[Senate Hearing 106-1093]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1093
JUNE 10, 1999 OLYMPIC PIPE LINE ACCIDENT
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 13, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Martha P. Allbright, Republican General Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 13, 2000................................... 1
Statement of Senator Gorton...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Witnesses
Asmundson, Mark, Mayor, Bellingham, Washington................... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Brabec, Bruce.................................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Chipkevich, Robert, Director, Office of Pipeline and Hazardous
Material Safety, National Transportation Safety Board.......... 82
Prepared statement........................................... 84
Corso, Mary, State Fire Marshal, Olympia, Washington............. 90
Prepared statement........................................... 93
Dalen, Katherine................................................. 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Felder, Richard B., Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline
Safety, Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation................................... 77
Prepared statement........................................... 79
Gast, Carl, Manager and Vice President, Olympic Pipe Line
Company, Renton, Washington.................................... 102
Prepared statement........................................... 105
Harper, Susan, Executive Director, Cascade Columbia Alliance,
Seattle, Washington............................................ 136
Hoggard, Calvin, City Manager, SeaTac, Washington................ 55
Prepared statement........................................... 57
King, Frank...................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Locke, Hon. Gary, Governor, State of Washington.................. 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Marshall, Connie, Deputy Mayor, Bellevue, Washington............. 52
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Matsuyama, W. Brian, Chairman and CEO, Cascade Natural Gas
Corporation, on behalf of the Local Distribution Companies of
Washington State............................................... 120
Prepared statement........................................... 122
Murray, Hon. Patty, U.S Senator from Washington.................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Robinson, Marlene................................................ 23
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Showalter, Marilyn, Chairwoman, Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission, Olympia, Washington................. 65
Prepared statement........................................... 67
Sluder, Robert L., Vice President, Williams Gas Pipeline-West,
Salt Lake City, Utah........................................... 110
Prepared statement........................................... 113
Stohr, Joe, Spill Program Manager, Department of Ecology,
Olympia, Washington............................................ 73
Prepared statement........................................... 75
Tanner, Jesse, Mayor, Renton, Washington......................... 45
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Weimer, Carl, Executive Director, on behalf of Safe Bellingham,
Bellingham, Washington......................................... 130
Prepared statement........................................... 132
Appendix
Joint Prepared Statement of Harriet A. Spanel, State Senator,
40th District and Kelli Linville, State Representative, 42nd
District, Washington........................................... 143
Montonye, James Terrence, Technical Program Director for the
SPIE, International Society of Optical Engineering, prepared
statement...................................................... 145
Written questions submitted by Hon. Patty Murray to:
Carl Gast.................................................... 143
JUNE 10, 1999 OLYMPIC PIPE LINE ACCIDENT
----------
MONDAY, MARCH 13, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Bellingham, WA
Hearing held pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. at City Hall,
210 Lottie Street, Bellingham, Washington, Hon. Slade Gorton,
presiding.
Staff members assigned to this hearing: Ann Begeman and
Charlotte Casey, Republican Professional Staff; Carl Bentzel,
Democratic Senior Counsel; and Debbie Hersman, Democratic
Professional Staff.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Gorton. I'm both honored and humbled to be here
today with my colleague, Senator Murray, to conduct this field
hearing on the Bellingham pipeline accident. This provides us
with an opportunity not only to commemorate the three young
citizens of Bellingham who lost their lives last June 10th, but
to learn from and apply the lessons of that day to the
reauthorization of the Federal Pipeline Safety Act.
This is a formal hearing of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the rules of the
Senate and the Senate committees are much more restrictive than
what most of you are accustomed to in public hearings. Only
witnesses who have been invited to testify may do so.
Nevertheless, the point of the hearing is to obtain information
and opinions that will inform and instruct the full Commerce
Committee in its work on revising the Federal law. So I invite
anyone who is interested to submit written comments to the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
within the next 10 days. Those written comments will be made a
part of the record of these proceedings. Because I'm here to
listen rather than to talk, and given the length of the witness
list, I hope these comments will be brief.
Until three young men were killed in a devastating liquid
pipeline explosion in Bellingham last year, most of us paid
little or no attention to pipeline safety. The tragic events of
June 10th changed that. While pipelines continue to be the
safest means of transporting liquid fuels and gas, and though
accidents may be infrequent and the more than two million miles
of pipelines in the United States often invisible, Bellingham
has shown us that pipelines pose potential dangers that we
ignore at our peril.
State government, local governments and citizen groups in
this state lost no time in answering the wake-up call from
Bellingham and examining what they could do to improve pipeline
safety. What they found was that while there are significant
actions Washington can take to prevent and respond to
accidents, such as improving the state's ``call before you
dig'' requirements, increasing public awareness and training
emergency response personnel, there is a lot the state cannot
do with respect to prescribing safety standards, because this
area is preempted by Federal statute.
In that light, I believe that Congress has an absolute
obligation substantively to revise the Federal statute. To this
end I advised my colleagues on the Commerce Committee last year
that I intended to be actively involved in the reauthorization
process this year, and my staff and I have spent considerable
time talking to and meeting with people in Washington State and
with Federal regulators and industry representatives about what
should be in these revisions.
Last week I cosponsored a bill, S. 2004, introduced by
Senator Murray, to amend the Pipeline Safety Act. Though we
still have a lot more listening to engage in, I feel the bill's
fundamental direction is correct, and I hope that the hearing
today will help us significantly in refining the bill.
Based on what I've heard to date, I'm committed to seeking
the following changes in Federal law: First, I will support
efforts to allow states greater authority to adopt and enforce
safety standards for interstate pipelines, particularly in
light of the absence of meaningful Federal standards. While
there may be good arguments for why pipelines should be managed
systemically, and why inconsistent state restrictions could
erode rather than promote safety, these arguments are fatally
undermined by the absence of meaningful Federal standards. To
tell state and local governments as the Pipeline Safety Act
effectively does, that they cannot require internal inspections
of pipelines passing through their communities, under their
schools and homes and senior centers when the development of
Federal safety requirements is years overdue strikes me as the
worse kind of Federal conceit. This increase in authority
should be accompanied by an increase of grants to states to
carry out pipeline safety activities.
Second, I agree with Senator Murray that we need to improve
the collection and dissemination of information about pipelines
to the public and the local and state officials responsible for
preventing and responding to pipeline accidents. We also need
to ensure that operators are collecting information necessary
to assess accurately the risks of the particular line and are
responding appropriately to these risks. State and local
governments as well as the public should be informed about
where pipelines are, what condition they are in, when they
fail, and why they fail.
That said, inundating people with unwanted technical detail
may lead them to ignore it entirely and may not be the best way
of meeting the public's right to know. We should, however,
ensure that relevant information is gathered and made available
over widely accessible means like the Internet.
Third, in addition to providing an explicit mechanism for
states to seek additional regulatory authority over interstate
pipelines, Federal legislation must ensure that meaningful
standards for pipeline testing, monitoring and operation are
adopted at the national level. Congress has directed the
department of transportation to do some of this in the past,
but as I mentioned before, some of the rulemakings are years
overdue. To the extent that lack of funding can account for
some of the delay, we should ensure additional appropriations
to allow the Office of Pipeline Safety to complete the
necessary rulemakings and to develop the technology needed to
conduct reliable tests of pipelines.
In addition to ensuring that the Office of Pipeline Safety
offers meaningful national standards, I agree with the
recommendation of the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General that the Office of Pipeline Safety should act upon,
either to accept or to reject, the recommendations of the
National Transportation Safety Board. I don't pretend to know
whether the Board's recommendations that have been accumulating
for years will advance safety. It's unacceptable, however, for
the Office of Pipeline Safety simply to ignore them.
Fourth, I have heard from citizens' groups who support the
creation of a model oversight oil spill advisory panel in
Washington State. I see real value in creating such a body and
imbuing it with meaningful authority not only to respond but to
initiate the development of pipeline safety measures.
As I said earlier, however, the purpose of this hearing is
not to lecture but to learn. Senator Murray is here with me,
and I think we can both say that Congressman Metcalf and
Congressman Inslee and other members of our congressional
delegation would have liked to be here. The House,
unfortunately, is in session this week and while we're in
recess, they're in Washington, D.C. With that, I defer to
Senator Murray for her opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Senator Gorton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Slade Gorton, U.S. Senator from Washington
I am honored to be here today with my colleague Senator Murray to
conduct this field hearing on the Bellingham pipeline accident. This is
an opportunity not only to commemorate the three young citizens of
Bellingham who lost their lives last June 10th, but to learn from and
apply the lessons of that day to the reauthorization of the federal
Pipeline Safety Act. The rules of the Commerce Committee of the United
States Senate, under the auspices of which this hearing is being
conducted, regrettably are far more restrictive than what most of you
are used to from public hearings. Only witnesses who have been invited
to testify may do so. Since the point of this hearing is to obtain
information and opinions that will inform the full Commerce Committee
in its work on revising federal law, however, I invite anyone who is
interested to submit written comments to the Committee within 10 days.
Your written comments will be made a part of the record of these
proceedings.
Because I am here to listen rather than talk, and given the length
of the witness list, I will keep my comments brief.
Until three young men were killed in a devastating liquid pipeline
explosion in Bellingham, Washington, last year, most of us paid little
or no attention to pipeline safety. The tragic events of June 10, 1999,
changed that. While pipelines continue to be the safest means of
transporting liquid fuels and gas, and though accidents may be
infrequent and the more than two million miles of pipelines in the
U.S., often invisible, Bellingham has shown us that pipelines pose
potential dangers that we ignore at our peril.
State government, local government, and citizen groups in this
state lost no time in answering the wake-up call from Bellingham and
examining what they could do to improve pipeline safety. What they
found was that while there are significant actions Washington can take
to prevent and respond to accidents, such as improving the state's
call-before-you-dig requirements, increasing public awareness, and
training emergency response personnel, there is a lot the state cannot
do with respect to prescribing safety standards because this area is
preempted by federal law.
In light of this, I believe that Congress has an absolute
obligation substantively to revise this federal law. To this end, I
advised my colleagues on the Commerce Committee last year that I
intended to be actively involved in the reauthorization process this
year, and my staff and I have spent considerable time talking to and
meeting with people in Washington state and with federal regulators and
industry representatives about what should be in these revisions. Last
week I co-sponsored a bill, S. 2004, introduced by Senator Murray to
amend the Pipeline Safety Act. Though we still have a lot more
listening to do, I feel the bill's fundamental direction is right and I
hope that the hearing today will help us significantly in refining the
measure.
Based on what I have heard to date, I am committed to seeking the
following changes in federal law:
First, I support efforts to allow states greater authority to adopt
and enforce safety standards for interstate pipelines, particularly in
light of the absence of meaningful federal standards. While there may
be good arguments for why pipelines should be managed systemically and
why inconsistent state prescriptions could erode rather than promote
safety, these arguments are fatally undermined by the absence of
meaningful federal standards. To tell state and local governments, as
the Pipeline Safety Act effectively does, that they cannot require
internal inspections of pipelines passing through their communities,
under their schools and homes and senior centers, when the development
of federal safety requirements is years overdue, strikes me as the
worst kind of federal conceit. This increase in authority should be
accompanied by an increase in grants to states to carry out pipeline
safety activities.
Second, I agree with Senator Murray that we need to improve the
collection and dissemination of information about pipelines to the
public and to local and state officials responsible for preventing and
responding to pipeline accidents. We also need to ensure that operators
are collecting information necessary to assess accurately the risks to
the particular line and are responding appropriately to these risks.
State and local governments as well as the public should be informed
about where pipelines are, what condition they are in, when they fail
(we need to lower the threshold for reporting failures), and why they
fail. That said, inundating people with unwanted technical detail may
lead them to ignore it entirely and may not be the best way of meeting
the public's right to know. We should, however, ensure that relevant
information is gathered and made available over widely accessible means
like the Internet.
Third, in addition to providing an explicit mechanism for states to
seek additional regulatory authority over interstate pipelines, federal
legislation must ensure that meaningful standards for pipeline testing,
monitoring, and operation are adopted at the national level. Congress
has directed the DOT to do some of this in the past, but as I mentioned
before, some of the rulemakings are years overdue. To the extent that
lack of funding can account for some of the delay we should ensure
sufficient appropriations to allow OPS to complete the necessary
rulemakings and develop the technology needed to conduct reliable tests
of pipelines.
In addition to ensuring that OPS adopts meaningful national
standards, I agree with the recommendation of the DOT's Inspector
General that OPS should act upon, either to reject or accept, the
recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board. I don't
pretend to know whether NTSB's recommendations, that have been
accumulating for years, will advance safety. It is unacceptable,
however, that OPS simply ignore them.
Fourth, I have heard from citizens' groups who support the creation
of a model oversight oil spill advisory panel in Washington state. I
see a real value in creating such a body, and imbuing it with
meaningful authority not only to respond to but to initiate the
development of pipeline safety measures.
As I said earlier, however, the purpose of this hearing is not to
lecture but to learn. That said, I invite my colleague, Senator
Murray's, opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. PATTY MURRAY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Murray. Thank you very much to Senator Gorton for
calling this hearing and lending your leadership to this very
important cause.
I also want to thank all of the panelists who have come
here today who are taking their time to testify on this very
important issue. I'm looking forward to hearing all of their
comments.
Today's hearing is one more step in a process to make
pipelines safer and certainly has been a group effort. I want
to first commend you Mayor Mark Asmundson for the tremendous
amount of work you have done. He's done more than anybody I
know to educate the public about this issue and to call for
higher safety standards, and we all thank you for your
tremendous amount of work.
I also want to take this opportunity to thank
Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater for his sensitivity and
his quick response to me in positioning a pipeline inspector
here in the State of Washington.
I also want to thank Governor Locke for convening a task
force in response to this accident, and also to your
representatives, Kelli Linville and Harriet Spanel, who are
here today and the tremendous work that they've done in this
session of the legislature to move this issue forward, but most
of all, I would like to really express my appreciation and
gratitude to the families of the victims who are here today. I
can't imagine how difficult it must be to live with this
tragedy, and I want to applaud the courage all of you have
shown all of us.
I want to tell the families that are here today that I will
not stop working until we have changed our nation's laws to
makes it less likely that another family will experience your
loss. We owe all of you at least that much.
I wish that we didn't have to be here today. I wish this
community was whole again. I wish that June 10th, 1999, was
just another pleasant summer day instead of a black mark in all
of our memory.
I remember that day well when my sister, who lives here in
Bellingham and works at Shuksan Middle School, called me within
hours after the accident to tell me frantically what had
occurred here. I couldn't imagine the loss that she was
describing and the scenes that she was describing.
When I came here to Bellingham a few weeks later and saw
what had occurred, I was just absolutely amazed. One and a half
miles of creek side was reduced to ashes in an instant. A
salmon spawning ground that I was actually supposed to dedicate
just a few weeks after the accident was nothing but an
environmental disaster area.
When I first started looking at this, I thought that the
Bellingham disaster was a freak, a fluke, something that hardly
ever happened. I have been amazed to find out as I've started
to investigate this issue at what I have been astonished to
learn.
We have a map here that shows a sampling, a sampling of
some of the major pipeline accidents that have occurred in the
last 20 years. It shows you how far reaching this problem is. I
want to tell you some of the statistics.
Since 1986, 14 years ago, there have been 5,700 pipeline
accidents, 5,700 accidents in the last 14 years. These
accidents have killed 325 people and have injured another 1,500
people. They have shattered communities from coast to coast,
and there are literally hundreds of Bellinghams out there that
have happened and hundreds more waiting to happen.
On average there is one reported pipeline spill in our
country every single day. These accidents have destroyed
families like they have here in Bellingham, and they have
destroyed our environment. Each year six million gallons of
hazardous liquids are released. That's like having an oil spill
the size of the Exxon Valdez every 2 years. This environmental
damage has been estimated to cost almost a billion dollars in
the last 14 years.
Now, it's true, and we all know that pipelines offer one of
the safest ways to move these hazardous materials.
Statistically, they are much safer than using trucks or barges,
and all of us rely on the pipelines to bring us the fuel we
need to heat our homes and power our cars, but none of us
should accept the status quo.
Unfortunately, efforts to improve safety have not worked.
Recent events tell the story. In 1997 we witnessed the third
highest net loss of material since the Office of Pipeline
Safety began keeping records. 1998 was the worse year for
property damage, and 1999 was tied for the second worse year in
fatalities. The changes that have been made so far have not
worked, and we must do more. In fact, environmentalists and the
National Transportation Safety Board have been complaining
about safety problems and lax regulations for years. Specific
recommendations from NTSB have gone unheeded and ignored for
more than a decade, and I find that unacceptable. That's why a
few months ago I asked the Inspector General of the Department
of Transportation to investigate the policies and practices of
the Office of Pipeline Safety.
On last Friday, I received the inspector general's final
report. Not surprisingly they were critical of the lack of
pipeline regulation and called on Congress to force the Office
of Pipeline Safety to issue long overdue safety rules. The
report also notes that had we need significant investments in
research and development to better test and inspect our
pipelines.
To date the Office of Pipeline Safety has failed to address
congressional mandates in training, testing and other key
areas. While I'm pleased that had they have recently committed
to fulfilling our congressional requirements, I want them to
know that they have to follow through on this commitment. I
believe that we can and must do better, and the time to act is
now.
I want to make sure that we don't just talk about making
pipeline safety. We need to make pipelines safer. That's why
last January after researching this issue for a number of
months, I wrote and introduced a bill that will make changes to
improvement the pipeline safety in this country. My bill has
in-depth testimony that, Mr. Chairman, I will submit for the
record, but basically it expands state authority, and improve
inspection practices and prevention practices. I was shocked to
find out that we only require inspection of these pipelines
when they're first laid. We in our bill require them to be
routinely inspected at least every 5 years, more if the
geography of the region requires it. We invest in new safety
technology. We have not done enough to improve the safety
technology to inspect these pipelines. It expands the public's
right to know. Everybody that lives or works or goes to school
near these pipelines has a right to know when they were last
inspected, what was found and what has been done to repair the
pipes, and finally we increased the funding to improve pipeline
safety. I have been working closely with Congressmen Metcalf
and Inslee and other House members and along with Sentor
Gorton, and I believe that we have to act this year in this
session of Congress before another tragedy occurs.
In closing let me say that we cannot undue what happened
here last June. We still don't know why it happened, but we can
learn from it, and we can change the law so it doesn't happen
again. I hope that in the coming days and weeks we can work
together to put the lessons of the Bellingham tragedy into
Federal law. Never again should our children be afraid to play
outside. Never again should our environment be scarred by
pipeline disasters, and never again should another community
suffer what Bellingham has gone through this past year. Our
work will only be done when families can feel confident that
the pipelines near their homes are safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Murray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Patty Murray, U.S. Senator from Washington
I want to thank my colleague, Senator Gorton, for calling this
hearing and for lending his leadership to this important cause. Let me
also thank our panelists for coming today. I'm eager to hear your
comments. I'm going to take what I learn from all of you today back
with me to the Senate and use it as we work to change the law.
Today's hearing is one more step in a process to make pipelines
safer, and this has certainly been a group effort.
I'd like to thank Mayor Asmundson. He has done more
than anyone I know to educate the public about pipeline safety
and to call for higher safety standards.
I want to thank Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater
for his sensitivity and for his quick response in stationing a
pipeline inspector here in Washington state last year.
And I'd like to thank Governor Locke for convening his
task force in response to the accident.
But most of all, I'd like to show my appreciation to the families
of the victims for being here today. I can't imagine how difficult it
must be to live with this tragedy, and I applaud the courage you have
shown us all.
I want to tell the families that I will not stop working until we
have changed our nation's laws to make it less likely that another
family will experience your loss. We owe you at least that much.
I wish we didn't have to be here today. I wish this community were
whole again. I wish June 10, 1999 was just another pleasant summer
day--instead of a black mark in our memory.
I'll never forget how I first heard about the explosion. That
evening, I stepped off a plane from Washington, D.C. into Sea-Tac
airport, and my cell phone started ringing almost immediately.
It was my twin sister, who lives here in Bellingham where she works
as a middle school teacher.
Her voice was frantic. She said, ``Patty, have you heard? Our whole
world just blew up!''
At first, I didn't know what she was talking about. Then she told
me that a pipeline running directly under the parking lot of her school
had blown up. It was just a block away from her classroom, and it took
place just hours after the last student had left.
The explosion rocked the school. Since it happened in the weeks
just after Columbine, many teachers raced from their classroom fearing
the worst. Instead, they encountered a nightmare of a different sort--a
hailstorm of burning branches falling into their school parking lot,
singeing their clothing and leaving them in fear.
I know I don't have to recount the events of that day for any of
you. You experienced them and were shaped by them, and many of you have
shared your own stories with me.
I came to Bellingham a short time after the accident, and I was
amazed at the wreckage I saw:
One and a half miles of creek side were reduced to
ashes in an instant.
A salmon spawning ground I was to have dedicated a few
weeks later had been turned into an environmental disaster
area.
At first, I thought the explosion was a fluke--something that
hardly ever happened. But then I started to investigate the issue, and
I was astonished by what I learned.
This map shows a sampling of some of the major pipeline accidents
in the past 20 years. It gives you a sense of how far reaching the
problem is.
Now I'd like to point out some statistics that show the frequency
of pipeline accidents.
Since 1986:
There have been more than 5,700 pipeline accidents--
5,700.
These accidents have killed 325 people and have
injured another 1,500 people.
They have shattered communities from coast to coast.
There are literally hundreds of ``Bellinghams'' out there, and
there are hundreds more waiting to happen.
On average, there is one reported pipeline spill in
our country every day.
Not only have these accidents destroyed families, they have
destroyed the environment. Each year, 6 million gallons of hazardous
liquid are released. That's like having an oil spill the size of the
Exxon Valdez disaster every two years. This environmental damage has
been estimated to cost almost $1 billion.
Now it is true pipelines offer the safest way to move these
hazardous materials around. Statistically, they are much safer than
using trucks or barges. And each of us relies on pipelines to bring us
the fuel we need to heat our homes and power our cars. But none of us
should accept the status quo.
Unfortunately, efforts to improve safety haven't worked. Recent
events tell the story:
1997 witnessed the third-highest net loss of material
since the Office of Pipeline Safety--or OPS--began keeping
records.
1998 was the worst year for property damage.
And 1999 was tied for the second-worst year in
fatalities. The changes made so far have not worked. We must do
more.
In fact, environmentalists and the National Transportation Safety
Board--the NTSB--have been complaining about safety problems and lax
regulation for years. Specific recommendations from NTSB have gone
unheeded and ignored for more than a decade. I find that unacceptable.
That's why a few months ago I asked the Inspector General of the
Department of Transportation to investigate the policies and practices
of the Office of Pipeline Safety.
On Friday, I received the Inspector General's final report. Not
surprisingly they were critical of the lack of pipeline regulation and
called on Congress to force OPS to issue long-overdue safety rules. The
report also noted we need significant investments in research and
development to better test and inspect pipelines.
To date, the Office of Pipeline Safety has failed to address
congressional mandates in training, testing and other key areas. While
I'm pleased that recently they have committed to fulfilling these
congressional requirements, I want them to know they must follow
through on their commitment. I believe we can and must do better. And
the time to act is now.
I want to make sure that we don't just talk about making pipelines
safer. We need to actually make pipelines safer. That's why in January,
after researching the issue for several months, I wrote and introduced
a bill that will make the changes we need to improve pipeline safety.
My bill, which is number S. 2004, is called the Pipeline Safety Act
of 2000. I introduced it on January 26th. I appreciate Senator Gorton's
support of my bill. I'm also pleased Senators Inouye, Lautenberg, and
Bayh have co-sponsored my bill as well.
To gain support for this effort, I went door-to-door and met with
many of my colleagues. I told them your stories, and I showed them
pictures of Bellingham's pipeline explosion. Then I showed them the
statistics and counted off the number of accidents that happened in
their own home states.
Few other senators knew much about pipeline safety. Those
discussions showed me that for too long, pipeline dangers have been
``out of sight, and out of mind.''
In preparing my bill, I looked at a lot of different ideas. I also
reached out to industry groups, federal oversight officials, and local
officials. I designed my bill to address five problem areas, and I'd
like to spend a moment to review how my bill will address these
problems.
Expand State Authority
The first way to improve pipeline safety is to give states more
authority to oversee pipelines. Unfortunately, states have been
virtually shut out of the process when it comes to regulating
interstate pipelines.
While interstate activities are the responsibility of the federal
government, states should be partners in preventing and responding to
accidents. Ideally, states should be able to test and inspect pipelines
within their boundaries if they have the expertise and resources to do
so.
States like Washington and Virginia have asked for this authority.
Other states have received notice that their authority is being
stripped from them.
My bill would establish a process that would make it much more
difficult for OPS to disapprove or withdraw a state's authority. My
bill would give states the ability to address any objections by OPS
before their authority is rejected or withdrawn. So the first step in
our efforts is to empower states to be partners in the safety process.
Improve Inspection and Prevention Practices
The next thing we can do to make pipelines safer is to improve
pipeline testing. Many pipelines are decades old, and they haven't been
inspected since they were first put into the ground. I find that
unacceptable. I've talked to many companies that do a good job of
testing their pipelines. Unfortunately, the industry has an
inconsistent record.
We must ensure pipeline operators are properly testing their
pipelines for corrosion, leaks and other problems. That's why we need
strong testing and inspection standards. These should include mandatory
periodic internal testing, valve monitoring, the use of reliable leak
detection devices, and other preventive activities.
For this to work, the operators must be required to take specific
action when they discover problems. My bill would require periodic
testing at least every five years with an option of more frequent
testing if required.
Certification
As we test pipelines, we should make sure the people operating and
inspecting them have the skills and training they need. In other fields
affecting public safety--such as aviation--we have procedures in place
to ensure that the people we depend on are properly trained and
qualified. My bill would require individual certification of pipeline
operators.
Invest In New Safety Technology
Another way to make pipelines safer is to develop the best tools to
find problems in pipelines before those problems turn into disasters.
Investing in the research and development of new testing and inspection
devices may well be the best thing we could do to improve safety.
The lack of good technology is surprising. I didn't know that for
many pipelines there are no devices available to do the type of testing
that is needed. I was also surprised to learn that hydrostatic testing
can have serious side-effects, such as stressing pipes and creating
wastewater that is costly to dispose of. Many of our most dangerous
pipelines--natural gas lines--bend and move in ways that make it
impossible for any internal inspection device to accurately detect
internal corrosion.
I've been told by OPS and industry representatives that there is
some progress toward new technologies to detect problems in all
pipelines. That is why my bill encourages more money for research and
development, and today, I call on industry to partner with OPS in
developing these new technologies.
Public Right To Know
Another way we can reduce the risk of pipeline tragedies is to
expand the public's right to know about pipeline hazards. Too many
communities are in the dark about what is going on with the pipelines
that run under their homes, by their places of work and near their
schools.
My bill has a very strong ``right to know'' provision that would
require operators to inform state, local, and neighboring residents
when there are problems with a pipeline. My bill requires companies to
provide summaries of testing and inspection data, and my bill makes
them tell us what they are doing to correct problems. Current law
provides the public with little opportunity to learn what is happening
around them. Without new federal legislation, we'll continue to be left
in the dark about possible hazards.
Increase Funding to Improve Pipeline Safety
A final key step we must take is to make sure we have the money to
improve pipeline safety. It does no good to pass new safety rules
unless we also provide the money to carry them out. My bill provides
funding for new state and federal pipeline safety programs. Those are
the five key areas my bill will address.
Changing the Law
The next question is: how do we take these ideas and actually put
them into law?
First, in Washington, D.C. the Commerce Committee needs to debate a
pipeline safety bill. Senator Gorton is on the Commerce Committee, and
I look forward to working with him to ensure that a bill is marked up
this year.
I've asked for consideration of a bill. I'm pleased that Senator
Inouye from Hawaii--who is the senior Democrat on the subcommittee of
jurisdiction--has called for a hearing and mark-up as well.
I've also personally asked the Secretary of Transportation and the
Administration to present their proposal to the Hill. They need to do
it very soon. Without meaningful federal legislation, whatever
temporary measures we institute will not protect us in the long-run.
I'd also like to mention the legislation that Representatives
Metcalf and Inslee have introduced in the House. Their measure is
similar to my bill, and I have been asking people to support it. I hope
it passes in the House.
In the end, we have learned many lessons from Bellingham and the
5,700 accidents around the country. We have a good idea of what needs
to be done. We need greater state involvement, more testing, better
testing devices, and we need to compel OPS to act on congressional
directives and give them the tools to enforce the law.
Today must not be the last day of our work to make pipelines safer.
Today must be the start. And our work will only be done when we have
passed a bill that addresses these critical safety issues. Again, I
thank my esteemed colleague Sen. Gorton for bringing us together today
to work on this issue.
In closing, let me say we can't undo what happened in June. We
still don't know why it happened. But we can learn from it and we can
change the law so it doesn't happen again.
I hope that in the coming days and weeks we can work together to
put the lessons of the Bellingham tragedy into federal law.
Never again should our children be afraid to play
outside.
Never again should our environment be scarred by
pipeline disasters.
And never again should another community suffer what
Bellingham has suffered.
Our work will only be done when families can feel confident that
the pipelines near their homes are safe.
Thank you.
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Senator Murray. We will first
hear from the families of the victims of last June 10th, Mary
and Frank King, Edward Williams and Katherine Dalen, Marilyn
Robinson and Bruce Brabec. There are seats for all six of you
up here.
Mr. and Mrs. King, you may start. We--whenever you have
written testimony, it is, of course, a part of the record, but
in the case of each of you, we're going to let you speak as you
will, understanding the very difficult nature of your coming
here in public today to do this. So take your time and tell us
what you believe we need to hear.
STATEMENT OF FRANK KING
Mr. King. My name is Frank King. This is my wife, Mary, and
my 10-year old son died as a result of burns over 90 percent of
his body, along with Stephen Tsiorvas, and Liam Wood was
overcome by gas fumes and drowned.
I want to correct a quote in the Seattle Times that was
made today that I do not hold Olympic Pipeline responsible for
my son's or Stephen Tsiorvas' or Liam Wood's death.
Unequivocally their negligence, their gross recklessness caused
my son to die and Stephen Tsiorvas and Liam Wood to die.
My family wants to thank all of Whatcom County and our
friends, our relatives, the rest of the families that were
involved in this, because without them we could not have gotten
through this horrible, horrific ordeal.
We have received so much support from our community that it
is absolutely unfathomable. We live in a nice, nice place. I
wouldn't wish the grief and anguish that I felt over the last 9
months on my worst enemy. It takes 9 months for a fetus to
mature in a mother's womb, and it's been 9 months now, and I
wish that I had the words so that I could make you feel how we
actually feel, because before this happened to me, I can
honestly say I had no idea how it felt.
I want to thank Senator Murray and Senator Gorton for their
efforts in going forth with this. I also want you to know that
I've talked with Jay Inslee. I've talked with Jack Metcalf's
office, and I appreciate their efforts, and I'm sure that we're
going in the right direction. I want to make sure that this
kind of accident never happens again.
You, as part of the Federal Government, have two problems.
You've got an industry that regulates itself. All you have to
do is look at the article that I put in your briefing there
about Koch Industries. Koch Industries was fined 35 million
dollars by the Department of Energy and what the DOE found out
in the investigation was they found the weak spots in their
pipe the easy way. They let them break, and then to boot, they
found out that when they did report a spill, they underreported
their spillage by as much as 90 percent. Those are standards of
the industry. Fix it when it breaks and lie to the public.
Secondly, you've got an Office of Pipeline Safety that was
mandated to keep the public safe. They have far wide ranging
authority over the pipeline industry. We don't really need
anymore legislation to legislate against the pipeline industry.
We need an Office of Pipeline Safety that is going to do the
job that they were mandated to do. They can't demand that these
guys hydrostatically test their lines. Do you know that there
aren't even any mandates that they need to internally inspect--
you just said that. Senator Murray just said that. They don't
even have to internally inspect their lines.
As far as I'm concerned, the 35 million dollars that's
spent on the Office of Pipeline Safety is a waste of taxpayers
money. Somebody needs to be put in charge of the Office of
Pipeline Safety that is not in the hip pocket of the oil
industry. The whole idea of pipeline safety has to be revamped.
There needs to be a zero spill tolerance.
Ms. Dalen. That's right.
Mr. King. Not we only kill two or three kids a year.
Ms. Dalen. That's right.
Mr. King. I'm going to say in a general statement the
pipeline industry as a whole is an outrage. Can we really make
the pipeline industry too safe? If we had no spills that harm
the environment and no deaths by the pipeline industry, are we
making it too safe? Nobody should have to go through this, and
I can't think of a more horrible way for three children to die,
and that's what they all were--was children--than to be burned
over 90 percent of their bodies.
On June 10, 1999, I want to tell you what Olympic Pipe
Line's behavior was, because their behavior is an outrage. It's
an outrage to the citizens of the Bellingham. It's an outrage
to the citizens of Washington and it's an outrage to the
Federal Government.
I asked this question last October when I testified before
Congress. Why is Olympic Pipe Line still operating south of
Bayview? Give me a logical reason. Congressman Frank wasn't
able to do it. I've written to President Clinton. I've written
to Secretary Slater of the DOT. You've gotten the faxes. Jay
Inslee has gotten the faxes. Janet Reno has gotten the faxes. I
am not going to relent on this thing. This company needs to be
shut down. They have eight employees that have information that
would help us in the why question, and you mentioned we still
don't know why this accident happened, but we can learn from
it. We won't learn anything until we know why this accident
happened. The owners of Olympic Pipe Line, Shell, Texaco, GATX,
ARCO, just since June 10th, have been able to generate 2.7
billion dollars worth of revenues operating south of here.
That's an outrage. They should be called on the carpet to tell
us why this accident happened.
In January 1997, Olympic Pipe Line did run pigs to
internally inspect their lines. In May 1997, Olympic Pipe Line
wrote the Department of Energy and said they had problems in
this section that split 2 years before this accident. In July
1997, an inspector from Olympic Pipe Line named R.J. Clauson
goes into the park with a backhoe to inspect that section of
pipe that split, and guess what he said? ``Gosh, you know, I
got all the equipment here, and you know, I'm ready to dig this
pipe up to look at it visually,'' but it was too difficult to
get to it. So he wrote his office back, and he said, ``I didn't
inspect this section of pipe. It was too difficult to get to.''
The DOE wrote them back and told them go in and replace this
section and tell us what happened. They never got back with
DOE.
So instead what Olympic Pipe Line does is they spend forty
million dollars, and they build Bayview station so that they
can increase their flow through the pipe by 20 percent, and
somehow they ill-design Bayview station, and they have a
blocked valve upstream from Bayview station that closes
uncommanded 59 times in less than 6 months, 59 times. Olympic
Pipe Line says hydrostatic testing is not the way to go to
inspect the pipeline, and yet they hydrostatically tested the
pipeline 59 times in less than 6 months, and then on June 10th
it closed for the 60th time and slammed shut for the 60th time
and blew a hole in the pipe that they already knew was in
disrepair. That's seven inches by 27 inches, and the rest is
history.
I ask the Office of Pipeline Safety didn't Olympic Pipe
Line have the obligation to find out why this blocked valve
slammed shut? Yeah, Rick Felder said yeah. I said, ``Why
haven't you followed up on it to find out?'' ``Well, it was
never reported to us.'' I said, ``It wasn't reported to you?''
``No.'' ``Why?'' ``That's a good question,'' was his answer.
That's a good question.
This same blocked valve closes on June 10th at 3:28 and
sends a shock wave that takes 23 seconds to go back up stream
over Lookout Mountain almost 21 miles, 23 seconds, and split
that pipe, and Olympic Pipe Line calls ARCO at 3:45, 7 minutes
after this blocked valve slams shut, and there's no room in the
pipe for any fuel, because it's already full of fuel. It's
already full of two million sixty-three thousand gallons of
fuel, a 37-inch line.
So then supposedly Olympic Pipe Line's computers go on the
fritz, and Jim Hall from the NTSB testified before Congress he
hasn't been able to get their computers to act that way, but
then guess what Olympic Pipe Line does? They call ARCO at 4:16
and tell ARCO to turn the pumps back on, and the pumps are
running at 9,000 barrels an hour, and it was at this point in
time that the river of gasoline runs down Hanna Creek and into
Whatcom Falls Creek and overcomes Liam Wood by fumes in a cloud
fume that's 12 to 16 feet high, and he falls in the creek
unconscious, which I've never heard of a person becoming
unconscious because of gas fumes, and he drowns.
ARCO (sic) finally calls ARCO at 4:32 and says, ``Turn off
the pumps. We got a problem.'' Sixteen minutes later my son who
works at my dealership which is a block off of Whatcom Falls
Creek, and I was not fortunate enough to be there. I was
unfortunately home at the time. He said, ``Dad, I stood on the
showroom floor, and I watched the fumes, the gas, the fire ball
come down Whatcom Falls Creek'' in front of his eyes. He said,
``Dad, the fire ball was a 150 feet in the air,'' and it just
rolled down Whatcom Falls Creek about a mile, and he watched it
for about a mile right in front of his eyes.
I think that everybody, every businessman along Whatcom
Falls Creek was absolutely horrified and thought they were
dead, because Cascade Natural Gas is right across the street.
Now, let me tell you about Olympic Pipe Line, and I'm going
to keep reiterating this, why is this pipeline company still
operating south of here? This company is an outrage. In May
1999 when Olympic Pipe Line was trying to get this Cross
Cascades pipeline to go from Seattle, I guess, over to Spokane,
Ron Branson, who is Olympic Pipe Line's supervisor of product
movement testifies that the company's leak detection system is
nearly fail safe and is capable of detecting the smallest of
leaks in 15 minutes. This leak went undetected for an hour and
34 minutes. In that same article he's quoted as saying there
may have been a time when some pipeline companies treated leaks
and spills as normal and acceptable part of doing business.
Olympic does not, and yet if you ask Olympic Pipe Line for any
maintenance records and the DOE has confirmed this when they
had this last leak in August, they don't have any maintenance
records, because the pipeline industry as a whole only fixes
valves and pipes when they break.
Of course, now Ron Branson is pleading the 5th Amendment
along with seven other Olympic Pipe Line employees, and it's
beyond belief that the Federal Government can allow these
people to plead the Fifth Amendment. I'm not going to say allow
them to plead the Fifth Amendment. That's not the right
question. I'm appalled that the Federal Government is going to
allow these people to continue to operate south of here
pleading the Fifth Amendment, and I maintain that had this
pipeline company been shut down completely from the start,
Equilon would have sacrificed these people in a heartbeat to
get their 2.7 billion dollars. The lawyers that are working for
these attorneys--the attorneys that are working for these
employers were hired by Olympic Pipe Line. They're working for
Olympic Pipe Line, not the employees. Olympic spokeswoman,
Maggie Brown, poor Maggie. Every time she opens her mouth, she
puts her foot further down her throat. She's quoted in the
paper on March 2, 2000, saying Olympic from the beginning has
been interested in finding out exactly what happened. Really?
So you tell your employees to plead the Fifth Amendment and
don't give the NTSB any information that might help them
conclude their investigation.
Olympic says the leading cause of spills is construction
damage, outside construction damage, and yet if you look at
their spills over the years, 80 percent of their spills are
caused from equipment failure and operator failure. Olympic
tells the public that they have voluntarily closed the 16-inch
line south of Bayview. I talked to Chris Hoidal of the Office
of Pipeline Safety, and Chris Hoidal says, he laughed. He said
without the 16-inch pipe going through Bellingham, that 16-inch
pipe is useless.
Before the City of Bellingham signed their franchise
agreement, Olympic Pipe Line goes into this section of pipe
after they've checked their pig runs from 1997, and they find
nine other sections of pipe that they know won't withstand
hydrostatic testing. So they go in, and they replace these nine
sections of pipe, because they're going to have a nightmare, a
public relations nightmare if they have nine sections that
split under hydrostatic testing. So they replace them, and they
still had one split that I believe that was within 30 yards of
Shuksan Middle School--Kulshan Middle School.
Now, Olympic is suing Imco. What an outrage. We didn't do
it. We didn't have any responsibility in it. Imco was in there
in 1994 and hit the pipe. That was the cause, and yet they knew
that that pipe was in disrepair in 1997 and didn't do anything
about it. This company is an outrage. It needs to be shut down.
This company needs to be shut down. We need to be asked why,
and I want to applaud Mark Asmundson's efforts, he's done a lot
of work, and I know spent a lot of time in talking about
pipeline safety, but the ``why'' question, since he won't
return my calls, there's nothing wrong with the City of
Bellingham's mayor asking the ``why'' question. We need to know
why this accident happened. It is the first step in learning
what do we have to do. There are no other steps.
I want to thank Jim Hall from the NTSB. I got to tell you I
asked a reporter this morning who she thought the busiest
person in government was today, and she, without, you know,
batting an eyelash, she said undoubtedly Jim Hall. This man is
so responsive and so sympathetic. Last week I called him at
3:10, which is 6:10 Washington, D.C. time. He's in a meeting. I
leave a message for him. He called me back at 9:30, and he
can't answer my question. So he calls Bob Chipkevich, and has
Bob Chipkevich call me at 10:00 his time to answer my question.
Olympic Pipe Line's gross, wanton recklessness killed my
little man. He was the light of my family's life. Wade was a
little man that had an uplifting spirit that touched many, many
people. My son said, ``Dad, you know, all he had to do was come
into the dealership, and he lifted my spirits.'' He was our joy
in life. He was a joy to many people in Bellingham.
Olympic Pipe Line needs to answer why this accident
happened, and they need to be forced to do it. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. King follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank King
My name is Frank King. My 10 year-old son, Wade, died as a result
of burns over 90% of his body along with his 10 year-old playmate,
Stephen Tsiorvas. Liam Wood, 18, was overcome by fumes, rendered
unconscious, and drowned. Three little boys died because of the gross
negligence of Olympic Pipe Line Co. No one could ever explain to you
what it is like to lose a child at the height of innocence.
My family wants to thank our friends, neighbors, and citizens of
Bellingham and Whatcom County. We are extremely lucky to live in this
Community. Because of their support we were able to find strength that
we never knew we had. My family would not wish this grief and anguish
on our worst enemy. It takes nine months for a fetus to mature in a
mother's womb . . . and it has been nine months since this accident
happened. And my family will always miss its son, brother, nephew,
cousin . . . every day of our lives. I wish that I could begin to
explain our families loss in a manner that you may have some
comprehension of what we are feeling so you would realize the
importance that this kind of accident will never be allowed to happen
again anywhere.
The Federal Government has two major problems. First, the pipeline
industry has no concern for public safety. Profits always come before
people. Read the attached article about Koch Industries. The DOE
recently fined Koch Industries $35,000,000. What the DOE found out is
that Koch Industries found weaknesses in their pipeline the easy way .
. . they let it break; and when Koch Industries reported a spill . . .
they under reported them by as much as 90%. This is standard behavior
in the pipeline industry . . . if it breaks we fix it and don't tell
the amount that really leaked. This is exactly how Olympic Pipe Line
runs their operation, and it is unbelievable that they are still being
allowed to operate from Bayview Station south.
Secondly, the Office of Pipeline Safety (The Federal Government's
regulatory agency) is in the pipeline industry's hip pocket and
consequently refuse to regulate the industry. They let the industry
regulate itself, even though OPS has a $35,000,000 budget and wide
ranging authority over the pipeline industry. There is no doubt that if
the OPS had been doing the job that it was mandated by the Federal
Government to do, we would not be here today. Wade King and Stephen
Tsiorvas would be skateboarding on the front sidewalk and Liam Wood
would still be fishing and probably taking some college courses today.
The whole idea of pipeline safety needs to be revamped. The OPS
must do the job it was mandated to do and that is to protect the public
and the environment. No spills. Someone needs to be put in charge who
isn't in the hip pocket of the pipeline industry. Someone needs to be
put in charge of the OPS who will make the pipeline industry
accountable. Put someone in charge that will welcome help from the
states that want to help with oversight and regulation. And if one
state finds that a regulation is good for its state, make it a
regulation for all states. That way there will be consistency in
regulations throughout the states. The pipeline industry's complaints
really stem from the fact that they are against any kind of regulation.
Can the pipeline industry ever be too safe? The OPS needs to be
completely revamped so that it does the job that it was mandated to do,
and accepts the help of the states that want to help. And Olympic Pipe
Line Co. needs to be shut down until we know why this accident
happened.
Look at the June 10, 1999 accident and Olympic Pipe Line's behavior
and response. It is behavior that is an outrage . . . an outrage to the
families of the victims; an outrage to the citizens of Bellingham; an
outrage to the citizens of Washington State; and particularly an
outrage to the people who live along this pipeline that stretches from
Cherry Point to Portland. It is an outrage to the OPS and the Federal
Government that this company has been allowed to continue to operate
south of Bayview Station, since they refuse to help the NTSB in finding
answers as to why this accident happened. Why are they still operating
their pipeline? I asked this question to Congress in October. No one
answered. But Olympic Pipe Line and its owners, Shell, Texaco, ARCO,
and GATX, have generated in excess of $2.7 billion in revenues just
since this accident happened. I have written letters to President
Clinton, Vice President Gore, DOT Secretary Rodney Slayter, Kelly
Coyner, head of OPS, etc. You have gotten copies of all correspondence.
So far I have received no response. Olympic Pipe Line must be shut down
and their employees forced to cooperate with the NTSB to determine the
exact cause of this accident. It is the first step in assuring we are
going in the right direction.
In January of 1997 Olympic Pipe Line ran smart pigs through their
pipe. They found three anomalies (problem areas) in the very section of
pipe that split on June 10, 1999. In May of 1997 Olympic Pipe Line
wrote the DOE, yes the DOE, not the OPS, that they had problems in that
section that split and would further evaluate those problems. The DOE
wrote them back and advised Olympic Pipe Line to get back to the DOE
concerning that section of pipe. Olympic Pipe Line never responded
concerning this problem again. And note that this section of pipe that
they had said was problematic was located in an area where there had
been known construction. And Olympic Pipe Line has said on many
occasions that the leading cause of pipeline spills is construction
damage. But they never bothered to visually inspect this section of
pipe. Instead, Olympic Pipe Line spent $40 million building Bayview
Station in Burlington, which was built to allow Olympic Pipe Line the
ability to increase its product flow by 20%. Bayview Station was
completed in late December 1998. Between then and June 10, 1999, a
block valve just north of Bayview Station closed 59 times uncommanded
by operators of the pipe. 59 times it slammed shut in less than six
months, virtually hydro-statically testing the section that runs
through Bellingham each and every time. And what does Olympic Pipe Line
have to say about hydro-static testing? On numerous occasions they have
stated that it over stresses the pipe. So by their own words, they over
stressed a pipe that they knew was in disrepair. That's real preventive
maintenance. Obviously, I'm being facetious.
Then on June 10, 1999 this same block valve slams shut for the 60th
time at 3:28PM. It sends a shock wave back up north that takes 23
seconds to split the pipe in Bellingham. It creates a hole in the pipe
that is 7" by 27" and a crater that is 25 feet in diameter at the top
and 5 feet at the bottom. It is about 10 feet deep and will hold about
60,000 gallons of gasoline. Finally, Olympic calls ARCO and tells them
to turn the pumps off at 3:35PM. The pumps have been running for 7
minutes and there is no room for any gasoline in the pipe because it is
full of about 2,063,000 gallons of gasoline already. Now the pipe sits
there and leaks until 4:16PM. At this point in time, Olympic Pipe Line
calls ARCO and tells them to turn the pumps back on. The pumps run at
9000 barrels per hour or 378,000 gallons per hour. Finally, Olympic
Pipe Line calls ARCO and tells them to turn the pumps off at 4:32PM--16
minutes later. A virtual river of gasoline now pours down Hannah Creek
and into Whatcom Falls Creek, creating a fume bank that is 12 to 16
feet high. It leaks for another \1/2\ hour until 5:02PM. The resulting
gas fumes ignite and explode in a fireball that runs down Whatcom Falls
Creek 150 feet in the air for approximately 1\1/2\ miles and
approximately \3/4\ mile back up Hannah Creek ending at the ruptured
pipe.
Now the outrage--
In May of 1999 Ron Berenston, Olympic's Supervisor of
product movement, testifies that the Company's leak detection
system is nearly fail-safe and is capable of detecting the
smallest of leaks within 15 minutes. This leak went undetected
for one hour and 34 minutes until it exploded in a fireball.
In July of 1999 Olympic tells the news media that
there was some sort of mastic on the pipe that split,
indicating that someone had damaged the pipe, repaired it and
covered it back up. Allan Beshore the NTSB's investigator told
me that there was no foreign substance on the pipe that split.
He further indicated that he had called Olympic Officials and
criticized them for reporting this information to the press.
Shortly after the accident 8 Olympic employees who
were in the control room on June 10, 1999 invoked their Fifth
Amendment rights, including Mr. Berenston. However, everyone
goes back to work at their same jobs on June 11, 1999 as though
nothing has happened.
Olympic Spokesperson, Maggie Brown, is quoted in the
Bellingham Herald on March 2, 2000 saying, ``Olympic, from the
beginning, has been interested in finding out exactly what
happened.'' Really . . . that must be why their employees won't
cooperate with NTSB. And let me add that there is no assurance
that these same employees won't plead the Fifth Amendment once
the criminal investigation is completed.
Olympic says that the leading cause of spills is
outside construction damage. However, if you examine the causes
of their spills you will find that 80% of their spills are
caused by operator error and equipment failure.
Mr. Berenston also testified that ``there may have
been a time when some pipeline companies treated leaks and
spills as a normal and acceptable part of doing business.
Olympic does not.'' And yet Olympic cannot produce any type of
maintenance records that shows anything was ever repaired
unless there was a spill. That is preventive maintenance. Same
old story, fix it when it breaks.
Olympic says they have voluntarily closed the 16" pipe
south of Bayview Station. However, Chris Hoidal, OPS' Western
Region Manager, stated that the 16" pipe south of Bayview is
useless unless the northern 16" pipe that goes through
Bellingham is running product.
While the 37-mile stretch of pipe that runs through
Bellingham lay idle, Olympic went back to its pig runs from
January 1997 and found 9 sections of pipe that they knew would
not withstand hydro-static testing. So before they had to
comply with OPS Corrective Action Order to hydro-static test
this pipe they replaced these nine sections of pipe. And they
still had one section of pipe that split near Kulshan Middle
School. What do you suppose the public would have thought had
10 sections split throughout this 37-mile stretch? For the
first time in its 35 year history, Olympic Pipe Line Co. did
some preventive maintenance.
