[Senate Hearing 106-229]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-229
POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 25, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
59-863 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Cohen, Stephen P., senior fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, the
Brookings Institution.......................................... 24
Prepared statement of........................................ 27
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl Frederick, Assistant Secretary of State for
South Asian Affairs, Department of State....................... 2
Prepared statement of........................................ 6
Responses of Assistant Secretary Karl F. Inderfurth to additional
questions submitted by Senator Brownback....................... 14
Wisner, Hon. Frank G., vice chairman, external affairs, American
International Group, Inc....................................... 16
Prepared statement of........................................ 20
(iii)
POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Sam
Brownback (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Sarbanes.
Senator Brownback. Thank you all for joining us this
morning.
I understand Paul Wellstone, Senator Wellstone may be
coming shortly, but his office has agreed that we go ahead and
get the hearing started since we are past the appointed hour.
I want to thank you all for coming to the hearing this
morning on the latest political and military developments in
India.
It was a year ago that we planned to hold a hearing on this
topic and wound up instead discussing the ramifications of the
nuclear tests conducted by both India and Pakistan. As you
know, these tests led to the immediate imposition of unilateral
sanctions mandated by the Glenn amendment. While they are not
the main topic of this hearing, I hope we will also cover where
we stand today with regard to those sanctions.
Today's headlines are screaming about the failures in our
understanding of China's foreign policy goals and intentions.
It is ironic that for the past decade, much of America's
foreign policy in Asia has focused almost single-mindedly on
China, while we have largely ignored India.
The administration has favored rewarding China. Successive
administrations have favored rewarding China, a country that
has openly and continually challenged the U.S.'s interests and
values, while first ignoring and now punishing India.
The administration's rationale has been that the United
States must engage China because of its large population, its
growing market for U.S. investment and its nuclear capability
and modern military force.
I am frustrated by the double standard that appears to
apply to the region; United States pandering to China, the
world's largest authoritarian state, and punishes India, the
world's largest democracy, which not only shares our basic
values, but also has enormous potential as a strategic partner
in the region.
It is my belief that the United States has real and
legitimate political, economic and security interests in India,
and we need to understand and engage with India on all levels
as soon as possible.
Seizing the opportunity that we have to build greater ties
with India should be one of our main foreign policy goals.
We are after all the two most populous democratic nations
in the world. The relationship should be based on shared values
and institutions, economic collaboration, including enhanced
trade and investment, and the goal of regional stability across
Asia.
Now, last June, the Senate passed legislation giving the
President authority to waive economic sanctions on India and
Pakistan. Since that time, however, we have moved forward. They
have had, I think, good progress on that; although, I am
troubled that now the administration appears to be more engaged
in what I believe to be too much a single issue diplomacy with
both India and Pakistan in an effort to pressure these two
democracies to conform to benchmarks laid out by the
administration.
Example, the ratification of CTBT: We seemed to have
narrowed our relationship with India to this one issue. And we
should not do that.
While security concerns are a vital issue, I do not believe
they should be the only issue on which we deal with a country
which is the largest democracy in the world. And certainly, we
should not be putting all our eggs in the CTBT basket. After
all, it is not even certain this treaty will be ratified in the
U.S. Senate.
It is important to try to get both India and Pakistan to
get their nuclear programs in line with international norms. It
should not be the only issue.
Recent events in India have demonstrated the vitality of
its democracy, and I look forward to hearing our witnesses'
views on the current political situation in India and where
this country is headed.
We have got several excellent presenters today. The first
will be the Honorable Karl Frederick Inderfurth, Assistance
Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs.
And we have a second panel of the Honorable Frank Wisner
and Mr. Stephen P. Cohen.
I do look forward to being joined by my colleagues, and I
look forward to a lively discussion on where the U.S./India
relationship shall go.
Mr. Inderfurth, welcome again to the committee. We are
always delighted to have you here. And the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. KARL FREDERICK INDERFURTH, ASSISTANCE
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
this opportunity to discuss today our view of recent political
developments in India. And the----
Senator Brownback. Mr. Secretary, if you could pull that
microphone a little closer to you?
Secretary Inderfurth. Closer?
Senator Brownback. Yes.
Secretary Inderfurth. And also discuss our vision of what
we would like to see our relationship with India become. I
might say that I believe that our visions are quite similar
about the relationship that we would like to have with India in
the years to come, and I look forward to discussing that with
you. And also I am sure you will be well informed by Ambassador
Wisner and Mr. Cohen as they come after me.
I want to thank you and Senator Wellstone for your
continued interest in this critical region.
I would also like to take this opportunity this morning to
call attention to the departure of George Pickart, who is with
me this morning, from the South Asia Bureau. As you know,
George was a valuable member of the Foreign Relations Committee
staff before coming to the South Asia Bureau 3 years ago as
senior advisor.
He has done extraordinary work for us on economic issues,
the environment, human rights and outreached to the U.S.
business community and the South Asian-American community. He
has also kept us in very close touch with Capitol Hill.
He has decided, however, to depart, take a position in the
private sector. I wanted to take this opportunity to wish him
well and great success and to let him know that he will be
missed.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much for your service,
George, and Godspeed to you in your new career.
Secretary Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, India----
Senator Brownback. Mr. Secretary, let us get that
microphone again close to you. I see people kind of straining
behind you. And I--we have to get better equipment up here.
Secretary Inderfurth. A person that used to make my living
as a broadcaster, I am somewhat chagrined that I have to be
told to--to speak up, but I will bring the mike closer.
Mr. Chairman, India is one of the world's most intense
democracies. Its adherence to democratic rules was demonstrated
in recent developments in India.
Prime Minister Vajpayee followed President Narayanan's
recommendation for a vote of confidence when his coalition
government lost the support of a key ally.
He subsequently resigned when he lost that vote of
confidence by one vote. When it became apparent that no party
could put together a parliamentary majority, President
Narayanan dissolved Parliament and ordered the Independent
Election Commission to set the dates for new parliamentary
elections. He also asked Prime Minister Vajpayee to remain in a
caretaker capacity until a new parliament is sworn in.
The election commission has announced that elections will
take place over several days in September and early October;
and a new government should be in place by mid-October.
Mr. Chairman, the coming elections will be India's third.
And the next government will be India's sixth within a 3-year
period.
India has had seven governments since 1989. These rapid
changes in government are a sign of major shifts in the social
basis of Indian politics, but they also indicate the
fundamental soundness of the institutions of governance: The
Parliament, the presidency, the judiciary and, above all, the
Indian Constitution.
Mr. Chairman, I might add that the rise of coalition
politics in India has coincided with the growing assertiveness
of groups formerly at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder.
Disadvantaged groups have learned that numbers count in a
democracy and they have forced the major political parties to
pay attention to their interests. When established political
parties fell short of expectations, these groups have started
their own political parties.
One of the most persistent demands has been an expansion of
India's policy of giving preferential treatment to the
country's most disadvantaged groups.
Inscribed in India's Constitution is a quota system for
society's most dispossessed, the Dalits. There are pressures to
expand the notion of quotas even further, and that includes
special provisions for the guaranteed representation of women
at all levels of the political system.
The New York Times had an excellent front page article on
May 3 by Celia Dugger about a low caste woman who occupied the
highest elective position in a small village in India's largest
state.
She and thousands of women like her across this vast
country are paving the way for a further transformation of
Indian society.
Mr. Chairman, with this devolution and diffusion of
political power, it becomes imperative that we maintain close
contacts with all the major political parties in India to
ensure that our message is fully understood and our interests
effectively pursued.
Ambassador Celeste and his predecessors have led our
mission in India in pursuing this goal. And we are well served
by the presence of three consulates in the other major regions
of the country, which focus on regional trends and issues.
I and other Department officials have taken care to meet
with leaders of Congress and other opposition parties on trips
out to the field.
Deputy Secretary Talbott has consulted with the head of the
Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi, and other national leaders,
including former Prime Minister Gujaral during his visits to
Delhi in the course of his 11-month-old security dialog with
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh.
I am confident that whatever government emerges from the
current political process, we will be well prepared to engage
immediately. More to the point, we will work with any
government that emerges on the many important items on our
agenda with India.
Obviously, non-proliferation is currently our central
concern. Our dialog over the past 11 months has been dominated
by the global reaction to India's and then Pakistan's nuclear
tests.
While there is still much to do in that area to enable us
to restore the bilateral relationship we had in May 1998--that
is, before the nuclear tests and the imposition of Glenn
sanctions--we still hope that we will be able to carry out
President Clinton's goal set in 1997 to deepen our engagement
with India and establish the broad-based relationship, I
believe, we both seek and clearly you want us to have.
In this regard, Prime Minister Vajpayee in New York last
fall called attention to his belief that the United States and
India were ``natural allies.'' We should strive to realize that
goal rather than remain what one scholar accurately described
as ``estranged democracies.''
Whether we are able in the coming years to consolidate our
natural affinity or remain stuck in old negative patterns will
be determined by the actions of both our governments.
Because we remain convinced that the vision we articulated
and the broad interests we identified are still valid and worth
pursuing, we will not be found lacking in our efforts to seek a
common approach with India on the great issues of the day.
Mr. Chairman, I should stress that since the time of
India's nuclear tests, our two countries have made progress
toward understanding each other's security considerations, but
we have yet to see the concrete actions taken that would help
us to reconcile our differences.
We regretted the decision last month by India to test an
extended range version of the Agni ballistic missile. While we
have a much better understanding after eight rounds of dialog
of what motivates India's strategic thinking, our concern about
further missile tests by India and Pakistan remains.
We nevertheless will seek to use the solid foundation we
have established in the dialog to continue exchanges with
whatever future government emerges.
It is our hope that we will be able to build on the work in
this area we have done thus far, and to continue to make
progress toward harmonizing our security concerns, to borrow a
phrase from Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh. This new
relationship, we believe, will benefit all concerned.
It is also our expectations that there will be continuity
in the search for more stable and better relations between
India and Pakistan.
The recent Lahore Summit, in which the Indian and Pakistani
Prime Ministers displayed both foresight and courage in
establishing a framework for bilateral cooperation and
reconciliation, received the enthusiastic support of millions
of Indian and Pakistani citizens.
Popular reaction to Lahore gives us the hope that any new
Indian Government will see fit to carry this process forward.
As President Clinton said in a statement shortly after the
February meeting of the two prime ministers, and I quote,
``South Asia, and indeed the entire world, will benefit if
India and Pakistan promptly turn these commitments into
concrete progress. We will continue our own efforts to work
with India and Pakistan to promote progress in the region.''
I would add that it is equally important that India and
China engage on their own security concerns. In that respect,
we are encouraged that these two nations, which are playing an
important role on the world stage, have restarted their annual
joint working group meetings to discuss border and other
issues, which we hope will include broader security concerns.
Prime Minister Singh had earlier indicated the possibility
of traveling to China. We hope he or his successor will do so.
We were also encouraged by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang's
statement that Beijing was committed to seeking good relations
with India into the new century.
Mr. Chairman, in our public diplomacy since the May tests,
we have sought to reach a broad audience, both in this country
as well as in India and Pakistan, to explain the basis of our
diplomacy toward these two countries.
Deputy Secretary Talbott has given a number of interviews
and speeches in this connection, and he has written articles on
the U.S./Indian dialog that have been widely disseminated at
home and abroad.
I have also sought opportunities with the news media to lay
out our thinking about South Asia and security.
We have done so, Mr. Chairman, because we firmly believe
that the steps we are asking India and Pakistan to take in the
security and non-proliferation areas are not merely steps that
serve our own policy interests, but are steps that will enhance
and increase their security and well-being and of South Asia as
a whole.
Mr. Chairman, it is our hope, indeed our vision, that we
will be able to move in the direction that both the United
States and India desire.
We look forward to the day when differences over security
policy no longer dominate the bilateral dialog. We look forward
to the kind of broad-based relationship that we enjoy with many
other democracies; one in which we are deeply engaged on an
agenda of economic growth and trade, science and technology
cooperation, cultural and educational exchange, law enforcement
and in many, many other areas.
