[Senate Hearing 107-43]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-43
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 28, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
72-228 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL NELSON, Florida
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Allison, Hon. Graham T., member, Russia Task Force, Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board, director, Belfer Center, Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge MA................ 37
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Baker, Hon. Howard H. Jr., co-chair, Russia Task Force, Secretary
of Energy Advisory Board, former United States Senator from
Tennessee, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell, P.C.,
Washington, DC................................................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 11
Letter from members of the Task Force transmitting a copy of
the final report........................................... 52
Cutler, Hon. Lloyd N., co-chair, Russia Task Force, Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board, former White House Counsel, Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering, Washington, DC............................. 18
Domenici, Hon. Pete V., U.S. Senator from New Mexico:
Prepared statement........................................... 11
News release entitled, ``Domenici: U.S. Should Not Act
Unilaterally or Take Axe to Nonproliferation Programs With
Russia,'' March 28, 2001................................... 13
Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., former Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, chairman of the board of directors, Keck
Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont
McKenna College, Claremont, CA................................. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, prepared
statement...................................................... 1
Statements submitted for the record:
United States Enrichment Corporation [USEC], statement
submitted for the record................................. 2
Briefing paper on ``The CANDU MOX Option for Disposition of
Surplus Russian Weapons-Origin Plutonium,'' March 2001... 7
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar
presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, Kerry, Wellstone, and Bill
Nelson.
Senator Lugar. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
This morning, the committee meets to review and hear
testimony on the activities of the Baker-Cutler Task Force and
its Report Card on the Department of Energy's Non-Proliferation
Programs with Russia.
We are deeply indebted to Senator Howard Baker and to Lloyd
Cutler for their leadership, and to the members of their
distinguished Commission. The Task Force's report has been
filed, and the experiences and recommendations outlined therein
should be taken very seriously.
As I think all of us on this committee would agree, the
gentlemen who headed the Commission, and those who served, have
rendered an extraordinary service.
And without further ado I will submit my statement for the
record, and turn to the distinguished ranking member, Senator
Biden.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR
Today, the Committee meets to review and hear testimony on the
activities of the Baker-Cutler Task Force and its Report Card on the
Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia.
No issue better illustrates the new challenges, complexities, and
uncertainties faced by the United States in the post Cold War era than
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. American efforts to
slow or stop proliferation are perhaps the most important foreign and
national security policies our government is implementing today.
The Cold War was marked by superpower competition in which the
United States and the Soviet Union maintained large nuclear arsenals.
As terrifying as the nuclear competition was, it had one grim
advantage--both nations had the ability and an interest in preventing
proliferation and keeping a tight lid on weapons systems. We lived in a
world in which nuclear annihilation was disturbingly possible, but
proliferation of the technology was highly unlikely.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, a new era in world history began.
The strict controls the Soviet government had employed to safeguard
these weapons crumbled. Meanwhile, the failure of the Russian economy
has provided huge incentives to sell these weapons or the scientific
knowledge of how to make them.
Rogue nations and terrorist groups can now seek to buy or steal
what they previously had to produce on their own. They seek ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union
as a means to intimidate or terrorize their neighbors and deter the
United States. This has led many experts to conclude that the current
threat environment is less stable and more dangerous than during the
Cold War.
In addition to unilateral policies, the United States has attempted
to address these threats through a framework of cooperative programs
with the former Soviet Union. These cooperative efforts have enjoyed
many important successes such as the Nunn-Lugar program's removal of
all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Over 5,000
warheads have been deactivated and more than one thousand missiles and
missile launchers have been destroyed. Large numbers of weapon- and
material-storage facilities have received security and safety
enhancements or upgrades to safeguard them from possible threats. Other
programs seek to employ former Soviet weapons scientists in peaceful
projects to reduce the chances of their sharing weapons expertise with
rogue states and terrorist groups.
To ensure success, our government must continue to review and
identify those efforts that have proven effective and seek ways to
intensify these activities. Likewise, we must acknowledge that some
policies and programs have not produced the results we had hoped. In
these areas, we must alter and improve our efforts so as to achieve
meaningful results.
The Baker-Cutler Report was an effort by the Energy Department to
review ongoing efforts and to offer recommendations on how to improve
its nonproliferation programs. The Task Force recognized that some of
the programs were succeeding and others were in need of fine tuning.
But most importantly, this distinguished group of experts and leaders
came to the conclusion that we must continue our efforts to eliminate
these threats at their source if we are to continue to safeguard the
American people.
The Bush Administration is reviewing our nuclear arms control and
nonproliferation strategy. I am hopeful they will be guided by the
Baker-Cutler report's conclusion that the threat from the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction is ``the most urgent unmet security
threat facing the United States today.'' We must respond to this
threat, and these programs play a critical role in that response.
I am pleased that my friend and former Senate Majority Leader,
Senator Howard Baker, has agreed to join us today to share his thoughts
on the conclusions that the Task Force reached. He is joined by another
good friend, Lloyd Cutler, Co-Chairman of the Russia Task Force. Mr.
Cutler is a founding partner of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served
as Counsel to Presidents Clinton and Carter.
Following this distinguished panel, we will be joined by Dr. Ron
Lehman and Dr. Graham Allison. Dr. Lehman was appointed to the
President's Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy and served as
Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency under Presidents Reagan and Bush. He also played
important roles in both the International Science and Technology
Centers at the Department of State and the Nuclear Cities Initiative at
the Department of Energy.
Dr. Graham Allison is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and
is currently the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard
University and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and
International Security. Graham has made tremendous contributions to
debates over nonproliferation policy and has the added distinction of
serving as a member of the Baker-Cutler Task Force.
Before I yield to Senator Biden for an opening statement or any
comments he may have, I would like to insert in the record some
briefing materials provided by the United States Enrichment Corporation
and Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.
Thank you.
[Additional statements submitted by Senator Lugar follow]:
PREPARED STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION [USEC]
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RUSSIAN HEU PURCHASE PROGRAM
(Megatons to Megawatts)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This marks the seventh successful year for USEC as the U.S.
executive agent for the 1993 government-to-government Russian Highly
Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement. As called for in this
nuclear nonproliferation agreement, USEC and the Russian executive
agent, Techsnabexport (Tenex), signed a contract in 1994 that governs
the commercial implementation of the 1993 agreement. This 20-year, $12
billion contract facilitates the conversion of 500 metric tons of
nuclear weapons-derived HEU into low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel
purchased by USEC for use in commercial nuclear power plants. The
program has come to be known as Megatons to Megawatts.
Russian shipments to USEC of weapons-derived LEU commenced in June
1995. Since then, USEC has received 84 shipments of 2,203 cylinders
containing 3,303 metric tons of LEU--an amount sufficient to meet U.S.
nuclear fuel demand for two years.
These seven years of implementation of the Megatons to Megawatts
program clearly demonstrate that both the U.S. and Russian partners
have been successful in making this 1993 agreement work. In doing so,
the partners have reduced the threat to world stability posed by the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.
The results are impressive. As of March 2001:
1. Approximately 113 metric tons of Russian warhead HEU have
been converted to LEU fuel and purchased by USEC for use by its
electric utility customers.
2. The 113 metric tons of HEU is the equivalent of more than
4,500 \1\ nuclear weapons--enough nuclear explosives to destroy
every large city in the world. The conversion of this material
eliminates its potential use as a nuclear explosive.
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\1\ The exact amount of HEU required for a weapon is classified
information and only estimates are used for illustration purposes.
3. USEC and Tenex are 40 percent ahead of the original 1993,
20-year schedule to convert a total of 500 metric tons of HEU
to LEU. This is equivalent to an estimated 20,000 to 25,000
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nuclear warheads.
4. No taxpayer dollars are required for this program. USEC
pays Russia hundreds of millions of dollars a year for these
purchases--a total to date of about $2 billion. Russia vitally
needs this hard currency to help offset the falling value of
the ruble, to meet the terms and goals of the HEU agreement and
for trade purposes.
5. USEC and Tenex have established a strong, flexible,
responsive and cooperative working relationship.
6. USEC and Tenex reached agreement in May 2000 on new
market-based commercial terms that would begin January 1, 2002,
when the current terms expire. The new terms are under review
by the respective governments.
These achievements demonstrate that the Megatons to Megawatts
program is working. Government nonproliferation and national energy
security objectives are being met and sustained by commercial
transactions. USEC has proven itself to be highly effective as
executive agent under sometimes difficult circumstances. In fact, it
has not been smooth sailing during the past seven years of implementing
this agreement. A number of contentious issues have emerged, ranging
from the appropriateness of USEC's privatization to issues of over
payment for, and disposition of, the natural uranium portion of the
deal.
Implementation of the contact requires continuing interaction and
responsiveness. USEC does not act unilaterally in this process. As
executive agent for the government, USEC is subject to an ongoing
consultative process that includes direction from the Administration
before acting on contract matters.
Still, the agreement has been a success story, and USEC is uniquely
positioned to continue as the sole U.S. executive agent. USEC's global
customer base, domestic enrichment operations, unique market
experience, financial resources and continuing commitment have all
contributed to the strong foundation that is essential to support the
continuing implementation of this unique and challenging program.
BACKGROUND
With the demise and breakup of the Soviet Union came steadily
increasing concerns about the security of nuclear weapons and related
materials in the former Soviet Union (FSU). As weapons reduction
programs were implemented, substantially greater efforts became
necessary for the safe and effective management of the dispersed
nuclear weapons, stored weapons-grade materials and nuclear materials
removed from dismantled nuclear weapons. These concerns resulted in
urgent actions to transfer these weapons and materials from FSU states
to Russia for safe disposition.
The U.S. government developed a number of nonproliferation programs
to assist Russia with its nuclear weapons and nuclear material security
efforts. Clearly, these activities would prove very costly and require
significant and ongoing funding that Russia itself can not afford.
The concept of converting highly enriched uranium (HEU) from
Russian nuclear warheads into fuel for commercial nuclear power plants
was first raised in the late 1980s. The biblical entreaty to turn
swords into plowshares eventually emerged as a self-sustaining
commercial pay-as-you-go program that established a clear nexus for
national security and commercial interests.
To accomplish this, it was essential to provide Russia with badly
needed hard currency to keep vital nuclear workers employed and to
secure and reduce its stock of nuclear warhead materials. One approach
was for Russia to take HEU from its dismantled nuclear warheads and
dilute it into low-enriched uranium (LEU). This LEU is useless for
nuclear weapons but is suitable as fuel for power plants. Financing
this effort was accomplished by the U.S. purchasing the resulting LEU
fuel from Russia for use in commercial nuclear power plants. The
program literally paid for itself.
By 1992, the Bush Administration had matured this concept through
negotiations with Russia into a mutually acceptable framework. This led
to the adoption of the 1993 government-to-government Russian HEU
Purchase Agreement that required commercial implementation by executive
agents.
The U.S. Congress authorized, and the Executive Branch designated,
the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) as its executive agent,
and the Russian Federation designated Techsnabexport (Tenex) as its
executive agent. On January 14, 1994, during the Presidential Summit in
Moscow, the parties signed a 20-year, $12 billion contract for USEC to
purchase the enrichment component derived from 500 metric tons of
Russian HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons. This amount of HEU
represents the equivalent of more than 20,000 Soviet-era nuclear
warheads.
While the 1993 government-to-government agreement and the 1994
implementing contract facilitated the beginning of the process, the
startup also brought the parties face to face with substantial
technical and financial difficulties. Although the LEU that results
from blending down HEU has substantial commercial market value to
Russia, Russia did not have the financial resources necessary to
process the material. And while it had the necessary facilities, it
needed technical support to do what had never been done--to reverse the
enrichment process and dilute the more-than-90 percent bomb-grade
material down to the 5 percent level with the purity required for
commercial nuclear fuel. USEC played a pivotal role in solving both
problems.
Through a series of advance payments totaling $260 million, USEC
provided Russia with the financial resources needed to initiate the
processing of the warhead material. In addition to the financial
problems, Russia encountered considerable technical difficulties due to
contamination of the HEU that had to be removed in order to meet
commercial-quality specifications required by USEC customers. USEC
assisted the Russians during 1994 and early 1995 to solve these
technical problems. The first shipment of LEU purchased by USEC from
Russia was received at the Company's Portsmouth, Ohio plant on June 23,
1995.
ONGOING COOPERATION
While an overall success, this agreement has also had its share of
controversial issues and problems, as would be expected in an
undertaking of this magnitude. Examples include the debate over the
appropriateness of privatizing USEC and concerns that a private sector
agent's business motivations would clash with government national
security objectives. Another issue was Russia's insistence that it be
paid immediately for the natural uranium portion of shipments. This
dispute led to the suspension of three shipments by Russia. While terms
concerning the natural uranium portion were clearly spelled out in the
agreement, ultimately Congress had to act to resolve that situation.
While such controversies are often heated and involve various
constituencies, the track record shows that they were resolved, and
these outcomes auger well for continuing cooperation and problem
solving.
Over the course of the contract, as both a govermnent corporation
and after July 1998 as an investor-owned company, USEC has accommodated
Russian requests for special considerations and flexibility. In fact,
there have been 13 amendments to the contract reflecting the parties'
ability to make such accommodations.
For example, in 1994, 1995 and 1996, at Russia's request, USEC made
payments in advance of delivery of LEU for $60 million, $100 million
and $100 million, respectively. The first two payments supported a
presidential commitment at the January 1994 Moscow Summit and an
agreement reached at June 1995 U.S.-Russia negotiations. The objective
was to help Russia finance the provision of nuclear fuel to the Ukraine
in order to secure full implementation of the transfer of nuclear
weapons from the Ukraine to Russia for dismantling. The 1996 $100
million advance payment facilitated a U.S.-Russia agreement on enhanced
transparency measures.
In 1999, USEC again demonstrated its commitment. In response to a
request by Minister Adamov to help meet revenue expectations in the
Russian government budget, USEC advanced Russia $173 million. In that
same year, as had been done on a number of previous occasions, USEC
agreed to accelerate its payments for deliveries to accommodate Russian
fiscal needs. There are many other examples of USEC's assistance to its
Russian partner. USEC provided Russia with cylinders for the storage of
uranium at no cost, established a Russian uranium storage account and
assisted Russia in protecting its Megatons to Megawatts assets in the
United States. The latter assistance resulted in a presidential
Executive Order that provided legal protection for certain Russian
assets in the U.S. on the grounds of national security.
INTERRUPTIONS IN SHIPMENTS BY RUSSIA
Despite substantial efforts to accommodate Russia's needs and to
facilitate the smooth performance of the HEU contract, Russia
unilaterally suspended scheduled delivery four separate times for
various reasons not connected with USEC's implementation of the
contract. While these suspensions were technically Russian breaches of
contract, USEC was able to overcome the impact of these suspended
shipments by using its substantial inventory and adjusting its uranium
enrichment production schedules to meet customer obligations. But this
came at a price to USEC, which was forced to incur additional
production costs to compensate for a cumulative delay of 12 months in
Russian deliveries to USEC. Once again, demonstrating its strong
commitment to the continuing success of the program, USEC has agreed to
reschedule delivery of the delayed LEU. These actions could not have
been possible without USEC's production capability, inventory and other
unique assets.
PRICING CONSIDERATIONS
The 1994 contract called for the executive agents to negotiate
price and quantities each year for the following year. Not
unexpectedly, this resulted in certain tensions surrounding annual
negotiations. In 1996, in a mutual commitment to stabilize performance,
both parties adopted a five-year amendment to the contract that set
prices and quantities through 2001. While this arrangement solved one
problem, it created another. By 1998, an unexpected and dramatic
decline in market prices occurred, due in large measure to excess
enrichment capacity, lower demand and aggressive pricing by
competitors. This resulted in a situation where USEC's purchase costs
for Russian material became higher than market prices. In effect, USEC
was losing money on each purchase, and the commercial viability of the
contract was being undermined. Even so, USEC was determined to sustain
the program going forward. It absorbed the financial losses and
addressed the issue with the U.S. government and its Russian partner.
The excellent working relationship of the executive agents
encouraged candid discussions about this problem over the period of a
year. In accordance with guidance provided by the Administration in May
2000, these discussions resulted in an agreement in principle to adopt
market-based pricing for the remainder of the 13 years of the contract
and, when approved, will go into effect at the beginning of 2002.
The terms of this agreement include the following:
A discounted, market-based pricing mechanism for purchases
of LEU derived from 30 metric tons of Russian warhead HEU each
year
The purchase of an additional amount of LEU from warhead HEU
through 2004 that makes up for previous Russian delivery
shortfalls
At Russia's request, the purchase of three million Russian
commercial (non-weapons derived) enrichment separative work
units (SWU) over five years in order to supplement their
revenues during the transition to market-based pricing.
current status of the new contract pricing amendment
On January 18, 2001, the Administration authorized USEC to complete
the new terms with Tenex. However, the Bush Administration informed the
Russian government that it will conduct a review of the overall HEU
agreement and the proposed amendment. USEC is awaiting completion of
this review. While the current contract pricing terms expire on January
1, 2002, USEC orders for 2002 material from Russia must be placed
earlier than that.
The timely adoption of new financial terms--which the executive
agents are ready to execute--is essential to maintain the continued
success and objectives of the Megatons to Megawatts program. These new
financial terms are consistent with the national security and economic
interests of both the United States and Russia. These terms will:
Stabilize and ensure successful completion of the HEU
agreement and contract for the remaining 13-year period on
self-sustaining financial terms.
Provide Russia, through USEC purchases, with vitally needed
hard currency to pay workers, to finance nuclear safety
upgrades, to clean up contaminated sites and to safeguard
nuclear materials. USEC payments constitute about 20 percent of
the nontax income of the Russian federal budget.
Ensure that the remaining Megatons to Megawatts Russian HEU,
representing an estimated 16,000 nuclear warheads, will be
converted to fuel for electric power plants.
Aid U.S. national security and nonproliferation objectives
at no cost to the government.
