

CRISIS IN PAKISTAN

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

—————
OCTOBER 14, 1999
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61-870 CC

WASHINGTON : 2000

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CRISIS IN PAKISTAN

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1999

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2:09 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACk. The hearing will come to order. Thank you all for joining us today. I anticipate we will be joined soon by Senator Wellstone and possibly some other members, but in the interest of time, the appointed hour has arrived and we will go ahead with the hearing.

Thank you all for joining us. Secretary Inderfurth, welcome again to the committee. As we talked previously ahead of time, it seems like you always come up during difficult times. So, I guess I should say I am not so happy to see you because that usually harbingers a difficult time we are having.

It was a disappointment to see the news previously, 2 days ago, of the military takeover in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif was the democratically elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, and he has been a good friend of the United States.

The problems we are experiencing today precede Pakistan's nuclear detonation. They precede Nawaz Sharif's current government and his previous one as well. They are, I believe, in large part the result of an inconsistent and I believe a flawed policy toward what was once one of our best friends in South Asia.

You will, I am sure, be pleased to hear that I am persuaded that both the administration and the Congress share the blame: Congress for sanctioning Pakistan and curtailing our ability to influence Islamabad; the administration for, I believe pursuing a one-issue policy since the nuclear test a year and a half ago.

Do not mistake what I am saying. The U.S. rightly strived to have influence in an important part of the world. One of the ways we can do that is by not falling into the trap of zero sum politics on the South Asian subcontinent. What is good for India is not bad for Pakistan and what is bad for Pakistan is not good for India. Each nation in its own right deserves a separate foreign policy. However—and this is a vital caveat—when the U.S. treats the same problem in India and Pakistan differently, we create problems for ourselves.

Neither nation should be in the nuclear business. Neither nation should have detonated a nuclear device. And when they did, each deserved the sanctions imposed on them by the President. Looking back, however, I believe we made a mistake in threatening and then sanctioning only Pakistan for its development of a nuclear weapon. While I understand some of the motivations behind the Pressler amendment, I am persuaded that ultimately it had the effect of driving Pakistan to a greater reliance on a nuclear deterrent. It also had the effect of lessening our influence over the Pakistani military which, whether we like it or not, is where the real power resides, in Pakistan.

The Pakistan army, once a bastion of U.S.-trained officers with secular pro-Western views, now relies on soldiers trained in Islamist institutions. It should hardly come as a surprise to us that the result is adventures such as the ill-considered incursion over the line of control in Kashmir earlier this year. Had we remained consistent in our engagement with the Pakistani military, we could possibly be in a better position than we are today.

The Pressler amendment is not the only culprit in the “who lost Pakistan” debate. Recent administration policy has also led us to where we are today. And here again let us face facts. What looks like a good South Asian policy in Washington is not necessarily good politics in Pakistan. With both carrot and stick, this administration has tried to force both India and Pakistan into signing the CTBT. This kind of single-mindedness on our part, I have said time and again, is dangerously short-sighted. This summer this administration used all of its powers of suasion to force a Pakistani withdrawal back to the line of control in Kashmir. While I agree that Pakistan’s actions in Kashmir have been dangerous and ill-considered, I also believe a negotiated withdrawal would have benefited both India and Pakistan without making Nawaz Sharif look like a U.S. puppet to his own people.

Another fact: The United States has pressured Pakistan not to do any further missile testing, and this is an excellent policy. But was it imperative to beat the Sharif Government into submission on this matter in light of India’s continued testing? I ask myself and I intend to ask you as well, how have we furthered our goals in South Asia policy by positioning and putting a weakened democratically elected government in Pakistan in an even more difficult and weaker position?

And now that we are faced with this extra-constitutional event—I guess that is diplo speak for a coup—what are we going to do? Are we going to cutoff aid? Did that. Give them a cold shoulder? Did that too.

We are left without too many options. Though we are providing the President with a waiver on the Glenn amendments, sanctions should not be waived under the current circumstances, I do not believe. Indeed, section 508 of the 1999 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act mandates a cutoff of aid in view of the military coup. Yet, if we let Pakistan go now without any sanctions relief, the United States will be left with no leverage at all. We will have no policy tool capable of providing any incentive for a military regime to bring back a democratically elected civilian government.

Democracy must be restored in Pakistan. If the duly elected government has lost all credibility, then a caretaker government should be appointed. Long-term military control is unacceptable.

Finally, I want it absolutely clear that I support the administration's desire to promote stability in South Asia. However, by making demands which I believe destabilize a fragile democracy in Pakistan, we may well have set back our goals by many years.

I look forward to hearing your comments, Secretary Inderfurth, as to where we go forward from here.

I would just like to note to those in attendance and those listening, this subcommittee, myself, Secretary Inderfurth have worked a great deal of time and put a lot of effort into providing the President with waiver authority toward sanction in Pakistan and in India. Those are in the defense appropriation bill that will be voted on later today by the Senate. I intend to vote for that bill, and I continue to believe that is the right policy for us to pursue.

I would hope that we could move forward, once that is done, press the government in Pakistan to return to a constitutional government, and then fully reengage with Pakistan on a broad basis, on a broad set of issues that the administration would be willing to engage with them on, economic, on military training, so that we can build these relationships and in 5 or 10 years not look back and find ourselves in the same predicament that we find ourselves in today. These are important times for us as a country and certainly for the Indian subcontinent. I think we need to be very careful in our review and see where we went wrong in the past and try to project into the future and say, how can we correct and not repeat the same mistakes again.