Our vision, Mr. Chairman, is not simply to return to the
situation in which we found ourselves on May 10, 1998. We
desire to raise our bilateral engagement to a new level of
intensity, breadth and depth.
As President Clinton has said, we want a new United States/
Indian relationship for the 21st century. And we would like to
see that relationship begin as soon as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am ready to answer your
questions and respond to the committee's inquiries.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Secretary Inderfurth for your
comments, and thank you once again for coming in front of the
committee.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Inderfurth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Karl F. Inderfurth
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased for the opportunity to discuss with you
and your colleagues today our view of recent political developments in
India. I want to thank you and Senator Wellstone for your continued
interest in this critical region.
indian democracy
India is one of the world's most intense democracies. Some two
thirds of the registered voters cast their ballots; dozens of political
parties scattered across the ideological spectrum compete for the
support of over 600 million voters; India's very free and very lively
press devotes most of its attention to politics. Underneath the sound
and furry of partisan politics in India is a firm foundation sustained
by the strength of the institutions and traditions that permit people
aggressively to advocate their views and push their interests.
This adherence to rules was demonstrated in recent developments in
India. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee followed the President's
recommendation for a vote of confidence when his coalition government
lost the support of a key ally; he subsequently resigned when he lost
by one vote--270-269. When it became apparent that no party could put
together a parliamentary majority, President Narayanan dissolved
Parliament and ordered the independent Election Commission to set the
dates for new parliamentary elections. He also asked Prime Minister
Vajpayee to remain in a caretaker capacity until a new parliament is
sworn in. The Election Commission has announced that elections will
take place over several days in September and early October. A new
government should be in place by mid-October.
The coming elections will be India's third, and the next government
will be India's sixth, within a three year period. India has had seven
governments since 1989. The only one to serve its full five-year term
in that period was that of Prime Minister Rao from 1991-1996. These
rapid changes in government are a sign of major shifts in the social
basis of Indian politics, but they also indicate the fundamental
soundness of the institutions of governance:the parliament, the
presidency, the judiciary and, above all, the Constitution. Throughout
this period, the military has remained scrupulously outside the
political process; the military has been firmly under civilian control
since India's independence in 1947.
The rise of coalition politics in India has coincided with the
growing assertiveness of groups formerly at the bottom of the socio-
economic ladder. Disadvantaged groups have learned that numbers count
in a democracy, and they have forced the major political parties to pay
attention to their interests. When established political parties fell
short of expectations, these groups have started their own political
parties. One of their most persistent demands has been an expansion of
India's policy of giving preferential treatment to the country's most
disadvantaged groups. Inscribed in India's Constitution is a quota
system for society's most dispossessed--the Dalits. There are pressures
to expand the notion of quotas even further and that includes special
provisions for the guaranteed representation of women at all levels of
the political system. The New York Times had an excellent front page
story on May 3 by Celia Dugger about a low caste woman who occupied the
highest elective position in a small village in India's largest state.
She and thousands of women like her across this vast country are paving
the way for a further transformation of Indian society.
the u.s. response
Mr. Chairman, with this devolution and diffusion of political
power, it becomes imperative that we maintain close contacts with all
the major political parties in India, to ensure that our message is
fully understood and our interests effectively pursued. Ambassador
Celeste and his predecessors have led our mission in India in pursuing
this goal, and we are well served by the presence of three consulates
in the other major regions of the country which focus on regional
trends and issues. I and other Department officials have taken care to
meet with leaders of Congress and other opposition parties on trips out
to the field. Deputy Secretary Talbott has consulted with the head of
the Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi, and other national leaders, including
former Prime Minister I.K. Gujaral, during his visits to Delhi in the
course of his eleven-month old security dialogue with Foreign Minister
Jaswant Singh. I am confident that, whatever government emerges from
the current political process, we will be well prepared to engage
immediately.
More to the point, we will work with any government that emerges on
the many important items on our agenda with India. Obviously, non-
proliferation is currently our central concern. Our dialogue over the
past eleven months has been dominated by the global reaction to
India's--and then Pakistan's--nuclear tests. While there is still much
work to do in that area to enable us to restore the bilateral
relationship we had in May 1998, before the nuclear tests and the
imposition of Glenn sanctions, we still hope that we will be able to
carry out President's Clinton's goal set in 1997 to deepen our
engagement and establish the broad-based relationship I believe we both
seek.
In this regard, Prime Minister Vajpayee in New York last fall
called attention to his belief that the U.S. and India were ``natural
allies.'' We should strive to realize that goal rather than remain what
one scholar accurately described as ``estranged democracies.'' Whether
we are able, in the coming years, to consolidate our natural affinity,
or remain stuck in our old negative patterns, will be determined by the
actions of both our governments. Because we remain convinced that the
vision we articulated and the broad interests we identified are still
valid and worth pursuing, we will not be found lacking in our efforts
to seek a common approach with India on the great issues of the day.
security dialogues
Mr. Chairman, I should stress that since the time of India's
nuclear tests, our two countries have made progress toward
understanding each other's security considerations, but we have yet to
see the concrete actions taken that could help to reconcile our
differences. We regretted the decision last month by India to test an
extended range version of its Agni ballistic missile. While we have a
much better understanding, after eight rounds of dialogue, of what
motivates Indian strategic thinking, our concern about further missile
tests by India and Pakistan remains. We nevertheless will seek to use
the solid foundation we have established in the dialogue to continue
exchanges with whatever future government emerges. It is our hope that
we will be able to build on the work in this area we have done thus
far, and to continue to make progress toward ``harmonizing'' our
security concerns, to borrow a phrase from Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh. This new relationship will benefit all concerned.
It is also our expectation that there will be continuity in the
search for more stable and better relations between India and Pakistan.
The recent Lahore Summit, in which the Indian and Pakistani Prime
Ministers displayed both foresight and courage in establishing a
framework for bilateral cooperation and reconciliation, received the
enthusiastic support of millions of Indian and Pakistani citizens.
Popular reaction to Lahore gives us the hope that any new Indian
government will see fit to carry this process forward. As President
Clinton said in a statement shortly after the February meeting of the
two Prime Ministers, ``South Asia--and, indeed, the entire world--will
benefit if India and Pakistan promptly turn these commitments into
concrete progress. We will continue our own efforts to work with India
and Pakistan to promote progress in the region.''
I would add that it is equally important that India and China
engage on their own security concerns. In that respect, we are
encouraged that these two nations, which are playing an important role
on the world stage, have restarted their annual Joint Working Group
meetings to discuss border and other issues, which we hope will include
broader security concerns. Foreign Minister Singh had earlier indicated
the possibility of traveling to China; we hope he or his successor will
do so. We were also encouraged by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang's
statement that Beijing was committed to seeking good relations with
India into the new century.
our message
Mr. Chairman, in our own public diplomacy since the May tests, we
have sought to reach a broad audience, both in this country as well as
in India and Pakistan, to explain the basis of our diplomacy toward
these two countries. Deputy Secretary Talbott has given a number of
interviews and speeches in this connection, and he has written articles
on the U.S.-Indian dialogue that have been widely disseminated at home
and abroad. I have also sought opportunities with the news media to lay
out our thinking about South Asia and security. We have done so, Mr.
Chairman, because we firmly believe that the steps we are asking India
and Pakistan to take in the security and nonproliferation areas are not
merely steps that serve our own policy interests--we are also convinced
they will enhance and increase the security and well-being of both
countries, and of the South Asian region as a whole.
Mr. Chairman, it is our hope--indeed our vision--that we will be
able to move in the direction that both the United States and India
desire. We look forward to the day when differences over security
policy no longer dominate the bilateral dialogue. We look forward to
the kind of broad-based relationship that we enjoy with many other
democracies--one in which we are deeply engaged on an agenda of
economic growth and trade, science and technology cooperation, cultural
and educational exchange, law enforcement, and in many other areas. Our
vision, Mr. Chairman, is not simply to return to the situation in which
we found ourselves on May 10, 1998. We desire to raise our bilateral
engagement to a new level of intensity, breadth and depth. As President
Clinton has said, we want a new U.S.-India relationship for the 21st
century.
Senator Brownback. With the report out today on the Cox
Commission and the breach of our security interests by the
Chinese, it would seem to me critical that the administration
in--in not only trying to stem the flow of technology to China,
also try to engage much more aggressively and broadly with
India to meet our security interests and to build a strategic
relationship with India.
I would--you have noted the President's comments. I would
think he ought to get on the phone today with as high-level
official as he could, even though India is in the middle of a
transition in their government, and start to engage in this
dialog of ``How do we broaden this United States/India
relationship as an offset to what is taking place in China?''
What were your thoughts on that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, we would rather not be
in a position of choosing one or the other of the two countries
of Asia that we are discussing this morning, China or India.
I think it is very clear that this administration has made
a policy decision to try to engage both countries.
Engagement rather than isolation is the view that--of the
President and the Secretary of State that--that that direction
will be the most important for our long-term interest.
Clearly, these two countries have great differences. India
is a democracy, a vibrant democracy, which is the reason that
we are having this hearing this morning to discuss those recent
developments.
China is not. China is an authoritarian regime. We have
concerns with China that we do not have with India.
China's human rights record is abysmal. India's is a
democratic tradition, one that we share concerns, but we
applaud the--the democratic tradition in India and its
practices.
We believe that we should not be in a position of trying to
offset or play one against the other. We would like to engage
both in terms that are productive for U.S. interests.
I would also say, though, that the reports of the last
several days and the release of the report today, I am sure,
will be read very closely in India to see what implications
that report has for its security deliberations, and we will
understand that.
The fact is that we have tried. Even though the pace
sometimes has been slower than some would like, we have tried
in these months since the nuclear tests, which were of great
concern to us and still are, of a year ago--we have tried to
better understand India's security concerns and requirements.
And those requirements, I am sure, will be affected by the
information contained in the report released today. And how
that plays into India's long-term requirements, we will have to
see.
These are decisions that India will have to make, but we do
hope that even as India addresses its security requirements,
that it can also address the concerns of the international
community about non-proliferation.
We think that these twin concerns can be harmonized, and we
hope that India will be able to do that.
Senator Brownback. What has been the initial reaction you
have received from Indian officials about the Cox report, the
technology that has gotten from the United States to China?
What--what have you heard from Indian officials?
Secretary Inderfurth. We have not heard anything directly
from Indian--Indian officials. There have been numerous press
reports about this, editorials in the Indian press. We have not
received, to my knowledge, any direct inquiries.
I am sure that they will want to see that report now that
it is publicly released.
We are, as you know, in a period of a caretaker government.
We will continue to have normal diplomatic relations with the
Indian Government. But I do not envision that we will be able
to have the kind of intense dialog that we had before the fall
of the Vajpayee government.
But we will certainly be prepared to answer any questions
that they have about that report and discuss it with them.
Senator Brownback. It would just strike me that if--if I
were an elected official in India today, I would be deeply
concerned about this breach of technology by a large country
that sits right on my border that I have had difficulties with
in the past.
Secretary Inderfurth. Well, I have had an opportunity to
see an advanced copy of testimony that I think you will be
hearing later this morning, which will touch on the--the China
dimension and India's security concerns.
And I think that what you have said is absolutely right.
That will have to be taken into account, and India's concerns
about China go back many years. They are concerns that they
have expressed very clearly to us.
As I noted in my testimony, however, we hope that these two
countries that do play and will increasingly play a role in the
world's stage in the 21st century, that they will address their
concerns directly.
That is the only way that those issues can be fundamentally
resolved, and we hope the expressions by both foreign ministers
in both countries to pursue that engagement will--will take
place; and the sooner the better.
Senator Brownback. It just--it seems to me that we might be
at a critical moment in our relationship to India if we do not
put the portal through which that relationship is--is dealt
with so narrow.
If we do it beyond just the issue of CTBT but say rather to
the Indian government, the caretaker government, or whoever
will follow after this one, ``We want a very broad, expansive
relationship,'' and if that were communicated directly and as
much as possible now, that there would be a number of people in
India and in the dialog that they have going on now with their
people through the election process, that would be quite
willing to engage the United States at this point in time that
perhaps 5 months ago, 6 months ago they would not have been.
