- COUNTERTERRORISM AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

[Senate Hearing 106-145]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 106-145

COUNTERTERRORISM AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

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HEARING

before a

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

SPECIAL HEARING

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-802 cc WASHINGTON : 1999
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
SLADE GORTON, Washington FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky TOM HARKIN, Iowa
CONRAD BURNS, Montana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HARRY REID, Nevada
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PATTY MURRAY, Washington
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
JON KYL, Arizona
Steven J. Cortese, Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
James H. English, Minority Staff Director
------

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
(ex officio)
Professional Staff
Jim Morhard
Kevin Linskey
Paddy Link
Dana Quam
Clayton Heil
Lila Helms (Minority)
Emelie East (Minority)
Eric Harnischfeger (Detailee)
Tim Harding (Detailee)

C O N T E N T S

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary of State

Page

Statement of Hon. Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State...... 1
Prepared statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell............ 5
Prepared statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg................ 7
Prepared statement of Madeleine K. Albright...................... 11

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Office of the Attorney General

Statement of Hon. Janet Reno, Attorney General................... 24
Attorney General Reno's opening statement........................ 24
Agency cooperation and preparedness.............................. 24
Infrastructure protection against terrorism...................... 26
Terrorism budget strategy........................................ 26
Federal partnership with State and local law enforcement......... 26
Threat of cyber attack........................................... 28
Prepared statement of Janet Reno................................. 29
Preventing and responding to terrorism........................... 32
Domestic preparedness efforts.................................... 34
Tools............................................................ 36
Resources........................................................ 38

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director............................ 40
Director Freeh's opening statement............................... 40
Interagency cooperation.......................................... 40
Critical national infrastructure protection...................... 42
Prepared statement of Louis J. Freeh............................. 42
Top down coordination............................................ 56
Embassy security................................................. 57
National Guard role.............................................. 60
Clarification of the Authority to activate the National Guard.... 61
FBI-local law enforcement cooperation............................ 61
FBI planning and exercise efforts................................ 61
Top off exercise................................................. 62
Role of the National Guard in response to domestic terrorist
incidents...................................................... 62
Y2K impact....................................................... 63
Preparations for possible year 2000 (Y2K) terrorist activities... 64
Additional legislative authorities............................... 64
Encryption....................................................... 65
Special events management........................................ 66
Aviation support................................................. 68
First responder training......................................... 68
Additional committee questions................................... 69
Department of State.......................................... 69
Questions submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici.......... 69
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg....... 70
Department of Justice........................................ 71
Questions submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici.......... 71
First responder training............................. 71
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg....... 75
Fundraising in support of terrorism.................. 75
Questions submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy.......... 76
Interoperable communications between Federal, State,
and local emergency and law enforcement personnel.. 76
Counterterrorism..................................... 78

(iii)

COUNTERTERRORISM AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1999

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and
State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Gregg, Campbell, Gorton, Hollings,
Mikulski, and Leahy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF
STATE
Senator Gregg. We will get started. I know the Secretary of
State is on her way. Since a number of the members did want to
make opening statements, we will make the opening statements
and then by that time the Secretary will be here. She was at
the prayer breakfast and is wandering over.
I want to thank the Attorney General, the Director, and the
Secretary of State for being willing to participate in this
hearing, the purpose of which is the ongoing effort that this
subcommittee has made and the Congress has made to address the
issue of terrorism, and make sure that the manner in which we
are approaching the terrorism issue is a coordinated one, so
that we have a plan as to what we are going to do relative to
the three elements that I think are essential. One is the
international issue of intelligence. Second is the threat to
American facilities both abroad and in the United States. And
third is the question of coordination with the local
communities and State agencies that are going to be responsible
should an incident occur.
We have, I believe, as a Nation made great progress on all
three of these accounts as a result of the hard work of the
people who are at the table today, but there is still a long
way to go. We are on a learning curve, and we are still in the
growth stages. We began as newborns and we are maybe
adolescents now. We are certainly not mature in our ability to
address terrorism, but progress has been made and it has been
considerable.
Certainly, the Attorney General's 5-year interagency
counterterrorism plan, which was put together after a great
deal of thought and effort, is, I think, a superb blueprint of
how we should be approaching the issue of terrorism. The State
Department's review process, which was done after the bombings
in Africa, is also an excellent proposal that we can use as an
outline as to how we try to bring our facilities overseas up to
speed to address the concerns which we are confronting.
The issue, however, comes back to one of coordination
within the different agencies and that is why I want to hold
this hearing today. I have to state right at the outset that I
was extremely discouraged--that is a conservative word, being a
conservative--relative to the President's press conference that
he held on terrorism. It appeared to me to be a press
conference which had been written out on the back of an
envelope.
The proposals put forward in that press conference, first,
they did not exist as far as I could tell, or as far as this
committee can determine, and second, the funding directed
toward them was arbitrary and really not relevant to addressing
the game plan which has been laid out by organizations like the
Attorney General's interagency task force efforts. It appeared
to be a press conference for the purposes of promoting a press
conference rather than an event directed at actually addressing
the issue of terrorism.
Now, I recognize that in this business, we all hold
political press conferences and we do that fairly regularly
and, sometimes, we do not expect much to come of them, but I do
think the issue of terrorism is a little different. I do not
think it should be trifled with. I think that we, as a
government, have an extraordinary obligation. This represents a
real threat to America and it should not be used for the
purposes of promoting political events. Anything that we do in
this area should be substantive, and unfortunately, that press
conference was not.
Secondly, I have a very serious concern about the budget
that was sent up, especially relative to the State Department.
Under the advisory committee review, the review committee, they
suggested that we would have to spend about $1 billion a year,
more than $1 billion a year, to get the State Department's
physical facilities in a position to where we could avoid the
type of situation that occurred in Africa.
Regrettably, the President's budget does not have anywhere
near that number in it. It has $300 million for the coming year
in this account. I do not know where the State Department is
going to be asked to get the additional $700 million to meet
the obligations of the plan which was put forward. I know this
was not State's request. I know this was done by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB).
But it still puts this committee, and I suspect that is why
it was done, in a very serious situation, because for us to
meet the obligations of protecting our people abroad, which
this White House has said it was going to do, we are going to
have to come up with the money even though the White House is
not willing to come up with the money. That is, to me, again,
playing games with the issue of terrorism for political
purposes, and it is wrong.
So I will hope to get some thoughts from the witnesses
today on those two thematic concerns that I have. But the
primary concern that I want to talk about today is this issue
of coordination and making sure we are making progress on this
at all levels.
Now I yield to the Senator from South Carolina, who has
been such a force in this area, a positive force.
Senator Hollings. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for your
leadership and attention to this problem and thank Attorney
General Reno and Judge Freeh and, of course, Secretary of State
Albright. Your approach is sound. It has got to be a
comprehensive approach.
I must note certain misgivings. I am not sanguine about the
ability of the Government to really get a proof positive
protection against terrorism. We looked at the Government
buildings and everything else of that kind. You cannot barrier
the buildings. If you did, they could go in as they did in the
World Trade Tower, so you cannot barrier all buildings.
More specifically, looking at the individual extremes,
Judge Freeh, you can see our friends in Israel. Terrorism
occurs over there about every week as long as you have got
suicidal agents, individuals who are willing to just go down
into a public square and blow themselves up with other people.
So you have got to look at this thing in a deliberate,
studied way. We have gone the Inman approach way and we got rid
of a lot of good, valuable property, built fortress America,
and it has not worked in the State Department. I will have lots
of time with Secretary Albright to go over that, but I can
identify the buildings and the properties lost and everything
else of that kind, the money wasted.
On the other hand, having served in the intelligence field,
I go back to the 1950s on the Hoover Commission, when we
investigated the CIA and the emphasis was on human
intelligence, and we knew what was going on in these countries.
I then relate back to the role on the Senate Intelligence
Committee when we had the Gulf War, and we went at it in Iraq
and Kuwait, and we did not have anybody in the CIA that could
brief us. We had to go over and get somebody from the
Department of Defense to tell us what was going on in Iraq.
We have gotten all the toys and the satellites and
everything else of that kind and we would spend $1 billion more
getting good human intelligence, finding out what is going on
or hiring the New York Times reporters to tell us what is going
on. You can mostly find out from them what is happening and
guard against certain attacks.
I want to express those views with you because, while we
have got the three, we need the fourth--the CIA itself--to
really do a better job, particularly in countries like in
Africa that they do not have any activity whatever and cannot
tell us what is going on.
So with that in mind, I do not think we are going to
appropriate $1 billion for a bunch of new buildings. We have
been there, done that. We have had the Inman report, which
started spending the billions. It did not work and there is no
absolute protection against this. We cannot just throw up our
hands and say, well, it cannot be done, and I commend you, Mr.
Chairman, on having the hearing, and let us hear from the
witnesses.
Senator Gregg. I did say that I would like to limit opening
statements, but I know that Senator Campbell had some points
that he wanted to make, and I will be happy to acknowledge him
now.
Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me
say how delighted I am to see our colleague from Maryland,
Senator Mikulski, back here looking very well and fit and
healthy. Even though all of her parts did not come back with
her, we are delighted to have her back here. [Laughter.]
Senator Mikulski. Some things are better left behind.
Senator Campbell. I suppose. [Laughter.]
I would like to submit a complete opening statement for the
record, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, and this article in
the Washington Times about something else I will speak just a
moment on. To Director Freeh and Attorney General Reno, thank
you for appearing this morning.
I brought some pictures that are very special to me because
they were taken at Vail, and I am sure that you are aware of
that terrible fire that transpired this last fall that was
targeted apparently by a group called the Earth Liberation
Front, which is, as near as I can tell, what would be called an
ecoterrorist group. The damage to this building was $12.5
million. Interesting enough, they tell me, just to purchase
logs out of the forest will cost more to replace this building
than if the terrorists had left it alone, so I do not see what
they gained by burning down a log building when we have to cut
more logs to replace it.
But one thing is for sure, when we talk about terrorism,
ever since 1972, with the killing of part of the Israeli
wrestling team at the Munich Olympic games, these high-profile
events, as Atlanta was in the last Olympic games, seem to be a
target for people that, although there might not be some
connection with other terrorist groups, the commonality is that
they are high profile.
The World Alpine Ski Championship, Mr. Chairman, is going
on now at Vail. They say 40 countries are involved. A hundred
million people will see that. So there is no question in my
mind that the people that are behind different kinds of
terrorism have the commonality that if they can get on TV
around the world, they can get their message out there. It
would seem to me that we need to be putting more attention
toward any kind of a high-profile event, whether it is a
sporting event or what.
We hosted the Summit of the Eight, as it was called, in
Denver last year, and I was pleased with the efforts that the
FBI and all the other agencies made because they did set up a
kind of a model to coordinate anticipated acts. We did not have
anything go wrong. It was just a wonderful event. It went very
smoothly. But I think that those kinds of models need to be
expanded on so that we anticipate, in, of course, all hopes
that nothing ever happens, but we anticipate the increased
kinds of terrorism that is focused on these high-profile
events.
The other thing that concerns me, too, Mr. Chairman, as we
move along on this and try to provide adequate funding for all
the agencies, including the FBI, is that there always seems to
be some kind of copycat activities after these high-profile
events. There is someone else that sees it happen and they
think, well, this is a good opportunity. We ought to do
something like it to strike for whatever they believe in, too.
I am pleased that the President is planning on devoting
more of the budget toward research and development of
counterterrorism measures and technology, and certainly, if we
increase our level of preparedness, even though everybody knows
that you cannot totally prevent terrorism, perhaps we can get
the message to those people that are inspired to do it that
they will not do it free, that there will be a day of reckoning
for them, and I thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator.

prepared statement

Senator Campbell. I also would direct your attention to
these before and after shots, if anybody in the committee is
interested in seeing what those terrorists did.
Senator Gregg. Quite startling.
[The statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to take the time to
thank our witnesses for appearing here today. I am looking
forward to hearing what they have to say about their efforts to
combat terrorism, both at home and abroad.
I am disturbed by the activities of wholly-domestic groups,
and how to combat their actions. For example, my state was
recently targeted by the Earth Liberation Front, and a series
of buildings in Vail were destroyed, causing $12 million in
damages. So far, we have not been able to apprehend those
responsible. This same group has also claimed responsibility
for a fire at U.S. Forest Industry Headquarters in Medford,
Oregon, and the arson that caused $1.9 million in damages at
two USDA federal animal research facilities near Olympia,
Washington.
Even more disturbing, three packages were delivered to
families in my state, with a warning that the contents were
contaminated with anthrax bacteria. Although analysis proved
that, in fact, the substance was harmless, the threat of
biological terrorism is real.
I was pleased to learn that the President is planning on
devoting more of the budget to research and development of new
counterterrorism measures and technology. With the continuing
tensions in the Middle East and Africa, we need to be prepared
for future attacks. The response to the embassy bombings in
Africa was exceptional, and we must continue to maintain this
level of preparedness. We must also be ready to deal with
terrorist threats at home, which are becoming alarmingly more
frequent. Although we are making great progress in bringing to
justice the perpetrators of the World Trade Center and Murrah
Federal Building bombings, we still must do more.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me the time to make
these remarks.

Senator Gregg. Did you have anything you wish to add,
Senator Mikulski?
Senator Mikulski. Yes, if I could be very brief, Mr.
Chairman. First of all, I would like to thank you and all my
colleagues for their wonderful good wishes on my speedy
recovery. I am happy to be back.
I would really like to compliment you on holding this
hearing on counterterrorism and the need for what are our
resources and what are the better ways to coordinate, and I
look forward to hearing from our Attorney General and our head
of the FBI. But, Mr. Chairman, I would like to recommend that
maybe this be a first in a series of hearings that the
Appropriations Committee has on counterterrorism for several
reasons.
Number one, in addition to what we are going to be focusing
on today with the State Department and the Justice Department,
there are other agencies that the President has talked about,
particularly biological and chemical. They are talking about
vaccine research, $43 million, and I do not want to see the
same fiasco as when we were stockpiling vaccines during the
health insurance debate. Public health surveillance, ten
National Guard units who were going to respond to an emergency.
I do not know if that is coordinated.
As the ranking on FEMA, on VA/HUD, I think the Chairman
knows that FEMA is within that agency and Senator Bond and I
have added more money for helping FEMA be able to respond. But
again, when we ask for coordination, we are going to have
training programs at the Fire Academy in Emmitsburg. That is
not a national response.
So I am concerned. We do not want to throw the money out
like pin the tail on the donkey and have no effective,
strategic, coordinated response to be able to do that. So,
really, I am concerned about threats abroad, threats within the
United States.
A good many of the State Department employees call Maryland
their American home, and it is my obligation to look out for
them or for all of our foreign operations, all of our State
Department people, regardless of their home State. Very often
when there is a tragedy, we say, a grateful nation will never
forget, but then we forget it in the budget. We forget it in
our coordination. And we forget to then operationalize our good
intentions. I think this is the year of do it now, to really
show that a grateful nation will not let it happen to other
wonderful, dedicated, valiant State Department employees.
Also, Mr. Chairman, Maryland has many Federal facilities
that are targets of terrorist threats. Some are national
security targets and others are targets of national honor, like
our Federal laboratories, where damage done to that, like an
NIH, would not affect our national security, but, yes, it
would, our biological research, and yet would affect our
national honor. So we need to really make sure that we have
what we need to do abroad as well as domestically.
So I look forward to working with you and thank you so
much. I agree, this should be not only bipartisan but
nonpartisan, and we should check our party hats at the door.
Thank you.
Senator Gregg. Thank you. I agree with your concerns,
Senator. In fact, this is actually our fourth hearing in the
sequence, but we are trying to coordinate with the other
appropriating subcommittees, and certainly Senator Stevens has
been very supportive of trying to make sure we coordinate with
Defense on this issue because of the major role that it has. So
I agree with you and the more we can do it, the better.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, I will talk to Senator Bond
about Federal Emergency Management.
Senator Gregg. Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. One, I
just am pleased to be on the subcommittee. I have been on the
Appropriations Committee for over 20 years now, but to be able
to join you and Senator Hollings, both of whom are good
friends, and in your case, a next-door neighbor. I am glad to
be here.
I have had counterterrorism discussions along the lines of
what we are talking about with Secretary Albright, Attorney
General Reno, and Director Freeh, as well as with others in the
audience like Dave Carpenter and Ann Harkins who are here. We
are such a powerful nation, that terrorism is a real danger. In
fact, history has never known a nation as powerful as ours. We
are at a point where we do not have to worry about armies
marching against us or navies sailing against us, air forces
coming against us.
What we have to worry about is a very small, well-trained,
well-equipped, well-financed, and determined terrorist group.
The determination may be political, ethnic, or religious. If
they have got the equipment, the money, the access, in a highly
technological society like ours, there is an enormous amount
terrorists can do. You saw it just in this area alone when we
lost electricity for a number of days from an ice storm, what
it did to us. Can you imagine if this became the routine thing,
if airports were shut down because of terrorist attacks and
switching gear and so on and so forth.
So I think this is an extremely important subject and I did
want to come here to compliment you and the ranking member for
having these hearings. I am scheduled for another hearing, so I
will leave, but I would ask permission that questions that I
might have of the witnesses could be included in the record.
Senator Gregg. Absolutely, and it is great to have you join
us. It means Northern New England will be well represented on
this committee, which I am sure will be positive for Northern
New England.
Senator Leahy. Thank you.
Senator Mikulski. Not Southern.
Senator Gregg. Well, there is a difference between Northern
and Southern New England.
Senator Campbell. We cannot move the FBI headquarters to
Vermont.
Senator Leahy. Do not even get us going on it, please.
Where Judd and I come from, we reported Massachusetts as a
Southern State, something that caused me to get a reprimand
from Strom Thurmond one day. [Laughter.]
Senator Gregg. A very different culture.

prepared statement of senator lautenberg

The subcommittee has received a statement from Senator
Lautenberg which will be inserted in the record at this point.
[The statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg

Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this hearing to
ensure that this Committee gives adequate attention and
necessary funding to counterterrorism programs.
The threat of terrorism is very real for Americans at home
and abroad. Secretary Albright, Attorney General Reno, FBI
Director Freeh, I commend you and the many people working
within your agencies who dedicate their efforts to protecting
the American people from the scourge of terrorism. While
success in preventing attacks may not always receive public
attention, our public servants should know that Congress and
the American people appreciate their dedication which lets us
all sleep better every night.
We must continue to strengthen our programs to counter
terrorist groups and prevent attacks whenever possible, and
respond rapidly to save lives and pursue the perpetrators when
attacks occur.
We must help our communities prepare for the challenges of
unconventional attacks as well as bombings like those at the
World Trade Center and in Oklahoma City.
We must reach out to other nations to develop a global
response to a global threat, and ensure that criminals cannot
feel safe anywhere. To make this happen, we must be firm in
dealing with nations which harbor terrorists. In particular, we
must strengthen international pressure on Libya to hand over
the Pan Am 103 suspects for trial.
We must also ensure that nations which sponsor terrorism
pay a price--including U.S. court judgements against Iran in
the Flatow and Cicippio cases. We need to hold individuals and
regimes responsible for their actions and ensure that whole
nations or religions are not inappropriately held accountable
for the misdeeds of the few.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with the
Administration and my colleagues to explore ways to strengthen
our counterterrorism programs.

Senator Gregg. We certainly appreciate and thank the
witnesses for their patience and we will begin, I guess, on the
order of seniority for succession to the Presidency. That is
probably the best way to go. So we will start with you,
Secretary Albright.
Secretary Albright. I am actually out of order. I was born
in a foreign country. [Laughter.]
Thank you very much, and I apologize for being late. I was
at the National Prayer Breakfast right in front and could not
leave early.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I welcome the
chance to testify along with my colleagues, Attorney General
Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh, regarding our efforts
to counter the threat that terror poses to our citizens and to
the world.
I want to begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and members
of the subcommittee, for the support that you have provided in
this effort and it is much appreciated. In my statement, I will
provide an overview of the international terrorist threat and
discuss our diplomatic policies and resource needs. The
Attorney General and the Director will bring you up to date on
the wide range of law enforcement initiatives.
We will each refer to the 5-year interagency
counterterrorism and technology plan. This plan was developed
in response to last year's appropriations law and serves as a
baseline strategy for coordinating our response to terrorism,
both at home and overseas.
Last August, I had the sad honor of bringing back to U.S.
soil the bodies of Americans who perished in the embassy
bombing in Kenya. Like the members of our armed forces who died
in foreign conflicts, these Americans went in harm's way for
our country, but there is a difference, for they were not
combatants in a war, as we have long understood that term. They
were casualties instead of a new kind of confrontation that
looms as the new century is about to begin.
In this struggle, our adversaries are likely to avoid
traditional battlefield situations, where American dominance is
well-established. They may resort instead to weapons of mass
destruction and the cowardly instruments of sabotage and hidden
bombs. We must be vigilant in protecting against the terrorist
triple threat posed first by countries that actively sponsor
terrorism; second, by long-active terrorist organizations; and
third, by loosely-affiliated extremists, such as, among others,
Osama bin Laden, who has urged his followers to kill Americans
when and wherever they can.
Our strategy must be long term. The 5-year plan is only the
beginning. Certainly, no single arrest or shut-down of a
terrorist operation will be sufficient. The advance of
technology has given us new means to counter terrorists, but it
has also enabled terrorists to develop more powerful weapons
and to travel, communicate, recruit, and raise funds on a
global basis.
Following the embassy attacks last August, President
Clinton ordered military strikes to disrupt terrorist
operations and deter new bombings. As this decision
demonstrated, we will not hesitate to use force when necessary
to respond to or defend against terrorist acts. But force is
only one element in our strategy. Every day in every part of
the world, we use the full array of our foreign policy tools to
wage a zero-tolerance campaign against international terror.
For example, we place the highest priority on measures to
prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong
hands. This imperative is on our agenda with virtually every
nation and figures in almost every major meeting that I have.
We constantly exchange information with friendly governments
concerning terrorist activities and movements, thereby
preventing attacks and facilitating arrests. We are expanding
our Antiterrorism Training Assistance so that other nations
will be better able to protect themselves and us. And, we are
making full use of the Terrorism Information Rewards program to
encourage those who know the truth about terrorist acts and
plans to come forward.
We are engaged in a vigorous research and development
effort to improve our ability to detect explosives, counter
weapons of mass destruction, protect against cybersabotage, and
provide physical security.
We impose economic sanctions against state sponsors of
terror, and around the world, we couple law enforcement with
diplomacy in order to bring suspected terrorists before the bar
of justice, and the Attorney General and Director Freeh will
provide more detail on these efforts, but let me stress two
points.
The first is that law enforcement success often depends
upon international cooperation, which in some recent cases has
been extraordinary.
Second, I believe every American should be proud of the
work of the FBI, the Justice Department, the CIA, and the State
Department's Diplomatic Security Service and what all of them
have been doing. When I was in Nairobi last August, I had a
chance to meet some of the FBI personnel who were literally
sifting the wreckage of the embassy for clues, and I was deeply
impressed by their dedication and by the progress made in
gaining custody of the suspects.
I am gratified, moreover, that the partnerships in the
field among the various agencies and our embassies are
excellent. Our people are working together well and doing a
great job for America.
The measures we take to physically protect our diplomatic
personnel also play a major role in our counterterrorism
strategy, and I know this is an area of great interest to the
subcommittee and certainly nothing is of more urgent concern to
me.
In the aftermath of the embassy bombings last August, I
established accountability review boards chaired by Admiral
William Crowe to investigate and recommend improved security
systems and procedures. The boards identified what they called
a collective failure by the Executive and Legislative Branches
of our Government ``to provide adequate resources to reduce the
vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions.''
The report suggested that responsibility for this failure
must be shared broadly, including by the Secretary of State,
and I have accepted that. The report recommends, and I concur,
that we provide sustained funding for enhanced security and new
construction reflecting the new range of terrorist threats.
The report also recommends, and again, I concur, that the
additional funds for security should not come at the expense of
other major foreign affairs programs. This is a key point, for
it would make no sense to enhance the security of our people
overseas while at the same time depriving them of the resources
they need to effectively represent American interests.
The State Department is determined to go forward with a
comprehensive multi-year program to upgrade security at all
posts. The President's fiscal year 2000 budget proposes the
minimum amount required to move ahead with such a program. In
an age of advanced technology and suicide bombers, no one can
guarantee perfect security, but our embassies represent
America. They should not be easy targets for anyone.
That is one reason why I recommended to the President that
he break precedent and appoint a career law enforcement
professional, David Carpenter, as our Assistant Secretary of
State for Diplomatic Security. Assistant Secretary Carpenter is
helping us to get the message out to all our posts that in
today's world, there is nothing automatic about security. It is
every person's responsibility. No detail should be overlooked,
no precaution shrugged off, no post considered safe, and no
assumptions made about when, where, how, or by whom a terrorist
strike might be perpetrated.
We all recognize that the price tag for needed measures to
improve security is and may remain at least for the foreseeable
future higher than the resources we have available for that
purpose, and we will continually have to make tough choices
about how best to use the resources we have and about how to
reconcile security imperatives with our need to do business
overseas.
In making these judgments, I am pleased to announce that we
will be aided by a new overseas President's advisory panel to
be chaired by Mr. Lewis Kaden. The panel will prepare
recommendations for criteria to be used in making decisions on
the size and composition of our overseas posts. It will also
design a proposed multi-year funding program for the Department
to restructure the U.S. presence abroad.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say a word about
coordination. This subcommittee has stressed the need for U.S.
agencies to work together in responding to the terrorist
threat, and you are absolutely right. I am in frequent contact
with my colleagues here at the table and with the Secretary of
Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
other key officials regarding the full range of antiterrorism
issues. I think we work together well and are getting better at
it every day.
One reason is that the President has made it clear through
both his policies and statements that this issue is the
Administration's highest priority internationally and
domestically, and that is true for a host of compelling
substantive reasons, but I suspect it is true for another
reason, as well.
Over the past 6 years, on too many occasions, the President
has had the job of comforting the loved ones of those murdered
and maimed by terrorists, and I know from my own experience, it
is an impossible task. After the last hand has been held and
the last words of condolence offered, all you can really do is
vow that everything within your power will be done to prevent
similar tragedies, and that is the vow of this Administration
this morning, and I suspect it is fully embraced by the members
of this subcommittee and by the American people.
Mr. Chairman, I have quoted New Hampshire's Daniel Webster
to you before and I do so again in closing my testimony this
morning. ``God grants liberty,'' said Webster, ``only to those
who love it and are always ready to guard and defend it.'' To
that, I say amen and thank you again for the opportunity to
testify.

