[Senate Hearing 106-241]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-241
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: MOBILIZING THE OPPOSITION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-045 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Chalabi, Ahmad, member, Executive Presidency, Iraqi National
Congress, London, England...................................... 16
Prepared statement of........................................ 21
Clawson, Dr. Patrick, director for research, the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC................. 23
Prepared statement of........................................ 26
Francke, Rend Rahim, executive director, Iraq Foundation,
Washington, DC................................................. 28
Prepared statement of........................................ 32
Jones, A. Elizabeth, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State............ 2
Prepared statement of........................................ 5
Wellstone, Paul, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, prepared statement. 12
(iii)
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: MOBILIZING THE OPPOSITION
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 11:18 a.m., in room SD-562, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Wellstone.
Senator Brownback. I will call the hearing to order. I
understand Senator Wellstone will be here shortly, but we will
go ahead with the presentations.
I want to apologize to everybody in attendance for being
late. We had a markup over at the Commerce Committee and I was
unavoidably detained. So, I do apologize for that. I apologize
to the witnesses. Hopefully we will still be able to conduct
the hearing in a timely fashion.
Deputy Secretary Jones, welcome to the committee. Thank you
for being willing to come back and up and to discuss Iraq and
the Iraqi opposition. We have some distinguished panel members
that will be presenting after you as well.
As you know, the Iraqi National Congress Executive
Committee was here in Washington recently. Assistant Secretary
Indyk and you met with the group, as did Secretary Albright and
Sandy Berger. And you are probably aware that they also had
meetings up here on Capitol Hill in the House and the Senate
side. I might note to you they were very well received in the
meeting I had where a number of Senate leaders were there,
including both Senator Lott and Senator Daschle. It was an
excellent meeting. It was a good discussion, a frank discussion
about what the United States needs to do in moving forward.
I was also encouraged to see the INC folks united with a
single message here in Washington, Dr. Chalabi. There were
those who told me--I think you might have been one of them,
Secretary Jones--that the INC was no longer a viable opposition
group to Saddam Hussein. It has always been my position that 10
different groups, all fighting each other, are not going to
deal with the Saddam problem. We, the United States, needed to
put all of our power and prestige behind one unified group
which could then represent a real threat to Saddam on the
ground. I now think we are well on our way to having that
group.
I would like to commend the administration for announcing
that the drawdown under the Iraq Liberation Act is going to
begin. These people, all the various Iraqi opposition groups,
the Kurds, Sunni, Shiites, and others that have been united
under the INC, need to see some tangible support on the ground.
They are the fighting force in Iraq that are suffering under
Saddam right now. They are the people who risk the most in
associating themselves with our policy goal of getting rid of
Saddam Hussein.
I notice that some anonymous administration source told the
Washington Post 2 weeks ago, though, that the Iraqis who came
to Washington are, as they put it, the ``day-after people.''
Aside from the fact that I felt that was an unnecessary insult
to people who are risking their lives to oppose a vicious
dictator, I also disagree with the characterization. The
question is, the day after what? Are we still hoping that some
magical being will come down and get rid of Saddam Hussein?
Surely 8-plus years of living with the man has proven that we
cannot rely on some magic bullet. We need a strategy and we
need proven allies on the ground.
I look forward very much to hearing your perspectives on
the options available to us for ridding the world of Saddam
Hussein's leadership in Iraq. And I am not going to make any
secret to you. I am interested in hearing what concrete steps
the administration will be taking to help the opposition not
simply with just fax machines and printers and conferences, but
with tangible, nonlethal and lethal assistance and training. We
need to get moving. I do not want Saddam to outlast another
American President.
I am appreciative, Secretary Jones, of the efforts that
have been made to date. I am going to continue to press you for
more efforts. I think now is the time to get moving. I think
the last time we had this hearing you were talking of some note
and need of patience and we have been patient a long time with
Saddam Hussein. And I think it is time we moved very
aggressively and I think we have got some people that we can
move with.
I look forward to your perspective and I look forward to
discussing it with you and some questions as well. Thank you
for joining us.
STATEMENT OF A. ELIZABETH JONES, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for
the opportunity to appear before you today.
Assistant Secretary Martin Indyk is very sorry he cannot be
here. He is in the Gulf working on some of our broader Gulf
issues, including Iraq.
I think that we are moving ahead very rapidly in all of the
areas that you have discussed, as well as some other areas, and
I would like to go through some of those briefly this morning.
Our policy rests on three pillars. First, as long as he is
around, we want to contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce
the threat he poses both to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi
people. The second one is that we want to alleviate the
humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people of his refusal to comply
with U.N. Security Council resolutions. And third, finally, we
want to work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as
with Iraq's neighbors, to change the regime in Iraq and to help
its new government rejoin the community of nations.
The policy of containment with regime change is designed to
help protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an
aggressive and hostile regime. Sanctions diminish the ability
of Saddam Hussein to reconstitute his military and weapons of
mass destruction capabilities. Operations Northern and Southern
Watch deter Saddam from using his air force against his
civilian populations north of the 36th parallel and south of
the 33rd. The United States maintains a robust force in the
region which we have made clear we are prepared to use should
Saddam cross the well-established redlines. Those redlines
include: should he try to rebuild or deploy his weapons of mass
destruction; should he threaten his neighbors; should he
challenge allied aircraft in the no-fly zones; or should he
move against the Kurds in northern Iraq.
I would like to be particularly clear on this point: The
United States is concerned for the protection of all Iraqis
against the repression of the Baghdad regime. Besides those
living in relative safety in parts of northern Iraq, the world
should not forget that Iraqi Shiites in the south, tribal Sunni
Arabs in the west and center, the Turkomans and Assyrians, and
even Tikritis themselves continue to suffer from Baghdad's
daily repression.
We are committed to maintaining U.N. Security Council
controls on the Iraqi regime while lifting the burden of
sanctions off the backs of the Iraqi people through the
expansion and streamlining of the oil-for-food program.
The humanitarian relief program, as I said, is the second
pillar of our policy. Sanctions were never directed against the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Food and medicine are
specifically exempt from sanctions. Iraq has always been free
to buy and import these goods, but Saddam Hussein has long
chosen not to do so in order to manipulate public opinion by
deliberately causing the suffering of his own citizens. Despite
interference by the regime, the oil-for-food program has
ensured that the people of Iraq receive the food and medicine
which their government denies them.
There is a fundamental principle at work here. As long as
the current Baghdad regime is in defiance of Security Council
resolutions, we will never allow it to regain control of Iraq's
oil revenues. They will continue to be escrowed by the U.N. and
their uses controlled by the U.N. sanctions committee. This
same approach underpins the British/Dutch draft Security
Council resolution currently under consideration in New York.
The draft would allow for the suspension of sanctions on Iraqi
exports in return for full compliance by Baghdad with a road
map of key disarmament tasks. Imports would continue to be
controlled and effective financial controls would remain in
place. These provisions are coupled with an effective,
intrusive arms control regime that preserves UNSCOM's mandate
and prerogatives. Though there are some aspects of the draft
which we will seek to improve in the course of Council
discussions, we support the British/Dutch draft because it
meets our bottom line criteria: real arms control, expansion of
the oil-for-food program on the basis of humanitarian need,
insistence on a standard of full Iraqi compliance for action on
sanctions, and denial of oil revenues to the regime. This is a
tough, credible package that deserves Council support.
On our regime change policy, if it is to be successful,
change must come from within, from the Iraqis themselves. In
particular, the security forces and the people must stand on
the same side. The support of Iraqi exiles, including the
politically active opposition, along with neighboring states,
is indispensable. The captive Iraqis need a voice. And, in
particular, the internal Iraqi resistance needs a voice,
through the Iraqi opposition living in freedom, to make clear
to all Iraqis and to the world its aims. The Iraqi National
Congress has described these resistance aims to us as: first,
to bring the security forces to the side of the people in
changing the regime; and second, after the current regime
passes, to stand with all Iraqis in promoting reconciliation
and reconstruction.
Free Iraqis, those in exile and those who live in relative
freedom in northern Iraq, bear a special responsibility to
develop a coherent vision for a brighter future. They must take
the lead in developing and promoting an alternative vision
based on the restoration of civil society, the rebuilding of
the economy, and the promotion of a new role for Iraq as a
force for peace and reconciliation in the region. They can also
play an effective role in delegitimizing Saddam Hussein, in
helping to build the case for his prosecution as a war
criminal, and in getting the truth into and out of Iraq. And,
as Iraqis committed to a future vision of Iraq that appeals to
Iraqis inside and to Iraq's neighbors, they can best build the
case for the support of regional states to channel more
material assistance to the Iraqi people and their resistance
elements.
Congress has provided the administration with a number of
important tools to support Iraqis who are working toward a
better future for Iraq. These include earmarks of $8 million in
existing economic support funds. We are using these funds to
strengthen opposition political unity, to support the Iraq war
crimes initiative, to support humanitarian programs and the
development of civil society, and for activities inside Iraq.
We have also established and recently stepped up
broadcasting hours for Radio Free Iraq, which operates
independently and broadcasts daily in Arabic uncensored news
and information to the Iraqi people.
Our Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, Frank
Ricciardone, is managing the overall effort. Mr. Ricciardone
has already had considerable success in helping disparate
opposition groups work together and elect a new interim
leadership that right now is preparing the way for an Iraqi
opposition conference aimed at achieving a broader
participation and a more effective program of activity. Last
month, as you mentioned, Secretary Albright met with an Iraqi
delegation, including the INC interim leadership and prominent
independents, to underscore the administration's support for
their efforts. And we are very grateful that they were very
warmly received on the Hill as well, as you mentioned.
Finally, there is the Iraq Liberation Act which provides
discretionary authority to the President to direct up to $97
million in Defense Department drawdown and training for
designated Iraqi opposition groups. We are in the process now
of drawing down this account for the provision of equipment and
training to the opposition.
Many have called on the President to use this authority to
arm the Iraqi opposition and support armed insurrection against
Saddam Hussein. There are a host of issues that must be
resolved before we can have confidence that providing arms to
the Iraqi opposition would advance our objectives of promoting
a change of regime and not just lead to more Iraqis being
killed unnecessarily. One requirement is a credible, broad-
based Iraqi political umbrella movement that can
authoritatively articulate a future vision for those Iraqis who
now lack a voice in their own fate. Such a movement is
indispensable to reassure those few Iraqis now supporting
Saddam Hussein that there is no future for them or Iraq under
his regime while there is a bright future afterwards, even for
them. Hence, the first kinds of support which we aim to provide
to the Iraqi opposition under the drawdown will be to meet
their most basic requirements: equipment for the infrastructure
vital to the effectiveness of an international political
advocacy movement, broadcasting equipment, and training in
civil affairs, including disaster relief operations. Further
kinds of material assistance to the Iraqi opposition can be
provided when they can best be absorbed and exploited.
I look forward very much to our discussion. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of A. Elizabeth Jones
I am pleased to appear before you this morning to discuss U.S.
policy towards Iraq.
Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, remains dangerous, unreconstructed and
defiant. We have come to the conclusion, after more than eight years of
effort at seeking Saddam's compliance with UN Security Council
resolutions, that his regime will never be able to be rehabilitated or
reintegrated into the community of nations. This conclusion is based on
what Saddam's record makes manifest--that he will never relinquish what
remains of his WMD arsenal, and that he will never cease being a threat
to the region, U.S. interests, and his own people. It is based on
Saddam's policies, not on any predetermined policy of our own. Thus, in
November of last year, President Clinton announced a new policy with
regard to Iraq: henceforth, we would contain Saddam Hussein while we
sought a new regime to govern in Baghdad. The President committed the
United States to support those Iraqis--inside and outside Iraq--who
seek a new government and a better future for all the people of Iraq.
Eight years after the Gulf War and Saddam's persistent defiance of
the international community, we are under no illusions that Iraq under
Saddam Hussein will comply with UNSC resolutions on disarmament, human
rights, accounting for POW's and the return of stolen property.
In view of this reality, our policy rests on three pillars. First,
as long as he is around, we will contain Saddam Hussein in order to
reduce the threat he poses both to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi
people. Second, we will seek to alleviate the humanitarian cost to the
Iraqi people of his refusal to comply with UNSC resolutions. Finally,
we will work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as Iraq's
neighbors, to change the regime in Iraq and help its new government
rejoin the community of nations.
Our policy of containment plus regime change is designed to help
protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an aggressive and
hostile regime. Sanctions diminish the ability of Saddam Hussein to
reconstitute his military and WMD capabilities. Operations Northern md
Southern Watch deter Saddam from using his air force against the
civilian populations north of the 36th parallel and south of the 33rd.
We maintain a robust force in the region, which we have made clear we
are prepared to use should Saddam cross our well-established redlines.
Those redlines include: should he try to rebuild or deploy his weapons
of mass destruction; should he strike out at his neighbors; should he
challenge allied aircraft in the no-fly zones; or should he move
against the people living in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Northern
Iraq.
