[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION PROTOCOL: STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 5, 2001
__________
Serial No. 107-71
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JIM TURNER, Texas
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVE WELDON, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah ------ ------
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida ------ ------
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho ------
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DAVE WELDON, Florida ------ ------
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho ------ ------
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
Jason M. Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 5, 2001..................................... 1
Statement of:
Zelicoff, Alan, senior scientist, nonproliferation
initiatives, Sandia National Laboratories; Amy Smithson,
senior associate, Henry L. Stimson Center; Barbara Hatch
Rosenberg, project director, Chemical/Biological Arms
Control, Federation of American Scientists; Gillian R.
Woollett, associate vice president, biological and
biotechnology, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America; and Colonel Robert P. Kadlec, professor of
military strategy and operations, National War College..... 6
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Kadlec, Colonel Robert P., professor of military strategy and
operations, National War College, prepared statement of.... 57
Rosenberg, Barbara Hatch, project director, Chemical/
Biological Arms Control, Federation of American Scientists,
prepared statement of...................................... 29
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut:
Letter dated June 1, 2001................................ 90
Prepared statement of.................................... 3
Smithson, Amy, senior associate, Henry L. Stimson Center,
prepared statement of...................................... 18
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts, prepared statements of Ambassador
Sheaks and Ambassador Mahley............................... 73
Woollett, Gillian R., associate vice president, biological
and biotechnology, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, prepared statement of............ 45
Zelicoff, Alan, senior scientist, nonproliferation
initiatives, Sandia National Laboratories, prepared
statement of............................................... 10
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION PROTOCOL: STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 2001
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Putnam, Gilman, Shrock, and
Tierney.
Staff present: Larry Halloran, staff director and counsel;
R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Jason M. Chung,
clerk; Kristin Taylor, intern; and David Rapallo, minority
counsel.
Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations
hearing, entitled, ``Biological Convention Weapons Protocol:
Status and Implications,'' is called to order.
In 1969, the United States unilaterally renounced the use
of biological weapons and foreswore all aspects of an offensive
bioweapons program. The Soviet Union also claimed no active
interest in germ warfare. Based in part on those mutual
assurances, rare in the bipolar cold war strategy environment,
drafters of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention [BWC], did
not attempt to include verification or enforcement provisions.
But the disclosure of a vast biological arsenal, of a vast
Soviet biological arsenal, Iraq's use of prohibited toxic
agents against Iran, and the emergence of terrorists eager to
inflict mass casualties generated calls to strengthen the BWC.
For almost a decade, discussions have been underway among the
159 BWC signatory nations on ways to verify compliance and
deter violations.
Consensus on a workable addendum or protocol to the BWC has
proven elusive. Negotiators have been frustrated by the
inherent difficulty, some would say utter impossibility, of
policing the proliferation of nationally occurring organisms
and dual-use technologies so easily converted from lawful to
lethal purposes. Many doubt arms control principles and
regimes--regimens designed to stop missiles will work against
microbes. Some believe the proposed protocol will provide
little benefit in the fight against biological weapons, while
placing an unjustifiable burden solely on those already
committed to wage that fight.
Working toward a target, not a deadline, of next November
to present a complete protocol to the BWC Review Conference,
the ad hoc group of negotiators in Geneva recently began
considering proposals to resolve critical and controversial
issues: expert controls, facility declaration thresholds,
inspection triggers, the extent of onsite activities, and role
of enhanced disease surveillance in detecting violations.
As the negotiating intensifies, pressure will build to
adopt a protocol, almost any protocol, if only as a symbol of
that political will to do something about biological weapons.
But against so insidious a threat, against a class of warfare,
the BWC itself declares, ``repugnant to the conscience of
mankind,'' a symbolic step is no substitute for substantive
progress. Settling for symbolism could in fact undermine the
political consensus and technical support needed to achieve
tangible results.
The previous administration said as much last September in
testimony before this subcommittee. Ambassador Donald Mahley,
special negotiator for chemical and biological arms control,
told us, ``the United States will not accept a protocol that
undermines rather than strengthens national and international
efforts to address the BW threat.''
Continuing our oversight of the U.S. approach to this
critical issue, we invited the new administration and the panel
of distinguished experts to assess the status and implications
to the BWC protocol. We ask them to address how the U.S.
negotiating position was formulated, how national security data
and private property can be protected in any intrusive
declaration and inspection regimen, and what additional steps
might be proposed to improve BWC implementation.
Yesterday the White House requested more time to finalize a
response to our questions. I regretfully in some ways acceded
to that request but felt that I would do that.
But we will hear testimony from witnesses who bring a
breadth of experience and depth of insight to this discussion.
We appreciate their time and their expertise, and we look
forward to their testimony.
And I will say that when the administration made the
request to defer testifying before this committee, we were
going to cancel, and then we realized, certainly we
acknowledged the fact that we have an excellent panel. We know
that some of you came here to testify, and we thought that it
is important that we proceed. So we are happy you are here. We
are delighted to have this hearing, very unhappy the
administration has once again requested a deferment before this
committee.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Shays. At this time I'd invite Mr. Putnam, if he has
any statement to make, the vice chairman of the committee.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
putting together this hearing and I appreciate the panel that
you have assembled coming here today, and eagerly await the
White House's response to your request.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Schrock.
Mr. Schrock. Mr. Chairman, I have no formal statement, but
I welcome you as well.
Mr. Shays. Great. Well, we are about to proceed, and let me
just get rid of some technical requirements here. I ask
unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be
permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that
the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without
objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statement in the record,
and, without objection, so ordered.
We have a panel of five people, and we have been looking
forward to hearing from this panel. We have Mr. Alan Zelicoff,
senior scientist, Nonproliferations Initiative, Sandia National
Laboratories. Did I say that right?
Mr. Zelicoff. You did, sir.
Mr. Shays. And we have Dr. Amy Smithson, senior associate,
Henry L. Stimson Center. Where is that?
Ms. Smithson. It is here in Washington, DC, sir, at Dupont
Circle.
Mr. Shays. And Dr. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a project
director, Chemical/Biological Arms Control, Federation of
American Scientists.
And we have Dr. Gillian R. Woollett?
Ms. Woollett. It's Gillian Woollett.
Mr. Shays. Gillian Woollett, thank you--with a nice accent.
Associate vice president, biological and biotechnology,
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.
And Colonel Robert P. Kadlec, professor of military
strategy and operations, National War College.
This is our only panel. We have 5 minutes. We are going to
roll over. So you have 10 minutes if you need it. Somewhere
between 5 and 10 we would like you to finish, and we are ready
to go, except we have to swear you in.
You can still see I am unhappy we have one panel instead of
two. If you would stand up and raise your right hands, please.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record everyone has responded in
the affirmative.
We need a little oil for this thing here.
You are on.
STATEMENTS OF ALAN ZELICOFF, SENIOR SCIENTIST, NONPROLIFERATION
INITIATIVES, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES; AMY SMITHSON, SENIOR
ASSOCIATE, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER; BARBARA HATCH ROSENBERG,
PROJECT DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL, FEDERATION
OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS; GILLIAN R. WOOLLETT, ASSOCIATE VICE
PRESIDENT, BIOLOGICAL AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA; AND COLONEL ROBERT P.
KADLEC, PROFESSOR OF MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS, NATIONAL
WAR COLLEGE
Mr. Zelicoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Zelicoff. I am honored for this opportunity to address
you today, and since your time is precious, I'll briefly fill
you in on my background and then get right to the items that
you have asked me to address.
My name is Alan Zelicoff. I am a physician and physicist,
and I work in the Center for National Security and Arms Control
at Sandia National Laboratories, which is one of the three
Department of Energy weapons labs, but we're charged with a
broad array of tasks addressing national security outside the
nuclear realm.
My center, in which I am one of two senior scientists, has
had considerable experience in the primary research and
development in a wide array of verification technologies for
use in most of the existing multilateral and bilateral arms
control treaties to which the United States is a signatory.
We're also deeply involved in the day-to-day analysis of data
of relevance to these treaties, and provide technical support
to both the international and national bodies responsible for
implementation and monitoring of these treaties.
In particular, Sandia designed and carried out the most
extensive of all mock trial inspections for the Biological
Weapons Convention, both in the United States and
internationally, following its participation in very similar
studies that predated the final negotiations and signatures on
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Now, the committee has heard before from Mr. Mahley and
others of the very--of the many problematic differences between
verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and putative
verification of the Biological Weapons Convention. I'm not
going to repeat those very important distinctions as I respond
to the committee's charge, but in so doing, I will try to
provide you with a technical as opposed to political reference
point and I will refer to some of those distinctions that have
been made previously.
And, again, I will try to be technical, as I'm quite sure
you get more than enough politicized information up here on the
Hill, and as a scientist I'll try to endeavor to highlight some
objective data and observations that I hope will assist you in
your work.
First, the committee asked how the United States developed
verification policy for the Biological Weapons Convention.
Well, we began well enough and I believe in a highly credible
way with a series of surveys of experts to identify the
potential unique and problematic aspects of inspections in
support of the BWC, followed then by increasingly sophisticated
mock inspection exercises based on questions raised during
those surveys.
These exercises were conducted in a variety of facilities,
including the manufacturing facility at Department of Defense
biological weapons defense laboratory, a university medical
school and the most advanced aerosol-biology facility in the
United States, and finally at an explosives testing facility,
all of which are of potential relevance to the BWC. And this
constitutes the entirety of the United States' experience in
testing measures such as challenge inspections, compliance
assurance, and familiarization visits; in other words, more or
less the compendium of all of the approaches that have been
advocated for strengthening the BWC. In my technical opinion,
these trial inspections constitute as well the entirety of
scientifically designed, well-controlled investigations into
the utility of various measures done anywhere by anyone.
And here I would like to issue an important caution to the
members of the committee. When you hear claims that other trial
inspections for the BWC resulted in successful demonstration of
such items as managed access, compliance checking, protection
of proprietary information, or validation of declarations under
the treaty, be just a bit skeptical. To the best of my
knowledge, none--and I mean none--of the other mock inspections
that have been conducted meet any of those scientific
requirements for trial inspections; and none save those--none
in the United States, have been published with their
methodologies, hypotheses and analyses for all to see.
Trial inspections are very difficult. They are expensive to
execute properly, and it is all too easy to conduct a trial and
populate it with hand-picked participants to get the answers
that one wishes to hear. We can do, and we did do much better
than this.
The U.S. trial outcomes, Mr. Chairman, were clear. Only two
measures that have been proposed for the BWC, challenge
inspections and disease outbreak surveillance and
investigation, resulted in information that was useful for
monitoring the BWC. The other oft-touted measures, such as
declarations checking, resulted in so much ambiguous data that
the inspection teams left the sites, convinced that legitimate
activities were covers for biological weapons activities.
There is no mystery in this. Most of the activities in the
daily work of pharmaceutical and biodefense facilities are
indistinguishable from activities that could be prohibited by
the BWC. Conversely, illicit work might be done in similar
places and is very easily hidden. And our technology,
regrettably, at the moment does not provide us with the
diagnostic tests that can separate evil intent from legal and
perfectly permissible activities.
To be concrete, a random visit to a modern pharmaceutical
facility, for example, would be unlikely to uncover prohibited
activities, even if they existed, because of the size and
multiplicity of processes taking place. Rather, the very acts
of genetic engineering, large-scale fermentation, and the
entire array of standard operating procedures will meet any
expectations in the pre-formed eye of the beholder.
On the other hand, if a specific allegation were to be
leveled, for example, production of large quantities of anthrax
at a specific time and place, there is a reasonable chance that
the illegal activity would be unveiled, assuming that access
was granted in a timely fashion.
Despite these valuable results, the process of policy
development within the U.S. Government, protocol negotiations
soon faltered. It is, Mr. Chairman, a not very well-kept secret
that there was intense friction between the National Security
Council and the entirety of the Interagency Working Group on
Biological Weapons Control throughout the past 8 years while
policy was under development. Essentially, nothing in the way
of tangible policy was put forward during this time because
one, or at most a few, low-level staffers within the NSC sought
to suppress the results of the mock inspections, break
interagency consensus on negotiating strategy, and impose an
extraordinarily ill-suited vision for the BWC protocol, which
was to make it like the chemical weapons protocol.
Nothing could be more wrong-headed, for all of the reasons
you heard in last September's testimony, and nothing could be
more destructive for the future of the BWC. There is no
question that there was a complete absence of serious
administration attention to the negotiations taking place in
Geneva. Otherwise these grating questions about goals and
tactics that haunted all members of the delegation for the past
8 years would have been resolved. That low-level NSC
functionaries were able to force gridlock speaks volumes about
the lack of leadership for and periodic review of the U.S.
negotiating stance.
Now, this brings me to the second question raised by the
committee, which is what was the ability--what is the ability
of the chairman's text to detect and deter rogue nations' BW
activity? The answer is very little, and the reasons are very
simple. The vast majority of effort in the chairman's text is
directed at routine random visits--primarily in the West, the
plurality in the United States--for purposes of checking on
declarations of items and stocks which are in and of themselves
very fluid. And it was these very types of visits that were
simulated in the U.S. trials and that were the source of so
much confusion and actual undermining of confidence in
compliance during those trials.
