[Senate Hearing 106-311]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-311
THE FUTURE OF THE ABM TREATY
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HEARING
before the
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 28, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
59-589 cc WASHINGTON : 2000
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Darla D. Cassell, Administrive Clerk
------
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Minority Staff Director
Julie A. Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
Senator Akaka................................................ 2
Senator Levin................................................ 26
WITNESSES
Wednesday, April 28, 1999
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Levy Professor of Government, Georgetown
University; Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, and
former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations................... 3
John B. Rhinelander, Senior Counsel, Shaw Pittman, and Former
Legal Adviser, SALT I Delegation............................... 13
Robert G. Joseph, Director, Center for Counter-Proliferation
Research, National Defense University, and former U.S.
Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission................. 17
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Joseph, Robert G.:
Testimony.................................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Rhinelander, John B.:
Testimony.................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 52
THE FUTURE OF THE ABM TREATY
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room 342, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (Chairman
of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Specter, Levin, and Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee will please come to
order.
I first want to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the
future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Last month, the
Senate and House of Representatives passed legislation making
it the stated policy of the United States to deploy a national
missile defense system. With the passage of these bills, we
have overcome the policy roadblock for national missile defense
deployment.
But there are other questions that must be answered. One of
the most obvious is the compatibility of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty with national missile defense. Called by some
the cornerstone of strategic stability, and regarded by others
as an obsolete relic of the Cold War, the ABM treaty represents
a commitment by the United States not to deploy a defense of
its territory against long-range ballistic missiles.
Because the recently passed legislation calls for
deployment of just such a system, there appears to be a clear
conflict between the terms of the treaty and our new commitment
to defend ourselves against ballistic missile attack. Today we
will consider whether this 27-year-old treaty is the impediment
it appears to be, and if so, what should be done about it.
To help us understand the issues surrounding the treaty
ramifications of our new policy, we have invited some very
distinguished witnesses to this hearing. The first witness
today will be Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, who is the Levy Professor
of Government at Georgetown University, a Senior Fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute and former U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations.
On our second panel are John Rhinelander, Senior Counsel
with the law firm of Shaw Pittman here in Washington, and
former legal advisor to the SALT I delegation; and Ambassador
Robert Joseph, who is Director of the Center for Counter-
Proliferation Research at the National Defense University, and
former U.S. Commissioner to the ABM treaty's Standing
Consultative Commission.
Before proceeding to hear from Dr. Kirkpatrick, I want to
yield at this time for any comments or statements from my
distinguished friend from Hawaii, the Ranking Democratic Member
of this Subcommittee, Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I will only tell you that I am delighted to be serving with
you on this Subcommittee and look forward to these hearings and
others that will be coming in the future. I want to thank you
very much for scheduling today's hearing on this important
topic. Both Democrats and Republicans are united in concern
that the United States pursue every possible option for
developing an adequate defense against missile attack from
rogue states.
As an early sponsor of S. 257, the National Missile Defense
Act of 1999, I hope that we will make progress soon on
effective programs. At the same time, I continue to believe
that an essential element of a good defense is maintaining a
robust arms control regime. The pattern of treaty obligations
which we developed with the Russians in the Cold War was
extremely effective at preventing nuclear war. In the post Cold
War period, I think we have to be careful about changing the
system of mutual obligations and restraining weapons
development that has helped prevent mutual destruction.
The administration's position has been that it might deploy
a national missile defense, NMD, before the year 2005, if
testing of a system goes flawlessly, according to Defense
Secretary Cohen. The administration has also indicated that it
would consider specific amendments to the ABM treaty once an
NMD architecture has been decided upon. These are two important
distinctions.
Mr. Chairman, I would just hate to eliminate unilaterally
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, or ABM, which has made
an important contribution to stable military relations between
Russia and the United States until we can be certain that
first, the ABM treaty no longer serves a useful purpose, and
second, we have an effective alternative defense system in
place.
Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this
important hearing. I appreciate the effort your staff has taken
to work with my Subcommittee staff and look forward to our
continued cooperation. I, too, want to welcome our panels
today. We have some excellent witnesses, and we join you in
welcoming them.
Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
I appreciate your kind remarks. I am very pleased that this
is our first hearing as a team on this Subcommittee. I look
forward to working closely with you and the other Members of
the Subcommittee as we explore the subjects under the
jurisdiction that's been assigned to us.
Dr. Kirkpatrick is very well qualified, in my opinion, to
give us her impressions of the issues that surround national
missile defense in relationship with the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. Again, we welcome you very sincerely, and thank you for
making time available to testify before this Subcommittee
today.
We appreciate very much the benefit of your statement,
which we will make a part of the record in full. We encourage
you to make any comments you think would be helpful to our
understanding of these issues. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK,\1\ LEVY PROFESSOR OF
GOVERNMENT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY; SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED
NATIONS
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you very much, Senator
Cochran, for inviting me to testify on this vitally important
issue, which we know directly affects the security and well-
being of the United States.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick appears in the
Appendix on page 39.
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Mr. Chairman, as you know, the number of non-democratic,
non-constitutional states which either have or soon will have
weapons of mass destruction and intercontinental ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear, chemical and biological
payloads on American cities has grown and is growing. States
such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and yes, China, have developed
these capacities with a speed that exceeded the expectations
and predictions of skilled prognosticators.
So that what George Washington called our blessed location,
between two vast oceans, can no longer protect America and
Americans from weapons of mass destruction available to the
states of violent predilection and intentions. We are wholly,
utterly vulnerable to incoming missiles.
I know, Mr. Chairman, that you are as aware as I of this
Nation's growing vulnerability to blackmail and destruction. I
congratulate you for the leadership that you and Senator Inouye
have offered in the effort to develop an effective defense that
can end this vulnerability. I also know there remains powerful
resistance in this administration against serious action to
develop an effective defense against incoming missiles. And
there are still too many in the administration and in Congress
who are more concerned with preserving the ABM treaty than with
preserving American lives. I wish this were not true.
I would like to state briefly reasons I believe the effort
to preserve the ABM treaty is mistaken and dangerous. I begin
by considering the argument that has been made for many years
that the ABM treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability in
the U.S. relationship with Russia, or as is now claimed, in the
relationship with China and Russia, or the cornerstone of
strategic stability in the world.
But Mr. Chairman, there is no strategic stability in the
world. The ABM treaty has no more been able to stabilize
strategic relations among nations than the Non-Proliferation
Treaty has been able to prevent the spread of nuclear
technology, or the missile control regime has been able to
control the number of governments capable of producing long-
range ballistic missiles. These are hard facts which need to be
faced.
Russia, of course, retains its huge arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction and ICBMs. Everyone concerned with these
issues knows now that a number of other countries also possess
these capabilities, and that the reach and the accuracy of
China's missiles in particular have increased and are
increasing still. China's weapons and delivery systems reflect
or soon will reflect, we also know, the most advanced U.S.
technology. So the United States need to be able to defend
ourselves grows even more rapidly than we had anticipated.
We also know that Russia's political and economic systems
are unstable. We regret this and where our government can help,
it works with constructive persons in the government of Russia
and Russian society to try to help them to deal with these
problems. But it is a fact that Russia confronts various types
of instability, and confronts two national elections in the
next year, which we need also to be aware of.
At the same time that Russia confronts growing instability,
the People's Republic of China has become more assertive, and
sometimes even threatening in its dealings with Taiwan, Japan,
the Philippines and from time to time, the United States. That
makes it especially significant that China has joined Russia in
declaring it an egregious offense for the United States to seek
an effective defense against deadly weapons through policies
which may conflict with the ABM treaty.
The recent warnings in the Russian-Chinese declaration
reflect, I believe, the spirit of the French jingle that says,
``This is a very bad animal, when it is attacked, it defends
itself.'' Because all that is at issue here and has ever been
at issue in the ABM treaty is our capacity to defend ourselves.
Actually, while China speaks for solidarity with Russia's
efforts to preserve the ABM treaty and strategic stability, so-
called, in the world, its own policies promote the spread of
nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea
and destabilize strategic stability. China's policies
destabilize strategic stability. They also, destabilize
strategic stability by their threatening and semi-threatening
policies toward Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the United
States.
That was observed and clearly stated in the Rumsfeld
Commission report, with which I am certain you are fully
familiar. And which also makes the point that in addition to
the ballistic missile threats posed by Russia and the People's
Republic of China, such states as Iran, Iraq and North Korea
will probably be able to inflict major damage on the United
States within about 5 years of a decision to acquire such a
capability. And the Rumsfeld Commission report further notes,
the United States may not be aware that such a decision had
been made even if U.S. intelligence agencies, such as the CIA,
are working at full effort to discern such effort.
What makes the recent spread of nuclear and missile
technology especially serious is that it puts weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of repressive one-party states--the
very governments that are most likely to use such weapons
aggressively. This is the issue.
It's widely understood by political scientists that
democratic nations do not start wars, in part because democracy
gives power to the people who fight the wars, and they're not
enthusiastic about it, but mainly because democracy breeds
habits of restraint in the use of power, restraint in dealing
with differences and in tolerating opposition. Some consider
these attributes to be irrelevant to strategic matters, but
they are very relevant to strategic matters because democratic
governments got accustomed to submitting their power to law and
consent. The unwillingness of rulers to share power or to
tolerate criticism in internal affairs warns us that they may
not be willing to share power or negotiate differences in
external affairs.
The uninhibited use of force against dissidents, for
example, warns us that a government may use force to impose its
will in external relations as well. The fate of Tibet is not
irrelevant to the fate of Hong Kong or Taiwan, or any other
distinct community that becomes an object of China's ambition
or is absorbed by it.
For all these reasons, the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, I believe that developing and deploying an
effective defense against incoming missiles is the most
important security problem faced by the United States. I
further believe that the ABM treaty is the most important
obstacle to an adequate defense. I believe therefore that the
United States should give notice of an intention to withdraw
from the treaty.
As we all know, the ABM treaty was conceived and ratified
as a bilateral treaty during a time that only the United States
and the Soviet Union had the capacity to reach the other's
territory with ballistic missiles. Whether the treaty
contributed to America's security even then, is a question for
historians with which we need not be concerned today. The
question that concerns us now is whether the ABM treaty
contributes to the security of the United States today, in a
context of proliferating weapons of mass destruction and
missiles.
I believe the answer is, ``No, the Treaty does not
contribute to our security today.'' I note moreover that when
only one country had the capacity to deliver weapons of mass
destruction the value of the Treaty was diminished because the
Soviets both violated the Treaty and lied about it.
I note also that supporters of the ABM treaty were
uninterested in pursuing the question of Soviet violations
although the Reagan Administration, in which I served, held the
view, that there was a good deal of evidence suggesting
violations were taking place.
It was not until the end of the Cold War, when the wall
came down, that Soviet Foreign Minister Edouard Schevardnadze
confessed that there had indeed been major Soviet treaty
violations at Krasnoyarsk.
