[Senate Hearing 106-749]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-749
UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE OPTIONS FOR THE ANDES
=======================================================================
HEARING
Before the
SENATE CAUCUS ON
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
of the
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
February 22, 2000
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-504 WASHINGTON : 2000
SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
one hundred sixth congress
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa, Chairman
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Delaware, Co-Chair
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BOB GRAHAM, Florida
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan
Wm. J. Olson, Staff Director
Marcia S. Lee, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Opening Statement:
Page
Senator Charles E. Grassley.................................. 1
Senator Joseph R. Biden...................................... 18
Senator Bob Graham........................................... 20
PANEL I
General Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy................................................. 25
Prepared Statement........................................... 30
Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Department of State......................... 44
Prepared Statement........................................... 49
Mr. Richard Fisher, Deputy United States Trade Representative,
Office of the United States Trade Representative............... 60
Prepared Statement........................................... 63
General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern
Command, Department of Defense................................. 72
Prepared Statement........................................... 75
SUBMITTED QUESTIONS
General Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy................................................. 117
Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Department of State......................... 134
Mr. Richard Fisher, Deputy United States Trade Representative,
Office of the United States Trade Representative............... 157
General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern
Command, Department of Defense................................. 160
UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE OPTIONS FOR THE ANDES
---------- --
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2000
United States Senate,
Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
and the Subcommittee on International Trade,
of the Committee on Finance,
Washington, DC.
The Caucus and Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10
a.m., in room SD-215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon.
Charles E. Grassley, chairman of the caucus and the
subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Grassley, Sessions, Biden, and Graham.
Senator Grassley. Even though my colleagues are not here,
I am going to go ahead and get started because some of our
witnesses, particularly General McCaffrey, have other
obligations outside the city today and I want to get started on
time.
First of all, I thank particularly our witnesses for
coming, taking time out of their busy schedules to help us with
the process of congressional oversight. All of you who are in
the audience, we thank you for your interest in this issue as
well.
The purpose of this hearing is to look at United States
counter-drug policy for the Andean region. We have a lot of
ground to cover today. The proposed emergency assistance
package that the administration has submitted to Congress is
one of the most significant foreign policy issues put before
Congress in recent years, and it also marks a very major
escalation in U.S. counter-drug efforts in Colombia. It comes
about as a result of a major expansion in drug production and
trafficking from Colombia.
The principal target for most of the drugs produced in
Colombia, of course, is the United States. That expansion has
occurred despite an already extensive U.S.-supported effort in
Colombia, and it has happened in large part because Marxist
guerrillas in that country have aligned themselves with drug
pushers, becoming in the end drug thugs themselves.
A high murder rate and endemic violence by narco-
traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitaries mean that Colombia
faces unprecedented challenges. The fate of democratic
institutions and the future of decent government are at risk.
Clearly, it is in the U.S. national interest to be concerned
about not only what is happening in Colombia, but what we can
and must do about the situation there to protect the American
people from this drug trafficking.
But it does make a difference how we engage, and the
purpose of our engagement, of course, is to make a difference.
This hearing is to look at how the present proposals will
accomplish important goals that will help Colombia as well as
help the United States.
Last year, Senators Coverdell and DeWine and myself
introduced the Alianza Act. The purpose of that effort was to
urge immediate and, let me stress, a very thoughtful response,
as opposed to just an ad hoc, temporizing, piecemeal effort.
What we asked for in that legislation was for the
administration to submit a strategy for how to make a
difference and not just some grab-bag of goodies bundled
together, because there are serious issues involved that
require serious consideration.
Our goal was and still is to see Colombia supported. The
Alianza Act indeed tries to prime the pump, but we also sought
to find a coherent, comprehensive, intelligent strategy, not
just a list of projects. I would like to quote from that Act
about what Congress wanted then and what we expect now. It is
not complicated, but it is necessary.
What we want to see is a plan that lays out priorities,
describes the actions needed to address the priorities, defines
the respective roles of the United States on the one hand and
Colombia on the other, details how the plan will incorporate
other regional partners, and delineates a time line for
accomplishing the goals based upon some understandable
criteria.
At this point, we have yet to see such a detailed plan.
What we have seen is various wish lists, and many of these have
been somewhat vague. Even these wish lists appear uncoordinated
and divergent. So it is my hope that we can clarify that
picture today during this hearing. This caucus tried to get
that clarity in a similar hearing late last year. The
administration did not seem able to shed much light then, and I
do hope that they can do better today.
So let me be clear. I believe that it is important to
support Colombia, that the situation there is serious and how
it develops is of direct concern to us. We have an obligation
to help because by helping we help the United States with the
drug trafficking that is coming here.
But it makes a difference how we go about providing that
help. Poorly conceived and badly implemented programs will do
more harm than if we did nothing at all. We will have a lot of
questions today about the issue of just what it is we are going
to do, how we are going to do it, and what we expect in
results.
So I would like to conclude by introducing for the record a
letter that I received from the General Accounting Office
detailing some of its recent findings on problems with our
efforts in Colombia. Members have copies of that communication
in their packages. So I just want to read a brief paragraph.
``. . . the executive branch has proposed a $1.3 billion
assistance package primarily designed to support Colombian
military and law enforcement activities, interdiction efforts,
economic and alternative development, and human rights and the
rule of law . . . However, at the time of our review, an
operational interagency strategy for Colombia had not been
developed. An official with the Office of National Drug Control
Policy indicated that it is considering developing such a
strategy, but there is currently no consensus among the
interagency counter-narcotics community whether an integrated
strategy should be developed. The official also stated that the
Office of National Drug Control Policy may not have the
legislative authority to make such a strategy work.''
[The letter referred to follows:]
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Senator Grassley. So I finish with this commentary on the
letter. This suggests that we are in the process of considering
a major support package without a clear idea of what it is that
we are proposing to do. That was true last year. I am not too
sure that things are better this year. That is what I hope to
hear more about today. We need an approach that will take the
initiative away from the traffickers and their allies. If we
don't, all we will be doing is playing an expensive game of
hopscotch, and we will be doing that all over the region and
that seems to me to be a formula for losing.
I now call on my colleagues, first Senator Biden and then
Senator Graham.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin by
commending you for holding this hearing. It is very important
that we consider the proposal for U.S. assistance to Colombia
and other options for the Andes. Though much of the focus of
the President's supplemental budget request is on Colombia, you
are correct to emphasize that we need a regional approach to
combat the drug problem in South America.
A decade ago, the Bush administration and Congress joined
in supporting the Andean Initiative, a multi-year effort to
combat drug trafficking in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and
Ecuador. Over the past 10 years, the United States has provided
considerable amounts of assistance as well as special market
access to certain Andean products under the Andean Trade
Preference Act.
As we start a new decade, we can look back with some
satisfaction that our joint efforts with these nations have
yielded some successes. In Bolivia and Peru, coca cultivation
is much reduced since 1995. In Colombia, large cartels that
once dominated the trade have been largely dismantled. Colombia
has resumed extraditing criminals to the United States, and
countries which a decade ago appeared to lack any political
will to combat drugs have become our partners in this effort.
That is the good news.
The bad news is that the scope of the problem is still much
the same. Cocaine continues to flow out of the region at
extremely high levels. Moreover, the face of the battle in
Colombia has changed. There, the cocaine trade has become
decentralized. Large cartels have been replaced by numerous and
smaller organizations. Colombian traffickers have also moved
into a new sector which some of us predicted in the mid-1990s--
that is, the cultivation of opium and the trafficking in
heroin--and are now major players in the eastern United States.
Finally, Colombia is now a major center for coca
cultivation, replacing Peru and Bolivia as the leading supplier
of the coca base. When we started the Andean Initiative and we
would speak with Colombians, they would basically say it is
your problem; we don't use it, we don't grow it, it is just
transshipped through us. Now, they use it. Now, they grow it.
Now, it is a serious domestic problem for them, beyond the
corruption that it breeds and the violence, just in terms of
use.
In sum, we face a different set of challenges in the region
today than we did at decade ago. To address the growing crisis
in Colombia, President Clinton has put forward an ambitious
proposal designed to support the, quote, ``Plan Colombia''
formulated by the Colombian government.
I agree with the Clinton administration that we must
significantly increase our assistance to Colombia, and do so
quickly, and I hope Congress will act promptly on the
President's request for an extra $1 billion for fiscal year
2000. But as Congress considers this proposal, we should go in
with our eyes wide open. Everyone should understand that we are
entering a new phase in the drug war in the Andes.
The proposal to train and equip counter-narcotics
battalions in the Colombian army is not without risk, and some
significant risk. Because the drug trade and the Colombian
civil war are intertwined in southern Colombia, it seems to me
almost inevitable that these battalions we are training will at
least occasionally become engaged in counterinsurgency
operations, and we should recognize that reality at the outset.
But we should guard against being pulled into Colombia's
guerrilla war. I am confident that the U.S. military doesn't
want to become enmeshed in Colombia's civil war, but I am not
so sure the Colombian military wouldn't like the United States
to become enmeshed in their civil war. We must make clear to
the Colombian government in our words as well as our deeds that
although we fight against narcotics trafficking and we view it
as our fight as well as theirs, their war against the
guerrillas is their war and their war to win.
In approving the administration's proposal, we should seek
transparency--I can't emphasize this enough to the four
witnesses today--absolute transparency, transparency about the
number of U.S. forces present in the country, transparency
about the use of our equipment, transparency about the
activities in U.S.-funded battalions, transparency as to
whatever the heck we are going to call those who are training,
if they are contract folks hired by the military to do the
training as opposed to uniformed military. There must be
transparency because when one element of this goes awry, the
whole house of cards will come down if it is presumed by the
public or the press that there hasn't been absolute
transparency.
Second, we should remain vigilant and seek continued
improvement in the human rights record of the Colombian
military. In past years, elements of the Colombian army have
been guilty of serious human rights violations. President
Pastrana has made serious efforts to address the problem and he
appears to be making progress. But we should demand that
institutional tolerance within the military for atrocities by
right-wing paramilitaries will cease or we will cease.
Third, we should consider additional measures to help
Colombia's neighbors. History, as no one knows better than our
drug director, General McCaffrey, tells us that pressure in one
area will cause traffickers to relocate their operations in
another area--the so-called balloon effect. We have seen it
when we did, through the military's assistance, such a
wonderful job in the Caribbean, and we moved everything up
through Mexico as a consequence of that. We are going to see it
again if we are successful in Colombia. Not only do Bolivia,
Ecuador and Peru deserve our continued assistance, but it is
essential that we maintain progress in those countries on the
drug war with them.
And, fourth, it seems to me we must be sure that the
economic aspects of this proposal receive sufficient emphasis
and support. If enforcement pressures succeed, we must be ready
with alternatives for the displaced.
And, finally, perhaps most importantly, we should all
understand that although the plan before us is a two-year
budget, this will be a long-term effort. Patience is not always
a virtue for which the American political system is known, but
we should recognize that it will take more than two years to
make significant progress in turning things around in Colombia
without making things worse in other parts of the Andes.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for
this hearing. I also commend the administration for stepping
forward with this plan. The President and his people have done
a good job in assembling a comprehensive proposal, and I look
forward to working with my colleagues and with the people
before us today to help gain its approval.
But, again, let me end by saying transparency,
transparency, transparency. I have been down this road before
in 28 years in this body. We will make a fatal mistake if it is
not totally transparent. I am not suggesting it is not. I am
suggesting, though, that that be a watch word.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grassley. Thank you.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also wish to
thank you and Senator Biden for holding this joint hearing
today and giving us an opportunity to learn from the various
perspectives represented here. I don't believe we could have
four more knowledgeable people of what the situation is in
Colombia and what our commitments are being asked to be.
I recently visited Latin America and I heard a recurring
question which was similar to what I have heard from people in
this country, and that is what is different. This combat in
Colombia has been underway for a long time, over 50 years in
terms of the guerrilla engagement, and over 30 years in terms
of serious drug issues. I personally visited Colombia for the
first time in 1979 to see what the U.S. effort was in terms of
drug suppression.
I think there are some significant differences that exist
today that have not been in place in the past, and which
justify the kind of U.S. commitment that we are being asked to
make. Let me just suggest what I think some of those
differences are.
First, an enormous increase in Colombian coca cultivation,
a 140-percent increase in the last 5 years, more than 300,000
acres of coca currently under cultivation in the jungles and
mountains of Colombia, with a particular surge in growth in the
southernmost regions of that country. Actual cocaine production
in Colombia has risen from 230 metric tons to 520 metric tons,
a 126-percent increase in the same 5-year period.
Second, traditional external funding sources for the
insurgent revolutionary armed forces of Colombia, the FARC, and
the National Liberation Army, the ELN, the two principal
guerrilla groups, no longer exists. Since the end of the Cold
War, their external support from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
other sources has largely evaporated. Thus, the FARC and the
ELN have been transformed from Marxist ideological movements
into Mafia-like criminal organizations that fund their anti-
government operation with drug trafficking dollars.
Third, the infusion of narco-dollars allows the FARC and
the ELN to act with relative impunity as they direct the
cultivation, processing, and transportation of coca and poppy.
They also attack oil pipelines and electric power facilities
and conduct sophisticated kidnapping operations throughout the
country.
Next, at the same time, the insurgents' growing involvement
in criminal activity has greatly reduced their public support
in Colombia. The most vivid example of that is that a majority
of Colombians today support the extradition of Colombian drug
traffickers to the United States for trial in U.S. courts. The
Colombian people recognize that the most effective way of
attacking the guerrillas is to cut off their source of economic
support from narco-trafficking.
