[Senate Hearing 106-266]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-266
CHALLENGES FACING THE NEXT U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA--(INCLUDES NOMINATION HEARING OF ADM. JOSEPH W. PRUEHER)
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 27 AND 28, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-245CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Wednesday, October 27, 1999
The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations
Page
Cox, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Representative from California....... 2
Prepared statement of........................................ 6
Human Rights Watch, prepared statement entitled, ``U.S.-China
Policy: Human Rights.''........................................ 46
Lord, Hon. Winston, former Ambassador to the People's Republic of
China; and former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs............................................ 16
Munro, Ross H., Director of Asian Studies, Center for Security
Studies, Washington, DC........................................ 40
Waldron, Dr. Arthur, Director of Asian Studies, American
Enterprise Institute........................................... 28
Prepared statement of........................................ 30
Wu, Harry, Executive Director, Laogai Research Foundation,
Milpitas, CA................................................... 33
Prepared statement of........................................ 36
Thursday, October 28, 1999
Nomination of Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, to be Ambassador to the People's
Republic of China
Brock, Hon. Bill, former U.S. Senator from Tennessee............. 57
Frist, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Tennessee.................... 56
Helms, Hon. Jesse, prepared statement............................ 53
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii................. 55
Prueher, Adm. Joseph W., of Tennessee, to be Ambassador to the
People's Republic of China..................................... 59
Prepared statement of........................................ 62
Stevens, Hon. Ted, U.S. Senator from Alaska...................... 54
Additional questions and responses for the record:
Responses of Admiral Prueher to pre-hearing questions
submitted by Senator Helms................................. 73
Responses of Admiral Prueher to additional questions
submitted by Senator Ashcroft.............................. 76
Responses of Admiral Prueher to additional questions
submitted by Senator Feingold.............................. 77
Responses of Admiral Prueher to additional questions
submitted by Senator Helms................................. 77
(iii)
THE FUTURE OF U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:42 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Thomas, Kerry and Feingold.
The Chairman. Good morning. The committee will come to
order.
Senator Biden is in another committee meeting, but he
suggested that we proceed without him. I try to have at least
one member of both sides here when we have a committee meeting.
I will say for the record and for the guests here that this is
the time of year when all of the committees are meeting all of
the time. Most committees have a scant number of Senators
present.
In any case, this morning we are going to consider the
subject of the future of U.S.-China relations.
Tomorrow we will hold a hearing on the administration's
nominee for the post of U.S. Ambassador to China.
It occurred to me that, prior to that, it might be useful
to have an evaluation of the China policy of the United States
and the policy of China itself.
We have assembled today a distinguished list of witnesses
who, I suspect, will provide a spirited discussion and
stimulate some thinking. We all need to do all of the thinking
we can constructively regarding this problem.
My own views about China are, I think, fairly well known. I
am not going to consume the committee's time with a lengthy
statement. However, I will be posing a few questions here and
there that may help frame the debate today.
For example, I would like to know: No. 1, how is it that
our relations with China have reached such a low ebb after 7
years of painstaking efforts by the administration to cater to
Red China's every whim and wish?
No. 2, how is it that after 7 more years of Most Favored
Nation, [MFN], after an unprecedented transfer of technology,
after red carpet treatment for an unending series of Chinese
officials, after unquestioned access to our capital markets and
opting not to introduce U.N. human rights resolutions, after
turning a blind eye to China's land grabs in the Spratley
Islands and after openly siding with China versus Taiwan, the
Clinton administration still has not been able to establish a
better relationship with Beijing?
Why, after all of this deference, have the Chinese frozen
our vaunted military relationship, cutoff the dialog on
proliferation and human rights, and ordered the U.S. military
out of Hong Kong?
Why wouldn't Jiang Zemin pick up the hot line when
President Clinton called last May as the Chinese Government was
ransacking our embassy and reducing our Ambassador to a
prisoner?
Yes, the Chinese Embassy was bombed--accidentally. I am
going to hear that over and over again and have already. Some
suggest that is the reason for China's actions. But is it not
clear, especially when one examines the lack of progress on all
of the other fronts prior to that unfortunate bombing, such as
China's draconian crackdown on various things, its mercantile
trade practices, a clearly offensive military buildup, further
provocations in the Spratley Islands, along with a tirade of
abusive threats and maneuvers against Taiwan, I say to the
committee and to those interested, is it not obvious that
something is amiss?
These are some of the questions that come to mind.
But now, let's hear from our witnesses, after, of course,
we have yielded to the Senator from Delaware, if he should get
here. But I suggest we proceed.
Mr. Cox, I appreciate your being here this morning. You may
proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS COX, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Senator. I thank this committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to share my
views on the appropriate American policy toward the People's
Republic of China.
Before doing that, I want also to take the opportunity to
emphasize the debt of gratitude that is owed to the chairman
and every member of this committee by all who labor for freedom
in China, for your leadership and for your consistent defense
of democratic principles.
There are two well noted books on U.S.-PRC relations
recently published by reporters respectively from the Los
Angeles Times and the New York Times, which are in agreement
that Presidents since Richard Nixon have sought to manage
relations with the People's Republic of China through a small,
secretive group of policy mandarins. Because you have worked
tirelessly to make sure that U.S.-PRC relations are open and
informed by our democratic process, this committee deserves our
heartfelt thanks.
The Communist government of the People's Republic of China
is a 50 year anomaly in a 5,000 year rich tradition of China's
civilization. At the end of the first millennium, 1,000 years
ago, China was easily the world's most advanced civilization.
But today, most of China's people live in Third World poverty.
The per capital gross domestic product of China is less than
that of Guatemala or Swaziland.
Because the Chinese people and their culture are so strong,
communism, as in East Germany, is not without its economic and
military successes in China. But communism in China is
inherently unstable.
Periodic eruptions from Tiananmen Square to the tragically
aborted formation of the China Democratic Party, to the recent
arrests of Falun Gong members display this.
If long-term stability is our aim, then assisting China's
democratic movement must be a principal national security
priority for the United States in Asia. A real transformation
will occur only if economic and political freedoms develop
simultaneously in China.
The Communist government of China is fond of saying that
Western values are at odds with Asian values and that they, the
Communist Party, faithfully represent Asian values.
Occasionally, they even go so far as to say that if one is an
opponent of the Communist Party in China, then one is not a
friend of China but is an enemy of China.
This Asian values argument posits a radical and seemingly
permanent opposition between democracy and pluralism and
markets and individualism on the one hand and authoritarianism,
conformity and traditionalism, corporate economics and the
primacy of group rights in the community on the other hand.
If this view were true, then Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
the Philippines, Thailand, and India all would be at odds with
Asian values. At the same time, Western Europe, before 1789,
and Central Europe throughout much of the 19th and 20th
centuries, would be perfect examples of Asian values.
Louis XIV and Phillip II of Spain were far easterners.
President Lee Teng-hui, President Kim Dae Jong and thousands of
Tiananmen Square demonstrators are closet Europeans.
That is what is wrong with the view of the Communist Party.
The founding fathers of Chinese civilization are not Karl Marx,
Friedrich Engels or Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.
There is another school of thought that is popular in
America. I call it the Manchester School Revisited. This second
school of thought is a much more persuasive one. It takes full
account of the democratic and capitalist experience in much of
Asia.
The Chairman. Will the Congressman suspend for a moment.
This is a hearing on China and we have some guests who are
not interested in that. They want to demonstrate on another
issue now.
I hope the security people will escort them out into the
corridor to let them wait there.
[A public demonstration occurred.]
The Chairman. I am always courteous to you where you work.
Now you please be a lady and be courteous to us. You are not
going to be heard.
Would the bailiff please escort them out.
[Pause]
Mr. Cox. I thank you, Senator. It is much easier to get
order in this hearing room than normally it is on the floor of
the House of Representatives.
The Chairman. I understand what you are saying.
I am sorry for the interruption. I think you know that I
had nothing to do with it.
Mr. Cox. Indeed. Thank you.
This Manchester School Revisited, as I was saying, takes
full account of the democratic experience of much of Asia. It
takes account of the affinities between free enterprise and
democracy and peaceful international conduct. But it is, in its
own way, an over-simplification.
The advocates of this school of thought argue that, in the
long run, economic development and, in particular, capitalism,
tend to erode dictatorship and promote democracy and peace.
While that is true--I certainly agree with that, that is the
way that free enterprise tends--that is, in the long run, that
is the key to understanding the flaw in this argument.
A lot can happen in the long run. There are a lot of twists
and turns on that road.
Take, for example, the cases of Germany and Japan, which
have free economies and political systems today. In 1900,
Germany and Japan had freer economies than does China today.
But getting from 1900 in Germany and Japan to 2000 in Germany
and Japan has been a traumatic experience. The intervening
history, the process of modernization, has had catastrophic
consequence not only for the citizens of those countries but
for their neighbors.
There is nothing automatic, in other words, in a peaceful
transition from statism to pluralism and free enterprise.
Accordingly, we can acknowledge that the PRC today is a
freer and wealthier place than the desperately poor and utterly
tyrannical despotism of the recent past under Mao without
concluding that it is, therefore, a smooth, steady, and
inevitable path toward becoming a new Japan, Taiwan, or South
Korea.
On October 1, the People's Republic of China regaled the
world with a throwback display, a Stalinist display, of sheer
military might that laid bare the government's current
priorities. Its new nuclear missiles, including the DF-31
intercontinental ballistic missile, that was revealed for the
first time in that 50th anniversary of communism parade, are
the latest products of the Communist State-directed scientific/
technical complex.
We need only to refer to the study on the PRC-Taiwan
military balance requested by Senator Murkowski and issued by
the Pentagon in February of this year to know that the PRC is
working rapidly to build an offensive military capability that
can be used to attempt reunification with Taiwan by force or by
intimidation.
We saw a preview of such PRC military intimidation tactics
in 1995 and early 1996. If more confirmation were needed, the
PRC's military intimidation of Taiwan again went into high gear
this summer.
Twelve weeks ago, in Beijing, an American Foreign Policy
Council fact finding delegation led by former Secretary of
Defense Don Rumsfeld visited a high tech exhibition
commemorating the 50th anniversary of communism in China.
The military section of this exhibit contained a diorama
depicting the invasion of Taiwan. It took up the entire 15 foot
section of a wall of the exhibit.
Here is a description of an observer of that exhibit. This
was just 2 weeks ago. ``Entering the military section of the
exhibit, the diorama depicting the invasion of Taiwan takes up
the entire 15 foot facing section of wall. Flanking the diorama
on either side, arranged like columns, are floor to ceiling
models of various missiles painted white with red horizontal
bands. To the left are the grassy dunes of the island, with a
long slope down to the sandy curve of beach that occupies the
center of the diorama.
``In the Taiwan Strait to the right the water is blue and
calm. Overhead are a few clouds and half a dozen helicopters,
their rotors whirling at the beach landing craft which are off-
loading tanks while several tanks and armored personnel
carriers already on shore are trundling up the beach and over
the dunes to the left. Soldiers have arrived on other landing
craft. They are wading through the water to the beach, holding
their weapons overhead. More landing craft are coming into the
beach from several carriers standing offshore to the right
along with submarines. There are flashes of light and smoke
from explosions far off behind the trees beyond the dunes.
That is the way the Communist Party celebrated their 50th
anniversary of one party dictatorship in China.
The hoped for dividends of the Clinton-Gore engagement with
the PRC have not materialized. From vehement opposition to
American plans for a non-nuclear missile defense to a campaign
to undermine our strategic alliances in Asia, to the State
sponsored demonstrations of terror against our diplomatic
territory in China, the PRC has been aggressively hostile to
U.S. interests.
This outward hostility mirrors the PRC rulers' attitudes
toward the democratic aspirations of China's population. The
regime correctly fears its own people.
The Communist ruling clique late last year staged a
national purge of State sanctioned democratic leaders. This
past spring and summer witnessed the brutal destruction of the
Falun Gong, which, as you know, is a large, but truly benign,
religious organization.
The most recent example of the Politburo's extreme paranoia
occurred just 2 weeks ago, on the eve of the announcement of
the Nobel Peace Prize, when the regime placed the mother of
peace prize nominee Wang Dan under arrest.
It is ironic that the Clinton-Gore administration, which
could not bring itself even to comment whatsoever on the arrest
of Wang Dan's mother, originally founded its China policy in
1993 in a rhetorical commitment to human rights. That
commitment, it is rather clear now, we have lost.
America deserves a much better China policy that not only
serves the short-run economic advantage of a handful of U.S.
firms with connections to the PRC State government but also
advances our democratic values and defends our vital security
interests. It is not an impossible task to accomplish all of
these things together.
It requires, however, restoring human rights and U.S.
national security to preeminence with our economic interests.
This positive vision of a post-Communist, free, stable,
prosperous, democratic and pacific China can become reality if
America supports China's democratic transformation and supports
democratic leaders, like Wei Jingsheng, Wang Dan, and Harry Wu,
who is with us here today. Assisted by the example of free
Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan and aided by forward thinking
policies of the United States, I believe we will see the end of
communism in China and a day, very soon, when her people will
be truly free.
I thank the committee and the chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cox follows:]
Prepared Statement of Congressman Christopher Cox
Chairman Helms and Distinguished Members of this Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to
share my views on the appropriate American policy toward the People's
Republic of China.
Before doing so, however, I should take the opportunity to
emphasize the debt of gratitude owed to the Chairman and all members of
this Committee by all who labor for freedom for the people of China--
for your leadership and your consistent defense of democratic
principles. Mr. Chairman, two well noted books on the history of U.S.-
PRC relations, published this year by reporters from the Los Angeles
Times and the New York Times, are in agreement that Presidents since
Richard Nixon have sought to manage relations with the PRC through a
small coterie of policy mandarins. For working tirelessly to make sure
U.S.-PRC relations are open, and informed by our democratic process,
this Committee deserves our heartfelt thanks.
The Communist government of the People's Republic of China is a 50-
year aberration in the amazing and rich 5,000-year history of China's
civilization.
At the end of the first millennium, China was the world's most
advanced culture.
But today, most of China's people live in third world poverty. The
per capita GDP of China is less than Guatemala or Swaziland.
Because the Chinese people and their culture are so strong,
Communism, as in East Germany, is not without its economic and military
successes in China. However, Communism in China is inherently unstable,
as periodic eruptions--from Tiananmen Square, to the tragically aborted
formation of the China Democratic Party--show. If long-term stability
is our aim, assisting China's democratic movement must be a principal
national security priority for the U.S. in Asia. A real transformation
will occur only if economic and political freedoms develop
simultaneously in China.
On October 1, the PRC regaled the world with a throwback Stalinist
display of sheer military might that laid bare the government's
priorities. Its new nuclear missiles, including the DF-31 ICBM that was
revealed for the first time, are the latest products of the Communist
state-directed scientific-technical complex. We need only refer to the
study on the PRC-Taiwan military balance requested by Senator
Murkowski, and issued by the Pentagon in February 1999, to know that
the PRC is working rapidly to build an offensive military capability
that can be used to attempt reunification with Taiwan by force or
intimidation. We saw a preview of such PRC military intimidation
tactics in 1995 and early 1996. If more confirmation were needed, the
PRC's military intimidation of Taiwan again went into high gear this
summer.
The hoped-for dividends of the Clinton-Gore engagement with the PRC
have not materialized. From vehement opposition to American plans for
non-nuclear missile defense, to a campaign to undermine our strategic
alliances in Asia, to the state-sponsored demonstrations of terror
against our diplomatic territory in China, the PRC has been
aggressively hostile to U.S. interests.
This outward hostility mirrors the PRC rulers' attitudes toward the
democratic aspirations of China's population. The regime correctly
fears its own people. The Communist ruling clique, late last year,
staged a national purge of state-sanctioned ``democratic'' leaders.
This past spring and summer witnessed the brutal destruction of the
Falun Gong, a large but truly benign religious organization. The most
recent example of the Politburo's extreme paranoia occurred just two
weeks ago, on the eve of the announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize,
when the regime placed the mother of Peace Prize nominee Wang Dan under
arrest.
It is ironic that the Clinton-Gore administration, which could not
bring itself to comment whatsoever on the arrest of Wang Dan's mother,
originally founded its China policy in 1993 in a rhetorical commitment
to human rights.
That commitment, it is rather clear now, is lost.
America deserves a much better China policy that not only serves
the short-run economic advantage of a handful of U.S. firms with
connections to the PRC state government, but also advances our
democratic values and defends our vital security interests. It is not
an impossible task to accomplish all those objectives together. It
requires, however, restoring human rights and U.S. national security to
preeminence with out economic interests.
This positive vision of a post-Communist, free, stable, prosperous,
democratic and pacific China can become reality if America supports
China's democratic transformation, and supports democratic leaders like
Wei Jingsheng, Wang Dan, and Harry Wu. Assisted by the example of free
Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and aided by forward-thinking policies
in the United States, I believe we will see the end of Communism in
China--and a day very soon when her people will be truly free.
The Chairman. That was an excellent statement, Chris. I am
going to call you that.
Ladies and gentlemen, our first panel is the distinguished
Congressman from California, Christopher Cox.
How long have you been in the Congress?
Mr. Cox. It's 11 years.
The Chairman. Eleven years. I believe you recently chaired
the House Select Committee on the U.S. National Security
Concerns with the People's Republic of China.
Congressman Cox, suppose we do about 10 minutes each, no, 7
minutes each because we are going to have other Senators coming
in. I will take my 7 minutes first.
Do you think, sir, that U.S. policy should promote the
rapid democratization of China? Or should United States policy
be concerned primarily with managing relations with the
Communist regime?
Mr. Cox. I think, Senator, you have put the fundamental
question for U.S. policy.
The Chairman. It is a rhetorical question, actually. It is
a rhetorical question and it answers itself, almost. But I want
you to comment on it, if you will.
Mr. Cox. I believe it is, in part, a question that answers
itself because, obviously, everyone in this room would prefer
that China were democratic.
But how to do that is a much more subtle and difficult
question.
We have had trouble, the United States has had trouble over
the last several years being ourselves, being comfortable about
American values which, indeed, are universal values of
individual freedom. I mentioned the fact that the President,
the Secretary of State and the leading officials of the U.S.
Government were absolutely mute when the mother of a Nobel
Peace Prize nominee was arrested on the eve of the announcement
of that award because of the extreme paranoia of the Communist
Chinese Government about freedom.
The fact that the President of the United States took an
extended visit to the People's Republic of China, the longest
visit to a foreign country by any President in American
history, and could not find time to meet with the founders of
China's Democratic Party is an example of the discomfort that,
apparently, the United States feels about being ourselves.
We are not promoting democracy by ostensibly promoting
business in this way.
I think business and its expansion in China can be a
liberalizing force. But we ought not to permit the perversion
of our business interests into the subversion of democracy.
The Chairman. How well is the administration's policy of
engaging Communist China advancing U.S. interests and expanding
human rights in China?
Mr. Cox. Well, the State Department's own reports on the
human rights situation in China make it abundantly clear that
things are getting, if anything, better rather than worse. We
have seen in recent years crackdowns unrivaled since the
Tiananmen Square massacre. Insofar as support for U.S. aims or
support even for neighborly relations with the United States,
we have not even seen that produced as a dividend.
You may not know, but for some years before I served in
Congress I had worked with and co-founded a company that
translated Pravda, the Soviet Union's Communist Party daily
into English on a daily basis. That was circulated to 26
countries around the world. There was a big market for it
because, even though it was an open source, people did not
speak Russian and they did not consult it as they ought to
have.
Once it was available, it provided a lot of insight into
how the party thought.
I think we overlook open source Communist Chinese
publications. They have a State run media, and what they say in
their State run media ought to be of some interest to us.
Just recently, Communist State run media in China wrote
this article. ``We urge hegemonism today to take a look at the
mirror of history.'' ``Hegemonism today,'' of course, is the
United States in their view. They said in this article, ``If we
ask which country in the world wants to be the lords of the
earth, like Nazi Germany did in the past, there is only one
answer, namely, the United States, which upholds hegemonism.''
The Communist State run media is replete with such things.
This is the dividend from our engagement policy.
The Chairman. I mentioned your select committee report. In
it I noted that you identified more than 3,000 Red Chinese
companies operating in the United States, many with links to
the Chinese military, espionage services, or both.
What do you think of proposals to set up an office of
national security at the SEC to review and report on these
companies? That is the first question.
Is this approach correct or do we, perhaps, need to go even
further than that?
Mr. Cox. The proposals that I have seen, some even in
legislative form, to set up essentially a national security
office within the Securities and Exchange Commission, have
merit. I think we need to be careful about execution.
It is entirely possible to set up a regime in the United
States securities regulatory scheme that is viewed as a
deterrent to foreign investment in the United States. And,
insofar as we urge the openness of trade and investment
throughout the world, we welcome it here in our own countries
and we do not want to set up barriers to investment.
But we also need to take a look at the degree to which
disclosure, which is what the SEC is supposed to be all about,
by foreign borrowers and foreign users of our capital markets,
does not measure up to disclosure by our own domestic
companies. Without question, there is a big drop-off in the
level of disclosure when you move from the free enterprise
profit motivated corporate sector in America to even our own
municipal borrowers.
I come from a county that had the largest municipal
bankruptcy in American history. One big reason behind that
bankruptcy was that the level and quality of disclosure in an
information statement for municipal borrowers is nothing as
compared to the quality of disclosure for a corporate borrower.
Then, when you go to foreign governments, you find that the
disclosure is far less adequate. Then, when you go to
governments that are as opaque, as nontransparent as the
Communist Government of the People's Republic of China, where
so much of enterprise is State run, where accounting is as much
creativity as hard figures, I think people are essentially
lending money to the State of China, to the Communist
Government of China, on the brand name and on the expectation
that they will somehow pay it back, but not because of any
substance of the disclosure.
So, to the extent that there are big, new offerings in U.S.
capital markets from the PRC State government, I think we need
to take a very hard look at the quality of that disclosure.
All of these proposals, by the way, are aimed only at
improving disclosure. That is what free and open capital
markets are all about.
The Chairman. I thank you, sir.
I told the timekeeper to limit me to 5 minutes because we
are going to have some other Senators here today.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Congressman, share with me this, if you will. We can all
find some criticisms here and there, I think, in what is a very
difficult relationship to manage. I think we have to
acknowledge that. But I would like you to try to be more
precise, perhaps, with me, with us, in exactly what you would
do differently in terms of the engagement process.
I know you would criticize human rights. Those are words. I
know you want to take some steps on the spying. That is more
internal here. Share with me where the points of confrontation
would be that you believe would elicit a constructive response
from the Chinese--and that is most important. What are the
steps that we would take that would, in fact, elicit the
response you want from the Chinese?
Mr. Cox. First, I would observe that words matter. In fact,
the chief tool that the United States and, indeed, the
President, personally has in advancing human rights, democracy,
pluralism, free enterprise, and pacific relations with the
People's Republic of China is the international attention that
he and that our government generally attract.
Senator Kerry. Well, let's assume we both agree that we
could be stronger on speaking out on certain things. We do
agree. I think we should have gone to the U.N. and taken up a
resolution on human rights.
But that said, help me with the other parts of this.
Construct the confrontational points in an engaged policy that
will result in positive reaction that will change the way we
want to change China, or the way you do.
Mr. Cox. A great deal of this is the manner of execution.
Whether it is a confrontation or whether it is simply America
being America is the essence of it.
If we only occasionally raise human rights because of
domestic political concerns here in the United States--you
know, somebody is complaining that we are selling out the
Chinese people and so, after 8 months we do something to
pacify, you know, a constituency here in the United States--
that kind of operation in fits and starts is itself
destabilizing.
The government in Beijing, and indeed governments around
the world, should expect from the United States that every day
that we wake up, just as surely as I get up and brush my teeth
and shave every day, that we are going to talk about these
ideals because they are important to us, that we are going to
stress these things in our relationship. If there is a
constancy, then I think we will find that we have much more
stability in the relationship and people will understand that
these things are not occasionally to be traded away.
Senator Kerry. But if all we are doing is talking, I mean,
we have had years of criticizing human rights. We have even
gone quite a bit further than that. China does not exactly
embrace our view. What is the next step?
Do you support, for instance, the Rule of Law Program the
administration wants to implement in China?
Mr. Cox. It is certainly a worthy goal. I think that, to
the extent that we participate in these exchanges with the
National Peoples' Congress, the U.S. Congress, to the extent we
exchange judges and lawyers here in our system with them, some
good can come of that. But we ought not kid ourselves that the
National Peoples' Congress is a legislature--it is not--or that
the lawyers and judges with whom our lawyers and judges are
meeting in the PRC are operating in any kind of an independent
judiciary. They are not. They are tools not only of the State
but of the Communist Party itself.
So we need to be a little bit more muscular than that.
Senator Kerry. When you say ``more muscular,'' would you
not say China has changed quite profoundly in the last 15
years?
Mr. Cox. Yes.
Senator Kerry. And say that that change tends to be toward
a more engaged entity, an internationally involved and
sensitive entity than it was prior to those 15 years?
Mr. Cox. Indeed, the entire world, of which the PRC is a
part, has changed and progressed. I think that the methods that
the Communist Party uses to control its citizens are much more
sophisticated and effective in this climate than anything that
they did in the past.
We all remember the heavy handed tactics of both the
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government
of the Soviet Union back in the 1950's, the 1960's and so on.
That sort of thing would be laughed at on television today.
So today we see Jiang Zemin coming to Philadelphia and
putting on a three cornered hat while talking about his
admiration for our American ideals. It is great televisions,
but, nonetheless, our State Department human rights experts
tell us that essentially every single dissident in the People's
Republic of China has been rounded up and jailed or is out of
commission.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Thomas.
Senator Thomas. Thank you, Chris, for your testimony. It
was very good. I am sure most people would agree with all that
you've said.
Thank you, too, for all the work that you have put in on
this issue and on the security issue certainly.
I guess the bottom line, of course, is that we all agree we
would like to see changes. The question is how do you do it.
There has been quite a little bit of publicity lately over the
50 years and interviews with people in the PRC in terms of
change. I guess you just commented on that. Don't you
recognize, isn't there a substantial change in the economy and
isn't there a, it seems like, transparency, where people can
see how the rest of the world works so that that tends to bring
about change more quickly than anything else?
Mr. Cox. I agree with all of that. I think that's right.
Senator Thomas. How do you assess the relationship, then,
with Hong Kong? How has that gone in your view?
Mr. Cox. Our hope, of course, is that Hong Kong, albeit the
tail to the dog, is, ultimately, the influence on the rest of
the PRC rather than the other way around.
I think that we have been in some ways pleased that Hong
Kong's freedoms have not been snuffed out and in other ways
disappointed that Hong Kong's freedoms have, at the margin,
been eroded.
Senator Thomas. I guess it comes back to this. It seems
like the alternative to working with China is to isolate China.
Our experience with isolating in the case of North Korea has
not worked well at all. You are not suggesting that, are you?
Mr. Cox. No, and I don't, frankly, know too many people who
are.
Senator Thomas. What do you suggest, then?
We had several hearings on policy in our subcommittee just
this past month, and we asked people what would you do to bring
about the change that we all desire differently than we are
doing.
Mr. Cox. I think that, right now, the United States gives
the impression that it is business first and not only human
rights but also security second. What we need to do is elevate
those national priorities to the same preeminence that our
business relationships presently enjoy.
Because we have been so lacking in constancy on two of the
three of our priorities, I think the PRC government has ably
taken advantage and has used these things as negotiating
levers.
Senator Thomas. What do you see as the threat to security?
Are you talking about the security of the United States?
Mr. Cox. In particular, my concerns with the overt military
expansion in the People's Republic of China are with the
regional security in Asia. Rather obviously, there is an arms
race underway in the region with Pakistan and India, Pakistan
being the beneficiary of PRC weapons proliferation, technology
proliferation, India feeling threatened by nuclear weapons and
Tibet by planned nuclear weapons on submarines in the Indian
Ocean, by the construction of PLA armed camp in Burma, and so
on, described to me by the prime minister of India as a pincer
movement by China on India.