USEC'S COMMITMENT TO THE ROLE OF EXECUTIVE AGENT
USEC demonstrated a solid and continuing commitment to the Megatons
to Megawatts program from its inception as a government corporation
through its privatization in 1998, and during its three years as an
investor-owned company. As executive agent for the U.S. government,
USEC has successfully balanced national security policy objectives with
the objectives of its own commercial interests, in certain cases to its
own financial detriment, proving that these differing interests can be
reconciled and well-served.
USEC remains uniquely suited and committed to its role as executive
agent for the Megatons to Megawatts program.
First, no other U.S. entity can as effectively and
expediently implement this 20-year, $12 billion national
security program and commercial commitment.
-- USEC has the best combination of customer, market and financial
strength to absorb this large amount of enriched material
over time without disrupting the market.
-- Only USEC has domestic enrichment production capability to
continue fuel supplies to customers in the event of future
Russian supply interruptions.
Second, USEC is the only domestic producer of enriched
uranium fuel and is committed to ensuring that this production
continues to meet long-term domestic energy security
objectives. In support of those objectives, adoption of the new
market-based pricing amendment will strengthen the global
competitive position of USEC's Paducah enrichment plant and its
1,700 employees.
Third, USEC has a seven-year track record of successful
implementation of this contract.
-- Without exception, the national security goals of the government-
to-government agreement and the implementing contract are
being consistently met.
-- As executive agent, USEC has consistently followed the guidance
of the U.S. government in the commercial implementation of
this program.
-- USEC has established a rare and continuing record with its
Russian counterpart of cooperation, problem solving and
long-term trust.
CONCLUSION
As the executive agent for the U.S. government, USEC employees have
exhibited pride, flexibility and commitment in implementing the
Megatons to Megawatts program. USEC employees continue to ensure the
full and timely implementation of the Russian HEU Purchase Program
consistent with U.S. policy objectives.
By the end of 2001, USEC will have purchased the LEU equivalent of
more than 140 tons of HEU--nearly 30 percent of the 500 metric tons
under the contract. This is the equivalent of an estimated 7,000 to
8,000 nuclear warheads.
This historic agreement between the governments of the United
States and the Russian Federation is being realized 40 percent ahead of
the original schedule and to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.
In addition to meeting the objectives of both countries, this agreement
has significantly reduced the threat of nuclear weapons and
demonstrated the effectiveness of the commercial implementation of this
national security program.
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MARCH 2001--BRIEFING PAPER ON
The Candu Mox Option for Disposition of Surplus Russian Weapons-Origin
Plutonium
issue: The CANDU MOX option has been identified as an acceptable
method for the disposition of excess weapons-origin plutonium by the
U.S. Department of Energy (``DOE''), and by officials of the Russian
Federation. The CANDU MOX option is not required to assist with
disposition of American surplus plutonium; however, it remains an
important potential solution to enable the Russian Federation to
achieve its plutonium disposition commitments made under the recent
U.S.-Russia bilateral agreement on plutonium disposition. As DOE and
other U.S. agencies consider steps to achieve the full and prompt
implementation of the U.S.-Russia bilateral agreement, it is vital to
keep in context the essential international benefits associated with
the CANDU MOX option, including acceleration of efforts to dispose of
Russian-origin surplus plutonium.
conclusion: The CANDU MOX option should receive appropriate
attention as a potential solution to the problem of achieving the full
benefits of the doubled plutonium disposition rates as defined under
the recent U.S.-Russia bilateral agreement. By adding the capabilities
of existing CANDU reactors in Canada to the disposition mission,
greater progress can be made to address this compelling international
issue.
Continuation of the Parallex Project;
Development of a trilateral international agreement on
plutonium disposition among the Russia, Canada and the U.S.;
and
Inclusion of the CANDU MOX option in ongoing international
plutonium disposition planning efforts, including the
development of a MOX fuel fabrication plant in Russia with the
flexibility to manufacture CANDU MOX fuel.
I. BACKGROUND
As a result of U.S.-Russia bilateral progress in the field of
nuclear disarmament, there is a surplus of at least fifty metric tons
of plutonium in each country based on START I levels. The United States
government has evaluated policy alternatives for the disposition of
excess weapons-origin plutonium, and is progressing towards
implementation of a domestic program, while encouraging the Russian
Federation and the international community to support parallel efforts
in Russia.
In a 1994 study, ``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium,'' the National Academy of Sciences states that ``the
existence of this surplus material constitutes a clear and present
danger to national and international security.'' This statement relates
principally to the risk of diversion of Russian-origin plutonium for
terrorist or weapons purposes, which underscores the need for the U.S.
to pursue policies that support the goal of securing and disposing of
Russian plutonium.
DOE has played the central role in developing U.S. plutonium
disposition policy, which although focused directly on the disposition
of U.S. plutonium, also has clear ramifications for U.S. foreign
policy. In the Record of Decision (ROD) for the Storage and Disposition
of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (Final PEIS) released by DOE on January 14, 1997, DOE
formally adopted the Final PEIS's preferred alternative to pursue a
dual strategy for plutonium disposition that includes both
immobilization and reactor technologies. The ROD maintained the option
to utilize CANDU reactors for the disposition mission, but conditioned
such use on the negotiation of a multilateral agreement among Russia,
Canada, and the U.S. In its ``Decision'' section on page 20, the ROD
states:
The Department reserves as an option the potential use of
some MOX fuel in CANDU reactors in Canada in the event that a
multilateral agreement to deploy this option is negotiated
among Russia, Canada, and the United States. DOE will engage in
a test and demonstration program for CANDU MOX fuel consistent
with ongoing and potential future cooperative efforts with
Russia and Canada. The test and demonstration activities could
occur at LANL and at sites in Canada, potentially beginning in
1997, and will be based on appropriate NEPA review. Fabrication
of MOX fuel for CANDU reactors would occur in a DOE facility,
as would be true in the case of domestic LWRs. Strict security
and safeguards would be employed in the fabrication and
transport of MOX fuel to CANDU reactors, as well as domestic
reactors. Whether, and the extent to which, the CANDU option is
implemented will depend on multinational agreements and the
results of the test and demonstration activities.
DOE has subsequently completed its evaluation of alternatives for
the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities in
the U.S. for the disposition of up to 50 metric tons of surplus
plutonium. In the ROD for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final
Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS) released by DOE on January 4,
2000, DOE selected the Savannah River Site as the location for the
three facilities. Based on this selection, DOE has authorized the
implementation of a base contract for MOX fuel fabrication and
irradiation services, to be conducted by the consortium of Duke
Engineering & Services, COGEMA Inc., and Stone & Webster (known as
DCS). The ROD indicated DOE would no longer pursue CANDU reactors for
the disposition of U.S. surplus plutonium, but that the CANDU option
was still being considered for the disposition of Russian surplus
plutonium. On page 28, the ROD states:
. . . Since the SPD Draft EIS was issued, DOE determined that
adequate reactor capacity is available in the United States for
disposition of that portion of U.S. surplus plutonium suitable
for MOX fuel. Therefore, DOE is no longer actively pursuing the
CANDU option. However, the CANDU option is still being
considered for the disposition of Russian surplus plutonium. To
assist U.S., Russia, and Canada in considering this option the
three countries are jointly conducting an experiment, which
will involve irradiating MOX fuel pins that have been
fabricated from U.S. and Russian surplus weapons plutonium in a
Canadian research reactor. This effort involves a one-time
shipment of a small quantity of weapons plutonium from the U.S.
to Canada.
Good progress has been made towards the CANDU MOX experiment, known
as the ``Parallex Project,'' being jointly conducted by the U.S.,
Russia, and Canada. All of the necessary MOX fuel has been fabricated
in the U.S. at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and transported to
Canada. A larger quantity of Russian MOX fuel has also been fabricated
and recently transported to Canada. The experiment in the research
reactor is set to begin before the end of 2000. The test is an
important demonstration of tri-lateral cooperation, and demonstrates
most elements of the infrastructure required to utilize excess weapons
plutonium as MOX fuel in CANDU reactors. The test will also contribute
to the database that would eventually qualify weapons-origin MOX fuel
for use in CANDU reactors.
An important achievement for the overall plutonium disposition
program was the signing, on September 1, 2000, of the bilateral
``Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and
Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense
Purposes and Related Cooperation.'' Under this agreement, each party
shall seek to begin operation of separate facilities in the U.S. and in
Russia, not later than December 31, 2007, enabling each party to
proceed to dispose of plutonium at a rate of no less than two metric
tons per year, with an obligation on each party to dispose of no less
than 34 metric tons. The agreement also requires that both parties
develop a detailed action plan within one year, including efforts from
other countries as appropriate, to at least double the disposition rate
(i.e., from two tons to at least four tons per year). It is recognized
under the agreement that development of near-term and long-term
international financial or other arrangements will be required to
support the necessary activities to be undertaken in the Russian
Federation.
Based on the above DOE ``Decisions,'' and provisions of the U.S.-
Russia bilateral agreement, it is essential that the CANDU MOX option
be maintained as an integral part of the potential program for
disposing of Russian surplus plutonium. In particular, it is necessary
to send the appropriate signal to the Canadian and Russian governments
that the U.S. considers the CANDU MOX option to be a potential
requirement to achieve the Russian obligations under the bilateral
agreement, including accelerated rate of disposition for Russian-origin
plutonium.
II. THE CANDU MOX OPTION
Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited (AECL) and Ontario Hydro (now
Ontario Power Generation, ``OPG'') have worked with DOE throughout the
PEIS process to support the consideration of the CANDU MOX option B use
of existing Canadian deuterium (CANDU) reactors B for the plutonium
disposition mission. Under the original CANDU MOX option, MOX fuel
bundles (incorporating plutonium from U.S. or Russian dismantled
warheads) would be fabricated in either U.S. or Russian facilities
(depending on the origin of the plutonium) and irradiated in CANDU
reactors operated by OPG. The irradiated fuel bundles would then be
stored permanently in Canadian secure facilities, subject to full
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and inspections. This
concept remains unchanged, aside from the current application being
only the utilization of Russian MOX fuel. The Canadian government has
made several official statements supporting the CANDU MOX option, and
U.S.-Canadian cooperation in this area has been the subject of
conversations and correspondence between President Clinton and Prime
Minister Chretien.
Previous technical studies have evaluated three different fuel
designs that could be used to implement the CANDU MOX option. Appendix
A summarizes the key parameters from the technical studies, and
indicates that a single CANDU reactor can consume from 0.8 to 1.5
metric tons per year of excess Russian plutonium, depending on the
final MOX fuel design that is selected.\1\ No changes to the CANDU
reactor plant are required to accommodate implementation of MOX fuel.
An addition to the planned Russian MOX fuel fabrication facility would
be required to produce between 28 and 80 metric tons of CANDU MOX fuel
annually, depending upon the desired rate of plutonium dispositioning.
Based on AECL and OPG analysis, the CANDU MOX option has the potential
to serve as a technically reliable, cost efficient and secure component
of the international plutonium disposition mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ There are 22 Canadian CANDU reactors in Canada. The decision to
consider using MOX fuel in any reactor would be made by the operating
utility, based primarily on regulatory and commercial considerations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. THE CANDU MOX OPTION TO ASSIST THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The CANDU MOX option represents one of the strongest opportunities
for meaningful collaboration with Russia to achieve symmetrical
drawdowns of excess weapons-origin plutonium. Russian officials have
indicated significant interest in pursuing the use of CANDU reactors in
Canada as one of their preferred options for disposition of their
dismantled nuclear warheads. It is becoming clear that the initial
target disposition rate of two metric tons of surplus plutonium per
year under the U.S.-Russia bilateral agreement, can be met primarily by
a Russian domestic program; however, involvement of additional
plutonium disposition capacity outside of Russia may also be required.
Certainly, to double the rate of plutonium dispositioning, as called
for under the U.S.-Russia bilateral agreement, will require involvement
of other reactor systems outside of Russia. The CANDU MOX option is a
leading candidate to complement the Russian domestic program and to
provide the additional reactor capacity required to meet the target
plutonium disposition rates. A doubling of the rate of surplus Russian
plutonium consumption can be achieved with as few as two CANDU
reactors. By harmonizing U.S. and Russian efforts toward the common
goal of reducing nuclear proliferation risks, the CANDU MOX option can
contribute significantly to the prompt disposition of weapons-origin
plutonium in a secure manner.
IV. NEXT STEPS FOR THE CANDU MOX OPTION
A. Parallex Project
AECL is continuing to work with DOE and Russian officials on a
project to test U.S. and Russian-origin MOX fuel in a Canadian research
reactor, referred to as the ``Parallex Project.'' The enabling
contracts were signed between AECL and the Bochvar Institute in Russia
and the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the U.S., the two
institutions which performed the fuel fabrication for the Parallex
Project. The U.S. and Russian MOX fuel fabrication work has been
completed, and the MOX fuel bundles from both countries were delivered
to Canada at the end of 2000. Irradiation of U.S. and Russian MOX fuel
began on February 3, 2001, and provides a tangible first demonstration
of parallel U.S. and Russian commitment to the actual disposition of
nuclear weapons materials.
B. Trilateral Agreement
DOE's ROD references the development of an international agreement
between the U.S., Canada, and Russia as the appropriate mechanism to
move forward with the parallel drawdown of each country's surplus
weapons-origin plutonium. At the Denver Summit in 1997, the G-7 foreign
ministers, including the Russian representative, issued a communique
referencing the CANDU MOX option. At the Birmingham Summit in 1998,
leaders endorsed efforts to maintain the momentum for parallel drawdown
of U.S. and Russian surplus weapons-origin plutonium, which is
patterned after the tripartite cooperation among the U.S., Canada, and
Russia. The Okinawa G8 summit, in 2000, applauded efforts by the U.S.
and Russia, while calling for a detailed project plan and arrangements
for international financing to be developed over the next year, and
prior to the summit in Genoa.
The recently concluded U.S.-Russia Agreement on Plutonium
Disposition is a significant step forward toward the reduction of the
threat posed by surplus weapons-origin plutonium in Russia. As noted
above, one of the key outstanding issues that remains to be resolved is
how to match the need for rapid disposition with available technical
resources that are supported both politically and financially.
Therefore, at the same time the U.S. and Russia move forward with the
implementation of the plutonium disposition bilateral, steps should be
taken to initiate discussions on trilateral agreements to include
Canadian support to accelerate the disposition of Russian-origin
plutonium.
C. Inclusion of the CANDU MOX Option in Ongoing International Planning
Efforts
As plans are developed for increasing the plutonium disposition
rates in Russia, in accordance with provisions of the U.S.-Russia
Agreement, the CANDU MOX option should be further evaluated, taking
into consideration the environmental, technical, and economic factors.
At the same time, the U.S. government should coordinate its efforts
with its Canadian and Russian counterparts in order to ensure that
efforts toward prompt and secure disposition of plutonium are conducted
in an efficient and timely fashion. Specifically, the CANDU MOX option
should be integrated fully into the international planning for the
construction and operation of a MOX fuel fabrication facility in
Russia, and the related procurement of MOX fuel services.
appendix a
Summary of CANDU Weapons-Derived Plutonium Management Options
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CANDU MOX Fuel Design
-----------------------------------------------
37-el MOX 37-el MOX 43-el MOX
(1994) (1996) (1997)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pu-Disposition Rate (metric tons Pu/year/reactor)............... 1.0 1.5 0.8
Fabrication Plant Capacity (metric tons MOX/year)............... 80 78 28
Net Pu-Destruction Efficiency (%)............................... 34 23 46
Net Fissile Pu-Destruction Efficiency (%)....................... 58 41 70
Pu-Disposition Rate (metric tons Pu/GWe.year)................... 1.56 2.22 1.23
Energy Produced (GWe.year/metric ton Pu)........................ 0.64 0.45 0.81
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, will ask consent for my statement to be placed in
the record.
And I begin by congratulating you, Mr. Leader. I not only
thought you were the best leader, and I have said it publicly,
but now that you are out of the Senate, it does not hurt your
reputation any more that in the 28 years that I have been here,
I have found you one of the finest people I have ever served
with.
I just warn you, you are going to have a rigorous hearing
for U.S. Ambassador to Japan; it may take all of about 12
seconds. But I congratulate you on being willing to take on
that responsibility. I am truly appreciative.
Lloyd Cutler is one of the most well-spoken and
knowledgeable men in this town whom I have ever encountered
over the last quarter century on matters relating to nuclear
weapons, proliferation, and arms control. It is an honor to
have you here.
I think your report is probably one of the most significant
and important reports that has been submitted to this committee
in well over a decade. Without any further elaboration, because
I want to get to questions and hear your statements, I
sincerely hope it is well read in the administration, because I
think you are right on target, and I look forward to going into
some detail.
Also, Mr. Chairman, we are also fortunate to have as a
second panel three very distinguished Americans who have been
before this committee many times, and I appreciate their being
here, but we will get to that when we get to them.
So welcome, gentlemen, and thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I have long admired the hard work you, Sam Nunn, and
Pete Domenici invested in laying the groundwork for the various U.S.
initiatives to help dismantle nuclear weapons and address the ``brain
drain'' problem in the former Soviet Union. This set of cooperative
efforts with Russia is probably one of the most cost-effective
investments the United States has ever made in helping protect our
national security.
Mr. Chairman, we are holding this hearing at a rather opportune
moment. I have been greatly alarmed by recent reports that the
administration is prepared to propose a full range of spending cuts in
the Energy Department's non-proliferation programs in Russia. If these
reports are true, they would sharply contradict statements of support
during the campaign by President Bush for increased funding for the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici programs.
I strongly urge the administration to conduct a thorough review of
these programs before choosing to make any cuts. They would be wise to
consult the recent findings of the bipartisan task force headed up by
Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, our first panel of witnesses.
This task force makes a strong case that unsecured nuclear weapons
and nuclear-grade material in Russia are the ``greatest unmet threat''
facing the United States today. The task force concludes that the
President, instead of cutting these programs, should be prepared to
expand significantly their scope and funding over the next decade in
order to secure and account for all nuclear weapons-grade material in
Russia.