Today the ABM Treaty hinders the development of an
effective national missile defense, and handicaps the
development of affecting theater missile defenses. For these
reasons, I believe we should give notice of our intention to
withdraw from the treaty in order to protect our most vital
national interests which includes our survival.
I want to address the issue of whether or not American
withdrawal from the ABM treaty would damage American security
by diminishing the likelihood of Russia ratifying the START II
treaty, which would eliminate several thousand Russian ICBMs.
But I desire to make two points.
One is that the Duma has had 6 years to ratify START II,
during which time the United States has meticulously honored
its Treaty obligations. And the Duma has not ratified START II,
because of the vehement opposition, of the Communist party in
the Duma, and the Zhirinovsky party as well. Today the
Communist party and the Zhirinovsky party constitute a solid
majority of the members of that legislative body.
So the prospects of ratification of START II by the Duma
are very slim. Moreover, I would also emphasize that even if
the Duma were to ratify, which is extremely unlikely, we would
be protected only against the several thousand ICBMs which
Russia destroyed. It would leave us still utterly defenseless
against other Russian ICBMs and defenseless against Chinese and
North Korean and all other weapons of mass destruction. START
II could not provide us an adequate defense.
Concerning the claim that the ABM treaty has been the
cornerstone of strategic stability, it is useful to recall that
the purpose of a defense is to defend. Stability is better than
instability, but it's not an ultimate value. And it was not the
search for stability that led us to conceive and ratify the ABM
treaty. And it is certainly not the search for stability that
concerns Americans today. It is the search for an adequate
defense. Defense is more important to us than stability.
It is the proliferation of missiles creates strategic
instability that characterizes the world today. The ABM treaty
and its continuation serves the interests of both Russia and
China, today. It serves the interest of Russia, because it
preserves American vulnerability and the full value of their
ICBMs.
And the ABM treaty serves China's long-term ambitions to
become the dominant power in East Asia, because in order to do
this, they must neutralize U.S. power in the region. It is
America's deterrent capacity that has maintained peace in East
Asia and protected that area from a nuclear missile race.
I have been disturbed by the predilection China's military
leaders have shown in recent years for using the threat of
force to blackmail others. We all remember when China's
Lieutenant General Xiong Guang Kai threatened the United States
at the time of the Taiwan Straits crisis, stating that he
didn't think they had to worry much about Americans, because if
Americans had to choose between having bombs fall on Los
Angeles and Taipei, it would be no choice.
That's the closest thing to an outright threat to American
cities, I think, that I have ever heard, more specific than
Khruschev's threat, ``We will bury you,'' became more precise.
I have also been shocked, as I'm sure others here have
been, by China's theft of American technology through
espionage.
I believe, that where Asia is concerned, it is now the ABM
Treaty that can keep the peace and maintain stability. It is
America's continued capacity to deter by its own strength and
its policies.
Mr. Chairman, we all know that the threat to the United
States security and interest is real and present. We know
Secretary Cohen stated recently, ``We are affirming that there
is a threat and that the threat is growing. We expect it will
pose a danger not only to our troops overseas, but also to
Americans here at home.'' And General Lyles, who added to that,
``The threat is here and now.'' Those clear statements from the
Pentagon and clear acknowledgement of a developing threat and a
developing need for an adequate missile defense system I think
have clarified the situation.
Let me just say that I am not a lawyer, I am a political
scientist. I have, however, read the reports and analyses both
of the Heritage Foundation report by David Rivkin, Lee Casey
and Darin Bartram. As you know, they demonstrate that the ABM
treaty collapsed with the Soviet Union. The Center for Security
Studies Feith and Meron analysis focuses on the question: Did
the ABM treaty of 1972 remain in force after the USSR ceased to
exist in December, 1991? Their answer is no, it did not remain
in force, because both international and domestic law make
clear that it could not remain in force. It would require such
alteration that it cannot be regarded as having remained in
force.
Their second question is, did it become a treaty between
the United States and the Russian Federation, as the
administration has suggested? Their answer to that is, no, it
did not because it could not, because the Russian Federation is
not simply a continuation of the Soviet Union. We all know
that.
The Soviet Union not only dissolved itself, but it also,
under President Yeltsin's leadership, permitted those CIS
states who were component states of the Soviet Union to declare
their independence and establish their own governments. That
does not mean, either, that the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and
Belarus and the Russian Federation can be treated as sort of
roughly the equivalent of the Soviet Union for legal purposes.
It doesn't work that way, because treaties are
painstakingly negotiated between specific states who then
assume those obligations in the Treaty. These are not the
states with whom the U.S. negotiated, this is not the treaty
that the Senate ratified. I believe that we need to face the
fact that the ABM treaty has expired and that restoring it
would be an obstacle to the development and deployment of an
effective and adequate missile defense for Americans, and that
it is now time to unleash the creativity of American scientists
and technicians and allow them to take on fully with all their
creativity the task of completing the development of an
adequate missile defense system.
The right of self defense is recognized in courts of law as
justifying the use of force and from time to time in criminal
law. It's also recognized in the U.N. Charter, in Article 51,
where there is a reference to the ``inherent right to self
defense.''
It is not necessary, Mr. Chairman, and prudent people will
not wait until they are attacked in order to provide an
adequate defense. It is irresponsible for the U.S. Government
to remain, to leave us defenseless until we actually confront
an attack. I believe the U.S. Government has a solemn
obligation to provide for the defense of America and that the
next step in doing so, in fulfilling this obligation, would be
to give notice of the American intention to withdraw from the
ABM treaty.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador.
This is a very interesting and thought-provoking statement for
us this afternoon.
Let me ask a couple of questions. I just noticed a light
went on and our buzzer system sounded, indicating a vote is
occurring now, beginning on the Floor of the Senate. We're
checking to see what that is, but within 15 minutes, we'll have
to go record our votes. We will be taking a break to do that.
But it seems to me that it is clear, as you point out, that
the restraints that are imposed on our efforts to develop
defenses against missile attack, whether we're talking about
theater missiles or a national missile defense system, are very
clear. We know that we're not doing things we would do,
probably, if we weren't constrained by the ABM treaty
otherwise, in the theater missile defense area. We know that
we're testing in a limited way to guard against violating the
treaty and to guard against violating an agreement that this
administration has reached with Russia, this demarcation
agreement that's been negotiated without the approval of the
Senate. So that's a very real problem.
I suppose we simply have to weigh one interest against the
other, that is, the benefits of being free from obstacles to
our efforts to develop and deploy theater and national missile
defense systems with the potential harm to our relationship
with Russia. As we try to assess that balance and make a policy
judgment, we need to understand what the potential harm to our
relationship with Russia would be.
In that connection, let me ask the first question, which
is, what would the Russian reaction be, in your view, to our
announcement of an intention to withdraw from the ABM treaty?
Would this reverse the successes of the de-escalation of
strategic weapons development, destruction of nuclear weapons
and changes in targeting of the Russian ICBMs? What do you
think?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, I believe we cannot
ever be certain what the response of another government will be
to a U.S. action. I think we could be clear in our own minds
that the United States does not see the issues involving the
ABM treaty as involving, as threatening to Russia. We are not
proposing any sort of action that would enhance the threat to
Russia. We're not proposing to attack Russia or to blackmail
Russia.
Moreover, I would remind the Chairman of the time that
President Reagan first made his speech proposing the
development of a national missile defense, which his opponents
usually called Star Wars, and those of us who supported it
called Strategic Defense Initiative. He actually announced
simultaneously that if this seemed too upsetting, if it seemed
upsetting to the Soviet Government, you would assure them that
it had no intentions to damage them and could in fact enhance
their security, and that he would himself propose to make
available to the Soviet Union, you recall this, make available
to the Soviet Union the benefits of the defense against
ballistic missiles that would derive from our research and
experience with the national missile defense system.
I have no doubt at all that if we were to think creatively
with the Russians, it should be possible to convince them that
we in no sense intend to threaten them and that we would, in
fact, be better able to protect not only ourselves, but any
country in the world, if we had a space-based missile system,
which is what, of course, President Reagan saw and which is
what would give us the longest view.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Akaka, before we have to go vote.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. That means my questions
will be limited.
As I expressed in my statement, I am very concerned about
what you think. My question to you would be, do you think our
ABM treaty has a useful purpose yet, presently? And second,
whether you know or feel that we have an alternative defense
system that can take its place in case we decide to remove the
ABM treaty?
This is in light not only of the Russia which is now the
past, but when we look at the present, and that is with our
NATO countries, as well as Japan, the kind of agreement we
should consider with them.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Let me just say that I know that
you know the first job of an American Senator or Congressman is
representation of his own constituents, and protection of those
constituents and their interests, as well as the Nation's. I
think Hawaii obviously has a very special concern in these
discussions because Hawaii is the State which is most readily
threatened by the technology which exists today in China and
North Korea.
I think the threat and the danger constitute a clear and
present danger. I do not see a comparable benefit either to the
United States, especially to those people that are threatened
directly by existing technology. But from the ABM treaty,
that's a very good example. Because the ABM treaty at best
provides some controls over the defenses that Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may develop. We really don't have any
interest in not having those countries not defend their own
people, by the way.
But the threat that exists from them, any threat from them,
is not a threat to the people of Hawaii, I might say. The
threat to the people of Hawaii that exists today comes from
states that have never been signatories to the ABM treaty. The
ABM treaty, we have to bear clearly in mind, is not a
multilateral treaty. It's a bilateral treaty between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
I just don't see any benefit to the people of Hawaii
derived from this.
Senator Cochran. Senator, I hate to interrupt, but we'd
probably better go vote. This is a motion to table the Kennedy
Amendment.
If you will excuse us, we'll be right back. The
Subcommittee will stand in short recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee will please come to
order.
It turned out that we had two votes, rather than one vote.
That caused a little extra delay, and we apologize very much
for that.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, you mentioned that there were new
threats emerging that the ABM treaty was not designed to deal
with--one is China. Our relationship with Russia is the only
relationship that was contemplated when the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Defense Treaty was entered into. What in your judgment
would the effect be on other countries, if any, by our
announcement that we were withdrawing from the ABM treaty?
Would it cause a new level of tension between the United States
and China? If so, should we consider that before making a
decision to withdraw from ABM?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I don't believe so. I believe that
the United States has a fairly complex relationship with China,
and that there are areas in which we have very constructive and
useful relationships, trade is one of those. I always say trade
in non-strategic goods. But cultural relations of various
kinds, we have important relations with China.
China does a good many things that we're unhappy with. And
we rarely do anything that China is very unhappy with, except
complain about some of the things that they do.
I think this would make them unhappy. And I think it's a
very important thing for us to do, just in fact to preserve
some degree of strategic stability in the East Asian theater.
But I don't think any of these specific issues in our
relationship with China will threaten the whole relationship. I
think there's always a lot of hype, over-dramatization of these
questions.