I wonder if we are not at a real strategic window here for
us to rapidly expand the relationship with India and put as
much intensity and focus on it as we do on China.
And I know that is not your desk; that is somebody else's.
But we put a lot of time and effort in an expanded view in our
relationship with China.
And we say, ``Well, OK. You have got human rights problems.
You have problems in Tibet. You have prison labor problems. You
have forced abortion problems. You have religious persecution
problems, but we are going to kind of look past all that,
because we want a broad relationship with you in China.''
And yet it seems as if India, we are saying, ``OK, now, if
you do not get through CTBT, we are not going to talk with
you.''
That--it just strikes me as not being balanced whatsoever,
nor appropriate given the time and the situation and position
that we, as America, find ourselves in relative to these two
enormous and important countries.
Now, I hope you can correct me that my perception is wrong,
but that is what strikes me as--as the situation that we
present to both of these two important countries.
Secretary Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, I would defer to my
colleagues at the Department for a--a better description of our
engagement with China, but it is my strong view that it has not
been one to brush aside concerns on human rights.
I think our most recent human rights report made it clear
that we will discuss all of our concerns on that score very
publicly and openly and, quite frankly, to the great
displeasure of the Chinese Government. And Secretary Albright
has gone to Beijing and raised these as part of our whole
agenda.
Now, on the question of our narrow portal, with respect to
India and, indeed, Pakistan, it is broader than CTBT. And I
think that in our discussions, you know that our concern about
non-proliferation goes beyond CTBT to include fissile material
production, export controls, strategic restraint or defense
posture, about what next steps the two countries might take now
that they have openly tested nuclear weapons, what they might
do with respect to deployment or weaponizing, other things,
which could lead to a nuclear or missile arms race, things of
concern to us and, we believe, to them.
So our--our portal is broader than you have described it,
but it is one that I think that recent events with respect to
China should actually underscore the importance of addressing
as soon as possible.
And I say that because in our view it is in India's
interests to see an international ban on any further nuclear
testing.
China has signed CTBT, but it has not ratified. We would
not want to see China move away from that commitment.
We believe that a fissile material cutoff treaty is also
important. China has stopped production of fissile material.
But they have not stated so publicly. They are engaged in
Geneva on the lead up to negotiations on an FMCT.
We believe it is in India's interest to see that the
current freeze by China on fissile material continues and, in
fact, made into an international treaty.
So we believe that there are boundaries around which the
nuclear and missile competition can be constructed and that
these international agreements are ways of doing that, that are
in India's interests, in part because of their concern about
China.
We would not want to see an open-ended competition between
India and China in terms of their nuclear or missile programs
and modernization, so we see this in--in India's interest as
well, obviously, as in Pakistan's.
At the same time, I, too, share your view that we need to
get beyond the single issue agenda. We do need to open up to
have the kind of broad based relationship that the President
indicated 3 years ago that he wanted to--to have with India.
And we were moving in that direction until the tests.
And, again, the reaction to the tests a year ago was not
just a United States reaction; it was an international
reaction. And we have tried to, therefore, address that
fundamental issue so we can move forward.
But let me just say this in--in a more encouraging
optimistic fashion: It is clear that we cannot do a great deal
on this during this period between now and October. It would be
inappropriate for the United States to try to engage the
government in New Delhi on fundamental issues in its current
capacity.
But we will make it clear that as soon as a new government
is formed, we want to re-engage immediately and to see whether
or not we can go in the direction that you are recommending, to
address our security concerns and to open up our dialog across
the board--and perhaps, I hope, with Presidential engagement.
He would like to do that.
Senator Brownback. Good. Well, I would certainly encourage
it and it seems to me, actually it is the right time to do it
while the Indian people are having the discussion, their
elected leaders, with them of the--through the process of an
election.
On the floor of the Senate right now we are discussing the
defense bill, and I anticipate putting up an amendment that
would provide for a 5-year lifting of sanctions on both India
and Pakistan.
I would hope that the administration could support us in
this effort. One of the first things we have to do to broaden
this relationship is get these sanctions off, and I would hope
that you could support us in this amendment as we move it
forward on the floor.
Secretary Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, I anticipated that you
would ask a question about the, what we are calling Brownback
II. I--I hope you realize it has now taken on that--that
nomenclature after your very valuable amendment last year,
which was Brownback I.
If I may, I would like to simply give you our--our views on
this--on this legislation and the process that you have
initiated here.
Mr. Chairman, as progress has been achieved in our
discussions with India and Pakistan, we have taken advantage of
the limited waiver legislation enacted last year by the
Congress, the Brownback amendment, to relax some of the
sanctions against the two countries. And as you well know, that
waiver expires in October of this year.
Although we are not prepared to waive additional sanctions
at this time, we do seek comprehensive permanent national
interest waiver authority for all of the Glenn and related
sanctions against India and Pakistan.
In addition, in order to ensure a level playing field in a
post-sanctions environment, we favor the repeal of the Pressler
amendment, which affects assistance to Pakistan. And I
understand that your new legislation includes that provision.
We have seen several proposals this year, including the one
by you, which calls for outright suspension of many of the
original sanctions and another by the House International
Relations Committee to extend the current waiver authority for
another year.
Mr. Chairman, the administration welcomes the readiness of
Congress to extend the scope and duration of existing sanctions
relief authority.
In our view, recent events have underscored the
advisability of providing the President with flexibility in the
form of waiver authority versus suspension, regarding both the
scope and timing of sanctions relief. We believe this flexible
instrument of diplomacy can contribute directly to the goals
that the Congress and the administration hope to achieve.
That said, we look forward to working together with this
committee and other Members of Congress. As the various
proposals move forward, we believe that this is an important
undertaking and one we support.
Senator Brownback. Now, I want to clarify here, the
amendment I am putting forward will provide a 5-year
suspension. I mean, we want to lift these sanctions and we do
not want to hold it as a sword over the head of the Indians or
the Pakistanis, purposefully stating to them: We want a broad-
based engagement here. We want to move aggressively forward in
the relationship with both India and Pakistan.
Now, I understand you to say you would--you would rather
have waiver authority but you are not going to oppose the
suspension that I am putting forward in this amendment.
Secretary Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, we realize that this
legislative process is starting here and will continue. We want
to continue discussing our views with you on the national
interest waiver authority versus suspension.
As I said in my statement just now, we would actually like
to see this go even further to have comprehensive permanent
authority for all these sanctions.
But we believe that this is a--a good start, one that we
want to go forward. We will continue having discussions as we
already have with you about this issue of waiver authority
versus suspension.
But we do believe--because the clock is ticking on the
authority we currently have, we do believe that it is very
important for this process to begin.
Senator Brownback. Well, we would appreciate your support
in whatever form we can get. And again I just think it is
critically important we send those sort of signals now, and
that this is the point in time--we do it now.
And if we are to engage into a long-term relationship, we
need to have some time with these and not just another 1-year
waiver that is--that is, you know, people cannot really plan
around. They do not know for sure what is going to take place.
And plus if these are countries that we want to really
engage in for a long period of time, that we see as strategic
allies, it should not be a year-to-year thing. This should be
something that--we say, in my part of the world, ``We are not
planting an annual. We are planting a perennial.''
This is something we want each year, just keep coming up,
but we do not have to plan it. We want a long-term relationship
here and so it needs to be for a period of years.
Secretary Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, we too want a long-term
relationship. And we also said this publicly on several
occasions: We also want to be moving in the direction of a
sanctions-free relationship with both countries.
These sanctions clearly inhibit the potential we have with
both India and Pakistan, two countries that we want to
establish long-term sustainable relations with; two countries
that are quite different in many respects.
We will have a different type of relationship with India
than we will with Pakistan, but we consider both of them
important friends and ones that we do not want to see
encumbered with sanctions over time.
Now, I must say, though, that we believe that there are
steps that they can take as well. We want to have choreography,
if you will, in moving toward the kind of relationship with
both countries that we wish.
We believe that there are steps that they can take to
address not only our concerns but those of the international
community on non-proliferation matters. And I know that you
feel strongly about--about that issue.
We do not want to see other countries take a page out of
India or Pakistan's book and move forward with their own
nuclear or missile programs.
We do not want to see that proliferation of dangerous
technology around the world. We, therefore, hope and believe
that both countries can take steps in their own interests to
address that; and as they do that, we can also move forward
with establishing the kind of broad-based relationship that you
are suggesting.
So these are things that we can do mutually. It is not an
either/or. It is not just us, or just them or vice versa. These
are things that I think that we can and we have established a
basis over these 10 months--we can do these things together.
Senator Brownback. Well, I hope we can move forward with
good speed and deliberation and send those positive signals to
the people across India and across Pakistan.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony. I
have a couple of other questions that I would like to submit to
you in writing rather than taking up the time here at the
hearing today.
[The information referred to follows:]
Responses of Assistant Secretary Karl F. Inderfurth to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Brownback
Question 1. In the past, Muslim and Sikh religious minorities have
more frequently been targeted by religious intolerance than Christians.
Has there been any improvement in the religious climate for these
groups?
Answer. The past eighteen months have been comparatively quiet with
respect to religious intolerance directed against Muslim and Sikh
minorities in India. There are allegations from Sikh human rights
groups that they are harassed by authorities in connection with their
attempts to seek investigation into police excesses of the late 1980's
and early 1990's but this has not translated into communal violence.
Question 2. Since the May 1998 nuclear tests, eight rounds of talks
have been held between the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and Indian
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and between Talbott and Pakistan Foreign
Secretary Shamshad Ahmad. What is the status of the talks--where has
progress been made and where has it not? How will the talks be affected
by a change in government in New Delhi?
Answer. Since the tests last May, we have engaged in intensive
diplomatic efforts, both in concert with other countries and
bilaterally, to convince India and Pakistan to turn away from the
dangerous course they have set by their nuclear tests and ballistic
missile competition. The United States remains fully committed to this
effort. We support the benchmarks set forth in the P-5 and G-8
communiques and UNSC Resolution 1172. We have tried in particular to
move India and Pakistan toward near-term steps to defuse tensions and
prevent an arms race.
These efforts have yielded some progress. India and Pakistan have
declared a moratorium on further nuclear testing and have stated their
intention to adhere to the CTBT. Both have committed to strengthening
controls on the export of nuclear and missile technologies. Both have
agreed to join talks in Geneva on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Finally, at the Lahore summit, the two countries' prime ministers
committed their governments to intensify efforts to resolve the issues
that have divided their countries for so long. Clearly, however, the
Kargil conflict poses a grave risk to the progress both countries made
at Lahore.
During Deputy Secretary Talbott's series of security and
nonproliferation talks with India and Pakistan, we have also maintained
contacts with a variety of parties across India's political spectrum.
Therefore, we are confident that, whatever government emerges from the
current political process, we will be well prepared to engage with it
as soon as possible.
Question 3. In 1995, a joint Indo-U.S. steering committee was
established to coordinate relations between the two countries' armed
services, including exchange visits, technical assistance, and military
exercises. What has been the status of this committee since the 1998
nuclear tests?
Answer. Before the nuclear tests of May 1998, the focal point for
our military relationship with India was the Defense Policy Group
(DPG), an annual steering group normally cochaired at the Assistant
Secretary of Defense level. The DPG's mandate was to oversee military-
to-military cooperation, security assistance, and defense research and
production cooperation under a Joint Technical Group. The initial DPG
meeting was held in 1995, and further sessions were held in 1996 and
1997. DPG activity was suspended in the wake of India's nuclear tests,
and remains so pending further progress in the U.S.-India security
dialogue.
Question 4. International Military Training Education (IMET)
funding of the $450,000 for India for FY1999 was restored under the
India-Pakistan Relief Act. How are these funds being used?