Next, after over 60 years of sustained economic growth,
Colombia today is struggling with its worst economic recession
since the 1930s. Unemployment in Colombia is at an historic
high of over 20 percent. The Colombian economy is suffering
from three consecutive quarters of negative growth. The
economic downturn in Colombia has undermined both foreign and
domestic investor confidence.
Finally, record numbers of Colombia's best and brightest
citizens are fleeing the country. In 1998, the United States
embassy in Bogota processed approximately 200,000 visas. As of
December 1, 1999, it had already had applications for 340,000
visas.
We are at a critical juncture in our relationship with
Colombia, with our hemisphere's oldest functioning democracy.
Plan Colombia, developed, as our chairman has indicated, by the
President of Colombia, demonstrates the commitment of the
Colombian people to fight the drug traffickers who threaten the
stability of the entire Andean region, to move the peace
process forward and to rehabilitate the Colombian economy, and
recognize the principle of basic human rights for all citizens.
However, in the face of its diminished economic capacity,
Colombia cannot complete this important missionalone. Plan
Colombia is a $7.5 billion initiative, of which Colombia will invest 60
percent of the necessary funding. The United States, as well as the
international community, must do its part to assure the successful
completion of this initiative.
I have analogized Plan Colombia to a puzzle which has ten
pieces. The Colombian government is going to be responsible for
six of those ten pieces, the United States for two, and we will
look to the international community for the other two. The
question is how do we construct a plan in which all of those
ten pieces will fit together and will achieve our goal of a
stable Colombia, politically and economically, which can resume
its position as a leading force for democracy in Latin America.
As we consider this proposal, there are a few additional
items which I think should be considered, and several of those
have already been mentioned by my two colleagues.
First, we must do more to assist Colombia's neighbors who
are our partners in reducing drug production. Bolivia and Peru
have drastically reduced coca production and their efforts must
be recognized and reinforced.
Second, in the area of alternative development and economic
assistance, we should consider such things as an early renewal
of the Andean Trade Preference Act to rebuild confidence in the
Colombian economy. This Act has been a great success, adopted
in 1991 when Colombian exports to the United States totaled
$2.7 billion, while U.S. exports to Colombia totaled almost $2
billion. So we had a negative balance of payments of $700
million.
Nine years after the Andean Trade Preference Act, Colombian
exports to the United States have increased to $4.7 billion,
while U.S. exports to Colombia have more than doubled, to $4.8
billion. So, today, we have a $100 million trade surplus with
Colombia. Early renewal of the Andean Trade Preference Act will
signal U.S. support of Colombia's economic reform efforts and
will boost confidence in both domestic and foreign investors in
pursuing business opportunities that create jobs and enhance
international trade with Colombia and the Andean region.
Finally, we must do more to address the deficiencies in
tactical intelligence that are at the center of any successful
counter-drug strategy and are a major contribution of the two
out of ten pieces of this puzzle which the United States can
make.
Plan Colombia is much more than a counter-drug strategy. It
is a multi-faceted and comprehensive approach to restore
Colombian national security, reform the institutions of
Colombia's government, and rebuild a prosperous Colombian
economy. Today's witnesses reflect the diversity of this
initiative and I look forward to hearing their testimony.
Senator Grassley. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Before I introduce witnesses, I am going to put a letter in
the record from Fanny Kertzman, General Director of the
Colombian Taxes and Customs Agency.
[The letter referred to follows:]
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Senator Grassley. I am going to introduce you in the way I
would like to have you make your presentations. General
McCaffrey is Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy. Since 1996, General McCaffrey has overseen, among other
things, the creation and implementation of the Federal Drug
Control Strategy, the Drug-Free Communities Program, and the
National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign.
Next, we have Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs for the Department of State. He has
served as Under Secretary since 1997. He is a familiar face
here on Capitol Hill.
Ambassador Richard W. Fisher, our third witness, serves
currently as Deputy U.S. Trade Representative at the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative. His primary responsibility is
covering trade issues for Asia, Latin America, and Canada.
Given the importance and high profile of this issue to the
administration and Congress, I had hoped that Ambassador
Barchevsky would be able to come. But I thank you, Mr. Fisher,
for filling in.
Our final witness today is General Charles Wilhelm. He has
served as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. SouthCom since 1997 and
has previously served as Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces
Atlantic and Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.
His decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal and the
Silver Star.
All statements will be included in the record. I would ask
you to summarize. And for the benefit of my colleagues who
didn't hear me say this, General McCaffrey has to leave at
11:30. I hope we will be able to do things in the normal
procedure, but just in case we aren't able to do that, we will
concentrate maybe our first questioning upon General McCaffrey,
but I would like to go through all four witnesses first.
General McCaffrey.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY R. McCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Mr. McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator Graham,
and your colleagues, I very much appreciate the chance to
appear and to put a statement into the record. We tried to draw
together our thinking and the data that are needed to
intelligently discuss the issue in one document, and I commend
this to your attention.
Let me also thank the committee for their past support to
put together and to maintain a sensible U.S. national drug
policy. I am enormously mindful that in an era of balanced
budgets that the U.S. Congress has given us an increase of some
55 percent in our funding for prevention and education
programs, and a more than 26-percent increase in drug
treatment, which I believe is going to turn this issue around
in the coming years.
Let me also, if I may, acknowledge the presence of the
senior team from the Government that has hammered out Plan
Colombia that we will discuss this morning, and particularly
acknowledge Under Secretary Pickering's leadership. Secretary
Albright, Mr. Sandy Berger, the President and I really have
looked to Mr. Pickering's leadership to try and pull together
the regional thinking about the drug issue, and I think he has
done an absolutely superb piece of work.
General Wilhelm is going to have to do the heavy lifting on
this at the end of the day. As we get into the details of this
package, it is clear that a good bit of it is a mobility
package for the Colombian armed forces, and some of it involves
the training of not only counter-narcotics battalions, but also
riverine elements and the skillful integration of intelligence
into that effort. General Wilhelm and U.S. Southern Command
obviously will have to be the primary agency to face up to that
in support of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota.
Then, finally, Ambassador Fisher. I thank him for his
tutorials on how we should think about the associated economic
issues that are at stake here.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, let me make four points
and then walk very quickly through some charts. The four points
begin the following: We have a strategy and it is working. You
know, I frequently fall back on an old assertion that we should
never argue about facts. They are either facts or they are not.
The facts are we have been able to pull together a national
strategy which has been sent to the Congress. We have consulted
with leading members of Congress. We have your views and they
are incorporated in this document.
There is a classified annex to the National Drug Strategy
which gives guidance to the intelligence, armed forces, and law
enforcement agencies to match this public document. We have
also pulled together in the space of some six months of hard
work our own understanding of what the Colombians are trying to
achieve, and that strategy is Plan Colombia.
We knew we could not substitute U.S. thinking for what
essentially has to be a Colombian approach, an approach that
takes into account not just the massive challenges posed by
25,000 heavily armed narco-guerrillas, but also the concurrent
problems which President Pastrana must face and for which he
will be held accountable--the economy which is undergoing such
difficulties, the peace process, as well as rebuilding
democratic institutions where they are lacking.
And then finally, if you will allow me, there is indeed an
administration proposal that pulls together and analyzes what
the contributing agency requirements will be to make the U.S.
support for Plan Colombia work. And I think there was some
confusion in the GAO report you referenced. There is no
question that we do have an interagency plan for supporting
Colombia. There is no question that we have a five-year budget
approach for the Andean Ridge.
I think what is quite correct is that we have not yet
gotten to campaign planning on an interagency basis for the
region, and I think that is really where you will see us go in
the coming months and years to flesh out----
Senator Biden. General, would you mind explaining what you
mean--I am being serious--by campaign planning?
Mr. McCaffrey. Yes. To some extent, it is a matter of
semantics. By ``strategy'' I mean we do have a conceptual
architecture and we have got resources tied to the concept. So
we don't just have a notion, we don't just have a shopping
list. We have got a blueprint and we have tied the resources to
that blueprint.
Now, in addition, for Colombia itself we have pretty much
moved out on developing programs to support the strategy and
the resources. So, hopefully, if you ask those charged with
implementing this, whether it is the Department of Justice,
Treasury, DoD or elsewhere, they will tell you what they are
trying to achieve with any sub-element of this plan. They will
be able to explain what we are doing to upgrade four Customs
aircraft, precisely why you are going about training three
counter-narcotics battalions, why you chose these helicopters,
what will be the deployment schedule. All that kind of work
clearly exists. I would also argue we have got a pretty good
Andean Ridge concept.
Now, a campaign plan for the region will take into account
that all three of these principal nations--Peru, Bolivia and
Colombia--are linked, and that indeed there has to be an
explicit linkage to Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, and the
Caribbean, and I think the mechanics of that have to be fleshed
out.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Mr. McCaffrey. To underscore the strategy, though, at the
end of the day, since 1995 there has been an 18-percent drop in
the global production of cocaine, period. It went down. This is
working. Peru and Bolivia have made dramatic achievements; the
Peruvians, in particular, more than 60-percent reduction. To my
astonishment, in barely more than 2 years, the Banzer
administration in Bolivia has reduced production by more than
50 percent.
The second point, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I
would make is that Colombia is the center of gravity. That is
where we have to go. It is quite clear that notwithstanding the
regional successes and the Peruvian and Bolivian country
successes, we do have a massive U.S. threat posed by cocaine
and heroin production.
Eighty percent of the drugs we are seeing in America (in
terms of cocaine and heroin) either originate in Colombia or
transit through that country. So if we believe our own
rhetoric, if we think these numbers we are using are correct,
this is killing 52,000 Americans a year. This causes $100
billion in damages. This is actually the cause of much of the
crime, the violence, the health problems, and the welfare
problems we have in this country.
We are going to Colombia to try and support their
democratic authorities in an attempt to stop the production of
cocaine and heroin. And I would tell you the figures on cocaine
are astonishing--520 metric tons in 1999. But we are also
seeing, according to CIA analysis--and I am so announcing this
really this morning--a 23-percent increase in opium cultivation
last year alone. We are now crediting Colombia with producing
now some 8 metric tons of heroin, and this is another major
threat to our young people, up and down the East Coast in
particular.
Point number three: the programs we will discuss today we
have been working on for six months. I say this not lightly.
This has involved many of us in the Departments of Defense,
Justice, Treasury, State, USAID, and others to pull together a
coherent plan and then to make sure that it is supportive of
Colombian thinking.
A final thought, Mr. Chairman is that this plan must be, in
my view, viewed as long-range. It will not, in our judgment,
work to pass a supplemental and not to see that this is a
multi-year effort to deal not just with Colombia, but also with
regional problems, and to support it not just in terms of
police, armed forces, and intelligence, but also in precursor
chemical control, arms smuggling, money laundering, alternative
economic development, et cetera. So we think it is long-term
and it requires bipartisan support.
Very quickly, let me just show you an overview in map form
of what we are talking about. There is the problem--Bolivia and
Peru, with dramatic reductions; concurrent, very definite
increases in cocaine and heroin production in Colombia.
Next chart.
The problem is drugs. I think we can form a very good
argument that the problems with the economy, with the peace
process, and with the guerrilla forces are all related to an
enormous amount of money that flows out of the production of
cocaine and heroin and into those insurgent groups. I would
include in that category the so-called paramilitary forces.
There is no question that they also in many cases are nothing
more than bandit formations whose arms and whose money comes
from guarding or in some cases directly taking part in the
growing or production of drugs.
Next slide.
To underscore, we don't think there can be a Colombia-only
solution. We have to take into account the spillover effect,
the hijacking of aircraft out of Venezuela, the 1,000 or more
FARC guerrillas that have moved into the Darien Peninsula, the
paramilitary forces now following to terrorize the population,
the impact on Ecuador, the movement of drug smuggling routes in
many cases from just formerly the fast boats and aircraft out
of Colombia and into the eastern Caribbean. Now we see a very
definite tendency to smuggling going out to the eastern Pacific
ports in Ecuador, Peru, and indeed in Chile, and other drug
routes now opening up through Brazil and even as far south as
Argentina.
And then here is a pie chart (A graphic displayed). We can
slice this $1.6 billion in many ways, but this gives you a
quick overview. Let me just summarize it by saying the $1.6
billion is a 2-year program. It involves a substantial amount
of support for Peru and Bolivia. They have made incredible
reductions. We are continuing to maintain support for their
efforts, and I think you will see about 15 percent of the total
package goes to those two nations.
There is additional money intended for Ecuador, Venezuela,
potentially Brazil, and potentially Panama. A good bit of that
funding, however, does go to Colombia, some 85 percent. And if
you look at the Colombia package, half of it goes to support of
a mobility package for the Colombian armed forces. Essentially,
it boils down to 30 Blackhawks and 33 UH-1Ns to allow Colombian
military and police to reinsert democratic control in the
south.
In two of those provinces, Putumayo and Caqueta, we have an
explosion of drug production. In fact, the CNP, the eradication
program of the Colombian police, has worked. They have had
dramatic successes out in the east in Guaviare province. The
production is now concentrated in the south. There are five
FARC fronts down there. They are heavily armed. 2,500 police
cannot insert themselves and eliminate drug production, never
mind have governmental bodies provide the concurrent packages
of humanitarian support that will be required as some 10,000
people are moved off this land where they are now involved in
growing illegal crops.
We think the mobility package is going to be a huge change
in the nature of the police ability to intervene in the south.
I am going to fly to Colombia today. I will be there through
Thursday. I will see these areas. When you look at the southern
province, a third of the arable land area is under coca
cultivation. It is outrageous, and the police simply can't get
in there.
