

IRAN: LIMITS TO RAPPROCHEMENT

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BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
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IRAN: LIMITS TO RAPPROCHEMENT

THURSDAY, JULY 22, 1999

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Brownback and Torricelli.

Senator BROWNBACk. The hearing will come to order. Thank you all for joining us today.

I want to note before I go to my opening statement that we have a memorial service going on for the two slain officers that took place at the Capitol. So our thoughts and prayers are with them and their families, and that may have some impact as well on others, other members that attend this session perhaps a little bit later.

I would like to welcome our panelists and everyone else here today to discuss the recent events in Iran and the implications for Iran's future and for the future of U.S. policy toward Iran. This hearing was postponed twice. We were originally planning to explore the progress President Khatemi has made in moving Iran toward democracy and the rule of law. In the meantime, Iranian students have answered this question and sent a very clear signal that progress has been disappointing, to say the least.

Yesterday commanders of the Revolutionary Guards reportedly warned President Khatemi that they are running out of patience at his moves toward political and social reform and blamed him for encouraging the sentiments that exploded in last week's pro-democracy demonstrations. The short-term outlook for more democracy in Iran appears bleak at the moment.

The administration had originally agreed to testify at this hearing, but since the events of the last 2 weeks the State Department's position is that a policy of public silence is the most prudent way to react. The fear is that any statement will be read as confirmation of the hard-liners assertion that the United States provoked the demonstrations.

We all know this is not the case. The recent uprisings were the result of oppressive internal policies and dashed hopes for more freedom which President Khatemi had promised. The administration's decision to avoid this issue can only achieve the very opposite of its weak intent. I cannot think of a policy that is more likely to

cause the Iranian public to believe that the United States is a guilty partner in the recent uprisings.

Rather than silence, the Iranian students need a reaffirmation of the principles that this Nation believes in: democracy, rule of law, and freedom of expression for all. The United States should not be hesitant to speak up for the principle of freedom of expression. It is very disappointing that the administration could even hesitate on such an important matter.

In fact, if one looks at the rhetoric of the hard-liners in Iran, there is very little the United States is not accused of doing repeatedly, even absent statements by the administration. Hiding our heads in the sand and pretending that if we lay low it will not happen is not keeping faith with those very ideals that this Nation stands for. Timidity does not suit our ideals well.

Also, even if one accepts the administration's argument, which I do not, why are they suddenly worried about coming forward to speak about Iran's foreign policy stance and U.S. policy in response to that? The fact is that there is little change in Iran's foreign policy and it is clear that Khatemi's moderate agenda does not extend beyond Iran. Under Khatemi Iran has continued its arms delivery to radical groups around the world, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran continues to seek to undermine the Middle East peace process, arrest innocent Jews and charges them with spurious accusations of espionage, and Iran has accelerated its missile program and will in a few short years, at the latest, have an ICBM capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Despite Mr. Khatemi's much-publicized message to the West calling for a dialog between our two peoples, one cannot help but note that the Iranian Government allows only a very small, select group of Americans to visit Iran.

What with Khatemi's disappointing message to the students that "Deviations will be repressed with force and determination" and the ongoing arrest and threats of execution on charges of which these students are clearly innocent, it appears that the so-called moderation of Iran's policy is but wishful thinking on the part of the West.

I look forward to hearing our panelists' views on this and on U.S. policy toward Iran in general. Our witnesses today, we have three witnesses and one panel: the Honorable Bruce Laingen, president, American Academy of Diplomacy here in Washington, DC; Dr. Azar Nafisi—and I think I probably mispronounced that. Give me the correct pronunciation?

Dr. NAFISI. "A-ZAR."

Senator BROWNBAC. "A-ZAR"?

Dr. NAFISI. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWNBAC. Is a visiting senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and Dr. Jerrold Green, director, Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

I want to thank the panelists for being here with us today on this very important and timely topic and one that we need to have a good discussion about just what is taking place in Iran and what the U.S. policy toward Iran should be in light of these circumstances and what we have seen in recent history and what we

have seen of elections and failed promises from those elections in Iran.

With that, I would like to turn to Mr. Laingen for his statement to put forward to us in front of the committee. Thank you for being here.

**STATEMENT OF HON. L. BRUCE LAINGEN, PRESIDENT,
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY, WASHINGTON, DC**

Ambassador LAINGEN. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for asking us. I applaud the fact that you are holding this meeting.

For the record, let me state—and I want to make a general statement and then I am quite prepared to respond to questions later about the events most recently in Iran.

Senator BROWNBACK. Good.

Ambassador LAINGEN. For the record, I served twice in Iran in my 40-year career in the Foreign Service. I am not now in government. I do not pretend to be that informed, if you will, and I have not been back to Teheran since I left, now soon 18, 19 years ago. But I have not lost interest in the place.

I would make my position very clear up front about policy. I favor the earliest possible dialog with that government in Teheran. In fact, I deeply regret the fact that we have not had contact, official contact, with that government, with that people, for soon 20 years, a country of immense consequence for us in that region.

Indeed, if it were possible I would favor immediate resumption of diplomatic relations, granted the difficulty of doing that. I have felt that way since January 20, 1981, from the time I boarded that Algerian aircraft on the tarmac in Teheran, not because I like that regime—I did not particularly like it then, I did not, and I do not today—but because the absence of contact in my view does not serve American interests. I proceed from that point.

Indeed, it complicates our strategic interests throughout the region, including those interests in the emerging central Asian states and their oil future. Our current policy denies us involvement with one of the largest emerging markets in the Middle East. It simply postpones the time when we need to deal directly with the Iranians about security issues in the Persian Gulf. And our policy has left us with inadequate contacts over these years with the future of Iran, that is its young people.

I simply cannot see that our sanctions-driven containment policy has worked. A poor word in any event, “containment.” Iran is not easily contained. Our capacity to change its behavior is limited. What may be beginning under Khatemi in my view is a product of the internal contradictions of that regime and not primarily or even largely because of outside effects.

To reiterate, I am no admirer of that regime. I do not like it now, I did not then. I do not like theocracies. I have seen them up close in Teheran. I returned, indeed, with a deep appreciation, a profound appreciation, of my great good fortune as an American to be living in a country with its traditions of separation of church and state. But it is reality, what is there today.

And I certainly do not appreciate its record in human rights. You, sir, and others probably have read the recent report of Amnesty International on the compilation of their record in human

rights in recent months and years, and it is not attractive by any means.

But to reiterate, it is reality. I believe it is a revolution here to stay in some fashion, although I am convinced it must and will change with time into something more compatible with Iran's own national traditions and Shi'a Islam.

I concede, Senator, I am a diplomat by training and experience and an optimist by nature, so I am prejudiced for those reasons toward dialog. But in all reality I see no other way to deal with the concerns to which you referred, and they are real, that we have vis-a-vis Iran except somehow finding a way to sit down and talking to them directly, or indirectly if necessary, through a third party if that were possible.

Their concerns are real, our concerns are real. I often in my wilder moments wish that some Iranians and Americans could go off somewhere like the Israelis and the Palestinians did, to Oslo, and come up quietly with some way to begin, in the first instance simply to begin talking about how we are going to talk about these issues.

It is long since past time to be talking at each other—that is what we have been doing—or past each other. But I am also a realist. It is clear that we have got a problem in talking when the other side is not open at the moment to talking. The supreme leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, is rigid on that point. Khatemi is on record, as he was in the CNN interview of now a year and a half ago, saying that Iran does not need a relationship with the United States. I believe in his mind he knows that they do.

Given that state of affairs, what to do? Well, to review where we have been, we have lowered our rhetoric. Both sides to some degree have done that, and in any effort to have a dialog one has to at least begin with that. We have taken some steps, as you know Senator, steps in the area of lifting sanctions dealing with food imports and medical supplies.

There has been some easing on visas on our part, although I think that is still very minimal, and certainly there has not been much on their part. We have removed Iran from our list of countries that facilitate the transit of illegal narcotics across their borders. We have responded favorably, at least in rhetoric, and I think the President has, to Khatemi's call for people to people contact.

There was a time about 8 months ago, a year ago, I think, when we got into a kind of pin-down diplomacy, reminiscent of ping-pong diplomacy with China, when our wrestlers went to Teheran and returned, and I was proud to have joined the President in the Oval Office to welcome them back.

These things are a start. Beyond that, yes, we need to be realistic. We are not likely to see much risk-taking there in the period leading up to elections next February or March. I concede full well that there is some danger in an embrace by us, a publicly evident embrace by us of Khatemi or any other of the reformers at this point. President Clinton expressed that concern very eloquently, I thought, yesterday and very well yesterday, and I think I would like to read into the record what he went on to say:

I think that people everywhere, particularly younger people, hope that they will be able to continue their religious

convictions and their personal opinions and dreams in an atmosphere of greater freedom that will allow them to be deeply loyal to their nation. I think the Iranian people obviously love their country and are proud of its history and have enormous potential.

The President has not failed to be on the record in recent months in that sense.

Beyond all of that, I believe myself that the charges of the risk of an embrace, granted that it is there, can be overstated and we need to be not quite that reticent. We are going to continue to hear the charges, no matter what we say or do, from the hard-liners about involvement by the great satan. But I believe that much, if not most, of informed public opinion in Teheran and Iran is weary of that and has set it aside.

Too much reticence in my view does not help us, because I think it is a given, I view it as a given, that our interests would be better served if the more moderate forces under Khatemi were to continue to progress. So I believe we should never fail to affirm our readiness for dialog. Secretary Albright has made that clear. I would like to see us—again I have to reiterate, I am not in government. I cannot be that well informed, obviously.

