[Senate Hearing 106-402]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-402
EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE OVERSEAS PRESENCE REVIEW PANEL
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 10, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-155CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Kaden, Lewis, Chairman, Overseas Presence Advisory Panel,
Washington, D.C.; Accompanied by Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.,
USN (RET.), Member, Overseas Presence Advisory Panel; and Hon.
Langhorne A. Motley, Member, Overseas Presence Advisory Panel.. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
(iii)
EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE OVERSEAS PRESENCE REVIEW PANEL
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Operations,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:32 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Rod Grams, chairman of the
subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Grams and Sarbanes.
Senator Grams. Well, good afternoon, gentlemen. They have
not given me a gavel. I do not think they trust me with a
heavy, blunt object. But I will just knock here and we will
bring this hearing to order.
Thank you very much for being here. First, I'd like to
welcome our witnesses today: Mr. Kaden, who is Chairman of the
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel; Admiral Crowe who, in
addition to serving on this panel, chaired the State Department
Accountability Review Board following the terrorist bombings of
the American embassies in East Africa; and also Ambassador
Motley, a member of the panel as well.
The list of accomplishments of each of these witnesses is
so long that let me state for the record that we have a very
distinguished panel whose combined expertise in military,
economic, and diplomatic affairs is out of the ordinary even
for this committee.
The panel's mission was to find creative solutions to
enhance the way the United States projects its nonmilitary
presence abroad, and I believe you have done so. Your report
details the failure of our current structure to effectively
manage and finance our overseas presence and recommends eight
categories of far-reaching changes. Now, I look forward to
hearing about those today.
Much of the media attention on the report is focused on the
poor condition of many of our overseas posts. The folding chair
embassy in Kiev, which is so crowded that employees must fold
their chairs to get to their desks, the consular shack in
Moscow to shelter visa applications because they could not be
accommodated in the embassy, and the trailer staff in Angola
who have worked in it for 8 years I think is unacceptable, as
is the outdated and incompatible information technology that
our overseas personnel are forced to put up with. And as the
report notes, we do not have an Internet-based network which
connects all agencies and posts, and many employees find the
best way to communicate with colleagues in Washington, D.C. is
from their home computers.
Now, I believe that overcrowding and the lack of
information technology are merely symptoms of longstanding
failure to foster a culture of flexibility and innovation and
develop a coherent interagency platform that would allow us to
respond effectively to changing foreign policy priorities.
I am not surprised by the shortcomings described in this
report. I have held hearings which have underscored these very
problems and neither, I am sure, does the General Accounting
Office, which has completed numerous studies on management
weaknesses and program risks at the State Department. But you
have done a great service in raising the public profile of
these issues in recommending very constructive changes.
Now, to date, the State Department has resisted calls to
fundamentally change the way it does business. Hopefully, the
Secretary of State's response to your report spurs a top-to-
bottom review of our overseas foreign policy apparatus.
Now, while I do have some questions concerning some of your
recommendations, I appreciate that we are not suggesting we
just throw more money at the problem. There is no doubt that a
robust U.S. presence throughout the world will require
continued and possibly increased resources. However, the panel
points out clearly that these resources must be allocated in a
different manner. More funding, if spent in the same way, will
not be adequate. We need to reform the methods by which we
operate overseas to reflect and accommodate a more complex
environment.
Also, as the report notes, we now have around 30 different
agencies with personnel stationed abroad whose activities are
not adequately coordinated. We need our foreign relations to be
conducted at the highest level of integration and coordination
and the highest level of representation of the sovereign
interests of this country and the American people. We must
ensure that our influence is used to advance the national
interest and to ensure respect for American leadership abroad.
National prestige is reinforced and enhanced when we operate
with a coherent, concise, and understandable foreign policy. It
is undercut when we are crippled by competing fiefdoms.
I want to underscore that one of your main tasks was to
determine how the U.S. Government could provide greater
security for its overseas personnel in the face of budget
restraints and increasing demands on our posts abroad. Now, I
have looked into the mistakes that we made in the past, and I
am committed to making sure that they do not happen in the
future.
Now, our embassies are not vulnerable because we lack
security requirements; they are vulnerable because over three-
quarters of our embassies had those requirements waived. I
understand that when the Inman-inspired security standards were
put forward in the 1980's, a number of existing embassies did
not meet the criteria. But I was surprised to find that many of
the embassies, built and purchased since that time, still do
not meet the Inman standards either.
My bill, which is now included in the State Department
authorization bill, takes an approach which is compatible, I
believe, to the findings in your report; and I would be
interested in your views about high level accountability and
collocation which have met with opposition from State.
Now, let me thank you once again for the sacrifices that
you have made to serve on this panel. I appreciate the time and
the effort that you have devoted to serve the best interests of
our country, and I look forward to working with you to push for
an overhaul of our overseas presence. I hope you will keep an
interest in this area for the long haul because I guarantee
that we will need to combine forces to eliminate the turf wars
and the bureaucratic resistance that will accompany any kind of
a push or any kind of an effort at reform. So again, gentlemen,
I want to thank you very much for your work.
I would like to now turn to the panel, and if you have any
opening statements, the committee would like to hear them now.
Mr. Kaden.
STATEMENT OF LEWIS KADEN, CHAIRMAN, OVERSEAS PRESENCE ADVISORY
PANEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.; ACCOMPANIED BY ADMIRAL WILLIAM J.
CROWE, JR., USN (RET.), MEMBER, OVERSEAS PRESENCE ADVISORY
PANEL; AND HON. LANGHORNE A. MOTLEY, MEMBER, OVERSEAS PRESENCE
ADVISORY PANEL
Mr. Kaden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted a
statement for the record. I will just make a few points as we
begin our dialog. We greatly appreciate your convening this
hearing and the opportunity to discuss our panel's report with
you. Let me just emphasize a few points from the report, and
they echo themes in your statement.
First, we make the observation--I think with some
determination--that the activities, the functions performed by
America's representatives overseas are extremely important.
They face an array of challenges, an agenda that increases in
scope and complexity on a regular basis. The old days of
diplomats interacting with their government counterparts and
taking their time to write an analysis of political or economic
developments in the country in which they serve is long past.
Today, as markets open, as political systems open, our
representatives need to be on the ground aggressively
interacting with the civil society, as well as the government
in which they serve. And they face a daunting array of issues
from global environmental and trade alliances, combatting drug
traffic, terrorism, spreading disease, to dealing with the more
traditional challenges of political and economic matters.