Answer. India plans to send personnel to the Air War College and to
an electromagnetic spectrum management course, and has requested course
``slots'' for the Army War College and Naval Command College. The total
cost of all four courses is approximately $130,000. Due to India's
initial hesitation to take advantage of IMET following the restoration
of the funding in December, and India's interest in a limited number of
courses, it will not be possible to utilize the entire $450,000 for
India this year. Therefore, the remainder of the funding for this
fiscal year is expected to be reallocated to other country programs
with unfunded requirements. We will provide the appropriate
notification to Congress of any such reallocation.
Question 5. There has been some confusion as to the legal authority
for the Administration to place companies on the ``entities list.'' Is
it the Administration's position that the ``Glenn Amendment'' required
the Administration to place some 300 Indian and Pakistani companies on
the entities list? If not, why did the Administration expand the list?
Please provide a list of those companies that comprise the entities
list.
Answer. The Glenn Amendment required that the authorities of
section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 ``shall be used to
prohibit exports . . . of specific goods and technology (excluding food
and other agricultural commodities)'' to India and Pakistan after their
May 1998 nuclear tests. There was no specific requirement to establish
an entities list. As a matter of policy, to bring clarity for U.S.
exporters and demonstrate to India and Pakistan the negative
consequences of the steps they took, the Administration decided to
impose restrictions on trade with selected entities having connections
to nuclear, missile or military activities. The length of the resulting
``entities list'' for India reflects the size, diversity and
decentralization of its economy. A copy of the list is attached.
[The list supplied has been retained in the committee files, but it
can be accessed at the following site:]
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Entities/entity.htm
Senator Brownback. And as always, I deeply appreciate your
willingness to come up because I know most people would rather
go to the dentist and have a root canal or two than testify in
front of a U.S. Senate hearing.
So I appreciate deeply your willingness to come up for the
root canal. Thank you very much.
Secretary Inderfurth. It--it is not nearly as painful as
you suggest. And I do want to, again, express my deep
appreciation to you for your continued deep interest in the
region and our relations, and we enjoy very much working with
you. Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The second panel will be the Honorable Frank G. Wisner,
vice chairman, external affairs, American International Group,
Inc., New York, New York; and the other witness will be Mr.
Stephen P. Cohen, senior fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, the
Brookings Institute here in Washington, DC.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us today. And,
Mr. Wisner, I believe, we have got you listed first on the
program. Unless you have arranged differently, we would like to
have--I would like to have your testimony first.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK G. WISNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC., NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Wisner. Senator, thank you very much. I am honored to
appear before your committee.
The occasion is a special one for me as I served as
Ambassador in New Delhi from 1994 to 1997, and in my work with
the American International Group have been able to pursue my
corporation's interests in India in risk management, in
investments, notably in Indian telecommunication and computer
software processing; and we have ambitions to expand into the
insurance market, into health care and into consumer finance.
I have also had the privilege, Senator, of serving on the
board of Enron Oil and Gas, which has substantial gas holdings
in the fields off the Maharashtra shores.
And I have been privileged to be associated with a number
of non-profit organizations, the U.S./India Business Council,
the Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Society, all of whom
have followed matters related to India.
It is a special privilege, therefore, to join you today and
reflect. I prepared testimony for the committee. I am
submitting that testimony for the record and rather than read
it through, would prefer, with your permission, to summarize my
views and make a point or two in addition.
Senator Brownback. Absolutely. And the full testimony we
will put into the record as if presented.
Mr. Wisner. I admire enormously your taking the time today
to receive all of us, to be able to consider an issue of the
importance of our policy toward India and Pakistan, especially
in the wake of the nuclear events of May 11, 1998 and the
actions Pakistan took in--in following it.
I recognize how many demands there are in your schedule and
how many other issues, including our engagement in the Balkans,
press upon your time. But the region is, as you noted,
extraordinarily important, representing approximately a quarter
of the world's population.
It is also an area of vital significance to the peace and
stability of Asia and especially as the new century comes on
us.
I believe and I join with you, Senator, that the time is
right to lay the basis for a new security and political
relationship with South Asia.
India has the attributes and is acquiring those of a major
Asian power capable of playing a role in ensuring the balance
of power in the region and in the peace of Asia in the century
ahead. Pakistan, in like manner, is critical to its own
neighborhood.
The May 11 test in an ironical fashion, I believe, freed
our diplomacy, for it gave us an opportunity to put our
proliferation objectives into perspective, to recognize that
there are broader issues; and now that the tests are over, to
seek that expanded relationship that you have outlined.
The United States' diplomacy since the 11th of May has been
active, more active than almost at any time in history; active
directly with India and with Pakistan, with our allies in the
Permanent V and the G-8, taking into account for the first time
the China factor, as one great importance to the region, and
seeking balance not only between the region and China, but
between India and Pakistan.
I do not believe that South Asia is poised on the brink of
a nuclear war. In fact, I believe there is promise in
stabilizing the India/Pakistan relationship.
But it is a time to be attentive and careful, for the
introduction of nuclear weapons and the intensified development
of delivery systems have raised the stakes in the region,
especially in light of the history of friction between the two
nations and the rudimentary communications that have existed
heretofore between the two governments and between New Delhi
and Beijing.
I want to underscore the Delhi/Beijing issue, the China/
India issue, for the risk that it poses to the United States
and the world in the next century as these two great nations
gain economic strength and military capabilities. And unless
they are on an even keel, one with the other, they represent an
issue of grave concern for all the rest of us.
The situation we face in South Asia, Senator, is not a
result of the failure of our proliferation policies, our
intelligence or the organization of our national security
community.
While clearly we could do better in all of these regards,
we have to be fair with ourselves and recognize that the
nuclear event in South Asia flowed from factors that are
related to that area: India's view of the world; its place in
the world; the end of the cold war; and India's isolation as a
result of the fall of the erstwhile Soviet Union; the issue of
China, and the continuing tensions and difficulties between
India and China; the success in a way of our proliferation
initiatives.
The very fact that we moved from the NPT to the CTBT
isolated India, increased the stakes in her mind that her
ability to defend herself would decline. And sadly, India's
negative attitude has been intensified by a long-standing
Indian suspicion of the United States.
The issue of proliferation can only be attacked
politically. And while some progress has been made, more must
be.
And after the Indian elections are over, it would be my
hope that the administration intensify its diplomacy and pursue
a fresh broader relationship, as well as an understanding on
the proliferation issues.
We must also keep China in mind, as you noted, engaging
China in finding ways to reduce tensions in the region and
increase dialog with the region.
We need to press China hard in this regard as we need to
encourage India. But we cannot ever afford to let our
relationship with China appear to be pursued at India's
expense, any more than we--we can allow our relationship with
India to appear to be pursued at Pakistan's expense.
Let me summarize several points. This is the time to
intensify and broaden relations with South Asia.
We should allow no single issue to dominate the agenda. We
should allow for a broad agenda, representing all interests,
including proliferation ones. And I believe and I welcomed the
word, the signal that Assistant Secretary Inderfurth gave this
morning that there is a role for high-level visits--a visit by
the President of the United States is long overdue, a visit by
senior Cabinet officers needs to continue.
I believe that it is also vital to deal with the constraint
of sanctions. On--our sanctions policy, in my judgment, has not
served to deter the nuclear event--events we faced in South
Asia. And we have relied excessively on sanctions to pursue our
diplomacy.
Those sanctions have eroded our credibility. The effects on
Pakistan have been extraordinarily severe. And U.S. business
has paid a price. Overall, U.S. influence most importantly has
paid the heaviest price.
I have written you separately and argued that, I believe,
that sanctions should only--only be applied unilaterally if
there is a direct threat to American national interests. If
there is not, then sanctions should be considered after
diplomacy is exhausted or needs reinforcement and then in a
multilateral context.
The above features should be accompanied by waivers and
sunset provisions.
And therefore, I--I support the initiative that you have
outlined today as well as the legislations that Senators Lugar,
Kerry and Hagel have under way and Congressmen Crane, Dooley
and--and Manzullo, especially their call for a careful
assessment of the consequences of sanctions before the United
States enters into them.
It is key, Senator, I would argue, to return to our
opposition to secondary boycotts and therefore to deal with the
ILSA and Helms/Burton legislation.
You were looking at the issue of the suspension of
sanctions. You have called for a 5-year suspension. I can only
think that that will make excellent sense in the broad context
of moving forward, to change the thrust of sanction--the
sanctions policies of this Government. And it notably sets the
stage for opening up our diplomatic dialog with India.
I hope that the suspension will be--will cover dual use
technology trade as well as trade in ordinary--I underscore
``ordinary''--military items.
I would ask that as you proceed forward, Senator, that the
Congress find a way to express to the administration its views
on what is called in the trade, the entities list.
That list, which prescribes trade with a number of Indian
corporations, is having an extraordinarily negative effect. The
restrictions have been too broadly defined by the
administration.
We should constrain trade only with entities that are
directly involved in nuclear and missile production, not those
that are indirectly or tangentially identified and in dealing
with companies that are directly involved in nuclear and
missile production, our constraints should only be on
technologies or goods that affect missile and nuclear
production, not secondary or tertiary items that do not affect
it.
In other words, the trade should be--the trade restraints,
where they need to exist, should be highly targeted. I would be
happy to discuss the refinements of that separately, Senator,
or answer questions on the same.
I ask that steps be taken that would signal that there is a
common American purpose, a common administration and
congressional purpose. I do not wish to see sanctions relief
brought in in a manner that appears that the United States'
house is divided.
And I welcome, therefore, your signal to Mr. Inderfurth
this morning to join you in support of what you are doing. We
need to speak with one voice.
I noted as well, Mr. Inderfurth's statement this morning
that he seeks a lifting of the Pressler amendment. I would
think that is an excellent idea, but I would like to make
certain that when it is raised, there are options available for
India--for example, the continuation of the production of the
light combat aircraft in which the United States has been so
heavily involved for a number of years.
The administration needs to be certain that it extends a
balanced view of how it wishes to proceed with an arms supply
relationship, spare parts and ordinary military goods.
Finally, Senator, let me close on a note that I think is
of--of great importance. It was my privilege as Ambassador in
India to be able to observe the work of the Agency for
International Development, while it was engaged not only in
dealing with India's enormous basic human needs, but also
encouraging the development of institutions, which underscored
Indian economic reform and made it possible for Indian
financial service institutions to develop and to be available
for American investors as well as Indian and other national
investors.
I would hope that--therefore, that it will be possible to
encourage AID, the Agency for International Development, to
return to the Indian job that it set for itself before, doing
its useful work in strengthening the stock exchange, regulatory
system in Bombay and being able to help in the financing of
city development, the floating of bond issues that will permit
infrastructure development.
These AID vehicles have been enormously useful to the
United States, our image in India, been useful to American
business. And they ought to be encouraged to be started again.
Their status today is suspended.
Senator, thank you very much for your attention to my
remarks and my best wishes, as well, to Senator Sarbanes who
just joined us.
And let me turn the floor over to Mr. Cohen.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wisner.
Those are excellent comments. I will look forward to following
with several of them on questions for you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wisner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank G. Wisner
united states' policy toward india and pakistan
It is a special honor to be asked to appear before this committee
to speak on a subject of fundamental importance: South Asia's nuclear
experience and its effect on relations between the region--notably
India and Pakistan--and the United States.
may 11, 1998
We meet today in a time of terrible testing for this country and
the NATO Alliance. We are also mindful of the fact that the world is
beset with crises--crises which will set the stage for relations
between states in the 21st century, every bit as much as the quest for
advantage among western European nations; the decline of the Russian
and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the retreat of the Ottoman Empire; the
wars in the Balkans and the quest for colonies defined the last days of
the 19th century and the first days of this one.
Today there is much to preoccupy our attention. In addition to the
Balkans; we confront a global economic crisis; a disaster in Central
Africa; tensions in the Levant as well as in Iraq; and tension on the
Korean peninsula.
Of no less importance is the question of South Asia, especially in
the wake of nuclear tests there and United States' relationships with
that part of the world.