Olympic Pipe Line originally said that 277,000 gallons
of fuel leaked out of their pipe, then revised it downward to
229,000 gallons of fuel which the news media now uses, but the
OPS has not accepted. All you have to do is some simple math
and you realize that the minimum amount of fuel that would have
leaked out of that pipe was 420,000 gallons of gas. By the time
the experts are done determining exactly how much leaked, you
will find that between 650,000 and 950,000 gallons of gasoline
actually leaked out of that pipe on June 10, 1999.
Olympic Pipe Line did pig runs in January 1997, and
admitted to the DOE that they had some problems in that section
of pipe that split. Instead of checking that section, they
spent $40 million building Bayview Station so they could
increase their flow 20%. They misdesigned Bayview Station and
had a block valve that closed 59 times in less than 6 months,
over stressing a pipeline that is already in disrepair.
Olympic Pipe Line goes to court and sues IMCo
Construction, a local contractor, for damaging the pipe. They
are suing IMCo for any costs that have been incurred trebled.
IMCo was a contractor to the City of Bellingham. Is the City of
Bellingham next to be sued?
Olympic Pipe Line has lied to the public before this accident
happened and continues to lie to the public in the aftermath of this
tragic accident. If the Pipeline Industry is to learn anything from
this tragedy, it is to do exactly the opposite of what Olympic Pipe
Line has done. Tell the truth. Cooperate with investigators to find out
the reason or reasons why an accident has happened. Again, why is this
company allowed to operate south of here without providing any answers.
Shut these people down and force those employees to talk to NTSB
investigators.
As we speak, there is a petition filtering through Bellingham and
Whatcom County to force our Mayor not to renew Olympic Pipe Line's
Franchise agreement that comes due in May, until the people of
Bellingham have an answer as to why this accident happened. The people
of Bellingham are aware that this accident could be duplicated again if
the valve closure problem is not resolved. And they are not about to
let that happen. The actions of our Mayor in recent months, make me
wonder what agenda he is working. His signature was on the first Safe
Bellingham petition last July. But he has neglected to ask the why
question since he signed the franchise agreement with Olympic in
September . . . against public sentiment.
The Chairman of the NTSB, Jim Hall (who by the way is one of the
most compassionate and responsive individuals I have met throughout the
last nine months), has told me that it will be at least June or
September before he concludes his investigation. And even then he has
admitted that the real causes of this accident may never be known
unless those operators in the control room on June 10, 1999 begin to
talk about what happened that day. Is pleading the Fifth Amendment an
admission of guilt? As a law abiding citizen I believe it is. Shut
Olympic Pipe Line down until they have told us why this accident
happened and the NTSB has concurred.
It is a sad state of affairs in this country when the Justice
Department goes after Microsoft as a monopoly, merely because a judge
took a personal disliking to Bill Gates. Then turns right around and
allows Exxon and Mobil to merge forming the largest oil company in the
world. Then turns right around and tells ARCO and BP Amoco they can't
merge. And then allows Olympic Pipe Line Co. to continue its operation
as though nothing has happened.
Olympic Pipe Line's gross, wanton recklessness killed a ``little
man'' that was the light of my family's life. Wade was a ``little man''
that had an uplifting spirit, who touched many, many people he came
into contact with. He had a knack for uplifting the spirits of everyone
he came in contact with. He was our joy in life. He was a joy to many,
many in Bellingham. And, unfortunately, we have been forced to live
without that wonderful little being for the rest of our lives. Our
family misses him every day. Olympic Pipe Line needs to be shut down
until they have told us why this accident happened.
Oil leaker fined $35 million
January 14, 2000, The Bellingham Herald
Washington, D.C.--Koch Industries, an oil pipeline company, found
the weak points in its pipes the easy way, the government said
Thursday. It simply waited for the pipelines to break and spill oil,
part of a pattern of negligence that resulted Thursday in the biggest
civil fine levied to a company for environmental violations.
The Environmental Protection Agency said that the company, based in
Wichita, Kan., had agreed to pay a $30 million penalty for more than
300 separate spills of crude oil, gasoline and other oil products
between 1990 and 1997.
Federal officials said it had taken them months to put the case
together, partly because the company did business under many different
names, and even when it reported spills it sometimes understated their
volume by as much as 90 percent. Even after the Justice Department
brought the case, Koch refused to say what pipelines it owned,
officials said.
To save money, the company did not inspect its pipelines for
corrosion, or pressure-test them, investigators said. ``It was cheaper
not to maintain them,'' said Steve Herman, the EPA's assistant
administrator for enforcement.
And so, officials said, Koch just waited for the pipelines to fail.
The company leaked 3 million gallons of crude oil and other
substances into ponds, lakes and rivers in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas,
Louisiana, Missouri and Alabama, according to Carol Browner, the
administrator of the EPA, in announcing the settlement. The settlement
was filed in U.S. District Court in Houston Thursday to settle charges
brought by the government between 1995 and 1997.
As part of the settlement, the company will also pay $5 million to
buy environmentally sensitive land and protect it from development.
``Today's landmark fine against Koch Industries for egregious
violations of the Clean Water Act sends a strong message that those who
try to profit by polluting our environment pay a price,'' Browner said.
The company offered a totally different interpretation, asserting
through a high executive that Koch had reduced its pipeline leaks by 90
percent in the last decade.
Federal prosecutors file motion to test segment of pipeline
March 2, 2000, The Bellingham Herald and the Associated Press
Federal prosecutors have asked a judge to approve tests to
determine what caused a pipeline rupture and resulting explosion that
killed two 10-year-old boys and an 18-year-old man in Bellingham last
June.
Prosecutors filed a sealed motion last week with U.S. District
Judge Robert Lasnik, The Seattle Times reported Wednesday, citing
unidentified sources familiar with the case.
The motion seeks permission for the National Transportation Safety
Board to cut into a 20-foot section of pipe that was excavated from the
rupture site.
Olympic officials said they want the pipeline tests done.
``We are as anxious as anybody to allow those tests to go
forward,'' company spokeswoman Maggie Brown said following a Wednesday
night meeting in Bellingham. ``Olympic, from the beginning, has been
interested in finding out exactly what happened.''
The NTSB had planned to conduct the test last fall, but was halted
by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Seattle, which feared the test would
allow lawyers for pipeline operator Olympic Pipe Line Co. to argue that
key evidence had been destroyed.
The new motion seeks to allow the tests, in addition to protecting
federal prosecutors from any claims relating to altering of evidence if
criminal charges are filed in the rupture and explosion, the Times
cited criminal experts as saying.
The testing could tell investigators whether defects or corrosion
existed before the pipeline rupture, NTSB spokesman Keith Holloway
said.
``It's a key component to the investigation because it can tell us
what happened,'' he said.
Prosecutors filing the motion notified lawyers representing
Olympic, its top officials and a Bellingham construction company that
previously dug near the pipeline, the Times reported. Investigators
have looked into whether the pipe had been damaged by excavation work,
and Olympic has filed a motion blaming the excavation contractor for
the rupture.
A federal grand jury is investigating whether environmental or
pipeline-safety laws were violated. No charges have been filed, and the
investigation is expected to continue for months.
The families of the two boys killed have filed a lawsuit against
Olympic.
Olympic could face a fine of as much as $10,000 in the Nov. 17
incident, when a significant amount of fuel was leaked during cleanup
of the Bellingham spill, resulting in some environmental damage, state
Department of Ecology spokesman Ron Langley said.
The company was told Friday it had violated state water-quality
laws and now has 30 days to respond, he said.
Olympic had failed to clean silt from a perforated pipe that draws
fuel and contaminated groundwater from soils in Whatcom Falls Park,
causing an overflow.
Olympic spokeswoman Maggie Brown said the amount of fuel spilled
was too small to be measured.
``It was a sheen,'' she said.
But Langley said the cleanup system leaked for 30 hours before a
state inspector noticed gas in the creek.
Olympic has appealed a $120,000 fine from Ecology for the June 10
spill of 229,000 gallons of petroleum fuel.
Senate Hearing March 13, 2000
Additional Testimony From Frank King
The question that was asked Senators Gorton and Murray still
remains unanswered. Why is Olympic Pipe Line allowed to continue to
operate their pipeline south of Bayview Station, when their employees
refuse to help the NTSB investigate this accident? Senator Gorton asked
that question of Mr. Gast from Olympic Pipe Line and Mr. Felder from
the Office of Pipeline Safety. Both responded by saying that they felt
the 20'' line south of Bayview Station was safe and operating at 80% of
normal operating pressure. My question does not ask if the pipeline is
safe!!! This Company needs to be shut down, until such time their
employees help the NTSB put together all the answers to the why
question.
Olympic Pipe Line did internal pig runs on their pipeline in
January of 1997. In May of 1997, they wrote the Washington State
Department of Ecology and advised them that they had three serious
anomalies in that very section of pipe that split on June 10, 1999. The
DOE wrote them back and told Olympic pipeline to go into the area and
dig up that very section of pipe and replace it or repair it as
necessary. In July of 1997, R. J. Klasen, Field Supervisor for Olympic
Pipe Line, goes into the area with a crew and a backhoe to dig up that
very section of pipe. He then reports back to his superiors at Olympic
Pipe Line and the DOE that he did not dig up that very section of pipe
because it was ``too difficult to get to.'' Olympic Pipe Line's gross,
wanton, reckless negligence murdered my son, Wade, as well as Stephen
Tsiorvas and Liam Wood. This same gross, wanton, reckless negligence is
the same reason that these people need to be shut down until we know
why this accident happened. Shut them down now.
As I sat in that Senate Hearing room and listened to Mr. Felder's
testimony and heard him say that the OPS has gone back to all the
pipeline operators and asked them all to come up with safety action
plans for their pipelines, I couldn't help but become extremely uneasy.
That is exactly the type of attitude that must be eliminated out of the
OPS. I thought that was why the OPS was created . . . to regulate the
safety of the pipeline industry . . . not to ask the pipeline industry
how it wanted to be regulated. Go back and list all the recommendations
that the NTSB has given to the OPS over the last 30 years. List them
all, and then make those the regulations by which the pipeline industry
is regulated. Then add one regulation. When a pipeline company has an
accident, its entire operations will be suspended until the cause of
the accident has been determined. It was very apparent that the NTSB
has seen very little change in the OPS' attitude to force the pipeline
industry to safeguard the public. The OPS needs to be a stronger
advocate for public safety and needs to welcome states help to mandate
that public safety.
This morning I read in the Bellingham Herald that a maintenance
supervisor at Alaska Airlines had been placed on administrative leave
because he had bullied the mechanics who maintain the airplanes into
not doing the proper job in their maintenance efforts. Olympic Pipe
Line Co. needs to be put on administrative leave, until the NTSB has
found the answers as to why this accident happened.
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Mr. King.
Does Mrs. King wish to add anything?
Mr. King. Pardon?
Senator Gorton. Does Mrs. King wish to add anything?
Mrs. King. No.
Senator Gorton. Ms. Dalen, we'll go to you.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE DALEN
Ms. Dalen. I'm a little nervous about squeals. The young
man that was sitting next to me is not Mr. Williams who has
been busy working with teachers down around the Seattle/Tacoma
area today. This man is my son and Stephen's brother, just
turned 18, so I hope you don't mind. He's been kind of
supportive.
Senator Gorton. Fine. Fine. You go ahead.
Ms. Dalen. I wish to thank Senator Gorton, Senator Murray
and other distinguished members of the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation for inviting me to speak today.
My name is Katherine Dalen, and I am the parent of Stephen
Tsiorvas, who at the age of 10 lost his life along with two
other sons of this community in a devastating accident that was
like so many others preventable.
When I decided to come and speak with you today, I puzzled
over what it was I most wanted to say. What of all the things I
feel, believe and know were most important to relate to you. I
wondered what words I could speak that would make the most
impact, and inspire change so that this tragedy would never be
repeated, so that other lives would be saved.
The first thing always on my mind is the depth of my sorrow
and grief over Stephen's death, and how much pain his loss has
brought my family. I could go on about that for hours. I could
tell you how sometimes the sadness tears our hearts apart and
drowns our spirits, but our grief is personal, as would be
yours had you lost a child by any means. My sadness, my
family's suffering can only serve to remind you how precious
life is, how important it is that we love and protect our
families and how easy it is to lose those we love. We need to
take better care of our children, our loved ones and our
neighbors. We need to commit ourselves again to making human
safety a priority.
Most folks in Bellingham, many in Washington and some
throughout the Nation realized again on June 10th, 1999, how
unexpectedly dangerous and deadly our neighborhoods can be. The
price of one human life is too great a price to pay for such a
reminder. Safety measures can and must be taken. Taking a human
life is not a business liability. It is murder. How many times
over how many years must the greed and sloth of industry be
allowed to play deadly games with human lives? Is that to be
our future? Our children's future? Our children's children's
future?
I need not remind the distinguished Committee that our
government was formed of the people, by the people, for the
people. Our democracy was based on that principle with a vision
of the future very much on the minds of those drafting the
rules for a balanced government. However, it does seem to me
that we tend to live rather selfishly. With our individual
lives and our individual pocket books and mind rather than the
lives of our neighbors, and the lives of those yet to be born,
this selfishness seems especially evident in those situations
in which we allow the fat corporate wolf to manage the fat
company wolves who then manage the hens in the hen house with
the corporate agenda. While some wolves may be fine fellows
indeed, a wolf is by nature a wolf. His agenda is based more on
filling his stomach than on the welfare of the chickens.
Our environment, our habitat, our earth cannot continue to
be raped, either by accident or by deliberate intent. If we are
to sustain human life and animal life, if we erode our
environment one small bit at a time, the human race will die,
if not today, tomorrow; if not by fire, by ice; if not
suddenly, then slowly.
The pipeline that burst here in this small city has been in
the ground for a long time. Others will testify to that, I'm
sure. The quality of that pipe and other pipes in this nation
carrying volatile fuels is in question, but the impact of yet
another disaster, the impact of yet another death is not.
Each accident wrecks havoc on the lives of residents, the
lives of native animals, and the land itself. Each accident
causes this nation, our neighbors, our families and our habitat
irreparable damage. We know that toxic materials in our
environment can poison us, leach into our food, pollute our
drinking water and hover in our air, yet we continue to allow
the wolves with the corporate agenda to manage not only the
hens in the hen house but the hen house as well.
The size and growing complexity of our nation's needs does
not abrogate our responsibilities as individuals, as a
community or as a nation. Nor does a challenge demand that our
complexity allow us to simplify our solution or grow lax in our
diligence to monitor and enforce our regulations. Though the
pipe is buried and out of our sight, the need for decisive
action is abundantly clear. We can no longer hide from the fact
that our behaviors and laissez-faire policies have direct
detrimental effects on our future. By allowing inaction and by
our own inaction, we become participants in the misdeeds of
business. My baby died because of inaction. His death was
preventable.
As a people, for the people, we must, must protect those
lives in our charge. The lives of those yet unborn and the land
which sustains humanity only for so long as humanity cares for
it. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Katherine Dalen
I wish to thank Senator Gorton, Senator Murray, and the
distinguished members of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation for inviting me to speak today. My name is Katherine
Dalen, and I am the parent of Stephen Tsiorvas who, at the age of ten,
gave up his life, along with two other sons of this community, in a
devastating accident that was, like so many others, preventable.
When I decided to come and speak with you today, I puzzled over
what it is I most wanted to say, what of all the things I feel,
believe, and know were most important to relate to you. I wondered what
words I could speak that would make the most impact and inspire change
so that this tragedy would never be repeated, so that other lives would
be saved. The first thing always on my mind is the depth of my sorrow
and grief over Stephen's death and how much pain his loss has brought
my family. I could go on about that for hours. I could tell you how
sometimes the sadness tears our hearts apart and drowns our spirits.
But our grief is personal, as would be yours had you lost a child by
any means. My sadness, my family's suffering can only serve to remind
you how precious life is, how important it is that we love and protect
our families, and how easy it is to lose those we love.
Additionally, I think I must speak to two issues. One, we need to
take better care of our children, our loved ones, and our neighbors. We
need to commit ourselves again to making human safety a priority. Most
folks in Bellingham, many in Washington, and some throughout the nation
realized again on June 10, 1999, how unexpectedly dangerous and deadly
our neighborhoods can be. The price of one human life is too great a
price to pay for such a reminder. How many times over how many years
must the greed and sloth of industry be allowed to play deadly games
with human lives? Is that to be our future as well? Our children's
children's future?
I need not remind this distinguished committee that our government
was formed of the people, by the people, for the people. Our democracy
was based on that principle, with a vision of the future very much on
the minds of those drafting the rules for a balanced government.
However, it does seem to me that we tend to live rather selfishly, with
our individual lives and our individual pocketbooks in mind rather than
the lives of our neighbors and the lives of those yet to be born. This
selfishness seems especially evident in those situations in which we
allow the fat corporate wolf to manage the fat company wolves who then
manage the hens in the hen house with a corporate agenda. While some
wolves may be fine fellows indeed, a wolf is by nature a wolf: his
agenda is based more on filling his stomach than on the welfare of the
chickens.
Two, our environment, our habitat, our earth cannot continue to be
raped, either by accident or by deliberate intent, if we are to sustain
human and animal life. If we erode our environment one small bit at a
time, the human race will die. If not today, tomorrow. If not by fire,
by ice. If not suddenly, then slowly. The pipeline that burst here, in
this small city, has been in the ground for a long time; others will
testify to that I'm sure. The quality of that pipe, and other pipes in
this nation carrying volatile fuels, is in question, but the impact of
yet another disaster is not. Each accident wreaks havoc on the lives of
residents, the lives of native animals, and the land itself. Each
accident causes this nation, our neighbors, our families, and our
habitat irreparable damage. We know that toxic materials in our
environment can poison us, leach into our food, pollute our drinking
water, and hover in our air. And yet we continue to allow the wolves
with a corporate agenda to manage not only the hens in the hen house
but the hen house as well.
The size and growing complexity of our nation's needs does not
abrogate our responsibility as citizens or as a government. Nor does
the challenge demanded by that complexity allow us to simplify our
solutions or grow lax in our diligence to monitor and enforce our
regulations. The need for stern decisive action is abundantly clear. We
can no longer hide from the fact that our behaviors and laissez fair
policies have direct, detrimental effects on our future, and all
futures to come--on us, on our children, and on our children's
children. As a people, for the people, we must, MUST, protect those
lives in our charge now, the lives of those yet unborn, and the land
which sustains us only for so long as we care for it.
It is time to act. We must not be deluded by false hopes or by
denial; we are in danger; we must not allow the fact that we do not see
the danger laying about in our front yard to make us unwary. If we do
nothing we may lose our chance. And we must let our neighbors,
throughout the nation, know of the danger that lurks three feet, two
feet, one foot below the surface of our homes, our fields, our parks,
and our schools.
Senator Gorton. Thank you very much, Ms. Dalen.
Mrs. Robinson?
STATEMENT OF MARLENE ROBINSON
Mrs. Robinson. I want to thank you for coming to Bellingham
and thank you for inviting us here to speak.
On June 10th of last year, my 18-year old son, Liam, who
had graduated from high school 5 days before, happened to be
fly fishing in his favorite place, Whatcom Falls Park, a
pristine piece of nature not 5 minutes from downtown. Just a
week before, Liam had come home one evening from fishing the
creek. While we ate dinner together, he told us about his
excitement when he came upon a big otter swimming peacefully in
one of the pools. He watched it for a long time. I'm sure that
he looked for that otter on June 10th as he made his way down
the creek. He was in a steep gorge with 230,000 gallons of
gasoline spilled down the creek. The oxygen in the gorge was
replaced by a 35-foot wall of hydrocarbon fumes. Liam was
overcome within seconds. He fell into the foot-deep creek and
drowned. A short time later, the gasoline and fumes exploded,
sending the fire ball down the creek that killed Liam and
Stephen and every other living thing in its path for a mile and
a half.
We in Bellingham are now painfully aware of the danger that
pipelines pose to every community in this nation. We have
learned that what happened in Bellingham was not an isolated
incident. The Federal Government has allowed the pipeline
industry to be largely self-regulated. This has led to a
pattern in the last 20 years of fuel transportation accidents.
The pipeline industry will never have as its bottom line the
health and safety of communities. It is up to communities,
themselves, and therefore their public representatives and
government agencies to insure that pipelines are safe.
The technology exists for pipelines to be safe. What we did
not know before the pipeline ruptured in Bellingham but have
learned at the price of our son's life is that what is lacking
is regulation and enforcement. The Federal Office of Pipeline
Safety has woefully, and over a long period of time, failed in
its mandate. The Federal Government has not responded to years
of unsafe pipeline practices and has at the same time
prohibited local and state governments from protecting their
citizens.
We in Bellingham are now working closely with many
communities across the Nation who, like us, are educating
themselves about the dangers posed to their citizens as a
result of the lack of responsiveness of the Office of Pipeline
Safety. We know that had OPS addressed this issue adequately in
the past, our town would not be still reeling from loss. We are
working together to make sure that no other community has to
suffer a similar loss.
I no longer have children to protect. Nothing I do or say
about this issue can bring Liam back. I do, however, consider
it my privilege and my obligation to do what I can to protect
the children of this and other communities. I need to impress
upon you that it is not enough to make minor changes in
pipeline safety regulation and to once again hand over the
reins to OPS. Before June 10th, none of us in Bellingham had
any idea that we needed to be experts in fuel transportation
safety. We frankly didn't even know that we had a gas line
pipeline running through the very heart of Bellingham under
streets, past houses, schools and parks. We thought we had a
Federal agency called the Office of Pipeline Safety, and we had
faith that that agency was doing its job. We no longer have
that faith.
I urge this committee to do what is necessary to protect
the citizens of this nation from further avoidable and
predictable tragedies caused by inadequate regulation,
oversight and enforcement. My recent education has convinced me
that we need two things. We need a Federal Office of Pipeline
Safety that is staffed by committed expert servants who have
the health and safety of communities as their bottom line. And
we need a strong, well-funded citizens advisory council to
insure that over time we do not return to business as usual.
Our children's deaths were not trivial. They were not an
``acceptable risk.'' We easily have the capacity to protect our
communities from just this so-called ``accident.'' What I need
from you, what every community in this country needs from you
is action that will finally guarantee us an Office of Pipeline
Safety that truly protects the safety of citizens across the
Nation, and that will include citizens in local and state
governments as effective partners in the national oversight of
pipeline safety.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Robinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marlene Robinson
On June 10th of last year, my 18-year-old son Liam, who had
graduated from high school five days before, happened to be fly-fishing
in his favorite place, Whatcom Falls Park; a pristine piece of nature
not 5 minutes from downtown. Just a week before, Liam had come home one
evening from fishing the creek. While we ate dinner together, he told
us about his excitement when he'd come upon a big otter swimming
peacefully in one of the pools. He watched it for a long time. I'm sure
that he looked for that otter on June 10th as he made his way down the
creek. He was in a steep gorge when the 230,000 gallons of gasoline
spilled down the creek. The oxygen in the gorge was replaced by a 35-
foot wall of hydrocarbon fumes. Liam was overcome within seconds. He
fell into the foot-deep creek and drowned. A short time later, the
gasoline and fumes exploded, sending the fireball down the creek that
killed Wade and Steven and every other living thing in its path for a
mile and a half.
We in Bellingham are now painfully aware of the danger that
pipelines pose to every community in this nation. We have learned that
what happened in Bellingham was not an isolated incident. The federal
government has allowed the pipeline industry to be largely self-
regulated. This has led to a pattern in the last twenty years of fuel
transportation accidents. The pipeline industry will never have as its
bottom line the health and safety of communities. It is up to
communities themselves and therefore their public representatives and
government agencies to ensure that pipelines are safe. The technology
exists for pipelines to be safe. What we did not know before the
pipeline ruptured in Bellingham, but have learned at the price of our
son's life, is that what is lacking is regulation and enforcement. The
federal Office of Pipeline Safety has woefully, and over a long period
of time, failed in its mandate. The federal government has not
responded to years of unsafe pipeline practices and has at the same
time prohibited local and state governments from protecting their
citizens.
We in Bellingham are now working closely with many communities
across the nation who, like us, are educating themselves about the
dangers posed to their citizens as a result of the lack of
responsiveness of the federal government through the Office of Pipeline
Safety. We know that had OPS addressed this issue adequately in the
past, our town would not still be reeling from loss. We are working to
make sure that no other community has to suffer a similar loss.
I no longer have children to protect. Nothing I do or say about
this issue can bring Liam back. I do, however, consider it my privilege
and obligation to do what I can to protect the children of this and
other communities. I need to impress upon you that it is not enough to
make minor changes in pipeline safety regulation and to once again hand
over the reins to OPS. Before June 10th, none of us in Bellingham had
any idea that we needed to be experts in fuel transportation safety. We
frankly didn't even know that we had a gasoline pipeline running
through the very heart of Bellingham, under streets, past houses,
schools, and parks. We thought we had a federal agency called the
Office of Pipeline Safety, and we had faith that that agency was doing
its job.
We no longer have that faith. I urge this committee to do what is
necessary to protect the citizens of this nation from further avoidable
and predictable tragedies caused by inadequate regulation, oversight
and enforcement. My recent education has convinced me that we need two
things. We need a federal Office of Pipeline Safety that is staffed by
committed, expert servants who have the health and safety of
communities as their bottom line. And we need a strong, well-funded
citizens advisory council to ensure that over time, we do not return to
business as usual.
Our children's deaths were not trivial; they were not an
``acceptable risk.'' We easily have the capacity to protect our
communities from just this kind of ``accident.'' What I need from you;
what every community in this country needs from you, is action that
will finally guarantee us an Office of Pipeline Safety that truly
protects the safety of citizens across the nation, and that will
include citizens and local and state governments as effective partners
in the national oversight of pipeline safety.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE BRABEC
Mr. Brabec. I am Bruce Brabec and I'm Liam's stepfather and
I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak today and
thank you for coming to Bellingham.
Marlene and I, as all the families, have received amazing
support from this Bellingham community, and it's, you know,
kind of maybe helped us to go on from day to day is all of the
support we've had from friends and from people that we don't
even know, and from people at large including the state.
A lot of times in conversation with people who are being
supportive to us, they'll say to Marlene and I, I'm sure the
others have heard it, too, people have said that they can't
imagine what this must be like, what it must be like for us,
and I thought, well, I can give you some sense of what it is
like, especially for those in the room who are parents, and
give you just a little bit of what it's like on a day-to-day
basis for us.
First of all, just imagine that you're going to go home
tonight and your child isn't home and never will be and then
add to this each morning very early when the newspaper is
delivered, it bumps on the front porch and you wake up because
of that sound and you're reminded of when the police stepped on
your porch and awakened you, also, and they had come to tell
you that your son was found dead in Whatcom Creek and then add
to this the experience that each time you go to a gas station
to get gas in your car and when you catch the smell of the
gasoline as you're filling it up, you imagine what it might
have been like for your child as he was engulfed by a wall of
gasoline vapor while fly fishing on Whatcom Creek, and then add
to each time somebody tells you a story about your child, which
we like to hear, but it also makes you think about what your
child might be doing now if he or she were alive.
Well, now you might have a little bit more information
about what it is like for us and those are just a few of the
things that happen to us on a daily basis.
Last week Marlene and I decided to visit the site where
Liam's body was found. We'd been there a few days after his
death and we weren't sure we could find it again and at that
time we'd seen how badly damaged the creek was and we wanted to
go back and some friends in the police department who knew
where the site was offered to take us back and we wanted to go
back because we wanted to have a good bearing on the site in
the future, so we could visit it on our own.
I planned to stand there and imagine Liam fishing in this
one beautiful canyon, and I imagined that in the future not
even at that point it would be a site where I would be able to
reflect joyfully about Liam, because I knew how much he loved
fishing in that canyon. How often I'd come home, and there'd be
a note that he had gone fishing, and I knew which creek he was
fishing on.
Well, the experience of going to the creek last week was
quite the opposite. I saw a burned out canyon, which as much as
I expected it, it was very difficult to see again, the burned
trees, the bare banks, the cracked rocks from the heat of the
explosion, and the downed trees in the water, and worst of all,
I saw Liam floating face down in the creek and I saw the part
of his body that was out of the creek that was charred by the
blast, because I know that that's how they found him.
Now, I'm not bringing this up to upset people, but really I
bring it up to make a plea that Liam's death not be in vain and
to plead that other families not have to be condemned as we are
to this kind of experience and to these memories. The loss of
our son--because of the loss of our son we are certainly biased
about the importance of stricter regulation and accountability,
but we believe that everybody should be similarly biased by our
experience.
I would like to bring another voice into the room and
that's a voice that's missing today and that's Liam's, Liam's
voice. If I were Liam, and I hadn't been fishing that day, and
I was alive, I would hope that I was invited to speak today,
because I would tell you how often I had walked that creek from
the mouth all the way up to its source. If I were Liam I would
tell you how many of my thoughts had been scoured from that
canyon by the blast, thoughts I shared with the creek as I
fished, thoughts about school, thoughts about my parents, about
girlfriends, about my place in the universe. If I were Liam I'd
tell you how many fish I'd caught and released, and I would
recount with pretty good sound effects and visualizations my
attempts and success at landing fish, and if I were Liam, I
would be telling you today that much more needs to be done
regarding pipeline regulation, to not only prevent damage,
injury or death, but also to support the living, to protect our
places of refuge, to protect our neighborhoods, to protect our
homes, to protect our families. If I were Liam, I would most
strongly ask that you tighten the accountability of the Office
of Pipeline Safety, that you support it with the funds to do
its job, but that you consider cleaning house to get staff who
are dedicated to be watch dogs of public safety, not just
supporters of pipelines and oil companies. If I were Liam, I
would most strongly urge you to allow states and especially
Washington State to regulate pipelines in addition to Federal
regulation, and if I were Liam, I would urge you to support a
well-funded citizen advisory group to provide regional
oversight to improve safety and to prevent oil spills, and if I
were Liam, and I would be not standing up and moving over you
at my over six feet height, and I would be volunteering to be
the first one on that advisory committee for this region,
because I would know how important it is, and I'd want to do
what I could to be helpful.
Marlene and I again want to thank you for the opportunity
to present our thoughts, our feelings today. We appreciate your
serious intentions. Let's join ours and that is to take steps
to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brabec follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Brabec
I am Bruce Brabec. I am Liam's step father.
Marlene and I have received amazing support from the Bellingham
community. And in conversations many people tell us that they can't
imagine what it must be like for us.
Well, to give you some sense of what it is like, especially for the
parents in the room . . .
Imagine going home tonight and your child isn't home .
. . and never will be.
Add to this--each morning, very early, when the
newspaper being delivered thumps on the front porch, you wake
up and are reminded of when you were awakened by the police
stepping on your porch--who came to tell you that your son was
found dead on Whatcom Creek.
Then--add the experience of each time you go to a gas
station to get gas for your vehicle, and you catch a smell of
gasoline--you imagine what it might have been like for your
child as he was engulfed by a wall of gasoline vapor while
flyfishing on Whatcom Creek.
Then add that each time someone tells you a story
about their child, you think about what your child might be
doing now--if he were alive.
Now you might have a bit more information about what it is like for
us.
Last week, Marlene and I decided to visit the site where Liam's
body was found. We had been there once, a few days after his death, and
weren't sure we could find it again. We had seen then how badly damaged
the creek was. This time, we were accompanied by some friends in the
police department who knew the site. We thought it would be good to get
a better bearing on the site so that we could visit it later on our
own. I planned to stand there and imagine Liam fishing in this once
beautiful canyon--I imagined it as a site where I would be able to
reflect joyfully about Liam as I knew how much he loved fishing in that
canyon . . . Well, the experience was quite the opposite. I saw the
burned out canyon, the burned trees, the bare banks, the rocks cracked
by the heat generated during the explosion, the downed trees in the
water. And I saw Liam floating face down in the creek and the part of
his body out of the water charred by the blast.
I am not bringing all this up to upset people, but to make a plea
that Liam's death not be in vain, to plead that other families not have
to be condemned as we are to these kind of experiences and memories.
Because of the loss of our son, we are certainly biased about the
importance of stricter regulation and accountability, but we believe
everyone should be similarly biased by our experience.
I would like to bring another voice to the room a voice that is
missing . . . Liam's voice.
If I were Liam . . . and I hadn't been fishing that day . . . and I
was alive . . . I would hope I was invited to speak today. I would tell
you of how often I walked that creek from the mouth all the way up to
its source. If I were Liam, I would tell you how many of my thoughts
had been scoured from that canyon by the blast--thoughts I shared with
the creek as I fished--thoughts about school, about my parents, about
girlfriends . . . thoughts about my place in the universe. If I were
Liam, I would tell you about the many fish I caught, and released, in
that canyon. And I could recount with good sound effects and
visualizations my attempts and success at landing a fish. If I were
Liam, I would be telling you today that much more needs to be done
regarding pipeline regulation to not only prevent damage, or injury, or
death, but to also support the living, to protect our places of refuge,
to protect our neighborhoods, to protect our homes.
If I were Liam, I would most strongly ask that you tighten the
accountability of the Office of Pipeline Safety--that you support it
with the funds to do its job, but that you consider cleaning house to
get staff who are dedicated to being watchdogs of public safety, not
just supporters of pipeline and oil companies.
If I were Liam, I would most strongly urge you to allow states and
especially Washington State to regulate pipelines in addition to the
federal regulations.
If I were Liam, I would urge you to support a well funded citizen
advisory group to provide regional oversight to improve safety and
prevent oil spills.
And, if I were Liam, I would volunteer to be on that first advisory
committee for this region.
Thank you for the opportunity to present our thoughts today. We
appreciate your serious intentions which join with ours--to take steps
to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future.
Senator Gorton. Well, we thank each of you who have gone
through great difficulty and who are here today, you know,
under a great deal of stress for the kind of insight into these
challenges that only each of us can know.
I've only one or two brief questions, and I think Mrs.
Robinson has already mostly answered the question.
How many of you before this accident even knew there was a
pipeline through the park with these hazardous materials going
through it? You said you were not, Mrs. Robinson?
Mrs. Robinson. No.
Senator Gorton. Mr. King, did you know it was there?
Mr. King. I knew the pipeline was there. I really, I never
paid any attention as to what went through it, because I felt
that, you know, they were taking care of it.
Senator Gorton. What do you think----
Mr. Williams. Senator?
Senator Gorton. I'm sorry. Do you want to answer the
question?
Mr. Williams. Yeah, I lived in the community for 10 years.
Senator Gorton. Uh-huh.
Mr. Williams. And I knew the pipeline was there, also, but
I couldn't find it, and when I would ask neighbors what was in
it, nobody knew.
Ms. Dalen. No.
Mr. Williams. Nobody knew what was being transported.
Senator Gorton. Did you know precisely where it was?
Ms. Dalen You can see it.
Mr. Williams. You can see where the right-of-way is in some
of the areas, but once again, no one knew what was being
transported in that pipeline.
Ms. Dalen. And it is literally out of the ground and goes
across that black pipe. It goes across from one side of the
creek in the little gully that the creek has made to the other.
You can see it. So you assume it's water or something.
Mr. King. My oldest son, Jason, fished like Liam Wood every
inch of that creek for 15 years. We've lived there for 22
years. He's probably stood on the pipe and fished off the pipe
as a little boy. He said it was--there was a greater chance of
him being killed back in there than Wade.
Senator Gorton. You've already, I think, each of you in
your testimony told us what you think we ought to do, but one
question in that connection, what's the best way to see to it
that people in the future here in the State of Washington or
anywhere else who live in the vicinity of these pipelines are
made aware of the dangers they pose and can participate before
something happens in seeing to it that they're safe? Do any of
you have a thought on that subject?
Part of Senator Murray's bill, of course, is public
information and public knowledge. Would that be important to
you?
Mr. King. I think that the most important thing that needs
to come out of this is the pipeline industry has no intention
of doing any preventative maintenance on the pipelines at all.
Are we going to eliminate spills? Probably not, but if we have
a zero tolerance, and we did get to zero spills, wow, wouldn't
that be something? The world isn't perfect, but does that mean
that we don't strive for perfection?
Mrs. King. It wouldn't have mattered that day if, what we
knew. After it had happened and the oil had spilled, it
wouldn't have mattered who knew, who we called, what we did. It
was going to happen. This shouldn't happen. I sit here and I
listen to all of this and I get angrier and angrier and
angrier. If this is properly maintained, regulated, whatever
you want to call it, this won't happen again. We won't have to
have numbers to call. We won't have to be looking out. This
isn't up to the citizens. This is our government that should be
doing this, and I don't care about an 800 number to call if I
detect a gas leak. If this is properly handled in the future,
it can't be anything but better. Anything is going to be better
than what's gone on in the past, which is nothing.
Mr. King. Hyman Rickover who is an admiral in the Navy had
a zero tolerance for nuclear accidents. There aren't very many
accidents in the navy concerning nuclear power, because he had
a zero tolerance.
Ms. Dalen. I also the wanted to say something. I believe
that there are several avenues that we can take to inform the
public. One of the things that I've been very concerned about
is the lack of information. Well, there has been some
information, but through the news media making sure that the
country understands that these things are not just out in the
farmland which is bad enough, not out, just out in the ranges
which is bad enough, but within feet of public schools, in the
middle of parks, down the back side of people's yards. They
need to know where it's at. So I ask the media and the
government to demand that the pipeline companies let us know
where their pipes go, No. 1.
I recognize near the beginning of this tragedy it was very
difficult for us to get Olympic to be forthcoming with their
maps. It seemed that they didn't exactly know where their own
pipes were going. Well, maybe that might be a little off. Maybe
they were trying to put us off, but nevertheless, they need to
be forthcoming. We need to have that information available, and
it can be printed. People all over the country in every type of
newspaper from the New York Times down to the, you know,
Pullman Herald can find out in their newspapers using the
Internet and making these things available for people who want
to take an active role, be actively involved in it, making sure
that every owner, every property owner knows that there's, if
there's a pipeline going through or by their property, and
every time those homes are bought or sold, every apartment
bought or sold, every parking lot bought or sold, every
business bought or sold that goes near a pipeline, make that
absolutely a part of the deal. They need to know.
Speaking of the nuclear industry, I happen to be under the
impression that they have pipes, and they have smart pigs that
are a heck of a lot smarter than the pigs they're using to
chase down our pipe leaks in our pipes, and I think we ought to
start using them. I don't care if they cost a little bit more.
Excuse me. I'm paying enough for gas right now. I'm willing to
pay an extra few bucks to save my neighbor's children. I'm
willing. I'm willing, and I think we ought to start making use
of multiple industrial safety measures and asking other people
how they keep their pipes safe.
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Senator Murray?
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any additional
questions. I just want to thank this panel for being so
courageous and for coming and sharing your stories with us. I
know how difficult it is. I know how much each of you have
helped to educate all of us, and I hope we can take your
courage back to the other Washington to convince senators and
legislators from across the country that what happened in
Bellingham last year could happen in their community today
unless we toughen many of these laws and go through with many
of the recommendations you've talked about.
So just personally, thank you very much for coming here and
sharing your stories.
Mr. Chairman: Thank you all.
Mr. King. May I make one----
Senator Gorton. Sure, of course you can.
Mr. King. I asked this back in Congress, why is Olympic
Pipe Line still operating south of Bayview station with their
eight employees still at the switch pleading the Fifth
Amendment? Why?
Senator Gorton. That we hope we learn from people who are
going to testify here later on in the day.
Mr. King. Well, the problem is there is no logical reason
why they're still operating, and everybody I ask that question,
they get stumped. Nobody wants to, nobody wants to address it.
Can you go back to Congress and ask among your other
senators why are these people still operating south of Bayview
station? All we're asking for is to make the pipeline industry
and particularly Olympic Pipe Line accountable, accountable for
what they did.
Senator Murray. Thank you.
Senator Gorton. Thank you all very much.
Governor Locke is here. We've given him the difficult
assignment to testify next, but Governor, we're honored to hear
from you.
Governor Locke.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR,
STATE OF WASHINGTON
Governor Locke. Thank you very much, Senator Gorton and
Senator Murray. Thank you, Senator, for holding this field
hearing to allow the people of the State of Washington to
express their concerns about the safety of pipelines that as
parents so courageously testified just a few minutes ago, are
in our parks, are in our yards, are next to our schools, in the
midst of our own communities.
On June 10th, 1999, Liam Wood, recent high school graduate,
Wade King, Stephen Tsiorvas, they died in a tragedy that never
should have happened. There can be no more children dying, not
in Washington State, not anywhere in America. We owe it to them
to make sure that a similar tragedy never occurs again
throughout the United States of America.
Since that horrible tragedy on June 10th, we've all become
so aware of the risk surrounding these vital pathways so
central to the distribution of fuel. We realize we need
pipelines to carry the natural gas and the petroleum products
that fuel and power our cars and our trucks, that warm our
homes and keep our factories humming, but for virtually all of
us, the risk posed by the pipelines were out of sight, out of
mind.
Immediately after this tragic event, I formed a task force
to evaluate our pipeline regulatory system and our response
capability, and that team worked incredibly hard for 5 months,
and Mayor Asmundson of Bellingham was part of that team, and
they spent their time analyzing the existing regulatory system
and response capability and preparing recommendations.
One of the first things they and the people of the State of
Washington learned was that our state has virtually no control,
no control over the pipeline that leaked the gasoline that
exploded. This interstate pipeline as well as six other
interstate petroleum and natural gas pipelines is solely under
the authority of the Federal Office of Pipeline Safety, and
until Senator Murray succeeded in obtaining an Office of
Pipeline Safety position for our state, the entire western
region of the United States had only 13 inspectors, three
located in Alaska, 10 others for the entire western United
States. That is simply inadequate and is a recipe for disaster.
When the task force finished its work, they issued a report
that included 30 strong and solid recommendations for improving
pipeline safety, not just in our state but all across America.
I have endorsed these recommendations and working with our
state legislature and other Governors and the members of our
congressional delegation, we're trying to turn them into
reality, but I want to thank State Senator Harriet Spanel to my
right, and State Representative Kelli Linville for prime
sponsoring the legislation in Olympia that just a few days ago
our legislature passed: the Washington State Pipeline Safety
Act which will truly strengthen the monitoring and the
prevention of accidents in our state.
The bill will also initiate studies by the State Fire
Marshal of the training and the equipment needs facing
communities that lie along these pipelines, but we need more
than anything else to have the Federal Office of Pipeline
Safety set tougher standards and to have more stringent
inspections of all pipelines, natural gas and volatile fuels.
We simply must have the Federal Pipeline Safety Act amended to
allow states to adopt and enforce standards stricter than
Federal standards when doing so would not interfere with
interstate commerce.
The Office of Pipeline Safety is woefully understaffed and
has not kept abreast with the latest developments to ensure
pipeline safety. Therefore, the Congress must step in and
insist on a tougher regulatory stance by the Federal agency,
and in fact, allow the states to go even farther to protect our
own citizens from such tragedies. Even before that occurs, the
Office of Pipeline Safety must grant authority to the states
for interstate pipeline oversight using current or future
Federal standards as it has done with four other states. Four
states now have been delegated the authority by the Federal
Office of Pipeline Safety to be in essence an arm of the
Federal Government given the fact the Federal Government has
been so lax. Washington has been asking for this delegation of
authority as have many other states including Virginia and
Arizona. We want the ability to help the Federal inspectors do
their job, but it should not take deaths before the Federal
Government says yes.
Just today we received a letter from the Federal Office of
Pipeline Safety indicating that it is willing to delegate
authority to the State of Washington.
Senator Gorton. Do you have a copy of that letter ----
Governor Locke. Yes.
Senator Gorton. --that we can put in the record?
Governor Locke. Yes, I do--but they're saying yes to our
request, because we've had three deaths. What about all the
other states that are looking for similar authority where there
have been massive spills and leaks, but without a death? The
Office of Pipeline Safety should not have to wait for more
deaths in other parts of American before granting similar
authority.
I have sponsored and the National Governors Association has
adopted a resolution supporting stronger Federal pipeline
safety as well as increased state involvement. We've been
working with Senator Murray and Representative Metcalf and
Representative Inslee to promote their bills that will No. 1,
push the Office of Pipeline Safety to adopt stronger standards
it should have enacted years ago, and that will two, authorize
states to go beyond the Federal standards on issues like
training, certification, leak monitoring, and accident
preparedness, and I want to thank you, Senator Gorton, for
cosponsoring Senator Murray's bill. We appreciate the time that
you're spending to give the people of the State of Washington
the opportunity to indicate their concerns about these tens of
thousands of miles of pipeline running through their
communities. We've been pushing hard to get the Federal
Government to give us that authority. They're now beginning to
respond, but we're going to have to continue to push, today,
tomorrow, every day.
We need to make sure that the legacy of Liam Wood, Wade
King, and Stephen Tsiorvas will be one of protection for all
the people all across America. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Governor Locke and letter
referred to follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gary Locke, Governor, State of Washington
I want to express my appreciation to Senator Gorton and Senator
Murray for holding this field hearing to allow the people of Washington
to express our concerns about the safety of the pipelines that lie
below our towns and cities.
Since the terrible tragedy on June 10, 1999, we have become all too
aware of the risks surrounding these vital pathways so central to our
fuel distribution network. We realize we need pipelines to carry the
natural gas and petroleum products that power our cars and trucks, warm
our homes, and keep factories humming and airplanes flying. But we also
know that for virtually all of us, the risks posed by the pipelines
were ``out of sight, out of mind'' before the explosion in Whatcom
Falls Park.
Immediately after this tragic event, I formed a task force to
research our pipeline regulatory system and our response capability.
That team worked incredibly hard for 5 months, analyzing the existing
regulatory system and response capacity and preparing recommendations
for improvement. They consulted with experts from the federal
government--including the National Transportation Safety Board and the
Office of Pipeline Safety--from other states, including Minnesota and
California that operate their own interstate pipeline safety oversight
programs--and from a variety of interest groups.
One of the first things they--and the people of Washington--learned
was that our state exercises almost no control over the pipeline that
leaked the gasoline that exploded. This interstate pipeline--as well as
6 other interstate petroleum and natural gas lines--is solely under the
authority of the federal Office of Pipeline Safety. And until Senator
Murray succeeded in obtaining an OPS position for our state, the entire
Western Region had only 13 inspectors.
When the task force's work was done, they issued a report that
included over 30 strong and solid recommendations for improving
pipeline safety. I endorsed those recommendations and have been working
with our state legislature, with other Governors, and with members of
Washington's congressional delegation to turn them into reality. I
would like to acknowledge the hard work done by the legislature on this
subject, especially Representative Linville and Senator Spanel.
Since December:
The Legislature adopted the Washington State Pipeline
Safety Act, which will strengthen our ``Call-Before-You-Dig''
program to reduce third-party damage to pipelines and will
promote comprehensive mapping of pipeline locations to inform
local governments who must make building permit decisions and
prepare for pipeline accident response. The bill will also
initiate studies by the State Fire Marshal of the training and
equipment needs facing communities that lie along pipelines.
The Legislature also adopted a Joint Memorial to
Congress and the President that cited the work of the task
force and urged you to amend the federal pipeline safety act to
allow states to adopt and enforce standards stricter than
federal standards when doing so would not interfere with
interstate commerce. Even before that occurs, the Memorial asks
the President to direct the Office of Pipeline Safety to use
existing law to grant authority to states for interstate
pipeline oversight.
I sponsored, and the National Governors Association
adopted, a resolution promoting stronger pipeline safety and
committing the NGA to work with Congress on legislation to
achieve that objective. This parallels a similar resolution
that several Washington cities successfully promoted to the
National League of Cities.
I have been working with Senator Murray and
Representative Metcalf to promote their bills that will push
the Office of Pipeline Safety to adopt the stronger standards
it should have enacted years ago and that will authorize
willing states to go beyond federal standards on issues like
operator training and certification, leak detection, and
accident preparedness.
Senator Gorton, I want to thank you for co-sponsoring
Senator Murray's bill. I appreciate your recognition that
pipeline safety is of paramount importance to the people in our
state and I want to do everything in my power to work with you
to ensure safe lines.
I am confident that with the concerted effort of my Administration
and our entire congressional delegation we can change the federal law
and institute a substantially stronger program here in Washington. That
will enable us to give our citizens the peace of mind they deserve that
the pipelines beneath our state are operated and maintained to protect
public safety and our environment. This will be the legacy of Liam
Wood, Wade King and Steven Tsiorvas.
Thank you very much.
______
U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special
Programs Administration
Washington, DC.
Hon. Gary Locke,
Governor of Washington,
Olympia, WA.
Dear Governor Locke:
I am writing to transmit to you two draft Interstate Pipeline
Transportation Agreements: one for hazardous liquids and one for gas.
Since our meeting in Washington, DC, in late February, my staff and
I have been working to find a way to authorize the state to serve as
our agent in conducting interstate pipeline oversight. Based on our
assessment, we have developed these draft agreements.
I must convey to you our perspective on implementation of these
agreements, should you choose to accept them. The Office of Pipeline
Safety has significant concerns about having the State of Washington's
pipeline safety program housed in more than one agency. This concern
arises for two main reasons:
With a single pipeline safety agency, the critical
mass of expertise can be established to contribute to
activities effecting both liquid and gas pipelines, for
example, metallurgical sciences, computer operations
management, mapping, etc.
While I understand that Washington is prepared to
provide adequate funding, it is inevitable that additional
resources will be required to duplicate expertise in two
locations. As I remarked when we met, I am concerned about the
state's ability to meet the resource needs associated with
interstate agent status and do not want that problem
exacerbated by unnecessary inefficiency.
As you know, we have had an effective working relationship with the
Utilities and Transportation Commission. Over the years we have worked
with them on their certified intrastate liquid and gas programs. This
agency has consistently achieved the highest level of funding we could
make available as a reflection of their successful performance of their
responsibilities. We would be concerned about any lapse in this
performance during a transition to a second agency.
Having reviewed the bill adopted by your Legislature, I must note
that we would have some concern if there were any legal uncertainty
surrounding the agency responsible for interstate liquid pipeline
oversight. I would hope that a means can be found to avoid this
problem.
I thank you for your strong interest in promoting pipeline safety
and look forward to working with you to achieve that objective.
Sincerely,
Kelley S. Coyner,
Enclosures
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Governor.
You have two distinguished members of the legislature with
you, and in light of the letter that you've just received from
OPS, is the legislation that they've sponsored and that I take
it that you're about to sign, is that adequate to meet what you
consider the responsibilities of the state to be?