I would like to see us take a little more seriously what she said about looking for parallel steps that we can both take leading to what she called a road map that might lead to a better relationship. I think we need to keep in mind that the President has authority, as I see it, to make further steps in the area of sanctions that could be eased in that field and be a signal.

There is the possibility, as I understand it, and I am not that well informed, that in the area of spares for Boeing aircraft in Iran, for example, there might be something that we could do to move things along.

As all of us know, one of the places we do have official contact with the Iranians and have had for 20 years is The Hague Tribunal in the Netherlands, one of the more useful products of the Algiers Accord that brought us hostages back to freedom. There we have had official contact with Iranian legal representatives dealing with past claims that have been very large, but where progress has been made, and I would hope that we might be able to find some way to expedite that continuing process.

I do not underestimate the fact that your hearings today, the fact that you are holding them, will make an important statement back in Teheran. I would welcome more interest on the part of the Congress. I think there has been much too little expression of interest by the Congress, by representatives of the American people, about Iran and our problems there, because our interests are so large in that region and are so impacted upon by the fact of Iran and our problems with that country.

The bottom line, Senator, on the public record should always be clear—and we have Radio Free Europe, Radio Iran, to help make that clear to the people of Iran—that the American people look forward to the day when our two peoples can again have a productive, reasonably cordial relationship with each other, that we applaud President Khatemi's call for a dialog of civilizations and are ready to respond; that as a Nation with one and a half million roughly,

more or less, Iranian-Americans among us now who have chosen to make America their home, that we welcome any and all movement toward greater freedoms in that society under a rule of law and a civil society within that Islamic revolution.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator BROWNBACk. Thank you.

Dr. Nafisi, please. Thank you for joining us today.

STATEMENT OF AZAR NAFISI, PH.D., VISITING SENIOR FELLOW, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. NAFISI. I would like to thank you for asking me to testify today. It is a great privilege.

Senator BROWNBACk. If you could, that microphone is pretty directional, so you need to get—

Dr. NAFISI. Should I push it back or forward?

Senator BROWNBACk. Pull it forward toward you.

Dr. NAFISI. Forward? Usually I have to push it back.

I would like to thank you for the privilege of being here today to testify. I just also want to go on the record about my own background. Sometimes I am mistakenly called an Iran expert. I am an Iranian; I am not an Iran expert. Actually my field of expertise, which I think my experiences in the past 18 years in Iran has shown to be one of the most subversive in relation to an authoritarian regime, is English literature, and that is what I do, not just for a living but for being alive.

I have been spending—after I finished my degree, I went back to Iran in 1979 and in that capacity I have been teaching, writing, and working as a woman for human rights of Iranian women, as well as working very closely with the Iranian students.

In 1980 when the government made the veil mandatory in Iranian universities, I and three of my colleagues at the faculty of English literature and languages—Persian literature and languages, refused to wear the veil, refused to go to the university, and were expelled, and this system of sort of guerrilla warfare has continued until today, when I am sitting here and have the privilege to testify about my people.

I would like to concentrate what I want to say today about the situation in Iran today and what has happened during the past 2 weeks. I would also like to take the student protests of the past 2 weeks and the role various factions in Iran have played in these protests as a microcosm of what is happening in Iran.

So what I will do, I will pose certain questions and then try to answer those questions, and at the end of the conclusion then I will talk a little bit about what I think, at least, as an Iranian, as a woman, and as an academic, but most important as a person who does believe in certain universal values and in democracy, what the United States could do which would be helpful to the struggle of the Iranian people.

So the first question that I have been asked during the past 2 weeks is: Who are these students? How representative are they of the rest of the society? Sir, I would like to tell you that these students are what the government a long time ago, 20 years ago,

called children of revolution. It is now the children of revolution that are questioning the basic tenets of that revolution.

A few months ago one of the, Manoochehr Mohammadi, who later on, actually about 2 or 3 days ago, was seen on the Iranian TV—under torture he was brought to the Iranian TV to testify that he came to the United States as a spy and that he had meetings with different Zionists and imperialist agents in order to work against his country.

Now, Manoochehr Mohammadi and another student rebel leader, Tabarzadi, these are representative of what the student body in Iran is today. Unlike what certain papers and op-eds have been saying, they do not come from the more comfortable section of the Iranian society. Seventy percent of the student body in Iran is the government's share. They come from the families of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, the Islamic militia, and families of the martyrs of the war with Iraq.

So the body of the students as represented by Mohammadi and Tabarzadi, both of whom are in jail now, are people who either come from families who belonged to the revolution, who were faithful to the revolution—Tabarzadi's two brothers were killed in the Iran-Iraq War—or they come from families who or they themselves as young people, like Mohammadi when he was 13, participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah.

These students today have changed the name of their organization from the Islamic Students Association to the Democratic Students Association.

I will go into more detail into what they are all about. These are the people who 20 years ago demonstrated so that I would be wearing the veil, and now when they come to Washington I would be one of the people they want to talk to. These are the people who not only said "Death to the Shah," but said "Death to the nationalists," to the Prime Minister Mossadegh. But now the Iranian Government is asking you to apologize for the 1953 coup. In fact, the Iranian Government has always been anti-Mossadegh, anti-nationalist, and one of the reasons for the torture of these students in jails right now, as they said to the radio here in Los Angeles, is the fact that they have been using the slogans that are pro-nationalist and pro-Mossadegh.

Now, what I want to say is that the change within the last 20 years has been very significant within the Iranian society, and these changes come from within that society, because when this revolution began my people went into the streets not wanting to take away their rights, but wanting more rights. They did not know what an Islamic republic meant, but their main slogans were for more political participation and for more social participation.

The contradictions we are confronted with now and the contradictions that the students here represent today come from using a religion and using it as an ideology and imposing it upon a very vibrant and dynamic society. So this is the problem that Iran is facing today.

Now, who are the allies of these students? How representative are they? As I said, since they come from the families of people who were supportive of the revolution and since the demonstrations

that started in Teheran spread to 17 other cities in Iran, you will see how all-embracing these demonstrations were.

Not only that, but the way the Iranian citizens acted in the streets in support of the students was very reminiscent of the 1979 revolution. People were passing students ice water and they were reprimanding the Revolutionary Guards and the militia, telling them: Why are you killing your own brothers? You should be ashamed of what you are doing.

Senator, if you know anything about a country like Iran you would know that 25,000 people coming into the streets to oppose the policies of the government are putting their lives on line, so it is very difficult to bring those people into the streets. But 100,000 people coming to the call of the government is nothing. Even during the Shah's time, there would be bus loads of people from government, from schools.

This time, Elaine Sholino in a report from Teheran also talked about the fact that the militia were told to wear civilian clothes and to participate in these demonstrations. So 100,000, when before they could bring a million people into the streets, is nothing and it shows how disappointed and disenchanting the Iranian people are with the state of their affairs.

The students, their demands and their slogans, and I will come to their slogans in a few minutes, reflect what the majority of Iran's nascent civil society has been asking, especially in the past 2 years. They were protesting very peacefully against the banning of the moderate paper Salaam, which by the way has been published for the past 10 years without being banned.

They were also protesting against a very repressive press law that was passed by the Iranian parliament. They were also asking for the trial of the murderers of the nationalist and secular leaders Daryush and Parvaneh Forouhar and three others to be brought to justice. This is what their demands were.

In these demands, they were supported not just by secular and nationalist forces. There was in fact support from people filling the ranks of the clerics. The Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, who is the highest ranking cleric in Iran, wrote a two-page virulent attack on how the government acted in this matter. Ayatollah Taheri of Esfahan did the same thing. There is a great deal of unrest within the younger clerics.

During the past 2 years, those who have been victims of this government, thanks to Mr. Khatemi, have been in fact people who were from within the wombs of the Islamic revolution. I will bring you two examples: Mohsen Kadivar, a young, very popular cleric who is now in jail and on whose behalf the students have also been protesting and demonstrating, and Hojatoleslam Sayidzadeh, who protested against the repressive laws against women.

You know that the laws against women—the rule of law that Mr. Khatemi is talking about is no Magna Carta, sir. This is the law which has changed the age of consent for girls from 18 to 8½ lunar years. So a girl of 8½ will be married, but a woman who is 50 years old cannot be married for the first time without the consent of her father.

This is the law that stones men and women for the crime of adultery. This is the law that does not consider women as whole human

beings. Women are considered as half a man, so two women witnesses will take the place of one man. So these are the laws that we are talking about when we are talking about the rule of law.

Above all, this is the law that has the supreme leader, religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the sole person who can say yea or nay to anything that goes on in that country today.

Now, what I want to say then is that the important thing is not that people like me, who were never enchanted by the revolution, are now today disenchanted. Today people who came from the heart of the revolution, who were in fact the instruments in creating this revolution, are now disenchanted, and that is why the government feels such a threat.

What are the people who attacked the students? I would not go into that, sir. You yourself in your statement talked about the vigilantes who, with the aid of the police, ransacked and threw the students from the rooftops of their dormitories.

But I would also like to bring to your attention that in the reports from the demonstrations one person who was badly wounded, and that is why he was discovered, belonged to the Hezbollah in Lebanon. So it is not just the vigilantes in Iran that are sort of participating in these demonstrations.

The last—the next point, and then I will try to come to my conclusion that I would like to make, is what do these people want? I would like to draw your attention to the slogans that these students have used. At the beginning of the revolution the slogans were “Death to America,” “Death to Zionism.” Now their slogans are “Death to Despotism, Long Live Liberty.”