For this reason, I appreciate the Committee's decision to take time
to consider the sub-continent. At issue as well is the conception of
Asia in general, especially how we will relate to the great states in
Asia--China, India, Japan and Russia as well as the key second tier
players--Indonesia, Australia, Korea, and Pakistan.
I must admit to a bias. I remain persuaded that the concept of the
balance of power remains every bit as important in the shaping of
interstate relations today as it has since nation states as we know
them emerged in Europe in the Eighteenth Century.
By a balance of power, I mean no state can pursue its interests in
a manner which appears to take advantage of another state or states--
without those states combining to contain the ambitions of the
offending nation. The concept of balance of power is not about human
rights, trade or other issues of vital significance; it is about issues
of power and stability--the essentials of the international order
without which no other objective can be pursued.
With this thought in mind and convinced that the principles of the
balance of power apply to Asia as they have applied to Europe, I ask
you turn your attention to South Asia, notably nuclear South Asia--
subjects which preoccupied American diplomacy since India exploded
nuclear devices on May 11, 1998. And Pakistan followed suite shortly,
thereafter. These events effect seriously the United States,
confronting us with a challenge to the non-proliferation regime we have
endeavored to construct around the world.
There are other dangers. We are reminded of the hostility between
India and Pakistan. While the two nations have not formally engaged in
war since the early 1970's, they live virtually at daggers drawn.
Until the Vajpayee-Nawaz Sherif summit in February in Lahore, the
communications between the two governments had atrophied. Pakistani
support for the Kashmir insurgency and covert assistance to other
Indian dissidents; occasional Indian mischief; and all too frequent
artillery duels along the Kashmir Line of Control have been the
dominant facts in relations between the two states this decade. The
nuclear fact simply adds to the region's tensions.
To make matters worse, the nuclear explosion has brought to the
fore an additional reality--India's extreme preoccupation with China
and India's view that absent some ability to regulate the relationship,
China and India are on a collision course, especially in the 21st
century when each nation has strengthened its economy and increased its
military power.
As dark as the picture appears to be, let me assure you that I for
one and I suspect some in the Administration and Congress see in the
South Asian nuclear event the possibility of freeing our diplomacy
toward the region from the thrall it has been in since the early
1970's--when India first tinkered with a nuclear explosion. At that
time we elaborated in response to India's nuclear excursion an array of
sanctions--sanctions we extended progressively and in later years in
response to developments there we imposed them on Pakistan. Sanctions,
I argue, which did little to deter India's and Pakistan's development
of nuclear weapons and their accompanying delivery vehicles but which
severely complicated our relations with both government, reduced our
ability to engage either government on the issue of proliferation and
by reducing Pakistan's defense capability, pushed that country deeper
into the embrace of its nuclear advocates.
an historical note
Allow me for a moment to set the historical stage. As we look back
at the 1974 Indian nuclear event, it is clearer than ever that India's
humiliating defeat at China's hands in the 1962 border war and China's
adoption of a nuclear option drove India's leaders to establish their
own nuclear weapons program. For nearly two decades that program made
only slow progress, constrained by the caution of successive Indian
governments and by the fact that India's relationship with the
erstwhile Soviet Union gave her a sense of security. That sense of
security served to reinforce restraint.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, India's
circumstances changed perceptibly. Alone in Asia and facing China
without a sympathetic great power at her side, India had to find new
security relationships or framework or India would look to her own
defenses. Indian officials could not ignore the implications of China's
provision of missile and nuclear weapons technology and equipment to
Pakistan. India's exposure and the challenge implicit in it, never
clearly articulated by New Delhi, was largely missed by Washington and
certainly never acted on. In fact, we have never considered South
Asia's, especially India's, security concerns as central to our own.
Even our decision to engage India in a security dialogue in the 1980's,
during the Reagan administration, was part of our drive to isolate the
Soviet Union and not a policy of engaging South Asia on its own terms.
We did not then, nor have we since, thought through a security
formula for the region which would integrate it more deeply into our
ambitions for stability in Asia; limit the potential for war in the
subcontinent or with China; and contribute to our broader quest for
non-proliferation norms. Instead we followed narrowly our non-
proliferation lodestar. Congress joined in adding legislative muscle to
our proliferation concerns.
I argue that there exists a security framework for India and
Pakistan, which is consonant with U.S. interests. That framework
springs from the notion of a balance of power and can be pursued in the
context of our broader quest for Asia's security. Suffice it to say,
the road was not explored nor traveled--by any party.
Instead, as the 1990's advanced, the conditions for India's going
nuclear multiplied. The permanent extension of the NPT reminded India
of her isolation. She saw her nuclear option narrowing. The NPT event
was closely followed by CTBT. As CTBT negotiations advanced, China and
France engaged in increased nuclear testing, events the international
community and the United States choose to accommodate.
India then suffered a serious diplomatic embarrassment in pursuing
its challenge to the CTBT. India, as its establishment has chosen to
put it, saw herself as a victim of ``nuclear apartheid''. India saw in
Article 14 of the CTBT treaty the potential of serious pressure on her
government to join the treaty in three years and forego forever
testing. With a Fissile Material Cutoff Ban Treaty on the horizon,
those responsible for Indian national security faced a dual dilemma--
how to stand by a policy of nuclear ambiguity and how to avoid
international isolation, at the same time maintaining a credible
deterrence. The arrival of the BJP led government in March 1998 was the
final straw.
The BJP never disguised its views on India's nuclear option. The
party is by its own definition nationalist. Its philosophy is rooted in
the view that India's weakness has laid her open to foreign invasion
and has prevented her from assuming her natural place of influence in
the world--inheritor as she is of a major civilization. The BJP
national security doctrine is based on the notion that international
relations are inherently predatory--the mighty take advantage of the
weak. Inevitably, China with her faster rates of growth, BJP
intellectuals argue, will seek advantage over India, unless India is
able to deter China and counter China's nuclear arsenal. The fact that
China is accepted by the international community de jure as a nuclear
power and India is not, only adds fuel to the fire of India's
discontent. If India is to be safe, BJP and other Indian defense hawks
argue, she must be able to stand behind a nuclear shield--one of her
own making since no international guarantee will give a great nation
confidence.
There are other aspects to the BJP's logic which I will not
elaborate. Sadly, that logic is rooted in a more broadly held Indian
view--one that exists across the Indian political spectrum: suspicion
of the United States. Even though no Indian can explain how the United
States stands to benefit by India's weakness, Indians are broadly
convinced that the United States has systematically opposed India over
the past fifty-years--favoring Pakistan and then China--and possibly
the two in combination. This suspicion makes it most difficult for
American leaders and diplomats to establish the common ground for a
security dialogue. As my Indian friends are often given to say, ``he,
who controls the assumptions, controls the conclusions.'' The
assumption of American hostility runs deep.
May 11 was not the first BJP dalliance with nuclear tests. The BJP
considered seriously a test when it held power for two weeks in the
summer of 1996 but time ran out on the government. It could not prove
its parliamentary majority. When it returned to office in 1998, the BJP
lost no time in setting plans for the test.
Pakistan, despite the President's involvement and our best efforts,
followed India's lead. In fairness to our Pakistani friends, it is hard
to see how a politically vulnerable Pakistani government could have
done otherwise, given history and the violent currents of public,
military and bureaucratic mood. Our offers to assist Pakistan were also
suspect in light of our inability in recent years to move the
relationship, settle outstanding issues like the disposition of
Pakistan's F16 aircraft, or carry Congress.
the permanent five responds
The response of the United States to the South Asian nuclear tests
was swift. We imposed additional sanctions--some required by the Glenn
Amendment; others outside its scope. In addition to those in place
before May 11, we declared opposition to World Bank and IMF lending for
all but ``basic human needs;'' we severed all military contacts, and in
India's case developed an ``entities list'' which proscribes or put
under review exports to key Indian firms.
We took our case to the Security Council. Japan, Germany and Canada
followed our lead imposing sanctions of their own, and the Permanent
Five elaborated a five point negotiating agenda. That prescription was
aimed at convincing India and Pakistan to come to terms and rebuild
confidence between the two and the rest of the international community.
At heart, the P5 offer--signing CTBT; negotiating FMCT;
articulating a minimal development and deployment posture for nuclear
weapons and their delivery vehicles; elaborating export controls and
reengaging the Indo-Pak dialogue--is about confidence--confidence
between India on the one hand, Pakistan on the other, Asia and the
world. That confidence is the necessary precondition to India's and
Pakistan's finding a secure footing in a volatile international order.
The United States took the lead in seeking to negotiate this
agenda. I have the highest regard for the Administration's record in
this regard--especially for Deputy Secretary Talbott and the able team
from across government which has supported him. Progress has been
registered in eight diplomatic rounds. On the first point, CTBT, by
September 1998 at the United Nations General Assembly, the two Prime
Ministers had agreed their governments would move toward adherence to
the CTBT. The Indian government must now secure parliamentary support
for its change in policy and both governments must commit themselves by
September of this year to sign.
Second, negotiators have explored in detail the Fissile Material
Cut Off Ban. Participation in an FMCT negotiation, in principle, is
agreed but further work is needed to define how nations producing
fissile material will suspend production while negotiations in Geneva
are underway. Knowing something about the Indian nuclear establishment,
I also suspect the issue of ``how much'' fissile material is needed
remains to be settled.
Third, defining a nuclear and delivery vehicle posture is a tough
nut to crack. Extensive discussions between U.S. and Indian experts
have taken place but decisions in the final analysis are Indian and are
related to perceptions of national security. Transparency in questions
of defense is an alien concept in the subcontinent. We must keep in
mind, neither the U.S. nor the P5 will dictate the nuclear posture of
India and Pakistan. Their governments are responsible for sovereignty
and security and only those governments can define and articulate their
defense posture. We should also bear in mind India and Pakistan will
have the right to change that posture later, if threats, not now
foreseen, to national security emerge. The United States reserves a
similar right.
The United States can help define choices but since we are a party
to the NPT, Washington cannot explicitly negotiate nuclear and missile
levels with India and Pakistan without compromising an important treaty
obligation. The burden to define a posture lies with the parties.
India's commitment to a ``minimal'' deterrent is significant. India's
willingness to alert Pakistan and others of the Agni test was a
sensible step. Washington's considered response was also appropriate.
The Agni, a long-range missile capable of reaching deep in China, was
an inevitable cohort of the May 11 nuclear test.
Fourth, I am pleased to note as well that progress has been made in
export control talks, even though more work needs to be done.
The Indo-Pak dialogue, while not a responsibility of the P5,
received a boost in February. We must hope the two sides will
articulate a concept of negotiations, build domestic support for them
and make it possible they will survive the changes in South Asia's
governments. It should not be impossible to structure negotiations
which address all issues, including Kashmir, and allow each issue to
reach term on its own, unlinked to other issues. The question of
Kashmir can be subdivided into separate categories--sovereignty, troop
levels, human rights, Siachen and trade, to mention a few. Progress on
one or more questions will give momentum for progress on all.
a word on kashmir
A word about Kashmir. The issue of Kashmir, especially the question
of sovereignty over the former princely state can only be resolved when
the parties are ready for an agreement. This disposition does not exist
today. An invitation to mediate is therefore a trap; accepting it can
only lead to trouble. Informal contacts and advice are one thing.
Formal involvement is not in the cards and any attempt to secure it
will undermine the role which the United States--or for that matter any
other party, including the Security General of the United Nations, can
play for helping the region sort out its affairs. The Kashmir dispute,
especially the question of sovereignty, will take years to resolve.
the role of china
China has a special role in the South Asian equation and our
diplomacy with China should take account of that fact. China is a
reality in South Asia's past and future. Unresolved borders and China's
arms relationship with Pakistan, especially where that relationship has
touched on nuclear and missile matters are of deepest importance to
India. The United States' decision to deal gingerly with China on
nuclear missile exports to Pakistan is resented in India; our inability
until very recently to discuss in candor and in depth our approach to
China on these questions has not helped. the United States' decision to
pursue our policy of engagement with China--while appearing to hold
India at arms' length--is regarded with suspicion. China has a
responsibility to accelerate and deepen its dialogue with India. At the
same time, the United States must keep in mind that we cannot be seen
to pursue a relationship with China at India's--or for that matter at
Japan's--expense, any more than we can be seen to pursue a relationship
with India at Pakistan's expense. The President's words last summer in
China, seemingly inviting China into South Asia, hurt our diplomacy.
dangers ahead
Eight rounds of talks not withstanding, the goal line in South Asia
has not been crossed. Full agreement on the elements in our dialogue
remains to be achieved. Nor, therefore, has a basis for a new
relationship between the United States, India on the one hand and
Pakistan on the other, been defined. Sanctions remain in place and
undermine our ability to pursue our goals with the two governments.