prepared statement

Senator Gregg. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I appreciate you
noting that Daniel Webster was from New Hampshire and not
Massachusetts. He may have served in the Senate from
Massachusetts, but he made a mistake.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Madeleine K. Albright
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I
welcome this opportunity to testify concerning U.S. efforts to counter
the forces of international terror. As you know, the President has
designated the Department of State as the lead agency for coordination
of our counterterrorism policy and operations abroad, while the FBI is
the lead agency for countering terrorism in the United States.
So I am delighted to be here with my colleagues, Attorney General
Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh. Their presence reflects the
fact that the battle against terror requires effective coordination
within our own government and between our government and law-abiding
nations around the globe.
It also requires a partnership between the Executive and
Legislative branches of the United States. And here I want to commend
the Chairman and members of this Subcommittee. For no one has been more
aware of the dangers to our diplomatic personnel, more supportive of
our efforts to improve security, or more helpful in providing resources
to respond to the terrorist threat, than this panel.
I look forward to the opportunity today to build on our partnership
and to explore with you the many dimensions to our strategy. In my
statement, I will provide an overview of the international threat and
discuss our diplomatic actions, policies, plans, and resource needs.
The Attorney General and the Director will then bring you up to date on
the wide range of law enforcement, technology, crisis management and
other initiatives that are underway.
We will each discuss the Five-Year Interagency Counter-terrorism
and Technology Crime Plan. This Plan serves as a baseline strategy for
coordinating our response to terrorism in the United States and against
American targets overseas. The Subcommittee has received copies of the
Plan, which was crafted under the leadership of the Attorney General.
You also have the written statements we prepared for this morning. We
have agreed to keep our oral presentations brief in order to honor your
time for questions.
The Threat
I will begin by discussing the threat posed to the United States
and the world by the forces of international terror. If you look at the
statistics, you will see that the number of terrorist incidents
worldwide is declining. This reflects the diplomatic and law
enforcement progress we have made in discrediting terrorist groups and
making it harder for them to operate. It reflects, as well, the
improved political climate that has diminished terrorist activity in
places such as Northern Ireland and Central America.
But you would not be conducting this hearing, Mr. Chairman, if the
dangers posed by international terrorism had declined. Tragically, they
have not.
Last August, I had the sad honor of bringing back to U.S. soil the
bodies of Americans who perished in the embassy bombing in Kenya.
Like the members of our armed forces who died in foreign conflicts,
these Americans went in harm's way for our country. But there is a
difference--for they were not combatants in a war as we have long
understood that term. They were casualties, instead, of a new kind of
confrontation that looms as a new century is about to begin.
In this struggle, our adversaries are likely to avoid traditional
battlefield situations because there, American dominance is well
established. They may resort, instead, to weapons of mass destruction
and the cowardly instruments of sabotage and hidden bombs. As we know
from explosions over the past decade in Africa, the Khobar apartment
complex, the World Trade Center and Pan Am 103, these unconventional
threats endanger both Americans and others around the world.
Accordingly, we must be vigilant in protecting against the
terrorist triple threat posed, first, by the handful of countries that
actively sponsor terrorism; second, by long-active terrorist
organizations; and third, by loosely affiliated extremists such as,
among others, Osama bin Laden, who has urged his followers to kill
Americans when and wherever they can.
Our strategy must be long-term. The Five-Year Plan is only the
beginning. Certainly, no single arrest or shutdown of a terrorist
operation will be sufficient. The advance of technology has given us
new means to counter terrorists. But it has also enabled terrorists to
develop more powerful weapons and to travel, communicate, recruit, and
raise funds on a global basis.
It is essential, therefore, that we work closely with others. The
perpetrators of terror include persons from a wide variety of creeds,
cultures and countries. And their criminality has claimed victims
almost everywhere, from Jerusalem to Japan, Tanzania to Turkey, and
Oklahoma City to Sri Lanka.
To counter this plague, law-abiding peoples everywhere must close
ranks to detect, deter, prevent and punish terrorist acts. It is not
enough for Americans to be concerned only about attacks against
Americans. We must reach out to all those victimized or threatened by
terror. The victims of the attacks orchestrated in Africa by Osama bin
Laden, after all, were predominately African, including many
practitioners of Islam. Terrorism is a highly indiscriminate form of
violence. It must be opposed not simply as a matter of national
interest, but as a fundamental question of right and wrong.
Fighting Back
Following the embassy attacks last August, President Clinton
ordered military strikes to disrupt terrorist operations and deter new
bombings.
The message he conveyed is that, in this battle, we will not simply
sit back and wait. We will take the offensive. We will do all we can to
limit terrorist movements, block terrorist funds and prevent terrorist
acts.
As the President's decision demonstrated, we will not hesitate,
where necessary, to use force to respond to or defend against acts of
terrorism. But force is only one element in our strategy.
Every day, in every part of the world, we use a full array of
foreign policy tools in our zero tolerance campaign against
international terror.
For example, we place the highest priority on measures to prevent
weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands. This
imperative is on our agenda with virtually every nation and figures in
almost every major meeting I have.
We constantly exchange information with friendly governments
concerning terrorist activities and movements, thereby preventing
attacks and facilitating arrests.
We work with other agencies and other countries to strengthen
screening procedures and increase intelligence sharing on visa
applications.
We are expanding our Anti-terrorism Training Assistance Program,
which has already instructed more than 20,000 law enforcement officers
from more than 90 countries, in subjects such as airport security, bomb
detection, maritime security, VIP protection, hostage rescue and crisis
management.
We are engaged, through the State Department-chaired Technical
Support Working Group, in a vigorous research and development program
to improve our ability to detect explosives, counter weapons of mass
destruction, protect against cyber sabotage and provide physical
security. In the technological race with terror, we are determined to
gain and maintain a decisive strategic edge.
We are making use of the Terrorism Information Rewards program to
encourage persons to come forward with information to prevent acts of
terrorism and apprehend those who commit them.
We impose economic sanctions against state sponsors of terror.
Currently, the seven governments on this list are Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.
And both domestically and internationally, we are working to
strengthen the rule of law.
The Rule of Law
At home, we have changed our statutes to block the financial assets
of terrorist groups, prevent them from raising funds in the United
States, and allow us to bar foreigners who support such groups.
Around the world, we couple law enforcement with diplomacy in order
to bring suspected terrorists before the bar of justice. As the
Subcommittee knows, we have done this successfully in the World Trade
Center case, the CIA killings and to a very considerable extent, in the
Africa embassy bombings--which triggered a worldwide manhunt for bin
Laden and his associates in murder. The Attorney General and Director
Freeh will provide more detail on these efforts, but let me stress two
points.
The first is that law enforcement success often depends upon
international cooperation. That cooperation has been extraordinary in
some recent cases. We cannot discuss these in public, but I did want
the record of this hearing to reflect our deep appreciation for the
timely and lifesaving help we have received.
Second, I believe every American should be proud of the work the
FBI, the Justice Department, the CIA and the State Department's
Diplomatic Security Service--or DS--have been doing.
When I was in Nairobi last August, I had a chance to meet some of
the FBI personnel who were literally sifting the wreckage of the
Embassy for clues. I was deeply impressed by their dedication and I
have been even more deeply impressed by the progress made in gaining
custody of suspects. I am gratified, moreover, that the partnerships in
the field among the FBI, Department of Justice, DS and our embassies
and other agencies are excellent. Our people are working together
closely and well to investigate past crimes and prevent new ones. They
are doing a great job for America.
I cannot leave the subject of bringing terrorists to justice
without highlighting the tragic case of justice delayed with respect to
the bombing more than a decade ago of Pan Am flight 103. As Senators
know, we have challenged the Government of Libya to meet its pledge to
deliver the two suspects in that case for trial in the Netherlands
under Scottish law. This approach has been approved by the Security
Council and is supported by Arab and African regional organizations. It
is an approach that is reasonable and fair and that has been on the
table now for more than six months.
I would like to take this opportunity once again to urge Libya to
deliver the suspects for trial and thereby gain suspension of the U.N.
sanctions. If this does not occur by the time those sanctions come up
for Security Council review later this month, we will seek additional
measures against the Qaddaffi regime.
Our effort to strengthen the rule of law against terrorism is
global. At its heart is the message that every nation has a
responsibility to arrest or expel terrorists, shut down their finances
and deny them safe haven.
Attached to my testimony is a chart showing the extent to which
countries have ratified eleven international antiterrorism conventions.
Our goal is to obtain universal adherence to these treaties. Our
purpose is to weave a web of law, power, intelligence, and political
will that will entrap terrorists and deny them the mobility and
sustenance they need to operate.
As we stressed in the aftermath of the murders in Kenya and
Tanzania, terror is not a legitimate form of political expression and
it is certainly not a manifestation of religious faith. It is homicide,
plain and simple.
It is right for nations to bring terrorists to justice and those
who do so should be recognized and rewarded appropriately.
It is wrong to finance terrorist groups, whether or not specific
contributions are for terrorist purposes. It is cowardly to give
terrorist groups money in return for not being targeted. It is
irresponsible simply to look the other way when terrorists come within
one's jurisdiction. And it fools no one to pretend that terrorist
groups are something they are not.
Consider the words of Hezbollah's Sheik Hassan Nasrallah shortly
after the Wye accords were signed: ``I call on any Palestinian who has
a knife, a hand grenade, a gun, a machine gun or a small bomb to go out
during these few weeks and kill the Israelis and the Accord.'' He also
called for the assassination of Chairman Arafat.
Some say Hezbollah is not terrorist, because it has a political
agenda. But that is sophistry. As long as it advocates indiscriminate
violence and assassination, it is terrorist. The same is true of other
groups, such as Hamas, the PKK, and Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers.
For each, the decision to use terror was a choice it did not have
to make. Law-abiding nations must unite in helping them realize that
the choice they have made is wrong.
In this connection, I was very disappointed that Germany failed to
make good on the recent opportunity to prosecute Abdullah Ocalan,
leader of the terrorist PKK; and that Italy and Turkey were unable to
find an alternative way to ensure he was brought to justice. Instead of
determination, this opportunity was greeted with handwringing and
vacillation. Ocalan has left Italy and his current whereabouts are
unknown. We call upon any nation into whose jurisdiction Ocalan comes
to cooperate in ensuring that he stands trial for his alleged crimes.
Diplomatic Force Protection
The measures we take to provide physical protection for our
diplomatic personnel overseas play a major role in our strategy for
countering terror. I know this subject is a matter of great interest to
the Subcommittee. And certainly, nothing is of more urgent concern to
me.
In the aftermath of the embassy bombings last August, I established
Accountability Review Boards, chaired by Admiral William Crowe, to
investigate and recommend improved security systems and procedures. I
received their report last month and will be submitting a formal
response this spring.
As you probably know, Mr. Chairman, the Boards found that the
security systems and procedures followed by the two embassies involved
were in accord with State Department policy. In both cases, the
terrorists were prevented from penetrating the perimeter of the post.
In neither case, did U.S. employees or members of the military breach
their duty.
The Boards did, however, identify what they termed ``a collective
failure'' by the Executive and Legislative branches of our government
over the past decade ``to provide adequate resources to reduce the
vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions.''
The report suggests that responsibility for this failure must be
shared broadly, including by the Secretary of State; and I accept that.
It reminds us all that no matter how much we care, no matter how much
we do, we can always do more when the lives of our people are on the
line.
The report cites some of the steps we have taken, particularly
since August, to strengthen perimeter defense, increase security
personnel and speed necessary construction and repairs.
It notes, as well, Congressional approval of the security-related
supplemental appropriation late last year. We were, and are, very
grateful for your swift action on that measure. It has helped us to
resume, albeit in a makeshift way, our diplomatic activities in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam. And it is enabling us to upgrade physical security
levels worldwide through the hiring of additional diplomatic security
agents and support personnel.
The Accountability Review Boards concluded, however, and I agree,
that these measures must be viewed as just an initial deposit towards
what is required to provide for the security of our posts overseas.
According to the report, ``We must undertake a comprehensive and
long-term strategy . . . including sustained funding for enhanced
security measures, for long-term costs for increased security personnel
and for a capital building program based on an assessment of
requirements to meet the new range of global terrorist threats.''
The Boards stress, and again I concur, that ``additional funds for
security must be obtained without diverting funds from our major
foreign affairs programs.'' This is a key point. For it would make no
sense to enhance the security of our people overseas while, at the same
time, depriving them of the resources they need to effectively
represent American interests.
The State Department is determined to go forward with an extensive,
multi-year program for upgrading security at all our posts. The
President's budget for fiscal year 2000, released earlier this week,
proposes the minimum amount required to move ahead with such a program.
First, it includes $268 million to fund what we call the ``tail''
of the supplemental. This includes the recurring costs required by
additional personnel, and security improvements not addressed in
emergency supplemental approved last fall. We expect such costs to run
about $300 million annually in subsequent years.
We recognize the need to continue an aggressive program of locating
suitable sites and building secure facilities overseas. The President's
budget includes an additional $36 million for site acquisition and the
design of new facilities; augmenting fiscal year 1999 emergency funds
available for site, design and construction. It also proposes $3
billion in advance appropriations for new construction in the years
2001 through 2005.
I feel strongly that in order to have a viable security
construction program, we need a long-term commitment of resources. The
President's request proposes that this be done by advanced
appropriations. We have been able to work together on such arrangements
in the past and I hope very much that we will able to do so in this
case.
I wish to stress, Mr. Chairman, that our request for support is not
special pleading. American embassies include a broad range of U.S.
Government employees and their families. They host a constant flow of
U.S. citizens who turn to our people for help on everything from
business advice to travel tips to emergency medical aid. They are open
to foreign nationals who wish to come to our country as tourists or
students or for commercial reasons. And as the casualty list for the
Africa bombings illustrates so starkly, many of our embassy employees
are locally hired.
Under international law, the host country is responsible for
protecting diplomatic missions. We hold every nation to that standard,
and will assist, where we can, those who need and want help in
fulfilling that duty. In an age of advanced technology and suicide
bombers, no one can guarantee perfect security. But our embassies
represent America. They should not be easy targets for anyone. We owe
our people and all who use or visit our facilities the best security
possible.
As I noted at the time I received Admiral Crowe's report, the
Department is already implementing, or studying the best way to
implement, a significant number of its recommendations.
I cannot detail in public everything that we are doing, often in
partnership with others, to prevent and prepare for potential terrorist
strikes.
I am able to say, however, that we will continue to implement
additional physical protection measures as rapidly as we can.
We are improving our programs for dealing with vehicle-bomb
attacks, such as those experienced in Africa.
We see the need for additional crisis management training and have
begun such a project at the Foreign Service Institute.
We are engaged, with other agencies, in a review of equipment and
procedural needs related to the possibility of a terrorist incident
involving the use of chemical or biological weapons.
We are striving to improve our emergency response capabilities. As
the Crowe report indicates, and our Five-Year Plan reflects, we need a
modern plane to replace the specially-configured aircraft used to
deploy the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) that we dispatch
overseas when there is a major terrorist incident. The current aircraft
is 36 years old and was delayed while en route to Nairobi last August
by the need to make repairs. This is not acceptable. The Department is
currently engaged with the National Security Council and the Defense
Department in discussions on the best way to replace the old aircraft
and the Administration intends to resolve the matter as soon as
possible.
Security and Diplomacy
Finally, we agree fully with the Accountability Review Boards on
the need to demonstrate the high priority we attach to security issues.
This is one reason why I recommended to the President that he depart
from past practice and appoint an outstanding career law enforcement
professional, David Carpenter, as our Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security.
Assistant Secretary Carpenter is helping us to get out the message
to all our posts that, in today's world, there is nothing automatic
about security. It is every person's responsibility. No detail should
be overlooked. No precaution should be shrugged off. No post should be
considered safe. No assumptions should be made about when, where, why,
how, or by whom, a terrorist strike might be perpetrated. Literally
nothing should be taken for granted.
We all recognize that the price tag for needed measures to improve
security is and may remain, at least for the foreseeable future, higher
than the resources we have available for that purpose. The result is
that we will continually have to make difficult and inherently
subjective decisions about how best to use the resources we have, and
about how to reconcile security imperatives with our need to do
business overseas.
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel
In making these judgments, I am pleased to announce that we will be
aided by a new Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, to be chaired by Mr.
Lewis Kaden. The Panel is charged with preparing recommendations for
criteria to be used in making decisions on the size and composition of
our overseas posts. It will also design a proposed multi-year funding
program for the Department to restructure the U.S. presence abroad.
In its deliberations, the Advisory Group will take into account the
heightened security situation, advances in technology, the
transformation of the world's political lineup, and the emergence of
new foreign policy priorities. The Panel is being asked to complete its
work by the end of this fiscal year.
Conclusion
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say a word about coordination. This
Subcommittee has stressed the need for U.S. agencies to work together
in responding to the terrorist threat, and you are absolutely right.
The Five-Year Plan will help. So has the President's designation of a
National Coordinator for Infrastructure Protection and
Counterterrorism. And I have the highest confidence in the State
Department's own new coordinator for counterterrorism, Lieutenant
Colonel (ret.) Mike Sheehan.
Personally, I am in frequent contact with my colleagues here at the
table, Attorney General Reno and FBI Director Freeh, and with the
Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and other
key officials regarding the full range of anti-terrorism issues. I
think we work together well and are getting better at it every day.
One reason is that the President has made it clear through both his
policies and statements that this issue is the Administration's highest
priority--internationally and domestically. That is true for a host of
compelling substantive reasons. But I suspect it is true for another
reason as well.
Over the past six years, on too many occasions, the President has
had the job of comforting the loved ones of those murdered and maimed
by terrorists. I know from my own experience--it is an impossible task.
After the last hand has been held, and the last words of condolence
offered, all you can really do is vow that everything within your power
will be done to prevent similar tragedies.
That is the vow of this Administration this morning. And I suspect
it is fully embraced by the members of this Subcommittee and by the
American people.
Mr. Chairman, I have quoted New Hampshire's Daniel Webster to you
before. I do so again in closing my testimony this morning. ``God
grants liberty,'' said Webster, ``only to those who love it, and are
always ready to guard and defend it.''
To that, I say ``Amen,'' and thank you again for the opportunity to
testify before you today.

,L2,i1,s20,10,10,10,10,10,10)0,10)0,10)0,10)0,10)0,10)0
PARTIES TO TERRORISM CONVENTIONS
[Based on ``Treaties in Force'' except where indicated. No information on reservations is included.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1988
Protocol 1971
1988 for the 1988 Protocol Montreal 1963 Tokyo
1991 Convention Suppression for the 1973 Convention Convention Convention
1998 Convention for the of Unlawful Supression of 1979 1979 on the for the 1970 Hague on
Convention for the Suppression Acts Unlawful Acts Convention Convention Prevention and Supression Convention Offenses
for the Marking of of Unlawful Against the of Violence Against on the Punishment of of for the and
Suppression Plastic Acts Safety of at Airports the Taking Physical Crimes Against Unlawful Unlawful Certain
of Terrorist Explosives Against the Fixed Serving of Protection Internationally Acts Seizure of Other Acts
Bombings \1\ for the Safety of Platforms International Hostages of Nuclear Protected Against Aircraft Committed
Purposes of Maritime Located on Civil Materials Persons the Safety on Board
Detection \2\ Navigation the Aviation of Civil Aircraft
Continental Aviation
Shelf
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan.................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Albania...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... \3\ Y \3\ Y Y
Algeria...................................... ............ Y \3\ Y ........... Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Andorra...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Angola....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... \3\ Y \3\ Y ..........
Antigua & Barbuda............................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Argentina.................................... ............ ............. Y ........... Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Armenia...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... Y Y .......... .......... ..........
Australia.................................... ............ ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Austria...................................... ............ ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Azerbaijan................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Bahamas...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Bahrain...................................... ............ Y ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Bangladesh................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Barbados..................................... ............ ............. Y Y ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Belarus...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Belgium...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... Y ............... Y Y Y
Belize....................................... ............ ............. \3\ Y ........... \3\ Y .......... .......... Y .......... \3\ Y ..........
Benin........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... Y ..........
Bhutan....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Bolivia...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Bosnia-Herzegovina........................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y .......... Y Y Y \3\ Y
Botswana..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Brazil....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... Y ............... Y Y Y
Brunei....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Bulgaria..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Burkina Faso................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Burma........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y \3\ Y
Burundi...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y .......... .......... Y
Cambodia..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y ..........
Cameroon..................................... ............ Y ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Canada....................................... ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cape Verde................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Central African Republic..................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Chad......................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Chile........................................ ............ ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
China........................................ ............ ............. Y Y ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Colombia..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Comoros...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Congo (Brazzaville).......................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... Y Y
Congo (Zaire)................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Costa Rica................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Cote D'Ivoire................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Croatia...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... Y Y Y Y Y
Cuba......................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Cyprus....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Czech Republic............................... ............ Y ........... ........... Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Denmark...................................... ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Djibouti..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Dominica..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Dominican Republic........................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Ecuador...................................... ............ Y ........... ........... ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Egypt........................................ ............ Y Y Y ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
El Salvador.................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Equatorial Guinea............................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Eritrea...................................... ............ Y ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Estonia...................................... ............ Y ........... ........... Y .......... Y Y Y Y Y
Ethiopia..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
EURATOM...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... Y ............... .......... .......... ..........
Fiji......................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Finland...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... \3\ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
France....................................... ............ Y Y Y Y .......... Y ............... Y Y Y
FYROM........................................ ............ Y ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... Y ............... Y .......... ..........
Gabon........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Gambia....................................... ............ ............. Y ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Georgia...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y ..........
Germany...................................... ............ ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ghana........................................ ............ Y ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Greece....................................... ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grenada...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Guatemala.................................... ............ Y ........... ........... Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Guinea....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y \3\ Y
Guinea-Bissau................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y ..........
Guyana....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Haiti........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Honduras..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Hungary...................................... ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Iceland...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y .......... Y Y Y Y
India........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... \3\ Y Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Indonesia.................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. v Y ............... Y Y Y
Iran......................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Iraq......................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Ireland...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... Y ............... Y Y Y
Israel....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Italy........................................ ............ ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Jamaica...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Japan........................................ ............ Y ........... ........... ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Jordan....................................... ............ Y ........... ........... Y Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Kazakhstan................................... ............ Y \3\ Y \3\ Y \3\ Y Y .......... Y \3\ Y \3\ Y \3\ Y
Kenya........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Kiribati..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y .......... .......... ..........
Korea (DPRK)................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Korea (ROK).................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Kuwait....................................... ............ Y ........... ........... Y Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Kyrgyzstan................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Laos......................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Latvia....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y .......... .......... ..........
Lebanon...................................... ............ Y Y Y \3\ Y .......... \3\ Y \3\ Y Y Y Y
Lesotho...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Liberia...................................... ............ ............. Y Y ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y ..........
Libya........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Liechtenstein................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y Y Y .......... .......... ..........
Lithuania.................................... ............ Y ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... Y ............... Y Y \3\ Y
Luxembourg................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y Y ............... Y Y Y
Madagascar................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Malawi....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Malaysia..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Maldives..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Mali......................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Malta........................................ ............ Y ........... ........... Y .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... Y
Marshall Islands............................. ............ ............. Y Y Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Mauritania................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Mauritius.................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Mexico....................................... ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Micronesia................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Moldova...................................... ............ Y ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... \3\ Y \3\ Y ..........
Monaco....................................... ............ Y ........... ........... Y .......... Y ............... Y Y Y
Mongolia..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Morocco...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Mozambique................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Namibia...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Nauru........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Nepal........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Netherlands.................................. ............ Y Y Y \3\ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
New Zealand.................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Nicaragua.................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Niger........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Nigeria...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Norway....................................... ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Oman......................................... ............ ............. Y Y Y Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Pakistan..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Palau........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y \3\ Y
Panama....................................... ............ Y ........... ........... Y Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Papua New Guinea............................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Paraguay..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... Y Y Y Y Y
Peru......................................... ............ Y ........... ........... Y .......... Y Y Y Y Y
Philippines.................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Poland....................................... ............ ............. Y Y ............. .......... Y Y Y Y Y
Portugal..................................... ............ ............. \3\ Y \3\ Y ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Qatar........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Romania...................................... ............ Y Y Y ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Russian Federation........................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rwanda....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Saint Kitts & Nevis.......................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Saint Lucia.................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
St. Vincent & Grenadines..................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... Y
San Marino................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Sao Tome & Principe.......................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Saudi Arabia................................. ............ Y ........... ........... Y Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Senegal...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. \3\ Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Serbia-Montenegro............................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Seychelles................................... ............ ............. Y Y ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Sierra Leone................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Singapore.................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Slovak Republic.............................. ............ Y ........... ........... \3\ Y Y Y Y Y Y \3\ Y
Slovenia..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Solomon Islands.............................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y .......... Y
Somalia...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
South Africa................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Spain........................................ ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sri Lanka.................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Sudan........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... Y Y Y ..........
Suriname..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Swaziland.................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Sweden....................................... ............ ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Switzerland.................................. ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Syria........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Tajikistan................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... Y ............... Y Y \3\ Y
Tanzania..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Thailand..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... \3\ Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Togo......................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Tonga........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y ..........
Trinidad & Tobago............................ ............ ............. Y Y ............. Y .......... Y Y Y Y
Tunisia...................................... ............ Y \3\ Y \3\ Y Y .......... Y Y Y Y Y
Turkey....................................... ............ Y \3\ Y \3\ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Turkmenistan................................. ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Tuvalu....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... .......... .......... ..........
Uganda....................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Ukraine...................................... ............ ............. Y Y ............. Y Y Y Y Y Y
(USSR)................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. (Y) (Y) (Y) (Y) (Y) (Y)
United Arab Emirates......................... ............ Y ........... ........... Y .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
United Kingdom............................... ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
United States of America..................... ............ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Uruguay...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Uzbekistan................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... Y Y Y Y \3\ Y \3\ Y \3\ Y
Vanuatu...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Venezuela.................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. Y .......... ............... Y Y Y
Vietnam...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Western Samoa................................ ............ Y ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y ..........
Yemen........................................ ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
(Yugoslavia)............................. ............ ............. ........... ........... (Y) (Y) (Y) (Y) (Y) (Y) (Y)
(Zaire)...................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... Y Y Y Y
Zambia....................................... ............ Y ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
Zimbabwe..................................... ............ ............. ........... ........... ............. .......... .......... ............... Y Y Y
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Not from TIF, information obtained from other sources.
\2\ Convention not listed in TIF; list of parties is from ICAO.
\3\ Convention not listed in TIF.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Office of the Attorney General

STATEMENT OF HON. JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL

attorney general reno's opening statement

Senator Gregg. Madam Attorney General.
Attorney General Reno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just so
very much appreciate your leadership over these years. You have
been consistent, you have been nonpartisan, you have cared so
deeply, and your suggestions have been so very helpful to us,
and your prodding helps, too.
The other members of the committee, Senator Hollings,
Senator Campbell, thank you very, very much. You have both
always been here and it has been so important.
Senator Mikulski, I am so glad you are back. Welcome, and
thank you so much for all that you have done on this issue and
the eloquence with which you speak about the human equation of
it all.
As Secretary Albright has said, there is a threat and it is
real. We have seen it here and around the world. It has taken
different forms. Conventional weapons are the ones we have seen
most, but we have clear, clear alert that weapons of mass
destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear
weapons, are there and are being considered for use. Director
Freeh will talk more about the threat, but I would like to talk
with you about what we are doing to plan and prepare and deal
with the very specific issues that I know concern you.
As you have pointed out, and you deserve much of the credit
for this, we have submitted a 5-year interagency
counterterrorism and technology plan. That was as a result of
this subcommittee's leadership and we appreciate that very
much. It is very good to have the subcommittee and a conference
report behind us as we try to develop this coordination.

agency cooperation and preparedness

The President has designated the Department of Justice,
through the FBI, as the lead agency for domestic terrorism. My
whole approach with that responsibility is to try to build a
partnership, first, between the Federal agencies, and one of
the first agencies that we dealt with long ago was the State
Department. I appreciate the Secretary's words and I concur
with her that there has been an excellent working relationship
as we have learned from each other, as we have met to discuss
these issues, and as she and her Department have been so
thoughtful in terms of trying to plan for assignment of legats
around the world. As Director Freeh, I think, will point out to
you, the fact that there were legats relatively nearby on the
continent able to go to the site of the bombing in East Africa,
that made a significant difference.
Our first goal amongst the Federal agencies has got to be
to do everything we can to prevent terrorism. The resources you
have given us since 1995 have given us personnel to help do
that. The work that Director Freeh has done in dealing with the
Central Intelligence Agency has been excellent, and the working
relationship that has existed and been developed between the
FBI and the intelligence community, I think, has been vital in
terms of preventing terrorist attacks.
But, Senator, you are absolutely right. We are not going to
be able to prevent them all. There is no way we can do that,
and we have got to be prepared. And to that end, finding that
we had such good fortune with the Department of State, we
started meeting on a regular basis with Deputy Secretary Hamre
of the Department of Defense to talk about how we could work
together--consistent with the laws of this land, Posse
Comitatus, various provisions relating to the declaration of
emergency--to make sure that we used resources the right way,
consistent with the laws, to see that we were prepared in terms
of an attack even with conventional weapons as well as weapons
of mass destruction.
One of the key areas, however, as many people spoke to me
about the problem was the fact that we were perhaps not as
prepared with respect to biological terrorism. The President,
so deeply concerned about this effort, called together a group.
I was there and it was a group of experts who had had
experience in the issue of biological terrorism. It was one of
the most informative times that I have had in Washington on
this issue and the President directed that we address the issue
of resources.
At that point, I met with Secretary Shalala to make sure
that she knew I would back her in every way. We developed a
process whereby the Department of Health and Human Service
representatives would meet with the FBI so that they learned to
work together. It is fine to have a detective out here, but if
he does not know anything about the biological aspects of it,
he needs a science detective on the other side, and we are
building that partnership.
It is slow. Sometimes, I do not think we have reached our
teenage years, as you point out, Mr. Chairman, and other times,
I think we are maybe 30 or 40. Sometimes we backslide a little
bit. But the process is in place and it is working, I think,
well.
If a terrorist incident happens, the first responsibility
is to save lives. FEMA has done a magnificent job around the
country in instances of natural disaster, and it has developed
a sound Federal response plan that can serve as a guide for us
as to what we must do when there are instances of terrorism
that bring together all of the agencies.
Under PDD 39 and its successor, PDD 62, the FBI is the lead
agency for crisis management. FEMA is the lead agency for
consequence management. Some people ask, when do you shift from
one to the other? When the crisis is over, it is my
determination as to when to shift responsibility to FEMA for
the consequence management. But whatever the case, whether we
are still in crisis or it is a matter of consequence
management, saving lives is the number one issue.

