[Senate Hearing 106-1114]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1114
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE PIPELINE SAFETY ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 11, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Martha P. Allbright, Republican General Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 11, 2000..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Brownback................................... 57
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Statement of Senator Gorton...................................... 2
Prepared Statement of Senator Hollings........................... 4
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 24
Prepared Statement of Senator Inouye............................. 5
Prepared Statement of Senator Lott............................... 5
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Wyden....................................... 2
Witnesses
Asmundson, Mark, Mayor, City of Bellingham, Washington........... 14
Brabec, Bruce, Bellingham, WA.................................... 18
Coyner, Hon. Kelley, Administrator, Research and Special Programs
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Dalen, Katherine, Bellingham, WA................................. 22
Haener, William J., President and Chief Executive Officer, CMS
Gas Transmission and Storage Company, on Behalf of the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America.................. 60
Prepared statement........................................... 62
Hammerschmidt, Hon. John A., Member, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Inslee, Hon. Jay, U.S. Representative, State of Washington....... 11
Kenow, Charles R., National Vice-Chairman, National Association
of Pipeline Safety Representatives............................. 78
Prepared statement........................................... 80
King, Frank and Mary, Bellingham, WA............................. 15
Mead, Hon. Kenneth M., Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Metcalf, Hon. Jack, U.S. Representative, State of Washington..... 10
Murray, Hon. Patty, U.S. Senator from Washington................. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Pates, James M., City Attorney, Fredericksburg, Virginia, on
Behalf of the National Pipeline Reform Coalition............... 94
Prepared statement........................................... 100
Reiten, Richard, President and Chief Executive Officer, Northwest
Natural Gas, on Behalf Of the American Gas Association and the
American Public Gas Association................................ 83
Prepared statement........................................... 83
Robinson, Marlene, Bellingham, WA................................ 18
Wright, Statement of Phillip D. Senior Vice President, Enterprise
Development and Planning, Williams Energy Services, on Behalf
of the Association of Pipe Lines and the American Petroleum
Institute...................................................... 70
Prepared statement........................................... 72
Appendix
Cascade Columbia Alliance, East Lake Washington Audubon Society,
Friends of the San Juans, Friends of the Earth, Friends of Tolt
River, Lake Joy Community Club, the Mountaineers, North Lake
Joy Estates, Ocean Advocates, Pacific Crest Biodiversity
Project, People for Puget Sound, Rainier Audubon Society, Safe
Bellingham, Surfrider Foundation, Washington State Chapter,
Surfrider Foundation USA, Tolt River Highlands, Washington
Kayak Club, Washington Public Interest Research Group,
Washington Trout, Willapa Hills Audubon Society, and Grays
Harbor Audubon Society, prepared statement..................... 137
Harper, Susan, Executive Director, Cascade Columbia Alliance,
prepared statement............................................. 139
Holmes, Edward J. Chair, NARUC Committee on Gas and Commissioner,
Kentucky Public Service on Behalf of the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), prepared statement 140
Locke, Governor Gary State of Washington, prepared statement..... 141
Somerhalder II, John W., President, El Paso Energy Pipeline
Group, prepared statement...................................... 143
Williams, George P., Director, Government Affairs, Sempra Energy,
prepared statement............................................. 146
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain:
Hon. Kelley Coyner........................................... 111
John A. Hammerschmidt........................................ 121
Kenneth M. Mead.............................................. 133
James M. Pates............................................... 133
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Patty Murray:
William J. Haener............................................ 131
Phillip D. Wright............................................ 136
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F.
Hollings:
William J. Haener............................................ 129
Phillip D. Wright............................................ 134
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE PIPELINE SAFETY ACT
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
The Chairman. Good morning. I am pleased to call to order
this full Committee hearing to address the critically important
issue of pipeline transportation safety. In our effort to
reauthorize and improve Federal pipeline safety programs,
today's hearing is designed to obtain input from public safety
advocates, the National Transportation Safety Board, the
Department of Transportation and its Inspector General,
industry, and others interested in promoting pipeline safety.
During this hearing, we will be told that statistically,
pipeline transportation is perhaps the safest form of
transportation, and statistically this may be true. But
statistics are little comfort to those who have experienced the
tragic consequences of the pipeline accidents that do occur.
This morning, we will hear of the enormous loss of three
families who lost their sons as a result of a pipeline accident
last June in Bellingham, Washington. While enduring the tragic
loss of their beloved boys, a tragedy almost impossible to
bear, these parents have demonstrated continued strength and
courage.
Over the past year, each has turned their personal tragedy
into a crusade to improve pipeline safety so that others will
never experience the kind of loss they have endured. I commend
each of them, Mr. and Mrs. Frank and Mary King, Ms. Marlene
Robinson and Mr. Bruce Brabec, and Ms. Katherine Dalen. The
Committee looks forward to hearing from you shortly.
In March, this Committee held a field hearing chaired by
Senator Gorton in Bellingham, Washington, during which 18
witnesses provided information and expressed views on the
Bellingham accident. Today's hearing will not repeat that
testimony. Instead, each witness has been asked to direct their
testimony to a broad range of pipeline safety issues, including
the three pipeline safety bills that have been introduced in
the Senate.
I am committed to moving a comprehensive pipeline
reauthorization bill through the legislative process as soon as
possible. We must act to help improve pipeline safety and
prevent future tragedies like that which occurred in
Bellingham. I also want to thank Senator Murray and Senator
Gorton for all their hard work on this issue. I look forward to
hearing from today's witnesses, and am eager to hear their
suggestions on what actions Congress should take to improve
pipeline transportation safety.
Senator Gorton.
STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, not only for
holding this hearing but for your commitment to reauthorizing
the pipeline safety act during the course of this year's
Congress.
I think all of us share one feature in common, and I
include the three witnesses from the Senate and the House as
well as you and Senator Wyden and myself. This was not an issue
to which we paid a great deal of attention before the tragedy
in Bellingham last year.
Now we are paying a great deal of attention to the subject,
and it behooves us to do more than pay attention to it. It
behooves us to take action, and so we need to hear from those
in the federal government who are responsible for pipeline
safety to a certain extent about what went wrong, but to a far
greater extent as to what measures they propose both internally
and through our reauthorization to see to it that the federal
safety role is more effective than it has been in the past.
We also need to hear from those who represent States and
local communities that often have not only the desire but the
ability to provide more significantly for the safety of their
citizens. As to their role, we need to consider what role
should be played by private organizations, by citizens
organizations themselves in helping both to oversee safety
measures and with respect to publicizing problems and helping
reach those solutions and, of course, we need to hear from the
industry itself as to how and why accidents like this happen
and what industry proposes to do to see to it that pipelines
are operated more safely in the future.
Obviously, these pipelines are necessary to our
transportation and to our industrial democracy, but they need
to be managed and conducted and supervised in a way that does
not threaten the lives and security of people who live in their
vicinity, and we need to dedicate ourselves to doing all we can
to ensure that the kind of tragedy that took place in
Bellingham last year does not take place in any other place in
the United States at any other time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Wyden.
STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much
appreciate your holding this hearing. Fire experts in my home
state of Oregon believe that a tragedy like the one in
Bellingham could strike in my home state as well.
We are especially concerned in Oregon about the line from
Portland to Eugene. Much of this line has been lying in moist
soil for decades. When you have that kind of situation the pipe
corrodes, so this is a very, very serious safety problem. I
appreciate your convening this hearing, and the leadership of
Senators Murray, Gorton, and our witnesses. I would just wrap
up my comments with two areas that I am especially interested
in, Mr. Chairman.
First, I think this is ultimately a public right-to-know
issue. The citizens of this country have a right to know where
exactly these lines are, and that means with clear maps, with
understandable markings, and certainly that ought to be part of
any reform package.
Second, as part of a public right-to-know program, the
results of pipeline tests ought to be available in an
understandable format. I am of the view, Mr. Chairman, that
especially because of our Committee's jurisdiction, that this
ought to be available online so that people with a click of the
enter button can get access to this information.
The second point I would make, and Senator Gorton I know
has been working in this area, is, we need to come up, as we
deal with this sort of regulatory side, with a partnership
between the state and the federal government. There is clearly
a need for a role for both bodies. Determining exactly what
that role ought to be is something that I think we can deal
with in a bipartisan kind of fashion.
I am very pleased you are holding this hearing, Mr.
Chairman. The stakes for folks that I represent, more than 3
million Oregonians, are very, very high, and we need to act and
act promptly, and I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wyden. Senator Breaux.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the
hearing. I think that the information we find will be
interesting and informative also, I think very helpful in
making sure we do everything we can to eliminate to the
greatest degree possible the potential for serious accidents
related to the transmission of fuel through pipeline systems.
One serious accident is one too many. I think the goal
obviously should be, and we all would agree, to eliminate the
possibility of serious accidents involving transmission lines
throughout this country.
I would note a couple of things, however, though, in the
area of transportation-related injuries. I think the pipeline
systems in this country have one of the best records of any of
the various systems that we have. When you compare marine-
related transportation accidents to pipeline accidents, when
you look at 40,000-plus people who are killed on our highway
transportation systems, you see that the transportation of
natural gas and gasoline is, in fact, an industry that has an
outstanding record. Again, one serious accident is one too
many, and one tragic loss of life is something that we ought to
try to do everything that we can to eliminate.
I think the final point I would make is that I think this
is an area where there indeed has to be a national role. You
cannot have 50 different rules and regulations and 50 different
standards regulating something that is interstate in nature. We
have to make sure the federal system is strong enough and is
doing an adequate job, but I think it would be a serious
mistake to allow 50 different states to oversee or supersede
the federal responsibility in this area, and hopefully we will
have some good discussion about it.
I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Breaux. I want to welcome
our congressional witnesses appearing before the panel, or
appearing before the Committee today. We know you are very
busy, and we appreciate the opportunity of hearing from you. We
will begin with Senator Murray. Welcome, Senator Murray.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator from South Carolina
I would like to thank the Chairman for convening this hearing on
the reauthorization of pipeline safety programs. Any map showing the
nation's pipelines is clear evidence of the importance of safe
pipelines to the nation. The question is not whether pipeline safety
programs should be reauthorized but rather what is the best way to
maintain the safety of the interstate pipeline system.
It is my pleasure to welcome Senator Murray to the Committee this
morning. I look forward to hearing her testimony on her legislation, S.
2004, which specifies requirements for strengthening safety and
environmental standards. Senator Murray has been a leader in moving the
reauthorization of pipeline safety programs forward, and I will
continue to work with her on this important issue.
Additionally, I would like to extend my condolences to the families
from Bellingham, Washington, who have agreed to come testify today
about their experiences. I appreciate their efforts on behalf of their
sons to improve pipeline safety for all of us, and I look forward to
hearing from them this morning.
As many of you know, in June of 1996, a liquid pipeline ruptured
where a corroded section of the pipeline crossed the Reedy River at
Fork Shoals, South Carolina. The rupture released almost a million
gallons of fuel oil into the Reedy River and surrounding areas. NTSB
investigated the accident and found that the estimated cost for clean-
up and settlement with the State of South Carolina was $20.5 million.
Fortunately, no one was injured in the accident, however it is
important that this type of accident be prevented in the future. I
understand that OPS is working on new corrosion guidelines and hope
that Administrator Coyner and Chairman Hall will comment on the
adequacy of existing corrosion standards.
Three bills have been introduced in the Senate this Congress.
Senator McCain and Murray have drafted proposals, and I have introduced
the Administration's bill by request. We are here today to solicit
opinions about the pending legislation from those who are most informed
about pipeline safety. I look forward to hearing their comments and
critiques of the existing pipeline safety programs and provisions in
the legislative proposals.
As far as a critique of the existing pipeline safety program, I
want to share my concerns about the delays in issuing congressional
mandates. The Office of Pipeline Safety has not issued final rules on
outstanding items from our 1992 and 1996 reauthorizations. The rules on
environmentally sensitive and high density areas should have been
completed by now, although I understand that they are expected this
year. The rules on operator qualification and periodic inspections are
not final either. I hope that Administrator Coyner will comment on the
status of these rules, it would certainly help to advance the cause of
pipeline safety if we could understand why these rules are not in place
or if additional standards need to be enacted.
Further I am curious about what new regulations may be appropriate
at this time. There are many new initiatives being proposed in the
three pending bills and I have a number of questions. What is the
appropriate level of authorization for funding? I note that the
pipeline safety budget proposal for FY 2001 represents an increase of
29 percent over the current level. If that funding request is not met,
how will the Office of Pipeline Safety implement existing requirements
and standards? If new requirements and standards are imposed in a
reauthorization bill, does the Office of Pipeline Safety have adequate
resources to carry out those new directives? I want to make sure that
we are not only providing appropriate direction for the pipeline safety
program, but appropriate expectations and resources.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses' comments and their views
on pipeline safety issues.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inouye follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
I would like to thank the Chairman for convening this hearing
today. Pipelines are an integral part of our transportation network,
facilitating large movement of both gas and liquid throughout the
United States. I was pleased to see that the overall pipeline accident
rate declined last year, but have concerns because the average spill
amount increased. While I recognize that pipelines are the safest way
to transport hazardous materials, there is still much that can be done
to ensure that pipelines are safer for people living near them and
safer for the environment.
It is my pleasure to welcome Senator Murray to the Committee this
morning. I look forward to hearing her comments on this important
issue. She has been a strong advocate for increased vigilance on the
subject of pipeline safety. Her legislation, S. 2004, lays out many
options for strengthening safety and environmental standards.
Today we will hear from several very distinguished panels about gas
and liquid pipelines. I would like to welcome all of the witnesses to
the Committee this morning. I appreciate the commitment to pipeline
safety that each of you have, and recognize that some of you are
testifying before the Committee today as a result of very personal
experiences. I want to thank all of the witnesses for their
participation, and I look forward to working with all of you as we
craft a constructive authorization bill.
As we begin the process of reauthorizing the pipeline safety
programs housed in the Office of Pipeline Safety, we have the
responsibility for ensuring that transportation is efficient, clean,
and safe. Three bills have been introduced in the Senate this Congress.
While I support S. 2004, introduced by Senator Patty Murray, I am
interested in learning the witnesses's views of all the pending bills.
I look forward to hearing from Administrator Coyner about pending
rulemakings as a result of congressional mandates from the 1992 and
1996 legislation authorized by this Committee. I would like to see the
Office of Pipeline Safety move ahead to implement outstanding mandates.
Clearly some of these directives have languished much too long and I
would be interested to know their current status.
On that subject, I would like to hear about personnel levels at OPS
and whether or not they are sufficient to carry out legislative
requirements. I see that your FY 2001 budget request is a 29 percent
increase over this year's enacted appropriation. In addition, your
grants to states and local entities is increased by 52 percent in your
budget request. I understand that there will be additional needs for
personnel and funding as research and development, inspections, and
information gathering is expanded. I look forward to hearing how these
demands will be met if your funding levels remain constant and what an
increase in funding will permit. I want to work to ensure that the
pipeline safety program gets the level of support needed to be
effective.
I will listen carefully to the testimony today. I look forward to
hearing about the differences between the provisions in the pending
legislative proposals and the program in use today.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lott follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Trent Lott, U.S. Senator from Mississippi
I would like to congratulate the Chairman for holding this hearing
and his commitment to reauthorize the Pipeline Safety Act.
Congress is reviewing the DOT's pipeline safety program in the
emotional aftermath of a tragic pipeline accident in Bellingham, WA.
Today we will hear from the families of the victims. It is very fitting
that they should be here to remind us of the seriousness of our
efforts. We will also hear from the Office of Pipeline Safety & the
pipeline industry about their proposals to prevent future pipeline
tragedies. My home state of Mississippi has a large pipeline presence,
and I commend the Chairman for his attention to this issue.
Oil and natural gas pipelines are of fundamental importance to all
Americans. Pipelines are essential to the basic infrastructure of our
economy. Millions of Americans depend on the fuels and raw materials
transported by pipelines. Americans would not have the productivity or
the quality of life we have without pipelines. Pipeline transportation
of oil and gas is not only convenient and economical, it is usually
very, very safe.
As Congress considers reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act,
we must look at the whole picture. Measures to increase safety must be
well coordinated to prevent unnecessary conflicts with the interstate
movement of materials due to the different regulatory efforts.
Reauthorization efforts must aim to provide for the continued safe
operation of this essential infrastructure system. The basic
responsibility for interstate pipeline transportation lies with the
federal government. While there are certainly local concerns that need
to be addressed in some fashion, only the federal government can bring
consistency to rules that govern the operation of pipelines crossing
state lines.
There is a potential for good bipartisan legislation. It is
Congress's responsibility to ensure that both the safety and integrity
of the entire pipeline system is upheld.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses.
STATEMENT OF HON. PATTY MURRAY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really
appreciate you holding this hearing, and the personal interest
you have taken in this very critical issue. I also want to
thank all of the members of the Committee. I have had the
opportunity to talk with most of them over the past several
months about this issue to raise the awareness of pipeline
safety, and I appreciate the time all of them have taken to
talk to me about this issue.
Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that this Committee is now
focusing on pipeline safety. I have been pushing for this for a
long time, and I am grateful that this day is finally here. At
the same time, I wish we did not have to be here today. I wish
we did not have to worry about pipeline safety, and I truly
wish that June 10, 1999 was just another quiet summer day in
the city of Bellingham instead of a black mark in our memory.
On that day, a gasoline pipeline in Bellingham ruptured,
spilling more than 275,000 gallons of fuel. That pipeline
disaster resulted in the deaths of three young people and left
thousands of people in my State wondering about the safety of
the pipelines near their homes.
Mr. Chairman, my twin sister teaches just a few blocks from
where that accident occurred, and I can assure you that she,
the other teachers, the students, the parents, and all of the
community members are still touched every day by this accident.
It has truly changed their lives.
We cannot undo what happened in Bellingham. It will never
be the same, but we can take steps to reduce the changes that
another community will suffer from a pipeline disaster, and I
know, Mr. Chairman, we can pass a strong pipeline safety bill
this year. Today is an important step in the legislative
process, and we are here today to see this through to the end.
If this Committee does not pass a pipeline safety bill this
year it will have missed a tremendous opportunity to protect
the people we all represent.
There are 2.2 million miles of pipelines running across
this country. They run near our schools, homes, and
communities. They do perform a vital service. They bring us the
energy we need to fuel our cars and heat our homes, but at the
same time they are not as safe as they could be. We have a
responsibility to pass a bill this year that will protect
families from the dangers of unsafe pipelines. That is why,
back in January, I introduced my own pipeline safety bill, the
Pipeline Safety Act of 2000, and I want to thank the Members
who cosigned that bill with me, Senators Inouye, Gorton, Wyden,
Lautenberg, and Bayh.
I went door-to-door, Mr. Chairman. I met with a number of
Senators and House members, and I showed them graphic pictures
of what happened in my State, and I showed them the statistics
of how pipelines were affecting the people in their own States.
I worked with administration officials, including
Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater, who was very responsive
to the tragedy in my State, and who has been a partner in
improving pipeline safety. I have also worked with and heard
from safety officials, citizen groups, and industry
representatives.
In March, as was stated, Senator Gorton and I participated
in a field hearing in Bellingham hosted by this Committee, and
last month I spoke at a national conference on pipeline safety
here in Washington, D.C., hosted by the National Pipeline
Reform Coalition, Safe Bellingham, and the Cascade Columbia
Alliance. That conference proved that people all across this
country are following this issue very closely. They understand
the problem and they are calling for action.
Mr. Chairman, I want to be clear, we cannot wait any
longer, and we certainly cannot let this year pass without
improving our Nation's inadequate pipeline safety laws. While
it may be true that transporting hazardous liquids through
pipelines is safer than transporting them on barges and trucks,
there are several areas where existing laws are not doing
enough to protect the public. The danger posed by aging,
corroded pipelines is not going away. In fact, it is getting
worse.
Since 1986 there have been more than 5,700 pipeline
accidents. There have been 325 deaths and more than 1,500
injuries, and there has been almost $1 billion in environmental
damage. On average, there is one pipeline accident every day,
and 6 million hazardous gallons are spilled into our
environment every year.
In the 4 months, in just the 4 months since I introduced my
own pipeline safety bill, at least 20 States have experienced
pipeline accidents. Let me repeat that. In just the last 4
months, at least 20 States have had pipeline accidents. I do
not want another community to go through what the people of
Bellingham, Washington have gone through. We can make pipelines
safer today.
Along with the bill that I introduced in January, I am
pleased that Senator Hollings has submitted the
administration's proposal, and that Senator McCain has also
offered a measure to improve our Nation's pipelines, and I am
proud, Mr. Chairman, to be a cosponsor of your bill.
While none of these bills are perfect, I hope when your
Committee marks up pipeline legislation this month and will
improve on the bills before you. Certainly, when this bill hits
the floor I will do everything I can to work with the members
of this Committee to make sure that we pass an effective bill.
I am pleased that all of the current proposals touch on
five key areas of pipeline safety. First, these bills recognize
the need to improve pipeline inspection and accident prevention
practices. Second, they recognize the need to develop and
invest in new safety and inspection technology. Third, they
expand the public's right to know about the problems with
pipelines. Fourth, they recognize that States can be better
partners in improving pipeline safety and, finally, these bills
increase funding for new State and Federal pipeline safety
programs.
I am proud to say we are making progress. Having the
administration, the Chairman of this Committee and Senator
Hollings fully engaged on this issue increases the chance we
will do the right thing and pass pipeline legislation this
year. During the Committee process, I hope we can all work
together in a bipartisan manner to improve pipeline safety.
Mr. Chairman, I know it is an election year, and we often
find ourselves being partisan at times like this, but pipeline
safety is not a partisan issue. It is something we can do this
year in a bipartisan way. As you see from the panel before you,
on behalf of all of our constituents, in my State the whole
political spectrum has come together to support pipeline
safety. I hope that this Committee and this Congress will
follow that example, and I look forward to working with the
members of the Committee in that effort.
Pipeline safety reform can become an accomplishment of the
106th Congress. We can do this.
Mr. Chairman, before I close I want to thank you so much
for lending your support and helping us move closer to pipeline
safety. I also want to thank all of the people who are going to
be testifying today, the administration witnesses, the industry
representatives, and those who are here from the environmental
and community advocate communities. I especially want to thank
our Governor, Gary Locke, and I want to ask unanimous consent
to admit his statement to the record. He has been a strong
worker on this as well.
I especially want to mention Mayor Mark Asmundson, who is
here from Bellingham. I can think of no one who has worked
harder than he has on behalf of his community, not just for the
families that were affected, but to make sure that this does
not occur anywhere else, and I especially want to thank the
families of the victims. Mr. Chairman, they have gone through
so much, and they are working so hard to make sure that no
other family has to endure what they have been through.
I know that it was not easy for them to come here today,
but their strength and their courage reminds all of us what we
have to do, and now it is up to the Senate to match their
courage by passing a meaningful pipeline safety bill this year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Murray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Patty Murray,
U.S. Senator from Washington
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing, and
thank you for your leadership on this issue. I'd also like to thank the
members of this Committee. I've met with many of you over the past few
months as I've tried to raise awareness about pipeline safety, and I
appreciate the time you have taken to consider pipeline safety reform.
Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased this Committee is now focusing on
pipeline safety. I've been pushing for this day for a long time, and
I'm grateful it is here.
At the same time, I wish we didn't have to be here today. I wish we
didn't have to worry about pipeline safety. I wish June 10, 1999 was
just another quiet summer day in the city of Bellingham, Washington--
instead of a black mark in our memory.
On that day, a gasoline pipeline in Bellingham ruptured--spilling
more than 275,000 gallons of fuel. That pipeline disaster resulted in
the deaths of three young people, and left thousands of people in my
state wondering about the safety of the pipelines near their homes.
Mr. Chairman, we can't undo what happened in Bellingham. It will
never be the same. But we can take steps to reduce the chances that
another community will suffer from a pipeline disaster. Mr. Chairman,
we can pass a strong pipeline safety bill this year. Today is an
important step in the legislative process, and we have to see this
through to the end.
If this Committee does not pass a pipeline safety bill--this year--
it will have missed an opportunity to protect the people we represent.
There are 2.2 million miles of pipelines running across the
country. They run near our schools, homes and communities. They perform
a vital service--bringing us the energy we need to fuel our cars and
heat our homes.
At the same time, they are not as safe as they could be. We have a
responsibility to pass a bill this year that will protect families from
the dangers of unsafe pipelines.
That's why back in January I introduced my own pipeline safety
bill--the Pipeline Safety Act of 2000. And I want to thank the members
who have signed on as co-sponsors--Senators Inouye, Gorton, Wyden,
Lautenberg, and Bayh.
I went door-to-door and met with a number of other Senators and
House members. I showed them the graphic pictures of what happened in
my state, and I showed them the statistics of how pipelines were
affecting the people in their own states.
And I worked with Administration officials--including
Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater--who was very responsive to the
tragedy in my state and who has been a partner in improving pipeline
safety. I've also worked with and heard from safety officials, citizen
groups, and industry representatives.
In March, Senator Gorton and I also participated in a field hearing
in Bellingham--hosted by this Committee. Last month, I spoke at a
national conference on pipeline safety here in Washington, D.C. It was
hosted by the National Pipeline Reform Coalition, SAFE Bellingham, and
the Cascade Columbia Alliance. That conference proved that people all
across the country are following this issue closely. They understand
the problem, and they are calling for action.
Mr. Chairman, I want to be clear. We cannot wait any longer, and we
certainly cannot let this year pass without improving our nation's
inadequate pipeline safety laws.
While it may be true that transporting hazardous liquids through
pipelines is safer than transporting them on barges and trucks, there
are several areas where existing laws aren't doing enough to protect
the public.
The danger posed by aging, corroded pipelines is not going away. In
fact, it's getting worse. Since 1986, there have been more than 5,700
pipeline accidents, 325 deaths, 1500 injuries, and almost $1 billion in
environmental damage. On average there is 1 pipeline accident every
day, and 6 million hazardous gallons are spilled into our environment
every year.
In the four months since I introduced my pipeline safety bill, at
least 20 states have experienced pipeline accidents. I don't want
another community to go through what the people of Bellingham,
Washington have gone through. We can make pipelines safer today.
Along with the bill I introduced in January, I am pleased that
Senator Hollings has submitted the administration's proposal. Senator
McCain has also offered a measure to improve our nation's pipelines,
and I'm proud to be a co-sponsor of his bill.
While none of these bills are perfect, I hope when your Committee
marks up pipeline legislation later this month you will improve on the
bills before you. Certainly when this bill hits the floor, I will do
everything I can to work with the members of this Committee to ensure
we pass an effective bill.
I'm pleased that all of the current proposals touch on five key
areas of pipeline safety:
First, these bills recognize the need to improve pipeline
inspection and accident prevention practices;
Second, they recognize the need to develop and invest in new safety
and inspection technology;
Third, they expand the Public's Right To Know about problems with
pipelines;
Fourth, they recognize that states can be better partners in
improving pipeline safety; and
Finally, these bills increase funding for new state and federal
pipeline safety programs.
I'm proud to say that we are making progress. Having the
administration, Senator McCain, and Senator Hollings fully-engaged in
this issue increases the chance that we will do the right thing and
pass pipeline legislation this year.
During the Committee process, I hope we can all work together in a
bipartisan manner to improve pipeline safety. I know it's an election
year, and we often find ourselves being partisan in times like this.
Pipeline safety isn't a partisan issue. It's something we can do
this year in a bipartisan way on behalf of all of our constituents.
In my state, the whole political spectrum has come together to
support pipeline safety. I hope this Committee and this Congress will
follow that example, and I look forward to working with the members of
this Committee in that effort.
Pipeline safety reform can become an accomplishment of the 106th
Congress. Put simply, Mr. Chairman, we can do this. Mr. Chairman,
before I close I would like to thank you for lending your support and
helping us move closer to making pipelines safer.
I would also like to thank those who will be testifying today--
administration witnesses, industry representatives, and those here from
the environmental and consumer advocate communities.
But I'd especially like to thank the families of the victims. They
have gone through so much, and they are working to make sure no other
family has to endure what they have been through.
I know it wasn't easy for them to come to here today, but their
strength and their courage remind us of what we must do. Mr. Chairman,
now it is up to this Senate to match their courage by passing a
meaningful pipeline safety bill this year.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mayor Asmundson of Bellingham, where are you? Thank you for
being here, sir, and thank you for your outstanding work, and
thank you for taking the time to join us at this hearing, and
if you would like to join the families when they come up for a
brief statement we would be glad to hear from you.
Senator Murray, we thank you, and thanks to you and Senator
Gorton and others we will lend every effort to try to mark up a
bill and get it through at least the Senate, and I hope through
the Congress, before the end of this year. Due to you and
Senator Gorton and the families and others, this issue has been
made one of highest urgency, thank you.
Congressman Metcalf, thank you for being with us.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACK METCALF, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Mr. Metcalf. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We are going by age on this.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Metcalf. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to
you for your recent efforts to improve pipeline safety. The
legislation you have introduced, combined with today's hearing,
has already dramatically raised the awareness level of this
issue in Congress.
I would also, of course, like to thank Senator Gorton,
Senator Murray, and Congressman Inslee for their work, and
particularly to thank Congresswoman Dunn, who is not here
today, for her input. It has been almost a year since the
tragic pipeline accident that claimed the three lives of the
people in our State. Since that time, more and more concerned
citizens throughout Washington and around the Nation have
clamored for additional protections from the network of
pipelines which criss-cross the United States.
Early this year, I introduced H.R. 3558, the Safe Pipelines
Act of 2000, to address many of the concerns raised by the
Bellingham explosion and by previous accidents. Under my
legislation, number 1, pipelines will be required to be
inspected both internally and with hydrostatic tests. Pipelines
with a history of leaks will be specifically targeted for more
strenuous testing.
Number 2, all pipeline operators will be tested for
qualifications and certified by the Department of
Transportation. The results of pipeline tests--this is number
3--and inspections will be made available to the public and a
Nation-wide map of all pipeline locations will be placed on the
Internet, where ordinary citizens can access it.
Number 4, all pipeline ruptures and spills of more than 40
gallons will be reported to the Federal Office of Pipeline
Safety, and number 5, States will be able to set up their own
pipeline safety programs for interstate pipelines, provided
that the States have the resources and expertise necessary to
carry out the programs, and the State standards are at least as
stringent as the Federal standards. In addition, the bill
requires studies on a variety of technologies that may improve
safety, such as external leak detection systems and double-
walled pipelines.
My bill has been cosponsored by the entire Washington
Statehouse delegation, and I thank them for that, as well as
Congressman Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, and John Lewis of Georgia.
I am working with the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure to pass my legislation this year. Pipeline
safety legislation has also been proposed by Senator Murray and
Senator Gorton, as you know, by the administration, and most
recently by the distinguished Chairman of this Committee.
There are excellent provisions on all three bills, and I
hope we can work together to pass quality legislation. The
tragedy in Bellingham was not the first deadly pipeline
accident, and it will not be the last unless we can come
together in a bipartisan way to bring meaningful improvements
to our pipeline safety regulations.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Congressman Inslee, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAY INSLEE, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Mr. Inslee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, it goes without saying that our pipeline
safety standards in this country have the consistency of Swiss
cheese, and I personally appreciate your efforts, because my
people are very concerned about that. This pipeline that
exploded runs right through my neighborhood, and I think some
of your efforts on campaign finance reform are going to be
important in our efforts ultimately to reform the safety
standards. These issues are related in the public's mind, and
accurately so, and I just want to tell you I appreciate your
efforts, because I think it will help not only on this safety
issue but on many others in the American economy.
I have two comments about our responsibilities, and two
comments about what I would hope is in our eventual legislation
we pass. First, comments on our responsibilities.
I think we are at a very, very unique moment legislatively.
This opportunity to pass comprehensive, meaningful legislation
may not come again until there is another tragedy of this
dimension, and that increases the burden on us to be
comprehensive in our approach. We cannot simply do something
this year thinking we are going to do the next step next year.
We have really got to touch all the bases this year. It has got
to be meaningful and comprehensive.
The second thing I would like to say, and I think it is
very important we draft this legislation, we cannot punt to an
agency. We cannot defer to an agency. We cannot seek further
clarification from the agency. We have done that for the last
20 years in this country, and we have sadly deficient standards
as a result.
The agencies have had the ability to do the things all of
us have suggested in this legislation for years, probably 50 to
75 percent of it, but it simply has not happened, and I think,
while it may be easy for us sometimes to leave some of the
definitional aspects to an agency, we cannot allow that to
happen here. We have to do the heavy lifting in Congress to
make specific requirements in regard to this industry.
Two points about the legislation, and I have spent a lot of
time trying to educate myself about this since this tragedy,
and the parents have done a good job educating me, the mayor
has done a good job educating me, and there is a couple of
points that I would like to share with you that I have learned.
The first has to do with the necessity of a very clearly
defined testing regimen for pipelines, and what I have found,
that if we in Congress do not have a very specific internal and
hydrostatic testing requirement, we are going to miss about 50
percent of the potential failures of pipelines, and let me tell
you what I mean by this.
What you are going to hear a lot about if you have not
already is these efforts to find corrosion failures, and there
is, broadly speaking, about three different traumas or failures
of pipelines. There is corrosion, there is trauma, and there is
seam failure, and we, in all of these approaches, talk about
internal inspections using what are called smart pigs, which
are very good tools at finding two out of those three types of
failures.
They are good at finding corrosion, and they are good at
finding trauma, but they are wholly inadequate at finding seam
failure. Seam failure--these are welded seam pipes,
longitudinally along the length of the pipeline, and what Mr.
Metcalf and I have proposed in our House legislation is to
require the only type of test which is currently available to
find that type of seam failure, and that is a hydrostatic test.
Mr. Chairman, I want to tell you what happened in
Bellingham when they did this, and I want to take my hat off to
the local folks in Bellingham, because after this failure they
used their local leverage to force the pipeline company to do
something they did not want to do and, in fact, the Federal
agency at the time did not want them to do, and that is to
require a hydrostatic test of the line before reopening, and
you know what happened when they did it, when they filled it
with water and they pressurized it? It blew up. It blew up a
second time, and that was a failure that only this hydrostatic
test was capable of finding.
That failure could have occurred 5 years from now, and
imagine how we would feel 5 years from now if we had another
explosion in Bellingham and we had not done this well-
recognized, technologically simple test, and that is why we
feel very strongly that we ought to have a hydrostatic test
component of our testing regimen, unless we can find some other
technology that can find those seam failures.
And you will learn, when you talk to your staff, there is a
type of pipe called a pre-1970 ERW pipe, electrically resisted
welded that has a history of these failures, and it is in the
ground all over this country. I encourage you to ask your
experts about that.
The second issue, I would suggest the Committee give very
strong thought to having a Federal certification standard, a
true Federal certification standard for at least some of the
operators for these pipeline systems. Let me tell you why I
think that is so important. In other industries, where we have
improved safety, we have a Federal certification standard for
the humans, not just the steel but the humans, and the humans
could be as much a problem in this accident in Bellingham
potentially as the pipe in a sense.
We do it in the trucking industry, where we do not allow
trucking companies to decide who drives the trucks. We have a
governmentally operated certification standard. In the airline
industry we do not just let the airlines decide who flies the
airplanes. We have a federally authorized certification system,
if you will.
We need a federally certified system of who makes the
operational decisions on these pipelines, and what I have
learned about these things is, one of the problem is the surges
that can occur. You know, these pipelines can go for years and
have no problems, but if an operator makes a mistake and closes
a valve at the wrong time you get these pressure surges. These
surges go back up the line, they find the weakest point in the
line, and then they blow up, and I would urge you to look very
carefully at our ability to improve not just the steel but the
humans involved in the system, and I hope that you include a
Federal certification standard eventually in the bill you pass.
I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for your efforts,
and members of the Committee, and I want to applaud the efforts
of the parents and the local officials here.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you, and I thank all three of
you for being here. I know you have other commitments. If you
would like to stay please do so. We appreciate your time before
the Committee, and I want to assure you again of our commitment
to trying to see legislation enacted before the end of the
relatively brief time remaining. Thank you very much. I thank
the panel. If it is agreeable to the members of the Committee,
since the family members came from a long distance away, I
would like to have them come next, if that is agreeable to the
members of the Committee on both sides.
We would like to call Mr. and Mrs. Frank and Mary King, Ms.
Marlene Robinson, and Mr. Bruce Brabec, and Ms. Katherine
Dalen, all of Bellingham, Washington, and Mayor Asmundson, you
are welcome to join the panel, and Senator Murray, you are
welcome to join us here on the dias if you would like.
Mayor, why don't we begin with you, and then we will move
on to the family members, and we thank you again for everything
you have done on behalf of the families, and your incredible
effort in trying to be of assistance in this very difficult and
tragic situation.
Welcome, mayor.
STATEMENT OF MARK ASMUNDSON, MAYOR, CITY OF BELLINGHAM,
WASHINGTON
Mr. Asmundson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
surprise and a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak with
this Committee today. I, along with Senator Murray and the
Congressmen you have heard from, am very grateful the Committee
has taken this step of a full Committee hearing on this issue.
I will try to be very brief.
Like probably everyone else in my community I was
completely unaware of the nature of the dangers that were posed
by a fuel pipeline passing through our city. Since this tragic
accident and the incredible experience that I had of attending
in one week funerals for three boys of families who I have
known for years, I was determined to find out what in the world
was going on, and how did this occur, and I can assure you that
what I found out was very startling.
What I learned, in fact, was that the more I knew about
pipelines, liquid fuel pipelines, the more I was concerned. I
was not less concerned. I was not more comforted. I was more
concerned because the reality is that historically the pipeline
regulation in this country has been wholly inadequate to meet
the needs of communities.
The Office of Pipeline Safety has failed to comply with
congressional mandates to meet requirements that have been
specifically and explicitly set forth in legislation, but I
believe that as a result of the very, very excellent work that
has been done by our Senators in our State, by the members of
our congressional delegation, by the family members, by the
very motivated community, that the Office of Pipeline Safety
has paid very close attention to what happened in Bellingham
and in fact has done a good job at this date.
But doing a good job after an accident just really does not
cut it, and this is the year, this is the time when the members
of this Committee and the Congress of the United States can
make a fundamental difference.
There was an article in Time Magazine about 2 months ago
which I found very disturbing. I am sure some of you are aware
of it. It was the cover article, and it was talking about how
effectively the only way to get anything to happen in Congress
was through the passage of lots of money around through
lobbying efforts, and you know, I read that, and I thought, I
know it is not true.
In fact, my immediate reaction was, I am going to write a
letter to the editor of Time Magazine, because I have been
involved with our Senators and with our congressional
delegation, and the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee staff on
this issue, and the city of Bellingham has no big money to pass
around, and the National Pipeline Reform Coalition has no big
money to pass around.
We do not have any money to pass around. These families
have no money to pass around, and yet this bill that was
introduced by Senator Murray and the response by the members of
the Senate and the members of the House to this issue, with no
money, with no influence, with people of no stature, has been
incredible, and it has been the right reaction.
This Committee acting to definitively and constructively
and seriously address the inadequacies of pipeline safety in
this Congress will be the best demonstration of the Year 2000
that the interest of the public, that the safety of the public,
that the protection of the environment is the priority of our
elected representatives. We have no power. We have no money.
But we have the right idea, and we care about the right things.
Your response proves that your thoughts are in the same
direction, and your purposes are the same.
This is the year. This is the chance. We need substantive
improvement. The administration recognizes it. Senator McCain,
you recognize it. Thank you for your bill. Senator Murray
recognized it. Senator Gorton. They have been wonderful in
support of and in understanding the inadequacies of the system
we have in place today. The integrity rule proposed by the
administration is a good step in the right direction. As
Senator Murray said, these bills are good. They might need a
little adjustment here and there, but that is why we come
together in the Committee to work these things out.
But this is the year to make positive steps, to make a
difference. There is nothing in it for Bellingham. We suffered
our loss, and we continue to mourn our dead, and the scars of
this fire through a mile and a half of our city will be there
for decades. All we want is that no other community and no
other families go through this experience again, and I hope
that no other mayor and no other Member of Congress and no
other Senator ever has to attend three funerals for children in
one week, as I had to.
I love these people. They had wonderful children. We do not
have any extra people in Bellingham. We could not afford to
lose them. You can make sure that no one else experiences this
loss through substantive and real change. Now is the time.
Thank you so much for the opportunity to speak with you
today.
The Chairman. Thank you, mayor, for your very eloquent
statement, and I have visited your beautiful city in the past,
and look forward to visiting it again in the future.
Mr. Asmundson. You will be more than welcome.
The Chairman. Thank you. We would like to welcome Mr. and
Mrs. Frank and Mary King, our first family members of the
panel. Thank you for being here today, and whichever one would
like to go first, please do so.
STATEMENT OF FRANK AND MARY KING, BELLINGHAM, WA
Mrs. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A Mother Remembers. The
silence is deafening. No one says a word. The phrase, ``Mom,
I'm home,'' will never be heard. No baseball and bat await by
the door. Gone are footballs, basketballs, and more. The school
bus drives by. My child is not there. I remember his smile and
his head of blond hair. His friends stop to see me; they've all
grown so tall. Just 1 year ago, they all seemed so small.
My son forever is 10 years old. My arms seem so empty
without him to hold. ``Just rebuild your life'' is repeatedly
said. But how would they know? Their child is not dead. It's a
parent's worst nightmare multiplied by ten. To know you will
never see your baby again. There must be a reason to endure all
this pain, to keep going forward with nothing to gain. But to
make this world better in memory of three is a hope we hold
onto, and know it can be.
Mr. King. My wife wrote that poem. It is not something that
she got out of a book. It is something that came from her
heart. I want to show you some pictures of this little man.
There is a picture of Wade King when he was about 8 at his
sister's wedding. He has an older brother and an older sister.
One is 26 and one is 28. Of all the pictures I have ever seen
of that little boy, it is the most beautiful picture I have
ever seen of him.
I am sure that those of you here who are at this meeting
who have children, or who have grandchildren, can imagine what
it must have been like, standing out in the front yard for 45
minutes to half-an-hour with Steven Travas and my son burned
over 90 percent of their body. They had no skin from their
ankles up.
I have got three sets of these pictures that I will give to
you, Mr. Chairman. This is a picture of my son, or of San
Francisco's baseball stadium, that was taken on 4 June. His
birthday was on 5 June, 5 days before this accident happened,
and it is a picture of the scoreboard and it says, Happy 10th
Birthday, Wade King. You're awesome.
And here is a picture of Wade as it came up on the
scoreboard, and he saw it. He could not believe it. And here is
a picture of Wade as he sits by the computer in his house.
I will give these pictures to you.
I stood out in the front yard with these two little boys
for about 45 minutes, trying to keep them calm after getting
them out of the woods. You need to understand that the skin was
literally dripping off their fingers.
The Chairman. Mr. King, I am not sure that is necessary.
Mr. King. These boys were medicated, flown to Harbor View
Medical Center where my wife and I, his brother, his sister,
numerous nieces, nephews, relatives were able to watch him die.
I cannot imagine a worse death for children. They virtually
swelled up from the inside out, until their hearts stopped. It
is the bravest act I have ever witnessed.
I can only tell you a few things about what I miss about my
son. I miss seeing him on the couch the first thing in the
morning with his chubby little fingers on the remote control
going from cartoon to cartoon, and probably from MTV. I miss
sitting on the couch with my arm around him watching baseball,
football, and basketball games. I miss him standing at the top
of the stairs after he has read books with his mother saying,
dad, it is time to put me to bed. It is time to say my prayers.
I miss saying his prayers with him at night every night.
The little boy virtually squeezed me when he said his prayers.
I miss him saying, and God bless everyone else that I know. I
miss him saying, ending his prayers with, please help me be a
good, kind, loving, giving, sharing boy, a 10-year-old that
always wanted to be more than what he was.
I miss my little man's unconditional love. He was my little
buddy.
My wife lost her job. My daughter used to call him Shorty.
My oldest son, every time he saw him, it uplifted his
personality. The reminders of him are around us forever. You
know, we drive by a baseball field and there is little kids out
playing baseball. We go to the grocery store, there is another
mother or father with their 10-year-old son. We cannot get away
from it, that our son will be no more.
I have been asking this question ever since Jim Hall from
the NTSB and Kelly Coyner from the RSPA, or Office of Pipeline
Safety, came out to Bellingham to view the accident scene. Why
has Olympic Pipeline been allowed to continue to operate when
they have five operators pleading the Fifth Amendment, and the
NTSB cannot find out why this accident happened?
I find it unconscionable that we can put Susan MacDougall
in jail for not wanting to say anything about anybody. I find
it unconscionable that we can bomb Iraq to tell them to get out
of Kuwait, but we cannot shut a pipeline company down until we
find out why the accident happened.
I have written to Vice President Gore. I have written to
the President. Patty Murray and Slade Gorton have gotten all my
letters. Jay Inslee, Jack Metcalf have gotten all my letters. I
finally got a letter from the President yesterday basically
telling me that we are really sorry. This company needs to be
shut down.
You here in the Senate and those of you who are in the
House of Representatives are under an illusion that there is a
regulatory agency called the Office of Pipeline Safety. It is
an illusion. They feel they have no authority----
The Chairman. Mr. King, we are going to have to interrupt
your testimony while the three of us go and vote. We had
Senator Hutchison go over and back, and I want to hear the end
of your testimony so we will have to take a brief break while
we go to vote.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will resume. I would like to
thank the witnesses for their patience. I apologize for this
interruption. We had a vote on the floor which required our
attendance, and now we will resume with you, Mr. King.
Mr. King. Let me start over. The Senate and the House is
under an illusion that the OPS is a regulatory agency. They
have by their guidelines far-reaching authority over the
pipeline industry and they do not seem to react at all. I want
to read you a regulation out of their own regulation book. It
is 195.6. It is on page 149.
It says, operator assistance in investigation. It says, if
the Department of Transportation investigates an accident, the
operator involved shall make available to the representative of
the Department all records and information that in any way
pertain to the accident and shall afford----
The Chairman. Mr. King, I would like to interrupt you again
and tell you we have two more panels of witnesses here. It is
already 10:30 this morning. I am going to have to ask you to
make your testimony as concise as possible. We have two other
family members and two other panels, and we need to get the
hearing completed. I would appreciate your being concise in
your comments so we have time to hear from the other witnesses.
Mr. King. Let me just explain to you, Mr. McCain, what I
would like to see in your bill. I believe that all pipeline
operators should be fined for a spill. What I proposed was
fining them $1,000 per barrel for the first 5 years every time
they have a spill, $5,000 in the next 5 years per barrel,
$10,000 for every year after that. The fine is nonnegotiable.
It should be paid within 30 days of a spill.
If a spill is caused by a third party, the pipeline
operator will be responsible for paying the fine. The pipeline
operator can then go after the third party. There are no
exceptions. If the spills are underreported by more than 15
percent, the fine will be triple based upon the correct amount
of the spill, 3,000, 15,000, or 30,000.
The second thing is, I would like to see the Office of
Pipeline Safety have the ability--in fact, it should be a law
that in case of a death or in case of a spill that exceeds
2,000 barrels the entire system be shut down until such time as
at least all the causes of the accident are known. The OPS
would probably still want to be able to keep them shut down if
they were a hazard.
And third, I would like to see protection for pipeline
employees, so that they could become whistleblowers. Apparently
pipeline companies can retaliate against employees who want to
come forth with information.
The Chairman. Does that complete your testimony?
Mr. King. Yes.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. and Mrs. King. Thank
you for being here.
Ms. Robinson.
STATEMENT OF MARLENE ROBINSON AND BRUCE BRABEC, BELLINGHAM, WA
Ms. Robinson. On June 5 of last year my 18-year-old son
Liam graduated from Seeholm High School. His graduation present
from us was his first heart shell whitewater kayak. Friends in
Oregon were bringing it up for him later in the month, and he
was so excited.
He pored over river kayaking books for the next 5 days
waiting for the kayak's arrival. He had just started working at
a local outdoor sports store to help pay his way through
Western Washington University, where in September he would
begin his first year of college. He had just finished a series
of swing dance lessons with his friend Jane, and the two of
them had signed up for tango lessons for the summer.
Liam never got to see his kayak. He never got to go with
Jane to any more dance lessons, or attend college. Five days
after graduation, on the morning of Thursday, June 10, Liam
called me at work to check in. He had gone into work but had
been given the day off when it was discovered the shop had too
many employees scheduled for the shift.
It was a beautiful sunny day. I did not ask Liam what he
was going to do. I wanted him to have the sense of freedom a
day like that gives. He was 18 years old, 6 foot 2, strong and
capable, and he deserved that sense of freedom.
As it turned out, Liam decided to do the thing that made
him happiest. He went fly fishing. He went to his favorite
place, Whatcom Falls Park, a pristine piece of nature not 5
minutes from downtown. He never had a chance to protect
himself. He was fishing in a steep gorge when the 270,000
gallons of gasoline spilled down the creek.
The oxygen in the gorge was replaced by a 35-foot wall of
hydrocarbon fumes. Liam was overcome within seconds. He fell
into the foot-deep creek and he drowned. A short time later,
the gasoline and fumes exploded, sending the fire ball down the
creek that killed Wade and Steven and every other living thing
for a mile-and-a-half along that creek.
Whatcom Falls Park will never be the same. The creeks that
were burned are destroyed forever, the deep humus and
vegetation burned down to rock that cracked open in the heat,
the leafy canopy formed by huge trees gone. We humans now go
about the enormous task of building new creeks, trying to mimic
the complexity, efficiency, and mystery of nature.
Our community will never be the same. Children are still
afraid to go to sleep at night. Parents are afraid that no
matter what they do, their children are not safe. Emergency
workers are left with horrible memories of a day and night
filled with fear, uncertainty, and death.
We sitting at this table will never be the same. We lost
two beautiful, much-loved 10-year-old boys and an 18-year-old
young man who had much to give and a whole lifetime yet to
live. We are joined in our grief by our families, our friends,
and our community. Just carrying on from 1 day to the next has
become a task requiring enormous self-discipline.
My question to you is, what have you lost in your home
States, and what are you willing to lose still, because though
we have the ability, we lack the means and the will to keep the
Nation's communities safe from pipeline accidents. We in
Bellingham are now painfully aware of the danger that pipelines
pose to every community in this Nation.
We have learned that what happened in Bellingham was not an
isolated incident. The Federal Government has allowed the
pipeline industry to be largely self-regulated. This has led to
a pattern the last 20 years of fuel transportation accidents
throughout the country.
The pipeline industry will never have as its bottom line
the health and safety of communities. It is up to communities
themselves, and therefore the public representatives and
Government agencies to ensure that pipelines are safe. The
technology exists for pipelines to be safe. What we did not
know before the pipeline ruptured in Bellingham but have
learned at the price of our son's life is that what is lacking
is adequate safety standards, regulation, and enforcement.
The Federal Office of Pipeline Safety has woefully and over
a long period of time failed in its mandate. We know that had
OPS addressed these issues adequately in the past, our town
would not still be reeling from loss. We are working to make
sure that no other community has to suffer a similar loss.
I no longer have any children to protect. Nothing I do or
say about this issue can bring Liam back. I do, however,
consider it my privilege and obligation to do what I can to
protect the children of our community and other communities. I
need to impress upon you that it is not enough to make minor
changes in pipeline safety regulation and to once again hand
over the reins to OPS.
Before June 10, none of us in Bellingham had any idea that
we needed to be experts in fuel transportation safety. We
frankly did not even know that we had a gasoline pipeline
running through the very heart of Bellingham under streets,
past houses, schools, and parks. We thought we had a Federal
agency called the Office of Pipeline Safety, and we had faith
that that agency was doing its job. We no longer have that
faith.
I urge this Committee to do what is necessary to protect
the citizens of this Nation from further avoidable and
predictable tragedies caused by inadequate regulation oversight
and enforcement. At this point I would also like to say that we
have some specific information about the failures of OPS that
we would like to submit for the record, if we may.
The Chairman. Without objection. *
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* The information referred to was not available at the time this
hearing went to press.
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Ms. Robinson. I am convinced we need two things. We need a
Federal Office of Pipeline Safety that is staffed by committed
expert servants who have the safety of communities as their
bottom line, and we need strong, independent, well-funded
regional advisory councils to ensure that over time we do not
return to business as usual.
Our children's deaths were not trivial. They were not an
acceptable risk. We easily have the capacity to protect our
communities from the kind of accident that killed our children
and has killed all too frequently and needlessly in other
States. What I need from you, what every community in this
country needs from you is action that will finally guarantee us
an Office of Pipeline Safety that truly protects the safety of
the citizens across the Nation, and that will include citizens
and local and State governments as effective partners in the
national oversight of pipeline safety.
