[Senate Hearing 106-739]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-739
NORTH KOREA: PROGRESS AFTER PERRY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 21, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-393 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Kramer, Hon. Franklin D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security, Department of Defense, Washington, DC.. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Sherman, Ambassador Wendy R., Counselor of the Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 6
(iii)
NORTH KOREA: PROGRESS AFTER PERRY
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TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Craig Thomas
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Thomas, Chafee, Biden, and Kerry.
Senator Thomas. I think we will go ahead and call the
committee to order. Good morning. We have Wendy Sherman here,
Counselor of the Department of State, and I think Assistant
Secretary for Defense Franklin Kramer will be here momentarily,
so we will go ahead and begin.
Today the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs
meets to examine what progress is being made by the
administration in implementing the recommendations contained in
the Perry report on North Korea.
Pursuant to Public Law 105-227, last year the President
appointed Dr. Perry as his North Korea Policy Coordinator. On
the surface, it sounded as if Dr. Perry's mission would be
pretty simple: conduct a review of our current policies
regarding North Korea and make recommendations to the President
and to the Congress regarding any changes that should be made.
In my opinion, however, this was not an enviable position to
assume. Some 20 countries are within the jurisdiction of this
subcommittee, and North Korea, I believe, is, hands-down, one
of the most difficult and frustrating at the present time to
deal with.
The Perry report was publicly released last October, and on
October 12, this subcommittee held its first congressional
hearing to examine the findings and the recommendations. In
short, the report recommended the United States move away from
its policy of total isolation with North Korea and pursue
instead a policy more in line with that of South Korea. Toward
that end, the administration contemporaneously announced a
loosening of U.S. trade and other restrictions on North Korea.
At the October meeting, I noted that while I am generally
supportive of the concept of engagement, there were some
caveats to that support as the process moves along. First, I
have stressed repeatedly to both Dr. Perry and Assistant
Secretary Roth any action which we take must and should be
preceded by close consultations with our South Korean and
Japanese allies.
Second, we should avoid even the appearance that we are
engaging in a ``tit-for-tat'' reward system with the North. In
my view, over time such a system simply encourages a country
like North Korea to turn to blackmail, increasing the chances
for the kinds of action--missile firings, nuclear developments
and so on--that we are trying to discourage.
Third, we must continue to be vigilant in terms of
verifying that the North is living up to its end of the deal.
They have shown in the past a disturbing willingness to renege
on their promises. I see no reason to assume that they will
change that propensity. As President Reagan said, ``Trust, but
verify.'' Finally, we should not be reticent to jettison this
policy if it becomes apparent that the results are not what we
want.
Since that hearing, we have been through several recesses
and other pressing domestic and foreign relations topics have
taken front stage, so the purpose of today's hearing is
essentially threefold: To examine where we are now in the
process of implementing the recommendations of the Perry
report, to examine how North Korea is responding, and indeed to
determine whether this policy is yielding what it was intended
to yield. So that is the purpose of it. I think it is timely
that we do take a look. Certainly, this is one of the most
important areas of our concern, and as I said, we have been
sort of taking observations in other places recently, so I
think it is important that we continue to monitor this, so we
are very pleased to have Wendy Sherman here today with us. And
if you care to begin, please.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WENDY R. SHERMAN, COUNSELOR OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Sherman. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
this opportunity to discuss the administration's North Korea
policy. And I know that my colleague, Assistant Secretary
Kramer, will get here as soon as the weather allows him to come
over the river. I have submitted a fuller version, a written
version of my testimony for the record, but wanted to try to
summarize some of that for the committee and make sure there
was time for questions that you might have.
As you noted, just in the fall of this last year, Dr. Perry
presented the findings and recommendations resulting from his
10-month review of our policy toward North Korea. I was very
privileged to be part of the policy review team as the senior
government official who worked most closely with Dr. Perry. I
chair an interagency working group implementing the report's
recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the Korean Peninsula remains
one of the most volatile areas in the world. Our overarching
goal there is simple but difficult to achieve, achieving
lasting peace and stability. Since 1994, the Agreed Framework
has been at the center of our Democratic People's Republic of
Korea [DPRK] policy and key to our success in achieving our
goal. Two events in 1998, however, called that policy into
question. That summer, we found ourselves in protracted
negotiations with the DPRK to gain access to a site at
Kumchang-ni that we suspected might be the future site of a
nuclear reactor. If confirmed, the existence of such activity
would have violated the Agreed Framework and jeopardized its
continued viability.
A visit to the site last May, demonstrated that it was not
involved in such activities, and we have just affirmed with the
North that we will revisit this site this spring. The
experience, nonetheless, demonstrated the need for a mechanism
to address similar concerns, should they appear in the future,
at least until such time as North Korea comes into full
compliance with its IAEA obligations under the terms of the
Agreed Framework.
Separately, in 1998, North Korea fired a long-range missile
over Japan in an apparently failed attempt to launch a
satellite. Even though missile controls are not part of the
Agreed Framework, this test firing rightly provoked a storm of
protest in both the United States and Japan, and led to calls
in both countries to end support for the Agreed Framework.
There is no doubt in my mind or in Dr. Perry's, however, that
had we aborted the Agreed Framework, the DPRK would have
responded by reopening its nuclear facility at Yongbyon. This
would have placed the DPRK in a position to resume production
of weapons grade plutonium and eventually to arm those very
missiles with nuclear warheads, the worst of all possible
worlds.
During that period in 1998, the Congress called for review
of policy toward the DPRK. President Clinton and Secretary
Albright agreed and asked Dr. William J. Perry to assemble a
policy review team. Over the course of 10 months, we met with
experts inside and outside of the U.S. Government, including
many Members of Congress, including the chairmen, and their
staff, including virtually everybody on the dais behind you. We
traveled several times to East Asia to consult with our allies
in the Republic of Korea and Japan and with China's leaders.
We also exchanged views with the EU, Russia, Australia, and
other interested countries. We visited Pyongyang to share our
views with members of the DPRK leadership. Through many long
sessions with our South Korean and Japanese allies, we
discussed how best to pursue our common goals of peace and
stability while taking into account our respective interests.
After many months, we reached a common understanding. The
Perry report is the result of that understanding.
The comprehensive approach recommended by Dr. Perry and
supported and approved by the President and the Secretary of
State and developed in very close coordination with our two
allies gave highest priority to our security concerns over DPRK
nuclear weapons and missile-related programs. The strategy Dr.
Perry recommended envisioned two paths. On the first path, the
United States would be willing to move step by step in a
reciprocal fashion toward comprehensive normalization if the
DPRK was willing to forgo its nuclear weapons and long-range
missile programs. Alternatively, if North Korea did not
demonstrate its willingness by its actions to remove these
threats, the United States would seek to contain them by
strengthening our already strong deterrent posture. Because the
second path is both dangerous and expensive, we and our allies
all strongly prefer the first alternative.
As I have indicated, coordination among the three allies
has been stronger than at any time in the past. This is largely
the result of the newly instituted Trilateral Coordination and
Oversight Group [TCOG]--not one of the world's greatest
acronyms, but nonetheless created nearly 1 year ago to ensure
more frequent close consultation among the United States, South
Korea and Japan at the subcabinet level. We have met nine times
trilaterally over the past year, including a meeting of Foreign
Ministers and a summit meeting and had our most recent TCOG in
Seoul in January.
Allied support for the U.S. approach is strong in part
because the Perry report is, in essence, a joint project. In
January, I visited Seoul and Tokyo. I met with President Kim
Dae-jung, participated as head of the U.S. delegation in a TCOG
meeting, and met with Japanese leaders. During our discussions,
President Kim again expressed his full support for our policy
as complementary to his own policy of engagement. We, in turn,
fully concur with his view that North-South dialog remains the
key to ultimate peace on the Peninsula. We hope the DPRK
leadership will have the foresight to take advantage of the
opportunities before it to address issues of mutual concern and
to move its relationship with the United States and the
Republic of Korea [ROK] and Japan more rapidly down the path
toward normalization.
There are increasing signs that other members of the
international community would be prepared to increase their
contacts with the DPRK as the DPRK addresses the international
community's legitimate concerns. Italy has established
diplomatic relations with the DPRK, and last night I had dinner
with Foreign Minister Dini, who is on his way via China to a
visit at the end of this month in Pyongyang. The Australians
and French both recently sent delegations to Pyongyang. Canada
received an unofficial DPRK delegation, the Philippines is
considering establishing relations and Japan, as you know, is
moving ahead with normalization talks publicly in April. We are
consulting closely with our friends and allies in North Korean
policy to assure that our approaches are coordinated.
Guided by the Perry recommendations, U.S. policy is already
making progress in a step-by-step reciprocal process
recommended by the Perry report. In September, the DPRK
announced its intentions to refrain from long-range missile
tests of any kind while high-level discussions were underway to
improve relations. This was a small but very important step in
dealing with our proliferation concerns.
In September, we announced our intention to ease economic
sanctions against the DPRK, those within the President's
purview. More recently, the North accepted Dr. Perry's
invitation for a reciprocal visit to Washington by high-level
DPRK visitors. From March 7 to March 15 in New York, Ambassador
Charles Kartman and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan held
their third round of preparatory talks for the high-level
visit. Further preparatory talks will be needed before the
visit occurs.
The DPRK also agreed in New York to recommence talks
related to our concerns about the DPRK's missile program and to
begin a new negotiation on implementation of the Agreed
Framework. As you know, as part of the positive path outlined
in the report, Dr. Perry proposed talks to deal with our
continuing concern about DPRK missile-related and nuclear
weapons-related activities.
Finally, the DPRK reconfirmed its agreement for another
U.S. visit to Kumchang-ni in May of this year. The negotiations
leading to the DPRK high-level visit have been difficult and
will probably continue to be difficult, as are all negotiations
with the DPRK. Nonetheless, we and our allies remain convinced
that the visit would advance our interests. We view the visit
as an opportunity for both sides to demonstrate their intention
to proceed in the direction of a fundamentally new
relationship. It would be an important, but modest step and
would make clear to the DPRK, that as it moves to address our
security concerns, we are prepared to reciprocate by taking
other steps to improve ties with the DPRK.
