[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 20, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-223
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
88-193 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations
STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Bonnie Heald, Deputy Staff Director
Chris Barkley, Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on August 20, 2002.................................. 1
Statement of:
Dalton, Patricia, Strategy Director, General Accounting
Office..................................................... 112
Gardner, Major General Gregory, Kansas Adjutant General...... 5
Hainje, Richard, Director, Region VII, Federal Emergency
Management Agency.......................................... 139
Jaax, Jerry, associate vice provost for research compliance,
university veterinarian, Kansas State University........... 50
Knowles, Terry, deputy director, Kansas Bureau of
Investigation.............................................. 61
Lane, James, undersheriff, Ford County Sheriff's Department.. 73
Maynard, Otto, president, chief executive officer, Wolf Creek
Nuclear Operating Corp..................................... 91
McCue, Kerry, director, Ellis County EMS..................... 23
Moser, Michael, MD, MPH, director, Kansas Department of
Health and Environment, Division of Health................. 17
Stafford, Kevin, special agent in charge, Kansas City Field
Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation.................... 96
Teagarden, George, livestock commissioner, Kansas Animal
Health Department.......................................... 56
Williams, Raymond, president, chief executive officer, Sumner
Regional Medical Center.................................... 28
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Dalton, Patricia, Strategy Director, General Accounting
Office, prepared statement of.............................. 115
Gardner, Major General Gregory, Kansas Adjutant General,
prepared statement of...................................... 8
Hainje, Richard, Director, Region VII, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, prepared statement of................... 141
Jaax, Jerry, associate vice provost for research compliance,
university veterinarian, Kansas State University, prepared
statement of............................................... 53
Knowles, Terry, deputy director, Kansas Bureau of
Investigation, prepared statement of....................... 63
Lane, James, undersheriff, Ford County Sheriff's Department,
prepared statement of...................................... 75
Maynard, Otto, president, chief executive officer, Wolf Creek
Nuclear Operating Corp., prepared statement of............. 93
McCue, Kerry, director, Ellis County EMS, prepared statement
of......................................................... 25
Moran, Hon. Jerry, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Kansas, prepared statement of..................... 3
Moser, Michael, MD, MPH, director, Kansas Department of
Health and Environment, Division of Health, prepared
statement of............................................... 18
Stafford, Kevin, special agent in charge, Kansas City Field
Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement
of......................................................... 98
Teagarden, George, livestock commissioner, Kansas Animal
Health Department, prepared statement of................... 58
Williams, Raymond, president, chief executive officer, Sumner
Regional Medical Center, prepared statement of............. 30
HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?
----------
TUESDAY, AUGUST 20, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial
Management and Intergovernmental Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Abilene, KS.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library Auditorium, 200
S.E. Fourth Street, Abilene, KS, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Horn and Moran.
Staff present: Russell George, staff director/chief
counsel; David Bartel, chief of staff; Bonnie Heald, deputy
staff director; Chris Barkley, assistant to the subcommittee.
Staff present for Mr. Moran: Kip Peterson and Travis
Murphy.
Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, this hearing of the
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations will come to order.
On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most
devastating attacks ever committed on U.S. soil. Despite the
damage and enormous loss of life, the attacks failed to cripple
this Nation. To the contrary, Americans have never been more
united in their fundamental belief in freedom and their
willingness to protect that freedom. The diabolical nature of
those attacks and then the deadly release of anthrax sent a
loud and clear message to all Americans: We must be prepared
for the unexpected. We must have the mechanisms in place to
protect this Nation and its people from further attempts to
cause massive destruction.
The aftermath of September 11th clearly demonstrated the
need for adequate communications systems and rapid deployment
of well-trained emergency personnel. Yet despite billions of
dollars in spending on Federal emergency programs, there remain
serious doubts as to whether the Nation is equipped to handle a
massive chemical, biological or nuclear attack.
Today, the subcommittee will examine how effectively
Federal, State and local agencies are working together to
prepare for such emergencies. We want those who live in the
great State of Kansas and the good people of cities such as
Abilene, Topeka and Kansas City to know they can rely on these
systems, should the need arise.
We are fortunate to have witnesses today whose valuable
experience and insight will help the subcommittee better
understand the needs of those on the front lines. We want to
hear about their capabilities and their challenges. And we want
to know what the Federal Government can do to help. We welcome
all of our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
Mr. Moran. Let me begin by thanking Chairman Horn for
bringing his subcommittee and this important field hearing to
the Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum in Abilene. It
is a fitting tribute that we would discuss issues such as
homeland security and defense at this location.
It was President Eisenhower who had the foresight to
advocate for an interstate highway system. The Dwight D.
Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways now
stretches for more than 46,000 miles and was part of
Eisenhower's vision for nationwide defense should the United
States face the prospect of atomic war.
Eisenhower faced a threat very similar to the one we face
today. The cold war, for which he prepared, was not won by a
single decisive battle--it was not conventional or quick. It
was a war that required detailed preparation and determination
by every aspect of society--from the armed services, from
elected officials and from everyday Americans. Just as
Americans did not waver from their convictions to stop the
spread of communism during the cold war, today, during this War
on Terror, we must not waver from our conviction to stop the
spread of terrorism.
Today, our enemies, the battlefields and the tactics of
this war are much different from those in the past. But, the
cause is the same. We fight, as Eisenhower fought, for the
cause of freedom and the promise of peace.
We are here today to discuss the preparations we have made
and the steps we will take to defend our way of life from those
who would do us harm. We have a distinguished group of
witnesses with us here today whose experience and insight is
invaluable. Thank you for joining us. I look forward to your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jerry Moran follows:]
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Mr. Horn. We have read your testimony and it would go in
automatically when we call on you and that would be in the
report that goes to the Committee on Government Reform and then
is part of a major report to the House of Representatives, so
all your words that you have written will be taken and now we
just need to get a summary of what those words are.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GREGORY GARDNER, KANSAS ADJUTANT
GENERAL
Mr. Gardner. As the Adjutant General of Kansas, I serve in
three roles; as commander of the Kansas Army and Air National
Guard, Director of Emergency Management and since September
11th the Director of Homeland Security. Our department's two
missions are to provide military capability for the Nation and
protect life and property in the State. The Constitutional
State and Federal roles caused confusion over time with the
military. There are basically three primary ways to employ the
Guard. State duty under Governor control using State dollars,
Title 10 duty under Federal control, using Federal dollars and
Title 32 duty under Governor control, using Federal dollars. We
have served around the world in Title 10 in the last seceral
years in 6 continents and 30 countries. Title 32, under
Governor control is how we served at the airports, borders, in
counter drugs and security. This is absolutely the best way for
us to perform the homeland security mission. It provides
advantages that other Title 10 status does not do.
For example, when a family member has a problem, we can
swap out the Guradsman. The same with an employer. If an
employer calls and says we will out of business if you don't
come back, we can swap the Guardsman out. We can train the
guardsmen in their home unit and maintain combat readiness and
it also is a lower cost way of doing business and finally,
we're not restricted by the Posse Comitatus law and are able to
do law enforcement. For all these reasons, we believe the Title
32 is the best way to do the homeland security mission.
The role of the National Guard has seen a lot of debate
nationally. Some have said why don't you make homeland security
a primary or only mission? That would be the worst possible
thing Congress could do. To date, beyond the Civil Support
Teams and the National Guard counter-drug program, no Federal
funds have been focussed on equipping or training National
Guard forces for Homeland Security missions to support local
responders preparing for biological chemical or nuclear attack.
Some level of Federal funding needs to be dedicated
specifically for this Federal mission performed in the States.
The Governors employ The Guard usining approximately
250,000 man-days per year State status. Combatant commanders
use 2 million man-days per year around the world. Our readiness
to do the war fighting mission around the world is what enables
us to do the mission at home so we don't want you to give away
that war fighting mission. Some say there's too much to do;
therefore, the Guard shouldn't be able to do them both. Well,
actually, the Guard has done both simultaneously throughout
history and since September 11th we have 60,000 guardsmen on
duty: 40,000 serving in Title 10; 13,000 serving in Title 32
status and 8,000 in serving State duty. That meant that at any
one time only 13 percent of 450,000 in the Guard was being
used. That allows us to rotate the people in peacetime and
surge for the major theater of war.
Civil support teams, you have given the Nation 32. We
respectfully request you give one to every State and because
that's a unique mission that is not maintained by the active
duty military. We need your continued support to maintain the
attention and dollars. Anytime you have a unique mission, it is
unlikely to get the highest priority from the military.
As to Posse Comitatus, that law basically reflects our
American belief in the limits on an active duty military in
representative democracy. The law prohibits the Army and Air
Force from enforcing civil law. It doesn't apply to the
National Guard because it is one of the missions prescribed for
us in the Constitution; to execute the laws of the Nation. In
Posse Comitatus, my comments are please leave it the way it is.
The spirit of the law is correct. It's anathema to a freedom-
loving America to alter the spirit of this law.
Emergency management. We have been preparing for terrorism
for almost a decade. Osama bin Laden was the culprit in a
Kansas Emergency Management exercise in 1993. Since then we
have been preparing for terrorism without much money. Funds
from the Nunn-Luger and the MMRS and HHS have been very helpful
in preparing us but that provides only spotty capability in our
State and left the rest of the State uncovered.
The DOJ grants. We identified a $20 million equipment
requirement. We got $2.3 million in the first 3 years. This
year $4.1 million is coming and equipment coverage has
expanded. The program is improving but the best thing about
that grant is it's 100 percent Federal.
From EPA water treatment facilities, $460,000 for four
Kansas plants. That covers 35 percent of the population but
leaves the rural part of our State completely uncovered and the
rules of that grant language don't allow it in the rural areas.
Federal distribution, dollars that come from grants. Most
of them have come directly to cities or directly to locals. As
you can see, all of Nunn-Luger and MMRS, HHS, DOJ, 97 percent
of the DOJ grant funds went directly to locals. However, Kansas
is a rural State. Fifty percent of our State is served by
volunteer or part-time emergency managers and first responders
and so a regional approach is the most effective way to
distribute the dollars in Kansas. What we ask is that you let
the Governors distribute the dollars based on our State's
strategic plan.
Matching funds. We match every dollar we have from
emergency management and State funds to FEMA funds now. We
don't have anymore State funds available to match and are
unlikely to get more because of the status of the State budget.
Without being pejorative, I would like to share a perspective.
If terrorism is a response to our Nation's foreign policy, then
perhaps terrorism dollars and preparedness should be primarily
a Federal responsibility. Bottom line, please give us 100
percent Federal dollars and if you can't, use a broad
definition of what soft or in kind matches are so that we can
actually do something with it.
First responders include law enforcement, fire and EMS. We
would like you to broaden that definition to ``emergency''
responders, like Public Health, Emergency Management and Public
Works.
Bioterrorism. Dr. Moser is going to testify on that. His
leadership has been crucial working with us and improving the
responsiveness in Kansas for bioterrorism incidents. CDC money
was very, very useful in Kansas. We can still use more and one
final comment about medical. In the Air Natinal Guard As we
have medical squadrons, at least one in every State around the
country and they have capability to respond. They are training
now in what we call the Emergency Medical Support or EMEDs.
It's a module system that allows them to respond locally to
help in disaster providing emergency and primary care occurring
and resuscitative emergency care. As you grow these modules,
you can provide greatly needed hospital capacity in a disaster
and what I would like you to do is not listen to me out in the
States. Please ask the Surgeon General of the Air Force to come
and testify to you about that. Lieutenant General Carlson will
tell you that starting in the States so that EMEDs can support
locals in our homeland is what he thinks we should do.
Finally, we support the President's proposal on homeland
security, and appreciate the House's fast passage of that
legislation. We hope the Senate will follow suit. We appreciate
the inclusive approach of Governor Ridge and the Office of
Homeland Security to date. They have been absolutely
tremendous. We feel like our voices are being heard in the
States from that office, creating a national strategy, instead
of a Federal strategy was a perfect example. Finally in
summary, please employ the National Guard and Title 32 status.
It is the best way to do homeland security. Keep us in both of
our constitutional missions, both the State and Federal
mission. Provide 100 percent Federal grants and let the
Governors determine what the distribution is. Thank you, sir.
Do you have any questions?
Mr. Horn. Thank you. That's a very fine presentation. You
have given us some other things to deal with. I'll get the
Surgeon General over if he likes it but we'll see.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gardner follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Now, we have to the next fine person. Dr. Michael
Moser is director of the Kansas Department of Health and
Environment, Division of Health.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MOSER, MD, MPH, DIRECTOR, KANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, DIVISION OF HEALTH
Dr. Moser. Good morning. Congressman Moran, Chairman Horn,
members of the audience. I am Dr. Michael Moser and I serve as
Director of Health for the Kansas Department of Health and
Environment. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. As
Director of Division of Health for the Department of Health and
Environment, I serve as State health officer for Kansas. In
addition, Governor Bill Graves has appointed me to serve as the
Executive Director for the Kansas Public Health Preparedness
and Response to Bioterrorism Program. I serve as chairman of
the Kansas Bioterrorism Coordinating Council and I represent
the Department of Health and Environment and the Kansas
Commission on Emergency Planning and Response. I believe you
have my written testimony.
