[Senate Hearing 106-234]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-234
CONFRONTING THREATS TO SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
PEACE CORPS, NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 22, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
60-899 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
PEACE CORPS, NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Joseph R., Jr., prepared statement........................ 3
Wilhelm, Gen. Charles E., U.S. Marine Corps, Commander in Chief,
United States Southern Command, Miami, FL...................... 4
Prepared statement of........................................ 8
Responses of Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm to additional questions
submitted by Senator Jesse Helms............................... 22
Responses of Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm to additional questions
submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr....................... 30
(iii)
CONFRONTING THREATS TO SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS
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TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD-562, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Coverdell (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. I am going to call this meeting of the
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations
Committee to order and welcome Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Commander
in Chief, United States Southern Command, Miami, Florida.
General, if you would bear with me a minute, I am going to
take a little more prerogative this morning on an opening
statement than I normally would, but I want to get this in the
record and then I will turn to you for your opening statement
and we will take it from there. I do want to say how
appreciative I am. I know this has been difficult for you to
do, and we are very appreciative that you would make this time
available this morning.
The purpose of this hearing today is to examine what I
consider to be very real threats to the security and stability
of the hemisphere. I cannot remember another time in recent
history when we have paid less attention to developments in our
own hemisphere. The current administration has failed to engage
the region on a consistent basis or to articulate and implement
a coherent policy for the hemisphere. Most of our attention has
been focused recently on the Balkans, the Middle East, China,
North Korea, and rightly so. These places certainly demand our
immediate attention, but we simply cannot afford to ignore
serious developments in this hemisphere in our own back yard.
In a hearing this subcommittee held several weeks ago, we
discussed the notion that the United States is good at
responding to crises, coups that actually change governments.
It was asserted that we are not as good at preventing
situations from reaching these crisis stages. And the reason
why is we tend to ignore problems and neglect them until we
must take action. We fail to engage in a regular, consistent
manner, and this has been a standard foreign policy flaw of the
current administration.
I want to talk briefly about Panama, a subject which in my
mind has been largely ignored. At the end of this year, almost
one century of a strategic U.S. presence in Panama is scheduled
to come to a close. If the schedule remains unchanged, by the
end of the year the United States will hand off the Panama
Canal to Panamanian authorities and will completely withdraw
all military forces.
The ramifications of this, as it relates to our ability to
effectively fight the war on drugs and in relation to general
security and stability in the region, are troubling. For years
Panama has been at the heart of our drug interdiction efforts
in the hemisphere. U.S. bases in Panama have provided secure
staging for detection, monitoring, and intelligence collecting
and have provided critical support to our Latin American
neighbors through aerial reconnaissance and counternarcotics
training.
The administration's response to the withdrawal of the
military from Panama has been to negotiate agreements for three
forward operating locations, FOL's, in the region, with another
one possibly to follow. While current events make the FOL
concept a necessity, I have serious doubts. Among them is the
cost of improving and updating infrastructure at the FOL's,
which is estimated to be several hundred million dollars, money
that has already been invested in Panama. In addition, the
negotiated agreements for FOL's are short-term agreements.
Long-term agreements may be more difficult to secure.
I find it difficult to give up on U.S. military assets so
strategically positioned. I do not understand why, as State
Department officials have recently affirmed, the administration
has not raised the issue of a continued U.S. troop presence
with the Panamanian President-elect. She herself is on record
as willing to negotiate some type of continued U.S. military
presence.
I am also concerned that we are leaving Panama without the
ability to defend itself from certain destabilizing threats,
such as incursions by Colombian guerrillas, narcotraffickers,
and paramilitary forces.
Less tangible, but no less important, is the fact that our
presence in Panama represents America's strong commitment to
cooperative security in the region. It also serves to reassure
investors, and provides a visible deterrent to those in the
hemisphere who would threaten U.S. interests.
Now to Colombia. Nowhere has this administration's failure
to consistently engage the hemisphere more apparent than in
Colombia. Few seem to be taking notice that the situation there
continues to deteriorate. Despite President Pastrana's well-
intentioned efforts at resolving the decades old conflict, the
number of casualties of both combatants and civilians continues
to rise. More than 38,000 Colombians have been killed in 30-
plus years of conflict, and according to the Department of
State, more than 300,000 people were internally displaced last
year alone. The administration's policy of neglect has
contributed to the balkanization of Colombia.
While the Pastrana Government continues to make concessions
to the guerrillas, including ceding them control over large
tracts of land in southern Colombia, the guerrillas have only
increased their efforts to undermine peace and stability. Most
recently members of the National Liberation Army, ELN,
Colombia's second largest guerrilla group, hijacked a domestic
flight with 41 people on board. This was followed by the
kidnapping of more than 140 innocent civilians from a church in
Cali, Colombia. While many of the hostages have since been
freed, these shocking occurrences serve to further undermine
the rule of law and erode any sense of stability that remains.
This obviously cannot be allowed to continue.
We know from General Serrano of the Colombian National
Police, the guerrillas have tapped into the vast resources of
the illicit drug industry. Estimates of guerrilla income from
the drug trade reach as high as $1.5 billion. The result is a
well-funded and well-armed guerrilla movement with little
incentive to compromise against an underfunded and undermanned
Colombian military.
As we have seen, the conflict in Colombia also threatens
peace and stability in neighboring countries. President Chavez
of Venezuela has had to move troops to its western border with
Colombia as a result. Recent reports indicate that increased
fighting in northeast Colombia between paramilitaries and
guerrillas has forced hundreds of innocent civilians across the
border into Venezuela. Just over a week ago, 600 Colombian
civilians from the region petitioned the Venezuelan Government
for refuge.
The conflict is also spilling over the border into Panama
with greater frequency. Reports indicate that FARC guerrillas
move freely across the border and have the citizens there
vacating in their wake. This is understandable considering that
Panama does not have a standing army to defend itself.
So, as we can clearly see, there are serious security
issues which must be addressed immediately in the hemisphere.
With this said, General Wilhelm, I look forward to your
remarks this morning and then engaging in an important session
of questions and answers. Thank you again for appearing before
the committee today.
[The following opening statement of Senator Biden was
submitted for inclusion in the record.]
Opening Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. General Wilhelm,
welcome. Before we start, I have to tell you that I don't envy you. The
good news is that Latin America is becoming an increasingly important
economic partner for the United States and the majority of the region
continues to work to solidify democratic political systems and the open
civic institutions necessary to support democracy. The bad news is that
illegal narcotics organizations continue to become more diversified and
agile. The plague of violence and corruption that these organizations
bring with them continues to spread throughout the region.
I am very interested, General, in hearing more about the
Administration's plans to replace the counterdrug and other
capabilities once maintained in Panama and your views of the current
situation in Colombia. I also hope you will let us know what sort of
resources you need to do your missions, particularly regarding the
illegal narcotics threat.
On the subject of replacing the capabilities we are losing in
Panama, I have more questions than answers General Wilhelm. I've been a
student of illegal narcotics for most of my career here in the Senate.
I know that the traffickers adapt to our tactics fairly quickly, so I
am interested in hearing how you and the Administration are
incorporating the military's new focus on flexible, expeditionary
forces into the new operational architecture that must be created with
the loss of Panamanian facilities.
While we are losing a significant capability, we also have an
opportunity to really re-think our tactics in Latin America and the
Caribbean. I hope that you will be able to go through some of that
thought process with us today to explain how the Administration arrived
at the current plan for new Forward Operating Locations and why this
makes operational sense. I also hope you will share with us your
thoughts on how significant an operational hindrance it will be if
Venezuela continues to deny the use of its airspace for counterdrug
missions.
On the subject of Colombia, I don't think there are any easy
answers. The security challenges confronting President Pastrana and the
people of Colombia are monumental. The guerrilla forces of the
Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, or FARC, and the National
Liberation Army, or ELN, control the eastern lowlands and southeastern
jungles of Colombia. Paramilitary groups have significant control and
free reign in the northern and central parts of Colombia. These groups
operate outside the law and threaten everyone--the people of Colombia,
the people and governments of the region, and, tragically, foreign
visitors.
Efforts by Colombian military units to confront these groups are
often tainted by the lawlessness behavior of some of those units. While
the military is beginning to clean-up its human rights record, they
have only just begun.
For the people of the United States and the world, those challenges
remain a significant security threat because Colombian traffickers are
still responsible for most of the world's cocaine production and
wholesale distribution. The Colombian traffickers are also major
suppliers of heroin and marijuana. The dominance of Colombian
traffickers in heroin supply is new this past decade. It is a sobering
reminder that traffickers will adapt and take advantage of any laxity.
In Colombia, the traffickers have a unique advantage because of
their links to rebel and paramilitary groups. The ability of illegal
narcotics organizations to use both guerrilla and paramilitary groups
for security gives them tremendous flexibility and reach. The mutual
dependence that is created by the need of both paramilitary and
guerrilla groups for funding is extremely dangerous. The money
generated by illegal narcotics is sustaining various lawless groups in
Colombia and poisoning democratic institutions.
So, for Colombia and her allies, the challenge is not merely to
disband violent, well-funded, and lawless organizations. The real
challenge is to create democratic Colombian institutions that are
Colombia feel safe.
I am not sure President Pastrana's initiatives and the risks he is
taking will lead to peace. In fact, I am concerned that some of the
initiatives aimed at peace may, in the short-term, undermine our
counter narcotics efforts. But, I support President Pastrana because I
am absolutely sure that peace has never been created without a
willingness to take risks.
I was extremely pleased to hear that official talks between the
government and the FARC guerrillas will begin on July 4th. In the long-
term, we will never win the war on drugs if there is no peace in
Colombia.
In sum, as I said in the beginning General, I do not envy you the
challenges you face. Illegal narcotics organizations do not provide
easy and obvious targets. They are much more difficult to fight than an
opposing military force because they are so interwoven with the
emerging institutions and economies of the region. I look forward to
hearing your thoughts regarding our strategy and the resources you need
for defeating these threats.
Senator Coverdell. I now turn to you, General Wilhelm.
STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES E. WILHELM, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND, MIAMI, FL
General Wilhelm. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell, I appreciate this opportunity to appear
before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, and we
appreciate your interest and the interest of the members of the
subcommittee in United States Southern Command and in its area
of responsibility.
Beyond that, sir, I wanted to tell you that we very much
appreciate your personal interest in the region which became so
apparent to us when, right on the heels of the last rainstorm
from Hurricane Mitch, you appeared in Central America. That was
a tremendous morale shot in the arm to our folks, and it really
let them know that the Congress is aware of what they are doing
and the conditions that they are doing it under. So, sir, from
all of them and from me, thank you very much.
Senator Coverdell. I appreciate your acknowledging that.
General Wilhelm. Sir, in your letter of 20 May you were
very explicit about the subjects that you wanted to address at
this hearing, and you mentioned that you wanted to discuss our
drug interdiction capabilities and certain other threats and
that you wanted to examine them in light of the upcoming
withdrawal of our forces from Panama, as you discussed in your
opening remarks, and specifically the closing of Howard Air
Force Base.
Sir, rather than to go through the customary opening
statement, which is normally very general, I thought this
morning I might ask your indulgence for another approach.
Really what we are talking about is geography, and we are
talking about resetting the United States Southern Command
theater architecture for the next century. So, I brought some
charts, sir, and if you do not mind, I thought I might suggest
that we begin this hearing by my providing you and up-to-the-
minute report on precisely where we are, what progress we have
made in setting this new architecture in place. Will that be
OK, Senator?
Senator Coverdell. That is absolutely fine. Thank you.
General Wilhelm. Yes, sir. Senator, I think the best way to
do this is to simply walk from north to south down the map
through the region, and I will provide an update concerning
each key note of our relocation and repositioning plan for the
theater.
I will start, sir, right at our home base, the headquarters
in Miami, Florida. As you know, the command officially moved to
Miami on the 28th of September 1997, and that move was made
after extensive deliberations about the best next site for
Southern Command headquarters as it departed its previous home
at Quarry Heights in Panama. Miami was selected from 126 sites
and 26 cities. Sir, at this point, we now have about 20 months'
experience operating on the ground in Miami, and I would just
like to reaffirm this morning the wisdom of the decision to
position the headquarters in Miami. In my judgment, sir, we are
in the right strategic location to do the business that
Southern Command must do during the next century. And, sir, I
would be glad to expand on the reasons for that opinion during
the question and answer period, if you would like.
Senator Coverdell. Very good.
General Wilhelm. Sir, moving about 150 miles south of Miami
down to Key West, as I know you are aware, prior to the
emergence of the requirement to relocate all of our forces from
Panama, we had intended to maintain Joint Interagency Task
Force South as our organization in Panama, really the central
element around which we intended to build the United States
component of the multinational counterdrug center. That element
would have continued to plan and oversee our counterdrug
operations in the source zone.
