[Senate Hearing 106-1011]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1011
CARIBBEAN DRUG TRAFFICKING: RETURN OF THE CARIBBEAN CONNECTION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 9, 2000
__________
Serial No. J-106-82
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-139 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JON KYL, Arizona HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
Manus Cooney, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Bruce A. Cohen, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina, Chairman
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
Garry Malphrus, Chief Counsel
Glen Shor, Legislative Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
DeWine, Hon. Mike, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio......... 2
Leahy, Hon. Patrick a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont,
prepared statement............................................. 26
Thurmond, Hon. Strom, a U.S. Senator from the State of South
Carolina....................................................... 1
WITNESSES
Shkor, John E., Vice Admiral, Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic
Area, prepared statement....................................... 4
Varrone, John C., Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Investigations, U.S. Customs Service........................... 18
Vigil, Michael S., Special Agent in Charge, Caribbean Field
Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of
Justice, prepared statement.................................... 10
APPENDIX
Questions and Answers
Responses of John E. Shkor to Questions from Senator Thurmond.... 33
Responses of John E. Shkor to Questions from Senator DeWine...... 36
Responses of Michael S. Vigil to Questions from Senator Thurmond. 36
Responses of John C. Varrone to Questions from Senator Thurmond.. 43
CARIBBEAN DRUG TRAFFICKING: RETURN OF THE CARIBBEAN CONNECTION
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 9, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Strom
Thurmond (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Also present: Senator DeWine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STROM THURMOND, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Thurmond. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today's hearing is concerned with the increasing use of the
Caribbean by narcotics trafficking organizations as a
transshipment point for smuggling drugs, primarily cocaine and
heroin, into the United States.
Without question, the illicit drug trade has a devastating
effect not only on the United States, but also on those
countries that are being used as transit points. Puerto Rico's
murder rate, much of it drug related, is reported to be the
highest in the United States or its possessions. Jamaican and
Dominican drug gangs are renowned for their unrestrained use of
violence to further their goals, and the drug trade has fueled
growing corruption of police forces and government officials in
these transit countries.
To add some context to this hearing, the Caribbean used to
be the favored route of smugglers, but as the United States
focused its counter-drug efforts on this region, the narcotics
traffickers shifted their efforts to our Southwest border
region. In response to this, we also shifted considerable
enforcement resources and efforts to the border.
However, the drug cartels and other traffickers are dynamic
and innovative, constantly changing their routes and methods to
exploit any potential weakness. Today, the entire Caribbean is
becoming an increasingly attractive avenue for trafficking and
is the second major conduit for contraband. Interagency studies
and intelligence sources indicate that detected smuggling
attempts in the Caribbean are up--I repeat--up 30 percent since
1998, and it is estimated that 33 percent of the total amount
of cocaine smuggled into the United States last year came
through the Caribbean.
Given the expanse of water, the seemingly countless
islands, and the instability of a number of nations in the
Caribbean, drugs are easily smuggled through the region.
Traffickers using cargo ships, private aircraft, and go-fast
boats are moving literally tons of cocaine and heroin out of
South America, through the Caribbean, and into the United
States.
Particularly disturbing is the prominent role which Puerto
Rico has taken in drug smuggling. Traffickers are eager to get
drugs onto Puerto Rico, for once their illicit cargo is on that
island it can be hidden among legitimate cargo bound for the
United States and will never have to pass U.S. customs
examinations and inspections.
Long before the explosion in drug trafficking, the
Caribbean was famous for being the home of offshore banks. The
lax banking regulations in several of the Caribbean nations had
made this part of the world attractive as a major drug money
laundering center. The flow of hidden money imposes significant
hardships on legitimate commerce, and for many Caribbean
nations money laundering creates financial volatility.
Clearly, the increased use of the Caribbean as a pipeline
for drugs bound for the United States represents a disturbing
trend and a serious threat to our Nation. Even more clearly, we
must refocus enforcement and interdiction efforts on this
region and find ways to increase cooperation amongst domestic
law enforcement organizations and between American law
enforcement agencies and their counterparts in the Caribbean.
We are fortunate to have a distinguished and honorable
panel testifying before us today: Michael Vigil, Special Agent
in Charge of the Caribbean Field Division of the DEA; John
Varrone, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner with the Office
of Investigation for the U.S. Customs Service; and Vice Admiral
John Shkor, Commander of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area.
These witnesses represent the agencies that are leading our
efforts to stem the flow of narcotics through the Caribbean,
and I am certain their testimony will be enlightening and
educational. Gentlemen, we appreciate your appearing before us
today. Before we get started, I would like to say for the
record that we appreciate all your hard work. There are few
professions more demanding and dangerous than law enforcement,
and I commend each of you for your hard work, selfless efforts,
and dedication to serving the Nation.
Would you like to make a statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DeWINE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
OHIO
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want
to congratulate you for holding this hearing. It is very
important that we focus on what is going on in the Caribbean
region in regard to drug trafficking and drug transit coming
into this country.
We do have a drug crisis in this country, as you have
pointed out, Mr. Chairman, and it is largely a result of the
abundant supply of drugs that originate many times inColombia
and that enter our country from transit points in the Caribbean.
The fact is that when drugs are readily available because
they cross our borders and end up on our streets, Americans,
usually our children, too often end up using them. To be
effective, our drug control strategy needs to be a coordinated
effort, a coordinated effort that directs and balances
resources and support among three key areas: domestic law
enforcement; international eradication and interdiction
efforts; and demand reduction, treatment, and education.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that part of our problem in the
last few years is our anti-drug strategy has become inbalanced.
We have not put enough resources into international
interdiction. We began to change that recently, but we need to
reexamine exactly where we are and exactly what is going on in
the Caribbean.
Because of the lack of emphasis on stopping drugs before
they reach our borders, drug traffickers prey upon weak
nations, weak nations unable to combat the strength and power
of the illicit drug trade. That is why the Caribbean remains a
prime enabler for a majority of the illicit drugs that make
landfall into the United States.
One example is Haiti. We all know that the situation in
Haiti is a mess. Because of the island's weak political and
economic condition, Haiti has become increasingly attractive to
international drug traffickers. According to a U.S. Government
Interagency Assessment on Cocaine Movement, in 1996 between 5
and 8 percent of the cocaine coming into the United States
passed through Haiti. But also according to that same study, by
1998 the amount jumped to nearly 20 percent.
And let me just say based on my own experiences in
traveling to Haiti on many occasions, I think it is probably
impossible for us to tell what is going through Haiti. But the
estimates are frightening.
I think we must recognize that Haiti's growing popularity
as a lane of choice on the drug trafficking highway is linked
to the continued political, economic, and legal instability
that continues to plague that country. The transit of drugs in
Haiti represents a serious threat to an already very fragile
democracy. If Haiti's current political vacuum is filled by
drug cartels and drug dealers, that democracy may collapse, and
we must not let this happen.
Mr. Chairman, in 1998 I came back from a trip to the region
convinced that unless we increase our investment in drug
interdiction, we risk losing the Caribbean to organized crime
and drug trafficking. As a result, we in Congress addressed
this concern with the passage of the Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act. This Act is a $2.7 billion, 3-year bipartisan
plan to increase our investment in international eradication,
interdiction, and crop alternatives.
As a result of our initial investment of $844 million for
international drug control and interdiction in fiscal year
1999, we made significant gains in stemming the flow of illicit
drugs into our country. For instance, the U.S. Coast Guard
seized a record amount of cocaine in fiscal year 1999--111,689
pounds.
However, Mr. Chairman, sadly, the administration has not
put significant emphasis on drug interdiction. Sadly, we have
not in the past year put enough resources into this bill. I
think it is our obligation this year to revisit this issue to
see exactly where we are, and I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that
after we do that, we will resolve as a Congress to put
additional funds into the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination
Act. It is vitally important that we do this.
If we are to continue having a significant impact on
illicit drug trafficking, we must be committed to invest in the
long term in the Coast Guard and other key agencies, such as
Customs and the Drug Enforcement Administration. These agencies
are America's front-line defense against drugs crossing our
borders. We must provide them the resources necessary to
address the illicit drug threat.
Mr. Chairman, I want to again thank you for holding this
hearing, and I want to thank our three witnesses. I look
forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you very much.
Panel one: Vice Admiral John E. Shkor.
Vice Admiral Shkor. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Thurmond. Glad to have you with us.
Mr. Michael S. Vigil, glad to have you with us.
Mr. Vigil. Good morning, Senator.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. John C. Varrone, glad to have you
with us.
Mr. Varrone. Thank you, sir.
Senator Thurmond. You may proceed.
PANEL CONSISTING OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHN E. SHKOR, COMMANDER,
COAST GUARD ATLANTIC AREA, PORTSMOUTH, VA; MICHAEL S. VIGIL,
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, CARIBBEAN FIELD DIVISION, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SAN
JUAN, PUERTO RICO; AND JOHN C. VARRONE, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE,
WASHINGTON, DC
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHN E. SHKOR
Vice Admiral Shkor. I am Vice Admiral John Shkor, Commander
of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss the Coast Guard's efforts
against the drug smuggling problem in the Caribbean.
With your permission, I ask that my formal statement be
accepted for the record and that I offer a summary at this
time.
Senator Thurmond. Without objection, so ordered.
Vice Admiral Shkor. The Coast Guard is the lead agency for
maritime drug interdiction and shares lead agency
responsibility for air interdiction with the Customs Service.
We are on the front line daily in the maritime drug
interdiction fight, facing an opponent who is well financed and
ruthless.
According to interagency figures, in calendar year 1999,
512 metric tons of cocaine flowed from source countries,
primarily Colombia, en route to the U.S. market. Our role is
against smugglers operating in the transit zone, and our goals
come from the National Drug Control Strategy. Goal 4 requires
us to shield America's frontiers from illegal drugs, and sets
out clear performance measures which call for us to reduce the
rate of illicit drug flow through the transit and arrival zones
by 10 percent in 2002 and 20 percent in 2007.
At the same time, our national emphasis is on source zone
operations, something that is vital to achieving our national
supply reduction goals. The operative metaphor is we must shoot
the archer rather than the arrows. It remains necessary, and
the National Drug Control Strategy provides for, a balance
which recognizes that while we fletch our arrows, prepare long
bows and seek a place down range from which to do battle, the
archer is killing some 15,000 of our citizens each year. We
must sustain the shield of transit zone interdiction while
source country programs take effect.
The chart on my left shows the path of cocaine moving
through the Caribbean. Last year, about half of the cocaine
leaving South American destined for the United States was
shipped through the Caribbean transit zone. About 90 percent of
the cocaine flow generally goes by sea. Much of that movement
is on go-fast boats, typically 40- to 50-foot boats with high-
horsepower outboard engines which carry more than half a ton of
cocaine on each trip. Much of the movement of cocaine is
carried on commercial vessels, large and small, as well.
The highest threat axis is to Puerto Rico and nearby
islands. The tonnage moved to Haiti is significant, but not
quite as large. Of note is that an estimated 40 percent of the
cocaine flow into Haiti is by way of non-commercial air and is
currently beyond our ability to directly influence. Lesser
amounts move to Jamaica and the western Caribbean. Indeed, the
flow estimates for the western Caribbean have dropped in the
past 2 years.
Nearly all of my available counter-drug effort is focused
on the Caribbean, amounting to nearly 90,000 cutter operating
hours and 16,500 aircraft flight hours last year. We allocate
60 percent of our major cutter operational time to the counter-
drug mission.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the Congress for the supplemental
funding for fiscal year 1999 which allowed the Coast Guard to
initiate several programs to enhance end game capability. We
have put the funds you provided to good use. The initial
deployment of armed helicopters with over the horizon small
boats has been a tremendous success. While this prototype
operation was limited to only two helicopters deployed only a
part of the time, six go-fast boats were detected and six were
stopped--much better than one out of six, as is the case
without this capability.
Senator DeWine, none of this would have been possible
without your interest in our Nation's drug problem. You were a
sponsor of the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. The
supplemental funding which followed has translated into
tangible improvements in the Coast Guard's ability to catch
smugglers and seize drugs. The equipment you enabled us to
deploy made last year a record for the Coast Guard, some 51
metric tons seized, and we are ahead of that pace this year
with 34 metric tons seized. Speaking on behalf of Coast Guard
men and women who have put those tools to use, a sincere thank
you.
Roughly one-fourth of all cocaine entering the United
States comes via the 110-mile-long island of Puerto Rico. My
primary counter-drug focus in Atlantic Area for the upcoming
year will be on Puerto Rico, with a secondary focus on Haiti.
Cocaine flow into Puerto Rico has doubled over the past three
years. Part of this increase can be attributed to a secondary
movement of cocaine first delivered to Haiti and then
transported westward.
You can see from this second chart that while the amount
seized by interagency efforts has risen, the percentage of that
amount as compared to the flow has decreased. The end result is
that significantly more drugsare successfully arriving in
Puerto Rico for further transport to the mainland United States.
Senator, I see a red light. Should I stop? I see a red
light, sir. Should I stop or continue with my statement,
Senator?
Senator Thurmond. Yes, proceed.
Vice Admiral Shkor. Reduction in cocaine movement during
1997 and 1998 was the result of a surge in operations by the
Coast Guard under Operation Frontier Shield and a surge by the
Customs Service under Operation Gateway. It is extremely
regrettable that because of resource limitations, neither
agency has been able to sustain that level of effort over time.
The Coast Guard is working with other members of the
Federal law enforcement community in Puerto Rico to develop a
systemic approach to attacking this reemerging threat. The U.S.
interdiction coordinator some months ago asked that the Federal
law enforcement community in Puerto Rico look at how it could
respond to the resurgence of cocaine movement.
I am pleased to report that my partner at the table, Mr.
Mike Vigil, is coordinating this effort through the Puerto Rico
HIDTA Executive Committee, of which he is chairman. We need to
dismantle smuggling organizations moving cocaine through Puerto
Rico. We need to cut the annual tonnage of cocaine moving
through Puerto Rico from something over 100 metric tons to
something under 50 metric tons and keep it there. We need to
regain control of our own backyard.
I would like to speak to Haiti briefly. When we focus on
Haiti, we must recognize the realities of our limitations
operating in and around there. These limitations result in an
extremely unfavorable operating environment, particularly on
the ground. We do not yet have the fundamentals of law
enforcement that we do in Puerto Rico, or even as is found in
most of the Caribbean nations with which we partner. This chart
shows that reality. U.S. law enforcement seizes 23 percent of
the cocaine moving into and through the Puerto Rico op area,
while only 4 percent of the cocaine moving to Haiti is seized.
The most effective means we have of addressing cocaine
movement into Haiti is to remove the incentive to the
trafficking organization. We suspect that a significant amount
of cocaine moves from Haiti to Puerto Rico, just as a
significant amount moves to south Florida. Attacking that
secondary flow effectively would reduce the attractiveness of
Haiti to smuggling organizations.
The appropriate strategy to address Haiti from our
perspective, then, takes three parts. First, we need to attack
the secondary flow into Puerto Rico with a closely coordinated
interagency response that maximizes the effect of combined
resources. This should involve land-based operations supporting
our partners in the Dominican Republic whose western border is
with Haiti, as well as maritime operations dealing with the
movement by sea. Land-based operations in Haiti itself seem
problematic for the time being. If the post-election situation
in Haiti results in a more favorable operating environment,
that should be pursued as well.
Second, we need to sustain the highly effective Operation
Riversweep that the Customs Service leads and which is
supported by the rest of us to support the secondary flow into
south Florida.
Third, we need to persuade Venezuela to open their air
space to United States tracker aircraft to enable end-game
effectiveness against smugglers now delivering cocaine to Haiti
by air. Our Colombian counterparts have demonstrated a
willingness and a capability to deal effectively with smuggling
aircraft when we can maintain track back into Colombia.
Smugglers exploit Venezuelan policies by flying through
Venezuelan air space on their way back to Colombia. It
functions like a pick in basketball, scrubbing the defender off
the man with the ball. And as a result, they are able to
reenter Colombia with impunity.
Senators, let me thank you again for the opportunity to
appear and present a Coast Guard view. Your ongoing interest
and legislation you have sponsored have made significant
improvements in the Nation's ability to protect itself from
drugs. I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Shkor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral John E. Shkor
Good morning, Mister Chairman and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee. I am Vice Admiral John Shkor, Commander of the Coast
Guard Atlantic Area. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the Coast Guard's efforts with regard to the Drug
Smuggling Problem in the Caribbean.
The Coast Guard is the lead agency for maritime drug interdiction
and shares lead agency responsibility for air interdiction with the
Customs Service. As the only Armed Service with law enforcement
authority, and the only Federal agency with broad enforcement authority
on the high seas, the Coast Guard is on the front line daily in the
maritime drug interdiction fight. Our opponent is well-financed, agile,
and ruthless in pursuing his single-minded purpose. Illegal drugs thus
remain a scourge on our society, and continue to pose a significant
enforcement challenge. According to the Interagency Assessment of
Cocaine Movement, in calendar year 1999, 512 metric tons of cocaine
flowed from source countries--primarily Colombia--en route to the
United States market.
THE COAST GUARD ROLE
The National Drug Control Strategy calls for a balanced array of
demand and supply reduction programs. The Coast Guard provides crucial
law enforcement essential to reducing supply. However, supply reduction
requires both source and transit zone operations. Emphasis on Source
Zone operations is, of course, vital to achieving our national goals.
The operative metaphor, as I understand it, is that, ``We must shoot
the archer, rather than the arrows.''
The Coast Guard's role with respect to maritime and air operations
is against smugglers operating in the Transit Zone. From that
perspective I want to review my goals, which come from the National
Drug Control Strategy. Goal Four requires us to shield America's
frontiers from the scourge of drugs, and sets out clear performance
measures. Those measures call for us to reduce the rate of illicit drug
flow through Transit and Arrival Zones by 10 percentage points by 2002
and 20 percentage points by 2007 as measured against the 1996 base
year.
Our transit zone interdiction operations are, of course, a
necessity. They provide a balance to source zone operations that
recognizes we must sustain the interdiction shield in the transit zone
until that archer in the source zone can be permanently stopped.