Secretary Inderfurth, again, delighted to have you here in the committee, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. KARL FREDERICK INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. INDERFURTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may, I would like to start off in a slightly unorthodox way to respond to the last point that you made about broader engagement. This is an area that I think you and I have discussed before and I think that we are very much in agreement on. I would like to say a word about the need for broader engagement.

As I said, I could not agree more with your view that what we need is greater not less involvement with Pakistan. It is a country where our national interests are engaged. Clearly the impact of almost a decade of sanctions has restricted our level of engagement, including valuable contacts with the Pakistani military. For some time, we have wanted to establish a broader relationship with Pakistan, one that is more sustainable for the future. That is still our objective and we will pursue it as soon as circumstances permit.

I also want to say that we are very pleased in this regard that it appears the Senate will pass the DOD appropriations bill and send it along to the President for signature. That bill contains the comprehensive waiver authority we were seeking with respect to the sanctions that were put into place after the nuclear tests by

India and Pakistan. I want to thank you, Senator Brownback, for your leadership in this regard. We look forward to working with you and members of the committee on determining how best to use that waiver authority and the appropriate timing. I thought that while that subject was at hand, that I would want to make that brief statement.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, and I look forward to working with you on that as well.

Mr. INDERFURTH. Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate, as I said to you before the hearing began, this opportunity to appear today. I do regret that once again I am bringing bad news to you and the committee. We have many issues in South Asia that warrant our full attention, but none is more important today than the political crisis in Pakistan that you asked me to address. I look forward to discussing with you how we can fashion a U.S. response which promotes a prompt restoration of democracy in that country.

I would like to begin by reading the statement issued last night by the White House from President Clinton. The President said—and I quote—“The events in Pakistan this week represent another setback to Pakistani democracy. Pakistan’s interests would be served by a prompt return to civilian rule and restoration of the democratic process. I urge that Pakistan move quickly in that direction. I am sending my Ambassador back to Islamabad to underscore my view directly to the military authorities and to hear their intentions. I will also be consulting closely with all concerned nations about maintaining peace and stability in South Asia.”

Mr. Chairman, let me now outline the facts as we know them, with a caveat, that the situation remains fluid.

On Tuesday of this week, October 12, the Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the retirement of Chief of Army Staff Musharraf, who was out of the country at the time. Musharraf arrived in Pakistan from a visit to Sri Lanka shortly after the announcement was made. Simultaneously, military personnel under Musharraf’s control placed the Prime Minister and other civilian and military leaders under house arrest. The armed forces closed the airports to civilian traffic, took over the state-controlled broadcast media, and interrupted some communications systems.

We listened closely to what General Musharraf had to say two nights ago when he addressed the nation about the decision and rationale for why the armed forces moved in to reestablish order—those were his words—in Pakistan, and why Prime Minister Sharif was removed from office. We also noted that General Musharraf promised that a further policy statement would be forthcoming shortly. We are still awaiting that statement. Apparently he has been consulting with constitutional experts, corps commanders, and prospective government appointees about his next steps. When his statement is made, we hope that General Musharraf will set forth clear plans for the restoration of civilian government in Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, that the military has deposed a democratically elected government is clear. It is, however, unclear whether General Musharraf intends to remain in political control, even in the short term. While the Pakistani army did shut down the parliament building today and our charge, Michele Sison, was in-

formed that the federal government and four provincial governments had been dissolved, martial law has not been imposed.

We understand that Prime Minister Sharif, his brother, the Chief Minister of Punjab, Sabbaz Sharif, some cabinet members, and General Ziauddin, head of the intelligence services, remain under house arrest. Our embassy in Islamabad has not been able to contact any of these individuals. We call upon the current Pakistani authorities to assure their safety and well-being.

The situation in Pakistan itself remains calm. Public reaction has been muted. Airports have been reopened. State-run radio and television have resumed normal programming. The financial markets remain closed on a banker's holiday.

I should also note that we have seen no reports of disruption or threats to Pakistan's nuclear facilities or any other installations.

Now, while Indian forces have gone on alert, this appears to be only a precautionary measure. There does not appear to be a heightening of tensions between India and Pakistan. The official Indian reaction, as expressed in statements of Prime Minister Vajpayee and others, has been cautious and low key.

Finally, we still have no reports of problems for Americans in Pakistan. The U.S. Embassy notified American citizens of the crisis and urged them to exercise caution, recommending in particular that they limit unnecessary movement outside their residences.

Mr. Chairman, the developments in Pakistan this week represent another setback in that country's long struggle to establish accountable and viable democratic institutions. In the 11 years since 1988 when Benazir Bhutto came to power, no elected prime minister has served a full 5-year term. Up to this week's action by the military, Prime Minister Sharif had served just over 2½ years of his 5-year term. Pakistan's unfortunate history of interrupted democracy continues.

Mr. Chairman, the political crisis in Pakistan which culminated in this week's events is a product of Pakistan's history and recent developments. I do not need to remind you of the two long periods of martial law in Pakistan. These two periods served both to instill in the Pakistani military and civilian political class the habit of military involvement in politics and to inhibit the development of a stable, democratic, constitutional system. Pakistan has yet to develop a consensus about how to share responsibility among civil institutions, nor has it forged a clear and accepted divide between civilian and military responsibilities.

Now, recent developments did not occur in a vacuum. Many Pakistanis viewed the current political and economic environment as alarming and getting worse. For the past year, Pakistan's economy has required IMF assistance to avert collapse. Pressing needs in education and health care went unmet in a budget devoted largely to debt service and the military. Terrorism and sectarian violence was spreading. Pakistanis were increasingly dissatisfied with the Sharif Government because of these economic trends and also criticized the government for taking actions that weakened the institutions of civil society, including the judiciary, the press, and non-governmental organizations.