infrastructure protection against terrorism

What I began to hear from so many people is, what are the
best tools? What is the best equipment? Are we being trained
the right way? Is everybody being trained, or is it just
happening in the big cities?
I will address that point in a moment, but I want to go on
and point out that another important player in this partnership
has got to be the private sector. As we deal with complicated
issues such as infrastructure protection, as we face the threat
of cyberterrorism, it becomes absolutely critical in order to
protect our infrastructure that we work in partnership with the
private sector.
After we save lives, after we care for the wounded, our
next responsibility is to make sure that these people are
brought to justice. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your
comments about the FBI. I second them, but I also say that
there was an excellent working relationship with the State
Department and we appreciated that very much in connection with
East Africa.
Some people despair and say, you are not going to be able
to bring them to justice. You can charge them, but you cannot
catch them. We will not stop until we catch them, and the
record of this Government in bringing people to justice, I
think, reflects that.

terrorism budget strategy

Mr. Chairman, you asked about the budget process. The
terrorism strategy that we developed and submitted to you did
not address the budget issues because we are, frankly, growing.
We are developing that capacity and I raised the issue with OMB
to make sure that we were going to address it. I expect that we
will be able to submit a cross-cutting budget to you, an
addendum, by March 1 that reflects, it would be my
anticipation, a thoughtful start at how we coordinate budget
efforts in this connection across the Government to make sure
that we do not fragment our dollars, that we do not waste our
dollars, and that we do not duplicate our dollars.
I frankly think, and I have spoken to you about it before,
but I think it is one of the real challenges that we face,
whether it be in law enforcement or fighting terrorism, that we
have a responsibility to make sure we spend our dollars as
wisely as possible. People like to sell us things, and instead
of a military-industrial complex, I think we are going to have
to think about a law enforcement-industrial complex. And how we
buy the right equipment without wasting it, Senator, without
stockpiling it for no purpose at all. How we buy the right
equipment, the right technology, and most of all, how we keep
it from becoming totally obsolete one year after another. I
look forward to working with you in that effort. Your
leadership in this regard has been extremely helpful.

federal partnership with state and local law enforcement

The second partnership that it is imperative that we work
on, improve is--and I want to say to you, as I said earlier
before the hearing began, I think Director Freeh has done a
wonderful job of building partnerships with State and local law
enforcement. I think it is imperative that we look to State and
local first responders, fire, emergency personnel, hospital
personnel, those who have expertise in biological terrorism. It
is going to be imperative that we have a two-way street between
State and locals and the Federal Government as we deal with
issues of terrorism because they are on the scene first.
That is going to require an exchange of information, and
one of the issues that we are addressing is how do we exchange
classified information with the State and locals. We are
exploring accelerated security clearances that will permit that
and other means of getting information to them as fast as
possible that will help prevent terrorist attacks within their
communities. I can give you some examples. If we have
intelligence about a particular individual, we want to make
sure that we protect sources and methods, but we can define the
situation so that the information gets out without endangering
or putting the sources and methods at risk. I think we have got
more to do on that issue, but I think that is one that we are
well on our way to solving.
I think it is important that we have a two-way street,
whether it be in the City of New York or a State like New
Hampshire, so that the representative of the FBI knows who is
who. They know who to call and the local officials know who to
call; there is an exchange of information; there is an
identification of key assets and key events that might be the
subject of a terrorist attack so that we can take appropriate
precautions.
But we are not going to be able to prevent it all, and we
have got to prepare for what might happen if a chemical or
biological weapon was used as a terrorist weapon in this
country.
It is important, we have heard again and again, to have one
Federal point of contact to go to for training, for equipping,
for exercising to see how the whole process works. This past
August, the Justice Department's Office of Justice Programs
called together stakeholders both from the Federal agencies and
from State and local first responders to hear from them what
was needed, and that is the hallmark of what we are trying to
do. Do not tell people what to do. Consult with them and see
from those who are on the front lines what they need to do the
job.
Again and again, they said, we need one point of contact.
The FBI was the lead agency, but I went to FEMA, I went to the
Department of Defense, I went to Secretary Shalala, and I said,
how do you want to structure this? The consensus was that the
FBI should be the lead agency, but there was also a clear
consensus that the Office of Justice Programs had long
experience in working with State and local officials and knew
how to distribute monies in a wise way that would avoid
entanglements along the way. We formed an idea in which the
Office of Justice Programs would work with the FBI in the
distribution of grants and in the distribution of training
programs that would be planned, meet the needs, and meet
certain standards.
As a consequence, we have proposed the National Domestic
Preparedness Office within the FBI to work with the Office of
Justice Programs to achieve this effort. There will, at the
same time be weapons of mass destruction coordinators within
every FBI field office with the goal, I hope, of developing a
relationship with State and local officials throughout the
States, with State emergency officials at the State capital,
and with the mayor of the smallest town to ensure that no part
of America is left unattended as we plan for how we respond to
domestic terrorism.
To do that, I think it is going to require States to
develop comprehensive plans in conjunction with the FBI and OJP
so that we make sure that the entire State receives the support
in equipping and training its personnel. I think it is
important that we make sure that the equipment is appropriate
for the circumstances and that we do not turn around in 10
years and find that somebody has put a fancy piece of equipment
on the shelf that was obsolete from the day it was purchased. I
think all of these issues can be addressed in a comprehensive
way.

threat of cyber attack

One issue that has been a major concern to me, and I do not
think that this country yet is grasping the nature of it, is
the threat of a cyber attack. Just now, in this past year, we
have been able to see instances in which 17- and 18-year-old
hackers can intrude into sensitive computers across this
country. If they can do that, our cyber system, our cyber
infrastructure is at risk, and we must develop the capacity to
deal with it with personnel and technology that can match the
wits of the smartest criminals and the smartest terrorists.
Director Freeh has established the National Infrastructure
Protection Center, which has formed a partnership with other
Federal agencies. The Department of Defense has particularly
commented to me on how helpful this structure has been, but it
is going to require that we reach out to State and locals, and
to the private sector as we come to grips with the fact that
our cyber infrastructure creates an interconnectivity between
the public and private sector that presents new and
unparalleled challenges for law enforcement. Our budget this
year will address that issue of the cyber threat, and I look
forward to working with you in that regard.
You have spoken often about how we develop the research
capabilities that are necessary to match wits with the bad
guys. I have had an opportunity to visit at one of the national
laboratories and we are trying to expand our efforts. The
Bureau, with its very distinguished director of the FBI lab,
Dr. Kerr, has done some great work in trying to reach out to
make sure that we have the advantage of the best thinking on
this issue and we are going to continue that effort.
This is an extremely complex subject, but there is none
more important to this Nation. I am not satisfied, because I
sometimes think we move too slowly. But I think, considering
all the agencies involved, we have made, as you point out, real
progress in addressing our ability to prevent, to prepare, to
save lives, and to bring people to justice. That is what it is
all about and we are going to continue to try our level best.
I look forward, Senator Mikulski, to other hearings. They
oftentimes serve as very good prods, and Mr. Chairman, I look
forward to working with you and the entire subcommittee in
doing everything we can to make the terrorism strategy a
reality, to do everything we can to prevent these things from
happening in the first place.

prepared statement

Senator Gregg. Thank you very much, Attorney General. We
appreciate those comments. You raised a lot of issues that we
want to get into.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janet Reno
introduction
I am pleased to appear before you today to continue the dialogue
between the Department of Justice and the Committee on our efforts to
combat terrorism. At the outset, I would like to thank the Chairman for
his leadership and express my appreciation to the Subcommittee for your
interest and support in counter-terrorism matters.
Since my testimony last March, we have made progress on developing
strategies to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist acts. We have
enhanced our process of interagency cooperation and consultation with
state and local authorities to prepare for, respond to, and investigate
terrorist incidents in the U.S. and abroad. I would like to highlight
for you what we have accomplished on these fronts in the last year.
As you know, under Presidential Decisional Directives (PDD's) 39
and 62, roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in counter-
terrorism activities have been clarified. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for responding to acts of
domestic terrorism. The FBI continues to work to identify, prevent,
deter, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur. We will not
always be able to prevent every incident and we will have to respond to
terrorist incidents here and abroad. In these instances the FBI will
lead the federal response to a domestic terrorist incident through the
coordinated crisis response mechanism of its Counter-Terrorism Section.
In addition, the FBI works with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) as the lead agency for consequence management. Building on this
framework the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in the
FBI is now a reality and is working to detect and respond to cyber-
based attacks on our critical infrastructures.
Under its role as the designated lead agency for domestic
terrorism, the FBI and the Department are taking positive steps to
ensure state and local communities are prepared in the event of a
terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We
convened a stakeholders conference last August to get input and
expertise from our federal agency partners in this effort, the
Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services
(HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and FEMA, as well as
from the state and local first responder communities.
Through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program first responders are
receiving valuable training and communities are being provided
protective, detection, and communications equipment.
We have proposed the establishment of the Office of State and Local
Domestic Preparedness Support (OSDLPS) within the Office of Justice
Programs (OJP) to coordinate the delivery of training, equipment and
technical assistance to state and local first responders.
We have also proposed the establishment of the National Domestic
Preparedness Office (NDPO) to be led by the FBI in partnership with OJP
to provide a national-level coordinating office and single point of
contact for the state and local responder community to access federal
domestic preparedness programs, including those under the Department of
Justice and other federal agencies.
In order to provide a coordinated capacity to respond to terrorist
incidents, the FBI has created--through funding provided by this
Committee--the Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC). The SIOC
is staffed 24 hours a day as a command post to direct special
operations and to respond to terrorist incidents.
Working in coordination with state and local law enforcement the
FBI has established 18 Joint Terrorism Task Forces operating in major
cities. These task forces serve to enhance coordination and cooperation
among federal, state and local law enforcement. Over 200 members of
state and local law enforcement participate on these task forces with
the FBI and other representatives from federal law enforcement to
investigate terrorism incidents.
With the support of and at the direction of this Committee, we
worked with other agencies to prepare the Administration's Five-Year
Counter Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan (Five-Year Plan) which was
submitted on December 30, 1998. The Five-Year Plan serves as a baseline
strategy for coordination of a national policy and capabilities to
combat terrorism in the United States and against American interests
abroad. As this Committee directed, the Five-Year Plan was developed in
partnership with other federal agencies, and with the input of academia
and state and local law enforcement. The resources required by the
actions set forth in this Plan will be presented in a separate Budget
Addendum. I consider this Plan a living document and I am committed to
working with you and your staff to update this Plan on a regular basis
and to address issues as they arise either in the context of our
strategy or individual incidents.
Secretary Albright will discuss the issue of international
terrorism in greater detail. As you know, PDD 39 provides that the
State Department is the lead agency for coordinating the U.S. response
to acts of international terrorism like the bombings in East Africa.
The FBI works with the State Department and other agencies to provide
support and crisis management assistance through the FBI's
International Terrorism Section. This coordination was evident in the
aftermath of the bombings in East Africa last August when the FBI and
the State Department worked together to rapidly deploy personnel to the
scene and collaborate with local law enforcement officials to identify
those responsible and begin the process of bringing them to justice.
Immediately upon notification of the bombings a coordinated effort
began under the State Department's lead to deploy two multiagency
Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST). The FBI supplied
representatives on the two FEST teams. In addition, the FBI deployed
Evidence Response Teams and activated the SIOC at FBI Headquarters.
Through this coordinated effort we worked with Kenyan and Tanzanian
authorities to mount the investigation that has resulted in the
indictment of 10 individuals, including Usama Bin Laden. But our work
continues.
Both the report of the Accountability Review Board on the Embassy
Bombings and the Five-Year Plan underscore the need to improve training
and contingency planning to deal with mass casualties and major
destruction from terrorist bombs. In these types of incidents, saving
lives and treating the injured is our first priority. Yet, as we
experienced in East Africa, necessary medical and emergency equipment
was not always ready and available. We need to improve our planning and
stockpiling for contingencies so that we can tailor our response for
individual incidents.
I would like to briefly describe the nature of the existing
terrorist threat. Terrorists will continue, in the near term, to employ
conventional weapons and methods, such as bombings, firearms and
kidnapings. We must continue to enhance our readiness to withstand and
respond to such attacks at home and abroad. This continuing need was
graphically demonstrated by the horrific attacks on our embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania last August. The devastation and senseless loss of
life caused by the terrorists responsible for these events were wrought
by the use of conventional explosives in large vehicle bombs--the same
type of weapons used to attack the World Trade Center in New York City
in 1993 and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. As
the Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings
in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam clearly indicates, we must continue our
efforts to detect and defeat such conventional weapons and to secure
our citizens here and abroad.
Terrorists will not confine themselves to the use of conventional
weapons. Our intelligence and investigative efforts indicate increasing
interest in biological and chemical weapons. A terrorist attack using a
biological weapon may not be immediately apparent, and the resulting
impact on victims, police, firefighters, and emergency medical
personnel--the first responders on the scene--could be far reaching. In
fact, as we have found recently the mere threat of the use of
unconventional weapons can cause concern and panic. Threats to release
harmful biological or chemical substances cannot be ignored; they
require a sizable commitment of law enforcement investigative resources
before they can be discounted.
This underscores the need to train and equip first responders and
emergency medical personnel adequately to deal with a range of
unconventional weapons including dual use substances--those which have
a benign, legitimate use as well as potential use as weapons--which
pose an added risk. We are working with the Department of Health and
Human Services, especially with the Public Health Service, to
strengthen the preparedness of our public health and emergency medical
resources to recognize and respond to terrorist events involving
biological and chemical agents.
Because we are increasingly reliant upon interdependent networks we
face the threat of cyber attacks on our infrastructure and information
systems which could significantly harm our military power and our
economy. The networks that connect our utilities, transportation, and
telecommunications systems rely on the National Information
Infrastructure (NII). These may prove to be attractive targets to
cyber-terrorists looking to exploit the global nature of the Internet.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in East Africa last
August, the threat posed by the network of loosely affiliated
individuals associated with and inspired by Usama Bin Laden has
received substantial public attention. Through cooperation with other
agencies we have made progress on this investigation. I know Director
Freeh and Secretary Albright will speak more about the scope of the
existing threat to Americans both at home and abroad and our
coordinated efforts to prepare for and respond to these threats. But, I
would like to emphasize today my commitment to continuing to use the
full panoply of our resources to bring terrorists like Osama Bin Laden
and those like him to justice.
I would like to discuss in more detail all the steps we have taken
and the solid advances we have made in developing and implementing a
comprehensive approach to combat terrorism. In so doing I want to
address directly the issues of mutual concern that have arisen in the
numerous discussions we have had with you and your staff.
I share the Committee's concern that state and local officials be
fully and continuously involved in our counter-terrorism planning
efforts. I want to focus on what we are doing to include state and
local first responders and to build trust and partnership relationships
with those on the front lines who will be the first to respond in the
aftermath of a terrorist attack.
We have looked to the state and local responder community to
provide us valuable input throughout our planning efforts for instance
in the stakeholder's conference, and in preparing the Five-Year Plan.
In the proposed NDPO effort, an advisory committee of state and local
authorities will be the bridge between the federal domestic
preparedness program planning and the needs and priorities of the
states and local emergency response and health care community.
In order to establish effective partnerships at the state and local
level we must get state and local officials the information they need
to protect the public and themselves and to aid their preparedness and
response efforts. Through the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the
Regional Terrorism Task Force concept, we are working to provide a
means of sharing classified information on case-related matters with
state and local law enforcement officials. These task forces, by
themselves, do not address all of the situations in which state and
local officials need access either to classified information or to
information derived from classified material. We are developing a
process investigating how to provide the appropriate security
clearances so that state and local officials will get the information
they need. In taking these steps, we are building on the FBI's thorough
and efficient success in making threat warning information about
specific threats to particular jurisdictions available in a timely
manner. State and local officials who work side-by-side with federal
officials, as in the NIPC and in the proposed NDPO, will hold
appropriate security clearances.
In addition, first responders absolutely need access to the
information necessary to protect the public and themselves, even when
that information is classified. In many instances, the source or method
by which the information was obtained, and which requires it to be
classified, can be removed and the information declassified before it
is shared with state and local officials. In the case of an actual or
threatened terrorist incident, state and local personnel who need
access to classified information will be provided clearances on an
expedited basis. Finally, state and local officials participating on
the advisory committee of the proposed NDPO will also be eligible to
receive classified information, as needed, to help make policy
recommendations.
Information sharing is critical to our preparedness efforts. As you
know, the Five-Year Plan was classified in its entirety. We have
recently made available to you a 50 page unclassified excerpt from the
Five-Year Plan which addresses strategies to enhance state and local
capabilities to respond to terrorist acts. We are making this document
widely available to state and local authorities. This report and the
results of the state and local questionnaire will serve as the basis of
a continuing dialogue with these officials on how we can implement,
improve, and expand upon the initiatives in the Five-Year Plan in ways
that will best strengthen the capabilities of states, cities, and local
communities across the country. As we update the Plan annually, we will
incorporate the views of state and local officials and of emergency
responders.
As we learned from the bombings of the World Trade Center in New
York and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, domestic
terrorism incidents have their initial and most devastating impact at
the state and local levels. It is the first responder and emergency
worker who must literally begin to pick up the pieces: locate,
extricate, and treat the victims; put out the fires; and take the first
steps to begin to restore order out of chaos. We owe it to these vital
personnel and to ourselves to enable them to be adequately trained and
equipped for these tasks. We cannot measure our preparedness to deal
with terrorist acts without measuring the degree to which we have
prepared first responders. Accordingly, we must continue to do
everything we can to enhance the capabilities of state and local
emergency responders, managers and officials who will play a critical
role in the immediate response to such events.
We must recognize that there is no single template for interaction
with state and local authorities since under our federal system there
is considerable variation in how local governments are structured and
organized. In the wake of a terrorist incident there may well be
initial confusion as we organize ourselves and bring all our resources
to bear on an effective response. But make no mistake, there is no
confusion that the first priority of all concerned is the saving of
lives.
I know there is concern that during a terrorist incident our
communications infrastructure could be disabled--thereby encumbering
the ability of first responders to communicate by radio or telephone.
Fortunately, such an occurrence would not cripple the Department's
communications capacity. Some degree of infrastructure-independent
radio communications, with security features intact, would still be
feasible. We are dedicated to maintaining this core capacity. In
addition, in our dealings with state and local public safety agencies,
we emphasize their need to develop and maintain communications systems
that are not wholly reliant on the existence of a communications
infrastructure.
The confusion that inevitably follows in the wake of a terrorist
incident makes it essential that federal, state, and local responders
work together to plan and execute exercises that can help the responder
community understand each other's functions in the event of a terrorist
attack and in particular a WMD incident.
Since I last testified before you, we conducted a tabletop exercise
in the District of Columbia using a WMD scenario. As this committee has
recognized, exercises and training must include senior level officials
to achieve senior level coordination. Thus, government officials and
emergency response personnel in the various jurisdictions within the
District of Columbia metropolitan area participated in this exercise.
This exercise demonstrated areas where we need to clarify our
respective roles and improve communication so that we can function more
effectively in the event of a terrorist incident. This is one of the
important purposes of such exercises, and I am committed to continuing
to conduct and participate in these exercises in order to improve our
unified operational capabilities.
We have made significant progress in our efforts to deter, prepare
for and respond to terrorist activity. In all of these efforts our
goals are clear. First and foremost we want to detect and prevent
terrorist acts before they occur. If they do occur, our highest
priority is to save lives and provide help to the injured. Finally, we
will work tirelessly to hold accountable the perpetrators of terrorist
acts and bring them to justice no matter how long it may take.
preventing and responding to terrorism
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)
Within the last year the NIPC was established to deter, detect,
analyze, investigate and provide warnings of cyber threats and attacks
on the critical infrastructures of the United States, including illegal
intrusions into government and private sector computer networks. The
NIPC will also evaluate, acquire, and deploy computer equipment and
cyber tools to support investigations and infrastructure protection
efforts. NIPC will play a major role in the national plan for cyber
protection, which the President has tasked in PDD 63. The national plan
will be finalized shortly.
The NIPC continues to recruit personnel at FBI Headquarters and in
the field. The NIPC currently has representatives from several
government agencies including DOD, DOE, Central Intelligence Agency,
National Security Agency, Secret Service, the Postal and Inspection
Service, as well as state law enforcement. The NIPC is also seeking
private sector representatives.
As computers pervade our lives and culture, they play an ever-
increasing role in a wide variety of criminal activity, not just cyber
terrorism or other sorts of illegal intrusions. Thus, computers can be
used in fraud schemes on the Internet or to disseminate child
pornography. In order to improve our ability to deal with these sorts
of computer-facilitated crimes we must raise the general level of
computer competence among all agents and prosecutors, not just those in
the NIPC and National Infrastructure Protection and Computer Intrusion
(NIPCI) field squads and the small cadre of specially trained
prosecutors. We need to aggressively train existing staff across the
board, so that all personnel in DOJ and FBI have the requisite
expertise to carry out these investigations.
In order to build up state and local capabilities, the NIPC, in
conjunction with NDPO, plans to conduct outreach and training efforts
for local first responders and state and local law enforcement. The
NIPC seeks to train investigators and at least one trainer from state-
level investigative agencies in each of the 50 states and the District
of Columbia. The NIPC also plans to train investigators from the
municipalities represented in the Major Cities Police Chiefs' and the
Major Sheriffs' Associations and has been consulting on this
possibility with the International Association of Chiefs of Police and
the National Sheriffs Association. A larger effort to include the
training of 500 state and local law enforcement personnel at a one week
hands-on course will be launched in the second half of this fiscal
year. In addition, the Administration has proposed the Cyber Corps
program to address the shortage of highly skilled computer science
expertise in the government. This program will encourage agencies to
recruit an expert class of computer security workers through existing
scholarship and financial assistance. Finally, the newly-created
National Cybercrime Training Partnership, an organization consisting of
federal, state, and local cybercrime trainers, is developing a
comprehensive set of courses, pursuant to rigorous academic standards,
to ensure that the cybercrime training available can meet the ever-
increasing demand.
Federal Crisis Response Structure
In the event of a domestic terrorist incident, under PDD's 39 and
62 the FBI is the lead agency for responding to terrorist threats and
incidents occurring within the United States. As the lead agency for
domestic terrorism response, the FBI will utilize its investigative and
law enforcement expertise in the crisis management of a terrorist
attack. The FBI will work with FEMA which has the lead responsibility
for consequence management.
Responsibility for operational coordination of resources and
information within the FBI during a terrorism event depends on the
nature and venue of the crisis and the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators.
If a terrorist incident occurs, the FBI's SIOC is immediately
activated. If necessary the new SIOC is capable of managing multiple
crises simultaneously. The SIOC has been recently utilized and tested
during recent alerts in response to intelligence developed in past
weeks. During a crisis, the SIOC functions as the conduit for
information and expertise at the headquarters level of all pertinent
agencies and components.
In a WMD incident, consequence management personnel from FEMA, EPA,
DOE, NDPO, and DOD will supplement FBI personnel in the SIOC just as
they would supplement FBI personnel in the field in the Joint
Operations Center (JOC). During a non-WMD incident, the SIOC structure
closely resembles the structure of the FBI Command Post in the field.
If a terrorist attack affecting U.S. interests overseas occurs,
SIOC will be activated immediately to facilitate communications and
prompt evaluation of the appropriate FBI response. As Director Freeh
will discuss, the FBI Legats stationed abroad are ready to offer
support and assistance to the Chief of Mission and to advise me as to
the situation at the scene. Likewise, deployment of the FEST by the
State Department will include FBI representation.
If an attack occurs overseas against U.S. persons or property, or
within the U.S. with foreign involvement, then the FBI's International
Terrorism Operations Section will coordinate the FBI's response. If a
WMD incident in the U.S. that is perpetrated by foreign terrorists, the
WMD Operations Unit will coordinate the federal response in support of
the International Terrorism Operations Section which would focus on the
actual investigation.
If there is a terrorist attack against our critical infrastructures
that is cyber in nature, the NIPC will coordinate crisis response
activities with the Counter-Terrorism Section or the International
Terrorism Section using the resources of the SIOC. To respond in a
coordinated fashion, a crisis action team comprised of criminal
investigators, computer scientists, analysts, watch standers, and other
federal agency representatives will be formed. The crisis action team
will attempt to determine the scope of the attack, the technology
employed, and the possible source and purpose of the attack. The NIPC
Watch and Warning Unit will continually assess the situation and issue
warnings, as necessary, to federal agencies, state and local
authorities, and the private sector. In the event of a physical attack
on an infrastructure, the NIPC will support the investigation using its
key asset network.
In the field, the FBI Field Office in the jurisdiction where a
terrorist incident occurs will establish a Command Post under the
direction of the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) to manage and coordinate
the crisis response. If the terrorist incident is of the magnitude
which requires the involvement of other agencies, the SAC will expand
the Command Post into a Joint Operations Center (JOC). The FBI's
Critical Incident Response Group will assist the field office in
establishing the Command Post/JOC by providing tactical advice and
equipment, and the Attorney Critical Incident Response Groups will
provide additional advice and keep me informed at all critical stages
of our response. If a crisis warrants it, Director Freeh may ask that I
seek interagency approval for the deployment of the Domestic Emergency
Support Team, also known as the DEST, to draw on specific federal
agency expertise, to transport these additional experts to the field,
and to incorporate them into the JOC. The composition of the DEST is
tailored to the particular incident. In the event of chemical,
biological or nuclear terrorism, HHS, EPA, DOD and DOE might be
represented on the DEST.
The FBI is developing a comprehensive approach to all states which
will help prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist threats by
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence broadly and
consistent with security concerns. The FBI has established Joint
Terrorism Task Forces in 18 major metropolitan areas composed of state
and local officials and local representatives from the FBI and other
federal agencies such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,
the Customs Service, the Secret Service, and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Participants, including state and local law
enforcement officials, hold security clearances and work together,
usually on a full-time basis to share information and investigate
terrorist activities. Recognizing that not all terrorist activity is
centered in urban areas, the FBI has developed the ``Regional Terrorism
Task Force'' concept to serve several rural states with common
terrorism concerns. Two such task forces have recently been
established.
domestic preparedness efforts
Office of Justice Programs and the National Domestic Preparedness
Office
We are working to streamline and improve our current and future
abilities to work effectively with state and local authorities toward
our common national goal of improved readiness. As you know, OJP is
responsible for specific financial and technical assistance to state
and local authorities under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 and the Justice Department's fiscal year 1998 and
fiscal year 1999 Appropriations Acts. OJP has served as the Justice
Department's principal link to state and local jurisdictions in the
areas of criminal and juvenile justice and victims services. OJP is now
bringing that expertise and experience to the area of domestic
preparedness. We have proposed the establishment of the Office of State
and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS) within OJP to provide
funds for equipment, training and technical assistance to state and
local authorities and emergency responders. OSLDPS is proposed as one
mechanism through which we will implement the mandate given to the
Justice Department by this Committee to enhance the capabilities of
state and local jurisdictions to better respond to incidents of
domestic terrorism.
Additionally, we have proposed the creation of the National
Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) which will be lead by the FBI
working in partnership with OJP and all federal agencies engaged in WMD
preparedness efforts. The NDPO is proposed as an interagency effort
aimed at enhancing government-wide coordination among federal programs
offering terrorism preparedness assistance to state and local
communities. As such, the NDPO and OJP will work together as a team in
a unified Justice Department effort to streamline access to federal
preparedness assistance programs. The NDPO, in coordination with OJP,
will serve state and local authorities as the single federal point of
contact they have requested to facilitate their access to federal
programs and resources which suit their preparedness needs. As the NDPO
is established, we seek the active involvement of participating federal
agencies, including FEMA, the DOD, HHS, DOE, and the EPA, as well as
state and local authorities and emergency responder organizations. The
participation of these agencies will be needed in staffing and in
otherwise supporting this effort. I want to stress that the NDPO is not
intended to be another layer of bureaucracy. Rather, it is intended to
streamline access to federal domestic preparedness assistance programs.
With the NDPO we plan to build upon OJP's considerable expertise
and experience in providing assistance to state and local authorities
on a range of issues. With regard to equipment in the domestic
preparedness effort, the major federal response to state and local
needs has been through the Nunn-Lugar equipment loan program which
provides WMD-related training equipment. In 1998, the Justice
Department, through OJP, provided $12 million for grants to local
jurisdictions for personal protection, chemical/biological detection,
decontamination and communications equipment. In 1999, OJP will award
grants in partnership with the standards, policy and guidance of the
NDPO. Under the OJP First Responder Equipment Acquisition Program,
$69.5 million in grant monies will go out to the 157 largest cities and
counties in the 50 states. An additional $4 million will fund equipment
to support training provided through the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium. The Consortium was formally organized on June 11, 1998, in
order to bring together various existing national assets, as identified
in the Department's fiscal year 1998 and 1999 Appropriations Acts, into
a singular, coordinated, and integrated training architecture. The
Consortium is comprised of the Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort
McClellan; the National Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center
at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; the National
Center for Bio-Medical Research and Training located at the Louisiana
State University; the National Emergency and Response and Rescue
Training Center located at the Texas A&M University; and DOE's National
Exercise, Test, and Training Center (Nevada Test Site).
The Municipal Fire and Emergency Services program provides $16
million to jurisdictions to provide specialized equipment to fire and
emergency service agencies.
Key to the equipment grant program will be the Standardized
Equipment List (SEL), developed jointly by DOD and FBI, to define the
types of equipment for which grant funds can be utilized within the
four categories of personal protective equipment, detection devices,
decontamination equipment, and first response communications equipment.
The FBI and DOD drew upon the expertise of state and local emergency
responders in drawing up the SEL so it meets their needs. OJP's fiscal
year 1999 application cycle will not be executed until the Needs
Assessment, due for initial reporting on March 1, 1999, is completed
and the application kit reviewed to ensure consistency with the
findings of the Needs Assessment. OJP will also initiate a technical
assistance program to provide state and local jurisdictions with hands-
on, on-site expertise and guidance to better enable these jurisdictions
to make well-founded decisions relating to both domestic preparedness
planning and response. OJP projects distribution of the application
kits to the selected jurisdictions by April 1, 1999.
Through OJP and NDPO's joint efforts, state and local first
responders will be able to access technical assistance for their
response personnel to help them in making decisions about equipment
grants and training.
It is through these initiatives, and the initiatives and programs
to be developed and expanded over the next fiscal year, that OJP--in
tandem with the FBI and our other federal agency partners in the NDPO--
will continue to fulfill the mission of assisting state and local
jurisdictions to better prepare and respond to incidents of domestic
terrorism.
The Five-Year Plan and Federal Agency Coordination
Let me lay out for you the mechanisms we have developed to ensure
that federal agencies will work together and with the state and local
community in the event of a terrorist incident within the U.S.
On December 30, 1998, I submitted to you the Administration's Five-
Year Interagency Counter-Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan.
Consistent with the direction you gave us in the Conference Committee
Report accompanying the 1998 Department of Justice Appropriations Act,
the Plan sets forth a baseline strategy for our nation's counter-
terrorism efforts. The long-range goal of the Five-Year Plan is to
achieve readiness nationwide and with respect to our interests abroad.
The Plan addresses critical technologies for targeted research and
development, preventing and deterring terrorism, integrating crisis and
consequence management, protecting our National Information
Infrastructure, and improving state and local capabilities. It
represents our best thinking as to where we are now, where we need to
go, and how we are going to get there in terms of national
preparedness. For example, the Plan recognizes that it is not enough to
provide initial training for first responders in select jurisdictions.
We must make such initial training available to first responders in all
fifty states and the territories, and we must provide refresher and
follow-up training as well.
The Five-Year Plan is consistent with the PDD's issued last year.
PDD's 62 and 63, set forth goals for national security, counter-
terrorism and infrastructure protection. These directives specify and
clarify lead agency roles in strengthening our preparedness for
combating terrorism, protecting our critical infrastructures, and
managing the consequences of terrorist acts, particularly those
involving weapons of mass destruction. These directives establish the
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and
Counter-terrorism to oversee program coordination and to aid the
National Security Council in carrying out its advisory role on issues
of national security to the President. The National Coordinator does
not direct the activities of the agencies, rather, he serves a
coordinating function for the policies and programs on threats to the
U.S. and to U.S. interests abroad, including attacks on our
infrastructure, cyber systems, and government operations; terrorism;
and defense against covert delivery of WMD.
We have closely coordinated our efforts in developing the Five-Year
Plan with the PDD 62 and 63 implementation efforts of the Office of the
National Coordinator in order to minimize duplication of effort and to
assure a consistent national approach in these vital areas. This
approach of coordinating and integrating related efforts must continue
as the Plan is updated in the coming years. We are working with the
Office of the National Coordinator to establish procedures that will
facilitate these updates and merge our efforts in overlapping areas.
As this Committee has recognized, state and local input is
essential to our counter-terrorism planning. In developing the Five-
Year Plan, we sought the input of state and local authorities through a
questionnaire sent to public officials and organizations representing
first responders and emergency response personnel. Also, at my
direction, OJP convened a state and local stakeholders conference in
August 1998, in Washington, D.C. Together with state and local
stakeholders, we brought together the expertise of the DOD, HHS, DOE,
the EPA, FEMA, the National Security Council and the FBI which have all
worked with state and local responder constituencies in response to a
variety of crises and catastrophes.
The PDD's set out specific crisis and consequence management
responsibilities in the event of a terrorist attack. PDD's 39 and 62
outlines the responsibilities of law enforcement and other agencies in
responding to a terrorist incident. Numerous federal, state and local
agencies have devoted considerable resources in recent years to the
development of crisis and consequence management plans. We must work to
integrate these plans so that in the event of a terrorist incident all
those involved in the response and mitigation efforts work together.
One of the planning documents developed over the past year to
further refine our interagency efforts in regard to domestic terrorism
is the Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN seeks to
establish a structure for a systematic, coordinated, effective national
response to threats and acts of terrorism. The CONPLAN describes how
the FBI crisis response structure, the Federal Response Plan, the
Federal consequence management mechanisms and state and local Incident
Command Systems will coordinate their activities in the event of a WMD
incident.
By educating themselves as to the scope and provisions of each
agency's and jurisdiction's plan, and by exercising and training
together, federal, state, and local entities can learn to work together
more effectively. This education, exercising and training process must
include senior level officials to achieve senior level interagency
coordination. The Top-Off exercise, which this Committee has required,
is a significant and necessary step in this direction.
The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection
and Counter-terrorism plays an important coordination role in our
preparedness and response to events involving international terrorism
and WMD. The National Coordinator does not have an operational role,
rather, the Attorney General advises him with regard to national
security information when a terrorist event occurs. The National
Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the government's policies
and programs concerning unconventional threats within the United States
and to Americans abroad. These unconventional threats include attacks
on our infrastructure, cyber systems, and government operations;
terrorism; and the covert delivery of WMD. He is also responsible for
coordinating the development of interagency procedures for deployment
of specialized crisis assets.
tools
As we enhance our readiness nation-wide to deal with terrorism, we
must have the right tools and personnel to improve our capabilities
across the broad spectrum of WMD and threats to our nation and its
critical infrastructures.
Expedited Procurement
I want to acknowledge the leadership of this Committee in this
effort and the recent authority granted to me to purchase or lease
necessary equipment or services on an expedited basis to support
ongoing counter terrorism, national security, or computer crime
investigations or prosecutions. It will enable me to quickly access
additional resources, should the need arise, to supplement federal
capabilities as well as to assist emergency responders first on the
scene, whether they are from federal, state, or local agencies or from
the private sector.
Also, with the leadership of this committee, the Department and the
FBI Laboratory are capitalizing on national laboratory resources for
the development and deployment of new applied science and engineering
capabilities to support counterterrorism, intelligence activities and
criminal investigations.
Legislation
Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
provided many necessary and additional legal tools, some modifications
to existing laws would clarify and strengthen these tools. Draft
legislation currently under review within the Department includes
proposals which would strengthen investigative tools, clarify and
supplement existing criminal and immigration statutes relating to
terrorist offenses and offenses involving WMD, and promote prompt
federal interagency cooperation in responding to terrorist incidents.
One of the items under review is clarification of the removal
ground of ``engage in terrorist activity'' in order to facilitate
removal of terrorists who engage in fund-raising or otherwise provide
material support to terrorist organizations. We are also considering
the addition of terrorist offenses as predicate offenses to the federal
racketeering and money laundering statutes. Also under review is
clarifying the definitions in the biological weapons statutes and
expansion of these statutes to provide better controls over biological
agents. For example, an amendment could be proposed outlawing the
possession of biological agents that could be used in weapons of mass
destruction by those with no legitimate purpose for possessing these
agents.
In addition, the Department is considering a High-Technology Crime
Bill to address several technical and procedural infirmities that
inhibit effective investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. While
not all cybercrime is perpetrated by terrorists, improving our overall
capabilities to combat cybercrime will improve our readiness to address
cyber terrorism.
The High-Technology Crime Bill could contain proposals to clarify
and expedite routine procedures used in the investigation of computer
crimes. Today, investigators must place multiple trap-and-trace devices
and execute multiple search warrants in the many jurisdictions through
which relevant information passes. Consequently, law enforcement often
finds itself well behind the criminals who traverse international
networks with the touch of the keyboard.
In this digital age of Internet-based communications, signals do
not travel along straight lines, thus the traditional trap and trace or
pen register is not effective. Signals are often broken up and may pass
through many providers, in several different jurisdictions, en route to
their destination. In order to obtain key prosecution information about
a telephone call that is routinely provided in response to an
authorized court order, law enforcement officers must obtain orders in
each successive jurisdiction through which a signal passes in order to
trace the communication to its source. This consumes valuable time and
scarce resources and impedes identification of the perpetrator. A
possible amendment to existing statutes could allow federal judges to
direct cooperation among successive communications providers that carry
a particular communication in tracing a call to its ultimate source or
destination.
Encryption
Court-authorized electronic surveillance (wiretaps) and search and
seizure are two of the most critically important investigative
techniques used by law enforcement to prosecute crime including
terrorism. The growing use of strong, commercially-available, non-
recoverable encryption will significantly impair our ability to
effectively use wiretaps and conduct searches and seizures.
Encryption is extremely beneficial when used legitimately by
individuals and corporations to protect the privacy and confidentiality
of voice and data communications and sensitive electronically stored
information (computer files). In order to provide individuals and
corporations with greater privacy protections as the world moves into
the information age, both industry and government are encouraging the
use of strong encryption. But the use of strong encryption by criminals
and terrorists poses a significant risk to public safety and national
security.
Law enforcement has steadfastly expressed its concern about the
adoption of an encryption policy based solely on market forces. Law
enforcement, including the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, the National Sheriff's Association, the National District
Attorneys Association, the National Association of Attorney Generals
and the Major City Chiefs, continues to call for the adoption of a
balanced encryption policy--one that meets the commercial needs of
industry as well as the needs of the public for effective law
enforcement.
The Administration is not currently seeking mandatory controls on
encryption, but instead is working with industry to find voluntary
solutions that meet privacy, electronic commerce and public safety
needs. We remain optimistic that such a voluntary approach will be
successful in addressing our public safety needs.
resources
The Department currently spends approximately $738.5 million for
counter terrorism and anti-terrorism activities. In fiscal year 2000,
the Department is seeking an increase of 319 positions (60 agents and
66 attorneys) and $122.6 million for counter-terrorism/cybercrime
programs to enhance our ability to deter, detect, investigate and
prosecute violations committed by terrorists and other computer
criminals. This reflects our concern that the interdependent systems
that support every critical aspect of American life, including
telecommunications, power delivery, transportation, delivery of
government services and banking and commerce, are vulnerable to
terrorist groups, organized criminals and, simply, lone hackers.
For the FBI, our request includes counterterrorism/technology crime
program increases totaling 207 positions (60 agents) and $45.7 million.
Of the total amount, we seek $9 million to modernize the Hazardous
Devices School at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, where state and local bomb
technicians are trained and certified. This request also includes 108
positions (60 agents) and $11.3 million to allow the FBI to establish
up to 12 field NIPCI Squads to investigate cyber intrusion cases,
address infrastructure protection matters, support computer facilitated
crime investigations, and provide equipment for 26 other field offices;
79 positions and $9.9 million to increase the number of Computer
Analysis Response Team (CART) examiners who provide forensic support in
cases involving computers, and provide CART members with appropriate
equipment and training; 7 positions and $4.2 million for data network
interception support and development; $7 million for counter-encryption
equipment and services; 13 positions and $2.6 million for protocol
analysis and processing staffing and equipment; and, finally, $1.7
million for NIPC operations.
We continue to require additional technologically proficient
personnel who are capable of protecting the security and integrity of
government systems and of enabling us to stay a step ahead of those who
would attack or otherwise compromise our capabilities. We will seek to
accelerate our efforts to hire, train and retain specialized and
technologically skilled personnel, not only for the NIPC and field
squads, but also for critical positions throughout the Department of
Justice. Using the authority provided by the exemption to Title 5 for
certain positions that was approved by this Committee, we will augment
our existing staff with specialized and technologically skilled
personnel.
To increase the United States' ability to protect its businesses
and its citizens, we are requesting 87 positions (55 attorneys) and
$7.3 million for the U.S. Attorneys. The Administration is committed to
protecting the nation's businesses and citizens from terrorists and
other computer criminals. But, to meet this commitment, there must be
additional attorneys and support staff for the investigation and
prosecution of computer crime in its various manifestations. The U.S.
Attorneys require additional staffing to handle significant cases of
national interest which are due, in part, to terrorism, computer and
other high tech crime generated by the steadily accelerating role of
computers in businesses, the personal lives of our citizens, the
exploding growth of on-line services and Internet use, the
vulnerabilities of computer systems to attack and abuse, and the
ability of terrorists and computer criminals to attack anonymously and
from locations throughout the world.
For the Criminal Division, the Department requests an increase of
13 positions (9 attorneys) and $1.8 million for counter terrorism/
cybercrime in the fiscal year 2000 budget. This enhancement will permit
the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Criminal
Division to focus additional resources on 3 areas: (1) infrastructure
protection; (2) international computer crime; and (3) intellectual
property rights enforcement. These resources will permit the Criminal
Division to investigate and prosecute attacks on the National
Information Infrastructure, and to assist in assuring the integrity of
systems that are integral to our telecommunications, power delivery,
transportation, delivery of government services and banking and
commerce. The global nature of the Internet, and the rapid expansion of
international commerce, have been accompanied by a globalization of
computer-related crime. Our need to address these international crime
problems calls for enhanced resources to coordinate global solutions.
Finally, the protection of intellectual property rights will expand
significantly in the 21st century, as this country's intellectual
capacity becomes, perhaps, our greatest resource. In all these areas,
the Criminal Division's Computer Crime attorneys will be critical in
the effort to combat successfully terrorism/cybercrime.
For the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, we seek an
increase of 5 positions (2 attorneys) and $357,000. This includes
resources to handle additional Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) applications, especially those in support of counterterrorism
work, as well as increased workload resulting from revision of the FISA
statute, which allows for separate ``pen register'' and ``trap and
trace'' FISA warrants.
Our request includes an overall increase of 7 positions and $38.5
million to expand the OJP domestic preparedness efforts. We propose
transferring the $135 million appropriated in the Counterterrorism Fund
in 1999 for state and local domestic preparedness assistance to OJP in
2000. In addition, we propose restructuring $31.5 million of these
resources, which, when combined with the requested increase of $38.5
million, will allow funding to be provided for the following
enhancements: $6 million to expand the First Responder Equipment
Acquisition Grant Program; $45 million to provide local bomb technician
squads with the specialized equipment necessary to allow them to detect
and react to a chemical or biological weapon threat or release; $7
million for a Law Enforcement First Responder Training Program to train
local law enforcement officers on the basic skills necessary to fulfill
their roles as first responders to a weapons of mass destruction
terrorist incident; $9 million for the Center for Domestic Preparedness
at Fort McClellan, Alabama, to continue training at the U.S. Army's
installation after the planned closure on September 30, 1999; and $3
million to expand the technical assistance component of OJP's domestic
preparedness efforts. In addition, OJP's request includes $1.9 million
for the National White Collar Crime Center to provide training and
technical assistance relating to computer crimes to state and local law
enforcement and regulatory agencies.
The Department also seeks $27 million for the Counterterrorism
Fund. These resources will be used to reimburse departments and
agencies of the Federal government for costs incurred in support of
countering, investigating, or prosecuting domestic and/or international
terrorism; finance reward payments in connection with such activities;
restore operational capacities of offices destroyed or damaged by
domestic or international terrorist acts; ensure continuance of
essential government functions during an emergency; protect the
Nation's critical infrastructure; provide for costs associated with the
NDPO; and provide for costs associated with design of the Federal
Intrusion Detection Network.
In 1999, the Department did not receive any new funding for
responding to extraordinary circumstances, but did receive $145 million
for earmarked initiatives. Since the Department expects to use all 1998
carryover funding, approximately $25 million, for the extraordinary
costs of countering, investigating and prosecuting terrorists in 1999,
the need for new funding is critical.
As I have mentioned before, having the right computer
infrastructure is more and more critical in our investigative work.
While this issue is much larger than counterterrorism, it warrants
attention here. The Department of Justice's 2000 request includes:
$38.8 million for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI)
Information Sharing Initiative (ISI), $13 million for the Drug
Enforcement Administration's Firebird System, and $37 million for the
U.S. Attorneys' Justice Consolidated Office Network (JCON).
While these enhancements support basic office automation related to
the missions of these agencies, I want to emphasize that to do our job
effectively, whether it be addressing counterterrorism or fighting
violent crime in general, we have to have up-to-date computer systems.
For example, it will be through the ISI system, once implemented, that
the FBI will be able to tie its intelligence information and case
documentation together in order for the appropriate analytical work to
be accomplished. The implementation of ISI is critical, to ensure that
the millions of pages of documents the FBI handles worldwide can be
shared among appropriate field offices and headquarters divisions.
Furthermore, to ensure the integrity of our computer
infrastructure, we must develop systems that can link our different
offices and agencies together, while ensuring a secure environment.
Most of today's computer software and network systems cannot function
on outdated hardware and legacy systems, which unfortunately is what
many of our investigators and attorneys are still using. Without these
systems, neither our investigators nor our prosecutors can adequately
address our complicated counterterrorism casework.
This Committee has been very supportive of efforts to build and
enhance law enforcement capabilities to deter, detect and defend
against acts of terrorism. We greatly appreciate this support and we
look forward to continuing to work together on this critically
important issue.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