When the negotiations with Panama were closed, we had to
think our way through a new approach. The new approach has been
to relocate Joint Interagency Task Force South to Key West
where we have merged it with Joint Interagency Task Force East,
which previously planned and supervised the execution of our
counterdrug operations in the transit zone. So, now we have a
single Joint Interagency Task Force that plans and oversees the
execution of counterdrug operations all the way from the
Florida Straits to the Southern Cone.
This was achieved with some savings. The numbers of
Department of Defense and Coast Guard people required to man
two independent joint interagency task forces was 378. The
merged organization operates with 279. We previously had a
requirement for 31 interagency representatives, Department of
Transportation, Department of Justice, Customs. Under the new
organization, we will up that by 3 to 36.
We have not achieved full manning, but we are convinced
that with the thoughtful use of the information technologies
that are available to us, we will be able to assemble a single
organization that will be able to look from north to south and
execute from south to north. The attraction of a single task
force of unity of command: we will have eliminated that line
between the source and transit zone, one of the seams which we
tend to be attacked along. So, we think there are some
efficiencies of scale to be realized in this, and if the
architecture for command and control comes together in the way
that we would like, it may well be a more efficient
organization than the two that we had before.
Sir, moving over to the southeast, I would like to comment
on the forces that will be moving to Puerto Rico. As a very
general statement, I think it is correct to observe that Puerto
Rico will now assume the role that Panama has for Southern
Command for about the last 50 years. Puerto Rico will really
become the hub for our operations in both the source and the
transit zone.
The first organization that I would like to discuss is U.S.
Army South. U.S. Army South at this moment is in the process of
moving from its previous home at Fort Clayton to Fort Buchanan
in Puerto Rico. The organization that existed in Panama had
3,860 members. The new organization at Fort Buchanan will be
1,382. Now, that is a substantial decrease in the number of
active component personnel in the Army component command
headquarters. We hope to compensate for the reduction in
numbers by forging a very close relationship between our active
component planners at the headquarters with the 16,000 Army and
Air Force Guardsmen and Reservists on Puerto Rico, all of whom
are bilingual, so they have equal applications and will be
equally effective whether they are operating in the eastern
Caribbean or in Latin America.
The second organization that has located to Puerto Rico is
the Special Operations Command South, our special operations
component. Our previous strength in Panama was about 353 people
on the ground. We have about 297 now occupying facilities at
the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station. The command actually
completed the move. They are operating out of tents there right
now because permanent facilities are not yet groomed for them,
but I instructed them that they must accomplish the move and
that we could accept no interruption to the operating tempo or
the flow of deployments into the region. They accomplished
everything that I asked them to do, and as I mentioned, sir,
they were up and operating on the 1st of June.
I would backtrack and mention as well, sir, that the merged
joint interagency task force was fully operational on the 1st
of April and assumed responsibility for the broad area mission
for the transit and the source zones.
The third element in Puerto Rico that I would like to talk
about is our Air Force element. Previously our business in the
air was conducted by the 24th Wing located at Howard Air Force
Base in Panama. We closed the runway at Howard on 1 May, just
as we had forecasted we would have to in order to comply with
the provisions of the Panama Canal treaties. We have relocated
a small number of aircraft to Puerto Rico. These are
principally our intra-theater airlift assets, our C-130's. We
have relocated six air frames to Puerto Rico. They are now
providing inter-theater airlift support for both U.S. South
elements and, perhaps most importantly, for Special Operations
Command South.
Sir, closing out that portion of the Panama equation, I
would like to talk very briefly about some of the modifications
that we have made to the force structure at Soto Cano Air Base
in Honduras. As I know you are aware, sir--and I know you
visited Soto Cano--we have had a continuous U.S. presence there
since 1983. When it became necessary to reset the architecture
in the ways that we are discussing, we took a very careful look
at Soto Cano and tried to come up with the best mix of forces
that would, one, be politically acceptable to the Honduran
Government and, two, that would best fit with the existing
structure of Joint Task Force Bravo.
We determined that this would be the best place to move the
additional helicopter assets from the first of the 228th
Aviation Battalion which has been traditionally aligned with
U.S. Army South in Panama. So, we moved four CH-47 Chinook
medium lift aircraft and we moved four additional Black Hawk
helicopters, some in a utility configuration and some in a
medevac configuration, to Soto Cano. We now have between 18 and
20 helicopters on the ground there on any given day. So, that
has become our rotary wing operating hub for the region.
Sir, I saved really what has emerged as probably the most
contentious issue for last, and that is the forward operating
locations. As I mentioned, probably the biggest loss that we
confront coming out of Panama and our bases there are the 8,500
feet of concrete, the ramps and taxiways, maintenance
facilities that have served us so well, as you pointed out, for
a great many years at Howard. That has been our single base for
most of our counterdrug assets. It supported AWACS operations,
P-3 operations, F-16's, ARL's, Customs trackers and Customs
domes, Citation 550's. Just about everything we have put into
the air in the drug struggle has been based at Howard at one
time or another. So, it was a very difficult proposition coming
up with offsetting locations to sustain those operations in the
future.
We selected three sites as potential locations for what we
termed forward operating locations, as I have gone to great
pains to point out, throughout the region. These are not U.S.
bases. These are simply access agreements to host country
facilities that will enable us to prosecute the operations of
shared interest against narcotraffickers.
The first sites are at Curacao and Aruba, and in truth,
sir, those are two. There are about 35 miles that separate the
two islands. Those negotiations were undertaken with the Dutch.
They were successfully concluded during April. An exchange of
diplomatic notes has occurred and we are now today operating
from both facilities, as I will show you in just a minute.
The second location that has been successfully negotiated
is the airfield at Manta in Ecuador. Negotiations were
successfully concluded and an exchange of diplomatic notes with
Ecuador also occurred during April. There we have some
refurbishment and repair to do before we can open the field to
unrestricted operations by U.S. counterdrug aircraft, but we
are operating out of there today.
The third FOL will be somewhere in Central America. We
looked initially at Costa Rica. As to whether or not we can
successfully negotiate an access agreement with Costa Rica is
somewhat problematic, sir. But we do need a third FOL and that
third FOL should be in Central America and it should afford us
access to the eastern Pacific operating areas and movement
vectors for narcotics, which of course is an area that we do
need to oppose.
Sir, just a quick thumbnail to show you where we are today
because I know there was a lot of justifiable concern in
Congress as to exactly what would happen on 1 May when we put
the sawhorses across the end of the runway at Howard Air Force
Base.
Well, sir, we are up and operating at the FOL's and other
traditional operating locations in the AOR. Very quickly, we
are operating AWACS and tankers out of MacDill Air Force Base
in Florida. We are operating E-2C Hawkeyes and Navy P-3's out
of Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico. We are operating Customs,
the double eagle package, the slicks and the domes, out of
Aruba, along with Citation 550 trackers. And in Curacao--I
visited there just week before last--we have five F-16's on the
ground and we have a C-130 variant aircraft with a classified
mission there as well. In Manta today we have just one Navy P-
3, but some modifications and refinements have been made to the
facility. And I am looking to expanded operations in Manta by
the end of the month.
Sir, I will close this out by just very, very quickly
giving you a sketch of the capabilities that these three FOL's
deliver. These arcs display the ranges. P-3's here with the
small dotted line. AWACS with the bold dotted line operating
out of Aruba and Curacao, and then we have range arcs that show
the P-3 operating range out of both Manta, Ecuador and Costa
Rica. With any one of these FOL's, sir, we will have about 65
percent of the coverage that we previously enjoyed from Howard
Air Force Base. With two, with Curacao/Aruba and with Manta, we
will have about 80 percent of the reach and operational
coverage that we had before, and with all three, we will have
about 110 percent. This arc happens to be inscribed on the
Liberia airfield at Costa Rica.
Sir, in a nutshell, that is precisely where we are at this
moment, and I thought that would be as good a point of
departure as any for our dialog today.
[The prepared statement of General Wilhelm follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm
introduction
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I welcome
this opportunity to provide you my assessment of counterdrug (CD)
efforts in the United States Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM's) Area of
Responsibility (AOR). SOUTHCOM's specific role is to provide and
coordinate Department of Defense (DOD) support to Goals Four and Five
of the National Drug Control Strategy. All of our CD efforts are
focused on providing this DOD support to the Department of State, U.S.
law enforcement agencies, U.S. Country Teams and our regional partner
nations in order to stem the growth, production, and shipment of
illegal drugs to the United States.
Today, I will provide you with the following: my personal
assessment of the region's overall security and stability; a strategic
overview of the regional drug trafficking threat; an overview of our
post Panama Theater Architecture; a brief discussion of resource
constraints; our CD strategy; country and regional assessments; and
finally my vision of the future.
security and stability in the southcom aor
The strategic and economic importance of Latin America and the
Caribbean to the United States continues to grow and cannot be
overemphasized. Our growing dependence on oil from the region, which
includes Venezuela as our single largest source of imported fuel--18
percent annually, combined with the region's growing dependence on U.S.
imports, fully justifies a consistent and balanced engagement strategy
in the region. Latin Americans currently spend 44 cents of every dollar
on imports from the U.S. By 2000 Latin America is expected to buy more
U.S. goods than Europe, and by 2010 more U.S. goods than Europe and
Japan combined. These figures are expected to increase as initiatives
of the Free Trade Area of the Americas take root.
For many years most Americans looked south and only saw problems:
coups, military dictatorships, communist-inspired insurgencies, and
economic crises. Over the last two decades, the Caribbean and Latin
America have embraced democratic governance--of the 32 nations in our
theater, all but one are governed by leaders who serve at the pleasure
of the people. The military forces of Latin America are also
contributing to this process by supporting civilian authority and the
rule of law. Human rights are accorded more respect, and in a region
where military governments and coups were commonplace, great progress
has been made. In fact, the only non-democratic country within the
entire SOUTHCOM AOR is Cuba, a sad remnant of the Cold War. We remain
hopeful that the people of Cuba will eventually enjoy the personal
liberties and increased economic opportunities that are inherent in a
free society with a market economy.
While we are encouraged by these political and economic trends, we
are mindful that many of these democracies are fragile. In a region
that fears no external power, is essentially at peace with itself, and
on a per capita basis, spends less on arms than any other region of the
world, transnational threats have emerged as the greatest dangers to
regional stability. There is a growing realization throughout the
region, from the tip of the Southern Cone to the Straits of Florida,
that the corrupting influences of drug trafficking, money laundering
and organized crime are undermining the foundations of democracy and
impeding economic development. It is against these transnational
threats, and specifically illicit drug trafficking, that SOUTHCOM has
framed its CD strategy.
the drug threat
The entrenched and increasingly diverse illegal drug business
continues to demonstrate an ability to meet the world demand, and poses
increasingly complex challenges to CD efforts throughout our area of
responsibility. Cocaine and heroin continue to be a formidable industry
in the Source Zone. Coca is grown almost exclusively in the three
Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. It is refined into
finished cocaine Hydrochloride, primarily in Colombia, then transported
to the United States. Colombian poppy fields are a primary source of
the opium that is converted into heroin also destined for the United
States. Finally, there are also numerous growing areas in the Caribbean
that supply significant amounts of marijuana for U.S. consumption.
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)
The nature and modus operandi of DTOs are well known. Their primary
strategic strength is their ability to operate with significant
financial backing and freedom of action in the source and transit
zones. Nurtured by a constant demand for their product, these
transnational criminal organizations are resilient, dynamic, and agile.
They have transformed and survived through the dissolution of
traditional drug cartel organizations. They have proven over time that
they can rapidly adjust transit routes and modes in response to U.S.
and Participating Nation interdiction efforts.
Motivated by profit, DTOs are increasingly gaining control over
Colombia's infrastructure, economy, and security apparatus. In some
areas, they operate with near impunity, controlling ports and many of
the rural areas of the Andean Ridge. An integral part of their
``security arrangement'' involves the cooperation of insurgents. These
insurgent groups, in turn, have become increasingly dependent on drug
profits to sustain themselves. As a result, this mutually beneficial
relationship has allowed DTOs to realize profit levels that support
sustained secure operations in rural areas--areas that are increasingly
encroaching on civilian population centers.
DTOs possess a large amount of capital and resources, which are
increasingly invested in legitimate businesses. Their disregard for
national sovereignty allows them to cross national frontiers with
impunity and gain unfair advantage over legitimate business
enterprises, which further undermines the civil government. However,
DTOs are not invulnerable. Inefficiencies caused by an effective CD
effort can drive up the price of illegal drugs to the point where U.S.
demand wanes. With the right amount of effort, the profit from drug
trafficking can be reduced to a point where it becomes a far less
profitable and lucrative business.
We know DTOs intend to maximize profits. To that end, they are
continuing to expand cocaine production and export to the United
States, Europe, Asia and new secondary markets in South America. They
are also continuing to plant higher yield varieties of cocaine in the
Putamayo and Caqueta growing areas in Colombia and expand cocaine
production within Peru and Bolivia. In the future, DTOs will likely
seek to expand cultivation within the border regions of Brazil, Panama,
and Venezuela. DTOs will also attempt to strengthen security alliances
with insurgent groups that undermine regional governments.
theater architecture
To sustain our support to on-going CD efforts in the region and to
compensate for our redeployment from Panama, we have worked hard to
reset a viable theater support architecture. Our goal is to continue
support to detection, monitoring and tracking operations as well as
sustain the logistics base for regional engagement activities.