With respect to foreign policy, February's euphoria, the good will, at "bus diplomacy"—and the historic summit meeting in Lahore be-

tween Prime Ministers Sharif and Vajpayee—had dissipated by the summer. The reason was Kargil, something you referred to in your statement, the incursion into territory on the Indian side of the line of control by forces from Pakistan. Serious and deadly fighting resulted, ending only when Prime Minister Sharif, in a meeting with President Clinton at Blair House, made the wise and courageous decision to take steps to encourage the intruders to withdraw.

Prime Minister Sharif's decision engendered strong opposition at home. Some argued that it was a mistake to withdraw from Kargil. We could not disagree more. It was the right thing to do. The mistake was to launch the incursion in the first place. Civilian and military leaders alike at the highest level of government share responsibility for that grave error which set back the prospect of reconciliation with India which had seemed so promising at Lahore and also raised the prospect of a larger war between two nuclear capable adversaries.

Now, in the weeks prior to the military takeover, a stream of opposition politicians had visited Washington and warned that the political situation was approaching crisis proportions. They said that Prime Minister Sharif had lost the confidence of much of the electorate and that tensions between civilian and military authorities were high. We were hearing similar reports from our embassy in Islamabad.

In private, we told the opposition and government alike that we opposed any extra-constitutional action against the elected government. At the same time, we encouraged the government to permit the opposition to demonstrate peacefully and to express its views without hindrance and to respect the freedom of the press. We also conveyed our views in public.

Just 2 weeks ago, it seemed that the crisis had been averted when General Musharraf was made simultaneously chief of army staff and chairman of the joint staff committee, and his term extended until October 2001. Unexpectedly and for reasons we do not know, Prime Minister Sharif on Tuesday decided to remove Musharraf from both positions, precipitating military action. Let me emphasize that our understanding of the motives of the parties involved is imperfect. What we can say is that today the elected Prime Minister and many members of his government are in military detention. General Musharraf and the military are in control. President Clinton, Secretary Albright, and other U.S. officials have expressed both our deep regret at this severe setback to democracy and our hope that they will see and do their duty to restore Pakistan to civilian, democratic, constitutional government as soon as possible. The best response to an imperfect democracy is not to replace it with an unelected government. The remedy is to take concrete steps to strengthen democratic institutions.

Mr. Chairman, until we see a restoration of a civilian democratic government in Pakistan, we have made it clear we would not be in a position to carry on business as usual with Pakistani authorities. In fact, as you know, section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act contains a prohibition against a broad range of assistance for any country whose democratically elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree. We are now in the process of making the legal determination that such sanctions

should be applied. As a practical matter, most forms of assistance were already prohibited for Pakistan under the Glenn amendment and other statutory restrictions.

Mr. Chairman, as President Clinton referred in his statement last night, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Bill Milam, who has just completed urgent consultations here in Washington, will arrive tomorrow in Islamabad. He will carry a message from the U.S. Government containing our publicly stated expectation that democracy and civilian government will be restored as early as possible. He will seek to deliver this message to General Musharraf immediately upon his arrival. He will also make clear that we expect that Prime Minister Sharif, Chief Minister Sharif, and other detainees will be treated properly.

Our view is that the sooner civilian democratic rule is restored, the better. Better for the Pakistani people. Better for Pakistan as a nation. Better for Pakistan's relations with the international community.

Mr. Chairman, we and other members of the international community are watching closely as the situation in Pakistan continues to evolve. We are consulting with key states regarding the situation. We have a great many important issues to address with Pakistan, issues which can best be addressed by a democratic government. These include contributing to the development of stable, peaceful relations between Pakistan and India; averting a nuclear arms race in South Asia; and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan and addressing questions of terrorism, human rights, and narcotics.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me underscore one very important point. Pakistan is important. It is important because it can serve as an example of a progressive Islamic democracy, because it is a link, both economic and political, between the Indian Ocean and Central Asia, because it has significant human and economic resources, and because it has historically been a friend of the United States. It is important, therefore, for the United States and other longtime friends of Pakistan to express their concern, exert their influence, and take those steps necessary and appropriate so that Pakistan can resume its course toward stable, constitutional democracy as soon as possible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Inderfurth follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KARL F. INDERFURTH
POLITICAL CRISIS IN PAKISTAN

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today. We have many issues in South Asia that warrant our full attention. But none is more important today than the political crisis in Pakistan you have asked me to address. I look forward to discussing with you how we can fashion a U.S. response which promotes a prompt restoration of democracy in that country.

I would like to begin by reading the statement issued last night by the White House from President Clinton: "The events in Pakistan this week represent another setback to Pakistani democracy. Pakistan's interests would be served by a prompt return to civilian rule and restoration of the democratic process. I urge that Pakistan move quickly in that direction. I am sending my ambassador back to Islamabad to underscore my view directly to the military authorities, and to hear their intentions. I will also be consulting closely with all concerned nations about maintaining peace and stability in South Asia."

The Current Situation

Mr. Chairman let me now outline the facts as we know them, with a caveat that the situation remains fluid, our information is imperfect, and our understanding of intentions uncertain.

On Tuesday, October 12, the Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the retirement of Chief of Army Staff Musharraf, who was out of the country at the time. Musharraf arrived in Pakistan from a visit to Sri Lanka shortly after the announcement was made. Simultaneously, military personnel under Musharraf's control placed the Prime Minister and other civilian and military leaders under house arrest. The armed forces closed the airports to civilian traffic, took over the state controlled broadcast media and interrupted some communications systems.