Unfortunately, as our report also concludes, this is an
area in which the Government stands in need of great
improvement. This system is perilously close to breakdown, to
failure. And it is not a product of inattention in the last few
years. These are problems that have grown up over several
decades through several administrations. Just as our panel was
entirely bipartisan and included not only Admiral Crowe and
Ambassador Motley, but leaders from the business community, the
labor community, people who had served in Government over many
administrations, so too these problems of neglect and
inattention to the quality of management practices, of
organization, of resources, of systems are the product of many
years of allowing this system to deteriorate.
But the net result is, as your statement indicated,
facilities that are inadequate and dilapidated, technology that
is outmoded, skill set and training and human resource
practices that do not meet the standards of first-class
organizations in both the public and the private sector,
security measures that leave our representatives more
vulnerable than they need to be to the threats that are in fact
part of their life, part of the responsibilities they have
undertaken.
In response to that assessment of the condition of our
overseas presence and the importance of those activities, our
panel has put forward, as you indicate, an array of reforms and
improvements we recommend. We do not think these are pie in the
sky or difficult to achieve. Most of them are the nuts and
bolts of how to administer these activities better, how to
organize our resources in the most efficient manner, how to
improve the skill set and quality, how to make use of the
talent and resources of people who seek public service in
representing the United States overseas.
I might add that this is not the State Department alone.
The State Department has the lead responsibility in this area,
and they have some serious shortcomings to address. But it is
really, as the report says, a responsibility of the U.S.
Government as a whole. These problems grew up as a result of
decisions and inattention to organizational and management
practices throughout the Government and they need to be
addressed in the same way. Representatives come from 30
agencies, and it will require an effort from all those agencies
to address it.
That is why, after going through these reforms--and we can
talk more about them in our colloquy--we suggest that the most
important recommendation we make is on implementation. Moving
forward on the improvements needed in our system of organizing
resources and activities overseas requires, in our view, a
partnership between the Congress and the administration. It
requires leadership from the President, because many of these
activities do cross agency lines. Only the President has the
capacity to get all the agencies of the Government onto the
same technology platform. He will need the help of Congress in
doing that, but only the strength from the center, only the
President's leadership, can address a circumstance that, as we
say, is a disgrace and an embarrassment.
The fact that if you work for the FBI, you cannot
communicate to the office next door with a person representing
the State Department or the intelligence community or the
Defense Department, much less back to your agencies at home and
across those lines to those whom you serve back at home and
around the world is a shortcoming that no quality organization
in the world accepts, no private sector business operating in
many countries.
I am part of a law firm of only a few hundred lawyers and
we take for granted that we have the degree of communication
capacity with our offices in Asia and Europe, as well as in the
United States and with our 50 most important clients. Now, that
is a product of technological developments in the last few
years, but it is incumbent on the Government, as it is on other
organizations, to keep pace with that measure of change.
Finally, we think that this partnership can come about on a
bipartisan basis. These are issues of good government that
transcend the kind of policy differences that we all occupy
ourselves with in other times. And we are hopeful that during
the rest of 1999 and the year 2000, if the President and the
Secretary of State join with Members of Congress, including
this committee, we can create some momentum behind these
improvements.
They will not all happen overnight. Some of them do require
resources, but as you indicate in your statement, this is not a
report for which the basic theme is give us more money, give us
more resources. What this says is the Government is not doing a
good job of managing their resources made available to it. If
they would do a better job through this partnership with the
Congress, we believe more support will be forthcoming in those
areas where investment is necessary for technology, for capital
improvements, for security, for training.
We also suggest that significant savings can be achieved to
offset those investments in the area of downsizing, of reducing
the size of some posts where there are simply too many people.
If we give our people the right talents, the right tools, the
right facilities, the right degree of security, we can do this
job more effectively and more efficiently with fewer people in
many of the posts around the world. There may be some posts
where more resources are needed, but we think we can do the job
more effectively with a significantly leaner and more agile and
better equipped force.
Those are the principal themes of our report, and once
again, we welcome the opportunity to discuss the
recommendations with you.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Kaden. As I noted,
your written statement will also be entered into the record in
its entirety.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kaden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lewis Kaden
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am
pleased to appear before you to discuss the report of the Overseas
Presence Advisory Panel, released last Friday, November 5.
Secretary of State Albright's charge to the Panel when we were
established last February was to prepare a report and recommend
criteria for the ``location, size, and composition of overseas posts.''
We were also to consider ``multi-year funding programs for the
Department'' of State. The principal factors we were to take into
consideration were (a) foreign policy responsibilities, (b) security,
and (c) budget.
Our Panel had 25 members, including serving and former ambassadors;
senior representatives from AID, CIA, and Justice; former members of
Congress; and representatives from business, non-governmental
organizations, labor, and academia.
We visited 23 posts overseas, a mix of small, medium, and large. We
talked to hundreds of people at post and here in Washington. To learn
from previous efforts and to avoid reinventing the wheel, we hired
consultants to review the existing literature, such as previous
studies, articles, speeches, and books. We also looked at the best
practices of multinational corporations and the human resource
practices of other governments operating overseas.
The Panel had 10 main findings:
1. Universality: To advance U.S. national interests overseas,
there is no substitute for face-to-face, day-to-day contact.
Our on-the-ground presence is more critical than ever before.
2. Security: Thousands of our employees abroad continue to
face an unacceptable level of risk from terrorism and other
threats.
3. Rationale for America's Overseas Presence: An extensive
overseas presence is vital to our efforts to ensure the
security and prosperity of the American people. Our posts are
both the vehicles to provide the ``traditional'' functions of
diplomatic work (such as managing bilateral relations and
building alliances) and the instruments for advancing less
traditional foreign policy priorities (such as building
democratic institutions and protecting the environment).
4. Interagency coordination: While some 30 executive branch
agencies operate out of our diplomatic missions, there is no
rational interagency system for determining the size, shape,
and goals of our overseas presence. The ability of Ambassadors
to run their missions is undermined by their lack of control
over the resources and personnel ostensibly working under them.
5. Presidential and Congressional leadership: The involvement
of both the President and the Congress is essential in
designing and funding our overseas presence.
6. Resources: ``Rightsizing'' the U.S. Government's overseas
presence would likely result in some missions becoming smaller
and the resources of all agencies operating overseas being
distributed differently than they now are. Resulting budget
savings to the entire U.S. Government would help support the
necessary additional investments in technology, security, and
training the Panel calls for.