As we move forward in our relations with North Korea, the
Agreed Framework will remain central to the policy. The turnkey
contract for light-water reactor construction was signed on
December 15, 1999 and became effective on February 3. This
means that, as soon as winter is over, construction can begin
in earnest. As you know, the ROK and Japan are committed,
respectively, to providing 70 percent of the actual costs in
the case of ROK and the yen equivalent of $1 billion in the
case of Japan based on the current estimated cost of $4.6
billion. Since the turnkey contract became effective, South
Korea has disbursed nearly $120 million and Japan over $51
million to KEPCO, the prime contractor for the project. We
believe that the Framework continues to be our best means of
capping and eventually eliminating the threat of DPRK nuclear
weapons by replacing the now dangerous and now frozen graphite-
moderated reactors with proliferation-resistant light-water
reactors.
Faithful implementation of the Agreed Framework by all
sides is absolutely essential to keeping the DPRK's nuclear
activities at Yongbyon and Taechon frozen and to the
maintenance of stability on the Peninsula. We thank the
Congress for its support and ask for continued congressional
support in order to continue to live up to our side of the
bargain by helping to provide heavy fuel oil, even as oil
prices, Mr. Chairman, are painfully high and make this, a
difficult task, even more difficult.
In doing so we will, of course, continue to hold the DPRK
strictly to its own obligations and commitments under the
Agreed Framework, including the rapid conclusion of spent fuel
canning and resumption of the North-South dialog. While we are
striving to advance our nonproliferation goals, we remain
committed to addressing other issues of concern with the DPRK.
We will do all we can to improve the monitoring of food aid and
other international assistance provided to North Korea.
We will continue to monitor, condemn, and work
multilaterally to gain improvement in the DPRK's dismal human
rights record, and we will support UNHCR's efforts to address
the plight of North Korean refugees. As suggested in the Perry
report, we will pursue our serious concerns about the DPRK's
chemical and biological weapons program multilaterally.
We will also continue to seek information on alleged drug
trafficking and other illegal activities, as I am sure we will
also hear in more detail from Assistant Secretary Kramer. I am
also personally committed to ensuring that we resolve as fully
as possible the status of the American soldiers who remain
unaccounted for from the Korean war. The DPRK has been
cooperative on this issue in the past, but the recent severe
lack of progress is a serious disappointment. In this 50th
anniversary year it is a very important issue for veterans and
families of those still missing and for all Americans, and we
have an obligation to continue to press the DPRK to work with
us on this very crucial humanitarian issues.
In concluding, let me stress that we are attempting to
pursue a constructive dialog with the DPRK that addresses
central security concerns and leads us more rapidly toward a
path of full normalization. The cold war still exists on the
Korean Peninsula. We hope that our dialog will be a crucial
step toward ending it.
We are under no illusions that it will be an easy path. We
recognize that everything we and our allies do in our diplomacy
requires the maintenance of strong allied defensive posture.
This is fundamental. In fact, the Perry report stresses that
there be no change in our conventional forces. Congress'
support of our forces in the region remains essential. The
presence of 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, 47,000 troops in
Japan demonstrates our commitment to stand with our allies
against any threat of aggression. With our South Korean and
Japanese allies, however, we believe that this comprehensive
two-path strategy recommended by Dr. Perry offers the best
opportunity to change the stalemate situation of the Korean
Peninsula in a fundamental and positive way. Through these
efforts, we hope to lead the Korean Peninsula working with our
allies to a stable, peaceful and prosperous future.
In closing, I would like to cite a senior American military
leader on the Korean Peninsula who told me during my most
recent trip there, ``When I came here 18 months ago, I thought
I would have to fight a war. Thanks to the efforts of your
team, I see this as an increasingly remote possibility.''
Making war an increasingly remote possibility, working to
address our concerns about weapons of mass destruction, and
addressing pressing human needs, these are challenging, very
hard to achieve objectives. It will take time, lots of time, to
accomplish them. I know, however, working with my colleagues
such as Assistant Secretary Kramer, that we share these goals
with Congress and working together, I believe we can and will
succeed in this mission. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am
glad to have my partner here with me. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sherman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you
and other Members of the Committee to discuss with you the
Administration's policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.
As you know, last September, Dr. William Perry sent to the
President a classified report of findings and recommendations resulting
from his ten month-long review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK. This
report was presented to the Hill at about the same time. An
unclassified version of the report was also circulated widely. I was
privileged to be a part of the policy review team. I am the government
official who worked most closely with Dr. Perry, and I chair an
interagency working group that is responsible for government-wide
implementation of the Perry report recommendations.
CONTEXT
Mr. Chairman, I think we agree that the Korean Peninsula remains
one of the most volatile areas in the world. On the Peninsula, the Cold
War still endures. There is no peace, but an armed truce. North Korea
maintains an army of one million forward deployed at the DMZ. We have
been thoroughly engaged with our allies in the region, the Republic of
Korea and Japan, as we address the challenges posed by the continued
division of the Peninsula. For more than 45 years, we, standing
together with our ROK allies, have helped maintain peace and security
on the Peninsula, often in difficult and unpredictable circumstances.
We remain committed to achieving lasting peace and stability on the
Peninsula and the presence of 37,000 U.S. troops in the South is a
tangible demonstration of that commitment.
THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND ITS CHALLENGES
Six years ago, you will recall, the DPRK's pursuit of a nuclear
weapons program dangerously raised tensions, with U.N. sanctions a
likely outcome that the DPRK said would be tantamount to war.
Fortunately, the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in 1994 provided a
means to address our concerns about the North's nuclear activities at
Yongbyon and Taechon. These facilities would have provided the DPRK the
surest and quickest path to an established nuclear weapons capability.
In exchange for DPRK agreement to freeze those facilities under
international monitoring, we agreed to arrange for the provision of two
proliferation-resistant light-water nuclear reactors to the DPRK and of
heavy fuel oil (HFO) to meet the North's energy needs until the first
of these reactors is finished. The facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon
have remained frozen since that time and will eventually be dismantled.
The spent fuel containing enough plutonium for perhaps a half-dozen
nuclear weapons is under seal and IAEA monitoring. It will eventually
be removed from the DPRK. Canning and securing the spent fuel is
virtually complete. Had we not had frozen the DPRK plutonium
production, today the DPRK would be well on its way to having a nuclear
program capable of producing dozens of nuclear weapons. Preserving the
accomplishments of the Agreed Framework is strongly in the U.S.
national interest and remains a cornerstone of stability on the
Peninsula.
In 1998, however, we found ourselves again in protracted
negotiations with the DPRK to gain access to a site at Kumchang-ni that
we suspected might be involved in nuclear weapons-related activities.
If confirmed, the existence of such activities would have violated the
Agreed Framework and jeopardized its continued viability. A visit to
the site last May demonstrated that it was not involved in such
activities, and we shall send a team back to Kumchang-ni this spring to
assure this is still the case. The experience nonetheless demonstrated
the need for a mechanism to address similar concerns--should they
appear in the future--at least until such time as the DPRK comes into
full IAEA compliance under the terms of the Agreed Framework.
Separately in 1998, North Korea fired a Taepo Dong I missile over
Japan in an apparent failed attempt to launch a satellite. Even though
missile controls are not part of the Agreed Framework, this test
firing, rightly so, provoked a storm of protest in both the United
States and Japan, and led to calls in both countries to end support for
the Agreed Framework. There is no doubt in my mind, however, that had
we aborted the Agreed Framework, the DPRK would have responded by
reopening its nuclear facility at Yongbyon. This would have placed it
in a position to resume production of weapons-grade plutonium and,
eventually, to arm its missiles with nuclear warheads--the worst of all
possible worlds.
THE PERRY REVIEW AND ITS CONCLUSIONS
During that tense and dangerous period in 1998, the Congress called
for a review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK. President Clinton also
believed that a thorough policy review was in order and asked Dr. Perry
to assemble a team to conduct one. Over the course of ten months of
study and consultation, we met with experts inside and outside the
United States Government. We traveled to the Capitol to give regular
status reports to Congress, and we benefited from comments and insights
received from Members of Congress and staff as we developed our ideas.
We traveled several times to East Asia to consult with our allies in
the Republic of Korea and Japan, and with China's leaders. We also
exchanged views with the EU, Australia, and other interested countries.
We visited Pyongyang to share our views with members of the DPRK
leadership. As a result of these consultations and efforts, Dr. Perry
reached four key conclusions (among others) that essentially drove the
recommendations that were made, and which he presented to the President
and to the Congress last September:
First, the military correlation of forces on the Korean
Peninsula strongly favors the allied forces, even more than
during the 1994 crisis. And, most importantly, this is
understood by the government of the DPRK. Therefore, deterrence
is strong. But that deterrence could be undermined by the
introduction of nuclear weapons, especially nuclear weapons on
ballistic missiles.
Second, there has been no production of fissile material at
Yongbyon since the Agreed Framework came into force. But
production at this site could restart in a few months if the
Agreed Framework were aborted. Ending the freeze at Yongbyon
remains the surest and quickest path for North Korea to obtain
nuclear weapons.
Third, a security strategy based on the Agreed Framework has
worked well these past five years. But this strategy is
unsustainable in the face of continued DPRK firings of long-
range missiles, since the firing of these missiles undermines
the necessary support for the Agreed Framework.
Finally, economic hardship has caused great privation to the
common people of North Korea, but is unlikely to weaken the
regime. Consequently, we must deal with the DPRK as it is, not
as we might wish it to be.
PERRY REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS
After considering a number of policy alternatives, and in close
consultation with our ROK and Japanese allies, Dr. Perry recommended a
strategy that focused on U.S. security concerns over DPRK nuclear
weapons- and missile-related activities as our highest priority. We of
course recognize that other issues also warrant our serious attention,
and plan to address these matters as well as relations between our two
countries improve. The strategy recommended by Dr. Perry envisioned two
paths. On the first path, the U.S. would be willing to move step-by-
step toward comprehensive normalization of relations if the DPRK was
willing to forgo its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs.
Alternatively, however, if North Korea did not demonstrate its
willingness--by its actions--to remove these threats, the U.S. would
take action to contain them. Our already strong deterrent posture would
have to be further strengthened.