At this time I would like to highlight the following
points. First, Federal financial and technical assistance over
the past 3 years have been critical in helping Kansas to
improve the preparedness of our public health system to respond
to the threat of biological terrorism. Second, public health
preparedness for the effective response to terrorism is a long
term mission. It will require long term Federal assistance,
both financial and technical. Three, dual function capacity
development should be a central tenet of our Nation's strategy
for public health preparedness. Virtually all modalities that
are necessary for effective public health response to
bioterrorism can also support more effective public health
action to address the leading causes of disease, illness and
injury. Development of these modalities for preparedness should
be integrated with the overall public health infrastructure.
Four, partnership with other organizations is at the center of
the preparedness strategy of the Department of Health and
Environment. We are working in partnership with local
organizations, particularly local public health departments and
hospitals, and with State agencies such as the Department of
the Adjutant General, the Kansas Bureau of Investigations, the
Department of Animal Health and our State's institutions of
higher learning. We also want to work in partnership with
Federal agencies--with historic partners such as the Department
of Health and Human Services, with new partners such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and with partners to be such as
the Department of Homeland Security. At this point I will
conclude my prepared testimony. Thank you for your attention.
If you have questions for me, I'll do my best to respond.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. That's very precise.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Moser follows:]
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Mr. Horn. We now have Kerry McCue, who is the director of
Ellis County Emergency Medical Service. Mr. McCue.
STATEMENT OF KERRY MCCUE, DIRECTOR, ELLIS COUNTY EMS
Mr. McCue. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Moran
and distinguished guests. I would like to thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you this morning. I'm currently the
Director of Ellis County Emergency Medical Services. Our county
is much like the community of Abilene. Ellis County is a rural
Kansas county with a population of approximately 27,500. We
have major transportation systems, both an interstate highway
and railways that transact. Because of these transportation
systems, many of our public service agencies have become
regional resources.
Existing Federal training and grant programs such as
hazardous materials training have greatly benefited many of
Ellis County agencies. However, much more is needed to allow
these agencies to insure successful management of devastating
events involving biological, chemical and nuclear agents. The
need is not only monetary. Personal protective equipment and
testing equipment is essential. It is not realistic for every
community to have testing equipment. However, every community
must have available to it testing equipment so that
questionable substances can quickly and accurately be tested.
When first responders are presented with hazardous situations,
they must have the ability to identify the source and contain
it, thus reducing the possibility of loss of life.
Traditionally, we have provided our staff with training on
how to treat patients that have become suddenly ill or injured.
We have also provided the very basics on the treatment of
patients affected by biological, chemical and nuclear agents.
Traditional training is no longer adequate.
With the events of last year, the changing terrorist threat
to our country and communities, we as an EMS provider, along
with other public safety providers, must ensure that our
personnel have the appropriate equipment and training to
function effectively when such devastating events occur. I
believe there are several obstacles preventing public service
agencies from obtaining such training and equipment. The first
obstacle is available manpower. EMS, like many other health
care professions, is significantly short of personnel.
Recruitment and retention of qualified personnel has become a
major source of concern for every administrator nationwide.
Second, most first responding agencies in rural areas of the
Nation must compete for limited funds available to local
governmental bodies for equipment. Such lack of support to
purchase necessary equipment has led providers to utilize
equipment that is adequate to handle basic day-to-day emergency
situations and not for significant terrorist events. Third, our
current training programs have to focus more on responders
awareness and treatment of victims of terrorist activities.
Communication systems must allow responding agencies to
communicate with each other.
A tornado in a neighboring community last summer pointed
out to the first responders here in Kansas how inadequate our
communication systems were. If this would have been a terrorist
attack utilizing biochemical or nuclear agents we could have
lost citizens, responding public service personnel, simply
because they could not adequately communicate. With the reality
of terrorist events, new alliances will have to be formed.
Chemical and biological nuclear attacks will create major
public health problems, problems that will overwhelm the health
care system as we know it. Such alliances can only be developed
with cooperative efforts of the Federal, State and local
government to insure commitment for adequate funding and
infrastructure to exist.
Local agencies struggle with equipment, technological
advances and short useful life spans of equipment. Technology
advances so quickly that frequently the equipment that agencies
purchase is outdated when it is delivered. More significant is
the fact that equipment purchased through grant programs
outdate or passes by the manufacturer's recommended expiration
date with no mechanism to replace it.
And finally, recent implementation of Medicaid fee
schedules for ambulances has dramatically affected the funding
for many of these problems in the EMS industry. Decreases in
patient revenues hamper any organization's ability to compete
with outside market forces for qualified personnel, purchasing
needed equipment and to provide quality training. So how can
the Federal Government help local EMS providers? By providing
more grants specifically targeting EMS providers; by providing
grants and funding programs that encourage cooperative
arrangements between all public service agencies; by providing
grants and funding programs that are less restrictive and
provide for replacement of equipment; address the negative
impact of the Medicare fee schedule on rural ambulance service
and increase availability of Federal training programs at local
and regional locations.
In conclusion, I would like to thank this committee and the
Federal Government for taking the time to address these issues.
If there are any questions I would be very happy to answer
them. Again, thank you for your time.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. We will go through a number
of questions after the next presentation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCue follows:]
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Mr. Horn. The next presentation is Raymond Williams III,
the president and chief executive officer of the Sumner
Regional Medical Center. Glad to have you with us.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS, PRESIDENT, CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, SUMNER REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Mr. Williams. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Moran, everybody in
the room. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to share my
perspective on the emergency issues facing our country's
hospitals. I'm especially pleased to be a voice for the rural
hospitals across America as we meet the daily challenge of
caring for our sick and injured 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
every day of the year.
The terrorist attacks of September 11th and the subsequent
anthrax attacks have changed our American view of safety and
security and have also changed Sumner Regional's view also of
its emergency preparedness response. Over the past 11\1/2\
months, the Nation's hospitals have focussed on strengthening
our national security and emergency readiness. Hospitals have
been upgrading their existing disaster plans as has Sumner
Regional. I'm personally involved in that responsibility at
Sumner Regional; have learned a great deal about our planning
process. I would like to note our effort to replace our current
disaster plan with the Hospital Emergency Incident Command
System. The American Hospital Association has reported that the
hospitals continue to tailor the plans to suit the needs of
their communities in the face of new and more ominous threats
of terrorism, particularly terrorist use of the chemical,
biological or radiological agents.
While a voluntary use of HEICS will be welcome, I think
strong consideration should be given by the Federal Government
in mandating its use without exception. The point I will stress
throughout this testimony is that, given the profound threat
terrorism imposes to the citizens of the United States, I
believe we need a clear and direct Federal direction with
financial support to achieve the posture Americans deserve. I
don't believe we have that now.
Another observation from our experience at Sumner Regional
is the woeful lack of information and guidance on how a
community hospital should be prepared for terrorism. The
closest information we could find was what we needed for a
hazardous material incident or event and quite frankly, we
can't meet those needs.
Additional areas Sumner Regional and perhaps other rural
hospitals need to address and find funding for includes but is
not limited to such things as portable negative air machines
and HEPA filters, large volume water purification equipment and
I could go on and on. The initial observation from our
experience at Sumner Regional was the readily apparent fact
that we didn't have the funds to acquire structural
improvement, to pay for equipment purchases, to pay for
increased medical supply inventory and for training needed to
better posture the staff at Sumner Regional in its new
environment.
While we, health care professionals in rural communities,
recognize the principal focus of homeland security is on urban
areas, I believe there's a value in recognizing that America is
small and rural. This may be especially true if urban
communities are threatened from terrorism attacks. Rural
hospitals may be critical institutions for emergency
preparedness if urban hospitals are incapacitated or
overwhelmed with casualties. If rural hospitals are to be
expected to care for the mass casualties of a major event for
any reason, I believe it is imperative that our institutions be
given greater attention with capital funding to prepare for
such events.
Focussing our emergency planning to include terrorism, we
are finding it more difficult to definitively quantify the
planning itself. We were able to gain some insight through an
American Hospital Association survey on emergency preparedness
and Sumner Regional's involvement with the State sponsored bio-
terrorism exercise, ``Prairie Plague 2002.'' These helped to
some degree to truly appreciate the limiting factors in our
plans; i.e., the need to have a decontamination facility, and
we didn't have one. We need better communication with local
health departments, law enforcement, EMS, the news
organizations. We need an offsite location to treat medical
emergencies. We didn't have the supplies or staff necessary for
such a treatment site. We didn't have personal protective
equipment necessary for such an event. We clearly need to
address security needs to protect our staff and provide
organization for treatment.
Today, hospitals are not stocked with suitable personal
protective equipment to protect clinicians and other health
care workers from exposure in the event of biological or
chemical attack, particularly one involving an unknown agent.
This is true of Sumner Regional and I regret to report to you
that we do not have one piece of personal protective equipment.
Of equal concern is our need to provide training for the use of
PPE once specific equipment requirements are identified and we
will have to fit appropriate staff members for such equipment.
Both the time for fitting and training will take needed staff
time away from patient care and customer services. Hospitals
should have a minimal level of decontamination for ambulatory
and non-ambulatory patients; the ability to ramp-up quickly for
a media event and access to a regional decontamination facility
for a larger event. This, too, is true at Sumner Regional and I
regret to report to you that we do not have decontamination
facilities on the Sumner Regional campus.
While we're working better at the local level, there's a
general agreement that duplication of equipment and supplies
and training must be controlled. We don't have the money to
support every agency conducting and performing their own
training, nor do we have the personnel, time or staff to send
to numerous training courses or facilities to obtain that basic
material.
I believe I have really covered the essence of my testimony
and wouldn't want to jeopardize someone else's and I'll
conclude my comments but I really appreciate the opportunity to
be with you today. Thank you very much.
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you.
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Mr. Horn. We'll now begin the questioning by your
Congressman, who will ask a number of questions.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and I
appreciate the witnesses testimony. This perhaps is a question
to General Gardner and Dr. Moser. Have we given thought in
Kansas as to what would be a likely terrorist scenario? Have we
narrowed down the events that we ought to be preparing to
respond to or is this simply looking at all possibilities for
terrorist attack in our State?
Mr. Gardner. We have been preparing for some years for a
multiple of possible events. I don't think there is any one
particular one. We have been preparing for foreign animal
disease, which would have a great economic impact on the State
and Nation--foot and mouth disease, for example. We have also
prepared for bioterrorism kinds of incidences, each year
exercising with a different highly likely scenario. So I don't
think we can pick one. I think you have to prepare for a
multiple of them and you have to build plans that allow you to
respond to anything that comes.
Dr. Moser. General Gardner has covered, I think, the
critical points. I would simply note that the Centers for
Disease Control, several years ago, published a list of the
highest priority edition for public health and bioterrorism
preparedness. Under our CDC funding we have focused activity on
developing capacity for that response. However, I think General
Gardner's point on the need to maintain a flexible capacity is
absolutely critical. Unlike our day-to-day war with biological
organisms, our enemies in the war on terrorism are intelligent
enemies and they are likely to be changing their capacities as
fast as we are developing our capacity to respond. Therefore,
it is essential that we develop capacities that are capable of
flexibility and deployment against whatever it is that our
enemies throw at us rather than being locked into a limited set
of scenarios that an enemy can work around.
Mr. Moran. I appreciate your answers, but it does seem to
me that the magnitude of tasks that you all face in that regard
is just--is huge, is tremendous. It's always useful to be able
to prioritize to see this is where we're going to focus but in
this area, it just seems to me there's a myriad of
potentialities that you have to be prepared for and I struggle
with that. I mean I think we spent a lot of time in Congress
dealing with the issue of security in our airplanes and on
airlines and yet, I have no belief that's necessarily where the
next attack by a terrorist organization would occur and yet, we
cannot take the risk of not being prepared and I do know that
we have restricted resources available. Problem is, I think
most Kansans probably believe that Kansas is not a likely
target for a terrorist attack and I'm often asked the question,
you've got to be prepared to take, to reduce our risk but what
does that mean? How are we supposed to live our lives and it
seems to me that involves, in some way, prioritizing something
that is very difficult to prioritize. Is there an ability to
put a scale of one to ten kind of where we were before
September 11th and where we are now in Kansas in regard to
ability to respond?