Our children are gone, and gone needlessly. We will not
rest until Congress passes a bill that ensures pipelines are
safe for all children and all communities across the Nation.
I thank you for all that you are doing and all that you
will do to help us reach our goal.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Brabec.
Mr. Brabec. I am Bruce Brabec. I am Liam's stepfather, and
I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak today. We
believe that the loss of our children has made it necessary for
our voices to be heard often in these discussions about
improving pipeline safety, and I know we had an opportunity in
Bellingham, and we appreciate this second opportunity to speak
to the Committee.
I think it is pretty clear that our families are here to
tell you that stronger pipeline safety regulations are very
necessary. The stakes are quite high. When things go wrong,
they go very wrong, and what happened in our community and to
our families is an example, a testament to how deadly and
serious the consequences can be, and from what we have learned
we know that the risks to our Nation have grown. This is not a
problem that is just in Bellingham. It is not a problem that is
just for the State of Washington, but it is at a national level
that these risks have grown.
We have learned that many pipelines were installed many,
many years ago. Since then, communities have grown much larger,
such that we have many aging pipelines in heavily populated
areas. We do not have a situation with an accident waiting to
happen any more. We have those accidents, and we have those
tragedies.
The current standards are inadequate, and the regulatory
agency at the Office of Pipeline Safety has been ineffective.
One example of this that we know is that just the poor record
that OPS has in responding to the safety recommendations from
the National Transportation Safety Board, and as our awareness
of the issues has gone up our confidence in the regulations and
our confidence in the job of OPS has gone down, and so it is
real evident and clear that stronger regulation is needed.
Many important changes are being considered by you. We are
aware of the different proposals from the different bills, and
also a lot of information that you have heard, or that you will
hear today, as well as you have heard in individual meetings,
and we believe that many changes, many of these changes you are
hearing about are necessary.
We especially have come to believe in the regional advisory
councils, that they are needed. This is similar to those that
were set up after the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill in Alaska, and
this would partner industry, Government, and community in
overseeing safety planning and compliance.
Another thing that I know that we are very interested in
seeing is the whistleblower protection, and in timely response
and action by the Office of Pipeline Safety to NTSB
recommendations, and we also believe that stronger fines and
penalties are necessary. We do need to motivate the financial
bottom line to become one of a safety bottom line.
These are only a few of the many changes that are proposed
in the bills and that we know you have heard about, and again I
want to say these and many others are necessary to improve the
safety and to help bring attention and solution to the problems
before you that you have become aware of and that we have
become aware of, so that more families do not have to join ours
to come here to tell you about our losses and to push for safer
standards.
I wish that Liam could be here to speak with you. He cannot
be, but he did leave us many messages. One that I would like to
share with you, Liam was a fly fisherman, as you have heard,
and this is one of his fly reels, and in a sense he left this
with us unknowingly, but he left it as a message for those of
us who know him. Particularly Marlene and I know that this
represents the beautiful life of our son. He was a very avid
fisherman from a very young age, and so it is something that
really represents his joyfulness, his love of nature and the
outdoors, and this kind of sound from a reel is a very familiar
sound, and so we have this to kind of--to use as sort of--to
help us with memories, but this sound is also a bittersweet
one, because this is the reel that he was using when he was
fishing on Whatcom Creek on June 10.
This reel represents lots of things for us. When he
collapsed into the water, he held onto his rod and reel, and
they were held underwater and they did not get destroyed in the
explosion, but the creek, did, as you have heard become really
a creek of gasoline, and this reel was saturated with gasoline,
and since a friend of ours has cleaned it and it has been
sitting in the open air since then, too, but you can still
smell the faint smell of gasoline on it.
So for us, this is, like I said, a beautiful reminder of
our son, but it is a chilling reminder of the way he died, and
I think it sort of speaks to the importance of the issue for
life, for nature, and that is the message from Liam.
Sunday is Mother's Day. Liam and I have not been able to
plan, which we enjoyed each year to do, how we are going to
honor Marlene on that day. We have not been able to spend time
thinking of what kind of gift we might give Marlene, and how we
might surprise her with something really special that would
convey the love and appreciation for her as a mother.
She will not get another card written by Liam, which every
one of them has been saved. She will not get another one that
she can save long into the future. Mother's Day is really just
going to be one more day for us. It is going to be another one
of missing Liam and another one of missing the future that we
should have had together.
We cannot have Liam back, we know that, and we cannot have
that future with Liam. What we want now to be able to do,
though, is to make a difference so that other families do not
have to feel this kind of loss that all three of our families
are feeling.
I want to thank you again for the opportunity and the
attention to our testimony. We need you to make serious changes
to improve pipeline transportation safety for Liam, for Steven,
for Wade, and for a safer future for our families and all of
our communities.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Dalen.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE DALEN, BELLINGHAM, WA
Ms. Dalen. Excuse me. I forgot that Sunday was Mother's
Day.
The Chairman. Can you move the mike a little closer so we
can hear you?
Ms. Dalen. Usually people do not have too much trouble
hearing me. OK. I wish to thank the Honorable Members of the
U.S. Senate Committee, to thank you and Senator Murray, Senator
McCain, for asking me to speak again.
As you may be aware, and this complicates the Mother's Day
thing, too, I guess, 11 months ago today my son, Steven Travas
died as a result of the burns suffered in the gas explosion at
Whatcom Creek, where he was playing, an explosion and fire that
claimed the lives of two other children. Because it was so
close to my home it might well have claimed other members of my
family, in fact, because the spill was over \1/4\ million
gallons. It might have destroyed many more lives. It might well
have destroyed the town of Bellingham. Unfortunately, though it
sounds a bit extreme, it is not. The whole town of Bellingham,
all of its residents were in jeopardy of losing their lives.
Steven's death has changed my life and the lives of each of
the members of my family. Missing him at every moment, thinking
of him at every turn, and dreaming nightly of his tender
involvement in our lives is a constant reminder of that
horrible night of June 10 when we stood as a family at his
bedside, gazed at his burned face, and watched him slowly die.
The loss of his lust for life and our loss, the loss of his
natural ability to make friends, his sweet song, his curious
mind and quick humor sends waves of grief and longing through
our very souls. It is upon occasion quite overwhelming. How
precious life is. The value of those who live and love is well
beyond any attempt to calculate. It is a blessing that some of
us can learn how precious life is from the experiences of
others while our own families can remain safely in our love, in
our protection.
It was shocking to us that our little one was killed while
he played, but it is not upon reflection surprising that the
accident happened. What adds to our frustration is the fact
that his death was not only preventable, but predictable. It
was an accident waiting to happen. It was an accident waiting
to happen. It might have happened to anyone.
So many of us are unaware of the dangers behind our homes
and in our parks and schoolyards. Many, many of the people of
this Nation seem to be unaware that the potential for such
devastation runs through their backyards. There is not a State
in this Union that does not have pipes actively engaged in
transporting volatile fuels running for miles within its
borders.
I have heard recently that some folks in Spokane,
Washington, are unaware of the pipes carrying volatile fuels
that run through their beautiful town, by their children's
schools, and through their yards. According to Senator Murray's
statistics, since 1984 the industry that killed my son Liam and
Wade has had 6,107 accidents, killing some 408 people. In Texas
there have been 1,654 accidents, injuring 2,190 people, killing
46, and causing nearly $138 million in property damage.
In Washington State, the state I have lived in almost all
of my life, there has been approximately $11 million of
property damage and five deaths, and it might not be over.
These are not acceptable statistics. Deaths are not
acceptable liabilities. My child's death, the deaths of Liam
Woods and Wade King are not acceptable. More must be done.
Action must be taken now. We need no more lessons. The pipeline
industry has not proven capable of regulating or watch-dogging
itself. We must take responsibility. It is time to take charge
of the safety and sanctity of our families, our homes, our
communities, our lives.
The corporate wolves must not be left in charge of the hen
house. They do not have the right to profit at the cost of the
lives of our children, at the cost of our environment, and in
addition to the work you are already doing to change pipeline
regulation, I ask that you implement a mandatory fine system
and activate a citizens' advisory board both on a Federal level
and on a regional level.
I ask that you protect whistleblowers and demand that OPS
reassess their priorities, reestablish citizen and
congressional trust, and get the wolves out of the
decisionmaking process. Let the death of my child and of Liam
and of Wade leave a legacy to the children and parents of this
Nation.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. I just want to thank all the panel members
who have given very eloquent testimony, and for their efforts
in this regard. I think you all are to be commended, and we
thank you for what you are doing. I know it is very difficult,
but it can and will make a difference. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Gorton.
Senator Gorton. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
Mark a question. Mark, you have had almost a year of dealing
very first-hand, close and personal with this issue. What
authority do you think ought to be granted to communities like
yours, municipal corporations, and what authority do you think
ought to be delegated to states in connection with pipeline
safety? Would you feel more comfortable with a greater degree
of authority with the State of Washington, for example, than
you do with the present system?
Mr. Asmundson. The answer to that is, Senator, I would feel
more comfortable with a greater degree of authority for the
State of Washington or other states that are qualified and
interested in participating in maintaining the safety of our
pipelines.
If I could expand real briefly, I would say that while it
is very important that we not have a balkanized patchwork
system of regulation involving pipelines, it is important there
be Federal consistency. These pipelines sometimes cross many,
many states. There still can be a very meaningful partnership
established between the Federal regulatory agency that gives a
significant and consequential role to the states in the
development of the pipeline integrity plans that are currently
being proposed in the administration bill. I think that is a
change that needs to be made, to give the states significant
participation in the ultimate approval of the integrity program
for individual pipelines.
That was not a brief answer, I am sorry, but I guess I am
saying yes, there is an important role for the states, but it
can be accomplished without undermining the important
interstate commerce needs of this transportation medium.
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, like
everyone in this room, have been very touched by the testimony
and your willingness to travel here to try to make sure that no
parent will ever have to suffer what you have. That is a
uniquely American trait, that those who suffer tragedy want to
try to help others never have to feel that pain, and I do
appreciate that.
I think Chairman McCain's bill is a very good bill, a very
good beginning to address this issue, and as the Chairman of
the Subcommittee that deals with pipeline safety I do want to
pass a bill this year that will improve federal oversight and
the community's right to know where these pipelines are and
what is going on.
I think the mayor has made some very good points. We want
to make sure that as we are strengthening the regulations, that
we do not do something that would make the situation worse, and
shutting down pipelines is not the answer, because I do not
want more fuel transported on the freeways and on the train
tracks, so we need to make our pipelines safe, and do the job
that they are meant to do in order to enhance safety for
everyone.
So, Mr. Chairman, I think you have a very good bill. I will
work with you, and let me just finish by saying that your
Senators from Washington have both talked to me as the Chairman
of the Subcommittee. They both have been so concerned about
this issue, and I really appreciate their efforts in this
regard. They are not just talking, they are actually doing
something.
Senator Gorton, as my designee, held a hearing in
Washington that I think was very beneficial, trying to get the
input from the community, and I think he did an excellent job
of that, so I really want to say, I think we are all committed
to doing something that will address many of your concerns, and
I will stand ready to work with the Chairman and the two
Washington Senators to make that become an accomplishment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you to all of the family members who have worked so hard
and traveled so far, and have given us all such compelling
messages today that I think will be very helpful to this
Committee as we move forward with the legislation, and we move
it through Congress, and I personally want to thank you.
And Mrs. King, I just want to thank you for writing that
very compelling poem as well. As a mother, it really touched my
heart. You talked about holding onto a hope, and I think that
because you have held on to that hope, we are here today, and
because you have held on to that hope we are closer to making
pipelines safer, and so I do not want you to surrender that
hope, because all of us are depending on you to keep that.
So again, thank you to all of you for being here today.
The Chairman. I also want to thank you for being here. We
are deeply moved by the tragedy, and we renew our motivation to
try to see legislation passed, so that we will never have a
repetition of this hearing again.
We thank you for being here. God bless.
Our next panel will be the administration witnesses, the
Hon. Kelley Coyner, Administrator, Research and Special
Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, the
Hon. Kenneth Mead, Inspector General of the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and the Hon. John A. Hammerschmidt, a member of
the National Transportation Safety Board. Please come forward.
Ms. Coyner, we will begin with you. Thanks for appearing
here today.
STATEMENT OF HON. KELLEY COYNER, ADMINISTRATOR, RESEARCH AND
SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Coyner. Thank you, Chairman McCain, for holding today's
hearing and for the opportunity to speak to the Committee today
about this very important issue, pipeline safety. I am the
Administrator of the Research and Special Programs
Administration which oversees the Federal pipeline safety
program. I would like to summarize my statement and submit the
full statement for the record, if I may.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Ms. Coyner. Our mission is to ensure the safe, reliable,
and environmentally sound operation of the Nation's pipeline
transportation system. We strive to protect people and the
environment from threats posed by pipelines. The tragic deaths
of three young people in Washington State last June reminded
each of us that we must be vigilant in our work to improve
pipeline safety.
Since the 1996 reauthorization of the pipeline safety
program we have continued to address the leading causes of
pipeline failure, and to work to reduce the impact of pipeline
ruptures if they occur. The four leading causes of pipeline
failure are outside force damage, corrosion, human error, and
material defects. We are taking aim at each of these challenges
within the program and are addressing them in the
administration's Pipeline Safety Communication Protection Act
of 2000.
Outside force damage poses the foremost threat to pipeline
integrity and, more importantly, to people. We have compiled
and shared information about the best ways to protect pipeline
from outside force damage, conducted public education
campaigns, as well as beginning to implement a new grant
program to address this area. We have made progress. Accidents
by outside force damage are decreasing.
The second leading cause of pipeline failure is corrosion.
This summer, we will issue new state-of-the-art standards for
preventing and detecting corrosion. Our research efforts will
work to develop more sophisticated tools to detect corrosion
problems.
Another leading cause of pipeline failure is human error.
Our operator qualification rule issued last fall requires
pipeline operators to ensure safety workers are trained and
tested to ensure that they are capable not only of handling
their usual job but emergency conditions, as well. We are also
addressing operator fatigue as another potential factor in
pipeline accidents.
The fourth leading cause of pipeline failure is material
defects. To address this, RSPA leads an interagency work group
on performance and safety of plastic pipe. In addition, the
administration's proposal provides research and development
initiatives that will help improve tools that detect material
defects in pipes.
The administration's legislative proposal, the Pipeline
Safety and Community Protection Act of 2000, reflects what we
know is needed for pipeline safety. First, comprehensive,
integrated periodic testing and measures to address the
problems detected by such testing, second, a strong community
right to know, third, a strong State role in the oversight of
pipelines, and fourth, research and development for better
monitoring and detection tools. Finally, fifth, stronger
enforcement tools.
The administration's proposal would mandate the completion
of a rulemaking on integrity testing. We recently proposed the
first in a series of rules requiring operators of hazardous
liquid lines to establish comprehensive testing programs to
maintain the safety of their pipelines. This approach would
require internal inspections, pressure testing, or other best
achievable technology to be performed on a periodic basis. It
would also require the placement of appropriate valves and
other safety protection devices as necessary, based on the
testing results.
We believe communities have a right to know about
pipelines, their safety records, and what is being done to
prevent pipeline failures. We propose to make it easier for
residents, businesses, and Government officials to get
information about pipelines. Pipeline incident reports and
safety related condition reports would be made available to the
public. Maps, pipeline safety programs, and other information
would be made available to State and local emergency response
authorities and local officials.
Mr. Chairman, we have a long history of working with States
to protect pipeline safety. Our proposal would expand the State
role and increase the authorization and funding of State
efforts. States could enter into agreements with the Department
to participate in the oversight of interstate liquid lines.
States would be reimbursed up to 100 percent for costs to
monitor new pipeline construction and investigate incidents.
States could also participate with us in standard inspections.
Improving the data we have about pipelines is key to
preventing pipeline failures. The administration proposal
provides for the creation of a national repository of
information about precursors of pipeline failures. The proposal
also reduces the reporting requirement for hazardous liquid
pipeline releases to 5 gallons.
There are some who will disregard strong safety efforts and
violate the law. The administration's proposal would strengthen
enforcement provisions not only of the Federal Government, but
also for citizens to ensure the pipeline operators follow safe
practices. The proposal also provides for criminal sanctions
against those who willfully cause third party damage to
pipelines.
The administration's proposal gives us the tools we need to
be responsive to recommendations issued by the Department's
Inspector General and by the National Transportation Safety
Board. We must remain vigilant in our work to protect the
American people and our environment by working together to
pursue the key safety initiatives and by securing the necessary
resources and funds so that we can improve safety and make a
difference.
The pipeline explosion in Bellingham last year took the
lives of three young people, forever changing that small
community. Secretary Slater and I are committed to working with
you and other members of the Committee and the Senate to enact
pipeline safety legislation as soon as possible. We will work
with you to ensure that this kind of tragedy does not happen
again.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Coyner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kelley Coyner, Administrator, Research and
Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Thank you Chairman McCain and Senator Hollings for holding today's
hearing and for the opportunity to speak to the Committee today about
this very important issue--pipeline safety. My name is Kelley Coyner
and I am the Administrator of the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA).
Within the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), the
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is charged with regulating the safe and
environmentally sound operation of the Nation's natural gas and
hazardous liquid pipeline systems. Pipelines transport natural gas to
60 million residential and commercial customers. They also transport 60
percent of the crude oil and petroleum products that fuel our industry,
our economy and our households. We have responsibility for over 2
million miles of pipelines involving approximately 2,400 operators, a
number that has grown 10% since February 1997. Our regulations cover
the design, construction, inspection, testing, operation, and
maintenance of pipeline systems. We achieve compliance with our
regulations through a partnership with state agencies, which assume
regulatory and enforcement functions primarily as they apply to
intrastate pipeline transportation, while the Federal government
assumes these responsibilities for interstate pipelines.
Our mission is to ensure the safe, reliable, and environmentally
sound operation of the Nation's pipeline transportation system.
Consistent with the Department's Strategic Plan, we strive to eliminate
pipeline-related deaths, injuries, and property damage, and reduce
pollution to the environment. This year we set a new goal of reducing
pipeline incidents caused by outside force damage by 25 percent over
the next three years, five times higher than our previous goal. Other
top priorities are reducing to zero the incidents caused by non-
compliance with pipeline regulations and working with operators to
reduce threats to pipeline integrity.
Over the past 30 years, there has been a steady decline in the
overall number of pipeline incidents. While the rate of decline has
slowed in the past decade, it remains moving in the right direction.
Also on the decline is the number of oil pipeline spills to water. This
is important because when pipelines spill into water, the results can
be far-reaching, long-term, and significant. Of greater concern is the
increasing number of fatalities--most, but not all, of which occur in
gas distribution systems. The tragic consequences of the pipeline
incidents in St. Cloud and Bellingham--to name only two--underscore the
need for unremitting attention to the potential impact of pipeline
transportation on people's lives. We are committed to improving the
pipeline safety and environmental record.
Since the reauthorization of the pipeline safety program in 1996,
we have continued to work to address the leading causes of pipeline
failure and to reduce the impact of pipeline ruptures. Sadly, as the
tragic deaths of three young people in Washington State reminded us
last June, our work is far from done. Today I will describe the
progress that has been made in tackling the key threats to pipeline
safety in the United States and will outline the key issues that should
be addressed in the reauthorization of the pipeline safety program.
The four leading causes of pipeline failure are (1) outside force
damage, (2) corrosion, (3) human error, and (4) material defects. The
Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety has taken aim
at each of these challenges, which are addressed by the
Administration's proposed Pipeline Safety and Community Protection Act
of 2000.
Damage Prevention
The foremost threat posed by pipelines to safe and livable
communities is incidents relating to outside force damage. Outside-
force damage, including the failure to fix previously caused outside
force damage, is the number one cause of pipeline incidents, accounting
for half of those that result in fatalities. This kind of damage can be
caused by excavation near pipelines and by natural forces such as
flooding, mudslides, lightning, and heavy rains.
In 1999, Secretary Slater set a goal of eliminating 25% of
excavation-related incidents over the next three years, and the
Department will continue to provide strong Federal leadership to
achieve this goal. We have seen some progress. In 1991, the Department
received 202 reports of incidents caused by outside-force damage. By
1999, that number had declined to 117, or 42% of the earlier level.
This progress is encouraging, but more work remains because the
consequences of even a single incident can be so severe.
One of the Department's key damage prevention efforts is Dig
Safely--a national public education campaign that Secretary Slater
announced in June 1999. Our state partners in this campaign indicate
that they are beginning to observe a decline in excavation-related
damage.
In another damage prevention effort, the Office of Pipeline Safety
convened 160 stakeholders from all areas of the excavation and
underground facility communities and from state and local government.
The result of this effort is Common Ground, a compendium of best
practices in one-call systems and damage prevention programs throughout
the country. We are implementing a new grant program to assist
communities in reducing damage to underground facilities by
implementing these best practices.
The Administration's legislative proposal provides for integrated
testing to identify and locate damage to pipelines more quickly and
efficiently. The proposal provides for research and development
partnerships among government, industry, and academia to accelerate the
introduction of new tools to avoid damage to these vital underground
structures. The proposal also strengthens the Department's and
citizens' authority to take enforcement action against those who ignore
pipeline safety regulations and cause damage to pipelines.
Corrosion Detection and Prevention
The second leading cause of pipeline failure is operator's failure
to address corrosion problems at their facilities. We have made some
progress on preventing corrosion through the adoption of improved
inspection technologies such as ``smart pigs,'' the sensing devices
that travel inside a pipeline and detect damage. While statistical
analyses indicate the rate of incidents may be beginning to decline, we
think that we can further improve our corrosion control standards.
We are currently working with the National Transportation Safety
Board and state agencies to develop new standards for corrosion
prevention, control, and detection. We expect to issue a proposed
rulemaking for liquid pipelines by the end of this year and for natural
gas pipelines next year. The integrated testing provision in the
Administration's proposal would require operators to identify corrosion
faster and more efficiently, and the research provision would enhance
technology for corrosion prevention and detection.
Human Error
Another leading cause of pipeline failure is human error. Human
error is different from excavation-related damage, which can be caused
when someone strikes a pipeline while digging. Human error refers to
pipeline failures caused by lack of appropriate operator training,
operator fatigue, and similar factors that can cause an operator to
perform inadequately or inappropriately on the job.
Our operator qualification rule, issued last fall, requires
pipeline operators to develop and maintain a written qualification
program to assess the ability of each worker. While this rule goes far
in addressing some causes of human error, we also are looking at
operator fatigue as another potential factor in pipeline incidents.
RSPA is actively involved in a DOT-wide initiative addressing the issue
of operator fatigue to increase safety across transportation modes,
including pipelines.
Material Defects
The fourth leading cause of pipeline failure is material defects.
Such defects include faults in pipe material, manufacturing processes
that cause defects, and welding technology that contributes to pipeline
failures. The use of plastic pipe is increasing, and there is a need to
collect information about the performance and reliability of plastic
pipe. To address that need, RSPA is leading an interagency workgroup
comprised of state, federal and industry partners that is investigating
the development and application of advanced materials, including pipe
strength and the long-term performance of plastic pipe. This workgroup
will develop a database of all types of plastic pipe failures to detect
trends with particular types of plastic pipe or pipe fittings.
The Administration bill provides for research and development
partnerships that will help improve the tools that detect material
defects in pipes.
Legislative Proposal
While I plan to spend the balance of my time discussing the
Administration's proposal, I want to acknowledge the other proposals
before the Committee and express the Administration's interest in
working with the Committee, other Members of Congress, and other
stakeholders to enact pipeline safety legislation this year.
As you know, in January, Senator Murray introduced S. 2004, the
``Pipeline Safety Act of 2000.'' In April, Senator Hollings introduced
the Administration's proposal by request, S. 2409, ``The Pipeline
Safety and Community Protection Act of 2000.'' Also in April, Chairman
McCain introduced S. 2438, the ``King and Tsiorvas Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2000.'' What is most striking about the three bills
is the degree to which they agree on fundamental principles. For
example, all three bills reflect a desire to improve the public's right
to know about pipeline activities in their communities. Similarly, all
three bills address a need to improve the integrity of pipelines and to
strengthen the tools available for enforcement of pipeline safety
standards. This is not to say that there are no differences among the
bills. Nevertheless, most of the differences among the three bills are
in the approach, rather than in the specifics of the goal. With that in
mind, I would like to explain the approaches taken in the
Administration's bill.
Pipeline Safety and Community Protection Act of 2000 (S. 2409)
On April 11, Vice President Gore announced the Pipeline Safety and
Community Protection Act of 2000. This proposal reflects the lessons we
have learned in pipeline safety and includes provisions on integrated
testing, community right to know, partnerships with states, research
and technology for better monitoring tools, and stronger enforcement.
The proposal reflects several key principles:
Integrated Testing--Successful pipeline protection must be
based on an integrated, comprehensive use of information
available to operators and regulators.
Community Right to Know--Communities have a right to know an
operator's safety record and what operators and government are
doing to protect them from pipeline incidents.
State Partnerships--State governments have a key role to
play in the safety of pipelines.
Research and Development for Better Monitoring Tools--We
need to improve and create innovative inspection and monitoring
tools to identify defects more quickly and efficiently.
Stronger Enforcement--The existing enforcement provisions
need to be updated to provide stronger sanctions for violations
by operators and those who cause third-party damage to
pipelines.
Integrated Testing
We recognize the need for a comprehensive safety program that will
enable operators to assess and address all threats to pipelines. We
recently proposed a rule to require operators of hazardous liquid
pipelines to establish comprehensive programs to assess the condition
of their pipelines and to use all available information--including the
results of these assessments--to develop and carry out actions to
maintain the safety of their pipelines. The proposed rule would require
operators to integrate results of the testing with other information
about risks that might impact the safety of their pipelines to more
accurately identify areas where safety may be at risk.
This is a comprehensive approach to safety and testing that would
require internal inspections, pressure testing, or other best-
achievable technology to be performed on a periodic basis. The proposed
rule clearly defines the criteria for analyzing the inspection or
testing and would require specific measures for preventing and managing
the consequences of pipeline failures.
The Administration's proposal mandates the completion of the
integrated testing rulemaking. Under the proposal, we would quickly
require large operators of hazardous liquid pipelines to provide
additional protection in populated or unusually environmentally
sensitive areas. The proposal would also require us to extend the rule
within two years to small liquid operators and natural gas transmission
lines. Within three years, we would be required to decide whether we
should extend the regulations to other areas.
Community Right to Know
The Administration's proposal would make it easier for residents,
businesses, and government officials to get information about pipelines
in their communities. Pipeline operators would have an affirmative duty
to carry out a continuing program of public education. Pipeline
incident reports and safety-related condition reports would be made
available to the public, and additional information such as maps and
pipeline safety programs, would be made available to state and local
emergency response authorities. Descriptions of the actions pipeline
operators are taking to ensure pipeline safety also would be provided
to local officials.
State Partnerships
We have a long history of working with states to protect pipeline
safety, and the Administration's proposal would extend our partnership
with states and authorize increased federal grants to support state
safety efforts. The Office of Pipeline Safety and state agencies have
collaborated on initiatives such as the Risk Management Demonstration
Program, the National Pipeline Mapping System, and many of our damage
prevention efforts. With their support, OPS continues to add state
repositories to the National Pipeline Mapping System, make progress on
the development of the risk-based approaches to pipeline safety, and
remove barriers to state action on damage prevention. Each year, OPS
and state partners hold national and regional meetings to promote
information exchange on pipeline technology, inspection techniques,
operational problems, significant incidents, and innovative approaches
for strengthening the pipeline safety program. RSPA's 2001 budget
requests a 30% increase in funding for state programs.
The legislative proposal would take the states' regulatory role
even further--states could enter into agreements with the Department to
participate in oversight of interstate pipelines. The Department would
be authorized to reimburse up to 100 percent of a state's costs in
monitoring new pipeline construction or investigating incidents. All
states will be encouraged to be active in damage prevention, local
preparedness and community right-to-know activities. This is a balanced
approach that addresses states' concerns about participating in the
oversight of interstate pipelines, without abdicating federal
responsibility for the interstate transportation of energy products.
Data Improvement
This proposal also will improve data on pipeline safety. The
proposal calls for the creation of a national depository to collect
information about the precursors of pipeline failures. This data is
vital to ensure we are all focused on the right issues--and that we can
measure our progress in addressing those issues. Additionally, the
proposal reduces the threshold requirement for reporting hazardous
liquid pipeline releases. Current regulations require operators of
hazardous liquid pipelines to report any release greater than 2,100
gallons. Under the proposal, operators of hazardous liquid pipelines
would be required to report any release greater than five gallons.
Research and Development for Better Monitoring Tools
The proposal calls for better and more innovative inspection and
monitoring technologies. Internal inspection technology has improved,
but still more improvement is needed. The bill calls for continued
support for research partnerships with government, industry, and
academia so that together, we can leverage our resources and our
ability to develop innovative inspection tools and monitoring
technologies. With better monitoring tools, we can better prevent and
detect pipeline failures and protect lives and the environment.
Stronger Enforcement
Finally, the Administration proposal would strengthen both the
Department's and citizens' enforcement authority by providing the
pipeline regulatory program with the enforcement tools available to
other public health and environmental statutes. The proposal
strengthens the ability of citizens and local communities most directly
affected by pipelines to seek penalties for violations of federal law
in a judicial enforcement action. In addition, the proposal enables the
Department to seek criminal sanction against the most egregious
violators, including third party operators that damage pipelines.
Conclusion
The pipeline explosion that occurred in Washington State last year
took the lives of three young people and forever changed the community
of Bellingham. It is my hope that, working together, final
legislation--influenced by important lessons learned from that tragic
event--will be enacted as soon as possible.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Mead.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After
listening to the families, I feel obliged to say that I think
the Committee's leadership on this issue, as well as Senator
Murray's and the families' is very important. The families have
gone through a terrible tragedy, and yet they are providing
leadership on what I believe is a very important national
issue.
I also want to express our appreciation to Administrator
Coyner for being responsive during the course of our work. I
have five points, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. First, RSPA's
action toward completing pipeline-safety mandates is at least 5
years behind congressional completion dates. The 1992 Pipeline
Safety Act established mandates to increase pipeline safety,
especially in sensitive areas where a pipeline rupture would be
the most dangerous--such as densely populated areas, critical
habitats, public drinking water supplies, areas such as that.
Instead of new safety regulations, our review found delays:
delays in defining sensitive areas, delays in preparing maps
showing location of pipelines, and delays in the issuance of
standards for pipeline inspections.
Last month, a notice of proposed rulemaking was issued.
That is 5 years after the statutory due date. The proposed
rule, though, only applies to hazardous-liquid pipeline
operators. It gives them another 7 years to fully comply, which
is too long in our opinion. Then they get 10 more years before
a reinspection is required.
The proposed rule does not address at all inspections for
over 300,000 miles of natural-gas transmission pipelines. We
understand proposed rules covering that area will come out
sometime this year or early next.
Second, RSPA has completed some very good research on
expanding the capabilities of internal inspection devices,
called ``smart pigs.'' A smart pig looks like a torpedo. It
travels inside a pipeline searching for corrosion, mechanical
damage, and metal loss.
Roughly 90 percent of hazardous-liquid pipelines have a
configuration that can accommodate smart pigs, but there is a
need to make these pigs even smarter. The current technology
has limitations in detecting stress-corrosion cracks, seam well
deficiencies, and longitudinal mechanical damage.
RSPA also needs to look to technology to inspect pipelines
that cannot accommodate smart pigs due to the pipeline
configuration. While most hazardous-liquid pipelines can use
smart pigs, we found that, incredibly, RSPA does not have
estimates of natural-gas pipelines that can be pigged. That is
important because natural-gas transmission pipelines account
for nearly 300,000 miles of pipeline, which is the majority, so
it is important that the Office of Pipeline Safety find out how
many miles of these pipelines can be pigged. One of the largest
natural-gas pipeline companies told us only about 15 percent of
their pipeline could accommodate pigs.
The most widely used method for inspecting these
pipelines--subjecting the pipe to high pressure--is called
hydrostatic testing. You have heard about it before today.
While there are benefits from that type of testing, Mr.
Chairman, you should know that that type of testing can harm or
weaken a pipe, and it does not determine the extent or severity
of defects. That is why research into smart pigs is needed, and
if a pipe cannot accommodate a smart pig, some alternative
effective technique should be used.
Third, Ms. Coyner mentioned accident data. The current
accident data are inaccurate too often and do not provide
adequate information. Let me give just a couple of examples.
RSPA data show that ``Other'' was the leading cause of
accidents 37 percent of the time for hazardous-liquid pipelines
in 1999. That was an increase from 29 percent, for the prior
year during which ``Other'' was again the leading cause of
accidents.
These numbers are going in the wrong direction, leaving
RSPA with increasingly nonspecific data.
We also found that 9 of 44 accidents in 1998 were
incorrectly reported as caused by ``Other,'' when in fact they
were actually caused by outside force damage.
Finally, on the data point, accident reports for natural-
gas transmission lines have only four causal categories to
report the cause of the accident. Three are specific, and the
fourth is for ``Other,'' so natural-gas operators put into the
``Other'' category things like incorrect operation by operator
personnel, or failed weld. I believe those categories need to
be tightened up, and they can be tightened up soon.
Fourth, pipeline inspectors and industry pipeline operators
need more specialized training. RSPA's training program does
not provide safety inspectors with state-of-the-art skills and
expertise in either how to use pigs or interpret the results of
pig inspections. This places RSPA in a position of having to
rely on a report generated by the pipeline operator or the
smart-pig vendor. That is not acceptable for an independent
oversight organization. It is like having an FAA inspector who
is qualified to inspect Piper Cubs inspect a 777. I think that
needs to change.
Finally, several of the reauthorization bills seek to
expand the State's role in the inspection of interstate
pipelines. We believe there should be considerably greater, not
less, State involvement in the inspection of these pipelines.
There is precedent for this, not just in the pipeline area but
also in the motor-carrier area, where Congress just enacted
legislation. However, we do recognize a major distinction
between a much greater role for the states in pipeline
inspections and giving the states discretion or license to
establish rules for pipeline safety.
Different safety rules from state to state for interstate
pipelines could themselves cause problems, however well-
intentioned they might be. Frankly, I think this issue of the
states setting their own protocols for pipeline safety has
probably been fueled by the delays in implementing the laws
which you established in 1992, as well as the delays in
implementing NTSB safety recommendations.
That concludes my statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Transportation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the
reauthorization of the Department of Transportation's pipeline safety
program.
The nation's pipeline infrastructure includes roughly 2.2 million
miles of pipe, including 156,000 miles of hazardous liquid transmission
pipelines, 325,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines, and 1.7
million miles of natural gas distribution pipelines. These pipelines
carry vast quantities of natural gas, petroleum products, and other
materials to fuel our commercial and consumer demands. Pipelines are a
relatively safe way to transport energy resources and other products,
but they are subject to forces of nature, human actions and material
defects that can cause potentially catastrophic accidents.
Following the deadly pipeline explosion and fire in Bellingham,
Washington in June 1999, Senator Patty Murray requested the Office of
Inspector General to review the Research and Special Programs
Administration's (RSPA) Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). Our March 2000
audit report identified needed improvements in OPS's oversight of the
Nation's pipeline infrastructure. My testimony today will address four
issues:
RSPA has not implemented Congressional safety mandates
related to defining environmentally sensitive and high-density
population areas, identifying pipelines in these areas, or
requiring increased pipeline inspections. Critical safeguards
required by Congress for hazardous liquid and natural gas
pipelines are at least 5 years overdue and could take as long
as 7 additional years for just large hazardous liquid pipeline
operators to complete these inspections.
Pipeline safety research and development must be expanded to
improve the capabilities of internal inspection devices--
referred to as ``smart pigs.'' Previous OPS research has
concluded that smart pigs can detect certain defects in a
pipeline before failures occur, but they have limited
capabilities to pinpoint stress corrosion cracks, longitudinal
mechanical damage, and defects in seam welds and pipe
materials.
OPS also must expand research to develop new inspection
technologies for pipelines that cannot accommodate a smart pig.
Roughly 11 percent of all hazardous liquid pipelines cannot
accommodate the use of smart pigs and OPS lacks statistical
data on the miles of natural gas pipelines that can accommodate
a smart pig. For those pipelines that cannot accommodate a
smart pig, operators must rely on visual inspections and
hydrostatic pressure testing to check the condition of the
pipe. However, visual inspections can only look for evidence of
leaks at the surface, and hydrostatic tests stress the pipe
material and can cause microfractures or crack defects harmful
to the pipe.
Pipeline accident data collection improvements are needed to
enable OPS to focus its resources on the most important safety
issues and to measure safety program performance. We found that
pipeline operators are incorrectly using the ``Other'' causal
category to report the causes of accidents. In fact, the
leading reported cause of hazardous liquid accidents for 1999
was ``Other.'' In the case of natural gas accidents, we found
``Other'' was being used to describe accidents caused by
incorrect operation by pipeline personnel, equipment
malfunctions, or failed pipes and welds because these causes
are not included on the accident form. OPS should modify its
accident report forms to include additional categories
identifying the causes of pipeline accidents and thereby reduce
the use of the ``Other'' category.
Pipeline inspectors are not adequately trained on either the
use of high-tech instruments or the interpretation of test
results. Incorrect operator decisions contributed to 16
hazardous liquid pipeline accidents in 1999. Specialized
training is essential for pipeline inspectors to make more
comprehensive safety assessments and to ensure pipeline
operators are qualified to do their job, thereby reducing the
probability and consequences of serious accidents.
First, RSPA has Yet to Implement 1992 Congressional Safety
Mandates. In 1992, Congress established mandates intended to increase
pipeline safety by requiring pipeline operators to conduct increased
inspections in areas where consequences of a pipeline rupture would be
most severe. RSPA's actions toward completing the mandates are at least
5 years behind the Congressional completion dates.
Congress mandated that OPS define the criteria to identify high-
density population areas for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines
and environmentally sensitive areas for hazardous liquid pipelines, and
to develop an inventory of pipelines in these areas by October 1994.
The definition for an environmentally sensitive area has not been
established, and until it is, OPS cannot develop an inventory of
pipelines located in these areas. The 1992 Act also established a 1995
deadline for the Secretary to prescribe standards for periodic pipeline
inspections and the use of smart pigs, or an equally effective
alternative method.\1\ Although smart pigs can detect certain types of
defects in a pipeline before it fails, OPS has not established
requirements for the Congressionally mandated increased inspections
including the use of smart pigs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Accountable Pipeline and Safety Act of 1996 (Public Law
104-304) amended the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 by removing the
requirement for periodic inspection standards and giving the Secretary
the discretion to determine if mandatory periodic inspections are
necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in April 2000 addressed
periodic pipeline inspection standards (using either a smart pig or an
equally effective method), but only for large hazardous liquid pipeline
operators.\2\ The proposed rulemaking requires operators to complete
baseline inspections to determine the existing condition of their
pipelines within at least 7 years of the effective date of the final
rule. OPS plans to issue the final rule by September 2000, allowing
operators until 2007 to complete baseline assessments. This timeframe
is too long. The American Petroleum Institute stated earlier this year
that 95 to 98 percent of the mileage of large hazardous liquid
pipelines operators can currently accommodate a smart pig to perform
the baseline inspection. Furthermore, the 10-year timeframe for
subsequent pipeline re-inspections to determine deterioration is also
too long. OPS does not address natural gas pipelines in its current
rulemaking. OPS needs to aggressively pursue the development of
regulations for increased inspections on these pipelines in high-
density urban areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Large hazardous liquid pipeline operators are defined in the
Proposed Rulemaking as operators of pipelines of 500 miles or more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, Enhancements are Needed in Pipeline Safety Research and
Development. Pipeline operators need advanced technologies to locate
defects and monitor pipelines before a failure occurs. Early detection
of serious defects in a pipeline reduces the risk of catastrophic
accidents. RSPA's current pipeline research and development (R&D)
program has resulted in improved defect detection by internal
inspection devices. However, RSPA's research and development program
now needs additional emphasis in three areas:
Improving the capabilities of smart pigs to detect pipe
defects such as stress corrosion cracks and seam weld
deficiencies or irregularities,
Enhancing technologies to detect the severity of pipeline
corrosion, and
Developing inspection and monitoring technologies for
pipelines that cannot accommodate smart pigs. Roughly 11
percent of all hazardous liquid pipelines (2 to 5 percent of
the large ones) cannot be `pigged', but OPS does not know what
percentage of natural gas transmission pipelines cannot
accommodate a smart pig.
We note Congress' strong support in the reauthorization bills for
expanding research and development programs on inspection technologies.
We support its efforts to advance pipeline technologies that will
enhance pipeline safety.
Third, the Collection of Pipeline Accident Data Needs Improvement.
OPS must have accurate accident data to focus its inspection and
research resources and to measure safety program performance. In order
to do this, accident reports should use precise categories that
identify the causes of pipeline accidents. OPS accident forms currently
use up to seven categories including ``Other'' to summarize the cause
of an accident. Data for hazardous liquid accidents list ``Other'' as
the leading cause of accidents. This category increased from 29 percent
in 1998 to 37 percent in 1999. However, because there are only 3
specific causal categories on the natural gas accident form, operators
of natural gas transmission lines use the ``Other'' category to report
such causes as ``Incorrect Operation by Operator Personnel'' and
``Failed Weld.''
OPS should expand accident categories to encompass the most
frequent accident causes now being grouped together as ``Other.'' One
of RSPA's goals is to reduce ``Outside Force Damage'' accidents by 25
percent over the next 3 years. However, with the category ``Other''
being used so often, RSPA cannot accurately measure how well it is
doing. For example, our examination of hazardous liquid accident
reports found 9 of 44 hazardous liquid pipeline accidents in 1998 were
incorrectly categorized as caused by ``Other'' when they should have
been classified as ``Outside Force Damage.'' The limitations of the
current accident reporting were recognized in both a 1998 National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report and 1999 American Petroleum
Institute report that recommended accident reporting be revised to
request more comprehensive data.
Last, Specialized Training is Needed for Pipeline Inspectors and
Operators. Pipeline inspectors are not trained on either the use of
current state-of-the-art technology or the expertise in smart pig data
analysis. The data obtained from smart pig inspections are an important
indication of a pipeline's condition. In addition, incorrect operator
decisions contributed to hazardous liquid pipeline accidents.
Specialized training is essential for pipeline inspectors to make more
comprehensive safety assessments and to ensure pipeline operators are
qualified to do their jobs, thereby reducing the probability and
consequences of serious accidents.
Our review of the OPS inspector training curriculum noted its lack
of training on smart pig technology and how to interpret smart pig
data. Since the use of smart pig technology is expected to grow, we
recommend OPS inspectors be trained to interpret results from smart pig
inspections. The OPS inspector would then possess the knowledge to
independently assess a pipeline's condition and could quickly make
safety improvement recommendations, rather than wait for
interpretational reports as they currently do.
Better pipeline operator qualifications can also improve safety.
Incorrect operator decisions contributed to 16 hazardous liquid
pipeline accidents in 1999. We support reauthorization provisions
requiring operators to submit their training plans to the Secretary for
approval. This issue warrants close monitoring to assure the process
does not focus on the paper record without assurance that the
individuals have the necessary knowledge and skills. We also agree with
provisions for periodic retraining and reexamination of pipeline
personnel.
Background
The pipeline infrastructure of the United States consists of
roughly 2.2 million miles of pipe including 156,000 miles of hazardous
liquid transmission pipelines, 325,000 miles of natural gas
transmission pipelines, and 1.7 million miles of natural gas
distribution pipelines. Each year these pipelines transport 617 billion
ton-miles of oil and oil products and over 20 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas. Pipelines are a relatively safe way to transport energy
resources and other products, but they are subject to forces of nature,
human actions and material defects that can cause potentially
catastrophic accidents. Although the number of natural gas and
hazardous liquid transmission pipeline accidents was relatively
constant from 1995 through 1997, natural gas accidents increased by 25
in 1998, and then dropped by 45 in 1999.\3\ Conversely, hazardous
liquid accidents decreased by 22 in 1998 and remained relatively
constant in 1999 (as shown in Figure 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The accident reporting criteria were changed in mid-1994 for
hazardous liquid pipelines. Previously, operators were required to
submit an accident report if property damage exceeded $5,000. OPS
raised the threshold to property damage exceeding $50,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1
Transmission Pipeline Accidents
The Office of Pipeline Safety administers the Department's national
regulatory program to assure the safe operation of the Nation's
transmission pipelines. OPS develops regulations on risk management,
design safety, construction, testing, operations, maintenance, and
emergency response of pipeline facilities.
Outstanding Congressional Mandates
RSPA has Yet to Implement 1992 Congressional Safety Mandates. In
1992, Congress established mandates intended to increase pipeline
safety by requiring pipeline operators to conduct increased inspections
in areas where consequences of a pipeline rupture would be most severe.
These mandates were to establish criteria identifying high-density
population and environmentally sensitive areas, inventory pipelines in
these areas, and prescribe regulations for increased inspections on
these pipelines, including the use of internal inspection devices.
RSPA's proposed completion dates for some of the mandates are at least
5 years behind the Congressional completion dates. The following table
depicts the Congressional mandates and their deadlines.
OPS Has Not Implemented Congressionally Mandated Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressional Deadline October 1994 October 1995
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Establish criteria to
Pipelines identify high-density areas
Establish additional safety
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazardous Liquid Pipelines Establish criteria to
identify high-density and
environmentally sensitive areas
Establish additional safety
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Definition of Areas. Congress expected OPS to define
environmentally sensitive and high-density population areas and to
develop an inventory of pipelines in these areas by October 1994. These
actions have not been done. Until the definitions are established, OPS
cannot develop an inventory of pipelines located in these areas.
According to OPS officials, this lengthy delay is primarily
attributable to the difficulty in developing a consensus on the
definition of an environmentally sensitive area among divergent groups
including Federal and state governments, environmental groups, and the
pipeline industry. Once these areas are defined, an inventory would
identify pipelines where increased inspections may be required.
Pipeline Inventory. Currently, the inventory of pipelines in high-
density and environmentally sensitive areas relies on voluntary
operator submissions of pipeline location data. In March 1999, OPS
developed standards for operators to submit their pipeline inventories.
However, as of May 2000, pipeline operators have submitted only 10
percent of total pipeline mileage through this voluntary initiative.
OPS needs to immediately initiate a rulemaking process to require
operators to submit their pipeline location data.
Establishment of Inspection Standards. In most cases, smart pigs
can warn of problems in a pipeline before a rupture occurs. The 1992
Act established a 1995 deadline for the Secretary to prescribe
standards for periodic pipeline inspections using smart pigs or an
equally effective alternative method. OPS has not yet established
requirements for the increased inspections including the use of smart
pigs. According to an OPS official, internal inspection technology in
1994 had only a limited capability to identify defects that could cause
ruptures. However, the capabilities of internal inspection technology
have improved since 1994. In April 2000, OPS issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking requiring operators of large hazardous liquid
pipelines (those with over 500 miles of pipelines) to use this
technology, or an alternate equally effective method, to inspect
pipelines. OPS plans to issue final regulations for large hazardous
liquid pipeline operators in September 2000.
Rulemaking Timeframes. OPS's April 2000 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking allows large hazardous liquid pipeline operators until at
least 2007 (pending the effective date of the final rule, planned for
September 2000) to complete baseline assessments of their pipelines.
This timeframe for baseline assessments is too long. The American
Petroleum Institute stated earlier this year that 95 to 98 percent of
the mileage of large hazardous liquid pipeline operators can currently
accommodate a smart pig to perform the baseline assessments.
Once the baseline is completed, a subsequent re-inspection is
required by the April 2000 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. RSPA's
rulemaking proposes a 10-year re-inspection interval to determine any
deterioration in the condition of the pipeline. This interval is also
too long.
We support reauthorization provisions to expedite RSPA's completion
of all outstanding Congressional mandates. As Congress intended back in
1992, these additional protections are critically needed to reduce the
risk of pipeline accidents and the devastating consequences on the
public and the environment.
Pipeline Research
Pipeline Safety Research and Development Should be Expanded. Early
detection of serious problems in a pipeline reduces the risk of a
catastrophic loss of human life and long-term damage to the
environment. Pipeline operators and Federal and state inspectors need
advanced technologies to locate problems and monitor pipelines before a
failure occurs. High technology inspection devices could give operators
and inspectors early warnings of serious problems in a pipeline and
lower the risk of pipeline releases.
RSPA's current pipeline research and development (R&D) program has
resulted in beneficial technical data on internal inspection devices.
The research concluded that smart pigs are reliable for detecting
internal pipe corrosion, certain types of external mechanical damage,
and pipe metal loss, but they have limited capabilities in pinpointing
stress corrosion cracks, longitudinal mechanical damage, and defects in
seam welds and pipe materials. OPS's program now needs to focus on
three areas:
Improving the capabilities of smart pigs to detect pipe
defects such as stress corrosion cracks, longitudinal
mechanical damage, and defects in seam weld and pipe materials,
Enhancing technologies to detect pipeline corrosion and its
severity, and
Developing technologies for internal inspection and
monitoring of pipelines that cannot accommodate smart pigs.
Capabilities of Smart Pigs. Pipeline operators use several
inspection methods to ensure the integrity and safe operating condition
of a pipeline (including smart pigs, hydrostatic pressure testing,
visual inspection, and pipe weld x-rays). Smart pigs, which travel
inside a pipe, are the most reliable technology currently available to
detect corrosion, metal loss, and mechanical gouges or dents, without
excavating a pipe. However, they have limited ability to detect other
types of serious defects, such as stress corrosion cracks, longitudinal
mechanical damage, and defects in seam welds and in pipe materials. We
noted that 10 percent of hazardous liquid pipeline accidents in 1999
were caused by failed pipe or welds, which might have been prevented if
better inspection technology were available. OPS research should focus
on expanding the smart pig's capabilities to pinpoint these types of
pipeline defects before a failure occurs.
Detecting Pipeline Corrosion. While current smart pig technology
can generally detect pipeline corrosion, R&D work is needed on advanced
technologies to detect additional types of corrosion and the severity
and extent of all types of corrosion. For example, current smart pigs
have a limited capability to pinpoint stress corrosion cracking, a type
of corrosion caused by temperature fluctuations and electric charges in
the line. In 1999, corrosion caused almost one-fourth (23 percent) of
all transmission pipeline failures and was the second leading cause of
accidents. Corrosion caused the failure of an 8-inch pipeline in
Lively, Texas, in 1996. A fire erupted when 5,518 barrels of liquid
butane were released, resulting in 2 fatalities and the evacuation of
25 families. Property damage totaled $217,000. Although pipeline safety
regulations provide standards to prevent corrosion, it is clear that
OPS should focus additional research to better analyze the severity and
extent of corrosion, including stress corrosion cracking, with a goal
of substantially reducing the number of accidents caused by corrosion.
Alternative Inspection and Monitoring Technologies. A pipe's size,
configuration, angle bends, and valve designs can prohibit a smart pig
from moving inside the pipeline, and natural gas pipelines are most
likely to require modifications for their use. Although there are
325,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines, OPS does not have
specific data on the percentage of miles that can accommodate smart
pigs. For hazardous liquid pipelines, a February 2000 American
Petroleum Institute survey concluded that smart pigs could be used in
89 percent, or roughly 139,000 miles, of these pipelines.
Additional research is needed to identify new inspection and
monitoring technologies for detecting potentially dangerous defects in
pipelines that cannot be ``pigged.'' Hydrostatic pressure testing is
widely used by industry as an alternative to smart pigs, but it can be
harmful to a pipe by causing tiny fractures or cracks. Furthermore,
this technique provides only a `snapshot' of a pipe's condition and
does not determine the extent or severity of corrosion or other
defects.
In our review of the various reauthorization bills, we noted
Congress' strong support for expanding research and development
programs on inspection technologies. We support legislative efforts to
further research that will lead to advances in pipeline inspection
technologies.
Pipeline Accident Data Collection
The Collection of Pipeline Accident Data Needs Improvement. OPS
must have accurate accident data to focus its inspection and research
resources and to measure safety program performance. Accident reports
should use precise categories that identify the causes of pipeline
accidents. OPS accident forms currently use up to seven categories
including ``Other'' to summarize the cause of an accident. For example,
in the case of natural gas accidents, we found ``Other'' could be used
to describe accidents caused by incorrect operation by operator
personnel, equipment malfunctions, or failed pipes and welds because
these causes are not included on the accident form. Table 1 lists the
cause categories on OPS accident forms for hazardous liquid and natural
gas transmission pipelines, as well as 1998 reported accidents.