They have specific targets as despots. Nobody in Iran in their right or wrong mind would dare come into the streets and say: We do not want the Islamic republic. They did not say that, sir. But let us see what they did say. Their slogans were mainly targeting Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the supreme leader, the judiciary system, the Iranian parliament, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and the Iranian militia. So who is left? You do away with these, you still want the Islamic republic, fine.

Were there any specific Islamic slogans, the way there used to be before? No, there was not. As far as I can tell—I cannot be sure about that—there was not one mention of even Ayatollah Khomeini.

Who were the main favorable targets of these slogans? The nationalist leaders and Prime Minister Mossadegh, plus the press. Did they ask just for the freedom of Islamic prisoners? No, they asked for the freedom of all political prisoners, the freedom of all expression.

Those who say that the Iranian people do not want democracy, they only want Islamic democracy, should define for us what does “Islamic democracy” mean? Do you have Christian and Judaic and Zoroastrian democracy? Do you want democracy and then stone men and women on charges of prostitution? The slogans of the Iranian students today, which has been supported by the various progressive forces within Iran, tells you exactly what kind of democracy Iranian people want, and it is neither Western nor Islamic. It is democracy.

The last part is the role of the regime. I think the Khamenei group and what is now called the hard-liners, their position is much simpler and actually I think it is much more understandable. Mr. Khamenei knows that any radical reform in Iran would lead to his ouster and he has nowhere to go. So he will use violence and he will consistently call the Jewish prisoners, the Bahais, the women, the progressive clerics, and now the students as agent provocateurs of Zionists and American agents.

Those who talk about a policy of silence should know that if America, if international organizations, keep silent, that would not mean that you would not now be implicated. What it would mean is that you are now complicit in the guilt that these people are trying to attach to the students.

I would like to bring your attention to the fact that each point in the case of Faraj Sarkouhi, the Iranian journalist, in the case of Sayidi Sirjani, in most cases in Iran where somebody's life was under threat, only the international organizations, only because of the pressure from abroad, did the regime do anything about it.

The students today have a web site. They have e-mail. They are asking for help from all strata and sectors of American or any other democratic society. So this silence is not to anybody's advantage.

Mr. Khatemi's position is more problematic. He is a paradox. On the one hand, in order to be elected he has to believe in the basic tenets of the Islamic regime and he has shown it, especially in the recent events. On the other hand, his agenda is an agenda that would be shaking the very foundations of that regime.

He should be judged according to what he does. As one of my students says, he has created an Islamic republic of words, which are democratic in words, but in an Islamic republic of action we have not seen any change. So we should—we should support Khatemi whenever he is doing right by the Iranian people and we should not support him and condemn him whenever he does not do so. So the good guy-bad guy formula does not apply.

The last point, and this is the last point that I would like to make, what you can do. This is the best, the golden opportunity for you to create a people to people dialog. Up to now the people to people dialog has been mainly the Iranian people, the Iranian members of the Iranian regime or members of Iranian civil society come here under the monitorship of the Iranian regime.

You should reach out your voice. After all, Mr. Khatemi correctly reached out to the America people. Why do you not? If you want stability in Iran, if you want the three conditions fulfilled, then you have to create a base, and the base should be democratic.

The Iranian people are in the streets today and telling you what they want. I think you should support them. This dialog with the government is fine. It is not the American Government who does not want dialog. It is the Iranian Government who is not in a position to have dialog.

So I would like to ask you—the lives of Mr. Mohammadi, Mr. Tabarzadi, and 1,400 people who have been arrested are in jeopardy. I would like to ask your support. I would like to end this by a message that the Iranian students—and this is the legitimate council that supports Mr. Khatemi—sent to Mr. Khatemi. I am

quoting them in their message. They told him: "The courageous Iranian people will judge your actions and will discover whether your declarations concerning civil society and so on are merely political or sincere."

I think this is the way the Iranian people will judge who their friends and who their enemies are. Thank you, sir.

Senator BROWBACK. Thank you, Dr. Nafisi. That was an excellent and very passionate statement, and I hope we can get from you the names of these freedom fighters that are imprisoned and whose lives are in peril, so that we could put their names forward for the rest of the world to see.

Dr. NAFISI. I have already given their web site and also the names that I got from the web site this morning, sir. I would appreciate that.

[The information referred to follows:]

(Press Release: 7/18/1999)

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED—(PARTIAL AND KNOWN TO US)

Followings are list of some of the people arrested in Tehran on or about Tuesday July 13, 1999 and thereafter. This does not reflect the complete list of arrested individuals. We are concerned that they may be tortured and executed.

Please publicise these names in order to put international pressure on Iranian authorities not to harm them.

These names are given to us by responsible people we know in Tehran. Please send us the names of any individual arrested with the source of information.

LATEST INFORMATION: Mrs. Elaheh Amir Entezam was arrested one hour ago. Abbas Amir Entezam reported that as many as 2000 arrested people were brought to Evin Prison and they are being tortured.

THE ENTIRE LEADERSHIP OF TABARZADI GROUP, including Seyed Javad Emami and Salamati, except Parvz Safari, were arrested.

Information issued by Shoraye Montakhabe Daneshjooyane Motahassen in Tehran Saturday, July 17, 1999 (Representative Council of Sit In Students)

One Female Student named Haami-Far was killed. Many more youths have been killed.

Other reports by Mohammad Milani from Daftare Tahkeim (Office of Strength) stated that:

CITY OF ESFAHAN—20 students arrested among them 5 female and Mohammad Majidi was beaten severely and was unconscious for many hours.

CITY OF TABRIZ—Vigilante groups armed with sticks and guns attacked students, 16 people were injured and they were taken to the hospital which was reporting they have been kidnaped from the hospital beds and their whereabouts is unknown.

Over 1400 Students and other Activists have been arrested.

Hezbe Melate Iran (Iran Nations Party, founded by Martyr Darioush Forouhar)

1. Khosrow Saif (One of the Leaders and Spokeperson, 70 years old).
2. Bahrām Namazi (One of the Leaders).
3. Safarifar (Kermanshah Leader).
4. Mir Abdolbaghi Kashani (Kermanshah).
5. Mehran Gorkani.
6. Farzin Mokhber.
7. Esmail Moftizadeh.

Jonbesh Democratic e Melli e Iran

1. Maryam Shansi (Maloos Radnia) (See Amnesty International Communiqué of 7/14/1999.)
2. Several other members have escaped the wave of arrests and are in hiding.

Andjomane Daneshjooyan va Daneshammokhtegan e Melli

1. Manouchehr Mohamadi.
2. Gholam-Reza Modjerejad

Anjomane Daneshjooyan va Daneshamookhtegane Islami, (Islamic Society of Students and Graduates, Tabarzadi Group, Tabarzadi was jailed before)

1. Mohammad Reza Kasraii (along with many more).

Hezbe Marze Porgohar, (Glorious Fronteirs Party)

1. Roozbeh Farahanipour (Chief Editor of Vahoumen Mag).
2. Hossein Ghadyani.
3. Davoud Ahmadi Mounes (Armin) (Caricaturist of Zan Magazine, 17 year old).
4. Afshin Tajian.
5. Hossein Zahmatkash (Fotographer of Neshat Daily News).
6. Maryam Danaii Broomand (Author of Forgotten Letters of Hedayat).
7. Maryam Taadi (Reporter of Khordad Mag).
8. Farima Kolahi.
9. Anahita Najafi.
10. Forough Bahmanpour (8,9,10 all Journalist of Free Trade Zone Magazine).
11. Mrs. Nasiri (Mother of Roozbeh Farahanipour) was arrested 24 hours after her son.

Unknown affiliation

1. Ms. Doctor Behieh Jilaani.—Based on information provided by Majame Islami Iranian, (Societies of Islamic Iranians). Announcement of 13 July 99.

The following individuals are either killed, injured, jailed or disappeared without any trace

1. Abbas Karami.
2. Ghorbanali faraji.
3. Morteza Hadadi.
4. Hamid Aghajani.
5. Mohammad Salary.
6. Mehdi Bazazadeh.
7. Amrollah Mir Ghasemi.
8. Davood Movahedi.
9. Alirreza Zamani.
10. Ahmad Darvish.
11. Mohammad Ghandi.
12. Baig Baler Saneei.
13. Alireza Sohrabian.
14. Zakeri.
15. Obaidi.
16. Naeimi.

Some of these arrests were carried out with violence at peoples residence such as shooting at windows and walls of Reouzbeh's house.

Please utilize these names in your activities and send them to various, international organizations.

We are concerned about the safety and lives of these and many other arrested people. We demand immediate release of the students and activists arrested.

LONG LIVE LIBERTY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN IRAN

The Student Movement Coordination Committe for Democracy in Iran—
www.iran-daneshjoo.org
iranstudents@hotmail.com
+1 (972) 504-6864

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you.

Dr. Green, thank you very much for joining us. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF JERROLD D. GREEN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST PUBLIC POLICY, RAND CORP., SANTA MONICA, CA

Dr. GREEN. Let me begin by saying I have written a statement which I hope will be entered into the record.

Senator BROWNBACK. Yes, it will.

Dr. GREEN. I do not want to go over what is in there, but instead to raise a few other issues.

Second of all, I would like to thank you for devoting so much of your precious time to discussing Iran, which is enormously important. I am privileged and delighted to be here to share my limited insights with you.

I am a political scientist. I began my study of Iran in the 1970's, wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on the Iranian revolution, and did field work in Teheran during the revolution. I have been back to Teheran twice since then. I have been involved in assorted track two meetings with various Iranian officials, who are indeed officials, monitored by Teheran, and who are limited in terms of their ability to influence change, both domestically and internationally.