In the Transit Zone, we must maintain a credible presence in high-
threat areas, assign assets to respond to all actionable information,
and conduct combined operations with our foreign law enforcement
counterparts. These activities involve both surface and air assets. In
addition, we must maintain an agile and flexible end-game capability
that is credible and able to respond to intelligence cueing. We have
taken steps to improve our end-game capability with initiatives such as
Deployable Pursuit Boats, Maritime Interdiction Support Vessels, and
Operation NEW FRONTIER, which includes Airborne Use of Force and Over-
the-Horizon cutter boats.
CURRENT THREAT
In calendar year 1999, more than 40 percent of the cocaine detected
leaving South America destined for the United States was shipped
through the Caribbean Transit Zone. About 90 percent of the cocaine
flow moves by maritime means, and in the Caribbean, over 80 percent of
the time the traffickers' choice of conveyance is by ``go-fasts''--
typically 30- to 50-foot, multi-engine boats which carry 500 to 1,500
kilograms of cocaine in each trip. This method of conveyance is agile
and responsive to smugglers' changing needs, and poses a significant
challenge for our slower and less maneuverable vessels. Clearly then,
the Caribbean Transit Zone requires significant attention and a focused
application of concerted effort.
In the Caribbean Transit Zone, the highest threat region is Puerto
Rico, followed by Haiti, then Jamaica, and the Western Caribbean. While
we are maintaining some Coast Guard presence in the waters around
Haiti, we see that around 40 percent of the cocaine transshipment
activity into Haiti is via non-commercial air and is currently beyond
Coast Guard Atlantic Area's ability to influence. The Drug Enforcement
Administration and Joint Interagency Task Force East are studying this
issue under the direction of the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator.
CURRENT EFFORT
Based on the threat, nearly all of my available counterdrug effort
is focused on the Caribbean Transit Zone. In fiscal year 1999, nearly
90,000 cutter operating hours, and over 16,000 aircraft flight hours
were applied against the Caribbean threat, amounting to nearly one-
third of the hours available from these assets for all missions within
Coast Guard Atlantic Area.
We continue to seek innovative solutions in expanding our efforts
in the transit zone. Operation New Frontier--the Use of Force from
Aircraft combined with Over-the-Horizon cutter boats using night vision
goggles, has been a tremendous success, stopping all six of the go-
fasts engaged. The Maritime Interdiction Support Vessel has sailed to
the Caribbean with Deployable Pursuit Boats that can match and exceed
the speed of the smugglers' go-fasts. And we have been able to upgrade
aircraft sensor packages to improve our ability to acquire and track
smuggling vessels.
I thank the Congress for its support in funding our new 87-foot
Coastal Patrol Boat fleet. That initiative has allowed us to reposition
the homeports of a number of our more capable 110-foot Patrol Boats
further south to place them closer to the counterdrug threat, reducing
patrol transit time and resulting in more ``steel on target.''
We continue to negotiate a series of bi-lateral maritime
counterarcotics agreements with foreign governments to enable more
effective and efficient coordination with interdiction forces. A
tribute to the success of these efforts is the recent signing of an
agreement with the government of Honduras, bringing the total number of
bi-lateral agreements withTransit Zone nations to twenty-two. These
agreements help maximize the effectiveness of our cutters by reducing
the time they spend waiting for authorization to either board suspect
vessels or to enter the territorial seas of signatory nations in
pursuit of suspect trafficking vessels. The Caribbean Support Tender,
that the Administration requested and Congress authorized, has already
begun its work of providing maintenance and logistics support in the
Eastern and Central Caribbean to lay the groundwork for improved
performance by their regional maritime services. Our multilateral
efforts have made significant progress toward effective cooperation
with our Caribbean neighbors who are working with us to deny safe
havens to drug smugglers who routinely violate the national sovereignty
of these nations.
Last year, with my full encouragement and support, the U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator made a decision to raise the priority of
counterdrug efforts against the movement of cocaine in the Eastern
Pacific. Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West, and Coast Guard
Pacific Area, made a number of record seizures and proved that effort
effective. Thus, we have demonstrated effective interdiction can be
accomplished in both oceans.
FUTURE FOCUS
My primary counterdrug focus in Atlantic Area for the upcoming
years is on Puerto Rico, where the smuggling infrastructure is well
developed, entrenched, and historically successful. Roughly half of all
cocaine flow to the U.S. in 1999 came through the Caribbean. About half
of that Caribbean flow is destined for Puerto Rico. Therefore, one-
fourth of all cocaine destined for the United States is being shipped
via the 110-mile long island of Puerto Rico. The utility of this route
to the smugglers is evident by the fact that although we have been more
effective seizing drugs along this route than any other route in the
Caribbean, it is still the route with the highest flow.
Cocaine flow into Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and their
approaches has increased nearly threefold over the past two years.
While the amount seized by interagency efforts has risen, the
percentage of that amount compared to the flow has decreased slightly.
The end result of these two factors is that significantly more drugs
are successfully arriving in Puerto Rico for further transport to the
mainland United States.
The profit margin in drug smuggling is high--indeed, the smugglers
treat their quarter-million dollar go-fast boats as consumable items--
and the smugglers' long-term transit strategy appears robust enough to
survive periodic shifts in routes. As such, the drug trafficking
organizations will continue to successfully operate if we simply repeat
history and cause them to shift between Haiti and Puerto Rico. Credible
law enforcement actions must disrupt the transportation and
distribution of cocaine--forcing them to abandon that route. We are
working with the Interagency to develop a systematic approach to attack
this re-emerging threat and to collectively force smugglers away from
Puerto Rico with a desired result of cutting the Puerto Rican
throughput in half. As mentioned earlier, the traffickers'
infrastructure in Puerto Rico is well established and increasing at sea
interdictions alone will not result in long-term behavioral changes.
Our focus is to engage in cooperative interagency efforts to achieve
breakthrough-level results, through linking interdiction and
investigation to permanently dismantle smuggling organizations.
As our efforts over time are successful in this regard we would
expect a shift to Haiti and Jamaica as smuggling activity in Puerto
Rico becomes prohibitively risky to traffickers. Thus we also need to
support continued interagency planning to deal with increased smuggling
through Haiti and Jamaica. We must be quick to shift to the emerging
threat, while remaining mindful that any time traffickers sense a
lessened resistance in Puerto Rico, they will return to that preferred
route.
To deal with cocaine movement into Haiti we are trying to remove
the reason for the trafficking organizations to ship it there in the
first place. Most of the secondary flow from Haiti goes to Puerto Rico,
a part of the U.S. Customs Zone, and to a lesser extent, to southern
Florida. By attacking that secondary flow effectively, I believe we can
reduce the primary flow into Haiti.
The appropriate tactical strategy position to address Haiti then
takes three parts. First, attack the secondary flow into Puerto Rico
with a closely coordinated interagency response that maximizes the
effect of combined resources. Second, sustain the highly effective
Miami River Operation to reduce the secondary flow into southern
Florida via Haitian coastal freighters. And third, influence Venezuela
to open their airspace to United States tracker aircraft to enable
effective end-games against the aircraft currently delivering cocaine
to Haiti and returning home with virtual impunity.
BUDGET SUPPORT
Congressional support of the President's fiscal year 2001 budget
request is essential for the Coast Guard's Deepwater Capability
Replacement Project. Without it, the Coast Guard's ability to
contribute to national drug interdiction efforts in the long-term, as
well as meet the demands of our many other missions that protect the
interests of the United States on the high seas, will be significantly
impeded as our major assets face obsolescence and retirement over the
next twenty years. Our fiscal year 2001 budget provides for investments
in the use of aviation assets, and force multipliers such as deployable
law enforcement detachments, intelligence collection, and international
engagement. We need your continued support.
CONCLUSION
The record seizures the Coast Guard has enjoyed this part year are
noteworthy and commendable, but they do not tell the whole story.
Increased cocaine flow challenges us each and every day. Your support
has enabled us to begin to close the gap through improved sensors and
equipment, and to increase Coast Guard and interagency end-game
effectiveness. More remains to be done.
To achieve the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy, we must
have the right arrows in our quiver--arrows that can be loosed in the
counterdrug fight without diminishing our ability to carry out our
assigned missions. The Deepwater Recapitalization Project will address
our operational capital needs for the future. Operational enhancements
and readiness-related budget initiatives within the President's budget
will provide us enhanced capabilities and will permit the most
effective use of resources for all our missions.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that annual
illegal drug profits are nearly ten times the Coast Guard's annual
budget, and we know they are using that ill gotten gain to invest in
current and future operations against our national interests. We have
the talent, expertise, and technology to deliver extraordinary
interdiction results--what we need are resources equal to the job
ahead. Funding the Coast Guard at levels requested by the President
will permit us to deliver what is needed in this fight.
Thank you for your support and for the opportunity to discuss this
important issue with you today. I will be happy to answer any questions
you may have.
Senator Thurmond. We would be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL S. VIGIL
Mr. Vigil. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear today to discuss the issue
of drug trafficking throughout the Caribbean. I would first
like to thank the subcommittee for its continued support of the
Drug Enforcement Administration and overall support of drug law
enforcement.
As you are all aware, the international drug syndicates
operating throughout our hemisphere are resourceful, adaptable,
and extremely powerful. These syndicates have an unprecedented
level of sophistication and are more powerful and influential
than any of the organized crime enterprises preceding them. The
leaders of these drug trafficking organizations oversee a
multi-billion-dollar cocaine and heroin industry which has
wreaked havoc on communities throughout the United States.
Over the last two decades, cocaine trafficking over the
United States southern border has shifted between the Southwest
border and the south Florida-Caribbean corridor. In the 1980's,
most of the cocaine that entered the United States transited
the Caribbean and south Florida. With increased law enforcement
pressure, the South American cartels eventually built new
alliances with criminals in Mexico in order to gain access to
their long-established smuggling routes into the United States.
The Colombian drug cartels turned increasingly to the
Southwest border in the 1990's. By June 1996, approximately 70
percent of the cocaine in the United States transited Mexico,
prompting the United States to concentrate its law enforcement
resources on the Southwest border. Today, five years into the
Southwest Border Initiative, drug trafficking is once again
increasing in and through the Caribbean-south Florida corridor.
For purposes of this hearing, I will provide an overview
and assessment of the drug trafficking situation in the
Caribbean, then specifically address drug-related issues in
Puerto Rico and Haiti. In concluding, I will briefly discuss
some recently concluded joint law enforcement operations and
initiatives in the region.
The Caribbean has long been an important transit zone for
drugs entering the United States and Europe from South America.
These drugs are transported through the region to both the
United States and Europe through a wide variety of routes and
methods. The primary method for smuggling large quantities of
cocaine through the Caribbean to the United States is via
maritime ships. Go-fast boats, small launches with powerful
motor; bulk cargo freighters; and containerized cargo vessels
are the most common conveyances for moving large quantities of
cocaine through the region.
The Caribbean also plays an important role in drug-related
money laundering. Many Caribbean countries have well-developed
offshore banking systems and bank secrecy laws that facilitate
money laundering. In countries with less developed banking
systems, money is often moved through these countries in bulk
shipments of cash, the ill-gotten proceeds of selling illicit
drugs in the United States.
The ultimate destination of the currency and/or assets is
other Caribbean countries or South America. Presently, many
international drug trafficking organizations utilize Puerto
Rico as a major point of entry for the transshipment of multi-
ton quantities of cocaine being smuggled into the United
States. Puerto Rico has become known as a gateway for drugs
destined for cities on the East Coast of the United States.
Puerto Rico's 300-mile coastline, the vast number of
isolated cays, and 6 million square miles of open water between
the U.S. and Colombia, make the region difficult to patrol and
ideal for a variety of smuggling methods. Only 360 miles from
Colombia's north coast and 80 miles from the east coast of the
Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico is easily reachable by twin-
engine aircraft hauling payloads of between 500 to 700
kilograms of cocaine.
The go-fast boats make their round-trip cocaine runs to the
southern coast of Puerto Rico in less than a day. Today,
cocaine and heroin traffickers from Colombia have transformed
Puerto Rico into the largest staging area in the Caribbean for
illicit drugs destined for the U.S. market. This situation has
aided in the creation of a public safety crisis in Puerto Rico.
This crisis has resulted in difficulties retaining Federal drug
enforcement personnel in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Few personnel from the continental United States are
willing to accept a transfer to Puerto Rico, and those who do
so often want to leave soon after arrival. Such quality of life
issues as independent public services, unreliable utilities,
limited accessibility of medical care, the high cost of living,
an exclusionary social structure, limited availability of
appropriate schools for dependent children, and the high
incidence of crime have contributed to early turnover and
family separations. As a result, DEA has in place several
incentive packages for special agents, diversion investigators,
and intel analysts relocating to Puerto Rico.
Just under 130 miles from Colombia's most northern point
and 80 miles from Puerto Rico, the island of Hispaniola is
easily by twin-engine aircraft hauling payloads, again, of
between 500 to 700 kilograms of cocaine. The two countries on
the island, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, share similar
coastal features, facilitating intra-island boat traffic.
Just as is the case with the Dominican Republic, Haiti
presents an ideal location for the staging and transshipment of
drugs. Furthermore, there is no border control between the two
countries, allowing essentially unimpeded traffic back and
forth. In addition, there is no effective law enforcement or
judicial system in Haiti, so there are few legal impediments to
drug trafficking.
Recently, DEA has significantly increased manpower in
Haiti, and increased interdiction efforts to counter air drops
and identify freighter shipments. However, recent statistics
released by the Interagency Assessment on Cocaine Movement, in
which the DEA participates, indicates that approximately 15
percent of the cocaine entering the United States transits
either Haiti or the Dominican Republic. DEA is represented on
the island of Hispaniola by the Port-au-Prince country office
in Haiti and the Santo Domingo country office in the Dominican
Republic.
Due to the lack of an integrated, cohesive intelligence
support network, the Caribbean Field Division created UNICORN,
which stands for the Unified Caribbean Online Regional Network.
With this system, participating Caribbean law enforcement
agencies can share photographs, data, and information
concerning various targets, locations, and groups involved in
drug trafficking and money laundering. The Drug Enforcement
Administration loans the equipment to participating agencies
and provides training to host country counterparts, as well as
installing and implementing the system.
The UNICORN system has already reaped tremendous benefits,
as exhibited in the success of Operations Columbus, Genesis,
and most recently Conquistador. These enforcement operations,
planned and coordinated by the Caribbean Field Division, have
severely disrupted drug trafficking organizations throughout
the Caribbean region.
For purposes of today's hearing, I would like to briefly
comment on Operation Conquistador. Operation Conquistador was a
17-day multinational drug enforcement operation involving 26
countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America. The
operation was simultaneously launched on March 10, 2000, in
Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Kitts, Nevis,
Antigua, Anguila, St. Martin, British Virgin Islands, Barbuda,
Grenada, Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Aruba, Curacao,
Jamaica, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.
The primary objective of Conquistador was to develop an
effective regional strategy intended to disrupt drug
trafficking activities and criminal organizations operating
throughout the Caribbean. Command and control of the operation
was executed from the DEA Caribbean Field Division in San Juan,
Puerto Rico, with forward operating command posts in Trinidad
and Tobago and the Dominican Republic.
The U.S. Coast Guard provided an expanded presence of
interdiction assets throughout the Caribbean, and executed air
and maritime command and control of sea and airborne drug
interdiction assets from all countries. The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms conducted traces of all seized weapons.
The operation concluded on March 26, 2000.
Although the arrests and seizures in Operation Conquistador
were extremely impressive, they were secondary to the
cooperation and coordination among the 26 countries that
participated in this endeavor. Despite limited resources and
infrastructure in many of the countries, all responded with
notable efforts and results. Throughout the duration of the
operation, all participants exchanged information with each
other through the UNICORN system.
In conclusion, we have discovered that the transit of
illegal drugs throughout the Caribbean creates unique
challenges to law enforcement. DEA is aggressively addressing
the drug trafficking threat and working to improve the ability
of DEA personnel assigned to the region to confront the threat.
In addition, DEA will continue to assist and support our
Caribbean counterparts in the counter-drug arena.
With the recent successes of the law enforcement
initiatives I detailed earlier, cooperation among the DEA and
the island nations in the region are continually progressing.
We must sustain this cooperative effort to effectively identify
and target the drug trafficking organizations operating
throughout the Caribbean.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before this subcommittee. I appreciate the interest you and the
subcommittee have shown in DEA's drug law enforcement efforts
in the Caribbean. At this time, I will be happy to answer any
questions you or any other committee members may have.
Thank you.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vigil follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael S. Vigil
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the issue of drug trafficking
throughout the Caribbean. I would first like to thank the Subcommittee
for its continued support of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
and overall support of drug law enforcement.
As all of you are aware, the international drug syndicates
operating throughout our hemisphere are resourceful, adaptable and
extremely powerful. These syndicates have an unprecedented level of
sophistication and are more powerful and influential than any of the
organized crime enterprises preceding them. Traditional organized crime
syndicates, operating within the United States over the course of last
century, simply cannot compare to the Colombian and Mexican drug
trafficking organizations functioning in this hemisphere. These drug
trafficking organizations have at their disposal an arsenal of
technology, weapons and allies, corrupted law enforcement, and
government officials enabling them to dominate the illegal drug market
in ways not previously thought possible. The leaders of these drug
trafficking organizations oversee a multi-billion dollar cocaine and
herein industry which have wreaked havoc on communities throughout the
United States.
Over the last two decades, cocaine trafficking over the United
States' southern border has shifted between the Southwest border and
the South Florida/Caribbean corridor. In the 1980s, most of the cocaine
that entered the United States transited the Caribbean and South
Florida. With increased law enforcement pressure, the South American
cartels eventually built new alliances with criminals in Mexico in
order to gain access to their long-established smuggling routes in the
United States.
The Colombian drug cartels turned increasingly to the Southwest
border in the 1990s. By June, 1996 approximately 70 percent of the
cocaine in the United States transited Mexico, prompting the United
States to concentrate its law enforcement resources on the Southwest
border. Today, five years into the Southwest Border Initiative, drug
trafficking is once again increasing in and through the Caribbean/South
Florida corridor.