7. People and human resources policies: We found talented and
dedicated staff struggling to meet the demands of an expanded
foreign policy agenda, with competition from the private sector
and hardship associated with overseas service threatening to
deplete the U.S. Government's talent pool. Personnel policies
must give more weight to family considerations and adopt best
practices for recruiting, training, evaluating, promoting, and
retaining talented people.
8. Information technology and knowledge management: Our
missions abroad are ill-equipped with antiquated, inefficient,
and incompatible information technology systems.
9. Capital needs and facilities management: Our employees
abroad in many places work in appalling conditions. In our
travels, we found worn, overcrowded, and inefficient
facilities. Many missions need significant capital improvements
to ensure security, improve working conditions, and equip
personnel with efficient and secure information and
telecommunications technologies.
10. Dangers of inaction: All of the findings I have listed
together threaten to cripple America's overseas presence, with
serious consequences to our Nation.
To remedy the situation, the Panel developed recommendations in
eight general areas. The most important ones are:
First, the Panel endorsed the security recommendations of the
Accountability Review Boards that looked at the 1998 Africa embassy
bombings, including support for the funding implications of required
security upgrades. Our own recommendations focused on actions that
would create a pro-security mindset among overseas personnel and
establish clear-cut identification of responsibility and
accountability.
Second, the President should establish by Executive Order a
permanent Interagency Overseas Presence Committee, to be chaired by the
Secretary of State with membership drawn from those agencies with
presence overseas. The Committee would:
Review the existing location, size, and composition of all
posts and make changes accordingly. Significant savings to the
entire U.S. Government should be achieved though this right-
sizing process.
Use a uniform decision-making matrix to ensure consistency
with goals and objectives.
Be innovative in the use of one-person posts and other
structures that stretch taxpayer resources and enhance
security.
The Committee would also have a technology subcommittee whose
immediate task would be to produce within 12 to 18 months an
integrated, secure, unclassified Intranet and Internet facility at all
posts for all personnel and with proper links back to the relevant
Washington agencies. Within 18 to 36 months, the subcommittee would do
the same for the classified environment.
Third, the President and the Congress should establish an Overseas
Facilities Authority (OFA) to replace the existing Foreign Buildings
Office in the Department of State. The Secretary of State would chair
the OFA and the Board of Directors would include representatives of
agencies with presence overseas. The OFA would:
Finance, design, build, lease, and maintain official and
residential facilities overseas pursuant to guidance from the
Interagency Overseas Presence Committee.
Have the authority to charge and collect rent from all
agencies, and borrow long-term capital from the Federal
Financing Bank.
Operate like a ``performance-based organization'' to ensure
attracting the best people and allowing for the most innovative
practices in that industry.
The Panel also made a number of recommendations for specific
improvements in the areas of human resources and training, consular
services, administrative practices, and an enhanced role for
ambassadors.
The Panel's work is done. Each member, however, feels very strongly
that our report must not become just one more study that gets filed
away on the shelf. We urge the President, you in the Congress, the
Secretary of State, and other heads of departments and agencies with a
stake in our overseas activities to act promptly to make the changes we
have put forward. What we have proposed is eminently doable--it simply
requires the will to carry the recommendations out.
Thank you very much. I would be pleased to respond to any questions
you might have.
Senator Grams. I might as well start out with the first
question to you, Mr. Kaden. The Congress has stressed
repeatedly that the State Department fundamentally needs to
change as an institution to meet the requirements of conducting
our foreign policy. The Overseas Presence Advisory Panel has
made some recommendations that are consistent with those made
by the Congress, such as the use of best practices, increased
reliance on technology, as you have mentioned, greater
interagency cooperation and also in cost sharing.
Now, given the lack of responsiveness to the Congress on
these issues, do you have any reason to believe or what would
lead you to believe that the State Department will take the
recommendations in this report and make those required changes?
Mr. Kaden. Well, I am comparatively new to this area, so
it permits me a degree of optimism that some of my colleagues
might not share. But I have discussed just that issue at length
with the Secretary of State, with other leaders in the
administration, and I am hopeful that in response to this
report you will see some energy and momentum generated from the
administration on some of these reforms. I know that Secretary
Albright has set up some working groups since Friday in
response to the report, and I know too that the senior staff in
the White House is busy evaluating it and considering what
their next steps are. So, I am hopeful that we will see the
kind of momentum that I think is necessary.
I am hopeful too that they will involve the congressional
leadership in that process. This ought to be a shared
enterprise. All of us have a stake in doing the job better, and
even though very few of our recommendations require legislative
action, I think the task of reform is one that should be
undertaken on a partnership basis.
Senator Grams. Admiral Crowe, would you add anything to
that?
Admiral Crowe. Well, I am hopeful likewise. I associate
myself very closely with the report and certainly with the
remarks of Mr. Kaden.
I was particularly pleased that the report supported the
review board's findings on security. I must say, in all
fairness, that the history of security reports and
investigations is not encouraging as to whether we are going to
get the kind of attention we need and whether people will truly
respond.
I would hope that the Congress takes this so seriously that
they not only respond in terms of limiting money and so forth.
It has always intrigued me that every year in the last few
years our foreign policy funds are going down, but the Congress
gives no direction as to what part of the ambitious foreign
policy we have they would like to scale back or what they would
like to do. I think when Mr. Kaden talks about a partnership,
that it would be very helpful if they got into those kinds of
things. If they are going to govern the budget and be very
tight fiscally, then they are going to have to get into the
substance of foreign policy as well as just the fiscal outline
of it.
In security this year, we have been pleased with some of
the things that took place. I think the final conference is
about $568 million for security, which is certainly a great
deal more than the administration originally funded or
requested. On the other hand, only $314 million of that is for
structures and building structures. That is less than 50
percent of what the State Department feels they can handle, and
it is about one-third of what we recommended.
Of course, in our situation on security, I think the real
proof of the pudding is going to be in the next 8 or 9 years,
whether the level of interest will remain high and whether they
are really concerned. The past has shown that things peak,
people are very sensitized, but in a matter of 12 months or 18
months, they are back to business as usual.
Senator Grams. Do you think things have dimmed since the
bombings in our African embassies?
Admiral Crowe. I am sorry?
Senator Grams. Do you think that type of urgency has dimmed
since the bombings in Africa?
Admiral Crowe. I do not think there is any question about
it. I am not so sure it has fallen that far.
Senator Grams. But the urgency is not being felt as it was
a year ago.
Admiral Crowe. We were full of very fine rhetoric for
about 3 months there, particularly when we were seeing
television coverage of the devastation, but the interest level
has fallen down. I am very worried about it.
