[Senate Hearing 106-1137]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1137
U.S. SEAPORT SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 4, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Ann Choiniere, Republican General Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on October 4, 2000.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Hollings.................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 1
Witnesses
Graham, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Florida...................... 5
Hart, Clyde J. Jr., Maritime Administrator, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Kelly, Hon. Raymond W., Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service....... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Loy, Admiral James M., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.............. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Nagle, Kurt J., President, American Association of Port
Authorities.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Robinson, Hon. James K., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice................................ 24
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Tousseau, John, Executive Board Member, International Longshore &
Warehouse Union................................................ 26
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Appendix
Wytkind, Edward, Executive Director Transportation Trades
Department, AFL-CIO, Prepared statement........................ 41
U.S. SEAPORT SECURITY
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
The Chairman. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
hear from witnesses on the findings and new recommendations of
the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
Seaports.
In April 1999 the President established the Interagency
Commission to look into the growing problem of crime and
security shortfalls in U.S. seaports. The President asked the
Commission to evaluate the nature and extent of serious crime
in seaports, as well as looking into the effectiveness of
current security measures.
After months of delay, the Commission issued its final
report on September 7, 2000. While the Commission was not able
to determine the full extent of serious crime at seaports, it
did report on 20 findings and made recommendations addressing
each of those findings. The Commission surveyed seaports on the
East, West, and Gulf Coasts, as well as the Great Lakes, and
found significant criminal activity at each.
The Commissioners determined that seaport crime encompasses
a broad range of crimes. These include the importation of
illicit drugs, contraband and prohibited or restricted
merchandise, stow-aways and alien smuggling, trade fraud and
commercial smuggling, environmental crimes, cargo theft and the
unlawful exportation of controlled commodities, ammunitions,
stolen property, and drug proceeds.
These findings leave little doubt that crime in our
Nation's seaports is a serious problem that has impacted well
beyond our port cities. For example, a car stolen in Kentucky
on Tuesday could be on its way out of the country through the
Port of Charleston on Wednesday.
It should be noted that, based on the Commission's
findings, the same vessel taking that car out of the country
may have in its inbound voyage brought in illicit drugs,
counterfeit merchandise, or illegal aliens that will go
undetected due to the lack of adequate controls at our Nation's
seaports. Further, the Commission's rating of security at the
seaports surveyed, described as ranging from poor to fair and
in a few cases good, must be taken seriously by ports,
transportation workers, and federal, state, and local agencies
involved in the operation and control of our seaports. Action
is needed to address the many identified problems and security
shortcomings.
I want to thank all the members of the Commission for their
efforts, and I look forward to hearing more on their findings
and recommendations from several of those members here today.
I'm also interested in hearing from our other witnesses,
who I understand share concerns raised by the Commission, but
are also very concerned about how the Commission's
recommendations will be implemented.
I know of no Member of Congress who has been more aware and
more involved in this issue than my friend from South Carolina.
Senator Hollings because of personal experiences, has been
involved in these issues for many years. I appreciate his
leadership and efforts to bring about at least some solutions
to these very difficult issues, and I would like to turn the
hearing over to Senator Hollings at this time.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Hollings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
been looking at a map earlier this morning to find a port on
the East Coast of Mexico. Altamira is the biggest one I can
find, and the reason I was doing that was to try to bring into
focus the importance of your calling this particular hearing.
What happens is, if I walk across from Tijuana to San Diego,
I'm stopped. I've got a coordinated policy. I'm checked
individually, my luggage and everything else of that kind. Same
thing coming from Juarez into El Paso.
If I fly from Mexico City and land in Phoenix, Arizona,
there is a coordinated security policy there, both the customs,
immigration and otherwise. In fact, the FAA really sets out the
security policies that have got to be followed by the various
airlines. They look the policy over, they inspect it, they make
sure the security procedures are sound and effective.
But if I load up one of these containers that can carry as
much as 80,000 pounds or 40 tons, at the Port of Altamira, and
if I load up 100 of those containers with cocaine, under the
facts and the findings, wherever the hundreds of those
containers come in, whether it is to Charleston, New York, or
wherever, 99 of them will not even be looked at. Ninety-nine
will not be looked at, not even inspected. There is no
coordinated policy.
We are in one heck of a fix, and we truly are indebted to
our colleague, Senator Bob Graham of Florida, who has bought
this to our attention, instituted the Commission study and
finding. I know he wants to testify, so we have got a lot of
things to comment upon here. But what we really are trying to
do, you and I at the Committee level, is fashion a policy from
these recommendations that is as sound as the security policies
followed by any airport, for any city like El Paso, or San
Diego, or otherwise, coming across our land borders. In
particular we must protect against threats of terrorism, as
well as the drugs that come in through our sea ports. Nobody is
going to fly into New York and bomb it, but it would be very
easy to come into these ports and spread viruses or other
threats, such as chemicals, or put in some sort of explosive.
But I am interested in hearing our witnesses so let me put my
statement in the record and yield to our real leader here,
Senator Graham.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator from South Carolina
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for scheduling this hearing
at this late date. I know that it is very late in the session, and I
know that it probably isn't all that important to your seaports in
Arizona, but I think that this is an issue that is important to the
general security of this nation.
Our seaport system is really straining at the seams. We seem to
have larger and larger ships, coming into port with fewer and fewer
sailors, carrying more and more cargo, and handling it with a fraction
of the number of longshoremen. The container business has been growing
annually a clip of 5 to 7 percent a year, and our overall maritime
trade volume is expected to double by the year 2020.
Currently, the major agencies charged with responsibility for
seaport security are already overextended and it is inconceivable given
current trends that we will be able to cope with a doubling in cargo
volume in the next twenty years.
Seaports are international borders. I know the average man on the
street would consider our international airports, or our land borders,
to be actual borders, but a lot of people do not picture a seaport as
an international border that needs to be protected in the same fashion
as the southwest land border, or as an international airport. Senator
Graham was the first in Congress to recognize the need to bolster
security at seaports, and I would like to commend him for his work on
this issue. He has problems in Florida with theft and drugs, and his
state is aggressively dealing with the problems. The problem is, that
as soon as we enhance security there in Florida, the criminal activity
will move right up the coast. Senator Graham was able to convince the
President that this issue deserved more attention, and an Interagency
Commission on Seaport Crime and Security was established to review the
status of seaport security in the United States.
Well the review is in and the report identified serious security
concerns at U.S. seaports. The Commission concluded that crime and drug
smuggling at U.S. seaports are high, and that better coordination among
various law enforcement agencies are needed. The Commission recommended
that voluntary minimum physical infrastructure guidelines be
implemented. Such guidelines would include practices for physical
seaport security, provisions that would restrict access to sensitive
areas, vehicular access and potential restrictions on carrying
firearms. The report also acknowledged that seaports are highly
vulnerable to terrorism, and that a potential terrorist attack could
cause substantial damage at our ports. The state of security was
generally rated as poor to fair.
I would like to commend the three co-chairs and the staff who
worked on the document, they did an excellent job. Many of the
recommendations of the report have been incorporated into S. 2965, the
Port and Maritime Security Act, which Senator Graham and I introduced
last month. I look forward to working with members of the Committee and
the various industry groups in order to reach some consensus on
improving seaport security.
Let me also be clear that our seaports are not the only ones to be
faulted, many of them have worked to enhance their security. Criminal
activity at U.S. seaports includes importation of drugs, contraband,
and illegal merchandise; stowaways and alien smuggling; trade fraud and
commercial smuggling; environmental crimes; cargo theft; and the
unlawful exportation of controlled commodities, munitions, stolen
property, and drug proceeds. Many of these violations are violations of
federal law. Additionally, the federal government also has the
responsibility of protecting the public from threats of terrorist
activity and in ensuring that our transportation strategic needs are
not sabotaged. So, the federal government also has a large role to play
in seaport security, but we need to work together with the ports
themselves and the local community to do this.
A recent report on international cargo security practices, prepared
by the U.S. Department of Transportation and issued last May, indicates
that drug trafficking and money laundering are international problems
that take advantage of the vulnerabilities in the transportation
system. At our ports high container volumes and limited inspection
resources result in statistically low probability of detection, with
most container facilities being able to inspect less than one percent a
day. That same report also indicates that organized crime has invested
in the transportation industry, and owns or controls its trucking
companies. So not only can they use the transportation system, they can
enter it, and monitor the progress of their illegal activities. In
essence, the floodgates of trade are open to criminals.
For instance, in my own state, the Port of Charleston which is the
fourth largest container port in the United States, until this month
Customs officials had no equipment even capable of x-raying intermodal
shipping containers. Prior to the receipt of the new x-ray equipment,
Customs, which is understaffed to start with, must have physically
opened containers, and requested the use of a canine unit from local
law enforcement to help with drug or illegal contraband detection. This
is not acceptable.
The Commission found that seizures at the twelve seaports accounted
for 56 percent of total cocaine, 32 percent of marijuana, and 65
percent of heroin seizures carried in commercial trains, planes, and
trucks at all U.S. ports of entry nationwide. Yet, we have done
relatively little, other than send in an undermanned contingency of
Coast Guard and Customs officials to do whatever they can.
Practically speaking, the Customs Service because of fiscal
constraints has focussed its oversight on policing cargo entry, and the
Coast Guard, also constrained by budgetary limitation, has tended to
focus more resources on water-side activities. At U.S. seaports, the
federal government invests nothing in infrastructure, other than the
human presence of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and whatever equipment those
agencies have to accomplish their mandates. Physical infrastructure is
provided by state-controlled port authorities, or by private sector
marine terminal operators. There are no controls, or requirements in
place, except for certain standards promulgated by the Coast Guard for
the protection of cruise ship passenger terminals. Essentially, where
sea ports are concerned we have abrogated the federal responsibility of
border control to the state and private sector.
By way of comparison, in the aviation industry, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) is intimately involved in ensuring that
security measures are developed, implemented, and funded. The FAA works
with various federal officials to assess threats directed toward
commercial aviation and to target various types of security measures as
potential threats change. Currently, each air carrier, whether a U.S.
carrier or foreign air carrier, is required to submit plans to meet its
security needs. Air carriers also are responsible for screening
passengers and baggage in compliance with FAA regulations. The types of
machines used in airports are all approved, and in many instances paid
for by the FAA. The FAA uses its laboratories to check the machinery to
determine if the equipment can detect explosives that are capable of
destroying commercial aircrafts.
At land borders, there is a substantial investment in security by
the federal government. In TEA-21, Congress approved $140 million each
year for five years for the National Corridor Planning and Development
and Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program. Activities under this
program include improvements to existing transportation infrastructure
that facilitate cross-border vehicles and cargo movements; construction
of highways and related safety enforcement facilities that facilitate
movements related to international trade; operational improvements,
including improvements relating to electronic data interchange and use
of telecommunications, to expedite cross border vehicle and cargo
movements; and planning, coordination, design and location studies.
While not all of the funds provided to National Corridor Planning and
Development account are used directly to address security concerns, the
funds help contribute to the mandate of conducting security.
Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service is provided
funds to erect physical security at land borders.
We need to do better at our seaports. The public deserves better,
and I look forward to working on this in the future to make sure that
we do better with our system of seaport security.
The Chairman. Senator Graham, welcome. Thank you for the
great effort you have made on this issue. I understand very
well that this issue in your home State of Florida is one of
very compelling importance. We thank you for your leadership
and all of your efforts on this issue, and welcome you before
the Committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB GRAHAM,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, let me
first express my appreciation to you for holding this important
hearing, particularly at this very congested period of our
Congress, on the important subject of seaport security and the
focus that you will give to the recent report issued by the
Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the
President for his leadership in establishing the seaport
Commission, and the members of the Commission for the
outstanding work which they have completed and have now
presented to us. Thank you very much for the advance position
that you have afforded us to consider these important matters.
Over the past 17 months, the Commission has uncovered a
wealth of information about security shortfalls and crime at
our seaports. Their work will be of great benefit to the
Congress and the administration as we seek to address the needs
of America's seaports.
A little background. In early 1998, in response to almost
daily reports of crime and narcotics trafficking at Florida
seaports, and following some personal experiences I had during
a day working with the Customs Service at Florida's Port
Manatee on October 14, 1997, I began an investigation of the
security situation at America's seaports.
At that time, and perhaps even more today, I was very
concerned that our seaports, unlike airports and, Senator, I
appreciate the comments you have just made drawing some of
those distinctions--lack the advance security procedures and
equipment that are necessary to prevent acts of terrorism,
cargo theft, drug trafficking and other illicit activities at
seaports.
In addition, although seaports conduct the vast majority of
our international trade, the activities of law enforcement and
trade processing agencies such as the Coast Guard, Customs, the
Department of Agriculture, FBI, and state and local agencies
are often uncoordinated and fragmented. Taken together, this
lack of security and Interagency coordination at U.S. seaports
presents an extremely attractive target for criminals and a
variety of criminal activities.
Why do I believe that seaport security is such a critical
problem? First, U.S seaports conduct 95 percent of the Nation's
international trade, and over the next 20 years the total
volume of imported and exported goods at seaports is expected
to increase three times.
Second, the variety of trade and commerce carried out at
seaports has greatly expanded. All cargo, containerized cargo,
passenger cargo, tourism, intermodal transportation systems,
and complex domestic and international trade relationships,
have significantly changed the nature and conduct of seaport
commerce.
Third, this continuing expansion of activity at seaports
has increased the opportunities for a variety of illegal
activities, including drug trafficking, cargo theft, auto
theft, illegal immigration, and the diversion of cargos such as
food to avoid safety inspections.
Seaports are also the bridge between international and
domestic commerce. If that bridge is not secure, it can cause a
sag in our economy that has the potential for even more serious
economic consequences.
In the face of these new security challenges, it appears
the United States port management system has fallen behind the
rest of the world. Unlike other developed trading nations,
where seaports are a component of the national transportation
system, the United States port system is largely a local
concern, often under the control of local or special
governmental districts. This decentralization has created a
potential vulnerability to crime, and in some cases has
influenced criminals to shop for ports that offer the best
opportunities for criminal activities.
If I may say, Senator, the reason I did my work with the
Customs Service at Port Manatee was because the Port of Tampa a
few miles north, had tightened its security and therefore those
persons who were engaged in criminal activities, in this case
primarily the export of stolen automobiles, had shifted to what
they considered to be a softer target at Port Manatee.