Looking at the map of the hemisphere and taking into account
SOUTHCOM's two primary missions, regional engagement and counterdrug,
Howard Air Force Base has served us well. However, in compliance with
our treaty obligations, we will turn over all facilities to the
government of Panama by the end of 1999. We are establishing a theater
architecture to support operations into the 21st century.
Puerto Rico will replace Panama as our main operating hub in the
theater. The United States Army South (USARSO) is in the process of
relocating its headquarters to Fort Buchanan. Once reestablished, this
force of 1,382 active and reserve component soldiers and civilians will
undertake the missions previously carried out by a contingent of 3,868
in Panama. To compensate for reduced manning, USARSO will rely heavily
on the more than 16,000 Army and Air Force Guardsmen and Reservists
stationed in Puerto Rico. In a great many ways this is an ideal
marriage. Puerto Rican guardsmen and reservists are bilingual, making
them equally effective whether conducting engagement activities with
members of English-speaking militaries in the Eastern Caribbean, or
with Spanish-speaking counterparts in Central and South America.
Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) is our most heavily
committed component. Each year the soldiers, sailors and airmen of our
theater Special Operations Command conduct nearly 150 deployments into
our Area of Responsibility. SOCSOUTH provides the quick reaction force
we need to respond to crises and other fast-breaking requirements. To
perform these demanding missions Special Operations forces must be
close to the action and keep a sharp edge on their language and
cultural skills. We are relocating approximately 350 members of
SOCSOUTH to Naval Air Station, Roosevelt Roads. We are also finalizing
basing arrangements for selected command and control and intra-theater
airlift assets on Puerto Rico. Collocation of ground and air forces is
imperative for precise planning and rapid execution of crucial
missions.
Another important organization, strategically located, at the Soto
Cano Airbase in Honduras since 1983, is Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo.
JTF Bravo is a contingent of about 500 soldiers and airmen who have for
16 years occupied temporary, expeditionary facilities on the east side
of the airfield. Soto Cano has been, and will continue to be, our main
hub for operations throughout Central America. To preserve adequate
tactical mobility, some of the 228th Aviation Battalion helicopters
formerly based in Panama will reinforce the limited aviation assets
assigned to JTF Bravo. The superior performance of JTF Bravo during the
tragic, early hours of Hurricane Mitch underlined the importance of
this unit's presence to the people of Honduras.
The SOUTHCOM Headquarters has now operated in Miami for 20 months.
I am convinced that we are in the right place to implement our
engagement and CD strategies. Miami is widely accepted by the nations
of this hemisphere as the de facto capital of Latin America. With its
economic, cultural, academic, transportation, and consular ties to our
area of responsibility, Miami has proven to be the most credible
location in the continental United States from which we can engage the
entire region. Relocating from Panama to Miami has supported our
mission, and afforded us opportunities to pursue ``smart business''
practices in providing support services to the SOUTHCOM military
community. Consistent with my desire to nurture and fully support
``smart business'' and business reform efforts, I believe the United
States Government will be best served by purchasing our headquarters
building and land. An initial review of the development trends in this
part of Miami reveals dramatic increases in the value of real property.
Until its recent deactivation, Joint Interagency Task Force South
(JIATF-South), operated from its headquarters at Howard Air Force Base
and served as our primary planning and execution agent for CD
operations and activities in the source zone. Our departure from Howard
has caused us to redesign our counternarcotics command and control
mechanism. We have merged JIATF-South with its counterpart organization
JIATF-East in Key West. Through deliberate integration of
communications and information systems we have created a single
organization capable of ``seeing'' from the Florida Straits into the
Andean Ridge. The merged JIATF will be responsible for planning,
coordinating and supervising the execution of detection, monitoring and
tracking and other CD missions in both the source and transit zones. To
achieve a streamlined and cost-effective organization, the SOUTHCOM
Headquarters will assume responsibility for some administrative,
logistical and programmatic activities previously performed by both
JIATFs.
We have also made significant progress towards establishing Forward
Operating Locations (FOLs) to support the air coverage that Howard Air
Force Base formerly provided. Interim access agreements have been
signed with the Government of Ecuador for the use of Manta and with the
Kingdom of the Netherlands for the use of Aruba and Curacao.
On 16 April 1999, Secretary Cohen designated the Department of the
Air Force as Executive Agent for Manta, Ecuador and Aruba/Curacao and
the Department of the Navy as Executive Agent for a future Central
American location. We are aggressively moving to establish these FOLs
to support on-going air operations. Expeditionary CD operations began
in May in Aruba and Curacao and will be expanded in the coming months.
Our focus will be on executing strategic/high payoff operations
designed to keep our level of support at the 1997 levels achieved from
Howard Air Force Base.
In order to sustain the 1997 level of CD operations, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict,
through his Drug Enforcement Policy and Support office, submitted a
proposed reprogramming action of $45,000,000 from the DoD Working
Capital Fund into the Central Transfer Account in February of 1999. To
meet immediate Post 1999 theater CD architecture requirements I
deferred $17,000,000 of current year SOUTHCOM CD requirements, some of
which are Congressional high interest items, and $15,000,000 of Post
1999 architecture requirements. Unless the requested reprogramming
action is approved in the very near future, the full Post 1999 CD
architecture will not be in place at the start of Fiscal Year 2000.
Additionally, I will face the challenge of determining which cuts to
make to the theater CD mission in Fiscal Year 2000 to fund these one-
time relocation expenses.
resource constraints
In addition to an effective theater architecture, SOUTHCOM requires
sufficient resources to support the goals and objectives of the
National Drug Control Strategy. The U.S. military services have
continued to contribute CD detection and monitoring resources to
SOUTHCOM in the form of dedicated CD aircraft flying hours and ship
steaming days. The standing Joint Chiefs of Staff CD Execute Order
establishes specific requirements. However, while the Air Force and
Navy are tasked to provide a specific number of platforms, higher
priority contingencies, maintenance requirements, and exercises have
prevented consistent and full allocation of these platforms to
SOUTHCOM. Over the past years, we have lost some capabilities. For
example, a degraded intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capability is eroding the effectiveness of our CD efforts.
Adequate ISR capabilities are key to quickly and successfully reacting
to drug traffickers' changes in operational patterns.
CD requirements place additional demands on low-density/high demand
forces. As a result, we are confronted with a large mission and limited
resources. In response to this challenge, we have devised creative
approaches that will enable us to effectively and productively carry
out our CD responsibilities in a resource-constrained environment. We
have developed a three-part strategy to sustain our CD efforts.
counterdrug strategy
The key components of the strategy are: (1) promoting effective
regional responses, (2) pursuing better coordination and more effective
employment of interagency resources, and (3) applying innovative
tactics, techniques and procedures.
Regionalizing the Effort
By expanding joint and combined operations, we are moving toward
multilateral and regional responses. For example, through the SOUTHCOM
sponsored Caribbean Nations Security Conference and the Association of
Caribbean Command Military Chiefs, we are strengthening our
relationships with European forces in the region. Subsequently, the
contribution of British, Dutch, and French surface and air assets to
multinational CD operations in the Caribbean has resulted in greater
operational efficiency and has lifted some of the burden from U.S.
forces in the region.
Exercise United CD 98 (UCD 98) is a prime example of how we are
supporting regional initiatives of the Summit of the America's. Fifteen
countries were represented at UCD 98, including Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela, and the United
States. UCD 98 brought together national CD teams that compiled
positive and negative lessons learned from air and maritime CD
operations. The exercise provided an opportunity to evaluate
operations, discuss information sharing, and increase CD cooperation
and coordination. In this regard, the Organization of American States
is now a full co-sponsoring partner for this year's exercise.
Interagency Involvement
In much the same way that we have sought better and more complete
coordination and cooperation with our European and Latin American
partners, we are pursuing a better integrated CD effort with the
Departments of State, Justice and Transportation. A Coast Guard Rear
Admiral commands the merged Joint Interagency Task Force in Key West,
which has 34 designated interagency billets in its new structure. We
have also instituted quarterly coordination meetings between CD
resource sponsors from State, Defense and the Office of National Drug
Control and Policy. In combination, these initiatives are generating a
better-managed and more fully coordinated CD effort.
Innovative Approaches
We have learned that the traffickers study and analyze our
operating patterns in much the same way we study and analyze theirs.
Therefore, we have developed innovative ways to maximize the use of our
limited resources.
One example of this is the series of ``pulse'' operations we have
conducted in the Caribbean. The first such operation, ``FRONTIER
SHIELD,'' successfully disrupted the heavy flow of drugs through Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Eastern Caribbean. Anticipating
that traffickers would shift their maritime routes westward through the
Central Caribbean, we conducted a follow-on operation, ``FRONTIER
LANCE,'' that targeted routes to and through Hispaniola. A third
operation, ``FRONTIER SABER,'' sequentially targeted transit routes
through the Bahamas and the Northern Caribbean.
We are now conducting follow on phases to these operations to stay
ahead of the drug traffickers in the Eastern and Central Caribbean.
Additionally, Operation ``COSTA ESMERALDA'' was recently completed
along the Western Caribbean movement vector and Operation ``CAPER
FOCUS,'' designed to disrupt and interdict drug traffic along the
Eastern Pacific movement vector, is underway today.
As a companion to these maritime efforts, we have initiated
Operations ``CENTRAL SKIES'' and ``WEEDEATER.'' These initiatives
involve surge operations by U.S. aviation assets in support of Central
American and Caribbean CD forces. These operations concentrate our
limited helicopter lift assets in specific areas where focused
intelligence tells us they will have the greatest effect.
In the Source Zone, we continue to provide Peru and Colombia with
night vision equipment and training, improvements and modifications to
their interceptors, as well as detection and monitoring support. Our
focus is to ensure they maintain the pressure on the long-haul
airbridge between Peru and Colombia. It appears that this route remains
essentially disrupted.
This has forced drug traffickers to shift their air routes over
Brazil and increase their reliance on the region's extensive river
systems. Anticipating this shift, we have embarked on an ambitious
five-year program to enhance the riverine interdiction capabilities of
Peru and Colombia. In 1998, the first year of the program, Peru opened
a joint riverine training center at Iquitos. Additionally, indigenous
riverine support craft have either been launched or are under
construction and a training and provisioning program is underway that
will ultimately result in the fielding of 12 operational Riverine
Interdiction Units in Peru. In Colombia, we have supported improvements
to their riverine infrastructure and the formation of seven additional
Riverine Combat Elements. We are optimistic that this type of support
will enable Peru and Colombia to exert greater control over their
inland waterways. We are considering extending the program to other
nations in the region.
SOUTHCOM is also assisting Colombia in its efforts to reform and
restructure its Armed Forces, transition the Colombian Army from its
defensive mindset, forge a better union with the National Police, and
improve its overall CD capabilities. Colombian leadership is in the
process of creating a Counterdrug Joint Intelligence Center and a
Colombian Army Counterdrug Battalion. This battalion is a highly mobile
unit, designed from the ground up to work with the Colombian National
Police, other Colombian Army units, or independently, taking the fight
to traffickers in the safe havens of Southeastern Colombia where the
majority of cocaine production takes place. SOUTHCOM is working closely
with the Colombian Armed Forces providing them guidance, advice, and
training, as they develop these new, important and very relevant
capabilities.
country and regional assessments
With the exception of Paraguay, which was granted a waiver based on
vital interests of the United States, all nations within the AOR have
passed the counternarcotics certification process.
Peru and Bolivia
For the second consecutive year, we have observed significant
reductions in coca cultivation, leaf production and base production in
both Peru and Bolivia. During 1998, cultivation dropped 26 percent in
Peru and 17 percent in Bolivia, while leaf and base production dropped
by roughly 25 percent in both countries. It is clear that Peru and
Bolivia are making steady and significant inroads into cocaine
production and we are assessing equipment and infrastructure
development options that will enable them to sustain or accelerate
these positive trends.
Colombia
Colombia is the producer of 75 percent of the world's cocaine HCl.
Lack of government control over nearly 40 percent of the countryside
has allowed cocaine cultivation in Colombia to increase by 28 percent
in the last year. Colombia's situation is especially complex because
the sophisticated international narco-criminal organizations cooperate
with a mature insurgency and an illegal paramilitary movement.
Colombian security forces confront a triangle of violence with
themselves on one point, two well entrenched insurgent groups on
another, and brutal paramilitary organizations on the third. Together,
these agents of instability and violence threaten not only the
democratic and economic security of Colombia, but provide a sanctuary
for a thriving narco-criminal element. Operating from safe havens in
eastern and southern Colombia, they are enlarging their domains into
Panama's Darien Province, as well as Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and
Peru.