One thing in which I remain interested is U.S. policy toward Iran. Having witnessed a rather shameful episode in our own history in terms of our ability to deal effectively with events in Iran in 1978-79, I am keenly committed to trying to think as systematically as I can about U.S.-Iran policy, the importance of which seems evident.

I think it can be synthesized to several points. The first is, what do we want in Iran? There are three areas in which we have had significant disagreements with the Government in Teheran. The first is the use of terrorism; the second is rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process; and the third is Iran's attempt to develop WMD capability and, in particular, a nuclear capability, specifically with assistance from Moscow and others.

Although there has been some progress on some of these divisions, there has also been backsliding. It is quite clear that progress has been insufficient, although we tend to be somewhat charitable about this insufficiency. This is because of President Khatemi, the speech he made to the American people on CNN, and an inchoate sense that he is a good guy with good values with whom we can deal. None of this has been articulated or has been fleshed out to my satisfaction.

The other issues, which are more recent, include the arrest of 13 Jews in Shiraz on charges of espionage for Israel, which have not been documented and are in my view highly unpersuasive, and subsequent events that are occurring not only in Teheran, but in Tabriz and elsewhere throughout Iran, as described by my colleague Dr. Nafisi.

It is within this context that the U.S. needs to figure out what is its policy, what are our strategic interests, what is it we would like to see happen in Iran, and what outcome would we like to see occur. This has not been articulated to my satisfaction.

The second question we have not talked about today involves how our Iran policy affects our broader regional interests. Significantly, one of the forces that led to a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, limited as it may be, was in fact a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement.

It is interesting to look at Iranian diplomacy and at its foreign relations. Foreign Minister Kharrazi recently visited Amman in Jordan. There has been an improvement in ties between Iran and Lebanon, not only Hezbollah, but the government of Lebanon itself. There was a very successful state visit to Italy, and a failed state visit to France because President Khatemi was unwilling to have

himself photographed at a dinner table littered with wine bottles and the French, being as devoted as they are to wine, were unwilling not to serve wine and therefore the visit was canceled.

Germany also canceled a state visit, because of the arrest of the Jewish prisoners in Shiraz.

Senator BROWNBACK. I thought you were going to say there were beer bottles on the table in Germany.

Dr. GREEN. When I was writing my statement I was feeling very eloquent, talking about a conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and French oenophilia!

In any case, it is quite clear that there is a lot of uncertainty and for us to conceptualize Iran in isolation from our other regional and global interests is a serious mistake. Israel is frequently invoked in a way that portrays the Israelis as being somewhat more monolithic on the Iran issue than they are. In fact, in Israel now, there is an interesting debate going on about what Israel's posture should be vis-a-vis Iran. There was an important dissenting piece written in one of the main Israeli newspapers, by a professor in Jerusalem.

The Israelis themselves are trying to grapple with the Iran issue, and the forces that led to these hearings have been outstripped in my view by the arrest of the people in Shiraz and other recent events in Iran. The question of rapprochement, dicey to begin with, may appear to be even more uncertain now because of these recent events.

Other regional issues which I think are important to talk about include Afghanistan, in which the United States and Iran for different reasons have problems with the Taliban as well as Pakistan, with its nuclear test. The foreign minister of Iran was in Islamabad within a week of the test talking about the Islamic bomb, which, put differently was, you have nuclear devices, we do not, what are the implications for us in Iran. Iraq is another area to which I think we need to be attentive.

I am not arguing for U.S. policy coordination with Iran on all these issues. More sufficient attention is needed however, about how our position and policies toward Iran affect our regional interests and even our global ones. A lot of time has been spent trying to persuade the Russians to halt their provision of WMD components to Iran without a great deal of success.

My next question is whether we can in fact have any impact on Iran or on events in Iran either through engagement or through containment? These are the two bookend positions. One argues that we engage the Iranians in the way in which the Europeans did. The other is that we contain them, as was the case with what used to be called dual containment.

Do either one of these really make a difference? Can we really have an impact on Iran, either domestically or regionally? Again, we could have a vigorous debate about precisely this issue. The reality is that I am not certain about the degree to which we can have an affect on Iran. Second of all, I am not certain the degree to which we want to have an affect on Iran, given our important strategic relations with a number of other partners including Saudi Arabia, our NATO allies, and others. It is really difficult to talk about Iran in isolation from all of these factors.

The next point involves whether we have partners in Iran with whom we can work? In other words, let us assume that we articulate a policy toward Iran. Our policy toward Iran needs an Iranian component. We need people with whom we can collaborate, people with whom we can talk, people with whom we need to run past our ideas, our expectations, and so forth. Again, I am not certain that there are people over the long haul with whom we can collaborate in Iran, certainly not President Khatemi by himself.

It is with these issues that I am deeply concerned, as we cannot have an Iran policy without Iran in it. The question is, with whom do we deal vis-a-vis this Iran policy? I have been in countless track two meetings with Iranian Government officials. I always find them beneficial although I always wonder why the meetings happen in Europe, how representative are the people with whom I am meeting. I find them fascinating, I find them important, but at the end of the day I am not certain that these people have the ability to forge the kind of deal that we would like.

Let me conclude. I think that this issue needs to be linked to the question of what is the U.S. interest in Iran, what are our strategic objectives, and how do we hope to accomplish them? As simple as this formulation sounds, it has been bedeviling us for 20 years. I saw it on the streets of Teheran, I saw it in the American Embassy in Teheran during and after the revolution. I have seen it elsewhere in the Middle East, and I think until we get that right, the rest of our discussion is just that. Discussion is interesting and informative, but I am not certain that the absence of focus is taking us down the road that we wish to take.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Green follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JERROLD D. GREEN

INTRODUCTION

In recent times we have begun to see a gradual but subtle decline in the acrimony that has characterized mutual perceptions of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. From the Iranian perspective, the most undeniable sign of improvement began with President Mohammad Khatami's address to the American people via a CNN interview where he advocated a "dialogue of civilizations." Other indicators have included an assortment of Track II type meetings between Iranians and Americans, sporting competition between the two countries, a modest increase in U.S. tourism to Iran, opportunities for American students to study in Iran, and a variety of other extremely limited improvements. Far more significant have been comments by senior American officials such as a speech delivered by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the Asia Society last spring, and more recently, comments made by President Clinton at a Holocaust Day memorial ceremony at the White House. Other factors which have contributed to an improvement include public statements by such well known Americans as James Baker and Lee Hamilton, as well as a *Foreign Affairs* article by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft. The common theme linking these pronouncements is a generalized recognition of the importance of Iran, and the utility to the United States of gradually re-establishing some sort of relationship with this key country. These efforts have been aided by the fact that most U.S. allies have improved their relations with Iran. The United Kingdom and Iran have agreed to re-establish diplomatic ties at the highest level, reflecting British satisfaction that official Iranian government support for the assassination of Salman Rushdie has come to an end. Having said this, the bounty on Rushdie's life by an Iranian *bonyad* (foundation) remains in place and was even increased in value. In this apparent paradox, we find intra-Iranian disagreement about ties with the West which remains a primary impediment to greater U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. Finally, other actions which have generally been interpreted positively in Tehran include the unwillingness of the White House to enforce the

Iran-Libyan Sanctions Act (ILSA) on foreign oil companies dealing with Iran (the French company Total being the company in question), a recent suspension of the use of food and medicine as an economic weapon by the United States which could clear the way for an American grain sale to Iran, and a general lessening of tensions on both sides whose significance is important but should at all costs not be exaggerated.

LINGERING PROBLEMS

Although it appears that most Americans, official and otherwise, seem to be persuaded by President Khatami's overture to the American people, it must also be recognized that the three issues that have traditionally divided the two countries, from an American perspective, remain significant, even though the magnitude of their significance may have lessened over time. The first of these is reliance by the Islamic Republic on terrorism which clearly has diminished in recent years. The next gap results from Iran's opposition to the American brokered Arab-Israeli peace effort. For various reasons, this too seems to have diminished in significance. In part, this diminution is a reflection of a reported discussion between the Iranian leadership and Yasir Arafat at the OIC meeting in Tehran in which Arafat was told by his Iranian interlocutors that although the Islamic Republic might not favor an agreement made between Arafat and the Israelis, that whatever agreement Arafat chose to make would be accepted by Tehran. The diminished pace of the Arab-Israeli peace process has made Iran's aversion to it somewhat less significant, although the salience of this problem will continue until Iran is willing to publicly and unconditionally accept any Arab-Israeli peace arrangement deemed acceptable by Israel and the Arab world. Having said this, a debate about Iran, not unlike that being held in the United States, is also emerging in Israel with knowledgeable Israelis trying to reassess Iran's regional role and its implications for Israel in much the same way that Americans have conducted parallel assessments of their own of Iran.

The final issue, and the one that remains of greatest significance, is Iran's attempt to develop a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. Here, the particular concern of the U.S. is Iran's drive to acquire nuclear weapons. From an Iranian perspective, acquisition of these weapons can be understood as a reflection of Tehran's concern about Iran's regional status and attempts by its neighbors to acquire the same weapons. The recent nuclear test by Pakistan, efforts by Saddam Hussein to acquire a nuclear capability which was slowed but certainly not eliminated by an Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities, the possibility of "loose nukes" floating around former Soviet Central Asia, and Iran's inability to rearm itself due to a weak economy and low oil prices, as well as the residual consequences of a debilitating eight year war with Iraq, all conspire to make nuclear weapons a comparatively cheap security alternative for the government of the Islamic Republic. Despite this, the United States is unwilling to sanction such acquisition and, indeed, Iran's nuclear program has not only continued to divide the U.S. and Iran, but also has contributed markedly to increased conflict between the United States and Russia, which is clearly one of Iran's primary supporters. Thus, if asked to choose the primary impediment to rapprochement with Iran from a U.S. perspective, I would argue that the nuclear issue clearly reigns supreme, although the peace process and terrorism issues could reassert themselves depending upon conditions in Tehran.