STATEMENT OF LOUIS J. FREEH, DIRECTOR
Senator Gregg. Director Freeh, unfortunately, I know the
Secretary of State is going to have to leave at 11:30, so would
it be possible for you to give your statement in about 5 or 10
minutes?
Mr. Freeh. I will do it in five, Senator.
Senator Gregg. That would be great. Thank you.

director freeh's opening statement

Mr. Freeh. Thank you very much. My written statement,
obviously, is submitted for the record. Let me just very
briefly, first of all, echo the comments of the Secretary and
the Attorney General thanking this committee and particularly
its leadership for paying attention and focusing on, and then
sustaining with both interest and resources, what I believed
when I became Director in 1993 to be our single greatest
challenge, which is responding to terrorism, not just at home
and abroad but in the new dimensions with which we are being
presented.
The Attorney General referred to cyber crime, Senator
Campbell to other types of terrorism. These are very complex
and challenging issues which challenge both our technical
ability, our resource allocations, but also, perhaps most
importantly, as you pointed out, the need to coordinate these
activities.
Let me just remark how over 5 years, the focus and the
attention on this problem has been so well maintained by the
Congress and the successful implementation by the Attorney
General of the coordinating tasks. The great progress that you
note is certainly appreciated. We also realize we have a lot of
work to do.

interagency cooperation

If I could just mention very briefly some of the aspects of
this problem that you are aware of, and I would start with your
first category of intelligence. Echoing what the Attorney
General said, the coordination, at least on the level of law
enforcement and intelligence services with respect to
counterterrorism issues abroad has never been superior, in my
view. The relationships, the exchanges of officers, the
coordinated activity that takes place with respect to terrorism
issues at the highest level, and more importantly, at the
operational level, between the Central Intelligence Agency and,
particularly, the FBI are exemplary. I have said before that
this relationship is much more efficient and certainly more
productive than the relationship between our agencies at the
height of the Cold War, and I thank Director Tenet and his
predecessor, Director Deutsch, for making that possible.
Taking very, very briefly the East African bombings as an
example, the ability to deploy rapidly, first with the
Department of State-led FEST team and then over the course of
several weeks by 500 FBI personnel--investigators, laboratory
experts, even computer experts, because some of the evidence
that we encountered was in the form of drives and hard disks.
Using all these combined resources and the complex undertaking
of doing an investigation in two separate countries under the
authority of our ambassadors but also with the permission and
support of the host countries, within 20 days we returned back
to the United States two of the subjects who are now charged. A
third subject was subsequently returned to the United States.
Nine other subjects are charged, the main subjects in that case
still being fugitives.
The ability to deploy very quickly to those two crime
scenes legats, one from South Africa to Nairobi and one from
Cairo to Dar es Salaam--those legats did not exist 15 months
ago--and the ability of those officers to arrive on the scene
and quickly join forces with the RSO and the diplomatic
security personnel to do basic things like securing the crime
scene and securing evidence, has played an important role in
the case.
The ability through the State Department to achieve the
rendition of two subjects in such a very rapid period of time,
accumulating the evidence, using all of the resources which
have been provided by the Congress in a coordinated fashion was
really responsible for those successes.
It was very interesting, in terms of the State and local
coordination, the officers who have the responsibility for
these cases are the Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York
City, which is made up of several Federal agencies and the New
York Police Department. One of the things I noticed, when I was
in East Africa shortly after the Secretary of State, one of the
officers sifting through the crime scene in Dar es Salaam was a
New York City police officer who is on our terrorism task
force. His expertise is vehicle identification numbers, which
proved very important not only in the World Trade Center case,
but also in this case in identifying a vehicle which was
subsequently corroborated by other evidence.
We have a number of tools to deploy both domestically and
overseas, whether an attack is sustained in Oklahoma City or
against one of our embassies in East Africa or our personnel in
Pakistan. The driving force on the implementation of this plan
is coordinated activity, whether it is on the FEST team, the
supporting operations of the two counterterrorism centers, one
at the CIA, one at the FBI, where personnel are cross-
designated, including personnel from the Diplomatic Security
Service.
The teams that are deployed to these fields, the manner in
which evidence is acquired, and the complicated issues with
respect to extraterritorial investigations and the support that
we need from our foreign partners all goes into the ability to
use the resources which have been provided in a coordinated
way, in an effective way.
I also note, as the Attorney General has, that much of this
development is in a very early stage, and although we are
pleased with the progress, we also note what has to be done to
achieve the type of coordination that will respond successfully
in a weapons of mass destruction incident here in the United
States.

critical national infrastructure protection

For instance, the National Infrastructure Protection Center
and the proposed National Preparedness Domestic Protection
Office are new establishments. Although we have a good idea and
a blueprint and a consensus as to what we want them to do, we
know that we have lots to learn with respect to carrying out
these operations.
As the Attorney General noted, we also have taken a lot of
effort and planning to avoid making this a Washington-led,
Federal Government-dominated, plan and program. That cannot be
done. Whether it is in Oklahoma City or in the World Trade
Center or in Nairobi, the Federal Government will not be, for
instance, the first personnel to arrive at the scene. The
private sector is playing an increasingly important part,
particularly in the complex development of cyber strategies and
infrastructure protection.
We need to keep in mind that the Federal laboratories, the
universities, and private industry have a lot more knowledge
and a lot more expertise in these areas. Part of our efforts,
and I compliment the Attorney General again for pursuing this
very successfully, is incorporating into the National
Infrastructure Protection Center and the proposed National
Domestic Preparedness Office people from academia, people from
private industry, people from our national laboratories, the
State and local fire departments and police authorities, and,
of course, there are 15,000 of them around the country. That
job in itself is a very complex one. We want to give them
training, we want to give them equipment, but we also want them
to tell us what they need so we can be guided by those
principles. I think that is the only way this is going to work.