I think without question Japan feels threatened by North
Korea's launching of a missile over its territory, and it is
now pursuing theater missile defense.
The destabilization of the region because of the actions of
the PRC, not to mention, of course, the U.S. stake in defending
the democracy on Taiwan, all of these things are the security
aspects that I speak of.
Senator Thomas. Do you know if our expression of policy on
the Taiwan Relations Act is sufficient to allow us to do what
we want to do?
Mr. Cox. I do, indeed. My concern is that the Taiwan
Relations Act is seemingly honored in the breach. It is for
this reason that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act has been
introduced in both the Senate and the House. As you know, that
passed with nearly a unanimous vote yesterday in the
International Relations Committee in the House with Democrats
and Republicans both supporting it.
Senator Thomas. I guess my confusion is, my question was do
you think the Taiwan Relations Act gives us enough authority to
do what we have said we were going to do, and then you say we
need another act. I don't understand that.
Mr. Cox. What I said is that I think that the Taiwan
Relations Act does give us not only the authority but the
mandate to assist Taiwan with defensive weapons, for example,
and that that act seems to be all too often increasingly, these
days, honored in the breach. It is for this reason that there
is the additional legislative activity on the subject.
Senator Thomas. So it is the implementation, not the
authority. Thank you.
Mr. Cox. Yes.
Senator Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for holding this important hearing. I
also want to thank Congressman Cox for being here, for his hard
work on these issues, for his interesting remarks and for what
I felt was an excellent answer to Senator Kerry's question.
I think the notion that we should be more consistent almost
on a daily basis in criticizing human rights abuses in China is
a very concrete suggestion, and if more Members of Congress and
the President were more consistent, I think we might find a
different result with regard to the Chinese Government's
response.
Basically, I don't think it is contrived. I think we ought
to try it and I want to praise you and the other Members of the
House who have done everything you can to raise these issues as
often as you can.
The title of this hearing is ``The Future of U.S.-China
Relations.'' But, of course, we cannot discuss the future
without examining the past and the past is not a proud one.
As I have said from this seat many times, this
administration has consistently placed more emphasis on
expanding trade relations with China than addressing the gross
violations of labor rights and human rights that occur in China
every day, even when the nature of that expanding economic
relationship has led to a ballooning trade deficit with the
PRC.
The recent history of U.S.-China relations has been a study
in the exercise of a double standard. That double standard
suggests that human rights are important in some countries but
less so in China, where the siren song of vast markets has
deafened too many ears to the news of oppression and abuse that
evades China's sensors and finds its way to the international
community.
Mr. Chairman, the application of this double standard has
led to a predictable result. China continues to be one of the
most oppressive States in the world. Just this week, China
tried four dissidents, members of the Chinese Democratic Party,
on charges of subversion. Officials would not even allow the
accused to read their defense statements in court.
Yet this administration continues to hold out incentives to
China, eager to see the PRC join the World Trade Organization,
despite China's heavy use of trade barriers. Unfortunately, the
administration's eagerness to forge a close relationship with
China opens the United States to charges of hypocrisy when it
does not stand up for human rights elsewhere in the world.
Mr. Chairman, it is my firm belief that we should stand up
for those rights worldwide, including the rights of women, and
I look forward to discussing those issues in this committee at
the appropriate time.
My own view is that the United States has gained little and
paid dearly in our relations with China, and I would hope that
the future of U.S.-China policy would include a very serious
effort to bring human rights to the forefront of our bilateral
relations.
I know that many of my colleagues are here because of their
concerns about security issues, and I agree that congressional
oversight and vigilance with regard to those issues is, of
course, of critical importance.
But I do not want human rights to get lost in the shuffle
or to be pushed out to the margins of this debate, as they so
often are.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing more about
human rights in China from the excellent panels of witnesses
here today and to discuss how the United States might bring
human rights concerns back onto the priority list in our
relations with China.
In my remaining time I would like to ask the Congressman
one question.
I would like to ask you about the World Bank financing of a
project to open traditionally Tibetan lands to impoverished
ethnic Chinese farmers. I believe you have introduced
legislation restricting U.S. support for the World Bank in
response to this project. Could you just give us an update on
the project and your understanding of the bank's plans.
Mr. Cox. Well, the project is something that the United
States opposes. The United States has registered its
opposition. The fact that, nonetheless, the World Bank is going
forward with it is indicative of a more general problem, and
that is that, even though the United States is the largest
national influence in the organization, the U.S., let alone any
other country, does not really exercise oversight when it comes
to the protection in this case of indigenous peoples or
environmental concerns and standards that we maintain in our
own country.
So U.S. taxpayers end up subsidizing essentially the
destruction of our own standards abroad.
For this reason, I introduced legislation that would permit
the United States, under our existing norms, after we vote
against a project to reduce our proportionate share by that
amount.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, before you let this witness
go, I have a couple of questions yet to be answered, if we
could, and I think this is a good opportunity to do so.
The Chairman. Well, I don't want us to get into a debate
with the witnesses.
Senator Kerry. No, no debate. I just want to ask a
question.
The Chairman. OK, ask your question.
Senator Kerry. I have no intentions of a debate.
The Chairman. I want to get this hearing over with.
Senator Kerry. Well, we have a hearing for the purpose,
obviously, of trying to elicit information and I just want to
do that.
The Chairman. OK. All right.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Congressman, I agree with a lot of your approach and I
agree with a lot of your comments. I am having difficulty
understanding the full measure of the terms of engagement,
however, that you are proposing.
The chairman, for instance, has suggested that engagement
is, per se, a dead letter. You, on the other hand, have a
different view. You have been quoted as saying it is time to
focus not on whether to engage but on what the terms of
engagement are, how to engage. I agree with that completely.
But you have suggested very specifically that we ought to
relax controls on encryption technology and streamline exports
of various other dual use technologies to China. This runs
quite counter to some others here on this committee and
elsewhere.
I happen to agree with you. I think that we need to find
ways to do that.
Could you just elaborate for a moment on sort of your terms
of engagement and, specifically, that component of it with
respect to trade, particularly in light of what Senator
Feingold just said about how we have gained little and
forfeited much. Yet you are advocating greater economic
involvement. How do you reconcile those?
Mr. Cox. Well, first, with respect to export controls, a
subject on which I have spent a lot of time in the last few
years, my recommendations are with respect not only to the
People's Republic of China but, essentially, the world.
Senator Kerry. I agree with you.
Mr. Cox. They run as follows.
To the extent we are seeking to control technology for
military and national security purposes, the touchstone of our
policy must be foreign availability.
If a product or service is available from someone else in
the world besides the United States, then our refusal to
provide it amounts to self-abnegation as national security
policy. It provides no incremental value to the national
security, probably destroys jobs here, and gets you nowhere.
We might, for example, if we looked only at this in
military terms say that we want to deny the PLA hammers, that
we are just not going to sell any hammers to the PLA. We will
not sell any hammers to the People's Republic of China because
they might give them to the PLA.
Now hammers are available widely. So we would simply deny
ourselves hammer sales. We don't wish to do that.
On the other hand, there is a great deal that we control
and that we can control if we wish to pursue this
multilaterally--another recommendation that I have strongly
urged in our select committee, urged unanimously--and ought to
control because it is in our national security interest. So we
need to discern which is which.
When it comes to encryption specifically, I have had
problems with our existing United States policy because it does
not start from the premise that foreign availability is the
beginning of an answer to the question.
So I think there is some great benefit in making sure that
we make commercially available encryption useful to people in
the PRC. Lin Hai, a web page designer in the People's Republic
of China, is now in prison. He is in prison because he shared
e-mail addresses with anti-Communist dissidents here in the
United States.
Actually, they are not dissidents. They are pro-freedom
people here in the United States.
I believe that, if he had had strong encryption
commercially available, the MSS could not have read his e-mail
and he would be a free man today.
I think there are costs as well as benefits to controlling
some of these technologies that are so-called dual use.
Finally, when it comes to dual use technologies, we need to
focus our control efforts on what really matters. My
observation has been that there is as much bureaucracy aimed at
the capillaries as at the jugular, sometimes more. We need to
correct that. We need to find out where that jugular is by
applying intelligence information that men and women loyal to
the United States are risking their lives to produce and that
oftentimes is bottled up someplace and not shared with people
who are making the export control decisions.
We have to share that information within the executive
branch and have a system that controls what really matters.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
I thank you very much, Congressman. You may get some
written questions from Senators who are not here this morning.
Mr. Cox. I appreciate that and I will be pleased to
respond.
The Chairman. Your testimony was just fine.
Our second panelist will be an old friend of ours. He's not
really an old friend, he is a young friend, but he has been
around for a little while. He is Hon. Winston Lord, former U.S.
Ambassador to the People's Republic of China.
We welcome you, sir. You may proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. WINSTON LORD, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA; AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
Ambassador Lord. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
few international issues are as critical and none as complex as
our relations with China. On our long, arduous journey with the
world's most populous nation, Americans will need
sophistication, steadiness, and stamina. Such qualities are
scarce in the current national debate.
I am distressed that the outer limits of views on China are
dominant--the apocalyptic and the apologetic.
We should understand that everything one hears about China
is true--the good, the bad, and the ugly. American policy must
steer between the shoals of hostility and indulgence.
Therefore, I welcome this opportunity to appear before the
committee and join the national discourse. I am pleased that
Admiral Prueher will be here tomorrow. People on all sides of
the China debate can agree that we need an ambassador in
Beijing, and people who know Admiral Prueher, as I did when I
worked closely with him at CINCPAC, concur that he is a superb
nominee, combining intelligence, experience, and integrity. He
will tell it like it is about China and he will forcefully
advance America's interests.
I urge his early confirmation and I urge a balanced
approach in our policy.
My name is ``Lord,'' and I will now proclaim ten
commandments for dealing with China. I trust you will engrave
these in stone.
The first commandment: thou shalt not demonize China. It is
not the Soviet Union. It does not claim or seek a global
mandate for its system or its ideology. It does not support
foreign Communist movements, or proclaim a Brezhnev Doctrine,
or station troops overseas. It confronts enormous economic
problems, including increasingly difficult reforms, the
pressures of globalization, and awesome environmental damage.
Its military strength is exaggerated, lagging further and
further behind the United States in most categories. It is
surrounded not by weak or vassal States but, rather, a string
of substantial powers, many of whom it has recently fought--
Russia, Japan, India, Vietnam.
Beijing faces severe domestic risks to its stability and
unity, including huge economic disparities, systemic
corruption, social unrest, a spiritual vacuum, and a longing
for greater freedom. It has been moving toward a market economy
and bettered the material lives of many citizens. It does allow
greater freedom for travel, work, and grumbling in private.
It is behaving more responsibly on nuclear nonproliferation
and is helpful on several regional and global issues. It seeks
positive relations with the United States in its own self-
interest.
In short, in our national debate, we should reject the
views of the apocalypse camp.
The second commandment: thou shalt not sanitize China. As
we head toward the 21st century, China represents our greatest
international challenge. It is the world's fastest growing
economic power. Its military strength is advancing in selective
areas and could threaten our friends and our overseas forces.
Its past aggressiveness includes, for example, Tibet in the
1950's, India in the 1960's, and Vietnam in the 1970's.
It now pressures Taiwan, trawls the South China Sea, and
flexes its missiles.
China opposes the United States on many key security
problems, such as Iraq and Kosovo, and it is friendly with
rogue States. It behaves suspiciously on missile proliferation.
It is brutal in its repression of dissidents, political and
religious freedom, ethnic minorities, and Tibet.
Beijing increasingly resorts to nationalism to maintain
political control, and its government media is highly abusive
of the United States. It seeks to reduce American power in the
Asia-Pacific region and envisages itself having a role in which
China is once again the Middle Kingdom.
In short, in our national debate on China, we should reject
the views of the apologists.
The third commandment: thou shalt not contain China. This
is the prescription of the apocalypse camp. It is neither
necessary, desirable, nor possible.
To treat China as an enemy would be a self-fulfilling
prophecy when the jury is out on its future course.
We would forfeit cooperation in areas where our interests
overlap and we would exacerbate tensions elsewhere. We would
divert military, diplomatic, and financial resources from other
tasks.
Unlike the cold war coalition for containment against the
Soviets, here we would be alone. While many countries are
apprehensive about China, they do not wish confrontation. We
could, in short, complicate China's emergence as a power, but
we could not control it.
If, instead, we attempt first to forge positive ties with
China and fail, then we would have demonstrated to our friends
and to our domestic public that containment was forced upon us.
The fourth commandment: thou shalt not roll over for China.
This is the prescription, however denied, or disguised, or
unintentional, of the apologist camp. While we should not
regard China as an enemy, neither should we assume it will be a
friend. China, as it should and we should, will act in its own
hardheaded self-interest. It will respect us and be more
cooperative if we act firmly and without illusions. We should
avoid excessive ``mea culpas.'' Often when there are frictions
in our bilateral relations, it is China's fault and not ours.
We should negotiate hard on issues and strictly enforce
agreements, with sanctions if necessary. We should scrupulously
control the export of sensitive technology. We should clearly
oppose Chinese threats against Taiwan. While adhering to a one
China policy, we should fulfill our security commitments,
including the Taiwan Relations Act and arms sales.
We should proceed with regional and national missile
defense, keyed in part to China's own actions. We should
continue to press Beijing publicly and privately on human
rights and democracy, the issues of Tibet, the rule of law. We
should strongly support the Voice of America and Radio Free
Asia. In so doing, we reject the rationalization that Chinese
history, or so-called Asian values, or stability justified
repression.
Congressman Cox was very eloquent on the phony Asian values
rationalization.
The fifth commandment: thou shalt erase the phrase
``strategic partnership.''
To be sure, the administration says that this is a goal,
not reality. But inevitably the distinction is lost. It tags
the United States as naive, complacent, overeager. It undercuts
domestic and congressional support for clear-eyed engagement.
So let us stop using the phrase in the same breath with
China and save it for our allies.
Our relationship with China blends cooperation,
competition, and conflict. We should treat it with respect,
reciprocity, and resolve.
The sixth commandment: thou shalt recall that China covets
America. I need not elaborate why China is crucial to American
security, economic, and diplomatic concerns. But it is
important, especially at times of tension, like now, that we
remember that China needs us at least as much as we need China.
There are the obvious economic incentives. We take a third
of their exports and run a $60 billion deficit. Beijing sorely
needs our investment and technology.
Less obvious, but equally significant, is the geopolitical
factor. The Soviet threat has disappeared and China is more
ambivalent about our Asian presence. But for several decades,
China will bank on the United States to provide balance in a
neighborhood filled with historical rivals.
Finally, of course, China must deal with us because we are
the world's super power.
The seventh commandment: thou shalt pursue a positive
agenda. Too often the debate on China in this country dissolves
to trade versus human rights, money versus morality, commerce
versus conscience. The fact is that both should be pursued.
Each builds on the other.
Again, I agree with the need to be consistent on human
rights, and when Wang Dan's mother gets locked up, something
ought to be said.
More fundamentally, there is an expansive agenda of other
issues where we and China can cooperate or at least pursue
parallel policies. These have been addressed but receive little
attention.
In the interest of time, let me just list some examples in
staccato form. They include wrestling with challenges of
regional security--Korea, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, Central
Asia; tackling global problems--the environment, energy, crime,
terrorism, drugs; and strengthening international
institutions--the United Nations, WTO, APEC--regional security
dialogs and arms control regimes.
We should encourage China's active participation in global
and regional organizations with a view to taming Chinese
adventurist impulses through interdependence.
The administration has been pursuing dialog and exchanges
on some of these topics. We need to work at this agenda more
systematically and publicize it so as to clarify the national
debate and bolster the case for engagement.
To this end, there should be routine summit meetings with
China in good times and bad.
The eighth commandment: thou shalt keep thy powder dry.
As we address this extensive agenda, we must also shore up
indispensable foundations. We should maintain our alliances and
our forward military presence. We should be prepared to use our
assets, if necessary, as we did near the Taiwan Strait in 1996.
We should build positive relations with China's neighbors as
ends in themselves but also to hedge against future Chinese
behavior.
The ninth commandment--and there are only two to go, Mr.
Chairman: thou shalt encourage freedom. Promoting democracy and
human rights cannot be our only goal in China, but it must be
high on the agenda. It supports our other objectives.
It is necessary for domestic and congressional support. It
reflects the American tradition of melding pragmatism and
principles. Moreover, it serves our national security as well.
A China that is more open, humane, and lawful will be less
aggressive and more cooperative on the world stage.
This is not a matter of seeking arrogantly to impose our
values on China. It is an appeal to China's self-interests. A
freer China would burnish its international image and its
relations with the United States. A freer China is essential
for future economic development in the age of information.
A freer China is needed for political stability. If Beijing
continues to shut off the safety valves of peaceful assembly,
expression, and dissent, it will sow the very chaos it fears.
The tenth, and final, commandment: thou shalt proclaim
these principles from the mountaintop.
The commandments I have sketched envisage a nuanced,
multilayered, strenuous, lengthy engagement with China.
Domestic backing will require persistent mountaintop,
Presidential attention, articulation and leadership.
Mr. Chairman, I believe a policy that embodies these ten
commandments will curb both hostility and indulgence toward
Beijing. If we honor these principles with steadiness and
stamina, we will promote both our interests and our values, and
we will preserve the support of the American people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ambassador Lord, I thank you very much.
I think all of us have speculated or thought to ourselves
what could I recommend we do. I think you have some pretty good
commandments there, though I don't know whether they are in
stone or not.
Let me ask you a couple of questions relative to what you
have said.
When you were Ambassador to China in 1989, you thought that
it was important to invite dissidents--and I agreed with you
then and agree with you now--like Fang Lizhi to a dinner hosted
by President Bush. Do you think that the Clinton administration
has done an adequate job on insisting on meeting with Chinese
dissidents?
Ambassador Lord. I basically support the administration's
policy of engagement.
The Chairman. I didn't ask you that.
Ambassador Lord. That is my lead-in to your question. I
think these do need some fine tuning on the human rights front.
I think, for example, as I said, when Wang Dan's mother was
detained, we should have spoken out. I hope, if we do not get a
meaningful dialog with China on human rights, and I don't
expect that, we will go to Geneva this year. I think there is a
need for somewhat more consistent speaking out on these issues.
The Chairman. Yes or no.
Ambassador Lord. Yes or no?
The Chairman. Name me one thing that the Clinton
administration has done about dissidents--one that they have
recommended.
Ambassador Lord. Again, I am not representing the
administration. As you know, I am a former member of it. So I
am speaking as an outside observer.
There has been considerable effort to get people like Wang
Dan and Wei Jingsheng out of jail. We worked hard to rescue
Harry Wu, a very courageous man who is on your next panel, so
that he was not in hot water in China. There has been a lot of
activity behind the scenes. There is not always as forceful
articulation publicly as perhaps should be done.
The Chairman. Thank you. I want to get to another question.
At your confirmation hearing back in 1993, you testified--
and I absolutely agreed with you then and I agree with you
now--that Americans cannot forget Tiananmen Square. Do you
still believe that? If so, how can we act upon that memory?
Ambassador Lord. I believe strongly in that. I believe
Tiananmen Square was a pivotal point in Chinese history, that
it represents the future of China. I am optimistic about the
future of China. I think they are going to have to go toward
democracy. That does not mean we should not press them. We have
to press them. They cannot develop their economy without it,
and you cannot keep down the people's longing for freedom.
So I think we should continue to raise that issue. I think
we should continue to urge the Chinese to reverse their verdict
on Tiananmen Square. That represented the future for China, and
it is consistent with the Chinese people's aspirations.
The Chairman. I am trying to use my time sparingly here
today. Do you think it is realistic to continue what I regard
as the fiction of a one China? Do you think it is ever going to
happen under any circumstances?
Ambassador Lord. What you have now, Mr. Chairman, is de
facto two separate entities. When President Lee spoke out
recently, he was describing what is objective reality.
My concern, however, is that Taiwan has done very well with
a de facto separation from the mainland. There should be no
pressure on it. It should be able to determine its own future
dealing with China.
But to make this de jure without consulting with the
administration I think did blindside the administration, did
not serve Taiwan's interest. But it is important that we warn
Beijing not to use force.
There will not be one China completely until the mainland
looks more like Taiwan, namely freer, and Taiwan has no
interest in joining up with it until that happens.
But in the meantime, a certain ambiguity has been pursued
by several administrations, including President Reagan and
President Bush, as well as Democrats, where you maintain a
certain ambiguity so that you can move ahead with China but
also assure Taiwan's security. Taiwan has done extremely well
under this ambiguity in terms of its economy, in terms of a
flourishing democracy, and in terms of its security.
So I think you have to be very careful before we tamper
with formulas, even though they make us somewhat uncomfortable
when you look at reality.
The Chairman. I have another question, but I may give that
one to you in writing. Thank you. I don't want to violate my
own timekeeping rule here.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome. I am delighted to have you here. I
think your outline, your opening statement is a very important
and extraordinarily competent articulation of the difficulties
of the relationship. I have been struggling with it, recently
trying to reevaluate how do we do some of these things.
There is no easy way, obviously, to do it.
In your fourth commandment you say thou shalt not roll over
for China. It is interesting. I agree and think everyone here
would agree--maybe not--I think most people would agree we
should not demonize China. On the other hand, you cannot
sanitize it. That is a tough balance and that is the balance we
are trying to fight for.
I agree completely with the chairman, Senator Feingold, and
others that we have to speak out loudly on human rights. But
there is a clear point there when we have gone through those
cycles and we clearly also have to deal with the realities of
choices that are internal that we are not going to determine
ourselves. We have always had that tension pushing back and
forth.
You say China will respect us and be more cooperative if we
act firmly and without illusions. Can you give us some examples
of where we might have acted or how we might act firmly and
without illusions that would have a constructive outcome in
your judgment?
Ambassador Lord. There are several examples I can cite.
When I was in office, we acted firmly in 1996 when China was
pressuring and threatening Taiwan and we dispatched two carrier
aircraft groups. This raised morale in Taiwan. It deterred
China from forceful action and it reassured our friends and
allies in the region that we were serious.
Senator Kerry. That is a security issue. I am trying to get
more specific.
The great tension--the chairman, all of us are concerned
about China's form of government. We are fighting to release
that energy you talked about regarding the longing for freedom.
You yourself have said that there is a greater chance of
resolving the problem of Taiwan when China moves toward Taiwan.
None of us is going to support the notion that Taiwan should
move toward China's form of government.
So the question is, really, when you talk to Chinese
leaders, they tell you well, we are working on it, or it takes
time, or it is more than a billion people and there are
difficulties of management. You hear all of the internal
reasons. You have heard them all.
Clearly, you can only force government to move so fast to
embrace someone else's form of government. So the question is
how do we do that without losing the other points of engagement
that are so critical to us--cooperation at the United Nations,
cooperation in North Korea, cooperation in the South China Sea,
cooperation on nonproliferation. All of these other issues are
enormously important, too. It is the balance that we are trying
to achieve.
A lot of people seem to think there is some formula for
that, and I am wondering if you are suggesting there may be or
how we actually arrive at it.
Ambassador Lord. There is no magic formula. It reflects the
complexity of this relationship. There are several points I
would make, some of which are in my statement.
First, we should not use the words ``strategic
partnership.'' That ought to be reserved for democratic allies
like Japan, for example, and it looks naive. So that is
misinterpreted.
Second, we have to continue to make clear to the Chinese
that we are going to try to work on this agenda that I laid out
and you have laid out. We cannot fully have a full relationship
as long as there is not a freer China. So there are certain
restraints that are going to be there just by virtue of
domestic support and our principles. That principle ought to be
consistently put forward.
You have to continue to speak out privately on individual
cases as well as general problems in China. But you also have
to do it more consistently than we have been, I think, in
public in terms of what has been going on just since the
President's trip. I agree that there are a crackdown and
paranoia going on. It is very disturbing. It suggests to me
that the regime in China is somewhat insecure. I think it is
the most volatile situation since Tiananmen Square.
Their over-reaction to the Falun Gong not to mention their
cruelty to the dissidents and their families suggests they
really are concerned whether a combination of corruption,
unemployment, and a longing for freedom are causing
instability.
Senator Kerry. Should we be wielding a stronger economic
stick?
Ambassador Lord. We tried conditional MFN, modest
conditions, early in the Clinton administration. We were
undercut by the business community and by some of our economic
agencies. We lost our leverage and it didn't work.
So I don't think that tool is going to work, frankly. It is
a blunt instrument. But we have to develop the rule of law. We
have to speak out. We have to work individual cases. But we
have to hold our nose a little bit and work on these other
issues which are also in our national interest.
I said in my statement that human rights cannot be the only
item on our agenda, but it has to be high up there. And I don't
have a better solution. You have to pursue the security and
economic interests, but you have to forcefully pursue these
principles.
I think in talking to the Chinese you can, as I suggested,
say look, you are not going to be able to develop an economy in
the age of internet computers and fax machines if you don't
have the free flow of information, if you lock up people who
put out web sites, if you lock up people. You are not going to
get investment without the rule of law. You are not going to
attack corruption without a free press.
So you can appeal to their self-interest. But it is not
going to convert them overnight. It is less arrogant.
You can also say if you are worried about so-called
stability, you had better stop bottling up free expression. You
are going to get violent expression as the only alternative. In
a painful transition, people have to have the right to debate
and discuss these issues.
So this kind of dialog has to go on. But you have to pursue
these other issues. Frankly, it is tough going.
This regime is using every possible rationalization to hold
on to power. Asian values is a phony argument. Stability they
have misjudged. Their history we keep hearing about. But these
are phony arguments to hold on to power.
They are trying to hold on by raising living standards,
repression, and an appeal to nationalism.
We are going to have a difficult time with this group as
long as they have that kind of government. But in our own
national interest, with the vast economic and security stakes
we also have, I do believe we should be engaging them, and it
is a tough dilemma. But you have to move ahead on the entire
agenda.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome.
Ambassador Lord. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. First let me comment on your ten
commandments. Like always, I appreciate that you have now put
this in the spiritual framework. That might lead us to some
celestial breakthrough here on a relationship with China.
So thank you for taking a more creative approach.
You are admired and respected throughout the world for your
expertise in this area and your practical hands-on experience,
as well, which I think has been demonstrated clearly in your
observations in your testimony this morning. I say this not
just because I happen to agree with everything you have said,
but I think it is the common sense approach that we must take
toward China.
I was in China in August and had a 90 minute meeting with
Premier Zhu Rongji and other officials. I then went south, all
the way down to Singapore and spent some time in Vietnam, as
well.
I am aware of your analysis in current terms because I
think you have framed it exactly right.
One of the things that you said in your response to Senator
Kerry, when talking about the insecurity of the Chinese
Government, struck me. I think therein resides an awful lot of
what we are dealing with here. We have to be somewhat careful
in how we craft policy and deal with them in that area. You
addressed that rather well in your points.
You said something else in your tenth commandment: domestic
backing--and I quote you if I am allowed to, sir--``domestic
backing will require persistent mountaintop, Presidential
attention, articulation, and leadership.''
In my opinion, you are exactly right. The next President of
the United States is going to be immensely consumed with this
issue and other issues like this that relate directly to China.
I had an interesting conversation with former General
Andrew Goodpasture, who I think everybody knows, recognizes,
and respects. General Goodpasture told me about a month ago
that, in his opinion, the United States, as we move into this
next millennium, is going to have to be focused, aside from all
the other tangential areas, on three predominant areas--our
relationship with Russia, our relationship with China, and
nuclear weapons. They are all interconnected, as you point out.