Let me be particularly clear on this point: the United States is
concerned for the protection of all Iraqis against the repression of
the Baghdad regime. Besides those now living in relative safety in
parts of northern Iraq, the world should not forget that Iraqi Shiites
in the south, tribal Sunni Arabs in the west and center, the Turkomans
and Assyrians, and even Tikritis themselves continue to suffer
Baghdad's daily repression. Hence, we believe that the world community
should tolerate no backsliding from Baghdad's obligations under any of
the UNSC resolutions intended to protect the people of Iraq and its
neighbors from the depredations of the current Baghdad regime. In
particular, UNSC resolution 688 twice cited the consequences of
Baghdad's repression of the Iraqi civilian population as a threat to
international peace and security. It therefore demanded not only that
Baghdad ``immediately end this repression,'' but it also insisted that
Baghdad give ``immediate access by international humanitarian
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of
Iraq.'' Baghdad is in flagrant violation of this UNSC resolution, as it
is of so many others.
We are committed to maintaining UNSC controls on the Iraqi regime,
while lifting the burden of sanctions off the backs of the Iraqi people
through the expansion and streamlining of the oil-for-food program
This humanitarian relief program is the second pillar of our
policy. Sanctions were never directed against the humanitarian needs of
the Iraqi people. In fact, food and medicine are specifically exempt
from sanctions. Iraq has always been free to buy and import these
goods, but Saddam Hussein has long chosen not to do so in order to
manipulate public opinion by deliberately causing the suffering of his
own citizens. Our response has been first to establish, and then to
expand, the oil-for-food program, which provides a mechanism for the
United Nations to control the use of revenues from the sale of Iraqi
oil for the purchase of humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people.
Despite interference by the regime, the oil-for-food program has
ensured that the people of Iraq receive the food and medicine, which
their own government denies them.
There is a fundamental principle at work here. As long as the
current Baghdad regime is in defiance of the UNSC resolutions, we will
never allow it to regain control of Iraq's oil revenues. They will
continue to be escrowed by the UN and their uses controlled by the UN
sanctions committee. This same approach underpins the British/Dutch
draft Security Council resolution currently under consideration in New
York. The draft would allow for the suspension of sanctions on Iraqi
exports in return for full compliance by Baghdad with a roadmap of key
disarmament tasks. Imports would continue to be controlled and
effective financial controls would remain in place. These provisions
are coupled with an effective, intrusive arms control regime that
preserves UNSCOM's mandate and prerogatives. Though there are some
aspects of the draft which we will seek to improve in the course of
Council discussions, we support the British/Dutch draft because it
meets our bottom line criteria: real arms control; expansion of the
oil-for-food program on the basis of humanitarian need; insistence on a
standard of full Iraqi compliance for action on sanctions; and denial
of oil revenues to the regime. This is a tough, credible package that
deserves Council support.
Although effective, the containment element of our policy has its
costs. As we have seen repeatedly since 1991, even a contained Iraq
under its current leadership remains a threat both to the stability of
the region and to the welfare of the Iraqi people. Both are paying too
high a price for Saddam's continued rule. In our judgment, both
urgently deserve better. It is past time for Saddam to go.
For these reasons, President Clinton announced in November that the
United States would work with the Iraqi people toward a government in
Iraq which is prepared to live in peace with its neighbors and respect
the rights of its people. We are fully committed to supporting the
Iraqi people in bringing this about. In pursuit of this objective, the
United States will adhere to two important principles: one, we will
uphold the territorial integrity of Iraq; and two, we will not seek to
impose from the outside a particular government or leaders on the
people of Iraq. We do support a change of government that will be
responsive to the aspirations of the Iraqi people--one that takes
meaningful steps toward a democratic future for the country and can
represent fairly the concerns of all of Iraq's communities. And we will
work with a new Iraqi government, as it pledges to fulfill its
international obligations, to lift the sanctions, to deal with the
large debt burden, and to reintegrate Iraq into the international
community.
If it is to be successful, change must come from within, from the
Iraqis themselves. In particular, the security forces and the people
must stand on the same side. The support of Iraqi exiles, including the
politically active opposition, along with neighboring states, however,
is indispensable: the captive Iraqis need a voice. And, in particular,
the internal Iraqi resistance needs a voice, through the Iraqi
Opposition living in freedom, to make clear to all Iraqis and to the
world its aims. The Iraqi National Congress has described these
resistance aims to us as: first, to bring the security forces to the
side of the people in changing the regime; and second, after the
current regime passes, to stand with all Iraqis in promoting
reconciliation and reconstruction. Our approach is to work in an
intensive and coordinated way with these Iraqis and other countries
that support these aspirations of the Iraqi people.
Free Iraqis--those in exile and those who live in relative freedom
in northern Iraq--bear a special responsibility to develop a coherent
vision for a brighter future. They must take the lead in developing and
promoting an alternative vision based on the restoration of civil
society, the rebuilding of the economy, and the promotion of a new role
for Iraq as a force for peace and reconciliation in the region. They
can also play an effective role in delegitimizing Saddam, in helping to
build the case for his prosecution as a war criminal, and in getting
the truth into and out of Iraq. And, as Iraqis committed to a future
vision of Iraq that appeals to Iraqis inside and to Iraq's neighbors,
they can best build the case for the support of regional states to
channel more material assistance to the Iraqi people and their
resistance elements.
Congress has provided the Administration with a number of important
tools to support Iraqis who are working toward a better future for
Iraq. These include earmarks of $8 million in existing Economic Support
Funds. We are using these funds to strengthen Opposition political
unity, to support the Iraq war crimes initiative, to support
humanitarian programs and the development of civil society, and for
activities inside Iraq.
We also have established and recently stepped up broadcasting hours
for Radio Free Iraq, which operates independently and broadcasts daily
in Arabic uncensored news and information to the Iraqi people.
We have named a Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, Francis
Ricciardone, who is managing the overall effort. Mr. Ricciardone has
already had considerable success in helping disparate opposition groups
work together and elect a new interim leadership that right now is
preparing the way for an Iraqi opposition conference aimed at achieving
a broader participation and more effective program of activity. Last
month, Secretary Albright met with an Iraqi delegation, including the
INC interim leadership and prominent independents, to underscore the
Administration's support for their efforts. We know they were warmly
received on the Hill as well.
Since then Mr. Ricciardone has worked further with the INC on their
plans for the opposition conference and has also consulted intensively
with regional states on how best to promote our shared interests in the
reintegration of Iraq to the world community under a government that
will act responsibly both internally and externally.
We have also made progress working with the two major Kurdish
factions in the North, the PUK and the KDP, to help them reconcile
their differences and better provide for all the people of northern
Iraq. Just last week, leading members of both groups came to Washington
for talks aimed at strengthening the reconciliation process. The two
major Kurdish leaders, the Turkomans, and other groups from Northern
Iraq, have played a very positive role in reunifying and reviving the
Iraqi National Congress. This portends well for the contribution the
Kurds, Turkomans, Assyrians, and Arabs of the North must also make in
reunifying and rebuilding Iraq when a new leadership in Baghdad makes
this possible.
Finally, there is the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides
discretionary authority to the President to direct up to $97 million in
Defense Department drawdown and training for designated Iraqi
opposition groups. We are in the process of drawing down this account
for the provision of equipment and training to the opposition.
Many have called on the President to use this authority to arm the
Iraqi opposition and support armed insurrection against Saddam Hussein.
We believe such action is premature. There are a host of issues that
must be resolved before we can have confidence that providing arms to
the Iraqi opposition would advance our objectives of promoting a change
of regime and not just lead to more Iraqis being killed unnecessarily.
One requirement is a credible, broad-based, Iraqi political umbrella
movement that can authoritatively articulate a future vision for those
Iraqis who now lack a voice in their own fate. Such a movement is
indispensable to reassure those few Iraqis now supporting Saddam
Hussein that there is no future for them or Iraq under his regime while
there is a bright future afterwards, even for them. Hence, the first
kinds of support which we aim to provide to the Iraqi Opposition under
the drawdown will be to meet their most urgent requirements: equipment
for the infrastructure vital to the effectiveness of an international
political advocacy movement; broadcasting equipment; and training in
``civil affairs,'' including disaster relief operations. Further kinds
of material assistance to the Iraqi opposition can be provided when
they can best be absorbed and exploited.
To channel substantial assistance to those resisting Saddam's
oppression inside Iraq, we will need the cooperation of Iraq's
neighbors. Although they all share and support the Iraqi people's
longing for a change of regime in Baghdad, they have strong views about
how we can help the Iraqi people reach this goal. We must take those
views into account, and gain their cooperation in promoting the
recovery of Iraq as a good neighbor and contributor to regional
stability.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Secretary Jones. Thank you
for being here today.
I want to note first, as I noted in my opening statement,
support for the administration beginning the drawdown of the
Iraqi Liberation Act $100 million that we put forward. That is
a good first step. I note with some hesitancy and some
displeasure that it is for things like fax machines and file
cabinets that I have seen thus far.
When will the administration begin supplying military
equipment to the opposition forces or some more aggressive
support and use of those funds?
Ms. Jones. The plan now is, Senator, to identify the
equipment and the training options that are of most use, as I
said in my opening statement, to the Iraqi opposition in
developing their political outreach in order to give the Iraqi
people a voice, give the Iraqi opposition inside Iraq a voice
and some themes around which they can build cohesiveness. The
Iraqi opposition plan, the INC plan, is to host a general
assembly of as many exiled Iraqis as possible in order to gain
even more political coherence and to hear the voice of those
Iraqis as well to hear the voice of Iraqis that they are in
touch with inside Iraq and to develop a more coherent and more
detailed plan of action for how to better effect regime change.
Once they have had that meeting, the idea is that they
would then communicate with us in greater detail the kinds of
things that they think would be most useful to them as they
proceed in their plans.
Senator Brownback. Is the administration opposed to
supplying military equipment to the opposition forces?
Ms. Jones. We are not fundamentally opposed to it at this
point, but we do not see an effective use of military equipment
now. Our goal at the moment is to be sure that we are not doing
something that cannot be absorbed by the Iraqi opposition
inside the country. In fact, the issue really is not weapons.
There are plenty of weapons inside Iraq. The issue is
empowering or having the Iraqi people feel empowered to use
those weapons to coalesce among themselves and to have the
security forces and the Iraqi people on the same side against
Saddam Hussein.
Senator Brownback. So, if you can see a rational use for
military equipment by the Iraqi opposition forces, the
administration will support that.
Ms. Jones. There is the potential for supporting that, yes.
It would be hard for us to say now because I do not know what
the constellation of groups would be that might be able to
receive such military equipment. As I say, our analysis at this
point is that there is plenty of equipment already inside, that
it is not lack of equipment that is holding back the Iraqi
opposition inside now. It is fear of reprisals and fear for
their lives and for the lives of their families that is holding
them back at this point.
Senator Brownback. I understand that, but I do not
understand your hesitancy to say, yes, if there is rational use
for this, we will be rapidly, readily considering military
equipment to the Iraqi opposition. If I am getting the press
accounts correct and talking with Secretary Indyk, there is
virtually daily reports of insurrection, uprisings in various
places taking place in Iraq. One would derive from that that
there is an active opposition taking place now and that we
should be pressing forward aggressively with all means and
certainly not excluding any means, that we would support that
opposition.
Ms. Jones. Senator, I do not think that we exclude any
means, but I do not think the time is right for those to be
considered. We would like to be led by the Iraqi opposition
themselves, as I say, have them consult with the broader Iraqi
body politic, the exiles and the people that they are in touch
with inside. They will tell us in a much more considered
fashion when it is that they think they need those items.
At the moment what they need most is methods of
communication and help in communicating, help in developing
what their vision for Iraq after Saddam Hussein is. One of the
areas that we have identified that needs work is a fear on the
part of the Iraqi people inside of the unknown, the fear that
Iraq will be a dangerous place to live, even a more dangerous
place to live should Saddam suddenly disappear from the scene.
We do not think that is the case. We think there are very
thoughtful people, a tremendous number of thoughtful people,
who can put together a vision for how one would govern Iraq
after Saddam Hussein. What would be the principles that would
govern such a country? For instance, what about reconstruction?
What about how to ensure a stable, unified Iraq that can take
its rightful place in the region? How can it do that if the
international community is insistent on their not developing
weapons of mass destruction and not having an arsenal of
weapons of mass destruction? We want to articulate and get
across the message that we think that Iraq should have a
conventional military force in order to protect itself. We are
not asking for a completely stripped bare Iraq.
We are asking for the Iraqi opposition, the Iraqi exiles,
and their contacts inside Iraq to develop a good sense of the
Iraq that will provide for the Iraqi people in terms of their
humanitarian needs, in terms of medicine, in terms of
education, in terms of books, in terms of security, in terms of
good neighbors in a way that is not taking place now.
Senator Brownback. Well, at least hear this Senator's
opinion and a number of others that I hope you will consider
military support because while books and all the other things
that you are noting are important, if they are not secure from
Saddam, it is going to be tough to teach kids. And that is just
going to have to be a first order. I hope you will hear that
opinion from here and from many other sources clearly.