Table 1
Accident Form Causal Categories and 1998 Reported Accident Occurrences
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Hazardous Liquid
---------------------------------------------------------------
Accident Form Causal Categories Percentage Percentage
Category Reported by Category Reported by
Applicable OPS Applicable OPS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Corrosion Yes 22% Yes 26%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Outside Force Damage Yes 37% Yes 27%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Other'' Yes 21% Yes 29%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Construction/Material Defect Yes 19% No
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Malfunction of Control or Relief No .............. Yes 6%
Equipment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorrect Operation by Operator No .............. Yes 5%
Personnel
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Failed Pipe No .............. Yes 5%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Failed Weld No .............. Yes 4%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage Total: .............. 99% * .............. 102% *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Totals do not add up to 100% because of rounding.
Source: Office of Pipeline Safety accident database
We found data for hazardous liquid accidents list ``Other'' as the
leading cause of accidents. This category increased from 29 percent in
1998 to 37 percent in 1999. OPS should expand accident categories to
encompass the causative factors now being grouped together as
``Other.'' The limitations of the current accident reporting were
recognized in both a 1998 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
report and a 1999 American Petroleum Institute report that recommended
accident reporting be revised to request more comprehensive data.
One of RSPA's goals is to reduce ``Outside Force Damage'' accidents
by 25 percent over the next 3 years. With the category ``Other'' used
so often, RSPA cannot measure how well it is doing. Our analysis found
9 of 44 hazardous liquid accidents that occurred in 1998 were
incorrectly categorized as caused by ``Other'' when they should have
been classified as caused by ``Outside Force Damage.''
OPS also needs to issue new regulations that require operators to
correct inaccurate accident reports they have submitted. Under current
regulations, OPS is unable to correct inaccurate information from
operators' accident reports without the operators' consent. For
example, in eight transmission pipeline accidents investigated by NTSB
between 1994 and 1998, in only one case did the operator submit an
updated accident form reflecting the NTSB results, although differences
existed between the results of NTSB investigations and the information
originally submitted by operators to OPS. In three cases, the NTSB
investigation reported a different cause for the accident, and in five
cases, NTSB investigations reported $20.4 million more in property
damage. As a result, the OPS accident database retained inaccurate
program performance information.
We endorse including provisions in the reauthorization that require
the development of a data collection plan and revisions to accident
report forms and instructions that are essential for detailed analysis
of accident causes.
Training of Inspectors and Operators
Specialized Training is Essential for Pipeline Inspectors and
Operators. The responsibility for pipeline safety is shared among OPS,
the States, and pipeline operators. Pipeline inspectors need state-of-
the-art skills, expertise, and ability to make accurate safety
assessments that lower the risk of pipeline failures. In addition,
pipeline operators must be well qualified to be the ``safe drivers''
behind operation of the nation's pipeline system.
Our review of the OPS inspector training curriculum noted a lack of
courses on smart pig technology. OPS estimates that operators conduct
smart pig inspections on 6,500 miles of natural gas and 12,480 miles of
hazardous liquid pipelines each year, which could include pipelines in
high-density population or environmentally sensitive areas. For
example, smart pigs are run annually through the 800-mile Trans-Alaska
Pipeline, which extends through some of the most sensitive environments
on the continent.
The data obtained from smart pig inspections are an important
indication of a pipeline's condition. Yet, OPS does not train its
inspectors on how to interpret these data. As a result, the OPS
inspection force must rely on a report prepared by the pipeline
operator or smart pig vendor for general information on a pipeline's
present condition. We find this condition unacceptable. As the use of
smart pig technology is expected to grow, we recommend the addition of
an OPS training program on the interpretation of results from smart pig
inspections. The OPS inspector would then possess the knowledge to
independently assess a pipeline's condition and make safety improvement
recommendations.
Several reauthorization provisions seek to expand the states' role
in the inspection of interstate pipelines. In sharing the safety
oversight role, Federal and state inspectors have a greater opportunity
to leverage limited resources for increasing the number and quality of
pipeline inspections. State agencies would also be able to address
numerous local issues and provide a local presence to address pipeline
safety. Therefore, we also support these provisions.
To ensure consistent implementation of pipeline inspection
regulations, state pipeline inspectors should receive the same level of
training as required of Federal inspectors. As Federal training
requirements change, such as a new requirement for smart pig training,
so should the states.' The safe operation of our Nation's pipelines
depends on uniform educational standards for the entire pipeline safety
inspection workforce. One possible way of ensuring the standards are
met would be testing or certification.
Incorrect operator decisions contributed to 16 hazardous liquid
pipeline accidents in 1999, resulting in 4 injuries and almost $3
million in property damage. In 1999, a Conoco Inc. hazardous liquid
pipeline spilled oil and gasoline in Oklahoma, resulting in 2 injuries
and $2 million in property damage, or two-thirds of the property damage
for the entire year. The operator listed the cause of the accident as
``Incorrect Operation by Operator Personnel.''
We support reauthorization provisions to ensure pipeline operators
are qualified to do their job, thereby reducing the probability and
consequences of serious accidents. Reauthorization provisions that
require operators to submit their qualifications programs to the
Secretary for approval and require periodic retraining and
reexamination of pipeline personnel would be beneficial. Operators
should be subjected to stringent qualifications programs and trained to
react to abnormal operating conditions when they occur. This issue
warrants close monitoring to assure the process does not focus on the
paper record without assurance that the individuals have the necessary
knowledge and skills.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Mead. Mr.
Hammerschmidt.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT, MEMBER, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Hammerschmidt. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of
the Committee, Senator Murray. It is an honor to represent the
National Transportation Safety Board before you today to
discuss pipeline safety issues. We have submitted prepared
testimony to the Committee, and I would like to limit my
statement this morning to three specific areas which are of
particular concern to the safety board, pipeline integrity,
employee qualifications, and excavation damage.
The first topic I would like to discuss is pipeline
integrity. The continued operation of pipelines with
discoverable integrity problems is a recurring theme in
accidents investigated by the Safety Board. In 1987, as a
result of investigations into three pipeline accidents, two in
Kentucky and one in Minnesota, the Safety Board recommended
that the Research and Special Programs Administration, or RSPA,
require periodic inspections to identify corrosion, mechanical
damage, or other defects. Thirteen years later, there are still
no regulations that require pipeline operators to perform
periodic testing and RSPA's responses to our recommendations
are in an unacceptable status.
The Safety Board is currently investigating at least five
accidents with potential pipeline integrity problems.
Frequently, as may turn out to be the case in the Bellingham,
Washington, accident, we learn that the damage area, or the
weak point, has been compromised for months or years before
rupture. We believe that inspection enables prevention, and we
need programs that not only provide adequate inspection, but
that adequately analyze and fix the problems uncovered.
Several weeks ago, RSPA issued a proposed rule speaking to
integrity issues, and that is a start. NTSB will undoubtedly
participate in this rulemaking. We earnestly hope that we can
see this work finished. RSPA can use its rulemaking authority
to galvanize, coordinate, and accelerate industry action, and
it should do so.
Turning now to the training and qualification of personnel,
we have a very similar story to tell on this issue. In 1987,
after several pipeline accidents in which inadequate training
was an issue, the Safety Board recommended that RSPA require
operators to develop training programs for pipeline personnel.
Eleven years later, with no adequate action from RSPA, we also
closed these recommendations as unacceptable.
Inadequate training continues to be a factor in pipeline
accidents. In the 1996 Fork Shoals, South Carolina accident,
the Safety Board found that controllers failed to recognize and
respond to observable emergency conditions. In that accident
the controller mistakenly shut down a pump station, failed to
recognize the consequences of this mistake, and continued to
operate the pipeline after it ruptured. Nearly a million
gallons of fuel oil poured into Reedy River as a result. We
asked how this could happen. The answer was largely lack of
training.
I should add that training is necessary throughout the
system, not just in the control rooms. We need it for
inspectors, maintenance crews, and managers. On November 21,
1996, a pipeline accident in San Juan, Puerto Rico resulted in
33 fatalities and 69 injuries. Our investigation determined
that the gas company's employees had not been properly trained
to survey, pinpoint, or test for pipeline leaks, and failed to
locate a reported leak before the explosion occurred.
In our subsequent accident report, the Safety Board
recommended that RSPA complete a final rule on employee
qualification training and testing within 1 year. Although the
Board urged RSPA to amend the proposed rule to include strong
training and testing requirements, last August RSPA published
its final rule without the requirements sought by our
recommendations. Hence, the training recommendations that were
developed after the San Juan tragedy are now also in an
unacceptable status.
The last area I have time for this morning in this brief
statement is excavation damage, the leading cause of pipeline
accidents. This issue is on the Safety Board's most wanted
list. In December 1997, the Board issued 26 recommendations
aimed at improving excavation damage prevention. We know that
Administrator Coyner also takes this issue very seriously.
Preventing excavation damage to pipeline systems is one of her
top priorities.
The Administrator has already spoken to their programming
efforts, of course, which involve the ongoing Nation-wide Dig
Safely campaign, and the common ground report. We applaud these
efforts, but think it fair to say that every avenue for
improved performance needs to be pursued, and we look forward
to a timely and favorable final action on our open
recommendations here.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy
to answer the Committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Hammerschmidt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John A. Hammerschmidt, Member, National
Transportation Safety Board
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am
pleased to represent the National Transportation Safety Board before
you today to discuss pipeline safety issues.
I would like to start with an update for the Committee on the
status of the Safety Board's investigation of the fatal pipeline
accident that occurred last June in Bellingham, Washington. I would
stress, however, that the Board's investigation is ongoing, and that
the following information is preliminary. It may be refined and changed
as the investigation proceeds.
As an initial point, I would note the National Transportation
Safety Board has experienced significant procedural problems with the
Bellingham investigation. The proximity of a criminal inquiry has been
a serious issue for us. We have been unable to talk to employees of the
operator, who fear the uncertainties of a criminal inquiry; and we
have, until recently, been unable to proceed with testing of the
physical evidence.
Parallel investigations, by accident investigators and criminal
authorities, pose a host of complicated issues. We requested, in our
own reauthorization package, a restatement of Congressional confidence
in the priority presently accorded by statute to our work, and we are
gratified that the House of Representatives has responded favorably.
We note similar provisions in the bill awaiting action by this
Committee. National Transportation Safety Board staff is working with
staff of this Committee to ensure that the uncertainties of Bellingham
do not become the norm, and we earnestly request your close attention
to this issue.
After a 16-inch diameter pipeline owned by Olympic Pipe Line
Company ruptured, approximately \1/4\ million gallons of gasoline were
released into a nearby creek. The gasoline ignited and two 10-year-old
boys and an 18-year-old young man lost their lives. Shortly after being
notified of the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board
launched a team of investigators to the scene. Safety Board personnel
were on scene for approximately 5 weeks.
The accident section of pipeline was originally installed in 1965
and then rerouted in 1966 to allow for construction of a water
treatment plant. In 1993 and 1994, a contractor working on behalf of
the City of Bellingham installed a 72-inch water line across Olympic's
pipeline, approximately 20 feet south of the rupture. A new 24-inch
diameter water line was also installed and connected to an existing
water line 10 feet south of the rupture.
Although Federal regulations do not require internal pipeline
inspections, in 1991, 1996 and 1997 Olympic inspected the section of
pipe that failed last June. The 1996 and 1997 inspections had
identified anomalies in the pipeline near the location of the
subsequent rupture, however the pipeline was not excavated, visually
inspected or repaired at those locations. The Safety Board is looking
into criteria used by Olympic Pipe Line to evaluate the identified
anomalies. However, Olympic personnel with direct knowledge of the
decision-making process have declined to be questioned by the Safety
Board.
Sections of the Olympic pipe were carefully excavated under the
Safety Board's supervision and then transported to our laboratory
facilities in Washington D.C. During the excavation process, the water
lines that had been installed across Olympic's pipeline in the vicinity
of the rupture were exposed, and indications of external damage to the
pipeline were observed. Safety Board investigators have interviewed
personnel from the City of Bellingham, the firm that designed the water
plant modifications and managed the construction activities on behalf
of the City of Bellingham, as well as the contractor who installed the
water piping. However, Olympic employees who were assigned to inspect
the construction activity have also declined to speak with Safety Board
investigators.
Preliminary visual examination of the ruptured pipeline segment has
shown that the fracture originated at a gouge mark on the surface of
the pipe. Additional gouge marks and dents were found on the exterior
surface of the ruptured pipe segment, and inward protrusions were noted
on the inside of the pipe. Examination of a second pipe segment noted
two dents.
Because of the criminal inquiry, we had not been able to test the
failed pipe until now. Microscopic examination of the fracture face is
underway this week to help us determine whether there are any
indications of fatigue near the point of origin. Additional tests are
also being conducted to determine the microstructure and
characteristics of the pipe material.
Based upon a review of Olympic's computer pressure data
automatically recorded during the accident sequence, our investigators
also began to examine the functioning of valves at a newly-constructed
pumping and storage facility near Bayview, Washington. Preliminary
information indicates that a block valve on the pipeline entering
Bayview Station had closed over 50 times since the facility began
operating on December 16, 1998. Our investigators are still evaluating
these events to determine the pressures involved and the functioning of
a relief valve.
Shortly after the accident, our investigators also began to
evaluate the actions of Olympic's personnel who were operating the
pipeline from the Renton, Washington, control center. Based on the
event logs, we know that flow within the pipeline was restarted
approximately 45 minutes after the rupture occurred. The pipeline was
then operated for approximately 17 minutes until the pumps shut down.
The Board's investigative staff are reviewing substantial
documentation provided by Olympic, such as pressure data, design
information, construction records, telephone logs and e-mail records,
along with the applicable company policies and procedures related to
pipeline operations and maintenance, as part of our investigation.
However, we may never know what happened within the control center
around the time of the accident unless we are able to interview the
individuals operating the pipeline when the accident occurred. There
are at least four key individuals who may have direct knowledge of the
events that occurred in the control room during the accident sequence.
Those individuals include two controllers who were on duty at the time
of the accident, their supervisor, and a former controller now
responsible for maintaining the SCADA system and acting as a relief
controller. He was reportedly performing modifications to the computer
programming at the time of the incident. These individuals are also
critical to our investigation into human performance issues, such as
training, fatigue, and ergonomics, that may be relevant with this
accident. As I mentioned, these individuals and others have declined to
talk with us.
Several of the issues being looked into as a result of the
Bellingham accident--excavation damage, pipeline integrity, training of
personnel--have been concerns of the Safety Board for many years
It is unfortunate that some of the issues we have addressed, which
have been the subject of Safety Board recommendations, have not been
acted on in a timely manner. Each of these issues could be accomplished
without legislative action. However, because the Department has not
acted, Congressional intervention may be necessary.
Safety Issues
I would now like to discuss general pipeline safety issues. As the
Federal regulatory agency for pipeline safety, the Research and Special
Programs Administration (RSPA) plays a crucial role. As the Board has
often stated, RSPA and its Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) have not
responded as aggressively to its mandate as we would have liked. RSPA's
implementation rate of pipeline safety recommendations is about 69
percent, the lowest acceptance rate of any modal administration in the
Department of Transportation. We do not think this low percentage is a
result of ill-conceived recommendations. In fact, the acceptance rate
of our pipeline safety recommendations issued to the pipeline community
as a whole is about 87 percent. Too often, RSPA will find it difficult
even to respond in a timely fashion, one way or another. We note that
Section 3 of S.2438 addresses the need for timely responses to pipeline
safety recommendations.
We believe that RSPA's lack of action continues to place the
American people at risk. Administrator Coyner has met with our Board
Members and has made a commitment to improve RSPA's response rate to
Safety Board safety recommendations. As a result, we have seen more
timely responses to new safety recommendations, and increased activity
on damage prevention and corrosion control issues. However, we are
still concerned about the lack of timely action on other issues. We
feel the areas listed below are areas that require immediate action:
pipeline integrity;
accident data collection;
training;
valve automation; and
excavation damage prevention.
Pipeline Integrity
The continued operation of pipelines with integrity problems is a
recurring issue in accidents investigated by the Safety Board. In 1987,
as a result of investigations into three pipeline accidents (Beaumont,
Kentucky; Lancaster, Kentucky; and Mounds View, Minnesota), the Safety
Board recommended that RSPA require pipeline operators to periodically
inspect their pipelines to identify corrosion, mechanical damage, or
other time-dependent defects that may prohibit their safe operation.
Yet, 13 years after our initial recommendation was issued, there are no
regulations that require pipeline operators to perform periodic
inspections or tests to locate and assess whether this type of damage
exists on other pipelines. Due to the length of time that had passed
without final RSPA action, the Safety Board in June 1999, classified
its recommendation as ``Open-Unacceptable Response.'' We note that on
April 24, 2000, RSPA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on
this issue, and the Safety Board is in the process of reviewing it. We
also note that Section 5 of S.2438 will require a pipeline integrity
inspection program to be completed within 12 months after the date of
enactment in unusually sensitive areas and high-density population
areas.
The Safety Board is currently investigating five other pipeline
accidents with potential pipeline integrity problems that occurred
during 1999-2000. In these accidents, the lack of inspections or
adequate corrective actions may be relevant safety issues.
Accident Data Collection
For over 25 years, the Safety Board has pointed out major
deficiencies and recommended changes to RSPA's pipeline accident data
collection process. In a January 1996 report, Evaluation of Accident
Data and Federal Oversight of Petroleum Product Pipelines, the Safety
Board concluded that RSPA's failure to fully implement the Safety
Board's 1978 recommendations to evaluate and analyze its accident data
reporting needs has hampered RSPA's ability to effectively oversee the
Nation's pipelines.
Then, in December 1997, another Safety Board report, Protecting
Public Safety Through Excavation Damage Prevention, indicated that
RSPA's reporting forms are poorly designed and fail to provide
necessary information. For example, the form for hazardous liquid
pipelines lists just seven generic causal categories, such as
corrosion, outside force damage, and other. In 1996, RSPA indicated
that ``outside force'' damage was the leading cause of accidents; the
second leading cause was ``other'' which may include landslides,
earthquakes and floods. Although we know that excavation damage is the
leading cause of pipeline accidents, it is not listed as a category.
Instead, most excavation damage accidents are reported as outside force
damage, other, or incorrect operation by operator personnel. The Safety
Board has repeatedly pointed out that RSPA's definitions of accident
causes are imprecise and that distinctions between categories are
vague. Such deficiencies preclude effective accident trend analysis and
performance evaluation. Therefore, the Safety Board has recommended
that RSPA revise the causal categories on its gas and hazardous liquid
pipeline accident report forms to eliminate overlapping and confusing
categories, to clearly list excavation damage as one of the data
elements, and to consider developing subcategories. We note that
Section 10 of S.2438 will require improved data collection within 12
months.
In an April 1998 report, Brittle-like Cracking in Plastic Pipe for
Gas Service, the Safety Board noted that RSPA's accident data are
insufficient to serve as a basis for assessing the long-term
performance of plastic pipe. Because the Board lacked adequate data
from RSPA, we had to review technical literature and contact experts in
gas distribution plastic piping to estimate the frequency of brittle-
like cracks in plastic piping. Based on that research, the report noted
that brittle-like failures could be the second most frequent failure
mode for older plastic pipe and recommended that RSPA determine the
susceptibility of older plastic piping to premature brittle-like
cracking.
Training of Pipeline Personnel
The Safety Board has long been concerned about the need to
adequately train personnel in all transportation modes, including
pipeline. In 1987, after several pipeline accidents in which inadequate
training was an issue, the Safety Board recommended that RSPA require
operators to develop training programs for pipeline personnel. After 11
years had passed since the recommendation was issued without final
action, the Safety Board classified the recommendation as ``Closed-
Unacceptable Action.''
However, inadequate training continues to be a factor in pipeline
accidents. In the 1996 Fork Shoals, South Carolina, pipeline accident,
the Safety Board found that pipeline controllers had been inadequately
trained to recognize and handle emergency conditions. In that accident,
the controller had mistakenly shut down a pump station, failed to
recognize his mistake, and continued to operate the pipeline after it
ruptured. As mentioned earlier, this action resulted in the release of
nearly one million gallons of fuel oil into the Reedy River.
On November 21, 1996, a pipeline accident in San Juan, Puerto Rico,
resulted in 33 fatalities and 69 injuries. Our investigation determined
that the gas company's employees had not been properly trained to
survey, pinpoint, or test for pipeline leaks, and failed to locate a
reported leak before the explosion occurred. Following that accident,
the Safety Board recommended that RSPA complete a final rule on
employee qualification, training, and testing within one year.
In October 1998, RSPA published an NPRM to require pipeline
operators to develop a written qualification program for individuals
operating pipelines. However, it did not establish training
requirements for personnel and it allowed companies to evaluate an
individual's ability to perform tasks using methods such as oral
examinations or observations of job performance. In January 1999, the
Board provided comments to RSPA that urged them to amend the rule to
include strong training and testing requirements to ensure that
employees can properly perform their jobs. In February 1999, the Safety
Board classified its recommendation as ``Open-Unacceptable Action,''
because the NPRM did not adequately address those issues. In August
1999, RSPA published its final rule, which was substantially unchanged
from the NPRM. We note the Section 4 of S.2438 would require
reformulation of RSPA's rule along the lines of the Safety Board's
recommendations for training and recurrent training. We also note that
legislation proposed by Senator Murray would require qualification
testing and certification, similar to requirements for aviation
personnel.
Valve Automation
The Safety Board has long advocated the increased use of valve
automation to protect public safety and the environment by reducing the
consequences of pipeline failures. The issue was first addressed 30
years ago in a study entitled Effects of Delay in Shutting Down Failed
Pipeline Systems and Methods of Providing Rapid Shutdown.
Since then, a number of other accidents have repeatedly highlighted
the need to control the accidental release of product. On July 8, 1986,
in Mounds View, Minnesota, gasoline spewed from a pipeline and flowed
down a city street before igniting and seriously burning three people,
two of whom later died. The Safety Board found that the pipeline
operator could not promptly stop the release of gasoline.
On March 23, 1994, in Edison, New Jersey, a high-pressure natural
gas pipeline exploded and a fire ensued. Heat from that fire ignited
several building roofs in an apartment complex. The Safety Board again
found that the pipeline operator's inability to promptly stop the flow
of natural gas contributed to the accident's severity. In February
1995, the Safety Board recommended that RSPA expedite requirements for
the rapid shutdown of failed pipeline segments. Later in 1995, RSPA
held a public workshop on this subject and it is continuing to study
the issue. Despite RSPA's failure to require these systems, several
companies have voluntarily put in valves to rapidly shut down their
failed pipelines.
In an accident in May 1996, near Gramercy, Louisiana, the pipeline
company took approximately 4\1/2\ hours to manually close the valves on
either side of a ruptured pipeline. Almost 500,000 gallons of gasoline
were ultimately released into the environment. In September 1998, the
Board recommended that the pipeline operator install more valve
automation into its pipeline system. The operator has advised the Board
that it is currently evaluating which existing valves to retrofit for
remote control operation and is planning to install this technology
into a new pipeline that may run from Kenova, West Virginia, to
Columbus, Ohio.
Obviously, this technology is available and is being used. We will
be waiting for too long, however, if we rely solely on voluntary
efforts of industry. RSPA must require systems that limit product
release after a major pipeline rupture for all operators, so that this
is understood, across-the-board, as a necessary cost of doing business.
Excavation Damage Prevention
Excavation damage is the leading cause of pipeline accidents. This
issue was added to the Safety Board's ``Most Wanted'' list of
transportation issues in 1997, and in December 1997, we published a
study entitled Protecting Public Safety Through Excavation Damage
Prevention. As a result, the Board issued 26 recommendations aimed at
improving excavation damage prevention covering such areas as:
technology to accurately locate and mark underground
facilities;
training and educating of excavation personnel;
use of data to evaluate programs; and
enforcement of damage prevention programs.
Preventing excavation damage to pipeline systems is a top priority
for RSPA. RSPA's efforts in the area of underground damage prevention
include: an ongoing nationwide Dig Safely Campaign, a completed report
on damage prevention best practices, Common Ground, and helping to
establish an organization to implement and continue to develop the best
practices.
State Inspection Programs
State pipeline safety programs are important to help ensure that
pipeline system operators comply with minimum safety standards. In
fact, state pipeline inspectors who conduct daily inspection activities
represent more than 90 percent of the safety inspection workforce. Yet,
Federal matching funds provided to states have consistently been below
the 50 percent level authorized by the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act.
The Board has been advised by representatives of several states that
funds have not kept pace with demand, and that inadequate funds
threaten the infrastructure of the Nation's pipeline safety program.
Additionally, we are concerned that while states have many more
inspectors than OPS, that OPS is removing states from interstate
pipeline inspection programs. State officials have advised that OPS,
while previously encouraging states to act as interstate agents, is now
denying their applications. In fact, states have advised the Safety
Board that OPS has effectively halted this program.
For example, in Virginia, approximately 2 million gallons of
petroleum products have spilled from pipelines since 1974. In an
accident near Reston, Virginia, in 1993, more than 407,000 gallons of
diesel fuel spilled from a pipeline into Sugarland Creek, a tributary
of the Potomac River. Because of several liquid pipeline accidents that
occurred in Virginia, the General Assembly passed legislation in 1994
authorizing the State Corporation Commission to seek interstate agent
status from OPS, which would allow state inspectors to inspect
interstate pipelines. OPS apparently originally supported this
legislation, and for several years encouraged the Commission to pursue
interstate agent status. Unfortunately, when the Virginia Commission
was ready to accept agent status, OPS denied their application.
The OPS currently has the ability to utilize these state resources
for regular inspection activities through its partnering agreements. We
believe state assistance in the interstate pipeline inspection program
may go a long way to improving pipeline safety. Because a single
pipeline may operate in as many as 10 states, effective Federal
oversight is needed to ensure that pipeline operators are meeting
minimum safety standards. It is also critical that comprehensive,
consistent, and effective regulatory requirements for interstate
pipelines be enacted at the Federal level to protect citizens in all of
the states. We believe that Congress needs to closely examine how the
states are utilized, funded, and evaluated by OPS. However, for the
consistent and effective application of regulatory requirements to
interstate pipelines, the authority and responsibility should rest with
the OPS.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to
answer the Committee's questions.
Senator Gorton. Thank you. Senator McCain has been required
to meet another engagement. He has a long series of excellent
and thoughtful questions that will be submitted to each of you,
and we would like your answers for the record.
I would like to start, Ms. Coyner, by saying that Mr. Mead
was highly critical of at least the procedural aspects of your
proposed rulemaking, both the tardiness with which it was
begun, but perhaps more significant for our purposes, with the
long lead times before some or all of these rules become
effective and how well they are enforced. Do you want to
comment on that critique?
Ms. Coyner. I think what is important to recognize in the
rulemaking is that companies have one rule in terms of their
initial compliance of putting together an integrity management
plan, and the integrity management plan encompasses internal
inspections but a number of other steps, and so I think it is
important to focus on that.
Second, it is a proposal. It was put together with the best
data available, and we invite comments in terms of
strengthening it. We would be delighted to be able to justify a
shorter timeframe in terms of requiring internal inspections.
That means that we have to be able to have a demonstrated
benefit, and we also have to be able to show the availability
of the actual testing devices in terms of timing, of putting
together the integrity management rulemaking.
Under the statute, the first requirement is that we have to
be able to define what an unusual area is. That is an
environmental term not existing in any other statute, and that
definition in fact was changed by Congress in 1996 in terms of
what the parameters would be. It is an important but
exceedingly complicated effort in terms of not only defining
what would fall in that area, but also identifying where it
would be on the pipeline.
That definition has been proposed. The comment period on
that is closing. We chose to go forward with the actual testing
requirement rule so it would be ready to go when the actual
definition rulemaking is done.
Can we do more in this area? Absolutely. We have to
continue to push forward to finish the other two rulemakings by
the end of the year, as well as making sure that we are
identifying technologies that are not used today to be able to
deal with some of the issues that can meet, and others have
raised, in terms of the ability to be able to pig natural gas
pipelines and to deal with other issues.
Senator Gorton. Does the administration bill enhance your
rulemaking capacity?
Ms. Coyner. The administration's bill does a couple of
things in that regard. One is that it says that if these
rulemakings for some reason do not go forward the statute will
require the standards that are proposed in the proposed
rulemaking, or liquid lines, for all lines.
Second, it says that after those have been in effect for 3
years, that the Secretary will have to review them and
determine whether or not they ought to apply beyond what they
call high consequences areas, the places where there are people
who live around the pipeline as well as unusually sensitive
areas.
So in fact it is not just a strengthening of the regulatory
requirement, it says if we cannot reach it one way, we are
going to make sure we reach it another way.
Senator Gorton. Mr. Mead, apparently all or almost all of
the recommendations that you have made are incorporated in
Senator McCain's bill. Do you think Senator McCain's bill is
adequate to meet the challenges that have been so graphically
illustrated to us both by this accident and by the general lack
of adequacy in pipeline regulation?
Mr. Mead. I think Senator McCain's bill forms a good
foundation, and it does refer to our recommendations, but I
also believe that Senator Murray's bill, and the administration
bill, have a number of good provisions. I do not think it is
generally a good way to legislate to say this rule is going to
take effect if for some reason the rule gets derailed.
But frankly, Congress contemplated the safety mandates
would be in place by 1995. The law was not vague when you
passed it, so I do not know what else I would recommend besides
the type of provision that Ms. Coyner described.
I also think that Senator Murray's bill is particularly
good in the area of encouraging states to have a role. I do not
think that the states should have to get the Federal
Government's permission to have a large role, but as I
indicated in my statement, I draw a distinction between that
and States actually enacting rules.
Senator Gorton. Given your position in the Department, are
you in a position to submit to us your recommendation of what
elements in each of these three bills is appropriate to make a
proper overall response to this challenge?
Mr. Mead. Yes, I am, and I will. The Inspectors General,
unlike the operating administrators, do not go through OMB for
clearance for our views on what the legislation should contain.
You will have that by the beginning of next week.
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Mr. Hammerschmidt, does that apply to you as well, at the
Safety Board? Have you looked at all three of these bills, and
can you recommend to us how they ought to be combined, or are
there any inadequacies in any of them, in a prompt fashion?
Mr. Hammerschmidt. Senator Gorton, we have reviewed the
different pieces of legislation, and we would like to offer the
Committee, if you would like us to do so, to provide you for
the record an analysis, a comparative analysis of the different
bills. I cannot speak for the board. I am just one of the board
members. But we would be glad to expeditiously get that
information to the Committee if you would like us to.
[The informations referred to follows:]
NTSB Comparative Analysis
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) staff met with your
Committee staff to discuss Safety Board recommendations for pipeline
safety improvements related to the proposed legislation. A review of
our data base reveals that safety recommendations issued to the
Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) can all be
accomplished without legislative action. However, a number of critical
safety issues in the proposed legislation have not been acted upon and
may warrant Congressional intervention.
Since 1987, the Safety Board has urged that RSPA require pipeline
operators to verify the integrity of their pipelines by mandating
periodic inspection and testing. Section 5 of S. 2004 would require
internal inspections at least every 5 years; the Board does not have
sufficient data to recommend a specific test period at this time.
Section 5 of S. 2438 would require operators to periodically inspect
and test pipelines; the Safety Board suggests that the frequency of the
inspections or tests required depend upon the characteristics of the
pipeline and the ability of inspection or test methods to detect
defects before the defects propagate to critical size. Under such a
mandate, RSPA could require that pipelines with protective coating
deficiencies or known corrosion conditions be inspected more
frequently, and that the frequency depend on the ability of the
inspection method to detect defects.
The Safety Board supports language proposed in Sections 2b and 2c
of S. 2409 that would require an operator to clearly define criteria
for evaluating and acting on the results of inspections, and that would
also require that prompt action be taken to address integrity issues.
The Safety Board has also urged, in safety recommendations, that
pipeline employees be required to be trained, tested to assess the
success of training, and periodically retrained and retested, as
appropriate. Training requirements in Section 4 of S. 2438 are
consistent with past Safety Board recommendations. Section 6 of S. 2004
would also require testing to determine whether individuals are
qualified to perform assigned functions. Such a requirement is
consistent with previous Safety Board recommendations. S. 2004 requires
certification by the Secretary of Transportation, which the Board has
not previously recommended. Objective criteria would provide regulators
with specific means to reassess the qualification of individuals after
an accident and before they resume regular duties.
Most of the provisions in Section 7 of S. 2438 are consistent with
past Safety Board recommendations concerning public education and
emergency preparedness needs.
Finally, the Safety Board is concerned that State officials'
ability to inspect interstate pipeline operators is threatened.
Effective oversight is needed to ensure that pipeline operators meet
minimum standards. Section 9 of S. 2438 Section 9 is consistent with
the Safety Board's support for participation of State authorities in
overseeing interstate pipeline activities.
Senator Gorton. I think that would be of great help to us.
In fact, Mr. Mead, you anticipated my next question when you
referred to Senator Murray's state participation in this. You
had felt that state participation ought to be enhanced. In this
particular connection, does this bill do enough? Does it
adequately define the State authority and responsibility?
Mr. Mead. Yes, but I should also say I think this is an
area where funding needs to be considered as well. This is an
authorizing committee. You can authorize money, but this is an
important area, and we are emphasizing R&D, which costs money.
We are emphasizing the state program, and I think the answer to
your question is yes, but some follow-through on the funding,
the R&D program and the grant program will be in order.
Senator Gorton. Thank you. Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
applaud all of you for your testimony and your work on this,
and Ms. Coyner, I want to thank you and the administration for
working so hard under some pretty strict timeframes we gave you
to get your bill forward, and I appreciate the work you did on
that.
I do have a number of questions. First of all, Ms. Coyner,
in Senator McCain's bill he includes pipeline personnel
qualifications that would require periodic retraining and
examination. Considering the rule on operating qualification,
you did issue last year----
Senator Gorton. Excuse me, Senator Murray. We now have
another vote going on. What I think I will do is, I will go
vote now while you finish your questioning, then John, and we
will do it continuously, and I will get back as quick as I can.
Senator Murray. I would be happy to do that.
Considering the rule on operating qualification that you
issued last year, which requires operators to submit plans to
OPS to qualify their employees by 2001, and implement these
plans by 2002, how do you think this requirement would
supplement these plans?
Ms. Coyner. As I understand the provision in Senator
McCain's bill, it would require that we review those individual
plans in an affirmative way, rather than the mere compliance
States that are in the rulemaking. I think that is something
that we can do.
I think the main issue, though, in terms of taking on that
additional review level is how do we define the roles as
between the federal government and state governments in the
review of those plans and second whether or not the Office of
Pipeline Safety has adequate resources to perform that
responsibility.
Senator Murray. Do you think operators could adjust their
plans to meet these requirements, which I think are common
sense requirements?
Ms. Coyner. I think that the issue would be the scope of
coverage. The operator qualifications rule that we propose has
very broad coverage in terms of the number of safety employees
that are covered and the types of conditions that they have to
be able to respond to. I think that the McCain deadlines may
mean that we would want to do some sort of phased-in
requirement in terms of the coverage, but what I would like to
say, Senator Murray, is that we want to work with you to make
sure that we have the right legislative requirements and
regulatory requirements in place in this area.
Senator Murray. Mr. Hammerschmidt, in your testimony you
criticized OPS's rule on operator qualification as allowing too
low of a threshold in evaluating pipeline personnel's ability
to perform tasks. In Senator McCain's bill he includes a
section on pipeline personnel's qualifications that would
require periodic retraining and examination. Do you think that
would satisfy NTSB's objection to OPS's current rule?
Mr. Hammerschmidt. Well, again, Senator, I am just one of
the four Board members, and I do not want to speak for the
Board on that question, but as I recall, having read Senator
McCain's bill, I was very impressed that his proposed language
dove-tailed with some of the recommendations that we had made
in the past and exhibited a very sensitive hand on the pulse of
our concerns for many years, and I would answer affirmatively
for myself.
Senator Murray. Thank you.
Ms. Coyner, in the technology section of the administration
proposal, you separate technologies into two types, one dealing
with outside force damage and one dealing with internal
inspection, and you assign two separate timeframes one year
apart to begin developing those kinds of technologies. As you
probably know, Senator McCain's bill does not make any
distinction between the two. Can you explain to us why in your
proposal you do that?
Ms. Coyner. That reflects our current activities and the
way we would be able to build on them, and second it is
basically strictly a resource issue, Senator Murray, in terms
of the timeframes that we have put in place.
Senator Murray. A resource issue from what perspective?
Ms. Coyner. In terms of, we could in fact start both of
them at the same time if there were adequate resources to do
that, in terms of the overall funding of the program.
Senator Murray. So it is just a matter of the fact that we
have not put enough money forward to develop technologies, so
you have separated them out from that perspective?
Ms. Coyner. I think what I want to emphasize is that the
proposal in that regard was really just that, a proposal. I do
not think that one is one where we believe that there's a
strong reason, other than our ability to ramp up to do the
work, and the resource component of it.
Senator Murray. So if there were more resources available
you could move forward on both internal and external?
Ms. Coyner. That is right.
Senator Murray. I do have to say I like the provisions in
your proposal that recognize the need to create public-private
partnerships with industry and academia to speed up some of the
development of these technologies. I hope that we do have that
provision in the final product.
Ms. Coyner, I did want to ask you some clarification about
a provision in the integrity management section of your
proposal which says that operators cannot use testing that
would, and I quote, increase environmental or safety risks.
Now, some people contend that hydrostatic testing increases
environmental and safety risks because of wastewater and the
level of pressure used. Wouldn't your section then allow an
operator to refuse to use certain types of testing techniques
such as hydrostatic testing, and if so, don't you think it is
unwise, since hydrostatic testing is the most comprehensive and
reliable testing method that we have at this time?
Ms. Coyner. I agree with you until the very final
statement, and that is with respect to hydrostatic testing
being the best available alternative. What hydrostatic testing
does is, it shows you the weakest place in the pipe. It does
not show you all defects in the pipe.
I think what is important is that hydrostatic testing be
used in combination with other forms of testing. If there is
concern that the administration's proposal and the language in
it would somehow preclude the use of hydrostatic testing, I
think we should work together to make sure that what is finally
passed does not say that. That was not our intent.
Our intent was really to make sure that we avoid the use of
hydrostatic testing as the only form of testing, or as a
testing of first result, not because of the wastewater issue,
though that is certainly one that is of concern, but also
because of the damage that hydrostatic testing may do to a
pipe.
Senator Murray. I understand that. I am just concerned that
the language would allow an operator to say no, we are not
going to do hydrostatic testing even if it is the only
available method.
Ms. Coyner. We ought to work together to make sure it does
not have that unintended consequence.
Senator Murray. Finally, the integrity management rule of
your proposal requires at least 500 miles of pipeline to apply,
and I understand that the proposed integrity management rule
that you recently issued for comment has that same threshold
requirement of 500 miles. Why did you create a minimum on this?
Why do you not include all pipelines?
Ms. Coyner. In the rulemakings we currently have scheduled
this year, it is our expectation that we would move forward
on--we call those large and small operators, above and below
500 miles, and so what our expectation is, is that we would
move forward with the small operators and with the natural gas
pipelines at the end of the year. What the legislation does is,
it uses the standard that we have currently proposed for large
operators as the basis for applying it to all operators if we
do not move forward on the rulemakings. Is that sufficiently
confusing?
Basically, it says 500 miles, because that is the
rulemaking that is out now, and that is the standard which we
would apply across the board if there were no further
rulemaking activity.
Senator Murray. 500 miles is a long space.
Ms. Coyner. It is not intended to mean that it would not
apply to pipelines of a shorter length. It is a definition to
describe a rulemaking right now that only covers the larger
pipelines. What the provision is designed to do, or was
intended to do, was to say the standard that applies to large
operators would apply to small operators as well if there is no
further action taken.
Senator Murray. I am going to call for a short recess.
There is 2 minutes left in the vote, and I need to get to the
floor and back. I do believe other members of this Committee
have questions for this panel, so if we could just take a short
recess, and we will be right back.
[Recess.]
Senator Gorton. Ms. Coyner, a question from Senator
McCain's material here. At the beginning of the year, RSPA
revoked interstate pipeline agents delegation status away from
Arizona and Nevada, authority under which the States inspect
interstate lines, report their findings, and the Department is
responsible for enforcement, also announced its intention to
revoke the status from all other states in the future.
How is this consistent with your own stated views and
Secretary Slater's testimony before the Committee when he
stressed the importance of federal and state partnerships?
Ms. Coyner. The issue with respect to the two states
mentioned refers to the current interstate agency program which
is a year, 2-year temporary program and turns on there actually
being inspections being conducted in that particular State.
Senator Gorton. And there were not in those two states?
Ms. Coyner. That is correct. In terms of the scheduled
inspections, however, we have repeatedly invited Arizona and
Nevada to reapply for interstate agency status as recently as 2
weeks ago.
The issue at stake here is a couplefold, and we have tried
to address it within the context of our legislative proposal.
The states have felt very strongly that they would like to see
permanent interstate agency status. There is no statutory
requirement for this particular part of the program, but we
would like to propose there be a statutory provision and that
it include a permanent grant of interstate agency status for
the purpose of inspecting liquid lines. We already have a
similar program for natural gas lines.
That provision would allow a state to do a number of
different kinds of inspections. Of particular interest to the
two states that you mentioned would be operation and
maintenance inspections. We have asked in that category that
there be a coordinated work plan, and the issue here is we want
to make sure that high priority issues are being addressed.
We want to make sure that intrastate lines are not being
neglected, and we want to make sure that there is not a
duplication of effort, but it is my view and Secretary Slater's
view that there is an important opportunity to allow for a
state input into the protection of pipelines as well as the
inspection of pipelines.
Senator Gorton. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
witnesses.
I have two short areas I want to get into. The first one,
in the Bellingham accident, NTSB member Hammerschmidt's
testimony indicates that, based on the event logs, we know that
the flow within the pipeline was restarted approximately 45
minutes after the rupture occurred. The pipeline was then
operated for about 17 minutes until the pump shut down, and I
note also from Mr. Hammerschmidt's testimony that back in 1995,
the Safety Board recommended that RSPA, your agency, expedite
requirements for the rapid shutdown of failed pipeline
segments.
Now, I know for a fact in off-shore areas of the Outer
Continental Shelf that there are federal requirements requiring
automatic shut-off valves when an off-shore pipeline has an
interruption for whatever reason. I guess my question, and they
were recommending this 5 years ago, why do we not have
requirements for automatic shut-off valves on gas pipelines?
Ms. Coyner. Senator Breaux, are you asking me about natural
gas pipelines, or liquid?
Senator Breaux. I am asking about natural gas pipelines. I
mean, I do not understand how this line could have had a severe
interruption to it and then for a substantial period of time it
says here that it was restarted again, and obviously the
interruption was still there, and that it operated something
like 17 minutes with a major leak.
Ms. Coyner. I think it is important to note, Senator
Breaux, that this was a liquid pipeline and not a natural gas
pipeline, and there is important differences in terms of the
use.
Senator Breaux. There is no requirements of automatic shut-
off on liquid pipelines?
Ms. Coyner. There is a difference in terms of the usage of
automatic shut-off valves on liquid lines in terms of the
potential for actually causing a more serious problem.
Senator Breaux. The question is, is there a federal
requirement that there be automatic shut-off valves on gasoline
pipelines?
Ms. Coyner. There is not a requirement. The integrity
management issue we have been discussing this morning would
require that a company install those in order to protect highly
populated areas and environmentally sensitive areas, balancing
the possible difficulties that they pose on liquid lines.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Hammerschmidt, you made this
recommendation, or your agency did, 5 years ago. Does it
disturb you that we still, 5 years later, do not have action on
this?
Mr. Hammerschmidt. Yes, it is disturbing, but that is just
one of many areas that have not been addressed for many more
years.
Senator Breaux. I think the lack of action speaks for
itself. I am disturbed by it. In another area, back in 1987,
the safety board recommended that RSPA--and neither one of you
were there--recommended back in 1987 that we require pipeline
operators to periodically inspect their pipelines, and yet you
point out, Mr. Hammerschmidt, that now we are 13 years later
and we do not have that recommendation in place. I know that is
not to say that pipelines are not inspected, because companies
do inspections without federal requirements.
Ms. Coyner, can you comment? I know you have the rulemaking
now, but why don't we have federal requirements that interstate
pipelines be periodically inspected, particularly when I would
imagine that most of them in fact are being inspected?
Ms. Coyner. I think in terms of the time with which it took
to address that issue, one of the things I would like to point
out is, over the last 5 years in terms of the NTSB
recommendations we have had almost a 95 to 97 percent
acceptance rate in terms of responsiveness. I think that
reflects, a change in the approach we have taken at the Office
of Pipeline Safety, but also the increased allocation of
resources in order to be able to address those issues.
Senator Breaux. I appreciate that, but with the two I
listed we do not have regulations yet, and it seems like the
two, the automatic shut-off valves and the regular periodic
inspections, have to be two of the biggest.
Ms. Coyner. On the issue of the automatic shut-off valves,
the NTSB recommendation indicates that the Bellingham accident
actually had to do with requiring a leak detection system. I
think it is important, and particularly important for the
families who are concerned here, to know that there was indeed
a leak detection system on this line, and that they were
subject to regulation in terms of what the standards were for
that leak detection system.
Senator Breaux. The problem is not finding out there is a
leak. The problem is the fact that the pipeline continued to
pump gasoline for 17 minutes after it was already interrupted.
Ms. Coyner. The requirements in terms of the automatic
shut-off valves is not one that the NTSB has recommended with
respect to liquid lines, only for gas lines. The rulemaking----
Senator Breaux. I am not sure anybody has to recommend
that. It seems like it is just sort of logical to be part of
your office to require automatic shut-off valves.
Ms. Coyner. The issue with respect to liquid lines is not
as clear as it is with natural gas pipelines. I would be glad
to submit for the record the technical documentation in that
respect, or with that regard.
I think in terms of the inspections the federal government
has long required a variety of different types of inspections
of pipelines. You are right that we have been long in requiring
the inspection by use of internal inspection devices. We have
required inspection through hydrostatic testing, we have
required inspection in terms of the gauges, in terms of aerial
surveys, and in terms of review of different corrosion issues.
Internal inspection devices have moved a long way. We
believe that now is the time to require periodic testing with
those internal inspection devices, and we also think it is
important to further push the envelope in terms of the
technology so that we can have continuous monitoring and
detection of corrosion problems, and also link them to fail-
safe mechanisms that would shut off the pipelines.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Hammerschmidt, Ms. Coyner says they do
have hydrostatic testing requirements and others, and your
statement says 13 years after the initial recommendations there
are no regulations that require pipeline operators to perform
periodic inspections or tests. She says yes, there are.
Mr. Hammerschmidt. Senator Breaux, what we are referring to
are the smart pig operations that would test for pipeline
integrity, and I believe we are talking perhaps apples and
oranges here, but there are no regulations that address that at
this point. In other words, as Mr. Mead said, running these
torpedo-like devices through pipelines to detect weak places.
Senator Breaux. That is not required?
Mr. Hammerschmidt. That is correct, and I might add, if you
would indulge me, I was in fact at the Safety Board in 1987. In
fact, I was on duty and on scene for an accident investigation
that led to these recommendations. Actually three accidents I
cited led to the 1987 recommendations, one of which was on
February 21, 1986, I believe, which occurred in Lancaster,
Kentucky, or as they call it down there, Lancaster, Kentucky.
The only reason I mention that is because it was the first
pipeline accident investigation I had been out on, although I
had been out on aviation accidents and other modal-type
accidents, but this was a 30-inch transmission line basically
going from Texas to the New York area. It had a rupture, and it
pretty much released the gas until it expended itself, ignited,
and in the process it basically incinerated an area, a rural
area of about 20 acres.
And the release of the gas--it was under such pressure, I
believe it was a little less than 1,000 psig, but the escaping
gas left a ditch that was approximately 500 feet long, 30 feet
wide, and 6 feet deep, and I remember that that was just a
scene of devastation to me, and it made a real impression as to
the potential devastating impacts of these pipeline accidents,
especially any type of hazardous materials pipeline accidents,
but in particular gas pipeline accidents.
Senator Breaux. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gorton. For any of you, can any of you tell me how
many criminal prosecutions there have been under the criminal
provisions of the present Pipeline Safety Act?
Ms. Coyner. Under the criminal provisions of the Pipeline
Safety Act?
Senator Gorton. Yes.
Ms. Coyner. I think the answer is that there has been one
subject to a particular provision, but actually that is not
true. I know of at least half-a-dozen of them. There have been
criminal prosecutions for falsification of records. There have
been criminal prosecutions that have been brought for knowingly
causing outside force damage and resulting in the rupture of
the line. Those are prosecutions that have happened in recent
years. I would be glad to submit those numbers.
Senator Gorton. Well, I would certainly like that.
Senator Gorton. Many of us have expressed our extreme
frustration in connection with Bellingham. We are now 11
months, I gather, to the day from the time of the accident, and
the people who know most about it have not said a word because
they are theoretically subject to criminal prosecution.
It seems to me that these criminal provisions often
frustrate our goal of greater safety, rather than to enhance
it. Would any of you feel it appropriate that the Department of
Transportation have the authority to grant immunity from
criminal prosecution if it felt it better to be able to get
prompt testimony in order to help prevent such accidents in the
future?
Mr. Mead. No, I would not feel comfortable with the federal
Government being able to do that. I am familiar with the
situation in Bellingham, and in a lot of these cases it is
important for the Justice Department, the Department of
Transportation, and the NTSB to get together very soon in the
process. In some respects, there are mutually supportive
things, but if you give transactional immunity to somebody who
has deliberately, intentionally falsified a report, I think
there is a certain trade-off, and I am not sure that I would
want to make that judgment alone.
I believe the chief law enforcement officer of the United
States has a role in giving out transactional immunity, plus I
think that the Department of Transportation would in the end be
subject to challenge that it was getting too close to the
industry in granting immunity in situations like that.
The key is getting the parties involved and cooperating
early to see if the Justice Department can give immunity to
certain----
Senator Gorton. Is that an implied criticism of the
proposition that that has not happened in this case?
Mr. Mead. It took longer than I think it should have in
this case, but it did happen. As you know, just recently the
court said it would be permissible for NTSB to do testing on
the pipeline, at least as I understand it.
Senator Gorton. But you still do not have the testimony of
these five or six people?
Mr. Mead. No.
Senator Gorton. Do you have any idea when a decision will
be reached that will permit that?
Mr. Mead. No, sir, I do not.
Ms. Coyner. I think that what is most important is that the
NTSB be able to conduct its safety investigation, and that we
need to work together with the Department of Justice and with
state prosecutors to make sure that if there is criminal
activity, that that can be pursued once the safety
investigation has been completed.
I am pleased to report that the Department of
Transportation has begun working with the Department of Justice
on policies that might guide individual U.S. Attorneys in their
approach to these things.
As you know, Senator Gorton, we have had this discussion in
other places. It is not a uniform policy from one U.S. Attorney
to another, but we believe it is one that would benefit from
discussion well before the incident ever occurs. I think that
the Southern District of Florida, Tom Scott there, probably has
a model for that. He has had an unfortunate number of cases,
from ValuJet to other aviation cases and hazardous materials
cases, and I think it is one that gives us a place to work
from.
I do not think--and I would agree with everything that Ken
Mead said about giving the Department the authority to grant
immunity. I do not think that would be constructive,
particularly when the NTSB is the lead safety investigators.
Mr. Mead. I will tell you where a very gray area is, that I
have not fully reached a conclusion on. It is not an issue of
whether somebody willfully and intentionally falsified a
document or a report, or something like that. Rather, it is
when there appears to be a pattern of negligence, perhaps even
gross negligence, and whether that should rise to the level of
criminal misconduct.
I think that is a very difficult area, particularly when
you are trying to balance whether it is more important to put
somebody in jail under those circumstances or fine them, or
more important to determine the cause of the accident.
Senator Gorton. That is what I would like to find out, if
you ever actually put anybody in jail.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Mead has hit on a
point. Under the Clean Water Act and other acts, the Migratory
Bird Act is one of them, a person can be held criminally liable
for ordinary negligence, not for having to show intentional
wrongdoing or criminal wrongdoing, or even gross negligence,
and what you are seeing in the Bellingham case and in others is
a hesitancy on the part of witnesses coming forward to testify
who may be ordinarily negligent in their actions because of the
risk of criminal prosecution for ordinary negligence, and not
having to even show intentional wrongdoing, or even gross
negligence.
It is a problem, and it is in congressional actions that
have created this problem, and that is why you see people not
being willing to come up and tell the truth about what
happened, because they fear being criminally prosecuted.
Senator Gorton. Senator Brownback, would you like to ask
questions?
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Brownback. If I could, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
and I apologize. I hope I do not hit some redundancies here,
and I have a statement for the record that I would like to
submit as an opening statement, too.
[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Brownback,
U.S. Senator from Kansas
Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing and for providing
critical leadership on an issue that is so important to the safety and
reliability of interstate pipelines.