If you look at the rest of that package, there is a
substantial amount--it has gone from about 5 percent last year
to 20 percent this year--in support for judicial reform,
alternative economic development, et cetera, so a huge increase
in the balance of this program. And it does include quite
specifically $240 million in support for these programs. We
think it is a balanced package, we think it will make a
difference, and over time we expect that a sense of support for
Colombian democratic authorities will save American lives.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the chance to make these
opening comments and I will look forward to responding to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCaffrey follows:]
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Senator Grassley. Ambassador Pickering.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. PICKERING, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I
am delighted to be here. I have a statement I will submit for
the record. I would like you and the members of the committee
to know how much I appreciate the opportunity to be with you
today to discuss our assistance to the Andean region, and what
I will do in excerpts of my statement is attempt to compliment
the excellent overview which General McCaffrey has just
presented.
I have just come back from a visit to Colombia, Venezuela
and Ecuador, and some of the testimony I will give today
incorporates my firsthand impressions. I know that we are all
very concerned about the impact of the situation in the Andean
region on our own country. The importance of fighting the
scourge of illegal drugs is an issue on which we all agree.
Narcotics have deleterious effects not only on the health of
the person who consumes them, but they have a corrosive effect
on democratic institutions and on the economies in the region,
something that I have just again witnessed firsthand. We look
forward to working with you, sir, and with the Congress as a
whole to take the decisive action that is necessary to address
these questions.
I want to speak a little more in-depth about Colombia and
our proposed assistance package to support Plan Colombia, and
then I will touch briefly on some of the other issues that come
up in the regional context.
The U.S. has consulted closely on the key elements that
make up the Plan with Colombian leaders and their senior
officials. The Plan ties together many individual approaches
and strategies that are already being pursued in Colombia and
elsewhere in the region. It attempts to use the success in
Bolivia and Peru as road maps to a successful plan. It was
formulated, drafted, and approved in Colombia by President
Pastrana and his team, and without the Colombian stamp the Plan
would not have the support and commitment of Colombia behind
it, and particularly that of President Pastrana.
Colombian ownership and vigorous Colombian implementation
are essential to the future success, and as General McCaffrey
said, we are now very heavily focused on implementation of the
Plan, the operational plan, if you would call it, or the
campaign plan. The U.S. shares the assessment that an
integrated and comprehensive approach to Colombia's
interlocking challenges holds the best promise of success.
Before I go on to describe in a little more detail our
proposal to assist Plan Colombia, let me remind you that the
Plan cannot be understood simply in terms of the U.S.
contribution, which is only a portion, and indeed a minor
portion of the overall Plan.
Plan Colombia is at least a $7.5 billion plan, of which
President Pastrana has said Colombia will commit itself to
provide $4 billion of its scarce resources to support. He
called on the international community for help to provide the
remaining $3.5 billion. In response to this request, the
Administration is now proposing a $1.6 billion assistance
package to Colombia of new monies and current funding for the
first two years of the Plan.
Our request for new monies includes, as you know, $954
million in FY 2000 emergency supplemental funds and $318
million in an FY 2001 funding package. A significant share of
our effort will go to reduce the supply of drugs to the U.S. by
assisting Colombia in its efforts to limit production,
refinement, and transportation of cocaine and heroin.
Building on current funding of over $330 million, for FY
2000 and 2001, the administration's proposal includes an
additional $818 million funded through international affairs
programs, the Function 150 account, and $137 million through
Defense programs, Function 050, in FY 2000, and $256 million
funded through Function 150 and $62 million through Function
050 in FY 2001.
We are looking to the European Union and the International
Financial Institutions to provide additional funding. In this
regard, the International Financial Institutions, we
understand, have already committed between $750 million and $1
billion to Plan Colombia activities.
The Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury,
as well as AID and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the
Office of National Drug Control Policy all played major roles
in proposing and crafting the Plan Colombia two-year support
package. General McCaffrey has been kind to offer me some
congratulations on this. I think that all of us on this side of
the table will accept them when we see Plan Colombia beginning
to realize some real progress in its objectives. But all of
these agencies have been instrumental in providing their
support and backing to the U.S. contribution and all of them
will play a central role in the interagency implementation
effort.
General McCaffrey has explained some of the overall
problems with production of cocaine and heroin in Colombia.
There has been an explosive growth in the crop in southern
Colombia, in the Department of Putumayo, and to a lesser extent
in the north in the Department of Norte de Santander. Putumayo
is an area that remains beyond the reach of the government's
coca eradication operations. Strong guerrilla presence, and I
would say increasing paramilitary presence from my recent
visit, and weak state authority have contributed to a lawless
situation in that Department.
As our successes in Peru and Bolivia demonstrate, it is
possible to combat narcotics production in the Andean region.
The package will aid the government of Colombia in their plans
to launch a comprehensive step-by-step effort in Putumayo and
the adjoining Department of Caqueta to concur the coca
explosion, including eradication, interdiction, and alternative
development over the next several years.
In doing this, as you have said yourself, Mr. Chairman, and
others, we cannot and will not abandon our allies in Bolivia
and Peru. Their successes are real and inspired, with 60- to
70-percent reductions in coca production in these countries.
But they are also tenuous against the seductive dangers of the
narcotics trade.
That is why our Plan Colombia support package includes
nearly $46 million for regional interdiction efforts and
another $30 million for alternative development in Peru,
Bolivia, and Ecuador. These countries deserve our continued
support to solidify the gains that they have worked so hard to
obtain, and we are not content to allow cultivation and
production of narcotics to be simply displaced from one Andean
country to another.
The various components of the assistance package I would
like to review in brief. Boosting governing capacity and
respect for human rights is the first element, and herethe
Administration proposes funding $93 million over the next 2 years to
fund AID and Justice Department and Department of State programs to
strengthen human rights and administration of justice institutions.
Expansion of counter-narcotics operations into southern
Colombia is the second element. The world's greatest expansion
in narcotics cultivation is occurring now as we speak in the
insurgent-dominated area of southern Colombia. With this
package, the Administration proposes to fund $600 million over
the next 2 years to help train and equip two additional special
counter-narcotics battalions and provide the 33 Blackhawks and
the 33 Huey helicopters that General McCaffrey spoke about to
make these air battalions air-mobile and to provide them with
sufficient intelligence support.
Alternative economic development is the third element. The
package includes new funding of $145 million over the next 2
years to provide economic alternatives for small farmers who
now grow coca and poppy, and to increase local government
ability to respond to the needs of their people.
The fourth element is more aggressive interdiction.
Enhancing Colombia's ability to interdict air, waterborne and
road trafficking is absolutely essential to decreasing the
price paid to farmers for coca leaf and to decreasing the
northward flow of drugs toward our country and elsewhere. The
Administration proposes to spend $340 million on interdiction.
The program includes funding over the next two years for radar
upgrades to give Colombia a greater ability to intercept
traffickers, and also to provide intelligence to allow the
Colombian police and military to respond quickly to narcotics
efforts. It also includes some of the elements of increase in
the riverine forces which Colombia has begun already to deploy.
The fifth element includes assistance for the Colombian
National Police. The Administration proposes an additional
funding of $96 million over the next 2 years to enhance the
Colombian National Police's ability to eradicate coca and poppy
fields. This requests builds on our FY 1999 counter-narcotics
assistance of $158 million to the Colombian National Police.
U.S. assistance to military and police forces will be
provided strictly in accordance with Section 564 of the FY 2000
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the so-called Leahy
amendment. No assistance is provided to any unit of the
security forces for which we have credible evidence of
commission of gross violations of human rights unless the
Secretary of State is able to certify that the government of
Colombia has taken effective measures to bring those
responsible to justice.
We are firmly committed to the Leahy amendment and have a
rigorous process in place to screen those units being
considered for assistance, and this is just but one of the many
areas where Senator Biden's admonition on transparency is being
taken seriously into account and applied.
Let me now turn to the region. In Bolivia, President Hugo
Banzer's administration has embarked on an ambitious five-year
plan called the Dignity Plan to eliminate all illicit coca and
permanently remove the country from the international narcotics
circuit. A goal that seemed utopian when it was announced early
in 1998 is now actually, Mr. Chairman, within reach.
More than 73 percent of the country's illicit coca has been
eradicated in less than 50 percent of the allotted time for
that task. It is vital that the Bolivians consolidate these
gains by providing alternative development options to the
farmers who are abandoning the coca trade, while maintaining
the focus on eradication and interdiction. U.S. assistance has
been and will continue to be essential.
In Venezuela, at this particularly important crossroads it
is important to continue to emphasize the value of staying
within democratic bounds and establishing precedents for
transparent, effective, and responsive government in that
country. We will continue to engage in bilateral cooperation
with Venezuela in a wide variety of areas, everything from
flood relief and reconstruction from the various serious floods
they suffered in December, to counter-narcotics, anti-
corruption, and judicial reform, and the creation of an
attractive investment and business climate in Venezuela.
Venezuela is cooperating broadly with Colombia on counter-
narcotics, border protection, and the search for peace in
Colombia. On my recent trip to Venezuela, I had a full and
valuable range of discussions with Venezuelan officials on
various issues, including a central focus on counter-narcotics,
and I am happy to report that I believe we recorded significant
progress on the few issues with Venezuela that are now not
already fully agreed upon.
In Peru, we enjoy a strong bilateral relationship with that
country that spans many issues, from counter-narcotics to
commercial ties. Our assistance seeks to strengthen democratic
institutions in Peru, enhance the government's ability to
interdict and disrupt narcotics production and distribution,
and to reduce poverty and promote economic and social
development. Our democracy assistance promotes civic and voter
education, journalism training, and support for press freedom
organizations, election monitoring, judicial training,
increased political participation of women, and increased
citizen participation in local government. Our programs also
help to strengthen and expand the Office of Human Rights
Ombudsman, and to support the work of credible human rights
NGOs. Peru is, of course, a country that is a serious source of
cocaine, and the value progress that they have made, described
by General McCaffrey, is indeed important in the continuing
effort that we are making in the region.
In Ecuador, while we reject the means by which the recent
president, President Mahuad, was removed from office, we are
committed to working with the new Noboa government on the full
range of issues of mutual interest, including, of course, our
joint narcotics operations from the Manta forward operating
location.
Ex-president Mahuad has since called on all Ecuadorans to
support the new president, President Noboa. The new president's
principal challenge will be to address the economic crisis
rapidly in Ecuador and to restore public confidence. We have
urged Ecuador to work very closely with the International
Monetary Fund and to take the economic steps necessary to put
the reforms in place and put Ecuador on the path to recovery,
including the urgent need for legislation in the country. The
Noboa government has put forward a package of necessary
reforms, and when I was there I strongly urged all of the
parties in the Ecuadoran congress to pass them.
The Andean Trade Preference Act, which will be addressed by
Ambassador Fisher, is also an important instrument for us and
for our activities in the region, and I believe is something we
need continually to keep in mind as part of the efforts that we
are making.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to make this
presentation, and I look forward very much to your questions.
Senator Grassley. Thank you, Ambassador Pickering.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:]
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Senator Grassley. Ambassador Fisher.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD FISHER, DEPUTY UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE
Ambassador Fisher. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator
Graham, thank you very much for inviting me to talk about the
trade aspects of this exercise. I also want to share with
General McCaffrey our gratitude to Under Secretary Pickering
for pulling our team together as he does so brilliantly.
I have just returned from a trip to Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay. These countries, of course, are remaining on track in
their economic recovery despite the recession they have
experienced and the financial turmoil that recently affected
South America. I had the opportunity to meet with all three
presidents of those countries and was struck by the expressions
of angst that came from them with regard to the Andean region.
The Andean region is not faring as well obviously as the
Southern Cone, and as each of you have noted, the scourge of
narcotics production and trafficking and all the economic,
social, and security problems associated with that illegal
activity are particularly intense in the entire region.
In addition to its general purpose in developing mutually
beneficial trade and investment bilateral relationships, our
trade policy in the region has been tailored to give the Andean
countries greater opportunities to move away from narcotics
cultivation into legitimate trade.
I would like to highlight for you our three major
initiatives in the region: the first, referred to by Ambassador
Pickering, the benefits created by the Andean Trade Preference
Act, or ATPA; the second, our strengthening of bilateral trade
relations with countries in the region which we have
intensified; and, third, the negotiations toward the Free Trade
Area of the Americas and how it is relevant to this exercise.
First, with regard to the special market access program
created by the Andean Trade Preference Act, known as ATPA, this
was originally applied to Bolivia and Colombia in 1992, then to
Ecuador and Peru in 1993, granting these four countries tariff
benefits comparable to those of the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act until the year 2001, in December. Its goal was to
help generate economic alternatives to drug production and
trafficking through reduced duty or duty-free treatment to most
of these countries' exports to the United States.
The ATPA has indeed been providing benefits to items of
significant export interest in the region; for example, cut
flowers from Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia, totaling about $440
million annually; precious metals and jewelry products from
Colombia and Bolivia and Peru, totaling about $210 million
annually; fish and fish products from Ecuador, totaling about
$80 million annually.
This has helped prompt substantial growth in our trade
relationships, as mentioned by Senator Graham. Bilateral trade
between the U.S. and the Andean region has more than doubled
since the passage of the ATPA. The four countries combined have
increased their exports to the United States by about 80
percent since 1991, with Colombia gaining approximately 95
percent and Peru nearly 140 percent.
In 1999, $1.7 billion in imports from the four relevant
countries entered the U.S. under the ATPA, $799 million from
Colombia, $607 million from Peru, $259 million from Ecuador,
and some $63 million from Bolivia. Our most recent formal
review submitted per the statute, which requires a review every
three years, was submitted in December of 1997 and showed that
ATPA had a positive effect on drug crop eradication and crop
substitution in the beneficiary countries.