We have long recognized that Colombia's problems are international
in their dimensions. The events of the past year have brought that
point home to all of the countries I have mentioned. We are
aggressively working with all of the affected nations to encourage
unity of effort against a threat they are individually incapable of
defeating.
Despite this dim picture, I believe Colombia is headed in the right
direction and I am cautiously optimistic. While the Government of
Colombia seeks a negotiated settlement with the insurgents, Colombia's
military leaders are purposefully pursuing reform and restructuring
initiatives that will make the security forces increasingly competitive
on the battlefield.
Venezuela
We have adopted a ``wait and see'' posture in the aftermath of Hugo
Chavez' landslide victory in Venezuela's December presidential
elections. We have been encouraged by President Chavez' declaration
that he desires closer and broader cooperation with the U.S. on CD
matters. It is notable that on several occasions since taking office,
President Chavez has pledged ``absolute and total'' commitment to the
regional CD effort. However, Venezuela has recently denied CD
overflight requests. My staff is conducting an assessment of the impact
of this stance by the Venezuelan Government. A U.S. delegation will
visit Venezuela soon to discuss CD cooperation. It is imperative that
we come to closure with Venezuela on CD cooperation, otherwise our
efforts throughout the region will suffer in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness.
Panama
As our forces withdraw in compliance with the treaties, I have
concerns about the ability of local security forces to deal with the
security challenges that confront Panama. The Panamanian Public Forces
(PPF) are neither organized nor equipped to deal with incursions by
Colombian insurgents into the Darien and San Blas Provinces. The
Maritime Service has already expressed reservations about their
capabilities to provide for canal security requirements and we have
detected recent indications of an upsurge in drug trafficking in and
around Panama.
It will be necessary to completely reassess our security
relationship with Panama as our forces depart. We have voiced strong
support for increased security assistance funding for Panama to enable
the maritime service to strengthen its capabilities, and we are
prepared to intensify our engagement with the PPF to assist them in
meeting other emerging security challenges.
Central America
Beyond Panama, the other nations of Central America have become a
vital link in hemispheric efforts to stem the flow of drugs. Fueled by
concerns over their emergence as transshipment points and increases in
internal drug use, over the past year we have seen the nations of
Central America take a more aggressive stance against narcotics
trafficking. Interagency estimates tell us that as much as 59 percent
of the cocaine destined for the U.S. travels along the Western
Caribbean/Eastern Pacific/Central American movement corridor. We have
increased our involvement and engagement with the nations of Central
America in the counterdrug struggle. Through Operation ``CENTRAL
SKIES'' we are providing tactical airlift support to host nation
security and law enforcement elements, enabling them to respond
instantly to intelligence cues. Some significant seizures have occurred
as a result of these operations. We have also forged maritime
agreements with several of these countries that have facilitated
interdiction efforts in their territorial waters. Increased cooperation
with Central American countries is slowly but steadily increasing the
risk to traffickers along a heavily used movement corridor.
Caribbean Basin
The Caribbean serves as the conduit for 30 percent of the cocaine
destined for the United States. Two primary conveyances are used. The
first is small aircraft that depart South America and fly to areas off
Puerto Rico, Haiti, Cuba, and the Bahamas where they conduct airdrops
to waiting high-speed boats that retrieve the drugs and bring them
ashore. These high-speed boats are the second common conveyance and are
referred to as ``go-fasts.'' These ``go-fasts'' conduct open-ocean
transits or skirt the Central American coast to crossing points on the
Yucatan Peninsula. As in Central America, many Caribbean nations have
aggressively taken up the fight against drug traffickers by
participating in operations, such as ``WEEDEATER.'' Even so, the
ability of DTOs to selectively exploit the limited security and law
enforcement capabilities available to Caribbean nations, and
particularly Haiti and the small island states of the Lesser Antilles,
creates a pressing need for U.S. support and close coordination of
regional responses to drug transshipment operations.
SOUTHCOM, in partnership with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Coast Guard, continues
to work to enhance regional interdiction capabilities by providing host
nations with training, infrastructure repair, modernization, and
support for maritime operations in support of host nation CD goals. The
Caribbean Support Tender, soon to be deployed with a multinational
crew, will provide Caribbean nations with a mobile training classroom
for their Navy and Coast Guard forces.
conclusion
My vision of the future for this region is succinctly stated in our
recently published Theater Strategy:
``A community of democratic, stable and prosperous nations
successfully countering illicit drug activities and other
transnational threats; served by professional, modernized,
interoperable security forces that embrace democratic
principles, respect human rights, are subordinate to civil
authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral
responses to challenges.''
Printed in Spanish and English, the document containing this
statement has been delivered to every military leader in our area of
responsibility. I consider this vision to be realistic, achievable and
affordable.
In SOUTHCOM we do not need armor divisions, carrier battle groups,
fighter wings or Marine Expeditionary Forces. We need modest numbers of
the right kinds of people, with the right skills, doing the right
things at the right times and places. This is an economy of force
theater and I have every intention of keeping it that way. However,
cheap does not mean free. Our modest requirements for forces and
resources must be met and the unique needs of this region must be
considered. I have mentioned several areas where levels of support have
receded unacceptably placing the mission at risk. These shortfalls must
be addressed and our forces must be positioned where they will do the
most good. I request your continued support of SOUTHCOM, especially our
efforts to create an efficient and effective theater architecture for
the next century.
Senator Coverdell. I appreciate it very much.
General Wilhelm. Thank you, sir.
Senator Coverdell. That was very informative. It does raise
a series of questions, General. If I might begin.
We are going to have to kind of work our way through this.
Going back to my opening statement, apart from the
architectural reconstruction that you have outlined here, would
you comment on the condition of or your view of Panama and its
situation without any presence at all and no standing military
in concert with the other forces that are now so obvious in the
area? Your general overview of that situation beyond security
for that immediate area, beyond the assets that it provided us
in terms of the logistics you described here.
Second, what your general observation is about the
President-elect's overture. What is your view that that means?
Let us start with those two, and then we will come back to
some of these technical issues that you have raised here.
General Wilhelm. Yes, sir. First, sir, regarding the future
security posture of Panama, I certainly believe that there can
be no mistake about it. The United States presence in Panama
was really an essential element in the nation's security
posture for a great many years and probably even more so in the
aftermath of Just Cause in 1989 when their military forces were
disassembled and were replaced by the Panamanian Public Forces.
At this moment, as we look at Panama, we do see some rather
significant challenges, and you mentioned one of them in your
opening comments. One of the first manifestations that we have
seen of Panama's inability to protect the sovereignty of its
borders has been the repeated incursions by FARC guerrillas
into the southern Darien Province. You mentioned some of the
conditions that have emerged in municipalities such as La Miel
where Panamanians have actually been displaced from their homes
by insurgents either seeking safe passage to other parts of
Colombia through Panama or are there for purposes of rest and
recuperation. So, I think that is certainly one source for
concern, and the Panamanian Public Forces in my judgment are
neither manned, trained, nor equipped to contend with the kind
of threat that the fronts of the FARC can present on their
southern border.
Another concern that has surfaced within Southern Command
is what we perceive to be the beginning of a more vigorous
thrust by narcotraffickers into Panama and into areas in and
around the canal. We conducted Operation Conjuntos, which did
enjoy some successes in terms of interdicting the flow of
narcotics, but by interdicting it, we confirmed the fact that
it is an active movement vector and that narcotics are moving
into Panama and in quantities that we had not seen in recent
times.
We have had a dialog with the Panamanian Maritime Service,
their Coast Guard equivalent, and that dialog has centered
primarily on the responsibilities that both nations have under
the second treaty, the treaty concerning the neutrality of the
Panama Canal, and specifically our shared obligation to ensure
right of free passage and the neutrality of the canal. It was
not my program, but if the information at my disposal is
correct, I think the Department of State attempted to get about
a half a million dollars in additional funding to help the
Maritime Service expand and improve their capabilities to
provide some of the maritime protection for the canal.
As you would appreciate, sir, we are very mindful, of
course, of our responsibilities under the neutrality treaty,
and we know that we have the obligation to intervene either
cooperatively with the Panamanians or unilaterally if the
condition dictates. So, we are conducting contingency planning
to that end.
We also have concerns about the transits of what we refer
to as our high value assets transiting the canal. Previously
this was a relatively simple mission because we had forces on
the ground to provide additional security for these high value
transits, and now we are having to come up with alternative
approaches, some of which involve cooperation with Panamanian
security forces.
We have maintained an active dialog with Ambassador Simon
Ferro in Panama.
We look forward, sir, to establishing a new relationship
with Mrs. Moscoso and her administration when she takes office
in September and the development of cooperative security
arrangements will be very high on our agenda.
Senator Coverdell. Well, I take it from what you are saying
that if there was a possibility yet of negotiating not the same
presence, because that is obviously impossible here to retrench
this architecture--it is so far implemented that it just stands
out from seeing this presentation that we would be going
backward if you tried to rebuild what had been there. But I do
take it that you think it would be valuable for there to be a
modern presence associated with the changes that have already
occurred in Panama if the Panamanian Government were to ever
agree to that.
General Wilhelm. Senator, I think you hit the nail squarely
on the head. Of course, when the negotiations were terminated
last June, we had to make alternative arrangements because of
the prosecution of counternarcotics and other operations must
be continuous. So, as you pointed out, yes, we have moved ahead
aggressively.
None of that, however, moves Panama or in any way alters
its geographic significance. Truly in every respect, it was the
optimum location to conduct counterdrug operations in the
transit zone and the source zone, eastern Pacific and
Caribbean. I would certainly say that if in the future it were
possible to conclude an FOL-like arrangement with Panama, it
might well be in the best interest of both countries.
Senator Coverdell. Potentially the third, the still
illusive third, FOL would be ideal if it could be established
in Panama.
General Wilhelm. That would certainly appear to me to be a
possibility, yes, sir.
Senator Coverdell. It would strike me that this 110 percent
figure would be even larger given where you are now if that
were one of the FOL's in the picture.
General Wilhelm. Yes, sir. I really hate to hang my hat too
heavily on that 110 percent figure.
Senator Coverdell. I understand.
General Wilhelm. As you would guess, that causes people to
say, oh, OK, so you got 10 percent excess capacity or excess
capability. So, we will just pare you back a little more.
I do need to put the caveat with that, that if we had every
asset that is currently obligated to us under the JCS execute
order under which we work, we could cover 15 percent of the
total area 15 percent of the time. So, that would be 110
percent of a fraction of the area. So, I do like to make that
point very clearly that we are not seeking an overmatch in
capability.
But I would have to do the geometry on that, sir. Part of
the expanding coverage we get using Costa Rica is that it is a
little bit further north, so it gives us some eastern Pacific
coverage that we probably would not have out of Panama, but I
am not sure that that would be statistically significant. I
would have to scribe the arcs again to come up with a correct
geographic computation of the coverage we would get.
Senator Coverdell. Is the assertion that there are very
significant costs in the build-out--you acknowledged certain
savings that are occurring in terms of a more productive force,
smaller force, but maintaining the mission. But the material we
are looking at suggests considerable sums of money are
necessary to make these FOL's, the three of them, give you the
capacity to achieve this reach that you are talking about here.
General Wilhelm. Yes, sir. There are an awful lot of
numbers that have floated in open source and in various
briefings about the cost of doing the necessary refurbishments
to the FOL sites to make them fully functional. I got a
briefing, sir--I believe it was Thursday or Friday of last
week--from Lt. Gen. Lansford Trapp who is my Air Force
component commander, and General Trapp had just finished doing
a pretty rigorous scrub of the requirements with his staff.
What they came up with was a military construction requirement
of about $122.5 million for all three FOL's.
Having said that, I regard that as being somewhat
overpriced because it contained facilities that I do not think
are necessary, bachelor officers' quarters and enlisted
quarters, where I believe we could make use of local hotels at
probably a substantial savings and avoid the recurring
maintenance costs.
So, the $122.5 million sounds like a lot of money, but as a
practical matter, sir, to operate Howard Air Force Base ran us
$75.8 million per year. This would be a one-time cost to create
the expeditionary facilities we would need to operate in
Curacao, Aruba, and Manta, those three locations. After that,
the annual recurring cost would be significantly less than the
$75.8 million that we spent in Panama. So, I think we need to
look at the economics on a pretty broad scope.
Senator Coverdell. Would you comment on the developments in
Colombia? I suppose I should ask you to do it specifically as
it relates to Panama, but I would like to hear your
observations just in general with regard to developments there
of late.
General Wilhelm. Senator, I would be pleased to do that.
I run the risk of being a real minority speaker here, but
Senator Coverdell, I am cautiously optimistic about Colombia. I
have personally been in and out of Colombia for about 20 years,
so I have had an opportunity to watch the problems grow. I
think I have probably a better than average acquaintance with
most of the key players on the military side.
The reason that I am cautiously optimistic about Colombia
is I think that with the inauguration of President Pastrana on
the 7th of August of last year and with the installation of the
new team that he put in charge of the nation's defense
structure, I think really a first-rate team assumed the reins.