Rolling back India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals is no longer in
the cards but how we will live with them or use our relationship to
improve prospects for peace and prosperity in Asia remain lively
questions.
Coming to a conclusion is complicated by the times we live in and
the crises we are facing elsewhere. Each of us are distracted and risk
becoming more so. America's hands are full with Kosovo; we are not good
at managing multiple national security problems. Our presidential race
is in the offing.
India's government collapsed on April 17. Congress, should it form
a government, has not been a direct party to the negotiations. It does
not share the same sense of commitment. Nawaz's government has not been
able to cope with Pakistan's economic problems. Trouble brought on by a
deteriorating economy is serious enough to effect his hold on
government.
I admit to a degree of pessimism. So much lies in the balance; much
has been accomplished and much remains to be done. Failure to reach
agreement on the benchmarks elaborated in the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant
Singh dialogue in the months ahead leaves the U.S. and India mired in a
debate over sanctions, potentially made worse if Congress provided
relief and the administration finds itself forced to reimpose
sanctions. Failure to reach agreement on the benchmarks will inevitably
complicate negotiations between India and Pakistan.
the road ahead
Let me close my remarks with a series of observations about the
road ahead--guideposts if you will; not a roadmap because in the wake
of the collapse of Vajpayee's government precise cartography is not
possible.
First. We must keep our eye fixed on the strategic objectives. If
we are to defend our interests in Asia in the next century, we will
only be able to do so if the balance of power is maintained and as a
concept it works. The United States has no fundamental quarrel with any
great or lesser power in Asia. We can engage all. But we need India in
the equation; without her the equation is not whole. And we need
Pakistan to insure the stability of South Asia and its environs. We
must, therefore, develop a security dialogue with India, exchanging
estimates and intelligence and thinking through how we would act in the
event of crises.
Second. India is emerging as a major force in Asia; it is emerging
as a major trading and investment destination we must accommodate
ourselves to these facts. India has a role to play in maintaining the
Asian balance of power. Not that India explicitly accepts the concept
of the balance of power; it does not. But as it was true during the
Raj, Indians see their sphere of influence extending from the Suez
Canal to the straits of Malacca and north to central Asia. India has
the intellectual establishment, diplomatic infrastructure and growing
economic power to put strength into its foreign policies. It needs
focus, of course and I would like to believe it requires a relationship
with the United States worth qualifying as strategic in significance. A
relationship with India gives the United States additional leverage in
containing crises in Asia and in securing stability.
Third. The whole of our ties to South Asia is greater than any of
its parts. Despite the importance of non-proliferation, it cannot be
the dominant fact in our relationship with South Asia to the exclusion
of other interests. We urgently need to work through a more substantial
definition, adding security architecture to it. In fact, success in
developing an overall relationship--one that provides India a long-term
framework for advancing her security interests--will strengthen our
ability to deal with non-proliferation imperatives.
Fourth. The present negotiation must be brought to a close--for
India's and Pakistan's good and for our own. The new government in
India should be addressed without delay to define what can be achieved
under present circumstances. We must work with the other members of the
P5 to ``keep up the side.''
Fifth. The style of negotiations is almost as important as their
substance. India and Pakistan are old and proud nations; both today are
democracies and vibrant ones. Parliament in India matters; so do
``think tanks'' and the press. India and Pakistan have high thresholds
of sensitivity. For American diplomacy to succeed in South Asia, we
must tread a wary line, avoiding the image of appearing to dictate our
views; strengthening instead the perception that we seek a partnership
among equals. India is especially sensitive to being lumped with
Pakistan. India is right and we need to readjust our language and
approach if we are to hold India's attention. In fact our policies
should treat India and Pakistan differently. We have a higher ambition
for India--a major economic agenda and an association with it in
securing Asia's peace in the century ahead.
Finally, engaging India and Pakistan means adjusting the rank order
of our national foreign policy priorities. No President has visited
South Asia since Carter; Mrs. Albright's very brief visit was the first
since George Schultz stopped by in the early 1980's. Our presidents and
India's Prime Ministers have long fallen out of the habit of
corresponding over global and Asian issues. India, to my way of
thinking, is a key part of the emerging Asian equation. We need to be
in close touch with it and with Pakistan; we need to have India by our
side in APEC and in the ASEAN forum. And the time is right to think
about India sharing the continent's and the world's responsibilities.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Cohen, thank you very much for
joining the committee.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN P. COHEN, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY
STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Cohen. Good morning, Senators, Senator Brownback,
Senator Sarbanes. I am honored to be invited to testify before
the subcommittee again.
What I--I have prepared some written testimony. I wish to
have that submitted for the record and what I will try and do
is--is improvise, because much of what Secretary Inderfurth and
Ambassador--the Ambassador has said, I agree with, and also
your--your--your opening remarks.
Senator Brownback. We will have your full statement put in
the record as if presented.
Mr. Cohen. OK. I am--I am by background an academic,
although I now have joined Brookings and have served for a
couple of years in the State Department, so my perspective
still remains that of an academic, a scholar who studied South
Asia and India for about 30 years.
And what I think--I think--I would like to say some
prefatory remarks about misunderstanding India, because I think
that much of American policy has been--has been based on false
premises or false understanding of India, in particular; to
some extent, Pakistan.
I think we have to understand that India is undergoing at
least five separate revolutions right now. There is a cultural
revolution, in that Indian social castes and classes are--are
now moving in a way very much reminiscent of the American Civil
Rights movement.
Simultaneously, there has been a Federal revolution in
India, with the power of the center declining as--in terms of
the power--vis-a-vis the power of the states of India.
There is an ideological revolution underway in India,
raising the question of what it means to be an Indian. The
recent--the recent attacks on Sonia Ghandi for being not an
Indian or being un-Indian because of her Italian birth really
stems from the BJP-inspired debate about citizenship of India.
There is also an economic revolution, which is now well
underway, although it is somewhat stalled.
And finally India has--has pursued--well, let me say that
India has been pursuing these revolutions from about 1989,
1990. They are all fairly recent in terms of their
intensification.
At about the same time, 1990, 1991 India's strategic
position changed dramatically. So you have a country of a
billion people, soon to be the world's largest country, with a
tremendous churning internally and also its external situation
quite unstable.
For many years, India relied on the Soviet Union for its--
for a quasi-strategic alliance. Before that, it had a close
relationship with the United States in that the United States
moved with India to counter China.
This is an aspect of Indian foreign policy that is not
understood here very much, but for many years, we encouraged
the Indians and the Indians were with us in--in attempting to
contain Chinese power.
And when the 1962 war with--with China occurred, then we
did supply India with considerable military assistance and even
helped establish one of their intelligence services.
Nixon's trip to China in 1969--1970, while important in its
own right, sent a signal to India that we now no longer
regarded India as a major partner in Asia, but that we had--in
a sense were using--were--were relying more on China in terms
of our strategic containment of the Soviet Union. And from that
point onward, the Indians have been groping for a new strategic
place in Asia.
Our continuing support of China after the--after the end of
the cold war made it appear to the Indians--I think
incorrectly, I would say--that we were engaged in a strategic
relationship, strategic alliance between China, Pakistan--
India's other enemy or their other antagonist--and the United
States.
And for many years, the dominant Indian view has been that
they face a world in which China, the United States and
Pakistan is--is--is attempting to keep India from emerging as a
great power.
Now, I do not think that has been American policy. But we
have conveyed that impression to the Indians. And therefore
they have pursued a policy of autarchy both in the nuclear area
and in terms of developing relations with other countries,
which they see as necessary to counter this--this large tri-
partite alliance.
I think that--I agree with your opening remarks in the
sense that we have to start fresh with India. I do not--I do
not think it is--it is--I do not think we should think in terms
of again trying to contain China, with India as an ally.
We should not think of fighting the Chinese to the last
Indian. Many Indians still in power today remember the
experience of 1960, 1961, 1962 and then 1964 where we, in
effect, withdrew from South--from South Asia. And they do not
want to be in a position where we are their surrogate in
dealing with China.
They understand that militarily they are much inferior to
China. Economically, they have fallen way behind China. You
know, both are nuclear weapon states, but China certainly is
superior in that regard, possibly with our assistance.
So they are not interested in a strategic alliance with the
United States against China. In fact, some Indians are--are--
contemplate an alliance with China to keep the--the superpower
hegemon out of Asia, which I think is an equally--equally
unlikely prospect.
As I see the Asian system evolving, it is going to consist
of a--of a dominant China, a significantly powerful Japan,
other states along China's periphery, and an India which is
increasingly capable in its own right, but which is not eager
to form a close alliance with anybody.
Our policy in a sense should be to keep our options open,
maintain a relationship, an engagement with China, but a
proportionate engagement with India, which is not a China in
terms of its capabilities but certainly has its own virtues and
its own values.
I could talk as my testimony does about the--about the
misperceptions we have had of India over the past few years, I
think, systematically putting the non-proliferation issue ahead
of all other issues and making it appear to the Indians that we
are trying to disarm them rather than develop them.
So I--I will not though. That is in the testimony. I do not
think there is any need to go further than that. Let me stop
here, I think, and then open myself to questions--to both of
us.
Senator Brownback. Thank you both for testifying.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen P. Cohen
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee:
I am honored to be invited to testify before this Subcommittee on
developments in India and their implications for American policy. India
is a much-neglected country and has been invisible to many American
policy makers over the past several years. Our neglect has complicated
our attempt to develop a balanced policy towards what will soon be the
world's largest country, and has hurt several important American
interests--including our interest in preventing or slowing the
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The detonation of eleven
nuclear devices in South Asia last May must be counted as one of the
great failures of recent American policy--all the more so because it
was foreseeable and preventable.
While I have specific comments on pending legislation, today I will
cast a somewhat wider net. It is evident to me, as a student of South
Asia and US policy towards India and Pakistan for over thirty years,
that the problems we have had with our regional policy stem in some
cases from a fundamental misunderstanding of India and Pakistan, and
the way in which our own policies have shaped--or misshaped--
developments in the region. I will confine myself to three
miscalculations, each of which have specific implications for American
policy.
india as a revolutionary state
First, we need to understand that India is a truly revolutionary
state, in that there are radical changes underway in its domestic
political and economic order. From about 1989, we have witnessed the
inauguration, or the intensification of five separate revolutions.
There has been a caste and class revolution, in which
hitherto suppressed or disenfranchised Indians have sought a
bigger share of the pie, often through the ballot box, but
sometimes through the gun.
We have witnessed the lift-off of an economic revolution,
hesitant at first, and now perhaps stalled, but a revolution
that has widespread support because only through a
transformation of the Indian economy can the system deliver the
goods to these newly assertive and powerful castes.
India has also seen the beginning of a federal revolution.
As new regional ethnic and caste groups achieve power, their
first goal is to capture their state government. As is the case
in the United States, the party that controls New Delhi may not
control the states, and power at the center must be shared
between parties who are rivals at the state level.
Led by the Bharatiya Janata Party and its associated social
organizations, India is now experiencing an ideological
revolution, in which long-established norms and values are
being challenged. Again, this can produce shocking acts of
violence, as in the case of the recent murder of an Australian
missionary and his sons.
Finally, as in many places around the world, India is
subjected to the information revolution as ideas and images
circulate more freely than ever before. This is accelerated by
satellite television and the internet, and cheap travel and
growing literacy.
Three points must be made about these revolutions.