We listened closely to what General Musharraf had to say two nights ago when he addressed the nation about the decision and rationale for why the Armed Forces "moved in" to "reestablish order" in Pakistan, and why Prime Minister Sharif was removed from office. We also noted that General Musharraf promised that a further policy statement would be forthcoming shortly. We are still awaiting that statement. Apparently he has been consulting with constitutional experts, corps commanders and prospective government appointees about his next steps. When his statement is made, we hope that General Mushanaf will set forth clear plans for the restoration of civilian government in Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, that the military has deposed a democratically elected government is clear. It is, however, unclear whether General Musharraf intends to remain in political control, even in the short term. While the Pakistani Army did shut down the parliament building today, and our Charge Michele Sison was informed that the federal government and four provincial governments had been dissolved, martial law has not been imposed.

We understand that Prime Minister Sharif, his brother, the Chief Minister of Punjab Shabbaz Sharif, some Cabinet members, and General Ziauddin, head of the intelligence services, remain under house arrest. Our embassy in Islamabad has not been able to contact any of these individuals. We call upon the current Pakistani authorities to assure their safety and well-being.

The situation in Pakistan itself remains calm. Public reaction has been muted. Airports have been reopened. State run radio and television have resumed normal programming. The financial markets remain closed on a "banker's holiday."

I should also note that we have seen no reports of disruption or threats to Pakistan's nuclear facilities or any other installations.

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We still have no reports of problems for Americans in Pakistan. The U.S. Embassy notified American citizens of the crisis and urged them to exercise caution, recommending in particular that they limit unnecessary movement outside their residences.

The Larger Context

Mr. Chairman, the developments in Pakistan this week represent another setback in that country's long struggle to establish accountable and viable democratic institutions. In the 11 years since the Pakistan People's Party victory in 1988 brought Benazir Bhutto to power, no elected prime minister has served a full five-year term. She served only two years of that term. Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League was victorious in 1990 but he resigned three years later. Benazir Bhutto was re-elected in 1993 and dismissed in 1996. Prime Minister Sharif won re-election in 1997 and, up to this week's action by the military, had served just over 2 years and eight months. Pakistan's unfortunate history of interrupted democracy continues.

Mr. Chairman, the political crisis in Pakistan which culminated in this week's events is a product of Pakistan's history and recent developments. I do not need to remind you of the two long periods of martial law in Pakistan. These two periods served both to instill in the Pakistan military and civilian political class the habit of military participation in politics and to inhibit the development of a stable, democratic, constitutional system. Pakistan has yet to develop a consensus about how to share responsibility among civil institutions, nor has it forged a clear and accepted divide between civilian and military responsibilities.

Recent developments did not occur in a vacuum. Many Pakistanis viewed the current political and economic environment as alarming and getting worse. For the past year, Pakistan's economy has required IMF assistance to avert collapse. Pressing needs in education and health care went unmet in a budget devoted largely to debt

service and defense. Terrorism and sectarian violence were spreading. Pakistanis were increasingly dissatisfied with the Sharif Government because of these economic trends, and also criticized it for taking actions that weakened the institutions of civil society including the judiciary, the press, and non-governmental organizations.

With respect to foreign policy front, February's euphoria at "bus diplomacy"—and the historic summit meeting in Lahore between Prime Ministers Sharif and Vajpayee—had dissipated by summer. The reason was Kargil, the incursion into territory on the Indian side of the Line of Control by forces from Pakistan. Serious and deadly fighting resulted, ending only when Prime Minister Sharif, in a meeting with President Clinton at Blair House, made the wise and courageous decision to take steps to encourage the intruders to withdrawal.

Prime Minister Sharif's decision engendered strong opposition at home. Some argued that it was a mistake to withdraw from Kargil. We could not disagree more. It was the right thing to do. The mistake was to launch the incursion in the first place. Civilian and military leaders alike—at the highest levels of government—share responsibility for that grave error, which set back the prospect of reconciliation with India which had seemed so promising, and also raised the prospect of a larger war between two nuclear capable adversaries.

In the weeks prior to the military takeover, a stream of opposition politicians had visited Washington and warned that the political situation was approaching crisis proportions. They said that Prime Minister Sharif had lost the confidence of much of the electorate and that tensions between civilian and military authorities were high.

In private, we told the opposition and government alike that we opposed any extra-constitutional action against the elected government. At the same time, we encouraged the government to permit the opposition to demonstrate peacefully and to express its views without hindrance. We also conveyed our views in public.

Just two weeks ago, it seemed that the crisis had been averted when General Musharraf was made simultaneously Chief of Army Staff and Chairman of the Joint Staff Committee, and his term extended until October 2001. Unexpectedly, and for reasons we do not know, Prime Minister Sharif on Tuesday then decided to remove Musharraf from both positions, precipitating military action. Let me emphasize that our understanding of the motives of the parties involved is imperfect. What we can say is that today the elected prime minister and many members of his government are in military detention.

General Musharraf and the military are in control. President Clinton, Secretary Albright and other U.S. officials have expressed both our deep regret at this severe setback to democracy, and our hope that they will see—and do—their duty to restore Pakistan to civilian, democratic, constitutional government as soon as possible. The best response to an imperfect democracy is not to replace it with an unelected government. The remedy is to take concrete steps to strengthen democratic institutions.