They took a loss. No question about it. The leader of the team
was Minister of Defense Rodrigo Lloreda, and when Minister
Lloreda stepped down, I think that was a loss for Colombia. But
he left behind people like General Fernando Tapias who is the
commander of their armed forces, General Mora Rangel, the
commander of the army; Admiral Garcia, commander of the navy.
These are gentlemen who I have known for quite some time. It is
a solid leadership team. They know their business. They are
professionals. The country has, in fact, published a national
strategy to combat the many ills that plague them. The frequent
lament of the military in the past has been the armed forces
are at war, but Colombia is not. And, sir, there was more than
a little bit of truth to what the generals and admirals were
saying. So, I see competent leadership.
I see an aggressive and I think constructive approach to
future defense structure. Minister Lloreda was really the
leader of a movement to overhaul the way the armed forces were
organized. As I know the Congress is aware, for a great many
years there has been a privileged class of soldiers. Those who
lost out in the draft lottery but had a high school degree were
categorized as bachelaris, and by a function of law could not
participate in combat operations, and that was over 30,000
troops. You cannot run an army that way.
Minister Lloreda's plan, which has been adopted by General
Tapias and is being carried forward, would place 15,000
additional combat troops in the field this year, next year, and
the following year. So, that would be 45,000 more trigger
pullers off of overpasses in Bogota and out in the southeastern
part of the country where the real battles are to be fought.
As I know you are aware, sir, Southern Command is very
heavily engaged with the Colombian armed forces now in the
construction of a counterdrug battalion. I was down there about
3 weeks ago and visited the troops in training at Tolemida.
Sir, if you would like, I will get into that in more detail. I
will not now in the interest of leaving the floor open for
other questions.
So, for all of these reasons, I think I see a tighter
national team forming. I see a country that is beginning to
realize that it has problems instead of just a national police
force led by an outstanding man like Jose Serrano, and I see
better team work between the Colombian National Police on one
hand and the armed forces of Colombia on the other.
This team work I think has been demonstrated fairly
recently, though it did not make front page news in the Miami
Herald or any other newspapers in the United States. In a kind
of quiet but effective way, the armed forces of Colombia boxed
the ears of the FARC on at least three occasions: once in
Arauca, once in Uraba, and once I believe it was in Cordoba,
three provinces where they inflicted what I would call mid-
level tactical defeats on the FARC. And this is on the tail of
those 10 very widely publicized major tactical reverses that
the armed forces and police suffered at the hands of the FARC
beginning at Las Delicias and extending all the way up to Mitu.
So, sir, that is some of the rationale for the cautious
optimism that I feel at this time.
Senator Coverdell. Well, that is most encouraging, the
first encouraging news that I have heard in recent months. I
hope your optimism is borne out. Obviously, moving 45,000 new
and, according to you, highly trained people into the field is
going to change the balance, that is a significant force.
General Wilhelm. Yes, sir.
Senator Coverdell. General, the extension of Colombian
narcotrafficking agents has been talked about recently here as
it relates to Cuba. I was curious as to any observation you
might have about any changes or acceleration of activity that
intertwines itself with Cuba.
General Wilhelm. Yes, sir. I think probably the one event
that probably spiked interest in this I think it was about a 7
metric ton seizure, if I remember correctly, that occurred off
the north coast of Colombia, and I think it was determined to
be en route to Cuba, which caused some speculation about where
it might go from that point forward.
Senator, as I know you are very much aware, Cuba has
bilateral conterdrug agreements with 18 nations, obviously not
the United States. I know of no move afoot on our part to
establish such relationships.
I really am not aware--and I talk with the Colombians very
frequently about this--of any aggressive desires on their part
to expand beyond the existing relationships they have with
Cuba, which to the best of my knowledge are primarily
information sharing. I do not know of any tactical cooperation
or any ability for their forces to tactically cooperate. And in
fact, Colombia does not really have the operational reach to
get to Cuba, and Cuba does not have the operational reach to
get to Colombia. So, I am personally unaware of any designs
that might exist in Bogota to expand that relationship.
Senator Coverdell. General, if you were about to conclude a
career and contemplate doing other things, as you were to leave
this post, what would your general sense be as you walked away,
your reflections about the level of concern because of your
unique oversight and knowledge of how we are doing in general
in this region, for which you have had charge? Do you feel
better? Are you optimistic as the point you made about
Colombia? Do you harbor concerns about the direction? What
would be your general demeanor when you had a cup of coffee
with one of your former colleagues and you were thinking about
the future of the United States, this hemisphere of
democracies, a new millennium? What would be the tone of that
meeting?
General Wilhelm. Senator, that is a great question that
could lead to a very long answer.
Senator Coverdell. Take your time.
General Wilhelm. I will try to be as concise as I can
possibly be.
First, when I assumed command of Southern Command on the
26th of September 1997, I have always felt that I sort of
assumed command of a success story, a team that was in first
place in an international sense. I say that because I looked at
the region and then I thought about the region in the context
of the national security strategy and its two principal tenets
of engagement and enlargement. Yes, we were engaged, but more
important was the whole subject of enlargement. There I stared
at a region consisting of 32 countries, which is what my
operating domain consists of, and 31 of them had functioning
democracies with free market economies. It certainly was not
that way 20 years ago when most of Central America was
embroiled in civil wars. There were either military strongmen
or outright Communist dictators who held sway in most of the
nations, and the majority of the people went to bed at night
serving under the rule of someone other than a leader that they
had popularly elected. So, that really is I think kind of an
inspiring success story in a lot of ways: 31 out of 32
countries.
And I have made the observation to others because life is a
competitive business and I compete with the other four CINC's
for every resource that I get, but I said, you know, if you
want to look around the world and study your globe for a minute
and then nominate to me a region where we can say our national
security strategy has really worked, I defy you to beat my
region. I think it is a success story.
Sir, I have been doing this for 36 years now and I have
come to reach the conclusion that sometimes we do not handle
success as well as perhaps we ought to. I would like to see us
do a bit more in the region, sir. Having said that, I recognize
that there are an awful lot of claimants for very few
resources. We have certainly seen that in spades in the
Balkans. That was a humanitarian outrage that absolutely
demanded our attention, but every time you respond to one of
those humanitarian outrages, there are other bill payers. And
again, our region was a bill payer for that.
The principal point that I try to make, sir, is that we
really need to look at Latin America and the Caribbean in a
very pragmatic way and we need to ask ourselves where our
future is. And I just cite a few facts.
Very interesting to me that Chile, a country of 14.5
million people, 14.5 million folks, we do more business with
them every year than we do with India which has 952 million.
Brazil, big country, biggest one we have got, 164 million.
We do more business with Brazil every year than we do with
China which has 1.3 billion.
And the beat goes on and on and on. There are many
examples. I point out that there are 411 million people living
in my area of responsibility, and they all have a requirement
for imported goods and services. They do an awful lot of trade
among themselves, but even when they have completed all of
that, 44 cents out of every dollar that they spend on imported
goods and services are imported goods and services from the
United States of America.
Then we look at, to me very, very important, demographic
trends. Where is the world and the region going? Right now we
are the fifth largest Spanish speaking country in the world,
the United States. By about 2005, we will be the third largest
Spanish speaking country in the world. And since we did the
measurement in 1997, we used 2047 as the benchmark year when
there will be 100,000,000 people of Hispanic descent in the
United States.
My observation is what we have previously referred to as an
American culture will really become a culture of the Americas.
When you see events like the free trade area of the Americas,
which is I hope heading toward a successful implementation in
the year 2005, and when we think about the projections made by
economists that by the year 2010, we will do more business with
our neighbors to the South than we will with all of Europe and
Japan combined, it really points the way I think toward a
future in which the Caribbean and Latin America play a very,
very important part for our country.
So, for all of those reasons, I advocate and argue, just as
strongly as I possibly can, for sufficient resources to do the
job that needs to be done in Latin America to sustain these
democracies because many of them are fragile. We know that.
They are youthful. They have got a lot of rough roads to go
down. There are many, many economic problems that confront the
region. The near total absence of a middle class in a lot of
the countries troubles me greatly, though it is not primarily a
military matter.
So, sir, I guess you are preparing me for September of the
year 2000 when I do have to take this suit off, and I have no
earthly idea what I am going to do with myself. But I think
those are a few of the things that might be going through my
mind.
Senator Coverdell. Well, General, I appreciate the
observations very much. I think that I take some comfort. They
are reinforcing when you take the data that you were referring
to, the interaction between this region and the United States.
I only think it underscores what a high priority that ought to
suggest to us. I have always felt that we have tended to take
too much of its value for granted.
I think that coming into this new century, for all of us,
us and our neighbors, all these countries you allude to, we
probably all ought to take note of, so to speak, a doctrine of
democracy, a criteria of standing democracy, so that our focus
is quickly drawn to any incident or circumstance that
destabilizes that doctrine and that we not let things slide in
such a way that there is a retrenchment which is possible. You
mentioned the fragility of these governments. When you look at
the power of the narcotic base, it is enough to make you
nervous, or me anyway, particularly when it confronts a small
or new and fragile government with all the resources they have
to destabilize it.
So, I am hopeful that over the next short period of time
that we might be able to, with the good work of people such as
yourself and your team and others, bring more focus, resource
to making sure that we have done everything we know to do to
secure these democracies and make them be the overriding
component of the next century versus what we have been dealing
with in the past.
I have heard so many facts about the interaction between
our countries here, but you have shared yet some new ones. I
need to get those from you. They are very, very moving.
General, I am going to keep the record open for 5 days for
other Senators so they may pose several particular questions.
We may yet pose several others over the next day or 2 to you,
both on and off the record. So, you might be prepared over the
next several days to have a few more questions that might come
from other members who could not attend here today.
I want to thank you for your willingness, as I said at the
outset, to be here. And I always want to take the opportunity
to thank somebody that has devoted their entire life to the
welfare of our country. You represent so many of your
colleagues. So, if you would first accept the thank you from a
citizen and extend it on to the others who work with you as
well, I would be most appreciative.
General Wilhelm. Senator Coverdell, that is very kind of
you, and I will certainly pass your words along personally to
my people and I have lots of ways to do that. It is much
appreciated, sir.
Senator Coverdell. Well, thank you for your service and
duty. Thank you.
We are going to move, after the general has gotten his
material here, to expedite the hearing of the nomination of
Gwen Clare to be U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Ecuador.
Thank you, General.
General Wilhelm. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Additional Questions Submitted Subsequent to the Hearing
______
Responses of Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm to Additional Questions Submitted
by Senator Jesse Helms
panama
#1. Senator Helms. How important have the U.S. military facilities
in Panama been to the overall effort to combat drug trafficking in the
region? Has the Department of Defense done any cost comparisons of
utilizing military facilities other than those in Panama to perform the
same functions? Please explain their conclusions.
General Wilhelm. U.S. military facilities in Panama have been
essential to supporting our overall counterdrug efforts. In addition to
providing basing for over 2,000 counterdrug sorties per year, Panama
also supported source and transit zone interdiction operations,
pierside boardings and searches, and hosted training facilities for
U.S. and host nation counterdrug units. Since 1995, missions flown from
Panama supported host nation counterdrug operations resulting in the
shootdown, forcedown, and/or destruction of 123 narcotrafficking
aircraft.
We studied several alternatives for replacing our Panamanian
airfield facilities with emphasis on sustaining our level of
counterdrug effort at a reasonable cost. We considered existing U.S.
military bases, specifically MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; Naval
Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; and Naval Station Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. These alternatives were inadequate because they reduced total
Detection and Monitoring (D&M) coverage to fifty percent of that
previously provided from Howard Air Force Base.
To maintain an operational counternarcotics reach into the Source
and Transit Zones, we require a network of Forward Operating Locations
(FOLs), covering three areas: the Caribbean, South America, and Central
America. This geographic coverage allows U.S. Southern Command to
continue supporting the National Drug Control Strategy effectively but
at a reduced cost. The cost of enhancing and operating three FOLs for
10 years is 40 percent of the cost required to operate Howard Air Force
Base for the same period.
FOLs provide an effective and efficient alternative to maintain our
presence in the region for counterdrug operations.
#2. Senator Helms. Is there any doubt in your mind that you could
carry out your anti-drug mission better and easier if we were able to
keep U.S. troops in Panama?
General Wilhelm. Keeping U.S. troops in Panama is not critical to
the success of our counterdrug mission. Panamanian facilities and its
geographic advantage provided an optimum location to support aircraft
conducting counterdrug missions in Central America, South America, the
Eastern Pacific, and the Caribbean. To compensate for the loss of
Panamanian facilities, we developed and implemented an option to
replicate our counterdrug Detection and Monitoring (D&M) efforts, at a
reduced cost.