Mr. Gardner. I think what many miss is that we have
actually been preparing long before September 11th and the
progress has just continued. It's accelerated since September
11th and probably the most important thing that September 11th
has done, which is really what Y2K did as well, was it created
interest and commitment of effort from more than the few
agencies assigned to that responsibility. For example, when we
hosted the Prairie Plague Exercise that Dr. Moser referred to,
103 of the 105 counties were represented, and 99.976 percent of
the population of Kansas. Prior to that the largest exercise
was maybe one-fifth that size, so since September 11th the
whole Nation has come on board in the preparedness for
terrorism. I don't know if you can put a number figure to it,
but it certainly has helped in our preparedness.
Mr. Moran. Let me put words in Mr. Williams' mouth, if I
might. I assume something you can tell us or prepared indicated
in your testimony is that with Medicare reimbursement being
what it is, your ability to expand your role, to have the
financial resources to do even more things, is limited.
Mr. Williams. Congressman, I couldn't have said that any
better. Shall I stop?
Mr. Moran. Well, it's always nice to be agreed with, but I
assume that's a significant issue that we, as Members of
Congress--I mean we're focused on terrorism, but there's a
broader issue here, and it's true of emergency medical services
as well. Since such a large portion of the Kansas population
are senior citizens, Medicare has a huge role to play in
financing the providing of medical services and the inability
of Medicare to pay for the cost of the services that you are
expected to provide already just has to create a tremendous
burden upon a community hospital in expanding their role.
Mr. Williams. Indeed, it does. Over the last 10 years we
have watched the Medicare reimbursement go lower and lower to
the point that today we find most every hospital in Kansas
getting paid below its cost, and it's gotten to the point where
we have had, if we had any cash reserves set aside to buy
equipment, to provide training or what have you, those funds
are no longer there. They are all depleted by trying to cover
the insufficient reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid and
that's really why the picture that I painted a little bit
earlier was so bleak and we need to have some quick solutions
to that area because I really don't think that whatever we get
in the way of grant dollars that are coming down, and greatly
appreciated, that they are going to be sufficient to sustain
the effort.
One of the things that I recently found out is, for
example, the personal protective equipment. If you needed a
Level I suit in the emergency room, that suit's life expectancy
is apparently about 5 years, so 5 years from now, if we had
one, we would have to buy another one and that continues on and
on.
Mr. Moran. In that regard, Mr. McCue, the training, what
happens if someone presents themselves either at Mr. Williams'
hospital or with your first responders claiming that they have
come in contact with a biological agent or they have smallpox.
Do we have a different procedure by which we handle that
circumstance if someone shows up in your waiting area or you
respond to someone's home and the claim is that they are
infectious? What do we do?
Mr. McCue. Well, unfortunately, much like Mr. Williams, our
staff is not properly protected. We do not have the appropriate
personal protective equipment at this point to function in that
environment and therefore, those first initial responders are
going to be exposed to whatever it is and at that point it will
be treated as a hazardous materials situation so we'll call the
local fire department, who is the only agency in our community
that does have the appropriate protective equipment to handle
that and essentially work very closely with them to contain and
decontaminate the situation. It becomes problematic then when
you transport that patient to the hospital to make sure that
they have the appropriate protective issues so that you don't
contaminate that whole facility.
Mr. Moran. Do you have any idea, Mr. Williams, whether your
circumstances are different than a larger hospital in Wichita,
Topeka or Kansas City? Would they have the additional equipment
than a community hospital in other places in Kansas have?
Mr. Williams. I do have a sense of that. I have had the
honor of serving on the Kansas Hospital Association's new
Hospital Emergency Preparedness Committee, and we have
responsibilities for urban and suburban and certainly rural
hospitals, and the committee has been meeting just since the
beginning of the year and we're addressing--really asking those
same questions. Each of us all feels the same way; that is,
that even if we have some capacity, it is not sufficient from
the standpoint that you really don't, as Mr. McCue commented,
really don't want any patient to contaminate another caregiver
or another patient and so that whole area of decontamination is
very time consuming, very labor intense and if you had ten
casualties, it would take quite awhile to get them
decontaminated.
Mr. Moran. Although the chairman was kind enough not to be
sworn in, I also work under the time constraints that you do
so, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity and looking
forward to your questions.
Mr. Horn. I think the one where I really feel the most, do
you feel the Federal Government and the grants that have been
made so far are helpful to that or do we need to do it in a
different way and we will have some of this in the witnesses
later, but since you are here, what do you feel on this?
Mr. Gardner. From my perspective, the grants have certainly
helped. They have built some islands of responsiveness and
capability but haven't covered the whole State and unless you
have an unlimited pot of money, if it all goes direct to
locals, it will take an unlimited pot of money so we hope that
you will extend 100 percent of the money and let the Governors
use that regionally based on a plan and strategy for the whole
State.
Mr. Horn. Do we have for those of you that have the
responders, particularly, either first or later, do we have
compacts between counties, between regions? Some have in these
particular hearings said maybe we ought to have a little more
regionalism. Well, a lot of that was talked about in the 1930's
and the 1940's and 1950's but does that make any sense or----
Mr. Gardner. The emergency management aspect allows us to
do that with other States. We have similar statutes in Kansas
that allow us to do that.
Dr. Moser. Under the Centers for Disease Control Public
Health Preparedness Program, in cooperation with the
association of local health departments for Kansas, we have set
aside funds that will encourage the development of inter-local
agreements between counties where the counties find it helpful
for their preparedness activities to work together in
cooperation. Regionalization, as I'm sure Congressman Moran
knows and some other members of the audience also know, can be
an explosive question for rural areas. Our approach has been--
and the Centers for Disease Control has been supportive of
this--to encourage this activity and to make some funds
available to help support it for public preparedness but not to
impose it rather to support inter-local agreements if they come
from the bottom up, but not to impose them from the top down.
Mr. Horn. We have had a lot of people say that we need to
do something differently and obviously it's the unexpected we
have to deal with, and we'll have others that will get to that
in terms--let's just take this example. You have a human germ
of some sort. It can be of a foreign nature to do that. It can
be somebody in our own country that we could have that; people
that are not happy about research can cause millions of dollars
of damage by destroying some of that research and so we have
had a whole series of things here. Now, the question would be,
when somebody seems to be in some situation where they are
coming into the emergency rooms and hospitals and so forth, do
we have the laboratories in terms of community colleges,
universities, even high schools and all, what are we going to
do to examine what has happened in that individual? It could be
in very rural places where you don't have the laboratory
facilities that are easily at hand.
Dr. Moser. First off, I would say that we are constantly in
the process of improving. What I tell people is that Kansas
will always respond. We are prepared and we will respond. What
we're working on is doing a better job of responding. With the
assistance of the Centers for Disease Control, we have upgraded
the State public health laboratory to full Biosafety Level III
capacity. We're now working on increasing the volume capacity
under that BSL-3. We are also in discussions with the Centers
for Disease Control about establishing additional satellite or
surge capacity for that activity in both the north central
portion of the State and the south central portion of the
State. I would just say those are still under discussion. We
believe that this is an important part of our preparedness
capacity. Combining with elements of the rest of the State's
preparedness capacity--the Highway Patrol, for example--has
been particularly helpful. In some cases the Air National Guard
has been involved. We have arrangements to rapidly move a
specimen from locations further out in the State to our testing
facility in Topeka or, if needed, all the way to Atlanta. I
believe General Gardner made mention in his written testimony
to an instance during the anthrax crisis where we had a large
volume of specimens that could best be handled in Atlanta. The
Air National Guard flew those to Atlanta where the capacity was
greater. I hope that's responsive. If not, tell me.
Mr. Horn. This is very helpful and I happened to grow up on
a farm and we need to make sure that the people way down from
the urban hospitals, we have to know how to get there and reach
them.
Dr. Moser. Our approach, and I would have to say my
personal philosophy, is that if one Kansan is vulnerable, we
are all vulnerable. I understand the desire of people in the
big cities to be protected. I support that entirely, but not at
the expense of the people of rural Kansas. What we are striving
for is a comprehensive public health and preparedness capacity
where someone who lives in Abilene or Garden City or Mayetta
need not feel that, because they live in a rural area or a
smaller city, they are less protected. That is certainly our
goal.
Mr. Horn. Any other thoughts on that?
Mr. Williams. Mr. Chairman, if I could go back to your
question about the effectiveness of the Federal grants that are
currently coming our way or already in place. I think that the
spirit of America and spirit of Kansans can readily demonstrate
the value of that support from the Federal Government. In
Sumner County, in Cowley and Harper, who is two counties
adjacent to Sumner County, we're starting to meet in a
bilateral forum in which the directors of emergency management,
directors of health departments, the hospital administrators,
EMS people, the law enforcement, etc., are actively involved in
discussion, actively looking for ways to collaborate and to
make sure that those precious dollars, when they get down to
the local level, are effectively used and I really believe that
a lot of that is due to the leadership that we have at the
Federal Government and certainly with Governor Graves and Dr.
Moser and all of the folks at State level have been very
sincere and very clear in their expectations that we all have
to work together to rapidly improve our abilities so this is
very encouraging. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Any other thoughts there? Let me pose this one.
When we started these hearings in Nashville, Tennessee and we
worked with the Vanderbilt University, the medical school and
very fine hospital and so forth, and we found out that when you
go through an exercise that the civilian helicopters that would
bring people in to the hospital get down on the roof and so
forth and when you put in the military in Tennessee, and you
have a lot of this in Kansas, that the helicopters they had and
the frequencies weren't there. You could not talk between the
civilian groups and the military groups. What are we doing on
that, General?
Mr. Gardner. That's a big dollar bill.
Mr. Horn. Can we go to a small little Radio Shack maybe and
not have to have an $8 million----
Mr. Gardner. I think two of the most important concepts for
Congress are do we have a standard protocol like ASCII was in
computers so that they can connect and second, will you please
keep the frequencies available so they can be used for
emergencies. Those are the two most important concepts for
Congress. Interoperative communications are absolutely critical
to our ability to respond.
Mr. Horn. Now, that would be for the military and the
health groups. Do we have, just as maybe you have had it for
years between the sheriff, the police and so forth?
Mr. Gardner. We have similar problems with those agencies
as well. We have a State--this is the post-September 11th,
after our inability in Kansas, we did put together a State-wide
group to work on interoperative communications. It's making
progress. It's a tough problem.
Mr. Horn. Well, is it just money or is it that we have on
the frequency situation that either one part of America has
more frequencies than other parts of America? I can remember
when I was the university president in southern California that
we had exercises with the Sheriff and everybody else and it
turned out all the frequencies seemed to be on the East Coast
and I don't know if that's changed or what, but we need to look
at that at a national level as well as a regional level.
Mr. Gardner. I'm probably not the best person to answer
that question other than to say that I know there are a limited
number of frequencies and Congress has some level of control
over them whether they are sold or not sold, who they are
maintained for the exclusive use of, so between that and the
standard way to connect all those communication elements is the
answer.
Mr. Horn. Well, is there a different set of frequencies
that is coming on in terms of just how you parcel out
frequencies?
Mr. Gardner. I don't think I'm qualified to answer your
questions, sir. Sorry.
Mr. Horn. Well, I'm just technically wondering if we ought
to find out from the Federal Communications Commission, and I'm
glad you mentioned the thought of someone to get the
frequencies up for auction and that sounds good that you want
to get more money in the Treasury, but it's nonsense when you
need communication to get from one place to the other and it's
a lot more important than getting a few bucks for the Treasury,
so I'm just wondering if your professional groups, health
directors and all the rest, are they sort of making
resolutions? I remember heading a national organization, you go
out there and you have all sorts of things you send to your
friendly senators and representatives and so forth. What about
the health?
Dr. Moser. I think that in terms of technical knowledge on
this topic, I have to step behind the general. In terms of the
criticality of the question, of its importance, there is
absolutely no question in our minds. Certainly in our
discussions with our colleagues in the hospitals, in my
conversations with folks in the emergency management community,
with law enforcement, this is a pervasive concern and question.
On the other hand, it's been my perception and I think the
perception of other people who are working on this that it
needs to be solved jointly, State-wide. I'm not smart enough to
tell you that it requires a Federal action. Maybe it does. I
just don't know that. But it's clear that for us to be prepared
to deal with the threat of terrorism and quite honestly, to
deal with a number of other threats to the health and well-
being of Kansans, interoperable, intercommunications capacity
between law enforcement, between first responders of all kinds,
between emergency management, between public health, between
hospitals, is absolutely vital and I can only reinforce more
what the general has said about our perception of the
importance of moving forward on that.
Mr. Gardner. To your question specifically, the Adjutant
General Association of the United States, and the National
Emergency Management Association of the United States and the
National Governor's Association all have a policy that supports
the things that I talked about and address the problem with
some more details.