Hence, I look forward to hearing what Mr. Baker and Mr. Cutler have
to say and I also eagerly await the views of our second panel of
distinguished witnesses, Ron Lehman and Graham Allison.
Senator Lugar. I would like to submit for the record a very
strong statement submitted by Senator Pete Domenici, our
colleague and Chairman of the Energy and Water Subcommittee of
the Appropriations Committee. He has much interest in the work
of the Commission, and I quote from Senator Domenici. ``The
report envisions an eight-to-ten-year timeframe, at a cost of
$30 billion. In my view, the national security benefits to the
United States citizens from securing 80,000 nuclear weapons
worth of fissile materials is a good investment. We have a
simple choice: We can either spend the money to reduce the
threat or spend more money in the future to defend ourselves. I
am a strong believer that threat reduction is the first best
approach in this case,'' end of quote from our colleague, Pete
Domenici.
[The prepared statement and a news release of Senator
Domenici follow:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Pete V. Domenici
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to offer my remarks
at today's hearing. As you and today's panelists know, the report under
discussion--and the general issue of our cooperative threat reduction
efforts--is critically important to U.S. national security. I thank
Senator Howard Baker, Mr. Cutler and our other witnesses for taking
time out to discuss in detail the report's findings and
recommendations.
I would like to begin with a quote from President Bush's address at
the Joint Session of Congress earlier this year. He stated:
``As we transform our military, we can discard Cold War relics and
reduce our own nuclear forces to reflect today's needs.''
I heartily agree with the objective, but I fear I must take issue
with the proposed implementation.
We cannot unilaterally downsize our own nuclear arsenal without
some assurance that Russia's rebuild capacity is in line with their
arms control commitments. Additionally, if we do not adequately address
``the most urgent unmet national security threat for the United States
today,'' we should have no confidence that changes to our nuclear
posture will account for the potential proliferation hazard of Russian
fissile materials and destitute weapons experts.
U.S. nonproliferation goals cannot be achieved through unilateral
action. This particular proliferation concern must be addressed through
cooperation with Russia. No other option exists.
Allow me to quote also Condoleeza Rice's accurate assessment of the
situation:
``American security is threatened less by Russia's strength than by
its weakness and incoherence. This suggests immediate attention to the
safety and security of Moscow's nuclear forces and stockpile.''
Dr. Rice is just one of many reaching a similar conclusion
regarding this particular threat. Our witnesses today and their
bipartisan commission also concluded that the U.S. response is not
commensurate to the threat.
I want to touch on just a few of your recommendations, because I
believe these are essential to a sufficient and efficient response.
First, the report discusses the dire need for a White House-level
nonproliferation czar. Second, you also recommend that the President
develop a strategic plan to address the fissile materials and human
capital aspect of the proliferation threat. I strongly agree.
We do not have a coherent, integrated agenda. Overlaps and
shortfalls exist. A strategic plan should address the scope of each
specific problem, identify means to reduce the threat, and offer a
concrete time schedule to reach a definite end goal. Further, we have
no one person who can view the entire spectrum and identify the gaps,
remedy turf battles and bring the necessary coordination to get the job
done efficiently and quickly. I and Senator Lugar have repeatedly urged
the creation and appointment of a nonproliferation czar and Congress
has advanced this issue through legislation.
These are the first two concrete steps toward streamlining and
enhancing our efforts with Russia. While I understand that the Bush
Administration is formulating a strategic plan, I have not heard any
discussion of attaining greater coherence in these programs at the
White House level. At the same time, the indication would be that the
Administration's strategic plan intends to take an axe to some of the
key programs currently involved in addressing the threat.
The cuts proposed amount to a new strategic direction without any
involvement of Congress.
The report envisions an 8-10 year time-frame at a cost of $30
billion. In my view, the national security benefits to U.S. citizens
from securing 80,000 nuclear weapons worth of fissile materials is a
good investment.
We have a very simple choice: we can either spend money to reduce
the threat or spend more money in the future to defend ourselves. I am
a strong believer that threat reduction is the first-best approach in
this case. Inaction will only drive up costs to defend ourselves
against unknowables that we could have squelched had we had greater
foresight.
I believe this recent report reiterates this point clearly and
offers several concrete policy recommendations for tackling this
challenge. I look forward to working with the new Administration to
ensure that a decade from now we have protected U.S. citizens from this
proliferation threat and secured a more peaceful future.
I want to conclude with one additional thought. One of the lessons
learned over the past decade of cooperative threat reduction is that
efforts in our mutual interest have continued almost without a hiccup
regardless of our disagreements with Russia at a different level. In
other words, we have avoided linkage between these efforts and other
concerns about Russia's activities that we might have at any given
time; Russia has done the same. We both have benefitted.
It is not in our national interest to link cooperative threat
reduction to any specific disagreement over Russian policy or
activities. If we wager these programs due to our discontent in some
other arena, we risk the following: Russia will continue to pursue
their own security interest, and we will lose the security benefits we
reap from these efforts. It's a lose-lose for us.
I thank the members of the panel for being here to testify today. I
thank you and all the members involved in writing this report for your
prolonged and serious effort in addressing this most fundamental and
difficult challenge.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
______
[News Release--March 28, 2001]
Domenici: U.S. Should Not Act Unilaterally or Take Axe to
Nonproliferation Programs With Russia
Senator Issues Statement for Foreign Relations Committee Hearing
Washington, DC.--U.S. Senator Pete Domenici today advised that
long-term U.S. security needs would be better served by not acting
unilaterally and taking an axe to cooperative nonproliferation programs
with Russia.
Domenici addressed the nonproliferation issue in a statement to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee which conducted a hearing on
Department of Energy Nonproliferation Programs with Russia. The hearing
specifically addressed a recent report issued by former Senator Howard
Baker and Lloyd Cutler, co-chairs of the Russia Task Force of the
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board.
The Baker-Cutler report recommended the naming of a White House-
level ``czar'' to oversee U.S. nonproliferation programs with Russia,
and the development of an overall strategic plan to better coordinate
these programs. Both are recommendations long advocated by Domenici,
chairman of the Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Subcommittee that funds these projects. Overall, the report envisions
an eight to 10-year time-frame at a cost of $30 billion.
``These are the first two concrete steps toward streamlining and
enhancing our efforts with Russia,'' Domenici said. ``While the Bush
administration formulates a strategic plan, I have not heard any
discussion of attaining greater coherence in these programs at the
White House level. At the same time, the indication would be that the
administration's strategic plan intends to take an axe to some of the
key programs currently involved in addressing the threat.''
Domenici noted that the proposed cuts amount to a new strategic
direction without any involvement of Congress. Domenici, chairman of
the Senate Budget Committee, will this week introduce the FY2002 budget
resolution. While the resolution will keep President Bush's
recommendation to provide a 4 percent increase in federal spending,
Domenici said Congress may set different priorities for federal
investment--including those related to DOE nonproliferation activities.
``In my view, the national security benefits to U.S. citizens from
securing 80,000 nuclear weapons worth of fissile materials is a good
investment,'' Domenici said. ``We have a very simple choice. We can
either spend money to reduce the threat or spend more money in the
future to defend ourselves. I am a strong believer that threat
reduction is the first and best approach in this case. Inaction will
only drive up costs to defend ourselves against unknowables that we
could have squelched had we had greater foresight.''
``We cannot unilaterally downsize our own nuclear arsenal without
some assurance that Russia's capacity to rebuild is in line with their
arms control commitments. Additionally, if we do not adequately address
`the most urgent unmet national security threat for the United States
today,' we should have no confidence that changes to our nuclear
posture will account for the potential proliferation hazard of Russian
fissile materials and destitute weapons experts,'' Domenici said.
``U.S. nonproliferation goals cannot be achieved through unilateral
action. This particular proliferation concern must be addressed through
cooperation with Russia. No other option exists.''
Senator Lugar. I am very privileged at this point to
recognize Senator Baker for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., CO-CHAIR, RUSSIA TASK
FORCE, SECRETARY OF ENERGY ADVISORY BOARD, FORMER U.S. SENATOR
FROM TENNESSEE; BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN & CALDWELL, P.C.,
WASHINGTON, DC
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Biden, thank you for permitting me to appear today
and testify.
My friend, Lloyd Cutler, and I have worked long and hard on
this report. We truly hope it is helpful to the committee, and
we hope it is helpful to the administrative and executive
department of the Government as well.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that my 16-page
statement be included in the record.
Senator Lugar. So ordered.
Senator Baker. In the interest of time, I will try to
summarize the major points.
Senator Lugar. Very good.
Senator Baker. First of all, in keeping with the tenor of
my friend Pete Domenici's statement, I have often said, and
will repeat now, that there is a special responsibility in my
view on the part of the United States and Russia to deal with
this problem, and to do so promptly and effectively.
And that is the problem of controlling and preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, because after
all, Russia and the United States invented the Nuclear Age. It
was a result of American research and Russian development that
we entered this age of destruction. It has fallen now to be our
responsibility to see whether we can survive in that Nuclear
Age. We invented it; now we have to see whether we can live in
it or not.
The most crucial issue really is how----
Senator Lugar. Mr. Baker, I apologize for interrupting, but
I can tell that they cannot hear you in the back.
Senator Baker. This is probably one of the few times in my
career in this building where people have not been able to hear
me.
It is usually the other way around.
I thank you, Senator. Shall I start over?
Senator Lugar. No. No.
Senator Baker. OK. But it is a special responsibility, it
seems to me, of the United States and Russia to recognize that
they are the creators of the Nuclear Age, at least in the
development of the Nuclear Age; and, therefore, I think we have
a special set of responsibilities to try to minimize the risk
to civilization as a result of this great stock and store of
nuclear weapons and nuclear material that exists, not only in
Russia, but in this country, and other parts of the world.
Russia, as I say in my statement, has over 40,000 nuclear
weapons, over 1,000 metric tons of nuclear material, vast
quantities of chemical and biological weapons and materials,
and thousands of missiles. The cold war arsenal is spread
across 11 time zones, but it lacks the infrastructure of the
cold war.
My good friend, Bob Strauss--and he is my good friend--was
designated by President Bush to be Ambassador to, first, the
Soviet Union and then Russia. In the spirit of that friendship
and in jest, I wrote him after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and said, ``Bob, in my time, I have known a lot of former
Ambassadors, but you're the first Ambassador to a former
country that I ever knew.''
Indeed, that is true. The world has changed. Russia has
changed. The balance of power between our countries has
changed. The dangers of the Nuclear Age have changed, because
we do not now have the discipline, as terrible as it was, of
mutually assured destruction, and the discipline that was
imposed by only two super powers in the world.
But the materials are still there, and the weapons are
still there. And one of the prime questions addressed by this
Commission, which I was proud to serve on with Lloyd Cutler,
was how well protected that material is in Russia, how
conscious the Russians were of the problems involved, how
willing they were to undertake the protective measures that are
necessary to see that it is not diverted, that it is not in the
hands of other nations, or non-national entities as weapons of
mass destruction.
In summary, Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, I found these
things: I found the Russians are aware of the problem. I found,
and I believe our Commission agrees, that they lack the
resources to deal with the problem efficiently and adequately.
In some cases, the security and storage of nuclear
material, and even nuclear weapons, is so primitive that the
address by the United States and other powers of the world to
try to reduce the risk simply consisted of providing padlocks;
in other cases, to provide warm clothing so that sentries could
walk their posts, or would walk their posts, in times of
excruciating cold winter Russian weather.
There are many, many other aspects of the program that have
been undertaken, and there are many branches to our efforts to
try to control the proliferation of weapons from Russia and
elsewhere.
I commend the Department of Energy, this, and prior
Secretaries of Energy, in recognizing this problem. I commend
the Congress for creating a unified structure, with General
Gordon, to try to oversee this effort. I believe that the
Congress is in a position to add materially to the safety of
the world by further addressing the question of storage and
protection of nuclear material.
We cannot bear the burden alone in this country. It is
absolutely essential that other nations of the world recognize
that they, too, are at risk, and that they must contribute as
well to the improvement of the safety, security, and storage of
nuclear material. I believe that can happen, if the United
States takes the lead.
It is obvious and equally important that Russia contribute,
to the extent of their ability, to the improvement of the
security of these weapons, and that they contribute as well to
pre-access and transparency, so that we and the world community
can know exactly what we are dealing with.
We cannot engage in a program of pouring money into a
bottomless bucket. We need to know how many weapons there are,
how much material there is. We think we know, but we need to be
assured, and the world community needs to be assured that we
know what we are dealing with.
But there is an old saying in my state that you cannot do
nothing, and while our approach to these problems is perhaps
imperfect and, indeed, they are always imperfect, that is not
an excuse for inaction.
So it is my hope that this committee, the Congress, will
see the urgency in this issue that I see and the committee
sees. It is my hope that the administrative and executive
departments of the Government will recognize, as we think we
recognize, the importance and relevance of an early address to
these issues.
This Commission is not trying to substitute our judgment on
priorities suspending for the Congress, or for the executive
department, but what we are doing is trying to pinpoint the
gravity of this risk and to say that time is not on our side,
and that we must address it carefully, fully, enthusiastically,
and in full cooperation with the Russian Government, the
Russian people, and the community of nations around the world.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Senator Baker.
[The prepared statement of Senator Baker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee today
to discuss our recent report on the Russian Nonproliferation Programs
of the Department of Energy. I recall that I served on this committee
for 14 of the 18 years I served in the Senate. It is interesting to
observe how much different it seems on this side of the table from
where I used to sit. I am pleased to be here with Lloyd Cutler for whom
I hold such high regard; we have worked together on many projects over
the years and worked closely on this Russian Task Force report. Thank
you for your kind words welcoming me to the committee today.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, we have been witnessing the
dissolution of an empire having over 40,000 nuclear weapons, over a
thousand metric tons of nuclear materials, vast quantities of chemical
and biological weapons materials, and thousands of missiles. This cold
war arsenal is spread across 11 time zones, but lacks the cold war
infrastructure that provided the control and financing necessary to
assure that chains of command remain intact and nuclear weapons and
materials remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-
proliferating states. This problem is further compounded by the
existence of thousands of weapons scientists who, not always having the
resources necessary to adequately care for their families, may be
tempted to sell their expertise to countries of proliferation concern.
In order to assess the Department of Energy's part of current U.S.
efforts to deal with this critical situation, in February, 2000 former
Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson asked former White House Counsel
Lloyd Cutler and me to co-chair a bipartisan Task Force to review and
assess DOE's Nonproliferation Programs in Russia and to make
recommendations for their improvement. after nine months of careful
examination of current DOE programs and review of related
nonproliferation policies and programs of the U.S. Government, the Task
Force reached three principal conclusions and formulated one major
recommendation.
The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States
today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable
material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile
nation states, and used against American troops abroad or our citizens
at home. This threat is a clear and present danger to the international
community as well as to American lives and liberties.
Current nonproliferation programs in the Department of Energy, the
Department of Defense, and related agencies have achieved impressive
results so far, but their limited mandate and funding fall short of
what is required to address adequately the threat.
Our Task Force commends current and past Secretaries of Energy and
General Gordon, the new Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, for their dedication, commitment and hard work in
seeking to address this issue. The cooperation of the Russian
Federation has also been a critical and significant factor in the work
carried out to date.
However, our Task Force concludes that the current budget levels
are inadequate and the current management of our Government's response
is too diffuse. The Task Force believes that the existing scope and
management of the U.S. programs addressing this threat leave an
unacceptable risk of failure and the potential for catastrophic
consequences.
President Bush and the leaders of the Congress face the urgent
foreign policy challenge of devising an enhanced national security
program proportionate to the threat.
An enhanced national security response should include: a net
assessment of the threat; a statement of a clear, achievable mission;
the development of a strategy with specific goals and measurable
objectives; a more centralized command of the financial and human
resources required to do the job; and an identification of criteria for
measuring the benefits for Russia, the United States, and the entire
world.
Our Task Force offers one major recommendation to the President and
the Congress. The President, in consultation with Congress and in
cooperation with the Russian Federation, should quickly formulate a
strategic plan to secure and/or neutralize in the next 8 to 10 years
all nuclear weapons-usable material located in Russia and to prevent
the outflow from Russia of scientific expertise that could be used for
nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Accomplishment of this
task will be regarded by future generations as one of the greatest
contributions that the United States and Russia can make to their own
long-term security and that of the entire world.
While emphasizing that enhanced efforts are needed from the U.S.,
the Task Force underscores that enhanced efforts are also required from
Russia. Ultimately, Russia will be responsible for securing its
remaining nuclear arsenal. If this program is conceived in full
cooperation with the Russian Federation, is adequately financed, and is
implemented as part of a growing, open and transparent partnership, the
Task Force believes that Russia should be ready to take over any
remaining work at the end of the 8 to 10 year period. If the Russian
Government is not prepared for such a partnership, then we believe full
success will not be achieved.
Bearing this in mind, the Task Force report outlines a suggested
national security program to secure and/or neutralize all nuclear
weapons-usable material located in Russia and to prevent the outflow
from Russia of scientific expertise that could be used for nuclear or
other weapons of mass destruction. We believe this program could be
carried out for less than 1 percent of the U.S. defense budget,
(approximately up to $30 billion over the next 8 to 10 years. The
Russian Government would, of course, be expected to make a significant
contribution commensurate with its own financial ability. The national
security benefits to U.S. citizens from securing and eliminating the
equivalent of more than 80,000 nuclear weapons and potential nuclear
weapons would constitute the highest return on investment in any
current U.S. national security and defense program. President Bush
should press other major powers such as the European Union, Japan and
Canada to assume a fair share of the costs of these efforts that will
enhance the security of these countries as much as that of the U.S. and
Russia. Contributions from other countries could significantly reduce
U.S. costs.
assessing current doe nonproliferation programs
The Task Force had the benefit of briefings by both government and
non-government experts and reviews of written materials. Members of the
Task Force also visited seven sites in Russia in July 2000, reviewing
DOE programs and meeting with 13 organizations over the course of a
week. Its members were able to visit only a few sites of the vast
nuclear complex. those sites may have been in better economic and
physical condition than others in the complex. Nonetheless, the dire
state of those sites visited was cause for grave concern.