We lack a comprehensive Nation-wide strategy to address the
security issues that face our seaport system. Therefore, later
in 1998 I asked the President to establish a federal Commission
to evaluate both the nature and extent of crime and the overall
state of security in seaports, and to develop recommendations
for improving the response of federal, state, and local
agencies to all types of seaport crime.
In response to my request, President Clinton established
the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
Seaports on April 27, 1999, and over the past 17 months the
Commission has conducted onsite surveys of 12 U.S. seaports,
including the Florida ports of Miami and Port Everglades. At
each location, interviews and focus group sessions were held
with representatives of government agencies and the trade
community.
The focus group meetings with federal agencies, state and
local government officials, and the trade community, were
designed to solicit their input regarding issues involving
crime, security, cooperation, and the appropriate government
response to these issues.
The Commission also visited two large foreign ports,
Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and Felixstowe in the United
Kingdom, in order to assess their security procedures and use
their standards and procedures as a benchmark for comparing
operations at U.S. ports.
In late August of this year, the Commission issued its
final report, the subject of today's hearing, which identifies
many of the common security problems that were discovered at
U.S. seaports. The report also issues 20 recommendations for
improving security at U.S. seaports. Although your other
witnesses will describe these recommendations in greater
detail, I would like to highlight a few of them.
Among other items, the Commission recommends the creation
of a national level security subcommittee of the Interagency
Committee on the Marine Transportation System. The specific
goal of this subcommittee will be to develop voluntary minimum
security guidelines for seaports and a model port concept which
would include detailed site plans and procedures that could be
adopted by all ports to improve their security.
Second, the establishment of local port security committees
with federal, state, and local and private sector membership.
Third, the preparation of an annual interagency crime
assessment report for each American seaport.
Fourth, the development of a 5-year crime and security
technology deployment plan to identify and evaluate advanced
investigative technology that can be deployed to seaports.
Senator I would like to comment that from my visits,
particularly to the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, I was
impressed at the gap that exists between what is the state-of-
the-art in the application of technology to issues such as how
to penetrate literally thousands of container cargoes per day,
how that is being done at Rotterdam as contrasted to how it is
not being done at most U.S. seaports.
I would hope that one of the results of this Commission
report and action by this Committee and the Congress would be a
much greater emphasis on developing of state-of-the-art
technology for security at our seaports, and then deploying
that technology to as many of our seaports as possible.
Next, the establishment of interagency federal inspection
stations at seaports to facilitate cooperation among federal
agencies and to expedite the flow of legitimate trade and
commerce.
Finally, an analysis of future federal personnel resource
requirements at seaports based upon future projections of
seaport crime, trade volume, technology improvements.
These, Senator are some of the primary recommendations of
the Commission. It is important to note that not all actions
with regard to seaport security need to be taken at the federal
level. As an example, the Florida Office of Drug Control has
recently published a state-wide security assessment of Florida
seaports which in many ways echoes the findings of the seaport
Commission's report.
Recognizing the shared responsibility for seaport security
among federal, state, and local governments, I believe that
this example of a state initiative could be used as a model for
other states which will look closely at this problem.
The publication of the Commission's final report should be
viewed as only an initial chapter in our efforts to enhance the
safety and security of U.S. seaports. Many of the Commission's
recommendations will require the administration to pursue
regulatory and budgetary actions to ensure they are fully
implemented.
I have asked the President and Mr. Jack Lew, Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, to include the necessary
funding in the fiscal year 2002 budget request to begin
addressing the security needs of our seaports. I will be
working closely with the administration to address these needs,
and I will fully support their efforts to provide the necessary
funding for any initiatives related to seaport security.
Finally, together with you, Senator, we have introduced the
Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000, which has been
introduced as S. 2965. This legislation would address those
security recommendations presented by the Commission which
require congressional enactment. Because time is running short
in this congressional session, we expect that this legislation
will be reintroduced as early as possible in the 107th
Congress. However, I am sure that any actions that we can take
with regard to this legislation or seaport security in general
in the final weeks of the year 2000 will facilitate the early
consideration of similar legislation in 2001.
Mr. Chairman, seaports play one of the most critical roles
in expanding our international trade and protecting our borders
from international threat. Both the report of the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports and the Port
and Maritime Security Act recognize these important
responsibilities of our seaports and advocate the use of
appropriate resources to move our ports into the 21st Century.
I urge all of us to look toward the future by supporting
enhanced seaport security and by taking action now to protect
one of our most valuable tools in the promotion of America's
economic growth.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hollings. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator. There is
no question you have done a thorough job, and we have these
valued recommendations in our S. 2965 measure, and as we go
along I am going to look to you, in particular, to recommend
any kind of changes as we learn exactly how we are going to get
a handle on this.
If I were asked on an exam who was responsible for the
security at my own home town, the Port of Charleston, I would
have to say the state and local officials, and not the United
States. True it is the United States that has the Customs
agents. In fact, my office is located in the Customs house, but
Customs is underfunded and undermanned, and we know that from
years of trying to get Treasury to boost the resources of the
Customs Service, and of trying to get additional resources for
the Coast Guard.
This Committee some 18 years ago increased the size of the
United States by one-third, extending the 200-mile economic
zone out, and then promptly cut the Coast Guard budget, so when
Senator Stevens and I, every time we meet on 050 budget, namely
the defense budget, we have to rob $300 to $350 million to help
supplement the Coast Guard budget.
So the Coast Guard is doing a good job within bounds,
mostly on the seaward side of the port. Customs is doing its
best trying to facilitate the move of traffic, and yet at the
same time, can you imagine trying to inspect one of these 40-
foot containers and go all the way through it and everything
else like that? It would almost take a day to inspect just one
container coming in.
So the state and the local authorities are looked upon for
the actual security itself, and I've seen a modicum of
cooperation. Our Customs agents actually are in some instances,
forced to go to the county sheriff to get the dogs to sniff if
they've got a suspicious piece of cargo coming in. They have to
go to the county sheriff, and I've seen them myself use the
county's dogs--customs doesn't have the necessary resources for
those kinds of things.
So we have got to fix areas of responsibility when we have
got everybody concerned to ensure that we have someone
responsible. But it is significant, Senator Graham, that of
this study Commission, and I think the record should show it,
that we have got Raymond Kelly of the Customs Service, James K.
Robinson of the Department of Justice who cochaired it, along
with Clyde Hart, the Maritime Administrator, and then we also
have participation from the Departments of Treasury, Commerce,
Defense, the National Drug Control Policy, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, State, and the Office of
Management and Budget, the National Security Council, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and also the Departments of
Justice, and of Health and Human Resources. These departmental
authorities are critical of our own ineptitude and lack of
security.
Senator Graham. Let me invite you, if you wish, to sit with
us at the Committee, because we are ready to call these
witnesses and maybe you would like to ask some questions if you
have the time this morning.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator. I will accept your
invitation. I am afraid I will not be able to stay very long
because we have a Finance Committee meeting starting at 10.
Senator Hollings. Well, I am confident anybody watching
this hearing, and to quote Plato's famous little couplet, the
politician makes his own little laws and sits attentive to his
own applause, I mean, you and I, having this hearing, we could
go back and forth all morning long, as long as that TV worked.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hollings. Thank you very much, then, Senator. Let
us get these witnesses here, because I cannot tell when they
are going to have a roll call. We have on the panel, Mr. Kurt
Nagle, president, American Association of Port Authorities,
Admiral Loy, the Commandant of United States Coast Guard, Hon.
Clyde Hart, Maritime Administrator, Hon. Raymond Kelly, the
Commissioner of the United States Customs, Hon. James K.
Robinson, Assistant attorney General of the Criminal Division
of the Department of Justice, and John Tousseau, executive
board member of the International Longshore & Warehouse Union.
Now, we will go from left to right. Mr. Nagle, you get the
microphone and start us off and see what we can learn here.
STATEMENT OF KURT J. NAGLE, PRESIDENT,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT AUTHORITIES
Mr. Nagle. Good morning, Senator Hollings. I am Kurt Nagle,
president of the American Association of Port Authorities. AAPA
is an association of almost 160 public port authorities in the
United States, Canada, the Caribbean and Latin America.
My testimony today reflects the views of AAPA's United
States delegation. AAPA port members are public entities,
divisions, or agents of state and local government charged with
developing port facilities and toward that end have invested
billions of dollars of public funds. AAPA's member ports serve
vital national interests by facilitating the flow of trade and
supporting the mobilization and deployment of U.S. Armed
Forces.
International trade has grown to account for almost one-
third of our gross domestic product. More than 11 million U.S.
jobs now depend on exports. In addition, the existing taxes and
fees on international commerce provide nearly $22 billion in
revenues to the federal government annually.
As Senator Graham mentioned, in the next 20 years overseas
international trade, of which 95 percent enters the Nation's
ports, is expected to double or possibly even triple. As the
link between the land and the water, ports continue to update
and modernize their facilities to not only accommodate this
growth, but to be secure.
U.S. port authorities do not condone illegal acts of any
kind taking place in public ports. Our members believe that the
protection of port cargo, passengers and facilities from
criminal activity is critical to ports, their customers, as
well as to the Nation as a whole. In fact, AAPA has a
longstanding Port Security Committee focusing on these issues.
Ports have invested significant resources in improving
security at seaports to prevent seaport crime from occurring.
Many ports spend millions of dollars annually on their own port
police as well as patrol vehicles, training, computer systems,
et cetera. Also, many of our port members have and continue to
invest in security infrastructure such as fencing, lighting,
and barriers.
In addition to providing this infrastructure, our members
work with local and federal authorities to eliminate criminal
activities, and will continue to seek new avenues to stop crime
at seaports. Security at seaports involves multiple state,
local, and federal government jurisdictions, as well as the
private sector. The federal government plays a large role in
maintaining security at these international borders.
While the association recognizes the need for the port
industry to continue working in cooperation with Congress and
the appropriate federal agencies in addressing port security
issues, we believe that moving S. 2965, the Port and Maritime
Security Act of 2000, at this time is premature. As you know,
the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
Seaports has just recently released its report, and we believe
that a comprehensive review of the findings and recommendations
is necessary to properly evaluate options for the most
effective federal programs.
Also, rushing legislation through Congress without
considering the diverse security needs of U.S. ports could have
a major impact on the port industry. Any legislation considered
by Congress should be sensitive to the nature and complexity of
the industry. There is no universal approach to security that
would appropriately address the wide range of individual port
requirements.
America's port industry is vast, versatile, and highly
competitive, consisting of deep draft commercial seaports
dispersed along the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf, and Great Lakes
coast. These ports range from huge load centers to relatively
smaller ``niche'' ports serving the unique needs of particular
regions, localities, or industries. With such a range of ports,
what works in one port to control crime and security may not
work in another.
The Commission's report concludes that the primary criminal
activities at seaports is in violation of federal laws for
which federal agencies are primarily responsible. We have
concerns that the bill as crafted places the responsibility on
ports for solving most seaport crime problems by instituting
industry security guidelines and offering limited loan
guarantees for security infrastructure. There is little in the
bill aimed at increasing federal agency resources to address
these problems, and Senator Graham noted the importance in his
testimony of adequate resources at the federal level.
Issues such as terrorism and other criminal activity
require significant resources. Confronting these challenges
requires a national commitment and resources by all levels of
government. More specifically, it means that federal and non-
federal jurisdictions must share resources, expertise, and work
together to deter criminal activity.
The Commission's report recommends a partnership to solve
crime and security issues. The bill, however, gives all
authority for adopting new federal mandates to the U.S. Coast
Guard and other federal agencies. Our members believe that a
cooperative public-private approach for recommending changes
would result in a more effective security program.
In closing, I want to thank you, Senator Hollings and
Senator Graham, for giving us the opportunity to be here to
discuss port and maritime security. We look forward to
continuing to partner with you, the Congress, and the federal
agencies in addressing these important issues.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nagle follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kurt J. Nagle, President,
American Association of Port Authorities
Good morning. I am Kurt Nagle, President of the American
Association of Port Authorities (AAPA). Founded in 1912, AAPA is an
association of almost 160 public port authorities in the United States,
Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition, the association
represents almost 300 sustaining and associate members, firms and
individuals with an interest in the seaports of the Western Hemisphere.
My testimony today reflects the views of AAPA's United States
delegation.
AAPA port members are public entities, divisions or agents of state
and local government mandated by law to serve public purposes.
Essentially, we are public agencies charged with developing port
facilities and facilities of commerce and toward that end have invested
billions of dollars of public funds. In 1970, trade represented only 13
percent of U.S. GDP. Trade has grown to account for almost one-third of
our GDP. More than 11 million U.S. jobs now depend on exports--1.5
million more than just four years ago. Significantly, wages for export-
related jobs are 13 to 17 percent higher than non-trade-related jobs in
the economy. In addition, existing taxes and fees on international
commerce provide nearly $22 billion in revenues to the federal
government annually.
AAPA's member ports serve vital national interests by facilitating
the flow of trade and supporting the mobilization and deployment of
U.S. Armed Forces. In the next twenty years overseas international
trade, of which 95 percent enters the nation's ports, is expected to
double. As the link between the land and the water, ports continue to
update and modernize their facilities to not only accommodate this
growth, but to be secure.
U.S. port authorities do not condone illegal acts of any kind
taking place in public ports. Ports believe that the protection of port
cargo, passengers and facilities from pilferage, theft, terrorism and
other criminal activity is critical to ports, their customers, as well
as to the nation as a whole. In fact, AAPA has a long standing port
security committee focusing on these issues.
Ports have invested significant resources in improving security at
seaports to prevent seaport crime from occurring. Some ports spend
millions of dollars on their own port police as well as, patrol
vehicles, training, computer systems, etc. Also, many of our port
members have and continue to invest in security infrastructure such as
fencing, lighting and barriers.