We recognize that successful execution of either strategy requires
the full participation of our ROK and Japanese allies. Because the
second path is both dangerous and expensive, the first alternative is
obviously preferred by both us and our allies.
Here, let me underline a central conclusion of our review: the
importance of close coordination with our allies.
I am pleased to say that coordination among the three allies is
stronger than at any time in the past, and I believe this has been one
of the most important achievements of the Administration's policy
toward North Korea. This accomplishment is largely the result of the
newly instituted Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, or TCOG,
created nearly one year ago to ensure more frequent, close consultation
among the United States, South Korea and Japan at the sub-cabinet
level. Allied support for the U.S. approach remains strong, in part
because the Perry report is in essence a joint project. We have met
nine times trilaterally with the ROK and Japan in the past year,
including a meeting of foreign ministers and a summit meeting. We plan
to meet again soon. In late January, I visited Seoul and Tokyo, during
which I met with President Kim Dae-jung, participated in a TCOG meeting
and met with Japanese leaders. During our discussions, President Kim
again expressed his full support for our policy as complementary to his
own policy of engagement. We, in turn, fully concur with President
Kim's view that North-South dialogue remains the key to ultimate peace
on the Peninsula. Similarly, in the context of this coordinated
trilateral approach, Japan in recent months has reengaged with the
North. As always, none of us are under any illusions, and we pursue all
of these efforts on a solid foundation of deterrence. Deterrence is
fundamental to our diplomatic approach to the DPRK.
There are increasing signs that other members of the international
community are prepared to increase their contacts with the DPRK as the
DPRK addresses the international community's legitimate concerns. Italy
has established diplomatic relations with the DPRK; the Australians and
the French both recently sent delegations to Pyongyang; the Philippines
is considering establishing relations; and Japan is moving ahead. We
are consulting closely with our friends and allies on North Korea
policy to ensure that our approaches are coordinated.
However, it takes two to tango. Therefore, the success of Dr.
Perry's first path depends on full cooperation from both sides. North
Korea needs to understand and demonstrate its acceptance of the
opportunities before it.
Following the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, the DPRK went through
what some observers surmised was a period of political uncertainty. The
structural flaws of its economic system were exacerbated by several
years of natural disasters and the economy has continued to falter.
Nonetheless, Kim Il Sung's son and successor, Kim Jong Il remains
firmly in control. We only hope that the DPRK under his leadership will
seize the opportunities before it to address issues of mutual concern
and to move its relationship with the U.S., the ROK, and Japan more
rapidly down the path toward normalization.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Since Dr. Perry appeared before your committee last October, there
have been significant developments in our relationship with the DPRK.
Last September, as you recall, the DPRK announced its intention to
refrain from long-range missile tests of any kind while high-level
discussions were underway to improve relations between our two
countries.
This was a small but important first step in dealing with our
proliferation concerns. On September 17, President Clinton announced
his intention to ease sanctions on the import and export of non-
strategic commercial and consumer goods; allow direct personal and
commercial financial transactions between U.S. and DPRK persons; ease
restrictions on investments; and allow U.S. ships and aircraft carrying
U.S. goods to call on DPRK ports. The Administration is well along in
the bureaucratic process of revising the relevant regulations to
implement this Presidential decision. More recently, the North also
indicated its intention to accept the invitation extended by Dr. Perry
during his May 1999 visit to Pyongyang for a reciprocal visit to
Washington by a high-level DPRK visitor.
In November, and again in January, Ambassador Charles Kartman met
in Berlin with his DPRK counterpart to pursue discussions aimed at
realizing this high-level visit. From March 7 to March 15 in New York,
Ambassador Kartman and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan held their
third round of preparatory talks for the high-level visit. They did not
complete their work, and the DPRK has agreed to schedule further
preparatory talks. The DPRK also agreed in New York to recommence talks
related to our concerns on the DPRK's missile program and to begin a
new negotiation on implementation of the Agreed Framework. As you know,
as part of the positive path outlined in his report, Dr. Perry proposed
two sets of talks to deal with our continuing concerns about DPRK
missile-related and nuclear weapons-related activities. Finally, the
DPRK reconfirmed its agreement for another U.S. visit to Kumchang-ni.
In our talks, we have discussed our concerns about the DPRK's
association with international terrorism, which warranted its inclusion
on our list of state sponsors of terrorism. Confronting terrorism, on a
worldwide basis, remains a high priority for the Administration. We
have begun to reengage the DPRK in a serious way in negotiations aimed
at stipulating the DPRK actions required for its removal from the
terrorism list. Just as in our other dealings with the DPRK, we are
under no illusions of speedy progress, but believe progress is possible
with cooperation on both sides.
THE HIGH-LEVEL VISIT
Negotiations leading to the DPRK high-level visit have been
difficult--as are all negotiations with the DPRK--and they continue.
Nonetheless, we and our allies remain convinced that the visit would
advance our interests. We view the visit as an opportunity for both
sides to demonstrate their intention to proceed in the direction of a
fundamentally new relationship. It would be an important, but modest,
step; and we would make clear to the DPRK that, as it moves to address
our security concerns, we are prepared to reciprocate by taking other
steps to improve ties with the DPRK.
Let me emphasize that the DPRK's September expression of restraint
in testing long-range missiles was only a single step. Our continuing
talks will give us the venue to address our broader agenda of concerns.
CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK, FOUR PARTY TALKS
As we move forward in our relations with North Korea, the Agreed
Framework will remain central to our policy toward the DPRK. As I
stressed before, the Framework continues to be our best means of
capping and eventually eliminating the threat of DPRK nuclear weapons.
KEDO is now ready to move forward with actual construction of the
two proliferation-resistant, light-water nuclear reactors. As you know,
South Korea and Japan are shouldering the major burden for this
ambitious project. Last December KEDO and KEPCO, the South Korean prime
contractor, concluded the Turnkey Contract for the project. More
recently, South Korea and Japan separately concluded all arrangements
necessary to finance the project. South Korea and Japan are committed,
respectively, to providing 70 percent of the actual costs and the yen-
equivalent of $1 billion, based on a current estimated cost of $4.6
billion. Since the Turnkey Contract became effective, South Korea has
disbursed nearly $120 million, and Japan over $51 million, to KEPCO,
the prime contractor for the project. Disbursements will reach close to
450 million dollars by the end of the first construction year. As I
indicated earlier, faithful implementation of the Agreed Framework--by
all sides--is critical to keeping the DPRK's nuclear activities at
Yongbyon and Taechon frozen, and to the maintenance of stability on the
Peninsula. The Administration is doing its best to fulfill its Agreed
Framework commitment to help provide heavy fuel oil (HFO).
Congress's enduring support for the Agreed Framework remains
essential if we are to be able to live up to our side of the bargain.
In doing so, we will of course continue to hold the DPRK to its own
obligations and commitments under the Agreed Framework, including the
rapid completion of spent fuel canning, and resumption of North-South
dialogue. As I said earlier, we fully recognize the centrality of the
North-South role in resolving issues of peace and stability on the
Peninsula.
In that same regard, we remain committed to the Four Party Talks as
the primary venue for discussing the replacement of the armistice with
a permanent peace regime. We have pressed the DPRK to resume the Four
Party Talks in the near future.
THE FOOD SITUATION IN THE DPRK
The food situation in the DPRK remains grim and malnutrition
remains a chronic problem. As you know, the United States committed
last year to provide 400,000 metric tons of food aid to the DPRK in
response to an appeal from the World Food Program (WFP). This
assistance is targeted on the most vulnerable population in the DPRK,
including its women and children, and the elderly. This assistance is
provided only in response to demonstrated need and is monitored by the
WFP's resident monitors through its network of offices. The U.S.
government also donated an additional 100,000 tons through a new
program called ``the potato project.'' In this project, U.S. PVOs,
under an agreement with the North Korean Flood Damage Reconstruction
Committee, conducted a seed potato multiplication project and
distributed and monitored the humanitarian food aid the U.S. government
provided. We are satisfied that there is no significant diversion of
food assistance to non-target populations in either program. Indeed,
there is ample evidence to confirm that U.S. humanitarian assistance to
North Korea continues to reach those for whom it was intended.
We understand that the harvest this past fall may have been only
marginally better than the previous year's, and that the DPRK will
continue to have a food shortfall in the range of 1.2 million tons. The
international community will be called on again to cover a large part
of this shortfall in order that the food situation not be pushed back
into crisis. As in the past, we will consult with international
organizations such as the WFP and with our allies, and will make any
decision on additional humanitarian assistance based on demonstrated
need and subject to strict monitoring. At the same time, we will
continue to urge the DPRK to carry out the kinds of agricultural and
economic reforms that could lead it toward improvement of its ability
to feed itself.
OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN
We remain committed to addressing other issues of concern with the
DPRK. We will urge improvement in the DPRK's dismal human rights
record, and we will support UNHCR's efforts to address the plight of
North Korean refugees. We will pursue our serious concerns about the
DPRK's chemical and biological weapons programs as well as alleged
North Korean drug trafficking and other illegal activities.
I am also personally committed to ensuring that we resolve as fully
as possible the status of the American soldiers who remain unaccounted-
for from the Korean War. The DPRK has been cooperative on this issue in
the past, but the current lack of progress is a severe disappointment.
This is a very important issue for veterans and the families of those
still missing, as well as the American people, and we have an
obligation to continue to press the DPRK to work with us on this
humanitarian issue.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Let me stress that we are attempting to pursue a constructive
dialogue with the DPRK that addresses our central security concerns and
leads us more rapidly down the path toward full normalization. The Cold
War still exists on the Korean Peninsula--we hope that our dialogue
will be the first step toward ending it. We are under no illusions that
it will be an easy path. We recognize fully that everything we and our
allies do in our diplomacy requires the maintenance of strong allied
deterrent posture. This is fundamental. Congress's support of our
forces in the region remains essential. The presence of 37,000 U.S.
troops in South Korea and 47,000 in Japan demonstrates our commitment
to stand with our allies against any threat of aggression. With our
South Korean and Japanese allies, however, we believe that this
comprehensive, two-path strategy recommended by Dr. Perry offers the
best opportunity to change the stalemated situation on the Korean
Peninsula in a fundamental and positive way. Through these efforts, we
hope to lead the Korean Peninsula to a stable, peaceful and prosperous
future.