prepared statement

I have a lot of other matters in my statement which I am
pleased to talk about, but in view of the time, I will just end
right here. Thank you.
Senator Gregg. Thank you very much, Mr. Director.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Louis J. Freeh
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am
pleased to have this opportunity to join Attorney General Reno and
Secretary of State Albright in discussing the threat to the United
States posed by terrorists both abroad and at home.
At the outset, I would like to thank you and the Subcommittee for
your extraordinary support for the FBI's counterterrorism programs and
initiatives. Over the past several years, you have generously provided
us with additional agents, technicians, and analysts, as well as the
technical and forensic tools, that allow us to respond quickly and
effectively to acts of terrorism against the United States and its
citizens wherever they occur--including, most recently, in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. Annual funding for the FBI's
Counterterrorism program has grown from $78.5 million in 1993 to $301.2
million in 1999. The number of agents funded for counterterrorism
investigations has grown from 550 in 1993 to 1,383 in 1999. You have
also provided additional funding for many programs in the FBI
Laboratory and Critical Incident Response Group that directly support
the FBI's capability for responding to the threat and acts of
terrorism. I am confident that our efforts will justify your past
commitment and continued support to this important area of the FBI's
responsibility.
I would also like to commend the Subcommittee for its leadership in
directing the preparation of the 5-Year interagency plan that was
submitted to the Congress on December 30, 1998. As you are aware, the
preparation of the plan coincided with the preparation of two major
Presidential Decision Directives regarding counterterrorism (PDD-62)
and critical infrastructure protection (PDD-63). The plan was also
prepared at the same time the FBI and many other agencies were
responding to the terrorist bombings of United States Embassies in East
Africa. I believe the Subcommittee will find the recommendations of the
plan to be particularly timely, consistent with these recent executive
orders, and reflect many of the lessons learned from our most recent
experiences.
To help put today's discussion in perspective, I would like to
start with a summary of the FBI's deployment and investigation of the
recent terrorist bombings in East Africa and follow with an assessment
of the current international and domestic terrorist threat and lessons
learned from our recent experiences. Finally, I would like to describe
current FBI counterterrorism initiatives, including those proposed in
our 2000 budget request to Congress.
The Bombings in East Africa
On August 7, 1998, at approximately 10:40 a.m., local time, a bomb
exploded near the United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
Almost simultaneously, a bomb detonated near the United States Embassy
in Nairobi, Kenya. The toll in both bombings, in terms of lives lost,
persons injured, and damage to buildings, was substantial. In Dar es
Salaam, 11 persons were killed, 7 of whom were foreign service
nationals employed by the United States at the Embassy. Another 74
persons were injured, including 2 American citizens and 5 foreign
service nationals. In Nairobi, where the United States Embassy was
located in a congested downtown area, 213 persons were killed,
including 12 American citizens and 32 foreign service nationals
employed at the Embassy. Approximately 4,500 persons were treated for
injuries, including 13 Americans and 16 foreign service nationals.
Immediately upon notification of the bombings, agencies of the
United States Government began to marshal their resources to respond to
these acts of terrorism. Two Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST)
departed Andrews Air Force Base at approximately 2:30 p.m. EST on
August 7. FEST is a multiagency team, including members of the FBI,
that is deployed to international emergencies involving United States
interests to advise and assist local Ambassadors and embassy personnel
in dealing with crisis situations. FEST is coordinated by the United
States Department of State. The FBI had eight representatives on the
two FEST teams. We were also able to include 19 others as part of a FBI
advance team.
Based upon our jurisdiction for the investigation of certain crimes
committed against American persons and property abroad, the FBI began
the deployment of agents, Evidence Response Teams, technicians and
laboratory examiners, and other personnel and equipment to Dar es
Salaam and Nairobi. We activated our Strategic Information and
Operations Center at FBI Headquarters to coordinate FBI efforts with
our Counterterrorism Center and other government agencies. Among the
first steps we took was to direct our Legal Attaches in Cairo, Egypt,
and Pretoria, South Africa, to respond to the scenes in Dar es Salaam
and Nairobi, respectively. Our Legal Attaches were the first non-
resident United States law enforcement officials to arrive on scene.
Upon arriving, these individuals were able to establish a cooperative
relationship with appropriate Tanzanian and Kenyan law enforcement
authorities and United States Embassy personnel, including Diplomatic
Security Service agents serving in these posts. Our Legal Attaches also
assisted in establishing logistical support for FBI rapid deployment
teams that subsequently arrived in both locations. The first increment
of the FBI investigative team arrived in East Africa 40 hours after the
bombings.
At our peak, the FBI had approximately 500 personnel on the ground
in East Africa. Among the individuals deployed were members of our
Joint Terrorism Task Forces from New York City. We also were assisted
by explosives experts from the United Kingdom. Over the course of the
eight-weeks immediately following the bombings, the FBI: logged 61
flight missions, of which 16 were transoceanic; transported over 1,000
agents, technicians, examiners, and other employees deployed to and
from East Africa; and moved 295 tons of equipment, supplies, and
related items to support our investigative teams.
From the two crime scenes in Tanzania and Kenya, as well as from
investigation and searches conducted in surrounding African nations and
Pakistan, we collected and transported back to the FBI Laboratory more
than three tons of evidentiary materials for examination and analysis.
Our on-scene deployments in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi temporarily
created what would have been among the largest FBI field offices in the
United States.
As you can imagine, providing extended operational and
administrative support to such a large overseas contingent was
especially challenging and trying. It was not something that we
accomplished on our own. In a large-scale overseas deployment such as
East Africa, we must depend upon support and cooperation from our
partners in the Departments of Defense and State. I would like to
acknowledge the tremendous job performed by the men and women of the
Departments of Defense and State under very adverse and trying
circumstances. And, I am equally proud of the way our own personnel
rose to meet the challenges presented by this difficult investigation.
We received exceptional cooperation and assistance from the
governments of Tanzania and Kenya in conducting our investigation. They
allowed us to recover and remove evidence for examination and transport
it back to the United States. They also allowed us to conduct
interviews and searches. The relationship established by our Legal
Attache from Pretoria with Kenyan authorities was instrumental in that
country's decision to allow the removal of two suspects for prosecution
in the United States. We were also able to conduct investigation and
searches in several other countries and locations.
As a result of these investigative efforts, 11 individuals
associated with al-Qaeda, including Usama bin Laden, have each been
indicted for conspiracy to kill United States nationals, the bombings
of the United States Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and murder. One
other individual, also an al-Qaeda member, has been indicted for
conspiracy to kill United States nationals, perjury before a Federal
Grand Jury, and lying to a Special Agent of the FBI. The progress and
results that have been obtained in this case are the result of
cooperation among many agencies, including the FBI, the Criminal
Division, the United States Attorneys' offices in New York City and
Washington, D.C., the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of
State, and Department of Defense, working together unselfishly in
response to brutal acts of terrorism committed against the United
States. Unfortunately, the bombing of United States Embassies in East
Africa is only the latest in a series of international terrorist
incidents directed against United States interests and policies.
The International Terrorist Situation
The current international terrorist threat can be divided into
three general categories that represent a serious and distinct threat
to the United States. These categories also reflect, to a large degree,
how terrorists have adapted their tactics since the 1970's by learning
from past successes and failures, from becoming familiar with law
enforcement capabilities and tactics, and from exploiting technologies
and weapons that are increasingly available to them in the post-Cold
War era.
The first threat category, state sponsors of terrorism, violates
every convention of international law. State sponsors of terrorism
currently designated by the Department of State are: Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. Put simply, these nations view
terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. In recent years, the terrorist
activities of Cuba and North Korea appear to have declined as the
economies of these countries have deteriorated. However, the terrorist
activities of the other states I mentioned continue, and in some cases,
have intensified during the past several years.
The second category of the international terrorist threat is
represented by more formal terrorist organizations. These autonomous,
generally transnational, organizations have their own infrastructures,
personnel, financial arrangements, and training facilities. These
organizations are able to plan and mount terrorist campaigns on an
international basis and actively support terrorist activities in the
United States.
Extremist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah, the Egyption Al-Gama'
Al-Islamiyya, and the Palestinian Hamas have supporters in the United
States who could be used to support an act of terrorism here. Hizballah
ranks among the most menacing of these groups. It has staged many anti-
American attacks in other countries, such as the 1983 truck bombings of
the United States Embassy and the United States Marine Corps barracks
in Beirut, the 1984 bombing of the United States Embassy Annex in
Beirut, and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 during which United
States Navy diver Robert Stehem, a passenger on the flight, was
murdered by the hijackers. Elements of Hizballah were also responsible
for the kidnaping and detention of United States hostages in Lebanon
throughout the 1980's.
The activities of American cells of Hizballah, Hamas, and Al Gama'
Al Islamiyya generally revolve around fund-raising and low-level
intelligence gathering. In addition, there are still significant
numbers of Iranian students attending United States universities and
technical institutions. A significant number of these students are
hardcore members of the pro-Iranian student organization known as the
Anjoman Islamie, which is comprised almost exclusively of fanatical,
anti-American, Iranian Shiite Muslims. The Iranian Government relies
heavily upon these students studying in the United States for low-level
intelligence and technical expertise. However, the Anjoman Islamie also
represents a significant resource base upon which the government of
Iran can draw to maintain the capability to mount operations against
the United States, if it so decides.
The third category of international terrorist threat stems from
loosely affiliated extremists, characterized by rogue terrorists such
as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and international terrorist financier Usama bin
Laden. These loosely affiliated extremists may pose the most urgent
threat to the United States because these individuals bring together
groups on an ad hoc, temporary basis. By not being encumbered with the
demands associated with maintaining a rigid, organizational
infrastructure, these individuals are more difficult for law
enforcement to track and infiltrate. Individuals such as Ramzi Yousef
and Usama bin Laden have also demonstrated an ability to exploit
mobility and technology to avoid detection and to conduct terrorist
acts. Fortunately, in 1995, we were able to capture Yousef and return
him to the United States to stand trial for the February 1993 bombing
of the World Trade Center and the conspiracy to attack American
aircraft overseas. Yousef was convicted in two trials and sentenced to
life imprisonment.
The FBI believes that the threat posed by international terrorists
in each of these categories will continue for the foreseeable future.
As attention remains focused on Usama bin Laden in the aftermath of the
East African bombings, I believe it is important to remember that rogue
terrorists such as bin Laden represent just one type of threat that the
United States faces. It is imperative that we maintain our capabilities
to counter the broad range of international terrorist threats that
confront the United States.
For many of us in this room, the threat of international terrorism
was literally brought home by the World Trade Center bombing in
February 1993. Although the plotters failed in their attempt to topple
one of the twin towers into the other, an outcome that would have
produced thousands of casualties, they succeeded in causing millions of
dollars worth of damage in a blast that killed 6 persons and injured
more than 1,000. After his capture in 1995, Ramzi Yousef, the convicted
mastermind behind the New York City bombing and other terrorist acts,
conceded to investigators that a lack of funding forced his group's
hand in plotting the destruction of the World Trade Center. Running
short of money, the plotters could not assemble a bomb as large as they
had originally intended. The timing of the attack was also rushed by a
lack of finances. Incredibly, the plotters' desire to recoup the
deposit fee on the rental truck used to transport the bomb helped lead
investigators to them. As horrible as that act was, it could very well
have been much more devastating.
We are fortunate that in the nearly six years since the World Trade
Center bombing, no significant act of foreign-directed terrorism has
occurred on American soil. At the same time, however, we have witnessed
a pattern of terrorist attacks that are either directed at United
States interests or initiated in response to United States Government
policies and actions. Among these acts are:
--the 1993 murders of two Central Intelligence Agency employees and
the wounding of several others by Mir Amal Kasi in Langley,
Virginia;
--the March 1995 attack against three employees of the United States
consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, which resulted in the deaths of
two Americans;
--the July 1995 hostage taking of four western tourists, including an
American, by terrorists in Kashmiri, India;
--the plot by Shayk Omar Abdel Rahman and his followers to bomb
several New York City landmarks, including the United Nations
building, the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, and federal
buildings;
--the November 1995 bombing of a Saudi Arabian National Guard
building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the deaths
of five United States citizens assigned to the United States
military training mission to Saudi Arabia;
--the June 1996 bombing at the Al-Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia, which resulted in the deaths of 19 United States
servicemen and the injury of 240 other military personnel and
dependents;
--a plot led by Ramzi Yousef to destroy numerous United States air
carriers in a simultaneous operation;
--a plot, also led by Ramzi Yousef, to kidnap and kill United States
diplomats and foreign officials in Pakistan;
--the November 1997 ambush and massacre of foreign tourists in Luxor,
Egypt, which appears to have been undertaken to pressure the
United States Government to release Shayk Rahman from federal
prison;
--the November 1997 murder of four United States businessmen and
their driver in Karachi, Pakistan, believed to be in
retaliation against the FBI's capture and rendition of Mir Amal
Kasi;
--the kidnaping of seven Americans during 1998 in Colombia by
terrorists groups, bringing to 92 the total number of United
States citizens reported kidnaped in that country between 1980
and 1998, of which 12 Americans have died in captivity; and
--the December 1998 kidnaping of a group of western tourists,
including two Americans, by terrorists in Yemen, during which
four hostages were killed and one American hostage wounded when
Yemeni security forces attempted a rescue operation.
As these examples illustrate, the threat of terrorism is real both
at home and abroad. Usama bin Laden readily acknowledges trying to
obtain chemical and biological weapons for use in his jihad, or holy
war, against the United States. We also know that domestic terrorist
groups have expressed interest in chemical and biological agents. The
willingness of terrorists to carry out more large-scale incidents
designed for maximum destruction places a larger proportion of our
population at risk. Today, Americans engaged in activities as routine
as working in an office building, commuting to and from work, or
visiting museums and historical sites in foreign lands, can become
random victims in a deadly game acted out by international terrorists.
America's democratic tradition and global presence make United States
citizens and interests targets for opportunists who are willing to shed
the blood of innocents for their causes.
Responding to the Threat of International Terrorism
The United States has developed a strong response to international
terrorism. Legislation and Executive Orders enacted over the past 15
years have strengthened the ability of the United States Government to
protect its citizens through five affirmative ways: diplomacy,
sanctions, covert operations, military options, and law enforcement
actions. For this, the Congress and the Executive Branch deserve the
gratitude of the American people. We cannot accurately gauge how many
potential strikes our government's strong stand against terrorism has
discouraged. We can, however, measure with considerable satisfaction
the success we have had in preventing plots detected in the planning
stages and our successes in investigating, locating, apprehending, and
prosecuting individuals who have carried out terrorist activities. I
would like to highlight two aspects of this response, renditions and
fund raising, that demonstrate the commitment of the United States
Government to combating terrorism.
During the past decade, the United States has successfully obtained
custody of 13 suspected international terrorists from foreign countries
to stand trial in the United States for acts or planned acts of
terrorism against our citizens. Based on its policy of treating
terrorists as criminals and applying the rule of law against them, the
United States is one of the most visible and effective forces in
identifying, locating, and apprehending terrorists on American soil and
overseas. The majority of terrorist renditions have been accomplished
with the cooperation of the foreign government in which the terrorist
suspect was located. Among the individuals recently returned to the
United States by this process have been Mir Amal Kasi, who shot and
killed two Central Intelligence Agency employees in Langley, Virginia,
in 1993, and who was rendered from Afghanistan to the United States in
1997, and Tsutomo Shirosaki, a Japanese Red Army member, who was
rendered to the United States in 1996, more than 10 years after firing
rockets at the United States Diplomatic Compound in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Every time the United States obtains custody of a terrorist for trial,
we send a clear message to terrorists everywhere that no matter how
long it takes, no matter the difficulty, we will find you and you will
be held accountable for your actions.
During fiscal year 1998, FBI investigative actions prevented 10
planned terrorist acts. Nine acts were prevented with the arrest of six
members of an Illinois-based white supremacist group who were planning
to target the Southern Poverty Law Center and its founder, Morris Dees;
the Simon Weisenthal Center; and the New York City office of the Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. This group had also discussed
robbing an armored car using a LAW rocket; poisoning the water supply
of East St. Louis, Illinois; and committing several murders, including
a homosexual man, a black female attorney, a member of another white
supremacist group who had made derogatory comments about the Aryan
Nations, and a former member of their own group. The arrest of Byron
Bazarte in August 1998 prevented the bombing of an unspecifed target in
Washington, D.C.
Using the authorities provided under Section 302 of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of
the Treasury, has designated 30 groups as foreign terrorist
organizations. This designation allows the United States Government to
take actions to block the transfer of funds in the United States in
which these organizations have an interest. The FBI provided
information concerning various organizations to the Department of State
to assist it in compiling the list of foreign terrorist organizations.
Consistent with provisions of the Act, the FBI did not make
recommendations concerning which groups should be designated as foreign
terrorist organizations.
In July 1998, the FBI arrested Mawzi Mustapha Assi, a procurement
agent for a foreign terrorist organization, in Dearborn, Michigan, in
July 1998, on criminal charges relating to providing material support
to a foreign terrorist organization, export of materials on the
munitions control list, and other export violations. The FBI and the
United States Customs Service seized $124,000 worth of sensitive night
vision and navigational devices. Assi became a fugitive after the
Government's unsuccessful attempts to detain him prior to trial.
We believe these provisions provide law enforcement with a
potentially powerful tool to disrupt the ability of terrorist
organizations to fund their destructive activities. Investigations into
the financial operations of clandestine organizations on the shadowy
fringes of international politics can be particularly complex, time
consuming, and labor intensive. Organizations have demonstrated an
ability to reinvent themselves with new names in an effort to thwart
law enforcement efforts. As with measures of this type, its most
powerful impact may be from its deterrent effect. As investigators and
prosecutors build successful cases and precedents to enforce anti-fund
raising activities, targeted groups may decide that fund raising in the
United States is too difficult and risky.
The Domestic Terrorism Threat
Domestic terrorist groups are those which are based and which
operate entirely within the United States, or its territories, and
whose activities are directed at elements of the United States
Government or its civilian population. Domestic terrorist groups
represent interests that span the full political spectrum, as well as
social issues and concerns. FBI investigations of domestic terrorist
groups or individuals are not predicated upon social or political
beliefs; rather, they are based upon planned or actual criminal
activity. The current domestic terrorist threat primarily comes from
right-wing extremist groups, Puerto Rican extremist groups, and special
interest extremists.
Right-wing Extremist Groups.--The threat from right-wing extremist
groups includes militias, white-separatist groups, and anti-government
groups. All right-wing extremist groups tend to encourage massing
weapons, ammunition and supplies in preparation for a confrontation
with federal law enforcement, as well as local law enforcement who are
often perceived as agents for the State/Federal government.
The goal of the militia movement is to defend and protect the
United States Constitution from those who want to take away the rights
of Americans. The militia movement believes that the United States
Constitution gives Americans the right to live their lives without
government interference. The FBI is not concerned with every single
aspect of the militia movement since many militia members are law-
abiding citizens who do not pose a threat of violence. The FBI focuses
on radical elements of the militia movement capable and willing to
commit violence against government, law enforcement, civilian, military
and international targets (U.N., visiting foreign military personnel).
Not every state in the union has a militia problem. Militia activity
varies from states with almost no militia activity (Hawaii,
Connecticut) to states with thousands of active militia members
(Michigan, Texas).
The American militia movement has grown over the last decade.
Factors contributing to growth include:
--Guns.--The right to bear arms is an issue which almost all militia
members agree and most militia members believe a conspiracy
exists to take away their guns. The national system of instant
background checks for all gun buyers, mandated by the 1993
Brady Act and which actually was implemented on November 30,
1998, has further angered many militia groups. These militia
members see this new law as another example of how the
government is conspiring to take away their guns. The banning
of semiautomatic assault weapons has also angered many militia
members.
--State laws.--Militias resent state laws forbidding them to gather
together to fire weapons. Sixteen states have laws which
prohibit all militia groups and 17 states have laws which
prohibit all paramilitary training.
--Mistrust of Federal law enforcement.--Is frequently mentioned in
militia literature and overall militia mythology. FBI and
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) actions, such as
Ruby Ridge, the Branch Davidians, and the Freeman standoff, are
cited, and thus are hated and distrusted by many militia
members.
--Taxes.--Militia members believe that they pay too many taxes and
that those tax dollars are wasted by a huge, uncaring and
inefficient bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. Since the Internal
Revenue Service collects federal taxes, it is widely hated by
militia members.
--The United Nations.--Is perceived as an organization bent on taking
over the world and destroying American democracy and
establishing ``the New World Order.'' The New World Order
theory holds that, one day, the United Nations will lead a
military coup against the nations of the world to form a one-
world government. United Nations troops, consisting of foreign
armies, will commence a military takeover of America. The
United Nations will mainly use foreign troops on American soil
because foreigners will have fewer reservations about killing
American citizens. Captured United States military bases will
be used to help conquer the rest of the world.
Most of the militia movement has no racial overtones and does not
espouse bigotry; there are some black and Jewish militia members.
However, the pseudo-religion of Christian Identity, as well as other
hate philosophies, have begun to creep into the militia movement. This
scenario is currently being played out in the Michigan Militia,
arguably the largest militia group in America. Lynn Van Huizen, leader
of the Michigan Militia Corps, is currently trying to oust Christian
Identity factions from his group. Christian Identity is a belief system
that provides both a religious base for racism and anti-Semitism, and
an ideological rationale for violence against minorities. This pattern
of racist elements seeping into the militia movement is a disturbing
trend, as it will only strengthen the radical elements of the militias.
Many white supremacist groups adhere to the Christian Identity
belief system, which holds that the world is on the verge of a final
apocalyptic struggle between God/Christ and Satan (The Battle of
Armageddon) in which Aryans (European Caucasians) must fight Satan's
heirs: Jews, nonwhites and their establishment allies (i.e., the
Federal Government). The Christian Identity belief system (also known
as Kingdom Identity) provides a religious base for racism and anti-
Semitism, and an ideological rationale for violence against minorities
and their white allies. Christian Identity teaches that the white race
is the chosen race of God, whites are the ``true Israelites'' and Jews
are the Children of Satan. Adherents believe that Jews have
increasingly gained control of the United States Federal Government and
are attempting to enslave the white population by enacting laws
subjugating the white people, such as affirmative action, pro-choice,
and anti-gun statutes.
To prepare for Armageddon, many Identity adherents engage in
survivalist and paramilitary training, storing foodstuffs and supplies,
and caching weapons and ammunition. As the next millennium approaches,
Identity's more extreme members may take action to prepare for
Armageddon, including armed robbery to finance the upcoming battle,
destroying government property and infrastructure, and targeting Jews
and nonwhites.
Due to Christian Identity adherents' widespread propaganda efforts
and Identity's racist/anti-Semitic/anti-government appeal, there are a
number of churches and diverse organizations throughout the United
States that embrace the doctrines of Identity. Identity beliefs are
also increasingly found in the rhetoric of all types of right-wing
extremist groups, including, but not limited to, militias, survivalist
communes, the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, skinheads, tax protesters, and
common law courts. Thus, with the approaching millennium, there is a
greater potential for members from such Identity influenced groups to
engage in violent activities as well.
As the next millennium approaches, violent and illegal acts may
increase, due to Christian Identity's belief that the world is on the
verge of a final apocalyptic struggle (aka The Battle of Armageddon)
between God/Christ and Satan. Identity members believe that this
entails Aryans (European Caucasians) fighting Satan's heirs (Jews, non-
whites, and their establishment allies). To prepare, Identity adherents
engage in survivalist and paramilitary training. As the year 2000
approaches, more extreme members may take action to prepare for or
bring about ``Armageddon,'' including armed robbery to finance the
upcoming battle, destroying government property and targeting Jews and
non-whites.
Other Anti-Government Groups.--The other right-wing anti-government
groups include Freemen, ``sovereign'' citizens, and common law courts.
The Freemen and sovereign citizens believe they have the right to
renounce their citizenship, after which they do not have to comply with
any laws or rules and the federal government would have no influence
over them. In addition, some, like the Freemen, believe they have the
right to issue their own money which is called ``certified comptroller
warrants.''
Some members of the right-wing have formed their own system of laws
to enforce and follow (called common law courts) to replace the
existing court system. The common law courts have no basis in
jurisprudence, but participants claim legitimacy based on the laws of
the Old Testament, English common law, the Magna Carta and commercial
law. Some common law courts have issued arrest warrants, but as of yet,
there are no reports that any of these arrests have been accomplished.
Puerto Rican Extremist Groups.--A resurgence in Puerto Rican
extremism has occurred in the past six months. A nearly decade-long
hiatus in terrorist activity ended on March 31, 1998, with the
detonation of an incendiary device at the ``Superaquaduct''
construction project in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. On June 9, 1998, a bomb
exploded outside a branch of Banco Popular in Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico.
The EPB-Macheteros publicly claimed responsibility for both attacks,
citing environmental concerns and opposition to the privatization of
the Puerto Rico Telephone Company.
Puerto Rican extremism remains a concern to the FBI. Traditionally,
the Puerto Rican Terrorists have targeted United States establishments
and interests in an effort to gain Puerto Rican independence. On
December 13, 1998, Puerto Ricans voted in a non-binding referendum
concerning Puerto Rico's political status. Voters were given the
opportunity to vote for independence, continued commonwealth status,
statehood, free association, or none of the above. Independence
garnered precious little support in the referendum, receiving a mere
2.5 percent of the vote, according to media reports. Despite the lack
of popular support for independence, militant independence activists
continue to pursue independence through illegal means. Recently, July
25, 1998 marked the 100-year anniversary of the United States invasion
of Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American War. In addition, several
convicted Puerto Rican terrorists remain incarcerated within the
federal prison system, and militant pro-independence activists continue
to lobby for their release. The militant independentistas may engage in
violence as a response to the prisoners' continued incarceration, or as
a symbolic commemoration of over 100 years of American control over the
island.
Special Interest Extremists.--Special interest or single issue
extremists advocate violence and/or criminal activity with the goal of
effecting change in policy vis a vis one specific aspect of society.
The most recognizable single issue terrorists at the present time are
those involved in the violent animal rights, anti-abortion, and
environmental protection movements. Each of these issues evoke strong
emotions within society at large, and violent aberrants continue to
tarnish the legitimate public debate on each issue.
The FBI continues to vigorously investigate various bombings of
abortion clinics and incidents of violence targeting abortion providers
across the country. The January 1998 bombing of an abortion clinic in
Birmingham, Alabama, has resulted in a significant allocation of FBI
manpower and resources to the investigation of the bombing. The recent
assassination of Dr. Barnett Slepian in Buffalo, New York, serves as an
acute reminder of the very real threat posed by anti-abortion
extremists.
Animal rights extremists continue to pose significant challenges
for law enforcement as well. Various arsons and other incidents of
property destruction have been claimed by the Animal Liberation Front
(ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). For example, on October 19,
1998, the Vail Ski Resort suffered a series of arson attacks that
damaged or destroyed eight separate structures and resulted in
approximately $12 million in property damage. In a communique issued to
various news agencies in Colorado, ELF claimed responsibility for the
arsons in retaliation for the resort's plans to expand its ski areas.
The group claimed that the proposed expansion would destroy the last
remaining habitat in Colorado for the lynx.
Although the frequency of terrorist incidents within the United
States has decreased in number, the potential for destruction has
increased as terrorists have turned toward large improvised explosive
devices to inflict maximum damage. The ease with which people can
obtain the recipes for manufacturing explosives and developing chemical
and biological weapons facilitates the potential of a major incident.
As technology and materials become more accessible, the possibility of
misuse and subsequent fatalities increases. One has only to look at the
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, in Oklahoma City, to see the
devastating potential for a terrorist act. Prior to April 19, 1995, no
one would have believed that Americans would commit such a tragic act
against other Americans. But they did, and the potential for another
such incident continues.
Looking Forward
If there was ever any doubt about the level of commitment and
determination that drives rogue terrorists to strike their perceived
enemies, convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef provided a glimpse into the
mind set of these individuals. When sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, Yousef boasted of his destructive
exploits saying, ``Yes, I am a terrorist and proud of it.''
Today's terrorists have learned from the successes and mistakes of
terrorists who went before them. The terrorists of tomorrow will learn
from the successes and mistakes of the Ramzi Yousef, Usama bin Laden,
and others. Tomorrow's terrorists will have an even more dizzying array
of deadly weapons and technologies, including chemical and biological
agents and computer networks, available to them for committing their
insidious acts. We cannot lull ourselves into a false sense of security
based on the capabilities that exist today and the successes we have
achieved. Rather, we must continue to improve upon our existing
readiness and develop the capabilities, technologies, and techniques
that will be required to keep pace with acts of terrorism in the
future.
The FBI has developed its Strategic Plan for 1998-2003 to guide us
as we deal with the challenges and changing crime problems that face
this organization. Under this plan, we have identified as our highest
priority foreign intelligence, terrorist, and criminal activities that
directly threaten the national or economic security of the United
States. Two of the strategic goals set for this priority area are
especially relevant to the problems we are discussing today: Prevent,
disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur; and deter
the unlawful exploitation of emerging technologies by foreign powers,
terrorists, and criminal elements.
Our goal is to move beyond just responding to acts of terrorism,
whether these terrorist acts be bombings here in the United States or
in foreign countries or cyber attacks against the national information
infrastructure. We recognize that to be successful in the future, the
FBI must become more proactive in dealing with these complex threats
and problems.
I would like to discuss several areas that I believe are especially
important to our national response to the problem posed by terrorism.
In doing so, I would like to highlight some of the programs and
investments the Subcommittee has supported in prior years and our
requests for the 2000 budget. For 2000, the FBI is requesting increases
totaling $9,000,000 for our Counterterrorism initiative and 207
positions (60 agents) and $36,742,000 for our Technology and Cyber
Crimes initiative.
Rapid Deployment.--The United States Government's response to the
bombings in East Africa demonstrated the firm and unequivocal
commitment to responding to acts of terrorism wherever they may occur.
Terrorists must know that if they act against the United States, the
FBI will pursue them relentlessly and for as long as it takes to bring
them before the bar of justice.
Earlier, I described the scope of the deployment of FBI personnel
to East Africa. Based on that experience, in the aftermath of the near
simultaneous bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, I directed the
establishment of five FBI Rapid Deployment Teams to provide a
capability of responding to multiple incidents. With the funding you
provided in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations and Emergency
Supplemental Act of 1999, we are establishing teams in New York City,
Washington, D.C. (2), Miami, and Los Angeles. Since the establishment
of these teams, there have been three instances where teams have been
placed on full alert due to the receipt of intelligence information
indicating a potential terrorist act.
We readily recognize that improvements are needed in working with
our partners at the Department of Defense so that necessary airlift
support for future deployments can be staged in a more timely and
organized manner. Again, your interest and assistance in the improving
the capability of the Department of Defense to provide aviation support
to the FBI is greatly appreciated and will help us place advance teams
on scene faster. As directed by Congress, we are also working to
develop a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defense to
address the full scope of airlift support and related services that are
required by the FBI.
Intelligence Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination.--The
collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence regarding
terrorist activities and threats are critical to the success of FBI
efforts to prevent incidents and in the investigation of acts that do
occur. Within the FBI, we have several programs and initiatives to do
this.
With the Subcommittee's support, the FBI established the
Counterterrorism Center at FBI Headquarters in 1995. The FBI
Counterterrorism Center encompasses the operations of the FBI's
International Terrorism Operations Section and Domestic Terrorism
Operations Section. Just this week the Diplomatic Security Service
joined nineteen other federal agencies assigning personnel to the FBI
Counterterrorism Center. Other agencies in the Center include: the Air
Force Office of Special Investigations, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce,
the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of
Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal
Aviation Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Internal Revenue Service,
the National Security Agency, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service,
the United States Customs Service, the United States Marshals Service,
and the United States Secret Service. The proposed National Domestic
Preparedness Office would also become a partner with the
Counterterrorism Center to ensure domestic preparedness programs and
activities can benefit from counterterrorism operational experiences
and reflect the most up-to-date threat information for making decisions
on training and equipment grants.
Providing intelligence and threat information to our State and
local partners is accomplished through the Counterterrorism Center and
the National Infrastructure Protection Center. Depending upon the
nature of the information, we use one or more of several avenues for
dissemination. The FBI has expanded the Terrorist Threat Warning
System, first implemented in 1989, to reach all aspects of the law
enforcement and intelligence communities. Nationwide dissemination of
unclassified information is achieved through the National Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS). In addition, the FBI
transmits threat information to security managers of thousands of
United States commercial interests around the country through the
Awareness of National Security Issues and Response (ANSIR) program. The
National Infrastructure Protection Center also uses NLETS and ANSIR to
reach State and local law enforcement and others regarding cyber and
infrastructure-related threats and information. The Center has
developed the InfraGard program which facilitates the sharing of
information about computer intrusions and research related to
infrastructure protection among network participants. The proposed
National Domestic Preparedness Office anticipates providing special
bulletins and related information on weapons of mass destruction issues
to a much broader base of State and local agencies, consisting of law
enforcement, fire fighter, emergency medical services, public health,
and emergency management, through the Law Enforcement On-Line intranet,
a website accessible through the Internet, newsletters, and a toll-free
assistance number.
Another mechanism for promoting coordination during an incident is
the FBI's new Strategic Information and Operations Center, which was
dedicated this past November. Congress provided funding for this
project beginning in 1995. The new Strategic Information and Operations
Center allows us to handle multiple incidents simultaneously. It also
provides us with greatly enhanced communications capabilities between
FBI Headquarters and field offices, as well as between the FBI and
other federal agencies. Our coordination of operational efforts in East
Africa were hampered, somewhat, by the physical and technical
limitations of the old center.
The FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency have taken several
steps to improve cooperation between agencies, including the exchange
of deputies, exchange of personnel assigned to each agency's
counterterrorism center, joint meetings, and joint operational and
analytical initiatives.
At the field operational level, the FBI sponsors 18 Joint Terrorism
Task Forces in major cities to maximize interagency cooperation and
coordination among federal, State, and local law enforcement.
Currently, 327 full-time and part-time federal, State, and local law
enforcement personnel participate on these task forces, in addition to
FBI personnel. Federal law enforcement participants include the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States Secret
Service, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Central Intelligence
Agency, Federal Protective Service, United States Marshals Service,
United States Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, the United States Border Patrol, the United States Department
of State, the Postal Inspection Service, and the Internal Revenue
Service. All task force participants are provided appropriate security
clearances that are necessary for their involvement in task force
operations and investigations. Joint Terrorism Task Forces have played
a critical role in many significant terrorism investigations. The FBI
recently expanded this concept to include Regional Terrorism Task
Forces. Regional task forces, of which two are now in existence, are
designed to meet the needs of communities where a terrorism problem
exists across a broader regional geographic area, but the situation
does not warrant a full-time task force. Regional task forces meet on
regular intervals to share information they have collected and
determine if there is a nexus for that information to any ongoing
investigation. The 5-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology
Crime Plan supports further expansion of FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Forces where warranted by assessments of activity.
One of our most effective means of obtaining information is the use
of court-authorized electronic surveillance. Communication, either
written or conversations with accomplices, is central to any
collaborative effort--including terrorist conspiracies. The capability
to lawfully intercept communications between criminals, terrorists, and
foreign intelligence agents, has been instrumental in our past
successes. These capabilities help the FBI, as well as law enforcement
in our States and cities, to prevent acts and to save lives. This
Subcommittee has been supportive our efforts to ensure that law
enforcement does not lose its capabilities to lawfully intercept
communications in the growing digital telecommunications environment. I
hope that you will be able to support our request in the 2000 budget
for $15,000,000 to support reimbursements to telecommunications
carriers for costs incurred in complying with the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).
Technology Development and Exploitation.--Developing and exploiting
technology for law enforcement and counterterrorism applications are a
key to maintaining our edge in the war against terrorists. This
Subcommittee recognized the value of research and development when you
set out your instructions and expectations for the 5-Year Interagency
Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan. In 1998, you provided the
FBI with $10,500,000 from the Attorney General's Counterterrorism Fund
for directed research and development projects. With that 1998 funding,
as well as other funding appropriated for the FBI Laboratory's Advanced
Render Safe and Hazardous Materials Response Programs, we took the
following actions:
--Entered into an agreement with the Department of Energy to improve
access by the forensic community to America's national
laboratories by seeking to leverage resources in five areas:
research, development, test, and evaluation; technology
transfer; specialized training; specialized forensic analytical
support; and hazardous materials response.
--Initiated 17 projects under the Department of Energy agreement, as
well as awarded contracts for 11 other projects with commercial
and academic entities, in the areas of explosives detection,
forensic evidence analysis and crime scene technology,
information infrastructure technology, and specialized
training.
--Began the process to establish separate agreements with the
Savannah River Site and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
--Continued our agreements with the United States Army Edgewood
Arsenal, Engineering Development and Education Center, Naval
Medical Research Center, United States Naval Medical Center,
and have begun the process of establishing other agreements
with other key components of the Department of Defense.
--Entered into an agreement with the Southwest Surety Institute at
New Mexico State University to establish forensic training that
complements FBI forensic curriculum requirements and which
supports counterterrorism related operational and support
services.
--Upgraded and enhanced the Automated Computer Examination System
(ACES), an automated forensic search capability for computer
evidence, and enhanced technical support of crime scene
evidence collection and execution of court-authorized
electronic surveillance on computer networks.
I am pleased that the FBI has been added to the Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG) Executive Committee. The Technical Support Working
Group is an interagency group that coordinates federal research and
development programs. The Department of State and Department of Defense
provide leadership to the group. The FBI has used the Technical Support
Working Group to leverage its funding by joining with other agencies in
co-sponsoring projects. The FBI encourages support for existing, proven
interagency efforts like the Technical Support Working Group to help us
meet the challenges posed by new and emerging technology.
Without continued, sustained investments, at both the agency and
interagency levels, in the development and application of new
technologies for law enforcement, we will fall behind in meeting our
goals of preventing terrorism. Unfortunately, law enforcement is not
alone in seeking to use new technology to improve its capabilities.
Shortly after the World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yousef made his
way to Pakistan. Eventually, he and several associates moved on to the
Philippines and rented a unit at the Dona Jasefa apartment complex.
That apartment served as a safehouse and improvised bomb factory. On
December 11, 1994, Yousef placed a small explosive on a Philippines
airliner en route to Tokyo via Cebu. A Japanese businessman was killed
when the device exploded under his seat. Investigation determined that
Yousef and his associates had used the device to test a new bomb design
and that Yousef planned to place more powerful devices on United States
airliners.
While mixing chemicals at the apartment on January 7, 1995, a fire
broke out, forcing Yousef and two co-conspirators to flee into the
street. Concerned that he had left his laptop computer in the
apartment, Yousef sent one of his associates back into the apartment to
retrieve it. Responding Philippines police arrested the associate and
were able to recover the computer--which contained encrypted files--
intact.
We were fortunate in that Yousef was careless in protecting his
computer password. Consequently, we were able to decrypt his files.
These files contained the details of Yousef's plot to destroy numerous
United States airliners using a timing device made from an altered
watch. After simultaneously planting the devices on United States
airliners, the five participants in the plot were to return to either
Pakistan or Qatar.
Had that fire not broken out or had we not been able to access
those computer files, Yousef and his co-conspirators might have carried
out the simultaneous bombings of 11 United States airliners, with
potentially thousands of victims.
Terrorists, both abroad and at home, are using technology to
protect their operations from being discovered and thwart the efforts
of law enforcement to detect, prevent, and investigate such acts.
Convicted spy Aldrich Ames was told by his Russian handlers to encrypt
his computer files. International drug traffickers also are using
encryption to avoid detection by law enforcement.
Most encryption products manufactured today for use by the general
public are non-recoverable. This means they do not include features
that provide for timely law enforcement access to the plain text of
encrypted communications and computer files that are lawfully seized.
Law enforcement remains in unanimous agreement that the continued
widespread availability and increasing use of strong, non-recoverable
encryption products will soon nullify our effective use of court
authorized electronic surveillance and the execution of lawful search
and seizure warrants. The loss of these capabilities will devastate our
capabilities for fighting crime, preventing acts of terrorism, and
protecting the national security. Recently, discussions with industry
have indicated a willingness to work with law enforcement in meeting
our concerns and assisting in developing a law enforcement
counterencryption capability. I strongly urge the Congress to adopt a
balanced public policy on encryption, one that carefully balances the
legitimate needs of law enforcement to protect our Nation's citizens
and preserve the national security with the needs of individuals.
The demand for accessing, examining, and analyzing computers and
computer storage media for evidentiary purposes is becoming
increasingly critical to our ability to investigate terrorism, child
pornography, computer-facilitated crimes, and other cases. In the past,
the Subcommittee has supported FBI efforts to establish a data
forensics capability through our Computer Analysis Response Teams.
There is a need to further expand this capability to address a growing
workload. Indeed, our limited capability has created a backlog that
impacts on both investigations and prosecutions. For 2000, the FBI is
requesting 20 positions and $13,835,000 for our cryptanalysis and
network data interception programs and 79 positions and $9,861,000 to
expand our Computer Analysis Response Team capabilities.
Our Nation's critical infrastructure--both cyber and physical--
present terrorists, hackers, criminals, and foreign agents with a
target for attacks, the consequences of which could be devastating.
Over the past several years, the Congress has been very supportive of
FBI efforts to develop and improve its capabilities for investigating
computer intrusions and other cyber-crimes. These efforts have included
the establishment of the National Infrastructure Protection Center and
the creation of specially-trained and equipped squads and teams in FBI
field offices. For 2000, we are requesting increases of $1,656,000 for
operations of the National Infrastructure Protection Center and 108
positions (60 agents) and $11,390,000 for additional field National
Infrastructure Protection and Computer Intrusion squads and teams.
Domestic Readiness.--The most potentially devastating threat facing
the United States as we enter the next century is the terrorist use of
weapons of mass destruction (large conventional explosive, chemical,
biological, radiological or nuclear devices). For terrorists, symbolic
targets, critical infrastructure or major special events make
attractive targets. These acts may result in a significant loss of
life, may cause psychological trauma and will attract a high level of
media exposure.
While the United States holds little credible intelligence at this
time indicating that international or domestic terrorists are planning
to attack United States interests domestically through the use of
weapons of mass destruction, a growing number (while still small) of
``lone offender'' and extremist splinter elements of right-wing groups
have been identified as possessing or attempting to develop/use
chemical, biological or radiological materials. Additionally,
religious/apocalyptic sects which are unaffiliated with far right
extremists may pose an increasing threat. With the coming of the next
millennium, some religious/apocalyptic groups or individuals may turn
to violence as they seek to achieve dramatic effects to fulfill their
prophecies. The possibility of an indigenous group like Aum Supreme
Truth cannot be excluded.
In all likelihood, State and local law enforcement, emergency
management, and public health agencies are going to be the first to
respond to and contend with the aftermath of a terrorist's large-scale
improvised explosive device or the release of chemical or biological
agents. Congress has recognized the critical importance of State and
local agencies in the national response to and management of such a
crisis by providing assistance through several programs, such as the
Department of Defense Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program
and training and equipment grants under the auspices of the Office of
Justice Programs. The FBI strongly supports efforts to train and equip
State and local first responders whose assistance and expertise will be
critical to our investigation of such terrorist incidents. I would like
to describe three FBI-led initiatives supporting domestic readiness:
the proposed National Domestic Preparedness Office, the Hazardous
Devices School, and the equipping of State and local bomb squads.
During the development of the 5-Year Counterterrorism and
Technology Crime Strategy, State and local stakeholders recommended
that the Attorney General designate a single federal agency to
coordinate the multitude of federal domestic preparedness activities.
In October 1998, the Attorney General announced her proposal to
establish a National Domestic Preparedness Office that would serve as a
single point of contact for State and local authorities. The Attorney
General delegated responsibility for implementing and managing the
Office to the FBI. After several months of working with key federal
agencies involved in this area, a blueprint to guide the implementation
of the National Domestic Preparedness Office was prepared and is under
review. Among the agencies we consulted with in developing the
blueprint were: the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department
of Health and Human Services, the Department of Defense, the National
Guard Bureau, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection
Agency, various components within the Department of Justice, and State
and local authorities. Using this blueprint as a guide, the Department
recently submitted to the Subcommittee a notification to establish the
National Domestic Preparedness Office.
The mission of the National Domestic Preparedness Office will be to
assist State and local emergency response agencies (law enforcement,
fire, hazardous materials, emergency medical services, emergency
management, and public health) by serving as a single coordinating
office and clearinghouse for federal efforts to prepare our Nation's
communities for the threat posed by the terrorist use of a weapon of
mass destruction. The Office will be organized around six program areas
that will focus upon specific issues or areas, including: planning,
training, exercises, equipment/research and development, information
and intelligence sharing, and health and medical.
State and local acceptance of the National Domestic Preparedness
Office is critical for its success. Part of the blueprint for the
office is the creation of a State and local advisory group patterned
after our highly successful Criminal Justice Information Services
Advisory Policy Board. The individuals comprising this group will
represent their respective areas of expertise and serve as a bridge
between federal domestic preparedness program planning and the needs
and priorities of states and local communities. We are also recruiting
experienced individuals from State and local first responder groups to
work in the National Domestic Preparedness Office. We also plan to
solicit State and local agencies for detailees to the Office.
In our local communities, the work of the National Domestic
Preparedness Office will be facilitated by a network of 56 full-time
coordinators, one in each FBI field office. These local coordinators
will serve as the primary point of contact for State and local
emergency first responders. State and local officials will also be able
to contact the National Domestic Preparedness Office through a toll-
free assistance number, an Internet website, and the Law Enforcement
On-Line intranet.
As we continue building State and local first responder
preparedness and readiness, we must keep in mind that this undertaking
is a long-term and costly commitment that must be sustained in the
future. Equipment provided in 1999 will need to be upgraded or replaced
in the future as newer, improved technologies become available. New
protective equipment may also be needed to respond to changes in the
chemical, biological, and nuclear threat. Basic training must be
available for State and local employees who will be hired in the
future. Advanced training must be provided to State and local personnel
who have completed basic training to maintain competencies.
The proposed National Domestic Preparedness Office is part of our
long-term commitment to sustaining State and local first responder
readiness. Through this office, we hope to provide better, more
coordinated service and assistance to State and local communities and
reduce duplication among federal programs.
Another initiative being undertaken by the FBI to improve State and
local readiness capabilities is the expansion of training and
modernization of facilities at the Hazardous Devices School, located at
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Through the Hazardous Devices School, the
FBI trains and certifies federal, State, and local bomb technicians in
accordance with standards developed through the National Bomb Squad
Commanders Advisory Board. The Hazardous Devices School is the only law
enforcement training facility offering certification for public safety
bomb technicians. The 5-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and
Technology Crime Plan recommends increasing the availability of federal
pre-blast and post-blast bomb technician training for first responders.
With the funding provided by the Congress in 1998, we were able to
train 963 students, an increase of 48 percent over the previous year.
In particular, we provided training to 386 students in a new Weapons of
Mass Destruction Bomb Technician Emergency Actions Course. Beginning
this year, the weapons of mass destruction course is being integrated
into the basic bomb technician course so that all new bomb technicians
receive this training. We will also continue to offer the separate
course to those bomb technicians already certified.
The expansion of training at the Hazardous Devices School is
placing great demands on current facilities. These facilities,
consisting of three aging metal buildings and small test ranges located
an inefficient distance from other facilities, limit the quantity of
personnel trained and the quality of instruction permissible.
Additionally, there is an increasing demand for basic and advanced
courses, as well as speciality courses that require advanced
techniques, that cannot be met with existing facilities.
For 2000, the FBI is requesting $9,000,000 to construct a practical
problems training course at Redstone Arsenal as a first step toward
improving instructional facilities. The proposed practical problems
training course would be comprised of a series of mock buildings that
would permit more realistic training scenarios and exercises for
students.
State and local bomb technicians may be among the first emergency
responders to encounter a terrorist device, including devices that may
combine the use of explosives and a chemical, biological, or
radiological agent. Recognizing the importance for providing State and
local bomb technicians with a capability for detecting the presences of
such agents, the FBI developed a multi-year initiative to provide basic
equipment and chemical/biological detection technology to the
approximately 630 State and local bomb technician squads across the
Nation. Congress directed the Attorney General in the 1999 Justice
Appropriations Act to provide $25,000,000 from the Department's Working
Capital Fund to begin this initiative. For 2000, the Department is
requesting $45,000,000 to continue this initiative which is being
managed by the FBI. This request directly supports the recommendation
contained in the 5-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology
Plan to prepare bomb technicians to address incidents involving a
combination of explosives and chemical, biological, or radiological
agents.
International Partnerships and Cooperation.--If, as recent events
seem to indicate, terrorists are going to strike against the United
States through its presence and citizens in foreign countries, then it
is in our national interest to develop and expand ``cop-to-cop''
relationships with friendly foreign law enforcement, provide basic
counterterrorism crime scene and related training, and share with them
our forensic and related technologies.
As I indicated earlier, FBI Legal Attaches from Cairo and Pretoria
were the first non-resident United States law enforcement officials to
arrive on the scene of the terrorist bombings in Dar es Salaam and
Nairobi. Both of these individuals were instrumental in establishing
productive relationships with the host governments and local law
enforcement authorities so that our main body of agents, technicians,
and others could do their jobs once they arrived. Our Legal Attaches
provided critical advice to local authorities on protecting the crime
scenes so that key evidence was not destroyed. And, as I also noted
earlier, our Legal Attache on scene in Nairobi was instrumental in
persuading Kenyan authorities to turn over to the United States two
individuals taken into custody.
This Subcommittee has strongly supported my efforts to increase the
number of FBI Legal Attache Offices. I am hopeful that we can continue
to depend upon your support as we complete the four year expansion
strategy that was started in 1996.
Both Tanzanian and Kenyan authorities expressed interest in
receiving training and technical assistance so that they will not only
be better prepared in the event of future acts of terrorism, but also
out of a desire to provide more effective basic law enforcement
services--modeled after those of American law enforcement--to their
citizens. Investments in these types of cooperative programs, such as
the Antiterrorism Training Assistance program of the Department of
State and the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, will
help provide foreign law enforcement with basic knowledge, such as
taking the steps needed to protect terrorism crime scenes until the
arrival of FBI rapid deployment teams and prevent the contamination or
destruction of evidence that could eventually be used in a United
States Court to prosecute an international terrorist.
In support of the Attorney General's leadership efforts within the
G-8 to strengthen international cooperation to combat terrorism, the
FBI is developing the WorldFACTS system, which will provide G-8
countries with access to four FBI forensic systems: EXPRESS, which
correlates information from bombing crime scenes and undetonated
explosives devices, and provides a reference base for explosives;
comparing and matching firearms evidence from shooting incidents and
seized firearms; searching and matching latent fingerprints from crime
scenes and evidence; and storing and sharing of terrorist-case related
DNA information. Funding for this effort was provided by the
Subcommittee in 1997. In 1998, we successfully completed a test of the
telecommunications line between Italy and the United States. We have
shipped WorldFACTS equipment to Italy in anticipation of the
finalization of operational guidelines between the FBI and Italian
authorities.
The FBI also assists the Department of Defense in its
counterproliferation program. The goals of this program are to train
and equip foreign law enforcement personnel to detect, prevent,
investigate, and prosecute incidents involving the illegal trafficking
in weapons of mass destruction and to deter the possible proliferation
and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in Eastern Europe, the
Baltic States, and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Under this
interagency program, which also involves the United States Customs
Service, the Department of Energy, the Department of State, the
Department of Commerce, and other agencies, the FBI has provided
counter-proliferation training for government officials from the
republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova.
Reducing the opportunity for terrorists to obtain radiological and
similar materials at the source is the first step toward preventing
their use against the United States.
Conclusion
To adequately understand the terrorist threat currently facing the
United States, we must appreciate the unique position America occupies
in the world today. As the sole superpower, the politics of the United
States are viewed with intense interest by nations around the world. To
some individuals and groups who feel powerless to affect their own
destinies through legal means, the breadth of influence and power
wielded by the United States represents a stunning contrast--and an
attractive target for their frustrations. Despite our successes against
various terrorist groups and individuals, new groups and new
individuals step onto the scene to take up the cause against America.
The FBI has developed a broad-based response to many external
threats that confront the United States today. Due to the strong
support of this Subcommittee, we are much better prepared to address
the terrorist threat at home and abroad than we were six years ago.
With the continued support of Congress and the Executive Branch, and in
cooperation with our partners in the intelligence and law enforcement
communities, we will continue to enhance our ability to protect the
American people from the threat of international terrorism.