Once again, the NSC broke consensus on even the utility of
disease monitoring, which was also demonstrated to be an
effective measure, which was a most unusual state of affairs,
because there was interagency consensus on the utility of
disease monitoring and, sadly, abrogation of the usual
understanding of the way interagency politics works cost the
U.S. delegation any chance of unifying to significantly
influence the outcome of debates in Geneva, including in the
western group.
Let me be clear. We were forbidden--and I mean forbidden--
to present the results of U.S. trial inspections, even after
other countries introduced data from scientifically very flawed
trials, and a leadership vacuum resulted.
Mr. Chairman, I do not suggest that the U.S. trial
inspection work constitutes a significantly large experience to
draw final conclusions about measures that may, with further
work, be crafted in a way to strengthen the BWC, but the design
of these experiments done in the United States is far superior
to those done in other countries that reported them in Geneva.
Rather, Mr. Chairman, when combined with the reports of the
U.N. Special Commission on inspections of Iraqi BW sites, the
analysis of all of this information leads me to question the
standard tenets of arms control in the context of biological
weapons. Frequent visits to check declarations are not
necessarily better than challenge inspections alone. Declaring
collections of microorganisms, whose functionality can easily
be changed from a predetermined list, is arguably worse than no
information at all. Doing something should never be confused
with doing something useful.
Verification advocates, especially those in the scientific
community such as the Federation of American Scientists, have a
responsibility to carefully test these assertions. It is
noteworthy that the Congress had sufficient insight to mandate
several years ago more trial inspections, yet the
administration just past ignored this requirement, almost
certainly because BWC verification proponents within the NSC
did not want to learn any lessons from those inspections.
But the end result need not be tragic. There are at least
two areas where I do believe substantive support to the treaty
can be garnered, as well as meet the interests of all States
Parties, and that would be technical cooperation in the
identification and mitigation of infectious diseases and swift
punishment for countries that employ biological weapons
resulting in those diseases or support terrorist groups who
acquire them.
On rare but important occasions, a network, which I believe
would cost only in the range of about $100 million over an
entire decade, of disease reporting stations could identify the
emergence of unusual symptoms and signs that would raise
questions of violation of the biological weapons treaty. There
is little doubt that the techniques of modern epidemiology
could identify the source of the disease and distinguish
between naturally occurring diseases and intentionally
introduced diseases.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, negotiations on a protocol for
the BWC have failed to produce a document that strengthens the
convention or increases the security of its member States
Parties. We must await new technologies in order to verify
nonproliferation of biological weapons. Only a political sea
change will permit the elimination of some of the controls that
currently exist, such as export controls, and I would never
advocate that. The current turmoil in Russia makes it unlikely
that the largest biological weapons program in the world cannot
come under control, protocol or not. But nations of goodwill
can immediately address the pervasive problems of infectious
disease, which is of concern to all of us, and the BWC provides
the best possible forum for meeting that need.
Thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you for your very provocative statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zelicoff follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Ms. Smithson.
Ms. Smithson. Given Al's summary of the missteps that have
occurred over the past several years--am I not on?
Mr. Shays. Yes, you are on. I need you to put the mic in
front of you and down a little lower, and you'll be great.
Ms. Smithson. Given Al's summary of the missteps over the
past few years, what I'd like to do is concentrate for the next
few moments on constructive steps forward for the United
States. My statement is based largely on the views of over 30
nongovernmental experts as presented in a recent Stimson Center
report, ``House of Cards.'' Concerned about the wayward
direction of the BWC negotiations and the U.S. Government's
rather lackadaisical approach to these talks, the Stimson
Center recruited stellar experts from the three types of
facilities likely to be monitored by the BWC; namely, research
institutes and universities, pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies and defense contracting firms. We asked these experts
to brainstorm the vexing technical challenges of BWC monitoring
and assembled a fourth group, nicknamed ``Inspection
Veterans,'' to cull the technical lessons they that learned
from several BWC inspection-like activities, such as the two
U.S. BWC trials and the 1992 trilateral agreement inspections,
which were aimed at confirming the closure of former Soviet
biowarfare facilities.
The academic and industry group experts separately devised
their own monitoring strategies that they believed would work
reliably and effectively in their respective settings. However,
they differed on several important inspection parameters with
what is known as the chairman's text. For example, the
chairman's text stipulates a four-member team for nonchallenge
visits, but academic experts asked for five to seven
inspectors; and industry experts, for an even larger team of
six to eight. Whereas the chairman's text would authorize just
2 days for nonchallenge visits, the academic group believed
that 3 days would probably be needed for large laboratories,
and the industry group thought that 5 days would be required at
commercial sites.
When addressing the BWC protocol, negotiators in Geneva on
May 7th, during the event releasing House of Cards, one of our
industry brainstormers, Dr. Steve Projan, who is the Director
of Antibacterial Research at Wyeth-Ayerst Research, summed up
the inadequacy of the draft protocol's nonchallenge inspection
provisions by saying, ``four inspectors for 2 days couldn't
even get around all the bathrooms at my facility.''
Quite frankly, the industry and academic experts were not
very impressed with the draft BWC protocol. The chairman's text
appears to have bent over backward to minimize the
inconvenience and intrusiveness of inspections. While it is
important to hold down the burden of inspections, skimping on
manpower and time onsite could yield poor results. These
experts repeatedly pointed out that while BWC inspectors must
be able to detect noncompliance, they must also know compliance
when they see it at legitimate facilities. BWC inspections,
they said, should not erroneously tar all university
laboratories, research institutes, and industry facilities with
suspicion that they are somehow operating outside of the law
when inspectors are not present. This can't leave question
marks hanging over everyone's head.
Asked to give the draft BWC protocol a grade, another one
of our industry experts explained why the industry groups
settled on a grade of D. That is really about the worst grade
you can get, said Dr. George Pierce, formerly the manager of
technology development and engineering for Cytec Industries. He
continued to explain that sometimes an F shows a little
innovation.
Aside from a BWC protocol that can reliably produce
meaningful monitoring results, other programs necessary to
grapple with a problem as complex as biological weapons
proliferation include, as Dr. Zelicoff has recommended,
enhanced global disease surveillance as well as the maintenance
of robust intelligence capabilities and defenses, and wisely
designed and well-implemented export controls.
I would add to that list cooperative threat reduction
program activities to reduce the leakage of weapons know-how
and ingredients from the former Soviet Union, over 50
biowarfare facilities involved.
These so-called brain-drain prevention programs are
particularly important if former--because if former Soviet
bioweaponeers were to succumb to job offers from terrorists or
from governments, they could accelerate rudimentary weapons
programs into ones capable of mass casualty attacks. An ounce
of prevention, via a hefty budget increase for collaborative
research grants, could help cut this proliferation problem off
at its source.
As for the BWC protocol, the nongovernmental experts that
participated in the Stimson Center's brainstorming series would
advise the U.S. Government to reject the chairman's text. Any
deal is not better than no deal in this case. But they would
certainly not advise the U.S. Government to abandon the
negotiating process. All four groups of experts recommended
additional technical research and field trials to identify and
refine the best monitoring procedures for the BWC. For its
part, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
long ago offered its expert technical assistance to help with
the BWC protocol. But years later, this statement rings empty,
since no industry field trials have been held. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the U.S. industry and the U.S. Government to
mount good-faith efforts to test BWC monitoring technologies
and strategies fully, inviting international observers into
this process to inspire confidence that the United States will
not desert the negotiations.
Congress should redirect both the executive branch and U.S.
industry to waste no time in initiating an earnest search for
meaningful, feasible and cost-effective monitoring approaches
to the BWC.
Thank you for the invitation, your time, and I look forward
to your questions.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Ms. Smithson.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Smithson follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Dr. Rosenberg.
Ms. Rosenberg. I want to thank you for the opportunity to
speak here for the many experts outside of government who
support the rapid completion of a protocol to strengthen the
Biological Weapons Convention. I chair the Federation of
American Scientists Working Group on Biological Weapons, a
group of professionals who have broad expertise, who volunteer
their efforts in the hope of contributing to the control of a
looming long-term global threat that is increasing every day
along with the explosive growth of knowledge in bioscience and
technology.
My working group has monitored the course of the Biological
Weapons Convention and contributed to every effort to
strengthen it for more than 12 years. We have conducted trial
inspections and held in-depth discussions with inspectors and
inspection agencies. We've contributed nearly 50 reports and
working papers on technical issues to the protocol negotiations
and have organized many seminars for negotiators in Geneva.
We've always worked closely with industry and have issued two
joint papers with representatives of the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America.
I want to start by making sure that a central point is
absolutely clear. We are not here to debate whether the
chairman's text for the protocol can be relied upon to detect
violations of the Biological Weapons Convention. In a situation
like this one, where there are similarities between legitimate
and illegitimate activities, no protocol or any other mechanism
can do that. Finding smoking guns is not what the protocol is
about and not what negotiators have ever aimed for. The United
States and all the other parties knew this before the
negotiations started--it started. They knew it when they
studied the feasibility of verifying the convention and issued
a positive report. It would be disingenuous to beat that dead
horse now.
Rather, the objective of the protocol is confidence
building and transparency. Let me explain for a moment what
transparency means in this context. Novices tend to suppose
that it would require divulging exactly what is going on at an
installation. That is nonsense. Experienced technical experts
can judge from the scale, the layout, the type of equipment
present, the ability to prevent the escape of dangerous agents
and such factors, that can judge from these whether these
capabilities match the alleged peaceful purpose of an
installation and its role, if any, in civil society. Rapid
cleanup of an installation before the arrival of inspectors is
almost irrelevant. It might even provide a clue in itself.
Factors like these were the ones that allowed UNSCOM inspectors
in Iraq to recognize questionable situations almost at first
glance.
Getting publicizable proof was the difficult part, but I
emphasize again, that is not the role of the protocol. Raising
suspicions or resolving them is what the protocol is about.
National means can then be focused on the sites or questions of
concern. The protocol's regime would effectively complement
national intelligence, military power and diplomacy. In a
serious situation, the protocol would provide bases broader
than we now have for international action.
To achieve adequate transparency, the chairman's text of
the protocol requires annual declaration of the sites of
greatest potential threat, plus a variety of onsite measures:
first, mandatory, randomly selected visits to declared
facilities; second, visits to clarify any remaining questions
if clarification consultations should fail; and third,
mandatory challenge investigations anywhere.
It's ironic that while we suspect Iraq of continuing its
biological weapons program and we decry its refusal to allow
U.N. inspections, the United States is poised to turn down an
international agreement that would provide three different
means for probing suspicious installations. Even a refusal to
allow access in violation of the protocol would provide
information.
A former Deputy Director of the CIA, Doug MacEachin, has
made a persuasive case for the deterrent effect of the protocol
regime. In a recent article, he explains why the regime would
prevent proliferators from using ostensibly legitimate
facilities for illicit programs. To avoid raising suspicions,
they would have to conduct bioweapons activities clandestinely,
with all the attendant difficulties and risks.
International steps to strengthen the Biological Weapons
Convention began in 1986 during the Reagan administration. They
continued with the positive feasibility study I mentioned
during the first Bush administration and then proceeded into
the protocol negotiations 6 years ago. Throughout, there was
vocal bipartisan support from the United States. We've led the
chorus in citing the need for action. Now with the goal almost
within our grasp, rejection of the protocol will send a message
to potential proliferators that will tell them that there is no
international will to enforce the ban on biological weapons.
Americans will pay the price as the prime target.
Military and nongovernment experts agree that bioterrorists
are highly unlikely to be able to launch a mass attack without
state support. It would be foolhardy not to do all we can to
cutoff the source by monitoring the compliance of states with
the biological weapons ban. But this is not something the
United States can do unilaterally.
The protocol is the available tool, and that's why our
European and other allies are so angered and dismayed by the
U.S. stance. Had the United States stood with its allies and
presented a united front at the negotiations, the chairman's
protocol text would be stronger now. Had the United States not
demanded many weakening concessions, the text would be better.
But one thing is clear. The protocol does not suffer from any
lack of technical information. The problems are political, not
technical. Although the United States submitted no reports on
trial onsite activities, 12 trials have been reported by other
countries, most of them U.S. allies. And some of the trials
took place at facilities belonging to the very same
corporations that are major players in the United States.
I have a table which may be projected here, but I believe
the Members have copies, and you can't read it anyway, but you
have copies. It's a 3-page table which shows the trial visits
that have been carried out. I will just point out that many of
the trials involved more than one country or included foreign
observers, and no U.S. trial will have any credibility that
doesn't do the same.
All the trials that have been carried out concluded that
the visits would be effective in strengthening the convention
and increasing confidence in compliance, and that confidential
information could be protected at the same time.
In addition to the trials, there are copious data from the
many different national and international inspections that are
carried out routinely at sites relevant to the protocol, both
here and in many other countries. The chairman's text meets all
the essential demands of U.S. industry. It provides more
safeguards for confidential information than the Chemical
Weapons Convention, which covers many of the same facilities
and to which we are already a party.
As for export controls, the rhetoric of the text may please
the critics of the Australian Group. The Australian Group is a
cooperative mechanism for controlling dual-use chemical and
biological exports. But the substance of the chairman's text is
fully in line with the western position. There are only
guidelines, no hard obligations regarding exports. Each state
party has full discretion over every measure suggested in the
text.