Now with that said, I would like to maybe veer this
conversation off into a couple of specific areas that you did
not directly touch upon here. One is the Panama Canal, about
which we have heard much. The other is WTO.
Obviously, you have stayed current with the Panama Canal
issue. There are many people in this body who are most
concerned about the Chinese engineering themselves, positioning
themselves to control the canal at both ends through a
corporate management company called the Hutchison Company.
Would you care to enlighten this committee on what you know
or about your thoughts on this issue?
Ambassador Lord. I will not pretend to be an expert on this
particular issue. I have followed it.
My understanding is that several congressional staff
committees have been going down, including one from this Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, to look at this issue and have
been somewhat reassured. Also, it is my understanding that some
of our agreements with Panama, as we turned over the canal,
should guarantee the free flow.
Finally, you have China's self interest and whether it
would really feel it is in its self interest to do something
provocative.
So those three elements give me some reassurance. But,
certainly, Chinese involvement in the Panama Canal is something
that, on the surface, raises questions and we ought to look at
it very carefully.
I do not pretend to know all the details. But I am
reassured by these three factors so far.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
What about WTO? Give us your sense of where you think the
Chinese are today and where we should be on this issue. It is
my opinion that the President misplayed his hand in April with
the People's Republic of China. I think the President realized
that error rather quickly after the error was made and tried to
come back around and put it back together. I would be
interested in your thoughts.
Ambassador Lord. I agree the President missed a chance at
the time and he, himself, has recognized that.
First, let me say why I think it is in our interest that
China get in, but only on acceptable terms, only if they open
up their market in a good deal, one as good as or better than
the one in April.
There are four reasons why it is in our interest, and I
will give you a sense of the status.
No. 1, we have a huge trade deficit with China. I am not
saying this will solve it, but we have to open up that market
further both to trade and investment. China has to make the
concessions. Our economy is essentially free in terms of
imports. So they are making most of the concessions.
No. 2, if they are in the WTO, we have multilateral
enforcement of rules. It does not mean China may not try to
avoid them just like Europe has, for example. But it is easier
to pressure China to implement agreements if you have the whole
world trading system behind you and not just the United States
by itself.
Third, I think it does reinforce reforms and opening in
China. I am not going to play good guys versus bad guys in the
leadership because that is dangerous and you get the good guys
in trouble. But for those who want to open up that economy, the
WTO openings, obligations, and rules will help it and help move
China in a more open direction.
Fourth, it could marginally help on the Taiwan front.
Taiwan deserves to get in right now, in my opinion, and should
not have to wait for China. Unfortunately, our allies are
chicken on this and they will not allow Taiwan in first because
of China's pressures.
But if China gets in, Taiwan gets in, which is good. Then
Taiwan and China under WTO rules have to deal with each other
directly, more fully, and I think this could ease tensions
somewhat. There will still be problems.
So those are the reasons why we should want them in if we
get a good deal.
I think there is a big debate in China going on now about
getting in. The fact that we did not take the deal in April has
subjected Zhu Rongji to attacks from protectionist industries
and those who want to hang on to a central economy. There is a
counter attack on some of the concessions. People are worried
about protecting their interests. Zhu Rongji felt somewhat
humiliated that he did not get the deal.
So I think there is a debate going on. Also, they are
concerned whether, with the Presidential election year coming
up, the Congress is going to pass normal trade relations
permanently in the wake of the WTO accession.
So I think there is a lot of self-interest for China to get
in--prestige, access to other markets--and there are also
concerns domestically in this debate. I think it is a 50/50
proposition now whether there will be a deal in the next couple
of months.
But I think the timing is less important than the
substance. Let's get a good deal, but I hope we can negotiate
their way in.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I, too, found your ten commandments to be
interesting and useful. I expect to refer to them on a number
of occasions.
Ambassador Lord. As long as you don't plagiarize and give
me the credit.
Senator Feingold. There are two aspects of your answers to
the questions that I found even more appealing and I appreciate
that. One was your willingness to say that there should be more
consistency with regard to the raising of human rights issues.
The second was your willingness to characterize the Asian
values argument with regard to human rights, as I believe you
said, as phony, as an excuse for some of the actions for the
Chinese Government.
I hope I am not incorrectly characterizing your comments.
Ambassador Lord. Congressman Cox was very eloquent on this
subject and I associate myself with his comments.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that. I just want to ask you
a couple of fairly specific questions.
Recent news reports have suggested that press freedom is
being stifled in Hong Kong. Could you comment on the status of
civil and political liberties in Hong Kong since the reversion
to Chinese rule?
Ambassador Lord. All right.
One quick point. I have said that the administration should
be more consistent, but I do want to make clear, though, that I
think its basic policy is sound. I think it is trying to steer
between hostility and indulgence and should be encouraged. It
is some fine tuning that I would like to see done, as I have
suggested.
On Hong Kong, I am concerned about Hong Kong. There was an
unrealistic view that maybe Hong Kong would collapse on July 2,
1997. That was never going to happen. China has too much self
interest. But, equally, there is too much optimism now that
Hong Kong is doing fine, thank you, and that China is keeping
its hands off.
I think there is a gradual erosion of liberty in Hong Kong.
We can see it in several areas. Because of the time pressures,
I will not go into detail, but there are the court rulings on
immigration, in which the National Peoples' Congress overruled
the court in Hong Kong on immigration with the encouragement of
the Hong Kong authorities. So the rule of law is under some
question there.
There are other cases I could cite about friends of Beijing
not getting prosecuted in a newspaper when others are, and so
on.
Second, there is self-censorship in the press. So, even if
there is not an absolute crackdown, many of the press is sort
of bobbing and weaving. They don't want to alienate Beijing.
Also, the independent minded civil servant who headed up RHTK
has just been assigned overseas, and that is a disturbing
element.
Third, of course, is the fact that the democrats, who are
the most popular there, are not well represented under the
rules in the LEGCO, and that is having an effect. It means they
can be less effective.
Fourth, you have just examples of where the Pope cannot
visit there, Dalai Lama cannot visit there, dissidents cannot
visit there. This is supposed to be two systems. I don't know
what happened to the other system. You cannot see one of the
recent popular movies on Tibet there, and you cannot get Falun
Gong manuals there.
So China has been somewhat skillful in not being too heavy
handed. It is maybe not as bad as some of the worst pessimists
thought it might be. But I am concerned about the trends and we
had better keep our eye on them.
Senator Feingold. That was a great answer given the time
constraints. I appreciate it.
As you know, many Members of Congress are extremely
concerned about Tibet. Also as you know, the U.S. Government
pressed to verify the safety and security of the young boy
recognized by the Dalai Lama as the reincarnation of the
Panchen Lama. How have the Chinese responded to that?
Ambassador Lord. How did they what?
Senator Feingold. How have they responded?
Ambassador Lord. Brutally. They continue their crackdown in
Tibet.
The Chinese said for many years that if the Dalai Lama
would only put aside independence, they would talk to him. So
the Dalai Lama puts aside independence, gets criticized by some
of the more radical followers for being too soft, and what
happens? The Chinese move the goal posts.
The Chinese calculation is that Tibet is remote and won't
get much attention, even in an age of global information; that
the Dalai Lama, a Nobel Prize winner of great stature, is
keeping this issue alive internationally and once he passes
from the scene, particularly when they have staked out their
own Panchen Lama, the future Dalai Lama, this issue will go
away.
I think they are making a major miscalculation. The Dalai
Lama is a man of great nonviolence. He has stuck his neck out
to try to have a peaceful resolution of this problem. He has
not been antagonistic to Beijing. He has made secret as well as
public gestures toward the Chinese, and they have rejected him
because they are worried about--I don't know what they are
worried about. They are worried about his popularity, I guess.
He has said he will settle for autonomy, which ought to be
in the Chinese interest, to preserve the religious and cultural
freedom there.
I am concerned that, without the Dalai Lama, the Chinese
are going to face a bigger problem which they ought to
recognize, namely a violent reaction. So I would hope the
Chinese would change in this. I know the administration and the
President have worked quite hard on this privately, and we have
a special envoy with the encouragement of the Senate. We are
going to have to continue to work for a dialog between Beijing
and the Dalai Lama.
Senator Feingold. Is it my understanding that the Chinese
Government has not responded at all with regard to the Panchen
Lama, to the question of the whereabouts of the Panchen Lama?
Ambassador Lord. I'm not sure we even know where he is.
Senator Feingold. So they have not responded?
Ambassador Lord. This is, I guess, the world's youngest
political prisoner, although he is getting older. It is an
outrage.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much for coming
this morning. I imagine you are going to have a number of
questions put to you in writing from Senators who were not able
to be here. It is a pleasure to see you again. Please give our
regards, those of all of us, to your dear wife.
Ambassador Lord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Now for our third panel I welcome a personal friend of mine
and a personal friend of many of us, one of the most courageous
men I have ever known--Harry Wu. He is the executive director
of the Laogai Research Foundation and is joined on our panel by
Dr. Arthur Waldron, director of Asian Studies at the American
Enterprise Institute, and Ross H. Munro, director of Asian
Studies at the Center for Security Studies.
Gentlemen, I welcome you and I thank you for being here.
Dr. Waldron, suppose you proceed, bearing in mind that we
would like to make a part of the record, our printed record,
your remarks in their entirety. If you would confine yourself
as best you can, I would appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF DR. ARTHUR WALDRON, DIRECTOR OF ASIAN STUDIES,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Dr. Waldron. Thank you, Chairman Helms and members of the
committee.
Ambassador Lord just characterized our, the
administration's, China policy as being basically sound. What I
would like very briefly to suggest is that it is unsound.
The reason that it is unsound----
The Chairman. Would you pull your microphone a little
closer, please.
Dr. Waldron. The reason that it is unsound has not so much
to do with China, but, rather, with Asia policy in general.
What this administration has done, really more than any for
some time, has been to make China the cornerstone of the entire
Asian policy. I would argue that this is the most fundamental
problem.
If you are going to make something a cornerstone, you have
to ask what sort of place it is. Again, I think Ambassador
Lord's comments here were very good. He was talking about the
situation in China today as being genuinely the most volatile
he has seen since before Tiananmen. I think this is an issue we
should all grasp.
Earlier, the question arose isn't there a lot of change
going on in China, say in the last 15 years. Certainly there
has been. But we have to recognize that, whereas, say, 15 years
ago change was moving in a forward direction, right now things
are beginning to go backward. I would just like to give two
examples.
The current leader of China is Jiang Zemin. He is regularly
described as a reformer. Actually, the term ``reformer'' would
be better applied to his predecessor, Zhao Ziyang, who was the
Prime Minister in 1989, at the time of the Tiananmen massacre.
Zhao has just turned 80 years old. He is in prison--not in
prison--he is under strict house arrest in Beijing. Only his
daughter is allowed to visit him.
It is said that during the National Day festivities, he was
actually taken out of the city lest he publish a letter, as he
sometimes does, in favor of democracy. His predecessor is Hu
Yaobang, now deceased.
But a few months ago, several people wanted to go visit Hu
Yaobang's grave and they were told by the police that they
would be arrested if they tried to do this.
The point I would like to make is very simple: not all
Chinese leaders are the same. There have been twists and turns
in the directions of China in the last 15 or 20 years. And,
although you could say, quite fairly, I think, that Hu Yaobang
and Zhao Ziyang were reformers, it is wrong to say that the
current administration are reformers. They are, as I think
Ambassador Lord quite correctly put it, concerned with holding
on to their power and they are standing in the way of reform.
Now from the point of view of the United States, this
means, I think, unless we believe they can sustain an outmoded,
archaic, inefficient, unrepresentative Leninist system in a
large country which is bubbling with dynamism--its people are
better educated than ever before, they are starting to have
money, they are starting to be able to think and act--it would
be contrary to all historical experience to imagine that that
sort of dictatorship can continue to run that dynamic a
country. That means that change is coming, whether they like it
or not.
The fundamental defect, I think, with the administration's
China policy is that it is not thinking about this change.
Instead of spending all our time trying to persuade the
people in Beijing that really it would be nice if they should
reform, and so forth and so on, we should be thinking about
what we are going to do if and when there is trouble and we
should hedge against it.
That would mean that we should shift the focus of our Asian
policy away from China to look at the other countries of Asia,
particularly the important democratic, free market countries--
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and there are many, many others. I
think that once China is put into that sort of context, then it
will be possible for us to have greater influence on them.
Now Senator Kerry raised the question of what do we do
differently. It is a very tough question. I think the answer,
speaking out more forthrightly on human rights, is a very, very
important part of that.
But if I were asked that question, I would say shift the
focus. Don't keep going to Beijing. Start looking at the other
Asian countries and start laying a stress on strengthening
relations with the countries with which we share values and
share systems, the countries that will be with us in the crunch
if and when there is trouble. Also recognize that the situation
today in China is, in fact, unstable. There are economic
crises, potentially. There are problems with unemployment.
There are problems with dissent. There are problems with
extensive corruption, gangsterism. You name it--there are all
sorts of things.
Sooner or later I think this is going to lead to trouble.
We have to stop telling ourselves nice stories and we have to
start thinking about how we are going to respond to that
situation if and when there is trouble.
Now what is the role of human rights in all of this? There
is a tendency, I think, to see human rights as being a kind of
frosting on the cake. Democracy would be nice, but it is not
practicable; so and so is a heroic man, but, you know, he gets
a little bit carried away; the Dalai Lama is OK, but you don't
want to say too much; you know, Wang Dan's mother might get us
in trouble.
What we fail to recognize there is that the system type in
China is really the key to many of the problems we have with
China. It is not that China is China. It is not that it has a
Confucian heritage. It is that it is one of the last of the old
fashioned Communist States.
These States tend to try to legitimize their authority at
home by directing hostility abroad. They have policies which
contribute to roiling the waters and creating trouble with
their neighbors.
If you wanted to name a single change that would transform
the security situation in Asia, it would be for China to become
democratic. That is the core. The regime type in China is the
core of American security interests, as well as of other
American interests.
I think that if our administration would begin with that,
recognize that realism requires close attention to the
direction of political changes in China and then start thinking
about how to do that, we would make a lot of progress.
Let me just say one more thing and then I will be quiet.
The other night Jiang Zemin was visiting France. President
Chirac took him out to his country place outside of Paris and
they had a nice dinner. Then they talked for several hours
about democracy, about Tibet, about human rights, and so forth.
Afterward, Jiang Zemin's spokesman said this was by far the
most thorough discussion of these issues that President Jiang
Zemin has ever had with a foreign leader.
The question I would like to ask is if this is the case,
what have we Americans been doing for the last 7 years. Surely,
this is an indication that all of the talk we hear about how
thoroughly we are engaging and discussing is only talk.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Waldron follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Arthur Waldron
What kind of a state is Jiang Zemin's China? How strong? How
stable? How confident? Let me begin to answer that question with
another question: What would we think if downtown Washington were
closed to the public so that official July Fourth celebrations could be
carried out undisturbed, by officials and their invited foreign guests?
That in effect is what was done in Beijing this past National Day,
on October 1, when the heart of the city was sealed off so that
officials and foreigners could review a tightly-scripted military
parade, while ordinary Chinese were told to stay off the streets (and
away from their windows, if they were on the parade route), and watched
the ceremonies on television.
It would be hard to imagine a clearer signal of the current Chinese
regime's lack of self confidence as it contemplates the problems it
faces and its own lack of ideas, capabilities, or legitimacy to deal
with them, but if that example does not suffice, let me give some
others:
Jiang Zemin came to power in 1989 as the pro-democracy movement was
being crushed. His predecessor was Zhao Ziyang, widely respected as a
genuine liberalizer as well as a champion of China's national
interests. Where is Zhao now? Well, he has just turned eighty and is
reportedly in good health--but under close house arrest, as he has been
for the past ten years, with only his daughter permitted to visit him--
and reportedly escorted out of Beijing during the National Day
festivities, lest he release an open letter supporting democracy, as he
has done in the past.
And how about Thao's predecessor? Hu Yaobang rests in a cemetery in
Zhejiang province. The government discourages visits to his grave.
Indeed, when some people from another province planned a trip there a
few months ago they were told that they would certainly be arrested and
forced to drop the plan.
The inference should be obvious. A ruler who keeps his predecessor
imprisoned and incommunicado, and who won't even honor the memory of
his next predecessor, is clearly worried about something and that fact
should be the starting point of our China and Asian policy.
In Asia, the basic fragility of the current political structure in
China is well known. I only wish it were better appreciated in
Washington. For our own plans and calculations, and those of our
democratic allies in Asia, depend a lot on what we think the future
holds for China. If China looks likely to encounter political
turbulence in the years ahead--and I think that is the best estimate--
then we should be thinking about how to prevent problems there from
spreading. That means ensuring above all that our ties with Japan and
other key democratic allies--the countries whom we count on in the
crunch--are strong enough to weather any possible disorder.
This is not and has not been the White House policy. Instead, the
administration continues to talk up the China connection and has now
staked more on it than has any previous administration, making a steady
stream of concessions, while lecturing Japan about how to reform,
providing the financial and food aid that allows North Korea to
continue its nuclear and missile programs, deflecting concern about
China from the Philippines and others, waffling on missile defense, and
turning a blind eye to threats against Taiwan--hoping against hope that
its wish for a China that is secure, prosperous, and strong will
eventually emerge.
How realistic is that hope? The omens in China are not good. Over
the past several months, we have seen a steady campaign aimed at
reimposing on the Chinese people something like the dictatorship which
they have partially dismantled over the past two decades. The Chinese
Democratic Party, a peaceful and law-abiding organization having an
impressive network throughout the country, has seen something like 200
of its leaders imprisoned. The Falungong, a traditional Chinese martial
arts and fitness society, has been ruthlessly pursued despite its
apolitical character. Discussions of liberalism and democracy in
academic and intellectual circles have been discouraged. The
dismemberment of Tibetan culture continues apace.
One premise of American policy is that the Beijing leaders are
somehow ``reformers.'' That was true under Zhao and Hu. But it is no
longer the case today. Jiang Zemin's government is focused on its own
survival. It maneuvers with some skill in the short run to keep
domestic and foreign troubles from overwhelming it. But it has no
vision for even the medium term and shows no inclination to face the
real problems or make the difficult choices. It is time for the United
States to stop pretending that this is a reform-minded government. It
is not. This is a government that stands in the way of reform.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the economic realm. China's
economic development is often contrasted favorably to the troubles
Russia has had since the end of communism. There may even be something
to be learned from the contrast. But consider this: Russia has a
convertible currency--China does not; Russia has a free press--China
does not; Russia holds elections for every level of government--China
does not. Or to sum it up: Russia has done a lot of hard things; China
has not. The judgment can only be made when China faces up to those big
difficulties--but there is no sign of her doing so anytime soon.
China's economy has enjoyed a very good run for twenty years, but
is now facing some trouble. Economic growth has been slowing, despite
massive public works and other government investment, and foreign
investment has been falling. The scale of the problem is now only
starting to become clear.
During the years of easy money and rapid growth, investments in
China were evaluated even less strictly than elsewhere in Asia, with
cronyism, bribery, and political influence steering vast flows into
ill-considered real estate ventures and other losing projects. At the
same time, the antiquated state-owned heavy industrial enterprises that
still employ much of the urban work force were not shut down (as in
Russia and Eastern Europe) but kept on life support with forced loans,
which in turn have rendered China's banking system insolvent. All this
would have been extremely difficult to fix even if reform had been
undertaken in earnest a decade ago. But the pervasive corruption of
China's political system prevented reform, guaranteeing that when the
attempt to change is made, it will bring at least as much distrust and
anger as it does progress.
Added to this are political problems. The aspirations expressed at
Tiananmen in 1989 were not some sort of aberration. They were the true
voice of the Chinese people, recognizable to anyone who knows the
history of this century--a hundred years in which the cry for
``democracy!'' which even the communists joined, has always had the
greatest resonance. Those aspirations have not somehow dissolved in the
decade now passed. Rather, they continue to develop and strengthen--as
one would expect in a country where educational and living standards
are rising, and where the complexity of society and technology has far
outstripped the capacity of a crude Leninist system to manage. But the
government is doing nothing to face the inevitable change in a
democratic direction.
Nor, I would add, are the United States or the Western powers
taking seriously their responsibility to speak candidly to the Chinese
leaders about what must be done, not only to preserve current bilateral
links, but in a certain sense to preserve China itself against chaos.
Just last week Jiang Zemin spent a few hours at the private estate of
Jacques Chirac in France, and the two men talked for several hours,
about democracy among other things. Jiang's aides proclaimed this the
most thorough discussion Jiang has ever had on the topic. I would ask:
what about all the much-vaunted U.S. discussions, in private? Does an
evening at Mr. Chirac's add up to more than all the deep engagement of
this administration?
Nearly a century ago, in the 1910s, Chinese thinkers like the
famous professor and writer Hu Shi were already pointing out that what
causes disorder in China is too much centralization. Loosen control a
bit, let localities run their own affairs, make government clean and
fair--and China will prosper. But let one man try to run it all
himself, and tensions will rise to criticality. That is what looks to
be happening now. China continues to bubble, despite continuing arrests
and detentions of dissidents, crackdowns on the media, insistent anti-
foreign propaganda, and other expedients. Political parties, religions,
labor unions, smuggling rings, kinship organizations, and messianic
cults all flourish under the deceptively clean and calm surface. Not
only the Chinese economy, but also the Chinese population, poses an
increasing problem to the regime, an old-style Leninist organization
that has dismantled most of its institutional props. What is the
answer?
When Japan was challenged by Commodore Perry's black ships in 1853,
the reaction in fairly short order was not only a change of
administration but also a transformation of governmental structure--the
Meiji Restoration--so that, by the end of the 19th century, the
institutions of Japan's constitutional monarchy differed little from
those of contemporary European states like Imperial Germany. When Japan
then defeated China in war, it looked as if Beijing might follow the
same path. But the attempt similarly to reconstruct China that began
during the ``hundred days reform'' of 1898 miscarried. The empress
dowager carried out a coup d'etat, initiating the pattern that has
followed ever since. Though repeatedly challenged militarily in the
past and economically in the present, and despite regular talk of
democratization, China has never actually modernized its political
structures. Indeed, a Ming courtier brought back to life would quickly
find his bearings in contemporary Beijing (but be baffled by Tokyo or
Taipei).
Few would argue that China can continue for very much longer on its
current course, which blends repression and muddling through with an
adamant refusal to ask the hard questions. That means change is coming,
one way or another. Without strong institutions, moreover, the
unraveling of purely personal power is difficult to arrest.
China for the first fifty years of this century was roiled by a
struggle over political authority, never far from the surface and
regularly exploding in civil wars. Starting as coups--relatively self-
contained struggles within the elite--these conflicts expanded until,
by the late 1940s, the fight between the Nationalists and the
Communists engulfed the country. The communist victory, however, solved
nothing. While Mao lived, the problems of economic and democratic
transformation were frozen by his personal authority. But with twenty
years of thawing, they are beginning to come to life again, and as the
various disorders and crackdowns of this year so far make clear, they
once again involve the population as a whole.
Even if the Chinese ruling group were unanimous in its interests
and views, which most clearly it is not, it could not hold back the
tide. Before too long, I suspect, the media will be full of stories
about China that begins with ``Everyone knew . . .'' or words to that
effect. It was clear to everyone that the current situation could not
last. But I do not see much imaginative or searching thought going on
here in Washington about just what course that change may take, and how
it will affect our interests and those of our allies.
China today is not a regime capable of supporting more than a
limited relationship with the U.S., even if we should desire it. Our
interests, however, argue for closer and more candid dealings with the
democratic states of Asia, with whom we share values as well as
interests. We share plenty of values with people in China but not, sad
to say, with China's leaders and it is no use pretending we do. Rather,
let us be a little more honest about the real situation and face the
difficult as well as the happy possibilities for the future, and while
welcoming good news should they come, be well prepared for trouble as
well. Not incidentally, such an approach is more likely to sway China
for the better than is what we do now, which is most unwise, both for
ourselves and for our allies.
The regime looks by no means robust, and rather than counting on
its success, we and our allies should be hedging against its failure.
The Chairman. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. Wu, it is good to see you again. You are looking well
and we will now hear from you with great pleasure and
admiration.
STATEMENT OF HARRY WU, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LAOGAI RESEARCH
FOUNDATION, MILPITAS, CA
Mr. Wu. Mr. Senator, you are looking well today, same as
me. I know that you are older than me, but you are in good
shape. Thank you for inviting me again.
No force on earth could return China to isolationism, and
any actor in world politics would be foolish to try to isolate
that nation of 1.3 billion. But we must still ask why the West,
the United States included, has adopted a kowtow culture in its
dealings with the Communist Government in China.
We pretend to have a strategic partnership with this
regime, which still oppresses its people.
The situation today in China we can describe using Lenin's
words: the people at the top are no longer ruling the people in
the old way. The people at the bottom are not satisfied being
ruled in the old way.
In fact, the Communist regime is hanging on by tooth and
nail to its monopoly on political and economic power. It is
jeopardizing the economic and political health of its own
nation. It is also undermining international political
institutions and international stability. A stable and dominant
Communist Party is not equivalent to a stable and prosperous
China.
It is true that communism in Asia is somewhat different
from that in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Each is
determined by culture and tradition. But all forms of communism
are enemies of individual freedom in theory and in reality.
They create governments that hold on to their power through
corrupt and totalitarian systems.
What happened in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc
yesterday will certainly happen in China tomorrow.
What is the reason, then, for the different treatment one
regime faced and the other receives today?
The Chinese market and cheap labor force present an
incurable temptation for Western investment. For 200 years, the
West has looked to the Chinese market eagerly--the ``if only
each Chinese would purchase one soft drink or role of film, we
would be rich'' theory.
Westerners have created several reasons for their pursuit
of the mythic Chinese market.
Some have tried to use Chinese despotism to their
advantage. Western business gets cheap labor and lets the
Chinese Communist Party take care of their other issues, like
trade unions, health, safety, and environmental issues.
Others claim that economic prosperity will gradually give
way to democracy and respect for human rights. This would be
the ideal: a peaceful and gradual mode of social revolution
from despotism to democracy. Of course, no one tried to apply
this policy to the Soviet Union's bloc, even never apply the
same idea to Cuba and North Korea today.
These concepts have played a role in U.S.-China policy.
They are all based on the same false idea, that the Chinese
Communist regime will bring true stability to China.
But a successful national policy cannot be crafted if we
ignore the fundamental realities of the Chinese Communist
regime.
We must realize the differences between true stability and
the appearance of stability. The Chinese Communist regime is
like a mansion. Two decades ago, this mansion looked horrible.
On the inside, there was the Great Leap Forward, the terrible
famine, the Red Guard's savage acts during the Cultural
Revolution, brutal political campaigns.
Externally, there was exportation of revolution in the form
of support for North Koreans and the Vietcong.
All of this ugliness gave the false impression that the
mansion, the Communist regime, was losing popular support and
was in danger of collapse. Actually, it was not. It was
relatively stable.
Why? It was stable because most people in mainland China at
the time had faith in the Communist Party and believed in Mao
Zedong. It was a kind of religion and Mao became the new
emperor, with a mandate from Heaven.
Mao's death and the Cultural Revolution left China in a
state of crisis. Deng's response to this crisis, however, was
not to dismantle the Communist apparatus. Rather, he restored
it by releasing farmers from the people's communes and by
introducing foreign technology, even more importantly, foreign
investment.
Deng Xiaoping's policy, adopted by Jiang Zemin, altered the
face of mainland China. On the surface, the mansion is now more
attractive. It looks nice. It has been touched up by Western
investment. The shiny skyscrapers and marble bathrooms seen by
the CEO's and company presidents attending the Fortune Forum
meeting in Shanghai last month must have been impressive.
But, in fact, the mansion is less stable than ever before.
