitment of participants to preparing the CTBT verification
system for near-term entry into force.
The conference will not waive the-entry-into-force provisions, in a
way that would permit the Treaty to come into force before all the 44
states specified had ratified. Nor will it impose sanctions on non-
ratifiers.
Question 7. Article XIV of the CTBT says that a conference may be
held ``three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for
signature'' and annually thereafter, seemingly implying a four-year
wait until the first conference. But countries are acting as though it
will be held this fall, which will be three years after the Treaty was
opened for signature. Does the negotiating record clarify the
negotiators' intent? If so, please provide some specifics in that
regard.
Answer. Those involved in the negotiation of Article XIV of the
CTBT clearly understand the Article to call for a conference three
years after the Treaty was opened for signature if it has not yet
entered into force. Thus a conference under Article XIV could take
place any time after September 24, 1999.
The states that have ratified the Treaty have informed the UN
Secretary General as depositary of their belief that the Article XIV
conference should be convened this fall, probably in October. The
Secretary General has replied taking note of their belief. All are
operating under the assumption that the conference should appropriately
be held after September 24, 1999.
Question 8. One problem with any arms control treaty is
verification. How does the CTBT address that challenge? Will the
International Monitoring System result in perfect verification? How
will it assist U.S. monitoring of foreign nuclear tests?
Answer. The CTBT includes a substantial verification regime. Its
International Monitoring System (IMS) provides global coverage by 321
seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound stations
whose data can be used to detect, locate, and identify nuclear
explosions in different physical environments. These stations are being
linked by a Global Communications Infrastructure to send data to an
International Data Center (IDC) in Vienna. The IDC will provide
integrated data and analysis to all parties. Raw data will also be sent
to the U.S. National Data Center to support our monitoring and
verification capabilities. Once the Treaty enters into force, its
mechanisms for confidence-building measures, consultation,
clarification, and on-site inspection will provide new tools to resolve
ambiguous events.
Question 9. General Shelton and his four immediate predecessors as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--going back all the way to the
Reagan Administration--have all endorsed ratification of the CTBT. Why
do they support ratification? Do they oppose nuclear testing? Or do
they believe that U.S. nuclear testing would be extremely unlikely,
even if the Senate were to reject the CTBT, and do they therefore
support ratification as a means of holding other countries to the same
ban on testing that we have imposed on ourselves since 1992?
Answer. It is, of course, for the Chairmen to state their positions
on nuclear testing. However, the most recent JCS posture statement says
that one of the best ways to protect our troops and interests is to
promote arms control, which can reduce the chances of conflict, lower
tensions, generate cost savings, and encourage peaceful solutions to
disputes.
The statement also says that our efforts to lower the numbers of
strategic nuclear weapons coincide with efforts to control testing of
nuclear weapons, and that the JCS support ratification of the CTBT,
with the safeguards package that establishes the conditions under which
the United States would adhere to the Treaty.
These safeguards, announced by President Clinton in August 1995,
will strengthen our commitment in the areas of intelligence, monitoring
and verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear
laboratories, and test readiness. The safeguards also specify
circumstances under which the President, in consultation with Congress,
would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the ``supreme
national interest'' provision in the unlikely event that further
testing might be required. Paragraph 2 of Article IX of the CTBT
recognizes the right of each State Party to withdraw from the Treaty if
events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interests.
The U.S. as a matter of policy continues to observe its nuclear
testing moratorium, and the 1994 DOD Nuclear Posture Review said that
no new-design nuclear warhead production was required. It makes sense,
both in our own national interest and in the interest of nuclear
stability, to hold others to this same standard by securing
ratification and early entry into force of the CTBT. This would allow
full implementation of the verification and compliance provisions,
including on-site inspection, essentially freeze nuclear arsenals in
their current relative positions, and eliminate the possibility of a
new arms race.
Question 10. How would U.S. national security interests be affected
if we were to withdraw from the ABM Treaty?
Answer. U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would have far-reaching
and extremely negative consequences for the entire range of arms
control issues between the U.S. and Russia. U.S. withdrawal would
substantially complicate the process of strategic arms reductions
initiated in START I and to be continued through START II and START
III.
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would have serious foreign and
defense policy implications, which extend beyond our relationship with
Russia. Such a decision would require very careful consideration, as
our credibility as a party to existing and future treaties would be
questioned. Such a step would concern our friends and allies who view
the ABM Treaty as an important component of global strategic stability.
Russia would clearly interpret withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as
evidence that the U.S. is not interested in working towards a
cooperative negotiation on the ABM Treaty and preservation of the hard-
won bipartisan gains of START. Our common goal should be to achieve
success in negotiations on the ABM Treaty while also securing the
strategic arms reductions available through START.
Accordingly, any decision concerning withdrawal should be
considered with the utmost caution, and not approached until after a
serious attempt to negotiate any necessary ABM Treaty amendments to
deploy a limited NMD. Indeed, the Treaty itself recognizes that the
strategic environment may change, requiring the Treaty to be adapted to
evolving security circumstances. We have modified the ABM Treaty in the
past, and I believe we can reach agreement on any necessary changes for
deployment of a limited NMD. At this time, Treaty withdrawal is an
unnecessary and dangerous action.