[House Hearing, 107 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] HOW EFFECTIVELY ARE FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WORKING TOGETHER TO PREPARE FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 1, 2002 __________ Serial No. 107-120 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform ____________ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 82-307 WASHINGTON : 2002 ___________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------ JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont ------ ------ (Independent) Kevin Binger, Staff Director Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois DAN MILLER, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York DOUG OSE, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York Ex Officio DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel Bonnie Heald, Deputy Staff Director Justin Paulhamus, Clerk David McMillen, Minority Professional Staff Member C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on March 1, 2002.................................... 1 Statement of: Gilbert, Wendell H., Tennessee Department of Veterans Affairs, deputy to the Governor for Homeland Security; Kenneth Burris, Regional Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency; Philip Thomas, Special Agent in Charge, Memphis field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Jayetta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office; Stanley H. Copeland, director, planning and training, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency; Adjutant General Jackie Wood, Tennessee National Guard; and Allen Craig, M.D, State epidemiologist, director of Communicable and Environmental Disease Services........................................... 19 Purcell, Bill, mayor, city of Nashville, TN.................. 12 Schaffner, William, M.D., chairman, Department of Preventive Medicine, professor of infectious diseases, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine; James E. Thacker, director, mayor's Office of Emergency Management, Nashville, TN; Kenneth H. Turner, chief, Nashville Police Department; Stephen D. Halford, director and chief, Nashville Fire Department; Ian David Jones, M.D., Vanderbilt University Medical Center; James E. Carver, director, Tennessee Valley Authority Police; and Jim Kulesz, program manager, Systems Engineering and Technology, Oak Ridge National Laboratory.. 106 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Burris, Kenneth, Regional Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, prepared statement of................... 29 Carver, James E., director, Tennessee Valley Authority Police, prepared statement of.............................. 138 Clement, Hon. Bob, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee: Letter dated February 28, 2002........................... 18 Prepared statement of.................................... 6 Copeland, Stanley H., director, planning and training, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, prepared statement of......................................................... 80 Craig, Allen, M.D, State epidemiologist, director of Communicable and Environmental Disease Services, prepared statement of............................................... 96 Gilbert, Wendell H., Tennessee Department of Veterans Affairs, deputy to the Governor for Homeland Security, prepared statement of...................................... 22 Halford, Stephen D., director and chief, Nashville Fire Department, prepared statement of.......................... 122 Hecker, Jayetta Z., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of...... 52 Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, prepared statement of................. 3 Jones, Ian David, M.D., Vanderbilt University Medical Center, prepared statement of...................................... 128 Kulesz, Jim, program manager, Systems Engineering and Technology, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, prepared statement of............................................... 148 Purcell, Bill, mayor, city of Nashville, TN, prepared statement of............................................... 15 Schaffner, William, M.D., chairman, Department of Preventive Medicine, professor of infectious diseases, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, prepared statement of....... 109 Thacker, James E., director, mayor's Office of Emergency Management, Nashville, TN, prepared statement of........... 114 Thomas, Philip, Special Agent in Charge, Memphis field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of......................................................... 38 Turner, Kenneth H., chief, Nashville Police Department, prepared statement of...................................... 118 Wood, Adjutant General Jackie, Tennessee National Guard, prepared statement of...................................... 87 HOW EFFECTIVELY ARE FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WORKING TOGETHER TO PREPARE FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK ---------- FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 2002 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, Nashville, TN. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in the Wyatt Center Rotunda, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, Hon. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Horn, Wamp, Clement and Bryant. Staff present: J. Russell George, staff director and chief counsel; Bonnie Heald, deputy staff director; and Justin Paulhamus, clerk. Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, the hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations will come to order. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most devastating attacks ever committed on the soil of the United States. Despite the damage and enormous loss of life, the attacks failed to cripple this Nation. To the contrary, Americans have never been more united in their fundamental belief in freedom and their willingness to protect that freedom. The diabolical nature of these attacks and then the deadly release of anthrax sent a loud and clear message to all Americans: We must be prepared for the unexpected. We must have the mechanisms in place to protect this Nation and its people from further attempts to cause massive destruction. The aftermath of September 11th clearly demonstrated the need for adequate communication systems and rapid deployment of well-trained emergency personnel. Yet despite billions of dollars in spending on Federal emergency programs, there remain serious doubts as to whether the Nation is equipped to handle a massive chemical biological or nuclear attack. Today, the subcommittee will examine how effectively Federal, State and local agencies are working together to prepare for such emergencies. We want those who live in the great State of Tennessee and the good people of Nashville to know that they can rely on the system, should the need arise. We are fortunate to have witnesses today whose valuable experience and insight will help the subcommittee better understand the needs of those on the frontlines. We want to hear about their capabilities and their challenges, and we want to know what the Federal Government can do to help. We welcome all of our witnesses and look forward to their testimony. I'm delighted that Bob Clement, who is the U.S. Representative for Nashville, will be our host. Ed Bryant and Zack Wamp are the U.S. Representatives in Tennessee and without objection all of these Members will be members of the subcommittee for the purposes of this hearing. I now yield the time for an opening statement by Mr. Clement who is highly respected in Washington and here. I am glad to have any statement that he would like to put in the record and any other comments that he might want to make. [The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.001 Mr. Clement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my statement be accepted into the record as if read. Mr. Horn. Without objection, it will be exactly that way. Mr. Clement. Mr. Chairman, it is great having you in Nashville, TN, Country Music, U.S.A. I might say about Chairman Horn, I have known him a long time and he is a good, effective Member of Congress, as a lot of you know, from the great State of California. Congressman Horn has distinguished himself in many ways, but he is also a former college president like myself. We have three former college presidents as members of the U.S. House of Representatives now, so when we see each one another in the hallway, naturally we refer to one another as Mr. President. [Laughter.] I also want to thank Chancellor Ghee and Chancellor Jacobson, as well as Mel Bass, being here at Vanderbilt University, such a great university and internationally renowned. My colleagues, Congressman Zack Wamp from East Tennessee, from Chattanooga, and Congressman Ed Bryant from West Tennessee. So the entire State of Tennessee is well represented today. And, Mayor Purcell, good to see you. I know you are going to be our opening speaker today. It is great to be here in your city, as well as mine, for this most important hearing. It is an important hearing because this hearing has to do with chemical, biological and nuclear attacks and what is our preparation, what are we doing, or what are we failing to do in order to ensure the people of Tennessee and this great country are protected. A lot of these variables are uncertainties for the future because we really do not know what to expect. We know with chemical and biological it could impact us and we do not even know what has happened until after the fact. That is why we need knowledgeable people and people that are truly experts to advise and counsel us. You are going to hear from many of them today from all over the State of Tennessee to bring us up to date on what we are doing. Because we at the Federal level want to do everything humanly possible to accomplish these goals and objectives. We want to make sure that the Federal Government is doing its part. Are we or are we not working together? Do we or do we not have the authority that is needed at the Federal, state and local level to handle emergencies if they happen. Do we have enough trained, educated people in place in order to get the job done? And also, what about turf fights? That can always happen at the Federal, State or local levels. Rather than helping other agencies get the job done, we become obstructionists. We don't want that to happen. A lot of you also know that the Bush administration has proposed a budget of $37 billion. We are now spending $19 billion on homeland security. So if we are going to have that big of a jump, are we going to spend those taxpayer dollars wisely? We need to ask that question because we know that in the cold war we had a massive buildup in our defense capability during the cold war and not all of those dollars were spent wisely. The same thing could happen with homeland security if we let it happen. That is why these investigatory hearings that Chairman Horn is having, not only in Tennessee--and I am proud to be able to say the first congressional field hearing anywhere in the United States is in Tennessee, because we are strategically important, are we not? Mr. Horn. Absolutely. Mr. Clement. Because we border more States, as you know, Mr. Chairman, than any other State in the United States. We have six interstate highway systems going throughout our State. We have got a waterway system, you know, the Tennessee River system, the Cumberland and the Mississippi River system, we have got TVA, we have got Oak Ridge. We have all of this in Tennessee. If we have got all of these assets here, we have got to make sure that we are doing everything we possibly can for the sake of our people in Tennessee, and not just for Tennessee, but for this great country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Hon. Bob Clement follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.004 Mr. Horn. Now, Mr. Bryant, if you wish to have an opening statement we would be glad to have it. Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I used to not speak very much. That is somewhat unusual for a lawyer, but after being in Washington, I learned that you never turn down an opportunity to speak before a crowd of TV cameras and a crowd of people. Mr. Chairman, I will take just a short-time here. I know we have some outstanding witnesses to listen to today and there is a great deal to be learned from them as opposed to what we might have to say in terms of knowledge. I do want to welcome you to Tennessee. You have been here before. It is a great State, as Bob Clement says, and I know Zack Wamp agrees. We may have some disputes among ourselves as to what part of the State is most beautiful, but I can tell you, we probably have the main target in West Tennessee for possible terrorism, and that is Graceland. [Laughter.] That goes to the heart of Tennessee and our Nation as a matter of fact. But Tennessee and Nashville is especially a hospitable place and I want to thank all of the folks that have made it out today, but especially our great mayor of Nashville, Mayor Bill Purcell, who will have some comments here in a few minutes. I want to tell you, Nashville, I think, is a good choice because it is so representative of the South. We have got so many things here, as we have across the South, that are important to us, but also important to a would-be terrorist. So I think this is a good area to hold a hearing, and what you hear today will be consistent with, I suspect, the rest of the South and probably the Nation as a whole. Our job in Washington--and one of the things that we are trying to learn today from these experts down here, the city, county, State folks, the fire departments, the police departments, the first-responders, those folks; we need to learn how we can best help them. We do a lot in Washington, mainly surrounding money. Money is really what drives Washington. How we spend that money is so important in responding to this problem. In looking over the statements, I can give you the preview that what they're going to tell us is how we construct this manner of distributing Federal money to help the State's money and the local money. This is going to be the key to our success in battling--in preparing for potential counter-terrorism. Also, I will tell you, as I wind down my remarks, that coordination is so important among the Federal folks, the State folks and the local folks that, as Bob alluded to, the turf battles that sometimes come up. That is going to be very important, as well as coordinating the efforts between the people who are out there trying to prevent these types of actions happening, as well as coordinating with the folks that are out there who are responding when bad things do happen. Through acts of terrorism we see and we learned very clearly from September 11th that it clearly overlaps very quickly. We do not have time in some cases to sit down and say what do we do. So it is going to take coordination among the State, Federal and local authorities, as well as among the people out there already in those positions who prevent these things from happening, as well as who will respond, so there is not any overlapping and we can be most effective. I conclude by telling you that my goal in all of this would be, when I go out to my town meetings and talk to people, that I do not sound silly when I tell them that I want them to live a normal life, yet do it with vigilance. Sometimes that sounds like a mixed message out there, I am telling them two different things. I think we all understand that what we are about here is trying to find a way that we can all work together so we can get back to a normal life in America, as much as we can, but knowing always that we are going to have to be vigilant from now--from this day forward. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this hearing. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Horn. And now we will have the gentleman from the other part of Tennessee, Mr. Wamp, for an opening statement. Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to thank Chairman Horn for choosing Nashville and our State for the first field hearing on this most important topic, and Congressman Clement for his leadership and his fairness. I have thoroughly enjoyed the 7\1/2\ years I have had an opportunity to work with you, Congressman. We have a very good working relationship and put the interest of our State ahead of any other interest together. And, of course, I admire Congressman Bryant so well. You have got a diversity of experiences here among the members and our respective committee assignments that I think is helpful, and certainly an excellent slate of witnesses. Mayor Purcell, I admire you so much. Thank you for being with us and for hosting us. To our friends here at Vanderbilt University as well, thank you. A friend of mine named Oz Guinnes told me not too long ago that we need to remember that the power to convene is greater than the power to legislate. That is a profound thought. If you are a Member of Congress and you recognize that sometimes you should use your positions to bring people together for a common cause, not just what bills can we pass to somehow legislate our way out of the problems that we face. Often times you cannot legislate your way out of problems, but we can bring people together to talk about solutions that need to be pursued at every level of government, private and public sectors. That is why we are here today. I am also here today, because we now know what we have always suspected, and that is, reality is more horrible than fiction can ever be. We saw that on September 11th, and we actually saw it in other ways following September 11th with the anthrax scare. It has awakened a new mindset in our country. I also thought on the way over here of 50 years ago when a famous Tennessee U.S. Senator named Estes Kefauver was holding field hearings all across America to try to root out crime and stop the growth of organized crime in our country. History repeats itself as we begin these field hearings across America to deal with terrorism, which is crime of the worst order in the world today. It is a generation call to courage that we all face to coordinate, work together, communicate and be brave like never before. I do come from East Tennessee where we are rich in what these professionals would call target assets for terrorism. When you think of Oak Ridge, as Congressman Clement said, or the TVA nuclear facilities, or even the hydropower system in abundant watersheds in east Tennessee where we have numerous dams that could be targeted. We have, though, I think fairly-- it would be fair to say that we have made great preparation in the past on those assets because the Federal Government has been so involved in East Tennessee with our security. So I come today to learn more about and help us all pursue solutions to biological and chemical threats because what briefings I've had tell me that the biological and chemical threats are actually much greater than the nuclear threats, and that the damage that could be inflicted from biological and chemical terrorism is much greater than even nuclear terrorism. I think we need to focus in on these unknown areas, which have not been focused on enough in recent years. I also want to open by saying I do not think we can overdo this. We cannot overemphasize the criticality of the issues that are before us today. We could meet like this every week and have the best experts we could summon and we still would not do enough because this is so critical and the timing is so critical. There are a few lessons learned, even in a micro sense from the anthrax situation that the Congress itself faced in just how to prepare--not how to totally prevent it from happening, because that is impossible to totally prevent it from happening. We can help prevent it from happening, but we cannot totally eliminate it. What we can do is prepare for how we respond better to this incident. Terrorism will never bring this country to its knees. It will not. It will hurt us if it happens again, but how we respond is what we are here today to address. We have got to do better to prepare for the response. I thank Senator Frist, as much or more than any person in our State, for the leadership that he has demonstrated in preparing our public health infrastructure and bringing about legislation for bioterrorism responses at every level because we need his kind of expertise and leadership in Washington more today than at any time in the history of our country. So I am here very encouraged, but also very thirsty to learn and to cooperate and to participate in a most important process for the good of not just the United States of America, but the entire free world. I thank our panel and look forward to a very healthy process of working together in the future. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Thank you. The colleague from Nashville has spoken about college presidents and we are on a college campus. I should say that there was a third member, and that was Ray Thornton, the president of the University of Arkansas and Arkansas State University. Then he decided to run for Congress, and the paper in the town said Thornton goes to Washington in big World War II type. An old timer was just crushed because he liked Ray so much, and he came over to tell Ray--he said ``Well, Ray, why are you leaving us? You live in that house up there we give you that looks like Mount Vernon and you make as much as a Member of Congress, why are you leaving us?'' And he said, ``I want to get away from politics.'' [Laughter.] All university types will understand what I am saying. Mr. Clement. That is right. Mr. Horn. OK, we will now have--we will not swear in the Mayor because we will have him with a greeting here. We are delighted to have the Honorable Bill Purcell, mayor, city of Nashville. STATEMENT OF BILL PURCELL, MAYOR, CITY OF NASHVILLE, TN Mayor Purcell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To Chairman Horn and my Congressman, our Congressman, Bob Clement, with whom we have an outstanding relationship--a collaborative relationship to Congressman Wamp, who I know has that same relationship with the new mayor of Chattanooga, Bob Corker, as well as the mayor and officials of Oak Ridge. That area is so critical to this discussion today. And to Congressman Ed Bryant, who will soon after the elections this fall--I am sure after the elections this fall will be representing a portion of Davidson County, and as a result of which, I know we will see even more of in the months and years ahead. Mr. Chairman, let me first take this opportunity on behalf of all the people of Nashville to thank you and the Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations here to Nashville for this hearing on the efforts of local and State governments to prepare for terrorist attacks. Your interest in bringing these hearings here into the heartland of America shows a welcome appreciation for the challenges that local governments face in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These challenges were spelled out in a survey issued in January by the U.S. Conference of Mayors. The survey of 200 cities finds that cities across the country expect to spend more than an additional $2.6 billion on security between September 11, 2001 and the end of this calendar year. On September 11th, the city of New York and Washington, DC, came under a foreign terrorist attack unprecedented in American history. Although Nashville did not come under attack, all departments of the metropolitan government, many of them represented here today, immediately began preparations under our comprehensive emergency management plan. Today you will hear from the leaders of our State and local homeland security. General Gilbert, who has done an excellent job--an outstanding job in coordinating between State and local officials across this State and represented our administration well here, and I believe in Washington as well. Since September 11th, we have all been engaged in the task of assuring the public safety of our citizens and assessing our preparedness for potential emergencies and crises. Within the week after the attack, our Deputy Mayor Bill Phillips convened a meeting of the Public Safety Department directors to assess Metro's initial response and to determine what additional actions by the various departments of Metro Government were under consideration or were appropriate. After a comprehensive review of relevant emergency plans regarding the terrorist attack, it was concluded that the government of Nashville and Davidson County had been and were well prepared to address terrorist attacks before the events of September 11th, and in subsequent weeks all departments demonstrated an even improved ability to respond to the terrorist challenge. This is a protocol that obviously played out in cities, large and small, all across America in the weeks following. Our review of our preparedness was released November 1st. The report concluded, ``Based on its prior level of preparedness, its response to a devastating tornado strike, its high marks by Federal officials on a chemical disaster exercise and additional preparedness actions taken subsequent to the September 11th attacks, it clearly appears that Metro government is indeed well prepared to respond to the threat of terrorism.'' A part of that report that is critical for me to thank you and other Members of the Congress for was the extent to which the Federal Government had assisted local governments in the months and years preceding that attack to review our level of preparedness and actually cause exercises to occur and then rank and rate those exercises. That was an enormous benefit to us and our report concluded that was one of the reasons that we were as prepared as we were, that early Federal support months and years before the attacks in New York. This report also highlights the things we have learned since that time, how we can better prepare for the future includes recommendations for improving our readiness. Some of these recommendations have already been addressed. For example, after increased threats of bioterrorism became apparent, Metro issued guidelines for receiving anthrax threats. These guidelines have been shared throughout the government with businesses and posted generally on the Internet. Since that time, we have also taken further steps to strengthen our preparedness. At the end of last year our Metro Council approved $2 million in funding for the construction of a temporary backup training center for E-911. An additional $4.2 million is now available for the construction of a new police precinct. These were actions that were planned before the terrorist attacks, but they reflect our resolve to protect the safety of our citizens. Like most jurisdictions, we have also assumed additional costs during this time. We were honored this week by the Department of Defense because the city of Nashville moved quickly to be sure that all of our employees who might be called to serve would find that neither their pay nor their benefits were in any way impeded. Now this is something the Federal Government has been a leader in, but we attempted, as a local jurisdiction, to be a leader as well and show other employers, private as well as public, that this is something we can and must do. This, however, comes at a cost. When the Nation's mayors met with President Bush in January--which was an extremely successful meeting from our perspective--he told us that he planned to increase the funding for homeland security for State and local governments. The President made good on that commitment in his budget, including an additional $3.5 billion within that larger amount of money that Congressman Clement talked about a few moments ago for State and local government preparedness efforts. You will hear from Chief Halford, our police chief, Emmett Turner, Jim Thacker, director of Nashville's Office of Emergency Management on our response and preparations. With your assistance, I am confident that we will both win the war against terrorism and strengthen our Nation and community. Again, thank you Chairman Horn for your leadership, for making this trip. I suppose, it is indirectly, between your district and your service in Washington, but it was a long trip for you and we greatly appreciate your work in convening this meeting here. We welcome your interest and we are ready as a city to discuss these important matters with you and the other members of the subcommittee. Thank you very, very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Purcell follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.006 Mr. Horn. Well thank you very much for your graciousness and your hospitality, we appreciate it. Mayor, I think you are going to be able to sit with us for awhile, if you have time? If you do not, I know you are busy. Mayor Purcell. Well actually I will be able to be with you for a time. Again, my department heads are well represented here. Today is also, I might add, Mr. Chairman, since you gave me the opportunity, Read Across America Day. We are celebrating Dr. Seuss' birthday and the children of Nashville are reading all across this city, and then hopefully we will be reading tomorrow the results of this hearing as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Thank you. We now have panel one. They are in place, and since this is an investigatory committee, if you would, take the oath. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Horn. The clerk will note that all seven have taken the oath. Mr. Clement. Mr. Chairman, could I submit this letter for the record from Senator Frist, who could not be here today because of a conflict? One statement he made in the letter, I think is real appropriate. It is not that we are unprepared for the threat concerning bioterrorism, rather we are under- prepared. I think that is something that we need to focus upon. And then also, I appreciate the representatives of Senator Fred Thompson being here today as well. Mr. Horn. And do you want those in the record? Mr. Clement. Yes. Mr. Horn. Without objection, so ordered. We will now go to the honorable Wendell H. Gilbert, the Tennessee Department of Veterans Affairs and Deputy to the Governor for Homeland Security. We are glad to have you here, Mr. Gilbert. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.007 STATEMENTS OF WENDELL H. GILBERT, TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, DEPUTY TO THE GOVERNOR FOR HOMELAND SECURITY; KENNETH BURRIS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; PHILIP THOMAS, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, MEMPHIS FIELD OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; JAYETTA Z. HECKER, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; STANLEY H. COPELAND, DIRECTOR, PLANNING AND TRAINING, TENNESSEE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; ADJUTANT GENERAL JACKIE WOOD, TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD; AND ALLEN CRAIG, M.D, STATE EPIDEMIOLOGIST, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICABLE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISEASE SERVICES Mr. Gilbert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. Mr. Chairman, I am a little bit intimidated here this morning because Congressman Bryant is my Congressman and he tends to tell stories about me, stories that are not true. Mr. Chairman, would you make sure that he exercises some restraint this morning? [Laugher.] I am currently serving as deputy to Governor Sunquist---- Mr. Bryant. General Gilbert, could I just make sure that you understand you are under oath. Laughter.] Mr. Gilbert. Thank you, Congressman, I had forgotten that. [Laughter.] Mr. Gilbert. I currently serve as deputy to the Governor for Homeland Security and I am also commissioner of Veteran Affairs. Those of you in uniform know you usually have a job description in the Army that says other duties as assigned, and the Governor has exercised that particular clause in my job description, I guess. The Governor has also appointed a Council for Homeland Security, which is made up of those senior members of the State government who would have a part to play in this mission, and several of the council members are here today. The council has worked diligently to develop a supplemental budget for this year and also a budget for next year, items that we feel are essential to be plussed up. Our dilemma is that the State of Tennessee--it appears unless some new revenue is found, will be in the hole about $350 million in July and for the following year about $800 million. Many of the departments who are involved in this mission in State government have funding that we call over-appropriation. The Governor realizing that we were going to have a shortfall began to reduce State budgets several months ago. So some of the departments that are involved in this mission have an over- appropriation. For example, the Department of Health and Agriculture. And they have now been authorized by the Governor to spend some of that money on those vital projects relating to homeland security. There are several departments that do not have an over-appropriation, including mine and some that are represented here, the National Guard and TEMA does not have an over-appropriation. So that is the reason I have come forward to ask for a supplemental from the General Assembly and that is before them at this time. What we did in the Council for Homeland Security was to establish priority 1 items and priority 2 items. We are only asking now for priority 1 items. Priority 1 items are those things we think are absolutely essential to this mission. We developed a priority 2 category in the event--and I pray that this will not occur, but if a threat got more serious, then we would already know what those other improvements are. We are very encouraged by the President's 2003 budget. I recognize that there is a need to get funding down to our first-responders on the local level. We also hope that some of that funding can also come to State governments, because we recognize that we are not the only State in the Nation that has serious budget problems. I will tell you that Governor Sunquist is very much hands- on on this subject, and I have received very, very strong support from all the members of our council. They always respond, they always do what I ask and they always participate in a very meaningful way. I do recognize that one major problem that needs to be addressed is intelligence at the Federal level. I would urge the committee to do everything it can to enhance the intelligence capability of this great Nation, especially vertical intelligence, so that information is analyzed quickly and sent all the way down to where the rubber meets the road. That, I think, needs to be plussed up. Mr. Chairman, you asked me to answer two specific questions. The first one is: What is the mechanism for disseminating information from your office to the local officials? Our Office of Homeland Security provides homeland security bulletins. We have already put out four of those. The bulletins contain a variety of information. Early on, we put out a bulletin that explained all about anthrax. A biological threat is something that is fearful. People are afraid of that, and we feel that if they know more about biological threats it will take some of the fear away. For example, anthrax is not contagious from one person to another. Also, the Governor has hosted two--we are planning a third conference call with all county executives, all mayors, all police chiefs, all sheriffs and all emergency management personnel across the State. We found those to be particularly helpful. In fact, we are planning one this month and the Director of FEMA has agreed to participate in our conference call. Information of an emergency nature is immediately disseminated through law enforcement channels and through our emergency management agency TEMA. The next question you asked me to answer, Mr. Chairman, was: Is there someone who has coordinated emergency management among Tennessee's VA medical facilities and local hospitals? The answer to that, Mr. Chairman, is yes. Coordination for hospital emergency management is done through several channels. During emergencies, the State Emergency Operation Center at TEMA coordinates all emergency management activities 24-hours a day through a collection of emergency service coordinators, which includes representation from the Tennessee Department of Health and VA hospital. The individual spearheading this planning efforts on a daily basis is Robert L. Ruth, Central District Manager, Emergency Management Strategic Healthcare Group and John D. Phillips, Jr., Management Assistant, Emergency Management Strategic Health Care Group, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. The VA hospitals in Tennessee are a part of the VA National Medical Response Network. I was also asked to comment about the planning. They are in the process of putting together a bioterrorism plan for the VA. It is a work in progress, but they are working diligently on that, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend Governor Ridge for the regional conference calls that are now being conducted every other week. They are very helpful in obtaining information and allowing us to provide input. In summary, let me say that we are in desperate need of some Federal funding here in the State of Tennessee for our homeland security mission and we need funding in a variety of areas. We hope the Congress will approve the President's budget request for homeland security in a timely way. We also urge the Congress to approve actions to enhance our intelligence capabilities. We must have timely and meaningful intelligence. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, so very much for focusing attention on this very, very vital subject for the future of America. Thank you, also, for coming to the great Volunteer State of Tennessee. [The prepared statement of Mr. Gilbert follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.012 Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. We will have questions after everybody has made their presentation. Mr. Ken Burris is the Regional Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. That agency goes back to President Truman and it has had a marvelous evolution in the last decade or two because of all of the earthquakes in California, floods in California, floods in the Mississippi. So this is a very important position. So, Mr. Burris, we want to hear from you. Mr. Burris. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. It is indeed a pleasure for me to be here today to discuss the pressing matters of how FEMA is assisting State and local governments to prepare for potential terrorists attacks involving biological, chemical or nuclear agents. FEMA is the Federal agency responsible for leading the Nation in preparing for responding to and recovering from disasters. Our success depends upon our ability to organize a community of local, State and Federal agencies and volunteer organizations. The Federal Response Plan forms the heart of our management framework and lays out the process by which interagency groups work together to respond as a cohesive team to all types of disasters. In response to the terrorist events of September 11th, the Federal Response Plan has proven to be an effective and efficient framework for managing all of the phases of disaster and emergency operations. The plan is successful because it builds upon the existing professional disciplines, expertise, delivery systems and relationships among the participating agencies in the Federal Response Plan. Much of our success in emergency management is attributed to our historically strong relationship with our State and local partners. Through preparedness programs, we provide financial, technical planning, training and, of course, exercise support to give State, local and tribal governments the capabilities they need to protect the public, the public's health and safety and the property from both before and after disaster strikes. In meeting the challenges ahead for State and local governments, FEMA's Office of National Preparedness is becoming more robust. The mission of the Office of National Preparedness is to provide leadership in coordinating and facilitating all Federal efforts to assist State and local governments and first- responders, as well as emergency management organizations with planning, training, equipment and exercises. FEMA has made the following changes to support this expanded mission within our agency. We have realigned the preparedness responsibilities, from our readiness response and recovery directorate to the Office of National Preparedness. We have realigned all training activities to the U.S. Fire Administration. This allows greater coordination between the training of emergency managers and the training of our country's first-responders. We have also moved the authority for credentialing, training and deploying urban search and rescue teams from our Readiness, Response and Recovery Directorate to the U.S. Fire Administration. We continue to work with all of the 50 States and the territories, tribal nations and local governments to enhance their capabilities to respond to all types of hazards and emergencies such as chemical incidents involving radiological substances and natural disasters. We recognize that chemical, biological and radiological scenarios will present unique challenges to our first-responder community. Of those type of attacks, we are, in many ways, better prepared for a chemical attack because such an incident is comparable to large scale hazardous materials incidents. Bioterrorism, however, presents the greater immediate concern. With a covert release of a biochemical or a biological agent, the first-responders will quickly become our hospital staffs, our medical examiners, private physicians and animal control workers instead of our traditional first-responders with whom we have had a long-term relationship. The Department of Health and Human Services leads this effort of the health and medical community to plan and prepare for a national response to the public health emergency and is a critical link between the health and medical community in our larger local response. The Federal Radiological Response Plan which has 17 signatories, of which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the lead Federal agency for coordinating overall response, with FEMA responsible for coordinating non-radiological support. Tabletop exercises have been conducted in order to determine agencies and resources for response to a terrorist attack with a radiological component. In addition, nuclear and radiological threats posed by improved or improvised nuclear devices and radiological dispersal devices are being evaluated and the preparedness of member agencies and local governments is being determined to deal with these threats. It is FEMA's responsibility to ensure that the Nation and the National Emergency Management System is adequate to respond to the consequences of catastrophic emergencies and disasters regardless of the cost. We rely on the States and our local level partners, and without question, they need to be further strengthened and supported to increase their operating capacity. FEMA must ensure that a national system has the tools to gather information, set priorities and deploy resources effectively. In recent years, we have made tremendous strides in our efforts to increase cooperation between the Federal, State and local first-responders, but now we need to do more. Our Office of National Preparedness is emphasizing training, planning, equipment and preparedness that will enable us to better focus our efforts and will help our Nation become better prepared for the future. I will be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Burris follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.019 Mr. Horn. Thank you. We next have as a presentation Philip Thomas, Special Agent In Charge of the Memphis Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Thomas. Mr. Thomas. Good morning Chairman Horn, members of the subcommittee and distinguished members of the Tennessee delegation. I value the opportunity to appear before you and discuss terrorism preparedness, including threats posed by attacks involving biological, chemical and nuclear agents, as well as measures being taken by the FBI and our law enforcement partners to address these threats. The mission of the FBI's counterterrorism program is to detect, deter, prevent and swiftly respond to terrorist actions that threaten the U.S.' national interest at home or abroad and to coordinate those efforts with local, State, Federal and foreign entities as appropriate. The counterterrorism responsibilities of the FBI include the investigation of domestic and international terrorism. As events in the past several years demonstrate, both domestic and international terrorist organizations represent threats within the borders of the United States. In the interest of time, what I would like to do is basically discuss the three primary issues that I think from an FBI perspective are most important to the committee. Those are training for counterterrorism preparedness, the effective use of JTTFs and the warning systems that the FBI is currently in the process of getting started or furthering. The first is counterterrorism preparedness. In the counterterrorism preparedness area, the FBI's Knoxville Division, responsible for the eastern Federal District of Tennessee, has within its territory the Oak Ridge and Sequoia nuclear power facilities. There are no nuclear facilities in the Memphis Division. There are research facilities and chemical manufacturers such as Dupont and the Williams Refinery in Shelby County. Key assets such as lakes, dams and facilities owned and operated by the TVA are monitored via cooperation with that agency in cooperation with the FBI. Counterterrorism preparedness includes field and tabletop exercises which test the ability of the response capability of agencies who would participate in a disaster involving biological, chemical and nuclear attack. The Memphis Division has participated in exercises held in Memphis, Nashville and Wilson County. The FBI, as the lead agency for crisis management, was called upon to implement a plan in coordination with other law enforcement, fire, emergency and health agencies. The response was reviewed and critiqued by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice. The most recent joint field exercise was conducted at Adelphia Coliseum and involved virtually every Federal, State and local agency including the Red Cross. An instructional film was made from that exercise and is used in various venues across the United States. The Memphis Division also participated in a professionally made film in Nashville which was used to train WMD personnel throughout the United States. Future training events include a hazardous materials drill hosted by the Shelby County Emergency Management Agency in March. I would also like to list out some of the training exercises that we have done in the State of Tennessee in the Memphis Division since October 1999. No. 1 was measured response. It was a biological exercise conducted at the Memphis Pyramid in October 1999. Domestic preparedness exercise at Vanderbilt University in September 2000. The Memphis HAZMAT exercise with the Memphis Fire Department, and a chemical exercise in September 2000. Operation Black Gold, which was a chemical exercise conducted with several divisions at Baton Rogue, LA in the year 2000. Local emergency planning committee drill, a chemical exercise in Millington, TN in the year 2000. We also did a West Tennessee domestic terrorism table top, a chemical and biological exercise in Jackson, TN in May 2001. And last, we did a weapons of mass destruction tabletop exercise involving a biological exercise in Memphis, Tennessee on September 11, 2001. It was my sad duty to cancel that operation while it was in progress because of the events in New York. I basically instructed everyone to go back to their agencies and we initiated our command post that day. So I think we have done quite a bit of training, and there always needs to be more training in these areas. The next thing I would like to briefly touch upon are the effective use of joint terrorism task forces. Cooperation among law enforcement agencies at all levels represents an important component in comprehensive response to terrorism. This cooperation assumes its most tangible operational form in joint terrorism task forces that are currently established in 44 cities across the Nation. These task forces are particularly well-suited to responding to terrorism because they combine the national and the international investigative resources of the FBI with the street-level expertise of the local law enforcement agencies. This cop-to-cop cooperation has proven highly successful in preventing several potential terrorism attacks. We are in the process here in the Memphis Division of standing up a joint terrorism task force. It should be operational by the end of December. And last, I would like to touch upon the threat warning systems that the FBI is currently involved with. That would be National Threat Warning System first implemented in 1989. This system now reaches all aspects of law enforcement and the intelligence community. Currently, 60 Federal agencies and their subcomponents receive information via secure teletype through this system. The messages are also transmitted to all 56 field offices and 44 legal attaches throughout the world. If threat information requires nationwide unclassified dissemination to all Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, the FBI transmits messages through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems [NLETS]. We are in the process of enhancing this dissemination of information through the use of the ANSIR program and the Intraguard program as well. I see my time has run out. I would just like to conclude by saying that the FBI cannot conduct terrorism investigations by itself, and in today's climate, we depend on cooperation with State, local and Federal agencies. I am proud to say that here in Tennessee that cooperation is at a high level. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.031 Mr. Horn. Well thank you. You did a very good summary. I would just like to mention one point, on page 6 where it says approximately 900 badges were bought or seized in this various law enforcement people. I happen to have a bill on that, it is public law and you could take it to the U.S. attorney and really nail these people. Mr. Thomas. Well that will be beneficial, Congressman, because in Tampa when that person was arrested, he was considered a misdemeanor, and that was a hinderance to the investigation. What we found out subsequently was, two of the badges were Naval Investigative Service badges that were actually stolen, and that provided us the felony count. So that would be very helpful. Mr. Horn. Thank you. Now we have a representative of the General Accounting Office, which is headed by Comptroller General of the United States. They work with the legislative branch, and they are our right arm on every hearing we have and they do wonderful work. The independence of the Comptroller General is very clear. He has got a 15-year term and he can call them as they see them. So we are delighted to have JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues of the U.S. General Accounting Office. Thank you for coming. Ms. Hecker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to be here this morning and to address this important issue about the significant threat posed by the highly diffuse and complex issue of bioterrorism. The key here, as we have heard from everyone, is how dependent an effective response is on an intergovernmental response. I think the kind of forum that you have established today and the opportunity to really hear from the range of participants is a critical first step. My remarks are based on, as you said, a wide body of GAO work. We cover virtually every aspect of the government and have been studying efforts to combat terrorism for over a decade. In fact, we had a major report issued on September 20th and several of our staff have testified before your committee on various aspects of that work. So I am drawing not only on the work that I direct, which is overseeing FEMA and emergency management, but on the work of our healthcare group that does bioterrorism work, our military group that looks at the combating terrorism activity, our justice group and many others within GAO. I am also drawing on our on-going work that we are doing for your subcommittee, which I think is particularly well focused on the issue that we're looking at today on the special challenges in really building effective State, local, Federal and even private partnerships to result in much more effective preparedness. The highlight is that GAO has long called for and been very concerned about the absence of a real national strategy to combat terrorism. Our focus here is not a Federal strategy, but a national strategy that, in fact, really fully integrates not only all of the wide range of Federal agencies that are involved, but the various levels of government. Basically, my remarks focus on three key areas that we think have to be part of a national strategy. I might note that, as I am sure many of you are aware, the President in the 2003 budget has committed Director Ridge to prepare a national strategy, and that is something that now is projected for the June timeframe. So the remarks that I have focus on some critical criteria are aspects that we think belong in a national strategy, and it basically covers three areas. The first is addressing the severe fragmentation of roles, not only of the Federal agencies but of the relative roles of different levels of government. The second point is the essential requirement for performance standards and accountability. What is preparedness? What does it amount to? How will we know it when we see it? And finally the third issue is about designing the most effective strategy using the full range of tools available to government, that it is not just a grant, it is not just regulatory approaches. There is really a wide range of tools and they vary in their effectiveness and some of their limitations. Now on the first point about the fragmentation. One area that we found when looking at bioterrorism was how incredibly complex the Federal roles were. And on the last page of my testimony--it is really kind of alarming--there is a pull-out chart that shows you as of about a year ago the relationships of all of the Federal agencies in having a role in trying to coordinate bioterrorism activities. It is just mind boggling and it is daunting and it is overwhelming and it is just pure spaghetti. It really is a very serious matter of concern. We, in fact, have outstanding recommendations to try to clarify the Federal roles. Some work we did on bioterrorism, we found that key agencies, Agriculture, FDA, the Department of Transportation, were not effectively involved in spite of the fact that they had very critical roles in bioterrorism. The second point is about performance and accountability. Given the large increase in funding that is planned, as well as the compelling need for a truly effective strategy here, it is absolutely essential that we have clear goals and performance measures so that we are more likely to have a successful effort. Mr. Ridge himself has said we cannot just throw the money out. We have to have clear criteria. We have to know what we are getting for it. And with the kind of major increase in Federal funding, the absence of these kinds of measures and goals in the past is really a severe problem that needs to be addressed. The third issue is about critical tools. The difference in tools is that they will vary in how effective you can target highest-risk, how effectively you build shared responsibility, and do not just have Federal funds supplant State or local activities that already existed. And also, the tool can make a difference in how effectively you can track and assess progress. That concludes the statement and I will be very happy to take questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Hecker follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.055 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.056 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.057 Mr. Horn. Thank you. Our next presenter is Stanley H. Copeland, director, Planning and Training for the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency. That is the one that reports directly to the Governor, does it not? Mr. Copeland. Say again, sir. Mr. Horn. I say you report directly to the Governor? Mr. Copeland. No, sir. My director is Mr. John White. We have been appointed by the Governor as an administrative agency for some grant funding, yes, sir. Mr. Horn. I see. Mr. Copeland. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Bob Clement and members of the subcommittee, if I can, I would like to submit my written testimony. Mr. Horn. It is automatic. Mr. Copeland. OK, thank you, sir. Mr. Horn. You will find it in a big thick hearing document. Mr. Copeland. Again, I thank the members of this subcommittee for recognizing the importance of preparing for acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. TEMA is responsible for directing terrorism consequence management activities and serves as the central coordination point for the State's response and coordination with local government and our Federal agencies. In 1999, our Nation's Governors were asked by the then U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno to designate a single agency to coordinate U.S. Department of Justice's State domestic preparedness equipment grant programs. Our Governor, Don Sundquist, appointed our agency, TEMA to administer that program. That was a 3-year program that provided funding to the State for acquisition of equipment, for the completion of a capability and needs assessment and a 3-year statewide domestic preparedness strategy. The State of Tennessee conducted that assessment in all 95 counties of our State. The results of that assessment revealed that many of the counties in our State lacked proper planning for acts of terrorism. Our agency partnered with those local governments to correct those deficiencies. I am now glad to say, sir, that every county currently has a basic emergency operation plan as well as a terrorism incident annex incorporated for that response. These plans are an initial effort on our part and local government on which improvements will be made on a regular basis through lessons learned and the conducting of exercise. I would also like to say in reference to exercises that we do numerous exercises with our Federal agencies and partners to include the Department of Energy as well as TVA and our fixed nuclear facilities in regards to our response. Also included in the assessment, we identified deficiencies in our responders' levels of training. Local government identified some 66,000 responders across our State that needed some level of training, whether it be at the basic awareness level or whether it would be at more advanced levels of training to include operational technician level type training. Some of this training is being addressed through programs provided by the Department of Justice, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as well as State agencies. However, there is currently insufficient funding at the State and local level to meet these training needs as identified in the assessment within a reasonable period of time. They also identified equipment that they had to respond on hand, as well as those equipment that was needed to enhance their current capabilities. We identified some $65 million worth of equipment across our State in support of that. Thus far, current appropriations have provided for approximately 6 percent of that need. To move on, currently there are no funds available to address maintenance issues for the money that is currently being spent, and within a very few years that is going to become a substantial problem. In addition to maintenance, we have the issues of shelf life for certain items of equipment that responders need. The replacement of those items will also need funding. So we basically would like to request that these issues be included in future funding for the WMD programs. A lack of flexibility in the current programs for the spending of money within the authorized equipment list provide by the Department of Justice is of current concern with our State. For example, I can buy a local fire fighter a Level A suit in a volunteer fire department, but we cannot use the money to purchase turnout gear, which is essential to his every-day response. Those are issues that we would like to have addressed, and continue to address with the Department of Justice. In closing, I would say that our Federal partners from FEMA also provide funding for our agency. Those dollars pay salaries and benefits and other expenses for emergency management personnel assigned exclusively for those preparedness activities. Over the past several years local jurisdictional demands upon the State have increased in regards to planning, training and management of exercises; however, there has been no increase in fundings to support those efforts. In summary, coordination of consequence management preparedness and response for the State of Tennessee should continue to have as its point of contact the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency. By requiring this continuity, the Federal Government can ensure accountability and proper coordination of its efforts in addressing these critical issues regarding terrorism. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Copeland follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.059 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.060 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.061 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.062 Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. Major General Jackie Wood, head of the Tennessee National Guard is our next presenter. General Wood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My testimony today will be in three parts. I will address how we are structured in the State, our mission in the State and our issues and concern. The Military Department has three major divisions. They are the Air National Guard, which is dispersed in our four major metropolitan areas. Our Army National Guard which is in 77 of the 95 counties and actually touches every city and hamlet throughout our State. And the Department of TEMA, which is our emergency management, which is spread into three grand divisions of the State and has personnel in offices in the three divisions. Our strength throughout the military side is 90 percent plus. The unique thing about my department is that we have two missions, sir. Our Federal mission is to provide the President and the Secretary of Defense with units capable of performing their wartime mission. Our State mission is to provide the Governor of Tennessee with units capable of performing missions in accordance with the Tennessee Emergency Response plan. And I submit to you, sir, Tennessee is the overall sixth largest National Guard State in the Nation. As we sit here today, we have men and women from the Tennessee National Guard deployed throughout the world. I would like to submit to you that as of just a couple of weeks after September 11th of last year, we deployed units to different parts of the country. They are involved in the operation Noble Eagle and operation Enduring Freedom. We provided airport security here, sir, in our State at our six major metropolitan airports. It consisted of 128 personnel. We also provide guard and security support to other facilities throughout the State, and the number of people involved in that were approximately 65 people. As I said, Tennessee Emergency Management is a department of ours. For your information, sir, last year they answered and had action on over 2,038 calls for assistance. Our homeland security issues that you are here discussing today, sir, to ask about--No. 1, we were awarded in November a civil support team to the State of Tennessee. This would be the 33rd State to have these teams. I know that the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army's hope is to have one in each State. This is a 22-member team that will be federally funded, equipped and trained to assist in the response to whether it is a natural disaster or a man-made act of terrorism. We have, concerns regarding the States medical assets. In the 1990's, in the right-sizing of the Army, the decision was made to take out many of the medical units from the Army National Guard. We feel this is a critical subject to look at in an effort to provide the type of support for a response should we have a disaster. Another item along this line, sir, is aircraft modernization. Should we have a disaster or a terrorism act, rapid evacuation is of most importance. It would be essential to not only move the people out of these areas, but to move the right equipment and the right personnel in. This concludes my testimony subject to your questions. Mr. Horn. Let me just ask you, on page 3, this is not a question in a formal sense. But I see New York, Texas, and California all have blue in it and I do not know if the Tennessee National Guard is deciding to invade those three States or---- General Wood. Sir, along with the national border defense, we have put people on our northern border along Kentucky and, sir, we also have some dispersed along the Alabama and Mississippi borders. [Laughter.] Mr. Horn. Well the Confederates were after our gold in California. It might still be there. But is that a relationship to the Guard here on say going to Korea should something break out in Korea? General Wood. These things, sir, would be a part of our Federal mission. We do have units within the State, both Army and Air, that would be for national defense, that could be deployed to any country in the world. And as I said, last year we had units deployed in approximately 36 different countries. So in planning for homeland security, which has been a Guard mission since the mid-1600's, since the Massachusetts Bay Colony, we also have to consider the men and women that may be deployed, and at some point in time the decision may have to be made, do you send them over there or do you keep some here for the emergency. Does that answer your question, sir? Mr. Horn. Thank you. General Wood. Thank you, sir. Mr. Horn. Although I am still not clear on that blue color. [Laughter.] [The prepared statement of General Wood follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.063 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.065 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.066 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.067 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.068 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.069 Mr. Horn. OK, we now have the last presenter on panel one and that is Dr. Allen Craig, the State epidemiologist, director of Communicable and Environmental Disease Services, Tennessee Department of Health. I think you have done a number of things for us in Washington. So please give us your presentation. Dr. Craig. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. In my role as State epidemiologist, I oversee bioterrorism preparedness and response for the Tennessee Department of Health and support similar activities in regional and local health departments throughout the State. The Tennessee Department of Health began planning for potential bioterrorist attack in 1998. The events of September 11th and the anthrax cases that followed made that planning effort come into focus and pointed out many areas for improvement. It also pointed out significant deficits in the public health system. The public health infrastructure in the United States has been gradually declining for many years. As many communicable and vaccine preventable diseases decline in incidence, it has been increasingly difficult to convince policymakers of the need to maintain a strong public health infrastructure. One specific example of the deterioration of the infrastructure is the current use of an old DOS-based computer program to report communicable diseases to the CDC from State health departments. E-mail and Internet access has been introduced only recently in many health departments and rapid access for emergencies does not exist in many rural health departments. As more and more patients are enrolled in managed care organizations, laboratory testing normally performed at the State public health laboratory has moved to the private laboratory with the consequence that public health laboratory staffing is decreased. Many public health laboratories are not computerized and rely on handwritten reports. There is virtually no surge capacity for large-scale emergencies. Most medium-sized cites do not have trained epidemiologists to respond to outbreaks. The events of last fall, particularly the anthrax cases and the multiple possible anthrax exposures highlighted these infrastructure defects. In Tennessee our public health system was stretched to its maximum capacity and we did not have a single case of anthrax or a positive environmental specimen. In our public health laboratory we tested over 1,000 environmental specimens for anthrax. Since our State laboratory was not computerized, we faced an enormous information management challenge. The microbiology staff worked 16-hour shifts 7 days a week to keep up. This experience pointed out a critical need for additional laboratorians to provide surge capacity. It also brought home the urgent need for a computerized laboratory information system. Epidemiologists, public health nurses and health officials and virtually everyone available was pressed into service to answer questions from the public, providers and media about the anthrax cases. Many public health staff worked with law enforcement at the scene of suspicious powder incidents to assess the risk to the public. Several clinical cases required further investigation to rule out anthrax or other bioterrorist agents. A major challenge we faced was communication. We had reasonably good e-mail and fax systems in place to communicate with key regional and large city health departments. We had no means of rapidly communicating with the 89 smaller rural county health departments across the State. Another challenge was reaching physicians with important information about the outbreak. We did not have e-mail addresses for most of the State's practicing physicians. We were able to reach some through their professional organizations and in one case, the professional society spent the time and effort to send out a packet of information by mail. It arrived 3 to 4 days later, which was an unacceptably long delay when recommendations were changes on an hourly or daily basis. The support of the Federal Government, particularly the CDC has been tremendous. At the height of the anthrax outbreak, we spoke with CDC on an almost daily basis to obtain new information and assistance in evaluating possible cases of anthrax. The individual staff was supportive and well informed. The major problem we had with the CDC was the slowness in obtaining alerts about new cases or recommendations because of the process of clearance that required senior staff approval before posting emergency alerts by e-mail or on the CDC's Web site. We were in the awkward position of learning about the first case of inhalational anthrax and other important developments from CNN before the emergency notification system reached us. As we look ahead, I can tell we have learned from our experience and taken stock of our system-wide shortcomings. We have restarted our bioterrorism planning in earnest. Federal funding has been a key resource in this effort. Since 1999, it has allowed us to substantially upgrade our laboratory testing capacity. We have used this new expertise and equipment to train many hospital laboratories in Tennessee on how to identify and safely handle bioterrorism specimens. This Federal funding and the anticipation of receiving substantial new funding this year for public health and hospital preparedness is an exciting development that will allow us to move forward in some key activities. Perhaps more importantly, it will allow us to begin the process of rebuilding a robust public health infrastructure that will be able to withstand any new infectious outbreak that comes our way. As we plan for the future, what is critical to Tennessee and all State health departments is the sustainability of funding for bioterrorism. To make these new readiness activities a success as measured by fundamentally upgrading the U.S. Public Health System and the local and State level, this funding must continue beyond the current crisis. To this end, we are pleased with the President's fiscal year 2003 budget which includes a continuation of the current level of funding. If Congress approves this level of funding, it will allow Tennessee and other States to hire and train qualified epidemiologists and laboratorians to respond to the next bioterrorist attack or unexplained outbreak. We appreciate the support of Congress as we work together at the Federal, State and local level in this preparedness effort. Thank you again for the opportunity to address this committee and for your interest in this important topic. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Craig follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.070 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.071 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.072 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.073 Mr. Horn. Thank you very much and we will now move to questioning. We will start with Mr. Clement, your U.S. Representative in this area and there will be a 5-minute limit on my colleagues, including myself, so that we can get through getting everybody into the area. So, the gentleman from Tennessee. Mr. Clement. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Hecker, I will start with you first. You rightly point out that homeland security policy is dispersed among 40 Federal agencies. In a perfect world, how would you organize an effective homeland security plan? Ms. Hecker. Start with an easy question, huh? Mr. Clement. Yeah. Ms. Hecker. Well, we think a positive step certainly was the creation of the Office of Homeland Security and the task now is really to, as I said, the first thing is clarify the roles and responsibilities. As that chart shows, there is a designated lead for consequence and crisis management. But the lack of clarity below that in terms of the relationships and the lead responsibilities really need further clarification. An important place to start is actually the relationship between the Office of Homeland Security and the office the President created within FEMA called the Office of National Preparedness. The mission statements are close to identical, so it starts at the top, to get some clarity of the mission, and again, the second point that I had in terms of getting clarity of the standard. That is something that really is missing. Until we have greater agreement, first at the Federal level or perhaps not even first, but at a national level of what preparedness is, because we know with the kind of threats we are facing, there is not one quick answer that this is what it is. Mr. Clement. Well, as you know, I am one of those that think that the time is coming when homeland security should be a Cabinet level position rather than a directorship, whereby they have some real authority. I think that might apply to the State of Tennessee as well, when that time comes--do we or do we not have the authority to get the job done or are we putting someone in a title position without the authority to fulfill the mission. What I want to ask of the FBI and Mr. Thomas, in your testimony you discuss the FBI's joint terrorism task forces that have been established in 44 cities. The goal is to increase that number to 56. These are good programs and participants are highly, rightly required to have security clearances. But numerous police chiefs have complained that their officers who work on the JTTFs cannot share the intelligence they obtain with anyone in the department, including the chief because they do not have the appropriate security clearances. Has there been any effort to correct this problem? Mr. Thomas. Yes, there has. There has been an effort to---- Mr. Clement. Get your microphone over there. Mr. Thomas [continuing]. Increase the number of clearances given to the chiefs in the various departments. What we are in the process of doing here in Tennessee, all the chiefs of the major cities and major departments are getting secret level clearances that we are conducting the background investigations and they will be getting the raw intelligence that we are getting. That should take care of that problem. The Director of TBI is in the process of getting a top secret clearance, which requires the full background. But we are in the process of getting the various chiefs the requisite clearances. It should be noted that several of the chiefs--and it is not in Tennessee, but I have gotten this from other SACs--also complain about the application procedure for the clearances and maybe there is a way we can streamline that, but you cannot have it both ways. Mr. Clement. OK. And General Gilbert, your role in the State appears to be similar to Governor Ridge's role in the Federal Government, some people are concerned that Governor Ridge lacks the authority to accomplish the daunting task of melding numerous Federal agencies into a coherent, well- organized response team. Do you have the authority to accomplish that goal among Tennessee agencies? General Gilbert. I am very satisfied with my current role and position with regard to authority. As I mentioned in my testimony, I get great cooperation from all the members on our council and we meet frequently. I get their feedback and we operate as a team. And also, the Governor himself is a very, very active participant on the council. So I am satisfied. I might also add that I am in the process of receiving a top secret clearance, which I of course used to have when I was in the military, and I have had a lot of people wanting to know if I am in trouble or not, because this investigation is rather thorough. For example, I hope they do not ask Congressman Bryant over there, I may be in trouble. [Laughter.] But I am very comfortable. It is a good question you asked, sir, but I am very comfortable with the progress we have made. My only real dilemma in terms of assuring that we are where we need to be is to get the General Assembly to move ahead on some funding for us, which I hope will be forthcoming. Mr. Clement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. We will now turn to the other gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Wamp, if you have questions. Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to ask three or four questions in the time we have. For Mr. Burris with FEMA, talking about people, and I would solicit any of your response to what can we do short of having additional resources to prepare for personnel problems when you said your first- responders changed based on a different line of attack; for instance, biological versus the traditional responses. How can we get the people on the ground, and how can we prepare to call on more people to enter the first-responder network? The personnel problems have to be immense as we prepare for some event that might happen in the future. What are we doing and what do we need to do that we are not doing? Mr. Burris. From the fire service side, let me start there, it is a fairly unique community in that the majority of the first-responders in that arena in our country are volunteer. It is one of the problems of training, having people leave their jobs, not unlike, you know, what our National Guard faces a lot of times when people have to leave their work environment to receive that type of training. Primary to that is that each State needs to have a comprehensive plan in what the risk that their State faces, which are unique to each State, and how that interfaces with the response and the first response community. That is the reason it is critically important that we start channeling our grants to prepare local first-responders through our State emergency management agencies. Mr. White, who is the Tennessee emergency manager sitting in the front row here, it is his responsibility to see that Tennessee is adequately prepared in that arena. Now it does little to support his responsibilities when numerous grants go outside of his purview to do just what we have been trying to do here, which is bolster the first- response community in their efforts to meet his plan and the State of Tennessee's plan. So that is one of the critical issues we have to get ahold of. Mr. Wamp. You know, I met with the Civil Air Patrol yesterday which is kind of a volunteer force out there at our command if we need them. I had a lot of veterans call right after September 11th and said where can I sign up, what can I do. Well, you know, they are not going to be called back up, if their age requirements no longer work. How can we establish a volunteer force of Americans that can be called into action in the event of a catastrophe in a State like this? That would seem to me to be some approach that we might take together. Mr. Burris. We are working on that through the CERT program that the President brought up, Certified Emergency Response Teams, which are located in the community, but then again, we have to support the State in that training initiative. The Federal Government is not going to actually come out and do that training, it will be done by the States and we need to support them in providing them the financial resources, the train-the-trainer programs and course curriculum to get that out. That is important, because you do not want--in the time of a disaster or an emergency, you have to have people responding to that have some minimal level of training that understands what an incident command system and how they interface in that. So that CERT program will certainly start that process. Mr. Wamp. Mr. Copeland, while I have still got time, I want to get to your question. I understand not only do you serve with TEMA, but you have got a real high-level background in the military. Without saying things you should not say, what are the greatest threats in our State right now in terms of--not specifically what somebody could do to hurt us because we do not want to telegraph things--but what should we be the most concerned about? I heard the FEMA representative, Mr. Burris, kind of list in order for him, bio and then chem and then nuclear, in that order. But what do you think the greatest threat is that we need to be preparing for in our State? Mr. Copeland. I feel the greatest threat, Congressman, is probably the bio terrorism side of the house. The reason I say that is because once a biological agent is released, it is uncontrollable, there is no way we can get it back or go in there to really try to control that thing. That control and that capability is going to come through our State health services to make that happen and it is very time consuming to do that in most cases. So I would say that is probably the greatest threat and could very well be the threat that is going to give us the most fatalities. Second, I would say that the chemical threat. Our State has a lot of chemicals that run up and down our State highway system, as we have already discussed this morning, the number of interstate highways we have in our State, and there are a lot of chemical agents that are in these tankers, rail cars that run through our State. They too could generate, create substantial casualties if properly used or released. However, the response, you know, would be sort of immediate there. We would have a chance to get in there, even though there may be fatalities, our fire departments, HAZMAT teams and things could respond and get in there and actually take some sort of action to minimize the fatalities. Mr. Wamp. The red light is on, but if I could just follow- up and ask Dr. Craig, if the provisions in the Frist-Kennedy Bill were fully implemented, would our public health infrastructure be able to deal with an incident like the one Mr. Copeland talks about? Dr. Craig. I think that the current funding that we are in the process of receiving right now as part of that legislation will be a tremendous help to us to build our system. It is going to take years to rebuild it I think to get to the capacity we need, but I think we are making--we will make good progress with this additional funding. Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant, 5 minutes to question the witnesses. Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have three questions. I am going to go right down the line rapid fire. If you could answer yes or no and just a short, maybe 30 second, follow-up, or thereabouts. Dr. Craig, on the heels of Mr. Wamp's question, yesterday, I was in a hearing on healthcare and a doctor testified that because of lack of insurance and coverage and all that, that we have a lot of people going to the emergency rooms to get their healthcare. That is another issue that we need to do a better job on, but he implied rather directly that because of that, our emergency room facilities might be over-crowded and not adequately prepared to accept a situation caused by some sort of catastrophic attack as we talked about. Do you see that as a problem in Tennessee? Dr. Craig. Absolutely. I think that your emergency room capacity as well as hospital bed capacity, will be an issue in a large scale emergency. Dr. Jones will be testifying in a little while, he can talk to you more about that because he works in the emergency department but I think that is a definite concern. Mr. Bryant. Mr. Copeland, as Mr. Wamp alluded to, you have got quite a record, you were the NBC advisor to the Delta Force for about 3 years at Fort Bragg, which is the second best post and second best unit behind the 101st. Given that, I heard your testimony to say that maintenance is being deferred, and I assume that maintenance is going to be a problem one of these days, is that right? Maintenance on the emergency response equipment is being deferred? Mr. Copeland. What I am saying, Congressman, is there is no funding currently that I am aware of that provides for continued maintenance and replacement of equipment that has a shelf life. For example, some equipment has a shelf life of somewhere between 3 to 5 years, so 3 to 5 years from now, even though we buy that piece of equipment to support a first- responder, at some point that piece of equipment is no longer going to be serviceable to respond and go into a Level A environment. So there is no funding that I am aware of currently being talked about for the replacement of such items, as well as the maintenance of equipment. You know, equipment breaks, it goes down. I am not aware of any funding or at least addressing any funding that is for that type of maintenance. Mr. Bryant. Thank you. Mr. Thomas, as the FBI agent who heads the office of both Nashville and Memphis and the region in between, thank you for coming out at my town meeting in Memphis right after this and kind of going over some of the concerns that the people had. I want to follow-up on a comment General Gilbert made about one of the most important things we can have is good intelligence; and the second part of that with you is that good intelligence be shared. I know the Director of the FBI indicated that there would be a better situation there in terms of sharing intelligence and I know it is not just the FBI, it is other Federal agencies, but we have to share that intelligence. Do you sense movement there? Mr. Thomas. I think there is movement and improvement. I just had the opportunity of serving as an on-scene commander at the Salt Lake City Games and I have been in the FBI 28 years and it was the first time in my career that I saw in our command center screens with NSA information, CIA information and FBI information on three screens with one keyboard per analyst. That was live-time and up-to-date information. And once again, as an FBI agent, I was driving a Cadillac out in Salt Lake, it was a $310 million Cadillac that we were driving, but it worked seamlessly and the cooperation level was there. I was at a conference when Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke to us and he basically said all the crap ceased on September 11th and that is what we saw in Salt Lake. Everybody cooperated, it might have appeared to be a bowl of spaghetti to outsiders, but it was a seamless operation and it worked very effectively. Mr. Bryant. Well, having been a U.S. attorney who worked with all the law enforcement agencies, there was a lot of crap going on, as you say, turf battles throughout. So I am pleased to hear that and I want to again thank you for coming up and standing up in front of folks like this answering questions, and very difficult questions, in a very difficult time. Mr. Thomas. Thank you. Mr. Bryant. Thank you. Mr. Horn. I have just one question and that is, do any of you disagree with anybody on the panel, and if so, get your things out on the record. Anything that you felt counter to? Mr. Thomas. Well, I think the comment from GAO about it being a bowl of spaghetti. I think the lines are confusing when you look at it from a schematic, but when you actually get into operation, things fall together and I think every person at this table, every agency represented in this room shows that we are here to help the United States. It is amazing what can be done when you are faced with a challenge and that is exactly what happened in Salt Lake. Mr. Horn. Well, that is well put and we will now go to--I am sorry, I did not see your hand. Go ahead. Ms. Hecker. I just want to say that this is not our observation based on the way the chart looks. This is really work that has been done working with State and local governments and reflecting the concern that they have had about dealing with the multiplicity of agencies, the confusion that it has caused, the ambiguity, the overlap. I think one interesting example is all the different agencies all require preparedness plans or strategies, they have not been coordinated and it is one of the reasons the Justice program, which actually had some funds available, only four States on September 11th had even bothered to do the plan because it was so complex and burdensome. It is true at an operational level that people do their very best and there is no doubt about that, to try to overcome the problem. But in fact, there are severe problems, there are dozens of training programs that are for the same folks and you are never sure, if you are a State emergency management director, is that good enough or do I have to send someone to the DOE and the NRC and the Justice--what is complete. So, there are very severe concerns which were validated in all of the major--the Gilmore Commission and all of these other studies. There are problems, they do have to be resolved. People on the frontlines are doing the best they can, but there are some problems that really need some streamlining and clarification. Mr. Horn. Well put and I am glad you made that point. If there are no more questions, we will go to panel two. Panel one, if it is possible to stay here, maybe we will have questions in panel two that we might like your knowledgable input. There are a few chairs around. We will get panel two in. Dr. Schaffner, Mr. Thacker, Mr. Turner, Mr. Halford, Dr. Jones, Mr. Carter and Mr. Kulesz. I thank panel two for making your presentations, and if you have heard me on this, we are an investigatory committee and so, if you would, please stand and raise your right hands and we will take the oath. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. First, we will note that there are seven witnesses and they all affirmed the oath. So we will start with Dr. William Schaffner, chairman, Department of Preventative Medicine, professor of infectious diseases at Vanderbilt University School of Medicine. Welcome. STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM SCHAFFNER, M.D., CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE, PROFESSOR OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE; JAMES E. THACKER, DIRECTOR, MAYOR'S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, NASHVILLE, TN; KENNETH H. TURNER, CHIEF, NASHVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT; STEPHEN D. HALFORD, DIRECTOR AND CHIEF, NASHVILLE FIRE DEPARTMENT; IAN DAVID JONES, M.D., VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER; JAMES E. CARVER, DIRECTOR, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY POLICE; AND JIM KULESZ, PROGRAM MANAGER, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY Dr. Schaffner. Good morning. Mr. Horn. Welcome to your own school. [Laughter.] Dr. Schaffner. That is always nice. Members of the committee, good morning, colleagues and guests. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today. I am Bill Schaffner, I am an infectious diseases physician and I chair the Department of Preventive Medicine at the Vanderbilt University School of Medicine. My focus is the prevention of communicable diseases, and in that capacity, I work very closely with colleagues at the Tennessee Department of Health, Dr. Craig and I work very closely together, and with colleagues at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. I have been requested to provide a few observations regarding the preparation for potential bioterrorism events and my comments will reflect both our local experience as well as observations from my contacts and colleagues around the country. So from the point of view of the local response, what is still needed? I would suggest three things: Coordination, communication and capacity. Since September 11th, hospitals in Nashville have worked diligently to create bioterrorism response plans to fit various possible scenarios and drills have been conducted to test their function. Dr. Jones will comment on some of this. However, I liken the current situation to an orchestra where the strings, horns and tympani are all practicing on their own, separate from each other. The effort continues to be earnest but we still do not have communicable disease response in Music City. At the moment, there is little coordination, there is no conductor that will knit these separate elements together to create a harmonious response to potential communicable disease threats and it will take a substantial effort by a respected and knowledgeable person to coordinate public health, hospitals, physicians, nurses, emergency management, etc., in a response to various bioterrorism scenarios. Be mindful, biological threats are quite different than chemical or explosive events, with which our current disaster management teams have more experience. The paradox is, as we heard already from panel one, it is the bioterrorism events that rank first. Thus, the responses to these events are distinctive and we need more work in that regard. The chemical response model cannot be applied directly to communicable disease scenarios--anthrax has shown us that. Now an essential element of coordination is communication among hospitals, physicians, nurses, public health workers, etc. Dr. Meir Oren, a senior official in the Israeli Ministry of Health, visited Nashville recently and we had the pleasure of meeting with him. He has major responsibilities for the design and implementation of Israel's medical response to terrorist acts. Dr. Oren reinforced the critical need for a multi-faceted communications network that ties together a community-wide response. Our community certainly has communications capacity. However, it is institution specific, partial and something substantially more sophisticated is needed that could tie all the elements of the response mechanism together. Dr. Craig commented about how difficult it is sometimes to reach elements of the total response plan. He mentioned physicians in particular and I would certainly reinforce that. Once alerted, there must be a trained response capacity. Given the structure and financing of healthcare in the United States today, there is only minimal surge capacity in the healthcare system. Regular winter outbreaks of influenza quickly fill up beds and back up patients in emergency rooms. We have had a very mild influenza season this year. Even so, Vanderbilt Hospital was full to the brim several times last month. There was not even a major stress. It will take substantial coordinated planning to create the capacity to deal with a sudden surge of patients seriously ill with an infectious disease. Again, a lesson from anthrax. The mortality from inhalation anthrax was much less than predicted from the older published literature, and that is because hospitals were able to provide sophisticated, modern intensive care--lives were saved. The medical capacity we would need in a bioterrorist event would not be satisfied simply by housing patients somewhere else with minimal care. Neither the medical community nor the public would find that sufficient today. Now, perhaps a more subtle aspect of capacity. One often thinks about large, obvious bioterrorism events that suddenly produce a large number of patients with severe, unexplained illness. That is kind of the chemical exposure model--it all happens at once, bingo, you know you have got a problem. That could happen. However, with bioterrorism events more likely is what occurred with anthrax. The occurrence of disease will be subtle, mimicking other illnesses, spread out geographically, occurring relatively slowly over time--a few cases here and there--and then perhaps gathering momentum. Training and coordinating physicians, both in the hospital and in the community, to recognize unusual infections and to respond appropriately is a task that has begun, but more needs to be done. Conversations with colleagues around the country indicate that these are common themes around the country. Now a word about the public health infrastructure already mentioned by Dr. Craig. You have heard and will hear more about the need to rebuild such a public health infrastructure and I endorse that strongly. The Federal response to bioterrorism will help restore some of that capacity which, while it readies itself to respond to terrorism, will provide enhanced public health capacity day-to-day. Indeed, by responding to the usual and to newly emerging communicable diseases, the public health system builds expertise to respond to unusual bioterrorist agents. In conclusion, let me just say I provide one last point-- something I will call a sobering reality check. In order to attract top people into these positions as we try to rebuild public health, one must provide reasonable and competitive salaries as well as genuinely professional environments. I must say, sadly, it is often the case that both are lacking. Salaries in many health departments are low and the working environment is often characterized as bureaucratic rather than professional. Of course, there are many good people in public health today, they are often infused with an extraordinary personal sense of dedication and mission, but we cannot rely on such dedicated idealism alone to support our country's response to bioterrorism. Again, these are circumstances that are common across the country. Members of the committee, thank you for coming, for listening, for responding. Across the country, we have done much; much more needs to be done and with your help, we will get it done. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Dr. Schaffner follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.074 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.075 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.076 Mr. Horn. Well thank you very much, Dr. Schaffner. Our next presenter is James E. Thacker, director, mayor's Office of Emergency Management, Nashville, TN. Mr. Thacker. Mr. Thacker. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. I was asked to speak about how the Federal Government is assisting State and local governments in preparation for a potential terrorist attack involving biological, chemical or nuclear agents. Since 1998, Nashville has participated with several Federal and State agencies to strengthen its local capabilities under provisions of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act. While the Domestic Preparedness Initiative got off to somewhat of a rocky start from a coordination standpoint, I have seen a conscious and sustained effort by our Federal counterparts to smooth out the process. I hope to see improvements in distinguishing responsibilities at all levels of government, allowing us all to work together in a more effective environment. Work needs to be done to improve the flow of information throughout the three levels of government. For instance, I hear Director Ridge is working on solving a part of this problem by instituting a state-of-the-art emergency notification system. I would encourage support of such programs to ensure we do not merely learn important information from the news media, but rather from official sources. Coordination, cooperation and communication are the most important elements of any emergency response and recovery process. In Nashville, we have a strong working relationship with our local, State and Federal agency counterparts. The central theme of planning, training and exercising is to do it together, because we have found that a basic familiarization with each other is vital to an effective response and recovery from incidents. In the area of funding, I encourage direct Federal grants. And a good place to start would be major cities with populations of more than 500,000. There should be separate funds for States, smaller U.S. cities and other areas deemed appropriate. Having worked for both State and local emergency management, I know the needs and vulnerabilities of the major cities are more vital to homeland security. The needs of State agencies are also vastly different from the smaller cities, particularly in the area of day-to-day public safety. I believe cities function most effectively with others of similar size and common makeup. For example, Nashville has gleaned helpful information by working with other major cities under the Metropolitan Medical Response System, a program that is managed by the U.S. Public Health Office of Emergency Preparedness. We meet biannually with our program contact from the U.S. Public Health and exchange this information. Statewide networking has limited value to us as Memphis is the only Tennessee city with a comparable size and scope of Nashville. With the many pass-through grants that give the State a single pot of money to disseminate at its own discretion, government has effectively created competition for grants that are not necessarily needs based. If we do not have pre-qualifying criteria attached to local grant funding, then I testify the system is less effective and basically destined to flounder. Once moneys are awarded, there needs to be more flexible spending requirements. Domestic preparedness funding under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act restricts local spending to pre- specified equipment--personal protective equipment, detection, decontamination, communication and pharmaceuticals. In Nashville, additional funds are needed for computers, software, wireless communications and other incident management tools that are not presently eligible for grant funding. Increased funding for local search and rescue teams is needed. While USAR teams were created before homeland security was a priority, ironically the three major terrorist attacks in the United States required a significant USAR response. Since minutes mean lives, all major cities need to have a local capability to perform USAR rather than having to wait many hours for outside assistance to arrive. Additional Federal logistics support is needed for the reception and distribution of CDC push-packs. Due to shipping and cost effectiveness, the pharmaceuticals and other supplies come in bulk packages that have to be repackaged after local arrival before they can be used. Technical advisers arrive with 50 tons of medical supplies are to supervise a recommended 300 local workers in the unpacking, repackaging and distribution. It makes more sense for the Federal Government to send a dedicated, trained work force with the push-packs to manage these tasks. With proper training and familiarity with supplies and equipment, they can do the job much faster and more efficiently. This also avoids placing an additional burden on the local government resources already stressed by a major emergency. In conclusion, I appreciate the work this committee is doing and the attention that emergency responders are receiving. I know as we continue to work together, we will make our cities, States and Nation a safer place. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Thacker follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.077 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.078 Mr. Horn. Thank you. And our next presenter is Emmett H. Turner, the chief of the Nashville Police Department. Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today. I am very pleased to report that from a law enforcement perspective, Nashville is well ahead of the curve in its terrorism preparedness. Last September, I appointed one of my assistant chiefs to chair a 10-member committee to ensure that the police department maintained a high-level of preparedness to respond to any terrorist act. The committee meets at least monthly and continues to assess the policies, procedures, training and equipment needs throughout the department. We have done a lot since last September. We have surveyed, evaluated and inventoried our chemical and riot equipment. We have requested the purchase of additional chemical and riot gear through the Office of Emergency Management. We have established a primary and secondary catastrophic event staging area for police personnel. At the request of the Metro Water Department, we have conducted unannounced security checks at Water Department facilities. The weaknesses we detected were immediately reported to the Department Director. We have been conducting joint tabletop exercises on biological and chemical situations with members of the Metro Fire Department. The events of September 11th clearly illustrate the importance of police and fire departments working closely together to successfully manage a biological or chemical incident. We have designated 25 police officers to participate in an Urban Search and Rescue team. These 25 officers completed their initial training last month. We have designated a lieutenant in our Intelligence Division to be the police department's representative on the FBI Middle Tennessee Counter-Terrorism Task Force. Over the years, the Metro Police Department and the FBI have formed a strong working relationship. The two agencies have made information sharing a priority, and I am very pleased with the two-way information flow between our department and the Nashville FBI office. I have heard that some of my colleagues in other cities have been critical of the lack of information they are receiving from their Federal offices. I am very pleased to say that is not the case in Nashville. Two months ago, our police officers arrested a man who had pointed an assault rifle in the direction of a Nashville synagogue. Given all of the circumstances involved in the case, we asked the Counter-Terrorism Task Force to join in the investigation. Working together with the FBI and ATF, we wound- up seizing a large number of pipe bombs, hand grenades, firearms, explosive components and bombmaking material. The suspect in this case is being prosecuted federally. The case illustrates the strong relationship between our department and the Federal law enforcement which, in the long-run, benefits the safety of Nashville citizens. Those of us at the local level very much appreciate the Federal Government's financial assistance in obtaining equipment and training to prepare our first-responders for any terrorist attack involving biological or chemical weapons. I do, however, have one suggestion to improve the Homeland Security Assistance Program. While grants available from the Federal Government have been very important in helping communities purchase personal protective suits and related equipment, we would like to see the grant criteria broadened to allow the purchase of technology such as satellite phones and computer software. Communication equipment and computer technology are vital tools necessary to adequately respond to terrorism incidents and should be part of a well-developed contingency plan. Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning and we appreciate all that you do for the citizens of Nashville, TN and for this Nation. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Turner follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.079 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.080 Mr. Horn. Thank you. We have now Stephen D. Halford, the director and chief of the Nashville Fire Department. Mr. Halford. Good afternoon. Chairman Horn and honorable committee members, you have my written statement and I will try not to read it to you. Let me first start out by saying that from a fire service perspective, effective Federal funding of front-line fire services should do two key things. They should better train us and better equip us. Those are the two main functions that the Federal dollars should go for. Let us talk about better training of firefighters for just a moment. We are talking a lot in this Committee and our panelists about the $3.5 billion that will be earmarked in the Fiscal Year 2003 budget and how those funds will be spent, and that is very important. But the training of firefighters across the United States for weapons of mass destruction and nuclear, biological and chemical events has been occurring for the last decade. So it is very important that although these agencies of the Federal Government that are helping us, they may not be getting any of these particular funds, they do have budgets and we need to focus on their budgets. There is a bedrock of training that is going on right now from these Federal agencies that will remain the bedrock and I ask you to look at these agencies' budgets and make sure that their budgets are properly funded. And the particular agencies that produce the best results for fire service training for WMD and NBC type incidents in the United States are the U.S. Fire Administration's National Fire Academy, U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agencies, Emergency Management Institute and the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Justice programs, Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support. Those three agencies of the Federal Government or actually sub-agencies, are producing very good quality programs in those areas right now and we need to make sure that their budgets are well supported, so we urge you to look at their budgets and see if you think they are, talk to their folks. The second objective of the Federal dollars in helping the fire service should be to better equip our firefighters and I think there are two components of that. One is that there be adequate Federal dollars, which I think there really is going to be with the $3.5 billion appropriation for all of our first- responders, but we need not to assume that because there is more money, that money is effective, which indeed has been commented on by several of you this morning. You have got to ensure that the dollars in order to achieve the specific goal of equipping our firefighters actually and directly reach us. It is also important to ensure that after the appropriation by Congress, Federal dollars earmarked for equipping us--and when I say us, I am talking about the fire service, our aspect of it--reach us promptly. We are concerned in the fire service about the channeling of the prospective funds to our fire departments. Now I am talking strictly about any specific appropriations for fiscal year 2003, the $3.5 billion. Those fiscal year 2003 appropriations that are specifically intended to better equip the fire service, and that is only part of that $3.5 billion-- that is what we are most concerned about. We would like for those funds to reach us under the Federal Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. The Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program, initially known as the Firefighters Investment, Response and Enhancement Act, is only 2 years old and it was a way to get Federal dollars directly to the departments. The Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program is the method we would like to continue to use to get those dollars to us. However, that program has essentially been gutted for fiscal year 2003 because it has been included in the large Homeland Security. We want to make sure those dollars come directly to us by way of our local governments which must approve the funds because they are grant matchers for it. We do not need to reinvent the wheel and have you distribute funds that are coming to the fire service. The concern is that the funds are given directly to the States. Technically there are no State fire departments. We will have to come up with work programs and submit programs for approval. We would like those funds to come directly to us. So in summary, the Federal effectiveness in supporting the Nation's fire department first-responders can best be achieved by supporting those Federal agencies that train us and those Federal spending authorizations that directly and expeditiously equip us. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Halford follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.081 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.082 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.083 Mr. Horn. Thank you. I particularly appreciate that formula situation. We now have Dr. Ian David Jones, Vanderbilt University Medical Center. Dr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I would like to give you a flavor of how these issues are being addressed at our hospital and on a local level. And to do that, I will divide my testimony into three parts. I want to talk about a situation we faced 6 months ago, the present situation and a description of the Vanderbilt bioterrorism subplan. And I would also like to identify some problems that I have identified within our current system. Our lack of preparedness to deal with a bioterrorist attack was made very clear on the morning of October 4, 2001 when an individual who was initially described to us as a terrorist slit the throat of a Greyhound bus driver near Manchester, TN. The bus ran off the road, flipped, there were a number of patients who were killed, a number of patients were brought back to Vanderbilt via Lifeflight. While the helicopter was en route to Vanderbilt with these injured patients, we received further information from what at the time we thought was a credible source that these patients had been contaminated with a biological agent. Nothing that we had experienced up to that point had prepared us to deal with the threat and many of the staff frankly in the ER were very frightened. On the very same day, the first case of inhalational anthrax was described by the CDC in Florida. As further cases of anthrax were reported in other cities, it became clear that the institution was not prepared to handle the large number of patients who might present in the event of a bioterrorist attack. As a result, at Vanderbilt, a committee was formed to draft a subplan to our Hospital Disaster Plan, which dealt exclusively with bioterrorism. The goals of this plan were twofold. We wanted to expedite the rapid evaluation and treatment of a large number of individuals who may have been exposed to biological agents and our goal was arbitrarily 1500 patients per day. And the other part of our goal was to educate patients, families and staff about biological agents, their risks of exposure and the potential signs and symptoms connected to that exposure. As a part of the plan, Vanderbilt created a hospital pharmaceutical stockpile at considerable expense to the hospital, that was coordinated and dispensed by our hospital pharmacist. We assembled first-line antibiotics enough to treat 5,000 people for 3 days in the event of an exposure. We assembled stock preparations which were available on an immediate pre-mixing dosage appropriate for children and we increased our hospital supply of antidotes, IV antibiotics and IV fluids. In addition, Vanderbilt has constructed a mass decontamination facility which is immediately adjacent to our emergency room. This was actually the first mass decontamination facility in the region and it was constructed about a year before the events of September 11th. Subsequently, our Veterans Administration Hospital has actually used our plans to construct an identical facility on their campus across the street. Our Environmental Health and Safety Office here is also providing ongoing training for emergency room nurses, physicians and other staff and the appropriate methods for decontamination in the event of a nuclear, biological or chemical event. We have concentrated heavily on education here at Vanderbilt. There are a number of our staff members who were very concerned and frightened obviously when all this occurred, so as a result, our Learning Center developed both videotape and written materials on nuclear, biological and chemical agents that have been taught to over 5,000 Vanderbilt staff members. In addition, all staff members who participate in our bioterrorism drill at Vanderbilt have received advanced training on agents of bioterrorism and critical stress debriefing techniques. In the past 2 years at Vanderbilt, we have participated in five separate drills that have dealt with either biological or chemical agents. Most recently, in January of this year, we had an internal drill involving 165 people who were simulated to have been exposed to anthrax at Nashville Predators hockey game. We have also participated locally, the city's 10 major hospitals have been coordinating disaster management efforts for over 15 years. As Mr. Thacker has told us, this is administered by the Office of Emergency Management and supplemented by our MMRS grant which is an integrated program between EMS, police, hospitals and the Nashville Health Department. This has given us resources for training and implementation at the EMS level as well as hospital resources for PPEs, decontamination equipment and antibiotics. I will tell you from what we have received, it is not enough. My testimony will conclude actually with identifying problems that I see within our current system. The No. 1 problem that I see we are facing today is emergency department over-crowding. There are times when our emergency department has 15 or 20 patients waiting in our waiting room and it is absolutely filled to capacity. The reasons for this are multi- factorial. We are serving as a safety net for uninsured patients in Tennessee without doctors; we are serving as a primary care resource because we do not have adequate primary care resources within the public healthcare system; there is an older, sicker population as the baby boomer generation ages and there is generally a breakdown in the mental healthcare system. We also see a number of patients coming in requesting alcohol and drug rehabilitation. Services that we are not used to providing in emergency rooms we are being forced to provide. We have a huge problem with citywide surge capacity. Right now, as Dr. Schaffner mentioned, a minor epidemic such as the flu that we have had this month has closed a number of hospitals in town. It does not take a lot of imagination to understand what might happen if 1,000 critically ill patients requiring ICU care were dumped on the system at the same, as might happen in a bioterrorism event. We also need to improve our regional communications. This broke down during the Greyhound bus event and we did not know what was going on. We have a number of EMS services with their own communication systems but there is no coordination in the State for that. We need to upgrade our laboratory facilities, as Dr. Craig has spoken about, and frankly our level of rural preparedness in Tennessee is still very low. It is not possible for the smaller hospitals to do what we have been able to do at Vanderbilt, because they do not have the expertise and they do not have the funding. This has cost Vanderbilt several hundred thousand dollars to put together and it is impossible for smaller hospitals to do that. I appreciate the time you have given me this morning. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Dr. Jones follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.084 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.085 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.086 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.087 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.088 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.089 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.090 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.091 Mr. Horn. Well, thank you, that's a key segment of anything to do with terrorism. We now have James Carver, the director of the Tennessee Valley Authority Police. Mr. Carver. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, welcome to the Tennessee Valley. I applaud you for holding these hearings and thank you for the opportunity to testify before you here today. Before I continue, Mr. Chairman, all of TVA would like to wish you well in your pending retirement from Congress and good luck in all your future endeavors. I would also like to thank the members of the Tennessee delegation who are here today--Congressman Wamp, Mr. Bryant. I just want to thank you and, Mr. Clement, thank you very much for being here today. I am pleased to give you an update of the Tennessee Valley Authority security and our ongoing coordination with State and local governments. As we all know, these two issues are of critical importance to the safety of all Americans. TVA's preparedness, diligence and coordination of resources are vital to the protection of citizens from future threats. I would first like to recognize the importance of the Federal, State and local agencies here today. Through their assistance and support, TVA has greatly enhanced its security and emergency preparedness plans. I am confident that as we continue to work together, communications and coordinations at all levels of the government will become stronger--not just here, but across the Nation. TVA's mission is to improve the quality of life for residents in the Tennessee Valley. TVA does this by providing an adequate supply of affordable and reliable electricity, management of the Tennessee river system, environmental stewardship and economic development programs. Our goal is to continually strive for excellence in business performance and public service. In order to fulfill this mission, TVA operates 49 dams, three nuclear plants and a number of other power production and transmission facilities. Managing the Nation's fifth largest river system also requires TVA to balance the demands of the Valley's water needs, including water quality protection. These operations require that TVA have in place specific security measures and emergency preparedness plans. Those of particular interest today pertain to water quality and TVA's nuclear assets. About 4 million Valley residents depend on the Tennessee River system for their water supply. This responsibility requires that TVA constantly monitor water quality for naturally occurring and non-natural substances. We do this by monitoring water quality at 60 sites year round and reporting results to local officials, as they need them. TVA dams are able to impound water, if the containment of a pollutant is needed. Our emergency procedures ensure that we respond quickly and that we work in close relationship, in partnership with State and local agencies to address those type problems. TVA has also initiated a dialog with State governments, updating and creating new action plans in the event of biological attack. The intent is to strengthen the protection of the water supply and discuss the capabilities and limitation with each agency represented. Additionally, TVA coordinates closely with State and local enforcement agencies to provide marine patrols, security on Federal properties, traffic control and other law enforcement activities. This cooperation bolsters the law enforcement presence at these key public health and recreation facilities. Since September 11th, security of the Nation's nuclear power assets has been a top priority. TVA's nuclear security staff has worked closely with the TVA police, local law enforcement agencies and emergency officials to further define interfaces and evaluate new ideas. One of these initiatives included meeting with the National Guard at our nuclear plants to solidify emergency contingency plans. Also, TVA has begun a series of meetings with local law enforcement agencies for organizing and clarifying responsibilities. Prior to September 11th, several coordinating points between TVA and other government agencies were already in place as contingencies for intentional or unintentional nuclear incidents. Examples are the establishment and continuation of emergency preparedness programs and annual emergency exercises. These initiatives specifically state precise actions and steps for both TVA and other government agencies in emergency circumstances. TVA assists in these situations partially by including technical expertise, development of field teams, site monitoring and a joint communications center. In conclusion, the terrorist attacks on America have reinforced the need of proactive planning between agencies. It is of the utmost importance for us to coordinate our collective resources. TVA and other agencies must work together to provide the safest environment for the public as possible, while also continually refining our ability to respond. Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today to share TVA's security and emergency response measures with you. And I commend you for your leadership here today. [The prepared statement of Mr. Carver follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.092 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.093 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.094 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.095 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.096 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.097 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.098 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.099 Mr. Horn. Our last presenter on panel two is Jim Kulesz, the program manager, systems engineering and technology, Computational Sciences and Engineering Division at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Thank you for coming. Mr. Kulesz. Thank you. Chairman Horn and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today to testify on a topic of how the Federal Government is assisting State and local governments to prepare for a potential terrorist attack involving biological, chemical or nuclear events. My name is James J. Kulesz and I lead the effort at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to develop SensorNet, a strategy to protect the United States by rapidly deploying a nationwide real-time detection and assessment system of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. SensorNet will provide a national operations office or center with the capability to dispatch informed first responders within minutes following a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear event. Dispatched first-responders will know the critical details of the event to include the exact identification of chemical and biological agents as well as levels of radiological releases. Not only will first-responders know the exact location and identification of the threat, but they will also know the projected route of dispersal in sufficient time to take corrective action. In the aftermath of such a terrorist event, the capabilities of SensorNet could save thousands, if not millions, of lives. By combining assets from both the government and private sectors, all components for SensorNet presently exist and a nationwide system can be rapidly deployed. In fact, field testing of SensorNet technology will be conducted in 2 weeks at three locations in the State of Tennessee. And incidentally, General Gilbert who heads the Tennessee Homeland Security Office, is graciously allowing us to use his office as a command center during those tests. Importantly, a nationwide system can be rapidly deployed because SensorNet's state-of-the-art sensors and remote telemetry will be located at existing cellular communicationsites. Presently, there are more than 30,000 cellular sites in the United States that have been strategically located, based on population densities to create the Nation's wireless telecommunications infrastructure. Therefore, SensorNet's ideal deployment template currently exists. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has developed the Block II Chemical-Biological Mass Spectrometer [CBMS] for the Department of Defense for use by the military. While continuously sampling the air, the CBMS detects and identifies both known and unknown chemical agents in less than 45 seconds and biological agents in less than 4 minutes. The CBMS is the only device in the world that has this proven capability. In addition, sensor technology to rapidly detect the presence of a nuclear release is available and will also be incorporated into the system. Through remote telemetry, each SensorNet site will communicate the detection, identification and assessment of a CBRN event to a National Operations Center within 5 minutes. SensorNet will include software models currently used in all military command centers throughout the world. This software modeling system is called Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability [HPAC]. Following the detection of a CBRN event by sensors, HPAC will, in real time, produce a plume model, determine the location and number of exposed people, predict the location and number of exposed people in the future, if no action is taken, and predict immediate and latent health effects on the population. In summary, SensorNet is a strategy to protect the Nation. The capability to dispatch informed first-responders within minutes following a CBRN event will save lives. This is an issue of the highest national concern for the Office of Homeland Security and meets the criteria of the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001 as well as other legislation. All components for SensorNet presently exist. We are in a state of war; there is a national need for the immediate deployment of SensorNet. Congressmen, to put the capabilities of SensorNet in perspective, if a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear event occurred at the start of my testimony, by now, SensorNet would have provided first-responders with information to save lives. Thank you, gentlemen. I welcome your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Kulesz follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.100 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.101 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.102 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.103 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.104 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.105 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.106 Mr. Horn. Thank you. I have a question for Mr. James E. Carver, the director, Tennessee Valley Authority Police; and that is this: We all agree that the emergency management programs must remain a priority in our government spending programs. Given that, if you could be granted one wish that would more improve the job you are doing, what would it be? Mr. Carver. Of course, the one wish would be unlimited manpower. That would be what I think all of us could use, is more personnel. But I