In addition to providing this infrastructure, our members work with
local and federal authorities to eliminate criminal activities and will
continue to seek new avenues to stop crime at seaports. Security at
seaports involves multiple state, local and federal government
jurisdictions as well as the private sector. The federal government
plays a large role in maintaining security at these international
borders. Federal agencies with law enforcement responsibilities at
seaports include U.S. Customs, Coast Guard, Department of Agriculture,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
While the Association recognizes the need for the port industry to
continue working in cooperation with Congress, and the appropriate
federal agencies, in addressing seaport security issues, we believe
that moving S. 2965, the ``Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000'' at
this time is premature. As you know, the Interagency Commission on
Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports has just recently released its
report and we believe that a comprehensive review of the findings and
recommendations is necessary to properly evaluate options for the most
effective federal programs.
Also, rushing legislation through Congress without considering the
diverse security needs of U.S. ports could have a major impact on the
port industry. Any legislation considered by Congress should be
sensitive to the unique nature and complexity of the industry. There is
no universal approach to security that would appropriately address the
wide range of individual port requirements, therefore, AAPA believes
that it is important for the port industry, Congress and the
appropriate federal agencies to work in cooperation in considering the
issues raised in the Commission's report.
America's port industry is vast, versatile and highly competitive,
consisting of deep draft commercial seaports dispersed along the
Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf and Great Lakes coasts. These ports range from
huge load centers handling millions of tons of containerized, breakbulk
and dry and liquid bulk cargos to relatively small ``niche'' ports
serving the unique needs of particular regions, localities, or
industries. Furthermore, ports differ in the way they are operated.
AAPA membership consists of operating, landlord and limited operating
ports. Operating ports are those in which cargo handling inland from
the pier is performed by port authority employees. At landlord ports,
these functions are performed by tenants. Limited operating ports
combine these roles, leasing some facilities and operating others. With
such varied control over port operations and facilities, what works in
one port to control crime and security may not work in another port.
The Commission's report concludes that the primary criminal
activity at seaports is in violation of federal laws, for which federal
agencies are primarily responsible. We have concerns that the bill as
crafted places the responsibility on ports for solving most seaport
crime problems by instituting industry security guidelines and offering
limited loan guarantees for security infrastructure. There is little in
the bill aimed at increasing federal agency resources to address these
problems.
Issues such as terrorism, drug smuggling, illegal aliens, trade
fraud, and export crimes require significant federal resources.
Confronting these challenges requires a national commitment and
resources by all levels of government. More specifically, it means that
federal and non-federal jurisdictions must share resources, expertise
and work together to deter criminal activity.
The Commission's report recommends a partnership to solve crime and
security issues. The bill, however, gives sole authority for adopting
new federal mandates to the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal
agencies. Our members believe that a cooperative public/private
approach for recommending changes would result in a more effective
program, and would ensure that the diverse security needs of ports are
adequately addressed. This is supported in the report which argues that
a cooperative group of Agency, local, private sector, and port industry
representatives should work together ``to discuss, evaluate, and
propose solutions related to seaport security and to address research
and development.''
In closing, I want to thank you Mr. Chairman for giving us the
opportunity to be here to discuss port and maritime security. We look
forward to continuing to partner with you, Congress and the federal
agencies in addressing these important issues.
Senator Hollings. Admiral Loy, if you and the others would
summarize as best you can so we can hear everyone this morning
and respond to questions. Your entire statement will be
included in the record, and we are delighted to have you.
Admiral Loy, we will hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY,
COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Loy. Good morning, Senator Hollings, Senator
Graham. I am honored to join my colleagues before you today to
discuss the Coast Guard's impressions of the final report of
the Interagency Commission. As you noted earlier, sir, I
participated as a member of the Commission. I believe we did
our work thoroughly, and I can report Coast Guard's full
concurrence with the recommendations package. I would like to
make just three points in my opening statement, sir.
First, this report I believe very properly reinforces
current responsibilities among key federal agencies. Those
responsibilities are provided for in the law, and the report
suggests strong support is in order to enable those agencies to
meet their growing responsibilities. For the Coast Guard, that
first order of business, as you described in your opening
statement, Senator Hollings, is to really restore our readiness
across the board, and invest in the modernization projects
necessary to allow us to do all of our work, including the
challenges represented in the Commission's report.
Second, the report reinforces in greater detail the report
on the Marine Transportation System submitted to the Congress
just last year. That report was the result of a 2-year effort
led by Coast Guard and MARAD for Secretary Slater to raise the
visibility of these very issues we speak about this morning.
Security in that report was one of five key areas of concern
reported then, and I am delighted to see that this Commission
reinforces those basic recommendations of the MTS report.
Third, I am convinced that we have really only begun to
understand the bigger picture here, and I would like to comment
on that for just a minute. Last year, Secretary Slater and I
stood in front of 6 tons of cocaine off-loaded from the cargo
hold of the motor vessel CANNES in Houston, Texas. It was
secreted in the depths of the cargo hold under tons of iron
ingots loaded in Brazil and destined for the United States.
It was a great seizure, keyed by superior Coast Guard
professionalism at sea, superior intelligence support from DEA
and others, excellent detection and monitoring by the
Department of Defense, superb professionals in the Customs
Service in the Port of Houston--a solid team effort.
But my thoughts as we stood there in front of that 6 tons
of cocaine were these. Imagine what that could have been,
chemical or biologic agents, a nuclear device, any of hundreds
of possibilities. We won that one with a very cooperative flag
state on a simple bulk cargo ship with superior agency
cooperation.
Now, imagine a 6,000 TEU flag-of-convenience container
vessel, with a multinational crew, cobbled together by a hiring
agency for an Algerian vessel operator who chartered the vessel
from a Greek shipowner, whose corporate offices were in the
Cayman Islands. All of a sudden the complexity index of that
challenge has gone up tenfold or more.
Mr. Chairman, the Hart-Rudman Commission published two
simple goals as part of their report at the end of the first
phase of their ongoing work. They wanted to make certain that
we sustained our economic prosperity and ensure the security of
our homeland. These are both absolutes for the future of our
Nation, and when you look hard, sustaining prosperity breeds
inevitable openness with regard to our port structures.
Trade is predicted to double, if not triple in the next 20
years, as you have already heard. Globalization and time-
definite logistics have put an incredible premium on rapid,
predictable cargo throughput. Disruptions such as multiple
federal agency inspections truly have huge economic impact on
ports, on companies, on regions of our country, or even on
countries themselves. On the other hand, ensuring homeland
security suggests a requirement to tighten down those borders.
These are opposing demands, and we must find a concept that
allows both to go forward.
I'd like to leave you today with just a bigger picture
concept, and I will call it for the moment ``maritime domain
awareness.'' Its key elements would be an integrated,
accessible data base of information for all the agencies that
need to get into it, one-stop coordinated inspections, high
technology sensors, and X-rays and scanners, and solid
decisionmaking bodies charged with taking on and solving these
problems.
I believe its key characteristics would be a systems
approach that integrates our many and varied efforts,
transparency in the domain from over there internationally to
here in U.S. ports, collaboration among federal agencies, and
certainly coordination among international, regional, local,
and federal interests, sensitivity to customer service, and a
risk-based decisionmaking concept that would allow us to do our
jobs well. Its tools would include solid vulnerability
assessments with action plan followups, a model port guide with
special attention to security guidelines, and as Senator Graham
has reinforced, counterterrorism and contingency plans, and
exercises that support those plans, with real-time cargo,
people, and vessel tracking systems.
Mr. Chairman, we have just finished our first prototype
vulnerability assessment as a trial run in the Port of
Baltimore. We worked with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
to produce a multiple week-long assessment process. It was a
challenging effort in a challenging port. It covered both the
commercial and military outload implications as if it were one
of our 17 designated strategic ports.
Our goal was to build and refine that assessment process,
and the results of this initial effort are now back under
review by the Security Subcommittee of the ICMTS, which has in
fact been established, ICMTS being the Interagency Committee on
the Marine Transportation System.
Mr. Chairman, the Commission's report is sound, it is very
solid and the recommendations are on target, and I suggest to
you and the Committee that this is an issue of huge consequence
for our Nation. I would hope that we would not wait for some
tragedy to provoke either legislation or a better way of doing
business.
I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Loy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral James M. Loy,
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
______
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee. As Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, I want to thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Coast
Guard's views regarding the final report of the Interagency Commission
on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, hereinafter referred to as the
Seaport Commission Report.
The Seaport Commission Report is unique in that all of the
appropriate federal agencies worked together to develop and agree to an
outline on how to improve security and reduce crime within our nation's
port environment. As a multi-mission, maritime, military service within
the Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard is a leader in
ensuring America's maritime security. As a lead agency for seaport
security, we provide valuable service to the American people by making
the nation safer, cleaner, more mobile, and more secure. The Coast
Guard concurs with and fully supports the findings and recommendations
of the report.
As you know from Secretary Slater's September 1999 Report to
Congress on the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS), U.S. trade is
expected to more than double by the year 2020. In addition, the
President's National Security policy, under Critical Infrastructure
Protection, states that ``Our national security and our economic
prosperity rest on a foundation of critical infrastructures . . .''
which includes transportation. The Seaport Commission Report identifies
a lack of adequate security for our critical MTS infrastructure, which
can potentially affect our entire economy. Therefore, it is very
important that we address the issues of security and crime in seaports
now. If we do, we can assure our National Security and our ability to
keep our nation's transportation system the very best in the world. The
report contains a solid prescription for making our ports secure,
guaranteeing our economic and national security, and reducing crime in
those ports.
We have begun to address some of the issues identified by the
Commission under Secretary Slater's MTS initiative. The Report to
Congress on the U.S. Marine Transportation System was developed in
concert with all government agencies and maritime industry stakeholders
involved in the MTS. The report outlines the current state of the MTS,
establishes a vision for the future, and identifies what is needed to
get there, including a framework of national, regional, and local MTS
coordinating committees. A significant piece of the MTS report deals
with security issues, from the standpoint of both national defense and
border control/law enforcement. The report states that the MTS is
especially vulnerable to crime and terrorism because of the scale,
complexity, and pace of activity in our ports, which often overwhelms
local, state, and federal enforcement capabilities. Fortunately, the
strength of the MTS design is the interagency partnership that has
developed from the national to the local level.
Similar to the MTS report, the Seaport Commission Report identifies
the need to balance the management of maritime cargo movement with
maintaining security of our MTS. The Commission suggests using MTS
interagency committees and an interagency operational systems approach
to facilitate both cargo growth and border control.
The Seaport Commission recognizes the leadership value of the MTS
coordination committees, MARAD's Marine Transportation System National
Advisory Committee (MTSNAC), and the Interagency Committee on the
Marine Transportation System (ICMTS), chaired by the Coast Guard. The
Commission recommends that the aforementioned committees develop
implementation plans for several important proposals stated in the
report. I fully endorse this approach. To this end, I am pleased to
note that progress has already been made in establishing a security
subcommittee in both the MTSNAC and the ICMTS.
The Commission recognized that additional resources are needed to
implement some of its recommendations. Examples include implementing
infrastructure improvements to allow for interagency systems
integration, and pursuing the ``model port concept'' through which best
practices by marine terminal operators are shared, and voluntary
minimum-security guidelines are developed.
The report indicates that, to the extent there are resource
implications, they must be weighed against other priorities in the
context of the overall budget. The Coast Guard intends to do that in
the context of budget development.
In summary, the Coast Guard is encouraged that seaport security
concerns are receiving national attention. I am also pleased that
Seaport Commission suggests that the MTS coordinating committees
implement many of their recommendations. Thank you for the opportunity
to submit this written statement for the record.
Senator Hollings. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Administrator Hart, welcome back.
STATEMENT OF CLYDE J. HART, JR., MARITIME
ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Hart. Thank you very much, Senator. It is nice to be
back. Good morning, Senator Hollings, Senator Graham. I am
pleased to be here today to share with you MARAD's views on the
important issue of port and maritime security. Port and
maritime security are finally receiving the attention that has
eluded it for many years. It could not come at a better time,
and I wish to express my appreciation to this Committee for its
leadership in bringing this issue before the American people.
This hearing will doubtless address many of the issues
discussed in the port Commission report recently submitted to
the White House. This report will serve as a foundation for
providing executive and legislative branches of government
important information and expert advice.
I was honored to serve as cochairman of this Commission. I
can testify to the zeal and experience its members brought to
the formidable maritime security challenges confronting us.
Senator Hollings and the cosponsors of S. 2965, the Port and
Maritime Security Act of 2000, have taken the port security
initiative to the next level.
Basically, I have two messages that I wish to share with
you. First, that government and industry need to work together
to heighten port security. Second, MARAD welcomes the challenge
of enhancing port security.
Why must government work hand-in-hand with industry on
bolstering security at our seaports to combat crime? Cargo
theft is no longer an inconsequential aspect of doing business.
Theft of high technology cargoes alone from the U.S.
manufacturers and their customers may exceed $5 billion
annually. Over 200,000 stolen automobiles last year worth more
than $4 billion were illegally shipped out of the United
States.
The siphoning off of legitimate profits through criminal
activity goes far beyond simple economic losses. Smuggling
illegal drugs into America focuses naturally in and around
ports. Drug trafficking has destroyed tens of thousands of
lives. The vulnerability of ports to terrorism is real, though
the threat to date has been low. We cannot permit military
mobilization to be adversely affected.
The Commission's report wisely counsels using the existing
government-industry channels to address this issue. The Marine
Transportation System National Advisory Council and the
Interagency Committee on the MTS are ideally suited to do just
that. MARAD has always been an active participant in
strengthening port and maritime security both domestically and
internationally.
MARAD played a lead role in developing the Department of
Transportation Publication, Port Security and National Planning
Guide, which provides a common basis upon which to establish
port security standards. We also produce the maritime security
report, which informs the maritime community about
international criminal activity that poses a threat to U.S.
commercial maritime interests.
MARAD chairs and serves as secretariat of the Technical
Advisory Group on Port Security of the Organization of American
States Interamerican Committee on Ports.
MARAD is also chair of the National Port Readiness Network,
so we work closely with the military for mobilization.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and
Senator Graham to accomplish our common goals of improving this
Nation's port and maritime security. The seaports Commission
report and Senator Hollings' bill deserve our attention. Port
and maritime security is important to everyone. Why? Few people
stop to consider that $3/2 trillion annually can be traced to
goods and services that flow through our ports. That is a lot
of money, a lot of jobs, and a lot of responsibility. We take
that duty seriously and inaction is not an option.