What We are Doing

Mr. Chairman, until we see a restoration of a civilian democratic government in Pakistan, we have made it clear we would not be in a position to carry on business as usual with Pakistani authorities. In fact, as you know, Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act contains a prohibition against a broad range of assistance for a country whose democratically elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree. We are now in the process of making the legal determination that such sanctions should be applied. As a practical matter, most forms of assistance were already prohibited for Pakistan under the Glenn Amendment and other statutory restrictions.

As President Clinton referred to in his statement last night, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Bill Milam, who has just completed urgent consultations in Washington, will arrive tomorrow in Islamabad. He will carry a message from the United States Government containing our publicly stated expectation that democracy and civilian government be restored as early as possible. He will seek to deliver this message to General Musharraf immediately upon his arrival. He will also make clear that we expect that Prime Minister Sharif, Chief Minister Sharif, and all other detainees will be treated properly.

Our view is that the sooner civilian democratic rule is restored, the better. Better for the Pakistani people. Better for Pakistan as a nation. Better for Pakistan's relations with the international community.

Mr. Chairman, we and other members of the international community are watching closely as the situation in Pakistan continues to evolve. We are consulting with key states regarding the situation. We have a great many important issues to ad-

dress with Pakistan, issues which can best be addressed by a democratic government. These include:

- Contributing to the development of stable, peaceful relations between Pakistan and India;
- Averting a nuclear arms race in South Asia; and
- Stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan and addressing the questions of terrorism, human rights, and narcotics.

Pakistan is important. It is important because it can serve as an example of a progressive Islamic democracy, because it is a link—both economic and political—between the Indian Ocean and Central Asia, because it has significant human and economic resources, and because it has historically been a friend of the United States. It is important therefore for the United States and other long-time friends of Pakistan to express their concern, exert their influence, and take those steps necessary and appropriate so that Pakistan can resume its course toward stable, constitutional democracy as soon as possible.

Senator BROWNBAC. Thank you very much, Secretary Inderfurth, for your comments.

I want to add my voice to yours and the administration that we urge the military in Pakistan to keep safe Prime Minister Sharif and the others that they have put under arrest, that they must do that. I add my voice to yours with that.

Secretary Inderfurth, there is a legal term about a coup. I believe under any normal definition, this is a coup that has taken place in Pakistan.

Has this, under the legal determination of the State Department, been declared a coup that has occurred in Pakistan?

Mr. INDERFURTH. We agree with your assessment. Indeed, the definition does meet that of section 508. As I said in my testimony, we are preparing the formal legal determination of that now.

Senator BROWNBAC. As you stated as well, there is not a whole lot left to throw at the situation as far as any sort of sanctions or relationships, but the coup determination does have a legal significance to that. And the State Department will be filing that soon?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Yes, we will.

Senator BROWNBAC. Have you had any communications with General Musharraf since the coup?

Mr. INDERFURTH. We have not. Again, Ambassador Milam will be arriving tomorrow in Islamabad, and a request has been made for an appointment with General Musharraf so that he can receive the message that we have prepared. But this will be the first contact with him since the coup took place.

Senator BROWNBAC. There have been assertions that the administration knew the problems that were brewing between General Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif, that these were taking place. You had made a public statement not favoring a coup attempt. What did the administration know ahead of this coup that took place and when did you know it?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Well, again, as my statement pointed out, we had been hearing both in Islamabad, as well as when visitors came to Washington, that for some time opposition was growing to Prime Minister Sharif. In September, two visitors in particular came to Washington, both Pakistani politicians, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, whom I met with, and Imran Khan who ran for office, another noted Pakistani politician. They had, along with other opposition parties, formed the Grand Democratic Alliance, 19 parties. As Mr. Imran Khan said to the Washington Post, when he

was here, the alliance has one agenda item, and that is the ouster of Nawaz Sharif.

Now, when I spoke to former Prime Minister Bhutto, she made it clear that this was a constitutional route that they were traveling. They wanted to see the Prime Minister resign.

In Islamabad, he was also under increasing opposition from Islamist groups that were opposed to the decision for the withdrawal from Kargil. The military, we were told, was unhappy with that decision. Some cited it as humiliation of the military that they were very opposed to.

So, we were hearing all of these things. Because of that, and indeed because of other visitors that came here, including the Prime Minister's brother—Chief Minister Sabbaz Sharif—we discussed the internal situation with him. It was very clear that, if you will, corridor talk in Pakistan was how to get rid of Prime Minister Sharif. And there were also demonstrations, I might add, demonstrations in Karachi, in Lahore, Islamabad, 40,000 people, demonstrations on that order.

So, because we had heard and because of the history of Pakistan of ousting constitutionally elected leaders, we both privately and publicly made it clear that we would not support and, indeed, would oppose extra-constitutional means to remove the democratically elected head of state, but we also made it clear that the government should allow peaceful protests, legitimate dissent, freedom of the press. And there had been a crackdown through detaining individuals before these demonstrations took place. We were concerned about the government not allowing peaceful protests and legitimate protests. So, that was the message that we got out both privately and publicly. So, there was a lot of discussion.

But again, it was the question of the civilian and the army relationship which was the key to whether or not there would be some move against the Prime Minister. On September 29, the Chief of the Army Staff, General Musharraf, and Prime Minister Sharif had seemed to patch up their differences. Indeed, some of the newspaper accounts in Pakistan had headlines such as this one saying, "No Differences with Government, COAS," the chief of the army staff. So, it did appear that there was a move to reconcile differences, and then 2 weeks after that appeared to be the case, we had the crisis.

Senator BROWNBAC. Did you know during that 2-week time period by intelligence sources or by other places that some move was taking place, that Prime Minister Sharif was going to be moving on the head of the military?