Using a network of Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in three
regions--the Caribbean, South America, and Central America--we can
sustain counterdrug D&M coverage, without the troop presence, base
infrastructure, and costs associated with Howard Air Force Base. We are
currently conducting counterdrug operations from a Caribbean FOL
(Aruba/Curacao) and a South American FOL (Manta, Ecuador). Improvements
to runways, taxiways, ramps and other support facilities are needed in
order for these sites to meet fully our operational and safety
requirements. When these improvements have been made, our D&M coverage
will be approximately eighty percent of that previously provided from
Howard Air Force Base. Once we begin operations from a Central American
FOL, our overall D&M coverage will increase to approximately 110
percent of that provided from Panama.
#3. Senator Helms. After we turn over the Panama Canal, this
country retains a treaty obligation to help preserve the neutrality and
stable operation of the canal. Is there any doubt in your mind that you
could do that job better and easier if we were able to keep U.S. troops
in Panama?
General Wilhelm. Southern Command can fully support its treaty
obligations with the new theater architecture, continued engagement,
exercises, and contingency plans. For future negotiations, I would
support a Forward Operations site in Panama, with a reduced presence,
to maintain operational flexibility and reach within the theater.
#4. Senator Helms. What is your assessment of Panama's planning for
reverted military facilities? Since the return to democratic rule in
1989, what has been Panama's record in utilizing land, buildings, and
other facilities that have been transferred back to Panamanian control?
General Wilhelm. The Secretary of Defense approved SOUTHCOM's
Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan on 3 February 1992. At this
point we have returned approximately 90 percent of lands and 65 percent
of facilities to the Government of Panama. I defer comments on Panama's
reutilization of reverted facilities to the United States Ambassador to
Panama.
#5. Senator Helms. When we speak of keeping U.S. troops in Panama,
many think of a U.S.-run ``base.'' But could you explain how we might
fashion an access agreement that allows us to deploy troops there using
facilities jointly operated with the Panamanians?
General Wilhelm. We have already executed a majority of the actions
necessary for all U.S. forces to leave Panama prior to noon on 31
December 1999. Southern Command headquarters is established in Miami;
Howard Air Force Base has ceased air operations; our two Joint
Interagency Task Forces have merged in Key West; the Special Operations
Command South has relocated to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto
Rico; and U.S. Army South stood up operations at Fort Buchanan, Puerto
Rico on 31 July 1999. All transition actions are in motion, and in my
opinion, irreversible.
We are currently completing the final critical step of resetting
the theater architecture--the establishment of Forward Operating
Locations (FOLs) in Manta, Ecuador; Aruba and Curacao; and a yet-to-be
determined Central American location in support of Department of
Defense and Interagency counterdrug air operations.
A similar access agreement for Panama might be a subject for
discussion if raised by the new Panamanian government after it assumes
office in September.
forward operating locations (fols)
#6. Senator Helms. You have seen the estimated costs of operating
the ``forward operating locations'' in Peru, Aruba, and Ecuador. Is it
cost-effective to build second-rate facilities elsewhere when the U.S.
taxpayer has already paid for first-rate facilities in Panama?
General Wilhelm. We are resetting the theater architecture to
accomplish our theater engagement and counterdrug missions. The new
architecture includes the capability to maintain Detection and
Monitoring (D&M) coverage from FOLs in three regions: the Caribbean,
South America, and Central America.
A network of FOLs allows us to sustain our counterdrug D&M
footprint effectively and efficiently. By investing in moderate
improvements to host nation airfields and operating facilities, we will
mitigate risks and create a safe operating environment for our deployed
forces.
To accomplish our missions, and meet requisite safety and
operational standards, the military construction requirement at our two
operational FOLs will be $122.47 million. After adding this investment
to an estimated ten-year FOL operating cost, the total FOL option will
require only 40 percent of the funds needed to operate Howard Air Force
Base for the same period with deployed forces. From an operational and
safety standpoint, these will not be second-rate facilities.
#7. Senator Helms. We understand that you have described the
``forward operating locations'' (FOLs) as ``expeditionary''
facilities--meaning that the U.S. deployments will be small and brief
(and perhaps) not even military. In light of our long-term struggle
against drugs and our permanent security obligations in this
Hemisphere, could these FOLs ever fill the void of losing access to
Panama?
General Wilhelm. FOLs in Curacao/Aruba; Manta, Ecuador, and a
future Central American (CENTAM) location will meet and, in most cases,
exceed the capabilities provided from Panama. Manta provides better
deep source zone (SZ) and Eastern Pacific transit zone (TZ) coverage.
Curacao/Aruba provides for both SZ and TZ coverage. A CENTAM location
will provide TZ coverage in both the Eastern Pacific and Western
Caribbean. FOLs will provide more geographic coverage, longer station
times in key areas, and greater flexibility in positioning assets.
When compared with area coverage provided by Howard Air Force Base,
one FOL (Manta or Curacao/Aruba) provides approximately 65 percent area
coverage; two FOLs (Manta & Curacao/Aruba) provide approximately 80
percent area coverage; and three FOLs (Manta, Curacao/Aruba, and
CENTAM) will provide approximately 110 percent area coverage.
tending to threats and engagement in the americas without forward
deployment
#8. Senator Helms. One of your jobs is to tend to the security
threats in the Western Hemisphere. Is there any doubt in your mind that
you could do your job better by keeping troops in Panama (particularly
because after we withdraw from Panama, the only sizable deployment
under your command outside the continental United States will be in
Puerto Rico)?
General Wilhelm. The closure of Howard Air Force Base and Rodman
Naval Station coupled with the relocation and reduction of Southern
Command component forces has challenged our ability to react quickly to
events in the southern and western reaches of our Area of
Responsibility (AOR). Southern Command's restructured theater
architecture will allow us to continue to conduct regional engagement
and support to counterdrug operations from bases in Puerto Rico, the
Continental United States, and forward operating locations in the AOR.
Southern Command has been evaluating and revising theater
contingency and functional plans to accommodate the loss of U.S. basing
in Panama, and adjusting to the downsizing and relocation of our
components to Puerto Rico and the Continental United States.
colombia
#9. Senator Helms. Critics of our ``war on drugs'' have criticized
policies that they say, ``militarize'' our anti-drug efforts. In
Colombia, we have seen what happens when the other side, the
narcotraffickers, militarize their operations by allying with the
guerrillas. Under that circumstance, is there any substitute for the
military playing a key role in confronting the narco-guerrilla threat?
General Wilhelm. Under current conditions, I see no viable
substitute for Colombian military involvement in countering the
intertwined narcotics trafficking and insurgent threats in Colombia.
Even though the Colombian National Police (CNP) charter requires them
to take the lead in addressing the counterdrug effort, current
circumstances justify aggressive engagement and support by Colombian
armed forces in counterdrug operations. The Colombian military plays a
key role by providing security during CNP counterdrug operations.
Recognizing a need for specially trained and equipped forces, the
Colombian government has recently demonstrated its commitment to
improve military support to counterdrug operations. The development and
fielding of a dedicated Army counter-narcotics battalion reflects this
commitment. This highly mobile organization, designed from the ground
up to work with the CNP, is focused on supporting CNP counterdrug law
enforcement activities in remote areas. The airlift and security
provided by the military allows the CNP to ``get to the fight,'' in the
jungles, in the insurgent-controlled safe-havens, where the majority of
cocaine production takes place.
This is a big step. I am encouraged by Colombia's commitment to
provide their National Police with the mobility and firepower needed to
minimize operational risks and maximize opportunities for success
during counterdrug law enforcement operations. The CNP and military,
when used together, offer Colombia the best option for countering their
growing narcoguerrilla threat. The U.S. can bolster this joint team by
providing increased support to the Colombian Armed Forces while
maintaining its current level of support to the Colombian National
Police.
#10. Senator Helms. Please describe the U.S. military support being
provided to the Colombian armies ``counter narcotics battalion.'' How
much does this operation cost? What kind of equipment is being donated?
What additional forms of support are being considered for this
battalion?
General Wilhelm. U.S. military training and material support is
being provided for the Colombian Army Counterdrug Battalion. Battalion
Training is being conducted in phases by Special Operations Forces from
the 7th Special Forces Group. Phase One training, April through June
1999, included basic instruction for the battalion staff, one line
company, the reconnaissance platoon, the medical platoon, and the
mortar platoon. Phase Two training, July through September 1999, will
include the remaining two line companies and the rest of the battalion
combat support and combat service support personnel. Finally, Phase
Three training is scheduled for October through December 1999 and will
include company and battalion level collective training. All branches
of the Colombian military and national police will participate in field
exercises during Phase Three. The total cost of training is
approximately $3.9 million.
Material support provided to the battalion comes from two sources.
The Office of the Department of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and
Support (DEP&S) funds material support of $3.5 million. Equipment
provided includes uniform items, field gear, medical equipment, and
communications equipment. Section 506 Drawdown equipment for Fiscal
Year 1998 will be directed by the Colombian Military Group Commander as
supplement for the battalion.
Additional uniform items, field gear, communications equipment,
Meals Ready-to-Eat (MREs), and ten 5-Ton trucks were among the items
requested. Drawdown material requests total $1.2 million.
In all, the training and material support is approximately $8.6
million. This allows an independent, skilled, self-sufficient, and
technologically smart counterdrug battalion to enter the jungles of
Colombia and, with intelligence support from the Joint Intelligence
Center, wage a winning counternarcotics war against narcotraffickers in
Colombia.
#11. Senator Helms. You know the Colombian army and its leadership
better than anyone else in our government. What steps have they taken
to become more effective and to improve their human rights record?
General Wilhelm. I dedicate a great deal of my time as Commander in
Chief to dealing with issues concerning Colombia. Human rights is at
the top of the list. Imbedding the ethic of human rights in our
counterpart security forces is and will remain a key element of our
strategy in Latin America. I emphasized this commitment to the previous
Minister of Defense Lloreda, the current Armed Forces Commander,
General Tapias, and the Commander of the Army, General Mora, and I see
encouraging improvements in the attitudes and actions of Colombian
Armed Forces with respect to human rights under the leadership of these
officers. Allow me to discuss areas where I consider the Colombians to
have made substantial progress.
Overall human rights performance: Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
regularly monitors statistics on human rights violations in Colombia.
The Department of State (DoS) provides this data. In their 1998 annual
human rights report, DoS reported the Colombian security forces were
responsible for three percent of the extrajudicial killings where the
perpetrator could be credibly identified. While no number is acceptable
here except zero, this does represent substantial progress.
Military officers prosecuted for human rights violations: Past
attitudes on the impunity of high level officers are changing for the
better. In the last three months, three general officers have been
suspended from duty on suspicion of involvement in human rights
violations. One of them was subsequently arrested, which I believe
sends a strong signal to the rest of the armed forces that the impunity
which military officers have traditionally enjoyed has ended.
Commitment to Human Rights Training: General Tapias and General
Mora continue to work with SOUTHCOM to expand the Colombian military's
human rights training program. SOUTHCOM developed a human rights/law of
war handbook jointly with the Colombians and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This important handbook incorporates
international human rights and international humanitarian law standards
and will simply and effectively convey the basic code of conduct and
international human rights standards to Colombian military personnel of
all services.
Severing ties with irregular armed groups ``paramilitaries:''
Colombian military leaders have ceased collaboration with the
paramilitaries and are now pursuing them as enemies of the state.
General Tapias reported the Colombian Armed Forces apprehended over 400
paramilitary members in 1998. The military makes it clear that
paramilitaries are not their partners.
Military justice reform: SOUTHCOM is working with the Colombian
military to establish a Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps in the
Colombian Armed Forces. This JAG Corps will guide essential
institutional reforms and ensure human rights violators in the Armed
Forces are investigated and prosecuted when allegations are
substantiated. We are in the early stages of developing this program.
Other actions in progress: Other developments which represent
measurable progress towards improving Armed Forces support of human
rights in Colombia include disbanding the 20th Intel Brigade,
cooperation on the End-Use Monitoring Agreement, willingness of the
Armed Forces to comply with the Leahy legislation certification
requirements, participation in hemispheric human rights conferences,
and military subordination to the civilian control by the Pastrana
administration. This subordination includes providing support to the
peace process. While challenges remain, Colombian military support of
human rights programs is on the right track, and their leadership is
committed to making the fundamental changes required.
#12. Senator Helms. If the guerrillas can count on endless
financing from the drug traffickers and the army is incapable of
defeating them as, a military force, what incentive is there for the
guerrillas to reach a peaceful settlement?
General Wilhelm. As I see it, for as along as the insurgents and
paramilitaries have access to financing provided by drug traffickers,
and security forces remain non-competitive on the battlefield, there
will be little if any incentive for the insurgents to engage in
meaningful negotiations leading to settlement of Colombia's four decade
of internal conflict.
In my judgement the success of President Pastrana's peace process
is inextricably linked to the battlefield performance of Colombia's
security forces. I am firmly convinced that it is within the
capabilities of the security forces to meet this challenge. The much
improved performance of the armed forces and national police during
July's countrywide insurgent offensive and reform initiatives currently
underway within the armed forces provide reason for cautious optimism.
This question is closely linked to question #14. For specifics
concerning the points raised above, please see my answer to that query.