Governor Locke. The legislation that was sponsored by
Senator Spanel and Representative Linville does enact most of
the recommendations of the task force that I formed several
months ago. The Office of Pipeline Safety, however, has
expressed a few concerns that are more technical issues dealing
with whether or not the duties that the state would assume with
the delegation of authority that's being proposed by the
Federal Government might be diluted if it were in several
agencies, and so a letter from Ms. Kelly Coyner is strongly
suggesting that the oversight be continued to be housed in the
current Utilities and Transportation Commission. The Office of
Pipeline Safety is concerned that in our legislation, it's
being bifurcated into two different agencies, but I think that
this can be solved. So I see no reason why the delegation of
authority can't proceed, so that the state can just help
enforce the Federal standards, using the same Federal standards
or whatever the Federal standards might be, and hopefully those
Federal standards will be toughened up, but we're ready to do
it. We're willing to use our own state resources to do it and
to bring our people into the task, and so I think with these
two legislators here, if there are any further technical
amendments or corrections that need to be made we can address
those in a special session now under way in Olympia.
Senator Gorton. You've anticipated my next question. While
Senator Murray's bill that has my support calls for Federal
assistance to the states, that's not a certainty by any stretch
of the imagination. You feel that you can secure adequate
resources to deal with this delegation here?
Governor Locke. Yes, we believe that we'll be able to find
the dollars because this is of such utmost importance for
safety in communities throughout the State of Washington, we
will make it work.
Senator Gorton. Do you think that Senator Murray's bill
delegates the state and local governments an appropriate amount
of authority?
Governor Locke. Yes, I do, and I very much support Senator
Murray's bill and also Representative Metcalf's bill. No. 1, it
would require the Federal Government to set even tougher
standards, and No. 2, it enables or clearly indicates to the
Federal agencies that they must enlist the support of the
states, and those states that are willing to do it, like the
State of Washington should not be thwarted in their effort. We
should not have to wait until there's a death before the Office
of Pipeline Safety is willing to consider that delegation and
sharing of responsibilities with the state.
The Federal Government, excuse me, the Office of Pipeline
Safety, has been woefully negligent in this area. There are
many states ready and willing to step up to the effort to help
out using our own nickel, our own resources and the Federal
agency should not be reluctant to engage in that partnership
with the states.
Senator Gorton. We have at least heard the rumor that the
Administration may want to take back that right to delegate
power to the states even in the limited amounts that it already
has. I know neither of us is going to approve of anything like
that, and you feel that the states have a potentially a far
greater scope, not a lesser scope than the present statute
allows?
Governor Locke. I firmly believe that it's thoroughly
proper for the Federal Government to set minimum standards, and
that the states should have the latitude to set tougher
regulations on top of that to really protect our citizens just
like in the area of tanker safety through our straits and so
forth. The Federal Government should help set a minimum floor,
but the states should not be precluded from enacting tougher
regulations to deal with any particular circumstances in their
communities, and clearly, given our environment and the fact
that these pipelines are going right through the heart of
communities, we should be able to ensure our citizens that
we're doing everything we can, especially since the Federal
Government or the Federal agency has been woefully inadequate
in this area.
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Senator Murray?
Senator Murray. First of all, Governor and Harriet Spanel
and Kelli Linville, thank you for the tremendous amount of work
you did in working this through this legislative session, and I
am delighted to hear that you've received a letter from Kelly
Coyner on a state delegation of authority. I'm glad that they
have responded to you.
I have a couple of questions. They have agreed to delegate
the authority. It sounds to me like you need to deal with the
concern of the split delegations or split regulations. You will
be able to deal with that in special session so that that
concern can be addressed?
Governor Locke. I believe we can address that, whether
administratively or through legislation in Olympia, if
necessary. What Ms. Coyner has indicated is they're sending us
some draft agreements and our lawyers are working on it, and
our administration people are working on it. This comes about
after I came back to Washington, D.C., about 2 weeks ago and I
had a very long meeting with Ms. Coyner and Secretary of
Transportation, Rodney Slater, and impressed upon them that in
seeking this delegation, we were not seeking Federal funds,
that we were not using this as a pretense for greater Federal
funds, that we're prepared to do this on our own nickel, using
our own resources, our own people, because this is so
incredibly important.
Senator Murray. I want to make it clear, what they're able
to delegate to you is to regulate current Federal standards,
and unless we raise the Federal standards to higher training
and certification standards and inspection standards, you don't
have much more authority than is currently out there, and we
need to do that as part of the next step in this process.
Governor Locke. That is correct. Again, this delegation
would be basically letting the states be almost an extension of
the Federal agency, but we all know that the Federal standards
are too lax. They need to be tightened up, and so we welcome
your legislation to insure that the Office of Pipeline Safety
is enacting and promulgating the most stringent requirements
with respect to integrity of the pipes, inspection,
enforcement, and monitoring, but then states should also have
the latitude to go even farther than the Federal Office of
Pipeline Safety rules and regulations.
Senator Murray. Which is what we do in our legislation.
Governor Locke. That's right.
Senator Murray. You indicated or responded to the question
about resources which is absolutely a critical one. This is
obviously a very hotly discussed topic here in the State of
Washington right now. Five years down the road from now, it may
not be if we all do our jobs correctly, and we all hope we do.
How do we know that 5 years from now, 10 years from now when
leadership changes and other people are in place that they will
continue to commit those same resources and follow the same
standards that we are all so adamant about today?
Governor Locke. Well, I can't guarantee the caliber of the
people at the Federal agency or the number of inspectors
throughout the states, throughout the western United States,
and that's why I think it's important that each state be
granted the authority if they so choose to be an extension of
the Federal Government, and that's why it's important that
states also have the latitude to enact tougher standards
knowing that their citizens, their children and their civic
leaders will be demanding greater scrutiny. Basically, you
know, we're closer to the people here, and if we at the state
level are not doing the proper job, those citizens will have
greater success in making sure that the job is done as opposed
to trying to lobby or convince the Federal Office of Pipeline
Safety.
Senator Murray. My concern is just that when budgets get
tight and issues become more difficult, will resources remain
there for the state to be able to oversee that and that will be
the responsibility of all legislatures at the time, I assume,
and Harriet, you wanted to add something?
Senator Spanel. In the bill we have the ability to look at
funding in the form of fees from the users.
Senator Murray. Kelli, did you have any comments?
Representative Linville. We also had anticipated a
potential problem with the division of the two departments and
hopefully had signalled our willingness to revise the
legislation for the fact that caused a problem with the
delegation, and I did bring a copy of our legislation and a
copy of the summary and was very happy to hear both of your
comments. I think we included a lot of your interests in how
you would change the Federal law in our state law, and be very
grateful and speaking on the fact of, on behalf of the people
in the community if in fact these recommendations that we've
worked so hard to put together would get included in some
Federal legislation that ups the standards, because as you said
if we get the delegation, the delegation we get now is only to
inspect to the Federal standards. I believe we can still do a
better job in Washington State with the Federal standards than
the Office of Pipeline Safety has been doing, but I would
implore you to develop greater standards. I think the citizens
of this community are demanding prevention not response, and
stricter standards are going to be what takes care of that.
Senator Spanel. I would just add--in listening to testimony
on the bills in Olympia, it's more than just Bellingham at this
point. It is all up and down the I-5 corridor, and I think this
is a bill that shows that a lot of people really supported it.
It passed unanimously out of the senate demanding exactly the
things that Governor Locke has stated: that we want tougher
rules on the Federal level, want to be able to make tougher
rules on the state level, and we do want the authority to
enforce them. I understand your question on funding, and that
is why we do know there has to be another source, but I, for
one, would never turn down Federal dollars in the future.
Senator Murray. Well, thank you very much to all three of
you for the tremendous amount of work you've done. You've done
a good job. We now have a responsibility to do ours.
Thank you very much.
Senator Gorton. Governor, thank you. I do appreciate,
you've now become a national spokesperson and a national leader
on this subject, and your words are being heard in Washington,
D.C., and Senator Spanel, Representative Linville,
congratulations. You work faster than we do.
Senator Spanel. We have shorter sessions.
Governor Locke. Thank you.
Senator Gorton. The next panel is a group of local
officials along that I-5 corridor, Mayor Asmundson, Mayor
Tanner, Deputy Mayor Marshall and City Manager, Joe Hoggard.
Mayor Asmundson, I share the compliments that Senator
Murray began this hearing with and would also like to thank you
for making this facility available for a hearing. We really
filled up city hall.
Mayor Asmundson. Yes, indeed, you have filled up city hall.
Senator Gorton. And we are, since you're our host, you will
start this panel group testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARK ASMUNDSON, MAYOR,
BELLINGHAM, WASHINGTON
Mayor Asmundson. Thank you very much, Senator Gorton, and
also to Chairman McCain and to other members of the Commerce
Committee conducting the field hearing today. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I'm very
grateful to see Senator Murray with us, also, so thank you.
The City of Bellingham, its citizens and I think the other
mayors and representatives of citizens up and down the I-5
corridor appreciate the opportunity to discuss pipeline safety.
I'm going to try and not repeat much of what you've heard
today, and much of what I've spoken with you both about in the
past, but I will try to focus on some issues that I think just
do not leave me in the course of my learning about pipelines
and interstate pipelines in this country.
The Olympic pipeline which travels through Bellingham goes
through 21 cities in Washington, cities with a combined
population of nearly 800,000. It also goes through very many
environmentally sensitive areas, lakes, aquifers, salmon
bearing streams and critical wetlands habitats.
Following our June 10th disaster, I began a period of
intense involvement in learning to understand the fuel pipeline
industry, its regulatory regime, and the circumstances that
might have led up to the horrible event that occurred here in
Bellingham, and I discovered that this event was not unique. As
Senator Murray said earlier, this is not a unique occurrence.
Based on the history of the pipeline industry in the United
States, I concluded that this event could have been expected.
In fact, given the current state of affairs involving
interstate fuel pipelines in America, the issue is not will
pipelines leak, the question is when will they leak, where will
they leak, and how bad will the harm be.
Over the course of the last two decades, there's been a
long history of disaster after disaster. Sometimes there's
serious injury. Sometimes there's death. There's always serious
environmental damage. While these continuing occurrences cause
alarm, what causes even more alarm, I think, is the answer to
the question why.
The Federal Government has preempted the regulation of
pipeline safety. The Office of Pipeline Safety in the
Department of Transportation has the responsibility of carrying
out the Federal Government's protection of the public from the
hazards of interstate fuel pipelines, but the Office of
Pipeline Safety has done a remarkably poor job over the years,
remarkably poor job. In part, this is because of limited
resources. However, my observations of the record indicate to
me that the fundamental problem with the Office of Pipeline
Safety is a lack of will on the part of the Office of Pipeline
Safety. The OPS does not aggressively and effectively pursue
public safety. It seems intent on making certain that it takes
no action that will be unacceptable to the industry they're
charged with regulating. So much so that the Office of Pipeline
Safety fails to comply with the explicit mandates of Congress
as you pointed out earlier.
The rules under which the pipeline industry operates simply
must change. Clearly the Federal Government must establish
minimum levels of safety that must be followed by this industry
throughout the country. However, the Federal Government's
legitimate concern and need to protect interstate commerce does
not preclude states having a meaningful role. A partnership can
and should be established between the Federal Government and
states whereby states can protect their citizens without
interfering in interstate commerce.
Interestingly, if the Office of Pipeline Safety were doing
its job, we wouldn't have a debate, because we wouldn't be
asking for delegation of authority to the states to protect our
citizens, because it would have been done, but it has clearly
not been done. It's not even come close to having been done,
and it is for this reason that I personally and with the
enthusiastic support of the community of Bellingham support
Senate Bill 2004, prepared by Senator Murray and cosponsored by
you, Senator Gorton.
I believe that this bill together with similar efforts that
the house of representatives set forth in House Bill 3558 by
Representative Metcalf will accomplish changes that are
necessary to ensure that not only will we have a strong, viable
fuel distribution system in America, but we can have a strong,
viable fuel distribution in America that does not endanger our
environment, does not kill our children and allows our citizens
living near pipelines to go to sleep at night without anxiety
about their personal safety.
Now, I'd like to talk a little bit about pipeline safety
from the perspective of what it means in practical human terms
as a lifetime resident and citizen of Bellingham, and as a
person who happens to be the mayor right now. Fundamentally
pipeline safety is not about legislation. It's not about
Federal bureaucracy. It's not about concepts. It's about
people, and it's about the environment.
When a pipeline rupture occurs, it doesn't happen in a
committee hearing. It doesn't happen in an agency office. It
happens in a neighborhood or in a park or a wetland, farm or
over a stream. The effects of the rupture are not theoretical.
They're not abstract. They're very real, and in Bellingham's
case it meant attending the funerals of three wonderful boys in
1 week along with a community of thousands of mourners. It
meant the disruption of our water supply for a quarter of our
citizens while alternate facilities were being developed. It
meant the indefinite delay in the restoration of a salmon
habitat restoration project. It meant children were afraid that
their neighborhoods might blow up. It meant anguish,
questioning, grieving and in most cases a totally unsatisfied
search for rational answers to the question why.
In Bellingham's case it means great frustration on the part
of locally elected officials like myself when asked by
citizens, ``What will you do to make sure that we are safe?''
The answer, ``I will do the best I can, but my hands are tied
by Federal law,'' is not very satisfactory.
The disaster in Bellingham was not unique. As Senator
Murray pointed out, they occur all over the country regularly.
In one way though, Bellingham was unique, because Olympic Pipe
Line Company had failed to keep its franchise current, and as a
consequence of that, the City of Bellingham had the opportunity
as a controller of property to enter into an agreement with
Olympic which required it to do very specific things, very
specific things that will ensure the safety and the protection
of the people of Bellingham, things like hydrostatically
testing its pipeline, a thorough review of its computer
monitoring system, a review of the placement, location and
operation of all the valves, a provision for a leak detection
system, provision for a thorough and adequate staffing and
training program, and comprehensive analysis of the entire
Olympic system to ensure that all aspects of its operation
including management, training and operating procedures are
sufficient to ensure that it will operate in a safe fashion. We
were able to do this simply, because they failed to renew their
franchise a few years ago.
Senator Gorton. How long is the franchise period?
Mayor Asmundson. The franchise period was 30 years, and it
had expired. The franchise was entered into in 1965, and it
expired in 1995 and just through lack of continuity, it was not
renewed. So we had this window of opportunity to engage in very
sophisticated safety protection for the people of Bellingham.
Ironically, we did that in 3 months. We achieved for the
people of Bellingham what I think is a blueprint for the other
communities in Washington and should be a model for pipeline
safety for this country. But the ironic question I have to ask
is, with no background or history in dealing with fuel pipeline
operations, the City of Bellingham in 3 months was able to
develop a comprehensive pipeline safety program that truly
meets the needs of our community both now and into the future--
why is it that after receiving millions upon millions of
dollars in Federal funds, having an expert staff and decades to
accomplish this, the Federal Office of Pipeline Safety has been
unable to do so? In 3 months we came up with a package that
will protect citizens.
The Office of Pipeline Safety in response to this accident
has been very attentive. It has adopted many, many of the
things that we achieved through our pipeline safety agreement
with Olympic Pipe Line Company, but I think what the citizens
demand is not a Federal agency that is very capable of coming
up with corrective action orders after an injury, after a
death, or after an environmental disaster, but rather an agency
that is oriented toward prevention and looks to the future.
The Office of Pipeline Safety must be made accountable. The
state legislature has taken the steps it needs to take in order
for the State of Washington to be a strong partner in
protecting our citizens, but the effectiveness of that
legislation does not lie with the Governor as to whether he'll
sign it or not. The effectiveness lies with the Federal
Government and whether or not adequate authority will be given
to the states to make a meaningful difference to protect our
citizens in our community and our environment.
I really must thank Senator Murray and Senator Gorton. I
must thank you both for the incredible hard work that you have
done. I need to thank Jean for her hard work. I need to thank
Dale and the rest of your staff for the hard work that they've
done on this. The people of Bellingham and Washington State
deserve to know how hard you have worked on this issue and how
important that is to us, and I personally thank you for your
commitment to making a difference, to seizing this opportunity
to truly make a difference and change the status quo.
Stephen Tsiorvas, Wade King and Liam Wood did not deserve
to die on June 10th, 1999. You know that, and it's my hope that
the memory of these wonderful boys and their needless sacrifice
will encourage you and all the members of the senate and
Congress to ensure that no other parents, no other elected
officials, no other friends must sit before another committee
of the U.S. Senate at any time in the future and repeat the
tales that you've heard today.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here.
[The prepared statement of Mayor Asmundson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Asmundson, Mayor, Bellingham, Washington
My thanks to you, Senator Gorton, and to Chairman McCain and other
members of the Committee for conducting the field hearing today. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Committee. I, and the
citizens of Bellingham appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
important subject of pipeline safety and to highlight the inadequacies
of the current methods of oversight of the safety of the interstate
fuel pipeline network in the United States.
In Bellingham, we have experienced, in a dramatic, tragic, and
profound way, the failure of the current system of ensuring pipeline
safety in America.
As you know, on June 10, 1999, the Olympic pipeline, which passes
through Bellingham, ruptured, spilling one quarter of a million gallons
of gasoline into a park and creek in the middle of our city. The
gasoline vapors ignited and two boys and a young man were killed as a
result. The city park was severely impacted and the salmon-bearing
stream was effectively sterilized for one and one-half miles of its
length. But for the inadvertent ignition by two of the boys, the
gasoline would undoubtedly have proceeded into and through downtown
Bellingham into Bellingham Bay, the result of which would have been
even further devastation to our community.
It goes without saying that the people of Bellingham are concerned
about the safety of the Olympic pipeline and the safety of pipelines
throughout our country. The Olympic pipeline travels through twenty-one
cities in the State of Washington. The combined population of these
cities is nearly 800,000 people. A significant portion of this pipeline
passes through highly urbanized areas, as well as environmentally
sensitive areas including lakes, salmon-bearing streams, aquifers and
critical wetland habitats.
In Bellingham, the Olympic pipeline travels through many
neighborhoods, near schools, across city parks, and traverses three
salmon-bearing streams.
Following the disaster, I began a period of intense involvement in
understanding the fuel pipeline industry, the regulatory regime, and
the circumstances that could have led up to the kind of event that
occurred in Bellingham on June 10, 1999. I discovered that the
Bellingham event was not unique. Based on the history of the pipeline
industry and the spills that have occurred over recent years, I have
concluded that this event could have been expected.
Given the current state of affairs involving interstate fuel
pipelines in America, the issue is not will pipelines leak, but when
will they leak, where will the leaks occur, and what kind of harm,
great or small, will result from the leak or rupture? Over the course
of the last two decades, there is a history of disaster after disaster
involving interstate pipelines. Many of these have resulted in serious
injuries or death. All of them have resulted in serious environmental
damage. (Attachment ``A'' highlights several significant leaks.)
Having looked at the history of pipeline accidents in America and
finding that the track record of safety for pipelines is truly
alarming, the question I had to ask myself is: Why? How can this
continue to happen?
While the ongoing occurrence of accidents such as the one that
occurred in Bellingham causes alarm, the answer to the question of why
these continue to occur is even more alarming.
The federal government has preempted regulation of pipeline safety.
It is clearly within the power and purview of the federal government to
do so. The alarming fact is that while the federal government has
prevented states and localities from engaging in safety and
environmental protection-oriented regulation of pipelines, it has not
come remotely close to ensuring that pipelines will be operated in a
safe fashion. In fact, in reviewing the many recent comments of Mr.
Hall, the chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, it is
apparent that the OPS has consistently failed to take steps reasonably
calculated to result in safer pipelines in our communities.
Why is it that the OPS has done a poor job of making pipeline
operations safe? In part, it is because of limited resources. It is
true that the OPS has not been adequately funded, particularly until
the most recent past. However, as a result of my observations and
review of the record, I have concluded that the fundamental problem is
a lack of will on the part of the OPS. Rather than aggressively and
effectively pursuing public safety, the OPS seems intent on ensuring
that it takes no action without the agreement and concurrence of the
industry it is charged with regulating.
I have also discovered that the OPS has failed to comply with the
explicit mandates of Congress with regard to safety and environmental
protection. For example, Congress has mandated that the OPS adopt
regulations for unusually sensitive areas and adopt regulations
regarding use of internal inspection devices. The deadlines for
completing these actions passed years ago. The OPS has simply failed to
accomplish these mandates. That is not to say that the OPS did not
undertake these mandates, but it is curious to note that whenever
agreement with the industry could not be achieved, the regulatory
process effectively ground to a halt. Even as you hear this testimony
today, and witness for yourselves our tragedy, the regulatory process
has not produced the safety regulations required by Act of Congress.
As I stated earlier, the Bellingham incident is not unique. Other
communities have experienced similar tragedies, and as a consequence,
like Bellingham, and like the State of Washington, these communities
have been awakened to the inadequacies of the federal regulatory
environment. Other states have sought to improve the safety of their
citizens through establishing comprehensive programs of pipeline safety
within their states. The full effectiveness of these efforts, however,
has never been realized, and the safety potential that could have
resulted from these proactive actions by states has never been achieved
because of the unwillingness of the federal government to release its
stranglehold on regulatory authority over the pipeline industry even
when that federal regulatory authority stands unused and unfulfilled.
Consequently, states like Minnesota and California, which have
established very thorough programs for pipeline safety, have never been
able to achieve their full potential because of the unwillingness of
the federal government to allow states to have a meaningful role in
ensuring the safety of their own citizens and the desire of the OPS to
maintain complete control over every aspect of the industry. This
desire for complete control by the OPS is demonstrated by its
determination to withdraw from the agency arrangements that it has in
place with four states authorized in the past to inspect, but not
regulate federal interstate pipelines within their boundaries.
The City of Bellingham, with many other cities and counties in the
state, has been working for passage of state legislation authorizing
much more extensive protection of our citizens related to pipeline
safety. The question as to whether or not this effort will be
successful is not, however, in the hands of the state legislature or
the governor, but in the hands of the federal government. Unless
Congress is willing to allow states to have a meaningful role in
ensuring the protection of their citizens through an active program of
regulation of interstate pipelines, this effort, like the efforts in
California and Minnesota, simply will not accomplish needed safety and
environmental protection.
The rules under which this industry operates simply must change. In
order for that to occur, changes are required by the federal
government. Since the federal government has shown its unwillingness to
regulate effectively this industry and provide the protection that our
citizens and environment need, deserve and demand, it is the
responsibility of the federal government to allow states to protect
their citizens. This is not to say that the federal government should
abandon the regulation of pipelines. I would be the last to argue for
such a step. Clearly, the federal government must establish a minimum
level of safety that must be followed by any interstate pipeline
operator. However, the federal government's legitimate concern about
interference with interstate commerce need not prevent states from
providing for the safety of their citizens. A partnership can be
established between the federal government and states whereby states
can protect their citizens without interfering with interstate
commerce, particularly in cases where the states have expertise or
where the federal government could have acted, but the federal
regulatory agency has chosen not to act.
It is for this reason that I heartily support Senate Bill 2004
offered by Senator Murray and cosponsored by Senator Gorton. I believe
that this bill, together with the similar effort in the House of
Representatives, as set forth in HB 3558, introduced by Representative
Metcalf, will accomplish the changes necessary to ensure that not only
do we have a strong, viable fuel distribution system in America, but we
have a strong, viable fuel distribution in America that can and will be
operated in such a fashion that it does not endanger our environment;
does not kill our children; and allows our citizens living near
pipelines to go to sleep at night without anxiety about their personal
safety.
My testimony thus far consists of an overview of the results of my
quite extensive examination of pipeline safety in America, the Federal
OPS, and the attempts by certain states to improve the safety of their
citizens. I would now like to discuss what pipeline safety means in
real, practical, human terms.
Fundamentally, pipeline safety is not about legislation, and it is
not about federal bureaucracies. Pipeline safety is about people and
the environment. When a pipeline ruptures, it doesn't rupture in a
committee hearing, and it doesn't rupture in an agency office; it
ruptures in a neighborhood, or a park, or a wetland, or over a stream,
or in a farmer's field.
The effects of the rupture are not abstract or theoretical, they
are real. They are practical. In Bellingham's case, it meant attending
the funerals of three wonderful boys in one week, along with a
community of thousands of mourners. It meant the disruption of the
water supply to one-quarter of the citizens of our community, and
restrictions on water use, while alternate facilities were being
developed to provide an adequate water supply. It meant the indefinite
delay of salmon restoration projects on a salmon-bearing urban stream.
It meant the devastation of one and one-half miles of wildlife habitat
along a stream corridor in the midst of one of the older and best-
established parks in our community. It meant children afraid that their
neighborhoods may blow up. It meant anguish, questioning, grieving,
and, in some cases, a totally unsatisfying search for rational answers
to the question, why?
In Bellingham's case, it means great frustration on the part of
local elected officials like myself. When asked by citizens, ``what
will you do to make sure that we are safe?'' the answer, ``I will do
the best I can, but my hands are tied by federal law'' does not
satisfy. In addition to the mayors here today, I wish it were possible
for there to be sitting at the table with me, Mayor George Spadoro of
Edison, NJ, City Councilman Robert Mann of North Blenheim, NY, and
Mayor Bill Greenup of Fredericksburg, VA. They are just a few of the
mayors and other local elected officials we have reached out to who
could tell you about the enormity of the disaster visited on their
communities by pipeline accidents over the years. I believe they would
echo my comments.
While the pipeline disaster in Bellingham was not unique, in a very
important way, the Bellingham situation is unique. For reasons unknown,
in 1995, the Olympic Pipe Line Company (``Olympic'') allowed its
franchise (its right to cross city property), to expire. As a
consequence, the City of Bellingham was in a strong bargaining position
to require that very explicit safety measures be taken by Olympic as a
condition for permission to utilize our property. As a result of this
quirk, we have been able to take steps that we believe will ensure the
protection of Bellingham's citizens. These steps included requiring:
Hydrostatic testing of the pipeline; a thorough review of the computer
monitoring system; a review of the placement, location, and operation
of all valves; the provision of adequate leak detection systems;
provision for thorough and adequate staffing and training; and a
comprehensive analysis of the entire Olympic pipeline system to ensure
that all aspects of the system, including its management and operating
procedures, are sufficient to ensure that it will operate in a safe
fashion. Remember, though, we were able to do this because of Olympic's
failure to renew its franchise a few years before this tragic accident.
The question, however, is ``why is it necessary for a community to
rely on a glitch, a happenstance, a mistake by the pipeline company in
the maintenance of its franchise, for us to have the ability to protect
our citizens?'' It shouldn't be.
With virtually no background or history in dealing with fuel
pipeline operations, the City of Bellingham, in a period of
approximately three months, was able to develop a comprehensive
pipeline safety program that meets the needs of our community.
Why is it after receiving millions upon millions in federal funds,
having an expert staff and decades to accomplish the same, the OPS has
not been able to do so? Honorable members of the Committee, the reason
that this has not occurred is because the will to do so has not been
present.
We have, through our actions, provided for the safety of our
citizens. We are confident that Olympic's pipeline, should it restart,
will be safe because of the actions we have taken in our pipeline
safety plan. What we have achieved in such a short time is something
that the citizens of every community in this state and the citizens
throughout this country, are entitled to receive. They will not receive
this level of protection unless action is taken to change the status
quo. The OPS has not adequately served the public interest. Congress
needs to take steps to protect our citizens and our environment. The
OPS must be made accountable. It must be required to fulfill its
mandate. Senator Murray's legislation creates an environment which will
result in an accountable agency and a responsive system of pipeline
safety.
Steven Tsiorvas, Wade King, and Liam Wood did not deserve to die on
June 10, 1999. May the memory of these wonderful boys and this needless
sacrifice encourage you to take steps that will ensure that no other
parents must sit before another Committee of the United States Senate
at some time in the future and repeat the tales that you have heard
today.
ATTACHMENT ``A''
Examples of Major Pipeline Accidents (1980-1999)
Accidents
(1) Fredericksburg, VA 1980 (and again in 1989)
330,000 gallons of aviation fuel entered the city water supply, and
the Rappahannock River, shut down the water treatment plant, a state of
emergency was declared, and businesses and residents hauled water for a
week.
Causes: Pipe damage upon installation, subsequent undetected
corrosion, operator error, insufficient valve placement.
(2) Moundsview, MN 7/8/86
An 8-inch gasoline pipeline burst, gasoline flowed along
neighborhood streets until it was ignited, killing 2 people who burned
to death and injuring 7.
Causes: Failure to correct known defects, inadequate pipe
specifications, inadequate operator training including delay in
responding.
(3) Flathead Indian Reservation, MT 1986-1993
Seventy-one leaks and three major spills of gasoline, aircraft
fuel, and diesel (including 163,000 gallons into a creek) over this
period resulted in the Flatheads refusing to renew Yellowstone's
franchise and move the line off of the reservation.
Causes: Inattention and failure to correct defects.
(4) North Blenheim, NY 3/13/90
A liquid natural gas pipeline burst sending 100,000 gallons of
product flowing down into the town--enough to engulf the entire town.
Residents noticed a ``heavy fog'' on their windshields, until one
called and notified a company employee. Two people were killed and
seven injured.
Causes: Negligent maintenance procedures resulting in cracks in the
pipe which were undetected; operator error; insufficient remotely
operated valves and check valves.
(5) Reston (Herndon), VA 3/28/93
Pipe burst sending a geyser of diesel fuel (407,000 gallons) into
the storm sewer and eventually into a tributary of the Potomac River.
(Could have been gasoline or jet fuel.) Significant environmental
damage ($1 million clean-up).
Causes: Third-party damage causing corrosion which went undetected
for a long period.
(6) Edison, NJ 3/23/94
Natural gas transmission line burst and exploded. 1500 residents
evacuated and $25 million damage. Injuries included minor burns and
cuts from broken glass.
Causes: Line hadn't been ``pigged'' since 1986, but it had
deteriorated; no remote automatic valves; pipe manufacturing standards
lax; no extra measures for highly populated areas.
(7) Allentown, PA 6/9/94
Natural gas pipe burst and product flowed underground into the
basement of an 8-story retirement home, where it migrated through vents
into other floors and was eventually ignited. One death and 55
injuries.
Causes: Company employee (backhoe operator) error; no excess flow
valves which had been recommended by NTSB since 1972; insufficient
public awareness.
(8) Reedy River, SC 6/26/96
Fuel oil pipeline crossing the river burst resulting in a $20
million clean-up effort.
Causes: Pipeline corrosion not responded to soon enough; computer
malfunction; employee error; inadequate leak detection.
(9) Lively, TX 8/8/96
Liquid natural gas pipeline burst, killing two men who accidentally
ignited it.
Causes: Inadequate corrosion protection.
(10) Murphreesboro, TN 11/5/96
84,000 gallons of diesel fuel (could have been gasoline) and $5.7
million damage.
Causes: Corrosion; operator error--3\1/2\ hours before detection.
(11) San Juan, PR 11/21/96
Thirty-three people killed when a liquid natural gas line exploded.
Causes: Employee negligence in responding to a leak which had been
ongoing for a week.
(12) Bellingham, WA 6/10/99
Notes
None of these accidents were the result of ``third party damage''
with the exception of the Reston incident.
All of them could have been prevented--if safety recommendations
had been acted upon.
The common causes of pipeline accidents are:
anomalies in the pipe not detected or not acted upon
operator inattention or error
computer system malfunction
shut-off capability insufficient or improperly
deployed
leak detection insufficient
On average 6 million gallons spilled each year; 8 million
last year.
Since 1996, 54 accidents investigated by NTSB, resulting in
209 recommendations.
Since 1986, 39 deaths/189 injuries (natural gas); 35 deaths/
247 injuries (liquid products).
Pipeline companies involved: Colonial, Yellowstone, Koch, Olympic,
Williams, Texas Eastern, and others.
Koch just fined $30 million for 300 separate spills of 3 million
gallons in six states between 1990 and 1997; leak detection system:
wait until it breaks. (See attached article.*)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred to was not available at the time this
hearing went to press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further resource: Battelle Labs' ``Causes of Pipeline Incidents,
Effect of the Aging Infrastructure on Incidents and Areas of Technology
Development,'' Robert J. Eiber (1994), delivered at an OPS summit on
pipeline safety.
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Mayor.
Mayor Tanner?
STATEMENT OF JESSE TANNER, MAYOR,
RENTON, WASHINGTON
Mayor Tanner. Senator Gorton, Senator Murray, thank you for
the opportunity to testify on the petroleum pipeline safety,
and the provisions we feel are necessary in pipeline safety
reauthorization legislation.
Renton serves as the headquarters for the Olympic Pipe Line
Company and many miles of petroleum pipeline run through
Renton. There have been two major Olympic Pipe Line production
leaks in Renton. In 1986 a leak at a blocked valve in the
Maplewood residential neighborhood resulted in 80,000 gallons
of gasoline entering the ground water, seeping into the Cedar
River which is home to the largest sockeye salmon run in the
lower 48 states, and causing explosive levels of fumes in five
homes. These homes where evacuated for a week. Remnants of
petroleum contamination still exist within a 1,500 foot long
ground water plume. The only reason that ground water plume has
not leached into our aquifer, our drinking water aquifer, is
there's an aquitard layer that prevents it. It's still there,
and the possibility still exists that will invade our aquifer.
In August 1999, 3,500 gallons of petroleum product from a
broken pump at Olympic Pipe Line's Lind Avenue control center
escaped to the ground.
Internal smart pig testing of the pipelines in 1996 through
1997 revealed over 270 pipeline flaws, 15 of which are in
Renton, and they're shown on that large map there. There's a
small map attached to the material which I provided to the
committee.
Even though Renton's franchise contract with Olympic Pipe
Line requires that such information be submitted to Renton,
this data was not received until October 1999. In fact, Renton
encountered a great deal of difficulty in obtaining this data.
After the Bellingham incident, Olympic Pipe Line refused to
provide the data on legal grounds. When Renton cited the
franchise requirements, Olympic Pipe Line continued to delay
until Renton issued an ultimatum that the information be
provided within 30 dates or else the franchise agreement would
be terminated, and Renton would request the pipelines to be
removed from the city.
I don't know how effective that would have been, but
anyway, that's what happened. On the 30th day Olympic provided
the smart pig testing data, but it was in a format that could
only be understood by Olympic Pipe Line employees. The
stationing data for the links along the pipeline were not
provided.
Finally enough information was provided to produce the
attached map showing the pipeline flaws in Renton. The map that
has been submitted to you shows the location of these pipeline
flaws, and of the 15 pipeline flaws in Renton, three involve
pipeline metal loss of 50 percent. One of these major pipeline
flaws is within 300 feet of Talbot Hill Elementary School, and
the other two are located over Renton's sole source drinking
water aquifer.
The Olympic Pipe Line Company has not repaired or even
inspected these flaws. They feel that they are not required to
by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers pipeline
regulations which they use, which allows pipelines to be
operated with up to 80 percent metal loss under certain
circumstances.
Renton disagrees with the Olympic Pipe Line's reading of
the ASME requirements. These standards call for pipeline
sections with gouges and grooves deeper than 12 and a half
percent of the pipeline wall thickness to be removed or
repaired. Pipeline operation with wall metal loss with up to 80
percent is only allowed if metal loss is due to corrosion
pitting, and even then the corroded area must be recoated.
Since the Olympic Pipe Line company did not visually
inspect the pipeline flaws in Renton, they cannot be sure of
what caused the flaws, corrosion pitting or external damage.
They have not met the requirement of either provision nor has
the Office of Pipeline Safety required them to do so.
Olympic Pipe Line Company objects to hydrostatic pressure
testing the whole pipeline because of concerns about the test
damaging the pipeline. We're not aware of any empiric data that
supports this concern. If the company is worried about
pressurized water damaging the pipelines, why do we not see a
corresponding worry about transient pipe pressure surges
damaging the pipeline when it is filled with gasoline?
Congressman Jay Inslee has obtained information indicating
that even high frequency electric resistance welded pipe has a
history of pipeline seam failure. The Office of Pipeline Safety
has required hydrostatic pressure testing only for low
frequency electric resistance welded pipe. This information
from our Representative Inslee indicates that no distinction
should be made. The entire line should be hydrostatically
pressure tested.
Renton is concerned about leak detection. As shown by the
1986 Maplewood leak which was 80,000 gallons occurring over
perhaps months of time, smaller but extremely dangerous leaks
cannot be detected by Olympic Pipe Line Company's pressure
sensors. Federal regulations should require improved leak
detection technology to be implemented particularly in
population centers and sensitive areas.
We also believe that states should be allowed to require
use of improved technology that would enable leaks to be
quickly detected and located.
Renton strongly supports S. 2004 and H.R. 3558 currently
before Congress, and we think that each one of those bills has
some provisions that the other does not, so we would suggest
that there is, that the provisions of both bills be combined.
Renton is particularly supportive of requiring hydrostatic
pressure testing every 5 years and the requirement for improved
leak detection technology to be implemented.
Renton also supports the other provisions of both bills. I
would like to close by requesting congressional support in
persuading the Office of Pipeline Safety to issue a corrective
action notice to Olympic Pipe Line Company to require the
entire 400 mile pipeline system to be hydrostatically pressure
tested. This is a very necessary stop gap measure that will
protect thousands of people exposed to the pipeline until more
comprehensive safety regulations can be put into place. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mayor Tanner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jesse Tanner, Mayor, Renton, Washington
Thank you Senator Gorton for the opportunity to provide testimony
before you today. The citizens of Renton, Washington, have a special
interest in the safety of hazardous liquid pipelines in that Renton
serves as the headquarters of the Olympic Pipe Line Company, and many
miles of petroleum pipelines run through our city.
I have been invited to speak to you about our recommendations on
options the Congress could consider to improve the transportation of
hazardous liquids through pipelines in the context of the Committee's
pipeline safety reauthorization legislation later this year. I am
honored to do so, and I believe that our experience and history with
this subject qualify us to present you with facts and perspectives that
will be useful to you in your deliberations on the pipeline safety
reauthorization legislation.
Olympic Pipe Line Company and Renton
In addition to having their headquarters in Renton, the Olympic
Pipe Line Company owns and operates a series of pipelines within the
city. The parallel 16-inch and 20-inch lines that run north-south
through the city were installed in 1965 and 1973 respectively. The
joint capacity of these lines exceeds 14.7 million gallons of gasoline,
diesel fuel and jet fuel per day. These large lines carry petroleum
product to the Lind Avenue pump station in Renton, where fuel is pumped
to Portland, Oregon through a 14-inch line installed in 1965, and to
Harbor Island, Seattle and Sea-Tac Airport through two 12-inch lines
installed around 1970. The attached map shows the routing of these
pipelines in Renton.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred to has been retained in the Committee's
files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 16-inch pipeline (which failed on June 10, 1999 in Bellingham)
is made of .312-inch wall steel pipe, and the 20-inch line uses .25-
inch pipe. These petroleum pipelines run through residential
neighborhoods, past schools, and over Renton's drinking water supply
aquifer along much of their length.
Olympic Pipe Line's history in Renton is somewhat checkered. There
have been two major fuel leaks. In early October 1986 an estimated
80,000 gallons of mixed gasoline, diesel and jet fuel were discovered
to have leaked into the Maplewood residential neighborhood. The fuel
product was released gradually, perhaps over a period of weeks or
months, at the location of a block valve. The leak was not detected by
the Olympic Pipe Line Company, but rather by citizens who noticed an
iridescent plume spreading into the nearby Cedar River. The Cedar
River, incidentally, is home to the largest sockeye salmon run in the
lower 48 states. At about the same time, some residents of Maplewood
noticed gasoline fumes in their basements, and the Renton Fire
Department was called to the scene. Explosive levels of fuel vapors in
basements caused five families to be evacuated from their homes for a
week. Investigation determined that the fuel had contaminated a 1,500
foot-long plume eight to twenty-three feet underground. The presence of
an impervious aquitard layer under the Cedar River caused the
contaminant to be released into the Cedar River rather than percolating
downward to contaminate Renton's drinking water supply. Olympic Pipe
Line Company provided an 18-month remediation program consisting of
ground water pumping, floating petroleum recovery and soil vapor
extraction. In 1998 the Washington State Health Department initiated a
round of monitoring and testing at Maplewood which once more revealed
elevated petroleum hydrocarbons in the ground water. These elevated
readings turned out to be contaminants left over from the 1986 event
rather than from a new leak. At that time the Olympic Pipe Line Company
indicated the intent to leave the petroleum product in the ground, but
after the application of significant pressure by Renton, determined to
remove the product by use of the air sparging process.
The second major fuel leak occurred on August 29, 1999. This spill
took place at the Olympic Pipe Line Company's Renton Lind Avenue
headquarters as the result of a transfer pump that had broken leaking
product onto the ground. Approximately 3,500 gallons of fuel escaped
over an approximate 40-minute period before the leak was discovered by
company employees. It was over an hour before the company contacted the
Renton Fire Department.
In 1996-1997 the Olympic Pipe Line Company conducted an internal
``smart pig'' test throughout their pipelines to determine the
condition of these aging lines. Over 270 ``anomalies'' or flaws were
found at that time. Although at least 15 of these flaws are located in
Renton, and in spite of the fact that the Olympic Pipe Line Company had
entered into a legal agreement (franchise) to turn over all test
results to the city, the City of Renton did not receive this
information until October, 1999. Furthermore, the information was only
received after repeated requests that included an ultimatum that we
would terminate the franchise agreement and request that the pipelines
be removed from Renton. Now that we have the test results, and have
mapped the flaws, we have significant concerns about the safety of the
pipelines. I will discuss these concerns later in this testimony.
Renton's Concerns
We are very aware of, and nervous about, the tragedy that occurred
in Bellingham on June 10, 1999. We think that it is possible that such
an event could happen again. In fact the evidence, and lack of
regulatory oversight, tends to make us think that it is likely that
such an incident will happen again, if not in Renton, elsewhere along
the pipeline.
What is this evidence? First, I will speak of the general
considerations. These are aging pipelines--some sections are up to 35
years old. They are high pressure and high volume lines, with a maximum
operating pressure up to 1,400 pounds per square inch. The pipelines
are metallic, and are therefore subject to corrosion. The product being
carried consists of highly incendiary, explosive grades of refined
petroleum. The pipelines run through residential neighborhoods and
schoolyards, beneath environmentally sensitive areas, and across
salmon-bearing streams. Oversight is provided by a severely
understaffed and underfunded federal regulatory agency which, until
recently, did not even have an inspector based in the state of
Washington. The current federal regulations call for little or no
mandatory pipeline or system testing, and do not provide means for
assuring safety of the operation. There appears to be no requirement
for public disclosure, little oversight on operator training, and no
requirement for cooperation, or even communication, with local
emergency response agencies. State and local governments are preempted
from involvement in the regulation of this industry, and regulation is
only minimally provided by the federal government. Even without more
specific information, these ingredients seem to be a recipe for
disaster.
However, we do have more specific information, and that information
is chilling. The attached map shows the route of these pipelines
through the City of Renton. The blue and pink areas of the map depict
Renton's drinking water aquifer protection areas. These areas occur
over the top of our sole source potable water supply, so that any
petroleum leaks in these areas could have catastrophic consequences to
our drinking water. The green lines on the map represent the Olympic
Pipe Line petroleum pipes, the blue boxes are schools, and the 15 flaws
are flagged out along the routes of the pipes. A key at the lower right
hand corner of the map shows what the numeric information in the
callouts means. Five of the pipeline flaw callout boxes are red--these
indicate the more serious flaws (between 29% and 57% of metal loss in
the pipeline wall!). Metal loss indicates the percentage of metal that
is missing in the pipeline wall. The most serious pipeline flaw in the
City, with 57% metal loss, is located within 300 feet of Talbot Hill
Elementary School. Two pipeline flaws with roughly 50% metal loss are
located over our drinking water supply. Most of these pipeline flaws
are in heavily populated residential neighborhoods.
Back in 1996-1997 when the Olympic Pipe Line Company acquired this
information through ``smart pigging,'' they were not sufficiently
concerned to perform any further investigation. They did not provide
this information to local government, to school districts, or to
residents. It remains the Olympic Pipe Line Company's position today
that no further action needs to be taken to address these pipeline
flaws. They cite the governing standards, ASME B31.4, as allowing
corrosion pitting of the pipeline wall up to 80% loss of wall thickness
before replacement is required. However, paragraph 451.6.2(a)(1) of
this standard states that gouges and grooves having a depth greater
than 12\1/2\% of the nominal wall thickness shall be removed or
repaired. How does Olympic Pipe Line Company know, without visual
inspection, whether the areas of metal loss are due to corrosion or to
gouges or grooves? And even if the metal loss were due to corrosion,
the ASME B31 Supplemental Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength
of Corroded Pipelines states, ``in all cases where the corroded region
is to be left in service, measures should be taken to arrest further
corrosion. Such measures should include coating the corroded region
and, if indicated, increasing the cathodic protection level.'' To our
knowledge, the Olympic Pipe Line Company has not ascertained the cause
of the pipeline flaws in Renton, has not taken measures to arrest
further corrosion, nor has the Office of Pipeline Safety required that
this information be ascertained or that any remedial measures be taken.
There is only one way that we are aware of to assure that these
aging, pitted pipelines can sustain the required test pressure without
failing, and that is to hydrostatically pressure test the pipelines.
The Olympic Pipe Line Company refuses to do this, and unaccountably,
the Office of Pipeline Safety has declined to force them to do so
through a Corrective Action Order. The Olympic Pipe Line Company
proposes to undertake another ``smart pig'' internal inspection of the
pipelines instead. Renton takes no issue with performing another round
of internal testing. However, the results of such testing cannot be
correlated to pipeline strength. Until a test is undertaken that can
demonstrate the current strength of the pipeline, no one can say what
pressure or operating conditions the pipeline will support. This can
only be determined by a hydrostatic pressure test.
One of the objections that the Olympic Pipe Line Company has raised
regarding hydrostatic pressure testing of the pipelines is the
potential that such testing could damage the pipelines. However, the
company to our knowledge has not presented scientific evidence to
support this claim. Hydrostatic pressure testing of pipelines is a
standard test procedure that has been in use for decades to demonstrate
that pipelines are capable of sustaining their rated test pressures. If
performed correctly, such testing should not result in damage to sound
portions of the pipeline. It is true that weakened portions of the
pipeline could fail, as was the case with the hydrostatic testing in
Bellingham. This is the very purpose of the test: to identify weakened,
dangerous portions of the pipeline so that these sections can be
replaced to prevent future catastrophes such as happened in Bellingham.
Our question for the Olympic Pipe Line Company is: if you are so
worried about test pressures damaging the pipelines when the pipe is
carrying water, why do you not appear to be worried about transient
surge pressures that also exceed the operating pressure causing damage
when the pipe is carrying petroleum products?
I would like to mention one other issue concerning strength of
pipelines. The Office of Pipeline Safety's current Corrective Action
Orders require hydrostatic testing only for sections of the Olympic
Pipe Line that are low frequency electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe.
These sections occur mainly in Whatcom County, in the Bellingham area.
However, Congressman Jay Inslee has investigated the failure history of
high frequency and low frequency ERW pipe. He has found information
from the Office of Pipeline Safety web site archives that compares the
number of failures of electric-resistance longitudinal welded pipes
manufactured by U.S. Steel Corporation, and pipe manufactured by Lone
Star Steel from 1970 to mid 1984 on gas pipelines. This information
seems to contradict the assertion that U.S. Steel does not have a seam
failure history for high-frequency ERW manufactured pipe. It is my
understanding that the majority of the pipeline is made of U.S. Steel
and other brands of high-frequency ERW manufactured pipe. A table
showing Congressman Inslee's findings is attached. This information
calls into question the Office of Pipeline Safety's distinction between
the reliability of Lonestar and U.S. Steel pipe, and supports the
argument that the entire pipeline should be hydrostatically tested.
Renton is also concerned about leak detection. Currently the
Olympic Pipe Line Company detects leaks by internal pressure loss. As
demonstrated by the Renton Maplewood leak, more gradual leaks, that can
also be devastating to safety and the environment, cannot be detected
by the Olympic Pipe Line Company's current technology. We feel that the
Federal regulations should require improved leak detection technology,
particularly in population centers and sensitive areas.
Renton's Recommendations
The City of Renton supports both the Pipeline Safety Act of 2000
(S. 2004) and the Safe Pipelines Act of 2000 (H.R. 3558). We
particularly support the provision of H.R. 3558 that requires
hydrostatic testing of all facilities once every 5 years, and the
provision of S. 2004 requiring the use of equipment to detect and
locate leaks. We support improved certification and testing of
operators, improved corrosion testing, better notification of spills
(particularly of the local agencies which are charged with providing
emergency response), and delegation of authority to states. Providing
additional funding to the Office of Pipeline Safety also seems like a
sound provision. This agency does not appear to us to be equipped to
handle the challenges of regulating petroleum pipeline safety in the
face of growing distribution systems and aging infrastructure.
Providing additional funding to this agency would seem to be
particularly essential if more regulatory authority is not delegated to
the states.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to make an appeal to
you to take a step that would help the citizens of Renton and others
living along the route of the pipelines sleep better at night. This
appeal is to contact Kelly Coyner, Administrator of the Office of
Pipeline Safety, and request that a Corrective Action Order be issued
to the Olympic Pipe Line Company requiring hydrostatic testing of the
entire length of their pipelines. By influencing the Office of Pipeline
Safety to do so, defective sections of the pipeline could be detected
and repaired in the near term, which would significantly reduce the
risk of catastrophic failure over the next several years.
Once again, I wish to thank you for inviting me to participate in a
process that could provide much needed protection to the citizens of
Renton as well as to other residents throughout the country whose
proximity to hazardous liquid pipelines exposes them to risks that are
not currently sufficiently regulated.
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Mr. Tanner.
Deputy Mayor Marshall?
STATEMENT OF CONNIE MARSHALL, DEPUTY MAYOR, BELLEVUE,
WASHINGTON
Deputy Mayor Marshall. Good afternoon, Senators. Thank you
for coming to Washington State to hear about this critically
important public safety issue.
My name is Connie Marshall. I am the Deputy Mayor of the
City of Bellevue. First, I would like to say how terribly sorry
I am to the families here who have lost their children.
When the Olympic pipeline exploded in Bellingham, I could
honestly say that I had no idea that this same pipeline ran 11
miles through our city. I can also tell you that since that
time I and the rest of my council and our city staff have spent
hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars getting up to speed
on this issue.
Our Mayor, Chuck Moser, was appointed by the Governor to
serve with Bellingham Mayor Mark Asmundson to the Washington
State Fuel Accident Prevention and Response Team formed in
response to the Bellingham accident.
What we have learned in these past months has not reduced
our fears that an accident like the Bellingham tragedy could
happen in Bellevue. To the contrary, we have no confidence that
the Olympic pipeline is safely operated and maintained within
the city. We are greatly alarmed at the complete lack of any
automatic shut off valves on this pipeline within the city.