Impediments to rapprochement exist not only in the United States, but also in Iran as well. Despite modest improvements in mutual perceptions, in Iran there remains significant distrust of the United States, its methods, and its motives. This can be attributed to a complex melange of factors including the Mossadeqh affair, U.S. support for the Shah, the U.S. commitment to Israel, and a generalized belief amongst many, certainly not all, Iranians, official and the man in the street, that the United States government wishes Iran ill. Although these negative perceptions have diminished among some in recent years, amongst others they remain tremendously significant.

According to some Iranians, the United States can do no right. For example, attempts by NATO to assist Kosovar Muslims are regarded as laudable, except when such attempts have their origins in Washington. In fact, some Iranians find themselves conflicted over this issue as they believe that these beleaguered Muslims should be assisted, but not by the United States. This contradiction is important and results from systemic differences, cultural misunderstandings, and a legacy of distrust which is difficult to erase. It is further exacerbated by the fact that although President Khatami has shown himself to be a sophisticated observer of the U.S. political scene, as well as of U.S. intentions, he does not have unquestionable control of all components of the Iranian political system. His opponents use his com-

paratively moderate views of the West in general, and the United States in particular, as a means to undermine him. Thus, periodic negative comments by Khatami about the United States and its policies, although they may or may not reflect his personal views, also should be perceived as attempts to keep his critics at bay by his not appearing to be overly pro-American. The culture of distrust towards the United States in Iran is palpable and significant, yet at times contradictory and ephemeral. It is difficult to pin it down with any specificity, although it undoubtedly exists, and this distrust serves as a significant road block to rapprochement between the two countries. This culture is part of a broader uncertainty in Iran about the qualities and character of the Islamic Republic itself, which asserts itself periodically in peculiar and unanticipated ways. For example, it is generally thought that President Khatami's recent trip to Italy, his meeting with the Pope as part of his dialogue of civilizations effort, and other activities related to this trip represent a diplomatic triumph for Iran. At the same time however, a parallel trip to France was canceled in large part because President Khatami could not allow himself to be photographed at meetings or at dinner tables in which wine bottles would be visible and spirits might be served by his European hosts! France refused to relent and to abstain from serving alcohol. Although this conflict between the Islamically mandated abstemiousness of the Islamic Republic, and the oenophilia of France seems almost comical, it is all too real and prevented an important state visit from coming to pass. Such sensitivity, when applied to the United States, is of even greater significance, and highlights an insecurity and uncertainty amongst the stewards of the Islamic Republic about what is desirable and acceptable for and in Iran, and what is not.

CONCLUSIONS

The challenge to both the U.S. and to Iran is for each to maintain its core principles while, at the same time, enhancing its interests by seeking further rapprochement with a country too important to be ignored. The United States will not back down from its commitment to Israel, to its democratic principles, and to other values held dear by the American people. The Iranians for their part, will maintain their commitment to the notion and the reality of an Islamic Republic, despite their own uncertainty about what such a polity is meant to look like or how it should comport itself internationally. Khatami's efforts are serious and should be regarded as such. Excessive U.S. attraction to Khatami will hurt him in the eyes of his competitors who eagerly seek new pretexts for conflict with the U.S. and instruments to undermine him. On the other hand, if we ignore Khatami's gestures, this will make rapprochement from Tehran even more difficult. Thus, the United States is presented with a significant challenge. Certainly, whatever Washington does it will be criticized or misinterpreted by some in Tehran. This is inevitable, yet nonetheless problematic, and, thus makes the process of rapprochement even more difficult. One way to transcend some of these divisions is to devote greater attention to areas in which the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran actually have issues in common. These range from the continuing threat of Saddam Hussein, to concern over the excesses of the Taliban in Afghanistan, in whom neither Washington nor Tehran has much confidence. Other common issues exist, such as the problem of drug trafficking, on which Iran has taken a hard line. Certainly the legacy of distrust between these two countries cannot be erased. Nonetheless, it could be muted somewhat in recognition of areas in which the two countries actually share some interests and might even be attenuated by remote collaboration, or at least, mutual understanding.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND NEW COMPLICATIONS

Since this statement was initially written, two other factors have emerged as potentially significant complications to any attempted rapprochement between the United States and Iran. The first was the arrest of 13 Jews in Shiraz on charges of espionage for Israel. Although this arrest has been interpreted by many Khatami supporters as an attempt by extremists to undermine President Khatami, the reality remains that the 13 remain, at this writing, in custody. Without a speedy and complete exoneration, there is a strong likelihood that many in the U.S. will regard President Khatami as lacking the necessary authority to promote any sort of rapprochement. This skepticism is not restricted to the United States alone, but extends to a number of Western European powers as well, many of whom have expressed in the strongest possible terms their concern over the fate of the prisoners. Even if these arrests are indeed an attempt by Khatami's opponents to undermine him, their ability to do just this certainly injects a significant note of uncertainty

about his ability to rule. This uncertainty has been heightened even further by another development which is of extreme importance.

In recent days there have been significant clashes between students at Tehran University, said to be supporters of President Khatami, and those critical of the students and, of Khatami as well, who represent key parts of the government beyond Khatami's control, most notably the military and intelligence services. Although the conflict between the groups appears to have been suppressed, at least for the moment, the smoldering tensions between them remains. And facile explanations about "pro-democratic forces" in conflict with more authoritarian elements fail, in my view, to capture the complexity of the political factionalism within Iran. The United States is in a difficult situation, as any official comments made by U.S. officials are likely to be used by extremist elements against President Khatami. The recent demonstration in Washington by emigre Iranian groups exacerbates this problem further as these groups are attempting to exploit the conflict in Tehran as a means to advance their own political agendas. In short, there is no ideal position for the United States to adopt other than to make it abundantly clear to all, that the evolution of domestic Iranian politics is an area to which the United States is attentive, but in which it has no actual involvement. Certainly there are those in Iran who will not accept such a statement at face value even though, in my view, it is accurate. But the current tensions in Iran, which are unlikely to abate soon, further complicate possible rapprochement with the United States and frustrate the efforts of those elements of the Iranian state apparatus who may seek such an improvement.

[From the Washington Post, July 15, 1999]

VOICES OF IRAN

(By Azar Nafisi)

To be taken by surprise by events in Iran has become almost routine. The election victory of Mohammed Khatami in May 1997 came as a surprise. Now, with the student demonstrations during the past week, Iran has once again surprised us with perhaps the biggest challenge to the Islamic regime in the past 15 years.

The easiest way for us to explain the unexpected turn of events would be to repeat the fashionable mantra that this is another instance of the clash between the hard-liners and reformist President Khatami.

A more apt description is that the events of the past few days reflect the paradoxes and contradictions in Khatami himself. He is on the one hand part of the ruling elite and believes in the basic tenets of the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, he is genuinely committed to certain changes and reforms.

But it seems impossible in the case of Iran to have "virtual theocracy." To the vast majority of Iranian citizens, "reform" means something different from what it means to Iran's rulers. This is clearly understood by the hard-liners, who justifiably see true reform as their own doom and the end for all practical purposes of the Islamic Republic. The hard-liners have been harassing, arresting, torturing and murdering for the past two years not just to oppose Khatami. They have committed these crimes mainly because they fear the growing forces within Iranian civil society. The women, progressive clerics, journalists and youths at the forefront of the struggles have demands that are not identical with Khatami's ideas of reform.

The past two years have witnessed an amazing flourishing of civil society, an unprecedented critique of reactionary laws and the rule of the supreme leader. At the same time, there have been continued human rights violations, murders of secular and nationalist figures, persecution of minorities, torture and detention of prominent clerics and stonings and executions of ordinary citizens as well as activists.

No, it would be too simplistic to conclude that the hard-liners have pursued these policies just to oppose the president. The main target of the hard-liners has been the forces within Iran's growing civil society, forces that now act in the name of democracy rather than that of Islam. These forces oppose reactionary laws against women and religious minorities, and reject the idea of a Western "cultural invasion." When the protesting students chanted "Long live liberty, death to despotism" and "Liberty or death," they were using the voices and slogans that ushered in the 1906 Iranian Constitutional Revolution.

The students' slogans for liberty and justice were not just general terms. The students have given these words specific meaning through their particular demands. The protests resounded against the main organs of the Islamic regime: the supreme religious leader, the judiciary, the security forces, the revolutionary guards and the

parliament. The students have demanded freedom for political prisoners and freedom of the press. They have evoked as their heroes and ideals not just Khatemi but also nationalist leaders Daryush and Parvaneh Forouhar, murdered in 1998, and former prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh, overthrown in 1953. These nationalists are no heroes of the Islamic Republic; the Ayatollah Khomeini so hated Mossadegh that he refused to tolerate having a street named after the prime minister following the Islamic Revolution.

Everyone from the leader to the president has condemned the acts of violence against the students and has promised justice and punishment for the perpetrators of violence. But these pleas and promises have been made before, in the aftermath of the murders of nationalist leaders, the numerous cases of harassment of ordinary citizens at the hands of vigilantes and, recently, the arrest of Jews as spies.