First, they are being waged largely by peaceful means, contained
within India's durable and flexible democratic framework. Historically,
India has seen the repeated transformation of revolutionary movements
into evolutionary movements, there is no reason to expect that the
present social tensions, violence, and disorder will not eventually
subside. More than in any other large non-Western democracy, the ballot
box is seen as the source of legitimacy.
Second, these revolutions occur unevenly across India. Some Indian
states remain backward and poor, others have powerful separatist
movements. Yet other states have experienced phenomenal growth in
income, literacy, voter participation, and good government.
Third, India can give as good as it gets. While Indian
intellectuals complain about Western cultural imperialism, especially
the American variety, Indian films, music, novels, and stories are
pervasive throughout South, Southwest, and even Central Asia, and are
establishing a toehold in the West. These reflect India's powerful
culture, adaptiveness, and ability to compete.
the strategic transformation of south asia
These social, economic, and cultural revolutions have occurred
simultaneously with two major foreign policy crises, one in 1987 (the
so-called ``Brasstacks'' crisis during military exercises) and a second
in 1990 (a compound crisis involving the Kashmir uprising, nuclear
threats, and two weak governments). These, in turn, took place just
before and during rapid changes in the larger international
environment, especially the decline and fall of the former Soviet
Union.
These two regional crises, while real, were misunderstood by many
Americans. When coupled with the domestic unrest that has grown in
India (and Pakistan), they conveyed the impression of a region on the
brink of war--a war that after 1990, could have turned nuclear. There
were crises, real threats may have been issued, and there were probably
nuclear weapons available to both sides in 1990, but Indians and
Pakistanis are not fools, and they learned the lessons of what was
their own version of the Cuban missile crisis. I am afraid that we have
not taken seriously, nor looked closely, at the way in which these two
states have managed to contain disputes, especially Kashmir, which not
only affect their vital security interests but their very national
identities.
america's influence in south asia
Finally, the United States has become a significant factor in
Indian (and Pakistani) strategic calculations. Whether we like it or
not our laws, our policies, and even our public statements affect their
views of each other and even of China. Too often, however, we have
approached the region with a bludgeon, a stick instead of a carrot,
treating both states as immature and irresponsible. They have made
serious political and military mistakes in the past, but perhaps no
more, and no more serious ones, than those committed by other major
powers, including ourselves.
Our attempts to legislate their security policy have been doomed to
fail from the start. No country, when its vital interests are at stake,
will forego any weapon or any technology. While I strongly believe that
by going nuclear they may have actually weakened their security, their
decisions become perfectly sensible, and were predictable, when one
understands the domestic and strategic context in which they were made.
Both governments, first Pakistan, now India, have had to conduct
foreign and security policy while trying to manage a tumultuous
domestic political situation. In both, foreign policy becomes hostage
to domestic politics, often driving governments to more extreme
policies than they would otherwise choose, and neither government has
yet fine-tuned the principle of bipartisanship in foreign affairs.
implications for american policy and legislation
These three sets of American miscalculations (our misunderstanding
of South Asian political dynamics, our inattention to the region during
a period of major international change, and our failure to appreciate
how we can best influence strategic and military decisions) have led to
a number of specific errors of perception and policy.
First, our incomprehension of India's domestic revolution led to an
underappreciation of the way in which domestic politics now influences
strategic and military decisions. Paradoxically, such decisions as
adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are both more and
less important to Indian governments. They are more important because
this is an issue that could be used to attack a very weak coalition
government; they are less important because Indians are less interested
in foreign policy issues than before. If we had developed a broader
relationship with the Indian people, then such issues as the CTBT, the
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMT), restraints on the development of
nuclear weapons and on further flight-testing of missiles, and
cooperation on containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and
their associated technologies would have been placed in a larger, more
``normal'' framework. Instead, our single-minded pursuit of the
proliferation issue made it impossible to expand these other ties, with
the consequence that we wound up with the worst of both worlds: a
proliferated India (and Pakistan), and even deeper suspicion about
economic and strategic ties with the United States.
Second, our failure to understand the significant changes in India-
Pakistan relations after their two crises, and the simultaneous end of
the Cold War led us to treat the region as crisis-prone: ``the most
likely place in the world for a nuclear war.'' Pursuing a one-issue
agenda, non-proliferation, we turned to China as a partner in South
Asia. Yet, China has been part of the problem as well as part of the
solution and our failure to understand China's key role in arming the
Pakistanis and as a factor in Indian calculations was a serious
mistake. I agree with our policy of ``engagement'' with China, but that
did not preclude a similar policy towards India. Instead, our China
policy looks to Indians very much like an alliance. As for our focus on
non-proliferation, while well-intentioned it conveyed the impression
that this was our only regional interest, whereas we have diverse and
complex interests there.
Third, we have been trying to conduct a complex diplomacy armed
only with sticks and stones. Our diplomacy, constrained by restrictive
and highly specific legislation, had nothing to offer but threats, and
these failed to work. Inadvertently, we strengthened the hands of the
anti-American groups in both countries as well as those who sought to
build and deploy nuclear weapons: they could now argue that India had
come in the American gunsight, and that they had better arm to protect
their countries. Conversely, we weakened the standing of the many
Indians who sought to cooperate with us on important economic,
strategic, and security issues.
toward a fresh start?
I would strongly urge that the Senate follow two broad paths.
First, it should move speedily to allow the Executive branch as much
freedom as necessary on existing economic sanctions and technology
embargoes. The latter appear to Indians and Pakistanis to be
discriminatory ``blacklists'' against regional institutions and even
individuals. Sanctions failed to deter India and Pakistan from moving
ahead with their nuclear programs, they can be lifted.
The argument that we have to ``make an example'' of India and
Pakistan to deter other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons is
well-intentioned but factually impossible to sustain. While sanctions
can be a useful tool of diplomacy (and certainly give the impression of
doing something), they must be evaluated in their application, not in
their abstract.
The remaining candidates for nuclear status fall into two broad
categories, allies and rogues. These allies (for example, Turkey, South
Korea, and Japan) look to the United States for their security. Our
commitment to their defense is far more important to them at the moment
than risking our ire with a nuclear weapons program that may be
ineffective in any case. The rogues are well known, most are already
under punitive regimes, some are under the threat of military attack--
and none regard India and Pakistan as a role model.
Further, neither India nor Pakistan have been ``rogues,'' they are
vast, complex democracies, struggling primarily with issues of domestic
reform. This has led them to turn inward, not outward. We want to
encourage this process, since the major security threats to both
countries come from within--slow economic growth, illiteracy,
separatist movements, terrorism, corruption, environmental;
degradation, extremist ideologies, and most serious of all, incompetent
governance. I think we can assume that both states will work out for
themselves the fact that nuclear weapons are of little use against
these enemies, but we should not underestimate that dangers to
democracy in both countries, especially Pakistan. In the past India had
its brief spell of civilian dictatorship and Pakistan has had its long
periods of military rule. It now seems to be slipping into an elected
autocracy, intolerant of any autonomous center of power. The Nawaz
Sharif government has systematically attacked most of the institutions
needed to sustain a genuine democracy, most recently the press and non-
governmental organizations. This has very serious implications for not
only our nuclear policy but our larger relationship.
Second, we need to undertake a comprehensive review of our India
and Pakistan policy. Right now, we have a nonproliferation policy
(which has demonstrably failed), we have warm and positive feelings
towards India (but feelings, no matter how warm, do not make a policy),
we have the residue of a special relationship with a former ally,
Pakistan, and we have various special interest groups advocating
particular goals. These do not add up to a whole. I urge the committee
to act upon current proposed legislation as a step towards a
comprehensive review of US policy.
Having spent two years in the government as a policy planner, I
know how difficult it is for governments to think more than a few weeks
or even a few months ahead. Practically speaking, the only time fresh
thinking takes place is when one administration (or one Congress)
succeeds another. Without completely giving up hope in the negotiations
now underway between Strobe Talbott and the lame-duck Indian foreign
minister, Jaswant Singh, Congress should, as it did in past decades,
undertake its own review of relations with this one-quarter of the
world. A multi-year suspension of most sanctions will bring us well
into the next administration. It is best that such a review be
undertaken before that administration assumes office so as to assist it
in conducting its own reexamination of American policy.
Senator Brownback. Let us--why do we not run the clock at a
10-minute interval here for Senator Sarbanes and myself, or did
you want to----
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I cannot stay. Let me
simply say that I appreciate your holding this hearing. I think
the relationship between the United States and India is an
extremely important one. It is often not given the visibility
or focus that I think it deserves and requires.
I think we are in a particularly sensitive time right now
given the upcoming national elections in India. Although, I
gather they will be with a caretaker government for a period of
some months before that occurs.
Meanwhile, a number of outstanding issues remain
unresolved. I know people do not want the nuclear proliferation
issue to dominate the perceptions and I do not quarrel with
that admonishment.
On the other hand, nuclear proliferation is an important
issue, particularly in that part of the world, where India and
Pakistan seem to be going a tit-for-tat. We are not certain
where that is going to lead, although the fact that buses are
going back and forth, might supplant the possibility that
missiles will go back and forth.
So, I think it is important to keep, as this hearing was
labeled, the political and military developments in India in
our focus. I very much appreciate the testimony of the
witnesses.
I am sorry I was not able to get here to hear the Assistant
Secretary of State, but I will have an opportunity to read his
statement.
I apologize to our two witnesses that I need to depart, but
I think they have some understanding of what congressional
schedules demand.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes, for joining
us and for--for those comments.
Mr. Cohen--and I would like, if we could here, so if each
of you--if you have an answer to what I am putting forward or--
or determine that the question is slightly off the mark, then
correct the question and answer the best--answer the question
you would like to because I--I really would like to engage you.
I wonder, Mr. Cohen and also Ambassador Wisner, how do you
perceive the Indians have responded or will respond to the Cox
report that is out today about our nuclear technology and some
missile guidance information making it to China?
Mr. Cohen. There is no doubt that they will see this as
justifying their own nuclear program, that China--and possibly
accelerating their--their plans to have a much bigger nuclear
program than they--then the dominant Indian school thinks.
They have been talking to the--the so-called nuclear
moderates have been talking about, oh, 80 to 100 nuclear
weapons. I think that the Cox report will encourage them to go
further and possibly try to get seaborne--seaborne nuclear----
Senator Brownback. So you are saying the nuclear
moderates--is that what your term was?
Mr. Cohen. Yes. That is you can divide the Indian nuclear
debate into moderates, extremists, hawks and so forth, very
much the way our nuclear debate evolved in the fifties.
And I think that this will be ammunition for those who
would like to go to the sea for a Triad nuclear deterrent, not
simply an air deliverable and a missile deliverable capability
but to build submarines and put missiles on the submarines,
which has grave implications for America, because a submarine
possibly could reach the United States.
In fact, a few Indian strategists have argued that they
should be able to attack the American--the United States just
as a way of demonstrating to the U.S. that--that we cannot
intervene in their region anymore.
Historically, Indians--Indians still talk about the sailing
of the U.S.S. Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal or up to the Bay
of Bengal in 1971 when it was sent there by the administration
as a way of demonstrating support for Pakistan. This was during
the India/Pakistan war.
And from that point onward, they have always regarded it
necessary--thought--some Indians have thought it necessary to
acquire a capability of keeping the U.S. or other powers out of
South Asia.
The irony is that in 1962, we had--we had sent the
Enterprise in as a demonstration of American support for India
against China. And the Indians have sort of selectively
forgotten that aspect of our--of our intervention in the
region.
So I think that the Cox report will encourage the hawks to
go for a sea-launch system. The economy probably cannot sustain
it, and the technology would be very difficult for them to--to
develop, but this is what--that--that is the consequence, I
think, of the report.
Senator Brownback. Ambassador.
Mr. Wisner. I--I would thoroughly agree with Dr. Cohen's
assessment that India will regard the information contained in
the Cox report as proof positive of their deep concerns that
China has had unique and special access to American military
technology and that this is to India's detriment and that India
has to take that into account in terms of the way she
constructs her national defense system.