Senator Cochran. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I can't help but remember a statement you made, Ambassador,
that there is no strategic stability in the world today, which
is something that we really need to care and think about. So we
have to look to see what we have on the books now that can
possibly be part of trying to reach some strategic stability.
In your view, Ambassador, from whom does the United States
continue to facte the greatest missile threat? If it is not the
Russians, how do you rank the Russian offensive missile threat?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I rank it serious, that's how I
rank it. I think it exists, I think it's real. Any threat
consists of capability and intention. And the Russians have the
capability. We hope they don't have the intention. The reason
that the world has been more relaxed and comfortable in the
years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union is just that,
that we took it as signaling an end to the Russians' hostile
intentions, not only Russia, but the other countries of the
former Soviet Union.
I believe that the Russia today does not have hostile
intent toward us. But I do not think we can--the capability is
so great and the level of instability in that country is
sufficient that I think it should be a continual concern to us.
That's what I think.
I had the privilege of hearing the late former President
Nixon on his return from Moscow giving a sort of last semi-
public statement that he gave before he was struck dumb, just 2
days before his stroke. He was reporting--he had gone to Moscow
for 3 weeks, and he was back and reported to President Clinton.
He invited 30 or 40 foreign policy wonks in Washington,
officials in former administrations like me and top journalists
who had specialized in Soviet relations, to hear a report.
He spoke for about 70 minutes, with great insight and
clarity. He began and ended that statement with the comment
that he very much hoped that his fellow Americans understood
that Russia remained for us the most important country in the
world, if for no other reason than they alone could destroy
large parts of our country in the matter of an hour or so.
I had a lot of respect for Mr. Nixon's foreign policy
insights and clarity. That comment made a special impact on me.
I think it's good advice. We should not forget it.
Senator Akaka. I know we still think about the Russians,
and we still worry about them. My question leads to looking for
the best means of dealing with them. One of them could be,
could it be through containment or elimination? So I come to
this question, if Russia deployed a national missile defense
system that could prevent the United States from retaliating
with its missile forces and still retained its nuclear forces,
would you think that would be good for U.S. security?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I have trouble with the question.
Because I can't conceive of the United States employing ICBMs
aggressively against Russia. But generally, I would simply say
that I do not believe that an effective defense is an
aggressive act against anyone. I would feel that way about
Russia as well. I would not feel that an effective defense
against incoming missiles in Russia was an offensive act
against the United States or a danger to us. I would not think
so. I wouldn't have even thought so during the Cold War, I
don't think. The question was never whether they were going to
undertake an aggressive war or not. Neither we, nor our NATO
allies, is going to make an aggressive move against Russia. I
take it for granted that defense against aggression is a duty
of every state. The provision of prudent defense against
others, against aggressors, is an obligation of every
government, in fact. I would think it was Russia doing its duty
vis-a-vis its own citizens, which is to provide for their
defense.
By the way, President Reagan felt that way too.
Senator Akaka. At this time--let me just finish with this,
because I know you have known the situation there since you
were very active in the administration following that, and
follow with this question: Do you think we should share
defensive technologies with Russia?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think we should consider sharing
defense, perhaps, with Russia. I am not prepared to share
technologies with Russia at this stage, because of Russia's
instability, frankly, and the uncertainty of the character of
its own government. But I would be willing to maybe share its
defense, some effort to assist in its defense. That's a
different issue.
Senator Akaka. I thank you so much for your responses. I
really appreciate it.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
One final question occurs to me, Dr. Kirkpatrick, and it
relates to the nature of our defense system that we are
developing with a view toward deployment as soon as technology
permits, and that is that it is a limited national missile
defense system. I think it may be incumbent upon us to
emphasize this in our relationship with other officials from
Russia, as we do encounter them on visits there and they come
here.
There's a meeting scheduled in Berlin in August, for
example, sponsored by the Aspen Institute, where there will be
officials from both the Duma and the U.S. Congress meeting to
talk about how to improve and stabilize the relationship. That
is to stress what our goals are when we do meet with the
Russian officials. It's not to defend against attacks from
Russia. It's to defend against a rogue state attack, or a
limited missile defense attack, or an accidental or
unauthorized launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
It seems to me that we do have that in common, and that is,
a vulnerability to that kind of attack. Russia and the United
States have that in common. Is this one way that you would
suggest that we might begin discussions at that level,
parliamentarian to parliamentarian, to try to reassure them
that it's not our intention to endanger Russia with the
deployment of a national missile defense system, but simply to
protect ourselves from this other kind of attack, and that they
may end up wanting to deploy a defense against limited
ballistic missile attack as well, because of similar concerns
they might have from other states, not the United States, but
other states?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Cochran, it might be an
interesting conversation. I think, myself, candidly, that we
need to work toward a less limited national defense system. I
am personally not very interested in the argument, the case for
a missile defense system which is limited to missiles from, one
missile from North Korea, although that could be very
destructive and very dangerous.
But I think as long as we're working on the problem, it
would be more cost effective and more prudent to work on a
system that provided a broader defense for America. Good luck
in your conversations.
Senator Cochran. But it doesn't have to result in an
unlimited defensive arms race between the United States and
Russia, or the United States and anybody else.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. No. Senator Cochran, see, I don't
think there's ever been a defensive arms race in history. And I
don't really think there could be a defensive arms race. I
don't see and I don't hear anyone seriously foreseeing a
defensive arms race, either with Russia or China or any of the
various states that are concerned with nuclear development and
capacity today. I just mention that.
The strategy of defense is a strategy that is adopted by
people who are above all interested in the survival of their
own society and its people. I thank you for inviting me today.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. You've been an
excellent witness and we appreciate so much your being here.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you so much.
Senator Cochran. Our next panel, we would invite to come
forward, Robert G. Joseph. Mr. Joseph is former Ambassador and
a Commissioner to the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative
Commission. He's Director of the Center for Counter-
Proliferation Research at the National Defense University.
John Rhinelander is Senior Counsel at the law firm of Shaw
Pittman and former legal advisor to the SALT I delegation.
We appreciate very much you being here today, and we
welcome you. Mr. Rhinelander, let's begin with you. You may
proceed.
STATEMENT OF JOHN B. RHINELANDER,\1\ SENIOR COUNSEL, SHAW
PITTMAN, AND FORMER LEGAL ADVISER, SALT I DELEGATION
Mr. Rhinelander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Akaka.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Rhinelander appears in the
Appendix on page 52.
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I have a 10-page statement which I would like to submit to
the record and then briefly summarize some of the points,
rather than reading the full statement.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. We will appreciate
that, and your statement will be made part of our hearing
record in its entirety.
Mr. Rhinelander. Thank you.
Just for the record, I was the legal adviser to the SALT I
delegation that negotiated the ABM treaty. I, in fact, drafted
the treaty originally. There then were 100 hands on it, so
nobody can claim full authorship of it.
I have written extensively about that treaty in book
chapters, testimony on the Hill, etc. I will be frank to say
that when I accepted Gerard Smith's invitation to come to
Vienna to prepare to draft the treaties I thought I was
undertaking a 2-week assignment. It is now 28 years and
counting. I never thought that would be the case.
Let me say that in terms of the treaty, while I have
written extensively on it, I have not had access to the
classified record since I left the SALT world in 1972. I have
written from my memory, which I think is pretty good. I have
talked to a lot of people.
I do understand that a 100-page analysis of the treaty that
I wrote when I was legal adviser to the SALT I delegation is in
the process of being declassified. It was classified top secret
at the time. I don't know how long that process will take.
Presumably some day, perhaps while I'm still alive, you will
have a contemporaneous view of what the U.S. SALT delegation
felt the treaty meant at the time we negotiated in 1972.
Let me start with three basic points before I get to the
details of the treaty. On the details of the treaty, it may be
best to handle it by questions and answers.
First of all, on the technology--I spent my Army years with
missile defense, going back to the late 1950's. It was a first
generation system called the Nike system. So I've been involved
in this world for more than 40 years.
We are still unable to achieve the extraordinarily
difficult task of intercepting an incoming ballistic missile,
at least a long-range, high-speed missile, whether or not it
has multi-warheads or whether or not it has chaff and other
kinds of systems. Not because we haven't tried, we have tried
very hard. But it is an extraordinarily difficult challenge.
The Russians haven't been able to do it either. They have a
system around Moscow which was no good in the 1960's and 1970's
when they put it up, and it's no good right now.
If the United States goes forward with a ballistic missile
program, I would urge the Subcommittee and others in the
Congress to make sure there is a realistic testing program. We
have not always had that in the past. I was down at White Sands
twice in my days in uniform when the tests were not realistic.
A couple of years ago, I went to the Army's national training
center which deals with ground forces, which is a remarkable
place. I would urge the Subcommittee to think about having
something as realistic as that if, in fact, we are seriously
going to count on missile defense to defend either the
continental United States or in the theater.
Second, the threat--I know my views may differ from others,
but I have ranked the threat. I think the single most important
threat now is the Russian strategic systems. These are the only
ones that could destroy the United States. They could destroy
us utterly, we know that, with only a fraction of the ones they
still have working.
The second threat I would say is the very large number,
we're not sure how many, of the Russian tactical systems,
whether or not they're aimed at our treaty allies. The loose
nuke problem with the Russian tactical system is very real. I
think our people aren't sure the Russians know where all their
systems are.
Third, and the thing that makes nuclear weapons different
from anything else, is the highly enriched uranium and the
plutonium. A number of years ago a Harvard group estimated that
the Russians had enough material, based on conservative usage,
that means relatively high use on weapons, to make 100,000
nuclear weapons. A small fraction of that material leaking out
would be an absolute disaster. These three Russian parts of the
equation to me are the ones which are by far and away the most
serious.
Fourth, I would go next to the Chinese. The Chinese are in
the process of modernizing their systems. I don't know where
they're going to go. I know they are converting from liquid
fuel to solid fuel on some of their missile systems. I do not
know whether they are going to be MIRVing, I don't know where
their MIRV program stands. And I don't know what numbers they
are likely to aim at. But it certainly seems to me that is a
question which ought to be of concern to us.
When we first got into the engagement with the Soviets,
McNamara made a famous speech in 1967 focusing on the Chinese
threat. It didn't exist at the time. Well, China is now coming
forward. So that is something we've got to look at
realistically.
Fifth, I would put Korea and Iraq and some of what I would
call the rogue states. I have never viewed the threat from
those countries as long-range, that is ICBM-range with nuclear
weapons. There is a terrorist threat, there is a short-range
threat, a threat with delivery by aircraft or ship, which seems
to me is much more likely than missiles.
I can recall, because I'm old enough, the original testing
programs, of U.S. programs, the Polaris program at sea and the
original ICBM programs. Most of our early missile tests failed.
It is tricky to do that. Korea has a long, long way to go
before they ever develop the full-range intercontinental, and I
view that as the least likely of their targets. But that's my
own judgment.