As you know the Iraqi National Congress is planning to hold
a national assembly meeting in July. The most logical place for
the meeting would be on the ground in northern Iraq. It is
certainly what all the parties would like to have happen. It is
what they noted to us when they were here on the Hill meeting
with the Senate leadership.
Is the administration prepared to assist the opposition in
meeting there where it would really count on the ground in
Iraq?
Ms. Jones. I think there is no question that that is a very
good option for a place for the general assembly to meet. There
are a number of considerations that have to be taken into
account, security being the most important one. It may be a
wiser course to have the first general assembly meeting
elsewhere because the organization of such a meeting is complex
in itself without having to take very serious security
considerations into account. And it may be a wiser choice to
have this general assembly meeting outside northern Iraq and
have northern Iraq be an option for a further meeting.
Senator Brownback. So, you are proposing that the initial
one not be in Iraq and a second meeting sometime later take
place in northern Iraq?
Ms. Jones. Well, frankly, it is really not up to us to
propose. We are being guided by the desires of the interim
leadership of the INC. That is their contention, as I
understand it, at this point.
Senator Brownback. Because we will hear from some of that
leadership in the next panel. My understanding was it was their
desire to meet in northern Iraq for the clear statement that
that is, but they would need United States support for that,
that Saddam not move in columns on that meeting taking place in
northern Iraq.
Ms. Jones. There is no question that it would make a very
dramatic statement. There is no question of that at all. But as
I say, the security concerns are legion. I think it is more
than just columns moving against them. It is something that, as
I say, I think would be a good one to consider down the road.
Senator Brownback. I mentioned in my opening statement that
many of us working for a free Iraq were upset by comments that
Iraqi opposition figures were suggested by an unnamed
administration source as day-after guys. Could you clarify the
administration's view on the Iraqi opposition or what that
comment meant from an administration source?
Ms. Jones. I assume that was sort of a partial statement
along the lines that I just addressed: that the initial effort
underway now by the INC, by the interim leadership of the INC,
and by the independent Iraqi opposition in exile is to create a
voice for the Iraqi people. That has serious implications for
encouraging regime change now because, as I say, one of the
things that we have identified is a hesitancy, a serious
hesitancy, on the part of people inside Iraq who might have
already moved against Saddam Hussein because they are so
concerned, but fear what would happen after Saddam Hussein.
Saddam, of course, is encouraging this view, and we are
trying to counteract that view. The Iraqi opposition is trying
to counteract that view with a very concrete vision, very
concrete suggestions, proposals, discussions among themselves,
as well as with the rest of the international community, as to
the kind of Iraq that the Iraqi people could look forward to in
very concrete terms on the day after Saddam leaves.
So, their role is to discuss among themselves the kind of
Iraq that would begin to take shape on the day after, but the
whole goal is to encourage faster regime change now and to
dispel the fear of the Iraqi people inside now as to what the
day after would look like.
Senator Brownback. Is it your professional opinion that
Saddam Hussein will outlast the Clinton presidency, or do you
think not?
Ms. Jones. To be very honest, I do not know. I do not know.
Senator Brownback. Is the administration then serious about
getting rid of Saddam Hussein?
Ms. Jones. We are very serious about getting rid of Saddam
Hussein. The sooner, the better as far as we are concerned. The
activities particularly that Frank Ricciardone has undertaken,
the intense activity that he has undertaken with the INC, with
the interim leadership of the INC, with the Iraqi independents
who are very important players, we think is hastening the end
of Saddam Hussein, but I am unable to make a prediction as to
when this will happen.
Senator Brownback. It just strikes me as odd, and I have a
great deal of respect for your and for Secretary Indyk's,
Secretary Albright's abilities. But it just seems like there is
a great hesitancy here in face of a lot of factors that would
seem to encourage one to move forward more rapidly if the
reports that we are getting about sporadic fighting internally
are taking place, if it is a real consideration that the Iraqi
National Congress is now pulling together a number of disparate
factors and disparate groups to work together and that they
could legitimately consider holding a meeting inside northern
Iraq. There are some security questions, but clearly still this
is a real consideration that one would think now is the time to
move forward and move forward with some aggressive move. And
yet, what I am hearing on your part is if it outlasts the
Clinton administration, that is fine. We would rather he not,
but we are not really going to move with the same dispatch or
intensity that we did in Kosovo on Iraq.
Ms. Jones. Well, Mr. Chairman, we certainly do not want it
to outlast this administration. We do not want it to outlast
even this year. But you ask for a prediction. I cannot actually
give a prediction. I do not know when the change will occur.
It is very accurate, as you have noted, that there is an
increase in opposition activity in the south, in Baghdad, in
the west. There is quite a bit of talk; our very strong effort
now--and I think it is an extremely important effort--is to
embolden the Iraqis inside to grasp the possibility and act on
the possibility that they can actually move for regime change
themselves.
Senator Brownback. Well, I think they are going to be
reacting to concrete U.S. steps, similar to what the Kosovars
did to concrete U.S. steps. I would encourage you to make those
bolder than what I am witnessing thus far.
Senator Wellstone, I apologize for taking so long. I had a
series of ones that I wanted to ask, and thank you for your
patience.
Senator Wellstone. No, that is fine. I am sorry to be late.
I am in and out today. I think, Mr. Chairman, what I will do is
just ask that my complete statement be included in the record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Wellstone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Paul Wellstone
Thank you for holding this hearing on the Iraqi opposition
movement, Senator Brownback. I want to welcome our witnesses, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Beth Jones, Mr. Ahmed Chalabi, Ms. Rend Rahim
Francke, and Dr. Patrick Clawson.
One of the toughest foreign policy challenges which falls within
the subcommittee's purview is Iraq. I think we all agree that under the
leadership of Saddam Hussein, Iraq is a threat to our interests, our
allies in the region, and to those most directly affected--the Iraqi
people themselves.
Having said that, I do not believe that there are any magic
strategies to managing Saddam Hussein, parrying his threats against
neighboring countries and blocking his efforts to develop weapons of
mass destruction. That will take patient containment and vigorous
diplomatic efforts. I also believe we must act responsibly and
carefully in giving any support to Iraqi opposition groups intent on
overthrowing Saddam Hussein. I am deeply concerned about statements
made by our military leaders about the lack of support in the region
for arming external opposition groups and that arming the Iraqi
opposition might just amount to ``rolling the dice'' in an explosive
region.
I'd like to take just a minute to focus on the plight of the Iraqi
people. We know that Saddam Hussein is the primary cause of the
suffering of ordinary Iraqis. But we also know that the toughest
sanctions ever applied to any country are having an unintended, but
devastating impact.
While the oil-for-food program has brought badly-needed
humanitarian goods into Iraq and improved conditions somewhat, the
reports we receive are still very disturbing. As many as 30% of Iraq's
children are malnourished; infant mortality rates are soaring; much of
the population lacks access to clean water and sanitation. These
abysmal conditions are leading to the decimation of Iraq's once vibrant
society and culture. Families are breaking apart, crime is rampant, and
Iraq's youth are being radicalized.
I know that Saddam doesn't lose any sleep over the suffering of his
people. But we should care. We should care not only because of the
awful humanitarian situation, but also because depravation in Iraq can
harm our long-term interests.
Some day, and I hope that day is soon, Iraq will have a new
leadership. If things continue on their present course, that leadership
may be as bad or worse than Saddam Hussein. We may inadvertently
contribute to such an outcome if we do not take steps to tangibly
improve the lives of ordinary Iraqis.
Right now, the Iraqi people don't believe that we are on their
side. They feel that they are made to pay for the sins of their
leaders. We must change that perception.
I believe the time has come to devise new and creative ways to
bring relief to ordinary Iraqis with whom we have no quarrel, and
indeed whose cause we support.
Iraq, with its rich history and its talented population, can be a
force for positive change in the Middle East. Unfortunately, today its
people are denied that chance by a tyrant.
Thank you.
Senator Wellstone. I am listening to the flow of discussion
and I will just sort of try and build on that.
First of all, to those of you who are part of the
courageous opposition, I thank you for your courage.
It does strike me as being that this is a--there is a whole
set of difficult questions here, and I am not sure there are
any magic strategies. As much as I wish I could kind of will
into existence Saddam Hussein's being gone, I am not sure there
are any magic strategies or magic bullets. I think it is kind
of a matter of patient commitment and also diplomacy and
responsible policy.
I came in when, Secretary Jones, you were discussing the
British/Dutch proposal, and I thought I might want to talk
about that for a moment because I know there was a question as
to if Saddam Hussein's gone, what is then the leadership that
we are going to be dealing with. I sometimes think--I have been
pressing for some time now about the need for us to consider
the effect of the sanctions on a lot of innocent people in Iraq
and part of the reason that I have wanted to continue to focus
on that question--I think it is a minority position here to
keep saying we ought to really think about how we can do this
differently. But the reason I have been saying it is in part
because while I do not think Saddam Hussein cares, I think we
should in terms of our own values. The reports that come out
about the effects of the sanctions on innocent children are
just devastating.
And then the second point is it is almost to me a self-
interest because I sometimes really fear that this turns this
civilian population against us. In terms of what follows, I
would like to see a very different kind of a leadership.
Thus, my first question. I gather that you have already
said today that we are supportive of the British/Dutch
proposal. I wanted to just suggest to you and maybe get a quick
reaction that if as a part of that we are focusing on getting
weapons inspectors back into Iraq, which I think is critically
important, I would also like to see an additional component
which would be human rights inspectors back to really be able
to document and maybe prevent some of the abuses that Saddam
Hussein is committing against his own people. I wonder what
your reaction would be to that.
Ms. Jones. We certainly are supporting the British/Dutch
draft. We think there are a few improvements that can still be
made. It has now been tabled in the Security Council, so there
will be quite a bit of discussion now and further changes to
various aspects of the draft.
One of the key elements of the draft deals with the
humanitarian situation in Iraq. That is extremely important to
us, Senator, just as it is to you. The goal of the sanctions
are to contain Saddam Hussein. We do not want the sanctions to
have an effect on the Iraqi people. That is the reason for the
oil-for-food program. That is the reason in the draft that we
have tried to find ways to increase the amount of money in the
oil-for-food program to further reduce the ability of Saddam
Hussein to pretend that the sanctions are directed against the
Iraqi people. They are not. Saddam is the one who has not
ordered the kinds of food and medicine that are allowed to be
ordered, very much so, under the sanctions regime, under the
oil-for-food program. A lot of the medical equipment and
medicines that he has ordered are sitting in warehouses in
Baghdad. They have not been distributed.
There is a marked difference between the way that the oil-
for-food program is administered in northern Iraq in the areas
that are not under Iraqi control, but are under U.N. control,
and the way it is being administered in the south. I found this
quite remarkable in my trip there where the people in the north
express great satisfaction with the oil-for-food program. They
would obviously like more in the oil-for-food program, which is
exactly what this resolution attempts to do.
I want to quickly add, though, that the effort to get more
money into the oil-for-food program is coupled with a very
strict escrow account management that does not permit any of
Iraq's oil revenues to get into Saddam Hussein's hands. They
all would be controlled through U.N. Security Council
mechanisms.
In terms of introduction of human rights inspectors, first
let me say, yes, the draft does speak very forcefully to get
the reinsertion of a disarmament verification regime back into
Iraq.
On human rights monitors, I would argue that we are already
addressing that as much as we can through provision of finance
to INDICT, an organization that is working very hard to compile
and collect war crimes information against Saddam Hussein and
the cronies in his leadership, and to monitor human rights
abuses, of which there are far too many. It is an extremely
tragic situation there.
There is also money being provided through the ESF programs
to other organizations to document and to try to find ways to
resolve the situation in Halabja where the chemical weapons
attack was conducted by Saddam 10 years ago. So, there are a
variety of things in train that we would be very happy to brief
you on in greater detail.
Senator Wellstone. I will not followup because a note
handed to me by a great staffer was that it is one thing about
past abuses, but we would be talking about monitors on the
ground to prevent future abuses, which is maybe the
distinction.
Rather than following up, because I do not want to run out
of time, I want to ask you about a couple of New York Times
reports about some of the bombing in northern Iraq. I am trying
to figure out what the purpose of the bombing is, and I also
want to know a little bit more about the civilian casualties.
We are not getting a lot of public information. It is being
provided by the Pentagon. I wonder whether you could spell out
for us what are the strategic goals in carrying out these
attacks, and do you believe that these bombings are having any
effect at all on the stability of Saddam's regime. And can you
give us any sense as to when this campaign would be concluded?
Ms. Jones. What you are referring to is Operation Northern
Watch in particular, but of course, there is also Operation
Southern Watch, which were put in place through Security
Council resolutions to prevent Saddam Hussein from using his
air force to go after the Kurds in the north and the Iraqis in
the south, mostly Shi'a. That has had a very good effect and
continues to have a very good effect in the sense that it
prevents Saddam from further depredations against the people in
the north and the south.
The fact of the matter is that the only times that allied
aircraft target the anti-aircraft and other Iraqi defense
capabilities in the north and the south is when they threaten
the aircraft themselves. The goal is to take out the military
equipment that is threatening allied aircraft and allied
pilots. There is every effort made not to hit anything that
could be part of the humanitarian infrastructure of Iraq and
certainly to avoid civilian casualties. That is absolutely the
goal.