In closing, I'd like to point to several additional actions
that need to be taken to supplement the protocol in controlling
biological weapons. These are described in my written
testimony, and there's no time here now. One of these actions
is a program for effective global surveillance of emerging
diseases. This program, proposed by an alliance of the World
Health Organization and several other health groups, known as
AllAID, Would fulfill the obligations of parties to the
convention to ``cooperate for the prevention of disease,'' to
use the words of the convention.
To do this, the proposed program addresses the specific
goals already agreed by the protocol negotiators, but there is
little hope of funding this necessarily multilateral program
without the incentives that the protocol would provide. And I
hope in the question period we will have a greater opportunity
to discuss this program. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Dr. Rosenberg.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenberg follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Dr. Woollett.
Ms. Woollett. Good afternoon. My name is Dr. Gillian
Woollett. I'm the associate vice president for biologics and
biotechnology at PhRMA, the trade association for research-
based pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries in the United
States. We are pleased to have the opportunity to share with
this subcommittee our industry's views on the development of a
protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. PhRMA
appreciates the very complicated challenge that the signatories
to the BWC face in trying to assemble a protocol that provides
any level of confidence for either compliance or verification
of the BWC. We welcome the opportunity to work with the
subcommittee----
Mr. Shays. Doctor, you can just move yours. I rarely have
the occasion to ask someone to move it away. Just step it 2
inches away.
Ms. Woollett. We welcome the opportunity to work with the
subcommittee as you explore and deliberate these very important
issues. PhRMA concurs with the goals and objectives of the BWC
and has been actively supporting efforts to strengthen this
convention by the inclusion of effective measures to help
enhanced compliance with its objectives and to reduce the
threat of biological warfare.
Indeed, the global pharmaceutical, chemical and
biotechnological industries join others in their belief that
biological weapons represent a serious and increasing danger to
people around the world. Since very similar microorganisms to
those used for legitimate purposes could be misused as weapons
of mass destruction, we accept that a protocol strengthening
the BWC cannot exempt private industry.
However, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry does
not make biological weapons. Our very purpose is the opposite.
We make products to counter unmet medical need, of which a
substantial proportion continues to be infectious disease. To
compromise our ability to develop medicines or to undermine
patients' confidence in those medicines without a definable
level of confidence in the proposed protocol would be a tragedy
for public health.
The chairman's text unduly targets vaccines and culminates
in requirements that not only compromise our industry's ability
to research and manufacture medicines but also establishes
mechanisms to expose confidential business information.
Measures strengthening the BWC should ensure the inhibition
of any misuse of microbiology without impairing its legitimate
lifesaving uses. We should encourage development in areas such
as health care, agriculture, nutrition and the environment. Our
concerns with the protocol include the scope of declarations
and onsite activities and the degree to which the burden is
balanced by its value for arms control purposes.
Declaration formats must be simple and without requirement
for disclosure of any confidential business information, and
their use must be apparent in impeding biological weapons
creation. Unfortunately, these criteria are not met in the
current chairman's text. The current triggers in the chairman's
text are ambiguous and the focus is on those facilities with
greatest legitimate capabilities.
Furthermore, the declarations are extensive. The format is
confusing, and they will require inclusion of confidential
business information.
PhRMA urges that clarification procedures between the
International Secretariat and the state party be established in
anticipation of questions about declarations. However, we
believe these procedures should not require any additional
onsite activities.
Since the nature of microbiology is such that it is often
easy to remove traces of any development, manufacture, or
storage of a biological weapons agent, any routine onsite
activity is not a useful concept under the protocol. However,
our industries are sympathetic to the concept of nonroutine,
nonrandom familiarization or educational visits, provided they
are voluntary and under full control of the company visited.
In the event of alleged serious violations, it may be
appropriate for the international community to conduct a
challenge inspection, but malicious or frivolous claims of
violations must not precipitate intrusive onsite activities.
Challenge inspections must be conducted according to an
established due process that is evidence based. Strict managed
access must be employed, and the inspected site must have the
final determination of what is proprietary information. If no
evidence of a violation is found, this fact must ultimately be
reported by the International Secretariat.
The global pharmaceutical, biotechnology and chemical
industries have tried to participate actively to reduce the
threat of biological weapons. Working globally with our
respective governments and international negotiators, our
companies believe that our industry can help strengthen the BWC
and reduce the serious threat to people around the world.
Unfortunately, the chairman's text, as proposed, strongly
suggests that our input to date has fallen on deaf ears.
As you deliberate this difficult topic, we urge that you
include the needs of patients and their intimate relationship
and confidence in our companies in the equation. More and
better medicines are dependent on the ongoing research and
manufacturing capabilities of the U.S. pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries. A global leadership is a credit to
the United States and not something to be intruded upon in the
search for biological weapons, which are clearly an anathema to
our industry. One of our industry's greatest contributions to
public health has been human vaccines, and yet vaccines find
themselves in the bull's-eye of this protocol. How can that
help global security? Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Dr. Woollett.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Woollett follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Colonel Kadlec.
Colonel Kadlec. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. It is a great pleasure to be here today, and it
looks like I am the cleanup batter for today's panel. But
before I begin my formal remarks, I'd like to remind you that I
am here on my personal auspices, and my views are solely my
own, not of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense,
National Defense University, or the U.S. Air Force.
To give you a little background in terms of my reason to be
here is that I served on the U.S. Delegation to the Biological
Weapons Convention from 1993 to 1996, participated in several
of the aforementioned U.S. department-sponsored trial
inspections, and also served as a U.N. Special Commission
inspector in Iraq in 1994, 1996 and 1998.
Mr. Shays. And, Colonel, right now you are a professor at
the War College?
Colonel Kadlec. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. So you are coming as a professor from the War
College with your own views? Fine. Thank you.
Colonel Kadlec. Thank you. To maybe address specifically
the issues that you raised in the letter that I received to
attend today's panel discussion, the first and foremost was how
did the United States develop a verification policy for the
U.S. BWC protocol? I think Dr. Zelicoff's comments touched on
maybe some of the more finer points, but I think in quick
summation, the fact is we really didn't have a clear
articulated strategy or approach for the negotiations, and that
clearly had a partial paralysis on the events on the ground in
Geneva. It clearly hamstrung the delegation to either accept or
reject positions that were being offered. It certainly limited
our ability to project positions in that--into national fora.
And more significantly, I think it had an impact on limiting
the kinds of things we could be doing back in the States,
particularly national trial visits, that would have helped us
understand the implications and consequences of some of these
measures as being proposed.
I think it's just worthy to note that the Department--or
Department trial visits that were conducted were sponsored by
specific government departments rather than the U.S. Government
at large, principally because there was no consensus, and
certainly there was no endorsement of those trial visits and
the reports and subsequent findings that came out of those. So
in the end I think, simply put, we were very limited in what we
could do.
As far as the current draft protocol and whether it would
be possible or whether it would be able to detect or deter
rogue nations or terrorist biological weapons activity, I would
judge that to be a low probability. Two principal reasons, and
one is inherent in the protocol and the other one is inherent
in, if you will, the nature of biological arms. First, the
protocol is certainly not comprehensive in its inclusion or
coverage of facilities of concern. I think it's noteworthy that
universities and many other facilities, food processing
facilities, are not included in that, and that there are
certain, if you will, arbitrary distinctions or criteria that
exclude R&D facilities or even small possible production
facilities. It's still a matter of concern but would not be
necessarily a matter of disclosure--voluntary disclosure
through this protocol.
The second part is, it's certainly the ambiguities that are
inherent in these activities. I always remind myself that the
original drafters of this convention back in the mid-seventies,
essentially seventies, did not include verification measures,
not because they didn't want to, but because it wasn't easy,
and certainly not clear then. And I would suggest that in some
ways it is less clear today because of the advances in
biotechnology that really provide great efficiencies and great
capabilities in facilities that were not considered, or even
unheard of back in the 1970's.
So with that as a backdrop, I would suggest that at least
for detection purposes, we may be better off, as Dr. Rosenberg,
to rely on our national capabilities within the intelligence
community. And maybe that's where we would be better served to
make investments to strengthen those capabilities that could
detect those proliferators pursuing these weapons, particularly
in the human intelligence side.
The issue of deterrence is a little more complicated,
principally because, as you well know, deterrence is based on
not only a capability but also a credibility of whatever tool
you have, particularly in this case the protocol, and that
would be the specific measures that it offers and the
procedures that it offers as well. It goes without saying, it
would probably--if it's unlikely to detect a cheater, it's
probably unlikely, or very low probability, to deter a cheater.
In that sense, I think, again, we may look to other investments
to see if we can bolster our capabilities. And, again, if you
look at this protocol as part of a larger national strategy,
the technical side of this is such that I would probably defer
to other means to give us confidence in whether or not the
treaty is being complied to.
Your issue about the extent to which the protocol will
improve verifiability of the BWC, I think it's a--I would say
it would be bold to advocate, and I think it is the consensus
here that it's probably not verifiable, but I would point out
that there also may be an unintended consequence of this
effort. And that is principally in if a state's party complies
with the protocol, does that necessarily mean that they comply
with the treaty? And that is a potential sleight of hand that
could be used by countries that are certainly suspected of
those intentions. Clearly in the course of negotiations, Iran
was one country that tried to make a case--and it will be
unclear until the end game whether they went out on this--that
they could somehow trade, if you will, their compliance with
the protocol with the abolition of multilateral export
controls. And that is just one possible outcome that needs to
be considered.
Finally, your last point is related; specifically, what
additional mechanisms could be used to strengthen the
effectiveness and improve implementation of the Biological
Weapons Convention. And there are two. I would like to endorse
the comments made earlier by Dr. Zelicoff and Dr. Rosenberg on
the fact that it seems like an odd paradox that the treaty that
is entirely devoted to the deliberative use of disease as a
weapon does not have any provisions to either create, expand,
or mandate systems to monitor disease occurrence. And this is
clearly one area that probably deserves more consideration and
certainly would be one that would--could objectively not only
strengthen our nonproliferation goals, but certainly strengthen
our national and international public health objectives as
well.
My last comment is directed to an issue that has been
touched on lightly here, but certainly where my experience
weighs heavily, and that is through the United Nations Special
Commission. I would just like to point out that the
verification of experts exercise that was conducted in the
early nineties, that basically produced the foundation for the
draft protocol and identified 21 possible measures both onsite
and offsite that could be used to strengthen the compliance
with the treaty, were actually all employed during the
experience in Iraq.
What is interesting to note, and I guess in part it's maybe
part of the cognitive distance that was existing in the U.S.
Government, but certainly the fact that chronological
experience was that they were parallel events that sometimes
operated, I won't say completely independently, but certainly
sometimes detached, and that is a systematic comprehensive
review of the UNSCOM lessons: clearly what worked, what didn't
work, and clearly making that as a benchmark to assess whether
or not a future protocol--whether this protocol or any protocol
could address these purposes.
Until, I think, we assess that and certainly conduct more
government-sponsored trial visits, it will be very difficult, I
believe personally, to negotiate or commit to any protocol that
is both sensible or effective. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Colonel.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Kadlec follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Schrock.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you all
for being here. This is a frightening subject to me, and it's
something I had not thought much about until I came to
Congress. I was privileged to serve in the Navy for 24 years,
and what we worried about in Vietnam were the Viet Cong; we
didn't worry about chemicals and biological-type things. But I
think the real enemy we're going to have now is that, and I
don't know how the devil we get our hands around it, and I am
concerned by that.
I have a comment for the Colonel, but I wanted to start
with Dr. Zelicoff. When the administration officials last
appeared before this subcommittee, one of the witnesses--I
believe it was Ambassador Mahley--said, ``the United States has
never judged that the protocol would produce what is to us an
effectively verifiable BWC.''
In other words BWC is not verifiable. Help me understand
what the technical meaning of ``effectively verifiable'' is and
to what extent is it verifiable?
Mr. Zelicoff. You will never get a U.S. Government agency
to define what ``verifiability'' means. I have tried.
Mr. Schrock. I'm sure.
Mr. Zelicoff. But I do believe that there is consensus, and
I would hazard a guess there is even a consensus on this panel
that verifiability has a certain minimalist standard, and that
is that it's more likely than not to catch a cheater before
he's able to do something disastrous with his biological
weapons and--and this is equally important and always ignored--
more probable than not, to not accuse somebody of violating the
treaty when in fact no violation has taken place.
Now, as a scientist, we refer to those things as--we have
terms for them. We call it the sensitivity and the specificity,
but you can think of it as the likelihood that you miss
something and the likelihood that you make a mistake by falsely
accusing somebody.
With that minimalist definition--that is, both being able
to have a more probable than not standard for finding a cheater
before he's able to do something significant--I don't think
that there is any question that the treaty does not--or the
protocol does not meet that verifiability standard.
With regard to the more problematic issue, that is, falsely
accusing somebody, what we learned very clearly in the U.S.
trial inspections--which I have to say were conducted in a
scientifically credible way, meaning that they were blinded,
meaning that no one who participated as an inspector knew
anybody who was at the inspected facilities, and other such
reasonable precautions to prevent bias--what we learned clearly
from those was that the probability of coming up with an
ambiguous result--that is, walking away with less confidence
that the site was in compliance--was actually the biggest
problem.