Senator Grams. Well, we have two hopefuls. Mr. Motley,
would you want to agree or----
Ambassador Motley. Yes. I think your question, the way you
postured it, is a legitimate question based certainly upon
previous happenings.
I tell you what I think we are talking about is two things.
One is obviously a change, and more fundamental change than
jumps out at you unless you really work at this stuff.
And the second thing is it is more than just the State
Department. We are talking about really a fundamental change in
how we operate overseas. If you would allow me, let me just
take you quickly through why the findings created a void and
our recommendations follow a pattern.
What we have today is an interagency process that deals
with policy, and it works reasonably well. It is called the
National Security Council. All the agencies get in there and
they hammer it out and get it done in different ways. That is
here in Washington.
Overseas the structure is you have an ambassador and
country teams, and they work fairly well, absent the problems,
the challenges of facilities and communications, but still they
work fairly well.
Now, what we are really talking about to focus on is not a
policy. We are talking about everything else. We are talking
about the structure that supports and provides for that. We are
talking about the back room. There is no interagency structure
in Washington to handle it. There are a couple of very good
reasons. It is not sexy. It is not a crisis. It is does not
have to be handled right away. But overseas you have it in the
country teams. They have to get together to make it work.
The void is between the platforms overseas and the
interagency process in Washington. If you look at our
recommendations, they follow a pattern to fill that void. One
of the first things we said is that there is a national foreign
affairs strategic plan. It is made in a State Department
document. It has been somewhat consulted, but not vetted
throughout the other 30 agencies, nor is it approved by the
President. So, that is the first thing. You need to have a
policy framework. What are our objectives and our priorities
overseas? Once you establish that, then the rest of our
recommendations flow very well. If you do that, then where
should you be, in what number, and how?
And that is the reason for preparing the Locations
Interagency Committee that will decide. This is something new.
The State Department, to a large degree, has all decided this.
But these people have a right to be at the table, these other
30 agencies.
Then how do you build them, how do you maintain them, and
the rest of it is the major, I think, centerpiece of our
recommendations, the Overseas Facilities Authority, and with
it, the Technology Subcommittee Interagency. Because what
happens today, each one of the departments goes to their
respective congressional appropriators, and they get different
types of money to do some of the same things. AID has certain
people that support them, the CIA, others, Department of
Defense. So, you have at once the Department of Defense
establishing a very good, nonclassified e-mail system, the CIA
is doing the same sort of thing, and the State Department. What
is lacking is one system--it is not rocket science--that they
can all get together with to save the stewardship of the
taxpayers' resources and make it work.
So, that is the void I think that we are trying to fill. It
is a huge change. There are problems. There are some people who
say you take away from the Secretary of State's prerogatives. I
do not think we have done that, but that is an issue that needs
to be looked at.
So, just amplifying on that, I think you are right. But I
think it is change and it touches more than just the State
Department.
Senator Grams. So, is that a hopeful?
Ambassador Motley. Yes. Hope springs eternal. We have all
seen the system. One of my partners was 20 years in the Foreign
Service, and he says that every year they say things are worse
than the last year and he says, they are right every year. So,
I think, yes, it is a question--we have to do something,
otherwise our presence overseas becomes a secondary asset.
Senator Grams. Mr. Kaden, the Overseas Presence Advisory
Panel recommends that the Secretary of State designate the
Deputy Secretary as the individual responsible for taking
charge of security of U.S. posts overseas, while the
Accountability Review Board recommended that the Secretary of
State should be the primary leader responsible for the security
of our U.S. embassies. Now, understanding that the Deputy
Secretary would be responsible for the day-to-day
implementation of security concerns, do you think that this
recommendation contradicts the intent of the ARB's conclusion
that the Secretary must become more engaged in the issue of
embassy security?
Mr. Kaden. No. I think we were careful in this report to
indicate our full support for all parts of the ARB
recommendation, but particularly for its views on
accountability. It is the Secretary's responsibility. He or she
must take that responsibility and be accountable for it.
Our suggestion with respect to the deputy, as your question
indicated, was that there needs to be someone with the day-to-
day responsibility for implementation, and because of the
importance of that function and the extent to which it cuts
across program and policy and administrative lines in the
overseas activities of the government, we thought the
appropriate person was the Deputy Secretary. Obviously, there
is a role to play for other officials at other levels, the
Under Secretary for Management, the Assistant Secretary for
Diplomatic Security, and many from other agencies as well. But
we thought clear lines of managerial responsibility were a good
idea and entirely consistent with the ARB report.
Senator Grams. Mr. Motley.
Ambassador Motley. It was a subject we discussed, and we
had two members from the ARB. Dr. Davis also was on our
committee. So, that kind of interchange was good.
In my view what we are really looking at is we are not
trying to take away from the law where the fundamental
responsibility lies with the Secretary. What we are trying to
do is establish a CEO/COO type of thing and put in one place
above the other under secretaries who may have policy issues,
who may have security interests, who may have others, one
person as the COO where the buck stops. That was the intent.
Admiral Crowe. Mr. Chairman, could I add to that? I think
what the Accountability Review Board was really getting at when
they fingered the Secretary is we felt one of the great
problems--and it is a problem of long standing and is probably
at the root of our security problem--is that security is not
taken seriously by the professionals throughout the world. They
feel that it is somebody else's business. If you are going to
change that culture, if you are going to have everybody assume
some responsibility for security, that has got to stem from the
top. That has got to come right from the Secretary herself,
that security is a high priority, that I worry about it, that I
will look into it, I will be visiting, I will be doing this,
and I am sincerely committed to security. It was not our
suggestion that she personally would administer. She just is
overburdened in that regard. She has to have a point of
contact. We suggested a single point of contact to handle
security, but we were not suggesting that she run it all
herself. That would be a very unrealistic suggestion.
But it is important that she talk about security a lot, not
just once a month or something, that she talk about it a lot
and that she make sure that her feelings are conveyed
throughout the structure.
Senator Grams. Admiral, I would like to followup. After the
August terrorist bombings, in violation of State Department
guidelines, AID headquarters decided not to move its missions
in Kenya and Tanzania into the more secure embassy compounds
that are going to be built. AID only reversed itself after
hearing from the Congress and U.S. officials in Kenya and
Tanzania.
Now, when you were last before this committee, you
mentioned that you would support requiring a waiver of this
magnitude to be made by the Secretary of State. Do you still
believe that this would be the case?