To answer the last part of your question, the protection of
the no-fly zones will go on until there is regime change, I
presume. There do not need to be attacks against the weapons
that are threatening the aircraft if they no longer threaten
the aircraft. It is that simple.
Senator Wellstone. My last question. I will not do a
followup so I can just stay within a reasonable time limit
because I may not have a chance to ask this question of others.
The administration has named seven groups that are eligible to
receive U.S. assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act. This is
just a question from an inquiring Senator so that I can learn
more. Do each of these groups follow policies and practices
that are consistent with U.S. democratic values and commitments
to human rights? And if they were to take power, in your view
what would be the prospects for forging a democratic Iraq that
respects human rights? Can you give me some sense?
Ms. Jones. Part of the criteria for designating the groups
was that they would adhere to those principles. Certainly that
is part of the discussion that the leadership of the INC--those
groups are mostly represented in the INC and through the
independents with whom Frank Ricciardone is working, with whom
we are working. They are working on those kinds of principles.
The idea that they have already articulated is for a
representative government that would respect the human rights
of all Iraqis, that would respect the political goals of all
Iraqis, and that would be inclusive of all Iraqi groups, all
Iraqi citizens, all parts of Iraq.
Senator Wellstone. This would be consistent with our past
experience with these groups in terms of commitment to
democratic values and human rights?
Ms. Jones. Yes, it is.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Wellstone.
Secretary Jones, regarding northern Iraq, how firm is the
U.S. commitment to protect northern Iraq? There appears to be a
great deal of loosening of it from Saddam's hands, the
possibility that the Iraqi National Congress could actually
meet there, although you note maybe not the first time but the
second time. How strong is the U.S. commitment to protect the
north and its freedoms that it has? Would we put forward a no-
drive zone so that if Saddam starts moving columns north, we
will stop them? Could you articulate U.S. policy on that?
Ms. Jones. The commitment is a very strong one. This is, as
I said in my opening remarks, a redline for the United States.
As we have articulated it, if there is an attack against the
Kurdish areas in the north, we will respond at a time and place
of our choosing. We would like to leave that vague in public.
It is a redline, as I say, that we are fully committed to. It
is one that has been mentioned very frequently in the last week
as we have had delegations from Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani,
the two main Kurdish parties in the north, in Washington over
the past week to discuss further reconciliation measures
between the two of them in followup to the Washington Agreement
and the Ankara process.
One of the things that we are especially committed to in
this whole context is the territorial integrity of Iraq, which
is why we do not like to differentiate completely between the
north and the south in that respect. The redlines are clear for
both areas.
Senator Brownback. I might submit to you that vagueness, if
I were one of the Iraqi opposition people on the ground, would
be hesitating to me if the U.S. policy is vague, a public
policy of vagueness on what our response would be and we would
respond at our choosing. I would encourage you to be far more
clear with what U.S. policy and what U.S. response would be if
we seek to stimulate that opposition in the north. We did not
articulate much vagueness in Kosovo, and it emboldened people
regardless of how one felt about that. I think the vagueness
would limit me if I were in the opposition, particularly a
public vagueness. Even if privately things are said
differently, I would say I want to make sure that that is a
commitment that I can count on before I am going to put my
life, my family on the line.
Ms. Jones. I would argue that Saddam knows very clearly
that we are very committed to our redlines. He sees it every
day or almost every day in terms of the redline related to the
no-fly zones, and he would see it were he to cross any of the
other redlines.
Senator Brownback. Well, good.
Secretary Jones, as always, I am impressed with your
abilities from first meeting you in Almaty, Kazakhstan. I was
impressed with you there and here.
I just got back from the Sudan about 2 weeks ago, and just
north of Yei in southern Sudan they have what they call Iraqi
Hill where a number of Iraqi troops were killed in Sudan
fighting for the northern government, the Khartoum Government,
which is a terrorist government seeking expansion. Now, I did
not investigate this, but that was what was noted to us, that
this was actually Iraqi Hill. And I found it very interesting
at that point.
Thank you very much. Thank you for your skill and your
diplomacy, and thank you for being here.
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Wellstone.
Senator Brownback. We will call up the next panel for
presentation, and included on that panel will be Mr. Ahmad
Chalabi, the member of the Executive Presidency of the Iraqi
National Congress; Dr. Patrick Clawson, director for research,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ms. Rend Rahim
Francke--I probably mispronounced that--executive director of
the Iraq Foundation. They will be the next panel.
Thank you all very much for joining us, and Mr. Chalabi, we
look forward to your presentation.
STATEMENT OF AHMAD CHALABI, MEMBER, EXECUTIVE PRESIDENCY, IRAQI
NATIONAL CONGRESS, LONDON, ENGLAND
Mr. Chalabi. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
am very pleased to be here today. It has been 15 months since I
last had the honor to testify before your committee. I am proud
to come before you again on behalf of the Iraqi National
Congress, the voice of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi National
Congress represents free Iraq and we are grateful for the help
of the free people of the United States. We are particularly
grateful for the assistance of the U.S. Senate and Congress.
The Iraq Liberation Act, declaring United States support for
removing the Iraqi dictatorship, has been a beacon to the Iraqi
people, and we look forward to working with you closely on its
implementation.
The Iraqi National Congress calls upon the United States
and its allies to recognize what is already fact: the United
States and its allies are at war with Saddam's regime.
Last summer it was proven that Saddam had ballistic missile
warheads loaded with deadly VX nerve gas, an active biological
weapons program, and the potential for nuclear weapons in less
than a year. In August 1998, Saddam ended the last illusion of
United Nations inspections as required under United Nations
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). In response, the
Congress passed and the President signed Public Law 105-235
declaring that the Government of Iraq is in material and
unacceptable breach of its international obligations under the
Gulf war cease-fire and empowering the President to take
appropriate action in accordance with the Constitution and the
relevant laws of the United States to bring Iraq into
compliance. In finding that Saddam had broken the cease-fire
and directing the President to enforce the terms of the cease-
fire, this joint resolution in effect stated that the Gulf war
was not over.
Indeed, since Operation Desert Fox over 6 months ago, a
virtual state of war has existed between the United States and
her allies and Saddam Hussein's regime. The Iraq Liberation Act
provides for significant military assistance to the Iraqi
National Congress to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein
from power in Iraq and to promote a democratic government to
replace that regime. On the 31st of October, the President
signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law. On November 15,
President Clinton announced that in response to Saddam's
continued defiance of international law, that the United States
would make the removal of Saddam's regime the centerpiece of
U.S. policy toward Iraq. The Iraqi National Congress strongly
welcomed this decision. On December 15, the United States began
a military assault on Iraq that continues to this day.
Operation Desert Fox and over 80 subsequent allied air attacks,
using thousands of precision munitions under broad rules of
engagement in the no-fly zones, have severely hurt Saddam's
military infrastructure.
Saddam considers this war. On the 5th of this month, Iraqi
Foreign Minister Sahaf formally protested to the United Nations
on behalf of Saddam that the Iraq Liberation Act was illegal
and that relations with the Iraqi National Congress constituted
aggression against a sovereign state.
The United States continues to recognize Saddam and Sahaf
and the rest of the gang as Iraq's Government. Neither the
interests of the American people nor the Iraqi people will be
served by the current suggestions in the United Nations
Security Council to write one more resolution, to make one more
deal with Saddam's gang. We do not need yet another resolution
that Saddam will violate. What we need is bold action. We
believe that the United States should take the following steps
immediately.
Protect the Iraqi people from Saddam's massive repression
and ease their suffering through a large-scale program of
direct humanitarian assistance that bypasses the regime. Saddam
is violating the oil-for-food resolutions. He is twisting them
to his advantage, and he will not willingly provide the Iraqi
people with food because Saddam uses hunger and disease as
weapons against the people of Iraq.
Broaden the rules of engagement for U.S. aircraft enforcing
the no-fly zones over much of Iraq to make all Saddam's
military forces moving against the civilian Iraqis targets for
the aircraft.
Help the Iraqi National Congress to develop an alternative
to the regime and assist us, including all the brave Iraqis
fighting Saddam inside the country.
The Iraqi people need protection from Saddam's
depredations. That is why human rights monitors deployed all
over the country under the auspices of the United Nations are
very important. It is not sufficient for the campaign of INDICT
to be supported for the cessation of human rights violations
against the Iraqi people. Human rights monitors must be
deployed.
Saddam's behavior, since the passage of the Iraq Liberation
Act, has been dictated by his preparations to deal with the
consequences of the act. He has increased repression in all
parts of the country because of his perception of the threat
that he faces and his quest to avert danger. He has divided the
country into four parts and appointed close members of his
inner circle as military Governors with unlimited powers. He
has massed troops against Iraqi Kurdistan in order to threaten
the people of the north. Part of the reason for his massing of
troops was the fact that the Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have
participated in meetings of the INC Executive Council and have
participated in the visit to Washington. They must not be
penalized for taking the side against Saddam and being on the
side of the United States.
He has massed troops in the south also. He has assigned his
son Qusay to lead a campaign of mass arrests and repression in
the south while his secret service continues to attack Shi'a
religious leaders. This culminated in the recent murder of the
highly respected Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Al-Sadr inside Iraq
where he was living and working inside Iraq. Hundreds of
thousands of people were coming to Friday prayers, led by him,
and Saddam considered that to be an unacceptable threat in the
face of the existence of the Iraq Liberation Act.
The spontaneous demonstrations that broke out all over Iraq
after Ayatollah Sadr's murder were squashed with Saddam's
customary brutality with hundreds of deaths in Baghdad and
other cities in Iraq. In addition, over 1,000 political
prisoners have been executed in the so-called prison cleansing
campaign. Iraqis are dying now. It is not useful to say that
any further aggressive moves against Saddam would get Iraqis
killed because Saddam is killing Iraqis now.
The rules of engagement for allied pilots over Iraq have
been significantly broadened in the past year from simply
intercepting aircraft in violation of the no-fly zones to
targeting air defense and command and control facilities once
Saddam threatens allied aircraft. We ask that the rules of
engagement be further broadened to include units of Saddam's
military that are being deployed against the Iraqi people. The
current no-fly zone does not protect the Iraqi people from
Saddam's armor and artillery, chemical weapons, and missile
forces. This will enhance the protection of the Iraqi people
while further diminishing Saddam's apparatus of control.
U.S. officials have said that attacking Iraqi Kurdistan
would lead to military action. We ask for this undertaking to
be spelled out clearly. Saddam should know in no uncertain
terms that he would be prevented from crossing the line into
all liberated areas of Iraq in the north. Specifically, a
statement would be made to warn against moving into all areas,
including areas below the 36th parallel which are not part of
the no-fly zones.
Many brave Iraqis associated with the INC are resisting the
dictatorship on the ground inside Iraq, particularly in the
south. They are in contact with the Iraqi National Congress and
they need support. They are looking to get equipment and
training through the INC under the Iraq Liberation Act. Indeed,
they need all kinds of support to resist the predatory
dictatorship.
With the assistance of the U.S. Government, the Iraqi
National Congress has held four meetings of its Executive
Council beginning with the meeting in Windsor, England on April
7-8, which was attended by representatives of the Clinton
administration and Congress. My colleagues and I were also very
pleased to welcome your colleague, Senator Kerrey of Nebraska,
who attended the meeting.
At the Windsor meeting, the Executive Council elected a
seven-member interim presidency to lead the INC until the
expanded Iraqi National Assembly meeting in July elects a new
leadership for the future. The Windsor meeting also reaffirmed
the unity of the Iraqi opposition and all the members of the
INC reaffirmed their commitments to the principles of
democracy, pluralism, federalism, and respect for human rights.
The Windsor meeting was followed up by a visit of an INC
delegation to the United Nations. We have also been vigorous in
reaching out to all Iraqis of all groups opposed to Saddam
throughout the world. Also, an expanded delegation of the Iraqi
opposition made a successful visit to Washington in May.
With the assistance of the U.S. Government, we have
reactivated our campaign to focus attention on the crimes of
Saddam and to maintain his international isolation. Frank
Ricciardone, the State Department's Special Coordinator for
Transition in Iraq, continues to work tirelessly to help us in
our quest to push forward the agenda of the united Iraqi
opposition, and my colleagues and I commend his efforts. He
already has had notable successes, to his credit, among the
Iraqi opposition. Also, he has visited several countries in the
region to explain U.S. policy.
Unfortunately, the position of some regional States toward
Saddam's regime remains ambiguous. We say to our neighbors in
the region that we stand for the unity of Iraq while Saddam has
effectively divided the country. We urge them to recognize that
the suppressed talents and good will of the Iraqi people must
be released from the tyranny of Saddam to ensure the peace and
prosperity of the region. Most of our Arab neighbors enjoy very
special relationships with the United States. They must not
begrudge us such relations. We look to the U.S. to help the
Iraqi people rid themselves from the scourge of Saddam and
establish democracy in Iraq. Our neighbors have nothing to fear
from a democratic Iraq.