For purposes of this hearing, I will provide an overview and
assessment of the drug trafficking situation in the Caribbean, then
specifically address drug-related issues in Puerto Rico and Haiti. In
concluding, I will briefly discuss some recently concluded joint law
enforcement operations and initiatives in the Caribbean.
TRAFFICKING THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN TO THE UNITED STATES
The Caribbean has long been an important transit zone for drugs
entering the United States and Europe from South America. The drugs are
transported through the region, to both the United States and Europe,
through a wide variety of routes and methods. The primary method for
smuggling large quantities of cocaine through the Caribbean to the
United States is via maritime vessels. Go-fast boats (small launches
with powerful motors), bulk cargo freighters, and containerized cargo
vessels are the most common conveyances for moving large quantities of
cocaine through the region. Drug traffickers also routinely transport
smaller quantities of cocaine from Colombia to clandestine landings
strips in the Caribbean, using single or twin-engine aircraft.
Traffickers also airdrop cocaine loads to waiting land vehicles and/or
maritime vessels.
Couriers transport smaller quantities of cocaine on commercial
flights from the Caribbean to the United States. Couriers transport
cocaine by concealing small multikilogam quantities of cocaine on their
person or in baggage. Couriers also transport small quantities (up to
one kilogram) of cocaine by ingesting the product.
Compared to cocaine, heroin movement through the Caribbean is
limited. Heroin is generally not consumed in the Caribbean, but rather
is transshipped to Puerto Rico or the Continental United States. Almost
all of the heroin transiting the Caribbean originates in Colombia.
Couriers generally transport kilogram quantities of Colombian heroin on
commercial flights from South America to Puerto Rico or the Continental
United States, concealing the heroin on their person or in baggage.
Couriers also transport smaller quantities (up to one kilogram) of
heroin by concealing their heroin through ingestion. The couriers
sometimes make one or two stops at various Caribbean islands in an
effort to mask their original point of departure from law enforcement.
Jamaica remains the only significant Caribbean source country for
marijuana destined to the United States. Go-fast boats from Jamaica
often transport multi-hundred kilogram quantities of marijuana through
Cuban and Bahamian water to Florida.
The Caribbean also plays an important role in drug-related money
laundering. Many Caribbean countries have well-developed offshore
banking systems and bank secrecy laws that facilitate money laundering.
In countries with less developed banking systems, money is often moved
through these countries in bulk shipments of cash--the ill-gotten
proceeds of selling illicit drugs in the United States. The ultimate
destination of the currency and/or assets is other Caribbean countries
or South America.
DRUG TRAFFICKING THROUGH PUERTO RICO
More than ever, international drug trafficking organizations
utilize Puerto Rico as a major point of entry for the transshipment of
multi-ton quantities of cocaine being smuggled into the United States.
Puerto Rico has become known as a gateway for drugs destined for cities
on the East Coast of the United States. Puerto Rico's 300-mile
coastline, the vast number of isolated cays, and six million miles of
open water between the U.S. and Colombia, make the region difficult to
patrol and ideal for a variety of smuggling methods.
Only 360 miles from Colombia's North Coast and 80 miles from the
East Coast of the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico is easily reachable
by twin engine aircraft hauling payloads of 500 to 700 kilograms of
cocaine. The ``go-fast'' boats make their round trip cocaine runs to
the Southern coast of Puerto Rico in less than a day. Today, cocaine
and heroin traffickers from Colombia have transformed Puerto Rico into
the largest staging area in the Caribbean for illicit drugs destined
for the U.S. market.
Once the illicit narcotics are smuggled into Puerto Rico, they are
routinely stored in secluded, mountainous areas of the island until
transportation to the Continental United States can be arranged. The
contraband is then repackaged into smaller shipments in preparation for
the move. The narcotics are smuggled out of Puerto Rico via commercial
maritime vessels and on commercial airlines, either in the possession
of couriers, or concealed in cargo.
Puerto Rico is an active Caribbean sea and air transportation
thoroughfare. The island boasts the third busiest seaport in North
America and fourteen busiest in the world, as well as approximately 75
daily commercial airline flights to the continental United States. This
presents an attractive logistical opportunity for drug trafficking
organizations. The sheer volume of commercial activity is the
trafficker's greatest asset. Criminal organizations have utilized their
financial capabilities to corrupt mechanics, longshoremen, airline
employees, and ticket counter agents, as well as government officials
and others, whose corrupt practices broaden the scope of the
trafficking.
Not only has corruption of legitimate business become a problem on
the island, but Colombian drug trafficking organizations will routinely
pay local criminal transportation organizations up to 20 percent of
their product (cocaine) for their services. This form of payment has
acted as a catalyst for the development of a very profitable, but
competitive, local distribution market. The interaction between
Colombian drug traffickers and local transporters, along with the
resulting distribution market, is commonly referred to as the ``spill-
over effect.'' The ``spill-over effect'' has resulted in an increase in
violence and bloodshed within the Puerto Rican community. It is
estimated that about 80 percent of all documented homicides in Puerto
Rico are drug related. Law enforcement efforts are further impeded by
the close-knit relationships shared by the drug trafficking
organizations, which have developed and been fostered over the years.
PERSONNEL CHALLENGES IN PUERTO RICO
The open use of the Caribbean as a narcotics transshipment center
has created a public safety crisis in Puerto Rico, and DEA must assign
resources to the island to address this threat. Although this is
necessary, we have had continuing difficulties retaining federal law
enforcement personnel in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Few personnel
from the Continental United States are willing to accept a transfer to
Puerto Rico, and those who do so often want to leave soon after
arrival. Such quality of life issues as inadequate public services,
unreliable utilities, limited accessibility of medical care, the high
cost of living, an exclusionary social structure, limited availability
of appropriate schools for dependent children, and the high incidence
of crime have contributed to early turnover and family separations. As
a result, DEA has in place the following incentive packages for Special
Agents, Diversion Investigators, and Intelligence Analysts relocating
to Puerto Rico:
Relocation incentives of up to 25% of base pay (not to exceed
$15,000) are tied directly to remaining in Puerto Rico;
A Foreign Language Bonus Package of up to 5% of base pay;
A Tour of Duty Office of Preference offer upon completion of
the assignment;
Adminsitrative leave available to find adequate housing and
complete moving arrangements;
5 year, Government funded access, in the San Juan area, to
Department of Defense schools (This now includes the children
of support personnel.);
Additional Home Leave, granted upon extension of assignment;
Security assistance for threatened employees, ranging from
home and personal automobile security systems to removal from
the area;
A 10% Cost of Living adjustment; and
Department of Defense Commissary privileges for individuals
on tour agreements.
DEA is further exploring the possibility of instituting incentive
initiatives, which are commensurate with our foreign office
assignments. However, DEA has not yet formulated an official position
on making Puerto Rico a foreign posting, as Puerto Rico is a
Commonwealth of the United States. There would need to be a change in
State Department regulations in additional to the passage of
legislation to establish service in Puerto Rico as a foreign posting.
HAITI: DRUG TRAFFICKING CROSSROADS OF THE CARIBBEAN
Haiti is strategically located in the central Caribbean, occupying
the western half of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the
Dominican Republic. At 27,750 square kilometers, the country is
slightly larger than the state of Maryland. With the Caribbean to the
south, and the open Atlantic Ocean to the north, Haiti is an
idealposition to facilitate the movement of cocaine and heroin from
Colombia to the U.S. DEA is represented on the Island of Hispaniola by
the Port-au-Prince Country office in Haiti and the Santo Domingo
Country Office in the Dominican Republican.
The island of Hispaniola is just under 430 miles from Colombia's
most northern point, and easily accessible by twin engine aircraft
hauling payloads of 500 to 700 kilos of cocaine. The two countries on
the island, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, share similar coastal
features, facilitating intra-island boat traffic. Just as is the case
with the Dominican Republic, Haiti presents an ideal location for the
staging and transshipment of drugs. Furthermore, there is effectively
no border control between the two countries, allowing essentially
unimpeded traffic back and forth. In addition, there is no effective
law enforcement or judicial system in Haiti, so there are few legal
impediments to drug trafficking. Recently, DEA has significantly
increased manpower on Haiti (from one to seven Special Agents) and
increased interdiction efforts to counter airdrops and identify
freighter shipments. However, recent statistics released by The
Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM), in which the DEA
participates, indicates that approximately 15% of the cocaine entering
the United States transits either Haiti or the Dominican Republic.
Due to the numerous uncontrolled points of entry and internal
instability, vast amounts of narcotics from South America arrive in
Haiti after being transported across the porous border with the
Dominican Republic, and then shipped on to Puerto Rico.
TRAFFICKING ROUTES AND METHODS IN HAITI
Drug smuggling through Haiti is aided by the country's long
coastline, mountainous interior, numerous uncontrolled airstrips, its
193-mile border with the Dominican Republic, and its location in the
Caribbean. Haiti's thriving contraband trade, weak democratic
institutions, and fledgling police force and judiciary system,
contribute to its utilization by drug traffickers as a transshipment
point.
As is the case throughout much of the Caribbean, the primary method
for smuggling cocaine into Haiti is via maritime vessels. Traffickers
also smuggle cocaine from Colombia into Haiti via general aviation;
either by airdrops at sea or by landing at clandestine strips. Other
common conveyances for smuggling cocaine into Haiti include cargo
freighters, containerized cargo vessels, fishing vessels, and couriers
on commercial aircraft.
As cocaine enters Haiti, it is usually stored locally until it can
be shipped to the United States or other international markets. Cocaine
is often smuggled out of Haiti in containerized cargo or on bulk cargo
freighters directly to Miami. The cocaine shipments aboard cargo
freighters are occasionally off-loaded to smaller vessels prior to
arrival in the Continental United States (CONUS). Cocaine is also
sometimes transferred overland from Haiti to the Dominican Republic for
further transshipment to Puerto Rico, the CONUS, Europe, and Canada.
There are three primary smuggling routes for cocaine through Haiti.
The first brings cocaine from Colombia into Haiti via general aviation
conducting airdrops at sea. The second route is from source countries,
via Panama or Venezuela, by commercial shipping. The third route is
from source countries, via Panama or Venezuela, in coastal or fishing
vessels.
A HEMISPHERIC LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE
With the assistance of state and local partners domestically as
well as counterparts in foreign governments, DEA works to build cases
against, and ultimately incarcerate, the leaders of these sophisticated
criminal syndicates as well as the underlings they send to other
countries. Over time, this strategy serves to steadily undermine a
criminal organization's ability to conduct business, leaving it even
more vulnerable to law enforcement strategies. Successful cases against
the leaders of international drug trafficking groups most often
originate from investigations being conducted in or having a nexus to,
the United States.
The Caribbean Corridor poses several impediments for a successful
law enforcement strategy. First, the traffickers' use of sophisticated
compartments in freighters make inspections very time consuming and
laborious. Second, the volume and variety of commercial cargo flowing
through the Caribbean further exacerbates inspection and interdiction
efforts. Third, the sheer vastness of the Caribbean frequently makes it
difficult to coordinate enforcement efforts with other countries in the
region. As such, any meaningful, effective interdiction program must
almost exclusively depend on quality, time sensitive intelligence. What
was needed in the Caribbean corridor was an intelligence support
network that would effectively serve the countries in the area.
As a result, the Caribbean Field Division, in an attempt to diffuse
this intelligence void, created the UNICORN system (Unified Caribbean
On-Line Regional Network). With this system, participating Caribbean
law enforcement agencies can share photographs, data, and information
concerning various targets, locations, and groups involved in drug
trafficking and money laundering. The Drug Enforcement Administration
loans the equipment to participating agencies and provides training to
host-nation counterparts, as well as installing and implementing the
system.
The UNICORN system has already reaped tremendous benefits, as
exhibited in the success of Operations Columbus, Genesis and most
recently, Conquistador. These enforcement operations, planned and
coordinated by the Caribbean Field Division, have severely disrupted
drug trafficking organizations throughout the Caribbean region. The
first of these operations, dubbed Genesis, was a bi-national initiative
designed to foster cooperation between Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. Due to a mutual, long-standing mistrust, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic had never before coordinated anti-drug efforts. The
second action, titled Operation Columbus, was a multi-national
operation, comprised of fifteen nations and their respective law
enforcement agencies. The final initiative, the recently concluded
Operations Conquistador, was a multi-national regionaloperation
designed to expand upon the successes realized in Operation Columbus.
The following is a brief synopsis of each operation:
OPERATION GENESIS
In concept, Operation Genesis was designed to foster and maintain
cooperation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This operation,
which was conducted during November 1998, resulted in 126 arrests
throughout Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Prior to Operation
Genesis, Haiti and the Dominican Republic had never before coordinated
their anti-drug efforts. However, the results garnered through
Operation Genesis will undoubtedly assist in improving the ability to
coordinate anti-drug efforts on the island of Hispanola.
The long-term objectives for Operation Genesis were to promote the
exchange of information between Haiti and the Dominican Republic,
facilitate the integration and coordination of Haitian and Dominican
anti-drug efforts, establish a mechanism that will support the counter-
drug effort, develop institutional mentoring and training, and disrupt
drug trafficking operations that are being conducted on the island of
Hispanola.
The operation was executed in both Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, using roadblocks at strategic locations and border crossing
points, interdiction operations at the international airports and
seaports, and United States Coast Guard maritime interdiction along the
southern coast of Hispanola.
Operation Genesis resulted in unprecedented exchanges of law
enforcement cooperation by both the Dominican Republic and Haiti. As a
result, the Haitian National Police (HNP) assigned an officer and an
analyst to the Dominican National Drug Control Agency's (DNDC) Santo
Domingo office, and four (4) more HNP officers were stationed at
Dominican border crossing points. DNDC officials, on the other hand,
were assigned to the HNP headquarters' at Port-au-Prince, as well as
several Haitian border crossing points.
The exchange of information was further expedited by the UNICORN
system, which facilitated data base checks of suspicious persons and
vehicles that were stopped. The information was sent to the Caribbean
Field Division (CFD)/San Juan office where system checks were
performed. The information was then sent back to the HNP via the
UNICORN system.
OPERATION COLUMBUS
Operation Columbus was a multi-national regional effort involving
the island nations of the Caribbean, in addition to Colombia, Venezuela
and Panama. The operation focused on air, land and maritime
interdiction, eradication and clandestine airstrip denial. DEA's Santo
Domingo Country Office and Trinidad and Tobago Country Office served as
the northern and southern command posts. The UNICORN system was used to
facilitate the exchange of actionable intelligence. Operation
Columbus's principle objectives were:
The development of a cohesive/cooperative environment among
source and transit countries,
Disruption of drug trafficking activities;
The consolidation of the counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean
transit zone; and
The continued development of a comprehensive regional
strategy.
Operation Columbus was planned and initiated by the CFD to severely
impact the drug trafficking activities in the Caribbean and source
country areas. Columbus was implemented through interdiction and
eradication efforts, enforcement operations involving the use of
undercover agents, confidential sources, Title III interceptions, and
surveillance.
OPERATION CONQUISTADOR
Operation Conquistador was a 17-day multi-national drug enforcement
operation involving 26 countries of the Caribbean, Central and South
America. The operation was simultaneously launched on March 10, 2000,
in Panama, Columbia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Suriname, Trinidad &
Tobago, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Kitts, Nevis, Antigua, Anguila, St.
Martin, British Virgin Islands, Barbuda, Grenada, Barbados, St.
Vincent, St. Lucia, Aruba, Curacao, Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican Republic,
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The primary objective of Operation
Conquistador was to develop an effective regional strategy intended to
disrupt drug trafficking activities and criminal organizations
operating throughout the Caribbean.
Operation Conquistador's main objectives were: (1) The development
of a cohesive and cooperative environment between source and transit
countries; (2) The integration within each country of all counterdrug
entities; (3) The continued development of a comprehensive regional
strategy; (4) To facilitate the exchange of information between the
participating countries with the use of the Unified Caribbean On-line
Regional Network (UNICORN); (5) The mentoring and training of counter-
drug entities in host countries; (6) To impact and disrupt trafficking
organizations in the Caribbean area and source countries.
Command and control of the operation was executed from the DEA
Caribbean Field Division in San Juan, PR, with forward command posts in
Trinidad & Tobago and Dominican Republic. The U.S. Coast Guard provided
expanded presence of interdiction assets throughout the Caribbean and
executed air and maritime command and control of sea and airborne drug
interdiction assets from all countries. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (BATF) conducted traces of all seized weapons. The
operation concluded on March 26, 2000.
Although the arrests and seizures in Operation Conquistador were
extremely impressive, they, however, were secondary to the cooperation
and coordination among the 26 countries that participated in this
endeavor. Despite limited resources and infrastructure in many of the
countries, all responded with notable efforts and results. Throughout
the duration of the operation, all participants exchanged information
with each other through the UNICORN system.
CONCLUSION
The transit of illegal drugs throughout the Caribbean creates
unique challenges to law enforcement. DEA is aggressively addressing
the drug trafficking threat and working to improve the ability of DEA
personnel assigned to the region to confront the threat. In addition,
DEA will continue to assist and support our Caribbean counterparts in
the counterdrug arena. With the recent successes of the law enforcement
initiatives I detailed earlier, cooperation among the DEA and the
island nations in the region are continually progressing. We must
sustain this cooperative effort to effectively identify and target the
drug organizations operating throughout the Caribbean.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee. I appreciate the interest you and the subcommittee have
shown in DEA's drug law enforcement efforts in the Caribbean. At this
time, I will be happy to answer any questions you or the other
committee members may have.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Varrone.
STATEMENT OF JOHN C. VARRONE
Mr. Varrone. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator DeWine. It
is my pleasure to have the opportunity to appear before this
committee to discuss the law enforcement activities of the
Customs Service, and in particular our enforcement efforts
directed against drug smuggling in the Caribbean.
Before I begin, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my
statement for the record.