Top down coordination

Senator Gregg. I congratulate all of you for your effort in
this area. My view 3 years ago when we got started on this was
that it was going to be impossible to get everybody to
coordinate. There were just so many different agencies. I think
we counted 24 different agencies involved.
I do think you have made immense strides. I think this
interagency report that you and the Attorney General and the
Director put together is superb. People have described it as
the bible for getting ready for terrorist activity. I think it
can be effectively described as that type of document, and it
shows coordination. I know that the departments are working
together. I have been to every department, I think, that is
involved in this issue, and I have been very impressed with the
willingness of people to work with each other.
I know the State Department has worked very hard on its
Accountability Review Board and is trying to respond to the
Accountability Review Board in an aggressive and positive way
and I congratulate you for that.
The sincerity of effort has been genuine and I think it has
been very positive. I do feel we have made great strides, but I
think we have to also acknowledge that there is a long way to
go, which you recognize.
I have got to come back to this frustration about this
Presidential press conference, because it just so antagonized
me because I think it was just the wrong message to send. When
we were trying to coordinate--because it was not coordinated--I
will not put you on the spot, but I do not think anybody at
this table was consulted about this press conference in any
depth. Maybe you were. Maybe you would like to correct that
statement. But I do not think you were. It really came out of
the blue. It is obvious that it has no consistency with the
interagency plan, the proposal that is put forward.
So my question is this: I know you are all trying hard, but
can we really do this if we do not have a top-down coordinated
effort? How are we going to do this if we set out a game plan
for accomplishing it, and then, suddenly, we have a side-
tracking event where a whole set of proposals just come out of
the blue, which is inconsistent with the proposals which have
just been agreed to?
Attorney General Reno. I think we are in a growing process,
and I think the instrument that we present to you this March
that reflects the cross-cutting budget, with the message that
you are sending, I think we can use that as a means of bringing
to the budget process the same working relationship that we
have at this table.
Senator Gregg. I appreciate that comment. I guess I was
just venting a little frustration. The message is not to you
because you folks are doing your job, and you are doing it very
well in this area. It is to the White House, which is not doing
its job, and not doing it very well in this area in my opinion.

Embassy security

Let me go on to another subject: there are two players not
at this table, of really huge significance, which are the CIA
and the military. I know you are working with them, but I would
be interested if you could give me your evaluation of two
issues.
Number one, from the Secretary, I would be interested in
your evaluation of progress relative to the expansion of
Marines and Marine security which is necessary at your
facilities.
And with the Attorney General and the FBI Director, I would
be interested in your thoughts on this concept of using the
National Guard as the second responder, setting up ten
districts of National Guard units, ten areas or regions that
the National Guard will be responsible for. It makes a lot of
sense to me, but I know there has been a lot of controversy
about it. I would like to hear your thoughts on it. Do we have
any Posse Comitatus issues there and does it make sense and how
will you tie it in with the FBI?
Let me start with the Marine issue, which goes to Secretary
Albright.
Secretary Albright. Thank you, also, Mr. Chairman. I really
think that you have prodded us on all these issues in a
remarkable way and have been ahead of your time in this, and we
appreciate everything that you are doing. I, for one, pledge
myself to work with you as closely as possible on this because
I think that all the issues that you have raised are key to our
cooperative activity on this.
Let me just say that I think there are two responsibilities
in terms of guarding our embassies. The Marine security guards
at our embassies and consulates are there for internal defense,
and this includes preventing compromise of classified material
and equipment and the protection of personnel and government
property there. At present, there are Marine security guard
detachments at 122 of our diplomatic posts, and we are in the
process now of adding 37 new Marine security guard detachments
around the world.
I recently had a conversation with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs about how we would work more closely together in
terms of protection around the embassies. This is clearly one
of the issues that we have to deal with, and again, how to do
this without stretching our military beyond what it can do. It
is being called upon to do a lot of work in other parts of our
readiness and defense. But I think it is important for people
to understand that the Marine guards are for internal security.
Senator Gregg. While we are on that subject, the
Accountability Review Board pointed out that there has to be an
overhaul of a large number of facilities. What percentage of
the facilities have done the initial steps and how far do we
have to go?
Secretary Albright. Well, we have begun, really, to upgrade
a lot of the embassies in terms of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
In terms of rebuilding other embassies, however, I do not have
the percentage. We have taken a lot of steps in order to put
barriers around them, to try to look at ways to have our host
governments assist us in closing off roads, buying extra
property and creating set-backs for places before we can
relocate them. About 10 percent of the work has been done. But
this is, I think, an on-going process that we are dedicated to
working on.
Senator Gregg. What is your build-out time frame? You have
gotten 10 percent done. In a year from now, will we have 50
percent done?
Secretary Albright. We will keep proceeding on the basis of
the resources that we have, and I will have to give you a
better estimate. I do not know. But this is a steady process
and we are doing everything we can at a number of embassies in
responding as best we can to the various requests that are
being made.
But I can just assure you that we have decided that there
is no such thing as a low-threat embassy, so we are looking in
every place to do upgrades in terms of how to protect the
surrounding area, giving training to the people within the
embassies and working with the host governments for increased
protection. But this is a steady program and I believe that as
we work out our plan there will be an increased rate of getting
the work done because we will be able to let contracts in a way
that allows us to do better work across the board.
I think that we are going to be able to do a lot of this
within 2 years. But we have a program that has been set out,
and it takes longer, obviously, to rebuild some of these
embassies, such as Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. But there is a
consistent program, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. I will go back to the National Guard in a
moment, but just so there is some continuity here, the
President has asked for $300 million in his budget for next
year. We have got emergency appropriations of $1.4 billion.
Obviously, we are not going to spend the $1.4 billion and it
will be available, and the $300 million, as you said in your
statement, was minimum. It is $700 million less than what the
review panel suggested.
My question is, at some point, your ability to rebuild and
your ability to fix up these embassies is going to outstrip the
money that has been put into the budget for you. That line is
going to cross fairly quickly, I would think, as you start to
rebuild these embassies and restructure them. Maybe you can get
by on $300 million this coming year, but I think it jumps to,
what, $450 million the next year?
Secretary Albright. Four-fifty in fiscal year 2002.
Senator Gregg. Those numbers are not going to work. At that
point, you will be close to $1.3 billion behind what the
Accountability Review Board suggested.
Secretary Albright. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, we have for
some time, obviously, been working on security within the
overall budget. This is not an easy issue because we have been
operating within the Budget Act and within the constraints of
trying to eliminate the deficit and also within what we have
for our Function 150, which deals not only with security and
buildings but the operations of the State Department and our
overall policies.
Senator Gregg. I understand that. My point is, I do not
want to strip those accounts. I want to fund what is needed in
order to make sure your embassies are safe and that your
personnel are safe. But I do not think under the numbers we are
being presented with that you are going to be able to do that
unless I go back and find some money somewhere else. Am I
wrong?
Secretary Albright. Well, we are trying to work within what
we have available, but as I said, it is a minimum requirement.
We are looking at various ways that we can use the money in the
best way possible and, obviously, would be very grateful to
you.
Senator Gregg. But I have to find $1.3 billion. Now,
obviously, Senator Hollings has laid a marker down this
morning. He said he is going to have some serious reservations
about going forward at the levels that the Accountability
Review Board asked for.
But my point to you is, OMB has sent up a budget that is
not going to work in order to protect the embassies, in my
opinion, and I do not want to go into your other accounts and
have to take $1.3 billion out over the next 2 years. So I would
like to work with you and go back to the drawing board and
figure out if we cannot find some other way to address this,
because I do feel very strongly that you are going to get to a
point here where you are not going to have the money to fix up
the embassies to make them secure.
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, can I just say this? I
think that, as the Attorney General said, we are at the
beginning stages of a lot of aspects of this, and we are
working very hard. I think the most important point here is
that we all need to work together on this and try to develop a
budget that not only provides us what we need to do but also is
within what is available.
I want very much to work with you and I appreciate greatly
your interest in this and your ability to see the fact that we
need more. So I am very grateful to you.