From what we have learned, we have even less confidence that
the Federal Office of Pipeline Safety is able to provide
adequate or meaningful oversight of pipeline operations here or
elsewhere in the country.
Our citizens are scared and demanding action, but our
ability to respond is extremely limited due to Federal
preemption in this area.
In Bellevue, the Olympic pipeline runs through several
single family neighborhoods, under a city park, by a middle
school and a community swimming pool. There are 11 schools and
one community college within one-half mile of the Olympic
pipeline in Bellevue. The pipeline also transverses numerous
creeks within Bellevue which are the subject of the Endangered
Species Act recovery actions. The pipeline also runs under two
major freeways, State Route 520, which is the main artery to
the Microsoft campus and other businesses in Bellevue and
Redmond, and I-90, our major east-west freeway across the
state. In fact, the Olympic pipeline runs underneath I-90 less
than one-third of a mile from what is one of the busiest
freeway interchanges in the state: where I-90 crosses under
405.
Why am I talking about freeways? For a very important
reason. Our consulting engineer with extensive expertise in
pipelines tells us that the locations where Olympic pipeline
crosses under State Route 520 and I-90 are, in fact, the two
most vulnerable points of the pipeline within Bellevue. This is
because they are the lowest topographical points where gravity
exerts the most pressure on the pipe.
One can only imagine the damage to our city and to this
region if the pipeline were to fail at these points. Increasing
this risk, there are no automatic shut-off valves anywhere
within the city. There are only two manual shut-off valves on
the 20-inch pipeline at locations within the city. Our engineer
tells us that in the event of a rupture, before it could be
shut off, the pipeline would drain as much as a million gallons
of fuel, four times more than what was involved in the
Bellingham accident, and due to our hilly terrain we are also
told that the existing technology cannot detect slow leaks in
the pipeline. Yet this is within current Federal standards. How
can this be allowed within a densely populated urban area?
Olympic last tested this pipeline in 1996 and 1997. They
found over two dozen anomalies on the pipeline within Bellevue.
Only six of these flaws were repaired. Olympic Pipe Line
Company tells us that the other flaws don't meet the Federal
threshold for action. Some of these involved as much as 48
percent corrosion on the pipe. Again, how can this be true? How
can we possibly explain this to our citizens? How can anyone
regard this as an adequate level of protection for our city
residents?
While we regard the Olympic Pipe Line Company safety plan
as an important step in the right direction, our engineer tells
us that the test they proposed will not provide us adequate
information regarding the safety or condition of the pipe. He
is recommending that we insist on hydrostatic testing unless
Olympic can present us with an equivalent alternative. We will
be doing so together with asking for better leak detection
devices and automatic shut-off valves.
We expect questions will be raised about our ability to
make these requests under current Federal law. I would also
note that it took us many months to obtain what we regarded as
the most basic information from Olympic about the condition of
the pipeline within Bellevue, and even the data that we now
have provides an inadequate picture. So we are also concerned
about the need to impose stricter reporting requirements and
public right to know laws on pipeline operators.
In summary, we believe there is an overwhelming case to be
made for enhanced regulations in this area. Stricter standards
are necessary particularly in urban areas, and because of the
limited staffing of the Office of Pipeline Safety, where
willing and able, states should be allowed to either act as a
proxy for the Federal Government in overseeing compliance or
enact stricter safety standards. We strongly support the two
pipeline safety bills currently before Congress.
Please work to see that we can ensure safety for our
residents. We need better reporting requirements. We need
better safety requirements such as safety valves and leak
detection devices. We need better Federal funding for OPS. We
need assurances that pipeline companies will be required to
work now with first responders such as our police and fire
departments to develop emergency response plans. We need your
help to ensure that the tragedy in Bellingham and the dozen of
similar tragedies around the country are not repeated.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Deputy Mayor Marshall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Connie Marshall, Deputy Mayor,
Bellevue, Washington
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, and thank
you for coming to Washington State to hear about this critically
important public safety issue. My name is Connie Marshall; I am the
Deputy Mayor of the City of Bellevue, Washington. Bellevue is an urban
city of 107,000 residents located directly to the East of Seattle, on
the shores of Lake Washington. We are a major job center in the Puget
Sound region, a major retail center, and home to many beautiful single
family and multi-family neighborhoods.
When the Olympic Pipe Line exploded in Bellingham, I can honestly
say I had no idea that this same pipeline ran 11 miles through our
City. I can also tell you that since that time, I and the rest of my
Council and our City staff have spent hundreds of hours and thousands
of dollars getting up to speed on this issue. Our Mayor, Chuck Mosher,
was appointed by the Governor to serve with Bellingham Mayor Mark
Asmundsen on the Washington State Fuel Accident Prevention and Response
Team, formed in response to the Bellingham accident.
What we have learned in these past months has not reduced our fears
that an accident like the Bellingham tragedy could happen in Bellevue.
To the contrary. We have no confidence that the Olympic Pipe Line is
safely operated and maintained within the City. We are greatly alarmed
at the complete lack of any automatic shut-off valves on this pipeline
within the City. From what we have learned, we have even less
confidence that the federal Office of Pipeline Safety is able to
provide adequate or meaningful oversight of pipeline operations here or
elsewhere in the country. Our citizens are scared and demanding action.
But our ability to respond is extremely limited due to federal pre-
emption in this area.
In Bellevue, the Olympic Pipe Line runs through several single
family neighborhoods, under a City Park, past a City golf course, by a
middle school and a community swimming pool. There are 11 schools and
one community college within \1/2\ a mile of the Olympic Pipe Line in
Bellevue. The pipeline also transverses numerous creeks within Bellevue
which are the subject of Endangered Species Act recovery actions.
The pipeline also runs under two major freeways: State Route 520--
which is the main artery to the Microsoft campus and other businesses
in Bellevue and Redmond; and I-90, our major East-West freeway across
the state. In fact, the Olympic Pipeline runs underneath I-90 less than
\1/3\ of a mile from what is one of the busiest freeway interchanges in
the state: where I-90 crosses under I-405. Why am I telling you about
these freeways? For a very important reason: our consulting engineer
with extensive expertise in pipelines tells us that the locations where
Olympic Pipe Line crosses under SR 520 and I-90 are in fact the 2 most
vulnerable points of the Pipeline within Bellevue. This is because they
are the lowest topographical points, where gravity exerts the most
pressure on the pipe. One can only imagine the damage to our City and
to this region if the Pipeline were to fail at these points. Increasing
this risk, there are NO automatic shut-off valves anywhere within the
City. There are only two manual shut-off valves on the 20 inch pipeline
at locations within the City. Our engineer tells us that in event of a
rupture, before it could be shut off, the pipeline would drain as much
as a million gallons of fuel, four times more than was involved in the
Bellingham accident. And, due to our hilly terrain, we are also told
that existing technology cannot detect slow leaks in the pipeline. Yet
this is within current federal standards? How can this be allowed
within a densely populated urban area?
Olympic last tested this pipeline in 1996 and 1997. They found over
two dozen ``anomalies'' on the pipeline within Bellevue. Only six of
these flaws were repaired. Olympic Pipe Line Company tells us that the
other flaws don't meet the federal threshold for action. Some of these
involved as much as 48% corrosion of the pipe. Again, how can this be
true? How can we possibly explain this to our citizens? How can anyone
regard this as an adequate level of protection for city residents?
While we regard Olympic's Pipe Line Company's Safety Plan as an
important step in the right direction, our engineer tells us that the
tests they propose will not provide us adequate information regarding
the safety or condition of the pipe. He is recommending that we insist
on hydrostatic testing, unless Olympic can present us with an
equivalent alternative. We will be doing so, together with asking for
better leak detection devices and automatic shut-off valves. We expect
questions will be raised about our ability to make these requests under
current federal law.
I would also note that it took us many months to obtain what we
regarded as the most basic information from Olympic about the condition
of the pipeline within Bellevue, and even the data we now have provides
an inadequate picture. So we are also concerned about the need to
impose stricter reporting requirements and ``public right to know''
laws on pipeline operators.
In sum, we believe there is an overwhelming case to be made for
enhanced federal regulations in this area. Stricter standards are
necessary, particularly in urban areas. And, because of the limited
staffing of the Office of Pipeline Safety, where willing and able,
states should be allowed to either act as a proxy for the federal
government in overseeing compliance, or enact stricter safety
standards. We strongly support the two pipeline safety bills currently
before Congress introduced by members of our Washington delegation: S.
2004 and H.B. 3558.
Please work to see that we can ensure safety for our residents. We
need better reporting requirements. We need better safety requirements,
such as safety valves and leak detection devices. We need better
federal funding for OPS. We need assurances that pipeline companies
will be required to work now with first-responders such as our police
and fire departments to develop emergency response plans. We need your
help to ensure that the tragedy in Bellingham, and the dozens of other
similar tragedies around the country, are not repeated.
Thank you.
[The attachments referred to have been retained in the Committee's
files.]
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Deputy Mayor Marshall.
Mr. Hoggard?
STATEMENT OF CALVIN HOGGARD, CITY MANAGER,
SEATAC, WASHINGTON
Mr. Hoggard. Senator Murray, Senator Gorton, thank you for
being here and your serious concern of the issues of the
community in regards to pipeline safety and thank you for the
opportunity to testify.
The City of SeaTac has 25,000 residents. About 35,000
people come to work in the city each day. Additionally at any
given time there are about 10,000 guests living in the hotel
rooms in our city. We have each day 75,000 people who come to
and from the airport. Large numbers of these people are at risk
because of the unsafe pipeline in our community. I share the
concerns that you've heard from the other communities that live
along the 400-mile pipeline corridor in western Washington.
The basis of our concern is the absence of adequate
requirements at the Federal level to operate the pipeline
safely, coupled with preemption by the Federal Government of
state and local oversight of pipelines, and we have a pipeline
operator that seems to be doing the minimum necessary to get
along.
The lack of Federal requirements include the lack of
requirements for periodic testing, lack of standards regarding
the frequency and type of testing, lack of independent
oversight of pipeline operations, testing of inspections and
followup on deficiencies, the lack of standards for
certification and qualification to operate and maintain
pipelines, lack of requirements to work with state and local
agencies regarding pipeline design, inspection, testing and
followup of tests, the lack of requirements to report on
inspection results and followup repairs, and a lack of
requirements to work in any city with local emergency response
agencies such as the police and fire departments including the
reporting of incidents in a timely way.
In SeaTac's case, the absence of the ASME requirements we
feel has led to poor management on the part of Olympic Pipe
Line Company and given us serious concern about our safety. The
pipeline in SeaTac is a 12-inch diameter pipe. It operates at
800 pounds per square inch. It pumps millions of gallons of
fuel to the airport, where there's a five million gallon
storage tank. It runs steeply uphill from the Sea-Tac Airport,
or downhill from the Sea-Tac Airport to the Green River valley,
a distance of about four miles in a heavily developed urban
area that includes the airport, retail businesses, offices,
restaurants, hotels, congested arterial highways, freeways and
homes, and there's no shut-off valves in that entire length. We
could do nothing to prevent the gravity release of thousands of
gallons from the pipe into the areas that I've described, with
devastating results.
One of our biggest immediate concerns is incident response.
Nothing requires the pipeline operators to provide notification
of emergency personnel or to develop effective emergency
response plans with all the government, police or fire
agencies. Olympic has a track record of delayed or no
notification of spills.
Despite our substantial efforts today, SeaTac does not yet
have an emergency response protocol worked out with Olympic
should an event occur in SeaTac. Though they have stated they
have done so in their literature, the Olympic Pipe Line Company
has not made substantive contact with law enforcement agencies
in King County as a whole to plan and train for emergency
responses involving pipeline fuel incidences.
Given the poor state of leak detection, and the current
operator practices that are in effect, we are relying on
witnesses at the scene to call us in order to have an emergency
personnel available at the site of a leak in any timely way.
Olympic investigates incidents on their own, and this
results in unacceptable delays in local jurisdictions' efforts
to contain, isolate, evacuate or otherwise mitigate the effects
of an incident. This places responding police and fire
personnel and the surrounding community in unnecessary
jeopardy.
Another concern that we have is the absence of warning
signage. Although third-party damage is one significant factor
leading to pipeline failures, the SeaTac Lateral is not
currently well marked or posted anywhere within the city to
warn potential excavators of its presence. This is one area
where local government through our public works and building
permit functions could help the pipeline if the pipeline was
required to work with us.
Another area of concern that's been mentioned previously is
pipeline maintenance. Pipelines are subject to many sources of
damage. Some of the particular concerns in western Washington--
in our wet northwest--are cathodic erosion which is rust,
stress due to steep terrain which is mentioned in the
Bellingham situation here, and also stress due to earth
movements or the pipe movement, itself, in our wet soils. All
of these conditions are found in the City of SeaTac. However,
Olympic believes, incredibly, that with proper maintenance and
care, a pipeline will last forever. It seems to us that if this
it is the approach that is taken, then strong emphasis must be
placed on proper testing, maintenance and care. We do not
believe Olympic has maintained the 35-year-old pipeline
adequately.
Although not required by any regulations, limited
resolution pig testing was conducted 4 years ago. We found it
very difficult to obtain information from the Olympic Pipe Line
Company about the anomalies, thus found, and we have not had an
explanation from Olympic as to the absence of their followup on
the anomalies that are within SeaTac.
We lack any confidence in the judgment of Olympic to
properly verify and followup to repair anomalies, given their
failure to do so previously. This is one concern with Olympic's
Pipe Line Safety Action Plan. There is no independent oversight
of their plan, and it's not a long-term plan.
We are also not confident in Olympic's long-term commitment
to maintenance and safety given their track record, and that
would require better marks such as testing requirements,
operator certification, exposure requirements and independent
oversight. We believe hydrostatic testing is necessary to
adequately insure pipeline safety. Hydrostatic testing is a
tried and true method, and if properly applied does not damage
the line. Since hydrostatic testing is required under Federal
law when a pipeline is first laid, and since Olympic and others
argue that a properly maintained line will last forever, why
should they have any fear of properly designed hydrostatic
tests?
We also support state-level independent oversight with
teeth to followup on concerns, and it would go a long way
toward eliminating our concerns about the safety of the
pipelines in Washington. Our community is alarmed and wants
action, but we're overly limited by Federal preemption. We
would like to see a delegation of pipeline oversight authority
to states, and we support the resolution of the National League
of Cities adopted in November 1999 calling for amendments to
the Pipeline Safety Act to address these concerns.
Our analysis of the Bellingham and our own situation
suggests that the same type of disaster that happened in
Bellingham could happen and could have occurred and may occur
anywhere in Olympic's system. Federal pipeline safety
monitoring is so lax that both in the requirements of the
pipeline operators and in administratively that we feel no
assurance that the appropriate procedures are in place.
We need your help because without these changes to
strengthen the independent oversight of pipeline operators,
such things as Olympic's Pipe Line Safety Action plan will not
have any long-term benefit.
We support the S. 2004 and H.R. 3558 legislation that's in
front of you. We encourage their speedy adoption, and I thank
you very much and would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoggard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Calvin Hoggard, City Manager, SeaTac, Washington
Senator Gorton and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Calvin
Hoggard, City Manager of the City of SeaTac, Washington. I appear and
testify today on behalf of the City of SeaTac. Attending here with me
today is Mayor Shirley Thompson. She and other Council members in our
City share the concerns I will express today. Thank you for your
serious interest in the safety of pipelines in our communities and for
the opportunity to testify.
The City of SeaTac is a ten-year old city that surrounds Sea-Tac
International Airport, south of Seattle. The City has 25,000 residents.
About 35,000 people come to work in the City each day. Additionally, at
any given time there are approximately 10,000 guests staying in hotel
rooms within the City and we have about 75,000 visitors passing through
our city each day. A key economic factor in the City's vitality is the
Airport. For this reason among others, SeaTac has not joined with six
neighboring jurisdictions in lawsuits fighting the expansion of the
Airport but has taken a course to cooperate with this essential
transportation facility. I mention this to indicate the generally
supportive attitude of the City toward federally regulated
transportation facilities.
In the case of Olympic Pipe Line we have a serious problem which we
share with other local governments along the 400-mile pipeline corridor
in Washington and Oregon. We do not believe the pipeline is reasonably
safe in our communities. In the SeaTac area Olympic Pipe Line operates
an east to west lateral pipeline or pipeline spur coming from the main
pipeline. The lateral to SeaTac runs from Olympic's Renton station to
the Sea-Tac Airport. The pipeline flow to SeaTac is intermittent. This
on-off flow is an added stress to the line from pressure cycling caused
by the change in flow. When not making deliveries to SeaTac this
lateral sits full of jet fuel under pressure.
Until the June 10, 1999 pipeline spill and explosion in Bellingham,
it is fair to say that few communities or government agencies in
Washington were particularly aware of the safety issues surrounding
hazardous liquid pipelines. Many of these pipelines--and there are
thousands of miles of such pipe nationwide--were installed 40 to 50
years ago, prior to significant environmental regulations. The oil
companies correctly emphasize that transporting oil and jet fuel by
pipeline is much preferable to the usual alternatives--transportation
by highway tanker truck and by barge. In SeaTac, where millions of
gallons per year of jet fuel are pumped to the airport, an amount
projected to greatly increase, a safe pipeline conveyance is clearly
preferable to the large number of trucks which would otherwise be
traversing our streets.
The main Olympic pipeline was built in 1965 making it almost 35
years old. The SeaTac segment of the pipeline, a 12" diameter spur, was
built later than most of the rest, in 1971. The 12-inch diameter
pipeline, which is constantly under pressure (800 pounds per square
inch) with jet fuel, runs from the City of Renton westward across the
Green River Valley crossing the Green River. The Green River is a major
salmon bearing and navigable river flowing into Elliott Bay in
Seattle's waterfront. From the Green River the pipeline continues
westward running just under a mile along Strander Boulevard between the
heavily congested Southcenter Shopping Mall and Target and other
stores. At Southcenter Parkway it turns south and runs about half a
mile along the Parkway that is lined with commercial and retail
development. It then turns west going through the City of SeaTac about
a quarter mile under Interstate 5 up a very steep hill above the City
of Tukwila (frequently mentioned in media traffic reports as ``the
Southcenter Hill'' due to its common traffic congestion). It then
travels about a mile and one-half along South 170th Street, a
residential street lined with homes, a corner grocery and one of our
fire stations. Next it turns south along International Boulevard, an
arterial that is heavily congested much of the time, for about a mile
then turns southwestward into a large 5 million gallon tank farm at the
International Airport. From the tank farm multiple smaller high-
pressure lines run around the Airport to feed various locations
traveling under City streets much of the way. The SeaTac Lateral is not
currently well marked or posted within the City to warn potential
excavators of its presence. There are very few signs, perhaps 3 or so
in the entire City. The City itself only recently learned about the
presence of the smaller pipelines as we pushed to obtain more detailed
information in the aftermath of the Bellingham accident.
Valve placement and control are big issues--if there is a leak, how
far back up the line is the place where the spigot can be turned off,
and how quickly? In the hilly terrain of western Washington, how do you
stop flow draining downhill without properly placed valves? For
example, there is only one valve in the SeaTac spur. It is east of
Tukwila. Therefore a pipe burst at the foot of the hill near
Southcenter in Tukwila would allow the pipe to drain downhill and out
of the rupture with no valve to stop it. Some valves are manual, some
computer-controlled. In shutting a valve, one must also shut off the
flow coming into the system; otherwise pressure will build up. The
pressure in the main pipeline is well over 1,000 pounds per square
inch, and ranges up to 800 PSI in the SeaTac Lateral, meaning that any
flow problem not handled correctly will quickly become a disaster. But
adding more valves can upset the flow dynamics of the entire line, and
cannot necessarily be done at each City limits. The addition of valves
needs engineering analysis and careful computation. State level
oversight seems right to attend to both local and system-wide concerns
like these.
From Sea-Tac Airport to the Green River, a distance of almost four
miles of heavily populated area, there is no shut off valve of any
kind. The first one is at the Green River itself. At that location
immediately on each side of the river is one valve. A pipeline rupture
anywhere along this entire area would seriously risk loss of life and
severe environmental and/or property damage. A pipe rupture on Strander
Boulevard, for example, would release under high pressure and gravity
pressure all the contents of the pipe draining down the hill from
SeaTac into a heavily populated shopping area. As I understand it from
our fire officials portions of the fuel would likely vaporize into a
cloud when released into normal air pressure. The rest would puddle up
or flow on the ground. The vapor would be heavier than air so it would
also travel along the ground until encountering an ignition source that
would cause it to explode with devastating results. Our fire and police
could only get people away and watch as the pipeline emptied if we were
lucky enough to have any time to have emergency personnel at the scene
to do that.
Given the state of leak detection and current operator practices we
may not have emergency personnel available at the site of a leak or
rupture in any timely way unless we get lucky. Olympic pipeline
monitors fuel pressure at a central station in Renton but even if they
detected the rupture, without valves they could also do nothing to
prevent the gravity release of thousands of gallons from the pipe into
the areas I have described. The leak detection system used at the
Renton monitoring station only imprecisely monitors unexpected pressure
drops in the 400-mile long line. When an unexpected significant drop in
pressure is noticed, the first step taken by Olympic is to determine
whether or not the pressure monitors are accurate. Then a person is
dispatched to go physically see if the pressure drop has occurred
because the line is leaking or ruptured. If it is leaking or ruptured
then our City emergency personnel are to be notified.
Such delayed notification results in delayed response, so the City
has been working with Olympic since the Bellingham explosion to get
earlier, immediate notification at the first hint of a problem because
time is so critical, the hazards are so great and we are usually closer
to the pipeline than Olympic to respond to check for leaks. The City
has not received notification from Olympic of prior instances when
there have been leaks. Nothing requires this sort of immediate
notification.
One of our biggest concerns right now is incident response. We have
not had contact with Olympic on this subject until only recently, at
our urging. Since it's the local fire departments that will need to be
quickly notified, send their trucks to put out fire and provide medical
assistance, and local police that will help evacuate an area if
necessary due to a spill, this local dialog is absolutely essential.
Moreover, the pipeline's emergency response plan must be not just
coordinated with, but approved by, the City Fire Department. At the
very minimum, the federal law needs to require this type of
coordination. Ideally, the federal level will assign to the local level
the determination of what type of incident response planning fits the
local area.
Although since the Bellingham explosion we have been pressing
Olympic and we are pleased there has now begun to be some dialogue, we
do not have a coordinated emergency response plan between the operator
and the City's emergency response personnel. Nothing requires Olympic
to work out such plans with local jurisdictions.
Though they have stated they have done so in literature, the
Olympic Pipe Line Company has not made substantive contact with law
enforcement agencies in King County to plan and train for emergency
responses involving pipeline fuel incidents. A poll of the King County
Sheriff and Chiefs of Police in February 2000 showed that Olympic had
not contacted any law enforcement agencies to establish a timeline to
do so. Olympic Pipe Line Company does not have acceptable policies and
procedures, even today, to contact and coordinate with emergency
responders of appropriate jurisdiction(s) in cases of suspected or
confirmed leaks.
Olympic investigates incidents on their own which results in
unacceptable delays in local jurisdictions efforts to contain, isolate,
evacuate and/or otherwise mitigate the effects of incidents. This
places responding police and fire personnel, and the surrounding
community, in unnecessary jeopardy. Pipeline emergency management, like
all emergency management is difficult, because emergencies by nature
tend to be dangerous, dynamic, complex and confusing. Most emergency
responders use the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage emergencies.
Timely notice, accurate information, effective communication,
organization, and training are essential elements of effective
emergency response plans. Federal law must be changed to insure that
pipeline companies are part of established emergency response teams.
In addition to the urban routing of a pipeline designed for a rural
setting and with no shutoff valves, the absence of signage to thwart
third party damage, the weakness of leak detection and the lack of
emergency response coordination, there are other reasons for our
concern about pipeline safety.
Pipelines tend to move in the ground, the amount of movement
depending on the type of soil, stresses on the pipeline, and whether
the area is subject to such events as mudslides or earthquakes. Some
communities have reported that the actual pipeline location, when
checked by probing, is well outside the swath of land (usually 5-10
feet wide) where it was supposed to be. This can be partly due to
movement after construction and partly due to lack of map accuracy
based on the lack of requirements for engineer-stamped as-built
drawings to be provided to local jurisdictions upon construction (i.e.,
the pipe was not placed in the exact location contemplated by the pre-
design drawings). With GIS technology it seems more accurate pipeline
location information could be easily provided if required.
There is no industry standard or even agreement as to an
appropriate replacement schedule for old pipe. If one buys a house
there are rules of thumb for the usual life of various building
materials and components. Olympic and others in the oil industry
believe that with proper maintenance and care, a pipeline will last
forever. It seems to us that if this approach is taken, and it is being
taken by Olympic and the pipeline industry generally, then strong
emphasis must be placed on proper maintenance and care. Judging by the
frequency of major accidents it appears to us that adequate emphasis on
maintenance is not happening in the industry in general or at Olympic.
One reason we feel it is unlikely that pipelines last forever is
the ``cathodic protection'' problem. Cathodic protection provides a
slight electric current running to the pipe outer surface which resist
the tendency for iron to return, or corrode, to its natural state. But
cathodic protection is not perfect. Among other concerns, another metal
pipe or structure in the ground can interfere with the cathodic
protection intended for the principal pipe.
Other reasons for potential damage to pipelines are strain from
earth movements and the strain that can result from being under
tremendously high, but varying, operating pressures for years and
years, which can fatigue the pipeline. The stress points introduced by
elevation variations such as in Washington also increases potential
damage.
The actions of ``Third Parties'' are often a major source of
damage. While not the dominant source, third party careless actions are
a significant source of pipeline damage. Washington has a ``one-call''
system with signs near buried utilities encouraging contractors and do-
it yourselfers to ``call before you dig.'' There is pipeline
participation in this program, but there do not seem to be any
mechanisms for ensuring that the signs stay in place. More often it
appears that people call in after they have hit something. Further,
even if the call is made first, there is no guarantee that the company
will respond appropriately. For example, prior to the Bellingham
accident, Olympic was advised of digging by a contractor in close
proximity to the pipe but may not have taken the necessary precautions
to protect the pipe's integrity. Persons seeking permits from the City
of SeaTac are informed of the pipeline and the need to avoid it, and to
contact Olympic. Our recent road and drainage projects on S. 170th had
a representative of Olympic present to assure no damage to the line, as
did the relevant sections of the International Boulevard projects. We
would like to see requirements surrounding these sorts of activities
that will better ensure the pipeline operator and contractor's follow
up.
The overall federal pipeline regulatory situation appears to be a
``Catch-22'' since despite the laxness of the federal requirements,
``federal pre-emption'' prevents states or local communities from
having stronger safety requirements of their own which should be
tailored to the area's unique environment.
Safety is of course best achieved through adequate preventive
measures such as inspection, testing and replacement of defective line
segments. Pipeline companies tend to do more than the federal
government requires, because the government requires so little. For
instance, while there is currently no requirement for in line testing
using a smart pig, many companies (including Olympic) use this
technique from time to time. But whether the methods chosen by any
given company (e.g., frequency of pigging; type of pig used; response
to anomalies identified) meet reasonable and appropriate standards is
very much in question.
The federal requirements do not include regular testing or
inspection, so problems are often only uncovered on an emergency basis
or if a report is made if the pipe is accidentally hit during some
unrelated construction project. Additionally, federal procedures do not
define what an adequate testing process would be. They do not require
more stringent standards for older pipelines despite the older age of
many lines.
Testing on a regular basis using appropriate methods is important
to assure safety. It's also important that the pipeline companies be
encouraged to share the results of that testing with states and local
communities to ensure accountability. Pipeline testing and follow-up is
a major area of concern because there is no routinely required testing
of pipelines and no independent third party monitoring of the follow-up
to test results. This lack of third party accountability is our major
criticism of Olympic's otherwise positive start with their Pipeline
Safety Action Plan. Federal requirements should more strongly provide
for this third party oversight. They do not at present in any effective
way. We support federal legislation which will allow state level
independent oversight of routine testing with teeth to follow up on
deficiencies by operators.
Various testing devices are used. ``Smart pigs,'' so named because
they make a squealing noise as they are pushed through the pipe by the
fluids, measure pipe geometry and pipe wall thickness and can infer the
existence of various anomalies. There is no oversight of how pipeline
operators use (or don't use) the data from smart pig and other testing.
The Olympic Pipe Line was smart pigged in 1996-7 throughout the state
and over 250 anomalies were found, but before June 10, 1999, according
to a July article in the Seattle Times, Olympic had only fixed a few of
these and determined that the remainder were insignificant. (One of the
supposedly ``insignificant'' anomalies was at or very close to the
point of the June 10 rupture in Bellingham.)
We have this same situation in SeaTac and throughout the rest of
the Olympic Pipe Line system. Anomalies have been found in the limited
1996 voluntary testing showing deterioration but assessed by Olympic to
not require excavation to verify or repair. In SeaTac there are at
least seven anomalies none of which have been verified by physical
inspection and none of which was determined by Olympic to require
repair. This information was only recently disclosed to us by Olympic
after much lengthy effort by the City. Similar experience in
neighboring cities with more complete review to date than we have been
able obtain in SeaTac has disclosed serious pipeline deterioration with
no follow up by Olympic. We fear the same situation exists in SeaTac.
The Pipeline Company has scheduled but not yet held sessions with the
cities to explain their actions. We should not be in this situation and
it does not appear to be unique to Olympic but an industry wide
practice. In fact, I understand that federal standards while not
requiring testing, allow up to eighty percent erosion of the thickness
of a pipe wall before replacement is required. This should be
investigated. Regular effective testing should be required against
proper standards with independent oversight of the results and follow-
up.
Another form of testing is ``hydrostatic.'' This means that the
line is emptied of petroleum products and filled instead with water at
deliberately higher pressure. Current Federal regulations call for
hydrostatic testing only when a pipeline is newly installed. Bellingham
required a new round of hydrotesting before re-opening that section of
the line. Both hydrotesting and smart pigging have their advantages and
weaknesses. Neither is a substitute for the other. We believe both
testing approaches should be used and if properly conducted do no harm
to the pipeline.
Pipeline companies describe the difficulties with more frequent
hydrostatic testing as follows. Such testing means they must stop
shipping product to perform the test (unlike pig testing), and must
purchase and then treat and dispose of large volumes of water, as well
as fully removing water from the pipe after testing, in order not to
contaminate the next petroleum products.
Pipeline companies may also claim that hydrotesting is done at
unrealistically high pressures, causing failures when none would occur
during normal operation. We do not believe that this is true, as
pipelines may fail at normal operating pressure for many reasons. It is
also claimed that hydrostatic testing damages the line. That is
possible if pressures are too high, but experts have told the City that
properly controlled hydrostatic tests are ``non-destructive'' i.e. they
cause no damage to the line. In fact, as evidence of its effectiveness,
hydrostatic testing is the only test method that can currently
determine certain defects. It is worth noting that before Olympic
performed the required hydrostatic tests in Bellingham, they first did
several repairs to anomalies on the line that smart pigging had
previously identified. Even so, the hydrostatic test demonstrated
additional pipe weaknesses when leaks occurred during the testing.
The Federal Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) which administers the
national Pipeline Safety Act, is years and sometimes decades behind in
implementing the recommendations of the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB). OPS can, in many cases, act administratively but has
often not done so. It is clearly an advantage that the safety body (the
NTSB) is independent and reports directly to Congress, but a
disadvantage that its recommendations are not mandatory.
OPS is empowered to pick certain states to which it will hand off
its authority and did so with a handful of states, including
California, Minnesota, New York and Arizona. For reasons that are not
clear, OPS subsequently decided that no more states would be granted
this opportunity. States need the right to adopt more stringent safety
requirements (that are also tailored to the local environs) than OPS
has in place at present.
Leak detection as I touched on earlier is another very important
issue. There is no federal requirement for pipeline operators to use
leak detection systems, and thus no standards for what would comprise
adequate leak detection. At present, leaks are mainly noticed because
of a drop in pipeline pressure. But if computers and gauges are not
operating, a huge leak (hundreds of thousands of gallons) can go
undetected for far too long. Olympic presently relies on pressure
monitoring in the Renton control center, and over-flying the line every
couple of weeks, to detect leaks. Independent, redundant leak detection
systems are vital in highly populated and environmentally sensitive
areas.
Another leak detection problem relates to slow, persistent leaks.
These are too small to be detected by the pressure gauges. But
undetected for weeks, months, or even years, they, too, can contaminate
groundwater with hundreds of thousands of gallons of petroleum product.
For example, a persistent leak in Renton, Washington in 1986 was
undetected for over one year and contaminated an aquifer that remains
polluted to this day. The recently detected incident in Delware, where
600,000 gallons leaked over twelve years again demonstrated this
problem.
In addition to the above, a review should be undertaken to insure
that the pipeline system has proper overpressure protection safety
equipment in place. Such equipment should not only prevent excess
pipeline pressures, but also reduce unnecessary pressure cycling (i.e.,
pressure surges) that can significantly ``age'' a pipeline.
Federal regulations are in place to protect workers and the public
in or near facilities such as refineries and chemical plants. These
regulations, however, do not protect the public living near pipelines.
Pipelines are specifically exempted from such ``process safety
management'' requirements intended to ensure that equipment is
designed, maintained, and operated safely. One has to have plans
reviewed and a permit issued to add a deck on a house. No such
technical review or permit is required to build, modify or operate a
pipeline.
Many of the problems associated with pipeline safety could be
addressed if pipeline operators were held to a standard to be tested
for competency and certified to meet minimum qualifications. This is
another area not at all uncommon in other critical industries that
should be addressed for pipelines through federal legislation allowing
states to do this.
We support the legislation now before Congress: S. 2004 and HR 3558
and encourage you to act now to pass these bills that will help stop
the repeated preventable leaks and explosions that cause so much safety
concern in our community.
Again, thank you for your attention to these issues of vital
concern to us.
Senator Gorton. Mayor Asmundson and Bellingham were very
fortunate in discovering an expired franchise and using that as
leverage, Mayor Tanner spoke a little bit about the threat to
cancel a franchise. How about, and I assume that franchise
still has a considerable period of time left in its term, Mayor
Tanner?
Mayor Tanner. It's 1996, and it's for 10 years. With good
conduct, it's extendable for another 10 years.
Senator Gorton. How about Bellevue and SeaTac? What are
your franchise lives?
Deputy Mayor Marshall. Ours is expiring in 2004, so we will
be looking very carefully at Bellingham's model agreement.
Mr. Hoggard. The City of SeaTac happens to be lucky because
management at Olympic Pipe Line didn't realize that they had
let their franchise with us lapse. We as a new city thought
we'd inherited a franchise that had been entered into with King
County, but it had lapsed in 1995. Another indication, I think,
of really the dereliction of management that they would allow
that to happen, but we are looking forward to going through the
same process that Bellingham went through.
Senator Gorton. You've got a good example, don't you?
Mr. Hoggard. Yes, we do, and we will use every bit of it.
Senator Gorton. Tell me, you all have in your communities
local pipelines that are intrastate in nature. Do you get
better information and better cooperation with intrastate
pipelines that are regulated by a state utilities and
transportation commission than you do with the interstate ones?
Mr. Hoggard. I can speak to the natural gas pipelines in
the city. Yes, we do. We have better ongoing dialog. We see
people from those utilities from time to time and have
discussions with them about issues, and I think we generally
enjoy a better working relationship with them. Olympic Pipe
Line largely is an intrastate line. It just barely goes over
the border of Washington into Portland.
Senator Gorton. Uh-huh.
Deputy Mayor Marshall. For months we asked Olympic Pipe
Line for information. Receiving it was difficult at best.
Finally, we asked our entire state delegation to breakfast in
city hall, and we told them about our problem, and it took a
letter signed by our state delegation to get Olympic Pipe Line
to honor our requests.
What we got was reams of information. Our staff got stacks
of it. We termed it X's and O's. Just like Mayor Tanner has
suggested, we had absolutely no way to interpret the data, so
that's why we had to employ a consultant at great expense to
the City of Bellevue so that we could understand what the
information even stated, and even with all that data, I just
want to say, we are powerless. We have no regulatory power. We
have created a map for you. It's in your packet. We have
citizens calling up, e-mailing us and saying, ``You know, I
have to go to a school meeting or a pipeline meeting. One: I
might lose my children entirely. They might die or I might have
them going to a different school. What do I do?''
Senator Gorton. Is there in your view a difference in risk
and a different form of regulation appropriate for natural gas
pipelines from liquid pipelines?
Mayor Tanner. I think there's a difference. We get natural
gas pipeline ruptures fairly regularly due to construction
activity and so on, and thus far we have not had any--the gas
company is completely responsive, just immediate response most
of the time, and the, we don't think that the danger is there
for the same----
Senator Gorton. And by-in-large they're regulated by the
state?
Mayor Tanner. Yes.
Mr. Hoggard. I might add in discussions with our fire
personnel, one of the things they pointed out to me was with
fuel like jet fuel or gasoline, you know, while it's under
pressure, the first little bit that comes out vaporizes like a
spray can. The rest will pool up, and of course, both the vapor
and the liquid fuel is heavier than air and flows along the
ground, and you've heard about the results of what occurs
there, and natural gas, I don't believe, has that same
characteristic, and so in many respects I think what we're
talking about here is even more dangerous and does call for a
higher level of regulation.
Senator Gorton. Senator Murray?
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it really
strikes me as I'm sitting here listening to four Mayors that
because of the accident that occurred here, all of you know
much more today than you did a year ago and are much more aware
of your franchise agreements and getting information is as
difficult as it has been. You've gotten some of it.
It is so important that we pass national tougher standards
of inspection and training and certification of our operators,
because there are literally hundreds of mayors across this
country who have no idea to look for what you've looked for. So
I think it's extremely important that we pass national
legislation to protect those who don't know to ask the
questions that all of you are asking.
One question I'd like to ask you is about the right to know
provision that we put into the legislation. As I'm listening to
you, you have begged and pleaded and asked for information. It
sounds to me like you finally got it after exerting some
pressure but it was not very understandable. What can we do to
make sure that if we require this information to be made
available to neighbors or local governments that it is put into
language that is easily understood?
Mayor Tanner. If I might respond to that, one of the things
that could be done is to require that it be done in the form of
a map similar to the map that we provided to you and similar to
the map that Bellevue----
Senator Murray. You created this from the information,
technical information, they gave you?
Mayor Tanner. Yes.
Senator Murray. They did not give you the map?
Mayor Tanner. No, they did not. They gave us, as she said,
a stack of material and incomplete material, and after we got
it, then we had to spend hours and hours and hours to produce
these maps on the anomalies and defects.
Mr. Hoggard. I think that it would be, the delegation to
the state is an appropriate level for that, and in that
expertise we would be looking for there, and we have contact
with state people all the time on environmental issues and so
forth, and I think with that expertise it would be sufficient.
As you know, pipes sometimes are not buried where the company
thought they were, and they can easily track that with GPS
technology and so forth where they should readily be able to
provide us information. By the way, SeaTac still does not have
information about your anomalies and most of the other cities
in western Washington do not.
Senator Murray. The right to know provision is extremely
important, and the companies need to know on a national level
they would be required to provide that information to the
communities.
On the franchise agreement, Mr. Tanner, you talked about
the franchise agreement you've put together but having trouble
enforcing it. What can we do perhaps at the Federal level to
help with the enforcement of franchise agreements?
Mayor Tanner. I suppose it would require the delegation of
authority to the local level--there's Federal preemption in
franchise--and as far as I can determine is unenforceable if it
conflicts with Federal law. We've got a tight franchise, but
I'm still not sure that it would be enforceable. We'd try, of
course.
Senator Murray. Comments from any of the rest of the
Mayors?
Deputy Mayor Marshall. Just first of all, I want to thank
you both for recognizing that public safety is the No. 1
responsibility of government. That is what our citizens are
begging for. They don't care about all the smart pigs and the
hydrostatic testing. When I go to citizen meetings, they first
and foremost ask me, ``Connie, am I safe? Are my kids safe?''
So we need your help in getting stricter Federal standards. If
we can't, we have no power to enforce anything.
You know, it's interesting, we have no authority to require
testing. We asked our consultant if they knew of another
accidents other than Bellingham that occurred in a city similar
to ours, and we had a public hearing much like this in
Bellevue, and he told us about an accident in Corona,
California, and I'm sure you're aware of that, where a train
wreck occurred, and it nicked the line. Those are some of the
words we hear when we ask for information, nick, dent. You
know, what does it mean? So Corona didn't have the ability to
detect slow leaks either. The pipeline ruptured, and it
destroyed two entire city blocks. Our citizens are scared.
They're--like you said, there are other communities where
citizens don't know about this. Our citizens are informed, and
they're not coming to us and throwing rocks and saying, ``Do
something.'' They're coming to us and saying two things.
They're saying, ``What can we do to help you?'' We can, we have
tons of engineers in Bellevue as you know because of Boeing.
``What can we do to help you interpret the data?'' and ``How
can we help you form the emergency response?'' They're not
coming to us begging for us to do it all. They're coming to us.
They're smart. They're informed, and they want to help us, and
so we're, I'm just translating that information, because I feel
so completely powerless to tell them, there's not much that I
can do, but we can all write Senator Murray and Senator Gorton
and support them, and that's what we asked them to do.
So again thank you just so very much.
Mr. Hoggard. With respect specifically to the franchise
agreements, I think it would be helpful to require pipeline
companies to enter into franchise agreements where they're
operating on public rights-of-way and to require them to honor
those agreements and, of course, I think we share the concern
of Renton about the enforceability, and it really gives us a
need for local enforcement powers. The reason that question
comes up is because inevitably because there's so little if any
Federal regulation. Anything you say in a franchise agreement
is going to go beyond that, and so by having stronger Federal
regulations, it will help us in our franchise agreements.
Senator Murray. Very good. Thank you very much to all of
you.
Senator Gorton. Thanks to all of you for your testimony.
We'll now hear from five representatives from state and
Federal Governmental agencies.
Again, I bring the hearing to order once again. Ms. Marilyn
Showalter, the Chairwoman of the Washington State Utilities and
Transportation Commission.
You've gotten pretty good marks so far here today.
Ms. Showalter. Thank you.
Senator Gorton. I'd be happy to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF MARILYN SHOWALTER, CHAIRWOMAN, WASHINGTON
UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON
Ms. Showalter. Thank you, Senator Gorton and Senator
Murray.
I was appointed to the Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission as chair just a little over a year
ago, so this Bellingham explosion came very soon after my
appointment, and I will say that we have made pipeline safety
one of our highest priorities since then.
I'm a former deputy prosecuting attorney in the criminal
division of the King County prosecutor's office. In fact,
that's where I met the Governor, Governor Locke. We were
prosecutors together, and as a former prosecutor, I firmly
believe that laws on the books mean little if they are not
enforced. Even the strongest rules are not effective unless our
enforcement of them is thorough and consistent.
I have provided the Committee with a detailed description
of our safety program, but let me just highlight a few of the
facts.
You have, I hope, a yellow sheet. I made it yellow so that
you could see it. Do they have that? I guess it's coming to you
right now. It's actually a duplicate of what I've already put
in the, what you can see there, since I think this can be
confusing, is that the utilities and transportation commission
regulates intrastate natural gas and hazardous liquids, and
that is about in the case of gas, there are approximately
17,000 miles of main lines, those are, generally speaking, the
smaller lines--and 246 miles of transmission lines. We do not,
as you know regulate interstate natural gas which is about
1,700 miles. And then in hazardous liquids we regulate about 83
miles of hazardous liquid pipelines. We do not regulate 777
miles of interstate pipelines, but as you've heard, there is
some interest on the part of OPS in delegating the interstate
inspection authority to the state, so that if we had that
authority, you can see from there that we would be helping the
Federal Government inspect approximately, as I say, 1,700 miles
of natural gas lines and 777 hazardous liquid interstate lines.
Our program consists of six full-time safety engineers, and
that is a 50 percent increase in the last year. We increased
the number of engineers by two since I was appointed. We have
about 80 combined years of pipeline safety experience. We spend
about 500 days in the field inspecting pipelines and providing
technical assistance to the operators.
The program for pipeline safety costs about $700,000 a
year. OPS pays 44 percent of this. That is the maximum
available funding that any state can receive.
In addition to inspecting pipelines, we also set safety
standards for intrastate pipelines. In the case of gas, these
standards are more stringent than the Federal guidelines, and
these are in the areas of operations, maintenance, construction
and reporting.
In the case of hazardous liquids we only received our
authority for intrastate and also from our state legislature in
1998. So to get off the ground quickly, we adopted the Federal
standards at that point, but we are intending to do a
rulemaking and look at whether we should have more stringent
standards for intrastate hazardous pipelines.
In the past 9 months, we have done a number of things to
improve pipeline safety. By the end of this month we expect to
have completed with the Office of Pipeline Safety a
comprehensive joint review and inspection of all interstate
pipelines. This involves physical tests of leak detection
systems, correction control, and other safety factors.
One of the things this joint effort has given our state is
some firsthand knowledge by our state engineers of the
interstate facilities located within Washington. Also, I was
appointed by the secretary of transportation to the technical
hazardous liquid pipeline safety standards committee, which is
an advisory committee to OPS, and in addition, one of our
members served on the Governor's task force this past 9 months.
As far as the future goes, we may get interstate authority,
which would be a major undertaking. We, as I said, are
reviewing both our gas and hazardous liquid intrastate rules to
see if they should be made more stringent. We have done and
will do a number of things to increase third party damage
prevention. As you have probably heard, by far the largest
cause of pipeline leaks and failures is third-party damage. In
our state, for the years 1992 through 1998, third-party damage
caused more pipeline leaks and failures than all other causes
combined. We will be developing educational and promotional
materials aimed at preventing third party damage. The new
legislation that our legislature just passed directs us to
establish a single one-call number. We now have six in the
state, and the legislation also increases penalties for third
party damage and failure to report. Finally, we are also
seeking the legislature----
Senator Gorton. Does it require an advance call for a
location or does it simply just require a report after an
accident has happened?
Ms. Showalter. The bill would require, it increases the
reporting requirements before you dig, and it also increases
the reporting requirements if you have an accident.
We are, the legislature also is setting up a procedure
whereby we can do mapping of pipelines throughout the state,
but it is a fairly costly proposition, and that will take some
time to complete.
Finally as you know, we have worked with the congressional
delegation to seek increased authority from the Federal
Government and increased standards, a bit of success of which
we heard today.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and to underscore
our commitment to public safety.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Showalter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marilyn Showalter, Chairwoman, Washington
Utilities and Transportation Commission, Olympia, Washington
Thank you Senator Gorton and distinguished members of the Committee
for inviting me to testify on the vital issue of pipeline safety. The
tragedy in Bellingham has served to focus attention on the need to
ensure that pipeline safety laws and practices are the most effective
they can be.
Since I was appointed to the Commission just over one-year ago, I
have made pipeline safety one of our highest priorities. As a former
deputy prosecuting attorney I believe that having strong laws on the
books means little if they are not enforced. This certainly is true in
the case of pipeline safety. The strongest rules will not be effective
unless our enforcement efforts are thorough and consistent.
Today I will provide you with some background on the Commission's
pipeline safety program, discuss our efforts over the past year to
improve pipeline safety, and speak to several specific initiatives that
are forthcoming.
I have provided the Committee with a detailed description of our
safety program. Let me highlight some important facts. The Commission
is certified by the federal Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) to adopt
safety regulations for and inspect intrastate natural gas and hazardous
liquid pipelines. Under that authority, we inspect nearly 17,000 miles
of natural gas mains and nearly 250 miles of natural gas transmission
pipelines. We do not inspect interstate natural gas transmission lines,
which amount to slightly over 1,732 miles in Washington State. For
hazardous liquids, we inspect slightly over 83 miles of pipelines but
do not have authority to inspect the 777 miles of interstate hazardous
liquid pipelines located within Washington State. In both cases, the
interstate pipelines are under the jurisdiction of OPS.
Our program consists of six full-time pipeline safety engineers, an
increase of two since I came to the Commission. These inspectors have
over 80 combined years of pipeline safety experience. Our inspectors
spend almost 500 days in the field inspecting pipelines and providing
technical assistance to operators. The program costs over $700,000
annually to operate, of which OPS pays 44 percent under the
certification program.
In addition to inspecting pipelines, we also set safety standards
for intrastate facilities. These state requirements are more stringent
than the federal guidelines for natural gas companies. In 1998, our
state legislature granted the Commission authority to inspect
intrastate hazardous liquid pipelines. We adopted the current federal
rules as our initial state standard. During this year, the Commission
will review these rules and adopt additional requirements if needed.
During the last year, we have also been active in a number of broad
efforts to improve pipeline safety. Foremost among these, by March we
expect to complete a comprehensive joint review and inspection of all
interstate pipelines in the state with OPS. Our pipeline safety
engineers have been in the field with OPS inspectors conducting
physical tests of leak detection systems, corrosion control, and other
vital safety factors. This joint program has given our pipeline safety
engineers detailed first-hand knowledge of the interstate facilities
located within Washington.
In addition was appointed by the Secretary of the United States
Department of Transportation to the national Office of Pipeline Safety
Technical Oversight Committee. Our policy director was a member of the
Governor's Fuel Accident Prevention and Response Team. We also have
worked closely with the Governor's office, the legislature, and other
agencies on pipeline safety legislation.
The aim of all of these efforts is to improve pipeline safety. Our
commitment to this goal is substantial and increasing. We will be
active agents in seeking to implement the Governor's recommendations
for improved pipeline safety, and in ensuring that the laws are
enforced.
The review process that followed the Bellingham accident identified
a number of steps that can be taken to further improve pipeline safety.
Some of these can be accomplished under current authority and funding,
others will require legal changes and additional resources.
As I mentioned earlier, we are currently reviewing our pipeline
safety rules for both natural gas and hazardous liquids to make sure
they are sufficient. As part of this review we plan to require that
operational safety plans be submitted to the Commission. This will help
ensure that pipeline operators are translating the requirements of the
rules into daily operating practice.
We will increase our efforts to prevent third-party damage to
pipelines. Third-party damage, primarily through excavation, is by far
the largest cause of pipeline leaks and failures. In fact, for the
years 1992 through 1998, third-party damage caused more pipeline leaks
and failures than all other causes combined. We are working with
industry and other government agencies to develop educational and
promotional materials aimed at preventing third-party damage. We have
also been active in efforts to establish a single, statewide ``one-
call'' system for pipeline locator services, and to increase penalties
for third-party damage. We want to make industry and the public more
aware to the problem of third-party damage, to make it easier to locate
pipelines, and to better enforce requirements to use locator services.
Finally, we have been strong advocates for ``one-call'' centers to
adopt minimum operating standards and ``best practices,'' designed to
improve consistence and quality.