It will not enhance confidence in the United States, the
Cox report. It will take time for India to think through why
the volume of information made its way to Chinese hands without
the United States being able to enforce its own procedures and
laws.
How far the Indians will go in responding physically is
another issue. There are real constraints on Indian resources,
Indian technology to develop a nuclear system, but there--the
debate will be activated, as Dr. Cohen points out, by the Cox
report.
I would add, though, that this puts a special challenge
before the United States. What do we do as a result of the--our
anticipated--or our assessment of where India will be headed.
And I think that it is of critical importance that we
engage the Indians on the question of China more deeply than we
have been able to engage her in the past.
I start out, as my testimony said, exactly where Professor
Cohen is and that is that the Asia of the future is a careful
balance of power, where China, Japan, Russia, India, the United
States are the principal actors in keeping peace in the area;
and that our ability to communicate with each of the players is
very, very important.
Our ability to communicate with India on issues of direct
national security importance means we have to talk about China.
We have to talk frankly at a high level about our
assessments of Chinese intentions, our reading of where China
is and where China is headed. It does not necessarily mean
violating the time-honored rule of ``friends on friends,'' but
it means being a lot franker with the Indians about where we
see China. We should also urge China to engage India at the
same time. If not the Indian suspicions of China, borne of the
history, will aggravate Asian tensions. And we have to keep
that very much in mind and try to tamp those down by engaging
ourselves diplomatically with the several governments, notably
China and India.
Senator Brownback. But I mean, clearly we have not engaged
India near to the degree that we have China and Russia, by--by
any stretch of the imagination. I do not think anybody could
assert that we have--we have engaged them equally as China or
Russia. And clearly, it is time to do it.
But I am--I am curious if both of you then feel that
actually the Cox report will stir up more suspicion toward the
United States and less willingness on the part of the next
Indian Government to engage with the United States on a
broader-based dialog; or will it cause them more to retract,
engage more to Russia for strategic weapons technology?
Mr. Wisner. Well, I think it will depend importantly,
Senator, on the actions that we take. Our communications with
the parties in and out of power during this transitional period
and the way we move as soon as there is a new Indian Government
in place in the latter part of October.
We--we will--we must be on--we must take a step forward and
India will be looking--looking for us to do so.
Mr. Cohen. Now, I think that some Indians will--will argue
that the Cox--that the leakage of American nuclear technology
to China was no accident, that we deliberately helped the
Chinese in order to continue to encircle India. I think that is
paranoid, but that interpretation will be heard.
More likely in the more dominant view of India is that the
United States is here to stay, that we are not going to be a
declining super power, and that we are not going to soon have a
world of--of eight or ten equal size states, that there will be
seven or eight major states, but the United States will be
clearly the major power for the next 10, 15 years, at least;
and that the dominant view in Delhi was--will be that they do
have to talk to the United States. They will get over the Cox
report.
I think the paranoid interpretation of U.S./China relations
will diminish, because, in fact, while I think we have bent
over backward, perhaps too far backward, to deal with the
Chinese on all issues, that we have, in fact, imposed
technology restraints on China, at least some, and that--and I
think our attitude toward China is changing to a more balanced
view of--of the Chinese.
Senator Brownback. Well, I think those are wise words that
I hope we convey as well and get to the administration, that
during this time period when you have got an election and that
the Cox report is out, that we have a lot of high-level
discussions with the Indians about--about the nature of this
and about our nature of relationship with China and with
Russia. I think it is a very important time for us to broaden.
I might ask each of you--it has been my assertion--you
heard me question Secretary Inderfurth that--that we have built
the entire U.S./India relationship right now at least on the
official level on CTBT.
I--I think that--that is far too narrow for us and, indeed,
in light of the Cox report and some other things, I would think
that the Indian Government would say, ``We will talk about
that, but we cannot do this now with the type of technology now
that we know that China has.''
What do you think--how are they going to respond to our
negotiations on CTBT in light of the Cox report?
Mr. Cohen. Well, I think the CTBT has been dead in the
water for some time. And I think--I was never very optimistic
that it would get through either country. Certainly, it has its
difficulties here.
And I think that the Indians have a good excuse not to move
ahead on the CTBT. And I think by pursuing the issue for too
long a period of time and, in fact, urging the Indians to sign
not only the CTBT but the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a sense
to renounce their nuclear weapons that they have developed, I
think we--we have wasted our time. And we should have, in a
sense, gotten off a--an obsession with treaty adherence to a
broader dialog.
I think we might have gotten adherence to the CTBT had we
had a broader relationship with India 3, 4, 5 years ago. And I
think our diplomacy then in particular was so treaty-focused
that it--it just--and then we tried to use--well, I--I think--I
think it was a failure of understanding.
Let me also add that I think that India may not be quite
ready for a dialog with the United States. As I have tried to
indicate in my remarks, India's security problems broadly
conceived are mostly domestic.
While they do have a problem with Pakistan and they
certainly see themselves as a long-term rival with China, it is
a society under tremendous internal turmoil, social, economic,
political change, ideological change.
And it is hard for a country in that--going through these
simultaneous revolutions to think consistently or clearly for
very long about foreign policy.
One thing that is happening is that power is devolving to
the states. And as in the United States, the--the states have
different interests than the center. And we are going to have
to figure out a way of dealing with all of India and not simply
with a very small group of people in New Delhi.
And as Rick Inderfurth said, we are going to have to
continue to expand our ties with all elements of Indian society
as the Indians are trying to develop their ties with--with
Americans. And I think that economic ties are perhaps the most
efficient way of doing that.
I was part of an Asian Society study group of several years
ago, and we used the term ``ballast'' for the importance of
economics; that a good economic relationship would provide a
ballast between--in the relationship, overall relationship
between the U.S. and India.
And here the obstacle is India. It is not the United
States. Indians are reluctant to move quickly in terms of
reforming, opening their economy.
And although the--although--progress is steady, but it is
very slow. And as that moves ahead, I think our other--it
will--it will have an impact on our other political and
strategic relations as well.
Mr. Wisner. Senator, I am going to part company with Dr.
Cohen on the issue of CTBT in one regard, and that is that I am
not as pessimistic as he is about CTBT's--the--the fate of CTBT
in Indian hands.
I took very careful note of what Prime Minister Vajpayee
said last September before the general assembly, the commitment
he made to move in the direction of reaching an agreement on
CTBT.
And I have taken heart from the diplomacy that has been
conducted that led us virtually on the eve of the fall of this
government to a prospect that the Indian Parliament would
debate with the view to seeking adherence.
I cannot predict exactly how the matter will come out, but
I have sensed a determination on the part of the outgoing
Vajpayee government to try to find a way to associate itself
with CTBT, and we had hoped it could happen by September.
If it happens after September, I believe there are terrific
benefits for India. She will strengthen her diplomacy.
She has already sent a signal of her nuclear capability for
the United States and for the world to put some boundary
markers around the nuclear testing issue.
As India's own scientists have pointed out, the further
tests are not necessary with respect to the Indian nuclear
deterrent.
Now, that said, where I strongly agree with both you and
Dr. Cohen is that CTBT and the treaties, if you will, have had
much too high a profile in our relationship and that that has a
counterproductive feature.
Dr. Cohen used the argument that our very insistence on NPT
adherence and CTBT adherence gave the impression the United
States' purpose was to disarm India, to weaken her. And that
view is deeply rooted in--among thinking in Indians across the
board.
I would argue that the contrary is true. And that is if we
had succeeded earlier on in making it clear that we had a stake
in Indian security, that that was rooted in our view of peace
and stability in Asia, that we had a broader relationship in
which we are engaged with the Indians in multiple ways,
including in the exchange of intelligence assessments, then the
stage would have been set for an easier dialog over CTBT, not
the other way around.
And I, again, obviously appreciate the line you have taken,
Senator, in trying to put now the horse before the cart. And I
think that is really where we ought to be headed as we face
into a new Indian Government.
Senator Brownback. Let me ask each of you a final question.
Mr. Wisner, you talked about having an even keel in the
relationship between China and India.
And, Dr. Cohen, you have spoken in some terms of a South
Asia or an Asia/China/India/Russia balance, not necessarily a
strategic use or playing off of India versus China.
If--if you each would have looked down the road 5 to 10
years of--and--and the best case scenario came out in South
Asia, what would that relationship look like between the United
States, China, India and, I might put in Russia, if you deem it
good?
Where would the best place for us be to head in how we
relate between those various countries in that region?
Mr. Wisner. Well, I feel that as history has dictated many
times over the past several hundred years since the emergence
of nation states, that the safest condition for all of us is in
a balance of power.
That does not mean that the United States picks favorites
or condones the domestic systems of states abroad but that we
recognize the need to maintain strong relationships with
nations who have--in whose future and who have a serious
capacity to affect the security of a major region, Asia in
particular.
Now, what are those nations? China, India, Russia, Japan,
the United States, for we are an Asian power. We are the most
important security presence in Asia.
Where Dr. Cohen made, I thought, a very sound point is that
we do not have to choose between one or another, but to engage
equally with all and to preserve an American flexibility to
join with a group of nations. If one of the nations in the
concert that can provide peace and stability acts out of--out
of line, threatens the balance, the United States can help
create a coalition to rebalance the equation without formal
alliances, which the Indians would shy away from.
Without compromising engagements, the United States can
through its diplomacy and engagement create--recreate a sense
of balance.
I would think it would be a tragedy, that we emerge with a
view that the right way to pursue the Indian relationship is to
downgrade our China relationship. I certainly do not argue
that. I believe engagement with China is in the vital interest
of the United States. It happens also to be good for India.
We have an opportunity now to move ahead on the WTO front,
to bring China into the WTO and create world blessed set of
rules to govern trade with China.
I believe that--I hope very much that the Senate will
support China's WTO accession I would hope for an evenhanded
approach with each of the major Asians and, indeed, others.
I think the way to look at Asia in the future, in the next
century, is that the United States is part of a very delicate
arrangement to maintain balance. If that balance is maintained,
then your best chance exists for the continuation of peace and
security.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. I certainly agree with--with the analysis. I
would say that it has to be a balance, not only of military
power but of, in a sense, economic and cultural power. The
major states should be accorded the kind of dignity and respect
that they feel they should have.
India, in particular, has been, I think, undervalued by us
and by some--some other countries in the world.
I would say that we also have a common interest, not only
in averting war between the--these--the major states of Asia,
and we are--we are an Asian power, but we have a shared
interest in averting the spread of nuclear weapons.
This is--should be an interest of India's as much as ours.
They do not want to see Bangladesh with a nuclear weapon or--or
central Asian states busting out with nuclear weapons.
And we also have a shared interest in managing the regions
or the states of--of Asia, which are going to fail or which are
going to be in deep trouble and which could, by--by splitting
apart could cause chaos among them.
I would say that Pakistan is--is at the top of that list in
South Asia. Pakistan is a country that has consistently
underachieved and is now in a--in a--in a state that is neither
democratic or a dictator--dictatorship. It seems to be ignoring
its own fundamental obligations to its own people.
And this--this first of all would affect India. A splitting
apart of Pakistan, a nuclear armed Pakistan would have
tremendous consequences for India itself.
So we have an interest in this. The Chinese have an
interest in this. The--and the Indians have an interest in--in
managing a relationship with Pakistan to hopefully keep
Pakistan democratic and free and stable.
And there are other--other countries in the region,
especially in Central Asia, which have that prospect as well.
So I would say that there is a shared interest not only in
balancing each others' power off, but in helping to manage Asia
as a whole.
And--and the Indians in particular should be at the
forefront of searching out for other countries with shared--
these shared interests, because they are the ones who would be
hurt the most, should some of these events take place.
Senator Brownback. Both of you have excellent thoughtful
comments, very--very provocative, very carefully stated and
obviously yielded from years of experience and work in the
region and with India.
Thank you for being here. If there are any additional
comments that you wanted to submit to the record, we would
certainly be willing to receive those. And I deeply appreciate
your thoughtfulness and your willingness to share that with the
committee.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]