National Guard role

Senator Gregg. I am sorry to get off track here. I do that.
Can you respond to this issue of the National Guard's role,
which I see as a major component of this whole exercise. It is
not necessarily under this committee's jurisdiction, but I
would be interested in your thoughts as to how it works.
Mr. Freeh. Mr. Chairman, our view is that, first of all,
there is no Posse Comitatus issue, at least as the proposal is
understood. The National Guard units, which come under the
jurisdiction not only of the Department of Defense but also the
State governors, would be in a role to assess, advise, and
facilitate emergency response by State and local responders.
Senator Gregg. How do you see them interfacing with your
chemical weapons people, your chemical threat people in your
offices?
Mr. Freeh. If we had a situation where a combination of
Federal, State, and local resources could not respond to a
crisis of such a proportion that we needed platoons or
companies of trained National Guardsmen, we would certainly
call on them and rely on them as part of the response plan. We
have a National Guard detailee in the proposed National
Domestic Preparedness Office which would give us that liaison.
They would be under the supervision and authority of the
Attorney General in terms of the PDD 39 crisis management. They
would also come under the authority of FEMA as regards
consequence management. So we would see them as a support
asset, a facilitator, and not interfering with the Federal
plan.
We also need, as you very well know, to make sure that this
is done in a coordinated fashion. We were pleased to learn
about that and we certainly welcome the commitment of
resources. But it has to be put into the domestic response
plan, and there has to be a clear demarcation between what
would be the law enforcement responsibilities and their
supporting facilitation responsibilities.
Senator Gregg. If there is a weapon of mass destruction
used against a community, the first contact would obviously be
with the local police and the local health agencies, and then
the next step, in your opinion, is to contact the regional
office of the FBI who would be immediately in charge of the
scene. Is that your view of the way it would work?
Mr. Freeh. Yes. Under a crisis response, the crisis manager
would become the FBI officer on the scene.
Senator Gregg. And would that person have the capacity
under the plan, as it is presently structured, to call in the
National Guard, or would that be left up to the governor?
Mr. Freeh. That part of the plan is not addressed, only
because it is a very new card on the table. But it is going to
be incorporated in terms of the crisis management response. The
authority that I would not only recommend but foresee is the
ability of the on-scene commander to call exactly that resource
into the scene.
Senator Gregg. How about the CDC? Who would have the
authority to bring them in?
Mr. Freeh. The same authority, the on-scene commander.
Senator Gregg. Through that commander?
Mr. Freeh. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]

Clarification of the Authority to Activate The National Guard

The FBI On-Scene Commander will be able to request the
assistance, support, and resources of the National Guard
through the Governor of the affected state, which has occurred
in past situations. It should be noted that only the State
Governor has the statutory authority to activate the National
Guard.

FBI-local law enforcement cooperation

Senator Gregg. How are you going to get over, to put it
nicely, the institutional barrier that exists today between
local law enforcement and the FBI?
Mr. Freeh. Well, I suppose, the same way we got over it in
Oklahoma City and in downtown Manhattan when the Trade Tower
bombing went off. We do not take it for granted that they are
going to work as successfully as they did in both of those
cases. In both of those cases, however, we had in the case of
the Trade Tower an already existent terrorism task force which
combined not only all the Federal agencies, including FEMA, but
also the New York City Police Department. So the SAC in our
office was not negotiating with the commissioner of 40,000
police officers over who was going to do what. That was a pre-
planned and coordinated effort.
Senator Gregg. How many other cities are at that level of
capability in this country?
Mr. Freeh. In terms of those types of joint task forces,
there are 18 of them now, with several more being proposed. But
in every city, and we can give you the details on this, we are
doing not only planning, but also conducting exercises with
respect to crisis management responses to nonconventional acts
of terrorism and other acts that would be contemplated.
For instance, just recently in South Carolina, we have
conducted a major exercise with respect to the Savannah River
facility that involved not just the law enforcement components
but the State and local components.
Senator Gregg. There were two exercises that I am familiar
with. Is that one of them, then, that was referred to?
Mr. Freeh. I think you are referring to the one in Norfolk,
which was where not only the people represented here and their
agencies, but whole regional departments participated.
[The information follows:]

FBI Planning and Exercise Efforts

The FBI has devoted much attention to improving the
coordination and integration of state and local agencies with
national-level Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism
contingency plans. In September of 1998, the FBI distributed
the WMD Incident Contingency Plan (WMDICP) to all FBI Field
Offices. These plans provide FBI agent responders and field
office crisis management personnel with guidance and
instructions on how to respond to a WMD threat or incident.
While previous plans have been classified, this year's plan was
not. The plan directed FBI Special Agents-in-Charge (SAC) and
WMD Coordinators to provide the WMDICP to state and local first
responders to insure a multi-agency domestic emergency response
to a WMD incident.
The FBI recognizes that coordination ahead of time will
insure our success during the response, investigation and
reconstruction stages of an incident. All FBI field offices
have been tasked to conduct WMD exercises in each of their
regions. With the promulgation of the above-mentioned plan,
field offices have even greater guidance and assistance in
forming a united approach amongst Federal, state, and local
responders.
The FBI's commitment to the WMD program and our
counterparts is growing. For example, this past summer, the FBI
deployed 350 agent and support personnel from 32 field offices
along with 6 SACs/On-Scene-Commanders for a one week period, 24
hours a day, in a Department of Defense led exercise. Other
agencies including the Federal Emergency Management
Administration, Department of Energy, Public Health Service,
Environmental Protection Agency, and others participated in
this extensive full-field exercise which brought nearly 2,000
participants together to test various areas of a Federal
response. Additionally, a major exercise, which engaged
Federal, state, and local participants in the Los Angeles area
in both crisis and consequence management was conducted in
February 1999. In the fall of this year, a full-field WMD
exercise is planned for the east coast which will further test
Federal, state and local crisis and consequence response. The
FBI plans to hold one full-field WMD exercise each year to
include all levels of government and test our response,
especially to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
(CBRN) terrorist act.

Top off exercise

Senator Gregg. Whatever happened to the surprise exercises
that this committee suggested be done about a year ago?
Mr. Freeh. With respect to the one mentioned in the report,
we are currently planning to undertake a no-notice exercise.
Senator Gregg. But we are not going to tell people we are
planning to undertake that.
Mr. Freeh. According to the Attorney General's plan, there
will be a no-notice exercise. This would be a surprise call-out
and exercise, but there is a great deal of planning that is
involved in it and we are in the process of doing that now.
Senator Gregg. I hope we will do it sooner rather than
later so that we can figure out--we ought to do two or three of
them, to be honest with you, so we find out just what we can do
and what we cannot do. We know we are not going to be able to
do a lot. I mean, we know it is going to be abysmal, in my
opinion, but we ought to figure out where the problems are
sooner rather than later.
Yes.
[The information follows:]

Role of the National Guard in Response To Domestic Terrorist Incidents

It is recognized that the National Guard may play a vital
role in the response to a major domestic terrorist incident,
including incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD). The National Guard possesses critical resources that
could be essential to crisis and consequence management if such
an event were to occur. For example, the National Guard
currently uses 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID)
teams, which are fielded in each of the 10 Federal Emergency
Management Administration regions. These teams are designed to
assess a suspected nuclear, biological, chemical, or
radiological event; advise civilian responders regarding
appropriate actions; and facilitate requests for assistance.
The FBI is currently coordinating the integration of the
National Guard Bureau (NGB) resources and plans with existing
plans to assist state and local jurisdictions in preparing for
WMD incidents. To ensure that resources available to the NGB
are integrated into strategies currently being developed to
address counterterrorism preparedness, a representative of the
NGB participated in several working group sessions that the FBI
hosted in formulating these strategies.
Moreover, the NGB has assigned a National Guard Officer to
the FBI on a full-time basis to ensure continued coordination
between the FBI and the NGB.

Attorney General Reno. Mr. Chairman, I think it is
important to put in perspective, it is going to differ from one
jurisdiction to another in terms of what the issues are, what
the resources are in the State. So that is the reason I think
it is so important that the FBI is engaged in this planning
effort at the State and local level, not reinventing the wheel
but using FEMA plans where appropriate and emergency response
plans where appropriate, developing the contacts and
understanding what the resources are up front. In some
instances, the National Guard may play a role, and in another
instance, they may be prepared. But what I would like to do is
come back to you with a further report on the National Guard
and how that is going to be used.
Your question is what happens, who is first on the scene.
That is going to again depend on the circumstance, because with
the World Trade Center, a New York police officer may be the
first on the scene, but immediately with the plans they had in
place, they were able to respond.
When you talk about the cooperation between State and local
law enforcement and the FBI, it is not just happening in the
big cities. You talk to some of the sheriffs and the law
enforcement personnel in Montana in another situation where the
FBI responded and you see, whether it be in a rural area or an
urban area, they have made real progress in developing that
two-way street and that respect. We have a way to go.
Senator Gregg. I agree. I think, Director Freeh, you have
made great, great strides on getting these turf issues dampened
down that have existed for so long between law enforcement and
certainly are not your creation. I feel very strongly that the
concept of a single person who is responsible for weapons of
mass destruction then coming on the scene who has the capacity
to call in whatever is needed and has the knowledge to do it is
absolutely critical to the whole exercise.
But I think, also, that we have to recognize that all this
stuff works in theory, but until we actually do a few practice
runs, we are not going to know where all the holes are, and
they are going to be different in New York, which is much more
sophisticated, than they are going to be, for example, in
Vermont. I could have used New Hampshire. [Laughter.]
I mean, the fact is, we have got to--and you are,
obviously, and I am just trying to prod you a little bit, but
you are obviously very attentive to this, and do not take my
questions as criticisms. They are just expressions of concern
which I know you also share.

Y2K impact

How are we doing with Y2K and the effects that it might
create for opportunities for terrorists' action due to networks
being down or other systems not being responsive and terrorists
being able to take advantage of that?
Attorney General Reno. I will follow up with a more
specific report for you so that you can be fully advised, but
we are very sensitive to the issues and are looking at every
point, with worldwide connections, with State and local
connections, where failure of other countries and failure of
State and local officials to correct the problem would produce
a significant impact on the Federal system and our Federal
ability. I think it is going to be a very difficult issue and
it is something that we are working through.
[The information follows:]

Preparations for Possible Year 2000 (Y2K) Terrorist Activities

The FBI has reason to believe that the potential failure of
computer networks and other automated systems as a result of
the Year 2000 (Y2K) computer malfunction may impact on the
activities, plans, and ideology of domestic terrorist groups.
To paraphrase a belief common among extremists, the Y2K
computer crisis to the extent that it occurs may be the final
fuse that will lead to the New World Order that has so long
been desired by forces seeking to do harm to United States
citizens. Any Y2K related problems, such as electric grid
problems and food shortages, will likely reinforce extremists'
beliefs that computer problems are part of a purposeful plan to
declare martial law and enslave United States citizens.
In preparation for such a scenario, domestic terrorist
groups are currently stockpiling weapons and food, and
conducting training based on their beliefs. Should there be
widespread computer failures, it is possible that domestic
terrorist groups will take action to prevent what they perceive
to be the imminent declaration of martial law.
The FBI is currently assessing the potential impact that
the Y2K problem may have on the domestic terrorism threat. The
assessment is expected to be completed in June of 1999, and
will serve as a guide for FBI preparations.

Senator Gregg. State?
Secretary Albright. The same is true for us. I mean, we
have a huge job, because in terms of Y2K, we are not only
responsible for ourselves but trying to make sure that the
countries in which we are involved are also moving forward with
the Y2K issue. It is something that I discuss with every one of
my counterparts, as do people at different levels within the
State Department. We just had a report at a meeting that I had
which really showed that we are on target, moving with getting
everybody that we have any dealings with at least conscious
about the problem.
But I am not underestimating here. There is an issue, and
it is not just a matter of us but the various countries that we
are dealing with. But we are very much aware that this is
something that we have to keep pushing.

Additional legislative authorities

Senator Gregg. What do you need from the Congress that you
are not getting or from--well, let us start from the Congress,
that you are not getting to give you support to address these
issues?
Mr. Freeh. Senator, there are some discussions going on, as
you know, beginning with legislative authorities as well as
other changes. One area is to incorporate into some of the
current Federal statutes, particularly the racketeering and the
wiretapping authorities, crimes of terrorism. That is an issue
that the Department is preparing to address and hopefully we
will do that in the next few months.
With respect to the coordinating mechanisms that are in
place, under the statutory authorities as well as the PDDs, it
is our belief--I think I can speak for the Attorney General
here--that we have the requisite authorities. What we need to
do now is establish the coordinating mechanisms that have to be
stood up, in some cases are already stood up, and then have
them interface successfully.
With respect to the 2000 requests, of course, we in the FBI
have asked for support, continued support, and we thank this
committee and your leadership particularly for this, for
technology enforcement expertise. Now, we call it technology
crimes, but they are areas of computer investigations as well
as evidence and information collection that really span both
the criminal enforcement, as well as counterintelligence and
counterterrorism.
We would like to also pursue the provision of funding for
our State and local departments to receive training,
particularly hazardous devices incorporating weapons of mass
destruction elements. The support you have given us in the
Hazardous Devices School in Redstone, expanding it 48 percent,
is a trend that we would like to continue.
Certainly, our overseas capacity with respect to the
establishment of legats has been very well appreciated. As I
mentioned, in East Africa, our presence there, in my view, went
a large way toward giving us the ability to work much more
efficiently and carefully.
Those are the general areas where we have----

Encryption

Senator Gregg. Have you given up on encryption?
Mr. Freeh. I have not given up on encryption, and I am----
Senator Gregg. I thought you might have.
Mr. Freeh [continuing]. Pleased to report that both the
Attorney General and I have had very good discussions with
leaders of the industry. We have reached some agreement on the
support of a technical center. In fact, legislation that was
passed in October gives us the authority to receive their offer
of services and personnel to solve some of these problems on a
case-by-case basis, if not on a global basis. We are very
optimistic about that. We also believe, however, that we need
to come back to the Congress for authority and certainly for
support in implementing a program where we have non-mandatory
controls and incentives which will give industry the impetus to
continue to support what we want to establish.
Senator Gregg. Does anybody else have anything they wish to
add?
Secretary Albright. I think, from our perspective, we do
not need any more legislative authority. But we do need, as you
pointed out, money. I think that is something that, as we
assess our needs and are able to absorb the lessons that we are
learning here, an accelerated pace of getting the money is
something that we will need.
Attorney General Reno. Mr. Chairman, we would be very
grateful if you would approve the National Domestic
Preparedness Office.
Senator Gregg. OK.
Attorney General Reno. Let me talk just in a larger picture
for a moment. I am trying to make sure that the Justice
Department looks at itself as a whole, because I have had too
many instances in which I arrive at a field office and the FBI
SAC, when I ask him what he needs, says, I need more
prosecutors. That is kind of a change when a SAC is asking for
more prosecutors as opposed to more agents.
We would like to work with you to make sure that as we add
agents, that we add the prosecutors to prosecute the cases and
look at the whole picture in terms of long-range planning. We
have tried to develop some long-range planning efforts that
would assist in that and we would love to sit down and talk to
you about it and show you what we have done on that.
Senator Gregg. OK. I guess I should not have asked that
question. [Laughter.]
Mr. Freeh. It is a good question.
Senator Gregg. Senator Campbell, I understand the Secretary
has to leave and I suspect the Attorney General probably does,
too, so I will let you wrap up questioning.
Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to
certainly assure all three of you that Chairman Gregg and I
have both, he chairing this committee and me with Treasury,
have tried to make sure there are adequate resources for all
the agencies that deal with law enforcement.
I did not really have any questions for you, Madam
Secretary, or for the Attorney General. Really, I did have some
for Director Freeh. If you have to leave or something, I
understand that.
I had some photos I shared before Madeleine Albright came
in. I will have them put back up there. They dealt with a fire
at Vail. You saw them a while ago, Director Freeh.
Mr. Freeh. Yes.

Special events management

Senator Campbell. I wanted to ask you a couple of questions
because I am so concerned about that component of terrorism. I
mean, we hear the big picture, the big press, of course, always
focuses on the bombings at the embassy or things of that
nature, but we have 26 ski areas in Colorado alone, as an
example. It is a major component of our--really, the backbone
of our tourist industry.
I have really been worried since this fire started, and I
told you it was a $12.5 million fire. There have been, to my
knowledge, no one who has any leads, and I do not want you to
tell me anything you should not be telling me, but what can I
tell the people of Colorado and Vail that are really worried
that there may be some copycat efforts because of this fire in
some of our other ski resorts.
I mentioned a while ago that it seems like sporting events,
because of the international focus, they have become a bigger
and bigger target. This happened to be done by the Earth
Liberation Front. Of course, they are the ones that took the
credit for it. But it seems to me that these big events with
national media are going to become more and more targets simply
because of the statement they can make. Can you tell me
anything about how we are doing on that?
Mr. Freeh. Yes, Senator Campbell.
Senator Gregg. Excuse me, Senator. Did you say you had no
further questions?
Senator Campbell. No, I had no questions for Secretary
Albright or Attorney General Reno. If you have to run to
another thing, I----
Attorney General Reno. I will wait.
Mr. Freeh. Senator, with respect to this specific
investigation, it has been very intensively pursued, not just
by the FBI, but there is an FBI-ATF task force which has worked
exceptionally well and has addressed this investigation from
its inception.
We do actually have a number of what we think are very good
leads. We have a number of individuals who we have focused on.
We are not at this point, certainly not here, able to give you
a lot more details on that. I think I might be able to do so in
a separate session with you, which I would be happy to do. But
we are pursuing the investigation and we have, I believe, some
good investigative opportunities as well as some suspects to
focus on.
On the larger issue with respect to concern for copycat
violations, of course, this is always an issue. As you see now
around the country, every day there is an anthrax letter
supposedly arriving someplace. This has become a very
disruptive and also dangerous phenomenon which we are trying to
respond to.
Special events management, not just the Alpine games but
the Denver summit, the State of the Union several days ago, and
really all major national events, including the Pope's recent
visit to St. Louis, are now routinely the subject of not just
great preparation, which you saw in Denver, but integrated
command posts, cross-designation of officers and very extensive
planning, including WMD contingency response planning in almost
every major event, including the ones I have mentioned.
We do not have the ability, unfortunately, to guarantee the
avoidance of problems. The Olympic games in Atlanta were
certainly a good example of that. Although all the other areas
were very, very secured, a public-accessed park was not--could
not be, probably, and there, of course, we experienced a very
tragic event.
So the special events planning has really matured
significantly over the years. Under PDD 62, there is a
structure, as well as a coordinating mechanism, to address
these events with combined resources and we feel fairly
confident about that progress.
But the events that you mentioned in Vail are certainly of
great importance and investigative focus for us. The
environmental groups who have not just claimed credit, but in
some cases have been proved to have committed criminal acts,
are a very, very serious part of our domestic terrorism focus.
Senator Campbell. And you are trying to make necessary
adjustments for future events, too, I assume. I just mention
some of this because we all have to be responsible to
constituents and when we spend money around here, we always get
criticized on spending it for frivolous activities. Since I
have been here, these international events, I have always tried
to support the resources that go with people that I think need
to be there, from your agency, from ATF and other agencies.
But when you go home and people question you, you mean to
tell me you voted for money for a sporting event? Some people
see it as kind of a frivolous waste of money. I do not think so
because of this new focus. I would hope you are also taking
adequate preparations for Utah, if the Olympic Committee out
there does not self-destruct all by themselves, and at the rate
they are going, they may, but I would hope you recognize that
is going to be another major focal point.
Mr. Freeh. Yes. That has been underway for a year in terms
of the security planning. We also have been supporting,
directly and otherwise, the Olympic games in Australia next
year where, of course, we will have many U.S. persons and
interests at risk.
Senator Gregg. This committee has committed a fair amount
of resources to Utah, and I have two kids at college and I am
paying for them.
Senator Campbell. You did not get any land deals out there,
did you? [Laughter.]
I am just teasing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Aviation support

Senator Gregg. I was wondering about the airplane
situation. Are we making any progress with getting you the
capacity to move around quickly?
Mr. Freeh. We are, Senator, on the fast jet subject matter,
for which I am very thankful to you and Chairman Stevens and
the chairmen in the House. We are working on drafts of a
memorandum of agreement between the Department of Defense and
the FBI with respect to access to a fast jet, which, as you
know, is critical for not only the insertion of an advance team
but for medical evacuation, and as we learned in East Africa,
for moving prisoners and defendants. In cases such as those,
many countries, including some of our closest allies, have
great concern about us using their territory for refueling, so
we need that long-range capacity and theater operations. So I
am pleased with the progress with respect to the fast jet.
On the larger issue of air support to move, in this case,
500 personnel, not just to East Africa but back and forth, we
still have a lot of work to do. I do not feel confident at this
point that we have all of the arrangements in place where if I
had to move one of the five rapid deployment teams that we have
set up from Los Angeles to New York, we could in unimpeded
fashion have access to that aircraft and be anyplace in the
world in 24 hours. We were pleased, as you know, to be in East
Africa in 40 hours, but that is much too long, and most of that
delay was because of aircraft problems. So we need to do some
work in that area and I certainly appreciate your support.

First responder training

Senator Gregg. This NDPO issue which you raised, before you
leave, let me just ask you, one of the hang-ups that I
understand that we are concerned about is the question of
training the first responders and whether that is going to stay
with OJP or whether it is going to end up with NDPO. Our
understanding was that that was going to be an expediting group
as versus an operational group.
Attorney General Reno. OJP is going to have responsibility
for the training, for the equipping. But I do not want them to
do it in a vacuum. I want them to listen to what others are
saying at the Federal level, as well, through the NDPO, and I
think it can work out as a very effective partnership. I think
OJP is comfortable with it. I followed this very closely
because I know----
Senator Gregg. Are the consortia comfortable with it that
we put together for this training?
Attorney General Reno. I have not checked with that and I
will do so and follow up on that and get back to you. But there
has got to be someplace. As I say, I did not say, let it be us.
I consulted with my partners in this, the Departments of
Defense, Health and Human Services, FEMA, and they all said
that the FBI is the logical place for it.
Senator Gregg. Well, there does have to be someplace. You
are absolutely right about that.
Attorney General Reno. So I think it is the best place. I
think Tom Kuker is doing a good job of addressing the issue. I
think the spirit is there for a two-way street to hear from
local law enforcement. OJP has that experience. They are the
ones that had the foresight to call the stakeholders meeting in
August, at which I participated. It is one of the best programs
that I have seen. The feedback was excellent. But the message
was, we need one contact point.
Senator Gregg. I agree 100 percent with that as the
structure.
Attorney General Reno. If you decide not to approve it, can
I come see you before you do?
Senator Gregg. I think it will get approved. It is just a
question of making sure we have got the proper comfort zone.
Attorney General Reno. Thank you.

Additional committee questions

Senator Gregg. Thank you very much. I appreciate your time.
It is possible that other questions will be submitted by other
Senators. In fact, I know Senator Domenici may want to submit
some.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
Question. The 2000 budget includes a request for five years of
advance appropriations totalling $3 billion for the State Department
embassy security initiative. These appropriations would begin in 2001.
If security is such an immediate threat, why are these funds not
requested for fiscal year 2000?
Answer. There should be no misunderstanding--security is an
extremely high priority for the Department and the Administration.
However, the budget request for fiscal year 2000 contains a modest
increase for security requirements--with $36 million for design and
some site acquisition of facilities at high threat posts and $3 billion
in advance appropriations for building construction in fiscal years
2001-2005.
As the President mentioned to Hill leaders in their meeting on
February 22, we need to work together to address the problem of
vulnerable overseas diplomatic facilities. The Administration wants to
work with the Congress to fit the best program we can within the
constraints of the budget. Moving more quickly presents a challenge
that is welcome but it will do little to improve the long-term safety
of American officials abroad unless longer-term commitments are made to
finance the many new facilities required.
Question. By asking for advance appropriations you take away most
of the flexibility for Congress to deal with this problem. Could you
explain how the State Department knows exactly what our needs will be
in the year 2001, let alone 2004?
Answer. In its facility management function, the Department has
records detailing its worldwide inventory of facilities, their
condition (including maintenance needs), and their security situation.
In addition, each post is measured against various threat assessments
to determine levels of vulnerability. With this information, we have
historically developed our annual budget requests for capital
construction and major repair and renovation projects.
In addition, as a result of the bombings, the Department dispatched
teams composed of security and facility specialists to posts considered
the highest threat terrorist posts. The results of these reviews and
consultations among regional policy folks, the intelligence community,
and others have allowed us to develop and cost out a prioritized list
of projects for the next five years. By funding design and site
acquisition one year and construction funding the next, we could
execute an aggressive schedule of overseas building that will not only
allow our posts to be more secure, but more modern and an appropriate
facility from which all U.S. Government agencies with overseas
operations can conduct their business and pursue U.S. policy
objectives.
We would of course welcome discussions with the Congress on the
best way to achieve our overall objective of a firm multi-year
commitment to a capital construction program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
Question. In December, President Clinton, speaking at the memorial
service for the victims of Pan Am 103 marking the tenth anniversary of
that heinous terrorist act, pledged to seek tougher U.N. sanctions at
the February sanctions review to compel Libya to turn over the suspects
for the trial. Do you plan to follow through on your commitments to the
victims' families to seek an embargo on Libyan oil exports? And will
you use the law withholding 5 percent of aid from sanctions violators
to improve compliance with U.N. sanctions measures?
Answer. UNSCR 1192 endorses the U.S.-U.K. initiative to try the
Lockerbie bombing suspects before a Scottish court in the Netherlands
and calls on Libya to transfer the suspects to Dutch custody. We are
currently working through the UNSYG and the UNSC to effect Libyan
compliance with UNSCR 1192.
If Libya refuses to surrender the suspects, the UNSC indicated in
UNSCR 1192 its intention to consider additional measures. We are in
consultation with our UNSC colleagues on such measures, but the SYG has
asked that there be no precipitate action while he awaits Libya's
response to his most recent message.
Most countries respect the U.N. sanctions on Libya. Over the past
six months, however, numerous African states may have violated the UNSC
prohibition on direct flights to and from Libya and servicing of Libyan
aircraft.
Those who may have violated sanctions more than once include: Chad,
Mali, the Gambia, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia,
Sudan, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Tanzania and Egypt.
Tunisia may also have transgressed the letter of the sanctions
regime by providing last-minute landing clearance for a direct flight
from Libya and then allowing the aircraft to depart. We recognize the
violations of others can place Tunisia in a position which it may lack
the means to effectively counter.
In a number of cases, the GOL has resorted to what appears to be
active deception to arrange offending flights.
In response to the apparent violations, we have taken a strong
position both in capitals and in New York. Where appropriate, we have
made direct approaches to the governments of states suspected of
sanctions violations. We have also supported action by the U.N. Libya
Sanctions Committee to question and castigate suspected violators.
In cases of violators that receive non-development assistance
monies from the USG, we cut assistance, as consistent with existing
legislation. Such cuts are primarily in the areas of peacekeeping
operations, international military education and training (IMET) and
foreign military financing (FMF). We are currently studying reports of
violations by Uganda, Mali, Tunisia, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Chad, Tanzania
and Eritrea for possible action.
Question. Secretary Albright, laws adopted in the past few years
allow American citizens to sue foreign state sponsors of terrorism in
U.S. courts. Steve Flatow won a $247 million judgment against Iran as
the sponsor of a bus bombing which killed his daughter Alisa. The
families of the Brothers to the Rescue pilots shot down by Cuba and
former Hizbollah hostages in Lebanon also won damages under this law.
Do these judgments provide a deterrent against state sponsorship of
terrorism? And why is the Administration not doing more to help its own
citizens to ensure that Iran and Cuba satisfy these awards to pay the
price for supporting terrorism?
Answer. The Administration conveys its deepest sympathy to the
families who have lost loved ones as a result of terrorist acts and
deliberate murders.
As is well known, the Administration has been unrelenting in its
efforts to combat state-sponsored terrorism.
It is too early to tell whether court judgments like those referred
to can make any meaningful contribution to these efforts.
Thus far, we have not seen any specific deterrent effect on Iran or
Cuba as a result of the existing judgments. Iran continues to provide
funding for the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the group which
conducted the bus attack in which Ms. Flatow was killed, and it also
continues to support HAMAS and Hizbollah. Cuba's attitudes also do not
appear to have changed.
The countries who are sued under the amended law tend not to
recognize U.S. jurisdiction in these situations and so are unlikely to
cooperate with our judicial process.
It remains unclear to what extent legally available assets are
present in the U.S. to enforce a resulting default judgment.
The Administration has looked for ways to provide information to
plaintiffs that may assist them in locating unblocked commercial assets
that are legally available for attachment.
In many cases, however, assets are diplomatic, or subject to
ongoing arbitral proceedings, or blocked for U.S. national security
reasons or otherwise not subject to attachment.
We will have to continue to look to all the tools available to the
U.S. Government to seek changes in the behavior of countries on the
terrorism list that poses a continuing threat to our citizens.
Question. In those countries where new embassy facilities need to
be constructed to address security concerns, will sufficient office
space for USAID be included within those new facilities?
Answer. We are working with OMB and USAID to prioritize other
planned projects, to identify specific USAID funding requirements, and
to ensure that USAID is included in all future planning and funding
request. We expect in the future as the Department of State constructs
new facilities that meet all security standards; USAID will be
collocated in these new facilities.
Question. Are there ways to regionalize some of our diplomatic
efforts?
Is the State Department going through a process to evaluate the
utility of all our facilities worldwide, to decide which ones we should
keep?
Answer. In the wake of the tragic bombings in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam, the Department put together a study group to look at how we
might reorganize functions in East Africa. We hope to have their
results in the coming months, and following on this we will consider
how to apply lessons we will learn elsewhere.
While the Department is considering regionalizing functions, we
remain committed to the principle of universality--the need to maintain
an American diplomatic presence wherever possible around the globe.
However, we do feel that it is time to look at how appropriate presence
in each country is determined. As a result we are setting up a high-
level panel to examine the overall question of worldwide presence at
our diplomatic posts.
Question. The Administration has requested $8 million to upgrade
overseas facilities used by the Agency for International Development
(USAID). How is that $8 million possibly adequate to fully address
USAID's security needs?
Answer. The $7.7 million Operating Expenses (OE) request is to
finance USAID's Office of Security, which was transferred in fiscal
year 1999 from the Office of the Inspector General to USAID's OE
budget.
The funds will be used for: Salaries and expenses for the 35 FTE in
the Security Office; Planned security projects for existing USAID
facilities overseas; and Procurement of armored vehicles and security
communication equipment for selected overseas missions.
The funds are not intended to finance construction costs or
relocation of existing facilities overseas.
______