As the committee is aware, the Customs Service is one of
the primary Federal law enforcement agencies with
responsibility for the interdiction of drugs in the arrival
zone. In addition, the Customs Service shares the lead with the
U.S. Coast Guard for air interdiction in the transit zone.
Through our air and marine interdiction assets, we provide
significant assistance to other domestic and international law
enforcement agencies who have responsibility in both the source
and transit zones.
I will begin by briefly describing our assessment of the
drug smuggling threat in the Caribbean. As this committee is
aware, the Customs Service continually develops, collects, and
evaluates a variety of drug intelligence from the Caribbean
area, where it is estimated by the Interagency Assessment of
Cocaine Movement that approximately 43 percent of the cocaine
destined for the United States arrives.
These estimates are clearly validated when you examine drug
seizure activity in the Caribbean. In fiscal years 1998 and
1999, respectively, the Customs Service seized 20,673 and
20,492 pounds of cocaine in the Caribbean. While cocaine is the
primary threat, Customs also seized 3,442 pounds of marijuana
in fiscal year 1999, which was an increase of more than 500
percent from the previous year. Thus far in fiscal year 2000,
we have already seized 15,639 pounds of cocaine, an increase of
more than 42 percent from the same period last year. In
addition to our successful drug seizure activity, in Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands the Customs Service effected
383 arrests in 1998 and 551 arrests in 1999 for drug-related
crimes, a dramatic increase of 44 percent.
In assessing the overall drug smuggling threat, we are
routinely confronted with a multitude of smuggling methods of
operation. The interdiction operations of the Customs Service
and other federal law enforcement agencies in the Caribbean
have demonstrated that noncommercial smuggling operations
remain a significant, if not our principal threat.
Customs intelligence analysis and recent drug interdiction
successes have provided insight as to how these drug smuggling
operations are conducted. For example, private aircraft are not
used as often for direct flights from source countries to the
United States as they once were. Rather, they are now being
used more frequently to conduct air drops in the transit zone
to a variety of vessels. These drops are predominantly made to
go-fast boats, who then smuggle the drugs into Caribbean
nations for staging and subsequent delivery to the United
States. This activity most frequently occurs in the waters off
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and the Bahamas.
We believe that this change is due in large measure to our
success in the interdiction and seizure of private aircraft
used for drug smuggling. Our success often raises the cost to
drug smuggling organizations and forces them to constantly
change their tactics.
As I mentioned earlier, our air and marine interdiction
assets fly in the source zone in support of the Andean region
plan. We have seen how our support in the source zone to both
source and transshipment countries has affected drug smuggling
operations and how they adapt to our efforts. A good example of
this impact or displacement is the use of Venezuelan air space
by drug smuggling pilots as a refuge to avoid the Colombian
shoot-down policy and our detection and monitoring assets.
While drug smuggling via private aircraft remains
consistently high, a potentially more significant threat is
posed by non-commercial maritime shipments, especially in
Puerto Rico. This is primarily due to the minimal investment
required for a maritime smuggling venture, as compared to the
cost and potential loss of an aircraft during an air smuggling
operation.
The minimal investment required for a go-fast boat is also
complemented by a much higher drug load capacity that can be
carried in go-fast boats, which on average carry 1,000-plus
pounds, versus the 250 to 400 pounds that can be carried by a
private aircraft. The number of go-fast boats intercepted and
found abandoned on the Puerto Rico coastline by Customs and
other agencies validates our current intelligence that drug
smuggling organizations consider these to be disposable
platforms.
To provide the committee with examples of our recent
successes, I would like to describe three recent significant
cocaine interdictions which highlight the importance of the
Caribbean corridor to smugglers as well as our investigative
operations.
On April 4, 2000, Customs agents in Puerto Rico developed
confidential source information which led them to obtain a
search warrant for a palletized shipment of 100 central
processing units bound from Puerto Rico to Queens, New York. As
a result of the execution of a search warrant, our agents
seized more than 1,000 pounds of cocaine whichhad been
concealed within the hollowed-out CPUs. As a result of this seizure,
two Dominican nationals were arrested.
Just last Friday, our Customs inspectors in Port
Everglades, Florida, seized approximately 820 pounds of cocaine
that had arrived from the Dominican Republic in containerized
cargo. And just last evening, Customs and other law enforcement
authorities seized in excess of 500 pounds of cocaine and a 33-
foot vessel near Rincon, Puerto Rico. As of this morning, they
were still chasing the suspects in the woods and they hadn't
come up with the bodies, unless Mike knows differently. But
that is the challenge, when they litter the coastline of Puerto
Rico with both their contraband and their boats, apprehending
the suspects.
We believe that these significant cocaine seizures clearly
demonstrate how criminal organizations are smuggling cocaine
into the Caribbean in non-commercial conveyances, and
subsequently smuggling it into the U.S. in commercial
shipments. I would also like to point out that our
investigative operations on Puerto Rico are aggressively
focused on the internal drug smuggling organizations that have
established bases of operation in Puerto Rico to support their
illegal activities.
Another example which illustrates the increasing drug and
related money laundering threat in Puerto Rico occurred between
November of 1997 and September of 1999 when we conducted a
long-term investigation entitled Operation Double Impact. This
operation targeted a large-scale heroin smuggling and money
laundering organization operating in and around San Juan.
The investigation used several long-term wiretap intercepts
to gather evidence on the group that was laundering in excess
of $1.3 million a month through money remittance businesses. As
a result of the investigation, 47 people were arrested, and 44
of them have already been convicted or pled guilty. In
addition, the investigation has resulted in the identification
of more than $8.5 million in drug-related proceeds which is
pending forfeiture.
I would also like to point out for the committee that the
island of Puerto Rico was recently designated under the
Treasury and Justice Department's 1999 crime strategy as a
High-Intensity Financial Crime Area, or HIFCA, in recognition
of this high level of drug-related money laundering activity
that investigations like Double Impact have highlighted. While
we continue to view Puerto Rico as one of the most significant
avenues of approach in the Caribbean, we know that these
criminal drug smuggling organizations continually change their
operations based upon many factors.
Switching to Haiti, Haiti provides a telling example of how
drug smuggling organizations adapt their operations in response
to law enforcement pressures. The political instability in
Haiti, combined with its lack of law enforcement capabilities,
provides a safe haven to drug smuggling organizations. Haiti is
clearly well positioned for traffickers to use as a path of
least resistance, particularly when enforcement activity in
Puerto Rico is high.
In response to the increased threat from Haiti, the Customs
Service led a multiagency enforcement operation called
Riversweep. This operation focused on Haitian coastal
freighters who were attempting to smuggle cocaine into the U.S.
along the Miami River. In one two-week period in early February
of this year, Customs officers seized more than 3,400 pounds of
cocaine from 5 vessels which had arrived from Haiti. During
April 2000, we have made two additional seizures, totaling more
than 359 pounds of cocaine, which was concealed within two
freighters also arriving on the Miami River.
I have brought with me today some photographs of these
seizures to illustrate the types of concealments that we are
constantly confronted with.
When you add these recent seizures to our fiscal year to
date totals, the Customs Service has seized more than 6,000
pounds of cocaine arriving directly from Haiti. In excess of
5,000 pounds of this cocaine was seized as a direct result of
Operation Riversweep.
Our air and marine interdiction assets have also been
active in both interagency and multilaterally in and around
Haiti working with other agencies and governments to interdict
cocaine moving from South America. On March 1 of this year, we
documented and recorded an ongoing suspected cocaine air drop
operation in Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, with your concurrence, I would like to
present a short video before the committee at the conclusion of
my remarks.
While Haiti is clearly an area where there is currently a
high level of activity, other areas in the Caribbean,
particularly Jamaica and the Bahamas, are also used by drug
smuggling groups as alternate delivery and storage locations
prior to movement to the United States. I have also brought a
second short video with me that depicts the detection of a
private plane first identified south of Cuba and subsequently
intercepted by a variety of law enforcement assets when it
approached the north of Cuba. And we observed it conducting an
air drop to a go-fast boat that was subsequently pursued by
Customs marine assets. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to show
you that short video.
On behalf of the men and women in federal lawenforcement
who are engaged on a daily basis in counter-narcotics activities in
Puerto Rico and the Caribbean, and specifically our U.S. Customs
officers, I thank you and your committee for all your support and the
opportunity to present our enforcement activities and recent successes
here today.
This concludes my remarks. I would be glad to answer any
questions you may have after the video presentation. Thank you.
I will just briefly describe both of the videos so that I
won't interrupt any of the questioning. The first video
occurred on March 1, 2000. The target aircraft was picked up by
radar approximately 22 miles from Maracaibo, Venezuela, as it
headed north. This aircraft had been observed on several prior
occasions and the tail number is a fictitious tail number.
After the air drop, our P-3 shadowed the aircraft until it
entered Venezuelan air space, where we requested over-flight.
Over-flight was denied, and therefore we are unsure if any end
game actually occurred in Venezuela. The observations made by
our officers during the suspected cocaine air drop was relayed
to JIATF East and then to our colleagues in DEA in Haiti.
However, due to lack of in-country support, no end games could
be effected.
The second video which I briefly described before is a
joint effort between Customs, the Coast Guard, and Department
of Defense assets. And this is a Piper Aztec that was detected
as a suspect aircraft south of Cuba. We picked it up just north
of Cuba, observed it do a drop into the water to a go-fast
boat, and like I said, we were able to intercept the go-fast
boat. But it was a high-risk operation because the go-fast boat
actually rams the Customs boat once or twice during this
operation. Fortunately, there were no injuries. Five
individuals were arrested on the vessel and the two pilots who
had conducted the air drop.
[Videotape shown.]
Senator Thurmond. Admiral, the Coast Guard recently
established a new policy which allows for the use of force from
armed helicopters and pursuit boats against narco-smugglers in
go-fast boats. Can you explain the parameters of this use of
force and when and how it will be utilized, and what impact do
you feel this will have on your ability to apprehend go-fast
boats?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Yes, sir, I can. Our new policy of
arming helicopters was motivated by a frustration at watching
high-speed smuggling boats simply leave behind our slower
surface ships. Often, this was videotaped by helicopters from
our ships. And we realized that if we could deploy a capability
from the helicopters to force the smuggling boats to stop, we
had a high chance of increasing our end game effectiveness.
Our policy calls for an escalating use of force that begins
with the least onerous, simply declaring our presence and
ordering vessels to stop. If they fail to do so after our
sirens and verbal warnings, we will move to an escalating array
of non-lethal technologies which include entangling devices
dropped from the helicopter and intended to foul their
propellers. It includes sting ball hand grenades used by law
enforcement for riot control.
Finally, the policy allows for first-warning shots which
are fired across the bow of go-fast vessels from a light
machine gun that we keep on the aircraft. And if that fails to
persuade, then we will undertake to shoot out the outboard
motors of the smuggling boats to mechanically bring them to a
stop.
I emphasize that our use of firearms in this mode is as a
specialized tool to stop a piece of machinery. It is not aimed
against human beings. We have demonstrated a capability on our
proving grounds, if you will, of reliably and repeatedly
hitting motors.
It has been extremely successful in its initial deployment.
The Hit Run 10 helicopter squadron has come face to face with
six instances of go-fast boats. We were able to stop all six.
In two instances, it was necessary to shoot out the motors. In
two instances, the use of other non-lethal technologies was
sufficient. And in two instances, simply knowing that we now
had a credible capacity caused the smugglers to voluntarily
pull back on the throttles and raise their arms in the air.
From our perspective, this capability has the potential to
change the calculus, if you will, for us and for the drug
smuggler. We will be extremely more effective, and what is
vitally important to us is we will do so without requiring a
huge increase in resources. This simply allows us to leverage
what exists in our fleet and then expand it that last bit to
achieve true end game effectiveness.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Varrone, do you feel that the Customs
Service should adopt a use of force policy that is parallel to
the one established by the Coast Guard?
Mr. Varrone. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are studying the
approach that the Coast Guard has taken and most of our
interceptions are marine interceptions in the arrival zone. I
would say that because, as you can see from the video, we have
numerous vessels engaged, shooting to render the vessels
incapable is a little more difficult in the situation that we
are in on the water.
So we are certainly studying that and other technologies,
but we have not committed to a specific shoot policy yet. We do
not as an organization shoot warning shots. When serious bodily
harm is threatened, then we will employ as much deadly physical
force as we need.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Vigil, several studies have
determined that Colombian drug trafficking organizations are
increasingly using the Caribbean as a transshipment point for
cocaine. Can you explain what is causing this shift in
trafficking patterns away from Mexico?
Mr. Vigil. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, sir, we
have what is called the Southwest Border Initiative, and we
have poured a lot of resources into the Southwest border, the
border along Mexico. We have conducted what I consider to be
very significant investigations, immobilizing very significant
traffickers along that area.
And as a result of that, what we are seeing is a shift from
Central America, Mexico, into the Caribbean. The thing that you
have in the Caribbean is that you have a multitude of
countries, for example, such as Haiti, that have very little
infrastructure in terms of their political and economic
infrastructure. Therefore, you have many of the major Colombian
organizations that are taking full advantage of this situation
to exploit the Caribbean in terms of its drug trafficking
endeavors.
Senator Thurmond. Admiral Shkor and Mr. Varrone, are you
satisfied with the progress being made in establishing forward
operational locations, and are they sufficient to meet your
needs?
Vice Admiral Shkor. From my perspective, United States
Southern Command has done a very, very fine job at establishing
alternative bases in Central America, in Curacao and further
down range in Ecuador, to replace the loss of use of Howard Air
Force Base. It is too early for me to tell what the true
impacts will be on interdiction, but I think they are making
the best of the situation that was thrust on them.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Varrone.
Mr. Varrone. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I concur completely
with what the Admiral has said. Basically, the DoD has the lead
on this, the FOLs. We are supporting them and looking forward
to their success in Ecuador, which will serve as another
platform for us.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Varrone, the banking laws in several
Caribbean countries are very conducive to support money
laundering. What we are doing to detract the flow of drug
proceeds into these Caribbean nations, and are we working with
these countries to find ways which we can form partnerships?
Mr. Varrone. Yes, sir. As stated in my testimony, the
designation of Puerto Rico as a HIFCA is a key ingredient to
that strategy. We are also doing international training along
with our colleagues in the Department of Justice on anti-money
laundering to many of the countries down in the Caribbean. I
believe that the cases like Double Impact and other significant
money laundering cases are identifying that the threat for
money laundering in the Caribbean has increased, and I believe
we are taking the appropriate steps to address that threat.
Mr. Vigil. If I could also add to that, Mr. Chairman, we do
have a serious problem with money laundering in several of the
countries in the Caribbean, and one of the things that we are
doing is we are working very closely with the host country
nationals in order to get them to pass effective legislation on
money laundering. Many of these countries have no legislation
whatsoever in terms of addressing this problem that continues
to expand.
One of the things that we have done in Puerto Rico is we
have established a multiagency money laundering unit. We have
established undercover shelf accounts, and we are working with
some of the countries in the Caribbean under mutual legal
assistance treaties to try to work joint investigations in
these areas and work with one another in exchanging information
so that we can amplify the investigations that are currently
being conducted in the Caribbean.
Mr. Varrone. If I may just add one thing, Mr. Chairman,
pursuant to the 1999 antimoney laundering strategy between DOJ
and the Department of the Treasury, we have created a money
laundering coordination center here in the Washington area, and
that will serve as a de-confliction center and a clearinghouse
for all the money laundering investigations conducted by the
Federal law enforcement agencies. So I think that that is a
mechanism that will serve us very well in the near future.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Vigil, how good are Caribbean nations
in prosecuting and imprisoning those who have been arrested for
narcotics trafficking-related offenses, and what Caribbean
nations can we be certain that an end game will take place?
Mr. Vigil. Well, the best way I can put it is that some
countries need appropriate legislation to be able to prosecute
some of these individuals. For example, you have Haiti that has
a very weak legal infrastructure. However, much to their
credit, as a result of Operation Genesis, they have now started
working with the Dominican Republic. For example, they arrested
the wife, son, and brother-in-law of Roberto Conelo, who is a
major Colombian drug trafficker.
They did not have charges on him in Haiti, and therefore
they took him to the border near the Malpass area and turned
him over to the Dominican officials for prosecution there. The
Dominicans, in return, have done the same, arresting Haitian
individuals and turning them back over to Haiti for
prosecution. We are working very closely with them, again, in
terms of passing laws, in terms of ensuring that these
individuals remain in these countries in terms of their legal
institutions.
The other thing that we are doing is we look at
establishing solid investigations in the United States and
hoping that we can establish extradition policies to extradite
them into the United States or arrest them in other countries
where we do have extradition treaties in order to allow for
prosecution in the United States.
Senator Thurmond. Admiral Shkor, in 1998 the National Drug
Control Strategy established a goal to reduce the flow of drugs
into the United States by 10 percent by 2002 and 20 percent by
2007. In the Caribbean area, what progress have you made to
date toward reaching this goal?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Sir, our approach to reaching these
interdiction goals is to deploy a major portion of our cutter
assets to that theater of operation. Literally 60 percent of
their time is spent there. We are, with the funding that you
have provided to us, improving the detection sensor packages on
our aircraft and on our cutters, and deploying new end game
assets.
These include not only the use of armed helicopters which I
described earlier, but the use of over-the-horizon RIBs which
enable the cutters to expand their cone of effectiveness beyond
the visible horizon and well forward of their location. We have
added to our arsenal a converted TAYGO ship, the Persistent,
which carries two 35-foot deployable pursuit boats, high-speed
ocean racing craft which can outrun and out-maneuver smugglers.
These are well-armed with weapons and communications
capability, and we are looking for a good return on that
investment.
But most important to us, we strive continually to partner
ever more effectively with our counterparts in DEA, Customs,
the FBI, and foreign nations so that collectively we have got a
better handle on what the smuggler is doing and where we can
stop him. Are we accomplishing the goal? Candidly, we are not
moving toward it nearly as much as I would like, and that has
to do with funding limitations.
Senator Thurmond. The next question is for any of you who
care to answer it. Your agencies are having difficulty getting
agents to accept assignments in Puerto Rico. Would making
Puerto Rico an overseas assignment for agents help you meet
your staffing needs in that territory?