Is it a possible threat, is it a theoretical worst case
threat? Yes, indeed. But is it a likely one, or is it high on
the ranking? Not in my mind.
I think we need more than anything else, and I don't think
it has been done honestly since 1969, the first year of the
Nixon Administration, a thorough, comprehensive review of the
offensive-defensive equations before the United States makes
any serious decisions. I think this will have to be undertaken
by the next administration. I don't think it's going to be done
by the Clinton Administration in year 7 or 8 of their reign.
But if this is done, it's going to be much more complicated
than when I was in government. Then we were looking only at the
Soviet Union. You've got China now, you've got the rogue states
right now. If in fact we are seriously looking at an end stage
of reductions around the world of offensive systems, you've got
concerns about NATO allies, including the French in particular,
which are nuclear armed. It will be much more complicated than
anything we undertook in 1969.
I think that ought to be done, though, before any decisions
are made to go forward.
With respect to the ABM treaty, the treaty is a relatively
short document. It was designed and written, and I think
effectively, to limit severely what could be deployed to a
fixed land-based mode in originally two, then one, site. The
prohibitions made sure that the programs which were over the
horizon could not be taken without the treaty being amended.
Those would be the sea-based, the air-based and the space-based
systems.
I must admit that when I was in this world, and reflecting
the views of others who were on the SALT I delegation, we felt
we could look ahead about 10 years in terms of technology. But
we couldn't look much beyond that. I thought personally that
the ABM treaty would be worked on through the Standing
Consultative Commission; the treaty amended, interpreted, as
you will, as technology changed, so you would have a live,
viable, modern treaty to go with technology as it was changed.
That simply has not happened. Basically what you have is a
treaty which is over 25 years old. Technology has evolved very
significantly since then. With respect to the treaty and where
we are going, as far as I know the administration has not made
any decisions on deployment and does not plan to make any
decisions until June 2000, a date which may slip.
I was asked to comment on some proposals coming out of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Most of what I have
seen raises questions on the ABM treaty. I think it's very
clear that the nationwide prohibition is explicitly on the
other side of the fence from the system that BMDO proposes.
The warhead package on the interceptor with a sensor on
board with the infrared system, which would effectively take
over from the old ground-based radar and is intended to take
the missiles to the intercept point, that really is a
substitute for the ground-based system. That raises the
earliest question of treaty compliance because that raises a
question under Article V of the treaty where the testing as
well as the deployment is prohibited. If you're only looking at
deployment issues, you've got a lot more time. If dealing with
testing prohibitions, that's another matter.
Rather than go through all the other issues, let me say
that some of the radar proposals, where we're proposing to put
some of the engagement radars outside the deployment area, that
is inconsistent with the treaty. If in fact the United States
is going to deploy initially in Alaska, with some limited
system, that could not be done either under the present treaty,
as amended in 1974, or under the original treaty.
The original treaty allowed two sites. But one had to be
around the National Capital area, and the Russians have theirs
around Moscow. The other was around ICBM fields, which is where
we had ours. We had ours at Grand Forks operational for a
couple of months. So Alaska would be entirely new. It's not
inconceivable that that concept is negotiable, to have a site
up there. But to the extent the key ABM components are not
within the circular area concept, it would be a very different
kind of deployment than that thought about and approved in
1972.
Let me just conclude with a couple of comments. When we
negotiated the ABM Treaty in the Nixon Administration, we were
concerned because the Russians had moved first in this world. A
lot of people forget it, but the Russians first deployed an ABM
system around Moscow. Even before that, they put up a surface
to air missile system around Talinn, in the Baltic area, which
our intelligence people first thought was ABM.
It wasn't, but when they began putting the Moscow system
up, the concern was that was the first in what was going to be
many steps. We responded in two ways. One was the MIRVs, multi-
independent re-entry vehicles, and the second was our own ABM
system which we had operational for 6 months and then shut down
because it wasn't cost-effective.
In conclusion, and I will answer any questions you want on
the technical side, I think the United States has a choice. If
we go forward with the kind of system which we're talking
about, which you've asked me to review, it cannot be done
consistent with the present ABM treaty. Whether or not it is
negotiable with the Russians is an open question. It would be
difficult. I don't think I would live long enough to go through
that kind of negotiation.
Basically what you're talking about is a world constrained
on offense with defense not constrained. If we go forward on
the ballistic missile defense side, we give up what I think are
two of the great recent triumphs of U.S. diplomacy, and that is
the ban on the land-based MIRVed ICBMs, the Russian systems,
and the ban on the heavy Russian systems. For 20 or 30 years,
this was our priority objective, to get rid of those.
There is no way Russia will agree to the START II ban if we
go forward with ABM outside the ABM treaty as presently is or
as amended. If amended, that would be fine. But I think that
choice is going to be there.
Now, Russia is clearly not going to stay where they are.
They're not going to build a defensive missile system. They
don't have the technology to do it. Their present system is no
good. They don't have the money to do it. They are going to
cannibalize, I think, what they have, and keep their SS-18s up
as long as they can. They can't produce new ones, because the
production line was in part in Ukraine.
But I think they will try to MIRV their new systems, and
keep up as many of the old as they can. That is what the choice
is going to be.
I would just note to you that in terms of the present
world, in many ways, what we're facing now is fundamentally
different, of course, from the old Soviet days. In some ways,
it's more threatening. The Russian economy is going to hell.
Their ICBM systems are not being maintained as they used to be.
Their boats are basically kept in port because they're
dangerous to take out and take underwater.
Their early warning system is blind for 2 or 3 hours every
single day. They don't know whether in fact we have fired at
them. In terms of strategic stability, we are in a very, very
dangerous world, because of their weakness, not because of
their strength which we saw when I was involved in this world.
So I think we have a very difficult world to deal with. I
think it's a world, as I said, we really need to look at
comprehensively before we go forward with anything such as a
ballistic missile defense deployment. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Rhinelander.
Ambassador Joseph, welcome and you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. JOSEPH,\1\ DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR COUNTER-
PROLIFERATION RESEARCH, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER
U.S. COMMISSIONER, STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Ambassador Joseph. Mr. Chairman, Senator Akaka, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today. It truly is an honor for
me to be here.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ambassador Joseph appears in the
Appendix on page 61.
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It's necessary for me to state at the outset that the views
that I am about to express are personal views, they are not the
views of the National Defense University, the Department of
Defense or any agency of the U.S. Government.
The prepared statement that I have submitted responds to
the issues included in the Chairman's letter of invitation.
That statement provides assessments of: First, the principal
changes to the ABM treaty that would be necessary to permit the
deployment of even a very limited missile defense; second,
additional treaty modifications that might be required to
counter the missile threat as it is likely to evolve; and
third, the prospects for achieving such changes to the treaty.
I will summarize from this prepared statement.
Mr. Rhinelander has addressed a number of treaty provisions
that would have to be altered if we are to pursue the ground-
based architectures currently being considered. And on this
subject, I would emphasize only one point. The words of Article
I of the ABM treaty are very clear. If one applies plain and
ordinary definitions to the terms that are used, I believe the
language makes evident the need to confront the very basic
contradiction between today's imperative to deploy missile
defenses to protect our population against ballistic missile
attacks from rogue nations, and the underlying strategic
rationale of the treaty.
Designed in the bipolar context of the Cold War, the
express objective of the treaty was to severely restrict
defenses in order to preserve and ensure the credibility of
offensive nuclear forces. In other words, by ensuring the
vulnerabilities of our societies to nuclear attack, the treaty
was seen as promoting strategic deterrence.
I believe very few would advance this same deterrent
concept today for states such as North Korea or Iran. Yet the
treaty does not provide an exception for defense against such
threats.
Moving to the issue of negotiability, which I have been
asked to address in my opening statement, I would note that
Secretary Cohen's announcement last January that the United
States will pursue a defense against rogue states armed with
long-range missiles is a most welcome statement. It appears at
least to me to return to and reaffirm the rationale for missile
defenses that was articulated during the Bush Administration,
for which I had the opportunity to serve.
In this context, I think looking back can be very
instructive in assessing some of today's arguments. In 1992,
following the Gulf War and the attempted coup in the then-
Soviet Union, the Bush team put forth both a deployment plan
and an arms control initiative to support this deployment. The
concern was really two-fold: A rogue state armed with a small
number of ballistic missiles that could strike American cities;
and second, an accidental or unauthorized launch, perhaps from
a breakaway military commander in the Soviet Union.
To deal with this limited threat, the United States
declared its intention to deploy what was called GPALS, or
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. For the near term,
this architecture consisted of up to 6 ground-based sites with
up to 1,200 interceptors, a space-based sensor capability and
robust theater missile defense.
On the arms control side, the United States formally
proposed fundamental changes to the ABM treaty consistent with
the GPALS concept. These included the elimination of all
restrictions on development and testing, in order to preserve
our ability to increase the competence of our defense in the
future; the elimination of restrictions on sensors; the
elimination of restrictions on the transfer of systems and
components; and the right to deploy additional interceptors at
additional fixed deployment sites.
In Washington, Moscow and Geneva, American representatives
presented these positions to the Russians, stating that the
emerging threat of long-range missiles compelled changes to the
treaty. The Russians were told that we could work together on
defenses, but that with or without them, we must protect
ourselves from limited attack.
It was also made clear to the Russians that the level of
defenses we envisioned would not threaten the offensive
capability of the Russian nuclear force at START levels or even
well below those levels. At the same time, we stressed to the
Russians that the United States and Russia should not base
their new relationship on the Cold War doctrine of mutual
assured destruction but rather on common interests and
cooperation.
The Russian reaction at that time I believe was most
telling. They didn't say yes and they didn't say no. They
listened and they asked questions. But most important, while we
were negotiating on basic changes to the ABM treaty, the
Russian START negotiators continued with those negotiations and
in fact, concluded those negotiations, which provided for the
first time for real reductions in offensive forces. That the
U.S. position on the ABM treaty did not affect the Russian
willingness to agree to offensive cuts was evident in their
signing of both START I and START II in quick succession.
Nevertheless, in 1993, the new administration reversed
course on both national missile defense and renegotiation of
the ABM treaty. For years, this policy position has prevailed,
often justified by two arguments. First, we have been told that
we must choose between offensive reductions and even limited
defenses. Second, we have been told that the rogue nation
threat is many years distant. I believe that both experience
and facts stand in stark contrast to these positions.
Yet the future of defenses is far from certain. Neither the
North Korean launch of the TaepoDong missile this past August,
a multi-staged, long-range missile, nor the recent legislation
that makes it the policy of the United States to deploy
defenses as soon as technologically possible, may lead to the
actual deployment of effective defenses.
In fact, the administration has reaffirmed that it has not
made a decision to deploy, and that it continues to uphold the
ABM treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability. Such an
approach, we are told, is necessary to save START II, a treaty
that Moscow has held hostage so many times to so many different
objectives over so many years, that I think few now believe it
will ever be ratified by the Duma, or if it is ratified, that
it will have much substantive impact.