The Task Force applauds the accomplishments of the current DOE
programs and the related programs of other U.S. Government agencies.
The Task Force in particular commends the dedication to duty exhibited
by the hundreds of DOE and national lab employees involved in these
programs. The Task Force was also impressed by the high quality of
cooperation demonstrated by most of DOE's Russian counterparts during
the course of its visit to Russia. Both Minatom and the Russian Navy
provided access to all of the facilities requested, in some cases
showing Task Force members sites that they had not expected to be
allowed to visit. Despite difficulties that have emerged in the overall
implementation of the DOE programs, the Task Force found Russia's
cooperation to be a significant and positive factor. The United States
and Soviet Union competed in creating the nuclear age; now the U.S. and
Russia are cooperating to dismantle it. The Task Force believes that it
is far better for the United States to be on the inside working
together with Russia than on the outside with no capability to affect
Russia's actions.
However, the Task Force finds very disturbing the ongoing Russian
trade with Iran in dual-use nuclear technology and missile technology
and Russia's apparent intention to supply new conventional weapons
systems to Iran. Despite the fact that these issues have been raised
with Russia at the highest levels of both governments, the problem has
not yet been resolved. The Task Force views the failure to resolve
these issues as very serious and believes the lack of satisfactory
resolution will increase the difficulties inherent in continued
cooperation with Russia and in carrying out the Task Force's
recommendations. While the Task Force affirms that the DOE
nonproliferation programs are unequivocally in the U.S. national
security interest, the Task Force is particularly concerned that if
Russian cooperation with Iran continues in a way that compromises
nuclear nonproliferation norms, it will inevitably have a major adverse
effect on continued cooperation in a wide range of other ongoing
nonproliferation programs. Among other consequences, there will be
little support in Congress and the Executive Branch for the major new
initiatives the Task Force is recommending.
Unquestionably, much has been accomplished by the array of programs
now being operated by DOE and other U.S. Government agencies.
Nonetheless, the Task Force believes it is time for the U.S. Government
to perform a risk assessment based on input from all relevant agencies
to estimate the total magnitude of the threat posed to U.S. national
security. The Task Force also believes there is a strong need to create
greater synergies among the existing nonproliferation programs, hence
its call for government-wide coordination of the current programs and
direct White House involvement.
the task force specifically finds . . .
By and large, current DOE programs are having a significant and
positive effect. The strategic plan recommended by the Task Force
should review the needs of each of these programs and, where
appropriate, provide for a substantial increase in funding. Expansions
of program scope and increases in funding, however, must take careful
account of the pace at which funds can usefully be expended in each
individual program.
The strategic plan and the associated budgets should identify
specific goals and measurable objectives for each program, as well as
provide criteria for success and an exit strategy. These should be
factored into the 5-year budget plan currently being developed for the
National Nuclear Security Administration.
A major obstacle to further expansion and success of current
programs is the continuation of differences between the U.S. and Russia
over transparency and access. As a condition for a substantially
expanded program, the U.S. and Russia should agree at a high level on
what degree of transparency is needed to assure that U.S.-funded
activity has measurable impacts on the program objectives and that U.S.
taxpayer dollars are being spent as intended.
Given the gravity of the existing situation and the nature of the
challenge before us, it is imperative that the President establish a
high-level leadership position in the White House with responsibility
for policy and budget coordination for threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs across the U.S. Government. The President
should appoint a person of stature who commands the respect and
attention of relevant cabinet officers and congressional leaders to
lead this program.
The U.S. administration of these programs should seek to eliminate
any unnecessary and overly restrictive controls that hamper swift and
efficient action. To overcome potential bureaucratic impediments that
often arise from ``business as usual'' practices within the Russian and
U.S. bureaucracies, DOE and related agencies should take practical
steps, including further enlargement of the DOE team working with the
U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, to ensure the most efficient on-the-ground
implementation of the programs in Russia.
It is imperative to mobilize the sustained interest and concern of
the Congress. The Task Force urges the Congress to consider the
creation of a joint committee on weapons of mass destruction, nuclear
safety and nonproliferation, modeled after the former Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy. Creation of such a committee would ensure that the
issues receive adequate high-level attention and that Member and staff
expertise is developed and preserved.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today on this
very important matter.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Cutler, you have testimony for us.
STATEMENT OF HON. LLOYD N. CUTLER, CO-CHAIR, RUSSIA TASK
FORCE, SECRETARY OF ENERGY ADVISORY BOARD, FORMER WHITE HOUSE
COUNSEL; WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Cutler. Senator Lugar, I am very pleased to be here.
We were a unanimous commission, and a non-partisan
commission, and Senator Baker's statement is essentially my
statement. I agree 100 percent with it.
You have noticed, and I believe you have already mentioned,
that the Commission included, in addition to Senator Baker,
several of your other former colleagues, including Alan
Simpson, Sam Nunn, and Jim McClure.
I think the best way to move forward would be simply to say
that I was delighted to work again with Howard Baker. I think
Japan is very fortunate to receive as our Ambassador one of the
true citizen statesmen of our time, and a person who,
unfortunately, will no longer be able to concentrate on this
problem, except perhaps to persuade the Japanese to contribute
their fair share.
Senator Lugar. A very good suggestion.
Mr. Cutler. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lugar. Let me commence the question period for our
witnesses.
First of all, I appreciate your outline, Senator Baker, of
the tasks ahead of us, and the fact that we must do something,
and we must do it effectively.
Essentially, some time ago, just after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, former Senator Sam Nunn and I offered legislation
to assist in the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in
the former Soviet Union. Senator Biden was a part of a
bipartisan group that came together to support our effort that
came to be known as the Nunn-Lugar Act.
Our efforts where augmented by Senator Domenici's efforts
with programs at the Department of Energy. His efforts were
crucial, in providing security for thousands of tons of weapons
materials in which security was either non-existent or very
difficult despite tremendous progress much remains to be done.
It has been my experience, even as recently as December of
last year, when I visited weapons and material storage sites in
Russia, that there are severe security problems, which require
our attention.
One of the criticisms put forth by some is the thought that
money is fungible. In other words, clearly, there are security
problems for the Russians. They acknowledge that. The Russians
understand their citizens are at risk from proliferation of
these materials, whether they are nuclear, or chemical, or
biological.
I believe the moneys we have spent to hire American
contractors to do this important work in the former Soviet
Union, through the Pentagon or Departments of Energy or State,
have been well accounted for, and have accomplished a lot.
But can you offer some advice as to how we might respond to
these arguments when we visit with our colleagues in the Senate
and the House? If we were to spend substantially more money to
secure these materials from leaking out of Russia to other
countries, or worse, to rogue states what should we say with
regard to the fungibility argument?
We are in a position to make a difference, but at the same
time, some would say, ``Not a penny more for this, because you
simply are aiding and abetting modernization of weapons,
sometimes weapons of mass destruction in newer forms.''
Senator Baker. Well, let me try to answer, if I may, Mr.
Chairman. I said earlier on in my remarks that the only thing
we cannot do is nothing.
While there are all sorts of arguments about why our
programs are not totally cost-efficient in Russia, while it may
be essentially unfair that we bear such a disproportionate
share of the financial burden, while it may be true that in
some cases they are of questionable efficiency, it is also true
that if we do not do it, no one will, not even the Russians,
partly because they do not have the resources, and partly they
do not have, I think, the same sense of danger that we have.
If I were arguing this matter on the floor of the Senate of
the United States on a matter of appropriations, I would simply
say that there are not any issues of national defense that are
more important, in my view, short of ultimate survival of the
nation, than seeing that we reduce the threat of proliferation.
And the greatest threat of proliferation is not the development
of new sources, but the protection and safeguarding of existing
sources of nuclear material.
I think we also would argue that we have to have a program
well developed and executed in order to argue convincingly to
other nations that they have a stake in this process, and that
there needs to be further effort to engage other nations in not
only the financing of these programs, but in their execution.
I would like to see other European or Asian nations
involved in visits to Russia to see for themselves what we are
talking about.
I guess if I were on the floor of the Senate of the United
States--and I have not been there for a long time--I would make
it clear that I am not trying to challenge the financial
priorities of the administration, but rather pointing out that
this is a competitor of great importance for available
resources, and acknowledge that the Congress, with cooperation
of the executive department, must order those priorities, but
then try to underscore that there are few priorities on
national defense that are more important than the avoidance of
a nuclear catastrophe.
I probably would take longer time than the Chair would
grant to me under the circumstances, but that is probably what
I would say.
Senator Lugar. Senator Biden, I would ask for extended
time.
Senator Biden. Oh, please. Go ahead.
Senator Lugar. I will ask one more question.
Senator Biden. No. Take your time.
Senator Lugar. Let me say that the Task Force recommended a
higher level leadership position in the White House responsible
for nonproliferation programs and policy.
In 1996, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation called for a
nonproliferation coordinator at the White House. There was
great resistance among the bureaucracies involved, quite apart
from the National Security Council and so forth.
Now, they have begun to move in that direction. I will not
try to outline the whole process, but I think that you have
highlighted very well in your report the need to properly
coordinate the efforts of multiple agencies on what is
considered the number one threat facing our country. This is a
very, very vital mission, we can't afford overlaps and gaps in
our efforts.
At some point, the President probably is best served if
there is somebody close by who tries to inform him of all that
is being done and what type of leadership structure is
necessary. But can you outline this a bit more, because I think
it is such an important part of our response to these threats?
Senator Baker. I can, Mr. Chairman. Let me first say that I
am a graduate of the old Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in
the Congress, and to say parenthetically that I thought the
whole nuclear program in Defense, and then in civilian
purposes, lost focus after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
was disbanded.
But in that same vein, I do think that there needs to be a
unifying theme, not only in Congress, but also at the White
House, and throughout the executive department.
I have had the privilege of serving here and also serving a
President at the White House, and I can say firsthand from my
experience that unless somebody focuses on a particular issue
with energy and enthusiasm, it tends to get lost in the
shadows.
And I will repeat, I guess, for the third time now, I do
not think there is any issue really that is more important than
making sure we do not annihilate ourselves in a nuclear
accident of some sort.
So I would favor, and this report, indeed, recommends that
there be a coordinating person of high rank who would have the
ear of the President and have the respect of the Cabinet and
other agencies of government in seeing that this issue does not
get lost in the shadows, and that it remains in the forefront
of the concern of the President and the White House.
Senator Lugar. Did you take testimony during your hearings
or deliberations from American officials who are involved in
these programs or from Russians with who we cooperate? Can you
outline some of the sources of information that you utilized?
Mr. Cutler. We did, Senator Lugar. We interviewed all of
the officials of the DOE who were conducting various programs.
We heard from all the NGO's who were interested in the problem
of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.
We made an extended trip to Russia, involving about ten to
twelve members of our Commission, and we split up into three or
four task forces within Russia, visiting some of the nuclear
cities, visiting the submarine bases, where the old nuclear-
powered submarines are being dismantled. We went to the
Kurchatov Institute, right outside of Moscow, and I think we
heard from everybody.
I think it is very important to remember, though, in
connection with your question about someone in the White House
giving serious attention to this problem, that there are turf
wars within the U.S. Government, and within the U.S.
bureaucracies, that need attention just as much as the many
problems that are on our agenda with the Russian Government at
this time.
And what we need, we think it is trite to say, but like a
drug enforcement czar--we did not use the word ``czar.'' We do
not even say who it should be, but to give you a prototype, if
we had a Senator Baker, someone with his gravitas in the White
House concentrating on this program, it would be of enormous
benefit.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, every President is entitled to
choose his own organizational structure within the guidelines
of the statute of the Constitution, but I do not--I totally
agree with what Lloyd Cutler has said, and I commend it to this
President and the administration, that there be an enhanced
focus on this issue, that there be an enhanced organizational
structure to see that it remains utmost in the scheme of
concerns for our national security.
Maybe it should be a portfolio of the chairman of the NSC.
The chairman of the NSC has a hundred other things competing
for his or her attention.
I do think that there needs to be one person whose
portfolio is exclusively this concern, and that may be an
existing officer in the White House, an existing position, but
it ought to be clearly recognized--it ought to be respected
throughout the government, and recognized as the program of the
President of the United States.
Senator Lugar. This concern--I think you are defining it as
really a concern about the leftovers of the cold war. But you
define it as ``the existing threat,'' as opposed to all of the
other threats. This is, in fact, the most important threat that
our security has.
Senator Baker. Could I add one other point to that, Mr.
Chairman? I do not mean to be unduly philosophical or
psychological about it, but it really boggles my mind that
there could be 40,000 nuclear weapons, or maybe 80,000 in the
former Soviet Union, poorly controlled and poorly stored, and
that the world is not in a near state of hysteria about the
danger, but it is a function of the human mind that after you
live with something for a while, you sort of get used to it.
I guess if we have a single purpose for our Commission, Mr.
Chairman, it is to refocus public attention and governmental
attention on the enormity of this danger. And the fact that we
have not blown ourselves up so far is no guarantee that we
could not still; or that some rogue nation or rogue group has
not yet successfully stolen a nuclear weapon does not mean that
they cannot still do it if all you have is a padlock out there.
So there ought to be a tight focus within the
administrative department. There ought to be broad-based,
bipartisan support from the Congress to do what needs to be
done, including to fund these programs.
There ought to be a public reawakening of the danger
involved, not panic, but a reawakening of the danger. There
ought to be a call for cooperation by other nations of the
world. It should not be exclusively our responsibility,
although, as I say, we and Russia invented the Nuclear Age, so
we have a special responsibility.
We ought to make sure that this is carefully coordinated,
and I think it falls to the lot of the United States, as it
often does, to see that all of that happens.
Senator Lugar. Well, I appreciate your testimony very much.
You know my personal enthusiasm for all that you are saying. I
would like to express my appreciation to Senator Helms for
asking me to chair this hearing, so that we could hear that
testimony, and underline the importance of this Commission.
Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lugar. Before turning to Senator Biden, I would
note we have received a press report from Russian sources that
Mr. Adamov has been fired from his position as Minister of
Atomic Energy. The executive director of the Kurchatov
Institute, that you visited with during your research, will be
the new director. So there are changes underway as we speak.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I am going to yield in 10 seconds to my
friend from Massachusetts, because he is chairing another
hearing, and he wants 2 minutes.
But I do not think we should go any further without stating
that we would not be where we are today if it were not for
Senator Lugar. The fact of the matter is, he--and Sam Nunn
before him--he has been carrying the ball here. And in his low-
key way, he has been the master of the facts and the details
and is the reason why what we have gotten done has been done.
His pitch is so compelling.
So I just want the record to note that and I do not want to
turn this into a mutual admiration society here, but I really
mean it Senator Lugar's nonproliferation initiative has been
the single most significant contribution that I think any
Member has made to the Congress in the last half-dozen years.
I hope that with the help of the two of us here, and others
on his side, we can give him some additional support to raise
the profile of this issue.
This is one issue that I find, when you sit down and talk
with anyone, from the most sophisticated to the most
unsophisticated American, they get it; they get it. And what I
worry about, I say to my colleagues, is this mind set that we
are in now, where we needlessly escalate the rhetoric on things
where there is genuine disagreement with Russia. We have
serious disagreements with Russia.
I have serious concerns about Putin, we all do, but my
mother has an expression, and I am sure your mother from
Tennessee has one as well, which is, ``Do not bite your nose
off, Joey, to spite your face.''
This is a case where, if we are not careful, we may be
biting our nose off to spite our face, if we do not follow the
lead of Senator Lugar and this Commission.
With your permission, I will yield to Senator Kerry.
Senator Baker. With your permission, can I say a word about
Dick Lugar?
Senator Lugar and I have been friends for a long time. We
have done a lot of things together, but I would simply add to
what Senator Biden said. This Commission probably would not
exist, our concern for this problem probably would not be
visible on the landscape, and certainly the programs which are
in place now would not have been created were it not for
Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn.
They have made an enormous contribution to the safety and
security of this country. We simply must not fail to give
credit where credit is due.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I
thank my colleague from Delaware. I will be very brief, because
I am chairing another hearing, and I need to get back to it,
but I did not want to let that prevent me from coming here to
underscore the importance of this.
And let me just share, Mr. Chairman, the thoughts already
expressed. You have been extraordinary on this. You led the
Senate, together with Sam Nunn, in helping us to recognize that
the chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of the former
Soviet Union were perhaps the goldmine for potential
terrorists, and for would-be proliferators.
It is almost extraordinary to me, because we went through
that period when arms control was on the front burner for such
a long period of time, and here we are today with really not
that kind of focus, and it is quite extraordinary.
What is equally extraordinary is that at least as of this
moment, the Bush administration not only has no intention of
revitalizing the support for these programs, but have indicated
there may be proposed cuts in the non-proliferation programs
for fiscal year 2002.
Now, this is absolutely stunning to me. I am sure it is
stunning to you, and unacceptable, and I hope that in the next
days wise heads will prevail, and wise men and women will weigh
in in a way that will change that.
I thank both of you so much for your contribution to this
dialog and to this effort in putting this report together, and
evaluating the non-proliferation programs. I wanted to just
leave a few questions on the table, if I may, to be answered
perhaps at a later time, but as part of this record.
With respect to the Russian plutonium disposition program,
in September of last year we agreed with Russia to dispose of
34 metric tons of excess weapons plutonium, and we have
appropriated $200 million for the program to test and
demonstrate disposition technologies, but disposing of that
plutonium is estimated to cost about $2.1 billion.
And to make up the difference, we have been working with
our allies in the European community to get them to shoulder
some of the burden, and that has been somewhat successful, but
we still need to figure out how we are going to deal with this
in the long run.
We have leveraged commercial interests in the nuclear fuel
market to try to address the highly enriched uranium. And under
a 1994 agreement, we are authorized to purchase 500 metric tons
of nuclear weapons converted to low enriched uranium suitable
for commercial purposes. There is some struggle between your
report and Russia disagreeing over the economic value of
plutonium, and that has precluded a similar arrangement with
respect to plutonium.