In other words, it is highly likely that if a properly, or
improperly I should say, politically motivated inspection team
came to a U.S. pharmaceutical facility they could see anything
they want to see and make a story that is completely in their
view credible for biological weapons violation even when no
such violation is taking place. That was precisely what
happened to us when the U.S. trial inspections took place at a
small vaccine facility in Michigan, a very modest facility by
comparison to the average pharmaceutical facility in the United
States, and indeed the report of the team, which we were not
allowed to release in Geneva, was that the team was less
confident that the facility was in compliance after than before
visiting.
So on those two standards of verifiability I think the
trial inspection experience is clear, false positives and false
negatives are very, very likely. Thank you.
Mr. Schrock. If it isn't verifiable, why have a protocol?
Mr. Zelicoff. That is not for me, I assume.
Mr. Schrock. It will stop shortly.
Mr. Zelicoff. It depends on what your goals are of course.
If your goal is verifiability, then you should not believe or
sign up to a protocol like this because it doesn't deliver the
goods. If the goal is something less than verifiability; for
example, improving confidence, then one can select among the
measures that are available that I think over time would
generate an increased belief of the credibility of the
enforcement of the treaty. But now we start to get into
judgments that as a scientist I am not prepared to make.
Mr. Schrock. Colonel, I am probably going to paraphrase
here and I like a comment I think you made, you said rogue
nations are likely not to use chemical-biological warfare. Did
I misread you? I thought I would sleep better tonight because
of that.
Colonel Kadlec. No, sir, I did not say that and I wouldn't
endorse that at all. My apologies if I left you with that
impression.
Mr. Schrock. Well, I'm glad you cleared that up, but I'm
sorry it's not true.
That's all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. We have had two visits to Geneva, we have had
one other hearing and we have had a lot of research done and we
have had the GAO and others report to us on this issue, and I
am left with a feeling myself after this brief kind of
introduction to this issue, I don't honestly know how you
verify. And as we start to go through the panel I got the
feeling, Dr. Zelicoff, that you don't like the BWC protocol as
written and that you wonder whether you can verify. Dr.
Smithson, I get the feeling you don't like the protocol as
written but you think something needs to happen. Dr. Rosenberg,
I get the feeling that you are very strongly supportive of the
protocol and you think it is clearly the way to go. And Dr.
Woollett, I get the sense that you don't want verification
inspections. That's the general sense I get. And Colonel, I get
the sense that you don't think the BWC protocol will work. That
is the general sense. So it is kind of like in a scale here,
panel, three against one--kind of against but something needs
to happen, and one and four.
Ms. Rosenberg. Can I correct what you said about me? It is
not exactly correct.
Mr. Shays. I understand. It may be that all of them aren't
correct. By the way, any question that I ask one any of you are
more than welcome to respond to. Before you take that, maybe
any comments that any of you wanted to make to the previous
questions that were asked, if you wanted to jump in to respond
to the questions that my colleague asked. Why don't we start
there and then we will deal with my summation of where you
stand. Anybody want to jump in on anything that was asked?
Ms. Rosenberg. On the question he asked?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Ms. Rosenberg. Yes, you asked why--if verification is
impossible why bother with the protocol? Because the protocol
does something else, as I tried to point out. It can raise
suspicion or it can allay suspicion, it can increase
confidence. It increases transparency, and this is something
that is not verification in the strict sense, where you prove
that there is no violation or full compliance, but it adds to
all the other national capabilities that we have. It is an
additional tool.
It has been pointed out there is a web of deterrence that
involves a series of different things like export control and
national intelligence, military preparedness, defense, and the
protocol is another tool in that web which gives us additional
capabilities and feeds in so that it helps us to focus our
intelligence on the facilities that might not have been
recognized as being a problem but that something might come up,
or to eliminate bothering with some that we feel convinced are
OK as a result of protocol procedures.
Ms. Smithson. I would like to address the question about
whether or not we can go forward and should we go forward with
this. At present we are dealing with from the U.S. perspective
really two data points. The two trials that the United States
has conducted I think are certainly the most robust ones that
have been conducted internationally. And what worries me is we
have incorrect data points in that we seem to be throwing up
our hands at this juncture. When you can't figure out
something, quite frankly you try harder to figure it out. And
the technical experts who sat at our table were certainly very
familiar with what inspections were all about, especially those
from industry. Those are individuals who have inspectors in
their plants all the time. They get no-notice inspections. They
get inspectors there for weeks at a time and they know how to
make things work for the host facilities and for the
inspectors. And I'll take their advice on this. They are
encouraging the U.S. Government and industry to actually get
out there and do the grunt work required to figure this out,
conduct the field trials, work harder.
Ms. Woollett. I think I have to make a comment at this
point that PhRMA has expressed a willingness over a number of
years. But what are we actually modeling? If we have to model
some method by which we prove ourselves innocent for the
reasons that Al Zelicoff has discussed earlier, that is simply
not doable. Our capabilities, should we be so inclined, are so
much more than would be needed. There is no way we can prove
that we haven't ever made a BW. We can affirmatively show what
we do indeed do. We can show we can make medicines but we can't
show that we haven't used the facilities for illicit purposes.
So the moment you have a lack of presumption of innocence, no
facility, however capable, can prove it hasn't made BW. So I
think this is the fundamental quandary as to what actually
inspections are for. That's what the text doesn't resolve,
particularly in terms of its routine inspections.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Rosenberg, you wanted to respond to my
characterization.
Ms. Rosenberg. Yes. You said that I, and I presume my
group, are strong supporters. We are supporters of a protocol.
The chairman's text is a good deal weaker than we would like to
see, much weaker. We know there could be a much better protocol
out there, there could have been. The problem though is not
technical. It is political. This is the best protocol we can
get at this time and for some time to come, and it is better to
have something than nothing because otherwise we are telling
proliferators that they can go ahead with impunity.
Mr. Shays. I am going to use Dr. Zelicoff's comments to
generate dialog with the four of you. It doesn't mean, Dr.
Zelicoff, you can't comment either. First I am going to read:
You said, doing something should never be confused with doing
something useful. But--this is a long paragraph but I would
like you to listen to it and then I would like you to comment
on it. You were referring, I am on page--no pages, doctor; you
automatically drop from an A to a B if I were grading you. I
have no pages on this. But at any rate, despite these valuable
results the process of policy development with U.S. Government
protocol negotiations soon faltered. You say it is not a very
well kept secret that there was intense friction between the
Security Council by the entirety of the Interagency Working
Group on Biological Weapons Control through the past 8 years
while the policy was under development. Then you say
essentially nothing in the way of tangible policy was put
forward during this time because one or at most a few low level
staffers within the NSC sought to suppress the results of the
mock inspections, break interagency consensus on negotiating
strategy and impose an extraordinarily ill-suited vision for
the BWC protocol which was make it like the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
I'm still going to read on. Nothing could be more wrong-
headed for all the reasons that you have heard in last
September's testimony; nothing could be more destructive for
the future of the BWC. There is no question that there was a
complete absence of serious administration attention to the
negotiations taking place in Geneva. Otherwise, the grating
questions about goals and tactics that haunted all members of
the delegation for all of the last 8 years would have been
resolved. That low level NFC functionaries were able to force
gridlock speaks volumes about the lack of leadership for and
periodic review of the U.S. negotiating stance throughout most
of the 1990's.
I will just tell you this summarizes my feeling about my
observation of the negotiations that have taken place during
the time that I followed, and I have no sense ultimately of
what we hope we can achieve, frankly. But let me ask you to
comment on this, all of you. First, Dr. Zelicoff, do you still
believe this?
Mr. Zelicoff. I do, sir.
Ms. Smithson. I would applaud Dr. Zelicoff's candor, as
someone who spends a great deal of time watching the U.S.
Government attempt to make decisions and often bumbling what
they do. His description here I believe is right on target, so
I will agree with it in total.
Ms. Rosenberg. I did talk about this in my written
testimony. I agree. I think we all recognize that there was no
high level leadership during the course of these 6 years of
negotiations, that although President Clinton issued several
statements in support of the goal, no one at the top levels
pushed it. It was left in the hands always of lower level
officials. And in the interagency group each one had his own
turf to protect and nobody took the common interest as an
overview, and I think that is a very sad commentary on our
government.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Woollett.
Ms. Woollett. I think your question of what do you achieve
is absolutely critical because this will be a balance of what
is put at risk, what is the burden, what is the cost on
whomever verus what you achieve. We're able as industry to
assess the risk to our patients, to our products. What we don't
understand is the arms control aspects. What would this do for
global confidence that we wouldn't have if we were left with
just the treaty, which, remember, is those people who've agreed
not to do this stuff in the first place. So we are only talking
about a subset of the world anyway.
So our question is fundamentally the same as yours: What
would you achieve with this protocol that you wouldn't have
otherwise?
Colonel Kadlec. Sir, I would concur with Dr. Zelicoff's
assessment. I would add, and again to expound on the point of
the chemicals weapons inspection, that there seem to be, and
again this is one of the cultural-technical differences between
the two communities of chemical versus biological processes
that seem to get often blurred, which is somehow you can take
it by direct extension and extrapolate it to the biological
processes, which I think is fallacious, and I think Dr.
Zelicoff pointed that out.
I would also add that there was a certain level of idealism
here that somehow you can go much further than you could with
this. And I would like to go back and address the point made
earlier, the question asked earlier about why have a protocol
and certainly Dr. Smithson's point about specifics as it
relates to doing national trial visits. You may or may not
recall a place called Al Hakam, but that was a facility that
the Iraqis declared in 1991 after the Gulf war. It was the site
of intense scrutiny by the U.N. Special Commission over a
number of years, thought to be very suspicious because of the
nature of the layout, physical features. It was dispersed,
there were unground bunkers, there were anti-aircraft sites
around it. But it was not until 1995, despite numerous
challenge, routine monitoring inspections of that facility that
truly the clear intent behind that was known based on Hussein
Kamel's defection. And I just highlight that as one of those
key points, that if you use traditional arms control
approaches, as we do in other disciplines, I think you will
come up short. And in fact in some ways you may wish to reserve
those capabilities. And when you look at a protocol it would
seem the challenge mechanisms that allow you to get to the kind
of situations that were encountered in Sverdlovsk in Russia in
1979 or certainly if there were an equivalent occurrence of the
use of chemical weapons in Iraq or against Iranians, that there
would be a mechanism outside the U.N. Security Council to
ensure that those things could be promptly and fully
investigated.
Mr. Shays. You made reference to an individual. Was that
one of Saddam Hussein's son-in-laws?
Colonel Kadlec. Son-in-laws.
Mr. Shays. And what we learned from both of them coming
forth was that there was a site that was not disclosed?
Colonel Kadlec. Well, sir, Al Hakam was disclosed. It was
declared by the Iraqis, but the true intent and purpose behind
that site was never known.
I left out one important piece of the story because during
the course of the 4-year, if you will, monitoring by UNSCOM the
Iraqis actually were building a new site on that facility that
gave it an incredible fermentation capacity of 50,000 liters
and this was done under the watchful eyes of UNSCOM. It was
given a nominal cover, if you will, of being a single cell
protein facility to make cattle feed, for which everyone
suspected that was not indeed the case but the smoking gun was
elusive, and even under the most stringent provisions that were
ever created for arms control through the UNSCOM and through
the U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, that was not really
appreciated until someone from the inside came out to basically
disclose what the purpose of that facility and site was.
Mr. Shays. We do have a clock on now, but Mr. Tierney has
joined us and I am eager to have my colleagues jump in. But let
me make sure that I am not, that we are spelling it out. Is it
your testimony before us that without an insider you could
basically disguise the use of the facility even with the
inspections?
Colonel Kadlec. Sir, again that's the practical experience
that came out of that episode. I think again Dr. Zelicoff
touched on the point of intent, that it is very difficult to
look at a fermentation kettle that is used for vaccines that
may well be used in 7 days or 7 hours after the inspection team
leaves to produce something other than a benign vaccine, and
again it is the dual use nature of the problem.
Ms. Rosenberg. I have talked with some of the inspectors
who entered that single cell protein plant, so called, and who
said they only had to step inside to recognize that this was
something much more than a single cell protein plant. They
didn't know exactly what it was and we did not find that out
until after the defection. But the point I would like to make
is that we knew Iraq was up to something. We knew we had to
keep our eye on them. And that is the kind of thing that the
protocol can do. It will not give us the full answer, but the
important thing is that we watch them so they don't go beyond.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Smithson, did you have a response? Dr.
Rosenberg, I am sorry, I am going to ask you to repeat your
last point. I got distracted.
Ms. Rosenberg. I said that I have spoken with inspectors
with UNSCOM who entered that single cell protein plant that Bob
mentioned and they could tell immediately that plant was
something more.
Mr. Shays. I got that part but then you made another point.
Ms. Rosenberg. Yes, and even though they did not know
exactly what it was for they knew that the Iraqis were lying.
They knew they were up to something and they knew enough to
keep their eye on it and to keep looking and to focus on
preventing them from using that plant for some illicit purpose,
which they succeeded in doing.
So I think this is a good example of what the protocol can
do. It may not give us the full answer but it raises suspicions
that will allow us to keep our attention on possible trouble
points.