We have called for a plenary session of the Iraqi National
Assembly in July. This body is the ultimate authority of the
INC. The July meeting will expand the INC and elect leadership
for the future. In the absence of firm security guarantees from
the United States and its allies, we unfortunately are not able
to hold this meeting in our first choice venue on Iraqi soil as
we did in Salahuddin in 1992. Logistics were much more
complicated then. The INC Executive Council has made the
request to the Secretary of State to hold the INC National
Assembly meeting in Washington. Similar requests have been made
to a number of Arab and European governments.
Kurdish reconciliation has been a fundamental step in the
efforts to energize and unite the opposition. We commend the
U.S. Government's role in brokering the Washington Agreement
between the KDP and the PUK. We hope that the Washington
Agreement will be implemented fully, and we commend Ambassador
Beth Jones' leadership role in the current negotiations between
the Kurdish parties.
Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, it is time for bold
action. It is time to call Saddam to account for his war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. We need the
United States' support and other friends of the Iraqi people to
act in the United Nations to convene a commission of inquiry
into the crimes of Saddam's regime. Secretary of State
Christopher told an INC delegation in April 1993 that the
United States would support the creation of such a commission,
and the Iraq Liberation Act addresses at length the indictment
of Saddam Hussein and other war criminals in his regime.
Perhaps the next session of the United Nations General Assembly
in the autumn will be the appropriate place to pursue this.
U.S. leadership on this issue is essential.
We are pleased to note the United States' support of
INDICT, the leading organization campaigning on this issue. The
U.S. Congress appropriated funds for INDICT. To date, INDICT
has not received funds, but we are told by the State Department
that INDICT will be receiving funds before the end of the
month.
INDICT also is not encouraged to look into evidence of war
crimes for fear of jeopardizing the future of this evidence in
the forthcoming tribunals.
We are encouraged by the statements of National Security
Adviser Berger to our delegation in which he said that the
United States is determined to help the Iraqi people remove
Saddam and is working diligently to achieve this noble aim. We
have had initial contacts with U.S. military officials to
discuss the commencement of drawdown assistance to the INC
under the Iraq Liberation Act. We look forward to the time when
this materiel and training can be used by the forces opposing
Saddam on the ground in Iraq. We recognize that there is an
urgent need for training and we are ready to commence training
immediately.
The Iraqi National Congress recognizes that the problems of
post-Saddam Iraq will be immense and complicated. But Iraq is a
rich country both in oil, water, and talent and can stand on
its own feet after the fall of the dictatorship. A significant
part of the credibility of the INC lies in our ability to
persuade the international community that we have plausible
plans for dealing with problems of Iraq in the political,
constitutional, economic, administrative, and security fields.
We are working with Iraqi and international experts to develop
and refine our plans in all these areas. We appreciate the
assistance and encouragement that the United States has given
us in these areas. However, development of the post-Saddam
agenda is no substitute to an active program to replace the
tyranny in Iraq. The Iraqi people are calling upon us to be in
the forefront of the effort to liberate our country.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to testify
before you again. I assure the U.S. Congress and the U.S.
people of our gratitude for your support in our struggle to end
the suffering of our people and to live in peace and freedom.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chalabi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ahmad Chalabi
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to be here today.
It has been fifteen months since I last had the honor to testify
before the Foreign Relations Committee. I am proud to come before you
again on behalf of the Iraqi National Congress, the voice of the Iraqi
people. The Iraqi National Congress represents free Iraq and we are
grateful for the help of the free people of the United States. We are
particularly grateful for the assistance of the United States Senate
and Congress. The Iraq Liberation Act, declaring United States' support
for removing the Iraqi dictatorship, has been a beacon to the Iraqi
people and we look forward to working with you closely on its
implementation.
The Iraqi National Congress calls upon the United States and its
allies to recognize what is already fact: the United States and its
allies are at war with Saddam's regime.
Last summer it was proven that Saddam had ballistic missile
warheads loaded with deadly VX nerve gas, an active biological weapons
program, and the potential for nuclear weapons in less than a year. In
August 1998, Saddam ended the last illusion of United Nations
inspections as required under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687 (1991). In response, the Congress passed, and the
President signed, Public Law 105-235 declaring that ``the Government of
Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its international
obligations'' under the Gulf War cease-fire and empowering the
President to ``take appropriate action, in accordance with the
Constitution and the relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq
into compliance.'' In finding that Saddam had broken the cease-fire and
directing the President to enforce the terms of the cease-fire this
Joint Resolution in effect stated that the Gulf war was not over.
Indeed, since Operation Desert Fox, over six months ago, a virtual
state of war has existed between the United States and her allies, and
Saddam's regime. The Iraq Liberation Act provides for significant
military assistance to the Iraqi National Congress to ``remove the
regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote a
democratic government to replace that regime.'' On the 31st of October
the President signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law. On November
15th, President Clinton announced that in response to Saddam's
continued defiance of international law that the United States would
make the removal of Saddam's regime the centerpiece of U.S. policy
towards Iraq. The Iraqi National Congress strongly welcomed this
decision. On December 15th, the United States began a military assault
on Iraq that continues to this day. Operation Desert Fox and the over
80 subsequent allied air-attacks using thousand of precision munitions
under broad rules of engagement in the no-fly zones have severely hurt
Saddam's military infrastructure.
Saddam considers this war. On the fifth of this month, Iraqi
Foreign Minister Sahaf formally protested to the United Nations on
behalf of Saddam, that the Iraq Liberation Act was illegal and that
relations with the Iraqi National Congress constituted ``aggression
against a sovereign state.''
The United States continues to recognize Saddam and Sahaf and the
rest of the gang as Iraq's government. Neither the interests of neither
the American nor the Iraqi people will be served by the current
suggestions in the United Nations Security Council to write one more
resolution, to make one more deal with Saddam's gang. We do not need
yet another resolution that Saddam will violate. What we need is bold
action. We believe that the United States should take the following
steps immediately:
--Protect the Iraqi people from Saddam's massive repression and ease
their suffering through a large-scale program of direct
humanitarian assistance that bypasses the regime.
--Broaden the rules of engagement for U.S. aircraft enforcing the no-
fly zones over much of Iraq to make all of Saddam's military
forces targets.
--Help the Iraqi National Congress to develop an alternative to the
regime and assist us, including all the brave Iraqis fighting
Saddam inside the country.
The Iraqi people need protection from Saddam's depredations.
Saddam's behavior since the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act has been
dictated by his preparations to deal with the consequences of the Act.
He has increased repression in all parts of the country because of his
perception of the threat he faces and his quest to avert danger. He has
divided the country into four parts and appointed close members of his
inner circle as military governors with unlimited powers. He has massed
troops against Iraqi Kurdistan in order to threaten the people of the
north. He has assigned his son Qusay to lead a campaign of mass arrests
and repression in the south while his secret services continue to
attack Shia religious leaders. This culminated in the recent murder of
the highly respected Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Al-Sadr. The spontaneous
demonstrations that broke out all over Iraq after Ayatollah Sadr's
murder were squashed with Saddam's customary brutality with hundreds of
deaths in Baghdad and other cities of Iraq. In addition, over a
thousand political prisoners have been executed in the so-called
``Prison Cleansing Campaign.''
The rules of engagement for allied pilots over Iraq have been
significantly broadened in the past year from simply intercepting
aircraft in violation of the no-fly zones to targeting air defense and
command and control facilities. We ask that the rules of engagement be
further broadened to include units of Saddam's military that are being
deployed against the Iraqi people. This will enhance protection of the
Iraqi people while further diminishing Saddam's apparatus of control.
U.S. officials have said that attacking Iraqi Kurdistan would lead to
military action. We ask for this undertaking to be spelled out clearly.
Saddam should know in no uncertain terms that he would be prevented
from crossing the line into all liberated areas of Iraq in the north.
Specifically, a statement would be made to warn against moving into
areas below the 36th parallel which are not part of the no fly zones.
Many brave Iraqis, associated with the INC, are resisting the
dictatorship on the ground inside Iraq, particularly in the south. They
are in contact with the Iraqi National Congress and they need support.
They are looking to get equipment and training through the INC under
the Iraq Liberation Act. Indeed they need all kinds of support to
resist the predatory dictatorship.
With the assistance of the U.S. Government, the Iraqi National
Congress has held four meetings of its Executive Council beginning with
the meeting in Windsor, England on April 7-8 which was attended by
representatives of the Clinton Administration and the Congress. My
colleagues and I were also very pleased to welcome your colleague
Senator Kerrey of Nebraska. At the Windsor meeting, the Executive
Council elected a seven-member interim presidency to lead the INC until
the expanded Iraqi National Assembly meeting in July elects a new
leadership. The Windsor meeting also reaffirmed the unity of the Iraqi
opposition and all the members of the INC reaffirmed their commitments
to the principles of democracy, pluralism, federalism and respect for
human rights. The Windsor meeting was followed-up by the visit of an
INC delegation to the United Nations. We have been vigorous in reaching
out to Iraqis of all groups opposed Saddam throughout the world. Also,
an expanded delegation of the Iraqi opposition made a successful visit
to Washington in May.
With the assistance of the U.S. Government we have reactivated our
campaign to focus attention on the crimes of Saddam and to maintain his
international isolation. Frank Ricciardone, the State Department's
Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, continues to work
tirelessly to help us in our quest to push forward the agenda of the
united Iraqi opposition and my colleagues and I commend his efforts. He
already has notable successes to his credit among the Iraqi opposition.
Also, he has visited several countries in the region to explain U.S.
policy.
Unfortunately the position of some of the regional states towards
Saddam's regime remains ambiguous. We say to our neighbors in the
region that we stand for the unity of Iraq while Saddam has divided the
country. We urge them to recognize that the suppressed talents and good
will of the Iraqi people must be released from the tyranny of Saddam to
ensure the peace and prosperity of the region. Most of our Arab
neighbors enjoy very special relations with the United States, they
must not begrudge us such relations. We look to the U.S. to help the
Iraqi people rid themselves from the scourge of Saddam and establish
democracy in Iraq. Our neighbors have nothing to fear from a democratic
Iraq.
We have called for a plenary session of the Iraqi National Assembly
in July. This body is the ultimate authority of the INC. The July
meeting will expand the INC and elect leadership for the future. In the
absence of firm security guarantees from the United States and its
allies, we, unfortunately, are not able to hold this meeting on Iraqi
soil as we did in Salahuddin in 1992. The INC Executive Council has
made a request to the Secretary of State to hold the meeting in
Washington. Similar requests have been made to a number of Arab and
European governments.
Kurdish reconciliation has been a fundamental step in the efforts
to energize and unite the opposition. We commend the U.S. Government's
role in brokering the Washington Agreement between the KDP and the PUK.
We hope that the Washington Agreement will be implemented fully and we
commend Ambassador Beth Jones' leadership role in the current
negotiations between the Kurdish parties.
Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier it is time for bold action. It is
time to call Saddam to account for his war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide. We need the support of the United States and
other friends of the Iraqi people to act in the United Nations to
convene a commission of inquiry into the crimes of Saddam's regime.
Secretary of State Christopher told an INC delegation in April 1993
that the United States supports the creation of such a commission and
the Iraq Liberation Act addresses at length the indictment of Saddam
Hussein and other war criminals in his regime. Perhaps the next session
of the UN General Assembly in the autumn will be the appropriate place
to pursue this. U.S. leadership on this issue is essential. We are
pleased to note the U.S. support of INDICT, the leading organization
campaigning on this issue.
We are encouraged by the statements of National Security Advisor
Berger to our delegation in which he said that the United Sates is
determined to help the Iraqi people remove Saddam and is working
diligently to achieve this noble aim. We have had initial contacts with
U.S. military officials to discuss the commencement of drawdown
assistance to the INC under the Iraq Liberation Act. We look forward to
the time when this materiel and training can be used by the forces
opposing Saddam on the ground in Iraq. We recognize that there is an
urgent need for training and we are ready to commence training
immediately.
The Iraqi National Congress recognizes that the problems of post-
Saddam Iraq will be immense and complicated. But Iraq is a rich country
both in oil, water and talent and can stand on its own feet after the
fall of the dictatorship. A significant part of the credibility of the
INC lies in our ability to persuade the international community that we
have plausible plans for dealing with the problems of Iraq in the
political, constitutional, economic, administrative and security
fields. We are working with Iraqi and international experts to develop
and refine our plans in all those fields. We appreciate the assistance
and encouragement that the U.S. has given us in these areas. However,
development of the post-Saddam agenda is no substitute to an active
program to replace the tyranny in Iraq. The Iraqi people are calling
upon us to be in the forefront of the effort to liberate our country.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to testify before the
Foreign Relations Committee again. I assure the U.S. Congress and the
U.S. people of our gratitude for your support in our struggle to end
the suffering of our people and to live in peace and freedom.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chalabi, and thank you
for your courage and your commitment and your hard work. You
lay forward an aggressive agenda, and it is a very encouraging
one to hear you articulate that agenda. I look forward to
discussing some of that with you a bit further.