#13. Senator Helms. What if President Pastrana's peace initiative
fails and he is forced to ask the United States for increased military
support, including money and equipment for his Army? Are we prepared to
tell him ``no,'' even if doing so means the war in Colombia will spiral
out of the control?
General Wilhelm. President Pastrana's peace initiatives support a
larger plan to end the ills and violence that plague Colombia. Should
the peace process not achieve the Government's objectives, I do not
foresee the situation in Colombia spiraling out of control.
The Colombian Government's establishment of a demilitarized zone
and demonstrated commitment to upcoming peace talks has not mitigated
the internal bloodshed. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have become increasingly
aggressive in recent months, conducting highly publicized kidnappings
and initiating clashes with Colombian security forces. There have been
over 50 such incidents during the last 90 days, highlighted by the
Avianca airliner hijacking and the abduction of churchgoers in Cali.
The situation in Colombia is threatening long-term regional
stability, peace, and economic prosperity. Additional U.S. government
support to Colombia in the form of increased detection and monitoring,
information sharing, equipment and training must remain an option.
Raising the level of support for the Colombian military equal to that
of the Colombian National Police will help strengthen the Colombian
Government's position at the negotiating table and improve their
ability to achieve success in the peace process and reverse current
trends.
#14. Senator Helms. What sort of impact does the Colombian conflict
have on neighboring countries. We understand that Peru and Venezuela
have been concerned enough to deploy additional troops on their borders
with Colombia and that Panama is practically defenseless against
Colombian guerrillas operating in its territory. What can we do to
address this threat to regional security?
General Wilhelm. Your question cuts to the heart of an issue that I
have pursued continuously since coming to Southern Command. The
problems that confront Colombia cannot be viewed in isolation. In one
way or another and to varying degrees or extents, the problems that
plague Colombia plague each of its five neighbors. Panama, Venezuela,
Peru, Ecuador and Brazil have all been affected by the Colombian
crisis, and I believe those affects are increasing in their severity.
As you mention, both Peru and Venezuela have deployed forces along
their borders with Colombia to prevent or limit intrusions by
insurgents, narcotraffickers and paramilitaries. In the case of
Venezuela, I have personally visited the majority of their outposts. On
any given day, Venezuela has approximately 10,000 troops along the
Colombian frontier. The cessation of hostilities between Peru and
Ecuador and implementation of the peace accords has freed troops from
both nations for commitment on their borders with Colombia. Thus far,
Peru has initiated the strongest response. The continuing economic
crisis in Ecuador has limited President Mahuad's options; however, the
border is a source of deep concern to the Ecuadorian military. Brazil
long asserted that it was exempt from the drug problem. Incursions by
insurgents and narcotraffickers into the coveted Amazon region have
caused Brasilia to rethink its position. Brazil has reinforced its
northwestern garrisons and during the past year has initiated focused
military operations to protect its sovereignty. Panama's position is a
difficult one. The disbanding of its military forces following
Operation Just Cause has left the country with only police forces. The
Panamanian Public Forces are neither manned, trained, nor equipped to
deal with the FARC formations that have made repeated incursions into
the southern Darien province.
We have emphasized to all of the militaries in the region that this
is a regional threat that can only be effectively countered by a
regional response. We have encouraged cooperation at the tactical level
among the forces positioned along the borders. We have enjoined the
armed forces to vigorously pursue information and intelligence sharing
initiatives, and we have provided assistance within our capabilities to
develop pathways for these exchanges. Counterdrug operations provide
additional opportunities for regional cooperation. The host nation
rider program is but one of many examples. Through our exercise program
we provide forums where military and civilians leaders can come
together to explore ways and means to combat these share threats.
When all is said and done, the decisive battle must be waged and
won within Colombia. Based on our experiences elsewhere in Latin
America, I am convinced that the solutions to Colombia's problems,
which are now the problems of the region, lie in depriving the FARC and
ELN of the revenues they receive from narcotraffickers and in achieving
and negotiated settlement to the four decades old insurgency. To
achieve these goals the armed forces must improve their battlefield
performance. The string of tactical defeats suffered by the security
forces at the hands of the FARC over the past two years have created a
situation whereby the FARC have little incentive to engage in
meaningful or substantive negotiations. To improve their combat
capabilities, the Colombian armed forces need help that only the United
States can or will provide. During the Samper administration we
continued to provide assistance to the Colombian National Police, but
provided little in the way of meaningful assistance to the armed
forces. As a consequence Colombian national capabilities are out of
balance. In my judgement, we must increase our support for the armed
forces while sustaining our assistance to the Colombian National
Police. Though a reputable and well-led force, the national police are
overmatched by the heavily armed and increasingly aggressive mobile
columns of the FARC.
I am encouraged by the performance of the armed forces during the
FARC's countrywide July offensive. In most engagements government
forces gave better than they got and we saw new and encouraging levels
of cooperation and coordination among the various services and between
the armed forces and the police. This may be a harbinger of better
things to come. The newly created Counter Drug Battalion is coming
together smoothly and we are on schedule to activate the Colombian
Joint Intelligence Center in mid-December at Tres Esquinas. I predict
that these will be high performance units that will give an excellent
account of themselves in the field and set new standards for the armed
forces. To reiterate, our continued support will be essential for the
success of these initiatives and for the long-term success of Colombia.
#15. Senator Helms. Have you consulted with regional defense
leaders about this problem? (Refer to question #14)
General Wilhelm. Yes, the situation in Colombia has been a topic of
frequent discussion with civilian and military leaders in the bordering
countries of Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil and Panama. All are
concerned about the violence in Colombia and its potential spread
across the borders. Concern is not limited to the Andean nations. I
have had recent discussions with officials from Chile, Argentina and
all of the nations of Central America about the pervasive impacts of
narcotrafficking and the ills it breeds.
#16. Senator Helms. One of the reasons that our policy has avoided
military help for Colombia is because of human rights concerns. Do you
think increased U.S. material support and training for the Colombian
military will help or hurt the human rights situation in Colombia?
General Wilhelm. Unquestionably, increased U.S. material support
and training for the Colombian military will help the human rights
situation in Colombia. First I'll address the training issue. All
training provided by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), including every
course, seminar, exchange, or exercise, contains a human rights
component. The Colombians already have a vigorous human rights training
program in place. We aggressively supplement that program with our own
additional training. SOUTHCOM's training serves both to reinforce the
importance we place on human rights and to bring an international
perspective to bear on the human rights efforts of the Colombian Armed
Forces. As a matter of public law, we allow only those members of the
Armed Forces who demonstrate respect for human rights and compliance
with international rights standards to receive the benefit of U.S.
military training.
Insofar as material assistance is concerned, the Leahy legislation
requires full compliance with human rights as a prerequisite for
providing material assistance. Units with a history of human rights
abuses cannot receive U.S. material assistance. These restrictions,
which we rigidly enforce, provide the Colombian Armed Forces powerful
incentives to prevent human rights violations.
venezuela
#17. Senator Helms. What are the practical implications of the
Venezuelan government's refusal to allow anti-drug flights over its
territory?
General Wilhelm. The Venezuelan Government's recent denial of
overflight rights for United States aircraft conducting
counternarcotics missions has two significant practical or operational
implications. First, denial of overflight impedes our ability to
maintain contact with suspect aircraft for ultimate handoff to host
nation forces and prosecution of end games. The countries most
significantly effected are Venezuela and Colombia. Second, denial of
Venezuelan overflight adds one to one and one-half hours transit time
for detection, monitoring and tracking aircraft proceeding from Forward
Operating Locations (FOLs) in Curacao and Aruba on missions over the
heart of the source zone in Colombia and Peru. Increased transit time
ultimately results in reduced on-station time.
This situation has reinforced the need to attain full operational
capability and capacity at the FOL in Manta, Ecuador. Given the ability
to operate the full complement of detection, monitoring and tracking
assets from Manta, we would have an immediate workaround to Venezuelan
overflight restrictions. For this and other reasons it is essential
that FOL enhancements be fully funded.
united states school of the americas (usarsa)
#18. Senator Helms. What is your response to those who say the
School promotes human rights violations and that it should be shut
down? Please provide your best argument for keeping the School.
General Wilhelm. Senator Helms, I appreciate this question and the
opportunity that it gives me to speak out again in support of the
United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA) and the unique and
singularly valuable role it is playing in support of the United States
Southern Command mission. In my professional view there is every reason
in the world to keep the doors of this institution open and there are
none at all for closing them. USARSA must be judged on its current
merits, not on isolated past deficiencies. As it stands today, USARSA
conforms strictly to all United States Army training standards, it
vigorously and effectively supports our nation's strategic goals and
objectives in this hemisphere, and it has the most expansive and
effective human rights training program of any Department of Defense
training institution.
As Commander in Chief of the United States Southern Command, I am
one of the primary benefactors of the School and the great work that it
does. My position on USARSA has been clear, consistent and unambiguous.
This School plays a key and essential role in our regional engagement
and counterdrug programs. It serves as an engine for positive change
within the militaries of the region. Graduates of USARSA leave Fort
Benning with a greatly increased appreciation for the proper role of
armed forces in a democratic society; with a clear understanding of the
reasons why militaries must be subordinate to civilian leadership, and
with greatly heightened awareness of the imperative requirement for
respect for human rights and absolute compliance with the tenets of
International Humanitarian Law.
I regard professional military education as a long-term investment
in healthy relationships with our neighbors to the south. Since its
inception more than 50 years ago, the School has trained nearly 60,000
officers, cadets, noncommissioned officers and civilians from North and
South America. The School has been a place where lifelong friendships
and professional relationships are forged. USARSA critics make much of
the handful of graduates who have violated the lessons that were taught
to them at the School. No mention is made of the legions of diligent,
honorable, principled and highly professional officers who have
returned to their countries and played leading roles in enterprises
such as the forging of the peace accords between Peru and Ecuador and
the recovery of devastated communities from the ravages of Hurricane
Mitch. Ignored are the constructive, disciplined, apolitical approaches
taken by USARSA graduates when confronted with challenges to democracy
and the rule of law as have recently been the cases in Paraguay and
Ecuador.
Because of USARSA's critical importance to United States Southern
Command and to United States interests in this hemisphere I will make
again a statement I have made before . . . if we were to lose USARSA
today, I would have no option other than to recreate it tomorrow at
considerable expense and with an unacceptable loss in the continuity of
one of the centerpieces of our regional engagement strategy.
military's commitment to counter-drug operations
#19. Senator Helms. Many informed observers believe that the U.S.
military has been and remains wary of getting involved in counter-drug
operations. What is your opinion of the level of commitment within the
military to this mission? What should be done to increase the level of
support for this mission?
General Wilhelm. As reflected by our Global Military Forces Policy
(GMFP) counterdrug missions are accorded a lower priority than missions
that support major theater wars, contingency operations, training, and
exercises. Therefore, when we are confronted with contingencies such as
Bosnia, Kosovo, and tensions between China and Taiwan, forces are
reassigned from counterdrug missions to address these higher priority
national military requirements. Though the reasons for these diversions
of forces are apparent, it is equally apparent that the inconsistent
availability of resources makes coherent planning and execution of
counterdrug operations problematic. In simple terms, we face a strategy
and forces mismatch. The same high-demand/low-density assets that are
required for higher priority contingencies are those most urgently
needed for effective and productive counterdrug operations. Thus, we
are confronted not with a lack of Department of Defense (DoD)
commitment, but with real world operational and resource constraints.
Our most critical deficiency is intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR). We generally have sufficient ISR assets to cover
15 percent of the source and transit zones 15 percent of the time. That
is more a statement about the magnitude of the task than of our
commitment to it. We need accurate, focused, and timely intelligence in
order to effectively commit limited assets and to obtain maximum
results from their employment. We are working with the Joint Staff and
the intelligence community to address these deficiencies.
In summary, I am convinced that DoD is committed to its role in
support of the National Counterdrug Strategy. Because a change in DoD
mission priorities is unlikely, I will continue to advocate for
increases in total force structure that will provide a broader base of
capabilities to meet counterdrug requirements.
terrorism threats in the hemisphere
#20. Senator Helms. What is the level of the terrorism threat in
the Americas?
General Wilhelm. Although we assess the overall terrorist threat to
U.S. interests in Southern Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR) as
low, Colombia is the exception. Despite recent success in combating
terrorism, the presence of terrorist and criminal groups in Southern
Command's AOR continues to pose a credible threat to U.S. individuals,
businesses, and government interests.
Latin America accounted for 110 of the 273 (40 percent)
international attacks conducted by terrorist groups according to 1998
Department of State Statistics. Of these attacks, 87 were directed
against U.S. interests in Latin America. Almost all the anti-U.S.
attacks in Latin America happened in Colombia or were connected to
Colombian terrorist groups. Of the 87 anti-U.S. attacks in the region,
77 were bombings of multi-national oil facilities in Colombia, in which
U.S. businesses have an interest. An oil pipeline-bombing incident in
October killed 71 people and injured more than 100.