Of all the changes in mainland China, the most basic and most
important change is that most people simply do not trust
communism and the Communist Party. The mansion's pillars are
rotten and the timing of its collapse will be as unpredictable
as that of the Berlin Wall.
It is the Communist Party itself that is causing the decay.
First, the regime would never grant its people the degree of
self-determination and freedom needed for true social
stability. The foundation of despotism laid down by Mao remains
the state ideology. It is still reinforced and even celebrated
by the current rules of China.
Every day in China people are making demands like those
made at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Whether they are dissidents
who fight for freedom of speech or farmers who are tired of
corrupt local officials, there is a broad discontent among the
people of China today.
Listening to these people would be a way to bring about
stability. It is tragic that this regime refuses to recognize
the basic fact that democracy is the best way to stability. It
is even more tragic that those abuses continue without any
serious consequences in the international arena.
Economically, the Communist Party will not be able to
institute a true market economy. The Chinese economic success
story of the eighties and nineties is based on largely bad
loans, a transfer of wealth from the State to party cadres and
their followers.
The so-called market economy in China, mainland China, is
actually a socialist market economy, controlled by the
government. There is no influential middle class in China
today. There is only an elite class, dependent on the Chinese
Communist Party.
The party knows that it is losing popular support. So it
offers incentives to party members, their families, and their
followers. It has allowed raising the banners of nationalism
and patriotism in order to regain some populist appeal.
The current slogans--``he who loves his country loves his
party;'' ``anti-communism equals anti-Chinese''--can be traced
to an old Chinese tradition of ``love your rules, love your
country.''
The Chinese Communist Government maintains their despotic
domination by fading out communism, even by completing shedding
their Communist garb. If this type of regime continues to
exist, it will be a huge factor of instability for
international peace.
As a Nation, the United States must shed its illusions of
the Chinese Communist Party ever being a true strategic
partner. We have to ask ourselves if, first, the regime can
actually bring true economic prosperity to China and, second,
if this regime's kind of economic progress can bring democracy.
For either of those to be possible, we would need to see a
respect for human liberty that is opposite that of this Chinese
Communist Party.
At present, the following aspects of human rights
conditions deserve particular attention.
No. 1, population control. In mainland China, no woman,
married or single, may give birth without government
permission. This is permission from the government. Every one
without permission is subject to forced abortion and forced
sterilization. Large-scale forced abortion and sterilization
surgeries, supplemented with disciplinary and economic
sanctions, are the principal means of population control.
Here is another document to show you [indicating]. This
man, because he has two daughters, was subject to
sterilization. The government destroyed his beautiful house.
No. 2 is the Laogai camp system. As the Chinese Communist
authorities themselves put it, Laogai camps are tools of the
dictatorship of the people's government. It is not a common
prison for punishing criminals.
The machine must be destroyed. Just like Nazi concentration
camps and Soviet gulag camps, it is not enough to release one
or two well known dissidents from the machine. We want to ask
the American Government to negotiate with China to allow the
International Red Cross and international human rights
organizations to visit the labor camps.
The death penalty and organ harvesting from executed
prisoners is very normal today in China. The Chinese Government
said execution of death row prisoners is a political action in
our country and is used to maintain the social order. Prisoners
are sentenced in mass sentencing rallies, are paraded through
the streets, and often are executed publicly.
They call this ``scare the monkey by killing the chicken.''
The harvesting of executed prisoners' organs for medical
and transplant purposes is also national policy. It is the
Chinese Government that coordinates this brutal practice.
No. 4, religious prosecution is still going on.
No. 5, persecution of the Tibetan nationals is still going
on.
No. 6, detention and harassment of labor activists still is
happening today in China.
No. 7, Laojiao, so called reeducation through labor, and
Jiuye, so called forced job placement policy, are still
implemented in this country.
No. 8, prosecution of civil organizations occurs. The
severe crackdowns on the China Democratic Party and Falun Gong
are serious abuses of freedom of assembly and association.
No. 9, repression of freedom of the press is still going on
today in China. Of course, China's history is written by
Chinese. But in today's international environment,
international political and economic pressures can play a very
important role.
The international community must tell China clearly that we
expect to see a peaceful, prosperous, free and democratic
China, not a prosperous and stable Communist China. Peace and
prosperity are possible only when human rights and democratic
freedoms are respected.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Harry Wu
No force on earth could return China to isolationism, and any actor
in world politics would be foolish to try to isolate that nation of 1.2
billion. This said, we must still question why the West, the United
States included, has adopted a kowtow culture in its dealings with the
Communist Chinese government, pretending to have a ``strategic
partnership'' with a regime whose goals and values are very different
from our own. It seems as if our relations with China are based on the
false premise that the stability of the Chinese communist party is
integral to successful political and economic relations with China, and
to the goal of stability in Asia and international peace in general. In
fact, this regime, by hanging on tooth and nail to its monopoly on
political and economic decision-making powers, is jeopardizing the
economic and political health of its own nation. It is also undermining
international political institutions and international stability. A
stable and dominant communist party is not equivalent to a stable and
prosperous China.
Recent history offers a lesson in the futility of communist
dictatorships. The last two decades of the Soviet Union and its Eastern
European satellites bear eloquent witness to the fact that as long as
they were bent on strangling freedom and democracy, all their
kaleidoscopic ``new policies'' devised to extricate them from their
political and economic dilemmas were doomed to failure.
The collapse of the Berlin Wall ten years ago was undoubtedly the
outcome of a multi-faceted policy of containment from the outside:
militarily, politically, economically, culturally, etc. Still, the most
important reason for the fall of communism in Europe was that
communism, then and now, does not enjoy the support of the people. It
breeds instability. It not only defies individual freedoms in theory,
in practice it has fostered governments that can only maintain their
power through opaque and corrupt totalitarian systems.
True, communism in Asia is somewhat different from that in the
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, being determined by their respective
cultures and traditions. Nevertheless, all forms of communism run
contrary to democracy and freedom and are therefore despotic in nature
and lifeless. What happened in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc
yesterday will inevitably happen in China tomorrow.
What is the reason, then, for the different treatment one regime
faced and the other receives today? Despite Khruschev's revelations of
Stalin's brutality, through the Breshnev and Gorbechev eras, the West
recognized that the fundamental nature of the Soviet Union had not
changed, and treated the Soviet Bloc accordingly. But certain people in
the West are already declaring impatiently that the Chinese are
forsaking communism and unconsciously moving towards freedom, democracy
and capitalism. Thus in the West, we roll out the red carpet for
Chinese communist leaders, and the Chinese Communist regime is enjoying
privileges in the international community that were unthinkable for the
Soviet Union.
The primary reason for the huge discrepancy is that China's market
and cheap labor force present an incurable temptation for Western
investment. For 200 years, the West has looked to the Chinese market
eagerly--the ``if only each Chinese would purchase xxx, we would be
rich'' theory. In recent years, disregarding the difficulty of actually
successfully entering the Chinese market, Westerners have created
several justifications for their dogged pursuit of the mythic Chinese
market.
Some have tried to use Chinese despotism to their advantage.
Chinese lack of concern for their workforce saves Western businesses in
China the trouble of trade unions, lawsuits, health, safety and
environmental concerns. Their business partner--the Chinese communist
government--``takes care'' of messy issues like democracy, human
rights, social equality and judicial due process. Western investors
pretend not to see these problems and have a clear conscience, claiming
that widespread abuses of human rights are due to so-called Chinese
cultural traditions. Thus, they repeat the false claims made by the
CCP.
Others claim that economic prosperity will gradually give way to
democracy and respect for human rights. This would be the ideal: a
peaceful and gradual mode of social revolution from despotism to
democracy. Of course no one tried to apply this policy to the Soviet
Bloc. In fact, in Mainland China, much of the new wealth is now in the
pockets of state bureaucrats who have a vested interest in the power of
the communist party. There is no influential middle class as an
independent social stratum in China; only an elite class dependent on,
and serving the CCP.
Others argue that we must bolster the Chinese economy, claiming
that economic failure in Mainland China would create insurmountable
problems for the world economic system; radical political conflicts or
civil war in China would trigger huge waves of refugees and regional
instability.
All these concepts, more or less, have found their expression in
the formulation of China policies. All are based on the same false
presumption: that the Chinese communist regime must be the bearer of
true stability.
To understand why this concept is a false one, we must clearly
understand the present stage of China's development. The Chinese
communist rule can be divided into two periods: the first being Mao
Zedong's thirty-year rule, the second being the last twenty years under
Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. True, the Deng/Jiang brand of communism
differs from that of Mao. Through two decades of implementation, Deng's
policies, adopted by Jiang, have altered the face of Mainland China.
Many Western scholars and politicians have wrongly interpreted these
changes as a break with communism, drawing clear differences when
condemning Mao's excesses but singing in praise of Deng and Jiang,
trying to create an impression that there is no continuity between the
two. Of late, we have even heard some United States government and
business officials go so far as to omit the words ``communist party''
when talking about China.
But a successful national policy cannot be crafted if we ignore the
fundamental realities of the Chinese regime.
We must differentiate between true stability, and the appearance of
stability. One can look at the Chinese communist regime like a mansion.
Three decades ago, this mansion looked horrible. On the inside, there
was the disastrous ``Great Leap Forward'' and the terrible famine that
resulted, the Red Guard's savage acts during the Cultural Revolution,
ceaseless brutal political movements and campaigns. . . . Externally,
there was ``exportation of revolution,'' in the form of support for
North Koreans and the Vietcong. All this ugliness gave the false
impression that the mansion, the communist regime, was losing popular
support and was in danger of collapse. Actually, it was relatively
stable. Why? Because most people in Mainland China at the time had
faith in the communist party and followed Mao Zedong steadfastly. It
was a kind of religion and he was the new emperor, entrusted with the
Mandate of Heaven.
Mao's death and the brutal excesses of the Cultural Revolution left
China in a state of crisis. Deng Xiaoping, in 1979, tried to explain
China's problems with what he termed the ``three credibility crises:''
(1) The people had no trust in the communist party, (2) They lacked
confidence in the socialist road, (3) They saw no way out, beset by
collapsing national economy, backroom politics, as well as languishing
cultural and educational institutions. Deng's response to these crises,
however, was not to dismantle the communist apparatus. Rather, he
restored it partially by releasing farmers from the disastrous people's
communes and by introducing foreign technology, and even more
importantly, foreign investment.
Through two decades of implementation, Deng's policies, adopted by
Jiang, have altered the face of Mainland China. On the surface, the
mansion has been beautified, touched up and restored by Western
investment. The shiny skyscrapers, gilded stairways and marble
bathrooms seen by the CEOs and company presidents attending the Fortune
Forum meeting in Shanghai last month must have been impressive indeed.
But in fact, the mansion is less stable than ever before. Of all the
changes we have witnessed in Mainland China, the most basic and most
important change is that most people simply do not trust communism and
in the communist party. This mansion's pillars are essentially rotten,
and the timing of its collapse will be an unpredictable as that of the
Berlin Wall.
It is the communist party itself that is causing the decay. First,
this regime will never grant it people the degree of self-determination
and freedom needed for true social stability. The foundation of
despotism laid down by Mao remains the state ideology. It is still
regularly reinforced and even celebrated by the current rulers of
China.
Ten years ago, after the start of Deng's economic reforms, we saw
Chinese Communist-style stability at work in the Tiananmen Square
Massacre in 1989. Tiananmen could have been a turning point. Even seen
in the most modest terms, the protests signified that economic openness
alone did not satisfy the Chinese people. The protests were a call for
transparency and an end to corruption. Fulfilling or at least beginning
a dialogue on these concerns would have brought great benefits, both
politically and economically, to the country.
Everyday in China, people are making demands similar to those made
at Tiananmen Square. The Chinese people have drawn a major lesson from
decades of political terror and economic corruption. Whether they are
dissidents in the traditional sense who fight for freedoms based on
broader principles or farmers who are weary of corrupt local officials,
there is a broad discontent among the people of China today. There is a
growing sentiment that it is imperative to fight for freedom and
democracy, and to cast aside the communist system. Listening to these
people would be a way to bring about stability. But the fact that these
demands came from outside the party was seen as too much of a threat.
That crackdown, and the others that have followed to this very day, was
justified by the Chinese rulers in the name of ``stability.'' It is a
tragic irony that this regime refuses to acknowledge the basic fact
that transparency, and eventually democracy, are the only way to ensure
stability. It is even more tragic that the abuses continue without any
serious consequences in the international arena.
Economically, the communist party will not be able to institute a
true market economy. The Chinese economic success story of the eighties
and nineties is based on bad loans, a transfer of wealth from the state
to Party cadres and their cronies rather than a production of wealth,
and on faulty accounting. The so-called ``market economy'' in China's
mainland is actually a ``socialist market economy,'' controlled by the
government. The legitimate private sector economy needs to free itself
from the shackles of the Party's economic system of public ownership in
order to truly flourish. In the coming decade, the need for true
economic reform and ideological freedom will play critical roles in
China's political structure.
The party is not blind to the continuing discontent in China, but
it is unable to completely discard communism. But the old standbys--the
Marxist and Leninist classics--do not afford viable solutions to most
of the problems the country is currently facing. The ruling party is
not willing to discard them, but they know that communism does not
attract popular support. So to reinforce their prestige internally,
they use a three-pronged approach of limited reform, favoritism, and
nationalist rhetoric.
To prevent further tarnishing the party's reputation, the party
higher-ups launch anti-corruption campaigns and implement minimal
judicial and political reforms. And so we have seen increased lawsuits,
even some narrowly directed against the government. But we will never
see an independent judiciary. We witness rudimentary village elections,
through which the party not only demonstrates their progressive nature,
but also route out overly entrenched local cadres. But they will never
tolerate true political competition or pluralism. Simultaneously, they
devote major efforts to expanding communist party ranks. The fact that
the membership of the Falungong outnumbered that of the communist
party, which now stands at sixty million, was a tremendous
embarrassment. Long before the recent crackdown, the party has been
trying to attract new candidates not with revolutionary ideals, but
with tangible political and economic incentives.
In addition to economic incentives to Party members, their families
and cronies, the Party has raised the banners of ``nationalism'' and
``patriotism'' in order to regain some popular appeal. In fact, these
banners may be more effective means for it to maintain domination,
rooted as they are in Chinese society. The Chinese, in particular the
so-called ``intellectuals,'' have often failed to differentiate between
ruler and motherland. The origin of the current slogans ``He Who Loves
His Country Loves His Party,'' ``Anti-Communist = Anti-Chinese'' can be
traced to millennia-old Chinese tradition of ``Love Your Ruler, Love
Your Country.'' The Chinese communist government can resist the trend
of democracy and freedom by resorting to nationalism and patriotism
alone, as they did in the orchestrated demonstrations following the
NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. They can maintain
their despotic domination by fading out communism, even by completely
shedding their communist garb. If this type of regime continues to
exist, it will be a huge factor of instability for international peace.
Generally speaking, China's history is written by the Chinese, but
in today's international environment, international political and
economic pressure can play an important role. For the sake of our
national interests, and for the sake of our national values, we must
shape our policies to promote respect for human rights and democracy.
As a nation, the United States must shed its illusions of the
Chinese communist party ever being a true ``strategic partner.'' We
must ask ourselves if, first, this regime can actually deliver economic
prosperity for China, and second, if the economic progress that has
been made will lay the foundations for democracy. For either of those
to be possible, we would need to see a respect for human liberty that
is antithetical to this Chinese communist party.
At present, the following aspects of human rights conditions
deserve particular attention:
1. Population Control: In Mainland China, no woman, married
or single, may give birth without government permission.
Population control is China's fundamental national policy. From
the center to the grassroots, communist party officials, who
are directly accountable for the execution of this policy,
control every town, every village, every child-bearing-age
woman through planned birth quotas. Large-scale forced abortion
and sterilization surgeries, supplemented with disciplinary and
economic sanctions, are the principal means of population
control. The Chinese communist authorities' planned birth
policy constitutes a grave violation of human rights, which
must not be pardoned by resorting to economic, cultural and
other pretexts.
2. Laogai (labor-reform) camp system. As the Chinese
communist authorities themselves put it, Laogai camps are tools
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, not common prisons for
punishing criminals. Over the five decades of communist rule,
tens of millions of people have been thrown into this mincing
machine and perished there. Like the Nazi concentration camps
and Soviet gulag camps, Laogai camps are not to be ``improved''
or ``upgraded'' but must be rooted out (this does not mean that
China should not have a prison system). Products of forced
labor must not be sold on the market for profit either
domestically or internationally. International Red Cross and
human rights organizations must be allowed to visit Laogai
camps.
3. Death penalty and organ harvesting from executed
prisoners: Execution of death-row prisoners is a political
action in Mainland China. Prisoners are sentenced at mass
sentencing rallies, paraded through the streets and often
executed publicly. The aim of this process is to ``manifest the
might of the communist party's dictatorship,'' and to ``scare
the monkey by killing the chicken.'' Maintaining social order
by executed prisoners in numbers unseen in the rest of the
world constitutes a crime against civilization. The harvesting
of executed prisoners' organs for medical and transplant
purposes is also national policy. This practice, in its extent
and brutality, is also unheard of.
4. Religious persecution: Christians not belonging to the
government sanctioned church face persecution ranging from
persistent harassment to beating and torture. A policy of
genuine religious freedom must be implemented. The ability of
the Roman Catholic Church to do missionary work in China would
be the litmus test of this policy.
5. Persecution of the Tibet nationalists and Buddhists in the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR): Numerous prisoners have died in
Tibetan prisoners from torture and beatings. Respect for the
Tibetan people's right of self-determination must be
established. As a spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama must be
allowed to return to Tibet.
6. Detention and harassment of labor activists: Those calling
for independent trade unions and labor reform are routinely
harassed and arbitrarily detained. Workers must be allowed to
establish independent trade unions.
7. Laojiao (reeducation through labor) and Jiuye (forced job
placement within the camp) systems: The Laojiao system is an
``administrative'' policy: public security unites can, without
any legal proceedings, wantonly deprive a citizen of his/her
freedom for up to three years. Over 200,000 people are
currently held in this system. The Jiuye system has been
significantly reduced in size since 1983, nevertheless, the
authorities are still forcing many prisoners and Laojaio
inmates who have served out their terms to remain in the
system, thus further depraving them of the civil rights and
freedoms.
8. Persecution of civil organizations: The severe crackdowns
on the China Democratic Party and Falungong are serious abuses
of freedom of assembly and association.
9. Repression of freedom of the press: Censorship is
pervasive in all forms of media in China, and those seeking to
work outside the confines of the state-controlled media may be
subject to detention and imprisonment.
The international community must tell China clearly: we expect to
see a peaceful, prosperous, free and democratic China, not a prosperous
and stable communist China. The international community must state
clearly that political reform and improvement of human rights
conditions must not only be synchronous with economic development, but
must, to a certain degree, precede it. Peace and prosperity are
possible only when human rights, democracy and freedom are respected.
The Chairman. Harry, you have appeared many times with us
and you always do well.
I want to circulate several copies, including the ten
things that you identified. I thank you very much.
Mr. Munro, I am looking for my paper on you.
Mr. Munro. I can introduce myself, if you would like,
Senator.
The Chairman. Please do that. I have so much paper up here.
Wait, just a minute, please.
You are the Joseph H. Lauder----
Mr. Munro. No. That is my friend, Arthur Waldron.
The Chairman. Then you are the director of Asian Studies at
the Center for Security Studies. We have dealt with you before
many times.
In any case, we are glad to have you. If you would proceed,
we would appreciate it. I'm sorry, but I'm surrounded now by
paper but no Senators.
STATEMENT OF ROSS H. MUNRO, DIRECTOR OF ASIAN STUDIES, CENTER
FOR SECURITY STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Munro. We're even because this is going to be a bit of
a back of the envelope presentation from me. I just returned
from 5 weeks in Asia and received very short notice about
appearing here today. But I am really privileged to do so.
It may interest you, Senator, that I have spent much of
this past year looking at China's relations with countries and
regions on its land borders. In fact, I was just in the Russian
far east, Siberia and Kazakhstan, looking at precisely that.
Earlier in the year I was in countries like Burma and Laos.
I can report to you that from Vladivostok to Rangoon, China
is consolidating and increasing its preeminence along its land
borders and throughout most of the land mass of continental
East Asia.
It is achieving this with an impressive array of
sophisticated--I did not say benign--sophisticated policies and
also by the sheer weight of its population and its economy.
I mention this because I think it directly relates to the
issues before your committee. China's increasingly dominant
position in continental East Asia today is one side of a rough
and fluid balance of power in Asia as a whole. Balancing China,
of course, is the United States and its democratic friends that
Arthur Waldron referred to, its democratic friends and allies
on China's eastern and southern rim. I am referring, of course,
to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, most of the island nations of
Southeast Asia. And ultimately, I believe, India will be on
that list as well.
By definition, a balance of power is a force for stability.
But stability in Asia today is precarious because China is not
satisfied with its growing dominance of continental East Asia
but also wants to dominate the democracies on its eastern and
southern rim.
In short, China wants to dominate all of Asia.
China's leaders, of course, do not put it quite so starkly.
In fact, they insist that they do not seek hegemony. But their
declared goals amount to a program for precisely that. They
want the permanent strategic subservience of Japan. They don't
want Japan to ever be a normal power militarily. They want to
conquer Taiwan. They, of course, want to, and they are explicit
about this, end the U.S. military presence in Asia, and they
want to control all the islands of the South China Sea. If they
achieve these announced goals, they will dominate Asia.
Now in some ways it is easy to understand the Chinese
leadership's great strategic ambitions. For one thing, the
ambition to dominate Asia harks back centuries to when powerful
Chinese dynasties expected all of its neighbors to know their
place and kowtow to the emperor in Beijing. Of course, today's
autocrats in Beijing are nationalistic, and aggressive foreign
and military policies serve to legitimize the regime, a regime
that has never been elected by the people.
Now what is much more difficult to understand is the
Clinton administration's response to China's growing ambitions
and to China's determination to destroy the balance of power in
Asia. Indeed, since 1996, this administration has repeatedly
demonstrated that either it is not committed to maintaining a
balance of power in Asia anymore, even though that has been the
strategy toward Asia of the United States for more than a
century, or it simply does not understand how central the
balance of power in Asia is to America's interests.
It refuses to come to grips with China's challenge to
America's interests. And, of course, it ignores--this is
something that was not brought up by other witnesses--it
ignores the fact that the assertion that the United States is
China's enemy pervades all serious writing and statements about
strategy or foreign and military policy in China today.
It is an implicit given or it is explicit, all the time,
that the United States is China's adversary. And yet, you do
not see a coherent or intelligent response by the Clinton
administration to that.
In fact, in 1997, as you know, the Clinton administration
began using the term ``strategic partnership'' with China just
as the Chinese were saying that it was unacceptable for the
U.S. military to be in Asia, which contradicts the whole
concept, I think, of any strategic partnership.
The situation got much worse in 1998, sir, when the
President made his trip to China and managed in just a few days
to deeply disturb Japan by not visiting it before or after his
trip to China, to undermine Taiwan by publicly reiterating the
three so-called ``no's,'' and to bully India by joining China
in condemning its nuclear tests--all in a few days.
These are the very countries on which we must depend to
maintain a balance of power to resist Chinese assertiveness
and, by the way--and here is where Dr. Waldron's and my views
mesh nicely--by resisting Chinese assertiveness and aggression,
that will lead, I think, in a way to delegitimizing the regime
because it is Chinese national chauvinism and Chinese economic
mercantilism that are two of the foundations of this
undemocratic regime's legitimacy today.
I don't know how much we can do directly to foster
democracy in China. But I believe very strongly that by
treating China as an external actor, by looking at its external
actions, where we have a lot of power to resist China, we can
indirectly undermine that regime and foster democracy.
The Clinton administration has neglected relations with all
these democratic countries around China, but the worst errors
have been made vis-a-vis Taiwan. Let's, just for purposes of
analysis, lay aside our legal commitments to Taiwan under the
Taiwan Relations Act and let's lay aside our moral commitment
to an old friend and ally. I take those commitments, by the
way, very, very seriously. But for purposes of discussion,
let's look at Taiwan purely now as a strategic issue. It is
very instructive to look at Taiwan through a purely strategic
prism.
Certainly, there is overwhelming evidence that in Beijing
the Chinese leadership, since the early 1990's, has viewed
Taiwan primarily in strategic terms as a strategic target. We
should no longer dignify Chinese policy toward Taiwan as a
policy of reunification. It is not reunification. They don't
care about the people of Taiwan. Chinese generals are saying
that they don't care if Taiwan is reduced to rubble. They want
the raw real estate.
Specifically, they want control of the air and sea space
because that will up-end the balance of power in Asia overnight
because China will suddenly be controlling the key air and sea
lanes, the most strategic air and sea lanes in East Asia.
The Clinton administration does not seem to grasp that at
all. Instead, the administration keeps pushing Taiwan to reach
some kind of interim agreement with Beijing. Well, presumably,
an interim agreement would require Taiwan to make some sort of
symbolic or legal concession to Beijing.
Clearly the Clinton administration believes that this would
placate Beijing at least for a while.
But Beijing does not want symbolism. Beijing does not want
a sop for nationalism. What Beijing really wants is the
territory, as I just said, and to overturn the balance of power
in Asia.
So I want to abbreviate my remarks. I have already spoken
longer than most of my friends.
Let me just say that there is one other thing I really want
to emphasize and that is that there are powerful elements in
this country, specifically in the China policy community--they
certainly are not at this table right now--who want to appease
China by tossing away some of our most important assets, some
of the most important levers we have in dealing with China.
One is Taiwan itself. They want to sacrifice Taiwan. I see
Taiwan as an asset, not as a liability.
Second, there are sinologists who are calling on the United
States to assure China in advance that we will never allow a
theater missile defense system to be installed in Taiwan.
Third, there is the whole WTO issue. I think, given the
fact that the vast majority of the Chinese elite either opposes
WTO or wants to sign the agreement but then not implement it,
we should be very wary of any WTO agreement and keep the
leverage that is inherent in that huge trade surplus that China
runs with us.
So, again, I have gone over a lot of material in a hurry.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Well you have done very well.
I have a situation to attend to. I want the three of you to
testify as long and as much as you will. I have no Senator here
to relieve me and I have a problem with my knees. So I am going
to do an unusual thing. I will adjourn this hearing but will
ask my staff representative to take my chair and ask the
questions that I have here so that you three gentlemen can go
on the record.
We are going to print the record we make today and
circulate its printed form.
If you will forgive me, I will absent myself. But you will
find that Mr. Doran knows more about this subject than I do,
anyhow.
I would ask the staff member to identify himself for the
record after I adjourn this hearing but to finish up for our
subject record.
Thank you. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Continuation of Discussion by Committee's Professional Staff
Mr. Doran. My name is James Doran. I am the senior
professional staff member for East Asian Affairs for the
committee under Senator Helms.
I think I will just go left to right here and start with
Dr. Waldron.
I just want to ask, Arthur, if you think that the policy of
economic engagement with China will necessarily lead to
liberalization in that country.
Dr. Waldron. I think that the answer to that is no. I think
that there are plenty of examples in history of countries which
have managed to separate the economy from a dictatorial rule. I
think that, on balance, it would be a good thing. I think it is
a good thing to encourage genuine entrepreneurial business in
China.
One thing we should be aware of is that a lot of the
Chinese entities with which we deal in so-called business are
not--these are State run enterprises or else they are part
foreign invested/part State invested. There is nothing yet in
China that comes close to approximating a genuine free
enterprise system in which people start their own businesses
and then can grow without limits.
If you get that sort of genuine private enterprise, that
will have very, very beneficial effects. But there is an
economist in Hong Kong who refers to a lot of investment in
China essentially as bridge loans. There are all kinds of
difficulties in the State run sector and they are using all
sorts of ways to bring in more money. But it is not
contributing, I don't think, to what we want.