Mr. Shays. I will let both of you respond, but I have an
observation, that I am wondering if only the human intelligence
can detect the wrongful intent of violating the BWC. In other
words, there are building signatures and you can't determine
intent, say, from a satellite photo or hear intent on an e-mail
interception. It seems to me that you almost need an insider to
say bad things are happening here. Without that insider you are
going to have a problem.
Ms. Rosenberg. An insider or an inspector from a regime
like the protocol would set up.
Mr. Shays. Because I think that an inspector, they close
down the operation.
Ms. Rosenberg. But that doesn't matter, you see. We are not
doing anything I believe at this plant that Bob mentioned. You
don't have to see it operating. It's capabilities that count.
It was much too, what's the word, it had capability that
wouldn't be needed to make single cell protein. It was much too
elaborate for that. And the inspectors immediately recognized
that this could be used for something other than what they said
it was.
Mr. Shays. I am going to jump both of you for a second, but
the bottom line is isn't that the problem. My limited
understanding of this issue is if you have dual uses it can be
used for something other than a legitimate use.
Ms. Rosenberg. That's right, but the point is you have to
declare in a regime--like the protocols, you have to declare
what is the use and there's evidence. If you say you're making
a pharmaceutical you can find out what's on the market that is
coming out of that place, you see. So you have a lot of other
evidence with which to compare the capabilities and if they are
beyond what are needed that raises suspicions. So all right,
you don't bomb them, but you keep an eye on them.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. I just want to followup on that. You go on. I
am looking at some of the comments that Ambassador Mahley made
not too long ago. There is a real value in increasing the
transparency associated with biological activity. This could in
our view complicate the efforts of countries to cheat on their
Biological Weapons Convention obligations. The United States
believes investigations are one of the most essential elements
of a BWC transparency regime. Actually talking to scientists
and production workers on the ground as well as observing the
atmospherics at a facility are ways for experienced observers
to detect anomalies. One can never discount either the
whistleblower prospect of an employee or the ineptitude or a
coverup of an illicit activity. While there is no likely way to
judge the likelihood of such an outcome, the deterrence
component is useful since it complicates the life of a
potential proliferator.
I see in that what you are talking about, but I also wonder
what has changed in the Bush administration to all of a sudden
back off these comments made by the Ambassador. What's happened
in the interim on that? Why is that still useful? We understand
that they are not fool proof and they're not absolute, but
there are advantages in moving in this direction. And what has
changed on that and why would they pull their witnesses today,
who would be able to expand on that? And Ambassador Mahley
might be able to tell us if in fact he has had a change of
heart there.
Ms. Rosenberg. Well, I think we have to consider the
possibility that this administration's policy here is not
determined by the logic of this particular situation but by an
ideological view of arms control in general, particularly
multilateral.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Rosenberg, in all fairness before Mr.
Tierney came here you acknowledged that for the last so many
years there has been no movement forward.
Ms. Rosenberg. I did, yes.
Mr. Shays. Let me just finish this one question.
Ms. Rosenberg. Let me say a pox on both your parties. I
think the common interest calls for doing something on
biological weapons and I don't think either party is pushing
appropriately. I am not standing behind either one.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney asked if I was happy now. Let me
have both of you respond.
Ms. Smithson. I too have spent a fair amount of time in the
company of individuals who served on the United Nations Special
Commission inspections. One of the things they told me time and
again, as well as the individual who went into Soviet
facilities, is that literally the minute they walked in the
door they knew they were in the midst of something that didn't
walk and quack like a duck. In other words, they were in the
middle of biological warfare facilities, and that is one of the
most important things that these inspections may be able to
tell us if we actually figure out the right way to do them.
As for the application of the satellite assets and SIGINT
and MAZINT and other types of capabilities, I fear your
suspicions are probably correct. We may not be able to tell as
much from those capabilities as we might have been for other
types of weapons of mass destruction. And in terms of work that
was done in our brainstorming sessions, one of the things that
all groups of experts that sat around our table consistently
pointed out is that if inspectors went in the door one of the
things they would look for would be inconsistencies with a
stated purpose. This would be waste treatment capabilities
beyond the needs of the facility, containment capacities beyond
the needs of the facilities or less than what they stated they
needed, or other types of activities or capabilities at a site
that simply didn't fit with what they said they were doing, in
their multiple ways that these experts from industry, from
research institutions believed that this could be tracked
through monitoring procedures. We just need to work harder to
figure that out.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Zelicoff, do you want to make a comment? Did
you forget what it was that you wanted to make? It was a while
ago.
Mr. Zelicoff. I don't think so. I have to respond to
several things that Barbara said because I think we are going
down a path----
Mr. Shays. You have to use last names. I am not on a first
name basis, so I am forgetting who Barbara is.
Mr. Zelicoff. Dr. Rosenberg.
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry, I would like to be on a first name
basis with the doctor, but not yet.
Mr. Zelicoff. We are going down a path that I don't think
is particularly useful for the work of the committee. When I
was practicing medicine we had a diagnostic tool that was 100
percent likely to find a disease, and it was called the 20-20
retrospectroscope. We would practice it all the time, and I am
afraid that is what we are hearing right now with regard to the
Iraqi UNSCOM program. Let's be clear, but for the defection of
Kamel Hassan we would not have had any idea of where to look
and what to look for.
Mr. Shays. I might say he was a whistleblower that had his
head chopped off. Disincentive to whistleblowers.
Mr. Zelicoff. That is correct. But even if it were true
that we could go into a facility and smell something rotten, I
want you to consider that biotechnology has advanced enormously
in just the past 5 years. I suspect that if the Iraqis are
carrying out a biological weapons program or if the Russians
are carrying out a biological weapons program, they are not
doing it like they did it even 5 years ago. Large scale
fermenters, facilities for waste treatment, all of that is
passe. It is completely irrelevant and this is simply because
of the advances in the modern tools of biotechnology which
require no large scale facility, don't require any special kind
of equipment and could easily be done in a laboratory that
would be a tenth the size of this room. Indeed, the Russians in
particular have adopted what they call a just in time
philosophy for biological weapons. They no longer brew up large
batches of anthrax in enormous fermentation facilities. Rather,
if the need should arise, the Russians plan to make their
biological weapons en route to the front on rail cars. Small
facilities can take tiny amounts of biological material, a few
organisms, and have hundreds of pounds of organisms like
anthrax in just a number of days.
Now let me return to something Mr. Schrock said because I
think this is the way the committee ought to look at the
utility of a measure being proposed in the current chairman's
text. Whenever a measure takes place, it is very much like a
medical diagnostic test. So I will give you an analogy that I
think is apropos here. That is to imagine doing a cardiac
stress test on everybody sitting up there. I will lay you
dollars to doughnuts, and that would include the people sitting
along the wall, that at least one of you will have a positive
cardiac stress test. Does that mean that person has coronary
disease? Absolutely not, because the test has about a 5 percent
false positive test. So if you do it 10 or 20 times it is
improbable that you not get a positive even though the person
does not have a coronary disease.
I state this to emphasize an important point. When you
carry out a measure or combination of measures and call those
measures a protocol, there are three possible outcomes. The
protocol could make the treaty better. The protocol could have
no effect whatsoever on the treaty. The protocol could make the
treaty worse. How could it make the treaty worse? By generating
numerous false positives that both undermine the political
consensus for the treaty as well as undermine the technical
validity of those tests. This is precisely why Ambassador
Mahley referred to certain measures that could be useful for
increasing confidence but they do not meet the standards that
we associate at least minimally with verification.
In particular, I think I want to summarize the one point
that I think everybody on the panel agrees on. We can make the
Biological Weapons Convention and the world a much better place
if we can somehow enhance disease monitoring. I think that is
obvious how that will help public health. But to address Mr.
Schrock's point, will it verify the convention? No. However, on
those rare occasions, like what happened in Sverdlovsk in 1979,
when there is an accident or an experiment gone awry, or even a
potential test of a biological weapon, should disease take
place in either animals, human or even in plants, I am as
confident as I can be about anything in science in saying that
I am quite certain that the tools of modern epidemiology can
separate a naturally occurring event from a man-made or
intentional event. Will that verify the treaty? No, because
those episodes are rare. In fact to the best of my knowledge,
we have only had one. However, what it will do is set us down
the path of enhancing disease monitoring, which will indeed
complicate the activities of someone who wants to violate the
treaty because ultimately they will have to test.
Mr. Shays. Interesting point, but if we are disease
monitoring then the disease has already taken root.
Mr. Zelicoff. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney, you have the floor for as much time
as you want.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having
these hearings. I will just ask the chairman one question. I am
a little late in getting here and I apologize for that. First
of all, have the testimonies of Ambassador Sheaks and
Ambassador Mahley that were submitted for the panel that did
not occur, have they been put on the record yet and, if not,
may we by unanimous consent put them on the record?
Mr. Shays. Sure, we will put them on the record; just note
that they weren't put under oath but the testimony is obviously
submitted by them and they will be put on the record. Without
objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statements of Ambassador Sheaks and
Ambassador Mahley follow:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Is there some indication that the
Ambassadors will be with us soon so they can testify before the
committee?
Mr. Shays. Yes, they asked for a postponement until the
administration is totally certain in what direction they want
to head and they feel that will happen in the next few weeks.
And let me say to the gentleman, we will call them before the
committee.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. My concern is of course this will
be at least the third instance of when this administration has
unilaterally pulled back from an international commitment that
people in other countries thought they had some right to rely
would at least be consulted and have the issue discussed with
them before such action was taken. You have the Kyoto Accords
and the national missile defense situation and now this. I
would like to see us have a more cooperative attitude and
relationship with people in dealing with an international
respect for our own credibility and for the sake of trying to
move forward on some of these.
I get the sense, Mr. Zelicoff, that you don't feel that any
protocol is useful in this or am I overstating the case?
Mr. Zelicoff. Yes, I'm sorry you weren't here earlier. You
are overstating the case. I do believe that a protocol that
focuses on challenge inspections for specific cause as opposed
to routine random inspections for no cause at all.
Mr. Shays. Could I ask you to defer? Don't be offended by
someone. A Member is in many places and I don't want to
discourage a Member from asking any question if they weren't
here. I just want to say to all the panelists this gentleman
works very hard and he may ask a question and we'll just repeat
it. And frankly it takes me three times to understand it, so it
is good reinforcement for me.
Mr. Zelicoff. Thank you. And the second item, Mr. Tierney,
was enhanced disease surveillance, and I believe that would
make a very credible protocol.
Mr. Tierney. As that was just discussed--while you are
saying that, I have the same thought the chairman had and that
is sort of after the horse is out of barn and a little bit
tough in doing as much good collectively in that. Going back to
your first issue, how do--is the only way I'm going to know to
challenge it--how am I going to make a challenge if I don't
have any information from inspections or other activities?
Mr. Zelicoff. Through the usual means, which tend to be
national technical means or some sort of evidence that an
accident has taken place. It is a tough problem.
Mr. Tierney. Again, a situation would have to occur, an
accident or something like that, to give us an indication.
Mr. Zelicoff. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of
intelligence identifying a site that is high probability for
violation.
Mr. Tierney. Dr. Smithson, do you agree? Is that your
position also? Do you have other reasons or other ways that you
think we might move forward on this?
Ms. Smithson. The groups of experts that sat around the
Stimson Center's table from industry, from research institutes,
from academia, from defense contractors and also veterans from
various types of inspection activities would all advise that
this chairman's text be rejected simply because it's not strong
enough to do what we would like for it to do. However, they
would also ask that the U.S. Government and U.S. industry go
forward with rigorous field trials and additional technical
research to ascertain what can be done. And two of those
groups, those from academia and from industry, strongly
believe, in fact laid out their monitoring strategies for how
inspectors could differentiate between legitimate facilities
and those that might be cheating and to do this on a reliable
basis.
Mr. Tierney. Would they rely on inspections for this?
Ms. Smithson. Absolutely.
Mr. Tierney. Would it just be inspections for cause or
interim inspections, periodic inspections?
Ms. Smithson. It would be both types, challenge inspections
if cause were demonstrated or if intelligence indicated there
were cheating taking place as well as a more routine type of
inspection. In fact, the defense contractors, academics and the
industry groups all did not want this to rely solely on
challenge inspections. They believe that routine inspections
are needed.
Mr. Tierney. For your own personal opinion on that, is
there any way that this protocol could be saved if we extended
out the date beyond November? Is it something that could be
worked with and have a result that was more in line with things
that would be acceptable for the group she talked about?
Ms. Smithson. If I had a nickel for every time I heard
someone say if we don't seize this window of opportunity all
chance will be lost and we will lose the agreement, well, I
would be a very wealthy woman. I don't believe that we need to
hurry this thing and get it done by November. I would rather
have us get it right than get it fast. And unfortunately, to do
so will take more time and effort on the part of the U.S.
Government and U.S. industry so, yes, this can be salvaged but
not necessarily with the formulas that are currently on the
table or the technologies that are currently being discussed.
Mr. Tierney. Dr. Rosenberg, what do you feel about
postponement versus moving forward with what is on the table
now?
Ms. Rosenberg. I would like to see the negotiations
continue, but what I would like isn't the point.
Mr. Tierney. No, but it is interesting and it helps.