Admiral Crowe. I am not quite sure what you are getting
at. That the waiver must be----
Senator Grams. Right. AID only reversed itself after----
Admiral Crowe. I understand that.
Senator Grams.--the Congress and everything else. When you
testified before this committee last, you mentioned that you
would support requiring a waiver of this magnitude to be made
by the Secretary of State.
Admiral Crowe. Absolutely. I would still support that.
I would say, in all fairness to the AID organization in
Nairobi, that the temporary embassy moved into their building
immediately, and I am sure they were pretty sick of that after
a while, in all fairness.
But, no, I think that kind of decision should be made by
the Secretary. On the other hand, as Ambassador Motley has
said, the Secretary should make those decisions in Washington
in a coordinated fashion. That is what gets the Ambassador in
trouble all the time.
Ambassadors, if they are sensitive and if they have any
leadership experience, do not have trouble running the country
team, but what they do have trouble with is they cannot control
the composition of the country team, how many are there, what
agencies are sending who, and those decisions are imposed upon
them and they are made back here without vetting throughout the
structure. It would help the Ambassador a great deal if
Washington could tell him you will have so many of this, so
many of that, and so many of that. And nobody can play with
that without the higher officials here in Washington agreeing
to it.
But those kind of waivers should definitely come from the
Secretary.
Senator Grams. From the Secretary.
Admiral Crowe. Absolutely, because that is a philosophical
thing. We have got to decide right now, as we begin to rebuild,
if we get the money to rebuild, but if we are going to rebuild
and go to the campus format, to have an individual agency
change that or not cooperate with it, that is unacceptable.
That must go to the high level.
Ambassador Motley. Mr. Chairman, if I might.
Senator Grams. Mr. Motley.
Ambassador Motley. If you have an interagency committee to
do the overseas facilities, as we are suggesting, and you take
away a lot of these arguments about I do not want to be in this
building because I cannot do this and the rest of it, I totally
agree with you, collocating is, purely from a leadership and
management point of view, out of sight, out of mind. If you are
45 minutes away, you are not going to be going backward and
forwards in the offices. It can be done, and I think that by
creating this structure, we can get to that point that you are
talking about, the collocation.
In other words, if OFA was there, you probably would never
have had this problem that has just come up. It would have been
settled at that level prior to that.
Senator Grams. Mr. Kaden?
Mr. Kaden. Well, I would emphasize the point that
Ambassador Motley made. I think in terms of philosophy, the
view of the panel was that collocation is a good principle,
that it is part of creating a country team to have people
working together, working closely together, have as much
interaction among them as possible. And the campus concept
where it is practical is probably the right approach.
The interagency facility we suggest to take over the
responsibility of buildings, construction, and maintenance
would, as Ambassador Motley said, solve some of these problems.
One of its principal contributions is intended to be provide
more input, more participation for the agencies other than the
State Department who are major users of the platform. It goes
along with that that we suggest that it would rationalize the
decisionmaking on staffing if each of those agencies also paid
their fair share of the cost of space so that if you, for
example, were running the FBI making a decision about how much
resources you need in a particular country, you can take into
account the cost of providing work space and facilities for
those staff as well as the other costs associated with sending
them. So, the creation of this interagency Overseas Facility
Authority that we recommend solves several of those problems at
once.
Admiral Crowe. Well, Mr. Chairman, I might just comment,
in London we did not have a large foreign assistance program,
as some of these other embassies do, but we had 26 agencies and
they were all in the same building in the embassy. And that
greatly facilitated our communication and work and it enhanced
the position of the Ambassador as a country team leader, and it
worked very well.
Mr. Kaden. I think one of the views the panel felt
strongly about was the importance of upgrading skills, having
the right talent mix in a particular post, given the array of
challenging issues that that post faces. That ties into the
strategic plan or the mission priority plan. That is more
important than what agency they come from.
In other words, the old debates about whether it is good or
bad to have a separate commercial service, separate
agricultural service, we think to a great extent those
functions are working well. We saw a lot of examples of
effective functions being performed by the Agricultural
Service.
The important thing ought to be that each Ambassador can
identify the functions that need to be addressed and the best
talent available to him to address it.
One simple example: One of the lessons we heard over and
over again, coming out of the financial crisis the last few
years, was that the Government would have been well served if
it had devoted some additional resources to providing
assistance to countries entering market economy in building
their own institutional infrastructure, having the accounting
standards, and securities regulatory facilities, and bank
oversight. That kind of investment would have paid off, and it
is a relatively modest investment. But whether those personnel
came from Treasury or Commerce or the Foreign Service or the
Justice Department would in our view be less important. They
may come from all of those agencies if you take them on a
global basis. In any particular country, they may come from any
of them depending on where the skills are available to do the
task.
Senator Grams. We have been joined by Senator Sarbanes.
Senator, would you have a comment to make or a line of
questions?
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank the panel for submitting this
report in such a prompt manner on such a tight time table. I
think it is enormously helpful.
Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your calling this hearing
almost instantly upon the receipt of the report.
There are a couple of points I want to get at. First, I
want to get at what I regard as this perennial chestnut that
says, well, we do not need to put any more money in to solve
the problem, we just need to do all these other things. There
are lots of things that could be done, and there is always the
cry for more money. While I accept the proposition that there
are lots of things that could be done, if I were to tell you
flat out that there was not going to be any additional money,
no more resources, what would that do to the possibility of
achieving your various recommendations?
Mr. Kaden. Thank you, Senator. We have identified a number
of areas where additional investment and resources are needed.
The technological improvements that we suggest are going to
cost some money. Improvements in capital facilities and
security does have a cost. We have specified all of that.
Additional training. I think we have indicated when you add it
up, that comes in our view to $500 million to $600 million
above the current administration request based on the June
supplemental.
We have said at the same time, though----
Senator Sarbanes. Now, what about the $1.3 billion a year
on security? Is that in or out of that figure?
Mr. Kaden. That is in in the sense that our recommendation
of $1.3 billion for capital improvements and security compares
to about $900 million in the administration's June request. In
other words, in response to Admiral Crowe's report and some
legitimate pressure from Members of Congress to increase
resources for security, the administration made a supplemental
request that comes out on a normalized basis, after they ramp
up over a few years, to $900 million. We changed that $900
million in our recommendation to $1 billion and we add $300
million for maintenance, both current and deferred. When I say
$500 million to $600 million additional, that includes the
additional money for security, the additional funds for
technology and training.