Mr. Vigil. I will take the question. I feel that if we can
make Puerto Rico a foreign post of duty and get a housing
stipend or housing for the individuals assigned to Puerto Rico,
I think it would go a long way. There have been some incentives
that we have obtained for the employees in Puerto Rico.
However, I feel that they are not sufficient to alleviate this
retention problem that all Federal agencies have on the island.
I believe that this would go a long way. I think that we
need large monetary incentives to also include after the first
3 years maybe a $25,000 incentive, or 25 percent of base pay.
But without this situation, we will continue to have retention
problems. The Drug Enforcement Administration stands to lose
between 25 and 30 percent of its agent workforce by the year
2001 because of this retention problem.
Senator Thurmond. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Mr.
Chairman, I do have a----
Senator Thurmond. Senator, I have got another commitment.
Could you take over?
Senator DeWine. I would be more than happy to. Thank you,
Senator.
For the record, I have a statement by Senator Leahy which I
would make a part of the record at this point.
[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Patrick Leahy, a U.S. Senator From the State
of Vermont
Earlier this year we began receiving requests from the courts for
additional resources to help them meet their responsibilities in border
districts like Puerto Rico. Unfortunately, Congress has taken no action
in these regards. Instead, Congress has moved in the other direction by
denying to these districts the resources that they need. Today, the
Subcommittee's hearing illustrates this point by focusing on drug
smuggling in Puerto Rico.''
The Commander of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area testified that his
``primary counter-drug focus * * * for the upcoming year is on Puerto
Rico, where the smuggling infrastructure is well developed, entrenched,
and historically successful'' with ``one-quarter of all cocaine
destined for the United States * * * being shipped via the 110-mile
long island of Puerto Rico.''
There has been a District Court vacancy in Puerto Rico for almost 6
years, from June 1994. Since 1994, the time from filing to disposition
for criminal felony cases in the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico
continues to increase--now to almost twice as long as it was in 1994.
Criminal felony filings jumped almost 70 percent last year alone. They
are now the highest in that entire Circuit. By far the greatest number
of criminal cases in Puerto Rico are drug cases, as over 40 percent of
all federal criminal cases in the District of Puerto Rico are drug
cases.
The President has nominated qualified people to fill the vacancy
for years but to no avail. Now we have the nomination of Jay Garcia-
Gregory, but there has been no action on his nomination.
I hope that as the Committee considers its reaction to this
hearing, one of the matters on which we will take action without
further delay is the confirmation of Jay Garcia-Gregory.
Senator DeWine [presiding]. Admiral, you made the
statement, we have virtually no ability to affect the
noncommercial air that is going into Haiti. Is that correct?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. Similar to the one we saw in the video?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Yes, sir. We can track them north into
Haiti, but there is not an effective on-the-ground end game
capability there. That is something that potentially could be
built over time, but I just don't see it present now. There are
security concerns even if we were to try to consider using U.S.
Hilo lift capability to carry in local police forces that would
have to be addressed. They are not insurmountable, but they are
there and they are difficult.
For that aircraft that returns southbound, JIATF East can
sustain track, but the smugglers' knowledge that we are not
allowed to fly into Venezuela makes that the route of choice
for them. So we are scrubbed off and they can get back into
Colombia.
Senator DeWine. If I could summarize your statement about
Haiti, basically what we are trying to do is indirectly to deal
with what flows out of Haiti. We are trying to deal with it as
it goes into Puerto Rico, for example.
Vice Admiral Shkor. To clarify, sir, I think historically
we in the Coast Guard have tried to deal with the maritime flow
going into Haiti. Recognizing now that such a large portion is
going by air and beyond our efforts, I think I am suggesting
that we need to shift our tactics as a future line of attack so
that we collectively are dealing with that outbound secondary
flow, whether it is to the Miami River or westward to Puerto
Rico.
Senator DeWine. But in both of those cases, you are fairly
optimistic. For example, in the Miami River, the three of you
have described the success there, and we are seeing some more
success in regard to dealing with Puerto Rico as well. Is that
correct?
Vice Admiral Shkor. I am optimistic, that is correct. Does
more work need to be done? My answer would be yes. I don't
think we have as sophisticated an understanding of those
secondary flows as we now realize we need to achieve.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Vigil, I have been on the border of the
Dominican Republic and Haiti, and I know exactly what you are
talking about. You can just stand at that border and watch
people walk back and forth, and Lord knows what they have on
them. They just come and go back.
The infrastructure, obviously, as you all have pointed out,
in Haiti is very fragile. The Dominican Republic is certainly a
different situation, and we are seeing more cooperation between
Haiti and the Dominican Republic. But it is still from a law
enforcement point of view very problematic.
Mr. Vigil. That is correct. I agree with the Admiral in
terms of trying to do the secondary interdiction of drug loads.
But at the same time, I think that we need to look at also
interdicting the drugs before they get into Haiti, quite
frankly, because they flow then northward to Cape Haitian, and
from there to the southeastern part of the United States, or it
goes across the border, as you mentioned, into the hands of
more sophisticated drug traffickers, the Dominicans. And then
from there also they have the routes directly into the
continental United States or across the channel into Puerto
Rico.
The thing is that unless we take a very proactive approach
in Haiti, we are going to have Haiti become another Colombia,
as it was many years ago. If you have been to Port-au-Prince,
you can see the mansions going up on the hillsides, and a lot
of those belong to Colombian traffickers who are establishing
routes. Once they become deeply embedded there, it is going to
be that much more difficult to eradicate the problem in Haiti.
Senator DeWine. In 1998, when I traveled to Haiti, I found
there was only one permanent DEA agent assigned to Haiti. So we
put some additional money in the supplemental. We are up to
eight now?
Mr. Vigil. Seven agents, and getting the eighth relatively
soon, yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. How effectively can they operate in Haiti?
Mr. Vigil. Well, we are working very effectively, I think,
in Haiti. Obviously, hopefully in the future we can get
additional personnel there, but we are working very well at the
Port-au-Prince International Airport with the BLTS, or the
counter-narcotics arm of the Haitian National Police. They have
made seizures. During the course of the last 8 months, I
believe that they have been responsible for the seizure of $8
million flowing from Haiti into Panama and other areas in the
Caribbean.
We are in the process of establishing a maritime task force
also in Port-au-Prince. We have intel projects where we are
developing informants at Cape Haitian and throughout the
country. Recently, I have started meeting with the Haitian
National Police Director, Pierre Denize, and other members of
customs, immigration, and what have you, to form a mobile
multiagency task force that would address voids in intel and
also investigative coverage throughout the country of Haiti.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Vigil, I understand that DEA has had a
successful program of vetted units in several countries, making
possible highly successful investigations and cases such as the
recent Operation Millennium in Colombia. Could this program be
properly expanded to the Caribbean, and what are your thoughts
about that?
Mr. Vigil. Sir, I think it is a great benefit. Right now,
we are working on establishing vetted units in the Dominican
Republic and Haiti. Initially, we looked at Haiti as being the
number one area. However, given the problems with the turmoil
with the situation with the national elections and the
instability of the Haitian National Police, I think it would be
best served if we look at the Dominican Republic that has a
little bit better infrastructure and then later look at the
vetted unit in Haiti.
Senator DeWine. But you are moving on the Dominican
Republic?
Mr. Vigil. Yes, sir, we are. That is correct.
Senator DeWine. Anyplace else in the Caribbean?
Mr. Vigil. I think that we should also look at areas such
as Barbados and Curacao. We do have somewhat of a vetted unit
in Suriname. So it is a beneficial program, I think, that would
obviously assist us in our investigations.
Senator DeWine. Admiral, how has the decrease in Department
of Defense ship days and aircraft flight hours in the transit
and source zones affected your counter-drug operations in the
Caribbean?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Yes, sir. As you know, the Department
of Defense is the lead agency for detection and monitoring.
They, if you will, will give us the targets against which we
will interdict and apprehend. And decreases in that capability
have a direct and adverse impact on our ability to discharge
our mission and accomplish the goals of the National Drug
Control Strategy.
The largest decrease, I think, has been the subject of
hearings held earlier this year and amply discussed there.
There was a 50-percent reduction in DoD assets in 1994.
Senator DeWine. What percentage?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Fifty percent, fully cut in half.
DoD continues to be pressed because as it is asked to
enable the source country strategy, that results in a tension,
or at least a competing appetite for the same kinds of assets
that can be used both in the transit zone and in the source
country.
Senator DeWine. Admiral, I wonder if you could step over to
the map over there a moment. I know it is contained in your
testimony, but maybe if you could just integrate it with that
map exactly what activity you have going on in the different
parts of the region. For example, my understanding is you don't
have anything going on, such as Operation Frontier Shield or
Operation Frontier Lance now. Is that correct?
Vice Admiral Shkor. We have it going on in name only. By
that, I mean we have some assets. Frontier Shield was our
effort that we mounted some time ago to focus on the Puerto
Rican corridor. It was extremely successful. The throughput of
drugs was reduced on an annualized basis from 25 to 30 metric
tons. And, again, the Customs Service with Operation Gateway
had mounted a similar surge operation at the same time.
It was truly a surge. It was at a level beyond which we
could keep our ships and airplanes online, and so we have
reduced to what we had hoped would have been an effective
maintenance level, some 20 percent of what took place during
the search. It has not been enough. Over the last 2 years, the
throughput of cocaine in the Puerto Rican theater has risen
from some 30 tons to something above 100 metric tons.
Senator DeWine. So this is not seizure?
Vice Admiral Shkor. This is the throughput.
Senator DeWine. Throughput.
Vice Admiral Shkor. Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. And how reliable is that figure?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Well, the figure that I am giving you
is interagency-based.
Senator DeWine. I understand.
Vice Admiral Shkor. I have a fair amount of confidence
about it simply because the people that make those estimates
tend to be relatively conservative. They don't want to be, if
you will, held up to embarrassment by overstating the case.
Senator DeWine. So this is a fairly reliable chart?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. And what is your summary of this chart?
What does it tell us?
Vice Admiral Shkor. It tells me that, collectively, we have
not maintained control of our backyard in Puerto Rico. In one
sense, it is a favorable operating area. U.S. law applies. We
don't have the problem of foreign sovereignty and we are
relatively asset-rich. But the smuggler has made the choice
that that is a place to bring cocaine into, and I think that
choice is driven by the fact that once it is in Puerto Rico,
from a Customs legal standpoint, it is effectively in Kansas.
That makes it very, very attractive.
The agencies have worked hard. They have sustained seizure
levels; 23 percent is the figure I gave you, and that is about
25 metric tons this last year. That is pretty good, but
standing alone it hasn't been enough to deter thatsmuggler from
making a business judgment. So from my perspective, we need to tighten
the noose back around Puerto Rico.
Senator DeWine. What is required for you to have a
deterrent effect? Is there a point where we know from past
experience that they will go somewhere else and they back off?
Vice Admiral Shkor. I am looking for a slide that I don't
have here. When we were doing Frontier Shield and Gateway at
the full-up level, the seizure rates were 35 percent of the
cocaine moving in. That level seemed to reduce the smuggler's
reliance on Puerto Rico.
For me, though, the answer is not just in pounds on the
table for seizures. I want very much to produce prosecutable
cases, and that is what our aircraft use of force does for us.
I don't want to just pick drugs out of the water. I want boats,
I want drugs, I want criminals. I want the U.S. attorney to be
able to put them in jail because that is where we really get
deterrent. And from that perspective, my guidance to my people
is to work very closely with Mr. Vigil and with Customs down
range because there is, in my view, a symbiotic relationship
between at-sea drug interdiction and support to investigatory
law enforcement, and that works both ways.
Senator DeWine. Well, let me ask you a basic question,
then. If I am looking at this map and I look at Puerto Rico, on
any one given day I would expect to see your assets where?
Where would they be deployed?
Vice Admiral Shkor. We will have assets operating on the
underbelly of Puerto Rico. We will have them operating on the
eastern end of Puerto Rico because there is a significant flow
that comes from the windward islands. Of this 108 metric tons
that we show flowing into Puerto Rico, maybe 20 to 22 metric
tons is estimated to come from the Virgin Islands and non-U.S.
windward islands.
There is also a flow of both migrants and drugs coming off
the Dominican Republic, and so we will maintain a presence
there. What we are not doing is maintaining it with a
sufficient asset density or with a sufficient detection rate to
provide that deterrence.
Senator DeWine. Then when I move over off the coast of
Haiti, what do I find?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Well, you will find, in our judgment,
about 78 metric tons going up into Haiti. Part of that, a
significant portion, will be carried by go-fast boats that can
make the run directly with enough fuel. They don't need to stop
or be gassed up along the way. Some of that seagoing movement
will go by small commercial freighter. We will often find drugs
hidden in cargoes of cement that will be off-loaded in Port-au-
Prince. But you are also going to find a very high density of
air tracks going from Colombia up into Haiti, as was described
very, very well in the videotapes.
Senator DeWine. And what about the Coast Guard's assets,
though, on any given day off Haiti? Would I find anything there
or not?
Vice Admiral Shkor. Much less, much less. We have an
Operation Frontier Lance, but----
Senator DeWine. But, again, that is not a surge?
Vice Admiral Shkor. No, sir, by no means.
Senator DeWine. The name is still there. You are there
sometimes.
Vice Admiral Shkor. Yes, sir. In fact, it is just the
opposite. I have made some reductions in operations this year,
so you are going to see less than you would have seen just last
year.
Senator DeWine. Do you want to take the rest of the
Caribbean and tell me what is going on there?
Vice Admiral Shkor. With regard to Jamaica, we will have
pulsed operations with the Jamaicans from time to time. They
have achieved the status of an archipelagic state, and that
means that a large body of water south of Jamaica is their
internal archipelagic waters. We have to operate there with
their permission. We are endeavoring to use our bilateral
agreements that allow ship riders and our operations in those
waters to get us there, but that is really the third order of
priority.
If I swing even further west, you will find much less of
our assets, and that is intel-driven. The flow estimates, if
you will, of cocaine going up into the Yucatan Peninsula have
been much down from what they historically have been. Whether
that has been effectiveness achieved by JIATF East--and they
did get a very high percentage of detections--or whether it is
action in Mexico or the Central American countries, I am not
quite sure. But we are content, if you will, to keep our
presence reduced and concentrate where we see the higher threat
axes.
Senator DeWine. Admiral, thank you very much.
Mr. Varrone, it is critical that we continue to explore new
technologies to combat illicit drug trafficking. Last year,
Senator Grassley and I in a letter to Commissioner Kelly
expressed support for a new passive radar technology that would
assist in closing coverage gaps in the arrival zone.
What is the status, in your opinion, of this program, and
how and where could Customs utilize this new technology?
Mr. Varrone. Sir, I am not familiar with the specific
technology that you are referring to. Are you talking about the
container x-ray technology or the radar technology?
Senator DeWine. This is the passive coherent location
system that provides a mobile surveillance capability that can
be deployed to directly impact air interdiction missions of
Customs. You are not familiar with that?
Mr. Varrone. No, sir.
Senator DeWine. OK, I appreciate that.
Well, listen, I thank you all very much. This has been a
very helpful hearing, and you all are doing a great job. I wish
we could give you more resources and more help, and we hope to
do that in the future.
Thank you all very much.
Vice Admiral Shkor. Thank you.
Mr. Varrone. Thank you, sir.
Senator DeWine. The record will remain open for one week
for any additional submissions.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m, the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions and Answers
----------
Responses of John E. Shkor to Questions From Senator Thurmond
Question 1. Cooperation from countries in the Caribbean is critical
to successful interdiction, especially given their limited resources.
In some of these countries, the United States does not have bilateral
treaties or agreements regarding counterdrug efforts, such as to enter
their waters. What is the status of efforts to achieve or strengthen
counterdrug agreements with Caribbean nations?
Answer 1. The United States currently has cooperative counterdrug
agreements with 22 nations, 21 of which have a Caribbean nexus,
including the Bahamas and Turks & Caicos. The agreements contain all or
portions of the components of a standard six-part maritime counterdrug
bilateral agreement. The six parts of a standard agreement address
shipboarding, shipriders, pursuit, entry-to-investigate, overflight,
and relay order-to-land. The United States is pursuing bilateral
agreements with nations with which there is no maritime counterdrug
treaty in place, and we are attempting to broaden treaties that
currently exist.
Building trust, enhancing multi-national capability, and
encouraging interoperability are keystones of the Coast Guard's
counterdrug strategy. We strengthen our international agreements
through service-to-service contracts and cooperative efforts, such as
the Coast Guard's Inernational Training Detachment, the Caribbean
Support Tender, stateside training for international officers, combined
international exercises (Operations TRADEWINDS and UNITAS), assistance
with the Caribbean Regional Security System, and cooperative operations
(Operations CARIB VENTURE, CONJUNTOS, MAYAN JAGUAR, RIPTIDE, and
FRONTIER LANCE).
Question 2. The General Accounting Office has often recommended
that counter narcotics agencies need to develop a centralized system
for recording and sharing lessons learned by various agencies while
conducting their operations. Do the federal agencies involved in
Caribbean interdiction have a formal arrangement for recording and
sharing lessons learned?
Answer 2. The Coast Guard is not aware of any formal arrangement
for recording and sharing lessons learned among federal agencies
involved in Caribbean drug interdiction. However, the Coast Guard and
its drug interdiction counterparts have extensive interagency
experience in operations planning, execution, and evaluation through
involvement in Joint Interagency Task Force-East (JIATF-E) and various
interagency operations. Interagency representation in these initiatives
fosters information sharing through joint planning sessions, operations
orders, and debriefings. For example, following Operation CONQUISTADOR,
a 17-day interagency Caribbean counterdrug effort involving 26
countries of the Caribbean, Central and South America, the Drug
Enforcement Administration reported that primary benefits of the
operation were the networking, intelligence sharing, and feedback among
participants.