So I would simply want to ask if in this record at some
point, Mr. Chairman, we could address a series of questions:
``What is the disagreement over it? What are the major
challenges to developing a commercial approach for plutonium
disposition? What will be the impact for non-proliferation if
we do not develop a funded, workable plan for the HEU and
plutonium? And will not that problem simply get more
exacerbated as the unilateral reduction takes place, and it is
not in place?''
So, again, I thank you for the work on this, which is
really so critical, and I wish the entire Congress would--I
mean we have spent billions, if not trillions of dollars,
building all of these weapons, facing up to this extraordinary
threat. And the fact is, the threat is really, while less, not
that much less in its current form, and we need to pay
attention to it equally.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. And I thank my colleague for letting me
leave those questions on the table. I apologize for having to
move to a different hearing.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
I recognize now Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, in response to Senator Lugar's
question about ``How do we make the case for the urgency and
the danger.'' I want to raise an idea with you and see what you
both think. We have, understandably, a generic and increasing
preoccupation among hawk, dove, and everybody in between, about
weapons of mass destruction, but the focus of the debate seems
to be moving toward rogue states obtaining weapons of mass
destruction .
National missile defense, and the rationale for it, is
against rogue nations emerging with a long-range missiles
capability that can, at a minimum, carry a biological or a
chemical weapon, and possibly a heavier nuclear weapon.
I think we can begin with the leadership of Senators
Domenici and Lugar on the Republican side, and a couple of us
on the Democratic side, to try to get this less a partisan
``who-is-doing-what-to-whom,'' and ``why is this administration
cutting,'' and so on and so forth, and instead talk about it in
an overall context of the threat of weapons of mass destruction
and the likely vehicles for delivery of those weapons, and
where the capacity to construct them and to launch them exists,
whether it is on the head of a missile, or in the hull of a
freighter coming into the San Francisco Harbor. If we do that,
I think we might be able to focus press and public attention in
a way that we are not able to do now.
Right now, there are basically four programs that have been
put in place: for securing excess plutonium; for securing
excess Russian HEU; for improving security in accounting for
other nuclear materials in Russia, and for downsizing and
restructuring Russia's excess nuclear complex. And also one
that you have added in your summary and in your outline of
proposed spending for insuring transparency in Russia and
verifiability of the programs.
All these programs relate, do they not, to the idea of
constraining and limiting the possibility that a weapon or
weapons of mass destruction will get in the hands of someone,
an individual group or a nation-state, that does not have the
capacity now.
Is there any fundamental difference between what you are
attempting to do relative to weapons of mass destruction and
what we are attempting to do with the national missile defense,
in terms of combating weapons of mass destruction, in terms of
the objective?
Obviously, the means are very different. Am I off in that?
Am I comparing apples and oranges here, or is the end-purpose
of each of these proposals, yours here, and a national missile
defense, basically the same? Is the objective the same, which
is to diminish the possibility that America, or the world for
that matter, but America in particular, will be either held
hostage to and/or subject to being held hostage, or open to an
attack by a weapon of mass destruction?
I do not believe this is a case of either/or, by the way. I
am not playing a game with you, Mr. Leader, that is, ``Well, if
you are for this, you are against national missile defense.'' I
am not suggesting that. I am just trying to get a construct
here.
Senator Baker. I accept that, Senator Biden, and I
appreciate the question. It is a penetrating and important
question, and the objectives are the same.
They are survival. The point of departure is different.
That is, are you going to try to interdict the weapons material
or weapons before they are diverted, or are you going to try to
catch them after they are launched?
In an earlier time in my career, in an earlier time in my
life, I would quickly engage in a conversation about that, but
I must ask your forbearance. This testimony today is based on
work that was completed before the President issued his notice
of intention to nominate me as Ambassador to Japan----
Senator Biden. Fair enough.
Senator Baker [continuing]. And I decided in my own mind
that the appropriate thing to do would be to go forward and
complete this work with Lloyd Cutler, and to testify about this
report. But I respectfully request that I may be excused from
commenting on----
Senator Biden. Fair enough.
Senator Baker [continuing]. Other items that have to do
with policy.
Senator Biden. Maybe Mr. Cutler would be willing to----
Mr. Cutler. Senator Biden, I am not subject to that same
restraint.
It is true----
Senator Biden. I wish you were, because I wish you were
actively----
Mr. Cutler. I have survived this long without ever having
been confirmed, but it certainly is true that there is a
spectrum of weapons of mass destruction that have to be dealt
with. And we have to ask ourselves: Are our present programs
well designed to meet those threats, just as you outlined them
across the board?
One of the most important points of a hearing like this, I
think, is to encourage the education of the public. The average
voter or the average citizen today is perhaps 40 or 45 years
old. He or she knows nothing about nuclear terror, about the
bomb shelters we all built for ourselves, about the cases of
tuna fish, about the exercises in the school room where you
would train to hide under your desk with a piece of linoleum
over your head, as if that was going to make any difference.
The public needs to be reawakened without being panicked,
as Senator Baker said, about the spectrum of threats, and it
needs to have the benefit of films like ``Thirteen Days,'' and
hearings like this. I wish there was some way of getting our
report into the Congressional Record or someplace where it
might actually be read or videoed in some way.
Senator Biden. Well, I assure you, we will get it in the
``Congressional Record.''
Mr. Cutler. That will not necessarily increase the
circulation, but I thank you for the offer.
Senator Biden. Well, again, and I will yield after this,
because we unfortunately have additional colleagues here who
wish to speak, and I know you have to leave, Mr. Cutler, at
11:00.
But your report lays out a fairly ambitious blueprint for a
national strategy to account for and secure all the remaining
nuclear-grade material in Russia over the next decade.
You have implied, if not said directly--and I am not sure
which it is, Mr. Leader--that you think that, for whatever
reasons, the Russians are prepared to follow through on this
for their own reasons, that there is not, at this point, a
significant resistance to us, quote, ``trying to help them with
their problem,'' which is also our problem.
The report proposes, over 10 years, a comprehensive program
that costs roughly $30 billion, about $3 billion a year. I do
not know how it gets parsed out exactly, but----
Senator Lugar. That is 8 years.
Senator Biden. Eight years? So it is a little more than $3
billion a year then, if we were to implement it. The report
highlights that this $30 billion is roughly 1 percent of what
we expect to spend over the same period of time on national
defense.
Quite frankly, I think it is going to be less than 1
percent if we spend it, because I predict we are going to be in
a position over the next several years where the national
defense budget is going to be well in excess of $300 billion.
But for what it is worth, that is my opinion.
It is a reasonable amount of money, but as pointed out by
the chairman, there is a counter-intuitive instinct on the
floor, which I do not quite get, which is that even if it does
help us, if it helps them, we do not want to do it.
Now, again, some of it literally is that knee-jerk. Some of
it is more nuanced and says, ``It is fungible money. It means,
now, that will enable them to spend time transferring weapons
to Iran,'' et cetera, but the essence of it is, ``Why should we
help those guys? They are still bad guys.''
I think that my friend is correct, that as strange as it
may sound, if someone were to read this record 25 years from
now, we are going to have a hard time with this. This is going
to be a hard deal to sell, and it should be the single easiest
sell, to spend money on this up here.
I mean if we can spend $30 billion on a crime bill over a
period of 8 years, we sure should be able to do this.
Now, here is my question. I think we are going to be faced
with a question of priorities. We are not going to get all that
we think we should get, but I completely concur with your
report, completely concur. And I want to make the point, and I
assume our second panel will point this out, that you make some
constructive criticism about these programs and this report is
not all Pollyannaish. It is not like, ``Everything is going
great. This is a wonderful deal. We have no mistakes. There is
no place we have to tighten up.'' You make constructive
criticisms about the existing programs I have mentioned, and
ways in which you would like to screw them down and tighten
them up.
But we are going to be faced, I suspect, with the
requirement of having to pick and choose here, because we are
not going to get all the money we want. I hope that is wrong,
but that is my guess.
If you want to kick this back to the next panel in the
interest of time, I understand but among the nearly 20 specific
proposals that your Task Force has made for inclusion in this
broad strategic plan, are there any that are of considerably
higher priority in the near-term, perhaps because change is
taking place so rapidly, that if we do not grab it now, we lose
it?
Is there any prioritization within your recommendations?
What if I said to you, ``OK, fellows, you are not going to get
$3 billion this year.'' Hopefully we are going to convince the
administration to restore what they are cutting. I think we
have to cut this administration, like every administration,
some slack here. They are brand new. They are just getting into
this. And they are very qualified people, I do not mean to
imply that they are not.
But I have observed, Mr. Leader, that every time we get a
Governor who is a President--they get elected more than
Senators do, as you and I both know.
But they are usually not very surefooted, the first several
months after they get here, on foreign policy and defense
matters.
So I am hopeful. I think that this administration can be
talked to and may be willing to alter their initial policies.
But if you are willing, or if you would rather think about
it and supply it for the record, how would you prioritize if we
came back and said, ``We are only going to be able to get a
total of $1 billion this year for your initiatives''? Is there
any priority within your recommendations, or among them?
Senator Baker. Senator Biden, in the report we do not
attempt to prioritize. And frankly, the one reason--I guess the
reason is because that really is Congress' job sort of to do,
and we are going to respect--obviously going to respect what
you decide.
I have a personal priority. I have not expressed it in the
report, but I will express it now. I am a little short of
terrified at some of the storage facilities for nuclear
material and nuclear weapons; and relatively small investments
can yield enormous improvements in storage and security. So
from my standpoint, that is my first priority.
Senator Biden. An adjunct to that, if I may: Are the
Russians, in your view, susceptible not only to continuing this
cooperation, but to us targeting the cooperation?
In other words, are they susceptible to us saying, ``OK, we
are not going to be able to get all that is needed, but we are
going to come up with x amount of dollars, but you must use it
for security as opposed to something you think is higher
priority''?
How likely if you could for the record, is that to work?
Senator Baker. Well, I think it is likely to work, because
I think they are very anxious to address this problem. There is
resistance within the Russian structure to doing anything, just
like there is in the United States to doing anything.
Could I take just a minute to give you an example?
Senator Biden. Please.
Senator Baker. I have had the privilege of visiting
Murmansk, the Northern Fleet base, and to see submarines tied
up that were obviously not working, and to go into storage
facilities that were barely--and to see flag-rank Russian
officers humiliated when they said, ``We have to have your
help. We know what to do, but we have to have your help.''
I sat there, in a great, long command car, with all this
braid next to me, thinking, you know, ``How this must rankle
with him, to hold his hand out to the United States for money
and assistance,'' but based on that experience and others, I
think they have crossed that threshold.
I think they are willing to do what has to be done, and I
think they are willing to let us decide the priorities, within
reason. I hope that is right. I think that is right.
Senator Biden. I will close with this, and yield to my
friend from Florida, who, I might add selfishly, since it is
always nice to have new members on the committee, is
particularly nice to have on the committee because he is so
knowledgeable. This is a fellow who as has been the case in our
additions on the Republican side, is a serious member on this
committee.
But let me conclude by just citing a couple of statistics
that you know well, but I want to mention just for the press to
understand. The finding in the nuclear cities, I will not go
into the program now, it is that more than 62 percent of the
employees in these nuclear cities and I remind everyone that
the Soviets literally built entire complexes and cities with
thousands of people that were devoted to one and only one
thing, and that is producing weapons and/or material for
weapons of mass destruction, earn less than $50 per month.
These are our equivalent, many of them, of our Ph.D.
nuclear physicists. These are equivalents of the people who
work at the laboratories out in New Mexico, whether they are
washing test tubes, or they are the top scientists, 58 percent
of the experts are forced to take a second job to earn money;
14 percent state they would like to work outside of Russia; and
6 percent express an interest in moving, quote, ``anyplace at
all to work.''
Now, we were pretty smart after World War II. We went into
Germany, and everybody who had a capability to deal with
serious weapons programs, we took, if we could. What makes us
think that that same instinct does not exist in Iran, Iraq,
North Korea, and other countries as well?
By the way, Russian missile enterprises report the same
thing, 28 percent of their experts are forced to take a second
job; 25 percent said they would like to immigrate to another
country; 21 percent said they would work in a military complex
in any other country they could get a job.
I yield. I thank my colleague.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Biden.
I want to recognize Senator Nelson.
And I also want to recognize that it is 11 o'clock, and we
appreciate very much your being with us, Mr. Cutler. I
understand, because you will be at the funeral for Roland
Evans, our dear friend, the need for you to leave at this
point. But we thank you very much for testifying for your
leadership.
Mr. Cutler. Thank you. And if I can deliver that last
message to Mrs. Evans, I will.
Senator Lugar. I wish that you would on behalf of all of
us. We knew Roland very well. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In your executive
summary there are three underlined sentences, the first of
which is--and I will just take parts out--that weapons-useable
material in Russia could be stolen or sold to terrorists or
hostile nation-states.
Mr. Chairman, the other day I took off down to Oak Ridge. I
had never been there. I had wanted to, as a member of this
committee, and as a new member of the Armed Services Committee,
to have an appreciation for it. By the way, they need a lot of
new facilities down there. They are still operating in World
War II buildings.
But the briefer said something very interesting. He said,
``We have very strict controls on all of the enriched uranium
here, and sometimes we cannot account for all of it.''
If they cannot account for that under strict controls, what
must it be like in Russia? I would like your comments, Senator
Baker.
Senator Baker. Senator, that is a very good question. As a
matter of fact, Oak Ridge, as you know, is in my home state of
Tennessee, and I grew up with it. My dad was a Member of
Congress when it was built.
The inventory or accounting for uranium, enriched uranium,
is a difficult job, because it goes through a process, and some
of it stays behind, and not just in Oak Ridge, but for a long
time there was a great concern that we had lost a significant
amount of nuclear material in a little place called Apollo,
Pennsylvania, and they finally messed around with it and
decided, ``Well, maybe it was still in the barrier pipes, and
maybe not. Maybe it went someplace else,'' but it is not easy.
In this country, we are talking about grams and micrograms
of material. In Russia, I am talking about kilograms of
material. I am talking about finished weapons that are barely
protected. I am talking about doors that have an ordinary
padlock on them, and sometimes not even that. The principle is
the same, but the order of magnitude is vastly different.
I must say that, if I could, on your time, Senator, the
remark made about nuclear scientists, the nuclear cities, I
think in a way is as important as the protection of nuclear
material. It is clear that a number of talented scientists have
already migrated to other countries, are already engaged in the
development of material that can lead to weapons of mass
destruction. That is a more difficult problem than finding
padlocks that will hold a door closed. I do not know what we
can do about it.
Of all the programs we have, maybe the nuclear cities
program is the least successful, but it is because the problem
is so diffuse, and there is really not an easy answer for it.
In Oak Ridge, to use your example, I remember when the
Federal Government sold the facilities, the houses and what
not, and kept the manufacturing facilities, and the transition
to a peaceful settlement was complete, thorough, and
successful.
But you cannot do that in Russia, because there is still an
overlay of the old Soviet hierarchy. There are still people
there that have no place to go. There is still a reluctance on
the part of industry or private enterprise in Russia, or
anyplace else in the world, to going behind those locked doors
and barbed wire fence.
Conserving the intellectual resources in this field,
protecting it, keeping it out of hostile hands, is at least as
difficult, perhaps more difficult, than protecting nuclear
material and nuclear weapons.
I have no answer for you, sir. I am sorry I do not. But I
am glad you went to Oak Ridge. We will invite you back.
Senator Nelson. It was a good lesson.
Now, when the old Soviet Union started to break apart,
instinctively, since I had some knowledge of the space program,
and some knowledge of the Soviet space program, the direction
that we were heading, regarding the cooperation with the
Soviets was a correct one. And it has certainly borne out, I
think, to be a policy that is in the interest of the United
States, where we are cooperating. Indeed, we are building a
space station together right now, as we speak.
But how many more of these things--so that admiral that you
were talking about, that is perhaps being seduced by some
terrorist organization, or that scientist, or that engineer,
that we could have cooperative programs with them, which
helping them is clearly in the interest of the United States.
Final question: We have to make a decision. I am on another
committee that I was fortunate to be appointed to, which is the
Budget Committee. We are going to mark up a budget next week.
Senator Lugar. I would not consider that good fortune, but
that is another----
Senator Nelson. Well, I have members who still have not
forgiven me. If we could ever get out of our partisanship
streak and start to strike a budget that is in the best
interest in a bipartisan way--we are not even going to have a
markup in the committee, because the chairman is refusing.
But be that as it may, I have to deal from the deck of the
cards that I have been delivered. And one of the things that we
have to do is to provide for expenditures, having to deal with
the subject of your report. I take it that you have said here,
and for the record, that those expenditures need to go up.
Senator Baker. I have said that, and the report says that.
I have also said, Senator, that I am in a, I suppose, delicate
position in that I am now the nominee, the President's nominee,
to be Ambassador to Japan, so I have to--I do not have to, but
I am going to walk a fine line, and tell you that I think the
funding should be increased, and I have said that in the
report.
I have not tried to establish priorities between the
several programs, and that is, I respectfully submit, this
Congress' responsibility and the administration's
responsibility.
I commend you for bringing up these points, and I
understand the frustration that you express. I have been there;
I have done that. I know how that works, but there is an
answer, and you will figure out.
I have enormous respect for the Senate, and I have seen it
in its best times and its worst times, but even its worst times
are better than anything you will find any place else in the
world.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Let me add that the International Science and Technology
Centers at the Department of State that your commission came in
contact with is a multi-national affair. This year the United
States is providing about 60 percent of the total budget. The
program is providing 25,000 stipends, to former Russian weapons
scientists, to work on peaceful projects instead of emigrating
to rogue states. Now, that is probably not all of the
scientists with weapons knowledge. It was 18,000 the year
before when I visited, so we are making progress.
This is an attempt to independently finance these people in
projects other than weapons of mass destruction. I would say
that has had a retentive force that is considerable.
I noted when I was there in December that the whole Russian
Government adopted a budget of $50 billion. It is
inconceivable, as we talk about our budget that, approximately
$7 billion, single-digit, $7 billion was for their defense
budget. As Senator Biden just mentioned, we are heading toward
$300 billion.