I would first like to express my condolences to the families who
lost loved ones during that horrific accident in Bellingham last June.
I realize that no legislation can take away the pain you have suffered
but I am hopeful that this Committee will pass a bill that will make it
more unlikely for these accidents to occur in the future.
While the recent accident in Bellingham was tragic, pipelines are
the safest mode for delivering energy. During the past 10 years, 11
fatalities have occurred from natural gas transmission pipeline
accidents, with liquid pipelines being responsible for 23 fatalities in
the same time period. On the other hand, about 20 fatalities per year
are associated with local distribution companies. As a point of
reference, more than 40,000 deaths per year are related to highway
accidents.
That having been said, third-party damage is by far the leading
cause of pipeline accidents that result in death and injury. In fact,
for natural gas transmission lines, third-party damage represents about
38 percent of all accidents, and about 70 percent of all fatalities
associated with pipeline accidents. For natural gas local distribution
companies, third-party damage is an even greater problem, causing
almost two-thirds of all accidents.
One of the most effective ways to combat third-party damage to
pipelines is the use of one-call (or ``call-before-you dig'') centers,
which provide excavators with information about underground utilities
prior to beginning their work. One-call centers are governed by state
law, and are funded by local pipelines and utilities. In 1998, Congress
passed comprehensive one-call legislation as part of the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). The bill established a
federal grant program for states that work to improve the coverage and
participation level of their one-call programs.
I applaud the efforts by the OPS in targeting third-party damage
through its national ``Dig Safely'' public education campaign and by
promoting damage prevention practices associated with one-call systems.
Congress should look at improving public education programs and
one-call systems in order to prevent third-party damage. However, it
should not involve weakening federal control over interstate pipelines.
Of the approximately 2 million miles of pipeline in the country,
about 75% or 1.5 million miles are natural gas local distribution
pipelines. These intrastate natural gas pipelines, along with
intrastate liquid pipelines, are, for the most part, under the
oversight of state pipeline safety regulatory agencies. Since the
Federal government regulates all interstate commerce activities, states
are only preempted from regulating about 500,000 miles of interstate
pipe.
Some interstate pipeline transmission systems, those that carry the
majority of the fuel to the eventual users, traverse more than 10
states and hundreds of localities as they transport natural gas from
the wellhead to the consumer. While a large pipeline may pass through
many state and local jurisdictions, it still must operate and be
maintained as a single system so that the pipeline system will operate
in a safe, consistent, and efficient manner.
If states were allowed to preempt federal safety standards for
interstate pipelines, the actions of one state could affect gas service
and deliverability to consumers in other states in which the pipeline
operates. Differing state safety standards also would be disruptive to
the testing, inspection and equipment replacement activities that
interstate pipelines currently perform. Additionally, individual state
requirements shift focus away from system-wide priorities and service
considerations, as well as resources from areas where the need is
greatest, without adding any additional margin of safety to the system.
Indeed, if one state's requirements were restrictive enough, it easily
would be possible for safety to actually be lessened in other states by
having resources deflected away from the areas which may be most in
need.
I look forward to working with Committee members in passing a bill
which I hope will improve upon the 1996 Act and provide for the safe
transmission and distribution of fuel across this country.
Senator Brownback. I thank the witnesses, and I want to
thank the first panel who I got to hear a portion of on the
television, and it is a terrible tragedy the families went
through, and all of our hearts go out to you, and thank you for
trying to make something right and something better or good
happen out of a terrible tragedy.
I am curious about looking at the issue of inter- versus
intrastate pipelines, if we could, and the regulatory regimes
within each of these, and I am certain that you follow these
pretty closely, but as I look at DOT numbers overall, within
this area--and help me if I am looking at this correctly or
not.
If you look at the pipeline totals in this country that are
just under state jurisdiction, it is about 75 percent of the
pipelines that are under state jurisdiction solely, is that
correct?
Ms. Coyner. 75 percent are under the primary jurisdiction
of the states. That means that they apply Federal standards to
the intrastate lines, and they have the opportunity to have
some standards in excess of that within their state.
Senator Brownback. Where have we had the most pipeline
problems in the recent couple of years? Has it been more in the
in-state, intrastate, or interstate pipelines?
Ms. Coyner. It has been on intrastate pipelines. It depends
how you define it.
Senator Brownback. Well, define it by the great number of
accidents and fatalities.
Ms. Coyner. That would be on intrastate lines.
Senator Brownback. But with the primary source of
regulation being within the state?
Ms. Coyner. Right.
Senator Brownback. Has that been changing over a period of
years? Has it been in the past where it was more of the
interstate or intrastate, or has that been fairly consistent
over, say, the past 10-year time period, do you know?
Ms. Coyner. I believe those numbers have gone up somewhat,
and the reason for that is the fatalities tend to happen on
local distribution systems, those gas lines that supply gas
directly to a residence or a business, and they are in areas
that by the very nature of where they are, there are more
people close to the pipeline, and so that is a tendency where
those were, where those accidents have been.
Senator Brownback. So it is more of a function of locality
than it is of percentage of pipelines or distances that they
are covering?
Ms. Coyner. It is a function of a couple of different
things. One is that if you hit--and outside force damage is a
leading cause of failure. If you hit a natural gas pipeline
that is serving a neighborhood, you both have a much more
immediate safety hazard as well as the likelihood that there
are people in the vicinity.
Senator Brownback. And what percentage of the accidents are
what you just described as the outside force on the pipeline?
Ms. Coyner. I think the numbers have changed somewhat. I
believe there are 50 percent on local distribution systems,
somewhat less on natural gas transmission lines, and 25 percent
on liquid, hazardous liquid lines like the one at Bellingham.
Senator Brownback. So the numbers I was looking at, the
number of injuries of the in-state lines last year that you
were having 31 lines, the number of injuries were under state
jurisdiction, and one accident of lines under federal primary
jurisdiction in 1999.
Ms. Coyner. Well, define accidents, in terms of injuries or
fatalities.
Senator Brownback. This is just injury.
Ms. Coyner. I think that the documentation they are looking
at, sir, is really defining a seriousness of a particular
accident in terms of the consequence of it.
Senator Brownback. As I have looked through this, I think
overall, Mr. Chairman, this is a very serious issue, and the
incident in Washington is a horrifying one. I am hopeful we can
move forward legislatively.
I have some real caution about the note of having--I think
the state inspection is a good notion, but you are saying not
state. I do not know if you put the term jurisdiction or
regulatory authority. That is where I have some real pause
about as we look at the overall issue here, because we all want
safer pipelines. You want that, I want that, but I think an
issue that I want us to be cognizant and aware of is, we have
got a lot of the problems that are happening right now that the
dominant regulatory entity is the State, and a lot of that, as
I understand from you, is the location of it.
But as we move forward I think we would be wise not to be
really giving that authority back over, or giving that
authority to the States in these particular instances.
Ms. Coyner. I think what is important about what you
focused our attention on is that, as we look to strengthen our
partnerships with States on intrastate lines, we want to make
sure that they are still focused on intrastate lines where we
have the greatest problems, and I think what you have expressed
is more eloquent than perhaps the way we put it, but we are
certainly in agreement with you on that.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gorton. Thank you, and I want to thank this panel,
and we will now hear from panel number 2. Will those witnesses
please come forward?
Mr. Haener, you are first on my list, from CMS Gas
Transmission and Storage.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. HAENER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CMS GAS TRANSMISSION AND STORAGE COMPANY, ON BEHALF OF
THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Mr. Haener. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In addition to
representing CMS Energy, I also am here to represent the
Interstate Natural Gas Association, whose member companies
represent the majority of the interstate pipeline in this
country.
I first want to say that we do appreciate the Commission's
and the Committee's interest in pipeline safety. We share your
concern. And clearly, the importance of pipeline safety has
been highlighted by this recent tragic petroleum pipeline
incident in Bellingham, which, really, we heard about today,
killed three young, innocent people. Unquestionably, it has
been a tragedy, a painful experience for everyone involved, the
parents that were here today, the communities. I commend the
parents. It took a lot of courage to come here today. I think
that is good. That is good for all of us.
And on behalf of INGAA, which is the Interstate Natural Gas
Association, I can assure you that the natural gas pipeline
industry is committed to safety now and into the indefinite
future.
Certainly, the pipeline industry, and the natural gas, has
had a very good safety record. I think the statistics show
that. Now, statistics are not the end all. We are committed to
continue to improve safety. We are supporting research
constantly. We are always looking at new procedures and new
technologies.
For the record, safety is a priority in our industry. It is
not a part-time job; it is a full-time job. We do have state-
of-the-art monitoring equipment that is in operation 24 hours a
day. We have a combination of high-tech tools and what we call
no-tech tools, which will range from periodically physically
walking the pipeline, hydrostatically testing the pipeline,
close-interval corrosion surveys, to smart pigs. They all have
a use. And we need to have the majority of those tools
available to us.
I will tell you as an engineer, there is not one tool that
is going to be the end all. We need to use them all. We need to
continue to improve them. We need to continue to research.
We fly the pipelines weekly. That is low-tech. But, again,
there is low-tech, there is high-tech. We need the combination
and will continue to support both.
I think that there is a misconception on the natural gas
side. There are a number of regulations in place. They go from
design regulations to reporting requirements to maintenance
requirements. As an example, we are required to constantly
monitor what we call class locations. This is the population
that lives close to the pipeline. If the population increases,
there is more people living there, we are required to change
the design criteria for the pipe, which might involve taking
that pipe out and replacing it with heavy-wall pipe. This is
something we are required to do by law. We want annual surveys.
And that is kind of a routine safety maintenance procedure that
we are required to do.
We do have reporting requirements. We do have very specific
design requirements that we have to meet and constantly
monitor. And we do have requirements to notify the public.
Annually, we have to notify the public. We look at the people
along the pipeline right away as our neighbors. We visit them
annually. We tell them who we are, where the pipeline is
located, what to do, who to call, and whatever we can do to
assist them, and we encourage them to communicate with us. If
they have any concerns, if they saw somebody near the pipe, we
leave them information on the pipe.
We also are required to give the local communities maps of
the pipeline system, the officials, where it is. We already do
this. Can we improve? I am sure we can. But I do not want to
leave the impression that this is not done. These are our
neighbors. We understand that and we do work with them, and are
required under regulation to do that.
Certainly, we have heard about damage prevention as being a
major concern from third parties. It is a major concern. It is
responsible for a good portion of accidents. We do have one-
call legislation, something called TEA-21, that Senator Lott
sponsored several years ago. It is a good system, but we need
to continue to improve that system.
While we do have a very good history of safety, we do need
to continue and improve, and we do need to continue to work on
legislation.
I would like to comment just on three or four things in the
legislation. First, I think it is important that the pipeline
integrity rules take into account the difference between liquid
and gas operations. Certainly, they are both safe operations,
but the medium they flow does have physical properties that are
different. In terms of natural gas, it is lighter than air. It
will vent into the air. It does not accumulate on the ground
like liquid.
Gas is a compressible fuel. Liquids are non-compressible.
They have different physical characteristics within the
pipeline, and will put different kinds of stresses within the
pipe. We need to recognize those in the maintenance and design
criteria. So we do need separate rules and regulations so that
in fact in the doing we have the safest operation under the
transportation of both media forms.
In terms of Federal preemption, this is a concern. The
pipeline that I am directly responsible for, the Panhandle
Trunk Line Companies, operate in 13 different States. We
operate it as an integrated system. We are required to. We
serve many municipalities along the line. We do need one set of
safety standards to operate under. We have that now. We need to
continue that system.
Can we improve the regulations? Yes. We need to work
together to do that. But we cannot have a situation of
individual States having their own regulations that are
different from the Federal.
In terms of operator training, the natural gas industry
does have a requirement, through OPS, under operator training.
We are in the process of implementing that. And that program
will be implemented by April of 2001. We ought to look at that
program, evaluate it, and, if it needs improvement, let us
improve it. Let us give it a chance to operate first.
In terms of public notification, I talked about that. We do
annually notify the people along our right of way. We leave
things with them so they do not forget us. I have numbers of
examples here. Here is a thermometer you can stick on your
window to look at the temperature. It has the name of the local
pipeline company, the numbers to call. If you have questions or
see an emergency, we encourage it. We do leave maps with local
officials. So those things are done. They are underway.
In closing--I know there are a number of witnesses here--I
would like to say that we are committed to work with the
Committee to ensure that OPS and the Committee comes up with
the best legislation that enhances safety. And on behalf of the
natural gas industry, we will do whatever is required to work
on this legislation and make sure it is passed in a timely
manner.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Haener follows:]
Prepared Statement of William J. Haener, President and Chief Executive
Officer, CMS Gas Transmission and Storage Company, on Behalf of The
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am William J. Haener,
President and CEO of CMS Gas Transmission and Storage, a division of
CMS Energy Corp., headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan. Today I am
speaking on behalf of both the Interstate Natural Gas Association of
America (INGAA) and CMS Energy.
INGAA is the trade association that represents virtually all of the
interstate natural gas transmission pipeline companies operating in the
U.S., as well as comparable companies in Canada and Mexico. INGAA's
membership accounts for approximately 180,000 miles of the 280,000
miles of natural gas transmission pipeline in this country. Our members
transport over 90 percent of the natural gas consumed in America.
CMS Energy Corporation has annual sales of more than $6 billion and
assets of about $15 billion throughout the U.S. and around the world
with businesses in electric and natural gas utility operations;
independent power production; natural gas pipelines, gathering,
processing and storage; oil and gas exploration and production; and
energy marketing, services and trading.
CMS Gas Transmission and Storage is the pipeline and field services
division of CMS Energy. CMS Panhandle Pipe Line Companies, a unit of
CMS Gas Transmission and Storage, operates over 10,800 miles of
mainline natural gas pipeline extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the
Midwest and Canada. These pipelines access the major natural gas supply
regions of the Louisiana and Texas Gulf Coasts as well as the Mid-
continent and Rocky Mountains. The pipelines have a combined peak day
delivery capacity of 5.4 billion cubic feet per day and 85 billion
cubic feet of underground storage facilities. In addition, Consumers
Energy, an affiliate of CMS Gas Transmission and Storage, owns and
operates an interstate pipeline and storage company located in
Michigan.
Before moving on to the rest of my testimony, I first want to say
how much we appreciate the Committee's interest in pipeline safety. We
share your concern. Clearly, the importance of pipeline safety has been
highlighted by the recent tragic petroleum pipeline accident in
Bellingham, Washington that killed three young people. It has
unquestionably been a tragic and painful experience for three sets of
parents--and for a local community--that probably had previously given
little thought to the pipeline before the accident. Others will testify
on behalf of the petroleum pipeline industry. On behalf of INGAA, I can
assure you that the natural gas pipeline industry is committed to
safety. As you have pointed out yourself, Mr. Chairman, the safety
record for natural gas pipelines is quite good, and we will continue to
improve safety with new procedures and technologies. My testimony will
discuss the industry's historical emphasis on, and continued commitment
to, ensuring that the nation's interstate pipeline system operates in a
safe and reliable manner. INGAA is committed to working with this
Committee to continue to build on our safety record.
Natural Gas Pipeline Integrity
Millions of Americans rely on clean, efficient natural gas to fuel
homes and workplaces, with little thought about the vast network of
pipelines that criss-cross the country transporting this abundant
source of clean energy from the wellhead to the burner tip. The
companies that build and operate interstate natural gas pipelines have
created the safest mode of transportation today--safer than highway,
rail, aviation and marine transport. And the interstate natural gas
pipeline industry is spending millions of dollars each year on research
and new technologies to make their systems increasingly safer.
Safety is the number one priority for interstate natural gas
pipelines. As the integrity, or soundness, of our systems is key,
operators of these pipelines take numerous steps to ensure the safety
of their systems and use a number of different tools and diagnostic
procedures to do so. No single tool or procedure will assure safety. In
a recent survey, interstate natural gas pipelines spent $560 million
dollars per year on safety for approximately 160,000 miles of pipeline.
That translates into approximately $3,500 per mile of pipe.
For years, these interstate pipelines also have pursued new
technologies to continue to improve the safety of their systems.
Through the Gas Research Institute (GRI) and the PRCI (formerly known
as the Pipeline Research Committee), interstate natural gas pipelines
have been pursuing technologies to examine the limits of internal
inspection devices such as ``smart pigs'' and to improve sensors used
in smart pigs. They also are seeking advanced technologies to detect
dents and metal loss caused by mechanical damage, and are developing
technologies to provide reliable operations.
Natural gas pipelines monitor and control safety in many ways.
Pipelines implement and comply with minimum safety standards imposed by
the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)
under the Pipeline Safety Act. Moreover, many companies have internal
procedures that exceed these minimum requirements. These safety
measures include, but are not limited to: ground and aerial surveys to
observe third party activity or discoloration of plants and grasses;
the use of cathodic protection (a small electric charge) to prevent
corrosion of below-ground pipeline; the use of high quality pipeline
materials and corrosion coatings; hydrostatic pressure testing of new
and replaced facilities; and the use of ``smart pigs'' to detect metal
loss.
Specific measures are incorporated in OPS regulations to raise the
level of safety for natural gas pipelines as the population density
around a pipeline increases. These categories of population density,
known as class locations, range from rural (Class 1) to heavy urban
(Class 4). More stringent design, construction, inspection and
maintenance practices are stipulated in higher population density
areas. Pipeline operators are required to constantly monitor the area
around the pipeline for changes in population density. When these
changes occur, the pipeline operator is required to insure that the
installed pipeline is commensurate with the new class location
requirements for pipe design. If it does not meet these requirements,
the pipe is upgraded to increase the margin of safety. The new class
location also requires increased frequency of inspections.
The Importance of National Standards
In the wake of the Bellingham accident, some have called for
changes to the federal Pipeline Safety Act which would allow each state
to enact its own safety regulations for interstate pipelines. INGAA
strongly believes that removal of federal preemption would be a
mistake. Almost invariably, interstate pipelines operate in more than
one state. Some systems traverse more than 10 states and hundreds of
localities as they ship natural gas from the wellhead to the consumer.
While a large pipeline may pass through many state and local
jurisdictions, it still must operate and be maintained as a single
system. This is why one set of standards and one national regulatory
authority is so important to the consistent, efficient and safe
operation of the interstate pipeline network.
The Pipeline Safety Act gives states the authority to adopt
additional or more stringent safety standards for intrastate pipelines
if such standards are consistent with federal minimum standards.
However, states cannot adopt safety standards for interstate
facilities. That authority is vested exclusively in the Congress and
the U.S. Department of Transportation.
The reason for federal preemption is simple. Allowing individual
states to create their own safety standards would be confusing and
problematic for pipelines that operate in multiple states. The actions
of one state might negatively affect gas service and deliverability to
consumers in all other states in which the pipeline operates. For
example, one state might require a lower gas pressure on pipelines
within its jurisdiction, and thus decrease the amount of natural gas
available to ``downstream'' consumers.
As Chairman McCain has stated, a ``mishmash'' of state regulations
would almost certainly hamper interstate commerce without improving
safety. The states do have an appropriate and important role; that is,
regulating intrastate pipelines, which account for over 70 percent of
all pipeline mileage, and creating state one-call damage prevention
programs.
Damage Prevention
The importance of these public awareness programs is most critical
in that the leading cause of natural gas pipeline accidents is
unintentional third party damage. For natural gas transmission lines,
third party damage represents about 40 percent of all accidents, and
about 70 percent of all fatalities associated with pipeline accidents.
For natural gas local distribution companies, third party damage is an
even greater problem, causing almost two-thirds of all accidents.
One of the most effective ways to combat third party damage to
pipelines is the use of one-call (or ``call-before-you-dig'') centers,
which provide excavators with information about underground utilities
prior to beginning their work. By using the local one-call center, a
homeowner, business owner or construction company can learn the
location of underground facilities ahead of time, and avoid serious
accidents. One-call centers are governed by state law, but are private
not-for-profit entities funded by local pipelines and utilities.
Congress passed comprehensive one-call legislation as part of the
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) in 1998. The
law established a federal grant program for those states that work to
improve the coverage and participation level of their one-call
programs. The legislation also required the U.S. Department of
Transportation to assemble a list of one-call center ``best
practices.'' This study, along with the framework for a new national
effort to focus on public awareness and damage prevention (entitled
Common Ground), was released by the Department in 1999. States should
use this report to continue to improve their one-call center practices,
thus making them eligible for the grants in TEA-21.
Public Information Disclosure
Another area where there has been renewed interest is in improving
public information and disclosure about pipelines and pipeline safety
efforts. INGAA wholeheartedly agrees that public education is a key
aspect in ensuring safety. In fact, natural gas pipeline companies
already provide a wealth of information about their systems to local
communities through voluntary efforts and regulatory requirements.
Public education has three goals: avoid accidents by educating the
public about the potential danger of damaging pipelines; educate those
living or working near pipelines about how to recognize potential
problems and what to do in an emergency; and train local emergency
response personnel in how to handle pipeline accidents.
Current Federal law requires natural gas pipelines to have public
education programs. The Pipeline Safety Act calls for public education
programs to include information about the use of local one-call (or
``call-before-you-dig'') systems, the possible hazards associated with
leaks and the importance of reporting suspected leaks to the proper
authorities. Federal law also requires natural gas pipelines to
participate in local one-call centers, so that their facilities can be
marked prior to the start of excavation work. Pipelines help to pay the
costs associated with the operation of local one-call centers and their
associated advertising and public outreach programs.
Current Federal regulations also call for pipelines to provide
information to local communities and emergency response personnel along
rights-of-way. For example, natural gas pipelines must provide local
communities with detailed maps of their systems to aid emergency
response planning and coordination. Pipeline operators also must engage
in a ``continuing educational program'' for local governmental
agencies, including police and fire departments. This is accomplished
through annual briefings and training exercises for emergency response
personnel hosted by the pipeline operator. Unfortunately, many pipeline
operators report difficulty in getting local emergency response
agencies to participate in these free events due to a lack of interest
or resources.
Since a pipeline can pass by thousands of homes and businesses,
pipeline operators also make information available to residents and
business owners along the right-of-way. To get the attention of these
individuals, pipeline companies often give out such items as calendars,
flyers, thermometers, and other items, all with information about the
pipeline, whom to call and what to do in an emergency. Landowners are
encouraged to look for signs of trouble, including unauthorized
excavation activity and indications of natural gas leaks.
The OPS has an extensive amount of information about pipeline
accidents, specific regulatory orders and corrective actions. Its web
site includes general statistics about pipeline safety, but also
includes detailed information about OPS investigations, compliance
orders, findings of violation, warning letters and more. In light of
the extensive public communications activities already performed by the
interstate natural gas pipeline industry, INGAA submits that there is
no need for additional requirements in this area.
Operator Qualification
Although the interstate natural gas pipeline industry is already
operating pipelines with qualified personnel, as is evidenced by the
low rate for incidents attributable to operator error, INGAA supports
the final rule on qualification of pipeline personnel issued by the OPS
and placed in the Federal Register on August 27, 1999 (Docket No. RSPA-
98-3783; Amendment 192-86; 195-67). This rule is the result of a
negotiated rulemaking that included representatives of natural gas
transmission and distribution pipelines, liquid lines, state pipeline
safety representatives, emergency response agencies, labor unions,
corrosion experts, federal safety agencies and others. The Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service convened and facilitated this
rulemaking.
This rule requires operators of all pipelines covered by 49 CFR
Parts 192 and 195 to have a written qualification program to evaluate
the ability of employees and contractor personnel to perform tasks that
are required under the pipeline safety regulations (called ``covered
tasks'') and also to recognize and react to abnormal operating
conditions that may occur while performing covered tasks. Operator
training is recognized as an important element in achieving and
maintaining qualification status. The new rule also sets record keeping
requirements that operators must follow to successfully demonstrate
compliance. This information must be maintained on each individual who
has been evaluated and deemed qualified to work on a pipeline facility.
OPS inspectors then audit this information to determine if the company
is in compliance with the regulations.
This rulemaking recognizes the difficulty of devising a system
appropriate for the wide variations in the operations and maintenance
procedures and facilities of individual operations by providing a non-
prescriptive, performance based regulation that requires each operator
to develop, or have developed, a written program for the qualification
of each individual. For example, some operators do not have
transmission lines in their systems, others do not have compressors,
pump stations, or storage facilities. Some operators perform a large
number of ``covered'' tasks while other, smaller operators may have
only a limited number of ``covered'' tasks. Therefore, each program can
be tailored to the unique operations and practices of each operator.
However, this also permits the OPS to audit each company's program
to determine what tasks are covered, what qualifications are necessary
to perform that task, and if the individual employees have demonstrated
those qualifications. OPS can examine the records of the qualification
of the employees maintained by each company and compare these to
similarly situated employees in other companies. This ``benchmarking''
will enable OPS to ensure the adequacy of these qualification programs.
Pipeline operators are now in the process of preparing these
written qualification programs (to the extent they have not already
done so), adapting (to the extent necessary) existing training and
development programs, and developing an auditable record keeping system
to ensure compliance with the rulemaking.
Safety Research
Pipeline safety research is another area where there has been a
heightened sense of interest. Since the earliest days of the industry,
the natural gas pipeline industry has historically collaborated on and
funded safety research. Two organizations currently provide
collaborative research and development activities for the natural gas
pipeline industry. The industry formed the Pipeline Research Committee,
now known as the Pipeline Research Committee International (PRCI), in
1952 to address industry-wide pipeline problems that needed R&D
solutions. In the late 1970s, the natural gas industry formed the Gas
Research Institute (GRI), which was supported by FERC-authorized
funding.
PRCI was founded by 15 natural gas transmission companies to
research problems with industry-wide implications through a cooperative
R&D program. The Committee became PRCI in 1995 to reflect the growing
number of international members, which now represent almost half of the
total 24-company membership. PRCI's funding comes from dues and co-
funding dollars received from GRI and others, with dues providing about
$3.5 million annually.
The PRCI Board of Directors, made up of key engineering and
technical officers from member companies, provides oversight of
research activities. Six committees of member company technical and
engineering representatives manage PRCI's research programs and
specific projects. The committees are line pipe, welding, non-
destructive testing, compressor efficiency and environmental
performance, offshore and onshore design, and corrosion. Most PRCI
programs focus on improving industry safety, processes for joining
materials, corrosion control, pipeline design, operations, maintenance
and construction, station efficiency, reliability, the performance of
line pipe and system integrity.
GRI is the more visible of the two gas industry research
organizations, as it performs research on all sectors of the gas
industry--production, transportation/transmission, delivery and
consumer and end-uses. As with PRCI, GRI uses industry input and
direction to identify, plan and manage research using outside research
companies. But they differ in that GRI's staff members, not technical
committees, manage all research programs. The Pipeline Program
Executive Committee (PIPEC) and the Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs),
made up of representatives of pipeline member companies, provide
guidance. There are five such groups in the Transmission Unit of GRI:
measurement, non-destructive evaluation, storage, integrity management
and systems optimization and compression.
INGAA Comments on Proposed Legislation
At this point I want to direct my comments to a few provisions of
S. 2438, the ``King and Tsiorvas Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2000,'' as well as S. 2409, the Administration bill. I would first like
permission to submit further comments on these bills and S. 2004,
introduced by Senator Murray, for the record.
Mr. Chairman, it is worth noting that natural gas pipelines already
face a strict regimen of regulations. Natural gas, crude oil and
petroleum liquids all have different properties. For example, natural
gas pipelines compress their product while liquid pipelines pump their
products. Additionally, natural gas is lighter than air, and therefore
moves into the atmosphere in the event of a leak. The probabilities and
consequences of an accident are, accordingly, different for natural gas
pipelines and for liquid pipelines. INGAA urges the Committee to
continue to recognize these important differences in any pipeline
safety legislation it approves.
First, we are concerned about the language in both bills which
would give states the ability to ``supplement the Secretary's program
and address issues of local concern'' with respect to interstate
pipelines. This language appears to give states additional authority to
go beyond those that exist under federal guidelines. INGAA believes
that interstate pipelines should be subject to one set of regulations.
Giving states the ability to ``address issues of local concern'' seems
to imply that a state authority can go beyond federal minimum standards
for these interstate facilities. As I noted earlier, this additional
layer of regulatory authority would almost certainly hinder interstate
commerce without improving safety. If the intent of this provision is
to expand state oversight authority to jointly inspect interstate
pipelines with the OPS, INGAA would like a better understanding as to
what activities such oversight authority would entail, as well as
language to clarify this intention.
The Pipeline Integrity Plan in S. 2409, the Administration's bill,
calls for ``best achievable technology.'' This appears to be similar to
EPA requirements for ``best available control technology.'' INGAA is
concerned that compliance with such an open-ended standard could be
disruptive to our operations, as well as costly to the industry. For
example, one could read this language to potentially require us to
continuously change the technology we use to construct pipelines. Taken
to an extreme, the test could apply even to the pipe we already have in
the ground. A ``best achievable technology'' mandate could also lead to
a dangerous focus on only one or two technologies, rather than the mix
currently employed by industry. Finally, it also assumes that pipeline
safety is only derived from new technologies when, in fact, improved
safety is often achieved through such ``low-tech'' methods as walking
and flying the pipeline right-of-way and visually inspecting it and its
surroundings.
The Administration also calls for EPA to consult with OPS when
developing an integrity rule for natural gas pipelines. As previously
mentioned, natural gas is lighter than air and is insoluble in water.
The environmental impacts of a natural gas leak are therefore minimal.
For that reason, INGAA fails to see why EPA should have more
involvement in the development of this natural gas pipeline rulemaking
than other federal agencies.
The Administration bill requires an integrity rule to be completed
for large hazardous liquid pipelines by the end of 2000, and for
natural gas pipelines within two years of enactment. However, if the
OPS were unable to complete an integrity rule for natural gas pipelines
within the specified period, then the existing hazardous liquid rule
would automatically apply to gas pipelines. While we anticipate that
the OPS will have this rulemaking out before the two-year period in the
legislation is reached, and we would work with OPS towards this end, it
is unfair to require us to fall under the liquid pipeline integrity
rule. Natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines are different, and the
regulations governing their safe operation need to reflect those
differences.
While your bill, Mr. Chairman, provides more flexibility for the
Secretary of Transportation to differentiate between natural gas and
liquid pipelines, it also calls on the Secretary to implement the
recommendations of the Inspector General. One of these recommendations
calls for DOT to complete action on various congressional mandates. We
want to make sure that Section 2 of S. 2438 would not require the
Secretary to perform an additional rulemaking beyond that required in
Section 5 of the bill requiring a pipeline integrity program. We also
have some recommended language to Section 5 to clarify that
requirements regarding unusually sensitive areas do not apply to
natural gas pipelines, as reflected in current law, since natural gas
pipeline accidents have only a minimal impact on the environment.
INGAA also objects to the provision (Section 2(g)) in the
Administration bill that would alter the existing ``grandfathered''
status for some pipelines. Some pipelines were grandfathered from
design, construction, and installation regulations because they were
designed, constructed and/or installed prior to the existence of the
new regulations. However, this grandfathered pipe was constructed
according to the existing industry and federal standards of the time,
and other safety regulations currently apply to these facilities. For
example, grandfathered pipelines are included in all inspection
proceedings and are inspected in the same manner as any other pipeline
on the system. Moreover, the proposed integrity rule will apply to
these facilities in the same manner as it applies to newer pipeline
facilities. The Secretary of Transportation already has the authority
to shut down pipeline facilities that he or she finds pose a hazard.
Yet, the provision in the Administration's bill could be read to
require replacement of entire pipeline systems. Such a requirement
would be extremely costly, could cause significant gas service
disruptions and is unnecessary in light of the fact that these
facilities must comply with current pipeline safety requirements.
Therefore, INGAA respectfully submits that there is no need to repeal
this provision of the law.
S. 2438 also establishes a new operator training requirement in
Section 4. We believe that the intent behind this provision is
important. However, we note that the new OPS operator qualification
rule (Docket No. RSPA-98-3783; Amendment 192-86; 195-67) already
includes training as a function of the employee qualification
requirement.
Finally, I leave this Committee with some comments on the
authorization level. First, I want to remind the Committee that part of
the Administration's budget request for FY 2001 has already been
authorized in TEA-21. I am referring to the $5 million in one-time
grants to states which improve their one-call systems. In this
authorization, Congress recognized that gas and liquid pipelines
generate only about one-fifth of the calls made by one-call centers to
mark underground facilities. This law states, in Section 6107, ``(a)ny
sums appropriated under this section shall be derived from general
revenues and may not be derived from the amounts collected under
section 60301 (user fee section) of this title.''
Neither bill breaks out what amounts should come from user fees,
what amounts should come from the Oil Spill Liability Fund and what
amounts should come from the Pipeline Safety Reserve. We would like to
work with the Committee on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you once again for giving us
the opportunity to provide our testimony. Over the last fifty years,
the natural gas pipeline industry has worked hard to improve our
already strong safety record. We appreciate your efforts to pass a
balanced, constructive Pipeline Safety Act reauthorization. INGAA wants
to work with you and the Committee in making this legislation a
reality.
appendix
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Mr. Wright.
STATEMENT OF PHILLIP D. WRIGHT, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING, WILLIAMS ENERGY SERVICES,
ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PIPE LINES AND THE AMERICAN
PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
Mr. Wright. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. My name is Phil Wright. I am Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines. I am
before you today to represent AOPL and API, the American
Petroleum Institute.
But before I begin, having heard the courageous testimony
of the families of those fine boys who perished in the tragic
accident in Bellingham, Washington, I would just like to
express, on behalf of myself and my colleagues in the industry,
how deeply saddened we are by that incident. And we never, ever
want that to occur again.
I wish I could promise that the industry will never again
experience a fatal accident. But not unlike the airline
industry, who could not possibly represent that there will
never be another plane crash, I cannot do that. What I can tell
you is that we view any accident, particularly those involving
injury or death, as totally unacceptable, and pledge to take
every step we can to avoid such accidents.
So, with that objective foremost in mind, let me begin by
briefly describing the task that we do as an industry. There
are about 200,000 miles of liquid pipelines in this country.
They move an enormous amount of materiel. And to put that into
context, that is about 600 billion ton miles annually. That is
525,000 million gallons. And I think it is important for us to
bear in mind the context of the job that is done by the
pipeline industry as we consider incidents and accidents and
the occurrences of them.
This volume amounts to 40 percent of the Nation's energy
requirements and 97 percent of the transportation fuels that we
use as a country. Pipelines are also critical in our national
defense, as they directly supply over 100 military bases in
this country. In short, pipelines are absolutely vital to the
quality of life the American people have come to enjoy.
The people in the pipeline industry are technically
sophisticated, environmentally aware, we are committed as
citizens, and dedicated to safety and the protection of the
environment as our number one priority. Over the last 30 years,
safety performance has steadily improved, whether measured by
the number of incidents or the volume released. During this
period of time, the number of incidents has declined 40
percent, the volume released has declined 60 percent, and the
median size of releases has decreased 65 percent.
And over the last several years, the volume of product lost
amounts to one-thousandth of 1 percent of the total product
transported. That is an excellent record, and I would stack it
up against any other industry's performance. We are, I think,
justifiably proud of the job we do, but we are far from
satisfied.
At my company, we have a slogan: ``Good enough never is.''
And I find that attitude to be pervasive throughout the
pipeline industry. No spill is deemed as acceptable, and we
believe that the public, the government and we ourselves must
control the factors contributing to accidents that we can
control. As you have heard this morning, one such factor is
external damage from excavation, the largest single cause of
pipeline accidents. Congress struck a blow last year in this
regard with the enactment of Federal One-Call legislation,
which has been referred to previously.
Now, turning to the legislation. First, it is our
observation that the current law provides the Office of
Pipeline Safety all the authority it needs to undertake its
mission. The industry is closely and effectively regulated by
the Office of Pipeline Safety.
Nevertheless, and this may surprise you, it is in our
interest and in the public interest, in our opinion, to have
rigorous, comprehensive and consistent Federal regulation. We
welcome appropriate regulation, because it is good for the
public confidence and because safe operation of our interstate
pipeline systems is our number one priority, indeed.
My written testimony has detailed comments on the various
bills before the Committee, but let me highlight just a few key
points. With respect to Federal versus State authority, we
believe that Federal rules should apply to pipeline facilities
operating in interstate commerce. We believe this guiding
principle is critical if we are to have a safe and efficient
interstate pipeline network in the United States. We,
therefore, oppose any provisions that weaken this principle.
We are also concerned about language in the administration
and the chairman's bills that would let States engage in
regulatory activities that, quote, supplement the Secretary's
program and address issues of local concern, end quote. The use
of this phrase implies that the States can impose standards
different from the Federal standards. And at a minimum, this
language will lead to confrontation and uncertainty.
Having said that, we totally agree that the Office of
Pipeline Safety should be responsive to State concerns, and we
certainly have no objection to creating a mechanism for States
to have issues of concern addressed.
With respect to integrity testing, we believe the integrity
rule recently proposed by the Office of Pipeline Safety will
indeed improve results. The guidance in the chairman's bill is
in keeping with the OPS approach. By contrast, the provisions
in the administration's bill are, in our opinion, too
prescriptive, detailed and, in some cases, ambiguous. For
example, the administration bill requires that an integrity
plan use the, quote, best achievable technology, end quote.
That term is undefined and will lead to great confusion and, we
think, unintended consequences.
Safety does not result from using a single test or tool, as
my colleague pointed out. Nor is there a single best
technology. Safety is achieved by using a combination of tools
and operational techniques, some of which are very low-tech. In
addition to those mentioned by my colleague, simply excavating
the pipeline and looking at it is often the best thing to do.
This is distinctly low-tech, but very effective in many cases.
And certainly an effective overall program will include the use
of high-tech and low-tech tools. But to suggest there is a
single best technology or even a single best plan we think
would be a mistake.
We note that Senator Murray's bill does not call for an
integrity program but does in fact mandate internal testing
every 5 years. We believe the superior approach is to target
testing and inspection resources to those areas posing the
greatest risk. A blanket inspection requirement that treats all
pipe equally will not produce that desired result.
In terms of public education and communities' right to
know, we are willing to make more information available to
local officials and the affected public. And we are here to
work out ways to do that very efficiently. We do not believe,
however, that it is useful to simply blanket an area with
technical information, when only a few people may be
interested. For this reason, we would like to see this
provision in the final bill refined to provide more targeted
information distribution.
In summary, the Association of Oil Pipe Lines and API
members are, in fact, proud of our safety record and the job we
do, while at the same time we also recognize that society and
our public expects and demands that we do better. We expect no
less of ourselves. And we look forward to working with the
Office of Pipeline Safety on the integrity rulemaking as the
next important step in that effort.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Phillip D. Wright, Senior Vice President,
Enterprise Development and Planning, Williams Energy Services, on
Behalf of The Association of Pipe Lines and The American Petroleum
Institute
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, my name is Phillip D.
Wright. I am Senior Vice President of Williams Energy Services for
Enterprise Development and Planning. Williams Energy Services owns and
operates around 22,500 miles of pipelines carrying crude oil, liquid
propane gas and refined petroleum products, including jet fuel, diesel
fuel, heating oil and kerosene. Our pipelines are spread through 17
states, primarily in the West, Southwest, and Midwest. Williams is also
a large operator of natural gas pipelines. Our company operates about
30,000 miles of interstate natural gas pipelines.
Currently I serve as Chairman of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines
and appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Committee today on
behalf of the Association and the American Petroleum Institute. The
Association of Oil Pipe Lines (AOPL) is an unincorporated trade
association representing 58 common carrier oil pipeline companies. AOPL
members carry nearly 80% of the crude oil and refined petroleum
products moved by pipeline in the United States. The American Petroleum
Institute (API) represents over 400 companies involved in all aspects
of the oil and natural gas industry, including exploration, production,
transportation, refining and marketing. Together, these two
organizations represent the vast majority of the U.S. pipeline
transporters of petroleum products.
The Liquid Pipeline Industry
Mr. Chairman, the background information for my testimony is
presented in the information packet included with my testimony. One of
these packets was delivered to each Member of Congress earlier this
week. I ask that this packet be made a part of the Record.
There are approximately 200,000 miles of oil and petroleum product
pipelines in all 50 states of this country. The liquid pipeline
infrastructure constitutes a fundamental part of our national economy.
Pipelines carry about 66% of the petroleum and petroleum products moved
domestically. About 29% is moved by water and about 5% by truck or
rail.
Chances are, the gasoline you put in your car gets to you, in part,
by pipeline. Our nation's airports rely on pipelines to deliver the jet
fuel that powers our aviation industry. The trucking system relies on
diesel fuel delivered by pipeline. Millions of heating oil and propane
customers rely on pipeline deliveries. And industries across America
rely on pipelines to deliver the feedstock they use to make many of our
household goods.
Pipelines are an extremely efficient transportation system. For
example, Williams' petroleum product lines moved roughly 591million
barrels of product through our system last year. That is the equivalent
of about 8,000 truck tanker loads every day. Gasoline may cost $1.50 a
gallon, but the pipeline transportation contribution to the cost is
around two cents.
As an industry, pipelines depend on a relatively small national
workforce to approximately 16,000 skilled men and women. That modest
workforce, however, and the 200,000 miles of pipelines for which they
are responsible, transport over 600 billion ton-miles of freight each
year. This mammoth job is accomplished so efficiently that America's
oil pipelines transport 17% of all U.S. freight, but represent only 2%
of the nation's entire freight bill.
The Industry's Safety Record
The liquid pipeline industry has a good safety record, a record
that we in the industry are striving constantly to improve. On average,
over the last ten years, liquid pipeline accidents have caused about
two deaths per year and 10-15 injuries. In three of the last ten years,
there have been no fatalities, and that is goal for which we strive.
Pipeline transportation of fuel is far and away the safest form of
transportation. For example, on a per gallon basis, deaths are 87 times
more likely to occur when transportation is by truck rather than by
pipeline. Many industries would be envious of our safety record.
Having said that, we have a slogan in our company that ``Good
enough never is'' and that applies here. A tragic accident like the
recent one in Bellingham, Washington reminds us that any accident
involving injuries or death is unacceptable and it's our desire and
intention to improve on the current accident record.
The same is true with regard to leaks from the pipeline system. The
last several years have seen, on average, about 160 reported leaks per
year and involved the loss of about 160,000 barrels of product. This
represents about one-thousandth of one percent of the total product.
Still, a spill of any significant size can create serious problems if
it occurs in an environmentally sensitive area. The recent spill here
in the Washington, D.C. area demonstrates that.
It is important for the Committee to understand that the desire to
operate safely does not result from OPS regulations, the threat of
fines, or the threat of lawsuits. The desire to operate safely is woven
into our corporate decision-making and into the industry-driven
initiatives undertaken by our trade organizations. We assume
responsibility for operating our lines safely. We care about the safety
of our employees. We care about the safety of the public who lives near
our lines. We care about preserving the environment. It is the right
thing to do.
It is also in our financial interest to operate a safe, accident
free system. Consider the practical fact that accidents have
unacceptable business consequences. Accidents disrupt service to our
customers and limit our ability to utilize our systems for an
indefinite period of time. Cleanup and mitigation costs are expensive.
Litigation costs can be substantial. Increasingly, our employees face
the possibility that criminal charges may be brought. Accidents cause
the public and government officials to question our commitment to
safety and our credibility. Some critics have suggested that our
companies have no financial reason to maintain high safety standards.
We would suggest that exactly the opposite is true. The cost of having
an accident, especially one involving deaths or injuries, is
financially unacceptable to us and our stockholders.
These real incentives have led to a renewed focus on safety. And
our efforts to improve safety have shown results. Real trends in safety
performance take a long time to see. As the chart here demonstrates,
over the last 30 years, our safety performance has improved steadily,
whether measured in the number of incidents or the volume released. The
number of pipeline incidents has decreased by 40% and the volume
released has gone down 60%. These improvements have occurred at the
same time that the total volumes transported have increased. Between
1977 and 1997, the amount of oil and petroleum products transported by
pipeline increased almost 13%.
Having said this, we understand and accept the fact that the public
expects the government to oversee the industry's safety efforts. The
public understandably wants to be assured that we are making every
reasonable effort to insure safety. We have worked with the Office of
Pipeline Safety over the years on any number of initiatives to improve
the safety of the liquid pipeline industry. Issues involving electric
resistance weld pipe, valve spacing, criteria for determining
environmentally sensitive areas, and establishing an operator
qualification program are just a few of the areas where the industry
has worked with OPS to the benefit of the public and to safety.
The Proposed Legislation
With this background, let me now turn to a discussion of the
proposals before the Committee to reauthorize and amend the Pipeline
Safety Act. There are a number of minor technical suggestions we have
and will be communicating to Committee staff but let me focus in this
testimony on our substantive comments and concerns.
Integrity Testing
Both S. 2438, introduced by the Chairman, and the Administration
bill, S. 2409, direct the OPS to develop pipeline integrity programs
that apply more stringent standards in ``high consequence areas,''
generally thought of as more densely populated and unusually
environmentally sensitive areas, as well as commercially navigable
waters. OPS is already undertaking this effort, issuing the proposed
rule for liquid lines a few weeks ago. S. 2004 introduced by Senator
Murray would prescribe mandatory internal inspection of all pipelines
at least once every five years and periodic external inspection once
such technology is developed.
We recommend the language in the McCain bill to that of the
Administration bill for several reasons. The McCain bill provides
guidance to OPS to develop an integrity program, whereas the
Administration bill is far more prescriptive and detailed, which is
suitable for regulatory development but not for legislation. The most
troubling feature of the Administration language is the requirement
that an integrity plan use the ``best achievable technology.'' The term
is undefined and will lead to great confusion and perhaps unintended
consequences.
Safety does not result from using one test or one tool. Safety is
achieved by using a variety of tools and operational techniques, some
of which are low tech or do not involve technology at all. In some
cases, the old fashioned technique of digging holes and visually
inspecting the pipeline may be the most effective method of determining
the condition of the pipe. Increased right-of-way patrolling and
promoting one-call programs may be the most effective way to avoid
third party damage in populated areas. In certain circumstances, a
hydrostatic test may be the most effective and appropriate test, but
this is distinctly a low-tech method. In sum, there is no question that
technology is important, and we support increased research into new
technology, but technology is not always the answer and it is a mistake
to build that concept into the law.
Also, the use of this term almost assures constant controversy and
probably litigation over its meaning. When different technologies
measure different parameters, how can you say that one is the ``best?''
The prescriptive use of the term in the Administration's bill raises
the question as to the point at which a company's integrity plan is out
of compliance with the law because it does not include the latest
wrinkle in technology. Taken to its most extreme, the term suggests
that we should dig up all the pipe laid in the past because newer pipe
is made using better technology. This is not realistic nor, we suspect,
the intention of the Administration, but it is the sort of unintended
consequence that will result if language like this is used in the
statute.
While there are parts of the Administration's provision on
integrity testing to which we would have no significant objection, it
is simply not necessary to go into such detail. The proposed integrity
rule for liquid pipelines has been issued using the authority under
existing law, so clearly there is no lack of statutory authority to
accomplish their objective.
S. 2004, introduced by Sen. Murray, does not call for an integrity
program, but, as previously indicated, does mandate internal testing
every five years. We believe that such a blanket requirement would
waste safety resources and detract from the objective of focusing
safety efforts on the areas of greatest need. Therefore we would oppose
that proposal. This does not mean that we oppose periodic testing of
our pipelines, merely that the type and timing of such testing should
be determined through rulemaking.
Public Education/Community Right-To-Know
While structured somewhat differently, the bill of Chairman McCain
and the Administration bill appear to contain substantially the same
provisions in this area. Senator Murray's bill also requires increased
dissemination of information to the public.
We in the liquid pipeline industry do not object to making more
information about our operations available to the public. We do not,
however, believe it is useful to simply blanket an area with technical
information, when only a few people may be interested. We also want to
understand exactly what is required, so there is not a dispute about
what constitutes compliance with the requirement.
With that in mind, we would recommend modifying Section 5(a) of S.
2438 to direct the Secretary to issue standards prescribing the
elements of an effective public education program. Also, the bill
currently calls for companies to submit their plans to the Secretary.
It has been our experience that OPS inspects these plans as part of
their overall inspection of company compliance with the statute. We
therefore suggest changing the language to say that plans shall be
``made available'' to the Secretary.
We also suggest that Committee Report language encourage OPS and
the industry to explore and make greater use of electronic means of
communications, such as the internet. We understand this is not a
substitute for more traditional means of communications, but we should
become more creative in how we approach this task than we have been in
the past. We must also use new electronic tools to ensure that local
public officials have access to the information they need when they
need it, something that is not always easily accomplished with paper
maps.
Enhanced State Oversight
Both the Administration bill and the bill offered by Chairman
McCain contain provisions allowing for greater state involvement in the
oversight of interstate pipelines. Senator Murray's bill allows for
greater state regulation of operator training and for delegation of
authority to states to enact more stringent regulations than those set
by federal law. A principal imbedded in the Act since its creation is
that federal rules should apply to pipeline facilities operating in
interstate commerce while states should be allowed to regulate lines
wholly with a given state's boundaries. We believe this guiding
principal is critical if we are to have an efficient, safe pipeline
network in this country. The industry simply cannot operate effectively
if states can impose their own rules. Our systems cross state
boundaries. Our operations and safety activities are planned and
implemented on a system-wide basis. If we faced separate regulations in
every state in which we operate, we believe the result would be a less
efficient, less safe system overall and a potentially significant
impediment to interstate commerce. Chairman McCain's statement
accompanying the bill said it well
``A mishmash of state laws regarding the construction,
maintenance, training and operation of pipelines would
certainly hamper commerce and would likely not improve
safety.''
We could not agree more. We cannot support the delegation of
authority to the state to enact pipeline safety laws that differ from
federal law, as provided in S. 2004. Our concern is that S. 2004 and
the language in the Administration and McCain legislation will lead to
efforts by states to do just that. While carefully drafted in many
respects, the McCain and Administration bills provide that a state, in
the process of overseeing interstate lines as agents for OPS, can seek
authority allowing it to engage in ``other activities . . . that
supplement the Secretary's program and address issues of local concern.
. . .'' The use of this phrase, with no explanation of its meaning,
raises serious questions. Are the states limited to applying the
federal standards or are they able, with OPS's permission, to establish
their own requirements? For example, could a state decide that the
definition of ``high consequence area'' established by OPS is too lax,
and require a pipeline to treat the entire state as a ``high
consequence area?'' Could the state create different public education/
community right-to-know requirements? Could the state treat one company
differently than another company? These are serious questions raised by
the language in the bills and by other proposals being made. If nothing
else, the legislative language will lead to confrontation and
uncertainty.
Some have suggested that states be permitted to regulate, and to
enact more stringent regulation of, an interstate line in lieu of the
federal government if those states enter into a compact to regulate a
line located between or among those states. This proposal raises
serious questions in addition to those raised above. By the very nature
of the compact, one or more interstate lines would be singled out for
different treatment than other lines to the same area. Aside from the
safety and coordination issues raised, this suggestion would appear to
raise serious competitive concerns. Interstate pipelines serving the
same markets would face different costs and different operating
constraints. This is precisely why regulation of interstate commerce is
left to the federal government.
OPS should be responsive to state concerns and we have no objection
to creating a mechanism for states to bring concerns to the attention
of OPS. However, we strongly recommend that the legislation clarify
that in no event can states apply regulations to interstate lines that
are different from the federal regulation.
It should be noted here that traditionally, the calls for greater
state involvement in the regulatory process come in the wake of a
specific accident. The Committee should keep in mind, however, that it
is the federal government that has consistently taken the lead on
pipeline safety. When the law was created, it set minimum standards for
intrastate natural gas lines because not all states had effective
programs for such regulation. Even today, many states do not regulate
intrastate liquid pipelines, but rely on the federal government to do
so. We would also note that in the case of natural gas, over 70% of the
accidents involving injuries or deaths occur on lines under state
jurisdiction. It is certainly fair to criticize OPS or the industry for
not doing a better job, but the suggestion that the answer is to allow
state regulation of interstate lines is simply not borne out by the
evidence.
In addition to the role states have in intrastate pipeline
regulation, states can improve safety results by establishing
reasonable setback requirements for future development near pipeline
rights-of-way and by requiring full participation (with no exemptions)
in call-before-you-dig/one call systems.
Operator Qualification
The bill of Chairman McCain requires companies to submit training
plans to the OPS within six months of enactment. The OPS has already
issued a rule requiring operators to develop programs for assuring that
operators are qualified to do their jobs and to document that program.
We suggest that the language here, which talks about ``training,'' be
changed to read in terms of ``qualification,'' which is a broader
concept than training, and that the time for completing those programs
be made to coincide with the operator qualification rule made effective
October 26, 1999 (64 Federal Register 46853 of August 27, 1999). Again,
rather than calling for submission of the plans to OPS, we suggest that
they be ``made available'' to OPS.