Mr. Doran. It seems to me, then, that basically the policy
of the 1990's, even preceding the Clinton administration, may
then be based on a false premise. It seems to me that that is
entirely the premise of U.S. policy for at least a decade, that
economic engagement will lead to political liberalization in
that country.
Dr. Waldron. I think if you read history, you find that it
is not that simple. Obviously, this is a complex relationship
to manage. I think we should manage our connections with China
more stringently, and I would associate myself with Ross and
the others. It is very, very important that we broaden it.
We do not need a China policy. What we need is an Asia
policy.
Mr. Doran. Thank you.
Also in your testimony, you advise us to start hedging
against the possibility of the current Chinese regime's
failure. It also seems to me that one of the Clinton
administration's arguments for essentially trying to prop up
this regime is that, if this current regime fails, there will
be chaos in China.
What is your view of that assumption?
Dr. Waldron. I think that we are running at a very
dangerous, or it is a perilous road that we are taking. This is
because we are not simply dealing with the Chinese regime
because it is the de facto ruler. We have moved from assessing
it as being a positive force to sort of hoping that it is a
positive force.
Now we are really very much, I would say, leaning to try to
support it. In other words, we have identified our national
interests with the continuation of that regime.
I think that this is a mistake. The regime is standing in
the way of reform. If there were going to be reforms made by
these people, we would be hearing about it. They would be doing
it. We would have some blueprints. I mean, let's have an
election. Let's release some political prisoners. Let's have
some laws that really guarantee private property. Let's start
reforming the judiciary.
These are all low priorities.
My diagnosis is, given the mismatch between the stubborn
regime and the dynamism in China, that sooner or later there is
going to be change and we should be thinking about that change
rather than sort of kidding ourselves and hoping that the
leadership is going somehow to succeed in seeing it through.
One of my Chinese said to me a few months ago that they
have no plan. The leadership in the PRC has no concept of how
it is going to get where it wants to go. And if you're dealing
with things like political reform, law, citizenship and so
forth, you have to think it through before you try to implement
it.
Mr. Doran. Thank you very much.
Let me turn now to Harry Wu for a second.
Harry, you testified that repression still exists in China.
I think most observers will admit that. But many observers,
while admitting this, insist that human rights have improved
over the last decade. Do you concur with that view?
Mr. Wu. Yes and no.
Before I give you my answer, I want to state that if there
has been some progress in human rights, it happened because the
ordinary Chinese people demanded change. No one should credit
the Chinese Communist Government with improvements.
At most you can say that Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin are
realistic. They know how to withdraw a few inches when they are
faced with a crisis. This is the way to keep their power.
We Chinese, we ordinary Chinese have paid a price. Millions
lost their lives in the Laogai, and we allowed the Chinese
Communist Party to destroy religion in China in the 1950's. We
supported the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
We sent our young men and women to Korea and Vietnam to fight
against American imperialists. We dedicated ourselves to the
Communist revolution.
Then we learned a lesson: communism is a joke.
To give an example, let me put it this way. The Communist
government now allows some religious freedom in China today. No
one could believe that this is because the Chinese Communist
Party respects religious freedom.
In the 1950's, the Chinese Communist Party violently
abolished religion in China and replaced it with Maoism. They
succeeded, but only temporarily.
In the past 10 years, the Chinese Communist Party has spent
a lot of money to rebuild and repair the churches and temples
and to set up some State approved religions. Should we credit
the Communist Party with this limited improvement?
They did it because they are realistic. They know that
today it is hard to block people from seeking a faith.
The Chinese Government still does not respect human
dignity. Signing the United Nations human rights document does
not mean that they have changed.
The indication of a real change I would suggest is a very
basic thing. First, allow the Red Cross to visit freely the
labor camps. Second, end the reeducation through labor. Third,
allow Tibetans in China to carry a photo of the Dalai Lama.
Fourth, allow independent publishers. Fifth, allow Amnesty
International and other international NGO's to legally set up
offices in China.
Do you think that I am asking too much by this?
Mr. Doran. Thank you very much, Mr. Wu.
We are short on time here and I am going to need to wrap
this up. I will just ask Mr. Munro one more question.
You mentioned Taiwan in your testimony. What do you think
is the likelihood that China could misjudge our resolve over
Taiwan right now? What do you think we could do to decrease
that likelihood?
For example, perhaps you could comment on a bill that
started moving through the House of Representatives yesterday
called the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.
Mr. Munro. Specifically on that, I feel that that is
necessary, that bill is necessary. In some ways, it is
unfortunate that it is necessary, but it is necessary because
this administration has been all over the map on Taiwan. But,
generally, the trend has been a weakening commitment, a
distancing from Taiwan. And yes, our U.S. credibility on Taiwan
has eroded. In fact, I think the Clinton administration itself
has done more than any party to undermine or destroy strategic
ambiguity which worked for a long time.
It no longer can work after this dangerous dance that
President Jiang and President Clinton have engaged in for the
past year and a half, where the Clinton administration has
responded to increasingly aggressive statements by the Chinese
on Taiwan with increasingly appeasing statements from
Washington.
So strategic ambiguity is almost dead, and something like
this piece of legislation is necessary.
Mr. Doran. Thank you very much.
Thanks to the three of you for coming.
We will probably have some more questions that we will
submit to you in writing for the record. So we will keep the
record open for a few days.
That is all I have for you. Thank you for staying on.
[At 12:52 p.m. the committee staff discussion ended.]
[The following statement was submitted for inclusion in the
record.]
Prepared Statement by Human Rights Watch
u.s. china policy: human rights
Human rights concerns dropped even lower on the agenda of the U.S.
and China's other major trading partners this year, even as the Chinese
government's restrictions on freedom of expression and association grew
tighter. Following the Belgrade bombing, the Administration was
preoccupied with getting bilateral relations back on track, largely
putting human rights concerns on the back burner. For its part, the
Chinese government suspended its bilateral human rights dialogue with
the U.S., put off a planned visit by the German chancellor until
November, and delayed talks on China's entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO). International protests against the banning of Falun
Gong and the crackdown on activists prior to the June 4 and October 1
anniversaries were mild or nonexistent.
At the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in April, China
sustained its successful campaign to prevent a debate on its human
rights record, persuading the European Union (E.U.) and other
governments to refrain from backing a resolution by the U.S., dooming
it to failure. Under Congressional pressure, the Clinton Administration
tabled a last minute resolution which was blocked by a Chinese no-
action motion. That motion was adopted by a vote of twenty-two to
seventeen, with fourteen abstentions. The E.U. and individual member
states refused to cosponsor the measure; Poland did agree to serve as a
cosponsor.
Since President Clinton's visit to China last year, Beijing has
made no progress in ratifying the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. (The U.S. would be in a better position to urge
ratification if the Senate would ratify the first treaty as well as
other important international human rights treaties.) Both treaties
have been signed, but are still under review by the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress.
Meanwhile, the E.U., Australia, and Canada continued human rights
dialogues and rule of law seminars; Japan's dialogue was delayed by
Beijing after Tokyo opposed the no-action motion in Geneva. The various
bilateral exchanges were sometimes useful, but they appeared to have
little direct impact on the human rights situation. Jiang Zemin visited
Australia in September and has also just completed a tour of European
capitals, where he signed multi-billion dollar trade deals. Except for
a brief visit to the U.S. by the Chinese labor minister in March and a
Canadian-led seminar in July, concerns about violations of worker
rights have been largely absent from the agenda.
u.s. human rights policy: recommendations
The Clinton Administration had no clear strategy to follow up the
president's visit to China.
It is crucial that the Administration begin now to lay the
groundwork for a sustained multilateral effort on China at next
spring's U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Only with U.S. leadership--
from both the White House and the State Department--can a serious
campaign be launched to hold China accountable in the highest U.N.
forum designed to protect and promote human rights.
We also hope the new U.S. ambassador to the People's Republic of
China will place a much higher priority on human rights, not only by
pressing China to take the steps outlined below, but also by increasing
regular monitoring of human rights abuses by embassy and consulate
staff; by energetically seeking access by diplomatic personnel and the
media to trials, such as the trials of Falun Gong members that have
recently begun and the trials of pro-democracy activists; and by
working with other embassies to develop coordinated strategies on key
human rights issues.
We urge the Administration to press China to take practical,
concrete steps to improve human rights in China and Tibet including the
following:
Getting agreement to release, amnesty or review the
convictions of approximately 2000 persons still imprisoned on
charged of ``counterrevolution.'' These offenses were formally
abolished as a crime in 1997, but the Chinese government has
stated that this will have no effect on those already
convicted. They include numerous nuns and monks from Tibet,
labor rights activists and individuals imprisoned in connection
with the June 1989 crackdown.
Initiation of a process to end the system of re-education
through labor, which leads to the arbitrary detention of
thousands of Chinese citizens each year, without charge or
trial.
Obtaining verifiable information on the current status and
whereabouts of the Panchen Lama, Gendun Choeki Nyima, the child
chosen by the Dalai Lama in 1995 as the reincarnation of an
important Tibetan religious figure.
Getting agreement on unrestricted access to Tibet and
Xinjiang by the international press, human rights and
humanitarian organizations.
Securing a commitment to implement safeguards on freedom of
association and labor rights. The International Covenants on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Civil and Political
Rights both contain important guarantees on freedom of
religion, association, assembly and expression.
WTO and Codes of Conduct:
In late November, the World Trade Organization will hold its
ministerial conference in Seattle, and talks with the U.S. and other
governments on China's potential entry into the WTO have recently
resumed. We believe that bringing China into the WTO on commercially
acceptable terms could help human rights and strengthen the rule of law
over the long term. As a member of the WTO, China would face increasing
demands--internally and externally--for greater transparency, an
independent judiciary, and protection of worker rights.
However, the Administration should not once again make the mistake
of overstating the benefits of its trade policy. The President has
stated that he would push for permanent NTR (Normal Trade Relations)
status for China as part of a WTO package, thus doing away with the
annual NTR renewal process. In return for permanent NTR--something
China has lobbied for over several years--we believe the Congress
should insist on reciprocal gestures on human rights by China. For
example, within one year of getting permanent NTR, China should ratify
either or both of the two UN covenants, and take some of the other
concrete steps outlined above. We hope the Administration will join the
Congress in supporting limited, realistic but meaningful human rights
conditions on permanent NTR.
We would also strongly support legislation on codes of conduct for
U.S. companies operating in China, along the lines of bills previously
introduced in both the House and Senate. Such legislation would express
the sense of Congress that U.S. companies doing business in China
should adopt certain principles to prohibit the use of forced labor,
prohibit a police or military presence in the workplace, protect
workers' rights of free association, assembly and religion, discourage
compulsory political indoctrination, and promote freedom of expression
by workers including their freedom to seek and receive information of
all kinds through any media--in writing, orally, or through the
Internet.
Legislation outlining principles for U.S. companies should contain
a registration and reporting procedure, and an annual report to
Congress on the level of adherence to the principles by U.S. companies.
Human Rights Developments in China, Tibet, Hong Kong:
Controls on basic freedoms were tightened during the past year, in
part because of Chinese authorities' desire to ensure stability on
several sensitive dates. These included the fortieth anniversary of the
March 10, 1959, Tibetan uprising, the tenth anniversary of the
crackdown in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, and the fiftieth
anniversary of the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949.
Trials of dissidents--and there were many--were neither fair nor
open. Gao Yu, a prominent journalist accused of leaking state secrets,
was released from prison early, but like many other released prisoners,
continued to face a variety of restrictions.
A prolonged economic slump coupled with illegal and excessive fees
and taxes fueled unrest and heightened the government's concerns with
stability. On the political front, President Jiang Zemin's
determination to bolster the Chinese Communist Party, to placate
hardliners, and to secure his own place in history contributed to
heightened intolerance of any organization openly critical of the
Party's platform or attempting to function outside Party control.
Individuals and groups suspected of ties to ``hostile'' foreign
organizations and those disseminating sensitive political information
overseas were particularly targeted.
State control of religious affairs in Tibet intensified. Dozens of
judicial executions were reported from Xinjiang, where some ethnic
Uighur groups were advocating a separate state; other alleged
``splittists'' were sentenced to long prison terms. Judicial
independence and the rule of law in the Special Administrative Region
(SAR) of Hong Kong were seriously undermined when the SAR government
asked Beijing to interpret a ruling by the SAR's highest court.
On the positive side, legal reform efforts continued, although the
legal system remained highly politicized. Supreme Court President Xiao
Yang announced in March that in the interests of transparency, trials
would be open and verdicts quickly made public, except for cases
involving state secrets. In April, he announced plans to curb
government interference with the legal process. Chinese judicial and
legal experts continued to meet with their counterparts in many
countries in an effort to further the reform process.
On November 23, 1998, former Premier Li Peng announced that China
would not tolerate any political system that would ``negate the
leadership of the Communist Party.'' A month later, three organizers of
the opposition China Democracy Party (CDP) received heavy sentences.
Veteran dissident Xu Wenli in Beijing, Qin Yongmin in Hubei province,
and Wang Youcai in Zhejiang were sentenced to thirteen, twelve, and
eleven years in prison respectively on charges of subversion. Other CDP
members were also tried. During the first week of August alone, Zha
Jianguo and Gao Hongming received nine- and eight-year terms in
Beijing, and She Wanbao and Liu Xianbin received twelve and thirteen
years respectively from courts in Sichuan. The following week, two
Shanghai CDP members, Cai Guihua and Han Lifa, instead of being
released on schedule, had their terms extended. Some thirty CDP members
were still in custody as of mid-October, and the crackdown on the CDP
had extended to some twenty provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities.
Legal authorities also squashed the China Development Union (CDU),
a nongovernmental organization committed to environmental and political
reform. In February, its leader, Peng Ming, was detained for fifteen
days on a charge of soliciting prostitution. Instead of being released,
he was then administratively sentenced to an additional term of
eighteen months.
Labor and peasant activists also received long sentences. Unrest in
Hunan province resulted in sentences of up to six years for nine
peasants who protested the imposition of exorbitant taxes; the arrest
of Liao Shihua for organizing workers to demand an end to pervasive
corruption in the province; and two-year terms for six farmers who
alleged that local elections had been rigged.
Throughout the year, China repeatedly demonstrated its
determination to prevent contacts between mainland and overseas
dissidents and to obstruct information flows. On January 20 the
Shanghai No.1 Intermediate Court announced a two-year sentence for
computer entrepreneur Lin Hai for passing some 30,000 e-mail addresses
to VIP Reference, an overseas dissident publication. Fang Jue, a former
economic planning official in Fujian province, whose essay on
democratic reform was published abroad in 1998, was sentenced to a
four-year prison term in June 1999 on what appeared to be spurious
fraud charges. In March, a district court sentenced Gao Shaokun, a
retired police officer, to a two-year term after he told the foreign
press about a peasant protest; on May 11; a Beijing court sentenced Liu
Xianli to a four-year term for his attempts to publish a work about
well-known Chinese dissidents. Song Yongyi, a Dickinson College
(Pennsylvania) researcher, was detained in August when he returned to
China on a Chinese passport to continue his research on the Cultural
Revolution.
Chinese authorities were clearly concerned about increasing use of
the Internet. New regulations in January required bars and cafes with
Internet access to register and inform the police about their business
operations and customers. In May; the Ministry of State Security
installed monitoring devices on Internet service providers capable of
tracking individual e-mail accounts. Special computer task forces began
round-the-clock checks on bulletin boards. In January; one of those
bulletin boards, ``Everything Under the Sun,'' was ordered closed for
posting messages critical of the government. In February; Chinese
authorities shut down the ``New Wave Network,'' a popular bulletin
board that featured political discussion. In September; police detained
Qi Yanchen, a former China Development Union member and a member of the
China Democracy Party, whose electronic magazine Consultations pushed
the CDU agenda. In early September, after overseas dissidents hacked
into the website of the official newspaper, People's Daily, a police
circular called for a crackdown on all anti-Party and government
articles on the Internet.
The government also tightened controls on publishing and the print
media. On January 1; new regulations required shippers of printed
material to obtain government permits. President Jiang Zemin personally
ordered senior officials to prevent the media from undermining the
fiftieth anniversary celebration. His complaints about the number of
publications in circulation resulted in a decision to stop issuing any
publication permits at least through June. In September; the government
decreed that local newspapers and magazines had to be placed under
Party management by October 30 or face closure, and it was estimated
that some 20,000 publications would be closed.
In September; Chinese authorities banned newsstand sales of special
editions of Time, Asiaweek, and Newsweek covering fifty years of
Communist Party rule. Censorship even affected computer games and
survey research, with authorities confiscating some 10,000 games that
featured Taiwan repelling a mainland invasion.
Restraints on religion and belief increased significantly during
the year. On April 25, ten thousand members of Falung Gong (also known
as Falun Dafa)--surrounded Zhongnanhai, the Beijing compound housing
China's top leaders. The peaceful, silent demonstration was to protest
a newspaper article disparaging Falun Gong. The size of the
demonstration clearly shocked the government, and while authorities
took no immediate action, they began a systematic crackdown three
months later. On July 22 the Ministry of Civil Affairs labeled Falun
Gong an illegal organization and accused it of spreading
``superstition'' and ``endangering social stability.'' It banned public
and private practice and distribution of the organization's literature.
Police detained thousands of practitioners for reeducation and began to
confiscate and destroy over one million books. A week later, the
government issued an arrest warrant for Li Hongzhi, the group's leader,
who had been living in the U.S. The government put the number of
practitioners at two million; other estimates run as high as seventy
million. Alarmed at the number of party members involved, the party
leadership mounted a full-scale internal ``rectification,'' using the
opportunity to emphasize the value of Marxism and reinvigorate
President Jiang's ``three stresses'' campaign to strengthen theoretical
study, political awareness, and good conduct among Party members. As of
October; at least three top Falun Gong leaders, Wang Zhiwen, Li Chang
and Ji Liuwu, were still in custody; and ten managers of printing
presses in Sichuan and Guangxi were being held for printing Falun Gong
materials. The Ministry of Justice announced that any lawyer wishing to
represent a Falun Gong follower must obtain government permission.
Police detained members of at least three other sects, the Men Tu
Hui or Disciples, Dongfang Shandian or Eastern Lightning, and a group
known as God's Religion. The government continued its longstanding
campaign to force Catholic congregations to register with the Bureau of
Religious Affairs. The campaign, centered in parts of Zhejiang and
Hebei provinces with large Catholic populations, was marked by
detentions, disappearances, ill-treatment, fines, and harassment. A
series of arrests in Wenzhou, Zhejiang, that continued into September,
forced some clergy into hiding. In one still unexplained incident,
Father Yan Weiping, from Hebei, was found dead on a Beijing street on
May 13. He had been detained that same day while saying Mass. In a
crackdown in southern Henan province, several prominent house church
leaders were briefly detained. The raid followed an earlier one in
central Henan on January 24 when pastor Chu Chang'en and forty-five
others were detained. In May, three students in China's most
prestigious Protestant seminary were expelled after protesting the
government's control of religious affairs.
Free assembly fared poorly during the year. Police in several
cities prevented those wishing to publicly commemorate the tenth
anniversary of the June 4 crackdown from laying wreaths or visiting
cemeteries. Jiang Qisheng, a student leaders in 1989, was formally
arrested for calling on people to remember the crackdown with a
candlelight vigil.
In a move to ensure order before the October 1 celebration, the
Beijing city government banned all public gatherings after July 1.
Police detained or expelled those without papers, legal residence
permits or permanent incomes. They targeted migrants, beggars, hawkers,
food vendors, the homeless, the unemployed, the mentally ill,
prostitutes, and other ``undesirables.'' On September 6; the Public
Security Bureau notified hostels, hotels, boarding houses, and private
citizens that they would be penalized for housing illegal migrants.
Dissidents were under heavy surveillance, their movements restricted,
and their phone lines cut. Any non-resident wishing to enter Beijing
needed a detailed letter of introduction.
The death penalty continued in use, and mass executions were
common. On September 27; the Guangdong Supreme People's Court declared
it would hold fifty-seven public rallies to announce 818 sentences. Two
hundred and thirty-eight prisoners were scheduled to be executed before
October 1. Executions also took place in Changsha, Hunan province and
Chongqing, a city formerly part of Sichuan province.
tibet
At the beginning of the year, authorities announced a three-year
campaign to free rural Tibetans from the ``negative influence of
religion,'' and to work against the Dalai Lama's ``splittist''
struggle. They continued to deny access to Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the
ten-year-old boy recognized by the Dalai Lama as the reincarnation of
the Panchen Lama, the second most important figure in Tibetan Buddhism.
No one has seen the child or members of his family since 1995 when the
Chinese government recognized another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, as the
reincarnation. On June 17, that boy arrived in Tibet for the first
time.
In response to a World Bank proposal to resettle some 58,000 Han
Chinese and Hui Muslims in a predominately Tibetan and Mongolian area
in Qinghai province, an Australian, Gabriel Lafitte, an American, Daja
Meston, and their Tibetan translator, Tsering Dorje, traveled to the
area to assess for themselves the feelings of residents in the
resettlement region. State security forces detained all three on August
15 but released them within two weeks. Lafitte and Meston, who was
severely injured in an escape attempt, were permitted to leave after
confessing to wrongdoing.
During the year, security forces detained Tibetans who openly
advocated independence. On March 10, the fortieth anniversary of an
abortive uprising against China, two Tibetan monks, Phuntsok Legmon and
Namdol, demonstrated in Barkor Square in Lhasa. On July 9 they
reportedly received three- and four-year sentences respectively, a
report that Tibetan officials have denied. In a preemptive move, some
eighty people were detained before March 10. Monks from major
monasteries could not enter the city, and the Jokhang, the most
religious site in Tibet, was closed for ``cleaning.''
Prison conditions in Tibet remained substandard. In February; the
official Chinese news agency acknowledged that ``quasi-military''
training for staff and prisoners had been carried out in Drapchi prison
``to improve police officers' managerial abilities and enhance
prisoners' discipline and awareness of the law.'' The use of torture
continued, sometimes resulting in death. Legshe Tsoglam, a Nalanda monk
who resisted reeducation, died in April, several days after his release
from Gutsa Detention Center. A Ganden monk, Ngawang Jinpa, died two
months after serving his full four-year term, and Norbu, also from
Nalanda, died almost three years after severe prison beatings damaged
his kidneys. All three were in their early twenties. Several monks,
arrested in 1998 for putting photos of the Dalai Lama on the main altar
in Kirti monastery in Sichuan Province, were sentenced in July and
August 1999. Ngawang Sangdrol, a twenty-three-year-old nun, severely
beaten after a protest in Drapchi prison in May 1998, had her original
three-year sentence extended for the third time for a total of twenty-
one years.
xinjiang
Local authorities, claiming that ``splittist'' elements in the
region were using terrorist tactics, ordered intensified efforts to
maintain stability in the run-up to the October 1 anniversary
celebrations. Executions of so-called ``splittists'' were commonplace,
as were long prison sentences and public sentencing rallies. In
January, a court official in Ili prefecture, the scene of massive
demonstrations and rioting in 1997, confirmed that twenty-nine people,
all but two of them ethnic Uighurs, had been given the death penalty.
In July; a court in Nonshishi sentenced another eighteen men to terms
ranging from ten to fifteen years for, among other things, allegedly
destroying the Party's religious policy. In an apparent attempt to
decrease the flow of information overseas, public security officers in
Urumqi, the capital, seized Rebiya Kadeer, a prominent Uighur
businesswoman, on August 11 as she was on her way to meet a visiting
American. She was later charged with trying to transmit information
across borders. Rebiya Kadeer's husband, a U.S. resident, publicly
advocates independence and appears regularly on Radio Free Asia and the
Voice of America. Rebiya, her son, Ablikim Abdyirim, and her secretary,
Kahriman Abdukirim, remained in prison as of October.
hong kong
This year China took several steps to curtail Hong Kong's autonomy
and the rule of law. The independence of the courts in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (SAR) was placed in jeopardy after Chief
Executive Tung Chee-hwa invited Beijing to intervene in a decision of
the highest court in Hong Kong, the Court of Final Appeal. Tung
campaigned against the court's decision on right of abode in Hong Kong
that would have allowed many more mainland Chinese to reside in the
S.A.R. (How many more was a matter of intense debate.) Fearing a flood
of Chinese immigrants, on May 18 Tung invited the Standing Committee of
China's People's National Congress, as the ultimate authority under
Hong Kong's constitution, the Basic Law, to overturn the ruling.
Leading judges and lawyers questioned the political decision of the
Chief Executive to invite Beijing to intervene. The Standing Committee
effectively reversed the Court of Final Appeal's decision.
Municipal councils, the middle tier of elected office in Hong Kong,
were abolished by Tung this year, in a transparent effort to weaken the
influence of pro-democracy political parties in Hong Kong.
Chinese officials barred entry to pro-democracy Hong Kong
lawmakers. On September 12, Margaret Ng (who was a witness before this
Committee last July) was prevented from attending a seminar on China's
constitution. China also interfered with requests for travel to Hong
Kong, refusing to consider a papal visit because the Vatican and Taiwan
maintain diplomatic relations. A senior official from Taiwan was
prevented from attending an academic conference at the University of
Hong Kong.
NOMINATION OF ADM. JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, TO BE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:38 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Smith, Thomas, Frist,
Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone, and Boxer.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
I am going to forego my opening statement because I see Ted
Stevens here, and I want him to work on that budget. So, we
will not keep you.
But I never saw such an array of friends. Bill Brock is
here and I told him I want him to say something. There he is.
[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms
Today the Committee will consider the Administration's nominee to
serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Admiral
Joseph Prueher. Admiral Prueher, we welcome you.
Yesterday, the Committee heard excellent testimony regarding the
future of U.S.-China relations. I believe a basis was set for today's
consideration of Admiral Prueher's nomination.
At the heart of the Committee debate yesterday was the
consideration of what is likely to challenge the next U.S. Ambassador
to Beijing; specifically, the question of how the United States can and
will deal with the People's Republic of China.
Just about everybody has his or her ideas about that.
For my part, I look with disfavor upon the policy of engagement,
certainly as it has been practiced by the Clinton administration. Not
only has the U.S. debased itself by consistently groveling before the
Butchers of Beijing; manifestly there has been an ABJECT FAILURE to
produce any substantive results. In fact, there has been a dismaying
failure over and over again.
The brutality of Red China against its own people is as bad as
ever; for example, the draconian crackdown on the peaceful
practitioners of Falun Gong and the underground churches.
Marxism, rather than fading away as the engagement theorists
predicted, is in full fashion with the typically Bolshevik ``3
Stresses'' campaign front and center.
In Hong Kong, those willing to look see that a slow roll is being
put to the rule of law by Beijing and its lackeys in the Hong Kong
government.
Militarily, Red China's doctrine has clearly shifted to an
unrelenting offensive, characterized by Beijing's mounting purchases
and indigenous development of advanced fighter aircraft, submarines,
ships armed with supersonic missiles and the deployment of hundreds of
ballistic missiles pointed down the throats of our allies on Taiwan.
And, regrettably, this is happening with the assistance of the Clinton
administration.
In the South China Sea, Red China continues its unilateral land
grabs and fortifications on islands within the boundaries of another
U.S. ally, the Philippines. Needless to say, this has not elicited even
a murmur of dissent from the Clinton administration.
On trade, Red China continues its mercantile ways. This year, the
U.S. trade deficit is again at record levels; 1999 has also brought
forth reports that--despite the carte blanche the U.S. gives China in
the U.S. market--and despite the embarrassing groveling of many U.S.
corporate CEOs--few U.S. businesses are in fact making money in China.
Most of all, the communist leaders in Beijing clearly no longer
have any respect for the United States.
Last year, after President Clinton declared our relations with Red
China a strategic partnership, a shiny new hotline was installed so
that our leaders could consult during a crisis. Last May, a crisis did
develop, when the Chinese government orchestrated anti-American riots
all across China, burned down a U.S. diplomatic residence and ransacked
the U.S. embassy in Beijing.