Mr. Horn. Well, the Sheriff's organization, I've learned
over the years, have quite a wallop from the Members of
Congress. Everybody knows they are a sheriff. Mr. McCue.
Mr. McCue. It's a very good question and to take it to the
local level from the State level, in my written testimony I
provided, I give you a perfect example of how inadequate our
systems are. We traditionally at the local level have been
concerned about just being able to talk to those people in our
own county, if you will, or city so you may have public service
agencies on three different frequencies in that jurisdiction.
Last summer we had that experience. We had a national disaster,
tornado in a small neighboring community. We had several
agencies coming into that community that could not talk to each
other. We could not know who was there, or what their resources
were. We could not transmit victim information; where are they,
how many. We could not even relate safety information to other
agencies. It's a huge problem at the local level and it needs
to be, as General Gardner said, unfortunately, it's a large
dollar solution but everybody at the local level needs to be
able to talk interactively along with those people at the State
level.
Mr. Horn. I just have more one question. That is water.
What are we doing looking at the water supply? When I was in
Europe with a congressional group, I just happened to be there
and at that time four of these idiots were trying to poison the
Rome reservoirs. They caught them, but what are we doing to be
preventative in our water supplies?
Mr. Gardner. I know that EPA has provided four grants for
Kansas and four major metropolitan areas in water treatment
plants to help with security and other related issues. I think
we're less concerned about the contamination of major water
bodies because it takes so large a quantity to do that. We
would probably recognize if somebody backed up five or ten dump
truck loads full of chemicals to put it in a reservoir so we're
more focused on the water treatment plants and security that
actually relates to the hazardous materials that are used for
some of that process, like chlorine tanks. A breach could cause
massive casualties in the population. There's much about what
they could do at that plant than actually affecting the water.
It's more difficult to do it at that level. It's easier to do
it at the entrance to a water supply to a particular building
that holds a lot of people.
Mr. Horn. Dr. Moser.
Dr. Moser. I introduced myself as head of Division of
Health and the Department of Health and Environment. There is a
Division of Environment and I know from conversation with the
director of that division that they have undertaken activities
to encourage and provide technical assistance to public water
facilities around the State on improving security. Now, in some
cases, because there were only those four grants that General
Gardner described, this has led to relatively low tech
solutions. But even so, these are improving the security of
public water facilities in Kansas. Even if it's putting a fence
around a treatment plant where a fence with a lock on it didn't
exist before, that's a step in the right direction. Again, we
are hopeful of continuing that progress and I'm sure that the
Division of Environment and its director could address this
point in more detail for you.
Mr. Horn. OK. Any other questions?
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, I chair a subcommittee on
Veteran's Affairs Health Care and one of the things I learned
since September 11th is that the Veteran's Administration has a
role to play in providing health care services in times of
national emergency. It responded in New York City. We don't
have any witness from the VA, but I was interested in knowing
if we have--if Kansas has a relationship with its VA Hospitals
such that they are a component of response in providing medical
services?
Dr. Moser. Pursuant to the Federal requirements under the
CDC public health grant and the Resources Health Services
Administration Services [HRSA] Hospital Planning grant, we have
included the Veterans hospitals in our discussions. Governor
Graves has appointed a representative of the veterans hospitals
in Kansas to both of those advisory bodies and that individual
is participating in our discussions. I would say the
communication is two-way. One, what can we do to help the VA in
their preparedness activities to serve veterans. Two, what can
they do to help the State of Kansas better serve the needs of
the people of Kansas. I think they are certainly part of the
process in our overall hospital planning.
Mr. Moran. Thank you for your answer.
Mr. Horn. I think it's an excellent point to bring in the
VA. If there is ever a livewire cabinet member, it is the
current Secretary of Veteran's Affairs. He is a mover and I
think we ought to make sure that he has regional people as well
as the individual at VA Hospitals and all the rest and there's
a lot of things that in an emergency, that's going to help,
just like our military hospitals, I would hope, about that. I
don't know if the Adjutant General has thought about that, but
if it becomes a real mess, we'll need every bit that is
available and we ought to have the VA in from now on.
Dr. Moser. I should note that Governor Graves also
appointed an individual from the base hospital at Ft. Riley to
be part of our hospital and public health advisory committees.
We are trying to achieve linkage with the active duty military
as well as with the reserves.
Mr. Horn. We stopped to visit Ft. Riley yesterday and I was
very impressed with what goes on there. Any other questions?
Mr. Moran. No, thank you.
Mr. Horn. If not, we will go to the next panel and our next
panel is going to be witnesses talking about agricultural
bioterrorism. We have Mr. Jaax, we have Mr. Teagarden, we have
Mr. Knowles and Mr. Lane. We did the second to last and next
will be Federal assistance programs but now we're talking about
agricultural bioterrorism. Given the tremendous agricultural
efforts of people in Kansas, we want to have those feelings and
if you will raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. When we call on you, your full statement
automatically goes into the record. Then we will go down the
line and when the fourth one finishes have questions from Mr.
Moran and myself. So if we now can start with Mr. Jaax, we're
delighted to have you here. Mr. Jaax is the associate vice
president for research compliance, university veterinarian,
Kansas State University.
STATEMENT OF JERRY JAAX, ASSOCIATE VICE PROVOST FOR RESEARCH
COMPLIANCE, UNIVERSITY VETERINARIAN, KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Mr. Jaax. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Moran. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify in front of the
subcommittee. Prior to coming to KSU, in a previous life I
served in various programs for medical defense against chemical
and biological agents, and in biological arms control
compliance, counter proliferation, and cooperative threat
reduction efforts with the Former Soviet Union so I got a first
hand look at biological warfare programs both from the medical
side and from the proliferation angle. I think it's important
to understand that chemical and biological agents are
completely different, completely different entities. A chemical
attack will usually be a Hazmat event that would enable a
response, whereas the biological attack would probably be a
prolonged public health event and preparation for one of those
events would not necessarily mean that you were prepared for
the other.
Mr. Horn. You want to identify what Hazmat means because a
lot of people don't know that.
Mr. Jaax. The use of hazardous materials. That would be
typical first responders that would respond to an emergency.
The biological threat is obviously very complex and
technological issues and environmental factors may very well
limit their usefulness. When you get into the highly contagious
agricultural agents, some of those technological issues may be
more easily overcomeable. Certainly we know that in the Former
Soviet Union that they had offensive BW programs that went into
incredible dimensions, perhaps up to 60 scientists and
technicians involved in offensive biological warfare programs
there. We also believe there may have been as many as 10,000 of
those 60,000 working in agricultural programs and, of course,
the great question is where are those people that were
associated with the programs and that, of course, forms the nut
of the proliferation problem associated with those programs.
I think that here in this country we had a paradigm shift
associated with awareness of the public as far as biological
weapons are concerned. Even the most casual observer would
recognize that biological agents are at least a potential
threat to humans, but I don't think that recognition flows so
freely to people regarding the vulnerability of the
agricultural sector to biological attack. John Wefald,
President of Kansas University, is fond of saying the great
engine of our national prosperity here in this country is our
ability to produce safe, plentiful and inexpensive food and any
sort of disruption to that sort of supply would obviously have
great impacts upon our economy. Time constraints limit my
ability to talk about specific agricultural agents, but I think
it's safe to say that foot and mouth disease is the one that I
think is gaining the most attention. I would say, however, that
the recent outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United
Kingdom cost the United Kingdom 25 billion pounds as far as
their economy is concerned. It is also my belief here in this
country that a well coordinated and concerted attack by
knowledgeable opponents could probably cause that much of a
loss within days of the attack being perpetrated here and
obviously you have other kinds of issues associated with
diseases that might have potential as well as just those that
would affect agricultural agents.
I would like to delineate some of the issues associated
with the bioterrorist threat and these are measures that we can
have to try to counter them. We need to develop coordinated
partnerships between State, Federal and local industry to
upgrade our local, regional and national awareness. National
and regional agra-threat assessments must be performed and
continually refined to ensure proper focus for research
programs and development of effective counter measures. We have
to enhance our critical research infrastructure, such as
biocontainment laboratories and facilities that will allow
targeted, applied research into plausible threat pathogens in a
safe and controlled environment. These specialized facilities
will not only allow us to find ways to counter these types of
threats, but would also provide critical surge capacity if an
outbreak occurs.
On an agent-by-agent basis, we must develop and deploy
effective and reliable rapid diagnostics, and forward
surveillance systems, and new treatments and vaccines.
Obviously, it's one thing to be prepared to respond, but if you
don't have an adequate response or mitigation strategy, then
that response becomes meaningless in some ways.
We need to develop and refine mitigation strategies, such
as carcass disposal plans that would be targeted for certain
geographic areas and potential targets so that we can
effectively contain and minimize the impact of any potential
outbreak and we need to develop and institute effective
education, training, planning and response capabilities for all
stakeholders involved to include public health, law
enforcement, military, Federal, State and local officials.
The good news is that the effective countermeasures against
specific biological threats can reduce risk and they can also
serve as deterrents. The bad news is that developing these
countermeasures and capabilities requires substantial
investment. With adequate facilities and resources, we can
build resource programs that will help address those plant and
animal threats that are most concerned here in the agricultural
heartland. Since most agraterrorist agents are naturally
occurring in other parts of the world, these programs will also
benefit us that these would help with natural or accidental
introductions of that pathogen. We at Kansas State University
are striving to build new programs and we are refocusing
research efforts to aid existing programs that will try to help
us aid against these threats. The inherent capabilities of the
Land Grant system and a major research university are
especially useful in programs that will would help us to
counter these significant agraterrorist challenges. As
background information, I am furnishing a copy of the testimony
of Dr. Wefald in October 1999 for the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capability where he testified about this very issue
and I think that it does underscore the prescient, long-
standing commitment of the university to try and find ways to
help protect us.
It's my very firm opinion that we have to take a long view
of the biological threat. This is not something that's going to
go away next month, next year, or even in the next decade. The
Defense Science Board recently stated that, ``Biodefense is the
single most significant challenge to U.S. sovereignty.'' I
think those are big words and I think they are something we
have to take seriously. There are those who would say we should
refrain from discussing these threats and our possible
vulnerabilities. However, I believe Representative Shays has
touched the heart of the matter when he recently said, ``Better
to be scared by the improbable possibility, than to be
unprepared for the catastrophic reality,'' and I think we can
ill-afford to disregard that advice because the fact is, our
agricultural infrastructure is certainly vulnerable and I think
we need to find ways to protect it. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify and thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaax follows:]
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Mr. Horn. We now have Mr. Teagarden and he is the livestock
commissioner, Kansas Animal Health Department, State of Kansas.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE TEAGARDEN, LIVESTOCK COMMISSIONER, KANSAS
ANIMAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT
Mr. Teagarden. Thank you, Chairman Horn. I'm not going to
read my testimony, but I just want to stress a few things and
try to keep this brief. Dr. Jaax has mentioned a couple of
things, and Dr. Moser, that I had in my testimony also. I think
to start out with, I'm sure that Congressman Moran has
explained to you the importance of agriculture in Kansas. Very,
very important to our economy here. Terrorist action or an
accidental introduction of a disease like foot and mouth would
wreck us, our entire State and our Nation's economy. I think
that if the terrorists really want to get into the United
States, they don't bomb buildings. They get through our
agriculture industry, food production and they have us big time
so I think that's something that a lot of people haven't been
aware of that potential there and haven't been concerned about.
A lot of people don't think that terrorists will come to the
heartland, to Kansas, through the Midwest because of the low
population, but if want to call it big time emergency damage,
that's where they will come.
Mr. Horn. I agree with you and we have put all the
testimony given for the report to go to the House of
Representatives and it's very clear that you are right on what
you're saying.
Mr. Teagarden. I don't think that we can prevent the
intentional introduction of a disease agent to our livestock or
agricultural industry or for that matter, any other thing in
the United States. I think they have pretty well proven that
they can do whatever they might want to. Introduction of a
disease would be extremely easy, a disease that could really
damage us, but I think we can be prepared to respond quickly,
to bring that under control and eradicate that disease and I
think that's what we have to address is being ready and capable
of that response.
The United Kingdom last year, they weren't prepared to
respond to that outbreak of foot and mouth and it consumed
their country for better than 10 months. Their agricultural
industry over there was--I don't know when they will ever
recover. It will be many years, but they weren't ready and
capable of responding quickly and it overwhelmed them. Dr.