Nevertheless, how Russia will react to our deployment of
missile defenses is, it seems to me, an important question. A
number of Russian and American officials have predicted dire
consequences if the United States pushes to amend the ABM
treaty or withdraws from the treaty, even though both courses
of action are entirely consistent with our legal rights.
Similar predictions were voiced in the context of NATO
enlargement and in the context of U.S. strikes on Iraq. Yet in
both of these cases, Russia acted on the basis of its interests
and not on the basis of its press statements.
The same is true regarding our arms control experience.
When NATO in response to the deployment of Russian SS-20s
decided to deploy intermediate range nuclear forces while
simultaneously negotiating for the elimination of this entire
class of weapon, the Soviet Union made stark threats to test
the alliance's resolve. Moscow promised to walk out of the
negotiations when the first NATO missiles were deployed, and in
fact, they did in November 1983, when the first Pershing IIs
arrived in Germany.
But when it became clear that the determination of the
alliance would not be shaken, the Soviet negotiators returned,
and the result was a total ban on these nuclear weapons.
The most recent arms control example of Russia pursuing its
own interests in the context of changing strategic realities is
in my view perhaps the most instructive. When the end of the
Soviet Union led Russia to conclude that the legal limits on
forces in its flank areas as established under the CFE treaty
were no longer in the interest of Moscow, its approach was
straightforward: It insisted that the treaty be changed. The
United States and other parties accommodated this demand in the
Flank Agreement.
Since then, citing further changes in the security
environment, I understand Russia is again insisting on
additional changes to this treaty. The principle seems to be
clear. Russia assesses the value of arms control agreements in
the context of its defense requirements. When the security
conditions change, it acts with determination to change the
treaties.
For us, the parallel to the ABM treaty and the principle I
would argue, should be the same. This leads to two final
observations on the issue of negotiability. The first is on
timing. Given the stated Russian goal of retaining the ABM
treaty without change and given Russian fears that any U.S.
deployment of defenses will provide the base for a robust
defense that could threaten the viability of their offensive
strategic forces, any negotiation can be expected to be long
and difficult.
Such negotiations, if we pursue that path, will not be
successful in my view unless the United States has a clear
deployment objective and the perceived resolve to move forward,
even if that requires withdrawal from the treaty under our
supreme national interest clause.
In light of the pace of missile programs in countries such
as North Korea and Iran, we simply don't have the luxury to
devote years to the renegotiation of the ABM treaty. The second
observation is that in attempting to modify the treaty, to
permit limited defenses, we need to ensure flexibility to
counter missile threats as they continue to evolve, taking full
advantage of developments in technology.
Narrow relief to allow for ground-based interceptors, to
protect against a very small and crude missile threat in the
near-term, must not be purchased at the price of fixing in
concrete a future that does not permit us to adapt our defenses
to meet the threat as it develops. The findings of the Rumsfeld
Commission and the launch of the TaepoDong missile underscore
that the threat is here now and will become increasingly
sophisticated.
To protect against this evolving threat, one that may very
well include ship-launched attack, the United States may need
to develop and deploy sea and space-based defenses. In fact,
such basing modes may well be the most cost-effective means to
protect against the threat.
In terms of longer-range objectives, I'll limit my remarks
to two final points.
First, prudent defense planning must give priority to the
rogue state threat. I believe most everybody agrees that the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
represents a major security challenge for the United States.
I also believe that we are near consensus on the missile
threat. The National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that
we would have warning and that we would likely not face a long-
range missile threat for 15 years has been widely repudiated.
In the area of proliferation shocks and surprises, we have
a long record of intelligence failures. From Sputnik and
missiles in Cuba to the recent TaepoDong launch, there is every
reason to believe that we will be surprised in the future about
the size, scope and speed of adversaries' missiles programs.
The same applies to their programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction.
I think most important, North Korea has settled the debate.
We now have a desperate, totalitarian regime that could, we are
told, possess a couple of nuclear devices, in the possession of
long-range ballistic missiles.
Second, it is incumbent upon us to consider the strategic
uncertainties that exist with both China and Russia. China
highly values both its nuclear arsenal and its ballistic
missile force. The degree of value can best be judged by
observing Beijing's actions. Its behavior--such as the
overflight of Taiwan with ballistic missiles, the ongoing
deployment of much greater numbers of ballistic missiles
opposite Taiwan, and espionage at our nuclear laboratories--
speaks very loudly. This is a country that intends to possess
these capabilities for the long-term, and to use them as a
means to advance its agenda.
The question is what are we going to do about it?
Specifically, are we going to accept the relationship of mutual
vulnerability with China? If not, we must assess accordingly
our defense requirements and the wider related implications.
Like China, Russia also highly values its nuclear and
ballistic missile force. In fact, these weapons play a greater
role today in Moscow's defense planning and declaratory policy
than in the past. Despite its economic distress, despite its
conventional forces literally deteriorating in the field,
Russia continues to invest in its nuclear and missile
infrastructure. Whether we like it or not, this will remain a
condition of the security environment for years to come.
Here the question is how best to promote better relations
and how to hedge against risks. In terms of improving our
strategic relationship, I believe we should advance cooperation
in areas of common interest, such as in areas of cooperative
threat reduction and perhaps in sharing early warning data.
Most important, we need to move beyond the policies based
on the philosophies and distrust of the Cold War. Here there is
no better example than the 1972 ABM treaty. Put directly, we
need to move beyond the ABM treaty. Promoting mutual assured
destruction as a basis for a healthy relationship is not sound
strategic policy. Prolonging the Faustian bargain that we can
destroy each other's populations inevitably has a very
corrosive effect on our relations and how we perceive each
other.
In conclusion, we must move to meet our national missile
defense requirements while attempting to place our strategic
relationship with Russia on much firmer ground. One clear
requirement, an imperative, I believe, is to deploy strategic
defenses sufficient to meet the now-present and growing
ballistic missile threat represented by hostile regional and
rogue states.
This can be accomplished, I believe, consistent with our
other national security goals. As I noted, we made formal
proposals to this effect during the Bush Administration while
making it very clear that Russia would not have a veto over our
defense needs. We sought to reconcile their concerns while
meeting U.S. security requirements against what was then
assessed to be an emerging threat, the threat that has now
emerged.
That concludes my opening statement. I thank you and look
forward to your questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Ambassador Joseph.
You both have set the stage, I think, for a very
interesting dialogue about the relevance of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty to current threats to U.S. security.
Mr. Rhinelander, you pointed out that the technologies of
1972, when you were working to help write the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, are much different from what they are today.
The emergence of previously unthinkable capabilities, such as
space-based tracking sensors, interceptor missiles that perform
many of the tasks that were done by the ABM radar back in those
days, are examples. Does this suggest that the ABM treaty is
technologically obsolete?
Mr. Rhinelander. I don't think it's technologically
obsolete, but if you wish to constrain or commit more than is
allowed by the treaty as we wrote it in 1972, obviously you're
going to have to amend the treaty. Because it does prohibit
many of the things which are listed, at least in the BMDO
documents--the kinds of components which BMDO is thinking
about.
It's a different question, of course, whether we want to go
that way. But if in fact we do go that way, there would have to
be very significant changes, really all the substantive
articles of the ABM treaty, or we would have to abrogate, which
we have the legal right to do.
No country has given notice and in fact withdrawn from an
arms control treaty since World War II. North Korea gave notice
and backed out 2 or 3 days before the final date. While
withdrawal is legally permissible, it is a very significant
political act to do that. No country has done it yet.
Senator Cochran. In Article I of the treaty, there's a
prohibition against the deployment of a territorial defense. It
obligates the sides, ``not to provide a base for such a
defense.'' What does ``provide a base'' mean for you?
Mr. Rhinelander. The ``provide a base'' concept was put in
the treaty in 1972 to prohibit the long lead time items that
might then lead on to an ABM defense. We didn't want the
Soviets, for instance, to begin placing big engagement radars
all over the Soviet Union, which would be a precursor for a
national defense.
The Krasnoyarsk radar, if you remember that notorious being
a few years ago, I always thought was an early warning radar,
and I think it proved out to be in the end. But the concern by
others was it was an engagement radar in the wrong place, and
was a precursor to others.
That is what we are talking about by a base. A point I
should have made in my earlier statement, and I didn't, is that
a basic concept of the ABM treaty was a buffer zone, both in
space and time. We wanted the longest warning time we could get
against Soviet actions that indicated they were going to go
against the treaty.
Now, if you amend the treaty to take care of a lot of the
current technology which is being thought of now, basically you
eliminate the buffer zone almost entirely. We talk, and I think
you have to talk when you're dealing with military matters,
about capabilities and intentions. I was taught this when I
first went in the Pentagon 30 years ago. In terms of
capabilities, if you have hot production lines, if you have
sensors in space, if you have radars forward, then you have
severely eroded the buffer zone, the kind of buffer zone we
wrote into the treaty.
Now, that may be what we want to do. But we ought to
recognize that if we go that way, the treaty will no longer
provide for either side, or for anyone, the long warning time
that the present treaty does.
Senator Cochran. Ambassador Joseph, the other day the
manager of the Boeing program for national missile defense said
that treaty issues have to be resolved by June of the year
2000, or the treaty would hold up the ability to deploy the
system by fiscal year 2003. The Secretary of Defense at the
same time suggested that the administration intends to maintain
the option of deploying a national missile defense by 2003.
Do you think it's realistic to expect that the actions that
have to be taken to resolve the conflicts in the treaty can be
accomplished in time to actually deploy a system by fiscal year
2003?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, that's a very difficult
question to answer. Let me say that if we do choose the route
of renegotiating the ABM treaty, I believe that we should begin
to engage the Russians now, if we are to have any hope of
achieving the changes that would be necessary for us to deploy
effective defenses.
The time that such negotiations would take is obviously
dependent on a number of factors. As I stated in my opening
comments, Russia is likely to seek to draw out the
negotiations. They have very little incentive to change the
treaty.
We, however, don't have the luxury of time, given the pace
of the ballistic missile programs in countries like North Korea
and Iran.
In my view, there is sufficient time to achieve an
acceptable negotiating outcome with Russia if at the outset the
Russians know that we are serious. I think this can only be
demonstrated by real programs and real policies and by the
demonstration of resolve to move forward to deployment, even if
that means we are compelled by Russian intransigence, to leave
the treaty, which is an option that is entirely consistent with
our legal rights.
I think most importantly, we must avoid mixed signals. And
we must be clear in explaining how defending against the
missile threat from rogue nations is an imperative on our part,
and that it requires us to modify the treaty. If that is not
feasible, if that's not achievable, again, we will be required
to leave the treaty.