Dr. Clawson, thank you for joining our committee and the
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. PATRICK CLAWSON, DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Clawson. Thank you. It is an honor to be here with you
today. I have submitted a statement for the record and, if you
will permit me, I would like just to summarize that briefly.
Senator Brownback. That will be just fine, and we will put
your entire statement in the record. You are free to summarize
as you see fit.
Dr. Clawson. Thank you very much.
After Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, the
Clinton administration decided that regime change was a
necessary goal rather than just a desirable aim. By publicly
identifying regime change as a policy objective, the United
States has put its prestige on the line. From now on, the world
will use a simple test to judge the success or failure of U.S.
policy toward Iraq, namely, is Saddam still in power?
Therefore, the policy of promoting regime change is not one
that should be done halfway. Success in this policy will depend
upon the vigor with which the policy is pursued. Regime change
is a realistic goal if, and only if, Washington puts itself
behind this effort, but it is not realistic if Washington sits
back to await others making it happen. The U.S. Government
should, therefore, devote vigorous effort to regime change
rather than presenting regime change as a long-term aim with
the implication that in the short term little will be done to
promote it.
It is in this context that we should consider the role for
the Iraqi opposition.
Replacing Saddam requires harnessing the potential inherent
in all the policy levers that the United States holds. That
means that we must coordinate military action, covert
operation, reducing Saddam's unsupervised oil income, as well
as support for the opposition. No one of these policies by
itself is sufficient to achieve the objective of regime change.
But taken together, the synergy among them creates the best
conditions for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, as well as
reinforcing the containment of Iraq.
U.S. military action can facilitate regime change,
especially when it targets the regime's internal security
apparatus, because that apparatus is the main obstacle to
overthrowing Saddam.
Covert action can diminish Saddam's image in the eyes of
his supporters, exacerbate strained relations between Saddam's
inner circle and the military, and it can stir up popular
discontent against the regime.
Reducing Iraq's unsupervised oil income, which amounts to
several hundred million dollars a year, cuts into Saddam's
ability to buy loyalty.
But it is support for the opposition which is the clearest
expression of America's commitment to regime change. Such
support, especially when it is given publicly and endorsed by
top officials, fosters the impression that the tide is running
against Saddam Hussein. Only when Washington demonstrates its
high level support for the opposition can it effectively lobby
regional governments to do the same. The more the United States
supports the opposition, the more regional governments will be
confident that Saddam will, in fact, go, and therefore they can
assist the opposition without facing eventual Iraqi
retaliation.
Some who would strictly limit U.S. support for the
opposition belittle its chances of accomplishing much. To be
sure, the opposition is unlikely to defeat Saddam's forces in
the field. But that is largely irrelevant. The issue is what
must be done to crack the aura of invincibility around Saddam
and his repressive apparatus. If Saddam's security
organizations are spending their time worrying about the
opposition, they will have fewer resources to repress outbreaks
of the seething popular discontent, and that will make more
likely opposition success either through a coup or through
uprisings.
If I may, let me address some specific measures which might
be taken to increase support for the opposition.
First, over the last 6 months, the United States has
stepped up its support for the opposition, but the support
remains low key and a secondary aspect of our Iraq policy. A
good indicator of where the opposition fits into overall U.S.
Iraq policy is to see how the opposition leaders were treated
during their recent visit to Washington, in comparison to their
reception 6 years ago in April 1993. Six years ago, the
opposition leaders saw the Vice President in the White House.
This time, when the opposition had been broadened to include
monarchists and prominent Iraqi Sunnis like former Foreign
Minister Adnan Pacachi, the opposition leaders saw the
Secretary of State, even though the administration had for
months been telling the opposition that the more broadly they
united, the higher the U.S. officials who would see them. This
distinction between seeing the Secretary of State and seeing
the Vice President matters to Saddam, to Middle Eastern
countries, and to the Arab public. It will be interesting to
see whether President Clinton sends greetings to the upcoming
meeting of the Iraqi National Assembly, and if so, how warm and
how specific those greetings will be.
Second, on the operational front, the opposition has been
unsuccessfully asking the United States to publicly commit
itself to strict enforcement of the existing U.N. Security
Council resolutions, especially U.N. Security Council
Resolution 949 which authorizes use of force if Iraq ``takes
any action to enhance its military capability in southern
Iraq.'' This is the so-called no-drive zone resolution. In
fact, the United States has rarely used the authority granted
by this resolution to hit at the tanks and other equipment that
Saddam has added to his forces in the south for the purpose of
hitting the opposition.
Third, the Clinton administration has announced that it
will begin using the drawdown authority contained in the Iraq
Liberation Act. Throughout the Middle East, not least of all in
Iraq, close attention will be paid to what kind of assistance
is provided under the drawdown program. Assistant Secretary
Indyk has said, ``to arm the Iraqi opposition is premature.''
Let us define a road map to maturity. The administration should
approach the opposition to develop a plan that includes
specific steps that each side will take to permit U.S. military
aid so that the opposition can expand the scope of its ongoing
military operations.
Next, there is the issue of what kind of non-lethal
equipment to give the opposition, specifically whether the
United States will provide what, in essence, are relief
supplies or whether the United States will provide equipment
designed to make the opposition more dangerous to Saddam. A
good barometer here is how much communication equipment and
training is included. Better communication equipment will let
the opposition report in real time on what is happening in
Iraq, and that could allow the opposition to identify when
Saddam is moving reinforcements into the no-drive zone or the
Kurdish areas, facilitating U.S. retaliation. Furthermore, the
ability to communicate and coordinate between different regions
and different cities could allow the news of unrest in one city
to spread elsewhere, increasing the prospect that the seething
discontent will erupt in riots.
In conclusion, President Clinton in his December speech to
the Nation said that the United States would support the
opposition ``prudently and effectively.'' Well, what is prudent
and effective is to put the full weight of the U.S. Government
behind that policy to which we have committed our prestige,
namely, regime change. Integrating vigorous support for the
opposition with well planned military action, covert
operations, and reduction in oil income will increase the
prospects for ending Saddam Hussein's rule soon. Plus, it will
bolster the containment of Iraq. The support for the opposition
should steadily increase as the opposition matures, with the
United States always pushing the process forward rather than
lagging behind.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Clawson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Patrick Clawson
what role for the iraqi opposition
While NATO aircraft have been bombing Yugoslavia, American combat
aircrews have also been engaged in another conflict, namely, a quiet
low-intensity war against Iraq. The differences between the two
theaters are many, not the least of which is the ultimate American
goal. The United States appears ready to live with Slobodan Milosevic,
whereas U.S. policy is now that Saddam Husayn must go. It took a long
time to come to this determination. Only after Congress passed the Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998 did the Clinton administration decide that
regime change is necessary, rather than just desirable.
Regime change is no easy goal; the prospects for success are
uncertain. However, by publicly identifying regime change as a policy
objective, the United States has already put its prestige on the line.
From now on, the world will use a simple test to judge the success or
failure of U.S. policy towards Iraq, namely, is Saddam still in power?
Saddam has already outlasted one U.S. president (George Bush); it would
not serve U.S. interests well if he outlasted another. The policy of
promoting regime change is not one that should be done half-way: it
should either be quietly buried or be put at the center of all U.S.
actions towards Iraq. And the simple fact is that success depends upon
the vigor with which the policy is pursued: regime change is a
realistic goal if Washington puts itself behind the effort, but it is
not realistic if Washington sits back to await others making it happen.
The U.S. government should therefore devote vigorous effort to regime
change, rather than presenting regime change as a long-term aim--with
the implication that in the short run, little will be done to promote
it.
It is in this context that we should consider the role for the
Iraqi opposition. Some see support for the opposition as the only
element necessary to achieve success in Iraq. This approach is
unrealistic. The opposition is unlikely anytime soon to create a
military force capable of defeating Saddam Husayn, even if supported
with American air power. Others see support of the opposition primarily
as a way to strengthen the containment of Iraq--limiting its ability to
threaten its neighbors and to develop weapons of mass destruction. This
approach is insufficiently ambitious, and it does not acknowledge the
need to take risks to change the regime in Baghdad before Saddam
rebuilds his weapons of mass destruction or containment collapses.
supporting the opposition as part of a multi-faceted policy
Replacing Saddam requires harnessing the potential inherent in the
four principal policy levers the United States holds--military action,
covert operations, reducing Saddam's unsupervised oil income, and
support for the opposition. No one of these policies by itself is
sufficient to achieve the objective of regime change. Taken together,
however, synergy among them creates the best conditions for the
overthrow of Saddam Husayn, as well as reinforcing the containment of
Iraq.
U.S. military action can facilitate regime change, especially when
it targets the regime's internal security apparatus. That apparatus is
the main obstacle to overthrowing Saddam Husayn; there is no shortage
of potential coup plotters or rebels. An air campaign that disrupts the
key security organizations communications and forces them to focus on
their own survival--and not that of the regime--increases the chances
that a coup or uprising will succeed. Moreover, new strikes might cause
Saddam to lash out verbally against Arab governments and Turkey (as he
did after Desert Fox), deepening his political isolation, while
reducing Iraq's ability to militarily threaten its neighbors--thereby
bolstering containment.
Covert action (with an emphasis on psychological operations) could
diminish Saddam's image in the eyes of his supporters, exacerbate
already strained relations between Saddam Husayn's inner circle and the
military, and stir up popular discontent against the regime. These
could lay the ground-work for a coup or uprising. At the very least,
these efforts would keep Saddam on the defensive and force him to
divert assets to deal with internal security, leaving fewer resources
available for clandestine technology procurement or trouble-making
elsewhere. This will also bolster containment.
Reducing Iraq's unsupervised oil income--amounting to several
hundred million dollars a year--cuts into Saddam's ability to buy
loyalty. Financial hardship could aggravate existing tensions among the
various Sunni tribal groups that form the bedrock of Saddam's power
base and foment unrest among these elements. The flow of unsupervised
income could be cut by renewed efforts to halt illicit Iraqi oil sales
via Syria and Turkey, to wean Jordan off Iraqi oil, and to stop
kickback schemes under the ``oil for food'' program. Less unsupervised
oil income also means less money for illicit arms purchases, which
reinforces containment.
Support for the opposition is the clearest expression of America's
commitment to regime change. Such support--especially when given
publicly and endorsed by top officials--fosters the impression that the
tide is turning against Saddam. It also undercuts the conspiratorial
view in parts of the Arab world that the United States really wants a
weakened Saddam Husayn to remain in power. Only when Washington
demonstrates its high-level support for the opposition can it
effectively lobby regional governments to do the same. The more the
United States supports the opposition, the more regional governments
will be confident that Saddam will in fact go and that therefore they
can assist the opposition without facing eventual Iraqi retaliation.
Plus, regional governments are more likely to support actions to
tighten the containment of Iraq if they need not worry that Saddam will
be around to exact revenge.
Some who would strictly limit U.S. support for the opposition
belittle its chances of accomplishing much. To be sure, the opposition
is unlikely to defeat Saddam's forces in the field. But that is largely
irrelevant. The issue is what must be done to crack the aura of
invincibility around Saddam and his repressive apparatus. If Saddam's
security organizations are spending their time worrying about the
opposition, they will have fewer resources to repress outbreaks of the
seething popular discontent. If emboldened protestors began to act on a
wide scale, an active opposition could catalyze and coordinate an
uprising, making what otherwise would be a riot into a regime-
threatening rebellion. Similarly, the busier that Saddam's security
organizations are chasing the organized opposition and spontaneous
protestors, the less they can do to detect and stop coup plotters. Plus
containment is strengthened when Saddam diverts time and resources from
the regular military to deal with the opposition--either because the
opposition is successful or because the loud U.S. support for the
opposition makes Saddam afraid.
specific measures to increase support for the opposition
Over the last six months, the United States has stepped up its
support for the opposition, but the support remains low key and a
secondary aspect of U.S. Iraqi policy. A good indicator of where
opposition support fits into overall U.S. Iraqi policy is how the
opposition leaders were treated during their recent visit to Washington
compared to their reception in April 1993. Six years ago, the
opposition leaders saw the Vice-President in the White House. This
time, when the opposition had been broadened to include monarchists and
prominent Sunnis like ex-Foreign Minister Adnan Pacachi, the opposition
leaders saw the Secretary of State--even though the administration had
for months been telling the opposition that the more broadly they
united, the higher the U.S. officials who would see them. These
distinctions matter to Saddam, to Middle East countries, and to the
Arab public. It will be interesting to see whether President Clinton
sends greetings to the upcoming meeting of the opposition Iraqi
National Assembly, and if so how, warm will they be.
Similarly, on the operational front, the opposition has been
unsuccessfully asking the United States to publicly commit itself to
strict enforcement of the existing UN Security Council (UNSC)
Resolutions, especially UNSC Resolution 949 which authorizes use of
force if Iraq ``takes any action to enhance its military capacity in
southern Iraq''--the so-called ``no-drive zone'' resolution. In fact,
the United States has rarely used the authority granted by this
resolution to hit at the tanks and other equipment Saddam has added to
his forces in the south for the purpose of hitting the opposition.