The National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) continue to pose the most significant
terrorist threat to Americans, as evidenced by the recent kidnapping
and execution of three U.S. citizens by the FARC (04 MAR 99) and the
aircraft hijacking by the ELN (12 APR 99). These two groups continue to
increase attacks (kidnappings, bombings, and extortion campaigns)
against Colombian security forces and civilians despite the current
peace process with the Colombian government. So far this year, 13
American citizens have been kidnapped in Colombia. Four of those
victims are still being held. Additionally, three members of the New
Tribes Mission abducted in 1993 remain missing.
Arrests of terrorist leaders from the Sendero Luminoso (SL) and
robust counterterrorism operations against the Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) have significantly diminished terrorist
capabilities to conduct attacks in Peru, particularly in urban areas.
Recently, we have witnessed the development of militarized criminal
groups (MCG), also known as criminal enterprise armies (CEA), using
terrorist-type tactics to achieve their goals and objectives.
Reportedly, one such group of bandits is operating along the border of
Belize and Guatemala. These groups pose a higher threat throughout our
AOR and their capabilities to conduct criminal operations challenge the
response of law enforcement agencies.
terrorism threats in the hemisphere
#21. Senator Helms. What efforts should be taken to address the
insecurity in the ``Tri-Border'' area with Argentina, Paraguay, and
Brazil?
General Wilhelm. Terrorist support elements are primarily in the
Tri-Border area to generate revenue. They, and other criminal
organizations, are attracted to the financially lucrative opportunities
offered by contraband trade, particularly in the large duty-free zone.
Illicit profits are well hidden and can easily be diverted to fund
terrorist organizations and operations in other parts of the world.
Similar corruption and contraband opportunities exist in other major
duty-free zones in the Southern Command Area of Responsibility, such as
those located in Colon, Panama and Margarita Island, Venezuela. The
presence of terrorist support elements and sympathizers, and the ease
of entering the region with counterfeit travel documents, attract
terrorists to the area to hide, rest and recuperate, and possibly to
plan, and coordinate operations worldwide.
Security in the Tri-Border area has improved as a result of
combined efforts by the Governments of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil.
Security can be further augmented through greater multi-lateral
information sharing between the region's law enforcement, security, and
intelligence services, as well as with U.S. counterparts. Improved
communications and computer connectivity between these agencies would
allow the development and shared use of databases and other information
to detect and deter the movement and actions of terrorists and their
support elements.
The attractiveness of the Tri-Border area to both terrorist and
criminal groups can be greatly reduced by increased customs and
immigration control measures and improved law enforcement efforts that
counter corrupt activities, money laundering operations and illegal
migration. Establishing effective information sharing networks between
the U.S. Government and those of the region is critical to the
enhancement of security in the Tri-Border region.
______
Responses of Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm to Additional Questions Submitted
by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
forward operating locations (fols)
#1. Senator Biden. General Wilhelm, studies show that we get more
bang for our buck from investing in drug treatment than by investing in
source country control. As you know, we already devote two thirds of
the national drug budget (65.8 percent) to supply reduction. I am not
convinced that this is the most effective use of funds. In your Area of
Responsibility we are now looking at establishing three new fully
operational Forward Operating Locations in Manta, Aruba and Curacao. I
have heard various estimates of what this will cost, and all of them
make it sound like this will be an expensive endeavor. How much do you
expect the new Forward Operating Locations to cost and from which
accounts would this money come from? Please provide a detailed
explanation of how you envision these new locations working to combat
illegal narcotics organizations. In other words, I want a tactical
match up--how our use of these bases will impact the methods of the
``bad guys.''
General Wilhelm. The National Drug Control Policy has a budget of
$17.9 billion for Fiscal Year 1999. The total budget for Goal 5, Break
Foreign and Domestic Sources of Supply, is $2.28 billion or 13 percent
of the total national counterdrug budget. The Department of Defense
(DoD) has a $937 million counterdrug budget for Fiscal Year 1999. Goal
5 accounts for $277.4 million, or 29.6 percent of the DoD counterdrug
budget.
The following validated and prioritized MILCON projects support
Southern Command Concept of Operations for the Counterdrug Forward
Operating Locations at Aruba, Curacao, and Manta Air Base (AB):
1. $10.60 million--Consolidated Planning and Design
2. $33.15 million--Manta AB--Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements
3. $31.00 million--Curacao--Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements
4. $ 9.10 million--Aruba--Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements
5. $ 9.20 million--Curacao--Aircraft Maintenance Hangar/Nose Dock
6. $ 6.70 million--Manta AB--Aircraft Maintenance Hangar/Nose Dock
7. $ .50 million--Aruba--Aircraft Maintenance Hangar
8. $ 2.13 million--Manta AB--Crash/Fire/Rescue Station
9. $ 3.10 million--Curacao--Maintenance Facilities
10. $ 4.96 million--Manta AB--Petroleum/Maintenance Facilities
11. $ 2.20 million--Curacao--Squadron Operations/Aircraft Maintenance
Unit
(AMU)
12. $ 2.61 million--Manta AB--Squadron Operations/AMU
13. $ .90 million--Aruba--Squadron Operations/AMU
14. $ 4.70 million--Manta AB--Visiting Airman Quarters/Dining Facility
15. $ 1.62 million--Manta AB--Visiting Officers Quarters
--------------
$122.47 million--Total
The $122.47 million will come from the Air Force Project Code (PC)
9500. PC 9500 is for Curacao, Aruba and Manta FOLs. The $122.47 million
total is for MILCON projects. The U.S. Air Force allocated
approximately $14 million per year in their Program Objective
Memorandum for Fiscal Year 2000 and Fiscal Year 2001 for combined
operating expenses at Curacao, Aruba and Manta.
I was pleased to receive your question concerning the tactical
impacts of the FOLs. Too often, these kinds of issues are relegated to
programmatic debates with little or no emphasis on strategic and
operational dimensions. The counterdrug mission is a challenging one.
When we have every asset that is committed to this mission through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Execute Order we are able to cover just 15
percent of the source and transit zones, 15 percent of the time. This
actually says more about the magnitude of the task than it does about
the adequacy of resources. We have two absolute requirements. The first
is, for the best possible intelligence support. Timely and accurate
intelligence enables us to commit limited resources at the right places
and at the right times to achieve the best possible effect against
narcotics traffickers. The second requirement is to position our assets
in such a way that we maximize coverage of key trafficking routes and
cultivation and production areas. Once all FOLs (to include Central
America) are fully activated, we will have roughly 110 percent of the
area coverage or operational reach that we enjoyed from Howard Air
Force Base in Panama. Of greater importance, transit time to critical
areas will be significantly reduced permitting us to spend more time
in, astride or over key mission areas. The Marita FOL is particularly
important. When improvements are complete and the airfield is capable
of supporting operations by the full complement of detection,
monitoring and tracking assets, we will have more responsive and much
improved coverage of the critical southern source zone. This includes
Southern Colombia where the majority of coca is grown and much of the
cocaine is produced, the air bridge between Colombia and Peru,
Northwestern Brazil and points of origin for maritime trafficking
through the Eastern Pacific. Curacao and Aruba will provide improved
coverage of the northern source zone (Colombia and Venezuela), and
heavily used trafficking routes through the Eastern, Central and
Western Caribbean. The Central American FOL will provide blanket
coverage of Central America which is emerging as a major transit area,
and much improved access to and coverage of the Eastern Pacific routes
that we regard as an open backdoor to Mexico and ultimately to the
United States. In addition to purely geographic advantages, the FOLs
will give us greater flexibility. We will be able to concentrate assets
at the location or locations best suited for operations based on
weather patterns, cultivation and production cycles and alterations in
routes and methods used by traffickers to move their product and evade
our interdiction efforts. If we execute the FOL plan as it is framed,
we will emerge with a significant tactical advantage in comparison with
previous single site operations from Panama.
#2. Senator Biden. Currently our short-term agreements allow use of
bases in Manta for six months and Aruba and Curacao for one year. All
three sites will require significant military construction to achieve
full operational capacity. Cost estimates have varied and we have yet
to see a solid cost-estimate and a detailed plan for post-Panama
operations. At the moment we have short-term agreements for our Forward
Operating Locations in Manta, Aruba and Curacao. What kind of military
construction will be required to bring these locations to full
operational capacity and how much will it cost? What are we doing to
guarantee that we will have use of these sites for long enough to
justify additional investments there? Is there a more limited, less
costly set of construction options that would allow us to increase
capability in the interim, until we have longer-term agreements in
place?
General Wilhelm. The military construction required to bring these
existing facilities to U.S. standards is primarily safety and
maintenance-related. Runway and parking ramp upgrades, hangers,
navigation aids, fire rescue, operations office space and quarters are
among the items that total $122.47 million for the next two years with
$42.8 million needed in Fiscal Year 2000. Costs by site are listed
below.
Temporary facilities like the Air Force's ``Harvest Bare'' are
currently being used for interim facilities. Their use will continue
until permanent facilities are completed. These expeditionary
facilities (tents and prefabricated structures) are effective, but have
a limited service life. After 18-24 months they require replacement or
significant maintenance. Additionally, they will not withstand
hurricane and storm force winds prevalent in the Caribbean and coastal
regions of South America. Permanent facilities will be constructed
using materials and methods, which will result in the least cost, both
in terms of initial construction and routine Operations and Maintenance
(O&M). ``Expeditionary'' type facilities (preengineered buildings, K-
spans, etc.) will be used where practical.
Ambassador Rich Brown, continues to serve as the State Department
negotiator for the FOLs. Ambassador Brown is heavily involved in
negotiating long term agreements (10 years), and has already held
initial discussions with both the Dutch and the Ecuadorians. I have
been informed of no significant impediments to reaching the long term
agreements we seek.
Economy has been a watchword during FOL concept development and
negotiation. Based on 10 year cost projections, we estimate that
operations from the FOLs will cost 60 percent less than continued
operations from Howard Air Force Base. We will strive to achieve
additional economies each step of the way. To answer more fully your
questions concerning costs associated with FOL development, I provide
the following prioritized list of MILCON requirements by site:
[In millions of dollars]
Common costs ($10.60)
Consolidated Planning and Design.......................... $10.60
Manta ($55.87)
Airfield Pavement/Site movements.......................... 33.15
Aircraft Maintenance Hangar/Nose Dock..................... 6.70
Fire Crash/Rescue Station................................. 2.13
Visiting Airmen Quarters/Dining Facility.................. 4.70
Squadron Operations/Aircraft Maintenance Unit (AMU)....... 2.61
Petroleum Oil & Lubricants/Maintenance Facilities......... 4.96
Visiting Officers Quarters................................ 1.62
Curacao ($45.5)
Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements....................... 31.00
Aircraft Maintenance Hangar/Nose Dock..................... 9.20
Maintenance Facilities.................................... 3.10
Squadron Operations/AMU................................... 2.20
Aruba ($10.5)
Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements....................... 9.10
Aircraft Maintenance Hangar............................... .50
Squadron Operations/AMU................................... .90
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total................................................. 122.47
#3. Senator Biden. On May 25th, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
said, ``We cannot accept U.S. counternarcotics flights because
Venezuela is a sovereign country.'' In contrast to that refusal,
President Chavez told reporters in the United States ten days ago that
Venezuela's commitment to cooperating with the United States on drug
issues is ``absolute and total.'' In the past, Venezuela has allowed
U.S. Customs planes to use its airspace for counterdrug missions, but
it has been inconsistent. How effective can the new Forward Operating
Locations be if Venezuela continues to deny the use of its airspace for
counternarcotics work? To what extent are your operations not based at
the new Forward Operating Locations hindered by Venezuela's denial of
the use of its airspace?
General Wilhelm. The Venezuelan Government's recent denial of
overflight rights for United States aircraft conducting
counternarcotics missions has two significant practical or operational
implications. First, denial of overflight impedes our ability to
maintain contact with suspect aircraft for ultimate handoff to host
nation forces and prosecution of end games. The countries most
significantly effected are Venezuela and Colombia. Second, denial of
Venezuelan overflight adds one to one and one-half hours transit time
for detection, monitoring, and tracking aircraft proceeding from
Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Curacao and Aruba on missions
over the heart of the source zone in Colombia and Peru. Increased
transit time ultimately results in reduced on-station time. Though we
are paying some operational penalties as a result of the Venezuelan
overflight issue, I would hasten to add that we are continuing to
conduct the full spectrum of counterdrug air operations, albeit at
reduced efficiency. Discussions are currently underway with Venezuela
and we anticipate that the overflight issue will soon be resolved.
This situation has reinforced the need to attain full operational
capability and capacity at the FOL in Manta, Ecuador. Given the ability
to operate the full complement of detection, monitoring, and tracking
assets from Manta, we would have an immediate workaround to Venezuelan
overflight restrictions. I should add that these workarounds would be
equally valuable if other conditions, such as inclement weather
precluded or restricted operations from a single FOL. For these and
other reasons it is essential that our plan for enhancement of the FOL
network be fully funded.
-