I will be pleased to answer any questions of Senator
Hollings or Senator Graham. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Clyde J. Hart, Jr.,
Maritime Administrator, U.S. Department of Transportation
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am Clyde
Hart, Maritime Administrator. I am happy to be here today to address
the important issue of port security and to discuss S. 2965, the Port
and Maritime Security Act of 2000. As everyone here knows Mr. Chairman,
our seaports are among the most vital pieces of real estate this
country has--both in terms of economics and national security. Any
hindrance of the flow of cargoes to or from our shores, whether they be
commercial or military cargoes, could have dire consequences.
Worldwide, ships and the cargoes they carry are being increasingly
targeted by criminal factions that specialize in alien smuggling, cargo
theft, drug smuggling and terrorist activities. Simply put, security
weaknesses in and around our ports allow these activities to continue.
The associated costs reduce competitiveness and threaten military
readiness.
In our view, government partnering with industry to remove those
weaknesses, while at the same time maintaining or improving upon the
efficiencies for the movement of cargo, is the basic premise upon which
all port security measures should be viewed. The Maritime
Administration (MARAD) is highly qualified to further this goal. As an
agency whose mission is focused on the development and maintenance of a
strong maritime industry for both economic and national security
purposes, MARAD has developed close relationships with key players to
improve port security. Not only do we believe that MARAD should play a
key role in port security initiatives, it is an area in which MARAD
already has been working for well over a decade, both domestically and
internationally.
Before I discuss in more detail some of the ways in which MARAD has
and will continue to promote seaport security, I would like to outline
briefly some of the reasons why seaport security has become a
government priority.
The Need for Heightened Port Security
In April of 1999 President Clinton signed an Executive Memorandum
establishing an Interagency Commission (The Commission) on Crime and
Security in U.S. Seaports. The President called for a comprehensive
review of seaport crime, the state of seaport security and the ways in
which government is responding to the problem. This critical first step
created the vehicle for the Commission to sound a warning that security
in and around our port areas needs improvement. Shortcomings in port
security not only cost our country valuable time and resources but also
have the potential to impact military readiness. The Commission, which
I was honored to co-chair, recently submitted its nearly 250 page
report to the President. The report specifically identifies threats to
seaports and recommends a number of measures intended to reduce the
vulnerability of maritime commerce, national security and the
infrastructure that supports them. We at MARAD applaud the President's
initiative in this area and are grateful to Senator Hollings and the
co-sponsors of S. 2965 for making security at our ports a priority.
Many factors have contributed to the need for increased port
security. As the Commission pointed out in its report to the President,
thefts of high technology cargoes alone, from U.S. manufacturers and
their customers, may exceed $5 billion annually in direct and indirect
costs. The cost of cargo theft is not limited to the manufacturer's
expenses to produce a certain product. Among other things, theft costs
include lost productivity, lost time and resources spent with police,
attorneys, and claims adjusters. Theft also results in increased
insurance premiums, greater liability exposure, lost trade, erosion of
goodwill and damaged reputation. Nevertheless, in the end, the price of
all these individualized costs is borne by you and me, as taxpayers and
consumers. Literally, billions of dollars per year are stolen from us
at the hands of thieves in and around our port areas.
Immigration crimes including alien smuggling and stowaways are
another major seaport security challenge. Stowaways, in particular, are
a significant concern for many U.S. ports. Vessels arriving in the U.S.
from third world countries frequently carry stowaways hiding on the
ship or in empty containers. Ship's crews spend precious time
inspecting the ship and empty containers prior to departure seeking to
ensure that stowaways are not aboard. These same crewmembers also
jeopardize their safety by confronting determined stowaways desperate
to seek a better life. Once at the port of arrival, the discovery of
stowaways aboard a vessel immediately results in a disruption of
service and can cost the vessel operator hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Vessel operators are responsible not only for the complete
costs of repatriating the stowaways but are generally subject to fines
for violating immigration laws. A century ago, stowaways were probably
considered no more than a minor inconvenience. Today, the financial
costs to steamship companies in a highly competitive global market can
be very significant. The problems created by stowaways domestically
also point directly to the shortcomings of port security abroad.
International seaport cooperation and recognition of the problem is
essential to its eradication. Strict control of access to port areas,
containers and ships is critical. Without international cooperation,
immigration crimes will continue to plague our ports.
According to the Commission's report, drug smuggling was the most
prevalent and most reported crime affecting seaport security. Both
passenger and cargo ships arriving at U.S. ports offer smugglers the
opportunity to transport vast quantities of contraband. While it is
obvious from the number of seizures made by law enforcement agencies
that the efforts against illegal drug trafficking continue, it is the
economic not the social impact that is the primary concern for the
transportation industry. Inspections of arriving ships and cargo must
be sufficiently effective to deter smugglers, yet not so intrusive as
to impact significantly the smooth flow of cargo to and from port
areas. In an era where ``just-in-time'' logistics allows companies to
maintain their competitive edge, undue delays to prevent the
importation of contraband can upset entire supply chains with a ripple
effect of negative consequences across the globe.
The Commission's report also discusses terrorism as a concern for
seaport security. While known incidents of terrorist activity at U.S.
seaports remain undocumented, it is the threat of such activity and the
vulnerability of seaports that are the reasons for concern. Addressing
port vulnerabilities is key to ensuring that our ports are not targeted
for terrorist and criminal activities. Moreover, most of the serious
crimes that take place in our seaports are in fact violations of
federal law. For this reason, it makes good sense for the federal
government to work with the ports to explore ways to minimize criminal
activity.
MARAD's Role in Contributing to Port Security
Mr. Chairman, the Maritime Administration does not need to be
convinced that port security is a good idea. Many of us have observed
firsthand the repercussions of security lapses. Nevertheless, achieving
appropriate levels of security in our seaports and seeking to educate
our international partners as to the need and benefits of seaport
security is no small undertaking. Since the advent of containerization
and with the advancement of technology, modern seaports often consist
of hundreds of acres of stacked containers, some empty, some loaded,
awaiting shipment. As one wanders through these areas one cannot help
but be struck by the fact that because of technology, fewer and fewer
people are required to move massive quantities of cargo. In some ways,
our reliance on technology has exposed us to unforeseen
vulnerabilities. Where port workers no longer patrol, security risks
abound. As noted in both the seaport Commission's report and in S.
2965, port security infrastructure improvement is a critical aspect of
modern port security needs. The Maritime Administration has long
recognized the need for more secure port infrastructures both at home
and abroad. We are pleased to support potential progress in this area.
MARAD has a long history of port security outreach. In early 1990,
MARAD conducted sessions on maritime terrorism and drug interdiction in
the Ports of New York, Los Angeles/Long Beach, New Orleans, and
Philadelphia. MARAD was also instrumental in developing a maritime and
terrorism course for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Over
the last five years, MARAD has conducted training sessions for Gulf
Coast port authorities on bomb threats to determine best practices and
capabilities of various government agencies and bomb squads. Over 100
port personnel have been trained in this effort. MARAD has also played
a lead role in developing two DOT security guides. These include Port
Security: A National Planning Guide and Port Security: Security Force
Management. These guides provide local governments and the commercial
maritime industry with a common basis upon which to establish port
security standards and the outcomes expected from meeting those
standards. In this regard, MARAD is well equipped to help carry out
specific objectives of the seaport Commission's report and S. 2965 by,
among other things, working with industry and the ports to develop and
implement meaningful voluntary guidelines on port security. MARAD is
confident that partnering with industry, working together on a
voluntary basis is the key to meaningful progress. Mandating security
with tight regulatory controls is likely to have a negative impact not
only on government's relationship with the ports but on port efficiency
as well. For these reasons MARAD supports those aspects of S. 2965 that
will foster the type of government-industry cooperation so necessary to
our common goal.
Secretary Slater's Marine Transportation System (MTS) initiative
has been an excellent example of how government and the maritime
industry can work together to find solutions to a wide range of
maritime issues. MARAD is optimistic that seaport security can be best
achieved through partnering and cooperation without hindering the flow
of commercial or military cargoes.
MARAD recognizes that the movement of military cargoes through our
commercial ports has and will continue to be standard practice. Because
of our dual mission, MARAD works closely with both the maritime
industry and the Department of Defense (DOD). As the seaport
Commission's report noted, forward deployment of U.S. troops and
equipment overseas in this post Cold War era is declining. Ongoing base
closure and realignment initiatives have resulted in the closure of
several military owned and operated ports. As a result, U.S. commercial
ports have become critical centers for military mobilizations. The
security of commercial ports during times of military mobilization is
therefore critical to national defense. In developing port security
standards MARAD has and will continue to work to bridge the gap between
military requirements and industry concerns. A National Port Readiness
Network was established by a memorandum of understanding between MARAD
and various DOD Commands to ensure, in part, the readiness of
commercial seaports in the event of a mobilization. MARAD, as the chair
of the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN), can lead the effort to
strengthen the NPRN in planning and coordination for military
mobilization security at each of 13 commercial ports around the country
designated as Strategic Ports.
On an international basis, MARAD serves as Chair and Secretariat of
the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) on Port Security of the Organization
of American States (OAS) Inter-American Committee on Ports. The purpose
of the port security TAG is to develop solutions and coordinate
multilateral approaches to improving port security in the Western
Hemisphere. The TAG has among its agenda: (1) developing a hemispheric
approach to improving the security of the Inter-American maritime trade
corridors; (2) developing a common port security strategy; (3) devising
basic guidelines and minimum standards of security for ports of member
countries of the OAS; and (4) organizing and conducting annual courses
planned under the Inter-American Port Security Training Program, which
are managed by MARAD.
MARAD has had an on-going port security program with the
Organization of American States (OAS) since the 1980s, including port
security outreach. Since 1995, MARAD has been conducting port security
training courses in the Western Hemisphere. Nearly 300 commercial port
authority police and security personnel from the 34 member countries of
the OAS have been trained.
MARAD also recently participated in the planning and execution of a
project to conduct port security assessments of Peruvian ports and
produce a report useful to the Government of Peru. The Peruvian
government had requested the assistance through the U.S. Embassy-Lima,
pertaining to Peru's interest in a national port security strategy. The
embassy, Narcotics Affairs Section, led the project and tasked the U.S.
Southern Command to organize a U.S. interagency team to execute the
project requirements. The team consisted of representatives from MARAD,
the Customs Service, Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration, and
the Port of Los Angeles Police Department. MARAD produced a project
report and other written documentation for use by the Peruvian
government to bolster their port security needs.
MARAD has continually engaged in outreach to foreign countries and
their port authorities to enhance the efficiencies of global commerce,
which in turn benefit our own maritime industry. By its very nature,
trade is an international business in which U.S. companies rely upon
the security and efficiencies of foreign ports. As another example of
our outreach efforts, MARAD and the Port Authority of Argentina signed
a bilateral document on June 24, 1999. This document considers the
critical importance of port security to commercial maritime trade and
affirms the need to develop channels of communication and exchange
information and experience in port security. Further, it declares the
mutual intention of the two government agencies to: (1) promote
improved security of seaports and waterways, (2) exchange information
in matters related to crime and security in seaports and waterways, and
(3) develop and coordinate training programs for personnel responsible
for seaport operations and security. This bilateral declaration began
in multilateral sessions through the OAS Inter-American Committee on
Ports.
Finally, since 1995 MARAD has produced and published a report
entitled the, ``Maritime Security Report''. The report is an
unclassified periodic publication prepared to inform the commercial
maritime industry and senior Maritime Administration officials of
international criminal activity and security issues which could pose a
threat to U.S. commercial maritime interests and the movement of
civilian cargoes in foreign trade. The Maritime Security Report is
intended to increase awareness of the scope and severity of economic
crime affecting U.S. maritime commerce. MARAD expects increased
awareness to contribute toward deterring criminal exploitation of the
maritime transportation system and improving port and cargo security in
international trade corridors.
Mr. Chairman, MARAD is no stranger to the importance of port
security. We have recognized it as a critical component of our maritime
industry and our national security for many years. We heartily support
the recommendations of the Port Security Commission. Many provisions of
S. 2965 are consistent with the recommendations in the Commission's
report, and we would support their enactment. At the same time, we
cannot at this time recommend congressional enactment of provisions not
included in the report--they will require additional study and
consideration by the Department. We appreciate your willingness to
consider our views on this topic.
I would be happy to answer any questions you or the other Committee
members may have.
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Hart. Mr. Kelly, we
welcome you.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND W. KELLY,
COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Senator Hollings, Senator Graham.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I sit before
you today in two different roles, the first as cochair of the
Interagency Commission and a contributor to its work, the
second as the head of one of the federal agencies most impacted
by the Commission's findings and recommendations. I would like
to offer my perspectives from both sides, but first I want to
express the Commission's gratitude to Senator Graham. Senator
Graham's leadership was crucial to the founding of the
Commission and the success of its year-long study.
Let me also take a moment to acknowledge my fellow cochairs
for their contributions to the Commission's report, James
Robinson from the Department of Justice, Clyde Hart of the
Maritime Administration, and special thanks to Admiral Loy, who
was a very active participant as a Commission member.
Senator the Interagency Commission uncovered a great deal
to be concerned about at our Nation's seaports. These include
security lapses that jeopardize our fight against drug-
smuggling, exposure of internal conspiracies, trade fraud,
cargo theft, stolen vehicles, and other serious crime.
The good news is the Commission also judged partnership
between the federal and private sectors at 12 major seaports it
surveyed to be productive. It also found coordination among the
law enforcement agencies at all levels to be good. Clearly, the
basis for cooperation exists to improve conditions in our
seaport environment. Our challenge now is to focus that
cooperation and provide the proper resources to make it
effective.
The recommendations contained in the Commission's report
are the result of extensive research, onsite visits, and public
listening sessions conducted with the major stakeholders in
seaport security. I believe these proposals meet the
President's goal of devising solutions that are viable, cost-
effective, and sound.
From a customs standpoint, implementation of these measures
will go a long way in addressing weaknesses along one of the
most critical fronts in our border mission. Booming activity at
our Nation's seaports is yet another welcome sign of our
prosperous times, but it also presents unique challenges for
our agency. We have to process all of that added commerce with
an eye toward protecting America from crime.