Moser and Dr. Jaax both have spoken about research and
laboratory capabilities. I think that's very evident today in
our systems, in the Federal system and our State systems, that
we need more capacity in our laboratories. We need to spread
out the Federal laboratories and do some of that work in our
local laboratories such as Kansas State University or different
laboratories around the country and do a lot of that work. Our
Federal laboratories, like I said, just do not have the
capacity and the capabilities to do that and research is very,
very important. Foot and mouth disease, in my opinion, hasn't
been researched much in this century or last century. Our
protocols right now to combat foot and mouth disease are the
same as they were in 1925. I have a book on my shelf in my
office that was printed in 1925 and we do the same thing today.
We have--there's got to be some better ways. There's got to be
some vaccine research we might be able to use to help us in
that regard. I think the one thing that the Federal Government
can do if we have an outbreak of a foreign animal disease is
allow us the opportunity to respond. In other words, do not
make things complicated as far as getting money and support and
help to the individual States. I don't think the Federal
Government, with USDA Veterinary Services, has the manpower
anymore to combat a disease. It will be up to the States to do
their own work, but just keep it simple. We're going to cause a
great damage when we have an outbreak of foreign animal disease
and we have to be prepared to help our producers and our
consumers overcome that problem. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. I have been on various delegations to the
European parliamentarians and recently a group of us were in
Russia with the DUMA, 40 Members and obviously we got into
these issues and they are trade issues and some of them are
absolutely phoney, like the poultry bit they are holding up off
St. Petersburg and Georgia. Millions of dollars go down the
drain on that because people say oh, you know, we can't get
that chicken and all because this, this and this is done. Over
the last 10 years we've tried to tell the parliamentarians in
the European Parliament, can't you get a national academy of
science where the people of scientific value have done what the
truth is and not the propaganda and so we face that with our
trade and the English foot and mouth disease doesn't really
help very much when that goes on. It ricochets into the United
States. And we need to get this--and they agreed. They said,
you know, we have to have a decent academy of sciences, like
our own academy does.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Teagarden follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Mr. Knowles, we're delighted to have you here.
The FBI has done a lot and I'm sure the Kansas Bureau of
Investigation will be involved in that.
STATEMENT OF TERRY KNOWLES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, KANSAS BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
Mr. Knowles. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and welcome
to the State of Kansas. Truly the KBI, we do follow the
leadership of the FBI and we work as a State-wide law
enforcement agency. We work in full partnership with a number
of the Federal law enforcement agencies and the Joint Terrorism
Task Force around the State at Wichita, Topeka and Kansas City.
On page 2 of my statement I detail the status of terrorist-
related investigative activity that we as a KBI have been
involved in and when I say we, I'm talking really in part for
Kansas law enforcement. We have conducted over 300 terrorist
related preliminary inquiries and if it requires further
investigation, we hand that off to the Joint Terrorism Task
Force for their consideration. We have made and participated in
over 41 arrests in the State of Kansas for INS, primarily on
visa violations. What I would like to address and followup what
my good friend and partner, George Teagarden, he talked about
the impact of a foreign animal disease and exactly what would
law enforcement's role be in first responding and then I'll get
to the prevention aspect.
There was an incident that occurred, a false rumor, foot
and mouth disease in Holton here in March of this year.
Following that incident we did an assessment, what would law
enforcement have done had that been a real event. It would have
required 12 road blocks, 36 officers per shift, roughly 96
commissioned officers per day for a minimum of 60 days. Now,
the livestock commissioner is empowered through the
Legislature, by the Governor. He will be in charge of those
quarantines. In addition to those 12 road blocks that we would
be operating for a minimum of 60 days until it's fully
eradicated, we would have to close off 62 roads coming into the
State of Kansas and virtually stop all movement of livestock.
Now, that is a major undertaking.
Now, we would be ably assisted by the National Guard, but
if you look at the resources that would be committed well
beyond the daily public safety response of law enforcement, it
would virtually bankrupt Kansas law enforcement, our resources
and ability to do that. The Kansas Attorney General, Carla
Stovall asked the KBI to look at bioterrorism threats to Kansas
agriculture and define our responsibilities. Having done that,
I'm at the point of saying that if it occurs, we're already
losing and our focus has to be on prevention. Now, the KBI,
much like a number of law enforcement agencies; specifically
the FBI, we are switching to a more intelligence driven,
prevention type of operations. To do that, we have created--we
are part of what we call the Kansas Law Enforcement
Intelligence Network. It's a computer-driven intelligence base
available to all 345 law enforcement agencies in the State of
Kansas. Now, to have this system--that's where local officers
could enter data, access data, make inquiries, say, in Ford
County, whether or not some suspicious activity is going on. Is
it occurring in other parts of the State here. This system is--
we're probably, if I said we had ten agencies on board of the
345, it will be another 18 months before we have that system
fully operational as an intelligence-driven or preventative
type system or network for Kansas law enforcement. Not for the
KBI but for Kansas law enforcement. We will need Federal
assistance to make that happen or we can sit back and let the
18 months kind of grind away as we presently are.
Making the shift to an intelligence-driven investigative
operation is a major diversion from the way we have done
business in law enforcement over the past 25 or 30 years where
we responded after the fact. If we develop sources or
intelligence data, it was always directed at the solution of a
case or at some narrow objective. Today we're looking at
trying--you asked the question in the first panel, what are the
threats. They are so broad that we're trying to shift our
intelligence capability to meet that demand and figure out
where they would strike in the State of Kansas and if the
Commissioner is correct and they come at our livestock, which
is 8 to 10 billion a year, we will be devastated here, so our
focus as a State agency will be on prevention and intelligence-
based to prevent those occurrences. I will be very glad to
answer and respond to questions later on, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Knowles follows:]
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Mr. Horn. OK. We now have Undersheriff James L. Lane, Ford
County Sheriff's Office.
STATEMENT OF JAMES LANE, UNDERSHERIFF, FORD COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT
Mr. Lane. Chairman Horn, Congressman Moran, I, too, am
honored to offer my thanks by testimony regarding the readiness
of our community. Historic Dodge City, much like Abilene, is
the county seat of Ford County. The Ford County Sheriff's
Office has a part with 12 full-time commissioned patrol
officers and ten additional commissioned officers. The county
is approximately 1,100 square miles with a population of about
35,000 people. Now, I would also like to add at any given time
there may be in excess of 300,000 head of live cattle on the
ground and I make that statement just to underscore that our
community is completely reliant upon the agriculture industry
and so I will speak with emphasis on our major concern, which
is the biological threat.
I want to say that our local emergency preparedness
committee is active in all aspects of terrorism planning and I
believe that we are far short of having all the tools that we
need. However, our community has developed partnerships with
the agriculture industry and we have developed a comprehensive
multi-jurisdictional response plan for such an attack and we
are confident that it's one of the few plans in the Nation that
is derived at the local level. We have completed the Domestic
Preparedness Plan or are in the process of equipping local
first responders to the greatest extent possible with the
$44,000 that we have received in Federal grant moneys. Without
these dollars we would be significantly less prepared. We have
devoted a great deal of time and effort in trying to identify
the consequences of such an attack and our response to it, and
I think we have had some success in that. So having a fairly
good understanding of the consequences and the underlying costs
it could echo, it is critical to focus on prevention.
Previously, I mentioned that we had a plan locally for dealing
with such an incident and we learned a great deal in that
planning process. We learned a great deal about our community,
and we really learned a lot about the impact that agriculture
has on it. I think we understand what the local response will
be. Maybe, with the exception of the FBI and the USDA, we're
unclear at how some other Federal agencies will respond to our
community. We also have a question if maybe they understand the
industry. We now understand the movement of livestock in the
State and especially locally and we know that it is paramount
to stop the spread of disease. When a quarantine is
implemented, it will severely tax local government and it will
devastate our private industry locally. We know that the
quarantine will lead to many consequences within our community
in addition to the ones I just mentioned. We know that there
may be some problems that arise with the National Guard in
getting them commissioned. There's some questions to that we
are trying to get answered as far as can we take National
Guardsmen and commission them to do the police function,
especially if we have a situation of civil unrest as a result
of a quarantine. Last but not least, we understand the economic
impact for Kansas and the rest of the United States and
probably the world. We have encountered a few problems in the
planning process. We found that there's somewhat of a lack of
communication between Federal, State and local levels of
government in the emergency preparedness. I think it's getting
much better. I think that we have all, or we all understand
now, that we're in this together and we have to have that
partnership to have any success. I am concerned that local law
enforcement may not always know what level of homeland security
we're on. There is some confusion in terms of the rules and
responsibilities and response of other agencies to any
terrorist attack at our level. I think there must be more
effort put forth in educating not only Federal agencies but all
agencies about the agricultural community. Undoubtedly that's
best accomplished by the USDA and I speak for our Sheriff and
the emergency manager and other first responders in our
community do support the President's proposal consolidation of
responding agencies under the Department of Homeland Security.
I think that when we can look for a single point for education
and funding and training and technical support, including the
intelligence and technology, that we can begin to promptly
focus on prevention and implement logical response plans.
In summary, understanding that the Federal resources are
not unlimited, we would offer the following statements in terms
of assistance that we ask for in meeting our communities needs.
No. 1 is continued funding for education and training in
communities so that planning begins in those communities. For
the frontline defense and identification of diseases, Dr. Jaax
referred to that in labs so that we understand the disease
better. For primary and secondary responders and equipment and
in research efforts. We need funding in technology for
intelligence gathering and dissemination, as Mr. Knowles
referred to, and I think at the local level we have a real need
for funding an emergency operations center so that if we do
have to respond in such a way that our emergency operation
center has the technology to deal with the problem at hand.
Equipment funding for equipment for first responders and maybe
physical security for the industry, I don't know that needs to
be mandated, but we may have better success if there is an
opportunity.
No. 2, we need a single source of information so that we
understand the roles and responsibilities of responding
agencies and second, we have a library of assistance so that
communities know what funding is available to them and that may
all be best accommodated through homeland security.
No. 3, we need to develop partnerships with private
industry. We need to have joint training between local, State,
Federal responders and the industry and No. 4, we want to
emphasize prevention on every level, including research,
education, planning intelligence, rapid and appropriate
response. Thank you for your consideration.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lane follows:]
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Mr. Horn. We'll now go to questions and the gentleman from
Kansas can begin the questions.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the
opportunity. I learned something--I learn something everyday
and I learned something from all you today, but I generally
have had the same response when people talk to me about ago-
terrorism in Kansas that I don't know how we can prevent it,
but we've sure got to be able to respond quickly; that it is an
issue of response and Mr. Teagarden highlighted that, but the
additional piece of information is prevention that comes
through intelligence activities and I can see absolutely the
importance of increasing our capability of learning about the
potential, the acts of potential terrorists in advance so it is
not just response but it's also prevention through
intelligence. I have always thought that we didn't have the
ability in Kansas to protect every farm, every feedyard and I
don't think we do, but we do have the ability to know what
people may be attempting to perpetrate and so I appreciate
highlighting it helps me explain to my constituents better what
the opportunities are and I would tell Chairman Horn that
Kansas very much is a livestock-producing State. We're often
thought of as the ``wheat'' but the actual State product is
derived, the largest portion comes from livestock. There's no
congressional district in the country more so than the first
district of Kansas that has cattle on feed so this is a huge
issue and the potential for our State's health and the health
of its economy is tremendous.
Mr. Jaax, you are a national expert and one thing I want to
highlight is that people who are knowledgeable about this
topic, you have to be on the top ten list and I want to make
sure that you have the sense that national leaders, those
involved in the issue of agraterrorism are utilizing your
expertise. Is that true?
Mr. Jaax. Thank you for those comments. I think that one of
the key elements of this whole discussion is recognizing that
agraterrorism is certainly a very significant subset of the
overall bioterrorist threat and I think that resources like the
ones that I represent at Kansas State and the land grant
statutes are very important in trying to help us come up with
national plans for how we would respond to various agents. I
want to re-emphasize when you're talking about response and how
we would protect ourselves and it goes back to a question that
you asked, Mr. Chairman, of the first panel, which was what
should we be worried about and I think that very thoughtful and
accurate risk assessments associated with plausible threats, if
we can find ways to counter them, if we have adequate counter
measures, then we can strike off those of the more ominous
threats until we can reduce the risk associated with an input,
but to go back to your question, sir, I think that clearly the
national authorities are looking for help because this is such
a huge problem, especially on the biological front because it
is so complicated and is so regionalized because the threats
are different everywhere. I think that they are coming to
people like me and certainly to organizations like the one--
like Kansas State to try to help to find effective
countermeasures and strategies for dealing with this, but the
fact is there's only so much--there are only so many resources
to go around and the threats are many.
Mr. Moran. Well, thank you for your efforts. I was
interested in your testimony, Mr. Knowles, about the number of
investigations related to these kinds of potential acts. One
thing that caught my attention is the role that apparently the
INS is asking the KBI to play and I'm confused by that because
I assume that INS violations are violations of Federal law.