In closing, I would like to cite a senior American military leader
on the Korean Peninsula who told me during my most recent trip there
that, ``When I came here 18 months ago, I thought I would have to fight
a war. Thanks to the efforts of your team, I see this as an
increasingly remote possibility.'' Making war an increasingly remote
possibility, working to address our concerns about weapons of mass
destruction, and addressing pressing human needs--these are
challenging, hard to achieve objectives. It will take time to
accomplish them. I know, however, that we share these goals and,
working together, I believe we can and will succeed in this mission.
Senator Thomas. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Mr. Secretary, welcome. Nice to see you.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Kramer. Thank you. I apologize for being late. Two
matters came up just as I was leaving, and then we ran into a
little weather, but I am delighted to be here. My prepared
testimony is in the record, so I thought I would just give you
a few points and then we could come to the questions which I
know is the heart of the issue.
The key issue for us, I think, both for the U.S. Government
and certainly for the Department of Defense, is to ensure that
we maintain deterrence on the Peninsula. That is the
fundamental of our whole approach and, of course, if necessary,
that we be able to prevail in a conflict. We have that problem
because despite the fact that there have been some numbers of
years in which there have been degradation of the North Korean
military, they have a very formidable capability, and that is
particularly true in the areas of artillery, special forces,
missiles. You probably have heard about their recent training
activities, so-called winter training cycle, summer training
cycle. So they keep up quite a capability, and they have a
force of roughly a million persons.
The elements of deterrence from our side depend on a very
close combined U.S.-ROK military posture. We, of course, have
37,000 forward U.S. forces, and we have an ability to
reinforce, and this is one of the theaters that we think about
on our so-called major theater war strategy. The ROK has
650,000 active forces. We do have a combined command that keeps
us working together in as close a fashion as I think is
possible, and I have been working on that issue since about
1979, if I recall, when I was in the government of another
administration when that was established, and this is really an
incredibly effective operation and command.
We do combined exercises. It allows us to ensure that both
we and the Republic of Korea can do the job that we have to do,
that we can reinforce from the United States, and we do a
combination of field exercises, computer-assisted exercises,
command post exercises that allow us to maintain the deterrent
capability of which the overall strategy is maintained. And as
Ambassador Sherman said, one of the fundamentals of Dr. Perry's
review was that we maintain our presence on the Peninsula. We
undertake on both sides, that is to say the U.S. side and the
Republic of Korea side, to maintain the capability.
In recent years, we have enhanced in our own forces. We
have put in attack helicopters. We put in rapid fighting
vehicles. We have enhanced our target capabilities with GPS.
Same on the ROK side. They have new tanks. They have new APC's,
and we continued to work with them to maintain their defense
budget for a few years in an environment that was very
difficult, and now an environment which they have recovered
somewhat and are able to continue to modernize.
One of the key issues, of course, on the Peninsula, is the
issue of weapons of mass destruction. From the war fighters'
point of view, our forces work very hard to be able to operate,
if necessary, in that environment and more broadly, we face the
overall issue of having to deal with weapons of mass
destruction and the means of delivery.
As Ambassador Sherman said, we strongly support the Agreed
Framework. We think it has been very effective. We think the
missile moratorium is, of course, of great value. As you know,
Mr. Chairman, one of the fundamental bases for the analysis
that has been made in connection with the national missile
defense for the United States has been North Korean threats, so
this is a threat that we take seriously, and having a missile
moratorium is very useful.
The last issue that I will mention, but I do not simply
want to mention in passing, is the POW-MIA issue. That office
in the Pentagon reports directly to me. We take this very
seriously. We have had some success in the recent past with
joint operations, and now we are at an impasse in terms of
negotiations with the North. We hope to overcome that, but we
do not want to overcome it by in any way undercutting either
the U.N. command or some of the key issues that we have to deal
with with North Korea. So we hope to get that started. We have
talked to the families groups and veterans groups with respect
to our positions and I think we have good support on that. With
that, let me stop, and I would be delighted to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Assistant Secretary Kramer
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Franklin D. Kramer
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you
and other Members of the Committee to discuss security aspects of the
Administration's policy toward the Korean Peninsula.
CONTEXT
U.S. efforts to steer North Korea toward more acceptable and
responsible behavior have accomplished some notable successes over the
past several years but have also left much more to be done. The North
Korea policy review conducted by Dr. William Perry grew from an
awareness that security and political circumstances have been evolving
on the Peninsula and that we must constantly reassess the premises and
objectives of our overall policy approach to ensure that they meet our
bottom-line security needs. Dr. Perry's review placed in bold relief
the importance of pursuing with renewed vigor U.S. concerns over DPRK
programs possibly related to nuclear-weapons acquisition and ongoing
missile activities.
Regardless of the refinements of our policy toward the DPRK, the
one unalterable starting point of the U.S. security calculus on the
Korean Peninsula is the importance of maintaining a close alliance
relationship with the Republic of Korea. This relationship, based on
shared interests and common values, is unshakable and manifests itself
in the integrated U.S.-ROK command structure, the robust U.S.-ROK
combined exercise program, and the presence of 37,000 U.S. service
members in South Korea. All these elements of our deterrence posture in
Korea help to ensure the security of the ROK and stability on the
Peninsula and in Asia. In this regard, U.S. security ties to the ROK
are the reality on which the hopes of our diplomacy are founded.
NORTH KOREA POLICY
U.S. policy toward North Korea is informed by a central dilemma: at
present, the DPRK is too reprehensible to fully embrace but too
dangerous to completely ignore. Therefore, over the past six years, the
U.S. has sought to identify its most pressing security concerns with
the North and then find some basis for addressing these issues,
primarily through bilateral channels but also in multilateral fora. The
most important agreement reached to date has been the October 1994
Agreed Framework, which still serves as the foundation for our dealings
with North Korea. The Agreed Framework froze the North's nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon under international monitoring and
provided for their ultimate dismantlement. In exchange, the North
received heavy fuel oil and the pledge of two proliferation-resistant
light water nuclear reactors, to be constructed by an international
consortium founded by the U.S., the ROK, and Japan. The Agreed
Framework remains an essential guarantee of peace and stability on the
Peninsula today and an important barrier against the outbreak of a
renewed crisis. Such a crisis could quickly result in a direct conflict
given the concentration of forces at the DMZ, the minimal decision time
available to assess threatening military moves, and the inherent
paranoia of the North Korean regime.
Therefore, the Department of Defense sees great value in the
maintenance of a properly functioning, strictly-enforced Agreed
Framework. U.S. determination to ensure that the DPRK adheres to its
obligations under the Framework was demonstrated in our insistence that
the North grant us access to a suspect site at Kumchang-Ni that we
believed might be connected to an underground nuclear program. While we
found nothing nuclear-related at the site, we could not determine its
true purpose definitively and so we will continue to monitor its
development through various methods, including a follow-up site visit
this year.
However, the Agreed Framework has not been sufficient to address
the array of concerns and issues that make our relations with the North
so potentially volatile. This was underscored with alarming effect at
the end of August 1998 when the DPRK launched a Taepo Dong 1 missile,
with a satellite payload attached, over Japan. In light of the North's
record of destabilizing behavior and its persistent threats against the
ROK and Japan, this step by the North was extremely disturbing and
provocative and served to spur stepped-up diplomatic and security
consultations with our allies in Northeast Asia. The missile launch
also catalyzed trilateral planning for coordinated responses across the
range of policy instruments, political, economic, and security-related.
Against this backdrop, Dr. Perry began a thoroughgoing review of
U.S. policy toward North Korea in the fall of 1998. Ten months later,
after much study and close consultations with Congress and our ROK and
Japanese allies, he recommended a strategy focusing on U.S. security
concerns over DPRK nuclear weapons- and missile-related activities as
our highest priority. Dr. Perry's approach envisioned two paths. On the
first path, the U.S. would be willing to move incrementally toward
normalized relations with the North in exchange for the DPRK's
cooperation in eliminating critical security threats to the U.S. and
its allies. These threats certainly encompass suspected nuclear and
missile activities, but also ultimately cover the broader range of
concerns related to all weapons of mass destruction, an offensively-
postured DPRK conventional force arrayed near the DMZ, and the North's
refusal to pursue meaningful inter-Korean tension-reduction through
direct contact with the ROK government.
If the North rejected our offer to improve relations and eliminate
sources of hostility, then the U.S., in close coordination with its
allies, would have to take additional steps to ensure the containment
of the DPRK threat. The U.S. and its allies would have to take measured
but firm steps with the aim of persuading the DPRK that it should
return to the first path and avoid destabilizing the security situation
in the region.
COORDINATION WITH OUR ALLIES
As General Schwartz, the new Commander of U.S. Forces on the
Peninsula in Korea, has indicated in his recent appearances before
congressional committees, the U.S.-ROK alliance remains one of the
linchpins of our influence in the region and lends weight and
credibility to our policy initiatives on the Peninsula. To these ends,
the U.S.-ROK alliance has never been stronger. The ongoing extensive
DPRK winter military training cycle this year and Pyongyang's continued
investment in military assets even as North Korea as a whole suffers
under great hardship provides telling confirmation of the need for this
strong alliance relationship.
Understandably, our overriding focus on the Peninsula is sustaining
deterrence and being prepared to respond in the event of provocation or
attack from the North. I can assure you that U.S.-ROK combined forces
are better equipped and more ready now than at any time in the history
of the alliance. The U.S. has in recent years been engaged in ongoing
efforts to modernize its Peninsula forces with the latest military
equipment, including AH-64 helicopters, Bradley Fighting vehicles,
Global Positioning System receivers, frequency hopping radios, and a
pre-positioned heavy brigade set. These measures have been complemented
by ROK efforts to outfit its military with the most modern tanks,
personnel carriers, and self-propelled howitzers. The ROK commitment of
resources to defense has been notable given the economic hardships that
have burdened the country in recent years.
In short, there has not been, and never will be, any complacency or
dropping of our guard on the Peninsula. Gen. Schwartz and his staff are
constantly working with their ROK colleagues to strengthen our combined
deterrent. The tight coordination between U.S. and ROK military
establishments, from fighting positions along the DMZ to policy offices
in Washington and Seoul, ensures that readiness will not be
compromised. The bedrock of peace is, and will remain, vigilance. And
in maintaining that peace, the U.S. and ROK will insist that the
Armistice Agreement that suspended hostilities in 1953 remain in effect
until a new peace regime is concluded between South and North Korea.