Ms. Rosenberg. I am familiar with the negotiators. I spend
a lot of time over there and I know our allies are fed up with
the whole process. They feel that they have been foiled at
every turn by the United States. They have tried to make a
strong protocol. The United States has insisted on weakening
it. Now the United States says it is too weak. They just don't
see any point in continuing this charade. So whether it is
going to be possible to continue I have very strong doubts at
this stage, and that is why I think we should take what we can
get now if possible.
I also want to comment on what Dr. Zelicoff said, at least
if I understood him correctly, that a good protocol would be
one that would concentrate on challenge inspections. I know
this is widespread thinking in the government right now. I want
to point out that challenge inspections are a very political
mechanism, that there have been no challenge inspections under
the chemical weapons inspections that has been enforced over
some years and there is thought that maybe there never will be
because the longer it is put off, it's also likely the more
fear there is to bring a challenge.
Second, there is also a mechanism for investigation of an
alleged use of biological weapons. Under the United Nations
there is a general resolution that gives the Secretary General
the power to assemble experts and investigate a possible
allegation. If it is not done that way, the only better way is
to have a standing inspector and you can't have a standing
inspector to do challenge inspections that doesn't do anything
else. They would soon lose their expertise because they are
going to happen once in 10 years, if ever. Therefore, for that
reason alone you have to have what Amy called routine, but
which is really a dirty word in negotiations. Never call
biological weapons inspections routine. They are random
inspections but not routine.
Mr. Tierney. Could you just expand a little bit on what
some of the demands that the United States made were that
weakened this to the point where now it is in a difficult
situation?
Ms. Rosenberg. Well, one of them was the trigger, the
criteria for declaring defense facilities. Our allies would
have liked to have had all defense facilities declared, just at
least they exist. But the United States objected to that. The
chairman's text therefore requires only declaration of a
certain kind of defense facilities and only those that have
more than 15 full-time employees. There are a lot of outputs
built into the chairman's text at the insistence of the United
States. I still think that the chairman's text concentrates on
the most important sites, but it leaves out others that I think
should be declared, and I don't see any way in which that is
going to happen in the foreseeable future.
Mr. Tierney. Are there others?
Ms. Rosenberg. There are other aspects, too. Our allies the
British, who have been the prime movers here as friends of the
Chair on compliance measures, have wanted a declaration of
production facilities. The United States was pretty much going
along with that until just the last couple of months in which
we pulled our support of that. And that is what has left
vaccine facilities hanging out there. As Dr. Woollett pointed
out, they are being singled out. We would agree with PhRMS that
it would be much better to have to require declaration of all
the production facilities, including vaccine, without singling
them out as some special case and of course have this kind of
declaration be a broad but shallow declaration which at least
covers all the kinds of facilities without delving too deeply
into their possibly confidential information. We would support
that. But the question is what about other parties. The
chairman has tried to make a compromise text that he can sell
to everyone. There is the problem.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Dr. Woollett, is this the type of a
protocol that we should enter into now and then look for a
second round of negotiations?
Ms. Woollett. No, I don't believe it is. I think there is
an undue focus on capability and we shouldn't question at all
the vast majority of the worldwide capability in pharmaceutical
and biotechnology is in the United States. And we don't believe
that legitimate capability should be put on trial, particularly
when we are having discussions along the lines of the
experiences in Iraq. We knew they were up to something. Our
facilities are undoubtedly the most capable in the world. If
someone was going to accuse us of being up to something, there
is no way we can overcome the lack of a presumption of
innocence and prove to somebody so inclined that we weren't up
to something. And I think this is why we are adverse to any
form of nonchallenge inspection. We don't know what we have got
to show in order to be off the hook. We can show what we do,
but apparently that is not enough if somebody thinks there is
something wrong in what they see in our facility, and this is
the quandary we face. How do we avoid the false positives of
any such inspection, and how do we avoid them slipping in some
allegation that compromises that facility's ability to make
life-saving medicines and those patients' confidence in those
medicines that they are taking to keep them alive?
Mr. Tierney. Colonel, do you want to make a comment on
this?
Colonel Kadlec. Sir, I have to put myself in the camp that
believes it is better to get it right than something that is
not right and basically may in the long term undermine what the
original treaty was trying to do. I mentioned earlier that it
was by no accident that the original drafters of convention
could not put together verification measures, not because they
did not want to but because it's hard. I am suggesting it is
not any easier today. And clearly Dr. Rosenberg pointed out
that there are certain exemptions and it clearly puts out the
possibility that the proliferator would have a road map to, if
you will, circumvent the measure of a protocol to pursue a
biological weapons program.
The other thing I would like to point out, and it gets back
to the routine side of the house, which is we have a very
capable military today and we don't go to war every day. We
don't have routine wars, thank God. It would seem odd to me to
say that we have to have routine inspections to maintain the
proficiency of the inspectors. It seems like exercises could be
done to maintain their proficiency, particularly in the realm
of challenge inspections where it really does require a very
expert cadre of people to look at it, look at a circumstance.
So I would kind of suggest that routine again because of--to
have routine inspections just because we need to train
inspectors doesn't make sense, particularly as it was pointed
out earlier that their likelihood of detecting or even
deterring someone's prohibited activities is probably very low.
The last point I would like to make and, again to capture
something mentioned earlier, it goes back to--I think Dr.
Smithson mentioned that you know it when you see it when you
walk into a facility. I have had that experience on several
occasions, certainly at Al Hakam in Iraq, and a couple of other
places there. But one of the ones where I had a similar one was
a large production facility that had an earthen covered bunker,
that had high security, that had an explosive handling
facility, that had within its culture collection pathogens of
concern and also had special handling of waste, all what I
would call certainly indicators of suspicious activity.
But that facility wasn't in Iraq. It wasn't in Russia. It
happened to be in Michigan. And clearly from my experience on
the ground, there is a pretext probability here. I always kind
of joke around with the idea that people are not ghost chasers
because they don't believe in ghosts. It is because they
believe in them. Certainly in these dual use facilities you can
find yourself in a situation because of in this case where
historically the production facility occupied an area that was
formerly a state police facility and had all these unusual
features about it, just because that is what was made available
to them back in the 1950's. So I am cautious to sign up to the
camp that says, well, we can tell it completely and it clearly
gets back to this issue of intent that is extremely difficult.
And I would like to maybe comment on a comment that Dr.
Zelicoff made, which suggests that national technical means may
be the way at this problem. I would suggest it is probably
human intelligence because you do hope, as the chairman has
said, a whistleblower or maybe an informer inside can provide
you that kind of information that gives you the probability
that facility or activity is certainly doing something
nefarious.
Mr. Tierney. Isn't that more likely to happen if you have
some sort of regularized inspections as opposed to just
challenge inspections?
Colonel Kadlec. Well, sir, and again I will not use the
Iraqi experience but certainly my experience in the department
trial visits I participated in, that the facilities that we
went to did an inordinate amount of preparation, both physical
and, if you will, personnel preparation. So I doubt, and this
was just for a routine visit, this was not for a challenge
scenario. This was at a facility that was doing all legitimate
work. So I can't help but believe that if a proliferator has a
facility that would come up for a routine inspection, that they
would probably go through a similar preparation phase that
would probably involve more than just simple preparation, but
active denial and deception methods that I think would if not
fluster, confuse even the most experienced inspector.
Mr. Tierney. On the whistleblower aspect of it, a
whistleblower is going to need an opportunity to talk to
somebody that they are not going to necessarily get if it is
just on a challenge basis, but if it was on a periodic
inspection basis then the opportunity that otherwise wouldn't
exist it would be there.
Colonel Kadlec. Well, that would be his first and last time
to blow that whistle. I can guarantee you, as experienced in
Iraq in the cases where an individual or others have kind of
raised their hand and said something is wrong there, they
haven't been seen again.
Mr. Tierney. I think I understand pretty much what the
issues are on that, but I would like to give Dr. Rosenberg a
last crack at this to respond to anything you might have heard
that you think you can enlighten us on.
Ms. Rosenberg. On that question of whistleblowers, actually
you don't have to have a whistleblower. In a random visit there
will be interviewing of various workers in a facility, and one
of the important--in fact a very important tool used by UNSCOM
in Iraq was interviews in which they were able to pick up
inconsistencies between things that different people said. This
is the kind of thing you don't get a chance to do unless you
have some kind of random type visit. What else can I say?
Mr. Tierney. What do you say about the false positive
argument? I get the feeling that you might be inclined--and
correct me if I'm putting words in your mouth--you might be
inclined to say go with what we have here and then if we can
improve it, improve it later. Do you see harm coming from what
is being proposed now and as part of that harm this concept
that it might be a false positive?
Ms. Rosenberg. I think when you get 143 countries together
to set up a regime that they are all going to be subject to the
chances of its being dangerous for any of them are vanishingly
small. There are going to be false positives that will end up
as accusations for some country, maybe the Netherlands let's
say, is just not a credible argument. The problem is to have
tight enough measures to get anything at all, when you are
trying to get a consensus agreement on a treaty with all of
these countries involved. So I think it is a red herring, the
false positive.
Mr. Tierney. You think that the document, at least as I
understand it to be at this point in time, does not create that
kind of a concern?
Ms. Rosenberg. It has very strong restrictions on when you
can actually go in to do a challenge. There has to be a vote by
the executive council and the most--the easiest vote is a 50
percent vote of those present and voting saying that the
inspection can take place. That would be for any facility
inspection would have to go through that.
My group has done a study on looking at past votes in the
Security Council and the General Assembly and so on and what
the different blocs would do and we determined that a 50
percent vote of this type would essentially never end up with
any challenge inspection in the United States. It is impossible
given the allies that we have. So it is--we opted for that as
the best possible formula because it will allow inspections in
the places that we might be concerned about but will not
subject our industry or others to inspections that are really
not meaningful or don't have a basis that's significant.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I was intending to give you last
word, but at the expense of Mr. Zelicoff not passing the
cardiogram he was talking about earlier, I would let him to
speak up.
Mr. Zelicoff. I did pass the poly--the cardiogram. Did you,
sir, is the question.
Dr. Rosenberg can assert whatever she wishes, of course,
but the science does not support her. In her last statement she
slipped from talking about routine inspections into challenge
inspections and the issue about false positives is not with
regard to challenge inspections. In fact our national trial
experience shows that with the properly phrased challenge
inspection the probability of a false positive is routinely
small. It is rather during routine inspections that false
positives are a problem, and indeed in all of the U.S. national
trial inspections a false positive was generated, which is to
say two things: The team was either unable to convince itself
that no illicit activity was taking place or if there were
perfectly legitimate activities taking place the
inconsistencies that normally occur in interviewing people who
work at any site raise ambiguities.
So it was interesting in the lessons learned in the U.S.
national trial inspection experience, which I would be happy to
submit for the record, what we learned from the people at each
of these facilities, and these were disparate facilities,
separated both in time and space, had nothing to do with each
other. What we learned from each of the facilities was were a
routine inspection to take place under the Biological Weapons
Convention, they would send their staff members home and they
would have a rehearsed set of statements to make delivered by
one or at most a few administrators to avoid the ambiguities
that took place, and that would be a perfectly legitimate
response on the part of the facility.
So in the routine inspections, as distinct from challenge
inspections, the probability of a false positive, while Dr.
Rosenberg may assert it is a red herring, in our national trial
experience was almost a certainty.
Mr. Tierney. Do you want to leave it at that, Doctor?
Ms. Rosenberg. No, I won't leave it at that because I
suspect that he didn't carry out his little trial according to
the rules in the chairman's text at present, which gives all
access to the discretion of the host government during a visit
and prohibits the inspectors even from mentioning whether or
not they were turned down for requested access in a visit. So
there is hardly any way that I can imagine that any false
allegations could come out of such a visit.
Mr. Tierney. Well, thank you all very, very much.
Mr. Shays. We will get the responses to this. This
disagreement among panelist keeps us awake, so I thank you.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that the following
article from the Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Issue
No. 39, March 1998, provided by Professor Matthew Meselson, co-
director of the Harvard-Sussex Program on Chemical and
Biological Weapons, Armament and Arms Limitation, be included
in the record. And this is at the request of the minority. I
think we had asked him and he couldn't make it. So we will do
that without objection.
I ask further unanimous consent to include in the record a
letter to the subcommittee received from the Centers of Disease
Control on the subject of global disease surveillance and the
BWC. Thanks.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0137.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0137.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0137.054
Mr. Shays. Did you want to make a comment? We are going to
have some disagreement and I just want to make clear what the
disagreement is, not that we will solve the disagreement.
Mr. Zelicoff. I simply want to state our little trial
inspections, as Dr. Rosenberg pejoratively referred to them----
Mr. Shays. You're getting kind of uppity. You've got to
loosen up here.
Mr. Zelicoff. I get uppity when the truth of science is
demeaned.
Mr. Shays. I know, but then she gets uppity and I get
uppity and we all get uppity.
Mr. Zelicoff. Well, science is what science is and in the
case of our little trial inspections, they occurred over 5 days
involving 30 inspectors as well as dozens of people at
facilities, and I think it discounts the efforts of all of the
interagency participants to characterize them as little,
insignificant. These are by far the most extensive trial
inspections that have ever been done. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I would like to know what is the
extent of the disease monitoring vision under the Chairman's
Text. Anybody want to jump in?