The fact is, every extra ship, every extra container
presents added opportunities for drug smugglers. The 12
seaports the Commission surveyed accounted for 69 percent of
all cocaine by weight seized from commercial cargo shipments
and vessels, one half of all marijuana, and 12 percent of all
heroin. Clearly, there is a serious threat out there that we
must do a better job of addressing.
Half the battle will be in knowing exactly what we are up
against. The Commission has proposed an annual threat
assessment for seaports handling major volumes of international
trade. This information will lay the groundwork for a
coordinated federal response to the problem of drug-smuggling
and other serious seaport crime.
The report also recommends several key initiatives that
will directly impact customs ability to target contraband.
These include enhancing the quality of manifest information,
the shippers' documentation we use to select high-risk goods.
We need regulatory changes that standardize manifest
information and require its advance delivery to customs in
electronic form.
We must also develop and implement our new automated system
for processing goods, the Automated Commercial Environment, or
ACE, as we call it. ACE represents one of customs' most
critical infrastructure needs. Among its many features is an
enhanced ability to use manifest information for selecting
suspect cargo.
Of course, the best targeting plans can be laid to waste by
internal conspiracies. That is why we need to implement better
controls at seaport facilities. Customs welcomes the
Interagency Commission's recommendation to achieve this through
strengthening physical security, tightening controls on the
movement of goods, and limiting who has access to sensitive
areas.
Clearly, we stand to benefit as well from acquiring better
technology. The report calls for a 5-year crime and security
technology plan to identify the tools we need to enhance
security at our seaports. Much of this can be drawn from
customs experience in utilizing technology at other points
along our borders.
Related to our technology needs, we must devise common
systems for sharing information about the movement of vessels,
passengers, and goods through our seaports. The report calls
for a coordinated effort by the principal federal agencies
involved in national security to achieve this goal.
Finally, I would like to highlight the need for added
manpower to implement these changes. The fact remains that
despite the gains technology and better information offer us,
we must have the personnel available to contend with our
spiraling workload.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, this is by no means an
exhaustive list. I fully support all the recommendations made
by the Interagency Commission. Taken together, they form an
effective start in addressing the problems we face at our major
seaports.
Again, I am proud of the work of the Commission and the
contribution of its members, but in truth we have only just
begun our work. I hope that with the help of this Committee we
can take the next important step and address the critical
resource challenges that we face in strengthening seaport
security. Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Raymond W. Kelly,
Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service
Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, Members of the Committee . . .
Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the report of the
Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports.
I sit before you today in two different roles: the first, as a co-
chair of the Interagency Commission, and contributor to its work. The
second, as head of one of the federal agencies most profoundly impacted
by the Commission's findings and its recommendations. I would like to
offer you my perspectives from both sides.
Before I begin, let me express the Commission's gratitude to
Senator Graham of Florida. Senator Graham's leadership was crucial to
the founding of the Commission and the success of its year-long study.
Let me also take a moment to acknowledge my fellow co-chairs for
their contributions to the Commission's report . . . James Robinson
from the Department of Justice, and Clyde Hart, of the Maritime
Administration. A special thanks as well to Admiral Loy of the Coast
Guard for his participation as a Commission member.
Mr. Chairman, the Interagency Commission uncovered a great deal to
be concerned about at our nation's major seaports. These include:
Security lapses that jeopardize our fight against drug smuggling;
exposure to internal conspiracies; trade fraud; cargo theft; stolen
vehicles; and other serious crime.
The good news is the Commission also judged partnership between the
federal and private sectors at the 12 major seaports it surveyed to be
productive. It also found coordination among law enforcement agencies
at all levels to be strong.
Clearly, the basis for cooperation exists to improve conditions in
our seaport environment. Our challenge now is to focus that
cooperation, and provide the proper resources to make it effective.
The recommendations contained in the Commission's report are the
result of extensive research, on-site visits, and public listening
sessions conducted with the major stakeholders in seaport security. I
believe these proposals meet the president's goal of devising solutions
that are viable, cost-effective, and sound.
From a Customs standpoint, I believe implementation of these
measures will go a long way in addressing weaknesses along one of the
most critical fronts in our border mission.
Booming activity at our nation's seaports is yet another welcome
sign of our prosperous times. But it also presents unique challenges
for our agency. We have to process all of that added commerce with an
eye towards protecting America from crime.
The fact is every extra ship, every extra container, presents added
opportunities for drug smugglers. The twelve seaports the Commission
surveyed accounted for 69 percent of all cocaine by weight seized from
commercial cargo shipments and vessels, over half of all marijuana, and
twelve percent of all heroin. Clearly, there is a serious threat out
there that we must do a better job of addressing.
Half the battle will come in knowing exactly what we're up against.
The Commission has proposed an annual threat assessment for seaports
handling major volumes of international trade. This information will
lay the groundwork for a coordinated, federal response to the problem
of drug smuggling and other serious seaport crime.
The report also recommends several key initiatives that will
directly impact customs' ability in targeting contraband. These
include:
Enhancing the quality of manifest information, the shipper's
documentation we use to select high-risk goods.
We need regulatory changes that standardize manifest information,
and require its advance delivery to customs in electronic form.
We must also develop and implement our new automated system for
processing goods, the Automated Commercial Environment, or ACE. ACE, as
the members know, represents one of customs' most critical
infrastructure needs. Among its many features is an enhanced ability to
use manifest information for selecting suspect cargo.
Of course, the best targeting plans can be laid to waste by
internal conspiracies. That's why we need to implement better controls
at seaport facilities. Customs welcomes the Interagency Commission's
recommendations to achieve this through strengthening physical
security; tightening controls on the movement of goods; and limiting
who has access to sensitive areas.
Clearly, we stand to benefit as well from acquiring better
technology. The report calls for a 5-year crime and security technology
plan to identify the tools we need to enhance security at our seaports.
Much of this can be drawn from Customs' experience in utilizing
technology at other points along our borders.
Related to our technology needs, we must devise common systems for
sharing information about the movement of vessels, passengers, and
goods through our seaports. The report calls for a coordinated effort
by the principal federal agencies involved in national security to
achieve this goal.
Finally, I would highlight the need for added manpower to implement
these changes. The fact remains that despite the gains technology and
better information offer us, we must have the personnel available to
contend with our spiraling workload.
Mr. Chairman, this is by no means an exhaustive list. I fully
support all the recommendations made by the Interagency Commission.
Taken together, they form an effective start in addressing the problems
we face at our major seaports.
Again, I am proud of the work of the Commission and the
contribution of its members. But in truth, we have only just begun our
work. I hope that with the help of this Committee, we can take the next
important step, and address the critical resource challenges that we
face in strengthening seaport security.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I'd be happy to take
your questions now.
Senator Hollings. Thank you, very much, Commissioner.
General Robinson, we welcome you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES K. ROBINSON, ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
General Robinson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Graham, I want to
join my cochairs in complimenting and expressing our
appreciation to Senator Graham for being the catalyst for
putting together this interagency process. I can tell you from
my vantage point the opportunity to work with the other
agencies on this critical problem was an eye-opening
experience, to see the vulnerabilities at our seaports, but
also the great opportunities in the area of protecting the
Nation's security, and also addressing serious crime problems.
I will abbreviate my comments to leave room for questions,
but I can tell you that we at the Justice Department will be
looking to the report for guidance in how we can improve law
enforcement efforts along the seaports.
From a law enforcement perspective, seaports are critical
border control points that afford law enforcement unique
opportunities to employ warrantless searches of cargo, to
intercept contraband and other goods being transported
illegally into our country.
The effectiveness of this border control function has crime
and national security implications for all parts of the United
States, not just the seaports themselves. The illegal drugs,
other contraband, and aliens that come into our country through
seaports do not stop at the seaports. They end up dispersed
throughout the country. Similarly, the stolen cars and other
stolen goods that are smuggled out of the United States are not
stolen from seaports. They are the fruits of crime that can
occur anywhere.
It is also important to not lose sight of the international
dimension of crime and security issues at our seaports
international cargo and passengers by definition originate in
foreign countries. If we have stronger law enforcement partners
in those countries, we can be more effective in stopping the
flow of illegal drugs and other criminal activities that use
our seaports.
Addressing seaport crime and security should be in that
sense a component of a larger international crime control
strategy that involves enhancing our efforts to provide
international training and other technical support to law
enforcement and promote the rule of law throughout the world,
particularly in countries that are ports of origin or key
transit points for illegal trafficking offenses.
This was a wonderful experience to learn as much as the
Commission was able to learn about this very important issue,
and we at the Department can pledge to the chairman we are
happy to work with you as you proceed in attempting to
implement some of the recommendations made by this Commission.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hollings and other Members of the
Committee, I am Jim Robinson, the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. I am happy to have an
opportunity today, along with my two Co-Chairs from the Inter-agency
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, to discuss with the
Committee the Commission's findings and recommendations. I think it is
fair to say that the Commission's Report reflects the first inter-
agency attempt to look comprehensively at the broad range of crime and
security issues involving seaports. These are important issues that
certainly deserve the attention of Congress and the Executive Branch,
especially as the volume of international commerce through our seaports
continues to expand. I commend this Committee for having this hearing
and for focusing attention on these issues, which I believe have
tremendous potential implications for law enforcement and our national
security.
I want to thank my Co-Chairs, the other Commissioners, and,
particularly, the staff of the Commission, for all their hard work in
gathering the facts, sifting through the policy implications, and
preparing the final report. One thing that quickly became apparent as
the Commission set about its work is the tremendous complexity of
seaport crime and security issues. A large number of government
agencies--federal, state, local, and federal--have interests in these
issues. In the private sector, there is an even broader array of
stakeholders. Everybody had a slightly different perspective on the
problem.
We also quickly realized that although there are general crime and
security issues common to most ports, the specific security issues vary
tremendously depending on the size and nature of the port. Seaport
security is an area where we have to be sensitive to local
circumstances. One size will not fit all. The Commission's Report
recognizes this, and the Report's recommendations emphasize--wisely, in
my view--the importance of port-specific crime and security measures as
well as more general national standards.
The Commission's findings and recommendations are the product of
extensive inter-agency discussion and negotiation, reflecting input
from many different perspectives. In order to build a consensus, there
were inevitable compromises. In the end, however, we were able to
produce a final report that was supported by every Commissioner and
which provides a solid inter-agency foundation on which agency-specific
budget, policy and planning efforts can build.
Certainly, we at the Justice Department will be looking to the
Report for guidance in how we can improve law enforcement efforts
involving seaports. From a law enforcement perspective, seaports are
critical border control points that afford law enforcement unique
opportunities to employ warrantless searches of cargo and persons to
intercept contraband and other goods being transported illegally into
our country. The effectiveness of this border control function has
crime and national security implications for all parts of the United
States, not just the seaports themselves. The illegal drugs, other
contraband, and aliens that come into our country through seaports do
not stop at the seaports; they end up dispersed throughout the country.
Similarly, the stolen cars and other stolen goods that are smuggled out
of the country are not stolen from the seaports; they are the fruits of
crime that can occur anywhere.
Many of the Report's recommendations involving physical and
personnel security will help enhance the effectiveness of our
interdiction efforts--on both the import and the export side. The
Report properly emphasizes the need for better technology for
inspections and improved intelligence gathering and sharing systems.
Without forward-looking improvements in the efficiency and precision of
our border inspection and investigative efforts, we cannot expect to
keep pace with increasing volumes of trade in the future. The benefits
of these changes will be felt not just in the seaports, but potentially
anywhere that is reached by goods that travel in international
commerce.
Finally, it is important that we not lose sight of the
international dimension of crime and security issues at our seaports.
International cargo and passengers by definition originate in foreign
countries. If we have stronger law enforcement partners in those
countries, we can be more effective in stopping the flow of illegal
drugs and other criminal activity that use our seaports. Addressing
seaport crime and security should in that sense be a component of a
larger international crime control strategy that involves enhancing our
efforts to provide international training and other technical support
to support law enforcement and promote the rule of law, particularly in
countries that are points of origin or key transit points for illegal
trafficking offenses.
At this point, I would be happy to answer questions from the
Committee.
Senator Hollings. Thank you. Very good. Mr. Tousseau.
STATEMENT OF JOHN TOUSSEAU, EXECUTIVE BOARD
MEMBER, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE & WAREHOUSE UNION
Mr. Tousseau. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. My name is John Tousseau, and I am appearing on
behalf of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union
president, James Spinoza, and the 60,000 working men and women
of the ILWU. I have been a member of the ILWU for 33 years, and
have for the past 7 years served on my union's national
executive board which makes governing decisions for the ILWU.
Let me first thank Chairman McCain, and I hope he did not
leave, because UCLA beat Arizona the other day, and Senator
Hollings for inviting us to share our view on the report of the
Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in the United
States Seaports and the solutions that will be considered by
the Committee and other Members of Congress.
The ILWU represents longshore workers on the West Coast and
warehouse workers in ports and surrounding areas, port guards,
and a marine division consisting of towboat and barge workers.
We are therefore in a unique position to help to address the
problems of crime and security at our Nation's ports, and we
actively participated in the public forums hosted by the
Commission and submitted written documents, written comments
that are attached to my testimony.
I regret that we have not had time to fully consider all
the findings and recommendations made by the Commission. This
will need to be done by our members through the democratic
process that our union relies on. However, I hope my testimony
will be useful to the Committee, given my over 30 years of
experience in working in the industry.
Members of the ILWU are committed to making our ports and
surrounding areas safe and secure and free from criminal
activities. In fact, it must be remembered that port security
is about more than cargo and illegal contraband. It is also the
physical safety of the port employees working with containers
on a daily basis.
I know that a lot of time we receive hazardous containers
that are not properly marked, and that can be detrimental to
the health and welfare to our longshore people who are working
there.
We have a vested interest in addressing the problems
identified by the Commission, and strongly believe that we
should be viewed as part of the problem and not as an automatic
security threat, as some might have you believe.
Unfortunately, the imposition of arbitrary and extensive
criminal background checks on all port employees would create
this exact situation. You cannot expect port workers to offer
assistance in stopping crime if at the same time you are
telling them they are automatic suspects simply because they
work in a port and carry a union card. A number of our Nation's
ports also impose criminal background checks, and I have
enclosed letters on the subject from the Port of Los Angeles,
the Port of Seattle, and the Port of Tacoma. The Port of Tacoma
points out that ILWU has been an important partner in keeping
the docks free from drug-smuggling and that the instincts of
one longshore worker led to the largest cocaine seizure in the
port's history.