What role does the KBI have in responding to an INS request for
investigation?
Mr. Knowles. We participated in a number of investigations
on those visa violations where INS is the lead agency. We will
provide the assistance, whether it be in terms of the
interviews or the arrest. Obviously the violation would fall
for the Federal Government and the U.S. Attorney's Office. We
merely support whether it be a investigation or the
apprehensions in those investigations. The KBI, through our
history, has been an agency that assists other--whether it be
Federal or local or county agency, we will assist as they
request. Now, we work, as I indicated, on the partnership on
the Joint Terrorism Task Force. We are a full partner but the
FBI will play a lead role along with the U.S. Attorney's Office
so it's not the State violation that we're focussing on. We are
simply a partner in the investigation.
Mr. Moran. Are those investigations, when you talk about
visa violations, are they in addition to being visa violations,
is there some thought that there's potential terrorist activity
associated with the person involved?
Mr. Knowles. In some cases and what we do, once we conduct
a preliminary inquiry, we'll forward those on to the Joint
Terrorism Task Force for further investigation. A lot of our
investigations in that respect are a response to calls from the
public. We do that preliminary inquiry to see, is it valid, is
the information--is it not generic and is it specific enough
for some type of either an arrest or a confrontational
interview and that's what we pass on to the task force.
Mr. Moran. You also, Mr. Knowles, indicated or mentioned in
your testimony about crop dusting.
Mr. Knowles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moran. Crop dusting is an integral part of our
agricultural economy. Are there things we need to be doing
more? Have we struck the right balance in regard to that
activity?
Mr. Knowles. When the President raised that issue
nationally, shortly after September 11th, about the threat of
this type of aircraft, we looked inward. We didn't have a data
base. We did not know the extent of pilots or aircraft within
the State of Kansas. Since then, KBI--we have had a face-to-
face interview with all pilots, with all owners and we have a
data base. There are 180 such aircraft in the State of Kansas
and 130 pilots or owners and it's very cooperative. They wanted
to come to us. We were getting all types of calls about
suspicious aircraft, low flying aircraft and now we have a good
handle on that and I think the first handle talked about the
progress from September 11th. We now have--if we have a
complaint, we can go right to the source and identify the
aircraft and/or the pilot.
Mr. Moran. Have you also identified the pilot schools,
pilot training in Kansas?
Mr. Knowles. To some extent. Trying to be proactive with
what was going on, whether it was in Florida or Arizona. We
certainly did not want it to happen in our State and going back
to this idea of prevention and intelligence gathering, we're
asking those pilots to, when some suspicious activity--if
something is not quite correct, if you have a question about
somebody's motive for learning to fly a crop duster, let us
know and we'll help you with that, but yes, since that
occurred, crop dusting is now on our scope and it's in our data
bank.
Mr. Moran. The Law Enforcement Center at Yoder, has that
course work--this may be a question for the Undersheriff as
well. As the course work changed in regard to what law
enforcement officers are taught, trained?
Mr. Knowles. Being under oath, the other director, as you
know, he's the former director of the Kansas Law Enforcement
Training Center in Yoder here. If I could defer to our director
and see if he might have a thought in that direction. Would
that be permissible, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Horn. Certainly.
Mr. Knowles. And I would introduce the director of the KBI,
Larry Welch, who is the former director of the Kansas Law
Enforcement Training Center in Yoder, Kansas.
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much. I did know that Deputy
Director Knowles was going to figure out a way to get me up
here. Congressman Moran, the answer to your question is while
the basic certification course at the Kansas Law Enforcement
Training Center at Yoder has not changed significantly because
of the events or the aftermath of September 11th, they have
reached out and added courses and training in what we would
call in-service training seminars throughout the State of
Kansas. But as far as basic training for certification of
Kansas law enforcement officers, I must answer the question
that they haven't really significantly changed the core
curriculum but considerable training has been done by the
Academy, by seminars and schools throughout the State and
indeed by others.
Mr. Moran. I appreciate your answer and I also appreciate
the efforts of the KBI not only in the area of terrorism but
just the full plate that you have in our State to try and
combat a number of law enforcement and therefore, problems for
our citizens.
Mr. Welch. Congressman, if I might interrupt and embellish
just a bit on the question that you asked of the deputy
director regarding why specifically we were so involved in the
INS matters, it's actually primarily a matter in that
particular situation of manpower on the part of Immigration.
They don't have enough agents--this office in Kansas City
covers half of Missouri and all the State of Kansas. They were
woefully undermanned after September 11th and it started out
primarily simply as a matter to provide manpower for them to
assist in arrests on visa violations and it kind of extended
from there.
Mr. Moran. I appreciate that answer and I asked the
question because the INS struggles greatly in performing its
duties, not only in our State, but nationwide and it's an issue
that we care lot about in Kansas about their ability to enforce
the law and I was interested in how the KBI became engaged with
the INS. Let me ask the undersheriff in Ford County or
southwest Kansas, do our cattle feeders do anything different
today than they were prior to September 11th that related
perhaps to this issue of intelligence?
Mr. Lane. I think so. I think we've seen--at least in our
community, I can speak for a number of biosecurity measures put
in place. I think that there are some cost prohibitive things
that have not been done and also, considering the vast expanse
of a typical 50,000 head feedyard over three or 400 acres of
land is difficult to put under surveillance so I think that
there is a good attempt at implementing biosecurity measures, I
think in Mr. Teagarden's recommendation early on, that a lot of
them started addressing those issues and we have seen some
success in our area. That's emphasizing cleanliness in
equipment, scrutinizing shipping papers so that an infected
animal may not come in from another State or another country.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Teagarden--my final question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Teagarden, would you walk you through the scenario of the
belief that if there's foot and mouth disease in feedyards in
Kansas, what should happen and who plays what role in that
response?
Mr. Teagarden. You want to take a deep seat first? If a
feedlot operator or a cowboy out in the feedlot found some
unusual disease symptom that they weren't familiar with, they
would notify probably their own veterinarian within that
feedyard. If that veterinarian thought there was something that
looked like a foreign animal disease, they would call our
department or USDA and we would send out a trained foreign
animal disease diagnostician. All of our veterinarians on our
staff and State have been to a special school at Plum Island
for foreign animal disease.
Mr. Moran. Is that vet, is he placed somewhere close to
southwest Kansas or somebody that comes from Topeka?
Mr. Teagarden. No. Stationed from Dodge City. From Kingman
to Dodge City is about 2\1/2\ to 3 hours for one of our vets
that would cover Dodge City so we would go out, collect
samples, ship them as quick as we could get them to Plum
Island. If our vet that was out there thought it was highly
likely, we would activate our emergency plan to at least a
Level III at that time. In other words, get people together,
start the system. We have a media team that would be ready to
send out notices to the media about what the situation was,
where it was at, so on and so forth. We would go into action.
We have been planning for an outbreak of foreign animal disease
for roughly 4 years now and we have--it's not a complete plan
and never will be, but we've got it down to where we kind of
know the first indication, true indication that we have a
foreign animal disease, we're going to go into action and we
believe in Kansas that the only way to combat an outbreak is to
hit it with all we've got. We're going to declare war on a
disease, such as foot and mouth, because that's the only way
we'll get ahead is hit it hard and hope we can stop it.
Mr. Moran. You indicated the sample would be sent to Plum
Island. Is that the efficient way of doing it?
Mr. Teagarden. That's the only place we can get a true
definitive diagnosis at the time and that's why we need more
laboratory capabilities.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Jaax.
Mr. Jaax. I would like to weigh in on that one also. I
think that in my testimony I talked about foreign diagnostics
and, obviously, the faster you find out that you have a
problem, the more confident you can be in your response and
those responses can be done in a very straightforward way. The
situation with foot and mouth, as I understand it with Plum
Island, is that those reagents that are necessary to make that
diagnosis really don't require the kind of containment that's
available at Plum Island, but it's a situation where they don't
want a false/positive made and have the responsibility for that
in the field. I think under pre-September 11th circumstances
perhaps that was completely understandable, but 36, 48 hours in
a foot and mouth outbreak is a lot of time and I don't think
that we can afford the luxury of finding out days after
diagnosis could be made that we have foot and mouth disease
here so I'm very strongly in support of having those forward
diagnostics so that we can find out very quickly that we have
an outbreak and again, with a very highly contagious virus like
foot and mouth disease, it can spread explosively so it's very
important to get your arms around it as fast as you can.
Mr. Moran. Does that capability currently exist in Kansas
to do the test?
Mr. Jaax. If we had the reagents we could do it.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, panel.
Mr. Horn. I just have a couple of questions here.
Throughout some of your testimony you talked about the West
Nile. Can you define that for me, Mr. Jaax?
Mr. Jaax. West Nile virus is a viral disease that
originated in sub-Saharan Africa. It is co-anodic, which means
it affects both animals and man. I think it's a great example
of those crossover diseases that we would be concerned about
that would go beyond just human disease or just animal
diseases. We have vectors in this part of the country, all
across the country and those vectors are, in this case, would
be mosquitoes that could transfer and serve as reservoirs for
the disease. You know, not each foreign animal disease or each
bioterrorism event would have to be an outbreak event. It could
be a much more insidious disease, like this one, and there are
clearly other diseases out there that would serve as a useful
model, but West Nile has become endemic in the United States.
It was not found here before, I believe, the last 2\1/2\ years.
One of the things that's interesting about West Nile, in my
view, is the current lack of meaningful communication between
the veterinary public health community and the traditional
public health community. This disease was recognized by a
veterinarian pathologist in New York sometime before the
official diagnosis was made and with a co-anodic agent they may
show up in animal populations prior to their manifestation in
human populations, so it's important that we build that linkage
of our public health infrastructure, which I think is a very
positive step associated with the September 11th event as far
as our national public health is concerned.
Mr. Horn. How does that get transmitted from Africa to New
York City and is it a food?
Mr. Jaax. No. Well, they don't know how West Nile got here
and there's all kinds of speculation you could make regarding
it. May very well have come with someone who was inflicted,
with some person because what happens with the disease is that
a mosquito would bite an infected animal or person and then
would then again transmit that to another person or to an
animal.
Mr. Horn. Is that what is going on in Louisiana?
Mr. Jaax. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. Now, Texas presumably is No. 1 in cattle. Has
anything happened as a result of all this?
Mr. Jaax. With West Nile?
Mr. Horn. Yes, or others like that.
Mr. Jaax. Well, there are clearly diseases that would have
the same sort of mechanism but those are, luckily, the most
severe ones we don't have in this country that would affect
cattle. To my knowledge, West Nile is not a serious pathogen in
food animals. It is a serious horse pathogen and people who
have horses are right to be concerned about that and it is a
human pathogen but again, it's not a significantly serious
disease unless you are one of the unfortunate people who
happens to get it.
Mr. Horn. Or your horses.
Mr. Jaax. Absolutely.
Mr. Horn. I'm curious about Texas now. Everybody says they
have the most cattle. Then there's an argument here on who is
two and three.
Mr. Jaax. We're right in there somewhere.
Mr. Horn. Well, is Nebraska No. 2 and then Kansas three or
is it Kansas two and Nebraska three? It's like the football
game. We've got the coverage now.
Mr. Jaax. I would defer to Mr. Teagarden on that.
Mr. Horn. Well, I would like to get that figured out just
for the Guinness records.
Mr. Moran. I'm probably the one who could answer, Mr.
Chairman. I'm not under oath.
Mr. Horn. And you will say?
Mr. Moran. Kansas.
Mr. Horn. I want to just, Larry, before you leave, just if
you don't mind, take the oath.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Horn. Any other questions? Well, it's a wonderful panel
we have had here who have a lot of scientific knowledge and
that's a good thought. Thank you very much for coming.
We have one last panel and that is Otto Maynard, President
and Chief Executive Officer of the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating
Corp.; Kevin Stafford, Special Agent in charge of the Kansas
City Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Patricia
Dalton, Strategic Issues, U.S. Office, and Richard Hainje,
Director, Region 7.
Let's start here with Mr. Otto Maynard, president and chief
executive officer of the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
Mr. Maynard. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. When we call on you, your whole written
presentation goes in the record at this point and we would like
you to summarize it.
STATEMENT OF OTTO MAYNARD, PRESIDENT, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
Mr. Maynard. Thank you very much. My name is Otto Maynard,
President and Chief Executive Officer of Wolf Creek Nuclear
Operating Corp. We operate the Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Station
near Burlington in Coffey County for three of our owners, which
is KG&E, a Westar Energy Co., Kansas City Power and Light, a
Great Plains Energy Co., and Kansas Electric Power Cooperative.
I'll start out by pointing out that I am not a government
agency. I know that for sure because I pay taxes and fees
rather than receiving taxes and fees, but to be successful, I
have to interact and coordinate with a number of local, State
and Federal agencies.