Mr. INDERFURTH. No.

Senator BROWNBAC. You did not know that?

Mr. INDERFURTH. We did not.

Senator BROWNBAC. He did not call or communicate that to the administration.

Mr. INDERFURTH. No. No, he did not.

Senator BROWNBAC. And you did not have any warning about that taking place through signs or the intelligence service that that was coming?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Actually we are going back through that now to see if there were any telltale signs. There were certainly not any

indications as explicit as what you are suggesting. We will look back and see whether or not there were any telltale signs that, with hindsight, could have been more of an indicator that the Prime Minister was about to make that move. But again, the fact that the army chief of staff's tenure had been reaffirmed through October 2001 and that he had been dual-hatted as chairman of the joint chiefs, as well as chief of the army staff, it appeared that, once again, things in this difficult relationship had settled down. We did not expect it to be permanently resolved, but we thought that at least for the moment it had settled down.

Senator BROWNBAC. Did you have any communications from the military that if the Prime Minister moved on the military—and let us move this back prior to the 2 weeks before it started to settle down—that if the Prime Minister moved to remove the head of the military, that they would respond with removing the Prime Minister?

Mr. Inderfurth. I think that General Musharraf himself said publicly that this would not be well received if there was an attempt to see him removed. This was not an entirely “behind closed doors” debate. Things were being said publicly, appearing in the press. The Pakistani press is quite lively and gets a lot of stories on this kind of thing. Again, there was no indication that we had that a plan was in place to respond in this fashion.

But again, it is the history that is repeating itself that gives anyone dealing with Pakistan, as we do in the South Asia Bureau, cause to look at that history and say, are we seeing signs of its repeating itself? Again, there has been no democratically elected head of state that has fulfilled his or her term in office, and the army has been in control in Pakistan for 25 of Pakistan's 52-year history.

Senator BROWNBAC. For that very reason that you just stated, Mr. Secretary, is one of the reasons why I think we should be far more engaged with the Pakistani military. A number of them used to be trained in the United States. The figures I am told is that of the military leadership in Pakistan, it used to be 50 percent of them were trained in the United States, and a lot of those relationships then were built back and forth, many of them in my State. Many of them were trained in Leavenworth at the Command and General Staff College and a number remembered well, good, bright students, military people.

But after the Pressler amendment and the stopping of that training and exchange back and forth, all of that dwindled off to the point where I am told now that of the military leadership, 10 percent or less has received training in the United States. Again, those relationships are not there and more of them have been trained in Islamic institutions.

I would ask your comments about that, but it is certainly my view that in the future, as we look forward and try to learn lessons from this past decade, that we would say we clearly need to engage them in the United States and we need to have them here and to talk about civilian control and to talk about the proper role of the military and relationships and, as well, have it such that our military leaders can easily contact them on a personal basis and try to understand better what is going on with a country that has been

a key ally in a tough situation. I would ask your response on that, whether we should be building and getting more involved in building those relationships with the Pakistani military.

Mr. INDERFURTH. We could not agree more. The best vehicle we have for that is the so-called IMET program, the International Military Education and Training program. It had been suspended since the Pressler amendment went into effect in 1990, as you said. We have lost touch with a generation of Pakistani military leaders.

The predecessor to General Musharraf was General Karamat who was a graduate of IMET. He is actually in the Leavenworth Hall of Fame. He went through that program. He rose to the top of the Pakistani military. He was removed by Prime Minister Sharif prior to General Musharraf assuming that position, and then Prime Minister Sharif tried to remove General Musharraf. I think you see a pattern developing here that gave the military some unease about its relations with the Sharif Government.

But we believe that IMET should be restored. Actually under the authorities granted in your legislation last year, IMET was restored for India and Pakistan following the nuclear tests. Unfortunately, Pakistan was not able to take advantage of that because of other provisions of law. They were behind in their debt repayments, so they were not able to take advantage this year of IMET.

But we would like to see that done. We believe that we need to have relations with the Pakistani military, and for precisely the reasons that you suggested, to have both a personal rapport with and also to try to influence their direction. It has in the past been a Western oriented military. There is clearly now a greater degree of influence of some of the Islamic parties and schooling, and to some degree Western orientation may be coming into question. So, I think we do need to resume, as much as we can, that kind of relationship.

Senator BROWNBACK. My fear is we may have missed our opportunity because of so much fomenting and turmoil that is taking place in that region of the world. Whether or not they will be willing to reengage with the United States—I hope they will, and I am glad you share my view on this.

I want to take you to General Musharraf. Does the administration expect that he will establish martial law? Do you have any indication of what he may do in the near future?

Mr. INDERFURTH. We do not have any indication. It is very clear, though, that what he is hearing from us and, indeed, other countries around the world is that martial law or a military government would lead to certain consequences for Pakistan, which I hope that he will not want to incur. Pakistan is quite dependent upon international financial assistance through the IMF. There is a tranche of IMF funding of \$280 million that is now under consideration for Pakistan. The Director of the IMF, Mr. Camdessus, said yesterday in Paris that he was not certain whether the fund could offer assistance to Pakistan after the military takeover.

That, combined with I would expect be a concern on his part of international isolation for a military government for martial law—I would hope these things would influence him to move quickly to restore democracy, to see a civilian government established, hope-

fully according to constitutional practices. He has been in consultation apparently with constitutional experts there.