As the U.S. Ambassador was imprisoned in his own embassy, President
Clinton tried to call Jiang Zemin on the hotline, but Jiang Zemin
didn't even take the call.
All of which speaks for itself.
Earlier this month hundreds of corporate CEOs gathered in Shanghai
to celebrate 50 years of Communism in China. Not content merely to
sponsor this bash, thus lining the pockets of Chinese Communists, the
Chairman and CEO of Time-Warner saw fit to present his ``old friend''
Jiang Zemin with a statue of Abraham Lincoln. Within hours of this
frenzy of, what to call it?--bootlicking?--Jiang Zemin repaid his old
friend from Time-Warner by banning Time magazine from China because the
current issue of Time Magazine contained an article by the Dalai Lama.
This was uncontested by Time-Warner and of course, by the Clinton
administration.
One wonders what a Teddy Roosevelt might have done under such
circumstances? Or a Ronald Reagan.
The U.S. has sunk to low depths indeed in this nation's dealings
with Red China. I will look forward to hearing Admiral Prueher tell us
how we can turn this situation around.
The Chairman. Senator Stevens, if you will proceed with the
introduction, that will be great.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You are
right as usual. I do have to leave, so I hope you will excuse
me right after I make my statement.
It really is a great pleasure for all of us to be here this
morning before you, Mr. Chairman. I and these other people are
here to support the nomination of Admiral Joe Prueher to be the
U.S. Ambassador to China. I would like to offer a few thoughts
on this nomination.
Admiral Prueher served as the Commander-in-Chief of the
U.S. Pacific Command from 1996 to 1999. Our relationship began
through that professional association, but my personal respect
for him has grown over the years that I have known him.
As you know, Admiral Prueher commanded our Nation's
military response to the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996. During
his tenure, he also reinvigorated our military relationships
with Japan and on several occasions positioned U.S. forces in
response to regional events in ways that made them available to
the President should they have been needed. He looked ahead.
I can say with the utmost confidence that the security of
our Nation has always been Admiral Prueher's foremost concern.
In the capacity that he had as Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific, he was charged with overseeing our national interests
throughout Asia and the total Pacific region. This is something
that is of great importance to me personally and to which most
Alaskans pay close attention. I believe that Joe Prueher will
provide the necessary leadership and oversight for our national
security in this vital region into the next millennium.
In my capacity as chairman of the Senate Appropriations
Committee and as chairman of the Defense Subcommittee, I have
witnessed firsthand the impact that Admiral Prueher has made in
promoting regional security and renewed cooperation throughout
the region. Let me tell you, Jesse, Dan Inouye and I have
visited with Joe Prueher at least once a year, many times twice
a year, and often on very short notice on crises that came up
in the Pacific. He was always ahead of the curve. I have never
seen an Admiral that was as far ahead of developments as Joe
Prueher.
In short, I think he is the right person for our Nation's
representative to the People's Republic of China. As you know,
I served there in World War II, and I am delighted that Joe
Prueher will go there and represent our country.
I urge your expeditious support of my friend's nomination,
and I thank you very much.
The Chairman. Great.
Senator Inouye.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this honor
and privilege to say a few words about my good friend.
The Chairman. Well, it is an honor to have you here this
morning.
Senator Inouye. I wish to join my chairman, Ted Stevens, in
supporting the nomination of Admiral Prueher. Like Ted, I have
known Admiral Prueher for the time he served as Commander-in-
Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command and also a resident of my
State.
Obviously the security of the Asia-Pacific region is
something that the State of Hawaii considers most important.
However, in his position as CINCPAC, the security of our Nation
was Admiral Prueher's foremost concern, as it has been
throughout his whole career. This was reflected in both his
words and deeds, and Mr. Chairman, he was an articulate
advocate of our Nation's military presence in Asia and took
active steps to resolve issues before they emerged as crises.
As Chairman Stevens indicated, he was ahead of the curve.
In his dealings with me and the members of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, the Admiral was always honest. He was
always direct and straightforward in his communications, and I
most respectfully believe that this will be an important
quality in light of the intensity of this committee's interest
in the China policy.
I join my chairman, Ted Stevens, in expressing my utmost
respect for Admiral Prueher's ability as both a military
commander and as a statesman. I cannot think of anyone better
who can better represent our Nation to the People's Republic of
China than Admiral Joseph Prueher.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I urge the
committee to support this nomination. Thank you very much, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Now let me see. The Senator from Tennessee, Dr. Frist.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL FRIST, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It indeed is an
honor to join my colleagues in the introduction of Admiral
Prueher to be our Nation's Ambassador to China.
This is my second opportunity to introduce him to a
committee of the U.S. Senate and I think that that reflects the
degree of respect and confidence that this body has in the
Admiral in terms of his service to the country.
For 35 years, Admiral Prueher has served this Nation with
distinction as a naval officer, as we have heard. The first 24
years of his career were spent in carrier aviation. He is a
Vietnam veteran, has piloted Navy aircraft in times of crisis
off of Lebanon and in Iran. As a flag officer, he commanded a
carrier battle group in the Pacific, commanded the 6th Fleet in
the Mediterranean Sea, was Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and
most recently, as has been mentioned, commanded all United
States forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters. As we
all know, this theater is not only the most geographically
expansive of all of our unified military commands, covering
half the globe, but it is the most politically and militarily
challenging as well.
Mr. Chairman, to be a successful commander of all armed
forces in the Pacific region at such a critical time for
America, it required much more than capable management, much
more than the confidence of the soldiers and the sailors and
the airmen and the marines who served him and the military
acumen. It also required a great deal of political and
diplomatic skill and commitment.
As a testament to his abilities in that respect, Admiral
Prueher gained an impeccable reputation as a commander and as a
statesman among our Japanese, Korean, Thai, Australian,
Filipino allies with whom he worked daily and with whom he
markedly strengthened our collective security arrangements
throughout the region. That level of confidence is reflected in
the remarkable fact that he was awarded the highest honor given
to a foreigner by seven nations in the Asia-Pacific.
I think it is worth pointing out, Mr. Chairman, that China
was not one of those nations. That relationship was built over
time, and it is unusual for a foreign military commander as it
is impressive.
He traveled to China six times to meet with their
commanders and officials, including President Jiang. He has
earned their respect for his strength and honesty, the two
qualities which undoubtedly are most important in this
increasingly difficult but monumentally important relationship.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, I will have to at least add that
of all people in this room today, I have known Admiral Prueher
longer than anybody. I will not say how big I was when I first
met him because it in some way might say something about our
relative ages, but I was quite small when in high school he was
the hero, the hero that he represents to all of us today,
whether it was out on the football field, where he was captain
of the football team or elected in his high school, which was
also my high school, as you can tell, as the most popular in
his class by the peers. I am not sure his wife even knows this.
He was elected as best looking in our high school.
Admiral Prueher. I counted the votes.
Senator Frist. That is right.
He has been a hero his entire life, representing the very
best of what a school has to offer, what a community has to
offer, and what the United States has to offer. The motto at
our high school was ``gentleman, scholar, athlete,'' and there
has been nobody that I know who best represents that triad of
qualities.
For that reason, I am here once again to recommend for an
important office of public service, one that I know that he
will fulfill with the highest of standards, character, and
integrity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
Fourth and not least is a gentleman who was a Senator from
Tennessee when I came here. I learned a lot from him and I, to
this day, miss him. Bill Brock.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL BROCK, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM
TENNESSEE
Mr. Brock. It is mutual, Mr. Chairman, and you do me honor
by letting me join you on this particularly special day.
I served, when I was U.S. Trade Representative, all over
the Pacific and made often the case that there is no way you
can describe adequately the importance of that part of the
world to the well-being of the people of the United States. I
cannot think of an ambassadorial post of greater consequence at
this moment than this particular one.
Joe Prueher and I go back in a different way, Bill. His
mother stayed in my home to baby-sit my children when I was
running for the U.S. Senate. So, I have a slightly different
perspective.
But I did want to say in my conversations with Joe, and
over the years with others among those who serve us in these
capacities, I have never had a more thoughtful, interesting,
and carefully constructed conversation in my life than I did
with Joe when we were talking about this particular position a
few months ago. He is someone who really does think large
thoughts. He has a vision, and I think that is particularly
needed at this time, given the importance of the relationships
that we are developing throughout the Pacific region and the
enormous consequence of China in that region.
I would conclude by noting for the record, as I would for
myself and for all of us who have had any success, Joe married
well above himself. He has a wonderful wife and family and it
is just a pleasure to be here and endorse his appointment.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank you so much, sir.
You know, fellows, I am tempted to say, all in favor.
I guess I better not do that.
Admiral, you introduce your family. I believe you have some
here.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.
The Chairman. If she will stand.
Admiral Prueher. My wife Suzanne.
The Chairman. I know why they call you lucky now.
Admiral Prueher. I will skip the Brock family members.
Our daughter Brooks who works here in Washington for the
National Trust. Brooks, will you stand up?
And my niece, Becky Conzelman, who has recently moved here,
lived in Hawaii also and is living in Annapolis now.
The Chairman. Very well. You are welcome and thank you for
coming.
I am going to save my little remarks until the last.
Senator Lugar?
Senator Lugar. No. I just look forward to hearing the
Admiral.
Senator Smith. I am just here out of respect and to wish
him well.
Senator Thomas. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to leave.
So, I do wish to express my gratitude for the Admiral being
here. He came by and visited some time ago. As chairman of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, I am particularly
interested in this, of course, and am impressed and look
forward, frankly, to your being there, Admiral. If we can have
a strong message for China, work with them, and make it better
for all of us. I appreciate your being here.
Senator Wellstone. Admiral, welcome. Why do we not hear
from the Admiral?
The Chairman. Very well.
Russ.
Senator Feingold. I will wait until the questions. Welcome,
Admiral.
The Chairman. All right.
Yesterday we had one of your predecessors here, and we had
some visitors during his testimony. But that did not detract
too much from what he said.
Do you have a copy of his speech of yesterday? Winston
Lord.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. I have read parts of it. I have
not read the whole speech.
The Chairman. Did you read the ten commandments?
Admiral Prueher. I have heard him offer those before, yes,
sir.
The Chairman. I suspect he has used those more than once.
But they are very effective.
The ten commandments I commend to you, sir. He was very,
very emphatic in what he said. Of course, all of us have known
Winston for a long time.
The committee debate yesterday was the consideration of
what is likely to challenge you as the next Ambassador to
Beijing, specifically the question of how the United States can
and will deal with the People's Republic of China. Just about
everybody has an opinion about that.
On my part, I look with disfavor on the policy of
engagement, and you and I talked on that when you came to see
us, certainly as it has been practiced. There is nothing
intended to be partisan about this, but as has been practiced
by the administration. Not only has, in my judgment, the United
States debased itself by consistently groveling before the
butchers of Beijing; manifestly there has been an abject
failure to produce any substantive results. We have got to
change that and that is what Winston Lord was saying yesterday.
The brutality of Red China against its own people I guess
bothers me more than anything else. Harry Wu has been here a
number of times and testified about the sale of human organs
from those executed a few minutes earlier because they were
politically on the other side.
So, Marxism is not fading away as the engagement theorists
had predicted it would.
In Hong Kong, those willing to look to see that a slow roll
is being put to the rule of law by Beijing and its lackeys in
the Hong Kong Government.
And militarily, Red China's doctrine has clearly shifted to
an unrelenting offensive, characterized by Beijing's mounting
purchases and indigenous development of advanced fighter
aircraft, submarines, and ships armed with supersonic missiles,
and the deployment of hundreds of ballistic missiles pointed
down the throats of our allies on Taiwan. And, regrettably,
Admiral, this is happening with the assistance of this
administration.
On trade, Red China continues its mercantile ways.
And most of all the Communist leaders in Beijing clearly no
longer have any respect whatsoever for the United States. I
have talked to various people who have visited, including the
present Secretary of State.
But anyway, last year, after President Clinton declared our
relations with Red China a strategic partnership, a shiny new
hotline was installed so that our leaders could consult during
a crisis. Last May, a crisis did develop when the Chinese
Government orchestrated anti-American riots all across China,
burned down a U.S. diplomatic residence, and ransacked the U.S.
Embassy in Beijing.
As the Ambassador was imprisoned in his own embassy, the
President tried to call Jiang Zemin--I guess is the way to
pronounce that--on the hotline, but he did not take the call.
And I think that speaks for itself.
So, one wonders what a Teddy Roosevelt would have done
under such circumstances and, if you will permit me, one
wonders what a Ronald Reagan would have done.
The United States has sunk to low depths in this Nation's
dealings.
And I am looking forward to hearing your remarks which you
may begin right now, sir.
STATEMENT OF ADM. JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, OF TENNESSEE, TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I
commence, I would like to thank the introducers and Senator
Stevens and Senator Inouye and Senator Frist and hope not to
dissuade you from some of things they have said by my remarks.
I am very honored to be here today.
I have submitted a statement for the record that I would
like to include, if I may, and summarize it in the interest of
time.
The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done, sir.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you.
It is an honor for me to be the nominee to represent the
American people as Ambassador to Beijing.
As you can tell from some of my past, I am a little more
accustomed to working in the field than to working here in the
halls of Washington all the time. In my previous confirmations,
I have always had to be in uniform, and it is the first time I
had ever thought about what I was going to wear to a
confirmation today.
Then I must admit, from afar as I read about the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, I share some apprehension on being
here with you today, but I am looking forward to it.
The Chairman. Mrs. Prueher picked out the right tie for you
this morning.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, she did. She tries her best in
my behalf.
But the real reason is I believe the United States'
relationship with China, good, bad, or indifferent, is at the
top or very close to the top of the international challenges
that our country faces for the next century. The task I think
will be a very full one. The opportunity to have an impact on
this relationship, this relationship between the United States
and China, so important to China, so important to our country,
and also to the region, is the reason I am here. This
opportunity to have some impact overrode any other
considerations in my family's decision to accept the nomination
for this post.
Mr. Chairman, as I understand the purpose of this hearing
today, is that it is for you to decide and for the committee to
decide on whether to approve Prueher as the person to be the
hands-on, day-to-day representative of U.S. interests in China
and can I handle that and will I capably and well advance the
interests of the United States in China. That is your decision
to make. I would like to go into a couple of things on what I
think you get if I am confirmed as nominee.
First off, you get a citizen who cares for our Nation, who
cares for its founding principles and its morals. I have
promoted national security all my time through 39 years total
of military service, and the last 3, as was pointed out, my
responsibility and accountability was for our Nation's security
and our interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
You get a person that believes that our Nation's security
rests on the right combination of military, political, and
economic strength and those foundations.
You get one who has studied China very hard for the last
several years, but more important, you get somebody who is
friends with and has access to a number of people across the
spectrum who have spent their lives studying and trying to
understand the issues with China.
You get a person who believes the correct approach to
dealing with the China issue is to deal, on one hand, from a
position of great strength, economic, political, and military
strength, and then also a respect for some considerable
challenges which face China as it needs to transition into the
next century, and also one who tries to anticipate versus react
to situations that occur, though this is not always possible.
You get somebody who recognizes the challenge of governance
and trying to manage change in China as their leadership tries
to cope with food, clothing, shelter, jobs, energy, and water
for 1.25 billion people. It is something of a daunting task,
but who believes that these immense challenges of managing this
change in no way accommodate either the excuse or the abuse of
human rights.
You do get someone who knows several of the Chinese
leaders. I visited them and have been visited by them. I
participated in both acrimonious arguments with the Chinese
leadership and also some constructive discussions, and I have
always tried to speak in very direct and plain terms so that we
are not misunderstood.
There are some other potential characteristics to assess
about me that I am sure your questions will bring out.
But foremost, you get somebody that is committed to our
Nation's national interest and someone who sees that the future
of a secure Asia and China's role in that is an important U.S.
interest and is something that needs a lot of work through this
period.
Now, the issues between the United States and China, as you
all know probably far better than I, there are many that just
beg serious attention. Many of them have come out. You have
mentioned them, Mr. Chairman. A peaceful resolution of the
differences between Beijing and Taipei, an improved recognition
of human rights in China, a reduction in weapons proliferation.
Some progress has been made. There is a lot more to do. Our
mistaken and tragic bombing of the embassy in Belgrade is not
understood by the Chinese. China's response, as you have
pointed out, where they did not protect and damaged and--one
can use the term--``ransacked'' both our embassy and two of our
consulates, one in Shenyang and the other in Chengdu. The terms
of China's access to the World Trade Organization.
And a more pragmatic issue is for our U.S. presence and our
ability to affect this in China is, for those of you who have
been there have seen the somewhat embarrassing condition, even
before the attacks on our embassy and our consulates, of both
our consulate and also the living conditions for the people
that we ask to go overseas and work for our Nation which need
improvement. This is something I would like to work on, given
the chance.
This is a sampling of some of the issues that are there.
There are many more, but each of them requires serious,
intelligent, steady, and unrelenting effort to solve. If
confirmed, I plan to try to help create foundations for a long-
term resolution of these problems, not band aids and not
snapshots. I would like to try to improve the tone and the
content of the dialog between us and China and to do what I can
to dampen some of the swings that occur in our relationship.
Without getting accused of clientitis, which most Ambassadors
do I think, is to try to do my best to assess the Chinese view
of our positions and assess the Chinese view for our
decisionmakers.
I would like to represent all factions of our interaction
with China, including the business community and agriculture,
and to try to do my best to serve as a bridge between where we
are now and the next administration getting their people in
place.
I would like to work with the White House, with Secretary
Albright, with the Foreign Service professionals at the State
Department, and also to consult regularly with Congress to make
sure that our dialog is a healthy one and is as accurate as we
can make it.
Building on the work of my predecessors in China to try to
encourage, as much as I can, as many congressional, personal,
and official visits to China so that people in our country can
see for themselves what is going on there and make their own
judgments.
Of course, like each of you all do every single day, I
pledge you my utmost effort at this task if I am confirmed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Prueher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Joseph W. Prueher (ret.)
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it is my honor to appear
before you today as our nation's nominee to be ambassador to the
People's Republic of China. Like each of you, I am grateful for the
opportunity to serve.
Though not diminishing the importance of our other global
alliances, partnerships, and relationships, I believe that the United
States' relationship with China is at or near the top of the list of
international challenges as we enter the next century. There are two
prospects. On one path, we can have a responsible global neighbor that
copes with its own daunting challenges and adapts to inevitable change.
The alternative path is one of enervating confrontation at every turn
and resulting slower progress on issues of importance to both our
nations. The chance to have some positive impact on our relationship
with this burgeoning nation of over one-fifth of the world's population
is why I am before you today. I hope to do my part, together with all
branches of government and our private sector, to help create a climate
that builds on our common interests with China and yields solutions to
the differences we have between our two nations. This factor overrode
all others in my family's decision to say yes when asked to accept the
nomination for this post.
Mr. Chairman, my understanding of the basic decision before the
Committee in this hearing is, ``Do we want to approve Prueher to be the
person who, day-to-day, in a hands-on way, represents our United States
to the People's Republic of China, and will he advance well our
interests?'' That question is yours to answer, but here is what I think
you will get with me:
1. A citizen dedicated to our nation and its founding ideals
and morals, who has nearly 39 years of military service, who
has served in combat, and who has always tried to promote our
nation's security.
2. A person who has had the opportunity to lead organizations
from small to large.
3. A person who supports the notion of comprehensive
security, that a nation's sense of security comes from the
right combination of political, economic, and military
underpinnings. As well, someone who thinks the foresight of
preventive defense is the most effective way to go.
4. A person familiar with Asia-Pacific security issues at
both a practical and personal level and familiar with many of
the Asia-Pacific region's political and military leaders.
5. One who has studied hard our issues witn China over
several years; important too, you get someone who has the
benefit of frequent counsel from people who have invested
decades trying to understand China's people and their methods.
6. A person who believes we should deal with China from a
position of political, economic, and military strength,
balanced by respect for the challenges facing China. A person
who recognizes the challenges of governance in providing food,
clothing, shelter, jobs, energy, and water for a population of
over 1.25 billion people, yet believes immense challenges do
not accommodate or excuse abuses of human rights.
7. Someone who knows several key Chinese leaders and has
hosted and been hosted by them. As well, someone who has
participated in both acrimonious confrontations and
constructive discussions with the People's Liberation Army
leadership.
8. Someone who has not had the benefit of visiting Taiwan.
Owing to the timing of this nomination, I declined an
invitation to visit the people on Taiwan. Nonetheless, my
admiration for their progress and economic and democratic
institutions is manifest.
9. One who is committed to our nation's interests, and who
sees a secure Asia, and China's responsible role in it, as
being one of those foremost interests.
Many issues between the United States and China beg serious
attention. The most complex of these is the peaceful resolution of
differences between Taipei and Beijing. There is also the core
importance we attach to respect for human rights, which contrasts with
documented abuses in many areas and facets of China-ranging from
political repression to cultural, religious, and ethnic repression in
Tibet. There is our mistaken and tragic bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade and damage done to our embassy and consulates in China by
Chinese rioters. There also remain some differences over the terms of
China's accession to the World Trade Organization. This list is but a
sampling, and these issues must be worked in a steady, unrelenting way.
Our nation has a long-term, common interest in a stable, secure,
prosperous Asia-Pacific region in which China is a major, responsible
player. We and the world need a China that can work with Taiwan to
resolve cross-Strait differences peacefully, that participates fairly
in global markets, that produces and consumes manufactured and
agricultural products, that works cooperatively with us on matters of
mutual interest. Our nation would like to help China move itself to
democratic institutions and open markets-both key characteristics of
successful nations.
If I am confirmed, I hope to work on these issues, to help create
the foundations for resolving them, to improve the tone and content of
the dialogue between our nations, and to be the bridge to the next
administration. Also, improvement of our embassy and consulate
facilities and adequate housing for U.S. government employees in China
will be a high priority. I look forward to consulting with the Congress
on these issues and, if confirmed, to encouraging both personal and
Congressional visits to China.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the Committee's questions.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you, sir. We are expecting some
other Senators, so maybe we better have a 5-minute round.
Mr. Ambassador--I am going to call you that a little
prematurely, but with assurance that I am right. In an
interview with Seapower in December 1998, you mentioned four
threats in the Pacific, including North Korea and
proliferation, but not China. But if North Korea is a threat
and proliferation is a threat, then why should we not consider
China, North Korea's biggest patron over the decades and to
this day a supplier of weapons and technology to North Korea, a
threat?
Admiral Prueher. This is a good question, Mr. Chairman, and
I think the context of that interview was on things that are
very near-term threats. Certainly the situation on the Korean
Peninsula is a great threat to the stability of the Asia-
Pacific region. In assessing the issue of a China threat, it
was one of the more difficult questions I ended up having to
answer as CINCPAC, and my determination had to do with near-
term issues and looking at the capability of China in the near
term to present a threat, and our own assessment and that of
the Intelligence Committee was that China was not a near-term
threat.
One can argue in the longer term it is something that we
have to watch very carefully, and in my position about dealing
with strength, as well as understanding, I think that I always
tried to follow that with we need to keep our powder dry.
The Chairman. Well, do you consider the security of Taiwan
to be in the national interest of the United States?
Admiral Prueher. Absolutely, sir.
The Chairman. Do you believe Red China poses a threat to
the security of Taiwan?
Admiral Prueher. I think the security of Taiwan has been
brokered by the commitment of the United States and the Taiwan
Relations Act for 20 years has helped provide security for
Taiwan. I think the continued security of Taiwan is dependent
on the continuation of that brokering of security, as well as
the U.S.-China relationship has an impact. Taiwan has always
prospered when the U.S.-China relationship was on an upswing
versus a downswing.
The Chairman. Well, that relationship involves some
assurance of support from the United States I think or
continued support. Do you agree with that?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, I do.
The Chairman. When you were the CINCPAC, you were regarded,
one of your friends mentioned, to be an active promoter of
closer and more frequent military ties with China. Now, that
could mean anything. But do you believe that our defense
relationship with Red China should be more or less robust than
our defense relationship with democratic Taiwan?
Admiral Prueher. I think our relationship with China should
be--in context when--our military relationship with China when
I came to my job at CINCPAC was zero. We had no contact. When
the Taiwan Strait crisis came about in March 1996, around the
time of the Taiwan elections, there was no way of trying to
preempt or prevent, through a military contact, or to clarify
and prevent miscalculation. So, in looking at that, we worked
hard to establish a dialog so that we could prevent
miscalculation.
I think in the context of a military relationship with
China, getting to know each other and prevent miscalculation is
the objective of that relationship. Our relationship with other
allies that we have in the world is one of interoperability and
our relationship with Taiwan, within the bounds of the Taiwan
Relations Act, is one of support and providing defense
equipment, which we do.
The Chairman. Well, I did not mean to spring a difficult
question on you, but it is one I want you to think about in
terms of the answer you have given me. Let me phrase the
question again, as I call on John Kerry. Do you believe that
our defense relationship with Red China should be more or less
robust than our relationship with democratic Taiwan?
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I will ask you about that later.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
Senator Kerry. Good morning, Admiral. Welcome, and thank
you for taking time to come and visit. I enjoyed the
conversation and I think we accomplished a lot.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kerry. Admiral, a lot of us believe that we are not
getting sufficient return for the good part of our relationship
with China, even as we understand it is a very complex one.
Yesterday Ambassador Lord suggested a series of ten
commandments. I think you have seen that. Among them, we should
not consider China a strategic partner at this point. They are
not but they are, nevertheless, a very important player, an
entity that clearly we need to improve the relationship with.
Would you share with the committee your sense of what the
possibilities are for how we better balance engagement with the
interests we have on human rights, on nonproliferation, and
other balancing interests that are obviously of enormous
consequence to us, North Korea, participation in the United
Nations, and so forth? What is your vision of that balance? And
do you agree that we, indeed, need to try to show a little more
progress in the relationship?
Admiral Prueher. The discussion of engagement with China is
a subject that is--as I think Senator Helms talked about,
something else could mean anything to anybody. Engagement is a
tactic rather than a policy I think, and it is perhaps bounded
on one end by containment and on the other end by mere dialog.
I do not think it is either of those things. I think it is the
range of activity in between.
In that context, I believe we need to engage China. I think
we need to engage China in the issue of human rights, which is
a core of our Declaration of Independence. We hold these truths
to be self-evident is a core value of the United States. It is
one that should permeate our foreign policy, and it is one that
we need to advance at every opportunity as we work with China.
I think this engagement is the way to move forward. In our
work with China, I hope we can do it in that light, but we need
to work the range of activities. The tough issue is to try to
keep things in the proper balance as China faces the challenges
of government and of change, of transition that they will go
through.
Senator Kerry. What do you think is the most complicated or
challenging part of the relationship at this point?
Admiral Prueher. At this point, I think the effort just to
have straight communications and clear communications and not
be misinterpreted on either side is perhaps the first order of
business right now.
Senator Kerry. Do you believe there is any
misinterpretation at this point with respect to the
relationship with Taiwan?
Admiral Prueher. This comes under constant pressure. I
thought one of the things in 1996, one of the clarifying issues
was that it was clear to China that the United States was
committed to uphold their obligations under the Taiwan
Relations Act. I think that continues to be true. Looking at
the range of dialog of things that occur in the media and the
range of opinions that occur, there is some room for
misinterpretation on Taiwan. However, I think from the
administration and from the Congress, the positions have been
clear.
Senator Kerry. Let me just understand the last part. You
said that what has been clear?
Admiral Prueher. I think our position with respect to
Taiwan, that we support the Taiwan Relations Act and the
commitments there, sir.
Senator Kerry. How extensive would you deem those
obligations under the Taiwan Act to be?
Admiral Prueher. Again, this is not my decision to make.