In the north, the Kurdish groups want to know what President
Clinton meant when he said that we ``remain ready to use [force] if
Saddam moves against the Kurds.'' Specifically, the Kurdish groups want
a guarantee that America will retaliate if Saddam attacks the Kurds in
retaliation for the opposition National Assembly meeting in the north.
The Clinton administration has announced that it will begin using
the $97 million in drawdown authority contained in the Iraq Liberation
Act. Throughout the Middle East, not least of all in Iraq, close
attention will be paid to what kind of assistance is provided under the
drawdown program. Assistant Secretary Indyk has said, ``to arm the
Iraqi opposition . . . is premature.'' Let us define a roadmap to
``maturity.'' Will the administration approach the opposition to
identify what must be done before arms distribution is appropriate--to
develop a plan that includes specific steps each side will take to
permit U.S. military aid so that the opposition can expand the scope of
its ongoing military operations?
And in the meantime, there is the issue of what kind of non-lethal
equipment to give the opposition, that is, whether to provide what are
in essence relief supplies or instead equipment designed to make the
opposition more dangerous to Saddam. A good barometer is how much
communication equipment and training is included. Better communications
would let the opposition report in real time on about what is happening
in Iraq. The opposition could then identify when Saddam is moving
reinforcements into the no-drive zone or the Kurdish area, facilitating
U.S. retaliation. The ability to communicate and coordinate between
different regions and cities could allow the news of unrest in one town
to spark unrest elsewhere, increasing the prospect that the seething
discontent will erupt in riots.
In sum, what is ``prudent and effective''--the words President
Clinton used in his December speech to the nation to describe how
America will support the opposition--is to put the full weight of the
U.S. government behind that policy to which we have committed our
prestige, namely, regime change. Integrating vigorous support for the
opposition with well planned military action, covert operations, and
reductions in illegal oil income will increase the prospects for ending
Saddam Husayn's rule soon, plus it will also bolster containment. The
support for the opposition should steadily increase as the opposition
matures, with the United States always pushing the process forward
rather than lagging behind.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Dr. Clawson. That was an
excellent statement and I think, unfortunately, an accurate
analysis from my perspective. It seems to me that we need to be
far more aggressive and far more specific and we know how to do
that. Witness the recent actions in Kosovo. We know how to be
aggressive and specific. And I hope that we can move the
administration toward that position here because I agree with
you as well that our prestige is on the line.
And you have got a regime that is very troubling to a
number of neighbors in this area. They do not want to see this
regime, and it is threatening to those neighbors far in excess
of what we see in some other regions of the world. So, this is
an important policy issue for the United States and on a broad
basis it is an important policy issue. So, thanks for your
testimony.
Ms. Francke. I hope I pronounced that correctly. Thank you
very much for joining us. We can take your full statement in
the record. If you would like to summarize, we would be happy
to receive it that way as well.
STATEMENT OF REND RAHIM FRANCKE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IRAQ
FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Francke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did, in fact, put a
statement for the record, and I will summarize and highlight
some points.
I would like to give a statement that gives you my
perception of the dynamics of the Iraqi opposition because I
believe that that is important in any kind of decisionmaking
that we are going to take.
Mr. Chairman, earlier this month, the official Iraqi media
offered a startling insight into the situation in Iraq. The
media announced that Saddam Hussein had met with senior Ba'ath
Party and security officials in the southern province of Basra
to urge them to restore the regime's control of the city. In
statements that were made public in the media, Saddam called on
his henchmen to ``spare no effort in thwarting the plans of our
enemies.'' He exhorted them to ``confront the influence of
hostile information,'' which Saddam described as ``greater than
the influence of bombs.'' And he also stressed the importance
of ``psychological preparation before entering the next
confrontation.''
Saddam was really talking not about an external threat, an
external foe. He was talking about the internal opposition in
southern Iraq that has made the situation in that region very
tenuous for the regime. It was a rare admission by Saddam of
the threat posed by the internal opposition and a rare display
of his fears. It is my assessment that the situation in Iraq in
general is far more explosive and volatile now than it has been
since March 1991.
Since the twin blows of the Iraq Liberation Act and Desert
Fox, Saddam's behavior has become more desperate and erratic
and has manifested in increased internal repression. This
internal repression has, in turn, triggered a response from the
population that has been steady and persistent since January.
What I have noted is that since the beginning of the year,
the resistance to the regime has been consistent, continuous,
and striking in its frequency and its tenacity. It is no longer
in isolated pockets in the southern marshes, and it is no
longer carried out by cross-border operations as it was from
1991 until early this year. I believe there has been a
qualitative change in the nature of this opposition in the
center and in the south of Iraq.
I am also struck by the geographic spread of the opposition
and by its spread through a very broad social spectrum of Iraqi
society. I would like to give you a few examples.
Dr. Chalabi commented on the spontaneous eruption of
demonstrations when the senior cleric Al-Sadr was assassinated
by the regime in February. The demonstrations and the
confrontations with the regime in consequence of that
assassination really went on for an entire month, and I do not
believe abated until late in March.
But in addition, in May a clandestine military group,
calling itself the Secret Organization of Iraqi Army Officers-
General Command, took responsibility for attacks in Baghdad
against buildings belonging to the secret services of the Iraqi
regime and took responsibility for the deaths of secret service
officers.
On June 14, a car bomb exploded in a Baghdad neighborhood.
This in itself is not unusual, but what was unusual was the
fact that the bomb exploded in a solidly middle class
neighborhood with a diverse population of Sunnis, Shi'a,
Christians, and even foreigners.
Back in March, a group of active and retired army officers
from some of the largest Sunni tribes in Iraq were plotting a
revolt centered in the northern city of Kirkuk. The plot was
foiled and the officers were executed.
Thus, it seems to me that the opposition has both spread
geographically, it has penetrated into different social
segments of Iraqi society, and it has been continuous and has
been sustained.
The question is, does this internal opposition mean that a
military coup or a popular uprising is about to overturn the
regime? Unfortunately, I do not believe so.
I want to take the military coup scenario first and say
that I believe the odds are overwhelming against a military
coup. Since 1991, there have been at least six verified
military plots and rumors of more. In every case, the plot has
been uncovered, the officer has been seized, and there have
been hundreds of executions as a result of the failure of these
plots.
It is virtually impossible to engineer a covert plan in
Iraq that can mature, gather momentum, and proceed to a
successful coup without being uncovered by Saddam and killed in
its early stages. Indeed, I would like to add that I doubt any
military faction can seize and hold onto power for more than a
few months in Iraq before being challenged by a rival faction
because of the fragmentation of the Iraqi army and because of
its division into regionalism and clan affiliations.
Coming to a popular uprising, I believe the obstacles
facing that were demonstrated in March 1991, and I do not
believe very much has changed. The civilian resistance in the
south and center of the country is geographically and
operationally disconnected. Communications within the region
where the resistance operates are difficult and the leadership
is dispersed. The resistance lacks a unified command and an
overarching political framework. As a result, although we see
increased activity, persistent activity, and bolder activity,
these activities are tactical rather than strategic. While this
type of resistance can debilitate the regime and sap its
resources, it lacks the concentrated and directed force to deal
a final blow.
In essence, there are three elements to the opposition
right now. We have an internal civilian resistance that engages
in open confrontation with the regime at great cost, but which
lacks organizational resources. We have dissident military
groups that repeatedly attempt covert coups, but fail and get
executed. And we have an external opposition. And I would like
to emphasize that I use this as a short term to imply the
opposition which is outside the control of Saddam's regime
either in northern Iraq or outside the country altogether. This
external opposition has had an uneven progress, but it
represents a wide cross section of Iraqi society and has
organizational potential.
The unfortunate thing is that these three elements are not
currently integrated, and yet they are interdependent and they
are complementary. And their integration is essential in my
belief to a successful effort against Saddam's regime. We need
to devise a strategy and support a strategy that knits these
strands together in a syncretic combination. A successful
challenge to Saddam requires, first, an opposition movement
with organizational capability, a unified strategy, and a
political vision. Second, it needs to include military and
civilian forces inside Iraq as part of that overall strategy.
And third, it requires a program that depends primarily on
overt activity and can capitalize overtly on the regime's
vulnerabilities and act as a magnet for Iraqis. Mounting such a
challenge requires much greater energy and boldness than an
overnight military coup, but I believe it is the only viable
strategy for challenging Saddam successfully.
Furthermore, I would add one indispensable element. A
unified Iraqi opposition that can act as this magnet, as this
organizational force requires a presence and an operation
inside Iraq but outside Saddam's control. Again, I believe this
is an indispensable component of an integrated strategic
solution. It is very well to speak of an external opposition
that is the voice of the inside opposition, that reflects the
aspirations of the Iraqi people, but I do not think this is
enough. I think the external opposition which is currently
external has to be internalized because this is the framework
that can bring together the disparate forces that are currently
working in Iraq but working without any organization and
without coordination. This is the opposition that has to
provide that coordinational framework.
For example, between 1992 and 1995, the Iraqi National
Congress, based in Iraqi Kurdistan, was able to establish
contacts with dissidents in government-controlled areas and
have the potential to provide such a political framework for
the forces actually confronting the regime. That experience,
while imperfect and not fully developed, can serve as a useful
model for the future.
I believe the ingredients for success in Iraq are there.
They need to be assembled. We have made great steps forward.
The Iraq Liberation Act is a step forward. The revival of the
Iraqi opposition is a step forward, and the efforts of the
administration to bring the Kurdish parties together to normal
relations is an enormous step forward. It is important that
this momentum that has been established be maintained and
developed. What concerns me is that we may lose the momentum,
and I am further concerned that in spite of these good steps,
we still do not have a conception of the process of change in
Iraq. We are doing disparate things, all of which are good, but
we are not pulling them into a unified whole.
Finally, I want to add that all these steps have addressed
the needs of the external opposition and not the needs of the
internal opposition, that which is functioning inside Iraq. I
will be very brief. The internal opposition itself needs a lot
of support because in the end that is the opposition that is
going to do the work, and that is the one that needs the
assistance.
I am often asked these following questions by people who
have contacts with the inside.
Will the United States support the resistance groups inside
Iraq?
Will the United States protect territory liberated from
Saddam's control in the south and the center of the country?
Why is the United States silent on providing real
protection for Iraqis in the south and the center who are
themselves being killed by the regime's paramilitary groups
every day?
These are important questions. I do not think they are
superfluous because the way we address these questions really
is going to determine the way we envisage the process of change
in Iraq. We have to look at these questions very carefully and
answer them squarely because they are going to determine our
future actions on Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Francke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rend Rahim Francke
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak about the
situation in Iraq. I speak in my personal capacity, and not in my
capacity as director of the Iraq Foundation.
1. The situation in Iraq today is closer to a boiling point that
ever since March 1991.
2. Classic modes of change, such as a sudden military coup, are
unlikely to succeed.
3. The United States can seize the opportunity and help a process
of change that can lead democratization in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, earlier this month, the official Iraqi media offered
a startling insight into the situation in Iraq. The media announced
that Saddam Hussein had met with senior Ba'th Party and security
officials in the southern province of Basra to urge them to restore the
regime's control of the city. In statements that were made public,
Saddam called on his henchmen to ``spare no effort in thwarting the
plans of our enemies.'' He exhorted them to ``confront the influence of
hostile information,'' which Saddam described as ``greater than the
influence of bombs.'' He also stressed the importance of
``psychological preparation before entering the next
confrontation.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ From Al-Hayat, June 18, 1999. See translation on
www.iraqfoundation.org
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rarely before has Saddam admitted the threat posed by the internal
opposition, or displayed his fear, or suggested that his regime's
control was shaky. It was an unprecedented public admission of weakness
from a man who knows he is sinking.
Since the twin blows of the Iraq Liberation Act and Desert Fox,
Saddam's behavior has been more desperate and his internal repression
even more brutal. Simultaneously, since January this year, Iraq has
seen a surge of resistance activity throughout the country, involving
increasing numbers of people across the social-political spectrum.
Opposition to Saddam's regime has been going on since the failure
of the uprising in March 1991. However, in January this year, and in
response to a particularly virulent campaign of terror in the fall, the
nature of opposition activity changed. Resistance activity is no longer
sporadic, confined to pockets in the southern marshes or carried out by
cross-border commandos, as it has been for several years. On the
contrary, today it is continuous and sustained, and striking in its
frequency, tenacity and boldness. Moreover, it has spread
geographically and across the social spectrum. This is an entirely new
development, and needs to be noted and evaluated.
In February this year, Saddam made the mistake of assassinating a
prominent Shi'a cleric. Cities in southern Iraq, as well as
neighborhoods in Baghdad, erupted into massive protests and armed
confrontations with Saddam's paramilitary. Since then, resistance
fighters have fought government troops daily, dissidents have attacked
government buildings, and there have been widespread incidents of civil
defiance.
The dissent is not confined to the south or to the Shi'a
population. In March, a group of active and retired army officers from
some of the largest Sunni tribes in Iraq were plotting a revolt
centered in the northern city of Kirkuk. The plot was foiled and the
officers were executed.
In May, a clandestine military group calling itself ``the Secret
Organization of Iraqi Army officers-General Command'' took
responsibility for attacks in Baghdad against buildings belonging to
the secret services.