The Commission report identifies internal conspiracies
which may include port employees as presenting the most serious
challenge to drug interdiction efforts at seaports. While we
are aware of some bad apples in our industry, it is patently
unfair and contrary to sound security policy to paint all ports
and all workers with the same broad brush. In fact, it must be
emphasized, as we have done in the past, that the ILWU will not
tolerate criminal activities by our members, and we have no
knowledge of any member involved in the international drug
trade or conspiracies as described by the Commission.
Let me talk for a few minutes about some of the specific
recommendations that have been made by the Commission and that
have been incorporated into the legislation introduced by
Senator Hollings. The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000,
S. 2965, would require the Port Security Task Force to issue
guidelines that outline which workers in a port facility should
have access to sensitive areas.
As a part of this effort, the task force is required to
consider the desirability and the feasibility of utilizing
criminal background checks. As explained earlier, we strongly
oppose intrusive criminal background checks on all our workers,
and thus do not believe that this is a legitimate area for a
nonelected body to explore. It is especially troubling, given
the fact that there is no requirement in the bill that
longshore workers and their unions be represented on the task
force. If changes to our work environment are going to be
considered, at a minimum we should have a seat at the table.
We are also concerned that the bill sets up the debate on
background checks using vague terms and concepts. For example,
the bill talks about the need to secure a sensitive area, but
does not define that term. The scope of any criminal checks are
not established. No privacy protections are contemplated, and
no limitations on what can be investigated are put into place.
Both the report and S. 2965 discuss the need to improve the
professionalism of port security officers. We could not agree
more with this goal, but we are concerned that little has been
said about the need to increase the number of security guards
in our ports. While there are some limited regulations in this
area, they are not universally enforced and do not adequately
define what are acceptable security standards.
Luisa Gratz, president of the ILWU Southern California
District Council, wrote to the Commission proposing minimum
staffing standards for security personnel, which we urge this
Committee to support. Sister Gratz cites the following problems
that are created when adequate staffing standards are not
required and enforced, including the fact that frequently there
is only one guard on some terminals. If there is an incident of
any kind that causes the lone security officer to be hurt or
otherwise occupied, there is no other security on the facility
to take care of the emergencies.
I also want to comment briefly on the report's emphasis on
the need to enhance electronic surveillance systems. As already
discussed, the port area is our workplace, and like any
American we are concerned about overly intrusive efforts to
track innocent movements and watch every action that we may
take on a given day. Given the sensitivity of this issue, we
will need to discuss this matter with our members, and look
forward to working with officials to strike a proper balance
between security needs and legitimate privacy rights.
The Commission's findings in recommendation 11 states that
vessel manifest information, import and export, is sometimes
deficient for the purposes of import risk assessment and export
cargo control. It recommends that all ocean manifests be
transmitted electronically to customs sufficiently in advance
of the arrival of the vessel to allow manifest information to
be used effectively.
It also recommends that all other agencies having
enforcement or regulatory responsibilities at the border
arrange for information to be distributed on a real-time basis
to all agencies having an interest in the goods covered by a
particular entry. The marine clerk typically does not receive
the manifest. In the past we did receive manifests. We would
look through the manifest and discuss things, but now with the
electronic revolution and new technologies, things are
automatically just faxed over the airways, and consequently a
clerk does not have the tools to perform the duties assigned to
him. With adequate information, the marine clerks could be more
effective in spotting and reporting suspicious activity like
contraband, import and export, drugs and tariff evasions to
authorities.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, we will be
discussing the full report in the months ahead at the longshore
caucus meetings and other forums where we can discuss and
debate the various findings and recommendations of the
Commission. We need to fully consider the cost of the
Commission's recommendations to our industry, and whether new
costs will lead to diversion of cargo to Canada and Mexico.
Studies have revealed that one longshore job equates to 10
indirect jobs in the immediate community and as many as 100 in
the State of California.
We also need to discuss how the recommendations would
affect the tremendous pressure on longshore workers to get
these containers off the ship and off the dock for just-in-time
delivery. Furthermore, we need to fully discuss the aspects of
the report that could be handled more effectively by state and
local government, rather than the federal government.
The ILWU looks forward to working with the Committee to
address the concerns identified by the Commission in a balanced
and fair manner that will protect the rights of our members and
will truly enhance port security and safety. Thank you for
inviting me to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tousseau follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Tousseau, Executive Board Member,
International Longshore & Warehouse Union
Good Morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is
John Tousseau and I am appearing on behalf of International Longshore
and Warehouse Union (ILWU) President James Spinosa and the 60,000
working men and women of the ILWU. I have been a member of the ILWU for
33 years and have for the past seven years served on my union's
International Executive Board, which makes governing decisions for the
ILWU.
Let me first thank you Chairman McCain and Senator Hollings for
inviting us to share our view on the report of the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Security in United States Seaports (Commission)
and the solutions that will be considered by this Committee and others
in Congress. The ILWU represents longshore workers on the West Coast,
warehouse workers in ports and surrounding areas, port guards and a
marine division consisting of towboat and barge workers. We are
therefore in a unique position to help address the problems of crime
and security at our nation's ports and we actively participated in the
public forums hosted by the Commission and submitted written comments
that are attached to my testimony. I regret that we have not had time
to fully consider all the findings and recommendations made by the
Commission--this will need to be done by our members through the
democratic process that our union relies on. However, I hope my
testimony will be useful to the Committee given my over 30 years of
experience in working in this industry.
The members of the ILWU are committed to making our ports and
surrounding areas safe, secure and free of criminal activities. In
fact, it must be remembered that the port security is about more than
cargo or even illegal contraband, it is about the physical safety of
port employees. We have a vested interest in addressing the problems
identified by the Commission and strongly believe that we should be
viewed as part of the solution and not as an automatic security threat
as some might have you believe. Unfortunately, the imposition of
arbitrary and extensive criminal background checks on port employees
would create this exact situation. You cannot expect port workers to
offer assistance in stopping crime if at the same you are telling them
they are automatic suspects simply because they work in a port and
carry a union card.
This is not only our view. When the House was debating this matter
in September of 1998 Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) told his
colleagues that ``it takes little imagination to conclude that if you
want to stop the infestation of our citizens with dangerous drugs, then
make working men and women employed at the transportation choke
points--such as longshore workers--a major part of the solution by
enlisting them as partners in this crucial endeavor.'' He further
commented on criminal background checks, ``we are passing value
judgements about their criminal records or intentions with no
justification other than anecdote.''
A number of our nation's ports also oppose criminal background
checks and I have enclosed letters on the subject from the Port of Los
Angeles, the Port of Seattle, and the Port of Tacoma. The Port of
Tacoma points out that the ILWU has ``been an important partner in
keeping the docks free of drug smuggling'' and that the instincts of
one longshore worker led to the largest cocaine seizure in the Port's
history.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Former Commission Executive Director Lynn Gordon commented to
our Washington, D.C. representative that she was impressed with the
level of cooperation between Customs, longshore workers, police,
employers, and the Port of Tacoma. She was impressed that the
stakeholders at the Port of Tacoma tend to treat each other as equals
and believed the Commission could encourage other ports to develop a
similar cooperative structure. The ILWU believes that if Congress
begins to question the character and integrity of the workers on the
front line, then we lose the equality in the partnership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission report identifies internal conspiracies, which may
include port employees, as presenting the most serious challenge to
drug interdiction efforts at seaports. While we are all aware of some
``bad apples'' in our industry, it is patently unfair and contrary to
sound security policy to paint all ports and all workers with the same
broad brush. In fact, it must be emphasized, as we have done in the
past, that the ILWU will not tolerate criminal activities by our
members and we have no knowledge of any member being involved in the
international drug trade or conspiracies as described by the
Commission.
We are disturbed that in an effort to support their ``criminal
conspiracy'' argument, the Commission makes some vague and questionable
allegations about activities at ILWU ports. For example, the report
makes reference to a case in Los Angeles/Long Beach concerning 587
pounds of cocaine that was seized in nine duffel bags in a tail end of
a container from Colombia intended for Vancouver, British Columbia.
After the seizure, a controlled delivery of the cocaine to Canada was
conducted. The report suggests that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
revealed an extensive internal conspiracy involving dockworkers at the
seaport in Vancouver.
At the time of this incident, ILWU Canadian President Tom Dufresne
stated clearly on March 5, 1998 that if officials believe that there
are individuals that are engaged in criminal activity then they should
take appropriate action. Dufresne added, ``we're a very proud
workforce, very proud union members, to be a member of the
International Longshore and Warehouse Union is one of the high points I
think in anybody's life when they get accepted into the membership, and
I don't believe people should have to go around apologizing for being
longshore workers.'' To date, no arrests of dockworkers have been made
in connection with this case, according to Dufresne. We believe it was
patently unfair for the Commission to take a leaked allegation and
subsequent press reports fingering members of the ILAFU and present the
allegation as fact. It is this type of rush to judgment that will only
hamper efforts in the port to create cooperative relationship designed
to stop criminal enterprises
Let me talk for a few minutes about some of the specific
recommendations that have been made by the Commission and that have
been incorporated into the legislation introduced Senator Hollings, the
Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000 (S. 2965). S. 2965 would require
the Port Security Task Force to issue guidelines that outline which
workers in a port facility should have access to sensitive areas. As
part of this effort, the Task Force is required to consider the
desirability and feasibility of utilizing criminal background checks.
As explained earlier, we strongly oppose intrusive criminal background
checks on all our workers and thus do not believe that this is a
legitimate area for a non-elected body to explore. It is especially
troubling given the fact that there is no requirement in the bill that
longshore workers and their unions be represented on the Task Force. If
changes to our work environment are going to be considered, at a
minimum we should have a seat at the table.
We are also concerned that the bill sets up the debate on
background checks using vague terms and concepts. For example, the bill
talks about the need to secure a ``sensitive area'' but does not define
that term, the scope of any criminal checks is not established, no
privacy protections are contemplated and no limitations on what can be
investigated are put into place.
Both the report and S. 2965 discuss the need to improve the
professionalism of port security officers. We could not agree more with
this goal, but we are concerned that little has been said about the
need to increase the number of security guards at our ports. While
there are some limited regulations in this area, they are not
universally enforced and do not adequately define what are acceptable
security standards.\2\ Luisa Gratz, President of the ILWU Southern
California District Council wrote to the Commission proposing minimum
staffing standards for security personnel, which we urge this Committee
to support. Sister Gratz cites the following problems, which are
created when adequate staffing standards are not required and enforced:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 33 CFR Part 126.15(a) requires that terminal operators handling
hazardous cargo must provide guards in such numbers and of such
qualifications as to assure adequate surveillance, prevent unlawful
entrance, detect fire hazards and check the readiness of protective
equipment.
Unauthorized pedestrians enter waterfront facilities with
little interference through employee turnstiles, parking areas
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and unattended gates.
Unauthorized persons embark upon vessels because there are
no requirements for terminal owners or operators to provide
gangway security.
Unauthorized persons enter terminals where there is
insufficient gate security to handle the traffic on entry lanes
for both truck and vehicular traffic and also exit lanes
simultaneously.
In an attempt to cuts costs, a terminal owner or operator
will only have one security officer for an entire facility,
leaving the operation vulnerable in numerous areas. Regularly
these owners and operators will require this lone security
officer to periodically roam the facility. When this occurs,
that lone officer is also required to lock the gates making
emergency Coast Guard, HAZMAT, police, Customs and fire
department personnel and their vehicular entry impossible.
Frequently, there is only one guard on some terminals. If
there is an incident of any kind that causes the lone security
officer to be hurt or otherwise occupied, there is no other
security on the facility to take care of emergencies.
Rail gates and rail operations will require greater
security. As rail operations increase so will the opportunity
for stowaways and other unauthorized activity.
Again, we believe that enacting minimum security personnel manning
standards should be a priority as Congress endeavors to secure our
nation's seaports.
I also want to comment briefly on the report's emphasis on the need
to enhance electronic surveillance systems. As already discussed, the
port area is our workplace and like any American, we are concerned
about overly intrusive efforts to track innocent movements and watch
every action that we may take in a given day. Given the sensitivity of
this issue, we will need to discuss this matter with our members and we
look forward to working with officials to strike the proper balance
between security needs and legitimate privacy rights.
The Commission's Finding and Recommendation 11 states that vessel
manifest information, import and export, is sometimes deficient for the
purposes of import risk assessment and export cargo control. It
recommends that all ocean manifests be transmitted electronically to
Customs sufficiently in advance of the arrival of the vessel to allow
manifest information to be used effectively. It also recommends that
all other agencies having enforcement or regulatory responsibilities at
the border arrange for the information to be distributed on a real-time
basis to all agencies having an interest in the goods covered by a
particular entry. The marine clerk typically does not receive the
manifests and consequently does not have the tools to perform the
duties assigned to him. With adequate information, the marine clerks
could be more effective in spotting and reporting suspicious activity
like contraband import and export, drugs, and tariff evasion to
authorities.
Years ago, there was a Customs officer assigned on every dock who
relied on the experience of people like me to report suspicious cargo.
However, documents no longer pass through hands of flesh and blood like
mine but rather through cyber links with less and less proximity to the
point of production. The vulnerable weak links are electronic. Manifest
inspecting, in-bond and transit confirmations and other functions have
been relegated to an increasing volume of deferred inspections,
samplings and document verifications that were once required dock
functions and now are left to cyber chance. Budget restrictions for
Customs programs and decreased staffing levels for Customs agents and
dock delivery and receiving book functions are a significant threat to
national security in the maritime sector.