The imperative of close coordination extends, to U.S. and ROK
security discussions with Japan also. I have personally worked very
hard to build a structure for trilateral consultations and coordinated
security steps that will strengthen our deterrence posture in
addressing crises on the Peninsula. Trilateral coordination reduces the
potential for DPRK adventurism by casting U.S., ROK, and Japanese
security efforts as a synchronized response and ensuring an optimal,
synergistic use of our respective defense assets. Our purpose is not to
unduly provoke the DPRK, but to take advantage of the natural
intersection of security objectives among the three countries and
ensure that our combined strength dissuades the North from ever
resorting to military means without understanding that the cost for
Pyongyang will be high.
ACCOUNTING FOR THOSE STILL MISSING IN KOREA
The Department of Defense, with its focus on deterrence, has had
little direct contact with its counterpart organization in North Korea,
the Korean People's Army. But one area where we have pursued exchanges
and direct contacts with the KPA is in providing the fullest possible
accounting of those still missing from the Korean War. While the DPRK
has cooperated on this issue in the past in arranging joint recovery
operations in the North, its current intransigence on this issue is a
severe disappointment. We have an obligation to the veterans and the
families of those still missing to make it clear that progress on
accounting for those missing from the Korean War is of central
importance in our bilateral relationship with the DPRK. We will
continue to pursue arrangements for joint recoveries operations on
terms that are acceptable to us and that honor the memory and sacrifice
of those service members who never returned from Korea.
CONCLUSION
While the North Korean willingness to engage with us under the
terms spelled out in the Perry approach is still not entirely clear,
our diplomatic efforts to date have yielded noteworthy security
benefits. Aside from the freeze on North Korean nuclear facilities at
Yongbyon and Taechon under the Agreed Framework, the DPRK commitment
last fall to suspend long-range missile tests while talks on improving
bilateral relations with the U.S. continued was a significant step.
These accomplishments are a foundation on which to build and call for
intensified efforts to draw the North into a deeper diplomatic process
that will address continuing concerns about destabilizing programs and
activities of the North. Efforts to curtail all the destructive aspects
of North Korean behavior will be a long-term enterprise and will demand
great patience, but they are absolutely worth the effort as long as
they are coupled with a strong deterrent posture and remain true to our
long-term objectives on the Peninsula. From a security standpoint, the
alternative could very well be direct conflict with the North, which
would take a devastating toll in lives and resources. For this reason,
it is important for the U.S. to adhere to the Agreed Framework and to
continue pursuing the objectives of the Perry process for the
foreseeable future.
Senator Thomas. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I
appreciate it. Obviously, this is one of the most important
areas to us. On the other hand, when did we start this DMZ,
37,000 troops being deployed there?
Mr. Kramer. DMZ, as you know, started in 1953. I cannot
remember when we went to 37,000.
Senator Thomas. Well, substantial numbers we have had there
since 1953.
Mr. Kramer. Long time. Yes, sir.
Senator Thomas. Nearly 50 years.
Mr. Kramer. I was there last year, and I have to tell you
that I get a sense that things hadn't changed very much.
Senator Thomas. Will it go on another 50 years this way?
How do we do that?
Ambassador Sherman. I think, Mr. Chairman, you really have
put your finger on the situation on the Peninsula. This is the
place where there is an armistice, not a peace, and it is an
armistice that has been in place for nearly 50 years, and it is
the one last bastion of the cold war. And what the United
States is trying to do in its policy working with South Korea
and Japan--and really with a hats off to President Kim Dae-
jung, who has worked very well in the alliance and trilaterally
with us and Japan to try to move this forward--looking for a
way to have dialog and engage the North that would ultimately
lead to at least peaceful coexistence, if not reunification on
the Peninsula so that we can end the cold war.
I think that North Korea has some fundamental decisions to
make. It seems to be sending some signals both in its diplomacy
with us and its diplomacy with everyone from China and Russia
to the EU, Italy and the Philippines and others that it wants
to reach out to the world and end its isolation, which is key,
I think, to being able to address our concerns about weapons of
mass destruction. But I cannot emphasize strongly enough that
this will be a, still, a long, tough, difficult process, but I
would cite, as Assistant Secretary Kramer did, that our
approach has frozen fissile material production at Yongbyon and
Taechon, has gotten a moratorium of testing of long-range
missiles, any type of long-range missiles, which is quite
crucial because it is very hard to continue to develop a
missile program when you cannot test your missiles. It has
allowed us to have site visits to Kumchang-ni, and really a
template for addressing concerns that we had. The United States
has been just extraordinary in its humanitarian efforts to feed
a starving population, and we have worked very hard to try to
move toward a North-South dialog, which is absolutely essential
to finally getting peace on the Peninsula.
Senator Thomas. Let me go on. You know, I have been hearing
this for a very long time. I am not critical, necessarily, but
I guess what I am saying is when you go 50 years and things
have not changed substantially, it seems like maybe you have to
change what you are doing. And hopefully, we are.
Mr. Kramer. I understand what you mean, Mr. Chairman, about
things have not changed. But I would like to point out some
things that have changed. And most fundamentally, the situation
in the Republic of Korea has changed. We ought to be very proud
as a country, and I have some small part in this, as many
people in this room did and you yourself did. That country has
moved a great deal. It is a full-fledged democracy.
It is a very prosperous country. I remember in a different
context seeing statistics, and I won't get the numbers right
but in 1957, they had a per capita of, say, $500--less than a
thousand. Now it is much, much higher. So we have had a policy
that has had great success.
What we have not done, of course, is change the attitude of
the North. I understand that is what you are focusing on but I
do not think we ought to forget that there have been very
fundamental positive aspects in the Republic of Korea itself
and its ability to take its place as an important country in
the region.
Senator Thomas. If that is the case, why has not our ratio
of troops changed?
Mr. Kramer. Are you talking about the forces?
Senator Thomas. No. They have somewhat increased, which I
agree with you. And I am very proud, too, of what we are doing,
but we still have the same amount of troops there to take our
position than the country that is substantially stronger.
Mr. Kramer. Yes. And I think the answer to that is that the
North poses a serious threat, and it is a very good use of the
forces that we do have, which is just a little under 40,000, to
deter the threat. The loss, the loss on the other side, that is
to say the downside of having a war start, which we could win,
would be incredible, and so it is worth the cost of deterrence
to ensure that the war does not start.
Senator Thomas. I want to make it clear when we talk a
little bit about questions and alternatives that I certainly
share as fully as you do the result, but it does--you know, we
keep talking about high-level meetings now. Does this mean that
the State Department is going to go to a higher level of
officials dealing with North Korea?
Ambassador Sherman. There are a couple of things that are
going to go on, Mr. Chairman. Out of the New York talks that
Ambassador Kartman just finished we expect to shortly have
dates for an Agreed Framework implementation negotiation which
Ambassador Kartman will head up, reintensified missile
negotiation, which Assistant Secretary Einhorn will head up,
and I believe that at some point we will indeed have a high-
level visit in Washington, and I will lead our delegation with
Dr. Perry for that high-level visit.
Senator Thomas. So our level of negotiators will remain the
same?
Ambassador Sherman. Our level of negotiators in terms of
the specific negotiating tracks will remain the same. The high-
level visit will provide an opportunity to raise in a more
macro sense the concerns that we have and hopefully to
establish a framework for proceeding in a new relationship with
North Korea, but I think this will still take a little bit of
time to get in place.
Senator Thomas. So we will still see Mr. Kartman being the
chief negotiator?
Ambassador Sherman. Yes.
Senator Thomas. Even though we were talking about it being
a higher level.
Ambassador Sherman. Yes. We will see him as still our
primary negotiator along with Assistant Secretary Einhorn. In
addition, we recommenced terrorism talks in New York. This is
an issue of great concern to the United States and I know to
the Congress. It is one of the greatest threats facing
Americans in the new century, and so we would very much like to
ensure that North Korea is not a state sponsor of terrorism and
ends any of its terrorism activities. And Ambassador Sheehan,
who heads up the counterterrorism office at the State
Department, is leading those negotiations and that dialog, and
I would expect those talk to continue in the future as well.
Senator Thomas. South Korea's Minister is urging that we
remove North Korea from the list of countries supporting
terrorism. What are the four conditions that have been laid
out?
Ambassador Sherman. Well, the legislation has some very
specific requirements in terms of ending state sponsorship of
terrorism, making sure that you do not harbor any terrorist
groups and take a variety of other actions. And Ambassador
Sheehan laid out to the DPRK in New York the kind of things we
are looking for. I would rather not get into specifics in a
public hearing, Mr. Chairman, because that really is a tactical
negotiation, but I would be glad to have someone come up and
fully brief members and the staff on the specific requirements
that we are asking for.
Senator Thomas. We have been joined by the leader of the
minority. We are very delighted to have you here.
Senator Biden. I love the euphemism of being the ranking
member, which translates in everyday language where I am from,
it means you have no power.
Senator Thomas. That is why I tried to avoid that.
Senator Biden. And you did it very tactfully, Mr. Chairman,
and because I have no power, I'll refrain from asking all but
one question, if I may.
I recently had an opportunity to speak to a group of
scientists and nuclear scientists and arms control folks,
combination of both, members of the Rumsfeld Commission, as
well as old time arms controllers about the question of our
national defense and what we were likely to do, what we should
do. Dr. Perry put on a conference and spoke and participated.
There was a consensus among the 25 participants, and I think
you would know every one of them, that the temporary refraining
from testing on the part of the North Koreans of their longer
range missile, Taepo Dong, was something that we should not
take such a great solace from. There was a split among our
group as to how optimistic we should be about the possibility
of them shelving that program, and there were talks about
upcoming talks. You have been discussing that, I assume, and I
guess what I wanted to ask you is this.