Our judgment of the success of this program is echoed by
the beneficiary countries. In October of last year, for
example, Colombia's Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, their
foreign minister, wrote that the ATPA has, quote, ``had a
remarkable socio-economic impact. Net ATPA-related employment
generation over 1992 to 1998 was 108,000 jobs in Colombia,''
end of quote.
The ATPA program expires in less than two years, as was
noted by Senator Graham, in December of 2001, as I mentioned
earlier, which is a rather short time in terms of business and
investment planning. The Andean community has requested that we
extend the program for at least several years, and asked us to
reduce the list of products excluded from preferential
treatment under the current legislation, and to add Venezuela,
which is the fifth member of the Andean community as a
beneficiary country. It has also been suggested that we request
an early extension of the program before the December 2001
expiration date, and we are prepared, Senator, to examine all
these proposals very closely in consultation with you and with
the Congress.
Second, as I mentioned in my introduction, we have been
intensifying our bilateral trade relationships with the Andean
region. For instance, in May of 1999 we and the five member
states of the Andean community met in Cartagena, Colombia, for
the very first meeting of the newly formed U.S.-Andean
Community Trade and Investment Council. We refer to it by an
acronym called TIC. The TIC meeting addressed issues such as
the FTAA negotiations, the intellectual property rights issues
between us, trade issues under the Andean Trade Preference Act,
and matters of mutual interest in the WTO and in bilateral
trade.
We also have an active program of bilateral investment
treaties, or BITs, and we have a BIT in force between the
United States and Ecuador since May of 1997. We signed one with
Bolivia in April of 1998 that is still subject to Senate
ratification, and we are in various stages of exploratory talks
with Peru and with Venezuela on possible bilateral investment
treaties. During his recent trip to Washington, I proposed to
President Pastrana that we proceed with a BIT negotiation with
Colombia, and we are awaiting his reply.
These treaties, Senator, provide mutual benefits by
enhancing investor certainty and confidence. They help create
jobs and long-term growth which are inherently desirable, and
also help economies diversify away from narcotics.
The administration has also made the point to the Andean
governments--and I have personally had the pleasure of meeting
with all five of the Andean presidents in that meeting around
the Cartagena meeting--that full implementation of the WTO
obligations and respect for the rule of law in such areas as
intellectual property and trade-related investment measures and
customs valuation are critical to creating favorable business
climates and to attracting investment into the region.
Indeed, the Plan Colombia which we have been talking about
so much today makes a similar point in the section in that plan
dealing with trade. The Plan also refers to the need to
implement business facilitation measures agreed to in the FTAA
negotiations, to promote a favorable environment for electronic
commerce, and recognize that, as Senator Biden referred to
earlier, transparency and due process in government procurement
is essential to achieving greater efficiency and integrity in
the use of public funds, not just in this country but, of
course, in the Andean region.
Third, and finally, in parallel with the special focus on
the Andean region per se, we and the Andean countries are full
partners in the construction of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. These talks are due to conclude by December 2004.
They are on track to meet that deadline. These negotiations,
when concluded, will greatly increase the alternatives to
narcotics trade in the Andean countries.
By eliminating obstacles to trade and goods, the Free Trade
Area of the Americas will create similar new opportunities for
the Andean countries not simply in the United States, but also
in the other countries of the hemisphere. Opening markets and
services will help to strengthen their economies and encourage
competition, transparency, and impartial regulation of
financial systems, telecommunications, insurance, and other
industries basic to a modern, diversified economy.
The elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers
envisioned by the FTAA will be a powerful stimulus for
investment in all of our economies, giving Andean nations and
others further opportunities to diversify away from and develop
alternatives to narcotics production. And it will strengthen
the value of openness, accountability, democracy, and the rule
of law, which themselves make the FTAA possible. These are
values central to any successful effort to combat narcotics
trafficking.
Senator Grassley, a strong trade and investment
relationship with the Andean region is a vital component of our
counter-narcotics efforts, as well as a critically important
goal in its own right. It is not in any sense a substitute for
the policies directly focusing on narcotics issues, but it
offers nations afflicted by poverty and by these conflicts
opportunities to grow and develop healthier, diversified
economies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Fisher follows:]
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Senator Grassley. General Wilhelm, inform me whether or not
it will take you more than seven or eight minutes. If it does,
I would like to go to questioning of General McCaffrey before
we hear from you. But if you can be done in seven or eight
minutes, I think we will just go ahead with your testimony.
General Wilhelm. Senator Grassley, I think I will be very
close to that.
Senator Grassley. Okay, thank you. Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES E. WILHELM, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
General Wilhelm. Chairman Grassley, Senator Biden, Senator
Graham, I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you United
States assistance options for the Andean region.
I know that during this hearing you intend to discuss U.S.
economic and political assistance policies for the region and
the Andean Trade Preferences Act. There are distinct linkages
between these policies and our counter-drug and military-to-
military engagement policies and activities. This morning, I
would like to comment on these linkages and Department of
Defense activities in support of Plan Colombia.
The counter-drug struggle provides the underpinning for
most of the military engagement activities in the region. With
regard to Colombia, I am encouraged by the progress that is
being made. During 1999, we created the first of the Colombian
counter-narcotics battalions. This 931-member unit is composed
of professional soldiers, all of whom have been vetted to avoid
human rights abuses. The battalion has been trained by members
of the United States Seventh Special Forces Group and is
designed to interact with and provide security for elements of
the Colombian National Police during counter-drug operations.
Tactical mobility has long been the Achilles heel of
Colombia's armed forces. This battalion will be supported by an
aviation element consisting initially of 18 refurbished UH-1N
helicopters provided through a cooperative effort on the parts
of INL at the State Department and United States Southern
Command. These new units will focus their operations in the
southern departments of Colombia which have been the sites of
recent wholesale increases in drug cultivation and production.
To assure that combined military and police units
conducting counter-drug operations have the best, most recent,
and most accurate intelligence, we have worked closely with
Colombia while developing the Colombian Joint Intelligence
Center, or COJIC, as we refer to it, at the Tres Esquinas
military complex that abuts the southern departments.
This computerized facility attained initial operating
capability on the 22nd of December of last year. Deliberately,
and without fanfare, these new organizations have commenced
operations. Their two initial forays into drug cultivation and
production areas near Tres Esquinas resulted in arrests,
seizures of drugs, destruction of laboratories, confiscation of
precursor chemicals, and identification and subsequent
eradication of new cultivation sites. The counter-drug
battalion and Colombian Joint Intelligence Center were created
by reprogramming and reprioritizing previously budgeted
resources during the past year.
The initiatives that I have just described we refer to
collectively as Action Plan 99. The follow-on effort, Action
Plan 2000, builds on these first-phase efforts. During the
coming year, we will build two additional counter-narcotics
battalions and a brigade headquarters. With a well-trained and
fully equipped counter-narcotics brigade consisting of more
than 3,000 professional soldiers, the Colombian armed forces
will be prepared to join forces with air mobile elements of the
Colombian National Police to reassert control over the
narcotics-rich departments of southern Colombia.
Continuing to focus on mobility and intelligence, we will
provide 15 additional UH-1N helicopters, rounding out the
aviation battalion. These UH-1Ns will ultimately be replaced by
UH-60 Blackhawks, which have the range, payload, high-altitude
capability and survivability required by Colombia's armed
forces to cripple the narcotics industry and bring the
remainder of the country under government control.
On the intelligence side, we will continue to develop and
refine the Colombian Joint Intelligence Center and pursue a
broad range of initiatives to improve our interdiction
capabilities. A key component of the interdiction plan is
first-phase development of the forward operating location at
Manta, Ecuador. This facility is urgently required to replace
capabilities lost when we left Panama and closed Howard Air
Force Base. Manta's importance stems from the fact that it is
the sole operating site that will give us the operational reach
to cover all of Colombia, all of Peru, and the coca-producing
regions of Bolivia.
Looking beyond 2000, we have engaged the services of the
Military Professional Research Institute, or MPRI. MPRI has
assigned hand-picked and highly experienced analysts to assess
Colombia's security force requirements beyond the counter-drug
brigade and its supporting organizations. Among other things,
the contract tasks MPRI to develop an operating concept for the
armed forces, candidate force structures, and necessary
doctrines to implement the operational concept.
I have now served at Southern Command for 28 months.
Shortly after assuming command and making my initial assessment
of security and stability conditions in the region, I stated
that I considered Colombia to be the most threatened nation in
my area of responsibility. Today, almost two-and-a-half years
later, I stand behind that assessment. However, I am encouraged
by what I see in Colombia.
Served by a first-class civilian and military leadership
team, Colombia demonstrates a level of national organization
and commitment that was simply not present two-and-a-half years
ago. To be sure, the recently reported upsurge in coca
cultivation and production provides cause for concern, but that
concern is partially offset by improved performance by
Colombia's security forces during tactical engagements with the
FARC, ELN, and others who are aiding and abetting narcotics
traffickers.
Cooperation between the armed forces and National Police
has improved. New levels of competence in air-ground
coordination have been demonstrated. Intelligence-sharing is on
the upswing. An aggressive program is underway to restructure
the armed forces. The armed forces and National Police are
poised to reassert control over the southern and eastern
portions of the country, and Plan Colombia provides a
comprehensive national strategy designed to defeat the narco-
traffickers and correct the ills they have visited on
Colombia's society.
On average, I visit Colombia about once every six weeks. I
am convinced that the second most populous nation in South
America, with the longest and strongest democratic traditions,
is turning the corner. With our help, Colombia will succeed.
In recent months, I have become increasingly concerned
about Colombia's neighbors. The adverse social, economic and
political conditions spawned wholly or in part by drug
trafficking and the other transnational threats that it breeds
are weakening the fabric of democracy in other nations in the
region.
For this reason, while I endorse a Colombia-centric
approach to the drug problem in the region, I caution against a
Colombia-exclusive approach. While we assist Colombia in making
important strides to reassert its sovereignty over its
territory and to curb growing cultivation, we should also take
appropriate steps to preserve the noteworthy successes achieved
by Peru and Bolivia, and be sensitive to emerging needs in the
bordering countries of Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela and Brazil.
This is truly a regional problem. As such, we must pursue
regional solutions.
In summary, I am convinced that we are headed in the right
direction and we are pursuing the right options in the Andean
region, but not a minute too soon. To seize the initiative in a
struggle which General McCaffrey has testified claims as many
as 52,000 American lives per year, I urge rapid approval of the
supplemental and increased support for other nations in the
region.
I thank the caucus for the help it has given us in the past
and I look forward to your questions that will follow. Thank
you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Wilhelm follows:]
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Senator Grassley. I suggest for my colleagues that on this
first round, so we can each get General McCaffrey if we want to
ask him questions, five minutes, and then we will take a longer
period of time after he leaves if other members want to follow
up with other people.
I am going to start with you, General McCaffrey, but maybe
this is also appropriate for Ambassador Pickering. I got the
point that you made that perhaps the General Accounting Office
was somewhat confused whether or not there was a detailed
strategy on the part of the administration. I kind of laid out
what I thought the detailed strategy ought to have, laying out
priorities, describing the actions needed to address those
priorities, defining the respective roles of the U.S. and
Colombia, details of how the plan will incorporate other
regional partners, and finally delineating a time line for
accomplishing the goals based on some understandable criteria.
Is there a document that you could place in front of us
that would have that information in it? Or is my presumption
wrong, if you want to take exception to my presumption that we
ought to have such a document? This is something that Senator
Coverdell and I and others were pursuing last September when we
introduced our legislation.
Mr. McCaffrey. First of all, let me just reiterate there is
a conceptual architecture. There has been enormous, extensive
involvement by the entire interagency in coming together not
just with the concept but with the resources that will support
the concept. So all of that is available.
I think what is also true is that the implementing plan
behind this architecture is still evolving and requires
continuing leadership. Ambassador Pickering may wish to address
our understanding that we had to do something differently. We
were barely managing a $150 million a year program. Now, we are
talking a multi-year effort that is not just $1.6 billion for
the United States, but as Secretary Pickering talked to, it is
$7.5 billion for the Colombians.
So in no way would I suggest that the decisionmaking
apparatus that now exists is yet adequate for the task ahead of
us. That has to be built. We are going to put together a high-
level team here in Washington to be the mechanism, the
secretariat of this. We have established a new deputies
committee and we will expect the Colombians to do the same
thing.
Senator Grassley. Before Ambassador Pickering responds, is
it wrong for me to assume that we ought to have this
information before Congress makes a decision of moving ahead on
spending the $1.3 billion, or whatever it is, that we are going
to be spending?
Mr. McCaffrey. No. I think we do have on the table a well
thought out, competent conceptual outline of what we are trying
to do with the resources, and we can explain to you why we
arrived at those conclusions. I do believe the documentation
and the professionalism of the people that built this should be
adequate to reach a decision.
Senator Grassley. Ambassador Pickering.
Ambassador Pickering. I just support what General McCaffrey
has said. I think that priorities are contained in the National
Drug Policy of the United States, plus Plan Colombia. The
actions taken to support those and defining the respective
roles, I think, are very clearly in the congressional
presentation document that you have got before you.
The role of the other regional parties is in the
congressional presentation document and the time line is being
prepared, but there is a rough time line already indicated in
the congressional presentation document about how and in what
way we will commit our funding for various objectives. And I
believe that we could provide you with a briefing on that time
line in a little more detail if you or your staff would like to
have that.
Senator Grassley. The second question is in regard to part
of the Alianza Act, the $410 billion that goes to support the
regional anti-drug interdiction and eradication programs.
According to reports by Occidental Petroleum Corporation, not
only are pipeline attacks at the highest rate of incidence, but
there is significant activity for new crop cultivation along
the Colombian-Venezuelan border.