So, we do not have any indication which direction he is moving. He has taken longer than expected to make his announcement. General Musharraf led us to believe with his first announcement 2 nights ago that his next announcement would be about what his plans were—that his intentions would be known very soon. We hope that the fact that he has not spoken is an indication that he is getting good advice and that he is looking at ways to restore a civilian government very quickly.

Senator BROWNBAC. What are his options if he does not establish martial law? What do you see as his options?

Mr. INDERFURTH. If he does not establish?

Senator BROWNBAC. Yes.

Mr. INDERFURTH. There are a variety of ways that he could see a civilian government established. I think in terms of speculation, the one that is probably at the top of the list right now is for him to turn power over to a civilian government headed by technocrats, in other words, non-political Pakistani leaders that could head a caretaker government for a period of time, 6 months to a year, and then elections being held. Now, we would want to see elections held much sooner than that if that is the direction that he is going. We want to see, as I said, elections held soon. We want to see a civilian government. We want to see constitutional practices restored.

But again, all of this is speculation right now. We have not been approached by anyone affiliated with General Musharraf to sound out any ideas. We hope again that Ambassador Milam will be able to meet with him and, as the President said, find out his intentions.

Senator BROWNBAC. I was just handed a note here that the International Monetary Fund, which last year negotiated a \$1.6 billion loan to Pakistan, announced an immediate cutoff of that loan until democracy is restored.

Mr. INDERFURTH. Well, again, that is what I was referring to in terms of the statements made yesterday in Paris by the Managing Director, Mr. Camdessus. What is up next in terms of that \$1.6 billion package is this \$280 million third tranche that has been held up since July, and it has been held up since July because of Pakistan's lack of compliance with agreed economic conditions. Now, that lack of compliance, combined with events this week—I would expect that that third tranche would be held up longer while they, and indeed while we, look at our support for that.

Senator BROWNBAC. How do you evaluate current threats of broader violence, sectarian violence, in Pakistan? Do you think these latest developments in Pakistan will affect this threat?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Well, as I mentioned in my statement, there has been an increase in sectarian violence. With respect to the events this week, again the situation does appear to be calm. This has not been an occasion where people have taken to the streets in opposition to what has taken place or indeed in celebration. It has been calm.

I think our reading at this stage is that there is no reason to believe that during this waiting period that there should be any further increase or outbreak of sectarian violence or indeed, and per-

haps more importantly, in terms of our look at foreign relations, any increase in tension between India and Pakistan. The new government of Prime Minister Vajpayee, which has just been sworn in, as you know, has adopted a very cautious, low-key approach to the situation. It is watching it closely. It is taking certain precautionary steps, but that would be normal under these circumstances.

Prime Minister Vajpayee has made it clear that he is ready, willing, and able to return to a dialog with Pakistan on their outstanding differences. We hope that there will be a government in Islamabad that can respond to that offer as soon as possible.

Senator BROWNBACK. I want to take you to the relationship with India, where we have a new leadership in Pakistan. General Musharraf appears to have been responsible for the actions in Kargil earlier this year. Do you draw anything out of that? Do you have any intelligence to tell us whether or not he would, because of that background and history, renew hostilities toward India?

Mr. INDERFURTH. I would certainly hope not. We agree with your assessment that the Pakistani military, headed by General Musharraf, was an active proponent of the Kargil incursion that took place. It was approved, we also believe, at the highest level of the civilian authorities, including Prime Minister Sharif, and we do believe that it was a mistake.

A brief digression. You had asked whether or not you thought it might be possible to have seen a negotiated settlement for Kargil as opposed to the meeting that took place at Blair House with President Clinton and Prime Minister Sharif. We think that what was done on July 4 was the right approach. Prime Minister Sharif, I think, realized that the situation had grown quite dangerous with India. The Indian military was, indeed, progressively retaking those positions across the line of control, and the fighting did have the potential for escalating either by calculation or miscalculation.

Prime Minister Sharif got in touch with President Clinton and said, I would like to see you. I would like to talk to you about this. And the President made it clear that he would expect the Pakistani Government to take steps immediately to restore the line of control, to restore the sanctity of the line of control, which would mean those forces withdrawing.

Prime Minister Sharif came here. They did meet throughout the day on the 4th of July, and he did return and he saw that decision taken. That brought this crisis to a close, which in our view was very important. It saved lives and it also meant that the possibility of it escalating was not there.

So, a negotiated settlement would have required the Indians to sit down with the Pakistanis. That would have been the negotiation. They were in no mood to negotiate what they saw as not only an incursion by Pakistani supported forces, but also a betrayal, in their words, of the spirit of the Lahore summit where the two sides, two Prime Ministers, had agreed to resolve all outstanding issues, including Kashmir, peacefully. And just a few weeks later, Kargil occurred.

So, I do not believe that there was any room there for negotiation. We had hoped there would be a decision to rectify what we believe was a mistake and then get the two parties back together.

That is why the President said that with that restoration of the line of control, he would work very hard and he would have a personal interest in an intensification and acceleration of their bilateral efforts to resolve their outstanding differences. Unfortunately, now with these events this week in Islamabad, we are unclear about when that bilateral effort by the two countries can resume.

Senator BROWNBACK. Let me ask you if the international community presses hard again on Pakistan with what has taken place in the military coup and our law kicks in, the section 508, with this, will we be forcing Pakistan into a closer relationship with countries like Afghanistan, other ones that have taken a lot of international condemnation, yet domestically appear to be willing to take that? I wonder about the effects of some of this, just as we look down the road. I am not advocating one way or the other, but I would like to hear your informed view of the likely effects of what that would do to General Musharraf in his efforts in leading his nation.