Prior to September 11, 2001, all the nuclear power plants
had professional security forces in place. At Wolf Creek we had
at that time, still have a very highly trained, well armed
security force. Many of the security officers are ex-military,
ex-law enforcement and we exercise them in a number of
different scenarios to provide the protection for our plant
against any type of attack that might be conceived.
The other thing that we had prior to September 11th was an
emergency plan. We are required to have an emergency plan. That
plan provides for the overall communication, coordination and
response to any type of event or issue affecting Wolf Creek
that could have some potential implication on the health and
safety of the public. That was all in place prior to September
11th. After September 11th, we further enhanced the security by
adding additional security officers, additional patrols and
many other things that were put in place to provide heightened
awareness and heightened security force. We got excellent
cooperation from the local sheriff, Kansas Highway Patrol,
Kansas National Guard and since September 11th we have also had
excellent cooperation with the U.S. military. A number of
exercises, round table discussions, scenarios have been played
out so that we very clearly understand what other roles and
responsibilities are, what the roles and responsibilities of
other agencies and what the response capabilities are and
exactly how we would utilize each other's resources in the
event there was something in the way of a terrorist attack
potentially impacting Wolf Creek.
I would also like to acknowledge that after September 11th
we got excellent cooperation from a number of Federal agencies.
Of course, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. You know, Region
IV of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the lead
Federal agency in issues affecting Wolf Creek and they provided
us with excellent communication throughout this last year,
provided us information that we needed to be aware of and in
making sure that we were doing the things that were prudent in
protecting the health and safety of the public. Also had
excellent cooperation from a number of other agencies; KBI, the
FBI, the FAA, a number of agencies, some of which we had not
coordinated or worked with that much before.
One of the reasons I believe it was easy for us to
establish some relationships, to get this level of cooperation
is because of the emergency plan that we had in place for
issues potentially affecting Wolf Creek. That plan provides, as
I said before, for coordination and communication, a common
level of threat assessment, so to speak, so that everybody
understands nationwide what level of issues that we may be
talking about and everybody can understand what the roles and
responsibilities are with already established communications so
that we knew who to talk to. We have facilities in place at
various locations so that the coordination can occur so that
each agency can do their own. I want to make it clear that
events or issues affecting Wolf Creek, that we do not direct
Federal, State or local agencies. Our primary responsibility is
taking care of the plant and in taking care of whatever the
issue is that may be affecting that and providing high quality
time and communication and recommendations to the local, State
and Federal agencies so that they can perform their role in
also protecting the health and safety of the public.
One last item I want to touch on, the one area that has
been some confusion since September 11th gets into the funding.
Of course, everyone would like to have increased security,
increased availability of a lot of things. These do cost money
and at times there were issues about who pays for that such
that the National Guard, or whoever, was able to pay their
folks and take care of that. I believe it's imperative that the
burden of funding and sharing of that cost needs to be equally
distributed among us all because the atacks from terrorists are
against the American people, all of us and our way of life, not
just a different industry or a different city and I believe
it's important that the burden of that be shared. If it is not
equally shared, then the terrorists have the ability to control
our economy by picking on various segments, such that you are
no longer able to have free competition. Again, I appreciate
the opportunity and glad to answer questions.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maynard follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Now we have Kevin Stafford, special agent in
charge of Kansas City Field Office for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN STAFFORD, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, KANSAS
CITY FIELD OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Stafford. Good afternoon, Chairman Horn, Congressman
Moran and guests. It's an honor to appear before you today to
discuss the issue that is being undertaken by the FBI and law
enforcement community in general in connection with prevention
of terrorism and related threats posed by incendiary,
biological, chemical or nuclear agents.
By way of background, Kansas City Field Office
investigative territory encompasses an area of approximately
650 miles from just east of Jefferson, Missouri to the west
border of Kansas and includes approximately 865 law enforcement
entities. This entire area is protected by approximately 134
FBI agents and 102 support personnel. With this vast geographic
area and significant differences in crime problems, effective
law enforcement levels requires leveraging personnel through
mutual cooperation and assistance. In this regard, we have
started the Heart of America Joint Task Force in September of
this past year to address and prevent acts of terrorism. The
task force has 18 participating agencies with 34 full-time
investigators. While oversight and intelligence is focused in
Kansas City, the task force includes investigators physically
located in Topeka, Garden City, Wichita as well as Jefferson
City and Springfield, Missouri. Additionally, an executive
board made up of chief law enforcement executives from the
Federal, State, county and municipal agencies has been
established and provide a forum for the exchange of
intelligence and to provide guidance regarding policy matters
and direction of the task force.
To facilitate the exchange of sensitive or classified
information, security clearances have been provided to all
members of the executive board. The Joint Terrorism Task Force
is also supported by the Kansas Domestic Terrorism Working
Group and Missouri Terrorism Working Group, which were formed
in 1997 for the purpose of sharing timely information regarding
terrorism. These groups are comprised of approximately 50
State, county and local law enforcement agencies. With respect
to combating terrorism, the Kansas City office, with the
cooperation and support of 14 bomb squads, form the Kansas/
Missouri Bomb Technician Working Group. Given the expenses
associated with equipping individuals in this area, this group
is specifically organized to share specialized tools, training
and intelligence regarding terrorist groups and devices. I'm
proud to note this group is nationally recognized and has
provided services to the National Institute of Justice, Office
of Science and Technology and the Combating Terrorism
Technology Support Office, Technical Support Working Group in
testing and evaluating a new incendiary device disrupter system
and is presently assisting in the development or robotic
disarming technology.
Kansas City Field Office has and continues to conduct
periodic training. Since December of the past year, we have
provided and participated in 32 training events with respect to
preparedness or potential terrorist acts and to unified
response from law enforcement. Recently the Kansas City office
was selected as one of five sites for a regional computer
forensics laboratory which has been named The Heart of America
Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory, a partnership to any
FBI, Federal, State and municipal law enforcement agencies to
provide examination of criminal investigations and
prosecutions. By combining the extraordinary talents and
resources of law enforcement agencies at all levels, the
ability to investigate acts of terrorism will be significantly
enhanced.
The Kansas City Field Office has also been selected as one
of only 20 sites for the initiation and development of Cyber
Crimes Task Force. The establishment of this task force would
be a powerful tool in the fight against terrorism, white-collar
crime, violent crime, and national infrastructure protection
matters. The Kansas City Field Office has an active InfraGuard
program where special agents maintain liaison with the owners
and operators of the Nations critical infrastructures.
Mr. Chairman, my remarks have been brief and have been
meant to merely highlight the counter terrorism initiatives
undertaken by the Kansas City Field Office and law enforcement
within Kansas and the Western District of Missouri. While the
FBI, both nationally and within the Kansas City Field Office,
have significantly increased our resources toward protecting
our country against further terrorist attacks, the FBI cannot
do such alone. As you can see, after the terrible events of
September 11th, the law enforcement community has risen to the
occasion by providing significant, tangible, real-time
cooperation and communication throughout the State of Kansas
and the Western District of Missouri. Through these efforts we
have established a well-developed and coordinated law
enforcement capability to address and prevent acts of
terrorism. However, despite our best efforts, it is impossible
for a law enforcement agency to guarantee to its legislative
oversight that future terrorism will not occur. What we can
guarantee is that men and women of the FBI, the Kansas City
Field Office, and our law enforcement partners throughout
Kansas and Missouri are serious and devoted to the role of
protecting our area and our Nation against future hostilities.
This concludes my remarks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, and we have had very good
relationships with the FBI in both Y2K and computers within the
executive branch and now terrorism so thank you for all your
doing. We appreciate it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stafford follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Now we've got Ms. Dalton, who is the strategy
director for the General Accounting Office. The General
Accounting Office is headed by the Comptroller General of the
United States, Dave Walker. He's done a wonderful job and he's
got a great crew and we always ask them to come to these
hearings because we want them, since they have over 58 reports,
and you can get it, just send them a letter and they have been
into the terrorist bit for several years and so we want Ms.
Dalton. There's always something we missed and that's why I
always put you here. You have a broad picture on what should we
have done that we didn't do.
STATEMENT OF PATRICIA DALTON, STRATEGY DIRECTOR, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Moran. It
is a pleasure to be here in Kansas to discuss these critical
issues. The challenges posed by homeland security exceed the
capacity and authority of any one level of government.
Protecting the Nation against these unique threats calls for
truly an integrated approach bringing together the resources of
all levels of government and the private sector and we have
certainly heard today many aspects of the roles and response of
both State and local government. In my testimony today, I would
like to focus on challenges facing us of establishing a
leadership structure, defining roles, developing performance
goals and measures and deploying the appropriate tools to best
achieve and sustain national goals.
President Bush has taken a number of important steps to
enhance the country's homeland security efforts, including
creating the Office of Homeland Security, proposing the
Department of Homeland Security and most recently putting forth
a national strategy. Both the House and the Senate have worked
diligently on these issues and currently are deliberating many
current proposals related to homeland security. The proposals
to create a statutorily based Department of Homeland Security
hold promise to strengthen leadership in this area and
specifically call for coordination and collaboration with State
and local governments and the private sector. Many aspects of
the proposed consolidation of homeland security programs are in
line with previous GAO's recommendation and show promise toward
reducing fragmentation and improving coordination, both among
levels of government and the private sector. For example, the
new department would consolidate Federal programs for State and
local planning and preparedness from several agencies and place
them under a single organizational umbrella. Based on prior
work, we believe that the consolidation of some homeland
security functions makes sense and will, if properly organized
and implemented over time, lead to more efficient, effective
and coordinated programs, better intelligence sharing and more
robust protection of people, borders and critical
infrastructure.
However, implementation of a new department will be an
extremely complex task, and in the short term, the magnitude of
the challenges that the new department faces will clearly
require substantial time and effort, and as the Comptroller
General has previously testified, will take additional
resources to make it effective in the short term. The proposals
also may result in other concerns such as maintaining a proper
balance in programs with dual purpose missions, whether they be
public health, research activities or food safety.
The recently issued National Strategy for Homeland Security
provides additional clarification of roles and
responsibilities. It lays out four strategic objectives;
preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing
vulnerability to terrorism and minimizing damage and recovery
from attacks, the strategy provides for strong State and local
roles. However, challenges will remain in defining appropriate
inter-governmental roles. Achieving national preparedness
hinges on creating effective and real partnerships, not with
Federal. Decision makers have to balance national interest of
prevention and preparedness with unique needs and interests of
local communities. A one-size-fits-all Federal approach just
simply will not work. Our fieldwork at Federal agencies should
be conceived as national, not Federal in nature. And at local
governments for this commitment signifies a shift is
potentially underway in the definition of roles and
responsibilities between Federal, State and local governments.
These changes may have far reaching consequences for homeland
security and accountability to the public.
The challenges posed by the new threats are prompting
officials at all levels of government to rethink long-standing
divisions of responsibility for such areas as fire safety,
services, infrastructure protection and airport security. In
many areas proposals under consideration would impose a
stronger Federal presence in the form of new national standards
or assistance. For instance, Congress is currently considering
mandating new vulnerability assessments and protective measures
on local communities for drinking water facilities. Another
area which we heard about today, first responders, reflects a
dramatic upturn in the magnitude and role of the Federal
Government in providing assistance and standards for fire
service training, equipment and exercises.
Governments at the local level are also moving to rethink
roles and responsibilities to address the unique scale and
scope of the contemporary threats from terrorism. In our case
studies, five metropolitan areas, we have identified several
common forms of regional cooperation and coordination. These
include special task force or working groups, improved
collaboration among other public health entities, increased
planning, mutual aid agreements and communications
improvements.
Performance goals and measures are also needed in homeland
security programs. As the national strategy and related
implementation plans evolve, we would expect clearer
performance expectations to emerge. Given the need for a highly
integrated approach to the homeland security challenge,
national performance goals and measures may best be developed
in a collaborative way involving all levels of government and
the private sector.
Communication is one example of an area in which standards
have not yet been developed, and other first responders have
continuously highlighted that standards are needed. That's what
we have heard today. The national strategy calls for the
proposed Department of Homeland Security to develop such a
national communication plan to establish protocols, processes
and the standards for technology acquisition.
Finally, the choice and the design of the policy tools the
Federal Government uses to engage and involve other levels of
government in the private sector in enhancing homeland security
will have important consequences for performance and
accountability. Governments have a variety of policy tools,
including direct grants, regulations, tax incentives, and
information-sharing mechanisms, available to motivate other
levels of government or the private sector to address security
concerns. The choice of policy tools will affect sustainability
of efforts, accountability and flexibility, and targeting of
resources.