We took this approach in 1992. We did it in negotiations
that were non-confrontational, but were done in a determined
way, and in a way that made very clear that it was also in
Russia's interests to change the treaty. Because a modified
treaty, in their calculation, is better than no treaty at all.
Senator Cochran. Which treaty are you referring to? Is that
the demarcation agreement?
Ambassador Joseph. That's when we proposed the fundamental
changes to the ABM treaty in 1992, following the Gulf War and
the attempted coup in the Soviet Union. This was the arms
control initiative that was done in the context of the GPALS
deployment.
Senator Cochran. What is your view about the practical
consequence of our decision, if we make it, to announce that we
are withdrawing from the treaty?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I see very few practical
consequences in that context. Given Russia's economic distress,
I see little chance for an arms race. In fact, we are told by
just about every analyst, American and Russian, that Russia,
for budget reasons, will have to go to lower and lower numbers
of strategic offensive forces.
On the political side, I believe that Russia will
understand and will accept our need to deploy defenses. They
certainly won't like it. But they'll accept it, just as they
have accepted our decision to enlarge NATO and to use force
against Iraq. I think at the end of the day, if the Russians
are given assurances that our defenses will not undermine their
nuclear offensive capability, they will have what they believe
they need, independent of whether or not the renegotiation of
the ABM treaty would be successful.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Rhinelander, I'm going to yield to my
colleagues for their questions, but before doing that, I'm
going to ask you what your answer to that same question is.
Mr. Rhinelander. Assuming it's the question of giving
formal notice of withdrawal under the ABM treaty with 6 months
notice, which of course we can legally do, I think that means
the end of limitations on all nuclear weapons between the
United States and Russia. And the question is, what is Russia
going to do. They are not going to build an anti-ballistic
missile system, as they could have done in the 1970's. Because
they don't have good technology, they don't have the money,
that's not the way they're going to go.
I think more likely than not, they're going to scramble
around to keep as long as they can their present MIRVed ICBMs,
the SS-18s, in the field, and probably work to MIRV, putting
the multi-warheads on their new Topol M.
Two things on that. I have been told by people who have
access to the classified information, which I don't any more,
that they could probably keep the SS-18s up another 5 years,
maybe 10 years at the most, beyond the present period of time.
We have kept our Polaris systems, our boats and other things,
in service long, long after their useful life.
But their maintenance has been so bad in their liquid fuel
missiles that they're not going to be able to keep those
systems up forever. But they certainly are going to try to keep
them active as long as they can by cannibalizing one to keep
another one going. They'll do the same thing with their boats
tied up in port, they won't take them out, because they're a
threat. And they'll clearly, I think, try to produce a new
missile with multi-warheads.
As I indicated earlier, I think one of the great
achievements over the last years was to get the agreement of
the Russians to no more MIRVs on the land-based systems and no
more heavy missiles. I think that agreement goes down the tubes
if we give notice to withdraw from the ABM treaty. So it's a
different kind of reaction than what they would have done in
1972.
Senator Cochran. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rhinelander, I'm impressed to hear that you were one of
the original writers of the ABM treaty. Also, about your
feeling that if we are going to try to improve our technology
that we must be sure that there is a realistic testing program.
Is it your view that testing of an NMD system would require
renegotiation of the ABM treaty, and if so, does this preclude
the United States from deciding on the NMD architecture?
Mr. Rhinelander. I think the answer is, in some cases it
would. But of course, it would depend on the elements chosen.
This goes to a question that the Chairman asked Ambassador
Joseph earlier. I think the early issue is not the deployment
issues. I think it's the testing issues of those components
which run up against Article V of the ABM treaty, which
prohibits the testing of spaced-based, the sea-based, the air-
based, etc.
The front end of the missile interceptor, as it has been
described in the documents which were given to me, has a sensor
on board that effectively takes the place of the old ground-
based radar. It's a homing system, an infrared system. That
substitutes for the old ground-based engagement radar as we
knew it in 1972.
The testing of that is prohibited by Article V of the
treaty. So in that case, you would have to have amendment to
the treaty there, even before you made a deployment decision.
There may be some other radars and sensors where you'd have
to amend it, but I'm not familiar with what the testing
schedule is vis-a-vis getting some elements out into the field.
But you certainly would have to amend the treaty with respect
to the interceptors, the smart interceptors, if you will, as
opposed to the dumb ones being guided from the ground.
And probably with some of the sensors, particularly the low
SBIRs, which is again a substitute for a tracking radar. You'd
have to look at it technology by technology, but some of the
present systems, as currently being discussed, would require an
amendment to the treaty to go forward with the testing program.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Joseph, you talk about real
programs that we need to think about and in the future. These,
I think you also mean, will certainly impact what we do with
the treaty.
From your comments you made before this, do you believe we
should withdraw now from the treaty?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I believe, if I can first just
refer to one of the earlier questions that the Chairman asked
Mr. Rhinelander about the obsolescence of the ABM treaty. I
believe that the ABM treaty is strategically obsolete. I
believe that we pay a high price for compliance with the ABM
treaty in terms of the development and--in the future--the
deployment of even limited missile defenses against small scale
threats from rogue nations.
If the treaty ever did make sense strategically--and I
think that's something that we could explore perhaps in an off-
line conversation--it lost its relevance with the end of the
Cold War, at least in the context of U.S. interests.
The ABM treaty doesn't protect us against any threat. The
ABM treaty doesn't defend us against any threat. In fact, it
denies us the protection against new threats that weren't in
existence in 1972. The new threats of rogue states armed with
long-range missiles, threats that we're hearing a great deal
about in the context of the Rumsfeld Commission and other
studies, threats that we're seeing in the context of the North
Korean TaepoDong launch last August. These are real threats.
I believe that it is very important how we manage moving
beyond the treaty with Russia. What we do matters a lot with
Russia. It seems to me that we don't want to posture, we don't
want to be confrontational with the Russians. If in fact we do
choose the route of renegotiating the treaty, what it will be
about is reconciling interests.
On the one hand, we do, I believe, have an imperative to
defend ourselves against North Korean type attacks. On the
other hand, at least for a transitional period, I can
understand why the Russians want assurances that our defense,
in terms of what we deploy, will not undermine the credibility
of their nuclear forces.
But I think we ought to aim higher than simply narrow
treaty relief for the short term, a short term accommodation
with Russia. I think we need to base our strategic relationship
not on distrust, not on Cold War philosophies, but rather on
cooperation and common interests. In some areas, that exists. I
think we ought to be able to find that same common ground in
this area.
Senator Akaka. You say that we paid a high price on the ABM
treaty. The question about making sense of it, and I repeat
part of it, and wonder here how you feel about it, my question
is should we withdraw now?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, if you're asking me for my
personal view, I think that we should withdraw. I think that we
can find a means of accommodation with Russia outside of the
treaty. This treaty is not healthy for us and it's not healthy
for the Russians.
Again, I can understand a transition period in which we do,
through a renegotiation of the treaty, provide certain
assurances. I can understand that. It's certainly better than
the current position that we have.
But I think fundamentally, we do need to move beyond the
treaty, for the sake of our overall strategic relationship and
to ensure us the capability of protecting against real world
threats that were simply not part of the picture when this
treaty was negotiated.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Joseph, I'm interested in your statement both
that we ought to try to negotiate a new relationship with the
Russians and we ought to unilaterally withdraw now from a
treaty which is so important to the relationship. Why you would
want to unilaterally withdraw before you need to unilaterally
withdraw in order to make a decision to deploy a system? In
other words, unless you need to withdraw now in order to
accomplish your national missile defense goal, you are
withdrawing prematurely and making it more difficult to
negotiate with a country that you say you'd like to negotiate
with.
I don't quite understand why you would then not take the
position that national missile defense is important, we ought
to develop it as soon as we can, and we shouldn't be
constrained by the treaty in that process. In the interim,
while this is going on, we ought to try to negotiate with the
Russians as new partners and friends, rather than adversaries.
And then when the point comes that the ABM treaty constrains
our development, if we haven't negotiated with the Russians a
change in the whole regime or a change in the treaty, at that
point, we would then make a decision whether to abrogate or
withdraw from the treaty.
Why isn't that more consistent with your stated belief that
we ought to have a new negotiated positive partnership
relationship with the Russians?
Ambassador Joseph. My answer to the question that was asked
about my personal view, whether or not we should withdraw now,
should be seen in the context of, if not a perfect world, at
least a more perfect world than we have today.
I understand the importance that Russia attaches to the ABM
treaty. Yet, I'm not comfortable with the rationale for why the
Russians want to continue to perpetuate mutual assured
destruction. And I think it's fundamentally unhealthy for our
relationship.
That said, I am certainly willing to accept the argument
that for a transitional period, while our strategic
relationship evolves to a more positive one, the treaty might
be of some assistance, if renegotiated, to allow us to do what
we need to do with regard to the imperative of defending
against rogue threats.
But I think we need to move beyond that perspective, that
Cold War perspective, with the Russians.
Senator Levin. I don't disagree with that. That's not my
question.
Ambassador Joseph. I was also going to address another
aspect of your question, and that is it seems to imply that we
are not paying a price for staying with the treaty in terms of
the development of a national missile defense architecture. I
believe we do.
Senator Levin. But let me ask you to assume that, since
that's what the missile defense folks say, if just for the
purpose of discussion, that we're not paying a price, we're not
constrained by the treaty. If you could accept that for one
moment as a hypothetical. If in fact we're not being
constrained now by the treaty, do you then not see some
advantage in trying to negotiate treaty changes or a new regime
with the Russians until we are constrained? Would you agree
with that as a theoretical matter?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, on this issue I have trouble
with theory. I have trouble with the hypothetical, because I do
believe that the treaty does impose restrictions on our
development of defenses. I think that absent the ABM treaty,
the United States would be considering different deployment
options than we're considering today. We would be considering
sea-based, for example, and space-based approaches that are
prohibited by the treaty.
Our development program is compliant with the treaty and
should be compliant with the treaty, but compliance in this
context comes at a price.
Senator Levin. Mr. Rhinelander, would you comment on my
question?
Mr. Rhinelander. Withdrawal, I think, would be one of the
more foolish acts we could do at the moment. First of all we
don't have the technical capability to put a system up so we
would be getting rid of something which is important in the
relationship with the Russians for no good purpose right now.
As I indicated in my statement earlier, I think Russia is
the principal threat we've got to deal with--their
capabilities. It's much more important to me than the rogue
states.
What we need to do with Russia right now is to sit down
with them and try to get them to get their warheads off their
ICBMs, get them out of their submarines, get their fissile
material under control and get a handle on their tactical
missiles that we don't know much about. We're not sure that
they have them under full control.
These are the kinds of things we need to do with them. I am
absolutely certain that if we withdraw from the ABM treaty, as
we're legally entitled to do, the chances of dealing with the
Russians cooperatively on what I think are the principal
threats just go out the window.