Other initiatives include the Drug Enforcement Administration's
Unified Caribbean On-Line Regional Network (UNICORN) designed to
support information sharing among Caribbean nations, a JIATF-E-
sponsored semiannual planning conference, and coordination of
counterdrug activities in the Puerto Rico operating area through the
Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA Executive Committee.
Question 3. While trafficking along the Southwest border may have
diminished slightly, I do not think anyone would contend that we are in
a position to remove the considerable counterdrug assets located in
that region. That said, it is obvious that narcotics traffickers are
now looking to exploit the relatively open Caribbean to transport drugs
into the United States. My question to each of you is ``How many more
assets are required to fight the flow of drugs in the Caribbean without
sacrificing the counterdrug infrastructure we have created on the
Southwest border?''
Answer 3. The assets the Coast Guard requires to fight the flow of
drugs in the Caribbean are reflected in its fiscal year 2001 budget
request. The President's fiscal year 2001 budget request supports the
three key priorities for Coast Guard drug interdiction efforts in
support of the supply reduction goals of the National Drug Control
Strategy:
Increase surface end-game capability, including the ability
to mount expeditionary pulse operations;
Increase airborne maritime patrol capability to support
surface end-game activities; and
Enhance the capability and effectiveness of current assets
with sensors, technology, and operational enablers such as
intelligence support.
The Coast Guard also fully cooperates in the interagency working
group that makes international interdiction asset recommendations. The
U.S Interdiction Coordinator, under charter from the Director, Office
of National Drug Control Strategy, leads the Interdiction Planning and
Asset Management Group (IPAMG). This standing interagency working group
makes asset recommendations to ONDCP, with full support of all federal
interdiction agencies.
Question 4. Would you please comment on what Caribbean nations are
cooperative and what nations are uncooperative in fighting drug
trafficking? Also, please address what effect Venezuela's refusal to
allow the United States overflight access, as well its general
resistance to our drug fighting efforts, is having on our ability to
pursue traffickers?
Answer 4. The Coast Guard concurs with the Presidential
Determination on Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug Transit
Countries (Presidential Determination No. 2000-16). Most Caribbean
nations are aware of the adverse impacts of drug smuggling on their
national security. Outward evidence of their concern is the existence
of 21 bilateral counterdrug agreements between the U.S. and Caribbean
nations. These agreements have enhanced our ability to conduct combined
and cooperative counterdrug operations, such as Operations MAYAN
JAGUAR, CONJUNTOS, BLUE WATER, and CARIB VENTURE, with these countries.
Further, the Coast Guard employs International Training Detachments and
the Caribbean Support Tender to help Caribbean nations needing
assistance in personnel training and boat maintenance and operations.
Venezuela has not generally resisted U.S. maritime counter-drug
efforts, as evidenced by the U.S./Venezuela bilateral agreement, and
the presence of a Coast Guard attache in Caracas. As for air
interdiction efforts, Venezuela has not authorized U.S. tracker
aircraft, in hot pursuit of drug smuggling aircraft, to enter its air
space to effect interdiction end-game. Venezuela has cited national
sovereignty concerns as their justification for protecting their air
space. This decision negatively impacts the U.S. ability to effect an
end-game on target aircraft since tracker aircraft are forced to break
off pursuit and therefore cannot follow drug smuggling aircraft to
their final destination to arrange for an end-game on the ground.
Question 5. I am concerned that we are not doing as good a job as
we could when it comes to strategic planning and information sharing.
What steps can we take to improve in these areas?
Answer 5. Federal counterdrug agencies have taken important steps
to improve strategic planning and information sharing. The Coast Guard
is completing an update to its counterdrug strategic plan, Campaign
STEEL WEB, which supports the National Drug Control Strategy. In
addition, the Coast Guard's operational commanders issue Theater
Campaign Plans to support STEEL WEB and focus on their area of
responsibility. The Theater Campaign Plans are developed with input and
information from other counterdrug agencies. For example, the Atlantic
Area Commander's Theater Campaign Plan was coordinated with the U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Joint Interagency Task Force-East
(JIATF-E) to complement each organization's counterdrug efforts. The
Coast Guard is also a full participant in the interagency process
sponsored by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator to develop periodic
Interdiction Planning Guidance (IPG). This document sets forth
strategic guidance for agencies involved in international interdiction
to best focus planning and coordination of counter-narcotics
operations.
The Coast Guard was an integral contributor to the General
Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP), which reflects the collective
need to clarify and make systemic improvements to U.S. drug
intelligence and information programs. The GCIP's goal is to establish
a drug intelligence framework that supports operators in the field,
improves federal, state, and local relationships, and responds to
policymaker needs as they formulate counterdrug policy, tasking, and
resource decisions.
The Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination Group (CDICG) and the
Counterdrug Intelligence Secretariat (CDX), with Coast Guard executive
membership, was established to improve information sharing among
National, Defense, and Law Enforcement intelligence agencies. The CDX
will enhance intelligence production at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels by providing analyses and recommendations for
deconflicting intelligence overlap, promoting intelligence exchange,
and enhancing support to customers of law enforcement-related
intelligence products at all levels of planning.
The Coast Guard and its drug interdiction counterparts have
extensive interagency experience in operations planning, execution, and
evaluation through our involvement in JIATFs and various interagency
operations. Interagency representation in these initiatives fosters
information sharing through joint planning sessions, operations orders,
and debriefings. For example, Operation CAPER FOCUS has been
exceptionally successful with record drug seizures in the eastern
Pacific, which were the result of long-term strategic planning, and
unprecedented interagency information sharing. Following Operation
CONQUISTADOR, a wide-ranging interagency Caribbean counterdrug effort,
the Drug Enforcement Administration reported that primary benefits of
the operation were the networking, intelligence sharing, and feedback
among participants.
Question 6. It seems that without having good information as to
when, where, and how drugs will be shipped, we are essentially
operating blindly. What steps can be taken to improve intelligence
gathering efforts in the source zones?
Answer 6. The Coast Guard is not a member of the National Foreign
Intelligence Community (NFIC) and as such has no legal authorization to
collect intelligence in source zone countries. Therefore, the Coast
Guard must rely on other agencies with requisite authority to provide
critically needed intelligence information. To improve source country
intelligence gathering efforts in support of Coast Guard operations, we
continue to work with our partners in the Intelligence community to
ensure that Coast Guard operational needs are supported to the extent
possible. These efforts include increasing participation of the Coast
Guard in the Defense Attache program, evaluating the feasibility of
Coast Guard membership in the NFIC/foreign intelligence community, and
establishing Coast Guard intelligence liaison officer positions with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Customs Service, and Interpol.
Question 7. I understand that one of the trends law enforcement is
beginning to notice is the merging of criminal enterprises. For
example, in the past, one organization might smuggle drugs, while
another organization might smuggle migrants, but today, one
organization might smuggle both. What sort of merging of criminal
enterprises are you seeing in the Caribbean?
Answer 7. Over the last five years, the Coast Guard has noted the
diversification of smuggling operations in the Caribbean. Smuggling
organizations in South Florida, the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic
move both illegal aliens and drugs as the opportunity arises. While
there have been indicators of this dual-cargo smuggling, it has been
difficult to find evidence of both types of trafficking in any single
interdiction. A recent joint investigation in south Florida involving
the Coast Guard, U.S. Border Patrol and U.S. Customs, has identified
four separate organizations tied to both drug and migrant smuggling.
This investigation is currently centered on go-fast type vessels, and
has yet to explore the possibility of other modes of transportation
such as coastal freighters.
Question 8. What would you rank as your most important priorities
to counter the trafficking situation in the Caribbean?
Answer 8. The Coast Guard's primary counterdrug focus in Atlantic
Area for the upcoming year is on Puerto Rico, where the smuggling
infrastructure is well development, entrenched, and historically
successful. As our efforts over time are successful in this regard we
would expect a shift to Haiti and Jamaica, as smuggling activity in
Puerto Rico becomes prohibitively risky to traffickers. Thus, the Coast
Guard must remain tactically flexible to address an anticipated
increased flow into Haiti and Jamaica as our operations in Puerto Rico
succeed.
Question 9. The Department of Defense assets devoted to
interdiction efforts has decreased considerably in recent years. From
1992 to 1999, the number of DOD flight hours devoted to tracking
illegal drug shipments in transshipment areas decreased by 68 percent.
While this decline has been slightly offset by increased Coast Guard
flights, the number of flight hours for all agencies combined is still
down considerably from what they were in 1992. Has this reduction
significantly harmed interdiction efforts in the Caribbean?
Answer 9. Successful counterdrug operations require robust
intelligence collection and dissemination capability, dedicated
detection and monitoring capability, and a credible interdiction and
apprehension capability. Since the drug seizure rate has increased in
recent years, no evidence seems to indicate that changes in DoD flight
hours have significantly harmed interdiction efforts. While Maritime
Patrol Aircraft assets continue to be an integral part of interagency
success, ongoing efforts to capitalize on interagency and international
coordination and intelligence sharing continue to show positive results
due to the ``force multiplier'' effect of such cooperation.
______
Response of John E. Shkor to a Question from Senator DeWine
Question 1. We have learned a lot about the readiness concerns of
the other Armed Services, especially concerning recruitment, training,
and equipment. I am disappointed that these discussions have not really
included the Coast Guard. In fact, we recently learned that you have
scaled back your operation 10 percent for the remainder of fiscal year
2000. Can you describe for me your current readiness situation, the
potential need for further operational reductions this year, and how
this has impacted your counterdrug operations in the Caribbean?
Answer 1. Lack of adequate funding has diminished our ability to
sustain counterdrug operations. In January, we were forced to cut major
cutters' annual operating days from 185 to 175, the equivalent of tying
a ship to the dock for a year. In March, my headquarters cut fixed wing
air operations by 10% because the parts bins were running dry and
couldn't sustain operations through the end of the fiscal year. That is
the equivalent of putting one C-130 and two Falcon interceptors in the
hanger for a year. Now we are looking at further cutting back my
counter-drug operations, by 25% because of fuel account shortfall. The
T-AGOS Maritime Interdiction Support Vessel with Deployable Pursuit
Boats promises tremendous payback, but funding constraint will limit us
to 180 days of operation in fiscal year 2001--rather than the 270 days
originally envisioned. The next phase of Aircraft Use of Force is now
being planned for a much lower rate of implementation because of
funding shortfalls.
Additionally, pilot shortages and the requirement to fully stand up
two Great Lakes Air Facilities, will reduce the flight deck fill rate
on counterdrug patrolling cutters from an already unacceptably low rate
of about 60 percent, to in the neighborhood of 20 percent for the
upcoming summer months.
______
Responses of Michael S. Vigil to Questions From Senator Thurmond
Question 1. Cooperation from countries in the Caribbean is critical
to successful interdiction, especially given their limited resources.
In some of these countries, the United States does not have bilateral
treaties or agreements regarding counterdrug efforts, such as to enter
their waters. What is the status of efforts to achieve or strengthen
counterdrug agreements with Caribbean nations?
Answer 1. Efforts are continual towards strengthening counterdrug
agreements with our cooperating Caribbean nations. Most of the nations
in the Caribbean do have ``shiprider'' agreements, which provide
authority to embark law enforcement officials on platforms of the
parties, where officials may then authorize certain law enforcement
actions. Recent operations such as Genesis, Columbus and Conquistador
have helped to create a unified bond of information gathering and
sharing between the Caribbean nations and the United States, via the
DEA Caribbean Field Division (CFD). DEA, along with other federal law
enforcement agencies, has established cooperative efforts with 25
countries, as well as memoranda of understanding with several of these
countries. DEA special agents assigned to the country offices work
along with host nation personnel on matters pertaining to law
enforcement. The use of United States (U.S.) military forces in these
countries will have to be negotiated with the Caribbean Nations after
cooperation efforts and bilateral treaties are established.
Question 2. The General Accounting Office has often recommended
that counter-narcotics agencies need to develop a centralized system
for recording and sharing lessons learned by various agencies while
conducting their operations. Do the federal agencies involved in
Caribbean interdiction have a formal arrangement for recording and
sharing lessons learned?
Answer 2. The conglomerate of federal agencies involved in the
interdiction of drugs throughout the Caribbean has formal processes for
recording and sharing lessons learned at the administrative,
operational, and strategic levels. The High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Area (HIDTA) initiative, located in San Juan, Puerto Rico, serves as
the forum through which all federal agencies exchange ideas,
experiences, and intelligence information, vital to their decision-
making processes. At the administrative level, the HIDTA Executive
Committee, made up of the entire federal agency Special Agents in
Charge (SACs), meets on a monthly basis. At the operational level, all
supervisors from the different initiatives meet on a monthly basis to
exchange information regarding their on-going investigations. At the
strategic level, the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) Group
Supervisors meet on a weekly basis to exchange intelligence information
on the latest drug trends and investigations.
Question 3. While trafficking along the Southwest border may have
diminished slightly, I do not think anyone would contend that we are
the relatively open Caribbean to transport drugs into the United
States. My question to each of you is ``How many more assets are
required to fight the flow of drugs in the Caribbean without
sacrificing the counterdrug in a position to remove the considerable
counterdrug assets located in that region. That said, it is obvious
that narcotics traffickers are now looking to exploit infrastructure we
have created on the Southwest Border?
Answer 3. While the southwest border continues to be the primary
point of entry for drugs into the United States, the role of the
Caribbean Corridor in the transshipment of drugs destined for the U.S.
cannot be ignored. The interagency Cocaine Movement Assessment Report
estimates that 30-33% of the cocaine destined for the United States
transits the Caribbean Corridor. In addition, the smuggling of heroin
through the Caribbean is on the rise as well as marijuana and other
dangerous drugs such as MDMA (Ecstasy). The international drug
trafficking organizations operating in the CFD area of responsibility
continue to exploit the advantages of the region. The vastness of the
Caribbean Sea and the geographically fragmented nature of the Caribbean
islands lure drug traffickers to the region. While the Unified
Caribbean On-Line Regional Network (UNICORN) system provides
institution building in the form of training, and several multi-
national operations have contributed to the development of a
comprehensive Regional Strategy, counternarcotic entities working in
the Caribbean still face many challenges.
With hundreds of well-funded drug trafficking organizations
operating throughout the Caribbean, the counternarcotic officers
ability to rapidly respond to the diverse trafficking situations of the
region is essential. Aircraft (helicopters), maritime interdiction
vessels, related technological equipment, wiretap interception
equipment, and trained personnel must be augmented in order to
effectively immobilize drug trafficking organizations. Without these
additional assets, the Caribbean, and subsequently the U.S., will
increasingly feel the negative effects of drug trafficking in the forms
of addiction, crime, and corruption.
Question 4. Would you please comment on what Caribbean nations are
cooperative and what nations are uncooperative in fighting drug-
trafficking? Also please address what effect Venezuela's refusal to
allow the United States overflight access, as well its general
resistance to our drug fighting efforts, is having on our ability to
pursue traffickers?
Answer 4. The CFD has established positive working relationships
with the various host-nation counterparts within its area of
responsibility. While these nations have demonstrated good faith in
their counternarcotic efforts, varying political and socioeconomic
infrastructures have allowed for varying degrees of impact on drug
trafficking.Overall, the nations covered by the CFD have been
cooperative within the parameters of their respective limitations. (See
previous questions for further details.)
Venezuela has become a major transshipment nation for cocaine and
heroin produced in Colombia. The cocaine and heroin are transshipped
through the chain of Eastern Caribbean islands enroute to the
continental United States, Puerto Rico, and/or the United States Virgin
Islands. Venezuela does not allow U.S. overflights in pursue of
traffickers. However, the U.S. can apply for permission to do so on an
individual basis. Venezuelan authorities rarely permit U.S.
overflights. In the past year, Venezuela approved one overflight
request. The lack of direct air interdiction has contributed to an
increase in drug trafficking activities via airplanes from Colombia to
Venezuela.
Question 5. I am concerned that we are not doing as good a job as
we could when it comes to strategic planning and information sharing.
What steps can we take to improve in these areas?
Answer 5. The CFD has taken significant steps to increase
information sharing and strategic cooperation between Caribbean
countries. The first of these efforts took place in October 1998 with
Operation Genesis. Operation Genesis was a CFD initiative to establish
a cooperative relationship between the Dominican Republic and Haiti.
Historically, these countries which have had a history of hatred and
distrust, agreed to cooperate in a major drug interdiction operation.
Haitian and Dominican authorities exchanged personnel in furtherance of
this operation. The objectives of this operation included: border
surveillance, airport interdiction and seaport interdiction, inspecting
pleasure craft, raiding local targets, eradication (where applicable),
patrolling targeted trafficking routes on land, sea, and air, follow-up
investigations to identify organization members (if applicable),
arrests, and seizures. The most important result of this operation was
the extradition of 4 members of the Coneo Rios drug trafficking
organization from Haiti to the Dominican Republic. The Coneo Rios
family had been carrying out its drug trafficking activities in Haiti
with impunity for many years until DEA personnel in conjunction with
Haitian authorities arrested several of their members. Subsequently, in
the first event of its kind, Haitian authorities extradited Sixta Tulia
Higuera Carcomo, Jose Manuel Coneo, William Jimenez-Herrera and Ricardo
Enrique Guerrero to the Dominican government. Operation Genesis paved
the way for future cooperation between these countries.
In 1998 the CFD initiated an information sharing communication
system known as UNICORN. UNICORN allows participating countries the
ability to share law enforcement information with neighboring
countries, especially under operational conditions. Participants can
rapidly disseminate actionable enforcement information, and coordinate
responses to emergent situations. The installed imagery capability,
provided by scanners, can help overcome language barriers. Those
nations with multiple UNICORN systems have them installed in the DEA
Caribbean offices as well as the offices of the local counterparts.
current unicorn participants/sets
1. Anguilla;
2. Antigua--1;
3. Aruba--2;
4. Barbados--2;
5. Bogota and Baranquilla, CO;
6. Bolivia;
7. Bonaire--1;
8. Caracas, VZ--2;
9. Curacao, NA;
10. Dominica--1;
11. Ecuador;
12. Grenada--1;
13. Port-au-Prince, Haiti--2;
14. Jamaica--2;
15. Miami (British Consulate);
16. Montserrat;
17. Panama--1;
18. San Juan, PR--3;
19. Santo Domingo, Dom. Rep.--3;
20. St. Kitts--1;
21. St. Lucia--1;
22. St. Vincent--1;
23. St. Maarten--1;
24. Suriname--1;
25. Tortola--1;
26. Trinidad--2.
Approximatley one dozen nations may be added to the system over the
next year.