We are seeking funding for a mapping program that will make it
easier for emergency response personnel to respond to pipeline
incidents. A funding plan will be completed this year, with the aim of
having a mapping system complete by the end of 2005.
Finally, we are working with our congressional delegation to seek
changes in federal law to ensure that state and federal pipeline safety
efforts support each other and allow more frequent and thorough
inspections.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today, and to
underscore our commitment to improved pipeline safety.
Washington State Pipeline Safety Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gas Hazardous Liquids
Subject -----------------------------------------------
INTRAstate INTERstate INTRAstate INTERstate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miles 17,120 \1\ 1,732 \2\ 83 777
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delegated Authority from OPS Yes No Yes \3\ No
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standards
Meets Federal Requirements Yes -- Yes --
Stricter than Federal Requirements Yes -- No --
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection Authority Yes -- Yes --
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enforcement Authority Yes -- Yes --
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding for 1999
Revenue from Regulatory Fees $1.2 M -- $33,950 --
Federal OPS Grant .2 M -- 42,800 --
------------ ------------
TOTAL $1.4 M -- $76,750 --
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Staffing 5.5 FTE -- .5 FTE --
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 16,874 miles/main; 246 miles/transmission.
\2\ Transmission miles only.
\3\ Hazardous Liquids authority was granted for common carriers in 1996; and private carriers in 1998.
washington utilities and transportation commission
pipeline safety section
overview
Regulatory Framework
In 1968, Congress passed the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, now
called the Pipeline Safety Law, 49 U.S.C. Section 60101 et seq. Section
60102 of the Pipeline Safety Law describes the general authority of the
Secretary of Transportation. The Law gives the federal government
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) authority over pipeline safety for
transporting hazardous liquids, natural, and other gases. The intent of
the Law is for states to assume responsibility for intrastate pipeline
safety, while the federal government retains responsibility for
interstate pipeline safety. A state may participate in the federal
program by certification or agreement as noted below:
Section 60105 State pipeline safety certification
program.
Section 60106 State pipeline safety agreement.
Section 60105
The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (Commission)
participates under an annual certification program Section 60105. The
certification allows the Commission to have pipeline safety regulations
and in-state enforcement authority for companies operating intrastate
pipelines. A state may adopt additional or more stringent safety
standards as long as the standards are compatible with the federal
minimum standards. The Commission's state authority for pipeline safety
is:
Chapter 80.28.210 RCW for natural gas, and;
Chapter 81.88 RCW for hazardous liquids.
The Commission's pipeline safety regulations are found under the
Washington Administrative Code (WAC):
WAC 480-93 Gas Companies, and
WAC 480-75 Petroleum Pipeline Companies including
Hazardous Liquids (carbon dioxide and anhydrous ammonia).
With the certification in place, the Commission's engineers will
inspect the following companies:
Intrastate Natural Gas Companies--16,874.0 miles/main, 246.3 miles/
transmission
4 public service companies
3 municipalities
1 propane gas distribution company
2 propane/air plants
7 direct sales
250+ master meter/small gas systems
Intrastate Hazardous Liquids Companies--83.4 miles pipelines
1 Common Carrier
6 Private Carriers
Section 60106
A state may participate under an agreement with the federal agency
under Section 60106 for companies that have intrastate or interstate
pipelines. The agreement allows the state to act as an agent of the
federal Office of Pipeline Safety. As agents, state engineers will do
the inspections, complete the audits, and file any probable violations
with the federal office for enforcement. With an agreement, the federal
office directs compliance and enforcement.
The Commission's rules do not apply to interstate companies:
Interstate Natural Gas--1732.1 miles transmission
3 Transmission Companies
1 Liquefied Natural Gas Facility
1 Gas Storage Field
Interstate Hazardous Liquids--777.0 miles
4 Trunk lines
1 Break Out Tank Company
Pipeline Safety Responsibility
Federal Program--Office of Pipeline Safety
Protecting people and our environment from the risk of pipeline
incidents is the responsibility of OPS. This work is shared with state
agencies through certification, agreement, or both. OPS administers a
range of regulatory protections on several phases of pipeline design,
construction, operation and maintenance, research, development, risk
management, and damage prevention. The technical Pipeline Safety
Standards Committee and the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety
Standards Committee are part of the OPS program. The committees provide
peer review for carrying out the requirements of the Pipeline Safety
Law. The committee may propose safety standards for gas and hazardous
liquids to the US Secretary of Transportation. The committee reviews
each of the new standards. OPS also requires pipeline companies to plan
for spills or leaks and to test their emergency preparedness through
planned exercises and other drills. Key to any pipeline safety program
is Emergency response by the operator and coordination with local
police and fire department. OPS provides training and technical
assistance to pipeline companies through the Transportation Safety
Institute (TSI) using formal class training and local in-state
seminars. TSI also provides education for federal and state inspectors.
OPS is implementing a damage prevention study and from that study has
identified a list of ``best practices'' to prevent excavation damage.
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission's Pipeline Safety
Program
The primary mission of the Pipeline Safety Section of the
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission is to inspect
pipeline companies and ensure that they are protecting public safety
concerning the transportation of natural gas and hazardous liquids.
This is accomplished through a commitment to maintaining well-qualified
and trained inspectors, field audits, and more stringent rules where
required. The Commission currently has six pipeline safety engineers,
including two additional full-time engineers authorized in 1999. The
inspectors have over 80 years of combined pipeline safety experience.
Each inspector is responsible for field inspections. Typical
inspections may include construction, standard, and specialized
reviews; operations and maintenance reviews; follow-up audits;
responding to incidents; and on-site training for operators.
The Commission has adopted more stringent regulations than the
federal minimum safety standards for natural gas companies. These items
include:
filing construction plans,
proximity and proscribed area reviews for new pipeline
operating over 250 psig,
telephonic and written incident reports,
increased frequency of leak surveys depending on type
of materials,
installing cathodic protection within 90 days of
construction,
classifying all leaks by grade,
required leak repair schedules.
The Commission was asked to participate, by the federal Office of
Pipeline Safety, in the hazardous liquids program, and staff started
the program with authority over one common carrier on January 1, 1996.
Legislation for private hazardous liquid carriers was granted and
became effective in 1998, and the Commission on January 30, 1999
adopted the WAC, at the minimum federal standard. A Commission priority
for the year 2000 includes additional rules for the hazardous liquids
program. There have not been any serious incidents or major spills on
the intrastate pipelines since the Commission started the liquids
program in January 1, 1996.
Pipeline Safety Funding
A Pipeline Safety User Fee funds the federal pipeline safety
program. Section 60301 of 49 U.S.C. authorizes the assessment and
collection of fees. Each operator of regulated interstate and
intrastate natural gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipeline
companies pay a share of the cost of the program based on the number of
miles of pipeline. In 1999, the State's appropriation for the combined
natural gas and hazardous liquid grant program was $13,000,000 for the
base program and $1,000,000 for damage prevention grants. The maximum
that a state could receive for 1999 calendar year is 44%. Grant funds
are reduced where states do not meet certain jurisdictional and
performance requirements and do not have monetary sanctions equal to
the federal requirements. Washington's program received the maximum
funding level.
Commission Estimated Pipeline Safety Cost
The Commission requested $540,000 for the natural gas and $42,586
for the hazardous liquid program for 1999. The Commission has been
authorized to receive the maximum 44% of program cost. The remainder of
the Commission safety program is funded by intrastate fees assessed to
the utility and common carriers regulated by the Commission.
Pipeline Safety Program--1999 Cost and Grant Allocation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grant Commission
Total Cost Allocation Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas $650,127 $238,161 $411,966
Hazardous Liquid $78,389 $37,564 $40,825
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pipeline Safety Focus
The Commission's Pipeline Safety Section continues to focus on
prevention of pipeline leaks. There are five main reasons for natural
gas pipelines to leak or fail. They are third-party excavation,
corrosion, construction, material defects and outside force. Other
causes of failure include cast iron bell-joint leaks and human error.
Attached are two charts on Gas Distribution Main and Service leaks, and
Third-Party Damage to Mains and Services. The leading cause of pipeline
failures is excavation damage, causing 58% of all leaks in Washington
State in 1998. When comparing mains to service lines, the damage to
service lines represents 82% of third-party damage and mains at 18%.
Construction equipment contacts with pipeline can create pipe gouges,
dents, scrapes, and cracks. This damage may appear benign at first, but
over time, can grow and lead to catastrophic failure. The cost of
repair, property damage, and relighting costs has ranged from $234 to
over $350,000. The volume of gas or liquid lost or dollar cost for
repair may not be an accurate measure of safety. For example:
A local gas company reported that an excavation contractor was
installing a telephone line under a residential driveway. The
crew was using an excavation tool called a hole hog that hit
and damaged a gas conduit and a \5/8\-inch polyethylene service
line. The damage caused gas to leak from the pipeline. The
excavator did not call the local gas company or the fire
department to report the damage or gas leak. A person passing
by the site smelled gas odor and reported it. The local gas
company and fire department responded on August 12, 1998, and
found the leak over the backfilled driveway. The gas company
removed the backfill and discovered a service line leak that
was wrapped with a gum-covered rag placed around the pipe! The
contractor's crew had dug up the drive, exposed the leaking gas
line, and attempted to stop the leak with a rag. The cost of
repair was $800 including overtime charges. The potential for
serious injuries and property damage was significant.
On March 5, 1996, in a similar incident, an excavator using the
same type of equipment hit a gas line. The escaping gas
migrated under the driveway, into the attached garage of a home
and ignited, resulting in an explosion and fire. The house and
four vehicles were destroyed, with damage estimated to be
$350,000. The excavator was digging in a joint trench without
first determining the precise location of the gas line. Any
uncontrolled leak has potential for serious injuries and large
property damage. Prevention is key to pipeline safety.
Washington State Damage Prevention Statute, Chapter 19.122 RCW
Washington State has a damage prevention law found in Chapter
19.122 RCW. The intent of the statute is to assign responsibilities for
the location and record keeping of utility location, protection and
repair of damage to existing underground facilities, and protection of
the public health and safety from interruption in utility services
caused by damage to underground utility facilities. The statute
provides for civil penalties of $1,000 for each violation and provides
for treble costs incurred in repairing or relocating the facility.
The statute requires underground facility owners to join a locator
service (One-Call Center). The locator service was set up so that an
excavator could call a single number and all underground facility
owners would be notified of the planned excavation. The statute
requires that excavators call two business days before they plan to
excavate, giving the utilities time to respond and surface mark their
underground facilities. Six locator services (Call Centers) operate in
Washington today. Most states (80%) have a single center and a few
states have two centers but no more than three centers. A single-call
center could handle all of Washington State's call requests, which are
estimated to be about 260,000 per year.
Easements and Rights-of-Way
Permits for land use and rights-of-way for pipelines generally fall
under the local jurisdiction of cities or counties and for major
projects the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council. Easements and
rights-of-way are not usually considered a pipeline safety regulation
and therefore the preemption of the Pipeline Safety Law Section 60104
does not apply. Cities and counties can control where the pipelines are
located but are restricted from having pipeline safety regulations. The
Commission has natural gas pipeline regulations (WAC 480-93-020 and WAC
480-93-030) that require an intrastate company to file for approval to
operate a high-pressure pipeline above 250 psig near people or
buildings. These regulations do not and cannot restrict persons from
building near a pipeline.
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Mr. Stohr from the State Department of Ecology.
STATEMENT OF JOE STOHR, SPILL PROGRAM MANAGER, DEPARTMENT OF
ECOLOGY, OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON
Mr. Stohr. Thank you Senator Gorton and Senator Murray.
My name is Joe Stohr, and I manage the oil spill
prevention, preparedness and response program within the State
Department of Ecology, and was also a member of the Governor's
task force.
I've been asked to come and give you a brief synopsis of
three different areas: First the response to the Olympic oil
spill on June 10th, 1999, second to comment on actions that
were taken in the aftermath, and then briefly describe to you
our regulatory relationship with the Olympic Pipe Line Company.
Let me first begin by clarifying that my agency's response
to spills is from an environmental perspective so in the case
of the tragic explosion and the fire at Bellingham, our role
initially took a back seat, and rightly so, to the fire service
and their public safety operations.
Over the years we've responded to a number of large
petroleum spills in our state, and our assessment of these
emergency responses typically centers around an evaluation of
command and control. You can imagine how challenging it is to
rapidly mesh together multiple local, state and Federal
agencies along with multiple private companies into a cohesive
organization in a matter of hours under emergency conditions.
Ecology was very pleased with the speed and selflessness
with which the unified command structure was formed and how
quickly the emergency operations center was activated in
downtown Bellingham. The unified command for environmental
response, not to be confused with the fire fighting response,
formed within approximately 3 hours of the explosion. It was
made up of representatives of the City of Bellingham, the State
Department of Ecology, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
and the Olympic Pipe Line Company. In addition, there were
literally dozens of public agencies and private companies that
were integrated into this unified command structure.
During those first few days of the incident, this command
operated in the background as the Bellingham Fire Department
maintained command of the fire zone to ensure site safety and
determine when it was safe for environmental clean-up efforts
to begin. There were no arguments about this nor were there any
significant organizational problems for the duration of the
unified command's handling of the environmental clean-up phase
of the agency. This effort worked well.
In terms of the aftermath and the restoration, biologists
continue to work with the pipeline company to restore Whatcom
Creek. For a distance of one-and-a-half miles, all forms of
life in or near the creek were killed, and in addition
everything in the creek itself, was killed from the ignition
point to three miles downstream where it empties into the sea.
After the accident, a joint restoration committee was
immediately formed of local, state and Federal agencies. The
committee's charge was to identify short-term actions necessary
to rehabilitate the stream and allow for the return of salmon
and other species.
The Olympic Pipe Line Company was responsive in carrying
out these actions which included conducting various studies and
monitoring programs, removing residual gas from the sediments,
containing further seepage, increasing spawning habitat,
hydromulching of sensitive areas to prevent erosion, and
developing a draft long-term restoration plan which we should
see soon.
In terms of our regulatory relationship with Olympic Pipe
Line, in contrast to the team approach immediately following
the accident, our regulatory relationship with the company has
not always been positive. Again, the Department of Ecology's
current authority resides in the enforcement of environmental
statutes, and the Olympic Pipe Line Company historically has
had a poor performance record in these areas.
Some examples include difficulties in getting the company
to submit a quality contingency plan for oil spills, reluctance
by the company to discuss spill prevention issues along the
main stem of the pipeline, the occurrence of over 50 oil spills
of over 825,000 gallons resulting in the assessment of a
hundred and fifty thousand dollars in penalties in addition to
assessments for natural resources damages, a general lack of
attention to spill prevention or response in the recently
withdrawn proposal to extend the existing pipeline to eastern
Washington, and I guess our perception that the company's
corporate culture didn't understand the need for spill
prevention and preparedness, and in fact, were far outside
industry norms in these areas. So the bottom line here is a
lack of change to this culture will probably lead to further
significant problems.
On the positive side----
Senator Gorton. Could I stop you there. You said in your
view, they're far beyond industry norms. That implies that most
of the rest of the industry, other companies have enforced on
themselves higher standards than Olympic does in your view.
Mr. Stohr. In this state, that's certainly the case,
Senator.
Senator Gorton. OK. Go ahead.
Mr. Stohr. On the positive side, recent changes in Olympic
Pipe Line management are welcome, and we see initial progress
being made to increase the focus on environmental protection.
We hope this trend continues.
That ends my comments and thank you for allowing us to be
here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stohr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joe Stohr, Spill Program Manager, Department of
Ecology, Olympia, Washington
Senator Gorton, members of the subcommittee, my name is Joe Stohr.
I manage the Oil Spill Prevention, Preparedness and Response Program
for the Washington State Department of Ecology. I have been asked to
give you a brief synopsis of the response to the Olympic Oil Pipe Line
Company, spill of June 10, 1999, comment on actions taken in the
aftermath and briefly describe our regulatory relationship with the
Company.
If I may, let me begin by clarifying that my agency responds to
spills from an environmental perspective. In the case of the tragic
explosion and fire in Bellingham, our role obviously took a back seat
to the fire service and their public safety operations and in my
characterization of the incident response I won't be speaking to the
fire fighting and rescue aspects.
That said, I will add that we have responded to a number of large
petroleum spills in our state, and our assessment of these emergency
responses typically centers on an evaluation of command and control. It
is quite challenging to rapidly mesh multiple local, state and federal
agencies, as well as multiple private companies, into a cohesive
organization in a matter of hours under emergency conditions. To pull
this off, emergency responders nationwide subscribe to a standard
organizing principle called the incident command system, and in this
case, a variation called unified command.
In short, the department of Ecology was pleased with the speed and
selflessness with which the unified command structure was formed, and
the emergency operations center activated in downtown Bellingham. The
unified command for environmental response (not to be confused with the
fire fighting response) formed within approximately three hours of the
explosion. It was made up of representatives
of the City of Bellingham, the State Department of Ecology, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and the Olympic Pipe Line Company.
Ultimately, dozens of public agencies and private companies were
integrated into this unified command structure.
During the first few days of the incident, this unified command
operated in the near background as the Bellingham Fire Department
maintained command of the fire zone to ensure site safety and determine
when it was safe for environmental clean up efforts to begin. There
were no arguments about this, nor were there significant organizational
problems for the duration of the unified command's handling of the
environmental clean up phase of the emergency.
In Bellingham, we believe the strengths of the environmental
response include:
A collaborative style of decision making in the
unified command partnership
Full participation and integration of local elected
officials, minimizing political conflicts
Successful tapping of statewide and nationwide
resources
We believe the lessons learned include:
The need for incident command training for peripheral
agencies and companies.
The need to smoothly integrate site safety plans into
response operations.
The need to smoothly transition the emergency clean up
to the long term restoration of the damage to natural
resources.
Aftermath
In the aftermath of this gasoline spill and fire, biologists are
working with the pipeline company to restore Whatcom Creek. For a
distance of one and one-half miles, all forms of life in or near the
creek were killed. Additionally, everything in the creek itself was
killed from the ignition point to three miles downstream where it
empties into the sea.
After the accident, a Joint Restoration Committee was immediately
formed of local, state and federal agencies. The Committee's charge was
to identify short-term actions necessary to rehabilitate the stream and
allow for the return of salmon and other species. The Olympic Pipe Line
Company was very responsive in carrying out these actions which
included:
conducting various studies and monitoring programs;
removing residual gas from the sediments;
containing further seepage;
increasing spawning habitat;
hydromulching of sensitive areas to prevent erosion;
and
developing a draft long-term restoration plan which we
should see soon.
In contrast to the team approach immediately following the
accident, our regulatory relationship with the Company has not always
been so positive. Again, the Department of Ecology's current authority
resides in the enforcement of environmental statutes and the Olympic
Pipe Line Company historically has a poor performance record in these
areas. Some examples include:
difficulties in getting the Company to submit a
quality contingency plan for oil spills;
refusal by the Company to discuss spill prevention
issues along the mainstem of the pipeline;
about 50 oil spills of over 825,000 gallons resulting
in the assessment of $150,000 in penalty in addition to
assessments for natural resource damages;
a general lack of attention to spill prevention in the
recently withdrawn proposal to extend the existing pipeline to
Eastern Washington; and
our perception that the Company's corporate culture
didn't understand the need for spill prevention and
preparedness and in fact were far outside industry norms in
these areas.
On the positive side, recent changes in Olympic Pipe Line
management are welcome and we see progress being made to increase the
focus on environmental protection. We hope this trend continues.
That concludes my remarks.
Senator Gorton. Mr. Felder, we appreciate you coming all
the way across the country to testify for us, and we want very
much to hear your testimony.
Your agency has obviously been criticized fairly roundly
during the course of the day, and I hope that you will not only
give
us your formal testimony but make some kind of response to that
critique.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. FELDER, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE
OF PIPELINE SAFETY, RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Felder. Thank you, Senator Gorton.
First, I'd like to thank Chairman McCain and you, Senator
Gorton, for the invitation to speak to the Committee today.
My name is Rich Felder. I'm the Associate Administrator for
pipeline safety in the Research and Special Programs
Administration at the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).
On behalf of Secretary Rodney Slater, Administrator Kelly
Coyner, and the rest of DOT, I'd like to express our
condolences to the families of Wade King, Stephen Tsiorvas, and
Liam Wood. No community or family should have to suffer the
loss that you all have experienced. I hope the steps the
department is taking and will be taking to respond to this
incident and to prevent others like it may bring this community
and these families some comfort.
The experience of this incident has caused all of us to
redouble our efforts to prevent such incidents from occurring.
In addition, I'd like to thank Senator Murray and Senator
Gorton for the extraordinary cooperation and assistance that
they and their staff have provided since this tragic event.
Both have shown great interest in our program and ways to
improve the level of pipeline safety in Bellingham, in the
State of Washington, and throughout the nation.
To respond to the tragic incident that took place here last
year, the department has worked closely with the State of
Washington and affected communities. We understand the need for
immediate response and answers following such an incident, and
we are working to provide the community with the assurance that
they need.
We brought the latest technology to bear in assessing this
pipeline. We've worked to restore public confidence, but
clearly we have a long way to go. We have required immediate
corrective action. We've maintained continuous oversight and
have assigned a permanent inspector to Washington State. We are
committed to long-term corrective action based on our
investigation findings and the findings of the NTSB. We will
continue to work with the safety board, with the Department of
Justice, the City of Bellingham, and Washington State in taking
enforcement action. The line has been shut down, and we will
not allow it to reopen until all safety concerns have been
satisfied.
Our corrective action plan is comprehensive. We've required
reduced pressure on the entire system which provides the same
margin of safety as a pressure test. We required pressure
testing of portions of the line. We required improvements to
valves and the computerized pressure control system. We've
required additional training with particular attention to
qualification of controllers. We assessed the ability of the
pipeline to withstand maximum pressure that could buildup in
case of a valve closure. We are requiring internal inspection
of the line. It is the testing which we believe will provide
the best possible information on any condition that could
affect future safety. We will require repair, replacement or
hydrostatic testing as appropriate for any such conditions. We
want to work with the State of Washington, local communities,
and other interested stake holders in every possible way to
assure your concerns are addressed.
We're working with the Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission in a comprehensive review of all
pipelines in the State of Washington. We are also developing a
state-wide map and inventory of all pipeline facilities which
will be made publicly available with our report this spring.
The information these communities are looking for will be
contained in that report. We believe this effort will provide
additional assurances for citizens here because we will address
all aspects of pipeline safety.
The department has learned a number of lessons from the
unfortunate experience in Bellingham that will benefit our
long-term plan for the national pipeline safety program. We are
committed to continuously improving the pipeline safety program
to better address risks to public safety and the environment.
Our goal is to prevent incidents like Bellingham from ever
happening again. The new regulation we're proposing this month,
and it will be out by the 30th of March, will require operators
to test their pipelines. That's mandatory testing, and develop
a safety plan based on assessing all available safety and
damage prevention information----
Senator Gorton. How long will they have to develop that
plan?
Mr. Felder. They'll have a year to develop the plan, and
they'll develop it under our watchful eye.
Secretary Slater has set a goal of reducing by 25 percent
incidents caused by excavation damage, the leading cause of
pipeline failures. We are addressing the human side of the
pipeline equation by implementing a comprehensive operator
qualification regulation. Building on what we've learned from
working with Governor Locke's Fuel Accident and Prevention
Response Team and from meetings with city and state officials,
in fact, I met with the city council of Bellevue on Friday, the
department will help communities better protect pipelines and
be informed about the effectiveness of each company's safety
programs.
We are pleased that the Washington State Utilities
Commission Chair, Marilyn Showalter, has joined our pipeline
safety advisory committee. We believe there are opportunities
to work better with organizations at the community level that
are broadly representative of community needs and capable of
making informed decisions about the adequacy of pipeline safety
and a community's prevention options.
We're working with SAFE Bellingham, the National League of
Cities and other public interest groups to pilot test new
approaches to improving communications among communities,
operators, and regulators.
Finally, we emphasize our commitment to state partnerships,
to providing adequate resources to support state programs and
to finding better ways of involving states in promoting
activities that enable communities to live safely with
pipelines.
These activities include identifying local concerns,
investigating those concerns, and identifying ways communities
can better protect themselves and the pipelines that traverse
them.
In closing, we renew our commitment to this
Administration's and Secretary Slater's No. 1 transportation
goal, safety, and we pledge continuous improvement in
protecting both the public and the environment.
President Clinton's budget for next year seeks an
unprecedented level of resources for the pipeline safety
program. This increase targets the leading causes of pipeline
failures and includes a 50 percent increase in grants to
states. With these resources we will work together and produce
the level of safety and environmental protection that
communities deserve.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Felder follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard B. Felder, Associate Administrator,
Office of Pipeline Safety, Research and Special Programs
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
I would like to thank Chairman John McCain and Senator Slade Gorton
for the invitation to speak to the Committee today. My name is Richard
B. Felder and I am the Associate Administrator for the Office of
Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). I speak
to you today to describe our ongoing efforts to respond to last year's
tragic pipeline incident here in Bellingham. In addition, I will
describe the pipeline safety program's efforts to keep American
communities safe, including our recent work to prevent failures, to
enhance environmental protection, to improve data and public access to
information, and to respond to emergencies.
On behalf of Secretary Rodney E. Slater, Administrator Kelly S.
Coyner and the rest of DOT, I would like to express our condolences to
the families of Wade King, Steven Tsorvias, and Liam Wood, and all
families around the country that have experienced a similar loss. No
community should have to suffer the loss that this community has
experienced, and no family should have to suffer the loss that these
families have experienced. I hope the steps RSPA is taking to respond
to this incident and to prevent others like it may bring this community
and these families some comfort. The experience of this incident has
caused all of us to redouble our efforts to prevent such incidents from
occurring.
In addition, I would like to thank Senator Murray and Senator
Gorton for their profound cooperation and assistance that they and
their staff have provided since this horrible accident. Both have shown
great interest in our program and in ways to improve the level of
pipeline safety in Bellingham, Washington, and throughout the nation.
Responding to Bellingham
To respond to the tragic incident that took place here last year,
RSPA has worked closely with the State of Washington and the affected
communities. We understand the need for an immediate response and
answers following such an incident, and we are working to provide the
community with the assurance they need.
We have brought the latest technology to bear in the Department's
assessment of the Olympic pipeline. While we have worked in the short-
term to restore public confidence, RSPA expects our long-term actions
to produce significant safety outcomes, and I will address those today.
In the short-term, RSPA has required immediate corrective action. We
have maintained continuous oversight and have assigned a permanent
inspector to Washington State. We are committed to assuring long-term
corrective action based on investigation findings. RSPA continues to
work closely with the National Transportation Safety Board, the
Department of Justice, the City of Bellingham and Washington State. We
will continue to take enforcement action as warranted, pending the
results of the investigation. The pipeline has been shut down and
Administrator Coyner has been clear and firm in her resolve that it
will not reopen until all safety concerns are satisfied.
Our corrective action plan is comprehensive. RSPA has required
reduced pressure on the entire system. This provides the same safety as
pressure testing because it reduces the pressure on the pipeline to the
same degree that the pressure test increases the pressure on the
pipeline, thereby providing the same safety margin. In addition, RSPA
required hydrostatic pressure testing on appropriate portions of the
line and improvements to valves and the computerized pressure control
system. We have required additional training, with particular attention
to the qualification of controllers. RSPA conducted a design review,
including assessing the ability of the pipeline to withstand the
maximum pressure that could build up in case of valve closure. RSPA
required diagnostic tests on the pressure control system.
RSPA required internal inspection of the line. This testing will
provide extensive information on the current condition of the line and
we believe it will provide the best possible way to detect any
conditions which could threaten future safety. RSPA will require
repair, replacement, or further hydrotesting as appropriate, for any
defects identified.
To conduct the additional testing, the line must be put back in
operation during the testing. This will be done at a reduced pressure.
Before this occurs, however, RSPA will assess the current condition of
the line and the ability of Olympic Pipe Line Company to operate
safely. We are close to finalizing our review. After the additional
testing is conducted, the line will once again be taken out of service
until the Department is satisfied that the line can be safely operated.
RSPA will continue to work with the State of Washington, local
communities, and other interested stakeholders in every possible way to
assure your concerns are addressed.
Comprehensive Statewide Inspection
On October 27, 1999, Secretary Slater directed the Office of
Pipeline Safety to work with the Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission (UTC) in conducting a comprehensive review of
all pipelines in the State of Washington. To this end, OPS is assessing
the safety level of all aspects of pipeline performance, and developing
a statewide map and inventory of all pipeline facilities which will be
made publicly available. RSPA believes this effort will provide
additional safety assurances for citizens here.
Our comprehensive review will address all aspects of pipeline
safety, including time of construction, pipe materials, maximum
operating pressure, type of commodity transported, internal
inspections, failure history, pipe inventory and weld type, maximum
flow rate and tank conditions. RSPA also is conducting field
verifications of equipment and personnel and visiting pipeline right of
ways.
In addition to ensuring the pipeline industry's compliance with all
existing regulatory requirements, RSPA is closely reviewing how
individual operators address issues of public safety and environmental
protection. We will also detail a plan for the continuing safety
oversight program for each pipeline system. As I already mentioned,
RSPA is also developing a statewide map and inventory of all pipeline
facilities which will be made publicly available.
In addition to the information just described, the final report on
our comprehensive review will include a description of the public
education, liaison, and emergency response planning activities which
are expected of every pipeline operator; an overview of the current
one-call system, including other aspects of excavation damage
prevention programs; and a list of regulatory compliance contacts and
executives for each operator. This report will be finalized this
Spring, and made available to the public. RSPA believes this
comprehensive review effort will provide additional assurances for
citizens here, and will serve as a model for pipeline safety activities
nationwide.
Long-Term Plan for Pipeline Safety
RSPA has learned a number of lessons from the unfortunate
experience in Bellingham that will benefit our long-term plan for the
national pipeline safety program. RSPA is committed to continuously
improving the pipeline safety program to address risks to public safety
and to the environment. Our goal is to prevent incidents like
Bellingham from ever happening again.
I would like to take this opportunity to discuss the existing
program, and to outline some of our ongoing efforts to enhance the
pipeline safety program and provide increased protection of public
safety and the environment.
Overall, RSPA has worked to solidify the foundation of pipeline
regulation and to revitalize our approach to oversight, both of
operators' compliance, and their broader efforts to assure the
integrity of the national pipeline system. While our regulations today
address the need for pipeline integrity through design, construction,
operation, maintenance, operator qualification and response, RSPA will
strengthen them further with additional requirements for testing,
assessing and addressing the integrity of the national pipeline system.
Our current safety standards and oversight practices speak to the need
for many forms of inspection and testing, sometimes with very specific
schedules. Our initiatives in recent years have focused on further
reducing incidents caused by four leading causes of pipeline failure:
outside force, corrosion, human error and material defects.
This pipeline safety program has evolved in the 1990's, from an $8
million to a $36 million dollar per year program. RSPA has set its
priorities based on the highest risks to public safety and the
environment. President Clinton's budget request for next year seeks an
unprecedented level of resources for the pipeline safety program, $47.1
million, a 28.5 percent increase above this year's budget. This
increase targets the leading cause of failures in all underground
utilities, including pipelines, damage associated with excavation. This
request includes about a 50 percent increase in grants to states to
assist communities with protecting their citizens from pipeline
failures by building their damage prevention capabilities and
increasing their efforts to oversee the integrity of pipelines. The
Administration's budget request includes additional funds for research
on outside force damage to locate defects on pipelines at the earliest
possible time.
Ongoing Efforts to Program Improvement
RSPA is undertaking a number of efforts, outlined below, to improve
the existing program:
Addressing Excavation Damage: First, RSPA will provide strong
Federal leadership to address one of the leading causes of pipeline
failures--excavation damage. Secretary Slater has set a goal of
reducing incidents caused by outside force damage by 25 percent, and
RSPA will need everyone to help share in the responsibility for digging
safely. RSPA will be providing initial support for a nonprofit
organization to continue best practice efforts; to educate the public
about how to Dig Safely, using our new national campaign; and to
establish a clearing house for damage prevention incident data so we
can evaluate program effectiveness. Our national Dig Safely efforts
continue, with more than 25 training sessions hosted around the country
since June to kick off local campaigns. Many communities are realizing
the importance of damage prevention. Also, we must invest in research
to better detect and monitor excavation damage. As already mentioned,
the Administration's FY01 request includes additional funds for
research on outside force damage to locate defects on pipelines at the
earliest possible time.
Ensuring Operators are Qualified: Second, we are addressing the
human side of the pipeline safety equation. Last year, RSPA finalized a
statutory requirement for an operator qualification program to assure a
workforce capable of performing safety functions and responding to
abnormal conditions. RSPA will work aggressively with operators to
review their progress in developing qualification programs. Where
progress is inadequate, RSPA will intervene.
Improving Data Availability and Use: Third, a critical lesson RSPA
has learned is that we have to improve data collection, and make better
use of the information we have. We can do this by assuring integration
of information obtained from internal inspections with one call and
operating data.
Improving Public Access to Information: Fourth, RSPA is
investigating how to help communities better protect pipelines and be
informed about the effectiveness of each company's safety programs. We
have learned much from the experience of working with Governor Locke's
Fuel Accident and Prevention Response Team and from meetings with city
and state officials. We are pleased that the Washington State Utilities
Commission Chair, Marilyn Showalter, has joined our Pipeline Safety
Technical Advisory Committee. While we have requirements today to alert
emergency responders about the existence of pipelines, we believe there
are opportunities to work better with organizations at the community
level that are capable of making informed decisions about the adequacy
of pipeline safety and prevention options. We are working with Safe
Bellingham, the National League of Cities and other public interest
groups on pilot testing some new approaches to improving communications
among communities, operators and regulators.
Fostering State-Federal Partnerships: RSPA emphasizes our
commitment to State partnerships--to providing adequate resources to
support State programs and to finding better ways of involving States
in activities that enable communities to live safely with pipelines.
These activities include identifying local concerns, investigating
those concerns, and identifying ways communities can better protect
themselves and the pipelines that traverse them.
The Administration plans to seek additional statutory authority to
protect public safety and the environment through an improved pipeline
safety program. RSPA looks forward to working with the sponsors of
existing pipeline safety legislation in both the House and the Senate,
and other Members of Congress, state and local governments, and
interested stakeholders on completing a pipeline safety bill this year.
Conclusion
In closing, RSPA renews its commitment to assure continuous
improvement in pipeline safety and in protecting both the public and
the environment. Thank you, and I would be pleased to answer any
questions you have.
Senator Gorton. Before we go on, I'd like you to be
explicit. If you get the amount of money recommended in the
president's budget, do you feel that you will be able to solve
all of the problems that have been outlined here today?
Mr. Felder. I think that we can certainly address them more
successfully than we have in the past.
Senator Gorton. Well, probably do that if we give you a
somewhat smaller increase in the budget as well. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Felder. Can we solve them all? We want to get down to
zero the same way everyone in this room does in terms of
injuries, fatalities, property damage. Senator, that's what
we're working for.
Senator Gorton. Mr. Chipkevich, you have been complimented
during the course of the events this day, and we're delighted
to have you with us from Washington, D.C. and look forward to
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT CHIPKEVICH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PIPELINE
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
BOARD
Mr. Chipkevich. Thank you. Good afternoon, Senators Gorton
and Murray. I appreciate the opportunity to appear on behalf of
the National Transportation Safety Board to report on our
investigation into the pipeline rupture and the fatal fire in
Bellingham last June.
Accidents are devastating to the victims, their
communities, and their families. Most are preventable, but not
without a dedicated and persistent effort by industry and
regulators to set and enforce high standards.
Attached to my testimony for the record are charts that
will help clarify my remarks. The first is a map of the Olympic
pipeline system in the northwest. Preliminary data indicate
that shortly before the rupture in Bellingham a pump at
Woodinville did not start when commanded. A relief valve at
Bayview should have worked to relieve upstream overpressure,
and failing this, a blocked valve at Bayview should have
closed, as we believe it did. Product was pumped into the line
at Cherry Point, and the closure of the Bayview blocked valve
would have sent a pressure wave back toward Ferndale and Cherry
Point. The rupture occurred about midway between Cherry Point
and Bayview at the Bellingham water treatment plant.
Preliminary data indicates that the rupture occurred at well
above the operating pressures, but substantially below the full
yield strength for the pipe of this design and size, and even
below the maximum allowable surge pressure permitted by
regulatory standards. It took several weeks to excavate the
ruptured segment, largely because the rupture occurred beneath
an area of extensive water piping.
You have also been provided with pictures of the pipe
section as initially uncovered. Preliminary inspection of the
ruptured segments indicates external damage to the pipe where
the failure is believed to have begun, along with additional
internal damage. You can see from the pictures that there is
some evidence of both external and internal deformities. I
would caution you, however, that this information is
preliminary, and intensive testing is required before we can be
confident of a complete failure. We plan to meticulously test
the ruptured pipe segment when possible to determine whether
external preexisting damage may have contributed to the
rupture, and to understand the consequences of repeated
seemingly abnormal closures at the Bayview station blocked
valve.
Records indicate that the valve may have closed 50 or more
times in the 6-months after it was installed in December 1998.
We will examine the reasons for their closures and their
possible impact on the upstream pipe's durability. We're also
interested in the functioning of a relief valve at the Bayview
station. This valve needs to be tested to determine if it is
capable of operating within specifications. The design and
construction of the Bayview facility also needs close attention
to determine if the valve would have been permitted to function
correctly in the application.
Given the extensive overlay of water piping, and what
appears to be external damage on the ruptured fragment, we are
also looking into possible excavation damage. The Safety Board
is carefully documenting and analyzing construction work done
at the water treatment facility, and Olympic's work to evaluate
information developed from internal or smart pig inspections.
We also want to document and analyze the data available to
controllers at the time of the accident and to understand their
actions during the accident sequence. They seem to have been
unaware of the rupture for an extended period of time, and
restarting a pipeline after a rupture suggests a significant
performance failure. We don't yet know whether this can be
traced to training, qualifications, equipment malfunction, poor
design in the computer-based control system or some other
undetermined reason.
The NTSB wants the answers to all these questions, and we
need to know them as soon as feasible. However, necessary tests
on the ruptured pipe have not been completed because of a grand
jury subpoena requested by the U.S. Attorneys Office and a lack
of cooperation from needed witnesses, but ultimately OPS is
answerable for the regulatory context in which the pipeline
company operates.
The NTSB has for many years argued that periodic
verification of pipeline integrity must be a requirement for
service. Internal inspections done at the Bellingham pipe
identified issues in the field that ultimately failed. That
inspection data produced no change, and the regulatory
processes did not require a correction.
OPS's response to our 1997 recommendation is in an
unacceptable status. Mandatory inspection and testing programs
are needed to protect the public and the industry alike.
Federal action is long over due.
The same is true of employee qualification standards. The
NTSB has had little success convincing OPS that strong training
and qualifications are needed for all personnel in safety
critical positions.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I'd be happy to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chipkevich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Chipkevich, Director, Office of Pipeline
and Hazardous Material Safety, National Transportation Safety Board
Good afternoon Senators Gorton and Murray. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you on behalf of the National
Transportation Safety Board to update you on our on-going investigation
into the pipeline rupture and subsequent fire that occurred in
Bellingham, Washington, last June, and to discuss pipeline safety
issues.
As you are aware, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
has been investigating pipeline accidents since 1967, and as a result
of those investigations, we have issued over 1,100 safety
recommendations that we believe would prevent a recurrence of similar
accidents. The steel pipeline that runs through Bellingham is just a
small part of the over 160,000 miles of pipelines transporting
hazardous liquids nationwide. In 1997, approximately 616.5 billion ton-
miles of oil and refined petroleum products were shipped via pipeline,
accounting for 64.5% of the oil and refined petroleum products moved
throughout the United States annually.
On June 10, 1999, at about 3:30 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), a
16-inch diameter pipeline owned by Olympic Pipe Line Company ruptured,
and gasoline leaked into the Hanna and Whatcom Creeks in Whatcom Falls
Park within the City of Bellingham, Washington. About 5:02 p.m., the
gasoline ignited, resulting in a fireball that traveled approximately
1\1/2\ miles downstream from the pipeline failure location. Two 10-
year-old boys and an 18-year-old young man lost their lives as a result
of this tragic accident. Eight additional injuries were documented,
along with significant property damage to a single-family residence and
the City of Bellingham's water treatment plant. The release of
approximately \1/4\ million gallons of gasoline caused substantial
environmental damage to the waterways. Shortly after being notified of
the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board launched a team
of investigators to the scene. Safety Board personnel were on scene for
approximately 5 weeks.
Before providing you with background on the pipeline system and
details of the Board's investigation, I would first like to address the
considerations the Safety Board must deal with in this investigation.
As you may be aware, key pipeline company personnel have refused to
respond to Safety Board questions, exercising their Fifth Amendment
rights. In addition, the Board has been served with a grand jury
subpoena, issued upon application from the United States Attorney's
office in Seattle, Washington, which has been extended on several
occasions, placing a hold on necessary destructive testing of the
sections of pipe which are in the Board's possession. We are working
with the United States Attorney's office to resolve these issues.
Before relating the progress of our investigation, let me give you
some necessary background on this pipeline system.
Background
Olympic Pipe Line Company is a partnership consisting of Atlantic
Richfield Company, Equilon Pipeline LLC (Equilon), and GATX Terminal
Corporation, with Equilon acting as the managing partner. Olympic's
system extends from refineries in the extreme northwestern corner of
Washington State to Portland, Oregon (see Attachment 1). The entire
pipeline system is remotely operated from a central control center
located in Renton, Washington. From this centralized location, pipeline
controllers can monitor key variables, such as pressures and flow rates
throughout the entire system. The controllers can also monitor and
operate mechanical components, such as pumps and motor-operated valves.
The accident section of pipeline, which was originally installed in
1965, ran from a pumping station near Ferndale, Washington,
approximately 37.4 miles southward, to Olympic's Bayview and Allen
pumping and storage stations near Allen, Washington. This steel
pipeline was constructed of pipe with a wall thickness of 0.312 inches
manufactured by Lone Star. In 1966, approximately 725 feet of the
pipeline, including the specific section that failed on June 10, 1999,
was rerouted to permit construction of a water treatment plant by the
City of Bellingham. This new, short section of pipe had the same
specified minimum strength and wall thickness as the original, but was
manufactured by U.S. Steel.
In 1993 and 1994, a contractor working on behalf of the City of
Bellingham installed a 72-inch water line across Olympic's pipeline,
approximately 20 feet south of the rupture. A new 24-inch diameter
water line was also installed and connected to an existing water line
10 feet south of the rupture. In addition, the water treatment plant
was being modified, a water pump station and additional smaller
crossings were being constructed.
According to personnel involved in the design and installation of
the water treatment plant modifications, Olympic was notified of the
water plant modifications and associated water pipeline installations,
and assisted the design firm with determining the exact elevations of
its pipeline during the design phase of the water plant modifications.
Olympic personnel were also on site during portions of the water
pipeline construction project. Documentation provided to the Safety
Board by Olympic includes reports Olympic generated as a result of the
water piping installations.
Although Federal regulations do not require internal pipeline
inspections, in 1991, Olympic inspected its pipeline from the Ferndale
to Allen Stations with a magnetic flux internal inspection tool, or
``smart pig.'' Although anomalies were reported on various segments of
the pipeline, no anomalies in the immediate vicinity of the rupture
were found during this inspection.
In 1996, Olympic conducted another internal inspection of its
pipeline with a similar magnetic flux internal inspection tool. As a
result of this inspection, three anomalies were reported in the
vicinity of the rupture. While our investigation continues to develop
information, preliminary indications are that one of these anomalies,
reported by the inspection company as a ``possible wrinkle bend,'' was
located in the immediate vicinity of the subsequent rupture. The other
two anomalies were located approximately 1.5 feet south of the first
girth weld, approximately 10 feet downstream of the rupture.
In 1997, under an administrative order from Washington State's
Department of Ecology, Olympic contracted for another internal
inspection with a caliper tool specifically to search for pipeline
buckles. An anomaly at the same location as the two located south of
the first girth weld downstream of the rupture was found as a result of
this inspection. In May 1997, Olympic submitted correspondence to the
Department of Ecology that indicated it intended to further evaluate
this anomaly.
Olympic documents indicate that the company analyzed 1996 and 1997
anomalies mentioned above; however, they elected not to excavate and
visually inspect or repair any of the anomalies located in the area of
the water treatment plant. Olympic has indicated that these anomalies
did not meet the applicable criteria for further action. The Safety
Board is looking into what criteria were used. Olympic personnel with
direct knowledge of the decision-making process have declined to be
questioned by the Safety Board, exercising their Fifth Amendment
rights.
NTSB's Investigation
I would now like to highlight factual information developed as a
result of our investigation. I would stress, however, that the Board's
investigation is ongoing, and that the following information is
preliminary. It may be refined and changed as the investigation
proceeds.
Upon the Safety Board's arrival in Bellingham on the morning of
June 11, 1999, several parties that had information critical to
understanding the accident were immediately identified; later, others
were invited to participate as the investigation unfolded. Parties to
the Bellingham, Washington, pipeline investigation include the U.S.
Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), the
Washington State Department of Ecology, the Washington State Fire
Marshal's Office, the City of Bellingham, Olympic Pipe Line Company
(Olympic), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Teledyne-Brown
Engineering, Fisher-Rosemount Petroleum, and IMCO General Construction,
Inc.
Because the water lines were still in service, the Safety Board did
not excavate the ruptured pipe until about two weeks after the
accident. If we had excavated immediately, water service would have
been jeopardized to approximately 25,000 customers. Sections of the
pipe were carefully excavated under the Safety Board's supervision as
soon as a new, temporary pump station was placed in service. The
segments were then transported to our laboratory facilities in
Washington D.C. where they await examination.
During the excavation process, the water lines that had been
installed across Olympic's pipeline in the vicinity of the rupture were
exposed, and indications of external damage to the pipeline were
observed. Safety Board investigators have interviewed personnel from
the City of Bellingham, the firm that designed the water plant
modifications and managed the construction activities on behalf of the
City of Bellingham, as well as the contractor who installed the water
piping. However, Olympic employees who were assigned to inspect the
construction activity have also declined to speak with Safety Board
investigators.
Safety Board personnel have conducted a thorough visual examination
of the ruptured pipeline segment and an adjacent segment that was also
removed from the scene. Each of these segments is approximately 10 feet
long. Preliminary visual examination of the ruptured pipeline segment
has shown that the fracture originated at a gouge mark on the surface
of the pipe, and that the gouge at the failure origin was oriented
longitudinally along the axis of the pipe. The wall thickness of the
pipe at the origin measured between 0.24 and 0.25 inches, a reduction
of approximately 20 percent from the original 0.312 inch nominal wall
thickness. The overall rupture measured 27 inches longitudinally (see
Attachments 2a, 2b, and 2c).* Additional gouge marks and dents were
found on the exterior surface of the ruptured pipe segment, and inward
protrusions were noted on the inside of the pipe that appeared to
correspond to some of the external gouge marks. The external coating on
this pipe segment appears to be the original spiral wrap material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred to has been retained in the Committee's
files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Examination of the second pipe segment noted two dents at the 3:30
and 4:00 positions on the pipe, located 18" and 22" respectively, south
of a girth weld on this segment. No coating repairs over any of the
damage have been noted, and no corrosion damage was observed on the
interior of the pipe surfaces or the bare areas of the external pipe
surfaces.
Microscopic examination of the fracture face is still necessary to
determine whether there are any indications of fatigue near the point
of origin. Additional tests are also necessary to determine the
microstructure and hardness of the pipe material.
Based upon a review of Olympic's computer pressure data
automatically recorded during the accident sequence, our investigators
also began to examine the functioning of valves at a newly-constructed
pumping and storage facility near Bayview, Washington (the Bayview
Products Terminal). Testing was then performed at the request of the
Safety Board to determine whether a relief valve at the station had
functioned properly. The field testing was inconclusive, and the valve
was removed from the pipeline and returned to the Safety Board's
facilities for further evaluation.
Preliminary information indicates that pressure began to build
within Olympic's Bayview Station as a result of delivery changes
underway further down the pipeline system. A relief valve, intended to
divert product into a storage tank to reduce the pressure within the
facility, had been installed when the station was built in 1998 to
protect the piping from overpressurization.
Based upon a preliminary review of pressure information recorded at
the Bayview Station, although the relief valve began to function,
pressure within the station continued to build, triggering a block
valve on the pipeline coming into the station to close. According to
information provided by Olympic, when the block valve closed, the
pressure on the pipeline upstream of Bayview increased to about 1500
pounds per square inch gauge (psig), and the pipeline ruptured.
Information provided by Olympic indicates that the maximum allowable
operating pressure was 1370 psig on this pipeline segment. Federal
regulations allow pressure surges to 1507 psig. The pipeline
theoretically should withstand internal pressure of approximately 2000
psig. The pressure is believed to have reached about 1422 psig at the
point of the rupture. After the accident, Olympic recalculated the
maximum operating pressure to be 1456 psig at the rupture location.
Preliminary information indicates that the block valve on the
pipeline entering Bayview Station had closed over 50 times since the
facility began operating on December 16, 1998. On many of these
occasions, the valve closure was triggered by a similar pressure
buildup within Bayview Station. Our investigators are still evaluating
these events to determine the pressures involved and the functioning of
the relief valve.
The relief valve was originally ordered with an internal spring set
to relieve the pressure at 100 psig. The original Bayview Station
design documents called for a set pressure of 740 psig. Olympic
subsequently reduced the intended set pressure to 650 psig. In order to
modify the valve's set pressure from 100 psig to 650 psig, Olympic
ordered a different spring to be installed within the valve's pilot
operator. We are looking into, however, whether Olympic replaced a
piston and cap as recommended by the valve's manufacturer.
As soon as legal issues have been worked out with the U. S.
Attorney's office, the Safety Board will examine the valve to evaluate
its performance. Since valves of this type or those with a similar
design are commonly used throughout the liquid pipeline industry, it is
extremely important fully to understand what occurred.
We also know that the pipeline system design plan for a control
valve located upstream of the relief valve intended the valve to be
capable of closing completely. The valve, however, had an internal stop
that prevented it from being capable of stopping the flow of product
into the Bayview Station. What effect this might have had on the events
that occurred June 10, 1999, is still under investigation.
Shortly after the accident, our investigators also began to
evaluate the actions of Olympic's personnel who were operating the
pipeline from the Renton, Washington, control center. A preliminary
reconstruction of the accident sequence is being performed from a
printed summary events recorded within the supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) system. A preliminary time line of key events is
included at Attachment 3 for your information.