Now, this is an improbable circumstance for our colleagues
to understand, but $7 billion does not go very far if you are
trying to pay and feed the troops, and many are not getting
paid or fed; providing to retirees, et cetera pensions. So we
are back up against the problem of security, whether it is the
padlocks or the scientists. The question is, who in the world
ought to care about it, and essentially, what should we do and
how much should we spend?
Finally, I would just unite my friends, all of our friends,
Senator Pete Domenici and Senator Nelson by saying at least on
this they are on the same wavelength. Senator Domenici has
protested vigorously with the administration, particularly the
changes in the Department of Energy areas. He is interested in
the others, but he has tremendous knowledge about these
problems, and I support him.
So we will not get you into that fight, Senator Baker, but
I would just say that we probably have a degree of bipartisan
budgetary unity at least in one area, and we are grateful for
that.
We thank you so much for coming this morning. This has been
wonderful to have you once again back in the Senate where you
belong.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Senator Biden. Mr. Leader, maybe with your new job--and I
mean this sincerely--you will be able to use your considerable
persuasive abilities to make the case to the Japanese that they
are very much in jeopardy as well. I am not being facetious
when I say that. I mean it sincerely.
Senator Baker. Well, thank you. I appreciate the remark. I
am sitting here struggling with what I could say in reply.
Senator Biden. No. I am not asking you to reply.
Senator Baker. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Biden, thank you.
Senator Nelson, I thank you.
It has been a real pleasure, and my experienced with Lloyd
Cutler has been extraordinarily positive, and I hope all of
this has been helpful.
Senator Lugar. It is very helpful. Thank you.
It is a privilege now to call our next panel. The Honorable
Ronald Lehman, former Director of Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, under President Bush, and Assistant Secretary of
Defense under President Reagan. He was recently appointed to
the President's Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy;
and the Honorable Graham T. Allison, member of the Russia Task
Force, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, now director of the
Belfer Center, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Dr. Lehman, it is great to have you back before the
committee, and likewise, Dr. Allison. I will ask you to testify
in the order that I introduced you, and we will ask you to
proceed with your testimony, Dr. Lehman.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY; CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, KECK CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES,
CLAREMONT MC KENNA COLLEGE, CLAREMONT, CA
Dr. Lehman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden. I am
honored that you have asked me to come back again, and I
actually think this is a terribly important effort.
As you know, I have been deeply involved in this effort for
many years, but I am speaking today not on behalf of any
particular program, but rather to help you engage in this
reexamination, which I think is terribly important to keep
momentum for these revolutionary and, I think, vital efforts.
I have a statement that I can submit for the record, if you
wish, and keep my remarks very brief, because you have already
gotten into many of the issues that are, in fact, in the
statement.
Let me simply say that I think Senator Baker and Lloyd
Cutler, and their Task Force, did an excellent job, and I
really would echo some of the important points they have made
about the utility of these programs for the national security
of the United States, and for our overall non-proliferation
objectives, but I also want to emphasize the other side of the
coin that they highlighted.
This should not become a cheerleading session. We have
problems. We need to address those problems. Indeed, the
strategy needs to be clearer; the goals need to be clearer.
Senator Baker noted that they had not made some of the
tough calls on priorities. Frankly, I found myself in much
agreement with the priorities that he personally described, but
I think these are issues that need to be addressed, and we have
an important opportunity now, because we have a new Congress,
we have a new administration, we have a new National Nuclear
Security Administration, and now we have changes in Russia.
What better time than right now to get these programs on the
right track?
Let me say that some of the areas that I think need
particular attention, in addition to strategy, goals, and
priorities, I think we really do need to look at the dynamics,
more objective measures of merit, greater coordination, less
bureaucratic encumbrances. I think it is right to emphasize
that this is just not a DOE problem. We have other departments
and agencies that contribute, and it is not just a nuclear
problem.
For example, it is important to deal with the biological
weapons issues, the chemical weapons issues, and the means of
delivery of all of these systems, and, frankly, some of the
advanced conventional capabilities as well.
I think it is important that the new administration take a
good look at this, to make sure that the programs are
accomplishing what they are doing, that they are not being
counterproductive.
It is not just that we want to get our money's worth,
although, I want to emphasize the importance of that, but not
just for obtaining congressional support for funding and public
support, but, in fact, we ought to know whether or not we are
doing a good job, because resources that are spent in one area
that could have been spent to address another issue, another
threat, even within these areas, is, in a sense, an opportunity
cost. We need to address that.
Finally, in your review, and I will urge the new
administration in their review, really spend some time with the
people in the field who are actually implementing these
programs, and not just the United States, and not just the
Russians, because there are a number of other countries that
are participating in some of these programs, that are very
important strategically, and from a non-proliferation point of
view.
The second thing is, I think, as was correctly pointed out,
a number of these organizations and efforts are
intergovernmental, multinational. The ISTC, which you have
mentioned, has as its members Japan, as well as the European
Union, and numerous other countries. Some of them need to do
more and do better, just as we need to do more and do better.
So let me stop there and simply say: I strongly support
these programs. They are revolutionary new tools, but they need
to be honed. We should not be penny-wise and pound-foolish, but
also we should not be foolish. We need to make sure we are
achieving what we need to achieve.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lehman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ronald F. Lehman
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Committee on
ForeignRelations:
I am honored that you have asked me to testify today. This re-
examination of the U.S. effort to engage the republics of the former
Soviet Union in cooperative nonproliferation and threat reduction is
necessary and timely. By insisting that the tough questions about the
relevant programs be answered quickly, you who helped create those
programs can give momentum to the most important of them. I will do my
best to help. I have been involved in some of these programs in the
past and continue to be involved with others now, but I am here today
as a private citizen and not as a representative of any program or
organization.
It is a privilege to follow the testimony of Howard Baker and Lloyd
Cutler, the Co-Chairs of the Russia Task Force created by the
Department of Energy's Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. I have had
the pleasure of working with each of them and with several members of
their Task Force numerous times over several decades. I count among the
Task Force members several good friends including Senator Jim McClure
of Idaho who gave me my first job in Washington many years ago. I also
had the opportunity to meet with the Task Force members during their
deliberations. At that time, I was involved with DOE in the development
of an accelerated conversion plan for the Russian nuclear city of
Snezhinsk, in the Urals. Because of the fine work of the Task Force in
preparing their report, my presentation today can be brief.
The Task Force is correct in saying that these DOE programs--and I
would add related programs in other Departments and Agencies--offer
important enhancements to our national security and could use more
resources. But they are also correct to emphasize that all of these
programs would benefit greatly from a clearer vision of goals,
strategy, and priorities. All of these programs also need a more
systematic approach, greater internal and external coordination,
stronger leadership, and less bureaucracy. A bold review of these
programs in the context of changing circumstances, new challenges and
past history is greatly needed. Such a review is necessary to build
bipartisan support and public support for the efforts necessary. More
importantly, such a review is needed to make certain that they achieve
their goals and are worth the cost.
Much of what I say will only bring emphasis to points already made
in the Russia Task Force report. As in that report, I wish to focus on
the big picture and avoid nit picking. And yet, although I have a
similar view, I want to offer a slightly different perspective, drawing
upon a number of lessons learned in the creation and implementation of
these programs. Again, the view I offer goes beyond the Department of
Energy programs. Any review must consider all of the U.S. and
international efforts and how they work together. For example, related
programs, important and successful, involve the Departments of Defense,
State, Justice, Commerce, Transportation, and others. Among these are
the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and
the State Department's science centers: the International Science and
Technology Center (ISTC) based in Moscow and Science and Technology
Center of Ukraine (STCU). Note that many of these programs involve
other countries. The United States and Russia must improve their
efforts, but other countries also could do more. My remarks are meant
to include all of these programs in general, although my detailed
knowledge of each of them varies considerably.
Let me here simply summarize my theme. All of these programs for
hands-on cooperation give us much needed new tools for dealing with the
post-Cold War challenges of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and for shaping relations with other nations. They are
essentially international security tools; tools that must be more
finely honed. They evolved from efforts at hard-nosed, practical and
often technological engagement during the Cold War, such as the Joint
Verification Experiment (JVE), but they have always been instruments of
broader social interaction and change.
These programs are highly leveraged when they involve meaningful
peer cooperation to meet common challenges: soldier to soldier;
scientist to scientist; citizen to citizen, and I might add,
parliamentarian to parliamentarian. They are also more effective when
guided by high standards and movement toward the best practices of
management and professionalism. They are weakened when they are guided
by unfocused policies, dominated by remote bureaucracies, conducted in
a government business as usual manner, or judged only through vague
measures of merit. Furthermore, these programs cannot be divorced from
the broader strategic, political, and economic background. These
programs are meant to influence developments in those spheres, and the
reality is that their success is influenced by those developments in
turn.
A new Administration, a new Congress, and the new National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) give us an urgent window of opportunity
to make the changes that may be necessary. During this review, I would
urge that care be taken not to disrupt the momentum of high priority
programs; for example, nuclear Materials Protection, Control and
Accountability (MPC&A). At the same time, it is my belief that of all
these programs would benefit from a fresh scrub.
More importantly, they would all benefit from a new look at what
goals, all commendable, deserve the highest priority and in what
timeframe. Take, for example, our concerns about many aspects of
nuclear proliferation: the spread of weapons know-how, the spread of
technology and equipment, and the spread of fissile materials. How do
we prioritize among these? And are they to be address more by
downsizing institutions and reducing infrastructure or by keeping
scientists in place and enhancing their facilities? And the nuclear
threat is not the only threat. What priority do we give to BW, CW and
means of WMD delivery? All are a threat, but which is the greatest
threat? Even within the nuclear realm, we must consider trades and
triage. It has long been conventional wisdom that potential
proliferators can easily get everything they need for nuclear weapons
except the material. That is all too true, but still an
oversimplification. Many potential proliferators or terrorists don't
have the knowledge and the technology, but may, in fact, seek to obtain
a full-up nuclear weapon.
The United States with all the money it could ever make available,
cannot make every risk disappear any more than it can by itself float
the Russian economy. Indeed, there are no systems we can put in place
anywhere that will absolutely eliminate all dangers of diversion,
particularly in the face of the so-called ``insider threat.'' We can,
however, help reduce the threat. Only part of that is through the
introduction of measures such as Western style inventory management and
physical protection. Much of this is by being a catalyst for awareness,
initiative, responsibility, and personal accountability at all levels
throughout the countries of concern. In the case of Russia, we must
make it absolutely clear that Russia is responsible for the security of
its material. The U.S. can and, I believe, must help, but paternalism
will only be counterproductive.
And new thinking is needed about what policies and procedures will
best achieve those goals. Perhaps new or different approaches are
needed. Indeed, a review is needed of what programs should be
essentially government to government and what programs are best left to
industry or non-profits, in either tight or loose cooperation with
government. Many of these programs are very centrally international
security cooperation programs and their core must remain government to
government, military to military, laboratory to laboratory, and the
like. In other areas, we must face one of the realities of the modern
world; namely, that the private sector can bring to many of these
challenges more resources, greater know-how, and more free energy than
can government. In areas in which our national security interests are
enhanced by economic development, the role and resources of the private
sector are vastly larger. The government sector is notoriously weak at
demonstrating to formerly centralized economies and their institutions
how to make a real profit in a real market economy. This is not to say
there is no important government role. It is a question of the right
role and the proper balance.
A related question is that of metrics of success. The measure of
merit for these programs is not money out the door. Indeed, in some
cases, there has been a reluctance to introduce real measures of merit
for fear that this or that program will be found wanting. These
measures of merit need not always be numerical, but they ought to give
some insight into the value of the program to both sides. Above all, we
must ask the difficult question of whether the provision of funding in
some cases is counterproductive. If we do not take more seriously the
evaluation of the quality of the output, it is hard to justify to the
Congress, to the Public, and to ourselves even small inputs. To
establish meaningful measures of merit, however, we must acknowledge
that these programs serve many different purposes, all at the same
time. They are primarily nonproliferation programs, and yet from them
we--and our counterparts in participating countries--can receive
greater and mutual scientific advancement, economic gain, and
reassuring transparency. We can, in short, normalize our relationships.
We must not forget, however, that these programs are important
precisely because the situation is not normal. Russia and numerous
other nations are going through difficult transitions in an age of
rapid change and great turmoil in much of the world. Some of these
programs are most valuable when relations deteriorate.
The multiple utility of these programs requires all the more that
they be well coordinated: within each Department or Agency, within the
U.S. Government, with foreign governments, and with the private sector.
Without proper coordination, mistakes are made and synergism is lost.
Within these programs can be found examples of the value of working
together. Fine professionals, many of them unknown to members of this
Committee, have made these programs advance, often in the face of
immense obstacles created by legacies of the Cold War and the
propensity on all sides to substitute ``administrivia'' for management.
This Congress and the new administration would contribute greatly to
the effectiveness and morale of public servants if they could cooperate
with each other and with other nations involved streamlining necessary,
but excessively cumbersome procedures, for example, for travel, access,
and interaction. Many of the problems are found in the host countries,
but some debilitating problems are to be found in our own.
Mr. Chairman, in summary, these programs have given us
extraordinary new tools that are desperately needed to deal with
proliferation of WMD. They involve tough, hands-on, practical
engagement that is needed in this dangerous era of transition. Now is
the ideal time for a review of each of the programs individually, but
also of all of them in their totality. All of these programs have had
some success, but many of these programs have fallen far short of what
was originally promised. Even as new programs have been started,
follow-up on existing ones is often weak. All of these programs are
underfunded, but some are more urgent than others, and most would
benefit from longer term budget planning and stability. Although none
of these programs has matured as rapidly as we would like, some need
more balanced participation or a handoff strategy. This is not the same
as an exit strategy, but some thinking should be given to that as well.
All of these programs have weakness that can and should be
corrected. Ideally, the total would be greater than the sum of the
parts. In fact, a blurred vision of the objectives, parochial
implementation, and uneven cooperation with other nations may have
resulted in the total being less than the sum of the parts. There are
many lessons to be learned and no one person or place that can impart
all of those lessons. All of these programs involve a number of truly
heroic and largely unappreciated individuals who do the work necessary
to move mountains only to move molehills. You, Mr. Chairman, have
worked with some of these individuals, and I think you understand the
kind of very fine professionals to whom I refer. I hope that the
Congress and the new administration will talk to those people who
actually implement these programs--especially those in the field--as
they conduct their reviews. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Allison.
STATEMENT OF HON. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, MEMBER, RUSSIA TASK FORCE,
SECRETARY OF ENERGY ADVISORY BOARD; DIRECTOR, THE BELFER
CENTER, KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
CAMBRIDGE, MA
Dr. Allison. Thank you very much, Senator. It is a great
honor for me to appear before the two of you.
If I go back to an earlier point that was made, I believe
strongly, and have written that the most significant piece of
legislative initiative in the period after World War II is the
legislation for which you and Senator Nunn were responsible. So
in some sense, we are discussing floods with Noah, so I
apologize for that, but it is a great pleasure to be here.
I will try to be very brief and pick up the comments that
have already been made, because I think Senator Baker and Mr.
Cutler rightly represented the Task Force of which I was a
member, and pleased to serve as a member. So just by way of
introduction, what I offered and what I submitted are three
simple questions, it seems to me.
The first question, which Senator Biden has already
addressed directly, is: Is the principal finding of the Baker-
Cutler Task Force true or false? Is it correct that, as the
Task Force says, the most urgent unmet national security threat
to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass
destruction, or weapons-useable material in Russia, could be
stolen, sold to terrorists or hostile nations, and used against
American troops abroad, or citizens at home?
As Senator Baker said, if one agrees with that proposition,
virtually everything else follows. If that proposition is
incorrect, then maybe there is a different discussion. So I
think that is a good place to start.
The second question goes particularly to the point that
Senator Biden raised in his earlier comment. Relative to other
items in the U.S. defense and national security programs,
relative to the rest of the spending and the $300 billion-plus
Defense budget, or other related national security budgets and
programs of the U.S. Government, for example, the National
Defense Missile, called for by President Bush, where does what
you might call a national nuclear defense, if we were to choose
a word, that the Baker-Cutler Task Force recommends, rank?
Specifically, as you look at the spectrum of threats to
American citizens at home as Senator Biden was saying, where do
weapons of mass destruction, warheads delivered by long-range
missiles for which we might need a missile defense, rank in
comparison to the loose nuke threat that the Task Force is
focusing on?
I think rightly, as you suggested, Senator Biden, that one
needs to look at the whole spectrum, and to think of these not
as contrary items, but as part of an overall defense effort
looking at U.S. interests.
Finally, if one accepts the Baker-Cutler diagnosis, what
should Congress do? Well, the Task Force, as you have already
mentioned, Senator Lugar, recommends that the President in
consultation with Congress, at the beginning of a new
administration now, promptly formulate a strategic plan, with a
specific goal, the goal being to secure and/or neutralize all
nuclear weapons, and all weapons-useable nuclear material in
Russia within the next 8 to 10 years.
So set a very high mission and objective, and to that end,
have a strategy, organized and planned, almost like this was a
military operation, as if it were Desert Storm, or something
else, something that mattered centrally to the well-being of
the Nation.
To that end, we outlined a plan--not a final plan, but we
outlined what it might look like, and we gave a sketch of a
budget, at a level of about $3 billion a year over the 8 to 10
year period, which we think should be shared significantly with
allies. And I am confident that with Ambassador Baker in Japan
we will be much more successful in actually getting the
Japanese to contribute to this effort, and, indeed, to the
Russians, because, again, part of what the plan called for is a
transition to an end-state, in which the Russians will be able
to sustain themselves with other income, for example, income
that could come from spent fuel storage schemes of the sort
that have been proposed and that are now under very active
discussion.
So to conclude, obviously, as Members of Congress, or as an
expert, I would be--I am somewhat reluctant to offer tactical
advice to Members, particularly to the father of the Nunn-
Lugar, but I think that sometimes the temptation is to say,
``Well, let us impose a legislative requirement that the
administration submit such a plan,'' and having, while in the
Defense Department, written some such plans, they usually
elicit a bureaucratic response that does not engage people
seriously.