Given the fact that the threat is not limited to the south,
what plans are there to address the northern regions of
Colombia, if you consider that a problem like these reports
seem to indicate it is a problem?
Mr. McCaffrey. Well, I don't think there is any question
but that to include the production of heroin, which you didn't
mention--it is now up to 8 metric tons--many of these
activities that are in Plan Colombia don't relate just to the
regaining control of the south element. That is the three
battalions, some riverine forces, intelligence support, as well
as associated alternative economic development and humanitarian
aid for people displaced by that action. But a lot of this
program goes to prison reform.
By the way, in a 3-year period, we are talking about $450
million-plus assistance provided to the Colombian National
Police. These are substantial resources that are on the table
now, not just for aircraft, but training and operations, et
cetera. So I think it does apply Colombia-wide. The piece of
it, the mobility package, is in the south.
Senator Grassley. If Congress were to fully fund the
President's emergency supplemental, what changes in cocaine
prices and purity could we expect to see, and when should those
changes begin to occur?
Mr. McCaffrey. Well, we have seen an 23-percent reduction
in hectares under cultivation. We have seen an 18-percent drop
in total tonnage produced in the Andean Ridge, and that came
primarily out of moving Peru from the dominant source of
cocaine to a distant number two, Colombia now being about 75
percent of it. It is our collective judgment that this plan
will work and that in the coming 2 years to 5 years we should
expect to see substantial reductions in the production of drugs
in Colombia.
Senator Grassley. According to the 1999 National Drug
Control Strategy measures of effectiveness, your office is
responsible for reporting on the outflow of drugs from source
countries. What changes of outflow of drugs from Colombia would
you see?
Mr. McCaffrey. Well, I think in the coming years, as we get
at the coca- and opium-producing regions, you will see an
almost immediate reduction in the production of these drugs as
they impact on the United States. Again, in my view, this is a
2-year plan we are now talking about, but this is clearly a 2-
to 5-year effort we are facing up to.
Senator Grassley. The CIA says that we have had a 12.7-
percent reduction since 1996 in coca production. How much of a
reduction of coca production do you expect to see as a result
of the aid package?
Mr. McCaffrey. Well, again, it gets at the point, can we
turn things around in the center of gravity, which is Colombia.
We assess that we can and as we have seen in Guaviare Province
where the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program
was enormously successful. It serves as witness that it will
work.
How do we get the Colombian National Police back into the
south so that eradication can take place and displaced people
can be cared for? Again, Senator, I would suggest the answer is
probably in the coming two to five years we will see a dramatic
impact.
Senator Grassley. What is the U.S. plan for how to deal
with the implications if our current package gets us more
involved in confrontation with the guerrilla forces?
Mr. McCaffrey. Well, I think this will not be U.S. service
men and women involved in this. This is a Colombian problem. It
must be a Colombian strategy; it must be their police, their
armed forces, their prosecutors and judges that face up to
this. I think that is what they plan on doing, so I would
anticipate U.S. military elements will not be involved in
counter-drug operations.
Senator Grassley. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
General, I wish you luck on your trip. I would like to
focus on two things. While I have you here, as well as General
Wilhelm, I would like to talk about one part that--I was going
to say ``concerns,'' but I am not sure it concerns me; I want
to make sure I understand it. I would like to talk about the
mobility package here.
Having spent a fair amount of time becoming acquainted with
the issue of mobility in the Balkans and watching Apache
helicopters and their movement into a region and the difficulty
that that took and the command and control problems that were
involved, it seems to me--and you have spoken to me about this
briefly, General McCaffrey--that there is going to be a need
for a serious presence on the ground of someone with more than
a couple of bars on their shoulder down in Colombia, as well as
some high-level State Department personnel assigned to the
embassy to make sure that this significant transfer of mobility
in terms of Hueys and Blackhawks--that is a big deal in terms
of maintaining them, locating them, getting them there, et
cetera. Can you tell me a little bit about what the deal is,
how you have worked that out?
My dad has an expression I won't quote precisely, but being
the oldest in a family of four, when he and my mother would
leave they would say, you are in charge, and point to me. And I
would say why me? He would say, you are the oldest and I want
to know who to hold responsible if something goes wrong.
Well, who do we hold responsible, who specifically? Are we
going to have a name of an individual who is the guy or the
woman on the ground making sure that this equipment, these
helicopters actually get in place, actually are put in the
position to be able to be used, actually are able to get up off
the ground? I mean, how are you going to do that practically?
Mr. McCaffrey. Well, I am sure CINC South will want to
respond. There is no question in my mind who is responsible.
Number one, it is the U.S. ambassador. We have got a
substantial team on the ground.
Senator Biden. But as good as they are, they don't know a
damn thing about helicopters.
Mr. McCaffrey. Right.
Senator Biden. They don't know a damn thing about how to
move them.
Mr. McCaffrey. We are going to have say the ambassador is
responsible. The Secretary of State is responsible. They can't
do it unless CINC U.S. Southern Command wakes up every morning
and views themselves as being primarily in support of the U.S.
embassy effort.
We do have to rethink who is in Colombia, the kinds of
skills they have, the numbers, et cetera. And I don't think
that process has been finished, and CINC will, I am sure, want
to respond. I think even more importantly, there is no question
in our own mind--and Under Secretary Pickering and the NSC and
I have discussed it--we need to change business as usual here
in Washington. We can't get by with the normal interagency
process when we ramp up to this level of support.
So we have discussed and we are moving to implement a
separate deputies committee steering group for policy
decisions, and we will put together a secretariat of some form
with a person full-time who is going to be our quarterback to
make sure the policy implications are considered.
Senator Biden. General.
General Wilhelm. Yes, Senator Biden. If I could pick up
where General McCaffrey left off, the General correctly, of
course, traced the hierarchy of responsibility. But I will tell
you I feel the weight of responsibility on my shoulders on the
military side. I think that is appropriate. I think that is
what you pay me to do.
We are trying to do this in a very thoughtful way. There is
a lot more to helicopters than air frames.
Senator Biden. You got it.
General Wilhelm. There is maintenance, there is training,
there is life cycle management, and there is intelligent
employment of assets and their preservation. We are keenly
mindful of all of those things. I am trying to do the very best
I can to provide Ambassador Curt Kamen the best advice that I
can, and work very closely with Rand Beers, sitting in the
audience in back of me, because since day one this has been a
shared Department of State-Department of Defense enterprise.
As you know, Senator, the $388 million that is in the
supplemental to buy the 30 Blackhawks are State Department
dollars. But we view ourselves at Southern Command as very much
partners in this enterprise. Where we have started, sir, is to
look first at an intelligent, well-integrated, well-thought-out
basing arrangement. We have come up with three bases.
We will use Tolemeida, which is a well-developed facility,
as our main operating base; Lorandia, another very well-
developed facility currently used by the Colombian National
Police, as our forward operating location. And then we will
actually marry the airplanes up with the troops who will embark
on them at Tres Esquinas as we push to the south.
We have already invested $600,000 well-spent on improving
force protection at Tres Esquinas, which is----
Senator Biden. That was going to be my next question.
General Wilhelm. Yes, sir. That is the branch furthest out
on the tree. Just a ``gee whiz'' number, 15,000 rolls of
concertina wire alone. I have troops on the ground right now,
and have since January, conducting not only an assessment of
the security conditions on the ground at Tres Esquinas, but
fixing the broken things just as rapidly as they find them. We
have a dedicated air base ground defense force drawn from the
Colombian Air Force. They are receiving blue-ribbon training
from a special forces A team.
So, sir, it could go on and on, but I think you can see
there are a collection of activities which involve, I think, an
intelligent appreciation of the geography, attention to force
protection. And I would add in conclusion I have proposed--this
is not anything that is in the bag right now, but I would very
much suggest that it would be appropriate for us to increase
the throw-weight of our MIL group commander in Colombia from a
colonel to a general officer, and I am pursuing that with the
joint staff in the embassy right now.
Senator Biden. Well, let me just say I have been a
champion--that sounds like the wrong word; it sounds like there
is some value to it. I have been a strong, strong supporter of
the State Department, but I hope the hell they get out of your
way here. Once the policy is made, once the judgment is made, I
hope everybody understands they don't know any more than this
committee knows about how to do whathas to be done, and you do.
Once the policy has been made, once the judgment has been
made that this is a basing arrangement and this is how many
helicopters are going to do it, this is the training, this is
the way in which it is going to be done, I hope to goodness
that we don't get into any bureaucratic malarkey here.
Once we have agreed on an objective, once we have agreed on
the strategy and the tactics as to where the deployments will
take place, and how, and how many people, et cetera, I for one
want to make it real clear that if I, one Senator with
diminishing influence in the minority here, find out that you
all are running into any difficulty, I will do all I can to
make it hell for whoever gave you any trouble because this is
serious logistical stuff that only gets done with guys with
those shiny little stars who have spent their whole careers
figuring out how to do it, not anybody like me who allegedly
knows something about foreign policy and makes the larger
judgment of whether we should or shouldn't be there. I don't
anticipate that difficulty, but we have been down this road
before over the last 20 years or so, never with this
concentration of hardware, and it is a big deal.
The last question I have--I don't know whether that light
is out for me or not; I think it is still green--is that you
have had remarkable success, General, or the Ecuadorans and the
Peruvians have had remarkable success, and Ambassador Pickering
has been, as I understand it, kind of the quarterback for what
has been going on here.
But my question is it seems to me the remarkable success
relates not in small part to the fact that there is no
significantly well-organized, well-armed counter-insurgency in
those other two countries. The reason why there has been such
movement to cultivation in Colombia is the existence of this
insurgency, well-armed and well-entrenched.
And it is not merely the fact that the ground is more
suitable and it is out of the Andes and it is in lower areas
that it can be cultivated, but it is not an accident that it is
where the guns are, it is where the guerrillas are. So I want
to know whether or not I am making too much of a leap here in
assuming that there is an absolute, direct correlation between
the ability to increase production in Colombia and the decrease
in production in the other two neighboring countries and the
existence of this counter-insurgency.
And if that is true, then don't we get to the point where
we aren't going to have significant success until there is
success against the FARC and the counter-insurgency movements?
That is a mouthful, but could you respond to it, General, since
you are going to be the one leaving shortly, and anyone else
the chairman permits to respond?
Mr. McCaffrey. Well, I think I would certainly agree the
three countries are all enormously different. They don't face
the same political, economic, counter-insurgency and drug-
related threats at all, although it is equally clear that the
Sendero Lumiroso, MRTA, and other insurgent groups in Peru were
devastating in their savagery, and also clearly involved in
coca production in Peru.
It is quite different in Bolivia. Bolivia certainly makes
an interesting contrast with Colombia. Bolivia accomplished
much of what it has done through a national dialogue
implemented by the Banzer administration in which they
convinced the people in the country that it was David versus
Goliath, and David was the people and Goliath was the drug
cartels. There has been much less violence there. There have
been 9-some-odd people killed. There has been sniping, but
there wasn't a huge mass of insurgents.
In Colombia, clearly the Colombians faced 25,000 people
with machine guns, mortars, planes, helicopters, wiretap
equipment, huge amounts of corrupting money targeted on their
journalists, their legislature, and their mayors. It is a very
different thing.
I don't believe there is any chance that the FARC, the ELN,
and the paramilitaries will walk away from the millions of
dollars they generate out of drug production unless there is a
reward and a punishment that forces them to do that. I see no
way for these brave Colombian policemen to intervene in the
south and cut down cocaine and heroin-producing areas that
threaten their own children and ours unless the military
intervenes and provides security for them. So to some extent, I
think you are quite correct.
Senator Grassley. General McCaffrey, can you accommodate
Senator Graham and Senators Sessions yet or do you have to go?
Mr. McCaffrey. Yes, sir.
Senator Grassley. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Was that a yes to the first or the second
question?
Mr. McCaffrey. I am trying to make a 1:00 plane out of
National and it would be terrible if I missed it, but I would
be glad to respond to your questions, Senator.
Senator Graham. In light of that, General, I will restrict
myself to one area of questioning and that is during a recent
visit to Mexico, you were reported as stating that drug
traffickers were returning to the Caribbean and their old
traditional routes of getting drugs into the United States. I
assume that in part that is due to some of the difficulties
that the new Colombian drug cartels, as outlined by Senator
Biden, are having dealing with the Mexicans, as well as the
softness that has occurred in some areas of the Caribbean,
specifically Haiti.
I would like your thoughts as to how Plan Colombia relates
to the next phase of the strategy, and that is the interdiction
in the routes between Colombia and the United States, with
specific concern about the allegations that Haiti has become a
major transport center within the Caribbean.
Mr. McCaffrey. Senator, I spent three days in Mexico and
was enormously impressed by the growing, deliberate momentum of
the Mexican efforts in the south. I think it is going to work
over time. They have just begun. It is a $520 million equipment
acquisition, it is $1 billion in operating money, it is 15,000
people. And I was looking at real machinery, some first-rate
deep-water Mexican Navy efforts that have resulted in three
gigantic drug seizures, in cooperation with the U.S. Coast
Guard; a pretty good amphibious commando effort by the Ganfi
forces in the Mexican Army; new counter-drug x-ray technology.
It is going to pay off, and these drug criminals are
watching what is happening in front of their eyes. They have
not stopped. They are still out in the eastern Pacific as the
principal drug threat to America, but we are seeing some
response. We also saw the Coast Guard with a brilliant air-sea
interdiction effort that has started to work against fast
boats.
So I think what we are seeing now is the beginnings of a
change in drug criminal smuggling. They are going to Haiti,
they are going to the Dominican Republic, they are going to
Jamaica. They are using now direct air landing strips in drugs
in Haiti, among other things, and we are going to have to
follow them.