We seem to all have adopted as fact the notion that nuclear
deterrence is of little consequence when it comes to North
Korea; that we are dealing with a regime that will not
attempt--if they have the capacity to strike the United
States--not unilaterally launch a strike. But rather, the North
will use it as leverage on being able to move on South Korea,
and that we will be frozen because we will be threatened with
annihilation of an American city. The North Koreans will be
psychologically impervious to the concern that we would be able
to obliterated them in a matter of about 28 minutes.
Now, I wonder whether or not you can give me a sense, and
you do not have to respond, either one of you, if you do not
want to. I know from my staff you have spoken about deterrence
today relative to our conventional forces and South Korean
conventional forces in the region. But which side of the
argument do you buy into? Is North Korea susceptible to the
rational view that if they strike us with a missile, we will
make North Korea a giant crater in the ground; the view in
which there is no question in anybody's mind about the relative
strength of the capabilities and our ability to literally, not
figuratively, annihilate every single square inch of North
Korea.
Now, do you really think that North Korea's political
establishment sits there and says: We do not have to worry
about that. We know the United States would never do that, and
so the United States will yield to threats on our part of being
able to strike. Talk to me about that.
Ambassador Sherman. You ask a very important question, and
recently, Senator, I went to Brussels to meet with Secretary
General Robertson and with the NAC to have this very discussion
about North Korea, what we were doing in our policy and what it
meant in terms of the national missile defense decision that
the President is undertaking. I do not think--to put it on the
positively, I think we all believe that deterrence does work,
conventional traditional deterrence does work on the Korean
Peninsula, but there are some buts to that and the buts go
something like this. I think North Korea, although it fully
accepts that it would be obliterated, I think they know that in
any war, in any conflict, that we would ultimately win. But I
also think they are a closed Stalinist regime that at the end
of the day may feel that their very survival forces them to
take these kind of risks that other people who work in our
paradigm might not take.
Second, I think they believe that they might have some
leverage with these weapons of mass destruction over the United
States coming to the defense of our allies in a regional
conflict and that we might think twice. And so, therefore, I
think it has led many in Congress and the President obviously,
Secretary Cohen, Secretary Albright, to think carefully about
whether we need to add to our arsenal of deterrence a defensive
system that would protect us from such a threat and such a
sense of leverage that North Korea might have. And third, we
have a timing problem.
We certainly hope that our diplomacy moves from this oral
missile moratorium on test launching and I agree with you. Just
because we have stopped the testing of long-range missiles,
which is a very important step, it is still only a step, and it
is a long way to North Korea getting rid of its indigenous
missile programs, stopping its exports, et cetera. That is a
tough road to go and it will take a long time. And in order to
deploy the first phase of the national missile defense, one
gets to that time line a heck of a lot sooner than you probably
get to the end of a successful diplomatic process. So as the
President considers the threat, the cost, the technical
feasibility, the strategic and foreign policy interests for the
United States in making the decision about deploying phase one
of the national missile defense, we are faced with a problem of
the timeframes not being the same and having to have an
advanced lead time to put things into place. I am sure my
colleague has some things he wants to add to this.
Mr. Kramer. I think those points are well said. Let me add
a couple of points. One, we have never thought that defense and
deterrence are incompatible. For example, in the ABM Treaty
itself it allows for limited defense, and so as we set up, if
you will, the structures of the cold war deterrent
capabilities, we did allow for some limited defense. Second,
the issue is not usually thought about in terms of both, but
what happens when you have the most difficult and intense kinds
of circumstances where the regime may, in fact, be thinking
that it may lose its capability to continue to rule, and so it
has to make the decision of the least worst approach for
itself.
We had a non-nuclear situation recently in which you would
have thought deterrents would have worked. On the conventional
side, I understand that is different. And that is the situation
in Kosovo. After all, Milosevic faced 19 NATO nations and by
any measure was not going to win the war, but he nonetheless
undertook actions to start it. By any measure Ambassador
Sherman says we will win the war, but what we do not want to
have happen would be a situation where the North Koreans could
somehow make a calculus that under their calculus the least
worst decision was to utilize a weapon of mass destruction.
Senator Biden. Just for the record, I think you are all
crazy. I cannot think of any time in human history where the
most desperate and the most radical, the most irrational
persons has made that kind of calculation. I cannot think of an
example of that calculation. But it amazes me that you all are
buying into this, and I must be the one that is wrong. I find
myself being one of the few people up here who thinks that that
calculus is wrong. You would fail my calculus course. I cannot
fathom how you reach the conclusion that there is a
circumstance in which the regime would believe it could survive
as a consequence of testing our resolve by threatening us with
a nuclear strike. I find that just mind-boggling.
And I think the analogy to Kosovo is fundamentally
different. There was never a risk of Milosevic losing his power
because we all stated at the outset we weren't going to take
him out. We weren't going after him. So it was a very different
calculus. That is something I do know a lot about, that policy.
And there was never at the NAC the decision to go after
Milosevic. We would not send ground forces in. He had already
lost Kosovo anyway, in his view, because he was going to have
to maintain a presence there that was not sustainable. I think
it's a very different circumstances.
So what I am trying to get at is this. If tomorrow the Lord
Almighty came down and sat where the stenographer is sitting
and said I want to guarantee you all one thing, there is no
longer a missile program in North Korea. There would be no
rationale for the timetable we have now on our national missile
defense policy. None. Zero. No rational person, no planner--and
I met with chiefs and I met with all of them--none of them
would choose to have to make these decisions in the short
timeframe that we have telescoped it out of necessity because
of North Korea.
So the premise upon which we are generating this is this
fundamental notion that this is the one place in the world
where deterrence is not, cannot be counted on to work, and
there is a need for a defensive capability that can take care
of these systems.
And my next question and my concluding question is this.
And by the way, again, I want to make it clear I think you
represent clearly the majority point of view, I am really the
odd man out on this. It does not calculate to me. I do not know
how we get there. We heard the same things about how irrational
the Soviets were all the time, and they never were. We go down
the list of all the irrational nations around the world and
what they are going to do. We heard that about China.
I think to myself, OK, we deal with this possible threat.
If as a result of having to deal with it we have to abandon
ABM, the result is that China will go from at least 18 to 200
to as many as 1,000 ICBM's. Are we safer? I think that is a
crazy calculus myself. If they go to that number, would Japan
be able to sit there and reportedly be non-nuclear for the next
three or four decades? Do I want a nuclear Japan? Not on your
life.
And so I sit and look at a missile defense that 10 years
down the road may defend us with 95 percent accuracy. We only
could get about 85 percent now. If North Korea has 10 missiles,
that means two get through anyway at 85 percent. And at 95
percent, one gets through. We used to have in my generation
when I was in undergraduate school a bumper sticker: ``One
Nuclear Bomb Can Ruin Your Whole Day.'' We used to be able to
think. And so I wonder whether or not we are gaining if in
exchange for a 95 percent surety against a nation who
supposedly is not susceptible to a deterrent threat, we have a
China that no longer has only 18 nuclear weapons but has 2,000
ICBM's, an India which will respond in kind, and a Pakistan who
would respond to that, and a Russia with a MIRV system in place
and Japan going nuclear. I wonder whether or not in terms of
overall strategic balance my grandchildren are better off. I
know which world I'll pick. I'll take the chance of deterrence
against five to eight missiles and not have the rest of that
happen.
But I hope we get into a dialog here about North Korea and
the consequences of our actions. Again my question, Mr.
Chairman, is this. Where, give me your assessment, and if you
have done this already, please refrain, and I'll check into the
record and ask staff, but what is the state of play? How would
you characterize relations between Beijing and North Korea? Not
on any one issue, but how would you characterize the state of
relations?
Ambassador Sherman. I would say in a word improving. North
Korea and China had obviously a historical relationship. The
Chinese came to be part of a tremendously difficult, costly and
bloody conflict. But ironically, when Dr. Perry and I and our
team began work on this process, we went to China as part of
our consultations, and were, I think, a little bit surprised at
how few high-level contacts there had been between China and
North Korea, though China is seen by the world as North Korea's
only reliable ally, and China provides oil and food and
assistance to North Korea. This was in part I think because of
the death of Kim Il-sung, and the time it took his son to gain
control of the country and feel confident in what he is doing.
But over the last couple of years, I would say that North Korea
has reached out to try to improve its relationship with China
and China for its part welcomes that connection, but I think it
welcomes that connection not just to the assistance of North
Korea, but I think for its own purposes, it shares the
objectives that the United States has on the Korean Peninsula.
The Chinese, Senator Biden, for some of the reasons that
you yourself elaborated a moment ago, do not want a Korean
Peninsula that has nuclear weapons and China does not want an
arms race on the Korean Peninsula. China worries about Taiwan
and about Japan, and it really does not want to exacerbate that
situation so although China is not going to coordinate with the
United States in the same way that South Korea or Japan would,
we know in fact that China has encouraged the North and asked
the North not to test long-range missiles because it creates
the potential for an arms race in the Peninsula, which is not
in China's interest.
Just now the Foreign Minister of North Korea is in China or
has just left China. Some people speculate that that is a
prelude to Kim Jong Il making a visit to China. I think no one
knows whether that is in fact going to happen, but Kim Jong Il
is trying to assess some signals because he made a foray to the
Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, which we might not think is a big
deal, but was a significant event for him to make that visit.
What the significance is, we have tea leaf readers who have
tried to make out what that means, but I do not think any of us
know for sure.
I say it is improving because I think the contacts between
the two countries are increasing. I think China wants to
maintain and rebuild its relationship with North Korea to keep
it from being a player in an arms race and or from provoking a
nuclear crisis on the Peninsula.
I think it is also important to note that the ROK under
President Kim Dae-jung's leadership I think has taken a very
good series of steps to build its relationship with China, and
I think China feels its relationship with the ROK is also
increasingly important in maintaining a balance on the
Peninsula, and I think one of the reasons North Korea has now
reached out to China is because North Korea is concerned about
China's growing relationship with the ROK, and so I think the
calculus has changed somewhat. And I think what is very
important for the United States is that we continue in
consultation with the Chinese, which we do on a regular basis,
and I would note, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and other
members, that when we accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy,
this was one area in which we continued to consult with China.
The week after the accidental bombing, Ambassador Lee was in my
office to continue our dialog on North Korea because of the
shared objectives in this instance.