The bill offered by Sen. Murray would require OPS to certify that
all individuals involved in the operation and maintenance of pipelines
have been tested and are qualified to perform their functions. OPS has
examined this issue and, along with a wide range of stakeholders,
including state safety officials and representatives of the public, has
concluded that it makes no sense for OPS to perform a certification
function. Under the standard developed, the industry must demonstrate
that its covered employees and contractors are qualified to perform all
tasks on the facility for which they are responsible. All of the
documentation is subject to DOT review and audit and DOT can verify the
implementation of the program.
Penalties
The Administration bill and that of Chairman McCain quadruple
penalties for violations from $25,000 per violation to $100,000 and
double the maximum civil penalty from $500,000 to $1,000,000. We are
aware of no evidence suggesting that the current penalty levels are too
low, nor have we seen any analysis as to why the higher penalties
proposed in the bills are appropriate. Before the Committee approves
increases of this magnitude, we believe there should be some rationale
articulated to justify the increase.
Shutdown Authority/Enforcement
Both the Administration bill and the bill of Sen. McCain contain
language involving the Secretary's authority to shut down pipelines
believed to be dangerous. OPS has the authority today to shutdown
pipeline systems and exercises that authority when necessary. We are
not sure why this additional authority is needed, but we do not object
to the provision.
The Administration bill also proposed two changes to the provisions
of the law involving civil actions taken by the Attorney General and
the citizen suit provision of the law. We do not object to the changes
made to Section 60120(a)(1) involving the civil action provisions.
The second provision, modifying the citizen suit authority in Sec.
60121, allows judges to levy fines, not just provide injunctive relief
if it finds an operator in violation of the regulations. We believe
this provision of the Administration bill will encourage additional
lawsuits, not improve safety, and object to its adoption.
If the Committee does consider this provision, however, there are
two changes that need to be made to the language. When the Secretary
levies penalties under Section 60122, the dollar limits on fines
discussed above apply. However, there are no such limits applied to
cases decided by the Court under this language. It should be made clear
that the same limits apply to judgements made under Section 60121 as
apply under Section 60122. Also, when the Administrator levies a fine
against a pipeline operator, the fine is paid to the federal government
as provided in Section 60122. If judges are to be allowed to levy fines
under Section 60121, then it should be made clear that those fines
should also be paid to the government.
Section 4(c) of the Administration's bill proposes correcting a
language flaw in Section 60123(d) of the Act. The language, as
currently drafted, requires a contractor both to ``knowingly and
willfully'' disregard the one-call notification system and to
``knowingly and willfully'' damage the pipeline. Intentional damage to
pipelines is already covered in sections 60123(b) and (c). Section
60123(d) should be modified to require only knowing and willful failure
to call the available one-call system.
The Administration bill would amend the penalty provisions of Sec.
60123, the section dealing with damage to underground facilities, to
provide that any person engaged in excavation activity without having
called a one-call system is guilty of a misdemeanor. While we want to
promote the use of one-call systems whenever possible, we believe this
provision is excessive. The provision does not define ``excavation
activity'' so conceivably activities as normal as gardening could be
covered. This provision should either be dropped or modified to clarify
what type of excavation activities are covered.
On a matter not covered in the bills, we have seen an increased
tendency for accident investigations to be delayed because prosecutors
want to investigate the possibility of criminal indictments. Frankly,
we worry about the trend to criminalize accidents, but the bigger
problem is that accident investigations by the NTSB are being delayed.
Both OPS and the industry want to know the cause of accidents as soon
as possible, in order to apply the lessons learned and reduce the
chances of possible future incidents. We are not sure if a solution to
this growing problem can be incorporated in this legislation, but it is
a problem we urge the Committee to address.
Innovative Technology Development
Both the McCain bill and the Administration's bill propose
increased research into the development of alternative technologies. We
support improved research in the listed areas. Traditionally,
technological innovation and improved safety inspection devices have
been supported and funded by the industry. We welcome DOT's involvement
in this important area. We support the Administration's proposal which
authorizes the Secretary to support technological development through
cooperative agreements with trade associations, academic institutions
or other qualified organizations.
Authorization of Appropriations
We certainly appreciate that OPS is engaged in a number of new
initiatives that require adequate funding. On the other hand, the
majority of the OPS budget is funded through user fees paid by the
pipeline industry. The budget must be sufficient but should not be
increased beyond what the agency is capable of spending productively.
The amounts proposed in S. 2004 go far beyond the needs of the OPS and
would result in a roughly 150% increase in pipeline user fees. A level
of funding closer to that proposed in the McCain bill appears to be
warranted. We also support drawing funds from the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund for work undertaken by OPS that falls within the scope of
that Fund.
Summary
In summary, AOPL and API members have built a solid safety record,
but we also recognize that society expects and demands that we do
better. We expect no less of ourselves. We look forward to working with
OPS on the pipeline integrity rulemaking as the next important step in
that effort. Achieving safety is the result of a system-wide effort
that focuses resources where they are needed. We believe OPS is on the
right track and that important progress has been made since this
Committee passed the last authorization bill in 1996. We pledge to work
with this Committee to pass an equally successful bill in this
Congress.
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Mr. Kenow.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. KENOW, NATIONAL VICE-CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF PIPELINE SAFETY
REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Kenow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to address the
Committee on a matter of grave importance to these states, this
nation and the public we serve. This is the issue of public
safety. As Vice-Chairman of the National Association of
Pipeline Safety Representatives, I can assure you the states,
who have been on the front lines of pipeline safety and damage
prevention, view the actions of this Committee with great
interest.
With me today is also the Chairman of NAPSR, Terry
Fronterhouse, Chief of Pipeline Safety, from the Arizona
Corporation Commission, who will also be available for
questions.
The issue of pipeline safety and the role of the states in
this federal/state partnership was discussed in great length at
our recent national board of directors meeting in Phoenix,
Arizona. Thirty-four states, who were represented at that
meeting, were involved in the discussion of these remarks. As
you may or may not be aware, this organization represents state
agency pipeline safety managers, engineers and technical
personnel who do inspect gas and liquid pipelines across the
nation. And our mission is to strengthen that program through
education, training and technology.
While the Pipeline Safety Act authorizes the Secretary of
Transportation to administer a pipeline safety program, it also
allows to delegate part of that inspection, or all of it, to
interested States for a grant of up to 50 percent of the cost
of those States' programs. Unfortunately, despite the active
involvement of these states, the high performance levels, based
on federal audits, scoring 95 to 100 percent, this state
funding level has never been reached. And we are pleased to see
in both Senate 2438 and 2409 that provisions are being made to
provide greater funding for specialized or what we would call
contracted state services.
We remain concerned, however, that this language is still
unclear with regard to the role of interstate operators and
agents, such as Minnesota and, until recently, Arizona, Nevada,
and seven other states. We would also like to set the record
straight on the role of the states. We have been actively
involved in this process since 1968. And in fact, state safety
personnel represent 90 percent of the federal/state inspection
work force.
Actually, we are the first line of defense at the community
level. Because we know the natural gas and hazardous liquid
operators and the emergency personnel, and have been strong
promoters of pipeline safety and underground utility damage.
Actually, we have inspected more than 10,000 gas operators and
360 hazardous liquid operators nationwide. And we do this by
not just going to their offices, we go out in the field in the
states and the communities where we have responsibility for
that.
So we are actually the first ones there. We are the ones
that are called if something happens. We are the ones that are
asked to be in public hearings and city council meetings to
explain what is going on. And we think we should continue that
effort.
In 1998, for example, we inspected more than 938,000 miles
of gas pipelines and 45,000 miles of hazardous liquid. And in
my detailed testimony, you will see there is over 25,000
inspection person days by state inspectors on the area of gas,
and over 2,000 in the liquid area, compared with the DOT's
current listing of 768 in 1998 and 621 in 1999 for the entire
nation. So we are an active part in this process.
We also support the damage prevention efforts and are
actively involved in Dig Safely and Common Ground. Some States
have done additional things. Minnesota, for example, did
several presentations, 231, to 13,000 operators. The State of
Virginia has reduced its damage prevention by 40 percent since
1996.
So what we would ask is further support and increasing
state grant funding for legislation, education and enforcement
of state One-Call laws beyond the base pipeline safety program
allocations. We think we can do even a better job of that.
As far as the two bills, the concern we have is with them
being too restrictive with respect to the discussion of
interstate agents and how they would be involved in this
process. And we have made suggestions to those sections,
particularly Section 9 of 2438, and Section 6 of 2409.
The other issue of concern is we need more clarity to
assure that States that are already in the interstate program
are assured due process before they may be removed by USDOT.
And those that have been removed should be reinstated. We think
that needs to be made clear, and we have made some
recommendations on the language there.
Mr. Chairman, the issue of states' rights and agreement is
the basis for this change. The states were summarily noticed
that their programs would be changed and limited. The States of
Arizona and Nevada were dropped this year. The other states in
the process were put on notice they would be phased out of this
process over the next 3 years.
Those states included Arizona, Connecticut, California,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, and West
Virginia. Other states have tried in the past to become
interstate agents. Washington, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, and,
I should add, New Hampshire, as well, had previously requested
but were denied this full interstate inspection status.
So we think that the removal of the state resources is
analogous to taking a trained force from the field and
replacing it with an outside force that has no knowledge of the
local terrain, people or the conditions in that area, and
replacing those with federal inspectors from Washington, D.C.,
Atlanta, Houston, Kansas City, and Denver regional offices,
when we are familiar with our own states' activities.
We firmly believe these inspections are critical to
ensuring interstate pipelines are constructed, operated and
maintained safely. We do not believe the temporary agent
program, as it is designed, will enhance that process. And I
would just like to say in closing, let me reaffirm that the
states' commitment is to pipeline safety and environmental
protection. We have the trained resources in place and have
been doing the job. We are familiar with those local
conditions, emergency responders and operators. And we have
been on the front lines of our communities, promoting public
safety and damage prevention.
We fully support your efforts here to enhance that, but we
want to make sure that it is not overly restricting those
states that want to assume a greater role in pipeline safety. I
would also call your attention to the resolution attached
supporting this from the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners, as well as the National Governors
Association.
Thank you for allowing me to comment before your Committee.
[The prepared statement and information of Mr. Kenow
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles R. Kenow, National Vice-Chairman,
National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to address the Committee on a matter of grave importance to
the states of this nation and the public we serve. This is the issue of
pipeline safety. As Vice-Chairman of the National Association of
Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR), I can assure you the states
who have been on the front lines of pipeline safety and damage
prevention view the actions of this Committee with great interest. With
me today, is the Chairman of NAPSR, Terry Fronterhouse, Chief of
Pipeline Safety from the Arizona Corporation Commission, who will be
available for policy questions.
The issue of pipeline safety and the role of the states in this
federal/state partnership was discussed at great length at our recent
National Board of Directors meeting in Phoenix, Arizona, April 24-28.
Thirty-four states were represented in this discussion and preparation
of these remarks. For those of you who are not familiar with NAPSR, the
organization was established in 1982 to represent state agency pipeline
safety managers, engineers, and technical personnel who inspect gas and
liquid companies. NAPSR's mission is to strengthen states' pipeline
safety programs through promotion of improved pipeline safety
standards, education, training, and technology.
As you are aware, the Pipeline Safety Act (``Act'') (49 USC 60101
et seq.) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation (DOT) to administer
a pipeline safety program for the gas and hazardous liquid pipelines in
the United States. The Act allows the Secretary to delegate all or a
part of the responsibilities for pipeline safety to interested states
for a grant up to 50% of the cost of the states' programs.
Unfortunately, despite the active involvement of the states, and high
performance levels from federal audits showing the majority of states
scoring 95-100%, this funding level has never been reached.
We are pleased to see in both S. 2438 the ``King and Tsiorvas
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2000'' and the Department of
Transportation's bill, S. 2409 the ``Pipeline Safety and Community
Protection Act of 2000,'' that provisions are being made to provide
greater funding for specialized or ``contracted'' state services. We
remain concerned over the restrictive language in the bill regarding
inspections of interstate operators by state agents such as Minnesota
and until recently--Arizona and Nevada.
First, I would like to set the record straight about the role of
the states in this inspection process, since certain information being
circulated about us is incorrect. States have been actively assisting
the Secretary in carrying out the pipeline safety program for the
United States since the Pipeline Safety Act was signed into law in
1968. In fact, States' pipeline safety personnel represent 90 percent
of the federal/state inspection workforce. These personnel are the
``first line of defense'' at the community level. They know their
natural gas and hazardous liquid operators, emergency personnel, and
have been strong promoters of pipeline safety and underground utility
damage prevention.
State inspectors conduct inspections of more than 10,000 gas
operators and 360 hazardous liquid operators nationwide. State pipeline
safety programs ensure public safety through periodic office and field
inspections of existing gas and liquid facilities, code compliance
activities, and construction reviews of new facilities. These
inspections ensure pipeline operators comply with safety regulations
and company procedures pertaining to pipeline operations and
maintenance. This directly results in the safe transportation of
products to consumers.
In 1998, states were responsible for inspecting more than 938,000
miles of gas pipelines, 47.5 million gas service lines and 1,851 gas
facilities such as liquid natural gas plants. States were responsible
for inspection of approximately 45,000 miles of hazardous liquid
pipelines. In 1998, the states conducted 25,785 inspection person-days
of gas facilities and 1,948 inspection person-days of hazardous liquid
pipelines. In comparison, US DOT's Office of Pipeline Safety's
inspections consisted of 768 in 1998 and 621 in 1999 for the entire
nation.
With respect to Damage Prevention, it is a well-known fact that
damage to pipelines caused by excavation activity remains the leading
cause of pipeline failures. It is imperative that all stakeholders take
action to reduce these damages. The states have been and remain, on the
forefront of initiatives that are designed to reduce damages to
pipelines and other underground infrastructures. Recent national
initiatives (DIG SAFELY and Common Ground) sponsored by the Federal
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) were fully supported by the states.
States have taken other actions on their own to reduce excavation
caused damages to pipelines. In Minnesota, from 1998-2000, 231 outreach
and educational talks were conducted by our engineers to 13,073
operators and excavators. We also added requirements for tracking
abandoned utilities and made calling 9-1-1 immediately a requirement
when there is a release of gas or hazardous liquid. In Virginia, since
1996, state efforts resulted in a 40% reduction of excavation damage to
pipelines. Nationally, in 1998, 1,800 inspection person-days were spent
on damage prevention activities. We support increasing state grant
funding for legislation, education, and enforcement of State One-Call
laws beyond the base pipeline safety programs.
Allow me to discuss our specific concerns with the bills. While
many of the provisions in the bill are useful, recent actions by DOT to
summarily limit the states' past role in inspecting interstate
pipelines remains of concern. We believe the current language remains
too restrictive and will neither improve pipeline safety nor ``enhance
the states' ability'' to maintain their current levels of inspection.
We believe existing interstate agent states will be adversely affected
by the limitations placed on their inspection program. If these new
conditions are written into law, they will overly restrict state
inspections and will prevent other states from entering into the
interstate inspection process.
Finally, we believe that additional clarity is needed to assure
that states already in the interstate program are assured due process
before they may be removed by US DOT.
The language changes we are suggesting are as follows:
Sec. 9 in S. 2438 and Sec. 6 in S. 2409 DOT bill:
ENHANCED ABILITY OF STATES TO OVERSEE OPERATOR ACTIVITIES
(a)(3) should be amended to read, ``An agreement under paragraph
(2) shall also include a program allowing states to assume full
inspection responsibilities to ensure compliance with pipeline safety
standards, provided that the Secretary determines that--(A), (B), and
then strike (C), change (D) to (C).
To assure that states receive due process before their agreements
are terminated, (b)(3) should be amended as follows: Section 60106(d)
is amended by inserting after the first sentence the following: ``In
addition, the Secretary may end or decline to renew an agreement for
the oversight of interstate pipeline transportation when the Secretary
finds that there are significant gaps in the regulatory authority of
the state authority over intrastate pipeline transportation . . .
This addition would address the state's right to a hearing should
its program be dropped by any administrative procedure by DOT. Due
process did not occur this past year when the interstate agency
agreements for the states of Arizona and Nevada were dropped.
Mr. Chairman, the rights of states who have effectively conducted
interstate inspections for years, as an ``agreement state'' is the
basis for this language change. Interstate agent states were summarily
put on notice that their programs would be cancelled or phased out over
the next three years and replaced by more limited ``contracted''
services. The states affected include Arizona, Connecticut, California,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia.
Other states including Washington, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia had
previously requested but were denied full interstate inspection status
in the past.
The removal and limitation of state resources is analogous to
disengaging a seasoned, fully trained force and their field commander
from the battlefield and replacing them with a force from a foreign
country that does not know the local customs, people, terrain, or rules
of engagement. This proposed language would adversely tie the states'
hands by re-designing the conditions that must be met in order to
fight, and then replacing state ``troops'' with federal ones from
Washington D.C., Atlanta, Houston, Kansas City, and Denver. History has
proven, more than once, this isn't the way to win the battle.
The states firmly believe their inspections are critical to
ensuring that interstate pipelines are constructed, operated, and
maintained safely. In several states including Minnesota, the state
legislature mandated they seek this inspection role, which we have been
successfully doing since 1991. In ending the current interstate agent
program, OPS unfortunately presumes it could be replaced with a
``temporary agent'' program, which has not been fully analyzed,
formalized or discussed with the states. This would only be for new
construction and incident investigation. It also assumes that they will
receive additional resources from Congress to replace state inspectors
with federal ones. Unknown, unproven, uncertain alternatives must not
be used to replace state activities that promote pipeline safety.
In closing, let me reaffirm the states' commitment to pipeline
safety and environmental protection. We have the trained resources in
place and have been doing the job. We are familiar with the local
conditions, emergency responders, and operators. We have been and
continue to be, on the front lines of our communities promoting public
safety and damage prevention. We fully support your efforts to enhance
this partnership without overly restricting those states that want to
assume a greater role in pipeline safety.
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before your
Committee.
Attachment
Resolution in support of Interstate Agents passed by National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) Washington,
D.C. Annual Meeting March 8, 2000 and supported by NAPSR and the
National Governor's Association.
Resolution In Support Of Interstate Agents
WHEREAS, The States have a vital interest in the safety of the
interstate pipelines within their respective States; and
WHEREAS, The Congress of the United States has provided a means for
States to take an active role in the safety of interstate pipelines by
becoming ``interstate agents'' for the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) via Section 60117(c) of
49 U.S.C.; and
WHEREAS, The States of Arizona, Connecticut, California, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia
currently have interstate agent status which enables them to conduct
safety inspections of interstate pipelines operating within their
States, and other States including New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Texas and
Virginia have requested but were denied interstate agent status; and
WHEREAS, By letters to the interstate agent States dated December 23,
1999, OPS announced that the States of Arizona and Nevada were being
terminated as interstate agents, and that the entire interstate agent
program would be phased out over three years; and
WHEREAS, This action was taken unilaterally and without notice to or
consultation with the affected States, and in the case of the
terminations the rationale given contained incorrect information; and
WHEREAS, In ending the interstate agent program OPS appears to presume
it could be replaced with a ``temporary agent'' program, which has not
been formalized or discussed with the States; and that it will receive
substantial additional resources from the current Congress, which is
not assured; and
WHEREAS, The States strongly believe their inspections are critical to
ensure that interstate pipelines are operated, constructed and
maintained safely; and that State activities which promote pipeline
safety should not be arbitrarily supplanted by unknown, unproven, and
uncertain alternatives; and
WHEREAS, The resources the States expend inspecting interstate
pipelines in no way diminish the safety inspection of local
distribution companies or other intrastate operators; and
WHEREAS, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has encouraged
the inspection of interstate pipelines by State inspectors; and
WHEREAS, The National Governor's Association has adopted a Proposed
Policy on Pipeline Safety encouraging greater State oversight of
interstate pipelines; and
WHEREAS, Washington State Governor, Senators, Congressional
Representatives and the Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission all desire a greater role in the oversight of the interstate
pipelines through their State; now therefore be it
RESOLVED, That the Board of Directors of National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) convened in its March 2000
Winter Meeting in Washington, D.C., urges the U.S. Department of
Transportation to stay any change in the pipeline interstate agent
program as historically administered, that any changes to the program
be made only after full consultation with the States and the
finalization of alternatives, and that OPS be instructed to accept
additional interested States as interstate agents.
Sponsored by the Committee on Gas
Adopted by the NARUC Board of Directors March 8, 2000
Senator Gorton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Reiten, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD REITEN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN GAS
ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC GAS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Reiten. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. My name is Dick Reiten. I am President and Chief
Executive Officer of Northwest Natural Gas, headquartered in
Portland, Oregon. We are a local gas distribution company,
serving more than 500,000 customers in Oregon and Southwest
Washington. And I am here to testify on behalf of the American
Gas Association and the American Public Gas Association.
As part of my testimony, I have an additional statement
from the American Public Gas Association.
Senator Gorton. It will be included in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Reiten, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Northwest Natural Gas, on Behalf of The American Gas
Association and The American Public Gas Association
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name is
Dick Reiten, President and CEO of NW Natural. NW Natural is a 141 year-
old company headquartered in Portland, Oregon. We are a natural gas
local distribution company serving more than 500,000 customers in
Northwest Oregon and Southwest Washington.
I am here testifying on behalf of the American Gas Association
(AGA) and the American Public Gas Association (APGA). Thank you for the
opportunity to comment on the essential matter of public safety and the
nation's natural gas distribution system.
AGA is the national trade association representing over 180
investor-owned natural gas utilities collectively serving almost 60
million consumers. The APGA represents 480 of the 1000 municipally
owned gas companies across the nation. They include municipal gas
distribution systems, public utility districts, county districts, and
other public agencies that own and operate natural gas distribution
facilities. Together we represent the companies that deliver virtually
all of the natural gas to consumers in the United States.
Our industry is a growing business as 70% of all new households
choose to have natural gas service. Our fuel is primarily domestically
produced, reasonably priced and environmentally friendly. Delivering
natural gas safely to our customers is essential for us to continue
conducting our business. Our industry's commitment to safety is borne
out each year through the National Transportation Safety Board's annual
statistics. Delivery of natural gas by pipeline is consistently the
safest mode of transportation.
Although State pipeline safety authorities regulate natural gas
utilities, our State governments routinely adopt the federal safety
standards as minimum standards. Therefore, what happens in Congress
affects our companies. We are very concerned that any perceptions or
allegations that we are not devoted to safety be addressed and
dispelled. Utilities are the ``faces'' of the natural gas industry. Our
companies and facilities are located within the communities we serve
and the public knows us well. We participate in many community programs
and charitable activities. The health of the community is the health of
our company.
Natural Gas Systems are Different From Liquid Systems
As the legislative process moves forward, there are important
differences between the natural gas and liquid pipeline systems that
Congress needs to recognize and understand when crafting new
requirements. While many may unintentionally link all ``pipelines''
together, there are significant differences between the liquid
transmission, natural gas transmission and natural gas distribution
systems. Each industry faces different challenges, operating conditions
and consequences of ruptures.
The federal regulations recognize the differences between the three
types of systems and different sets of rules have been created for
each. 49 CFR Part 192 sets out the regulations for natural gas
transmission and distribution and the rules discriminate between the
two. 49 CFR Part 195 sets out the regulations for liquid transmission
lines.
Transmission systems are generally long and straight pipelines are
large diameter and operate at high volumes and high pressures.
Distribution systems are constructed in pipe configurations that look
like grids or web, use smaller diameter pipe and operate at low volumes
and low pressures.
Natural gas moves a single product, methane, by periodic
compression along the pipelines. Natural gas transmission lines take
our product from the producing areas to our towns where the utility
receives it and distributes the product to homes and businesses. Liquid
transmission pipelines move commodities such as crude oil, gasoline,
heating oil, jet fuel, diesel, propane and other liquids. These
products are physically pumped through the pipeline to distribution
centers or end-users.
The Leading Cause of Accidents--Third Party Damage
The leading cause of accidents on distribution pipelines is
excavators unintentionally striking our lines, commonly third party
damage. Year after year these strikes cause over 60% of the total
ruptures on utilities and the vast majority of injuries and fatalities.
While we work very hard to provide for safety we can't do it alone.
Excavators and other underground utility operators need to work with us
to provide for safe and reliable natural gas service.
This Committee recognized the problem last Congress and created a
federal program to reward States with strong one-call laws. These laws
require excavators to call before they dig and for utilities to
accurately mark their underground facilities. The Committee also
directed DOT to gather all stakeholders together to produce a ``best
practices'' study. This effort was completed last year and we are
working to help implement the best practices to improve field
operations of one-call systems. The DOT/stakeholder effort is called
``Path Forward'' and utilities are participating fully. We thank you
for your work on one-call and hope to find additional ways to improve
this important safety tool.
Distribution Safety Initiatives
Natural gas utilities are working with federal and state
governments on a variety of new safety initiatives. These include the
creation of a voluntary data gathering effort on performance of older
plastic pipe; pipeline system integrity regulations; operator fatigue
surveys; utility transmission mapping and many other efforts. We view
these as investments in our customers and the communities we serve.
In addition to our voluntary efforts, LDCs must comply with a
regulatory program that pays stringent attention to design,
construction, maintenance, operation, replacement, inspection and
monitoring practices. We continually refine our safety practices.
Combined, natural gas utilities spend an estimated $3.4 billion each
year in safety related activities. Roughly half of this money is spent
in compliance with federal and state regulations. The other half is
voluntarily spent to ensure that our systems are safe and that the
communities we serve are protected.
Over the past ten years we have seen the rate of incidents on
natural gas distribution lines decreased by almost 40% while the volume
of natural gas use nationwide has increased by 25%. Our industry has a
tremendous incentive to maintain our excellent safety record. Safety is
a matter of corporate policy and a top priority for every company.
These policies are carried out in specific and characteristic ways.
Each company employs safety professionals, provides on-going employee
evaluation and safety training, conducts rigorous system inspection,
maintenance, repair and replacement, distributes public safety
information, and complies with a wide range of federal and state safety
regulations and requirements. Individual company efforts are
supplemented by collaborative activities in the safety committees of
regional and national trade organizations. Examples of these groups
include the American Gas Association, the American Public Gas
Association and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America.
Collaboration and Professional Organizations
Company safety professionals also participate in a variety of
professional organizations dedicated to advancing the practice of work
place and public safety. A partial list of the leading groups include
the following: National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE),
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), National Safety Council
(NSC), American Petroleum Institute (API), American Welding Society
(AWS), American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Transportation
Safety Institute (TSI), American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), and
the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE).
Research and Development
Utilities also contribute to research and development through such
organizations as the Gas Research Institute and Institute of Gas
Technology where advanced safety devices and technologies are designed
and tested. Interstate pipeline and local distribution companies invest
millions in non-construction safety-specific activities. We are always
seeking better technologies to use in our safety activities.
Senate Legislative Proposals
Legislative proposals have been made to address a number of
concerns that are contained in the three pipeline safety
reauthorization bills before the Senate--S. 2438, S. 2409 and S. 2004.
Allow me to comment broadly upon some general themes. More specific
comments on each bill are included with this testimony as attachments.
We appreciate the opportunity to discuss the various proposals and to
suggest specific language changes.
Operator Qualification
Concerns have been raised about expertise and abilities of the
natural gas industry's workforce. While we have maintained that our
excellent safety record shows that our employees are qualified, we are
fully participating in the new Operator Qualification rule that was
issued in August 1999. For the first time operators will be required
document this qualification in writing. Utilities' written
qualification plans must be completed by April 2001 and are subject to
audit by our state regulatory authorities. In the event of an accident
this information is subject to discovery in court.
Some have suggested that we focus on training and certification.
The current rule encompasses training and the employees are actually
certified by the company under an enforceable federal rule. Some may
question self-certification but the fact remains that operators are
``on the hook'' and responsible for their decisions and actions.
(Please see Attachment #4 for more details)
System Integrity Rule
The Administration has proposed legislative language that tracks a
pipeline system integrity rule for the liquid transmission industry.
The language as written does not discriminate between natural gas and
liquids and includes such language as a requirement to use ``best
achievable technology.'' Natural gas distribution companies are
actively working with the Office of Pipeline Safety to develop a rule
that can be applied to our systems. It is evident that the system
integrity rule for natural gas is going to be very different than the
one for liquid transmission. As mentioned before, our systems are very
different.
Unlike most liquid transmission lines, the physical characteristics
of distribution lines preclude the use of internal inspection devices
in many cases. Distribution companies to maintain their lines utilize
other means of inspection. Regulations require utilities to perform a
greater level of safety activities in more highly populated areas
within our systems called ``business districts.'' This is similar to
the Class location approach used for natural gas transmission lines.
Public Education/Community Right To Know
We support the public's right to know and understand how and where
the natural gas system operates. An informed public will be better able
to contribute to accomplishing the objectives of improved public
safety. In many instances, improving public information is a
cooperative effort between the natural gas industry and communities
served. Whether new efforts extend or improve existing programs,
utilities will participate in their development and implementation.
However, we ask that our unique relationship with our state regulatory
agencies and local communities is recognized and any new requirements
are crafted in a way that takes this into consideration.
We also support advanced preparation and training for fire, police
and emergency service personnel who are often first to arrive at a
hazardous site. It is critical for them to know and understand the
nature of a natural gas incident and how best to manage it.
State Jurisdiction for Interstate Pipelines
Utilities are concerned that different requirements imposed by
States on interstate transmission could lead to supply disruption to
our customers. Uninterrupted flow is critical in natural gas systems.
If interstate flows are interrupted, the ability of a utility to
maintain adequate pipeline pressure to serve customers is immediately
impaired. In such situations we must manually turn off service to
individual customers. When flows resume, we must then restore service
and re-light each gas appliance in every affected home and business.
The process is a long and tedious one, and is obviously not without its
own risks. Unnecessary disruptions should be avoided.
Summary
In summary, the natural gas industry is proud of its safety record.
Natural gas has become the recognized fuel of choice by both citizens
and the federal government. This customer growth and confidence also
bears with it an added responsibility. As such, public and employee
safety is a top priority for natural gas utilities. We will continue
our ongoing efforts to operate safe and reliable systems and to
strengthen one-call laws and systems in every State.
Thank you for providing the opportunity to present our views on the
important matter of pipeline safety. We look forward to working with
federal, state and local authorities, as well as within our industry,
to achieve the highest possible level of public and employee safety.
Attachment #1
S. 2438
THE KING AND TSIORVAS PIPELINE SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2000
By the American Gas Association and The American Public Gas Association
May 11, 2000
IG Report
Section 2 requires the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) to respond
to the recommendations of the Inspector General's report on the Office
of Pipeline Safety. Some of the other provisions of S. 2438 go to areas
mentioned in the IG report. Any inconsistencies should be rectified.
Operator Training Plans
Section 4 would require distribution companies to develop written
training plans and submit them to the Department of Transportation.
Normally, distribution companies work directly with their state
regulatory authorities. States do adopt the federal standards as their
minimum safety standards. However, the state pipeline safety inspectors
inspect and enforce the rules on distribution companies. There are
approximately 1200 natural gas utilities nationwide. We suggest that
the requirements be changed to indicate that utilities will work with
their state regulators when developing their final operator
qualification plan that includes training.
All companies are now implementing the new federal Operator
Qualification rule that was issued in August of 1999. The new rule
requires companies to ensure that their safety related employee force
is qualified to do their jobs and respond to abnormal circumstances.
Companies must document this qualification in writing and this
documentation is subject to audit by the regulatory authorities.
Training is one of the tools used in qualification but not an end unto
itself. An employee can go through a training program but not
necessarily demonstrate the skills, knowledge and abilities to receive
qualification. The focus should be on having a qualified workforce.
(Please see Attachment #4 for further detail.)
Pipeline Integrity Inspection Program
Section 5 requires the Secretary to establish rules for inspection
in ``high-density population areas'' and ``unusually sensitive areas.''
Under the current statute the terms are defined whereby ``high-density
population areas'' cover both natural gas and liquid pipelines and
``unusually sensitive areas'' cover only liquid pipelines. The language
should be clarified to make this distinction. Unusually sensitive areas
are designed for environmental protection measures. Natural gas
ruptures do not result in environmental pollution.
Public Education and Community Right to Know
Section 7 requires distribution companies to engage in a number of
public education programs including informing the public about how to
use the one-call programs. We strongly support better knowledge of the
use of one call or ``call-before-you-dig'' programs. Almost 60% of the
accidents on natural gas distribution lines are caused by third parties
unintentionally digging into the lines.
We already participate in many public education and outreach
programs with state and local official and emergency response, police
and fire personnel. One section requires distribution companies to
``advise municipalities, school districts, businesses and residents of
pipeline facility locations.'' Does this mean that utilities are
required to directly contact every citizen, public official and
business owner in the cities we serve regarding the location of our
lines? It is far more effective to notify citizens that they need to
call before they excavate or report any gas leaks directly to the
utility. Information sent directly to individuals is often ignored. It
is more effective to repeatedly put out your safety messages through
various forms of advertisement. Natural gas utilities operate within
the communities they serve and constantly interact with them.
The section also requires that companies provide maps to the
municipalities where their pipes are located. Unlike long-line
transmission pipelines that are relatively straight and are mainly
located in rural areas, natural gas utilities are, by their nature,
located in populated areas. We are concerned that releasing the
location of our utility facilities may represent a security problem. A
city could be seriously disrupted if such information fell into the
wrong hands. A requirement to duplicate our maps and provide them to
all municipalities also represents a significant storage issue for the
municipal authorities. It is much more workable to simply require that
company's supply any maps to the state or local authorities if they
request them.
Authorization of Appropriations
Section 12 authorizes an increase in overall appropriations
including an increased draw from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
The majority of the appropriations are funded through user fees
assessed on transmission lines. Natural gas utilities absorb a portion
of these fees as part of the transportation costs and these costs are
passed to the consumer. It is therefore important that any increased
fees be wisely spent and not unduly burden the natural gas consumer. It
is important to note that companies provide for the actual safe
operations of their pipelines.
Attachment #2
S. 2409
THE PIPELINE SAFETY AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION ACT OF 2000
By the American Gas Association and The American Public Gas Association
May 11, 2000
Additional Pipeline Protections
Section 2 requires the Secretary to establish and implement a
pipeline integrity program. The language also calls requirements to use
``best achievable technology.'' If accepted the requirement would
likely mean that local distribution companies (LDCs) would constantly
be out of compliance and subject to fines. What is ``achievable'' is
unclear. At what price is it ``achieved.'' The language also appears to
track the ongoing integrity rule for liquid pipelines. The discussions
and issues surrounding the natural gas rule indicate that, because of
the differences in the two products and systems, that it could be very
different from the liquid rule. As the rules are ongoing, Congress
should not confuse the matter with unnecessary legislative language.
The natural gas industry is participating in developing the rule for
our industry in good faith and these efforts should not be undercut.
Community Right to Know and Emergency Preparedness
Section 3 requires companies to promote knowledge about one-call
notification systems and other possible hazards. Companies strongly
support continued efforts to educate the public regarding one-call and
how to respond to a natural gas leak. LDCs also would be required to
work to ensure that emergency response authorities be educated to
respond to natural gas leaks and other information.
Enforcement
Section 4 would expand the Department of Transportation's (DOT)
enforcement authority and penalties. These provisions are unnecessary
as the Secretary already has very wide enforcement authorities. The
section also would broaden the existing citizen's suit provisions in
the law. We question why this is necessary. Pipelines need to focus on
safety activities not court cases.
Underground Damage Prevention
Section 5 would make it misdemeanors for an excavator to hit a
natural gas line. We support strong enforcement for those that
continually refuse to use one-call systems or wantonly endanger
themselves or the pipelines. However, it is more important that an
excavator report a strike, even if it relieves him of a penalty. One of
the most serious problems is excavation activity damaging pipes and
then reburying the pipe.
Improved Data and Data Availability
Section 7 would establish a national data depository for
information other than incident related data. DOT is already working
with both the liquid and natural gas industries to voluntarily develop
a database to help identify any trends or problems. These programs are
just being implemented and should be allowed to continue. There is no
need to spend user fee dollars to create another depository.
Enhanced Investigation Authorities
Section 8 would allow the Secretary to collect ``extraordinary
expenses of incident investigation.'' Currently, the National
Transportation Safety Board investigates accidents on LDCs when there
is a death or injury. State authorities also investigate LDC accidents.
We are concerned that there is no definition of the expenses or caps
for an agency, that's primary role is to create safety regulations and
to enforce them, not investigate accidents.
International Authority
Section 9 would allow DOT to support international efforts to share
information. Once again LDCs fail to see the benefit to the public
safety. The U.S. has one of the best pipeline systems in the world. If
other countries benefit from our expertise they should foot the bill.
Support for Innovative Technology Development
Section 11 would direct DOT to take appropriations (user fees) and
participate in the development of alternative technologies for
identifying outside force damage. LDCs have for many years supported
the development of technologies used in preventing or identifying
outside force damage. If Congress desires to have DOT involved in
research then the projects should be useful and, where possible, be in
conjunction with industry supported efforts.
Authorization of Appropriations
Section 12 would authorize DOT's FY2001 budget request. The request
asks for a 43% increase in user fees. Any additional funding for the
Office of Pipeline Safety should come from increased drawdown of both
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and the OPS ``reserve fund.'' $5
million of the requested increase is for a state grant program for
states with one-call programs. These funds are authorized to come from
general revenues and should. One-call systems protect all underground
facilities, excavators and the public in general. Solely pipeline user
fees should not fund the grants program. The request for full 50%
funding for the annual state pipeline safety programs is acceptable but
the level should be $15 million not $17 million.
Attachment #3
S. 2004
THE PIPELINE SAFETY ACT OF 2000
By The American Gas Association and The American Public Gas Association
May 11, 2000
Expanded State Authority
Section 3 proposes to give State's the authority to promulgate and
enforce regulations for interstate transmission pipelines. Varying
state regulations on interstate transmission lines could result in
requirements that cause the pipeline to interrupt service to local
distribution companies (LDC) serving a different state. This could
cause disruption of residential and business services that would
require LDCs to individually visit them one by one to re-light their
pilot lights for safety reasons.
New Federal Requirements
Section 5 would require that pipeline facilities capable of
accommodating an internal inspection device be inspected every 5 years
and that an external inspection occur every 5 years if the Secretary
determines that the technology exists and is reliable. This provision
would mandate internal inspection of any part of the nation's 1.7
million-mile distribution system, including service lines if the line
could accommodate the same. Distribution lines are normally smaller in
diameter and lower pressure and internal inspection devices are not
routinely used. Other inspection means are much more prevalent.
The section also would require external inspections. In order to
externally inspect the lines they would have to be entirely excavated
every 5 years. The cost of these provisions would be enormous; the
disruption to citizens and the public in urban areas by excavation
every 5 years would be extreme. Basically, every city's streets served
by natural gas would be cut and excavated on a continuing basis.
Enhanced Qualifications of Pipeline Operators
Section 6 would require that employees of pipeline facilities be
tested and certified as qualified by the Secretary of Transportation.
The industry is in the midst of implementation of DOT's Operator
Qualification Rule. Under the rule companies must ensure that employees
performing safety related jobs be qualified to perform their jobs and
to respond to emergency and unusual circumstances. Companies must also
keep records of an employee's qualification and such records are
subject to audit by the Office of Pipeline Safety and, in the case of
distribution companies, the state pipeline safety inspectors. The rule
was created through two and one-half years of hard work in a negotiated
rulemaking that was facilitated by the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service.
Study and Report
Section 7 requires studies on internal and external inspection
devices, burial depth, automatic failsafe mechanisms and equalizing
priorities between natural gas and liquid pipelines. Numerous studies
exist on many issues important to pipeline operation. Prior to
expending user fees to conduct additional studies, Congress should
avail themselves to the existing body of work. If an area of interest
has not been covered, a study could be conducted.
Authorization of Appropriations
Section 8 would increase user fees $81 million for FY2001 and
accelerating to $108 million by FY 2005. Currently user fees total a
little over $30 million. Natural gas consumers eventually absorb the
majority of user fees assessed on pipelines. Diverting pipeline safety
dollars away from field activities to the federal government does not
increase safety. The Office of Pipeline Safety's mission is to
promulgate regulations, inspect and enforce. Pipelines are responsible
for operating their systems safety 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365
days a year. Collectively, natural gas transmission and distribution
spend approximately $4 billion annually on safety related activities.
Our excellent safety record bears out our industry's commitment to
safety.
Attachment #4
PIPELINE OPERATOR QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING
BRIEFING PAPER
By the American Gas Association and The American Public Gas Association
May 11, 2000
Background
The Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996 amended
the statute to broaden a requirement for testing and certification of
operations personnel, law required DOT to adopt regulations requiring
that ``all individuals who operate and maintain pipeline facilities
shall be qualified to operate and maintain the pipeline facilities''
and ``shall address the ability to recognize and react appropriately to
abnormal operating conditions that may indicate a dangerous situation
or a condition exceeding design limits'' (49 U.S.C. 60102(a)).
The Department of Transportation issued a final Operator
Qualification Rule on August 27, 1999. Companies are currently required
to have their written qualification plan completed by April 27, 2001
(49 CFR Part 192, Sec. 192.805 Qualification Program).
Qualification Encompasses Training
Rather than only requiring training to an individual, the DOT
Operator Qualification (OQ) rule was designed to focus on ensuring that
an individual is qualified. This means a candidate for qualification
must have the knowledge, skills, experience and demonstrated ability to
perform covered tasks.
A task is covered by the OQ rule if it meets all four of the
criteria below:
Performed on a pipeline facility,
It is an operations and maintenance task,
It is performed as a requirement of the pipeline safety code
(49 CFR Part 192), and
Affects the operation or integrity of the pipeline.
Qualification is the process of acquiring and demonstrating the
ability to perform a covered task. Training is an enabling process that
helps an individual acquire only the knowledge and skills to perform a
covered task. But training alone may not be enough; after training, the
individual must gain the experience and demonstrate the ability to
perform a covered task in order to be qualified. So, the OQ rule is
broader in scope than a rule that only emphasizes training.
An individual who acquired the ability to perform a task by
regularly performing it prior to the effective date of this
rule may be evaluated and determined to be qualified in
accordance with evaluation methods and criteria established by
the operator.
An individual who will be performing a new task must also
acquire the ability. This may be by training or any other
appropriate means. The rule is flexible as to how this is to be
done. Under the rule the individual must be evaluated to verify
their ability to perform the covered task.
In the event an individual is not able to qualify
(demonstrate through evaluation their ability to perform a
covered task), the operator may elect to help that individual
acquire the ability through training or other appropriate
means. After acquiring the ability the employee may be
periodically evaluated to verify his/her qualification.
Recognizing that the great majority of the individuals in gas
utilities are already qualified to perform covered tasks, the OQ rule
was designed to be flexible as to the type of process needed to acquire
the qualification, emphasizing also those areas where additional
efforts are needed by the operator in order to improve the safety of
its pipeline system operations and maintenance.
During the negotiated rulemaking that took place in
developing the OQ rule, it was determined that a national
qualification program conducted by the Research and Special
Programs Administration, another federal agency, or a state
agency, would not be an appropriate or practical response to
the 1996 Act. While such a system would offer the advantages of
national consistency, including the ability of contractor
employees to work for different operators under a single
qualification regime, the complexity and cost of administering
such a system, coupled with the difficulty of devising a system
appropriate for the wide variations in the operations and
maintenance procedures and facilities of individual operators,
precluded this from being an effective option. It was
determined the mandate would best be met by a non-
prescriptive, performance based regulation requiring each
operator to have, a written program for the qualification of
individuals. This would allow operator programs to be tailored
for some to their unique operations and practices, without
precluding others, including contractors, from joining each
other to agree on specific common aspects of qualification.
A straightforward, performance oriented rule was developed
that applies to both gas and hazardous liquid pipeline
operators. It contains five sections that include the scope,
definitions, requirements of the qualification program, record-
keeping and specifies the schedule for compliance.
In the requirements section (49 CFR Part 192, Sec. 192.805
Qualification Program), the OQ rule requires operators to identify
covered tasks, to carry out evaluation of individuals, and to identify
periods of reevaluation of individuals along with the corresponding
covered tasks for which they have to be qualified. It also has
provisions for changes in covered tasks, and what is required in
special situations involving individuals that are not or may not be
qualified.
The OQ rule also includes a requirement for evaluation of
individuals. An integral part of these evaluation methods is the
requirement that training be performed if an employee fails the
qualification test.
Acceptable evaluation methods are subject to certain restrictions
and include, written exam, oral exam, work performance history,
observation during:
performance on the job,
on the job training,
simulations,
or other forms of assessment.
Many operators in industry have been carrying out training and
qualification of their workforce in connection with operation of their
systems. They may not necessarily have their plans or carry out
qualification in the format that the OQ rule requires. Operators have
been given 18 months to prepare written plans for compliance with the
rule and an added 18 months to comply by completing the qualification
of their workforce.
Critical Tasks Are Further Covered
The rule also recognizes that there are specific critical tasks
with a high level of specialized ability that may have to be performed,
such as welding of a pipeline, fusion/joining of plastic pipes, or
ensuring corrosion protection of steel piping. These tasks are already
prescribed in detail the existing pipeline safety code. They are left
intact by the OQ rule, with the added requirement that the individual
qualified to perform them must also have the ability to recognize and
react to abnormal conditions that may be encountered in connection with
these tasks.
OQ Efforts Are Under Way
Preparations for the qualification process are well under way
within a great majority of the gas industry. Taking advantage of
similarity in some aspects of their operations and maintenance
activities, some companies have joined together to develop common
covered tasks or processes for qualification. Other companies are
working by themselves. Both are supported by a cadre of recognized
experts in instruction and training developing additional specialized
teaching curriculums and evaluation materials and methods. The great
majority of the operators are working with their state regulators to
develop measurement criteria to verify compliance with the rule.
Let the DOT OQ Rule Run Its Course
Requiring operators to submit plans for training within six months
of the passage of Reauthorization, could result in the premature
submittal of plans in a wide variety of formats. Because of the large
variation in the scope of programs in effect by various operators, this
would be making it very difficult to evaluate the adequacy of the
operator qualification programs in existence and under development
today. This could in turn lead regulators and legislators to the wrong
conclusions. Alternatively, imposing more prescriptive requirements
under the above deadline would result in inefficient and wasteful use
of resources by the stakeholders involved, without added benefit to
safety. Therefore, it is suggested that implementation of the DOT OQ
rule be allowed to run its course.
Mr. Reiten. Thank you.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to comment on the
matter of public safety and the Nation's natural gas
distribution system. Let me start by saying our industry
understands the importance of safety and the terrible
consequences that can result from a pipeline failure. And
please understand, in testifying today, we do not want to
diminish in any way the seriousness of the Bellingham incident
or the tragic loss of life that occurred there. As a father and
a grandfather, I think I have a keen awareness of what could
be, and certainly I extent my sympathies to the families who
are here today.
As the legislative process moves forward, there are
important differences between the natural gas and the liquid
pipeline systems that we would hope Congress will recognize.
While many may unintentionally link all pipelines together,
there are significant differences between liquid transmission,
natural gas transmission--high-pressure transmission, if you
will, and the natural gas local distribution systems. Each face
different challenges, operating conditions and consequences of
ruptures and problems.
Current federal regulations recognize the differences
between the three type of systems and different sets of rules
have been created for each. We hope that that differentiation
will play a part of any new legislation.
In the U.S., there are 2 million miles of natural gas
pipelines, as was discussed here earlier; 300,000 miles of
interstate and intrastate high-pressure transmission pipelines;
and 1.7 million distribution miles of pipeline. The federal
Office of Pipeline Safety regulates the interstate pipelines.
The distribution pipelines are basically under the authority of
the states, who routinely and most always adopt federal
pipeline safety standards as a minimum.
The leading cause of accidents on distribution pipelines is
excavators unintentionally striking our lines. Year after year,
these third party damages cause over 60 percent of the total
ruptures on pipelines and the vast majority of injuries and
fatalities. While we work very hard to provide for safety, we
cannot do it alone. Excavators and other underground utility
operators need to work with us to provide for safe and reliable
natural gas service.
The Committee recognized this problem last Congress, and
created a federal program to reward states with strong One-Call
laws. These laws require excavators to call before they dig,
and for utilities to accurately mark their underground
facilities. This Committee also directed DOT to gather all
stakeholders together to produce a best practices study. This
study was completed last year, and we are working to help
implement it to improve field operations of One-Call systems.
So we thank you for this work on One-Call and hope to find
additional ways to improve this important safety tool.
I would mention, in Oregon, we have one number, one set of
regulations, training for contractors and penalties for failing
to adhere to it.
Natural gas utilities are also working with federal and
state governments on a variety of new safety initiatives. These
include the creation of voluntary data gathering on the effect
and performance of plastic pipe, pipeline system integrity
regulations, operator fatigue surveys, utility transmission
mapping, and many other efforts. We view these as investments
in our customers and the communities we serve.
In addition to our voluntary efforts, local gas
distribution companies must comply with a regulatory program
that pays stringent attention to design, testing, construction,
operation and maintenance practices. We continually refine our
safety practices. Combined, natural gas utilities spend an
estimated $3.4 billion each year on safety-related activities.
And these efforts have really made a difference.
Over the past 10 years, we have seen the rate of incidents
on natural gas distribution lines decrease by almost 40
percent, while the volume of natural gas used nationwide has
increased by 25 percent. So, safety is a top priority for
everyone, every company. Companies employ safety professionals
and conduct ongoing employee evaluations, safety training,
rigorous safety system inspections, maintenance, repair,
replacement, distribute public safety information regularly,
and comply with a wide range of federal and state safety
regulations and requirements.
Legislative proposals aimed at addressing various concerns
about pipeline safety have been introduced and are contained in
three bills before the Senate. More specific comments on each
bill are included with my written testimony. With respect to
this legislation, I would like to comment on three topics.
First, concerns have been raised about the expertise and
abilities of our industry's work force. It is clear from the
Office of Pipeline Safety data that we have an exceptional
safety record. Still, we are fully participating in the new
operator qualification rule that was issued in August 1999.
This rule encompasses training and requires that employees are
actually certified by the company, but under enforceable
federal rules.
Second, Senate bill 2409 contains language about system
integrity. It does not differentiate between natural gas and
liquids. Natural gas distribution companies are actively
working with the Office of Pipeline Safety to develop a rule
that can be applied to our systems. It is evident that the
system integrity rule for natural gas should be different from
the one for liquid transmission. We hope you will consider this
in your deliberations.
We are also concerned about any requirement that might
impair the reliability of natural gas transportation service to
local distribution companies from interstate pipelines. Unlike
liquid lines, uninterrupted flow is critical in natural gas
lines. If interstate flows are interrupted, the ability of a
local distribution company to maintain adequate pipeline
pressures may be impaired and customers may lose service. The
process of restoring natural gas service to these customers is
a long and tedious one and is not without its own risks.
Unlike liquid transmission lines, the physical
characteristics of distribution lines, especially older ones,
preclude the use of internal inspection devices in many cases.
So distribution companies use other means of inspection to
maintain pipeline integrity. In addition, regulations require
utilities to perform a greater level of safety activities in
more highly populated areas within our systems.
Finally, we do support the public's right to know where
natural gas systems are located and how they operate. Whether
new efforts extend or improve existing programs, utilities will
participate in their development and implementation. However,
we ask that our unique relationship with our state regulatory
agencies and local communities be recognized, and any new
requirements be crafted in a way that takes this into
consideration.
We also support advanced preparation and training for fire,
police and emergency service personnel, who are often first to
arrive at a hazardous site. We work very hard at this. It is
critical for them to know and understand the nature of a
natural gas incident and how best to manage it.
So, in summary, the natural gas industry is proud of its
safety record. Natural gas has become the recognized fuel of
choice by both citizens and the federal government, and this
customer growth and confidence also bears with it an added
relationship. As such, public and employee safety is a top
priority for natural gas utilities. We will continue our
ongoing efforts to operate safe and reliable systems, to
strengthen the One-Call laws and systems in every state.
Thank you for providing the opportunity to present our
views on this important matter of pipeline safety. And we look
forward to working with federal, state and local authorities to
achieve the highest possible level of public safety.
Thank you.
Senator Gorton. Thank you.
Mr. Pates.
STATEMENT OF JAMES M. PATES, CITY ATTORNEY, FREDERICKSBURG,
VIRGINIA, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL PIPELINE REFORM COALITION
Mr. Pates. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Senator Murray.
My name is Jim Pates. I am the City Attorney for the City of
Fredericksburg, Virginia. I am here as Vice-President of the
National Pipeline Reform Coalition.