The unkept promises of the past are coming back to haunt Khatemi. The students, disappointed that Khatemi has not been more active, chanted, "Khatemi, Khatemi, where are you?" Surprisingly, it was Khatemi who condemned the protesters' leaders as "attacking the foundations of the regime and of wanting to foment tensions and disorders." He warned that "deviations will be repressed with force and determination."

President Khatemi is not a cause but rather a symptom of change. He represents the paradox of both belonging and remaining faithful to the regime, and at the same time presenting an agenda that shakes its very foundations. He is caught between two forces.

The standard by which we judge Khatemi, or any force in Iran, should be the Iranian people's demands and aspirations, as articulated by representatives of the growing civil society. Democratic forces around the world cannot afford to be cynical about their own values: They should support those values when they are being reasserted and fought for in countries like Iran. When and if Khatemi encourages those values through deeds as well as words, he should be wholeheartedly supported. And when he attempts to block them or throw doubts upon them, he should be criticized accordingly.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Dr. Green. I particularly appreciate your comments about the importance of Iran relative to the rest of the region, where we have such involvement in strategic interests. You can look at Iraq and what is taking place there. You can look at central Asia and Iran's impact and influence that they are trying to build and grow in that region. You can look at the Middle East peace process, where the next 15 months may be a very critical time for it, and Iran continues to fight with us in that area. And then the expansion and support that Iran is expressing even in some places in Africa. They are a key component of our foreign policy concerns.

We welcome Senator Torricelli to the committee. Thank you for joining us. I had had an opening statement earlier. If you would care to make a statement now, or we can go to questions.

Senator TORRICELLI. I prefer to ask some questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBACK. If we could, I would like to look at the students and at the protesters first, because that is the item that is first and foremost on the news. Are you in some regular contact with students, Dr. Nafisi?

Dr. NAFISI. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWNBACK. Again, you can get that microphone down, if you will.

Dr. NAFISI. Yes, I am in regular contact with them, through e-mail and faxes and phone calls. Actually, I had just a fax from them last night.

Senator BROWNBACK. What is the key plea that you get from the students that you are in touch with during this process?

Dr. NAFISI. Right now, because of the extreme repression and because the lives of so many are at stake, this is the main thing, to create some sort of international support for them.

Senator BROWNBACk. Of those who have been arrested and are being threatened?

Dr. NAFISI. Yes, because a number of them have been missing. Then the bodies of those who were killed have not been given back to their families. So nobody knows exactly what is happening.

In one report which I think I have given to you in my statement, they said that the bodies of those who were wounded, some of them were stolen from the hospitals and they do not know where the missing are.

Senator BROWNBACk. The students, do they give you any estimate on the number that have been killed already?

Dr. NAFISI. They are not very sure because the government has not given back any of the bodies. We know that one girl, whose name is also on the list that I gave you, has been definitely killed—they have been able to identify her—and one member of the militia. These two they are sure of.

At the very beginning they gave the number as to 5, but that was in the first 2 days when they entered the hostels. We do not know as yet how many.

Senator BROWNBACk. Do they talk to you about how many are missing?

Dr. NAFISI. They said that—

Senator BROWNBACk. Any estimate of that?

Dr. NAFISI. The last number was 1,400 who have been arrested or missing. They also said that they have started arresting members of their families. Mr. Amir Entezam, who was the speaker for the Barzangon government, who has been in jail now for 17 years, he was let out during the Khatemi era and taken back again, his wife has also been arrested.

Four members of the Nationalist Party of Daryush Forouhar and his wife—who were murdered—have also been arrested, and their names are all given.

So they are trying to create this conspiracy theory where the student leaders and the nationalists have contact with the U.S. and Israel.

Senator BROWNBACk. And the students seek for outside international pressure to state these are students who are being held for political reasons and their lives are in danger?

Dr. NAFISI. Yes. It is mainly a plea for—the pleas they have made, of course, to the government has been for, first of all, the resignation and punishment of the chief of police, who is mainly responsible for these events, bringing to justice the vigilantes who have been inciting these riots, release of those arrested, release of the bodies of those murdered and identification of the whereabouts of those who are missing, plus the most urgent thing is the guy whom they brought to the television and two of the student leaders because of their lives being in danger.

Senator BROWNBACk. Well, as you pointed out in your testimony, these students are being heroic in putting their lives on the line for simple principles of democracy, and we should support them any way that we can. I would hope that as you get us names or

as we can put them forward that we can post those names and write to, contact the government in Teheran, and ask what is taking place to these students, and try to build that international pressure for their liberation.

Dr. NAFISI. Sir, also, since then one other publication has been shut down and the editor, Mr. Hajarjian, has been arrested. So there are a number of people. I will give you all the names.

The journalists—they gave out a communique saying the time when the Iranian press could please the enemies of the Islamic republic by publishing falsehoods has passed, that anyone who publishes anything against the government will be treated accordingly.

There is almost a martial law right now in Teheran.

Senator BROWNBAC. And they fear that it will spread even further?

Dr. NAFISI. I had a call from one of my students. I had actually talked also to my family. They said that it is very much—there are curfews in the streets. Of course, you know that the government has given out orders to the Iranian people to spy out, to tell them the whereabouts of anyone who has participated in the riots. At nights there is curfew in the streets of Teheran.

The phones are most probably bugged. But these students did put a phone number to be contacted. They have also an e-mail. This indicates that they feel the only way they can be safe would be through international pressure. The government is also concerned about its image and its relations with the West, so it will hear your message definitely.

Senator BROWNBAC. That is something that some of us here maybe find a little bit of a stretch, is that the Iranian Government is concerned about its international image. It has not appeared to be.

Dr. NAFISI. At least a faction of the government, at least Mr. Khatemi. You know, you would be damned if you do, you would be damned if you do not.

One of the papers in Teheran, Neshat, recently said that the government has accused those who were murdered by the Iranian security as agents of Zionism and U.S. imperialism. It has also accused the murderers of those people as agents of U.S. imperialism and Zionism. This is the first case where both the victims and the murderers are agents of the same forces.

You can tell how powerful you guys are, you know. It is a shame you abdicated your title of the great satan.

Senator BROWNBAC. Yes, I guess so.

But let us get those names out and published and pushed for. You look back in hindsight on some of the great protests that have taken place for freedom and liberty and, whether it was in Tiananmen Square or here, clearly we as a Nation stand for liberty and we will stand for it everywhere around the world, and we want to stand for it as well with these students and stand with them.

Dr. Green, there was an editorial yesterday in the Boston Globe calling or asking, is President Khatemi Iran's Gorbachev? I do not know if you had a chance to look at that editorial. I guess this sort of notion has floated around in some circles.

Do you have a thought about that?

Dr. GREEN. Well, let us take the case of the Jews in Shiraz, in which it is being argued by Khatemi's supporters that the 13 in Shiraz were arrested by his opponents in order to embarrass him. Even if this is the case, Khatemi's inability to do anything about it raises significant questions about his ability to rule, which is one of the concerns of the students that Dr. Nafisi has been talking about, that in a sense his good intentions are only as significant as his ability to implement them.

I think that it is quite clear that being compared to Gorbachev is a compliment and an insult simultaneously. There are elements of both of those qualities which I think can be attributed to Khatemi. He has not shown himself as forceful, dynamic, or as effective as even those who are his most fervent supporters. Khatemi is only as good as his authority, and his authority is extremely limited.

Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Torricelli.

Senator TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask these questions to anyone on the panel that would like to respond. First off, the degree to which you believe that these student actions are entirely of their own volition? Is there any evidence that exile organizations are in concert with them or provided any inspiration to them or worked in concert with them?

Dr. NAFISI. Well, sir, definitely there will be different exile organizations who would have claims. I would like to say that especially Mujahedin-e-Khalq, who have been making claims, are not a popular organization at the time being in Iran. They do not have popular support, so that is one thing that I would like to mention.

The ferment, what has been happening in Iran, basically comes from within Iran. Now, obviously different groups outside Iran will use it to their own advantage.

Senator TORRICELLI. That is a different question. But the actual stimulation for this activity was from the students themselves?

Dr. NAFISI. From within the students. This Mr. Mohammadi who came abroad—he came when the dialog between people to people was being talked about—he talked openly to all the newspapers and he met with different groups. But it was not an incitement. Already within Iran a lot of things were happening before this.

Senator TORRICELLI. Do any of you believe that, if you were to project out, which I recognize how difficult this is to do, that this either leads to an increase in student activism and larger demonstrations that are difficult to control or, given the reaction of the government to this, forces an underground political operation, either way threatening the regime?

Dr. GREEN. I think that this activity has not been restricted exclusively to Teheran. It has been happening elsewhere in the country. I certainly could see this growing in a way that would, if not threatening the regime, would certainly undermine its already extremely limited ability to accomplish much of anything.

Senator TORRICELLI. I know I am asking you something that is very difficult, to provide some fair amount of guesswork. But more likely that this becomes in public demonstration and open organization, despite the risks, or, given the regime's reaction, forcing this underground, either an armed insurgency or organization?

Dr. GREEN. I would say being driven underground, but it is unclear what that is likely to bring.

Ambassador LAINGEN. Senator, may I comment on that point?

Senator TORRICELLI. Please.

Ambassador LAINGEN. Let me just say at the outset, Senator, that I salute you as a former participant in A Presidential Classroom for Young Americans. As a board member and former chairman of the board, I take every opportunity that I have to commend what you have done then and what you do today—

Senator TORRICELLI. Thank you very much.

Ambassador LAINGEN [continuing]. To support the work of A Presidential Classroom for Young Americans.

I do not believe this affair is a threat to the regime. It depends on what you mean by that. The regime can cope in the short term, as you have seen on the streets, with the security they have got and the help they have got from the vigilantes and the Hazari Hezbollah and the Besijj. Yes, it can cope, so in that sense I do not think it is a threat.