There's another thing we should do, and this is almost
independent of the treaty, but if we withdraw from the ABM
treaty, that's by the boards, too. I think we've got to work
out a system to provide early sharing of data, early warning
sharing. Because the Russians are partly blind. Every day they
are blind for 2 or 3 hours.
In the old Cold War day, if we were blind or they were
blind for 2 or 3 hours, and the worst case thinking was at
work, maybe they fired a missile the moment we went blind, and
they won't know until after it hits. I can't think of a more
serious situation if we ever come to a moment of crisis.
I understand we've been negotiating, but we haven't gotten
very far. I don't think we're going to be able to do anything
constructive with the Russians, though. It starts with--it's
their perspective, not necessarily ours--NATO expansion.
Gorbachev and his people thought there was an implicit promise
that NATO would not move farther east. We have moved east.
The Duma was going to vote on START II either December 18
or December 25 if we didn't bomb Iraq. We bombed Iraq. They had
another vote set for April 2 if the bombing didn't start in
Kosovo.
Now, in a sense, the whole system is cursed. SALT I never
got off the ground at the beginning when the Soviets went into
Prague. So we have had external events coming up time and time
again.
We've got to try to work through these and work
cooperatively with Russia, because it is the single largest
threat. They're a bigger threat in their weakness, in many
ways, than they were when they were strong.
Senator Cochran. Let me ask a question, Mr. Rhinelander,
given the concerns about the Russians, and how any defensive
system in their view would threaten them, is that to you a
valid concern, that any defensive system that we develop and
deploy is in reality a threat to their retaliatory
capabilities?
Mr. Rhinelander. Senator, you know there's a strange
history of all this going back 20 or 30 years. They view any
defensive system that we're thinking about as much more likely
to work than I do. As you know, I'm very highly skeptical.
But on the other hand, looking at Soviet systems in times
past, we looked at these as the greatest threat. I cannot tell
you how much time we spent at SALT I dealing with what we call
the SAM upgrade problem. They had a single ABM system around
Moscow. But they had 1,200 sites for surface to air missile,
anti-aircraft systems, around the Soviet Union.
The Pentagon was convinced that with a few tweaks, doing a
few things here and there, they could make this fairly quickly
into a robust nationwide ABM system. Personally, I thought that
was crazy. But we spent an enormous amount of time. We came up
with partial responses to that concern.
So I think the answer to your question is that each side
sees the worst case in the other, whether it's believable to a
third party is not the question. They did initially with Star
Wars. They felt Star Wars in fact could do some of the things
which we felt it could do.
So I think the answer is not how we feel about our system,
not our present intent in terms of a limited system against the
Korean threat. It's partly a question of capabilities and
partly a question of how they are likely to see it. And they
see things very differently from the way we do.
Senator Cochran. Ambassador Joseph, would you comment on
that question?
Ambassador Joseph. I certainly agree that it's how they see
it that's important. But I don't find the Russian concerns in
this regard to be at all valid. The architectures that we are
considering for limited missile defense in no way under any
circumstances provide the type of capability that could
threaten the offensive credibility of Russian strategic forces
at levels well below START II, well below even those numbers
that we've been hearing for START III.
It's not just numbers, it's also the quality of their force
and the ability of their individual warheads to penetrate any
defense that we might build, or any defense that we are
considering.
Again, going back to 1992, we talked about this issue with
the Russians. We talked about it, and they didn't disagree with
us. We talked about offense-defense, and we had a sound
conversation. I think they understood that even at the GPALS
level, which is a much more significant level than the
architectures that we're considering today, our defenses would
not undermine the credibility of their nuclear forces.
And again, in the context of those negotiations on the ABM
treaty, at our mission in Geneva, we had literally in the next
room, their START negotiators working with our START
negotiators. They came to the conclusion that offensive
reductions in the context of START I was the way for them to
go, knowing that our position was to make fundamental changes
to the ABM treaty--much more fundamental than the changes that
would be necessary to achieve the types of capabilities under
the various architectures we're contemplating today.
So I don't believe the Russian concerns are valid, sir.
Senator Cochran. It seems to me that we're caught in a
situation where the most logical step for us to take may be
between what we are hearing recommended today at this hearing.
Doing what the administration is doing right now, which is
ignoring the reality that our development program even violates
the ABM treaty terms, and not engaging the Russians in a frank
discussion, which is indicated by the emerging technological
realities of these systems, is in the view of some Russians
possibly duplicitous, dishonest, and provocative in itself,
while announcing that we're going to withdraw from the treaty
would also, I agree, be provocative as well.
So we're caught between a suggestion for one action that
would possibly get us in a more dangerous situation than we are
right now and actions that the administration are taking, which
are equally proactive in my view. We've got to find a different
course of action to take, in my opinion.
I think Ambassador Joseph has suggested the right course.
I'll withhold making any final decisions about it, but this is
just my reaction. It seems to me we have to adapt this
defensive treaty we have with the Russians to the technological
realities of today, and no longer pretend that we have only the
technologies of 1972 available to us.
What's your reaction to that, Mr. Rhinelander?
Mr. Rhinelander. Mr. Chairman, let me make two comments to
it. One is that I haven't been in Moscow now for 4 or 5 years.
I was due there last week, I didn't go. But when I talk to
Russians, and I think it's probably true with Chinese, who I
haven't spoken to personally, but I've talked to a lot of
people who have, they simply can't believe we're going to build
a system against the North Korean threat, because they know as
much as we do.
So they see this system as one really designed against
them. We can say no, it's not our intention. It's not, but then
they say, OK, look at the capabilities.
If we put up the SBIRs low--I don't know how many we're
talking about--we will have in space a highly capable system,
if it works the way it's designed to work.
If we have tested the interceptors with the smart front end
package to it, even if we put 100 of them just at North Dakota,
they would look at the breakout capacity we have.
We would have broken entirely the buffer zone concept that
we had in the ABM treaty--the long lead time--because we could
change our mind from a limited system, in their view. I don't
know how long it would take if we had the production lines open
to go from 100 interceptors to 200 to 300. It depends on how
many contractors we have, etc.
But they don't see it as limited, the way we are describing
it. There will be a great problem trying to convince them that
a system with these kinds of components, assuming they would
work, was in fact going to be as limited as you think it would
be.
Senator Cochran. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to follow up and ask Mr. Rhinelander to comment on
Ambassador Joseph's comment. This interests me, the comment
that they just made now that any U.S. NMD architecture would
not threaten Russia's nuclear force credibility.
Mr. Rhinelander. If we were to go forward with a testing
program of the kinds of components which we have here, and if
we say, OK, we're going to start in Alaska and then we're going
to put a second site up in North Dakota, we would have the
production lines open, we would have the satellites in space,
we would have the interceptors already tested and deployed in
limited numbers, a couple of hundred.
The Russians would view that as threatening, not because of
what the deployed ones could do, unless their systems fall
apart even faster than I think they are. But they could see us
with the capability, very quickly, of putting up a system which
would be much more robust.
Now, I understand from talking to some Americans who have
talked to Russians, so it's not first-hand, it's second-hand,
but sophisticated ones say that one of the Russians' concerns
right now as we move forward in NATO is with our smart non-
nuclear armed missiles. We could basically take out the systems
in Moscow, their control system, etc., and they wouldn't even
know they were coming.
So they have an extraordinary concern that the way the U.S.
capability is moving. They are vulnerable, and they might never
even see the punch coming. If we take some things out, they
have a few ragged systems to respond, how many left, I don't
know. But that's what they would be looking at.
Now, if in case we did strike them with even conventional
weapons of one kind or another, what would they have left?
Would they have enough to get through? I think that's the kind
of analysis which they are going through right now.
So a lot of it depends, of course, on whose systems do you
believe. They tend to look at ours and believe everything is
going to work perfectly. They look at theirs with the high
failure rates. I think their ICBMs are going to be down into
the hundreds, maybe 700 or 800, within the next 10 years, even
as they cannibalize, simply because that's the way things are
falling apart over there.
But as they get down to 700 or 800 systems deployed,
normally you have 20 percent of those systems down at any one
point in time, doing working modernization and repairs, etc.
Say they were trying to preserve several hundred, a good many
aren't going to get off the ground, for different reasons.
Their worst case analysis will be that, are the Americans going
to put up enough of a defense so that they could counter a
ragged retaliatory response, which is all they might be capable
of 10 years down the line.
I think that's the way they would look at it. Is it
rational? I won't say it is. But that's the kind of analysis
which tends to go on when they look at us or we look to them.
Senator Cochran. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Let me just ask Ambassador Joseph a couple
of questions about the SS-18s. Is it to our advantage that
those SS-18s be dismantled?
Ambassador Joseph. Absolutely, Senator. I think perhaps the
greatest achievement of decades of arms control to reduce
offensive forces was the elimination of SS-18s in the context
of START II. I think that would be a great achievement, if it
were to occur.
Senator Levin. Which means that if we acted in a way where
the Russians decided not to dismantle the SS-18s that we would
then have some pluses and minuses in your perspective, it
wouldn't all be pluses?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, they have told us that we have
acted in such a way when we enlarged NATO and when we struck
Iraq. They've even talked about this in the context of Kosovo.
Senator I think your question----
Senator Levin. I know they've told us that. But let me read
you what our two leaders, their president and our President,
have said about the importance of the ABM treaty. I know that
this is not something you agree with, but it's something which
they surely feel, and at least this President feels. This is a
summit statement, this isn't some statement of parliamentarians
saying, oh, you guys now have hit Iraq, we're not going to
ratify START II. This is a summit statement of the two
presidents:
``President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their
commitment to strengthening strategic stability in
international security, emphasizing the importance of further
reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the
fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
for these objectives, as well as the necessity for effective
theater missile defense systems, consider it their common task
to preserve the ABM treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and
enhance its viability.''
I know you don't agree with that. That's not my question.
But you've got the President of Russia and at least this
President of the United States who say that this treaty is
fundamentally significant to the further reductions in
strategic offensive arms. They didn't say that about the
bombing of Iraq or the expansion of NATO. There was no summit
agreement where two presidents agreed that that's what the
result would be from either of those two events.
But here you've got something so central to them that for
the life of me, I've got to tell you, I don't understand why we
cannot try to pursue both the development of a limited national
missile defense and a modification of this treaty, so that we
can deploy such a system. I don't understand why we would
withdraw prematurely, as long as our ballistic missile defense
office says we're not constrained by and we haven't violated
the ABM Treaty. You may not agree with either of those
positions, but we've got at least our ballistic missile defense
folks saying we're not constrained by it yet, and we haven't
violated it yet.
For the life of me, I don't understand why, if this
relationship is important to you, as you say it is, and we know
it's important to them as they say it is, we don't take the
time until there is a problem to make a good faith effort to
negotiate either a totally new regime, which is fine with me,
or a modification of the ABM treaty.
I happen to think it is in our advantage to be able to
deploy a national missile defense system, if we can make it
operationally effective, and cost-effective. Because I think
there is a threat. I think there's probably a greater threat
from trucks, ships, and other sources, by the way. So I don't
want to put all of our eggs in that basket.