Before I get started, though, I would like to point out to
you that I have with me this morning a copy of a letter that
was sent, I believe, to the Committee this week by the National
League of Cities, which is now in support of some of the
measures that we are talking about today. And I would ask that
their letter be included in the record.
Senator Gorton. It will be. *
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* The information referred to was not available at the time this
hearing went to press.
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Mr. Pates. Thank you.
The National Pipeline Reform Coalition is a new
organization, having only been formed a couple of years ago by
State and local government representatives, environmental
organizations, local community organizations, and businesses
that are committed to the idea of pipeline safety reform in
this country.
We have heard today about the Bellingham accident. But
please do not get the impression or allow the public to get the
impression that this accident is somehow an isolated case. In
fact, our organization was formed because there have been so
many accidents and so many communities adversely affected by
these accidents that we felt that there was finally a need for
us to work together to try to get some change, because we have
gotten, as a group, so little satisfaction or help from the
Office of Pipeline Safety.
In my written testimony, I discuss some of these accidents,
many of them equally tragic to the one you have heard about
here today.
Within the last 15 years, we have seen serious accidents in
Greenville, South Carolina; Lively, Texas; San Bernardino,
California; Houston, Texas; MoundsView, Minnesota; and you just
read about the recent spill here in Maryland.
The city of Fredericksburg has had the unfortunate
distinction of having twice lost its entire public water supply
due to oil pipeline accidents, first in 1980, and then again in
1989. A 32-inch pipeline, operated by Colonial Pipeline
Company--it is an interstate line, which runs from Houston to
New York and provides a great deal of the petroleum to the East
Coast--runs 30 miles west of Fredericksburg. On two occasions,
this pipeline ruptured, causing petroleum to spill into the
Rappahannock River, which is our sole water source.
Each time, our water system was contaminated. We had to
shut down our whole system for a week. The first time, the
Governor declared a state of emergency. And they had a
tremendous impact on our community, although we did not suffer
the fatalities that you have heard about here today.
Both of these accidents were due to a rare phenomenon known
as ``railroad fatigue.'' Which means that when the pipeline was
originally constructed back in the early sixties and the pipe
was shipped on railroad gondola cars, it jostled along the
railroad enough times that tiny, hairline fractures developed
in the pipeline which were not readily detectable at the time.
And then, over normal usage over the years, these fractures
eventually will propagate to failure.
After our second accident, we decided that enough was
enough and that we needed to really look at this situation and
educate ourselves about the risk from a pipeline that did not
even lie within our jurisdiction. Our conclusion was that the
Office of Pipeline Safety had not taken adequate action after
the first accident, and we were not convinced that they would
do so now.
They entered into an agreement with Colonial. Testing was
done. Pressure was reduced on this line to 455 psi. That is now
10 years ago. And that pipeline is still operating under the
reduced pressure, because, I assume, that OPS still considers
the pipeline dangerous. We certainly do.
In the aftermath of our accident, that pipeline was
hydrostatically tested. And hard as it may be to believe, when
they tested that line, it ruptured, which is not surprising.
But what was amazing was--and this was in approximately 1992, I
believe, when they tested that line--the joint of pipe that
burst--and pipe usually comes in 40-foot segments, called
joints--and the joint that burst that time, under testing, was
the exact same joint of pipe that had failed in 1980, the first
time. What had happened was when that pipe broke the first
time, Colonial went in, cut the pipe in half, and left the
other half of the defective pipe in the ground to fail again.
I have heard here today that pipeline safety is first and
foremost in the minds of the industry. And I am sure, for many
operators, it is. But, to me, that hydrostatic testing rupture
reflects a shocking lack of regard for safety on the part of a
single operator and on the part of the Office of Pipeline
Safety in inspecting and monitoring the activities of the
pipelines.
Over the past 10 years that I have been involved in this
issue, we have not seen much cause for optimism when it comes
to the Federal Government. I am hoping this year is different.
I think the two of you are to be commended, to have both
Senators from a State take the personal interest in an issue
like this, which generally attracts zero public attention, and
for you to be pursing this I think is commendable. And I am
hoping that it will be fruitful.
I would encourage you, however, to ask some hard questions
of the administration, and not to accept glib, bureaucratic
answers at face value. Our group would like to ask you to focus
on three issues as you look at this bill--or these bills,
actually, the four of them.
First, there is no question that there are insufficient
financial incentives for pipeline operators to prevent
accidents. Under current Federal law and enforcement policy,
there is little financial incentive for companies to take the
serious actions needed to reduce the risk of accidents.
Generally, unless there are fatalities or calamitous
environmental damage to surface waters, pipeline operators
generally face no fines or penalties at all for accidents that
could have been prevented altogether.
Even when State or Federal authorities do seek penalties
for oil spills under the Oil Pollution Act or similar State
statutes, the penalties and remedies are related to
environmental damage and remediation, not to public safety,
pipeline design, operation or maintenance. In other words, what
we see treated are the symptoms or the results of these
accidents, but not the disease itself, which is the design,
operation and maintenance, and location of pipelines.
You have heard here today that the Office of Pipeline
Safety already has considerable enforcement tools at its
disposal, but has deliberately chosen not to use them. They can
impose civil penalties, seek injunctive relief, seek criminal
penalties for willful violations. But these enforcement tools
are rarely used.
From 1987 to 1989, for example, at a time when over 33
million gallons of petroleum were spilled, in hundreds of
separate accidents, OPS collected fines of only $188,000. That
adds up to less than 5 cents per gallon spilled. Both the
administration's bill and S. 2438 contain provisions increasing
the maximum alowable civil penalties from $25,000 to $100,000.
While such additional penalties are helpful, OPS's track record
strongly suggests that such enhanced penalties will never be
used.
Rather than relying on such discretionary penalties, the
Pipeline Reform Coalition strongly urges the Committee to look
at the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 as a model for providing
stronger financial incentives for pipeline companies to act on
their own to adopt operational practices that will reduce the
likelihood of catastrophic accidents.
Specifically, we recommend that the bill be amended to
include mandatory fines for gas and hazardous liquid pipeline
releases that exceed a certain minimum threshold, or when
fatalities are involved, regardless of fault. In addition, we
would suggest that you take a hard look at the citizen suit
provision that is already in the current law. Under the Act,
any person may file suit against OPS or a pipeline operator for
violations under the Act.
When this was first enacted, Congress intended that this
section serve as a powerful incentive to ensure compliance with
the law. Unfortunately, the citizen suit provision has not
worked. We are unaware of a single incident in the last 20
years where any person has successfully brought a citizen suit
under this Act.
The reason for this is that the Act bars any person from
bringing a citizen suit as long as the agency is diligently
pursuing some form of administrative proceeding to correct the
violation. Since OPS's proceedings often go on for years and
years--I mean, Colonial has been under an order in our case for
10 years--so, in essence, what happens is, by having this
administrative proceeding hang out there for 10 years, you are
helping the company by protecting them from a citizen suit.
This section should be amended to bring it more into line with
other Federal statutes, which provide that violators are
shielded from citizen suits only if they are under judicial
supervision.
The second issue we would like to have you focus on is the
fact that OPS has consistently disregarded congressional
mandates to establish higher safety standards, to protect the
environment and to penalize operators who violate the law. You
have heard here today about one of the most egregious examples.
And that is the fact that Congress, in 1992, added protection
of the environment for the first time as part of OPS's
statutory mandate and mission. And they were given those 2
years to come up with criteria for identifying environmentally
sensitive areas.
As of today, almost 6 years after the Congress' deadline,
no final rule on these criteria has been adopted, much less any
additional safeguards actually put in place. Now, I would
submit to you that there is simply no excuse for such a
dereliction of duty by OPS.
You have heard how OPS has failed to carry out NTSB
recommendations. They also have relied, and continued to rely,
on notoriously inaccurate data. I, for one, would question any
statistics about pipeline accidents, whether they are given by
the industry, given by us or given by NTSB. The studies have
shown, time and again, that the figures compiled by OPS are
almost completely inaccurate.
For instance, you were talking about different causes of
accidents. I do not think anybody can realistically pinpoint
percentages on causes of accidents because the data is so poor.
In our opinion, this pattern of neglect by OPS shows that
OPS, as an agency, needs to be fundamentally restructured or
reinvented. Instead of seeing itself as an advocate and
protector of the industry, OPS must refashion itself as an
advocate and protector of the public interest. In this regard,
we would make several suggestions.
Number one is that either this Committee or some
congressional committee should conduct some meaningful
oversight hearings on OPS. NTSB Chairman Jim Hall recently
recommended such hearings that would look into the repeated
failure of OPS to carry out congressional mandates. Such
hearings would also be able to evaluate this Federal/State
partnership that we have been talking about today. And they
could also examine the peculiarly close relationship between
OPS and the industry that it is supposed to be regulating.
We would also recommend that in your legislation you
mandate some tougher safety requirements. We commend the
chairman on his bill, and Senator Murray and Senator Gorton, on
the specific safety requirements that have been included in
your bills. We would suggest, however, that these be
strengthened and additional ones be added to require:
Number one, that by December 31, 2002, all pipeline
operators complete internal inspections of their pipelines if
it is technologically possible; number two, that OPS mandate
minimum operator qualification and training standards; three,
that operators develop fail-safe mechanisms to protect
pipelines from over-pressurization in the event of equipment
failures; four, that all liquid pipelines install emergency
shutoff valves, with stiff requirements for pipelines located
in environmentally sensitive areas; five, that pipelines with
significant accident histories undergo periodic hydrostatic
testing; and, six, that OPS develop leak detection standards
for all pipelines and require the operators to utilize such
systems.
The third issue that we would ask you to look at is that
Congress needs to enhance, not reduce, the role of State and
local governments in protecting the public from pipeline
accidents. Specifically, right now, as you know, there are two
systems in place. First, States can be certified to handle the
intrastate program. And then, on the interstate level, the OPS
may designate States as its interstate agents.
It is hard to believe, in the wake of the Bellingham
accident, that OPS would still be pursuing its stated policy of
phasing out the existing interstate agent program within 3
years. Following our accident in Virginia, our most recent one,
in 1989, Virginia adopted legislation to authorize our public
utility commission to develop a liquid pipeline program.
At that time, OPS came to Virginia, testified in support of
that bill, saying that not only do we welcome Virginia assuming
responsibilities for its intrastate lines, but also being
designated as an interstate agent. So, Virginia went through
the process, hired the necessary people, trained them, got
their intrastate program up and running. And then, when they
were ready to assume responsibility for the interstate lines,
which are the main ones in Virginia and the ones that cause all
the problems, OPS said, oh, sorry, we do not need your help
anymore.
And the chairman of our utility commission wrote back to
OPS and said: Why is it that after you have led us on for all
these years and encouraged us to assume this responsibility,
and we have incurred expenses, hired people, and now you are
telling us that you do not need us anymore?
I find that absolutely incomprehensible, when you look at
the scope of the problems that are facing all levels of
government with this problem. We are convinced that the real
reason OPS is attempting to reduce the States' role in pipeline
safety arises from a demonstrated commitment by a number of
States, including ones such as Washington, Minnesota and
Virginia, to take a more aggressive approach on pipeline safety
than OPS is willing to do.
As far as this interstate agent issue goes, we would
propose that S. 2438 be amended to grant States the authority
to develop and administer their own pipeline safety programs
for interstate lines, provided they do not overburden
interstate commerce or compromise public safety. OPS would
still rightfully be entrusted with primary authority over
interstate pipelines, but States would be given a legitimate
partnership role in protecting the public from pipeline
accidents.
Finally, we would encourage the Committee to include two
other measures that would enhance State and local involvement
in pipeline safety. The first is the creation of these regional
advisory councils. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 provides a
model for fostering long-term partnerships among industry,
government and local citizens in monitoring compliance with
safety and environmental laws.
Under that statute, Congress established these regional
committees, comprised of local elected officials and other
community representatives for the purpose of working with the
Alyeska Pipeline Company to promote their mutual goals. By all
accounts, the program has been very successful. We would urge
you to consider extending this concept to pipeline safety by
allowing communities interested in forming such regional
councils to do so.
Lastly, we would encourage the Committee to amend the bill
to require OPS to institute a program aimed at encouraging
State and local governments to take a more active role in
utilizing their existing legal authority to promote pipeline
safety. As a local government official myself, I can tell you
that most cities and counties in America are largely unaware
that large transmission pipelines run through their
communities.
Senator Gorton. Mr. Pates, can I ask you to finish up
quickly? Senator Murray has been called to the floor of the
Senate, and I want to give her a chance to ask questions.
Mr. Pates. On this issue, we would ask the Committee to
direct the National Research Council to conduct an independent
risk assessment study to determine the public safety and
environmental risks posed by new and existing pipelines, and to
develop model standards for easement widths, building setbacks,
fire codes, and other measures that local governments could
then use.
Thank you so much for giving us the opportunity to appear
today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pates follows:]
Prepared Statement of James M. Pates, City Attorney, Fredericksburg,
Virginia, on Behalf of The National Pipeline Reform Coalition
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
My name is Jim Pates and I serve as City Attorney of the City of
Fredericksburg, Virginia. I am appearing today as Vice-President of the
National Pipeline Reform Coalition (``NPRC''), a national pipeline
safety advocacy organization consisting of individuals, state and local
governments, citizens groups, environmental organizations, pipeline
accident victims, and businesses committed to promoting pipeline safety
reform in the United States. We are a new and growing organization,
having been formed in 1998 in response to numerous oil and gas pipeline
accidents across the country and efforts by pipeline companies to
construct new pipelines without adequate public safety and
environmental safeguards. We recently sponsored our first national
conference here in Washington and were pleased to see how well attended
it was and how many national organizations are supporting our efforts
to secure meaningful pipeline safety reform.
Introduction
I would first like to thank the Chairman, Senator McCain, and
Senator Hollings for being permitted to speak here today. All too
often, the Pipeline Safety Act (``Act'') has been the subject of
Congressional hearings and reauthorization proceedings that have not
included input from public interest organizations, local governments,
or victims who have personally suffered from pipeline accidents. You
are to be commended for your willingness to hear from these families
today. We thank you for including the NPRC and hope that our comments
will be received in the same spirit in which they are offered, that is,
simply, to improve pipeline safety regulation in this country.
The NPRC exists for one simple reason. Communities and individuals
that have either experienced pipeline disasters or who have sought
assurances that new pipelines will be constructed in a safe and
environmentally sound manner have discovered, to their dismay, that our
federal laws and the agencies charged with enforcing them, particularly
the Office of Pipeline Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation
(``OPS''), do not adequately protect the public interest.
You have heard today from the people of the State of Washington,
who have suffered one of the worst pipeline accidents within the past
decade. But please don't think that their story is an isolated case.
There have been many other similar accidents, most of which you are
probably unaware. For example:
1. Greenville, South Carolina--Shortly before midnight on June
26, 1996, an interstate oil pipeline ruptured along the Reedy
River near Greenville, South Carolina, spilling almost a
million gallons of diesel fuel into the river. For hours, fuel
poured into the river, killing an estimated 34,000 fish and
other wildlife and threatening public water supplies before an
emergency crew of 500 workers could stanch the flow. By the
time the leak was stopped the next day, the pipeline's owner,
Colonial Pipeline Company, and the state of South Carolina had
each experienced their largest oil spills in history. The state
Department of Natural Resources later catalogued 23 fish
species that had been decimated, including catfish, largemouth
bass, suckers, shad, carp, bullhead, and warmouth, as well as
turtles, muskrat, snakes, crawfish, and wood ducks.
2. Kemp, Texas--Two months later, on August 24, 1996, in the
small town of Kemp, Texas, about 50 miles southeast of Dallas,
a transmission pipeline carrying liquid butane ruptured,
creating a massive cloud of foul-smelling gas. Two teenagers,
Jason Stone, 17, and Danielle Smalley, 18, jumped into their
pickup truck to warn others. Sparks from the engine ignited the
highly flammable gas, causing an explosion that sent a fireball
into the air visible from 40 miles away. Both teenagers were
killed.
3. San Bernardino, California--In May 1989, a Southern Pacific
train derailed in San Bernardino, plowing through a residential
neighborhood and killing four people. The train landed on top
of a pipeline operated by Calnev Pipeline Company, an
interstate carrier that transports petroleum from California to
Nevada. Thirteen days after the train derailment and train
service had been restored, the pipeline exploded in the same
location. The flames rose 500 feet in the air. Two people were
killed, 10 homes destroyed, and dozens of people injured.
4. Fredericksburg, Virginia--In 1980 and again in 1989, my
hometown of 20,000 people lost its public water supply for a
week due to oil spills in the Rappahannock River. Both
emergencies were caused by the failure of an interstate oil
pipeline operated by Colonial Pipeline Company. The first
accident resulted in 92,000 gallons of fuel oil spilling into a
tributary of the river, the City's sole water source. Nine
years later, it happened again, with 212,000 gallons of
kerosene flowing into the river. Both accidents took place 20
miles upstream of the city's water intake. Each time, fish and
wildlife were killed, businesses were forced to close, and the
city had to haul water from neighboring jurisdictions.
5. Houston, Texas--On October 20, 1994, Houston's San Jacinto
River, swollen by heavy rains and flooding, gouged a new
channel through the floodplain and exposed 17 underground
pipelines. Four of them broke. Gasoline from Colonial's 40-inch
line ignited, sending flames down the river and destroying
houses, trees, and barges. ``It was like hell had opened up and
swallowed the whole river,'' said Mike Norman, 34, who
witnessed the explosion.
6. Mounds View, Minnesota--At 4 o'clock in the morning on July
8, l986, a gasoline pipeline owned by Williams Pipeline Company
ruptured in the small town of Mounds View, sending vaporized
and liquid gasoline into the streets of a residential
neighborhood in this suburb of Minneapolis. Twenty minutes
later, an automobile passed by, causing the gasoline to ignite.
Two people were burned to death while fleeing their home. When
the City of Mounds View attempted to delay the pipeline from
resuming operations until local safety concerns had been met,
company officials went to court and secured a permanent
injunction blocking the city from taking any action that might
restrict their operations.
Since 1990, there have been nearly 4,000 incidents reported to OPS
involving gas and hazardous liquid pipelines,--more than one every
single day. These incidents have resulted in over 200 deaths, nearly
3,000 injuries, and at least $780 million in reported property damage.
Over 62 million gallons of oil and other hazardous liquids have been
released into the environment over the past 10 years, making oil
pipeline accidents one of the largest point sources of oil pollution in
the country. It is not a record of which any of us should be proud.
Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act
This year, we see history repeating itself.
For those of us who have been involved in pipeline safety reform
efforts for years, we recognize a familiar pattern unfolding. For the
past several years, there has been little discussion on a national
level about pipeline safety because there have been only one or two
high-profile accidents. During this time, the Office of Pipeline Safety
and the pipeline industry have worked together quietly to avoid any
regulatory measures which would place any new requirements on pipeline
operators or reduce industry profits. In fact, they have been busy
trying to reduce state and federal regulation of pipelines generally.
But then along comes an accident such as the one in Bellingham and
the public demands action. Congress responds by directing OPS to devise
tougher standards, by imposing deadlines for agency action, by granting
OPS additional enforcement authority, and by increasing the agency's
budget.
Then several more years pass, during which time OPS conducts
studies (generally funded and directed by the industry) and determines
that no new standards are actually needed or that compliance with them
should be strictly voluntary. It ignores the deadlines set by Congress
and uses its increased funding to pursue deregulation of the industry.
Then another tragic accident occurs and the process repeats itself.
Throughout such cycles, very little actually changes and preventable
accidents continue to plague unsuspecting communities and individuals
who happen to live near dangerous transmission pipelines.
We hope this year will somehow be different. As you know, there are
at least four different bills that have recently been introduced as a
result of the Bellingham accident. The NPRC has reviewed all four of
these bills and believes that all of them contain useful provisions. We
would urge the Committee, however, to take advantage of this narrow
window of opportunity and to delve deeply into the serious problems
that plague OPS, to ask some hard questions, and not to accept glib
bureaucratic answers at face value.
We urge you to focus on three fundamental issues in formulating
this legislation:
ISSUE #1--There are Insufficient Financial Incentives for Pipeline
Operators to Prevent Accidents.
Under current law and federal enforcement policy, there is little
financial incentive for pipeline companies to take the actions needed
to reduce the risk of serious accidents. Unless an accident results in
deaths or calamitous environmental damage to surface waters, pipeline
operators generally face no fines or penalties at all for accidents
that they could have prevented altogether or that could have ended
tragically. Even when state or federal authorities do seek penalties
for oil spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the Clean Water
Act, or other state statutes, the penalties and remedies are related to
environmental damage and remediation, not to public safety, pipeline
design, operation, or maintenance. In other words, the symptoms or
effects of pipeline accidents get treated, but not the disease itself.
The Office of Pipeline Safety already has considerable enforcement
authority but they have deliberately chosen not to use it. Under
current law, OPS has the power to impose civil money penalties up to
$25,000 per day per violation (up to a maximum fine of $500,000), to
obtain injunctive relief and punitive damages against operators, and to
seek criminal penalties for willful violations. The agency can also
utilize a special statutory remedy called a ``hazardous facility
order,'' which allows OPS to find that a pipeline or other facility is
either
(1) hazardous to life, property, or the environment; or
(2) constructed or operated, or a component of the facility
is constructed or operated, with equipment, material, or a
technique the Secretary [of Transportation] decides is
hazardous to life, property or the environment.
Unfortunately, these enforcement tools are rarely used. From 1987
to 1989, for example, at a time when over 33 million gallons of
petroleum were spilled in 580 separate accidents, OPS collected fines
of only $188,000. That adds up to less than five cents per gallon
spilled.
Both S. 2438 and the Administration's bill contain provisions
increasing potential civil penalties under current law from $25,000 to
$100,000 per violation. While such increased penalties are helpful,
OPS' track record strongly suggests that such enhanced penalties will
never be used.
Rather than relying solely on such discretionary penalties, the
NPRC strongly encourages the Committee to look to the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 as a model for providing stronger financial incentives for
pipeline companies to act on their own to adopt operational practices
that will reduce the likelihood of catastrophic accidents.
Specifically, we recommend that S. 2438 be amended to include
mandatory fines for gas and hazardous liquid pipeline releases that
exceed a minimum threshold amount or when fatalities are involved,
without regard to fault. Pipeline operators would be authorized to
recover these mandatory fines from third parties if such persons were
actually responsible for a release. Repeat offenders would face even
stiffer statutory penalties.
In addition, we suggest that the Committee consider enhancing the
citizens suit provisions under current law. The Act now provides that
any person can file suit against OPS or a pipeline operator for
violations under the Act. Congress intended for this section to serve
as a powerful incentive to ensure compliance with the law.
Unfortunately, the citizens suit provision has not worked.
We are unaware of a single instance where anyone has been able to
bring a successful citizens suit under the Pipeline Safety Act. The
reason for this is that the Act bars any person from bringing a
citizens suit so long as the agency is diligently pursuing an
``administrative proceeding'' to correct the violation. This section
should be amended to bring it more into line with other federal
statutes, which provide that violators are shielded from citizens suits
only if they are already under judicial supervision.
Finally, we would recommend that a ``whistle blower'' provision be
added to the statute to protect pipeline company employees who report
pipeline safety violations. We hear of instances where pipeline company
employees fear for their jobs if they report violations to state or
federal officials. Such laws have proven helpful in other areas by
protecting lower level employees who recognize and seek to correct
their employer's unlawful conduct.
ISSUE #2--OPS Has Consistently Disregarded Congressional Mandates To
Establish Higher Safety Standards, To Protect the Environment,
and To Penalize Operators who Violate the Law.
Although we do not yet have a final report from the National
Transportation Safety Board on the causes of the Bellingham accident,
it will undoubtedly conclude, as its reports have repeatedly found in
the past, that a large part of the culpability rests with OPS. As the
Committee considers this legislation, we urge you to keep in mind that
Congress' past efforts to deal with the shortcomings of OPS have been
largely unsuccessful.
As noted earlier, Congress has increased civil penalties in the
past but OPS has refused to impose them. The agency has also been
derelict in carrying out the major environmental mandate that Congress
conferred upon the agency in 1992. As you know, OPS was ordered at that
time to incorporate ``protection of the environment'' into its overall
regulatory mission and to establish criteria for identifying pipelines
located in high-density population and environmentally sensitive areas.
In this way, higher safety standards and environmental protection
measures could be applied to high-risk areas. The agency was given two
years, until October 24, 1994, to complete the task. As of today,
almost six years after Congress' deadline, no final rule on the high-
density population and environmental criteria has been adopted, much
less any additional safeguards actually put in place. There is simply
no excuse for such dereliction of duty by OPS.
As noted recently in the Audit Report of the DOT Inspector General
(Report No. RT-2000-069, issued March 13, 2000), the Office of Pipeline
Safety has failed to respond to, much less carry out, various
recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board, continues
to rely on pipeline accident data that is notoriously unreliable, and
has failed to conduct research on ``smart pigs'' and other technologies
that could detect pipeline problems before they cause accidents.
The list of bureaucratic failings goes on and on. For years, OPS
has ignored calls by the NTSB and Congress to set tougher pipeline
safety standards. Beginning 20 years ago, in 1980, the NTSB first
called upon OPS to require gas pipeline operators to install certain
equipment known as ``excess flow valves'' to isolate failed pipelines
after they break, thus reducing the risk of fire and explosion. In
1992, Congress finally required the agency to formulate performance
standards for such valves and to determine under what circumstances, if
any, they must be installed. Three years later, in 1995, OPS finally
concluded that no such valves should be required. Even today, in 2000,
no such requirement is in place.
In our opinion, this pattern of neglect shows that OPS, as an
agency, needs to be fundamentally restructured or ``reinvented.''
Instead of seeing itself as an advocate and protector of the industry,
OPS must refashion itself as an advocate and protector of the public
interest. To help accomplish this objective, the NPRC recommends that
the Committee:
1. Conduct oversight hearings. As NTSB Chairman Jim Hall
recently recommended, Congress should convene a series of
oversight hearings into the repeated failure of OPS to carry
out Congressional mandates and NTSB recommendations, to
evaluate the federal-state regulatory partnership, and to
examine the peculiarly close relationship between OPS and the
industry it is supposed to be regulating. No such hearing has
been held within the past decade and could go a long way toward
explaining the real reasons for OPS' ineffectiveness.
2. Mandate tougher safety requirements. We commend the Chairman
for including in his bill provisions requiring operators to
develop employee qualification and training plans and directing
OPS to develop a pipeline integrity management program. We
would recommend, however, that these provisions be strengthened
and additional ones added to require:
that by December 31, 2002, all pipeline operators complete
internal inspections of their pipelines and take
appropriate corrective action when serious anomalies are
discovered;
that OPS mandate minimum operator qualification and
training standards;
that operators develop ``failsafe'' mechanisms to protect
pipelines from over-pressurization in the event of
equipment failures or other mishaps;
that all liquid pipelines install emergency shut-off
valves, with stiffer requirements for pipelines located in
environmentally sensitive areas;
that pipelines with significant accident histories undergo
periodic hydrostatic testing; and
that OPS develop leak-detection standards for all
pipelines and require operators to utilize such systems.
Many of these issues have been addressed in the past by Congress,
NTSB, GAO, and other outside studies, but OPS has either failed to act
on them or has been so dilatory in pursuing them that Congress should
proceed and set the standards itself.
ISSUE #3--Congress Needs To Enhance, Not Reduce, the Role of State and
Local Governments in Protecting the Public From Pipeline
Accidents.
As you know, the Pipeline Safety Act envisions that regulation of
the design, construction, maintenance and operation of gas and
hazardous liquid pipelines should primarily be a federal
responsibility. This is appropriate, given the impact of pipelines on
interstate commerce. There is an obvious need for uniform standards in
our interstate transportation system. But the current law also
envisions a strong federal-state partnership in which the federal
government sets and enforces national safety standards for interstate
pipelines but states may perform day-to-day inspection and
administrative duties and can even adopt more stringent safety
standards for intrastate pipelines.
Specifically, the Act currently provides that OPS can ``certify''
states to assume federal jurisdiction over intrastate pipelines if they
have adopted federal standards and do not impose more stringent
standards that are incompatible with federal standards. Certified
states also enjoy full enforcement authority over intrastate operators.
In addition, under a separate program, OPS may designate certified
states as its ``agent'' to administer the interstate pipeline programs,
except that all enforcement authority over interstate facilities
remains with OPS. States have been actively encouraged in the past to
assume federal responsibilities under both the intrastate and
interstate programs through a cost-reimbursement formula that enables
them to recover up to fifty percent (50%) of their costs from the
federal government.
This bifurcated federal-state regulatory system has produced a
confusing regulatory maze. As of 1999, 49 states were certified to
implement the intrastate gas program, 9 served as agents to administer
the interstate gas program, 4 were permitted to inspect intrastate gas
or liquid facilities but not to enforce federal standards, 12 were
certified to implement the intrastate liquid program, and 4 served as
agents to administer the interstate liquid program. Now OPS has
indicated that it intends to phase out the entire interstate agent
program within the next several years.
The Office of Pipeline Safety has put forth several rationales for
phasing out the interstate agent program, including claims that
additional Congressional appropriations for OPS preclude the need for
interstate agents and that some states are doing an inadequate job of
regulating intrastate pipelines. The NPRC suspects that the real reason
for OPS attempting to reduce the states' role in pipeline safety arises
from a demonstrated commitment by a number of states, including ones
such as Washington, Minnesota, and Virginia, to take a more aggressive
approach on a whole range of issues.
As someone who has been personally involved in this issue from a
local government perspective for the past 10 years, I can tell you that
the state pipeline regulators with whom I have dealt are far more
vigilant in conducting inspections, monitoring new construction, and
enforcing regulations than is OPS. As a group, they generally favor
tougher safety standards than those approved by OPS and are more
willing to take strong enforcement action against recalcitrant
operators. Their help should be welcomed, not discouraged.
The Administration, in Section 6 of its bill (S. 2409), has put
forward a proposal titled, ``Enhanced Ability of States to Oversee
Operator Activities.'' Such a title constitutes a total
misrepresentation of what the bill actually does. Instead of enhancing
state authority, it actually limits state activities to ``special
investigations involving new construction or incidents'' and to ``other
activities overseeing interstate pipeline transportation that
supplement the Secretary's program and address issues of local
concern,'' provided OPS makes certain findings that such state
activities are consistent with ``the Secretary's program for
inspection.'' In addition, it would place the imprimatur of Congress on
OPS' ongoing efforts to cancel the interstate agent agreements already
in place. Given OPS' public announcement that it intends to eliminate
the entire interstate agent program within three years, how can the
Administration's bill possibly state authority?
The NPRC strongly believes that states should be encouraged to
assume a much larger role in promoting pipeline safety than is allowed
under current law. This should be true for interstate, as well as
intrastate, pipeline facilities. There are several reasons for this.
First, the record reflects that states have generally done a better
job of carrying out federal regulations affecting intrastate gas and
liquid pipelines than OPS has. Several states have gone beyond the
minimum federal standards and promulgated their own standards to
enhance public safety for intrastate facilities or taken the stronger
enforcement actions against violators than OPS ever has. For example, I
invite you to look at the record of the Virginia State Corporation
Commission in administering the federal program for intrastate liquid
pipelines; it far surpasses the track record compiled by OPS prior to
Virginia's certification.
Second, each state has unique conditions that may warrant slightly
different regulatory standards. For example, states suffering risks
from flooding or earthquakes may need different operational or design
standards to protect the environment from natural disasters.
Third, states can allocate additional resources and personnel to
conduct more rigorous inspections that OPS has been willing or able to
do.
The NPRC proposes that S. 2438 be amended to grant states the
authority to develop and administer their own pipeline safety programs
for interstate pipelines, provided they do not overburden interstate
commerce or compromise public safety. OPS would still rightfully be
entrusted with primary authority over interstate pipelines but states
would be given a legitimate partnership role in protecting the public
from pipeline accidents.
Finally, the NPRC would encourage the Committee to include two
other measures in S. 2438 to enhance state and local involvement in
pipeline safety:
1. Creation of regional advisory councils. The Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 provides a model for fostering long-term
partnerships among industry, government, and local citizens in
monitoring compliance with safety and environmental mandates.
Under that statute, Congress established regional advisory
committees comprised of local elected officials and other
community representatives for the purpose of working with the
Alyeska Pipeline Company to promote their mutual goals of
reducing oil spills and protecting the environment. By all
accounts, the program has been very successful.
The NPRC urges the Committee to consider extending this
concept to pipeline safety by allowing communities interested
to form similar regional councils. The membership of the
councils would consist of representatives of local government,
tribes, property owners, emergency responders, and other
interested parties. The governor of the host state would
certify each council. The duties of the councils would be
purely advisory but they could provide invaluable assistance on
a variety of pipeline safety issues. Federal agencies such as
OPS would be required to consult with the councils on issues
affecting that state. To ensure technical competency, each
council would be assured a continuing source of funding under
the statute.
Such a program would, for the first time, create a true
partnership among industry, government, and the public on
pipeline safety issues. It would provide a vehicle for industry
and localities to work with each other instead of against each
other. It would provide a continuity of expertise and local
involvement instead of the sporadic public hysteria that often
arises out of pipeline accidents or proposals for new
pipelines. We believe that such a vehicle could prove to be a
constructive means of promoting dialogue on these difficult and
technically complex pipeline issues.
2. State and local government study and grants. The NPRC also
urges the Committee to amend S. 2438 to require OPS to
institute a program aimed at encouraging state and local
governments to take a more active role in utilizing their
existing legal authority to promote pipeline safety. Most
cities and counties in America are largely unaware that large
transmission pipelines run through their communities or that
such facilities may pose significant threats to their citizens
and the environment.
The fact is that state and local governments can and should
play a much larger role in pipeline safety. Local governments
largely control land use, both as it affects existing and
proposed pipelines, yet few localities adequately address
pipelines in their comprehensive land use plans, zoning and
subdivision ordinances, or building codes. Even localities such
as Fredericksburg and Bellingham that have suffered serious
accidents often do not comprehend what sort of risks pipelines
pose or how their local laws should restrict human activities
near pipelines. They need federal guidelines and technical
assistance to help them make such sound, scientifically based,
decisions.
In addition, few states or localities set minimum easement
widths for new pipelines. We see many instances of existing
transmission pipelines having been built within rights-of-way
that are entirely too narrow. Now, new buildings, schools,
hospitals, and homes are being built within 15 or 20 feet of
these hazardous facilities. Who's protecting the hapless people
who happen to live and work right next to these facilities?
We urge the Committee to direct the National Research Council
to conduct an independent risk assessment study to determine
the public safety and environmental risks posed by new and
existing transmission pipelines and to develop model standards
for easement widths, building setbacks, fire codes, and other
measures that state and local governments can use to protect
their citizens and the environment.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for permitting the National Pipeline
Reform Coalition to participate in today's hearing. We have worked very
hard, over a very short period of time, to scrutinize these various
bills and to formulate our own reform proposals. We look forward to
working with you, the Office of Pipeline Safety, the National
Transportation Safety Board, the pipeline industry, and other
interested parties to reduce the likelihood of accidents such as the
one that has devastated and continues to haunt the people of
Bellingham.
Thank you.
Senator Gorton. Senator Murray, you must go to the floor of
the Senate, so it is your turn.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I truly
appreciate that.
Let me just ask the panel this. One of the issues that has
come before us consistently from our State is the need for a
public right to know provision. And I am sure all of you are
aware of the different provisions in the bills before us. One
of the ideas that has been put forward is for the industry to
collect the information into a summary of problems with the
pipelines and submit that information to local officials and
emergency responders in the area that is being impacted.
Can you put some information together in a way that is
easily understood by the local governments so that this can be
useful for them?
Mr. Reiten. Senator Murray, Dick Reiten.
Yes, we can. We already have the information and mapping
where our systems are, both high-pressure and low-pressure. We
do make that available to the local jurisdictions upon request.
And I am sure we could revise that in some way, although it
would be an enormous burden to provide maps of everything to
every jurisdiction on a continuous basis. We would rather have
it that it is available to them and that they can access it at
any time that they would need to.
Senator Murray. I think the second half of that question is
just as critical, which is what Senator Gorton and I heard when
we had our hearing in the State. Which was that it could be
understood by the local governments in an easily readable way.
Mr. Reiten. Right, I think so. And I think we could revise
that. I think we could also do more to advise local officials
of the various jurisdictions where the local distribution
companies and interstate pipelines operate, about where the
lines are and how to access the information and the
terminology, so that they are equipped to get the information
and interpret it quickly when required.
Senator Murray. Mr. Wright?
Mr. Wright. Thank you. Phil Wright.
I would just add to that, and recognize, as someone else
did earlier today--I cannot remember exactly who--that with the
technology we have available to us to affect Web sites and the
like for easy access, that in putting up those kinds of
facilities we can have a more efficient distribution than sort
of just blanketing every jurisdiction, as Dick pointed out.
Senator Murray. Mr. Haener?
Mr. Haener. Let me add that I think that the interstate
industry is doing a lot of that. But I think we do need to be
careful, when you said putting technical data out in an
understandable form. We can certainly tell you where the
pipeline is, what the operating pressure is, those kinds of
things. But putting out maintenance data in a simple form that
people understand I think would be very difficult and it would
not serve to improve safety.
Senator Murray. When the local agency's main goal is to
protect the citizens in their communities, it is really
important that they have information that is understood. So,
hopefully we can work with all of you to make sure that that is
available to those communities so they can do that.
Mr. Chairman, I do have to go to the floor to manage a
bill. I will submit the rest of my questions as post hearing
questions.
Senator Murray. And I want to thank Senator Gorton, the
other members of this Committee, and Chairman McCain for
working so diligently to have this hearing today. I want to
especially thank Senator Gorton, who has been working with me
in a very cooperative, bipartisan manner, to move legislation
that I think will ensure the safety of many families. I also
want to thank the families, again, who have travelled here and
have so diligently worked for so long to make sure that we
continue to do the right thing here.
My hope is this Committee will pass a bill out before the
end of this month. My true hope is that the Senate can pass a
bill out before the anniversary of June 10th. And hopefully we
can have a bill by the end of this Congress on the President's
desk. I think that would be a true tribute to the courage and
integrity of the families and the community of Bellingham, but
also, as Mr. Pates said, to the many other families that have
suffered tragedies in this country.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And again, thank you to
all of the witnesses.
Senator Gorton. One question to each of you, following up
on the question that I asked to the previous panel. I
understand that there is a pipeline company that has expressed
support for granting Federal immunity for criminal charges for
workers who cooperate with government investigators. And I
would like to know the views of each of you on that subject,
both from the point of view of getting that kind of cooperation
and whether or not, internally, those of you who represent
companies have any penalties for operators or employees who
refuse to cooperate when legitimate inquiries are being made.
Mr. Wright. Senator, I will start. First of all, I think
that you and Senator Breaux were on the right track on the
issue of ordinary negligence. Certainly, if there is egregious,
willful misconduct, that is an issue that perhaps should be
segregated from the issue of ordinary negligence. I am not a
lawyer and should probably not wander off too far into that
arena, but it has been problematic, as we have seen firsthand
in trying to get to the bottom of the issues in Bellingham.
Nobody wants to know more than we in the liquid pipeline
industry precisely what the causes were in that catastrophe,
and we cannot do that, given where we are right now, as people
are attempting to protect their rights.
As to your second question with respect to penalties within
the company, certainly part and parcel to a person's
accountability that is operating a pipeline system is to do
those things that comply with the law and with the agencies
that are accountable for regulating our systems. And if there
is some kind of misconduct involved, apart from protecting
their given rights under the Constitution, yes, there are
disciplinary actions that logically should be taken.
I am not aware of us ever having to do that at my company,
but I am confident that we would if challenged with that.
Mr. Reiten. I cannot add a lot to that except to say that,
in our company, we have standards for forthrightness and
honesty in all matters. Certainly, there is a difference
between willful negligence and human error, and you have to try
to separate between the two. There is also the issue of
personal rights under the law, and we have to recognize those.
But I think it is important, and it is almost hard to
believe that we could go a year after a major accident and not
have the critical information necessary to evaluate it. And
something is wrong with a system that allows that to happen.
Senator Gorton. Mr. Haener?
Mr. Haener. Let me say that I am an engineer, so I
apologize for that part of it. But I think it is a very
critical point. And as I sat here today, I hear that the
solution to pipeline safety is stiffer penalties, fines, throw
people in jail. And I think the priority needs to be to find
out what the problem is so we can fix it and correct it.
And sitting here and not knowing the final cause of an
accident a year later because of people's rights, that is a
problem. So if we need take those kinds of steps so we can get
the facts sooner, I think we should do those kinds of things.
As I understand it, some of the penalty provisions that are
proposed get into contractors and the One-Call system. I think
everyone on this panel has agreed that third party damage is a
problem and we need to improve the system. But if we propose a
penalty to a contractor that hits our pipe because he did not
call the One-Call system, but he hit our pipe so he had to
report to us. And by his reporting to us, we know he did not
report that he was digging there he is going to get a $100,000
fine, I think you may hurt safety.
Because that contractor is going to say to his partner--and
some of these are small people--gee, I forgot to call this
morning as I took my kids to school, we have hit this pipe, if
we call in now, we are going to get a large fine. Well, they
are going to cover it up and move on to the next location. I
want them to call. I want to get out there. I want to open that
pipe up and I want to see if there is a problem. And if there
is a problem, we will fix it.
So I think we need to be careful how we do this, and we
need to promote safety, not punishment.
Mr. Pates. Mr. Chairman, I guess my short response would be
I do not think I would trust OPS to give immunity to anybody.
But, second of all, it raises an important issue. And that is
we have seen an increase in the last several years of the
number of criminal prosecutions brought against pipeline
companies.
I think that it would be a very, very good subject of
discussion for an oversight hearing to talk about why that is.
How many criminal referrals has DOT sent to Justice for
pipeline accidents? And to hear from the U.S. Attorney from
Washington, to know why that case is not moving forward. I
think those are all very good questions. But I doubt that the
answer lies in granting immunity.
Mr. Kenow. Mr. Chairman, the only comment I have is not
specifically on immunity. But there is a need to strengthen
some of the language in the national One-Call law. And I
believe some of that is in the administration bill. Because the
State of Minnesota was involved in that case where there was an
intentional cover-up of a third part hit of a pipeline, where
240,000 gallons of liquid was spilled. The Justice Department
was involved with that, but had difficulty prosecuting under
the One-Call law. They did use the Oil Pollution Act.
Our State inspectors who were part of that interstate agent
agreement did the investigation for that and supplied that
information to the Justice Department. So there is an example
of us being on site, being able to participate. Unfortunately,
because of the way the law was written, there were very light
penalties, and it was definitely an admission of guilt. We had
to evacuate an entire town of 240 people. And in the same farm
field, another line broke about a month later, as well. And
that one is still under investigation.
Senator Gorton. Yes, Mr. Reiten.
Mr. Reiten. Senator, I would like to make just maybe one
final point, picking up on what Bill commented on. And that is
that, as stated in a number of testimonies, two-thirds, or
nearly two-thirds, of all the incidents in both local
distribution lines and interstate pipelines are caused by other
than utility personnel. These are contractors and other people.
So they are outside our control with respect to management,
our companies' standards. So the One-Call legislation, the
training of contractors and so on, would address the majority
of the people who are causing the problems. And it really does
not lie--only one-third of the problem lies with employees of
the utilities and pipeline companies.
Senator Gorton. Thank you. This hearing will be adjourned.
I want to emphasize to this panel and to the earlier panels
that I believe that action in this Committee is likely to take
place very promptly. If you have any other suggestions,
critiques of the various bills or suggestions for their
improvement, the Committee will welcome them, but they need to
be submitted promptly.
Senator Gorton. With that, thanks to this group, to the
others, especially to the parents. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain
to Hon. Kelley Coyner
Question 1. The Bellingham accident is not the only accident involving
the Olympic Pipe Line Company. In August 1999, 3500 gallons of
petroleum product spilled from a broken pump at another Olympic Pipe
Line control center.
a) Why does the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)
continue to permit Olympic Pipe Line to operate south of the Bayview
station?
Answer. RSPA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
worked together to identify the circumstances surrounding both
accidents. We issued a corrective action order requiring Olympic to
address the identified safety issues. The operating pressure of the
pipeline is restricted to 80 percent of the pre failure (June 1999)
maximum operating pressure until internal inspections are completed and
any necessary repairs are made.
b) Are Olympic Pipe Line employees who were working in the pipeline's
control room at the time of the Bellingham accident, and who are not
cooperating with the existing investigations by pleading the 5th
Amendment, still working on product operation positions at Olympic?
Answer. Yes. We do not have enough information to conclude that any
individual's actions were responsible for causing the spill. We are,
however, taking specific and comprehensive action to ensure the
pipeline can safely operate. We can require removal of specific
individuals from performing certain functions if they fail a drug or
alcohol test. However, the employee controlling the pipeline when it
failed and a computer specialist who attempted to fix the
malfunctioning control system both passed a post accident drug test.
Our Corrective Action Order requires a training program for controllers
including classroom, practical exercises and, as appropriate, the use
of simulators specific to the Olympic control system. The training
program will address responding to abnormal operations and the starting
up and shutting down of the pipeline system. Further, we are requiring
a review of the qualifications of each controller in performing their
duties, recognizing conditions that are likely to result in
emergencies, and predicting consequences of facility malfunctions or
failures such as those occurring on June 10, 1999.
c) As a safety measure, OPS has limited Olympic Pipe Line from
operating its line in excess of 80 percent operating pressure. Was the
80 percent operating pressure threshold in force at the time of the
August 1999 spill?
Answer. Yes. The August 1999 release was due to a mechanical
failure of a piston in the pump at a station. It is unrelated to the
Bellingham failure, which the 80 percent pressure reduction was
designed to address.
d) What is the current status of Olympic's request to reopen the entire
line?
Answer. Olympic is internally inspecting the pipeline under close
scrutiny by RSPA. After each section of pipeline is tested, the
pipeline will be shut down again until various company and government
experts have reviewed the internal inspection results and assured that
all needed corrective action is completed.
e) What has OPS done to ensure the safety of the communities along this
pipeline?
Answer. RSPA ordered the company to shut down the pipeline in some
areas and restrict use in other sections until a series of integrity
verification tests and corrective actions were completed. These actions
are designed to prevent recurrence of the Bellingham tragedy. RSPA has
ordered the best technology and testing methods available and has
devoted considerable resources to closely monitor these corrective
actions. We have met with state and local representatives on a variety
of occasions and in public meetings to hear and address their concerns
wherever feasible. For example, RSPA assisted the City of Bellingham to
monitor Olympic's performance of an agreement between the two. We have
permanently stationed an inspector in the state of Washington and have
conducted, in cooperation with the state pipeline safety program, a
joint review of all pipeline facilities in Washington.
Question 2. The Administration's pipeline safety reauthorization
submission proposes to increase the maximum amounts or civil penalties.
a) In recent years, how often has OPS used the maximum civil penalty
currently authorized by statute?
Answer. RSPA has assessed the maximum civil penalty for individual
violations four times in the past few years for overpressure of a
pipeline. The maximum civil penalty is restricted to $25,000 for each
day the violation exists. Overpressure of a pipeline, which usually
occurs in minutes rather than days, is a serious and preventable
violation. However, the civil penalty restriction limits the maximum
assessment to $25,000 per event. RSPA has not assessed the maximum
aggregate civil penalty of $500,000.
b) What does OPS do with the money it collects from civil penalties?
Answer. The funds collected from civil penalties go directly to the
Department of the Treasury and are deposited into the general fund.
c) How much did OPS collect from civil penalties last year and how much
does OPS anticipate collecting annually if the higher penalties are
enacted?
Answer. OPS collected $16,500 in civil penalties last year. RSPA
has finalized new standards for protection of tanks and operator
qualification and expects to finalize new standards for corrosion and
integrity management this year. While it is difficult to estimate in
advance the extent to which operators will comply with these standards,
we expect that some operators may have difficulty. We plan to enforce
compliance, and penalties are likely to increase on that basis alone.
The number and magnitude of civil penalty actions are not true measures
of the safety impact of the RSPA compliance program. We continue to
take strong enforcement action, including civil penalties and
compliance orders, for a serious noncompliance. Enforcement is not the
only means to achieve the desired safety impact. We focus on the best
safety solutions.
Question 3. The Administration's reauthorization bill includes a
section that directs DOT to support ``international efforts to share
information about the risks to the public and the environment from
pipelines and the means of protecting against those risks.'' The
Administration's section-by-section document accompanying the
submission acknowledges that pipeline safety is primarily a national
issue, but that environmental issues ``may have'' worldwide impact.
a) Is statutory language necessary since the submitted section-by-
section states that the Secretary already provides technical assistance
to foreign governments?
Answer. The Department's involvement in international pipeline
safety matters has been limited and has usually been at the request of
other agencies, such as the Department of State. A statutory provision
is not needed to continue current practice. However, as the world gets
smaller, there will be more opportunities to become involved in the
international arena than the agency can accommodate. The
Administration's proposal provides a statutory basis consistent with
the Nation's pipeline safety needs upon which to base decisions on
participation.
b) What international meetings involving pipeline safety issues has the
Secretary attended and where have those meetings taken place?
Answer. The Secretary did not attend any international meetings
having to do with pipeline-specific issues.
c) For the record, please identify the DOT Presidential appointees, the
DOT civil service employees, and the total travel expenditures that
were associated with attending those meetings. Please provide a chart
listing those expenses and individuals involved for the record.
Answer. Not applicable.
d) In your opinion, what should take precedence as Congress considers
reauthorizing the pipeline safety act, enhancing U.S. community
awareness efforts or international outreach?
Answer. Although U.S. community awareness clearly takes precedent,
the Administration's proposal on international outreach is fully
consistent with and supportive of that effort. One of the
considerations for international activities is the extent to which the
knowledge gained will benefit the public. For example, international
activities could increase our understanding about issues that are
important to communities, such as new monitoring and detection
techniques or the performance of pipelines in particular environments,
such as earthquake or flood zones. This knowledge would put us in a
better position to respond to community concerns in those areas.
Question 4. At the beginning of this year, RSPA revoked interstate
pipeline agent delegation status from Arizona and Nevada--whereby the
states inspect the interstate lines, report their findings, and the
department is responsible for enforcement actions. RSPA also announced
its intention to revoke this status from other states in the future.
a) What has been the safety record in the states that have requested
and received delegation status for the program been to date?
Answer. Currently, we do not have mileage information by state, so
we are unable to compare normalized incident rates by state on a per
mile basis at this time. Without normalizing on a per mile basis,
comparing a large state with high mileage to a small state with low
mileage, one would expect to see more incidents in the larger state.
Definitive conclusions about the relative risk of the two states can't
be drawn without normalizing on a per mile basis. A comparison of the
state incident rate against the national average provides a useful
comparison methodology.
We have prepared three charts for states with interstate agent
status showing national and by-state average number of incidents for
the ten-year period from 1990-1999. The first chart compares intrastate
vs. interstate jurisdiction for states with hazardous liquid programs.
The second chart compares intrastate vs. interstate jurisdiction for
states with natural gas programs. The third chart compares natural gas
distribution and transmission incidents, and hazardous liquid incident
rates.