The entire Colombian package, though, again--and I think
CINC's notes had an interesting statement. When you look at the
interdiction piece, the Caribbean-Eastern Pacific-Central
American is an area the size of the United States. This is
huge, hundreds of miles of empty ocean out there in the eastern
Pacific.
The interdiction effort in Colombia is a fairly definable
place. We take satellite photographs of coca fields. We know
where they are, and this riverine-army-police effort will
directly interdict those drugs. So I think it is going to help
south Florida, the Gulf Coast States, the four border States,
quite directly in the coming years.
Senator Graham. Could you comment about the issue of Haiti
and its increasing use as a transport center?
Mr. McCaffrey. Senator, it is a disastrous situation and I
am not sure we have a grand idea of what to do. We have upped
our DEA presence substantially. We are doingfirst-rate work
with the Dominican Republic to try and seal that border.
We need to stand behind U.S. Coast Guard efforts to
interdict at sea. There has been first-rate work by the U.S.
Customs Service in south Florida, the Port of Miami, trying to
get at these tramp steamers coming out of Haiti. But it looks
to me as if the Haitian law enforcement, judicial system,
political system in terms of confronting the drug cartels is in
a state of rapid collapse, and they have become a preferred
target which we will have to deal with really externally to
Haiti. I think that is where it is headed.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Grassley. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McCaffrey. General Wilhelm said, I believe, in 1998
that the Colombian armed forces were incapable of defeating the
guerrillas, which are Marxist-dominated and funding themselves
in large part from narcotics trafficking.
What percentage of Colombia is now held by guerrilla
forces, the land mass, the land area?
Mr. McCaffrey. Senator, it is probably a deceptive
statement. The figure we use is that the FARC, ELN, and
paramilitaries may have enormous influence over as much as 40,
50 percent of the country. I think there are probably 200-or-so
communities where their presence, according to Colombian
published reports, is omni-present. But they don't control
anything but the despeje. The Colombian police and the
Colombian armed forces have not conceded or written off
anything in the country.
Senator Sessions. Well, you have a great record of combat
and experience in the armed forces. If Colombia gets its act
together and acts with determination and a full commitment, is
there any doubt in your mind they could defeat the guerrilla
forces and take that country back?
Mr. McCaffrey. Senator, the key question is political will.
Does the Colombian leadership, the Colombian people, want to
turn their future over to these ferociously well-armed and
savage insurgent forces, fueled by drug money and production?
The answer is they don't. The political will is there.
I agree with the CINC's assessment. Both their political
and their military leadership and the police leadership now
gives us an unusual opportunity for them to defend themselves.
So our collective view is that this program we are advocating
will work and protect not only the United States but regional
partners.
Senator Sessions. Well, you just said it, though. The
question is political will. Lincoln had it. He faced a more
formidable situation, I suppose, than the country of Colombia
faces today. He recognized the future of his nation was at
stake and he led with relentless commitment to a goal to taking
back that country.
Don't you think that those of us who have the money here to
support Colombia ought to ask whether or not the Colombian
government is sufficiently committed to this enterprise before
we continue to pour money into an operation? Shouldn't we
insist that the Colombian leadership state unequivocally that
they intend to end this occupation and to defeat the drug
dealers and Marxist guerrillas?
Mr. McCaffrey. Well, I would suggest that Plan Colombia,
the product of the collective leadership of Colombian
democratic institutions, does represent a collective will to
confront this problem. I find it very credible.
Senator Sessions. Well, what is the story about if you have
a high school degree, you can't go into combat? Would you
explain that to me? Is that consistent with a nation that is
committed to victory?
Mr. McCaffrey. I think the Colombians recognize that that
is a product of inadequate political will. I think it is a
disastrous statement to their own people. They have to face up
to that. They said they will. They are going increasingly, as
General Wilhelm can talk to, to a professional military, 30 to
40,000 people and a rapid reaction force. They had an old
system that doesn't suit the new threat to their stability.
Ambassador Pickering. Barry, could I just make a point? I
talked to the Colombian defense minister on Friday about that.
He made it very clear that they were going to change that, and
that was something they hoped to do very shortly.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think that is a beginning signal.
Ambassador Pickering, is it the position of the State
Department that we are neutral in this war, this effort, this
guerrilla fight in Colombia?
Ambassador Pickering. It is our position, Senator, that we
should do everything we can to fight this nexus between
narcotics trafficking and insurgency. The focus is on the
narcotics trafficking. That is what affects us.
Senator Sessions. Well, all right.
Ambassador Pickering. That is the centerpiece of our
effort. The interesting thing is you go down to Colombia and
you find that that nexus is increasing. It is hard to find
places, frankly, where the FARC, the ELN, and the
paramilitaries, I have to emphasize, in all the briefings I
received, in all of the areas of highest production of
narcotics, are not all intimately involved.
Senator Sessions. Well, what I am concerned about is these
guerrillas are not democrats, they are not believers in
democracy. They are Marxists, they are connected to the drug
industry, and we have got one of the oldest democracies and one
of the finest countries in the world in Colombia that is on the
ropes. We don't have a choice on whose side we are on?
Mr. McCaffrey. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, may I
withdraw?
Senator Grassley. Yes. Thank you, General, for coming. Good
luck.
Mr. McCaffrey. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Whose side are we on, or do we have a
side?
Ambassador Pickering. We have a side. We are clearly on the
side of the government in their fight against narcotics
trafficking and everything at all that contributes to that.
Senator Sessions. Then are we publicly committed, or are we
not, to the Colombian democratic government defeating the
guerrilla forces in Colombia? Do we support that effort?
Ambassador Pickering. We are, insofar as those guerrilla
forces are involved in narcotics trafficking. That is the
centerpiece of our effort. It is the centerpiece of the
Colombian government's effort in Plan Colombia.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think you have just answered the
question that you don't have confidence in the integrity of the
Colombian government sufficient to support it, and now we are
asked to spend over $1 billion on drug trafficking fighting,
which to me sounds pretty hopeless if we can't take back that
territory from the Marxist drug traffickers.
Ambassador Pickering. I think that the focus is on the drug
traffickers, whether they are Marxists, republicans, democrats,
anarchists, whoever they might be. That is the focus we are
putting on it.
Senator Sessions. Well, it may not make a difference to
you, but it makes a difference to me whether a Marxist group
takes over Colombia or not. Does it not make a difference to
the State Department?
Ambassador Pickering. It certainly makes a difference to
all of us, and it makes even more difference because they are
intimately involved in the drug trafficking, and that is the
focal point of the Plan. It is the focal point of our support
mechanism for the Plan.
Senator Sessions. Well, it just seems to me, Mr. Chairman,
that I have a strong belief that Colombia is a nation of good
people and it has a great democratic tradition. I remember
distinctly when I was prosecuting amajor drug smuggling case in
Mobile, Alabama, when I was United States Attorney and we had a young
policeman who came and testified against them. And I remember asking
him about his personal safety and how he was willing to come to the
United States and testify against these people, when so many people
have been assassinated who do so. And he was just courageous and he was
a believer in his country's government, and I remember that.
I just don't know how we can proceed with a policy that
doesn't understand fundamentally who we ought to be supporting.
I think this government of Colombia has not gotten its act
together. I do not believe that they have committed with
sufficient will, as General McCaffrey said, to win this war.
And if they have the will, they can win this war. And if they
have the will, we ought to support them. But just to pour more
money in an attempt to reduce drug trafficking while we don't
deal with the fundamental political insurgency that is going
on, I think is doomed to failure and I am very dubious.
I thank you for having this hearing and raising these
issues.
Senator Grassley. We will go to a second round of
questioning. I have just one question for Ambassador Fisher,
and also one for Ambassador Pickering--well, I have two
questions for Ambassador Fisher. Let me pick up something that
came up since you testified.
Your testimony mentions that you will examine proposals to
extend ATPA in consultation with the U.S. Congress. Will the
administration do more than just examine proposals and actually
send a specific proposal to extend ATPA to Congress?
Ambassador Fisher. Senator, ATPA expires in December of
2001, as I mentioned earlier. We are eager to find ways to deal
with the uncertainty that that creates. That is a major concern
that Colombia and the other Andean countries have.
We had some consultations last year with the Senate Finance
Committee staff. I consulted with a couple of the members of
this committee just informally. There didn't seem to be an
appetite to put something ahead of the road early before that
year. It seems to me that some of this interest has now
intensified, in part, around these hearings and also around the
Plan Colombia. And we would be willing to contemplate this if
indeed we have a sense that the Congress, the Senate, are
interested in the subject matter.
The key to ATPA, it seems to me, is to provide certainty.
It is interesting. If you look at these countries, they also
have a choice of GSP treatment. That is on-again, off-again
program, and they prefer to go down the ATPA route because
there is a longer period of certainty for investors, and in
this case it was a 10-year program.
I would just make one other comment, Senator, on this
subject. We are in the midst of preparing the negotiations of a
Free Trade Area of the Americas. The reason I referenced it in
my testimony is because if we look to an extension, whether it
is early or upon maturity in 2001, of the ATPA program, it
seems to me we want to structure it so that we incentivize
particularly the Andean countries to participate actively in
the Free Trade Area of the Americas effort which leads to a
broad liberalization throughout the hemisphere and that they
have a vested equity in that process.
Senator Grassley. There is some sensitivity because of the
concern that Congress is giving to the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and whether or not in one sense we are concerned
about the economic development there and not enough concerned
about the economic development of the Andean nations. You don't
have to comment on that. I guess I just need to express that to
you.
Ambassador Fisher. We have been working very hard on trying
to get the CBI and ATPA initiative through.
Senator Grassley. And it is not exactly easy, I know.
Ambassador Fisher. Yes, sir.
Senator Grassley. I know, I know.
In regard to the International Trade Commission study about
ATPA--and this was September of 1998, and I quote, ``It has
been important in promoting diversification in Colombia's
economy since the early 1900s.'' We are putting together a 3-
year, $15 million program to focus on alternative economic
development, and this obviously is to reduce public
participation in illicit drug production and moving workers
into alternate jobs.
What is the administration's plan to implement the issue of
this development as an alternative to the production of drugs?
Ambassador Pickering. Maybe I should answer that. I think
that is more in the area that I deal with, Mr. Chairman. I
think that you have to look at this in two particular phases.
Phase number one or part number one has to do, frankly, with
the very close linkage between the government's regaining
control and dealing with the people protecting the narcotics
trafficking, whether they are guerrillas or paramilitaries, and
the laboratory structures, and the ability to eradicate the
crops.
Once you begin to eradicate the crops, the Bolivian model
is a very germane one, and the Bolivian model has an
intensified effort. $15 million may be the money for this year,
but it will be larger in the supplemental, as explained in the
presentation documents, and it will require a very significant
effort to find alternative crops.
There are some important ideas to locate the areas where
those crops can be grown and to aid the individuals who will
agree under the Plan, or if they don't agree their cocaine will
be fumigated, to go into the alternative crop activities. Those
who are on land that cannot be used in alternative crops are a
more complicated situation. We will have to find alternative
land for them elsewhere in Colombia and move it ahead.
Could I make just one other point? Senator Biden raised an
important question about the military focus of this activity.
And there is; there is a huge military focus. And I can tell
you, Senator, having been involved now for the last 8 or 9
months, there is no daylight between the Department of State
and the military in making that happen.
I have to tell you, however, this is a team effort covering
a wide range of activities. If you look at overall Plan
Colombia, the $7.5 billion program, less than 50 percent, in my
view, will end up being military and the rest will be
developmental, justice reform, human rights. It is an area
where we all have to play on one team and where that team has
to work together and where, happily, in my experience over the
last six months, we have a strong team and that team can work
together.
If one piece of this falls out, the whole thing can go to
hell. If, in fact, we don't have the alternative development
activities engaged as the military regains control of the
countryside and the planted areas in the south, we will have a
bust. We will not have a success, and those people will move
off into other areas of Colombia or Ecuador or Peru and start
moving again back into this particular area, and we will see
the balloon phenomenon.
So I am in Colombia and here preaching a strategy of
cooperation and integration. It has got to be political, it has
got to be military, it has got to be police, it has got to be
development, it has got to be justice, it has got to be
civilians and the uniformed people all in the same room working
on the same plan and carrying out the same sort of effort, each
doing their part, or it won't work.
That is why it was successful in Bolivia and Peru, and I
think that is why it can be successful in Colombia. But I
wanted to make that set of points both in connection with your
question, Senator Biden, and with the chairman's question
because I think it is germane.
Senator Grassley. Ambassador Pickering, you mentioned that
the plan deals with guerrillas--and I think these are your
words--insofar as they do drugs. But the plan suggests major
escalations and the potential for confrontation with narco-
trafficking guerrillas and paramilitaries. Where is the
discussion for dealing with this potential and what are the
possibilities? For instance, what if the paramilitaries and
their involvement in drugs--what is the plan for dealing with
those?
Ambassador Pickering. Precisely the same as it is for the
guerrillas. I was in Colombia last week. I was briefed on the
presence of growing numbers of paramilitaries in the southern
departments of Colombia. The government has an obligation to
take back control of its own country. Those people on both
sides, guerrillas and paramilitaries, are clearly involved in
protecting, fostering, and sometimes actively engaged in drug
trafficking, taking taxes, setting prices, making sure that
individuals deliver, fostering the increase in the cropping of
coca. All of those things go on.
The government will have to take back control in order to
eliminate those crops. Whoever they have to take control from,
they are, under Plan Colombia, obligated to do that and they
are committed to do that in the discussions I have had down
there. And I believe that there is no distinction in Plan
Colombia between dealing with whoever, left, right, or the
middle, protects or fosters or carries out narcotics
trafficking or production.