But we also say that the right-sizing process that we
recommend, the interagency process to take a look at each post
and come up with a staffing pattern that matches mission
priorities, could produce significant savings. We drew that
encouragement in part from the comments of Ambassadors from
some of the large posts, including Admiral Crowe, based on his
service in London, Ambassador Rohatyn in Paris, Ambassador
Holbrooke in Bonn. Some of these posts, particularly the large
western European, posts have grown too large. They could do a
better job if they were leaner, faster moving, better equipped;
and there are some real savings there. Those resources can be
allocated to these areas of need.
Admiral Crowe. Well, Mr. Chairman, can I address that
question directly, though? From a security perspective, if
there is not going to be more money available in the out-years
or appropriated this year, you are not going to have safe
embassies anytime. You are going to continue to send people
overseas in harm's way, just as soldiers, just as sailors, just
as marines, without giving them a safe, reliable, and
reasonable environment. I look at it not as a foreign policy
issue. I look at it as a national security issue. If you are
going to send people overseas, then you should protect them.
Otherwise, do not send them.
But I hear nothing about, when the budget is cut, well, do
not send this or do not send that. But that is what you are
saying when you cut that budget, and if you do not give more
funds in security, that means we are not really interested in
saving lives.
Senator Sarbanes. Chairman Kaden, let me ask you this
question. You say in your executive summary, the panel supports
legislation proposed by the Office of Management and Budget to
allow the Department to keep an additional $500 million of the
consular fees it collects overseas in order to address critical
shortfalls in infrastructure, personnel systems, capital needs,
technology training, and other needs. Now, presumably on the
basis of the analysis you just gave me, that $500 million is
not encompassed within the figure you gave me. Is that correct?
Mr. Kaden. No. I think much of it is. Part of the thrust
of that recommendation is to provide a predictable flow of
funds. In other words, if Congress supported the Government
keeping those fees and applying them to the capital needs and
other requirements of the services the Government is providing,
it would support one of the goals of the report, to ensure
through all these measures more predictability in the flow of
capital funds so that one could engage in the planning process
to address security issues over a longer period of time without
having the degree of uncertainty that now sometimes applies.
Some of those additional fees are for new requirements that
we identified, but not all. And, to a considerable extent, the
$500 million is incorporated in the numbers we have been
talking about, the additional resources required, the $1.3
billion. Those are overlapping recommendations, not
incremental.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I want to make sure I understand
this, because I am having trouble with my math. You said $500
million to $600 million more was what you needed in terms of
extra money to do your recommendations. Is that correct?
Mr. Kaden. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes. You then said that included within that
was the additional security money which was $400 million of it
because you go from $900 million to $1.3 billion. Correct?
Mr. Kaden. That is right.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, that leaves another $100 million to
$200 million over and above that.
Mr. Kaden. And much of that would go----
Senator Sarbanes. But you have another recommendation that
talks about leaving $500 million for personnel systems,
technology training, and other similar things. Now, I cannot
make that math work.
Mr. Kaden. That's why I said those are----
Senator Sarbanes. I may be too much a prisoner of the old
math.
Mr. Kaden. --not entirely additive. On the capital
requirement side where we see the administration asking for
$900 million in its June supplemental, we would change that to
$1 billion. That is plus $100 million. In addition, we would
support $300 million a year on a recurring basis for
maintenance so that one could catch up with deferred
maintenance and continue maintaining these 12,000 facilities
year by year. That is $400 million. Most of the additional
incremental funds that are required are needed for investment
and technology. We identify over a period of years an
investment in technology of approximately $300 million, but it
is going to take a number of years to do that. So, those are
the principal areas of additional need. The training and other
needs identified are in much smaller amounts.
Senator Sarbanes. Where does the $130 million for
communications and technology come from?
Mr. Kaden. That is part of the technology improvements
that I mentioned. $130 million is the first phase which we
estimate could be done over approximately 18 months to 2 years
for a global network, Internet-based for unclassified
communications. We suggest that be followed by a study of how
to provide the same global network in the classified
environment. That will take longer. But if you are adding up
incremental requirements, that is all part of the $500 million
to $600 million I identified above the administration's current
position.
Senator Sarbanes. All right. Well, I hope it is all there.
I think it is important for you to state what it is that is
needed and not to try to down-shade it. Otherwise, we do not
really have an appropriate standard to work against.
Mr. Kaden. I think the report is clear----
Senator Sarbanes. Something Admiral Crowe did do with his
report is he was very clear about how much money was needed and
how imperative it was and laid it out there. In fact, because
of that, it became something of a benchmark, which I think to
the extent we are even beginning to come anywhere near it, it
was greatly helped by being given such a clear and indefinite
standard to shoot for and also, of course, such a compelling
rationale which we just heard enunciated a few minutes ago at
the witness table.
Mr. Kaden. Well, I think on the security needs, we are
four square with Admiral Crowe. I think the specifics of
additional budgetary requirements are all in here. But perhaps
what we will do is put them together in a one-page chart and
get them to you.
Senator Sarbanes. All right.
I have one other question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. I gather
you support the notion of universal presence for our embassies.
Mr. Kaden. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes. It would be helpful if you would just lay
out your rationale for that. I tend to agree with that, but I
would be interested in hearing your rationale.
Mr. Kaden. This was a subject we discussed at the panel
sessions at great length and discussed in the course of our
visits to 23 countries. I think our conclusion goes along the
following lines. We support the value to the national interest
of on-the-ground presence essentially everywhere. There may be
a handful of exceptions, but essentially we support universal
presence through an ambassador because in our view there is no
substitute for the kind of relationship building and
interaction with the host country that comes through that
presence.
Now, it does not always have to be substantial in number,
and it does not have to include necessarily each of the policy
areas and certainly not all of the administrative support
functions. We do support regional service centers for
administrative support. We support bringing back----
Senator Sarbanes. Like in the Caribbean, for example, I
would assume.
Mr. Kaden. Yes, exactly. We support bringing back to the
U.S. some of the paper processing and back room functions.
But we do conclude that there is no substitute for being on
the ground, interacting government to government, and our
representatives with the elements of the civil society in the
country they serve. Part of the reason for that is not only the
array of issues on the agenda, but also the unpredictability of
where the next challenge arises, where the next threat emerges,
where the next opportunity for a constructive relationship that
is part of an important global alliance on an issue may emerge.
All of those factors support the notion of having an American
presence interacting with the government and the society
essentially everywhere.