think the primary thing and the most important wish I would have is that we can continually work together, as I think we are here in the State of Tennessee to coordinate our efforts. We have done that since September, we did that prior to September 11th, in trying to prepare for these type disasters. But I think the cooperation and coordination that we strive for is, above all, what we need to continue to pursue. Mr. Horn. Thank you. I will now give my colleagues 5 minutes each, and we will start with Mr. Wamp and work our way up. Mr. Wamp. Thank you. I have two questions, and one may require our GAO professional to come back up. I am on the Appropriations Committee and we have talked, particularly in the first-responder arena--law enforcement, firefighters--about grants. And with this much new money coming online all at one time, are there ideas of how we can better fund these programs so that the money gets to the needs in the most effective way? People have actually used the term ``earmark,'' today and of course if you are a member of the Appropriations Committee and you say earmark, everybody thinks you're a porkmeister, that you are trying to earmark moneys just for a parochial interest. But frankly, earmarking can be a way to actually get the money to the specific need rather than just throwing it in a big pot and hoping that it arrives where it needs to. So I just wonder--I know that we created the firefighter grant program 2 years ago, $100 million, for smaller firefighting efforts in rural America, and I guess I am looking for ideas or feedback that might help us direct these resources quicker to where they need to go. Mr. Halford. I would be happy to address that. I think you hit the nail right on the head. The proof in the pudding is how moneys are distributed for funding. The Firefighters Assistance Program, which is 2 years old, the Fire Act, as you said, started out with $100 million, current fiscal year it is $360 million, and it was targeted to be $900 million in fiscal year 2003. The people who decide how this money should be distributed to the fire departments--and that could be local government if it is a paid fire department, but it could be a volunteer fire department which may not be part of local government--but in any event, there is consensus by the International Association of Fire Chiefs, which the paid management of the fire service, the International Association of Firefighters, which is labor organization, and the National Volunteer Fire Council. And in fact, I have a letter that I will leave with you today that is signed by all three groups, that we would like to continue any money that is funneled to the fire service, whether it is through this prospective $3.5 billion, go through that group that funnels the money to us, because the group is composed of fire chiefs and volunteer officers from all over the country, and they decide--they sit and they take grant applications, they review, they funnel the money directly to us. Now you should understand that anything that we do to enhance ourselves before the focus of September 11th better prepares us to handle all emergencies. So I think the point that you are inquiring on, and I am just speaking for the fire service--there are ways that have already been invented to distribute that funding. The fire service does not want that going to State governments who then must filter and distribute. We have got a good method. Any time you get the International Association of Fire Chiefs, Firefighters and Volunteer Fire Council all together on one issue, you have accomplished something because we are very passionate people and our groups have some different ideas, but the whole--the Nation's fire service is totally united on distributing these funds through that grant act. Mr. Wamp. Dr. Schaffner, an example is I am one of the members who have committed to doubling the funding for NIH over a 10-year period of time, and this past year we increased NIH funding by 15 percent--huge single year increase. But I am told that with a level that is arbitrary, 15 percent, we are still not getting the money directly to where it needs. I would solicit, not just today, but in the future, your input on how the moneys can best get to the specific needs as opposed to an arbitrary dollar figure, we need this nationwide, as opposed to exactly what do we need, how can that money really rifle shot in on the need. Dr. Schaffner. I would just comment that the NIH moneys fund basic research and Tony Fauci, the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases actually provides a great deal of guidance about how that money should be spent, and actually we are pretty happy with how that is working. I would suggest you pay equal attention to how the CDC is funded, because the CDC works directly with State and local health departments and that agency takes the fruits of the research and actually applies it. They are the first line responders and investigators of potential outbreaks of communicable disease and we rely strongly on that agency to be the strong Federal backbone of our public health system. Mr. Wamp. Very important. My time is up, but I want to comment that it is good to hear that there may be some other productive use for those awful 30,000 cell towers that have cropped up all over our country. And I am also very proud that SensorNet comes from our State, from our region and that, yet again, we are out on the cutting edge of breakthroughs that can actually solve the free world's problems, especially at this level of high-technology. I tell my colleagues that I understand that the funding requests to actually meet the national plan is only $10 million, and so we will be coming to you for funding I think for SensorNet from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. But is that not exciting for all Tennesseans to hear of that potential investment that we could make to help solve this problem. And with that, the red light is on and I yield back. Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman. Now Mr. Clement. Mr. Clement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Turner, you state that the Nashville Police Department has conducted unannounced security checks at Water Department facilities and weaknesses were found. Have these weaknesses been corrected? Mr. Turner. Congressman, to my knowledge, they have been corrected. Certainly the insufficient security measures that we found were reported to the Director of the Water Department, and I feel confident that he has taken the necessary steps to correct those deficiencies. Mr. Clement. Dr. Jones, could you explain what you mean by hospital diversions and surge capacities? Do they occur often? Why are these diversions increasing and what happens if all hospitals in a particular region were to go on diversion at the same time, and has it ever happened? Dr. Jones. Hospital diversion is when a hospital fills, essentially, due to a number of reasons. There are either not enough nurses to staff the hospital or the hospital is physically full of patients, every bed in that hospital has a patient in it. When that occurs, you request that the EMS services no longer bring you patients by ambulance. If patients still want to come to your facility, they can, but in order to take some of the pressure off the hospital, we make that request. That is what diversion is. There are a number of times in the year that hospitals in this city, including Vanderbilt, are on diversion. This problem is not as big as it is in some other cities. We have never had a situation here where--that I know of--where every hospital has been on diversion at the same time. But that has happened in other communities. When that happens, there is really nowhere for the EMS service who may be carrying critically ill patients, to take them. There are reports of ambulances driving around cities looking for places to take patients and there have even been patients who have died during that. So it is a serious problem. I do not know if that addresses all of your question or you might want to--is that OK or do you need a little bit more? Mr. Clement. No, I think you did. Dr. Jones. OK. Mr. Clement. And Dr. Schaffner, I know you commented to some degree on this, but you present a pretty grim picture of the Nation's public health system. Do you see any light at the end of the tunnel in rebuilding the public health system? Dr. Schaffner. I think that there has been an awakening of interest and a realization that the public health system needs to be rebuilt. Dr. Craig told us about some Federal funding that is helping us in Tennessee to rebuild the laboratory capacity. Likewise, that sort of assistance is needed across the country to rebuild laboratory and communicable disease investigative capacities and the capacity to respond. That is something we need to work on. Mr. Clement. OK. And Mr. Carver, you state in your testimony that military guards assisted you in protecting the substation that supplies power to Fort Campbell. Is there any arrangement in place to use either military forces or the National Guard on a broader basis to protect TVA facilities in the event of a major attack? Mr. Carver. Yes, Congressman, we have worked closely with the National Guards across the Valley for that very purpose, so that if we, TVA police, and TVA expends its resources to the point that there is something imminent or something more disastrous that we are not expecting to occur this suddenly, then we have contingency plans to where we can contact and work with the National Guard across the Valley for their rapid response; yes, sir. Mr. Clement. Mr. Kulesz, I am really excited about the SensorNet and its potential in the future. Mr. Kulesz. Thank you, sir. Mr. Clement. I want to know more about it. Do other agencies around the country know of its potential and how it could---- Mr. Kulesz. We are getting the word out now and trying to talk to as many people as we can in the other agencies to look for funding sources for bits and pieces of SensorNet. Mr. Clement. Well, I am looking forward to working with you and Mr. Wamp. Mr. Kulesz. Thank you, sir. Mr. Clement. Thank you. Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant. Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that I speak for all my other colleagues here from Tennessee in just thanking you and whoever else helped put these two outstanding panels together. The very high quality of these folks makes us all proud here and I very much appreciate it. I think they have been very informative. I also want to put in a good plug for TVA. You can tell by the testimony of Mr. Carver today that we have got a great organization here in the Valley. We in the Valley are very proud of TVA, they have, without Federal dollars--they do not use Federal money in their budget--they have been a wonderful asset to this region, with reliable electricity and inexpensive electricity. And being a member of a subcommittee that actually is talking about deregulating electricity and being at the table on behalf of TVA and the consumers, you can see the reluctance of many of us to want to talk about that subject during these times. But I have two questions back to the subject at hand. One would be to Dr. Jones, I asked the question with the earlier panel about the emergency rooms and I think you very clearly have responded to that question. I would ask you, keeping in mind that I have one more question that I would like to ask Mr. Kulesz about his equipment, but Dr. Jones, I would ask you, since most of Tennessee probably would be classified as rural, certainly a lot of my district, as I go down to Memphis and toward Pickwick and up to Clarksville and over here, with everything in between, much of it is rural. We have a number of rural hospitals. How do we help these folks at these hospitals get a grasp on what could happen out there without causing people all surging into the metropolitan areas for their care? Is there hope? Dr. Jones. I think there is certainly hope. I would really like to see the approach taken that we have the major academic medical centers in Tennessee serve as centers of excellence. We have the resources at the bigger hospitals that are affiliated with universities that have teaching staff and residents to formulate these plans and dispense them to the smaller hospitals. I think what we need to do--and some of this is actually being done right now through the THA--is appropriate fundings to the larger hospitals to form these centers and then have the centers accumulate the materials and then disperse it throughout the State. Our plan could be someone else's plan. We can coordinate how we are going to take care of this at the small hospitals, we can discuss decontamination, we can use the expertise that we have here, Dr. Schaffner and others, and let it trickle down to the smaller hospitals. Mr. Bryant. Is this concept that we talk about some in Congress--I know I have advocated it and others have-- telemedicine, where bigger hospitals can reach out via telecommunications and actually help out---- Dr. Jones. Sure. One of the things that we have talked about is actually putting some of these resources on the internet. Certainly when we put our bioterrorism subplan together we actually used a template that was already available on the Internet through APIC which is an infection control organization, and we have subsequently modified that. But I think the best way to get this into small facilities certainly would be through the Internet and on the Web. I mean we have developed a lot of protocols here, we have actually taken our patient information sheets on a number of agents and translated them into six languages. So I think we have got a lot of resources that we could share with other hospitals in the State. Mr. Bryant. OK. Mr. Kulesz, I have just a very short question. Mr. Kulesz. Sure. Mr. Bryant. Your equipment, in terms of its ability to detect biological or chemical agents--two questions. Does it work in water as well as in the air, and No. 2, now much does it cost with a government discount? Mr. Kulesz. The underlying instrument behind the chemical, biological mass spect is really designed originally for environmental purposes and it is certified through EPA to do air, water and soil and has those characteristics. And actually in the implementation, full deployment of SensorNet, we would look at all media because obviously that could be a problem. Cost-wise, as you mass produce these things--and the way this was designed from the start for Soldier Biological Chemical Command, we are designing a machine that can be mass produced and as the volume of production goes up, the cost goes down. Mr. Bryant. Thank you. Mr. Kulesz. Sure. Mr. Horn. Let me ask Ms. Hecker of the General Accounting Office if you have any thoughts on this, as you did with the first panel, and do you want to make a comment on that? Ms. Hecker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just add that I thought the framing that I tried to provide about the critical issues of the roles and the accountability and the issue of the tools and approaches of government really have played out in what you have heard. There are fundamental issues as you deliberate the proposals by the administration for the increase in homeland security funding about a tradeoff between flexibility and accountability. And I think you are hearing the dynamics of that, that on the one hand there is really a call, an active call for bringing the money directly to us, fewer strings, less tying of our hands on what we want to do. On the other hand, there are issues of what are we going to accomplish, what are the priorities, where are the greatest needs and what are the greatest risks. So there are really tradeoffs and the administration proposal has some interesting elements to it about how the money would be disbursed and we are happy to work with your committee, the Appropriations Committee on analyzing some of the tradeoffs of the block grant approach and some of the other tools and the tradeoffs of going through States or direct to communities, because we have some experience with different programs that have worked different ways. So I think some important issues have been played out and it was really a wonderful opportunity for the committee to have done this and brought this dialog so clearly out in the front. Thank you. Mr. Horn. And I will say to the panel do you have any additional thoughts after you have heard all this dialog, anything we have missed? [No response.] Mr. Horn. Well, good, it shows all my three questioners here have done a great job. I want to thank all of you for taking your time. I think this is very important and we are going to see around the country if Nashville should be the standard, why we will need to see who is the standard west of the Mississippi. [Laughter.] I want to thank the following staff that have been involved with this very fine hearing, and that is J. Russell George, staff director and chief counsel to the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations. Mr. George is right behind me. Bonnie Heald had a lot to do with putting the pieces together for this hearing and she is the deputy staff director. And we have a new member of our staff, Justin Paulhamus, clerk. And from Atlanta came Bill Warren to be the court reporter and we are glad to have you here again. Then the following people from the Tennessee delegation and the Vanderbilt University: Caroline Nielson is the chief of staff to Congressman Bob Clement; and Helen Hardin, chief of staff to Congressman Zach Wamp. Paulina Madaris, scheduler to Congressman Zach Wamp, Polly Walker, Scheduler to Congressman Ed Bryant and Mel Bass, director of Federal affairs for Vanderbilt University in the Washington office. Colette Barrett of Vanderbilt here and Brian Smokler, Vanderbilt University also. It is a lovely place to have this hearing. I wish we had them all across the country, but Vanderbilt is a great university and we are glad to be here. And a lot of people have helped on this and I know a lot of your staffs have helped on this. So my colleague who is very eloquent wants a 30 second---- Mr. Clement. That is all I ask for. I just want to thank the chairman again and his wonderful staff, Bonnie and Russell and Justin, and I want to thank my staff too. You mentioned Caroline Nielson but also Court Rolleson and Christie Ray, Bill Mason, Jason Spain and all of them for helping coordinate this. I want to thank the witnesses, this was most helpful and I assure you we will take it back to Washington, DC, and study it and evaluate it and try to do something with it. And thank you all in the audience today for being here. This is a most important hearing and as we mentioned earlier, this is the first of many that Chairman Horn will have over the country and I thank my colleagues again for being here and participating in such an active way. Mr. Horn. Thank you all and have a nice week. [Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 1:07 p.m.] -