Much more important, indeed, I think what is central here,
is that people who believe in this analysis need to engage
members of the administration, and Members of Congress, and the
public in a debate about a comprehensive strategy that deals
with the most urgent threats.
In that context, looking at national missile defense and at
the danger of weapons or weapons-useable material being stolen
from Russia as part of the same picture, and if it needs to be
addressed in the same terms, then ask ``Which is more urgent?
Which is larger? What is the prospect that the action that we
could take would have the desired effect?'', to that end, I
would recommend to you, as I do in my submitted testimony, a
speech that your colleague, Senator Nunn, is going to give at
the National Press Club tomorrow, trying to engage more of the
public in this debate.
Thank you very much for letting me appear.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Allison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Graham T. Allison \1\
It is an honor for me to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee today as part of your review of Department of Energy
Nonproliferation Programs with Russia. Members have received copies of
the Baker-Cutler Task Force Report \2\ and have heard from Messers.
Baker and Cutler. I will therefore forego a lengthy opening statement
and respond to Members' specific questions.
In three minutes of introductory comment, let me suggest three
central questions for Members' consideration.
1. The threat. Is the principal finding of Baker and Cutler
in the DOE Task Force true--or false? Specifically: are Baker
and Cutler--and their colleagues former Senators McClure, Nunn,
Simpson and other members of the Task Force--correct when they
assert that: ``The most urgent unmet national security threat
to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass
destruction or weapons-useable material in Russia could be
stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used
against American troops abroad or citizens at home''? Or are
they incorrect?
2. Priorities. Relative to other items in U.S. defense and
national security programs, for example, the National Missile
Defense called for by President Bush, where does the ``National
Nuclear Defense'' that the Baker-Cutler Task Force recommends
rank? Specifically: as one analyzes the spectrum of threats to
American citizens at home, where do weapons of mass destruction
warheads delivered by long-range missiles rank in comparison to
the ``loose nukes'' threat the Task Force spotlights?
3. Prescription: If one accepts the Baker-Cutler diagnosis,
what should Congress do? The Task Force calls on the President,
in consultation with Congress, to quickly formulate a strategic
plan to secure and/or neutralize all nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable material located in Russia within the next ten
years. To that end it offers a sketch of a plan for ``finishing
the job'' and suggests a budget of approximately $30 billion--
to be funded by the U.S., our allies, and Russia. At the end of
this road in 2010, Russia would have in place the programs and
income streams to sustain this posture.
Congress can, of course, impose a legislative requirement that the
administration submit such a plan. Such a requirement would most likely
elicit a bureaucratic response.
Instead, I would urge Members who are persuaded by the Task Force
report to engage key members of the administration on these issues.
Members might communicate their readiness to address National Missile
Defense as a part of comprehensive strategy that deals with the most
urgent threats.
My suggestion is not that you hold missile defense hostage to what
I believe are larger and more urgent threats, but rather that you
stimulate serious debate among members of the administration, Congress,
and the public about nuclear and other WMD threats to Americans' lives
and liberties. As part of that effort, let me commend to you and others
here a speech your former colleague Senator Nunn will deliver at the
National Press Club tomorrow.
--------------
\1\ Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard and Director
of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
\2\ ``A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation
Programs with Russia,'' United States Department of Energy, The
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, January 10, 2001.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much for that
testimony.
I would just start by saying that I think you have
highlighted what I found to be the two most important points of
the report. First of all: Is the threat of these weapons of
mass destruction the greatest threat we face?
I believe that it is, but you have to say, compared to
what, the Russian Armed Forces, the Chinese Armed Forces, the
armed forces of somebody else? What are the other threats out
in the world?
As you think through the ways in which more Americans might
lose their lives, our cities might be destroyed, and other
terrible things happen, what we are talking about today is the
biggest threat.
Now, we may be in denial about it, but nevertheless, it is
there. And the Commission has once again sort of put its arms
around the situation, but then gone beyond that to say for $30
billion over 8 years, you could do something effectively about
all of it. Now, this is with cooperation of Russia.
I think it is counter-intuitive for many people as to why
over the course of 10 years Russians would cooperate with us,
would guide us into more and more layers of the problem, but it
was not difficult for this Commission to understand. It is
because these items are a threat to Russia too. It is their
lives; whatever is going to be left of their country is also at
stake.
They have built an awesome amount of weaponry that has
overwhelmed them, and it might overwhelm us. So that is why we
must take these threats seriously and respond to them in a
coordinated well-rounded fashion.
Ron Lehman has been through all of the difficulties of
working on these programs with Russia. It is difficult, because
some problems to dispose weapons materials affects markets in
the United States. They sometimes become commercial problems.
Some would say, ``Well, this is absurd. Here, we are
talking about the future of the world, of mankind, people being
blown up, and you are talking about the price of uranium going
up and down in the United States.''
Well, it is a concern for those people in a very parochial
way, and we understand that. But on the other hand, we have not
ever been able to come to grips with exactly how the flow of
this goes on, even if there are willing sellers and buyers.
Even as we speak, with the privatization of a part of this, we
have considerable difficulty; but, nevertheless, that is a
worthy objective. These programs take these dangerous materials
out of circulation.
Likewise, the plutonium has been even tougher. Now, Senator
Domenici, to his credit, has done a lot in this area. He has
tried to move both the last administration and this one into
this area, but the Russians have been very reluctant, as you
know. They have felt there was value in every ounce of the
plutonium.
Now, they are prepared to talk about changing a third of it
into reactor fuel. But even then, this is an objective that
will require considerable international negotiation with
Russian partners, because it is not very clear how we get to
the end of the road, even if the funds are available to do it.
But at least you have tried to quantify this with a
strategic plan of the fact that this is the biggest threat, and
this is how we might all proceed to save our two countries and
the rest of the world in the process.
I remember, Dr. Allison, one hearing in which you appeared
another witness brought to that hearing a steel shell, that he
calmly removed during the course of his testimony, and laid out
on the table. He then used a Geiger counter to show that he had
radioactive material.
And this disturbed some people in the audience, including
some Senators, who were looking at all of this.
He pointed out that if the material was highly enriched
uranium in this particular shell, he would be close to having
what he needed to make a nuclear weapon. As a matter of fact,
the particular blow would be four square miles around it.
Now, for the benefit of my colleagues, I visited a chemical
weapons storage site in Russia as scheduled, 1,200 miles east
of Moscow. I asked a Russian major to photograph me putting an
85-millimeter shell filled with sarin gas, taken right off the
shelf there into the thin briefcase. There was room for three
more in the thing.
Two million shells were filled with poison gas. It wasn't
nuclear but deadly nonetheless. I tell this story to show that
the threats we face are vast and diverse. These chemical
weapons were stocked in a wooden building with glass windows.
Security was good, because the United States had provided
assistance to improve hardware at the site.
Our hope is that we will soon begin destroying the Russian
chemical arsenal one weapon at a time.
But that will require appropriations from both the House
and Senate. And for the last 2 years, the House has said
``no.'' So we have considerable work to do, even with those
things that are the most obvious, in terms of proliferation.
This 2 million shells are stacked like logs there, and they are
portable, either by a human being, or many could be taken out
in a normal car.
This is why the problem is urgent; although many people
have wrestled with it temporarily. There is the destruction of
the plutonium, the sale of the uranium, the destruction of
these chemical weapons. It can be done, and our Government has
done a good job of identifying the problems, and moving toward
solutions.
Let me just ask: You both have mentioned other countries
getting involved in the response to these threats. The Germans
are involved with the chemical weapons business, but they are
the only other country making a substantial contribution.
How do we go about effectively engaging the attention of
other countries that it is their world, too? In other words,
one thing that some Members of Congress would say, I think
quite rightly why us? Why the United States? Some would say,
``They made their bed. Let them sleep in it.'' They have
created a horrible mess, and their country may blow up over
there. But if that were to happen we would be adversely
affected, this is one of the problems of living in a small
world.
Both of you have been involved in this, and that is why I
ask you. You have traveled widely. You have talked to people in
NATO, as well as in Japan, or elsewhere, who might have an
interest in these threats. Do they see it in the same way?
Would they agree with the thesis of the doctrine that has been
introduced today: that this is the most urgent security
problem, not only for us, but really for them, too? Would
either of you comment?
Dr. Allison. I will make a quick comment, because basically
I agree here with everything that you have said. There has been
a temptation by other countries, particularly ones that have
the means, including Germany and Japan, to say ``This is an
American problem. Americans deal with nuclear weapons. We are
not part of that story.''
We have been unsuccessful and ineffective in pressing these
countries to the extent that we should have. So that is my
bottom line on it.
I believe that for us and for them, there is a temptation
almost, as Senator Baker was saying earlier, to believe that
this is happening on a different planet, and if it were on a
different planet, it might be too bad for this generation of
Russians.
As a veteran cold warrior, I would normally say that they
should have to make their own bed, but this is not somewhere
else and consequences of this could happen here. The job of
people who are taking responsibility for American security is
to do what is necessary for American security, even if, quote,
``fairness'' is not the result.
Finally, I think that Senator Baker will have his work cut
out for him, but I remember very well Desert Storm, and I
remember another Baker, Jim Baker, who went out to Japan,
initially with a proposal that they contribute to what was
actually a great victory that affected oil prices, of which
Japan was a significant beneficiary.
Initially, the proposition was that Japan could not pay
more than--I cannot remember, but I think it was $200 million.
And eventually, they said, well, maybe they could contribute
$500 million, but Senator Baker left with $12 billion, $12
billion.
I think it was a failure of the Clinton administration not
to get some significant contribution from Japan, and I would
say similarly from Europe, but it will not be voluntary; it
will be extracted.
Senator Lugar. Well, I appreciate that point, because
without putting extra burdens on Senator Baker's confirmation,
I am hopeful that there will be some transference of this
experience that he has had.
As others might point out, there were contributions from
other countries too. I cannot recall, but it was an
international effort, $50 billion or $60 billion was sent to
pay for the war, essentially, because the security interests of
other nations were at stake. Without that fuel coming from the
Middle East, their economies are dead. They understood that.
I remember being in the White House with former President
Bush when he got the call from the Japanese Prime Minister for
the first $1 billion, and he was elated that finally they were
making some headway.
Now, maybe as you have looked at these issues, you have
identified potential donors. I am sort of trying to tease this
out in the process of utilizing your experience, but I think we
are going to have to think through this.
And I hope the administration will try to think along with
us because this is expensive, and my guess is $30 billion will
not cover all of it.
Finally, we have to come to grips, if we ever got
agreements on final reconciliation of all the weapons and
materials, we would have to understand that previous experience
would indicate that prices escalate as you proceed.
Dr. Lehman, do you have a thought about it?
Dr. Lehman. Mr. Chairman, just to illustrate why it is so
important to work with our friends around the world: As Graham
was answering your question, my pager went off. One of our
colleagues in Brussels wanted to tell me that there had been
changes at the Ministry of Atomic Industry in Russia, and to
make sure that I rushed to see the latest information.
I think you are absolutely right. We need to work very
closely to get more international buy-in. Let me begin with an
anecdote that is a confession of a mistake I made, an
inaccurate analysis.
When we were first engaging in the Stockholm negotiations,
I was very nervous, because I was used to multinational
negotiations in which you had a divided alliance, non-neutral
and non-aligned nations that are not entirely neutral and not
entirely non-aligned, and a fairly rock solid Warsaw Pact.
I was wrong, in fact, largely because the Transatlantic
Alliance was under pressure. In the INF context, the Alliance
stepped up and coordinated its efforts extremely well. It
became--it was one of the high points of Alliance success.
In the East, largely because of developments such as
solidarity in Poland, we began to see the first signs of
fissure. But one of the most important developments was that
because all the countries involved had to negotiate about their
own assets, their own forces, and their own interests, we
suddenly discovered that the neutral and non-aligned were much
less willing to simply tell us what we had to do, and rather
had to look out for their own interests.
The result was an agreement that actually served everyone's
interest, and turned out to have revolutionary security and
political impact.
Why do I tell this story? Because you asked about the
Chemical Weapons Convention and destruction. I was deeply
involved in that negotiation, and as you know, some people
blame me for its successful conclusion.
Having said that, let me say that one of the issues I had
to deal with throughout the negotiation was going to many of
our allies and friends and colleagues around the world and
asking them, ``Do you understand the financial implications of
the types of things that you are insisting upon, because we are
not going to pay all the bill?''
Well, as you know, the United States has an uneven record
of paying its bills, but nevertheless, we are the big
billpayer. I think we have to go back to some of these
countries and remind them that they have obligations, because
how can we persuade our people, our Members of Congress that
this is so important if nobody else thinks it is?
Senator Lugar. Indeed. Well, I appreciate both of your
comments on this. They are very important.
Senator Baker, in response to a question, I think, from
Senator Biden or someone else, indicated that you needed
somebody in the White House close to the President to
coordinate all of this. If it is the most important security
issue, it deserves that kind of coordination and attention.
Conceivably, if this person were there, he might very well
conduct these negotiations, and with the strength of the
President, approach our allies and tell them its time to ``pay
up.'' I think it will take this kind of effort as opposed to
Members of Congress opining about it and sort of suggesting
that everybody ought to be thinking about it, because I think
this is a big sum of money.
It is either important or not important, if we decide it is
very important, it should happen. So the question then is:
Tactically, how do you do it after you have determined a
strategy?
Let me turn now to my colleague, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would like to pursue three
different avenues, and if I do not get done within my time
allotted here, maybe I can come back to it, because I do not
want to trespass on the time of my friend from Florida.
Mr. Secretary, you have been involved with several
administrations. Your knowledge base is deep and respected, and
you are not considered to be easily duped or Pollyannaish about
what possibilities exist--I mean this sincerely--with Russia,
or any other country that we have been at odds.
Dr. Allison, you have worked with Democratic and Republican
administrations. Sometimes I suspect critics would suggest that
you are too enamored with--I think you are not--but too
enamored with the prospects of treaties and agreements with the
Russians, a category I am often placed in. So you have slightly
different perspectives, and you both have considerable
knowledge bases.
One of the things, I think, in order to get to where
Senator Lugar acknowledges we have to get, to figure out how we
can get the administration, to decide at some point that this
is a priority. And there has to be some coordination--whether
it is by a single person, or whatever it is. There has to be
someone who can speak with authority, when they arrive at a
consensus on how to deal strategically with this problem.
I might note, by the way, before I begin with a specific
question, that your threat analysis--and you cannot see this
chart, nor can anyone else--but your threat analysis is no
different from the unclassified threat spectrum put out by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I know you have copies of this.
The vertical line on the one side is the potential damage
to our vital interest, and the horizontal line is the drain on
our military capability. This line is the threat continuum, in
terms of from most likely to least likely, and the other line
is the probability of occurrence.
What we are talking about here ends up here, although it is
not laid out the same way you laid it out in your report. A
terrorist attack has a much higher probability than a strategic
missile attack, rogue missile attack, major theater wars, et
cetera.
So the assessment here, I guess the only point I am wishing
to make is: It is not as though this report came along and
differs in any material way from what others tell us about the
threat. In terms of your question, Graham, ``Is the principal
finding of the Task Force true or false,'' the fact is that the
Intelligence community and the Defense community of this
country have reached a similar conclusion that it is a
relatively high threat, and it is a higher threat than many
other things that we talk more about.
But what I want to get at here is coordination: This is not
directed at this administration; let us talk about the last
administration. I was somewhat frustrated by the fact that the
last administration, although generally acknowledging this
problem, and although supporting the initiatives with more
money, did not go the whole route, and take this coordinated
notion, and try to put it in place, as did the guy who
literally thought of and drafted the Office of National Drug
Control Policy. He spent 8 years realizing that not only did
Presidents Nixon and Ford not like it, but President Carter did
not like it either, and President Reagan did not like it
either. No President wanted to acknowledge the need to take 32
agencies dealing with drug problems and have some coordinated
strategy.
So I understand the institutional resistance to new
structural frameworks to deal with the problem. But talk with
us a little bit about: Why is this such a hard sell, even with
an administration that you think would be ideologically more
inclined to support such an initiative, and not fear, as I am
speculating, that it would be put in competition with other
things they place a higher priority on?
Could you be a little constructively critical for me as to
why more was not done in the last administration?
Dr. Lehman. As you know, most of my friends feel very
strongly about economic engagement, and most of my friends are
right. All of my friends are right. You have to make these
tough tradeoffs. Different departments and agencies have
different emphasis, different programs. To some degree, the law
tells you that what you believe is where you sit. You have
certain mandated responsibilities.
My own view, as Senator Baker's, is to some degree you have
to give the President some freedom to organize, but in the end,
that also suggests that we know who should be held accountable
and is responsible. It is the President.
Now, over the years, there have been a number of ideas
about how you help the President, because the President has
many responsibilities. The ideas of czars come and go. Some
czars have actually worked, but it is usually because the
person is very competent, very influential, and has the ear of
the President.
Senator Biden. Right.
Dr. Lehman. If they do not have the ear of the President,
then they need to have a lot of other ears, and that is hard.
Let me also comment: You may remember some years ago you
drafted legislation to create a nonproliferation agency. I said
to you at that time, ``We do not need that agency, because it
already exists.'' That was my agency at the time. I said,
``Times have changed. Our priorities need to change, and this
is exactly what we ought to do, is to give that agency a strong
mandate.''
In the end, the decision was made to move it in a different
direction, to eliminate that agency completely. The rationale
for that action was, correctly, that everybody should care
about proliferation, but when everybody cares about
nonproliferation, who do you hold accountable for
nonproliferation?
Senator Biden. Exactly.
Mr. Lehman. Well, you hold the President accountable, but
he has to be doing other things. So where do I come out? Based
on having served in just about all the departments and agencies
at one time or another, I have become NSC-centric. I think you
have to have a strong NSC staff, not to run programs, not to
implement, but on behalf of the President to make sure that his
interests are being served, and that everybody is coordinating,
and that there is a coherent strategy, coherent priorities, and
effective implementation.