Others have pointed out that this is the beginning, the beginning, as someone reported the other day, in the contest leading up to the elections in February 2000, the parliamentary elections, when both sides are going to be very active out there.

I think, in response to another question either you or Senator Brownback raised, whether there is evidence of outside involvement in these demonstrations, no, not in their origin, but when it went onto the streets briefly then I think there is evidence that outside elements, from hooligans to possibly the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, took advantage of that to stir things up a little further.

Senator TORRICELLI. On the government side, does it appear that the government has succeeded in infiltrating the organizations, the student organizations, to compromise their ability to continue to organize and operate?

Ambassador LAINGEN. I think the government has that capacity. I cannot speak to whether it has or not.

Dr. NAFISI. Well, you know, the situation in Iran right now is very different from before. The activities have been mainly very open. I think the government does have an estimate of who the leaders are. This is very different from the 1979 revolution in that underground activity the way the guerrilla organizations could effectively do then is not effective now. Almost the whole citizenry is involved.

You should remember that this is a government that has made—my students were expelled because one of them was charged with giggling, with laughter of the giggling kind. Another one was charged with running up the stairs for her class because she was late. Now, when you do that then you involve the whole citizenry. The non-political people like myself become involved.

So what the government is dealing with right now is these people in the streets. The way the young people do, they do not go into the streets and demonstrate. They let a little bit of hair out. There are patrols in the streets with guns for me showing my hair. So this is how the situation is.

I do not think—and the fact that they have the web site right now and the fact that they are trying to appeal to the government openly shows that as long as they can they will make it open.

Senator TORRICELLI. Let me ask you a final thing before my time expires. I had read that it actually had been acknowledged that many of the 13 people of the Jewish faith who had been arrested in Iran, acknowledged that they were not in fact spies. Has that actually been said by people in authority?

Dr. NAFISI. By who?

Senator TORRICELLI. By people in authority.

Dr. NAFISI. No.

Senator TORRICELLI. There has been no—there has been no presentment of charges and no acknowledgements of innocence or guilt?

Dr. GREEN. Well, it is not clear what they are being charged with, other than vague suggestions that they were involved with the defense ministry and somehow were sending information to Israel. But formal charges have not yet been laid.

Senator TORRICELLI. Let me just say finally, too, my hope would be that the administration would recognize that, given events in the streets of Teheran, any easing of relations in my judgment, any attempt at dialog at this point, would be greatly misinterpreted and misunderstood. I know there are some in the Congress who may be attempting to lift American trade sanctions to allow the exportation and importation of different items. I hope people recognize how damaging this would be, how it would be misused and misinterpreted by the government in Teheran, and how very much these students might feel abandoned if this appeared to be an embrace of the regime at a time when they are this repressive.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador LAINGEN. Senator, I think I can speak for my colleagues on the panel that we all recognize that danger and that that is very clear in the context of the immediate events, and not least given the sentiment that we have heard for so long about the activity of the great satan behind the scenes.

Senator TORRICELLI. Yes, and I am not talking about the long-term development of a relationship as the regime may change or reform.

Ambassador LAINGEN. I know.

Senator TORRICELLI. But I am talking about at the moment I would urge the administration and the Congress not to engage in any miscalculation. The potential for being misunderstood and abandoning these students is enormous.

Ambassador LAINGEN. I read into the record, Senator, before you came in, the statement by the President yesterday. President Clinton in his press conference had alluded to that same point, but then went on to say that as an American obviously, looking at those students, we share their concern for freedom. To me, that is what we ought to be saying now, carefully.

Senator TORRICELLI. Exactly.

Dr. GREEN. But I also think that we are analyzing events which have only manifested themselves in the last 2 weeks, at least in

a vivid public fashion. I think to expect that the government is going to fall, that the government is going to be shaken—

Senator TORRICELLI. I understand that. It is always difficult to reach any conclusions on potentially great moments in history from the perspective of a few days. This could become a footnote in the history of the Iranian revolution or events could now be set in motion that are going to change the course of Iranian history. It is impossible to know.

We simply have the responsibility not to interfere against the possibility that this is a great event. It is not for us to control, but we do have the responsibility not to become a problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador LAINGEN. I wanted to add to that, if I may, Senator. Senator BROWNBACK. Please.

Ambassador LAINGEN. All of these events involving the last few days are reminiscent to me, of course, of the events of 1979, 20 years ago, when students then in a new revolution took to the streets, particularly with the seizure of the embassy in November 1979, to redirect the course of that revolution into the more radical direction that it has been on ever since.

As I write in an article in the Christian Science Monitor, today, these students are again a kind of engine of change. They are not challenging the revolution directly, but they do want to redirect it, if you will, calling on Khatemi to be responsive, to be showing that he means what he says about greater freedoms within the rule of law.

I do not think that these students are a challenge to the regime. I think they are a challenge to the hard-liners, yes. But they are calling on Khatemi. They are, as I think Dr. Khatemi said—excuse me, Dr. Nafisi said—these are children of the revolution. They are indeed, and they are not challenging it directly.

Dr. NAFISI. Sir, perhaps the safest—and I do not mean not risk-taking, but the most principled—way to go about it would be not to support individuals merely, but to support the principles and ideas they stand for.

Senator BROWNBACK. Indeed, they are our ideas and principles, the slogans that you have put forward Dr. Nafisi.

Dr. NAFISI. Where Mr. Khatemi does act according to those, he should be supported. Where not, he should not. It just depends.

Senator BROWNBACK. The slogans you putting forward, “Death to Despotism, Long Live Liberty,” that is the lead slogan.

I am curious. What do you think led to the arrest of the 13 Jews that were arrested, and how would you assess the administration’s response?

Dr. GREEN. My impression is the fact that it was in Shiraz outside, not in Teheran, is significant, in large part because I do think it was an attempt by extremists to embarrass Khatemi. Why they chose this particular cause celebre as opposed to others is unclear to me, but there was a demonic wisdom in making this particular selection, largely because it really did paralyze certain foreign policy initiatives vis-a-vis the Europeans and others, and particularly Germany.

But one thing I would also say, to go back to an issue we were talking about in relation to external involvement. Everything

that happens in Iran is a product of—I do not want to say global forces. That sounds too dramatic. But it is not self-contained. This is not Albania in the old days or North Korea. Iran is an electronically wide open country, with telephones and the Internet and so forth.

The Iranian revolution in 1978–79 was an information revolution. Khomeini was very effective in using the tools of modern communication. This is magnified even further, with tools that did not even exist then, like the fax machine and the Internet and so forth. So that it is clear there is some external involvement.

But the question is is it institutional or is it individual. Do students at Stanford University with Iran related web sites and home pages matter? Khatemi had a web site in the U.S. during the election, even though Iranians in Iran were not really able to access it. So there is clearly an international dimension to this. It is not at all certain what it means.

The second point is that although the regime's existence is not threatened, but its already limited ability to do anything is threatened. And if it is paralyzed, which in fact it may well be, this could have dire consequences for Iran, because it is just this paralysis that led the students out in the street in the first place, also to broken promises, things that Khatemi was sympathetic to, but that he could not deliver.

I think the issue is not is the government being toppled a la 1978–79, but rather how efficacious is it going to be, given its limited efficacy to date. There I think there really is a risk of paralysis and inactivity.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, it seems as if Khatemi's words and deeds just do not match up. I mean, he is able to put forth and articulate a softer line, but we continue to see support for Hezbollah, we continue to see a lack of freedoms for the people within Iran, that there is just a mismatch.

I wonder if you would agree that, or if you think, that one of the losers in this recent crisis in Iran is President Khatemi?

Dr. NAFISI. Sir, and also in terms of the Jewish prisoners, I just wanted to add to what Dr. Green and Ambassador Laingen were saying. The Iranian Government in the past when it gets into crisis, especially on the international level, does this sort of thing. In response to the Germans, they arrested a German businessman on the charge of adultery with an Iranian woman and they charged him and they were going to execute him. Then they negotiated behind the scenes with the German Government for about a year and a half before they finally retried him.

The best case in the case of the Jews, as in the case of the Germans, is to be firm. Bahais would tell you about that, that it was only international pressure on the regime which has saved the lives of the few Bahais that have been saved.

Senator BROWNBACK. Yes, Mr. Laingen.

Ambassador LAINGEN. Dr. Nafisi has referred to Khatemi as a paradox. He is indeed that. She also referred to the way in which he has constructed a democracy of words, alluding to what you have said. It is not clear what he is saying, what he means. I think it is very unclear, in terms of the context of Iran, where he thinks he can take that.

Senator BROWNBACK. You say he is very unclear?

Ambassador LAINGEN. I think it is unclear just what he is talking about when he speaks of a rule of law and a civil society. What does he mean by that? To read his speeches, particularly those he has made in the West, that is in Italy in that state visit he made, they are beautiful words. Read them: pluralism, rule of law, democracy. But the rest of us should be given the respect to ask, what do you mean by that? Is that compatible within the kind of theocracy that he still represents?

He is, after all, a member of the revolution, of Khomeini origins. He is a cleric. He is of that regime. Khatemi in my view is not the future, but he does symbolize a demand, a sentiment, broadly in that society. That society is weary of the revolution, at least weary of its strictures and its limitations and its denials of what they seek. And this is a complex, once Western-oriented society, and there are a lot of them who are troubled by that kind of stricture.

He is not the future, but he does symbolize a different direction that that revolution must take if it is to continue, if it is to maintain—not to maintain, to gain the support of the emerging young people of that society, evident in these students. The young people in Iran are no different really; they hear a lot and they see a lot and they want to be part of the world out there.