Bob Carson, a marine clerk from San Francisco testified on this
subject at the Commission's public forum in San Francisco. He made the
point, which I agree with, that the AMS (Automated Manifest System) has
deep flaws, mainly in the in-bond movements, which allow a shell game
to be played out with many containers across many ports of
transshipment. It is not uncommon for a container originating in the
Orient to be transloaded, transshipped, ``feeder shipped'', etc.,
before it even gets to cross the Pacific. Once it arrives somewhere on
our Coast, the same process in reverse is played out, i.e., diverted
from one port to another where it is taken off a local clearance and
moved ``in bond'' to points thousands of miles away. Not infrequently,
containers and their throughput simply disappear off the computer
screens. As volume increases, it will become infinitely harder to catch
these glitches where the real threat of smuggling and tariff evasion
lies. Nothing should move off the dock until the steamship line
presents a hard copy customs manifest. The Clerks must make sure all
the information is correct before the containers are released off dock
into the United States.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, we will be discussing
the full report in the months ahead at Longshore Caucus meetings, and
other forums where we can discuss and debate the various findings and
recommendations of the Commission. We need to fully consider the cost
of the Commission's recommendations to our industry and whether new
costs will lead to diversion of cargo to Canada and Mexico. Studies
have revealed that one longshore job equates to ten indirect jobs in
the immediate community and as many as 100 in the State of California.
We also need to discuss how the recommendations would affect the
tremendous pressure on longshore workers to get these containers off
the ship and off the dock for just-in-time delivery. Furthermore, we
need to discuss aspects of the report that may be handled more
effectively by state or local government.
The ILWU looks forward to working with the Committee to address the
concerns identified by the Commission in a balanced and fair manner
that protects the rights of our members and that will truly enhance
port security and safety. Thank you for inviting me to testify today.
______
International Longshore & Warehouse Union, AFL-CIO
San Francisco, CA, August 16, 1999
Ms. Lynn Gordon,
Executive Director,
Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports,
Washington, DC.
Dear Executive Director Gordon:
As President of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union,
representing 60,000 workers in the United States and Canada, I am
writing to express our views on the work of the President's Commission
on Seaport Security. As you may know, our union represents longshore
workers on the West Coast, warehouse workers at our nation's ports,
port guards, and a marine division working in and around West Coast
ports. ILWU members have a tremendous stake in the ultimate
recommendations you make to the President and Congress.
I was pleased to learn that you had the chance to meet with a
number of our members from the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and
the Ports of Tacoma and Seattle, Washington. Generally, our members are
hard working, proud, honest, and of course, out-spoken. I believe our
members are unambiguous in their positions on issues that question
their integrity and invade their privacy.
A federal law allowing the Justice Department to perform criminal
background checks on our members is not an option. In the strongest
terms possible, I urge you to affirmatively reject such a draconian
approach to seaport security. You must understand that it was the
Federal Bureau of Investigation that for twenty long years illegally
wiretapped the phones of ILWU leaders, monitored their mail, and
wrongfully imprisoned them. It was not a matter of corruption that
motivated the FBI for there was never any hint of corruption within the
ILWU leadership. No, the full force of the FBI attempted to destroy
this union because the union refused to discriminate against any member
based on their political beliefs. It was as simple as that--the ILWU
refused to participate in the dark agenda of the McCarthy era. The
Justice Department does not have the moral authority to meddle in the
affairs of an honest, principled labor union and their hard working
members--period.
Productivity will suffer greatly on the West Coast if criminal
background checks are conducted on ILWU members. The members of the
longshore division have a history of taking it upon themselves to
remedy the unfair treatment of just one worker including work stoppages
along the entire Coast. ``An injury to one is an injury to all'' is a
slogan adopted by the union and I can assure you it is taken quite
literally by the membership. There is no chance--zero--that our
employer will see the productivity gains which they envision in a
hostile environment in which our members integrity is constantly being
questioned.
Supposedly, Rep. Clay Shaw introduced H.R. 318 as a tool to halt
the flow of drugs into the United States. On the West Coast, drugs have
been stopped when longshore workers reported suspicious activity to the
Customs officials. It is ironic that the Shaw legislation would have
the unintended consequence of impeding cooperation between union
members and Customs. More drugs--not less--would flow through our
nation's ports if the Shaw legislation became law.
It is my understanding that the Commission solicited the views of
ILWU members on wearing Identification badges. That is an issue that
our employer has raised in the past and continues to be handled through
negotiations. Members do carry identification cards with them and could
easily produce them if asked. Identification badges are unnecessary and
any requirement to wear them should be negotiated between the employer
and the union.
I am sure you are aware that our ILWU marine clerks are receiving
less than adequate information about the cargo on ships calling our
ports. Before the technology revolution, clerks would receive bills of
lading and ships manifests so they could adequately facilitate and
track the flow of cargo and to assess the risks if any of the cargo to
longshoremen and other port workers. Today, Customs clears cargo
electronically so vital information is not at the point of production
and therefore denied to marine clerks. The front line workers are
unable to help authorities in cases involving theft or
misclassification of cargo because they are denied information. This
practice of denying information to marine clerk professionals is
untenable and should be changed.
I am sure you were made aware by Sister Luisa Gratz, of the urgent
needs of guards at our ports. Marine terminal operators are simply not
providing enough guards to prevent problems. It appears to me that
operators are violating current law by not providing a sufficient
number of guards to assure adequate surveillance, prevent unlawful
entrance, detect fire hazards and check the readiness of protective
equipment, and to respond to emergency situations. The ILWU Southern
California District Council supports the adoption of a new law
mandating manning and training requirements for guards. Penalties would
be assessed on operators that fail to comply with the law. The
International would support such a proposal as well.
In sum, our members are hard working and honest. Our people do not
steal. They do not smuggle drugs. They are not a threat to port
security. Based upon results along with my personal experience of over
30 years at West Coast docks there is no evidence of waterfront workers
including port authority workers, maintenance security, and warehouse
workers, ever participating in the smuggling of contraband. I challenge
anyone to show me otherwise. We suggest that the Commission enlist our
union members as partners in securing our nation's ports rather than
impose measures that will only exacerbate security problems.
Sincerely,
Brian McWilliams,
President.
______
Port of Tacoma
Tacoma, WA, August 6, 1999
Hon. Jennifer Dunn,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Congresswoman Dunn:
The Port of Tacoma places a high priority on maintaining its
waterfront facilities as a safe and secure environment for workers and
cargo. A bill being considered by Congress, ``The Drug-Free Ports Act''
(H.R. 318), has a laudable title but we have several concerns about the
timing and intent of this legislation.
H.R. 318, introduced by Rep. Clay, Shaw (FL-R), seeks a national
solution for a local situation. Though some drug handling problems have
occurred at ports in Florida, the Port of Tacoma has had a strikingly
different experience. The longshore workers in Tacoma, members of the
International Longshore & Warehouse Union (ILWU), have been important
partners in keeping the docks free of drug smuggling. One illustrative
occasion occurred several years ago when a longshore crane operator
reported a wrapped box in a bulk shipment. The instincts of this
longshore worker led to discovering the largest cocaine seizure in the
Port's history.
The bill's provisions, which authorize the Department of Justice to
grant port authorities (and other local jurisdictions of a state)
access to criminal background information presents serious privacy
questions. It is important to note that some measures for addressing
potential drug problems are already in place. The Pacific Maritime
Association, which handles matters related to longshore employment,
currently requires several drug tests. These occur when a longshore
worker is first hired as a casual, when a longshore worker reaches a
registered status, and when training on new equipment is conducted. In
addition, the kind of criminal background information that would be of
interest to local law enforcement jurisdictions (and port authorities)
is already available through a National Crime Information Center check.
The Port of Tacoma is pleased that this important issue is
currently being reviewed by the White House's Interagency Commission on
Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports. This Commission, known as the
``Graham Commission'' (due to its leadership by Senator Bob Graham of
Florida), is in the process of touring 12 ports around the country and
will be visiting the Port of Tacoma from August 9-12. This dialogue
will be an important component in addressing the issues raised in H.R.
318. By visiting a variety of Ports, the Graham Commission will have a
broader context for making its recommendations on security
improvements.
The Port of Tacoma encourages you to hold off on cosponsoring
legislation such as H.R. 318 until after the Graham Commission has
issued its report in April 2000. Thank you for your interest and
consideration.
Sincerely,
Andrea Riniker,
Executive Director.
______
Port of Seattle
March l7, 2000
Hon. Adam Smith,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Congressmember Smith:
On behalf of the Port of Seattle, I urge you to refrain from
cosponsoring H.R. 318 (Drug Free Ports Act). This bill would allow
those with jurisdiction over a ``port area'' to obtain U.S. Justice
Department files on individuals they are considering for hire. While
the bill gives significant authority to local government bodies such as
the Port, I am not currently convinced that there is sufficient
evidence to warrant national legislation on this issue
Government policies ought to encourage cooperation between all the
parties involved in the work environment. Unfortunately , H.R. 318 does
just the opposite. Dockworkers in the Seattle-area are very much
opposed to H.R. 318. Currently, dockworkers cooperate with U.S. Customs
officials and other law enforcement personnel by reporting suspicious
activity and serving as active ``monitors'' in the effort to keep our
docks ``clean.'' In Seattle, we have had no major drug-smuggling
activities involving those who work on port property or in other areas
of the waterfront. H.R. 318 was drafted to address a problem in
Florida. Its utility on the West Coast is questionable and may actually
be counterproductive as we strive to move goods as quickly and
efficiently as possible on and off our docks.
It is important to note that measures to address potential drug
problems among dockworkers are already in place. The Pacific Maritime
Association, which handles matters related to longshore employment,
requires several drug tests. Those occur when a longshore worker is
first hired (after 50 hours), when he or she reaches a registered
status (no longer working casually, but put on a permanent payroll) and
when training on new equipment is conducted.
While there may be some additional actions warranted in the future
to address drug smuggling at U.S. ports, H.R. 318 seems heavy-handed
and unnecessary. Again, I urge you to refrain from cosponsorship of
this bill. It goes against the sort of cooperation we have worked hard
to achieve in Seattle. If you have questions, please feel free to
contact me on this issue.
Sincerely,
Jack Block,
Commission President.
cc:
D. Lynn Gordon, Executive Director-Interagency Commission on Crime
and Security in U.S. Seaports
Brian McWilliams, Int'l. President-ILWU
Pete Jones, Interim Reg. Dir.-Inland Boatman's Union
Bob Gilmore, President-ILWU Local 9
Scott Reid, President-ILWU Local 19
Ian Kennedy, President-ILWU Local 52
Ron Crabtree, President-ILWU Local 98
______
Port of Los Angeles
San Pedro, CA, May 1, 2000
Dear Congressman Shaw:
I am writing to you to express my concern for H.R. 318 as presently
written. The Port of Los Angeles is among the busiest in the world and
a major gateway for cargo arriving in our country to meet the demands
of commerce and the American public.
Of particular concern is the provision for port worker background
checks. Unless there is information regarding security issues which has
not been revealed, the legislation presupposes a major problem with the
workers in all of the ports of America. The Port of Los Angeles is one
of, if not the, safest in our nation. Crime in maritime commerce most
generally occurs away from the environment of the port, on the highways
and byways of our nation. To the best of my knowledge, Los Angeles is
basically secure. The tenants at the Port and the Port Police have a
record of security and crime suppression which would be envied by most
governmental jurisdictions. Our Port Police are long-term participants
in the multi-jurisdictional Cargo Cats organization.
Since it is our belief that this port is secure, then the reason
for H.R. 318 needs further explanation prior to applying solutions. Its
unintended consequence is that it would discourage cooperations among
all parties involved in the work environment in the ports. Currently,
all parties, management and labor, cooperate with U.S. Customs
officials and other law enforcement personnel by reporting suspicious
activity and serving as active monitors in the effort to keep our piers
and docks safe and secure.
If there are facts to the contrary regarding the Port of Los
Angeles, I should very much like to know them.
Please consider this expression regarding H.R. 318 while making
your future considerations of this matter. Thank you for your
consideration of my view.
Sincerely,
Larry A. Keller,
Executive Director.
cc:
Congressman Michael G. Oxley, 4th District, Ohio
Congressman Mark Foley, 16th District, Florida
Congressman Porter J. Goss, 14th District, Florida
Congressman Mark Souder, 4th District, Indiana
Congressman Phil English, 21st District, Pennsylvania
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Tousseau. I like your
suggestion that the marine clerks receive those manifests. As
you say, they are very able to discern immediately whether
there is some hanky-panky or contraband cargo or whatever, but
I cannot understand--I do not find in this report any
inordinate invasion of privacy, particularly in sensitive
security areas.
Your objection to the security checks or backgrounds
checks, and the scanners along the port and everything else of
that kind, you go into a Wal-Mart and they have a mirror up
there, and they can monitor behavior. They can follow anybody
to see whether they are stealing merchandise off the shelves.
You go into any supermarket, they have got that sort of
security. We should at least try and scan the dock to see
whether anybody is illegally entering on a ship or abetting
some sort of crime. The officer standing at the door has to
have a background and security check, and he has to take a
polygraph before he gets a job here on the Capitol Police. With
respect to your airport personnel and the customs agents
working, they all have background checks, but all of a sudden
at the seaports we are not going to have background checks on
security personnel? Is that your position?
Mr. Tousseau. Well, during the Vietnam War, when we went
into sensitive areas, when we had cargo for the military that
was going to Vietnam, we all had Coast Guard passes and we all
had security checks. In the past we did.
Senator Hollings. And it worked.
Mr. Tousseau. And it worked, and we do have security on the
terminals at the present time. I work at American President
Lines in Southern California, which is the biggest terminal on
the West Coast, if not the United States, and we do have
security there. Security does monitor, TV cameras. That is not
what we are saying.
But if this is to imply that the Commission wants to import
more than just what is in place now as far as security is
concerned, cameras, searching restrooms, everything else like
that, then we are not in favor of that.
Senator Hollings. Well, I sort of agree with you. I do not
think we can go overboard, accusing personnel at the ports. It
is just our own lack here of a policy which is troubling. As I
understand, reading the report and knowing how the ports
operate, the primary security responsibility has been done at
the state level and at the port level through private security.
However, the Commission report does not find fault with
long shoremen, Heavens above, it does not say that they are all
crooks. Just that we might need some sort of security checks in
sensitive areas.
I work very closely with Ken Riley at the Charleston port,
and before him Danny Richardson, and before him George German,
so I have been 50 years working with ports and longshoremen.
As a matter of fact, I told one of your agents yesterday
when he came to see me, that your membership dues are
responsible for my completing a college education. My sophomore
year at The Citadel I went aboard a ship with my roommate. We
were going to sea. We were going to get a job and do something
to make a living.