Ms. Rosenberg. Yes, can I say something about that? That
section of the Chairman's Text comes directly from the rolling
text and it is totally unbracketed; that is to say, it has been
totally agreed upon by the negotiators.
Mr. Shays. Define rolling text.
Ms. Rosenberg. It is the draft text which keeps getting
updated. So at some point the draft text was taken which the
chairman--and he tried to resolve all of the unresolved parts
of it, but he didn't have to do anything with that section
because it was already fully agreed. And the whole section on
cooperative scientific and technological activities is focused
on infectious activities, on surveillance, diagnosis,
recognition, control, prophylaxis, and so on of infectious
diseases. It sort of repeats itself over and over about
supporting and promoting all of these activities. And the
interesting thing is that not only does it say that countries
should promote, that the parties of the treaty should promote
these activities, but they have to declare annually what they
have done to promote them, and there will be a cooperation
committee that will read these annual declarations and be
empowered to make comments or suggestions.
Mr. Shays. I need a translation. The bottom line is, is
there extensive monitoring in surveillance in the rolling text
or are we basically ignoring this issue? And I open that up to
you and then to others.
Ms. Rosenberg. Well, the first point I think I should make
is to clarify, the treaty itself is not proposing to monitor
diseases and that no treaty should try to do that because
infectious disease----
Mr. Shays. Am I mixing the word ``monitor'' and
``surveillance''?
Ms. Rosenberg. No, I don't mean to make that distinction. I
am saying it shouldn't be done under an arms treaty. I am
saying it is a public health issue. If you try to carry out a
public health measure under an arms treaty you will not find
cooperation from all the groups and governments that you need
it from.
Mr. Shays. Let me respond to that. Whether or not you find
cooperation, the issue is, is that necessary and helpful to
have a good treaty?
Ms. Rosenberg. It is very important and that is why the
treaty has this section which calls upon its parties to do
something on these problems and to report on what they have
done. But the activities will not be carried out directly under
the treaty organization, but will be left to the parties to
work with the international organizations outside the treaty,
but to meet the ends that are specified under the treaty, and I
think everybody in the field recognizes that this is the only
way to handle this if you want to get public health
cooperation.
That is why the World Health Organization and others have
gotten together to make a proposal about how to carry out those
goals that are specified in the treaty, and the parties who are
negotiating have found--have welcomed this----
Mr. Shays. Are you making an assumption that others would
agree with? And then am I hearing you correctly? Are you saying
that to make it part of the treaty means that information of
health statistics will be less readily available?
Ms. Rosenberg. Oh, absolutely. The World Health
Organization is always willing to make information like that
available.
Mr. Shays. No. Listen to my question. What I was hearing
you say, and I want to just make sure I heard you properly, was
that the reason health information, health surveillance is not
part of a treaty is that it might distort the type of
information you get----
Ms. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. On health statistics, and so I hear
you saying health statistics. You don't want to bring it into a
treaty because you want accurate health statistics. Are you
saying that?
Ms. Rosenberg. Right.
Mr. Shays. Are you saying that?
Ms. Rosenberg. I am saying that. Because you have to
remember that when there is a serious outbreak in a country, it
cuts off tourism, trade. India had a big problem when it had
the plague break out a few years ago. It lost--millions of
dollars in economic loss. So countries are not--especially if
it might suggest that they perhaps violated an arms treaty.
Perhaps there is an epidemic that somebody might think was due
to a biological weapon.
Mr. Shays. But, Doctor, what you are reinforcing in my own
bias, and I admit it's a bias, there are all these reasons why
we can't write a treaty that will really do the job. That's
kind of where I am coming from. And I didn't start out that
way. And you're making an argument that you can't--if you
really want a treaty that works, it would strike me--and I
realize, you know, and I acknowledge, you know, that something
is out of the barn, but, still, that is going to be one basis
for knowing if we have got a gigantic problem. You know, we see
a distortion in health in a certain area, and we try to assess
it, and we come to some conclusions. It's natural or not
natural. But we want that information.
Let me ask you this. First, let me let others comment to
what you said, and then I'll ask the next question. Yes, Dr.
Woollett.
Ms. Woollett. It's an interesting parallel to transparency.
We want people to be transparent. And what I'm noticing in what
you've said is de facto is part of an arms control treaty,
you're dissuading them, because it is in a context that has a
certain supposition to it. And I think that's where the U.S.
pharmaceutical biotech industry has a problem, because routine
inspections become part of us being somehow checked up on for
what we shouldn't be doing, rather than us affirmatively
showing what we are doing, which is the true meaning of
transparency. So there is actually a parallel in the
surveillance side. The disease surveillance indeed should be
done. We are not adverse to the world knowing what we do, but
in the context of arms control, there is a context that can be
very difficult to overcome.
Mr. Shays. Any other comment, and then I'll----
Ms. Rosenberg. So the advantage of the protocol is that it
requires this to be done, but it doesn't actually do it. It
allows countries to do it outside and then report on what
they've done. That's why an organization like the World Health
Organization is essential to carry out something like this,
because it's the only health organization that every country
feels they have some part in, they are members of and they can
trust it to have their interests at heart.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Woollett, do you want to make--anybody maybe
a comment? Yes.
Colonel Kadlec. Sir, I would like to, because it kind of
gets back to maybe a point I made earlier but also I think is
consistent with the theme here with regard to this protocol,
that some of the more significant measures to strengthen, if
you will, our ability to either detect or respond to these
events, a possible event of use or even development, are going
to exist outside the protocol and that they deal with global
disease monitoring that is outside, if you will, the text of
the protocol but certainly a very important supplement part, if
not a foundation piece, to build a protocol on.
And the same thing with intelligence. I mean, that's,
again, one of these kind of just odd kind of situations. And,
again, it runs counter to maybe some of the other experiences
in some of the more conventional elements of arms control to
date that you do look for more ancillary, outside the formal
text kind of capabilities to help you pursue nonproliferation.
Mr. Shays. That would argue, though, for not having to make
a challenge, because they're not part of the protocol, so you
couldn't count it as a challenge. That would argue for just
being able to do it at will based on all of this ancillary
information that you get. In a sense, it's a challenge, but you
can't use it as a challenge.
Am I speaking in tongues here?
Colonel Kadlec. Well, no, sir. I think the point I would
like to make is that outside information is what helps you go
to a challenge scenario.
Mr. Shays. I know, but it's--we're hearing one point, is
that you don't need a challenge, and you shouldn't operate
based on a challenge. And the other argument is there should be
probable cause. Now, if it's not a part of the treaty--let's
just deal with this issue of probable cause. If it's not part
of the treaty, this ancillary information, could you use it as
a probable cause? And it would strike me you can't, because
it's not part of the treaty process. And maybe that's an
assumption I'm making that's incorrect.
Colonel Kadlec. I would suggest otherwise.
Ms. Woollett. Yeah. My understanding is that any evidence
that you have that you're willing to declare is a basis for the
due process, a bona fide allegation you can indeed use.
Now, of course, in declaring it, there may be other
concomitant liabilities to where you got it from, but the basis
of knowing that there is a reason to go for a challenge,
putting the evidence on the table and going ahead with the
challenge, you're not limited at all to where you got the
information from.
Mr. Shays. You raised the question of capability and--and
versus intent. Tell me, the United States potentially has what
world's capability? Is it 40 percent, 50?
Ms. Woollett. It's into the 90's, depending on where you do
the cutoff in terms of sophistication. But of the most--I mean,
for instance, if we look at pharmaceutical R&D anticipated for
this year by our companies alone, something like $30 billion is
the total expense, of which the high 20's are in the United
States. The vast majority of the most sophisticated capability
unquestionably is in this country.
Mr. Shays. With the gross domestic product of Europe being
larger than the United States, I mean, the whole union, you're
saying that our capability would dwarf Europe's?
Ms. Woollett. In terms of R&D and where the pharmaceutical
and biotechnological industries are doing their investments.
Now, the three principal markets are Europe, United States, and
Japan.
Mr. Shays. OK. But then let me--so should--is R&D more
important than production in terms of----
Ms. Woollett. Well, it depends where the cutoff comes. R&D
is critically important in terms of confidential business
information. That's your future products. Production is the
high volume end, if that's where you do the cutoff in terms of
the largest amount of----
Mr. Shays. OK. Let's just do production. Is production 50/
50? I mean----
Ms. Woollett. I would have to double-check. It's still the
majority is the United States, but----
Mr. Shays. But with the rest of the world, then, we still
are 50 percent plus?
Ms. Woollett. I would say that Europe, United States, and
Japan have the vast majority.
Mr. Shays. Take--so is Europe equal to the United States?
And the reason is----
Ms. Woollett. Not equal, but it's going to be high, too. It
would be targeted, but--certainly on terms of vaccine
manufacturer, there's four principal companies, two in the
United States, one in France and one in Belgium.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Rosenberg, my visits, obviously, have been
guided by the previous administration, but either
administration--so I've met with some of our allies, and I have
not heard the--and I'm sure it exists. So it's--the point you
made about our allies' feeling that we've been dragging our
feet in saying we're weakening the protocol and then we
criticize it for being so weak, I know there's some who feel
that way, but it's not your testimony that all our allies feel
that way? I mean, there is----
Ms. Rosenberg. Oh, yes. I can testify that they all do.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Ms. Rosenberg. I----
Mr. Shays. You leave no one out? Australia you put in
there?
Ms. Rosenberg. I would--oh, no. They are definitely in
there. Yes. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, all of Europe, the
EUs, the strongest group.
Mr. Shays. And it would be your testimony before this
committee that they feel the United States has consistently
over the past few years weakened the protocol?
Ms. Rosenberg. Yes. You know, worse than U.S. demands for
specific weakening points is the fact that the United States
has not stood together with the rest of the western group,
which means that the western group was perceived to be split by
other countries such as China. We now stand with China, Libya,
Iran, Cuba and Pakistan. Those are the five dissidents with the
United States.
Mr. Shays. Yeah, but for different reasons.
Ms. Rosenberg. Well, no, not for different reasons. For
objecting to the protocol. Pretty much for the same reasons.
And the problem is that if the western group had been together
they could have pushed through certain points that would have
made a stronger protocol, but because everyone saw that the
United States was not with them, it was not possible to do that
and other points of view carried the day in many cases. So the
United States has weakened the protocol in a number of
different ways.
Mr. Shays. If anyone wants to jump in, I just want to ask a
few more questions. Is there any--yes?
Mr. Zelicoff. I was a member of the U.S. delegation from
1992 through 1999. I sat in on every western group meeting, and
there was not quite an unanimity of opinion, sans the United
States, that we were the treaty busters. The Japanese have
violent disagreements with the rest of the western group as
well, and I think it goes largely to where pharmaceutical
capabilities are located as well as advanced R&D.
Mr. Tierney. Dr. Rosenberg, where would you say most
objection comes from, the commercial end or the national
security end of things?
Ms. Rosenberg. In the United States?
Mr. Tierney. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Rosenberg. National security, although they love to
hide behind industry. We know that--I mean, the classical case
was the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, where
the industry was very pro-treaty, and the United States was
still blaming some of its positions on industry, when industry
was saying, oh, no, we disagree with you. We want these
measures. They've continued to do that with the pharmaceutical
industry, and I've been very happy whenever there's been any
resistance on the part of industry. But I don't believe that's
where the real problem lies.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Rosenberg, you talked about our allies and
where they stand. Who represents the greatest threat in terms
of the production and use of biological agents?
Ms. Rosenberg. Which countries? None of our allies.
Mr. Shays. None of our allies. Correct. So who are they?
Ms. Rosenberg. Well, you know, there's the usual 10 or 12
that are always cited.
Mr. Shays. And why don't you cite them for me. Who----
Ms. Rosenberg. Which of the countries are?
Mr. Shays. Yeah.
Ms. Rosenberg. North Korea, Syria, China, Israel, maybe
Libya. I'm not sure whether Libya is in there right now. Well,
India and Pakistan have occasionally been mentioned. I think
they're pretty uncertain. It's the usual suspects, in other
words.
Mr. Shays. We've left out one or two.
Ms. Rosenberg. Right.
Mr. Shays. But the bottom line to it is that they are all--
the irony is that I don't think you fear the United States
using----
Ms. Rosenberg. Absolutely not.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. Biological--and I didn't mean it to
sound facetious. You don't. The irony is that we're negotiating
with--in the treaty with people that we know for a fact produce
it, and some have used it, and it's wild to be in an
environment where I hear them speak and--frankly, very
sanctimoniously--and yet we know that they're, as we speak, are
involved in the production of biological agents and believe
they would use them.
So what I wrestle with, knowing what I know as a Member of
Congress--and there is more that we could put on the table that
we can't. I mean, there is more that we know that we could put
on the table, but we can't--we are dealing with people who we
know have the capability and the interest and potentially the
inclination to use biological agents. Those are the groups that
I'm most concerned with, and yet I'm wondering if we have the
capability with a treaty to prevent them from debating it, you
know, research, doing the production and so on, because I side
on the equation that says it's not the gigantic plant, but it
is--you could do it in trucks. You can move trucks. You can do
it in tents.
So get me beyond that. If I can get beyond that, then I
would be a lot more receptive to your eagerness to see this
treaty move forward.