On June 14, a car bomb exploded in a Baghdad neighborhood--not
itself an unusual event. What was unusual was the fact that the bomb
exploded in a solidly middle class neighborhood with a diverse
population of Sunnis, Shi'a, Christians and foreigners. There are
reports that the bomb exploded near a Republican Guard command post.
The situation in Iraq is more volatile now that it has been since
March 1991. The Iraqi people are resisting Saddam's rule everyday
throughout the country, without external help and at enormous cost to
their lives and the lives of their families. Thousands of men and women
have died fighting or have been executed. The regime has razed
villages, deported communities, and confiscated property.
Does this widespread and sustained dissent mean that a military
coup or a popular uprising is about to overturn the regime? I don't
believe so.
The odds are overwhelming against a military coup. Since 1991,
there have been at least six verified military plots, and rumors of
many more. In every case, the plot was uncovered in its embryonic stage
through a ubiquitous system of intelligence and security organs, or
through sheer fear. Hundreds of officers are known to have been
executed as a result--officers from the army, the Republican Guard, the
air force, and even the Special Republican Guard closest to the
presidency.
It is virtually impossible to engineer a covert plan that can
mature, gather momentum and proceed to a successful coup without being
uncovered by Saddam and killed in its early stages. In any case, the
Iraqi military is no longer a cohesive institutions with an
acknowledged hierarchy, but is riddled with factionalism. Indeed, it is
doubtful that any military faction can seize and hold on to power for
more than a few months before being challenged by a rival faction.
The obstacles facing a popular uprising were demonstrated in March
1991. The civilian resistance in the south and center of the country is
geographically and operationally disconnected. Communications within
the region are difficult and the leadership is dispersed. The
resistance lacks a unified command and an overarching political
framework. As a result, its activities are tactical rather than
strategic. While this type of resistance can debilitate the regime and
sap its resources, it lacks the concentrated and directed force to deal
a final blow. Thus Saddam's regime survives in Iraq not because of its
inherent strength but because of the organizational weakness of the
opposition.
There are three elements to the opposition:
1. An internal civilian resistance that engages in open confrontation
with the regime at great cost, but lacks organization.
2. Dissident military groups that repeatedly attempt covert coups,
but fail and get executed.
3. An ``external opposition,'' which is outside the regime's control
in Kurdistan or in a foreign country, that has had an uneven
progress but represents a wide cross-section of Iraqi society
and has organizational potential.
At present these elements are not integrated, and yet they are
interdependent and complementary, and their integration is essential to
a successful effort against Saddam's regime. We need to devise a
strategy to knit these three strands together in a syncretic
combination. A successful challenge to Saddam Hussein requires, first,
an opposition movement with organizational capability and a unified
strategy; second, inclusion of military and civilian forces inside Iraq
as part of this strategy; third, an overt program that can capitalize
on the regime's vulnerabilities and act as a magnet for Iraqis.
Mounting such a challenge demands greater energy and boldness than an
overnight military coup, but I believe it is the only viable strategy
for effecting change in Iraq.
A unified Iraqi opposition that operates inside Iraq but outside
Saddam's control is an indispensable component of an integrated
strategic solution because it can serve as the political and
organizational framework for confronting the regime of Saddam Hussein.
To be effective, such an opposition needs a credible presence inside
Iraq, whether in Iraqi Kurdistan or other region of the country. For
example, between 1992 and 1995, the Iraqi National Congress, based in
Iraqi Kurdistan, was able to establish contacts with dissidents in
government controlled areas and had the potential to provide such a
political framework for the forces confronting the regime. That
experience, while imperfect and not fully developed, can serve as a
useful model. Clearly, the closer the organizational base is to the
forces on the ground, the more effective it will be.
The ingredients for change are gathered in Iraq but they need to be
assembled. It is in the interest of the United States to help in that
process by strengthening and supporting the Iraqi opposition inside and
outside Iraq. The Iraqi situation was essentially frozen from 1996 to
1998, but there have been several welcome advances in the past twelve
months.
The Iraq Liberation Act has had a strong impact on the Iraqi
situation, signaling to Iraqis an explicit American backing for an end
to Saddam's dictatorship and open support for the Iraqi democracy
movement. The Iraqi opposition, stagnant since Saddam's invasion of
Iraqi Kurdistan in August 1996, has revived and is beginning to
coalesce for future action. There is still some way to go in re-
structuring and expanding the opposition umbrella, but I believe this
process can be successful. Finally, the Kurdish parties are being
encouraged by the U.S. Administration to restore normal relations and
conditions to the northern region under their control and participate
as full-fledged partners in the Iraqi opposition.
But the momentum established by these steps has to be maintained
and developed with more political, diplomatic and logistical support
from the U.S. If the momentum slackens, there will be renewed
disappointment and a return to stagnation, precisely at a time when the
internal situation in Iraq is critical and requires resolute movement.
Moreover, these steps have only targeted the ``external
opposition.'' Support is also needed by those daily fighting the regime
inside Iraq, and some linkage has to be established between work
outside and work within Iraq. Judging from the evidence, the United
States has so far neglected the forces inside Iraqi territory. I
recognize that supporting the resistance within Iraq is more
complicated and entails more risks than supporting the external
opposition, but ultimately it is this domestic resistance, both
civilian and military, which carries the responsibility for confronting
the regime and also bears the consequences its repression and terror.
Iraqis involved with the resistance often ask these questions:
--Will the United States support the resistance groups inside Iraq?
--Will the U.S. protect territory liberated from Saddam's control in
the south and center of the country?
--Why is the United States silent on providing protection for Iraqis
in the south and the center, who are being killed by the
regime's paramilitary troops and executed in its jails?
These questions are germane to the issue of how we want to confront
Saddam Hussein. I believe the United States should address these
questions squarely because the answers will be inseparable from the way
we envisage the process of change in Iraq.
Finally, I would like to stress that for thirty years the Iraqi
people have suffered under Saddam's brutality, compounded for the past
nine years by the deprivations of stringent international sanctions.
They feel that their dual suffering has received only lip-service from
the world, which has abandoned them and let them down. Helping Iraqis
is not only in the geo-political interest of the United States, but
also a moral imperative.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Ms. Francke. That
is a very thoughtful analysis of key questions.
What, Ms. Francke, do you think would be the most important
thing that the U.S. Government could do near term, now to
support the opposition and that would help to galvanize these
three parts that you were saying that are apart? What are the
things that we need to do right now?
Ms. Francke. Mr. Chairman, I think a very important step is
for the opposition to create a unified and broad platform for
itself and articulate its message clearly.
But as far as the United States is concerned, apart from
encouraging such unity, I think the most important step is to
find a way by which the Iraqi opposition, the INC or anything
that emerges from it, can have a base of operations in Iraq. I
think this is crucial. I personally saw what the INC could do
from Iraqi Kurdistan. It was impressive. It was not perfect but
it was very impressive. And I think this is an essential way
forward.
Senator Brownback. So, the first thing that we need to do
is to help establish a beachhead for the INC or whatever comes
out of the July meeting to operate inside Iraq.
Ms. Francke. Indeed, sir. I think so, yes.
Senator Brownback. And then have that link the three parts
together that you identified of the internal opposition, the
military coups that have been attempted, having them operate
internally.
Ms. Francke. I believe that if the opposition has a
beachhead inside Iraq, it can provide the organizational and
political framework. The political framework is to provide a
concept of what the political vision is for Iraq. How are we
going to operate politically? Organizationally the problem in
Iraq is that you have groups that are operating independently,
and there has to be some kind of unified command. I do not
think that can be done from outside the country. The unified
command has to be from within.
Senator Brownback. Is it more important that the INC, or
whatever comes out of the July meeting, operate inside of Iraq?
Is that more important than their meeting inside northern Iraq
in July, or would you put those as steps along the same
progression?
Ms. Francke. I would put those as steps along the same
progression. I think a meeting inside Iraq in July is very
desirable. However, it does not only depend on the Iraqi
opposition. It rather depends also on the U.S. administration.
So, there are two parties that have to agree to the
prerequisites for a meeting inside Iraq. I think it would be a
very good idea if it can be done, yes, sir.
Senator Brownback. And it strikes me that it would be as
well, that this is a very bold statement and it is a statement
of clear support. It is not a vague, private statement. It is a
bold statement of United States support. It is a bold statement
on the part of the INC, Mr. Chalabi. A meeting and an
organizational set within Iraq strikes me as some very
important things to do.
Mr. Chalabi, how do you react to the analysis of Ms.
Francke, what she puts forward of the steps that need to take
place? You articulated a number of things that you would
suggest for U.S. policy, many of which I took mental note that
I think sound very good. How do you react to her analysis?
Mr. Chalabi. I agree with her analysis of the opposition in
Iraq altogether, and I agree that these groups, these three
strands that she talked about, ought to be brought into focus
and work under a common leadership.
She referred to the experience that we were working with in
Iraq in the period she mentioned for about 4 years. That is in
fact what we were doing. We were integrating all the opposition
that existed in Iraq and linking it to the opposition that was
outside and enhancing communication between the two sides. We
were reporting in almost real time on the events that were
going on in Iraq, bringing the message of the Iraqi people to
the outside world and bringing the message of the outside world
to the Iraqi people. And we extended all this and we had
significant contacts with all the groups, military groups,
tribal groups opposing Saddam and we were working to get
everything into focus to move finally against Saddam.
That is what we need to do now. Let us not go back why this
did not work earlier, but that is in fact the consensus of
almost everybody on how to move forward. We need to move
forward and we have a vehicle for United States support and
that is the Iraq Liberation Act. It is now very important for
us to bring into focus all these groups and make use of the
Iraq Liberation Act.
Senator Brownback. Anybody on the panel. If the United
States took an aggressive position at this point and said we
are going to support a no-drive zone in southern, central, we
are going to protect from military movement opposition groups
that develop in those regions, we want to see the INC establish
itself within Iraq on Iraqi territory, is the fall of Saddam
imminent then with what you see? I realize that is a tough
question to predict, but several of you, a number of people,
have noted key factors that appear to indicate a weakness that
has not been there previously.
Dr. Clawson. Sir, if I may, there is the risk that we would
make this announcement and then Saddam would hit back to test
us as to how sincere we were and how committed we were. But
frankly, I think that risk is one that we should run because we
have put our prestige on the line to get rid of Saddam and
because, as the other speakers have noted, there is a lot of
evidence that Saddam is at the weakest state that he has been
at since 1991. The very fact that Saddam did not take advantage
of the war in Kosovo to try and strike back at us was really
rather surprising. That is really his wont. The fact that the
United States has hit Iraq more than 80 times during the course
of this year without Saddam provoking some international crisis
is something that is really quite unprecedented. He likes to be
on the front pages of the news and to strike back, and he has
been very quiet recently. It seems that he is quite weak.
If the United States were to make the kind of statements
that you spoke about, take the kind of actions you spoke about,
that would have a catalytic effect throughout the region and
many governments in the region would decide that the United
States is pretty serious about this and they might well do
things which are now rather unthinkable to help provide that
beachhead inside the country that Ms. Francke was speaking
about.
And there are many Iraqis who might take many more risks if
they felt that there was a powerful friend ready to help them.
So, I think the catalytic effect of the kinds of statements
that you are taking would suggest that we might well achieve
success, and the risk is with taking.
Ms. Francke. Mr. Chairman, I believe very strongly that
Saddam has remained in power not because of his strength, but
because of weaknesses in the opposition that confronts him, not
weaknesses in their will to confront him, but in their
resources and in their ability to get together and move against
him. The focus has been missing. He is not strong. He is very
weak. But there has not been anybody there to give a firm kick
to his rotting seat. I think that the process of change will
actually be rather rapid if all the resources are marshalled
including substantial and overt U.S. support.
Mr. Chalabi. Mr. Chairman, I would say to you clearly,
without equivocation, that if the United States announces no-
drive zones in the south, in the north, and west of the
country, in very short order Saddam would lose control over
those areas. We are in a situation which is very different from
Kosovo in one sense. The Iraqi military, unlike the Serb
military, do not support Saddam. We have been in touch with,
continue to be in touch with military commanders. They fear a
reprisal from Saddam, but if the United States announces a no-
drive zone in the south and in the north and in the west, the
situation will be very different. Saddam already has lost
control in the north, and this will embolden the Kurdish
leaders to take further overt steps to confront Saddam. And in
the south, I believe he would lose control very rapidly, and
that is very important because he would lose most of Iraq's oil
and Iraq's only access to the sea. With that, he cannot stay in
power.
Senator Brownback. Well, thank you all very much. It has
been an excellent panel, very thoughtful, very specific on its
suggestions, and good at articulating.
This is a very important issue for the United States and it
is very important issue for the world, and it is obviously a
very important issue for the Iraqi people and for their
freedom. Our objective is to support the people of Iraq so that
they can join that league of nations and so that they can have
the same vital human rights that everybody else around the
world enjoys. And I look forward to that day when that occurs,
and I hope it occurs sooner--much sooner--rather than later.
Thank you for joining us, for attending the hearing.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]