Senator Kerry. What do you understand them to be?
Admiral Prueher. An insistence on a peaceful dialog that
the issue is for the Chinese on both sides of the strait to
solve. It is their issue and that we insist on that occurring
with a peaceful dialog.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Prueher, I appreciated the comment in your opening
statement about your intent to work with the administration and
the Congress on the improvement of the facilities in our
embassy in Beijing. I also appreciate likewise your comments on
the housing for those who will be working with you, and the
communications in the embassy that you did not mention, but you
have commented on privately. I think this is critical and will
characterize your Ambassadorship as a success if you are
achieving these situations because they recognize the
importance of our relations with China, and the importance of
our own people in being effective in that very, very important
role that they are going to play. So, I just highlight that
part and indicate that I know there are many of us who will
support what you request, and we hope that you will give us a
report of that situation as you find it.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lugar. I am curious what strategy or what ideas you
may have with regard to how the trade deficit that we now
suffer with China might improve. Clearly it is a large deficit.
It has dwarfed that of almost any other country in some months
recently, and it is not really clear how it is going to change.
Yet we hear from macroeconomists, leaving aside China, that
this huge trade deficit that we have as a country is inevitably
going to affect the value of our currency or our bonds or even
our prosperity. Have you given thought to that and do you have
any plan of action?
Admiral Prueher. Well, sir, I tread in a lot of areas where
I probably ought not to, but I am not an economist. But I think
the trade deficit is something that is certainly of great
concern. Looking at capital markets, which are a lot of
issues--again, I am treading on fairly thin ice for my
expertise, but I think a commercially viable WTO is an
important thing. I have spent a good bit of time with Charlene
Barshefsky talking about this where she has been educating me
on the prospects of this, but a commercially viable WTO where
market access issues are resolved and we level the playing
field for our business in China goes a long way toward helping
with the trade deficit. Beyond that, I would have to get back
after I learn a little more, sir.
Senator Lugar. Very well.
Another broad question. Clearly, in NATO we had an
opportunity for European countries and in a trans-Atlantic way
with the United States and Canada to work on mutual security.
Many people point to the role of NATO, as founded, to combat
the former Soviet Union, but others say it was very important
to fix Germany and France and those relationships physically in
Europe.
In that same context, the Chinese relationship is often
seen as one of either insecurity or difficulty vis-a-vis Japan
or India or the Koreas or others. What is your view, from a
longtime experience in the Pacific, as to the role of the
United States in providing some type of security arrangement, a
glue factor, or eventually some type of multinational
relationship in which these countries find security because of
American interests across the Pacific?
Admiral Prueher. That is a full-bodied question, sir.
I think the climate in Asia from the light of my experience
is most of the nations do not necessarily have the common bond
that would cause the amalgam of NATO to occur in the Pacific. I
think the United States' role--and if one defines stability as
not static, but providing stable conditions under which people
can pursue prosperity is what I think about in terms of
stability--that our role is like that of a flywheel. We
balance. We provide the assurance of security in Asia. People
are always concerned, extremely concerned, that the United
States will withdraw its interests from Asia, and the United
States has vital interests in Asia. So, our role is one of
trying to balance the issues and to use our forces and to use
our diplomatic and economic skills and power to try to be a
balance.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I enjoyed your remarks.
The position to which you have been nominated is obviously
as challenging as it is important, and I thank you for taking
it on.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Feingold. As you know, many of us in Congress are
deeply concerned about U.S. policy toward China, and should you
become America's Ambassador to the PRC, of course, you can
expect the substance of your job to be followed closely by me
and all of my colleagues.
Given your extensive military experience, I expect that
many of your preparations to date have focused on security
issues. I agree that these are of critical importance.
But I also want to make sure that the grave human rights
abuses perpetrated in China each day are not treated as
marginal issues. As the Unitede States pushes for improved
relations with the PRC, it must keep human rights at the
forefront of our agenda and do so consistently, as Mr. Lord
suggested yesterday, in addition to the need for clarity that
you have mentioned. I look forward to learning more about your
views today.
Let me ask you, first of all, the State Department's human
rights report on China indicates that the economic reform of
state-owned enterprises has had especially severe consequences
for women. How do you plan to address that problem?
Admiral Prueher. First I need to learn some more about it.
The conversion of the state-owned enterprises I think is a
daunting task of transition for China, and that particular
issue of the impact on women I think has--I only know a sketchy
amount about that. As I learn more, I would like to provide a
better answer to you. It deserves better consideration than I
can give it right now, sir.
Senator Feingold. I would appreciate the opportunity to
talk to you about it when you get a chance.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. As you know, the U.S. Embassy staff has
encountered difficulty in gaining access to remote regions of
China in the past, and that problem has severely restricted our
capacity to monitor the human rights situation in the country.
As Ambassador, how would you approach the difficult question of
human rights monitoring in China?
Admiral Prueher. The issue of human rights--and in my
previous job, working on security issues, I was always able to
retreat after I talked about complex subjects, but I am a
simple sailor and I keep trying to do that. But I do not find
it to work anymore.
But the issue of human rights, as we have talked about, is
something that is core to our Nation. It is core to our
interests. It is core to our foreign policy. As we pursue this
in China, the way I will see myself, when we get there, is the
senior officer in China responsible for access, reporting, and
furthering our human rights agenda in China.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Admiral.
Yesterday former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia
and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Lord, expressed his concerns about
increasing self-censorship and limits on judicial independence
in Hong Kong. Are you concerned about civil and political
liberties in Hong Kong, and how do you plan to address them as
Ambassador?
Admiral Prueher. Since the turnover in 1997, I think we
have been watching very closely that the special administrative
region of Hong Kong maintain the status that we understood and
that China said they were going to grant Hong Kong. We have
kept our consulate in Hong Kong separate from Beijing in
furtherance of that, and on a security issue, we have watched
ship visits, which is an aspect of it. But the legal issues I
think we need to watch very closely to ensure that the status
of Hong Kong does not erode. I think this is also very
important to the reputation for China, as they work with other
issues that are equally sensitive, on their following through
on what they said they were going to do.
Senator Feingold. Let me just recommend to you the answer I
got yesterday from Winston Lord on some of the specifics of the
Hong Kong situation. You may already be aware of all these
things, but I did find it troubling.
Recently the State Department has designated China as a
severe violator of religious freedom. What kinds of sanctions
do you expect to be imposed in response to this finding?
Admiral Prueher. I have spent some time talking with the
Secretary who is in charge of that, and the level of
sanctions--I have not been involved and have not been briefed
in the sanction process for the religious freedom. We had
discussions on this and this is a great concern and something
that I will also look carefully at, if I am confirmed, and will
report back to you on that.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Admiral.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, it is nice to see you again and I did enjoy the
chance we had to talk.
I have a question on the issue we discussed when we met
dealing with the World Bank, but before I get to that, I want
to congratulate you on being introduced by the three Senators:
Senators Stevens, Inouye, and Brock. One of them is still here,
Senator Inouye, which is most unusual to have a Senator who has
a busy schedule sit through a hearing like this. I just want to
say it goes a long way with me and I think many of us to see
that kind of in-depth support.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Boxer. Let me say that I am a believer in engaging
China and not being an apologist for China. I have a statement
here. Tell me if it really reflects the way you approach your
work, that China should not be seen as our ally or our enemy
and we should not be apologists for China's policies that we
disagree with. Does that kind of come close to your philosophy?
Admiral Prueher. Very close.
Senator Boxer. Why do you think China has reacted as it did
to the Falun Gong spiritual movement? How do they see that as a
political threat? It is confusing to me.
Admiral Prueher. I will try to be as succinct as I can, but
I think it is a very complex phenomenon. Senator Helms and I
talked about that a little bit in his offices.
I think the difficulty of governing in China is large. I
think the President of China--if you can draw a parallel that I
have had some academics draw for me, if you had a country the
size of the United States with almost five times the people and
80 percent of them lived east of the Mississippi, and we did
not have enough water for them, that is a little bit of the
environment of governance that occurs in China.
I think the firm grip on governance and the issue of
control is one that maybe makes the leadership feel less secure
than they might and causes what I would consider and I think
most of us would consider an adverse or over-reaction to
possible dissent.
Senator Boxer. When we spoke, we talked about the World
Bank and its involvement with China and the fact that they
agreed to suspend a project called the China Western Poverty
Reduction Project. That plan called for the relocation of
60,000 Chinese farmers into Dulan county, a region historically
inhabited by Tibetan and Mongolian people. With fewer than
10,000 people living on this land, such a transfer of
population would overwhelm the indigenous populations and
amount to a complete cultural occupation.
Many of us called President Wolfensohn of the World Bank
and voiced our concerns over this project. And it is being
reviewed by an independent inspection panel.
I wonder what your views might be on our support of these
kinds of projects. Do you have any comments on the World Bank's
role in China in general?
Admiral Prueher. As you helped me get educated on that
topic, our country voted against the World Bank project in the
first place. The reinvestigation of it to see if that is the
right way to go by the World Bank is something that I think we
need to watch with care to make sure--or not to make sure, but
to seek the right outcome on that. I hope to, if I am
confirmed, get a chance to visit Qinghai and that part of the
country fairly early on in order to see that for myself and to
help form a better opinion on it, Senator.
Senator Boxer. I see the yellow light on. I have one last
question.
The Chairman. Go right ahead.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
The Chairman. Sure.
Senator Boxer. I just wanted to urge you to stay on top of
that issue because I think it is very important that we stand
up for the human rights of these indigenous populations.
Human Rights Watch has asked the administration to get an
agreement with China to release or review the convictions of
about 2,000 persons still imprisoned in Tibet on charges of
counter-revolution. This so-called crime was outlawed by China
a few years ago. Yet, these people are still in prison.
Now, I did not forewarn you that I was going to ask you
this question, so if you do not know the specifics, if you
could get back to me in writing. But I just hope that our
embassy will take a greater role in monitoring the human rights
abuses in Tibet in the future. So, perhaps you could give me
somewhat of an answer and get back to us later on a fuller
answer.
Admiral Prueher. All right. The issue with Tibet is one
that is of great interest to many people in our country and, in
fact, worldwide. It is a piece of the overall human rights
discussion with China. We acknowledge that Tibet is part of
China, but as we look at the issues there, President Jiang
Zemin assured President Clinton in 1997 that he would meet with
the Dalai Lama. I think we need to encourage that and to not
relent on our interest and intensity in seeing through on this
issue.
I will get back to you more specifically on the details of
it, Senator.
Senator Boxer. Well, thank you. And I look forward to your
confirmation.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Ambassador--I will refer to you that way--in early 1998
I think it was, we invited Chinese military observers to the
RIMPAC joint military exercises. Did we invite Taiwan to those?
Admiral Prueher. No, sir, we did not.
The Chairman. Well, if someone will put up a placard over
there that I had prepared. I hope the television gentlemen can
focus on it.
On the right, we see Taiwan's largest air base. On the
left, we have an exact replica of the Taiwan air base, but it
is in Red China where the Chinese military is practicing
attacks on Taiwan. Do you see what they have done? They have
duplicated the air base of Taiwan.
I just want to know, Admiral, were you aware of that?
Admiral Prueher. I have--yes, sir.
The Chairman. That was when you were CINCPAC. Is that
right?
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you have any reaction you want to tell me
about when you saw that?
Admiral Prueher. I do not care for it.
The Chairman. What do you think it says about the nature
and the intentions of the Chinese, though, toward Taiwan?
Admiral Prueher. Well, I think it says that the PLA
prepares for a lot of contingencies. I think it indicates what
you or I infer your implication is the same. It is a reason
that we need to be very steadfast in our balance, and as we try
to proceed in a positive relationship with mainland China, to
make sure we keep this in balance. As I said before, it is
something where I think our Nation always--as a military
person, you always hope for the best and prepare for the worst,
not unlike a Senate hearing.
The Chairman. I have closed up my book. I just want to talk
about what we talked about when you came by the other day.
I think the American people in general like the Chinese
people. As everybody knows, 1,000 years ago China had the
greatest civilization that the world had known. I have been
dealing with young Chinese students in this country ever since
I came to the Senate, and they are the most delightful, bright
young people I have ever seen. I have enjoyed that relationship
and I hope I will continue to do so.
As we said yesterday, I think we agreed--it is not much of
an agreement. It is not a difficult agreement, I will put it
that way. I just wish that you could convey to the
administration in Beijing that the American people would like
to get along with them, and I do not know how to do that. We go
over. Some of my very good friends have gone over, and they
have drunk champagne with them and tinkled their glasses and so
forth, and nothing changes.
Is it just that they are imbued with communism and they do
not want to like everybody, they want to control everybody? Or
is it possible in your mind for there to be built a people-to-
people relationship with the Chinese people?
Now, I am going to run over just a minute myself.
One of my best friends and Dot Helms' best friends is Billy
Graham's wife, Ruth Graham. She was born in China and she loves
the Chinese people. That is about the only time she fusses at
me is because I do not appear to like the Beijing
administration, and she is exactly right about that.
But perhaps you will have some occasion to build the idea
of the absolute potential for a great relationship between the
people in this country and the people in their country.
One other example. Not so long ago Dot Helms and I had
dinner with the then Ambassador from Beijing and his wife, a
delightful man. He had been briefed absolutely because when I
walked in, he shook hands and he said, I was educated at a
Baptist college.
I said, that is good. We have got a good start here.
But anyhow, we got along fine. I talked to him about this,
and he agreed thoroughly. I just wonder why it is so difficult
to get these people to understand that we do not want to be
belligerent toward them, but neither do we want them kicking
Taiwan around. As long as I am in the Senate and chairman of
this committee, I am going to do my best to stand up for
Taiwan.
But there is no reason in this world why we cannot work
something out. That is sort of an ethereal proposition I know,
but bear it in mind and see if you cannot set it because there
are a lot of people in this country, officials of this country,
who would go over and discuss that. I think there is a great
potential for it, but they are the ones who are constantly
saying no.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Well, I want to associate myself with those
remarks very clearly. We have a tremendous opportunity here.
These are really good people and there are so many. It is
difficult to govern. And it may be slow in coming around to the
democracy that we want, but we should encourage their moving
toward democracy. I know it is a difficult line that you will
have to walk. I totally understand that. I know that Jim Sasser
was faced with that and every administration is faced with
that. But I am optimistic. People want the same things, and
they do want their freedom. When the leaders I think understand
this, it will be much better for the people of China.
Today there was a story that there is not really great
leadership happening right now in China. It was a very
interesting story, Mr. Chairman, in today's Washington Post
about that. There is not strong leadership. There is doubt. In
some ways it is good that there is doubt.
I went to China the first time before Tiananmen, and I was
appalled by the attitude of the rulers there. It was stunning.
Their attitude toward the working people, that they would keep
them down. It was rather amazing. It was many years ago.
Then I went back. There are some changes. I think some of
the new leaders see the United States in a different light.
They come here. Some of them are educated here. They understand
more about us.
I think what the chairman is saying to you is a good thing,
that you are in a position now in this perhaps turning point
where they can go one direction or another. We certainly hope
that you will find the strength within to communicate that. It
is a tough job, but we are really hopeful for you.
Admiral Prueher. Thank you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Well, I am not going to ask any more questions.
Admiral Prueher. Senator, may I have a chance to comment on
what you said?
The Chairman. Well, I was going to say that the best
speeches I never made are the things I think of when I am
coming back from having made a speech.
I was going to ask you to use whatever time you want to add
to whatever you said.
Admiral Prueher. Well, my wife would advise me to not say
anything.
The Chairman. They are all alike, you know.
Admiral Prueher. But as usual, I will blunder ahead a
little farther.
I think the comment you made about communicating to the
Chinese the issue we talked about in your office and what you
have just expressed, what you have just said in public, coming
from you--and I do not mean to pander to the committee here--I
think will go a very long way toward helping grow any seeds of
bonding between the people of the United States and China and
the people of China. It will go a long way toward helping those
seeds grow. I think the fact that you have said it here in a
public forum means a tremendous amount, more than anything I
might say. So, I thank you for that because I think you have
made that communication on my part much easier by doing so.
I also do not want to overplay that hand because you said
that is on the one hand, and the other we do not kick Taiwan
around on the other hand.
The Chairman. That is right.
Admiral Prueher. And that is very important as well. Both
of those things are important as we move forward in a steadfast
way.
I thank you for the time, sir.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you for coming.
Do you have any further comments?
Senator Boxer. No.
The Chairman. By the way, the record will be kept open
until tomorrow night at 6 o'clock for Senators to file
questions with you in writing, Senators who are tied up in
other committee meetings.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. But thank you for coming. I think it is
pretty likely that you will be confirmed. Ma'am, you can go
home and pack now.
We stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Responses for the Record
Responses of Admiral Prueher to Pre-Hearing Questions Submitted by
Senator Helms
Question 1. According to a Reuters story on February 29, 1996, you
stated, ``The (Chinese military exercises) seem to have abated a little
bit in the last several days,'' then described the movements as
``moderate'' in size and said China had every right to conduct the
drills on its own soil and that ``they seem to be doing so
responsibly.''
China's belligerent missile drills just off Taiwan began just days
after this interview. Did you have bad information in February 1996, or
do you think, in retrospect, you may have underestimated the Chinese?
Answer. My comments in the Reuters article referred to exercises
the People's Liberation Army was conducting in Fujian province at that
time and their stated follow-on plans to conduct naval exercises at sea
in international waters. My comments were meant as a signal to the
nations of the region that Pacific Command was both monitoring and
analyzing these events with great care.
My command had good information on the conduct of these exercises.
I do not believe we underestimated the Chinese capability. Our
information showed no capability or activity that could support an
invasion, despite media speculation to the contrary.
When the PRC announced their plans to launch missiles in the
vicinity of Taiwan, the PRC exceeded what I considered ``peaceful
resolution'' of the PRC-Taiwan issue. I immediately contacted Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili to recommend
initiating a military response; this ultimately resulted in the
deployment of aircraft carrier battlegroups to the vicinity of Taiwan.
Question 2. According to a Reuters story on May 29, 1997, you
stated that China's pending acquisition of two destroyers armed with
Sunburn missiles from Russia was a ``matter of interest but not of
over-concern or alarm for us.''
According to public reports, these Sunburn missiles are nuclear-
capable, supersonic, have a range of 65 miles, and are specifically
designed to overcome Aegis-equipped vessels. Why should our sailors,
and Taiwan's sailors, not worry about this development? Will any
military adjustment by the U.S. and/or Taiwan be required in response
to this development?
Answer. The ships that China plans to acquire are Russian
Sovremennyy-class destroyers. This ship-class entered service in the
Soviet Union's fleets in 1981. The United States Navy has already
developed weapons and tactics for dealing with this ship-class and its
associated weapons. Thus, the acquisition of two Sovremennyy destroyers
by China is a matter of interest, but not over-concern or alarm for the
United States.
This does not mean that these ships can be ignored. If these ships
actually become part of the Chinese Navy's inventory, American and
Taiwan fleet operators will have to account for the capabilities of
these ships and associated missile systems; they will also have to
adjust their tactical thinking. We would be required to allocate some
intelligence assets to track them under certain circumstances and to
continue assessing their technical and operational capabilities.
Question 3. Were you supportive of the decision to dispatch the
carriers to the Taiwan Strait in March 1996? Did you at any time prior
to the decision express any reservation about the proposal to dispatch
the carriers?
Answer. I was not only supportive of President Clinton's and
Secretary of Defense Perry's decision to dispatch U.S carrier
battlegroups to the vicinity of Taiwan in March 1996, my command also
developed the proposal and plan for this deployment and recommended
executing it. I had no reservations about dispatching the carriers.
Question 4. In your December 1998 Asian Wall Street Journal piece,
you wrote that one of the lessons learned from the March 1996 crisis
was that ``maybe those in the U.S. had perhaps lost sight of the fact
that the issue of Taiwan is a core sovereignty issue for China.
Is this passage a reference to Congress' decisive support for
President Lee's 1995 visa? Do you think this was a mistake? Do you take
as a lesson then, that we should work with Communist China to restrain
Taiwan in its desire to secure greater international legitimacy?
Answer. The passage is not a reference to Congress's support for
the decision to grant President Lee a visa in 1995. My comments refer
to my view that the events surrounding the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis
had sharpened understanding (my own included) of how serious mainland
China is about sovereignty with respect to Taiwan. These events also
reminded China of U.S. commitment to a peaceful resolution of cross-
Strait differences.
Question 5. While you were CINCPAC, were you privy to any
information that China was engaged in proliferation activities of any
sort?
Answer. I was privy to information provided to me by the Central
Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations. I also had
access to media reports of Chinese proliferation activities. I was not
privy to any information beyond what was available to other U.S.
decision-makers.
Question 6. If you are confirmed as Ambassador, how will you
approach the issue of human rights?
Answer. Human rights are part of our nation's agenda with China.
They are a core value of the United States and a key element of our
foreign policy. If confirmed, I will pursue this agenda in a steady,
steadfast way with the Chinese leadership. I will articulate frankly to
the Chinese our nation's human rights principles. If confirmed, I will
hold myself as the senior U.S. official in China responsible and
accountable for reporting, communicating, and advancing human rights.
Question 7. Do you believe China's opinion or anticipated reaction
should be taken into account when the U.S. considers defense sales to
Taiwan? To your knowledge, has this ever been the case for any defense
request of Taiwan?
Answer. The Taiwan Relations Act commits our nation to support a
peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences. Sales of defensive
arms to Taiwan are a key ingredient in this process. The Taiwan
Relations Act provides that our decisions on arms sales should be based
on our judgment of Taiwan's needs. China's opinion or anticipated
reaction should not determine our view of Taiwan's legitimate defense
needs or our decisions on what defense equipment to sell Taiwan.
In making our judgement of Taiwan's needs, we should consider the
regional security environment as well as the impact of a proposed arms
sale on Taiwan's overall security, i.e., not only its military
security, but also its political and economic security. In this
context, we should assess whether providing a certain capability would
prompt a Chinese response that erodes Taiwan's security and the
prospects for a peaceful resolution of differences between the two
sides.
To my knowledge, China's opinion or anticipated reaction has not
swayed decisions on arms sales to Taiwan.
Question 8. According to a March 1999 Army Times article, a Dec. 7
e-mail written by an Army official complained that you were pressuring
the Army into granting a Chinese military delegation unprecedented
access to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, against the
wishes of the Army. Is this true? If so, what are the reasons in favor
of giving the Chinese such access?
Answer. I recall the potential visit of a People's Liberation Army
delegation to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. I do not
recall having or voicing an opinion one way or another about providing
access to the Center.
Question 9. The Defense Authorization bill recently signed into law
places restrictions on our military-to-military relationship with
China. If confirmed as Ambassador, how will you interpret and implement
this law?
Answer. I have read the provisions in the FY2001 Department of
Defense Authorization Bill pertaining to military-to-military relations
with China. If confirmed, I will uphold all the laws of our nation,
including this one, to the utmost of my ability.
Question 10. Would you favor an increase in the number of political
officers in the embassy in Beijing and the U.S. consulates in China to
report on abuses of religious freedom, political dissent, and other
violations of human rights? How many officers are currently assigned to
this task? Is this sufficient?
Answer. Presently, there are 19 political officers assigned to the
embassy in Beijing and U.S. consulates in China. Certain officers have
primary responsibility for this kind of reporting, while for others it
is a collateral responsibility. Quite often, responsibility for this
kind of reporting is extended to other officers as the situation in
China varies over time. Most organizations--and the State Department is
no different--needs this kind of management flexibility to carry out
its full range of responsibilities.
Right now, I simply do not know a good answer to this question. I
do know that all 19 of the political officer billets in China are
filled. If I am confirmed, I will be in a better position to assess the
requirements for political officers after I arrive in Beijing. If I
come to the conclusion that the current number is insufficient, I would
support increasing the number of officers with these reporting
responsibilities.
Question 11. According to information received by the committee, in
July 1997 you granted access to a U.S. nuclear submarine to a visiting
Chinese delegation against the advice of a representative of the
Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs. Is this true? If
so, please inform the committee as to why you felt granting this access
to the Chinese was necessary. Have the Chinese, either before or after
this incident, given us access to one of their submarines equal to the
access you gave them?
Answer. This issue came up during General Wu Quanxu's visit to
Pacific Command headquarters. General Wu brought with him one naval
officer, RADM Zhao Guojun. This presented us with an opportunity to
expose a flag officer in the People's Liberation Army Navy to the high
caliber of our nation's submarine fleet and crews. Thus, there were
some discussions among my staff, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the staff of Commander in Chief U.S.
Pacific Fleet about Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet's proposal to
give RADM Zhao an unclassified tour of USS Dallas. Since a previous
People's Liberation Army delegation had been given an unclassified tour
of a U.S. nuclear submarine in March 1997, I supported the proposal.
The tour was comparable to what one might see on the Discovery Channel.
The People's Liberation Army Navy has given me similar access to
one of their diesel submarines (not a new one) and given Commander-in-
Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet and his party access to a nuclear submarine.
Question 12. According to the Straits Times of April 10, 1996, you
stated that the U.S. is ``committed to the peaceful reunification
process'' between China and Taiwan. Is this your understanding of U.S.
policy?
Answer. No, this is not my understanding of U.S. policy. The United
States supports the peaceful resolution of PRC-Taiwan issues. I do not
recall making this statement though it is possible I did. If I did say
this, I spoke inaccurately.
Question 13. Do you believe that any Chinese actions in the 1990s
have merited U.S. sanctions?
Answer. Though I personally have never been a part of this decision
process, our nation has sanctioned Chinese actions several times during
the 1990's. I believe these are serious matters that deserve serious
attention, particularly in the areas of religious persecution, human
rights abuses, and proliferation. In my current status, I am not a
party to the ongoing reviews of Chinese actions. If confirmed, I hope
to have a voice in the decisions and would expect to consult with the
Congress on these matters in the future.
Question 14. In a question for the record to Kurt Campbell pursuant
to the Committee's August 4 hearing on the Taiwan Security Enhancement
Act, the following question was asked: ``Please provide for the
committee a list of planned military exchanges with Taiwan for 1999, or
a list of actual exchanges from 1998, in classified form if necessary.
Please provide this list in a format similar to that of the Pentagon's
`Game Plan for Sino-U.S. Defense Exchanges' ' that was provided to the
committee and released publicly in February 1999.''
Dr. Campbell's response was that the DOD is prepared to brief
committee staff on this topic at any time.
Unfortunately, this response is inadequate. Please work with DOD to
ensure the requested list is delivered to the Committee by the close of
business Monday, October 25, 1999.
Answer. I have been in contact with Dr. Campbell's office as well
as Under Secretary Slocombe's office. I understand that the information
you have requested has been provided to Mr. Doran on the committee.
__________
Responses of Admiral Prueher to Additional Questions Submitted by
Senator Ashcroft
Question 1. Senator Bob Smith writes in the Washington Times
(October 28, 1999) that you ``. . . allegedly ordered deletion of the
section of the classified U.S. plan for the defense of Taiwan dealing
with strategic matters . . .'' and that Strategic Command and the Air
Force objected to this proposed deletion. Did you order the deletion of
the section of the classified U.S. plan for the defense of Taiwan that
Senator Smith references? Did any personnel in Strategic Command or the
Air Force object to your proposed deletion and, if so, what was the
substance of their objections? While you were Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific (CINCPAC), did the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
transfer Taiwan planning from Pacific Command to the JCS? If so, why
did he make the transfer?
Answer. Senator Smith, or his researcher, appears to have been
given erroneous and partial information. The discussion of this issue
is simple but should be at a classified level. Senator Ashcroft, since
we missed the opportunity for a discussion prior to the hearing, I
recommend that I come see you to discuss these press allegations,
which, in my view, are extremely misleading.
Question 2. Have you opposed any arms sales to Taiwan, such as
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles or submarines? Should the
United States provide theater missile defense equipment to Taiwan, and,
if so, under what circumstances?