Senator Grassley. A last question and then I will go to my
colleagues. There was a story today in the Boston Globe saying
that there has been 50,000 acres cleared for coca in northern
Colombia. Does this support package have anything to address
that or the potential spread of coca cultivation?
Ambassador Pickering. This support package has as its first
and primary endeavor on dealing with activity in the south
because that is the area where we have seen the greatest
expansion. We have had a 65-percent success rate in two
departments of the south in aerial eradication. The real
problem is that the growth in planting and production has
exceeded the capacity now of the Colombians to take back
control of their own country and to protect the aircraft and
the ground-based eradication efforts that have to go on. So the
next piece will be to go where the production and the increase
has been greatest.
But I can assure you that all of us have very much in mind
in other areas of Colombia, as General McCaffrey said, the $400
million-plus support in the package and previously for the
Colombian National Police is to be effective all over their
country, wherever that is necessary, and to be backed up by the
military if it is necessary for the military to deal with well-
armed, heavy-weaponed, if I could put it this way, guerrilla or
paramilitary forces when the police run up against it.
It is a combined and, I think, very significant set of
activities to deal with it. The strategy is to go where the
growth in production has been greatest most recently, but then
to go on from there into the other areas.
Senator Grassley. Thank you, Ambassador Pickering.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thanks very much.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you for illuminating more your view
of the coordination, but let me make clear what I mean. You are
not going to have anybody from CINC working on justice. You are
not going to have anybody from CINC working on development. No
one from you guys should be working on helicopters. That is all
I am saying. Let's stop this State Department-speak.
Ambassador Pickering. Well, we fund helicopters and we
obviously have an obligation to the Congress to make sure that
that money is well-spent. We do it in coordination with the
military.
Senator Biden. We trust these guys.
Ambassador Pickering. Actually, the military sets the
production guidelines for when we can get the helicopters off
the line.
Senator Biden. That is right.
Ambassador Pickering. So we are very dependent on the
military and the full cooperation.
Senator Biden. That is not the point I am talking about. I
am talking about when they get in-country, not offthe line. We
trust them more than we trust you--not you personally, the State
Department--about whether or not these helicopters are being used in an
efficacious way, okay?
Ambassador Pickering. Wherever they are used in a military
function, Senator, of course, we have to have that.
Senator Biden. Well, that is the only function they are
going to be used in. They are not for tourism.
Ambassador Pickering. Some are for police and some are for
eradication purposes.
Senator Biden. And you mean you guys are going to be
running that show?
Ambassador Pickering. The police are going to run it.
Senator Biden. And who is going to be coordinating that,
you?
Ambassador Pickering. No. The coordination in-country, in
my view, has to be a combined effort. If the military and the
police and the civilians in Colombia cannot sit down and do
this themselves and make it happen, with each one doing their
mission in conjunction with the others, it won't work.
Senator Biden. I guarantee you they can't; absolutely,
positively guarantee you they can't. They do not have the
capacity now to absorb this kind of materiel and know what to
do with it and how to use it for the next couple of years. You
know it and I know it. That is the only point I am making. So
these guys are the guys who are going to make that work. They
don't even know how to fly the suckers yet. I mean, come on.
Ambassador Pickering. Well, Senator, they already have a
large number of Blackhawks and there will be more coming. There
is, in my view, no argument between us on the role of the
military and how they should play it. I think we are a hundred
percent agreed on that. I don't want to pick a fight,
respectfully, on an issue that I think is all understood
between us. The point I was making only is that if it isn't
coordinated and integrated, it isn't going to work.
Senator Biden. I agree with that, by the way. The way this
is going to come undone real quickly is not when the next
minister of justice is shot, not when the court system
continues to be riddled with problems. It is when you lose four
Blackhawks.
Ambassador Pickering. Yes, I agree.
Senator Biden. That is when it is going to come undone. You
have been around this town long enough.
Ambassador Pickering. And when we lose troops, and we all
see that, and police.
Senator Biden. That is when it happens, that is when it
happens.
Ambassador Pickering. Yes.
Senator Biden. And on the point raised by my friend from
Alabama, who is quoting Lincoln, which I found interesting----
Senator Sessions. Killed my great granddaddy at Antietam.
Senator Biden. Well, no. I am amazed.
Senator Sessions. And got the country back together in the
course of it, however.
Senator Biden. I have been here 28 years. This is the first
time I have ever heard a Senator from Alabama talking about
Lincoln pulling the country back together again. I thought that
was a war of Northern aggression that was fought, but anyway I
won't get into that.
Senator Sessions. Victors write the description of the war.
We need to have a victory in Colombia is what we need.
Senator Biden. A la Lincoln. You heard that, General.
General Wilhelm. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. I want you to know that. I don't know where
the hell you are from, but don't tell me. I don't want to know.
Senator Sessions. Southern Command.
Senator Biden. All kidding aside, there is a distinction
with a difference, in my view, between whether or not we say we
are engaging U.S. military trainers, men and women in uniform
and military contract personnel, in another country for what
purpose. If we state that the purpose is to defeat the
guerrillas, in my view, big nations can't bluff.
It is not sufficient to put ourselves in the position that
we are going to put ourselves in with as little U.S. military
force in-country and say we are doing this to defeat the
guerrillas. It arguably is sufficient in terms of material and
personnel to train Colombian personnel to defeat the drug
trafficking.
And this is fungible, in a sense. If they have a couple of
battalions who are focusing on this, as I said in my opening
statement, there is no question that they are going to be
engaged in--I can't imagine there being a circumstance where
the commanding officer for the Colombian military a year from
now is on an eradication mission in the high Andes going after
the opium crop and hearing that there is a large concentration
of the FARC in a particular place that if they moved right away
they could get--I can't imagine the drug eradication not
becoming the second priority at that moment, at that day, with
that person.
So the idea that we think we are going to be able to parse
out controlling the Colombian military, these battalions you
are training, and the use of those helicopters only for the
purpose of interdicting and eradicating drug trafficking, I
think is not reasonable. They are going to be used
interchangeably at some point once they are trained.
But I do think it does make a difference whether or not--
and this is where I do agree with Ambassador Pickering's
description of our role. Words matter here, and in this case to
suggest that our purpose in providing this military equipment
and this aid is to deal with the narco-trafficking in these
areas--and incidentally, to the extent that it takes out any,
all, or part of the counter-insurgency, that is fine, but that
is not our first purpose.
If that is our first purpose, we are making a commitment in
terms of our credibility that far exceeds the commitment we are
making relative to attempting to deal with drugs. If we wish to
do that, then I think the Senator from Alabama and others
should so move, should move on the floor of the Senate to
suggest that. And we should debate whether or not we want to do
all that need be done militarily to aid the Colombians in
regaining control of their country from Marxist insurgents.
But I think it is a distinction with a difference that
needs to be made here as to what our purpose is. And if we wish
to go further, General, I am going to want you to have a whole
hell of a lot more than 60 more helicopters that you are not
going to be flying. I want you to have a whole hell of a lot
more in terms of us going down to aid the Colombians.
Now, that does not mean that we could not in a separate
package unrelated to this provide military aid to the
Colombians for purposes of going after the guerrillas, if you
want to do that. But that is not the function here, although
incidentally it has to be part of the solution. But I do think
it matters how we say it, and that is the only point that I
wish to make.
I have no further questions.
Senator Grassley. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to talk some about the international aspects
of Plan Colombia beyond the United States. I understand that
President Pastrana has been in Europe recently discussing the
prospects of European cooperation both financially and in the
peace process. I know that there will be a meeting in Madrid
shortly of potential friends of Colombia.
Ambassador Pickering, could you outline where that process
is? Specifically, how close is Colombia to getting the balance
of the funding package committed? And, second, what will be the
role of other countries besides the United States in attempting
to move the peace process forward?
Ambassador Pickering. First, Senator Graham, essentially
what you have said is a good resume of what hasbeen going on.
Let me just recapitulate a little bit. The plan is estimated at $7.5
billion for 3 years. $4 billion coming from Colombia is a very
important contribution. That will be probably more predominantly non-
military, but there will be a very significant military and police
component to that.
There will be, in addition to that, already committed
probably $750 million to $1 billion from the international
financial institutions, the IBRD, the IMF, and the various
regional banks in Latin America. That will be to cover the very
significant share of the civilian component.
Senator Graham. Is that part of the $4 billion that
Colombia----
Ambassador Pickering. No. That is part of an add-on to the
$4 billion. There will be, in addition to that, of course,
depending on the will of Congress and your decision, the money
proposed from the U.S. side. There will be, in my view, because
both President Pastrana, then his foreign minister, then now
his foreign minister and the coordinator of the plan are
currently in Europe talking to the Europeans--the idea is to
have, as you said, a meeting in the summer, I hope early
summer, in Madrid. The Spanish have agreed to host that.
There is a target to fill in a very considerable amount; I
would say less than $1 billion, but more than $500 million, we
would hope, as a good target for the Europeans. That will
cover, I think, the bulk of the financing for the plan,
depending, of course, on what we do in the third year which is
not yet, I think, a reality by any means, but something that we
would clearly want to follow up the present package with.
There is, in addition to all of that, a commitment beyond
Plan Colombia for development and macroeconomic currency
stabilization and other financing. Recognizing the general good
health of the Colombian economy and recognizing that it is a
country with lots of resources, that can, as a backdrop to the
plan but not focused on the plan, provide an enormous amount of
support essentially in the economic, the non-military area.
And this, I understand, has attracted up to perhaps as much
as $7 billion in international support, outside of Plan
Colombia. Some of it may be in Plan Colombia. Let's say $6
billion outside of Plan Colombia, at least, which will be
enormously important for the future of that country. You can't
obviously separate everything in Colombia to Plan Colombia and
non-Plan Colombia. There will be a symbiotic and mutually-
reinforcing relationship for those, and that is the commitment
of those institutions over, I think, the next three to five
years. So we have to keep that in perspective.
As a result, I think that we are optimistic, given
President Pastrana's determination and commitment, given the
support that he has begun to receive and the work that he and
his people are putting in to deal with not only Europe, but I
would expect that we will see some of the wealthier countries
in other parts of the world in Asia, in particular, to round
out the funding commitments that are now still outstanding.
And we will, I hope, by the summertime be able to give you
a lot clearer view as to are there gaps still and where should
they come and how does that feature or fit into our thinking as
we come into the 2002 budget year. We are working obviously now
on the current supplemental and 2001.
Senator Graham. The second part of the question had to do
with the internationalization of the peace process. I know that
some of the guerrilla organizations in Colombia, the FARC
specifically, have had longtime relationships with European
countries in Scandinavia and elsewhere. Has there been an
effort to try to get some of those nations engaged in the peace
process to encourage a more conciliatory attitude by the FARC?
Ambassador Pickering. Yes, there has been, and that is
really now beginning to show up, if I could put it that way, on
the scope. There are several things that should be mentioned.
One that is very important is that with the help of the Swedes,
with the help of the Norwegians, and now of other countries in
Europe, including Italy and the Vatican and Spain and others,
there is a joint delegation of FARC and government and non-
government people going through those countries to give the
FARC, I think, something they need very badly--they have been
40 years in the bush and they are clinging to doctrinal and
other ideas that now have been discarded almost everywhere else
in the world--and they have very little understanding of how
the world at the beginning of the 21st century is working--to
give them a real sense of the fact that they have been in many
ways passed by by time and by circumstances and that there is a
significant imperative for them to engage in a clear way and in
an accurate way in a process of ending the conflict and
bringing peace to the region, obviously, on terms and
conditions which will preserve democracy in Colombia and on
terms and conditions which will not in any way at all allow any
opportunity for permission to engage in drug production or drug
trafficking. Those are absolutely sine qua nons.
The government of Colombia is also cooperating very closely
with the Venezuelan government. They had a recent meeting on
Friday on the frontier involving all the military, all of their
intelligence people, and all of their senior foreign affairs
people to coordinate strategy. And I believe from my
conversations with the Colombian government they have found
Venezuelans have been cooperative and helpful not only in
reestablishing control over the border which, as you point out,
is a place where there have been incursions back and forth to
the detriment of the interests of both countries, but also
helpful in promoting meetings in the context of making progress
bilaterally between the government and their guerrilla
opponents. The Venezuelan government can be useful and helpful,
and I believe has been in the eyes of the Colombian government,
whose judgment on this I think we have to respect.
Senator Graham. A final question on the alternative
development plan. Based on the Bolivian experience, there seem
to be some principles that are important to effective
alternative development. It has to be part of a dual structure
or strategy--law enforcement pressure, economic development.
One won't work without the other.
There is a tendency to think of alternative development as
if it has to be agriculture. In fact, some of the most
significant job opportunities in economic development are
outside of agriculture.
There has to be a focus on labor intensity even within
agriculture. Fresh flowers in Colombia employ ten people per
hectare. Cattle-raising might employ one person per ten
hectares. So it is important to keep the focus on providing
employment opportunities that will be of a sufficient level
that they will attract people away from illicit coca
production.
My question is how refined is our alternative development
strategy and what proportion of those persons who are going to
be displaced from their current illicit activity will it
provide economic opportunities for?
Ambassador Pickering. These are extremely important
questions, and another criterion obviously is the people doing
it have to make a living. They have to be in a position, if not
competing with the high rates of return they made on coca, they
have to be able to feed their families, see a future for
themselves and move ahead, which means that the choice of
alternative crops also has to be wise. The Colombians have
begun looking at things that have a market value not in
Colombia but as export crops that will be important because
those can generate higher returns to the individuals.