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
first responder training
Question. Attorney General Reno, the Administration has touted its
commitment to fighting terrorism both domestically and internationally.
Last year, the Department established the National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium to coordinate the Department's efforts in
training first responders to a terrorist act. I was at the ceremony and
supported funding for the Consortium at $20 million for fiscal year
1999--$8 million for Fort McClellan Headquarters, and $3 million each
for the four consortia members doing the actual training of state and
local law enforcement personnel. You reference the four consortia
members, including the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology,
on page 12 of your testimony.
With all the Administration's focus on counterterrorism and the
push to adequately train state and local first responders, why does the
Administration propose to eliminate support approved for the Consortia
members in 1999 and redirect this $12 million to other expanded or new
programs in 2000?
Answer. In 1999, Congress appropriated a total of $20,000,000 to be
distributed among five members of the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium. Of this amount, $16,000,000 is available under the First
Responder Training Program and $4,000,000 is available under the First
Responder Equipment Acquisition Program.
As provided in the 1999 Department of Justice Appropriations Act, a
total of $3,000,000 will be provided to each of the following four
Consortium members: New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, the
National Center for Bio-Medical Research and Training, Louisiana State
University, the National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center,
Texas A&M University, and the National Exercise, Test, and Training
Center, Nevada Test Site. A total of $8,000,000 will be provided to the
Center for Domestic Preparedness, Ft. McClellan.
The funding requested for counterterrorism programs under the
Office of Justice Programs includes an overall increase of $38,500,000.
This increase, along with $6,500,000 from OJP's counterterrorism base
resources, are proposed to be used to fund the FBI bomb tech equipment
program at a total level of $45,000,000, $20,000,000 more than is
available in 1999. As you are aware, Congress allowed the Department to
use $25,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to pay for this program
in 1999. The bomb tech equipment program was supposed to be multi-year,
and the Department cannot assume that funding will be available from
the Working Capital Fund in 2000 to continue this program. We believe
that we can work with congressional appropriators within the total
level of counterterrorism program funding proposed in the 2000 budget
to continue the training programs begun in 1999 by the consortium
members while providing some permanent base of funding for the bomb
tech equipment program.
Also, within the limited base resources available in 2000,
$17,000,000 was included for the Center for Domestic Preparedness at
Fort McClellan, which is a member of the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium; this is an increase of $9,000,000 from 1999. OJP will
assume full responsibility for the live agent training infrastructure
at the base in 2000, and this increase is necessary to fund first
responder training at Fort McClellan as well as the additional overhead
costs that will be incurred once the transition is complete.
Question. Congress has provided two years of funding for the four
members of the National Consortium, and they are actively involved in
hands-on training of these personnel. New Mexico Tech has done classes
for Seattle, St. Louis, Chicago, Phoenix, and Fairfax County, Virginia,
for example. Each of these four institutions have existing expertise
and facilities to bring to the first responder training program and are
doing the job. Why does the Administration propose to eliminate both
1999 funding and propose no funding for other than the Center for
Domestic Preparedness in 2000?
Answer. In 1999, Congress appropriated a total of $20,000,000 to be
distributed among five members of the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium. Of this amount, $16,000,000 is available under the First
Responder Training Program and $4,000,000 is available under the First
Responder Equipment Acquisition Program.
As provided in the 1999 Department of Justice Appropriations Act, a
total of $3,000,000 will be provided to each of the following four
Consortium members: New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, the
National Center for Bio-Medical Research and Training, Louisiana State
University, the National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center,
Texas A&M University, and the National Exercise, Test, and Training
Center, Nevada Test Site. A total of $8,000,000 will be provided to the
Center for Domestic Preparedness, Ft. McClellan.
The funding requested for counterterrorism programs under the
Office of Justice Programs includes an overall increase of $38,500,000.
This increase, along with $6,500,000 from OJP's counterterrorism base
resources, are proposed to be used to fund the FBI bomb tech equipment
program at a total level of $45,000,000, $20,000,000 more than is
available in 1999. As you are aware, Congress allowed the Department to
use $25,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to pay for this program
in 1999. The bomb tech equipment program was supposed to be multi-year,
and the Department cannot assume that funding will be available from
the Working Capital Fund in 2000 to continue this program. We believe
that we can work with congressional appropriators within the total
level of counterterrorism program funding proposed in the 2000 budget
to continue the training programs begun in 1999 by the consortium
members while providing some permanent base of funding for the bomb
tech equipment program.
Also, within the limited base resources available in 2000,
$17,000,000 was included for the Center for Domestic Preparedness at
Fort McClellan, which is a member of the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium; this is an increase of $9,000,000 from 1999. OJP will
assume full responsibility for the live agent training infrastructure
at the base in 2000, and this increase is necessary to fund first
responder training at Fort McClellan as well as the additional overhead
costs that will be incurred once the transition is complete.
Question. How does the Administration propose to continue its first
responder training program without the four major training partners of
the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium?
Answer. As mentioned above, in 1999, Congress appropriated a total
of $20,000,000 to be distributed among the five members of the National
Domestic Preparedness Consortium. Of this amount, the Center for
Domestic Preparedness, Ft. McClellan will receive $8,000,000 and the
balance of $12,000,000 will be equally divided among the remaining four
members. In 2000, $17,000,000 is requested to continue training
activities at the Center for Domestic Preparedness, Ft. McClellan.
The 2000 budget request for counterterrorism programs within the
Office of Justice Programs is $173,500,000, which is a $38,500,000
increase above the amount appropriated in 1999.
This request contains $17,000,000 for the Center for Domestic
Preparedness (CDP) at Fort McClellan. During 1998, the CDP operated as
a tenant of the U.S. Army and shared training facilities (including the
``live agent'' training facility), lodging, and dining facilities.
Through 1999, all operations, maintenance, and facilities' support will
be provided by Army personnel, based on an agreement between OJP and
the Army. This agreement terminates with the Army's departure from Fort
McClellan at the end of fiscal year 1999. As a result, in 2000, CDP
plans to occupy and maintain buildings and other structures at Ft.
McClellan necessary for administration, classes, lodging, dining,
maintenance, storage, and support. Transition of operation, support,
and maintenance of the facility to OJP is estimated to cost around
$11,500,000 in 2000. Some of these costs include providing a 24-hour
security guard force for the training facility, physical security plans
of all the CDP property including the live agent facility, and physical
security systems, such as fencing and intruder detection.
The remainder of the $173,500,000 for counterterrorism programs
under the Office of Justice Programs will be used as follows:
--$17,000,000 for continued base funding for three OJP
counterterrorism programs that have been in existence since
1997: $5,000,000 for the Firefighter and Emergency Services
Training Program, $2,000,000 for the State and Local
Antiterrorism Training Program, and $10,000,000 for the
Development of Counterterrorism Technologies Program.
--$81,500,000 for the Equipment Acquisition Program, which is the
second of a proposed multi-year effort to provide equipment for
first responders.
--$6,000,000 to provide technical assistance for each of the
jurisdictions receiving equipment grants. Technical assistance
is an integral part of OJP's grant programs. In 2000, OJP
anticipates providing resources to more than 200 state and
local jurisdictions; this is significantly higher than the 41
grantees we provided funding to in 1998.
--$7,000,000 in new funding for the Law Enforcement Training Program.
This program was developed by the New Mexico Institute of
Mining and Technology (with $2,000,000 in funding provided by
OJP in 1998). Of this amount, $5,000,000 will be used to
deliver basic first responder training to 47,000 law
enforcement officers and 750 qualified trainers from the
targeted jurisdictions. The remaining $2,000,000 will be used
to (1) modify the command level and tactical training programs,
which are currently being developed for fire and emergency
medical services, to address the similar unmet needs of the
first responder law enforcement community and (2) initiate the
process of integrating OJP's curricula into states' law
enforcement certification processes--ensuring that state-
mandated basic and advanced training requirements for all law
enforcement personnel are maintained.
--$45,000,000 in new money for the State and Local Detection
Equipment Program, a program run in coordination with the FBI
to provide specialized equipment and training to state and
local bomb tech squads. This represents the second year of a
multi-year effort to support and protect state and local bomb
squads by outfitting them with equipment to enhance their
capabilities to render safe improvised or conventional
explosive devices and to detect and render safe chemical,
biological, radioactive, or nuclear (CBRN) explosive devices.
The goal of this program is to provide equipment to the
existing 229 accredited state and local bomb technician squads
throughout the United States with a baseline of render safe
equipment and also to another 200 state and local bomb
technician squads receiving accreditation through the FBI's
Hazardous Devices School (HDS) at the Redstone Arsenal. In
1998, the FBI's HDS created a one-week specialized Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) Bomb Technician Emergency Action Course,
based on the realization that even though bomb technicians may
be among the first emergency responders to encounter a
terrorist explosive device, they are relatively unprepared to
address incidents involving the combined use of explosives with
CBRN enhancements. In 1999, the FBI has begun the first year of
a multi-year equipment and training program for accredited
state and local bomb technician squads with $25,000,000 from
the Working Capital Fund, consistent with language contained in
the 1999 Justice Department's appropriations act. The
Department had proposed in our amendment last year that we
receive a direct appropriation of $49,000,000 for this program
in 1999, so that we would have base funding available to
continue this multi-year program in 2000 and beyond. The
funding provided from the Working Capital Fund is one-time in
nature, and we cannot assume that we will have this funding
available in future years.
Question. On page 142 of the Department of Justice ``2000 Budget
Summary,'' the Department of Justice indicates that the Center for
Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan is the only ``live-agent''
training facility in the U.S. that provides the hands-on training to
respond to domestic terrorism involving various weapons of mass
destruction. The other four members of the consortia include the Nevada
Test Site; the National Center for Bio-Medical Research and Training at
Louisiana State University; the National Emergency and Response and
Rescue Training Center at Texas A&M University; and the New Mexico
Tech, a leading expert in conventional explosives. How can the
Department make such a sweeping statement when there are these existing
assets to train first responders?
Answer. The Chemical Defense Testing Facility--housed at Ft.
McClellan--is the only facility of its kind, where live chemical agents
are used in actual training. This statement did not, in any way,
detract from the fact that the other Consortium member facilities are
indeed excellent assets in our training architecture.
Question. I believe the most important outcome of the first
responder program is training real people. Congress tapped existing
facilities with the expertise to do the job to carry out the first
responder training program. Will you please provide for the
Subcommittee an accounting of the number of state and local personnel
trained by each member of the National Consortia in fiscal year 1998
and the projected training program in fiscal year 1999?
Answer. In 1998, $2,000,000 each was appropriated for the New
Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology (NMIMT) and Ft. McClellan to
provide first responder training. As a result, in 1998 540 first
responders were trained at NMIMT and an additional 500 first responders
were trained at the Center for Domestic Preparedness, Ft. McClellan. In
1999, it is estimated that the Center for Domestic Preparedness will
train approximately 1,300 first responders and that each of the four
other Consortium members will train approximately 331 first responders,
for a total of 1,324.
Question. I have learned that the Office of Justice Programs, in
implementing the first responder training program, originally committed
to fund the $1,000 per student stipend and other miscellaneous costs
for state and local personnel who are trained through the first
responder program. After the fiscal year 1998 funding was committed to
the consortia members, OJP changed its mind and now requires that the
consortia members pay those stipends out of their $2 million training
budget. OJP has received healthy funding increases and should pay the
stipend costs so that more personnel can be trained. How can the
Department justify this policy when it means that for every four
classes held, the consortia member loses one class simply to pay the
stipend costs?
Answer. In order to make training available to our nation's state
and local first responder community, it has always been and continues
to be OJP's intention that the training resources provided to
Consortium members would be used to fund the full cost of training--
which includes the costs associated with the development and delivery
of training, as well as the costs necessary to transport, house, and
feed first responders.
Question. Last year, Congress added an equipment component to the
First Responder Training program, and as one of the sponsors of that
funding, I can tell you that it was our intent to allow the additional
$1 million in equipment funding to be used for both equipment purchase
and training in the use of that equipment. I believe this will ensure
that the proper use of the equipment is well understood and that the
federal dollars spent on equipment and at the state and local level are
well spent. Why does the Administration refuse to allow the consortia
members to use these funds in a flexible manner to maximize the first
responder training program?
Answer. The Department is following direction from the 1999
Conferees in requiring that the additional funds be used for equipment.
The Conference Report on 1999 appropriations includes language, on page
998, directing that of the $75.5 million provided for equipment
purchases, ``* * * $4 million is for equipment for the National
Domestic Preparedness Consortium to be distributed as described below
under Training.'' Under Training, the Conference Report states that
each of the four members of the consortium, besides Ft. McClellan, is
to receive an additional $1 million from the equipment grant program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
fundraising in support of terrorism
Question. Director Freeh, your testimony highlights the importance
of controlling fund-raising by terrorist groups. You even point out
that the World Trade Center bombings could have been much more
devastating had the perpetrators not run short of money. Are the laws
now in place sufficient for you to stop fund-raising in support of
terrorism?
Answer. Using the authorities provided under Section 302 of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the
Secretary of the Treasury, has designated 30 groups as foreign
terrorist organizations. This designation allows the United States
Government to take actions to block the transfer of funds in the United
States in which these organizations have an interest.
We believe these provisions provide law enforcement with a
potentially powerful tool to disrupt the ability of terrorist
organizations to fund their destructive activities. Investigation into
the financial operations of clandestine organizations can be
particularly complex, time consuming, and labor intensive. As with
measures of this type, its most powerful impact may be from its
deterrent effect. As investigators and prosecutors build successful
cases and precedents to enforce anti-fund-raising activities, targeted
groups may decide that fund-raising in the United States is too
difficult and risky.
The AEDPA provided the statutory support needed to address
terrorism. However, modifications to existing legislation are needed to
strengthen laws intended to combat terrorism. This includes adding 18
U.S.C. Sec. 2339B, which relates to providing material support or
resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization, as a
predicate offense to the money laundering statute.
The Department of Justice is the lead agency for fund-raising
investigations. The Attorney General's ``Five-Year Interagency Counter-
Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan'' calls for a nationally-
coordinated approach to terrorist fund-raising investigations.
Question. Are you working with your counterparts in other countries
to track and control the flow of funds to terrorist organizations?
Answer. Yes, where we can, we are cooperating with our foreign
allies. Cooperation with foreign countries in the investigation and
collection of evidence necessary to prosecute these cases is essential.
In fund-raising investigations, the United States enjoys the
cooperation of a number of our allies both on an informal and formal
basis. We have raised this issue at the international level in both
formal and informal meetings. Fund-raising has been discussed in
meetings of the G-8, the European Union, the Organization of American
States and the Financial Action Task Force.
The Counterterrorism Experts Group of the G-8 placed major emphasis
on countering terrorist fund-raising and did substantial work to
advance a French draft international convention to make such fund-
raising illegal. The first round of negotiations was initiated in March
1999, at the United Nations. The next round of negotiations is planned
for the fall.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
interoperable communications between federal, state, and local
emergency and law enforcement personnel
Question. I am concerned about the possibility that Federal, state
and local law enforcement personnel will not be able to communicate
with each other during a terrorist attack. Although we are well into
the information age, many police officers, firefighters and emergency
medical service personnel cannot communicate with each other or the
appropriate Federal officials because their communications systems are
not interoperable.
I believe we must provide leadership at the Federal level to find
the answers to make interoperable law enforcement communications a
reality. For instance, I have worked with Chairman Gregg to improve
police communications between New Hampshire and Vermont law enforcement
agencies after the Carl Drega shootout in our states in August 1997.
Effective communication between Federal, state and local emergency
and law enforcement personnel should be key to any counter terrorism
strategy. What steps are the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) taking to help ensure interoperable
communications between Federal, state, and local emergency and law
enforcement personnel?
Answer. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is addressing
interoperability with Federal, state, and local public safety
organizations through a series of complementary efforts. The DOJ is
consolidating the development and management of wireless communications
systems through the activities of the Justice Management Division (JMD)
Wireless Management Office (WMO), through coordination with the Public
Safety Wireless Network (PSWN) and the Federal Law Enforcement Wireless
Users Group (FLEWUG). Where feasible and appropriate, the WMO will
begin to consolidate DOJ component land mobile radio (LMR) assets and
systems, determine a complementary mix of commercial services and LMR
solutions, develop formal relationships with Federal, state, and local
public safety forums, foster interoperability, and begin planning a
consolidated Justice Wireless Network (JWN). The WMO is also sponsoring
pilots or initiatives in Seattle, Salt Lake City, Los Angeles, and San
Diego to investigate the operational and technical issues involved with
a shared DOJ LMR systems environment. Solutions to interoperability
with other Federal, state, and local public safety organizations are a
significant element of each pilot. By June 1, 1999, the WMO will have
the technical basis to begin the full-scale design of the Justice
Wireless Network. This response includes WMO activities, WMO efforts
with the PSWN, and WMO efforts with the FLEWUG.
In addition, the Department is also a co-sponsor with the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Treasury on
the Federal Communications Commission's newly established Public Safety
National Coordination Committee (PSNCC). The PSNCC was established to
help plan and administer the newly allocated non-government spectrum
for public safety communications. The DOJ role in the PSNCC is to
foster Federal, state, and local shared use of this new spectrum to
assist public safety in achieving interoperability.
WMO Efforts
The following is an overview of the Wireless Management Office's
five point plan for 1999.
Established the JMD Wireless Management Office (WMO)
Plan and oversee LMR system development and implementation.
Develop department-wide procurement vehicle for infrastructure
equipment, operations and maintenance, and installation and
administration.
Consolidate site management, maintenance, and leases where
possible.
Establish formal relationships with other Federal, state, and local
public safety organizations and forums.
Develop a comprehensive technical assessment for the
Justice Wireless Network
Develop technical/systems design based on an analysis of existing
systems to protect and maximize investments.
Conduct spectrum analysis to determine the feasibility of migrating
all components into the VHF band.
Analyze the costs, benefits, and risks of various commercial
wireless services (e.g., cellular, PCS, Nextel).
Halt or slow new infrastructure development
New system development will be halted except for instances of
failing systems, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) relocation orders due to NTIA mandates, or
existing contractual obligations.
Immigration and Naturalization Service.--Complete ongoing
installations funded in 1998. Defer further system implementation until
June 1 when the technical analysis is complete.
Drug Enforcement Administration.--Complete ongoing installations
funded in 1998. Defer further system implementation until June 1 when
the technical analysis is complete.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Marshals Service,
Office of Inspector General.--No major infrastructure improvements
planned for 1999. However, normal replacement of aged infrastructure
will continue.
Sponsor pilots and initiatives related to the development
of the Justice Wireless Network
San Diego Consolidated Network Pilot--will transition all or part
of each DOJ component's radio traffic onto the new INS radio network.
The new INS system will comply with NTIA narrowband requirements. The
pilot will focus on operational and technical issues associated with a
shared LMR resource environment. In addition, solutions to
interoperability with other Federal, state, and local public safety
organizations will be tested.
Salt Lake City Consolidated Network Pilot--will transition all or
part of each DOJ component's radio traffic onto the FBI LMR
infrastructure. In addition, solutions to interoperability with state
and local public safety organizations will be tested. The pilot will
also provide a platform for systems expansion and planning for 2002
Winter Olympics.
Los Angeles Commercial Wireless Services Pilot--will test the
functionality, reliability, cost effectiveness, security, and
performance of Nextel Communications' service as a public safety
communications tool.
Seattle Consolidated Dispatch Center Initiative--will consolidate
dispatch functions and assets for all DOJ components in the FBI's new
office building in downtown Seattle. The pilot will promote the
development of department-wide standard operating procedures for
dispatch service. The pilot will significantly enhance the scope and
availability of dispatch services for most components.
Coordinate the purchase of subscriber equipment
Develop a department-wide mobile and portable standard radio
configuration.
Negotiate best rates based on volume and analysis of existing
contract vehicles; one-time consolidation of component subscriber
equipment yielded more than $800,000 of cost savings.
Investigate ways to foster competition in subscriber equipment
market.
WMO Efforts with FLEWUG
The DOJ Wireless Management Office is coordinating its efforts with
the Federal Law Enforcement Wireless Users Group (FLEWUG) to foster
interoperability among Federal law enforcement organizations. The
FLEWUG is jointly managed through a memorandum of understanding between
the Departments of Justice and Treasury. The FLEWUG was established as
a result of a recommendation in National Performance Review that
recognized interoperability shortfalls in the public safety community.
The FLEWUG provides a common Federal forum to investigate, review, and
analyze wireless solutions that support overall Federal law enforcement
wireless capabilities. The WMO, along with the components, participates
in the FLEWUG to provide DOJ representation and to leverage FLEWUG
activities.
WMO Efforts with PSWN
To address interoperability outside the Federal arena, the FLEWUG
oversees the Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN) program. The PSWN
program is conducting case studies in several areas of the country to
identify interoperability needs and solutions. Some of these efforts
include case studies in Salt Lake City and San Diego. The WMO sponsored
pilot initiatives in Salt Lake City and San Diego are related to these
two PSWN case studies as a part of the total public safety requirements
for these target areas. The development of the WMO pilot initiatives
will complement the PSWN case study effort that will coordinate the
Federal requirements with those of state and local public safety
organizations to enhance interoperability in those two cities. A goal
of the WMO pilot initiatives is to identify solutions to
interoperability within DOJ that can be replicated in other areas of
the country. A goal of the PSWN case studies is to identify
communications requirements of Federal, state, and local public safety
users and provide solutions that achieve interoperability.
Conclusion
The DOJ is developing wireless solutions that improve DOJ wireless
capabilities, ensure effective and efficient communication, and foster
interoperability among Federal, state, and local public safety
organizations. The DOJ is designing these solutions to address the
range of law enforcement missions, including counter terrorism, border
patrol, drug interdictions and enforcement, among many others. In
developing these solutions, the DOJ is conducting several pilots to
ensure the operational effectiveness of solutions and to achieve cost
savings, as possible.
Question. The DOJ 2000 budget request includes a new proposal to
fund $80 million for the Public Safety Wireless Telecommunications
Assistance Program. According to DOJ budget documents, the goal of this
new program is ``to ensure that state and local public safety wireless
communications systems are compatible with Federal law enforcement
radio systems.'' Please describe in detail how the Public Safety
Wireless Telecommunications Assistance Program would be implemented and
how the award of grants would be determined if this new program is
funded in 2000.
Answer. The Public Safety Telecommunications Assistance Program is
proposed for the first time in the 2000 budget at a funding level of
$80,000,000. Currently, every Federal, state, and local law enforcement
agency operates separate tactical networks in every metropolitan area
in the country. This program would provide planning grants (to states),
technical assistance and demonstration programs that would help to
ensure that the next generation of radio systems used by Federal,
state, and local law enforcement officials are interoperable. The
$80,000,000 will be used as follows:
--$51,000,000 will be used to provide planning grants to the States
and eligible territories for the purposes of encouraging these
jurisdictions to include several criteria in their planning
process, including interoperability across all local, State,
and Federal public agencies. This competitive grant program
will assist States by providing Federal resources to allow them
to (1) recognize the security risks associated with public
safety communications systems and (2) create comprehensive
statewide public safety telecommunications system plans through
collaborative efforts at all levels of government and with
different agencies. It is estimated it will take States and
municipalities approximately 19-24 months to plan and develop
their systems and 2 to 3 years to implement them.
--$9,000,000 is requested for NIJ to administer a technical
assistance program to assist States and municipalities in the
planning and design of improved public safety communications
systems, structured to account for States at differing stages
of system development. This flexibility is necessary because of
the large number of agencies currently procuring replacement
communications systems because they currently lack existing
systems leaving them unable to take advantage of new
technologies.
--$20,000,000 is requested to provide the Commerce Department's
National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA)
with funds for demonstration grants that will assist a limited
number of states and municipalities in implementing public
safety communication systems. NTIA has played a major role in
the demonstration of new uses of the National Information
Infrastructure by public safety agencies, and its Office of
Spectrum Management advises the Administration on public safety
communication issues.
counterterrorism
Question. Does the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) consider the
Immigration and Naturalization Service Law Enforcement Support Center
(LESC) as one of its resources to track and locate criminal aliens? If
so, how does the JTTF use the LESC and do all JTTF agents have access
to a query link with the LESC?
Answer. Currently, certain FBI field offices are authorized to make
formal electronic inquiries to the LESC. Nationally, the FBI does not
have a formal agreement with the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) for JTTFs to utilize the LESC. JTTFs, through use of assigned INS
agents, can access INS databases independently. Access to the LESC is
not required for the local JTTF to obtain INS information. The FBI is
interested in obtaining national access to the LESC for JTTFs to
supplement the specialization of the INS agents currently assigned,
i.e., in the absence of those agents should they be detailed away, on
leave, or during non-business hours. The FBI and the INS intend to
explore the development of a formal agreement on access to, and
dissemination of, LESC information.

conclusion of hearing

Senator Gregg. We will be having another hearing on March 9
where we will be seeing the Attorney General again. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., Thursday, February 4, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]