But there is a threat, and we ought to try to address that
threat, if we can do so in an operationally effective manner.
But I don't understand this idea that we've got to prematurely
now, your testimony is now, say that we're pulling out of the
treaty, when a good faith statement by our ballistic missile
defense people is that we have not violated the treaty, and
that we're not constrained by the treaty. Why not use this
period of time, until there is some constraint to try to
negotiate that new regime, if you really believe that it is
important, and if you really believe that getting rid of SS-18s
is useful?
That's a long question, but there it is.
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I'll try to answer that. Let me
say that I think the greatest likelihood is we will go down the
path of negotiations. In fact, both my prepared statement and
my opening statement deal with my view on the negotiability of
making the types of changes that I believe we need to make to
the treaty in order to provide us not just relief to permit a
very narrow defense, but to permit the type of defense that can
evolve as the threat evolves. I think we've all come a very
long way in terms of our view of the sophistication of the
threat.
Senator what I was reacting to is what I consider to be
this fallacy of false alternatives that often clouds thinking.
That is, we are forced to make a choice between offensive
reductions and even limited defenses. I reject that. I do not
believe that that is a real choice that we must make. I believe
that in fact we need to pursue defenses, and we need to pursue
additional offensive reductions with the Russians.
Senator Levin. Equally?
Ambassador Joseph. I believe that it is an imperative to
deploy defenses against the rogue state threat. I believe that
threat to be real, as you do. I believe that we will have the
capability to defend against it.
I think the defense that is required to protect our
population against that threat will under no circumstances
threaten the credibility of Russian offensive forces. I think
that our interests are not irreconcilable. I think our
interests are not mutually exclusive. I think we have to work
with the Russians to find accommodation, whether inside or
outside of the treaty.
My personal sense is that it is best to do it outside the
treaty, because the treaty comes at a high price. As long as
we're in the treaty, we should comply with the treaty. And
compliance does entail a cost in this regard, a cost with
regard to the effectiveness of the type of defense that we
need.
Senator Levin. Do you think it's also important to try to
negotiate further reductions with the Russians?
Ambassador Joseph. Yes, Senator.
Senator Levin. You do?
Ambassador Joseph. I do.
Senator Levin. My last question, but I'd like to ask Mr.
Rhinelander, if I have another minute, to any comment he might
want.
Mr. Rhinelander. Well, as I've said several times, I think
getting those Russian systems and all the complications we have
to deal with down and separated is the imperative we deal with.
We've had inspectors over there at operating missile bases
where there's basically nobody there, they're all out hunting
for food. We've heard stories of people out there in submarines
with gun battles on board the submarines armed with ballistic
missile systems.
These are the systems which can threaten us, the only
systems right now that can threaten us.
Senator Levin. Threaten us with what, leakage,
proliferation?
Mr. Rhinelander. All of that, of course. The ICBMs and the
SLBMs are the threats to us right now, the deployed systems.
The administration has a position, we don't move to START III
until START II is ratified. I would go way beyond that. I would
sit down with them and say, let's sit down and try to get the
deployed systems down as fast as possible, move the warheads
off the missiles. I think you could take the launchers out much
later.
They are living in a world of launch on warning as
doctrine, they are living in a world where they are partially
blind every day. I think this is the threat we have to face,
and you have to deal with it by getting their systems down and
out as fast as we can, which is by negotiation. We have to do
it mutually. We take ours down, they'll take theirs down.
It's going to be difficult doing that anyway. Dealing with
the president of the Russian government is not going to be easy
under any circumstances. They have elections coming up, and who
follows orders in Moscow right now is an interesting question.
But I would focus very much on sitting with them and
getting these Russian systems down. Because these are the
things that concern me. It's both the loose nukes proliferation
question as well as the systems aimed at us.
On the submarines, they have now got long-range missiles on
their submarines. They can keep them tied up up north--they
won't take them out because they may not come up if they go
underwater--but they can fire from where they are right now.
These are ones which I would like to see those missiles off, as
many as possible.
Another point I would make, if in fact they're likely to go
down on their own into the hundreds, which I think is where
they're going to be in 10 years from now. Because of the way
things are going, the lower they get, because their economy and
everything else is driving it that way, the greater they're
going to see the threat of whatever we do.
If they've got 2,000 or 3,000 strategic ballistic missiles,
having a couple of hundred interceptors here isn't going to
change the equation very much. But if they get down to 400 or
500 operating systems at best, many of which don't work, then a
relatively modest defensive system in our time could
realistically change the equation.
I'll simply close with one final comment, Ambassador Joseph
said offensive-defensive ought to be separated. They have been
linked ever since I've been involved in this world. They were
certainly linked during the ABM and SALT I negotiations, where
we dealt with both offense and defense. One was conditioned on
the other.
The START I treaty is conditioned on the United States
staying within the ABM treaty. I can remember when Cap
Weinberger was Secretary of Defense, it must have been 1985. He
was asked what would we do if the Soviets--it was still the
Soviets in those days--would begin to put up a nationwide ABM
defense? He said, of course, we would multiply our offense. And
of course, that is exactly what we would have done.
They don't have the technical capability to do a lot of
things now that they had earlier on. But I am sure they are
going to keep as many of those offensive MIRV systems up as
long as they can on hair triggers, which is the biggest threat
we face today.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. It seems to me, Mr. Rhinelander, that
there's agreement that we've come to today that if we continue
to pursue the national missile defense system architecture that
has been laid out, we need to negotiate changes in the ABM
treaty. It seems to me that it's dangerous not to begin that
right now. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Rhinelander. Let me say yes and no. I think we
obviously need, if we had firm decisions now and we knew what
we were doing, then obviously you've got to negotiate. I think
until you know exactly what you want to do, you're in an
awkward position in terms of negotiations.
Ambassador Joseph or somebody made a comment earlier that
we ought to make a decision and stick to it. Having been
involved in this world for 40 years, I guess, I can make one
comment on the U.S. political system. We never stick with
anything on this subject very long anywhere. It's left or
right, it's not biased one way or the other.
I would add one issue which I haven't commented on but I
think goes to the heart of those who are proposing deployment.
And that is to what degree are we willing to share with Russia?
Ronald Reagan, as you will recall, at the Reykjavik summit,
made the suggestion we would share our defensive technology.
Every single advisor he had with him then was absolutely
horrified at the thought. It hadn't been cleared. And of
course, it disappeared.
I don't believe we ever will. I don't believe this
Congress, any Congress, is going to agree to amend all the laws
so we can ship over every bit of defensive technology we have
to Russia. Even if that were done, I don't think the Russians
would believe we would do it.
If we keep saying we're going to share and then take it
back, the Russians look at us and say, you're trying to kid us
again. If it is humanly possible with our political system, we
need to come to some coherent decisions and stick with them.
As I said earlier, I don't see that happening until after
the national election of the year 2000. We don't have much time
running before then. One of the earliest priorities of the new
administration, whichever it will be, whoever is going to staff
it, is the necessity for a comprehensive review, offensive-
defensive, involving much more than simply the United States-
Russian relationship. I think that's got to be done before we
undertake some of these steps.
If we are gung-ho to test a system, presently prohibited by
the ABM treaty, and we want to go by the book, and the Russians
don't agree to amendment and therefore we withdraw, we have
taken a step which I think forecloses avenues which are much
more productive.
We've got to look at this thing comprehensively, which we
haven't done. I know this administration hasn't done it. I have
no faith that it will be done during the remainder of this
administration. I have served in the last couple of years of an
8-year term, and that is not the most productive time.
So I think we're really looking forward to the next
administration to look comprehensively at a very complicated
question and then come up with what's the net interests of the
United States in this world.
Senator Cochran. Ambassador Joseph, what is your answer to
that question?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, first, for the record, I did
not say that we should separate offensive and defense. I don't
think that is an option, nor would I want to do that if it were
an option. In fact, in 1992, when we attempted to renegotiate
fundamental changes to the treaty, the discussions on offense-
defense were very important discussions. We had very frank,
very serious discussions.
As I said, we talked about how the GPALS architecture,
which was much more robust than the ones we're talking about
today, would not impact on the credibility of their offensive
forces, and in fact, the START agreements were finalized in
that context, the context of us stating explicitly that the
strategic rationale of the ABM treaty as signed in 1972 was
fundamentally bankrupt.
I think we need to keep that experience very much in mind.
Most of all, we need to move beyond this Cold War framework
that we're talking about even today, such as our advanced
conventional capabilities taking out their command and control.
We need to get beyond that.
I think we can get beyond that. I think we can base our
interests on common ground, on common interests and
cooperation. There are many areas in which we do cooperate. The
co-optive threat reduction initiative is a very important
initiative in that regard. Perhaps the sharing of early
warning.
There are certain areas that we can build on. But let's
move beyond the Cold War concept of the treaty. I think, and I
hate to end on a comment like this, but I truly think if
someone were to come up with the concept of an ABM treaty today
and bring it to the U.S. Senate, they would have to take that
individual off to St. Elizabeth's. It's simply not part of
today's strategic culture, and shouldn't be part of the
strategic culture. It's simply not healthy. It's not healthy
for us and for the Russians.
Let's find the means by which we can accommodate their
concerns and yet achieve the imperative that we have for the
deployment of strategic defenses.
Senator Cochran. I think that is a good note on which to
conclude our hearing today, and observe that our witnesses have
been very helpful to us in reaching an understanding of some of
the problems that we have in deploying a national missile
defense system and remaining in compliance with the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty.
It's obvious to me that there are clear obstacles that the
treaty poses to the deployment of any national missile defense
system regardless of its architecture. For one that's
sophisticated enough to give us the kind of defense we need, or
that will evolve, there are obvious conflicts between the
treaty's terms and the deployment of a national missile
defense.
It also follows that this is an urgent matter. While it
would be nice to wait until the next election or wait until
things settle down in Russia in terms of their politics and
who's in charge of what, I think it's dangerous for us to wait
any longer. I think we need to get busy and reach out to the
Russians at the highest levels of our government and start
talking about these issues and do it in a very serious-minded
way.
I don't know anything that's a bigger threat or a greater
danger to our security or the safety of our citizens than, as
Mr. Rhinelander so clearly described it, the condition of the
strategic weapons systems in Russia today.
So taken all together, the facts form a very serious
challenge for the United States and our policymakers. Those who
advocate that we should remain a party to the treaty, no matter
what, have to now understand that the treaty has to be changed
significantly and rapidly if we're going to continue adhering
to it while developing and then deploying a national missile
defense system.
We appreciate all of the witnesses who've testified, Dr.
Kirkpatrick, Mr. Rhinelander, Ambassador Joseph, and the
Members of our Subcommittee who have attended and participated
in the hearing. I think it's been a very important undertaking.
The Subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:18 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned,
to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
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