Now, you can give them all the titles you want, but in the
end, if the President says, ``My view is Cabinet government,''
and you have rogue departments and agencies, you do not have
effective government, the end.
Senator Biden. Let me ask one more question.
And I would like you to answer as well, Graham; but, Ron,
if you would follow-on. How much of a role does ideology play
here in this issue of nonproliferation?
Here, we had one administration that came to office, was
there for 8 years, and said nonproliferation was their highest
priority. Remember that? That is what they said. They said that
it was--well, I think they said the highest at one point, if I
am not mistaken, but a very high priority. They talked about
it, and we still did not get the kind of focus we are talking
about.
I am not sure--and in fairness to this administration, it
is brand new, only 8 weeks, or 9, whatever it is but how much
of a role do you think higher priorities play in not addressing
this subject? If I can make an analogy to a totally different
issue, so that I am not making judgments about this
administration, years ago, I drafted a piece of legislation
called the Violence Against Women Act. Now, you may say, what
does that have to do with this? It does not have anything to do
with this, except the point I am about to make. I thought when
I drafted that--and I worked on it a long time--that the groups
that would be the happiest with me, most embrasive of the
initiative were the leading women's groups in America, the
National Organization for Women, all the various organizations.
They were resistant. They did not support the legislation for
the first couple of years.
First of all, I was suspect, because I was a guy. A guy was
writing this--and I am not being facetious now; I mean this
seriously. Second, because, as I learned--I was so confused
about this, I could not figure it out, but once I figured it
out, I was able to get around it--there was a genuine concern
that if this became the priority in the Congress, the issue of
choice on procreation would be relegated to a less important
standpoint, and the issue of gender--an issue of sexual
preference, that is, homosexuality being given an equal
standing--would further be reduced, and the focus would be that
we all, not wanting to address those, would turn and say, ``OK.
We are going to deal--to satisfy the, quote, `women's groups'--
we are going to deal with this issue.''
Well, when I found that out, what I did was, I literally
went out in the field. I went to Rhode Island for a conference
with all the providers of help for rape victims, and all the
providers and I went to other states. And then the word got
back here that this was a big deal to women out there, and all
of a sudden things began to change. My legislation got support.
It passed. Now it is a bipartisan and strongly endorsed notion.
The reason I mention this to you is that I cannot quite get
set in my mind what we have to do to--we move the fulcrum here
on this issue--to shift the emphasis to what everyone, I have
to believe, knows in their gut and knows intellectually is very
important. But there seems to be almost, in my mind, in my
judgment, an unwillingness to address nonproliferation as
frontally as they would like to, for fear that some other item
on their agenda will take a back seat, or will not be given
significant priority.
I will read from one paragraph in the report, Graham, on
page eight. It says, ``Through 1999, Congress authorized some
$3 billion for these programs. The Clinton administration's
expanded threat reduction initiative proposes to spend $4.5
billion over the 2000 to 2004 timeframe. This is an
insignificant amount of money compared to U.S. spending on
nuclear weapons during the cold war. It is estimated that from
1940 to 1996, the U.S. spent more than $5.8 trillion in
constant 1996 dollars on this nuclear weapons program.
``For fiscal year 2001, the Defense Department plans to
spend roughly $7.3 billion, more than a 25 percent increase
than the previous year to defend and counter the worldwide
proliferation threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. For
a small fraction of that sum, DOE and other U.S. Government
agencies, are working to eliminate critical elements of the
global proliferation threat. Accelerating this process to
secure all attractive systems and weapons-useable material is a
worthy and important goal.''
Now, the reason I read this is it seems as though, to me,
there is a mind set over there in both administrations that
maybe this competes with other things that we want to have
happen more.
A very long question. I will not ask any more, but can you
followup, Ron, and speak to that for me? And then, Graham, if
you could answer the whole question. And I will yield the
floor.
Dr. Lehman. That is one of the great and big questions. Let
me try to be somewhat brief. All of these issues have many
dimensions. They have economic dimensions, both overseas and at
home. They have environmental dimensions. Many of them, like
material disposition, are related to your view of energy
policy, disarmament policy, and all of these weigh on the
priorities you give to the nonproliferation aspect. And even
within the nonproliferation aspect, there are different
calculations you have to make.
That is why I say in the end, you cannot confine this to
one department, one type of weapon, and one type of approach.
You have to integrate that. Frankly, I do not think anyone has
actually done that very well yet.
Now, having said that, I think your reference to charts
like this was very useful, because to some degree you are
dealing with the probabilities of something happening versus
the consequences if it happened.
I have a chart I sometimes use that has a curve from the
cold war that basically says, you know, all-out nuclear
exchange, the probabilities are very low, but the consequences
are very high, and if you check the box, the size of the threat
is a certain size.
If you go out and you look at wars in the Nth world, the
probabilities are very high, but in many cases the consequences
are very low, and you can draw a box that calculates the size
of that threat. Now, it is all kind of subjective.
Then I asked people, what does that curve look like today?
It is very interesting to just give people a blank piece of
paper and draw it, because they all draw it quite differently.
For nuclear abolitionists, it is a very steep curve, having to
do with the U.S. and Russia; and, in fact, for some of the
Western abolitionists, it is the U.S., because we are viewed as
an arrogant superpower; we are the threat; we are going to
cause the incident.
On the other hand, if you go to the Pentagon and say,
``Draw your curve,'' it is going to be a very flat curve. They
are not too much worried about the central nuclear exchange;
they are worried about the fact that in these areas where the
probable threats are rising, the consequences are also rising,
because of the spread of weapons of mass destruction potential
and capabilities.
Someone has to step back and do that kind of analysis. As
Aristotle said, ``We should not demand more precision than the
subject matter warrants,'' and I think if you get a lot of
Beltway Bandits coming in with fancy charts with real numbers,
be suspicious.
Having said that, I think reasonable people can take a look
at the threats and make reasonable judgments about the
priorities. Some of those issues come up right in what you are
talking about. For example, the whole question of plutonium
disposition, that needs a good look.
I tend to agree with what I think I heard Senator Baker
say, which is, some of the most important things you have to do
is influence the behavior of the Russians, because, first of
all, it is their responsibility to guard their material. The
material that gets stolen, or maybe more importantly, the
weapon that gets stolen, if it is stolen by a Chechyan, he may
not be interested in the United States.
I was in Moscow 2 weeks ago, and I was rather pleased to
see in the newspaper a real debate over the consequences of
arms sales and technology sales among the Russians, saying,
``Why are you selling to some of these people?'' Now, in some
cases, these are sales to countries that were fraternal friends
and allies of the Soviet Union, and there was not a lot of
belief that some of those countries will be threats.
In other cases, there was some skepticism, but what I also
found interesting was the Russian public and intelligencia
asking the question, ``How much are we secretly subsidizing
these sales? How much are we increasing our future financial
mortgages?'' Well, they need to have that debate, but we need
to help. We can help, and that is why I think these programs
are important.
Now, let me get to the thing that has to do with the
consequences of special interests and the process that you-all
know better than I know. Years ago, when I worked on the staff
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, one of my additional
duties was to deal with the national security stockpile. So I
was the new kid on the block; I wanted to do my job well and
professionally, so I thought it would be appropriate to go look
at legislative intent, ``Indeed, what is the law? What is it we
are supposed to do?''
Well, with a little bit of tongue-in-cheek, let me
summarize what the Congress in its wisdom had passed and
Presidents had signed. You buy when things are scarce. You sell
when they are plentiful. You do so at no cost to the
government, and without impacting on the market price. Well,
you know, I was young, and so I figured, ``Well, all right, I
will do that.''
Let me tell you something: The consequence of this
legislation, cumulative over time, no one in particular to
blame, was most of the national security stockpile of the
United States was junk, not relevant to anything we were going
to do.
On the other hand, there were a few items in that stockpile
that had appreciated at an incredible rate, and this turned out
to be some of the best investments that government had ever
made. It may be the only time in history that anything the
United States did ever made a profit, at least with respect to
those items.
I raise that example, in part, because it is not this
issue, but to highlight in a more neutral context the kinds of
issues that I am afraid people are going to have to step up to,
because when--you ask how many billions of dollars do we want
to spend on putting U.S. plutonium in glass, or mobilizing it
in some way, versus how much we want to put on making sure that
the Russians actually not only have physical security, but they
actually have all the other methods under way to make sure they
have a handle on their material.
Some years ago, about five or six--no, more than that, 6 or
7 years ago, after the National Academy of Sciences did its
study on long-term plutonium disposition, there was sort of an
internal brainstorming session. And a large number of
government officials got together and informally went off in
groups, and I was asked to chair a little group on the
international security consequences of long-term plutonium
disposition.
And I did not have any particular ax to grind, but one of
the things I learned was that special interests manifest
themselves in many strange ways, but in the end, that group
reached a consensus. And I think that it is a consensus that we
ought to at least revisit and check to see if it still applies
today.
And that was that the most important long-term security
implications of plutonium disposition were the short-term
security implications, because what was clearly the case is
that because we were trying to go to the Russians, get in their
face, and say, ``You do not understand. Plutonium is bad,''
they would not engage us on securing plutonium.
Now, fortunately, we were able to turn that around and
finally get them to engage, but they saw this as a conspiracy.
Some describe it to me as potential economic warfare. Well, the
truth is that we in the United States are not enamored of a
plutonium economy. Some in Russia are totally enamored of a
plutonium economy.
Those are, in many cases, economic issues, but they in
other aspects become disguised as nonproliferation issues, even
though they are truly important nonproliferation consequences.
I have probably gone on too long. I will stop there.
Senator Biden. Dr. Allison.
Dr. Allison. I will make three points quickly. First, the
puzzle you raised, Senator Biden, about why it is hard to raise
$1 billion a year, as the Clinton program roughly has been, or
$3 billion, as the Task Force calls for to address the most
important threat to U.S. national security: It is a puzzle, and
I think your notion of trying to understand how the fulcrum
works and where and how it might be moved, is very important.
If the Defense Department had as a mission homeland
defense, which is emerging, and if we are asked and required to
explain how in order to defend the American homeland this issue
was addressed, and where in the Defense budget, and where in
the Defense programs it was dealt with, one might be able to
get it better into a picture, rather than having it spread.
That is my first point.
The second point on your question of high-level
coordination: As Nunn-Lugar-Domenici had recommended, the Task
Force recommends that in the White House there should be
somebody, as Lloyd said, of gravitas, with the President's
confidence, able to deal with the rest of the U.S. Government,
able to deal with the Congress, and also able to deal with oyr
allies.
As you heard from Senator Baker's presentation, he has this
issue; he understands it deeply, and cares very deeply about
it. My hope was that this was going to be his assignment, so I
am not proposing that you divert him from Japan--though, he
would have taken this assignment, I believe, and he would be
able to do this assignment, but he is the kind of person that
you need.
The final, third point on your first question: If you go
back to Nunn-Lugar in 1991, or your puzzle about Clinton, and
the Clinton administration, the highest priority, but not
really a strategic plan for getting the job done, and not the
budget that would go against a program of that sort, Nunn-Lugar
was conceived in a deficit-defined environment. So you can
remember very well that anything that costs money, ``Forget
it.'' Even in and through most of the Clinton administration
there was a deficit-defined environment.
The reason why, the Task Force believes, this is a very
special opportunity for the new administration and for Congress
now, is that this is a new environment. And one can ask the
question relative to the crime bill that you mentioned, or
relative to national missile defense, or relative to many
things that are elsewhere in the budget, ``How important is
this? How much impact can you make on it? And for how much?''
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Senator Nelson. Let me mention to all
Senators that a vote will occur at 12:15.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. It is
an honor for me to participate here with two Titans on this
subject----
Senator Lugar. That means we are old.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. And likewise, on the panel,
both panels.
I think we have a job to do. Picking up on what Dr. Allison
has just said, in this environment of a surplus, we better
strike while the iron is hot, because a year from now there may
not be as much surplus, and if this is a high national
priority, we better strike.
And, Mr. Chairman, you ought to be having a prayer session
with Senator Domenici, so that he has a sufficient amount in
that mark.
Mr. Chairman, you also ought to be having a conversation
with Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens, so that there is an
appropriate amount in that appropriations bill. And you give me
the orders, and I will be your lieutenant, and I will go carry
some of the water for you.
I am curious, Dr. Allison. Back in 1992, I had the
privilege of being at your Institute of Politics, and it was
right at the time that the Soviet Union had started to
disintegrate. And I had posed the question to you, ``Do we
think that the tactical nuclear weapons are going to get out
into hands that would do dastardly things?'' And you felt
fairly confident at the time that they were not.
Would you bring that answer forward, now another 8 to 9
years, not only with regard to the tactical nuclear weapons,
but with regard to the uranium, and plutonium, and so forth?
Dr. Allison. Well, it is a good question. Let me try to
answer briefly. I think it is a remarkable fact for which we
should all give thanks every day, and I do, that no tactical
nuclear weapons, of which there were some 15,000 or 17,000
spread across the former Soviet Union, came loose, and found
their ways into the international arms bazaars.
I do not believe that would have happened without Nunn-
Lugar, which is part of the reason why I am such a great fan of
what Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn did. It would have also not
have happened without a good appreciation by the Russian
military and Russian security services of their own self-
interest.
If this was something they were doing for us as a favor,
this would be one subject, but as Senator Lugar said, one of
the nice features of this is that you are building on a
foundation, a bedrock of genuine common interests, because as I
explain to Russian colleagues every time I see them, which is
almost every other day, the first target for a tactical nuclear
weapon in the hand of a Chechyan is not New York, and it is not
Washington. It is Moscow; it is Petersburg; it is right there
at home. So that has been, I think, a great accomplishment.
Second, I think, without Nunn-Lugar, you would not have
seen four strategic nuclear arsenals, Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus--shrink to one. So all the weapons,
more than 2,000 weapons or missiles that were aimed at the
United States are now completely gone. So all that is back in
Russia. So that is the good news.
The bad news is that over the last decade as we have
watched this story, Russia has become more chaotic, more
criminalized, more corrupted. So I still regard it as a
remarkable fact every day that professionals who are in this
system, and who sometimes do not have their pay provided for
some period of time, and two or three of them, if they got
together, could successfully steal this material, have so far
not--that it has not happened.
So I would say we can give thanks for what has been
accomplished. We can look at what we have learned in this
initial period.
But the reason why I think there is an urgency for getting
on with the job now is that tomorrow you could see a rupture
after which we might say, ``Well, this was inevitable. There
was not much we could do,'' whereas, in fact, I think that
actually, given the mentality now, the recognition of the
problem, and all that has been learned in the work of Nunn-
Lugar to this period, it is timely for a plan to get the job
finished.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, let me just express my
appreciation, also, for the leadership that you, and Sam Nunn,
and Joe Biden took on in this early in the nineties. Now, this
magnificent creature that you have created has to be fueled
with additional fuel, so let us go do it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. An excellent sentiment. I really appreciate
that very much, because as Senator Biden and I were just
discussing, it is wonderful to have new allies, and you are
one, Senator Nelson, and we appreciate that.
Let me just thank both of you very, very much for your work
on this Commission, and for your work throughout the years, as
distinguished public servants, as genuine thinkers, inside and
``outside the box,'' or wherever you were doing this thinking,
because you have enriched our hearing today and our
understanding and I think our resolve to move ahead.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you close, could I ask
unanimous consent that the letter from the members of the Task
Force, Baker, McClure, Butler Derrick, David Boren, Sam Nunn,
Lee Hamilton, Gary Hart, Alan Simpson, et cetera, be entered
into the record?
Senator Lugar. Yes, indeed.
[The letter referred to follows:]
January 18, 2001.
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.
United States Senate,
221 Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Biden:
The condition of nuclear materials, weapons and scientists in
Russia presents an urgent risk to national security.
We are writing as a result of our just-concluded work as members of
a bipartisan task force, commissioned by Secretary Bill Richardson,
which examined the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs in
Russia. A copy of our final report, ``A Report Card on the Department
of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs With Russia,'' is enclosed. Our
findings confirm that Russia's current inability to secure nuclear
material and technical talent presents rogue nations and other bad
actors with an unprecedented opportunity to steal or buy nuclear
materials and technology.
No one in our bipartisan group dissented from the conclusion that
the current U.S. nonproliferation programs are inadequate to meet the
threat of proliferation of nuclear materials and expertise.
U.S. government programs have achieved some remarkable successes,
but continuing at current levels won't get the job done quickly enough.
Therefore, we recommend heightened attention to this issue, increased
funding for these nonproliferation programs, including increased allied
funding and participation, and formulation of a coordinated government-
wide strategic plan to secure and neutralize this nuclear material and
expertise.
Sustained support from Congress is an essential prerequisite to
success in this endeavor. We urge you to work with the new President to
strengthen the U.S. nonproliferation effort. Your efforts will make a
major contribution to world security and will mean a great deal to the
dedicated staff who keep these programs running.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Howard Baker.
David Boren.
Gary Hart.
James McClure.
Sam Nunn.
Alan Simpson.
Butler Derrick.
Lee Hamilton.
David Skaggs.
Senator Biden. As well Mr. Chairman, I am asking your
permission and permission of the witnesses for some of us to
submit--and I will not burden you with a lot of questions--but
several questions about two areas.
I would like you, if you would, to think about what it is
that you can criticize most in the existing programs, and where
their shortfalls are. Because I do not think we should go into
this in a way that says, ``Everything is wonderful the way it
is, and no need to change''; and second, if you would be
willing to expand on where the economic interests and the
strategic interests butt heads most often. It would be useful
for me to educate myself, but also for us to educate our
colleagues on this issue.
Senator Lugar. I would certainly encourage the witnesses to
respond, if you would. You have given us a number of practical
examples from your experience. That is why the questions are
especially relevant, because you have had to work with the
bureaucracy, in addition to your own idealism, and that would
be helpful to this committee, and to all others who are
interested in pursuing this.
We thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
Senator Biden. Thank you, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]