And Khatemi I think recognizes more, certainly more than Khamenei does, that somehow that revolution has got to change in the direction of ensuring that it wins the allegiance, keeps the allegiance, of young people. It risks failing that, I think it risks failing that under Khatemi, although he may be much more of a “democrat” than I conclude now. He sounds good, but he remains—as Dr. Nafisi said, he speaks of a democracy of words, and I do not know where that is going, and I am not sure he does.

Senator BROWNBACK. Let me ask you, Dr. Green, how would you interpret Iran’s efforts to build better relationships externally? Egypt, Saudi Arabia, some of the Gulf States, and some other places have been noted. How do you interpret that?

Dr. GREEN. I am much impressed by Iranian diplomacy. I think Iran realized that it could not remain isolated. It was being contained by the United States and it needed to find strategic alternatives. I think that the opening up to Saudi Arabia was a brilliant piece of diplomacy on their part. I was very impressed by their ability to ignore a lot of their own ideological concerns, which they do regularly, and to make a deal with Saudi Arabia. Indeed the Saudi’s and the UAE have been in disagreement over Saudi’s Iran policy, which the UAE feels is a little bit too tolerant of Iran.

Khatemi’s visit to Italy was a brilliant triumph. To have a dialog of civilizations with the Pope, it does not get much better than that. But the failure of the trip to France was unbelievably foolish and difficult to understand, showing in fact the limitations on Khatemi, just as my colleagues are saying. That that trip did not happen really is something which shows with great eloquence how limited he is.

But the establishing of a relationship with Lebanon, as opposed to groups in Lebanon, Egypt, after a poisonous relationship between Egypt and Iran—the Iranians have been very effective in their international diplomacy and very successful, and at times at

our expense, given that U.S. policy to Iran has been unlike the policy of any other state toward Iran. We have been very, very isolated in our views of Iran, which has made our international diplomatic situation somewhat more difficult.

When the United Kingdom re-established diplomatic ties with Iran at the highest level, despite Rushdie—the Iranians were able to have it both ways with Rushdie, which is on the one hand the bounty was increased, on the other hand the Government in Teheran saying, we are not going to act on this because it is not really us. When Britain agreed to this, in a sense that was the last straw for the United States because we were the last state to seek Iranian containment, and we were left very much by ourselves.

Senator BROWNBACk. Dr. Green, would you agree, though, that even though they have had some excellent diplomatic triumphs, that their actions internationally have not changed appreciably over the last 5 years?

Dr. GREEN. I think that, again, they would like to have it both ways so that one could argue both sides of it. They told Yasser Arafat at the OIC meetings in Teheran, any deal you make with Israel is fine with us, while at the same time issuing exactly the kind of rhetoric that my colleagues have been referring to. They would like to have it both ways. Khatemi is trying to appeal to multiple constituencies simultaneously. What we may see happening now is his failure to attract any of them to a significant degree.

The WMD issue is the one that I am most concerned about. That is the most important issue.

Senator BROWNBACk. And they continue to pursue that—

Dr. GREEN. Absolutely.

Senator BROWNBACk [continuing]. With aggressiveness?

Dr. GREEN. Oh, I think so.

Senator BROWNBACk. That is all the reports that I see.

Dr. GREEN. They do.

Senator BROWNBACk. They continue to support Hezbollah.

Dr. GREEN. Hezbollah I regard as a less significant issue, in part because they have been trying to diversify their relationship with the Lebanese Government and ultimately I think Hezbollah in Lebanon is only as good as its ability to make mischief. I am hoping that the Barak election and a lot of the movement that you referred to earlier is going to give Hezbollah fewer opportunities to exert itself.

Interestingly, Iranians are to Hezbollah what a lot of other foreign forces have been to other groups in Lebanon. The Iranian experience in Lebanon has been as frustrating for them as our experience has been to us, the Israelis' has been to the Israelis, and the French experience has been to the French. At the end of the day, the Hezbollah will not play. They do not want to turn Lebanon into the Islamic republic of Lebanon. They are not all out studying Persian. They are Lebanese trying to forge a Lebanese solution, and Hezbollah within Lebanon has dual qualities as well. The way the Lebanese regard it is somewhat different than the way in which we regard it.

So I think it is less of an issue. I believe the terrorism and Israel issues could change tomorrow. The Iranians have taken significant steps to clean up their act on those two issues, not to complete sat-

isfaction but there has been improvement. It may not be enough, but it is better.

But I also think that the improvement could be ephemeral, depending upon other contextual political conditions. Iran could return to the terrorism game if it wanted, or to aversion to the peace process if it wished.

The WMD issue, however, that has not abated. The problem here is that this is not only a bilateral U.S.-Iran issue. It is a bilateral U.S.-Russia issue, and that brings in NATO and a whole variety of other factors, so that it makes it a particularly contentious and difficult issue.

Senator BROWNBAC. It strikes me that Iran's objectives have not particularly changed, their sophistication has. Their external objectives have not changed, but their sophistication at moving so, and perhaps they take some of the edges off of some places in their foreign policy efforts or in their efforts to spread the revolution, but it has merely grown much more sophisticated.

Dr. GREEN. I think I would disagree with you, only in that I think that they have become more realistic about their ability to export the revolution and they have become more accustomed to failure. No where have they succeeded in creating significant long-term mini-Iran type revolutionary scenarios.

In Bahrain, they failed. No one has really emulated the Iranian revolution. So what you are hypothesizing, and I think it is worth considering, is that although their tactics have failed, their goals remain the same; they may be trying different tactics, which is what you are suggesting, which is possible.

Senator BROWNBAC. And on a slower road, that it may not happen in 5 years, but we will get there in 15.

Dr. GREEN. The revolution is now 20 years old. A lot of the enthusiasm, a lot of the naivete, a lot of the excitement, a lot of the freshness has paled. Indeed, when Iran got out of the exporting revolution business and diminished its support for terrorism—they did not completely eliminate it, but they diminished it.

What you are suggesting—and it is quite possibly accurate—is they are using different techniques to accomplish the same things. I think that the revolution fatigue has also limited their expectations about their ability to transplant what was in fact a uniquely Iranian event, despite the Islamic character of it, elsewhere; and that the Islamic world is as diverse as is other portions of the world.

Lebanese Muslims are not simply Shi'a Muslims. They are also Lebanese. And it is the Iranian part of it that does not travel well, simply because there are differences. But you may well be right. It is an important issue.

Senator BROWNBAC. Anything else? Yes, Mr. Laingen?

Ambassador LAINGEN. It is a question, I think as you say, of appreciation—

Senator BROWNBAC. Could you get up close to that mike? I am having a little trouble hearing you.

Ambassador LAINGEN. It is a question of appreciable change or something else. There is no question today in my view that Iran, Iran's leadership, particularly Khatemi, are concerned about their image for a variety of reasons, including economic problems of their

economy—we have not talked about that—which underlie much, undergird or underlie and affect much of the actions of the government today.

Their change of image, their concern about image, is not least in the context of Saudi Arabia. Khomeini on his deathbed issued a last will and testament in which he warned his revolutionary colleagues and the people of Iran about the evils, the dangers of dealing with Saudi Arabia, that nation to the south. Today what Iran is doing in terms of reaching out, changing its image, is exemplified particularly vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, and of course there is an economic factor there with the oil pricing issue. The low cost, low price on oil, recently has been buoyed, not least by the degree to which Iran and Saudi Arabia have been able to cooperate in that context.

In the area of perception, I think it is clear that the Iranians have cleaned up their act a little bit in the field of terrorism broadly. On the Arab-Israeli peace process, that very critical factor I think in the degree to which the American public sees any change in that regime, there has not been that much change. Dr. Green has referred to what was supposedly the assurance that Arafat got at one point. Since then, of course, Khatemi himself, that symbol of supposed change, when he was in Damascus recently received and talked with some of the most hard-line leaders of the anti-Israeli position in the Middle East there.

On weapons of mass destruction, there I think we should not forget that the Iranians regard themselves as a major power in that region, that the regime there today looks around and sees its neighbors engaged in what we call weapons of mass destruction or the pursuit of some of them—Pakistan and India and the former Soviet Union, Russia, to the north, Iraq and its activities in the past, Israel of course.

The view of the regime there today in terms of weapons of mass destruction, in terms of military prowess, is no different essentially from the viewpoint of the Shah of Iran, who wanted to see Iran respected and recognized in time as the dominant regional power, and that that should be accompanied by the kind of military prowess that in his view, and in the view of some of the leaders of the revolution today, feel must accompany that claim.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, thank you all very much. It has been a wonderful panel and a good discussion on an important topic that we have not discussed near enough and will continue to be with us as the U.S. Government.

The record will remain open for 3 days if you would care to add additional comments or writings that you have had into that record. I appreciate greatly your traveling and coming here and sharing of your expertise.

Ambassador LAINGEN. Senator, I want to put on the record before we disperse, the concern that Dr. Nafisi has registered about the arrest of the wife of Amir Entezam in Teheran. That is apparently happening in this context. Amir Entezam has suffered for almost 20 years because of his involvement with the United States in the past. He was the deputy prime minister when I was there after the revolution, a man whom I continue to respect enormously, who has suffered for now 20 years in and out of prison, and I re-

gret deeply, and I hope it is not true, that his wife has now been arrested as well.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, I think we have to do much to publicize these people who are in prison there, and advocate for their freedom internationally and push for that. So that is why I hope we can continue to get these names in and pursue those and pursue that publicly.

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