Incidentally there was no security check on the ship. We
just climbed right on up, and went and found the captain up on
the top deck, and he said, what do you young fellas want? We
wanted a job. He said, well, go down to the office and get an
ILA card, and we would be glad to take you on board, and when
we found out it was $650 we rushed back to the barracks so we
would not get caught, because we did not have any $650 to join.
So I thank you for the high price of membership.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hollings. But we want to work closely with you. We
are not trying to find fault or fix blame. I look at ourselves.
It is the Congress that has let this thing go. And Senator
Graham brought it to the attention of the President and got
this outstanding study here, really in the study we are
criticizing ourselves. We have got to get more security
personnel. We have got to get better equipment. We have got to
fix the security responsibility.
Along that line, as I understand it now under our
particular bill, Admiral Loy, the responsibility is fixed with
the Coast Guard, is that right?
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir, as I understand the bill, just in
terms of the task force challenge you have offered us, sir.
The comment that I would make sort of immediately is to
seek some recognition for the Interagency Committee on the
Marine Transportation System, which is already in place as a
result of the Marine Transportation System study and report
that we did last year. They have been established, as well as
has the private representation to the Secretary's council in
the National Advisory Committee on the MTS. That also is
already in place. They are meeting.
We have now, as a result of this Commission's report,
established a Subcommittee on Security to focus on the specific
challenges that the report offers, and we are already underway
in establishing the agenda for both of those Committees. What
we would certainly want to marry up, sir, is the bill's thought
process of a task force with the existing effort we have
already mounted since MTS and the security Commission's report.
Senator Hollings. But if S. 2965 was passed into law this
afternoon, where would the responsibility be for security at a
port in the United States? Where would that be?
Admiral Loy. We would own it.
Senator Hollings. That is right, the Coast Guard, just like
the FAA more or less has it at the airports.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
Senator Hollings. Mr. Nagle, suppose we passed S. 2965 this
afternoon. I understand you do not like it, or you have some
objections. What specifically would be wrong? What is wrong
with this bill that we ought to correct?
Mr. Nagle. Well, sir, I think the first issue is, as the
Commission report indicated, and as all of the witnesses here
testified to this morning, what I think is the key is the
partnership between all of the various federal agencies
involved, and as you indicated in your initial statement all of
the various federal agencies that have various responsibilities
at seaports.
But in addition to all of those federal agencies, the
importance is to have the industry itself represented as well;
labor, the port authorities, state and local governments, so
that it is a true partnership and the Commission recognizes
that the most beneficial approach toward improving security is
to have a cooperative approach between the local and federal
governments, and industry itself, and we think that is
important, and that right now, sir, is not included in the bill
because it is strictly a federal task force.
As Admiral Loy mentioned, the MTS initiative includes both
an interagency committee and a national advisory committee,
which includes private interests, and we think both of those
are important.
Senator Hollings. Well, right, and I agree with you,
probably we should have had in this Commission study the state
ports represented and the longshoremen represented that are
doing the operations and doing all of the work, there is no
question about that, and that is one of the reasons we wanted
you, particularly both you and Mr. Tousseau, at the hearing
here today. But is there any specific section of S. 2965 that
we ought to improve upon or eliminate?
Mr. Nagle. Well, sir, I think the other issue that we have
primarily with S. 2965 as it is currently drafted is, again,
while the Commission report identifies security as primarily a
federal responsibility with partnership with the locals, S.
2965 deals significantly with responsibilities at the port
level, and provides some limited loan guarantees.
We believe you should look at it from a more holistic
approach. As the Commission report stated, it is clear that
federal resources have not kept pace with the growth in trade
and the various agencies, Coast Guard, Customs, Maritime,
Justice, do not have adequate resources for personnel nor
resources to adequately handle the responsibilities that they
have as well as in partnership with the local ports.
Ports are investing heavily, but the federal government
needs to increase its resources as well.
Senator Hollings. Well, fortunately, General Robinson, we
have not had any terrorist activity at a port, but there is no
question that the testimony here now shows that there is $5
billion in high tech theft, and $4 billion in annual thefts of
automobiles. We know that there is $5 billion lost in textiles
coming in that Commissioner Kelly & Customs do not have the
adequate personnel to check. The FBI itself says it is an $8 to
$10 billion theft at the ports, so we have got to do a way
better job.
Commissioner Kelly, you gave sort of an OMB report, a
glossary of all the manpower and equipment needed. What are we
talking about in dollars?
Mr. Kelly. Senator, what we have done is put together a
resource allocation model. We used a very reputable consultant
to come in. I think it is the first time done in the federal
government. It looks at all of our ports of entry. It is a
workload-driven report, or vehicle, I should say, to determine
what we need.
That has gone forward to Treasury and to OMB. It is being
studied. I think that is the means by which we can catch up,
getting close to where we should be. It is difficult to put a
dollar figure on it, because it will actually change every
year. It is workload driven.
We predict that trade will double in the next 5 or 6 years,
let alone 10 years, so that is the means that I hope will give
us a picture of what we need to accomplish our mission, and
then you can put a price tag on it, but it is not an
insignificant amount of money, no question about it.
We need an automated system. The system I mentioned in my
written comments, ACE, now, the price tag on that system is
$1.5 billion. It is serious money, but we are very grateful
that it appears that in the 2001 budget we will be getting $130
million toward that project, but it is something that is
critically needed.
So we need a much better information system, and we need
more personnel to run the systems. We need nonintrusive
technology. We mentioned we have some of it on the border. We
do not have enough of it, and we certainly do not have enough
of it in our port of entry.
So I cannot give you a dollar figure, but it will be
substantial.
Senator Hollings. Have you had a chance to observe the Port
of Rotterdam's, scanner, or the X-ray equipment there?
Mr. Kelly. No, sir. I have heard a lot about it. I have
read about it.
Senator Hollings. How about Admiral Loy? Have you observed
it?
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir, I have seen it, and that is exactly
why I think the Commission was so enthralled with the thought
process that to some degree technology could really help us
here, thus the recommendation associated with the full
development of a plan on where technological devices can help.
Senator Hollings. We could have the Rotterdam security
model at each one of these significant ports at least, the 12
ports that you all examined and everything else. We could at
least have that equipment as soon as possible at those ports
and then at all ports of entry, just like we have a scanner at
every airport that you might land and come into.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. The thrust of the model port concept
is to sort of design, if you will, the generic port that would
meet security specifications that we would like to see in all
of our ports, knowing full well that any port of the 361 or so
that we have in this Nation, and certainly the strategic ports,
those 17, have local peculiarities.
Some of them are break-bulk ports, some of them are
container ports, some of them are both. We need not only to
have a model port threshold of security that we are trying to
insist upon across the full Nation, but also to take into stock
the local peculiarities and challenges in any given single
port.
The other thought that I would like to offer, sir, is, as
Mr. Nagle suggested, it is enormously important for us to be
collaborative with private industry, with the port authorities
locally, with labor, and with everyone, and that is the thrust
of the Interagency Committee on the MTS, working the federal
issues together, the National Advisory Council seeking for the
Secretary counsel from private industry, and then matching them
up with local security committees or harbor safety committees.
The name almost does not really matter, but the thrust of
having that same coordination happening at the local port, and
fitting those things in between, making certain that there is
collaboration in between, that is the design, and that is what
we are working on, sir.
Senator Hollings. There is no question that the state ports
are operating the ports at the present time, or Commissions at
the state and local levels. They have got the best knowledge.
They have got the responsibility now.
But as Mr. Nagle has testified, overall border security is
a federal responsibility, so in trying to install that system,
it has got to be done in a judicious fashion and worked out
with the local authorities.
Admiral Loy. And we welcome the leadership role you have
offered us on that.
Senator Hollings. Does any member of the panel want to add
anything? I am going to leave the record open with respect to
questions of the members. We have got about five other things
going on. We are winding up supposedly this week and going at
least till next week, but is there any other further comment
from any of you?
[No response.]
Senator Hollings. Well, we appreciate very much your
presentations here this morning and your help with the report,
and particularly Mr. Nagle and Mr. Tousseau for coming also,
because they have got to be included in this particular
endeavor.
The Committee will be at ease. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
Appendix
Prepared Statement of Edward Wytkind, Executive Director Transportation
Trades Department, AFL-CIO
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Hollings and Members of the
Committee, on behalf of the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO
(TTD) and our 30 affiliated unions (see attached), I want to thank the
Committee for giving us this opportunity to share our views on the
report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in United
States Seaports. My name is Edward Wytkind. I am the Executive Director
of TTD whose affiliated unions represent several million workers
employed in all areas of the nation's transportation system including
several thousand who work in our nation's ports. I am pleased to join
the International Longshore & Warehouse Union (ILWU) and International
Longshore Association (ILA) to offer the views and concerns of
transportation labor on the issues affecting security at our nation's
seaports.
Today our ports serve as the gateway through which products and
goods are imported to, or exported from, the nation. America's ports
handle over 95 percent of the volume and 75 percent of the value of
cargo moving into and leaving the nation. There can be little doubt
that American ports and their employees have had a clear role in
spurring job creation and providing substantial benefits to the economy
as a whole. These economic benefits to the nation make protecting the
integrity of our ports and stopping the influx of illegal drugs a
worthy goal that transportation workers support. As an organization
dedicated to promoting a safe and drug free workplace, our members
expect nothing less.
We agree with the statements of the ILWU and ILA that longshore
employees and their unions are in a unique position to help address the
problems of crime and security at our nation's ports. Our members are
in the line of fire for criminal activities occurring at our ports. As
such, we are more committed than anyone to ensuring that our ports and
surrounding areas are safe, secure and free of criminal activities.
Transportation labor does not condone illegal activities of any kind
taking place in our seaports. We believe that the protection of port
cargo, passengers, and facilities from theft, terrorism, and criminal
activity is critical to our members and the nation as a whole.
For that reason, longshore workers and their unions have been at
the forefront of advocating programs that are designed to create a safe
and drug-free workplace. ILWU's alcohol and drug prevention and
rehabilitation program has even won recognition from former President
Bush's ``Thousands Points of Light'' initiative. Additionally,
longshore workers have played a critical role in promoting U.S.
national interests and security at our ports by supporting the
deployment and mobilization of the U.S. military. This has included
maritime movements of equipment and troops in the course of offshore
military operations.
The important contributions of longshore unions in developing a
safe and secure workplace provide a good starting point to review the
findings of the Commission Report. TTD submitted comments to the
Commission during its fact-finding process. Unfortunately, we have not
had time to fully consider all the findings and recommendations made by
the Commission. Over the coming months, however, we will be working
with ILWU and the ILA to review the findings and recommendations and to
determine the most appropriate federal measures. One issue I should
mention is one that we raised in our comments dealing with criminal
background checks. We register our strong objections to any proposal to
impose extensive and unnecessary criminal backgrounds checks on all
port workers and related employees, even those who have worked in this
industry, often for single employers, for 20 or more years. These types
of proposals have been offered previously and they have been rejected
by Congress.
The Commission Report identifies internal conspiracies, which may
include port employees, as presenting a serious challenge to drug
interdiction efforts at seaports. We understand that there will always
be individuals who carry out or participate in criminal activities in
our industry. And as we have already stated, we do not condone nor
defend such conduct. However, other than anecdotal evidence, it has
never been clearly shown that longshore workers--including those with
impeccable records over decades of employment--have any greater
likelihood of engaging in illegal conduct than other persons dealing
with or reviewing the cargo as it moves through our transportation
network. Furthermore, in today's intermodal transportation marketplace,
the vast majority of cargo moves from the vessels and to gates of
terminals in sealed containers, whose contents are secure. As such,
there is no sensible reason for instituting these background checks on
the overwhelming majority of honest, hardworking workers who are
employed at our ports and who do not pose a legitimate safety or
security threat.
Mr. Chairman, this appears to be a case of a solution in search of
problem. We are adamant that such a ``solution'' would have negative
consequences for workers and other interests in the longshore industry.
While we have been vocal opponents of this proposal, other groups have
also raised concerns about the feasibility of sweeping criminal
background checks. A number of the nation's ports are opposed to
criminal background checks such as the Port of Los Angeles, Port of
Seattle, and Port of Tacoma. This growing consensus in the longshore
industry against criminal background checks should give all
policymakers reason for pause and reevaluation.
Let me also comment on legislation (S. 2965) introduced by Senator
Ernest Hollings that incorporates some of the recommendations of the
Commission. We commend Senator Hollings for his aggressive commitment
to addressing seaport security issues, but it is our view that this
legislation needs more input from key stakeholders including
transportation labor and deserves more careful and deliberate
evaluation. We have grown accustomed to a close working relationship
with Senator Hollings on a number of transportation safety and security
issues and know that the Senator welcomes our rightful place at the
table.
We would argue that any legislation considered by Congress should
recognize the unique skills and talents of longshore workers and the
ability of these front-line employees to play a vital role in
addressing security concerns at our nation's ports. In so doing, the
Congress will recognize the need for cooperation and partnership
between longshore unions, port authorities, the ocean shipping industry
and appropriate federal agencies in considering the issues raised by
the Commission report. Only then, will we have a chance to adopt fair
and meaningful measures that work.
In closing, I want to thank you Mr. Chairman and all the Members of
this Committee for giving us this opportunity to discuss port security
issues. TTD, along with ILWU, the ILA and the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, will continue reviewing the various findings and
recommendations of the Commission and will provide to the Committee
additional input and information at a later time.
We look forward to working with the Committee, Congress, and the
appropriate federal agencies to address the concerns identified by the
Commission and to make our ports safer and more secure for workers,
businesses and the American people.
Thank you.
Attachment
______
TTD Affiliates
The following labor organizations are members of and represented by the
TTD:
Air Line Pilots Association
Amalgamated Transit Union
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
American Federation of Teachers
Association of Flight Attendants
American Train Dispatchers Department
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen
Communications Workers of America
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union
International Association of Fire Fighters
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Forgers and
Helpers
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
International Union of Operating Engineers
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
National Air Traffic Controllers Association
National Association of Letter Carriers
National Federation of Public and Private Employees
Professional Airways Systems Specialists
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union
Service Employees International Union
Sheet Metal Workers International Association
Transportation Communications International Union
Transport Workers Union of America
United Mine Workers of America
United Steelworkers of America
June 2000