Of course, you hear arguments that the Internet and media
has changed that, that the direct contact between the President
and the members of the cabinet and foreign leaders has changed
that. I think our conclusion, after a good deal of discussion,
was that in fact those developments enhanced the need for on-
the-ground presence. It is the Ambassador's relationship
building, it is the embassy's ties with the different
constituencies in the society in which they serve that provide
the foundation for effective interaction at higher levels and
that provide the foundation for effective problem solving when
a challenge or an opportunity does emerge.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, the paper, in reporting on your
report, has said--let me just read this. Although the report
calls for spending $500 million to $600 million per year beyond
the administration's budget request, which is of course the
issue we were exploring here earlier, its authors claim the
extra costs could be offset by such measures as reducing the
size of diplomatic missions in countries that no longer require
large American presence. Now, I skimmed your report very
quickly. I did not come away with that conclusion. Is that part
of your----
Mr. Kaden. I think it is there, very much so. One of the
central recommendations we make is that the President establish
by executive order this interagency committee on right-sizing
and that he include on it the representatives of the
departments and agencies with a major presence and platforms
around the world in embassies around the world, and that over a
course of 3 years, this interagency process attack the issue of
staffing patterns and the match-up of staffing patterns with
mission priorities post by post.
Senator Sarbanes. So, I could then, in your view,
reasonably take the view that I do not need to give you any
more money because if we would just do this right-sizing, we
will pick up from that exercise the money that is needed to do
these other things. Is that correct?
Mr. Kaden. We think there are substantial savings to be
realized, but we cannot quantify those until you go through the
process. We believe there are significant savings to be
achieved through the right-sizing. We say, by way of example,
that if you were able to reduce by 10 percent the total number
of personnel, all agencies around the world, U.S. nationals and
foreign nationals, that amounts to $380 million. But you have
to go through the exercise in 160 embassies, matching
priorities with staffing patterns for all agencies, in order to
know the answer to that. The investment in technology and
security and the other areas we believe has to be made
notwithstanding that. Whether at the end of the day they
balance perfectly or they come close depends on the
effectiveness of that interagency process.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, it seems to me you are leaving it
open to the interpretation that I just advanced. I myself am
not comfortable with that because I think we have been short-
changing the investment and we need to make it. But if you come
along and tell me, look, you could make all these other changes
in the workings of the system and the savings you would accrue
by making all these other changes would pay for the additional
things that we think ought to be done, it seems to me that is
an invitation to go down the path of linking directly together
those changes with those investments. So, in effect, we say,
well, we don't really need to provide any more money. All we
need to do is see that they do this, as you call it, right-
sizing, and the process of doing the right-sizing will provide
the money to do these other measures.
Mr. Kaden. I think the way we have been describing it is
what it invites is a partnership between the leadership of
Congress and the administration in improving the way we
organize and deploy these resources. If you do that, we will
improve the management and effectiveness of these activities.
We will save some resources by the right-sizing and allocation
of those resources, and we will make the needed investments.
Now, whether at the end of the day--it is highly likely, as
this report says, that the needed investments will more than
offset the savings. But the savings are significant and the
savings will come if we attack the process of reform with vigor
and a seriousness.
Admiral Crowe. I really think, Senator, we are going to
have to spend some money in the short term in order to
recognize or realize savings in the long term. They are not
going to happen the same time. I know in the military business,
you know, when you close a base to save money, closing a base
costs more than keeping the base for a while.
Mr. Kaden. But the thing that was striking to us was how
many Ambassadors came to us and said there are 2,000 or 2,200
people in London. I am not sure we need that number to do the
job effectively in the year 1999. Or there are 1,500 people in
Paris and that may have made sense 30 or 40 years ago, but
maybe not today. And on the other hand, the resources we
allocate to some countries in Asia or some places in Latin
America may be short of the kind of talents and mix of skills
that we need in those posts.
Senator Sarbanes. Yes. I think you are giving us a little--
Mr. Chairman, if I may say so--not this Mr. Chairman, but that
Mr. Chairman--bit of an Alice in Wonderland scenario. You need
security clearly, which is big dollars. You need technology.
You need personnel training. True, some of the embassies are
over-staffed, but almost in the same breath, what I hear you
saying is, well, other embassies are understaffed. Presumably
that will be in some rough balance. So, it still seems to me
you come out needing an infusion of resources into the system
if it is going to have any chance of working. Unless you put
some resources in, you do not create the kind of lubrication
with which you can make some of these changes and introduce
some of this flexibility in order to move things around.
Mr. Kaden. Well, you are absolutely right. As Admiral
Crowe said, you need to make investment up front as part of the
process of reform. But I think our panel believed that this
effort to create the right size and shape of missions was
equally important. And if there are too many people and a poor
allocation of those resources, then that is part of the process
of reform too. That is also part of setting the foundation for
supporting the investment.
There are skeptics about these activities. We have to
acknowledge that. So, as a Government, we need to be able to
stand up and say we are doing these activities in the most
effective, most efficient manner possible. Then the case for
making the investment in technology and facilities and better
buildings will be much easier to make, much more effective.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, we have said that to the U.N. We
said, you got to do these reforms or we will not give you the
money. They did some of the reforms, not all of them, but they
made some of the changes. They still do not have the money, and
their system is completely, sort of almost breaking down now as
a consequence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Gentlemen, I apologize. I have got about 4 minutes before I
have to leave. So, I wanted to ask one question to wrap some of
this up.
One of the things the panel's report calls for is the
creation of an Overseas Facilities Authority which would
operate more like a private sector real estate entity. Now, you
mentioned that the OFA would be able to issue a debt or take
loans from the Federal Financing Bank of the U.S. Treasury. So,
I guess the question I would ask you gentlemen is what level of
debt do you think is prudent for the institution to incur, and
what level would be cause for alarm? Now, you say there is some
level they could, but there must be a level that you would be
afraid if they got in too deep. Mr. Kaden?
Mr. Kaden. Yes. I think that is related to the rent
charging or transfer pricing mechanism that we recommend as
part of that. In other words, this government chartered
corporation responsible for the buildings and grounds function,
as I describe it, would have representation from all the
agencies who use the platform. It would have the capacity to
charge them rent for the facilities. That rent flow would be a
definable capital base, if supported by Congress, because it is
still subject to the normal congressional appropriation
process. But that would establish the predictable flow of funds
that creates the foundation for use of flexible financing
tools, including access to the Federal Financing Bank.
We did not take the position that this was a proposal to
circumvent in any manner the normal appropriations process. In
other words, Congress should have exactly the same oversight it
has today over the capital needs process and the appropriation
process, but more flexible financing tools, including access to
the Federal Financing Bank, including in some respects use of
lease-purchase financing, would be part of an approach of
providing a more predictable flow of funds to address this
billion or $1.3 billion a year of capital improvements for
security that we recommend and that Admiral Crowe's ARB
recommended.