Ms. Rosenberg. Well, first of all, it's interesting that
many of these countries that are suspected are involved in the
negotiations, and I think that's a big advantage, because they
obviously don't want to admit their interest in biological
weapons----
Mr. Shays. Could I----
Ms. Rosenberg [continuing]. And they therefore are not
going to block the treaty because----
Mr. Shays. But that to me is the hypocrisy of it all.
Ms. Rosenberg. Hypocrisy, who cares, as long as we are able
to get onsite or, you know, as long as we're----
Mr. Shays. What good does it do to get onsite if they move
the truck, if they move the tents, if they shut down the--see,
because my--this is sincerely asked. It's right--and it's maybe
my ignorance, but I can see the capability--if you were trying
to put out incredible amounts of this, you would build a big
facility, and it would have a signature to it, and you would
all know. But a country that simply has more interest in
terrorist use, in production over years but low output but over
time it adds up, they have the capability, and the treaty in my
judgment would be a joke----
Ms. Rosenberg. Well, you don't----
Mr. Shays [continuing]. For preventing those.
Ms. Rosenberg. Excuse me. You don't add up biological
weapons, because they don't--most of them don't have that long
a shelf life.
Mr. Shays. That's true.
Ms. Rosenberg. And to do any----
Mr. Shays. Other than something like anthrax.
Ms. Rosenberg. Right.
Mr. Shays. Well, but--no. With all due respect, we----
Ms. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. Are having all our military have
vaccines on that, so it's not a minimal concern. Anthrax seems
to be the one that most have the biggest concern about.
But, at any rate, your point is, some are, some aren't----
Ms. Rosenberg. Well, my point is that I think there has
been a lot of hype about the terrorist possibilities of bathtub
production and that kind of thing. I think that producing--that
developing and producing biological weapons is not an easy
task. You might be able to produce it in a boxcar, but you have
to have tested it somewhere before. You've got to have a lot of
knowledge about it. You have to know how to deliver it. You
have to know that it's going to stay viable as an aerosol.
There is an awful lot of information you need. It's not simple.
And, you know, Russia, which was a problem--I mean, the
Soviet Union, had tens--dozens of tons of smallpox and other
agents stockpiled. Those are the problems that we have--we want
to know about, and we didn't. So----
Mr. Shays. Yeah. I----
Ms. Rosenberg [continuing]. You know, the boxcar that
hasn't bothered to do testing somewhere, that hasn't gone
through a whole process of development, you know, is--it may be
a little--has a little bit of danger involved, but it's minor
compared to the big time.
Mr. Shays. OK. I will--I see some hands going up. Mr.
Gilman is here, and I would call on him if he would like to be
recognized.
But I do want to say to you, it may be only a few years
that I've been involved, this committee and me in particular,
in the whole issue of this protocol, but it has been years and
years that I've been involved in the issue of terrorism. And I
can't emphasize enough my concern. I believe there will be a
biological, chemical or nuclear attack on the United States. I
have no reluctance in saying it. It's not a question of if it
will happen. It's a question of when and where and, obviously,
the magnitude.
And, you know, this kind of treaty, in my judgment, will
not stop any of the kind of concern that I particularly have.
And--but it's not to say we shouldn't be trying to make a good
treaty. I just have not yet in my own mind seen how I would--if
I were President of the United States, whether it was Bill
Clinton or Mr. Bush--since I said Bill Clinton, I should say
George Bush--President Clinton, President Bush--I don't know
what I would be directing my people.
Let me just let you all make some comments, and we're ready
to kind of draw it to a conclusion here. But, yes?
Colonel Kadlec. Sir, I just wanted to capture the point
that you made earlier, that it is one of the paradoxes of a
potential protocol to a--a protocol to the BWC that if you
comply with the protocol, it somehow confers legitimacy to you
potentially as a proliferator and, again, may obviate some of
the other things that we are using today, some of the other
tools that we have in our toolbox in terms of multilateral
export controls that help us put a cap on this or delay it.
The second issue is the issue of whether or not there has
been, as Dr. Rosenberg put out, a reluctance on the basis of
national security or the industry--the pharmaceutical industry
and their resistance to a protocol. And I'd just point out that
it's very hard to divide the two today because of the role of
economics in our national security, but more significantly to
the point you just made about when you look at the role of
terrorism and domestic response, how much we rely upon the
pharmaceutical industry to provide those products that we need
to use to either defend or treat our populace, should something
happen. And I just throw that word of caution out.
Mr. Shays. Any other comment?
Mr. Zelicoff. We have a very bad problem with biological
weapons, and it's certainly possible to take the biological
weapons proliferation problem and make it worse. Dr. Rosenberg
is correct when she states that it's necessary to test
biological materials to see if they will work as weapons, but
that depends on the scenario. But, more to the point, that
testing has already been done. Stockpiling is no longer
necessary, because the parameters for growing materials into
pound or ton quantities are also very well known and can take
place in a matter of a few days or a few weeks.
And then, finally, whenever you think you've got your hands
around the biological weapons problem and think that things
like onsite inspections, routine visits are going to solve the
problem, always consider the case of smallpox. Here is an agent
that spreads perfectly well from person to person. So all of
the criteria that Dr. Rosenberg laid out earlier, such as large
quantities, aerosolization, need to know whether it infects,
none of those things obtain in the case of smallpox.
Were a country to desire to undertake a terrorist event
with biological weapons, smallpox is arguably the way that they
would do it, and the facility necessary to produce it would be
an Erlenmeyer flask that looks something like this or certainly
about that size. And you can create enough material to infect a
dozen or two dozen people, and then they will do the chain of
dispersal for you.
And so this is what the American Federation of Scientists
is putting out. The technologies of the 1950's that required
large fermentation vats have been supplanted by the modern
tools of biotechnology and a recognition that we have
infectious agents that undermine all of the tenets that are put
down in the treaty as signatures or markers of something
adverse taking place. None of that would obtain in the real
world.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Yes, Dr. Woollett.
Ms. Woollett. I would just like to comment that if there is
the prevailing assumption, which seems to be fairly broadly
held, that we have signatories to the existing Biological
Weapons Convention who don't comply with it, are we actually
expecting them to comply with the protocol either? What are the
checks? Are there any checks? It seems to be a real leap of
faith that if they don't play cricket on one treaty they
certainly will on another.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I'm ready to close. I know, Mr. Gilman, that you
have a deep interest in this issue, but you're kind of coming
at the conclusion. I don't know if you want to say hello or
good-bye or hello and ask your question.
Mr. Gilman. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
conducting what I consider to be a very important issue as we
address all aspects of terrorism.
I just would like to question the panelists. Is there any
central authority in our government that is reviewing the
possibility of biological and chemical weapons? Who is in
charge of this in our government? Is there any--we found in
exploring terrorism that we had a great deal of--a
proliferation of responsibilities, and there was really no
central--good central issue, and the chairman that had been
conducting hearings, I think we found some 40 different
agencies that had responsibilities. What about the biological
and chemical weapons' situation? Is there any central
authority? I'm asking the entire panelists.
Mr. Shays. Four are smiling. One is putting his hand over
his nose. And three are smiling, one is smirking. Which one do
you want to pick?
Mr. Gilman. I'll go right down the line, starting here with
our Mr.----
Mr. Shays. Let me just say it is an interesting question
for you all outside of--directly outside of government now to
tell us who you think would be responding.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Zelicoff, do you want to respond?
Mr. Zelicoff. Is your question with regard to who is
developing policy or who responds in the case of an attack?
Mr. Gilman. Who is in charge?
Mr. Zelicoff. I am not the person to answer that question.
Mr. Gilman. Implementation, is there anyone in our
government in charge of this?
Mr. Zelicoff. The last time I looked, there was a chart
that had a whole bunch of agencies connected with various
strings of higher--but I don't know who is in charge now.
Mr. Gilman. Ms. Smithson.
Ms. Smithson. Volunteering has its risks. I'm not sure I'm
volunteering here, but it's fairly new in the Bush
administration, but I think it's accurate and traditional to
say that the National Security Council would be in charge of
policymaking here, Bob Joseph and Rich Falkenrath being the two
individuals that have this portfolio principally at the NSC.
The Ambassador to the U.S. negotiations is Don Mahley. He
works out of the State Department.
The intelligence community, the Department of Defense and
the Commerce Department also have very important roles to play
in policy formulation here, as does the Department of Energy,
because they have a number of assets and have had members on
our delegation for quite some time.
So, in a certain sense, it's somewhat similar to the
organization to address terrorist problems. There are a lot of
agencies at the table here.
Mr. Gilman. But would you say it would be important to have
some central authority to produce overview of all of these
problems?
Ms. Smithson. I'd always advocate having central authority
in our government, but find as a student and observer of our
government's policymaking process that the individual who has
the title for having central authority sometimes doesn't
necessarily find himself or herself able to fulfill that role,
because everybody is grappling for power.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you.
Dr. Rosenberg.
Ms. Rosenberg. Well, this is not an area that I've
specialized in, but I do read some of the literature on it, and
I observe that all the experts outside of government have
complained rather bitterly that the program is much too
diffuse, there is no central authority, and there is a
desperate need to do something about that if we are going to
have a meaningful response to bio or chemical terrorism.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you. Dr. Woollett.
Ms. Woollett. I think it has been fairly conspicuous that
there is no central authority. We within the industry have
worked with whomever is available whenever they are available,
but one very apparent deficit is those agencies with the most
technical expertise are the very few that are absent. For us,
that would be the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and also
those players at USDA that have expertise in the infectious
diseases. Even CDC hasn't been actually very conspicuous at
all. So it's been sort of policy devoid of the science and the
technical, which ultimately will be the limitations on this
protocol.
Thank you.
Mr. Gilman. Colonel Kadlec.
Colonel Kadlec. Sir, I don't think I have much more to add
than what has been offered here today. I think clearly that it
seems like the group senses that there doesn't seem to be a
focal point for this issue.
Mr. Gilman. And, Mr. Chairman, just one other question. If
we were to have some administration of people come before us on
this issue, what questions should we ask the administration
witnesses about the U.S. position on the BWC protocol when they
do appear before our subcommittee? Can anybody----
Mr. Shays. One or two choices. What would be the questions
we should ask?
Mr. Gilman. We'll start again right down the line. Mr.
Zelicoff.
Mr. Zelicoff. If you had just one or two questions, I think
the questions that I would ask are, should we move ahead with
the current protocol as it is, or should we try to negotiate
something that might be either more effective or more
responsive to the needs of the United States?
And, second, I would specifically ask whether or not the
administration has a position on strengthening, either directly
or indirectly, the limited capability worldwide for disease
monitoring.
Mr. Gilman. Dr. Smithson.
Thank you, Mr. Zelicoff.
Ms. Smithson. Actually, the questions you posed to this
panel and the other witnesses I think were quite good ones.
Perhaps I could add to that list. Given the widespread
expectation that the Bush administration will reject the
chairman's texts, what steps forward do they have to--in mind
to keep this process going guard constructively? And, second to
that list, how will they turn the sour relationship with
industry into a constructive one that helps create workable,
meaningful monitoring procedures for this treaty similar to the
relationship that existed between the U.S. Government and the
chemical industry for working on the Chemical Weapons
Convention?
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Dr. Smithson.
Dr. Rosenberg.
Ms. Rosenberg. In Geneva, the negotiations--the U.S.
delegation has talked rather freely about its dislike of the
present negotiating mandate and how they prefer a different
one. I would find out what kind of a mandate exactly they would
like to have and what kind of a treaty protocol might come out
of such a mandate and how would they--how do they propose to
keep our allies involved and participating in such an endeavor.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Dr. Rosenberg.
Dr. Woollett.
Ms. Woollett. I think something along the lines of how will
this protocol help global security and then in particular,
commensurate with its costs with the United States, it will be
undoubtedly focused on the United States. If it's not this
protocol, what are the options they see for proceeding with a
time line? I think a time line is critical. Thank you.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Dr. Woollett.
Colonel Kadlec.
Colonel Kadlec. Sir, I would just offer one, and that is
specifically one that is I think touched on by your
subcommittee today, and that is, has the deterrence value of a
protocol--of this particular protocol--this particular draft
protocol.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our panelists.
Mr. Shays. I want to thank the gentleman for coming,
because I'm happy he asked the questions he did.
Before we actually hit the gavel, is there any closing
comment that any of you would like to make? We'd be happy to
have that. Yes.
Ms. Rosenberg. I just would like to encourage you to
continue to pursue the question of surveillance for infectious
diseases, although we didn't really get into it today. I think
it's a terribly important issue from the point of view of
biological weapons and public health in general.
Mr. Shays. The two times I've gone to Geneva I've met with
the World Health Organization, because I happen to agree with
you. I fear the spread of disease in a way that I didn't a few
years ago, both natural and man-made.
You all were five excellent witnesses. This was a
fascinating panel, and I liked a bit of disagreement that you
had, and I learned from all of you. So--and I think the rest of
the committee did, and we will be transcribing this in 3 days,
and you will actually be looking at the text of it. It will
help us with our next hearing. So thank you so much.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Note.--``Procedures for Investigating Suspicious Outbreaks
of Infectious Disease in a Noncooperative Environment,'' by
Jonathan B. Tucker may be found in subcommittee files.]
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]