In conclusion, although we have taken a number of important
steps, many challenges do remain. Our government partnerships
will be critical to meeting those challenges. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Our last presenter is Richard Hainje, Regional
Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Thank you
for coming again. We have had you in Nebraska.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD HAINJE, DIRECTOR, REGION VII, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. Hainje. We didn't have that discussion about Nebraska
versus Kansas at that meeting. Thank you, Chairman Horn. Thank
you, Congressman Moran, for this opportunity. I'm pleased to be
with you here today to discuss the challenges facing emergency
managers and first responders in their efforts to be better
prepared to respond to acts of terrorism. FEMA is a Federal
agency responsible for leading the Nation in preparing for and
responding to and recovering from disasters. The Federal
Response Plan forms the heart of our management framework and
lays out the process by which inner agency groups work together
and respond as a cohesive team to all types of disasters. It is
successful because it's built upon existing professional
disciplines, delivery systems and relationships among the
participating agencies. The National Strategy for Homeland
Security proposed by President Bush builds on the experience of
the Federal Response Plan to develop one all-discipline, all-
hazard plan to cover events of national significance and
clarify the roles and responsibilities of different levels of
government.
FEMA Region VII takes an active role in preparing the
response to a terrorism event. It is our responsibility to
coordinate Federal, regional and State terrorism planning
training and exercise activities. Prior to September 11th, the
President tasked the Director of FEMA with creating the Office
of National Preparedness. The mission of the Office of National
Preparedness is to provide leadership in coordinating and
facilitating all Federal efforts to assist all State and local
first responders and emergency management organizations with
planning, training, equipment and exercises. To further these
efforts, the President has requested $3.5 billion in the 2003
budget to support first responder initiatives. These funds
would help them plan, train, acquire needed equipment and
conduct exercises in preparation for terrorist attacks and
other emergencies. In the recent past 2002 supplemental,
Congress provided FEMA with $100 million for State and local
governments to update and enhance existing emergency operation
plans. The funds for the planning initiative will be allocated
to the States and other State level entities on the basis of
population. These comprehensive plans will form the foundation
for the work to be done in 2003 and prepare first responders
for terrorist attacks. A unique challenge that a biological or
chemical scenario would present for the first responder
community emphasizes the need for effective planning. With a
covert release of a biological agent, the first responders will
be physicians or animal control workers instead of the
traditional first responders with whom we have a long term
relationship at FEMA.
Across the government we are working to enhance our ability
to detect biological attacks, better link to public health and
emergency response communities, and train and equip traditional
first responders to respond to bioterrorism. The President's
proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security would
strengthen the linkages that are critical to our capacity to
respond to terrorism. Consequently, the structure of this newly
proposed department recognizes that FEMA's mission and core
competencies are essential components of homeland security. For
this reason, Congress can continue to be assured that the
Nation will be prepared for acts of terrorism and will
coordinate its efforts with the entire first responder
community.
Terrorism creates tremendous challenges. In recent years we
have made strives to increase cooperation between the various
response communities. At FEMA, the creation of the Office of
National Preparedness and our emphasis on training, planning,
equipment and exercises will enable us to better focus our
efforts and will help our Nation be better prepared for the
future. The proposed Department of Homeland Security will
integrate these capabilities into a broader whole that will
help our Nation respond to the terrorist threat. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hainje follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Ms. Dalton, looking at your testimony, you noted
the following: ``In addition, as you know, the
Intergovernmental Law Enforcement Sharing Act of 2001, (H.R.
3483),'' which I had sponsored, the last I knew Mr. Chambliss
proposal was going through judiciary and I don't know where any
of this is right now. All I do know is that the FBI and local
law enforcement need that authority in order to get
intelligence sharing and maybe there's some way we can get the
FBI or whatever or the Comptroller General to say hey, it's
about time to get this rolling, if it isn't rolling. So I'm not
sure exactly what they are doing but we need to do it.
Ms. Dalton. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. In the proposals for
the new Department of Homeland Security, I believe all of them
do provide for an intelligence sharing component. How that
finally is structured, obviously the verdict is still out, but
I think there's a broad recognition that intelligence sharing
is going to be critical to defending our country and our people
against terrorist attacks.
Mr. Horn. So that's sitting in the Senate right now.
Ms. Dalton. It currently is. My understanding, it has gone
through the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and scheduled
to go to the floor when the Senate returns.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. Gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Maynard, have
Federal regulations involving the security of nuclear power
plants changed since September 11th?
Mr. Maynard. Yes. The regulations themselves have not. We
have been issued orders that provide increased requirements,
defined specific levels of numbers of people, types of things
we had to be able to defend against. That document itself is
safeguarded so it's difficult to go into the details of that,
but we did have--orders came that all nuclear power plants had
to make some changes to their plans.
Mr. Moran. Do you have an obligation to notify law
enforcement of some event?
Mr. Maynard. Yes, we do. In fact, at any suspicious event,
we have communications in place where we do notify local law
enforcement and also through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
it will be handled either by the FBI, whichever agency is most
appropriate for that type of item. In fact, one of the things
talked about earlier is airplanes flying around and if there's
any suspicious activity, a call is made and the response is
quite rapid.
Mr. Moran. Is there a no-fly zone over a nuclear power
plant?
Mr. Maynard. Yes and no. There is no longer a restricted
area. For a short time there was a restricted area that was
published that did not allow any type, any airplanes within a
ten-mile radius. Now there is a notice to airmen out that
notifies all pilots to not fly directly over any nuclear power
plant or any other industrial structure, including other types
of power plants as well and definitely no loitering around or
sight-seeing around them.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Hainje, FEMA, I asked earlier about the VA.
Is there any working relationship between FEMA and the
Department of Veteran's Affairs in regard to VA responding to
emergencies?
Mr. Hainje. I wouldn't classify myself as an expert on the
background with the VA response, but the way the Federal
Response Plan works is in any emergency and prior to any
emergency, for planning purposes, we have emergency support
functions. One of those is Disaster Medical Services and we
work with the public health as the lead on that and certainly
they would draw in and they work with their partners in the VA.
So basically as a Federal agency response under the Federal
Response Plan, Public Health would be the lead on the medical
side and then they would draw in other Federal resources to
help and assist.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Stafford, can you help me at all prioritize
where we, at least from a law enforcement perspective, ought to
be focussing our efforts at terrorist prevention? Congress, as
I said earlier, spends a lot of time on airport and airline
security. We have talked a bit about nuclear power plants. Mr.
Horn asked about the public water supply. Is there--certainly
we had a long discussion on the introduction of biological
agents into agriculture. Is there any kind of way to prioritize
where law enforcement ought to be focussing its efforts?
Mr. Stafford. As you alluded to earlier, fortunately Kansas
has a high coal electric production capability. We have
tremendous telecommunications, transportation, water,
financial. So most of what we spend our time on is looking at
intelligence that we have collected, analyzing it and
disseminating it to the appropriate regulatory agencies, but
unfortunately, I can't provide anymore insight than anybody
else. The Bureau does not get into providing physical security.
Most of the nuclear power facilities--as a matter of fact,
theirs is so good at Wolf Creek, I was denied access for about
15 minutes when myself and a SWAT team went out there for a
tour. They have an outstanding security force. Unfortunately,
that's not necessarily consistent among all other areas like a
coal production plant I went to in Garden City. Their security
was not quite anywhere near the standards of Mr. Maynard's so
there is not the consistency probably there should be among the
different types of key assets within----
Mr. Moran. Have you increased your intelligence
capabilities?
Mr. Stafford. We have primarily utilized the Joint Task
Force on Terrorism. We traditionally only had access to those
intelligence basis within our unit. As I indicated, we have 18
different agencies. Some of those agencies have actually
brought their computers into our space so we can gain immediate
access through their employees and our space. Other agencies,
all we have to do is make a phone call and we can gain access
into their intelligence systems.
Mr. Moran. There's been some criticism, suggestion about
the inability of the FBI or the failure of the FBI to
communicate from region to region. Is that different today than
if it was a problem, is it less of a problem?
Mr. Stafford. It's definitely less of a problem through the
joint leaders of task forces.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Maynard, to give you the chance, it does
seem like perhaps we have highlighted nuclear power generation.
Is there anything you would like to point out about others who
generate electricity as well, kind of important things we ought
to be aware of and not just nuclear that would be a problem?
Mr. Maynard. Well, I believe as a Nation we have to be
careful that we don't get focused on one industry or one
activity and put all our efforts on that. Nuclear power plants
certainly get highlighted as targets, but it's also one of the
best defended, most robust-built facilities around. We have
other infrastructure items and other industries; petro
chemical, pharmaceutical. There's a lot of different other
industries that may not have that same level of security and
for a Nation to focus totally on one that may already have it
and not focus on some of the others, I think, would be a
mistake so I think we need to take a big picture look.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, sir. Thank you all.
Mr. Horn. Ms. Dalton, in your testimony you say that in
leadership by statute will ensure among others things that it's
held accountable to Congress and the American people but
without performance measures such as national standards to
ensure that all first responders receive proper training and
equipment, how could anyone determine whether the department is
doing a good job despite all the PR and so forth, so what is
your feeling on that on getting the standards in there?
Ms. Dalton. I think establishing performance standards,
performance goals and performance measures is certainly one of
the critical next steps that we need to take as a country to
ensure that we have established clearly what we want to
accomplish, how we want to accomplish it and ultimately
determine whether or not we have in fact accomplished it. By
forming the Department of Homeland Security, certainly that
provides a focal point in leadership and does enhance
accountability to that extent, but it's important to take it to
the next step which is clearly stated in the National Strategy
of establishing performance measures and standards and then as
I said, holding ourselves accountable to them. So, that will be
the next step, and it's part of an evolving response to the
events of September 11th.
Mr. Horn. Mr. Hainje, you fit right in there because you
and GAO agree that national standards are necessary if we're
going to have a successful national homeland security strategy.
I remember Mr. Albaugh, the Director of FEMA, has also stressed
the importance of nationwide standards. Is FEMA working on
setting these standards and if so, how can we see them?
Mr. Hainje. I think we are working for the guarantee of
minimum capability at each State and some of the issues that
will be resolved there will be as we receive plans from the
States under the planning grant that are coming up, plans that
will be more elaborate as to how they intend to proceed within
their States and then try to give guidance as that process goes
along. Well, the Office of National Preparedness was given the
issue, if you will, of supporting the development of
comprehensive response plans that hopefully will help with some
standardization. There also has been assignment to FEMA. Ron
Miller, the Chief Information Officer of FEMA is being asked to
work on standardization and interoperability of communications
equipment and that's an issue that keeps coming up and
something that I worked with in my former life also, where we
tried to make a State-wide compatible interoperable system so
Project Safecom is something that numerous agencies at the
Federal level are working together on and Ron Miller from FEMA
is the lead on that. And then also trying to improve and make
even more standard the training that is provided to first
responders and I guess those are some of the areas where we're
trying to work a little bit toward standardization.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. I'm now going to thank the people that
really put this together and it isn't easy to have long
distances and everything else. The staff director, chief
counsel of the subcommittee is Mr. Russell George, which will
probably be one of his last ones because he's been confirmed to
be the Inspector General of the agency; Dave Bartel, is he
here? Chief of Staff. There he is. He's the gentleman that
looks like he's Secretary of State. For you Kansans, he is a
Kansan and he was Nancy Kassebaum's Chief of Staff and the
minute she retired, pulled him back out of the Senate and I
think we can probably make a few comments about foot and mouth
disease in terms of Senate versus the House and we were
delighted to have Dave come over and be my Chief of Staff. He's
done a great job for Kansas and California. Now, of course, I
come from Long Beach, California where it's called Iowa by the
Sea and there was a lot of Kansans in there, too, at the turn
of the century and then to my left here and your right is
Bonnie Heald, the Deputy Staff Director and the gentleman
trying to get all microphones going and everything is Chris
Barkley, the assistant to the subcommittee. Michael Sazonov is
not with us today but he's the staff assistant also for this;
and Mr. Moran's staff were very helpful, Kip Peterson and
Travis Murphy; and the person that really was very kind to us
in terms of this auditorium and the Eisenhower situation is
Daniel Holt and his staff and I had a chance to talk with him
yesterday for a couple of hours and if there was ever an
encyclopedia of modern history in the second world war and the
General Eisenhower so we appreciate--Dan, are you out there
somewhere? This is a wonderful area and auditorium and I gather
the former president, of course, will be here to announce all
that and our court reporter is Kathy Bonfiglio. We thank you
all for that. Jerry, in particular, we're delighted. I know
Members of Congress this time are out usually campaigning. I
would hope he doesn't have to campaign very much.
Mr. Moran. Always, sir.
Mr. Horn. That's right. So thank you very much and we're
delighted to be here. We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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