State Agencies Acting as Liquid Interstate Agents
1990-1999--National average--3.9 incidents/year/state
1990-1999 Incidents per Interstate Agent State
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
Transmission Average
State Jurisdiction Incidents Incidents
(1990-1999) Per Year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
California State Fire Intrastate 156 15.6
Marshall \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 54 5.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 210 21.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minnesota Intrastate 1 .1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 31 3.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 32 3.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York Intrastate 1 .1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 16 1.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 17 1.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona \2\ Intrastate 3 .3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 5 .5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 8 .8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Agencies Acting as Gas Interstate Agents
1990-1999--National average--1.5 incidents/year/state
1990-1999 Incidents per Interstate Agent State
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
Transmission Average
State Jurisdiction Incidents Incidents
(1990-1999) Per Year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecticut Intrastate 0 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 2 .2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 2 .2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minnesota Intrastate 2 .2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 7 .7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 9 .9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio Intrastate 3 .3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 7 .7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 10 1.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iowa Intrastate 1 .1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 9 .9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 10 1.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York Intrastate 7 .7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 4 .4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 11 1.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
West Virginia Intrastate 2 .2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 19 1.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 21 2.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michigan Intrastate 5 .5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 8 .8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 13 1.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona \2\ Intrastate 1 .1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 11 1.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 12 1.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevada \2\ Intrastate 3 .3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate 0 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3 .3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Ten-Year State Averages (1990-1999)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Loss
Acc/ Deaths/ Injured/ Property (Bbl)
Pipeline Mode Year Year Year Damages Liquid
Operators
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas 1.6 .02 .24 $396,960
Transmission
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas 2.4 .34 1.5 $350,059
Distribution
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid 3.9 .05 .25 $786,205 1,570
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ten-year Averages by State (1990-1999)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Loss
Acc/ Property (Bbl)
State Pipeline Mode Year Deaths Injured Damages Liquid
Operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecticut Natural Gas Transmission .2 0.0 0.0 $9,600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 1.2 0.0 .6 $278,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid .2 0.0 0.0 $295,000 29
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minnesota Natural Gas Transmission .9 0.0 .2 $32,100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 2.1 .8 1.6 $71,960
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid 3.2 0.0 .2 $1,976,503 2,105
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio Natural Gas Transmission 1.0 .2 0.0 $446,900
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 4.1 .4 3.0 $528,641
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid 3.4 0.0 .2 $790,205 557
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iowa Natural Gas Transmission 1.0 .1 .1 $56,380
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 1.8 .8 .5 $193,669
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid 4.7 0.0 .4 $511,717 4,124
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York Natural Gas Transmission 1.1 0.0 0.0 $76,514
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 6.2 .7 4.4 $1,517,800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid 1.7 .2 .5 $352,285 151
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
West Natural Gas Transmission 2.1 0.0 .6 $145,520
Virginia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 1.1 .1 1.3 $18,327
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid .1 0.0 0.0 $0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michigan Natural Gas Transmission 1.3 0.0 .4 $44,920
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 5.5 1.3 2.8 $642,531
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid 2.1 0.0 .1 $160,788 295
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona \2\ Natural Gas Transmission 1.6 0.0 .4 $177,576
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 1.3 0.0 .4 $65,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid .8 0.0 0.0 $63,500 237
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevada \2\ Natural Gas Transmission .3 0.0 .1 $31,196
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 1.3 0.0 1.0 $216,997
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid .2 0.0 .3 $40,800 34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
California \1\ Natural Gas Transmission 2.9 .1 .6 $743,163
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Natural Gas Distribution 9.2 1.0 3.5 $4,398,970
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liquid 21.0 .1 .9 $7,661,170 4,118
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Without normalizing incident rates on a per mile basis, skewing may occur. California may appear to have a
higher incident rate than smaller states, but we do not know if this is true on a per mile basis.
\2\ Arizona and Nevada are no longer interstate agents but are included for comparison purposes.
b) Are either Arizona or Nevada being prevented from participation
based on safety performance?
Answer. No. This year, Arizona and Nevada are not participating as
interstate agents in the pipeline safety program because there are no
major system inspections or construction projects within those states.
System inspections are coordinated team inspections of entire pipeline
systems. Different pipeline systems are selected each year for these
comprehensive inspections. None of the pipeline systems scheduled for
this year cross into either Arizona or Nevada. Both of these states
have performed well in the past as interstate agents.
c) Does RSPA currently have the resources to take over the work of the
states that have historically carried out the interstate inspections?
Answer. No. We hope to continue current interstate agent programs
with a different type of interstate agreement that would be mutually
beneficial for safety oversight on interstate pipelines. These
agreements would focus on the development of annual plans to utilize
the states' expertise in addressing local concerns, such as new
construction, damage prevention and emergency response activities.
d) How many RSPA inspectors are needed to carry out all of the
interstate inspections, what is the federal funding level for the
necessary FTEs, and how many pipeline inspections are completed solely
by federal inspectors each year?
Answer. We currently have 58 federal inspectors that perform
approximately 800 pipeline inspections annually and we requested four
additional positions for federal inspections. These positions will
require $100,000 per FTE, or $200,000 in FY 2001.
e) How do you intend to utilize states to oversee pipeline safety?
Answer. The Administration's legislative proposal outlines its
continuous commitment to working with its state partners on pipeline
safety. It offers an expanded role for all states to participate in
numerous ways to improve oversight of interstate pipelines. We invite
states to work with us on the evaluation of interstate pipelines,
especially on new construction, accident investigation and major
rehabilitation projects and, are proposing to fund, for the first time
up to 100 percent of the costs associated with those inspections. The
Administration's proposed legislation has provisions for state
participation in federal inspections and other activities that will
contribute to improved safety and environmental protection,
particularly in the areas of identifying local issues of concern,
broadening damage prevention activities, and improving community
outreach and emergency response planning endeavors.
We would work with each participating state agency to establish an
annual work plan to support these various functions and to agree on how
we would share responsibilities. As examples, for new pipeline
construction, the state would monitor the pipeline construction and
report noncompliance issues to OPS. For accident investigations, the
state may evaluate inspection results and witness testing. The state
may audit an operator's risk management demonstration project or
initiate or participate in ongoing damage prevention projects. They may
assess or recommend improvements to response planning and procedures.
They may work with local officials who need to understand specific
pipeline risk assessments and remedial actions.
We would expect to keep participating states in the program as long
as their intrastate programs are in order. We believe this proposal
promotes federal/state collaboration and more efficient scheduling of
interstate pipeline inspections which all contribute to greater safety.
We believe this expansion will improve our national understanding of
the pipeline infrastructure, the risks to it and the public, and will
improve our ability to evaluate the adequacy of operators' system-wide
safety and environmental performance.
f) In April, DOT proposed legislation to reauthorize the pipeline
safety program that includes provisions to allow states to participate
somewhat in the oversight of interstate pipelines. What are the
differences between the state partnership program you are canceling and
the new one you are proposing?
Answer. The Department is proposing improvements to its policy
relating to interstate agents and plans to put in place a different
type of interstate agreement that would be of mutual benefit to both
the Federal Government and the States in safety oversight of interstate
pipelines. The current interstate agent program limits funding to 50
percent of a state's costs for performing inspections on our behalf and
turning over the results to OPS for possible enforcement action.
DOT's proposed legislation would substantially expand the state
oversight role. States could participate in the oversight of interstate
pipeline transportation. Accident investigation and new construction
would be major roles but a state would also work on other areas of
local concern. Under this new proposal, the Department would be
authorized to reimburse up to 100 percent of the states' cost in
investigating accidents or inspecting new construction. Other
activities related to interstate pipelines would be funded at the 50
percent level. We hope that damage prevention, local preparedness, and
community right-to-know activities will be enhanced through this
program. This program will be open to all states, not just those
already having interstate agent status.
Question 5. On April 24, 2000, RSPA issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking proposing that hazardous liquid pipeline operators that have
pipelines in high consequence areas (environmentally sensitive areas,
populated areas, and navigable waterways) develop plans for enhanced
protection of these areas from pipeline rupture.
a) How does RSPA intend to evaluate the adequacy of these plans and
whether the operators are following the plans?
Answer. One year from the effective date of each integrity
assessment rule, OPS plans to begin field review of (1) operators' plan
for baseline assessment of all pipelines that could affect a high
consequence area and, (2) a framework addressing the required program
elements. In reviewing the baseline assessment plan, OPS will evaluate
timelines for internal inspections, pressure tests, or equivalent
alternative technology to determine the integrity of the pipeline in
high consequence areas; methods; and explanations of risk factors
considered, and priority given, to material, manufacturing information,
local environmental factors, activities in the area, coating, product,
repair history, previous test data, corrosion and leak history. In
reviewing the program framework, OPS will review the process the
operator establishes for continuous evaluation; the process for
integrating information, including potential for excavation damage,
data from past integrity assessment, results of inspections and tests,
including corrosion control monitoring and cathodic protection surveys
on the pipeline, and the consequences of a failure; repair criteria and
prioritization; identified preventive and mitigative measures to
protect high consequence areas; methods used to ensure the
effectiveness of the program (e.g., performance measures); and a
process to ensure that qualified personnel will review and interpret
assessment results and data. More important, we will begin to observe
how operators implement their plans.
In examining integrity assessment plans, field inspections will
include review of documents that support the analyses and decisions
made and actions taken to implement the plan. In reviewing this
documentation, we will closely examine how well an operator's program
addresses the main elements of the integrity assessment rules. We will
follow these reviews with subsequent field inspection of the testing,
repair, prevention, and mitigation actions an operator makes. RSPA
inspectors and contractors will verify that assessments have been
conducted according to an operator's plan, and identified weaknesses
that could affect the integrity of the pipeline have been repaired, and
that the operator has taken the planned mitigative and preventive
measures.
We anticipate that our performance-based rules will be supplemented
by consensus standards (liquid pipeline standards are currently being
developed under the auspices of the American National Standards
Institute). We expect these standards to be specific and articulate the
range of testing methodologies and repair criteria. We will monitor
performance in accordance with these standards.
b) To what extent will this approach require additional federal
resources?
Answer. Actual implementation of integrity reviews will begin in FY
2002. A decision on additional resource requirements will be made at
that time. RSPA currently has 58 inspectors on staff. We anticipate
requiring additional resources for this effort. Of the resources
needed, significant support may be supplied through technical
contractors and third party experts. The initial three-year period will
include review of each pipeline operator's framework and plan and then
subsequent inspection of the testing, repair, prevention, and
mitigation activities. Because we are issuing separate rulemakings to
address each of the major pipeline types, such as large hazardous
liquid, small hazardous liquid, interstate and intrastate natural gas
transmission pipelines, the compliance dates will likely be phased in
up to six months or one-year apart, due to the time needed to complete
the rulemaking process.
Question 6. The Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of
1996, sponsored by our distinguished Majority Leader, authorized the
Secretary of Transportation to implement a risk demonstration program
to test the use of a risk management approach to pipeline safety. The
act further required the Secretary to report by March 31, 2000, on the
results of the projects carried out under this program, including an
evaluation of the safety and environmental protection provided by the
projects.
a) What is the status of the program? Has OPS issued a report?
Answer. The report required by Congress is now in clearance within
the Department. The report, entitled ``Beyond Compliance: Creating a
Responsible Regulatory Environment that Promotes Excellence,
Innovation, and Efficiency,'' describes the Pipeline Risk Management
Demonstration Program and its progress to date and outlines
recommendations for future activities based on lessons learned. It
describes our experiences exploring different applications of risk
management. Its fundamental conclusion is that OPS's near-term focus
should be on regulatory approaches that use risk management programs,
processes, and tools in combination with, rather than as a replacement
for, existing regulations. This finding is consistent with, and
provides a foundation for, the integrity management/high consequence
area rulemakings now underway.
b) Has OPS evaluated whether the projects have provided safety and
environmental protection beyond that provided by current pipeline
safety regulations?
Answer. Yes. Each demonstration project accepted into the program
includes risk control activities that exceed current regulations or
that produce better performance than could be achieved through
compliance with the current regulations. Specific examples:
Implementation of the Equilon Risk Management Program (covering
its Cortez Pipeline) is resulting in improved emergency
response capability and enhanced public and emergency personnel
protection and awareness. These new risk control activities
exceed the current regulations and even go beyond the risk
control activities included in Equilon's original proposal.
Equilon will test the ``First Call System,'' a high speed
community emergency notification network. The First Call System
immediately phones both emergency officials and local residents
in the event of a leak or rupture. Emergency officials would be
informed about the location and nature of the event, who to
contact for further instructions and information, where to
report, what emergency precautions need to be taken, etc.
Landowners would be provided current, up-to-date information on
the incident and on what precautions they should take. Upon
validation, this notification network will be used elsewhere,
including other Equilon pipeline systems.
Equilon will also develop and distribute an emergency response
guideline tool to employees, emergency responders, and the
public. This tool provides the necessary safeguards and
protective actions to be taken in the event of a release in an
easy-to-understand format. The tool uses the results of
Equilon's latest carbon dioxide and ethylene dispersion
analyses performed as part of the risk management program to
identify distances from the pipeline and type of leak for which
various protective actions are required.
Phillips' Excavation Risk Assessment Process has resulted in a
number of benefits. For example, in some instances outside
parties have rerouted or altered proposed projects to reduce
the likelihood of hitting Phillips' pipelines during excavation
activities. This has reduced the risk of outside force damage
during excavations and has improved safety and service
reliability. Through the use of performance measurement,
Phillips' project has significant potential to demonstrate
superior performance, and provide valuable input to OPS's
damage prevention initiatives.
Northwest has implemented a comprehensive geologic hazards
program that helps identify where land movement might be a
threat to pipeline safety, and implements activities that are
designed to prevent failures in these locations. A key feature
of this program is the use of instrumentation to measure
precursors to land movement including pipe strain, soil
movement, and moisture level. Company personnel regularly
monitor these instruments to obtain advance indication of
potential land movement. Using this early warning, the company
is able to relieve stress on the pipe and prevent ruptures. The
company has evidence that this advance warning and remediation
was able to prevent at least three ruptures in recent years.
Columbia has been able to expand its internal inspection
program through risk management. Columbia will be able to
internally inspect and repair more miles of its system,
focusing on those segments identified as most susceptible to
corrosion or other material defects. These inspections and
associated repairs will reduce the likelihood of corrosion
failures, improving safety and reliability.
As part of a major project to reverse the direction of flow on
part of its Salt Lake Products System, Chevron used its risk
management process to identify and address the risks associated
with operation in this new configuration. A review of the risks
at major river crossings indicated that installation of new
valves at these locations would minimize the volume of products
that would be discharged into the river should a failure occur
at or near the river crossing. As a result, Chevron installed
valves to provide an additional level of protection for these
waterways.
c) Why does the Administration's submission include provisions to
statutorily enact certain conditions contained in an executive order
the President signed when he signed the 1996 reform Act into law?
Answer. These conditions--relating to the compliance record of the
operator and the level of safety and environmental protection provided
by the project--have been part of the risk management demonstration
program from the beginning. Therefore, it is appropriate to include
them in any limited continuation of the individual projects.
Question 7. RSPA data show the leading cause of pipeline failure is
outside force damage. What is the leading cause of pipeline product
spills and what is OPS doing to reduce pipeline product spills?
Answer. Outside force damage and corrosion run about even as the
leading causes of liquid pipeline accidents by total number. Spills
from outside force damage, however, have higher consequences.
Over the past 10 years, more than 25 percent of all reportable
liquid accidents, resulting in nearly 40 percent of all releases to
water, and more than 40 percent of total property damage from these
incidents, were caused by outside force damage. Hazardous liquid
pipeline accidents attributable to outside force damage result in
nearly double the average net loss of products than occur from
accidents attributable to other sources of pipeline failure.
OPS has several program initiatives in the areas of damage
prevention, corrosion regulation, and response planning underway to
target both outside force damage due to excavation and corrosion, as
well as to better prepare for any accidents.
Our national Dig Safely damage prevention education
campaign, promotion of the best practices identified by all
stakeholders in our widely heralded Common Ground damage
prevention effort, the work of the Common Ground Alliance (the
nonprofit organization we are helping to establish), and our
current smart pig research program is all squarely focused on
preventing or identifying previous damage to pipelines, as well
as to other critical underground facilities (water, electric,
telecommunication, sewer, etc.).
OPS will, this summer, propose new regulations to modernize
corrosion regulations based on our collaboration with the
National Association of Corrosion Engineers.
OPS requires, reviews, and approves emergency response plans
for all liquid pipeline operators. Further, we conduct about 20
tabletop and field deployment exercises each year to ensure
that these plans can translate to action, if needed.
OPS has issued several recent rulemakings that strengthen existing
spill prevention and planning regulations including:
Final oil breakout tank rule: April 1999.
Operator qualification final rule: October 1999.
Unusually Sensitive Areas (USA) proposed rule: December
1999.
Enhanced Protection for High Consequence Areas proposed
rule: April 2000.
Question 8. What are the existing training requirements for federal and
state pipeline inspectors and do those training standards meet the
recommendations issued by the NTSB?
Answer. Federal and state pipeline safety inspectors are all
required to take a minimum of nine weeks of training at DOT's
Transportation Safety Institute focused on the pipeline safety
regulations and specialized safety issues (e.g., corrosion and cathodic
protection). These same inspectors are required to take and
periodically refresh training in occupational safety and emergency
response. In addition, specialized training (e.g., reading in line
inspection tool results, breakout tank standards, etc.) is provided on
an ad hoc basis. Most OPS inspectors and many of those employed by the
states are professional engineers, many with graduate degrees in
engineering. Further, OPS inspectors have an average of 10-15 years of
related experience, mostly in pipeline and utility systems engineering
and inspection.
We are not aware of any NTSB recommendation addressing training of
the Federal and State pipeline safety inspection workforce. OPS
continues to support the NTSB during significant accident
investigations and to conduct those where NTSB chooses not to become
involved. The NTSB has many times complimented OPS on the helpfulness
and thoroughness of our inspectors. We continue to work with NTSB
wherever and whenever possible so that we can both successfully
discharge our responsibilities to the public.
We are currently working to address recommendations of DOT's Office
of Inspector General (IG) on improving the training of pipeline safety
inspectors in interpretation of in-line inspection tool results. We
have already begun using available funds for this purpose, and will
accelerate this specialized training for Federal inspectors over the
next two fiscal years. This training will ensure that our inspectors
are fully prepared to monitor compliance with our integrity management
rules.
Question 9. The DOT-Inspector General (IG) has highlighted the fact
that RSPA has not implemented Congressional safety mandates, and in
some cases, is at least five years overdue and counting. How do you
defend this poor performance?
Answer. The DOT-IG report highlighted several authorities provided
to RSPA by the Congress. It also noted that RSPA has recently taken
regulatory action to fulfill several Congressional mandates: (1)
defining Unusually Sensitive Areas (USAs), (2) providing enhanced
protection for USAs and populated areas, and (3) requiring periodic
inspection of pipelines in high-consequence areas. This action is
intended to respond fully to these outstanding mandates. These three
mandates were the focus of the DOT-IG's recommendations.
Our response to these mandates was delayed due to the complexity of
the USA issue (on which our response to several mandates rests), the
lack of in-house environmental expertise, the required consultation
with all federal environmental agencies, and our decision to seek broad
public involvement. In addition, Congressional direction to RSPA on
some of these items changed in 1996 to allow RSPA more flexibility in
its responses.
RSPA has recently completed pilot testing of the proposed
definition of USAs in the states of California, Louisiana, and Texas
(which represent 45 percent of total pipeline mileage). This pilot test
is being peer-reviewed by ecological and drinking water experts from
each of these states, other federal agencies, and academics. The pilot
test results and summary of the peer review are available to the public
on the OPS Internet web site. The comment period for the proposed USA
definition ends in late June 2000. RSPA is working to issue a final
rule on the USA definition by the end of the year.
In April 2000, RSPA published the first in a series of rulemakings
to focus company and regulatory attention on pipeline protection in
high-consequence areas, including USAs, populated areas, and waterways.
These rules will satisfy the Congressional mandates and build on RSPA's
ongoing risk management demonstration program, integrity-based
inspection program, and risk-based regulations to add additional
pipeline safety protection. These initiatives supplement RSPA's
comprehensive pipeline safety inspection program. These rules will
address several Congressional mandates and will: (1) require pipeline
operators to periodically inspect their lines; (2) integrate the
results of these tests with other available information regarding
threats to pipeline integrity; and (3) provide for governmental
oversight of the company's testing protocols, schedules, and results.
The first proposed rule in this series addresses larger hazardous
liquid pipelines, which account for 87 percent of total liquid pipeline
mileage.
We expect to issue a similar rulemaking to the operators of smaller
liquid pipelines and natural gas pipelines later this year. We are also
considering a rulemaking to require pipeline communities to communicate
more detailed pipeline safety information to local communities.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain
to John A. Hammerschmidt
Question 1. The NTSB has had on-going concerns over the need for
adequate pipeline operator training. As you are aware, last August,
RSPA completed a negotiated rule on operator qualifications, which is
just now beginning to be implemented.
a. What is the Board's view of the rulemaking outcome? Does the NTSB
believe the new procedures are an improvement over the previous rules?
Answer. On January 26, 1999, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) provided comments to a proposed rulemaking on the
negotiated rule dealing with qualification of pipeline personnel
(Docket No. RSPA-98-3783). Our comments noted that, as proposed,
operators could determine that an individual was qualified based solely
on observation of an individual and that the proposed rule failed to
include strong training and testing requirements. Our comments
referenced the pipeline accident that occurred in San Juan, Puerto
Rico, in 1996, and noted that as a result of its investigation the
Board concluded that the gas company's employees were not properly
trained in testing for leaks. The Board's comments noted the prevalence
of accidents in the pipeline industry associated with deficient
personnel training and urged that the final rule include strong
training and testing requirements to ensure that employees can properly
perform tasks. We are disappointed that the proposed rule became a
final rule, virtually unchanged. No training or testing requirements
were included in the final rule.
Previously, there were no training or qualification requirements
for individuals operating or maintaining gas pipeline systems operating
under 49 CFR Part 192. The negotiated rule, effective October 26, 1999,
allows an operator to determine that an individual is qualified based
merely on observations or work history. Still no testing or training is
required for individuals operating gas pipeline systems subject to Part
192.
Individuals working for hazardous liquid pipeline systems operating
under 49 CFR Part 195, on the other hand, are currently subject to
training requirements. Title 49 CFR Section 195.403 requires operators
to conduct continuing training for operating and maintenance personnel
and to work with employees annually to ensure the training is meeting
their needs. However, as a result of the negotiated rule on operator
qualifications issued by the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA) last August, this section will be revised.
Training requirements for all these operating and maintenance personnel
will be eliminated effective October 28, 2002, and replaced by
qualification requirements based on observation or work history. Thus,
Title 49 CFR Part 195, Subpart G, for hazardous liquid operators
contains the same deficiencies as noted above for Part 192.
b. Aside from providing comments to DOT during the rulemaking process,
did NTSB participate in the negotiated rulemaking negotiations and, if
not, why did the NTSB fail to take a more active role given the
significance of operator performance in accidents?
Answer. Safety Board staff attended some of the negotiated
rulemaking meetings on operator qualifications, as observers, to learn
about proposals being considered and the comments presented. NTSB
policy has been not to participate directly in negotiated rulemaking
between regulators and industry. NTSB staff did meet with RSPA's Office
of Pipeline Safety staff on a regular basis to discuss open safety
recommendations, including those calling for qualification and training
requirements. These meetings usually included the Directors of the
Safety Board's Office of Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety and
the Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments. Through these
meetings we continuously urged RSPA to move forward on this rulemaking
and to include strong training and testing requirements. When a
proposed rule on operator qualifications was issued by RSPA, the Board
provided comments to the docket.
About six months before RSPA's final rule was issued, the Board
classified an open safety recommendation on this issue as unacceptable
because the NPRM did not require adequate training or testing. Further,
in testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,
Hazardous Materials, and Pipeline Transportation on July 27, 1999,
Safety Board Chairman Jim Hall, representing the Board, testified that
the proposed rule was inadequate for these same reasons.
c. Other than providing public comments and offering suggestions, did
any NTSB representatives directly work with the parties to improve the
rulemaking? If not, why not?
Answer. Safety Board staff meets periodically with representatives
of the Association of Oil Pipelines and the American Gas Association.
During these meetings, the staff discusses ongoing safety issues.
Discussions have included the Board's position on the need for strong
training and testing requirements for pipeline operator personnel,
accident investigations conducted by the Safety Board that support NTSB
recommendations on this issue, and the lack of training and testing
requirements in the proposed rulemaking.
Question 2. NTSB data show that RSPA has the worst safety
recommendation acceptance rate for all DOT modes since the NTSB began
issuing recommendations.
a. Recognizing that acceptance rates differ from one year to another,
what has RSPA's acceptance rate been for each of the past five years?
Answer.
Percentage Acceptance Rate
1996 73.3
1997 72.4
1998 72.3
1999 65.6
2000 62
b. For the record, provide a chart showing the DOT modal
administrations' acceptance rates for each of the past five years for
which statistics are available.
Answer. A chart is attached (attachment 1) as requested.
Question 3. I appreciate your overview of the on-going Bellingham
investigation. You gave a good indication of the difficulties you face
due to Olympic's employees refusal to cooperate and the interference of
the Justice Department officials. What has been the Board's experience
with the Company in general--has Olympic been cooperative?
Answer. Soon after arriving at the accident site, our investigation
team began the task of identifying pipeline operator employees that
could help us gather and understand information needed to determine
what happened. The day after our team arrived on-scene, a Vice
President at Olympic Pipe Line issued a memorandum to all employees
informing them that the company was not requiring or recommending what
decision each employee should make in deciding whether or not to be
interviewed by federal representatives. The company noted that it would
provide an attorney for each employee to consult with before deciding
whether to agree or decline to be interviewed. This had an extremely
chilling effect on our ability to obtain first-hand accounts of the
events leading up to the accident. Most employees, including those
operating the system at the time of the accident, decided not be
interviewed by NTSB staff.
Under the Safety Board's party system for accident investigations,
companies, government agencies and other organizations that have
employees, functions, activities or products involved in the accident
and can provide needed technical assistance may be named as
``parties.'' Parties assist the Safety Board by offering specific
technical expertise and relevant information in the development of the
best possible factual record. As a party to the investigation, Olympic
Pipe Line Company has provided the Safety Board staff written technical
information and other documentation specifically requested. However,
Olympic's participation as a party to the investigation has not been
typical in that key employees with specific technical expertise have
not been available to provide technical assistance and information
about the events that day.
Question 4. In addition to the provisions contained in my legislation
to reauthorize the Pipeline Safety Act, I am considering a number of
additional provision to further strengthen safety. Two of these
provisions are in response to the difficulties NTSB has faced with the
on-going Bellingham investigation.
First, I think we should include whistle blower protections for
pipeline employees similar to the protections afforded for other
industries. Second, while I fully recognize the right of citizens to
exercise their rights to protect themselves, I do not believe they have
the right to continue to carry out the same critical duties during an
on-going safety investigation if they are not cooperating with the
investigators. I believe that at a minimum they should be placed on
Administrative leave.
a. What are your thoughts on these legislative concepts?
Answer. Uncooperative employees should at least be reassigned to
other, non-operations positional because their performance at the time
of the accident cannot be properly scrutinized. However, reassignment
or administrative leave will not solve the problems uncooperative
personnel pose for the Board's investigation. The threat of criminal
prosecution sanctions is far more serious than even unpaid
administrative leave. Until recently, we were rarely faced with an
employee unwilling to cooperate with an investigation intended to make
their industry safer.
In principle, whistle blower protection may encourage the
disclosure of legitimate safety issues. We would view any law that
would provide positive information to the Safety Board as a positive
action. In other industries, such as aviation, there are mechanisms
available to obtain safety-related information. The Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) permits employees to anonymously report safety
problems with no fear of reprisal from the Federal Aviation
Administration for unintentional acts. The Flight Operating Quality
Assurance (FOQA) is a program for reviewing recorder data. Such
mechanisms could be considered for the pipeline industry.
Question 5. Your testimony also touches on the Board's concerns that
RSPA is halting its interstate pipeline inspection program in which
states are allowed to inspect interstate pipelines. To your knowledge,
what has been the safety record of the state inspection program?
Answer. The Administrator for Gas Pipeline Safety, Arizona
Corporation Commission, is the current National Chairman of the
National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR). He
advised us that until recently Arizona participated as an Interstate
Agent for the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline
Safety. That agreement was terminated for the year 2000. The Arizona
Commission noted that under its inspection program, transmission
pipeline incidents in Arizona decreased steadily from 1990 to present:
the Commission noted that from 1989 through 1995 there were 10
incidents, and for the last 4 years none. The Commission attributes
this reduction to its ``aggressive and proactive'' audit and compliance
program. NAPSR notes that in 1999, nine States acted as interstate
agents for the gas pipeline safety program and four for the hazardous
liquid program. It advises that State agency duties normally consist of
operator inspections, compliance and enforcement, training and safety
programs, accident investigations, and record maintenance and
reporting.
The Safety Board does not have quantitative data that can
demonstrate the effectiveness of State pipeline safety programs. The
Chairman of NAPSR provided us a report of various State activities.
Attached is a copy of the Executive Summary of that report (attachment
2). The information shows that States conducted 652 accident
investigations in 1998 compared to 128 Federal accident investigations,
and 461 State accident investigations in 1999 compared to 55 Federal
accident investigations. Other identified State activities include
enforcement of one-call laws, participation in other damage prevention
efforts, training of operators, and inspection activities.
______
Executive Summary
The Pipeline Safety Act (``ACT'')(49 USC 60101 et seq.) authorizes
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to administer a
pipeline safety program for the gas and hazardous liquid pipelines in
the United States, The Act allows the Secretary to delegate all or part
of the responsibilities for pipeline safety to interested states for a
grant of up to 50% of the cost of the states' programs.
Since the Pipeline Safety Act was signed into law in 1968, the
States have been very active in assisting the Secretary in carrying out
the pipeline safety program for the United States. In fact, States'
pipeline safety personnel represent more than 90 percent of the State/
Federal inspection workforce. These personnel are the ``first line of
defense'' at the community level to promote pipeline safety and
underground utility damage prevention.
For many years now, states have been burdened with providing more
than 50 percent of the cost of carrying out a partnership with OPS and
performing the majority of the pipeline safety activities required by
the Act. States' pipeline safety activities have continued to increase
due to many new mandates, but grant dollars have not kept pace with
these demands. The lack of adequate grant funds will result in programs
that do not protect the public or the environment. For FY2001, the
States' project a total grant of $17.5 million is necessary to fully
fund their programs at the 50% level.
This report details the scope of the states pipeline inspection
activities for 1998 and the associated costs. As will be noted upon
reading the report, states continue to perform the majority of the
nation's pipeline safety activities, despite the inadequate funding
from the Federal government. The continued shortfall in Federal funding
discourages states from fully participating in the nation's pipeline
safety program. It is hoped that this report will provide a better
understanding of the states' contribution to pipeline safety and the
need for fully funding the pipeline safety grant for the states'
pipeline safety activities.
Background
The statutory basis for the pipeline safety program is found in
Chapter 601 of Title 49, United States Code. This chapter establishes
the framework for promoting pipeline safety via federal authority for
regulation of interstate pipeline facilities and federal delegation to
the states for all or part of the responsibility for intrastate
pipeline facilities under an annual certification or agreement. Chapter
601 also authorizes federal grants-in-aid of up to 50 percent of a
state agency's costs relative to its pipeline safety efforts. The
resulting federal/state partnership is the cornerstone for ensuring
uniform implementation of the pipeline safety program nationwide.
The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is the federal agency
responsible for protecting the people and environment in the United
States through a comprehensive pipeline safety program. Under
delegation from the Secretary of the Department of Transportation
(DOT), OPS manages the national pipeline safety program and develops,
issues, and enforces minimum safety regulations for interstate and
intrastate pipelines. OPS also administers the grant-in-aid funding to
those states that assume responsibility for pipeline safety.
The responsibility for a state's pipeline safety program is
delegated by the state to the appropriate agency. This agency may be a
Public Utility Commission, a State Fire Marshal, or a State Public
Service Commission, among others. States currently have jurisdiction
over almost all intrastate gas, hazardous liquid, and carbon dioxide
facilities in the United States. Several states also act as agents for
UPS relative to pipeline safety for certain interstate pipeline
facilities. State agency duties normally consist of; 1) operator
inspections, 2) compliance and enforcement, 3) training and safety
programs, 4) accident investigations, and 5) record maintenance and
reporting.
The States, through their involvement within their respective
states and two active associations, the National Association of
Pipeline Safety Representatives and the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners' Pipeline Safety Subcommittee, promote
improved pipeline safety standards, proper education and training of
operators, and the advancement of pipeline technologies, to enhance
public safety. For a discussion of these two associations, see Appendix
1.
Pipeline Safety Activities
Inspections
While the Pipeline Safety Act (``Act'') requires the federal
government to ensure pipeline safety throughout the United States,
state pipeline safety personnel represent more than 90 percent of the
state/federal inspector workforce. The state inspectors conduct
inspection activities of more than 10,000 gas operators and 360
hazardous liquid operators nationwide.
The state pipeline safety programs ensure public safety through
periodic inspections of gas and liquid existing facilities, records,
and construction of new facilities. The inspections are to make certain
pipeline operators comply with the appropriate regulations and company
procedures pertaining to pipeline safety, resulting in the safe
transportation of products to consumers. This attachment also details
the hazardous liquid facilities that are inspected. In 1998, the states
inspected approximately 45,000 miles of transmission lines.
Attachment No. 1 to this report presents the type and the number of
miles of gas facilities jurisdictional to the states. In summary, the
states are responsible for inspections of more than 938,000 miles of
gas pipelines, 47.5 million service lines and 1,851 gas facilities such
as LNG plants.
Attachment No. 2 to this report details the number of standard,
specialized, follow-up and construction inspections, accident
investigations and operator training conducted by each state during
calendar year 1998. In summary, the states conducted 25,785 inspection
person-days of gas facilities and 1,948 inspection person-days of
hazardous liquid pipelines. Attachment No. 3 presents the percentage of
inspections for each type of inspection activity in 1998.
Accident Investigations
In addition to inspections and other proactive efforts by states to
further improve pipeline safety, states are responsible for
investigating accidents. The purpose of these investigations is to
determine probable cause of failures and require action that minimizes
the possibility of recurrence. These investigations cover incidents
that are reported as required by Sec. 191.5 of 49 C.F.R. as well as
those that are reported in response to states' more stringent reporting
requirements.
During calendar year 1998, states spent more than 1,400 inspection
man-days on failure investigations relative to gas systems and
approximately 150 inspection man-days on failure investigations of
liquid facilities. In addition to investigating 128 incidents
reportable under Sec. 191.5, states investigated 652 incidents
reportable under the more stringent state's reporting requirements.
These investigations and subsequent findings resulted in a number of
corrective actions that operators were required to undertake. The
corrective actions ranged from requiring an operator to join a
qualified one-call center to requiring hydrostatic pressure testing of
storage field pipelines. Inasmuch as the actions required by states
have enhanced pipeline safety, it is appropriate to include the
majority of the actions taken by states during 1998/99 as an attachment
to this report (See Attachment No. 4).
Damage Prevention
Damage to pipelines caused by excavation activities remains the
leading cause of pipeline failures. It is imperative that all
stakeholders take action to reduce these damages. The states have been,
and remain, on the forefront of initiatives that are designed to reduce
damages to pipelines and other underground infrastructures. The recent
national initiatives (Dig Safely and Common Ground) sponsored by OPS
were fully supported by the states. Additionally, states have taken
other actions to reduce excavation-caused damage to pipelines in their
own respective states.
Dig Safely
In September 1996, OPS convened the Damage Prevention Quality
Action Team (DAMQAT) to develop a national damage prevention education
campaign. This team is comprised of representatives from the federal
and state government and the various industries. States were very
active in assisting DAMQAT to complete its mission and help carry out
the Dig Safely campaign. Their activities included the following:
Active participation by NAPSR and NARUC on DAMQAT.
Conducting research on state's enforcement activities for
DAMQAT use.
Participation in the pilot program by States of Virginia and
Tennessee
Collection and analysis of pilot program data
Participation in implementing the Dig Safely campaign.
Common Ground Study
In accordance with the Transportation Equity Act of the 2lst
century (TEA21), the ``Common Ground: Study of One-Call Systems and
Damage Prevention Best Practices'' report was prepared. Representatives
of many stakeholders participated in conducting this study. For nearly
a year, a number of teams worked to identify, define and agree on more
than 130 best practices governing all aspects of damage prevention.
Representatives from states served on many of these teams and provided
valuable input into this process.
Currently, the states are working with other stakeholders to
promote these practices and reduce damages to pipelines and other
underground facilities in their own states.
Other Damage Prevention Efforts
States are involved with a number of other efforts that have
significantly reduced excavation-caused damage to pipelines. These
efforts range from educational programs for excavators to enforcement
of one-call laws. In 1998, at least 1,800 inspection man-days were
spent on damage prevention activities.
The states' efforts have resulted in reduction of excavation caused
damage to pipelines. For example, in Virginia, damage to pipelines has
dropped by 43 percent since 1996. This is an average of 10 percent per
year since Virginia began enforcing their law.
Operator Training and Information Dissemination
Training of operators and information dissemination is an integral
part of every state's pipeline safety program. States' pipeline safety
staff conduct and participate in training programs to further pipeline
safety.
In 1998, the states spent more than 1,300 inspection person-days
training more than 25,000 individuals on pipeline safety issues. This
training addressed, among others, the new operator qualification rules,
corrosion, LPG, leak detection. master-meter operators, first responder
training, damage prevention, and training of housing authority
operators.
In addition, states disseminated informational material to promote
pipeline safety and compliance with existing regulations. This
information included, but was not limited to, guidance manual for small
operators; damage prevention brochures, videos, etc.; copies of NFPA
publications; sample operator and maintenance plans; law; rules; and
regulations.
Industry/Government Committees
As part of its commitment to the safe operation of pipeline systems
across the country, the states actively participate in a number of
industry/government committees. These committees work to address
certain issues, resolve certain problems or identify better ways to
promote public safety, A list of some of the Committees and a brief
mission statement of each committee in which the states currently
participate is found in Attachment No. 5.
Waivers
States review applications requesting waivers to certain pipeline
safety codes. This review involves following each state's specific
rules of practice and procedures and the OPS' notice requirements.
These waivers, when granted, achieve the same or enhanced level of
safety and provide certain relief for the operator.
In 1998/99, states issued waivers dealing with: excess flow valves,
inactive service lines, depth of pipe cover, use of polyamide pipe at
160 psig, frequency of odorant sampling, use of plastic pipe inside
casings, and uprating of systems.
Resolutions
States arc very active in communicating important pipeline safety
issues to RSPA through submission of resolutions. These resolutions are
reviewed annually at NAPSR and NARUC meetings and, are forwarded to
RSPA for their consideration. Here are a few examples of issues
contained in resolutions that have been forwarded to RSPA:
Study the use of controlled density fill (CDF) around or in
proximity to plastic pipe and appurtenances.
Amend D2513 standard to require sustained pressure testing
of plastic pipe fittings that utilize o-rings, gaskets, etc.
Conduct technical studies to set design, installation, and
maintenance criteria for aluminum gas pipe.
Since 1986, more than 50 resolutions have been submitted to RSPA
and NAPSR recommending various actions.
Interstate Agent Activities
In addition to administering pipeline safety and damage prevention
programs for the intrastate pipeline operators, several states have
been heavily involved with OPS' interstate pipeline safety program. In
1999, nine states acted as interstate agents for OPS' gas pipeline
safety program and four for the hazardous liquid program.
The interstate agent program has been successful for a number of
reasons. First, states' pipeline safety personnel live and work in
close proximity to interstate operators and their facilities as
compared to OPS personnel. This enables states' personnel to interact
more efficiently with the interstate operators in the particular state
during routine inspection and review activities. Second, interstate
agent states have played a key role in coordination in emergency
planning and response involving local officials. This is critical in
effectively planning for response to a major pipeline emergency event.
Third, in today's environment, the citizens are extremely concerned
about, and adverse, to large, high pressure pipelines going through
their communities. This fact is evident from virtually every approval
process for proposed pipelines in the last 15-20 years. Citizens do not
trust the large corporations that own and operate these interstate
pipelines, nor are they willing to trust a Washington-based pipeline
safety program to guarantee their safety and the protection of their
environment. The recent high impact accidents involving interstate
pipelines, such as the Bellingham accident in the state of Washington,
has further fueled these concerns.
The OPS' inspection program principally involves advance notice of
inspection activities. Operators know when inspections are conducted
and what these inspections involve. States have found that to truly
gauge compliance, certain unscheduled inspections must be conducted.
These types of inspections allow the inspector to see how an operator's
compliance actually is instead of reviewing prechecked, prepared
records and facilities for an advance-noticed inspection.
Although states believe the interstate agent program has been very
effective in enhancing public safety, OPS has put in motion a policy to
eliminate all interstate agent programs over the next three years. This
policy is not in the best interest of pipeline safety.
State's Resources to Carry out Pipeline Safety Responsibilities
As noted previously, Chapter 601 of Title 49, United States Code,
provides the basis for the pipeline safety program. States, under a
partnership agreement, conduct the vast majority of pipeline safety
inspection activities in the US. In exchange for this effort, which
substantially reduces federal government obligations in this area,
Sec. 60107(a) authorizes grants to reimburse states for ``not more than
50%'' of the cost of their pipeline safety program. The grant funds are
distributed through a performance-based allocation process in which a
state's grant is reduced if federal performance standards are not met.
As discussed below, the federal grant has not kept up with the costs of
the states' pipeline safety programs.
As a result of the prosperous economy, construction of gas
pipelines has increased 15-20 percent in the past few years. The
majority of the new facilities have been constructed by contractors
with little company supervision. State personnel should be available to
witness installation and require corrections as needed. State personnel
who have witnessed construction have reported instances of improper
procedures used by contractors when constructing new facilities, the
states are unable, in terms of lack of resources, to provide adequate
monitoring of construction. Without correcting these problems, at the
time of construction, it is only a matter of time until corrosion
occurs at welds and joints, or other types of breaches of integrity
occur. States are able to cover about 50% of their inspection units
(7,035 of 13,398 units in natural gas distribution and 343 of 580 units
in hazardous liquid pipelines). Proper funding of states programs
should substantially improve inspection coverage to monitor the
majority of their units, particularly new construction activities.
Additionally, state inspectors are the first line of defense at the
community level to educate local officials, excavators, utilities, and
others on the importance of improvement in damage prevention practices.
State inspectors are a primary means of encouraging the adoption of
these practices at the local level, where construction occurs.
Extensive construction of telecommunications, electric, water, sewer,
and gas distribution lines in the same right of way increases the
urgency of getting the Office of Pipeline Safety's best practices
adopted.
Attachment No. 6 presents the grant levels requested by the states
and amounts appropriated by the Department of Transportation for 1992-
1999. It is obvious that the allocated funds have continuously fallen
short of the program costs. In 1999, the shortfall was more than $1.5
million or 12 percent of the states' requested level.
For many years now, states have been burdened with providing more
than 50 percent of the cost of carrying out a partnership with OPS and
performing more than 90 percent of the pipeline safety activities
required by the Act. States' pipeline safety activities have continued
to increase due to many new mandates, but grant dollars have not kept
pace with these demands. The lack of adequate grant funds will result
in programs that do not protect the public or the environment.
Consequences of Not Fully Funding
Without adequate funding, states will not be able to conduct the
required inspections of the existing pipeline facilities, conduct
inspections of new facilities construction, and encourage compliance
with the safety regulations. As discussed earlier, states have only
been able to cover approximately 50% of their inspection units. States
represent 90% of the state/federal inspector work force that oversees
pipelines nationwide. Grants are an effective way to leverage resources
and increase total inspection capability since states match or exceed
Federal funding. A shortfall in Federal funding discourages states from
taking part in the pipeline safety program. The states' projection for
FY2001 shows that a total grant of $17,519,000 is needed to fully fund
their programs at the 50% level. *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Attachments referred to were not available at the time this
hearing went to press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings
to William J. Haener
Question 1. As you know, OPS is attempting to map the national pipeline
system with information provided by the industry on a voluntary basis.
Do you believe that your members will be able to provide the mapping
information to OPS by the end of the year?
Answer. No, the voluntary mapping data in the format requested by
OPS will not be available by the end of the year for all interstate
natural gas transmission pipelines. The previously agreed upon schedule
for a more detailing mapping system is 10 to 15 years for total
completion. However, OPS already has mapping information in electronic
format for all interstate natural gas transmission pipelines. This
mapping information was compiled by the U.S. Department of Energy. I
have attached an explanation of the voluntary process and the agreement
that was reached between the INGAA members and Office of Pipeline
Safety.
Question 2. I understand that there are many obstacles for gas pipeline
operators to overcome to conduct extensive internal inspections or
``pig.'' What percentage of your lines do you currently pig? Can you
identify some of the problems associated with ``pigging'' your company
or the gas pipeline industry faces?
Answer.
Operational considerations for pipeline ``piggability'' (Liquid vs.
Gas)
Natural gas pipelines are not as piggable as liquid lines because
of differences in the type of product being transported. Liquid lines
frequently use ``pigs'' (not ``smart pigs,'' but the uneducated kind)
to separate and move batches of liquid products through a pipeline, or
to clean out a pipeline. This is why liquid lines are generally
designed to accommodate pigs, including the instrumented ones that are
used for internal inspections. Natural gas pipelines carry only one
product, in a gaseous form, which is far more compressible and able to
negotiate differing pipeline diameters, valve spaces, etc. Therefore,
natural gas pipelines were not originally designed to accommodate large
solid objects moving through them.
Pigging and other corrosion detecting tools
The solitary reason for installing pig launchers and receivers on
natural gas transmission pipelines is to permit the use of inline
inspection tools known as ``smart pigs.'' All natural gas transmission
pipelines constructed after 1994 have been required by OPS to
accommodate smart pigs. Pipelines built prior to that time must be
modified in varying degrees in order to accommodate these devices. Some
of these modifications are relatively minor, such as installing
aboveground launchers and receivers for smart pigs. In other cases,
entire sections of pipe, or valves, must be replaced, causing major
service disruptions.
Corrosion protection systems and their accompanying aboveground
diagnostic procedures are the first, second, and third levels of
defense to prevent corrosion. These systems are constantly monitored
and adjusted to maintain effectiveness. Only in rare circumstances do
these protection systems fail. When this occurs, additional diagnostic
tests are performed. These could include ``bellhole'' examination
(digging up sections of pipe to physically look for damage),
hydrostatic testing (using water pressure to test the integrity of the
pipeline), and inline inspection. Therefore, the major reason for
modifying a pipeline for inline inspection is a determination that
there is a high probability of corrosion on a particular pipeline
segment.
INGAA conducted a survey of its members to see how much of the
interstate natural gas transmission system is piggable. This sample
reflects responses for about 70% of INGAA's membership. We believe the
sample to reflect the present state of the interstate natural gas
transmission system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines That Can be Pigged
Sample Size 103,000 miles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
30.14% Mileage that is easily piggable (launchers and
receivers available)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
24.45% Mileage that can be pigged without much work (temp.
launchers, receivers)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
42.71% Mileage that cannot be pigged without extensive
modifications (new bends installed, significant
service disruptions, etc.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.87% Mileage that cannot be pigged at all (not enough
pressure to push the pig through)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines That Have Been Pigged
Sample Size 103,000 miles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
25.48% Mileage that has been pigged at least once
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.34% Mileage that has been pigged more than once
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 3. I note from your testimony that a recent survey revealed
that the interstate natural gas industry spends approximately $3,500
per mile of pipe on safety. Can you identify some of the components of
this safety investment? What about spending on research and
development?
Answer. I have included a report of the original survey that was
referenced in the testimony. The report is structured to show where and
how the expenditures are used to ensure safety on the natural gas
pipeline safety system. As you can see in the report there are
significant expenditures in various categories.
I have also included a chart on the expenditures of cooperative
research for natural gas transmission pipeline safety within the last
ten years. Natural gas pipeline companies have been conducting
cooperative research since 1953 primarily through the Pipeline Research
Committee International and the Gas Research Institute.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Patty Murray
to William J. Haener
Question 1. The McCain bill, my bill, and the administration's proposal
focus on the public's right to know about what your operations are
doing. One idea is that it would be up to you guys to collect the
information about your practices and a summary of problems with your
pipeline then to submit that information to local officials and
emergency responders in areas impacted by your operation. Could you put
such information in a form that would be easily understood and how hard
would it be to submit that information to these local entities? How
difficult do you foresee having to submit that information to the
public at large, such as mailing to people within the right of way on a
periodic basis?
Answer. A quick trip to the Office of Pipeline Safety website will
tell you that a great deal of information is already available to the
public upon demand. In recent years, OPS has done an excellent job of
posting information about specific enforcement actions, safety
statistics, and general information about pipelines, onto the Internet.
The current regulations for natural gas pipelines require a
continuing education program for public officials, emergency responders
and citizens who live near rights-of-way. Our members host local
meetings with community groups annually, to discuss safety issues and
emergency planning. We also send information about our pipelines out to
all those who own property on the right-of-way, to alert them about
potential hazards, what to do in an emergency, and who to call if there
are questions.
Some of the legislative proposals we have seen would require
pipelines to send technical information about pipelines inspections and
other activities to the parties near a pipeline. Obviously this kind of
information would be of a technical nature, and we do not think it
would be easy for most laypeople to understand. As a result, such a
general effort would either be ignored by the public, or might even
alarm them if they did not have a background in engineering or
mechanics. Pipelines provide inspection information to pipeline safety
regulators as part of their auditing process. This information is
complex, lengthy, and potentially confusing to those who are not
familiar with pipeline operations. We think it would be feasible for
OPS to disseminate the results of these audits to local officials,
perhaps through an Internet-based system. Not only would that indicate
that inspections had been performed, but it would also provide an
auditing record for pipelines within their respective jurisdictions.
To generate a large volume of technical information for the general
public, which we believe would largely be ignored, does not seem like a
rational use of safety resources, however.
Question 2. This question is for those that work in the natural gas
business. Senator McCain's bill and the administration's proposal both
contain mapping requirements. I am aware of the voluntary National
Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) and applaud that effort. The
administration's proposal would require liquid pipelines to provide to
local officials maps of their pipeline. Senator McCain's bill would
require both natural gas and liquid pipeline operators to have to
provide those maps. Do you already map your facilities? I also
understand that natural pipeline facilities would take longer to map.
Could we not simply allow natural gas companies more time, but still
retain a mapping requirement for natural gas lines, to map their
facilities to take into account the fact that your facilities are more
complicated?
Answer. All interstate natural gas transmission pipelines are
mapped at this time, just not in the particular format currently
requested by OPS. The U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information
Agency has had available mapping information for interstate natural gas
pipelines in electronic format since 1994. OPS originally decided to
use the DOE mapping information, but has since determined that it wants
to use a different format. For the new format, we are estimating a 10
to 15 year time period for completing that very expensive and time-
consuming effort. See the enclosed mapping information.
Question 3. Another question for the natural gas folks. There has been
much discussion, which is reflected in the administration's proposal
that it is difficult to internally inspect with the exception of
hydrostatic testing many of your lines. What other types of inspections
do you do? Do you know of any experimental methods being tested to
internally inspect currently non-piggable natural gas lines?
Answer. The attached report entitled ``INGAA Pipeline Safety
Survey'' gives an overview of the various types of inspections that are
performed on natural gas pipelines. Visual inspections of the right-of-
way, by foot or from the air, are perhaps the most important
inspections, because they look for leaks or unauthorized excavation
activity. Close interval surveys, which test the effectiveness of a
pipeline's cathodic protection, are also a key inspection tool.
Pipelines can be inspected externally using ``bellhole inspections,''
which involve digging up sections of pipe to check and verify its
condition.
Some new technologies have been tried recently to impart sonic
waves on the exterior of pipeline and measure the back reflection.
Unfortunately, this technology is limited in applicability. Generally,
the best alternate inspection method to verify a pipeline's overall
condition is to individually monitor the progress of deterioration
prevention mechanisms. Several new methods, such as Direct Current
Voltage Gradient (DCVG) which identifies specific areas where cathodic
protection is not adequately protecting the pipe from corrosion, have
shown promise.
Question 4. Do you think you could adjust your personnel qualification
plans that are due to OPS by April 2001 to address Senator McCain's
periodic retraining and examination requirements?
Answer. Since operator training is a component of an operator's
overall job qualification, we believe the training requirement
contained in Senator McCain's bill is incorporated in the present rule.
Therefore, training plans will be a part of the individual plans which
are scheduled to be completed by April 27th of 2001.
Question 5. I've heard from many of you that your current business
practice met nearly all of the provisions of these proposals, thus no
need for legislation. If that is correct, then why oppose it?
Answer. We do utilize the technologies and techniques mentioned in
your legislation, and have for many years. It was the natural gas
pipeline industry, for example, that funded the research which lead to
the development of ``smart pig'' inspection devices. Our quarrel is not
with the technologies, but rather, with the idea that technologies or
techniques should be employed on a ``one-size-fits-all'' basis. Each
pipeline system is different, and therefore faces different potential
risks. We believe an individual pipeline operator should be given the
flexibility to meet the unique safety risks associated with its system
in the most effective manner possible, rather than being forced to
employ nationwide mandates which give little weigh to specific
conditions or potential risk.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain
to Kenneth M. Mead
Question 1. Some of the pending pipeline reauthorization bills call for
the wider use of internal pipe-defect identification devices, often
referred to as ``smart pigs.'' Yet your recent audit reports that OPS
investigators are incapable of interpreting the data reported from the
internal devices.
a) Where should we focus our efforts, on expanding internal pipeline
examinations or training investigators in how to interpret the data?
b) Or, should we focus on training the inspectors first and then
require more widespread use of the devices?