Based on the event logs, we know that flow within the pipeline was
restarted at approximately 4:16 p.m., approximately 45 minutes after
the rupture occurred. The pipeline was then operated for approximately
17 minutes until the pumps shut down.
Olympic initially reported that a ``slowdown'' of the computer
systems occurred during the accident sequence that affected the ability
of the pipeline controllers to change settings on the pipeline system.
Olympic further stated that one of its employees may have modified
software settings prior to the accident, and may have been working on
the computers at the time of the event. A report prepared by Olympic,
in response to an OPS corrective action order, acknowledges that the
alleged SCADA system slowdown could not be verified or reproduced.
The Safety Board is continuing its analysis of the computer system
tapes. Our preliminary review has not identified that a slowdown
actually occurred on the day of the accident. Although Olympic has
reported to OPS that it has improved its SCADA system by upgrading
hardware and balancing workloads between the computer systems since the
accident occurred, until we fully understand what happened during the
accident sequence, the impact of these changes on future system
operations cannot be fully evaluated.
The Board's investigative staff are reviewing substantial
documentation provided by Olympic, such as pressure data, design
information, construction records, telephone logs and e-mail records,
along with the applicable company policies and procedures related to
pipeline operations and maintenance, as part of our investigation.
However, we will never know what happened within the control center
around the time of the accident unless we are able to interview the
individuals operating the pipeline when the accident occurred. There
are at least four key individuals who may have direct knowledge of the
events that occurred in the control room during the accident sequence.
Those individuals include two controllers who were on duty at the time
of the accident, their supervisor, and a former controller now
responsible for maintaining the SCADA system and acting as a relief
controller. He was reportedly performing modifications to the computer
programming. These individuals are also critical to our investigation
into human performance issues, such as training, fatigue, and
ergonomics, that may be relevant with this accident. As I mentioned,
these individuals and others have declined to talk with us.
The Safety Board is also continuing its analysis of internal
inspections conducted by Olympic on the pipeline prior to the rupture,
and of the computer operating system and design of the Bayview Station
and its effect on the pipeline. We are also hopeful that as the
investigative process continues, additional Olympic personnel will be
in a position to talk with us.
Safety Issues
Several of the issues being looked into as a result of the
Bellingham accident--excavation damage, pipeline integrity, training of
personnel--have been concerns of the Safety Board for many years.
Excavation damage is the leading cause of pipeline accidents, and the
prevention of excavation damage is an issue on the Board's ``Most
Wanted'' list. Recommendations regarding excavation damage were first
issued by the Safety Board in 1973, and we are currently investigating
several recent accidents in which excavation damage may have played a
role.
Our concerns regarding pipeline integrity go back to 1987. As a
result of investigations into three pipeline accidents, the Safety
Board recommended that the Research and Special Programs Administration
(RSPA) require pipeline operators to periodically determine the
adequacy of their pipelines to operate by performing inspections or
tests capable of identifying corrosion, mechanical damage, or other
time-dependent defects that could be detrimental to the safe operation
of pipelines. Yet, 12 years after our initial recommendation was
issued, there are no regulations that require pipeline operators to
perform periodic inspections or tests to locate and assess whether this
type of damage exists on other pipelines. OPS has indicated that it
intends to enhance enforcement efforts to ensure that pipeline
operators who perform internal inspections more aggressively evaluate
the results and make appropriate repairs.
The Safety Board is concerned that, although the objective is
laudable, the efforts may be counterproductive if companies that
perform voluntary internal inspections are penalized, thus discouraging
them from performing such inspections. It is essential that OPS mandate
and enforce a pipeline integrity inspection program for all pipeline
operators. The Board's recommendation regarding pipeline integrity was
placed in an open-unacceptable status in June 1999.
The need for adequate training of pipeline personnel was also the
subject of safety recommendations issued in 1987. The Safety Board
recommended that RSPA require operators to develop training programs
for pipeline personnel. In October 1998, RSPA published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to require pipeline operators to develop a
written qualification program for individuals operating pipelines.
However, the NPRM did not establish training requirements for
personnel, and it allowed companies to evaluate an individual's ability
to perform tasks using methods such as oral examinations or
observations of job performance. In comments on the rulemaking
submitted in January 1999, the Board urged RSPA to amend the rule to
include strong training and testing requirements to ensure that
employees can properly perform their jobs. We were disappointed that
the final rule published in August 1999 was substantially unchanged
from the NPRM.
It is unfortunate that some of the issues we have addressed, which
have been the subject of Safety Board recommendations, have not been
acted on in a timely manner. Each of these issues could be accomplished
without legislative action. However, because the Department has not
acted, Congressional intervention may be necessary.
Before closing, I would like to take this opportunity to comment on
a concern that has been raised by some state officials. As you are
aware, state pipeline safety programs are important to help ensure that
pipeline system operators comply with minimum safety standards. In
fact, state pipeline inspectors who conduct daily inspection activities
represent more than 90 percent of the safety inspection workforce. Yet
Federal matching funds provided to states have consistently been below
the 50 percent level authorized by the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act.
We have been advised by representatives of several states that funds
have not kept pace with demand, and that inadequate funds threaten the
infrastructure of the nation's pipeline safety program.
Additionally, we are concerned that while states have many more
inspectors than OPS, that OPS is removing states from interstate
pipeline inspection programs. State officials have advised that OPS,
while previously encouraging states to act as interstate agents, are
now having their applications denied. The OPS currently has the ability
to utilize these state resources for regular inspection activities
through its partnering agreements. It is also critical that
comprehensive, consistent, and effective regulatory requirements for
interstate pipelines be enacted at the Federal level to protect
citizens in all of the states.
For example, in Virginia, approximately 2 million gallons of
petroleum products have spilled from pipelines since 1974. In an
accident near Reston, Virginia, in 1993, more than 407,000 gallons of
diesel fuel spilled from a pipeline into Sugarland Creek, a tributary
of the Potomac River. Because of several liquid pipeline accidents that
occurred in Virginia, the General Assembly passed legislation in 1994
authorizing the State Corporation Commission to seek interstate agent
status from OPS, which would allow state inspectors to inspect
interstate pipelines. OPS apparently originally supported this
legislation, and for several years encouraged the Commission to pursue
interstate agent status. Unfortunately, when the Virginia Commission
was ready to accept agent status, OPS denied their application. In
fact, states have advised the Safety Board that OPS has effectively
halted this program.
We believe state assistance in the interstate pipeline inspection
program may go a long way to improving pipeline safety. Because a
single pipeline may operate in as many as 10 states, effective Federal
oversight is needed to ensure that pipeline operators are meeting
minimum safety standards. We believe that Congress needs to closely
examine how the states are utilized, funded, and evaluated by OPS.
However, for the consistent and effective application of regulatory
requirements to interstate pipelines, the authority and responsibility
should rest with the OPS.
That completes my testimony, and I will be happy to respond to any
questions you may have.
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Our state fire marshal.
STATEMENT OF MARY CORSO, STATE FIRE MARSHAL, OLYMPIA,
WASHINGTON
Ms. Corso. Thank you, Senator Gorton, Senator Murray. My
name is Mary Corso. I'm the Washington State Fire Marshal and
the Director of the Fire Protection Bureau with the Washington
State Patrol.
I'm pleased with the opportunity to be here to talk about
this very important issue relating to pipeline safety, the
protection of citizens, the first responder community, law
enforcement, fire, EMS, and the environment.
I hail originally from Minnesota where I served 22 years in
the fire service, 15 years of which I served as a fire fighter,
the remainder, in state service with both the Minnesota State
Fire Marshal's office and most recently as the Washington State
Fire Marshal.
Twice I have seen the effects of a pipeline incident.
First, in 1986 in Minnesota where a pipeline rupture was
responsible for two deaths and one serious injury. This rupture
took place in a residential neighborhood where people
attempting to flee were consumed by an explosion and fire ball
leaving no place for escape.
Secondly and most recently in Bellingham where a pipeline
rupture allowed hundreds of thousands of gallons of gasoline to
flow into a waterway creating a significant tragic event, and
three more lives were lost. Three families, an entire
community, and the State of Washington bear the grief of this
preventable incident.
I am a strong advocate of prevention and preparedness, as I
have devoted the last 11 years of my career to protecting life
and property through enforcing, engineering, education, and
response activities. Protecting people where they live, work
and play takes a holistic approach. Protecting people takes
passive protection, comprised of safeguards, the majority of
which most of us don't see, but exists silently in the
background, safeguards such as cathodic protection, monitoring
devices and periodic testing. These passive protections need
constant vigilance, continuous maintenance, and technically
certified operator to insure the integrity of the pipeline.
While you have and will hear significant testimony on these
issues, I will focus my remarks on the responses or activities
that are also critical in, and vital to protecting our
communities.
We are not opposed to pipelines in the State of Washington,
and we, in fact, realize that these pipelines may be the safest
way for conveyance of liquid and gas fuels. It has been stated
numerous times, there are not significant numbers of events
involving flammable liquids and natural gas compared to the
volume of product that is delivered throughout the state each
year. Senator Murray stated it very adequately when she said on
average there is one spill per day. This is 365 too many in 1
year.
These numbers of incidents from a response perspective are
viewed as low frequency, high risk and have the capability of
causing a catastrophic event if a failure occurs. Those who
risk their lives in service of their community are in reality
community problem solvers. Each time the alarm sounds or the
radio crackles, another problem must be solved. This is what we
do. There are no second thoughts, no hesitations, just a
natural, automatic response to a need in our community.
In the State of Washington each year, first responders--the
law enforcement community, fire and EMS--answer over 700,000
calls for help. These include fires, emergency medical
incidents, hazardous conditions, law enforcement related
activities and a myriad of other emergencies related to public
safety. These are the everyday events that we respond to almost
automatically, instinctually, if you will.
Our practice and experience comes from these incidents
because of their frequency. We concentrate our training,
equipment, and planning on these activities as they are what
our public expects in terms of protection on a daily basis.
On the other hand, a hazardous material incident due to
spills or leaks of flammable liquids and/or the release of
natural gas is an infrequent event. Therefore, the necessary
training and equipment may not always be current or available.
It is very difficult, at best, for many public safety agencies
to provide the necessary equipment and training for this very
reason. That is why I'm here to talk to you today. Funding,
training, and the necessary equipment to respond to these
infrequent incidents are vital to our state and our nation's
first responders who are called upon to protect life and
property and the environment.
The needs of the first responder community are significant.
They provide for our ability to maintain the peace, protect the
public from fire, and answer the need for emergency medical
services, all vital parts of a safe community. Our state's fire
service is comprised primarily of volunteers. Up to 71 percent
of the emergency responders in our state are volunteers. Of the
650 fire departments in this state, 580 serve populations of
20,000 or less, and they have vast differences in the
capabilities within each community.
It was fortunate that Bellingham had a hazardous material
response team that was capable of responding to the event that
took place on June 10, 1999. Unfortunately, that may not have
been the case in many other areas along the pipeline.
The major difficulties facing first sponsors are these.
Fire departments are underfunded to deal with hazardous
materials. They have significant problems covering the high
cost of equipment and maintenance of the necessary equipment
for hazardous material response. Greater assistance is needed
from the state and Federal level to support local first
responder training and equipment needs. The state needs a
greater regional response capability for hazardous material
teams along the pipeline, with dedicated funding to coordinate
training, equipment and supplies.
In Washington State there are only 24 hazardous material
response teams associated with fire departments, 12 of which
are specialized teams. Yet hundreds of cities are located along
the hazardous liquid pipelines in our state. All face serious
problems in keeping their staff trained and prepared.
As a member of the Governor's Fuel Accident Prevention and
Response Team task force, we identified specific
recommendations to assist local first responders. They are: to
evaluate the local first responders in communities housing fuel
transmission lines for their preparedness; to work in
consultation with other state agencies to assess the needs,
equipment, and training of local first sponsors; to evaluate
the need for training programs to enhance regional incident
management teams to assist local responders in managing fuel
line pipeline accidents; to amend the Washington State Fire
Protection Statute, 48.48 to direct the State Fire Marshal to
require that local first responders are immediately notified by
pipeline operators if a leak or spill occurs, and; to consult
with other agencies to identify the need for and legislative
means of achieving consistent application of the National
Interagency Incident Response Team.
Pipeline companies need to be active players in this
recommendation. It is also important that those who may be
called upon at a pipeline incident are able to communicate with
each other and operate under a common set of guidelines,
terminology and structures.
Additionally, critical to communications is the need for
sufficient dedicated radio spectrums identified for public
safety agencies to utilize. These systems must be interoperable
and provide a system where all responders are able to talk to
each other at the scene. That is currently not the case for
most major emergencies. This includes first responders,
emergency managers, state agencies, and pipeline companies.
Standardization, planning, and preparation by all players to
prepare for an incident are critical and essential to a safe
and positive outcome.
The Governor's Fuel Accident Response Team recommendation
and Governor Locke's support for pipeline safety in the State
of Washington needs to be emulated at the Federal level to
support and protect our public, our nation, and our
environment.
In conclusion, I urge passage of the Pipeline Safety Act of
2000, thereby encouraging these same recommendations you have
heard today at the Federal level to ensure prevention of future
incidents and to ensure our nation's first responders are
prepared when needed.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Corso follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mary Corso, State Fire Marshal,
Olympia, Washington
Chair Gorton, Senator Murray, and Committee Members:
My name is Mary Corso. I am the Director of the Washington State
Patrol Fire Protection Bureau--State Fire Marshal. I am pleased to have
the opportunity to address the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee regarding this very important issue related to
pipeline safety and the protection of citizens, the first responder
community (law enforcement, fire and EMS), and the environment.
I hale originally from the state of Minnesota, where I served for
22 years in the fire service, 15 years of which I served as a
firefighter; the remainder in state service with both the Minnesota
State Fire Marshal's office; and, most recently, as the Washington
State Fire Marshal. Twice, I have seen firsthand the effects of a
pipeline incident: first, in 1986 in Minnesota where a pipeline
incident was responsible for three deaths in a residential neighborhood
where people attempting to flee the dangers were consumed by an
explosion and a fire ball, leaving no place to escape. Secondly, and
most recently, in Bellingham where a pipeline broke, allowing hundreds
of thousands of gallons of gasoline to flow into a waterway, creating a
significant threat to life safety, property, and the environment.
Unfortunately in this tragic event, three more lives were lost. Three
families, an entire community, and the state of Washington bear the
grief of this preventable incident.
I am a strong advocate of prevention and preparedness, as I have
devoted the past 11 years of my career to protecting life and property
through enforcement, engineering, education, and response activities.
Protecting people where they live, work, and play takes a holistic
approach. It takes passive protection, comprised of safeguards, the
majority of which we don't see, but exist silently in the background to
protect us. Safeguards such as cathodic protection, monitoring devices
and periodic testing. These passive protections need constant
vigilance, continuous maintenance, and technical operators to ensure
the integrity of the pipeline.
While you have, and will hear significant testimony on these
issues, I will focus my remarks on the response, or active protection
that is so critical and vital to protecting our communities.
We are not opposed to pipelines in the state of Washington. In
fact, we realize that these pipelines may be the safest way for
conveyance of liquid and gas fuels. While it has been repeated numerous
times, there are not significant numbers of events involving flammable
liquids and natural gases, compared to the volume of product that is
delivered throughout the state each day. However, such operations from
a response perspective, are viewed as low frequency, high risk, and
have the capability of causing a catastrophic event if a failure
occurs.
Those who risk their lives in service of their community are really
community problem solvers. Each time the alarm sounds or the radio
crackles another problem must be solved. This is what we do. There are
no second thoughts, no hesitations, just a natural automatic response
to a need in our community.
In the state of Washington each year the first responders (law
enforcement, fire and EMS) answer over 700,000 calls for help. These
include fires, emergency medical incidents, hazardous conditions; law
enforcement related activities and a plethora of other emergencies
related to public safety. These are the everyday events that we take
care of almost automatically--instinctively, if you will. Our practice
and experience comes from these incidents because of their frequency.
We concentrate our training, equipment, and planning on these
activities, as they are what our public expects in terms of protection
every day.
On the other hand, a hazardous materials incident due to spills or
leaks of flammable liquids and/or the release of natural gas are an
infrequent event. Therefore, the necessary training and equipment may
not always be current or available. It is very difficult at best for
many public safety agencies to provide the necessary training and
equipment for this very reason.
It is for this very reason I am here to talk to you today. Funding,
training, and the necessary equipment to respond to these infrequent
incidents are vital to our State's and the Nation's first responders
who are called upon to protect life, property, and the environment. The
needs of the first response community are significant; they provide for
our ability to maintain the peace, protect the public from fire, and
answer the needs for emergency medical services--all vital parts of a
safe community.
To complicate matters, our State's fire service is comprised
primarily of volunteers, making up 71% of the emergency response
community. Of the 650 fire departments in the state, 580 serve
populations of 20,000 or less, with vast differences in the
capabilities within each community. It was fortunate that the City of
Bellingham had a hazmat response team that was capable of responding to
the event that took place on June 10, 1999. Unfortunately, that would
not have been the case in many other areas along the pipeline.
The major difficulties facing local first responders are:
Fire departments are under-funded to deal with
hazardous materials; they have significant problems covering
the high cost of purchase and maintenance of necessary
equipment for a hazardous materials response.
Greater assistance is needed from the state and
federal level to support local first responder training and
equipment needs.
The state needs a greater regional response capacity
for hazardous material teams along the pipeline--with dedicated
funding--to coordinate training equipment and supplies. In
Washington State there are 24 publicly funded hazardous
material teams, 12 of which are specialized teams. All face
serious problems in keeping their staff trained and prepared.
As a member of Governor Locke's Fuel Accident Prevention and
Response Team task force, we identified specific recommendations to
assist the local first responders. These recommendations directed the
State Fire Marshal to:
Evaluate preparedness of local first responders in
communities housing fuel transmission lines.
In consultation with the Military Department's
Emergency Management Division, the Department of Ecology, and
local agencies, the Fire Marshal should conduct a needs
assessment of local first responders' readiness and equipment
needs particularly relevant to fuel transmission pipelines.
This should include consideration of the costs and benefits of
meeting identified needs.
Establish a temporary position to develop training
programs for local first responders--police, fire, and
emergency medical service staff and volunteers--to deal with
pipeline accidents. This person should coordinate with pipeline
operators to identify their role in providing the training and
to identify the timetable and costs for providing this training
to first responders in communities housing transmission
pipelines. The program should also address community education
and response, including support materials and handouts.
Evaluate the need for a training program to enhance
regional incident management teams to assist local responders
in managing fuel pipeline accidents.
To amend the State Fire Protection Statute (RCW 48.48)
to direct the State Fire Marshal to require that local first
responders are immediately notified by pipeline operators of
any leak or spill, and to;
Consult with other agencies to identify the need for
and legislative means of achieving consistent application of
the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS).
It is important that those who may be called upon in a pipeline
incident are able to communicate with each other and operate under a
common set of guidelines, terminology and structure. Additionally,
critical to communications is the need for sufficient dedicated radio
spectrums identified for public safety agencies to utilize. These
systems must be interoperable and provide a system where all responders
are able to talk to each other on the scene. This includes first
responders, emergency managers, and the pipeline companies.
Standardization, planning and preparation by all players to prepare for
an incident are critical and essential to a safe and positive outcome.
The Governor's Fuel Accident Prevention and Response Team
recommendations and Governor Locke's support for pipeline safety in the
State of Washington needs to be emulated at the federal level to
support the protection of our public, our Nation and our environment.
In conclusion, I urge the committee to support the ``Pipeline
Safety Act of 2000,'' thereby encouraging these same recommendations
you have heard today, at the federal level, to ensure prevention of
future incidents and to guarantee that our nation's first responders
are prepared and ready when needed.
Thank you.
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Ms. Showalter?
Ms. Showalter. Yes.
Senator Gorton. What if we were to amend the present law
and Senator Murray's bill to say that where an interstate
pipeline where more than 90 percent of the interstate pipeline
is associated in a single state, that state would have full
regulatory authority over the pipeline, would you welcome that
delegation of authority? Could you carry it out, and would we
have a better result with Olympic?
Ms. Showalter. We would welcome that authority. I think we
could not carry it out immediately without, of course, putting
more resources into our inspection program, but whether we get
the authority through the delegation of OPS of its authority or
whether we were given our own authority, we will, in general,
have the capability to do it, but we would have to add several
more engineers and inspectors.
Senator Gorton. Do you think you could then do a better
job?
Ms. Showalter. I think we would do a better job, probably,
because we care more about our state, but I have to say I think
equally important is I think we would do a better job because
we would put more resources into it.
If you look at the number of inspectors that we have or the
number of inspectors that we would add if we get interstate
delegation, it's probably three or four inspectors, and so we
would have a total, say, of, with our intrastate authority of
about 10. That is way more than----
Senator Gorton. --than the one?
Ms. Showalter. Than the one, right. So I think both
elements are important, what are the resources devoted to it,
which could be at the Federal level, but we're willing to
devote those resources, and then the other is who has the legal
authority.
Senator Gorton. The rest of the panelists will pardon me if
all or almost all of the rest of my questions are for Mr.
Felder.
Mr. Felder, you've been here all afternoon. You heard Mr.
King's question. Given Olympic's record, why is its pipeline
continuing to be operating below Bayview?
Mr. Felder. The reason that we have not shut that pipeline
down is because we have already reduced the operating pressure
on that portion of the line to 80 percent, which is as I said
in my statement, is the equivalent of pressure test. It's the
same thing as pressure testing the line, you get the same
margin of safety, and we took a look at the safety and the
operating history of the line below Bayview, and all of the
other information that we have at hand based on our inspections
of the Olympic pipeline and deemed it safe to operate, which is
not to say that we've given it a final check mark. We certainly
have not. We would not allow the pipeline below Bayview to
return to a full level of service until we have conducted a
full gamut of internal inspections with all of the high
resolution tools and the best available technology. So we want
to give the citizens of this state what is the equivalent of a
brand new pipeline, something that they have confidence in,
something that they understand the condition of, and something
that they can live with with a much higher level of comfort
than I've seen in this room.
Senator Gorton. Then the concerns expressed by the
officials from Bellevue, Renton, and SeaTac are without much
foundation? You're convinced that their cities are
appropriately protected?
Mr. Felder. Not only have we reviewed the internal
inspection runs that they are concerned about, but we've also
had outside experts take a look at it, because I know that
certainly in this environment our credibility isn't the
highest. So we may as well get somebody in that everybody has
confidence in. These things have been looked at.
For example, in Renton, we've been in touch with the Mayor
there. We've gotten back to him on the evaluation of what he
was concerned about. The areas that we had a common concern
about in fact had already been addressed, and if in fact after
these more sophisticated tools, if they show anything of
concern that needs to be examined and then repaired, replaced,
whatever is required, we are going to order that. It falls
within the gamut of the corrective action that we're going to
take, and we intend to take it.
Senator Gorton. On another subject, why has there been no
action positive or negative over a period of years on so many
of the National Transportation Safety Board's recommendations?
Mr. Felder. Well, Senator Gorton, I can only say if you
take a look at where we are today, we've got a couple of old
recommendations. It's absolutely true. There's probably five or
six of them that predate 1995 that are still open that are on
the books, and all of those recommendations we believe will be
satisfied when we put this rule out on the 30th. They have to
do with periodic testing. Some of them where not as pointed as
this. I mean the oldest one was put out in 1987, and it
concerned hydrostatic testing, and its safety goal was to
ensure the integrity of pipelines, and when we addressed that
recommendation, we tried to address it in a way that was as
responsible as possible, which was to take all of the pipelines
in America that we thought had susceptibility to the type of
defect that a pressure test would expose and order the pressure
testing of those lines, and we did that, and we feel that by
the time that protocol is completed, and it will be completed
within the next year, any pipeline that has that kind of a
defect will have been addressed, and I think the good news is
that there is now a new, more sophisticated internal inspection
device which can actually detect the kind of seam problems that
a hydrostatic test is designed to expose, and that tool we are
ordering for the first time to be used here in the State of
Washington. We've worked on the development of that over the
past 3 years.
Senator Gorton. You've listened today, and you've listened
before today to a wide range of complaints by local officials
here. We and the Congress keep hearing rumors or confusing
reports that the Administration of the Office of Pipeline
Safety may be seeking to amend the Federal law by revoking the
agency authority that it's given to four states and now offered
to the State of Washington.
Is there anything to that rumor?
Mr. Felder. Well, I'm very glad you raised that, Senator,
because this is a great time to clear the air on that.
The traditional interstate agent policy that we had was one
that was developed a number of years ago when the office that I
run today had a budget that was in the single digits of
millions of dollars. It had a staff that was about a third of
what we have today, and it had the same set of
responsibilities. So really out of a sense of urgency and out
of lack of resources we developed a program to have the states
conduct interstate inspections on interstate pipelines on our
behalf. We feel it was imperative because otherwise we could
never cover the interstate systems with the resources that we
had.
Fortunately or unfortunately as you may assess it, after
the tragic accident in Edison, New Jersey in 1994, Congress
doubled our budget. We went from what had finally grown to 17
million to 37 million dollars in 1 year, and since the budget
was raised to thirty-seven, to that 37 million dollars, we took
those resources as the Congress provided them to us and hired a
large number of new inspectors. We went from 25 inspectors up
to 55 to cover the interstate systems, and as we acquired those
resources and were able to do those inspections, we actually
put a freeze on creation of new state authority to conduct
inspections on our behalf.
I will add that states weren't actually beating down the
door for this, but there were some states who were interested
who we did not authorize, including the State of Texas.
However, we have entered into agreements with the State of
Texas periodically to do any number of inspections and special
construction investigations either apart from us or in
conjunction with us. We have always partnered effectively with
the state pipeline safety programs, but what we're looking
forward to, and let me give you the second part of it, we have
a legislative proposal which I hope will reach you by the end
of this month, and what we're looking to do, we're not ending
any programs where we don't have the ability to conduct those
inspections, and if there is a concern that we are not
inspecting often enough or thoroughly enough in a state, we're
very happy to respond to that, but the program that we have in
our proposed legislation actually not only reaches out to
states, asks them for their local concerns, both to their
population and their environment and has us put a work plan
together to address those concerns through inspections and
other activities, but it also fully funds that. So what we're
looking forward to is support from everyone for the dollars and
the resources to partner effectively with states, not just have
them conduct inspections using our standards, but to develop
work plans based on local and state concerns and conduct those
inspections.
Senator Gorton. Well, that's a nice long answer, but I'm
not at all sure that it answers the question that I asked.
Just put it very simply----
Mr. Felder. I can give you a one word answer. Are we ending
the program? No.
Senator Gorton. And if we give you the money that the
president's budget has asked, you will not back away from these
delegations?
Mr. Felder. Well, I think that we should, we should
continue that debate, and I think that that's what the--no,
really. I think that's what this reauthorization debate is all
about, whether it's a better idea to have each state conduct
the pipeline safety investigations or to have a Federal
oversight of the pipeline safety investigations with adequate
resources or something in-between. I think that's really what
this is about, and we want to be involved in that. If there's a
determination that we should just be a grant giving agency and
have the state perform all the inspections, that's a decision
that can be made. If it's something that goes to the other end
of it, or if it's somewhere in-between, what we think is
important is to really involve states in decisionmaking and
partnership in pipeline safety concerns not just to use them as
our extra work force.
Senator Gorton. What kind of history do you have? You've
got four states that have had this inspection authority for
some time. Is the record of incidents with those states better,
the same or worse than the other 46 states?
Mr. Felder. Actually, we took a look at that, and there's
no material difference.
Senator Gorton. Senator Murray?
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up on what Senator Gorton asked you, Mr. Felder,
what would be the arguments against allowing states to develop
their own inspection regulations?
Mr. Felder. Well, if we have the responsibility to oversee
the safe operation of pipelines, let me give you one, an
example of one pipeline, Colonial Pipeline. It runs from Texas
to New Jersey, and its control center is in Atlanta, Georgia. I
guess the question is who would set the standards, and the way
we see it we would rather work with all of the states up and
down that pipeline corridor, identify their concerns and then
putting together a comprehensive program which we honestly
believe we have in the Colonial setting to make sure that that
pipeline is operated safely. So we don't, we are not, we don't
want to count the states out, but we want them to give us what
we need to help protect their citizens. I believe that everyone
in this room and in this state knows more about what's
important locally both population and environmentally than we
do.
Senator Murray. So your concern is more for the states
where a pipeline goes through two, three, four, five states at
a time and who would set the regulations and rules, and that
what Senator Gorton suggested a moment ago, if 90 percent of a
pipeline operates within one state, would you have concerns
about that if the state had authority?
Mr. Felder. We don't regulate the transmission lines that
are in one state.
Senator Murray. Right.
Mr. Felder. So if you wanted----
Senator Murray. But the majority is in Washington State,
partially in Oregon, would that be of concern to you if
Washington State had particular regulations or operated the
pipeline?
Mr. Felder. It might be a concern to Oregon.
Senator Murray. Well, let me continue on, Mr. Felder. I
think you've heard the charges and the insinuations.
Mr. Felder. Oh, yes.
Senator Murray. But I wanted to ask you specifically
because we keep hearing the concern that the Office of Pipeline
Safety has more the interests of the industry in its purview in
making decisions rather than citizens. How do you respond to
that?
Mr. Felder. I respond to that by saying absolutely not. I
respond to that by saying that we are out there every day
inspecting, enforcing and trying to get the highest possible
standards in place. Some of these things take time. We've been
criticized for taking too much time. We'd like to quicken the
pace, but in no way do I accept any suggestion that we're
either favoring or working on the behalf of the folks that we
regulate.
Senator Murray. Mr. Chipkevich, you've been critical for a
long time of the Office of Pipeline Safety and many of the
regulations. You've listened to the testimony today. Do you
think progress is being made? Do you think we can feel perhaps
Bellingham made a difference and things are going to be better?
What's your view from listening to all this?
Mr. Chipkevich. I hope Bellingham does make a difference,
but we've seen proposed rules in the past that haven't been
effective, or that haven't gone as far as the Safety Board felt
the rulemakings needed to go.
An example is in the qualification or training requirements
for people operating pipelines. We believe that final rule is
insufficient even after many years, and now there's a final
rule.
We know there's work being done to improve regulations for
corrosion inspection and for the testing of pipelines. But we
haven't seen what the final rule is and if it's strong enough.
No, we haven't seen the change yet, but I hope this accident
does provide the impetus to make those strong changes.
Senator Murray. In our legislation that we are proposing at
the Federal level, we increase those standards nationally, and
I suppose that you would support that?
Mr. Chipkevich. I've looked at the legislation, and I think
there's some very strong, important elements in that
legislation. I think that some of those standards could have
been certainly implemented without legislation, but maybe
legislation is required in order to get what we're finally
looking for. We can certainly provide you some specific
comments for the record on that.
National Transportation Safety Board staff met with your
Committee staff to discuss Safety Board recommendations for
pipeline safety improvements related to the proposed
legislation. A review of our data base reveals that safety
recommendations issued to the Research and Special Programs
Administration can all be accomplished without legislative
action. However, a number of critical safety issues in the
proposed legislation have not been acted upon and may warrant
Congressional intervention.
Since 1987, the Safety Board has urged that RSPA require
pipeline operators to verify the integrity of their pipelines
by mandating periodic inspection and testing. Section 5 of S.
2004 would require internal inspections at least every 5 years;
the Board does not have sufficient data to recommend a specific
test period at this time. Section 5 of S. 2438 would require
operators to periodically inspect and test pipelines; the
Safety Board suggests that the frequency of the inspections or
tests required depend upon the characteristics of the pipeline
and the ability of inspection or test methods to detect defects
before the defects propagate to critical size. Under such a
mandate, RSPA could require that pipelines with protective
coating deficiencies or known corrosion conditions be inspected
more frequently, and that the frequency depend on the ability
of the inspection method to detect defects.
The Safety Board supports language proposed in Sections 2b
and 2c of S. 2409 that would require an operator to clearly
define criteria for evaluating and acting on the results of
inspections, and that would also require that prompt action be
taken to address integrity issues.
The Safety Board has also urged, in safety recommendations,
that pipeline employees be required to be trained, tested to
assess the success of training, and periodically retrained and
retested, as appropriate. Training requirements in Section 4 of
S. 2438 are consistent with past Safety Board recommendations.
Section 6 of
S. 2004 would also require testing to determine whether
individuals are qualified to perform assigned functions. Such a
requirement is consistent with previous Safety Board
recommendations.
S. 2004 requires certification by the Secretary of
Transportation, which the Board has not previously recommended.
Objective criteria would provide regulators with specific means
to reassess the qualification of individuals after an accident
and before they resume regular duties.
Most of the provisions in Section 7 of S. 2438 are
consistent with past Safety Board recommendations concerning
public education and emergency preparedness needs.
Finally, the Safety Board is concerned that State
officials' ability to inspect interstate pipeline operators is
threatened. Effective oversight is needed to ensure that
pipeline operators meet minimum standards. Section 9 of S. 2438
is consistent with the Safety Board's support for participation
of State authorities in overseeing interstate pipeline
activities.
Senator Murray. I would appreciate that, and Miss
Showalter, you were asked whether you could oversee the
interstate pipelines if that authority was given to you. All of
a sudden the responsibility would be in your pocket if an
accident like Bellingham occurred. Do you believe that there
is, are the inspection divisions available today that the, that
there is the ability right now to get the information you would
need to assure citizens from Renton, Redmond, Bellevue, SeaTac
that they have indeed safe pipelines that they were living next
to?
Ms. Showalter. You mean is there the technology available?
Senator Murray. Correct.
Ms. Showalter. It's hard for me to answer that question.
I'm not a technological expert. I can say that I think the
State of Washington would have at least as good an ability as
the Federal Government to avail itself of that technology, and
as I said before, I think because we would put more resources
into it and because I think because we're more responsive to
the demand of our state we would do at least as good if not a
better job to do that.
Senator Murray. Mr. Felder, would you respond to that?
Mr. Felder. We want to say that we think the provisions in
your bill on research and development and the need to strength
research and development are exactly where they need to be.
I've spoken to folks in the pipeline industry and outside of
the pipeline industry, and quite frankly, I personally am
astonished that as we're into the next millennium we do not
have safety solutions from advanced technology to address the
kind of problems that have been discussed in this room here
today, and we would pledge to use additional funding to lead
new research and development into advanced tools.
Senator Murray. I would absolutely agree with you, and my
concern would be is if we do approve legislation at some point
that gave Miss Showalter the authority to oversee the
pipelines, is that there wouldn't be the inspections available
to give you the assurance that you could give to the
communities that they would be safe, and if we don't develop
that research and development of testing, we would well have
not made any progress whatsoever. So I will continue to work on
that as well.
Mr. Chairman, I have other questions. If I could submit
them for the record, I would appreciate it.
Senator Gorton. All right. I'm going to take one more crack
at Mr. Felder.
Mr. Felder, you used the example of the Colonial Pipeline
from Texas to New Jersey, I think quite appropriately, as an
example of where obviously uniform Federal rules are vitally
important. I don't know precisely where that pipeline goes, but
the way I count my geography, it must go through 10 different
states.
My question for Miss Showalter, however, was very
different. The particular pipeline we're talking about here
isn't 90 percent in the State of Washington. It's got to be 98
or 99 percent in the State of Washington. She said that if she
were delegated or the state were delegated the authority, full
regulatory authority over that pipeline, first, of course,
she's here. I'm more directly responsive to the people of the
state than any Federal entity can be, and second, that almost
certainly the single state would have more, would have a
greater number of inspectors. I asked her not about Colonial or
a 10-state pipeline but whether or not it would be appropriate
as a matter of the statute, the bill that Senator Murray and I,
to make a statutory delegation to a state under those
circumstances, i.e. 90 percent or more of a pipeline's length
being within a single state if the state wished to accept that
responsibility.
She gave me a quite enthusiastic yes to a question that she
hadn't heard before. Is your answer to that question no? Would
you and the administration oppose a mandatory delegation of
authority under those circumstances?
Mr. Felder. I can't, I can't really answer that question
for the record, because I don't know the Administration's
answer. I could give you a personal answer.
Senator Gorton. Yes, that's what I want then.
Mr. Felder. I've been working in various forms of
transportation in the public and private sector for my whole
professional career, and I honestly do believe that the
regulation of fixed facilities that operate in interstate
commerce should be directed by the Federal Government. I think
it's very important to work with the states, but I think when
it comes down to it, if you're talking about the movement of
goods and services around the country, I think the founding
fathers got it right, that interstate commerce belongs in
Federal hands.
Senator Gorton. No, the founding fathers said we had that
authority if we wanted to take it. It doesn't require us to
take it.
Mr. Felder. No, it doesn't require us to take it. I
couldn't agree with you more, but I'll just say that yes, I
think, personally I think it should reside where it resides,
but well informed by the Federal system.
Senator Gorton. OK. We perfectly understand your views.
That's a straightforward answer to our question whether we
agree with it or not.
I apologize to those of you that didn't get asked any
questions during this period of time. We do value your
testimony, and we value the testimony of all of you very much.
Thank you very much.
Senator Gorton. Well, the three of you have been waiting
all afternoon for this opportunity, and we now wish to hear
from you, and Mr. Gast, we'll start with you.
Mr. Gast. Thank you, Senator Gorton.
STATEMENT OF CARL GAST, MANAGER AND VICE PRESIDENT, OLYMPIC
PIPE LINE COMPANY, RENTON, WASHINGTON
Mr. Gast. I'm Carl Gast, Manager and Vice President of the
Olympic Pipe Line Company.
With me today is Tony Palagyi, Senior Environmental Project
Manager, who has played a leading role with the Whatcom Falls
Park restoration effort.
I'd like to thank Senators Gorton and Murray for inviting
us to participate in this panel today.
Before I begin my remarks, allow me to introduce myself. I
joined Olympic Pipe Line on January 3rd of this year. I oversee
the day-to-day operations of the company here in Washington and
in Oregon, as well as the implementation of the company's
corridor safety action plan which is a comprehensive effort to
address safety issues along the entire length of the pipeline
from Ferndale to Portland.
As a certified engineer, I have 31 years of experience in
the liquid fuels pipeline industry at various locations in the
United States. Throughout my career as a pipeline engineer and
manager, I've always made safety my No. 1 priority. I have been
involved in a number of efforts to address safety issues for
pipelines, but I must say that the safety action plan developed
by Olympic in the last few months is the most far reaching
effort with which I have ever been involved.
On behalf of myself and Olympic Pipe Line, I want to
express again sincere sympathy and condolences to the families
and friends of the three young people who lost their lives in a
tragic accident. There is nothing I can say that will replace
that loss, but I do want to talk about Olympic, what Olympic is
doing to address safety issues along the entire pipeline, as
well as our efforts to restore Whatcom Falls Park where the
accident occurred.
In addition, I will touch upon our work with the Governor's
Fuel Accident Prevention and Response Team and our community
out-reach activities along the pipeline corridor.
I'd like to start by mentioning the restoration efforts at
Whatcom Falls Park. Olympic is working closely with members of
the joint restoration committee, not only to restore Whatcom
and Hanna Creeks, but to introduce significant improvements. It
has been an excellent group effort. Proof of that significant
effort is the return of salmon to the creek earlier than
expected as well as the return of many native plant and animal
species. Olympic will continue working closely with the state
holders during this long-term restoration phase expected to
last up to 5 years. Mr. Palagyi is here to answer your
questions regarding the park restoration.
Next I'd like to discuss the two major safety action plans
undertaken by Olympic. The Bellingham safety action plan was
developed in cooperation with the City of Bellingham and
addresses safety efforts in Whatcom and Skagit Counties. Our
corridor safety action plan was approved in October by the
board, Olympic board of directors as a comprehensive program to
address safety along the entire pipeline. The actions we are
implementing in these safety plans are intended to address all
issues we understand are under investigation by the National
Transportation Safety Board as a potential cause or
contributing factor to the accident. We are not waiting until
after the investigation is complete to take action. In other
words, we are implementing safety actions in each area under
investigation regardless of whether the area ultimately is
found to have been involved in the accident. These areas
include the integrity or condition of the pipe, valves,
pressure levels, computer software and hardware, and the
actions by employees who operate the pipeline from Olympic's
control center in Renton, and in the time allowed me today, I
would like to take a moment to discuss some of the safety
actions Olympic is taking in the areas that we understand to be
under this investigation. My written testimony provides a
fuller description of all of the actions we are planning to
take.
In the area of valves, Olympic has retained an independent
professional engineering firm to determine whether changes
should be made in the number, location and type of valves. The
firm, Marmac, has completed its study of the northeastern
segment of the line. As a result, Olympic has installed five
new valves in the Bellingham area. Marmac is now working on
similar studies of the pipeline all the way to Portland.
In regard to pressure issues, Olympic has retained an
outside consultant to conduct computer simulated pressure surge
analysis. The intent of these analyses is to show that the
pressure might result at various points along the pipeline
under a variety of operating conditions--normal, abnormal, and
emergent--to insure that the pressure under these conditions
will not exceed the pipeline's designed maximum allowable
operating pressure or the maximum allowable surge pressure.
These analyses are being done in concert with the valve
placement study.
I should point out that the results of the surge analysis
reenacted at the June 10th accident show that at the time of
rupture of the pipe, the pressure in the pipeline at the
rupture point was below its maximum allowable operating
pressure and its maximum allowable surge pressure. In other
words, the pipe failed at a pressure lower than what it was
designed to withstand.
As many of you probably know, the NTSB has reported that
the section of pipe that ruptured showed clear evidence of
damage consistent with markings left by construction equipment.
To check the condition of the line, the entire pipeline from
Ferndale to Portland will be inspected internally.
CC Technologies of Dublin, Ohio has been retained to help
develop and implement the internal inspection program. The
entire pipeline will be inspected internally using two devices
that employ the best accepted technology available today. One
checks the roundness of the pipe. The other looks for areas of
metal loss typically caused by corrosion or manufacturing
defects. Olympic has voluntarily inspected its pipeline on
about a 5-year basis, but the upcoming round of inspections is
the most comprehensive program we have ever done.
In cooperation with the Office of Pipeline Safety and
community representatives, Olympic will review the internal
inspection data and determine if there are any anomalies
requiring visual inspection. In cooperation with the Office of
Pipeline Safety and community representatives, Olympic will
review the internal inspection data and determine if a visual
inspection of the pipe is required. Olympic is also a committed
partner to the state ``one call'' program which requires
excavators to call before they dig near utility lines to give
utilities opportunities to properly mark their lines and/or
observe any digging around their lines.
I want to emphasize that our safety action plans are not an
end in themselves but an ongoing continuous effort as we
address safety along the entire pipeline.
That outlines some of the actions we have taken that
support our January 14th request to the Federal Office of
Pipeline Safety for permission to restart flow of product
through the segment of 16-inch line that's been shut down since
June 10th.
At this point we do not know when the Office of Pipeline
Safety will complete its review of all of the materials we have
submitted and make its decision regarding restart.
I'd like to take a few moments now to discuss our recent
work with the Governor Locke's Fuel Accident Prevention
Response Team. We want to acknowledge the hard work of the
team. We appreciate their recommendations to approve public
awareness and strengthen emergency response. We also support
state efforts to strength our one call system.
Our issue of current debate is the degree of authority the
state would allow over interstate pipelines. In our view, the
existing division of regulatory responsibility makes sense. We
are concerned about the potential for patchwork regulations
that differ from state to state and the implications it would
have on interstate commerce. Having a unified set of
regulations is important for smooth regulation. Ultimately, we
recognize that the balance between Federal and state
authorities is up to elected officials such as yourself.
However, we encourage you to consider carefully the need for a
unified set of regulations for interstate pipelines.
Last, certainly not least, I'd like the talk about the
community involvement. Olympic is committed to reaching out to
communities along the pipeline. Our corridor safety action plan
contains a strong community out reach core. Since the board
approved this plan last October, we have met with local media
up and down the corridor as well as held three major community
briefings in December in the three most populace communities
through which the pipeline travels. We have held numerous
meetings with local city councils, other elected officials,
local emergency response groups, school districts, and
neighborhood locations.
As I mentioned before, we are also committed to reviewing
with the communities along the pipeline the data from our
upcoming internal and field inspections, our valve detect
study, and our surge analysis. In fact, tomorrow, Wednesday,
and Thursday of this week we are holding three pipeline
integrity workshops to help technical community representatives
better understand the results of our internal inspections as we
move ahead with the corridor safety action plan.
In conclusion, I'd like to stress that Olympic's safety
action plans are comprehensive and community oriented. We are
dedicated to working with communities and elected officials to
address safety along the entire pipeline. We are working
closely with the Governor's response team, the state
legislature and others in pursuit of a common goal. We believe
that the Whatcom Falls Park restoration effort is an example of
what we can achieve if we work together.
If you have any questions, I'd be happy to answer them for
you now or later.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl Gast, Manager and Vice President,
Olympic Pipe Line Company, Renton, Washington
I am Carl Gast, manager and vice president of the Olympic Pipe Line
Company. With me today is Tony Palagyi, Senior Environmental Project
Manager, who has played a leading role in the Whatcom Falls Park
restoration efforts. I would like to thank Senator Gorton and members
of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for
inviting us to participate in today's panel.
Before I begin my remarks, allow me to introduce myself. I joined
Olympic on January 3rd. I oversee the day-to-day operations of the
company here in Washington and Oregon, as well as the implementation of
the company's Corridor Safety Action Plan, which is a comprehensive
effort to address safety issues along the entire length of the pipeline
from Ferndale to Portland.
As a certified engineer, I have 31 years of experience in the
liquid fuels pipeline industry at various locations in the United
States. Throughout my career as a pipeline engineer and manager, I have
always made safety a priority. I have been involved in a number of
efforts to address safety issues for pipelines, but I must say that the
Safety Action Plan developed by Olympic in the past few months is the
most far-reaching effort with which I have been involved.
On behalf of myself and Olympic Pipe Line Company, I want to
express again sincere sympathy and condolences to the family and
friends of the three young people who died in that tragic accident.
There is nothing I can say that will replace the loss, but I do want to
talk about what Olympic is doing to address safety issues along the
entire pipeline, as well as our efforts to restore Whatcom Falls Park,
where the accident occurred. In addition, I will touch upon our work
with the governor's Fuel Accident Prevention and Response Team, and our
community outreach activities along the pipeline corridor.
Whatcom Falls Park Restoration
I would like to start by discussing restoration efforts in Whatcom
Falls Park. Olympic Pipe Line Company is working closely with members
of the Joint Restoration Committee not only to restore Whatcom and
Hannah Creeks, but also to introduce significant improvements. The
Joint Restoration Committee is composed of representatives and
specialists from Olympic, the City of Bellingham and other consultants.
They are advised by the Trustees which includes a committee composed of
the Department of Ecology, Department of Natural Resources, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Lummi and Nooksack Tribes, and
the Department of Fish and Wildlife.
The initial funding for all the restoration and improvement efforts
has been provided by Olympic Pipe Line Company.
Restoration. Creek banks and plant life are being restored by
the collaborative efforts of the Restoration Committee and nature. Here
are some examples:
1. Fallen trees were added along the bank to reduce perennial
flooding of both Whatcom and Hanna Creeks.
2. Woven matting was used extensively at Hannah Creek to
solidify the banks against erosion. Matting holds the soil
while allowing grasses and plants to grow through the mesh.
3. By October, plants and grass were growing up through the
matting and a significant amount of native plants, such as
ferns and salal, were making a comeback. In addition, invasive
plants such as Canadian thistle and reed canary grass are being
removed.
4. Hydromulching was added to creekbanks to reduce erosion,
while native grass seed was added to the banks for soil
retention.
5. Trees in the burn zone will be monitored through the spring
of 2000 to determine which scorched trees will recover. More
trees and shrubs will be planted this spring.
Improvements. In addition to restoration efforts on the creek,
Olympic has worked with the Joint Restoration Committee team to improve
significantly the creeks and the surrounding affected area.
Improvements include:
1. Building 30 new spawning pools for the salmon.
2. Creating pools and minimizing obstructions to help salmon
move upstream.
3. Adding creek meanders and placing logs in the creek banks to
help retain the banks of the streams. The increase in meanders
helps slow Hannah Creek down, which improves the fish habitat.
4. Establishing intentional log/debris spots in the creek. This
builds habitat needed to capture organic matter that nurtures
and sustains the life of the creek at the micro level. The logs
also provide refuge for fish.
5. A total of nearly 6,000 pounds of metal debris was pulled
from the creek during the clean up.
6. We are replacing the Valencia Street Bridge and making
improvements directly related to the park.
Salmon are returning. As early as late August, salmon were
returning and had made it as far as naturally possible to Pixie Falls,
inside Whatcom Falls Park. And late November, approximately 20 Chum
Salmon were sighted at the Falls, which is more than usual and is
considered a good sign.
Ultimately, restoration efforts have increased salmon habitat in
the park by about 60 percent. Along with these restoration efforts,
creek improvements will enhance the habitat needed by salmon and
resident fish such as rainbow and cutthroat trout for years to come.
Long-Term Restoration: Olympic will continue working closely
with the Natural Resources Trustee group, chaired by Clare Fogelsong of
the City of Bellingham, and the Department of Ecology. The long-term
restoration phase expected to last up to five years.
Key elements of the Long-Term Restoration effort will include:
1. Control of invasive plants
2. Re-vegetation
3. In-stream habitat improvements
4. Multi-year monitoring
5. Potential land acquisitions and,
6. Monitoring ground water.
Olympic's Safety Action Plans
Next, I would like to discuss two major safety action plans
undertaken by Olympic. The Bellingham Immediate Safety Action Plan was
developed in cooperation with the City of Bellingham and addresses
safety efforts in Whatcom and Skagit Counties. Our Corridor Safety
Action Plan was approved in October by the Olympic Board of Directors
as a comprehensive program to address safety along the entire pipeline.
Following the June accident, the Office of Pipeline Safety issued a
Corrective Action Order, which it amended twice. These directives
spelled out the steps Olympic was required to take before receiving
permission to resume operation of the pipeline.
Collectively, these safety actions address all the issues we
understand are under investigation by the National Transportation
Safety Board as potential causes or contributing factors to the
accident.
These areas include the integrity or condition of the pipe, valves,
pressure levels, computer software and hardware and actions by the
employees who operate the pipeline from Olympic's Control Center in
Renton.
In other words, we are implementing safety actions in each area
under investigation, regardless of whether that area ultimately is
found to have been involved in the accident.
Here are some of the major actions we have taken to comply with the
requirements of the federal Office of Pipeline Safety.
1. Valves
First, investigators are attempting to determine whether a pressure
relief valve may have failed to function properly, and if that was a
factor in the June 10 accident. Investigators are also evaluating
whether the number of mainline block and check valves could have
reduced the size of the release.