The effort is first to obviously base ourselves on the
lessons that we have all learned in Peru and Bolivia and then
try to apply those. In Colombia, they have an alternative
development agency called PLANTE which has begun already in
Colombia to design the programs, to work on Colombian
experience. And we consulted with them last week in our
planning meetings in Colombia and they clearly, as you have,
distinguished between places in Colombia wherepeople could
actually go into alternative development and places where the soil
conditions are so poor, the future is so sparse that those places
probably ought to return to forest land.
In fact, the Colombians have also thought about the
environmental consequences of what they are engaged in as ways
to protect that and find alternative employment in those kinds
of activities, as well as, I would hope, moving people to areas
where there is good land available, some of it confiscated from
drug cartels, that could be exploited and developed by people
to either move into agriculture or into light manufacturing,
whatever can be done in terms of investment in the country.
These are hugh problems for Colombia, one of the reasons
why we have moved from 5 percent of our assistance to 20
percent of our assistance is to take into account the fact that
they will require resources, planning, and additional support
to be able to do it. I think the raw material is there and I
think the principles are there and I think there are the right
people working on it. The coordination is what I am most
concerned about and that has to be put in place.
Senator Grassley. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. You know, I think the Colombians'
argument they made 20 years ago that the problem is more an
American consumption problem than a production problem for
drugs is, as time has gone by, more plausible to me than it
used to be as a Federal prosecutor.
I think the way for the United States to defeat drug use in
America is to reemphasize what we do within this country with a
strong will, which at one time we had which I sense is now
being undermined. I was a part of the effort. I prosecuted
hundreds of cases, many involving Colombian importation cases.
I have read about the underground empire and all the books at
that time about that. I chaired a committee in the Department
of Justice on narcotics.
But I do not believe we are going to solve America's drug
problem by stopping production in South America. We have been
trying to do that, and we have heard testimony and this
committee has heard testimony for over 25 years, probably, that
somehow we are going to solve the problem by getting the
Peruvians, the Bolivians and the Colombians to stop producing
it. So from that point of view, I have real doubts about the
overall effectiveness of this effort. It would have some
positive impact, but not much, in my opinion.
As soon as the source gets shut down in one area, it pops
up in another country. We have seen that over and over and over
again. Now, I wish it weren't so. I wish we could do it that
way. It just has not worked, so I have serious doubts about
that.
I believe fundamentally, though, that we will never have a
major reduction in drug production in Colombia until the nation
is in charge of its territory. As General McCaffrey said, 40 to
50 percent of the country is controlled by the guerrilla forces
who are providing protection to drug dealers and making money
off the drug trade. Not only that, but they are totalitarian
Marxists who want to destroy Colombian democracy. So I don't
know what to say about it. I am stunned that we continue to
push the peace process.
Ambassador Pickering, isn't it fair to say that in these
matters if you don't make progress on the battlefield, you
can't make very much progress when the State Department starts
the negotiation process? Aren't you troubled by the fact that
the United States is encouraging Colombia to negotiate with
these insurgents? Isn't that the wrong thing for us to do as a
Nation? Shouldn't we encourage them to fight for their nation
and their democracy?
Ambassador Pickering. Let me address a couple of the
problems. First, General McCaffrey ought to address the
domestic issue and the demand reduction, but I have to do it
because when I go to Latin America or elsewhere to talk to
people about their part in the program, I have to keep pointing
out to them that only 3 percent of the many multi-billion-
dollar national budget of the United States goes to foreign
supply reduction. The other 97 percent--and this is in the
multiple billions, tens of billions of dollars--goes to deal
with all of the aspects of the problem in the United States
that you as a prosecutor are so familiar with.
Senator Sessions. You are counting State and local law
enforcement, I guess.
Ambassador Pickering. Yes, including demand reduction.
Senator Sessions. That is a fair analysis.
Ambassador Pickering. And I believe, and General McCaffrey
has the figures, that we can see serious impacts in a positive
way in demand reduction at least in some of these areas.
Unfortunately, I understand in synthetic drugs it is not nearly
as successful as it has been in cocaine and heroin use in the
United States. I am not the expert on that, but I have to talk
about it, so----
Senator Sessions. I know the numbers on that. I can share
them with you.
Ambassador Pickering. You know the numbers on that.
Senator Sessions. They are not quite as good as you
suggest.
Ambassador Pickering. Well, I think they are a lot better
than many of us thought five years ago we would see, and I
think that we can continue to do better in that area and it
proves that it isn't hopeless.
Secondly, I think that you yourselves have answered the
question you keep asking me because on every occasion when you
raise the question of helping Colombia, you mention the drug
problem and I mention the drug problem, and that is the central
focus of the reason why we are helping Colombia.
Now, the third point is the question of bringing an end to
the insurgency. I agree with you a hundred percent, and I have
told this to President Pastrana and so have all of the senior
American officials who have met with him, that you cannot end
the insurgency through a negotiating process that is not backed
up with all of the effort of the Colombian government in
whatever area to pursue that particular effort against a
position of strength and a position of continuing to make it
clear to the guerrillas that you are not going to permit them
to engage in this huge amount of money production for
themselves which just feeds the insurgency by continuing to
engage in narco-trafficking, and that the government is not
going to gird itself up in every area, in better human rights
performance, in judicial reform, in all those things that
strike at the heart of what it is these people, deeply engaged
as they are in narco-trafficking, are in a sense looking for.
Secondly, I don't believe the negotiating process is at all
a bad idea. I was associated with it in El Salvador. I watched
it in Guatemala. It ended up ending for all intents and
purposes the armed insurgencies in both of those countries, but
it only proceeded under the conditions that you have set out
and that I fully agree with that the government has to make a
major effort.
In this particular case, the nexus between all of these
organizations that wish to see the end of the government,
whether they are paramilitaries for their own purposes or
straight-out criminals or guerrillas who are engaged in narco-
trafficking--the unifying theme for the United States is their
engagement in the narcotics effort, and that is the central
focus of the supplemental that we are providing and that is the
reason why we have this support package for Plan Colombia.
Senator Sessions. Well, I believe the nation is not going
to prevail until there is more national will on the
battlefield. And if they start prevailing on the battlefield,
they will be in a position to negotiate some sort of settlement
perhaps in the future, but I don't see that now.
The Scandinavians and Swedes and Italians--if they want to
go down there and preside over an international peace process
right now, I would say let them put their money in it, not
ours. I do not believe we are ready to do that, and I think we
ought not to be having our policy with Colombia substantially
affected by that kind of thinking, just because other nations
may have an interest. I just have serious doubts.
General Wilhelm, with regard to the status of the military
there, has there been any success of significance in the
military battle between the guerrillas and the government in
the last year, six months?
General Wilhelm. Senator Sessions, I would say that
absolutely there have been some significant successes. I think
we only have to go back as far as the nationwide offensive that
occurred in July of last year. I have been to Colombia and
visited with the military leaders. I have viewed the
intelligence analysis and I have viewed the photographs of the
aftermaths of the contacts which were nationwide.
Sir, I can tell you as a matter of certainty the Colombian
armed forces emerged with the upper hand, and this was the
first occasion after a series by my count of ten of what I have
referred to as stinging tactical defeats. This then carried
forward into the month of November, when again both the FARC
and the ELN embarked on widespread engagements where they
attacked isolated garrisons, both national police and military.
Once again, at the end of the day the Colombian armed forces,
in my judgment, emerged with the upper hand. And that is more
than wishful thinking on my part. Again, I looked at the
evidence. I looked at the hard evidence, to include the aerial
photography of the battlefields.
What has changed? Answer: a number of things. One, the
military is behaving much more professionally on the
battlefield. We are seeing levels of air-ground integration
that we haven't seen before. In General Velasco, the Colombian
Air Force has a first-class tactical commander who spends his
time on flight-related and target engagement business, which is
awfully important.
We are seeing much better integration between the Colombian
National Police and the armed forces. Small garrisons are no
longer being left on the limb where they can wither and die.
There is, in fact, a reinforcement plan. Quick-reaction forces
have been formed. Quick-reaction forces have been provided some
mobility means. This will improve markedly if we execute our
support plan for Plan Colombia as it is framed right now.
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield was woefully
lacking when I went to Southern Command two-and-a-half years
ago. The most fundamental assessments of terrain and weather
weren't being made. It shouldn't come as any great surprise if
your main advantage is air power that your adversary is going
to take you on during periods of low visibility, rain, and
other inclement weather. These things are all being thought
through now.
So, sir, the answer to your question is, yes, we have seen
a change in the military's fortunes, and it has nothing to do
with luck. They created their own luck by good leadership,
thoughtful intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and
thoughtful integration of combat systems.
Senator Sessions. Well, that is good to hear, and I have
heard some things to that effect previously, but we have got a
good way to go. Two things trouble me. If we are beginning to
get our military act together and they are beginning to be
effective, are we assisting them effectively if we are
encouraging peace negotiations in the middle of military
success? I have doubts about that.
To me, I am not sure we would have served Lincoln well if
we tried to get him to negotiate a peace settlement while the
war was going on. There were plenty of opportunities and people
wanted to do that. He saw that a nation can't compromise away
its territory. Victory is in this circumstance essential, it
seems to me, and I am just not sure we are in the right frame.
I want to help Colombia. I do not want to be involved in a
civil war in Colombia. I think what we ought to do is tell the
Colombian government, and the President of the United States
needs to tell him, you show leadership, you go out there and
start showing that you can effectively prevail against these
insurgents and we will try to assist you, both because we have
a special interest in drugs and because we believe in democracy
in the world. And we would like to see you prevail and bring a
united nation together again in Colombia.
Mr. Chairman, I am just real troubled about a proposal that
has got international peace process members who want to cut
deals while we give billions of dollars in an area, in my view,
that has just got to be won on the battlefield.
Senator Grassley. Ambassador Pickering.
Ambassador Pickering. The difference, Senator Sessions,
with respect, is that I believe President Pastrana is committed
to principles, that he is not going to close off the
opportunity for the guerrillas to come and accept his
principles and to push them very hard on both fronts, on the
struggle front particularly focused on the counter-narcotics
struggle which affects them directly because it is their
livelihood--that is where they are getting all the money, that
is where they are getting the new uniforms and the radios, and
that is how they are paying for the arms. All of that has to
obviously be part of the effort, and I agree with you fully on
that. I don't think we disagree on that.
I think the opportunity to work on the guerrillas' heads in
a negotiating process to come back into Colombia's life in the
mainstream, to accept democracy, to accept where the country is
going to go, to be part of the future, is also something that
is extremely important. Psychologically, it helps to build the
strength of his own country, and I don't think he ought to be
afraid of the negotiating process and I don't believe he is.
I think he can manage that with clear command. That is the
direction in which he wants to go, and I believe that those are
all part of the same effort of getting these guys out of the
narcotics business, out of the anti-democracy business,
whatever you want to call it, and having an option of becoming
part of the future of the new Colombia or being made
irrelevant.
Senator Sessions. Well, I know General Wilhelm knows nobody
wants to be the last guy to die on a battlefield before the
commander-in-chief cuts a deal. To me, President Pastrana needs
to make clear that he has certain standards he will accept. He
would be glad to welcome these people back into his government
under certain terms, and then he is prepared to wage war until
he gets those terms and be fair and generous about it.
But these negotiations have the ability to undermine the
strength of the domestic support, the will of the people of
Colombia, and these negotiations strengthen the will of the
guerrillas. When the Scandinavians and the United States are
saying negotiate with these people, it encourages them and
discourages the people in Colombia.
Isn't that true, Ambassador Pickering?
Ambassador Pickering. I want to be very careful and I want
to be very clear. The United States is supporting President
Pastrana's initiative to negotiate on the terms and conditions
that President Pastrana has made clear to his own people and to
the guerrillas themselves.
Senator Sessions. We have encouraged that, have we not?
Ambassador Pickering. No. We have adopted a policy of
supporting President Pastrana's initiative. He was the one who
during the political campaign leading up to his election as
president found, in fact, that this was what the public wanted
him to do. And he agreed to go ahead and do it and he was
elected on that basis and he has promised to carry it out. But
he hasn't promised to carry it out on the basis that you assume
that every negotiation is going to mean a defeat for the
government involved in the negotiation.
Quite the contrary, he assumes, in fact, that he can pursue
his efforts to bring about change, reform, permanent democracy,
and end drug trafficking by both methods, and that he can find
a way to articulate those as others have successfully in the
past to the advantage of the future he sees for Colombia.
I don't believe that it is right for the United States to
undermine that, and I believe President Pastrana--I have talked
to him many times--is fully committed along those lines, and
that our support for that effort, but it was his initiative, is
important to keep that process moving.
Senator Grassley. Can I ask one question and then we will
quit, and that is some update on the black market peso
exchange, the extent to which U.S. companies are being used as
conduits for money laundering, what we are doing to encourage
our companies to cooperate with that effort, and what
assistance are we doing, if anything, with the Colombian police
on that matter.
Ambassador Pickering. I would like, because it goes into a
range of detail that I am not personally familiar with, to
provide you a written answer to that for the record.
Senator Grassley. Yes, okay.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator Grassley. Let me close with one final comment,
then, and this is based on what I have heard today and what I
kind of surmised before we opened our hearing. It would seem
that we do have an outline for a strategy, but that an outline
is not a strategy, and that is especially true when we are
talking about more than $1 billion we are going to spend. That
is real money.
I think it is something that really commits Colombia and
the United States to a very major new engagement both in depth
and in breadth. And so I caution us that this requires that we
be very thoughtful in our efforts. The Colombians have a
planning document. I am concerned that we don't have one, and I
hope that we can see one before we are asked to vote on it. And
I think maybe a place to give us more detail and more in
writing is maybe when this issue is brought before the Foreign
Relations Committee later on this week.
I thank you all very much for your cooperation. The hearing
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the caucus and subcommittee were
adjourned.]
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