Mr. INDERFURTH. Well, it is not our hope or intention to see Pakistan further isolated. We want to, as I believe you do, work with them to address these issues. We certainly do not want to push them any closer to Afghanistan and the Taliban, and indeed we want to work with them on Afghanistan to try to address—and I mentioned that in my testimony. We have many concerns in Afghanistan today, some that we have talked about with you in this committee, including terrorism, including human rights, including narcotics trafficking. All of these are the spill-over effects of Afghanistan. We need Pakistan's help on that. We do not need to see Pakistan walled off and unreachable in terms of their engagement.

I think that it is very clear from what we are saying here—and I am sure what will be reported in Islamabad—that General Musharraf and his colleagues will recognize that certain fundamental choices will need to be made about whether or not there will be a return to democracy, whether or not there will be a restoration of a civilian government, how that will be accomplished.

I would rather hope that that will take place than start to discuss all the dire consequences if it does not. They have heard enough about U.S. sanctions. We have sanctioned them with so many different pieces of legislation. Section 508 will barely add to that, if at all. They proved in their pursuit of a nuclear capability that that was more important to them than getting out from under the Pressler sanctions in 1990. Let us hope that we do not have to go down that road. We should know that, I think, fairly soon.

Senator BROWNBACK. I would hope too that we do not have to go down that road. I am sitting here. I am very troubled as I try to look two or three steps ahead in the chess game and speculate what takes place or try to anticipate then how somebody else then moves. There has been a lot of discussion amongst people that I have met with and experts and others talking about the blow-back effect from Afghanistan into Pakistan. If that is truly happening and if the military has grown more Islamist in its orientation and thinking, I truly worry about the sort of consequences that could be set up by further isolation. I know we share that concern. I want to give voice to it.

I also want to say really to Pakistan we want to be rightly related with them. We do not want to have a full set of sanctions

against this nation. We want to work closely with them. It is not any of our desire whatsoever to press them into a deeper dependency or working relationship, however, you might put it, with a nation like Afghanistan and the Taliban. It would have dire consequences on us, I would think, as well. You would agree that it would have significant repercussions right next door to its neighbor on India if that happened as well. Would you agree with that?

Mr. INDERFURTH. I would.

Senator BROWNBAC. They are difficult things to contemplate, and yet you can almost see the setup of various of the pieces there, the potential, for those sort of things which we had not thought even really much in the potential category. The seeds actually exist for the possibility of those to happen if we do not handle these types of situations with one of an open hand and not so much a closed fist. So, while our own rules and laws put into place a certain set of sanctions, I hope our communications are one of encouragement in trying to work with them to get back to a constitutionally established government quickly and that we would be willing to engage with them broadly in ways that would be very positive if we can get through that period of time.

Mr. INDERFURTH. Well, I think that that will be very much our approach, and I think Ambassador Milam in his message will approach it in that fashion. We are not going there with a dictat. Pakistan has never, nor will it ever, respond to dictats from the United States or any other country. We are also not going there for the purpose of interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs. That is something that we have been charged with at various times, and that is not something that we intend to do. We do believe that these issues are ones that the Pakistanis themselves must address and resolve, but at the same time, we do believe that issues of civil liberties, of constitutional practices, of democracy are ones that we need to speak out about and to urge that these things be followed.

There is no question that the direction of Pakistan in recent years, despite the interruptions, has been toward greater democracy, toward trying to find a way to express itself through the ballot box, through elections, through civil society, through the growth of non-governmental organizations. But it is still a difficult process and there are still setbacks, some of which, as I said earlier, have occurred not just from opposition to government but by government itself.

So, we will certainly approach our task in the way that you have suggested and we hope that we will have a favorable response.

Senator BROWNBAC. Mr. Secretary, one last question I would like to ask you. One point that I had raised in my statement was that by our disengagement with Pakistan, we have actually made them more dependent on the nuclear capacity. I would like your thoughts as to whether or not the U.S. could have been in contribution actually to Pakistan's dependence on the nuclear option by our failure to work with them, as we have in the past, on conventional military forces, as we had previously but that has been cutoff in recent years. Have we contributed to their dependence on nuclear options?

Mr. INDERFURTH. Well, the Pakistani officials that we meet with, both those in government and those out of government, have made

the point for a very long time that the imposition of the Pressler amendment, by cutting off our military supply relationship, forced them to have a greater reliance on pursuing the nuclear option. They say that the conventional balance was so disrupted with India that it directed their energies, even to a higher degree, to attaining and acquiring a nuclear capability. This is very, very unfortunate.

And it is for that reason that we have been trying, as you well know, over the past number of months with Deputy Secretary Talbott in the lead, to have very in-depth discussions with Pakistani as well as Indian officials on security and nonproliferation concerns and what those concerns are from their point of view and what can be done about them.

But it seems that every time we start getting closer to an appreciation of their views, or closer to being granted new authorities to waive sanctions—through the legislation that we have discussed—or closer to some breakthrough in relations between India and Pakistan, like the Lahore summit—every time we get closer to some kind of better understanding and perhaps better relationship, something like this occurs. So, we keep going back to square one.

We recognize the views of Pakistani officials on this issue, and we hope at some point that we will be able to find some way to see these concerns addressed.

Senator BROWNBACK. I hope we shall, and if nothing else, we can learn from our mistakes in the past and not repeat them in the future.

Secretary Inderfurth, again, thank you very much for coming up, particularly on such notice and on a very important matter.

The record will remain open for 3 days if there are other additions you would like to put into the record or if other members want to put additions into the record.

With that, thank you. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