Answer. Data generated by inspections are critical to determining a
pipeline's condition and identifying serious defects before a failure
occurs. Smart-pig vendors use the data to prepare an inspection report
for the pipeline operator, who reviews the report and takes appropriate
actions. This critical flow of information should continue--and be
expanded--concurrent with the Research and Special Programs
Administration's design and implementation of a training program on pig
technology for Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) safety inspectors.
c) Did your audit examine the capabilities of state pipeline inspectors
to interpret such data?
Answer. No, our audit did not examine the capabilities of state
pipeline inspectors to interpret smart-pig data. However, we believe
Federal and state inspectors need state-of-the-art skills, expertise,
and the ability to make accurate safety assessments that lower the risk
of pipeline failures. As we noted in our testimony, state pipeline
inspectors should receive the same level of training as Federal
inspectors in order to ensure consistent implementation of pipeline-
inspection regulations.
Question 2. During your testimony, you highlighted concerns over a lack
of adequate training of pipeline inspectors and operators. What are
your views on the August 1999 negotiated rule on operator
qualifications? Do you believe additional requirements are needed and
if so, what do you recommend?
Answer. The intent of the negotiated rule on operator
qualifications is to ensure a qualified workforce in the pipeline
industry and to reduce the probability and consequence of incidents
caused by human error. We support these goals.
However, pipeline operators are not required to submit their
qualification programs (to evaluate an individual's ability to perform
certain work tasks) to RSPA for approval. Consistent with our
testimony, we support reauthorization provisions requiring operators to
submit their qualifications programs to the Secretary for approval. We
also support requirements for periodic retraining and reexamination of
pipeline personnel. The issue of operator qualifications should not
focus on the paper record of the training process, but rather on
assurances that pipeline personnel have the necessary knowledge and
skills to safely perform their jobs.
Question 3. What are your views on RSPA's actions to halt its
interstate partnership agreements with the states?
Answer. We support the reauthorization provisions seeking to
expand, rather than eliminate, the states' role in interstate pipeline
inspections and oversight. By sharing the safety oversight role with
states, RSPA has the opportunity to leverage limited resources to
increase the number and quality of pipeline inspections. States should
also be involved in special investigations involving new construction
or pipeline accidents.
However, we do not support granting States the ability to establish
inspection, operations, or maintenance standards for interstate
pipelines. Where additional standards for interstate pipeline integrity
and safety are required, they should be established at the Federal
level.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain
to James M. Pates
Question 1. I understand that certain states exempt certain city-run
municipal pipeline entities from regulations. For example, Virginia
exempts the City of Richmond municipal facility and Pennsylvania
exempts a municipal gas distribution facility in Philadelphia. If
states won't allow their own pipeline inspectors to inspect certain
state pipelines, why should those same states be given inspection
authority over interstate lines?
Answer. First, let me emphasize that the City of Fredericksburg
supports the concept that all municipal gas utilities should be subject
to the same regulatory authority as privately owned ones, whether that
regulator be OPS or a state public utility commission. However, a
state's lack of jurisdiction over a handful of public gas utilities
should not serve as a roadblock to a state becoming a more active
partner in interstate pipeline regulation.
In the case of Virginia, for instance, the fact that the State
Corporation Commission (SCC) lacks jurisdiction over intrastate gas
facilities in the City of Richmond has absolutely nothing to do with
the SCC's ability to serve as an effective interstate agent over
hazardous liquid pipelines.
Second, the fact that a municipal utility such as the City of
Richmond has managed to remain subject to the more lax supervision of
OPS should not allow all public and private utilities in Virginia to be
held to a lower standard of public safety and environmental protection
than would be achieved by bringing them under the authority of the
State Corporation Commission. How could that possibly serve the public
interest?
We would encourage the Committee to consider the example of
Virginia's intrastate liquid program. Up until 1995, intrastate liquid
pipelines in Virginia were regulated by OPS. That same year, the SCC
gained certification to administer the intrastate program on behalf of
OPS and began regular inspections of the main intrastate carrier in
Virginia, ST Services. The Commission discovered significant violations
involving the company's Operations and Maintenance Plan and other
requirements and fined the company $83,000. Most, if not all, of these
violations existed during the years that the company was subject to OPS
jurisdiction but that agency had never taken any corrective action.
This one example is typical of the manner in which most states
provide better inspections and oversight than OPS. I am absolutely
confident that if the Commonwealth of Virginia, rather than OPS, had
been inspecting Olympic Pipeline Company in the years preceding the
Bellingham accident, that pipeline would not have failed and those
three boys would not have died.
In other words, the fact that Virginia lacks the authority to
oversee Richmond's gas utility should not deprive the citizens of this
state of a higher standard of safety for interstate liquid pipelines
than what OPS has been providing.
Question 2. Should state pipeline enforcement enhancements be
conditioned upon a state's repeal of such exemptions.
Answer. No, but perhaps OPS could instruct its inspectors to place
such exempt utilities on the same inspection schedule and subject them
to the same standard of review exercised by that particular state over
other intrastate operators. This would remove any ``double standard''
that may exist. In other words, this is a problem that could
undoubtedly be resolved administratively by OPS.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings
to Phillip D. Wright
Question. As you know, OPS proposed a rule which attempts to define
High Consequence Areas last month. Do you believe that this proposed
rule will provide for accurate assessments of high density and
unusually sensitive areas?
Answer. Yes, with some qualifications. The rule depends heavily on
data from a number of federal, state and private sources. Data from
multiple sources--for example, state data bases for environmental
information supporting the definition of areas unusually sensitive to
environmental damage; heritage programs, such as those of The Nature
Conservancy; state data bases on drinking water; U.S. Census Bureau
information on population--are needed to provide a solid basis for a
definition of HCAs that will withstand professional and legal scrutiny.
The level of completeness, compatibility, accessibility and usability
for these sources vary. The Office of Pipeline Safety is working with
the data providers to turn database information into mapped high
consequence areas that operators can then use for conducting
assessments. The information available to pipeline operators will be
limited by the quality of the original data sources, the resources
those data providers have applied to collecting and updating the
information, and OPS's capacity for providing HCA maps. These data
sources will improve over time, but the quality of HCA definitions will
always depend heavily on the quality, utility, completeness and
availability of information from the agencies that have the information
in the first instance. This said, we believe the proposed definition,
when properly implemented with adequate data, can capture those areas
that are, in fact, high consequence areas.
Question. What percentage of your lines do you currently pig? How often
do these internal inspections take place?
Answer.
API Survey on Internal Inspection
In January 2000 the American Petroleum Institute conducted a survey
on internal inspection practices in the liquid pipeline industry.
Responses were received from 24 companies operating 129,046 miles of
liquid pipelines or 82% of the approximately 157,000 miles of pipeline
mileage regulated by OPS. Because this survey represents such a large
portion of the total mileage, we have projected our statistical summary
analysis to the entire 157,000 miles. The time period for information
on integrity testing is 1990 to 1999. The results for Williams track
the industry results.
We estimate that 89% of US hazardous liquid pipeline mileage is
currently capable of being inspected using in-line inspection tools.
This means that 11% of US hazardous liquid pipeline mileage has
significant barriers to in-line inspection tools. These barriers
include, for example:
lack of commercially available in-line inspection tools for
the particular pipeline diameter, especially small diameter
pipe;
bends with radii too tight for tool passage; or
restrictions resulting from valve design or changes in pipe
diameter.
This category also includes mileage that is currently being
maintained, but is not in active service. Of those companies with more
than 500 miles of pipe, companies varied from a high of 39% of miles
with barriers to using in-line tools to a low of 0% of mileage with
barriers to using in-line tools. Most companies fall within the range
of 2-5% of total mileage that currently has barriers to in-line tools.
We did not receive sufficient responses from companies with less than
500 miles of pipe to make any definitive statements.
Summary: Total Use of In-Line Inspection Tools by Hazardous Liquid
Pipelines
Since 1990, 49% of the pipeline mileage regulated by OPS has
been inspected using in-line inspection tools.
Since 1995, 31% of the pipeline mileage regulated by OPS has
been inspected using in-line inspection tools.
The trend is clearly toward increasing use of high-
resolution tools; however, low-resolution tools continue to
have value.
Based on this survey, we suggest that the current capability
of in-line inspection vendors using high-resolution tools to
serve the liquid marketplace is about 20% of the total mileage
(157,000 miles) over 5 years, or 5% per year (8000 miles) per
year. This vendor capability may grow based on demand for the
service and capability of a relatively small market to meet
demand.
In-Line Inspection with High-Resolution Tools
Since 1990, 24% of the pipeline mileage regulated by OPS has
been inspected using high-resolution in-line inspection tools.
Since 1995, 22% of the pipeline mileage regulated by OPS has
been inspected using high-resolution in-line inspection tools.
Ultrasonic tools represent the introduction of a new type of
high-resolution technology and their use is increasing. The
capabilities of ultrasonic tools are also being validated
through field application. Since 1990, 3% of the pipeline
mileage regulated by OPS has been inspected using ultrasonic
in-line inspection tools. Some portion (undetermined by our
survey) of the mileage inspected using an ultrasonic tool may
also have been inspected using other high-resolution tools.
In-Line Inspection with Low-Resolution Tools Only
Since 1990, 22% of the pipeline mileage regulated by OPS has
been inspected using low-resolution tools only.
Since 1995, 8% of the pipeline mileage regulated by OPS has
been inspected using low-resolution tools only.
These two percentages indicate that pipeline companies are
clearly shifting away from using low-resolution tools and
toward the use of high-resolution tools. Low-resolution tools
continue to have value and are suitable for certain types of
pipeline conditions.
For additional information, see the API comments to Docket No.
RSPA-99-6355; Notice 1, the rulemaking on enhanced protection of high-
consequence areas.
Question. As you know, OPS is attempting to map the national pipeline
system with information provided by the industry on a voluntary basis.
Do you believe that your members will be able to provide the mapping
information to OPS by the end of the year?
Answer. The liquid pipeline industry and the OPS have been working
to support the National Pipeline Mapping System. OPS readiness to
absorb various kinds of mapping data is evolving. OPS has commissioned
a number of state repositories in addition to a national repository.
State repositories are in various stages of preparedness for handling
electronic or paper submittals. Each pipeline company is in a different
stage of preparedness to provide information. Some companies are paper-
mapped based; some companies are electronic-mapped based; many are in a
transitional phase moving from paper-based maps to electronic GIS based
maps. Technology is getting better and less costly. Currently the
liquid pipeline industry has contributed mapping information on 21,823
miles or 14% of the total liquid mileage of 157,000 miles. Many oil
pipeline companies have committed to making significant contributions
by the end of 2000. The proof of course, is in the actual mileage
filed. We believe that contributions from API and AOPL members will
approach 50-70% of the total liquid pipeline mileage by year-end.
Williams expects to have 100% of its mapping data submitted by year-
end.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Patty Murray
to Phillip D. Wright
Question. The McCain bill, my bill, and the administration's proposal
focus on the public's right to know about what your operations are
doing. One idea is that it would be up to you guys to collect the
information about your practices and a summary of problems with your
pipeline then to submit that information to local officials and
emergency responders in areas impacted by your operation. Could you put
such information in a form that would be easily understood and how hard
would it be to submit that information to these local entities? How
difficult do you foresee having to submit that information to the
public at large, such as mailing to people within the right of way on a
periodic basis?
In our experience, there are three ``publics'' that a right-to-know
program needs to address: local public officials with responsibilities
along the pipeline corridor; our right-of-way neighbors who live or
work near the pipeline; and the public generally. An effective program
should be aware of and fashion its work product to, the needs and
interests of each of these audiences.
Local Public Officials
The pipeline industry can provide good quality information in a
format that can be understood and used by local officials. In fact, we
have already committed to the Office of Pipeline Safety to prepare
materials and pilot test the effectiveness of new types of materials
with local officials in areas impacted by pipeline operations. OPS is
convening a group of stakeholders to conduct pilot tests of specific
approaches in several states. We seek a strong partnership with local
officials along our pipelines. We enhance safety and environmental
protection when we ensure that these officials are knowledgeable and
prepared to take action if an incident occurs. In the past, the biggest
challenge in this area has not been developing or providing the
information for this audience. The biggest challenge is getting local
officials to focus on the information when it is provided and to commit
to being effective in the roles that are available to them in ensuring
pipeline safety--enacting good state laws on damage prevention;
supporting quality one-call systems; enforcing damage prevention
statutes; implementing land use planning that reduces the risks of
pipeline accidents; and developing effective emergency response
mechanisms We welcome ideas that will improve the partnership between
pipeline companies, regulators and local public officials.
Right-of-Way Neighbors
The pipeline industry is already providing right-of-way neighbors
with information on a periodic basis under 195.440 and 442. We need
knowledgeable right-of-way neighbors as a first line of defense in
protecting the pipeline from damage and in recognizing and sounding the
alarm about problems that may occur. We want right-of-way neighbors to
have the information and understanding they need to protect themselves
in the event of an incident. As an industry we recognize this as a
communication challenge that it is our responsibility to address, and
we are open to advice and direction about how to accomplish these goals
more effectively. The type of information needed for the right-of-way
public is different than for officials if only because we do not want
to lose the audience with a message that is off-putting, overly
technical or otherwise difficult to understand. Nor do we wish to
overstate safety concerns.
The industry is committed to the DIG SAFELY campaign as an umbrella
communications program that will ensure that the efforts of excavators,
all underground utilities (electricity, water, sewer, cable, telephone,
pipelines, etc.), one-call notification centers and public officials
are coordinated under a unified message. The DIG SAFELY campaign is a
major asset in informing right-of-way neighbors and the public.
The General Public
Communicating with a broader audience adds additional concerns
related to purpose, content and the mechanism of distribution of
information that will be used by and useful to the general public. Our
experience is that it is both wasteful and counterproductive to
undertake massive mail campaigns to long lists of addresses. The
communication that occurs under these schemes appears to us to be
minima. The information becomes rapidly out of date. As a
communications vehicle, mass mailings are fundamentally inflexible.
Rather than enact an affirmative requirement in law that companies
contact and supply a preset list of data to large groups of potentially
affected persons, we'd prefer to work with OPS, the states and local
officials to make understandable information available to those who are
interested, perhaps in electronic format, and experiment with ways to
communicate effectively. As part of the OPS's pilot test of
communications, the stakeholder group is also looking at information
more suitable for the general public.
Question. Do you think you could adjust your personnel qualification
plans that are due to OPS by April 2001 to address Senator McCain's
periodic retraining and examination requirements?
Answer. Yes, however, we recommend that the plans be made available
to OPS, for example, as another matter to be reviewed during
inspection, rather than being formally submitted to OPS as a document.
Question. I've heard from many of you that your current business
practice met nearly all of the provisions of these proposals, thus no
need for legislation. If that is correct, then why oppose it?
Answer. We are not opposed to pipeline safety legislation and
support reauthorization of the pipeline safety act. Our detailed
testimony, already provided to the Committee, provides specific changes
that we feel are necessary and appropriate in achieving Senator's
McCain's objectives in proposing this legislation.
______
Prepared Statement of Cascade Columbia Alliance, East Lake Washington
Audubon Society, Friends of the San Juans, Friends of the Earth,
Friends of Tolt River, Lake Joy Community Club, The Mountaineers, North
Lake Joy Estates, Ocean Advocates, Pacific Crest Biodiversity Project,
People for Puget Sound, Rainier Audubon Society, Safe Bellingham,
Surfrider Foundation, Washington State Chapter, Surfrider Foundation
USA, Tolt River Highlands, Washington Kayak Club, Washington Public
Interest Research Group, Washington Trout, Willapa Hills Audubon
Society, and Grays Harbor Audubon Society
FEDERAL PIPELINE SAFETY ACT AND PIPELINE SAFETY LEGISLATION
On 9 June 1999, the Olympic Pipe Line Company (operated by Texaco/
Shell as ``Equilon,'' along with part-owners Arco and GATX) made a long
afternoon presentation to the Washington State Parks and Recreation
Commission regarding their application for an easement and right-of-way
through three State Parks for their proposed 231 mile Cross Cascade
petroleum pipeline project. This proposed project, from north of
Seattle to Pasco, WA, would also have crossed hundreds of wetlands,
aquifers, streams and rivers, two National Forests and a National
Wildlife Refuge.
Olympic argued that they should be granted an easement and right-
of-way through three State Parks and defended the environmental and
safety record of Olympic's existing 400 plus mile pipeline running from
north Puget Sound refineries down the I-5 corridor to Portland, OR.
The next day, 10 June, Olympics existing pipeline ruptured in
Bellingham, WA, sending as much as 300,000 gallons of gasoline into
Whatcom City Park down Whatcom creek toward the city center. Liam Wood,
19, was rendered unconscious from inhaling the fumes, and subsequently
drowned in the creek. Two other children, Stephen Tsorvais and Wade
King, both 10, died when the gasoline vapor cloud exploded in a
gigantic fireball. Had this explosion taken place even a short time
later, even more people would have died. Later it was learned that
Olympic had run a smart-pig test in 1996, but had ignored signs of
problems with the three-decade old pipeline.
Transportation of hazardous materials is regulated by the Federal
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), which is administered by
the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the U.S.
Department of Transportation. Congress has failed to reauthorize this
Act since it expired on September 30, 1997, and the program has been
continued through the annual appropriations process, but at levels
below those authorized. For FY 99, a total of $16 million was
appropriated for hazardous materials, with an obligation limitation of
$11 million for emergency preparedness grants funded from registration
fees.
Petroleum pipeline safety is governed by the Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (HLPSA, Subtitle VIII of Title 49, U.S.
Code). The program is administered by the Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS) within the Research and Special Programs Administration. During
FY 99, the pipeline safety program is funded at $34.6 million with the
program funded from annual fees from the pipeline industry (with a
small amount from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund).
What we have learned as a result of our review of Olympic's
petroleum products pipeline operations and applications is shocking and
alarming:
a) Existing Federal safety and environmental regulations on
petroleum pipelines are woefully inadequate.
b) Efforts to increase safety and environmental standards at
the state level are strongly opposed by the oil industry.
c) Efforts of local jurisdictions to protect their citizens
from pipeline routing decisions are strongly opposed by the oil
industry.
d) The Federal Office of Pipeline Safety (within the Research
and Special Programs Administration of the Dept. of
Transportation) is a captive of the oil industry, relies on the
oil industry to establish both standards and self-policing
practices and too often refuses to implement either the
recommendations of the Department of Transportation and
National Transportation Safety Board or requirements of
Congress.
e) In addition, there is a lack of regional liquid fuel
energy planning in this country. As a result, hazardous
material pipelines are constructed in the absence of clear
demonstration of public need and without requiring an
examination of the least environmentally damaging alternative.
A significant part of the problem lies with Congress. During the
104th Congress, the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of
1996, was passed which re-authorized the pipeline safety program for FY
96-2000. The Act moved the pipeline safety program towards a new
``risk-based'' approach by incorporating risk assessment and cost-
benefit analysis in the establishment of new pipeline safety standards,
in accordance with Executive Order 12866. The Act established a risk
management demonstration program whereby pipeline operators may be
exempted from any or all safety requirements if the operator submits,
and DOT approves, a safety plan that will achieve a level of safety
equal to or greater than that which would be achieved through following
existing regulations.
This industry-backed approach, which has moved us away from much-
needed federal oversight and away from compliance based regulations,
has resulted in a de-emphasis in developing, issuing, and enforcing
regulations for the safe transportation of petroleum via pipeline.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We, therefore, recommend that Congress:
a) Increase funding for both the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Program and the Pipeline Safety Program.
b) Require enforceable standards for repair of pipelines
after internal inspections.
c) Require a showing of public need and least damaging
environmental alternative before allowing the construction of
new pipelines.
d) Remove the provisions designed to allow industry to self-
audit and perform risk assessment in lieu of compliance with
federal safety standards.
e) Allow state and local jurisdictions to impose human
health, safety, and environmental land use standards as long as
not in conflict with federal regulations.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony.
______
Prepared Statement of Susan Harper, Executive Director,
Cascade Columbia Alliance
Thank you Chairman, Senator McCain and Senator Hollings for holding
this hearing on the Pipeline Safety Act (``Act'') and accepting this
written testimony on behalf of Cascade Columbia Alliance (CCA). I
represent with my testimony a coalition of citizens, elected officials,
environmental and civic groups, labor and businesses in Washington
State. I am also a board member of the National Pipeline Reform
Coalition (NPRC). You have heard from Mr. James Pates, NPRC Vice
President. We wholly support his testimony.
CCA's association with pipeline victims in other states began in
1996 when Olympic Pipe Line Company proposed the 230-mile Cross Cascade
Pipeline. During the siting process we learned many disturbing facts
about pipelines and the inadequacy of the Federal Office of Pipeline
Safety (OPS). The most frustrating lesson we learned is that this
problem had plagued communities for years, and had proper action been
taken by the OPS, the Bellingham nightmare could have been prevented.
We urge this Committee to take swift action to set right a tragedy that
should have never happened by implementing the recommendations for
safety improvements that CCA, the NPRC and others have presented. I
would request that the attached material, including letters and
petitions from concerned citizens be made part of the hearing record.
Mr. Pates' testimony describes many horrific stories about victims
of pipeline company and OPS negligence. According to Mr. Pates
testimony, since 1990, there have been nearly 4,000 accidents involving
gas and hazardous liquid pipelines reported to OPS, resulting in over
200 deaths, nearly 3,000 injunes, and at least $780 million in property
damage. Over 62 million gallons of oil and other hazardous liquids have
been released into the environment over the past 10 years, making
pipeline accidents one of the largest point sources of oil pollution in
the country. In fact, in the report submitted to this Committee by the
Inspector General they point out the flaws in the OPS reporting
systems, so this is an understatement of a huge problem that you have
the power to set right.
On March 13th, I presented testimony at the Field Hearing held by
Senator Gorton and Senator Murray. My testimony focuses on the role of
citizen participation in the oversight, siting and operation of
hazardous fuel pipelines. Since pipeline accidents happen locally, the
people who have the most to lose need to play an active role in
preventing them. In an attached press release by Senator Gorton, he
expresses his support for such a body.
After the Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989, a joint citizen, local
government and tribal oversight body came together in Prince Williams
Sound. Alaska Governor Knowles credits the Regional Citizens' Advisory
Council (RCAC), formally established and funded in OPA-90, as creating
the safest oil transport system in the United States. OPA-90 also
encouraged the establishment of other regional citizen and local
government monitoring bodies elsewhere. Given the current climate
surrounding the Office of Pipeline Safety and the public mistrust of
the agency, establishment and funding for Regional Advisory Council's
(RAC) to monitor hazardous pipelines is essential to a comprehensive
reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act.
In Washington State a loose coalition has been working together to
oversee the safety action plans of Olympic Pipe Line Company as they
work with OPS and the National Transportation Safety Board to discover
the cause of the explosion and prevent future spills from the same
pipeline. An article about that effort is attached to this testimony.*
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* The information referred to was not available at the time this
hearing went to press.
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Something must be done now, before another tragedy like Bellingham
happens again. The OPS has not acted on recommendations that were made
many years ago because of their cozy relationship with the industry.
The public needs to be assured this will not happen again. Citizens can
play a positive role in preventing pipeline accidents. A Regional
Advisory Council (RAC) will help regulators do the right thing and not
succumb to industry pressure. The diverse membership comprised of
representatives of local governments, tribes, surface and groundwater
protection agencies, pipeline right-of-way property owners, emergency
responders, and environmental organizations assures that the RAC
represents the broader public interest. We are pursuing the
establishment of an RAC in Washington State, and encourage other states
that have had problems with the pipeline industry and OPS to do the
same.
Thank you again for this opportunity to present this additional
testimony. I am happy to provide additional information upon request.
______
Prepared Statement of Edward J. Holmes, Chair, NARUC Committee on Gas
and Commissioner, Kentucky Public Service on Behalf of the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC)
As Chairman of the Committee on Gas with the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), I am pleased to be given
this opportunity by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation to offer NARUC's comments concerning the reauthorization
of the Pipeline Safety Act (49 USC 60101, et seq.).
NARUC is a quasi-governmental nonprofit organization founded in
1889. Its membership includes the State public utility commissions for
all States and territories. NARUC's mission is to serve the public
interest by improving the quality and effectiveness of public utility
regulation. NARUC's members regulate the retail rates and services of
electric, gas, water and telephone utilities. We have the obligation
under State law to assure the establishment and maintenance of such
energy utility services as may be required by the public convenience
and necessity, and to ensure that such services are provided at rates
and conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory for all
consumers.
The majority of State regulatory agencies have various
responsibilities concerning the safe construction, maintenance and
operation of natural gas and hazardous liquids pipeline facilities in
the States. In most cases, this regulatory responsibility concerning
intrastate pipeline facilities is exercised at least in part under
partnership agreements with the Office of Pipeline Safety, Research and
Special Projects Administration, and U.S. Department of Transportation.
In several States, also, partnership agreements are in effect in which
State pipeline safety personnel inspect interstate pipeline facilities
as agents of the Office of Pipeline Safety and report their findings to
QPS for enforcement action by OPS.
NARUC supports the pipeline safety programs of OPS and is strongly
supportive of the OPS/State agreement programs. The Commissioners
believe that the States have continually demonstrated strong commitment
to enforcement of pipeline safety regulations. The States have brought
to State/OPS partnership programs invaluable knowledge of local
conditions, facilities and operators within their jurisdictions. The
OPS/State intrastate partnership programs have been very important in
ensuring the safe construction, maintenance and operation of facilities
within the States. NARUC has consistently and strongly supported full
authorization of funds to enable OPS to fully fund 50 percent of the
States' intrastate agent program costs.
The States also have been very active with OPS in informing
operators of the importance of safe excavation practices, especially
calling the State One-Call agency to obtain marks of existing
underground facilities prior to new excavation.
This year, NARUC, at its March 2000 Winter Committee Meetings,
adopted a resolution recommended by the Committee on Gas concerning the
interstate agent program. The resolution expressed the concern of NARUC
about the termination of some, and possibly all, of the interstate
agent programs. NARUC urges that, regardless of which of the bills now
before this Committee might ultimately be enacted, and regardless of
such authority as might be conferred on OPS to ultimately change the
interstate agent programs, that any changes to the program be made only
after full consultation with the States. I have attached a copy of the
resolution for your review.
NARUC thanks the Committee for this opportunity to comment on these
matters.
NARUC
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
resolution
Resolution In Support Of Interstate Agents
WHEREAS, The States have a vital interest in the safety of the
interstate pipelines within their respective States; and
WHEREAS, The Congress of the United States has provided a means for
States to take an active role in the safety of interstate pipelines by
becoming ``interstate agents'' for the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) via Section 60117(c) of
49 U.S.C.; and
WHEREAS, The States of Arizona, Connecticut, California, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia
currently have interstate agent status which enables them to conduct
safety inspections of interstate pipelines operating within their
States, and other States including New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Texas and
Virginia have requested but were denied interstate agent status; and
WHEREAS, By letters to the interstate agent States dated December 23,
1999, OPS announced that the States of Arizona and Nevada were being
terminated as interstate agents, and that the entire interstate agent
program would be phased out over three years; and
WHEREAS, This action was taken unilaterally and without notice to or
consultation with the affected States, and in the case of the
terminations the rationale given contained incorrect information; and
WHEREAS, In ending the interstate agent program OPS appears to presume
it could be replaced with a ``temporary agent'' program, which has not
been formalized or discussed with the States; and that it will receive
substantial additional resources from the current Congress, which is
not assured; and
WHEREAS, The States strongly believe their inspections are critical to
ensure that interstate pipelines are operated, constructed and
maintained safely; and that State activities which promote pipeline
safety should not be arbitrarily supplanted by unknown, unproven, and
uncertain alternatives; and
WHEREAS, The resources the States expend inspecting interstate
pipelines in no way diminish the safety inspection of local
distribution companies or other intrastate operators; and
WHEREAS, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has encouraged
the inspection of interstate pipelines by State inspectors; and
WHEREAS, The National Governor's Association has adopted a Proposed
Policy on Pipeline Safety encouraging greater State oversight of
interstate pipelines; and
WHEREAS, Washington State Governor, Senators, Congressional
Representatives and the Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission all desire a greater role in the oversight of the interstate
pipelines through their State; now therefore be it
RESOLVED, That the Board of Directors of National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) convened in its March 2000
Winter Meeting in Washington, D.C., urges the U.S. Department of
Transportation to stay any change in the pipeline interstate agent
program as historically administered, that any changes to the program
be made only after full consultation with the States and the
finalization of alternatives, and that OPS be instructed to accept
additional interested States as interstate agents.
Sponsored by the Committee on Gas
Adopted by the NARUC Board of Directors March 8, 2000
______
Prepared Statement of Governor Gary Locke, State of Washington
I appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the critical
topic of pipeline safety. As you know, the tragedy in Bellingham,
Washington has focused tremendous public attention on the need to
ensure that pipeline safety laws, regulations and practices at the
state, federal and local levels are as effective as they can be.
Washington communities, government agencies, and others involved in gas
and hazardous liquid transportation have made pipeline safety one of
their highest priorities.
I am pleased that the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation is holding this hearing on reauthorization of the
Pipeline Safety Act. I hope this effort will result not only in a new
law to increase pipeline safety, but will also ensure strong, thorough
and consistent enforcement of pipeline safety requirements.
I also want to thank the Committee for holding a field hearing in
Bellingham in March. Some members heard direct testimony from the
families and the community on the devastating effect of last summer's
pipeline tragedy. They also heard about our state's commitment to a
strong and effective pipeline safety program. That commitment has been
underscored by new state legislation on pipeline safety. Now we are
seeking a stronger federal partnership to protect our citizens and
those across the nation.
I believe any pipeline safety bill that is passed must incorporate,
at a minimum, the following five fundamental principles:
Increased state role in regulation. A critical component of
any effort to improve pipeline safety is the strengthening of
states' ability to oversee pipeline operator activities and
compliance. Many states, including Washington, are eager to
participate in a full partnership with the Office of Pipeline
Safety (OPS). As effective partners, states need the authority
to develop and impose standards that may be more stringent than
federal standards without interfering with interstate commerce.
They also need the authority to inspect operations and to
enforce federal and state standards. Specifically, each state
must have the authority to work directly with all pipeline
operators in the state. That authority needs to be supported by
the free flow of data regarding pipeline operations between OPS
and its state partners.
High standards. I urge you to adopt a bill that will require
state-of-the-art safety standards for the construction,
testing, operation, and maintenance of pipelines. In addition,
standards need to be toughened for prompt public reporting of
spills and leaks. We would also like to see increased standards
for certifying pipeline operators.
Effective oversight and enforcement of the federal program.
The bill you pass should include an effective and independent
mechanism for oversight of the federal government's activities
related to pipeline safety. An effective pipeline safety
program requires that the federal regulatory body be held
accountable for any shortcomings in its activities. For
example, ``risk management'' or ``integrity assessment'' plans
could be a valuable means for the industry to develop standards
and practices to ensure pipeline safety. But they will fulfill
this promise only if OPS exercises its independent judgment
that the substance of the plans, not just the process of
developing them, advances public safety. While the main burden
here falls on OPS, I believe that Congress will need to
continue active oversight of that agency's pipeline safety
activities to ensure that the program goals are being met.
Communities' right to know. Another important aspect of any
new legislation is strengthening communities' access to
information about the pipelines located beneath them. Both
pipeline companies and their regulators should be required to
provide education and outreach activities to those communities
and their residents. Communities in Washington, for example,
are eager to participate in activities ensuring safe excavation
around pipes. Our recent state legislation directs that an
improved mapping system be established so that pipelines can be
clearly and easily located. We need a similar commitment from
the federal government to make pipeline information more
accessible.
Adequate funding. Adequate funding is essential for the
success of a pipeline safety program. Sufficient federal
funding is required for better federal regulation for increased
state involvement and enforcement in pipeline safety efforts,
and for a greatly expanded program of research and development
on technology improvements, such as internal inspections for
small diameter pipes and distribution systems.
At the National Governors' Association Winter 2000 meeting, I
sponsored, and NGA adopted, a policy on Improved Pipeline Safety,
specifically identifying five recommendations for the reauthorization
of the Pipeline Safety Act. Those recommendations include requirements
for:
increased state authority,
Congressional oversight,
more effective rules,
appropriate funding, and
intergovernmental cooperation.
I urge you to consider these NGA recommendations as you work to
adopt a pipeline safety bill; a copy is attached to this testimony.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this very important
issue. I look forward to working with your Committee in the next few
weeks. Together, I hope we can ensure passage of an effective pipeline
safety bill that will give the people and the environment of this
country the protection they need and deserve.
______
Prepared Statement of John W. Somerhalder II, President,
El Paso Energy Pipeline Group
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am John Somerhalder,
President of El Paso Energy's regulated pipelines. I am submitting this
written testimony on behalf of El Paso Energy, the nation's largest
natural gas pipeline operator.
El Paso Energy operates nearly 40,000 miles of natural gas
pipelines that are regulated by the federal Department of
Transportation. Our pipelines stretch from California to New England
and from the Canadian border to the Gulf of Mexico. We operate in 25
states and bring natural gas to fuel American homes and businesses.
The natural gas pipeline transmission industry is a safe industry.
By continuously monitoring and inspecting our pipelines, we work to
ensure that transportation by pipeline is the safest mode of energy
transportation. I appreciate the Chairman's recognition of this fact.
Operating and maintaining a safe system is embedded in every aspect of
our business. The benefits of developing and implementing safety
programs are widely recognized within our industry and are at the core
of what we do. We are continuously working to improve our record of
safety--for like you, we believe one fatality is one too many. It is
with this thought in mind that I can say that our interests are
directly in line with what this Committee and the public at large are
interested in--reliable delivery of natural gas through safe pipelines.
I now would like to comment on a number of areas in Chairman
McCain's bill and the Administration's bill with which we have
concerns.
National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations
Presently, the National Transportation Safety Board has a number of
open recommendations to the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). This is
recognized in S. 2438, the McCain bill. I agree that OPS should be
required to respond to these recommendations in a timely manner, that
any responses should be open to the public, and that the responses
should be reported to Congress.
Pipeline System Integrity
On November 18 and 19, 1999, the Office of Pipeline Safety held a
public meeting to begin a pipeline system integrity rulemaking. To date
that effort has resulted in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published
on April 24, 2000, for the hazardous liquid operators with over 500
miles of pipeline. OPS has indicated they plan to issue a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for natural gas in the fall. The Interstate Natural
Gas Association of America (INGAA), which represents interstate natural
gas pipelines including El Paso Energy, is working to have this
rulemaking technically based. INGAA and El Paso Energy agree that this
will permit the greatest possible chance of positively impacting
natural gas pipeline safety. However, this task is difficult. The
natural gas pipeline safety regulations are much more comprehensive
than the hazardous liquid regulations, and I believe these regulations
form a basis for the excellent safety record of the natural gas
transmission pipeline industry. Unfortunately, we have been so
effective that simple solutions to improve our safety record do not
exist. It is our intent in this pipeline system integrity rulemaking to
comprehensively analyze and propose to OPS a program providing the
greatest opportunity for improvement to occur.
It is my recommendation that any legislation recognize the
differences between natural gas and liquid pipelines, including the
risks and consequences of an incident and the regulations already
imposed on these pipelines. Since the legislative proposals before this
Committee address the issue of pipeline integrity, I offer the
following comments:
1. Under no circumstances should the hazardous liquid rule be
applied to natural gas transmission pipelines. First, upon
release, natural gas and hazardous liquids behave very
differently. Natural gas, which is lighter than air, rises and
rapidly dissipates, whereas a liquid, let's say oil, that is
heavier than air, spills onto the ground causing a variety of
environmental concerns. Second, the ability to utilize internal
inspection devices to look for a wide variety of potential
flaws is very different. Third, the ability to test a pipeline
hydrostatically is very different--our reliable gas service
would be curtailed where there is only one pipeline serving the
public. Clearly a rule tailored to each pipeline product should
be considered.
2. The required use of the ``best achievable technology'' is
open-ended and a moving target with which pipeline operators
would be required to comply. While in theory this language
sounds laudable, it leads people to believe that there are one
or two technologies that solve the problem of safety for the
pipeline. Natural gas pipeline operators have a number of tools
they use to ensure the safety of their systems. These range
from non-technical items such as walking the pipeline to look
for changes to soil or vegetation to more technical items such
as cathodic protection (a small electric current) and smart
pigs. Industry voluntarily has been investing in research to
continue to pursue better technologies for more than fifty
years. Use of ``best achievable technology'' is also a relative
term, meaning someone determines what this is whether or not
the technology is truly proven.
If Congress is concerned about OPS issuing a natural gas rule in a
timely manner, I suggest that OPS be given a timeframe for issuing
Final Rules. If those dates are not met, Congress should require OPS to
prepare a report to Congress explaining why those dates were not met.
Forcing the natural gas transmission pipeline industry to comply with a
rule that is completely inappropriate for our product because OPS
failed to act is nonsensical and would not, in the least, result in
improved safety.
Enhanced State Oversight
Interstate pipeline operators, like virtually all forms of
interstate commerce, are under the jurisdiction of the federal
government. For an operator like El Paso Energy, with operations in 25
states, this is an important pipeline safety issue. Consistency in the
application of safety standards is paramount to pipeline safety.
If individual states were permitted to create and enforce their own
safety standards, operators like El Paso Energy would be forced to
approach pipeline safety in a piecemeal manner, rather than on a
system-wide basis. If pipeline operators were forced to comply with
individual state requirements, it would actually lessen safety across
the entire system, because it would reduce needed resources going to
those areas most in need of risk reduction. Permitting the states to
dictate specific activities would reduce pipeline safety overall.
Avenues are already in place for states to supplement the federal
program and address issues of local concern. Approximately 75 percent
of the natural gas pipelines in the United States are local
distribution systems, which supply natural gas to homes and businesses.
All of these systems, as well as intrastate transmission pipelines, are
subject to the safety oversight of the states. If a state has a
specific concern regarding an interstate operator, the states can
address that concern by bringing it to the attention of the federal
Office of Pipeline Safety. States also have complete control over the
various one-call centers, whose primary purpose is to provide a
mechanism for underground utilities to be marked to prevent accidental
excavation damage. Third party damage by excavation is the biggest
cause of pipeline failures.
Operator Qualification
On August 27, 1999, a Final Rule was published by the Office of
Pipeline Safety which required operators of pipelines to prepare an
operator qualification plan and have the applicable operating personnel
qualified within specific time frames. This rulemaking was based on an
extensive cooperation and negotiation between the Office of Pipeline
Safety, natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines, liquid
pipelines, labor unions, state pipeline safety representatives,
corrosion experts, emergency response agencies, federal safety
agencies, and other affected parties. Operators diligently have been
preparing their qualification plans for over a year to meet the rule
deadlines. Moving these deadlines up, as some of the legislative
proposals suggest, would place an undue burden on operators, would
sabotage some of the benefits expected to be realized by the
rulemaking, and would have no effect on safety. It would seem best to
let the existing regulatory process work by allowing the Operator
Qualification rule to reach fruition.
I also am concerned that some of the proposals require operator
training rather than operator qualification. A one-size fits all
training program is not appropriate for the different systems upon
which operators work and the varied tasks that operators must perform.
The parties to the negotiated rulemaking recognized these differences
and, after much discussion and analysis, agreed to an operator
qualification rule rather than a training rule. Such a rule allows
operators the ability to best address the specific concerns of their
systems. As such, El Paso Energy believes that any legislative proposal
addressing operators should focus on qualifications, not training.
Training is only one component used to assure that an operator is
qualified.
Public Education and Community Right-to-Know
The existing natural gas pipeline safety regulations require
operators to provide a variety of information to the public about the
pipelines. This information includes maps, emergency response
information, educational materials, and one-call or location
information. However, even with these efforts, third party damage is
still the leading cause of pipeline failures, and is believed to have
contributed to the gasoline pipeline failure in Bellingham, Washington.
The Office of Pipeline Safety is in a unique position to
disseminate facility location information to the public. Since they are
a federal agency, it would appear that they could serve as an
information clearinghouse for public right-to-know issues, as well as
many other issues that concern the public about pipelines. OPS could
utilize accepted forums for information dissemination such as their
Internet homepage or the Internet-based National Pipeline Mapping
System for location information.
Improved Data and Data Availability
The interstate natural gas transmission pipeline industry has, in
conjunction with the Office of Pipeline Safety, developed a new form
for reporting incidents. This new form allows better analysis of
incident trends and better determination of the actual causes of
incidents. This effort is in line with the DOT Inspector General's
report and the National Transportation Safety Board's recommendations
and will result in greater pipeline safety.
The Office of Pipeline Safety has maintained records on pipeline
incidents since the early 1970's. These records are available to the
public on OPS' Internet homepage (http://ops.dot.gov) and are also
available by contacting OPS.
Based on the aforementioned facts, it would not appear that a
legislative effort to improve data or data availability would
demonstrably improve what is currently being done.
Technology Development
The natural gas transmission pipeline industry has been conducting
independent research since the early 1950's through the Gas Research
Institute (GRI) and Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI),
among others. This research has led to many advances in pipeline safety
and is a significant contributor to our outstanding safety record.
The bills state that the Office of Pipeline Safety should direct
research attention to work that is ongoing by the industry. If OPS is
to expand its role in pipeline research, I believe it would be prudent
to have OPS direct the research funding to existing, proven research
organizations such as those mentioned above. This would ensure that the
research is performed in an efficient manner, that OPS funding is in
partnership with industry funding for increased effectiveness, and that
all affected parties would have input into the direction of the
research efforts.
Penalties
Presently, the pipeline safety regulations permit penalties up to
$25,000 per incident per day up to a maximum of $100,000. Both bills
would increase the penalties to $100,000 per incident per day up to a
maximum of $1,000,000. El Paso Energy complies with the pipeline safety
regulations because they are the law and because we believe that in
most cases they increase pipeline safety. El Paso Energy's goal is to
increase pipeline safety, not avoid penalties. As such raising the
penalty amounts for non-compliance would not result in El Paso Energy
or our industry better complying with the regulations.
Authorization of Appropriations
I believe it is important to note that part of the Administration's
budget request for FY 2001 already has been authorized in TEA21. TEA21
authorized $5 million in one-time grants to states that improved their
one-call systems. In this authorization, Congress recognized that
natural gas and liquid pipelines generate only about one-fifth of the
calls made by one-call centers to mark underground facilities. As such,
Congress required that any sums that are appropriated for state grants
must be taken from general revenues, not from user fees.
The bills before the Committee do not break out what amounts should
come from user fees, the Oil Spill Liability Fund, and the Pipeline
Safety Reserve. El Paso Energy would be more than happy to work with
the Committee on this issue.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude by thanking this Committee for allowing me
the opportunity to provide this written testimony. I also would like to
encourage this Committee to remember the outstanding safety record of
the natural gas pipeline transmission industry and the many efforts
natural gas pipeline operators already take to assure that we can
reliably deliver natural gas to consumers in the safest manner
possible. El Paso Energy appreciates your efforts to pass a balanced,
constructive Pipeline Safety Act reauthorization and we look forward to
working with you in making this legislation a reality.
______
Prepared Statement of George P. Williams, Director, Government Affairs,
Sempra Energy
Introduction
Sempra Energy is pleased to offer testimony to the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation regarding the reauthorization
of the Pipeline Safety Act. Although our comments specifically address
S. 2438, we would be pleased to similarly address S. 2004 and S. 2409
should the Committee so desire.
Sempra Energy is a Fortune 500 energy services holding company
whose subsidiaries include Southern California Gas Company and San
Diego Gas and Electric Company. Together these two local distribution
companies operate 3500 miles of transmission pipeline in some of the
most heavily populated areas of the country. Southern California Gas
Company is the nation's largest local natural gas distribution company
serving over 18 million consumers through 5 million meters in a service
territory stretching from San Luis Obispo to the Mexican Border. San
Diego Gas & Electric is a combination utility providing service to over
3 million consumers in San Diego County through 1.2 million electric
meters and 720 thousand natural gas meters.
Sempra Energy commends the author and Committee chair, Senator
McCain, in introducing this legislation to address the serious issue of
pipeline safety. Sempra Energy also commends the Senators from
Washington who are co-authoring this proposal and have first hand
knowledge of the problems that result if a pipeline failure occurs.
Background on Sempra Energy Pipeline Integrity Programs
Southern California Gas Company and San Diego Gas & Electric have a
pipeline integrity management program. We have a Pipeline Integrity
Team that addresses the overall operation of our facilities including
ensuring strict compliance with local, state and federal pipeline
safety regulations and evaluating our operations to ensure that the
risks to our facilities are known and addressed. On a routine basis,
this team identifies hazards and vulnerabilities of the pipeline
system, performs specific risk assessments, evaluates data, and
prioritizes areas to be addressed. In addition, this team evaluates the
applicability of new technology to our operations. At a strategic
level, this team works to integrate our operating experience with the
study of the interrelationships among various failure causes and known
risks, to ensure resources are directed at protecting public safety and
maintaining the integrity of our pipelines.
In addition to internally focused activities, Sempra Energy
actively participates in industry and government sponsored forums on
pipeline system management. Southern California Gas Company and San
Diego Gas & Electric have a long history of active participation in
regulatory proceedings, including rulemakings, sponsored by the Office
of Pipeline Safety (O.P.S.) and by other regulatory bodies such as the
California Public Utilities Commission, O.P.S.'s designated enforcement
agency for the state. Sempra Energy believes that continued emphasis
should be placed on improving pipeline integrity and we continue to
work with other stakeholders to ensure that the risks to pipelines from
damage due to excavation, failures, etc. are minimized to maintain the
highest levels of public safety. In addition, we strongly support the
pursuit of new technology and engineering advances that would lead to
greater pipeline safety and encourage the authors to consider directing
resources towards research and development of new technologies.
Sempra Energy wholeheartedly agrees that public safety concerns
should be paramount when operating and maintaining the infrastructure
used to deliver natural gas. We do, however, have concerns that certain
provisions in this bill may not achieve the desired objectives and in
fact, may give rise to a false sense of security regarding public
safety. We ask that you consider the following input as you continue to
refine this bill.
Specific Comments on S. 2438
Internal Inspections
Section 5 of the proposal requires the Secretary to issue
regulations that would require natural gas and hazardous liquid
pipeline operators to evaluate risks to their pipeline facilities based
upon specific criteria to determine the adequacy of pipelines to
operate in unusually sensitive areas and high-density population areas.
We readily agree that pipeline operators should continually evaluate
the risks to their pipeline facilities. However, although we recognize
the inherent necessity of vagueness in this type of directive, we are
concerned about the preliminary references to mandatory ``smart
pigging'' or other types of internal inspections for natural gas
pipelines. While there are situations when certain internal inspections
are warranted and as an operator, we utilize internal inspections to
assess certain vulnerabilities on a targeted basis, we do not endorse
the thought that internal inspection should be mandated on a routine
basis for natural gas transmission pipeline facilities. Overall, we
believe that a comprehensive integrity management program can be
completely effective without mandating these types of inspections on a
routine basis.
We are actively working with the Office of Pipeline Safety, other
operators, state regulators and key stakeholders to look at possible
modifications to the federal pipeline safety regulations as they relate
to pipeline integrity management. In fact, on April 24, 2000, a notice
of proposed rulemaking was published in the Federal Register concerning
an Office of Pipeline Safety proposal to add additional regulations to
``test, repair and validate through analysis the integrity of most
hazardous liquid pipelines that could affect populated areas,
commercially navigable waterways and areas unusually sensitive to
environmental damage.'' While this notice of proposed rulemaking
governs regulations under 49 C.F.R. Part 195 for hazardous liquid
pipelines, this is the first stage of an overall integrity management
rulemaking process that will then address 49 C.F.R. Part 192
regulations for natural gas pipelines. Practically speaking, we are
aware of many inspection and evaluation techniques capable of assessing
a pipeline's identified vulnerabilities that could be far more
effective in ensuring public safety than devoting resources to
performing internal inspection on natural gas pipelines on a routine
basis.
As a side note, as you consider the possible mandate of routinely
``smart pigging'' natural gas transmission pipelines, please keep in
mind the current capability of ``smart pigs.'' For example, we believe
that the current capability of smart pigs to find prior mechanical
damage, on a scale of 1 to 10, is about a 4, a number far from
infallible. In addition, we analyzed reportable incidents on gas
transmission and gathering lines filed with the Department of
Transportation from 1985-1997 and determined that ``smart pigging'' the
pipeline would not have identified the determined cause of over 70% of
the failures. This is not to say that smart pigging is without value.
We do believe that the use of ``smart pigs'' should be part of an
overall inspection program to ensure pipeline integrity by assessing
vulnerabilities on a targeted basis. Accordingly, we would support
language directing the Secretary to give natural gas transmission
pipeline operators options to allow for the use of, ``internal
inspection, pressure testing or other evaluation techniques capable of
assessing the pipeline's identified vulnerabilities.''
Provision of Maps to Local Authorities
Sempra Energy understands the concerns prompting this particular
proposal; however, Sempra Energy is very concerned that the widespread
provision of detailed maps could do more harm than good. In addition,
we believe that information that will be made available through the
National Pipeline Mapping System (N.M.P.S.) project sponsored by the
Office of Pipeline Safety will successfully address many of the issues
the authors have noted.
Southern California Gas Company is participating on the M.Q.A.T.
(Mapping Quality Action Team) sponsored by the Office of Pipeline
Safety to develop the National Pipeline Mapping System. This project
was created to address Congress' concerns about having better
information on the nation's hazardous liquid and natural gas
transmission pipelines, especially during emergency situations. A
partnership was created between industry and the Office of Pipeline
Safety to develop an electronic mapping system that would give the
Office of Pipeline Safety, as well as other public agencies,
information regarding the general location of these pipeline
facilities. Through this system, information regarding the location of
facilities, within 500 feet, the type of product, and the owner of the
line will be available through the Internet and readily accessible to
the general public. Regulatory personnel and public agencies will have
access to more detailed information. Based on the current schedule,
this system should be ready for deployment by the end of 2000.
Sempra Energy is concerned with the authors' proposal to provide
maps outside of the National Pipeline Mapping System as this material
could provide local authorities with a false sense of security. Our
maps are fluid proprietary documents. They are updated on a continuous
basis. We do not want to take a chance that a local official would rely
on an outdated map in responding to an emergency. In addition, we do
not want others that are not ``qualified personnel,'' no matter how
well intentioned, to operate our system under any circumstances.
Operating pipeline systems without proper training by unqualified
personnel could lead to significant public risk.
Sempra Energy's concern is also based on the very real threat posed
by terrorists. The United States is no longer immune from terrorist
attacks, from both domestic and foreign perpetrators. Sempra Energy
believes it would be extremely unwise to make detailed maps available
to a public that could include terrorists.
We do not believe that public safety would be advanced by providing
either maps or specific details such as operating pressure of our
facilities to schools or the public. We do however, strongly endorse
the one-call system and other practices to address damage prevention to
our facilities and general public safety. Instead of providing local
officials, and potentially the general public, with detailed maps,
other than those provided through the National Pipeline Mapping System,
Sempra Energy recommends that local distribution companies continue to
work closely with local officials in responding to emergencies. Not
only do we know our systems the best, but we also have highly trained
personnel available to assist the local officials.
Operator Training Programs
Section 4 requires pipeline operators to submit training plans
designed to enhance training for personnel and to reduce the likelihood
of accidents and injuries. Sempra Energy concurs with the motivation
behind this requirement; however, we are concerned that this provision
is needlessly duplicative of a recent regulatory proceeding.
The Office of Pipeline Safety issued a final rule on operator
qualification and training on August 27, 1999. This ruling, ``Pipeline
Safety: Qualification of Pipeline Personnel'' is designed to ensure a
qualified workforce which will result in a reduced risk of accidents
attributable to human error. This rule, effective on October 26, 1999,
requires that operators have a written qualification program in place
by April 27, 2001 and complete the qualification of individuals
performing covered tasks by October 28, 2002. This ``Operator
Qualification Rule'' specifically requires that operators develop a
qualification program to ``evaluate an individual's ability to perform
covered tasks and to recognize and react to abnormal operating
conditions that may occur when performing covered tasks.''
Sempra Energy believes that the training programs mandated in S.
2438 are premature in light of the recent ``Operator Qualification
Rule.'' We believe that the ``Operator Qualification Rule'' will be
sufficient to ensure qualified personnel and we encourage the authors
to consider not requiring implementation of a new training program
before operators fulfill the regulatory mandates specified by the
Office of Pipeline Safety on this issue and the results are evaluated.
Conclusion
In closing, Sempra Energy commends the authors in this effort to
address the issue of pipeline safety. We believe that we should work
together to continually strive to reduce the risk to public safety
through technological advances and improved practices for operating
pipelines and specifically encourage you to support more resources
towards research in this area as it would ultimately serve the
interests of public safety.