The UNICORN system played a major role in Operation Columbus, the
second major CFD initiative directed at increasing cooperation between
Caribbean and South American countries in the fight against drug
trafficking. Operation Columbus had a much larger scope than Operation
Genesis. Operation Columbus was a multi-faceted operation initiated by
the CFD involving fifteen countries and their respective law
enforcement agencies united by a common goal to disrupt drug
trafficking activities in the Caribbean corridor. The operation began
on 9/29/99 and terminated on 10/10/99. The Santo Domingo Country Office
served as the north command center and the Trinidad & Tobago Country
Office served as the South Command Center.
The countries that participated in this joint cooperative effort
were: Barbados, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Curacao, Aruba,
Suriname, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Colombia (Barranquilla &
Bogota), Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela, and Puerto Rico.
The primary objectives of Operation Columbus were:
1. The development of a cohesive and cooperative environment among
source and transit countries.
2. The integration within each country of all counter-drug
entities.
3. The continued development of a comprehensive regional drug
strategy.
4. The facilitation and exchange of information between the
participating countries through UNICORN.
5. Mentoring and training of counter-drug entities in host
countries.
6. To impact and disrupt drug trafficking organizations in the
Caribbean corridor and source countries.
UNICORN was successfully used to facilitate the exchange and
dissemination of information of strategic, operational and tactical
value and was instrumental in handling information in a timely manner.
During March 1999, the third major multi-national CFD enforcement
operation was carried out. Operation Conquistador was a multi-faceted,
joint regional operation initiated by the CFD and supported by the
United States Coast Guard Greater Antilles Section (USCG/GANTSEC).
Operation Conquistador brought together twenty-six countries and their
respective law enforcement agencies united by a common goal to disrupt
drug trafficking activities in the Caribbean and South America.
The participating countries in this effort were: Jamaica, Haiti,
Dominican Republic, British Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Dutch St.
Maarten, Montserrat, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Aruba, Curacao,
Antigua, Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts, Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, Suriname, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Puerto Rico. The Santo Domingo Country Office and the Trinidad and
Tobago Country Office served as the two command centers for the
duration of the operation that began on 3/10/2000 and ended on 3/26/
2000.
UNICORN once again played a key role in the exchange and
dissemination of information with strategic, operational, and tactical
value to all participating law enforcement entities of the
participating countries.
The objectives of Operation Conquistador were:
1. The development of a cohesive and cooperative environment among
source and transit countries.
2. The integration within each country of all counter-drug
entities.
3. The continued development of a comprehensive regional drug
strategy.
4. The facilitation and exchange of information between the
participating countries through UNICORN.
5. Mentoring and training of counter-drug entities in host
countries.
6. To impact and disrupt drug trafficking organizations in the
Caribbean corridor and source countries.
As a result of these multinational operations, and the
establishment of the UNICORN system, the Caribbean Field Division has
made great advances in the sharing of information and strategic
cooperation among Caribbean nations.
Question 6. It seems that without having good information as to
when, where, and how drugs will be shipped, we are essentially
operating blindly. What steps can be taken to improve intelligence
gathering efforts in the source zones?
Answer 6. Within the CFD area of responsibility, the major source
countries are marijuana producers. St. Vincent and Jamaica are the
major marijuana growing countries in the Caribbean. During the past
years, DEA has carried out multiple eradication operations in these
source countries. The DEA Country Offices in Jamaica and Barbados have
greatly improved our intelligence gathering capabilities in these
countries. Also, increased funding to allow DEA Intelligence Analysts
to travel to source and transshipment countries would allow for the
gathering of first hand information about smuggling methods. Increased
funding for wiretaps and Confidential Source recruitment would greatly
improve intelligence gathering methods involving transshipment events.
Question 7. I understand that one of the trends law enforcement is
beginning to notice is the merging of criminal enterprises. For
example, in the past, one organization might smuggle migrants, but
today, one organization might smuggle both. What sort of merging of
criminal enterprises are you seeing in the Caribbean?
Answer 7. The Luis Munoz Marin International Airport (LMMIA) in
Puerto Rico is an important gateway of illicit smuggling activities.
This is the busiest international air facility in the Caribbean and
reportedly processes in excess of nine million passengers annually. The
LMMIA is the eighth largest airport in the U.S. by number of arrival
flights from foreign destinations.
According to INTERPOL, about 35% of all cocaine entering Puerto
Rico is believed to be smuggled via Hispaniola (Haiti and Dominican
Republic). Half of the total volume of cocaine entering Puerto Rico
comes directly from Colombia or Venezuela.
DEA Intelligence reports have shown that approximately 30% of the
cocaine that reached Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands was for
local consumption and the other 70% was for transshipment to the U.S.
According to DEA, the South American drug traffickers continue
transporting multihundred kilograms of cocaine to Jamaica, the U.S.,
and the British Virgin Islands where it is warehoused and eventually
transported to the U.S. Reportedly, the cocaine is broken into
convenient smaller loads to be smuggled into the United States and
Canada. The final movement is carried out by couriers on commercial air
or air cargo flights, concealed shipments via containers, or via cruise
ship passengers and crew.
Reportedly, another 15% of the total volume of cocaine entering
Puerto Rico transits via the eastern Caribbean Island. The island of
Vieques, located east of Puerto Rico and Culebra located to the
northeast, are sometimes used as storage centers. St. Maarten,
Netherlands Antilles (NA), remains an important transit center for
narcotics destined to the U.S. via Puerto Rico. Recently, St. Maarten,
NA, has realized an increased presence of Dominican smugglers and
organizers. Go-fast boats routinely leave from St. Maarten to meet
mother ships or pick up loads that have been airdropped.
During fiscal year 1999, Colombian drug traffickers had been
``stashing'' or warehousing considerable shipments of narcotics in
Haiti. Intelligence has shown that Haiti received over 50 metric tons,
approximately 15% over the previous years. Significant airdrops and
smuggling activities via motor vessel have been detected in and around
Haiti during fiscal year 2000.
International traffickers appear to have invested great efforts in
Hispaniola over the last years and have been able to organize a supply
and stash area for cocaine and other narcotics. Colombian drug barons
come to Haiti mainly to exploit the many under-patrolled coastal areas
of this impoverished country.
Traffickers may choose to warehouse and be selective about what
shipments they conduct, depending on the challenge posed by authorities
at any particular time. They can choose to send a shipment of a few
hundred kilos of cocaine by go-fast boat directly to Puerto Rico, or
load larger quantities aboard Haitian freighters heading to the United
States.
Federal authorities have reported an increase in the frequency of
alien trafficking during the past quarter. Local smugglers have been
known to both smuggle cocaine and aliens, using the same trafficking
patterns and vessels.
Over the years thousands of persons from Dominican Republic have
made a journey to the southwestern coast of Puerto Rico using small
boats, called ``yolas'' as means of transportation. The captains of
these ``yolas'' will load as many as they can possibly fit in them. The
presence of large segments of Dominicans in Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands has effectively created a vast manpower pool for drug
traffickers who have been described as an ``army for hire''.
Intelligence reports have noted that although some of the Colombian
cartels worked primarily with their own countrymen, others continue to
rely on Dominican nationals as transportation groups.
While the Colombian organizations broaden their grasp on drug
trafficking in the Caribbean, Dominican organizations continue to be
involved in dangerous aspects of the trade. They have been
consolidating their own interests and groups to the point of locally
challenging Colombians, and other local associates in the drug criminal
infrastructure. The crimes associated with their presence and influence
in the illegal drug activity leads to an increase in murders, assaults,
robberies, rapes, and carjackings.
Dominican nationals have migrated throughout the Caribbean
including Antigua, St. Maarten, Barbados, St. Lucia, and Puerto Rico.
Although Colombians are responsible for the vast supply of cocaine and
heroin smuggled, some Dominican groups have challenged their role in
some drug smuggling ventures.
The Colombian drug trafficking organizations (DTO's), utilizing
Dominican immigrants have created an efficient drug distribution
system. They have made the Dominican Republic their choice location for
command and control operations. The DTO's from Colombia view the
Dominicans as reliable business partners who have proven their ability
to manage a complicated distribution system and expand its reach
through aggressive marketing practices.
Question 8. What would you rank as your most important priorities
to counter the trafficking situation in the Caribbean?
Answer 8. 1. The most important priority is to place more
specialized personnel in the area of intelligence gathering.
2. Conduct additional multi-national operations involving law
enforcement entities from the Caribbean.
Question 9. What criminal organizations are operating in the
Caribbean, and what are their ties to the United States? Do you see
evidence of La Cosa Nostra, Russian Mafia, Nigerian Crime Groups, and
Asian triads and tongs, etc.
Answer 9. Most of the drug trafficking organizations operating
throughout the Caribbean are made up of Colombians and Dominicans.
However, intelligence information obtained from different sources
appears to indicate that other ethnic groups do have an influence in
areas related to drug trafficking operations. For instance, although
there are no official on-going investigations (guided by HIDTA or DEA
CFD) involving the influence of Italians, Nigerians, or Asians, there
is evidence of their presence regarding illegal businesses throughout
the Caribbean. There is information that several Italian groups operate
casinos and other businesses in the Dominican Republic which are
allegedly used to launder drug proceeds. These groups also appear to be
helping the Colombians move their drugs through the use of cargo
containers.
In Puerto Rico, on the other hand, there seems to be a subtle
increase of Nigerians who dedicate themselves to various financial
frauds and schemes. Additionally, during the past decade, the presence
of illegal Asians in Puerto Rico and the U.S.V.I. has been on the rise.
Regarding the Russian presence, intelligence compiled during the course
of an on-going DEA investigation has identified a criminal organization
operating in Puerto Rico and New York with direct ties to the Russian
Mafia.Specifically, the criminal organization operating in Puerto Rico
as well as the organization operating in New York, are purchasing
heroin from a source of supply in Romania and Kyrgystan. Payments are
wired through Western Union and the heroin is sent via United Parcel
Service parcels utilizing illegal aliens. Intelligence indicates the
source of supply has been in the business of bringing illegal aliens
into the United States.
Question 10. Without question the illicit drug trade has a negative
effect in countries used as transit points. Puerto Rico's murder rate,
much of its drug related, is reported to be the highest in the United
States or its possessions.
Answer 10. For a long time Puerto Rico was used mainly to transship
drugs to the U.S. by the Colombians. When the Dominicans started to
take over as contractors for the transportation of drugs, a greater
percentage of the cocaine made its way into the island of Puerto Rico.
Dominicans requested 20% to 30% of the loads as payment for their
services. The increased availability of drugs in Puerto Rico accounts
nowadays for approximately 90% of all the homicides perpetrated on the
island. However, corruption of government officials and police forces
is not as prevalent in Puerto Rico as in other island/nations within
the Caribbean corridor.
The Western Caribbean continues as the primary threat corridor for
non-commercial aircraft movement and go-fast activity. This is
primarily due to the lack of resources and corruption, especially
within the countries of Haiti and Jamaica, where certain government and
law enforcement officials are alleged to be involved in drug
trafficking. The economic upheaval these two countries are submerged
in, make any citizen a possible resource for the Colombians and other
local drug traffickers. Substantial amounts of U.S. currency go through
the Port-au-Prince International Airport and intelligence information
indicates that Jamaica is overwhelmingly being utilized for storing
drug shipments. Since the termination of Operation Frontier Lance II a
substantial increase in both seaborne and airborne narcotics smuggling
activities has been detected throughout the Western Caribbean corridor.
Lack of assets and advanced warning continues to be a significant gap,
hindering effective staging for detection, monitoring, and
interdiction.
Question 11. Cuba has been found to be a state which sponsors
terrorism. Do you think Cuba's involvement in drug trafficking is
simply a criminal enterprise or is it being used by the government to
raise currency to back terrorist actions?
Answer 11. DEA has no current information to suggest that senior
Cuban government officials are involved in the drug trade and/or
benefit from drug-related corruption. Furthermore, DEA has no
information that senior Cuban government officials have engaged in drug
trafficking to raise currency to back terrorist actions.
Question 12. In 1998, the Congress provided 60 additional DEA
agents for the Caribbean Division, although they were not requested in
the Presidents Budget. How many of these agents were assigned to work
outside of South Florida.
Answer 12. In 1998 the 60 additional agents were assigned as
follows: 19 agents assigned to the San Juan Divisional office, 40
agents assigned to the Miami Field Division, and one agent assigned to
DEA Headquarters, Domestic Operations Caribbean.
Question 13. What nations in the Caribbean need to either establish
or update extradition treaties with the United States?
Answer 13. Most of the nations in the Caribbean have established
extradition treaties with the United States, with the exception of
Haiti. Suriname has a treaty in place from previous Holland rule, but
will not extradite their nationals at this time. The Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba have functioning extradition treaties. Barbados and
all the eastern Caribbean states now have established extradition
treaties, with the most recent addition being Dominica. In 1998, the
Dominican Republic signed an extradition treaty with the United States
that is presently being put into action. 15 people have been extradited
from the Dominican Republic since the treaty took effect. Martinique,
Guadeloupe, the French side of St. Martin, St. Barthelemy, and French
Guiana are subject to French law and all international conventions
signed by France.
Question 14. The number of DEA wire intercepts in the Caribbean
increased from 0 in 1995 to 30 in 1998. Are these wire intercepts
proving effective and is their use continuing to expand?
Answer 14. In 1999, 36 wire intercepts were used, an increase of
six from 1998. Since 1995, there has been an increase of wire
intercepts every succeeding year. The use of the Title III wire tap is
an effective method to gather reliable information to prosecute
criminals and to obtain intelligence in furtherance of our drug
interdiction efforts.
Question 15. Narcotics trafficking has a tendency to breed
corruption and to serve as a cancer on good government. It can even act
as a destabilizing force on the government which is already in danger
of collapsing. Are there any nations in the Caribbean that you would
characterize as either having been turned into nations run by criminals
or that are in danger of becoming such.
Answer 15. Every nation/territory within the area of operation of
the CFD has experienced official corruption in one form or another as a
result of drug trafficking throughout the region. The situation in
Haiti stands out as particularly grim. With a history of smuggling
through the island of Hispaniola (shared by Haiti and the Dominican
Republic), the instability of the Haitian political system, and the
grinding poverty in which the majority of its citizens live, Colombian
traffickers have found fertile ground on which drug trafficking and
corruption can flourish.
Drug monies have corrupted Haitian society through the following
methods:
1. Financing of political campaigns. Intelligence has indicated
that major Haitian and Colombian traffickers have contributed large
sums of money to the campaigns of Haitian politicians throughout the
country. Investigations are continuing in order to ascertain to what
level the corruption has risen.
2. Corruption of Law Enforcement agents and personnel at the
airports and seaports. This form of corruption represents the most
visible form of official acquiescence, both passive and active, to drug
trafficking through Haiti. Low-level Haitian police agents have been
involved in transporting drug shipments that have been air-dropped over
land in Haiti as well as shipments that have arrived via go-fast
vessels. Law enforcement personnel have also served as escorts to
traffickers both in transporting drugs over land in Haiti as well as
through the Port-au-Prince International Airport. Allegations have
arisen as to law enforcement personnel serving as sources of
information for traffickers in regard to upcoming enforcement
operations. Investigations are continuing in order to ascertain to what
level the corruption has reached.
It is mainly the lack of resources dedicated to fighting drug
trafficking throughout Haiti that has made the nation so attractive to
Colombian traffickers. The vast, unpatrolled coastline and the
inadequate security measures at the two international airports have
often made official corruption unnecessary.
The Netherlands Antilles is another area in which official
corruption has been problematic. Allegations have arisen against low-
level enforcement personnel in relation to protected shipments arriving
via go-fast vessels and leaving via commercial air and go-fast vessels.
Law enforcement personnel have also served as sources of information
for the traffickers. Nevertheless, the Curacao Country Office reports
that excellent working relationships have developed with important
local counterparts.
The situation is similar in Jamaica, though drug-related corruption
in the area of political campaigns if rife. Traffickers are
particularly useful to police in the area of non-drug related crime.
Tourism is the most important industry in Jamaica and murders and
street crime with discourage vacations to the island. (The traffickers
often provide information to the police that helps them solve and
prevent crimes in the major north coast tourist resorts).
The traffickers have long had officials of the Jamaican
Constabulary Force (JCF) on their payrolls and they are often seen
having lunch together. This corruption ensures the traffickers are
aware of any potential actions against them and to potentially make
them aware of informants that they (the traffickers) may be dealing
with. While top officials to the JCF may not be tainted, the people
underneath them generally are, though not all of the same degree.
The traffickers have long been active in Jamaica's two main
political parties, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's
National Party (PNP). Many of the posses (drug gangs) of today started
as armed supporters and security personnel of the JLP and PNP. From
there it was a short step into the world of drug trafficking. The
posses are active abroad as well, in cities such as New York, London,
and Toronto. In addition, large scale traffickers generously donate
funds to both parties.
______
Responses of John C. Varrone to Questions From Senator Thurmond
Question 1. Cooperation from countries in the Caribbean is critical
to successful interdiction, especially given their limited resources.
In some of these countries, the United States does not have bilateral
treaties or agreements regarding counterdrug efforts, such as to enter
their waters. What is the status of efforts to achieve or strengthen
drug agreements with the Caribbean nations?
Answer 1. The primary tool used by the Customs Service to enhance
our working relationship with our counterparts in law enforcement in
the Caribbean is the Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC).
CCLEC was established in the early 1970s as an informal association of
Customs Administrations within the Caribbean region. Its principal
objective was the exchange of information on smuggling and helping the
smaller regional administrations adjust to the new threat of organized
drug trafficking through the region. In 1990, 28 members of the CCLEC
signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding mutual assistance and
cooperation for the prevention and repression of Customs offenses in
the Caribbean zone. Since that time, the membership of the CCLEC has
grown to 37 nations.