Mr. Kramer. I would agree with that. I do not think I
really have much to say other than to say from our perspective,
also, the Chinese have been what I would call modestly helpful
in things like party talks and the like. And they talked to us
a lot not only about--they had spoken about a nuclear freeness
for a number of years. A few years ago in talks at high levels,
they added the notion of a chemical-free Peninsula, and we have
discussed that with--Secretary Cohen has--on a number of
occasions. Their overall stated objective, putting aside
precisely what they do accomplish, is not just a nuclear-free
Peninsula, but actually a WMD-free Peninsula. They have helped
us again modestly with respect to the missile programs.
Senator Biden. I think in the end it is always best to take
a chance on self-interest prevailing, assessments of one's own
self-interest prevailing, and projections of conduct. And it
seems to me that you have it right, that there is a rationale
for the Chinese, to have a confluence of interests with us in
seeing to it that the Peninsula is damped down and not heated
up. But I appreciate your answer. I appreciate your time and I
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me a question.
Senator Thomas. Thank you, sir. Let me ask one, and then
I'll turn to Senator Kerry. Back to the question of terrorism.
Try to get away from that listing and so on and a couple of
parts to it. Is kidnapping an important part of terrorism,
considered so? If so, can you confirm that the South Korean
Government has said that they hold more than 400 kidnapped
South Koreans and then more specifically in the last 3 weeks
another South Korean was kidnapped?
Ambassador Sherman. What I can best say in open forum about
that, which is clearly a very serious issue, is that before
Ambassador Sheehan began this round of terrorism talks in New
York, we had bilateral consultations with the South Koreans and
Japanese to make sure that we went into these talks knowing
what were issues of concern to each of those governments. So we
reviewed the whole range of concerns that we thought they might
have. And so I think that their views and their concerns are
represented and again, I would be glad to have someone come up
and brief you in detail about those specifics.
Senator Thomas. Glad to be joined by the ranking member on
the subcommittee. Senator.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I have
too many hearings today. It is good to be with you. Thank you
very much.
Madam Secretary, thank you for the great communication that
you and Dr. Perry have had with us and the efforts you have
been making. And I think your initiative and his initiative
have been really well-taken, and my sense is it has helped us.
It has helped us to understand. It has helped them to make
progress, and I know with the bilateral talks coming up, our
hope is obviously that we can make some more progress.
Help me understand a couple of things, if you will. With
respect to the missile situation, is the focus of the talks
limitations on the Taepo Dong-II, or is it any kind of missile
program at all?
Ambassador Sherman. The missile negotiations which
Assistant Secretary Einhorn will head up deal with the
development, deployment, testing and export of long-range
missiles beyond the MTCR guidelines and that includes the No
Dong missile as well as what is known as the Taepo Dong-I and
Taepo Dong-II, as well as some versions of the scuds that fall
out of the MTCR range. And so that is our goal, and to have a
verifiable cessation of any missile program that goes beyond
the MTCR guidelines. This is going to be very difficult and
time-consuming to achieve, but that is the objective.
Senator Kerry. Understanding that, then, the suspension of
their tests which they agreed to pending our discussions, I
assume there is nothing else that they have engaged in with
respect to the missile program that at this point indicates
anything other than the potential for us holding out hope that
we are still on the track where those talks could produce
something?
Ambassador Sherman. I would say that in terms of this
forum, and again we would be glad to have further briefings in
a classified setting, but I think there have been public
reports of engine testing. I would suspect that as we go
forward in this process, when they want us to be particularly
nervous about whether we are making progress when they wanted
to try to leverage some positive response by us, they probably
will take actions that our satellite imagery will pick up just
to sort of yank our chain and make us nervous that, in fact,
they are going to proceed ahead. We have to take that
seriously, and we will have to with the intelligence community
and with the Defense Department analyze what they are in fact
doing and decide whether we need to take any specific actions.
But I think it is fair to say that their suspension of
long-range testing is an important step, indicates that they
want to stay on positive trajectory, but I would still be very
cautious about that, and I think we have to remain vigilant
because until we get down to the hard negotiations of their
indigenous missile program and the exports which are a very,
very serious threat, not only in the region, but quite frankly
in other regions of the world, particularly in the Middle East,
we really will not have done the job that we need to do here.
Assistant Secretary Kramer may have a perspective from the
Defense Department.
Senator Kerry. Do you want to add anything?
Mr. Kramer. I think that is a fair statement. We have
achieved the moratorium. We have not achieved the total goal.
Senator Kerry. I understand that. I was just trying to get
your sense of the plight. Now, they have permitted the
inspection and have reiterated that they are willing to have us
go back and reinspect? That is still on the table?
Ambassador Sherman. Yes. That has been reaffirmed in the
talks in New York with Ambassador Kartman. That is on schedule
and still on the table.
Senator Kerry. How are we interpreting the session in
Pyongyang with the Chinese Ambassador? People have sort of said
wow, 4 hours. They do not usually meet with foreigners. Is this
reasonable? Is there any way to look at it and say anything at
all?
Ambassador Sherman. I think we have some of our analysts
who believe, Senator, that this was a significant event maybe
foreshadowing a visit to Beijing. Some believe this was meant
to send a signal because the Chinese Defense Minister had
recently visited the ROK, and so this was a signal to say we
have a special relationship with the Chinese as well. I think
no one is quite sure what the meaning of it was, and I am sure
there are several other interpretations in addition to those.
And I think we will just have to see how all of these pieces
fit together, including the Foreign Minister's visit to
Beijing, which just concluded. I always get mixed up on the
timeframes, is a prelude to a visit by Kim Jong Il, and whether
there is a significant change that is going to occur here. We
honestly do not quite know for sure.
Senator Kerry. Italy now having established diplomatic
relations, Japan apparently engaging in talks on the abductees,
in addition to that a delegation going to China to view
economic systems, it seems that there are stirrings in a way
that may in fact bring a potential for more fruits from the
Perry initiative and so forth. Would you not say that that is
kind of in the air?
Ambassador Sherman. I agree with you completely, Senator.
That is in the air. There is a lot going on. They have reached
out for a lot of diplomatic relations. As I mentioned to the
chairman, I had dinner with Foreign Minister Dini last night,
who is going to visit Pyongyang. We have tried to stay in touch
with and talk with everyone who is engaging in diplomacy with
North Korea, not to threaten nor to provoke, but so they will
all have a coordinated approach that will best help end the
DPRK's isolation and address the international community's
concerns about weapons of mass destruction and other issues
that we have.
I think these are stirrings. I think we all have to be
careful that North Korea is not just doing, as we say in State
Department lingo, forum shopping, looking for the best partner
to get the most out of the relationship and then leveraging
that relationship against all the other countries that you
might be dealing with, and I think that is why the trilateral
consultation we have with the ROK and Japan and the growing
consultation coordination we have had with other countries of
interest is quite critical.
Japan expects to begin their normalization talks in early
April, and I think that one of the things that we all have to
keep in mind and I think is the point you were making, Senator,
is that each of these bilateral forays is really in the
aggregate a testament to the framework set out by the Perry
process that was developed in consultation with the Congress.
Senator Kerry. The visit to Washington would be when?
Ambassador Sherman. I'll take out my crystal ball and my
guess will probably be as good as anyone's. I think that most
of us assumed wrongly, that the North Koreans visiting
Washington in reciprocation for our visit to Pyongyang was not
a difficult thing. But in fact, I think it is quite a difficult
thing for the North. It would really be a statement that they
had made a fundamental decision to move down a positive path in
a pretty profound way. I think they have had some concerns
about whether they are ready to take that step, whether they
have moved far enough along, and I think what is most important
is not the sequencing of negotiations, but reaching the
objectives of our negotiation, which is to end their long-range
missile program and their exports and to make sure that they do
not have a nuclear weapons program, and so if in fact Agreed
Framework implementation negotiation, missile negotiation gets
started before we ever have a high-level visit, I think again
the sequencing is not what matters here, it is getting to the
objectives and I think there is a variety of ways to do that. I
still expect and anticipate there will be a high-level visit.
At exactly what point I think is a little less clear, but those
discussions between Ambassador Kartman and Vice Foreign
Minister Kim Gye Gwan will continue.
Senator Kerry. And the missile talks and nuclear talks are
separate tracks?
Ambassador Sherman. They are separate tracks that are
coordinated in overall interagency efforts, but they are
separate negotiating tracks, but we try with our allies and do
so in terms of the Japanese talks and any South Korean, North
Korean talks both in the private channels and in the public
channels to coordinate our efforts so that all of the carrots
and all of the sticks as we all talk about, we are all
deploying in a conscious effort together.
Senator Kerry. From our perspective, is there any virtue to
any kind of additional high-level visits to North Korea?
Ambassador Sherman. I think that is certainly always an
option that we have in front of us as to continuing to look at
how we proceed. There is nothing planned today.
Senator Kerry. I appreciate it. Obviously, we would all be
elated if we could bear fruit on this effort. This has been one
of the great puzzles in the region for a long time, and it
would be wonderful, particularly with the current question
marks about China and Taiwan, to diffuse this one a little bit.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Mr. Kramer. Senator, could I make--one point worth picking
up is borne fruit. I think the trilateral cooperation which
existed to some extent, but really was developed in connection
with the Perry process with Ambassador Sherman, is an extremely
important element and positive both on the diplomatic side and
the defense side, so I think--I know we have not gotten to that
kind of fruit yet, but we really have had some really positive
achievements here we should recognize.
Senator Kerry. I think I did recognize that in my original
statements. I am not--there is big fruit and there is little
fruit and ripe fruit and there is not so ripe fruit.
Mr. Kramer. Fair enough.
Senator Kerry. I am looking for the big break.
Senator Thomas. Thank you. I have a few more questions. We
can do it briefly. I'll try and stay away from--you have not
answered most of my questions because you say it is for
security reasons. I understand North Korea is pressing the
Clinton administration to replace the U.N. food program with
the unilateral program? What is your response to that?