Answer. Pacific Command was opposed to the introduction of any
beyond-visual-range missiles into East Asia, in order to avoid sparking
a regional arms race and to preclude other nations in the region from
acquiring Russian missiles of similar capability. With respect to
theater missile defense equipment for Taiwan, U.S. policy does not
preclude provision of this equipment should the technology eventually
be available. I believe that we must meet our obligations under the
Taiwan Relations Act and look at Taiwan's defense needs in a
comprehensive way.
Question 3. Have you opposed direct military communications links
with Taiwan? Did the lack of such links endanger U.S. forces in the
Taiwan Strait in March 1996?
Answer. To my knowledge, there were never any proposals to
establish direct communications links with Taiwan while I was CINCPAC.
During the 1996 crisis, I was confident about the communications
available to me, especially links to our forces in the vicinity of the
Strait.
Question 4. Did anyone in the Pentagon object to the tour you gave
to a Chinese delegation of a U.S. nuclear submarine? Did the tour you
granted of the submarine undermine U.S. efforts to get reciprocity in
reviewing Chinese military hardware? In hindsight, do you think
granting the tour of the U.S. nuclear submarine was the right decision?
Answer. I was aware of an objection during the staff level
discussions of this issue. The tour does not appear to have undermined
U.S. efforts to gain access to Chinese military hardware. If anything,
in light of the tour of a Chinese diesel submarine given to me and the
tour of a Chinese nuclear submarine given to Commander-in-Chief U.S.
Pacific Fleet, the tour for the PLA Navy officers of the U.S. nuclear
submarine advanced our objectives in this regard. In hindsight, the
decision to allow a tour of the submarine seems to have been a good
one.
Question 5. While CINCPAC, did you decide that no nuclear target
planners would be assigned to Pacific Command staff and did Strategic
Command object to this decision? If so, what was the substance of their
objections?
Answer. The issue was how best to coordinate the nuclear weapons
responsibilities of Pacific Command and Strategic Command. I was in
frequent contact with Commander-in-Chief Strategic Command on this
issue; the solution we worked out by mutual agreement was to have a
full-time nuclear command-and-control cell at Pacific Command and a
cadre of planning specialists at Strategic Command who would be
available to deploy to Pacific Command. This arrangement made the most
sense in light of available manpower.
Question 6. Under what circumstances do you think the United States
should defend Taiwan if attacked by China?
Answer. The U.S. policy is clearly expressed in the Taiwan
Relations Act that we would consider any effort to determine the future
of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or
embargoes, a matter of grave concern. As stipulated by the TRA, the
President and Congress shall determine in accordance with
constitutional processes appropriate action by the United States in
response to any such danger. I support this policy.
Question 7. What are China's strategic interests and objectives in
East and South Asia? Do you view China's efforts to extend its
influence in the South China Sea with concern, and how should the
United States ensure that our security interests in this area are
protected?
Answer. As I understand them, China's stated strategic interests
and objectives in East and South Asia include: maintaining sovereignty
over territorial claims; precluding emergence of a regional hegemon;
restraining a regional arms race, especially in South Asia; maintaining
a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; and maintaining access to markets that
provide energy, food, and vital trade.
New construction on the part of China and other countries in the
South China Sea are a concern insofar as they complicate efforts to
resolve competing claims peacefully and raise tensions in the region.
So far, they have not undermined freedom of navigation, a core U.S.
interest. I was particularly concerned about this issue during the
hiatus in the U.S.-Philippine defense relationship, owing to the lack
of a Visiting Forces Agreement. In response to this concern as CINCPAC,
I directed an increase in the visibility and activity of ship transits
through this region. The United States must continue to monitor this
issue carefully.
Question 8. Do you favor aggressively pursuing national and theater
missile defense programs to counter North Korea's missile programs?
Will you advocate close cooperation with Japan on theater missile
defense in spite of Chinese objections?
Answer. I support theater missile defense wherever we have
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines deployed and vulnerable to
missile attack. My view is not specific solely to Asia.
I believe our cooperation with Japan on theater missile defense is
presently at the right level. In my discussions with the Chinese, I had
made the point that theater missile defense is in response to
threatening missiles. A lack of threat would diminish the need for TMD.
______
Responses of Admiral Prueher to Additional Questions Submitted by
Senator Feingold
Question 1. The State Department's Human Rights Report on China
indicates that the economic reform of state-owned enterprises has had
especially severe consequences for women. How do you plan to address
this problem?
Answer. In addition to what was noted on this subject in the State
Department's 1998 Country Report on Human Rights, a December 1998 Asian
Development Bank report sustains this view. I intend to do my part to
help bring China into the World Trade Organization and to promote other
ways to enhance economic growth that would improve the well-being of
women in China.
Question 2. Recently, the State Department has designated China as
a severe violator of religious freedom. What kinds of sanctions do you
expect to be imposed in response to this finding?
Answer. As a result of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Congress
enacted legislation restricting U.S. exports and assistance to China,
including restrictions on the export of crime control and detection
equipment. The Secretary of State has designated these existing
sanctions as satisfying the requirements of the International Religious
Freedom Act.
______
Responses of Admiral Prueher to Additional Questions Submitted by
Senator Helms
Question 1. According to a member of your delegation, the PRC
Ministry of Defense described your December, 1997 visit to China as
enjoying the broadest access ever accorded to a visiting military
official on any one trip. Why do think the Chinese selected you for
this access?
Answer. I do not know for a fact that this statement is correct. In
any event, I think I was given access in part because Pacific Command
and American Embassy Beijing pressed this issue very hard with the
Chinese. Pacific Command's communications with the People's Liberation
Army, though sometimes adversarial and sometimes productive, have
always been direct and candid.
Question 2. Some analysts assert that diplomacy alone may not be
sufficient to counter the Chinese missile threat to Taiwan because
missiles are so integral to China's military modernization objectives.
What is your assessment of this, and if confirmed as Ambassador, how do
you propose to confront the problem of Red China's massive buildup
opposite Taiwan?
Answer. In any potential military situation, I would not want to
count on diplomacy alone. For example, forward-deployed military forces
working in concert with diplomacy and economics are a much more
effective means of accomplishing national security objectives than
diplomacy alone. If confirmed, U.S. national security interests will
remain among my top concerns and I will look for ways to reduce PRC-
Taiwan tensions, including cross-Strait dialogue and reducing the
number of missiles opposite Taiwan.
Question 3. Is it your view that China is a cooperative partner
with the U.S. in restraining North Korea? Can you provide examples of
Chinese cooperation on the North Korean issue?
Answer. China does not coordinate its policies with the United
States in this regard. However, restraining North Korea is strongly in
their interest. China has told us that they favor our efforts to
encourage North Korea not to engage in provocative actions and to bring
about a peaceful, non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. Although China has been
increasingly communicative about its contacts with the DPRK, they do
not report on the contents of these discussions. The PRC cooperates
well with the U.S. in the Four Party Talks.
Question 4. While you were CINCPAC, in October 1998, China moved
aggressively to fortify its structures on Mischief Reef, which lies
within Philippine maritime boundaries. During this time, did you have
any dialogue with the Chinese about this matter? What did you tell
them? Did you have any dialogue with the Filipinos about this matter?
What did you tell them?
Answer. I did have a dialogue on this subject with General Acedera,
at the time the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
I told General Acedera that I lacked much latitude to work with the
Philippine Armed Forces owing to the lack of a Visiting Forces
Agreement. However, I directed an increase in the visibility and
activity of U.S. military ship transits through the South China Sea and
arranged for a channel of exchanging information with the Philippine
Armed Forces. On at least two occasions I reiterated our U.S. policy to
Chinese delegations, although these were not calls in response to
specific acts.
Question 5. What do you think the Chinese are pursuing on Mischief
Reef? Do you think this situation requires an increased emphasis on
repairing the U.S. Philippine alliance?
Answer. The Chinese appear to be improving their ability to assert
sovereignty over Mischief Reef. Reinvigorating the U.S.-Philippine
alliance is a good idea, period. The Mischief Reef situation highlights
the need to enhance that relationship.
Question 6. What is the nature of Chinese military cooperation with
and activity in Burma and Cambodia? Do you think it is possible that
China is attempting to flank the Strait of Malacca? If you are
confirmed as Ambassador, will you pressure China to cease its support
for these unsavory regimes?
Answer. Though it is possible, I do not recall seeing evidence of
China's intent to flank this vital strait, either from own sources or
from nations flanking the Strait. China's growing activity with Burma
and Cambodia is not usually in our interest and I shall look for
effective ways to discourage it, if I am confirmed.
Question 7. The Defense Appropriations bill for FY 2000 provides
$10 million for the U.S. Pacific Command to enhance regional
cooperation, military readiness and exercises. As former CINCPAC, how
do you think that money ought to be used?
Answer. CINCPAC has a well-vetted plan for enhancing regional
cooperation and maintaining military readiness. I cannot easily add to
this effort.
Question 8. Do you believe the U.S. should take the lead in
multilateral forums, such as the UN Commission on Human Rights in
Geneva, to sponsor a resolution critical of China's human rights
record?
Answer. The United States has consistently taken a lead role in
multilateral diplomacy to keep the spotlight on China's human rights
record and to urge the Chinese authorities to respect the human rights
of Chinese citizens. We have worked with other governments each year at
the UNHCR in Geneva, at times sponsoring a resolution on China's human
rights record, and at other times supporting such a resolution
sponsored by likeminded countries. This year, the United States
government will continue those efforts, in consultation with other
concerned governments.
Question 9. Could you describe the role of the People's Liberation
Army and People's Armed Police in maintaining tight government control
in Tibet and Xinjiang? What steps could the U.S. take to open up
China's ethnic minority regions to greater outside access by
journalists, diplomats, and human rights monitors?
Answer. China stations People's Liberation Army units in Tibet and
Xinjiang, as in other outlying regions, for military defense. My
understanding, however, is that the main instruments of control over
local populations are provincial and local public security bureaus
which oversee the police. It is these bureaus and police that are
usually associated with repressive actions, although the military have
been called in during crises.
The United States has long urged China to open access to Tibet,
Xinjiang, and other minority areas to journalists, NGO's and others. In
1998-99, foreigners, including international NGO personnel, have
experienced fewer restrictions on access to Tibet than in 1997, and
several official delegations traveled to Tibet to discuss human rights
issues, although the Government tightly controlled these visits. The
U.S. government will continue to work with other governments and
multilateral organizations for improved access to Tibet and Xinjiang.
Question 10. How should the U.S. respond to the intensified
``patriotic education campaign'' in Tibetan monasteries in the past
year, leading to the expulsion of Dalai Lama supporters?
Answer. Secretary Albright, Assistant Secretary Koh, and ranking
U.S. officials in Beijing have raised with Chinese officials the human
rights situation in Tibet, including concerns about intensification of
the ``reeducation'' campaign in Tibet's monasteries, the treatment of
political and religious prisoners, and the campaign against the Dalai
Lama. We have also raised cases of imprisoned Tibetans, requesting that
they be released, and asked that an international observer be granted
access to Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama as
the Panchen Lama, to verify his whereabouts and well being. We will
continue to vigorously press at both high levels and working levels
against repression in Tibet.
Question 11. Is there anything to be gained from the bilateral
U.S.-China human rights dialogue, which Beijing suspended in May after
the Belgrade embassy bombing? How could these dialogue meetings--
underway since 1990--be restructured to make them more useful?
Answer. This question deserves a better answer, which I will be
able to provide, if confirmed, after I have been able to see firsthand
the status of the dialogue. In the past, we have used the dialogue as a
channel to secure information on political prisoners and sometimes to
get them released. Without dialogue, progress in these areas is
minimal. One area in which restructured dialogue would be particularly
useful is religious freedom. Under the International Religious Freedom
Act, Secretary Albright has designated China as a country of particular
concern for violating religious freedom. The time may be ripe for talks
about positive steps and systemic changes needed to enhance religious
freedom. Specific issues that need to be addressed include reforming
the registration process to enable ``underground'' and ``house''
churches to operate more openly; permitting manifestation of faith
(such as belief in the Second Coming); and generally restraining
governmental intervention in the substance of religious belief and
activity.
Question 12. What should the U.S. position be on the banning of the
Falun Gong movement in China, the detention of its members, and the
expected trials of some of them on charges of subversion?
Answer. The crackdown on the Falun Gong in July is a violation of
international human rights standards as set forth in human rights
instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights China has signed. While the United States government
takes no position on the substance of Falun Gong beliefs, I am not
aware of any evidence that practitioners have done anything other than
peacefully exercise their rights. We will continue to urge China to
exercise restraint, lift the ban on Falun Gong and allow practitioners
to peacefully express their personal beliefs, and release all those who
have been detained for peacefully exercising their rights.
Question 13. What efforts can the U.S. undertake, bilaterally or
with other governments, to press China to do away with its huge system
of reeducation through labor?
Answer. The United States government has pressed the Chinese
authorities to end the abuses associated with China's ``reeducation
through labor'' camps--the so-called laogai system. Such practices have
no place in any internationally responsible nation. The U.S. Government
has addressed these issues repeatedly and vigorously in the annual
State Department Human Rights Report for China, in bilateral talks with
the Chinese Government, and in multilateral forums such as the UNHCR in
Geneva. We will continue to press the Chinese authorities to end the
abuses characterizing the laogai system.
Question 14. Do you think the President should visit China again
before his term ends, and if so, under what conditions would such a
visit be worth considering?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be in a better position to answer this
question once I have had an opportunity to assess the situation in
Beijing.
Question 15. In an interview with Sea Power in December 1998, you
stated that strict reciprocity with the Chinese in military exchanges
was not necessary. Why do you believe this?
Answer. I believe the United States currently enjoys overwhelming
superiority in conventional weaponry relative to the rest of the world
and that one of the primary purposes of military exchanges with the
Chinese is to prevent miscalculation. For that reason, it is not
necessary to maintain an exactly equal ledger sheet for each visit or
minor exchange with the People's Liberation Army.
Question 16. Do you think it is proper for the World Bank or other
IFI's to be funding Chinese government projects that will have the
effect of reducing the Tibetan population in historically Tibetan
regions?
Answer. As I understand it, the USG--as a matter of law and
policy--opposes all IFI loans to China except those defined as meeting
``basic human needs.'' Though the China Western Poverty Reduction
Project may address basic human needs, the U.S. Executive Director
voted against it when it was presented to the World Bank's Board of
Directors in June and strongly supported an independent investigation
of the project. I am briefed that the World Bank did not perform a
thorough assessment of the project's potential impact on the indigenous
peoples and environment of the project area, thus not complying with
its own guidelines or rules.
I am encouraged to see the World Bank's Inspection Panel has
returned from Qinghai and look forward to reviewing the report about
whether the Bank has fulfilled its obligations on this project.
Question 17. Should China gain entry into the WTO yet continue its
current mercantile practises? How do you think we should respond? In
such a case, will you, if confirmed as Ambassador, lobby for vigorous
multilateral sanctions against China?
Answer. China's accession to the WTO under commercially viable
conditions will lead to greater market access for U.S. goods and
services--especially telecommunication and financial services--
throughout China. As China's trade system becomes increasingly more
open and transparent, and more in line with international rules and
standards, I believe one outcome is that U.S. businesses and
agricultural interests will be able to win their fair share of
contracts, establish a reputation for quality and reliability, and,
reduce America's deficit with the PRC. I am committed to achieving a
level playing field for U.S. business and agricultural interests.
We do have recourse if China does not abide by its WTO commitments
or global trading rules. The U.S. and other WTO members will be able to
take China to WTO dispute resolution. If China did not comply with a
ruling against it, the WTO could authorize sanctions. Industry
representatives value access to multilateral dispute resolution
precisely because it has helped lower foreign trade barriers. In
addition, countries have generally been more willing to comply with
multilateral dispute resolution decisions than with unilaterally
imposed sanctions. We will not hesitate to make use of the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism to rectify any Chinese behavior that discriminates
against U.S. interests.
If confirmed, I plan to be increasingly informed on measures, not
simply sanctions, to achieve fair market access.
Question 18. In your answer to a previous question, you stated that
the U.S. Navy has already developed weapons and tactics for dealing
with the Russian Sovremennyy destroyers and Sunburn missiles. Which
weapons systems are those? (A classified response is acceptable if
necessary.) Can the Phalanx system shoot down the Sunburn? What point
defense against the Sunburn does Taiwan's Navy have? Do they have the
Phalanx?
Answer. Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and embarked airwings, Los
Angeles-class attack submarines, Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missiles, Mk-48
torpedoes, Harpoon missiles, the SPY-1 radar, and the Standard Missile-
2, electronic locating data, over-the-horizon targeting, and below-the-
radar-horizon missile launches are among the weapons and tactics for
dealing with Sovremennyy class destroyers.
Under some circumstances, it is possible for the Phalanx to shoot
down the Sunburn. Many of Taiwan's surface combatants are armed with
the Phalanx.
Question 19. Do you think that providing a visa to Taiwan President
Lee in 1995 was a mistake? Please provide a yes or no answer.
Answer. I understand why the Administration thought it was
appropriate at the time to issue the visa. With the benefit of
hindsight, my opinion is Lee Teng-hui made a mistake in pursuing parts
of his visit because it increased cross-Strait tensions, hurt Taiwan's
economy, and eroded Taiwan's security.
Question 20. [Classified].
Question 21. Do you believe that the Six Assurances of 1982 are and
should remain U.S. policy?
Answer. I agree with the Administration's reaffirmation of the
principles articulated by then Assistant Secretary Holdridge in his
1982 testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I believe that
these principles should remain U.S. policy.
Question 22. His Holiness the Dalai Lama's message has for years
been the same: that he wants to establish real substantive dialogue
with the goverment of China, yet they refuse. How, as Ambassador, will
you press the Chinese government to engage the Dalai Lama?
Answer. The Dalai Lama has indicated his interest in a dialogue
with the Chinese Government to resolve issues of human rights and
cultural preservation; most recently, in Milan, Italy, he reiterated
that his objective was to discuss with China's leaders real, genuine
autonomy for Tibet within the Chinese state. The U.S. has actively
promoted such a substantive, direct dialogue between the Chinese
Government, and the Dalai Lama or his representatives, but China has
not recently indicated an interest in such a dialogue. If confirmed as
Ambassador by the Senate, I will address with the Chinese authorities
our strong interest in their initiating discussion with the Dalai Lama
on the core issues of Tibet's status, to try to reach a acceptable
resolution of these issues.
Question 23. Within the past twelve months, has there been any
indication, no matter how slight, that Chinese individuals or companies
have exported any product or technology to Pakistan or any country on
the terrorism list, which would enhance their weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), or missile programs? If so, please provide details.
Answer. I am not personally aware of any information to this
effect. However, I have been briefed as part of my preparations for
confirmation that this is an area that the State Department and
intelligence agencies are examining closely. I understand that these
agencies have provided or are prepared to provide appropriate
briefings.
If confirmed, I will treat with utmost seriousness any reports of
Chinese exports of products or technology to Pakistan or any other
country on the terrorism list that would enhance their WMD or missile
programs.
Question 24. Within the past twelve months, has there been any
indication, no matter how slight, that Chinese individuals or companies
have been present in Iran, Syria, Libya, or Pakistan providing any sort
of cooperation, assistance or guidance to their weapons of mass
destruction or missile programs? If so, please provide details.
Answer. I am not personally aware of any information to this
effect. However, I have been briefed as part of my preparations for
confirmation that this is an area that the State Department and
intelligence agencies are examining closely. I understand that these
agencies have provided or are prepared to provide appropriate
briefings.
If confirmed, I will treat with utmost seriousness any reports of
Chinese entities providing any assistance, cooperation or guidance of
this kind to Iran, Syria, Libya, or Pakistan.
Question 25. Within the past twelve months, has there been any
indication, no matter how slight, that Chinese individuals or companies
have been assisting or cooperating with a Cuban chemical or biological
weapons program? If so, please provide details.
Answer. There is no indication of which I am aware that such
cooperation is occurring. China's relationship with Cuba, particularly
the potential for cooperation in areas of concern to the United States,
will be an issue I will monitor closely. This concern will be reflected
in post reporting.
Question 26. Within the past twelve months, has there been any
indication, no matter how slight, that Cuba and the PRC are cooperating
on intelligence gathering, including Signals Intelligence, directed
against the United States or its citizens? If so, please provide
details.
Answer. I am not aware of any such cooperation. China's
relationship with Cuba, particularly the potential for cooperation in
areas of concern to the United States, will be an issue I will monitor
closely. This concern will also be reflected in post reporting.
Question 27. Within the past twelve months, has there been any
indication, no matter how slight, that the military regime in Burma and
the PRC are cooperating on intelligence gathering, including Signals
Intelligence? If so, please provide details.
Answer. I am not personally aware of any information to this
effect. However, I have been briefed as part of my preparations for
confirmation that this is an area that the State Department and
intelligence agencies are examining closely. I understand that these
agencies have provided or are prepared to provide appropriate
briefings.
If confirmed, I will treat with utmost seriousness any reports of
Chinese military cooperation or intelligence gathering with Burma.
Question 28. What is your estimate of the dollar value of the
military supplies delivered by the PRC to the military regime in Burma
since 1989? Is the Burmese regime paying for these arms with the
receipts of its narcotics trafficking or the grant of special
privileges to the PRC, including military bases on Burmese soil?
Answer. The Burmese regime the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), closely guards information on its military spending. The dollar
value of PRC-sourced military supplies is not known to me and revenue
sources for such procurement would be, at best, speculative on my part.
Question 29. Within the past twelve months, has there been any
indication, no matter how slight, that Chinese individuals or companies
are assisting the WMD or missile programs in North Korea by serving as
conduits for Western goods or technology to Pakistan or any country on
the terrorism list? If so, please provide details.
Answer. I am not personally aware of any information to this
effect. However, I have been briefed as part of my preparations for
confirmation that this is an area that the State Department and
intelligence agencies are examining closely. I understand that these
agencies have provided or are prepared to provide appropriate
briefings.
If confirmed, I will treat with utmost seriousness any reports of
Chinese assistance to WMD or missile programs in North Korea or
Pakistan, or any country on the terrorism list.
Question 30. Within the past twelve months, has there been any
indication, no matter how slight, that Chinese individuals or companies
have used North Korea as a transshipment point for any WMD or missile-
related goods or technology destined for Pakistan or any country on the
terrorism list? If so, please provide details.
Answer. I am not personally aware of any information to this
effect. However, I have been briefed as part of my preparations for
confirmation that this is an area that the State Department and
intelligence agencies are examining closely. I understand that these
agencies have provided or are prepared to provide appropriate
briefings.
If confirmed, I will treat with utmost seriousness any reports of
Chinese entities using North Korea as a transshipment point for WMD or
missile related goods or technology destined for Pakistan or any
country on the terrorism list.
Question 31. While you were CINCPAC, you were known as an active
promoter of close and more frequent military ties with China. Do you
believe that our defense relationship with Red China should be more, or
less, robust than our defense relationship with democratic Taiwan?
Please answer this with a yes or no.
Answer. I want to be responsive, but am unable to give a simple yes
or no because our military relationships with the PRC and with Taiwan
are inherently different.
With respect to Taiwan, our relationship mainly involves providing
equipment and training that meet Taiwan's defense needs.
With respect to the PRC, our relationship is not one of military
equipment and training but rather one of dialogue and exchanges so that
we can better understand each other's capabilities and avoid any
miscalculation. The military interactions are a clear subset of our
overall relationship, but these interactions can improve our ability to
influence China's activity.
Question 32. In your December, 1998 Asian Wall Street Journal
piece, you noted your agreement with Red Chinese leader Jiang Zemin
that there must be understanding between nations before there can be
trust. Is it your view that a lack of understanding and communication
is at the heart of our disagreements with China, or do you think that
the communist ideology and methods of the Chinese government have
anything to do with it?
Answer. Our different values and forms of government are the
foundation of our disagreements with the PRC. The point I tried to make
in the article is that improved communications can lead to
understanding, and potentially a modicum of trust; such an atmosphere
would gives us potential to grapple with our disagreements.
Question 33. Again quoting from your Wall Street Journal article,
you wrote that, ``There's an awful lot of ignorance in the U.S. about
the difficulties of governance in China,'' given its size, etc., and
that ``our nation needs to understand this.'' Is this to say that there
is no way to govern a nation of 1 billion people other than Communist
dictatorship?
Answer. Not at all. I noted the challenges of providing food,
clothing, shelter, jobs, energy, and water for 1.25 billion people. As
we encourage a positive transition to open markets, democratic
principles, and respect for human rights in China, these challenges to
governance will impact the pace at which change can occur, owing to the
inertia of size and difficulty of effecting change.
Question 34. If you are confirmed as Ambassador, will you insist on
the release of political prisoners, the granting of religious freedom,
and true autonomy for Tibet as conditions for a genuine partnership
with China? If not, please explain why this would not be in our
interest?
Answer. If confirmed as Ambassador to China, I will raise with
Chinese leaders, in the most effective way I can, the issues of
political prisoners, religious freedom, and true autonomy for Tibet.
Freedom of political and religious expression, and the right to one's
cultural identity, are core values of the American people. I will
express those values strongly and clearly to the Chinese leadership. I
will try to help them understand that constraints on freedom--whether
the incarceration of persons for peaceful political activity, the
limits placed on freedom of religion and conscience, or the constraints
imposed on the religious, cultural, and linguistic autonomy of the
Tibetan people--truly limit the nature of the United States-China
relationship that is so important to the Asia-Pacific region.
Question 35. If you are confirmed as Ambassador, will you insist
that the Chinese reimburse us for the damage they purposely did to our
embassy and consulates in China, before or in tandem with any
reimbursement we make for their embassy in Belgrade?
Answer. We have made it very clear to the Chinese, that any
resolution to their claim for damages to their Belgrade embassy must be
concurrent with a resolution to our own claims. I agree with this
position.
As I understand it, parallel negotiations for payments for damages
done to our respective diplomatic facilities are ongoing. Our last
discussions with the Chinese took place on October 20-21 in Beijing. We
continue to make progress on both negotiations and will meet again at a
future date.
Question 36. At your confirmation hearing you stated that we
invited Chinese military observers to the RimPac joint military
exercises in 1998, but not Taiwan observers. Why did we not invite
Taiwan? Do we plan to in the future?
Answer. As a military commander, I did not have the latitude under
our current Taiwan policy to invite Taiwan observers. As far as I know,
we do not plan to invite Taiwan observers.
Question 37. Earlier this year Assistant Secretary Roth and other
administration officials urged China and Taiwan to consider so-called
``interim agreements.'' Prior to his joining the government NSC Asia
Director Lieberthal spelled out his notion of an ``interim agreement,''
calling for Taiwan to constitutionally forego independence for 50 years
in exchange for Beijing's promise not to use force. If confirmed as
Ambassador, would you support the notion of encouraging such a solution
to the problem of Taiwan's status?
Answer. I would support any solution worked out peacefully by the
two sides through dialogue. The U.S. government position, which I
support, is that PRC-Taiwan differences are matters for those on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait to resolve. Our sole abiding interest is
that any resolution be a peaceful one. We do not seek to play a
mediating role.
It is certainly logical, that as cross-Strait talks unfold between
Taiwan and the PRC, they may wish to reach interim agreements on any
number of issues as they pursue this process.
Question 38. Also in your Wall Street Journal piece, you expressed
concern over the lack of communication with Red China we had at the
time of the 1996 crisis. But we also did not have any direct or secure
military communications with Taiwan, just as our carriers were possibly
on the verge of defending them. How much of a concern was that to you?
Do you think we ought to rectify this situation?
Answer. Though I have been away from the particulars of the
situation for eight months, I thought communications with Taiwan,
though unofficial, were adequate. Our communications were sufficient
and rapid enough for our purpose.