Here's what OPL is doing or has done:
OPL has tested its relief valves and commissioned a
detailed engineering study of the delivery facility where the
relief valve was located.
Olympic also has retained an independent professional
engineering firm to determine whether changes should be made in
the number and location of valves to reduce the potential
impact of an accidental release on environmentally sensitive
areas and population centers.
Marmac has completed a study of the northern segment
of the line, and as a result, Olympic has installed five new
valves in the Bellingham area.
Marmac is now working on similar studies of the
pipeline all the way to Portland.
In addition, it's important to note that Olympic
regularly tests the pipeline mainline valves and will perform
additional tests in the upcoming months. These tests are
conducted through field inspections by an operations technician
as well as through monitoring at its Control Center in Renton.
2. Pressure Issues
Second, investigators are attempting to determine if a pressure
increase in the pipe contributed to the accident.
Here's what OPL is doing or has done in this area:
Pressure Surge Analysis: Olympic has hired Stoner
Associates to conduct computer simulated pressure surge
analyses to show what pressures might result at various points
along the pipeline under a variety of operating conditions.
June 10 re-enactment. Results of the surge analysis
re-enacting the June 10 accident showed that, at the time, the
pressure in the pipe at the rupture point was below both its
maximum allowable operating pressure and its maximum allowable
surge pressure, as established under Department of
Transportation regulations.
3. Line Integrity
The third issue investigators are looking into as a possible cause
of the rupture is line integrity or the condition of the pipeline. The
NTSB has reported that the section of pipe that ruptured showed clear
evidence of damage consistent with markings left by construction
equipment.
Here's what Olympic is doing about the issue of line integrity:
Internal Inspections: The entire pipeline from
Ferndale to Portland will be inspected internally. CC
Technologies of Dublin, Ohio, has been retained to help develop
and implement the internal inspection program. This includes:
Identifying and evaluating available inspection
tools;
Developing a process to use and verify the
information;
Developing a method and protocol for inspections;
Implementing the program systemwide.
Olympic likely will begin the process of internal inspection
in Whatcom and Skagit Counties. The section of the pipeline
from Ferndale Station in Whatcom County to Allen Station in
Skagit County will be inspected using three state-of-the-art
devices: a geometry device; a high resolution magnetic flux
device; and an ultrasonic device. These inspection devices run
inside the pipe and are propelled down the pipeline by the flow
of petroleum products.
The Office of Pipeline Safety must approve the selection of
the devices that will be used for the internal inspection of
the pipeline.
Each device is designed for a specific purpose.
A geometry device looks for changes in the roundness
of the pipe.
A high-resolution magnetic flux device uses a
magnetic field to locate and identify metal loss due to
internal or external corrosion.
An ultrasonic device utilizes ultrasonic pulses to
inspect the pipe. This device is designed to identify the same
range of features and defects as the high-resolution magnetic
flux tool but uses ultrasonic pulses rather than a magnetic
field to collect the data.
Field Inspections and Repairs: In cooperation with the
Office of Pipeline Safety and community representatives,
Olympic will review the internal inspection data and determine
if there are any anomalies requiring visual inspection. In
cooperation with the Office of Pipeline Safety and community
representatives, Olympic will review the internal inspection
data and determine if a visual inspection of the pipe is
required. These field inspections will be undertaken based on
Department of Transportation requirements and any repairs will
be made in accordance with standards set by the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers.
Olympic plans to add another step to the internal inspection
process. The Company will dig up and visually inspect an
additional number of anomalies that fall below the criteria for
excavation as approved by the Office of Pipeline Safety. The
purpose of this additional step is to compare the internal
inspection data with a visual inspection of the corresponding
portion of pipe.
Olympic also is a committed partner in our state's One-Call
Program which requires excavators to call before they dig near
utility lines to give utilities the opportunity to properly
mark their lines and/or observe any digging near or around
their lines.
4. Operations Controller Actions
Investigators are evaluating whether any actions taken on June 10th
by the employees who operate Olympic's computer system in Renton were a
contributing factor to the accident.
Here are the actions OPL has undertaken:
Operator Re-Training: Olympic has completed a re-
training program for its operations controllers, who operate
the pipeline from Olympic's Control Center in Renton. Training
also is being provided for the technicians who perform a
variety of field tasks, including maintaining pumps and valves,
testing the petroleum stream, and supervising the ``one-call
system'' in effect when anyone digs near the pipeline.
Technicians who cover Whatcom and Skagit Counties have already
received additional training.
The retraining program goes beyond requirements of the Office
of Pipeline Safety's first amended corrective action order in
that it includes training for the technicians. The program also
begins the process of early fulfillment of OPS' ``final rule''
announced August 26 that requires pipeline operators to develop
and maintain a written qualification program for individuals
performing safety tasks on pipeline facilities.
All employees in other areas along the corridor and
throughout the company will receive training and be re-
qualified by the end of next year, well in advance of the
deadline of Oct. 1, 2002 set by OPS in its final rule.
5. Computer software and hardware
Investigators are attempting to determine whether an internal
database error, along with a simultaneous increase in processing
demands, caused a computer slowdown on June 10th. During the computer
slowdown, the controllers were unable to obtain current pipeline
information on the computer screens and to process commands to
equipment, such as pumps along the pipeline.
Here's what Olympic has done in this area:
Computer Analysis and Upgrade: Olympic has completed
an analysis of its Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
System (SCADA), the software that operates its computer system.
Based on that analysis, system parameters have been modified.
Olympic has also made modifications, upgrades and design
changes to its computer system, including an increase of 750
percent in processing capacity.
That outlines some of the actions we have taken that support our
January 14 request to the federal Office of Pipeline Safety for
permission to restart the flow of product through the segment of our
16-inch line that has been shut down since June 10.
At this point we do not know when the Office of Pipeline Safety
will complete its review of all the materials we have submitted and
make its decision regarding restart.
However, I would like to review with you what Olympic will do once
we receive written authorization to resume flow of product.
First, personnel trained in startup procedures will be present at
the Ferndale and Bayview stations during the first 12 hours of
operation. Trained personnel also will be stationed at block valves at
milepost 7 (north of Bellingham) and milepost 16 (at Lakeway Drive in
Bellingham).
Two controllers with a minimum of ten years' operating experience
will be on duty at Olympic's control center in Renton at all times
during the startup.
Only diesel and jet fuel, which are less volatile than gasoline,
will run through the pipeline during the first week of operation.
The pressure in the line running from Ferndale to Bayview will be
limited to 70 percent of its normal operating pressure until it is
verified that the system is operating properly. At that time, pressure
may be increased only to 80 percent of its normal operating pressure.
The pressure in the entire system is limited to 80 percent until
Olympic receives written authorization to increase the pressure from
the Office of Pipeline Safety.
The successful startup will signal the next phase of testing we
have agreed to do that will include the use of different internal
inspection devices throughout the entire system, as previously
described.
I want to emphasize that our Safety Action Plans are not an end in
themselves, but an on-going continuous effort as we address safety
along the entire pipeline.
Governor's Fuel Accident Prevention and Response Team
I now would like to take a few moments to describe our recent work
with Governor Locke's Fuel Accident Prevention and Response Team. I
want to acknowledge the hard work of the Team. Pipeline safety covers a
broad range of issues, from complicated legal questions of federal,
state and local government relationships, to highly technical
engineering questions of pipeline operations, as well as complex
logistical questions of emergency response. We appreciated the Team's
efforts to begin to tackle the issues presented.
The Team made several recommendations concerning public awareness,
local emergency response, and the One-Call system, many of which are
now the subject of pending state legislation.
Olympic believes these issues are all extremely important, and
supports recommendations that would strengthen and improve public
awareness and emergency response.
Olympic strongly supports continued development of the One-Call
system. One statewide number will reduce confusion.
One issue that keeps coming up is the degree of authority states
will have over interstate pipelines. In our view, the existing division
of regulatory responsibility makes sense. Further, we are concerned
about the potential for patchwork regulations that differ from state-
to-state and the implications that would have for interstate commerce.
Having a unified set of regulations is important to its smooth
operation.
Ultimately, we recognize that the balance in this issue is up to
elected officials such as yourselves. However, we encourage you to
consider carefully the need for a unified set of regulations for
interstate pipelines.
Community Outreach
Last but certainly not least, Olympic is dedicated to reaching out
to the communities along the pipeline. Our Corridor Safety Action Plan
contains a strong community outreach core. Since the Board approved
this plan last October, we have met with local media up and down the
corridor, as well as held three major community briefings in December
in the three most populous counties through which our pipeline travels.
We have held 64 meetings with local governments, other elected
officials, local emergency response groups, school districts and
neighborhood associations.
We also are committed to reviewing with the communities along the
pipeline the results from our upcoming internal and field inspections,
our valve effectiveness study and our surge analyses.
Since the new inspections won't be completed for a number of
months, many communities have asked us to review the results of our
1996/97 inspections. However, our recent experience in sharing this
technical information with some communities is that it can be difficult
to understand.
Therefore, this week we are holding three Pipeline Integrity
Workshops that are designed to assist communities in understanding the
1996/97 data as well as our upcoming inspections, and the criteria used
to conduct field inspections. The workshops also will cover how the
technology employed by the inspection tools we are using in 2000
differs from what was used in 1996/97. Our consultant, CC Technologies
will be conducting the workshops.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to stress that Olympic's Safety Actions
Plans are comprehensive and community-oriented. We are dedicated to
working with communities and elected officials, such as yourselves, to
address safety along the length of our pipeline. We have worked closely
with the Governor's Response Team, the state legislature, and others in
the pursuit of this common goal. We believe the Whatcom Falls Park
restoration effort is an example of what we can achieve if we work
together.
Now, if there are any questions I will be happy to answer them now
or in writing.
Thank you.
Senator Gorton. We'll defer most of our questions until
we've heard from the other two witnesses, but I do have one for
you now.
Where is your predecessor, the person that was in charge on
June 10th?
Mr. Gast. He is in Houston, Texas.
Senator Gorton. OK. Mr. Sluder.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. SLUDER, VICE PRESIDENT, WILLIAMS GAS
PIPELINE-WEST, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
Mr. Sluder. Thank you, Senators Gorton and Murray. I'm
Robert L. Sluder, Vice President of Operations for Williams Gas
Pipeline-West. Williams is a diversified energy and
communications company with operations in 50 states.
Williams gas pipeline unit consists of five wholly owned
interstate pipeline systems. In aggregate, we move
approximately 16 percent of the natural gas consumed in the
United States.
Senator Gorton. Natural gas only? No liquid?
Mr. Sluder. Natural gas. Our western operations include
Northwest Pipeline which runs from New Mexico through the
states of Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, Oregon and Washington
to the Canadian border. We operate approximately 1,400 miles of
pipe in the State of Washington and have done so since the
pipeline was constructed in the late 1950's. PG&E gas
transmission northwest also operates the other interstate
pipeline in the State of Washington. Together we deliver
virtually all of the natural gas that is consumed in the State
of Washington. We do that through our four local, four major
customers who are local distribution company or intrastate
companies. Those are Cascade Natural Gas, Puget Sound Energy,
Avista and Northwest Natural. We also have direct connection to
several industries and municipalities in the State of
Washington.
Williams is testifying today not because we were directly
involved in the incidents here in Bellingham, but because we
have been drawn into the debate of overall pipeline safety as a
result of those incidents, and we welcome the opportunity to
participate in this debate.
We understand and accept the fact that Federal, state and
local governments want to be involved in our industry safety
efforts, so that they can assure the public that we are
providing a safe service.
I'd like to state or make the assertion that states already
play an important role in that safety effort. It's been
mentioned earlier that the intrastate system in the United
States is under the governance and the jurisdiction of the
states. That amounts to 75 percent of the total pipeline
mileage in this country.
Second, the states' ``one call'' laws are a major factor in
interstate pipeline safety, and last, state inspectors
accompany DOT personnel on audits throughout all of our system.
Whether those states are authorized as was discussed earlier by
DOT or not, it is my experience that they have always been
welcome by the DOT and have accompanied the DOT inspectors on
many inspections in the states of Utah, Colorado, et cetera. We
strongly believe, however, that for interstate pipeline
systems, the Federal Government is the appropriate agency to
set standards and to administer interstate programs. We believe
that the interstate natural gas transportation industry has a
good safety record.
Attached to my formal testimony are statistics that I
believe will bear that out. We have achieved that record not by
chance. Safety for us begins at the mill where the steel is
rolled into the pipe and very strenuous metallurgical testing
is done not only to the pipe, but to the valves, the fittings
and all of the other appurtenances that go into our system.
Through careful design and construction the pipelines are built
and constructed and ultimately hydrostatically tested with
water prior to putting them into service.
Now, in theory, if nothing changed after that initial
hydrostatic test, there would be no reason to doubt the
strength of the steel and the concept is it may last forever,
but things do change. The soils attack the pipe, the coating.
Land forces attack the steel, itself, and exert pressures on
the pipe. External digging occurs around the line. So many
things do change, but we don't sit by as was suggested earlier
and do nothing. We do many things to observe the changes and
monitor them and make decisions about safety and maintenance in
conjunction with those. We routinely fly our rights-of-way and
in many congested areas in cities and towns we drive or
physically walk those rights-of-way. We look for signs of
unusual activity, either unusual construction activity or
unusual activity such as landslides or other stream erosion
type events. We participate very strongly with the states in
the ``one call'' program which is designed to prevent the
unintended digging near our pipelines. We also monitor our
cathodic protection systems designed to mitigate the effects of
corrosion. We assess all of these concerns and in many
instances then make the decision to internally inspect the
pipeline.
We do run smart pigs. We have run smart pigs in many
locations in the State of Washington on the Northwest Pipeline
system, but we did so after it was warranted by the information
that I described earlier.
Changes in population occur along our pipeline. The
pipeline again was built in the 1950's. Many areas have
developed and grown up around the pipeline. DOT requirements
have for many years required us to do either of several things,
either reduce the pressure that we operate the pipeline at when
an increase in population has grown up along the pipeline,
which is really not practical, because we are obligated to
provide a service and our ability to move gas is a function of
the pressure that we operate under, and so traditionally what
we've done is go in and replace the pipe. Dig it out and
replaced the pipe with heavier walled pipe in heavier density
area. Today we look at that, and we also look at smart pigging
the line, internally inspecting the line and not removing good
quality pipe if we can determine that it is good quality pipe,
and often times we'll do hydrostatic testing in those areas as
well. What we have to do is judge what inspection tools and
practices would be most effective at any given location in the
pipeline.
Lastly, to ensure safety, we work with public education
programs. We provide the residents and emergency response
officials all along this system the information about the
operations and appropriate actions to take during normal
operations and in the event of an emergency.
And then there are unique circumstances. In the State of
Washington we are susceptible to landslides, not only
Washington, we have the same circumstances through parts of
Oregon, Idaho and Colorado. Utah as well. To cope with that we
have instituted a special monitoring program wherein we have
identified over 95 active landslides and have instrumentation
in those landslides to protect the pipeline, and I hope that
the community can see that it's not just one-size-fits-all in
protecting pipelines.
As important as safety is, there are two other factors that
are very important as well, and very important to interstate
commerce, and that is the reliability of our service and the
affordability of our service.
Interstate pipelines operate as an integrated system. Our
Northwest Pipeline has natural gas entering the system at three
locations, on the extreme southern end in the states of
Colorado and New Mexico, in the mid-section in the Rocky
Mountains of Idaho, Utah and Wyoming, then gas that is brought
across from Canada and produced in B.C. and Alberta. Gas moves
through local distribution customers and end users in a variety
of ways, and it changes as pricing patterns change, and as
loads on their systems change.
The question came earlier about state authority. Mr. Felder
gave an example of a liquids line in the east. I can give an
example right here in the State of Washington that is perhaps
even more pertinent. If Idaho decided to increase the safety
margins by requiring that pipelines operate at lower pressures
in their state, our ability to deliver gas to Oregon and
Washington would be adversely affected by virtue of the fact
that most of the gas that comes into this state comes from the
south, not all of it comes from the Canadian side. If on the
other hand Washington chose to mandate hydrostatic testing,
whole lines would have to be taken out of service, and
customers south of this state, i.e., Oregon, Idaho, et cetera,
would suffer the effect of that service disruption.
Under Federal jurisdiction there is consistency in
interpretation and application of regulations and a
consideration for the overall interstate commerce that we are
involved in.
Again, I do not imply that states do not have a role to
play. I believe they play an important role, again, by virtue
of their authority over the approximate one and a half million
miles of intrastate pipelines. They play a major role in that
system.
Secondly, their ``one call'' systems, the statistics
indicate that
80 percent of those accidents involving death or injuries can
be attributable to dig-ins, and it is our commitment in the
pipeline industry to work hand and hand with the states and to
seek better laws and to seek better enforcement of those laws
to promote better safety.
In conclusion, the interstate natural gas pipeline systems
are proud of their safety record, and I personally am very
proud of the Washington-based employees that our company
employs here and that work day-in, day-out to provide the
natural gas service and do so in a safe, reliable and efficient
manner. We certainly are actively seeking ways to improve on
that record. However, I cannot promise that there will never be
another pipeline incident, but I can promise that we are
committed to take every effective action we can to prevent the
next one from ever happening.
We are also committed to working with the Office of
Pipeline Safety as they do their job of overseeing the safety
efforts of our interstate industry. We hope that Congress will
give us and the Office of Pipeline Safety the flexibility we
need to accomplish this mission.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sluder follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert L. Sluder, Vice President, Williams Gas
Pipeline-West, Salt Lake City, Utah
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Robert L.
Sluder. I am Vice President of Operations for Williams Gas Pipeline--
West. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Committee on
behalf of Williams to discuss natural gas pipeline safety issues.
Williams is a diversified energy and communications company with
operations in all 50 states. Our Williams Gas Pipeline unit consists of
five wholly owned interstate natural gas pipeline systems. We also have
partial ownership in several other systems. Approximately 16% of all
natural gas consumed in the United States is transported on Williams'
system.
Our western operations include Northwest Pipeline, which runs from
the New Mexico/Colorado border, through Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho,
Oregon and Washington to the Canadian border. We operate 1,400 miles of
pipe in Washington and have done so since the system was constructed in
the late 1950s. PG&E Gas Transmission--NW also operates an interstate
pipeline in Washington. Virtually all of the natural gas consumed in
the state is delivered through these two pipeline systems. Our primary
customers are the four local distribution companies operating in
Washington--Cascade Natural Gas, Puget Sound Energy, Avista and
Northwest Natural. We also deliver gas directly to some industrials and
municipalities. Attached to my testimony is a map, which shows the
Northwest and PG&E Gas Transmission systems and the service territories
of the local distribution companies we serve. Williams has recently
proposed to construct a new line from our Sumas, Washington, location
across Whatcom County to Vancover Island.
SUMMARY
At the outset, let me summarize my testimony. The interstate
natural gas pipeline industry has an excellent safety record--superior
to other modes of transporting fuel or products. Operating and
maintaining a safe system is embedded in every aspect of our business.
The cost associated with having an accident--both human and financial--
far outweigh the costs of a responsible safety program.
We understand and accept the fact that Federal, state and local
governments want to oversee the industry's safety efforts so that the
public can be assured that we are making every reasonable effort to
insure safety. States already play an important role in insuring the
safe delivery of natural gas by virtue of their jurisdiction over
intrastate pipelines, which comprise 75% of the total pipeline mileage
in the country. States also have jurisdiction over ``one-call'' or
``call-before-you-dig'' programs. Since 80% of the accidents on
intrastate natural gas pipelines involve third party digging activity,
the strength of a state's one-call laws is a major factor in interstate
pipeline safety.
We strongly believe, however, that for interstate pipeline systems,
the Federal government is the appropriate body to be the safety
regulator. Our systems cross state boundaries. Our operations and
safety activities are planned and implemented on a system-wide basis.
If we faced separate regulations in every state in which we operate, we
believe the net result would be a less efficient, less safe system
overall.
NATURAL GAS AND OUR SAFETY RECORD
For natural gas pipelines, there is no more important objective
than to operate and maintain a safe system. It is in our own best
interest to do so. Natural gas transmission pipelines have an excellent
safety record. Attached to my testimony are two charts. The first shows
the safety record of natural gas pipelines compared to other forms of
transportation. The second shows the number of incidents, injuries, and
fatalities for natural gas pipelines over the last ten years. While
this record encourages us, we continuously seek ways to improve our
current practices and seek new technologies to further enhance safety.
Accidents have serious and unacceptable consequences. Accidents can
cause injuries or death, to our own employees and the public. They also
can disrupt service to our customers and limit the full utilization of
our systems for an indefinite period of time. Accidents cause the
public and government officials to question our commitment to safety
and the credibility of the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The recent
accident here in Bellingham demonstrates this quite clearly.
Unless the public believes that the industry can produce, transport
and distribute natural gas safely, we cannot stay in business, and
America would lose its cleanest fossil fuel.
I should note that the physical differences between natural gas and
petroleum products are such that the characteristics of a natural gas
pipeline accident differ from that of a petroleum pipeline accident.
Natural gas is primarily composed of methane gas. Natural gas is
lighter than air, insoluble in water and does not cause environmental
damage when released. Most of the incidents that occur in natural gas
transmission pipelines are small leaks. These leaks are easily found by
pipeline personnel during their routine inspections and are fixed. In a
worst-case scenario--a total pipeline rupture--only the area directly
around the rupture presents a direct risk to the public at the
initiation of the rupture. The size of this area depends on the
pressure and size of the line but generally should not extend more than
600-feet on either side of the pipeline rupture. After the initial
rupture, the noise of the escaping natural gas or, if there is
ignition, the resulting fire will cause people to move away from the
location immediately.
The probability of such an event occurring along the interstate
natural gas transmission pipelines in the U.S. is small. During the
period of 1986-1999, onshore interstate gas transmission accidents have
caused no fatalities and nine injuries among the general public. This
is a commendable record for a system that transports over one quarter
of the nation's energy needs.
STEPS WE TAKE TO ASSURE SAFETY
A natural gas pipeline approaches safety from a system-wide
perspective. Pipelines implement and comply with the minimum safety
standards imposed by the Office of Pipeline Safety. Williams, along
with other interstate pipelines, has internal procedures that exceed
these minimum requirements in many respects.
The first step in the safety process is to make sure that the line
is constructed properly. Safety actually begins at the mill where the
steel is made. Pipeline representatives inspect the pipe at the mill to
insure that it meets quality standards. During construction, the
integrity of coatings designed to protect against corrosion are checked
and imperfections are corrected. Welds are quality checked with x-rays.
The line is tested with water to a pressure significantly higher than
its maximum operating pressure prior to going into service.
Once a pipeline is in the ground, it is monitored in a number of
ways. Among the procedures we employ, employees physically walk and
inspect the pipeline corridor periodically. Companies also fly the
right-of-way at least once a month, often more. In both cases, we look
for signs of unusual activity on the right-of-way or any discoloration
of plants or grasses that might indicate a small leak. Companies
participate in one-call programs designed to prevent unintended digging
near pipelines and other underground facilities. Employees test for
leaks using analyzers and verify the effectiveness of cathodic
protection, electrical systems that prevent corrosion on a pipeline.
Valves are inspected and compressor engines are maintained. Any missing
pipeline markers used to identify the location of the pipeline are
replaced. In areas where we suspect corrosion may have degraded the
integrity of the pipe, we do periodic internal inspections utilizing
specialized detection equipment commonly known as ``smart pigs.''
Specific measures are incorporated into the regulations to raise
the level of safety of natural gas transmission pipelines as the
population density around our pipeline increases. These categories of
population density, known as class locations, range from rural (Class
1) to heavy urban (Classes 3 and 4). As the population density
increases, more stringent design, construction, inspection and
maintenance practices are stipulated. We are required to walk our
entire system once a year to monitor the area around the pipeline for
changes in population density. When these changes occur, the pipeline
operator is required to insure that the installed pipeline meets the
criteria for pipe design that applies in the higher class location. If
it does not meet these requirements, the pipe is replaced, the
operating pressure in the line is reduced, or similar safety measures
are undertaken to achieve the required margin of safety. The new class
location also requires increased frequency of many different
inspections.
A pipeline operator also gains a tremendous amount of knowledge
about the condition of the line as systems are expanded, new meter
stations or delivery points added, and laterals attached. While these
activities are not directly safety related, they involve digging up
parts of the system and documenting the condition of the pipeline,
thereby giving the operator additional information to assess the
integrity of the pipeline.
All of the information that a company gathers about its system goes
back into tailoring the safety activities of the company, so that parts
of the system in the greatest need of attention receive greater
scrutiny. For example, we decide where and when to run smart pigs based
on this accumulated knowledge. Smart pigs are very good at providing
certain types of information about the condition of the pipe, but they
do not provide a complete solution. We have to judge what inspection
tools and practices will be the most effective at any given location on
the pipeline.
Federal law requires pipelines to have public education programs.
We provide residents who live along our rights-of-way with information
about the pipeline, including what activities to look for and what to
do in an emergency. We provide information and our emergency phone
number to call in the event of seeing anything unusual. We work with
local emergency response officials to educate them about the nature of
our operations and the appropriate actions to take if there is an
accident. We encourage our employees to interact with local officials
and educate them about the pipeline. Unfortunately, our experience
often is that emergency response personnel and local officials are
often so pressed by the immediate demands facing them that getting
their attention to learn about pipeline facilities that have never
caused them any problems can be difficult.
The level of safety effort is substantial. A recent survey by our
trade association, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
(INGAA) revealed that its pipelines members, operating 160,000 miles of
pipe, spent about $560 million a year, or about $3,515 per mile on
safety related efforts. Our transmission pipeline industry, since the
1950s, has supported and been active in two organizations that research
ways to improve safety practices and technology--the Gas Research
Institute (GRI), and the PRCI (Pipeline Research Committee
International). These organizations budget millions of dollars each
year for these activities. In addition, since 1990, the INGAA
Foundation has supported the efforts of companies who develop and
promote safety technology in the marketplace.
Without question, natural gas pipelines are committed to safety and
have consistently demonstrated a commitment to invest substantial sums
to maintain and protect their systems and the surrounding environments.
However, conditions differ from system to system and from location to
location on a given system, making it difficult to create one-size-
fits-all rules for when each activity is performed. Lines in damp soil
will require a different type of attention than lines in the desert.
Lines in areas where coal mining has occurred are susceptible to
subsidence problems, whereas lines in other areas are not. In our case,
we have found that at certain hillside locations here in Washington,
the ground has become unstable after periods of uncharacteristically
prolonged rainfall. We have experienced landslides that pulled the
steel pipeline apart. We now have instituted a special monitoring
program identifying and targeting these locations, but it is a
localized problem, not system-wide.
My point is that the details of an effective safety program will
vary from pipeline to pipeline and even on a given system. An effective
program will focus resources differently from year to year, depending
on the needs of the system.
REACTION TO WASHINGTON STATE ACTIONS
Williams made presentations to the Governor's task force during its
deliberations, and I have spoken before the committees of the state
legislature implementing the Task Force recommendations. I do not want
to repeat all of that testimony here, but there are two key areas I
believe it would be useful to address in the context of this hearing.
National Standards vs. State Authority
The report from the Governor's task force raises the issue of
whether to retain exclusive Federal jurisdiction over interstate
natural gas and hazardous liquid lines or to give states authority in
this area as well. It is our strong conviction that retaining exclusive
Federal regulation of interstate pipeline safety is critical. Let me
give you several reasons why we believe continuing the current
structure will benefit the public, both from the standpoint of safety
and service.
As I mentioned, pipelines are operated as integrated systems. Our
Northwest pipeline has natural gas entering the system at three
locations: gas produced from the San Juan basin of Colorado and New
Mexico; gas produced from the overthrust belt area of the Rocky
Mountains, and gas produced in Canada. Gas moves to local distribution
customers, end users, or other pipeline customers in a variety of ways
that change as pricing patterns change. We have designed a system that
allows this to occur without regard to the weather or other factors
that influence demand for natural gas. Safety work is scheduled so as
not to interfere with the basic operation of the system.
If states have the authority to impose more stringent safety
standards, they could interfere with operational flexibility and
thereby impact our ability to serve customers, including customers in
other states. For example, if Idaho decided to increase the safety
margin by requiring that pipelines operate at lower pressures, our
ability to deliver gas to Oregon and Washington would be adversely
affected. If a state were to require hydrostatic testing, whole lines
would have to be taken out of service, wreaking havoc on our ability to
serve. Every time a state would adopt a new or different testing or
inspection requirement, it would reduce an operator's flexibility and
ability to operate the system according to the needs of the system as a
whole.
Allowing states to impose different safety standards would also
complicate the compliance process. Generally, safety teams move up and
down the system performing tests and maintenance. In fact, the industry
has moved more toward this functional approach in order to achieve
greater uniformity of safety programs across the systems. If these
individuals have to apply different standards in different states, it
will erode the very uniformity we are trying to achieve.
Just as it makes sense for pipelines to adopt a holistic approach
to safety, oversight by inspectors should take the same approach. When
the Office of Pipeline Safety conducts an inspection, they are not
limited to examining our practices within a single state, but can look
system-wide. Also, Federal enforcement allows for consistency in the
interpretation and application of regulation. If we get into a
situation where different state inspectors interpret regulations
differently, the resulting confusion will hurt, not help, safety.
Finally, if state actions force a company to allocate its safety
dollars in an inefficient manner, the result will be less, not more,
safety overall.
I do not mean to imply that States do not have an important role to
play in pipeline safety. States now have safety authority over the
approximately 1.5 million miles of intrastate natural gas lines,
including the natural gas lines of local distribution companies. This
is 75% of the total pipeline mileage so states already have
jurisdiction over the vast majority of pipeline activity.
States also have jurisdiction over the single greatest opportunity
to improve safety on interstate and intrastate systems: one-call
systems that can help prevent accidents caused by parties digging into
pipelines by mistake. Of the accidents that do occur on interstate
natural gas pipelines, about 80% of those involving deaths or injuries
are the result of these accidental dig-ins. Those most likely to be
affected are the excavators themselves.
The industry has pleaded for stronger one-call programs for years
and led the fight for a Federal statute aimed at encouraging states to
strengthen their programs. Too often, state laws in this area exempt
some excavators and don't provide for effective enforcement. While the
cause of the Bellingham accident is still under investigation, it
appears from what has been learned that excavator damage played some
role in the accident. The Office of Pipeline Safety has sponsored an
initiative called ``Common Ground'' and their June, 1999 report reviews
the ``best practices'' found in one-call programs around the country.
We urge the State to review its law in light of these recommendations
and strengthen the law where appropriate.
Public Right to Know
As I mentioned earlier, pipelines already provide a good deal of
information to state and local organizations and to individuals who
live along our pipeline rights of way. Still, we are willing to discuss
what kind of additional information would be useful to local officials
and residents.
I noted that Federal law already requires pipelines to have public
education programs. We participate in one-call programs. We provide
residents who live along our rights-of-way with information about the
lines and phone numbers to call in the event of seeing anything
unusual. We work with local emergency response officials to educate
them about the nature of our operations and the appropriate actions to
take if there is an accident. We encourage our employees to interact
with local officials.
The advent of the Internet may provide another opportunity to
educate interested persons in pipeline activities. The Office of
Pipeline Safety maintains a web site with a wealth of information and
it may be possible to build on that effort.
One additional word of caution. At times in the past, the industry
has been warned by the federal government that pipeline facilities may
be targeted by terrorists and asked to take steps to guard against
possible attacks. For this reason, the industry has been wary of
providing detailed information indiscriminately. Given the growth of
the Internet, it is probably unrealistic to think this information
could be kept confidential, but security concerns should be given some
thought as part of this process.
CONCLUSION
If there is one point that I hope to impress upon you today, it is
that safety is the result of a combination of activities that vary from
company to company and location to location. Across the board mandates
to conduct inspections at specific intervals or to conduct specific
tests at specific intervals rarely make sense in practice.
In summary, the interstate natural gas pipelines are proud of our
safety record. At the same time, we are actively seeking ways to
improve upon that record, whether its by developing new and better
technology, re-examining our current methods, or doing a better job of
educating the public and excavators about pipeline safety. We certainly
cannot promise that there will never be another accident, but we remain
committed to taking every effective action we can to prevent the next
one from ever occurring. We are also committed to working with the
Office of Pipeline Safety as they do their job of overseeing the safety
efforts of the industry. We hope that Congress will give us and the
Office of Pipeline Safety the flexibility we need to accomplish this
mission.
Senator Gorton. Through how many states do the pipelines
run by your company pass?
Mr. Sluder. In total all of Williams' gas pipelines, I
think it's about 35 states, Senator.
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Mr. Matsuyama.
STATEMENT OF W. BRIAN MATSUYAMA, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, CASCADE
NATURAL GAS CORPORATION, ON BEHALF OF THE LOCAL DISTRIBUTION
COMPANIES OF WASHINGTON STATE
Mr. Matsuyama. Senator Gorton, Senator Murray, good
afternoon. I do thank you for the opportunity to be here and
participate today.
My name is Brian Matsuyama. I'm Chairman of Cascade Natural
Gas Corporation. We are one of the four local distribution
companies' or LDCs' that operate here in the State of
Washington. Our job essentially is to receive gas that is
transported into the state by the interstate natural gas
companies like Williams and in turn deliver that gas to the
businesses and homes in our local communities.
The other three LDCs here in the state are NW Natural,
Puget Sound Energy, and Avista Corporation. I'm appearing on
behalf of all four companies.
My company, Cascade, is the company that serves Bellingham,
and----
Senator Gorton. I think you might want to get a little
closer to your microphone.
Mr. Matsuyama. My company does serve the City of
Bellingham, and as members of the community many of our
employees personally shared the trauma after the gasoline
explosion that occurred here last June. But all of the people
of the state's natural gas industry share the sorrow of the
community, the sorrow of the families that tragically lost
children in that incident.
Natural gas was not involved in that explosion, but we do
recognize that our systems are not immune to problems; and we
pledge to support all the efforts to implement responsible
measures to minimize the possibility of future accidents. We
are in fact already engaged in such efforts. Both interstate
natural gas pipelines and LDCs participated in the public
processes that followed the June incident, such as Governor
Locke's task force, and we provided technical support and
assistance to the state legislators that prepared new pipeline
safety laws here in the state.
Our work on safety goes back a lot father than that. We are
well aware of our responsibility to our customers and to the
public that we serve, and safety has always been the top
priority for every one of our companies. We employ safety
professionals. We provide continuous safety training. We
conduct rigorous safety oversight and maintenance. We
distribute public safety information. We comply with a wide
range of safety regulations and requirements. In fact, I might
add that in many instances the construction standards and
maintenance practices that we follow far exceed the standards
that are imposed on us by regulation.
Our people are active in regional and national safety
committees. They belong to numerous organizations dedicated to
advancing safety. We support and contribute heavily to
institutions that are engaged in developing advanced safety
technologies. In 1999, the regional interstate natural gas
pipelines and local distribution companies spent about 20
million dollars on non-construction, safety-specific
activities.
Safety is a matter of corporate policy for every LDC. So we
are, of course, extremely interested in the various measures
that are being considered to improve public safety here in the
State of Washington, and I'd like to summarize our perspective
on some of those.
First of all, we take no position regarding the state
regulation of hazardous liquid pipelines. I'd only note that
we, the LDC's that we're talking about, are already subject to
the jurisdiction of the state with respect to our intrastate
operations, and that includes, of course safety matters. The
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission has long had
jurisdiction over us in safety matters, and the staff has
always done a conscientious and thorough job. Therefore, we do
not at all question their ability to--given appropriate
resources, and I think Ms. Showalter commented on that--we
don't question their ability to expand the oversight of their
responsibilities.
However, as customers of the interstate natural gas
pipelines, we are dependent on them to provide safe, reliable,
economic transportation of natural gas into our state.
In his testimony, Mr. Sluder identified some substantive
issues regarding state regulation and jurisdiction over
interstate natural gas operations. We LDCs, as their customers,
simply urge the committee to give those issues due
consideration.
We also urge the committee to avoid legislatively imposing
specific prescriptive requirements for application both to
liquid and natural gas pipelines. Our construction and
operating characteristics and the materials that we transport
are materially different. We are not at all suggesting that
valid safety requirements be compromised. That's got to be
number one, but we believe that regulatory processes, whether
Federal or state can craft better requirements that fit
particular operations than requirements from legislative
processes. Failure to appropriately address industry
differences for specific operating conditions could produce
unintended consequences, and, of course, the worst of those
consequences could be the reduction of safety rather than
enhancement.
We are especially concerned about requirements that might
impair the reliability of natural gas transportation service
from the interstate pipelines, and thereby create new risks
downstream of their systems.
Let me illustrate what I mean here. We are different from
the liquid lines in that uninterrupted flows are critical to
natural gas systems. If the interstate flows to us are
interrupted, safety considerations require us to turn off
service for each of our individual customers, then when flow is
resumed, we have to go back and individually turn on every
appliance in every home and every business that we serve. The
reason that we do that is to ensure that raw gas isn't escaping
from some pilot light. That process is long. That process is
involved. That process obviously entails its own risk. I'm
simply pointing out that a poorly designed requirement, no
matter how good the intentions, could result in such loss of
service to hundreds of thousands of customers just in
Washington State, and that creates far more downstream risks
than may be warranted by the upstream benefits.
I want to stress that we do not oppose measures to improve
public safety. We merely recommend that they should be adopted
only after careful study and with a clear understanding of all
likely outcomes.
And finally, we support three specific recommendations that
were made by the Governor's task force: the public's right to
know and to understand how and where the natural gas system
operates; the improvement of the one-call system; and advanced
preparation and training for fire, police and emergency service
personnel who are often the first to arrive at a hazardous
site.
With that, I'd like to again thank you for the opportunity
to share our views. We look forward to working with Federal,
state and local authorities as well as within our industry to
insure the highest degree of public safety.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Matsuyama follows:]
Prepared Statement of W. Brian Matsuyama, Chairman and CEO,
Cascade Natural Gas Corporation, on behalf of the Local Distribution
Companies of Washington State
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name
is Brian Matsuyama. I am Chair, President and CEO of Cascade Natural
Gas Corporation. My company is one of four local distribution companies
(LDCs) serving the State of Washington. I am pleased to have this
opportunity to comment on the essential matter of public safety and our
pipeline system on behalf of these companies.
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
The natural gas industry, interstate and local distribution
companies, provides a significant portion of the energy that drives the
Pacific Northwest economy. In 1999, the natural gas industry delivered
approximately 40 percent of the total energy used by 1.8 million
residential, commercial, industrial and electric generation customers
in the states of Idaho, Oregon and Washington. We operate 7,000 miles
of pipeline within the state and employ nearly 10,000 of the state's
citizens.
There are two interstate natural gas pipeline companies serving the
state: PG&E Gas Transmission--Northwest and Williams Gas Pipeline--
West. There are four local distribution companies in Washington State
regulated by the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission:
Cascade Natural Gas Corporation, NW Natural, Puget Sound Energy and
Avista Corporation.
THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY AND THE BELLINGHAM TRAGEDY
Let me begin by saying that my company, Cascade Natural Gas, serves
the Bellingham area. This makes the tragedy that occurred in that
community very personal. The people of the region's natural gas
industry feel deeply for the families who lost their children in the
Bellingham explosion on June 10, 1999. As neighbors, friends and fellow
citizens, we share their grief and the trauma suffered by the entire
community. We pledge our support to find and implement responsible
steps that minimize the possibility that such an event could occur on
the natural gas system.
Although the Bellingham incident did not occur on the natural gas
system, we deemed it essential to take part in the assessment that
followed. Governor Locke's formation of the Fuel Accident Prevention
Response Team provided a forum to evaluate all areas of pipeline
safety. Both interstate pipelines and local distribution companies
followed and actively participated in the public process. We have
remained involved by offering support, technical advice and comment
regarding pipeline safety laws being prepared in the Washington State
legislature.
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY COMMITMENT TO SAFETY
The natural gas industry understands that its systems are not
immune to problems. We also know that the public, our customers,
depends on us to ensure their safety. The rapid growth of our customer
base reflects the important role natural gas plays in providing
affordable, environmentally clean and safe fuel. We are doing
everything possible to sustain this confidence.
A recent AGA survey revealed that almost 55 percent of all American
households used natural gas. In 1998, 69 percent of all new single-
family homes were connected to natural gas. During that same time
period, 64,000 homeowners switched to natural gas from oil, electricity
or propane. In the Pacific Northwest, more than 90 percent of all new
homes are connecting to natural gas when it is available. In order to
retain the public confidence that underlies this growth, we recognize
that the safety of our operations is critical.
Consequently, our industry has a tremendous incentive to maintain
an enviable safety record. Safety is a matter of corporate policy and a
top priority for every company. These policies are carried out in
specific and characteristic ways: Each company employs safety
professionals, provides on-going employee safety training, conducts
rigorous system oversight and maintenance, distributes public safety
information, and complies with a wide range of safety regulations and
requirements.
Individual company efforts are supplemented by collaborative
activities in the safety committees of regional and national trade
organizations. Examples of these groups include the Pacific Coast Gas
Association, American Gas Association, Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America and the American Public Gas Association. Other
safety-focused activities exist within industry-government groups. A
current example is the Government-Industry Consensus Team (GICT); a
specialized group formed to develop and maintain a voluntary data
collection process that supports the analysis of plastic pipe
characteristics. The GICT is composed of representatives from the
American Gas Association, American Public Gas Association, the U.S.
Department of Transportation's Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners, and the Plastic Pipe Institute.
Company safety professionals also participate in a variety of
professional organizations dedicated to advancing the practice of work
place and public safety. A partial list of the leading groups include
the following: National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE),
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), National Safety Council
(NSC), American Petroleum Institute (API), American Welding Society
(AWS), American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Transportation Safety
Institute (TSI), American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), and the
American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE).
Companies also contribute to research and development through such
organizations as the Gas Research Institute and Institute of Gas
Technology where advanced safety devices and technologies are designed
and tested. It is estimated that in 1999, the region's interstate
pipeline and local distribution companies invested approximately $19.7
million in non-construction safety-specific activities. These voluntary
expenditures reflect the high level of corporate commitment to public
and employee safety.
AN LDC VIEW OF CHANGES IN WASHINGTON STATE PIPELINE SAFETY
Arguments are being made for state jurisdiction over safety
regulation of interstate hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines.
The State of Washington, through the Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission, already has regulatory authority over LDC's
intrastate operations, including safety matters. Our safety record
attests to the conscientious, thorough approach taken by the Commission
and its staff. Therefore, we do not question the ability of that
agency, given appropriate resources, to oversee safety matters relating
to the interstate pipelines, and we take no position regarding safety
jurisdiction over hazardous liquid pipelines. However, we are aware of
practical, substantive issues raised by the interstate natural gas
pipelines regarding the imposition of a patchwork of state-by-state
regulations. As customers of the interstate pipelines, and dependent
upon them to provide safe, reliable, economic transportation of gas
into our state, we urge the Committee to give due consideration to the
concerns they raise.
We also urge the Committee to avoid legislatively imposing specific
prescriptive requirements intended to be uniformly applied across both
liquid and natural gas pipeline systems whose construction and
operating characteristics are materially different. All of Washington's
LDC's are deeply committed to safety, and we are not suggesting that
valid operating requirements be compromised. However, we believe that
regulatory processes, whether federal or state, are better equipped to
craft requirements that fits the particular operation being regulated
than are legislative processes. Failure to adequately address industry
differences could produce unintended consequences, not the least of
which would be to reduce rather than enhance the level of public
safety.
We are especially concerned about requirements that might impair
the reliability of natural gas transportation service from the
interstate pipelines. Unlike liquids lines, uninterrupted flow is
critical in natural gas lines. If interstate flows are interrupted, the
ability of LDC's to maintain adequate pipeline pressures to serve end
use customers is immediately impaired. In such situations we must
manually turn off service to individual customers, one by one. When
flows resume, we must then restore service and re-light each gas
appliance in every affected home and business. The process is a long
and tedious one, and is obviously not without its own risks. A poorly
conceived requirement designed to improve pipeline safety, could result
in such a loss of service to thousands of Washington customers,
creating more downstream risks than are warranted by upstream benefits.
We support the public's right to know and understand how and where
the natural gas system operates. An informed public will be better able
to contribute to accomplishing the objectives of improved public
safety. In many instances, improving public information will be a
cooperative effort by the natural gas industry and communities served.
Whether such efforts extend or improve existing programs or are new
initiatives, local distribution companies will participate in their
development and implementation.
At the present time, states have jurisdiction over the single
greatest opportunity to improve safety on interstate and intrastate
systems--the one-call system. We encourage and support the strongest
possible one-call system for the State of Washington, including
regulations for effective enforcement and graduated penalties for non-
compliance. While the cause of the Bellingham incident is still under
investigation by the Department of Transportation, it appears that
excavator damage may have contributed to the explosion. The Office of
Pipeline Safety has sponsored an initiative called ``Common Ground.''
Their June 1999 report describes one-call ``best practices'' found in
programs across the country. We encourage the State of Washington to
review these recommendations when attempting to strengthen the one-call
operation.
Local distribution companies will continue to support advanced
preparation and training for fire, police and emergency service
personnel who are often first to arrive at a hazardous site. It is
critical for them to know and understand the nature of a natural gas
incident and how best to manage it.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
The natural gas industry is an important component of the Northwest
economy. The fuel the industry provides increases energy diversity,
helps the environment, and is less expensive than most other energy
options. It is also demonstrably safe. Nevertheless, the tragedy in
Bellingham is a dramatic reminder that safety is the result of constant
vigilance and a continuing effort to improve.
The natural gas industry is proud of its safety record. Natural gas
has become the recognized fuel of choice throughout the Northwest. This
customer growth and confidence also bears with it an added
responsibility. As such, public and employee safety is the top priority
for every natural gas company.
The natural gas industry believes that specific steps can and
should be taken to improve public safety. However, these actions should
be made only after careful study and with a clear understanding of all
likely outcomes. Some recommendations of the Washington Governor's Fuel
Accident Prevention and Response Team have significant potential--
improved public information, an enhanced state one-call system, and
training for emergency response personnel.
Thank you for providing the opportunity to present our views on the
important matter of pipeline safety. We look forward to working with
federal, state and local authorities, as well as within our industry,
to achieve the highest possible level of public and employee safety.
Senator Gorton. Mr. Matsuyama, is Cascade entirely engaged
in intrastate commerce exclusively regulated by the state
utility commission?
Mr. Matsuyama. Yes. Senator. We serve two states. We also
serve the State of Oregon, but we do not have activities that
go across the state lines, in terms of transporting gas or
lines that run between the two states so that our operations
are entirely state regulated.
Senator Gorton. That's interesting. Is the regulatory
regime significantly different from the regulatory regime in
Washington?
Mr. Matsuyama. In the terms of the quality of the
commission?
Senator Gorton. Uh-huh.
Mr. Matsuyama. It is not. They've been just as active in
pursuing safety matters in that state.
Senator Gorton. Mr. Sluder, Williams on the other hand with
respect to its operations in the State of Washington is
exclusive interstate and governed by the Office of Pipeline
Safety?
Mr. Sluder. Correct.
Senator Gorton. So you have nothing to do with the state
Utilities and Transportation Commission?
Mr. Sluder. That's correct.
Senator Gorton. But I take it, and Mr. Matsuyama was fairly
precise on this, but I take it that both of you believe that
both the safety considerations, the potential for disaster with
respect to natural gas transmission is different than that of
liquid fuel and that they should not be subject to precisely
the same kinds of requirements?
Mr. Sluder. I'll take a shot at that first, Brian.
Yes, that is correct, Senator. There are various, there are
many characteristics that are different. It was mentioned by
one of the previous testifiers about the pooling of liquid. Our
material does not do that. It is lighter than air, and so it
escapes vertically. It does not pool or buildup in any
concentrations on the ground.
The valving situations, valves are, are a better control in
a liquids pipeline and a more viable, useful control than they
are perhaps in a gas pipeline. Our first line of defense is to
keep the gas in the pipe, to keep the pipe, itself, integral,
be it from corrosion or dig-ins or landslide or whatever. So
there are, there are numerous differences between the liquids
and the gas substances and the way the pipelines react.
Senator Gorton. Senator Murray at the very beginning of the
hearing showed us a chart indicating the number of fatalities
from pipeline accidents over a period of, I think, it was 14
years. How many of those were from natural gas pipeline
accidents? Do you have any idea, either of you?
Mr. Sluder. I believe Senator Murray had a chart at one
time that indicated that there, during that period of time
there were
280 fatalities attributable to natural glass.
Senator Gorton. OK.
Mr. Sluder. That is broken down by intrastate, interstate
and then off-shore. All three of those components, each of
those have different pieces of the 280 which you showed though
the 14-year period.
Senator Gorton. Were more of them bystanders or employees?
Mr. Sluder. I can give you the interstate piece of that. In
that 14-year period, 13, I'm sorry, 39 of those fatalities were
attributable to interstate systems. In 1 year, 22 alone were
attributable to two off-shore platform accidents, where
employees exclusively and contract personnel were the victims.
Senator Gorton. Thank you two for your testimony.
Now I'm going to turn to Mr. Gast.
Mr. Gast, Olympic is subject to a great deal of criticism
here today. One of the statements that I found most remarkable
because I hadn't heard it before was from the official from the
state Department of Ecology who said that Olympic's safety
record is far below industry norms, and when I specifically
asked him does that mean that other interstate liquid, that
pipelines operated far more safely than Olympic does, his
answer was yes.
I'd like your--how is it that Olympic has so much worse a
record than so many other liquid pipeline companies?
Mr. Gast. I assume that he was discussing leaks, those
sorts of things is where he was coming from, as far as events.
Senator Gorton. Well, he was discussing the general
reputation of Olympic as being relatively indifferent to safety
and not meeting even minimal industry standards.
Mr. Gast. I don't, I have not made a comparison between
Olympic and industry standards, so I really don't have those
numbers.
Senator Gorton. Well, it might be well if you got them.
Mr. Gast. Senator, I certainly agree with that. I, right
now at this present time, we're spending an awful lot of time
with the corridor safety action plan and the other points that
we're trying to do to reassure the communities and the public
that we have a safe system here, and I'll guarantee you there
are a lot of different areas that I need to go further into as
we go down the road here.
Senator Gorton. Along that same line, all three of the
cities south of Bellingham through which your pipeline passed
spoke about the lack of cooperation on the part of Olympic when
it sought information, and then the presentation of information
in a form that an ordinary person or official simply couldn't
understand, and at least one of them testified that rather than
getting a map of the pipeline from the company, they had to
hire outside consultants to look at the materials that you
provide them and even to make that determination. Why that lack
of cooperation with local officials?