Ambassador Sherman. We think that it is quite critical to
respond to the World Food Program's appeal for food, and the
reason we do is, first, because there is a coordinated effort
to meet a humanitarian need which is the underlying basis for
the United States providing food. More importantly, however,
the World Food Program can monitor the provision of that food
and few countries have that capacity on a bilateral basis, and
I think it is very important that we be able to tell the
American people that the food that we are providing is, in
fact, reaching the most vulnerable. Although the food
monitoring is not perfect by the World Food Program, it has
increased tremendously. Since 1995, there has been an
appointment of an American as the North Korean director, which
is important for our provision of food. They have gone from 3
to 486 internal staff, from one to six offices now in 162 out
of 211 counties, and they have doubled to 400 the number of
monitoring visits undertaken each month, and people who have
visited on a regular basis have in fact seen physically with
their own eyes a change.
Senator Thomas. Are you interested in replacing the United
Nations with a unilateral program?
Ambassador Sherman. No. We are not. We think the
fundamental provision of food should be through the World Food
Program. The North is very interested and has raised with us
getting Public Law 480 bilateral food assistance, but in order
for them to do that and as you know, Senator, it is a very
small program, so it won't provide very much food aid, but they
would have to get off the U.S. terrorism list in order to be
eligible to meet the requirements which have creditworthy
requirements and several other requirements to get bilateral
food assistance. We are a long way from that, and that is not
how we think fundamentally our food should be provided.
Senator Thomas. You have spoken that the basic direction is
nuclear missiles. Almost every other country we have dealt
with, China and all others, we are talking about internal
reform. Why do we not talk about them here?
Ambassador Sherman. I think we do talk about internal
reforms, and you are right to point them out. North Korea is a
despicable regime. They treat their people terribly. While they
do not have enough arable land to feed their population, they
could undertake agricultural reform.
A decision was made in the Perry process that we had to set
some priorities, and the first priority ought to be the
security of the United States and the citizens of the United
States and the security of the region and the world. And so
that is why that is our first focus. But you are quite right to
point out, and we do in our ongoing dialog with them continue
to point out all of these other areas, but our first priority,
we believe, needs to be the security concerns.
Senator Thomas. You mentioned, both of you, that the basis
of what we are doing is basically the Agreed Framework. When
was that put into place? When did we have an Agreed Framework?
Ambassador Sherman. We negotiated the Agreed Framework in
1994, and the point of the Agreed Framework--and Dr. Perry when
he testified in front of you in October when the report came
out eloquently said that this was the point in his tenure as
Secretary of Defense that we came closest to a potential, very
serious conflict and it was a true crisis. We were on our way
to the U.N. to get sanctions, and we really were looking at
moving our forces forward in anticipation of a very serious
conflict, if not a war.
But Ambassador Bob Galucci and with the assistance of a
visit by President Carter, who was in Pyongyang and met
directly with Kim Il-sung, we did get agreement that they would
freeze their graphite-moderated reactors at Taechon and
Yongbyon, and the United States would provide heavy fuel oil
while financing of the construction of light-water reactors was
put in place.
Mr. Kramer. Can I just go to the premise of the question?
What you said was that there were several elements of our
policy, and they include the Agreed Framework, they include
conventional deterrents, they include missile moratorium, the
trilateral diplomacy, the effort we are doing in national
missile defense and overall diplomacy, including working with
the South Koreans' sunshine policy, so I think it is important
to look at all of these elements.
Senator Thomas. My point is, though, and I think it is fair
to say in the Perry report they said we based it on the Agreed
Framework?
Ambassador Sherman. We are building on the framework.
Senator Thomas. That has been 6 years. What is the status
of the light-water reactor?
Ambassador Sherman. We will begin construction as soon as
winter is over. The financing has gotten through the
legislatures in both Korea and Japan. They have begun
disbursements. We have signed the turnkey contract, which went
into effect in February. I think we are on track. The light-
water reactors will not be in place as soon as we anticipated
for a whole variety of reasons on many sides, but I do think we
are on the track to move forward with construction which is
critical and as you know, North Korea will have to come into
full compliance with all IAEA safeguards before key components
are shipped to North Korea.
Senator Thomas. Is that the reason it has taken 6 years
before it has ever begun?
Ambassador Sherman. Well, I think it has taken a long time
because we had to get financing in place, the administrative
mechanism in place. The world has never tried multilaterally to
do such a project before. It is quite complicated. There need
to be a lot of safeguards in place for it to go forward, so I
share your frustration that it has not yet gone forward and as
Assistant Secretary Kramer has helpfully pointed out, the
financial crisis in Asia probably created another point of
slowdown in this process, but I give both Korea and Japan
credit for having overcome that and following through.
Senator Thomas. We agreed to 500 tons of oil, $35 million.
What is it going to cost this year?
Ambassador Sherman. I cannot give you that answer today,
Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the Congress' support in our
appropriation, leaving us waiver authority, reprogramming
authority. We need to decide to use additional dollars. The
heavy price of oil right now is complicating the needs that we
will have, but one of the things that I am determined to do and
have asked the folks at the State Department to re-energize, is
seeking other donors around the world. Part of my visit to
Brussels was not just to talk to the NAC, but was also to talk
to Chris Patten and to the EU about increasing its dollars, and
there is not a meeting I have with a leader of another country
here or abroad where we do not appeal for additional KEDO
funding, and I think we have to redouble our efforts to get
donors around the world to ante up to this very critical
security effort.
Senator Thomas. I understand. I understand the crisis is
something you cannot control. The Philippines, however, took
care of their own severe shortage in about 2 years. This seems
like it has been pretty drawn out sort of a situation.
Let me--sort of a question on the side here. When the
President goes to places like India, where does he get $200
million everywhere he goes?
Ambassador Sherman. Not being the Under Secretary of
Management, I probably cannot give you a very specific answer,
but Presidents of every administration have traveled the world.
This is something that we as the last remaining superpower have
an even greater responsibility.
Senator Thomas. That is not my point. Where does the money
come from? I presume that the State Department has a budget
that designates where this money goes, but for some reason or
other, wherever he goes, he is able to disburse hundreds of
millions of dollars. I am asked that all the time and I have
not the faintest idea.
Ambassador Sherman. In terms of foreign assistance?
Senator Thomas. In terms of whatever he did last week in
India.
Ambassador Sherman. Right. When he travels and when his
Secretary travels for that matter, it is sometimes an
opportunity to try to move a program or an effort forward, and
that program funding comes out of the regular appropriations
that the Congress authorizes and appropriates every year.
Senator Thomas. Would you get me a little more information
and tell me what was reduced in order to increase this?
Ambassador Sherman. Sure. And I am not sure that anything
was increased or reduced, Senator, but we will find out for you
whether this is part of the development assistance program.
Senator Thomas. You have hundreds of millions of dollars of
extra money in the State Department?
Ambassador Sherman. I do not think it is extra money at
all, sir. We will get it for you.
[At the time of publication a response had not been
received.]
Senator Thomas. You are shaking your heads in the first
row. People ask about it. It is always in the news. I think it
is an obligation to say where that came from.
One final. As you mentioned, in 1992 Secretary Perry was
indicating that the crisis that was there pretty much also
indicated that in the meantime, North Korea's economic
stability and strength has diminished, as well as their
military strength. Is that your point of view?
Ambassador Sherman. I think it is our sense that although
they might be slightly more stable than they were a year or two
ago when famine was at its highest, they are nonetheless a
declining economy, not a strengthening economy.
Mr. Kramer. With respect to the military, it is something I
have tried to highlight in the testimony, some of their areas
of increase. They spend a lot of time on their artillery.
Special forces have obviously been talking about that
continuously. They have tried to give themselves the capability
to move more quickly. They have a great number of underground
facilities they continue to develop. There are other aspects
because they do not have all the resources that they used to.
But as to what Secretary Perry said, I think that what we think
is that in the overall, they have a very dangerous capability
because they have the great preponderance of their forces
within about 100 miles of the DMZ, and so they could cause a
great deal of havoc even if they couldn't prevail and, in fact,
they wouldn't prevail.
Senator Thomas. I am sure that is true. Again, and I
understand, but it seems like we are moving toward a military
that is more deployable, and in fact we are concerned about the
number of troops that are deployed overseas, and that can be a
difficult thing for the military. It can be very expensive. I
am told much of the strength, if we had to use it, would be
comfortable.
I am confused again. As things changed in terms of military
deployments we seem to say the statements around the DMZ. Why
is that?
Mr. Kramer. We go through the war planning process greatly,
and the general who left the command in chief left extensive
analysis of the war plan. In order to ensure that we prevail,
we do not plan to have a fair fight. We plan to win as promptly
as we possibly can with the least possible casualties to us and
to the Koreans. We use all the analytic and judgmental factors
that are in our ability to decide what we need, and I can in
private go through those, but I can assure you that it is the
military judgment that based on what the capabilities of the
North Koreans are, the posture that we have now is designed to
effectively, quickly, and very decisively defeat them, but it
does require a substantial overthrow.
Senator Thomas. Finally, I think James Rubin indicated that
on the agenda of a high-level visit would be steps to formally
end the Korean war. Is that correct, and what items would be
involved there?
Ambassador Sherman. I am not familiar with that specific
quote, Mr. Chairman. I think that on the agenda for a high-
level visit would be the whole range of concerns that we have,
and our ultimate goal to in fact replace an armistice with a
peace agreement, but I want to be quite clear that any such
peace agreement or peace treaty is something that has to happen
in the context, not just by America or standing alone. We are
working this with our allies. We do not anticipate in a high-
level visit renegotiating the end of the Korean war in one
high-level visit to Washington, DC.
Senator Thomas. That was a statement by Mr. Rubin on the
1st of January, this year.
Ambassador Sherman. I will look at it. I think he meant
wanting to end a hostile relationship between the United States
and North Korea is on our agenda. We do want to do that.
Senator Thomas. Do you perceive that the South Korean
notion, of course, it changed a little bit in terms of what
they call sunshine through engagement. The reunification is not
used now as much as some sort of a relationship, is that not
true?
Ambassador Sherman. That is correct. President Kim Dae-jung
talks about peaceful coexistence more than reunification. He
does talk about the importance of dialog to ultimately decide
what happens on the Peninsula, which we agree with. This is
really something that has to be determined by the Korean
people, what they think their vision of their future ought to
be.
Senator Thomas. Thank you both very much. I think it is
important that we try to revisit this issue so that we are as
informed as possible. So if any others have questions, we will
submit them to you. In the meantime, thank you very much for
being here. The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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