One of the early steps taken by the Council was the establishment
of the Caribbean Enforcement Network (CEN), which is a system that
supports the exchange of information between members. Each member has
nominated an Enforcement Liaison Officer (ELO) who is generally an
experienced enforcement or investigative officer at management level.
Enforcement communications and other activities are originated with the
ELO. In partnership with the World Customs Organization (WCO), the
Joint Intelligence Office (JIO) was created within the U.S. Customs
Service Communications Center in San Juan, Puerto Rico, to coordinate
all regional activity in the CEN and to serve as the communications
center of support for the ELOs.
CCLEC continues to assist its members in their counter-narcotics
efforts through the following current key projects:
The Regional Clearance System (RCS) is an information system which
monitors the movement of small vessels and aircraft in the region. The
aim of the project is to develop intelligence which will direct
enforcement activity and detect smuggling. Phase one of the training
and installation is underway.
The Regional Airport Anti-Smuggling Initiative (RAASI), which began
in 1996, addresses the smuggling threats at regional airports. This
drug trafficking through Caribbean airports, often involving Caribbean
nationals, poses a significant threat to communities in the region.
RAASI examines systems and controls currently in place at the major
Caribbean hub airports, identifies strengths and weaknesses, and
recommends the implementation of effective countermeasures.
Based on an agreement negotiated by the State Department, the
Customs Service has been operating from a forward operating location
(FOL) in Aruba, Netherlands Antilles, since April 1999. This important
FOL replaced our operation at Howard Air Force Base, Panama, which
closed in April 1999.
We also work with Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), a
joint DEA-Bahamian operation based in Nassau. Assets from the Miami or
Jacksonville Air and Marine Branches are launched when targets are
identified. We also have sent Senior Detection Systems Specialists to
our Embassy in Nassau on a TDY basis to help coordinate OPBAT
operations. Customs Service P-3 aircraft assist in tracking targets in
the Bahamian area. We have a large presence in Puerto Rico at the
Caribbean Air and Marine Branch (CAB) and its subordinate units as well
as at our Drug Intelligence Operations Center in Puntas Salinas, Puerto
Rico. The CAB works closely with the Puerto Rico Air National Guard.
Question 2. The General Accounting Office has often recommended
that counter narcotics agencies need to develop a centralized system
for recording and sharing lessons learned by various agencies while
conducting their operations. Do the federal agencies involved in
Caribbean interdiction operations have a formal arrangement for
recording information and sharing lessons learned?
Answer 2. Federal agencies involved in Caribbean interdiction
operations currently have effective informal methods for recording
information and sharing lessons learned. Following interagency
operations, Joint Interagency Task Force East conducts a debrief or
``hot wash'' at the action officer level to capture lessons learned. An
after action report that discusses important issues is distributed to
all law enforcement addresses.
High Intensity Drug Traffic Area (HIDTA) meetings are conducted
monthly in Puerto Rico to discuss law enforcement issues in Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. All federal law enforcement agencies, the
National Guard and United Forces of Rapid Response (FURA) or
Commonwealth police have representation.
Following joint operations such as Operation Bahamas, Turks and
Caicos (OPBAT), an after action report is drafted and distributed to
the participating agencies.
Question 3. While trafficking along the Southwest Border may have
diminished slightly, I do not think anyone would contend that we are in
a position to remove the considerable counterdrug assets located in
that region. That said, it is obvious that narcotics traffickers are
now looking to exploit the relatively open Caribbean to transport drugs
into the United States. My question to each of you is, ``How many more
assets are required to fight the flow of drugs in the Caribbean without
sacrificing the counterdrug infrastructure we have created on the
Southwest Boarder?''
Answer 3. There is clearly a need to strike a balance between
infrastructure needs in different regions that affect one another.
Several critical elements of the Caribbean counterdrug effort are
unique. With current estimates that as much as 90% of the cocaine flow
has a maritime component (airdrops to vessels or vessel transportation)
in the Caribbean, there is a shortage of modern Maritime Patrol
Aircraft (MPA).
The Customs Service operates detection and monitoring (D&M)
aircraft, interceptors, maritime patrol aircraft, and a variety of
vessels in the Caribbean. Our D&M assets are tasked to U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM), as are the Customs interceptor aircraft based in
Aruba. MPA, interceptor aircraft and vessels are assigned to Customs
Caribbean Air and Marine Branch. They are based at several locations in
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Additional assets and
personnel from other Air and Marine Branches continuously augment our
forces in the Caribbean.
The Customs Service has issued Requests for Information to industry
soliciting data on new MPA and multi-role interceptor aircraft.
Response from manufacturers was brisk, with several platforms in
production meeting the criteria specified. Customs is examining these
as replacements for aircraft in the existing fleet as part of our
comprehensive modernization plan. When complete, the effectiveness of
these replacement aircraft will allow us to safely and efficiently
protect the Continental United States as well as meet our expanding
obligations in the source and transit zones.
The Customs Service vessel inventory in the Caribbean is adequate
to meet our existing missions, but most of the vessels have exceeded
their serviceable life. As identified in the Customs Air and Marine
Interdiction Division comprehensive modernization plan, each type of
vessel in the current inventory has a serviceable life limit. In order
to ensure safe and efficient operation, replacement is required when
the vessel reaches its service life limit.
The Customs Service needs more vessel operators and aircraft
crewmembers in order to meet our current commitments and increase
operations in the Caribbean. The Customs Service has been recruiting to
fill existing vacancies and has a 5-year plan to increase the number of
vessel operators to accommodate an expanded maritime mission.
In order to meet our drug interdiction responsibilities in the
Caribbean, without sacrificing the counterdrug infrastructure we have
created on the Southwest Border, the Customs Service needs to:
Acquire new Maritime Patrol Aircraft;
Increase manpower to support Caribbean operations;
Acquire new multi-role interceptor aircraft; and
Acquire/refurbish replacement vessels.
Question 4. Would you please comment on what Caribbean nations are
cooperative and what nations are uncooperative in fighting drug
trafficking?
Answer 4. Based on our expertise and our interdiction perspective,
all of the Caribbean nations cooperate to some extent. Internal
politics and resources determine the amount of cooperation. Eradication
and interdiction operations have been conducted with many of the
Caribbean nations. Also, many have received training and equipment to
improve their counterdrug capabilities.
Because of political instability, Haiti has no credible law
enforcement interdiction response to airborne drug movements but allows
overflight of U.S. interdiction aircraft. The Haitian Coast Guard is
ineffective because it is limited to operations in the Bay of Gonave
and intelligence indicates that maritime drug smuggling occurs on the
southern coast of Haiti.
A weak economy has impaired the ability of the Cuban government to
effectively respond to the smuggling threat. U.S. Government aircraft
do not have overflight authority to transit Cuba or its territorial
waters but, Cuban border guards have responded to U.S. Coast Guard
requests to pursue smuggling vessels.
The Bahamian government has historically worked well with the
United States in fighting drug trafficking. When Howard AFB closed,
U.S. interdiction assets moved to Aruba and Curacao with minimal impact
to the operational tempo. The government of Trinidad and Tobago has
actively cooperated in fighting drug trafficking by sharing information
and participating in the United Counterdrug seminars.
Question 4a. Also, please address what effect Venezuela's refusal
to allow the United States overflight access, as well its general
resistance to our drug fighting efforts, is having on our ability to
pursue traffickers?
Answer 4a. The denial of Venezuelan overflight authorization for
Customs Service aircraft has significantly decreased successful end-
games in Colombia and has resulted in no end-games in Venezuela.
Interagency data indicates that South American airborne drug smugglers
are increasing their use of Venezuelan airspace during transits between
Colombia and the transit zone. Smugglers flying between Colombia and
other South American countries also routinely use Venezuelan airspace.
Some air smugglers have been observed using Venezuelan airstrips as
recovery points after completing drug shipments. Customs Service P-3
AEW aircraft patrolling in Colombia have often detected and tracked
aircraft entering Colombia from Venezuela. Those aircraft were observed
landing near the border, offloading and returning quickly to Venezuela.
Opportunities to gather intelligence and support Venezuelan counter-
drug programs were lost because requests for overflight were denied.
Question 5. I am concerned that we are not doing as good a job as
we could when it comes to strategic planning and information sharing.
What steps can we take to improve in these areas?
Answer 5. The Customs Service is an active participant in several
strategic planning mechanisms that we believe enhance the effectiveness
of our counter-drug operations. For instance, the Customs Service
participates in the annual and semi-annual joint planning conferences
hosted by the United States Interdiction Coordinator (USIC). As you
know, the Customs Service provides a substantial percentage of the
detection and monitoring assets that are deployed in the Source and
Transit Zones. These joint planning conferences provide strategic
guidance to agencies operating in the Source and Transit Zones to
insure that common goals are achieved.
More recently, the Customs Service has been working with other
agencies on the development of an Arrival Zone Interdiction Plan
(AZIP). A key element of the AZIP has been identified as the creation
of an Arrival Zone Interdiction Coordinator (AZIC). The AZIC will be
responsible for coordinating all of the interdiction operations in the
Arrival Zone and will complement the role of the USIC in the Source and
Transit Zones. The AZIC will be responsible for insuring that
interdiction operations in the Arrival Zone further the strategic goals
of the National Drug Control Strategy.
With respect to information sharing, the Customs Service is an
active participant in the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
intelligence coordination center in San Juan, Puerto Rico, which also
has representatives from the other law enforcement agencies in Puerto
Rico. In addition, the Customs Service has a full time liaison to both
the USIC and Joint Interagency Task Force (East).
Question 6. It seems that without having good information as to
when, where, and how drugs will be shipped, we are essentially
operating blindly. What steps can be taken to improve intelligence
gathering efforts in the source zone?
Answer 6. The Customs Service traditionally has relied on the
intelligence gathering efforts of the Drug Enforcement Administration
and the intelligence community all of whom have extensive networks and
responsibilities for collecting drug related intelligence overseas.
Customs has extensive relationships with DEA and the intelligence
community that facilitate the movement and exchange of intelligence on
activities in the Source and Transit Zones that may be of interest to
Customs.
More recently, The Customs Service has signed a new Memorandum of
Understanding with the DEA, under the auspices of the General
Counterdrug Intelligence Plan, that permits the placement of Customs
Service staffed foreign intelligence teams in DEA foreign offices.
Customs Service Foreign Intelligence teams are multidiscipline teams
that have the sole responsibility of collecting information on drug
smuggling in the countries where they are assigned. The Customs Service
is in the process of deploying these teams in the Source Zone to
collect intelligence and information that can be used by the Customs
Service for interdiction and enforcement purposes. The Customs Service
has fielded three pilot teams in the past 10 months, including two
teams to Mexico and one team to Ecuador.
The Source Zone continues to be a high priority for the Customs
Service particularly as it relates to information on impending drug
shipments and/or information that could assist Customs Service aircraft
in their efforts to detect and monitor ongoing drug operations. The
Customs Service will continue to actively purse information in the
Source Zone by pursuing all of its avenues of information including the
deployment of foreign intelligence teams.
Question 7. I understand that one of the trends law enforcement is
beginning to notice is the merging of criminal enterprises. For
example, in the past, one organization might smuggling drugs, while
another organization might smuggling migrants, but today, one
organization might smuggle both. What sort of merging of criminal
enterprises are you seeing in the Caribbean?
Answer 7. Our investigative and seizure activity has shown that
there has been a limited amount of expansion on the part of criminal
groups that have moved into new areas of criminal activity.
One recent example has been the expansion of Dominican smuggling
groups into Ecstasy smuggling to the United States. Our investigations
currently indicate that the Dominican Republic is being used as a
transit point for European origin Ecstasy that is being smuggled to the
United States. We have also recently documented an instance in which
Dominican smuggling groups have smuggled cocaine to Europe where it has
been exchanged for Ecstasy that was smuggled to the U.S.
We have also received periodic intelligence that Haitian cocaine
smuggling groups are also involved in smuggling illegal aliens to the
U.S. In a 1999 seizure in Fort Myers, Florida, Customs agents seized 56
pounds of cocaine and arrested five illegal aliens who had arrived on a
private aircraft from Haiti.
Question 8. What would you rank as your most important priorities
to counter the trafficking situation in the Caribbean?
Answer 8. Customs Air and Marine Interdiction Division has
addressed the following priorities to counter the trafficking situation
in the Caribbean:
Acquire new Maritime Patrol Aircraft;
Increase manpower to support Caribbean operations;
Acquire new multi-role interceptor aircraft; and
Acquire/refurbish replacement vessels.
With current estimates that as much as 90% of the cocaine flow has
a maritime component (airdrops to vessels or vessel transportation) in
the Caribbean, there is a shortage of modern Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA). The Customs Service currently operates a fleet of DOD surplus
aircraft converted for the maritime patrol mission. To enhance safety,
efficiency, and effectiveness, the Customs Air and Marine Interdiction
Division comprehensive modernization plan identifies the need for a
new, integrated maritime patrol aircraft.
The Customs Service needs more vessel operators and aircraft
crewmembers in order to meet our current commitments and enhance
operations in the Caribbean. Customs has been recruiting to fill
existing vacancies and has a 5-year plan to increase the number of
vessel operators to accommodate an expanded maritime mission.
The current Customs Service fleet of interceptor aircraft were
acquired an average of 13 years ago. Their primary mission was
detection and tracking of low and slow General Aviation targets common
to the Southwest Border. Changing smuggler profiles and tasking
throughout the source and transit zones have necessitated a
reevaluation of mission capabilities in our interceptor aircraft. To
enhance safety, efficiency, and effectiveness, the Customs Air and
Marine Interdiction Division comprehensive modernization plan
identifies the need for a new, multi-role interceptor aircraft.
The Customs Service vessel inventory is adequate to meet our
existing missions, but most of the vessels have exceeded their
serviceable life. As identified in the Customs Air and Marine
Interdiction Division comprehensive modernization plan, each type of
vessel in the current inventory has a serviceable life limit. In order
to ensure safe and efficient operation, replacement or refurbishment is
required when the vessel reaches its service life limit.
Question 9. Your agencies are having difficulty getting agents to
accept assignments in Puerto Rico. Would making Puerto Rico an overseas
assignment for agents help you meet your staffing needs in that
territory?
Answer 9. The Customs Service supports in concept the idea of
making Puerto Rico a foreign assignment in order to attract qualified
candidates to fill critical vacancies. Since there is not a
``diplomatic mission'' in Puerto Rico, designating the island as a
foreign post of duty may pose regulatory or legal obstacles.
In order to address recruitment and retention issues on a more
immediate basis, on March 13, 2000, Customs approved a Rotation Policy
for all of our hardship locations, including Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. Under this new policy, Office of Investigations
personnel who have been assigned to a hardship location for 3
continuous years are eligible for a government funded transfer to a
non-hardship location.
We have begun the implementation of this policy and have identified
approximately 130 Special Agents who are eligible for transfers under
the Policy. We have begun the process of initiating moves under the
policy, but we anticipate that, with current funding, it will take
several years to fully implement the policy and resolve the backlog of
moves.
In addition, all personnel assigned to Puerto Rico receive a 10
percent cost of living allowance and pay taxes to the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.
Question 10. I understand that the DOD wants Customs to take over
the Coronet Nighthawk program. Does Customs want to assume this mission
and what assets would you need to perform this operation?
Answer 10. The Customs Service would be willing to take over the
Coronet Nighthawk program if adequate funding is provided. We believe
that Customs assumption of the program would benefit the overall U.S.
counternarcotics program since it would allow us to cover the major
transshipment corridors in the Caribbean. We also hope that the removal
of F-16 military aircraft from Curacao would result in Venezuela
reconsidering its position on the issue of overflight clearance. As an
interim measure, we would perform the mission using aircraft already in
our inventory with TDY crews. However, to perform this mission
effectively on a permanent basis, we would require funding for a number
of items. These include:
Purchase two replacement multi-role interceptor aircraft;
Hire 14 new personnel (3 crews);
Upgrade and expand our facility at Aruba;
Maintenance support; and
PCS costs.
Question 11. What are Customs current marine and aviation assets
operating in the Caribbean area and have these numbers gone up or down
in the last 10 years?
Answer 11. At the current time, we have 27 vessels, including 15
interceptors and 8 utility, as well as 10 aircraft assigned to the
Caribbean Air and Marine Branch and its subordinate units. We should
also point our that personnel and assets from other Air and Marine
Branches are used to augment our efforts in the Caribbean as required.
The majority of this additional support comes from the Miami and
Jacksonville Air and Maine Branches. In February 2000, the Customs
Services began P-3 operations from Jacksonville, Florida, resulting in
increased radar coverage in the Caribbean region. There has been a
significant increase in the number of Customs assets and personnel
assigned to the Caribbean region over the last 10 years. The Caribbean
Air and Marine Branch, which was established in 1986 as a 2-man unit,
because a branch in 1992 and the assets and personnel allocated to that
location have grown steadily ever since. The number of vessels assigned
to the Caribbean area has risen from 11 in 1990 to the current 27.
Although the number of vessels assigned to the Caribbean is adequate
for the current tasking, many of these vessels have exceeded their
serviceable life limit and must be refurbished or replaced.
Question 12. How will trade agreements between the United States
and Caribbean nations impact efforts to fight drug trafficking?
Answer 12. The overall impact of trade agreements in the Caribbean,
or anywhere else, will be to increase the flow of goods from Caribbean
countries to the U.S. From the Customs Service perspective, this means
that we will be faced with an increase in the volume of cargo that
passes through our custody and control and, therefore, the opportunity
to smuggle will increase. In order to minimize the ability for drug
smugglers to exploit this opportunity, however, we are engaged in a
number of programs that focus on working with private industry to
reduce the possibility that legitimate cargo can be compromised by drug
smugglers.
Under the auspices of our industry Partnerships Program, for
example, the Customs Service provides training and conducts site
surveys for transportation companies and foreign manufacturers in order
to enhance their internal controls so that drug smugglers cannot
introduce drug into otherwise legitimate cargo.