Mr. Gast. Again, I can tell you what my experience has been
since I've been here in this last couple of months is we have
attended a lot of council meetings, city meetings, neighborhood
meetings, and when I do talk to the folks that come back like
the next day. I do hear the same thing is we weren't
responsive. We didn't provide materials, and when I talk to my
folks, I said, ``Were you out there? Did you do these things?''
They said, ``Yes, we did.''
I will be happy to sit down with the cities and talk out
what the issues are. I think it's the same sort of thing. We
need to get in a community of cooperation, talking with one
another. That's what really needs to be developed here from
what I heard today. I did hear a lot of angry people, and that
upsets me. Believe me. It upsets me deeply. So I do want to get
with them, sorry.
Senator Gorton. Again that rather pervasive anger, what is
your answer to Mr. King's question why should under the
circumstances Olympic be operating even south of Bayview?
Mr. Gast. The pipeline as it stands with everyone checking
it out, and I'll tell you, you can imagine everyone is looking
at this. I mean we have help from all over as far as reviewing
the pipeline system, you know, from OPS, ourselves, from folks
that we bring in from the outside as contract people to look at
it, and basically what they see and what the pressure reduction
that's been made, it is a safe system to operate according to
all the technical experts in the field. Right now we're
operating at 80 percent of where the normal operating pressure
would be.
Senator Gorton. Well, I suppose I can't blame you for this,
but it is rather frustrating to have at this hearing someone
who's only been here 2 months from Olympic and who maybe
naturally doesn't have answers to many of these questions.
I'm sure that both Senator Murray and I will have a number
of written questions too, the answers to which you don't have
here right now.
Obviously, the company wanted to create a new image here in
Bellingham and the State of Washington, but it does mean it's
rather difficult for us to get our questions answered.
Senator Murray?
Senator Murray. Well, Mr. Chairman, I share your
frustration. You've obviously only been here a few months, and
you have had the opportunity, Mr. Gast, to listen to the
testimony today, and I think you would agree with us that the
public confidence is not there.
Mr. Gast. Yes, I do.
Senator Murray. In terms of Olympic pipeline and reopening
it, part of what I believe needs to be done at the Federal
level is to pass legislation that I've introduced and Senator
Gorton has cosponsored through Congress to assure citizens that
pipelines are inspected on a routine basis, that they have
access to that information, that the pipeline operators have
training and certification, that we develop testing that they
feel is adequate and that that confidence is restored.
As we work this legislation through congress, hopefully
soon, will your company be supporting or opposing that
legislation?
Mr. Gast. The company, I'm sure, will support anything that
drives the system to safer, safer pipeline operation.
Senator Murray. Will you be supporting the legislation
directly?
Mr. Gast. When we are talking about the types of items that
you mention, community involvement, emergency response, you
bet.
Senator Murray. Will there be any portions of our
legislation--I assume you've seen the legislation?
Mr. Gast. To be honest with you, I have not read through
the whole thing. I have heard portions of it.
A Voice. Then what are you doing here?
Senator Murray. Well, I would ask Mr. Gast if you could
please have Olympic Pipe Line let us know directly in a public
manner in response to this Committee if you are going to
support the policies of the legislation that's being proposed,
and again, I would just tell you, and obviously you're not
going to answer, but this community needs to know that they
have the confidence that Olympic and other pipelines are
operating safely, and we want to move that forward.
I do have a couple of other questions for you. One of the
concerns that we have heard from the local fire and police
agencies is that part of the policies of Olympic do not include
notifying police and fire immediately when problems are
detected in the computer systems or in the operation system.
Has Olympic pipeline changed its policy and procedure manuals
at this point to assure that police and fire are notified
immediately when a problem is detected?
Mr. Gast. When we have a problem, when they have a problem,
such as a release or that sort of thing, absolutely, we dial
the 911 number.
Senator Murray. But is it part of your policies and
procedures?
Mr. Gast. Yes, it is. Yes, it is.
Senator Murray. To do that, my understanding at least at
the time of June 10th accident and since that time that it's
not part of the policy manuals. Has that been changed?
Mr. Gast. It's part of the policy manual that I know of
since I've been there.
Senator Murray. OK. Since you've been there. Were you just
hired by Olympic in January? Is that correct, or just this----
Mr. Gast. Yes, I actually transferred to Olympic Pipe Line
in January.
Senator Murray. You worked for a different company before
that?
Mr. Gast. Right.
Senator Murray. Mr. Gast, last Thursday, OPS told you that
you cannot open the pipeline until further inspections are
done. Can you tell us how Olympic will comply with that order?
Mr. Gast. Right now we have to respond to OPS's order and
whether we have agree with what we're proposing and what the,
versus what they have sent to us, and I suspect that we're not
far from being at a point where we're, everything looks all
right to them, that we would reopen the pipeline. It's a matter
right now of just addressing issues of, to OPS and what they've
sent to us.
Senator Murray. Can you tell me how you qualify your
pipeline operators right now or what kind of identification
requirements or testing requirements you have?
Mr. Gast. Yeah, we're actually starting along the program
with the operator qualification requirements that the Federal
Government is asking us to do by the year 2002, but we're
starting the program, hopefully, we're done by the year 2001,
but there are several things that are done with a pipeline
operator. They have to go through what we call computer-based
training. There are training modules that are on the computer.
We actually put them, set them down with a simulator,
simulating pipeline operations. We can induce simulated
abnormalities in the pipeline and see how this, have them talk
through it, what you they see, how it's doing. We put them
through hydraulic courses. We talk about emergency resource
issues, communications with the field. It's a whole myriad of--
--
Senator Murray. What is the length of education and
training do you give to an employee before they're allowed to
operate a pipeline?
Mr. Gast. It can vary with the individual, but minimum,
we're talking several months before a trainee comes on board.
Senator Murray. What are the education requirements you
have for those that operate the computers?
Mr. Gast. Basically high school education. Hopefully they
will have some, might have some pipeline experience, and we can
pull them in where they have operational experience in the
field which is helpful, and in all cases you can't do that from
the start, you know, if you don't have somebody that wants to
come into the control center, so we go outside. We get them
from other companies.
Senator Murray. Will your company oppose the national
certification and training requirements that we have in our
bill?
Mr. Gast. It's like the OQR?
Senator Murray. In our bill we will require national
certification and training certificates.
Mr. Gast. I believe that falls right in line with what's
being proposed with that.
Senator Murray. You mean by----
Mr. Gast. By actually the operator qualification
requirements that are coming out of DOT.
Senator Murray. Mr. Gast, I have several other questions I
will submit for the record,* since I don't know that you have
the answers to them, but let me just say that I think it is
absolutely imperative that Olympic work very hard to restore
public confidence. It's unfortunate that someone isn't here who
has worked there longer than yourself, and I don't blame you
that being unable to answer those questions, because that is
part of restoring the public confidence that I think is so
important.
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*The information referred to can be found in the Appendix.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gorton. One more question, Mr. Gast, that I think
you can answer.
Will you support or oppose a delegation of authority from
the Office of Pipeline Safety to the state and the Utilities
and Transportation Commission, regulatory authority over the
operations of Olympic in the State of Washington?
Mr. Gast. I would say what I would support would be a
unified type of rule. I would hope that the state and the
Federal Government could get together and come up with a
uniformed set of rules that would apply. It would be great
rules for all states in the United States. That would be my
hope.
Senator Gorton. Well, that doesn't quite answer my
question. Would you support or oppose a delegation of
regulatory authority from the Federal Government to the state
Utilities and Transportation Commission over your operations in
the State of Washington?
Mr. Gast. I would prefer a single point of regulation.
Senator Gorton. --i.e. Federal?
Mr. Gast. The Federal Government.
Senator Gorton. Now that you've answered the question, OK.
I think that we will thank this panel for its efforts here and
go onto the last group, Mr. Weimer and Ms. Harper.
OK. This has been a long afternoon, and we'd like to get
this last panel an opportunity to speak.
Mr. Weimer.
STATEMENT OF CARL WEIMER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ON BEHALF OF SAFE
BELLINGHAM, BELLINGHAM, WASHINGTON
Mr. Weimer. Senators Gorton and Murray, thank you for this
opportunity to testify. I appear on behalf of SAFE Bellingham,
and with me is David Brickland, who has been active in public
safety issues up and down the Puget Sound corridor, and he can
answer technical questions, questions about franchise
agreements or whatever you desire.
My father-in-law, now retired, was a tankerman for most of
his career. He was responsible for loading and unloading fuel
and oil barges from refineries and oil tankers throughout North
America. He liked his job, and he raised a family that I'm now
proud to be a part of. Like any family there are subjects that
we avoid at family meetings. The dealings of the oil industry
is one such subject. So I was surprised recently when he began
the tell me why he thought that the Olympic pipeline should be
reopened again. He told me of a recurrent nightmare that he
still has after all these years. It is a fictitious event where
he mistakenly overfills a barge and spills crude oil in to
Puget Sound.
That nightmare along with his years of experience
transporting oil over the water lead him to the conclusion that
pipelines are the safer form of transportation. He went on to
say that he feared that if the Olympic pipeline did not reopen,
it was only a matter of time until some sort of terrible spill
occurred in Puget Sound.
I kept my thoughts to myself. I didn't say that barge
safety had changed substantially in the last 10 years or that
the accident records really don't support his conclusions. I
didn't even say that in reality we need all of the different
modes of fuel transport so they should all be as safe as
possible.
What I did come to realize was the terrible amount of
responsibility and pressure that the oil industry has placed on
its employees. Why does one of the richest industries ever
created on the face of the earth continue to put profits ahead
of safety? They could easily invest in the many high tech
advancements that could now prevent many spills and help
relieve their employees from this terrible worry.
If safety had been the highest concern then employees of
Olympic Pipe Line would not now have to be taking the 5th
Amendment. If safety had been the highest concern, then three
families would not now have to grieve the loss of their
children, and if safety had been the highest concern, then
members of our community along with the employees of Olympic
Pipe Line Company could sleep through the night without
reoccurring nightmares.
Unfortunately, pipeline companies throughout the Nation
have not put safety first. Even more difficult to understand,
the government regulators who are supposed to keep pipelines
safe also have failed to keep pipelines safe.
In the aftermath of our local tragedy we have learned many
things, and sadly one of the first things we learned was that
some of the most fundamental aspects of pipeline safety are not
properly addressed in current Federal law. Consider the
following: current Federal law requires pipelines to be
pressure tested only once before operation can commence, never
again. There's no Federal regulation requiring that internal
inspection devices be used. There is no Federal requirement for
pipeline operators to utilize leak detection systems. There's
no federally defined Federal minimum standards for ensuring
that a pipeline cannot be overpressurized to the point of
breaking the pipe.
Further, Federal reporting requirements are inadequate to
help us recognize current problems or protect us from repeating
the same mistakes. Valve placement in current Federal law does
not take into account the number of important factors in
determining the adequate number and placement of valves to
limit the volume of potential spills. And there are no Federal
requirements for safety management in audit practices that
Congress determined were needed to protect the public in other
energy-related industries.
You will hear from the industry that it is in their own
self interest to regulate themselves and avoid spills, but the
sad truth is that in much of today's corporate world the focus
is on the bottom line, not the bottom line 5 years from now,
the bottom line this year, this month, today. Industry risk
assessments may make sense to the corporate executive in
Houston, but how do they explain to a family with a dead child
that the profits are better than spending a tiny portion of
those profits to ensure that a child's life is not lost.
Congress should act quickly to mandate Federal safety standards
before we lose another innocent life.
We are encouraged that OPS may delegate authority to the
State of Washington, even so there are numerous examples where
state regulatory agencies have also failed to protect human
health and the environment. In the wake of the Exxon Valdez
accident, Congress mandated the formation of an oversight
council. We believe that for locally elected officials and
citizens to once again have confidence in the pipeline
companies serving our community, and the regulators who are
supposed to oversee them, that a similar oversight council
needs to be established.
We would hope that the new pipeline legislation or the
reauthorization of the Office of Pipeline Safety, itself, would
mandate the creation of a model local advisory council here in
Puget Sound based on the Alaska model which was meant to be
replicated.
The purpose of this council would be to review, monitor and
comment on all fuel transportation operations, proposed
operations and environmental impacts. The whole advisory
council would play a major role in increasing public awareness
of pipeline safety, spill response, spill protection and
environmental protection issues. The local advisory council's
members would be comprised of representatives of appropriate
interest groups such as local municipalities and counties,
tribes, environmental organizations, fishing organizations and
agricultural.
This proposal is designed to promote partnership and
cooperation between local citizens, industry and government. It
will also go a long ways toward rebuilding the trust that was
shattered when the pipeline exploded on June 10th, 1999. We
believe that the local governments and citizens that have the
most to lose if something goes wrong with the pipeline should
have an active role in the oversight of this pipeline. A model
local advisory council, established here in Puget Sound, which
if successful could later be replicated in other parts of the
Nation would serve as a crucial link for this local
involvement.
In conclusion, if there's one message that I hope you take
back to Washington, D.C. it is that this event is not unique to
Bellingham. Pipeline spills occur almost daily. Similar spills
and explosions have happened nationwide. According to the
Office of Pipeline Safety in the past 15 years 342 people in 41
different states have been killed by pipeline accidents, which
spilled over a hundred and thirty million gallons. The property
damaged from these spills was over a billion dollars.
The time is now for pipeline regulations to be updated to
include a whole range of safety improvements that are now
possible. Pipeline companies need to be required to invest in
safer pipelines, and state and local governments need to be
allowed to set stricter pipeline regulations if they deem them
necessary.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, those most impacted
if something goes wrong transporting fuel need to be included
in all aspects of the transportation of fuel through their
communities.
Referring to a different northwest problem, Senator Gorton
recently summed up our view perfectly when he said ``it's time
for the Federal Government to let those who will be affected by
the decisions help make those decisions.''
Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weimer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl Weimer, Executive Director, on behalf of
Safe Bellingham, Bellingham, Washington
Senator Gorton, I appear today on behalf of SAFE Bellingham. Thank
you for this opportunity to testify.
My father-in-law, who retired a number of years ago, was a
tankerman for most of his career. He was responsible for loading and
unloading fuel and oil from barges, refineries, and oil tankers from
Alaska to Puget Sound to Puerto Rico. I believe he liked his job. He
certainly made a good living, bought a fine home overlooking Fidalgo
Bay, and raised a family that I am now proud to be a part of. My
children are his grandchildren.
Like any family there are subjects that we avoid at family
gatherings. The dealings of the oil industry is one such subject, so I
was surprised at a recent birthday celebration when he began to tell me
why he thought that the Olympic Pipe Line should be reopened again. I
bit my tongue and listened as he went on to tell me of a recurring
nightmare that he still has after all these years. The nightmare, which
still regularly wakes him, is of a fictitious event where he mistakenly
overfills a barge and spills crude oil into Puget Sound. That
nightmare, along with his years of experience transporting oil over the
water, led him to the conclusion that pipelines are safer than the
forms of fuel transport he is knowledgeable about. He went on to say
that he feared that if the Olympic Pipe Line did not reopen it was only
a matter of time until some sort of terrible spill occurred in Puget
Sound, perhaps right outside his window on Fidalgo Island.
I kept my thoughts to myself. I didn't say that barge safety had
changed substantially in the past ten years, or that the accident
records really don't support his conclusion. I didn't even say that in
reality we need to use all the current modes of fuel transport, so they
should all be as safe as possible. What I did come to realize was the
terrible amount of responsibility and pressure that the oil industry
has needlessly placed on its employees. Why does one of the richest
industries ever created on the face of the earth continue to put
profits ahead of safety? They could easily invest in the many high tech
advancements that could now prevent many spills and help relieve their
employees from the terrible worry, and associated nightmares, of
responsibility for needless accidents?
If safety had been the highest concern than employees of Olympic
Pipe Line Company would not now have to be taking the Fifth Amendment.
If safety had been the highest concern then three families would not
have to grieve the loss of their children. And if safety had been the
highest concern then members of our community, along with the employees
of the Olympic Pipe Line Company, could sleep through the night without
recurring nightmares.
Unfortunately pipeline companies around the nation have not put
safety first. Even more difficult to understand the government
regulators who are supposed to keep pipelines safe also have failed to
put safety first. That is why we are here today--from the Governor of
the State of Washington to an ordinary citizen like myself--asking that
you join with us to regain control of the laws that govern pipeline
safety.
SAFE Bellingham is a community based organization which did not
even exist on June 10, 1999--the day that the Olympic Pipe Line
exploded in a fireball in Bellingham, Washington killing three young
people and plunging a fiery dagger in the heart of this community. SAFE
Bellingham came into existence shortly after this tragic event as the
community tried to come to grips with the pain, shock, and sorrow. In
the aftermath, we have learned many things. We have learned about
weaknesses in the federal oversight of petroleum pipeline safety. We
have learned about the federal government's efforts to prohibit state
and local governments from protecting their citizens from tragedies
like these. And we have learned that pipeline companies--driven by this
year's bottom line--sometimes this quarter's bottom line--do not have
the economic incentive to deal with hidden risks that may not explode
onto the scene until some later year. We come here today to share our
new found insights with you.
While our organization may be new, the information we bring to you
is not. If there is one message that I hope you take back to Washington
DC it is that this event was not unique to Bellingham Washington.
Similar spills and explosions have happened nationwide. According to
the Office of Pipeline Safety in the past fifteen years 342 people in
41 states have been killed by pipeline accidents which spilled over 130
million gallons. The property damage from these spills was over a
billion dollars. The only really unique thing about the disaster here
in Bellingham, thanks in large part to the Senators from Washington
State, is that the U.S. Senate has come to town to consider ways to
make sure that such a disaster never happens again. We hope the rest of
the Senate will also remember the 337 other families, in 40 other
states, who have not had the benefit of such a hearing.
I would like to focus on four things we have learned in the
aftermath of the Bellingham accident: the inadequacy of current federal
regulations; the inappropriate federal preemption of state and local
safety regulations; the absence of adequate self-regulation by Olympic
Pipe Line Company; and the need for effective community involvement in
overseeing pipeline safety issues.
INADEQUACY OF CURRENT FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Sadly, one of the first things we learned was that the petroleum
pipeline industry has escaped the safety regulations that have made so
much of America a safer place in the last part of the 20th century.
Some of the most fundamental aspects of pipeline safety are not
addressed or are addressed inadequately in current federal law.
Consider the following:
Testing and Inspection of Pipelines
Current federal law requires pipelines to be hydrostatically
pressure tested only once--before operations commence. These pipes then
sit in the ground for years and decades. They are subjected to
corrosion and strain from earth movement. They are subjected to
enormously high operating pressures. But there is no requirement that
these pipelines ever be hydrostatically pressure tested again.
Pipelines can also be inspected internally by the use of so-called
``smart pigs.'' These internal inspection devices use different
technologies such as ultrasonic or magnetic waves, to try to detect
some (not all) anomalies in the pipe. Different types of pigs have
different strengths (and weaknesses) in detecting different types of
anomalies. Over the last decade or two, some vendors have developed
smart pigs with much better capabilities than earlier versions. While
not perfect, these devices provide a useful tool for determining the
condition of the pipe after it is put into service. Ironically, while
federal regulations require that new pipelines be designed to
accommodate smart pigs, there is no federal regulation requiring that
the smart pigs be used.
There also is no oversight of how pipeline operators use (or
neglect) the information they receive from these internal inspection
devices. In Bellingham, Olympic had run a smart pig through the pipe
five years before the accident. The inspection device had detected
numerous anomalies but Olympic chose to ignore most of them. Only after
the tragedy was Olympic forced (by the Office of Pipeline Safety) to
dig up the pipe in numerous additional locations where anomalies had
been detected and finally determine whether the pipe's integrity had
been compromised. Notably, before Olympic undertook a remedial
hydrostatic pressure test this fall, it first repaired a dozen or more
sections of the pipeline that had been identified as containing
anomalies five years earlier.
Leak Detection
There is no federal requirement for pipeline operators to utilize
leak detection systems. If a computer based leak detection system is
used, there are only very general regulations specifying how it should
be configured. These standards fall far short of assuring reliability.
Thus, the Bellingham explosion was preceded for more than an hour by a
huge rupture, which dumped almost 300,000 gallons from the pipeline.
There was so much gasoline flowing down Whatcom Creek that it turned
the creek into a river of gasoline. Yet Olympic's controllers 100 miles
away in Renton, Washington apparently were unaware. For more than an
hour, the gasoline gushed with no warning to the controllers because of
the unreliable leak detection system.
Management Audits
Even a properly designed and constructed pipeline becomes a menace
to the communities through which it crosses if it is not operated and
maintained well. If settings on safety valves can be adjusted in the
field with no comprehensive oversight, there is a problem. If safety
procedures are not updated when new facilities are added to the line,
there is a problem. If operators cannot find records of what type of
pipe they have in the ground, there is a problem.
Other segments of the petroleum industry have been required to
adopt extensive safety management practices and undergo safety
management audits. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.119. But these
federal requirements have not yet been made applicable to petroleum
pipelines. In fact, the pipeline industry has been specifically
exempted from the very safety management practices Congress determined
were needed to protect employees and the general public in other energy
related industries.
Right-of-Way Encroachment
Current regulations require right-of-way minimums of 50 feet--but
this is waived if there is at least 12 inches of dirt covering the
pipe. This makes no sense. The industry is aware that construction
backhoes and other heavy equipment are a major source of damage to
pipelines and such equipment has the capability of reaching far more
than 12 inches below the ground surface.
There also is no regulation assuring that a pipeline operator
responds appropriately once notified of construction in the right-of-
way. In Bellingham, for instance, there are indications that in 1994
Olympic knew heavy construction equipment was operating in very close
proximity to its pipe (where it ruptured in 1999) but Olympic did not
provide continuous oversight of the construction to prevent damage to
its pipe.
Avoiding Over-Pressurization
There is no federally defined minimum standard for assuring that a
pipeline is ``fail-safe,'' i.e., that it cannot be over-pressured to
the point of breaking the pipe. Many pipeline companies install pumps
that can create pressures greater than the pipes can withstand. They
then use pressure safety valves to prevent over-pressurization. But
there are no federal regulations assuring that these critical devices
are adequately designed, installed, maintained--or even used! In the
Bellingham explosion, for instance, there are indications that a key
pressure safety relief valve was improperly selected and/or installed.
The NTSB report suggests that it operated numerous times in the
preceding months--far too frequently for a valve that was supposed to
activate for emergencies only.
Further, without adequate oversight, there is a danger that a
supposedly redundant backup safety system will be just as susceptible
to failure as the primary system. For instance, in the Bellingham
accident, flawed input data apparently caused Olympic's main computer
to fail. But then when the backup computer came on line, it was fed the
same flawed data and it failed, too. There is also no redundancy when
both a primary and backup system rely on the same power source. With no
regulatory standards established, the industry is free to make critical
mistakes like these.
In the end, the best protection against over-pressurization is
assuring that the pumps are not sized so large that they can create
pressure to the point of bursting the pipe. But there is no federal
prohibition on over-sizing pumps.
Valve Location Requirements
The strategic placement of check valves and block valves can do
much to limit the volume of a spill. The very general, minimum
requirements in current federal law do not address spill volume,
elevation changes, and other factors such as terrain and population
density that must be taken into account in determining an adequate
number and placement of valves.
Inadequate Reporting
We can learn from the past only if we know what has happened in the
past. Current federal law seems designed to frustrate our ability to
learn from past mistakes. The duty to report to OPS certain ``safety
conditions'' is waived if the condition is corrected within a
particular timeframe. Spills of less than 2,100 gallons generally need
not be reported. The City of Bellingham recently negotiated with
Olympic Pipe Line an agreement that requires Olympic to report these
``safety conditions'' regardless of whether they are corrected within
the timeframe and virtually all spills regardless of size. The federal
government should establish similar reporting requirements.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Ironically, at the same time that federal law is so inadequate in
mandating safety requirements for the pipeline industry, federal law
simultaneously prohibits state and local governments from adopting
their own safety-based standards. Congress is well aware that state and
local governments can regulate safety and environmental protection
without compromising industry's ability to operate on a national and
international level. To take but one obvious example, the trucking
industry, whose fleets criss-cross our state borders thousands of times
a day, are subject to safety requirements at the state and local level.
See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 14501(c)(2). As long as state and local safety
regulations do not interfere with interstate commerce and do not
conflict with federal requirements, Congress has seen fit to allow this
additional level of protection.
Yet when it comes to oil pipelines, Congress has set a different
standard. Here, Congress prohibits state and local government from
protecting their own citizens from the calamities that can befall them
from a poorly designed, operated, and/or managed pipeline. The sooner
states and local government are given the power to protect their
citizens, the sooner we will see significant advances made in safety
protection for this industry.\1\
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\1\ This is not the first time that the states have called for
stronger federal regulation of petroleum pipelines and a relaxation of
federal preemption. Following the pipeline explosion and fire in
Moundsview, Minnesota, the Minnesota Commission on Pipeline Safety
investigated and deliberated over four months and concluded that
federal regulations of petroleum safety had to be increased and that
federal preemption of state regulations should be relaxed. These
recommendations were finalized in December 1986, nearly 13 years ago
and circulated widely in Congress. Sadly, the federal government has
failed to fully pursue, adopt, and implement most of the Commission's
recommendations. Perhaps Liam Wood, Wade King, and Stephen Tsiorvas
would be alive today if it had.
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THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY DOES NOT ADEQUATELY REGULATE ITSELF
You will hear from the industry that it is in their own self-
interest to regulate themselves and avoid spills of valuable petroleum
products and explosions, which cause the deaths of innocent people. But
the sad truth is that in much of today's corporate world the focus is
on the bottom line--not the bottom line five or ten years from now, but
the bottom line this year, this quarter, this month--TODAY. Short-term
financial incentives frequently push managers in the direction of
maximizing revenues and profits at the expense of risks, which may not
manifest themselves for years or even decades. Industry risk
assessments may make sense to the corporate executive in Houston, but
how do they explain to a family with a dead child that profits are a
better bet than spending even a tiny portion of those profits to ensure
that a child's life is not lost?
This approach is not unique to the oil pipeline industry. As a
society, we have responded to this phenomenon by imposing safety
standards on other industries. Those standards are far and above those
that have been required of the pipeline industry. How many more
tragedies likeBellingham's must be witnessed before we see the same
level of safety mandated for petroleum pipelines as we do for other
segments of the petroleum industry? Hopefully none. Congress should act
speedily to mandate federal safety standards before we lose a single
more innocent life.
COMMUNITY OVERSIGHT
In the wake of the Exxon Valdez accident, Congress (in the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90)) mandated the creation of a well-funded,
independent, non-profit citizen oversight council. See 33 U.S. Code,
Sec. 2732. We believe that for local elected officials, and citizens to
once again have confidence in the pipeline companies serving our
communities, and the regulators who are supposed to oversee them, that
a similar oversight council needs to be established. We would hope that
any new pipeline legislation, or the reauthorization of the Office of
Pipeline Safety itself, would mandate the creation of a model citizen
council here in Puget Sound, based on the OPA 90 model which was meant
to be replicated. The purpose of this council would be to review,
monitor, and comment on pipeline companies' risk management and risk
assessment studies; their spill response and prevention plans; their
prevention and response capabilities; their safety and environmental
protection programs; and their actual impacts on the environment.
The Citizen Advisory Council would play a major role in increasing
public awareness of pipeline safety, spill response, spill prevention,
and environmental protection issues. The Citizen Advisory Council would
have no law enforcement or regulatory authority but would have the same
access to pipeline facilities and records as state and federal
regulatory agencies. Like the OPA 90 language, the proposed legislation
should direct federal agencies to cooperate with and consult with the
Citizen Advisory Council on substantive matters related to pipeline
operations.
The Citizen Advisory Council's members would be comprised of
representatives of appropriate interest groups such as local
municipalities and counties, tribes, environmental organizations,
fishing organizations, and agricultural groups.
This proposal is designed to promote partnership and cooperation
between local citizens, industry, and government. It would also go a
long way towards rebuilding the trust that was shattered when the
pipeline exploded on June 10th 1999. We believe that the local
governments and citizens that have the most to lose if something goes
wrong with a pipeline, should have an active role in the oversight of
those pipelines. A model Citizen Advisory Council established here in
Puget Sound, which if successful could later be replicated in other
parts of the nation, would serve as the crucial link for local
involvement.
In conclusion please remember that the accident here in Bellingham
was not unique. Pipeline spills occur almost daily. Pipeline
regulations need to be updated to include a whole range of safety
improvements that are now possible. Pipeline companies need to be
required to invest in safer pipelines, and state and local governments
need to be allowed to set stricter pipeline regulations when they deem
them necessary. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, those most
impacted if something goes wrong with a pipeline need to be included in
all aspects of the pipelines running through their communities.
Referring to a different northwest problem Senator Gorton recently
summed up our view regarding pipelines perfectly when he said ``It's
time for the federal government to let those who will be affected by
the decisions make these decisions.''
You have our support, and we wish you luck, on the pipeline reform
measures you are supporting. We hope you will include our proposals as
well. Thank you for your time today.
Senator Gorton. Thank you very much, Mr. Weimer.
Miss Harper.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN HARPER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CASCADE COLUMBIA
ALLIANCE, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Miss Harper. Thank you. Thank you for holding this hearing,
Senator Gorton and Senator Murray.
My name is Susan Harper. I'm Executive Director of Cascade
Columbia Alliance. I feel privileged to be here to speak on
behalf of the coalition of citizens, elected citizens,
environmental civic groups, labor and businesses that I'm
representing with my testimony.
I'm also on the board member of the National Pipeline
Reform Coalition to promote pipeline safety nationwide.
The people who originally came together as the NPRC did so
for the reason that we are here today. Elsewhere at another
time before Bellingham was a tragedy from a pipeline accident
that equaled in magnitude the grief and confusion that we feel
in this room today.
Through our association with the National Coalition since
1996 when the Olympic Pipe Line proposed a 230-mile Cross
Cascade pipeline, we learned many of the lessons that could
have prevented a Bellingham nightmare.
We urge the Committee to take swift action, to set right a
tragedy that should have never happened by listening to the
recommendations for safety improvements that CCA and others
have presented today.
I would also the request that this packet of about a
hundred letters from concerned citizens be included in the
record.*
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* The information referred to was not available at the time this
hearing went to press.
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Senator Gorton. It will be without objection.
Miss Harper. Thank you. Make no mistake that this is not an
isolated incident. Broadly in terms of pipeline safety
nationally, but also the company that manages Olympic Pipe Line
is called Equilon, and most likely the gentlemen speaking today
was an employee of Equilon. Equilon also runs a refinery at
Anacortes, Washington that exploded last November 1998, killing
six workers. That means within 7 months Equilon's safety record
includes nine fatalities.
The Pipeline Safety Act in 1996 was actually weakened and
moved toward a risk management demonstration project-based
procedure. We're listening to testimony today that gives
evidence to this lack of, of regulation and this moving to
pipelines being self-regulated, and in fact, Jim Hall's
testimony in 1997, excuse me, in 1998, or 1999, sorry about
that. It's a little nerve racking.
Senator Murray. Miss Harper, I should tell you, she's
getting married this weekend.
Miss Harper. I am, and I'm just a little nervous, but he
did testify in 1999 before the house that there were 28
recommendations before the Office of Pipeline Safety, and they
followed up on those in 1997 only to find up that seven of
those had actually been implemented.
CCA wholly supports the bills that are before Congress
right now, and we're very appreciative of those. I want to
emphasize the importance for an independent oversight body to
monitor and review the plans of the industries and the agencies
to protect our interests, and you've heard today about this
regional citizens oversight committee in Prince William Sound.
In fact, Alaska Governor Knowles credits the regional oversight
body as creating the safest oil transport system in the United
States.
The State of Washington is clearly in need of such a model,
and we would request that part of the reauthorization of the
Pipeline Safety Act includes such an oversight model as we have
been discussing here today, and I know Senator Gorton has
supported in his talking points.
We have compiled a long list of safety recommendations that
we've attached to our testimony.* However, we do not agree that
pipelines are necessarily the safest means of transportation,
but we would agree that all are inherently dangerous and that
we need to take steps to make sure that all of those systems
are made safer including double wall tank ships, double wall
trucks and double wall pipelines where needed.
Congress must all require that the industry carry out the
recommendations of the NTSB and that OPS make that, or remove
any blockage of doing that.
During our review of Olympic's proposed Cross Cascade
pipeline, here I have a copy of the draft EIS. It's kind of
small, actually, you'll note for such a large pipeline. During
that time, we were very concerned about the I-5 pipeline, and
in fact, we requested that Olympic's existing I-5 pipeline be
inspected and replaced as an alternative since the pipeline was
built in 1965 and had 44 spills on record with OPS. Our
coalition was very concerned about the condition of the
pipeline that we were being told was oversubscribed. Not only
did Olympic refuse, but Jones and Stokes, the consultants hired
to prepare the draft environmental impact statement to this
pipeline, were not directed to or decided not to disclose
information about the pipeline's condition. Those who had full
access to information concerning Olympic's existing woefully
inadequate and unsafe pipeline system continuously reassured
the public that this pipeline was safe and that Olympic's leak
detection system was adequate.
In the draft EIS Jones and Stokes gave high marks to
Olympic's existing supervisory control data and acquisition
system, and assured the public that major leaks could be
detected and shut off within minutes. This false and rosey
picture was completely blown away by Olympic's devastating June
10th explosion.
In our view those who had access though this information
bear responsibility for misleadingly the public about the risks
from Olympic's existing pipeline.
As a society we also need to reduce our reliance on this
non-renewable energy. We need to enforce automotive fuel
economy standards, and we appreciate Senator Gorton's support
for CAFE standards.
In addition, for an independent citizen oversight body that
can address safety issues, the Pacific Northwest is solely
lacking in a basic energies fuels planning strategy similar to
the Northwest Power Planning Act.
We would also in hearing the testimony today, I would like
to bring up one additional thing that wasn't mentioned in here.
I know that Secretary Slater has written a letter saying that
the UTC could be the best place to have delegated authority for
pipeline safety. During the Cross Cascade pipeline which was
proposed to be an intrastate pipeline, the UTC was silent. They
decided not to give comments on this pipeline proposal.
However, the Department of Ecology was very involved.
Also, the UTC during their rule adoption period when they
got to the delegation of intrastate regulation for liquid fuel
pipelines, we were participating in that process, and
unfortunately all of our recommendations to go beyond the
Federal standards and all of our evidence that was presented at
that meeting was basically ignored, and the Federal code were
adopted, and the UTC settled on the Cross Cascade pipeline
saying that they would defer to the Federal codes.
As you can see, we have real concerns with the agency that
will be overseeing pipeline safety in Washington State.
However, we know that any agency does need to have good follow-
through and oversight over it. That's why we would so wholly
support the citizen monitoring organization that we've been
referred to in Alaska called the Regional Citizens Advisory
Council. We'd also wholly urge that we need to raise the floor
for pipeline safety laws nationally in order to make sure that
we are having a process that is coordinated through one agency
that has adequate standards to do its job which is to protect
the public interest and the environment, and the last thing
that I would like to say in conclusion is that we would request
your full support in getting legislation passed this year.
We are planning a national pipeline safety conference on
April 9th and 10th in Washington, D.C. because we are very
aware that this needs to be a national issue and that the State
of Washington needs the support of the entire nation to make
this happen. We're very excited to let you know that we've got
about half the states with activists in them that are willing
to come to this or public officials or pipeline safety
professionals, and we would urge you to support that fully, and
it would be a really great way to actually be able to make
these changes, and finally, the Colonial Pipeline, I have the
record for that pipeline, by the way. It's the largest, or it's
a very large pipeline, and it has one of the worst spill
records in the U.S. Eight point five million gallons have been
spilled since 1968 with a total of a 186 spills, and 60 of
those were in the last 5 years, and the fact sheet that we
created was created in early 1999. So as you can see the Office
of Pipeline Safety needs some help from us, and we're willing
to give it.
So we'll really appreciate that not only do we get
delegated authority but we get citizen oversight and thank you
for your time today.
Senator Gorton. Thank you. Perhaps both of you can comment
on this, but Mr. Weimer, you first, how does the citizens'
oversight council differ from the peer review councils that
exist under the present act?
Mr. Weimer. My understanding is the way the citizen
oversight panel was set up in Alaska, it's totally independent,
and it's actually funded by the oil companies up there, but
there's a contract between the oil companies and the citizen
oversight that make it independent, and it's designated in the
Federal legislation instead of being within the department,
like underneath the Office of Pipeline Safety. It's an
independent functioning body with funding of its own that hires
experts to look at different proposals of the pipeline
companies or their environmental records.
Senator Gorton. That's the nature of your recommendation?
Mr. Weimer. That's our nature. We'd like something that's
independent, and there's already examples even within
Washington state, and there's already a group that has formed,
a city-county forum, and number of the cities' mayors were here
today, and they've been meeting, and such a group I think could
be turned into an oversight panel fairly easily, and that way
they would be spending the oil companies' money hiring experts
to try to figure out what pig runs mean instead of having to
spend their own taxpayer moneys to do that.
Senator Gorton. Miss Harper, you agree totally with that?
Miss Harper. Yeah, I would agree with that, but I would add
that the current advisory body that sits under OPS, it's
reactionary. The people who sit on that body are chosen by OPS,
and in fact, Lois Epstein, one of the engineers from the
environmental defense fund, has been very chagrined at the
recent selection and one of our own, Greg Winter, was somebody
that we put up to be on that committee. He served on the
regional citizens advisory council in Alaska as a chair of one
of those committees, so we feel that he was very well capable
of doing the job, but unfortunately his access was denied. So
there isn't a process that is set up that you have to go
through to get on that committee.
Now, with the regional citizen advisory council, because
first off the money is mandated, this council does not have to
pay homage to the industry, because they're going to get their
money no matter what.
Secondly, as Carl had mentioned, the pipeline safety forum,
I've been an extremely active, or I've been a very active part
of that. In fact, I've been on one of the steering committees,
and I find that working with local governments as we're doing
is a very good way to work, and I found that environmental,
tribal, fishing, recreational groups and local governments
really make a good mesh, because you're not, you know, just
leaning too fair in one direction. You're really working with
pragmatic people who are looking out for public safety, but
also water quality protection, pipeline spills underground. In
fact, in Delaware there was just a recent spill that we've
heard has been going on for 12 years from a city plant there,
and those kind of spills are just unacceptable and with water
resources so scarce today, we really need to be careful with
those resources.
Senator Gorton. Senator Murray?
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your testimony and your support of our legislation, and we look
forward to working with you.
It's been a long day, and it's I just have ask one
question. In order to get this passed at the national level,
the awareness has to be extremely high. Here in our state, a
lot of people are involved in local communities up and down the
I-5 corridor and even in eastern Washington. How are you
working with your national organization to insure that that
awareness is just as high, and do you find that more and more
increasing awareness or is it still a challenge?
Mr. Weimer. I think there's a tremendous amount of
awareness. There's certainly been media coverage of this. There
was a 500,000 gallon spill Friday in Texas. Texas has a fairly
bad record of pipeline spills. There was a spill in Delaware.
There was a spill in Philadelphia not long ago. So there's a
whole lot of reasons for people being active. I spent all
weekend on the phone with a mayor from New Jersey, a mayor from
New York, a property rights organization in Pennsylvania
helping to organize this national conference in early April,
which we're trying to bring together fairly rapidly which is
somewhat insane, but the support is there, and people are going
to be there in Washington, D.C., to talk about pipeline issue.
Miss Harper. In fact, we've all the been down to Texas to
speak to a group down there. Pipeline proposals are also a big
puzzlement for people, and in fact, this was an Ashland
Marathon project that was proposed that the project was just
pulled off the table because very same pipeline had a major
rupture.
In Ohio, we have people. In Illinois we have people. In
Montana, you know about the Flathead Indian reservation and
their issues there. We have support in Alaska. So we definitely
have a web of support, and I think that, the tragedy that
happened in Bellingham can be the type, most unfortunately I
say this, but also optimistically I say this, the Exxon Valdez
of the pipelines.
We can't accept anymore deaths, Senators. I want you next
time there's a tragedy like this that happens to anybody, any
community to be able to say we did everything we could to
prevent this. We're sorry, and if you can go that far then
we're on the right track.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much.
Senator Gorton. Thank you. That's quite appropriate end to
this day, Miss Harper. Thank you.
Miss Harper. Thank you.
Senator Gorton. Remember that anyone who wishes to comment
has 10 days to submit written comments to the Commerce
Committee in Washington, D.C., and those comments will be
included in the record.
With that, we're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Patty Murray to Carl Gast
1. LMr. Gast (Olympic)--Last Thursday, OPS told you that you
couldn't reopen the pipeline until further inspections are done. Could
you explain how you intend to comply with that order?
2. LMy first question is for all of you. Pre-Bellingham, which most
of us feel created an incentive for all of you to do a better job--
certainly too costly of an incentive--what types of inspection and
testing procedures did you use? How often did you inspect?
3. LHow do you qualify your pipeline operators? Are there education
requirements?
4. LDo you have any initial concerns about the integrity rule that
will be up for comment soon?
5. LDo you have any thoughts or concerns on how we could establish
a ``right to know'' standard that would require you to establish a
dialogue with those whom your lines affect?
6. LWhat types of R&D activities are you involved with? Are you
interested and do you think it would help for the federal government to
increase investments in R&D?
[Response was not available at the time this hearing went to
press.]
______
Joint Prepared Statement of State Senator Harriet A. Spanel, 40th
District and State Representative Kelli Linville, 42nd District,
Washington
Thank you to Senators Gorton and Murray and to the Senate Commerce
Committee staff and Chairman John McCain for holding this important
hearing in Bellingham. Your commitment to addressing this critical
issue is greatly appreciated. In our combined 2l years of public
service, there has been no greater tragedy to befall the citizens we
represent.
Speaking as a senator and representative in the Washington State
Legislature, we address you as fellow elected officials--those of us
who try to make government the best it can be--and whose primary
purpose therefore is to represent the interests of the citizens we hear
from on a daily basis. Pipeline accidents happen here, in the cities
and towns and counties we inhabit and which we are elected to
represent.
As such, the question that keeps jumping out at us over and over
again is ``How could this happen?''
We have read the federal Pipeline Safety Act. On first reading, we
are encouraged: so many aspects of pipeline safety are addressed, so
many regulations are to be developed, so many apparent assurances that
things will be ok.
But, like the pipelines themselves, this is a false hope of safety.
It has not gone as possibly the authors of the federal act had hoped.
For whatever reason, the guidelines of the federal act--which preempt
anything we can do here at the state level--have not been implemented.
Our constituents' anger is easy to understand.
And while the Office of Pipeline Safety dawdles, accidents continue
to happen all over the country. Just since the first of this year, in
Clark County, Kentucky, a pipeline burst and spilled 900,000 gallons of
crude oil into a tributary of the Kentucky River--possibly the worst
spill in the state's history. Drinking water was being shipped in, the
smell was awful, and cattle watering holes were polluted.
A week later, in Toms River, New Jersey, lack of leak detection was
blamed for a spill of 56,000 gallons of crude oil into the John Heinz
Wildlife Refuge near Philadelphia. A visitor to the refuge, not the
company, detected the spill. The pipeline in question was 50 years old.
And, committee members may remember that earlier this year Koch
Industries was fined an unprecedented $30 million on account of its
``wait to see if it breaks'' leak detection system.
We have attached a short list of some significant pipeline
accidents in recent years. Please note that none of these accidents
were the result of ``third party damage'' with the exception of the
Reston incident. All of them could have been prevented--if NTSB safety
recommendations had been acted upon.
The common causes of pipeline accidents are:
anomalies in the pipe not detected or not acted upon
operator inattention or error
computer system malfunction
shut-off capability insufficient or improperly
deployed
leak detection insufficient
Because of the sorry record of federal regulation, we heartily
endorse Senate Bill 2004 which Senator Murray introduced and Senator
Gorton has sponsored. S. 2004 not only expands state authority to allow
higher standards for training and leak detection, but it also pushes
the Office of Pipeline Safety to enter into further agreements with
states for inspection of interstate lines. The bill also provides much
needed funding for the federal effort.
In anticipation of enhanced federal regulations and a stronger
federal-state partnership for pipeline safety, we worked diligently in
the State Legislature this year to obtain passage of House Bill 2420.
This bill sets the stage for the increased authority S. 2004 allows. It
also strengthens Washington's programs for preventing third-party
damage and responding to accidents.
But we all know that the state law alone will not prevent further
accidents. That is up to the federal government. And there is simply no
reason to wait any longer for meaningful steps to be taken--to wait for
more deaths and environmental disasters.
It would be presumptuous of us to reiterate the extent of the
impact on the dear families who have lost children. You have heard
their grief But we do not believe it is presumptuous of us to tell the
federal government that we are not going to sit idly by and let a
similar tragedy befall yet another community. Accordingly, we pledge to
work with you to accomplish the maximum improvements possible in
pipeline safety regulation.
Thank you, again, for your consideration.
Examples of Major Pipeline Accidents (1980-1999)
Accidents
(1) Fredericksburg, VA 1980 (and again in 1989)
330,000 gallons of aviation fuel entered the city water supply, and
the Rappahannock River, shut down the water treatment plant, a state of
emergency was declared, and businesses and residents hauled water for a
week.
Causes: Pipe damage upon installation, subsequent undetected
corrosion, operator error, insufficient valve placement.
(2) Moundsview, MN 7/8/86
An 8-inch gasoline pipeline burst, gasoline flowed along
neighborhood streets until it was ignited, killing 2 people who burned
to death and injuring 7.
Causes: Failure to correct known defects, inadequate pipe
specifications, inadequate operator training including delay in
responding.
(3) Flathead Indian Reservation, MT 1986-1993
Seventy-one leaks and three major spills of gasoline, aircraft
fuel, and diesel (including 163,000 gallons into a creek) over this
period resulted in the Flatheads refusing to renew Yellowstone's
franchise and move the line off of the reservation.
Causes: Inattention and failure to correct defects.
(4) North Blenheim, NY 3/13/90
A liquid natural gas pipeline burst sending 100,000 gallons of
product flowing down into the town--enough to engulf the entire town.
Residents noticed a ``heavy fog'' on their windshields, until one
called and notified a company employee. Two people were killed and
seven injured.
Causes: Negligent maintenance procedures resulting in cracks in the
pipe which were undetected; operator error; insufficient remotely
operated valves and check valves.
(5) Reston (Herndon), VA 3/28/93
Pipe burst sending a geyser of diesel fuel (407,000 gallons) into
the storm sewer and eventually into a tributary of the Potomac River.
(Could have been gasoline or jet fuel.) Significant environmental
damage ($1 million clean-up).
Causes: Third-party damage causing corrosion which went undetected
for a long period.
(6) Edison, NJ 3/23/94
Natural gas transmission line burst and exploded. 1500 residents
evacuated and $25 million damage. Injuries included minor burns and
cuts from broken glass.
Causes: Line hadn't been ``pigged'' since 1986, but it had
deteriorated; no remote automatic valves; pipe manufacturing standards
lax; no extra measures for highly populated areas.
(7) Allentown, PA 6/9/94
Natural gas pipe burst and product flowed underground into the
basement of an 8-story retirement home, where it migrated through vents
into other floors and was eventually ignited. One death and 55
injuries.
Causes: Company employee (backhoe operator) error; no excess flow
valves which had been recommended by NTSB since 1972; insufficient
public awareness.
(8) Reedy River, SC 6/26/96
Fuel oil pipeline crossing the river burst resulting in a $20
million clean-up effort.
Causes: Pipeline corrosion not responded to soon enough; computer
malfunction; employee error; inadequate leak detection.
(9) Lively, TX 8/8/96
Liquid natural gas pipeline burst, killing two men who accidentally
ignited it.
Causes: Inadequate corrosion protection.
(10) Murphreesboro, TN 11/5/96
84,000 gallons of diesel fuel (could have been gasoline) and $5.7
million damage.
Causes: Corrosion; operator error--3\1/2\ hours before detection.
(11) San Juan, PR 11/21/96
Thirty-three people killed when a liquid natural gas line exploded.
Causes: Employee negligence in responding to a leak which had been
ongoing for a week.
(12) Bellingham, WA 6/10/99
______
Prepared Statement of James Terrence Montonye, Technical Program
Director for the SPIE, International Society of Optical Engineering
SPIE, which is located just south of Western Washington University
in Bellingham at 20th and Knox streets, is the largest international
professional society serving developers and appliers of optical,
optoelectronic, and imaging instrumentation. It's imaging conferences
range from x-ray to radar to acoustical. It is foremost in imaging
spectroscopy and deals with the diagnostics of materials of all kinds.
SPIE employs 145 people and has gross revenues of $20M. It produces
proceedings for 350 nominal two-day topical conferences per year and
does about 350 short courses for engineers per year at twenty-four
different meetings around the world. It has 13,500 members.
It happens that SPIE holds a non-destructive testing meeting in
California each March that has produced three proceedings titled
``Nondestructive Evaluation of Utilities and Pipelines.'' These
proceedings contain papers by instrument developers from universities,
laboratories, OEM corporations, and non-destructive testing
contractors. Although we've tried hard to get them there, state and
municipal engineers seldom attend this meeting.
Here's my thought. The nondestructive testing meeting in San Diego
is a meeting where state pipeline inspectors could meet each year to
work on realistic standards for pipeline inspection in the presence of
people who develop the instruments and contractors who use them.
Materials and materials testing will continue to evolve. Wealth
creation through the conversion of natural materials into consumable
products is a never ending process. Similarly, standards in important
areas such as pipeline safety should be recognized and organized for a
continual process of evolution, as well. I cannot think of a better way
for the evolution of efficient and effective pipeline safety standards
to occur than at a meeting of technical experts on the instrumentation
required to do the testing.
Any electrical, materials, or mechanical engineer should be able to
handle the job of inspection and standards development. But, there is
another very important consideration in regulation enforcement. Jack
London brought it out in ``Fish Patrol.'' His effectiveness as an
enforcement official he attributed to his youth as an oyster pirate.
This same principle holds for pipeline inspectors. There are two major
hazards with any federal or state inspection organization, graft and
incompetence. We all are aware of many examples of both. The best way
for states to handle this problem is to pay high wages to pipeline
inspectors who had been engineers within the pipeline industry in other
states. The high wage and out-of-state experience would serve to dispel
graft. Engineering experience from within the industry would serve to
provide the competence to get the job done efficiently and effectively.
Senator Gorton, these comments are respectively offered for your
consideration following this public hearing on pipeline safety in the
City of Bellingham on 13 March, 2000.