Senator Grams. Mr. Motley, the panel makes recommendations
to reinforce the Ambassador's authority and gives the
Ambassador more freedom to innovate. What barriers did you
personally experience as an ambassador to creating a most
productive environment possible and how will these
recommendations help alleviate some of the problems that you
probably faced?
Ambassador Motley. My experience goes not only serving as
Ambassador, but I have co-chaired the Ambassadorial seminar for
the last 15 years. So, 600 of the people that are nominated and
confirmed here end up in the seminar that I run at the State
Department. It is just a hobby and an avocation.
But what I have found is the biggest frustration with
Ambassadors is how to manage Washington, not how to manage
their----
Senator Grams. That is a task.
Ambassador Motley. Yes, and they have varying degrees of
success on that factor.
The law is very clear. It requires the Ambassador to
direct, coordinate, and supervise all executive branch
employees and all of their activities. It is a fairly clear
piece of law. The President's letter that reinforces that goes
in and tries to clarify things that have happened in other
administrations. In fact, following an instance in the Reagan
administration where an ambassador was misinformed by a
national security officer, the following letter issued by the
President said you will take instructions from the Secretary of
State or me personally and no other way, that you could not
speak on behalf of him.
So, those two are the kind of things. It is more dealing
with Washington than it is on the ground. On the ground, the
country team thirsts for leadership, looks for it. If it is
provided, it works well. It is really getting through this
thicket we are trying to get past now by creating this other
interagency mechanism.
Senator Grams. Between the Ambassador and Washington, did
you see any lack of coordination between various agencies
overseas to be a problem as well?
Ambassador Motley. Sure. It happens. It happens in the
best of families. Each agency has, going over there, their own
idea of what they want to do or not do. So, it falls to the
Ambassador to make sure that it all fits within the overall
plan, what are the objectives of the United States. We tell
Ambassadors there are four basic things that they should look
for, and if it does not fit one of those four, that nobody
should be doing it. So, it really is individual perspectives
here that are not coordinated that then get out in the field
and then they have to be kind of brought together.
Admiral Crowe. Can I add a little to that?
Senator Grams. Yes.
Admiral Crowe. For example, we have been under fiscal
pressure for now quite some years, and while I was 3 and a half
years in Great Britain, we reduced the size of the embassy
about 15 percent. While we were reducing it 15 percent, the
other 25 agencies that were in the embassy either increased or
did not reduce any. They were not under similar instructions,
and they chose to take their reductions in moneys here in
Washington and keep their overseas presence large while the
State Department was steadily cutting back. And the Ambassador
had no control over that at all.
Also, I had a real run-in with a Washington Department,
which I will not mention, but they had a foreign policy issue
that involved several countries, and I got a call saying, we
are sending over a big delegation to check with Great Britain
once more to be sure they are aboard. I said, they are aboard.
We see them every day. There is no problem. These other
countries you are dealing with may need your presence, but I
can guarantee you there is not a problem in Great Britain. They
will vote with you and they will support you. He insisted on
coming anyway. I did not have any control over that. I thought
it was totally unnecessary. It was a hell of a waste of money.
Senator Grams. Mr. Kaden, did you have----
Mr. Kaden. Well, I think we saw many examples of the kind
that Ambassador Motley and Admiral Crowe have mentioned. The
point that it brought home to me is it is a complex job being
an ambassador in a large post where 20 or 30 agencies are
represented. It requires unusual skills of leadership and
management. We saw some very good examples of strong
Ambassadors creating effective country teams. We saw some
examples on the other side of that fence too.
I think the lesson the panel drew from that was that the
Ambassador's authority, as leader of that team, has to be clear
and transparent. We suggest that the President's letter be
clarified and incorporated in an executive order. So, it is
more transparent.
And second, it goes without saying that the Nation's
interest is well served when the President selects and the
Congress confirms quality Ambassadors because this is a job
that is not a place for anything but high quality managers and
leaders.
Senator Grams. Just one final question. Admiral Crowe, the
panel urged the State Department to continue to implement the
recommendations made by your Accountability Review Board. Now,
your ARB report called--and I quote--flying glass the most
dangerous element in the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings and
said that mylar coated windows did not provide sufficient
protection. So, I guess the question is, has the State
Department moved toward installing the laminated glass that you
called for?
Admiral Crowe. They are certainly looking into it and they
are moving pretty fast. Of course, you are in an area here
where it is sort of like the Internet. It moves ahead of you.
You keep trying to catch up with it. Well, the experimentation
on glass has the same problem. They are still using mylar
because it does have some minor protections, but they are
trying to move to another degree that will also prove to be
very expensive, incidentally. But, yes, they are going, I
think, in the right direction.
Incidentally, our report also mentioned a great deal of
procedures that had nothing to do with money, and I think the
State Department has moved on all of those. I am very
encouraged in that regard.
Senator Grams. So, I think you would be optimistic then
that some of the other recommendations of the ARB are being
implemented as well, or do you have any concerns?
Admiral Crowe. No. I think some of them are, yes. I think
a great many are.
Senator Grams. At a pace that you would be happy or
satisfied with?
Admiral Crowe. Well, I will never be happy with the pace,
but certainly it is as I can reasonably expect. And it is a big
problem. You start talking about 240 installations, even if you
are just concentrating on something like glass, getting that
organized and the priorities and who moves first and so forth.
Also, incidentally, it is not just a matter of laminated
glass. I hate to get technical but the frame itself has to be
anchored to the core part of the building, and then that
laminated glass put in that. That is a big job.
Senator Grams. Any other final comments?
Mr. Kaden. I think this is an area where the Secretary and
Under Secretary Cohen and Assistant Secretary Carpenter have
really put their shoulder behind the ARB report and they have
been making some progress.
Senator Grams. Well again, gentlemen, I want to thank you
very much for your work and your diligence and your time and
coming before this committee.
I will just ask Senator Sarbanes if he has any additional
questions.
Senator Sarbanes. No, thank you.
Senator Grams. All right. Well, again, just thank you very
much.
One thing I would like to do is leave the committee hearing
record open for at least 3 more business days in case any other
members would like to submit questions that they have or
concerns to you gentlemen. Again, I want to thank you very much
for your work.
Mr. Kaden. Thank you.
Senator Grams. The committee is completed. [Whereupon, at
3:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]